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Title: Summa Theologica
Creator(s): Thomas Aquinas, Saint (1225?-1274)
Rights: Public Domain
LC Call no: BX1749 .T5
LC Subjects:
Christian Denominations
Roman Catholic Church
Theology. Doctrine. Dogmatics
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ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province
Acknowledgment: This digital file was produced through the kindness of Sandra
K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio.
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FIRST PART (FP: QQ 1-119)
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TREATISE ON SACRED DOCTRINE [1](Q[1])
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THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE (TEN ARTICLES)
To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to
investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning
this there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is necessary?
(2) Whether it is a science?
(3) Whether it is one or many?
(4) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(5) How it is compared with other sciences?
(6) Whether it is the same as wisdom?
(7) Whether God is its subject-matter?
(8) Whether it is a matter of argument?
(9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes?
(10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in
different senses?
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Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?
Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no
need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is
above reason: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee" (Ecclus.
3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in
philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides
philosophical science is superfluous.
Objection 2: Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for
nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But
everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science---even God
Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the
divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore,
besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further
knowledge.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): "All Scripture, inspired
of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in
justice." Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical
science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is
useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other
knowledge, i.e. inspired of God.
I answer that, It was necessary for man's salvation that there should
be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up
by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to
an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen,
O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait
for Thee" (Is. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to
direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary
for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason
should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those
truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was
necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the
truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a
few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors.
Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the
knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men
might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary
that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was
therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by
reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.
Reply to Objection 1: Although those things which are beyond man's
knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason,
nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by
faith. Hence the sacred text continues, "For many things are shown to
thee above the understanding of man" (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this, the
sacred science consists.
Reply to Objection 2: Sciences are differentiated according to the
various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer
and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth,
for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e.
abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself.
Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from
philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason,
may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within
revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind
from that theology which is part of philosophy.
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Whether sacred doctrine is a science?
Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every
science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine
proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since their
truth is not admitted by all: "For all men have not faith" (2 Thess.
3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.
Objection 2: Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this
sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is
not a science.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) "to this science
alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished,
protected and strengthened." But this can be said of no science except
sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.
I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that
there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a
principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as
arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from
principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of
perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music
from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred
doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established
by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the
blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the
principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is
established on principles revealed by God.
Reply to Objection 1: The principles of any science are either in
themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher
science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred
doctrine.
Reply to Objection 2: Individual facts are treated of in sacred
doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they
are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as
in moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those men
through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture or
doctrine is based, has come down to us.
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Whether sacred doctrine is one science?
Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for
according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) "that science is one which
treats only of one class of subjects." But the creator and the
creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be
grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore sacred doctrine
is not one science.
Objection 2: Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal
creatures and human morality. But these belong to separate
philosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one
science.
On the contrary, Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: "Wisdom
gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of holy things" (Wis. 10:10).
I answer that, Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty
or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material
aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an
object. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise formality
of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore,
because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality
of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed
possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science; and
therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science.
Reply to Objection 1: Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and
creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far
as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the unity
of this science is not impaired.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits
from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher
faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards
the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the
"common sense" is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore,
whatever is visible or audible. Hence the "common sense," although one
faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly,
objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical
sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under
one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation. So
that in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the
divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.
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Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science?
Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for
a practical science is that which ends in action according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action:
"Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only" (James 1:22). Therefore
sacred doctrine is a practical science.
Objection 2: Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the
New Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical science.
Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.
On the contrary, Every practical science is concerned with human
operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and
architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned
with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a
practical but a speculative science.
I answer that, Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which
belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each
the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through
divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one
is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine
includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself
and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because
it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it
does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to
the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss. This is a
sufficient answer to the Objections.
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Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences?
Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other
sciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it
establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be
doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its
principles---namely, articles of faith---can be doubted. Therefore
other sciences seem to be nobler.
Objection 2: Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon
a higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in a
sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his
Epistle to Magnus, that "the ancient doctors so enriched their books
with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou knowest not
what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or their
scriptural learning." Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other
sciences.
On the contrary, Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this one:
"Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower" (Prov. 9:3).
I answer that, Since this science is partly speculative and partly
practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one
speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by reason
of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its
subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other
speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other
sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason,
which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of
divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth
of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those
things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other
sciences consider only those things which are within reason's grasp. Of
the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained to a
further purpose, as political science is nobler than military science;
for the good of the army is directed to the good of the State. But the
purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal
bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical
science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every standpoint, it
is nobler than other sciences.
Reply to Objection 1: It may well happen that what is in itself the
more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness
of our intelligence, "which is dazzled by the clearest objects of
nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun" (Metaph. ii,
lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles of
faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but to the
weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest knowledge that may
be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most
certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said in de
Animalibus xi.
Reply to Objection 2: This science can in a sense depend upon the
philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but
only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its
principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by
revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon
the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as handmaidens:
even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply their
materials, as political of military science. That it thus uses them is
not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our
intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known through natural
reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that which is above
reason, such as are the teachings of this science.
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Whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom?
Objection 1: It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom. For
no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of
wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (Metaph.
i). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science is
not wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles of
other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is clear
in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of other
sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas
wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among
the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Is. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is not
the same as wisdom.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of nations."
I answer that, This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not
merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a
wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be
judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in
any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus
in the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called
wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim the
wood and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect, I have laid the
foundation" (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life, the
prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a
fitting end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore he
who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe,
namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the
knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But
sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest
cause---not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as
philosophers knew Him---"That which is known of God is manifest in
them" (Rom. 1:19)---but also as far as He is known to Himself alone and
revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom.
Reply to Objection 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from
any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as
through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.
Reply to Objection 2: The principles of other sciences either are
evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through
some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes
through revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no
concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge of
them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of
this science must be condemned as false: "Destroying counsels and every
height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God" (2 Cor.
10:4,5).
Reply to Objection 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold
manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way
by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of
what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it
is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human
acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral
science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he
had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs
to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost:
"The spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15). And Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ii): "Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by
experience of divine things." The second manner of judging belongs to
this doctrine which is acquired by study, though its principles are
obtained by revelation.
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Whether God is the object of this science?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the object of this science. For
in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this
science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. i, iv): "It is impossible to define the essence of God."
Therefore God is not the object of this science.
Objection 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science
must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ
we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many other
things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is not the
object of this science.
On the contrary, The object of the science is that of which it
principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about
God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is
the object of this science.
I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between
a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty
and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit
is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that
faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight
in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects
of sight. But in sacred science, all things are treated of under the
aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they
refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is
in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the
principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is
about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must
be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its
principles. Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this
science, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have asserted
the object of this science to be something other than God---that is,
either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole
Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we
treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God.
Reply to Objection 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the
essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His
effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in
regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even
as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a
cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of
the cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this
sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or
accidents but as in some way related to Him.
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Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?
Objection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For
Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought."
But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things are
written that you may believe" (Jn. 20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is
not a matter of argument.
Objection 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is
either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems
unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest
form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting its end,
because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith has no merit in those
things of which human reason brings its own experience." Therefore
sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.
On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace that
faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to
exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9).
I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their
principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths
in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its
principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on
to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ
argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15). However, it is
to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the
inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those
who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest
of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its
principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he
concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer
his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above
itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the
opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine
revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ,
and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from
another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there
is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning,
but only of answering his objections---if he has any---against faith.
Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a
truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought
against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can
be answered.
Reply to Objection 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot avail
to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine
argues from articles of faith to other truths.
Reply to Objection 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments
from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation:
thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the
revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of
this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human
reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine
revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of
human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of
faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are
put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy
nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the
natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says:
"Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of
Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the
authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to
know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus:
"As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His offspring"
(Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these
authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the
authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and
the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be
used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation
made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, and
not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors.
Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only those books of
Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such
honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing
them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their
works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and
written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning."
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Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors?
Objection 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors. For
that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this
science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the
aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least
of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science
should make use of such similitudes.
Objection 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth
clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: "They that
explain me shall have life everlasting" (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such
similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths
by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.
Objection 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they
approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to
represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the
higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in
Scriptures.
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied
visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets."
But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use
metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.
I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and
spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God
provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it
is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible
objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy
Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of
material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): "We
cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within
the covering of many sacred veils." It is also befitting Holy Writ,
which is proposed to all without distinction of persons---"To the wise
and to the unwise I am a debtor" (Rom. 1:14)---that spiritual truths be
expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order
that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp
intellectual things may be able to understand it.
Reply to Objection 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a
representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with
representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both
necessary and useful.
Reply to Objection 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished
by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow
the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the
metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through
those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive
instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught
metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught more
openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise
of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of the
impious, according to the words "Give not that which is holy to dogs"
(Mat. 7:6).
Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more
fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less
noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly,
because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For
then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of
divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been
expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who
could think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is
more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what
He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes drawn
from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate that
God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him. Thirdly, because
thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy.
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Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?
Objection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several
senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and
anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion and
deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but
only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But
Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy.
Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a word.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that "the Old
Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy and
allegory." Now these four seem altogether different from the four
divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem
fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four
different senses mentioned above.
Objection 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical,
which is not one of these four.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner
of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same
sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery."
I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to
signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also
by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are
signified by words, this science has the property, that the things
signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore
that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the
first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby
things signified by words have themselves also a signification is
called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and
presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For
as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law,
and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a figure of
future glory." Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a
type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old
Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense;
so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which
signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral
sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there
is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is that which the
author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one
act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as
Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the literal sense,
one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.
Reply to Objection 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not produce
equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these
senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things,
but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types
of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the
senses are founded on one---the literal---from which alone can any
argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as
Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture
perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is
contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward
by the Scripture in its literal sense.
Reply to Objection 2: These three---history, etiology, analogy---are
grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine
expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it is called
etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason
why Moses allowed the putting away of wives---namely, on account of the
hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of
one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another.
Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses.
Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.) includes the anagogical
under the allegorical sense, laying down three senses only---the
historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.
Reply to Objection 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the
literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively.
Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense.
When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not that God
has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely
operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie
the literal sense of Holy Writ.
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)
Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of
God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of
things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is
clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to
expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational
creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way
to God.
In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall
consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever
concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the
procession of creatures from Him.
Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God
exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is NOT the
manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations---namely,
His knowledge, will, power.
Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?
(2) Whether it is demonstrable?
(3) Whether God exists?
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Whether the existence of God is self-evident?
Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now
those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which
is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first
principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the
knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the
existence of God is self-evident.
Objection 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which
are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1
Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration.
Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once
recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as
the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen
that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which
nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and
mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore,
since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it
also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God
exists" is self-evident.
Objection 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For
whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist:
and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not
exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But
God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn. 14:6)
Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.
On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is
self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states
concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of
the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in
his heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is
not self-evident.
I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on
the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident
because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as
"Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If,
therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the
proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the
first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things
that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and
part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of
the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be
self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of
the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as
Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is
good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the
learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I
say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for
the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own
existence as will be hereafter shown ([2]Q[3], A[4]). Now because we do
not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us;
but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us,
though less known in their nature---namely, by effects.
Reply to Objection 1: To know that God exists in a general and confused
way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude.
For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by
man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know
absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching
is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is
Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's
perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in
pleasures, and others in something else.
Reply to Objection 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God"
understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be
thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted
that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it
does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word
signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it
be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there
actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought;
and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not
exist.
Reply to Objection 3: The existence of truth in general is self-evident
but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?
Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith
cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific
knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it
cannot be demonstrated that God exists.
Objection 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration.
But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what
it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore
we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
Objection 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this
could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate
to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between
the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a
cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it
seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
On the contrary, The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.
1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be
demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we
must know of anything is whether it exists.
I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through
the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is
prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a
demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior
relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And
from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because
since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the
cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is
not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects
which are known to us.
Reply to Objection 1: The existence of God and other like truths about
God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith,
but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural
knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to
prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of
faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
known and demonstrated.
Reply to Objection 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated
from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the
cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in
regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it
is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and
not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the
question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from
His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from
His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word
"God".
Reply to Objection 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no
perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect
the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God exists?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two
contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But
the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the
world. Therefore God does not exist.
Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be
accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it
seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other
principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be
reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can
be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore
there is no need to suppose God's existence.
On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Ex.
3:14)
I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is
certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are
in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for
nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards
which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from
potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality
to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that
which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot,
to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not
possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and
potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For
what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it
is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in
the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and
moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in
motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in
motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in
motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to
infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and,
consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only
inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff
moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is
necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and
this everyone understands to be God.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world
of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no
case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found
to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to
itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible
to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in
order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the
intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the
intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause
is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among
efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate
cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity,
there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an
ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is
plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient
cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.
We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since
they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they
are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always
to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.
Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there
could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now
there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist
only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at
one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for
anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in
existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely
possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is
necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by
another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary
things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been
already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but
postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own
necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in
others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among
beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the
like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things,
according as they resemble in their different ways something which is
the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more
nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something
which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest
in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the
maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which
is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there
must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being,
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that
things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end,
and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the
same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not
fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever
lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is
shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists
by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we
call God.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is
the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works,
unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out
of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should
allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
Reply to Objection 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under
the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs
be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done
voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than
human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things
that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an
immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body
of the Article.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)
When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the
further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may
know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather
what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather
how He is not.
Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by
us; (3) How He is named.
Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed
to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore
(1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him;
and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a
part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His
infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.
Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a body?
(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?
(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature,
and subject?
(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?
(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?
(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?
(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?
(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?
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Whether God is a body?
Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has
the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three
dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and
what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The
measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job
11:8,9). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since
figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it
is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Now
a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the
brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His
substance" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now
Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
God?" (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps.
33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps.
117:16). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something
which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the
Lord sitting" (Is. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Is. 3:13).
Therefore God is a body.
Objection 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local
term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken of
as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and
be enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that
depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13). Therefore
God is a body.
On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (Jn. 4:24):
"God is a spirit."
I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this
can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been
already proved ([3]Q[2], A[3]), that God is the First Mover, and is
Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.
Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in
no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes
from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to
the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to
potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into
actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already
proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality
because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is
therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is
the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the
most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate;
and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But
an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies
would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other
thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by
which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore
it is impossible that God should be a body.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([4]Q[1], A[9]), Holy Writ
puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of
corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions
under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual
quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden
things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length,
the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or,
as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the
incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His
all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch
as all things lie under His protection.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as
regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals.
Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it
is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" (Gn.
1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence
it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal,
that man is said to be according to the image of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in
Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain
parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye
attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not
sensibly; and so on with the other parts.
Reply to Objection 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only
attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting,
on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on
account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.
Reply to Objection 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since
He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions
of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to
withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of
local motion.
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Whether God is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For
whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is
the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is
mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man
liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My
soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
Objection 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the
composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was
exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is
composed of matter and form.
Objection 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But
God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for
dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a
body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed
of matter and form.
I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First,
because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ([5]Q[2], A[3])
that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible
that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because
everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness
to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter
participates the form. Now the first good and the best---viz. God---is
not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the
participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed
of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form;
hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is
an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must
be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He
is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form;
and not composed of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts
resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our
soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His
soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on
account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly
the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of
as His anger.
Reply to Objection 3: Forms which can be received in matter are
individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject
since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself,
unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is
individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject;
and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or
nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
God---i.e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that
God is not the same as His essence or nature.
Objection 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every
agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" is not
identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity.
Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only
that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn.
14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the
relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very
Godhead.
I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand
this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the
essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of
the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the
definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this
that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not
included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh,
these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the
definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the
accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not
included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is
man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has
humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but
humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the
principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal
constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand,
in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization
is not due to individual matter---that is to say, to "this"
matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is
necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting "supposita."
Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God
then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead,
His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
Reply to Objection 1: We can speak of simple things only as though they
were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge.
Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His
subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are
composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In
saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we
indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not
that there is any composition in God.
Reply to Objection 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly,
but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective,
precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by
divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and
therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether essence and existence are the same in God?
Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in
God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it.
Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is
predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in
general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For
men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21).
Therefore God's existence is not His essence.
Objection 2: Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above
([6]Q[2], A[2]); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's
existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or
nature.
On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an
accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in
God is His existence.
I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the
preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in
several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be
caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a
property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of
laughing is proper to a man---and is caused by the constituent
principles of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is
caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs
from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior
agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a
thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles,
for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its
existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from
its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot
be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause.
Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from
His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or
nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only
because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be
compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality
to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as
shown above [7](A[1]), it follows that in Him essence does not differ
from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly,
because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on
fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not
existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as
shown above [8](A[3]) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He
will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be
the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence,
and not merely His own essence.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of
two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for
example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without
reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it,
inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added
to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of
the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to
lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the
first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the
second sense.
Reply to Objection 2: "To be" can mean either of two things. It may
mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a
proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject.
Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence
nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this
proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is true; and
this we know from His effects ([9]Q[2], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is contained in a genus?
Objection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance
is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God.
Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its
own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But
God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph.
x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But
nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is not
in any genus.
I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely
and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being
reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and
unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while
blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit.
But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of
any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a species is
constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference
constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from
which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality.
For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were,
for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on
the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is
rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is
compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument
holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added
to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a
species. Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God
were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus
is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But
the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus,
for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now
no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a
difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly,
because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus
which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their
existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as
also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus,
existence and quiddity---i.e. essence---must differ. But in God they do
not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain
that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is
also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any
definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of
Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a
demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible
to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible
to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the
principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous
quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not
contained in any genus as its principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The word substance signifies not only what exists
of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the
body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the
property of existing in this way---namely, of existing of itself; this
existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is
not in the genus of substance.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure
which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a
measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of
all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as it
resembles Him.
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Whether in God there are any accidents?
Objection 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance
cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that
which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus
it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because
it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like,
which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God
there are accidents.
Objection 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But
there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members
of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other
than God---which is absurd.
On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a
subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.
I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no
accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents
as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made
actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as
was shown ([10]Q[2], A[3]). Secondly, because God is His own existence;
and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have
something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a
heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as
whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat.
Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental.
Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing
accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the
capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such
accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now
there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence
it follows that there is no accident in God.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and
of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in
God as there are in us.
Reply to Objection 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the
principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the
substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if
contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all
being, outside of every genus.
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Whether God is altogether simple?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever
is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings;
and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has
made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether
simple.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But
with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;
thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals
than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God
is altogether simple.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
absolutely simple."
I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many
ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is
neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a
body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ
from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is
there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and
accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is
altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to
its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first
being, as shown above ([11]Q[2], A[3]). Thirdly, because every
composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite
unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown
above ([12]Q[2], A[3]), since He is the first efficient cause.
Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and
actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts
actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole.
Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one
of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar
parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot,
a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something
which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part
of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain
things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of
the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no
part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is
something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of
whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself,
as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the
essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing
besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute
being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument,
when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made up of
things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that
are dim."
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused
things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to
be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from
its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ([13]Q[4], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 2: With us composite things are better than simple
things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in
one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine
goodness is found in one simple thing ([14]Q[4], A[1] and [15]Q[6],
A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God enters into the composition of other things?
Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other
things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things
is that which is above being---the Godhead." But the being of all
things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters
into the composition of other things.
Objection 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.,
[*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated
form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some
compound.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from
each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no
way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But
primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does
God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some
differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary
matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each
other.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part
with part."
Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with
them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).
I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have
affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those
who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others
have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was
the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of
Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all
these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to
enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a
material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause.
Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of
the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But
primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical
with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the
latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient
cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which
enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and
essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not
act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God
cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound
can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form,
though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is
merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to
actuality, as is clear from the foregoing ([16]Q[3], A[1]): while a
form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that
which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise
is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior
to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is
absolutely primal being ([17]Q[2], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things, as
their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
Reply to Objection 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that
is part of a compound.
Reply to Objection 3: Simple things do not differ by added
differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse
differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which
differences, however, do not differ from each other by other
differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they
are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but
things which are different differ by something." Therefore, strictly
speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very
being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.
__________________________________________________________________
THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)
Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's
perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called
good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the
divine goodness.
Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is perfect?
(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the
perfections of all things?
(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is perfect?
Objection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we
say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit
God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
Objection 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the
beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of
animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
Objection 3: Further, as shown above ([18]Q[3], A[4]), God's essence is
existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most
universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is
imperfect.
On the contrary, It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly
Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48).
I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient
philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate
"best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that
the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a
material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is
merely potential, the first material principle must be simply
potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not
material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most
perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as
such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle
must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is
perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that
perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our
lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that
which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because
created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are
brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not
wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.
Reply to Objection 2: The material principle which with us is found to
be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by
something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life
reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from
which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be
that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into
act by some being already actual.
Reply to Objection 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for
it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for
nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is
that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not
compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather
as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the
existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a
formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which
exists.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the perfections of all things are in God?
Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in
God. For God is simple, as shown above ([19]Q[3], A[7]); whereas the
perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections
of all things are not in God.
Objection 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of
things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its
specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided,
and "species" constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore because
opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the
perfections of all things are not in God.
Objection 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely
exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore life
is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the
essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the
perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one
existence prepossesses all things."
I answer that, All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken
of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator,
Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be
seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists
in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same
formality, if it is a univocal agent---as when man reproduces man; or
in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent---thus in the sun
is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is
plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause: and
although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to
pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect,
and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the
efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more
perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause of
things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more
eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of
God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He
is all, as the cause of all." Secondly, from what has been already
proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent ([20]Q[3], A[4]).
Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of
being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole
perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its
full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the
virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is
subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be
wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the
perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they
have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection
of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is
implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists not
in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely,
without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he adds that, "He is the
very existence to subsisting things."
Reply to Objection 1: Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom.
v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself
first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and
diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a kind of natural
unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and
in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without
injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply to the Second
Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that,
although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if
they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living
thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things
also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although
therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that
which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of
existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and
wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to
Him who is subsisting being itself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any creature can be like God?
Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is
written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O
Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are
called participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be
said to be like God.
Objection 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no
comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither can
there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like
whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as God: since God is
no "genus," as shown above ([21]Q[3], A[5]). Therefore no creature is
like God.
Objection 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in
form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone,
essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.
Objection 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for
like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will
be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To
whom have you likened God?" (Is. 40:18).
On the contrary, It is written: "Let us make man to our image and
likeness" (Gn. 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to
Him" (1 Jn. 3:2).
I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication
in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in
form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same
form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode;
and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness;
as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this
is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as
alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though
not according to the same measure, but according to more or less, as
something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and
this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be
alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same
formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent
reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts
according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way
resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in
the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form
between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same
formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent
and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a
likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as
things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as
like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its
specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is
an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still more
distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to
participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same
specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of
analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things,
so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal
principle of all being.
Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ
declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all
likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God:
like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly
imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their
cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that which is less
white falls short of that which is more white; but because they are not
in agreement, specifically or generically.
Reply to Objection 2: God is not related to creatures as though
belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus,"
and as the principle of all "genera."
Reply to Objection 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on
account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same
genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is
essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are in
some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like
creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual
likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between
a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a
man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of as in some
sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
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OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)
We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the
goodness of God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?
(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?
(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?
(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?
(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?
(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the
pleasant?
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Whether goodness differs really from being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For
Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore
goodness and being really differ.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called
good which has the form of being", according to the commentary on De
Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
Objection 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be
more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,
"inasmuch as we exist we are good."
I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only
in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of
goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is
clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for
all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it
is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it
exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear
from the foregoing ([22]Q[3], A[4]; [23]Q[4], A[1]). Hence it is clear
that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the
aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.
Reply to Objection 1: Although goodness and being are the same really,
nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a
thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that
something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to
potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being,
accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in
potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being.
Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being
simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being
relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white
does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a
thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But
goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of
ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said
to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it
ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some
perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only
relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e.
substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good
relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete
actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply.
Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.), "I perceive that in nature
the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,"
is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being
simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply
exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply---in
such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good,
and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness
signifies complete actuality.
Reply to Objection 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less
according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to
knowledge or virtue.
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Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For
names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified
by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place,
amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His
being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Objection 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in
idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius
notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and
non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone."
Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
Objection 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But
goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the
aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it
is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been
born" (Mat. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Objection 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life,
knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence
is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible.
Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of
created things is being."
I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning
signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of
the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that
is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the
first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is
knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the
proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as sound
is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to
goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom.
i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he
says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since
it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the
causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act
except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence
the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is
prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names
signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again,
according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary
matter from privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more
extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in
goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not
participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore
Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
Reply to Objection 2: The same solution is applied to this objection.
Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing
things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it
can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply
those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not
actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only
actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even
those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being
implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or
exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which
are actual.
Reply to Objection 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only
relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be
removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot
be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some
being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only
relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one
cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as
relatively good.
Reply to Objection 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so
far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being
is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and
consequently nothing is good except being.
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Whether every being is good?
Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is
something superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever is
added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc.
Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.
Objection 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good
and good evil" (Is. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore
not every being is good.
Objection 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter
does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore
primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore
not every being is good.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in
mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities;
otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every
being is good.
On the contrary, Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now
every creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4): and God is the greatest
good. Therefore every being is good.
I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being,
has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some
sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness,
as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every being as such is
good.
Reply to Objection 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything
included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature.
Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the
aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being,
whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.
Reply to Objection 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as
being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be
evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,
because it lacks the power to see well.
Reply to Objection 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so it
is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists,
primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the
privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a
certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for,
goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to
desire.
Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as
realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted;
but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted
from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that
there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of
goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as
was said in the preceding article.
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Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final
cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of
a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.
Objection 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and
are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we
exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as the
efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient
cause.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of
which something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final
cause.
I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and
since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes
the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see
that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g.
heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the
heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing,
goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act;
secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes
the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take
place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being;
secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect
in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the
Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of
goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical
fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the
form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ
logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness
being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an
end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the
other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due
proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in
what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason,
just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by
assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs
to the nature of a formal cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the
sense that an end is said to move.
Reply to Objection 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as
he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever
powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good
understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as
to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good"
has reference to the final cause.
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Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in
mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But
mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it
is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and
weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode
and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the
mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it
rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist
in mode, species and order.
Objection 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good.
Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The
same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.
Objection 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order.
But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of
goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
Objection 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness
cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species
and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order.
Objection 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight,
number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But
not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says
(Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not to have been created
in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does
not consist in mode, species and order.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in
everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are
very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do
not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be
unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence
of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect;
for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above [24]AA[1],3). Now
a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode
of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and
since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain
things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good
it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon
that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of
its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by
the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the
form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in
its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species,
for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a
number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a
definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an
inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for
everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that
which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and
order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in
perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.
Reply to Objection 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it
is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
Reply to Objection 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and
to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but
because it is through them that other things are both beings and good.
Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they
are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by
something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus
whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else;
but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object
that is white.
Reply to Objection 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence, according
to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has
a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on;
according to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of
some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is
sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only
such as follow upon the being of sight.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every
mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and
order). "But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being
less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they
ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out
of place and incongruous."
Reply to Objection 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being without
number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with
corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal
things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that
causes change, i.e. the heavens.
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Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the
pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered as fitting.
(cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the
virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the
ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous,
the useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament.
Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.
Objection 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these
three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no
wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division
were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be
opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this
division is incorrect.
Objection 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there
is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it
is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided
against the pleasant and the virtuous.
On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
Offic. i, 9)
I answer that, This division properly concerns human goodness. But if
we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal
point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns
goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and
is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement
can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now
the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and
relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the
movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of movement, so far as it
terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement
can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it
tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in
the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the
movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which something
tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as
the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as
a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called
the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own
sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the
form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant.
Reply to Objection 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being,
is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it
according to its proper formality.
Reply to Objection 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by
opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no
other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant,
being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful
applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are
desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter
medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in
themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as
something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as
something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and
posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of
the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.
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THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness belongs to God?
(2) Whether God is the supreme good?
(3) Whether He alone is essentially good?
(4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
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Whether God is good?
Objection 1: It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For
goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to
belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything
else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
Objection 2: Further, the good is what all things desire. But all
things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and
nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not
belong to God.
On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 3:25): "The Lord is good to them
that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."
I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is
good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own
perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a
certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and
hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the
very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its
likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all
things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness
belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to
God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good
"as by Whom all things subsist."
Reply to Objection 1: To have mode, species and order belongs to the
essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence
it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others;
wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.
Reply to Objection 2: All things, by desiring their own perfection,
desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so
many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said
above ([25]Q[4] , A[3]). And so of those things which desire God, some
know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature;
others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also
to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge,
as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.
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Whether God is the supreme good?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme
good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good.
But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound
thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is supremely
simple; as was shown above ([26]Q[3], A[7]). Therefore God is not the
supreme good.
Objection 2: Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the
end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This
appears also from what is said (Lk. 18:19): "None is good but God
alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g.
supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God
cannot be called the supreme good.
Objection 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the
same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or
less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as
other good things, as appears above ([27]Q[3], A[5]; [28]Q[4], A[3]) it
seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the
divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds."
I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing
in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was
said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow
from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him
as from a univocal agent, as shown above ([29]Q[4], A[2]); but as from
an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or
genus. Now the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found
uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as,
heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as
good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all
things, it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is
called the supreme good.
Reply to Objection 1: The supreme good does not add to good any
absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to
creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in
God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation
to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge
depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be
composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are
deficient in comparison with it.
Reply to Objection 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it is
not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all;
but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is
said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of
essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.
Reply to Objection 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way
comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we
say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that
He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the
principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess,
and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.
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Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to
God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; as
we said above ([30]Q[5], A[1]). But every being is one essentially, as
appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is
good essentially.
Objection 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being
itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. But
everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good
essentially.
Objection 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore
if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary to
say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness,
since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by some other
goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we
must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not
good by any other goodness. Therefore the first supposition holds good.
Therefore everything is good essentially.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God
are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.
I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For everything is called
good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is
threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being;
secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its
perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to
something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of
fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness
and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own
place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own
essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in
Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others
accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and
the like, as appears from what is stated above ([31]Q[3], A[6]); and He
is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last
end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind
of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good
essentially.
Reply to Objection 1: "One" does not include the idea of perfection,
but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its
own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both
actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided
only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but
not good essentially, as was shown above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although everything is good in that it has being,
yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does
not follow that a creature is good essentially.
Reply to Objection 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very
essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some
added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself
thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it
called being because by it something has being, not because it itself
has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called
good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has
some other goodness whereby it is good.
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Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
Objection 1: It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness.
For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away
this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see
God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good." But
everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by
that very good which is God.
Objection 2: Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are
called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by
reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the
divine goodness.
On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But
they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their
own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness,
but by their own goodness.
I answer that, As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic
denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and
"measured" from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions
differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas ([32]Q[84], A[4]) of
all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as
participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is
called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid
down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and
absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and
of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and
by participation of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and
what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme
good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he
called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by
way of participation.
Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate
ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as Aristotle
argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first
something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we
call God, as appears from what is shown above ([33]Q[2], A[3]), and
Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially
such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as
it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far
removed and defective; as appears from the above ([34]Q[4], A[3]).
Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from
the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness.
Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of
the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own
goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is
one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.
This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.
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THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine
infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in
all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.
Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is infinite?
(2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?
(3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?
(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
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Whether God is infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite
is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter,
as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not
infinite.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite
and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for
He is not a body, as was shown above ([35]Q[3], A[1]). Therefore it
does not belong to Him to be infinite.
Objection 3: Further, what is here in such a way as not to be
elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a
thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to
substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or
wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is
infinite and eternal, and boundless."
I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the
first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they
considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle.
But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as
a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as
they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they
attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect
that some infinite body was the first principle of things.
We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it
is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form
by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter,
before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on
receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made
finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to
many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one
particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is
made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature
of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the
other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is
contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of
the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect.
Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is
shown above ([36]Q[4], A[1], OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being
is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being
as was shown above ([37]Q[3], A[4]), it is clear that God Himself is
infinite and perfect.
From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be
seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated,
is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the
infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to
God; as was said above, in this article.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that the being of God is
self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called
infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and all
others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a
self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in
anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness
existing in a subject.
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Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that something else besides God can be
essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its
essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be
infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent
of a power is known by its effect.
Objection 2: Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite
essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it
apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of
singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is
infinite.
Objection 3: Further, primary matter is something other than God, as
was shown above ([38]Q[3], A[8]). But primary matter is infinite.
Therefore something besides God can be infinite.
On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys.
iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first
principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.
I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but
not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to
matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a
form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter,
considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in
potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can
be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to
its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in
potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of the
infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the
forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way
infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter,
but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these
will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not
terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form
thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows
that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature.
Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.
Reply to Objection 1: It is against the nature of a made thing for its
essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created
being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely
infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot
make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two
contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make
anything to be absolutely infinite.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that the power of the intellect extends
itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form
not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the
angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the
act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.
Reply to Objection 3: Primary matter does not exist by itself in
nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it
is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary
matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but
relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.
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Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?
Objection 1: It seems that there can be something actually infinite in
magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is no lie
in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But
mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in
his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is
not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.
Objection 2: Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can
agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of
magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be
properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some
magnitude to be infinite.
Objection 3: Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the
continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear
from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same
thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase
opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to
infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.
Objection 4: Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity
derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in
Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be
infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular
movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it
against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.
On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But every body which has a
surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body.
Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and
to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.
I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another
to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite in
magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence,
because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and
confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these
premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still remains to
inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.
We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude,
can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its
quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.
Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For
every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since
therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is
necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate
form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has
a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for a
natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because
every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body
could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing
moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and
this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy every
place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place.
Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires
that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place
occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards an
infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the
farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each
other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be
infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the
place belonging to any other.
The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a
mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some
form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the
form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure,
and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.
Reply to Objection 1: A geometrician does not need to assume a line
actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he
subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the infinite is not against the nature
of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species
of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or
tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now
what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence
there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude
is infinite.
Reply to Objection 3: The infinite in quantity, as was shown above,
belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter,
forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we
approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the
infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement and time are whole, not actually but
successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But
magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers
to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it
agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to
matter to be in potentiality.
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Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
Objection 1: It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible.
For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But
number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an
infinite multitude actually to exist.
Objection 2: Further, it is possible for any individual of any species
to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore
an infinite number of actual figures is possible.
Objection 3: Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct
each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can
still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not
impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to
infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.
On the contrary, It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in
measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21).
I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as
Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually
infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally
infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be
infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that
something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail
something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its
generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass
through an infinite medium.
A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as
such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example,
in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude;
namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and
supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering
work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an
infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as
one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it
happens by accident that many hammers are used, and it matters little
whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the
work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they said that
there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.
This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong
to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be
reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is
infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is
impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either
absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and
everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the
Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be
comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an
actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a
potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of
multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a
thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the
infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous,
because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding article,
by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the
addition of multitude.
Reply to Objection 1: Every potentiality is made actual according to
its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively,
and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to
act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be
succeeded by another multitude to infinity.
Reply to Objection 2: Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of
number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral,
quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is
not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the supposition of some things does not
preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an
infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it
is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)
Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere,
and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and
concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is in all things?
(2) Whether God is everywhere?
(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?
(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
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Whether God is in all things?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above
all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the
Psalm (Ps. 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore
God is not in all things.
Objection 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God
is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore
God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says
(Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are, rather than He
is in any place."
Objection 3: Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended
is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore
His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is
it necessary that He should be in all things.
Objection 4: Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the
demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Cor.
6:14). Therefore God is not in all things.
On the contrary, A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in
all things, according to Is. 26:12, "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all
our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.
I answer that, God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their
essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon
which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts
immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii
that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since
God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper
effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this
effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as
they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun
as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing
has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being.
But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in
all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a
thing, as was shown above ([39]Q[7], A[1]). Hence it must be that God
is in all things, and innermostly.
Reply to Objection 1: God is above all things by the excellence of His
nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of
all things; as was shown above in this article.
Reply to Objection 2: Although corporeal things are said to be in
another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things
contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body.
Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain
similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God;
inasmuch as they are contained by Him.
Reply to Objection 3: No action of an agent, however powerful it may
be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the
great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence
nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself.
But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in
nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own
nature.
Reply to Objection 4: In the demons there is their nature which is from
God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it
is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with
the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in things not deformed
in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.
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Whether God is everywhere?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere
means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to
God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal
things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a place." Therefore
God is not everywhere.
Objection 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as
the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action
or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one
indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place.
Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is
not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.
Objection 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part
elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has
no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not
everywhere.
On the contrary, It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (Jer.
23:24).
I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood
in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i.e. as one thing
is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a
place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed
are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every
place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things
giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every place as
giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in
place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not,
indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it
excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a
place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very
fact that He gives being to the things that fill every place, He
Himself fills every place.
Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of
dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.
Reply to Objection 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of
the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in
succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things,
forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of
place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or
movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or
action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the
indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in
this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the
continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence,
according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small
thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places,
and in a small or large place.
Reply to Objection 3: A whole is so called with reference to its parts.
Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the
matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference
are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which
any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by
totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place, because the
quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the
place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of
place. But totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of
place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of
essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also
in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example,
whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its
totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its
species it is found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its
totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally,
then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand,
incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or
accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence.
Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole
in all things and in each one.
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Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?
Objection 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is
not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For what
is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not
essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of
anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by
essence, presence and power.
Objection 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent
from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His essence,
that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in
all things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it
is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence,
presence and power.
Objection 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all
things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is
not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither
is He present by His power.
Objection 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance
of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if
God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it
seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special
mode of God's existence in things.
On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that,
"God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and
substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by
grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].
I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way
after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of
operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of
the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the
thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially
in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or
habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this
prerogative by grace, as will be shown later [40](Q[12]). He is said to
be thus in the saints by grace.
But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from
human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom
by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is
said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its
inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who
nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house.
Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the
Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject
to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject
to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is
necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.
But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the
divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to
these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He
walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our
things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]"
(Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all
things by His presence.
Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's
providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but
that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the
others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things
by His essence.
Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things
are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all
things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His
essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.
Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be in all things by essence, not
indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their
essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to
all things as the cause of their being.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing can be said to be present to another,
when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was
shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are
necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.
Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known
should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who
wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than
God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence
by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by
power an agent may be said to be present to another.
Reply to Objection 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to
substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and
loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's
existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's
existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place
(TP).
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Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God
alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is
everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies,
is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is
said above [41](Q[3]). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to
God alone.
Objection 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole
universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom
(Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole
universe, and is thus everywhere.
Objection 3: Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body"
(Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there
is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to
God alone.
Objection 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist
outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be
everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.
Objection 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is
"whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts."
Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be
everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
Objection 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels
where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But
the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it
comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the
soul is everywhere.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to
call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"
I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to
God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole
self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its
parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere,
forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong
to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs
primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere
absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally,
that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be
everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore
to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it
must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For
whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be
supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God
should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him.
Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and
is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to
exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to
His very self.
Reply to Objection 1: The universal, and also primary matter are indeed
everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
Reply to Objection 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not, of
itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only
part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow
that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.
Reply to Objection 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but
not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but
according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because,
supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in
them.
Reply to Objection 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be
everywhere; but according to its parts.
Reply to Objection 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would be
everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
Reply to Objection 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this
can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere"
determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this
sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the
heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not
follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to
exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act
of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that
where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives
according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it
is everywhere.
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THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)
We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His
immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether God is altogether immutable?
(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
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Whether God is altogether immutable?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For
whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by
time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable.
Objection 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile
than all things active [Vulg.'mobilior']" (Wis. 7:24). But God is
wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.
Objection 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But
these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw
nigh to you" (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.
On the contrary, It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not"
(Malachi 3:6).
I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether
immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first
being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act,
without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that,
absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is
in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident
that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. Secondly,
because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and
passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness,
remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved,
there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown
above ([42]Q[3], A[7]) that in God there is no composition, for He is
altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved.
Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its
movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since
God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of
perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend
Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence
movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients,
constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle
was immovable.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato,
who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a
movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving,
are called movements. Therefore because God understands and loves
Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not,
however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in
potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.
Reply to Objection 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude,
according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things;
for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by
way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal
principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist.
And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom
proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate more
fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in
a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and movement
of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to
the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of
the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of
light.
Reply to Objection 3: These things are said of God in Scripture
metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out,
according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to
us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,
or decline from Him.
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Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God
alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in
everything which is moved." But, according to some, certain created
substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be
immutable does not belong to God alone.
Objection 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What
therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But
some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the
blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.
Objection 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But
forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is
essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does not
belong to God alone to be immutable.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is
immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are
mutable."
I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every
creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable
thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a
power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, were
possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but
by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into
existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends on
the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should
be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever
giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all
things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce
them before they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the
Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing.
In this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they
are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by Him, and
are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.
If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also
in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a
twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which
enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in
attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered
according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not
mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is
consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is
mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter
can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards
their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with privation
of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with
"not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed from white to not-white.
But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential
principles of the subject, then the privation of such an accident
cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as
regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made
black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with
privation of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of
the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial
being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with
privation of this or that place. On the other hand incorporeal
substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to
their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not consistent with
the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon
form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form. Hence in the form
itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of
substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence.
Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual created
substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also
are incorporeal and immaterial substances." Still, there remains in
them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their
end; and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice
from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as
regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain
fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills
all places, as was shown above ([43]Q[8], A[2]).
Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as
regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as
regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as
regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to
divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all
creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose
power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none
of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether
immutable.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as
regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of
such movement.
Reply to Objection 2: The good angels, besides their natural endowment
of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine
power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.
Reply to Objection 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they
cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation
because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they
vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though
they were the subject of being, but because through them something has
being.
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THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six
points of inquiry:
(1) What is eternity?
(2) Whether God is eternal?
(3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
(4) Whether eternity differs from time?
(5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one
eternity?
(6) Whether there is only one aeviternity?
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Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole an
d
perfect possession of interminable life"?
Objection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius
(De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole
and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word
"interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is
defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the
definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be found.
Objection 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration.
But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word
"life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather
the word "existence."
Objection 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to
eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be
"whole."
Objection 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist
all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it
is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of
eternity" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, "According to the
revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (Rom. 16:25). Therefore
eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
Objection 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing.
Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described
as "perfect."
Objection 6: Further, duration does not imply "possession." But
eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of
compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means
of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and
"after." For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part
comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in
movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the
measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of
movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As
therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and
after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of
what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.
Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a
beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved
there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly
immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.
Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal
is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term
either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being
simultaneously whole.
Reply to Objection 1: Simple things are usually defined by way of
negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to
be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our
intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the
knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.
Reply to Objection 2: What is truly eternal, is not only being, but
also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being.
Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather
than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is called whole, not because it has
parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.
Reply to Objection 4: As God, although incorporeal, is named in
Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though
simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
Reply to Objection 5: Two things are to be considered in time: time
itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect.
Hence the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea
of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.
Reply to Objection 6: Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and
quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of
eternity, we use the word "possession."
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Whether God is eternal?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be
predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that
flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of
eternity." Therefore God is not eternal.
Objection 2: Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is
not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is
before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the
Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and
ever']" (Ex. 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.
Objection 3: Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured
belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.
Objection 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future,
since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article.
But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in
Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal,
the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."
I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea
of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence,
as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be
eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas,
no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now
God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He
is His own eternity.
Reply to Objection 1: The "now" that stands still, is said to make
eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is
caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so
the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the
"now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of
eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God
communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates
His immutability.
Reply to Objection 2: From this appears the answer to the Second
Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is
shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is
said that "intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of Exodus,
"The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for
age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will
reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i.e.
beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period
of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond
eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to
exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some
philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign
is simultaneously whole.
Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence
God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the
idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our
mind alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Words denoting different times are applied to
God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were
altered through present, past and future.
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Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be
eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice,"
shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all
eternity']" (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not
be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
Objection 2: Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal
[Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (Mat. 25:41). Therefore God is not the
only eternal.
Objection 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are
many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of
demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not
the only eternal.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only
one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not
eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.
I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone,
because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above
([44]Q[9], A[1]). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability
from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said
of the earth, "it standeth for ever" (Eccles. 1:4). Again, some things
are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their
duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the
hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal
hills." (Dt. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the
nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in
being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed,
who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no
changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according
to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3).
Reply to Objection 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly
as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because
it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost,
according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy
waters" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but
rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for
ever" (Ps. 80:16).
Reply to Objection 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and
truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind.
Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because
they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone;
hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
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Whether eternity differs from time?
Objection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two
measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the
other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together;
nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,
considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur
together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since
therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds
time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is
not a different thing from eternity.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the
"now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of
eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole
space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now"
of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is
not substantially different from time.
Objection 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the
measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that
the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is
the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine being.
Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of
things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either
eternity or is a part of eternity.
On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a
"before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same
thing.
I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same.
Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither
beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This,
however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference
because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to
the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for
ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as
Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is
simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is
the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement.
Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the
part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then
there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time
which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the
heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the
whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it
would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning
and end in time.
Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in
themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities;
because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to
note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts:
thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which
cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the
essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously
whole, but that time is not so.
Reply to Objection 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and
eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the
case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are
time and eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: The "now" of time is the same as regards its
subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for
inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what
is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time,
but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is
movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is
time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and
aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.
Reply to Objection 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent
being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according
as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to
change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the
being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured
by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually
changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures
movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is
naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
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The difference of aeviternity and time
Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the
spiritual through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of
spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
Objection 2: Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and
"after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as
was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity;
for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is before age."
Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after";
and thus it is the same as time.
Objection 3: Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in
aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no
difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is
impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that it
is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since
God can reduce them to nothing.
Objection 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is
infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is
impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to
be separate from aeviternity."
I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the
mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist
in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a
beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference,
however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding
article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would
always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be,
which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would
still be distinguished from eternity, and from time.
Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact
that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has both,
together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has
"before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This theory,
however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if
innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since
"before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity
has "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the
first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly
appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it
does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then
an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old
with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the
changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after"
in the measure, as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an
aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation,
comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not
contain "before" and "after." We say then that since eternity is the
measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from
permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede
from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or
consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all
movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others
recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither
consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they
have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This
appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is
unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness
of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable
being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice;
moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections and of
places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity
which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is
measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In
this way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no
"before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while
eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with
such at all.
Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive
affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to
be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured
by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a
share of eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is
not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
Reply to Objection 3: In the very being of an angel considered
absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as
regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will
be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of
our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison
with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was,
we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not subject
to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet
suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence of an
angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can
make the existence of an angel not future; but He cannot cause him not
to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.
Reply to Objection 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite,
forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity
in saying that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by
any other creature.
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Whether there is only one aeviternity?
Objection 1: It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is
written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power of ages
are with Thee, O Lord."
Objection 2: Further, different genera have different measures. But
some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly
bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels.
Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
Objection 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where
there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all
aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after
others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore
there is not only one aeviternity.
Objection 4: Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to
have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all
temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some
way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on
each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore
there is not only one aeviternity.
On the contrary, Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is
nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is
aeviternity one only.
I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there
is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities.
Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is
one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of
spiritual things.
Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch
as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number,
according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a
sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the
thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would
not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason
of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it
exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is
different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of
eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of
time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their
principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things
receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other
hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it
is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither
of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are
one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one
absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is
one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which,
since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore
time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the
thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives
unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the
measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their
multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.
This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed
concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God
in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least
many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual
substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that
among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the
last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion,
it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many
aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion,
it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only;
because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its
genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be
measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all
the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the
second opinion is truer, as will be shown later ([45]Q[47], A[2]); we
concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.
Reply to Objection 1: Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is,
a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when
we mean ages.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things
differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a
changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.
Reply to Objection 3: All temporal things did not begin together;
nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first
measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity
by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.
Reply to Objection 4: For things to be measured by one, it is not
necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more
simple than the rest.
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THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?
(2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?
(3) Whether God is one?
(4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?
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Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?
Objection 1: It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For
everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which
penetrates all "genera." But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is
the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore
"one" adds something to "being."
Objection 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an
addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many."
Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."
Objection 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and
"being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to call
"being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to
call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition to
"being."
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which
exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is
not an addition to "being."
I answer that, "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a
negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is the
very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either
simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and
potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts
are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is
manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; and hence
it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being.
Reply to Objection 1: Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with
"being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were
divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the
"one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," but
signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same
applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And because
number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the
substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary,
considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a
reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities
would not be a species of quantity), thought that the "one" convertible
with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to
"man." This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is
"one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but
by its substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were
again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence
we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the
"one" which is convertible with "being," does not add a reality to
being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a
reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quantity.
Reply to Objection 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one
way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in
number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in
one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if it is absolutely
undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its
essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its
essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; or because
it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in
the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such a case a thing will be "one"
absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be
undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided
in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be
"many" absolutely and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number
and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being is
divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by
"many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under
"being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that "there is no kind of
multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts,
are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in
subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are
many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in processions,
are one in principle."
Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say
"being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being."
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Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?
Objection 1: It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed.
For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every
"multitude" is in a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding
article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude."
Objection 2: Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite.
But "multitude" is constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed to
"multitude."
Objection 3: Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few"
is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."
Objection 4: Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed
as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it as
privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it
would follow that "one" comes after "multitude," and is defined by it;
whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there
would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is inadmissible.
Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.
On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves
opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in
indivisibility; and the idea of "multitude" contains division.
Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.
I answer that, "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The
"one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which
is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies
the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude" measured by
"one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with
"being" is opposed to "multitude" by way of privation; as the undivided
is to the thing divided.
Reply to Objection 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a
thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according
to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes
away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the
privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case
in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the
like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good, which
are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in
some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing.
Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some
good thing, and non-being is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite
is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the
other is relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is
non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being in the
genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental
being. In the same way, what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or
vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and
vice versa.
Reply to Objection 2: A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is
homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is
heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous
whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as,
for instance, every part of water is water; and such is the
constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every
heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting in the form
belonging to the whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a
house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of
a whole. Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the
multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of
not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as
they are undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so
far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house
by the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not
houses.
Reply to Objection 3: "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in
that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some
kind of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the
first sense two are many but not in the second sense.
Reply to Objection 4: "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch
as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior
to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of
apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and
hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of
a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on "one"; because we do not
understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude except by the
fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in
the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" is not placed in the
definition of "one." But division comes to be understood from the very
negation of being: so what first comes to mind is being; secondly, that
this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a
consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of
multitude.
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Whether God is one?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there
be many gods and many lords" (1 Cor. 8:5).
Objection 2: Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be
predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise,
neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of
God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an
imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.
On the contrary, It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one
Lord" (Dt. 6:4).
I answer that, It can be shown from these three sources that God is
one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why
any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be
communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be
communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is
only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what
makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates,
so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God
alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above ([46]Q[3],
A[3]). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God.
Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.
Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it
was shown above ([47]Q[4], A[2]) that God comprehends in Himself the
whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would
necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to
one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one
of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of
them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist.
Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth,
when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there
was only one such principle.
Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that
exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But
things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they
are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one
better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many
are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way
one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so "per se"
and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into
one order should be only one. And this one is God.
Reply to Objection 1: Gods are called many by the error of some who
worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and
other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence
the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc.
Reply to Objection 2: "One" which is the principle of number is not
predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle
of number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in
being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one" which is
convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on
matter in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still,
according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to us by way
only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain
kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that
He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God
that He is one.
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Whether God is supremely one?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely "one." For "one" is so
called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater
or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are
called "one."
Objection 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is
actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a
thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible.
Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and a point is
"one."
Objection 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good.
Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one." But every being
is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore
every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is not "one" more
than any other being is "one."
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called
one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."
I answer that, Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is
supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided.
Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as
His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined;
since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He
is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor
potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as
was shown above ([48]Q[3], A[7]). Hence it is manifest that God is
"one" in the supreme degree.
Reply to Objection 1: Although privation considered in itself is not
susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject
to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light
of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more divided, or is
divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more,
or less, or supremely, "one."
Reply to Objection 2: A point and unity which is the principle of
number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in
some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely "one." For as a
subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within it
of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.
Reply to Objection 3: Although every being is "one" by its substance,
still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the
substance of some things is compound and of others simple.
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HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to
consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning
which there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
(2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any
created image?
(3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?
(4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own
natural powers to see the essence of God?
(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to
see the essence of God?
(6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than
another?
(7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?
(8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all
things in it?
(9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?
(10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?
(11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of
God?
(12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?
(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace
above the knowledge of natural reason?
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Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of
God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on Jn. 1:18, "No
man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither
angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is
increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God:
"Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor
knowledge of Him."
Objection 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God
is infinite, as was shown above ([49]Q[7], A[1]). Therefore in Himself
He is unknown.
Objection 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things.
For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being.
Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but
above all intellect.
Objection 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower
and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no
proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is
an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect
cannot see the essence of God.
On the contrary, It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn.
2:2).
I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual,
God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in
Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself,
may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess
of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the
sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of
its excess of light.
Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can
see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as
the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest
function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that
the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain
to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside
God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the
rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its
being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle.
Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in
every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he
sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the
rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of
things, the natural desire would remain void.
Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of
God.
Reply to Objection 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of
comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words
cited, "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom
likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most certain
vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and
comprehension as the Father has of the Son."
Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form,
is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas
the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely
known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as
appears from what was said above ([50]Q[7], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did
not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch
as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be
known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means
that He is not comprehended.
Reply to Objection 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a
certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double,
treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every
relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this
sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it
is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to
its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to
know God.
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Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an
image?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image
by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when He
shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall
see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 3:2).
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God,
some likeness of God is made in us."
Objection 3: Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible;
as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch
as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the
intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God
is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by
some similitude.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle
says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark
manner']," "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are
signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God." But to
see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision,
but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine
essence is not seen through a similitude.
I answer that, Two things are required both for sensible and for
intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen
with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is
in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that
the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its
likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the
vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not there.
But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one
and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would
receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that
one same thing.
Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power,
and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the intellective
power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is
some kind of participated likeness of Him who is the first intellect.
Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an
intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether
this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection
superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there
must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty,
whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of
the object seen, which must necessarily be united to the seer, the
essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because
as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), "by the similitudes of the inferior
order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the
likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known.
Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created
likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very
existence, as was shown above ([51]Q[3], A[4]), which cannot be said of
any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude
representing the essence of God to the seer. Thirdly, because the
divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself
super-eminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created
intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created
likeness; for every created form is determined according to some aspect
of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing.
Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the
divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.
Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is
required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of
glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the
Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of God,
however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the
divine essence itself as it really is.
Reply to Objection 1: That authority speaks of the similitude which is
caused by participation of the light of glory.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on
earth.
Reply to Objection 3: The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as
other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united
to the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself
is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the
created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the
intellect in act by and of itself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the
corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see
. . . God," and (Job 42:5), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard
Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee."
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those
eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power of
sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of
serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by
these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even
incorporeal things." Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can be
raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God.
Objection 3: Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the
imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,"
etc. (Is. 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the
imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen by a
vision of sense.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one has
ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life,
as visible things are seen by corporeal vision."
I answer that, It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of
sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For
every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be
shown later [52](Q[78]). Now act is proportional to the nature which
possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal
things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above ([53]Q[3], A[1]).
Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by
the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my
Saviour," do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh,
but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God.
Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood of
the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit
of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart"
may be "enlightened" (Eph. 1:17,18).
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and
conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore
they will have an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes),
if they shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains
this, saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane
bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God
everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see
the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when
we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the functions of
human life, we do not believe they live, but see it." Hence it is
evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our eyes see the
life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a
thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the sense; which
indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some
other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the
intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal things,
happens from two causes---viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect,
and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused into the body after
its renovation.
Reply to Objection 3: The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the
imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God
according to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine
things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine
essence?
Objection 1: It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine
essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
"An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to
say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection is seen, the
original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power
understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he
understands the Divine essence.
Objection 2: Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible
to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But
the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is
supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is
supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other
intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he
understand God.
Objection 3: Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand
incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see
the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it
follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of
God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above
[54](A[1]). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created
intellect to see the Divine essence.
On the contrary, It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting"
(Rom. 6:23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine
essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that they may
know Thee the only true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3). Therefore to see the
essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not
by nature.
I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to see the
essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated
according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is
in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge
of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the
mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result
that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the knower. Now
the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being
only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But others are
subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are
not their own existence, but receive it; and these are the incorporeal
beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own
subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we
know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form of
certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the
act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in
individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is
another kind of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and
this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect
naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter; not as
they are in such individual matter, but according as they are
abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it
follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as
universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic
intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter; but this is
beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its
present life, united as it is to the body. It follows therefore that to
know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone;
and this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect; for no
creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is
participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of
God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect,
as an object made intelligible to it.
Reply to Objection 1: This mode of knowing God is natural to an
angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel
himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the
essence of God, as was shown above [55](A[2]). Hence it does not follow
that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.
Reply to Objection 2: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect
be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it
ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense
every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it
does not possess the excellence which is in God.
Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight, as being altogether material,
cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic
intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature,
can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The
proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows
concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one
particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider
abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things
which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite
into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by
itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it
naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to
separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing
itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the
created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete
form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of
resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate
subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the
essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any
created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself
lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to
be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is
intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created
light.
Objection 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen
in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a
medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.
Objection 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature.
Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, such
a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that
creature would not need any other light to see God; which is
impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should
require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.
On the contrary, It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (Ps.
35:10).
I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its
nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for
example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by
some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees
the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible
form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural
disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be
raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural
power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the
essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary
that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now
this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of
the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the
name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the
Apocalypse (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz.
the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are
made "deiform"---i.e. like to God, according to the saying: "When He
shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall
see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 3:2).
Reply to Objection 1: The created light is necessary to see the essence
of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is
of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to
understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even
so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as
it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible of color.
Reply to Objection 2: This light is required to see the divine essence,
not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the
intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that
this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but
as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the
immediate vision of God.
Reply to Objection 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be
natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory
cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine
nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is
made deiform, as is said in this article.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than
another?
Objection 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one
does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 Jn.
3:2): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is only in one way. Therefore
He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be
seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii):
"One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than
another." But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine
essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was
shown above (A[3] ). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one
does not see more clearly than another.
Objection 3: Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another
can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on
the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it
may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the
seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude;
but this does not apply to the present question, for God is present to
the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, but by His essence.
It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this
happens according to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it
follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see
Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since equality with
angels is promised to men as their beatitude.
On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according
to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in
eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by
the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (1 Cor. 15:41).
I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more
perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had
a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will
not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one
intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another.
The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created
intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which
establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from
what is said above, in the preceding article.
Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God
the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the
light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater
charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes
the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence
he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and
will be the more beatified.
Reply to Objection 1: In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the
conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the
object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is,
because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does
not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if
the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is
the perfect mode of God's existence.
Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said
that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better
than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing
understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is,
does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of
understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the
understanding of another.
Reply to Objection 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the
part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to
all---viz. the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse
participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will
arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed,
the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend
God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "But I follow after, if I may
by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the Apostle did not
follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): "I . . . so run, not as at
an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others
also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: "So run that you may
comprehend."
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That
is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is
hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen
whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple.
Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.
Objection 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not
"wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either to the
mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the
essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is
considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees
Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect
will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore all who see
the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.
On the contrary, It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful,
the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible
in thought" (Jer. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.
I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend
God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great
beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii).
In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is
perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as
it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific
demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof,
it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific
demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right
angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a
probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be
said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that
perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no
created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of
the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus
appears---Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God,
whose being is infinite, as was shown above [56](Q[7]) is infinitely
knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the
created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in
proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since
therefore the created light of glory received into any created
intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created
intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible
that it should comprehend God.
Reply to Objection 1: "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is
taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the
one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by
intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot
be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain
Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now
take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension" is taken more
largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is
said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is
comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I
will not let him go" (Cant 3:4); in this sense also are to be
understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension.
And in this way "comprehension" is one of the three prerogatives of the
soul, responding to hope, as vision responds to faith, and fruition
responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is
held or possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar
off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we
always enjoy what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in
them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so
as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things
in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as
present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they
enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire.
Reply to Objection 2: God is called incomprehensible not because
anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as
He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is
known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it
is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition;
but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known.
Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is
comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden
from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or
traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely
surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.
Reply to Objection 3: The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object;
not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the
mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he
who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is
infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend
to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person
can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable,
although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.
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Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all
things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see,
who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore
those who see God see all things.
Objection 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in
the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in
a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees
God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.
Objection 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand
the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or can
do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can
understand all that God does, or can do.
Objection 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know
all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, its
natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not
be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows
all things.
On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know
all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior
angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels." Also they
are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for
this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the
essence of God, does not know all things.
I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence,
does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that
things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in
God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things
are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that
the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen
in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one
demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of
many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he
needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can
know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in
the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created
intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above [57](A[7]).
Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does
or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God
does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it
sees God.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being
sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows
forth all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows
all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror
should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the
mirror itself.
Reply to Objection 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all
things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things
are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things,
but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in
this article that the more things are known in God according as He is
seen more or less perfectly.
Reply to Objection 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to
know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect,
namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and these
everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other
singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the
perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out
to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that
exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone
were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all
truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing
else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified.
Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all
these" (i.e. all creatures) "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso
knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee
and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone."
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Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen
through any similitude?
Objection 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the
Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of
knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object
known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible,
and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is
informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude of
color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine essence
understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their
similitudes.
Objection 2: Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul,
seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see
the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34),
remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he
said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to
utter" (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain
similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the
same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain
similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.
On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one
likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.
Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own
essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or
ideas.
I answer that, Those who see the divine essence see what they see in
God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to
their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is
in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things
which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the
cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two
ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is
directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in
itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles
the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in
itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man in
himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know
things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in
themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their
similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a
difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to
the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of
God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other similitudes but by
the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God
Himself is seen.
Reply to Objection 1: The created intellect of one who sees God is
assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the
Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.
Reply to Objection 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images
from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived
images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden
mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and
difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the
similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the
original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God, by
the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the
similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in
Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind
of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived, is
not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.
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Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same
time?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see
all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the
Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but
only one is understood." But what is seen in God, is understood; for
God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see
all in Him at the same time.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God
moves the spiritual creature according to time"---i.e. by intelligence
and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God.
Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively;
for time means succession.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not
be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall
see all we know at one glance."
I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but
at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many
things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of
many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many
diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one
body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many
things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same
time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all
at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if
all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood
simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in God, are not
seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one
essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not
successively.
Reply to Objection 1: We understand one thing only when we understand
by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood
simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and
"rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the
roof.
Reply to Objection 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they
know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all
things simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of
understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God,
they see all at the same time.
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Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence.
For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (Gn. 32:30). But to see
Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We
see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face" (1 Cor.
13:12).
Objection 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to
mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the
Lord" (Num. 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it
is possible to see the essence of God in this life.
Objection 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and
whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even
now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If
we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say
is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in
me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our
minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all things
according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the
duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the
incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind
could not be incommutable." Therefore even in this life we see God
Himself.
Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24,
25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by
intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things,
not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (Gen.
ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His
essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.
On the contrary, It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (Ex.
32:20), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be
seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own
nature."
I answer that, God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being,
except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as
was said above [58](A[4]), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of
the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this
life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only
what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it
is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature
of material things. For it was shown above ([59]AA[2],9) that the
knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision
of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life
to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more
our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of
receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations
of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events
are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the
soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of
intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is
said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude
representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen God
face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure
representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of
prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as
will later be explained (SS, Q[174]) in treating of the degrees of
prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some
exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.
Reply to Objection 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so
also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the
minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to
the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher
of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of
rapture (SS, Q[175]).
Reply to Objection 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all
things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we
know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a
participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and
judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only be
seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As therefore in order to
see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the
sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not
necessary to see the essence of God.
Reply to Objection 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in
the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.
And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our
soul, but by presence, essence and power.
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Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this
life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp
simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above
([60]Q[3], A[7] ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
Objection 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason
without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination
of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural
knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both
good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge
of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The
weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless
purified by the justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by
natural reason.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:19), "That which is known of
God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest
in them."
I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our
natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things.
But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of
God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God
as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole
power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.
But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be
led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know
of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all
things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the
cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He
is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are
not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because
He superexceeds them all.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to
know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is."
Reply to Objection 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the
images of His effects.
Reply to Objection 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it
belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason
can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i),
retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said in
prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it
can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths," i.e.
by natural reason.
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Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural
reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not
obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to
Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who
nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred
by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is,"
comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to
us by grace than by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by
natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to
the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that
"it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as
screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we
cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith.
But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in
Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of
knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent
knowledge of God by grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His
spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10),
namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by
natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by
natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible
objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract
from them intelligible conceptions.
Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of
grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the
infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the
human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things
better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears
in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices,
are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism,
the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the
Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Mat. 3:17).
Reply to Objection 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life
we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to
one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more
excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we
attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which
natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and
One.
Reply to Objection 2: From the images either received from sense in the
natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much
the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the
intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by
the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine
light.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the
intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this
determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the
believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as
faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which
belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object
by the vision and understanding of first principles.
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THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine
knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For
everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:
(1) Whether God can be named by us?
(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him
substantially?
(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are
all to be taken metaphorically?
(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?
(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally
or equivocally?
(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied
first to God or to creatures?
(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?
(8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?
(9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?
(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God,
by nature, by participation, and by opinion?
(11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of
God?
(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
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Whether a name can be given to God?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be
found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the
name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (Prov. 30:4).
Objection 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But
concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do
abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any
perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.
Objection 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with
quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns
the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be
applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time;
moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be
described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing
mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns.
Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war,
Almighty is His name."
I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words
are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident
that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium
of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a
name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown
above ([61]Q[12], AA[11],12) that in this life we cannot see the
essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and
also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be
named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies
Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man"
expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the
definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by
the name is the definition.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be
above being named, is because His essence is above all that we
understand about God, and signify in word.
Reply to Objection 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the
names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures,
of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of
this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their
form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a
thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a
complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to
compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a
thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for
instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God
is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to
signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and
perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode
of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as
He is.
Reply to Objection 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify
the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.
Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify
His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God
signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which
signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all
time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by
way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple
eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a
natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative
pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what
is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him.
Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are
applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns.
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Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially.
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God
signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or
expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or
operation."
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a
chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly
and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God."
Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are
distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what
expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence.
Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand
it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance.
Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the
being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that
simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of
this kind signify the divine substance.
I answer that, Negative names applied to God, or signifying His
relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance,
but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His
relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to
Himself.
But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good,"
"wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For
some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God
affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express
some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists
positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives,
we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like
manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses.
Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship
towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is
the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other
names.
Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons.
First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some
names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the
cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things;
therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is
the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is
a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He
is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary
matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God
would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as
healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only
the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called
healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who
speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more
than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from
inanimate bodies.
Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names
signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God,
although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is
proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know
Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as
far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above ([62]Q[4], A[2])
that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures,
being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature
represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection;
yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus,
but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short,
although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms
of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained
above ([63]Q[4], A[3]), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore
the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect
manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say,
"God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or
"God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to
creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent and higher way.
Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness;
but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is
good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32),
"Because He is good, we are."
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify
what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed
what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as
creatures represent Him imperfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: In the significance of names, that from which the
name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to
signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the
fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to
signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind
of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone
[*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis" which has no
place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are
imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse
processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of
God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows
and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless
these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if
when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from Him"; but
to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists
in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be
understood or signified.
Reply to Objection 3: We cannot know the essence of God in this life,
as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is
represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed
by us signify Him in that manner only.
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Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?
Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all
names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained
above [64](A[1]). But the names of creatures are applied to God
metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like.
Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
Objection 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if
it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such
names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God
than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).
Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.
Objection 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a
metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names
imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up
with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all
these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which
express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express
the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are
applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude." Therefore not all
names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some
which are said of Him in their literal sense.
I answer that, According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God
is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which
perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our
intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it
apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names
applied to God---viz. the perfections which they signify, such as
goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As
regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God,
and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied
primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do
not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification
applies to creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: There are some names which signify these
perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the
imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part
of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a
material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a
metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections
absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their
signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and
such names can be literally applied to God.
Reply to Objection 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are
denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not
belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more
eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance
and all life.
Reply to Objection 3: These names which are applied to God literally
imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards
their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God
metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing
signified.
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Whether names applied to God are synonymous?
Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous
names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But
these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the
goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom.
Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
Objection 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the
same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an
idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if
these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all
these ideas are vain notions.
Objection 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is
more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is
supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and
many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify
different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
On the contrary, All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as
when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God
are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet
it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is
Thy name" (Jer. 32:18).
I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would
be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove,
or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would
follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things
denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even
according to what was said above [65](A[2]), that these names signify
the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear
from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For
the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of
the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God
from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions
proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which
perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures
they are received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the
different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple
principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a
various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied
conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple
principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood.
Therefore although the names applied to God signify one thing, still
because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are
not synonymous.
Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous
terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify
different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and
absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through
the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and
vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality
represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are
manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly.
Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in
idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as
things represent Him.
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Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of
them?
Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures
are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as
many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of
the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some
univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to
infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their
effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are
some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although
the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the
first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal
agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is predicated
univocally.
Objection 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things.
Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the
word of Genesis (Gn. 1:26), "Let us make man to our image and
likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures
univocally.
Objection 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured.
But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is
homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally
to God and to creatures.
On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the
same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no
name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for
instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a
different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the
definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is
said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from
each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal
predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which
are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be
predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal
predication can be applied to them.
I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and
creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an
adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the
similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that
falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects
resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the
sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in
all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article,
all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist
in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to
a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other
perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we
signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct
from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when
we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from
His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term "wise" applied
to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing
signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but
it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the
signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is
not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to
other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of
creatures.
Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a
purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it
follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated
about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the
fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who
proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says:
"The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the
things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these
names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e.
according to proportion.
Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things
are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of
medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body,
of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according
as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of
medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the
animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures
analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal
sense. For we can name God only from creatures [66](A[1]). Thus
whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the
relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all
perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community
of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For
in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same,
yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is
thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one
thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal
health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.
Reply to Objection 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced
to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the
univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of
the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the
generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal
efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause
of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular
cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of
participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is
not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the
particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal,
nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not
produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical
agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first
non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect,
for it does not represent one and the same generic thing ([67]Q[4],
A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things
measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in
the same genus.
The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these
names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do
not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
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Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?
Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures
rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it,
since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we
know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us
are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from
creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said
primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the
like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied
primarily to creatures rather than to God.
Objection 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures,
are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De
Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is
applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily predicated of
animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore
these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.
On the contrary, It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our
Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"
(Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God
and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God
rather than to creatures.
I answer that, In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all
are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this
one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that
expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is
put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these
others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for
instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of
"healthy" applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the
cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of
"healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far
as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied
metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than
to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such
creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the
field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human
smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God
means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his.
Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be
defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not
applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if
they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For
when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the
cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God
would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good"
would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown
above [68](A[2]), these names are applied to God not as the cause only,
but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify
not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these
exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name
signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to
creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as
regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us
to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of
signification which belongs to creatures, as said above [69](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the
name.
Reply to Objection 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and
to other names, as said above.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection would be valid if these names were
applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as
"healthy" is applied to medicine.
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Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God
temporally?
Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are
not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine
substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that
this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance;
and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now
the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these
names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally.
Objection 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be
described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to
make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God
temporally.
Objection 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as
implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things
that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God
implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity
He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved
thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also other names
implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to
God from eternity.
Objection 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore
that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it
cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case
God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in
creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the
relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in
God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God
temporally.
Objection 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for
instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the
relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows
that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.
Objection 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in
nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist
without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But
relative things which are said of God and creatures are not
simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God
to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus
these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity,
and not temporally.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative
appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied
to God temporally, and not from eternity.
To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a
reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from
the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and
habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has
two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or
logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when
mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension
of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason
apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a
certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to
relations between "being" and "non-being" formed by reason,
apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations
that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.
Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both
extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things
according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all
relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and
half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same
applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive
power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.
Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in
the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two
extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively
to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they
are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and
intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real
relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to
the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in
themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real
relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the
intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and
sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called
relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as
others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is
not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the
right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the
animal.
Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all
creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that
creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no
real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as
creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these
names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of
God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of
the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal,
without change in itself, but by change in the animal.
Reply to Objection 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the
relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and
"son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental
[secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from
which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the
head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives
are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same
two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude
itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine
substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the
divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine
substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently
the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and
these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names
are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either
principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either
directly or indirectly.
Reply to Objection 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only
in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God
only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say,
"Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1).
Reply to Objection 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is in
the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the
action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity;
whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our
mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as
"Saviour," "Creator," and the like.
Reply to Objection 4: Relations signified by these names which are
applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite
relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should
be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that
the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the
same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the
creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable
relatively because knowledge relates to it.
Reply to Objection 5: Since God is related to the creature for the
reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of
subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in
idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the
manner in which the creature is subject to Him.
Reply to Objection 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by
nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of
things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations
themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa,
then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and
son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not
vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to
science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a
potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the
knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but
if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with
science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is
known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the
signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa,
these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by
nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to
Himself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?
Objection 1: It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the
nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so
called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all
things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our God is a fire
consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all
things." But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name
"God" signifies His operation and not His nature.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the
divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not
signify the divine nature.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the
nature.
I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies
are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its
properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its
operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from
its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but
still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the
stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in
themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named
from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name
and its source are the same.
Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made
known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as
said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as
relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His
universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend
to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and
goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to
signify the divine nature.
Reply to Objection 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence;
which is the source of the signification of the name "God."
Reply to Objection 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we
have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we
can know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone"
signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the
definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which
the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph. iv. Now
from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so
as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of
causality, and of negation as stated above ([70]Q[12], A[12]). Thus the
name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to
signify something existing above all things, the principle of all
things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to
signify all this.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this name "God" is communicable?
Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For
whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name
itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is
communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great
[Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.:
'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet. 1:4).
Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to others.
Objection 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this
name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from
the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You
are gods" (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name "God" is communicable.
Objection 3: Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as
explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects
are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name
"God" is communicable.
On the contrary, It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to
wood and stones" (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine name.
Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.
I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by
similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole
signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable
according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance
this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same
nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who
participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
strength, and those who thus participate are called lions
metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable,
we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by
which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in
idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea;
whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but
only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing
in many subjects; and the reason is because the mind understands the
nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be
in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of
the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as
existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular,
is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any
singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the
plurality of this individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived
in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly
communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a
person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may
possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On
the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum,"
but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as
they are in themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or
in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of
individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple
self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as
compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the
first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing
in some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules
apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things as to
names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.
Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as
stated above [71](A[8]), and since the divine nature cannot be
multiplied as shown above ([72]Q[11], A[3]), it follows that this name
"God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just
in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to
the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is
written: "You served them who by nature are not gods," (Gal. 4:8), and
a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless
this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in
some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who
share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You
are gods" (Ps. 81:6).
But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as
to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this
something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for
instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like
giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine nature is only communicable according
to the participation of some similitude.
Reply to Objection 2: This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a
proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor;
although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular.
For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the
mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable
according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the
name "sun."
Reply to Objection 3: These names "good," "wise," and the like, are
imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they
do not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections
themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to
many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper
operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine
nature.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by
participation, and according to opinion?
Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally
by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where a
diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation
and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic
who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol
is God." Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally.
Objection 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth,
so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion,
and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to
this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also
this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also
in opinion.
Objection 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain
one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands
by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while
the heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God."
Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both.
On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is
in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied
to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this
name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied
equivocally.
Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does
not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not
signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the
true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name
"God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and
to God according to opinion.
I answer that, This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is
taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is
apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same
thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical
terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the
definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance,
"being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition of
being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is
placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine.
For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the
cause of health.
The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as
signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to
denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by
participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the
true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we
understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is
manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said
analogically.
Reply to Objection 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on
the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name
"man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is
predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name
"man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant
to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another meant to
signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it is
evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the
pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD
to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he
does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then
speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense,
as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (Ps. 95:5).
The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these
reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not
from its various significations.
Reply to Objection 4: The term "animal" applied to a true and a
pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes
equivocal names in a large sense, including analogous names; because
also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be
predicated equivocally of different predicaments.
Reply to Objection 5: Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very
nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to
some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion ([73]Q[12], A[12]).
So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an
idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if
anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even
name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know
not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?
Objection 1: It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper
name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this
name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE
WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of
good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it
especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things.
Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this
name HE WHO IS.
Objection 3: Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to
creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this name
HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO
IS is not the most applicable to God.
On the contrary, It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should
say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord
answered him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to
you" (Ex. 3:13,14). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs
to God.
I answer that, This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for
three reasons:
First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but
simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His
essence itself, which can be said of no other ([74]Q[3], A[4]), it is
clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for
everything is denominated by its form.
Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are
either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above
it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine
it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this
life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining
what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God
is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are
applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO
IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all
in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and
indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of
substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no
mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it
denominates the "infinite ocean of substance."
Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence;
and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not
past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).
Reply to Objection 1: This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more
properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely,
existence; and as regards the mode of signification and
consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by
the name, this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify
the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed
to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may
so speak, singular.
Reply to Objection 2: This name "good" is the principal name of God in
so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered
absolutely comes before the idea of cause.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not necessary that all the divine names
should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be
imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among
these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed
about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about
God are true; but affirmations are vague."
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form
cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as
shown (Q[3] ): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about
which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject.
Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.
Objection 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a
thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any
composition as shown above ([75]Q[3], A[7]). Therefore since every
affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows
that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.
On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative
propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He is
omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about
God.
I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be formed about God.
To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition
the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in
reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case
both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those
which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and
"white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea of
man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies
when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is man is
truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by
reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason
of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are
the same as to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in
propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same
rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the
"suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in the
predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the
"suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken
formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea
corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect
signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.
God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple,
yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot
see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him
under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple
object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of
predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the
intellect represents the unity by composition.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius says that the affirmations about God
are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch
as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of
signification.
Reply to Objection 2: Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting
forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as
compound things in which there is something taken as subject and
something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as
a subject, and attributes something else to it.
Reply to Objection 3: This proposition, "The intellect understanding
anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses,
accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word
"understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of
the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood,
the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which
understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this
does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming
a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that
He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the
proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is
different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear
that our intellect understands material things below itself in an
immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial
things; but its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when
it understands simple things above itself, it understands them
according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so
as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is
not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.
__________________________________________________________________
OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)
Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to
treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent,
and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat
first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the
intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of
the power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding
to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of life,
after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and
falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types
of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the
consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas.
Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:
(1) Whether there is knowledge in God?
(2) Whether God understands Himself?
(3) Whether He comprehends Himself?
(4) Whether His understanding is His substance?
(5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?
(6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?
(7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?
(8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?
(9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?
(10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?
(11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?
(12) Whether He knows the infinite?
(13) Whether He knows future contingent things?
(14) Whether He knows enunciable things?
(15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?
(16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?
Objection 1: It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge
is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the mean
between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.
Objection 2: Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind
of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of
principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in
God.
Objection 3: Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in
God there is no universal or particular ([76]Q[3], A[5]). Therefore in
God there is not knowledge.
On the contrary, The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the
wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (Rom. 11:33).
I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove
this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from
non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form;
whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the
form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the
knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being
is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent
beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher
says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all things." Now the
contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said
above ([77]Q[7], A[1]) forms according as they are the more immaterial,
approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that
the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and
according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence
it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are
wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images
free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because
it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii.
Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated
above ([78]Q[7], A[1]), it follows that He occupies the highest place
in knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: Because perfections flowing from God to creatures
exist in a higher state in God Himself ([79]Q[4], A[2]), whenever a
name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be
separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that
imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of
God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures
exists in God simply and unitedly ([80]Q[13], A[4]). Now man has
different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His
knowledge. He has "intelligence" as regards the knowledge of
principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he
has "wisdom," according as he knows the highest cause; he has "counsel"
or "prudence," according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows
all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown [81](A[7]).
Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in
such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so
far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of
imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be
retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength,
He hath counsel and understanding" (Job 12:13).
Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who
knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of
the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than
that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the
mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or
habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God understands Himself?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is
said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his own
essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go
out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot return
to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.
Objection 2: Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement,
as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind of
assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection
of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect by
itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own
likeness." Therefore God does not understand Himself.
Objection 3: Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect,
because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands
other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore God understands
Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.
On the contrary, It is written: "The things that are of God no man
knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. 2:11).
I answer that, God understands Himself through Himself. In proof
whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an
external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the
term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that
remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation,
resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the
operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that
"the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is
intellect in act." For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing
is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible
or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that
sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible
object, since both are in potentiality.
Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure
act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He
neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our
intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible
species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it
differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the
intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus
God understands Himself through Himself.
Reply to Objection 1: Return to its own essence means only that a thing
subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving
it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to
itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore those
cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of
organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses;
whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know
themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his
essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God to be
self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely
returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement and passion are taken equivocally,
according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or
passion, as stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement
that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but
it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect.
Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object,
i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is
sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of
potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and
assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the
likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby,
as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine
intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected by the
intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own
perfection, and its own intelligible object.
Reply to Objection 3: Existence in nature does not belong to primary
matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form.
Now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects
as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as
regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural
things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning
intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible
species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an
intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is
manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also
its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual
faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in
the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself
through Himself.
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Whether God comprehends Himself?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends
itself is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite.
Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.
Objection 2: If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to
Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is
truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but
infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is
against what was laid down above ([82]Q[7], A[1]). Therefore God does
not comprehend Himself.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that
"Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God
understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.
I answer that, God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus
proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the
knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known
as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable
proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however,
when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God
knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything
is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing
is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is
in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is
as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that
He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is
cognitive, as shown above ([83]AA[1],2). Whence it is manifest that He
knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He
perfectly comprehends Himself.
Reply to Objection 1: The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies
that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything
comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. But
God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His
intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and
included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of
negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not
contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be
comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from
Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is
comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it
is hidden from the seer."
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this
is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion,
because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as
anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not
to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood
Himself to be something finite.
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Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance?
Objection 1: It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His
substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation
signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of
God's intellect is not His substance.
Objection 2: Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to
understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, and
but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of
understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand
our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not
be something great.
Objection 3: Further, every act of understanding means understanding
something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is not
distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He
understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God's
intellect is not His substance.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the
same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand.
Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's
existence is His substance, as shown above ([84]Q[3], A[4]). Therefore
the act of God's intellect is His substance.
I answer that, It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His
substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His
substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii),
would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which the
divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is
altogether impossible; because the act of understanding is the
perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how
this is. As was laid down above [85](A[2]), to understand is not an act
passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his
own act and perfection; as existence is the perfection of the one
existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to
understand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no
form which is something other than His existence, as shown above
[86](Q[3]). Hence as His essence itself is also His intelligible
species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be
His essence and His existence.
Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the
object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of
understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to
be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance.
Reply to Objection 1: To understand is not an operation proceeding out
of the operator, but remaining in him.
Reply to Objection 2: When that act of understanding which is not
subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we
understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to
the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.
Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine
understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is
not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.
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Whether God knows things other than Himself?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things besides Himself.
For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says
(Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out
of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.
Objection 2: Further, the object understood is the perfection of the
one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides
Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be
nobler than He; which is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the act of understanding is specified by the
intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence
the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object
understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God
understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified
by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not
understand things other than Himself.
On the contrary, It is written: "All things are naked and open to His
eyes" (Heb. 4:13).
I answer that, God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it
is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His
existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of
understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of
necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything
can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since
therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact
that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from
the aforesaid ([87]Q[2], A[3]), God must necessarily know things other
than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the
every existence of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own
act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in
the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things
must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for everything which
is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.
Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must
consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another.
A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species
adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the
image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that
which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of
the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the
mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.
So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself
through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in
Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things
other than Himself.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage of Augustine in which it is said that
God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as
if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is
outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.
Reply to Objection 2: The object understood is a perfection of the one
understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to
which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in
De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." Now
those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch
as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence
it does not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect
other than the divine essence.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual act is not specified by what is
understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which
other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by
its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the
intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form
which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the
intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which
makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal
thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which
all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that
the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by
anything else than the divine essence itself.
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Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things other than Himself
by proper knowledge. For, as was shown [88](A[5]), God knows things
other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things
are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God
as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general,
and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself
by general, and not by proper knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine
essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But
the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said
above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created essence be known
by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it
follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so
as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge of it.
Objection 3: Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through
its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, it seems
that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing
cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God
has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to
know things otherwise than by their proper ratio is to have only a
common and general knowledge of them.
On the contrary, To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them
not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God
knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even
to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the
marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart;
neither is there any creature invisible in His sight" (Heb. 4:12,13).
I answer that, Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows
things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For
as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far
as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of
being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as
they are beings.
But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in
particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect,
when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal
and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular;
as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys.
i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than
Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His
understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would
His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above
([89]Q[4], A[1]). We must therefore hold that God knows things other
than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is
common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other.
In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God
knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for
instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that
proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all
colors.
Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as
regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect,
that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle,
not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as
regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is
not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the
diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity of the
lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind
of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper
knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise.
For it was shown above ([90]Q[4], A[2]) that whatever perfection exists
in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an
excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz.
being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes them
distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the
like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and
the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby
each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus
all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all,
but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And
therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of
God is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to
the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to
the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were
to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect
numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act
imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper
knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by
proper knowledge; and whoever knows the number six, knows the number
three also by proper knowledge.
As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection
contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know
in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to
each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine
perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless
He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by
others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows
all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.
Reply to Objection 1: So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be
understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of
knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is
false. For the knower does not always know the object known according
to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a
stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of
the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according to its
existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the
object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower,
the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence
outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the
intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows
that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its
own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to import the mode
(of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that
only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the
knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the
more perfect is the mode of knowledge.
We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in
Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their
own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is
in Him.
Reply to Objection 2: The created essence is compared to the essence of
God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence
cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but
rather the converse.
Reply to Objection 3: The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner
as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all
creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing
according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate
in, and imitate it.
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Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?
Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the
knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now
the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard
many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at
a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as
shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that He does not understand all at once,
but discourses from one to another.
Objection 2: Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect
through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect
(is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.
Objection 3: Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we
know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we
go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that
the same applies to God.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all
things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately
here and there; but He sees all things together at once."
I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the
proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold
discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have
actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something
else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as
when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The
first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, which
we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we
understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for
instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things
in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself.
Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise
the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because
this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for
whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider
both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from
the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is
known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in
the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is
attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects
into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees
His effects in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.
Reply to Objection 1: Altogether there is only one act of understanding
in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),
as shown above.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not know by their cause, known, as it
were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the
cause; and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.
Reply to Objection 3: God sees the effects of created causes in the
causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a
manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the
knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His
knowledge is not discursive.
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Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?
Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of
things. For Origen says, on Rom. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also
justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as
future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God,
before it exists."
Objection 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the
knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the
cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.
Objection 3: Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is
its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is
posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of
God is not the cause of things.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are,
does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He
knows them, therefore they are."
I answer that, The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the
knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the
artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the
artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that
the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect
must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating.
Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that
remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of
action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and
likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action
in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is
added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through
the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite
things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would
not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing
by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is
manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is
His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of
things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of
God as the cause of things is usually called the "knowledge of
approbation."
Reply to Objection 1: Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of
knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the
will is joined to it, as is said above.
But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because
they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of
consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things
are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the
futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.
Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of God is the cause of things
according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be
eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge
of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural things are midway between the knowledge
of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things,
of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural
objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure,
so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure
of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of
the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his
knowledge of the house from the house already built.
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Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?
Objection 1: It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are
not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and
"being" are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of
things that are not.
Objection 2: Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower
and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any
likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be
known by God.
Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is
known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a
thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of
things that are not.
On the contrary, The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that
are not as those that are" (Rom. 4:17).
I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now
it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a
certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas
things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or
of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of
thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning
whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the
creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God,
although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has
knowledge even of things that are not.
Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those
things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act
now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all
these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of
understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since
eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present
glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in
any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in
God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will
be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of
vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the
things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.
Reply to Objection 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so
far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in
potentiality; and as such they are known by God.
Reply to Objection 2: Since God is very being everything is, in so far
as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so
far as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by
God, although they are not in act.
Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the
cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows,
is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He
wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God
not that they be, but that they be possible.
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Whether God knows evil things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the
Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in
potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of
good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect
of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from
the foregoing (A[2] ), it seems that God does not know evil things.
Objection 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing
known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of
evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil
things.
Objection 3: Further, everything known is known either by its likeness,
or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His
essence, as is clear from the foregoing [91](A[5]). Now the divine
essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it;
for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.
Objection 4: Further, what is known through another and not through
itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the
thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through
another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly;
which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore
God does not know evil things.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 15:11), "Hell and destruction are
before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."
I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can
be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption
by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things
perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in
the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that
it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He
knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of
darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through light."
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood
as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not
know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what
he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known
by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms
are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they
actually in our intellect, they would not be known by privation. It is
thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore
knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite
good.
Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil;
but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.
Reply to Objection 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine
essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects
of God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the
opposite evils.
Reply to Objection 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs
to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil
is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means
the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known
except by good.
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Whether God knows singular things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For the
divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the
human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular
things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do
with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not
know singular things.
Objection 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular,
which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But
in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all
materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.
Objection 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of
some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they
are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of
singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is
altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know
singular things.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:2), "All the ways of a man are
open to His eyes."
I answer that, God knows singular things. For all perfections found in
creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the
foregoing ([92]Q[4], A[2]). Now to know singular things is part of our
perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher
considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to
God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii)
that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the
perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and
unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal
and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things,
nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.
Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular
things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing,
that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of
an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and
can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is
not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain
forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not
individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates
because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or
because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he
is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God
would not know
singular things in their singularity.
On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by
the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this
will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless
he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the
reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of
singular things.
Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of
things by His knowledge, as stated above [93](A[8]), His knowledge
extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of
God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality,
but also to matter, as we shall prove further on ([94]Q[44], A[2]), the
knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are
individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself
by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active
principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all
things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the
singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it
were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.
Reply to Objection 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species
from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in
our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and
on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the
intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of
God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the
principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of
things, whether principles of the species or principles of the
individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also singular
things.
Reply to Objection 2: Although as regards the species in the divine
intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received
in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial
and material things.
Reply to Objection 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality
recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in
this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.
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Whether God can know infinite things?
Objection 1: It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the
infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to
those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as
the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the
comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary.
Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God.
Objection 2: Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are
finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the
essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite
that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not
traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in
Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor
even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in God's
knowledge, which is infinite.
Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is
known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be
measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot
number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose
knowledge has no bounds."
I answer that, Since God knows not only things actual but also things
possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above [95](A[9]),
and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite
things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to
things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as
some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that
generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals be
infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must
hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision.
For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be
multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.
The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of
every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle
of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only
one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one
individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the
likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is
participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the
intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not
however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the
nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible
species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the
individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the
other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect
understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be,
not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards the
principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that
the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from
each other.
Reply to Objection 1: The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as
the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the
order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of
the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite
cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will
always remain something else outside. But God does not know the
infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since
He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above
[96](A[7]). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite
things.
Reply to Objection 2: Transition imports a certain succession of parts;
and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite,
nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because
that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the
comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be
comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be
called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as if it
were traversable.
Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of God is the measure of things,
not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of
measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For
everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it
imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the
art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for
instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous
quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it
is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being,
because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence
they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of God.
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Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?
Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future
contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary
effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said
above [97](A[8]). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He
knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of
contingent things.
Objection 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the
antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary
consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are
to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary
conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true
conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will
be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is
eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent
is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is
necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
Objection 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be,
because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of
course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no
future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent
future thing is known by God.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 32:15), "He Who hath made the
hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e.
of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free
will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.
I answer that, Since as was shown above [98](A[9]), God knows all
things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and
creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it
follows that God knows future contingent things.
In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be
considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in
act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present;
neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of
two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be
infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense
of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a
contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this
way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet
determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to
opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to
any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its
cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all
contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as
each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things
become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things
not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but
simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by
eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole
comprises all time, as said above ([99]Q[10], A[2] ). Hence all things
that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He
has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because
His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in
their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are
infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine
sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in
relation to their own causes.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the
effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause;
just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the
proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is
the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are
contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of
God, which is the first cause, is necessary.
Reply to Objection 2: Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this
contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because,
although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This
however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had
relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes
does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is
contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as
this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is
to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be
future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and
not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or
necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the
proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true
that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is:
and the same applies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said
that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as
some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the
antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent
by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the
conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary
cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I
said, "if the sun moves, the grass will grow."
Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains
anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken
not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of
a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the
soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is
immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in
the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew
anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is
subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality.
And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything
that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says
in Peri Herm. i.
Reply to Objection 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us
successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is
above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know
future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone,
whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes
along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who
sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the
way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in
itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us.
Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in
which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but
not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this
proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually
distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it
refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is,
"Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying,
it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that
which is known by God is' is necessary."
Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good
with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I
said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as
applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing
which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing
is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the
subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, "A
black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be
known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God
cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words
"that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject;
but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed
to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is
not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge;
thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is
not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
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Whether God knows enunciable things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to
know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and
divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition.
Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
Objection 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some
likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since
He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
On the contrary, It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men"
(Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of
men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.
I answer that, Since it is in the power of our intellect to form
enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in
that of creatures, as said above [100](A[9]), it follows of necessity
that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.
Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things
simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of
enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or
division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple
intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by
the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all
that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our
intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the
intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to
represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not
forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we
understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this
account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by
way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the
species of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to
represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the
essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection would avail if God knew enunciable
things after the manner of enunciable things.
Reply to Objection 2: Enunciatory composition signifies some existence
of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the
similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.
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Whether the knowledge of God is variable?
Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For
knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation
to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to
the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable
according to the variation of creatures.
Objection 2: Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can
make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. Thus
His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.
Objection 3: Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does
not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born
in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and
thus the knowledge of God is variable.
On the contrary, It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow
of alteration" (James 1:17).
I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear
from the foregoing [101](A[4]), just as His substance is altogether
immutable, as shown above ([102]Q[9], A[1]), so His knowledge likewise
must be altogether invariable.
Reply to Objection 1: "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations
to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of
God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because
everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who
understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner;
while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that "Lord",
"Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent upon the acts
which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as
they are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed to God
variously, according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and
"love," and the like, import relations consequent upon the acts which
are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God
in an invariable manner.
Reply to Objection 2: God knows also what He can make, and does not
make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does
not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred
to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those
things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that
He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might
not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable,
but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however,
anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards
knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for
whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His
eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of
time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it
cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because such a
proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then
afterwards knew.
Reply to Objection 3: The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same
thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born";
because the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity
of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He
knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same
thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false;
both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a
diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a
proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary
to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this
sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting, and false when
he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is
not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to enunciable
propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the
knowledge of God is variable. For as it is without variation in the
divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be,
and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine
knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true,
and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if
He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and
division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either
as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when either as regards
truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we
retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as
if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought
that he was not sitting; neither of which can be in God.
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Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?
Objection 1: It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of
things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above
[103](A[8]). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things
known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
Objection 2: Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from
things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the
knowledge of God is not speculative.
On the contrary, Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to
God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical
knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics.
Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.
I answer that, Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical
only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof
whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in
three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not
operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or
divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing---as, for
instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and
considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider
operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically
operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not
the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles.
Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in
its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii).
For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation;
whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of
truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not
ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it),
this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end,
although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is
speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative.
But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is
partly speculative and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an
operative end it is simply practical.
In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of
Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable.
But of all other things He has both speculative and practical
knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for
whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God
knows all this much more perfectly.
Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has
not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical
from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some
period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not
operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good
things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also
sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician,
inasmuch as he cures them by his art.
Reply to Objection 1: The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of
Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that
is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is
virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make,
and which nevertheless are never made.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that knowledge is derived from things
known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only
accidentally in so far as it is human.
In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect
knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so
far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in
every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as
such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this
does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as
He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself
speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he
possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.
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OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)
After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas.
And about this there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are ideas?
(2) Whether they are many, or one only?
(3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?
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Whether there are ideas?
Objection 1: It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for
nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore
there are no ideas.
Objection 2: Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been
already said ([104]Q[14], A[5]). But He does not know Himself through
an idea; neither therefore other things.
Objection 3: Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of
knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle
of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to
suppose ideas.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is
the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are
understood."
I answer that, It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For
the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are
understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things
themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing
itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of
which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of
that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in
him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear
for the following reason:
In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any
generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the
form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as
may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be
made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by
their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas
in other agents (the form of the thing to be made pre-exists) according
to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus
the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this
may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build
his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was
not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear
later ([105]Q[46], A[1]), there must exist in the divine mind a form to
the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an
idea consists.
Reply to Objection 1: God does not understand things according to an
idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the
opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in
the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: Although God knows Himself and all else by His
own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things,
except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect
to other things; though not with respect to Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: God is the similitude of all things according to
His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
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Whether ideas are many?
Objection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is
His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one
idea.
Objection 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and
operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts
or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according
to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the
contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are
many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of
the eternal.
Objection 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures
only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not
from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas
are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real
in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the
plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De
Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, except
"ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not
many.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas
are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of
things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and
existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine
intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being
nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed
that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."
I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In
proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate
end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an
army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good
existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the
Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the
universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result
of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have
taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature
created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of
beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea
of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the
universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must
have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea
of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which
the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a
house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must
needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all
things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each
thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," from
which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can
easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if
we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as
that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands,
which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the
house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to
the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not
repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many
things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His
understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas
exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved
thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it
according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known
not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by
creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has
its own proper species, according to which it participates in some
degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God
knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He
knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like
manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands
many particular types of things and these are many ideas.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so
far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or
type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch
as many types are understood through the self-same essence.
Reply to Objection 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which God
understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one
understands many things, and that not only according to what they are
in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is
to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an
architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form
of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as
devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he
understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house.
Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He
also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And
this means that He understands the several types of things; or that
many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.
Reply to Objection 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are
caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect
comparing its own essence with these things.
Reply to Objection 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in
created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as
those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood
by God.
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Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?
Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things
that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would
follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God.
Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
Objection 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be,
nor have been, as has been said above (A[9]). But of such things there
are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the
divine will are the determining and effective types of things."
Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
Objection 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be
no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
Objection 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species,
but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of
these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not
ideas in God of all things known by Him.
On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is
clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the
proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of
all things known by Him.
I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the
knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the
principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and
belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of
knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to
speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect
to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle
of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though
they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows
according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a
speculative manner.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type,
but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God,
neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."
Reply to Objection 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually,
of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with
respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an
"exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."
Reply to Objection 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter
as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a
concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by
God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not
apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither
exist, nor be known.
Reply to Objection 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of
species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot
exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents
that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being
along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject,
have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of
the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those
that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or
any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now
individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of
species; both because particular things are individualized by matter,
which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the
idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and
produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to
individuals as will be shown later ([106]Q[22], A[3] ).
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OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of
the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?
(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
(3) On the comparison of the true to being.
(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.
(5) Whether God is truth?
(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?
(7) On the eternity of truth.
(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.
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Whether truth resides only in the intellect?
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect,
but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this
definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would
follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true
stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is
true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to
know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless
someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true
which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the
intellect.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If,
then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so
far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient
philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so.
Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by
different persons at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is
itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it
is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is
true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore
truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the
false reside not in things, but in the intellect."
I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite
tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any
knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is
in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends
towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good,
is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true,
is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as
that thing is related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of
goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far
as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the
true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object
understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect
to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to
be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing
understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or
accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it
depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by
which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related
essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the
intellect upon which it does not depend.
Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by
what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true
absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it
depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a
being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that
expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words
are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far
as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine
mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to
a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus,
then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in
things according as they are related to the intellect as their
principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth.
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made
manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes
being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is
in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are
related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera
Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a
principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is
rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for that is right which is
in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph.
viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which
is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the
equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things,
and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect;
for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
Reply to Objection 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of
natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by
chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they
were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our
intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and
which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not
follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation
to the divine intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by
the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there
primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine,
rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its
health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In
the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of
truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or a
word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is
true."
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Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as
the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so
is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and
division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a
thing is." Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing.
Objection 2: Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth
is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with
regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard
to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing
as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to
simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the
intellect nor in things."
I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect,
in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the
form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing,
must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this
being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the
conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is
to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight
has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the
comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself
apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity
with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of
a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing
corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then
first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and
dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes
from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the
predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing,
as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does
not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with
complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or
in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is
true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the
word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known.
Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing
and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what
a thing is."
And thus the Objections given are solved.
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Whether the true and being are convertible terms?
Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible
terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated
[107](A[1]); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not
convertible.
Objection 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not
convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;
for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not.
Therefore the true and being are not convertible.
Objection 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of
priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true
appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under
the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the
same disposition of things in being and in truth.
I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is
related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far
is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is
in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And
therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as
good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation
to the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect,
as said before [108](A[1]). But the true that is in things is
convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the
intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the
manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said
already [109](A[1]). It may, however, be said that being also is in the
things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is
primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in
idea.
Reply to Objection 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be
known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable.
Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of
logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended
except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two
ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended,
unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is
true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended
unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But
the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended
also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the
same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot
be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be
understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly,
being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by
understanding being.
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Whether good is logically prior to the true?
Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For
what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i.
But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind
of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically
prior to the true.
Objection 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect
composing and dividing as said above [110](A[2]). But that which is in
things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is
logically prior to the true.
Objection 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from
Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says
(De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore
the good is prior to the true.
On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the
true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in
mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.
I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with
being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner
the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two
reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than
is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately;
while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some
way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the
fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true
regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be
prior in idea to the good.
Reply to Objection 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one
another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the
intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object
of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and
conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the
universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of
intelligible things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that
the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the
order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is
prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being
itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly,
it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first,
that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in
things.
Reply to Objection 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth
in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows
himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to
"life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his
life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has
been said that truth exists in other things [111](A[1]). Whereas the
truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his
neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these
particular truths to truth in general.
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Whether God is truth?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the
intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition
and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.
Objection 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig.
xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no
likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the
first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all
being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is
truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone
sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.
On the contrary, Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"
(Jn. 14:6).
I answer that, As said above [112](A[1]), truth is found in the
intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things
according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to
the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed
to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act
of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of
every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of
understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but
that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.
Reply to Objection 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither
composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He
judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is
truth in His intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its
conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which
it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their
conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this
cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in
so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if
we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot understand this
unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one
says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another."
Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the
principle," inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His
intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of
themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all
apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that
exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is
true"---is entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person
fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.
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Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?
Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which
all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1),
"nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is
greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of
truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not
according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore
there is no other truth but God.
Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the
relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true
things." But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore
there is only one truth, by which all things are true.
On the contrary, it is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."
I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one,
and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that
when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in
each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each
species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things
analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper
nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is
predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is
only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is
called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is
called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health
is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something
whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have
said [113](A[1]) that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and
secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine
intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the
intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths
in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect,
according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2,
"Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one
man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths
are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as
it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to
which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus,
although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the
divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to
be true.
Reply to Objection 1: The soul does not judge of things according to
any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it
is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first
principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the
primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth,
which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply,
but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that
nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as
things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
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Whether created truth is eternal?
Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says
(De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a
circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these
is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.
Objection 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals
are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is
truth, which is the most universal.
Objection 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the
present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition
regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition
regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
Objection 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal.
But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their
truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth
was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was
before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an
end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still
be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.
On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before ([114]Q[10],
A[3]).
I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of
the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself:
but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth,
according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account
of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus
urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the
health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been
already said that things are called true from the truth of the
intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone
truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but
God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself,
as shown already [115](A[5]).
Reply to Objection 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and
three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
Reply to Objection 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be
understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of
extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be
everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself
determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be
one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all
distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be
everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place
and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal,
except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.
Reply to Objection 3: That which now is, was future, before it
(actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if
the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But
the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was
always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future
being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.
Reply to Objection 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is
the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal,
but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was
not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the
divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to
say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason
of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason of any
truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and
not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect
apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so
far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.
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Whether truth is immutable?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De
Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals,
otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."
Objection 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as
primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after
all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for
after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not.
Therefore truth is immutable.
Objection 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it
changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus
change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain
rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine
mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives
from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it
has the same signification even though he does not sit. Therefore the
truth of the proposition in no way changes.
Objection 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same
effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three
propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of
each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one.
Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for
the same reason that of any other.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 11:2),"Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."
I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect,
as said before [116](A[1]); but things are called true in virtue of the
truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be
regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which
consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity
may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one
of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the
intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing
which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is
changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change
from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can
be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can
escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect,
as is clear from what has been said before ([117]Q[14], A[15]). Hence
the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our
intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change,
but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus
forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect
is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this
is altogether immutable.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.
Reply to Objection 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence
just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but
accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or
generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that
no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was
before.
Reply to Objection 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things
are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that
which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it
said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the
truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the
intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion
changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting,
both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is
significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it
signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains,
but the second is changed.
Reply to Objection 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of
the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning
when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth
which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions
concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though
one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains
invariable.
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CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether falsity exists in things?
(2) Whether it exists in the sense?
(3) Whether it exists in the intellect?
(4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.
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Whether falsity exists in things?
Objection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For
Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will
be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear
to the contrary."
Objection 2: Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But
things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they
show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in
things.
Objection 3: Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity
to the divine intellect, as stated above [118](Q[16]). But everything,
in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true
without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a
true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being
unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it.
Therefore in all things falsity exists.
I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites
stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where
primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in
things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the
intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs
to it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it
accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared
with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared
"per se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another
intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things
depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human.
Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in
themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence
a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the
proper operation of his art.
In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as
they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place
in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps
in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to
withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil
of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the
Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love
vanity, and seek after lying?" (Ps. 4:3): as on the other hand virtuous
deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of
the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to
the light" (Jn. 3:21).
But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared
thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively;
and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and
thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by
word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to
be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should
say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher
says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The
true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything
can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In
another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause---and thus a
thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And
whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances,
since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and
naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external
accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be
false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and
tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We
call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:"
and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that
are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are
not." In this way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions
or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise
and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing compared with the intellect is said to be
true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not.
Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq.
ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain non-being,
so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.
Reply to Objection 2: Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by
accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear
to things which they actually are not.
Reply to Objection 3: Things are said to be false, not as compared with
the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as
compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.
To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective
representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as
it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to
be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the
resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any
one case, but in the majority of instances.
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Whether there is falsity in the senses?
Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine
says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are
affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it
seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that
falsity is not in them.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that
falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.
Objection 3: Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor
false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not
belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the
senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."
I answer that, Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as
truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the
senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things
truly, as said above ([119]Q[16], A[2]), and this takes place through
the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that
falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging
things to be otherwise than they really are.
The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence
of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist
in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own
nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other
sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not
primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of
other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, neither
primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there
is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental
to the colored object to be a man.
Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except
accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does
not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects
because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of
the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an
unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common
objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed sense
may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly,
but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other
things.
Reply to Objection 1: The affection of sense is its sensation itself.
Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows
that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we
experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected
erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports
erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the
object, but not about the fact of sensation.
Reply to Objection 2: Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since
sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another
translation it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object,
is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it
represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when
anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing
itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason
the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams
are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things
that are not present in substance.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that the false is not in the
sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.
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Whether falsity is in the intellect?
Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For
Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived,
understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to
exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore
falsity does not exist in the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the
intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the
intellect.
On the contrary, It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there
is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood."
But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood
exist in the intellect.
I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the
knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known.
Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to
them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent
qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to
be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the
thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with
regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto.
For it has been said [120](A[2]) that sight is not deceived in its
proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that
object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is
directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the
intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the
intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the
intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it
understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or
is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards
judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or
accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as
before mentioned regarding truth ([121]Q[16], A[2]), that falsity can
exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of
that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity
does not exist as known, as stated above [122](A[2]).
But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with
the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in
that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a
thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it.
This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying
to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a
man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. In
another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually
exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but
false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed
animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it;
for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is
false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its
knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands
nothing at all.
Reply to Objection 1: Because the essence of a thing is the proper
object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing
when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes
place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense
Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived,
understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that
no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is always right as regards first
principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason
that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known
principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood,
from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the
subject.
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Whether true and false are contraries?
Objection 1: It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true
and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for
"truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But
that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries.
Therefore true and false are not contrary things.
Objection 2: Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But
falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A
tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true
tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.
Objection 3: Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is
contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii,
2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a
lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (Jer. 8:5), that is to say, "an
idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false
opinion is contrary to a true one.
I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as
some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must
be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any
subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for
instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing,
whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject,"
as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of
one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert
something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of
color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or
seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is.
For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity
implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are
contraries.
Reply to Objection 1: What is in things is the truth of the thing; but
what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth
primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended.
To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the
Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God
is good," is, "God is not good."
Reply to Objection 2: Falsity is not founded in the truth which is
contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is
contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens
in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with
being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a
being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some
truth.
Reply to Objection 3: Because contraries, and opposites by way of
privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there
is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect
to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing
false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false
opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called
lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false opinion
concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.
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THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the
divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About
this, four points of inquiry arise:
(1) To whom does it belong to live?
(2) What is life?
(3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?
(4) Whether all things in God are life?
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Whether to live belongs to all natural things?
Objection 1: It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For
the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of
life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural
things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of
life.
Objection 2: Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in
themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local
movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of
growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since
then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local
movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.
Objection 3: Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less
perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living
waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo
of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life
is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to
plants. Therefore they have not life.
I answer that, We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what
it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life
manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De
Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore,
distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by
reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life
is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal begins
to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement
appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no
longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power,
then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is
clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves
by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as
the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is
called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of
the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called
movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine
themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things
that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a
similitude.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Philosopher may be understood
either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or
of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called
the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and
not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the
heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the
heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also every
natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude
to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were
one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force,"
as some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the
life of all natural bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does
not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural
conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the
place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants
and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with
the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by
receding from it, for in so far as they recede from such movement, so
far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light
bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and
giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not
therefore move themselves, as do living bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Waters are called living that have a continuous
current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually
flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is
merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess
makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in
its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves
but from the cause that generates them. The same is the case with the
movement of other heavy and light bodies.
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Whether life is an operation?
Objection 1: It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided
except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain
operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who
distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local
movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.
Objection 2: Further, the active life is said to be different from the
contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the
active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.
Objection 3: Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as
is clear from the words of Jn. 18:3, "Now this is eternal life, that
they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living
things, to live is to be."
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said ([123]Q[17], A[3]),
our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its
proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects
are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the
knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in
accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already
been said ([124]Q[13], A[1]), so from external properties names are
often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken
strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is
their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the
properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the
word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of
their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of
quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a
certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely
to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the
application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To
live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that
nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the
word "running" denotes "to run" in the abstract.
Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate.
Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from
which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9)
that to live is principally to sense or to understand.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an
operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and
intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations,
sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic.
ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to
have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he
distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in this lower
world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some
to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a
consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition,
to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without
movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place,
as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others,
as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.
Reply to Objection 2: By vital operations are meant those whose
principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator
produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men
not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their
natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits
inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations,
so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by a
similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his
bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered
with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are
said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In
this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and
thus to know God is said to be life eternal.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.
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Whether life is properly attributed to God?
Objection 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For
things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously
stated [125](A[2]). But movement does not belong to God. Neither
therefore does life.
Objection 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some
principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4)
that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God
has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.
Objection 3: Further, the principle of life in the living things that
exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in
corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal
things.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God."
I answer that, Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof
of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so
far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more
perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life
of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is
found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal
agent is that which acts through its form, and sometimes it does so
through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of
the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action.
Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of
any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the
executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of
the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this
kind are plants, which move themselves according to their inherent
nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and
decay.
Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only
with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form,
the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of
this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a
naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the
more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of
self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move
only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their
movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the
sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection
and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves
to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the
latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of
their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to
themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for this has been
implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to
any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as
move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are
superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose
province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to
that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life
is that of intelligible beings; for their power of self-movement is
more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man
the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their
command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the
art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of
ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only
concerned with preparing the material for the ship.
But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are
supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and
the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to
some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be
moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is
its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not
determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such
is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher
concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that
God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most
perfect and always in act.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold.
Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut;
whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand,
to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the
former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the
thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent.
Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement, the latter
action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its
movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing
moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although
movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in
potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is
to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense,
therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands
itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also
taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an
act of the imperfect.
Reply to Objection 2: As God is His own very existence and
understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He
has not principle of life.
Reply to Objection 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a
corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and
nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not
found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold
good with incorruptible natures.
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Whether all things are life in God?
Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is
said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all
things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
Objection 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But
things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all
things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life
in God.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living
substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore,
things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems
that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears
to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God
potentially.
Objection 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are
known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but
never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch
as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will
never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears
inadmissible.
On the contrary, (Jn. 1:3,4), it is said, "What was made, in Him was
life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are
life in God.
I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as before stated
[126](A[3]). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of
understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as
understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all
things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it
follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold
sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by
the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are
in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in
their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the
Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being,
living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense
things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense
they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not
distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are
the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not
movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not
movement, but life.
Reply to Objection 2: The thing modelled must be like the model
according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form
has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the
thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the
architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that
exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas
of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine
mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.
Reply to Objection 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural
things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in
the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which
reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man;
and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But
since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that
those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in
themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in
themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or
horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in
the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material,
which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has
nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material
house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.
Reply to Objection 4: Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as
being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as
created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him.
They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot
be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in
time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding
only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far as
life implies a principle of operation.
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THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we
consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is
about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to
His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to
His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in God?
(2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
(3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?
(4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
(5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?
(7) Whether the will of God is mutable?
(8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
(9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?
(10) Whether God has free will?
(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?
(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the
divine will?
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Whether there is will in God?
Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of
will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end.
Therefore there is not will in God.
Objection 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it
is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot
be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54),
the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement,
and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is
not will in God.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 12:2): "That you may prove what
is the will of God."
I answer that, There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will
follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by
their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its
intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural
form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it,
it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection,
which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without
knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures
have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so
as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to
possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every
intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there
is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is
intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
will.
Reply to Objection 1: Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet
He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this
by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above
([127]Q[6], A[3]): for the end has the aspect of good.
Reply to Objection 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,
although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what
it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it
does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having
always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not
distinct from His essence.
Reply to Objection 3: A will of which the principal object is a good
outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine
will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of
God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by
itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said
to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first
mover moves itself.
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Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself.
For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than
Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.
Objection 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the
appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills
anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which
is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks
nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely
satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from
Himself.
Objection 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the
number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things
apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold,
and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is
impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This is the will of
God, your sanctification."
I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from
Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
[128](A[1]). For natural things have a natural inclination not only
towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if
possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good
amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in
so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains,
therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible
to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the
divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of
likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect,
communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the
divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much
as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things
to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that
end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should
be partakers therein.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine will is God's own existence
essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways
of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has
already been said ([129]Q[13], A[4]). For when we say that God exists,
no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say
that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from
Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the
whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves
the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of
the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills
nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is
different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone
may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own
sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the
sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that
anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence,
so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the
divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from
itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its
goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that
essence knows other things.
Reply to Objection 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the
many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and
simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its
own goodness.
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Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?
Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For
everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from
eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as
He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is
necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of
all necessity, as above shown ([130]Q[2], A[3]). But it belongs to His
nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing
over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever
He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is
possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does
not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not
to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not
will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two
things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and
mutable.
Objection 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one
or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to
one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes]
says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard
to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from
another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.
Objection 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as
the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): "Who worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to
the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does
not will necessarily whatever He wills.
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be
necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to
be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the
predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is
absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the
subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is
absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it
is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary
absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is
sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly
as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of
absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the
divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that
is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily,
even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty
has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance
the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God
wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His
own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily
will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end
cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve
life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not
necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a
horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the
journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the
goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch
as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His
willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it
can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing,
then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.
Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity
whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily;
except by supposition.
Reply to Objection 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness,
He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness;
for it can exist without other things.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those
other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not
unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary
relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in
the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to
some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the
solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the
cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the
things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will,
but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely,
that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect
accompanies all created good.
Reply to Objection 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined
to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
necessary relation.
Reply to Objection 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so
is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge
has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the
thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as
they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they
exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary
existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so
as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in
themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills,
but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
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Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by
pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can
participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours
the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary
agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by
will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
Objection 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is
essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first
which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He
acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature,
and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
Objection 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being
"such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is
the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the
cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God
is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.
Objection 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created
things is the knowledge of God, as said before ([131]Q[14], A[8]).
Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:26), "How could anything endure,
if Thou wouldst not?"
I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of
things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed,
by a necessity of His nature.
This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active
causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in
Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary
means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and
definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence
the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts
by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He must
act by intellect and will.
This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of
which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature
operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is
because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent;
and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance
with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being.
Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity
of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and
indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown
([132]Q[7], A[2]). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His
nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection
according to the determination of His will and intellect.
Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For
effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they
pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now
effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore
since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him
after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the
same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived
appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of
things.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to
exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in
so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain
things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
Reply to Objection 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and
will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He
acts after the mode of intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: Good is the object of the will. The words,
therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His
goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before
(A[2], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect
is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is
conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the
intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the
effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has
nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the
effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in
God all these things are one.
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Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine
will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say
that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what
is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will
of God has some cause.
Objection 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and
whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause
of all things, as has been already shown [133](A[4]). If, then, there
is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any
cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain,
since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems
inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine
will.
Objection 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no
cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has
no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will,
and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient
cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than
the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
I answer that, In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of
which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect,
there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as
there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands.
The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its
conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding
the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the
understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself,
apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this
case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding
the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would
be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause
of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which
the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means
to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the
means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and
means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say
that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by
one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills
all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is
not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the
effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His
willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end.
Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this
on account of that.
Reply to Objection 1: The will of God is reasonable, not because
anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one
thing to be on account of another.
Reply to Objection 2: Since God wills effects to proceed from definite
causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not
unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would,
however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary,
and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says
(De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to
attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to
perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God."
Reply to Objection 3: Since God wills effects to come from causes, all
effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the
will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect
depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that
God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and
intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might
enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this cannot be
reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on
the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.
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Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved, and
to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen.
Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Objection 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is
that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills
all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might
exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Objection 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does
not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be
hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive
power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect
of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes.
The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 113:11): "God hath done all things,
whatsoever He would."
I answer that, The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof
of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the
agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as
with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing
may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the
universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man
or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same
must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of
any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal
cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any
particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance
of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the
universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order
of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects;
yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this
hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate
causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the
will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that
the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems
to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another
order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will
as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will,
when by its justice he is punished.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men
to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a
restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine
says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be
saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish
saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not
will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they
mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved,
males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of
every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the
consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the
divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor
consequent, but to the things willed.
To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is
good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and
absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some
additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent
consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should
live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely
considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer
or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an
evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills
all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In
the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but
consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we
will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a
qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in
themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular
qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it
when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is
meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge
wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he
would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a
qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute
will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place;
although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
Reply to Objection 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as
the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty
is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can
have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it
does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth;
but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in
Whom all good virtually exists.
Reply to Objection 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by
deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first
cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in
no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said
above.
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Whether the will of God is changeable?
Objection 1: It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord
says (Gn. 6:7): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever
repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a
changeable will.
Objection 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will
speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull
down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I
also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (Jer.
18:7,8) Therefore God has a changeable will.
Objection 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God
does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law
to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a
changeable will.
Objection 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as
said before [134](A[3]). Therefore He can both will and not will the
same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is
changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in
that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as
regards His will.
On the contrary, It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie,
nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (Num. 23:19).
I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point
we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that
certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a
thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will
to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if
one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to
will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we
presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the
substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in
two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be
good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him.
Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire;
though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first
time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has
already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are
entirely unchangeable ([135]Q[9], A[1]; [136]Q[14], A[15]). Therefore
His will must be entirely unchangeable.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood
metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when
we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so
without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the
same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have
repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by
the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had
made.
Reply to Objection 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal
cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce
certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in
power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power,
knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior
causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only
on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not rise again," but
looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise
again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior
cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause
it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that
God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls
under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet
does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher
cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for
thou shalt die, and not live" (Is. 38:1). Yet this did not take place,
since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge
and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5):
"The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say,
the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent,"
His words must be understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent,
when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.
Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow from this argument that God
has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should
change.
Reply to Objection 4: Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute
necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the
unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above
[137](A[3]).
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Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the
things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved,
except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to
will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."
Objection 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its
effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84)
"Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder
it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rom.
9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes
necessity on the things willed.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is
necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die,
being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are
related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have
necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a
thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is
necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary
absolutely.
On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If
therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that
all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will,
counsel, and all other such things.
I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed
but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to
intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes
is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.
This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of
the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause
is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is
hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause
can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if
the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the
divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better
therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the
divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows
upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its
manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in
the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in
accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the
divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things
are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in
the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done
necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for
the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has
attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible
and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is
not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed
by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes
for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.
Reply to Objection 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a
necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but
conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it
must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the
divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God
wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently
according to His will.
Reply to Objection 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents
according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the
divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have,
either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute
necessities.
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Whether God wills evils?
Objection 1: It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists,
God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good,
yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil
things." Therefore God wills evil things.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would
conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And
Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the
admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called
evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently
in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with
evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty
of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His
creatures. Therefore God wills evil.
Objection 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are
contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not
exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not
always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause
of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom.
Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He
is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore
it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that
every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.
I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as
said before ([138]Q[5], A[1]), and since evil is opposed to good, it is
impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the
appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite
which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far
as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a
natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to
which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation
of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion
kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the
animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure
for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now
the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good.
Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally,
unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the
good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more
than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than
another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the
privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural
defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which
such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment;
and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some
things to be naturally corrupted.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that although God does not will
evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although
evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This
they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good
end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil
should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not
of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside the
intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as
it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs
should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be
said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it
is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged
of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which
belongs to it essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and
beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1).
Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the
perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an
absurdity.
Reply to Objection 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil
exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that
anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so
opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil
to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be
done; and this is a good.
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Whether God has free-will?
Objection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a
homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who
is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having
free-will, can be inclined to either side."
Objection 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will,
by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has
been said [139](A[9]). Therefore there is not free-will in God.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit
divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice
of the will, not in obedience to necessity."
I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what we will not of
necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not
appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals,
that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by
free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other
things not necessarily, as shown above [140](A[3]), He has free will
with respect to what He does not necessarily will.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply,
but only as regards the inclination to sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away
from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown
(De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil
of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He
can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves,
without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.
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Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be
distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so
is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom.
Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.
Objection 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with
the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the
expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that
will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No
expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is the very essence
of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of Ps.
110:2: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all
His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.
I answer that, Some things are said of God in their strict sense;
others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before
([141]Q[13], A[3]). When certain human passions are predicated of the
Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the
effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is
signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus
with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment
becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is
signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the
same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes
metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a
precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a
divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in
the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (Mat. 6:10).
There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger
is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it
includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore
in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as
attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the
will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of
expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.
Reply to Objection 1: Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done,
unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know,
unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to
knowledge, but to will.
Reply to Objection 2: Expressions of will are called divine wills, not
as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the
usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus
punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called
anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in
ourselves.
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Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?
Objection 1: It seems that five expressions of will---namely,
prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not
rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids
us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and
the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They
ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.
Objection 2: Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the
Scripture says (Wis. 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct
from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be
comprehended in the will of expression.
Objection 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all
creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some
action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to
rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one
division, not being of one order.
Objection 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good
happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not
right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of
evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in
the case of good.
I answer that, By these signs we name the expression of will by which
we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that
he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may
show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly
and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person;
in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it
indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an
impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the
expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of
another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting
upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by
persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of
man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with
regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That
precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear
from the words of Mat. 6:10: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in
heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is
clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done,
unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by
actually doing it."
Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time,
permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good.
Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to
good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his
will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words
that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing
should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of
prohibition or permission.
Reply to Objection 2: As God may by metaphor be said to will what by
His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be
said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is
nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good
pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the
same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not;
both because the former regards the present, and the two latter the
future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the
latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.
Reply to Objection 3: Rational creatures are masters of their own acts;
and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are
assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to
act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by
the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are
concerned with these.
Reply to Objection 4: All evil of sin, though happening in many ways,
agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard
to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the
other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness,
since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the
fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and
there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these are
the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only
concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the
avoiding of lesser evils.
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GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of
God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves
both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the
habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence
we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and
mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love exists in God?
(2) Whether He loves all things?
(3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?
(4) Whether He loves more the better things?
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Whether love exists in God?
Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there
are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.
Objection 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually
divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to
God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting
and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is
simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.
On the contrary, It is written: "God is love" (Jn. 4:16).
I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there is love: because
love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty.
For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend
towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is
essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite,
whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed
to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard
good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for
instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of
itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the
more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the
intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place
to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the
will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy
and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope
regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good
universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the
first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other
appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For
nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that
is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the
object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things
like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle.
Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be
love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting.
Now it has been shown that will is in God ([142]Q[19], A[1]), and hence
we must attribute love to Him.
Reply to Objection 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except
through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the
universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as
stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual
appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the
sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the
proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore
always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change
affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part.
animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals.
Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed
to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the
will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are
passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite,
they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they are in God.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation
that is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without
passion.
Reply to Objection 2: In the passions of the sensitive appetite there
may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily
change---and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the
appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the
heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the
formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is implied,
as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is
about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes
sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no
imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on
their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that
even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him;
except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show
([143]Q[3], A[2] , ad 2; [144]Q[19], A[11]). Whereas, those that do not
imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of
God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before
([145]Q[19], A[11]).
Reply to Objection 3: An act of love always tends towards two things;
to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it:
since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as
we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible,
union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God,
yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for
Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as above
shown ([146]Q[6], AA[1],3). And by the fact that anyone loves another,
he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the
place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself.
So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to
ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine
love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it
implies no composition in God.
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Whether God loves all things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For according
to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself,
and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it
is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and
passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God
loves things other than Himself.
Objection 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from
God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love
anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is
no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than
Himself.
Objection 3: Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire,
and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures
with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself.
Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with
irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2).
Therefore God does not love all things.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou hatest all the
workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved.
Therefore God does not love all things.
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that
are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."
I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things,
in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is
itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it
has been shown above ([147]Q[19], A[4]) that God's will is the cause of
all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or
any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every
existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love
anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is
manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love.
Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but
is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to
anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its
goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we
will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the
good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the
love of God infuses and creates goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made to
pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the
beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for
his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the
truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of
all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside
Himself by His providence for all existing things."
Reply to Objection 2: Although creatures have not existed from
eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from
eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for
that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within
us, know things existing in themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational
creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one
with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or
ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them
is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures
cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and
beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not
love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were
with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational
creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in
need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services
they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for
ourselves.
Reply to Objection 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being
loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves
sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence
and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not
existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from
God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.
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Whether God loves all things equally?
Objection 1: It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is
said: "He hath equally care of all" (Wis. 6:8). But God's providence
over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He
loves all things equally.
Objection 2: Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence
does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not
therefore love some things more than others.
Objection 3: Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do
His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things
more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither
therefore does He love some things more than others.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all
things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and
of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son
Himself."
I answer that, Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold
way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the
act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God
does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things
by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In
another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the
beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another,
for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense.
In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than
others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has
been said [148](A[2]), no one thing would be better than another, if
God did not will greater good for one than for another.
Reply to Objection 1: God is said to have equally care of all, not
because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He
administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is based on the intensity of love
on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But
the good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence.
Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.
Reply to Objection 3: To understand and to will denote the act alone,
and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which
God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with
respect to God's love.
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Whether God always loves more the better things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not always love more the better
things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human
race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He
loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered
Him up for us all" (Rom. 8:32). Therefore God does not always love more
the better things.
Objection 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said
of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (Ps. 8:6).
But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said:
"Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He
taketh hold" (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love more the
better things.
Objection 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ
more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying:
"Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved
John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the
words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is
John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him
only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore God does not
always love more the better things.
Objection 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant,
since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank
after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent;
since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that
there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance,
more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (Lk. 15:7).
Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
Objection 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the
predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He
wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not
always love more the better things.
On the contrary, Everything loves what is like it, as appears from
(Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing
is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more
loved by God.
I answer that, It must needs be, according to what has been said
before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown
([149]AA[2],3), that God's loving one thing more than another is
nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because
God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some
things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater
good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things.
Reply to Objection 1: God loves Christ not only more than He loves the
whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe:
because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that
is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of
His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the
salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious
conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder," according to
Is. 9:6.
Reply to Objection 2: God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of
God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that
nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the
Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with
the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of
glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of an
angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are found
nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to
natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not
assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more;
but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a
house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not
give to his own son in sound health.
Reply to Objection 3: This doubt concerning Peter and John has been
solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says
that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the
contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious
of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently
desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves
more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it does
not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.
Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was
loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the
Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved
more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care.
Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with
the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more
and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is
said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor;
but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of
familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on
account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved
Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more,
from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the
better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better,
and was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass
judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the
weigher of spirits" (Prov. 16:2).
Reply to Objection 4: The penitent and the innocent are related as
exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the
better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal,
innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to
rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often
penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence
Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In
battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and
bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has
never done a brave deed."
Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are
more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as
conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a
hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a
king.
Reply to Objection 5: Since God's will is the cause of goodness in
things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned
according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine
goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by
the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is
better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because
even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.
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THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and
mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is justice in God?
(2) Whether His justice can be called truth?
(3) Whether there is mercy in God?
(4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?
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Whether there is justice in God?
Objection 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is
divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God:
neither therefore does justice.
Objection 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does
not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh
all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11). Therefore
justice cannot be attributed to Him.
Objection 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God
is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice
cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards
the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to
God.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 10:8): "The Lord is just, and hath
loved justice."
I answer that, There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in
mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds
of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls
commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of business.
This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath
first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Rom. 11:35).
The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice;
whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As
then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of
multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of
the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of
will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He
gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each;
and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that
properly belong to it."
Reply to Objection 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with
the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and
daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only
metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above
([150]Q[20], A[1] ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive
appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the
subject of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are
concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice,
liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive
faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our
attributing these virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in
such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political
virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Since good as perceived by intellect is the
object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what
His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in
accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does
according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do
according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power,
God is a law unto Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: To each one is due what is his own. Now that
which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns
the servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own
cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or
necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has
to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is
directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to substance,
and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created
things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be
regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in
either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be
fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what
manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's justice regards what
befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself.
It is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is
ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other
animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He
gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This
debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each
thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And
although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not
the debtor, since He is not directed to other things, but rather other
things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the
fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of
merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10):
"When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with
their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just;
since it befits Thy goodness."
Reply to Objection 4: Although justice regards act, this does not
prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the
essence of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not
always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect
to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason
it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the
general to the special.
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Whether the justice of God is truth?
Objection 1: It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice
resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a
rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does
not appertain to truth.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not
appertain to the idea of justice.
On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 84:11): "Mercy and truth have met each
other": where truth stands for justice.
I answer that, Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as
said above ([151]Q[16], A[1]). Now the mind, that is the cause of the
thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse
is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When
therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists
in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For
according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our words about it
are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things,
truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the
work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his
art.
Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related
to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which
establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom,
which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also
in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in
the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are
governed according to the law, it resides in the will.
Reply to Objection 2: The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in
this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and
deed such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the
sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its
cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.
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Whether mercy can be attributed to God?
Objection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy
is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But
there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.
Objection 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot
remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. 2:13): "If
we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He
would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words.
Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.
On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 110:4): "He is a merciful and gracious
Lord."
I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in
its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it
must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors],
as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected
with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence
it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if
it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To sorrow, therefore,
over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly
belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by
that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of
some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as
shown above ([152]Q[6] , A[4]). It must, however, be considered that to
bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also
to His justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. The
communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to
goodness, as shown above ([153]Q[6], AA[1],4); in so far as perfections
are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to
justice, as has been already said [154](A[1]); in so far as God does
not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness,
it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by
God expel defects, it belongs to mercy.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an
affection of passion.
Reply to Objection 2: God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against
His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who
pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one
hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or
mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence
committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a
gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one
another, as Christ has forgiven you" (Eph. 4:32). Hence it is clear
that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness
thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above judgement"
(James 2:13).
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Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?
Objection 1: It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and
justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the
justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation
of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that
hath not done mercy" (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work of God
do mercy and justice appear.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews
to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rom. 15).
Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.
Objection 3: Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world;
which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and
mercy.
Objection 4: Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but
of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose
something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing.
Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 24:10): "All the ways of the Lord are
mercy and truth."
I answer that, Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's
works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not
every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect
in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to
happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt
paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to
some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work
of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His
wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that
anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created
things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein
consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's
works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of
mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures,
except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this
is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that
precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to
something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will---which
is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is
due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational soul is
due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the
divine goodness. So in every work of God, viewed at its primary source,
there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains,
and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first
cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does
God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due
to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since
less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the
divine goodness confers; because between creatures and God's goodness
there can be no proportion.
Reply to Objection 1: Certain works are attributed to justice, and
certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly
and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is
seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates,
in punishing short of what is deserved.
In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits
sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that
love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she
hath loved much" (Lk. 7:47).
Reply to Objection 2: God's justice and mercy appear both in the
conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice
appears in the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the
conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account
of the promises made to the fathers.
Reply to Objection 3: Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the
just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in
them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God.
As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils that press on us
in this world force us to go to God."
Reply to Objection 4: Although creation presupposes nothing in the
universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In
this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the
production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom
and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change
of creatures from non-existence to existence.
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THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now
proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and
the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things;
predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these
acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For
in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the
consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong.
Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?
(2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?
(3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?
(4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things
foreseen?
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Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?
Objection 1: It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For
providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence.
But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18),
it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt
for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to
God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is
not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are
not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore
there is no providence in God.
Objection 3: Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence
seems to be something composite, because it includes both the intellect
and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, Father, governest
all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father,
governeth it.']."
I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all
the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was
shown above ([155]Q[6], A[4]). In created things good is found not only
as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an
end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the
divine goodness ([156]Q[21], A[4]). This good of order existing in
things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the
cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of
every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone
before ([157]Q[19], A[4]), it is necessary that the type of the order
of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and
the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking,
providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other
parts are directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding
of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and
the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the
future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in
regard to oneself---as for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who
orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others
subject to him, in a family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said
(Mat. 24:45), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath
appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may
suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing
ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of order in
things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence
Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence is the divine type
itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which
disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards
an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10),
"Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has
rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. [158]FS, Q[57],
A[6]]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from
the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful,
nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an
end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God,
according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass
away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God.
Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things
to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry
necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those
who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who worketh all
things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).
Reply to Objection 2: Two things pertain to the care of
providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence
and disposition; and the execution of order, which is termed
government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.
Reply to Objection 3: Providence resides in the intellect; but
presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about
things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence
presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty
is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence
has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not
affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect
are one and the same thing, as we have said above [159](Q[19]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine
providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then
everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And
thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.
Objection 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as
far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many
evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not
omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.
Objection 3: Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require
providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent
concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, then, many things
happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.
Objection 4: Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to
the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God in
accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left
him in the hand of his own counsel" (Ecclus. 15:14). And particularly
in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of
their heart" (Ps. 80:13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to
divine providence.
Objection 5: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God doth not care
for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the
same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the
care of divine providence.
On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to
end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).
I answer that, Certain persons totally denied the existence of
providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the
world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only
were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their
individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this
respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job
22:14): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our
things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses,
however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on
account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in
reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion
of the others.
We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence,
not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is
made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering
of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the
first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent
something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because
the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of
the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to
all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also
as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible,
but also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist in
whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as
the Apostle says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered
[*Vulg.'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt,
a Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and
invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" (Rom. 13:1).
Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the
type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it
necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in
existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also
been shown ([160]Q[14], AA[6],11) that God knows all things, both
universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to
the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art,
all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things
wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art.
Reply to Objection 1: There is a difference between universal and
particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause;
but not the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order
of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of
some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented
from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular causes
are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect
should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far
then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said
to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard
the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is
said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants,
although to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully
foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one
place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other.
Reply to Objection 2: It is otherwise with one who has care of a
particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a
particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his
care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows
some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be
hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to
be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the
plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to
the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption
of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a
species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for
all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in
particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be
hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent
from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying
of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no
tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty
God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were
so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would
appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have
just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible
things---e.g. casual and evil things---as removed from the care of
divine providence.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is not the author of nature; but he uses
natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human
providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from
necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the
author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who
withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence,
attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
others of the ancients.
Reply to Objection 4: When it is said that God left man to himself,
this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but
merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only
the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted
upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of
themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like
rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which these
are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly
said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since the very act of free
will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that
everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to
divine providence. For human providence is included under the
providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God,
however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more
excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything
happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that
love God, all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). But from the
fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is
said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence
from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not
preserved in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had
weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence
human affairs concerning which we take counsel.
Reply to Objection 5: Since a rational creature has, through its free
will, control over its actions, as was said above ([161]Q[19], A[10]),
it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that
something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is
given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this
way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however,
that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine
providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God has immediate providence over everything?
Objection 1: It seems that God has not immediate providence over all
things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be
attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he
should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his
subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over
all things.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to
an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But
it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore
every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore
God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary
causes would be withdrawn.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is
better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example,
vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But
whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not
immediate providence over bad and vile things.
On the contrary, It is said (Job 34:13): "What other hath He appointed
over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On
which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the
world which He Himself hath made."
I answer that, Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of
the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of
this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these,
God has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His
intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever
causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to
produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the
type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain
intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs things inferior by
superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of
the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is
imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by
Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a
threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity,
Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus
over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes.
The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be
generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate
in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move
corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over
human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers
placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1,
2: viii, 14).
Reply to Objection 1: It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers
who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of
those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in
himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it
considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.
Reply to Objection 2: God's immediate provision over everything does
not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of
His order, as was said above ([162]Q[19], AA[5],8).
Reply to Objection 3: It is better for us not to know low and vile
things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is
better and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously;
because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil.
This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one
glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.
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Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?
Objection 1: It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon
things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either
present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity;
as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God,
since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of
necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore divine
providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.
Objection 2: Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he
can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He
assigns the stability of necessity to things provided.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the
immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes
by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that
providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.
On the contrary, Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt
nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some
things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose
any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.
I answer that, Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things;
not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs
to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is
an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves
is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all
grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine
providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared
for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for
others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency,
according to the nature of their proximate causes.
Reply to Objection 1: The effect of divine providence is not only that
things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by
necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence
ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of
necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine
providence conceives to happen from contingency.
Reply to Objection 2: The order of divine providence is unchangeable
and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been
foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.
Reply to Objection 3: That indissolubility and unchangeableness of
which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which
fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they
do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that
properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon
being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency
falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for all
being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some
particular order of things.
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OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of
predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?
(2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the
predestined?
(3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?
(4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is
to say, the predestined are chosen?
(5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or
reprobation, or election?
(6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will
infallibly be saved?
(7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
(8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the
saints?
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Whether men are predestined by God?
Objection 1: It seems that men are not predestined by God, for
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that
God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows
all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit
and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts
by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not
predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done away.
Objection 2: Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine
providence, as was said above ([163]Q[22], AA[1],2). But other
creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are
men.
Objection 3: Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as
men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there
never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine
says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity
[miserendi]" [*See [164]Q[22], A[3]]. Therefore men are not
predestined.
Objection 4: Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by
the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1
Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the
Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us
from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since
predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be made
known to each predestined; which is clearly false.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them
He also called."
I answer that, It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all
things are subject to His providence, as was shown above ([165]Q[22],
A[2]). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end,
as was also said ([166]Q[22], AA[1],2). The end towards which created
things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion
and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that
consists in seeing God which is above the nature of every creature, as
shown above ([167]Q[12], A[4]). The other end, however, is
proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain
according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to
something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by
another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark.
Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life,
is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that
direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all
things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the
type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of
pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the
aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life
eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send.
Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part
of providence.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene calls predestination an imposition of
necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined
towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will
malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not
excluded by Him.
Reply to Objection 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end
which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be
properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used
in respect of any other end.
Reply to Objection 3: Predestination applies to angels, just as it does
to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not
take its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto."
Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white,
whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise
it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether
one is predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not.
Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which
is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously ([168]Q[21],
AA[3],4).
Reply to Objection 4: Even if by a special privilege their
predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should
be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined
would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.
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Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?
Objection 1: It seems that predestination does place something in the
predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore
predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the
predestined.
Objection 2: Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was
predestined," etc. (Rom. 1:4): "Predestination is of one who is not;
destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.):
"What is predestination but the destination of one who is?" Therefore
predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places
something in the predestined.
Objection 3: Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared.
But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine
says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something
in the predestined.
Objection 4: Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of
eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the
definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of
grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore
predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is
in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that
"predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But
foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who
foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who
predestines, and not in the predestined.
I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but
only in the person who predestines. We have said above that
predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything
in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider,
as was proved above ([169]Q[22], A[1]). But the execution of providence
which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed,
and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that
predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons
towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution,
however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but
actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and
magnification; according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:30): "Whom He
predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also
magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."
Reply to Objection 1: Actions passing out to external matter imply of
themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting;
but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and
willing, as said above ([170]Q[14], A[2]; [171]Q[18], A[3], ad 1).
Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does
not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes
out to external things, has an effect in them.
Reply to Objection 2: Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of
someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone
actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission
which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to
destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way
it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any unlawful things for
the love of life" (2 Macc. 6:20). Thus destination can be of a thing
which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the
antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does
not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.
Reply to Objection 3: Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect
to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to
action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination,
and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act,
accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus,
God from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea
of the order of some towards salvation.
Reply to Objection 4: Grace does not come into the definition of
predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as
predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and
of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is
anything temporal.
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Whether God reprobates any man?
Objection 1: It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates
what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wis. 11:25):
"Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things
Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.
Objection 2: Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary
for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as
predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause
of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will
likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For
it is said (Osee 13:9): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is
only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate any man.
Objection 3: Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he
cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For
it is said (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can
correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to
any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not
reprobate anyone.
On the contrary, It is said (Malachi 1:2,3): "I have loved Jacob, but
have hated Esau."
I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was said above
[172](A[1]) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence,
however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are
subject to providence, as was said above ([173]Q[22], A[2]). Thus, as
men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it
likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from
that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part
of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so
reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside
from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but
also something more, as does providence, as was said above ([174]Q[22],
A[1]). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace
and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to
fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of
that sin.
Reply to Objection 1: God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as
He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them
all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular
good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobated them.
Reply to Objection 2: Reprobation differs in its causality from
predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in
the future life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is
received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the
cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of
abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in
the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the
free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In
this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely, "Destruction is thy
own, O Israel."
Reply to Objection 3: Reprobation by God does not take anything away
from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that
the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as
implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as
was said above ([175]Q[19], A[3]), that the predestined must
necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do
away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by
God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that
particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly
imputed to him as guilt.
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Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]
Objection 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his
rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the
goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a
participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection
communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.
Objection 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But
predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist.
Therefore, some are predestined without election.
Objection 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God
"wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, predestination
which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.
On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 1:4): "He chose us in Him before the
foundation of the world."
I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in the order of
reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that
predestination, as stated above [176](A[1]), is a part of providence.
Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect
directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved
above ([177]Q[22], A[2]). But nothing is directed towards an end unless
the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some
to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God
wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and
love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal
salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above
([178]Q[20], AA[2],3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to
some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above
[179](A[3]). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in
God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause
good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and
therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes
love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in
loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed
by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes
election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination.
Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.
Reply to Objection 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in
general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election;
inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His
goodness, as we said above ([180]Q[6], A[4]). But if we consider the
communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it
without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He
does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory
election is implied.
Reply to Objection 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited
to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen,
the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as
happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above
([181]Q[20], A[2]). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11):
"Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His
choice."
Reply to Objection 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent
will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His
consequent will, which is to will simply.
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Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?
Objection 1: It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of
predestination. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He
also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 9:15: "I will have
mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who,
I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart." Therefore it seems
the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.
Objection 2: Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will,
which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the
purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17).
But there can be no other reason for predestination than the
foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of
predestination.
Objection 3: Further, "There is no injustice in God" (Rom. 9:14). Now
it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all
men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality
in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore
God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and
reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and
demerits.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): "Not by works of justice
which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He
saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore,
foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.
I answer that, Since predestination includes will, as was said above
[182](A[4]), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the
same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above
([183]Q[19], A[5] ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will
on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the
part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account
of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that
merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the
predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the
effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing,
whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of
predestination to anyone on account of any merits.
Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination
was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former
life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men
were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their
works different states were assigned to them in this world when united
with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says
(Rom. 9:11,12): "For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good
or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of
her: The elder shall serve the younger."
Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and
cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that
the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from
God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was
granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by
preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the
saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to
think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of
action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it
cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the
effect of predestination.
And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination
are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God
gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because
He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a
king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make
good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that
which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the
same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is
of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered
as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of
predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of
predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there
is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of
predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a
secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God
produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was
above shown ([184]Q[22], A[3]). Wherefore, that which flows from
free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the
effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light---in one
way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of
predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a
subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final
cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as
its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the
matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on
account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit
glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered
in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of
predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us;
because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all
included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for
grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help,
according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): "convert us, O Lord, to
Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way,
in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards
which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and
from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The use of grace foreknown by God is not the
cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as
was explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness
of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular
effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already
stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason for the predestination of some, and
reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus
He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the
divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary
that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be
manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in
themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for
the completion of the universe there are required different grades of
being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe.
That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows
some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said
above ([185]Q[22], A[2]). Let us then consider the whole of the human
race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His
goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of
His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he
reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the
reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle
refers, saying (Rom. 9:22,23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath
[that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known,
endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath,
fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on
the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Tim.
2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and
silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor,
but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and
reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence
Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another
He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus
too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary
matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God
from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of
earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature.
Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form,
and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from
the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part
of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some
stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this
account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares
unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary
to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted
as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given
gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases
(provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of
justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is
thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?"
(Mat. 20:14,15).
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Whether predestination is certain?
Objection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on
the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown,"
(Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not
receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which is the
effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore
predestination cannot be certain.
Objection 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible
follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may sin
and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the
effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not
impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.
Objection 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now.
But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore
now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not
certain.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also
predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and
preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will
most certainly be freed."
I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes
effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its
effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above
[186](A[1]), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all
things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from
contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which
divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of
providence is infallible, as was shown above ([187]Q[22], A[4]). So
also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not
destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency.
Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will
([188]Q[14], A[13]; [189]Q[19], A[4]) must also be taken into
consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things,
although they themselves are most certain and infallible.
Reply to Objection 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person in
two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his
crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain
way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another
person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's
place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others;
according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable,
and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in
the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews.
He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives
the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the
good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good
whether done by himself or by others.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible for one who is
predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not
possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is
predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall
short of its effect.
Reply to Objection 3: Since predestination includes the divine will as
stated above [190](A[4]): and the fact that God wills any created thing
is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the
immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so
the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say
that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated,
taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely speaking, God can
predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is
not destroyed.
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Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
Objection 1: It seems that the number of the predestined is not
certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain.
But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it
seems; for it is written (Dt. 1:11): "The Lord God adds to this number
many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who
belong to Him." Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.
Objection 2: Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to
salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged
by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained
by God cannot be certain.
Objection 3: Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those
of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of
things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the
saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved
than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Mat. 7:13,14: "For wide is the
gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are
who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that
leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number
of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of
the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor
diminished."
I answer that, The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said
that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say
that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not
however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of
predestination; of which we spoke above [191](A[6]). Therefore we must
say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only
formally, but also materially. It must, however, be observed that the
number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason
of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be
saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the
sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and
determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that
every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has
been said above when we treated of the infinite ([192]Q[7], AA[2],3).
Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out
some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very
nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things
which are required not principally, but only on account of something
else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts
and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other
thing. For instance, a builder thinks out the definite measurements of
a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make
in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does
not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses
just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the
wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole
universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of
the whole of the universe, and what number would befit the essential
parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been
ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many
elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo
corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the
universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species
is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number
of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not
pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so
many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all
creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the
universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain
to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate
end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only
by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal pre-ordination.
It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the
reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the
elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Rom.
8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so
many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were
angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It
is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is known the number for
whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the
missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as
applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to
present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished,
but not the number of the predestined.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason of the quantity of any one part must
be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God
the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things,
or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal
parts to the good of the whole universe.
Reply to Objection 3: The good that is proportionate to the common
state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the
minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be
found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear
that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance
of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be
half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of
things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest.
Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds
the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is
deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are
saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the
mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which
very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature
fall short.
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Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?
Objection 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the
prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything
temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making
something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since
the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause
anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered
by the prayers of the saints.
Objection 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account
of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through
defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He
predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the
Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been
His counsellor?" (Rom. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be
furthered by the prayers of the saints.
Objection 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be
hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore
it cannot be furthered by anything.
On the contrary, It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife
because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive"
(Gn. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was
predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had
never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the
prayers of the saints.
I answer that, Concerning this question, there were different errors.
Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that
prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain
salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the
predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal
salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy
Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.
Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through
prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who
thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be
frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the
authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel
will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Kings 15:29);
and that "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance"
(Rom. 11:29).
Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are
to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As
regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered
by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that
anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is
said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good
works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not
do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order
of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects
are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to
bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would
not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such
a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under
the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those
of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would
not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good
works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most
certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by
good works you may make sure your calling and election" (2 Pet. 1:10).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument shows that predestination is not
furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.
Reply to Objection 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways;
in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped
thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we
are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another
way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out
his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by
us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "We are
God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power
of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the
beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may
communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.
Reply to Objection 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the
first universal cause, as has been said above ([193]Q[19], A[6]),
indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be
furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.
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THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)
We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the book of life?
(2) Of what life is it the book?
(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?
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Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?
Objection 1: It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as
pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life"
(Ecclus. 4:32)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss.
This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not
predestination.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the
book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to
each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine
energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine
power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as
predestination.
Objection 3: Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if
the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be
a book of death, as there is a book of life.
On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, "Let them be
blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of
God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew."
I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical
sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual
among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed
in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly
were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding
([194]Q[23], A[4]) that all the predestined are chosen by God to
possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined
is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be
written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory,
according to Prov. 3:3: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My
commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart."
For things are written down in material books to help the memory.
Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has
predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of life. For as
the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the
knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to
eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: "The sure foundation of God
standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His."
Reply to Objection 1: The book of life may be understood in two senses.
In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus
we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of
those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and
this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old
and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done,
and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his
deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life.
Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the
names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the
art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.
Hence the solution of the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are
rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death
corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.
Reply to Objection 4: Predestination and the book of life are different
aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of
predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.
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Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?
Objection 1: It seems that the book of life does not only regard the
life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge
of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore
the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in
regard to the life of the predestined.
Objection 2: Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does
the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is
called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of
nature be so called.
Objection 3: Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not
chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have
not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (Jn. 6:71). But
the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated
above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.
On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge of predestination,
as stated above [195](A[1]). But predestination does not regard the
life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are
not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book
of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.
I answer that, The book of life, as stated above [196](A[1]), implies a
conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is
chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again
that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier
is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since
this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the
life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above
([197]Q[23], A[1]). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life
regards the life of glory.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine life, even considered as a life of
glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election,
and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is
chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are
consequent on nature.
From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no
election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end,
but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be
chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is
directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to
obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively.
Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply,
but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life,
according to their participation in grace.
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Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?
Objection 1: It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of
life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge,
which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be
taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination.
Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the
disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal
and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in
a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.
Objection 3: Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But
nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither
therefore can he be blotted out.
On the contrary, It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of
the living" (Ps. 68:29).
I answer that, Some have said that none could be blotted out of the
book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For
it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it
becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life,
inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the
present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident,
either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from that
state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus
a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out of the book of
the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is
placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, "He that
shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not
blot his name out of the book of life" (Apoc. 3:5) (and what is
promised to holy men, is not merely something in the opinion of men),
it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out,
of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man,
but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription
of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two
sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and
from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for
eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some are directed
by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it
through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal
life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life
simply, because they are written therein to have eternal life in
reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those,
however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through divine
predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book
of life not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to
have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these
latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting
out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and
afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God
knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not
ordained when he falls from grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of blotting out does not refer to the
book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were
any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.
Reply to Objection 2: Although things are immutably in God, yet in
themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting
out of the book of life refers.
Reply to Objection 3: The way in which one is said to be blotted out of
the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein
anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have
relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in
the knowledge of God, although not anew.
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THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)
After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things
pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God.
About this are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is power in God?
(2) Whether His power is infinite?
(3) Whether He is almighty?
(4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?
(5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?
(6) Whether what He makes He could make better?
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Whether there is power in God?
Objection 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter
is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary
matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the
first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19),
better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and
action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better
than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown
above ([198]Q[3] , A[3]). Therefore, there is no power in God.
Objection 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the
divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in
God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there
is no power in God.
Objection 4: Further, it was shown above ([199]Q[14], A[8]; [200]Q[19],
A[4]) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the
cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore,
to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.
On the contrary, It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is
round about Thee" (Ps. 88:9).
I answer that, Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at
all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act
and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas
everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now
it was shown above ([201]Q[3], A[2]; [202]Q[4], AA[1], 2), that God is
pure act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any
imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be
an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the
other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active
power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else;
whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something
else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore,
that in God there is active power in the highest degree.
Reply to Objection 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is
founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but
passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as
it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only
active power.
Reply to Objection 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be
nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for
both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His
essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God
nobler than His power.
Reply to Objection 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of
action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is
retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however,
as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself;
except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the
divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists
in created things, can be understood either under the notion of action,
or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of
"suppositum" possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly
the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle
of an effect.
Reply to Objection 4: Power is predicated of God not as something
really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them
logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting
into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs,
which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the
knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle,
has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of the
knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as
the cause precedes the operation and effect.
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Whether the power of God is infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For
everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher
(Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore
it is not infinite.
Objection 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect;
otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were
infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if
the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause
instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous
movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal
creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23).
Therefore, His power is not infinite.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is
immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is
immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.
I answer that, As stated above [203](A[1]), active power exists in God
according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is
infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it,
as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of
the divine essence ([204]Q[7], A[1]). Wherefore, it is necessary that
the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it
found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts
the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the
greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power
to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine
essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above
([205]Q[7], A[1]) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity
in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs
to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above
([206]Q[7], A[1]); and consequently so also His power. It does not
follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly
manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is
not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal
agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect:
as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself
in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is
clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him
either in species or in genus, as was shown above ([207]Q[3], A[5];
[208]Q[4], A[3]). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than
His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of
God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even
if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be
ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards
an end to which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered
toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the
effect produced by it.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a
body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he
shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can
move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his
reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would
move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The
reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal agent;
wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in
its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more
quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power
were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to
move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal
agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be
manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and especially since
it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.
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Whether God is omnipotent?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and
passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for
He is immovable, as was said above ([209]Q[2], A[3]). Therefore He is
not omnipotent.
Objection 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin,
nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not
omnipotent.
Objection 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His
omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th
Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the
divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater,
however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another
world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
Objection 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom
of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom
of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those
things to be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it
would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them;
but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent,
all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we
take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what
necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be
nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But
this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
On the contrary, It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God"
(Lk. 1:37).
I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this
phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God
can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to
be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a
thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some
power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible
to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the
very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent
through being able to do all things that are possible to created
nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we
were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that
are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in
explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing
else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able
to do.
It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do
all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very
terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not
incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely
impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.
It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being
warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power
in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence,
whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the
absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called
omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except
non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the
same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,
within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under
the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God,
but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.
Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is
numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come
within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the
aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things
cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to
the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God."
For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no
intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His
active power, not to passive power, as was shown above [210](A[1]).
Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to
His omnipotence.
Reply to Objection 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action;
hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is
repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because
of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3)
that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood
either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible---as, for
instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For
there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true,
though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one
were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be
understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be
evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is,
perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought
that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.
Reply to Objection 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in
sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God
has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one
who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them
on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate
effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above ([211]Q[21],
A[4]), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the
divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of
something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine
omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the
first foundation of all good things.
Reply to Objection 4: The absolute possible is not so called in
reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in
reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is
named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things
which it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to
create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible in reference
to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to
be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to
those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the
proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was
shown above ([212]Q[14], A[1], ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the
world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it
judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of
God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity.
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Whether God can make the past not to have been?
Objection 1: It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For
what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is
only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in
itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore,
and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for
the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates
not to be running is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his
running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to
have been.
Objection 2: Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power
is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that
he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he
did not run.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than
virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost
virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not
have been corrupt.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do
all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been
corrupted." Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that
anything else which is past should not have been.
I answer that, As was said above ([213]Q[7], A[2]), there does not fall
under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a
contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a
contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates
is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did
not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the
past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen.
Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the
scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says
(Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him
make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to
say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very
fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to make undone
the things that have been done."
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the
past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for
instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is
considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not
only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus,
it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is
nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference
to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible
things do come beneath the scope of divine power.
Reply to Objection 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the
divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to
His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we
regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He
can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of
possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of
the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not
to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.
Reply to Objection 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and
body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been
corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the
fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed
from the sinner.
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Whether God can do what He does not?
Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For
God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would
do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything
except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.
Objection 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is
right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is
it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do
except what He does.
Objection 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and
befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them
to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what
He does.
On the contrary, It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My
Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of
angels?" (Mat. 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His
Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does
not.
I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some
laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as
from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually
takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come,
and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there
could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that
which now is. But we showed above ([214]Q[19], A[3]) that God does not
act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all
things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to
those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events
produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not
happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to
this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom
and justice without which God does nothing. But since the power of God,
which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be
fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not
in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the
whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by
divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as
said above ([215]Q[21], A[2]), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom
that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of
things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man
puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end
is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the
maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is
an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the
divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no
other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that
God can do other things than those He has done.
Reply to Objection 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are
distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and
will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in
the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence,
will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence,
there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His
just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will
cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things,
except upon supposition, as was said above ([216]Q[19], A[3]), neither
are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as
was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the
divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the
order which He has place in things. Again, because power is considered
as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as
directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is
said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a
kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above
[217](A[3]). What is, however, attributed to the divine power,
according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God
is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must
say that God can do other things by His absolute power than those He
has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen
that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not
pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to
His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His
nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet
the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.
Reply to Objection 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when
it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by
this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and
just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in two
ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would
be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His
power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the sense is
that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If,
however, they be joined directly with the verb "can" (which has the
effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the
present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The
sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything
except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just."
Reply to Objection 3: Although this order of things be restricted to
what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted.
Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the
things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them
another order.
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Whether God can do better than what He does?
Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For
whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing
is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done.
Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8):
"If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been
envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better things
than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been
envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes
everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than
He does.
Objection 3: Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be
bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine
says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and,
taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the
wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe
could not be made better by God.
Objection 4: Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has
the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created
happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better.
And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels,
and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all
things better than He has made them.
On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 3:20): "God is able to do all things
more abundantly than we desire or understand."
I answer that, The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of
the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the
essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better
than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it;
even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if
it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the
addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the manner
of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of
goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of
a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God
can make better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however,
God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.
Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that God can make a thing better
than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition
is true. For He can always make something else better than each
individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than
it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however,
"better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus
God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because He cannot
make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner
of the thing done, He can make something better; because He can give to
things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the
accidents, although not as regards the substance.
Reply to Objection 2: It is of the nature of a son that he should be
equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the
nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made
by God. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: The universe, the present creation being
supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order
given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For
if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be
destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be,
the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other
things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would
be another and a better universe.
Reply to Objection 4: The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is
united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is
the fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is
the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the
infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be
anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better
than God.
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OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)
After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence,
we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?
(2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act
of intellect?
(3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?
(4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?
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Whether beatitude belongs to God?
Objection 1: It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For
beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made
perfect by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of
goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude
does not belong to God.
Objection 2: Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply
to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.
On the contrary, The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show,
who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of
Lords." (1 Tim. 6:15).
I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For
nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the
perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing
that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it
is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own
actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God,
namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence beatitude
belongs to God in the highest degree.
Reply to Objection 1: Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner
not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in
creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above ([218]Q[4],
A[2]; [219]Q[13], A[4]), in simplicity and unity.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs as an accident to beatitude or
happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to
beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to
a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God
has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not
acquired by merit.
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Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His
intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in
God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which
is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). Therefore
beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not
to His intellect.
Objection 2: Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end
is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is
said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to
His intellect.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who
whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in
glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy
God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole of the
reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that
beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect.
I answer that, Beatitude, as stated above [220](A[1]), is the perfect
good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires
the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to
be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is
the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps
everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists
in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the
same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them.
Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His
intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by
reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that beatitude belongs to
God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of
His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of
the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power.
Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the
act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the
intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the
intellect.
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Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?
Objection 1: It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed.
For God is the supreme good, as was said above ([221]Q[6], AA[2],4).
But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as
also is clear from what has been said above ([222]Q[11], A[3]).
Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be
the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God
Himself.
Objection 2: Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature.
But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God.
Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.
On the contrary, The beatitude of one is greater than that of another,
according to 1 Cor. 15:41: "Star differeth from star in glory." But
nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different
from God.
I answer that, The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an
act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the
object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself
which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side
of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from
this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying
of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth Thee, though
he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding,
beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even
in this way, it is an uncreated thing.
Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme
good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is
their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a
creature can participate.
Reply to Objection 2: End is twofold, namely, "objective" and
"subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely,
the "thing itself" and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and
its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational
creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the
use, or rather fruition, of the thing.
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Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?
Objection 1: It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all
other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing
false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace
all other beatitudes.
Objection 2: Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists
in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of
these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His
beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
On the contrary, Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine
perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above
([223]Q[4], A[2] ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other
beatitudes.
I answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether
true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the
divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a
continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things
else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the
whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight,
riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.
iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His
delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which
is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for
dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He
possesses the admiration of all creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: A particular kind of beatitude is false according
as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in
God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the
whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.
Reply to Objection 2: The good that exists in things corporeal in a
corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.
We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the
divine essence.
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TREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY TRINITY (QQ[27]-43)
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THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FIVE ARTICLES)
Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it
remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God.
And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other
according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads
us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; secondly,
the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.
Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is procession in God?
(2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation?
(3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides
generation.
(4) Whether that other procession can be called generation?
(5) Whether there are more than two processions in God?
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Whether there is procession in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God.
For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing
mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession
in God.
Objection 2: Further, everything which proceeds differs from that
whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme
simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.
Objection 3: Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the
nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as shown
above ([224]Q[2], A[3]). Therefore in God there is no procession.
On the contrary, Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" (Jn. 8:42).
I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which
signify procession. This procession has been differently understood.
Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its
cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father
as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the
Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is contrary to what
is said of the Son, "That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is true
God" (1 Jn. 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you not
that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?" (1 Cor. 6:19).
Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this procession
to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing
its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood by Sabellius,
who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the
Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying
the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words of the Lord
contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, "The Son cannot
of Himself do anything" (Jn. 5:19); while many other passages show the
same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful
examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as
meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms procession as
existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes
action, and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act
tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession
corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This applies most
conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the
intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by the very fact of
understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception
of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual
power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception
is signified by the spoken word; and it is called the word of the heart
signified by the word of the voice.
As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God,
not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but
from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual
substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in
the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to
be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local
movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect,
as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot.
Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for
example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet
remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession
as existing in God.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection comes from the idea of procession
in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external
matter, or to an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not
exist in God, as we have explained.
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is
necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas,
whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not
necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more
closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear
that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the
intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent;
since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with
the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very
supreme perfection of God ([225]Q[14], A[2]), the divine Word is of
necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without any
kind of diversity.
Reply to Objection 3: To proceed from a principle, so as to be
something outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable
with the idea of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform
procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a
first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the
house, in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and
it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the
builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first
principle of all things, may be compared to things created as the
architect is to things designed.
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Whether any procession in God can be called generation?
Objection 1: It would seem that no procession in God can be called
generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence,
and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both.
Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist
in God.
Objection 2: Further, procession exists in God, according to an
intelligible mode, as above explained [226](A[1]). But such a process
is not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called
in God.
Objection 3: Further, anything that is generated derives existence from
its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But no
derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the
divine existence is self-subsisting ([227]Q[3], A[4]), it follows that
no generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is
no generation in God.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 2:7): "This day have I begotten Thee."
I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is called generation.
In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning:
one common to everything subject to generation and corruption; in which
sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence.
In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things; in which
sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living
principle; and this is properly called birth. Not everything of that
kind, however, is called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what
proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the aspect of
generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds by way of a
similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice; for a worm which is
generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship,
although it has a generic similitude; for this kind of generation
requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the
same specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a
horse. So in living things, which proceed from potential to actual
life, such as men and animals, generation includes both these kinds of
generation. But if there is a being whose life does not proceed from
potentiality to act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes
entirely the first kind of generation; whereas it may have that kind of
generation which belongs to living things. So in this manner the
procession of the Word in God is generation; for He proceeds by way of
intelligible action, which is a vital operation:---from a conjoined
principle (as above described):---by way of similitude, inasmuch as the
concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:---and
exists in the same nature, because in God the act of understanding and
His existence are the same, as shown above ([228]Q[14], A[4]). Hence
the procession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word
Himself proceeding is called the Son.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection is based on the idea of generation
in the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to
act; in which sense it is not found in God.
Reply to Objection 2: The act of human understanding in ourselves is
not the substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which
proceeds within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature
as the source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be
properly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence is
the very substance itself of the one who understands ([229]Q[14],
A[4]). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same
nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture
employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to
signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and
birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths
were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was
brought forth." (Prov. 8:24). In our way of understanding we use the
word "conception" in order to signify that in the word of our intellect
is found the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no
identity of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything derived from another has existence
in another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance
of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could
receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God
receives its existence from the generator, not as though that existence
were received into matter or into a subject (which would conflict with
the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as
received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine existence from
another; not, however, as if He were other from the divine nature. For
in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the
Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the Word, with
whatever belongs to His perfection ([230]Q[4], A[2]).
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Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?
Objection 1: It would seem that no other procession exists in God
besides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we
admit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and so
on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first,
and hold that there exists only one procession in God.
Objection 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of
self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from
their terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of
the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature
([231]Q[11], A[4] ), it follows that only one procession exists in God.
Objection 3: Further, if any other procession but the intelligible
procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession
of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession
is identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect,
inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect ([232]Q[19],
A[1]). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession
of the Word.
On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (Jn. 15:26);
and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, "I will ask My
Father, and He will give you another Paraclete" (Jn. 14:16). Therefore
in God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word.
I answer that, There are two processions in God; the procession of the
Word, and another.
In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God, only
according to an action which does not tend to anything external, but
remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual nature
is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word
is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will
within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love,
whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the
word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent.
Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him
another procession called the procession of love.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no need to go on to infinitude in the
divine processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the
agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the
will.
Reply to Objection 2: All that exists in God, is God ([233]Q[3],
AA[3],4); whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the
divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward,
and this does not apply to other natures.
Reply to Objection 3: Though will and intellect are not diverse in God,
nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions
belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the
procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the
Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in
the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the
principle whence He proceeds, although in God the substance of the
intellect and its concept are the same; so, although in God the will
and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its
very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect,
there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the
procession of the Word in God.
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Whether the procession of love in God is generation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is
generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living
things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by
way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be
extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external procession.
Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds as generated
and born.
Objection 2: Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so
does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that "every beast loves its
like" (Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by
way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of
generation.
Objection 3: Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus.
So if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some
special name besides this common name of procession. But no other name
is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of love in God
is generation.
On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost
Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the
statement of Athanasius: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the
Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding."
I answer that, The procession of love in God ought not to be called
generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and
the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by
the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the
intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of
the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to
the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of
similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets
its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of
similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an
object.
So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten,
or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a
certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described
as moved or impelled by love to perform an action.
Reply to Objection 1: All that exists in God is one with the divine
nature. Hence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which
one procession is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of
this unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must be
taken from the order of one procession to another; which order is
derived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each
procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and
intellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is;
and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives the divine
nature, but is not said to be born.
Reply to Objection 2: Likeness belongs in a different way to the word
and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object
understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator;
but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, but
because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not follow
that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the principle of
love.
Reply to Objection 3: We can name God only from creatures ([234]Q[13],
A[1]). As in creatures generation is the only principle of
communication of nature, procession in God has no proper or special
name, except that of generation. Hence the procession which is not
generation has remained without a special name; but it can be called
spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit.
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Whether there are more than two processions in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than two processions in
God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power.
Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it
seems that there must also be a third procession of power.
Objection 2: Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of
procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there must
be a procession of goodness in God.
Objection 3: Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than
in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but
there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also from
one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two
processions.
On the contrary, In God there are not more than two who proceed---the
Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him but two processions.
I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the
actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is
intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts
of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears
to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the
intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the
sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by
the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other
procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of
Love.
Reply to Objection 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on
another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the
divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is
indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs
to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the
object of the will.
Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain
actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to
goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love,
according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and
goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: As above explained ([235]Q[14], A[5]; [236]Q[19],
A[5]), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act
also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession
of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one
perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His
perfect fecundity.
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THE DIVINE RELATIONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether there are real relations in God?
(2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are
extrinsic to it?
(3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each
other?
(4) The number of these relations.
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Whether there are real relations in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For
Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as regards
the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated
relatively." But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of
Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in
the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is
the relation of the same to the same." But a relation of this kind is
only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in
reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real
relations, but are formed only by the mind.
Objection 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a
principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not
import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity
in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same
reason to the other relations in God.
Objection 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an
intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of
the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation
in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations.
On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the
Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation
existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son,
but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian
heresy.
I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may
consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in
the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other
genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their
strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But
relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to
another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of
things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered
to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are
necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination
and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body a
certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other
things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by
relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing
one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for
instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the
genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature,
then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the
same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore
as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as
above explained ([237]Q[27], AA[2],4), these relations, according to
the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.
Reply to Objection 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according
to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its
proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is
inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius
did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it
was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in
Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of
relation to another.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation signified by the term "the same" is
a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing;
because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by
reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some
two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are
called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus
Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in
every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not
diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of
identity.
Reply to Objection 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of
nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any
relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce
the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will,
as is above explained ([238]Q[14], AA[3],4; [239]Q[19], A[8]).
Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in
creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are
contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails
dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one
and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.
Reply to Objection 4: Relations which result from the mental operation
alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as
reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the
mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the
intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding
and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but
are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real
things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them
intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds
from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in
God.
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Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as
the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that
is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things
relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not
refer to the substance." Therefore the relation is not the divine
essence.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every
relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as
master is a man, and slave is a man." Therefore, if relations exist in
God, there must be something else besides relation in God. This can
only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.
Objection 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to
another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the
divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially
itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the
perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and
self-subsisting ([240]Q[3], A[4]). Therefore relation is not the divine
essence.
On the contrary, Everything which is not the divine essence is a
creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the
divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of
latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the
distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty."
I answer that, It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this
point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he
said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed.
To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of
the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is
the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident;
which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for
the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is
the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart
from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true idea
of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for
quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the
disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken
from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to
something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations
formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and
not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect
which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something
else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in
a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree
considered relation in the former mode only.
Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered
as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no
accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as
relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really
existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way
distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to
something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to
its opposite term.
Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the
same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as
in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed
in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and
essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that
paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very
being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated
under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied;
but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in
God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are
spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing
that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or
of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by
reason of God's supreme simplicity.
Reply to Objection 2: As the relation which exists in creatures
involves not only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so
the same applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in
the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of
relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God there
is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is not
perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were comprehended
in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained
([241]Q[13], A[2]), in treating of the divine names, that more is
contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified
by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything
besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by
us.
Reply to Objection 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is
signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect,
being thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing
more were contained in it than what is signified by the word "wisdom,"
it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of
the divine essence is greater than can be included in any name, it does
not follow, if a relative term or any other name applied to God signify
something imperfect, that the divine essence is in any way imperfect;
for the divine essence comprehends within itself the perfection of
every genus ([242]Q[4], A[2]).
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Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?
Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really
distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the
same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is
really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not
really distinguished from each other.
Objection 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name
distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and
power. But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction
of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any
real distinction of paternity and filiation.
Objection 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of
origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore
the relations are not really distinguished from each other.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance
contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore, if
the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there
would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is
the error of Sabellius.
I answer that, The attributing of anything to another involves the
attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is
attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him.
The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to
another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in
God there is a real relation [243](A[1]), there must also be a real
opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes
distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed,
according to that which is absolute---namely, essence, wherein there is
supreme unity and simplicity---but according to that which is relative.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this
argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing
are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical;
as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ
logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the
same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that
action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of
something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas
passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another.
Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as
the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and
definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from
each other.
Reply to Objection 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition
in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.
Reply to Objection 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not
arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as
opposed according to the procession of one from another.
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Whether in God there are only four real relations---paternity, filiation,
spiration, and procession?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are not only four real
relations---paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it must
be observed that in God there exist the relations of the intelligent
agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to the object
willed; which are real relations not comprised under those above
specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in God.
Objection 2: Further, real relations in God are understood as coming
from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible
relations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God
there exists an infinite series of real relations.
Objection 3: Further, ideas in God are eternal ([244]Q[15], A[1]); and
are only distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to
things, as above stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal
relations.
Objection 4: Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are
relations: and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more
relations are eternal in God than the above named.
Objection 5: Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are
fewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. iii text 24), "It is the same way from Athens to
Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens." By the same way of reasoning there
is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity, and
from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and thus there are not
four relations in God.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation
is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and
passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son, the master
and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity in God, for
He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it
follows that a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such
relations are not based on the actions of God according to any
extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to creatures
are not real in Him ([245]Q[13], A[7]). Hence, it follows that real
relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions
according to which there are internal, and not external, processions in
God. These processions are two only, as above explained ([246]Q[27],
A[5]), one derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of
the Word; and the other from the action of the will, the procession of
love. In respect of each of these processions two opposite relations
arise; one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the
principle; the other is the relation of the principle Himself. The
procession of the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the
term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the relation of the
principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity;
and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called
filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own
([247]Q[27], A[4]); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper
name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession is
called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called
procession: although these two names belong to the processions or
origins themselves, and not to the relations.
Reply to Objection 1: In those things in which there is a difference
between the intellect and its object, and the will and its object,
there can be a real relation, both of science to its object, and of the
willer to the object willed. In God, however, the intellect and its
object are one and the same; because by understanding Himself, God
understands all other things; and the same applies to His will and the
object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds of
relations are not real; as neither is the relation of a thing to
itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real relation;
because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action;
and not as a thing understood. For when we understand a stone; that
which the intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the
word.
Reply to Objection 2: Intelligible relations in ourselves are
infinitely multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act,
and by another act understands that he understands the stone, and again
by another, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of
understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the
relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He
understands all things by one act alone.
Reply to Objection 3: Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence
it does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations
in God; but that God knows these many relations.
Reply to Objection 4: Equality and similitude in God are not real
relations; but are only logical relations ([248]Q[42], A[3], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 5: The way from one term to another and conversely
is the same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence,
we cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the
same as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of
something absolute, if there were such between them.
__________________________________________________________________
THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the
processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the
persons.
First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively
as regards each other. We must consider the persons absolutely first in
common; and then singly.
The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four
points: (1) The signification of this word "person"; (2) the number of
the persons; (3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is
opposed thereto; as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and (4)
what belongs to our knowledge of the persons.
Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:(1) The
definition of "person."
(2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.
(3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?
(4) What does it signify in Him?
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The definition of "person"
Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by
Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient---that is, "a person is an
individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can be
subject to definition. But "person" signifies something singular.
Therefore person is improperly defined.
Objection 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition of
person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is the
former, the word "individual" is superfluous, because first substance
is individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word
"individual" is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since
second substances are the "genera" or "species." Therefore this
definition is incorrect.
Objection 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in the
definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal"
would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing,
and "species" is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is the
name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature),
the word "individual" which is an intentional name comes improperly
into the definition.
Objection 4: Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in
those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," as
Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as in
God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" ought not to enter
into the definition of person, but the word should rather be "essence."
Objection 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of
the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not
properly defined as above.
I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every
genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs
to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself;
whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the
substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because it
exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the
individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their
own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances.
Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and
the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion
over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like
others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to
singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a
special name even among other substances; and this name is "person."
Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of
person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the
term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in rational
substances.
Reply to Objection 1: Although this or that singular may not be
definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be
defined; and so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives
a definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines
person.
Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of some, the term "substance" in
the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the
hypostasis; nor is the term "individual" superfluously added, forasmuch
as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of
universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in
general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a part.
But where "individual" is added, the idea of assumptibility is excluded
from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it
is assumed by a greater---that is, by the Word of God. It is, however,
better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as
divided into first and second, and when "individual" is added, it is
restricted to first substance.
Reply to Objection 3: Substantial differences being unknown to us, or
at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental
differences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say
that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are the
effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms
expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if used to
signify things which are unnamed. And so the term "individual" is
placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence
which belongs to particular substances.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the
word "nature" was first used to signify the generation of living
things, which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation
comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the
intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines
"nature" (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of principle is either
formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature.
And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence
of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called nature.
And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab.
Nat.) that, "nature is the specific difference giving its form to each
thing," for the specific difference completes the definition, and is
derived from the special form of a thing. So in the definition of
"person," which means the singular in a determined "genus," it is more
correct to use the term "nature" than "essence," because the latter is
taken from being, which is most common.
Reply to Objection 5: The soul is a part of the human species; and so,
although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains
its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance,
which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand nor
any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of
person belongs to it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether "person" is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that "person" is the same as "hypostasis,"
"subsistence," and "essence." For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that
"the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by
the name hypostasis." But this with us signifies "person." Therefore
"person" is altogether the same as "hypostasis."
Objection 2: Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we
say there are three subsistences in God; which implies that "person"
and "subsistence" have the same meaning. Therefore "person" and
"subsistence" mean the same.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that the Greek
{ousia}, which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and
form. Now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual
substance called "hypostasis" and "person." Therefore all the aforesaid
names seem to have the same meaning.
Objection 4: On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that genera
and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent,
but also substand. But subsistences are so called from subsisting, as
substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding. Therefore, since
genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these are not the
same as subsistences.
Objection 5: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that matter is called
hypostasis, and form is called {ousiosis}---that is, subsistence. But
neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person differs
from the others.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is
twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by
its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance
of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks {ousia},
what we may call "essence." In another sense substance means a subject
or "suppositum," which subsists in the genus of substance. To this,
taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an
intention; and thus it is called "suppositum." It is also called by
three names signifying a reality---that is, "a thing of nature,"
"subsistence," and "hypostasis," according to a threefold consideration
of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in
another, it is called "subsistence"; as we say that those things
subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies
some common nature, it is called "a thing of nature"; as, for instance,
this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the
accidents, it is called "hypostasis," or "substance." What these three
names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name
"person" signifies in the genus of rational substances.
Reply to Objection 1: Among the Greeks the term "hypostasis," taken in
the strict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the
genus substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the
individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of that
nature.
Reply to Objection 2: As we say "three persons" plurally in God, and
"three subsistences," so the Greeks say "three hypostases." But because
the word "substance," which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning
to "hypostasis," is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it
sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to
avoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use
"subsistence" for hypostasis, rather than "substance."
Reply to Objection 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is
expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the
principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in
things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the
form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the
common form, as the principles of the species. But what is composed of
this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For
soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul,
this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore
hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of
essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed
of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity
([249]Q[3], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist,
inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the
fact that they belong to genera and species comprised in the
predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera
themselves subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that
the species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To
substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to
the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species.
Reply to Objection 5: The individual composed of matter and form
substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence
Boethius says (De Trin.): "A simple form cannot be a subject." Its
self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does not
supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the
matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account,
therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and {ousiosis}, or
subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of
substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the word "person" should be said of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the name "person" should not be said of
God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should ever dare to say or
think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what
has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles." But the name
"person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore
"person" is not to be applied to God.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "The word person
seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies
and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando],
since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the
mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called {prosopa}, as they
were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes."
This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore
the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically.
Objection 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word
"hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab.
Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not
exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, "in this word
hypostasis, poison lurks in honey." Therefore the word "person" should
not be said of God.
Objection 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing
defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as given
above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive
knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above ([250]Q[14],
A[12] ); and thus God cannot be said to have "a rational nature." And
also because God cannot be called an individual substance, since the
principle of individuation is matter; while God is immaterial: nor is
He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore
the word "person" ought not to be attributed to God.
On the contrary, In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person
of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost."
I answer that, "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all
nature---that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence,
since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch
as His essence contains every perfection, this name "person" is
fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures,
but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving
them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when
treating of the names of God ([251]Q[13], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 1: Although the word "person" is not found applied
to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless
what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places
of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the
most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in the
very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could
speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or New
Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find
new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a kind of
novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not
lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to
avoid "profane novelties of words" (1 Tim. 6:20).
Reply to Objection 2: Although this name "person" may not belong to God
as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs
to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in
comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given to signify those
who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church
came to be called "persons." Thence by some the definition of person is
given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity." And because
subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every
individual of the rational nature is called a "person." Now the dignity
of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name
"person" pre-eminently belongs to God.
Reply to Objection 3: The word "hypostasis" does not apply to God as
regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but
it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify
the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this word,"
forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics
used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess many
essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word
"substance," which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly
taken amongst us to mean essence.
Reply to Objection 4: It may be said that God has a rational "nature,"
if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general
sense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an "individual"
in the sense that His individuality comes from matter; but only in the
sense which implies incommunicability. "Substance" can be applied to
God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. There are some,
however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted above
[252](A[1]), is not a definition of person in the sense we use when
speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this
definition by adding that "Person" in God is "the incommunicable
existence of the divine nature."
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Whether this word "person" signifies relation?
Objection 1: It would seem that this word "person," as applied to God,
does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin.
vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing
else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to
Himself, and not in regard to the Son."
Objection 2: Further, the interrogation "What?" refers to essence. But,
as Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness in
heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked,
Three what? the answer is, Three persons." Therefore person signifies
essence.
Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of
a word is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this: "The
individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated.
Therefore "person" signifies substance.
Objection 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify
relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified
relation, it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in
angels.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that "every word that refers
to the persons signifies relation." But no word belongs to person more
strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore this word
"person" signifies relation.
I answer that, A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word
"person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of the
Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence;
nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words which express
relation.
Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses
absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and this word "Wise";
but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree
that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and especially in the
plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when we
say, "Three persons," or, "one is the person of the Father, another of
the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either
absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory
explanation; for, if this word "person," by force of its own
signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that
forasmuch as we speak of "three persons," so far from the heretics
being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this,
others maintained that this word "person" in God signifies both the
essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies directly
the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as "person" means as it
were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence.
And what is "by itself" implies relation indirectly; for the Father is
understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct from the Son.
Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation
directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in the definition of
"person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer
to the truth.
To determine the question, we must consider that something may be
included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in
the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of
"man," and not in the meaning of "animal." So that it is one thing to
ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when
the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning
of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the meaning of
"person" as applied to God. For "person" in general signifies the
individual substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself is
undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore "person" in any
nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature
it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the
individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to
"person" in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a
particular human person.
Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above
([253]Q[28], AA[2],3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a
subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for
the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the
divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a
divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to
signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a
hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that
which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus
it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly,
and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as
expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the
essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the
same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as
distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the
notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this
signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it
was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word "person" was used just as
any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express
relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word
"person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the
first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.
Reply to Objection 1: This word "person" is said in respect to itself,
not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by
way of a substance---which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine
says that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the
same as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is
are the same.
Reply to Objection 2: The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature
expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we
answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the
"suppositum," as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A
fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.
Reply to Objection 3: In God the individual---i.e. distinct and
incommunicable substance---includes the idea of relation, as above
explained.
Reply to Objection 4: The different sense of the less common term does
not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an
ass have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree
univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies
to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in
the signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of
a human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though
neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally
of God and creatures ([254]Q[13], A[5]).
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THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are several persons in God?
(2) How many are they?
(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?
(4) The community of the term "person."
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Whether there are several persons in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God.
For person is "the individual substance of a rational nature." If then
there are several persons in God, there must be several substances;
which appears to be heretical.
Objection 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a
distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less
therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God
there is no plurality but of relations ([255]Q[28], A[3]). Therefore
there cannot be several persons in God.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is
truly one which has no number." But plurality implies number. Therefore
there are not several persons in God.
Objection 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus,
if in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and part
in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father,
another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost." Therefore the Father,
and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.
I answer that, It follows from what precedes that there are several
persons in God. For it was shown above ([256]Q[29], A[4]) that this
word "person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine
nature. It was also established ([257]Q[28], A[1]) that there are
several real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are also
several realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means that
there are several persons in God.
Reply to Objection 1: The definition of "person" includes "substance,"
not as meaning the essence, but the "suppositum" which is made clear by
the addition of the term "individual." To signify the substance thus
understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis." So, as we say, "Three
persons," they say "Three hypostases." We are not, however, accustomed
to say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean three essences
or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification of the term.
Reply to Objection 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness
and wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they
really distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist,
nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities---that is,
several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not
subsist, although they are really distinguished from each other, as
whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties in
God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other ([258]Q[28],
A[3]). Hence the plurality of persons in God.
Reply to Objection 3: The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude
every kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of
relations. Because relations are predicated relatively, and thus the
relations do not import composition in that of which they are
predicated, as Boethius teaches in the same book.
Reply to Objection 4: Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and
three and four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men
and two horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or
abstractedly, there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in
Him, and thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding;
forasmuch as number regarded apart from things numbered exists only in
the intellect. But if number be taken as it is in the things numbered,
in that sense as existing in creatures, one is part of two, and two of
three, as one man is part of two men, and two of three; but this does
not apply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude as the
whole Trinity, as we shall show further on ([259]Q[42], AA[1], 4).
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Whether there are more than three persons in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in
God. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of
the relative properties as stated above [260](A[1]). But there are four
relations in God as stated above ([261]Q[28], A[4]), paternity,
filiation, common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four
persons in God.
Objection 2: The nature of God does not differ from His will more than
from His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will, as
love; and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another
proceeds from His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds from
His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not only three
persons in God.
Objection 3: Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior
operations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond other
animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not
only is there a person proceeding from the will, and another from the
intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore there are
an infinite number of persons in God.
Objection 4: Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father
that He communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine
person. But also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the
Holy Ghost produces a divine person; and that person another; and so to
infinity.
Objection 5: Further, everything within a determinate number is
measured, for number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense,
as we say in the Creed of Athanasius: "The Father is immense, the Son
is immense, the Holy Ghost is immense." Therefore the persons are not
contained within the number three.
On the contrary, It is said: "There are three who bear witness in
heaven, the father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost" (1 Jn. 5:7). To those
who ask, "Three what?" we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii, 4),
"Three persons." Therefore there are but three persons in God.
I answer that, As was explained above, there can be only three persons
in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are the several
subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But a real
distinction between the divine relations can come only from relative
opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two
persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must needs belong
to the same person. Since then paternity and filiation are opposite
relations, they belong necessarily to two persons. Therefore the
subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; and the subsisting
filiation is the person of the Son. The other two relations are not
opposed to each other; therefore these two cannot belong to one person:
hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid persons;
or one must belong to one person, and the other to the other. Now,
procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of
them; for thus it would follows that the procession of the intellect,
which in God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation are
derived, would issue from the procession of love, whence spiration and
procession are derived, if the person generating and the person
generated proceeded from the person spirating; and this is against what
was laid down above ([262]Q[27] , AA[3],4). We must frequently admit
that spiration belongs to the person of the Father, and to the person
of the Son, forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either to
paternity or to filiation; and consequently that procession belongs to
the other person who is called the person of the Holy Ghost, who
proceeds by way of love, as above explained. Therefore only three
persons exist in God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Although there are four relations in God, one of
them, spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of
the Son, but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is
not called a property, because it does not belong to only one person;
nor is it a personal relation---i.e. constituting a person. The three
relations---paternity, filiation, and procession---are called personal
properties, constituting as it were the persons; for paternity is the
person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession is
the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.
Reply to Objection 2: That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as
word, proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by
way of nature; thus, as above explained ([263]Q[27], A[3]), the
procession of the divine Word is the very same as generation by way of
nature. But love, as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that
whence it proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being
divine; and therefore the procession of love is not called generation
in God.
Reply to Objection 3: As man is more perfect than other animals, he has
more intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is
something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more
simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no
imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one real
operation---that is, His essence. How there are in Him two processions
was above explained ([264]Q[27], AA[1],4).
Reply to Objection 4: This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost
possessed another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for
then if the Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy
Ghost also would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and
the same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by
the personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as
derived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle of
its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not allow
the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation of
principle of another divine person; because He Himself proceeds from
the other persons who are in God.
Reply to Objection 5: A determinate number, if taken as a simple
number, existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we
speak of a number of things as applied to the persons in God, the
notion of measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three
persons is the same ([265]Q[42], AA[1],4), and the same is not measured
by the same.
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Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something real
in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every number is
unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God signifies the
essence; and therefore it denotes something real in God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs
to God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral
terms denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in
God.
Objection 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real
in God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as
plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality;
it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and
obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be
said that the numeral terms denote something real in God.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit
companionship"---that is, plurality---"we exclude the idea of oneness
and of solitude;" and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When we say one God,
unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God."
Hence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove
something; and not to denote anything positive.
I answer that, The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral
terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative
meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.
In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a
consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and
is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a
species of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material
things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called
formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of
division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but
is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by
many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things.
Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete
quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God,
asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, but
remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of
multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the strict
sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God there
is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the proper
sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity.
But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from
number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only a
metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as
length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude
in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to
the many of which it is predicated, as "one" convertible with "being"
is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to
being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the
divine unity ([266]Q[11], A[1]); for "one" signifies undivided being.
So, of whatever we say "one," we imply its undivided reality: thus, for
instance, "one" applied to man signifies the undivided nature or
substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things,
multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each
undivided in itself.
But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident
added to being; as also does "one" which is the principle of that
number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which
they are said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated (Sent.
i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D, 24). So
when we say, the essence is one, the term "one" signifies the essence
undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the person
undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify those
persons, and their individual undividedness; for it is of the very
nature of multitude that it should be composed of units.
Reply to Objection 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more
general than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude;
hence in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to the
context. Still, the very signification of such names adds a negation of
division, beyond substance and relation; as was explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in
creatures, is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking
of God: unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to
those of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable
to God.
Reply to Objection 3: "One" does not exclude multitude, but division,
which logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove
unity, but division from each of the individuals which compose the
multitude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity
([267]Q[11], A[2]).
It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not
sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude is
excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does not
follow that these terms express this signification alone. For blackness
is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness does not
signify the mere exclusion of blackness.
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Whether this term "person" can be common to the three persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that this term "person" cannot be common to
the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the
essence. But this term "person" does not signify the essence directly.
Therefore it is not common to all three.
Objection 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable.
But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as appears
from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor ([268]Q[29], A[3],
ad 4). Therefore this term "person" is not common to all the three
persons.
Objection 3: Further, if the name "person" is common to the three, it
is common either really, or logically. But it is not so really;
otherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so
logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is
neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we
proved above ([269]Q[3], A[5]). Therefore this term 'person' is not
common to the three.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask,
"Three what?" we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is
common to them.
I answer that, The very mode of expression itself shows that this term
"person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for when
we say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three. Now it is
clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one essence
were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one person of
the three, as also one essence.
What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by
those who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community of
exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of "person" contains the word
"incommunicable." Others thought it to be a community of intention, as
the definition of person contains the word "individual"; as we say that
to be a "species" is common to horse and ox. Both of these
explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that "person" is not a
name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must
therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name "person" is
common by a community of idea, not as genus or species, but as a vague
individual thing. The names of genera and species, as man or animal,
are given to signify the common natures themselves, but not the
intentions of those common natures, signified by the terms "genus" or
"species." The vague individual thing, as "some man," signifies the
common nature with the determinate mode of existence of singular
things---that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from others.
But the name of a designated singular thing signifies that which
distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates signifies
this flesh and this bone. But there is this difference---that the term
"some man" signifies the nature, or the individual on the part of its
nature, with the mode of existence of singular things; while this name
"person" is not given to signify the individual on the part of the
nature, but the subsistent reality in that nature. Now this is common
in idea to the divine persons, that each of them subsists distinctly
from the others in the divine nature. Thus this name "person" is common
in idea to the three divine persons.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is founded on a real community.
Reply to Objection 2: Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode
itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many.
Reply to Objection 3: Although this community is logical and not real,
yet it does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or
genus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the
community of person the same as community of genus or species; and
because the divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species
and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in being.
__________________________________________________________________
OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which
gives rise to four points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning the word "Trinity";
(2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?
(3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can be
joined to an essential name in God?
(4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is trinity in God?
Objection 1: It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name
in God signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" does
not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each one
of the persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not express a
name that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is not to be
applied to God.
Objection 2: Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since
it signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the
unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God
there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word "trinity"
does not apply to God.
Objection 3: Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not
triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore neither
is there trinity in God.
Objection 4: Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the
divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity
exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus
in God there would be three essential unities; which is heresy.
Objection 5: Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is
predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the
Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would
be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore the
word trinity is not to be applied to God.
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in
Unity is to be revered."
I answer that, The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate
number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires that
we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately
signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate
manner.
Reply to Objection 1: In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity"
seems to signify the one essence of the three persons, according as
trinity may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it
rather signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this
account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not
three persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the
Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and
hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things are implied in a collective term,
plurality of the "supposita," and a unity of some kind of order. For
"people" is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In
the first sense, this word "trinity" is like other collective words;
but in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine
Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is
unity of essence.
Reply to Objection 3: "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it
signifies the threefold number of persons. "Triplicity" signifies a
proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion,
according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not
triplicity, but Trinity.
Reply to Objection 4: In the divine Trinity is to be understood both
number and the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we
do not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three
times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature; as
the "supposita" of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the
other hand, we say "Unity in Trinity"; meaning that the nature is in
its "supposita."
Reply to Objection 5: When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the
number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself;
since the word trine imports a distinction in the "supposita" of which
it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine;
otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be
three "supposita" of the Trinity; as when we say, "God is trine," it
follows that there are three "supposita" of the Godhead.
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Whether the Son is other than the Father?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father.
For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If,
then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the
Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that
when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity."
Objection 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in
some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the
Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against
what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the Son are one in
Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor any
diversity."
Objection 3: Further, the term alien is taken from "alius" [other]. But
the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin. vii)
that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien,
nothing separable." Therefore the Son is not other that the Father.
Objection 4: Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius
et aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the
Son is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a
thing apart from the Father.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.] says:
"There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which
the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost
another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the
Holy Ghost another."
I answer that, Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, Ep. lvii.], a
heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we
must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the
quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful." Now, in treating of
the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed
cautiously between them---namely, the error of Arius, who placed a
Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of
Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.
Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms
diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of
essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the
relative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or
"difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of
"diversity" or "difference" are taken to mean "distinction." But lest
the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the
terms "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a
whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the
use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid
the terms "alien" and "discrepant." For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that
"in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead":
and according to Hilary, as quoted above, "in God there is nothing
alien, nothing separable."
To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity,"
lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence
Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father
and the Son are separate in Godhead." We must avoid the adjective
"only" [unici] lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary
says in the same book: "We exclude from God the idea of singularity or
uniqueness." Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there is
no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity
is common to several. We avoid the word "confused," lest we take away
from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide
i): "What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity where
there is no difference." The word "solitary" is also to be avoided,
lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says
(De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God."
This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only
a distinction of "suppositum"; and hence we can properly say that "the
Son is other than the Father," because He is another "suppositum" of
the divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.
Reply to Objection 1: "Other," being like the name of a particular
thing, refers to the "suppositum"; and so, there is sufficient reason
for using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of
hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in
the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from
the Father, although He is another.
Reply to Objection 2: "Difference" implies distinction of form. There
is one form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the
form of God" (Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term "difference" does not
properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet,
Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the
divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by
way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from each
other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But
"difference" is taken for "distinction," as above stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The term "alien" means what is extraneous and
dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and
therefore we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not that
He is anything "alien."
Reply to Objection 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the
masculine is formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common
essence is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by
the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the
common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this man?
we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the "suppositum"; whereas, if
we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal animal. So, because
in God distinction is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say
that the Father is other than the Son, but not something else; while
conversely we say that they are one thing, but not one person.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the exclusive word "alone" should be added to the essential term in
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is
not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the
Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another." But
God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot
say that God is alone.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God
can be predicated of every person "per se," and of all the persons
together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the
Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says
(De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that the Father is not
true God alone." Therefore God cannot be said to be alone.
Objection 3: Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an
essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal
predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as
it is false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a father;
nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this
saying were true, "God alone creates," it would follow that the "Father
alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father;
and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this
expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential term in God.
On the contrary, It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible,
the only God" (1 Tim. 1:17).
I answer that, This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical
term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one
which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given "suppositum"; as, for
instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man." If the term
"alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any
term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is
joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is
above stated [270](A[2]). A syncategorematical term imports the order
of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or "no
one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other
"suppositum" from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone
writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no
companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way
nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term in
God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said
"God alone is eternal," because nothing but God is eternal.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints
are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not
exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not
removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus
anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals
are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary,
though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons
were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does
not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it remove
respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.
Reply to Objection 2: This expression "alone," properly speaking, does
not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the
"suppositum," as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it
qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied
either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"---that
is, no one else---"runs: and Socrates runs only"---that is, he does
nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God
alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be
assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is God Who
alone is God." In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is
that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the
predicate, and not to the "suppositum." So, when Augustine says that
the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he
speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of
ages, invisible, the only God," as applying not to the Father, but to
the Trinity alone.
Reply to Objection 3: In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an
essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean
two things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the
Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can
signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation
of paternity is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense.
Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor, does it follow,
"therefore the Father alone creates," because, as logicians say, an
exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is
said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an
individual contained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, "Man
alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot conclude, "therefore
Socrates alone is such."
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Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term?
Objection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to
the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord
speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true
God" (Jn. 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God.
Objection 2: Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father"
(Mat. 11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to
know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion
follows.
Objection 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters
into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not
exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we
say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his hand is not white,"
or that "man is not white." But one person is in the concept of
another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and conversely.
Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do not exclude the
Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true.
Objection 4: Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O
Jesus Christ."
On the contrary, This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes
two assertions---namely, that the Father is God, and that no other
besides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for
the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is
false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.
I answer that, When we say, "The Father alone is God," such a
proposition can be taken in several senses. If "alone" means solitude
in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in
a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways.
For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is
true, the sense being "the Father alone is God"---that is, "He who with
no other is the Father, is God." In this way Augustine expounds when he
says (De Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because He is
separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not
the Father together with Him." This, however, is not the usual way of
speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though we said
"He who alone is called the Father is God." But in the strict sense the
exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if
it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it
in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father,
but not another thing; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost. But
because this diction "alone," properly speaking, refers to the subject,
it tends to exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence such
a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be
piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic work.
Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not
understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the
whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if
understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not
excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word
"only" excludes another thing, as above explained.
The same Reply can be given to OBJ 2. For an essential term applied to
the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of the
unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the
term "no one" [*Nemo = non-homo, i.e. no man] is not the same as "no
man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of
the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual
way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what
enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do
not differ in "suppositum," as part and universal. But the Son differs
in "suppositum" from the Father; and so there is no parity.
Reply to Objection 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is
Most High; but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the
glory of God the Father."
__________________________________________________________________
THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons;
and this involves four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?
(3) The number of the notions?
(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these
notions?
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Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can
be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of
God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said
many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo
et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"---namely, three---"we bring
ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all
things created." And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have read in
their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various
reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,
and the Word was God," and so on; in which passage the distinction of
persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on Rom. 1 and Ex. 8
that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign---that is, as
regards knowledge of a third person---i.e. of the Holy Ghost ---and
thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise
Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon itself
its own heat." By which words the generation of the Son and procession
of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the
divine persons can be obtained by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I
believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be
found for any explanation of the truth." So even to prove the Trinity
some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God,
who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine
persons; while some are moved by the consideration that "no good thing
can be joyfully possessed without partnership." Augustine proceeds (De
Trin. x, 4; x, 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession
of the word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in
this ([271]Q[27] , AA[1],3). Therefore the trinity of persons can be
known by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot
be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine
tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of
persons can be known by natural reason.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think to reach
the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind." And Ambrose says (De
Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The
mind fails, the voice is silent." But the trinity of the divine persons
is distinguished by origin of generation and procession ([272]Q[30],
A[2]). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding
grasp that for which no necessary reason can be given, it follows that
the trinity of persons cannot be known by reason.
I answer that, It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the
Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained ([273]Q[12],
AA[4],12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason
except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God,
as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can
know of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the
principle of things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in
treating of God as above ([274]Q[12], A[12]). Now, the creative power
of God is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the
unity of the essence, and not to the distinction of the persons.
Therefore, by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of
the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons.
Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason,
derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of
faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible
things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that
"faith is of things that appear not" (Heb. 11:1), and the same Apostle
says also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of
this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak the wisdom
of God in a mystery which is hidden" (1 Cor. 2:6,7). Secondly, as
regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in
the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not
cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they
suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on such
grounds.
Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by
authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards
others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible.
Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly resists
the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the
truth of the word"---i.e. "the sacred word, we too follow this rule."
Reply to Objection 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the
trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as
paternity, filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's words,
"We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the
world"---i.e. the philosophers---"knew" (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless,
they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons,
as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Ghost;
as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, "By this number,"
etc., we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold number in God,
but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number
in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing
in the number three. In the Platonic books also we find, "In the
beginning was the word," not as meaning the Person begotten in God, but
as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all things, and which is
appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these were appropriated
to the three persons, yet they are said to have failed in the third
sign---that is, in the knowledge of the third person, because they
deviated from the goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that
knowing God "they did not glorify Him as God" (Rom. 1); or, because the
Platonists asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also
declared to be the father of the universe, they consequently maintained
the existence of another substance beneath him, which they called
"mind" or the "paternal intellect," containing the idea of all things,
as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They did not, however, assert the
existence of a third separate substance which might correspond to the
Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ
in substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this
followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad,"
etc., this does not refer to the generation of the Son, or to the
procession of the Holy Ghost, but to the production of the world. For
one God produced one world by reason of His love for Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a
point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some
principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought
to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity.
Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof
of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by
showing the congruity of its results, as in astrology the theory of
eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby
the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained;
not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other
theory might explain them. In the first way, we can prove that God is
one; and the like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the
Trinity; as, when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must
not, however, think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by
such reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the
infinite goodness of God is manifested also in creation, because to
produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God
communicates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that
an infinite effect should proceed from God: but that according to its
own mode and capacity it should receive the divine goodness. Likewise,
when it is said that joyous possession of good requires partnership,
this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it
needs to share some other's good, in order to have the goodness of
complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in
the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves
univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by
faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two reason why the knowledge of the
divine persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right
idea of creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His
Word excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by
necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we
show that God produced creatures not because He needed them, nor
because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of
His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," subjoined, "God said, Let there be light,"
to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "God saw the light that it
was good," to show proof of the divine love. The same is also found in
the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly, that we may
think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, accomplished
by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are notions in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are no notions. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything of God
but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture." But Holy Scripture
does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in
God.
Objection 2: Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the
essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern
the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither
can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions: for
instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can what
belongs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do not say
that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore there
do not exist notions in God.
Objection 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract
notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of
composition: for they are known of themselves. But the divine persons
are supremely simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in
God.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): "We recognize
difference of hypostases [i.e. of persons], in the three properties;
i.e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional." Therefore we
must admit properties and notions in God.
I answer that, Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the persons,
said that in God there were no properties or notions, and wherever
there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the concrete. For
as we are accustomed to say, "I beseech your kindness"---i.e. you who
are kind---so when we speak of paternity in God, we mean God the
Father.
But, as shown above ([275]Q[3], A[3], ad 1), the use of concrete and
abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine
simplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it.
Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the
divine essence, considered in itself, and therefore, our human
intellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own
mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, whence
its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to
signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent things we use concrete
terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by
abstract names, to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their
subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names.
But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in
the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but the
same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity and
Father.
Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the
obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask:
"Whereby are They one God? and whereby are They three persons?" as we
answer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be
some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the persons are
distinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an
abstract term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore the divine essence
is signified as "What"; and the person as "Who"; and the property as
"Whereby."
The second motive is because one person in God is related to two
persons---namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son and
the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one relation;
otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the Holy Ghost would be
related to the Father by one and the same relation. Thus, since
relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow that the Son and
the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it be said with
Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to creatures, while
creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the Father is related
by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost; whereas these two
persons are related to the Father by two relations. For, since the very
specific idea of a relation is that it refers to another, it must be
said that two relations are not specifically different if but one
opposite relation corresponds to them. For the relation of lord and
father must differ according to the difference of filiation and
servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His creatures by
one specific relation. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are not related
to the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence there is no
parity.
Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the
creature ([276]Q[28], A[1],3); while there is no reason against our
admitting in God, many logical relations. But in the Father there must
be a real relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence,
corresponding to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,
whereby they are related to the Father, we must understand two
relations in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person of the Father, it is
necessary that the relations should be separately signified in the
abstract; and these are what we mean by properties and notions.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy
Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of
notions, as the abstract is contained in the concrete.
Reply to Objection 2: In God the notions have their significance not
after the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the
persons are known; although in God these notions or relations are real,
as stated above ([277]Q[28], A[1]). Therefore whatever has order to any
essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions; forasmuch
as this is against their mode of signification. Hence we cannot say
that paternity begets, or creates, or is wise, or is intelligent. The
essentials, however, which are not ordered to any act, but simply
remove created conditions from God, can be predicated of the notions;
for we can say that paternity is eternal, or immense, or such like. So
also on account of the real identity, substantive terms, whether
personal or essential, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say
that paternity is God, and that paternity is the Father.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the persons are simple, still without
prejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons can be
abstractedly signified, as above explained.
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Whether there are five notions?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not five notions. For the
notions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are
distinguished from each other. But the relations in God are only four
([278]Q[28], A[4]). Therefore the notions are only four in number.
Objection 2: Further, as there is only one essence in God, He is called
one God, and because in Him there are three persons, He is called the
Trine God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be
called quinary; which cannot be allowed.
Objection 3: Further, if there are five notions for the three persons
in God, there must be in some one person two or more notions, as in the
person of the Father there is innascibility and paternity, and common
spiration. Either these three notions really differ, or not. If they
really differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed of
several things. But if they differ only logically, it follows that one
of them can be predicated of another, so that we can say that as the
divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the
common reality, so common spiration is paternity; which is not to be
admitted. Therefore there are not five notions.
Objection 4: On the contrary, It seems that there are more; because as
the Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion of
innascibility; so from the Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And in
this respect there ought to be a sixth notion.
Objection 5: Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin
of the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost to
proceed from the Father. Therefore, as one notion is common to the
Father and the Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son
and to the Holy Ghost.
I answer that, A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine
Person. Now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their
origin: and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another
comes, and of someone that comes from another, and by these two modes a
person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be known
by the fact that He is from another; but by the fact that He is from no
one; and thus the notion that belongs to Him is called "innascibility."
As the source of another, He can be known in two ways, because as the
Son is from Him, the Father is known by the notion of "paternity"; and
as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known by the notion of "common
spiration." The Son can be known as begotten by another, and thus He is
known by "filiation"; and also by another person proceeding from Him,
the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in the same way as the Father is
known, by "common spiration." The Holy Ghost can be known by the fact
that He is from another, or from others; thus He is known by
"procession"; but not by the fact that another is from Him, as no
divine person proceeds from Him.
Therefore, there are Five notions in God: "innascibility," "paternity,"
"filiation," "common spiration," and "procession." Of these only four
are relations, for "innascibility" is not a relation, except by
reduction, as will appear later ([279]Q[33], A[4], ad 3). Four only are
properties. For "common spiration" is not a property; because it
belongs to two persons. Three are personal notions---i.e. constituting
persons, "paternity," "filiation," and "procession." "Common spiration"
and "innascibility" are called notions of Persons, but not personal
notions, as we shall explain further on ([280]Q[40], A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 1: Besides the four relations, another notion must
be admitted, as above explained.
Reply to Objection 2: The divine essence is signified as a reality; and
likewise the persons are signified as realities; whereas the notions
are signified as ideas notifying the persons. Therefore, although God
is one by unity of essence, and trine by trinity of persons,
nevertheless He is not quinary by the five notions.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the real plurality in God is founded only
on relative opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they
are not relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor
again are they predicated of each other, because they are different
ideas of the persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is
the attribute of knowledge, although we do say that knowledge is power.
Reply to Objection 4: Since Person implies dignity, as stated above
([281]Q[19], A[3] ) we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from
the fact that no person is from Him. For this does not belong to His
dignity, as it belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from
no one.
Reply to Objection 5: The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one
special mode of existence derived from the Father; as the Father and
the Son agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the
principle on which a notion is based must be something special; thus no
parity of reasoning exists.
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Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to have various
contrary opinions of the notions. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3):
"No error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity": to which
mystery the notions assuredly belong. But contrary opinions must be in
some way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary opinions
of the notions.
Objection 2: Further, the persons are known by the notions. But no
contrary opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated. Therefore
neither can there be about the notions.
On the contrary, The notions are not articles of faith. Therefore
different opinions of the notions are permissible.
I answer that, Anything is of faith in two ways; directly, where any
truth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and
unity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like; and concerning
these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if
it be held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial
of it involves as a consequence something against faith; as for
instance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, for it
follows that the divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such
things anyone may have a false opinion without danger of heresy, before
the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences
against faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown; whereas when
it is manifest, and especially if the Church has decided that
consequences follow against faith, then the error cannot be free from
heresy. For this reason many things are now considered as heretical
which were formerly not so considered, as their consequences are now
more manifest.
So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the
notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with faith.
If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the notions,
knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would follow,
he would lapse into heresy.
By what has been said all the objections may be solved.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the
Father, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Father is the Principle?
(2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this name
"Father"?
(3) Whether "Father" in God is said personally before it is said
essentially?
(4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Father cannot be called the
principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause are
the same, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not say
that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say that
He is the principle of the Son.
Objection 2: Further, a principle is so called in relation to the thing
principled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows
that the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which
appears false.
Objection 3: Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in
God there is no "before" and "after," as Athanasius says. Therefore in
speaking of God we ought not to used the term principle.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), "The Father is the
Principle of the whole Deity."
I answer that, The word "principle" signifies only that whence another
proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way we call a
principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another
proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The Greeks use the words "cause" and "principle"
indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not
use the word "cause," but only "principle." The reason is because
"principle" is a wider term than "cause"; as "cause" is more common
than "element." For the first term of a thing, as also the first part,
is called the principle, but not the cause. Now the wider a term is,
the more suitable it is to use as regards God ([282]Q[13], A[11]),
because the more special terms are, the more they determine the mode
adapted to the creature. Hence this term "cause" seems to mean
diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is
not implied in the word "principle." For in all kinds of causes there
is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of
perfection or of power: whereas we use the term "principle" even in
things which have no such difference, but have only a certain order to
each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a line; or
also when we say that the first part of a line is the principle of a
line.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the
Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom
with our Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father
something of authority by reason of His being the principle, still we
do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or
to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In this way, Hilary
says (De Trin. ix): "By authority of the Giver, the Father is the
greater; nevertheless the Son is not less to Whom oneness of nature is
give."
Reply to Objection 3: Although this word principle, as regards its
derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does not signify
priority, but origin. For what a term signifies, and the reason why it
was imposed, are not the same thing, as stated above ([283]Q[13],
A[8]).
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Whether this name "Father" is properly the name of a divine person?
Objection 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not properly the
name of a divine person. For the name "Father" signifies relation.
Moreover "person" is an individual substance. Therefore this name
"Father" is not properly a name signifying a Person.
Objection 2: Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every
father begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term is
more properly applied to God, as stated above ([284]Q[13], A[11]).
Therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and
genitor than Father.
Objection 3: Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of
anyone. But the word is by us metaphorically called begotten, or
offspring; and consequently, he of whom is the word, is metaphorically
called father. Therefore the principle of the Word in God is not
properly called Father.
Objection 4: Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said
of God first before creatures. But generation appears to apply to
creatures before God; because generation seems to be truer when the one
who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not only by
relation but also by essence. Therefore the name "Father" taken from
generation does not seem to be the proper name of any divine person.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 88:27): "He shall cry out to me: Thou
art my Father."
I answer that, The proper name of any person signifies that whereby the
person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and soul
belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular man
belong this particular soul and this particular body; and by these is
this particular man distinguished from all other men. Now it is
paternity which distinguishes the person of the Father from all other
persons. Hence this name "Father," whereby paternity is signified, is
the proper name of the person of the Father.
Reply to Objection 1: Among us relation is not a subsisting person. So
this name "father" among us does not signify a person, but the relation
of a person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought;
for in God the relation signified by the name "Father" is a subsisting
person. Hence, as above explained ([285]Q[29], A[4]), this name
"person" in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text
49), a thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end.
Now generation signifies something in process of being made, whereas
paternity signifies the complement of generation; and therefore the
name "Father" is more expressive as regards the divine person than
genitor or begettor.
Reply to Objection 3: In human nature the word is not a subsistence,
and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word
is something subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly
and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father.
Reply to Objection 4: The terms "generation" and "paternity" like the
other terms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures
as regards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of
signification. Hence also the Apostle says, "I bend my knee to the
Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and
on earth is named" (Eph. 3:14). This is explained thus. It is manifest
that generation receives its species from the term which is the form of
the thing generated; and the nearer it is to the form of the generator,
the truer and more perfect is the generation; as univocal generation is
more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of a
generator to generate what is like itself in form. Hence the very fact
that in the divine generation the form of the Begetter and Begotten is
numerically the same, whereas in creatures it is not numerically, but
only specifically, the same, shows that generation, and consequently
paternity, is applied to God before creatures. Hence the very fact that
in God a distinction exists of the Begotten from the Begetter as
regards relation only, belongs to the truth of the divine generation
and paternity.
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Whether this name "Father" is applied to God, firstly as a personal name?
Objection 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not applied to
God, firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common
precedes the particular. But this name "Father" as a personal name,
belongs to the person of the Father; and taken in an essential sense it
is common to the whole Trinity; for we say "Our Father" to the whole
Trinity. Therefore "Father" comes first as an essential name before its
personal sense.
Objection 2: Further, in things of which the concept is the same there
is no priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem to be
of the same nature, according as a divine person is Father of the Son,
and the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature's; since,
according to Basil (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the
creature and to the Son. Therefore "Father" in God is not taken as an
essential name before it is taken personally.
Objection 3: Further, it is not possible to compare things which have
not a common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by reason
of filiation or generation, according to Col. 1:15: "Who is the image
of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature." Therefore
paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has the same
concept as, paternity taken essentially.
On the contrary, The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is the
Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the creature
in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal sense as
regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the creature.
I answer that, A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly contained
its whole signification, before it is applied to that which only
partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of a
kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the signification
of the name; since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things.
Hence this name "lion" is applied first to the animal containing the
whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so called, before it is
applied to a man who shows something of a lion's nature, as courage, or
strength, or the like; and of whom it is said by way of similitude.
Now it is manifest from the foregoing ([286]Q[27], A[2]; [287]Q[28],
A[4]), that the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found
in God the Father, and in God the Son, because one is the nature and
glory of the Father and the Son. But in the creature, filiation is
found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator
and the creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain
likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we approach to the true
idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of some creatures, by
reason only of a trace, for instance of irrational creatures, according
to Job 38:28: "Who is the father of the rain? or who begot the drops of
dew?" Of some, namely, the rational creature (He is the Father), by
reason of the likeness of His image, according to Dt. 32:6: "Is He not
thy Father, who possessed, and made, and created thee?" And of others
He is the Father by similitude of grace, and these are also called
adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage of eternal glory by the gift
of grace which they have received, according to Rom. 8:16,17: "The
Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of
God; and if sons, heirs also." Lastly, He is the Father of others by
similitude of glory, forasmuch as they have obtained possession of the
heritage of glory, according to Rom. 5:2: "We glory in the hope of the
glory of the sons of God." Therefore it is plain that "paternity" is
applied to God first, as importing regard of one Person to another
Person, before it imports the regard of God to creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of
our intelligence, come before proper terms; because they are included
in the understanding of proper terms; but not conversely. For in the
concept of the person of the Father, God is understood; but not
conversely. But common terms which import relation to the creature come
after proper terms which import personal relations; because the person
proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production of
creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is first
understood to proceed from the artist before the thing designed, which
is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the artist's mind; so
the Son proceeds from the Father before the creature, to which the name
of filiation is applied as it participates in the likeness of the Son,
as is clear from the words of Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew and
predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son."
Reply to Objection 2: To "receive" is said to be common to the creature
and to the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain
remote similitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures.
Hence the authority quoted subjoins: "That He may be the First Born
among many brethren," after saying that some were conformed to the
image of the Son of God. But the Son of God possesses a position of
singularity above others, in having by nature what He receives, as
Basil also declares (Hom. xv De Fide); hence He is called the only
begotten (Jn. 1:18): "The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the
Father, He hath declared unto us."
From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection.
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Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be
unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which it
is the property. But "unbegotten" supposes nothing in the Father; it
only removes something. Therefore it does not signify a property of the
Father.
Objection 2: Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in
a negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not begotten
can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten; neither
is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also to the
essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be taken in a
privative sense, as every privation signifies imperfection in the thing
which is the subject of privation, it follows that the Person of the
Father is imperfect; which cannot be.
Objection 3: Further, in God, "unbegotten" does not signify relation,
for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance;
therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son, Who
is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore
the Father ought not to be called unbegotten.
Objection 4: Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since,
then, there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there is
nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another.
Therefore the Father is not alone unbegotten.
Objection 5: Further, as the Father is the principle of the person
begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his
opposition to the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be
unbegotten it follows that it is proper to Him also to be unproceeding.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "One is from one ---that
is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten---namely, by the property in
each one respectively of innascibility and origin."
I answer that, As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary
principle, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before or
after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the Father;
and the principle from a principle, Who is the Son.
Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one
way as the first "principle," by reason of its having a relation to
what proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a "first"
principle by reason of its not being from another. Thus therefore the
Father is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards
the persons proceeding from Himself. But as the principle, not from a
principle He is known by the fact that He is not from another; and this
belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word
"begotten."
Reply to Objection 1: Some there are who say that innascibility,
signified by the word "unbegotten," as a property of the Father, is not
a negative term only, but either that it means both these things
together---namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is the
principle of others; or that it imports universal authority, or also
His plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does not seem true,
because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct from
paternity and spiration; but would include them as the proper is
included in the common. For source and authority signify in God nothing
but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with Augustine (De
Trin. v, 7) that "unbegotten" imports the negation of passive
generation. For he says that "unbegotten" has the same meaning as "not
a son." Nor does it follow that "unbegotten" is not the proper notion
of the Father; for primary and simple things are notified by negations;
as, for instance, a point is defined as what has no part.
Reply to Objection 2: "Unbegotten" is taken sometimes in a negative
sense only, and in that sense Jerome says that "the Holy Ghost is
unbegotten," that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise "unbegotten" may be
taken in a kind of privation sense, but not as implying any
imperfection. For privation can be taken in many ways; in one way when
a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another, even though it is
not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a stone be
called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally belongs to some
other things. In another sense, privation is so called when something
has not what naturally belongs to some members of its genus; as for
instance when a mole is called blind. In a third sense privation means
the absence of what something ought to have; in which sense, privation
imports an imperfection. In this sense, "unbegotten" is not attributed
to the Father as a privation, but it may be so attributed in the second
sense, meaning that a certain person of the divine nature is not
begotten, while some person of the same nature is begotten. In this
sense the term "unbegotten" can be applied also to the Holy Ghost.
Hence to consider it as a term proper to the Father alone, it must be
further understood that the name "unbegotten" belongs to a divine
person as the principle of another person; so that it be understood to
imply negation in the genus of principle taken personally in God. Or
that there be understood in the term "unbegotten" that He is not in any
way derived from another; and not only that He is not from another by
way only of generation. In this sense the term "unbegotten" does not
belong at all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by procession, as
a subsisting person; nor does it belong to the divine essence, of which
it may be said that it is in the Son or in the Holy Ghost from
another---namely, from the Father.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9),
"unbegotten" in one sense signifies the same as "uncreated"; and thus
it applies to the substance, for thereby does the created substance
differ from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is not
begotten, and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation is
reduced to the genus of affirmation, as "not man" is reduced to the
genus of substance, and "not white" to the genus of quality. Hence,
since "begotten" implies relation in God, "unbegotten" belongs also to
relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father unbegotten is
substantially distinguished from the Son begotten; but only by
relation; that is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father.
Reply to Objection 4: In every genus there must be something first; so
in the divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from
another, and which we call "unbegotten." To admit two innascibles is to
suppose the existence of two Gods, and two divine natures. Hence Hilary
says (De Synod.): "As there is one God, so there cannot be two
innascibles." And this especially because, did two innascibles exist,
one would not be from the other, and they would not be distinguished by
relative opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from each
other by diversity of nature.
Reply to Objection 5: The property of the Father, whereby He is not
from another, is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity
of the Son, than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost;
both because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as
stated above ([288]Q[27], A[4], ad 3), and because also in the order of
nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, it being denied
of the Father that He is begotten, although He is the principle of
generation, it follows, as a consequence, that He does not proceed by
the procession of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not the
principle of generation, but proceeds from the person begotten.
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OF THE PERSON OF THE SON (THREE ARTICLES)
We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to
the Son---namely, "Son," "Word," and "Image." The idea of Son is
gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider
Word and Image.
Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term?
(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son?
(3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Word in God is a personal name?
Objection 1: It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name. For
personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and Son.
But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on (Jn. 1:1),
"In the beginning was the Word." Therefore Word is not a personal name
in God.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10), "The
Word is knowledge with love;" and according to Anselm (Monol. lx), "To
speak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought." But
knowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God. Therefore
Word is not a personal term in God.
Objection 3: Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But,
according to Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father is intelligent, the Son
is intelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so the Father
speaks, the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each
one of them is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential
term in God, and not in a personal sense.
Objection 4: Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is
something made. For it is said, "Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms
which do His Word" (Ps. 148:8). Therefore the Word is not a personal
name in God.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "As the Son is
related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is."
But the Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore
so also is Word.
I answer that, The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense,
is a personal name, and in no way an essential name.
To see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its
proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth sense it is
taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense is
when it is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds from
an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior
word---that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the
sound. For, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound
signifies the concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds
from the signification or the imagination, as stated in De Anima ii,
text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called a
word: wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact
the it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows
that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a
word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior
concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound
is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of words (De
Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that "word" is called "the natural movement
of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as
light and splendor;" which is the first kind. "Again," he says, "the
word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is uttered in the
heart;" which is the third kind. "Again," also, "the word is the
angel"---that is, the messenger "of intelligence;" which is the second
kind. Word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for that which is
signified or effected by a word; thus we are wont to say, "this is the
word I have said," or "which the king has commanded," alluding to some
deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of command.
Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the
intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10): "Whoever can
understand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before
thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see some
likeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the
Word." The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed
from something other than itself---namely, from the knowledge of the
one conceiving. Hence "Word," according as we use the term strictly of
God, signifies something proceeding from another; which belongs to the
nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine persons are
distinguished by origin ([289]Q[27], AA[3],4,5). Hence the term "Word,"
according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said
not essentially, but personally.
Reply to Objection 1: The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that
the Son differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavored
to maintain that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to
be understood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word proceeding
should compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same
substance as the Father. For the interior word proceeds in such a
manner from the one who pronounces it, as to remain within him. But
supposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit
Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be called a word
metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation;
either it makes something manifest as a word, or it is manifested by a
word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it is
manifested. If it is called a word because it exteriorly manifests,
what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except in as far as
it signifies the interior concept of the mind, which anyone may also
manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word may be sometimes
said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must also admit Word in the
proper sense, and which is said personally.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied
to God personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that
which emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its
conception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is
made actual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely;
likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual intellect what
existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding does not
signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an act
remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that word is knowledge,
the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any
one of its habits, but stands for what the intellect conceives by
knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1) that the Word is
"begotten wisdom;" for it is nothing but the concept of the Wise One;
and in the same way It can be called "begotten knowledge." Thus can
also be explained how "to speak" is in God "to see by thought,"
forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the gaze of the divine thought.
Still the term "thought" does not properly apply to the Word of God.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16): "Therefore do we speak of the
Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we believe that in God
there is something unstable, now assuming the form of Word, now putting
off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless." For
thought consists properly in the search after the truth, and this has
no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth,
it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm
(Monol. lx) takes "thought" in an improper sense for "contemplation."
Reply to Objection 3: As, properly speaking, Word in God is said
personally, and not essentially, so likewise is to "speak." Hence, as
the Word is not common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not
true that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine
says (De Trin. vii, 1): "He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is
understood as not alone in God, but as being with that very Word,
without which, forsooth, He would not be speaking." On the other hand,
"to be spoken" belongs to each Person, for not only is the word spoken,
but also the thing understood or signified by the word. Therefore in
this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to be spoken in
the same way as a word is spoken; whereas in the way whereby a thing is
spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs to each Person to be
spoken. For the Father, by understanding Himself, the Son and the Holy
Ghost, and all other things comprised in this knowledge, conceives the
Word; so that thus the whole Trinity is "spoken" in the Word; and
likewise also all creatures: as the intellect of a man by the word he
conceives in the act of understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm
took the term "speak" improperly for the act of understanding; whereas
they really differ from each other; for "to understand" means only the
habitude of the intelligent agent to the thing understood, in which
habitude no trace of origin is conveyed, but only a certain information
of our intellect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form
of the thing understood. In God, however, it means complete identity,
because in God the intellect and the thing understood are altogether
the same, as was proved above ([290]Q[14], AA[4],5). Whereas to "speak"
means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived; for "to speak" is
nothing but to utter a word. But by means of the word it imports a
habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is
manifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the Person who utters
the Word is "speaker" in God, although each Person understands and is
understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word.
Reply to Objection 4: The term "word" is there taken figuratively, as
the thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus
creatures are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect,
whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine wisdom;
as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the work to
which he is appointed by the king's word.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether "Word" is the Son's proper name?
Objection 1: It would seem that "Word" is not the proper name of the
Son. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not
signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word
cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son.
Objection 2: Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being
uttered. Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from
the Father, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine;
as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).
Objection 3: Further, every proper name of a person signifies some
property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper
name, it signifies some property of His; and thus there will be several
more properties in God than those above mentioned.
Objection 4: Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act
of understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs
to the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.
Objection 5: Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1:3): "Bearing all
things by the word of His power;" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v,
11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is not
proper to the Son.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): "By Word we
understand the Son alone."
I answer that, "Word," said of God in its proper sense, is used
personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it
signifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds in
God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; and this
procession is called generation, as we have shown above ([291]Q[27],
A[2]). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in
God.
Reply to Objection 1: "To be" and "to understand" are not the same in
us. Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to
our nature. But in God "to be" and "to understand" are one and the
same: hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of
His; but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be
something subsistent; for whatever is in the nature of God subsists;
and so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that "the Word of God is
substantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own]
are activities if the soul."
Reply to Objection 2: The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the
Arians pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being
uttered, as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the
different mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from
Augustine (De Haeres. xi).
Reply to Objection 3: In the term "Word" the same property is comprised
as in the name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "Word and
Son express the same." For the Son's nativity, which is His personal
property, is signified by different names, which are attributed to the
Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is of
the same nature as the Father, He is called the Son; to show that He is
co-eternal, He is called the Splendor; to show that He is altogether
like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten immaterially,
He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be expressed by only one
name.
Reply to Objection 4: To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same
way as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God
essentially, as stated above ([292]Q[14], AA[2],4). Now the Son is God
begotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as
producing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the
Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but
is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation.
Reply to Objection 5: When it is said of the Son, "Bearing all things
by the word of His power"; "word" is taken figuratively for the effect
of the Word. Hence a gloss says that "word" is here taken to mean
command; inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, things are
kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word things
are brought into being. Basil speaks widely and figuratively in
applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the sense perhaps that everything
that makes a person known may be called his word, and so in that way
the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word, because He manifests the
Son.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the name "Word" imports relation to creatures?
Objection 1: It would seem that the name 'Word' does not import
relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in
creatures, is said of God essentially. But Word is not said
essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation to
creatures.
Objection 2: Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of
God in time; as "Lord" and "Creator." But Word is said of God from
eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature.
Objection 3: Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it
proceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it follows
that the Word proceeds from the creature.
Objection 4: Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their
various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to
creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many.
Objection 5: Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this
can only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know
beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are
implied relations to non-beings; which appears to be false.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that "the name
Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to
those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power."
I answer that, Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing
Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the mind is
representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there
are in ourselves different words for the different things which we
understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all
things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of
all creatures.
And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas
as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word
of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both
expressive and operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps.
32:9): "He spake, and they were made;" because in the Word is implied
the operative idea of what God makes.
Reply to Objection 1: The nature is also included indirectly in the
name of the person; for person is an individual substance of a rational
nature. Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the personal
relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in
what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its
implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is included in
its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the Son, so it
properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten;
and in this way the name Word imports relation to creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the relations result from actions, some
names import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows
on the action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to
create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. But
others import a relation which follows from an action which does not
pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent---as to know and
to will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of relation
to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it true that
all names which import the relation of God to creatures are applied to
Him in time; but only those names are applied in time which import
relation following on the action of God passing into exterior effect.
Reply to Objection 3: Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge
derived from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it
is not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although
the Word is expressive of creatures.
Reply to Objection 4: The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify
relation to creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to
God; and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed
chiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation to
creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands every
creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and that is a personal
one.
Reply to Objection 5: God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word
about non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less
than does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14).
Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is
expressive and manifestive of non-beings.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMAGE (TWO ARTICLES)
We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether Image in God is said personally?
(2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether image in God is said personally?
Objection 1: It would seem that image is not said personally of God.
For Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says, "The Godhead of
the Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one."
Therefore Image is said of God essentially, and not personally.
Objection 2: Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): "An image is a like
species of that which it represents." But species or form is said of
God essentially. Therefore so also is Image.
Objection 3: Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies
"before" and "after." But in the divine persons there is no "before"
and "after." Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "What is more absurd
than to say that an image is referred to itself?" Therefore the Image
in God is a relation, and is thus a personal name.
I answer that, Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not any
kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image, but only
similitude of species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal
things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we see
that the species of different animals are of different figures; but not
of different colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on a
wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise
depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or of figure is
enough for an image, which requires also the idea of origin; because,
as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74): "One egg is not the image of
another, because it is not derived from it." Therefore for a true image
it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in species, or
at least in specific sign. Now whatever imports procession or origin in
God, belongs to the persons. Hence the name "Image" is a personal name.
Reply to Objection 1: Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds
forth in likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything
proceeds, is properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly
called the image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) uses the name of
Image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the Holy
Trinity is the Image to whom man was made.
Reply to Objection 2: "Species," as mentioned by Hilary in the
definition of image, means the form derived from one thing to another.
In this sense image is said to be the species of anything, as that
which is assimilated to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has
a like form.
Reply to Objection 3: Imitation in God does not signify posteriority,
but only assimilation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son?
Objection 1: It would seem that the name of Image is not proper to the
Son; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18), "The Holy Ghost
is the Image of the Son." Therefore Image does not belong to the Son
alone.
Objection 2: Further, similitude in expression belongs to the nature of
an image, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74). But this belongs to
the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude.
Therefore the Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image does not
belong to the Son alone.
Objection 3: Further, man is also called the image of God, according to
1 Cor. 11:7, "The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image
and the glory of God." Therefore Image is not proper to the Son.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): "The Son alone is the
Image of the Father."
I answer that, The Greek Doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost is
the Image of both the Father and of the Son; but the Latin Doctors
attribute the name Image to the Son alone. For it is not found in the
canonical Scripture except as applied to the Son; as in the words, "Who
is the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures" (Col.
1:15) and again: "Who being the brightness of His glory, and the figure
of His substance." (Heb. 1:3).
Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with the Father, not
in nature only, but also in the notion of principle: whereas the Holy
Ghost agrees neither with the Son, nor with the Father in any notion.
This, however, does not seem to suffice. Because as it is not by reason
of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality in God,
as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6), so neither (by reason thereof do we
consider) that similitude which is essential to image. Hence others say
that the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Image of the Son, because
there cannot be an image of an image; nor of the Father, because again
the image must be immediately related to that which it is the image;
and the Holy Ghost is related to the Father through the Son; nor again
is He the Image of the Father and the Son, because then there would be
one image of two; which is impossible. Hence it follows that the Holy
Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof: for the Father and
the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, as we shall explain
further on ([293]Q[36], A[4] ). Hence there is nothing to prevent there
being one Image of the Father and of the Son, inasmuch as they are one;
since even man is one image of the whole Trinity.
Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that, as the
Holy Ghost, although by His procession He receives the nature of the
Father, as the Son also receives it, nevertheless is not said to be
"born"; so, although He receives the likeness of the Father, He is not
called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and it is essential
to word to be like species with that whence it proceeds; whereas this
does not essentially belong to love, although it may belong to that
love which is the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is the divine love.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly
employ the term image as meaning a perfect similitude.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the Holy Ghost is like to the Father and
the Son, still it does not follow that He is the Image, as above
explained.
Reply to Objection 3: The image of a thing may be found in something in
two ways. In one way it is found in something of the same specific
nature; as the image of the king is found in his son. In another way it
is found in something of a different nature, as the king's image on the
coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father; in the
second sense man is called the image of God; and therefore in order to
express the imperfect character of the divine image in man, man is not
simply called the image, but "to the image," whereby is expressed a
certain movement of tendency to perfection. But it cannot be said that
the Son of God is "to the image," because He is the perfect Image of
the Father.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost,
Who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the Love and Gift of
God. Concerning the name "Holy Ghost" there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether this name, "Holy Ghost," is the proper name of one divine
Person?
(2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds
from the Father and the Son?
(3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son?
(4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this name "Holy Ghost" is the proper name of one divine person?
Objection 1: It would seem that this name, "Holy Ghost," is not the
proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the
three persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of
'Holy Ghost' [*It should be borne in mind that the word "ghost" is the
old English equivalent for the Latin "spiritus," whether in the sense
of "breath" or "blast," or in the sense of "spirit," as an immaterial
substance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x, 7),
"The Gost of Storms" [spiritus procellarum], and in the latter "Trubled
gost is sacrifice of God" (Prose Psalter, A.D. 1325), and "Oure
wrestlynge is . . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the ayre"
(More, "Comfort against Tribulation"); and in our modern expression of
"giving up the ghost." As applied to God, and not specially to the
third Holy Person, we have an example from Maunder, "Jhesu Criste was
the worde and the goste of Good." (See Oxford Dictionary).] is common
to the three persons; for Hilary (De Trin. viii) shows that the "Spirit
of God" sometimes means the Father, as in the words of Is. 61:1: "The
Spirit of the Lord is upon me;" and sometimes the Son, as when the Son
says: "In the Spirit of God I cast out devils" (Mat. 12:28), showing
that He cast out devils by His own natural power; and that sometimes it
means the Holy Ghost, as in the words of Joel 2:28: "I will pour out of
My Spirit over all flesh." Therefore this name 'Holy Ghost' is not the
proper name of a divine person.
Objection 2: Further, the names of the divine persons are relative
terms, as Boethius says (De Trin.). But this name "Holy Ghost" is not a
relative term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine
Person.
Objection 3: Further, because the Son is the name of a divine Person He
cannot be called the Son of this or of that. But the spirit is spoken
of as of this or that man, as appears in the words, "The Lord said to
Moses, I will take of thy spirit and will give to them" (Num. 11:17)
and also "The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus" (4 Kings 2:15).
Therefore "Holy Ghost" does not seem to be the proper name of a divine
Person.
On the contrary, It is said (1 Jn. 5:7): "There are three who bear
witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost." As
Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4): "When we ask, Three what? we say,
Three persons." Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine
person.
I answer that, While there are two processions in God, one of these,
the procession of love, has no proper name of its own, as stated above
([294]Q[27] , A[4], ad 3). Hence the relations also which follow from
this procession are without a name ([295]Q[28], A[4]): for which reason
the Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper name. But as some
names are accommodated by the usual mode of speaking to signify the
aforesaid relations, as when we use the names of procession and
spiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly signify the
notional acts than the relations; so to signify the divine Person, Who
proceeds by way of love, this name "Holy Ghost" is by the use of
scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The appropriateness of this name
may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from the fact that the person who is
called "Holy Ghost" has something in common with the other Persons.
For, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17; v, 11), "Because the Holy
Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that properly which both
are called in common. For the Father also is a spirit, and the Son is a
spirit; and the Father is holy, and the Son is holy." Secondly, from
the proper signification of the name. For the name spirit in things
corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion; for we call the breath
and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is a property of love to move
and impel the will of the lover towards the object loved. Further,
holiness is attributed to whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because
the divine person proceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved,
that person is most properly named "The Holy Ghost."
Reply to Objection 1: The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two
words, is applicable to the whole Trinity: because by 'spirit' the
immateriality of the divine substance is signified; for corporeal
spirit is invisible, and has but little matter; hence we apply this
term to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the word
"holy" we signify the purity of divine goodness. But if Holy Spirit be
taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the usage of the
Church, is accommodated to signify one of the three persons, the one
who proceeds by way of love, for the reason above explained.
Reply to Objection 2: Although this name "Holy Ghost" does not indicate
a relation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it
is accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by
relation only. Yet this name may be understood as including a relation,
if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed [spiratus].
Reply to Objection 3: In the name Son we understand that relation only
which is of something from a principle, in regard to that principle:
but in the name "Father" we understand the relation of principle; and
likewise in the name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power.
But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a divine
person; but rather the reverse. Therefore we can say "our Father," and
"our Spirit"; but we cannot say "our Son."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say
anything concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been
divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles." But in the Sacred
Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son;
but only that He proceeds from the Father, as appears from Jn. 15:26:
"The Spirit of truth, Who proceeds from the Father." Therefore the Holy
Ghost does not proceed from the Son.
Objection 2: Further, In the creed of the council of Constantinople
(Can. vii) we read: "We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and
Life-giver, who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son
to be adored and glorified." Therefore it should not be added in our
Creed that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who added
such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i): "We say that
the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the spirit of the
Father; but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we
name Him the Spirit of the Son." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not
proceed from the Son.
Objection 4: Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But
the Holy Ghost rests in the Son; for it is said in the legend of St.
Andrew: "Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the
Father, and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one Holy
Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son." Therefore
the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.
Objection 5: Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our breath
[spiritus] does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word.
Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.
Objection 6: Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the
Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the
Son.
Objection 7: Further "the actual and the possible do not differ in
things perpetual" (Phys. iii, text 32), and much less so in God. But it
is possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even
if He did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De Process. Spir.
Sancti, ii): "The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the
Father; but each in a different way; one by Birth, the other by
Procession, so that they are thus distinct from one another." And
further on he says: "For even if for no other reason were the Son and
the Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would suffice." Therefore the Holy
Spirit is distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him.
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father
and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."
I answer that, It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For
if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally
distinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above
([296]Q[28], A[3]; [297]Q[30], A[2]). For it cannot be said that the
divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense;
for it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three
persons: since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense,
belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the
divine persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations.
Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as
they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the
Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and
by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations,
and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one
person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there
were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the
Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither
would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them.
Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the
person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two
relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is
heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son
and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations.
Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except
relations of origin, as proved above (Q[28], A[44]). And opposite
relations of origin are to be understood as of a "principle," and of
what is "from the principle." Therefore we must conclude that it is
necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no
one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.
Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this
conclusion. For it was said above ([298]Q[27], AA[2],4; [299]Q[28],
A[4]), that the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and
the Holy Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a
word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental
conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost
proceeds from the Son.
We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature
itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one
without order except in those which differ only by their matter; as for
instance one smith produces many knives distinct from each other
materially, with no order to each other; whereas in things in which
there is not only a material distinction we always find that some order
exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of creatures
produced, the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So if from the
one Person of the Father, two persons proceed, the Son and the Holy
Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any other be
assigned except the order of their nature, whereby one is from the
other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost
proceed from the Father in such a way as that neither of them proceeds
from the other, unless we admit in them a material distinction; which
is impossible.
Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the
Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant that the Holy
Ghost is the Spirit "of the Son"; and that He is from the Father
"through the Son." Some of them are said also to concede that "He is
from the Son"; or that "He flows from the Son," but not that He
proceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just
consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word
procession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin
of any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin; as
when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a
stream from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence, granted
that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can conclude
that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.
Reply to Objection 1: We ought not to say about God anything which is
not found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But
although we do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that
the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense
of Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy
Ghost, "He will glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine" (Jn.
16:14). It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said of
the Father, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive
term; except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations,
whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For
when the Lord says, "No one knoweth the Son, but the Father," the idea
of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded. So therefore when we say
that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it be added
that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thereby be at
all excluded; because as regards being the principle of the Holy Ghost,
the Father and the Son are not opposed to each other, but only as
regards the fact that one is the Father, and the other is the Son.
Reply to Objection 2: In every council of the Church a symbol of faith
has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council
at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as
making a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in the
first symbol was explained by some addition directed against rising
heresies. Hence in the decision of the council of Chalcedon it is
declared that those who were congregated together in the council of
Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not
implying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their
predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but explaining what
those fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because at the
time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the Holy
Ghost did not proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary
to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas, later on, when
certain errors rose up, another council [*Council of Rome, under Pope
Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter was explicitly defined by
the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient
councils were summoned and confirmed. Nevertheless the truth was
contained implicitly in the belief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from
the Father.
Reply to Objection 3: The Nestorians were the first to introduce the
error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a
Nestorian creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was
embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him,
among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is not
to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by some that while
Damascene did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son, neither
do those words of his express a denial thereof.
Reply to Objection 4: When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in
the Son, it does not mean that He does not proceed from Him; for the
Son also is said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the
Father. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of
the lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human nature of
Christ, by reason of what is written: "On whom thou shalt see the
Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who baptizes" (Jn.
1:33).
Reply to Objection 5: The Word in God is not taken after the similitude
of the vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for
it would then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the
mental word, whence proceeds love.
Reply to Objection 6: For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from
the Father perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds
from the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one
power belongs to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from
the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property
of filiation; for the Son is not from Himself, although He is from the
Father.
Reply to Objection 7: The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son,
inasmuch as the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the
other; but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the
Son is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father
and the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished
from each other, as explained above, and in [300]Q[27].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
the Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through
another, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost
proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed
immediately; which seems to be unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father
through the Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account of
the Father. But "whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so."
Therefore He proceeds more from the Father than from the Son.
Objection 3: Further, the Son has His being by generation. Therefore if
the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows that the
Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds; and thus
the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is heretical.
Objection 4: Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be
said conversely. For as we say that the king acts through the bailiff,
so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through the king.
But we can never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through the
Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father spirates the
Holy Ghost through the Son.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. xii): "Keep me, I pray, in this
expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the Father---namely
Thyself: that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee: and that I may
deserve Thy Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only Begotten."
I answer that, Whenever one is said to act through another, this
preposition "through" points out, in what is covered by it, some cause
or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent
and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition
"through" is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent; and
in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be a
final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It is
a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works through
love of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works through
his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works through the
command of another. Sometimes, however, that which is covered by this
preposition "through" is the cause of the action regarded as terminated
in the thing done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts
through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause
why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause why the thing made
proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even this effect from the
artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that this preposition
"through" sometimes denotes direct authority, as when we say, the king
works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect authority, as when we
say, the bailiff works through the king.
Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy Ghost
proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the Holy
Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father
through the Son, which has the same meaning.
Reply to Objection 1: In every action two things are to be considered,
the "suppositum" acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for
instance, fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and
the Son the power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no
mean, for this is one and the same power. But if we consider the
persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both
from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and
thus He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did
Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father;
and mediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam;
although, indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to
signify the immaterial procession of the divine persons.
Reply to Objection 2: If the Son received from the Father a numerically
distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow
that He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy
Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son; whereas, on
the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the Father and to the
Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both, although
sometimes He is said to proceed principally or properly from the
Father, because the Son has this power from the Father.
Reply to Objection 3: As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with
the begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the
Son), so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His
principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost
proceeded; but each of the operations is eternal.
Reply to Objection 4: When anyone is said to work through anything, the
converse proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the
mallet works through the carpenter; whereas we can say that the bailiff
acts through the king, because it is the bailiff's place to act, since
he is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet's place to act,
but only to be made to act, and hence it is used only as an instrument.
The bailiff is, however, said to act through the king, although this
preposition "through" denotes a medium, for the more a "suppositum" is
prior in action, so much the more is its power immediate as regards the
effect, inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the second cause
to its effect. Hence also first principles are said to be immediate in
the demonstrative sciences. Therefore, so far as the bailiff is a
medium according to the order of the subject's acting, the king is said
to work through the bailiff; but according to the order of powers, the
bailiff is said to act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the
king gives the bailiff's action its effect. Now there is no order of
power between Father and Son, but only order of 'supposita'; and hence
we say that the Father spirates through the Son; and not conversely.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one
principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
the Father and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature,
for the Holy Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is one
in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any one
property, for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two
subjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son
as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are not
one principle of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, in this proposition "the Father and the Son are
one principle of the Holy Ghost," we do not designate personal unity,
because in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor
again do we designate the unity of property, because if one property
were the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the
Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of His two properties, the Father
would be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, which cannot
be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of
the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is
the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one principle
as regards any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father
and the Son.
Objection 4: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of
the Holy Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father.
But we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is
the Father, it follows that the Son is the Father; and if the one is
not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore
we cannot say that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy
Ghost.
Objection 5: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of
the Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one
principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems
to be false; for this word "principle" stands either for the person of
the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it is
false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Father and
the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 6: Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the
Father and the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows
that they are the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we
cannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy
Ghost.
Objection 7: Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called one
Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the
Father and the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert; and
this agrees also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "the Holy
Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as authors."
Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy
Ghost.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and
the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost.
I answer that, The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever
there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since
there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the
Holy Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of
the Holy Ghost.
Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: "The Father
and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," because, they
declare, since the word "principle" in the singular number does not
signify "person," but "property," it must be taken as an adjective; and
forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective, it
cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son are one principle
of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken as an adverb, so that the meaning
should be: They are one principle---that is, in one and the same way.
But then it might be equally right to say that the Father is two
principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost---namely, in two ways.
Therefore, we must say that, although this word "principle" signifies a
property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as do the words
"father" and "son" even in things created. Hence it takes its number
from the form it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the
Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of the form that
is signified by this word "God"; so they are one principle of the Holy
Ghost by reason of the unity of the property that is signified in this
word "principle."
Reply to Objection 1: If we consider the spirative power, the Holy
Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the
spirative power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the
property, as we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against
one property being in two "supposita" that possess one common nature.
But if we consider the "supposita" of the spiration, then we may say
that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct;
for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both.
Reply to Objection 2: In the proposition "the Father and the Son are
one principle of the Holy Ghost," one property is designated which is
the form signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by
reason of the several properties the Father can be called several
principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not by reason of relative properties that
we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the
essence. Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is to
the Son; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father than is
the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 4: These two propositions, "The Father and the Son
are one principle which is the Father," or, "one principle which is not
the Father," are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not
necessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the Father
and the Son are one principle, this word "principle" has not
determinate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for two
persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of "figure of speech" as the
argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate.
Reply to Objection 5: This proposition is also true:---The one
principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son; because the word
"principle" does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for
the two persons as above explained.
Reply to Objection 6: There is no reason against saying that the Father
and the Son are the same principle, because the word "principle" stands
confusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together.
Reply to Objection 7: Some say that although the Father and the Son are
one principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of
the distinction of "supposita," as also there are two spirating,
because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the
name "Creator"; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the
Son as from two distinct persons, as above explained; whereas the
creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons, but
as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because
spirating is an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say that
the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the plurality of
the "supposita" but not two spirators by reason of the one spiration.
For adjectival words derive their number from the "supposita" but
substantives from themselves, according to the form signified. As to
what Hilary says, that "the Holy ghost is from the Father and the Son
as His authors," this is to be explained in the sense that the
substantive here stands for the adjective.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST---LOVE (TWO ARTICLES)
We now inquire concerning the name "Love," on which arise two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether "Love" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that "Love" is not the proper name of the
Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): "As the Father, Son
and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I
know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not be called
Charity, and all together one Charity." But no name which is predicated
in the singular of each person and of all together, is a proper name of
a person. Therefore this name, "Love," is not the proper name of the
Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but love
is not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action
passing from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper
name of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a unitive force." But a bond is a medium
between what it joins together, not something proceeding from them.
Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son,
as was shown above ([301]Q[36], A[2]), it seems that He is not the Love
or bond of the Father and the Son.
Objection 4: Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost
is a lover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, He
must be love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost.): "The Holy
Ghost Himself is Love."
I answer that, The name Love in God can be taken essentially and
personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy
Ghost; as Word is the proper name of the Son.
To see this we must know that since as shown above ([302]Q[27],
AA[2],3,4,5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the
intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of
the will, which is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is
the more known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to
express our various considerations as regards that procession, but not
as regards the procession of the will. Hence, we are obliged to employ
circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the relations
following from this procession which are called "procession" and
"spiration," as stated above ([303]Q[27], A[4], ad 3), and yet express
the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the term.
Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of each procession
simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in
the one who understands a conception of the object understood, which
conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain
impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of
the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the
lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands; so
that when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself, not
only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one
who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover. As regards the
intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual
relation of the one who understands the object understood, as appears
in the word "to understand"; and other words are used to express the
procession of the intellectual conception---namely, "to speak," and
"word." Hence in God, "to understand" is applied only to the essence;
because it does not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas
"Word" is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the
term "to speak" is a notional term as importing the relation of the
principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other hand, on the
part of the will, with the exception of the words "dilection" and
"love," which express the relation of the lover to the object loved,
there are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the
impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by
fact that he loves---to the principle of that impression, or "vice
versa." And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we
express these relations by the words "love" and "dilection": just as if
we were to call the Word "intelligence conceived," or "wisdom
begotten."
It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to
the object loved, "love" and "to love" are said of the essence, as
"understanding" and "to understand"; but, on the other hand, so far as
these words are used to express the relation to its principle, of what
proceeds by way of love, and "vice versa," so that by "love" is
understood the "love proceeding," and by "to love" is understood "the
spiration of the love proceeding," in that sense "love" is the name of
the person and "to love" is a notional term, as "to speak" and "to
beget."
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is there speaking of charity as it
means the divine essence, as was said above (here and [304]Q[24], A[2],
ad 4).
Reply to Objection 2: Although to understand, and to will, and to love
signify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are
actions that remain in the agents, as stated above ([305]Q[14], A[4]),
yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain
relation to their object. Hence, love also in ourselves is something
that abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something
abiding in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed by
word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, there
is more than this; because both Word and Love are subsistent.
Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father
for the Son, or for something else; we do not mean anything that passes
into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as also in
the Word is imported the relation of the Word to the thing expressed by
the Word.
Reply to Objection 3: The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of the
Father and Son, inasmuch as He is Love; because, since the Father loves
Himself and the Son with one Love, and conversely, there is expressed
in the Holy Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and
conversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact that
the Father and the Son mutually love one another, it necessarily
follows that this mutual Love, the Holy Ghost, proceeds from both. As
regards origin, therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the
third person in the Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid relation
He is the bond between the two persons, as proceeding from both.
Reply to Objection 4: As it does not belong to the Son, though He
understands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand as
the word proceeding; so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost loves,
taking Love as an essential term, still it does not belong to Him to
spirate love, which is to take love as a notional term; because He
loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as the one whence love
proceeds.
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Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love each
other by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves that
the Father is not wise by the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is Wisdom
begotten, so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as explained above
([306]Q[27], A[3]). Therefore the Father and the Son do not love
Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the proposition, "The Father and the Son love
each other by the Holy Ghost," this word "love" is to be taken either
essentially or notionally. But it cannot be true if taken essentially,
because in the same way we might say that "the Father understands by
the Son"; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for then, in like
manner, it might be said that "the Father and the Son spirate by the
Holy Ghost," or that "the Father generates by the Son." Therefore in no
way is this proposition true: "'The Father and the Son love each other
by the Holy Ghost."
Objection 3: Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and
Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy
Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the
act; since it cannot be said that the "Father begets Himself," or that
"He spirates Himself." Therefore, neither can it be said that "He loves
Himself by the Holy Ghost," if "to love" is taken in a notional sense.
Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy Ghost; because it
imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs to the essence.
Therefore this also is false: "The Father loves the Son by the Holy
Ghost."
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): "The Holy Ghost is He
whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves His
Begetter."
I answer that, A difficulty about this question is objected to the
effect that when we say, "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost,"
since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean
that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the Father and the Son;
which cannot be admitted.
In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that "the
Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost"; and they add
that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to
the effect that "the Father is wise by the Wisdom begotten." Others say
that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as that
"the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost"---that is, "by His
essential Love," which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others
further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a sign,
so that it means, "the Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father loves the
Son"; inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as Love.
Others, again, say that this ablative must be construed as importing
the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Ghost is the love
whereby the Father and the Son formally love each other. Others, again,
say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a formal
effect; and these approach nearer to the truth.
To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is
commonly denominated from its forms, as "white" from whiteness, and
"man" from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in this
particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form. So
when I say, "this man is clothed with a garment," the ablative is to be
construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the garment
is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated from
that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its action,
but also as from the term itself of the action---that is, the effect,
when the effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For we
say that fire warms by heating, although heating is not the heat which
is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and
we say that a tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is not
the tree's form, but is the effect proceeding from the form. In this
way, therefore, we must say that since in God "to love" is taken in two
ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken essentially, it
means that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy
Ghost, but by their essence. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7):
"Who dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son,
nor the Holy Ghost, except by the Holy Ghost?" The opinions first
quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term Love is taken
in a notional sense it means nothing else than "to spirate love"; just
as to speak is to produce a word, and to flower is to produce flowers.
As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say
that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Himself, and His
creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by
the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding.
Reply to Objection 1: To be wise or intelligent is taken only
essentially in God; therefore we cannot say that "the Father is wise or
intelligent by the Son." But to love is taken not only essentially, but
also in a notional sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father
and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained.
Reply to Objection 2: When the idea of an action includes a determined
effect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the
action, and from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree
flowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the idea of
an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case, the
principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect, but only
from the action. For we do not say that the tree produces the flower by
the flower, but by the production of the flower. So when we say,
"spirates" or "begets," this imports only a notional act. Hence we
cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost, or begets by the
Son. But we can say that the Father speaks by the Word, as by the
Person proceeding, "and speaks by the speaking," as by a notional act;
forasmuch as "to speak" imports a determinate person proceeding; since
"to speak" means to produce a word. Likewise to love, taken in a
notional sense, means to produce love; and so it can be said that the
Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as by the person proceeding,
and by Love itself as a notional act.
Reply to Objection 3: The Father loves not only the Son, but also
Himself and us, by the Holy Ghost; because, as above explained, to
love, taken in a notional sense, not only imports the production of a
divine person, but also the person produced, by way of love, which has
relation to the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and
every creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the Word "begotten"
adequately represents the Father and every creature; so He loves
Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy
Ghost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby the Father
loves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to
the creature is implied both in the Word and in the proceeding Love, as
it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the divine truth and goodness
are a principle of understanding and loving all creatures.
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OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT (TWO ARTICLES)
There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which there
are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether "Gift" can be a personal name?
(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
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Whether "Gift" is a personal name?
Objection 1: It would seem that "Gift" is not a personal name. For
every personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of
"Gift" does not import a distinction in God; for Augustine says (De
Trin. xv, 19): that "the Holy Ghost is so given as God's Gift, that He
also gives Himself as God." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
Objection 2: Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence.
But the divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son,
as Hilary says (De Trin. ix). Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19)
there is no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift
implies a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as
regards him by whom it is given. Therefore "Gift" is not a personal
name.
Objection 4: Further, "Gift" imports relation to the creature, and it
thus seems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said of
God from eternity; as "Father," and "Son." Therefore "Gift" is not a
personal name.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): "As the body of
flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing
but the Holy Ghost." But the Holy Ghost is a personal name; so also
therefore is "Gift."
I answer that, The word "gift" imports an aptitude for being given. And
what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to that
to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless it
was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine
person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son
belongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to
possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in this way a
divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united
to God. Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however,
in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the
effect thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as
when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding,
so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the
rational creature alone can possess the divine person. Nevertheless in
order that it may possess Him in this manner, its own power avails
nothing: hence this must be given it from above; for that is said to be
given to us which we have from another source. Thus a divine person can
"be given," and can be a "gift."
Reply to Objection 1: The name "Gift" imports a personal distinction ,
in so far as gift imports something belonging to another through its
origin. Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is
His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man
belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix): "What
is more yours than yourself?" Or we might say, and more fittingly, that
a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the phrase, "this is this
one's," can be understood in several senses. In one way it means
identity, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix); and in that sense
"gift" is the same as "the giver," but not the same as the one to whom
it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in that sense. In another
sense, a thing is another's as a possession, or as a slave; and in that
sense gift is essentially distinct from the giver; and the gift of God
so taken is a created thing. In a third sense "this is this one's"
through its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father's; and
the Holy Ghost belongs to both. Therefore, so far as gift in this way
signifies the possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished
from the giver, and is a personal name.
Reply to Objection 2: The divine essence is the Father's gift in the
first sense, as being the Father's by way of identity.
Reply to Objection 3: Gift as a personal name in God does not imply
subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the
one to whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as above
explained.
Reply to Objection 4: Gift is not so called from being actually given,
but from its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called
Gift from eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow
that it is an essential name because it imports relation to the
creature; but that it includes something essential in its meaning; as
the essence is included in the idea of person, as stated above
([307]Q[34], A[3]).
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Whether "Gift" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the Holy
Ghost. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Is. 9:16 says:
"A Son is give to us." Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well
as to the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, every proper name of a person signifies a
property. But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy
Ghost. Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man,
whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but "God's Gift" only.
Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "As 'to be born' is,
for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, 'to be the
Gift of God' is to proceed from Father and Son." But the Holy Ghost
receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from Father and
Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
I answer that, Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of the
Holy Ghost.
In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable
giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)---i.e. a thing which is not
given with the intention of a return---and it thus contains the idea of
a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is
love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously
forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him is the love
whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the nature
of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the
Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above ([308]Q[27], A[4];
[309]Q[37], A[1]), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says
(De Trin. xv, 24): "By the gift, which is the Holy Ghost, many
particular gifts are portioned out to the members of Christ."
Reply to Objection 1: As the Son is properly called the Image because
He proceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude
of its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father;
so also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is
properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the Son
is given is from the Father's love, according to the words, "God so
loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son" (Jn. 3:16).
Reply to Objection 2: The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to
the Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the
origin of the Holy Ghost---that is, His procession.
Reply to Objection 3: Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the
giver; but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore,
because "Gift" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called a
gift of man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been
given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.
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OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely,
we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence,
to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of
these with each other.
As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person?
(2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?
(3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the
plural, or in the singular?
(4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be
predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?
(5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the
abstract?
(6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete
essential names?
(7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons?
(8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?
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Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as
person. For whenever essence is the same as person or "suppositum,"
there can be only one "suppositum" of one nature, as is clear in the
case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really
one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in
God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what is
above expounded ([310]Q[28], A[3]; [311]Q[30], A[2]). Therefore essence
is not the same as person.
Objection 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same
things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation
are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas
essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.
Objection 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is
subject to essence; whence it is called "suppositum" or "hypostasis."
Therefore person is not the same as essence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): "When we say the
person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the
Father."
I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider
the divine simplicity. For it was shown above ([312]Q[3], A[3]) that
the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as
"suppositum," which in intellectual substances is nothing else than
person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the
divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its
unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), "relation multiplies
the Trinity of persons," some have thought that in God essence and
person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be "adjacent";
considering only in the relations the idea of "reference to another,"
and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above
([313]Q[28], A[2]) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in
God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God
essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons
are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated
([314]Q[29], A[4]), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine
nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ
therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to
an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that
opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.
Reply to Objection 1: There cannot be a distinction of "suppositum" in
creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles;
because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations
are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they
distinguish the "supposita"; and yet the essence is not distinguished,
because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other
so far as they are identified with the essence.
Reply to Objection 2: As essence and person in God differ in our way of
thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and
affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need
not suppose the other.
Reply to Objection 3: Divine things are named by us after the way of
created things, as above explained ([315]Q[13], AA[1],3). And since
created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of
the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called "subjects,"
"supposita," or "hypostases." So the divine persons are named
"supposita" or "hypostases," but not as if there really existed any
real "supposition" or "subjection."
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Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?
Objection 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons are
of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and
Holy Ghost "are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony." But the
substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are not of
one essence.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can
be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius
(Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy
Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.
Objection 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine
essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one
nature.
Objection 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the
essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it
does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not
say that the three persons are "from one essence [ex una essentia],"
lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and
the persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the
oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three
persons are "of one essence [unius essentiae]."
Objection 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be
occasion of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one
essence or substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says
(De Synod.): "One substance predicated of the Father and the Son
signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one
substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior
substance taken and assumed by the other two." Therefore it must not be
said that the three persons are of one substance.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word
{homoousion}, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians,
means that the three persons are of one essence.
I answer that, As above explained ([316]Q[13], AA[1],2), divine things
are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for
in that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things
created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect
derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by
the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is
the "suppositum" of the form; so also in God the essence is taken as
the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification.
Now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is
the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we
do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form,
unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: "That woman
is of a handsome figure," or: "This man is of perfect virtue." In like
manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not
multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three
persons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be understood
as designating the form.
Reply to Objection 1: Substance is here taken for the "hypostasis," and
not for the essence.
Reply to Objection 2: Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ
in so many words that the three persons are of one essence,
nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance,
"I and the Father are one (Jn. 10:30)," and "I am in the Father, and
the Father in Me (Jn. 10:38)"; and there are many other texts of the
same import.
Reply to Objection 3: Because "nature" designates the principle of
action while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said
to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which
give heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one essence"
which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying
that the three persons are "of one essence," than by saying they are
"of one nature."
Reply to Objection 4: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be
designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say "the
virtue of Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont
to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to
qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are
required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the
determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter is of
great virtue [magnae virtutis]," or else one genitive must have the
force of two, as, for instance, "he is a man of blood"---that is, he is
a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine
essence signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said
that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse,
unless we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the
Father is a person of the "divine essence"; or, the three persons are
"of one essence."
Reply to Objection 5: The preposition "from" or "out of" does not
designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an
efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases
distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For
nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a
thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So,
when we say, "three persons of one essence," taking essence as having
the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from
person, which we should mean if we said, "three persons from the same
essence."
Reply to Objection 6: As Hilary says (De Synod.): "It would be
prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just
because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand
{homoousion}, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The
oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from
community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both
Father and Son."
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Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three
persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that essential names, as the name "God,"
should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in
the plural. For as "man" signifies "one that has humanity," so God
signifies "one that has Godhead." But the three persons are three who
have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are "three Gods."
Objection 2: Further, Gn. 1:1, where it is said, "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," the Hebrew original has "Elohim," which may
be rendered "Gods" or "Judges": and this word is used on account of the
plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are "several Gods,"
and not "one" God.
Objection 3: Further, this word "thing" when it is said absolutely,
seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three persons
in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "The things
that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and Holy
Ghost." Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural
of the three persons.
Objection 4: Further, as this word "God" signifies "a being who has
Deity," so also this word "person" signifies a being subsisting in an
intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for the
same reason we can say there are "three Gods."
On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 6:4): "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy
God is one God."
I answer that, Some essential names signify the essence after the
manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of
adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of
the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those
which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three
persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives signify
something by way of substance, while adjectives signify something by
way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has
existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or multitude;
wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends
upon the form signified by the name. But as accidents have their
existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from their
subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives
depends upon their "supposita." In creatures, one form does not exist
in several "supposita" except by unity of order, as the form of an
ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a form are
substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular, but
otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college,
or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians. Now
in God the divine essence is signified by way of a form, as above
explained [317](A[2]), which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as
shown above ([318]Q[3], A[7]; [319]Q[11], A[4]). So, names which
signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of
the three persons in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then,
is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are "three
men"; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are "three
Gods," but "one God"; forasmuch as in the three "supposita" of human
nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine Persons
there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which
signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three
persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of "supposita." For we say
there are three "existent" or three "wise" beings, or three "eternal,"
"uncreated," and "immense" beings, if these terms are understood in an
adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say "one
uncreated, immense, eternal being," as Athanasius declares.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the name "God" signifies a being having
Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the
name "God" is used substantively; whereas "having Godhead" is used
adjectively. Consequently, although there are "three having Godhead,"
it does not follow that there are three Gods.
Reply to Objection 2: Various languages have diverse modes of
expression. So as by reason of the plurality of "supposita" the Greeks
said "three hypostases," so also in Hebrew "Elohim" is in the plural.
We, however, do not apply the plural either to "God" or to "substance,"
lest plurality be referred to the substance.
Reply to Objection 3: This word "thing" is one of the transcendentals.
Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God
in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it
is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage
quoted, that "the same Trinity is a thing supreme."
Reply to Objection 4: The form signified by the word "person" is not
essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are three
personalities---that is, three personal properties in the Father, Son
and Holy Ghost---it is predicated of the three, not in the singular,
but in the plural.
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Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot
stand for the person, so that we can truly say "God begot God." For, as
the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for." But
this name "God" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be
predicated in the plural, as above explained [320](A[3]). Therefore,
since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for
person.
Objection 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term
in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense
signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name
"God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God begot," this term
"God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.
Objection 3: Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father
generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget,"
because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and
there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two
Gods.
Objection 4: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is
Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself;
for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself."
Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore
it is false to say, "God begot God."
Objection 5: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is
the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father,
then God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then
there is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it
cannot be said that "God begot God."
On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, "God of God."
I answer that, Some have said that this name "God" and the like,
properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by
reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This
opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which
requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the
same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God,
is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of
expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no
less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the
divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man"
signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this
word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense,
stand for person, as does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes
stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this
predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form
signified---that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person,
either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when
we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King
of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).
Reply to Objection 1: Although this name "God" agrees with singular
terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless
it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be
found in several "supposita." So it need not always stand for the
essence it signifies.
Reply to Objection 2: This holds good against those who say that the
word "God" does not naturally stand for person.
Reply to Objection 3: The word "God" stands for the person in a
different way from that in which this word "man" does; for since the
form signified by this word "man"---that is, humanity---is really
divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the
person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person---that
is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature,
however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the
mind. Hence this term "man" does not stand for the common nature,
unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, "man is a
species"; whereas the form signified by the name "God"---that is, the
divine essence---is really one and common. So of itself it stands for
the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to
stand for the person. So, when we say, "God generates," by reason of
the notional act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father.
But when we say, "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to
determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase
means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however,
something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this
proposition, for instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true.
Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a "God generator,"
and a "God not generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the
persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the
generator" and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not
follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one
God, as was said above [321](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 4: This is false, "the Father begot God, that is
Himself," because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to
the same "suppositum." Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep.
lxvi ad Maxim.) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum se],"
forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then it
means "He begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single
relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however,
either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would
really mean, "He begot another most like to Himself." Likewise also it
is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son is
another than the Father, as above explained ([322]Q[31], A[2]),
nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as
this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the
substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a
distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God" is
tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a substantive,
and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it. This, however,
is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving
occasion to error.
Reply to Objection 5: To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is
wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to
"God," the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so
that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; and then
the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore
the negative of the proposition is true, "He begot God Who is not God
the Father." If however, we understand these words not to be in
apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary,
the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that
the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is the Father." Such
a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say
simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is
true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are
false, because this relative "Who" in the affirmative proposition can
be referred to the "suppositum"; whereas in the negative it denotes
both the thing signified and the "suppositum." Whence, in the
affirmative the sense is that "to be God the Father" is befitting to
the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that "to be God the
Father," is to be removed from the Son's divinity as well as from His
personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according
to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is
open also to negation.
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Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?
Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for
the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets essence."
For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and the Son are
one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is
from Wisdom, as essence from essence."
Objection 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies
generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is
generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems
that the divine essence is generated.
Objection 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is
clear from what is above explained ([323]Q[3], A[3]). But, as was
shown, it is true to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also
true: "Essence begets essence."
Objection 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is
predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can
stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.
Objection 5: Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the
essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not
begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not
begetting": which cannot be.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is
the principle of the whole Godhead." But He is principle only by
begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the
Godhead.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets
itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only,
since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence.
Therefore the essence does not beget essence.
I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting
that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence begot
essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is
nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if
we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not
only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its
signification as above stated [324](A[4]). Now although "God" is really
the same as "Godhead," nevertheless the mode of signification is not in
each case the same. For since this word "God" signifies the divine
essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can
of its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly
belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, "God," as, for
instance, we can say "God is begotten" or is "Begetter," as above
explained [325](A[4]). The word "essence," however, in its mode of
signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the
essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the
persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be
attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the
divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the
"supposita."
Reply to Objection 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the
holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis
than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging
upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for
instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even
by personal names; as when we find "essence from essence"; or "wisdom
from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, "the Son" who is essence
and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless,
as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed,
forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the
persons because actions belong to "supposita." So "nature from nature,"
and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than "essence from essence."
Reply to Objection 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same
nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically
distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases
to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted
accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as
the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either
directly or accidentally.
Reply to Objection 3: Although God and the divine essence are really
the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of
signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.
Reply to Objection 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by
mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not
follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification
being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which
are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.
Reply to Objection 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival
names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them,
whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the
substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is
considered in the light of "suppositum," whereas the adjective
indicates something added to the "suppositum." Therefore substantive
personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are
really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a
distinct essence; but it belongs to the "suppositum" implied in the
substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated
of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the
"essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence is a thing
begetting," or that it is "God begetting," if "thing" and God stand for
person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no
contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing begetting," and "a
thing not begetting"; because in the first case "thing" stands for
person, and in the second it stands for the essence.
Reply to Objection 6: So far as Godhead is one in several "supposita,"
it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So
when we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the
term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it
is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He
is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of
the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is
the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it,
but as communicating it by generation and spiration.
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Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?
Objection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the
concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "God is
three persons"; or "God is the Trinity." For it is false to say, "man
is every man," because it cannot be verified as regards any particular
subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man.
In the same way this proposition, "God is the Trinity," cannot be
verified of any one of the "supposita" of the divine nature. For the
Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to
say, "God is the Trinity," is false.
Objection 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except
by accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for it is
accidental to animal to be man. But this name "God" as regards the
three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the
persons cannot be predicated of this name "God," except in an
accidental sense.
On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii, in
coena Domini], "We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity."
I answer that, As above explained [326](A[5]), although adjectival
terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the
essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to
the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not only
really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three
persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of
the essence as if we were to say, "The essence is the Father, and the
Son, and the Holy Ghost." And because this word "God" can of itself
stand for the essence, as above explained (A[4], ad 3), hence, as it is
true to say, "The essence is the three persons"; so likewise it is true
to say, "God is the three persons."
Reply to Objection 1: As above explained this term "man" can of itself
stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for
the universal human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man";
because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the
contrary, this word "God" can of itself be taken for the divine
essence. So, although to say of any of the "supposita" of the divine
nature, "God is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the
divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not take
note of this distinction.
Reply to Objection 2: When we say, "God," or "the divine essence is the
Father," the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in
regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and
singular. Hence, as this proposition, "The Father is God" is of itself
true, so this proposition "God is the Father" is true of itself, and by
no means accidentally.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be
appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith
should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome
says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [*In substance Ep.
lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common
to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be
supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are
appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the
others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated
to the persons.
Objection 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the
abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to
another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of
which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially
when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the
persons.
Objection 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for
property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential
attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as
what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential
attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.
On the contrary, the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the
wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24).
I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that
the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For
although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as
was above expounded ([327]Q[32], A[1]), nevertheless it is fitting that
it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the essential
attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason
than the personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge
of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of
knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal
properties, as was above explained ([328]Q[32], A[1]). As, therefore,
we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures
for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the same manner
do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of
the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called
"appropriation."
The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the
essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things
which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds
by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as power
is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by
reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything of the kind be
imagined of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to
the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to
make the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as
above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather
manifestation of the truth.
Reply to Objection 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to
the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would
follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which
Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the
Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son
were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called
wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is called the
Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is
Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together are
one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by
Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper
concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding;
nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent
the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated.
Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally
prior to "white body," considered as white.
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Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a
fitting manner by the holy doctors?
Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are
appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary
says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in the
Image; and use is in the Gift." In which words he designates three
names proper to the persons: the name of the "Father," the name "Image"
proper to the Son ([329]Q[35], A[2]), and the name "Bounty" or "Gift,"
which is proper to the Holy Ghost ([330]Q[38], A[2]). He also
designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates "eternity" to
the Father, "species" to the Son, and "use" to the Holy Ghost. This he
does apparently without reason. For "eternity" imports duration of
existence; "species," the principle of existence; and 'use' belongs to
the operation. But essence and operation are not found to be
appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are not fittingly
appropriated to the persons.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "Unity
is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the
concord of equality and unity." This does not, however, seem fitting;
because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is
appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom
begotten, as above explained ([331]Q[37], A[2], ad 1). But, as he
subjoins, "All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by the
Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost." The above, therefore, are not
fittingly appropriated to the Persons.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is
attributed "power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost "goodness."
Nor does this seem fitting; for "strength" is part of power, whereas
strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text,
"Christ the strength [*Douay: power] of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is
likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words,
"strength [*Douay: virtue] came out from Him and healed all" (Lk.
6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.
Objection 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "What the
Apostle says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken in
a confused sense." And (Contra Maxim. ii) "'from Him' refers to the
Father, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost.'" This,
however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to
imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes.
Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the Father,
Who is "the principle from no principle."
Objection 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to
Jn. 14:6, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"; and likewise "the
book of life," according to Ps. 39:9, "In the beginning of the book it
is written of Me," where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father
Who is My head," also this word "Who is"; because on the text of Is.
65:1, "Behold I go to the Gentiles," a gloss adds, "The Son speaks Who
said to Moses, I am Who am." These appear to belong to the Son, and are
not appropriated. For "truth," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig.
36), "is the supreme similitude of the principle without any
dissimilitude." So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who
has a principle. Also the "book of life" seems proper to the Son, as
signifying "a thing from another"; for every book is written by
someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be proper to the Son; because
if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who am," the Trinity spoke, then
Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the
Holy Ghost sent me to you," so also he could have said further, "He Who
is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you,"
pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no
person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common to
the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.
I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from
creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from
creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves
to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is
considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its
intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth
point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this
fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.
According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God
absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies,
according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father, "species"
to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. For "eternity" as meaning a
"being" without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the
Father, Who is "a principle without a principle." Species or beauty has
a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes three
conditions, "integrity" or "perfection," since those things which are
impaired are by the very fact ugly; due "proportion" or "harmony"; and
lastly, "brightness" or "clarity," whence things are called beautiful
which have a bright color.
The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch
as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the
Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin.
vi, 10): "Where---that is, in the Son---there is supreme and primal
life," etc.
The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the
express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be
beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is
indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), "Where there
exists wondrous proportion and primal equality," etc.
The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is
the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi,
10): "As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak,
the art of the omnipotent God," etc.
"Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the
"use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of "to
enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the beck of the
will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin.
x, 11). So "use," whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other,
agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "That love, that delectation, that
felicity or beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the "use" by
which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the
Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "In
the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the Begettor and the
Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and
wealth." Thus it is clear how "eternity," "species," and "use" are
attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or
operation; because, being common, there is nothing in their concept to
liken them to the properties of the Persons.
The second consideration of God regards Him as "one." In that view
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity" to the Father,
"equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to the Holy Ghost. It is
manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For
"unity" is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else;
and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other
person is not presupposed since He is the "principle without
principle." "Equality" implies unity as regards another; for that is
equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is
appropriated to the Son, Who is the "principle from a principle."
"Union" implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the
Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can
understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5)
that "The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by
reason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost." For it
is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first:
just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul,
because therein we find the first trace of life. Now "unity" is
perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible
hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other persons derive
their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do
not find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose
the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were
the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son
equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His
equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy
Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the
Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot
understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son. So
all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy
Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be united.
According to the third consideration, which brings before us the
adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a
third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and "goodness." This
kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards
what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we
consider what is in creatures. For "power" has the nature of a
principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the
principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting
sometimes by reason of old age. "Wisdom" has likeness to the heavenly
Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In
an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years.
"Goodness," as the nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy
Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a
certain violent impulse, according to Is. 25:4: "The spirit of the
strong is as a blast beating on the wall." "Strength" is appropriated
to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not as denoting the power itself of a
thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power;
for instance, we say that the strong work done by an agent is its
strength.
According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God's relation to His
effects, there arise appropriation of the expression "from Whom, by
Whom, and in Whom." For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes implies
a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God;
and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which
can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is
appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition
"by" [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say
that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word "by" is not always
appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly,
according to the text, "All things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3); not
that the Son is an instrument, but as "the principle from a principle."
Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form "by" which an agent
works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as wisdom
and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression "by
Whom." The preposition "in" strictly denotes the habitude of one
containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their
similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing in His
knowledge. In this sense the expression "in Him" should be appropriated
to the Son. In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as
He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a
fitting end; and in this sense the expression "in Him" is appropriated
to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is "goodness." Nor need the habitude of
the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the
Father, Who is "the principle without a principle": because the divine
persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him
as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They proceed
by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a
natural power.
Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth"
belongs to the intellect, as stated above ([332]Q[16], A[1]), it is
appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For
truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing
itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are
referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be
said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth as
appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means knowledge
but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained ([333]Q[24],
A[1]), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal
life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior
movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the Holy Ghost as
Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book
considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So
this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to
a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated to the person of the
Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as,
in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race
accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word "Who" is taken in a
relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and
in that sense it would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we
to say, "The Son is the begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten
is personal." But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And
although the pronoun "this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a
particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to can be
grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not
a person; as we may say, "this stone," and "this ass." So, speaking in
a grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies and stands for
the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun "this,"
according to Ex. 15:2: "This is my God, and I will glorify Him."
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OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or
properties; and there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether relation is the same as person?
(2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?
(3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves
the hypostases distinct?
(4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding,
presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?
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Whether relation is the same as person?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God relation is not the same as
person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others
are multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in
the person of the Father there is paternity and common spiration.
Again, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the
Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text.
24), nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; nor
can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for
otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore relation, or
property, is not the same as person in God.
Objection 3: Further, when several things are identical, what is
predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is
predicated of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say
that the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting.
Therefore property is not the same as person in God.
On the contrary, in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same,
according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). But the Father is Father by
paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the
persons.
I answer that, Different opinions have been held on this point. Some
have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons;
and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the
relations, which do not indeed signify existence "in" something, but
rather existence "towards" something. Whence, they styled the relations
"assistant," as above explained ([334]Q[28], A[2]). But since relation,
considered as really existing in God, is the divine essence Itself, and
the essence is the same as person, as appears from what was said above
([335]Q[39], A[1]), relation must necessarily be the same as person.
Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties
were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; for, they said,
there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as stated
above ([336]Q[32], A[2]). We must, however, say that there are
properties in God; as we have shown ([337]Q[32], A[2]). These are
designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons.
So, since the nature of a form requires it to be "in" that of which it
is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and
yet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God,
and yet is God.
Reply to Objection 1: Person and property are really the same, but
differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is
multiplied, the other must also be multiplied. We must, however,
consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold
real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For,
since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and
form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete,
as "Godhead" and "God." And as the divine simplicity excludes the
composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is
attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are
the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence. According
to this twofold identity, property in God is the same person. For
personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract
and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting
persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation
is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal
properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of
identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence.
Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the
person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that
as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one
property in the two persons, as above explained ([338]Q[30], A[2] ).
Reply to Objection 2: The properties are said to be in the essence,
only by mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of
identity, not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification;
as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and
distinguish the persons, but not the essence.
Reply to Objection 3: Notional participles and verbs signify the
notional acts: and acts belong to a "suppositum." Now, properties are
not designated as "supposita," but as forms of "supposita." And so
their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs
being predicated of the properties.
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Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?
Objection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by
the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the
persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by
themselves, and not by the relation.
Objection 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its
genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But
"hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance.
Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
Objection 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative.
But the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction.
Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.
Objection 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the
first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction,
which comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is
towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God
cannot be relation.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.): "Relation alone multiplies
the Trinity of the divine persons."
I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to be found something
common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of
distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we
must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are
several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the divine
persons, and these are "origin" and "relation." Although these do not
really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification; for
"origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and "relation" by
way of the form, as "paternity."
Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that
the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say
that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former
begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the
properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons as
resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest the
distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the
material principles.
This opinion, however, cannot stand---for two reasons. Firstly,
because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their
distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to
both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their
form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but
means the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies
the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator.
Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator
should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the generator and
in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be
distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to
presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the
persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons
are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because
the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if
what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence
remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must
constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the
properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons,
inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity is
the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract and
the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin that
it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an
active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it
presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as "nativity,"
signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet constituting
the person.
It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are
distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in both
ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding
they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations; whence this
name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also the hypostasis;
whereas this term "Begetter" or "Begetting" signifies property only;
forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies the relation which is
distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term
"Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which is not distinctive
and constitutive of the hypostasis.
Reply to Objection 1: The persons are the subsisting relations
themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine
persons for them to be distinguished by the relations.
Reply to Objection 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as
regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but
only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their
distinction.
Reply to Objection 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it
approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction.
So the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes
the least possible; and this is by relation.
Reply to Objection 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the
subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent,
it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is
said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word
"another" signifies the correlative which is not prior, but
simultaneous in the order of nature.
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Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from
the persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the hypostases remain if the properties
or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For that to
which something is added, may be understood when the addition is taken
away; as man is something added to animal which can be understood if
rational be taken away. But person is something added to hypostasis;
for person is "a hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity."
Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a person, the
hypostasis remains.
Objection 2: Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is
someone, are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by
paternity, supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that
the Son, in Whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone." So
when paternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains
"someone"---that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property be removed
from person, the hypostasis remains.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): "Unbegotten is
not the same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son,
nothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten." But if He had not
begotten the Son, there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if
paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the Father
as unbegotten.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has nothing else
than birth." But He is Son by "birth." Therefore, if filiation be
removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds as
regards the other persons.
I answer that, Abstraction by the intellect is twofold---when the
universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from
man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a
circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The
difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in
the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which
the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the difference of
rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the
intellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the form
from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the intellect;
as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from brass, there
remains in our intellect separately the understanding both of a circle,
and of brass. Now, although there is no universal nor particular in
God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless, as regards the mode
of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God;
and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "substance is
common and hypostasis is particular." So, if we speak of the
abstraction of the universal from the particular, the common universal
essence remains in the intellect if the properties are removed; but not
the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it were, a particular.
But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the
non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases
and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's
being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father,
the Father's hypostasis or person remains.
If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of
the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not
to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added
to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own
"supposita," inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus
paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something
distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. So, as
relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above
explained [339](A[2]), it follows that if the personal relations are
mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however,
think, as above noted, that the divine hypostases are not distinguished
by the relations, but only by origin; so that the Father is a
hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as from
another by generation. And that the consequent relations which are to
be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of a
person, and are thus called "personal properties." Hence, if these
relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the persons,
remain.
But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations
distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above [340](A[2]);
secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as
appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) that, "person
is the individual substance of a rational nature." Hence, to have
hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the
rationality from the nature, but not the property from the person.
Reply to Objection 1: Person does not add to hypostasis a
distinguishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of
dignity, all of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this
distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is
understood as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the
distinguishing property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no
longer remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the
nature removed; for both person and hypostasis are individual
substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs
essentially to both.
Reply to Objection 2: By paternity the Father is not only Father, but
is a person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It does not follow,
however, that the Son is not "someone" or a hypostasis; just as it does
not follow that He is not a person.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine does not mean to say that the
hypostasis of the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity
were removed, as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the
hypostasis of the Father; for this would be impossible, since "being
unbegotten" says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself
says. But he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not every
unbegotten being is the Father. So, if paternity be removed, the
hypostasis of the Father does not remain in God, as distinguished from
the other persons, but only as distinguished from creatures; as the
Jews understand it.
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Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are understood before
the properties. For the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. i, D,
xxvii) that "the Father always is, because He is ever begetting the
Son." So it seems that generation precedes paternity in the order of
intelligence.
Objection 2: Further, in the order of intelligence every relation
presupposes that on which it is founded; as equality presupposes
quantity. But paternity is a relation founded on the action of
generation. Therefore paternity presupposes generation.
Objection 3: Further, active generation is to paternity as nativity is
to filiation. But filiation presupposes nativity; for the Son is so
called because He is born. Therefore paternity also presupposes
generation.
On the contrary, Generation is the operation of the person of the
Father. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore
in the order of intelligence, paternity is prior to generation.
I answer that, According to the opinion that the properties do not
distinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest
them as already distinct and constituted, we must absolutely say that
the relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional
acts, so that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that "because
He begets, He is the Father." A distinction, however, is needed if we
suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the divine
hypostases. For origin has in God an active and passive
signification---active, as generation is attributed to the Father, and
spiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and
the Son; passive, as nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession
to the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in the
passive sense, simply precedes the personal properties of the person
proceeding; because origin, as passively understood, signifies the way
to a person constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified
actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal
relation of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration
precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed relative property
common to the Father and the Son. The personal property of the Father
can be considered in a twofold sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus
again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for
relation, as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as it
constitutes the person; and thus the notional act presupposes the
relation, as an action presupposes a person acting.
Reply to Objection 1: When the Master says that "because He begets, He
is Father," the term "Father" is taken as meaning relation only, but
not as signifying the subsisting person; for then it would be necessary
to say conversely that because He is Father He begets.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection avails of paternity as a relation,
but not as constituting a person.
Reply to Objection 3: Nativity is the way to the person of the Son; and
so, in the order of intelligence, it precedes filiation, even as
constituting the person of the Son. But active generation signifies a
proceeding from the person of the Father; wherefore it presupposes the
personal property of the Father.
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OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS (SIX ARTICLES)
We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts,
concerning which six points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?
(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?
(3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or
from something?
(4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts?
(5) What this power means?
(6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?
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Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are not to be
attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever is
predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine
substance, except what pertains to the relation." But action is one of
the ten "genera." Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to His
essence, and not to a notion.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that,
"everything which is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His
substance, or relation." But whatever belongs to the substance is
signified by the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the
relations, by the names of the persons, or by the names of the
properties. Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to
be attributed to the persons.
Objection 3: Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause
passion. But we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are
notional acts to be placed in God.
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says: "It
is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional acts
are to be placed in God.
I answer that, In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin.
But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts. Wherefore,
to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we must attribute
notional acts to the persons.
Reply to Objection 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In God
there is a twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature
proceeds from Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so
those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding
of creatures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin
in God regards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts
which designate the order of this origin are called notional; because
the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons, as
is clear from what was above explained ([341]Q[32], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: The notional acts differ from the relations of
the persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are
altogether the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and
nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D,
xxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from
another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be changed
from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause.
Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement; for, as
movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called
"passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another
and terminating in what is moved, is called "action." Hence, if we take
away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin, in so
far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is from
that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists, the
personal action of the one producing a person is only the habitude of
the principle to the person who is from the principle; which habitudes
are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of
divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible
things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and
passions, so far as these imply movement, differ from the relations
which result from action and passion, and therefore it was necessary to
signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the manner of
act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident
that they are really the same, differing only in their mode of
signification.
Reply to Objection 3: Action, so far as it means origin of movement,
naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not attributed
to God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical
standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking, as we
attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son "to be begotten."
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Whether the notional acts are voluntary?
Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For
Hilary says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father led
to beget the Son."
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the
kingdom of the Son of His love" (Col. 1:13). But love belongs to the
will. Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy
Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He
proceeds voluntarily.
Objection 4: Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the
Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore the
Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.
Objection 5: Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if
the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He
begot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad
Orosium qu. vii).
On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father
begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity."
I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will,
this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative
designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my
will---that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be said that
the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He
wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other sense, the
ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that the
workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work;
and thus in that sense it must be said the God the Father begot the
Son, not by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will.
Whence in the book De Synod, it is said: "If anyone say that the Son
was made by the Will of God, as a creature is said to be made, let him
be anathema." The reason of this is that will and nature differ in
their manner of causation, in such a way that nature is determined to
one, while the will is not determined to one; and this because the
effect is assimilated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter
acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural
form whereby it exists; and hence such as it is itself, such also is
its work. But the form whereby the will acts is not only one, but many,
according to the number of ideas understood. Hence the quality of the
will's action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on the
agent's will and understanding. So the will is the principle of those
things which may be this way or that way; whereas of those things which
can be only in one way, the principle is nature. What, however, can
exist in different ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it
belongs to the nature of a created being; because God is of Himself
necessary being, whereas a creature is made from nothing. Thus, the
Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father
begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle. But we,
on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by
will, but by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of
God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the
Son a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things
created are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God,
subsists in the perfect likeness of God."
Reply to Objection 1: This saying is directed against those who did not
admit even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of
the Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner
by nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves
suffer many things against our will from natural necessity---as, for
instance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears from what
precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for thus we
read: "Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were
led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son."
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of
God, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as
if love were the principle of the Son's generation.
Reply to Objection 3: The will, as a natural faculty, wills something
naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise God
naturally wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things other
than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself, as
above explained ([342]Q[19], A[3]). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as
Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally,
although He proceeds by mode of will.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of
the mind, a return is made to those first principles which are
naturally understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus
the conception of the divine Word is natural.
Reply to Objection 5: A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and
"by reason of another." Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold
meaning: firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus
necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause, when
a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as
without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well
attained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation necessary;
because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject to
compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary "of itself" which
cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to be; and in the
same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son.
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Whether the notional acts proceed from something?
Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from
anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will be
either from Himself or from something else. If from something else,
since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it
follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and
this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that, "In
them nothing diverse or different exists." If the Father begets the Son
from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be
something permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated
therefrom just as we say, "The man is white," since the man remains,
when not from white he is made white---it follows that either the
Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father is
the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son
from something, but from nothing.
Objection 2: Further, that whence anything is generated is the
principle regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the
Son from His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or
nature of the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a
material principle, because in God nothing material exists; and
therefore it is, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is
the principle of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence
generates, which was disproved above ([343]Q[39], A[5]).
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three
persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not
another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another
thing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not from the
Father's essence.
Objection 4: Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture
the Son is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus. 24:5), in the
person of the Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most
High, the first-born before all creatures": and further on (Ecclus.
24:14) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning,
and before the world was I created." Therefore the Son was not begotten
from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the
Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said (Zech. 12:1): "Thus saith the
Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of
the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him"; and (Amos 4:13)
according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "I Who form the earth,
and create the spirit."
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says:
"God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal
to Himself."
I answer that, The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the
Father's substance. For it was explained above ([344]Q[27], A[2];
[345]Q[33], AA[2] ,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and
truly exist in God. Now, this is the difference between true
"generation," whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and "making,"
that the maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter
makes a bench out of wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself.
Now, as a created workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes
things out of nothing, as will be shown later on ([346]Q[45], A[1]),
not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made,
but because the whole substance of a thing is produced by Him without
anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from
the Father as out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what
the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of
filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the
Son of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be
properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is stated (1
Jn. 5:20): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ." Therefore the
true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten.
That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of
God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain
likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is
the only true and natural Son of God, He is called the "only begotten,"
according to Jn. 1:18, "The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of
the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so as others are entitled sons
of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the "first
begotten," according to Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew He also
predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He
might be the first born of many brethren." Therefore the Son of God is
begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man
is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation passes
into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine nature
cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father in
begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but
communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin
remaining as explained above ([347]Q[40], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 1: When we say that the Son was born of the Father,
the preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle,
but not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter,
is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the
divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.
Reply to Objection 2: When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of
the Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v),
this denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he
expounds, "the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"---that is,
of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13):
"When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said
more explicitly, of the essence of the Father."
This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words.
For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence; but not
that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them otherwise,
by observing that the preposition "of" [de] always denotes
consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the builder,
since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, however, that
something is "of" another, if this is its consubstantial principle, no
matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the
son is said to be "of" the father, or a material principle, as a knife
is "of" iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which
the forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we can say
that an angel is "of" an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say
that the Son is begotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as
the essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the
Son.
Reply to Objection 3: When we say that the Son is begotten of the
essence of the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But
when we say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there
is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the
preposition, so there is no parity of argument.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be
understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom
given by God to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely,
Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His works"
(Ecclus. 1:9,10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to
speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created is
a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be
referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense
be, "From the beginning and before the world was I made"---that is, I
was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as
both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the
divine generation; for in generation what is generated receives the
nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection; whereas in
creation the Creator is not changed, but the creature does not receive
the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is called both created and begotten,
in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of the Father
may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the
Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text
of Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages quoted do not refer to the
Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes
air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other
invisible substance.
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Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God there is no power in respect of
the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or passive;
neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which
we call passive power, as above explained ([348]Q[25], A[1]); nor can
active power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine
persons were not made, as stated above [349](A[3]). Therefore in God
there is no power in respect of the notional acts.
Objection 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the
divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary. Therefore,
as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there
cannot be power in God.
Objection 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the
concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which
belongs to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and
not as regards intellect and will, as stated above ([350]Q[25], A[1]).
Therefore, in God power does not exist in reference to the notional
acts.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the
Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God
the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts.
I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also
a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the
principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of
generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of
spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and
the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power of
generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every
generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we must
suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power of
spirating.
Reply to Objection 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does not
proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts
has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person
as proceeding.
Reply to Objection 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a
consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, in
God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in
the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this
latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so
also is it possible that the Son should be generated.
Reply to Objection 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle
implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must
observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real
distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real
distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of which
He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct from
the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God the
distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action
would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to those actions
in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from God,
either personally or essentially, we may ascribe power to God in its
proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of
creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating.
But "to understand" and "to will" are not such actions as to designate
the procession of something distinct from God, either essentially or
personally. Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe
power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way of
understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate by different terms
the intellect and the act of understanding in God, whereas in God the
act of understanding is His very essence which has no principle.
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Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of
spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power
signifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active power
is the principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in
God principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in
God, power does not signify essence but relation.
Objection 2: Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are
not distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore, the
same applies to the power of begetting.
Objection 3: Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common
to the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the
three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify
the essence.
On the contrary, As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He
wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence.
Therefore, also, the power to beget.
I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget signifies
relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is
properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that
produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as to
the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in
his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget
a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in
which the begotten is like the begetter.
Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine
nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power
of begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of God cannot
but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist
other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God."
We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies
principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii),
and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as
identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For
although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless
it is a personal property, being in respect to the person of the
Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the
individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but
is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would
beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood as that by which
the Father begets, but as constituting the person of the Father,
otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the
Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to Him.
And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that generation
is the "work of nature," not of nature generating, but of nature, as
being that by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of
begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation
indirectly.
Reply to Objection 1: Power does not signify the relation itself of a
principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it
signifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which
we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that by which
the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and
the generator from that which it generates: but that by which the
generator generates is common to generated and generator, and so much
more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore,
the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter
begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity,
and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the fact
that we say that the divine essence "is the principle by which the
Begetter begets," it does not follow that the divine essence is
distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that
the divine essence begets.
Reply to Objection 2: As in God, the power of begetting is the same as
the act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as
the act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: When I speak of the "power of begetting," power
is signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say,
the "essence of the Father." Wherefore in respect of the essence, which
is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three persons:
but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the
person of the Father.
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Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?
Objection 1: It would seem that a notional act can be directed to
several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or
spirated in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But
the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He
cannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore
there can be several Sons in God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son
did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved Him
not."
Objection 3: Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than
has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God
can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished
after begetting the Son.
On the contrary, In God "that which is possible," and "that which is"
do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be
several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more
than three Persons in God; which is heretical.
I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father,
one Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given.
The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the
Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations
themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or
several Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or more
than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except
owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species are not
multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore
there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could
be but one subsistent whiteness.
The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God
understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can
be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is
the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of love, which
person is the Holy Ghost.
The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed.
For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said [351](A[2]), and
nature is determined to one.
The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons.
For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation is
contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is
similar in regard to the other persons.
Reply to Objection 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son
has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has
the power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the
gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has
the "power to beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the same
being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the
notional term added. But if the word "generandi" [of being begotten] is
taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power "generandi" is in
the Son---that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be said
if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the
sense be "the power of generation"---that is, a power by which it is
generated by some person.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words
that the Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not
because He could not, as we shall see later on ([352]Q[42], A[6], ad
3).
Reply to Objection 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of matter
in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have
explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any
lack of begetting power in the Father.
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OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another:
firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard to
mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry.
(1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons?
(2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He
proceeds in eternity?
(3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons?
(4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?
(5) Whether the one divine person is in another?
(6) Whether they are equal in power?
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Whether there is equality in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine
persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in
quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the
divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic
quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which
we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete
quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality is
not becoming to the divine persons.
Objection 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have
said ([353]Q[39], A[2]). Now essence is signified by way of form. But
agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore,
we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality.
Objection 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are
equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine
persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine
says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers perfectly to that whereof
it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which it
represents cannot be said to be equal to the image." But the Son is the
image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the Son.
Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons.
Objection 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common
to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the
relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
On the contrary, Athanasius says that "the three persons are co-eternal
and co-equal to one another."
I answer that, We must needs admit equality among the divine persons.
For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality
signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything
greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin.
i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak
of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the
Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus involving a
plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have
the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His
essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the
divine persons, they would not have the same essence; and thus the
three persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must
therefore admit equality among the divine persons.
Reply to Objection 1: Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of "bulk"
or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things,
and has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of
"virtue," which is measured according to the perfection of some nature
or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something
as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or less, perfect
in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its
source---that is, by the perfection of that form or nature: such is the
greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great heat on
account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De
Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be
greater is to be better," for the more perfect a thing is the better it
is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by the effects of the form.
Now the first effect of form is being, for everything has being by
reason of its form. The second effect is operation, for every agent
acts through its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both
in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to being,
forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration;
and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature
are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad
Petrum i) says: "We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and
Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or
excels in greatness, or surpasses in power."
Reply to Objection 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual
quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it
excludes excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to
be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as
the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to
be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than another.
And because not only is the same nature in both Father and Son, but
also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not only that
the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the error of
Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error
of Arius.
Reply to Objection 3: Equality and likeness in God may be designated in
two ways---namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns,
equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the
Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because
the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Wherefore,
just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is therefore equal
to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the Son, and is
therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness are not mutual." For
effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the
form of their causes; but not conversely, for the form is principally
in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.
But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not
in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son
receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father,
and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled to
the Father, but not conversely.
Reply to Objection 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us to
consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in
which they are distinct. Now equality implies both ---namely,
distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself;
and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to
one another, that they are of the same greatness and essence. Now it is
clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation.
Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation:
for when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is
not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in both
these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore
equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation
distinct from the personal relations: but in its concept it includes
both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the unity of
essence. For this reason the Master says (Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in
these "it is only the terms that are relative."
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Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son
with the Father?
Objection 1: It would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal
with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives twelve
modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a
point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like
the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality of
nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a seal;
wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The fourth is
the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also consubstantiality is
wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject;
but the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a
species from matter, as sense receives the species from the sensible
object; wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity. The
seventh is the exciting of the will by knowledge, which excitation is
merely temporal. The eighth is transformation, as an image is made of
brass; which transformation is material. The ninth is motion from a
mover; and here again we have effect and cause. The tenth is the taking
of species from genera; but this mode has no place in God, for the
Father is not predicated of the Son as the genus of a species. The
eleventh is the realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer
arises from the one in the mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is
begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteriority of
time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in
every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son is from the
Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later than the
Father, or both.
Objection 2: Further, everything that comes from another has a
principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is
not eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence
everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is
existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins
to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.
Objection 4: Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He
is always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is
begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process of
generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive things,
which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it follows
that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be admitted. Thus
there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the Son, and
before that moment the Son did not exist.
On the contrary, Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are
co-eternal with each other."
I answer that, We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father.
In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from
a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons:
one on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action.
On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free
agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account of the choice of
time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect,
as stated above ([354]Q[41], A[2]), so it can choose the time in which
to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens
from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very
first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man
is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of
action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously
with its principle when the action is successive. So, given that an
agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not
exist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's
termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said
([355]Q[41], A[2]), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but
by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity;
and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not
successive, because thus the Son would be successively generated, and
this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which
is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son existed
whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the
Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38),
no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the
divine generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many
of these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied
from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let
Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the
Father; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth; let the
name Son insinuate His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the
procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly;
the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an
intellect passing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said of
God.
Reply to Objection 2: Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but
not the principle of origin.
Reply to Objection 3: Every corruption is a change; and so all that
corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation,
however, is not changed, as stated above ([356]Q[27], A[2]). Hence the
Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting.
Reply to Objection 4: In time there is something indivisible---namely,
the instant; and there is something else which endures---namely, time.
But in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have
said above ([357]Q[10], A[2] ad 1, A[4] ad 2). But the generation of
the Son is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And
so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say
that "He is ever being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as
Gregory [*Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super Ps. 2:7] said, it is
better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence of
eternity, and "born" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus,
therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when He
was not," as Arius said.
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Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does not
exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the essence, or
a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the
essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no
order of nature in God.
Objection 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes
before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in the
divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as
declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no
order of nature.
Objection 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists.
But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is not
subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.
Objection 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But
there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of
nature.
On the contrary, Where plurality exists without order, confusion
exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius
says. Therefore in God order exists.
I answer that, Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore
since there are many kinds of principle---namely, according to site, as
a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and
according to each individual cause---so are there many kinds of order.
Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as
we have stated ([358]Q[33], A[1]): so there must likewise be order
according to origin, without priority; and this is called 'the order of
nature': in the words of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one
is prior to another, but whereby one is from another."
Reply to Objection 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of
origin in general, not a special kind of origin.
Reply to Objection 2: In things created, even when what is derived from
a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle
still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally
considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of
cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding
therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in
the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the
definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the
persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the
nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to
another, not even in the order of nature and reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The order of nature means not the ordering of
nature itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons
according to natural origin.
Reply to Objection 4: Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a
principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more
correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence.
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Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in
greatness. For He Himself said (Jn. 14:28): "The Father is greater than
I"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:28): "The Son Himself shall be
subject to Him that put all things under Him."
Objection 2: Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But
paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not
possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness
to the Father.
Objection 3: Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many
parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are
more than two, or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a
part; for under relation or notion, several notions are included.
Therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the
Son there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal to the Father.
On the contrary, It is said (Phil. 2:6): "He thought it not robbery to
be equal with God."
I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness.
For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature.
Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the
Son by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of
the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the
Father Himself. But since in men generation is a certain kind of
transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it follows
that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him, but
attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a defect in the
principle of generation it should happen otherwise. From what precedes
([359]Q[27], A[2]; [360]Q[33], AA[2] ,3), it is evident that in God
there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that the
power of generation in the Father was defective, nor that the Son of
God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by change.
Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in
greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): "Remove bodily
weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and all human
shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural nativity, is the
father's equal, because he has a like nature."
Reply to Objection 1: These words are to be understood of Christ's
human nature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him;
but in His divine nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed
by Athanasius, "Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than the
Father in humanity": and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): "By the fact of
giving, the Father is greater; but He is not less to Whom the same
being is given"; and (De Synod.): "The Son subjects Himself by His
inborn piety"---that is, by His recognition of paternal authority;
whereas "creatures are subject by their created weakness."
Reply to Objection 2: Equality is measured by greatness. In God
greatness signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (A[1],
ad 1), and belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God
have reference to the essence; nor can there be inequality or
dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations. Wherefore
Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), "The question of origin is, Who
is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what kind, or how
great, is he?" Therefore, paternity is the Father's dignity, as also
the Father's essence: since dignity is something absolute, and pertains
to the essence. As, therefore, the same essence, which in the Father is
paternity, in the Son is filiation, so the same dignity which, in the
Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. It is thus true to say
that the Son possesses whatever dignity the Father has; but we cannot
argue---"the Father has paternity, therefore the Son has paternity,"
for there is a transition from substance to relation. For the Father
and the Son have the same essence and dignity, which exist in the
Father by the relation of giver, and in the Son by relation of
receiver.
Reply to Objection 3: In God relation is not a universal whole,
although it is predicated of each of the relations; because all the
relations are one in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with
the idea of universal, the parts of which are distinguished in being.
Persons likewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above
([361]Q[30], A[4]). Wherefore all the relations together are not
greater than only one; nor are all the persons something greater than
only one; because the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in
each person.
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Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each
other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes of
one thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son in
the Father, or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each
mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other.
Objection 2: Further, nothing that has come out from another is within.
But the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according to Mic.
5:2: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of
eternity." Therefore the Son is not in the Father.
Objection 3: Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But
the Son and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot be
in the other.
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 14:10): "I am in the Father, and the
Father is in Me."
I answer that, There are three points of consideration as regards the
Father and the Son; the essence, the relation and the origin; and
according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The Father
is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own
essence and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on
His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's essence is in the Son,
the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His own
essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is His
essence. This is expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), "The unchangeable
God, so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an unchangeable
subsisting God. So we understand the nature of God to subsist in Him,
for He is God in God." It is also manifest that as regards the
relations, each of two relative opposites is in the concept of the
other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the procession of the
intelligible word is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains
in the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word is therein
contained. And the same applies to the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: What is contained in creatures does not
sufficiently represent what exists in God; so according to none of the
modes enumerated by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each
other. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be
found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle,
except that the unity of essence between the principle and that which
proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created.
Reply to Objection 2: The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode
of the interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and
remains therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the
distinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation.
Reply to Objection 3: The Father and the Son are relatively opposed,
but not essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite
is in the other.
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Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in
power. For it is said (Jn. 5:19): "The Son cannot do anything of
Himself but what He seeth the Father doing." But the Father can act of
Himself. Therefore the Father's power is greater than the Son's.
Objection 2: Further, greater is the power of him who commands and
teaches than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the
Son according to Jn. 14:31: "As the Father gave Me commandment so do
I." The Father also teaches the Son: "The Father loveth the Son, and
showeth Him all things that Himself doth" (Jn. 5:20). Also, the Son
hears: "As I hear, so I judge" (Jn. 5:30). Therefore the Father has
greater power than the Son.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to be able
to beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii,
7), "Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the
omnipotence of God the Father?" But the Son cannot beget a Son, as
proved above ([362]Q[41], A[6]). Therefore the Son cannot do all that
belongs to the Father's omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him
power.
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:19): "Whatsoever things the Father
doth, these the Son also doth in like manner."
I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power.
Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures,
for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater
power is there for action. Now it was shown above [363](A[4]) that the
very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son
should be the Father's equal in greatness---that is, in perfection of
nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power;
and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both.
Reply to Objection 1: The words, "the Son cannot of Himself do
anything," do not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the
Father, since it is immediately added, "Whatsoever things the Father
doth, the Son doth in like manner"; but their meaning is to show that
the Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His
nature. Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), "The unity of the divine
nature implies that the Son so acts of Himself [per se], that He does
not act by Himself [a se]."
Reply to Objection 2: The Father's "showing" and the Son's "hearing"
are to be taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to
the Son, as He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can
be explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge
and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be
referred to Christ in His human nature.
Reply to Objection 3: As the same essence is paternity in the Father,
and filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and
the Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the
Father can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to
argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for
generation signifies a divine relation. So the Son has the same
omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation; the Father
possessing power as "giving" signified when we say that He is able to
beget; while the Son possesses the power of "receiving," signified by
saying that He can be begotten.
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THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We next consider the mission of the divine persons, concerning which
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent?
(2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?
(3) In what sense a divine person is invisibly sent?
(4) Whether it is fitting that each person be sent?
(5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent?
(6) To whom the invisible mission is directed?
(7) Of the visible mission
(8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly?
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Whether a divine person can be properly sent?
Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person cannot be properly
sent. For one who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine
person is not less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by
another.
Objection 2: Further, what is sent is separated from the sender; hence
Jerome says, commenting on Ezech. 16:53: "What is joined and tied in
one body cannot be sent." But in the divine persons there is nothing
that is separable, as Hilary says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one person
is not sent by another.
Objection 3: Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes
anew into another. But this does not apply to a divine person, Who is
everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be
sent.
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 8:16): "I am not alone, but I and the
Father that sent Me."
I answer that, the notion of mission includes two things: the habitude
of the one sent to the sender; and that of the one sent to the end
whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind of
procession of the one sent from the sender: either according to
command, as the master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as
an adviser may be said to send the king to battle; or according to
origin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habitude to the term to
which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to be
present there: either because in no way was he present before in the
place whereto he is sent, or because he begins to be there in some way
in which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a divine person
is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from
the sender, and as meaning a new way of existing in another; thus the
Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He
began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas "He
was" previously "in the world" (Jn. 1:1).
Reply to Objection 1: Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when
it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or
counsel; forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the
counsellor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of
origin, which is according to equality, as explained above ([364]Q[42],
AA[4],6).
Reply to Objection 2: What is so sent as to begin to exist where
previously it did not exist, is locally moved by being sent; hence it
is necessarily separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no
place in the mission of a divine person; for the divine person sent
neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases
to exist where He was. Hence such a mission takes place without a
separation, having only distinction of origin.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection rests on the idea of mission
according to local motion, which is not in God.
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Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?
Objection 1: It would seem that mission can be eternal. For Gregory
says (Hom. xxvi, in Ev.), "The Son is sent as He is begotten." But the
Son's generation is eternal. Therefore mission is eternal.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something
temporally. But a divine person is not changed. Therefore the mission
of a divine person is not temporal, but eternal.
Objection 3: Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of
the divine persons is eternal. Therefore mission is also eternal.
On the contrary, It is said (Gal. 4:4): "When the fullness of the time
was come, God sent His Son."
I answer that, A certain difference is to be observed in all the words
that express the origin of the divine persons. For some express only
relation to the principle, as "procession" and "going forth." Others
express the term of procession together with the relation to the
principle. Of these some express the eternal term, as "generation" and
"spiration"; for generation is the procession of the divine person into
the divine nature, and passive spiration is the procession of the
subsisting love. Others express the temporal term with the relation to
the principle, as "mission" and "giving." For a thing is sent that it
may be in something else, and is given that it may be possessed; but
that a divine person be possessed by any creature, or exist in it in a
new mode, is temporal.
Hence "mission" and "giving" have only a temporal significance in God;
but "generation" and "spiration" are exclusively eternal; whereas
"procession" and "giving," in God, have both an eternal and a temporal
signification: for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but
temporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or
likewise by dwelling in man according to His invisible mission.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the
Son, not from the Father, but from His mother; or it may be taken to
mean that He could be sent because eternally begotten.
Reply to Objection 2: That a divine person may newly exist in anyone,
or be possessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the
divine person, but from change in the creature; as God Himself is
called Lord temporally by change of the creature.
Reply to Objection 3: Mission signifies not only procession from the
principle, but also determines the temporal term of the procession.
Hence mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the
eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For the
relation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the
procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal, not
that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double term,
temporal and eternal.
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Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only according to the
gift of sanctifying grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission of the divine
person is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For the
sending of a divine person means that He is given. Hence if the divine
person is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the
divine person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and this
is the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is not given, but
that His gifts are given.
Objection 2: Further, this preposition, "according to," denotes the
habitude of some cause. But the divine person is the cause why the gift
of sanctifying grace is possessed, and not conversely, according to
Rom. 5:5, "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy
Ghost, Who is given to us." Therefore it is improperly said that the
divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "the Son,
when temporally perceived by the mind, is sent." But the Son is known
not only by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace, as by
faith and knowledge. Therefore the divine person is not sent only
according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
Objection 4: Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was given to the
apostles for the working of miracles. This, however, is not a gift of
sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine person
is not given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the Holy Ghost
proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctification." But mission is
a temporal procession. Since then the creature's sanctification is by
sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission of the divine person is
only by sanctifying grace.
I answer that, The divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that He
exists newly in any one; and He is given as possessed by anyone; and
neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace.
For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according
to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which
participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode,
however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature
wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower,
and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature by its
operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to
this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational
creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other
effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the
rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace. Hence, the
divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only according to
sanctifying grace.
Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy: and
to have the power of enjoying the divine person can only be according
to sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and
dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence
the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.
Reply to Objection 1: By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational
creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created
gift itself, but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the
invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying
grace; and yet the divine person Himself is given.
Reply to Objection 2: Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess
the divine person; and this is signified when it is said that the Holy
Ghost is given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift
itself of grace is from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the words,
"the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost."
Reply to Objection 3: Although the Son can be known by us according to
other effects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by
us according to those effects.
Reply to Objection 4: The working of miracles manifests sanctifying
grace as also does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous
graces. Hence gratuitous grace is called the "manifestation of the
Spirit" (1 Cor. 12:7). So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the
apostles for the working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was
given to them with the outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying
grace given to them without the grace itself, it would not be simply
said that the Holy Ghost was given, except with some qualifying term;
just as we read of certain ones receiving the gift of the spirit of
prophecy, or of miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power of
prophesying or of working miracles.
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Whether the Father can be fittingly sent?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is fitting also that the Father
should be sent. For being sent means that the divine person is given.
But the Father gives Himself since He can only be possessed by His
giving Himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father sends Himself.
Objection 2: Further, the divine person is sent according to the
indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us
according to Jn. 14:23: "We will come to him and make Our abode with
him." Therefore each one of the divine persons is sent.
Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to one person, belongs to them
all, except the notions and persons. But mission does not signify any
person; nor even a notion, since there are only five notions, as stated
above ([365]Q[32], A[3]). Therefore every divine person can be sent.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3), "The Father alone is
never described as being sent."
I answer that, The very idea of mission means procession from another,
and in God it means procession according to origin, as above expounded.
Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it fitting for
Him to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son and to the Holy
Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another.
Reply to Objection 1: In the sense of "giving" as a free bestowal of
something, the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing Himself to be
enjoyed by the creature. But as implying the authority of the giver as
regards what is given, "to be given" only applies in God to the Person
Who is from another; and the same as regards "being sent."
Reply to Objection 2: Although the effect of grace is also from the
Father, Who dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and the Holy Ghost,
still He is not described as being sent, for He is not from another.
Thus Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Father, when known by
anyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He
is, or from whom He proceeds."
Reply to Objection 3: Mission, meaning procession from the sender,
includes the signification of a notion, not of a special notion, but in
general; thus "to be from another" is common to two of the notions.
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Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting for the Son to be
sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the divine person is according
to the gift of grace. But all gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost,
according to 1 Cor. 12:11: "One and the same Spirit worketh all
things." Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly.
Objection 2: Further, the mission of the divine person is according to
sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to the perfection of the
intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be held
without the gift of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I should
have prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if
I should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and have not
charity, I am nothing." Therefore, since the Son proceeds as the word
of the intellect, it seems unfitting for Him to be sent invisibly.
Objection 3: Further, the mission of the divine person is a procession,
as expounded above ([366]AA[1],4). But the procession of the Son and of
the Holy Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct
missions if both are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous,
since one would suffice for the creature's sanctification.
On the contrary, It is said of divine Wisdom (Wis. 9:10): "Send her
from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the seat of Thy greatness."
I answer that, The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying
grace, according to Jn. 14:23: "We will come to him, and will make Our
abode with him." But that a divine person be sent to anyone by
invisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way
within him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both
to the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by
grace, and to be from another, it therefore belongs to both of them to
be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by grace,
still it does not belong to Him to be from another, and consequently He
is not sent.
Reply to Objection 1: Although all the gifts, considered as such, are
attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the
first Gift, since He is Love, as stated above ([367]Q[38], A[1]), some
gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature, are
appropriated in a certain way to the Son, those, namely, which belong
to the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mission of
the Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Son is sent
to anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone."
Reply to Objection 2: The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for
a divine person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a
likening of the soul to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift of
grace. Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to the
Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission of the Holy Ghost
is according to the mode of charity. Whereas the Son is the Word, not
any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love. Hence Augustine says
(De Trin. ix 10): "The Word we speak of is knowledge with love." Thus
the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of
intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual
illumination, which breaks forth into the affection of love, as is said
(Jn. 6:45): "Everyone that hath heard from the Father and hath learned,
cometh to Me," and (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire shall flame
forth." Thus Augustine plainly says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Son is
sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone." Now perception
implies a certain experimental knowledge; and this is properly called
wisdom [sapientia], as it were a sweet knowledge [sapida scientia],
according to Ecclus. 6:23: "The wisdom of doctrine is according to her
name."
Reply to Objection 3: Since mission implies the origin of the person
Who is sent, and His indwelling by grace, as above explained
[368](A[1]), if we speak of mission according to origin, in this sense
the Son's mission is distinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost,
as generation is distinguished from procession. If we consider mission
as regards the effect of grace, in this sense the two missions are
united in the root which is grace, but are distinguished in the effects
of grace, which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the
kindling of the affection. Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot
be without the other, because neither takes place without sanctifying
grace, nor is one person separated from the other.
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Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission is not to all who
participate grace. For the Fathers of the Old Testament had their share
of grace. Yet to them was made no invisible mission; for it is said
(Jn. 7:39): "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet
glorified." Therefore the invisible mission is not to all partakers in
grace.
Objection 2: Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the
invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue; because
progress in virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or
decreases; and thus the mission would be continuous. Therefore the
invisible mission is not to all who share in grace.
Objection 3: Further, Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace.
But mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas
Christ, as man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God.
Therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace.
Objection 4: Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and
it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore
the invisible mission is not to all that have grace.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4; xv, 27), the
invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Now every
creature that has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission
is to every such creature.
I answer that, As above stated ([369]AA[3],4,5), mission in its very
meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was
not before, as occurs to creatures; or begins to exist where he was
before, but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to the
divine persons. Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is sent
implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain renewal by
grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom are to be
found these two conditions.
Reply to Objection 1: The invisible mission was directed to the Old
Testament Fathers, as appears from what Augustine says (De Trin. iv,
20), that the invisible mission of the Son "is in man and with men.
This was done in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets." Thus
the words, "the Spirit was not yet given," are to be applied to that
giving accompanied with a visible sign which took place on the day of
Pentecost.
Reply to Objection 2: The invisible mission takes place also as regards
progress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.
iv, 20), that "the Son is sent to each one when He is known and
perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived according
to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united
perfectly to Him." Such invisible mission, however, chiefly occurs as
regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of a new act, or in the
acquisition of a new state of grace; as, for example, the proficiency
in reference to the gift of miracles or of prophecy, or in the fervor
of charity leading a man to expose himself to the danger of martyrdom,
or to renounce his possessions, or to undertake any arduous work.
Reply to Objection 3: The invisible mission is directed to the blessed
at the very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made
to them subsequently, not by "intensity" of grace, but by the further
revelation of mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such
an increase is by the "extension" of grace, because it extends to a
greater number of objects. To Christ the invisible mission was sent at
the first moment of His conception; but not afterwards, since from the
beginning of His conception He was filled with all wisdom and grace.
Reply to Objection 4: Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of
the New Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments
of the art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent to
the passive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to its
term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the
sacraments, but to those who receive grace through the sacraments.
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Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in
a visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is said to
be less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be less
than the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a
visible manner.
Objection 2: Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union
to a visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh. But
the Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature; and hence it cannot
be said that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in others,
unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the sacraments,
and in all the figures of the law. Thus the Holy Ghost is either not
sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes place in all these
things.
Objection 3: Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth
the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason of
those visible creatures more than any other person.
Objection 4: Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest
kind of creature---namely, the human nature. Therefore if the Holy
Ghost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational
creatures.
Objection 5: Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by
the ministry of the angels; as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). So
visible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the
angels. Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost.
Objection 6: Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner is
only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission; as invisible
things are made known by the visible. So those to whom the invisible
mission was not sent, ought not to receive the visible mission; and to
all who received the invisible mission, whether in the New or in the
Old Testament, the visible mission ought likewise to be sent; and this
is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent visibly.
On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 3:16) that, when our Lord was
baptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the shape of a dove.
I answer that, God provides for all things according to the nature of
each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the
invisible by visible things, as explained above ([370]Q[12], A[12]).
Wherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by
the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has
demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible
creatures, according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the
invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest
by some visible creatures.
This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and to
the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as Love,
to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of the
Holy Ghost, it belongs to the author of this sanctification. Thus the
Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the Holy
Ghost as the sign of sanctification.
Reply to Objection 1: The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He
appeared, into the unity of His person, so that whatever can be said of
that creature can be said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of the
nature assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the Holy
Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared, into
the unity of His person; so that what is said of it cannot be
predicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less than the Father by
reason of any visible creature.
Reply to Objection 2: The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not
apply to the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy; because as
Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 6): "The prophetic vision is not displayed
to corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by
the spiritual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire,
saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy Ghost the same
relation to these images that the Son has to the rock, because it is
said, "The rock was Christ" (1 Cor. 10:4). For that rock was already
created, and after the manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it
typified; whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify
only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to the flame of
the burning bush seen by Moses and to the column which the people
followed in the desert, and to the lightning and thunder issuing forth
when the law was given on the mountain. For the purpose of the bodily
appearances of those things was that they might signify, and then pass
away." Thus the visible mission is neither displayed by prophetic
vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not to the body, nor by
the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament, wherein certain
pre-existing things are employed to signify something. But the Holy
Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as He showed Himself in
certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures,
still they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or
that person. For as the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by
diverse names, so also can They each one be signified by different
things; although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them.
Reply to Objection 4: It was necessary for the Son to be declared as
the author of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible
mission of the Son was necessarily made according to the rational
nature to which it belongs to act, and which is capable of
sanctification; whereas any other creature could be the sign of
sanctification. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a
purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His
person, since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action, but
only for the purpose of a sign; and so likewise it was not required to
last beyond what its use required.
Reply to Objection 5: Those visible creatures were formed by the
ministry of the angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to
signify the Person of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided
in those visible creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that
account the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an angel.
Reply to Objection 6: It is not necessary that the invisible mission
should always be made manifest by some visible external sign; but, as
is said (1 Cor. 12:7)---"the manifestation of the Spirit is given to
every man unto profit"---that is, of the Church. This utility consists
in the confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible signs.
This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles, according to
Heb. 2:3, "which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed
unto us by them that heard."
Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to
Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints on whom the
Church was in a way founded; in such a manner, however, that the
visible mission made to Christ should show forth the invisible mission
made to Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of
His conception. The visible mission was directed to Christ at the time
of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show
forth in Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual
regeneration; hence the Father's voice spoke, "This is My beloved Son"
(Mat. 3:17), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the
only Begotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance of
a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; and hence it was
said, "Hear ye Him" (Mat. 17:5). To the apostles the mission was
directed in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their
ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said,
"Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven" (Jn. 20:23): and
again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of
teaching; whence it is said that, "they began to speak with divers
tongues" (Acts 2:4). The visible mission of the Holy Ghost was
fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the
visible mission of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the
Holy Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son
manifests the Father. Visible apparitions of the divine persons were,
however, given to the Fathers of the Old Testament which, indeed,
cannot be called visible missions; because, according to Augustine (De
Trin. ii, 17), they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the
divine person by grace, but for the manifestation of something else.
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Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds
eternally?
Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person is sent only by the one
whence He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (De Trin. iv), "The
Father is sent by no one because He is from no one." Therefore if a
divine person is sent by another, He must be from that other.
Objection 2: Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But
there can be no authority as regards a divine person except from
origin. Therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one
sending.
Objection 3: Further, if a divine person can be sent by one whence He
does not proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although
He proceeds not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De
Trin. xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only by the one whence
He proceeds.
On the contrary, The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to Is.
48:16, "Now the Lord God hath sent Me and His Spirit." But the Son is
not from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a divine person is sent by one from
Whom He does not proceed.
I answer that, There are different opinions on this point. Some say
that the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds
eternally; and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the
Holy Ghost, this is to be explained as regards His human nature, by
reason of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine,
however, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent by Himself, and by
the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the Son;
so that to be sent in God does not apply to each person, but only to
the person proceeding from
another, whereas to send belongs to each person.
There is some truth in both of these opinions; because when a person is
described as being sent, the person Himself existing from another is
designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the
mission of the divine person. Thus if the sender be designated as the
principle of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but
that person only Who is the principle of that person who is sent; and
thus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the Holy Ghost by the
Father and the Son. If, however, the person sending is understood as
the principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the
whole Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a
man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect
of grace.
The answers to the objections appear from the above.
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TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-46)
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THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS
(FOUR ARTICLES)
After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must
consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration will
be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the
distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and government.
Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1)
the first cause of beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures from
the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?
(2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent
coordinate principle with Him?
(3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are
other exemplar causes?
(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?
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Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be
created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be
found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its
cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be
understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and
therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by God.
Objection 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to
exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an
efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever
necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many
necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from
God.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated
by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the
efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3);
therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause.
On the contrary, It is said (Rom. 11:36): "Of Him, and by Him, and in
Him are all things."
I answer that, It must be said that every being in any way existing is
from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be
caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes
ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above ([371]Q[3], A[4]) when
treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially
self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown ([372]Q[11], AA[3],4) that
subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it
would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients.
Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are
beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are
diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or
less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most
perfectly.
Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude;
and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in
being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every
truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all
heat.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of
the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence,
on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has
being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a
being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without
having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter
into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to
find a being uncaused.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection has led some to say that what is
necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly
false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the
causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph.
v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of
their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is required is
not merely because the effect is not necessary, but because the effect
might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is
true, whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible.
Reply to Objection 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as
though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not
abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an
efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object
of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that
cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of
the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from
its efficient cause.
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Whether primary matter is created by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by God.
For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else
(Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore
primary matter cannot have been made by God.
Objection 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a
division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first
passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two
principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the
other.
Objection 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since
every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that
everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in
potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against
the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast
Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other
nigh unto nothing"---viz. primary matter.
I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step
by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser
mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible
bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it
except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to
rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation. And supposing as
they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, they assigned
certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity,
discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when
they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial
form and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when
they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to
essential forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain
universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according
to Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must
take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a
determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is
contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being;
for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore,
considered "being" under some particular aspect, either as "this" or as
"such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things.
Then others there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as
being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as
"such," but as "beings."
Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be
the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by
accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial
forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in
any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is
created by the universal cause of things.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking
of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either
accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according
to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which
emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from
the former mode of being made.
Reply to Objection 2: Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is
reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the
first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one
perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle
says (Metaph. xii, text 40).
Reply to Objection 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is
not created, but that it is not created without form; for though
everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is
necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all
that belongs to its being is created.
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Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides
God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures are far
from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to
something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as
stated above [373](A[1]). But whatever exists in sensible things exists
only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that
in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species,
but also individuating principles added to the principles of the
species. Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as
for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which
are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
Objection 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with
species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because
there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there
are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular
things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion
follows as above.
Objection 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says
(Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting
life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.
On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas,
according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which
are contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of
things are not outside God.
I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof
whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an
exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a
determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in
matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar
beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in the mind.
Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate
forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom
as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the
universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore
we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things,
which types we have called ideas---i.e. exemplar forms existing in the
divine mind ([374]Q[15], A[1]). And these ideas, though multiplied by
their relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine
essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared
diversely by different things. In this manner therefore God Himself is
the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may
be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness
thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of
imitation.
Reply to Objection 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural
likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten
is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him,
forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is
like to the house in the architect's mind.
Reply to Objection 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a
man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular
man is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to
anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species,
such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.
Reply to Objection 3: Although every science and definition is
concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing
should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our
understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active
intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that
the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be
their exemplars.
Reply to Objection 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by
"self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God
Himself, sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any
self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
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Whether God is the final cause of all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the final cause of all
things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God
needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing
generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70),
because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But
God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the
final cause of all things.
Objection 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things do
not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the
end of all things.
Objection 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If,
therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows
that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord has made all things
for Himself."
I answer that, Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would
not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it
were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered
as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the
impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient
intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are
both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents,
and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition
of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent
only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to
communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every creature
intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the
divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the
end of all things.
Reply to Objection 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect
agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not
belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal
giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own
goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The form of the thing generated is not the end of
generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the
generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the
form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator,
since the end is more noble than the means to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: All things desire God as their end, when they
desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or
sensible, or natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good
and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to
God.
Reply to Objection 4: Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the
final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it
follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But
this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him,
some of which come into our mind before others.
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THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the
First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight points
of inquiry:
(1) What is creation?
(2) Whether God can create anything?
(3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?
(4) To what things it belongs to be created?
(5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
(6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any
one Person?
(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?
(8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature
and of the will?
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Whether to create is to make something from nothing?
Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from
nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To make
concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something
by bringing forth something from what was already."
Objection 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is
considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to
good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But
creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all
actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from
being to being.
Objection 3: Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of
some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a
statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being,
nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something
from nothing.
On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, "In the beginning God created,"
etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing."
I answer that, As said above ([375]Q[44], A[2]), we must consider not
only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but
also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God;
and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what
proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation;
as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from
"not-man," and white from "not-white." Hence if the emanation of the
whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is
impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation.
For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a
man is from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is
the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is "nothing."
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal
sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as
when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of
creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
Reply to Objection 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the
term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore a change is
more perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is
more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding
to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply
nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form
is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the
substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more
imperfect than the contrary, which is the term "wherefrom" in
alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than
generation and alteration, because the term "whereto" is the whole
substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term
"wherefrom" is simply not-being.
Reply to Objection 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing,
this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but
only order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after
morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition "from"
[ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing,"
or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm
the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous
non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the
order is denied, and the sense is, "It is made from nothing---i.e. it
is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of
nothing," because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified
in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But
in the first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has
been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material
cause, which is denied.
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Whether God can create anything?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot create anything, because,
according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient
philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing
is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the
contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make
the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation
are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from
nothing, or create.
Objection 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing,
to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore
creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears
by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of what is in
potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of
nothing by God.
Objection 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been
becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same time,
is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is
becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it would
follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore
when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having been made. But
this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which the becoming is
sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from
nothing.
Objection 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite
distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not happen
that something is made from nothing.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth."
I answer that, Not only is it not impossible that anything should be
created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created
by God, as appears from what has been said ([376]Q[44], A[1]). For when
anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he
makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action;
thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which
are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So
also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but
presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act from something
presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be
caused by Him. Now it has been shown above ([377]Q[44], AA[1],2), that
nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of
all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God brings things into
being from nothing.
Reply to Objection 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above
([378]Q[44], A[2]), considered only the emanation of particular effects
from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their
action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from
nothing." But this has no place in the first emanation from the
universal principle of things.
Reply to Objection 2: Creation is not change, except according to a
mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should
be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the
same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in
motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is
the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the
subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole
substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as
different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so
that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards
as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the substance of
motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text
20,21), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse
relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the
mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said
above ([379]Q[13], A[1]), creation is signified by mode of change; and
on this account it is said that to create is to make something from
nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable
expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to
make" and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of
effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
Reply to Objection 3: In things which are made without movement, to
become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is
the term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated
and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of
movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same
time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak of its
being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not previously.
Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and
is already created at the same time.
Reply to Objection 4: This objection proceeds from a false imagination,
as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is
plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken
to signify a change existing between two forms.
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Whether creation is anything in the creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that creation is not anything in the
creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the
creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the
Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator,
because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something
temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the
creature.
Objection 2: Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the
creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both:
since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the
creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same
reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity.
Therefore creation is not anything in the creature.
Objection 3: Further, if creation is anything besides the created
substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident
is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of
creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term
of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the
accident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the
action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action
and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.
On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made according to its
entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or
accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby
anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form,
is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation,
whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in
the thing created.
I answer that, Creation places something in the thing created according
to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or
by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from
something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular
productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all
being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by
creation produces things without movement. Now when movement is removed
from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above
(A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation
to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion,
which implies movement, is implied a relation to the principle of
motion.
Reply to Objection 1: Creation signified actively means the divine
action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in
God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a
relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a
real relation, as was said above ([380]Q[13], A[7]) in treating of the
divine names.
Reply to Objection 2: Because creation is signified as a change, as was
said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the
mover and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium
between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is
in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further
creation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature
being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations,
but by themselves; as was also shown above ([381]Q[42], A[1], ad 4), in
treating of the equality of the Persons.
Reply to Objection 3: The creature is the term of creation as
signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real
relation, and is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the
accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the
part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of
the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it
should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature
to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
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Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?
Objection 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to
composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv)
it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing
created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does
not belong to subsisting and composite things.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But
composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own
component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.
Objection 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is
properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the
natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the
thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and
not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite
things. Therefore creation belongs to them.
I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown
above ([382]Q[44], A[2], ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the
being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to
whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting
things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate
substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For
being belongs to that which has being---that is, to what subsists in
its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings,
not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as
whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it.
Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is
more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being." Therefore, as
accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said
to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather
"concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created
things are subsisting beings.
Reply to Objection 1: In the proposition "the first of created things
is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation,
but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created
thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is "this"
being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal
Being, as was said above [383](A[1]). We use a similar way of speaking
when we say that "the first visible thing is color," although, strictly
speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.
Reply to Objection 2: Creation does not mean the building up of a
composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the
"composite" is created so that it is brought into being at the same
time with all its principles.
Reply to Objection 3: This reason does not prove that matter alone is
created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for
creation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.
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Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to
create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34),
what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are
more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their
own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an
immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself. But
immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it has no
matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the
thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But a
"contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more
power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a
creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore
can a creature do this.
Objection 3: Further, the power of the maker is considered according to
the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we proved
above when treating of the infinity of God ([384]Q[7], AA[2],3,4).
Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by
creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a
creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor
bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other
creatures.
I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according
to what precedes [385](A[1]), that to create can be the action of God
alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more
universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is
being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and
most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis
prop., iii) that "neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being,
except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now to produce being
absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is
manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.
It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of
another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts
by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of
fire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper
act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the
power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that
the first separate substance created by God created another after
itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the
substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in
the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can
communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can
create ministerially, not by its own power.
But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause
does not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch
as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of
the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what
is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any
need of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a
saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form,
produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the
principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is
presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence
nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect,
since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed
by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible
for any creature to create, either by its own power or
instrumentally---that is, ministerially.
And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no
body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its
action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is
contrary to the very idea of creation.
Reply to Objection 1: A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a
likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by
applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the
cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of
himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten;
and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter whereby he
is an individual man. But as an individual man participates human
nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of
being; for God alone is His own being, as we have said above
([386]Q[7], AA[1],2). Therefore no created being can produce a being
absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it
is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before
the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in an immaterial
substance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this
thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being,
since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial substance cannot
produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its
being, but only as regards some added perfection; as we may say that a
superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
iv, x). In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle
says (Eph. 3:15): "From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is
named." From which evidently appears that no created being can cause
anything, unless something is presupposed; which is against the very
idea of creation.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is made from its contrary indirectly
(Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in
potentiality. And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it
impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to
induce, as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to
itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby
the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to
act; and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is
required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much greater
power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus
therefore it appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a
thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the maker is reckoned not only from
the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being
made; for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore
although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, yet
to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears
from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater power is required in
the agent in proportion to the distance of the potentiality from the
act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no
presupposed potentiality is infinite, because there is no proportion
between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power
of a natural agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and
"being." And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any more
than it has an infinite being, as was proved above ([387]Q[7], A[2]),
it follows that no creature can create.
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Whether to create is proper to any person?
Objection 1: It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For
what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect is
the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person
is prior to the procession of the creature: and is more perfect,
because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its
principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude.
Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of the
processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.
Objection 2: Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each
other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever
difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them
according to the processions and relations of the Persons. But the
causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons;
for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that "He is the Creator
of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by
Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He
is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation of creatures belongs
to the Persons according to processions and relations.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature
flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person,
this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is
caused by every essential attribute---viz. by power, goodness and
wisdom---and thus does not belong to one more than to another.
Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed
to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished in
creating according to relations and processions.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused
are the common work of the whole Godhead.
I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the
being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of
action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be
fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God
according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the
three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one Person, but is
common to the whole Trinity.
Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their
procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as
was said above ([388]Q[14], A[8]; [389]Q[19], A[4]), when treating of
the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His
intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made
by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his
mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Hence
also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His
Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the
processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures
inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.
Reply to Objection 1: The processions of the divine Persons are the
cause of creation, as above explained.
Reply to Objection 2: As the divine nature, although common to the
three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as
the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost
from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the
three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives
it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to be the
Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not receive the
power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said (Jn. 1:3),
"Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power,
but from another; for this preposition "through" usually denotes a
mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy
Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is attributed that by His sway
He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son.
Again, the reason for this particular appropriation may be taken from
the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes.
For, as above stated ([390]Q[39], A[8], ad 3), to the Father is
appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it
is attributed to Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated
wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is
said: "Through Whom all things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is
appropriated goodness, to which belong both government, which brings
things to their proper end, and the giving of life---for life consists
in a certain interior movement; and the first mover is the end, and
goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: Although every effect of God proceeds from each
attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is
naturally connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom,"
and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness" poured
out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very
substance of a thing, is reduced to "power."
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Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?
Objection 1: It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily
found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its
traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures,
as was above stated ([391]Q[32], A[1]). Therefore there is no trace of
the Trinity in creatures.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if
the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of
their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity,
it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each of these
(properties): and so on to infinitude.
Objection 3: Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the
causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to the
relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore
in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the
unity of essence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace of
the Trinity appears in creatures."
I answer that, Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but
diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause,
but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is
called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not
who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude
of its form, as fire generated represents fire generating; and a statue
of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the representation of
"image." Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the
acts of intellect and will, as was said above [392](Q[27]). For the Son
proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as
love of the will. Therefore in rational creatures, possessing intellect
and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of
image, inasmuch as there is found in them the word conceived, and the
love proceeding.
But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch
as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily
reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature
subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to
a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a
created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in
that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle
from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it
represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the
conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it
represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of
the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And
therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity
is found in every creature, according "as it is one individual," and
according "as it is formed by a species," and according as it "has a
certain relation of order." And to these also are reduced those three,
"number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned in the Book of Wisdom
(9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing limited by
its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the
order. And to these three are reduced the other three mentioned by
Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species," and "order," and also
those he mentions (QQ. 83, qu. 18): "that which exists; whereby it is
distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance,
is distinct by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar
expressions may be easily reduced to the above.
Reply to Objection 1: The representation of the trace is to be referred
to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a
knowledge of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we
have said ([393]Q[32], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: A creature properly speaking is a thing
self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be
found. Nor is it necessary that these three things should be found in
all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being is the
trace ascribed in regard to those three things.
Reply to Objection 3: The processions of the persons are also in some
way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above
[394](A[6]).
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Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?
Objection 1: It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature
and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is
produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no
part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every
operation of nature and art there is creation.
Objection 2: Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause.
But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which is
an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not
produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it must be produced
by creation.
Objection 3: Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are
found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident in
animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is
not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to other
things.
Objection 4: Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If
therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would
follow that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.
On the contrary, Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the
work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of
creation.
I answer that, The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which,
some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but
previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent.
This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how
to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms
pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they asserted that they
pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or
caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to
each operation of nature is joined creation. But this opinion arose
from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the
form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a
thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong
properly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown above [395](A[4]), it
does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be
"concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is
the "composite," which is made from matter.
Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is
presupposed to the work of nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Forms begin to be actual when the composite
things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only
"indirectly."
Reply to Objection 2: The active qualities in nature act by virtue of
substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces
its like according to quality, but according to species.
Reply to Objection 3: For the generation of imperfect animals, a
universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial
power to which they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a
kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are
created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect
animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is
required, in the shape of a univocal generator.
Reply to Objection 4: The operation of nature takes place only on the
presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature
are called creatures.
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OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)
Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures,
about which there are three points for treatment:
(1) Whether creatures always existed?
(2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith?
(3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?
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Whether the universe of creatures always existed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the
world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything
which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise
it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began to
exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible
being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence, which results
from a form, and to non-existence, which results from privation of
form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed
before the world. But matter cannot exist without form: while the
matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world
existed before it began to exist: which is impossible.
Objection 2: Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes
is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing extends
so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be
always; for its power does not extend to any determinate time.
Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not:
but everything which has a beginning at some time is, and at some time
is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there are
many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all
intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not begin to exist.
Objection 3: Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the
Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and
also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten.
Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.
Objection 4: Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there
might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body
where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there,
otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world there
was a vacuum; which is impossible.
Objection 5: Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through
either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before.
But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore
before every new movement there was a previous movement. Therefore
movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was,
because movement is only in a movable thing.
Objection 6: Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But
neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For nature
always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede
either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing, there
cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there
before. And the will, without itself being changed, puts off doing what
it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change, at
least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow,
and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow, but is not
today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come;
and this cannot be without change, because time is the measure of
movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there
was a previous movement; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
Objection 7: Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always
in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is not
in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is
in its beginning and end, because there is no time except "now" which
is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time
cannot begin or end, and consequently neither can movement, the measure
of what is time.
Objection 8: Further, God is before the world either in the order of
nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only,
therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God
is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior in duration
constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which
is impossible.
Objection 9: Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an
effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause,
requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the
sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by reason of His
goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient
cause, by reason of His power as appears from the above ([396]Q[44],
AA[2],3,4). Since therefore God is eternal, the world is also eternal.
Objection 10: Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But
the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the
world is eternal.
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 17:5), "Glorify Me, O Father, with
Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and (Prov.
8:22), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He
made anything from the beginning."
I answer that, Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is
far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above ([397]Q[19],
A[4]) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are
necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will them, since the
necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph.
v, text 6). Now it was shown above ([398]Q[19], A[3]), that, absolutely
speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except
Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will that the world
should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to
exist, since the being of the world depends on the will of God, as on
its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always;
and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration.
Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively,
demonstrative---viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the
ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite
impossible manner. This appears in three ways. Firstly, because, both
in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions,
as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward
reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this
subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way
of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is probable. Thirdly,
because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical
problems, about which we have nothing to say from reason, as, "whether
the world is eternal."
Reply to Objection 1: Before the world existed it was possible for the
world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter,
but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a
thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but
from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each
other; in which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as appears
from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of
having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before
it received that power, it did not exist.
Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120)
does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist;
but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things
generated and corruptible begin.
Reply to Objection 3: Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter
is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to
derive its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that
heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to be
generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way,
except that matter and heaven did not begin by generation, as some
said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and heaven were
produced into being by creation, as appears above ([399]Q[44], A[1], ad
2).
Reply to Objection 4: The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is
nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in
which there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text
60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before the world
was.
Reply to Objection 5: The first mover was always in the same state: but
the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be
whereas hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but
by creation, which is not change, as said above ([400]Q[45], A[2], as
2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys.
viii), is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal
movable things, but not eternal movement, as appears from the opinions
of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that
movable things began to exist movement also existed.
Reply to Objection 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And
although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not
produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be
presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take
into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that
presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal
agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the form,
and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce
the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct
to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into
another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But it is not
correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas
it is correct to say of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form
and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it
presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time
"after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary succession
of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and
time also, is not correctly described as acting now, and not before,
according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if
time were presupposed to His action; but He must be considered as
giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according
to what was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more
evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not
always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not
always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what
always was.
Reply to Objection 7: As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and
"after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence
beginning and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement.
Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given
moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need
not be if movement be a beginning. The same applies to the "now" of
time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as being
always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time
and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward this reason (Phys. viii,
text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied
the eternity of movement.
Reply to Objection 8: God is prior to the world by priority of
duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of
eternity. Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary
time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above
heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary
place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond
those of the heavenly body.
Reply to Objection 9: As the effect follows from the cause that acts by
nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from
the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined
by the agent, as appears from what was said above ([401]Q[19], A[4];
[402]Q[41], A[2]). Therefore, although God was from eternity the
sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was
produced by Him, except as preordained by His will---that is, that it
should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare
its author.
Reply to Objection 10: Given the action, the effect follows according
to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But
in agents acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be
taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from the
eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an
effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has being after not
being.
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Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a
demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is
made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved
demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed
this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be
demonstratively proved that the world began.
Objection 2: Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made
by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from
something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of
the world would have preceded the world; against which are the
arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was
ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world was made from
nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have
begun.
Objection 3: Further, everything which works by intellect works from
some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by
intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore,
which is His effect, did not always exist.
Objection 4: Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have
developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some
fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been
always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist.
Objection 5: Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God.
But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration.
Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.
Objection 6: Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that
infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass
through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at
this present day; which is manifestly false.
Objection 7: Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was
eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite
series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii,
text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite
series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).
Objection 8: Further, if the world and generation always were, there
have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal:
therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist,
which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the
world began, and not only is it known by faith.
On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be proved
demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (Heb.
11:1). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world
began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in one God," etc.
And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of
the past, saying, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": in
which words the newness of the world is stated. Therefore the newness
of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be
proved demonstratively.
I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can
it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above of
the mystery of the Trinity ([403]Q[32], A[1]). The reason of this is
that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the
world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a
thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from
"here" and "now"; whence it is said that universals are everywhere and
always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone
were not always. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of
the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be
investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must
will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among
these, as was said above ([404]Q[19], A[3]). But the divine will can be
manifested by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world
began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or
science. And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to
demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not
cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that
on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the
opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was
twofold. For some said that the substance of the world was not from
God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by
proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal,
although made by God. For they hold that the world has a beginning, not
of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way
it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De
Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in the dust from
eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was
caused by him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its
Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the
efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its effect
in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every
agent must be the principle of action. But if the action is
instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker to
be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of
illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if God
is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world
in duration; because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a
successive change, as was said above ([405]Q[45], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Those who would say that the world was eternal,
would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was
made after nothing, according to what we understand by the word
creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some of
them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph.
ix, text 4).
Reply to Objection 3: This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in
Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion,
except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what
should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human intellect,
but not the divine intellect ([406]Q[14], AA[7],12).
Reply to Objection 4: Those who hold the eternity of the world hold
that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being
uninhabitable to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they
hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents,
were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence
Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular
changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world.
Reply to Objection 5: Even supposing that the world always was, it
would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v,
6); because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without
succession; but with the world it is otherwise.
Reply to Objection 6: Passage is always understood as being from term
to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day
there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The
objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an
infinite number of mean terms.
Reply to Objection 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed
to infinity "per se"---thus, there cannot be an infinite number of
causes that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for instance,
that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to
infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity
"accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the
causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one
cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by
means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be
broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts
after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this
particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he
generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men
generating hold one grade in efficient causes---viz. the grade of a
particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be
generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if
the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary
body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
Reply to Objection 8: Those who hold the eternity of the world evade
this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there
to be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of
Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But this
was disproved above ([407]Q[7], A[4]). Some say that the soul is
corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will
remain. But others, as Augustine says [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De
Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a
circuit of souls---viz. that souls separated from their bodies return
again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which
matters will be given later ([408]Q[75], A[2]; Q[118], A[6]). But be it
noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one
might say that the world was eternal, or least some creature, as an
angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as
to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
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Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?
Objection 1: It would seem that the creation of things was not in the
beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part of
time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation
the substance of things was brought into being; and time does not
measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things.
Therefore creation was not in the beginning of time.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that
everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies a
"before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is
indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, since to be
created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not
created in the beginning of time.
Objection 3: Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be
created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the
beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was
not in the beginning of time.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth."
I answer that, The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to
exclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that
time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the beginning"
are expounded---viz. "of time." And some said that there are two
principles of creation, one of good things and the other of evil
things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded---"in the Son."
For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason
of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son by
reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. 103:24), "Thou hast
made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all
things in the beginning---that is, in the Son; according to the word of
the Apostle (Col. 1:16), "In Him"---viz. the Son---"were created all
things." But others said that corporeal things were created by God
through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is
expounded thus: "In the beginning"---i.e. before all things---"God
created heaven and earth." For four things are stated to be created
together---viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, by which is
meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Things are said to be created in the beginning of
time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but
because together with time heaven and earth were created.
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of
being made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because,
since in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one
point in a given movement---that is, whilst anything is in the process
of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after,"
because what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not in
"being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the term of
movement, as was said above ([409]Q[45], AA[2],3). Hence a thing is
created in such a way that it was not being created before.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing
exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according
to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from
it time begins.
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TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (Q[47])
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OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (THREE ARTICLES)
After considering the production of creatures, we come to the
consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be
threefold---first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly,
of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of the
spiritual and corporeal creature.
Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry:
(1) The multitude or distinction of things.
(2) Their inequality.
(3) The unity of the world.
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Whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of things
does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one. But God is
supremely one, as appears from what precedes ([410]Q[11], A[4]).
Therefore He produces but one effect.
Objection 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its
exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said
above ([411]Q[44], A[3]). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one
only, and not diverse.
Objection 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the
end of the creation is one---viz. the divine goodness, as was shown
above ([412]Q[44] , A[4]). Therefore the effect of God is but one.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:4, 7) that God "divided the light
from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore the
distinction and multitude of things is from God.
I answer that, The distinction of things has been ascribed to many
causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself
or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient
natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter, attributed it
to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction of things comes
from chance according to the movement of matter. Anaxagoras, however,
attributed the distinction and multitude of things to matter and to the
agent together; and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by
extracting what is mixed up in matter.
But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown
above ([413]Q[44], A[2]), even matter itself was created by God. Hence
we must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher
cause. Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not
the form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their
proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of
the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is formless, in
order that it may be accommodated to different forms.
Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents,
as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself, produced
the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own
being, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as
will appear later ([414]Q[50], A[3]). And so the first intelligence,
inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second
intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality
it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as
it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the
heavens.
But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it was
shown above ([415]Q[45], A[5]) that to create belongs to God alone, and
hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God
alone---viz. all those things which are not subject to generation and
corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the
universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the
first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such
an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore,
the perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of
things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible.
Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come
from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought
things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to
creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could
not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many
and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the
representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For
goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold
and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the
divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any
single creature whatever.
And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of
things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word
of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read in
Gn. 1:3,4: "God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the light from
the darkness."
Reply to Objection 1: The natural agent acts by the form which makes it
what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its
effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was
shown above ([416]Q[19], A[4]), acts by an intellectual form. Since,
therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand
many things, as was shown above ([417]Q[15], A[2]), it follows that,
although He is one, He can make many things.
Reply to Objection 2: This reason would apply to the representation
which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by
reason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is
only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly,
which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by
many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the
plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of
things.
Reply to Objection 3: In speculative things the medium of
demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one
only; whereas probable means of proof are many. Likewise when operation
is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the end, one only
is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to its end, which
is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary.
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Whether the inequality of things is from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the inequality of things is not from
God. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things
that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs
to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal.
Objection 2: Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text
20). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal.
Objection 3: Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to
unequal things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, no
inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives
being to things, it seems that He has made all things equal.
On the contrary, It is said (Ecclus. 33:7): "Why does one day excel
another, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun
another sun? [Vulg.: 'when all come of the sun']. By the knowledge of
the Lord they were distinguished."
I answer that, When Origen wished to refute those who said that the
distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and
evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by
God. For he asserted that God first created only the rational creatures
and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free-will, some
being turned to God more and some less, and others turned more and
others less away from God. And so those rational creatures which were
turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the order of angels
according to the diversity of merits. And those who were turned away
from God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their
sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation and diversity of
bodies. But according to this opinion, it would follow that the
universality of bodily creatures would not be the effect of the
goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it would be for the
sake of the punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said: "God
saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good" (Gn.
1:31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 3): "What can be more
foolish than to say that the divine Architect provided this one sun for
the one world, not to be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit
of corporeal things, but that it happened through the sin of one soul;
so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there would be a hundred suns
in the world?"
Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of the
distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the cause of their
inequality. This may be explained as follows. A twofold distinction is
found in things; one is a formal distinction as regards things
differing specifically; the other is a material distinction as regards
things differing numerically only. And as the matter is on account of
the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the formal
distinction. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only
one individual of each species, forasmuch as the species is
sufficiently preserved in the one; whereas in things generated and
corruptible there are many individuals of one species for the
preservation of the species. Whence it appears that formal distinction
is of greater consequence than material. Now, formal distinction always
requires inequality, because as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii,
10), the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by
addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species seem
to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than
the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and
men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more
perfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of
the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the
universe, so it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not
be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.
Reply to Objection 1: It is part of the best agent to produce an effect
which is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes
every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the
whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be
taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus,
therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole, according
to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single creature
best, but one better than another. And therefore we find it said of
each creature, "God saw the light that it was good" (Gn. 1:4); and in
like manner of each one of the rest. But of all together it is said,
"God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good" (Gn.
1:31).
Reply to Objection 2: The first effect of unity is equality; and then
comes multiplicity; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according
to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son
proceeds to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the
creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but nevertheless even
creatures share in a certain equality---namely, of proportion.
Reply to Objection 3: This is the argument that persuaded Origen: but
it holds only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of
which is due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things there
is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality, either of
merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality comes from
the perfection of the whole. This appears also in works done by art;
for the roof of a house differs from the foundation, not because it is
made of other material; but in order that the house may be made perfect
of different parts, the artificer seeks different material; indeed, he
would make such material if he could.
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Whether there is only one world?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not only one world, but many.
Because, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46), it is unfitting to say
that God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason
He created one, He could create many, since His power is not limited to
the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was shown
above ([418]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore God has produced many worlds.
Objection 2: Further, nature does what is best and much more does God.
But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many
good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made
by God.
Objection 3: Further, everything which has a form in matter can be
multiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because
multiplication in number comes from matter. But the world has a form in
matter. Thus as when I say "man" I mean the form, and when I say "this
man," I mean the form in matter; so when we say "world," the form is
signified, and when we say "this world," the form in the matter is
signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of many
worlds.
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 1:10): "The world was made by Him,"
where the world is named as one, as if only one existed.
I answer that, The very order of things created by God shows the unity
of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order,
whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come
from God, have relation of order to each other, and to God Himself, as
shown above ([419]Q[11], A[3]; [420]Q[21], A[1]). Hence it must be that
all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can assert
that many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but
rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that this world,
besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a casual
concourse of atoms.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason proves that the world is one because
all things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore
from the unity of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text
52) the unity of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of
the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.
Reply to Objection 2: No agent intends material plurality as the end
forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself
tends to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end.
Now when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this has
reference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the
intention of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it
might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if He
had made three; and so on to infinite.
Reply to Objection 3: The world is composed of the whole of its matter.
For it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one,
since every earth would naturally be carried to this central one,
wherever it was. The same applies to the other bodies which are part of
the world.
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TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF GOOD AND EVIL (QQ[48]-49)
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THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and
firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the distinction of
the spiritual and corporeal creatures.
Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.
Concerning evil, six points are to be considered:
(1) Whether evil is a nature?
(2) Whether evil is found in things?
(3) Whether good is the subject of evil?
(4) Whether evil totally corrupts good?
(5) The division of evil into pain and fault.
(6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil?
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Whether evil is a nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a
nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x) that
"good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things."
Therefore evil is a nature.
Objection 2: Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a
nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality;
for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality
from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
Objection 3: Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But
evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as
contraries, as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that
between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a
return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
Objection 4: Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it
corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.
Objection 5: Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe
except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection
of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the
"admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all things. In which
even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the eminent
commendation of what is good." Therefore evil is a nature.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither a
being nor a good."
I answer that, One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is
known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the
nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything
appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its
own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection
of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or
any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is
signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that
"evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such, is
good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.
Reply to Objection 1: Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion
of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and
therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil.
For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward examples
that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers. Or,
it may be said that, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 6), "the
first kind of contrariety is habit and privation," as being verified in
all contraries; since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to
another, as black in relation to white, and bitter in relation to
sweet. And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply,
but in regard to contraries; because, as every form has the nature of
good, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Good and evil are not constitutive differences
except in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is
the object of the will, the source of all morality. And because good
has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific
differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of
the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself
constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end;
just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural
things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore, the evil
which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined
to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the
intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the
delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a
constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is
annexed.
Reply to Objection 3: This appears from the above. For the Philosopher
speaks there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect,
between good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as
something rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right
order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, i) that a "prodigal man is foolish, but not evil." And from
this evil in morality, there may be a return to good, but not from any
sort of evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although
blindness is an evil.
Reply to Objection 4: A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In
one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in
that sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good,
forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In another
sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a
wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final cause, as the
end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause. But in these two
ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation,
but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For every action comes from
some form; and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection.
And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Evil does not act,
nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of
itself it is nothing definite, and beside the scope of our will and
intention."
Reply to Objection 5: As was said above, the parts of the universe are
ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and
according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said
above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil
neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come
under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is, by reason of
some good joined to it.
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Whether evil is found in things?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not found in things. For
whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of
something, that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from
non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things.
Objection 2: Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore
evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is
contrary to what has been said [421](A[1]).
Objection 3: Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white,"
as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good
unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is
best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there
is no evil.
On the contrary, On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and
penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.
I answer that, As was said above ([422]Q[47], AA[1],2), the perfection
of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so
that every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of
goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of
goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this grade
is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which
cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while some there
are which can lose it, as things corruptible.
As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there
should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings;
so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some
which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they
do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that
a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found in
things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is distant both from simple being and from
simple "not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation,
but a privation.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14),
being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity
of a thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense
it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and
neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the
truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by a
copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense being is what
answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of
blindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way
even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction
some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil is said to be
in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself.
Reply to Objection 3: God and nature and any other agent make what is
best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in
order to the whole, as was said above ([423]Q[47], A[2]). And the whole
itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more
perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes
fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it
belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature," as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should
sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), "God
is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil." Hence many good
things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire
would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of
a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging
justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no
injustice.
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Whether evil is in good as in its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For
good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4)
that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists." Therefore,
evil is not in good as its subject.
Objection 2: Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But
"non-being" does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither
does evil require good as its subject.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But
good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its
subject.
Objection 4: Further, the subject of whiteness is called white.
Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in
good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is
said (Is. 5:20): "Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!"
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists only
in good."
I answer that, As was said above [424](A[1]), evil imports the absence
of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can
be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken
negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not
exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not
having the good belonging to something else; for instance, a man would
be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a
lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil;
as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness.
Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same---viz.
being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality, as
primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of
privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative
potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent
body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however,
manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a
good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every
potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For
as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality.
Therefore, the subject of evil is good.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius means that evil is not in existing
things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.
Reply to Objection 2: "Not-being," understood negatively, does not
require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such "not-being" is an evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its
subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not
"sight," but "animal." Yet, it appears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion
13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid down that
contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring
to good and evil in general, but not in reference to any particular
good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, and the like
contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special sense,
because they exist in some determinate genus; whereas good enters into
every genus. Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another
good.
Reply to Objection 4: The prophet invokes woe to those who say that
good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above,
as is clear from the explanation given.
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Whether evil corrupts the whole good?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one
contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are
contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts
inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and
uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.
Objection 3: Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away
good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at some
time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any
created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot
wholly consume good."
I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must
consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed
by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly
destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is
neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good
which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air
is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by
evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a
subject to some actuality.
The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered
by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of
remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise
of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this
kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the
matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in
the subject the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form;
and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary
dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the
more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as
regards the actuality.
Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and
intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the
aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the
active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and
humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is
diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the
contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid
aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless,
it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is
the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to
infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to light
would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly
removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is
transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude,
whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened;
and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and
God, according to Is. 59:2: "Our sins have divided between us and God."
Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it
belongs to its very nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken
away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.
Reply to Objection 2: The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between
subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil;
but where it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore,
although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to
different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.
Reply to Objection 3: Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind
of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the
continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever
same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so
is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here.
For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we continue to
subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half of the
whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above
mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance either
equally or more.
Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite
thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per se," but
accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased
infinitely, as explained above.
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Whether evil is adequately divided into pain* and fault?
[*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification, being
derived from "poena." In this sense we say "Pain of death, Pain of
loss, Pain of sense."---Ed.]
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into
pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all
creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own
existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore
evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.
Objection 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault
nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are
evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.
Objection 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for
"temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion
for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not is
it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows
afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and
fault.
Objection 4: On the contrary, It would seem that this division is
superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil
"because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil
comes under pain.
I answer that, Evil, as was said above [425](A[3]) is the privation of
good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act,
however, is twofold; first, and second. The first act is the form and
integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil
also is twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form,
or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness is
an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the body.
In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation,
either because it does not exist, or because it has not its due mode
and order. But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil,
which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational
creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which comes from the
withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has the nature of a
pain; and especially so on the supposition that all things are subject
to divine providence and justice, as was shown above ([426]Q[22],
A[2]); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will.
But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due operation in
voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this is imputed to
anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect action, of which he is
master by the will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be
looked upon as a pain or a fault.
Reply to Objection 1: Because evil is the privation of good, and not a
mere negation, as was said above [427](A[3]), therefore not every
defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is
naturally due. For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it
is an evil in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to
see. So, likewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be
preserved in existence by itself, because existence and conservation
come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an
evil as regards a creature.
Reply to Objection 2: Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely
considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.
Reply to Objection 3: Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is
always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is
not, properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some
change is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of
the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the
tempter he falls into fault.
Reply to Objection 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must be
said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the
agent in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury
to the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as
including the idea of injury.
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Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For
fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good than
merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has.
Objection 2: Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the
greater good. But pain, as was said above [428](A[5]), is opposed to
the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the
action. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it seems
that pain is worse than fault.
Objection 3: Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in
forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation of
the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.
On the contrary, A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent
a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body. But
divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a
greater evil than pain.
I answer that, Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not
only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal
goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any
kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to
include privation of grace or glory.
There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil
by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be
made worthy of punishment." And this because, since good absolutely
considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate
act is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that
the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use of
something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will.
Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is
called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a
bad will can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his
own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself
consists in the disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in
the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in
it than pain has.
The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of
the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because the
evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either
something created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something
uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature
forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed
to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine
will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself,
and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that
fault has more evil in it than pain has.
Reply to Objection 1: Although fault results in pain, as merit in
reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is
for the reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so
that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.
Reply to Objection 2: The order of action which is destroyed by fault
is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second
perfection, than the good taken away by pain, which is the first
perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and
order to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some
way, both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is
removed from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch
as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due
end.
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THE CAUSE OF EVIL (THREE ARTICLES)
We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three
points of inquire:
(1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?
(2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
(3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all
evils?
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Whether good can be the cause of evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For
it is said (Mat. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit."
Objection 2: Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But
evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of
evil.
Objection 3: Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a
deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause,
if it has one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil.
Therefore the cause of evil can only be evil.
Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no
cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no
possible source of evil except good."
I answer that, It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause.
For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a
thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can
come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For
a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor
does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment. But only
good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as
it is a being, and every being, as such, is good.
And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent,
the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which belongs to
the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the
nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the
material cause was shown above ([429]Q[48], A[3]). For it was shown
that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather
is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause, but
rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the
end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to
the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly,
but accidentally.
In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action
otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason of
the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the
instrumental agent; thus the defect in the movement of an animal may
happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of
children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in
the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not in the
proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent,
sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter.
It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when
there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the
privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire
there follows the privation of the form of air or of water. Therefore,
as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly
does it impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it
corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and
water comes from the perfection of the fire: but this is accidental;
because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of water, but at
the bringing in of its own form, though by doing this it also
accidentally causes the other. But if there is a defect in the proper
effect of the fire---as, for instance, that it fails to heat---this
comes either by defect of the action, which implies the defect of some
principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the matter,
which does not receive the action of the fire, the agent. But this very
fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which of
itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any
but an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause of evil.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord
calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree." Now, a
good will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good
will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the
movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature,
which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Good does not cause that evil which is contrary
to itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes
evil to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act
morally evil. And, as explained above ([430]Q[19], A[9]), this is by
accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes
another by accident: for instance, the exterior surrounding cold heats
(the body) through the concentration of the inward heat.
Reply to Objection 3: Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things
otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the
same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some
exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence
evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in
the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in voluntary things
the defect of the action comes from the will actually deficient,
inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule.
This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault follows upon it from
the fact that the will acts with this defect.
Reply to Objection 4: Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental
cause, as was said above.
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Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of
evil. For it is said (Is. 45:5, 7): "I am the Lord, and there is no
other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and
creating evil." And Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, which the
Lord hath not done?"
Objection 2: Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to
the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above
[431](A[1]). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was
shown above ([432]Q[2] , A[3]; [433]Q[6], AA[1],4), it follows that
also every evil is from God.
Objection 3: Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text
30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But
God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause
of all perdition and of all evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not the
author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being."
I answer that, As appears from what was said [434](A[1]), the evil
which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect
of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest
perfection, as was shown above ([435]Q[4], A[1]). Hence, the evil which
consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the
agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause.
But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced
to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things
and voluntary things. For it was said [436](A[1]) that some agent
inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption
and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is
manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is
the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe
requires, as was said above ([437]Q[22], A[2], ad 2; [438]Q[48], A[2]),
that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And
thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe,
consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of
things, according to 1 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." But
when we read that "God hath not made death" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is
that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order
of justice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires that
penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the
evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of
what is said above.
Reply to Objection 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and
not to the evil of fault.
Reply to Objection 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is
reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of
being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as
whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the
motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come
from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And,
likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is
reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not
caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.
Reply to Objection 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor
as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of
the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for
the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.
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Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the
cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes. But
contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: "Good is
set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against
a just man." Therefore there are many contrary principles, one of good,
the other of evil.
Objection 2: Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other.
But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as
was shown above ([439]Q[2], A[3]; [440]Q[6], AA[2],4). Therefore, also,
there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.
Objection 3: Further, as we find good and better things, so we find
evil and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to
what is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to
some supreme evil.
Objection 4: Further, everything participated is reduced to what is
essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially,
but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential
evil, which is the cause of every evil.
Objection 5: Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which
is "per se." But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we
must suppose some supreme evil which is the "per se" cause of evils.
Nor can it be said that evil has no "per se" cause, but only an
accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in
the many, but only in the few.
Objection 6: Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of
the cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause,
as was said above ([441]AA[1],2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in
this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of
every evil.
On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was
shown above ([442]Q[2], A[3]; [443]Q[6], A[4]). Therefore there cannot
be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.
I answer that, It appears from what precedes that there is no one first
principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.
First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good,
as was shown above ([444]Q[6], AA[3],4). But nothing can be essentially
bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good
([445]Q[5], A[3]); and that evil can exist only in good as in its
subject ([446]Q[48], A[3]).
Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and
perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above
([447]Q[6], A[2]). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was
shown above ([448]Q[48], A[4]), although evil always lessens good, yet
it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing
can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the wholly evil could be, it would destroy
itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for
something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away, since
its subject is good.
Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first
principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown
above [449](A[1]), and because evil can be only an accidental cause,
and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is
subsequent to the direct cause.
Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other
evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other
strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to
consider the universal cause of all being, and considered only the
particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they
found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they
thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance,
if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the
house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything
does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon
what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein
every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above
([450]Q[47], A[2], ad 1).
Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two
contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these
contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore
they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles.
But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to
search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper
causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the
power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter
how, there exists one first principle of being, as was shown above
([451]Q[2], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also
agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have
contrary particular cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one
first common cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same
subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as
was said above ([452]Q[48], A[3]). Hence, since evil is privation of
good, as appears from what was said above ([453]Q[48], AA[1], 2,3), it
is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the
supreme good, who is pure act.
Reply to Objection 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the
nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation
removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is
intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by
receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and
worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it
is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.
Reply to Objection 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by
privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to
any essential evil.
Reply to Objection 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was
shown above [454](A[1]). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil
is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply
false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can
there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe. And
again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number.
In man alone does evil appear as in the greater number; because the
good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man---that
is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses
than good according to reason.
Reply to Objection 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to
infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows
accidentally.
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TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ[50]-64)
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OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE ARTICLES)
Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures:
firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is
called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the
composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.
Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their
substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what
belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.
Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal
things.
Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether
incorporeal?
(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of
matter and form?
(3) We ask concerning their number.
(4) Of their difference from each other.
(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.
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Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal.
For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation
to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as
regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore
he is not simply incorporeal."
Objection 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii) that "an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance."
Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance.
Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every
creature is limited within its own nature." But to be limited belongs
to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's
creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His
angels"; and, farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were made;
He commanded, and they were created." Therefore angels are corporeal.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 103:4): "Who makes His angels
spirits."
I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is
principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in
assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect
to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according
to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now,
God produces the creature by His intellect and will ([455]Q[14], A[8];
[456]Q[19], A[4] ). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that
there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the
action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is
limited to "here" and "now." Hence the perfection of the universe
requires the existence of an incorporeal creature.
The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of
intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense
and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could
be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall
under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies,
as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence came the
error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8).
But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof
that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect
alone.
Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and
corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to
be the other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be
cold; and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material
and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it
is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an
ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not
as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are.
Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.
Reply to Objection 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to
bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to
all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De
Spir. Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained in
corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their
substance."
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Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and
form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of
the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the
species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from
the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a
genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of
substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.
Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is
matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand;
whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that "a simple form cannot be a
subject": and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an
angel is composed of matter and form.
Objection 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act.
But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore
an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.
Objection 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter.
So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of
an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the
form of an angel is in matter.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first creatures
are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal."
I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and
form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of
the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are
distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards
incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which
distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in
common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal
from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is
subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, is
its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and
corporeal things is the same; so that it must be understood that the
form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual
things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the
matter of corporeal things.
But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of
spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a
spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of
matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and
spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the
corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter,
however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity;
and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys.
i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual
things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is
impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same
matter.
It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any
kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to
the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether
immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act
receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according to
its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are
individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it
must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.
But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily
distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend
things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence
material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in
a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on
the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect cannot
attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own
mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also
it apprehends God [457](Q[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: It is difference which constitutes the species.
Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is
determined to some special grade of being because "the species of
things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of
unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material
things there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that
is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the
matter; and hence from the latter the "genus" is derived, and from the
former the "difference." Whereas in immaterial things there is no
separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self
holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them "genus" and
"difference" are not derived from different things, but from one and
the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of conception; for,
inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the
idea of their "genus"; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately,
it derives the idea of their "difference."
Reply to Objection 2: This reason is given in the book on the Fount of
Life, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the
intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For
matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some
species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the
intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the
opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to the
effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the
intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a
form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of
receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.
Reply to Objection 3: Although there is no composition of matter and
form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be
made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain
a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby
the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own
existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related
to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no
matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter,
there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very
existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is
understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an
angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence,"
and "what is," as Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself
subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as
the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and
"what is" are not different as was explained above ([458]Q[3], A[4]).
Hence God alone is pure act.
Reply to Objection 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its
existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature
to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being
considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the
part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the
matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are finite
in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms
are not received in anything else; as if we were to say, for example,
that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of
whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while
its "being" is finite as determined to some one special nature.
Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite
from above," as receiving its being from above itself, and is "infinite
from below," as not received in any matter.
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Whether the angels exist in any great number?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers.
For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a
continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are
incorporeal, as was shown above [459](A[1]). Therefore the angels
cannot exist in any great number.
Objection 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the
less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other
created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore
since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible
number in the angelic nature.
Objection 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances
seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of
the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we
can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the
movements of the heavenly bodies.
Objection 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and
intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine
goodness." But a ray is only multiplied according to the different
things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is
receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are
immaterial, as was shown above [460](A[2]). Therefore it seems that the
multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the
requirements of the first bodies---that is, of the heavenly ones, so
that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be
terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as
before.
On the contrary, It is said (Dan. 7:10): "Thousands of thousands
ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood
before Him."
I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the
number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate
substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to
maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and
according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number
of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible
things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31)
because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things.
Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar species of
these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are
higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held
(Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures bear relation to
these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he
strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to
the number of the first movements.
But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred
Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony,
held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial
substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly
movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he
contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are
styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which
manifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the
custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be
designated as angels.
Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are
immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all
material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv):
"There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences,
surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers." The
reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the
universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more
perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created
by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their
magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their
multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, exceed
corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire
sphere of things active and passive is something very small in
comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude
that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably exceed material
substances as to multitude.
Reply to Objection 1: In the angels number is not that of discrete
quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that
which is caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is
reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above ([461]Q[30],
A[3]; [462]Q[11]).
Reply to Objection 2: From the angelic nature being the nighest unto
God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not
so as to be found in few subjects.
Reply to Objection 3: This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text
44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were
made for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances would
exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to appear in
corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances
exist on account of the corporeal, because the end is nobler than the
means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 44) that this
is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to make
use of this argument, since only through sensible things can we come to
know intelligible ones.
Reply to Objection 4: This argument comes from the opinion of such as
hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this
was refuted above ([463]Q[47], A[1]). Accordingly, the multiplication
of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to
bodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders
of immaterial substances.
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Whether the angels differ in species?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species.
For since the "difference" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things which
agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate
constitutive difference; and so they are the same according to species.
But all angels agree in what is noblest in them---that is to say, in
intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one species.
Objection 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the
angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and
less---namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect.
Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually
from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore are
the angels.
Objection 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more
ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but
one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of
one species.
On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as
"first" and "second" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there
are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x).
Therefore the angels are not of the same species.
I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual substances, even
souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are
of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the
angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.
But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ
in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If,
therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said
above [464](A[2]), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to
be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be
several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are
not several, except in so far as they are in several substances. And if
the angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of
one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the principle
of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the
division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the
diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes
diversity not merely of species, but of genus.
Reply to Objection 1: "Difference" is nobler than "genus," as the
determined is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the
common, but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it
would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species;
or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the
sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according
to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like
manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse
degrees of intellectual nature.
Reply to Objection 2: More and less change the species, not according
as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but
according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance,
if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the
angels are diversified according to more or less.
Reply to Objection 3: The good of the species preponderates over the
good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be
multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the
one species.
Reply to Objection 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn
out infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific
multiplication, as was said above ([465]Q[47], A[3]). Hence the
perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species,
but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species.
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Whether the angels are incorruptible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for
Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is
"an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not
by nature."
Objection 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose
maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature,
yet indissoluble because I so will it." But gods such as these can only
be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible by
their nature
Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), "all things
would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved
them." But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore,
since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are
corruptible of their own nature.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the intellectual
substances "have unfailing life, being free from all corruption, death,
matter, and generation."
I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are
incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing
is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence,
since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said
above [466](A[2]), it is impossible for its substance to be
corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can
never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in
relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else
is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never
be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a
bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its
circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for
everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is
an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter
and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the
matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the
angels, as was said above [467](A[2]), it cannot lose its being.
Therefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is
incorruptible by its own nature.
A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual
operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the
operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and
nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an
intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every
intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality,
which includes complete immutability; since "every change is a kind of
death," as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain
perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later [468](Q[62]).
Reply to Objection 2: By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the
heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and
therefore dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever
preserved in existence by the Divine will.
Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above ([469]Q[44], A[1]) there is
a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it
is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for
its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that
all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved
by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle
of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is
dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible
not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing
His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of
corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the
potentiality of matter.
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OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)
We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things;
and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly, of
the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of their
comparison with local movement.
Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?
(2) Whether they assume bodies?
(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
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Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?
Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to
them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute
alone---that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost,
as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any
material substance and without any companionship of corporeal
addition." Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.): "Let us assign
incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature
alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs
the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that every created
spirit needs corporeal substance." Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit.
iii): "The demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their
nature is akin to that of aerial bodies." But the nature of demons and
angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to
them.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational
animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels
have bodies naturally united to them.
Objection 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls.
But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore the
angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are
understood to be incorporeal."
I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For
whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally
in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of
the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to
understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as
will be shown later ([470]Q[75], A[2]), it follows that to have a body
united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as
such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of
something else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a
body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of
intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own
nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily
senses, as will be explained later on ([471]Q[84], A[6]; [472]Q[89],
A[1]). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must
presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the
intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances,
which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things.
Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but
some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call angels.
Reply to Objection 1: As was said above ([473]Q[50], A[1]) it was the
opinion of some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem
to have thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing
except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was
the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this
is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above
all things, according to Ps. 8:2: "Thy magnificence is exalted beyond
the heavens"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God,
followed the above opinion of others regarding the other substances;
being deceived here as he was also in many other points, by following
the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's expression can be
explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which
is not naturally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be
explained [474](A[2]). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but
merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there
are some aerial animals, which they termed demons.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal
metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.
Reply to Objection 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply
speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kings 2:6): "The Lord
killeth, and maketh alive." But to give life formally belongs to a
substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within itself
the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which
is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a
body.
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Whether angels assume bodies?
Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there
is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of
the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the
angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since
his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not
assume a body.
Objection 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union;
because to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a
body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated [475](A[1]);
while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not
said to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by
the angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume
bodies.
Objection 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or
water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire,
otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from
air, because air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not
assume bodies.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels appeared
to Abraham under assumed bodies.
I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels never assume
bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of angels
happened in prophetic vision---that is, according to imagination. But
this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in
imaginary vision is only in the beholder's imagination, and
consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture from time
to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all;
just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his
whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the
angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it
is clearly shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision,
whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can
accordingly be seen by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be
beheld. Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they
bodies naturally united with them, as is clear from what has been said
[476](A[1]; [477]Q[50], A[1]), it follows that they sometimes assume
bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves,
but on our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may
give evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to
have with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies
under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God
would take a human body; because all the apparitions in the Old
Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared in
the flesh.
Reply to Objection 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as
its form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the
assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of
intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible,
in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by
angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an
angel. And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body.
Reply to Objection 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of
rarefaction has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both
be shaped and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels
assume bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is
needful for forming the assumed body.
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Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life
in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But
it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live
and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions.
Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.
Objection 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing
without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the
senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the
angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel
perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of
life.
Objection 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the
functions of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the
angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was
said (Gn. 18:16) that "Abraham walked with" the angels, who had
appeared to him, "bringing them on the way"; and when Tobias said to
the angel (Tob. 5:7,8): "Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city
of Medes?" he answered: "I know it; and I have often walked through all
the ways thereof." Therefore the angels often exercise functions of
life in assumed bodies.
Objection 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for
it is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed
from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred
Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their
assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.
Objection 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the
Lord after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having
resumed life (Lk. 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies
they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored
them as God (Gn. 18). Therefore the angels exercise functions of life
in assumed bodies.
Objection 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has
befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related: "After
the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth
children, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown" (Gn. 6:4).
Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed
bodies.
On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was
stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise
functions of life through assumed bodies.
I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in
common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of
a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so
far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far
as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in
assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such
operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects;
because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that which
has the faculty has the action." Hence nothing can have a function of
life except what has life, which is the potential principle of such
action.
Reply to Objection 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for
intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible
figures, since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that
intelligible things are sensible, but in order that properties of
intelligible things may be understood according to similitude through
sensible figures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels
that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men,
although they are really not. For the bodies are assumed merely for
this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may
be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not
so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men; because the
properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels.
Reply to Objection 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function.
Consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through
the organs of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned
in vain; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation
through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual
powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as by the eye the power
of the angel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other
members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier.).
Reply to Objection 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper
function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus
moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved
accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as
movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be
elsewhere which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is not
moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is
everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the
movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to the
movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the
movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not change
place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is
there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the
world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but
according to a fixed quarter; because "the moving energy is always in
the east," as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.
Reply to Objection 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through
their assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as
they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.
Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to
eat, because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the
substance of the eater.
Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the
substance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing matter;
nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be
changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by
angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of
such a nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was
not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the
angel said to Tobias: "When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and
to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink" (Tob. 12:19).
Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom,
nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the prophets,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi).
Reply to Objection 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): "Many persons
affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as
have experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk
call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have
sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny
it. But God's holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the
deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth,
who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates
those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be wondered at
that giants should be born of them; for they were not all giants,
albeit there were many more before than after the deluge." Still if
some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of
such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the seed of men
taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first the form of a
woman, and afterwards of a man; just as they take the seed of other
things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii),
so that the person born is not the child of a demon, but of a man.
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OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE (THREE ARTICLES)
We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are
three subjects of inquiry:
(1) Is the angel in a place?
(2) Can he be in several places at once?
(3) Can several angels be in the same place?
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Whether an angel is in a place?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For
Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "The common opinion of the learned is that
things incorporeal are not in a place." And again, Aristotle observes
(Phys. iv, text 48,57) that "it is not everything existing which is in
a place, but only a movable body." But an angel is not a body, as was
shown above [478](Q[50]). Therefore an angel is not in a place.
Objection 2: Further, place is a "quantity having position." But
everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a
position cannot benefit an angel, since his substance is devoid of
quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position.
Therefore an angel is not in a place.
Objection 3: Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be
contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. iv,
text 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a
place, because the container is more formal than the contained; as air
with regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an angel is not
in a place.
On the contrary, It is said in the Collect [*Prayer at Compline,
Dominican Breviary]: "Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in
peace."
I answer that, It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel
and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A body
is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place
according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such
quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an
angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic
power in any manner whatever to any place.
Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed
commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the
continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with
dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this
account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an
incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes
into contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body
as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is
said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained,
but as somehow containing it.
And hereby we have the answers to the objections.
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Whether an angel can be in several places at once?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at
once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But
the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part
of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be
in several places at once.
Objection 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and,
since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he
is in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are
various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "where the
angel operates, there he is." But occasionally he operates in several
places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (Gn.
19:25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "while the
angels are in heaven, they are not on earth."
I answer that, An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the
Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things,
is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and
is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the
angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one
determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be
compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all
being is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one
particular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since
the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place,
it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in
only one place.
Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were
unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the
indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently
they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point.
But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something
indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is
indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation.
Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one
indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible
or indivisible, great or small suffices, according as to his own
free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the
entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one
place to him.
Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to be
everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to what is
first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in which there
is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east: hence the
Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the heavenly
mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers
do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres
immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere.
So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite
differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a
place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An
angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he is
not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a place
in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither
circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.
From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because the
entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied, is
reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.
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Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place?
Objection 1: It would seem that several angels can be at the same time
in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time in the
same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not fill a
place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not empty, as
appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58). Therefore several
angels can be in the one place.
Objection 2: Further, there is a greater difference between an angel
and a body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body
are at the one time in the one place: because there is no place which
is not filled with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv,
text. 58. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place.
Objection 3: Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according
to Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess
souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon
are at the one time in the same place; and consequently for the same
reason all other spiritual substances.
On the contrary, There are not two souls in the same body. Therefore
for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place.
I answer that, There are not two angels in the same place. The reason
of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be the
causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident in every
class of causes: for there is one proximate form of one thing, and
there is one proximate mover, although there may be several remote
movers. Nor can it be objected that several individuals may row a boat,
since no one of them is a perfect mover, because no one man's strength
is sufficient for moving the boat; while all together are as one mover,
in so far as their united strengths all combine in producing the one
movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact
that his power touches the place immediately by way of a perfect
container, as was said [479](A[1]), there can be but one angel in one
place.
Reply to Objection 1: Several angels are not hindered from being in the
same place because of their filling the place; but for another reason,
as has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel and a body are not in a place in the
same way; hence the conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 3: Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a
body according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its
form, while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.
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OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which
heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an angel can be moved locally.
(2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through
intervening space?
(3) Whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous?
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Whether an angel can be moved locally?
Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as
the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing which is devoid
of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term "wherefrom," it is
not moved; nor while it is in the term "whereto," for it is then
already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved,
while it is being moved, is partly in the term "wherefrom" and partly
in the term "whereto." But an angel is without parts. Therefore an
angel cannot be moved locally.
Objection 2: Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as
the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is not
imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.
Objection 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy
angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.
On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved
as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said
that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith
that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is
moved locally.
I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to
be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so
likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it
is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence
it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with
the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the
continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; and
according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as
commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is
not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate
with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the
place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is a non-continuous
movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as
was said above ([480]Q[52], A[1]), it follows necessarily that the
movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various
contacts of various places successively, and not at once; because an
angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above
([481]Q[52], A[2]). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be
continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in
such contacts. Because, as was said above ([482]Q[52], A[1]), there is
nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel
according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to
a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not
all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises
continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively
quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his movement
will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in
the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus
his movement will not be continuous.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold
reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with what
is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place
necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.
Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which
is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be
said that a thing is moved where it is in the term "wherefrom," and
while it is in the term "whereto": because the very succession of
"wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in
whichever of those "wheres" the thing might be, it could be said to be
moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing
which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is
not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be
not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly
in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the
angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not
hold good. But according as the angel's movement is held to be
continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement,
he is partly in the term "wherefrom," and partly in the term "whereto"
(yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel's substance,
but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the
angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved;
but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place
which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies. This
very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the
angel from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his
power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows
regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it is
divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his
power can be applied to something which is divisible.
Reply to Objection 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is
the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application
of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is
the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for
any need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of
our need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are
all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to
minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation."
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Whether an angel passes through intermediate space?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not pass through
intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space
first travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing
through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is
indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes
through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his movement:
which is not possible.
Objection 2: Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul.
But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another
without going through the middle: for I can think of France and
afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands
between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to
another without going through the middle.
On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one place to another, then,
when he is in the term "whither," he is no longer in motion, but is
changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change:
consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he
was not moved so long as he was in the term "whence." Therefore, he was
moved while he was in mid-space: and so it was necessary for him to
pass through intervening space.
I answer that, As was observed above in the preceding article, the
local motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it
be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another
without passing through the mid-space; because, as is said by the
Philosopher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), "The middle is that into
which a thing which is continually moved comes, before arriving at the
last into which it is moved"; because the order of first and last in
continuous movement, is according to the order of the first and last in
magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, text 99).
But if an angel's movement be not continuous, it is possible for him to
pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle:
which is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are
infinite intermediate places; whether the places be taken as divisible
or as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which
are indivisible; because between every two points that are infinite
intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a
middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of
necessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from the
continuous movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to
place except in time. But in the whole time which measures the movement
of a body, there are not two "nows" in which the body moved is not in
one place and in another; for if it were in one and the same place in
two "nows," it would follow that it would be at rest there; since to be
at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now and
previously. Therefore since there are infinite "nows" between the first
and the last "now" of the time which measures the movement, there must
be infinite places between the first from which the movement begins,
and the last where the movement ceases. This again is made evident from
sensible experience. Let there be a body of a palm's length, and let
there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it travels; it is
evident that the first place from which the movement starts is that of
the one palm; and the place wherein the movement ends is that of the
other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to move, it gradually
quits the first palm and enters the second. According, then, as the
magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are the intermediate places
multiplied; because every distinct point in the magnitude of the first
palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the magnitude
of the other palm is the limit of the same. Accordingly, since
magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points in every magnitude are
likewise infinite in potentiality, it follows that between every two
places there are infinite intermediate places.
Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate
places by the continuity of its movement; because, as the intermediate
places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must there be reckoned
some infinitudes in movement which is continuous. Consequently, if the
movement be not continuous, then all the parts of the movement will be
actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable body be moved, but not by
continuous movement, it follows, either that it does not pass through
all the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers infinite
places: which is not possible. Accordingly, then, as the angel's
movement is not continuous, he does not pass through all intermediate
places.
Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going
through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's nature; but
not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained
under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its
movement. But an angel's substance is not subject to place as contained
thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence it is under his
control to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through or
without the intervening place.
Reply to Objection 1: The place of an angel is not taken as equal to
him according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so
the angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet
even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as was said above:
but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is evident
from the foregoing.
Reply to Objection 2: While an angel is moved locally, his essence is
applied to various places: but the soul's essence is not applied to the
things thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So there
is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: In continuous movement the actual change is not a
part of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede
change. Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in
movement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is a
part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even
without the mid-space, constitutes such movement.
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Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous.
For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist
the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel
moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a
body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the
lessening of the time. But between one length of time and any other
length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is moved in
time, an angel is moved in an instant.
Objection 2: Further, the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily
change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as
illumination; both because the subject is not illuminated successively,
as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does not reach sooner
what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is the angel's
movement instantaneous.
Objection 3: Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time,
it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term
"whereto": but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the
place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term "wherefrom"; or
else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it follows that
he is divisible; which is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the
preceding time he is in the term "wherefrom." Therefore he rests there:
since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as
was said [483](A[2]). Therefore it follows that he is not moved except
in the last instant of time.
On the contrary, In every change there is a before and after. Now the
before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently every
movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and
after in it.
I answer that, Some have maintained that the local movement of an angel
is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from place to
place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term
"wherefrom"; but in the last instant of such time he is in the term
"whereto." Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms, just
as there is no medium between time and the limit of time. But there is
a mid-time between two "nows" of time: hence they say that a last "now"
cannot be assigned in which it was in the term "wherefrom," just as in
illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire, there is no
last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or in which the
matter was under the privation of the form of fire: but a last time can
be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time there is light in
the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so illumination and
substantial generation are called instantaneous movements.
But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown thus.
It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise
disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time
which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the same "where" in the
first, in the middle, and in the last "now." On the other hand, it is
of the very nature of movement for the subject moved to be otherwise
now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time which
measures movement, the movable subject is in various dispositions;
hence in the last "now" it must have a different form from what it had
before. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some
(disposition), for instance, in whiteness, is to be in it in every
instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in
one term during the whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the
last instant of that time to be in the other term. But this is possible
in movement: because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the
same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore all
instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement:
just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter, and
illumination is the term of the local movement of the illuminating
body. Now the local movement of an angel is not the term of any other
continuous movement, but is of itself, depending upon no other
movement. Consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any place
during the whole time, and that in the last "now" he is in another
place: but some "now" must be assigned in which he was last in the
preceding place. But where there are many "nows" succeeding one
another, there is necessarily time; since time is nothing else than the
reckoning of before and after in movement. It remains, then, that the
movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his
movement be continuous, and in non-continuous time if his movement is
non-continuous for, as was said [484](A[1]), his movement can be of
either kind, since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of
movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99).
But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the
time which measures the movement of the heavens, and whereby all
corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from the
movement of the heavens; because the angel's movement does not depend
upon the movement of the heavens.
Reply to Objection 1: If the time of the angel's movement be not
continuous, but a kind of succession of 'nows,' it will have no
proportion to the time which measures the movement of corporeal things,
which is continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however,
it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of
the proportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the
proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides, the
swiftness of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity of
his power, but according to the determination of his will.
Reply to Objection 2: Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an
alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood
to be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote. But
the angel's movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term of
movement; hence there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection is based on continuous time. But
the same time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. So an angel
can be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next
instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel's
movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places
throughout the whole time which precedes the last 'now'; as was already
shown [485](A[2]). Nevertheless he is partly in one of the continuous
places, and partly in another, not because his substance is susceptible
of parts, but because his power is applied to a part of the first place
and to a part of the second, as was said above [486](A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)
After considering what belongs to the angel's substance, we now proceed
to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In the first
place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: secondly, into
his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects known: and fourthly,
into the manner whereby he knows them.
Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Is the angel's understanding his substance?
(2) Is his being his understanding?
(3) Is his substance his power of intelligence?
(4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect?
(5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the
intellect?
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Whether an angel's act of understanding is his substance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his
substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active
intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its
own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his
Commentator [*Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more is the
angel's substance his action---that is, his act of understanding.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that
"the action of the intellect is life." But "since in living things to
live is to be," as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life
is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an
angel who understands.
Objection 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not
differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the
middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are
the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence.
Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and
the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who
understands.
On the contrary, The action of anything differs more from its substance
than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its substance,
for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above
([487]Q[3], A[4]). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any
other creature, is its substance.
I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any
creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the
actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance
or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure
act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own
actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone
is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His
existence and His action.
Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it
would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of
intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists.
Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from
God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in
itself, nor from the substance of another angel.
Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then
be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes
about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.
Reply to Objection 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own
action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because,
since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in
itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive
intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to
act.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation between "life" and "to live" is not
the same as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that
between "a race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the
abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if
"to live" is "to be," that "life" is "essence." Although life is
sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), "Memory
and understanding and will are one essence, one life": yet it is not
taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that "the act of
the intellect is life."
Reply to Objection 3: The action which is transient, passing to some
extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject
receiving the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not
really a medium between the agent and the object, but only according to
the manner of expression; for it really follows the union of the object
with the agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by the
union of the object understood with the one who understands it, as an
effect which differs from both.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the angel to understand is to exist?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist.
For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii, text. 37). But to "understand is in a sense to live" (De
Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.
Objection 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect
to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the
form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel
to understand is to exist.
On the contrary, The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as
is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement.
Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.
I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any
creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text.
16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to
something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and
another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the
agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing
outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent.
It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be
the agent's very existence: because the agent's existence is signified
as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from
the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature
has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple
infinity, we have the act "to understand," of which the object is "the
true"; and the act "to will," of which the object is "the good"; each
of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will,
of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its
species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively
infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does
to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to
one in genus and species; God's being alone is simply infinite,
comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its
own act of will.
Reply to Objection 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the
living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one
whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher
says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he
distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the
various functions of life.
Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his
entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding,
since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in
its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the
existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is
compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely,
truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the
same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding
according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow
that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to understand.'
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angel's power of intelligence is his essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of
understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and
"intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages of
his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds."
Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.
Objection 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything
besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which
is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple
form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an
angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been
previously said ([488]Q[50], A[2]).
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the
angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh
unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler
nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter
is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of
intelligence.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels are
divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore substance,
power, and operation, are all distinct in them.
I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or
operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus.
Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the
diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account
it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in
every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared
to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been
already said ([489]Q[44], A[1]). Now the act to which the operative
power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not
the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other
created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is
not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its
power of operation.
Reply to Objection 1: An angel is called "intellect" and "mind,"
because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a
soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive.
Reply to Objection 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the
subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as
potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is
Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own
existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the
subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the
species: for such accident belongs to the form---whereas an accident
which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole
species, results from the matter, which is the principle of
individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard
to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards
accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive
intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17)
that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby
it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make
all things." But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an
active and a passive intellect in an angel.
Objection 2: Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is
to receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active
intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel
receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one.
Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect.
On the contrary, The distinction of active and passive intellect in us
is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive
intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors
to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not
so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in
the angel.
I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is
derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in
potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power,
which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to
intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it
apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is the
power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for
admitting an active intellect is due to this---that the natures of the
material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as
immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in
potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is
necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such
natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the
active intellect.
But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are
neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to
such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their
intelligible in potentiality, but they are actually such; for they
first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear
later ([490]Q[84], A[7]; [491]Q[85], A[1]). Therefore there cannot be
an active and a passive intellect in them, except equivocally.
Reply to Objection 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher
understands those two things to be in every nature in which there
chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not
generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is not
need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the function of the active intellect to
enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in
potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually
intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality
with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known, and
sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one angel to enlighten
another does not belong to the notion of an active intellect: neither
does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened
with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is
sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the
names of active and passive intellect, he will then be speaking
equivocally; and it is not about names that we need trouble.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not
exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that in
the angels there is "life which understands and feels." Therefore there
is a sensitive faculty in them as well.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have
learnt many things by experience. But experience comes of many
remembrances, as stated in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they have
likewise a power of memory.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a
sort of "perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the
imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the
demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of
the same nature.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that "man senses in
common with the brutes, and understands with the angels."
I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers whose operations
are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts
of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are
some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed
through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any
parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to
them, as is manifest from what has been said already ([492]Q[51],
A[1]). Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to
them.
The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the
separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in
keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual
creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul.
For this reason the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as was
said above (A[3], ad 1).
A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it
may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the
opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies
naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in
his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De
Civ. Dei xxi) that "such an inquiry does not call for much labor."
Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be
understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure
apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common usage of
speech, when he understands something for certain, to say that we
"sense it." And hence it is that we use the word "sentence." Experience
can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things
known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have
experience when we know single objects through the senses: the angels
likewise know single objects, as we shall show ([493]Q[57], A[2]), yet
not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in the angels,
according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the mind; although it
cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul.
In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' is attributed to demons, since
they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good; while
deception in us comes properly from the phantasy, whereby we sometimes
hold fast to images of things as to the things themselves, as is
manifest in sleepers and lunatics.
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OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (THREE ARTICLES)
Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic
knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some
species?
(2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as
they have derived from things?
(3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower
angels?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels know all things by their substance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their
substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels,
according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are
happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his essence. Therefore
the angel knows things by his essence.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text.
51; De Anima iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter, the
intellect is the same as the object understood." But the object
understood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that
whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as
the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very
substance of the one understanding it.
Objection 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is there
according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an
intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an
intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower orders
of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the
lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
God "enfolds the whole in the whole," i.e. all in all. Therefore the
angel knows all things in his substance.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are
enlightened by the forms of things." Therefore they know by the forms
of things, and not by their own substance.
I answer that, The medium through which the intellect understands, is
compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it is
by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be
perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to
which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is
that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly
complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of
the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that
form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to understanding
all things: because the object of the intellect is universal being or
universal truth. The angel's essence, however, does not comprise all
things in itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and
species. This is proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite,
simply and perfectly to comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God
alone knows all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all
things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected by some
species in order to know things.
Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that the angel knows things
according to his own nature, the words "according to" do not determine
the medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the
thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the
angel of his own nature.
Reply to Objection 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as
stated in De Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the
sensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one
thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the
intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that
the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it
understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is
precisely the same thing to say "in things which are without matter,
the intellect is the same thing as the object understood," as to say
that "the intellect in act is the thing understood in act"; for a thing
is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial.
Reply to Objection 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and those
which are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed
perfectly, nor according to their own proper formality---because the
angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own formality
from other things---but according to some common formality. Yet all
things are perfectly and according to their own formality in God's
essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from which
proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore God has a
proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this the angel
has not, but only a common knowledge.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn
from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness
within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing
in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness
is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is
caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding
must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by
it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that
belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary for
the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from
things.
Objection 2: Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of
the active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect
abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of
the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So
there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands
through species drawn from things.
Objection 3: Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to
what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from
sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by
species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to
things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no
purpose.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not
gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible."
I answer that, The species whereby the angels understand are not drawn
from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that there
is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual
substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The
highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully
perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of
matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some
agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower
intellectual substances ---that is to say, human souls---have a power
of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively
completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things.
But in the higher spiritual substances---that is, the angels---the
power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species,
in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to
understand all things which they can know naturally.
The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances.
The lower spiritual substances---that is, souls---have a nature akin to
a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently
from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their
intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise they
would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand, the
higher substances---that is, the angels---are utterly free from bodies,
and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature;
consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through an
intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of
things known, together with their intellectual nature. Hence Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): "The other things which are lower than the
angels are so created that they first receive existence in the
knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own nature."
Reply to Objection 1: There are images of creatures in the angel's
mind, not, indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the
cause of creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first
exist. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type,
according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God
before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same
type exists first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the
very fashioning of the creature."
Reply to Objection 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is
necessary to pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the
imagination, which form is without matter but not without material
conditions, stands midway between the nature of a form which is in
matter, and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by
abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Consequently,
however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce
material forms to an intelligible condition, except it were first to
reduce them to the nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since
the angel has no imagination, as was said above ([494]Q[54], A[5]).
Even granted that he could abstract intelligible species from material
things, yet he would not do so; because he would not need them, for he
has connatural intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 3: The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to
what is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not
purposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the
purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the
lower angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand by
more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal,
seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not
understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be
said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less
universal.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly
known than what is known generically; because to know anything
generically is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If,
therefore, the higher angels know by more universal species than the
lower, it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than
the lower; which is not befitting.
Objection 3: Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But
if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which
the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the
higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things.
Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each; which
seems unbecoming.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher
angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in De Causis
it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms.
I answer that, For this reason are some things of a more exalted
nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which
is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is
contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which
God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created
intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it is
necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what God
knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the intellect
is lower.
Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be
able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore his
forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were, extending
to more things. An example of this can in some measure be observed in
ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible
truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and detail; this
comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are others of
stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.
Reply to Objection 1: It is accidental to the universal to be
abstracted from particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it
derives its knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which
does not derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows
will not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be
pre-existing to them; either according to the order of causality, as
the universal ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in
the order of nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the
angelic mind.
Reply to Objection 2: To know anything universally can be taken in two
senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only
the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is
something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of
a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the part of
the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect to know a
thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by one universal
medium can know each of the things which are properly contained in it,
is more perfect than one which cannot.
Reply to Objection 3: The same cannot be the proper and adequate type
of several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the
proper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a universal
prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which can be
taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the
lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of wariness;
and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of Its eminence,
is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each thing contained
therein: hence each one is likened to It according to its proper type.
The same applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the
angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many things can be known
through it with a proper knowledge.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS (THREE ARTICLES)
We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the
objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of
immaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first heading
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Does an angel know himself?
(2) Does one angel know another?
(3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angel knows himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For
Dionysius says that "the angels do not know their own powers" (Coel.
Hier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power is known.
Therefore an angel does not know his own essence.
Objection 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he
would not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing
single is intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only
knowledge which is intellectual, no angel can know himself.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible
object: because, as stated in De Anima iii, 4 understanding is a kind
of passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears
in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that "the angel knew
himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth."
I answer that, As is evident from what has been previously said
([495]Q[14], A[2]; [496]Q[54], A[2]), the object is on a different
footing in an immanent, and in a transient, action. In a transient
action the object or matter into which the action passes is something
separate from the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat,
and the building from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for
the action to proceed, the object must be united with the agent; just
as the sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that
sense may actually perceive. And the object which is united to a
faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the
form which is the principle of action in other agents: for, as heat is
the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species of the
thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.
It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object exists
sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; and then there is
only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may be actual
knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be actuated by
the species. But if it always actually possesses the species, it can
thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding change or
reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the nature of
knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as knowing in
potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the action, it
makes no difference whether it be inherent in something else, or
self-subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the less if it
were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something else. So
therefore, if in the order of intelligible beings there be any
subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since an
angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he is
actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself by
his form, which is his substance.
Reply to Objection 1: That is the text of the old translation, which is
amended in the new one, and runs thus: "furthermore they," that is to
say the angels, "knew their own powers": instead of which the old
translation read---"and furthermore they do not know their own powers."
Although even the letter of the old translation might be kept in this
respect, that the angels do not know their own power perfectly;
according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine Wisdom, Which to
the angels is incomprehensible.
Reply to Objection 2: We have no knowledge of single corporeal things,
not because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which
is their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any
single things subsisting without matter, as the angels are, there is
nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the intellect, in so far as if is
in potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not
happen in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that he
understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect is not of the
same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes into
some other matter.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one angel knows another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not know another. For
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 4), that if the human
intellect were to have in itself any one of the sensible things, then
such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending
external things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored with
some particular color, it could not see every color. But as the human
intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is the
angelic mind for understanding immaterial things. Therefore, since the
angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate nature from
the number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot understand
other natures.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in De Causis that "every
intelligence knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it;
and what is beneath it, in so far as it is its cause." But one angel is
not the cause of another. Therefore one angel does not know another.
Objection 3: Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the
essence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected by way of
a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the
essence of the angel known, except generically; as is clear from what
has been said before ([497]Q[50], A[4]; [498]Q[55], A[1], ad 3). Hence,
it follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of
another, but only a general knowledge. In like manner it cannot be said
that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known; because
that whereby the intellect understands is something within the
intellect; whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind. Again, it
cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species; because
that species would not differ from the angel understood, since each is
immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one angel can
understand another.
Objection 4: Further, if one angel did understand another, this would
be either by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if God
were now to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by
the existing angels; or else he would have to be known by a species
drawn from things; and so it would follow that the higher angels could
not know the lower, from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way
does it seem that one angel knows another.
On the contrary, We read in De Causis that "every intelligence knows
the things which are not corrupted."
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit. ii), such things as
pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him in
two ways: first, into the angelic mind; and secondly, so as to subsist
in their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in such a
way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the things
which He produced in their own natural being. Now in the Word of God
from eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal things, but
likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every one of these
spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both corporeal and
spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so that in every
angel there was impressed the form of his own species according to both
its natural and its intelligible condition, so that he should subsist
in the nature of his species, and understand himself by it; while the
forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed in him
only according to their intelligible natures, so that by such impressed
species he might know corporeal and spiritual creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual natures of the angels are
distinguished from one another in a certain order, as was already
observed ([499]Q[50], A[4], ad 1,2). So the nature of an angel does not
hinder him from knowing the other angelic natures, since both the
higher and lower bear affinity to his nature, the only difference being
according to their various degrees of perfection.
Reply to Objection 2: The nature of cause and effect does not lead one
angel to know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause
and effect are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be
admitted in the angels, this will suffice for one to know another.
Reply to Objection 3: One angel knows another by the species of such
angel existing in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose
image it is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but
according to natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself a
subsisting form in his natural being; but his species in the intellect
of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only an intelligible
existence. As the form of color on the wall has a natural existence;
but, in the deferent medium, it has only intentional existence.
Reply to Objection 4: God made every creature proportionate to the
universe which He determined to make. Therefore had God resolved to
make more angels or more natures of things, He would have impressed
more intelligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who, if he
had intended to build a larger house, would have made larger
foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature to the universe,
means that He would add a new intelligible species to an angel.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angle knows God by his own natural principles?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their
natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God "by His
incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds." Afterwards
he adds that, "since He is above all substances, He is remote from all
knowledge."
Objection 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an
angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it
appears that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through
a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." From this it appears
that there is a twofold knowledge of God; the one, whereby He is seen
in His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to face;
the other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was already
shown ([500]Q[12], A[4]), an angel cannot have the former knowledge by
his natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror belong to the
angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God from sensible
things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the angels
cannot know God by their natural powers.
On the contrary, The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet men
can know God through their natural principles; according to Rom. 1:19:
"what is known of God is manifest in them." Therefore much more so can
the angels.
I answer that, The angels can have some knowledge of God by their own
principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a thing
is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence in the
knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said that an
angel knows himself---secondly, by the presence of its similitude in
the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye from its image
being in the eye---thirdly, when the image of the object known is not
drawn directly from the object itself, but from something else in which
it is made to appear, as when we behold a man in a mirror.
To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He
is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue
to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above
([501]Q[12], A[4]). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we
know God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in creatures,
according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen,
being understood by the things that are made." Hence, too, we are said
to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby according to his
natural principles the angel knows God, stands midway between these
two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is seen through
the species abstracted from it. For since God's image is impressed on
the very nature of the angel in his essence, the angel knows God in as
much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold God's essence;
because no created likeness is sufficient to represent the Divine
essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the specular kind;
because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the
Divine image.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of
comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not
known by any created intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: Since an angel's intellect and essence are
infinitely remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him;
nor can he see God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not
follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all:
because, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge
which God has of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an
angel has of Him.
Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway
between these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more
to one of them, as was said above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS (FIVE ARTICLES)
We next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels.
Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things?
(2) Whether they know single things?
(3) Whether they know the future?
(4) Whether they know secret thoughts?
(5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels know material things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material things.
For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it.
But material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are
beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know material things.
Objection 2: Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as
exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [*On 2
Cor. 12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the
material things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor into
the angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual
vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are
apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in
themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the
angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know
material things.
Objection 3: Further, material things are not actually intelligible,
but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which
does not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things.
On the contrary, Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do
likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior
to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much more can the
mind of an angel.
I answer that, The established order of things is for the higher beings
to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is contained
deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to
be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of
fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of
things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect of His
simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among other
creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most; hence
they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things
pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in
themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in
God.
Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the manner
of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of their own
nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do
the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their
intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 1: The thing understood is the perfection of the one
who understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in
his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the
intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that
intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: Sense does not apprehend the essences of things,
but only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the
imagination; for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The intellect
alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De Anima
iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is "what a thing is,"
regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense regarding its
proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of material things
are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in
him who understands, and not according to their real natures. But some
things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures;
and in either case there is intellectual vision.
Reply to Objection 3: If an angel were to draw his knowledge of
material things from the material things themselves, he would require
to make them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he
does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things
themselves; he has knowledge of material things by actually
intelligible species of things, which species are connatural to him;
just as our intellect has, by species which it makes intelligible by
abstraction.
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Whether an angel knows singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the
Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): "The sense has for its object
singulars, but the intellect, universals." Now, in the angels there is
no power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident
from what was said above ([502]Q[54], A[5]). Consequently they do not
know singulars.
Objection 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of
the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any
assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so far
as it is singular; because, as was observed above ([503]Q[50], A[2]),
an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity.
Therefore the angel cannot know singulars.
Objection 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by
singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species;
because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of
species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not the
sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because singular
things are not known in the universal except potentially. Therefore the
angel does not know singulars.
On the contrary, No one can guard what he does not know. But angels
guard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: "He hath given His angels
charge over Thee." Consequently the angels know singulars.
I answer that, Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of
singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith,
which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels,
according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all ministering spirits." Now, if
they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision
over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals:
and this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5: "Say not before the angel:
There is no providence." Secondly, it is also contrary to the teachings
of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to be the
movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to their
knowledge and will.
Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of
singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular
effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming
eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This
opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a
singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as
singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing
from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to
happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking
place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and
movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing.
Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various
powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending
universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular
and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental
power. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher a
thing is, so much the more is its power united and far-reaching: thus
in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher
than the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything
apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other things which no
outer sense knows; for example, the difference between white and sweet.
The same is to be observed in other cases. Accordingly, since an angel
is above man in the order of nature, it is unreasonable to say that a
man knows by any one of his powers something which an angel by his one
faculty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence
Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord, which is
known to us, should be unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph.
text. 15).
The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered
from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may
subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that
they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes
forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature, but
likewise all that goes to make up their principles of individuation;
since He is the cause of the entire substance of the thing, as to both
its matter and its form. And for as much as He causes, does He know;
for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as was shown above
([504]Q[14], A[8]). Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes all
things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all things, not
only as to their universal natures, but also as to their singularity;
so through the species imparted to them do the angels know things, not
only as to their universal nature, but likewise in their individual
conditions, in so far as they are the manifold representations of that
one simple essence.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect,
which apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such
abstraction from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a
universal. Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the
nature of the angels, as was said above ([505]Q[55], A[2], A[3] ad 1),
and consequently there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not according to their nature that the
angels are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another
by agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears
resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way
there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and
form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever is
to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the angel's
intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence, are the
images of things not only as to their form, but also as to their
matter.
Reply to Objection 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms, which
nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and
as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by
the same species, has been already stated above ([506]Q[55], A[3], ad
3).
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Whether angels know the future?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know future events. For
angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many
future events. Therefore much more do the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the present and the future are differences of
time. But the angel's intellect is above time; because, as is said in
De Causis, "an intelligence keeps pace with eternity," that is,
aeviternity. Therefore, to the angel's mind, past and future are not
different, but he knows each indifferently.
Objection 3: Further, the angel does not understand by species derived
from things, but by innate universal species. But universal species
refer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears that
the angels know indifferently things past, present, and future.
Objection 4: Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of
time, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which are
distant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things distant
according to future time.
On the contrary, Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, does
not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the exclusive
sign of the Divinity, according to Is. 41:23: "Show the things that are
to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore the
angels do not know future events.
I answer that, The future can be known in two ways. First, it can be
known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily
from their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will
rise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their causes in the
majority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus
the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient. This manner of
knowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the more
than it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more
universally and more perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply
into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the
future issue thereof. But events which proceed from their causes in the
minority of cases are quite unknown; such as casual and chance events.
In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the
future in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely to know those
events which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but even
casual and chance events; for God sees all things in His eternity,
which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time. And
therefore God's one glance is cast over all things which happen in all
time as present before Him; and He beholds all things as they are in
themselves, as was said before when dealing with God's knowledge
([507]Q[14], A[13]). But the mind of an angel, and every created
intellect, fall far short of God's eternity; hence the future as it is
in itself cannot be known by any created intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Men cannot know future things except in their
causes, or by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same
way, but much more distinctly.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the angel's intellect is above that time
according to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a
time in his mind according to the succession of intelligible concepts;
of which Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that "God moves the
spiritual creature according to time." And thus, since there is
succession in the angel's intellect, not all things that happen through
all time, are present to the angelic mind.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the species in the intellect of an
angel, in so far as they are species, refer equally to things present,
past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future;
nevertheless the present, past, and future do not bear the same
relations to the species. Present things have a nature according to
which they resemble the species in the mind of an angel: and so they
can be known thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a
nature whereby they are likened to such species; consequently, they
cannot be known by those species.
Reply to Objection 4: Things distant according to place are already
existing in nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the
angel; whereas this is not true of future things, as has been stated.
Consequently there is no comparison.
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Whether angels know secret thoughts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For
Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job 28:17: "Gold or crystal cannot
equal it," says that "then," namely in the bliss of those rising from
the dead, "one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and
when once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same
time be penetrated." But those who rise shall be like the angels, as is
stated (Mat. 22:30). Therefore an angel can see what is in another's
conscience.
Objection 2: Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to
the intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its
shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the
intelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently, when one
angel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the
thoughts of both.
Objection 3: Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel
more than do the images in our imagination; because the former are
actually understood, while the latter are understood only potentially.
But the images in our imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal
things are known: because the imagination is a corporeal faculty.
Therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of the
intellect.
On the contrary, What is proper to God does not belong to the angels.
But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts, according to
Jer. 17:9: "The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable;
who can know it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart." Therefore angels
do not know the secrets of hearts.
I answer that, A secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in its
effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also by
man; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect is
the more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by
outward act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell
some passions of the soul by the mere pulse. Much more then can angels,
or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those occult bodily
modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that demons
"sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions, not only
when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought, when the
soul expresses them by certain signs in the body"; although (Retract.
ii, 30) he says "it cannot be asserted how this is done."
In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and
affections as they are in the will: and thus God alone can know the
thoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is,
because the rational creature is subject to God only, and He alone can
work in it Who is its principal object and last end: this will be
developed later ([508]Q[63], A[1]; [509]Q[105], A[5]). Consequently all
that is in the will, and all things that depend only on the will, are
known to God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the
will for anyone actually to consider anything; because a man who has a
habit of knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will.
Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11): "For what man knoweth the things
of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?"
Reply to Objection 1: In the present life one man's thought is not
known by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of
the grossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets.
The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not
exist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in the
angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show forth the
quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and of glory. In this
way one will be able to see the mind of another.
Reply to Objection 2: Although one angel sees the intelligible species
of another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank
of these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it
does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by
actual consideration.
Reply to Objection 3: The appetite of the brute does not control its
act, but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual
cause. Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their
dispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or
in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of man,
in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through following some
bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens in brutes.
Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive
appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are
moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower part of the soul
has some share of reason, as obeying its ruler, as is said in Ethics
iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the angel knows what is
passing through man's sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what
is in the thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject
to the sensitive appetite or the imagination, but can make various uses
of them.
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Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace.
For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all
mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in God through the
ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly
places." And the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:16): "That great mystery of
godliness appeared unto angels*." [*Vulg.: 'Great is the mystery of
godliness, which . . . appeared unto angels.'] Therefore the angels
know the mysteries of grace.
Objection 2: Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are
contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom,
which is His essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace.
Objection 3: Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is
clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew mysteries
of grace; for it is said (Amos 3:7): "For the Lord God doth nothing
without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." Therefore
angels know the mysteries of grace.
On the contrary, No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the
highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated
(Coel. Hier. vii) that "Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly
essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of
His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly": as is
evident in Is. 63:1, where, on the angels asking, "Who is he who cometh
up from Edom?" Jesus answered, "It is I, Who speak justice." Therefore
the angels do not know mysteries of grace.
I answer that, There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first is
his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by his
essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels cannot
know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure will
of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel,
which depend upon the will of such angel, much less can he ascertain
what depends entirely upon God's will. The Apostle reasons in this
fashion (1 Cor. 2:11): "No one knoweth the things of a man [*Vulg.:
'What man knoweth the things of a man, but . . . ?'], but the spirit of
a man that is in him." So, "the things also that are of God no man
knoweth but the Spirit of God."
There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it
is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By
such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do
they all know them equally; but just as God wills them to learn by
revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): "But to us God hath
revealed them through His Spirit"; yet so that the higher angels
beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper
mysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the
lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mysteries they knew
from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught
afterwards, as befits their ministrations.
Reply to Objection 1: One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the
Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was revealed
to all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason of this is,
that this is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are
ordered. For "all are [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all.'] ministering
spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of
salvation (Heb. 1:14)"; and this is brought by the mystery of the
Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in
this mystery from the very beginning.
We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to
its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on all
points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these
afterwards, as appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine
wisdom, yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them
to know everything hidden in it.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the
mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels.
And although God revealed in general to the prophets what He was one
day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still the apostles
knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets did not know.
Thus we read (Eph. 3:4,5): "As you reading, may understand my knowledge
in the mystery of Christ, which in other generations was not known to
the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles." Among the
prophets also, the later ones knew what the former did not know;
according to Ps. 118:100: "I have had understanding above ancients,"
and Gregory says: "The knowledge of Divine things increased as time
went on" (Hom. xvi in Ezech.).
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OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (SEVEN ARTICLES)
After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic
knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel's intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and
sometimes in act?
(2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time?
(3) Whether the angel's knowledge is discursive?
(4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing?
(5) Whether there can be error in the angel's intellect?
(6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening?
(7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do they
differ?
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Whether the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in
act?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's intellect is sometimes in
potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what is
in potentiality, as stated in Phys. iii, 6. But the angels' minds are
moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the
angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality.
Objection 2: Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but
possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality
thereto. But it is said (1 Pet. 1:12): "On Whom the angels desire to
look." Therefore the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality.
Objection 3: Further, in the book De Causis it is stated that "an
intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance." But
the angel's intelligence has some admixture of potentiality. Therefore
it sometimes understands potentially.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): "Since the angels
were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout
contemplation." Now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality,
but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8; Phys.
viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first, "as
before learning or discovering," that is, before it has the habit of
knowledge; secondly, as "when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but
does not actually consider." In the first way an angel's intellect is
never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural
knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the heavenly, bodies
have no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the
same way the heavenly intellects, the angels, have no intelligible
potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible
species. But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there is
nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: because even the
heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by
the sun.
In the second way an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with
regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always
actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge. But
as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds in the
Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always
actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the Word. For
the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and beatitude does not
consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8).
Reply to Objection 1: Movement is taken there not as the act of
something imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality,
but as the act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing.
In this way understanding and feeling are termed movements, as stated
in De Anima iii, text. 28.
Reply to Objection 2: Such desire on the part of the angels does not
exclude the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to
desire the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they
receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform.
Reply to Objection 3: In the angel's substance there is no potentiality
divested of act. In the same way, the angel's intellect is never so in
potentiality as to be without act.
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Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things
at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that "it may
happen that we know many things, but understand only one."
Objection 2: Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be
informed by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by
shape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore
neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various
intelligible things.
Objection 3: Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no
movement terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be
understood altogether.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): "The spiritual
faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time
all things that it wills."
I answer that, As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so
is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens that
several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a
continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered severally they
are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they
grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another way they are
taken as forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped both by
sense and intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the
entire continuous whole is considered, as is stated in De Anima iii,
text. 23. In this way our intellect understands together both the
subject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition; and
also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point
of comparison. From this it is evident that many things, in so far as
they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; but in so far as they
are comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood
together. Now everything is actually intelligible according as its
image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one
intelligible species, are known as one intelligible object, and
therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various
intelligible species, are apprehended as different intelligible
objects.
Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through
the Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which is
the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all
things at once: just as in heaven "our thoughts will not be fleeting,
going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall survey all
our knowledge at the same time by one glance," as Augustine says (De
Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things
by innate species, they can at one time know all things which can be
comprised under one species; but not such as are under various species.
Reply to Objection 1: To understand many things as one, is, so to
speak, to understand one thing.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is informed by the intelligible
species which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many
intelligible objects under one species; as one body can by one shape be
likened to many bodies.
To the third objection the answer is the same as the first.
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Whether an angel's knowledge is discursive?
Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of an angel is
discursive. For the discursive movement of the mind comes from one
thing being known through another. But the angels know one thing
through another; for they know creatures through the Word. Therefore
the intellect of an angel knows by discursive method.
Objection 2: Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do.
But the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects; all
of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the
angel, which is higher in the order of nature, can with greater reason
do this.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) says that "demons
learn more things by experience." But experimental knowledge is
discursive: for, "one experience comes of many remembrances, and one
universal from many experiences," as Aristotle observes (Poster. ii;
Metaph. vii). Therefore an angel's knowledge is discursive.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not
acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they led to
something particular from something common."
I answer that, As has often been stated [510](A[1]; [511]Q[55], A[1]),
the angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the
heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances: for Dionysius calls
them "heavenly minds" [512](A[1]; [513]Q[55], A[1]). Now, the
difference between heavenly and earthly bodies is this, that earthly
bodies obtain their last perfection by chance and movement: while the
heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very
nature. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the human, intellects obtain
their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and
discursive intellectual operation; that is to say, as they advance from
one known thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known
principle they were straightway to perceive as known all its consequent
conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at all. Such is
the condition of the angels, because in the truths which they know
naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known
in them.
Therefore they are called "intellectual beings": because even with
ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said
to be understood [intelligi]; hence "intellect" is defined as the habit
of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth
by the discursive method are called "rational"; and this comes of the
feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they possessed the
fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first
aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range,
by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.
Reply to Objection 1: Discursion expresses movement of a kind. Now all
movement is from something before to something after. Hence discursive
knowledge comes about according as from something previously known one
attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards known, and which was
previously unknown. But if in the thing perceived something else be
seen at the same time, as an object and its image are seen
simultaneously in a mirror, it is not discursive knowledge. And in this
way the angels know things in the Word.
Reply to Objection 2: The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing
a syllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet
they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by
syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.
Reply to Objection 3: Experience is affirmed of angels and demons
simply by way of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things
which are present, yet without any discursion withal.
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Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by composing and
dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, there
is composition of the same, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 21. But
there is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind; because
angels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at
one time. Therefore there is composition and division in the angel's
mind.
Objection 2: Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than
any two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions is that
of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant
natures not by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what was
said [514](A[2]). Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by
diverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and
dividing.
Objection 3: Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in
speaking to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which
are signs of composition and of division in the intellect; as is
manifest from many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems
that the angel understands by composing and dividing.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the intellectual
power of the angel shines forth with the clear simplicity of divine
concepts." But a simple intelligence is without composition and
division. Therefore the angel understands without composition or
division.
I answer that, As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion is
compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and
dividing, the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our
intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the
principle, it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In
like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the
subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed
to, or removed from, the subject, it would never understand by
composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus it
is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by
discursion, and by composing and dividing, namely, that in the first
apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp
all that is virtually contained in it. And this comes from the weakness
of the intellectual light within us, as has been said [515](A[3]).
Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel, for he is
a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), it
follows that as the angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither
does he by composing and dividing.
Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of
enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms: for he
understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable
immovably, and material things immaterially.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every multitude of things understood causes
composition, but a multitude of such things understood that one of them
is attributed to, or denied of, another. When an angel apprehends the
nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever can be
either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a
nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by
composing and dividing.
Reply to Objection 2: The various natures of things differ less as to
their mode of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the
way in which they are known, affirmation and negation have something
more in common; because directly the truth of an affirmation is known,
the falsehood of the opposite negation is known also.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that angels use affirmative and negative
forms of speech, shows that they know both composition and division:
yet not that they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply
the nature of a thing.
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Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel's
intellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv), there is "a perverted fancy" in the demons.
Therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of the
angels.
Objection 2: Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely.
But, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), there can be nescience in the
angels. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them.
Objection 3: Further, everything which falls short of the truth of
wisdom, and which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in its
intellect. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons.
Therefore it seems that there can be error in the minds of the angels.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that
"the intelligence is always true." Augustine likewise says (QQ. 83, qu.
32) that "nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence"
Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood in the angel's
knowledge.
I answer that, The truth of this question depends partly upon what has
gone before. For it has been said [516](A[4]) that an angel understands
not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what a thing is.
Now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing is, just as
the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in De Anima iii,
text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood creep in, when we
understand the essence of a thing by some kind of composition, and this
happens either when we take the definition of one thing for another, or
when the parts of a definition do not hang together, as if we were to
accept as the definition of some creature, "a four-footed flying
beast," for there is no such animal. And this comes about in things
composite, the definition of which is drawn from diverse elements, one
of which is as matter to the other. But there is no room for error in
understanding simple quiddities, as is stated in Metaph. ix, text. 22;
for either they are not grasped at all, and so we know nothing
respecting them; or else they are known precisely as they exist.
So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in
the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally; but very
differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the
quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process, as when, by
division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition. Such
is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowledge of the)
essence of a thing they know everything that can be said regarding it.
Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can be a source of
knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such thing, or
excluded from it; but not of what may be dependent on God's
supernatural ordinance. Consequently, owing to their upright will, from
their knowing the nature of every creature, the good angels form no
judgments as to the nature of the qualities therein, save under the
Divine ordinance; hence there can be no error or falsehood in them. But
since the minds of demons are utterly perverted from the Divine wisdom,
they at times form their opinions of things simply according to the
natural conditions of the same. Nor are they ever deceived as to the
natural properties of anything; but they can be misled with regard to
supernatural matters; for example, on seeing a dead man, they may
suppose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding Christ, they may
judge Him not to be God.
From all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the
question are evident. For the perversity of the demons comes of their
not being subject to the Divine wisdom; while nescience is in the
angels as regards things knowable, not naturally but supernaturally. It
is, furthermore, evident that their understanding of what a thing is,
is always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an undue
manner, referred to some composition or division.
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Whether there is a "morning" and an "evening" knowledge in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is neither an evening nor a
morning knowledge in the angels; because evening and morning have an
admixture of darkness. But there is no darkness in the knowledge of an
angel; since there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore the angelic
knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, between evening and morning the night intervenes;
while noonday falls between morning and evening. Consequently, if there
be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels, for the same
reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night
knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge is diversified according to the
difference of the objects known: hence the Philosopher says (De Anima
iii, text. 38), "The sciences are divided just as things are." But
there is a threefold existence of things: to wit, in the Word; in their
own natures; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine observes (Gen.
ad lit. ii, 8). If, therefore, a morning and an evening knowledge be
admitted in the angels, because of the existence of things in the Word,
and in their own nature, then there ought to be admitted a third class
of knowledge, on account of the existence of things in the angelic
mind.
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,31; De Civ. Dei xii,
7,20) divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and evening
knowledge.
I answer that, The expression "morning" and "evening" knowledge was
devised by Augustine; who interprets the six days wherein God made all
things, not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the
sun was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, namely, the day of
angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things. As in the
ordinary day, morning is the beginning, and evening the close of day,
so, their knowledge of the primordial being of things is called morning
knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word. But their
knowledge of the very being of the thing created, as it stands in its
own nature, is termed evening knowledge; because the being of things
flows from the Word, as from a kind of primordial principle; and this
flow is terminated in the being which they have in themselves.
Reply to Objection 1: Evening and morning knowledge in the angelic
knowledge are not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness, but as
compared to beginning and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine
puts it (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent us from
calling something light in comparison with one thing, and darkness with
respect to another. In the same way the life of the faithful and the
just is called light in comparison with the wicked, according to Eph.
5:8: "You were heretofore darkness; but now, light in the Lord": yet
this very life of the faithful, when set in contrast to the life of
glory, is termed darkness, according to 2 Pet. 1:19: "You have the firm
prophetic word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that
shineth in a dark place." So the angel's knowledge by which he knows
things in their own nature, is day in comparison with ignorance or
error; yet it is dark in comparison with the vision of the Word.
Reply to Objection 2: The morning and evening knowledge belong to the
day, that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the
darkness, that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while
knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn to
darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the praise of God,
in Whom, as in their principle, they know all things. Consequently
after "evening" there is no night, but "morning"; so that morning is
the end of the preceding day, and the beginning of the following, in so
far as the angels refer to God's praise their knowledge of the
preceding work. Noonday is comprised under the name of day, as the
middle between the two extremes. Or else the noon can be referred to
their knowledge of God Himself, Who has neither beginning nor end.
Reply to Objection 3: The angels themselves are also creatures.
Accordingly the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is
comprised under evening knowledge, as also the existence of things in
their own nature.
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Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one?
Objection 1: It would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge
are one. For it is said (Gn. 1:5): "There was evening and morning, one
day." But by the expression "day" the knowledge of the angels is to be
understood, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the
morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two
operations at the same time. But the angels are always using their
morning knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in
God, according to Mat. 18:10. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were
different from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening
knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which
is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away."
But, if the evening knowledge be different from the morning, it is
compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the
evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24): "There is a vast
difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of God, and as
it is in its own nature; so that the former belongs to the day, and the
latter to the evening."
I answer that, As was observed [517](A[6]), the evening knowledge is
that by which the angels know things in their proper nature. This
cannot be understood as if they drew their knowledge from the proper
nature of things, so that the preposition "in" denotes the form of a
principle; because, as has been already stated ([518]Q[55], A[2]), the
angels do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then, that
when we say "in their proper nature" we refer to the aspect of the
thing known in so far as it is an object of knowledge; that is to say,
that the evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the
being of things which those things have in their own nature.
Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas,
or by the forms of things existing in the Word. For by beholding the
Word, they know not merely the being of things as existing in the Word,
but the being as possessed by the things themselves; as God by
contemplating Himself sees that being which things have in their own
nature. It, therefore, it be called evening knowledge, in so far as
when the angels behold the Word, they know the being which things have
in their proper nature, then the morning and the evening knowledge are
essentially one and the same, and only differ as to the things known.
If it be called evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas
they know the being which things have in their own natures, then the
morning and the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to
understand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other.
Reply to Objection 1: The six days, as Augustine understands them, are
taken as the six classes of things known by the angels; so that the
day's unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood;
which, nevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it.
Reply to Objection 2: There can be two operations of the same faculty
at the one time, one of which is referred to the other; as is evident
when the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end;
and the intellect at the same instant perceives principles and
conclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired
knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24), the evening
knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels; hence
there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the
angels.
Reply to Objection 3: On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite
imperfect is done away: just as faith, which is of the things that are
not seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection of
the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the morning
knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not opposite to its
being known in its cause. Nor, again, is there any inconsistency in
knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is more perfect and
the other less perfect; just as we can have a demonstrative and a
probable medium for reaching the same conclusion. In like manner a
thing can be known by the angel through the uncreated Word, and through
an innate idea.
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THE WILL OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)
In the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of the
angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will itself; secondly,
of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in the angels?
(2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect?
(3) Is there free-will in the angels?
(4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them?
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Whether there is will in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For as
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The will is in the
reason." But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher
than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something
higher than the will.
Objection 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is
evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the appetite
argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of something not as
yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels,
especially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will in them.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that
the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible
object understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are
incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the image of
the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory, understanding,
and will. But God's image is found not only in the soul of man, but
also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable of knowing God.
Therefore there is will in the angels.
I answer that, We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In
evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow
from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by
appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to good
by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and
inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called "a natural
appetite." Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some
knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they
apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet,
the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension
is called "a sensitive appetite." Other things, again, have an
inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive
the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This is most
perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were
merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like things
devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things
which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in
general. Such inclination is termed "will." Accordingly, since the
angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is
manifest that there is a will in them.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason surpasses sense in a different way from
that in which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense
according to the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of
particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there
must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which
appetite belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards
particular good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and
reason differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect
knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of
discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion
reason comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely, the
universal. Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty
on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same.
Therefore in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no
appetite higher than the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the name of the appetitive part is
derived from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part
reaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things;
thus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot
[laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same
way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger [ira]; though at
the same time there are several other passions in it, as hope, daring,
and the rest.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is called a mover which is moved,
according as to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind;
and there is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in
the angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as
stated in De Anima iii, text. 28.
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Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ
from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple
than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form
towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the
angel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists,
or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the angel
inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an
intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to
the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his
nature or his intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while
the object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ,
not really but only logically [*Cf. [519]Q[16], A[4]]. Therefore will
and intellect are not really different.
Objection 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not
differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives
color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually
related as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to
wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good,
does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.
On the contrary, The will in the angels regards good things only, while
their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both.
Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect.
I answer that, In the angels the will is a special faculty or power,
which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not their
nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is
completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to anything
beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies that the
inclination to being does not come from anything superadded to the
essence, but from the matter which desires being before possessing it,
and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists. But
the inclination towards something extrinsic comes from something
superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes from gravity or
lightness, while the inclination to make something like itself comes
from the active qualities.
Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there
alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained
within the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills
nothing beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot
be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to
the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the
angel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence.
In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect
of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object
known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself
to what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside it
is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes
out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it
tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one
faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to
another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect
and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is
not so with God, for He has within Himself universal being, and the
universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.
Reply to Objection 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its
substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by
something additional, as has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material
difference of their objects, but according to their formal distinction,
which is taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently the
diversity derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the
difference of intellect from will.
Reply to Objection 3: Because the good and the true are really
convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect
as something true; while the true is desired by the will as something
good. Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for
diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
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Whether there is free-will in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels.
For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with
the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking
counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in Ethic.
iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for
this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore it appears that
there is no free-will in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives.
But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such
indifference; because, as was observed already ([520]Q[58], A[5]),
their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally
intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their appetitive
faculty can there be free-will.
Objection 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to
them according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels
the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the
free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in
them.
On the contrary, Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels'
dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men,
with much more reason is it in the angels.
I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any previous
judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the
arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some
kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals;
for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it
esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judgment is not a free one,
but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can
act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the
common note of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other
thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is
free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect, so
is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection
than in man.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is
in man. As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an
angel's in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other
does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in
the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but
by the sudden acceptance of truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As was observed already [521](A[2]), knowledge is
effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a
mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should
naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his
nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he
can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of
this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the
perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is
inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore it
does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined
with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue imperfection in
him, with he to be indeterminate to what is above him.
Reply to Objection 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher
angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the
intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of
compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less
degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased
directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through the
addition of some qualification.
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Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a
concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence."
But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered
their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while
anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred
Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the
wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
Objection 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible
appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance
appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the
irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both
a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the
irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does not
exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible
and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The
reason of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from
one another not according to the material but only by the formal
distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object
according to some common idea, there will be no distinction of
faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained
under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of
sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of sight
distinguished according to the difference of black and white: whereas
if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white, then the
faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of
seeing black.
Now it is quite evident from what has been said [522](A[1]; [523]Q[16],
A[1]), that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as
the will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can
there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the
intellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the
distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite
is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its
common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly, since
there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their
appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but
remains undivided; and it is called the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to
be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;---on account
of the resemblance in the effect.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are
in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple
act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to
love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to
repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these
things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei ix).
Reply to Objection 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible
appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible
appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine
goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind. For
the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the
irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible appetite is
something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue of
hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and divine.
Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with the
desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible
faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside
in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a
human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fortitude in the
irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in
them there are no passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to
be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated
of them according as in moderation they display their will in
conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed to
them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of this
is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible
appetite.
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OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)
The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is
love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive faculty comes of
love.
Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?
(2) Whether there is in them love of choice?
(3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of
choice?
(4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves
himself?
(5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love?
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Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection
in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from
intellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an
angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.
Objection 2: Further, those who love with natural love are more acted
upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own
nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves;
because they possess free-will, as was shown above ([524]Q[59], A[3]).
Consequently there is no natural love in them.
Objection 3: Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now
ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to
wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is
above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no
natural love in the angels.
On the contrary, Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved
except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But
there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also
natural love.
I answer that, We must necessarily place natural love in the angels. In
evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always
sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect,
because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently
whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects
as have intellect. But it is common to every nature to have some
inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This inclination
is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each
according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there
is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the
sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a nature
devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to
something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there
must be a natural love in his will.
Reply to Objection 1: Intellectual love is contradistinguished from
that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to
a nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or
intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: All things in the world are moved to act by
something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that
He is in no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will
are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to
act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the
Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not
act himself, because he has free-will.
Reply to Objection 3: As natural knowledge is always true, so is
natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than
the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a
natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the
Author of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from
the rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude perfects
the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and
the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.
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Whether there is love of choice in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no love of choice in the
angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice
follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now
rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to
angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice
in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides
such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to
acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to
everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first
principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as
has been already stated [525](A[1]; [526]Q[16], A[1]). Consequently,
besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels.
Therefore there is no love of choice in them.
On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But
by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of
choice in them.
I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of
choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice;
because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of
a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what
belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.
This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and
his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from such
knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by
him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner,
the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the
intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will
tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills
happiness: and all other desires are caused by this natural desire;
since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore
the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his
natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of something
loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice.
There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the
part of the will. Because, as was stated already ([527]Q[59], A[2]),
the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the
known within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man's
intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all
things capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he
is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive
faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards
things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are
appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to
something else, and being appetible on account of something else.
Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring, for
him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else from
choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the intellectual
nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive
knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both
natural love and love of choice.
In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which
are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof:
but we shall speak of them later on [528](Q[62]).
Reply to Objection 1: Not all love of choice is rational love,
according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For
rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as
was said above ([529]Q[59], A[3], ad 1), when treating of free-will,
every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only
human choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.
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Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both
with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said [530](A[2]),
natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the
means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot
be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the
love of choice cannot have the same object.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a
uniting and a binding power." But uniting and binding imply various
things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.
Objection 3: Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement
tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot
love himself with either natural or elective love.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): "Love for others
comes of love for oneself."
I answer that, Since the object of love is good, and good is to be
found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from Ethic. i, 6,
a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good;
and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a
subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that
which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or inherent good:
thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but that it
may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by the name
"concupiscence" while the first is called "friendship."
Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything
naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to
mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own
good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man
naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what
is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with the love of
choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will
benefit himself.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not under the same but under quite
different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and
with elective love, as was observed above.
Reply to Objection 2: As to be one is better than to be united, so
there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love
which unites one to others. Dionysius used the terms "uniting" and
"binding" in order to show the derivation of love from self to things
outside self; as uniting is derived from unity.
Reply to Objection 3: As love is an action which remains within the
agent, so also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does
not of necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected
back upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is
reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not love another with
natural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But an
angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows
himself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as
was said above ([531]Q[56], AA[1],2). Therefore it seems that one angel
does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.
Objection 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and
the principle than what is derived from it. But love for another comes
of love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one
angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.
Objection 3: Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is
unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such love
can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no
love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another with
natural love as he loves himself.
On the contrary, That seems to be a natural property which is found in
all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, "every beast loves its
like," as is said, Ecclus. 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves
another as he loves himself.
I answer that, As was observed [532](A[3]), both angel and man
naturally love self. Now what is one with a thing, is that thing
itself: consequently every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if
this be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love;
but if it be one with it by non-natural union, then it loves it with
non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social
love, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so far
as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation.
Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with
another, is the one according to nature. And so everything loves
another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in
so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things
devoid of knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate
its form to another thing, wherein consists this other thing's good; as
it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne
upwards.
So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural
affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an
angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from
him in other respects, he does not love him with natural love.
Reply to Objection 1: The expression 'as himself' can in one way
qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and
loved: and thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows
the other to be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the
expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the
knower and lover. And thus one angel does not know another as himself,
because he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the
other's essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves
himself, because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not love
another by the other's will.
Reply to Objection 2: The expression "as" does not denote equality, but
likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the
angel naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he
loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what is one only
generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a like
love for another as for himself, in this respect, that as he loves self
in wishing well to self, so he loves another in wishing well to him.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of
that end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one
wills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to
oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels,
without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good
angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But they
hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to righteousness
and unrighteousness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love God by natural
love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated [533](A[4]),
natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far
above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the
angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel.
Objection 2: Further, "That on account of which a thing is such, is yet
more so." But every one loves another with natural love for his own
sake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the
angel does not love God more than self with natural love.
Objection 3: Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we
behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But
nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards
anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does not
love God more than himself from natural love.
Objection 4: Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than
self. But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for "it is
poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to them,"
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels do not
love God more than themselves by natural love.
Objection 5: Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the
love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who
sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), "Two loves have made two
cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the
earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the
heavenly city." Therefore it is not natural to love God more than self.
On the contrary, All the moral precepts of the law come of the law of
nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral precept
of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently from
natural love the angel loves God more than himself.
I answer that, There have been some who maintained that an angel loves
God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of
concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather
than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in
so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself;
because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he
wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the
natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he
naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.
The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider
whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because
the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the
natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature.
Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally belongs to
another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that other to
which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural tendency is
evidenced from things which are moved according to nature: because
"according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn aptitude to
be thus moved," as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we observe that
the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as,
for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for
the whole body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the
same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous
citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of
the state; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such
inclination would be natural to him.
Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good both
man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every creature
in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it follows that
from natural love angel and man alike love God before themselves and
with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than
God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it
would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Such reasoning holds good of things adequately
divided whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of
the other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it
does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with
the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and
goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self;
because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more
than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the
species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the good
of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence everything
in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in
so far" as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far"
denotes an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God
for his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature of love
on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature
of anyone to love God, except from this---that everything is dependent
on that good which is God.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as
to certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for
everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but
likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural
inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.
Reply to Objection 4: God, in so far as He is the universal good, from
Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural
love. So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all
with supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 5: Since God's substance and universal goodness are
one and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement
of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other
things, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is
naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is
impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him.
But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular
effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they
are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the universal
good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (FOUR ARTICLES)
After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will,
it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a
general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the
first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence;
secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly,
how some of them became wicked.
Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?
(2) Whether he has existed from eternity?
(3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?
(4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
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Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels have no cause of their
existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created by
God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not
created by God.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16)
that if any substance be a form without matter, "straightway it has
being and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity."
But the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above ([534]Q[50],
A[2]). Therefore they have no cause of their being.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very
fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the angels
are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the
angels have no active cause.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:2): "Praise ye Him, all His
angels"; and further on, verse 5: "For He spoke and they were made."
I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing,
except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence; while in
everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown
above ([535]Q[3], A[4]). From this it is clear that God alone exists of
His own essence: while all other things have their existence by
participation. Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what
exists essentially; as everything ignited is caused by fire.
Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the
angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of
things, but are designated by the name "heavens" or of "light." And
they were either passed over, or else designated by the names of
corporeal things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as
yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had
been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal
nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which
they were inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard
them.
Reply to Objection 2: Substances that are subsisting forms have no
'formal' cause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as
produces its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality
to actuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire
substance.
From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.
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Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from
eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does
not act through something besides His essence. But His being is
eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.
Objection 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at
another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid
down in the book De Causis. Therefore the angel is not at one time
existing and at another non-existing, but exists always.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's
incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as
truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual
nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but
likewise eternal.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person of begotten
Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He
made anything from the beginning." But, as was shown above [536](A[1]),
the angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.
I answer that, God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from eternity.
Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to the contrary
must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He
made them "from nothing"; that is, after they had not been.
Reply to Objection 1: God's being is His will. So the fact that God
produced the angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude
that He made them also by His will. But, as was shown above
([537]Q[19], A[3]; [538]Q[46], A[1] ), God's will does not act by
necessity in producing creatures. Therefore He produced such as He
willed, and when He willed.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel is above that time which is the measure
of the movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a
corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the
measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, and
which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations.
Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) that "God moves the
spiritual creature according to time."
Reply to Objection 3: Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by
the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of
truth. But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was
bestowed upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not
follow that the angels existed from eternity.
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Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created before the
corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): "Six thousand
years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the
time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones,
Dominations, and the other orders served God?" Damascene also says (De
Fide Orth. ii): "Some say that the angels were begotten before all
creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all devised
the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making
thereof."
Objection 2: Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the
Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from
eternity; while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic
nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity.
Objection 3: Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the
corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one
corporeal nature was made before another; hence the six days of the
production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much
more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal
nature.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth." Now, this would not be true if anything had been
created previously. Consequently the angels were not created before
corporeal nature.
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in
the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the
angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the
angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of
themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting
one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature
to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the
good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the
whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose "works are
perfect," as it is said Dt. 32:4, should have created the angelic
creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not
to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory
Nazianzen, "whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight
that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the
case with the doctrine of Athanasius," as Jerome says.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of
the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have
taken place previously to that of the corporeal world.
Reply to Objection 2: God is not a part of, but far above, the whole
universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the
universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe.
Hence the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while
the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation
of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the
creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not involve
creation of the universe.
If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gn. 1, "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the beginning,"
must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In the beginning of time": but
not, "In the beginning, before which there was nothing," unless we say
"Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures."
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Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in the
empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a
substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its
existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation.
Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that
the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the
empyrean heaven.
Objection 3: Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest
heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven, it
would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is
contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the
sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven" (Is. 14:13).
On the contrary, Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the
visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual
firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendor;
and which was filled with angels directly it was made."
I answer that, As was observed [539](A[3]), the universe is made up of
corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures
were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature,
and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the
angels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over
all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven, or
whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that the highest heaven is
the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage of Dt. 10:14: "Behold
heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven of heaven."
Reply to Objection 1: The angels were created in a corporeal place, not
as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their
being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal
creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal
place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that
they are by their power in touch with bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly
means the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of
affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not
speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the
opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing
to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an exalted
and universal power over all corporeal things, were created in the
highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other angels, as
having more restricted powers, were created among the inferior bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal
heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the
sinning angel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some
manner to God, as will appear later on ([540]Q[63], A[3]).
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OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY (NINE
ARTICLES)
In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the
order of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine points
of inquiry:
(1) Were the angels created in beatitude?
(2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?
(3) Were they created in grace?
(4) Did they merit their beatitude?
(5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?
(6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural
capacities?
(7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain?
(8) Could they have sinned afterwards?
(9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?
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Whether the angels were created in beatitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude.
For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue in
the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess
the excellence they have." Therefore the angels were created in
beatitude.
Objection 2: Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal
creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation was
made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take precedence in
time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 15).
Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature imperfect and
incomplete. But its formation and perfection are derived from its
beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was created in
beatitude.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34; v,
5), the things which we read of as being made in the works of the six
days, were made together at one time; and so all the six days must have
existed instantly from the beginning of creation. But, according to his
exposition, in those six days, "the morning" was the angelic knowledge,
according to which they knew the Word and things in the Word. Therefore
straightway from their creation they knew the Word, and things in the
Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the Word.
Consequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from the very
beginning of their creation.
On the contrary, To be established or confirmed in good is of the
nature of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in good as soon
as they were created; the fall of some of them shows this. Therefore
the angels were not in beatitude from their creation.
I answer that, By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate
perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that
it is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its
ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of
rational or of intellectual nature. The first is one which it can
procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure called
beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man's
ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby
in this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and that is
God. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look forward
to in the future, whereby "we shall see God as He is." This is beyond
the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above ([541]Q[12],
A[4]).
So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first beatitude,
which the angel could procure by his natural power, he was created
already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such beatitude by
any progressive action, as man does, but, as was observed above
([542]Q[58], AA[3] ,4), is straightway in possession thereof, owing to
his natural dignity. But the angels did not have from the beginning of
their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power of
nature; because such beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end;
and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the
beginning.
Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude is there taken for that natural
perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence.
Reply to Objection 2: The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning
of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by
its operation; consequently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v,
4,23; viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take place
at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of
the plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the angelic
creature in the beginning of its existence had the perfection of its
nature; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by
its operation.
Reply to Objection 3: The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word;
the one which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a
natural knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude
thereof shining in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby
he knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the
angel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural knowledge,
and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first knowledge
of things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset of his
creation; while the second was not, but only when the angels became
blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly termed their
morning knowledge.
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Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order
to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can
accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because he
loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said ([543]Q[60],
A[5]). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks.
Now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because
there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had
no need of grace in order to turn to God.
Objection 3: Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for
grace; hence it is said (Zech. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to
you." But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare
ourselves for grace: for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore
the angel did not need grace to turn to God.
On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the angel reached to
beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it
would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess
everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle
(Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God is life everlasting."
I answer that, The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to
God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above
([544]Q[60], A[2]) the natural movement of the will is the principle of
all things that we will. But the will's natural inclination is directed
towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is
anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined towards it,
unless helped by some other supernatural principle. Thus it is clear
that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and to generate
fire; whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural power of fire;
consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in so far as it is
moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul.
Now it was shown above ([545]Q[12], AA[4],5), when we were treating of
God's knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate
beatitude of the rational creature consists, is beyond the nature of
every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the
movement of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be
moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help of
grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own
will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is
the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to
God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is "difficult" which is beyond a power;
and this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the
natural capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some
help, it is said to be "difficult"; but if it can in no way be
attained, then it is "impossible"; thus it is impossible for a man to
fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, not according to
the natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening
hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of
the motive power of the soul; because the soul, considered in itself,
can be moved in any direction; but is hindered from so doing by the
weight of the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to mount
upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult for man,
both because it is beyond his nature, and because he has a hindrance
from the corruption of the body and infection of sin. But it is
difficult for an angel, only because it is supernatural.
Reply to Objection 3: Every movement of the will towards God can be
termed a conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God.
The first is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature
enjoying the possession of God; and for such conversion, consummate
grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits
beatitude; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is the
principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man disposes
himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual grace is
required; but the operation of God, Who draws the soul towards Himself,
according to Lam 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be
converted." Hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to
infinity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels were created in grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in grace.
For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that the angelic nature was
first made without form, and was called "heaven": but afterwards it
received its form, and was then called "light." But such formation
comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.
Objection 2: Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God.
If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever
have turned away from God.
Objection 3: Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But
the angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems
that they were not created in grace; but that they were first created
in nature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were
beatified.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), "Who wrought the
good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will,
that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same
time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them?"
I answer that, Although there are conflicting opinions on this point,
some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state,
while others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it seems
more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that
they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things
which, in the process of time, being created by the work of Divine
Providence, were produced by the operation of God, were created in the
first fashioning of things according to seedlike forms, as Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees, animals, and the rest. Now
it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to
beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural effect;
hence (1 Jn. 3:9) grace is called the "seed" of God. As, then, in
Augustine's opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all
natural effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally
created, so straightway from the beginning the angels were created in
grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Such absence of form in the angels can be
understood either by comparison with their formation in glory; and so
the absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or
else it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and so
it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as
Augustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things (Gen.
ad lit. i, 15).
Reply to Objection 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of
the subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to
be inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the
movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace can
fail to make use of it, and can sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in the order of nature grace comes
midway between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in
created nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory is
the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace stands
not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as the
principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting for grace to be
given straightway with nature.
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Whether an angel merits his beatitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude.
For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the
angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous
action was not meritorious for him.
Objection 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But
it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not
thereby merit beatitude.
Objection 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he
did so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not
before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before whereby
to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he would be
meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower
angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher, and the
distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is not
admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude.
On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the "measure of the
angel" in that heavenly Jerusalem is "the measure of a man." Therefore
the same is the case with the angel.
I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because
existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude,
however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now
everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation
leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is
not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing
art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when
such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it;
wherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing. Now it is evident
from what has gone before ([546]AA[1],2; [547]Q[12], AA[4],5), ultimate
beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It remains,
then, that both man and angel merited their beatitude.
And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit,
there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude: as
also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had
glory.
But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then
have to be said that he had beatitude without merit, even as we have
grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which
conveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be said, as
some others have maintained, that the angels merit beatitude by their
present ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite contrary,
again, to the notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a means
to an end; while what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking,
be moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce what he
already enjoys. Or else it will have to be said that one and the same
act of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is meritorious;
and so far as it attains the end, is the fruition of beatitude. Even
this view will not stand, because free-will is not the sufficient cause
of merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as coming
from free-will, except in so far as it is informed by grace; but it
cannot at the same time be informed by imperfect grace, which is the
principle of meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of
enjoying. Hence it does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy
beatitude, and at the same time to merit it.
Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was
admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The angel's difficulty of working righteously
does not come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers; but
from the fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel did not merit beatitude by natural
movement towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of
grace.
The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude
instantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man to
do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after one
act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel.
Objection 2: Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant,
from the very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin to
be moved in the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of
a body could be instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it
would have movement in the first instant of its generation.
Consequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will, he
merited it in the first instant of his creation; and so, if their
beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the
first instant.
Objection 3: Further, there must be many intervals between things which
are far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far remote
from their natural condition: while merit comes midway between.
Therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in
order to reach beatitude.
On the contrary, Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for
beatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints.
Now the soul separated from the body, if it has merit deserving
beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be some
obstacle. Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in his
first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since
there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by
only one meritorious act.
I answer that, The angel was beatified instantly after the first act of
charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is because
grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature; as every
perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection, according
to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its
natural perfection not by passing from one stage to another; but to
have it at once naturally, as was shown above [548](A[1]; [549]Q[58],
AA[3],4). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to natural
perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence instantly after
merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel
and man alike can be from merely one act; because man merits beatitude
by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an angel was
beatified straightway after one act of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Man was not intended to secure his ultimate
perfection at once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to
man than to the angel for securing beatitude.
Reply to Objection 2: The angel is above the time of corporeal things;
hence the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken
except as reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which
merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of
beatitude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect grace,
and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, it remains for
different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel merited
beatitude, and in another was beatified.
Reply to Objection 3: It is of the nature of an angel instantly to
attain the perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one
meritorious act is required; which act can so far be called an interval
as through it the angel is brought to beatitude.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their
natural gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and
glory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is
bestowed of God's absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace depends
on God's will, and not on the degree of their natural gifts.
Objection 2: Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with
grace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace. But
grace does not come "of works," as is said Rom. 11:6. Therefore much
less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural
gifts.
Objection 3: Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or
grace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree of
his natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel.
On the contrary, Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences (Sent.
ii, D, 3) that "those angels who were created with more subtle natures
and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed with
greater gifts of grace."
I answer that, It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and
perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the
degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from
two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of His
wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as the
angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude, so
likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the
various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the
builder chisels the stones for building a house, from the fact that he
prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is
clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the
house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of
grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature.
Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is
not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the one
thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man, in
whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or
thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is
nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy.
So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher nature,
were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same thing
happens in men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed according to
the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it appears that
the angels who had the greater natural powers, had the more grace and
glory.
Reply to Objection 1: As grace comes of God's will alone, so likewise
does the nature of the angel: and as God's will ordained nature for
grace, so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various
degrees of grace.
Reply to Objection 2: The acts of the rational creature are from the
creature itself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it
seems rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than
according to works.
Reply to Objection 3: Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the
angels, who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another
way in men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on
account of the end; while numerical difference is because of the
matter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or
impede the movement of his intellective nature; but not in the angels.
Consequently the argument is not the same for both.
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Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not
remain in the beatified angels. For it is said (1 Cor. 13:10): "When
that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done
away." But natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with
beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural
knowledge and love cease.
Objection 2: Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But
the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels.
Therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love
to remain.
Objection 3: Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts,
as the same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points.
But the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified
knowledge and love; for, as is said Ethic. i, 8, happiness consists not
in habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge
and love in the angels.
On the contrary, So long as a nature endures, its operation remains.
But beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its perfection.
Therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and love.
I answer that, Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For as
principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations
themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to
second; because beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must
ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved
in beatitude: and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved in
the act of beatitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The advent of a perfection removes the opposite
imperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the
perfection of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the
power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken
away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In
the same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to
the perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing hinders us from
knowing a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at the
one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative one. In
like manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this appertains
to his knowledge of glory; and at the same time he can know God by his
own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: All things which make up beatitude are sufficient
of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the
natural gifts; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the
uncreated beatitude.
Reply to Objection 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty
at the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural
knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory.
Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from
existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.
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Whether a beatified angel can sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as was
said above [550](A[7]), beatitude does not do away with nature. But it
is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a
beatified angel can sin.
Objection 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as
the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the
angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is
inclined towards good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to
be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not lessened
in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that "there is in the
holy angels that nature which cannot sin." Therefore the holy angels
cannot sin.
I answer that, The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is,
because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence.
Now, God's essence is the very essence of goodness. Consequently the
angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same way as anyone
else not seeing God is to the common form of goodness. Now it is
impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming
at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as
such. Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as
aiming towards God. Now whoever wills or acts in this manner cannot
sin. Consequently the beatified angel cannot sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Created good, considered in itself, can fail. But
from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union of
beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason already
alleged.
Reply to Objection 2: The rational powers are referred to opposites in
the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the
things whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred to
opposites. For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known
principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good,
formally as good; because the will is naturally ordained to good as to
its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is referred to
opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have no
tendency to opposites with regard to God Himself, Whom they see to be
the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards
God, which ever alternative they choose, that is not sinful.
Reply to Objection 3: Free-will in its choice of means to an end is
disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident
that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to
different conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to
proceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the
principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the perfection
of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite
things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the
defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the
order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of
will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can
sin.
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Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in
beatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is perfect
charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can merit. Now,
as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases. Therefore the
beatified angels can progress in beatitude.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that "God
makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same
thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations";
since "they are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering
spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of
salvation" (Heb. 1:14). This would not be for their profit were they
not to merit thereby, nor to advance to beatitude. It remains, then,
that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance in beatitude.
Objection 3: Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying
the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not in
the highest degree of beatitude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher,
it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them; which is
not admissible.
On the contrary, Merit and progress belong to this present condition of
life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beatitude, they
are already in possession of beatitude. Consequently the beatified
angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude.
I answer that, In every movement the mover's intention is centered upon
one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable subject;
because intention looks to the end, to which infinite progress is
repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature cannot of its
own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in the vision of God,
as is clear from what has gone before ([551]Q[12], A[4]), that it needs
to be moved by God towards its beatitude. Therefore there must be some
one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to
its last end.
Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist
precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all
the blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of
vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of Him
Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the rational
creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it should be
led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which is
comprehension, for this belongs to God only; as is evident from what
was said above ([552]Q[12], A[7]; [553]Q[14], A[3]). But since infinite
efficacy is required for comprehending God, while the creature's
efficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite being is
in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pass that
the rational creature understands God more or less clearly according to
infinite degrees. And as beatitude consists in vision, so the degree of
vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision.
Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its
beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought even to a
determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is once
secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.
Reply to Objection 1: Merit belongs to a subject which is moving
towards its end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end,
not merely passively, but also by working actively. If the end is
within the power of the rational creature, then its action is said to
procure the end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the
end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another, then the
action will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the
ultimate term is not said to be moved, but to have been moved.
Consequently, to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life;
whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward.
Even as in acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is
productive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is
both perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect charity
has no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the
reward.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First
of all, as being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beatitude is
useful. Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall for
a house. In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the
beatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; for
to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what is
perfect, considered as perfect.
Reply to Objection 3: Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in
the highest degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the
highest degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the
joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of such
as are saved by their ministrations, according to Lk. 15:10: "There is
[Vulg.'shall be'] joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing
penance." Such joy belongs to their accidental reward, which can be
increased unto judgment day. Hence some writers say that they can merit
as to their accidental reward. But it is better to say that the Blessed
can in no wise merit without being at the same time a wayfarer and a
comprehensor; like Christ, Who alone was such. For the Blessed acquire
such joy from the virtue of their beatitude, rather than merit it.
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THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN (NINE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of all
with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as to the evil of
punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for
consideration:
(1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?
(2) What kind of sins can be in them?
(3) What did the angel seek in sinning?
(4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are
any of them naturally evil?
(5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in
the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will?
(6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his
creation and fall?
(7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the
angels?
(8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning?
(9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?
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Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the
angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in
potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19),
because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the
angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms.
Therefore there can be no evil in them.
Objection 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies.
But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies.
Therefore neither can there by in the angels.
Objection 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But
it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love
towards God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in
loving God they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.
Objection 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently
good. Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a
true good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at
least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it
truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good.
Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.
On the contrary, It is said (Job 4:18): "In His angels He found
wickedness."
I answer that, An angel or any other rational creature considered in
his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to
sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the
condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing
else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have;
whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the
rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of
rectitude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he
could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but if the rightness
of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving may be right
or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God's act, because
it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will has
rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the Divine
will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every desire of a
subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior; for
instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of his commanding
officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas
there can be sin in the will of every creature; considering the
condition of its nature.
Reply to Objection 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural
existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as
regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this
respect there can be evil in them.
Reply to Objection 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural
operation. Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their
nature; so neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural
action. But besides their natural action there is the action of
free-will in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the
movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural
being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural
beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away by
sinning.
Reply to Objection 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of
free-will. First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by
choosing adultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of
ignorance or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as
good. The adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an
inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the
inclination of passion or of habit; even though he does not err in his
universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect. In
this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there are no
passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest
from what has been said above ([554]Q[59], A[4]); nor, again, could any
habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin
comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not
according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces
sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated,
but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to pray,
without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin does
not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of the
things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned, by
seeking his own good, from his own free-will, insubordinately to the
rule of the Divine will.
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Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels
besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any
kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even
in the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.
Objection 2: Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are
sloth, avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the
spirit, just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can
there be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices
spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is
granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and envy
in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other vices in
them.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil "is
not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort; yet he
is proud and envious."
I answer that, Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all by
actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are in
the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all
sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in the demons which
can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be
affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by such as
are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is affected
except with regard to something which is in some way suited to its
nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good of the
spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the superior be
not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride---not to be subject to a
superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first sin of the
angel can be none other than pride.
Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them,
since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on
its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines
over the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his neighbor's
good to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good could not be
deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked angel, except
inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which would cease to be
singular because of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin of
pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel, whereby he
grieved over man's good, and also over the Divine excellence, according
as against the devil's will God makes use of man for the Divine glory.
Reply to Objection 1: The demons do not delight in the obscenities of
the sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal
pleasures: it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all
sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man's good.
Reply to Objection 2: Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is
the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of
human life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these
demons are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal
pleasures. Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them.
But if every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed
avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in
the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence;
consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth is
a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual
exercises because they weary the body; which does not apply to the
demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual
sins which can be found in demons; yet so that envy is not to be taken
for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another.
Reply to Objection 3: Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are
comprised all other sins derived from them.
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Whether the devil desired to be as God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God.
For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under desire;
because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether
sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such
desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall under
apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the finite
equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an
angel could not desire to be as God.
Objection 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without
sin. But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature
naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by
equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin.
Objection 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of
wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being
the equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only
things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation.
Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.
On the contrary, It is said, in the person of the devil (Is. 14:13,14),
"I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most High." And
Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being "inflated with
pride, he wished to be called God."
I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God.
But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; secondly,
by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way; because
by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible: and there was no
habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his
mind, so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in
some particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And even supposing
it were possible, it would be against the natural desire; because there
exists in everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature;
which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature.
Consequently, no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of
a higher nature; just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were
it to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the
imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think that, because a
man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can
increase without the destruction of the subject, he can also seek a
higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to
exist. Now it is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not
merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel,
another. Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to
desire equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with
God.
To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In
one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened
unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he
commits no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper order,
that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he
to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and
not of God's power. In another way one may desire to be like unto God
in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were to desire
to create heaven and earth, which is proper to God; in which desire
there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as
God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to no one
else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own 'not-being'; since
no creature can exist except by holding its existence under God. But he
desired resemblance with God in this respect---by desiring, as his last
end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his
own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude,
which is attained by God's grace. Or, if he desired as his last end
that likeness of God which is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it
by the power of his own nature; and not from Divine assistance
according to God's ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who
says [*De casu diaboli, iv.] that "he sought that to which he would
have come had he stood fast." These two views in a manner coincide;
because according to both, he sought to have final beatitude of his own
power, whereas this is proper to God alone.
Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of
another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have
dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto
God.
From this we have the answer to all the objections.
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Whether any demons are naturally wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For
Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There is a
class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the
souls of the dead." But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some
demons are naturally wicked.
Objection 2: Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But
some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Wis. 12:10): "Their
malice is natural." Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked.
Objection 3: Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions
by nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally
rapacious; yet they are God's creatures. Therefore, although the demons
are God's creatures, they may be naturally wicked.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the demons are not
naturally wicked."
I answer that, Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a
particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it comes
from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to its
principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil connected
with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes
other things: but with the universal good no evil can be connected. If,
then, there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some
particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil; not as evil, but
accidentally, as connected with some good. But if anything of its
nature be inclined to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot
be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature
is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend and which
is the object of the will. Hence, since the demons are intellectual
substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any
evil whatsoever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the
demons are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not
naturally so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held
that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are
animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined
towards some particular good, with which evil may be connected. In this
way, then, it can have a natural inclination to evil; yet only
accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good.
Reply to Objection 2: The malice of some men can be called natural,
either because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the
natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some
inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or
lustful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their
sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain
evils are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural
inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit.
Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to
him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes
(De Div. Nom. iv).
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Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first
instant of his creation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of
his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of
the devil (Jn. 8:44): "He was a murderer from the beginning."
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the
lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of
time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad lit.
ii, 8), the "heaven," which is said to have been created in the
beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed:
and when it is said that God said: "Be light made: and light was made,"
we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning to the
Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light was
made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light was made,
it was made distinct from "darkness," whereby the angels who sinned are
denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation some of the
angels were made blessed, and some sinned.
Objection 3: Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual
nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of
Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could
sin in the first instant of their creation.
Objection 4: Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the
corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in
the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards in
the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have
his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation
was either ordinate or inordinate. It ordinate, then, since he had
grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the angels the reward
follows immediately upon merit; as was said above ([555]Q[62], A[5]).
Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would never
have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by
inordinate action in their first instant.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all the things that
He had made, and they were very good." But among them were also the
demons. Therefore the demons were at some time good.
I answer that, Some have maintained that the demons were wicked
straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their
nature, but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was
made, the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with
those Manichean heretics who say that the devil's nature is evil of
itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the
authority of Scripture---for it is said of the devil under the figure
of the prince of Babylon (Is. 14:12): "How art thou fallen . . . O
Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning!" and it is said to the devil in
the person of the King of Tyre (Ezech. 28:13): "Thou wast in the
pleasures of the paradise of God," ---consequently, this opinion was
reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous.
Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their
creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this view also is
repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the
other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one
instant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to
his creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel's very
being, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems,
then, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first
instant of his existence.
This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in
such movements as are measured by time, and take place successively;
thus, if local movement follows a change, then the change and the local
movement cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the changes
are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant there can
be a term to the first and the second change; thus in the same instant
in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the
moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also is
the movement of free-will in the angels; for, as has been already
stated, they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning
([556]Q[58], A[3] ). Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term
of creation and of free-will from existing in the same instant.
We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for
the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of
free-will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant
of its existence, nevertheless, that operation which begins with the
existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature; just as
upward movement in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if
there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause,
which can be the cause of a defective action, it can in the first
instant of its existence have a defective operation; just as the leg,
which is defective from birth, through a defect in the principle of
generation, begins at once to limp. But the agent which brought the
angels into existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin.
Consequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the first
instant of his creation.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it
is stated that "the devil sins from the beginning," "he is not to be
thought of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but
from the beginning of sin": that is to say, because he never went back
from his sin.
Reply to Objection 2: That distinction of light and darkness, whereby
the sins of the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be
taken as according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xi, 15), that "He alone could discern light and darkness, Who
also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall."
Reply to Objection 3: All that is in merit is from God; and
consequently an angel could merit in the first instant of his creation.
The same reason does not hold good of sin; as has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: God did not distinguish between the angels before
the turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were created
in grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of them at once
placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their
preceding merit; and consequently they were deprived of the beatitude
which they had merited.
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Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the
angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was some interval between the
angel's creation and his fall. For, it is said (Ezech. 28:15): "Thou
didst walk perfect [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast walked in the midst of the
stones of fire; thou wast perfect . . .'] in thy ways from the day of
thy creation until iniquity was found in thee." But since walking is
continuous movement, it requires an interval. Therefore there was some
interval between the devil's creation and his fall.
Objection 2: Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that "the serpent
of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly"; which
refers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the
first instant of his creation.
Objection 3: Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and
angel. But there was some delay between man's formation and his sin.
Therefore, for the like reason there was some interval between the
devil's formation and his sin.
Objection 4: Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct
from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a middle time
between every two instants. Therefore there was an interval between his
creation and his fall.
On the contrary, It is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44): "He stood not in
the truth": and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), "we must
understand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not
remain in it."
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the more
probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the
Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his
creation. This must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act
of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was
created in grace; as we have said ([557]Q[62], A[3]). For since the
angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said above
([558]Q[62], A[5]), if the devil, created in grace, merited in the
first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that
first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning.
If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace,
or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant,
then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between
his creation and fall.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual
instantaneous movements are represented by corporeal movements which
are measured by time. In this way by "walking" we are to understand the
movement of free-will tending towards good.
Reply to Objection 2: Origen says, "The serpent of old did not from the
first walk upon his breast and belly," because of the first instant in
which he was not wicked.
Reply to Objection 3: An angel has an inflexible free-will after once
choosing; consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a
natural movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to
beatitude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with man;
and therefore the argument does not hold good.
Reply to Objection 4: It is true to say that there is a middle time
between every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is
proved Phys. vi, text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the
heavenly movement, which is primarily measured by continuous time, time
is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of their
affections. So the first instant in the angels is understood to respond
to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects itself by
its evening knowledge because on the first day evening is mentioned,
but not morning. This operation was good in them all. From such
operation some of them were converted to the praise of the Word by
their morning knowledge while others, absorbed in themselves, became
night, "swelling up with pride," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv,
24). Hence the first act was common to them all; but in their second
they were separated. Consequently they were all of them good in the
first instant; but in the second the good were set apart from the
wicked.
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Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all?
Objection 1: It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned
was not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezech. 28:14): "Thou wast
a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy
mountain of God." Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order of
the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii). Therefore, the
highest angel among those who sinned was not the highest of all.
Objection 2: Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it
might attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels
sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the
noblest creature which is unfitting.
Objection 3: Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything,
so much the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is,
so much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the less
can he turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the angel
who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels.
On the contrary, Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says that the chief angel
who sinned, "being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed them in
brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among them."
I answer that, Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the
proneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels
we consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels were
less likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over the
terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view of the
Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6,7; x, 9,10,11).
For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some of the demons
were good, and some bad; naming as 'gods' the intellectual substances
which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of "demons"
the intellectual substances which are beneath it, yet higher than men
in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary
to faith; because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God
through the angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently
there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were
divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies, the higher over
the higher bodies; and the highest to stand before God. And in this
sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the
lower grade of angels; yet in that order some of them remained good.
But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed in
the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said
[559](A[2]), the demons' sin was pride; and the motive of pride is
excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory says
that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be the
more probable view: because the angels' sin did not come of any
proneness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that argument seems
to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet
this must not be prejudicial to the other view; because there might be
some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower
angels.
Reply to Objection 1: Cherubim is interpreted "fulness of knowledge,"
while "Seraphim" means "those who are on fire," or "who set on fire."
Consequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible
with mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity,
which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who
sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub.
Reply to Objection 2: The Divine intention is not frustrated either in
those who sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the
end of both; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His
goodness, and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual
creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this
unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intellectual creature
was so made by God, that it lies within its own will to act for its
end.
Reply to Objection 3: However great was the inclination towards good in
the highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him:
consequently it was in his power not to follow it.
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Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not
the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect.
But, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one
time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others'
sinning.
Objection 2: Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was
shown above [560](A[2]). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more
contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to
a superior; and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by
desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the
sin of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if he
had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear that
the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.
Objection 3: Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to
another against God, than to wish to be over another against God;
because there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the
foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning, in that he induced
them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would have
sinned more deeply than the highest one; which is contrary to a gloss
on Ps. 103:26: "This dragon which Thou hast formed---He who was the
more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in malice."
Therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others
sinning.
On the contrary, It is said (Apoc. 12:4) that the dragon "drew" with
him "the third part of the stars of heaven."
I answer that, The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others
sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind of
exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are
subjects of that highest one; as is evident from our Lord's words: "Go
[Vulg. 'Depart from Me'], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was
prepared for the devil and his angels" (Mat. 25:41). For the order of
Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil
suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to
(2 Pet. 2:19): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the
slave."
Reply to Objection 1: Although the demons all sinned in the one
instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For
an angel needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as
man, who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and
vocal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time.
And it is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant
when he takes thought; and in the last instant of speech, another who
catches his meaning can assent to what is said; as is especially
evident with regard to primary concepts, "which everyone accepts
directly they are heard" [*Boethius, De Hebdom.].
Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is
required in us; in the same instant in which the highest angel
expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the
others to consent thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: Other things being equal, the proud would rather
be subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to
be subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an
advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior.
Consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to
serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they wanted to have him
as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their ultimate
beatitude of their own natural powers; especially because in the order
of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel.
Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above ([561]Q[62], A[6]), an
angel has nothing in him to retard his action, and with his whole might
he is moved to whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently
since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower
angels, he fell into sin with intenser energy, and therefore he became
the greater in malice.
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Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm?
Objection 1: It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm.
For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Evil is in many, but good
is in few."
Objection 2: Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way
in men and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found than
good; according to Eccles. 1:15: "The number of fools is infinite."
Therefore for the same reason it is so with the angels.
Objection 3: Further, the angels are distinguished according to persons
and orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it would
appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders.
On the contrary, It is said (4 Kings 6:16): "There are more with us
than with them": which is expounded of the good angels who are with us
to aid us, and the wicked spirits who are our foes.
I answer that, More angels stood firm than sinned. Because sin is
contrary to the natural inclination; while that which is against the
natural order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its
effects either always, or more often than not.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men,
in whom evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which
are known to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason,
which good is known to the few. In the angels there is only an
intellectual nature; hence the argument does not hold.
And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty.
Reply to Objection 3: According to those who hold that the chief devil
belonged to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly
affairs, it is evident that some of every order did not fall, but only
those of the lowest order. According to those who maintain that the
chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some fell of
every order; just as men are taken up into every order to supply for
the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty of free-will is more
established; which in every degree of creature can be turned to evil.
In the Sacred Scripture, however, the names of some orders, as of
Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to demons; since they are
derived from the ardor of love and from God's indwelling, which are not
consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of Cherubim, Powers, and
Principalities are attributed to them; because these names are derived
from knowledge and from power, which can be common to both good and
bad.
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THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
It now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons;
under which heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of their darkness of intellect;
(2) Of their obstinacy of will;
(3) Of their grief;
(4) Of their place of punishment.
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Whether the demons' intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of
all truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the demons' intellect is darkened by
being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For it they knew any
truth at all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to know
separated substances. But this is not in keeping with their
unhappiness: for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as
that some writers have assigned as man's last happiness the knowledge
of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all
knowledge of truth.
Objection 2: Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be
specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the same is
not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of our
intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes from
the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of the
sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most manifest of Himself,
because He is the sovereign truth; and this is because they are not
clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore neither can
they know other things.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22), the
proper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely, morning and evening.
But the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do not see
things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowledge, because this
evening knowledge refers the things known to the Creator's praise
(hence, after "evening" comes "morning" [Gn. 1]). Therefore the demons
can have no knowledge of things.
Objection 4: Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of
the kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei
xi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: "for if they had
known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory," as is
said 1 Cor. 2:8. Therefore, for the same reason, they are deprived of
all other knowledge of truth.
Objection 5: Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either
naturally, as we know first principles; or by deriving it from someone
else, as we know by learning; or by long experience, as the things we
learn by discovery. Now, the demons cannot know the truth by their own
nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33), the good
angels are separated from them as light is from darkness; and every
manifestation is made through light, as is said Eph. 5:13. In like
manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor by learning from the good
angels: because "there is no fellowship of light with darkness [*Vulg.:
'What fellowship hath . . . ?']" (2 Cor. 6:14). Nor can they learn by
long experience: because experience comes of the senses. Consequently
there is no knowledge of truth in them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, "certain gifts
were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at
all, but remain entire and most brilliant." Now, the knowledge of truth
stands among those natural gifts. Consequently there is some knowledge
of truth in them.
I answer that, The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes of
nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of
grace is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when
Divine secrets are imparted to an individual; the other is effective,
and produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the gift
of wisdom.
Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor
lessened in the demons. For it follows from the very nature of the
angel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on
account of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be withdrawn
from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural
powers, as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or a foot or
of something else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the
natural gifts remain entire in them. Consequently their natural
knowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, however,
which comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been utterly
taken away from them, but lessened; because, of these Divine secrets
only so much is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is done
either by means of the angels, or "through some temporal workings of
Divine power," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 21); but not in the
same degree as to the holy angels, to whom many more things are
revealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of the third
knowledge, as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived.
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness consists in self-application to
something higher. The separated substances are above us in the order of
nature; hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated
substances, although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the
first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for one separate
substance to know another; as it is natural for us to know sensible
natures. Hence, as man's happiness does not consist in knowing sensible
natures; so neither does the angel's happiness consist in knowing
separated substances.
Reply to Objection 2: What is most manifest in its nature is hidden
from us by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely
because our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine
substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect, but
even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his own
nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the perfection of his
intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God than man
can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons. Although
they do not possess the purity which comes with grace, nevertheless
they have purity of nature; and this suffices for the knowledge of God
which belongs to them from their nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The creature is darkness in comparison with the
excellence of the Divine light; and therefore the creature's knowledge
in its own nature is called "evening" knowledge. For the evening is
akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when the light fails
utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of things in their own
nature, when referred to the praise of the Creator, as it is in the
good angels, has something of the Divine light, and can be called
evening knowledge; but if it be not referred to God, as is the case
with the demons, it is not called evening, but "nocturnal" knowledge.
Accordingly we read in Gn. 1:5 that the darkness, which God separated
from the light, "He called night."
Reply to Objection 4: All the angels had some knowledge from the very
beginning respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found its
completion in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were
beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never had.
Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it; hence the
demons much less fully understood the mystery of the Incarnation, when
Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix,
21), "It was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels, who
enjoy a participated eternity of the Word; but it was made known by
some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into them." For had they
fully and certainly known that He was the Son of God and the effect of
His passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion of the Lord
of glory.
Reply to Objection 5: The demons know a truth in three ways: first of
all by the subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened by
privation of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light
of their intellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the holy
angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will, they do
agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual nature,
according to which they can accept what is manifested by others:
thirdly, they know by long experience; not as deriving it from the
senses; but when the similitude of their innate intelligible species is
completed in individual things, they know some things as present, which
they previously did not know would come to pass, as we said when
dealing with the knowledge of the angels ([562]Q[57], A[3], ad 3).
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Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will of the demons is not obstinate
in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual
being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said above
[563](A[1]). But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained to
good rather than to evil. Therefore the demons' will is not so
obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good.
Objection 2: Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than
the demons' malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the malice
of sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy. Therefore
the demons can likewise return from their state of malice to the state
of justice.
Objection 3: Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then
their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they fell.
But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the motive
for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore the demon
is not obstinate in malice.
Objection 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that man can be
reinstated by another, since he fell through another. But, as was
observed already ([564]Q[63], A[8]), the lower demons fell through the
highest one. Therefore their fall can be repaired by another.
Consequently they are not obstinate in malice.
Objection 5: Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs
any good work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses
the truth, saying to Christ: "I know Who Thou art, the holy one of God"
(Mk. 1:24). "The demons" also "believe and tremble" (Jam. 2:19). And
Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that "they desire what is good and
best, which is, to be, to live, to understand." Therefore they are not
obstinate in malice.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that hate
Thee, ascendeth continually"; and this is understood of the demons.
Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice.
I answer that, It was Origen's opinion [*Peri Archon i. 6] that every
will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to good and
evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of the union
of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of true
beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature of true
beatitude; hence it is termed "life everlasting." It is also contrary
to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that demons and
wicked men shall be sent "into everlasting punishment," and the good
brought "into everlasting life." Consequently such an opinion must be
considered erroneous; while according to Catholic Faith, it must be
held firmly both that the will of the good angels is confirmed in good,
and that the will of the demons is obstinate in evil.
We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of the
sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. For as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to men, what the fall is to the
angels." Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave or less
grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they are
without remission and endure for ever.
To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind
that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the
apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For the
sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks the
universal good, as was said above ([565]Q[59], A[1]); as also the sense
apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers
universals. Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this
respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we
apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit
of "intelligence"; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably,
passing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by
which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's
will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and
of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres fixedly
and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its
adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite
(namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he
has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that
man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after
choice; but the angel's free-will is flexible either opposite before
the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to
justice, were confirmed therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are
obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who
are damned (SP, [566]Q[98], AA[1], 2).
Reply to Objection 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but
according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent.
But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and
are not delivered by the Divine mercy.
Reply to Objection 3: The devil's first sin still remains in him
according to desire; although not as to his believing that he can
obtain what he desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can
commit murder, and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is
taken from him; nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so
that he would he had done it, or still would do it if he could.
Reply to Objection 4: The fact that man sinned from another's
suggestion, is not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable.
Consequently the argument does not hold good.
Reply to Objection 5: A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate
will; and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the
demon's part is always wicked; because, although at times he does
something good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth
in order to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not
willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act
is natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to the
goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.
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Whether there is sorrow in the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For
since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the same
subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing against
the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: "The devil has power
over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices over this
sinister power." Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things
cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are
present. But there is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41:24,
"Who was made to fear no one." Therefore there is no grief in the
demons.
Objection 3: Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the
demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at least
for the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience.
On the contrary, The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man is
punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin, according
to Apoc. 18:7, "As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in
delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her." Consequently
much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow, because he
especially glorified himself.
I answer that, Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are
passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the
sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According,
however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the
demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because
sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the
resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is evident
that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are, and others
to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they would wish others to be
damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in
them: and especially because it is of the very notion of punishment for
it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are deprived of
happiness, which they desire naturally; and their wicked will is curbed
in many respects.
Reply to Objection 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are
opposites, but not about different things. Hence there is nothing to
hinder a man from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another;
especially so far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will;
because, not merely in different things, but even in one and the same
thing, there can be something that we will, and something that we will
not.
Reply to Objection 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present
evil, so also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, "He
was made to fear no one," this is to be understood of the fear of God
which restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that "the devils
believe and tremble" (James 2:19).
Reply to Objection 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the
sin bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin
is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, for the evil of
sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the goodness of
nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that "sorrow for good lost by punishment,
is the witness to a good nature." Consequently, since the demon has a
perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin.
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Whether our atmosphere is the demons' place of punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons'
place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual
nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no place of
punishment for demons.
Objection 2: Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But
man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the
demons' place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome
atmosphere.
Objection 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire.
But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the darksome
atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the
darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment
day."
I answer that, The angels in their own nature stand midway between God
and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it
procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But
man's welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of
all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil;
and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way,
indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against
opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be
brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be
of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of
punishment is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this
is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the
darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment.
Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment
day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with demons
endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to us
here; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial:
although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they
have led astray; just as some of the good angels are with the holy
souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men
and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: A place is not penal to angel or soul as if
affecting the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by
saddening it: because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a
place not agreeable to its will.
Reply to Objection 2: One soul is not set over another in the order of
nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature; consequently
there is no parallel.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have maintained that the pain of sense for
demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the
beatitude of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day.
But this is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2
Cor. 5:1): "If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we
have a house in heaven." Others, again, while not admitting the same of
souls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same
judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good
souls and good angels.
Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs
to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their
coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the same
way as we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is not
actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said, that
although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of hell
while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their punishment
is none the less; because they know that such confinement is their due.
Hence it is said in a gloss upon James 3:6: "They carry fire of hell
with them wherever they go." Nor is this contrary to what is said (Lk.
8:31), "They besought the Lord not to cast them into the abyss"; for
they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for them to be cast
out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it is stated, "They
[Vulg. 'He'] besought Him that He would not expel them [Vulg. 'him']
out of the country" (Mk. 5:10).
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TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ[65]-74)
__________________________________________________________________
THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES (FOUR ARTICLES)
From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of
corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture
makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as
given in the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth";
the work of distinction as given in the words, "He divided the light
from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the
waters that are under the firmament"; and the work of adornment,
expressed thus, "Let there be lights in the firmament."
First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the work
of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the first
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?
(2) Whether they were created on account of God's goodness?
(3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels?
(4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from
God.
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Whether corporeal creatures are from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God.
For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works which
God hath made, continue for ever." But visible bodies do not continue
for ever, for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): "The things which are seen are
temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." Therefore God
did not make visible bodies.
Objection 2: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all things that
He had made, and they were very good." But corporeal creatures are
evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in
serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called
evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are
not from God.
Objection 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God,
but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God.
Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18): "While we look not at the things which
are seen." Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 145:6): "Who made heaven and earth,
the sea, and all things that are in them."
I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not
created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof
of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), "The god of this
world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers." But this position is
altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point,
there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in
nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different
things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these
different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as
different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being
is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There
must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in
whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and
spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of
this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him,
of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense, "Whose god
is their belly" (Phil. 3:19).
Reply to Objection 1: All the creatures of God in some respects
continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will
never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a
creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is
immovable. For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their
matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But
incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though
they are mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the
heavenly bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the
Apostle's words, "The things which are seen are temporal," though true
even as regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as
every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to
movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they
are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these
visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure for
ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor. 4:17): "It worketh for us . . . an
eternal weight of glory."
Reply to Objection 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are
good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the
consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities,
though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate
things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can
derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems
simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious
to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves
the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And
this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.
Reply to Objection 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from
God, but lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of God are clearly
seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). If,
then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them
foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): "Creatures are turned into a
snare to the feet of the unwise." And the very fact that they can thus
withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot
lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good
that they have from Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether corporeal things were made on account of God's goodness?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on
account of God's goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God "created
all things that they might be." Therefore all things were created for
their own being's sake, and not on account of God's goodness.
Objection 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the
greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual
creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to
the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of
spiritual creatures, and not on account of God's goodness.
Objection 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to
the unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God
must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not
created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all
inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now,
corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the
former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on
account of God's goodness.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all
things for Himself."
I answer that, Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal
creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in
punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that
God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal
nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God,
and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher
or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from
God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the
degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the
first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after
narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins,
"God saw that it was good" (Gn. 1), as if to say that everything was
brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But
according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not
because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another
might be punished. Secondly, because it would follow that the
arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise from
mere chance. For it the sun's body was made what it is, that it might
serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it
would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way
as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns
would exist in the world; and so of other things. But such a
consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this
theory as false, and consider that the entire universe is constituted
by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts.
Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that
whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the
sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly,
that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses
for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all
parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form,
since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore,
the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the
fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every
creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less
noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man
exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for
the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire
universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end,
inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine
goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in
some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain
to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is
plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.
Reply to Objection 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing
being, it represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore,
that God created all things, that they might have being, does not
exclude that He created them for His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate
end. Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the
sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of
God's goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution,
since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit.
But this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as
an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in
different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent
difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection
of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the
different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to
secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of various
and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice,
since no diversity of merit is presupposed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the
angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by
God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed
by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps.
103:24 "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." But "it belongs to wisdom
to ordain," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). Hence
in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a
certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore
in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should
be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher.
Objection 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes,
since like always produces like. It then all creatures, both spiritual
and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no
diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed from God
than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that
some things are corruptible because they are far removed from God (De
Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).
Objection 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a
finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could
be, and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for
in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is
possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that
nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These,
therefore, were produced immediately by God.
I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God
by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him
immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the
production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable,
since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by
which matter itself is produced: for in the act of coming into being
the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible
that anything should be created, save by God alone.
In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause,
the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the
underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which
informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living,
living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one
thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from
a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things,
belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no
secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in
the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But
creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing
being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that
nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore,
in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses
said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
Reply to Objection 1: In the production of things an order exists, but
not such that one creature is created by another, for that is
impossible; but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades
are constituted in creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many
and different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature,
as has been shown above ([567]Q[15], A[2]); so that by His wisdom He is
the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by
apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.
Reply to Objection 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured
not only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for
one and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another
by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is
presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such,
can belong to no creature.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the
angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without
matter come the forms that are in matter." But forms that are without
matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the
forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual
substances.
Objection 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to
that which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms
essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation.
Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual
substances.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation
than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things
here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and
corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from
spiritual substances.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "We must not suppose
that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather
that it obeys God thus." But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve
that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not
from the angels, but from God.
I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are
derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there
are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the
forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms
immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held that
there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth,
and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are
constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the
impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of
assimilation, or as he calls it, "participation" (Phaedo xlix). And,
according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the
order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single
separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst
above this is separate life, or "per se" life, as they term it, which
is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they
call being itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however,
and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things
do not subsist "per se" in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they
say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures
(called "intelligences" by them, but "angels" by us) proceed all the
forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from
the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the
same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God
indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter,
and differentiated it into species.
But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact,
sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought
into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28),
proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite." Now, such
are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at
another exist not, without being themselves generated or corrupted, but
by reason of the generation or corruption of the "composite"; since
even forms have not being, but composites have being through forms:
for, according to a thing's mode of being, is the mode in which it is
brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must
not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but
in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire.
Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some
immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act
by some composite agent. But since the composite agent, which is a
body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are
derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the
term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic
intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms,
must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production
of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can
have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had
when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding alone
matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces
each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or "that," to
denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom,
according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4], is
"all form and fitness and concord of parts."
Reply to Objection 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the
types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3):
"By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God;
that from invisible things visible things might be made." But if by
immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come
material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.
Reply to Objection 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred,
not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held,
but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which
they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine
intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things,
that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.
Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by
movement, not by emanation.
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of
creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself. Under
the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its
formation?
(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?
(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with
formless matter?
(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?
Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time
its formation. For it is said (Gn. 1:2): "The earth was void and
empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another version
[*Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as
Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until
it received its form.
Objection 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of
God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of
nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in
the Divine working.
Objection 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is
part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without
substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause
matter to exist without form.
On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent.
But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him
(Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." Therefore the work of His
creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation of corporeal
creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is
opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. It, therefore,
formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that
at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in
the corporeal creation.
I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for
instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter
was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order
of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.), Ambrose (In
Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that formlessness of
matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem
mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little; for
Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from
the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we
thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was
prior in time either to its formation or to its distinction. As to
formation, the argument is clear. For it formless matter preceded in
duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since
the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say,
then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being
existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms.
Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which
afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. For this
would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who
maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as
fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed
that to be made means merely to be changed; for since that preceding
form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing
to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make
an actual being, but 'this' actual being; which is the proper effect of
an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely
accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we must
assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor
under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the
formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of
primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not
precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and
nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to
act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand
by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that
beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation.
Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded
its form in duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that
Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees,
as will be shown later ([568]Q[69], A[1]; [569]Q[74], A[2]).
As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty
was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to
be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that
transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that
"darkness was upon the fact of the deep." And the earth lacked beauty
in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil
was withdrawn, and so we read that "the earth was void," or
"invisible," inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view;
secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants,
for which reason it is called "empty," or, according to another reading
[*Septuagint], "shapeless"---that is, unadorned. Thus after mention of
two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the formlessness of the
heaven is indicated by the words, "darkness was upon the face of the
deep," since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of
the earth, by the words, "the earth was void and empty."
Reply to Objection 1: The word earth is taken differently in this
passage by Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the
words "earth" and "water," in this passage. primary matter itself is
signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea
of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the
similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in
speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they
should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it
has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and
to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect,
then, the earth is said to be "void and empty," or "invisible and
shapeless," that matter is known by means of form. Hence, considered in
itself, it is called "invisible" or "void," and its potentiality is
completed by form; thus Plato says that matter is "place" [*Timaeus,
quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15]. But other holy writers
understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said [570](A[1])
how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form.
Reply to Objection 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in
potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality
must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God
produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a
perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power.
Reply to Objection 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of
act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality.
Hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form,
than for accident to be without subject.
In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if,
according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the
informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's part,
but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due order in the
disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection.
In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient
natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction;
except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and
without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy
Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being
that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction
is expressed, as will be shown later [571](A[3]; [572]Q[68], A[1]).
This is signified by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven
and earth." The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements
according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That
air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the
corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and
water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus
xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words,
"Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for air, and considered
that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be
composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But
Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says
that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire does
not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold
to what we stated above; because by the words "Spirit of God" Scripture
usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the waters,"
not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will may be said
to move over the material to which he intends to give a form. The third
distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to be under the
waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of
darkness, is described as being above the waters, in the words:
"Darkness was upon the face of the deep." The remaining distinctions
will appear from what follows [573](Q[71]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?
Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal
things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two
things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he says
that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he
says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the
matter of all corporeal things is the same.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10):
"Things that are one in genus are one in matter." But all corporeal
things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all
bodies is the same.
Objection 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities,
and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the
same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.
Objection 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in
potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter
considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.
On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually
interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener.
i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each
other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.
I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have
differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are
of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements
have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption
prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the
fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not
to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom
he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: "By your own nature you
are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My
will is more powerful than the link that binds you together." But this
theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural
movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a
natural movement, different from that of the elements, it follows that
they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which
is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the
movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards,
another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without
contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their
nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it
follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies
are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural
corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all
bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity
were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish
bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be
true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and
so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be
merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms---that
is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but partial,
since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the
ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was
some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form
exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath
generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of
corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it
is in itself, is in potentiality to form.
Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all
those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is
in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to
all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more
perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves.
For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection
and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality
to a perfect form, and "vice versa." Matter, therefore, whilst existing
under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to
the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the
latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form
in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this
condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that
bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should
possess the same matter.
Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii.] imagines,
that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven---beings in
potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its
form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it
is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be
act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside,
then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with
motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form---that
is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form---it
follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing
is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not,
being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly
bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone
which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to
inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form
perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no
potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle
[*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly
bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so
far as they agree in the character of potentiality.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato,
who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter
is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of
corporeal creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense,
corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on
account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph.
x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one genus of
all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of
corporeity.
Reply to Objection 3: The form of corporeity is not one and the same in
all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are
distinguished, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: As potentiality is directed towards act,
potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight
is by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of
the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because
the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental
form.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter
?
Objection 1: It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at
the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything
at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are movable,
and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so, its movement
would be ascertained by the movement of some visible body, which is not
the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously
with formless matter.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the lower
bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order." If, therefore,
the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily
exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to
be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for
one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore the
empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.
Objection 3: Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the
place of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the
contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "In so far as we mentally
apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world"; from which
it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this
world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation.
Objection 4: Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly
transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven.
There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the
aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher
heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the
air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night.
Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless
matter.
On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth," heaven denotes not the visible
firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven.
I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of
Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect,
namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede
say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil [*Hom.
ii. in Hexaem.] says: "Just as the lost are driven into the lowest
darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond
this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of rest." But they
differ in the reasons on which they base their statement. Strabus and
Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven, because the firmament,
which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is said to have been made,
not in the beginning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given
by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His
first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert, when they call the God of
the Old Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, are not
very cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made
on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and in another by
other holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained
according to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. i; vii.], by supposing that
formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded form not by duration, but
by origin. According to others, however, since darkness is no creature,
but a privation of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the
things it created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect
state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. But a better reason
can be drawn from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come
a two-fold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in
the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be
made new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the
world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised
to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning,
there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something
corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and
change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after
the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called
the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness.
It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says
that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that
the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But
Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be
fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to
denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it,
swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said
to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean
heaven in the sense understood by modern writers.
Reply to Objection 1: Sensible corporeal things are movable in the
present state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures
is secured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is
finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must
have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.
Reply to Objection 2: It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that
the empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end,
does not influence inferior bodies of another order---those, namely,
that are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more
probable that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself
motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist [*Infra,
[574]Q[112], A[3]], influence those of lower degree who act as
messengers, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches
(Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of
the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved,
produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of
movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of
conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to
dignity.
Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not
as necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may
correspond to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.)
says: "The ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his
habitual dwelling in light and joy."
Reply to Objection 4: As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): "It is
certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body,
and sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it
encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the
light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region. "But
since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for that
it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can see
the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that the
empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does,
but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory
which differs from mere natural brightness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously
with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find
two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary
corporeal matter, and the angelic nature. "Therefore time was not
created with formless matter.
Objection 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the
beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when "God
divided the light from the darkness. "Therefore in the beginning time
was not.
Objection 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement;
and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day.
Therefore in the beginning time was not.
Objection 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be
reckoned among the first things created, rather than time.
Objection 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created
things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned
among the things first created.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): "Both spiritual
and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time."
I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things created were
these four---the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless
corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is
not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only
two things as first created---the angelic nature and corporeal
matter---making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two,
namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the formation,
by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede
formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time, therefore,
cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that
of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness of matter
preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence
of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no
such measure.
Reply to Objection 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion
that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or
nature.
Reply to Objection 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was
in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was
in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into
day and night.
Reply to Objection 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin
immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the
measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of
whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the
firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if
the first movement was another than this, time would have been its
measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And it
must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement
of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in
the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived,
since time is nothing else than "the measure of priority and succession
in movement."
Reply to Objection 4: Among the first created things are to be reckoned
those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore,
among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common
measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable
subject.
Reply to Objection 5: Place is implied as existing in the empyrean
heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has
reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality.
But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as
actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the "now."
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the
work of the first day; secondly, the work of the second day; thirdly
the work of the third day.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of
spiritual things?
(2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal?
(3) Whether light is a quality?
(4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the word "light" is used in its proper sense in speaking of
spiritual things?
Objection 1: It would seem that "light" is used in its proper sense in
spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that "in
spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is not
called Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the former is
to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically."
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the
intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper
sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense
in spiritual matters.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13): "All that is made
manifest is light." But to be made manifest belongs more properly to
spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that "Splendor" is among
those things which are said of God metaphorically.
I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways---that is to say,
either in its original application or in its more extended meaning.
This is clearly shown in the word "sight," originally applied to the
act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most
trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge
obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, "Seeing how it tastes,"
or "smells," or "burns. "Further, sight is applied to knowledge
obtained through the intellect, as in those words: "Blessed are the
clean of heart, for they shall see God" (Mat. 5:8). And thus it is with
the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that which makes
manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that
which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, the word is
taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be understood
metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose says (De
Fide ii). But if taken in its common and extended use, as applied to
manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual
things.
The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has
been said.
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Whether light is a body?
Objection 1: It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says (De
Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that "light takes the first place among
bodies."Therefore light is a body.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that "light is
a species of fire." But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.
Objection 3: Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection,
belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and
its rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they
are bodies. Therefore light is a body.
On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the same place
simultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore
light is not a body.
I answer that, Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons.
First, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is different
from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any
two bodies of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same
place; since contiguity requires distinction of place.
The second reason is from movement. For if light were a body, its
diffusion would be the local movement of a body. Now no local movement
of a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one place
to another must pass through the intervening space before reaching the
end: whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor can it be
argued that the time required is too short to be perceived; for though
this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in distances
so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as
the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated from end
to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part of movement that
whereas all bodies have their natural determinate movement, that of
light is indifferent as regards direction, working equally in a circle
as in a straight line. Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is
not the local movement of a body.
The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were a
body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the absence
of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and its matter
would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a
body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it appear from
what matter a body can be daily generated large enough to fill the
intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say that a body of
so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the luminary. And
should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves
around with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is
obscured by the intervening object the whole room is darkened? It is
not that the light is condensed round the candle when this is done,
since it burns no more brightly then than it burned before.
Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but
to common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in
act---in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.
Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in
its own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is "flame," or in
earthly matter is "burning coal." Nor must too much attention be paid
to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he
merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various
writers.
Reply to Objection 3: All these properties are assigned to light
metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For
because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order of
movement as is proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to
local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For
even the word distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place,
to that of all contraries, as is said Metaph. x, text. 13.
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Whether light is a quality?
Objection 1: It would seem that light is not a quality. For every
quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the quality
be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire. But light
does not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn.
Therefore light is not a quality.
Objection 2: Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold
is opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case
with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light
therefore is not a sensible quality.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the
light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of earthly
bodies, and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by making them
actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a
substantial or spiritual form.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a
species of quality.
I answer that, Some writers have said that the light in the air has not
a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an
intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this cannot
be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name to the
air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not
do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Secondly, because
light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun bodies are
warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions.
Others have said that light is the sun's substantial form, but this
also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substantial forms
are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the
intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text. 26:
whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place, because it is
impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the
accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very
nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and
everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial
form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is
withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.
We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the
substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on
the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself
luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays
of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse
natures of bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: Since quality is consequent upon substantial
form, the mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the
mode differs in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when
matter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the
form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted
into fire. When, however, substantial form is received imperfectly, so
as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather than fully
impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not
permanent; as may be seen when water which has been heated returns in
time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the
transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a
substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial
form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its
active cause.
Reply to Objection 2: It is accidental to light not to have a contrary,
forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of
change, which is itself removed from contrariety.
Reply to Objection 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire,
as an instrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does
light act instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards
producing substantial forms; and towards rendering colors actually
visible, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?
Objection 1: It would seem that the production of light is not
fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above
[575](A[3]), is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such
should have, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production of
light, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day.
Objection 2: Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day,
and this is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made
on the fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have
been on the first day.
Objection 3: Further, night and day are brought about by the circular
movement of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an attribute
of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made on the second
day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night from day, ought
not to be assigned to the first day.
Objection 4: Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken
of, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels the
darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for even the
demons were in the beginning good, as has been shown ([576]Q[63],
A[5]). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to
the first day.
On the contrary, That without which there could not be day, must have
been made on the first day. But there can be no day without light.
Therefore light must have been made on the first day.
I answer that, There are two opinions as to the production of light.
Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not have
fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature, and
therefore when we read, "In the beginning God created heaven and
earth," a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the
word "heaven," and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the
word "earth." And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of higher
dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this spiritual
nature is signified by the production of light, that is to say, of
spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by the
enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God.
Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was
purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil [*Hom. i in
Hexaem.] says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning of
time which belongs to sensible things; but that the spiritual or
angelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand.
Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Genes.] gives as a reason for the omission that
Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things alone
appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the service of
idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry if he had
spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all
corporeal creatures; for they would have paid them Divine worship,
since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon, and stars,
which was forbidden them (Dt. 4).
But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the
corporeal creature. One is where we read that "the earth was void and
empty," and another where it is said that "darkness was upon the face
of the deep." Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the
formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the
production of light. In the first place because light is a quality of
the first body, as was stated [577](A[3]), and thus by means of light
it was fitting that the world should first receive its form. The second
reason is because light is a common quality. For light is common to
terrestrial and celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we proceed from
general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For the living
thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before the man, as
is shown in De Gener. Anim. ii, 3. It was fitting, then, as an evidence
of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of distinction the
production of light should take first place, since light is a form of
the primary body, and because it is more common quality.
Basil [*Hom. ii in Hexaem.], indeed, adds a third reason: that all
other things are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth,
already touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless light
exists, which was made therefore on the first day.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the opinion of those who hold that
the formlessness of matter preceded its form in duration, matter must
be held to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms,
afterwards receiving those that are accidental, among which light holds
the first place.
Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of some the light here spoken of
was a kind of luminous nebula, and that on the making of the sun this
returned to the matter of which it had been formed. But this cannot
well be maintained, as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture
records the institution of that order of nature which henceforth is to
endure. We cannot, then, say that what was made at that time afterwards
ceased to exist.
Others, therefore, held that this luminous nebula continues in
existence, but so closely attached to the sun as to be
indistinguishable. But this is as much as to say that it is
superfluous, whereas none of God's works have been made in vain. On
this account it is held by some that the sun's body was made out of
this nebula. This, too, is impossible to those at least who believe
that the sun is different in its nature from the four elements, and
naturally incorruptible. For in that case its matter cannot take on
another form.
I answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that the light was the
sun's light, formless as yet, being already the solar substance, and
possessing illuminative power in a general way, to which was afterwards
added the special and determinative power required to produce
determinate effects. Thus, then, in the production of this light a
triple distinction was made between light and darkness. First, as to
the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun we have the cause
of light, and in the opaque nature of the earth the cause of darkness.
Secondly, as to place, for in one hemisphere there was light, in the
other darkness. Thirdly, as to time; because there was light for one
and darkness for another in the same hemisphere; and this is signified
by the words, "He called the light day, and the darkness night."
Reply to Objection 3: Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that day and
night were then caused by expansion and contraction of light, rather
than by movement. But Augustine objects to this (Gen. ad lit. i), that
there was no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction
since there were neither men nor animals on the earth at that time, for
whose service this was required. Nor does the nature of a luminous body
seem to admit of the withdrawal of light, so long as the body is
actually present; though this might be effected by a miracle. As to
this, however, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. i) that in the first
founding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles, but for
what is in accordance with nature. We hold, then, that the movement of
the heavens is twofold. Of these movements, one is common to the entire
heaven, and is the cause of day and night. This, as it seems, had its
beginning on the first day. The other varies in proportion as it
affects various bodies, and by its variations is the cause of the
succession of days, months, and years. Thus it is, that in the account
of the first day the distinction between day and night alone is
mentioned; this distinction being brought about by the common movement
of the heavens. The further distinction into successive days, seasons,
and years recorded as begun on the fourth day, in the words, "let them
be for seasons, and for days, and years" is due to proper movements.
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine teaches (Confess. xii; Gen. ad lit.
1,15), formlessness did not precede forms in duration; and so we must
understand the production of light to signify the formation of
spiritual creatures, not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in
which they were not created, but with the perfection of grace, which
they possessed from their creation as said above ([578]Q[62], A[3]).
Thus the division of light from darkness will denote the distinction of
the spiritual creature from other created things as yet without form.
But if all created things received their form at the same time, the
darkness must be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked, not
as existing from the beginning but such as God foresaw would exist.
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the work of the second day. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day?
(2) Whether there are waters above the firmament?
(3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?
(4) Whether there is more than one heaven?
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Whether the firmament was made on the second day?
Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament was not made on the
second day. For it is said (Gn. 1:8): "God called the firmament
heaven." But the heaven existed before days, as is clear from the
words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore the
firmament was not made on the second day.
Objection 2: Further, the work of the six days is ordered conformably
to the order of Divine wisdom. Now it would ill become the Divine
wisdom to make afterwards that which is naturally first. But though the
firmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are
mentioned before the formation of light, which was on the first day.
Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.
Objection 3: Further, all that was made in the six days was formed out
of matter created before days began. But the firmament cannot have been
formed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to
generation and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on the
second day.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): "God said: let there be a
firmament," and further on (verse 8); "And the evening and morning were
the second day."
I answer that, In discussing questions of this kind two rules are to
observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit. i, 18). The first is, to
hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is that since
Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should
adhere to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be ready
to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty to be false; lest Holy
Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be
placed to their believing.
We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as made
on the second day can be understood in two senses. They may be
understood, first, of the starry firmament, on which point it is
necessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers. Some of
these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the
opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the
firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are, so
to say, not in disunion, but in harmony. Others held the firmament to
be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them,
but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of Plato,
who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that the
heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a fifth
body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of Aristotle
(De Coel. i, text. 6,32).
According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted
that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day.
For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the
elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to
give forms to the elements that pre-exist.
But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on the
second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, according to whom
the making of the firmament implies the production of the element of
fire. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, at
least, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter preceded
in time its formation, since the first form received by matter is the
elemental.
Still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the
firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of Aristotle,
seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas the
firmament, being naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not
susceptible of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of
matter existing antecedently in time.
Hence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of
creation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second day,
according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), the
light of the sun was without form during the first three days, and
afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form.
If, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the
natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not
succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying, whilst
holding any one of the opinions given above, that the substantial
formation of the firmament belongs to the second day.
Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that was
made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but the
part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which has
received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the air.
"For a body is called firm," that is dense and solid, "thereby
differing from a mathematical body" as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii
in Hexaem.). If, then, this explanation is adopted none of these
opinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen. ad
lit. ii, 4), recommends it thus: "I consider this view of the question
worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor difficult
to be proved and believed."
Reply to Objection 1: According to Chrysostom (Hom. iii in Genes.),
Moses prefaces his record by speaking of the works of God collectively,
in the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and then
proceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the same way as one
might say: "This house was constructed by that builder," and then add:
"First, he laid the foundations, then built the walls, and thirdly, put
on the roof." In accepting this explanation we are, therefore, not
bound to hold that a different heaven is spoken of in the words: "In
the beginning God created heaven and earth," and when we read that the
firmament was made on the second day.
We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in the beginning is
not the same as that made on the second day; and there are several
senses in which this may be understood. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i,
9) that the heaven recorded as made on the first day is the formless
spiritual nature, and that the heaven of the second day is the
corporeal heaven. According to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the heaven
made on the first day is the empyrean, and the firmament made on the
second day, the starry heaven. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii) that of the first day was spherical in form and without stars, the
same, in fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it the ninth
sphere, and the primary movable body that moves with diurnal movement:
while by the firmament made on the second day he understands the starry
heaven. According to another theory, touched upon by Augustine [*Gen.
ad lit. ii, 1] the heaven made on the first day was the starry heaven,
and the firmament made on the second day was that region of the air
where the clouds are collected, which is also called heaven, but
equivocally. And to show that the word is here used in an equivocal
sense, it is expressly said that "God called the firmament heaven";
just as in a preceding verse it said that "God called the light day"
(since the word "day" is also used to denote a space of twenty-four
hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as pointed out by Rabbi
Moses.
The second and third objections are sufficiently answered by what has
been already said.
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Whether there are waters above the firmament?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not waters above the
firmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend
naturally downwards, not upwards. Therefore there are not waters above
the firmament.
Objection 2: Further, water is fluid by nature, and fluids cannot rest
on a sphere, as experience shows. Therefore, since the firmament is a
sphere, there cannot be water above it.
Objection 3: Further, water is an element, and appointed to the
generation of composite bodies, according to the relation in which
imperfect things stand towards perfect. But bodies of composite nature
have their place upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that
water would be useless there. But none of God's works are useless.
Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:7): "(God) divided the waters
that were under the firmament, from those that were above the
firmament."
I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, "These words of
Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect.
Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of existence,
we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there." As to the nature of
these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i in Gen.) that the
waters that are above the firmament are "spiritual substances."
Wherefore it is written (Ps. 148:4): "Let the waters that are above the
heavens praise the name of the Lord," and (Dan. 3:60): "Ye waters that
are above the heavens, bless the Lord."To this Basil answers (Hom. iii
in Hexaem.) that these words do not mean that these waters are rational
creatures, but that "the thoughtful contemplation of them by those who
understand fulfils the glory of the Creator." Hence in the same
context, fire, hail, and other like creatures, are invoked in the same
way, though no one would attribute reason to these.
We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but their exact nature
will be differently defined according as opinions on the firmament
differ. For if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, and as
being of the nature of the four elements, for the same reason it may be
believed that the waters above the heaven are of the same nature as the
elemental waters. But if by the firmament we understand the starry
heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of the four elements then
the waters above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the
elemental waters, but just as, according to Strabus, one heaven is
called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account of its splendor: so
this other heaven will be called aqueous solely on account of its
transparence; and this heaven is above the starry heaven. Again, if the
firmament is held to be of other nature than the elements, it may still
be said to divide the waters, if we understand by water not the element
but formless matter. Augustine, in fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich.
i, 5,7) that whatever divides bodies from bodies can be said to divide
waters from waters.
If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in
which the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament
must rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised
above a part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to
say, as some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), that
waters resolved into vapor may be lifted above the starry heaven, is a
mere absurdity. The solid nature of the firmament, the intervening
region of fire, wherein all vapor must be consumed, the tendency in
light and rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the vault of the
moon, as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not to rise even to
the tops of the higher mountains, all to go to show the impossibility
of this. Nor is it less absurd to say, in support of this opinion, that
bodies may be rarefied infinitely, since natural bodies cannot be
infinitely rarefied or divided, but up to a certain point only.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have attempted to solve this difficulty by
supposing that in spite of the natural gravity of water, it is kept in
its place above the firmament by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. ii, 1), however will not admit this solution, but says "It is our
business here to inquire how God has constituted the natures of His
creatures, not how far it may have pleased Him to work on them by way
of miracle." We leave this view, then, and answer that according to the
last two opinions on the firmament and the waters the solution appears
from what has been said. According to the first opinion, an order of
the elements must be supposed different from that given by Aristotle,
that is to say, that the waters surrounding the earth are of a dense
consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer consistency, in
proportion to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven.
Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to
be signified.
Reply to Objection 2: The solution is clear from what has been said,
according to the last two opinions. But according to the first opinion,
Basil gives two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers first, that a
body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be rounded, or
convex, above. Secondly, that the waters above the firmament are not
fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a mass of ice, and
that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the third opinion given, the waters
above the firmament have been raised in the form of vapors, and serve
to give rain to the earth. But according to the second opinion, they
are above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This,
according to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily
revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the continuance of generation
is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the zodiacal
movement, is the cause whereby different bodies are generated or
corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars, and their
various influences. But according to the first opinion these waters are
set there to temper the heat of the celestial bodies, as Basil supposes
(Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that
some have considered this to be proved by the extreme cold of Saturn
owing to its nearness to the waters that are above the firmament.
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Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?
Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament does not divide waters
from waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have
naturally one and the same place. But the Philosopher says (Topic. i,
6): "All water is the same species." Water therefore cannot be distinct
from water by place.
Objection 2: Further, should it be said that the waters above the
firmament differ in species from those under the firmament, it may be
argued, on the contrary, that things distinct in species need nothing
else to distinguish them. If then, these waters differ in species, it
is not the firmament that distinguishes them.
Objection 3: Further, it would appear that what distinguishes waters
from waters must be something which is in contact with them on either
side, as a wall standing in the midst of a river. But it is evident
that the waters below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore the
firmament does not divide the waters from the waters.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): "Let there be a firmament
made amidst the waters; and let it divide the waters from the waters."
I answer that, The text of Genesis, considered superficially, might
lead to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain
philosophers of antiquity, who taught that water was a body infinite in
dimension, and the primary element of all bodies. Thus in the words,
"Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the word "deep" might be
taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as the principle
of all other bodies. These philosophers also taught that not all
corporeal things are confined beneath the heaven perceived by our
senses, but that a body of water, infinite in extent, exists above that
heaven. On this view the firmament of heaven might be said to divide
the waters without from those within---that is to say, from all bodies
under the heaven, since they took water to be the principle of them
all.
As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons, it
cannot be held to be the sense of Holy Scripture. It should rather be
considered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of
condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as
are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated can perceive by
their senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not
evident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been
philosophers who said that air is nothing, and called a space filled
with air a vacuum.
Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no
express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant
persons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to express
the truth to those capable of understanding it, he implies in the
words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the existence of air
as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be understood from
these words that over the face of the water a transparent body was
extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is the
air.
Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or the
cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the waters
from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless matter,
or any kind of transparent body, as fittingly designated under the name
of waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies
from the higher, and the cloudy region divides that higher part of the
air, where the rain and similar things are generated, from the lower
part, which is connected with the water and included under that name.
Reply to Objection 1: If by the firmament is understood the starry
heaven, the waters above are not of the same species as those beneath.
But if by the firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air,
both these waters are of the same species, and two places are assigned
to them, though not for the same purpose, the higher being the place of
their begetting, the lower, the place of their repose.
Reply to Objection 2: If the waters are held to differ in species, the
firmament cannot be said to divide the waters, as the cause of their
destruction, but only as the boundary of each.
Reply to Objection 3: On account of the air and other similar bodies
being invisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of
water, and thus it is evident that waters are found on each side of the
firmament, whatever be the sense in which the word is used.
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Whether there is only one heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one heaven. For the
heaven is contrasted with the earth, in the words, "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth."But there is only one earth. Therefore
there is only one heaven.
Objection 2: Further, that which consists of the entire sum of its own
matter, must be one; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher proves
(De Coel. i, text. 95). Therefore there is but one heaven.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is predicated of many things univocally
is predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there are
more heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if
equivocally only, they could not properly be called many. If, then,
they are many, there must be some common notion by reason of which each
is called heaven, but this common notion cannot be assigned. Therefore
there cannot be more than one heaven.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:4): "Praise Him, ye heavens of
heavens."
I answer that, On this point there seems to be a diversity of opinion
between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is only one
heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.), and that the words 'heavens of heavens' are
merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according to which the word
is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there are many nouns
that are wanting in the singular. On the other hand, Basil (Hom. iii in
Hexaem.), whom Damascene follows (De Fide Orth. ii), says that there
are many heavens. The difference, however, is more nominal than real.
For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the whole body that is above the
earth and the water, for which reason the birds that fly in the air are
called birds of heaven [*Ps. 8:9]. But since in this body there are
many distinct parts, Basil said that there are more heavens than one.
In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be
borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense.
Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it
denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially,
and incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the
first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the second is the
aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called the
starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous, and
divided into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the fixed
stars; the other seven, which may be called the seven heavens, are the
spheres of the planets.
In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that
participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and
luminosity, actual or potential. Thus Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii)
holds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon's
orb, calling it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three
heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both these, of
which the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself that
he was "rapt to the third heaven."
But since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and
in each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region
Rabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens. The higher
region of fire he calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian
heaven from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region of air he
calls, from its brightness, the ethereal heaven; the lower, the aerial.
When, therefore, these four heavens are added to the three enumerated
above, there are seven corporeal heavens in all, in the opinion of
Rabanus.
Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this
name is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the Light and the Most
High Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words, "I
will ascend into heaven"; whereby the evil spirit is represented as
seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual
blessings, the recompense of the Saints, from being the highest of all
good gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so
signified, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the
words, "Your reward is very great in heaven" (Mat. 5:12).
Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and
intellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens, in reference to
which Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) expounds Paul's rapture "to the
third heaven."
Reply to Objection 1: The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the
centre of a circle to its circumference. But as one center may have
many circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be
many heavens.
Reply to Objection 2: The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so
far as it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that
sense it is one.
Reply to Objection 3: All the heavens have in common sublimity and some
degree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY (TWO ARTICLES)
We next consider the work of the third day. Under this head there are
two points of inquiry:
(1) About the gathering together of the waters;
(2) About the production of plants.
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Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should tak
e
place, as recorded, on the third day?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering
together of the waters should take place on the third day. For what was
made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been "made"
in the words, "God said: Be light made," and "Let there be a firmament
made."But the third day is contradistinguished from the first and the
second days. Therefore the work of the third day should have been
described as a making not as a gathering together.
Objection 2: Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by
the waters, wherefore it was described as "invisible" [*[579]Q[66],
A[1], OBJ[1]]. There was then no place on the earth to which the waters
could be gathered together.
Objection 3: Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot
occupy one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact, and
therefore all were not gathered together into one place.
Objection 4: Further, a gathering together is a mode of local movement.
But the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the sea.
In their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was
unnecessary.
Objection 5: Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation
by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
Therefore the imposition of its name on the third day seems to be
recorded without necessity.
On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices.
I answer that, It is necessary to reply differently to this question
according to the different interpretations given by Augustine and other
holy writers. In all these works, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit.
i, 15; iv, 22,34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i, 5, 7), there is no order of
duration, but only of origin and nature. He says that the formless
spiritual and formless corporeal natures were created first of all, and
that the latter are at first indicated by the words "earth" and
"water." Not that this formlessness preceded formation, in time, but
only in origin; nor yet that one formation preceded another in
duration, but merely in the order of nature. Agreeably, then, to this
order, the formation of the highest or spiritual nature is recorded in
the first place, where it is said that light was made on the first day.
For as the spiritual nature is higher than the corporeal, so the higher
bodies are nobler than the lower. Hence the formation of the higher
bodies is indicated in the second place, by the words, "Let there be
made a firmament," by which is to be understood the impression of
celestial forms on formless matter, that preceded with priority not of
time, but of origin only. But in the third place the impression of
elemental forms on formless matter is recorded, also with a priority of
origin only. Therefore the words, "Let the waters be gathered together,
and the dry land appear," mean that corporeal matter was impressed with
the substantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with
the substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance.
According, however, to other holy writers [*[580]Q[66], A[1]] an order
of duration in the works is to be understood, by which is meant that
the formlessness of matter precedes its formation, and one form
another, in order of time. Nevertheless, they do not hold that the
formlessness of matter implies the total absence of form, since heaven,
earth, and water already existed, since these three are named as
already clearly perceptible to the senses; rather they understand by
formlessness the want of due distinction and of perfect beauty, and in
respect of these three Scripture mentions three kinds of formlessness.
Heaven, the highest of them, was without form so long as "darkness"
filled it, because it was the source of light. The formlessness of
water, which holds the middle place, is called the "deep," because, as
Augustine says (Contr. Faust. xxii, 11), this word signifies the mass
of waters without order. Thirdly, the formless state of the earth is
touched upon when the earth is said to be "void" or "invisible,"
because it was covered by the waters. Thus, then, the formation of the
highest body took place on the first day. And since time results from
the movement of the heaven, and is the numerical measure of the
movement of the highest body, from this formation, resulted the
distinction of time, namely, that of night and day. On the second day
the intermediate body, water, was formed, receiving from the firmament
a sort of distinction and order (so that water be understood as
including certain other things, as explained above ([581]Q[68], A[3])).
On the third day the earth, the lowest body, received its form by the
withdrawal of the waters, and there resulted the distinction in the
lowest body, namely, of land and sea. Hence Scripture, having clearly
expresses the manner in which it received its form by the equally
suitable words, "Let the dry land appear."
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 7,8;
iii, 20], Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that it
was made, as it says of those that precede, in order to show that
higher and spiritual forms, such as the angels and the heavenly bodies,
are perfect and stable in being, whereas inferior forms are imperfect
and mutable. Hence the impression of such forms is signified by the
gathering of the waters, and the appearing of the land. For "water," to
use Augustine's words, "glides and flows away, the earth abides" (Gen.
ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again, hold that the work of the third day was
perfected on that day only as regards movement from place to place, and
that for this reason Scripture had no reason to speak of it as made.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is easily solved, according to
Augustine's opinion (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), because we need not
suppose that the earth was first covered by the waters, and that these
were afterwards gathered together, but that they were produced in this
very gathering together. But according to the other writers there are
three solutions, which Augustine gives (Gen. ad lit. i, 12). The first
supposes that the waters are heaped up to a greater height at the place
where they were gathered together, for it has been proved in regard to
the Red Sea, that the sea is higher than the land, as Basil remarks
(Hom. iv in Hexaem.). The second explains the water that covered the
earth as being rarefied or nebulous, which was afterwards condensed
when the waters were gathered together. The third suggests the
existence of hollows in the earth, to receive the confluence of waters.
Of the above the first seems the most probable.
Reply to Objection 3: All the waters have the sea as their goal, into
which they flow by channels hidden or apparent, and this may be the
reason why they are said to be gathered together into one place. Or,
"one place" is to be understood not simply, but as contrasted with the
place of the dry land, so that the sense would be, "Let the waters be
gathered together in one place," that is, apart from the dry land. That
the waters occupied more places than one seems to be implied by the
words that follow, "The gathering together of the waters He called
Seas."
Reply to Objection 4: The Divine command gives bodies their natural
movement and by these natural movements they are said to "fulfill His
word." Or we may say that it was according to the nature of water
completely to cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds
both water and earth; but as a necessary means towards an end, namely,
that plants and animals might be on the earth, it was necessary for the
waters to be withdrawn from a portion of the earth. Some philosophers
attribute this uncovering of the earth's surface to the action of the
sun lifting up the vapors and thus drying the land. Scripture, however,
attributes it to the Divine power, not only in the Book of Genesis, but
also Job 38:10 where in the person of the Lord it is said, "I set My
bounds around the sea," and Jer. 5:22, where it is written: "Will you
not then fear Me, saith the Lord, who have set the sand a bound for the
sea?"
Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. Manich.
i), primary matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned,
but in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself.
Again it may be said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), that the earth is
mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature, but here in
respect of its principal property, namely, dryness. Wherefore it is
written: "He called the dry land, Earth." It may also be said with
Rabbi Moses, that the expression, "He called," denotes throughout an
equivocal use of the name imposed. Thus we find it said at first that
"He called the light Day": for the reason that later on a period of
twenty-four hours is also called day, where it is said that "there was
evening and morning, one day." In like manner it is said that "the
firmament," that is, the air, "He called heaven": for that which was
first created was also called "heaven." And here, again, it is said
that "the dry land," that is, the part from which the waters had
withdrawn, "He called, Earth," as distinct from the sea; although the
name earth is equally applied to that which is covered with waters or
not. So by the expression "He called" we are to understand throughout
that the nature or property He bestowed corresponded to the name He
gave.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on
the third day?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the production
of plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as
animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not of
distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants, as
also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded as
taking place on the third day, which is devoted to the work of
distinction.
Objection 2: Further, a work by which the earth is accursed should have
been recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. But
the words of Gn. 3:17, "Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and
thistles shall it bring forth to thee," show that by the production of
certain plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of
plants in general should not have been recorded on the third day, which
is concerned with the work of formation.
Objection 3: Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are
stones and metals, which are, nevertheless, not mentioned in the work
of formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the
third day.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:12): "The earth brought forth the
green herb," after which there follows, "The evening and the morning
were the third day."
I answer that, On the third day, as said [582](A[1]), the formless
state of the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as
twofold. On the one hand, the earth was "invisible" or "void," being
covered by the waters; on the other hand, it was "shapeless" or
"empty," that is, without that comeliness which it owes to the plants
that clothe it, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either
respect this formless state ends on the third day: first, when "the
waters were gathered together into one place and the dry land
appeared"; secondly, when "the earth brought forth the green herb." But
concerning the production of plants, Augustine's opinion differs from
that of others. For other commentators, in accordance with the surface
meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced in act in
their various species on this third day; whereas Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then produced
plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then the power
to produce them. He supports this view by the authority of Scripture,
for it is said (Gn. 2:4,5): "These are the generations of the heaven
and the earth, when they were created, in the day that . . . God made
the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung
up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew."
Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, within the earth,
took place before they sprang up from the earth's surface. And this is
confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first days God created all
things in their origin or causes, and from this work He subsequently
rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in the work of
propagation, "He worketh until now."Now the production of plants from
out the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they were not
produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only. However, in
accordance with other writers, it may be said that the first
constitution of species belongs to the work of the six days, but the
reproduction among them of like from like, to the government of the
universe. And Scripture indicates this in the words, "before it sprung
up in the earth," and "before it grew," that is, before like was
produced from like; just as now happens in the natural course by the
production of seed. Wherefore Scripture says pointedly (Gn. 1:11): "Let
the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed," as
indicating the production of perfection of perfect species, from which
the seed of others should arise. Nor does the question where the
seminal power may reside, whether in root, stem, or fruit, affect the
argument.
Reply to Objection 1: Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense
and local movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly
discernible. And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth,
their production is treated as a part of the earth's formation.
Reply to Objection 2: Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and
thistles had been produced, either virtually or actually. But they were
not produced in punishment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled
to gain his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence it is
said: "Shall it bring forth TO THEE."
Reply to Objection 3: Moses put before the people such things only as
were manifest to their senses, as we have said ([583]Q[67], A[4];
[584]Q[68], A[3]). But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the
bowels of the earth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct
from earth, and would seem to be species thereof. For this reason,
therefore, he makes no mention of them.
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OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by
itself, secondly as to all seven days in general.
In the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day,
secondly, that of the fifth day, thirdly, that of the sixth day, and
fourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) As to the production of the lights;
(2) As to the end of their production;
(3) Whether they are living beings?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day?
Objection 1: It would seem that the lights ought not to have been
produced on the fourth day. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature
incorruptible bodies: wherefore their matter cannot exist without their
form. But as their matter was produced in the work of creation, before
there was any day, so therefore were their forms. It follows, then,
that the lights were not produced on the fourth day.
Objection 2: Further, the luminaries are, as it were, vessels of light.
But light was made on the first day. The luminaries, therefore, should
have been made on the first day, not on the fourth.
Objection 3: Further, the lights are fixed in the firmament, as plants
are fixed in the earth. For, the Scripture says: "He set them in the
firmament." But plants are described as produced when the earth, to
which they are attached, received its form. The lights, therefore,
should have been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is to
say, on the second day.
Objection 4: Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other
heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature. The
lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth day,
but on the third day.
Objection 5: Further, as astronomers say, there are many stars larger
than the moon. Therefore the sun and the moon alone are not correctly
described as the "two great lights."
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, In recapitulating the Divine works, Scripture says (Gn.
2:1): "So the heavens and the earth were finished and all the furniture
of them," thereby indicating that the work was threefold. In the first
work, that of "creation," the heaven and the earth were produced, but
as yet without form. In the second, or work of "distinction," the
heaven and the earth were perfected, either by adding substantial form
to formless matter, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11), or by
giving them the order and beauty due to them, as other holy writers
suppose. To these two works is added the work of adornment, which is
distinct from perfect. For the perfection of the heaven and the earth
regards, seemingly, those things that belong to them intrinsically, but
the adornment, those that are extrinsic, just as the perfection of a
man lies in his proper parts and forms, and his adornment, in clothing
or such like. Now just as distinction of certain things is made most
evident by their local movement, as separating one from another; so the
work of adornment is set forth by the production of things having
movement in the heavens, and upon the earth. But it has been stated
above ([585]Q[69], A[1]), that three things are recorded as created,
namely, the heaven, the water, and the earth; and these three received
their form from the three days' work of distinction, so that heaven was
formed on the first day; on the second day the waters were separated;
and on the third day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land. So
also is it in the work of adornment; on the first day of this work,
which is the fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the
heaven by their movements; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds
and fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate
element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one;
while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth,
to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be noted that
Augustine's opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production of lights is
not at variance with that of other holy writers, since he says that
they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for the firmament
has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of producing
plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: "Let the firmament produce
lights," though it says: "Let the earth bring forth the green herb."
Reply to Objection 1: In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty
here; for he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so
there was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another
form. Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the
heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be
said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as animals
and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the heavenly
bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and naturally
incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were substantially
created at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless,
is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form, but a
determination of power. As to the fact that the lights are not
mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only as made on the
fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.) explains this by the need of
guarding the people from the danger of idolatry: since the lights are
proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not from the
beginning.
Reply to Objection 2: No difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in
holding the light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made
on this day to be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first
day is understood to be itself corporeal, then it must be held to have
been produced on that day merely as light in general; and that on the
fourth day the lights received a definite power to produce determinate
effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have one effect,
those of the moon another, and so forth. Hence, speaking of such a
determination of power, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that the sun's
light which previously was without form, was formed on the fourth day.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are
not fixed in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the
movement of the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.)
that He is said to have set them in the firmament, not because He fixed
them there immovably, but because He bade them to be there, even as He
placed man in Paradise, to be there. In the opinion of Aristotle,
however, the stars are fixed in their orbits, and in reality have no
other movement but that of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive the
movement of the luminaries and not that of the spheres (De Coel. ii,
text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvious to sense, out of
condescension to popular ignorance, as we have already said
([586]Q[67], A[4]; [587]Q[68], A[3]). The objection, however, falls to
the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day as having
a natural distinction from that in which the stars are placed, even
though the distinction is not apparent to the senses, the testimony of
which Moses follows, as stated above (De Coel. ii, text. 43). For
although to the senses there appears but one firmament; if we admit a
higher and a lower firmament, the lower will be that which was made on
the second day, and on the fourth the stars were fixed in the higher
firmament.
Reply to Objection 4: In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexaem.), plants
were recorded as produced before the sun and moon, to prevent idolatry,
since those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that
plants originate primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom
remarks (Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars cooperate in the
work of production by their movements, as the husbandman cooperates by
his labor.
Reply to Objection 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called
great, not so much with regard to their dimensions as to their
influence and power. For though the stars be of greater bulk than the
moon, yet the influence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses
in this lower world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its
apparent size is greater.
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Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?
Objection 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production
of the lights is not reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): "Be not
afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear." Therefore the
heavenly lights were not made to be signs.
Objection 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the
lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore they
are not signs.
Objection 3: Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from
the first day. Therefore the lights were not made "for seasons, and
days, and years," that is, in order to distinguish them.
Objection 4: Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is
inferior to itself, "since the end is better than the means" (Topic.
iii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were not
made "to enlighten it."
Objection 5: Further, the new moon cannot be said "to rule the night."
But such it probably did when first made; for men begin to count from
the new moon. The moon, therefore, was not made "to rule the night."
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, As we have said above ([588]Q[65], A[2]), a corporeal
creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper
act, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the
glory of God. Of these reasons only that which points out the
usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order
to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Dt. 4:19):
"Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the
moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou
adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of
all nations." Now, he explains this service at the beginning of Genesis
as threefold. First, the lights are of service to man, in regard to
sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful for
perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: "Let them shine in
the firmament and give life to the earth." Secondly, as regards the
changes of the seasons, which prevent weariness, preserve health, and
provide for the necessities of food; all of which things could not be
secured if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he
says: "Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years." Thirdly, as
regards the convenience of business and work, in so far as the lights
are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as favorable
to various occupations. And in this respect he says: "Let them be for
signs."
Reply to Objection 1: The lights in the heaven are set for signs of
changes effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which
depend upon the free-will.
Reply to Objection 2: We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of
hidden effects through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence
nothing prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But he says
"signs," rather than "causes," to guard against idolatry.
Reply to Objection 3: The general division of time into day and night
took place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is
common to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on that
first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons and
years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season than
another, and one year than another, are due to certain particular
movements of the stars: which movements may have had their beginning on
the fourth day.
Reply to Objection 4: Light was given to the earth for the service of
man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies.
Nor is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake
of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of
the universe.
Reply to Objection 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in
the evening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and
it was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding
seed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the perfect is
developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must
exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit.
ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting that God
made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.
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Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?
Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings.
For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned. But a
body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with
fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of
heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.
Objection 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its
form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or
animals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all
forms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence
Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxix) says: "Every living substance stands
higher in the order of nature than one that has not life." The lights
of heaven, therefore, are living beings.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun,
moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in the
case of animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life from
the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly
bodies a living soul.
Objection 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly
bodies are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7,8): and natural movement is
from an intrinsic principle. Now the principle of movement in the
heavenly bodies is a substance capable of apprehension, and is moved as
the desirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36).
Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the
heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings.
Objection 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all
things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as is
proved in Phys. viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself
precedes that which is by another. But only beings that are living move
themselves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore the
heavenly bodies are living beings.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "Let no one esteem
the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for they have
neither life nor sense."
I answer that, Philosophers have differed on this question. Anaxagoras,
for instance, as Augustine mentions (De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), "was
condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass
of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being." On the other
hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life. Nor was
there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church. It was
the belief of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were
alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words (Eccles.
1:6), "The spirit goeth forward, surveying all places round about." But
Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem.) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii)
maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the
matter in doubt, without committing himself to either theory, though he
goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living
beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic nature (Gen. ad lit.
ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).
In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of
opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul
and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body; for the
form does not exist for the matter, but the matter for the form. Now
the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through its operation,
which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of these operations,
as sensation and nutrition, our body is a necessary instrument. Hence
it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a
body in order to exercise their functions. There are, however,
operations of the soul, which are not exercised through the medium of
the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to their production.
The intellect, for example, makes use of the phantasms derived from the
bodily senses, and thus far is dependent on the body, although capable
of existing apart from it. It is not, however, possible that the
functions of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which the
nutritive soul operates, can be exercised by the heavenly bodies, for
such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible.
Equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can
appertain to the heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the
sense of touch, which perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs
of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of
elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental.
It follows, then, that of the operations of the soul the only ones left
to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and
moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual
perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the
intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body as
their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses.
Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot
be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul
to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the
intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether the movement of
the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power, not that the
soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter
as its form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that
which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), after
showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and
the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union between these two
parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both
are bodies; on the part of one only, if one is a body and the other
not. The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way,
as a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and since Plato
holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else
but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as
their moving power. A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the
direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like
bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas
nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this
does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows
that they are moved by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears
to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all
corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin.
iii, 4).
From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies are
not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if
they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also be seen
that the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and those who
deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of
words.
Reply to Objection 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the
universe by reason of their proper movement; and in this way the
heavenly luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment,
for they are moved by a living substance.
Reply to Objection 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely,
but not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that
the souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals
absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with
regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their
matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas a
soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that moves
the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is
of the nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and
therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can
impart life in virtue of that agent.
Reply to Objection 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural,
not on account of their active principle, but on account of their
passive principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for
being moved by an intelligent power.
Reply to Objection 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it
is compounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the
form, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive
power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may
be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with respect
to that active principle; just as we say that voluntary movement is
natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)
We must next consider the work of the fifth day.
Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.
For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to
produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of
every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are
generated from seed. Therefore the words, "Let the waters bring forth
the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the
earth," do not fittingly describe this work.
Objection 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water
only, but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition,
as is shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth
and rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly that fishes and birds are
produced from water.
Objection 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air.
If, then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be
produced from the air, and not from the waters.
Objection 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for
some, as seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of
fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, "Let the waters
bring forth the creeping creature having life."
Objection 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and
fishes which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs,
and generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings,
whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has
precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought not
to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals.
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, As said above, ([589]Q[70], A[1]), the order of the work
of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction.
Hence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction, the
middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of water,
which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the work of
adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to the
adornment of the intermediate body, by the production of birds and
fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light on
the fourth day, to show that the fourth day corresponds to the first
day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this fifth day
he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show that the
fifth day corresponds to the second. It must, however, be observed that
Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the
production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of
plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the
fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the waters produced
them on that day potentially.
Reply to Objection 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all
kinds can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and
naturally, without any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to
the fact that nature produces its effects by determinate means, and
consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed
cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then, rather
to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are
generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power
of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from
putrefaction, the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly
bodies. The material principle, however, in the generation of either
kind of animals, is either some element, or something compounded of the
elements. But at the first beginning of the world the active principle
was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements,
either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine
teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of
producing all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves, as
Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the elements of
producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the
influence of the stars.
Reply to Objection 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered
from two points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be
evident that the earthly element must predominate, since the element
that is least active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in
quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of
the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move with
certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity with the
bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which their
generation is described.
Reply to Objection 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the senses,
is not enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the
water, because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery
exhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But birds
move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly "beneath the
firmament," even if the firmament be taken to mean the region of
clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to the water.
Reply to Objection 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through
the medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type
between the animals of the air and those of the water, having something
in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to that class
to which they are most allied, through the characters possessed in
common with that class, rather than with the other. But in order to
include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have special
characters like to theirs, the words, "Let the waters bring forth the
creeping creature having life," are followed by these: "God created
great whales," etc.
Reply to Objection 5: The order in which the production of these
animals is given has reference to the order of those bodies which they
are set to adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals
themselves. Moreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached
through the less perfect.
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the work of the sixth day.
Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.
For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals.
But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words,
"Let the earth bring forth the living creature," should rather have
been, "Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures."
Objection 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species.
But beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to
be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle.
Objection 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and
species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said of
his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been said
about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is said
"according to its genus" and "in its species."
Objection 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is
recorded to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and
fishes are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much
more reason, of the other animals as well.
Objection 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction,
which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first
founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been
produced at that time.
Objection 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to
man. But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man
sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at
all, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had
sinned.
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the
water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so
the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by
the production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence the
earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. v) that the production was potential, and other holy writers
that it was actual.
Reply to Objection 1: The different grades of life which are found in
different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in
which Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem.).
The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to
discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of
their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in
generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of nutrition
and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will be shown
later on ([590]Q[78], A[2]). But amongst animals, those that live on
land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes, not
because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds (Hom. viii in
Hexaem.) and Augustine rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but because their
limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher order, (yet
some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more intelligent in
certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call fishes "living
creatures," but "creeping creatures having life"; whereas it does call
land animals "living creatures" on account of their more perfect life,
and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them
something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of
their life, are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them.
But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be
produced, like the life of other animals, by earth or water, but
immediately by God.
Reply to Objection 2: By "cattle," domestic animals are signified,
which in any way are of service to man: but by "beasts," wild animals
such as bears and lions are designated. By "creeping things" those
animals are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the
earth, as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to life them far
from the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals,
as deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word
"quadrupeds" is added. Or perhaps the word "quadruped" is used first as
being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for even
some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed.
Reply to Objection 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made
of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But
it was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already
been said of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals
and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to
signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas
man is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God."
Reply to Objection 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by
generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of the
making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of the
earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however, is
repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children has a
special relation to the number of the elect [*Cf. Augustine, Gen. ad
lit. iii, 12], and to prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin
whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants, since they
experience neither desire of propagation, nor sensation in generating,
they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing.
Reply to Objection 5: Since the generation of one thing is the
corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation
of things, that from the corruption of the less perfect the more
perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the
corruption of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated
then. But those generated from corruption of animals could not have
been produced then otherwise than potentially.
Reply to Objection 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr.
Manich. i): "If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer
he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use,
and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary.
Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself
with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the
things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use,
laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with
many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their
existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house,
these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe." And,
since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world
conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have
injured him.
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ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day. Under
this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) About the completion of the works;
(2) About the resting of God;
(3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the
seventh day?
Objection 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works
ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are
done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of
the world will be at the end of the world (Mat. 13:39,40). Moreover,
the time of Christ's Incarnation is a time of completion, wherefore it
is called "the time of fulness [*Vulg.: 'the fulness of time']" (Gal.
4:4). And Christ Himself, at the moment of His death, cried out, "It is
consummated" (Jn. 19:30). Hence the completion of the Divine works does
not belong to the seventh day.
Objection 2: Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But
we do not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather
that He rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works
does not belong to the seventh day.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many
things are added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is
called perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess.
But many things were made after the seventh day, as the production of
many individual beings, and even of certain new species that are
frequently appearing, especially in the case of animals generated from
putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work of the
Incarnation was a new work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22): "The Lord
hath created a new thing upon the earth." Miracles also are new works,
of which it is said (Eccles. 36:6): "Renew thy signs, and work new
miracles." Moreover, all things will be made new when the Saints are
glorified, according to Apoc. 21:5: "And He that sat on the throne
said: Behold I make all things new." Therefore the completion of the
Divine works ought not to be attributed to the seventh day.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): "On the seventh day God ended
His work which He had made."
I answer that, The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first
perfection and the second perfection. The 'first' perfection is that
according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this
perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole
having its parts complete. But the 'second' perfection is the end,
which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the
harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the
builder is the house that he makes by building. But the first
perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the
principle of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end of
the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the
consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness
of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is ascribed to
the seventh day.
Reply to Objection 1: The first perfection is the cause of the second,
as above said. Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are
required, nature and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection of
beatitude will be at the end of the world. But this consummation
existed previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding
of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, "Grace
and truth came by Jesus Christ" (Jn. 1:17). So, then, on the seventh
day was the consummation of nature, in Christ's Incarnation the
consummation of grace, and at the end of the world will be the
consummation of glory.
Reply to Objection 2: God did act on the seventh day, not by creating
new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work
proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the "second"
perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the
completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, though
according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Either version,
however, may stand, since the completion of the universe as to the
completeness of its parts belongs to the sixth day, but its completion
as regards their operation, to the seventh. It may also be added that
in continuous movement, so long as any movement further is possible,
movement cannot be called completed till it comes to rest, for rest
denotes consummation of movement. Now God might have made many other
creatures besides those which He made in the six days, and hence, by
the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh day, He is said on
that day to have consummated His work.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God,
but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the
work of the six days. Some things, indeed, had a previous experience
materially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God formed
Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their causes,
as those individual creatures that are now generated existed in the
first of their kind. Species, also, that are new, if any such appear,
existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and
perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by
the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning.
Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of
individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the
offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in
their causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed
beforehand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And the work
of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as we read (Phil.
2:7), The Son of God "was made in the likeness of men." And again, the
glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by way of
similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the
empyrean. Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), "Nothing under the sun is
new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before us."
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Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work?
Objection 1: It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day
from all His work. For it is said (Jn. 5:17), "My Father worketh until
now, and I work." God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all
His work.
Objection 2: Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which
movement causes. But, as God produced His work without movement and
without labor, He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day from
His work.
Objection 3: Further, should it be said that God rested on the seventh
day by causing man to rest; against this it may be argued that rest is
set down in contradistinction to His work; now the words "God created"
or "made" this thing or the other cannot be explained to mean that He
made man create or make these things. Therefore the resting of God
cannot be explained as His making man to rest.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): "God rested on the seventh day
from all the work which He had done."
I answer that, Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and
consequently to the labor that arises from movement. But although
movement, strictly speaking, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is
applied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one
hand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine
goodness is said to move and go forth to its object, in communicating
itself to that object, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other
hand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to
move towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense
meaning a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire.
Now, in either sense God is said to have rested on the seventh day.
First, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for,
as said above (A[1], ad 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not
existed previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly,
because He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was
happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were made He
is not said to have rested "in" His works, as though needing them for
His own happiness, but to have rested "from" them, as in fact resting
in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And
even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in
Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest
which belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the
meaning of God's resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).
Reply to Objection 1: God indeed "worketh until now" by preserving and
providing for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of new
ones.
Reply to Objection 2: Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement,
but to the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an
external object.
Reply to Objection 3: Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy
in the enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the
enjoyment of God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both
from His works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that
God rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be
set down as the only one, and the other is the first and principal
explanation.
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Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day?
Objection 1: It would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due to
the seventh day. For it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for
that some good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided. But
whether God works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is lost
to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to the
seventh day.
Objection 2: Further, the Latin "benedictio" [blessing] is derived from
"bonitas" [goodness]. But it is the nature of good to spread and
communicate itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days,
therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather
than the day on which He ceased producing them.
Objection 3: Further, over each creature a blessing was pronounced, as
upon each work it was said, "God saw that it was good." Therefore it
was not necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day
should be blessed.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:3), "God blessed the seventh day
and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work."
I answer that, As said above [591](A[2]), God's rest on the seventh day
is understood in two ways. First, in that He ceased from producing new
works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures He has
made. Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Himself.
According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the seventh
day, since, as we explained (Q[72], ad 4), the blessing referred to the
increase by multiplication; for which reason God said to the creatures
which He blessed: "Increase and multiply." Now, this increase is
effected through God's Providence over His creatures, securing the
generation of like from like. And according to the second meaning, it
is right that the seventh day should have been sanctified, since the
special sanctification of every creature consists in resting in God.
For this reason things dedicated to God are said to be sanctified.
Reply to Objection 1: The seventh day is said to be sanctified not
because anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because
something is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their
resting in God.
Reply to Objection 2: In the first six days creatures were produced in
their first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied
and preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And
the perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge
that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its
fruition.
Reply to Objection 3: The good mentioned in the works of each day
belongs to the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached
to the seventh day, to its propagation.
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ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON (THREE ARTICLES)
We next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) As to the sufficiency of these days;
(2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one?
(3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating
the works of the six days.
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Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that these days are not sufficiently
enumerated. For the work of creation is no less distinct from the works
of distinction and adornment than these two works are from one another.
But separate days are assigned to distinction and to adornment, and
therefore separate days should be assigned to creation.
Objection 2: Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and
water. But one day is assigned to the distinction of water, and another
to the distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought to be
devoted to the distinction of fire and air.
Objection 3: Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ
from the beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other
animals than all animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day
is devoted to the production of fishes, and another to that of the
beast of the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the
production of birds and another to that of man.
Objection 4: Further, it would seem, on the other hand, that some of
these days are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the
luminaries in the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is
produced at the same time as the accident proper to it. The light and
the luminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different
days.
Objection 5: Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting
of the world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that
day ought not to be enumerated with the others.
I answer that, The reason of the distinction of these days is made
clear by what has been said above ([592]Q[70], A[1]), namely, that the
parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part
adorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now the
parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three, according
to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or highest part,
the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the lowest part. Thus the
Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three things, the
beginning, the middle, and the end. The first part, then, is
distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the middle
part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the
third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the sixth.
But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the last
three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him,
spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the
two others, the higher bodies being formed on the first these two days,
and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the Divine
works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which is the sum
of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is assigned to the
forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and
three to the work of adornment.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine, the work of creation
belongs to the production of formless matter, and of the formless
spiritual nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says
(Confess. xii, 12). Thus, then, the creation of either is set down
before there was any day. But it may also be said, following other holy
writers, that the works of distinction and adornment imply certain
changes in the creature which are measurable by time; whereas the work
of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the substance of
beings instantaneously. For this reason, therefore, every work of
distinction and adornment is said to take place "in a day," but
creation "in the beginning" which denotes something indivisible.
Reply to Objection 2: Fire and air, as not distinctly known by the
unlettered, are not expressly named by Moses among the parts of the
world, but reckoned with the intermediate part, or water, especially as
regards the lowest part of the air; or with the heaven, to which the
higher region of air approaches, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii,
13).
Reply to Objection 3: The production of animals is recorded with
reference to their adorning the various parts of the world, and
therefore the days of their production are separated or united
according as the animals adorn the same parts of the world, or
different parts.
Reply to Objection 4: The nature of light, as existing in a subject,
was made on the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the
fourth day does not mean that their substance was produced anew, but
that they then received a form that they had not before, as said above
([593]Q[70], A[1] ad 2).
Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 15),
after all that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days,
something distinct is attributed to the seventh---namely, that on it
God rested in Himself from His works: and for this reason it was right
that the seventh day should be mentioned after the six. It may also be
said, with the other writers, that the world entered on the seventh day
upon a new state, in that nothing new was to be added to it, and that
therefore the seventh day is mentioned after the six, from its being
devoted to cessation from work.
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Whether all these days are one day?
Objection 1: It would seem that all these days are one day. For it is
written (Gn. 2:4,5): "These are the generations of the heaven and the
earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord . . . made the
heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field, before it sprung up
in the earth." Therefore the day in which God made "the heaven and the
earth, and every plant of the field," is one and the same day. But He
made the heaven and the earth on the first day, or rather before there
was any day, but the plant of the field He made on the third day.
Therefore the first and third days are but one day, and for a like
reason all the rest.
Objection 2: Further, it is said (Ecclus. 18:1): "He that liveth for
ever, created all things together." But this would not be the case if
the days of these works were more than one. Therefore they are not many
but one only.
Objection 3: Further, on the seventh day God ceased from all new works.
If, then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows
that He did not make that day; which is not admissible.
Objection 4: Further, the entire work ascribed to one day God perfected
in an instant, for with each work are the words (God) "said . . . . and
it was . . . done." If, then, He had kept back His next work to another
day, it would follow that for the remainder of a day He would have
ceased from working and left it vacant, which would be superfluous. The
day, therefore, of the preceding work is one with the day of the work
that follows.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1), "The evening and the morning
were the second day . . . the third day," and so on. But where there is
a second and third there are more than one. There was not, therefore,
only one day.
I answer that, On this question Augustine differs from other
expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven, are
one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ.
Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were seven
distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as
explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely different.
For Augustine understands by the word "day," the knowledge in the mind
of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day denotes their
knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the second day their
knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, then,
each work is said to have been wrought in some one of these days,
inasmuch as God wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God
wrought nothing in the universe without impressing the knowledge
thereof on the angelic mind; which can know many things at the same
time, especially in the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge is
perfected and terminated. So the distinction of days denotes the
natural order of the things known, and not a succession in the
knowledge acquired, or in the things produced. Moreover, angelic
knowledge is appropriately called "day," since light, the cause of day,
is to be found in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit.
iv, 28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify a
succession both in time, and in the things produced.
If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the
mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the
diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown
([594]Q[67], A[1]; [595]Q[69], A[1]), between Augustine and other
writers is taken into account. First, because Augustine takes the earth
and the water as first created, to signify matter totally without form;
but the making of the firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the
appearing of dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal
matter. But other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first
created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing
under the proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort of
distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown
([596]Q[67], AA[1],4; [597]Q[69], A[1] ). Secondly, some writers hold
that plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six
days; Augustine, that they were produced potentially. Now the opinion
of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is
consistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other
writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter
existed under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with him
also that in the first instituting of the world animals and plants did
not exist actually. There remains, however, a difference as to four
points; since, according to the latter, there was a time, after the
production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the firmament
had not been formed, and the earth was still covered by the waters, nor
had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth difference;
which are not consistent with Augustine's explanation. In order,
therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of either side.
Reply to Objection 1: On the day on which God created the heaven and
the earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed,
actually, but "before it sprung up in the earth," that is, potentially.
And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to
the first instituting of the world.
Reply to Objection 2: God created all things together so far as regards
their substance in some measure formless. But He did not create all
things together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies
in distinction and adornment. Hence the word "creation" is significant.
Reply to Objection 3: On the seventh day God ceased from making new
things, but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter
work it belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days.
Reply to Objection 4: All things were not distinguished and adorned
together, not from a want of power on God's part, as requiring time in
which to work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting
of the world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be
assigned to the different states of the world, as each succeeding work
added to the world a fresh state of perfection.
Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine, the order of days refers
to the natural order of the works attributed to the days.
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Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days?
Objection 1: It would seem the Scripture does not use suitable words to
express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament, and
other similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the heaven
and the earth. For "all things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3). Therefore
in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works, mention
should have been made of the Word of God.
Objection 2: Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is
not mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not sufficiently
described.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all the things
that He had made, and they were very good." It ought, then, to have
been said of each work, "God saw that it was good." The omission,
therefore, of these words in the work of creation and in that of the
second day, is not fitting.
Objection 4: Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not
befit God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, "The Spirit
of God moved over the waters," are unbecoming.
Objection 5: Further, what is already made is not made over again.
Therefore to the words, "God said: Let the firmament be made . . . and
it was so," it is superfluous to add, "God made the firmament." And the
like is to be said of other works.
Objection 6: Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide
the day, since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, "The
evening and morning were the second day" or, "the third day," are not
suitable.
Objection 7: Further, "first," not "one," corresponds to "second" and
"third." It should therefore have been said that, "The evening and the
morning were the first day," rather than "one day."
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the
person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world,
and in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place.
For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world
receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by means
of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be called
his intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is by the
word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction and
adornment the Word is mentioned. But in creation the Son is mentioned
as the beginning, by the words, "In the beginning God created," since
by creation is understood the production of formless matter. But
according to those who hold that the elements were created from the
first under their proper forms, another explanation must be given; and
therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.) that the words, "God
said," signify a Divine command. Such a command, however, could not
have been given before creatures had been produced that could obey it.
Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by
the heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the
earth, the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no
creature is omitted. But, according to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem.), the
heaven and the earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the
intervening things being left to be understood, since all these move
heavenwards, if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And others say that
under the word, "earth," Scripture is accustomed to include all the
four elements as (Ps. 148:7,8) after the words, "Praise the Lord from
the earth," is added, "fire, hail, snow, and ice."
Reply to Objection 3: In the account of the creation there is found
something to correspond to the words, "God saw that it was good," used
in the work of distinction and adornment, and this appears from the
consideration that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, "there are two
things," says Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God's love
of His creatures, their existence and their permanence. That they might
then exist, and exist permanently, "the Spirit of God," it is said,
"moved over the waters"---that is to say, over that formless matter,
signified by water, even as the love of the artist moves over the
materials of his art, that out of them he may form his work. And the
words, "God saw that it was good," signify that the things that He had
made were to endure, since they express a certain satisfaction taken by
God in His works, as of an artist in his art: not as though He knew the
creature otherwise, or that the creature was pleasing to Him otherwise,
than before He made it. Thus in either work, of creation and of
formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation the Person of
the Father is indicated by God the Creator, the Person of the Son by
the beginning, in which He created, and the Person of the Holy Ghost by
the Spirit that moved over the waters. But in the formation, the Person
of the Father is indicated by God that speaks, and the Person of the
Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit
by the satisfaction with which God saw that what was made was good. And
if the words, "God saw that it was good," are not said of the work of
the second day, this is because the work of distinguishing the waters
was only begun on that day, but perfected on the third. Hence these
words, that are said of the third day, refer also to the second. Or it
may be that Scripture does not use these words of approval of the
second days' work, because this is concerned with the distinction of
things not evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again, because by the
firmament is simply understood the cloudy region of the air, which is
not one of the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the principal
divisions of the world. The above three reasons are given by Rabbi
Moses [*Perplex. ii.], and to these may be added a mystical one derived
from numbers and assigned by some writers, according to whom the work
of the second day is not marked with approval because the second number
is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection of unity.
Reply to Objection 4: Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) understands by the
"Spirit of the Lord," the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says
that it is so called according to the custom of Scripture, in which
these things are throughout attributed to God. But according to the
holy writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is
said to "move over the water"---that is to say, over what Augustine
holds to mean formless matter, lest it should be supposed that God
loved of necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in
need of them. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the
object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved
over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that movement is
not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. i, 7). It is the opinion, however, of Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.)
that the Spirit moved over the element of water, "fostering and
quickening its nature and impressing vital power, as the hen broods
over her chickens." For water has especially a life-giving power, since
many animals are generated in water, and the seed of all animals is
liquid. Also the life of the soul is given by the water of baptism,
according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy
Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."
Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these
three phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their
being in the Word, denoted by the command "Let . . . be made";
secondly, their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, "It
was . . . done"; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the
words, "He made." And because the formation of the angels is recorded
on the first day, it was not necessary there to add, "He made." It may
also be said, following other writers, that the words, "He said," and
"Let . . . be made," denote God's command, and the words, "It was
done," the fulfilment of that command. But as it was necessary, for the
sake of those especially who have asserted that all visible things were
made by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, in
order to remove that error, that God Himself made them. Hence, in each
work, after the words, "It was done," some act of God is expressed by
some such words as, "He made," or, "He divided," or, "He called."
Reply to Objection 6: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,30),
by the "evening" and the "morning" are understood the evening and the
morning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained ([598]Q[58],
A[6],7). But, according to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.), the entire
period takes its name, as is customary, from its more important part,
the day. And instance of this is found in the words of Jacob, "The days
of my pilgrimage," where night is not mentioned at all. But the evening
and the morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day, since day
begins with morning and ends with evening, or because evening denotes
the beginning of night, and morning the beginning of day. It seems
fitting, also, that where the first distinction of creatures is
described, divisions of time should be denoted only by what marks their
beginning. And the reason for mentioning the evening first is that as
the evening ends the day, which begins with the light, the termination
of the light at evening precedes the termination of the darkness, which
ends with the morning. But Chrysostom's explanation is that thereby it
is intended to show that the natural day does not end with the evening,
but with the morning (Hom. v in Gen.).
Reply to Objection 7: The words "one day" are used when day is first
instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours.
Hence, by mentioning "one," the measure of a natural day is fixed.
Another reason may be to signify that a day is completed by the return
of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course. And yet
another, because at the completion of a week of seven days, the first
day returns which is one with the eighth day. The three reasons
assigned above are those given by Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.).
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TREATISE ON MAN (QQ[75]-102)
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OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE
FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL (SEVEN
ARTICLES)
Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now
proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal
substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of
his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation
to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the
body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our
consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi)
says that three things are to be found in spiritual
substances---essence, power, and operation---we shall treat first of
what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to
its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.
Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is
the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of
the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of
inquiry.
(1) Whether the soul is a body?
(2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?
(3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
(4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?
(5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
(6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?
(7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?
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Whether the soul is a body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the
moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First,
because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since
nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not
give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not
moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find
proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be the case in the
movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul
is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the soul
is a body.
Objection 2: Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness.
But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If,
therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of
corporeal things.
Objection 3: Further, between the mover and the moved there must be
contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the soul
moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is
simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy
space by its bulk."
I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the
soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which
live: for we call living things "animate," [*i.e. having a soul], and
those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life is shown
principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of
old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the
principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted
that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is
nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal.
This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make
use of only one proof, based on universal and certain principles, which
shows clearly that the soul is not a body.
It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for
then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the
same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is
the "first" principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a
body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart
is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the
first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of
life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such;
since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a
principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing
or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is actually
such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act.
Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a
body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of
calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.
Reply to Objection 1: As everything which is in motion must be moved by
something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we
must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to
pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the
thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in
Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not
moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause
an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover,
which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for
this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is
the soul. There is, again, another mover, which is moved
essentially---namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old
believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every
mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity
actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows
potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing
known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only
potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but
only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of
corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that
there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the
ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and
potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to
have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the
principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity,"
and of "power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by
the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves
that body.
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Whether the human soul is something subsistent?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is not something
subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular
thing." Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of
that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not
something subsistent.
Objection 2: Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does
not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to say that
the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or
builds." Therefore the soul is not subsistent.
Objection 3: Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some
operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the
body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does
not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the
body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that
the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body,
will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are
led astray through associating with the soul those things without which
they are unable to think of any nature---i.e. imaginary pictures of
corporeal things." Therefore the nature of the human intellect is not
only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something
subsistent.
I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of
intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both
incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the
intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever
knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because
that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything
else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a
feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and
everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle
contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies.
Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is
impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise
impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the
determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies;
as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the
eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of
that same color.
Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the
intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. Now only that
which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate
but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts
heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore,
that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is
something incorporeal and subsistent.
Reply to Objection 1: "This particular thing" can be taken in two
senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which
subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense
excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter
excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be
called "this particular thing" in the first sense, but not in the
second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can
indeed be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being
something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is
composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing."
Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his
own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to
be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate
"per se" belongs to what exists "per se." But for a thing to exist "per
se," it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a
material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that
is rightly said to subsist "per se," which is neither inherent in the
above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the
hand cannot be said to subsist "per se"; nor can it for that reason be
said to operate "per se." Hence the operation of the parts is through
each part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the
eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say
that what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking,
does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul understands, as
the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands
through the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: The body is necessary for the action of the
intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object;
for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight.
Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be
non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is
non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in
order to perform its act of perception.
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Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are
subsistent. For man is of the same 'genus' as other animals; and, as we
have just shown [599](A[2]), the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore
the souls of other animals are subsistent.
Objection 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible
objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to
intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body,
apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart
from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls
of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent;
just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.
Objection 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the
body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute animals
has an operation apart from the body.
On the contrary, Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi,
xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the
souls of animals are not subsistent."
I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no distinction between
sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has
been said [600](A[1]). Plato, however, drew a distinction between
intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle,
maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as
such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are
subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul,
understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. On the
other hand, sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive
soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act
of vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflection of color:
and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul
has no "per se" operation of its own, and that every operation of the
sensitive soul belongs to the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as
the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations they are not
subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its
being.
Reply to Objection 1: Although man is of the same "genus" as other
animals, he is of a different "species." Specific difference is derived
from the difference of form; nor does every difference of form
necessarily imply a diversity of "genus."
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the
sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual
faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in
potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ,
inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied
with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible
corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect.
For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects
is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. If,
however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary,
this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the
operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.
Reply to Objection 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive
power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive
soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like
nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive power
is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the
appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in moving, but in
being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an act of the
sensitive soul without the body.
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Whether the soul is man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2
Cor. 4:16): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is
renewed day by day." But that which is within man is the soul.
Therefore the soul is the inward man.
Objection 2: Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a
universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore
it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person.
Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as
holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul
and body."
I answer that, The assertion "the soul is man," can be taken in two
senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man,
Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I
say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the
species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species.
This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the
definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not
signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural
things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter,
which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as
it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this
soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of
man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in
common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given
species, must belong to the substance of the species.
It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man;
and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the
sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that
case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the
soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is
that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is
man. But it has been shown above [601](A[3]) that sensation is not the
operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of
man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only,
but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that
sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul
making use of the body.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a
thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what the
governor of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way
sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes,
indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is
called the "inward" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body
is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go
beyond the senses. And this is called the "outward" man.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or
a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence
a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor,
likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human
species.
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Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and
form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things
are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by
participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living
things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v).
Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the
first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter.
Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality;
which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially
understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary
matter, as part of itself.
Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found,
there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the
soul---namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject
to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and
from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of
their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6).
But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God.
Therefore the soul has matter.
Objection 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure
act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul
has matter.
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the
soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.
I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in
two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs
to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a
form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of
itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible
that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand
something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that
which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since
potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If,
however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that
part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the
"primary animate."
Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul
inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is
received into something is received according to the condition of the
recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower.
But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for
instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the
form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the
intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an
absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if
the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of
things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only
know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which
receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by
which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the
intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge
of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 1: The First Act is the universal principle of all
acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as
a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as
potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But
the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are
participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one
potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which
all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality
would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive
potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive
potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the
things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms;
whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence
of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the
soul is composed of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to
matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the
potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of
primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of
subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge,
and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in
potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the
agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes
it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however,
does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause
transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted
above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and
form "there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to
act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once."
[*The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid."
The Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim
per se unum quiddam est . . . et ens quiddam."]
Reply to Objection 4: Everything participated is compared to the
participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to
subsist "per se," must have existence by participation; for "even
life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by
the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own
existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances
there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of
matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some
say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which
they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.
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Whether the human soul is incorruptible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For
those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a
like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of
animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is
alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing
more than the beast," as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as
the same text concludes, "the death of man and beast is one, and the
condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are
corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to
nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as
it is written (Wis. 2:2), "We are born of nothing"; which is true, not
only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in
the same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had not been," even
as to our soul.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But
the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a
phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing
without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body as the
Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the
dissolution of the body.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to
Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have "an
incorruptible substantial life."
I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which we
call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in
two ways---"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any
substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the
generation or corruption of something else. For generation and
corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is
acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has
existence "per se" cannot be generated or corrupted except 'per se';
while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material
forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or
corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above ([602]AA[2],3)
that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human
soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies
are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it
were corrupted "per se." This, indeed, is impossible, not only as
regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is
a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of
itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which
is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual
existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the
form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be
separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent
form to cease to exist.
Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some
pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is
incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety;
since generation and corruption are from contraries and into
contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter
subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no
contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the
manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are without
contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves
contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it
is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover we
may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires
to existence after its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge,
desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence,
except under the conditions of "here" and "now," whereas the intellect
apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything
that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural
desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is
incorruptible.
Reply to Objection 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the
foolish, as expressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the saying
that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the
body; for all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of
the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the
body; whereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is
written as to other animals: "Let the earth bring forth the living
soul" (Gn. 1:24): while of man it is written (Gn. 2:7) that "He
breathed into his face the breath of life." And so in the last chapter
of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: "(Before) the dust return into
its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God Who gave
it." Again the process of life is alike as to the body, concerning
which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): "All things breathe alike," and
(Wis. 2:2), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke." But the process is
not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals are not.
Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than beasts." Thus
death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: As a thing can be created by reason, not of a
passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the
Creator, Who can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that
a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a
potentiality to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing
to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because
there is in it a potentiality to non-existence.
Reply to Objection 3: To understand through a phantasm is the proper
operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After
separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding,
similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear later
on ([603]Q[89], A[1]).
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Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an
angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of
its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the
end of the soul is the same as that of an angel---namely, eternal
happiness. Therefore they are of the same species.
Objection 2: Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest,
because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing
nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual
nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific
difference: therefore they belong to the same species.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an
angel except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the
essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species.
Therefore the soul and angel are of the same species.
On the contrary, Things which have different natural operations are of
different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an
angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), "Angelic
minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their
knowledge of Divine things from visible things." Subsequently he says
the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an angel are
not of the same species.
I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls and
angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that
in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as
resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above ([604]Q[47],
A[2]). But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot
be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of
nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are
subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a
diversity of species. For a separate form cannot be understood
otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate
whiteness to exist, it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness
does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But
diversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature;
thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another; and the
same applies to other species, because differences which divide a
"genus" are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are compared
to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the "principle of
contrariety is habit, and privation thereof," as is written Metaph. x
(Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the aforesaid substances were
composed of matter and form. For if the matter of one be distinct from
the matter of another, it follows that either the form is the principle
of the distinction of matter---that is to say, that the matter is
distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and even then
there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or
else the matter is the principle of the distinction of forms. But one
matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of
quantity, which has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as
an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the
soul to be of the same species. How it is that there can be many souls
of one species will be explained later ([605]Q[76], A[2], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proceeds from the proximate and
natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end.
Reply to Objection 2: The ultimate specific difference is the noblest
because it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is
nobler than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is
not the noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees
of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees
in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one
species, so neither are all intellectual things of one species.
Reply to Objection 3: The body is not of the essence of the soul; but
the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so
that, properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the "composite," is
the species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires
the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a
grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not
united to a body.
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OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning
this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its
form?
(2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically
according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence for all
men?
(3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle,
there is some other soul?
(4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?
(5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual
principle is the form?
(6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?
(7) Whether by means of an accident?
(8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?
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Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?
Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to
the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that
the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body.
Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.
Objection 2: Further, every form is determined according to the nature
of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would be
required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were
united to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate
nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature;
and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear
from what has been said ([606]Q[75], A[2]); which is contrary to the
nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the
body as its form.
Objection 3: Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body,
receives a form materially and individually; for what is received must
be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form of
the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and
individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the
intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and
universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore
the intellect is not united to the body as its form.
Objection 4: Further, power and action have the same subject; for the
same subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action is
not the action of a body, as appears from above ([607]Q[75], A[2]).
Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But
virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence
from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither is the
substance of the intellect the form of a body.
Objection 5: Further, whatever has "per se" existence is not united to
the body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists:
so that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by
itself. But the intellectual principle has "per se" existence and is
subsistent, as was said above ([608]Q[75], A[2]). Therefore it is not
united to the body as its form.
Objection 6: Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its
nature exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the
form by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by
an accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and
form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally
one. Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the
intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above
([609]Q[75], A[6]), remains separate from the body, after the
dissolution of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not
united to the body as its form.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher, Metaph. viii (Did. vii
2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which
constitutes man is "rational," which is applied to man on account of
his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the
form of man.
I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle
of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that
whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act
is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is primarily
healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is
knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form
of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is
in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is
clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as
life appears through various operations in different degrees of living
things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital
actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our
nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our
understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily
understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual
soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by
Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2).
But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the
body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding
is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it
is himself who understands. Now an action may be attributed to anyone
in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1); for a
thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of its whole self, for
instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a man sees
by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as when we say that
something that is white builds, because it is accidental to the builder
to be white. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is
clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally; since it is
ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. We must
therefore say either that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole
self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or
that intelligence is a part of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was
shown above ([610]Q[75], A[4]), for this reason, that it is one and the
same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses.
But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some
part of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates
understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to
the body of Socrates.
The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible
species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and in
the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the
intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of
this or that particular man. But this link or union does not
sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the act
of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the
sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things
relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the
intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he
says De Anima iii, 5,7. Therefore, as the species of colors are in the
sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect. Now
it is clear that because the colors, the images of which are in the
sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the
wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is seen.
Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the
possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the
phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood.
Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the
body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one thing
so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. This
is, however, absurd for many reasons. First, because the intellect does
not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which
presupposes the operation of the intellect. The reason therefore why
Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his intellect, but
rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his intellect because he
understands. Secondly, because since Socrates is an individual in a
nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be
not the form, it follows that it must be outside the essence, and then
the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved.
Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent, and does not pass
into something else, as does the action of heating. Therefore the
action of understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason
that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the action of a
motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to an
instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore if
understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves
him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to an instrument. This
is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that
understanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument (De Anima
iii, 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be attributed
to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed to a man; yet it
is never attributed to another part, except perhaps indirectly; for we
do not say that the hand sees because the eye sees. Therefore if the
intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner, the action of
the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates
be a whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever else
belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to those other
things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates is not one absolutely,
and consequently neither a being absolutely, for a thing is a being
according as it is one.
There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by
Aristotle---namely, that this particular man understands, because the
intellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of the
intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to
the body as its form.
The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species. For
the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper
operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses
all other animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the
ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly
belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that which
is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything is
derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual
principle is the proper form of man.
But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above
corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it
excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the
form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental
qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more
we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the
vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive soul
excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and
noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by
the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter
has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect.
It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of
matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the
form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in
potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the
form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by
virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we call
the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the "primary
animate," as was said above ([611]Q[75], A[5]).
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the
ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the natural
philosopher is directed is indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. He
proves this from the fact that "man and the sun generate man from
matter." It is separate indeed according to its intellectual power,
because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as
the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act
which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing.
But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, to which this power
belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation. And
so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is separate,
because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ.
From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections:
since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by means
of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial
things and universals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be
not the act of the body.
Reply to Objection 4: The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is
not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore
there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the
body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body.
Reply to Objection 5: The soul communicates that existence in which it
subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual
soul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the
whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the case
with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains
its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas it is not
so with other forms.
Reply to Objection 6: To be united to the body belongs to the soul by
reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to
be raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its
proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for
its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when
separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination
to be united to the body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of
bodies?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual principle is not
multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one
intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in
number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial
substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown
above ([612]Q[75], A[5]). Therefore there are not many human souls in
one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore there is but one
intellect in all men.
Objection 2: Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also
removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the
number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number
of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a
single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the
distinction of rewards and punishments.
Objection 3: Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect,
my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are
things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever is
received into anything must be received according to the condition of
the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received
individually into my intellect, and also into yours: which is contrary
to the nature of the intellect which knows universals.
Objection 4: Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which
understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what
is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you;
and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be
only potentially something understood; so that the common intention
will have to be abstracted from both; since from things diverse
something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is
contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would
seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to
follow that there is one intellect in all men.
Objection 5: Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the
master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge
in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form,
such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, that the
same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the
disciple; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect in both.
Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple and master is but
one; and, consequently, the same applies to all men.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: "If I
were to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself."
But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect.
Therefore there is one intellect of all men.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the relation
of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular
causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul, one in
species, should belong to animals of different species. Therefore it is
impossible that one individual intellectual soul should belong to
several individuals.
I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong
to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the intellect
itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and
that they are not distinct from each other, except by something outside
the essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would
be no other than that of one man with a tunic and another with a cloak;
which is quite absurd.
It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the
opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the
intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man.
For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form, as
it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the
principle of existence.
Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the
manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is
manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two
instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but several
actions; as when one man touches several things with his two hands,
there will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the contrary,
we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say
that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if there be
many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many drawing, but
one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one
instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when the
smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Now
it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or coupled to
this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other
things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey the
intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to
have several intellects and one sense---for instance, if two men had
one eye---there would be several seers, but one sight. But if there is
one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things of which
the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it possible to say
that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And
if to this we add that to understand, which is the act of the
intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect
itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent and one
action: that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and
have but one act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one
intelligible object.
However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action
form yours by the distinction of the phantasms---that is to say, were
there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you---if the
phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a
form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to
divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of
things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the
phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the
intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now
in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only
one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom
there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only
one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the
intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of
a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if
there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which
are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of
intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows, therefore,
that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that
there exists one intellect for all men.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellectual soul, like an angel,
has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a
certain matter; in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to
the division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while it
is quite impossible for many angels to be of one species.
Reply to Objection 2: Everything has unity in the same way that it has
being; consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we
judge of its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by
virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after
the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own
being. In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the
multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies,
the souls retain their multiplied being.
Reply to Objection 3: Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the
species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding of
universals; otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent
substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand
universals. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species
whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as every
action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent acts, as
heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according
to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. Now it is clear
that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the
individuating principles which come from the matter. Therefore if the
form, which is the means of knowledge, is material---that is, not
abstracted from material conditions---its likeness to the nature of a
species or genus will be according to the distinction and
multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles; so
that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible.
But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual
matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things
which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of
the universal. Nor does it matter, as to this particular point, whether
there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it
would necessarily be an individual intellect, and the species whereby
it understands, an individual species.
Reply to Objection 4: Whether the intellect be one or many, what is
understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not
according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the
stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, De Anima
iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of
the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on itself:
otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only
intelligible species. Now it happens that different things, according
to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And since knowledge
is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing
known, it follows that the same thing may happen to be known by several
knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the
same color, according to different likenesses. In the same way several
intellects understand one object understood. But there is this
difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense
and the intelligence---that a thing is perceived by the sense according
to the disposition which it has outside the soul ---that is, in its
individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed
outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the
soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. For the
common nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles;
whereas such is not its mode of existence outside the soul. But,
according to the opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside
the soul in the same condition as those under which it is understood;
for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter.
Reply to Objection 5: One knowledge exists in the disciple and another
in the master. How it is caused will be shown later on ([613]Q[117],
A[1]).
Reply to Objection 6: Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would
involve a plurality of species.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls
essentially different from one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are
in man other souls essentially different from one another, such as the
sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and
incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual soul
is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the
nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above ([614]Q[75], A[6]).
Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive
soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same.
Objection 2: Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is
incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ
generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the
sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is
corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive
soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same "genus." Now an
animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, therefore,
"animal" will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which
is absurd.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2),
that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the form.
But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is taken from
the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" by reason of his
having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual
soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive soul, as form
to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is not essentially
the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material
subject.
On the contrary, It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus
xv: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and
other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and
which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys the
reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both
gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its
own reasoning."
I answer that, Plato held that there were several souls in one body,
distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different
vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the
concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain.
Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to
those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this reason,
that in those animals which continue to live when they have been
divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense
and appetite. Now this would not be the case if the various principles
of the soul's operations were essentially different, and distributed in
the various parts of the body. But with regard to the intellectual
part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be "only logically"
distinct from the other parts of the soul, "or also locally."
The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was
supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor.
For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be
moved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according to its
various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the
body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially
different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three
different reasons.
In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which
there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one
form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same
source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are
denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance,
"a white man." If, therefore, man were 'living' by one form, the
vegetative soul, and 'animal' by another form, the sensitive soul, and
"man" by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man
is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. viii (Did. vii,
6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the
idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this
reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the
body, he asks (De Anima i, 5), "what contains them?"---that is, what
makes them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one body;
because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the
reverse.
Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one
thing is predicated of another. Those things which are derived from
various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if
the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that something
white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential
predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject
belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is
presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is
colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.)
Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and
another form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these
two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally,
supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another---or that
one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of
essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But
both of these consequences are clearly false: because "animal" is
predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not part
of the definition of an animal, but the other way about. Therefore of
necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man
would not really be the thing which is an animal, so that animal can be
essentially predicated of man.
Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one
operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never
be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one.
We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the
intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul.
This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species
and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things differ
from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of
things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals
more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of
these genera there are various degrees. For this reason Aristotle,
Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things to numbers,
which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And
(De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the species of
figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and
exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains virtually
whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the
nutritive souls of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of a
pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by
another---since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in
the pentagonal---so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal
by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man.
Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by
reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual.
When, therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when
with sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For
although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot
deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility.
Reply to Objection 2: Not forms, but composites, are classified either
generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other animals.
And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the
part of the forms does not involve a generic difference between man and
the other animals.
Reply to Objection 3: The embryo has first of all a soul which is
merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more
perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be
shown further on ([615]Q[118], A[2], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 4: We must not consider the diversity of natural
things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions,
which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can
apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as
we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to
the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately
what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something imperfect
and material. And because it observes that this is something common to
man and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the "genus";
while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it
takes as formal and perfecting; thence it gathers the "difference" of
man.
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Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that in man there is another form besides
the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that
"the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially."
Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body has
a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other
substantial form in the body precedes the soul.
Objection 2: Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now
everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one
moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii,
5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part must
be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved (Phys.
v, 1), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything that is
moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal there must be
another substantial form, by which the body is constituted.
Objection 3: Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to
primary matter; for "before" and "after" apply by comparison to some
beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial
form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately
to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most
imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately.
Objection 4: Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does
not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere corruption.
Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and
these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body there are
other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul.
On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But
the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing
there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form
of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another
substantial form besides the intellectual soul.
I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united
to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists
maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another
substantial form, by which the body is established in its being as
movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to
the body as its substantial form, as we have said above [616](A[1]), it
is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual
soul to be found in man.
In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial
form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form
does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does
not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the
coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or
generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular
condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a
thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the
substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is
said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply.
For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary
matter was some actual being---for instance, fire or air, or something
of that sort---maintained that nothing is generated simply, or
corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an
alteration," as we read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore, if besides the
intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form
by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would
follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that
it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there
would not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption,
all of which is clearly false.
Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man
besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually
contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually
contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the
imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the
sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants,
and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect.
Reply to Objection 1: Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act
of a body only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has life
potentially"; and that this potentiality "does not reject the soul."
Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul
itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot,
and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were two
separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light. In
like manner, the soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc., because
by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life potentially. Yet
the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is
operation; for such a potentiality "does not reject"---that is, does
not exclude---the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul does not move the body by its essence,
as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which
presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the
soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate body
is the part moved.
Reply to Objection 3: We observe in matter various degrees of
perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what
is added is always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter
only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that
form which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the
most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately.
Reply to Objection 4: Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the
elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is made
by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an average.
But this is impossible, because the various forms of the elements must
necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the distinction of which
we must suppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible.
Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body.
But various bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that
elements in the mixed body would be distinct as to situation. And then
there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole; but
only a mixture apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles.
Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their
imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms,
and so can be "more" or "less"; and therefore in the mixture they are
modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from them.
But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial being of
each thing consists in something indivisible, and every addition and
subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph.
viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any
substantial form to receive "more" or "less." Nor is it less impossible
for anything to be a medium between substance and accident.
Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener. i,
10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not
actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements
remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary
forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the
substantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone,
or of any sort of soul.
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Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly
united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form.
But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not
properly united to a corruptible body.
Objection 2: Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial
form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does
not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter.
Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for
instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body.
Objection 3: Further, since the form is the principle of the species,
one form cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual soul
is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is
composed of parts belonging to various species.
Objection 4: Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should
itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect
of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally
provided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes,
and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with
arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual soul
should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as being
deprived of the above means of protection.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the soul
is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially."
I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the
matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the
matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual soul,
as we have seen above ([617]Q[55], A[2]) in the order of nature, holds
the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not
naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but
has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in necessary
things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with
the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now the
action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument.
Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to be united to a body
fitted to be a convenient organ of sense.
Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ
of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and
cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the
perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and
is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is
reduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the touch.
But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its
completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists
more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a
mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For
this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among
men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence.
A sign of which is that we observe "those who are refined in body are
well endowed in mind," as stated in De Anima ii, 9.
Reply to Objection 1: Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by
saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer
does not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was
immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its
immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the
immortality of the devil.
Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two
conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that the
matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of the
first disposition. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw
chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the
teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of the
matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable
complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If,
however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the
formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but
what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy
against death in the gift of grace.
Reply to Objection 2: A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul
by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on
account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable
temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a
body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire
was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an equability of
temperament. And this body of an equable temperament has a dignity of
its own by reason of its being remote from contraries, thereby
resembling in a way a heavenly body.
Reply to Objection 3: The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye,
hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the
whole does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that these
are of different species, but that they are of various dispositions.
This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in
its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is manifold in power:
and therefore, for its various operations it requires various
dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. For this
reason we observe that there is a greater variety of parts in perfect
than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater variety than in
plants.
Reply to Objection 4: The intellectual soul as comprehending
universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot
be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to
certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case
with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and
power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead of all these, man
has by nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of
organs" (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself
instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes.
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Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of
accidental dispositions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the
body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form
exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are
accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter
before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the
soul is a substantial form.
Objection 2: Further, various forms of one species require various
parts of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without
division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose dimensions
in matter before the substantial forms, which are many belonging to one
species.
Objection 3: Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is
corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its power.
Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a
power, which is an accident.
On the contrary, Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order
of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says, Metaph.
vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any accidental
form exist in matter before the soul, which is the substantial form.
I answer that, If the soul were united to the body, merely as a motor,
there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions
mediating between the soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be
necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required the power to
move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude to be
moved by the soul.
If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the
substantial form, as we have already said above [618](A[1]), it is
impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and
the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its matter. The
reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts
in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts must be
understood as being first in matter. Now the first among all acts is
existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as
hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. But matter has actual
existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely,
as we have said above [619](A[4]). Wherefore it is impossible for any
accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial
form, and consequently before the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: As appears from what has been already said
[620](A[4]), the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs
to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it
perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the
same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being,
an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every "genus" follow its
own proper accidents. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected
in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so
those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist
before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter
before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the
subsequent effect.
Reply to Objection 2: Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent
to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter,
once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as
distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms
according to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is
essentially the same form which gives matter the various degrees of
perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as different
when brought under the observation of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: A spiritual substance which is united to a body
as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the
intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a form;
and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue.
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Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body?
Objection 1: It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by
means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 19), that "the
soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air,
which is most akin to a spirit." But fire and air are bodies. Therefore
the soul is united to the human body by means of a body.
Objection 2: Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing
the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But when
breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the
breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul and
body.
Objection 3: Further, things which are very distant from one another,
are not united except by something between them. But the intellectual
soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and
because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to the
body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly
light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them together.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): "We need not
ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its
shape are one." But the shape is united to the wax without a body
intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body.
I answer that, If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to
the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other
bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal
whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means
of something nearer.
If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have
said [621](A[1]), it is impossible for it to be united by means of
another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as
it is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual
since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give existence by
means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of
matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of
its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there any other
cause of union except the agent, which causes matter to be in act, as
the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6).
From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who
maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and
body of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual
soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it is
never separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible
body of man. Others said that the soul is united to the body by means
of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the body by means of
light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth
essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to the body by
means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means
of the light of the crystal heaven; and the intellectual soul by means
of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fictious and
ridiculous: for light is not a body; and the fifth essence does not
enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is
unchangeable), but only virtually: and lastly, because the soul is
immediately united to the body as the form to matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves
the body; whence he uses the word "administration." It is true that it
moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And the
first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the
Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x).
Reply to Objection 2: The union of soul and body ceases at the
cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union, but
because of the removal of that disposition by which the body is
disposed for such a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of
moving, as the first instrument of motion.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if
we consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a
separate existence, many means of connection would have to intervene.
But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an
existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own
existence is united to the body immediately. This is the case with
every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from matter,
which is a being only in potentiality.
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Whether the soul is in each part of the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of
the body; for the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot.
animal. x): "It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the
body; it suffices that it be in some principle of the body causing the
other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement of its own."
Objection 2: Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act.
But it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in an
organic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body.
Therefore the whole soul is not in each part.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima. ii, 1) that the
relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the sight
to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the soul to the
whole body of an animal. If, therefore, the whole soul is in each part
of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal.
Objection 4: Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the
essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of
the body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part
of the body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye,
and this is absurd.
Objection 5: Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body,
each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus one
part would not depend on another; nor would one part be nobler than
another; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each
part of the body.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that "in each body
the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire."
I answer that, As we have said, if the soul were united to the body
merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the
body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But
since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily
be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an
accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the
substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the
whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which
does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form
consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and
such a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and
therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but
also of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do
not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a
painted animal or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the
flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof of
which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body
retains its proper action; although that which retains its species,
retains the action of the species. But act is in that which it
actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole body, and in each
part thereof.
That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this,
that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, there are three
kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. There is a
whole which is divided into parts of quantity, as a whole line, or a
whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical and
essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the parts of a
definition, and a composite into matter and form. There is, further, a
third kind of whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts. The
first kind of totality does not apply to forms, except perhaps
accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have an indifferent
relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as whiteness, as
far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to be in the whole
surface and in each part of the surface; and, therefore, the surface
being divided, the whiteness is accidentally divided. But a form which
requires variety in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul
of perfect animals, is not equally related to the whole and the parts:
hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole is divided. So
therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the soul,
either essentially or accidentally. But the second kind of totality,
which depends on logical and essential perfection, properly and
essentially belongs to forms: and likewise the virtual totality,
because a form is the principle of operation.
Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole
surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. If we
mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the
whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. The same is to be
said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole
surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small
part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence, then the
whole whiteness is in each part of a surface.
Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither
essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say
that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of
perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not
in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with
regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in
the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the soul
requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as
its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is compared primarily
and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible; but to
the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive
power of the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its
primary and proportionate perfectible.
Reply to Objection 3: An animal is that which is composed of a soul and
a whole body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate
perfectible. Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not follow
that a part of an animal is an animal.
Reply to Objection 4: Some of the powers of the soul are in it
according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the
intellect and the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any
part of the body. Other powers are common to the soul and body;
wherefore each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but
only in that part of the body, which is adapted to the operation of
such a power.
Reply to Objection 5: One part of the body is said to be nobler than
another, on account of the various powers, of which the parts of the
body are the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler
power, is a nobler part of the body: as also is that part which serves
the same power in a nobler manner.
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OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (EIGHT
ARTICLES)
We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the
soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under the first head
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power?
(2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several?
(3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another?
(4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another;
(5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject?
(6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul?
(7) Whether one power rises from another?
(8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?
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Whether the essence of the soul is its power?
Objection 1: It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power.
For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and love
are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing,
essentially": and (De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, and
will are one life, one mind, one essence."
Objection 2: Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But
primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul
its own power.
Objection 3: Further, the substantial form is simpler than the
accidental form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not
intensified or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is
its own power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is
the soul.
Objection 4: Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand
by the intellectual power. But "that by which we first sense and
understand" is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2).
Therefore the soul is its own power.
Objection 5: Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an
accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else besides
the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine,
who says that the foregoing (see OBJ 1) "are not in the soul as in a
subject as color or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a
body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the subject in which it is:
Whereas the mind can love and know other things" (De Trin. ix, 4).
Objection 6: Further, " a simple form cannot be a subject." But the
soul is a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, as
we have said above ([622]Q[75], A[5]). Therefore the power of the soul
cannot be in it as in a subject.
Objection 7: Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial
difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences; and
they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the soul.
Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; and so it would
seem that the power of the soul is its own essence.
On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly spirits
are divided into essence, power, and operation." Much more, then, in
the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power.
I answer that, It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is
its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present purpose
this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power and act
divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a power and its act
to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of
substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in the genus of
substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of
substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own
substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of His
operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of
the soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when speaking of
the angels ([623]Q[54], A[3]). Secondly, this may be also shown to be
impossible in the soul. For the soul by its very essence is an act.
Therefore if the very essence of the soul were the immediate principle
of operation, whatever has a soul would always have actual vital
actions, as that which has a soul is always an actually living thing.
For as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, but the
ultimate term of generation. Wherefore, for it to be in potentiality to
another act, does not belong to it according to its essence, as a form,
but according to its power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its
power, is called the first act, with a further relation to the second
act. Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual with
respect to its vital operations; whence also it is said in the
definition of the soul, that it is "the act of a body having life
potentially"; which potentiality, however, "does not exclude the soul."
Therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is not its power. For
nothing is in potentiality by reason of an act, as act.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and
loves itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known
and loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very
substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. In the same way
are we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those
things are "one life, one mind, one essence." Or, as some say, this
passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is predicated
of its parts, being midway between the universal whole, and the
integral whole. For the universal whole is in each part according to
its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and in a horse; and
therefore it is properly predicated of each part. But the integral
whole is not in each part, neither according to its whole essence, nor
according to its whole power. Therefore in no way can it be predicated
of each part; yet in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of all
the parts together; as if we were to say that the wall, roof, and
foundations are a house. But the potential whole is in each part
according to its whole essence, not, however, according to its whole
power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of each part, but not so
properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the
memory, understanding, and the will are the one essence of the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: The act to which primary matter is in
potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of
matter is nothing else but its essence.
Reply to Objection 3: Action belongs to the composite, as does
existence; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has
substantial existence through the substantial form; and it operates by
the power which results from the substantial form. Hence an active
accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance,
heat compared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the
soul.
Reply to Objection 4: That the accidental form is a principle of action
is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the
first principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this
sense the Philosopher says that "the soul is that whereby we understand
and sense."
Reply to Objection 5: If we take accident as meaning what is divided
against substance, then there can be no medium between substance and
accident; because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that
is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a
subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it
must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species of accident,
that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five universals,
in this sense there is a medium between substance and accident. For the
substance is all that belongs to the essence of a thing; whereas
whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident in
this sense; but only what is not caused by the essential principle of
the species. For the 'proper' does not belong to the essence of a
thing, but is caused by the essential principles of the species;
wherefore it is a medium between the essence and accident thus
understood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a
medium between substance and accident, as being natural properties of
the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the
soul as accidents in a subject, this must be understood in the sense
given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the soul, not as loving
and knowing, but as loved and known. His argument proceeds in this
sense; for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would
follow that an accident transcends its subject, since even other things
are loved through the soul.
Reply to Objection 6: Although the soul is not composed of matter and
form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above
([624]Q[75], A[5], ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of
an accident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure
Act; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De
Trin. i).
Reply to Objection 7: Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not
taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and
rational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in
themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing
prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial
differences.
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Whether there are several powers of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several powers of the
soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of
God. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the
intellectual soul.
Objection 2: Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is.
But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore
above all others it has one virtue or power.
Objection 3: Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the
one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different
degrees of perfection, as we have seen above ([625]Q[76], AA[3],4).
Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of
various degrees.
On the contrary, The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De
Anima ii, 2,3).
I answer that, Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul.
To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De
Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect
goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few
movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect
goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect
goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those
things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever.
Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire
imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who
can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and better still,
he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health
without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are
below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few
determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and
perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the
last degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is
possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations
and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In
God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence.
There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of
powers---because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal
creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine
likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire
perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it
falls short of more perfect creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: A unified power is superior if it extends to
equal things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over
many things.
Reply to Objection 3: One thing has one substantial existence, but may
have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with
several powers.
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Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul are not
distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its
species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is
subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore
the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects.
Objection 2: Further, contraries are what differ most from each other.
Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows
that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly
false in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to
white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter.
Objection 3: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed.
Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects,
the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly
false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired
by the appetitive.
Objection 4: Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is
the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong to
various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color
belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they come
under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not
distinguished according to the difference of their objects.
On the contrary, Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what
precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "acts and
operations precede the powers according to reason; and these again are
preceded by their opposites," that is their objects. Therefore the
powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects.
I answer that, A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek
to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, and
consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the
act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according
to the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an
active power or of a passive power. Now, the object is to the act of a
passive power, as the principle and moving cause: for color is the
principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand,
to the act of an active power the object is a term and end; as the
object of the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of
growth. Now, from these two things an act receives its species, namely,
from its principle, or from its end or term; for the act of heating
differs from the act of cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from
something hot, which is the active principle, to heat; the latter from
something cold, which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the
powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects.
Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not
change the species. For since to be colored is accidental to an animal,
its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a
difference in that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is to
say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes
rational, and sometimes otherwise. Hence "rational" and "irrational"
are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In
like manner therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the
powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power of its
very nature is directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are
directed to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color,
sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with
regard to color, namely, the sight, and another with regard to sound,
namely, hearing. But it is accidental to a passive quality, for
instance, to something colored, to be a musician or a grammarian, great
or small, a man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the
powers of the soul are not distinct.
Reply to Objection 1: Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is,
nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is
with regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is,
nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those conditions
which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and
end.
Reply to Objection 2: If any power were to have one of two contraries
as such for its object, the other contrary would belong to another
power. But the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the
contrary as such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; as
sight does not regard white as such, but as color. This is because of
two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the other, since
they are to one another as perfect and imperfect.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents things which coincide in
subject, from being considered under different aspects; therefore they
can belong to various powers of the soul.
Reply to Objection 4: The higher power of itself regards a more
universal formality of the object than the lower power; because the
higher a power is, to a greater number of things does it extend.
Therefore many things are combined in the one formality of the object,
which the higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the
formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus it is that
various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects, however,
are subject to one higher power.
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Whether among the powers of the soul there is order?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order among the powers of
the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is
no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers
of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore there
is no order among them.
Objection 2: Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their
objects and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not
order among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects
are various and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no
order among the powers of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, where there is order among powers, we find that
the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the
action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for
sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore there
is no order among the powers of the soul.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the parts or
powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among
themselves. Therefore the powers of the soul have order.
I answer that, Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and
since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a
certain order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul.
Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of which
correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third
is taken from the order of the objects. Now the dependence of one power
on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of nature,
forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect
things; and according to the order of generation and time; forasmuch as
from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to
the first kind of order among the powers, the intellectual powers are
prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they direct them and command
them. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the
powers of the nutritive soul.
In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers
of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of
the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The
same is to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the
intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers
are ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. For
the visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher and
lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally prior
to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the result.
Reply to Objection 1: The species of a given genus are to one another
as before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their
nature; although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they
receive the predication of the common genus.
Reply to Objection 2: This order among the powers of the soul is both
on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its
essence, has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and
on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as
we have said above.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is verified as regards those powers
among which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which
the two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one
depends on another.
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Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the
soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body;
so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject
of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the
powers of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are
attributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2), "The soul is that by which we sense
and understand primarily." But the natural principles of the operations
of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily in the
soul.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the
soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the
body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body. But if
the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their subject, the
soul could not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is
the subject of the sensitive powers; and for a similar reason, of all
the other powers.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that
"sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the
composite." Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as its
subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the powers.
I answer that, The subject of operative power is that which is able to
operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now the
same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate.
Wherefore the "subject of power" is of necessity "the subject of
operation," as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno
et Vigilia. Now, it is clear from what we have said above ([626]Q[75],
AA[2],3; [627]Q[76], A[1], ad 1), that some operations of the soul are
performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence
the powers of these operations are in the soul as their subject. But
some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs;
as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the
other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore the
powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject
in the composite, and not in the soul alone.
Reply to Objection 1: All the powers are said to belong to the soul,
not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul
that the composite has the power to perform such operations.
Reply to Objection 2: All such powers are primarily in the soul, as
compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their
principle.
Reply to Objection 3: Plato's opinion was that sensation is an
operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many
things relating to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of
Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far
as the present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul
senses some things with the body, and some without the body, this can
be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words "with the body or without the
body" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the
sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because the
action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal
organ. Secondly, they may be understood as determining the act of sense
on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with
the body, that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a
wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without
the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the
apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing
something.
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Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from
its essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple thing.
But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the
powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot proceed from its
essence.
Objection 2: Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause.
But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the
powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes.
Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.
Objection 3: Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But
nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii, 1,2);
except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to
be moved by itself, because one part thereof moves and another is
moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De Anima
i, 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its powers within itself.
On the contrary, The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But
the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is
included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii
(Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence
as their cause.
I answer that, The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and
partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that by
each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however,
in two respects. First, because the substantial form makes a thing to
exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But
the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be
such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for its subject is
an actual being. Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the
substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject: and since
that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the
substantial form causes existence in its subject. On the other hand,
actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to
its being observed in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of
the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the
subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the
accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I
say of the proper and "per se" accident; for with regard to the
extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, the accident being
caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substantial and accidental
forms differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists
for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore
exists on account of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the
accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject.
Now it is clear, from what has been said [628](A[5]), that either the
subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the
subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality,
as we have said above (A[1], ad 6); or else this subject is the
composite. Now the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear
that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul
alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from
their principle; because it has already been said that the accident is
caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is received into
it according as it is in potentiality.
Reply to Objection 1: From one simple thing many things may proceed
naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of
recipients. Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various
powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and also
by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.
Reply to Objection 2: The subject is both the final cause, and in a way
the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the
material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this
we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its
powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as
receptive thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: The emanation of proper accidents from their
subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural
resultance; thus one thing results naturally from another, as color
from light.
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Whether one power of the soul arises from another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise
from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does
not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at
the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from
another.
Objection 2: Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an
accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the
subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident.
Therefore one power does not arise from another.
Objection 3: Further, one opposite does not arise from the other
opposite; but everything arises from that which is like it in species.
Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species.
Therefore one of them does not proceed from another.
On the contrary, Powers are known by their actions. But the action of
one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of
the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power of the
soul is caused by another.
I answer that, In those things which proceed from one according to a
natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is
nearer to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more
remote. Now it has been shown above [629](A[4]) that among the powers
of the soul there are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of
the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of
another. But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers
both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle,
either separately by itself, or together with the body; and since the
agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as
such, is less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which
precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the
principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active
principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of the
intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a
certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore,
according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence
as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive
principles, the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the
others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is
considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the
intelligence. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the
others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before
the man.
Reply to Objection 1: As the power of the soul flows from the essence,
not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is
simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards
another.
Reply to Objection 2: An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an
accident; but one accident is received prior to another into substance,
as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be
the subject of another; as surface is of color, inasmuch as substance
receives an accident through the means of another. The same thing may
be said of the powers of the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: The powers of the soul are opposed to one
another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers
and figures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one
from another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect
things.
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Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in
the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu et
Anima that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense
and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and
irascibility."
Objection 2: Further, the powers of the soul are its natural
properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong; and
are never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it
even after death.
Objection 3: Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not
weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says
(De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he
would see even as well as a young man." But weakness is the road to
corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the
body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.
Objection 4: Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the
Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the
separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in
hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy
lifetime" (Lk. 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul;
and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.
Objection 5: Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part,
which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate
souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive.
Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as
the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some
things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite
separate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the sensitive
part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate
soul; and consequently all the other powers.
On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two
substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the
body with its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive
powers do not remain.
I answer that, As we have said already ([630]AA[5],6,7), all the powers
of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some
powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence
and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the
destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected in the
composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now
accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject.
Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain
actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle
or root.
So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even
after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they
say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because
these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.
Reply to Objection 1: That book has no authority, and so what is there
written can be despised with the same facility as it was said; although
we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually
but virtually.
Reply to Objection 2: These powers, which we say do not actually remain
in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of
the composite.
Reply to Objection 3: These powers are said not to be weakened when the
body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the
virtual principle of these powers.
Reply to Objection 4: The recollection spoken of there is to be taken
in the same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in
the mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul.
Reply to Objection 5: In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in
the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.
Reply to Objection 6: Augustine in that passage is speaking as
inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which
he had said there (Retrac. ii, 24).
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OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian,
however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual
and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the
knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other
powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically
will be divided into three parts: first, we shall consider those powers
which are a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual
powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The powers of the soul considered generally;
(2) The various species of the vegetative part;
(3) The exterior senses;
(4) The interior senses.
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Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not to be distinguished five
genera of powers in the soul---namely, vegetative, sensitive,
appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul
are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly
assigned---namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the
rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in the
soul, and not five.
Objection 2: Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of its
vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): "In several ways a thing is said to
live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is said to
live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly,
movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment." Therefore there
are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetitive is
excluded.
Objection 3: Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned
as regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to
each power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible
object; whence we read (Ecclus. 40:22): "The eye desireth favor and
beauty, but more than these green sown fields." In the same way every
other power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive
power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul.
Objection 4: Further, the moving principle in animals is sense,
intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10).
Therefore the motive power should not be added to the above as a
special genus of soul.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), "The powers are
the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotion, and the
intellectual."
I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above
numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes
of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls being
distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the
operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for the whole
corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to it as its
matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation of the
soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even
performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the operation of the
"rational soul." Below this, there is another operation of the soul,
which is indeed performed through a corporeal organ, but not through a
corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the "sensitive soul";
for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and other such corporeal
qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they are not
required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes place by
virtue of such qualities; but only for the proper disposition of the
organ. The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is
performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal quality.
Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature; because the
movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle, while these
operations are from an intrinsic principle; for this is common to all
the operations of the soul; since every animate thing, in some way,
moves itself. Such is the operation of the "vegetative soul"; for
digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by the action of
heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4).
Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their
objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal is the object to
which it extends, as we have said above ([631]Q[77], A[3], ad 4). But
the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order.
For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only the body
that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are called
"vegetative" for the vegetative power acts only on the body to which
the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the soul,
which genus regards a more universal object---namely, every sensible
body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet
another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a still
more universal object---namely, not only the sensible body, but all
being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera
of the soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely to that
which is united to them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since
whatever operates must in some way be united to the object about which
it operates, it follows of necessity that this something extrinsic,
which is the object of the soul's operation, must be related to the
soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic
has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its
likeness in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers
---namely, the "sensitive" in regard to the less common object---the
sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard to the most common
object---universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an
inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic. And in this way
there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one---the
"appetitive"---in respect of which the soul is referred to something
extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention; the
other---the "locomotive" power---in respect of which the soul is
referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and
movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its
desires and intentions.
The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of
living things. There are some living things in which there exists only
vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the
vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive
power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which
besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require
many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek
necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things
which with these have intellectual power---namely, men. But the
appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things; because
wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima ii, 3).
Thus the first two objectives are hereby solved.
Reply to Objection 3: The "natural appetite" is that inclination which
each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its
natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But
the "animal appetite" results from the form apprehended; this sort of
appetite requires a special power of the soul---mere apprehension does
not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature,
whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to its own
nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight
desires naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act
only---namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the
appetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely for the purpose of
seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul did not require
things perceived by the senses, except on account of the actions of the
senses, that is, for the purpose of sensing them; there would be no
need for a special genus of appetitive powers, since the natural
appetite of the powers would suffice.
Reply to Objection 4: Although sense and appetite are principles of
movement in perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not
sufficient to cause movement, unless another power be added to them;
for immovable animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have not
the power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the appetite
and sense as commanding the movement, but also in the parts of the
body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves them. Of
this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are deprived of
their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience to the
appetite.
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Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the
nutritive, augmentative, and generative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are
not fittingly described---namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and
generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of
the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class
the above forces as powers of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, we should not assign a particular power of the
soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But
generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted,
whether living or not living. Therefore the generative force should not
be classed as a power of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the
body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more,
therefore, does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul
is not distinct from the generative power.
Objection 4: Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby
it exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing
exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now
the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing
(De Anima ii, 4), being "a power which is capable of preserving
whatever receives it." Therefore we should not distinguish the
nutritive power from the generative.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the
operations of this soul are "generation, the use of food," and (cf. De
Anima iii, 9) "growth."
I answer that, The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative
part, as we have said [632](A[1]), has for its object the body itself,
living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is
required. One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed
the "generative" power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its
due quantity; to this is directed the "augmentative" power. Another is
whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its existence and in
its due quantity; to this is directed the "nutritive" power.
We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The
nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist,
since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the
augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul.
But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body
but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the
generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive
soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in
a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is highest
in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher
nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore, of
these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility,
and perfection, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it
belongs to a thing which is already perfect to "produce another like
unto itself." And the generative power is served by the augmentative
and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the nutritive.
Reply to Objection 1: Such forces are called natural, both because they
produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence,
quantity and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these
things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform their
actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which
are the principles of natural actions.
Reply to Objection 2: Generation of inanimate things is entirely from
an extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a
higher way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the
semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore there
must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this
is the generative power.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the generation of living things is from a
semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be
generated. For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it
is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated
from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore it receives at
once its nature and its quantity, according to the condition of the
matter.
Reply to Objection 4: As we have said above [633](A[1]), the operation
of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property
of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the
humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food
is changed into the substance of the body. This is also necessary for
the action of the augmentative and generative powers.
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Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished?
Objection 1: It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior
senses. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are
distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied
according to the number of the kinds of accidents.
Objection 2: Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are
called "common sensibles," are "not sensibles by accident," but are
contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now
the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since,
therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is, it
seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power than can
grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or sound.
Objection 3: Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight
regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several
contraries; such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore
it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than
five senses.
Objection 4: Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But
taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a
distinct sense of touch.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): "There is no
other besides the five senses."
I answer that, The reason of the distinction and number of the senses
has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the
elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has
been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or
extrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have
ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according
as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity.
But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the
organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there are not various
powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary,
for this has nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be
adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various
mediums for the various senses, according to the convenience of the
acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible
qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect.
The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must
therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and
"per se." Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by
the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation
is what is "per se" perceived by the sense, and according to the
diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified.
Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual.
Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being
received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as
heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation
takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a
spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of
color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored.
Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is
required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the
sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for
the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo
alteration.
But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in "sight"
while in others we find not only spiritual but also a natural
immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the
part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural
immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of "hearing"; for
sound is caused by percussion and commotion of air: and we find natural
immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of "smelling";
for in order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by
heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation takes place in
"touch" and "taste"; for the hand that touches something hot becomes
hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavored
morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in
their respective operations by any natural immutation unless
indirectly.
Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ
or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most
universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the
smell, which require a natural immutation on the part of the object;
while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the
motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). Touch
and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction of which we
shall speak later on (ad 3,4). Hence it is that the three other senses
are not exercised through a medium united to them, to obviate any
natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two
senses.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every accident has in itself a power of
immutation but only qualities of the third species, which are the
principles of alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the
objects of the senses; because "the senses are affected by the same
things whereby inanimate bodies are affected," as stated in Phys. vii,
2.
Reply to Objection 2: Size, shape, and the like, which are called
"common sensibles," are midway between "accidental sensibles" and
"proper sensibles," which are the objects of the senses. For the proper
sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since
they are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are
all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear that they
are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity. Shape is a
quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists of fixing
the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as the
subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject
or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth or of
locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in some sensible
qualities, as in the movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement
and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the
proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is
of color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first
and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the
surface by reason of color. Yet they are not accidental sensibles, for
they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. For
sense is immuted differently by a large and by a small surface: since
whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore it is
divided according to its proper subject.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii,
11), the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several
specific senses, and for this reason it extends to various
contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one another
in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their
distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and
the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the whole body;
so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all
those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate genus, and all in a
common genus, which is the common and formal object of touch. Such
common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate genus of hot
and cold is unnamed.
Reply to Objection 4: The sense of taste, according to a saying of the
Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue
only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the
species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense
only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must say
that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different
formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only a
spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is
its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by
a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper
object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter: but by
reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the
flavor, which quality is moisture, the object of touch.
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Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?
Objection 1: It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably
distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper.
Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior
sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses.
Objection 2: Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of
apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the
proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things;
for each sense judges of its proper object. In like manner they seem to
suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the action
of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it seems
that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as being
nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other senses.
Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior power, called
the common sense.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin.
i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the "first
sensitive." But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore
memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from
the senses.
Objection 4: Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any
power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what
it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that "those
who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge." Therefore much less
should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the
"estimative" power, for the perception of intentions which the sense
does not perceive.
Objection 5: Further, the action of the cogitative power, which
consists in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the
reminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the
sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the estimative
and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the
action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add the cognitive
and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers, or the
estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the
imagination.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7,24) describes
three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the
sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy;
and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there
is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the
imagination.
On the contrary, Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior
sensitive powers; namely, "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the
estimative and memorative powers."
I answer that, As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must
needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the
life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to
the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since
a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the
soul's operation.
Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal
should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but
also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action
follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something
absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect
animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards
something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the
sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things,
when it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and
preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things,
reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive, but
retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things.
Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ,
it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things
must be distinct from the power which preserves them.
Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and
disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need
to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those
forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes
pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to
seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or
otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and
uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a
wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy: and
again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to
the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Animals,
therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense
does not perceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this;
since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by
the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those
intentions.
Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the "proper
sense" and the "common sense" are appointed, and of their distinction
we shall speak farther on (ad 1,2). But for the retention and
preservation of these forms, the "phantasy" or "imagination" is
appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it
were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore,
for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the
senses, the "estimative" power is appointed: and for the preservation
thereof, the "memorative" power, which is a storehouse of such-like
intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of
memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that
something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past,
which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions.
Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference
between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the
extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above
intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some
natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of
ideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the
natural estimative, in man is called the "cogitative," which by some
sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also
called the "particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain
particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares
individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares
universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only
memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past;
but also "reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a
recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions.
Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative,
a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from
the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we
compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen.
But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in
whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes
attribute this action in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So
there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the
sensitive part---namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the
estimative and memorative powers.
Reply to Objection 1: The interior sense is called "common" not by
predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and
principle of the exterior senses.
Reply to Objection 2: The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by
discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for
instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight
nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between
two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be
assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all
apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again, all
the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that
he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows
the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation
the action of sight is completed, and from immutation follows another
in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.
Reply to Objection 3: As one power arises from the soul by means of
another, as we have seen above ([634]Q[77], A[7]), so also the soul is
the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination
and the memory are called passions of the "first sensitive."
Reply to Objection 4: Although the operation of the intellect has its
origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses,
the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In
like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.
Reply to Objection 5: The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe
their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but
to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so
to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct powers,
but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.
Reply to Objection 6: Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is
effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is
clear that it is common to all interior apprehensions.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head
there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?
(2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?
(3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?
(4) Whether it is something in the soul?
(5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?
(6) Whether memory is in the intellect?
(7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?
(8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?
(9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?
(10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?
(11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct
powers?
(12) Whether "synderesis" is a power of the intellectual part?
(13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the
soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the
same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the
essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and spirit are not
relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect
is the essence of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not
united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the
appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's
powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united in
the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and
will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of the
very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.
Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the
Ascension (xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels
are called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect
of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.
Objection 4: Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it
is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence.
Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its
essence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a
power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).
I answer that, In accordance with what has been already shown
([635]Q[54], A[3]; [636]Q[77], A[1]) it is necessary to say that the
intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul.
For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate
principle of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as
power is to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in
God alone His action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in
God alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual
creatures, the intellect is power.
Reply to Objection 1: Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and
sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name
from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the
intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief
power; and thus we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a
substance." And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is
spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16).
Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive and intellectual powers are
different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different
formalities of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly
with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode
of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for
appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will
in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9).
Reply to Objection 3: In the angels there is no other power besides the
intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this
reason an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole
power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, such as the
sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: The immateriality of the created intelligent
substance is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has
the power of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect
is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the intellect is a passive power?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power.
For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the
intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent
substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive
power.
Objection 2: Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we
have said above ([637]Q[79], A[6]). But "if the intellect is passive,
it is corruptible" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power
is not passive.
Objection 3: Further, the "agent is nobler than the patient," as
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says.
But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the
lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the
intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to
understand is in a way to be passive."
I answer that, To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly, in
its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which
belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper
inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man
becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be
passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away
from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive,
but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is
joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide
sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in
potentiality to something receives that to which it was in
potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly,
whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive,
even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be
passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as
we have seen above ([638]Q[78], A[1]), has an operation extending to
universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act
or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of
the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose
relation to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such
is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which
originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause.
And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure
act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole
universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being.
Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things
intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is compared to these
intelligible things as a potentiality to act.
Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality
which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of the heavenly
bodies ([639]Q[58], A[1]). And there is another potentiality which is
not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe
in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic
intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can
understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is
pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the
lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection
of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things
intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is
written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear
from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand,
and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident
that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion
in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection is verified of passion in the
first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the
third sense passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality
to act.
Reply to Objection 2: "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to
the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which
appetite is also called "rational by participation," because it "obeys
the reason" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive intellect
to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular reason." And
in each case "passive" may be taken in the two first senses; forasmuch
as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the
intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which
for this reason Aristotle calls the "possible" intellect (De Anima iii,
4) is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a
corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible.
Reply to Objection 3: The agent is nobler than the patient, if the
action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always,
if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power
in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is
active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united
to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being
nobler than such an active one.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is an active intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as
the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things
intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible,
the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since
our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that
we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is
passive.
Objection 2: Further, if we say that also in the senses there is
something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for
sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for
color of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation
of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought
into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.
Objection 3: Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the
patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive
intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature
suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form is
intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore
there is no need for an active intellect to make the species actually
intelligible.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in every
nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all
things, and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we must
admit an active intellect.
I answer that, According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for
an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; but
perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as
will be explained farther on [640](A[4]). For Plato supposed that the
forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently
that they are intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible from
the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms "species
or ideas"; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal
matter was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally
established in their proper genera and species: and that our intellect
was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the
genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not allow that
forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing
in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of
forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually
intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by
something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually
sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some
power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the
species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an
active intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Sensible things are found in act outside the
soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is
clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in
the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there
is something active and something passive.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions as to the effect of light.
For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors
actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is
required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as
light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is
required for sight; not for the colors to become actually visible; but
in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the
Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle's
comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that
as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing;
but not for the same reason.
Reply to Objection 3: If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that
its likeness is received variously into various things, on account of
their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the
disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now the
intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider
the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter.
And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the
passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active
intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way of
abstraction.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active intellect is not something
in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light
for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher
than the soul: according to Jn. 1:9, "He was the true light that
enlighteneth every man coming into this world." Therefore the active
intellect is not something in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the
active intellect, "that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes
not understand." But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it
understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active
intellect is not something in our soul.
Objection 3: Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If,
therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is
something belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which
is an active power: it follows that a man would always be able to
understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the active
intellect is not something in our soul.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the
active intellect is a "substance in actual being." But nothing can be
in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If,
therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all
things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for
the active intellect to be also something in our soul.
Objection 5: Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul,
it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since
habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the
passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the
passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But
every power flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore
follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul.
And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some
higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore the active intellect is
not something in our soul.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it is
necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active
intellect, "to be in the soul."
I answer that, The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks,
is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must
observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a
superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of
understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile,
and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something
essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called
intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign
of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part.
Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a
certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect
understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and
because, in those things which it does understand, it passes from
potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher
intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.
Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the
active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were, makes
them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of
such a separate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign
to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect,
by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just
as in other perfect natural things, besides the universal active
causes, each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those
universal causes: for the sun alone does not generate man; but in man
is the power of begetting man: and in like manner with other perfect
animals. Now among these lower things nothing is more perfect than the
human soul. Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power
derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the
phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we
abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to
make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs to anything
except through some principle formally inherent therein; as we have
said above of the passive intellect ([641]Q[76], A[1]). Therefore the
power which is the principle of this action must be something in the
soul. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) compared the active
intellect to light, which is something received into the air: while
Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun,
as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima iii. But the separate
intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who
is the soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on
([642]Q[90], A[3]; FS, [643]Q[3], A[7]). Wherefore the human soul
derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Ps. 4:7, "The
light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."
Reply to Objection 1: That true light enlightens as a universal cause,
from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have
explained.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher says those words not of the
active intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already
said: "Knowledge in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer
those words to the active intellect, then they are said because it is
not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes
we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality.
Reply to Objection 3: If the relation of the active intellect to the
passive were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of
the visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could
understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is that
which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an
object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act:
for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the
presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers,
and practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing
understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made
propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this point
of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something
belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul.
Reply to Objection 4: The intellectual soul is indeed actually
immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the
contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are
immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same
soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which
it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions
of individual matter: which power is called the "active intellect"; and
another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive
intellect" by reason of its being in potentiality to such species.
Reply to Objection 5: Since the essence of the soul is immaterial,
created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it
derives from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from
matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its
other powers.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the active intellect is one in all?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is one active intellect in all.
For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the
number of bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in
the many human bodies, but is one for all men.
Objection 2: Further, the active intellect is the cause of the
universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity
is still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in
all.
Objection 3: Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts.
But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all agree
in one active intellect.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active
intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various
things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in
various men.
I answer that, The truth about this question depends on what we have
already said [644](A[4]). For if the active intellect were not
something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance,
there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they
mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the
active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its
powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as
there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men,
as we have said above ([645]Q[76], A[2]). For it is impossible that one
same power belong to various substances.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher proves that the active intellect
is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate:
because, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than
the patient." Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, because
it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the
active intellect is also called "separate"; but not as a separate
substance.
Reply to Objection 2: The active intellect is the cause of the
universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need
not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one
in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the
universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this
befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.
Reply to Objection 3: All things which are of one species enjoy in
common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and
consequently the power which is the principle of such action; but not
so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first
intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species.
Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of
this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no
need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from
one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the
first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which
Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect,
which Aristotle compares to light.
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Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part
of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the
higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not "common to
man and beast." But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (De
Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that "beasts can sense corporeal things through the
senses of the body, and commit them to memory." Therefore memory does
not belong to the intellectual part of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of
something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a thing
under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the
conditions of "here" and "now." But this is not the province of the
intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the
intellectual part, but only in the sensitive.
Objection 3: Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those
things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen in
the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that
the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act
implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually
understands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the
memory is not in the intellectual part.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory,
understanding, and will are one mind."
I answer that, Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the
species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must
first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be
preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was
impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive
part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs,
in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual
apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ,
nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of which
the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus,
therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to understand
something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our
intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we must turn
to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in
order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into our
passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the
active intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude
in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect; which
aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to this
supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is not
actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory
in the intellectual part.
But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For
he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect "is
identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act," and
that "this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then, it is
in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and
discovering." Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing,
inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the
fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it
owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be
always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain
sense, though otherwise than before the act of understanding---namely,
in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to
actual consideration.
The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received
into something is received according to the conditions of the
recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more
immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds
the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something
through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, much more
cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species
unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things
sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, therefore,
if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say
that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we
include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the
intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends
individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a
condition of fixed time, is something individual.
Reply to Objection 1: Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is
not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the
sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul
united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the
intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of
any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4)
that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the
intellect."
Reply to Objection 2: The condition of past may be referred to two
things---namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of
knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which
apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present
sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed
before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing. But as
concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in
itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect
understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he
exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the
condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the
intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of
understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time,
inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow.
And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an
act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial
act, as we have said above of the intellect ([646]Q[76], A[1]); and
therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an
individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding,
which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this
way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events,
is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it
previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands the
past as something "here" and "now."
Reply to Objection 3: The intelligible species is sometimes in the
intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in
potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as
regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in
act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state,
between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In
this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not
understand in act.
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Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct
from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul
memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a
distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the
intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the
sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in
the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said ([647]Q[78],
A[4]). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the
intellect.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7),
memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows
from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the
same power. Therefore they are not the same power.
On the contrary, From its nature the memory is the treasury or
storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes
this to the intellect, as we have said (A[6], ad 1). Therefore the
memory is not another power from the intellect.
I answer that, As has been said above ([648]Q[77], A[3]), the powers of
the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their
objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to
which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said
above ([649]Q[59], A[4]) that if any power by its nature be directed to
an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will
not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that
object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the
common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of black
and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the common ratio
of being: since the passive intellect is that "in which all are in
potentiality." Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by
any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between
the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect: because
as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to
be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by
the object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared to its
object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the
passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as being in
potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other
difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active.
Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the
intellect: for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as
well as to receive.
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory,
intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with
the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we
take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul,
whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the
memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand
when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which
unites the child and its parent." Wherefore it is clear that Augustine
does not take the above three for three powers; but by memory he
understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of
the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Past and present may differentiate the sensitive
powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above.
Reply to Objection 3: Intelligence arises from memory, as act from
habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a
power.
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Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the
intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish
to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid,
then imagination, then reason, then the intellect." Therefore the
reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect
is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to
the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason
and intellect are not the same power.
Objection 3: Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and
sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man,
whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense.
Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the
intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called
intellectual.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that in
which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence
or whatever appropriate name we like to give it." Therefore, reason,
intellect and mind are one power.
I answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers.
We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective
actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth:
and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as
to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to
their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no
need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth
simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by
advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called
rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as
movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs
to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always
proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence
it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances
from certain things simply understood---namely, the first principles;
and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles,
in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear
that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but
to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a
thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the
same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man
reason and intellect are the same power.
Reply to Objection 1: That enumeration is made according to the order
of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that
book is not of great authority.
Reply to Objection 2: The answer is clear from what we have said. For
eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius
compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.
Reply to Objection 3: Other animals are so much lower than man that
they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But
man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible
truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of
knowledge is not of a different genus fro that which is in the human
reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.
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Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are
distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image
of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the
lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher
and lower reason are two powers.
Objection 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason
flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the
higher reason is another power from the lower.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the
scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things,
is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative" and
"reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And he proves
this from the principle that for those things which are "generically
different, generically different parts of the soul are ordained." Now
contingent and necessary are generically different, as corruptible and
incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and
temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher
calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the higher reason,
which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the
consideration and consultation of things eternal"; and that what the
Philosopher calls the "reasoning" or "opinionative" part is the same as
the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, "is intent on the
disposal of temporal things." Therefore the higher reason is another
power than the lower.
Objection 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "opinion
rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or
error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence" men's (mind) "is
derived from" metiendo [measuring]. "And therefore the intellect
regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true
decision." Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower reason,
is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may understand
the higher reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher and
lower reason are only distinct by their functions." Therefore they are
not two powers.
I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by
Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that
"the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and
consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation it sees
them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action
from them. But he calls the lower reason that which "is intent on the
disposal of temporal things." Now these two---namely, eternal and
temporal ---are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them
is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we come
through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal,
according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20), "The invisible
things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made": while by way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we
judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we
dispose of temporal things.
But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong
to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to
the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from
them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the
principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science---for
example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such that both
medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were,
a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes
through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower
reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are
distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their
various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science
to the lower.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is
divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts,
the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are
different powers.
Reply to Objection 2: The lower reason is said to flow from the higher,
or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower
reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher
speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are
found even among temporal things, of which natural science and
mathematics treat. And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part is
more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things
contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a
power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from
a power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both
under the same objective aspect---namely, under the aspect of being and
truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect
being in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which
it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows
contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but
imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do
not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting,
and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits
themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts
of the soul---namely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," not
because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to
a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the
variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though
differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the
common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which
they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect.
Reply to Objection 4: That distinction given by Damascene is according
to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For
"opinion" signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of
a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" or
"measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain
principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word "mens"
[mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed judgment
with approval.
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Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than
the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to
rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid,
then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards
intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore
also intellect and intelligence are distinct.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense
considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another,
intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason.
Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect,
as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.
Objection 3: Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher
says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from others
attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that
"the first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence which
is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and
conforms the soul to that which is understood is called invention, and
invention when it remains in the same man, examining and judging of
itself, is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if dilated
makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from which, they say,
comes speech expressed by the tongue." Therefore it seems that
intelligence is some special power.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that
"intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing
false." But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect.
Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect.
I answer that, This word "intelligence" properly signifies the
intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works
translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call
angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that
such substances are always actually understanding. But in works
translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or "minds."
Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from
power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even
by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four
intellects---namely, the "active" and "passive" intellects, the
intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the
active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all
things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of
these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is
sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive;
sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is
called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act, which
is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual
intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: If this authority is accepted, intelligence there
means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against
intellect as act against power.
Reply to Objection 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act
of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he
also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence
alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things
without any investigation.
Reply to Objection 3: All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong
to one power---namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of
all only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence."
Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something
else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when it
goes on in search of what it "intends," it is called "invention." When,
by reference to something known for certain, it examines what it has
found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to "phronesis"
or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to the wise man to judge," as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained
something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the
means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of
"interior speech," from which proceeds "external speech." For every
difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot
be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above
([650]Q[78], A[4]).
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Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that the speculative and practical
intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are
different kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the
speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the
practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct
powers.
Objection 2: Further, the different nature of the object differentiates
the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," and
of the practical is "good"; which differ in nature. Therefore the
speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers.
Objection 3: Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect
is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative
power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the
imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above ([651]Q[78],
A[4]). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the
practical.
On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension becomes
practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into
another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not
distinct powers.
I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects are not
distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above
([652]Q[77], A[3]), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a
power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a
thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things
are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended
by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation
or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects
differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it
apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while
the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to
operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10);
that "the speculative differs from the practical in its end." Whence
each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other
practical---i.e. operative.
Reply to Objection 1: The practical intellect is a motive power, not as
executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it
according to its mode of apprehension.
Reply to Objection 2: Truth and good include one another; for truth is
something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is
something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as
the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect
of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the
object of the practical intellect is good directed to the operation,
and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth,
just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation.
Reply to Objection 3: Many differences differentiate the sensitive
powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have
said above (A[7] , ad 2; [653]Q[77], A[3], ad 4).
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Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?
Objection 1: It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power,
distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one
division, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on
Ezech. 1:6, "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the
concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore
"synderesis" is a power.
Objection 2: Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But
"synderesis" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because
"synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to
evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine
(De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that 'synderesis' is a
power just as sensuality is.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the
natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of virtue,
both true and unchangeable." And this is what we call synderesis.
Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our judgment
belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 2), it seems that "synderesis" is the same as reason: and thus it
is a power.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2),
"rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not
regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis" is
not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since
it is not found in brute animals.
I answer that, "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though some
held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [*Cf.
Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, Q[73]] said that it is reason
itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we
must observe that, as we have said above [654](A[8]), man's act of
reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the
understanding of certain things---namely, those which are naturally
known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an
immovable principle---and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as
by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things
which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the
speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical
reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed
on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical
principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by
nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which
is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher
explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles,
bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a
special natural habit, which we call "synderesis." Whence "synderesis"
is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through
first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have
discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power, but
a natural habit.
Reply to Objection 1: The division given by Jerome is taken from the
variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts
can belong to one power.
Reply to Objection 2: In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to
"synderesis" is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species
of one genus.
Reply to Objection 3: Those unchangeable notions are the first
practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are
attributed to reason as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit.
Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis."
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Whether conscience be a power?
Objection 1: It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says
[*Commentary on Rom. 2:15] that "conscience is a correcting and guiding
spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and
made to cling to good." But in the soul, spirit designates a
power---either the mind itself, according to the text (Eph. 4:13), "Be
ye renewed in the spirit of your mind"---or the imagination, whence
imaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of
the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some
that "their mind and conscience are defiled" (Titus 1:15). Therefore it
seems that conscience is a power.
Objection 3: Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a
habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always
exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but
many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge.
Therefore conscience is a power.
On the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be
laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.
I answer that, Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an
act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things
which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For
conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the
relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into
"cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to an individual case. But
the application of knowledge to something is done by some act.
Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience
is an act.
The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to
conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and
also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the
application of knowledge or science to what we do: which application is
made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done
or not done something; "Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often
spoken evil of others" (Eccles. 7:23), and according to this,
conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the
conscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in
this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way,
so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or
ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or
torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual
application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking,
conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act,
sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural
habit---namely, 'synderesis': thus Jerome calls 'synderesis' conscience
(Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil [*Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the "natural
power of judgment," and Damascene [*De Fide Orth. iv. 22] says that it
is the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for causes and
effects to be called after one another.
Reply to Objection 1: Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit
is the same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of
the mind.
Reply to Objection 2: The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a
subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone
knows he is defiled.
Reply to Objection 3: Although an act does not always remain in itself,
yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all
the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless
have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first
principles, which is called "synderesis." And for this special reason,
this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said above.
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OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)
Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four
heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general;
second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the
first there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the
soul?
(2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and
sensitive as distinct powers?
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Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of
the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things
which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is
common to animate and inanimate things: since "all desire good," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special
power of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But
what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive
power is not distinct from the apprehensive power.
Objection 3: Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But
each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing---namely
its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is
the desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power
distinct from the others, called the appetitive power.
On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the
appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22)
distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers.
I answer that, It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the
soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination
follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to
rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more
perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in
those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form
is found to determine each thing only to its own being---that is, to
its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural
inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in those things
which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being
by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive
of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species
of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible,
so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and
intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way,
approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a
higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be
in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is
called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to
the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to
desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by
its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power
to the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: Appetite is found in things which have knowledge,
above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have
said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a
particular power.
Reply to Objection 2: What is apprehended and what is desired are the
same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as
something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable
or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not
material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.
Reply to Objection 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and
has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by
the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above
which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the
apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this
or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but
simply as suitable to the animal.
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Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual
appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by
accidental differences, as we have seen above ([655]Q[77], A[3]). But
it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by
the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual
appetites are not distinct powers.
Objection 2: Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so
it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things.
But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part: for
since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual things,
seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual thing.
Therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from the
sensitive.
Objection 3: Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive
is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the
motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from
the motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like
reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a
double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite
moves the lower.
I answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a
distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power is
a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended:
wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved,
while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in De
Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things passive and
movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the
corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be
proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive: indeed,
the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its
active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect
and what is apprehended by sense are generically different;
consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not accidental to the thing desired to be
apprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this
belongs to it by its nature; for the appetible does not move the
appetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the
thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And
so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of
the things apprehended, as their proper objects.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellectual appetite, though it tends to
individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as
standing under the universal; as when it desires something because it
is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred
can regard a universal, as when "we hate every kind of thief." In the
same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial
good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue, and
suchlike.
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OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)
Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?
(2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct
powers?
(3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?
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Whether sensuality is only appetitive?
Objection 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but
also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the sensual
movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common
to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive
powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.
Objection 2: Further, things which come under one division seem to be
of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality
against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge.
Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive.
Objection 3: Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the
place of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, the
serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin,
which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a
cognitive power.
On the contrary, Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things
belonging to the body."
I answer that, The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual
movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the
name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing.
Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive
apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly
called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the operation of
the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing
apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the
appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne
towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the
apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the operation of the
appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual
movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power: so that
sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: By saying that the sensual movement of the soul
is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to
understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but
rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the
bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the
bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a
preamble.
Reply to Objection 2: Sensuality is divided against higher and lower
reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the
apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a
motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.
Reply to Objection 3: The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but
also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is
signified by the serpent.
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Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and
concupiscible as distinct powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided
into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same
power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards
both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11).
But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible
power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with
what is harmful, it seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same
power in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is
suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the
concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing
from the concupiscible.
Objection 3: Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says
on Mat. 13:33: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible
power." But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible
part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive
appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible.
I answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is
called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species
of the sensitive appetite---the irascible and the concupiscible. In
order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible
things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of
what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to
resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a
hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of
harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, not only to rise
from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher
position which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or
hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an
inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an
inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the
sensitive part two appetitive powers---one through which the soul is
simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and
to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and
another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is
suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we
say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to
overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced
to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant
things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order
that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight
against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible
appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since
the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being
roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from
the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender
of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the
acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or
against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for
this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the
passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for
instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance,
terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are
about things concupiscible---namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher
says [*De Animal. Histor. viii.].
Reply to Objection 1: The concupiscible power regards both what is
suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power
is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.
Reply to Objection 2: As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive
part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which
do not impress the senses, as we have said above ([656]Q[78], A[2]); so
also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power
which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses,
but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is
the irascible power.
Reply to Objection 3: Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible
appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may
belong to the irascible appetite.
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Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible
appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts
of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is
signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12,13).
Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.
Objection 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it.
But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according
to the Apostle (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting
against the law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and concupiscible
appetites do not obey reason.
Objection 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the
rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the
sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear
nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the
powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey
reason.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the part
of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into
concupiscence and anger."
I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey
the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will;
first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in
their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is
naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep,
esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power,
as we have said above ([657]Q[78], A[4]), is replaced by the cogitative
power, which is called by some 'the particular reason,' because it
compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite
is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular
reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason:
wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from
universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason
directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and
irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular
conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect,
as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and
concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the
intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying
certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be
modified or excited.
To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which
is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement
follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for
instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no
superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at
once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he
awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For
wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second
only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite is not
sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And
this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher
appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the
lower." In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are
subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what
is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and
concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the
part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We
observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul
dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the
appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called despotic
whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any
way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing
of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man
rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the
ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which
they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is
said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the
body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's
command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by
voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is
said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power:
because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue
whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive
appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other
animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason
guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we
experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist
reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which
reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the
fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something,
we must not conclude that they do not obey.
Reply to Objection 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior
sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which
is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and
apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are
subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify
the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms
of the imagination.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)
We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?
(2) Whether it desires anything of necessity?
(3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?
(4) Whether the will moves the intellect?
(5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will desires something of necessity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing. For Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is not
voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore
nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a
rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is in
the reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and
therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions.
But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act
of the will cannot be necessitated.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire
happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but
contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the
will desires something of necessity.
I answer that, The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For that
which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it
by an intrinsic principle---either material, as when we say that
everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible---or
formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a
triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is "natural" and
"absolute necessity." In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to
it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the
agent. On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not to be
attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be
necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is
called "necessity of end," and sometimes also "utility." On the part of
the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so
that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called "necessity of
coercion."
Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For
we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing. But
the very movement of the will is an inclination to something.
Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the
inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is
according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is
impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so
it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and
voluntary.
But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot
be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea,
arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship.
In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will.
Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to
the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last
end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the
principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally
and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining
thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and
every movement arises from something immovable.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of
the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take away
the liberty of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10).
Reply to Objection 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally,
corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than
to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this
respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.
Reply to Objection 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of
our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end,
but "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9).
Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions
of which we are masters.
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Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of
necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
"evil is outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will tends of
necessity to the good which is proposed to it.
Objection 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as
the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable
necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's
object moves it of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object
of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is
the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But
what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of
necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are
moved by things seen." Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended
by the intellect moves the will of necessity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the will by
which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to opposite
things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever
it desires.
I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it
desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the
intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles,
so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already
[658](A[1]). Now there are some things intelligible which have not a
necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent
propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the
first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of
necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary
connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions,
a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to
these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the
necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it
does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it
recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the
will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary
connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and
to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some
things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of
which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists.
Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the
necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God
of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the
man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as
now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the
will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.
Reply to Objection 1: The will can tend to nothing except under the
aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the
will is not of necessity determined to one.
Reply to Objection 2: The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in
the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing
movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as
the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its
capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is
not of necessity moved by it.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive power does not compare different
things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some
one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the
sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that
compares several things together: therefore from several things the
intellectual appetite---that is, the will---may be moved; but not of
necessity from one thing.
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Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the
intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end
is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and
highest power.
Objection 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a
progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the
powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more
noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act
of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power
than the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as
perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the
will---namely, charity---is more noble than the habits which perfect
the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should know all
mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am
nothing." Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect.
On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher
power than the intellect.
I answer that, The superiority of one thing over another can be
considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is
considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself:
but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If
therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to
themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear
if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object
of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of
the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of
appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the
intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more
abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and
therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the
will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to
its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is
higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with
something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the
intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in
something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect.
Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler than
sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than
something in which there is color, though color is nobler and simpler
than sound. For as we have said above ([659]Q[16], A[1]; [660]Q[27],
A[4]), the action of the intellect consists in this---that the idea of
the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of
the will consists in this---that the will is inclined to the thing
itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher says in
Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that "good and evil," which are objects of the
will, "are in things," but "truth and error," which are objects of the
intellect, "are in the mind." When, therefore, the thing in which there
is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea
understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than
the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the
soul, then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher
than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge
of God; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is
better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is
nobler than the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing
one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is
found to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and
extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something
true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect
is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most
excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.
Reply to Objection 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is
less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes
act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely
and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes
potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the
motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the
passive; for good which is understood moves the will.
Reply to Objection 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared
with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love
God.
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Whether the will moves the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect.
For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is
an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). But the
intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above
[661](A[3]). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except
perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the
good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas
the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved
by the will.
Objection 3: Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If,
therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to
understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the
intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will,
and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does
not move the intellect.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in our
power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our power
by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will
moves the intellect.
I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end;
for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the
intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of
the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as
an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves
what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the
powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The
reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active
powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers
which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature
and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal
preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all
inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own
species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common
good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of
cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object
of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed
to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the
perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth.
Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their
respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part,
which are not subject to our will.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellect may be considered in two ways: as
apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a
particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will
may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its
object---that is to say, as appetitive of universal good---and as a
determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore,
the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to
the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said
above [662](A[3]), the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the
will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature
of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the
intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion
of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and
its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act,
and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as
stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and
truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its
object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special
power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is
truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the
common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the
intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why
these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect
understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to
understand. In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it
is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired
good.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and
the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we
must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every
movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every
apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle
of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher
than our intellect ---namely, God---as also Aristotle says (Eth.
Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to
proceed indefinitely.
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Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the
superior appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and
concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For
the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" [to desire],
and the irascible part from "irasci" [to be angry]. But there is a
concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only
to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of wisdom,
of which it is said (Wis. 6:21): "The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth
to the eternal kingdom." There is also a certain anger which cannot
belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when
our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on Mat.
13:33 warns us "to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part."
Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of
the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive.
Objection 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the
concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in
the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but
intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible
power to the intellectual part.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul
has these powers"---namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and
rational---"before it is united to the body." But no power of the
sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body
united, as we have said above (Q[78], AA[5],8). Therefore the irascible
and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual
appetite.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says "that
the irrational" part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and
irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is in reason, while
in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or
"desire and animus."
I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said
above ([663]Q[59], A[4]; [664]Q[79], A[7]), a power which is directed
to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by
special differences which are contained under that common notion. For
instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common
notion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied
according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power
regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be
distinct from a power regarding black as black.
Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good,
because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore
the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different
notions of particular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to
it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable
to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as
something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will
regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in
the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no
differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the
intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible
power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the
apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the
senses.
Reply to Objection 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be
understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions---arising,
that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are
commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive
appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they
are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and
thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are
attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they
do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is
called the will.
Reply to Objection 2: The will itself may be said to irascible, as far
as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion,
but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be
said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus in
the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope---that is, in the
will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may understand
the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible and
concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body
(as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time),
although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence
the answer to the third objection is clear.
__________________________________________________________________
OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man has free-will?
(2) What is free-will---a power, an act, or a habit?
(3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?
(4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man has free-will?
Objection 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has
free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is
written (Rom. 7:19): "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil
which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not free-will.
Objection 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or
not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for it
is written (Rom. 9:16): "It is not of him that willeth"---namely, to
will---"nor of him that runneth"---namely, to run. Therefore man has
not free-will.
Objection 3: Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is
not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. 21:1): "The
heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He
shall turn it" and (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in you both to
will and to accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will.
Objection 4: Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own
actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written
(Jer. 10:23): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to
walk." Therefore man has not free-will.
Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According
as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in our
power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from
nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end,
and therefore we are not free in so doing.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from the
beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the gloss
adds: "That is of his free-will."
I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations,
commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In
order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act
without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all
things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free
judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a
thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it
judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing
is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from
judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something
should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of
some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act
of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and
retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in
contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic
syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are
contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may
follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch
as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([665]Q[81], A[3], ad 2),
the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case
can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the
good which man does not when he wishes---namely, "not to desire against
reason," as Augustine says.
Reply to Objection 2: Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as
though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because
the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped
by God.
Reply to Objection 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement,
because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of
necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause
of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be
the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes
both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He
does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary
causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather
is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each
thing according to its own nature.
Reply to Objection 4: "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the
execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or
not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of
God.
Reply to Objection 5: Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and
adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part,
or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man
is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual
part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which
desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will,
as is clear from what we have said above ([666]Q[82], AA[1],2). But on
the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a
natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition
due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which
cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a
corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality,
such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a
man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations
are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys,
as we have said ([667]Q[81], A[3]). Wherefore this is in no way
prejudicial to free-will.
The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which
a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even
these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such
qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to
acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them,
or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to
free-will.
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Whether free-will is a power?
Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will
is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a
power. Therefore free-will is not a power.
Objection 2: Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will
and reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due
to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De
Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the soul's habit of
disposing of itself." Therefore it is not a power.
Objection 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But
free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, by
abusing free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is
not a power.
On the contrary, Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a
habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it
chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.
I answer that, Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium---i.e. free
judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of
speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by
which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both
power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge
and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a
power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit
nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways.
First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit;
for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural
habit in us with respect to those things which come under free-will:
for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural
habits---for instance, to assent to first principles: while those
things which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as
we have said of the desire of happiness ([668]Q[82], AA[1],2).
Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be
a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against
its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.
Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason
of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and
passions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as
regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by
knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know
the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will is
indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for
free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not unusual for a power to be named from
its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the
power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will
denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.
Reply to Objection 2: Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for
operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of
free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but
as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of
relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit: for
by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the
habit he is apt to act well or ill.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is said to have lost free-will by falling
into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion,
but as regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall
treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work
(FS, Q[85], seqq.; [669]Q[109]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether free-will is an appetitive power?
Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a
cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that
"free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature." But reason is
a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
Objection 2: Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free
judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore
free-will is a cognitive power.
Objection 3: Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose.
But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain
comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive
power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is
"the desire of those things which are in us." But desire is an act of
the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that
by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.
I answer that, The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that
we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing
another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature
of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things
concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on
the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power,
counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to
another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that
the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle
(Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to
the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is
either "an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite." But
(Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when
he describes choice as "a desire proceeding from counsel." And the
reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to
the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is
called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the
appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the
appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 1: The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive,
and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies
the rational power.
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates
counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason;
secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, we
desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice
itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name.
Reply to Objection 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice
belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though
the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by
the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of
comparison by choosing one in preference to another.
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Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the
will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that {thelesis} is one
thing and {boulesis} another. But {thelesis} is the will, while
{boulesis} seems to be the free-will, because {boulesis}, according to
him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two
things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the
will.
Objection 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which
is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because
"the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means
to the end" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power
from the will.
Objection 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the
intellect there are two powers---the active and the passive. Therefore,
also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another
power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will.
Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is
nothing else than the will.
I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the
apprehensive powers, as we have said above ([670]Q[64], A[2]). Now, as
on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and
reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and
free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is
clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For
the act of "understanding" implies the simple acceptation of something;
whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of
themselves without any comparison. But to "reason," properly speaking,
is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore,
properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from
the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to "will"
implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said
to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to "choose" is to
desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore,
properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of
knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we
assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters,
the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the
end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is
the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been
shown above ([671]Q[79], A[8]) that it belongs to the same power both
to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be
at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same
power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the
free-will are not two powers, but one.
Reply to Objection 1: {Boulesis} is distinct from {thelesis} on account
of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.
Reply to Objection 2: Choice and will---that is, the act of willing
---are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to
understand and to reason, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving
the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an
active and a passive will.
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HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT
(EIGHT ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the
intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers of the
soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian.
Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under the
consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of
them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration of
moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we
shall treat now.
In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order:
First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the
body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom.
The former of these inquiries will be threefold: (1) How the soul
understands bodies which are beneath it; (2) How it understands itself
and things contained in itself; (3) How it understands immaterial
substances, which are above it.
In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points
to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul know them? (2) How and
in what order does it know them? (3) What does it know in them?
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?
(2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any
species?
(3) If through some species, whether the species of all things
intelligible are naturally innate in the soul?
(4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain separate
immaterial forms?
(5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands?
(6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses?
(7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is
possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms?
(8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in
the sensitive powers?
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Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through
the intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that "bodies cannot
be understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it
can be perceived by the senses." He says also (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24)
that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by
their essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore the soul cannot know
bodies through the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the
intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the
senses, understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore
by no means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, which are
sensible.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are
necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable.
Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.
On the contrary, Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the
intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of
bodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile
bodies.
I answer that, It should be said in order to elucidate this question,
that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures of things,
thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And because they
observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them to be ever in
a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no certain
knowledge of the true nature of things. For what is in a continual
state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude, for it
passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon: according to the
saying of Heraclitus, that "it is not possible twice to touch a drop of
water in a passing torrent," as the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv,
Did. iii, 5).
After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our
knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, besides
these things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate from
matter and movement, which beings he called "species" or "ideas," by
participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things
is said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like. Wherefore he said
that sciences and definitions, and whatever appertains to the act of
the intellect, are not referred to these sensible bodies, but to those
beings immaterial and separate: so that according to this the soul does
not understand these corporeal things, but the separate species
thereof.
Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because,
since those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge of movement
and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to
natural science), and likewise all demonstration through moving and
material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous, when we seek
for knowledge of things which are to us manifest, to introduce other
beings, which cannot be the substance of those others, since they
differ from them essentially: so that granted that we have a knowledge
of those separate substances, we cannot for that reason claim to form a
judgment concerning these sensible things.
Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed
that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he
thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the
knower in the same manner as in the thing known. Then he observed that
the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions
of universality, immateriality, and immobility: which is apparent from
the very operation of the intellect, whose act of understanding has a
universal extension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity:
for the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the agent's form.
Wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must have in
themselves an existence under the same conditions of immateriality and
immobility.
But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is
to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in
another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and
of a less intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with
sweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible
form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the
soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things
without receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving
gold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under
conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and
mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver according to the
mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore, that through the
intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial,
universal, and necessary.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Augustine are to be understood as
referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its
object. For the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not
indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species; but
through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul
by their own essence.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29), it is
not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect
knows only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels
would not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that
the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the
higher power; whereas the higher power operates in a more excellent
manner those things which belong to the lower power.
Reply to Objection 3: Every movement presupposes something immovable:
for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and
when there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved.
Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves
immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it
is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one
place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an
immovable science of movable things.
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Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things
through its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the soul
"collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the
soul and of the soul: for in forming them it gives them something of
its own substance." But the soul understands bodies by images of
bodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through its essence, which it
employs for the formation of such images, and from which it forms them.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that "the
soul, after a fashion, is everything." Since, therefore, like is known
by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself.
Objection 3: Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now
lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in
themselves, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all
corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in
themselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through its
essence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that "the mind gathers
knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses." But the soul
itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not
know corporeal things through itself.
I answer that, The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows bodies
through its essence. For it was universally admitted that "like is
known by like." But they thought that the form of the thing known is in
the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. The Platonists
however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having observed that the
intellectual soul has an immaterial nature, and an immaterial mode of
knowledge, held that the forms of things known subsist immaterially.
While the earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known are
corporeal and material, held that things known must exist materially
even in the soul that knows them. And therefore, in order to ascribe to
the soul a knowledge of all things, they held that it has the same
nature in common with all. And because the nature of a result is
determined by its principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of a
principle; so that those who thought fire to be the principle of all,
held that the soul had the nature of fire; and in like manner as to air
and water. Lastly, Empedocles, who held the existence of our four
material elements and two principles of movement, said that the soul
was composed of these. Consequently, since they held that things exist
in the soul materially, they maintained that all the soul's knowledge
is material, thus failing to discern intellect from sense.
But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material
principle of which they spoke, the various results do not exist save in
potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in
potentiality, but only according as it is in act, as is shown Metaph.
ix (Did. viii, 9): wherefore neither is a power known except through
its act. It is therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature
of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all,
unless we further admit in the soul natures and forms of each
individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and the like; thus
does Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De Anima i, 5). Secondly,
because if it were necessary for the thing known to exist materially in
the knower, there would be no reason why things which have a material
existence outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge; why, for
instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which is
outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire.
We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs
exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of
this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the
knower: for we know things even that are external to us. Now by matter
the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is
clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality. And
consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially,
have no power of knowledge whatever---such as plants, as the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing
receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its
knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not only
from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has
more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the form of the
thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions.
Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most perfect knowledge,
because it is the least material, as we have remarked above
([672]Q[78], A[3]): while among intellects the more perfect is the more
immaterial.
It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an intellect
which knows all things by its essence, then its essence must needs have
all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held
that the essence of the soul, that it may know all things, must be
actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is
proper to God, that His Essence comprise all things immaterially as
effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, therefore,
understands all things through His Essence: but neither the human soul
nor the angels can do so.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine in that passage is speaking of an
imaginary vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the
formation of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just as
a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this way
the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some part
of the soul be turned into this or that image; but just as we say that
a body is made into something colored because of its being informed
with color. That this is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he
says that the soul "keeps something"---namely, not informed with such
image---"which is able freely to judge of the species of these images":
and that this is the "mind" or "intellect." And he says that the part
which is informed with these images---namely, the imagination---is
"common to us and beasts."
Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually
composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that
the soul is all things, "after a fashion," forasmuch as it is in
potentiality to all---through the senses, to all things
sensible---through the intellect, to all things intelligible.
Reply to Objection 3: Every creature has a finite and determinate
essence. Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a
certain likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have
something in common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness
thereof, because it is determined to a certain species other than the
species of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect
likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created,
being the universal principle of all.
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Whether the soul understands all things through innate species?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul understands all things through
innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix
in Ev.), that "man has understanding in common with the angels." But
angels understand all things through innate species: wherefore in the
book De Causis it is said that "every intelligence is full of forms."
Therefore the soul also has innate species of things, by means of which
it understands corporeal things.
Objection 2: Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than
corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under
the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the
intellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. And so the
soul understands corporeal things through innate species.
Objection 3: Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning
what he knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired
knowledge, answers the truth to every question if put to him in orderly
fashion, as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato, concerning
a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of things even
before we acquire knowledge; which would not be the case unless we had
innate species. Therefore the soul understands corporeal things through
innate species.
On the contrary, The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De
Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written."
I answer that, Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be
related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is to
that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then
that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only
potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs be
actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only a potential
knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from
such potentiality to act---through the action of sensible objects on
his senses, to the act of sensation---by instruction or discovery, to
the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul
is in potentiality both to the images which are the principles of
sensing, and to those which are the principles of understanding. For
this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 4) held that the intellect by
which the soul understands has no innate species, but is at first in
potentiality to all such species.
But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act
according to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing
may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold
that naturally man's intellect is filled with all intelligible species,
but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the
realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. First,
because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems
impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such
knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for no man
forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is
larger than the part, and such like. And especially unreasonable does
this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to
the body, as we have established above ([673]Q[76] , A[1]): for it is
unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered
by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the falseness of this
opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense be wanting, the
knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also:
for instance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colors.
This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all
intelligible things. We must therefore conclude that the soul does not
know corporeal things through innate species.
Reply to Objection 1: Man indeed has intelligence in common with the
angels, but not in the same degree of perfection: just as the lower
grades of bodies, which merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on
Ascension, xxix In Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection as the
higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally
completed by its form, but is in potentiality to forms which it has
not: whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by its
form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we have
said above ([674]Q[66], A[2]). In the same way the angelic intellect is
perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature;
whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species.
Reply to Objection 2: Primary matter has substantial being through its
form, consequently it had need to be created under some form: else it
would not be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in
potentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not
receive substantial being through the intelligible species; and
therefore there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: If questions be put in an orderly fashion they
proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular.
Now by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner.
Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is
not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for
the first time. For it matters not whether the teacher proceed from
universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by asserting; for
in either case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by
that which preceded.
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Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain
separate forms?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species are derived by
the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by
participation is caused by what is such essentially; for instance, that
which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the
intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding,
participates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in act
is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in its
essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual soul
actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually
understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the
intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused by some
separate forms.
Objection 2: Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the
sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the
senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object which
exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible species,
by which our intellect understands, are caused by some things actually
intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these can be nothing else
than forms separate from matter. Therefore the intelligible forms of
our intellect are derived from some separate substances.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by
something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in
potentiality, afterwards actually understands, this must needs be
caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a separate
intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we actually
understand, are caused by some separate substances.
On the contrary, If this were true we should not need the senses in
order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from the
fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge
of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.
I answer that, Some have held that the intelligible species of our
intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And
this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said [675](A[1]), held that the
forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for
instance, the form of a man which he called "per se" man, and the form
or idea of a horse which is called "per se" horse, and so forth. He
said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul and
by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge thereof,
and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence: so that, just as
corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an
individuating stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of a
stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea
takes place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as a
model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that the sensible
forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from the ideas as
certain images thereof: so he held that the intelligible species of our
intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And for this
reason, as we have said above [676](A[1]), he referred sciences and
definitions to those ideas.
But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their
forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves in many ways
(Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held
that the intelligible species of all sensible things, instead of
subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the
separate intellects: from the first of which, said he, such species are
derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect which he
called the "active intelligence," from which, according to him,
intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible species into
corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the
intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate
forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while Avicenna
placed them in the "active intelligence." They differ, too, in this
respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do not remain
in our intellect after it has ceased actually to understand, and that
it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in order to receive them
anew. Consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate knowledge,
as Plato, who held that the participated ideas remain immovably in the
soul.
But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul
being united to the body. For it cannot be said that the intellectual
soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is
form for the sake of matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the
moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary
to the intellectual soul, for the latter's proper operation which is to
understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the body.
But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for receiving
intelligible species through the influence of only certain separate
principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it would not
need the body in order to understand: wherefore to no purpose would it
be united to the body.
But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to
understand, through being in some way awakened by them to the
consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it
receives from the separate principles: even this seems an insufficient
explanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul,
except in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists
expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body:
and thus the senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except
for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters
through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union
of the soul with the body still remains to be sought.
And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the
soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the "active
intelligence" from which it receives the species: neither is this a
sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to
understand through species derived from the "active intelligence," it
follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of the
senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the inclination
of its very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to the
effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding
sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born blind could have
knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We must therefore
conclude that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands,
are not derived from separate forms.
Reply to Objection 1: The intelligible species which are participated
by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first
principle which is by its essence intelligible---namely, God. But they
proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material
things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
vii).
Reply to Objection 2: Material things, as to the being which they have
outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually
intelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and
intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Our passive intellect is reduced from
potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active
intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we have said ([677]Q[79],
A[4]); and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although
perchance as remote cause.
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Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know
material things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is
known must itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual
soul of man, in the present state of life, does not know the eternal
types: for it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but is
"united to God as to the unknown," as Dionysius says (Myst. Theolog.
i). Therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal types.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 1:20) that "the invisible
things of God are clearly seen . . . by the things that are made." But
among the invisible things of God are the eternal types. Therefore the
eternal types are known through creatures and not the converse.
Objection 3: Further, the eternal types are nothing else but ideas, for
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46) that "ideas are permanent types
existing in the Divine mind." If therefore we say that the intellectual
soul knows all things in the eternal types, we come back to the opinion
of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): "If we both see
that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true,
where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you
see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is
above our minds." Now the unchangeable truth is contained in the
eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all true things in
the eternal types.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): "If those
who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and
consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust
possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are spurious
imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to
avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens." Consequently
whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the
Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he
adopted it: and those thing which he found contrary to faith he
amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above [678](A[4]), that the
forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; and these he
called ideas, by participation of which he said that our intellect
knows all things: so that just as corporeal matter by participating the
idea of a stone becomes a stone, so our intellect, by participating the
same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since it seems contrary to
faith that forms of things themselves, outside the things themselves
and apart from matter, as the Platonists held, asserting that "per se"
life or "per se" wisdom are creative substances, as Dionysius relates
(Div. Nom. xi); therefore Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), for the ideas
defended by Plato, substituted the types of all creatures existing in
the Divine mind, according to which types all things are made in
themselves, and are known to the human soul.
When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all
things in the eternal types? we must reply that one thing is said to be
known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known; as
one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In this
way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in
the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and all things in Him,
thus know all things in the eternal types. Secondly, on thing is said
to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge: thus we might
say that we see in the sun what we see by the sun. And thus we must
needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eternal types,
since by participation of these types we know all things. For the
intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a
participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained
the eternal types. Whence it is written (Ps. 4:6,7), "Many say: Who
showeth us good things?" which question the Psalmist answers, "The
light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," as though he were
to say: By the seal of the Divine light in us, all things are made
known to us.
But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible
species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us to
have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is not
due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists
held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for
knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16): "Although the
philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in
time according to the eternal types, were they able to see in the
eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds of animals there
are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this information from
the story of times and places?"
But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their
"eternal types" or in the "unchangeable truth," as though the eternal
types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu.
46)---viz. that "not each and every rational soul can be said to be
worthy of that vision," namely, of the eternal types, "but only those
that are holy and pure," such as the souls of the blessed.
From what has been said the objections are easily solved.
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Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?
Objection 1: It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived
from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that "we
cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the
body." This he proves in two ways. First, because "whatever the bodily
senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never the same
cannot be perceived." Secondly, because, "whatever we perceive by the
body, even when not present to the senses, may be present to the
imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by
the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible object or the
deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be perceived which cannot be
distinguished from its counterfeit." And so he concludes that we cannot
expect to learn the truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge
apprehends the truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge cannot be
conveyed by the senses.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16): "We must
not thing that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as
though the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the
body's action; for that which acts is in every way more excellent than
that which it acts on." Whence he concludes that "the body does not
cause its image in the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself."
Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.
Objection 3: Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its
cause. But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for
we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses.
Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii, 15)
that the principle of knowledge is in the senses.
I answer that, On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For
Democritus held that "all knowledge is caused by images issuing from
the bodies we think of and entering into our souls," as Augustine says
in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle says (De Somn. et
Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is cause by a "discharge of
images." And the reason for this opinion was that both Democritus and
the other early philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and
sense, as Aristotle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the
sense is affected by the sensible, they thought that all our knowledge
is affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things.
Which impression Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images.
Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the
senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a
corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be
affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not
brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by
separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as we
have said above ([679]AA[4] ,5). Moreover he held that sense is a power
operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a
spiritual power, affected by the sensible: but the sensible organs are
affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a way
roused to form within itself the species of the sensible. Augustine
seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where he says
that the "body feels not, but the soul through the body, which it makes
use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what is
announced from without." Thus according to Plato, neither does
intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible
knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the
sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse the intellect
to the act of understanding.
Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that
intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not
its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to
feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the "composite." And he
held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part.
Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects
which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the
"composite," Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the
operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the
sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by
some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every operation
is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i, 8.
But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is
independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make
an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the
intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by
the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required,
for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener.
i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is
effected in us by the mere intellectual operation is effected in us by
the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that
the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of
which we have spoken above ([680]Q[79], AA[3],4) causes the phantasms
received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of
abstraction.
According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms,
intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms
cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be
made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said
that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual
knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause.
Reply to Objection 1: Those words of Augustine mean that we must not
expect the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active
intellect is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of
changeable things, and discern things themselves from their likeness.
Reply to Objection 2: In this passage Augustine speaks not of
intellectual but of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the
opinion of Plato, the imagination has an operation which belongs to the
soul only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are
impressed on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the
same argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect
must be separate, namely, because "the agent is more noble than the
patient." And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the
imagination there must needs be not only a passive but also an active
power. But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the
action of the imagination, is an action of the "composite," there is no
difficulty; because the sensible body is more noble than the organ of
the animal, in so far as it is compared to it as a being in act to a
being in potentiality; even as the object actually colored is compared
to the pupil which is potentially colored. It may, however, be said,
although the first impression of the imagination is through the agency
of the sensible, since "fancy is movement produced in accordance with
sensation" (De Anima iii, 3), that nevertheless there is in man an
operation which by synthesis and analysis forms images of various
things, even of things not perceived by the senses. And Augustine's
words may be taken in this sense.
Reply to Objection 3: Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of
intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that
intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible
species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can actually understand
through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without
turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the
intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the intellect is
in act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices for
the intellect to understand actually, without turning to the phantasms.
Objection 2: Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses
than the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can actually
imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more can the
intellect understand without turning to the phantasms.
Objection 3: There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the
imagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our
intellect cannot understand anything actually without turning to the
phantasms, it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal.
Which is clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the
angels.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that "the soul
understands nothing without a phantasm."
I answer that, In the present state of life in which the soul is united
to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand
anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms. First of all
because the intellect, being a power that does not make use of a
corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act through the
lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were not required the
act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now sense,
imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make
use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear that for the intellect
to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but
also when it applies knowledge already acquired, there is need for the
act of the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the
imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for
instance in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is
hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered
from actually understanding things of which he had a previous
knowledge. Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when
he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve
him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is
desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that when we wish to
help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from
which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding.
Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned
to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of the angelic
intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible
substance separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of the human
intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing
in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it
rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to
such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from
corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to
be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an
individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any
material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much
as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the
individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for
the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of
necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal
nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our
intellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists say, the
natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual; there
would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it
understands.
Reply to Objection 1: The species preserved in the passive intellect
exist there habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we
have said above ([681]Q[79], A[6]). Wherefore for us to understand
actually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice; we
need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things of
which they are the species, which things are natures existing in
individuals.
Reply to Objection 2: Even the phantasm is the likeness of an
individual thing; wherefore the imagination does not need any further
likeness of the individual, whereas the intellect does.
Reply to Objection 3: Incorporeal things, of which there are no
phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which
there are phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of
which we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i),
we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other
incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by
way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And,
therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to
turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of the
things themselves.
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Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the
sensitive powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not
hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does
not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher
than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not
hindered through suspension of the senses.
Objection 2: Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But
during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in De Somn. et Vigil.
i and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep.
Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through
suspension of the senses.
On the contrary, What a man does while asleep, against the moral law,
is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had free use
of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is
hindered by suspension of the senses.
I answer that, As we have said above [682](A[7]), our intellect's
proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now
a perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all
that pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be
ignored which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher says
(De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical science is action, so
the end of natural science is that which is perceived principally
through the senses"; for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife
except for the purpose of action, in order that he may produce a
certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher
does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for
the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things which
he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge
perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the knife: and in
like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural
things, unless he knows sensible things. But in the present state of
life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible
things. Consequently it is not possible for our intellect to form a
perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which
sensible things are known to us.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellect is superior to the senses,
nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and
principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore
suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the
judgment of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The senses are suspended in the sleeper through
certain evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read
in De Somn. et Vigil. iii. And, therefore, according to the amount of
such evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the
amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also the
imagination, so that there are no phantasms; thus does it happen,
especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking copiously.
If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but
distorted and without sequence; thus it happens in a case of fever. And
if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phantasms will have a
certain sequence: thus especially does it happen towards the end of
sleep in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination.
If the evaporation be very slight, not only does the imagination retain
its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; so that
sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream,
discerning, as it were, between things, and their images. Nevertheless,
the common sense remains partly suspended; and therefore, although it
discriminates some images from the reality, yet is it always deceived
in some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense
and imagination are free, so is the judgment of his intellect
unfettered, though not entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes
while asleep, when he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some
respect.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under this
head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from
the phantasms?
(2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are
what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?
(3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more
universal?
(4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?
(5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and
division?
(6) Whether the intellect can err?
(7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another?
(8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the
divisible?
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Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by
abstraction from phantasms?
Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand
corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For
the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it
really is. Now the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted
from the particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if
we understand material things by abstraction of the species from the
phantasm, there will be error in the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, material things are those natural things which
include matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood apart
from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things
cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter is the principle of
individualization. Therefore material things cannot be understood by
abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is the process
whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the
phantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight. But
seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color, but by color
impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of
understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm,
but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are
two things in the intellectual soul---the passive intellect and the
active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to
abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive
them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the
active intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light is to
color; since light does not abstract anything from color, but rather
streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction
from phantasms.
Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that "the
intellect understands the species in the phantasm"; and not, therefore,
by abstraction.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "things
are intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter."
Therefore material things must needs be understood according as they
are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms.
I answer that, As stated above ([683]Q[84], A[7]), the object of
knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are
three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power, namely,
the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of
every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And
since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every
power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual.
There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a
corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such
is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is
therefore a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know
material things, yet they do not know them save in something
immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human
intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; yet
it is a power of the soul which is the form the body, as is clear from
what we have said above ([684]Q[76], A[1]). And therefore it is proper
to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not
as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in
individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the
form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms.
Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material
things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things
thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just
as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the
immaterial.
But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect,
and not its being in a way united to the body, held that the objects of
the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by
abstraction, but by participating things abstract, as stated above
([685]Q[84] , A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way
of composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does
not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by
way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand one thing
without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to abstract one
from another things which are not really abstract from one another,
does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood. But, in the
second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which
are not really abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood,
as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we understood or
said that color is not in a colored body, or that it is separate from
it, there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we
consider color and its properties, without reference to the apple which
is colored; or if we express in word what we thus understand, there is
no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple is not
essential to color, and therefore color can be understood independently
of the apple. Likewise, the things which belong to the species of a
material thing, such as a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought
of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the
notion of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the
universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the
phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from
its individual qualities represented by the phantasms. If, therefore,
the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise
than as it is, that is so, if the word "otherwise" refers to the thing
understood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing
otherwise than as it is; and so the intellect would be false if it
abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to
regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it is
not so, if the word "otherwise" be taken as referring to the one who
understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in
one who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in
existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who
understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not
materially, according to the mode of a material thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Some have thought that the species of a natural
thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If
that were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural
things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold,
common, and "signate" or individual; common, such as flesh and bone;
and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect therefore
abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible
matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it
abstracts the species of man from "this flesh and these bones," which
do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph.
vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in the species: whereas
the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect form "flesh
and bones."
Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from
sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter;
not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter.
For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible
qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while
intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is
manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities
are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which
are the terminations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible
qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they
cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is
subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common
intelligible matter. Yet they can be considered apart from this or that
substance; for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible
matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible
matter, such as "being," "unity," "power," "act," and the like; all
these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial
things. Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of
abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things
which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in
reality.
Reply to Objection 3: Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter,
have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they
can impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are
images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same
mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the
power of themselves to make an impression on the passive intellect.
This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning
towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain
likeness which represents, as to its specific conditions only, the
thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible
species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm; not that the
identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in
the passive intellect, as a body transferred from one place to another.
Reply to Objection 4: Not only does the active intellect throw light on
the phantasm: it does more; by its own power it abstracts the
intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on the
phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power
by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the
active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction
therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect
abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by
the power of the active intellect we are able to disregard the
conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the
specific nature, the image of which informs the passive intellect.
Reply to Objection 5: Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible
species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of
things in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in
the phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of which it
abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have
said above ([686]Q[84], A[7]).
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Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to
our intellect as that which is understood?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted
from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is
understood. For the understood in act is in the one who understands:
since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing
of what is understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save
the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this species is what is
actually understood.
Objection 2: Further, what is actually understood must be in something;
else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the soul:
for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be
actually understood. Therefore what is actually understood is in the
intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid
intelligible species.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) that "words
are signs of the passions in the soul." But words signify the things
understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore these
passions of the soul---viz. the intelligible species, are what is
actually understood.
On the contrary, The intelligible species is to the intellect what the
sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is
perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the
intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by
which the intellect understands.
I answer that, Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know
only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is
cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to
this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely,
the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is
what is understood.
This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the
things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if what we
understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would
follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside
the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus,
according to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas,
which they held to be actually understood [*[687]Q[84], A[1]].
Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the
ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true" [*Aristotle,
Metaph. iii. 5], and that consequently contradictories are true
simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it
can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression
made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will
always judge of its own impression as such; and so every judgment will
be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when
anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would
judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is
bitter, this would be equally true; for each would judge according to
the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true;
in fact, every sort of apprehension.
Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to
the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus.
There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains
in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and another which
passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and
each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form
from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the
likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a
likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which proceeds an action
remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by
which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the
likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is
the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect
reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own
act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the
intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that
which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is
the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient
philosophers, who said that "like is known by like." For they said that
the soul knows the earth outside itself, by the earth within itself;
and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth
instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who
says "that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the
stone"; it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its
intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 1: The thing understood is in the intellect by its
own likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing
actually understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of
the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a
sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not
follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually
understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: In these words "the thing actually understood"
there is a double implication---the thing which is understood, and the
fact that it is understood. In like manner the words "abstract
universal" imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction
or universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be
understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only in
individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as
universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in
the senses. For the sight sees the color of the apple apart from its
smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen apart
from the smell, it is quite clear that the color which is seen is only
in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is
owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight receives the
likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner humanity understood
is only in this or that man; but that humanity be apprehended without
conditions of individuality, that is, that it be abstracted and
consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it
is brought under the consideration of the intellect, in which there is
a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of
individuality.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two operations in the sensitive part.
One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses
takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is
formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an
absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations
are found in the intellect. For in the first place there is the passion
of the passive intellect as informed by the intelligible species; and
then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a
division, or a composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the concept
conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the
intellect's division or composition. Words do not therefore signify the
intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for
itself for the purpose of judging of external things.
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Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the more universal is not first in our
intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its own
nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves. But
universals come first as regards their nature, because "that is first
which does not involve the existence of its correlative" (Categor. ix).
Therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards our
intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation
to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known
secondarily by us.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the
object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its
definition. But the more universal is part of the definition of the
less universal, as "animal" is part of the definition of "man."
Therefore the universals are secondarily known by us.
Objection 4: Further, we know causes and principles by their effects.
But universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily
known by us.
On the contrary, "We must proceed from the universal to the singular
and individual" (Phys. i, 1)
I answer that, In our knowledge there are two things to be considered.
First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible
knowledge: and, because sense has singular and individual things for
its object, and intellect has the universal for its object, it follows
that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the
latter. Secondly, we must consider that our intellect proceeds from a
state of potentiality to a state of actuality; and every power thus
proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete
act, which is the medium between potentiality and actuality, before
accomplishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is
complete knowledge, when the object is distinctly and determinately
known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the
object is known indistinctly, and as it were confusedly. A thing thus
imperfectly known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality,
and hence the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that "what is manifest and
certain is known to us at first confusedly; afterwards we know it by
distinguishing its principles and elements." Now it is evident that to
know an object that comprises many things, without proper knowledge of
each thing contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this
way we can have knowledge not only of the universal whole, which
contains parts potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each
whole can be known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to
know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the
less common, as to "animal" indistinctly is to know it as "animal";
whereas to know "animal" distinctly is know it as "rational" or
"irrational animal," that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our
intellect knows "animal" before it knows man; and the same reason holds
in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal.
Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to
act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by sense we
judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both to
place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar off it
is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to be an
animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before it seen to
be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards time, for a child
can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from
that, and therefore "children at first call men fathers, and later on
distinguish each one from the others" (Phys. i, 1). The reason of this
is clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of
potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as he who knows
"genus" is in a state of potentiality as regards "difference." Thus it
is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality and
act.
We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and
individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal;
as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both
sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the
knowledge of the less common.
Reply to Objection 1: The universal can be considered in two ways.
First, the universal nature may be considered together with the
intention of universality. And since the intention of
universality---viz. the relation of one and the same to many---is due
to intellectual abstraction, the universal thus considered is a
secondary consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the
"universal animal is either nothing or something secondary." But
according to Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the
universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the
latter, according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent
universals which he called ideas.
Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself---for
instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And thus
we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of generation and
time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way
the more common comes first in the order of nature; as appears clearly
in the generation of man and animal; for "the animal is generated
before man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). The
other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature:
for instance, act considered absolutely is naturally prior to
potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common
comes naturally before the more common; as man comes before animal. For
the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal but
goes on to the generation of man.
Reply to Objection 2: The more common universal may be compared to the
less common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering
that in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less
universal, but also other things, as in "animal" is contained not only
"man" but also "horse." As part, considering that the less common
contains in its idea not only the more common, but also more; as "man"
contains not only "animal" but also "rational." Therefore "animal" in
itself comes into our knowledge before "man"; but "man" comes before
"animal" considered as part of the same idea.
Reply to Objection 3: A part can be known in two ways. First,
absolutely considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts
being known before the whole, as stones are known before a house is
known. Secondly as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs
know the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we
know its different parts. So likewise principles of definition are
known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined
would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are
known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to
distinguish all that belongs to human nature.
Reply to Objection 4: The universal, as understood with the intention
of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so
far as the intention of universality results from the mode of
understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of
knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato
thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and
substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered,
according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of
existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi,
13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as
existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a formal
principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the result of
matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the generic
nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a
material principle, because the generic nature is taken from that which
is material in a thing, while the idea of species is taken from that
which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken from the sensitive
part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the intellectual part.
Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and
not to the individual, or the genus: because the form is the end of
generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither is it
necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of any cause or principle
should be secondary: since at times through sensible causes we become
acquainted with unknown effects, and sometimes conversely.
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Whether we can understand many things at the same time?
Objection 1: It would seem that we can understand many things at the
same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of
before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not
understand different things in succession, but at the same time.
Objection 2: Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not
opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as, for
instance, color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible species
are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to prevent
the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible
species, and thus it can understand many things at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same
time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts.
Therefore the intellect understands many things at the same time.
Objection 4: Further, we cannot know the difference between two things
unless we know both at the same time (De Anima iii, 2), and the same is
to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the
difference and comparison between one thing and another. Therefore it
knows many things at the same time.
On the contrary, It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that "understanding is of
one thing only, knowledge is of many."
I answer that, The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as
one, but not as many: that is to say by "one" but not by "many"
intelligible species. For the mode of every action follows the form
which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the
intellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the
same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same time,
because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever
things the intellect understands under different species, it does not
understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it is
impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same
time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is
impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different
colors or different shapes. Now all intelligible species belong to one
genus, because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty:
although the things which the species represent belong to different
genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be
perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as
actually to understand different things.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellect is above that time, which is the
measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself
of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible
operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this
vicissitude is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii,
20,22), that "God moves the spiritual creature through time."
Reply to Objection 2: Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to
exist at the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms
belonging to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one
another, as is clear from the examples of colors and shapes.
Reply to Objection 3: Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a
confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known through
the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way
they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its species; and so
they are not understood at the same time.
Reply to Objection 4: If the intellect sees the difference or
comparison between one thing and another, it knows both in relation to
their difference or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as
it knows the parts in the whole.
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Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?
Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand by
composition and division. For composition and division are only of
many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same
time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division.
Objection 2: Further, every composition and division implies past,
present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as also
from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not
understand by composition and division.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect understands things by a process of
assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things,
for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the
subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the composition
be true, for "man" is truly what "animal" is. Therefore the intellect
does not act by composition and division.
On the contrary, Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the
Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition and
division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions.
Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division.
I answer that, The human intellect must of necessity understand by
composition and division. For since the intellect passes from
potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated,
which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by
degrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect
knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends
something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first
and proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents,
and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily compares
one thing with another by composition or division; and from one
composition and division it proceeds to another, which is the process
of reasoning.
But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible
things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the
angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing
at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a
thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division,
and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition,
division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic
intellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by
the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence.
Reply to Objection 1: Composition and division of the intellect are
made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many
things by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and
comparison of things.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the intellect abstracts from the
phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the
phantasms, as we have said [688](A[1]; [689]Q[84], A[7]). And forasmuch
as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect
involve time.
Reply to Objection 3: The likeness of a thing is received into the
intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the
mode of the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing
corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect; but it
does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For
the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material
thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the imagination.
Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. First, there is
the composition of form with matter; and to this corresponds that
composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated
of its part: for the genus is derived from common matter, while the
difference that completes the species is derived from the form, and the
particular from individual matter. The second comparison is of accident
with subject: and to this real composition corresponds that composition
of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we
say "the man is white." Nevertheless composition of the intellect
differs from composition of things; for in the latter the things are
diverse, whereas composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity
of the components. For the above composition of the intellect does not
imply that "man" and "whiteness" are identical, but the assertion, "the
man is white," means that "the man is something having whiteness": and
the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject having
whiteness. It is the same with the composition of form and matter: for
animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that
which has an intellectual nature; man, that which has both; and
Socrates that which has all these things together with individual
matter; and according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates
the composition of one thing with another.
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Whether the intellect can be false?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the
Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that "truth and falsehood are
in the mind." But the mind and intellect are the same, as is shown
above ([690]Q[79], A[1]). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.
Objection 2: Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect.
But falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the
intellect.
Objection 3: Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin
involves falsehood: for "those err that work evil" (Prov. 14:22).
Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), that "everyone who is
deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is deceived." And
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10), that "the intellect is always
true."
I answer that, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares intellect
with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper
object, as sight in regard to color; has accidentally through some
hindrance occurring to the sensile organ---for example, the taste of a
fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his
tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, may be deceived as
regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when, for example,
it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it
exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived concerning
accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that vinegar is honey by
reason of the color being the same. The reason of this is evident; for
every faculty, as such, is "per se" directed to its proper object; and
things of this kind are always the same. Hence, as long as the faculty
exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail.
Now the proper object of the intellect is the "quiddity" of a material
thing; and hence, properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault
concerning this quiddity; whereas it may go astray as regards the
surroundings of the thing in its essence or quiddity, in referring one
thing to another, as regards composition or division, or also in the
process of reasoning. Therefore, also in regard to those propositions,
which are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first
principles from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of
scientific conclusions.
The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity of
composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the intellect is
a faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the part of the
composition affecting the definition, when, for instance, the
definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as the
definition of a circle applied to a triangle; or when a definition is
false in itself as involving the composition of things incompatible;
as, for instance, to describe anything as "a rational winged animal."
Hence as regards simple objects not subject to composite definitions we
cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we understand nothing whatever about
them, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 10.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the
intellect in regard to composition and division. The same answer
applies to the Second Objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and
to the Third Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs in
the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute
consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and of those things which are
known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense are to be
understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion.
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Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than anothe
r
can?
Objection 1: It would seem that one person cannot understand one and
the same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu.
32), "Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not
understand it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect
understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and therefore
there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing: nor can one
person understand a thing better than another can."
Objection 2: Further, the intellect is true in its act of
understanding. But truth, being a certain equality between thought and
thing, is not subject to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be
more or less equal. Therefore a thing cannot be more or less
understood.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is
in man. But different forms cause different species. Therefore if one
man understands better than another, it would seem that they do not
belong to the same species.
On the contrary, Experience shows that some understand more profoundly
than do others; as one who carries a conclusion to its first principles
and ultimate causes understands it better than the one who reduces it
only to its proximate causes.
I answer that, A thing being understood more by one than by another may
be taken in two senses. First, so that the word "more" be taken as
determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood;
and thus, one cannot understand the same thing more than another,
because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or
worse, would entail being deceived, and such a one would not understand
it, as Augustine argues (QQ. 83, qu. 32). In another sense the word
"more" can be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part
of him who understands; and so one may understand the same thing better
than someone else, through having a greater power of understanding:
just as a man may see a thing better with his bodily sight, whose power
is greater, and whose sight is more perfect. The same applies to the
intellect in two ways. First, as regards the intellect itself, which is
more perfect. For it is plain that the better the disposition of a
body, the better the soul allotted to it; which clearly appears in
things of different species: and the reason thereof is that act and
form are received into matter according to matter's capacity: thus
because some men have bodies of better disposition, their souls have a
greater power of understanding, wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9),
that "it is to be observed that those who have soft flesh are of apt
mind." Secondly, this occurs in regard to the lower powers of which the
intellect has need in its operation: for those in whom the imaginative,
cogitative, and memorative powers are of better disposition, are better
disposed to understand.
The reply to the First Objection is clear from the above; likewise the
reply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect consists in the
intellect understanding a thing as it is.
Reply to Objection 3: The difference of form which is due only to the
different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a
numerical difference: for different individuals have different forms,
diversified according to the difference of matter.
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Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect understands the
indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1)
that "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and
elements." But principles are indivisible, and elements are of
divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the
divisible.
Objection 2: Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known
previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more known,"
as is said Topic. vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition
of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of a line; for
as Euclid says, "a line is length without breadth, the extremities of
which are points"; also unity comes into the definition of number, for
"number is multitude measured by one," as is said Metaph. x, Did. ix,
6. Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the
divisible.
Objection 3: Further, "Like is known by like." But the indivisible is
more like to the intellect than is the divisible; because "the
intellect is simple" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first
knows the indivisible.
On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that "the indivisible is
expressed as a privation." But privation is known secondarily.
Therefore likewise is the indivisible.
I answer that, The object of our intellect in its present state is the
quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, as
above stated ([691]Q[84], A[7]). And since that which is known first
and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must
consider its relationship to that quiddity in order to discover in what
order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, as is
said De Anima iii, 6. First, the continuous is indivisible, since
actually it is undivided, although potentially divisible: and this
indivisible is known to us before its division, which is a division
into parts: because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge,
as we have said above [692](A[3]). Secondly, the indivisible is so
called in relation to species, as man's reason is something
indivisible. This way, also, the indivisible is understood before its
division into logical parts, as we have said above (De Anima iii, 6);
and again before the intellect disposes and divides by affirmation and
negation. The reason of this is that both these kinds of indivisible
are understood by the intellect of itself, as being its proper object.
The third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a
point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually or
potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the
privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by way of
privation "as that which has no parts"; and in like manner the notion
of "one" is that is "indivisible," as stated in Metaph. x, Did. ix, 1.
And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain
opposition to a corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary
and proper object of the intellect.
But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate
indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow that
a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to the
Platonists what is first is first participated by things.
Reply to Objection 1: In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and
elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible
effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible
causes. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always
depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the
Philosopher says in the same passage: "Then do we consider that we
know, when we can resolve principles into their causes."
Reply to Objection 2: A point is not included in the definition of a
line in general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite
length, and in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially.
Euclid defines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions a
point in the definition, as the limit in the definition of that which
is limited. Unity is the measure of number: wherefore it is included in
the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in the
definition of the divisible, but rather conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: The likeness through which we understand is the
species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first,
not on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on
account of the power's aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would
perceive hearing rather than color.
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WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it knows singulars?
(2) Whether it knows the infinite?
(3) Whether it knows contingent things?
(4) Whether it knows future things?
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Whether our intellect knows singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For
whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our
intellect knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it belongs
to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows
this singular, Socrates.
Objection 2: Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But
action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows
the singular.
Objection 3: Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself
it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; for
actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.
Objection 4: Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an
inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore, can
the intellect know it.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that "the universal
is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense."
I answer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular in material
things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle
of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our
intellect, as have said above ([693]Q[85], A[1]), understands by
abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is
abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our intellect
knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a
kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because, as we have said
above ([694]Q[85], A[7]), even after abstracting the intelligible
species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the
phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii,
7. Therefore it understands the universal directly through the
intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the
phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition "Socrates is a man."
Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: The choice of a particular thing to be done is as
the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is
said Ethic. vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly
concluded from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a
singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the
practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the
particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said De Anima iii,
11.
Reply to Objection 3: Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular
not as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise
than immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such as
the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be intelligible.
Reply to Objection 4: The higher power can do what the lower power can,
but in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially
and concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect
knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the universal.
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Whether our intellect can know the infinite?
Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite.
For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, as
we have said above ([695]Q[12], A[1]). Much more, therefore, can our
intellect know all other infinite things.
Objection 2: Further, our intellect can naturally know "genera" and
"species." But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in
number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the
infinite.
Objection 3: Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same
place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being
in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in
the same intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the same
time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an
infinite number of things.
Objection 4: Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as
we have said ([696]Q[76], A[1]), it appears to be an infinite power.
But an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore
our intellect can know the infinite.
On the contrary, It is said (Phys. i, 4) that "the infinite, considered
as such, is unknown."
I answer that, Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each
other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object,
which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the
infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in the sense of
one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is
potentially in our mind through its considering successively one thing
after another: because never does our intellect understand so many
things, that it cannot understand more.
On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either
actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot know
actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species.
But the infinite is not represented by one species, for if it were it
would be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be
understood except by a successive consideration of one part after
another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for the
infinite is that "from which, however much we may take, there always
remains something to be taken." Thus the infinite could not be known
actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is impossible.
For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite:
because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration:
since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1.
Wherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an
infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered
the entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession
of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually
nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only
potentially as explained above.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([697]Q[7], A[1]), God is
called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in
material things, the term 'infinite' is applied to that which is
deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas
matter cannot be known without form, it follows that the material
infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of
Himself known; but He is unknown to us by reason of our feeble
intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for
material objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our present life
except through material effects. In the future life this defect of
intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be able
to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to comprehend
Him.
Reply to Objection 2: The nature of our mind is to know species
abstracted from phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or
habitually species of numbers or figures that are not in the
imagination, except in a general way and in their universal principles;
and this is to know them potentially and confusedly.
Reply to Objection 3: If two or more bodies were in the same place,
there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in
order for the things placed to be counted according to this succession
of occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into
our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually
understood at the same time: and therefore there must be a definite and
not an infinite number of species in our intellect.
Reply to Objection 4: As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it
know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is
not terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal,
which is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is
not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an
infinite number of individuals.
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Whether our intellect can know contingent things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent
things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects of
understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary
things.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, "what sometimes is and
sometimes is not, is measured by time." Now the intellect abstracts
from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is
proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, it
seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect.
On the contrary, All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences
are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of
which are human actions subject to free-will; and again, the natural
sciences in as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible.
Therefore the intellect knows contingent things.
I answer that, Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either
as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity, since every
contingent thing has in it something necessary: for example, that
Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation of running to
motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs.
Now contingency arises from matter, for contingency is a potentiality
to be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter; whereas
necessity results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is
of necessity in the subject. But matter is the individualizing
principle: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form
from the particular matter. Moreover it was laid down above [698](A[1])
that the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its
object; while the object of sense is the singular, which in a certain
way is the indirect object of the intellect, as we have said above
[699](A[1]). Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known
directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal
and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the
intellect. Hence if we consider the objects of science in their
universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if
we consider the things themselves, thus some sciences are of necessary
things, some of contingent things.
From which the replies to the objections are clear.
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Whether our intellect can know the future?
Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For our
intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from the
"here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it can
know the present. Therefore it can know the future.
Objection 2: Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know
some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect is
freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the
intellect of its own nature can know the future.
Objection 3: The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any
knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows by
their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can the
intellect know the future.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 8:6,7), "There is a great
affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things
to come he cannot know by any messenger."
I answer that, We must apply the same distinction to future things, as
we applied above [700](A[3]) to contingent things. For future things
considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect
knows them by reflection only, as stated above [701](A[1]). But the
principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter
the domain of the intellect and become the objects of science.
Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we
must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in
itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by
God alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events
is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole
course of time, as we have said above when treating of God's knowledge
([702]Q[14], A[13]). But forasmuch as it exists in its cause, the
future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to
have a necessary connection with its future result, then the future is
known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the
future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as to produce a certain
result more frequently than not, then can the future be known more or
less conjecturally, according as its cause is more or less inclined to
produce the effect.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers that knowledge which is
drawn from universal causal principles; from these the future may be
known, according to the order of the effects to the cause.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Confess. xii [*Gen. ad lit.
xii. 13]), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its
very nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal
sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the
knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were
to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating the ideas as
the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by its nature
would know the universal causes of all effects, and would only be
impeded in its knowledge by the body, and hence when withdrawn from the
corporeal senses it would know the future.
But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus,
but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it is not natural for
the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather does
it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and
corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human
intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the
phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the
influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the future
known to the demons, as explained above ([703]Q[57], A[3]). The soul is
naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual
causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then nearer to
the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions. The same may
also come from superior corporeal causes. For it is clear that superior
bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the
sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of
the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected, and so, as
the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives
certain images of some such events. These images are perceived more at
night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake,
because, as stated in De Somn. et Vigil. ii [*De Divinat. per somn.
ii.], "impressions made by day are evanescent. The night air is calmer,
when silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, when
slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness, and such
movements produce in the imagination images from which the future may
be foreseen."
Reply to Objection 3: Brute animals have no power above the imagination
wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their
imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus
from such animals' movements some future things, such as rain and the
like, may be known rather from human movements directed by reason.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), that "some who are most
imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is not burdened
with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety moving at
the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it."
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HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all
within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?
(2) Whether it knows its own habits?
(3) How does the intellect know its own act?
(4) How does it know the act of the will?
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Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by
its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the mind
knows itself, because it is incorporeal."
Objection 2: Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus
of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own
essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul.
Objection 3: Further, "in things void of matter, the intellect and that
which is understood are the same" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human mind
is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above
([704]Q[76], A[1]). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same
in the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by
its own essence.
On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect
understands itself in the same way as it understands other things." But
it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their
similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own
essence.
I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not,
so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for a thing
is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is
actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the eye
does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored. In like
manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material
things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does not know
primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i,
7. Consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by their own
essence according as each one is actual by its own essence.
Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is
simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own
Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence
belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as "act," but not
as a "pure act," nor as a "complete act," and hence the angel's act of
intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an angel
understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot understand all
other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself
by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in
the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a
potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is called
"possible" [*Possibilis---elsewhere in this translation rendered
"passive"---Ed.]. Therefore in its essence the human mind is
potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to
understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. For
even the Platonists asserted than an order of intelligible beings
existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect
understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said
that the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the
human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by participating
separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such
participation of incorporeal beings. But as in this life our intellect
has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as
stated above ([705]Q[84], A[7]), it understands itself according as it
is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through
the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the
intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality,
actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself
not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the
first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he
has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In
the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the
human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however,
that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know the
nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our
intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of
all things as above stated ([706]Q[84], A[5]). Hence Augustine says (De
Trin. ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as
perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind is, but what it
ought to be in the light of the eternal types." There is, however, a
difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in
this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the
mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself,
and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards
the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not
suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry.
Hence many are ignorant of the soul's nature, and many have erred about
it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry:
"Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to
discern itself as present"---i.e. to know how it differs from other
things; which is to know its essence and nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The mind knows itself by means of itself, because
at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its
own act: because it is itself that it knows since it loves itself, as
he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in
two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself,
as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is not
accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas substance
is visible by its accident.
Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of
intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing
understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself:
not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to
intelligible things---as is the passive intellect---or is the act of
intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms---as is the active
intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher is universally
true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in
act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in
act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act,
by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of
the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by
the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the same
species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without matter
the intellect and what is understood are the same," is equal to saying
that "as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is
understood are the same." For a thing is actually understood in that it
is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of
some things are immaterial---as the separate substances called angels,
each of which is understood and understands, whereas there are other
things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract
likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the
proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a
sense it is verified in their regard, and not in regard of other
substances, as already stated (Reply OBJ 2).
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Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the
soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith is
not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be
seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most
certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence";
and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul.
Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by
themselves.
Objection 2: Further, material things outside the soul are known by
their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be
known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their
essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by
their essence.
Objection 3: Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is
still more so." But habits and intelligible species cause things to be
known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in
themselves.
On the contrary, Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as
is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior to
powers." Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus
habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.
I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere
act. Now, it has been said [707](A[1]) that nothing is known but as it
is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it
falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its
act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that
he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the
nature and idea of the habit by considering the act. The first kind of
knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact
of its presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of
knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained
above of the mind [708](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Although faith is not known by external movement
of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the
interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he
knows that he believes.
Reply to Objection 2: Habits are present in our intellect, not as its
object since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is
the nature of a material thing as stated above ([709]Q[84], A[7]), but
as that by which it understands.
Reply to Objection 3: The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing
being such, is still more so," is true of things that are of the same
order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say
that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life is more
desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is
not true: for we may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does
not follow that medicine is more desirable than health, for health
belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the
order of efficient causes. So of two things belonging essentially to
the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of
the other being known, is the more known, as principles are more known
than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of
objects of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as
on account of an object known, but as on account of a disposition or
form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not
prove.
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Whether our intellect knows its own act?
Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not know its own
act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the
act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its
own act.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then,
the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it
knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely,
which seems impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as
sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act,
for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2.
Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I
understand."
I answer that, As stated above ([710]AA[1],2) a thing is intelligible
according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect
consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to
something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished,
as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the
agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8.
Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of
understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects.
For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of
intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and
the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His
Essence is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect,
the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said
above ([711]Q[79], A[1]), and yet the first object of that act is the
angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction
between the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that
whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and
the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper
perfection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing,
together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another,
namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act of
understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of
understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing. And
therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object
of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which
that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is
known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this
reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts,
and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the intellect is something
universal, namely, "being" and "the true," in which the act also of
understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its
own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in
this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but "being"
and "true," as considered in material things, as we have said above
([712]Q[84], A[7]), from which it acquires knowledge of all other
things.
Reply to Objection 2: The intelligent act of the human intellect is not
the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the
nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by
one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act.
Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct
from the act whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so
on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially
infinite, as explained above ([713]Q[86], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: The proper sense feels by reason of the
immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A
material object, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by
another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the
common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act
of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there
is no comparison.
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Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect does not understand the
act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be in
some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in
the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct. Therefore
the act of the will is not known by the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the act is specified by the object. But the
object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect.
Therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object
of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the
intellect.
Objection 3: Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections
that "they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by
their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now it does not
seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but
either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof.
Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such
affections of the soul as the acts of the will.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I
will."
I answer that, As stated above ([714]Q[59], A[1]), the act of the will
is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just
as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural
form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its
mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a
natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible
appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the
intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the
intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper
subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii,
9)---that "the will is in the reason." Now whatever is intelligibly in
an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the
act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one
knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act,
and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or
power.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold good if the will and the
intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for
then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as
both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is in
a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the
will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The "good" and the "true" which are the objects
of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is
contained in the other, as we have said above ([715]Q[82], A[4], ad 1;
[716]Q[16], A[4], ad 1); for the true is good and the good is true.
Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those
of the intellect can fall under the will.
Reply to Objection 3: The affections of the soul are in the intellect
not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their
subject, as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle,
which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says
that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions.
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HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself,
viz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are three points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand
the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?
(2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of
material things?
(3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?
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Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand
immaterial substances in themselves?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul in the present state of
life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine
(De Trin. ix, 3) says: "As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of
corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from
itself the knowledge of incorporeal things." But these are the
immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial
substances.
Objection 2: Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more
akin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature is
immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above ([717]Q[76],
A[1]). Since then our mind understands material things, much more is it
able to understand immaterial things.
Objection 3: Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves
most sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted
by their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a
corrupting influence from its object, as is stated De Anima iii, 4.
Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of
intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material
things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them actually
so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear that those
substances are more intelligible in themselves whose nature is
immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than are material
things.
Objection 4: Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that "nature
would be frustrated in its end" were we unable to understand abstract
substances, "because it would have made what in itself is naturally
intelligible not to be understood at all." But in nature nothing is
idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood
by us.
Objection 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to
the intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether
superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our
intellect can understand all intelligible substances, even the superior
and immaterial.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 9:16): "The things that are in
heaven, who shall search out?" But these substances are said to be in
heaven, according to Mat. 18:10, "Their angels in heaven," etc.
Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation.
I answer that, In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not
only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of all.
For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called
"Ideas," are the proper objects of our intellect, and thus first and
"per se" understood by us; and, further, that material objects are
known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up with the
mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the more clearly does
it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things.
But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our
intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to
the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand by
turning to the phantasms, as we have said above ([718]Q[84], A[7]).
Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall
under sense and imagination, cannot first and "per se" be known by us,
according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have.
Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this
present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate
substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance, which
he calls the "active intellect," and which, being a separate substance
itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, when it is
perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to understand
perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate substances, as
in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united
to us, we can understand material things. Now he said that the active
intellect is united to us, thus. For since we understand by means of
both the active intellect and intelligible objects, as, for instance,
we understand conclusions by principles understood; it is clear that
the active intellect must be compared to the objects understood, either
as the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. For
an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways; to a
principal agent and to an instrument, as cutting to the workman and the
saw; to a form and its subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both
these ways the active intellect can be compared to the intelligible
object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to
potentiality. Now a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection
at one and the same time, as the reception of what is actually visible
synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. Therefore the
passive intellect receives the intelligible object and the active
intellect together; and the more numerous the intelligible objects
received, so much the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union
between ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that when we
understand all the intelligible objects, the active intellect becomes
one with us, and by its instrumentality we can understand all things
material and immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man
to consist. Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether
the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate
substances by the instrumentality of the active intellect, as he
himself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive
intellect can never understand separate substances (because according
to him it is corruptible), but man understands separate substances by
means of the active intellect.
This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active
intellect to be a separate substance, we could not formally understand
by its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action
consists in its form and act, since every agent acts according to its
actuality, as was said of the passive intellect ([719]Q[70], A[1]).
Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation, the
active intellect, supposing it to be a separate substance, would not be
joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as participated
in things understood; and would not extend to the other acts of the
active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial
substances; just as when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not
united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun, but its
light only is united to us, that we may see the colors. Thirdly, this
opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above explained, the active
intellect were united to us in substance, still it is not said that it
is wholly so united in regard to one intelligible object, or two; but
rather in regard to all intelligible objects. But all such objects
together do not equal the force of the active intellect, as it is a
much greater thing to understand separate substances than to understand
all material things. Hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all
material things would not make the active intellect to be so united to
us as to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate
substances.
Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for
anyone in this world to understand all material things: and thus no
one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against
what the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that happiness is a "kind of
common good, communicable to all capable of virtue." Further, it is
unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end of the
species.
Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that happiness
is "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and after enumerating
many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i, 7) that
ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest things
intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in the
sixth chapter he had named as the chief of speculative sciences. Hence
Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge
of separate substances, obtainable by speculative science; and not by
being united to the active intellect as some imagined.
Sixthly, as was shown above ([720]Q[79], A[4]), the active intellect is
not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself
actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends
receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive
intellect is "all things potentially," and the active intellect is "all
things in act." Therefore both intellects, according to the present
state of life, extend to material things only, which are made actually
intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive
intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot understand
separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by the passive or
by the active intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge
of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself.
This is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge
concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate
substances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of
incorporeal substances, such as is within its compass; not that the
knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause
of knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true ---that the
soul needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But
knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the
knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the
present state of life, is such that it can be informed with similitudes
abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows material things
rather than immaterial substances.
Reply to Objection 3: There must needs be some proportion between the
object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the
passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible
objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely
to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being
improportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that immaterial
substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our present state
of life, so that it cannot understand them.
Reply to Objection 4: This argument of the Commentator fails in several
ways. First, because if separate substances are not understood by us,
it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for
they are understood by themselves, and by one another.
Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances:
while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails to attain its end.
It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial substances are
purposeless, even if they are not understood by us at all.
Reply to Objection 5: Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior,
in the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we
do not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way.
The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which is
impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of
what is immaterial.
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Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its
knowledge of material things?
Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial
substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. i) that "the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial
contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is led thereto by
material guidance according to its own nature." Therefore we can be led
by material things to know immaterial substances.
Objection 2: Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are
sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene
defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of
both in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can be
understood by us.
Objection 3: Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial
substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by which it
understands material things. Therefore also other material substances
can be understood by us, through their material effects.
Objection 4: Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended
through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and
this belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial
substances can be understood by us through material things.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "intelligible things
cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite things
through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal."
I answer that, Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a philosopher named
Avempace [*Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183] taught that by the
understanding of natural substances we can be led, according to true
philosophical principles, to the knowledge of immaterial substances.
For since the nature of our intellect is to abstract the quiddity of
material things from matter, anything material residing in that
abstracted quiddity can again be made subject to abstraction; and as
the process of abstraction cannot go on forever, it must arrive at
length at some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without matter; and this
would be the understanding of immaterial substance.
Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms
and species of these material things; as the Platonists supposed. But
supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ
altogether from the quiddity of material things, it follows that
however much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things
from matter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial
substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand immaterial
substances through material substances.
Reply to Objection 1: From material things we can rise to some kind of
knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge
thereof; for there is no proper and adequate proportion between
material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from material
things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar
therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).
Reply to Objection 2: Science treats of higher things principally by
way of negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) explains the heavenly
bodies by denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it
follows that much less can immaterial substances be known by us in such
a way as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific
knowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to material
things.
Reply to Objection 3: The human soul understands itself through its own
act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its
power and nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances
cannot be perfectly known through such act, nor through any other
material thing, because there is no proportion between the latter and
the power of the former.
Reply to Objection 4: Created immaterial substances are not in the same
natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power or
in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even
immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, as their
essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection
with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical genus;
because God is in no genus, as stated above ([721]Q[3], A[5]). Hence
through the likeness derived from material things we can know something
positive concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though
not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any
such knowledge at all about God.
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Whether God is the first object known by the human mind?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is the first object known by the
human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by which
we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to the
eye, and first principles to the intellect. But we know all things in
the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De Vera Relig. xxxi; [*Confess. xii,
25]). Therefore God is the first object known to us.
Objection 2: Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so.
But God is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is "the true light
which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" (Jn. 1:9).
Therefore God is our first and most known object.
Objection 3: Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar
to which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine
says (De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to
our mind.
On the contrary, "No man hath seen God at any time" (Jn. 1:18).
I answer that, Since the human intellect in the present state of life
cannot understand even immaterial created substances [722](A[1]), much
less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it
must be said simply that God is not the first object of our knowledge.
Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle (Rom.
1:20), "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made": while the first object of our knowledge
in this life is the "quiddity of a material thing," which is the proper
object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages ([723]Q[84],
A[7]; [724]Q[85], A[8]; [725]Q[87], A[2], ad 2)
Reply to Objection 1: We see and judge of all things in the light of
the first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether
natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first
truth upon it, as stated above ([726]Q[12], A[2]). Hence, as the light
itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, much less can
it be said that God is the first object known by our intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The axiom, "Whatever causes a thing to be such is
more so," must be understood of things belonging to one and the same
order, as explained above ([727]Q[81], A[2], ad 3). Other things than
God are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object,
but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: If there existed in our souls a perfect image of
God, as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know
God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument
does not prove.
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OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this
head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?
(2) Whether it understands separate substances?
(3) Whether it understands all natural things?
(4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?
(5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?
(6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?
(7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge?
(8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the separated soul can understand anything?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul separated from the body can
understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4)
that "the understanding is corrupted together with its interior
principle." But by death all human interior principles are corrupted.
Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted.
Objection 2: Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding
when the senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained
above ([728]Q[84], AA[7],8). But death destroys the senses and
imagination, as we have shown above ([729]Q[77], A[8]). Therefore after
death the soul understands nothing.
Objection 3: Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must
be by means of some species. But it does not understand by means of
innate species, because it has none such; being at first "like a tablet
on which nothing is written": nor does it understand by species
abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs of sense
and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of species: nor
does it understand by means of species, formerly abstracted and
retained in the soul; for if that were so, a child's soul would have no
means of understanding at all: nor does it understand by means of
intelligible species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not be
natural, such as we treat of now, but the effect of grace. Therefore
the soul apart from the body understands nothing.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), "If the soul had
no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body." But the
soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper operation
and above all, that which consists in intelligence. Therefore the soul
can understand when it is apart from the body.
I answer that, The difficulty in solving this question arises from the
fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to
the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed from the
soul's very nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with
the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish; for in
that case when the body was once removed, the soul would at once return
to its own nature, and would understand intelligible things simply,
without turning to the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of
other separate substances. In that case, however, the union of soul and
body would not be for the soul's good, for evidently it would
understand worse in the body than out of it; but for the good of the
body, which would be unreasonable, since matter exists on account of
the form, and not the form for the sake of matter. But if we admit that
the nature of the soul requires it to understand by turning to the
phantasms, it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that
it can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms are wanting
to which it may turn.
To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except
so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from
its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the
body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the
same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an
accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very
nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it is
in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper
place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to
the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of
understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in
corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode
of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is
proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the
soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be
joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in
accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning
to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to the
body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable
to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is
always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand by
turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the
phantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so that the nobler
way of understanding would have been natural to it, and it would not
have needed the body for that purpose.
In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is
true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something
higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a
mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible
to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual
substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the Divine
light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther
off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the
more is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines
radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one
Essence understands all things; while the superior intellectual
substances understand by means of a number of species, which
nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper
comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the
intellectual power of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual
natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal,
and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they
recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If,
therefore, the inferior substances received species in the same degree
of universality as the superior substances, since they are not so
strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through
them would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We can
see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker
intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal
conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things are
explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the
natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual
substances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades
of being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in the same
way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so
far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to
make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper
knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be
joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge
of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus we see in
the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible
examples.
It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to
a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms.
Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and
also to understand in another way.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher's words carefully examined will
show that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding
is a movement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he
had not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We
may also say that he is referring to the way of understanding by
turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of the second objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The separated soul does not understand by way of
innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species
retained, and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state
understands by means of participated species arising from the influence
of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate
substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to
act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to the
superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the
author of the influx of both of the light of grace and of the light of
nature.
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Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?
Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not understand
separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the
body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human
nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in
that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate
substances as shown above ([730]Q[88], A[1]). Therefore much less is it
able to do so when apart from the body.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence
or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul
by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means
of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more
simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all
understand separate substances.
Objection 3: Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate
happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If,
therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its
happiness would be secured by its separation alone; which cannot be
reasonably be said.
On the contrary, Souls apart from the body know other separated souls;
as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and
Abraham (Lk. 16:23). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the
angels.
I answer that, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires the
knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"---i.e. by knowing itself
([731]Q[88], A[1], ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the
separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate
things. Now it was said above [732](A[1]), that as long as it is united
to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore
it does not understand itself save through becoming actually
intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it
understands itself through its own act, as shown above ([733]Q[87],
A[1]). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no
longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible
objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now,
every separate substance "understands what is above itself and what is
below itself, according to the mode of its substance" (De Causis viii):
for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who
understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of
that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated soul is
inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other
separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect
knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and
defective knowledge of the angels so far as its natural knowledge is
concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise.
Reply to Objection 1: The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect
considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the
body: but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight
and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence
in the present life.
Reply to Objection 2: The separated soul understands the angels by
means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect
knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to
that of an angel.
Reply to Objection 3: Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the
knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who
is seen only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if
perfectly understood gives great happiness---not final and ultimate
happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly,
as was shown above in this article.
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Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural
things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate
substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances,
they also know all natural things.
Objection 2: Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible,
will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the
separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the
highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it
understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of
intelligibility.
On the contrary, The devils have greater natural knowledge than the
separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to
learn many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono
i). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things.
I answer that, As stated above [734](A[1]), the separated soul, like
the angels, understands by means of species, received from the
influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is
inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the
soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect
knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated
souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to
imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have
to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know
all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the
respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the
angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it
follows that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain
and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused manner.
Reply to Objection 1: Even an angel does not understand all natural
things through his substance, but through certain species, as stated
above ([735]Q[87], A[1]). So it does not follow that the soul knows all
natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion.
Reply to Objection 2: As the soul separated from the body does not
perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all
natural things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above
explained in this article.
Reply to Objection 3: Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future
which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so
far as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine
revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural
things.
Reply to Objection 4: Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and
perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not
follow that to study in order to learn is useless.
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Whether the separated soul knows singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not know
singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the
separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above ([736]Q[77],
A[8]). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown
([737]Q[86], A[1]). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.
Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate
than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no
determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much
less can it know singulars.
Objection 3: Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for
the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all
singulars. Therefore it knows none.
On the contrary, The rich man in hell said: "I have five brethren" (Lk.
16:28).
I answer that, Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not
even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that
there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction
from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by
the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above ([738]Q[86], A[1]).
The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God,
and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For
as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the
cause of universal and individual principles ([739]Q[14], A[2]), so
likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a
kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence. There is a
difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact
that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper
knowledge of things; whereas separated have only a confused knowledge.
Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these
species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the
singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these
species know only those singulars to which they are determined by
former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural
aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever
is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the
recipient.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellect does not know the singular by way
of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of the separated soul is confined
to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of
determinate relation, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 3: The separated soul has not the same relation to
all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others.
Therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all
singulars.
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Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this
life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for the
Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" (1 Cor. 13:8).
Objection 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy
knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of
knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some
who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are
better; which seems unreasonable.
Objection 3: Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by
influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge
here acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two
forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which
cannot be.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4,5), that "a
habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed
by sickness or the like." But in this life there is no change so
thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is
destroyed by death.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn on
earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven."
I answer that, Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the
intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative,
cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not
kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that
when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also
be entirely destroyed.
But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of
species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of
knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive
powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the
very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the
actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of
the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by
the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers.
Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain
facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid
sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of
the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible
object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the
intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the
inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.
Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in
the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers;
but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain;
because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form
may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its
contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject
is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted
through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an
incorruptible faculty, as above stated ([740]Q[79], A[2], ad 2).
Neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be
corrupted by their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible
"intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a thing
is." But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental
composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what is false in
statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be
corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from the
knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work
mentions two ways in which knowledge is corrupted directly: namely,
"forgetfulness" on the part of the memorative power, and "deception" on
the part of a false argument. But these have no place in the separated
soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as
it is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a
habit, but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the
assertion quoted, "Now, I know in part."
Reply to Objection 2: As a less good man may exceed a better man in
bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge
in the future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge,
however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the
better man.
Reply to Objection 3: These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same
species, so there is no impossibility.
Reply to Objection 4: This objection considers the corruption of
knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers.
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Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does
not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i,
4), that when the body is corrupted, "the soul neither remembers nor
loves." But to consider what is previously known is an act of memory.
Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here
acquired.
Objection 2: Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in
the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But
in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without
turning to phantasms, as shown above ([741]Q[84], A[7]). Therefore the
separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by
intelligible species acquired in this life.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that "habits
produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired." But the habit
of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to
phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts,
however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in
the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired in
this life.
On the contrary, It was said to Dives in hell (Lk. 16:25): "Remember
thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime."
I answer that, Action offers two things for our consideration---its
species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the
faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which
is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power
of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of
the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due to the eye's
visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species remain in the
separated soul, as stated above [742](A[5]), and since the state of the
separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that
through the intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart
from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a
different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a
soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here
acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a different way.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according
as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way
to the intellect, as explained above ([743]Q[79], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 2: The different mode of intelligence is produced by
the different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of
species.
Reply to Objection 3: The acts which produce a habit are like the acts
caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do
just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of
political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic.
v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that local distance impedes the separated
soul's knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that
"the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here."
But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance
impedes the knowledge in the separated soul.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that "the
demon's rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to
us." But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless
their knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a
much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose
nature is inferior to the demon's.
Objection 3: Further, as there is distance of place, so is there
distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the
separated soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it
seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 16:23), that Dives, "lifting up his
eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off." Therefore local
distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul.
I answer that, Some have held that the separated soul knows the
singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be
that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible
would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible, and in
either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is,
however, impossible because abstraction of the species from the
sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which
do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body. But the soul
when separated understands singulars by species derived from the Divine
light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence knowledge
in the separated soul is not hindered by local distance.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says that the souls of the departed
cannot see what is done here, not because they are 'there,' as if
impeded by local distance; but for some other cause, as we shall
explain [744](A[8]).
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks there in accordance with the
opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have
sensitive powers, which require local distance. In the same book he
expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of
narration than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. Dei xxi, 10.
Reply to Objection 3: The future, which is distant in time, does not
actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far
as a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being
knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is knowable
in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of
place.
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Whether separated souls know that takes place on earth?
Objection 1: It would seem that separated souls know what takes place
on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have,
according to what Dives said (Lk. 16:27,28), "I have five brethren . .
. he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of
torments." Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth.
Objection 2: Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or
awake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared to
Saul (1 Kings 28:11). But this could not be unless they knew what takes
place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth.
Objection 3: Further, separated souls know what happens among
themselves. If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us,
it must be by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be
false [745](A[7]).
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:21): "He will not understand
whether his children come to honor or dishonor."
I answer that, By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the
souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows from
what has been laid down [746](A[4]), since the separated soul has
knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by
some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine
order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the
living, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst
they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and
hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives
the reason thus: "The dead do not know how the living act, for the life
of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as corporeal
things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are distinct in
knowledge" (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same (De Cura pro
Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, "the souls of the dead have no
concern in the affairs of the living."
Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as
regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the
passage above quoted: "The case of the holy souls is different, for
since they see the light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that
external things are unknown to them." But Augustine (De Cura pro Mort.
xiii) expressly says: "The dead, even the saints do not know what is
done by the living or by their own children," as a gloss quotes on the
text, "Abraham hath not known us" (Is. 63:16). He confirms this opinion
by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his
mother, as when she was alive; and he could not think it possible that
she was less kind when in a happier state; and again by the fact that
the Lord promised to king Josias that he should die, lest he should see
his people's afflictions (4 Kings 22:20). Yet Augustine says this in
doubt; and premises, "Let every one take, as he pleases, what I say."
Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, "We cannot
believe." His opinion, indeed, seems to be the more probable one---that
the souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For
they are equal to the angels, of whom Augustine says that they know
what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the
blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer
from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in
accordance with Divine justice.
Reply to Objection 1: The souls of the departed may care for the
living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead
by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of
their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to
them not immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by
angels and demons, or even by "the revelation of the Holy Ghost," as
Augustine says in the same book.
Reply to Objection 2: That the dead appear to the living in any way
whatever is either by the special dispensation of God; in order that
the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living---and this
is to be accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur
through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the
knowledge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the living
appear, without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine
says in the same book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared
through Divine revelation; according to Ecclus. 46:23, "he slept, and
told the king the end of his life." Or, again, this apparition was
procured by the demons; unless, indeed, the authority of Ecclesiasticus
be set aside through not being received by the Jews as canonical
Scripture.
Reply to Objection 3: This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the
obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above.
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OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man,
concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: (1) the
production of man himself; (2) the end of this production; (3) the
state and condition of the first man; (4) the place of his abode.
Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be
considered: (1) the production of man's soul; (2) the production of
man's body; (3) the production of the woman.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man's soul was something made, or was of the Divine
substance?
(2) Whether, if made, it was created?
(3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?
(4) Whether it was made before the body?
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Whether the soul was made or was of God's substance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's
substance. For it is written (Gn. 2:7): "God formed man of the slime of
the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was
made a living soul." But he who breathes sends forth something of
himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine
substance.
Objection 2: Further, as above explained ([747]Q[75], A[5]), the soul
is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure
act; which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God's
substance.
Objection 3: Further, things that exist and do differ are the same. But
God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be
differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite.
Therefore God and the human mind are the same.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain
opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and
contrary to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion
that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself."
I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves
a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said
([748]Q[77] , A[2]; [749]Q[79], A[2]; [750]Q[84], A[6]), the human soul
is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence
---acquires its knowledge somehow from things---and thus has various
powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is
a pure act---receives nothing from any other---and admits of no variety
in itself, as we have proved ([751]Q[3], AA[1],7; [752]Q[9], A[1]).
This error seems to have originated from two statements of the
ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things,
being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but
bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they
considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held
that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded
as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that
the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this
supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal
light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the
body.
Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the
existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the
form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the world
by movement and reason," as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 [*The
words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.]) So some supposed man's soul
to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for
they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of
spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies.
But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above ([753]Q[3],
AA[1],8; and [754]Q[75], A[1]), wherefore it is evidently false that
the soul is of the substance of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the
material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe [spirare], is
the same as to "make a spirit." Moreover, in the material sense, man by
breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an
extraneous thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is a simple form in its
essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by
participation, as above explained ([755]Q[75], A[5], ad 4). Therefore
it is not a pure act like God.
Reply to Objection 3: That which differs, properly speaking, differs in
something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also
resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be
compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble
each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet
all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are
diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter
into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the
difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these
again differ by some further difference.
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Whether the soul was produced by creation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation.
For that which has in itself something material is produced from
matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act.
Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created.
Objection 2: Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the
potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to
act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act
of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the
soul is educed from the potentiality of matter.
Objection 3: Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is
created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come
into existence by generation; which is not true.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:27): "God created man to His own
image." But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was
created.
I answer that, The rational soul can be made only by creation; which,
however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be
made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is
suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which
itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence.
Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas
an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and
so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being,
because by it something is white. Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did.
vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than
as something." The same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms.
Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing
form to be made; but such are said to be made through the composite
substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a
subsistent form, as above explained ([756]Q[75], A[2]). Wherefore it is
competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of
pre-existing matter---whether corporeal, which would render it a
corporeal being---or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation
of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it
cannot exist except by creation.
Reply to Objection 1: The soul's simple essence is as the material
element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which
participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence,
because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds if
the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some
maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another
form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul
would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of
pre-existent matter.
Reply to Objection 2: The production of act from the potentiality of
matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously
was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its
existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the
capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen ([757]Q[75], A[2]), it is
not educed from the potentiality of matter.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have said, there is no comparison between
the rational soul and other forms.
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Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately
made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual
things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are
produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are
produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things;
for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things
from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their
end. But "inferior things are forwarded by the higher," as Dionysius
says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into
existence by the higher, and souls by angels.
Objection 3: Further, "perfect is that which can produce its like," as
is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect
than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own
species, much more are angels able to produce something specifically
inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7) that God Himself "breathed
into the face of man the breath of life."
I answer that, Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God,
produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against
faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced
except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent
alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the
second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause,
as above explained ([758]Q[75], A[3]): and every agent, that
presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein.
Therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone
acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be
produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately
by God.
Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce
their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher
things lead forward the inferior---all these things are effected
through a certain transmutation.
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Whether the human soul was produced before the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul was made before the
body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and
adornment, as shown above ([759]Q[66], A[1]; [760]Q[70], A[1]). But the
soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the
work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.
Objection 2: Further, the rational soul has more in common with the
angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before
bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas
the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were
made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body.
Objection 3: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in
the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was
created before the body.
On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality.
Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was
produced in the body.
I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul
of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the
same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that
all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their
natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of
them---namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies---are united to
bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from
matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken ([761]Q[47], A[2]); and
so we need say nothing about it here.
Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the
first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body,
for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during
the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to
some "causal virtues"; which cannot be said of the soul, because
neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter,
nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems
that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things
were made, was created, together with the angels; and that afterwards,
by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not
say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad
lit. vii, 29): "We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid,
that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was
created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that
the soul was already created."
Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself
a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as
its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the
body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above
supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the
first things in their perfect natural state, as their species required.
Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection
only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for
the soul to be created without the body.
Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the
six days ([762]Q[74], A[2]), we may say that the human soul preceded in
the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it
has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself
created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints,
both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of
the six days.
Reply to Objection 1: If the soul by its nature were a complete
species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would
prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the
soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not
separately, but in the body.
Reply to Objection 2: The same observation applies to the second
objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have
something still more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the
body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle.
Reply to Objection 3: That the soul remains after the body, is due to a
defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the
soul was first created.
__________________________________________________________________
THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The matter from which it was produced;
(2) The author by whom it was produced;
(3) The disposition it received in its production;
(4) The mode and order of its production.
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Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the body of the first man was not made
of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make
something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is
farther off from actual existence than "being in potentiality." But
since man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was
fitting that in the production of man's body, the power of God should
be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the
slime of the earth, but out of nothing.
Objection 2: Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly
bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is
perfected by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it
should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body.
Objection 3: Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as
is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most
noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the
slime of the earth.
Objection 4: Further, the human body is composed of the four elements.
Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four
elements.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): "God made man of the slime of
the earth."
I answer that, As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection
on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect"
(Dt. 32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things
are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united in
one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as
various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue.
This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which
are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their
knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way.
For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but
is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a
rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to
the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable
temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance,
yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate
in him by their power; for life is mostly found where there is heat,
which is from fire; and where there is humor, which is of the air. But
the inferior elements abound in man by their substance; otherwise the
mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior
elements, which have the less power, predominated in quantity.
Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of
the earth; because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for
this reason man is called 'a little world,' because all creatures of
the world are in a way to be found in him.
Reply to Objection 1: The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in
man's body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting
that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might
have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being something
between spiritual and corporeal substances.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler
than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the
heavenly body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the
knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of
which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is
it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the
composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul
is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they
say is false---that light is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for
something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body,
and to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is
impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed
bodies, except as in the effects of its power.
Reply to Objection 3: If fire and air, whose action is of greater
power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would
entirely draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality
in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the
sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the
organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries of
which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either in
such a way that it is entirely void of the whole "genus" of such
contraries---thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without color,
so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is not
possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very
elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense---or so
that the organ is a medium between two contraries, as much needs be the
case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the
extremes.
Reply to Objection 4: In the slime of the earth are earth, and water
binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no
mention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we
have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention
is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of
uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately
addressed.
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Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human body was not produced by God
immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal
things are disposed by God through the angels." But the human body was
made of corporeal matter, as stated above [763](A[1]). Therefore it was
produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by
God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not
necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be
produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain
animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a
heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat
and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the
human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by
some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement
of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the
human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly
body had part in its production.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's
body was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal
virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards
it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature
by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body.
Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not
immediately by God.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:1): "God created man out of
the earth."
I answer that, The first formation of the human body could not be by
the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God.
Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are
derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes this
opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in
themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained
([764]Q[65], A[4]); and because the agent must be like its effect, it
is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce
a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that
the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the
cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made
by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by
His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can
produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material
form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by
making use of something in the nature of a seed, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed
whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first
human body was of necessity made immediately by God.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels are the ministers of God, as
regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond
the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight
to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man
from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as
ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same
way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust.
Reply to Objection 2: Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be
made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined;
although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the
work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26),
"man and the sun beget man from matter." For this reason, a place of
moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other
animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production
of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is
clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an
imperfect thing.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the heavens causes natural
changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are
caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life,
or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the
slime of the earth.
Reply to Objection 4: An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal
virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive
potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing
matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it.
Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of
pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according
to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous work in their
causal virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt
disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to
be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense
and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement
than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight.
Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.
Objection 2: Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body
lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with
covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking.
Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.
Objection 3: Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from
the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in
stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right."
I answer that, All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and
so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to give
to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best
as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the
artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for
the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the
object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this
be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an
obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural
being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its
proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And
because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance."
Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its
operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments
are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned
the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to
such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition
of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a
necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the
body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its
operations.
Reply to Objection 1: The sense of touch, which is the foundation of
the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and
for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all
animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior
sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above ([765]Q[78],
A[4]). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals
in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least
sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the
body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers
required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above
([766]Q[84], A[7]); and in order that the low temperature of the brain
may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man
for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason
of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness.
In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener
sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account of a
hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability
of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some
animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of
speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament.
Reply to Objection 2: Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some
animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which
are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly
element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the
human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man.
Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself
arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety.
Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), "the organ
of organs." Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature,
which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to
make for itself an infinite number of instruments.
Reply to Objection 3: An upright stature was becoming to man for four
reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the
purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed
on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas
the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as
ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of
sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are
situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the
ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a
livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the
senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates
further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the
sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather
intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom
of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions
are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other
parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the
ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; and thus their
utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man's
stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet,
he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he
would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a
hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we
see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder
speech, which is reason's proper operation.
Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For
man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of
the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world;
and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of
his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world,
since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part
towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition,
for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and
the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in
Scripture?
Objection 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is not
fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by
God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other
works it is written, "God said; Let it be made, and it was made."
Therefore the same should have been said of man.
Objection 2: Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as
explained above [767](A[2]). Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let
us make man."
Objection 3: Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself
which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man of
the slime of the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed
into him the breath of life."
Objection 4: Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the
whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly
said: "He breathed into his face the breath of life."
Objection 5: Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while
the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore
having said: "To His image He made them," he should not have added,
"male and female He created them."
On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man
surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as
though He did not make other things; since it is written (Ps. 101:26),
"The work of Thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere (Ps. 94:5), "His
hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is made to God's
image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture uses a special way
of speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. For we
are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have
chiefly in mind.
Reply to Objection 2: We must not imagine that when God said "Let us
make man," He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to
think. But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine
Person, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have thought that man's body was formed
first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused
into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the
production of things, that God should have made either the body without
the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human
nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body
depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.
To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made man,"
must be understood of the production of the body with the soul; and
that the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the breath of
life," should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on
His Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" (Jn. 20:22). But this
explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by
the very words of Scripture. For we read farther on, "And man was made
a living soul"; which words the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:45) refers not to
spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we
must understand the soul, so that the words, "He breathed into his face
the breath of life," are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for
the soul is the form of the body.
Reply to Objection 4: Since vital operations are more clearly seen in
man's face, on account of the senses which are there expressed;
therefore Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into
man's face.
Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the
works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to
him man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was
not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of
the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements.
But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man
were actually made.
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THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of
things?
(2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?
(3) Whether of man's rib?
(4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?
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Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been made in
the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii,
3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing misbegotten or
defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore
woman should not have been made at that first production.
Objection 2: Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin,
for to the woman was it said after sin (Gn. 3:16): "Thou shalt be under
the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin, there
is no inequality." But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity
than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman should not have
been made in the first production of things before sin.
Objection 3: Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God
foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He
should not have made woman.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:18): "It is not good for man to
be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."
I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture
says, as a "helper" to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works,
as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in
other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This can be
made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various
living things. Some living things do not possess in themselves the
power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent,
such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly
bodies, from some fitting matter and not from seed: others possess the
active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which
are generated from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is
generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of
generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect
animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the
passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital
operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally
directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with
the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that
we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in
plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them
preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to
a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation.
Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two
forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from
the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore
directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall be
two in one flesh" (Gn. 2:24).
Reply to Objection 1: As regards the individual nature, woman is
defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends
to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the
production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some
material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as
that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De
Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human nature in
general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's
intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the general
intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of
nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not only the male
but also the female.
Reply to Objection 2: Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue
of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and
this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of
subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior
makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind
of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have been
wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser
than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally
subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates.
Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we
shall prove ([768]Q[96], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: If God had deprived the world of all those things
which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been
imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in
order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so
powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end.
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Whether woman should have been made from man?
Objection 1: It would seem that woman should not have been made from
man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals
the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have
been so with man.
Objection 2: Further, things of the same species are of the same
matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man
was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of
the same, and not from man.
Objection 3: Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the
work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for
that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as
is written (Lev. 18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from
man.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:5): "He created of him,"
that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman.
I answer that, When all things were first formed, it was more suitable
for the woman to be made from man that (for the female to be from the
male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a
certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the
whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle
of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that "God made the whole
human race from one" (Acts 17:26). Secondly, that man might love woman
all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be
fashioned from himself. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23,24): "She was
taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and
shall cleave to his wife." This was most necessary as regards the human
race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not
the case with other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. viii, 12), the human male and female are united, not only for
generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic
life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the
man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman
to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a
sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church
takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32):
"This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."
Reply OBJ 1 is clear from the foregoing.
Reply to Objection 2: Matter is that from which something is made. Now
created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined
to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore
from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species.
On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things
of the same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of
the earth, and a woman from out of man.
Reply to Objection 3: A certain affinity arises from natural
generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was
not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power
alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this
argument does not prove.
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Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been formed
from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's
body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only---either
by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made
out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself)---or by
rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x): "A body
cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction." But the woman's body is
not more rarefied than man's---at least, not in the proportion of a rib
to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed from a rib of Adam.
Objection 2: Further, in those things which were first created there
was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the
integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained
imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose.
Objection 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain.
But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib
to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:22): "God built the rib, which He
took from Adam, into a woman."
I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man.
First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman
should neither "use authority over man," and so she was not made from
his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man's contempt as
his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Secondly, for the
sacramental signification; for from the side of Christ sleeping on the
Cross the Sacraments flowed---namely, blood and water---on which the
Church was established.
Reply to Objection 1: Some say that the woman's body was formed by a
material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our
Lord multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such
an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance
of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change
of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in
itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and
has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size
are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore
multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter
itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless it
receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the
same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says
(Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged,
without being rarefied, is to combine contradictories ---viz. the
definition with the absence of the thing defined.
Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of
matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or
which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract.
xxiv in Joan.) that "Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves,
in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of
corn"---that is, by transformation of the nourishment. Nevertheless, we
say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made
from the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing
matter of the loaves and of the rib.
Reply to Objection 2: The rib belonged to the integral perfection of
Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race;
just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is
released by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore,
was it possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should
be produced from the man's rib.
From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.
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Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by
God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another
individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is
of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal
things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body was
formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the
ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God.
Objection 3: Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to
their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and
not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its causal
virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God.
On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work: "God alone, to Whom
all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from
the man's rib."
I answer that, As was said above (A[2], ad 2), the natural generation
of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence
man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore
from any other matter an individual of the human species cannot
naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can
produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary course of nature.
Therefore God alone could produce either a man from the slime of the
earth, or a woman from the rib of man.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is verified when an individual is
begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same
species.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do
not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of
the woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by
the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the
woman formed by them from the man's rib.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The
first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus;
it made it possible for her to be thus made." Therefore the body of the
woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first
created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a
potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the
Creator.
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THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)
We now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is
said to be made "to the image and likeness of God." There are under
this head nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the image of God is in man?
(2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?
(3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?
(4) Whether the image of God is in every man?
(5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence,
or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?
(6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?
(7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and
acts?
(8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object?
(9) Of the difference between "image" and "likeness."
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Whether the image of God is in man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it
is written (Is. 40:18): "To whom have you likened God? or what image
will you make for Him?"
Objection 2: Further, to be the image of God is the property of the
First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. 1:15): "Who is the image
of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature." Therefore the
image of God is not to be found in man.
Objection 3: Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can. Synod.
Ancyr.]) that "an image is of the same species as that which it
represents"; and he also says that "an image is the undivided and
united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." But
there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a
comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no
image of God in man.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): "Let Us make man to Our own
image and likeness."
I answer that, As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image
exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there
is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness is
essential to an image; and that an image adds something to
likeness---namely, that it is copied from something else. For an
"image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of
something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and
equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because
it is not copied from it.
But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image there is not
necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a
glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect
image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a
copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God,
copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of
equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore
there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but
imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was
made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to" signifies a certain
approach, as of something at a distance.
Reply to Objection 1: The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man.
Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But
God made a spiritual image to Himself in man.
Reply to Objection 2: The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image
of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He
is said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to
be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by reason
of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot
be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His
first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the
same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature,
as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine says
explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore).
Reply to Objection 3: As unity means absence of division, a species is
said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one
not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according
to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one
with God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which
adequately represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect
image.
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Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?
Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in
irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are
contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of
rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God
is to be found in irrational creatures.
Objection 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it
approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine
goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God.
Objection 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the
more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness
than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together
are called "very good" (Gn. 1:31). Therefore the whole universe is to
the image of God, and not only man.
Objection 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding
the world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore the
whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's
excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by
giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of
the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's
image.
I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied from
something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be
only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does
not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a
worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image,
merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white
like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for
whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of
an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king
exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly
in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary
says pointedly that "an image is of the same species."
Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate
difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly
because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because
they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu.
51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures
nothing comes nearer to Him." It is clear, therefore, that intellectual
creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image.
Reply to Objection 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of what
is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image,
so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in
some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are
"contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they happen
[contingit] to be so, but not absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine
goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity
which is involved in the idea of an image.
Reply to Objection 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the
intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but
intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is
found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the
highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided
against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we
say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do
not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that
the other parts are excluded.
Reply to Objection 4: Boethius here uses the word "image" to express
the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species
in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the
exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using
the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature,
that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being;
as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the
Supreme Wisdom.
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Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of
God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii (de
verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man
to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are
more than man to the image of God.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is
so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between
Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a creature
is called God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore the angels
are not more to the image of God than man.
Objection 3: Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as
it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not
admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing,
since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image
of God than man.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is
called a "seal of resemblance" [Ezech. 28:12] because in him the
resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression."
I answer that, We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we may
consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the
intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the
angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect,
as is clear from what has been said ([769]Q[58], A[3]; [770]Q[79],
A[8]). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its
accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation
of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from
God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole
body, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul
is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to
the whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more
perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves
belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose
the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even
brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their
intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man
is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the
image of God than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to
God.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft
of reason from the image of God; but not the angels.
Reply to Objection 2: As fire is said to be specifically the most
subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle
than another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human
soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had
said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in
likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." Wherefore this does
not mean that the angels are not more to God's image.
Reply to Objection 3: When we say that substance does not admit of more
or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more
perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not
participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another;
nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different
individuals in a greater or lesser degree.
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Whether the image of God is found in every man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in every
man. For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman is
the image [Vulg. glory] of man" (1 Cor. 11:7). Therefore, as woman is
an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual
is not an image of God.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): "Whom God foreknew,
He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son."
But all men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the
conformity of image.
Objection 3: Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as
above explained [771](A[1]). But by sin man becomes unlike God.
Therefore he loses the image of God.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:7): "Surely man passeth as an
image."
I answer that, Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of
his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to
that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now
the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God
understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God
is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural
aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists
in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly,
inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though
imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace.
Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image
consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, "The light
of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), the gloss
distinguishes a threefold image of "creation," of "re-creation," and of
"likeness." The first is found in all men, the second only in the just,
the third only in the blessed.
Reply to Objection 1: The image of God, in its principal signification,
namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman.
Hence after the words, "To the image of God He created him," it is
added, "Male and female He created them" (Gn. 1:27). Moreover it is
said "them" in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22) remarks,
lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one
individual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in man,
and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is
the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle had said
that "man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of
man," he adds his reason for saying this: "For man is not of woman, but
woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man."
Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in the
conformity of grace and glory.
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Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man
as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De Fide ad
Petrum i): "One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one
is the image to which man was made." And Hilary (De Trin. v) says: "Man
is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity." Therefore
the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of the
Trinity of Persons.
Objection 2: Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of
God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as "an
intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement." Gregory of
Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture says
that "man was made to the image of God, it means that human nature was
made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the fulness of
goodness." Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence
than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the image of God in
man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence.
Objection 3: Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which
it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to
the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural
reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the
Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above
([772]Q[32], A[1]).
Objection 4: Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the
Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2)
that "the Son alone is the image of the Father." Therefore, if in man
there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an
image of the Trinity, but only of the Son.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The plurality of the
Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been
made to the image of God."
I answer that, as we have seen ([773]Q[40], A[2]), the distinction of
the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations
of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in
each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being
produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and
plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the
Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore to be to
the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude
being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons:
but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in
man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature
and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is
one Nature in Three Persons.
Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument would avail if the image of God in
man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De
Trin. xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within
ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: "We see,
rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we
believe rather than see that God is Trinity."
Reply to Objection 4: Some have said that in man there is an image of
the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6).
First, because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of
essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to
the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly,
because if man were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would
not have said, "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness"; but "to
Thy image." When, therefore, it is written, "He made him to the image
of God," the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the
Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity
made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it is said
that God "made man to His image," this can be understood in two ways:
first, so that this preposition "to" points to the term of the making,
and then the sense is, "Let Us make man in such a way that Our image
may be in him." Secondly, this preposition 'to' may point to the
exemplar cause, as when we say, "This book is made (like) to that one."
Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly
called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as some
say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person
imitates another.
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Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?
Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not only in man's
mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:7) that "the man is the image . .
. of God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to
be observed not only in his mind.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Gn. 1:27): "God created man to His
own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He
created them." But the distinction of male and female is in the body.
Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the
mind.
Objection 3: Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape
of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God
is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.
Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24)
there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or
imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual vision
that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of
which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must
be another trinity in the others.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:23,24): "Be renewed in the
spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given to
understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man,
belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10): "Putting on the new"
man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to the
image of Him that created him," where the renewal which consists in
putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be
to the image of God belongs to the mind only.
I answer that, While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to
God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" as we
have explained above ([774]AA[1],2); whereas in other creatures we find
a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect or mind is that
whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this
image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the
mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen
to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to
which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be
likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the
way in which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents
anything. An "image" represents something by likeness in species, as we
have said; while a "trace" represents something by way of an effect,
which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the
likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of
animals are called "traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and
desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army.
Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and
others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine
Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the
uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature,
rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the
representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only
in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained
[775](A[2]); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we
observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if
we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is
distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of
Love from both of these, as we have seen ([776]Q[28], A[3]); so we may
say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word
in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there
exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation
of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the
principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a
certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced
them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature,
proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to
the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to
the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by
reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of
the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a
likeness to God by way of an "image" in his mind; but in the other
parts of his being by way of a "trace."
Reply to Objection 1: Man is called to the image of God; not that he is
essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his
mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the
king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as
existing in every part of man.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have
thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but
severally. They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father;
those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a
third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from
man as not to be his son or daughter." All of this is manifestly
absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the
principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's
offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one
Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have
mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the
offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said,
"to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He
created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the
distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes,
since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction.
Wherefore the Apostle (Col. 3:10), after saying, "According to the
image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male nor
female" [*these words are in reality from Gal. 3:28] (Vulg. "neither
Gentile nor Jew").
Reply to Objection 3: Although the image of God in man is not to be
found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among
terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted
to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is
made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other
animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But this is not to be
understood as though the image of God were in man's body; but in the
sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God
in the soul by way of a trace.
Reply to Objection 4: Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision
we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in
corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body;
secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the
sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention
of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen.
Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the
memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative
power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the
species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both
together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image.
For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the
soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the
soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls
short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine
Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the
species of the external body, but from this, and at the same time from
the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the
species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the
imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the
Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the
will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in
corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy
Ghost from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.
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Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in the
acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man
was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist,
and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist does not signify
an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's
acts.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in
the soul to these three things---mind, knowledge, and love. But mind
does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the
intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the
acts of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of
the Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But these
three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the Sentences
says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and
does not extend to the acts of the soul.
Objection 4: Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the
soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God
does not extend to the acts.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity
in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision,
whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the
mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be referred
to actual vision.
I answer that, As above explained [777](A[2]), a certain representation
of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image
of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it
where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the
species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from
each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker,
and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word
"cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv,
7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be
found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge
which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and
thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the
habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle,
therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may
be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits,
forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.
Reply to Objection 1: Our being bears the image of God so far as if is
proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in
so far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the
same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which
consists in mind, knowledge, and love.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine observed this trinity, first, as
existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself
entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know
itself---namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it
searches itself, as Augustine subsequently proves---De Trin. x, 3,4);
therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he
takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely,
memory, understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of
possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these
three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be
said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we
actually consider them, and when we do not think of them. When they are
not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory
only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of
knowledge and love [*Cf. [778]Q[79], A[7], ad 1]. "But since," as he
says, "a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we think
everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word
belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly consists in these
three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I
mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will,
love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its
parent." From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine
Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as
existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus
the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he
says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding,
and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences.
Reply to Objection 4: Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's
statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself, ever
understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean that
the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes
this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think of itself
as actually distinct from other things." Thus it is clear that the soul
always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually;
though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands
itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always
actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these
acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their
principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin.
xiv, 4): "If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense
that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider
God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its
existence."
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Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison
with God as its object?
Objection 1: It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in
the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image
of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above
[779](A[7]), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and
love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object.
Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any
object.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we
seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without
separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the
consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of the Trinity is
to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.
Objection 3: Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If,
therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of
the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not
in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.
Objection 4: Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed
to the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2
Cor. 3:18): "We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory to
glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. Therefore
the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of God
exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves
itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember,
understand, and love God by Whom it was made." Much less, therefore, is
the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects.
I answer that, As above explained ([780]AA[2],7), image means a
likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a
representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image
of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of
species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a
creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated ([781]AA[6],7), are
distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word
from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the
Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love
proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that
diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in
the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from
that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is
specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the
verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived
therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the
soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to
God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and
immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone
sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned
towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), the "the mind
remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive
this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless,
rightly called the image of God." But this is due to the fact, not that
the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can
furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority quoted above
(Arg. On the contrary).
Reply to Objection 1: For the notion of an image it is not enough that
something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe
what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God
proceeds from knowledge of God.
Reply to Objection 2: In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity,
not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the
contemplation of eternal things, "any third thing should be required to
make up the trinity," as he adds in the same passage. But in that part
of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although a
trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there," as
he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is
adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal
things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are
actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they
begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which
comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life
faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be
in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love
as seen above ([782]Q[12], A[12]; [783]Q[56], A[3]; [784]Q[60], A[5]).
This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can
make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image
of God abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of God be so
obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in
those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured and disfigured," as
in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine says
(De Trin. xiv, 6).
Reply to Objection 4: By the vision of glory temporal things will be
seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong
to the image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6),
when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully
adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the
Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures.
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Whether "likeness" is properly distinguished from "image"?
Objection 1: It would seem that "likeness" is not properly
distinguished from "image." For "genus" is not properly distinguished
from "species." Now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species:
because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not
conversely" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness" is
not properly to be distinguished from "image."
Objection 2: Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the
representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation of
the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and
indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness is in the
essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in
other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi).
Objection 3: Further, the image of God in man is threefold---the image
of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained [785](A[4]). But
innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is
incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is taken from the
memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from
innocence and righteousness."
Objection 4: Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and
love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image.
Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image
consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of
virtue."
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider that
these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and
"likeness," since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed."
I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality
causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now,
since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted
to each single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the
good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and
as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in
the same way there exists a kind of comparison between "likeness" and
"image." For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an
individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as
we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect
virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a
preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image,
as we have said above [786](A[1]): and, again, it may be considered as
subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of
image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents,
according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness
may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and
existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things
which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the
image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu.
51) that "the spirit" (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the
image of God. "But the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's
inferior faculties, or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some
made to God's likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii)
that the likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for
corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But
likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression
and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being, endowed
with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness
of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the same sense
"likeness" is said to belong to "the love of virtue": for there is no
virtue without love of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the
general notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but
so far as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it
perfects the idea of "image."
Reply to Objection 2: The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as
representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the
intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general
notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.
Reply to Objection 3: Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at
least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural
"likeness" exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term
"image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness."
Reply to Objection 4: Love of the word, which is knowledge loved,
belongs to the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to
"likeness," as virtue itself belongs to likeness.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as
regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning the first
there are two things to be considered: (1) The condition of man as to
his intellect; (2) the condition of man as to his will.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?
(2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?
(3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?
(4) Whether he could err or be deceived?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the first man saw God through His Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man saw God through His
Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine
Essence. But the first man, "while established in paradise, led a life
of happiness in the enjoyment of all things," as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "If man
was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have been in
paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!" Therefore the first man
in paradise saw God through His Essence.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that
"the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." But
our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine
Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence.
Objection 3: Further, the vision of God is His Essence is whereby God
is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence
"saw God immediately," as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent.
iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies
obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity resulted
from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw God through His
Essence.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was not first
which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see God through
His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the primitive
state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence.
I answer that, The first man did not see God through His Essence if we
consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be said
that he saw God in a vision, when "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam"
(Gn. 2:21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is
beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence
has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear
that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, since
naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness.
Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away
from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence
are so firmly established in the love of God, that for eternity they
can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not
see God through His Essence.
Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now.
Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the
present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see
God through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the
vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the
vision of God through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is,
and the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it; for
instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his
image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more
perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those
which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is
impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible
creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible
things. Now, it is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right." And
man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers
were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not
to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by
exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the
intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first
truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps God used to speak
to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a
ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the
experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the
Divine Essence." Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God,
man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now.
Reply to Objection 1: Man was happy in paradise, but not with that
perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the
vision of the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with "a life of
happiness in a certain measure," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi,
18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.
Reply to Objection 2: A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will
of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have,
while in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward.
Reply to Objection 3: A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through
which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for
example, a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror:
another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of
something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was seen
without this second kind of medium, but not without the first kind. For
there was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of God
by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew
God simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intelligible
effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must remark that the
obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be of two kinds:
first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with
the immensity of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma,
because he saw Him in a created effect: secondly, we may take obscurity
as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of
intelligible things by being preoccupied with sensible things; in which
sense Adam did not see God in an enigma.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence
?
Objection 1: It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw
the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1): "In
paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of
heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels."
Objection 2: Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the
knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body which
"is a load upon the soul," as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore the
separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained
([787]Q[89], A[2]). But the body of the first man was not a load upon
his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to
see separate substances.
Objection 3: Further, one separate substance knows another separate
substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the
first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.
On the contrary, The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours. But
our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore neither
could Adam's soul.
I answer that, The state of the human soul may be distinguished in two
ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence; and in
this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the
state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of the soul
is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of
natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state of innocence
is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's soul, in the
state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body;
wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a "living soul";
that is, a soul giving life to the body---namely animal life. But he
was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the body was
entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said
above [788](A[1]). Now it is clear from what has been already said
([789]Q[84], A[7]; [790]Q[85], A[1]; [791]Q[89], A[1]) that since the
soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life,
it is fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is
by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was
becoming to the soul of the first man also.
Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees
of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first is
by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on
itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be associated
with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the third is when
the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good," that is, to
God.
In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to
itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the
intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external
things, as we have said above ([792]Q[87], A[3]): and so by the
knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly,
as an act through its object. And through the intellectual operation
itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through
its proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect
knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to
phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above
([793]Q[55], A[2]); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the
soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an
angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for
even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know themselves, are
not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason
of its surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man could
not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more
excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess,
because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more
certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this
excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he enjoyed the company
of the angelic spirits."
This makes clear the reply to the first objection.
Reply to Objection 2: That the soul of the first man fell short of the
knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that
the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object
fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present
state, fall short on account of both these reasons.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul of the first man was not able to arrive
at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as
we have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others in
its own measure.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the first man knew all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man did not know all things.
For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, or
by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired
species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as
stated in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained
experience of all things. Nor through connatural species, because he
was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says (De
Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written."
And if his knowledge came by infused species, it would have been of a
different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves.
Objection 2: Further, individuals of the same species have the same way
of arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning,
knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time
according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all things
when he was first created.
Objection 3: Further, the present state of life is given to man in
order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the
soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would
have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in
knowledge. Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things.
On the contrary, Man named the animals (Gn. 2:20). But names should be
adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals'
natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all
other things.
I answer that, In the natural order, perfection comes before
imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in
potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God
created things not only for their own existence, but also that they
might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in
their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man can
be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body,
but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was
produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of
generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to
instruct and govern others.
Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the
first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge
of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are
whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles,
that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in
order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not
only those things which can be naturally known, but also things
surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a
supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of
faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was
endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was
necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those
things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not
necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first
man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some
individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream;
and the like.
Reply to Objection 1: The first man had knowledge of all things by
divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from
ours; as the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not
different from those given by nature.
Reply to Objection 2: To Adam, as being the first man, was due to a
degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from
what is above explained.
Reply to Objection 3: Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge,
not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing;
because what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by
experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have
advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation;
as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover there is no
comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one
man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to
another a principle of knowledge.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man in his first state could be deceived?
Objection 1: It would seem that man in his primitive state could have
been deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14) that "the woman being
seduced was in the transgression."
Objection 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, "the
woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought
that he had received the faculty of speech from God." But this was
untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived.
Objection 3: Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is
from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not
changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of
innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what
he saw, just as he is deceived now.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in
sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the
things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten
and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been
deceived, adhering to images as to realities.
Objection 5: Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other
men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above
[794](A[3]). So if anyone had told him what was false about these
things, he would have been deceived.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard what
is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment
of man condemned."
I answer that, in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things;
namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as
though it were true, but without the assent of belief---or it may mean
a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of
these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended; but
as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might have
been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term for
any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with the
idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in
such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is not to
be blamed.
Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of
the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and
while it remained so, no evil could exist." Now it is clear that as
truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of
innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to
assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such
as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man, though
no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect the
absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion.
This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by
virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower
faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to
their action. And from what has preceded ([795]Q[85], A[6]), it is
clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and
hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception occurs
must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the
like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we
are not deceived by such images, but only when it is not free, as is
the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the
primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the woman was deceived before she sinned
in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior
pride. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could
not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already
acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of
self-conceit."
Reply to Objection 2: The woman thought that the serpent had received
this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of
some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of
the Sentences in this point.
Reply to Objection 3: Were anything presented to the imagination or
sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he
would not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to
judge the truth.
Reply to Objection 4: A man is not accountable for what occurs during
sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's
proper action.
Reply to Objection 5: If anyone had said something untrue as regards
future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the
primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might have
believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to
entertain a false opinion.
It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from
above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did
not extend.
If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though
he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had already
sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine
aid.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL---NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNES
S
(FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning
which there are two points of treatment: (1) the grace and
righteousness of the first man; (2) the use of righteousness as regards
his dominion over other things.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the first man was created in grace?
(2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?
(3) Whether he had all virtues?
(4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the first man was created in grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man was not created in grace.
For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Cor.
15:45): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into
a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore
Christ alone was made in grace.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123)
[*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever
possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in
grace.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God
so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they
could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the
discernment of righteousness." God thus first created men and angels in
the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on
them.
Objection 4: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man
was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient
to advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the
first man was not created in grace.
Objection 5: Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of
the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place
between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore
man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation.
Objection 6: Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is
from glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes
glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.
On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the
angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9):
"God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with
grace." Therefore man also was created in grace.
I answer that, Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it
was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of
the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.
But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was
endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in
grace, according to Eccles. 7:30, "God made man right." For this
rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower
powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection
was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was
subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as
Augustine says [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.
i, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul
and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it
would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural
gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence
it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which
reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a
supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect
should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine
command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their
nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as
though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience."
Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the
soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul
through grace existing therein.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle in these words means to show that
there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the
spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of
the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's
words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in
his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not
disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted
with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the
faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness
directly after death.
Reply to Objection 3: This passage from Augustine does not assert that
angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed
grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before
being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so
confirmed.
Reply to Objection 4: The Master here speaks according to the opinion
of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a
state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace,
yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he
could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.
Reply to Objection 5: As the motion of the will is not continuous there
is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the
first moment of his existence.
Reply to Objection 6: We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not
merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions.
For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit"
(Gal. 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence.
Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his
body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.
Objection 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the
moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore
the passions were entirely excluded from him.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our
first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions of
the soul.
I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite,
the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the
soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is
evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was
neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a
good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such
as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of
good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence.
But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which
regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope
that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise,
however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite,
wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence
at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other
times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual
appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the
inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state
the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment
of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the
rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the
state of innocence.
Reply to Objection 2: The human body was impassible in the state of
innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of
nature, as will be explained later on ([796]Q[97], A[2]); likewise the
soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use
of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take
away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as
he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic.
iii, 11.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Adam had all the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some
virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is
restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the
state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore
neither did these virtues then exist.
Objection 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions
which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with
fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as
stated above [797](A[2]). Therefore neither did those virtues exist
then.
Objection 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed.
Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state of
innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did
those virtues exist.
Objection 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it
not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every
virtue.
Objection 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the
state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which
seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.
On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos):
"The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the
earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by
temperance, refulgent with brightness."
I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a certain sense
possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes.
For it was shown above [798](A[1]) that such was the rectitude of the
primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers
to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby
reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according
to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the
Virtues (FS, [799]Q[63], A[2]). Wherefore the rectitude of the
primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every
virtue.
It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do
not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these
virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and
in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection
either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection
be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues
necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things not
seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection
of that state did not extend to the vision of the Divine Essence, and
the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence
faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and
as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with
the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a
habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow
for sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness;
because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible with the
perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as
habits in the first man, but not as to their acts; for he was so
disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for;
and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbor, he would have done his
best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher
says, "Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a
virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he
would be ashamed if he did wrong" (Ethic. iv, 9).
Reply to Objection 1: It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to
subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which
happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are 'per
se' competent to moderate the passions.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions which have evil for their object were
incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil
be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But
passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the
perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the
demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the virtues which
relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit
and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in
the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in
the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of
penance and of mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation
not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which
relates not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which
relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of
temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates
pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating daring and hope,
but not as moderating sorrow and fear.
Reply to Objection 3: appears from what has been said above.
Reply to Objection 4: Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one
sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a
choice of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed
perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue;
signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which
sense Adam did not possess perseverance.
Reply to Objection 5: appears from what has been said above.
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Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?
Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of the first man were less
meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the mercy
of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in
need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace
is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of
merit, our actions are more meritorious.
Objection 2: Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit;
for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned except he
strive lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object
of virtue is the difficult and the good." But there is more strife and
difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.
Objection 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man
would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit
now, when he resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than
in the primitive state.
On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be better off after
sinning.
I answer that, Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways.
First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured
corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the
enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions
proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of
merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree is of
two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites into
the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others
who put great sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow gave
more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her
means. In each of these cases the degree of merit corresponds to the
accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good.
We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were
more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the
degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more
copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like
manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because,
as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater
works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason
for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a
small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty
than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.
Reply to Objection 1: After sin man requires grace for more things than
before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even
before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief
reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also for
the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.
Reply to Objection 2: Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of
merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above
explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after
what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is caused
by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs
an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed;
because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him. But the
actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy
for sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The first man would not have gained merit in
resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he
did not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have
not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the
primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our
present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist
temptation even without grace.
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OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of
innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?
(2) Whether he was master over all creatures?
(3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?
(4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?
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Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no
mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14),
that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the
angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not have
intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore
in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the animals.
Objection 2: Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one
another should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals
are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all
animals were not brought under the mastership of man.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome says [*The words quoted are not in St.
Jerome's works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as
quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Gn. 1:26]: "God gave man mastership
over the animals, although before sin he had no need of them: for God
foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to man." Therefore,
at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his
mastership.
Objection 4: Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a
command is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man
had no mastership over the irrational animals.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): "Let him have dominion over
the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the
earth" [Vulg."and the whole earth"].
I answer that, As above stated ([800]Q[95], A[1]) for his disobedience
to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which
should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before
man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to
him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved
in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for just as in
the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of
the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form;
and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there
order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use
of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their
nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both
plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of
nature, that man should be master over animals. Hence the Philosopher
says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and
natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right. Secondly, this
is proved by the order of Divine Providence which always governs
inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as man, being made to the
image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his
government. Thirdly, this is proved from a property of man and of other
animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of
natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man
possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters. Now
whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal.
Therefore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be
natural.
Reply to Objection 1: A higher power can do many things that an
inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an
angel is naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard
to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for
instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals.
Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of some, those animals which now
are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not
only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is
quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man's
sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others,
would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede's
gloss on Gn. 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all
animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural
antipathy between some animals. They would not, however, on this
account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at
present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of God,
Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would
have been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic
animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon.
Reply to Objection 3: In the state of innocence man would not have had
any bodily need of animals---neither for clothing, since then they were
naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of
concupiscence---nor for food, since they fed on the trees of
paradise---nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for
that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental
knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led
the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their
respective natures.
Reply to Objection 4: All animals by their natural instinct have a
certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the
fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all
animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present
state some domestic animals obey him.
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Whether man had mastership over all other creatures?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not
have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally
has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8),
"corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels." Much
less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence.
Objection 2: Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants
are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these doe not
naturally obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man.
Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have
mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion
over plants.
Objection 3: Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it.
But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for
this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii).
Therefore man had no dominion over them.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): "That he may have dominion
over . . . every creature."
I answer that, Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so
according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he
can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things
in man: his "reason," which makes him like to the angels'; his
"sensitive powers," whereby he is like the animals; his "natural
forces," which liken him to the plants; and "the body itself," wherein
he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of a
master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the
angels in the primitive state; so when we read "all creatures," we must
understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over the
sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey reason
in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state
of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them.
But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by
commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence
man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in
commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without
hindrance.
The answers to the objections appear from the above.
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Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence all would
have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): "Where there is no sin,
there is no inequality." But in the state of innocence there was no
sin. Therefore all were equal.
Objection 2: Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual
love, according to Ecclus. 13:19, "Every beast loveth its like; so also
every man him that is nearest to himself." Now in that state there was
among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore
all were equal in the state of innocence.
Objection 3: Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But
the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part
of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on
the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of
nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which
would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 13:1): "The things which are of
God, are well ordered" [Vulg."Those that are, are ordained of God"].
But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xix, 13): "Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper
place." Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and
orderly, inequality would have existed.
I answer that, We must needs admit that in the primitive state there
would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because
generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age;
for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have
been sterile.
Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to
righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of
his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or
less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a
greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others.
There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not
entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from
exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was
dependent on food wherewith to sustain life.
So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the
stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and
also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so
that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been
no defect or fault either in soul or body.
Reply to Objection 1: By those words Gregory means to exclude such
inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is
that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty.
Reply to Objection 2: Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love.
Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than
between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father
naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although
the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him.
Reply to Objection 3: The cause of inequality could be on the part of
God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that
He would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the
more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part of
nature as above described, without any defect of nature.
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Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not
have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 15):
"God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His
image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men,
but over cattle."
Objection 2: Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin
would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made
subject to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman
(Gn. 3:16): "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power." Therefore in the
state of innocence man would not have been subject to man.
Objection 3: Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is
one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the
state of innocence, "where nothing was wanting that man's good-will
could desire," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man
would not have been master over man in the state of innocence.
On the contrary, The condition of man in the state of innocence was not
more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the angels
some rule over others; and so one order is called that of
"Dominations." Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state of
innocence that one man should be subject to another.
I answer that, Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed to
slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject
as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a general sense
to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has the office of
governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the state
of innocence man could have been a master of men, not in the former but
in the latter sense. This distinction is founded on the reason that a
slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of
himself, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics, whereas a
slave is ordered to another. So that one man is master of another as
his slave when he refers the one whose master he is, to his
own---namely the master's use. And since every man's proper good is
desirable to himself, and consequently it is a grievous matter to
anyone to yield to another what ought to be one's own, therefore such
dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject; and
consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have
existed between man and man.
But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either
towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of
mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and
man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social being,
and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a
social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the
presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such,
seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the
Philosopher says, in the beginning of the Politics, that wherever many
things are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head
directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and
virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to
the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. 4:10, "As every man hath
received grace, ministering the same one to another." Wherefore
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): "Just men command not by the love
of domineering, but by the service of counsel": and (De Civ. Dei xix,
15): "The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make
man."
From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the
first-mentioned mode of mastership.
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OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man:
first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as
regards the preservation of the species.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?
(2) Whether he was impassible?
(3) Whether he stood in need of food?
(4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?
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Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not
immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But
if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined.
Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.
Objection 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically
distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there
can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man
was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state.
Objection 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence,
this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature,
for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also
have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace;
for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to Wis.
10:2: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have regained
his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore man was not
immortal in the state of innocence.
Objection 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward,
according to Apoc. 21:4: "Death shall be no more." But man was not
created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward.
Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:12): "By sin death came into the
world." Therefore man was immortal before sin.
I answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on
the part of matter---that is to say, either because it possesses no
matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in
potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things as
these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is
incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet
it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from
corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as
Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul of such a
powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to
the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption." Thirdly,
a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in
this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of
innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work
of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine]): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that
he might achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was
indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but
by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it
was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it
remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for
since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, as
above explained ([801]Q[76], A[1]), it was most properly endowed at the
beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing
the capacity of corporeal matter.
Reply OBJ 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural
incorruptibility and immortality.
Reply to Objection 3: This power of preserving the body was not natural
to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace
as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not
recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this
was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was
to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further on
(TP, [802]Q[14] , A[4], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 4: The promised reward of the immortality of glory
differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of
innocence.
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Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was
passible. For "sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of
innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been
passible.
Objection 2: Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the
state of innocence, according to Gn. 2:21, "God cast a deep sleep upon
Adam." Therefore he would have been passible.
Objection 3: Further, the same passage goes on to say that "He took a
rib out of Adam." Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the
cutting out of part of his body.
Objection 4: Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally
passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in
contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have
suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible.
On the contrary, Had man been passible, he would have been also
corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive
suffering wastes the very substance."
I answer that, "Passion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its
proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its
natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature
contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one thing
changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, "passion" can
be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging
to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and sensation
are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the
state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first
sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise
immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so
long as he refrained from sin.
Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since
sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but
are ordered to his natural welfare.
Reply to Objection 3: As already explained ([803]Q[92], A[3], ad 2),
the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in
man, who is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not
suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he
through the separation of the rib.
Reply to Objection 4: Man's body in the state of innocence could be
preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of
his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by
Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature
could come upon him unawares.
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Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not
require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has
lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible.
Therefore he had no need of food.
Objection 2: Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment
involves passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it does
not appear how food could be needful to him.
Objection 3: Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But
Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would
not have died. Therefore he did not require food.
Objection 4: Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the
surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore it
seems that man did not take food in the primitive state.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:16): "Of every tree in paradise
ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat."
I answer that, In the state of innocence man had an animal life
requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual
life needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that
the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul by
reason of what it possesses in common with other souls---that is, as
giving life to the body; whence it is written (Gn. 2:7): "Man was made
into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body. But the
soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself,
and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power.
Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body
what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called "animal"
[*From 'anima', a soul; Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 seqq.], through having its
life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior
creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative
soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and
growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of
innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul
will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what properly
belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility,
glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called "spiritual."
So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he
required it in the state of innocence.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19
[*Works of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine]): "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained
by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." For we
have explained [804](A[1]) that the immortality of the primitive state
was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic
disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the body might
lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption
of the humor, man was obliged to take food.
Reply to Objection 2: A certain passion and alteration attends
nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the
thing nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was
passible, but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of
passion conduced to the perfection of the nature.
Reply to Objection 3: If man had not taken food he would have sinned;
as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the
same time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and
to eat of every other tree of Paradise.
Reply to Objection 4: Some say that in the state of innocence man would
not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been
nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as
implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there
was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be
decorous and suitable to the state.
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Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by th
e
tree of life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause
of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as an
effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible,
otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the
substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not
give incorruptibility or immortality.
Objection 2: Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other
natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused
immortality, this would have been natural immortality.
Objection 3: Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient
fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which
the Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4).
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 3:22): "Lest perhaps he put forth
his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever."
Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an
anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "A
taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even
after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat
of the tree of life."
I answer that, The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of
immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe
that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of
life, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects was the
lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the
soul's instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with
food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided
with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect,
as the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that the
humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the humor
already existing, lessens the specific active power: as water added to
wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is added,
the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery.
In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force of the
species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food
as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what suffices for
growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not suffice for
growth, but only replaces what is lost. Last of all, in old age, it
does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body declines,
and finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect man was
provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was to
strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting from
the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake
his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old age";
and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author, among
the supposititious works of St. Augustine]) "The tree of life, like a
drug, warded off all bodily corruption."
Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the soul's
intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life, nor was
it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality,
whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from the fact that
every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life could
not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an
infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is manifest that
the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect; therefore,
since the power of the tree of life was finite, man's life was to be
preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and when that
time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life,
or had need to eat once more of the tree of life.
From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first
proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality;
while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off
corruption, according to the explanation above given.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)
We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and,
first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Under
the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation?
(2) Whether generation would have been through coition?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the state of innocence generation existed?
Objection 1: It would seem there would have been no generation in the
state of innocence. For, as stated in Phys. v, 5, "corruption is
contrary to generation." But contraries affect the same subject: also
there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence.
Therefore neither would there have been generation.
Objection 2: Further, the object of generation is the preservation in
the species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore
there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever.
But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever. Therefore
in the state of innocence there would have been no generation.
Objection 3: Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the
multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid
confusion of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the
animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights when
the human race increased by generation. This is against the natural
law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore says
(Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in the
state of innocence.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:28): "Increase and multiply, and
fill the earth." But this increase could not come about save by
generation, since the original number of mankind was two only.
Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence.
I answer that, In the state of innocence there would have been
generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race;
otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great
blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by his
nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and
incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while
his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's
purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and
incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of
nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a
time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but as it were,
subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist,
nature's purpose would become void.
Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and
permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of
nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which
natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible
substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the
individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief
purpose of nature.
Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the
naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is
incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should
be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, Who
alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the
multiplication of the human race, He established the begetting of
offspring even in the state of innocence.
Reply to Objection 1: In the state of innocence the human body was in
itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the
soul. Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man
was not to be deprived thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Although generation in the state of innocence
might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet
it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual.
Reply to Objection 3: In our present state a division of possessions is
necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as
community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says
(Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men
would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would
have used in common, according to each one's need, those things of
which they were masters---a state of things to be observed even now
among many good men.
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Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by
coition?
Objection 1: It would seem that generation by coition would not have
existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was
"like an angel." But in the future state of the resurrection, when men
will be like the angels, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as
is written Mat. 22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would there have
been generation by coition.
Objection 2: Further, our first parents were created at the age of
perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed
before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise:
which was not the case according to Scripture (Gn. 4:1).
Objection 3: Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other
time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight
which he takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man
refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason
of sin, according to Ps. 48:13: "Man, when he was in honor, did not
understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to
them." Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such intercourse
of man and woman.
Objection 4: Further, in the state of innocence there would have been
no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse.
Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of
innocence.
On the contrary, God made man and woman before sin (Gn. 1, 2). But
nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned,
there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex
is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to
man (Gn. 2:18, 20). But she is not fitted to help man except in
generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help
in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation also
in the state of innocence.
I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of
concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded
that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected
in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. Opif. xvii) that
in paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other
means, as the angels were multiplied without coition by the operation
of the Divine Power. He adds that God made man male and female before
sin, because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take place
after sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreasonable. For what is
natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. Now it is
clear that generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his
animal life, which he possessed even before sin, as above explained
([805]Q[97], A[3]), just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as
the corporeal members make it clear. So we cannot allow that these
members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before
sin.
Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state
of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from nature, is
the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an
active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is
distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is
female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation
there should be concurrence of male and female. The second thing to be
observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in
the state of innocence would not have existed, when the lower powers
were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 26): "We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be
begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been
equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with
calmness of soul and body."
Reply to Objection 1: In paradise man would have been like an angel in
his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After
the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and
body. Wherefore there is no parallel.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first
parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin
they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the
woman; or because, having received the general Divine command relative
to generation, they awaited the special command relative to time.
Reply to Objection 3: Beasts are without reason. In this way man
becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate
concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would
have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of
sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have
been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the
greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of
concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such
pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen
sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from
cleaving to it immoderately. By "immoderately" I mean going beyond the
bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food
taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers
less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words
quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of
innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore
continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence,
whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes
fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state
fecundity would have been without lust.
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that
state "intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal
integrity; this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses.
And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans
of pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the
union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action."
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the condition of the offspring---first, as regards
the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge. Under the
first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full
powers of the body immediately after birth?
(2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength
of body as to the use of its members immediately after birth?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its
members, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit.
et Remiss. i, 38): "This weakness of the body befits their weakness of
mind." But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness
of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of body in
infants.
Objection 2: Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to
use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore much
more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth;
and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that
strength.
Objection 3: Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes
affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their
limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something
pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted,
which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of
innocence, children would not have been deprived of the use of their
limbs.
Objection 4: Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to
that of infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been no
weakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such
weakness in infancy.
On the contrary, Everything generated is first imperfect. But in the
state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation.
Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size
and power.
I answer that, By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature,
and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any
assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those
things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine
authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to
the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient
strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth. Because in
proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore
it is natural, on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in
children, that the nerves which are instruments of movement, should not
be apt for moving the limbs. On the other hand, no Catholic doubts it
possible for a child to have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs
immediately after birth.
Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that "God made man right"
(Eccles. 7:30), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As,
therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the
human limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, so was it
impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands.
Now the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are
befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every
season of life. We must, therefore, conclude that children would not
have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose
of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts befitting the
state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we
observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of
infancy; as is clear from his preceding remark that "even when close to
the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to
suckle."
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that some animals have the use of their
limbs immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since
more perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the
brain, and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so
that a small amount of strength suffices them.
Reply OBJ 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that they
would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; and only what
was befitting to their state of life.
Reply to Objection 4: In the state of innocence man would have been
born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there
could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but
not senile defects leading to corruption.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not
have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that
woman is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product outside the
purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have been unnatural
in human generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been
born.
Objection 2: Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented
by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot
burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male.
Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's active force was not
subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman,
it seems that males would always have been born.
Objection 3: Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered
to the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been
sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that
they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of innocence,
there was no need for women to be born.
On the contrary, Nature's process in generation would have been in
harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But
established male and female in human nature, as it is written (Gn. 1,
2). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have
been born.
I answer that, Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature
would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as different
grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of
sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore in the state
of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten.
Reply to Objection 1: Woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as
being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the
individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as
above explained ([806]Q[92], A[1], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2: The generation of woman is not occasioned either
by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection
proposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the
Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): "The northern wind favors
the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females":
sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the parents), which
may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). Especially was
this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject
to the soul; so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the
offspring might be diversified.
Reply to Objection 3: The offspring would have been begotten to an
animal life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting
that all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it
seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal number.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to
righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?
(2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not
have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says
(De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have begotten children
sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness."
Objection 2: Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the
Apostle says (Rom. 5:16, 21). Now grace is not transfused from one to
another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone.
Therefore children would not have been born righteous.
Objection 3: Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not
transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness have
been transmitted from parents, to the children.
On the contrary, Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man did
not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness
together with the rational soul."
I answer that, Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself.
Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the
species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its
operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But
individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and
child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created,
was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused
by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the
entire human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of
the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original
righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted
from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the
children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards
original righteousness.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Hugh are to be understood as
referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of
the act thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Some say that children would have been born, not
with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but
with original righteousness. But since the root of original
righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he
was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God,
which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained
([807]Q[95], A[1]), we must conclude that if children were born in
original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus
we have said above that the first man was created in grace ([808]Q[95],
A[1]). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would
not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been
conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the
same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is
infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.
From this the reply to the third objection is clear.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed i
n
righteousness?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says
(Moral. iv) on the words of Job 3:13: "For now I should have been
asleep, etc.: If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he
would not have begotten "children of hell"; no children would have been
born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer."
Therefore all would have been born confirmed in righteousness.
Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first
parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have
been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have
been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children would have been
born confirmed in righteousness.
Objection 3: Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the
first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin.
Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his
descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving
righteousness.
Objection 4: Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while
the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable
henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been
confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten
children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born
confirmed in righteousness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would
have been the whole human race if neither they---that is our first
parents---had committed any evil to be transmitted to their
descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they
would have been condemned." From which words we gather that even if our
first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done
evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in
righteousness.
I answer that, It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence
children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For it is
clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection
than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long
as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness.
For the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the
beatitude given by the clear vision of God; and when once it has seen
God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness,
wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but
under the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law; for
it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we
believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. And as soon as Adam
had attained to that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would
have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have
ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that
children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.
Reply to Objection 1: If Adam had not sinned, he would not have
begotten "children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from
him sin which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own
free-will they could have become "children of hell." If, however, they
did not become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not
have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to
Divine Providence preserving them free from sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but
only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as
follows: "It seems that if they had lived, etc."
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm
seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above
quoted. For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not
have been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is
the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have
transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which is
only in the blessed.
Reply to Objection 4: There is no comparison between man and the
angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before and after
choice; whereas the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in
treating of the angels ([809]Q[64], A[2]).
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OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (TWO ARTICLES)
We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. Under
this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born
with perfect knowledge?
(2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of
birth?
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Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfec
t
knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have
begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect
knowledge ([810]Q[94], A[3]). Therefore children would have been born
of him with perfect knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf.
FS, [811]Q[85], A[3]). But ignorance is privation of knowledge.
Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon
as they were born.
Objection 3: Further, children would have been gifted with
righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness,
since it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been
gifted with knowledge.
On the contrary, The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on
which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4).
But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the
state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been
without knowledge at birth.
I answer that, As above stated ([812]Q[99], A[1]), as regards belief in
matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so,
when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of
nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the
senses, as above explained ([813]Q[55], A[2]; [814]Q[84], A[6]); and
for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for
its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed
at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We
must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not
have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they would
have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning.
Reply to Objection 1: The perfection of knowledge was an individual
accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the
father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot
children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents
which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some
particular time; and this would not have been in children from their
birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that
time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience
in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy
angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii).
Reply to Objection 3: Children would have had sufficient knowledge to
direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by
universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have
been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise
their knowledge of other universal principles.
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Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth?
Objection 1: It would seem that children would have had perfect use of
reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in
our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body;
which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, "The
corruptible body is a load upon the soul" (Wis. 9:15). Therefore,
before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would
have had the perfect use of reason at birth.
Objection 2: Further, some animals at birth have the use of their
natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more,
therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of
reason at birth.
On the contrary, In all things produced by generation nature proceeds
from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have
had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.
I answer that, As above stated ([815]Q[84], A[7]), the use of reason
depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers;
wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers
hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who
are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in
corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered,
the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise,
consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use
of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they
have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in
the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of
reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they would
have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding
that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their
limbs ([816]Q[99], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: The corruptible body is a load upon the soul,
because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong
to man at all ages.
Reply to Objection 2: Even other animals have not at birth such a
perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is
clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like
may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists
in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above
([817]Q[99], A[1]).
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OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?
(2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?
(3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?
(4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?
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Whether paradise is a corporeal place?
Objection 1: It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For
Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on Gn. 2:8] says that "paradise reaches to the
lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description, both
because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so
high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would
consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.
Objection 2: Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in
paradise (Gn. 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible
sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i).
Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.
Objection 3: Further, although men have explored the entire habitable
world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore
apparently it is not a corporeal place.
Objection 4: Further, the tree of life is described as growing in
paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written
of Wisdom that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her"
(Prov. 3:18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a
spiritual place.
Objection 5: Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also
of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for
corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of
the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days.
Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general
opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely
corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose
opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and
spiritual."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing
prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise;
so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having
there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set
down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this
method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a
foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so
paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the
east, its name being the Greek for garden." It was fitting that it
should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in
the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right hand on
the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and the
right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that God
should place the earthly paradise in the east.
Reply to Objection 1: Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its
obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise
reaches to the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as
Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually
even temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies,
which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made of the
moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly bodies,
the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the
earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to be
almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the moon---that
is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind, and the like
arise; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But
in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through
being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament,
as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is
probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers,
whose sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance
underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that
such is the case with some other streams?"
Reply to Objection 3: The situation of paradise is shut off from the
habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which
cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make
no mention of it.
Reply to Objection 4: The tree of life is a material tree, and so
called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as
above stated ([818]Q[97] , A[4]). Yet it had a spiritual signification;
as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified
Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a
material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after
eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent
punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil
of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will
as some say.
Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii,
3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in
their seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the
plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According
to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were
actually produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise;
and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work
of the six days is to be understood, they say, by way of
recapitulation. Whence our text reads: "The Lord God had planted a
paradise of pleasure from the beginning" (Gn. 2:8).
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Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?
Objection 1: It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be
the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to
beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence
were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed---that is, the empyrean
heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there
also.
Objection 2: Further, if some definite place were required for man's
abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of the
body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which
is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of heaven is
implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any
other place than the one provided for other animals. Therefore paradise
was not at all adapted to be the abode of man.
Objection 3: Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But
after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were
adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to
no purpose.
Objection 4: Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting
place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an
even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator---a
situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes
vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was
not a fit dwelling-place for man.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was a
divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God's
image."
I answer that, As above stated ([819]Q[97], A[1]), Man was
incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to
incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving
the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from
within or from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the
consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained
([820]Q[97], A[4]), and man was able to ward off such corruption by
food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief
seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such
corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In
paradise both conditions were found; because, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was permeated with the all pervading
brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked
with ever-flowering plants." Whence it is clear that paradise was most
fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original
state of immortality.
Reply to Objection 1: The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal
places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two
conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as
Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through
spiritual creatures." Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature
should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding
over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state
of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability.
Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the angel;
therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's nature,
since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation: it
is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore
he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was
destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude.
Reply to Objection 2: It is ridiculous to assert that any particular
place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though
some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual
substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as
regards both his body and his soul---that is, inasmuch as in his soul
was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This
could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise";
although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither
by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the
complicity of the devil.
Reply to Objection 3: Paradise did not become useless through being
unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on
man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's
kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that
Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.
Reply to Objection 4: Those who say that paradise was on the
equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most
temperate, on account of the unvarying equality of day and night; that
it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and
never too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the
inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. However,
Aristotle distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is
uninhabitable on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable;
because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically
overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the
sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that
paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the
equator or elsewhere.
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Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?
Objection 1: It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress
and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would
not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the
cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (Gn. 3:17). Therefore
man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it.
Objection 2: Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no
fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of
trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep
paradise.
Objection 3: Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep
it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and
not contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place
in paradise to dress and keep it.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2: 15): "The Lord God took man and
placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it."
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these words
in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that God
placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him,
by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into
darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by
keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly, that man might
dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have involved labor,
as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's
practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor would man have kept
paradise against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep
paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin. All of which was
for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and
not conversely.
Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.
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Whether man was created in paradise?
Objection 1: It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the
angel was created in his dwelling-place---namely, the empyrean heaven.
But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems
that man was created in paradise.
Objection 2: Further, other animals remain in the place where they are
produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth
from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise
after he was created ([821]Q[97], A[4]). Therefore he was created in
paradise.
Objection 3: Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater
than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:15): "God took man and placed him
in paradise."
I answer that, Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the
incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was
man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that
this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature, God made man
outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there
during the whole of his animal life; and, having attained to the
spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the
angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there.
In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit
those animals in their nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her
own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which
her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been
born in paradise, where their parents were already.
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TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ[103]-119)
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now
consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the
government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this
government. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the world is governed by someone?
(2) What is the end of this government?
(3) Whether the world is governed by one?
(4) Of the effects of this government?
(5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?
(6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?
(7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?
(8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?
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Whether the world is governed by anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone.
For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for
an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world
do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their
end. Therefore the world is not governed.
Objection 2: Further, those things are governed which are moved towards
an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has
stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.
Objection 3: Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature
to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of
government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain
necessity determined to something particular in their actions and
movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, O Father,
governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De Consol.
iii): "Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal."
I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of
the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an
opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation
of things themselves: for we observe that in nature things happen
always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case
unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end;
which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things
is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a
well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it
in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle
[*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration of Divine
goodness, which, as we have said above ([822]Q[44], A[4]; [823]Q[65],
A[2]), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as
"it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is not fitting that
the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them
their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate perfection consists in the
attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as
it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and
this is to govern.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways.
First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational
creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the
means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an
end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow
directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the
arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end
shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the
unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows
clearly that the world is governed by some reason.
Reply to Objection 2: In all created things there is a stable element,
at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under
movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both:
because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing,
would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand,
as will be explained later ([824]Q[104], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: The natural necessity inherent in those beings
which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression
from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an
arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression
from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference,
inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature,
while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their
nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the
movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural
necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the
world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the world
is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the
government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought.
But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself;
thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in
him. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not
outside, but within the things themselves.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends
are an operation; some are a work"---i.e. produced by an operation. But
nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and
operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the
end of the government of things.
Objection 3: Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in
order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of
things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the
peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the
government of the world is not an extrinsic good.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all
things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the
universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to
them.
I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it
is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their
beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something
outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been
expounded above ([825]Q[44], AA[1],2), that we must conclude that the
end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason.
For it is clear that good has the nature of an end; wherefore, a
particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the
universal end of all things is the Universal Good; Which is good of
Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness;
whereas a particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest
that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not
such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the
whole universe must be a good outside the universe.
Reply to Objection 1: We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as
a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as
something done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house;
thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer of
a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore
nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to which
it is directed.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of
various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation
itself, as the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of
other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is
not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen
that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as
possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that
Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we
may say that some good outside the whole universe is the end of the
government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for
each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to an assimilation
thereto, as far as is possible.
Reply to Objection 3: A good existing in the universe, namely, the
order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its
ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus
the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph.
xii, Did. xi, 10.
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Whether the world is governed by one?
Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For
we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the
universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but
some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways.
Therefore the world is not governed by one.
Objection 2: Further, things which are governed by one do not act
against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the
ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not
together, and act against each other; as is evident in the case of
contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one.
Objection 3: Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But
it "is better that two should be together than one" (Eccles. 4:9).
Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.
On the contrary, We confess our belief in one God and one Lord,
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 8:6): "To us there is but
one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to
government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the
name of God is taken from Providence as stated above ([826]Q[13],
A[8]). Therefore the world is governed by one.
I answer that, We must of necessity say that the world is governed by
one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which is
essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the
world must be the best kind of government. Now the best government is
the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing
but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in
some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, as Boethius
proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good,
so do they desire unity; without which they would cease to exist. For a
thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist
division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises
from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a
multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For
it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord,
except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is
a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united.
Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From
this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form
of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher
(Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and
multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be
one ruler."
Reply to Objection 1: Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by
the mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity
of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the
universe ([827]Q[47], AA[1],2; [828]Q[48], A[2]), and not by a
diversity of governors.
Reply to Objection 2: Although contraries do not agree with each other
in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end,
so far as they are included in the one order of the universe.
Reply to Objection 3: If we consider individual goods, then two are
better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no
addition is possible.
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Whether the effect of government is one or many?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one effect of the
government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is
that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the
good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an army.
Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.
Objection 2: Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But
the world is governed by one as we have proved [829](A[3]). Therefore
also the effect of this government is but one.
Objection 3: Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason
of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many
things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we
cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all and
fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government
belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of
the Divine government.
I answer that, The effect of any action may be judged from its end;
because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. Now
the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the
participation and similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the
effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways.
First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way there is but one
effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. Secondly, the effect
of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those
things by means of which the creature is made like to God. Thus there
are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is
assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God
is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and
secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in
others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be
good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation
of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good. Thirdly,
we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the
world; and in this way they are without number.
Reply to Objection 1: The order of the universe includes both the
preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards
these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better
than another; and one is moved by another.
From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other
two objections.
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Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all things are subject to the
Divine government. For it is written (Eccles. 9:11): "I saw that under
the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor
bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the
skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to the Divine
government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are
under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God hath no care
for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs.
Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.
Objection 3: Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed
by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is
master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by
another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore all
things are not subject to the Divine government.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only heaven
and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest
animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of
the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their nature."
Therefore all things are subject to His government.
I answer that, For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is
their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and
this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of
some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as
proved above ([830]Q[44], AA[1],2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing
which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not
subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of
the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those
things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the
Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown [831](A[2]).
Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine
goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above
([832]Q[44], A[4]; [833]Q[65], A[2]), so it is impossible for anything
to escape from the Divine government.
Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the
corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human
affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are
represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth" (Ezech. 9:9).
Reply to Objection 1: These things are said to be under the sun which
are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all
such things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs
in such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And
the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves
that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless
corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to
nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge.
So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the nature
of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet
according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say absolutely
that he observes chance in all things, but "time and chance," that is
to say, that defects may be found in these things according to some
order of time.
Reply to Objection 2: Government implies a certain change effected by
the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a
movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys.
iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act.
Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as
regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one art of the
Divine governor, various things are variously governed according to
their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves,
having dominion over their actions; and these are governed by God, not
only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them
interiorly; but also in this, that they are induced by Him to do good
and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and
punishments. But irrational creatures which do not act but are acted
upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that
"God hath no care for oxen," he does not wholly withdraw them from the
Divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational
creatures are governed.
Reply to Objection 3: The rational creature governs itself by its
intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected
by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government
whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act,
it requires to be governed by God.
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Whether all things are immediately governed by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that all things are governed by God
immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the
opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he
ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all
universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary
deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and
corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who
are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all
things are immediately governed by God.
Objection 2: Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if
possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But
God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause.
Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.
Objection 3: Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it
seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus an
earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself,
and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires to
govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things
immediately.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower and
grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater
subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of
life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and
just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself."
I answer that, In government there are two things to be considered; the
design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution of
the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things
immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means
of others.
The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so
everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness.
Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or
knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists in knowing
the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who
can only give his attention to general principles, but who can consider
the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we must say
that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the
very least.
But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by
government, this government will be so much the better in the degree
the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater
perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of
goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so
governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in
government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils,
but gives also the faculty of teaching others.
Reply to Objection 1: Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he
held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design
of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence,
which is the design of government, into three parts.
Reply to Objection 2: If God governed alone, things would be deprived
of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many
would not be accomplished by one.
Reply to Objection 3: That an earthly king should have ministers to
execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of
his dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is
brought into greater evidence.
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Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?
Objection 1: It would seem possible that something may occur outside
the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii)
that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens outside
the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil
exists.
Objection 2: Further, nothing that is in accordance with the
pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing
occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that
there is nothing fortuitous and casual.
Objection 3: Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and
unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design.
Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine
government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing
is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something
to occur outside the order of the Divine government.
On the contrary, It is written (Esther 13:9): "O Lord, Lord, almighty
King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist
Thy will."
I answer that, It is possible for an effect to result outside the order
of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal
cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order
of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause; which
other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as
indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some
such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which again is to be
ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first
universal cause. Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of
one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for
anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government; but from
the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the
order of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular
cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some
other cause.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for
evil is ever founded on good, as shown above ([834]Q[48], A[3]).
Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the
order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of
the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.
Reply to Objection 2: Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some
particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the
order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance,"
as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
Reply to Objection 3: Certain effects are said to be contingent as
compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects;
and not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of
Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the
order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself
subject to the Divine government.
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Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?
Objection 1: It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to
the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Is. 3:8): "Their
tongue and their devices are against the Lord."
Objection 2: Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not
rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God's
commands, no one would be justly punished by God.
Objection 3: Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine
government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things rebel
against the order of the Divine government.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that
can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this
sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all
sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.
I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine providence in two
ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of
all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular
cause which executes the order of the Divine government.
Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine
government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the fact that
the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and
everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only, "for no
one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly
from the fact that, as we have said above (A[1], ad 3; A[5], ad 2),
every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing
but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of
the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from
the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to
its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this
reason God is said "to order all things sweetly."
Reply to Objection 1: Some are said to think or speak, or act against
God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government;
for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but
because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature
or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.
Reply OBJ 2 is clear from the above.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that one thing opposes another, it
follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause;
but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.
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THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular;
concerning which four points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?
(2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?
(3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?
(4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?
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Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in
being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in
being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from
departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be.
Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle
proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the nature of a
thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be in it;
thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be
an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, because everything is
actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are
subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels ([835]Q[50], AA[2],5):
and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to
those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to one form only, as
above explained of heavenly bodies ([836]Q[66], A[2]). Therefore such
creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot
not-be; for there can be no potentiality to not-being, either in the
form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form
which it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other
form.
Objection 2: Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But
a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be
preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder
has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire
has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to
be kept in being, after He has ceased to create it.
Objection 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some
active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and
violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be.
Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some active
cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that
nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances and
heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being,
even if God were to withdraw His action.
Objection 4: Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by
some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be
efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving
power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is not
so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since
being is not given to that which already is: nor does it add anything
new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature in
being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to
the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are
not kept in being by God.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 1:3): "Upholding all things by the
word of His power."
I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are
kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing
is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and
accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing
the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child,
whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God preserves
some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a nature
that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them
from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another 'per se'
and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver
in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all
creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature
depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would
fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the
Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).
This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so
far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the
cause of the "becoming" of its effect, but not directly of its "being."
This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings: for the
builder causes the house in its "becoming," but he is not the direct
cause of its "being." For it is clear that the "being" of the house is
a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and
arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of
certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural
activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of
cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain
order and to preserve it. Therefore the "being" of a house depends on
the nature of these materials, just as its "becoming" depends on the
action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things.
For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be
directly the cause of "being" which results from that form; but it will
be the cause of the effect, in its "becoming" only.
Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot
directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the
cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the
other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in
matter---in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter"
receives "this form." And this is to be the cause of "becoming," as
when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural
effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause
an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the
"becoming" of the effect, but not its "being," depends on the agent.
Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the
impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as
may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the
same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the
generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such
an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing
in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of "becoming"
but also the cause of "being."
Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action
of the agent ceases which causes the "becoming" of the effect: so
neither can the "being" of a thing continue after that action of the
agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in
"becoming" but also in "being." This is why hot water retains heat
after the cessation of the fire's action; while, on the contrary, the
air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun
ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the
fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it
were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that
form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and
inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the
imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand,
air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it
exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since it
has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun.
Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun
which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and
as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is
Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence;
whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence
is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv,
12): "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures,
their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse." In
the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: "As the air becomes
light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence
of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness."
Reply to Objection 1: "Being" naturally results from the form of a
creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light
results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the
sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and
heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His
influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in
being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He
make it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature
needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect
depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with
an agent that is not the cause of 'being' but only of "becoming."
Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds in regard to that
preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all
creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: The preservation of things by God is a
continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is
without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the
air is by the continual influence of the sun.
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Whether God preserves every creature immediately?
Objection 1: It would seem that God preserves every creature
immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action,
as above stated (A[1], ad 4). But God created all things immediately.
Therefore He preserves all things immediately.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But
it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less
therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore
God preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving
them.
Objection 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only
of its "becoming," but also of its being. But all created causes do not
seem to cause their effects except in their "becoming," for they cause
only by moving, as above stated ([837]Q[45], A[3]). Therefore they do
not cause so as to keep their effects in being.
On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being.
But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore
He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.
I answer that, As stated above [838](A[1]), a thing keeps another in
being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or
hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and "per
se," by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as the
being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created
thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal
things there are many causes which hinder the action of corrupting
agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt
preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many other
things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its
being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it
necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and
principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on
all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal cause
of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle
causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause is
higher and nearer to the first cause.
For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and
continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the
diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated;
whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of
diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner
astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things
which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain
things in being, by means of certain causes.
Reply to Objection 1: God created all things immediately, but in the
creation itself He established an order among things, so that some
depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He
remains the principal cause of their preservation.
Reply to Objection 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause
on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can
only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power
of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another.
Reply to Objection 3: No created nature can be the cause of another, as
regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by
virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something
presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect,
without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form
or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow
some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light is
without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source
of light.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can annihilate anything?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything
tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to
annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.
Objection 2: Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things
exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because God
is good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He
cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He
to annihilate anything.
Objection 3: Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by
His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is
existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in
something generated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes
corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord, but
yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."
I answer that, Some have held that God, in giving existence to
creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not
annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have
said above ([839]Q[19], A[4]), such an opinion is entirely false, and
absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God
created things of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6:
"Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done." Therefore that God gives
existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve
things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence
into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed,
God was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after
they are made, He is free not to continue their existence; and thus
they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them.
Reply to Objection 1: Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is
a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as
such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a
thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency of
itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be
the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing His
action therefrom.
Reply to Objection 2: God's goodness is the cause of things, not as
though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not
depend on creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without
prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into
existence, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve
things in existence.
Reply to Objection 3: If God were to annihilate anything, this would
not imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anything is annihilated?
Objection 1: It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end
corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing
but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall
be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.
Objection 2: Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite
power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.
viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time."
Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at
some time it will be reduced to nothing.
Objection 3: Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of
themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are
reduced to nothing.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all
the works that God hath made continue for ever."
I answer that, Some of those things which God does in creatures occur
in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen
miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be
explained ([840]Q[105], A[6]). Now whatever God wills to do according
to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but
those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the
manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To each one is given
the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" (1 Cor. 12:7); and
subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.
Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated.
For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality to
non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist,
at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the subject of
generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does
not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather the power and
goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in
existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that
anything at all will be annihilated.
Reply to Objection 1: That things are brought into existence from a
state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them;
but that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that
manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His
preserving all things in existence, according to the Apostle:
"Upholding all things by the word of His power" (Heb. 1:3).
Reply to Objection 2: A creature's potentiality to existence is merely
receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence
is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence
of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things, however, is given
a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may
be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving the influx of
existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot resist, for an
infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary,
although they have a finite power, continue to exist for ever.
Reply to Objection 3: Forms and accidents are not complete beings,
since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a
being"; for it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so
far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely
reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that
they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the
change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God;
secondly, the change of one creature by another.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?
(2) Whether He can immediately move a body?
(3) Whether He can move the intellect?
(4) Whether He can move the will?
(5) Whether God works in every worker?
(6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?
(7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?
(8) Of the diversity of miracles.
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Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately
to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did.
vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except
that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is not
a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.
Objection 2: Further, any agent inclined to several effects will
produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by
some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a
general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some
particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of
all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form, except by
means of a particular agent.
Objection 3: As universal being depends on the first universal cause,
so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we
have seen above ([841]Q[104], A[2]). But the determinate being of a
particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things
are produced by God, only by means of particular causes.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): "God formed man of the slime
of the earth."
I answer that, God can move matter immediately to form; because
whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active
power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine
power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be reduced to act
by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to
a form; for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.
Reply to Objection 1: An effect is assimilated to the active cause in
two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by
man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the
cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause:
thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are
like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way
the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the
power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both
matter and form; as we have said above ([842]Q[14], A[2]; [843]Q[44],
A[2]); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God
by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite
generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite
generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing
like itself; so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter
can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends
over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by
imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold if God were to act of
natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which
knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms,
it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on
matter.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that secondary causes are ordered to
determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other
causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by
Himself without any other cause.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can move a body immediately?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For
as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some
contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact
between God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is no
contact with God." Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.
Objection 2: Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the
desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object of
desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the
intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore God
cannot move a body immediately.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an
infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body
to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between
opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the
same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved
immediately by an infinite power. But God's power is infinite, as we
have explained ([844]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore God cannot move a body
immediately.
On the contrary, God produced the works of the six days immediately
among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gn.
1:9 "Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore God
alone can move a body immediately.
I answer that, It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce
all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause.
Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we
cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any bodies
whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated [845](A[1]).
For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as
the movements of things heavy and light result from the form which they
have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is
called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating tends to the form
of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to
dispose to that form, and to give the movement which results from that
form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and moves
things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in
matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever in respect of any
movement whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: There are two kinds of contact; corporeal
contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the
cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the
first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor
is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by
moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no
creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words,
"There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be
touched.
Reply to Objection 2: God moves as the object of desire and
apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being
desired and apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired
and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove
that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover "of
bulk," by the following argument. The power of the first mover is
infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover can move
in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power "of bulk,"
would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the infinite
power of the first mover must be in something which is not measured by
its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time
can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason is that every
power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of
its nature. But an infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any
finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is
the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in
a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does not move in
any time; for between one time and any other time there is some
proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not in bulk is the
power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according
to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it cannot be fitting
for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves
without time.
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Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?
Objection 1: It would seem that God does not immediately move the
created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its
own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in
Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by another
does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore
the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently God cannot
move the created intellect.
Objection 2: Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient
principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the
intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say
that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher
says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to
the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding. Therefore it is
not moved by another.
Objection 3: Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the
intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible to
us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot
move our intellect.
On the contrary, The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But
it is written (Ps. 93:10) that God "teaches man knowledge." Therefore
God moves the human intellect.
I answer that, As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which
gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to
move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the
principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the
intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation
in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power itself,
which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality;
while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the
likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing
is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands
the power of understanding; or impresses on him the likeness of the
thing understood.
Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First
immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality,
it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in
each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude
that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He
is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their
First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the
mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything
exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects
in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived
by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created
intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether
natural, or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the
intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and
species in existence.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual operation is performed by the
intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds
from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is
given to the one who understands.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellectual light together with the likeness
of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but
it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.
Reply to Objection 3: The intelligible object moves our human
intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by
means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the
likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not
sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through
His Essence, as we have seen above ([846]Q[12], A[2]; [847]Q[56],
A[3]). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be
intelligible to it, as we have explained ([848]Q[12], A[4]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can move the created will?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For
whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be
forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be
moved by God.
Objection 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at
the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be
voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another.
Therefore God cannot move the will.
Objection 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than
to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but
to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that
voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this
is false. Therefore God does not move the will.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God who worketh in
us [Vulgate---'you'] both to will and to accomplish."
I answer that, As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver
of the power of intelligence, as stated above [849](A[3]), so is the
will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the
power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object, but
by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a
movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover
surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable. Now
the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its
object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is
the universal being. But every created good is some particular good;
God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of
the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner the
power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to
be inclined towards the object of the will, which is universal good.
But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover,
to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to
him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his
subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God
to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior
inclination of the will.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved
against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving
to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy
body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is
not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force
it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.
Reply to Objection 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from
within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle
may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within
is not repugnant to being moved by another.
Reply to Objection 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way
to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be
imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does
not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad
2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God works in every agent?
Objection 1: It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For
we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works
in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be
superfluous for the created agent to work at all.
Objection 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time
from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to
two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God
operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the
creature; and so no creature works at all.
Objection 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the
thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if
God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be
inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the
beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate
any further in the operating creature.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast wrought
all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us."
I answer that, Some have understood God to work in every agent in such
a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God
alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that
it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But
this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would
be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power
in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it
bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers
which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no
purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things
created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an
operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its
operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more
perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so
the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation,
which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature.
We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner
that things have their proper operation.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few
kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the
subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end,
the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain
order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the
agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the
agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own
form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman
is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, for instance
a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its
being sharp.
Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three
things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of
some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or
apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the
Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of
every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there
are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the
first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents
act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action
in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things
to operated, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation,
just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times
does not give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents their
forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action
not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the
generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and
light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as
the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors,
inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made
manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all
the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and
because in all things God Himself is properly the cause of universal
being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things
God works intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations
of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according to
Job 10:11: "Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me
together with bones and sinews."
Reply to Objection 1: God works sufficiently in things as First Agent,
but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents
is superfluous.
Reply to Objection 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of
the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding
from a primary and a secondary agent.
Reply to Objection 3: God not only gives things their form, but He also
preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover
the end of every action, as above explained.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the
established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3)
says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against
nature." But that which is outside the natural order seems to be
against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order.
Objection 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the
order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of
justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do
anything outside the order of nature.
Objection 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it
God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is
changeable; which cannot be said.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God sometimes
does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."
I answer that, From each cause there results a certain order to its
effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the
multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders,
subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore a
higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but
conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the
father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is
contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the
ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king,
by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.
If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first
cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He
would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But
if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause,
thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to
the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is
subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but
by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order
of things. Wherefore God can do something outside this order created by
Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of
secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which
secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi,
3): "God acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does
He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against
Himself."
Reply to Objection 1: In natural things something may happen outside
this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an
agent which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for
example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to
him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be
against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom
the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is
clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature;
although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward
direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on
which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore since
the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything
outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says
(Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused
by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature."
Reply to Objection 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the
First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do
nothing against such order.
Reply to Objection 3: God fixed a certain order in things in such a way
that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do
otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this
order, He does not change.
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Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?
Objection 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside
the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the
world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done
by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the
action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles.
Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural order is a
miracle.
Objection 2: Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom
occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our
hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate
credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of nature are not
arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and
healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they happen
frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed
by the shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the faculty of
nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our
hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which
nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all
things are outside the course of natur are miraculous.
Objection 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now
admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes things
happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the
senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without
studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside
the order of nature is miraculous.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God
does anything against that order of nature which we know and are
accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."
I answer that, The word miracle is derived from admiration, which
arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when
a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher
says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause of a manifest
effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is
wonderful to one man, and not at all to others: as an eclipse is to a
rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so called as being
full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this
cause is God. Wherefore those things which God does outside those
causes which we know, are called miracles.
Reply to Objection 1: Creation, and the justification of the
unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking,
miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other
cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do
not belong to that order.
Reply to Objection 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on
account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because
it surpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual,
not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the
usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be
above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of the
thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which it is
done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not
above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith, whereby we
believe in the future resurrection.
Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although not
manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it
was shown to be wonderful.
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Whether one miracle is greater than another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than
another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In
miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the
doer." But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore
one miracle is not greater than another.
Objection 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite
exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason
exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one
miracle is not greater than another.
On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (Jn.
14:12): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these
shall he do."
I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the
Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the
power of God, according to Is. 40:15: "Behold the Gentiles are as a
drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a
balance." But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power
of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is
surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is
surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for
instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes
backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is
absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among
miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the
deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and
giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but
not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a
thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which it is
done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or
the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed
into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the
prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold the lowest place in
miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according
to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed.
From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do
from the Divine power.
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HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration
will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual
creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a
spiritual and a corporeal nature.
Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered:
(1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel acts on a corporeal
nature; (3) How an angel acts on man.
The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech
of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the good and
of the bad angels.
Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?
(2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?
(3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?
(4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that
he knows himself?
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Whether one angel enlightens another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another.
For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain.
But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34:
"They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his
brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.
Objection 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of
grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature
by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of
glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God. Therefore one
angel does not enlighten another.
Objection 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational
mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten
the mind of another.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of
the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the
angels of the first hierarchy."
I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we
must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a
manifestation of truth, according to Eph. 5:13: "All that is made
manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to
communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according
to the Apostle (Eph. 3:8): "To me the least of all the saints is given
this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the
dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in
God." Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting
the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
vii): "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings
are taught Divine science by the higher minds."
Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have
said ([850]Q[105], A[3]), namely, the intellectual power, and the
likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify
the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual
power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by
the neighborhood of a more perfect body ---for instance, the less hot
is made hotter by the presence of what is hotter; so the intellectual
power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel
turning to him: since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to
another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one
angel manifests the truth to another as regards the likeness of the
thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of
truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior
angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to
him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the
superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives
universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus
he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us that the teacher,
in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the
knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed
by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with
provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed
on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by
analogy."
Reply to Objection 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see
the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach
another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he
adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know
the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the
greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in
God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends
Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the
more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more about the
types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these
the former enlightens the latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the types of existing
things."
Reply to Objection 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him
the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural
light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of
nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God,
either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the
image of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form:
for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it
adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that
proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to this
ultimate form.
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Whether one angel moves another angel's will?
Objection 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel's
will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above [851](A[1]), as one
angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But
cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former
seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to
be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will.
Therefore an angel can move another angel's will.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names
of the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are so
called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which
belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel's will.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the
higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior
angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the
superior angel can change the will of another angel.
On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it
belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of
the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel
cannot change another angel's will.
I answer that, As was said above ([852]Q[105], A[4]), the will is
changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the
power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is the
object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the
appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one who
proves something to be good. But as we have said above ([853]Q[105],
A[4]), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing
sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God.
And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who,
when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show thee all
good" (Ex. 33:18,19). Therefore an angel does not move the will
sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he
inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created
good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the
love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.
But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by
God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the
willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination,
Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent
alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to
which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the
creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the
intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's
will.
Reply to Objection 1: Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood
according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by
changing the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of
intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and
will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect,
as explained above [854](A[1]); therefore an angel is to be understood
as cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as
perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the
knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in the
heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an
enlightening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect
knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed
by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and
perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored object.
Reply to Objection 2: One angel can induce another to love God by
persuasion as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive
appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite,
because it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the
inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not
apply to the angels.
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Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a
superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and
represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is
called "our mother" (Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are
enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
14:31): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all
may be exhorted." Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the
superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.
Objection 2: Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on
the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But,
as was said above ([855]Q[105], A[6]), God sometimes acts outside the
order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside
the order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise
than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors
enlightened by God can enlighten superiors.
Objection 3: Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns,
as was above explained [856](A[1]). But since this turning to another
is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the
others. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter
can enlighten his superiors.
On the contrary, Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable
law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier.
iv; Eccl. Hier. v).
I answer that, The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but
are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above
explained ([857]Q[105], A[6]), one order is under another, as cause is
under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to
order. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done
outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior
cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is passed over
from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously
outside the order of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the
knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to
spiritual substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God;
since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are the
operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to
spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that the inferiors
are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.
Reply to Objection 1: The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the
heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly
hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness
to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more sublime in
grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors
are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the ecclesiastical
hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in sanctity, are
in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also
are eminent in one kind of science, and fail in another; and on that
account superiors may be taught by inferiors.
Reply to Objection 2: As above explained, there is no similarity
between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that
of spiritual nature. Hence the argument does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another
angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which
made the order in the angels.
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Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himsel
f
knows?
Objection 1: It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten
the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge;
and the inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. But more
is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular
knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior angels know, is known by
the inferior, through these being enlightened by the former.
Objection 2: Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that
the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation,
whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished.
Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in
ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who knew,
answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory," as Dionysius
expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior
angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves.
Therefore they do not do so.
Objection 3: Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior
about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be
unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could
communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to
objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all
things.
On the contrary, Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory,
Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though there are
some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." And Dionysius
says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift
derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above
[858](A[1]).
I answer that, Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so
as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature
of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents
give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent
is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more
does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far as
possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace share
in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received grace,
ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the manifold
grace of God" (1 Pet. 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy angels,
who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart
the same to those below them.
Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior
as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in a
higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master
understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him.
Reply to Objection 1: The knowledge of the superior angels is said to
be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: The Master's words are not to be understood as if
the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the
Incarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior
angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when
the Mystery was accomplished.
Reply to Objection 3: Till the Judgment Day some new things are always
being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of
the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is
always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior.
__________________________________________________________________
THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)
We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether one angel speaks to another?
(2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?
(3) Whether an angel speaks to God?
(4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?
(5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one angel speaks to another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another.
For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection
"each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less,
therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech
manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not
necessary that one angel should speak to another.
Objection 2: Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks
to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior
speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or
some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot
apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
Objection 3: Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what
he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to
listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one
angel does not speak to another.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): "If I speak with the
tongues of men and of angels."
I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says
(Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties
of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods
of interior speech."
To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that,
as we explained above ([859]Q[82], A[4]), when treating of the actions
and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation.
Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways;
first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv,
6,7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as
related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible object
passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will,
and hence in the definition of habit these words occur, "which anyone
uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible object passes from
the second to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept
of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either to
the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now
when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual
knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind
is called "the interior word." And by the fact that the concept of the
angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the
angel himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and
in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another only
means to make known the mental concept to another.
Reply to Objection 1: Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold
obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept
within, or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the
mind of another, according to 1 Cor. 2:11: "What man knoweth the things
of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle
whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge,
comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will directs
the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make
known to another; but some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes
to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand
aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make
ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show
what we really are." But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he
can make his concept known to another at once.
Reply to Objection 2: External speech, made by the voice, is a
necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does
not befit an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this
includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its
being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an
angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests
his mental concept.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no need to draw the attention of the
good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as
one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself.
But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and even
now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect
is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the
sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the sensible object,
so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some
intelligible power.
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Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?
Objection 1: It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to
the superior. For on the text (1 Cor. 13:1), "If I speak with the
tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the
angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the
inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above
explained ([860]Q[106], A[3]). Therefore neither do the inferior speak
to the superior.
Objection 2: Further, as was said above ([861]Q[106], A[1]), to
enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another;
and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same;
so the same conclusion follows.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the
angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and
invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever
God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an
enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a
superior angel.
On the contrary, According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier.
vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this King of
Glory?"
I answer that, The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make
this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an
angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an
enlightening; because, as we have said [862](A[1]), for one angel to
speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he
directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to the
other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold
principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of
the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything. But
because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the
rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind,
as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment;
for example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was created by God";
or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however, of what depends on
the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment,
but is only a speech; for instance, when one says to another: "I wish
to learn this; I wish to do this or that." The reason is that the
created will is not a light, nor a rule of truth; but participates of
light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as
such, an enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may
understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect; but only
to know the truth in reality.
Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by
comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment, which
depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior
angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the principle, he
who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what
belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one who wills. In
that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and the
inferior speak to the superior.
From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second
objections.
Reply to Objection 3: Every speech of God to the angels is an
enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it
belongs to the perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know
even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the
angels, as was explained above.
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Whether an angel speaks to God?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For
speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make known
anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not
speak to God.
Objection 2: Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in
reference to another, as was shown above [863](A[1]). But an angel ever
orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever
speaks to God; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an
angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an
angel never speaks to God.
On the contrary, It is written (Zech. 1:12): "The angel of the Lord
answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy
on Jerusalem." Therefore an angel speaks to God.
I answer that, As was said above ([864]AA[1],2), the angel speaks by
ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered
to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of giving
one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the
patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and
in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns
the truth, or of whatever depends on the created will; because God is
the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way
one thing is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural
things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech the
disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either
by consulting the Divine will of what ought to be done, or by admiring
the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says
(Moral. ii) that "the angels speak to God, when by contemplating what
is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration."
Reply to Objection 1: Speech is not always for the purpose of making
something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the
purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the
disciples ask instruction from the master.
Reply to Objection 2: The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense
of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by
consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to
perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
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Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?
Objection 1: It would seem that local distance affects the angelic
speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works
where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an
angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is
limited by the bounds of that place.
Objection 2: Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of
the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one to
another" (Is. 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has
some effect.
On the contrary, It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham,
notwithstanding the local distance (Lk. 16:24). Much less therefore
does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.
I answer that, The angelic speech consists in an intellectual
operation, as explained above ([865]AA[1],2,3). And the intellectual
operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our
own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the "here
and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do
not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted
from "here and now," neither difference of time nor local distance has
any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is
no impediment.
Reply to Objection 1: The angelic speech, as above explained (A[1], ad
2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it
exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who
speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing
another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered
to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his speech.
Reply to Objection 2: The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by
reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of
what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what
Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less one cries
out."
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Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to
another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do not
know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local
distance has no effect, as above explained [866](A[4]). Therefore all
the angels know what one speaks to another.
Objection 2: Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in
common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known by
one, it is for the same reason known by all.
Objection 3: Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the
enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels,
because, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the heavenly
beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore the speech
of one angel to another extends to all.
On the contrary, One man can speak to another alone; much more can this
be the case among the angels.
I answer that, As above explained ([867]AA[1],2), the mental concept of
one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the
concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be ordered
through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the
concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and
therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another;
whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of local distance, but
on account of the will so ordering, as explained above.
From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.
Reply to Objection 3: Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate
from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the
angels; and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But
speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created
will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not
necessary that these speeches should be common to all.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and
orders; for it was said above ([868]Q[106], A[3]), that the superior
angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.
Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?
(2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?
(3) Whether in one order there are many angels?
(4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?
(5) Of the names and properties of each order.
(6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.
(7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?
(8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
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Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident that
they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is
for it to be governed by one authority, as the Philosopher shows
(Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is
nothing but a sacred principality, it seems that all the angels belong
to one hierarchy.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy
is order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one order
towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are
ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
Objection 3: Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be
found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy. Therefore
likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.
On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three
hierarchies of angels.
I answer that, Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above
explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and
the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one
God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all
creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but
also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of sacred
things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There are two
cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the
other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality on the part
of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to
be "one" accordingly as the multitude can be subject in "one" way to
the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the
same way by a prince belong to different principalities: thus, under
one king there are different cities, which are governed by different
laws and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the
Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels; for the angels
receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them
under sensible signs, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore
there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic
hierarchy. In the same manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies.
For it was shown above ([869]Q[55], A[3]), in treating of the angelic
knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of
the truth than the inferior angels. This universal knowledge has three
grades among the angels. For the types of things, concerning which the
angels are enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First
as preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of
knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with
God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius
says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on
the universal created causes which in some way are already multiplied;
which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these
types are applied to particular things as depending on their causes;
which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more
clearly when we treat of each of the orders [870](A[6]). In this way
are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the multitude of
subjects.
Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of
Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it the
"supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists,
indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order, for as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is so
directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and that
others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from us to
apply to the Divine Persons.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers principality on the part
of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as
the Philosopher asserts in those passages.
Reply to Objection 2: As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in
one way---that is, in His essence---there is no hierarchical
distinction among the angels; but there is such a distinction as
regards the types of created things, as above explained.
Reply to Objection 3: All men are of one species, and have one
connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels:
and hence the same argument does not apply to both.
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Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not
several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined
is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one
hierarchy only, but many.
Objection 2: Further, different orders are different grades, and grades
among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among
the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is
possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not
different orders of angels.
Objection 3: Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are
distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing," "enlightening,"
and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is "cleansing," the order of
priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops "perfecting," as Dionysius
says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and
perfects. Therefore there is no distinction of orders among the angels.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that "God has set the
Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion":
which are the various orders of the angels, and some of them belong to
one hierarchy, as will be explained [871](A[6]).
I answer that, As explained above, one hierarchy is one
principality---that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule
of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused,
if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy
requires diversity of orders.
This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and
actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders
according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who
judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who labor
in the fields, and so forth.
But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced
to three, when we consider that every multitude has a beginning, a
middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be
seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others are the last, as
the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the
middle-class [populus honorabilis]. In the same way we find in each
angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their actions
and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three---namely, to
the summit, the middle, and the base; and so in every hierarchy
Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).
Reply to Objection 1: Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the
order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a
hierarchy is called an order. In another way one grade is called an
order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so
called.
Reply to Objection 2: All things are possessed in common by the angelic
society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than
by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can
communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the hot
thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to
give heat. And the more perfectly anyone can communicate a gift, the
higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect grade of
mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can
reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the angels, according to
their different offices and actions.
Reply to Objection 3: The inferior angel is superior to the highest man
of our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the
kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"---namely, John the Baptist, than
whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of women"
(Mat. 11:11). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not
only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher way than
can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the heavenly orders are not
distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different
acts.
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Whether there are many angels in one order?
Objection 1: It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For
it was shown above ([872]Q[50], A[4]), that all the angels are unequal.
But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in
one order.
Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many,
which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one
angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more
sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the
sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore,
the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated above
[873](A[2]), several angels in one order would be superfluous.
Objection 3: Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the angels are
unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four),
are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more
akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of his
own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the
latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many angels of one
order.
On the contrary, It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another"
(Is. 6:3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the
Seraphim.
I answer that, Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish
its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he
who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a
general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, one who knows
natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general
way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order, inanimate inferior
bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another; whilst he
who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different
orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other
orders.
Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders
in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we
knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should
know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order
among things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden
from us.
Reply to Objection 1: All the angels of one order are in some way equal
in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but
absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who
are first, middle, and last.
Reply to Objection 2: That special distinction of orders and offices
wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.
Reply to Objection 3: As in a surface which is partly white and partly
black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as
regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less
akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders
are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the
others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for similar
offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.
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Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic
nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of
orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a sacred
principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it
"approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel. Hier. iii).
But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not
by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the
angels is by grace, and not by nature.
Objection 2: Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling,"
as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which
comes not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our
hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5): "which is said
not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature,
but from grace.
Objection 3: Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the
heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the gift
of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and
another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the angels
are the orders from nature, but from grace only.
On the contrary, The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order is a
multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some
gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural
gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels is not
only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.
I answer that, The order of government, which is the order of a
multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the
angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty
of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge and
love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the
angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, the end of the
angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers,
which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the
unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end they can reach only
by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are
adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by
natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts
according to the capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case
with men, as above explained ([874]Q[62], A[6]). Hence among men the
orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and
not according to natural gifts.
From the above the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?
Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of the angels are not
properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and
heavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to
individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly
named.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to
the words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one
order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations."
Objection 3: Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government
and likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore these
three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.
Objection 4: Further, archangels are as it were angel princes.
Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to
the "Principalities."
Objection 5: Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which
pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But
charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore
they ought not to be names of any particular orders.
Objection 6: Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God
knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it.
Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the
"Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the orders of
angels are not properly styled.
On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so
named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in Is. 6:2; the name "Cherubim"
in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in Col. 1:16; "Dominations,"
"Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in Eph. 1:21;
the name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the
name "Angels" is found in many places of Scripture.
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the
angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each
order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each
order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something may be
found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and
by way of participation. A thing is said to be in another by way of
property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its nature: by excess
when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is
possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have stated ([875]Q[13],
A[2]) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by
participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not fully
but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation.
Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating its
property, it ought not to be named from what it participates
imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that
which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we wish properly to
name a man, we should call him a "rational substance," but not an
"intellectual substance," which latter is the proper name of an angel;
because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to
man by participation; nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which
is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property
of a man, and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other
animals.
So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual
perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more
excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in
these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to
the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior
by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the
inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess;
and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior
perfection.
So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the
orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they
signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom.
xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for
he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and
the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought; by
the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities preside
over the good spirits themselves."
Reply to Objection 1: Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly
spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels."
But the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this
manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The
lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common
manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation only;
and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest order,
as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order
can be specially called the order of "angels," forasmuch as they
announce things to us immediately.
"Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the
medium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all the
heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly
essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and
thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. viii) that the "name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile
and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine operations
which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus
it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the Divine behests
appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.
Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is
attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine
word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by
participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the Divine
gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name
"Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free from servile
condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and from
tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly,
it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not
bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are subject to or
oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies "the desire and
participation of the true dominion which belongs to God." Likewise the
name of each order signifies the participation of what belongs to God;
as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of the Divine virtue;
and the same principle applies to the rest.
Reply to Objection 3: The names "Domination," "Power," and
"Principality" belong to government in different ways. The place of a
lord is only to prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom.
xxiv in Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are
subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name "Power"
points out a kind of order, according to what the Apostle says, "He
that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God" (Rom. 13:2).
And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Power"
signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception of Divine
things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors
towards inferiors by leading them to things above. Therefore, to the
order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those
who are subject to them. To preside [principari] as Gregory says (Hom.
xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as being first in carrying
out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix)
that the name of "Principalities" signifies "one who leads in a sacred
order." For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly
called "princes," according to the words, "Princes went before joined
with singers" (Ps. 67:26).
Reply to Objection 4: The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel.
Hier. ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium
compared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the
nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and hot
compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel princes";
forasmuch as they are princes as regards the "Angels," and angels as
regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.)
they are called "Archangels," because they preside over the one order
of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing greater things: and the
"Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the heavenly
"Virtues" who fulfil the Divine commands.
Reply to Objection 5: The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity
only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or
fire. Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim"
according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of heat. Now
in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is
upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are borne inflexibly
towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat," which is not
found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of
most penetrating action, and reaching even to the smallest things, and
as it were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action
of these angels, exercised powerfully upon those who are subject to
them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their
heat. Thirdly we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or
brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an
inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others.
In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of
knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," which
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the
perfect vision of God; the full reception of the Divine Light; their
contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard
to the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth
copiously upon others.
Reply to Objection 6: The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior
orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine
works; whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the
"Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two excellent
attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones"
does not include the other two; and so the order of the "Thrones" is
distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the "Seraphim." For
it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior
is contained in the superior, but not conversely. But Dionysius (Coel.
Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its relation to material
seats, in which we may consider four things. First, the site; because
seats are raised above the earth, and to the angels who are called
"Thrones" are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of
things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed
strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the
reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made firm by God.
Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be
carried thereupon; and so the angels receive God in themselves, and in
a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in
its shape, a seat is open on one side to receive the sitter; and thus
are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him.
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Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the grades of the orders are not
properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the
names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves
imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be supreme.
Objection 2: Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is.
But the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is nearer
to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is
the highest.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is
higher than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher
than the "Seraphim."
Objection 4: Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the
"Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed
immediately above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).
On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest
hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle,
the "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the
"Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the "Powers"
last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first, then the
"Archangels," and lastly the "Angels."
I answer that, The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory
(Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as
regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For Dionysius
places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above the "Powers";
the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the "Archangels."
Gregory, however, places the "Principalities" between the "Dominations"
and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the "Powers" and the
"Archangels." Each of these placings may claim authority from the words
of the Apostle, who (Eph. 1:20,21) enumerates the middle orders,
beginning from the lowest saying that "God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on
His right hand in the heavenly places above all Principality and Power,
and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he places "Virtues" between "Powers"
and "Dominations," according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing
however to the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same orders from the
highest, he says: "Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities,
or Powers, all things were created by Him and in Him." Here he places
the "Principalities" between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also
Gregory.
Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in
which we see, that, as said above [876](A[1]), the highest hierarchy
contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the
universal causes; and third in their application to particular effects.
And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but
also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to
consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal disposition
of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this
disposition to the effect, which is the carrying out of the work; for
it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation.
So Dionysius, considering the properties of the orders as derived from
their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of
which are taken from their relation to God, the "Seraphim," "Cherubim,"
and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle hierarchy those orders whose
names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition---the
"Dominations," "Virtues," and "Powers"; and he places in the third
hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the
"Principalities," "Angels," and "Archangels."
As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we
consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end;
thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an
addition to the first, and the third an addition to both. And because
God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as
the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar
order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the
dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader;
others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; and others above
these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this
similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the
first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the
familiar recipients of God in themselves, in the sense of knowing
immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the
whole of the first hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets
supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme
excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such
a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the "Thrones";
as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are
all called "Angels."
As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of
which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this belongs
to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out
what is to be done, which belongs to the "Virtues"; the third is to
order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried
out by others, which belongs to the "Powers."
The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing
Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners
and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and
officers; this belongs to the "Principalities." There are others who
simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others
hold a middle place; and these are the "Archangels," as above
explained.
This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the
highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the
higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the
first order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the Holy
Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first
hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of love. The
lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the "Thrones," who in
their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for the "Thrones,"
according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called "because through
them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are enlightened by Him
in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening of the second
hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine
ministrations. The order of the "Powers" is akin to the order of the
"Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose order on
those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the
name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government of
peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in
the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; "for
the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man" (Ethic.
i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of the kingdom of the
Persians resisted me" (Dan. 10:13).
The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also
reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order what belongs
to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged
according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine
ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii),
"bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior; and
all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good
spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called that of
"Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then the "Powers,"
who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly
powers, as it is written (Rom. 13:3,4). After these come the "Virtues,"
which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles;
after these are the "Angels" and the "Archangels," who announce to men
either great things above reason, or small things within the purview of
reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The angel's subjection to God is greater than
their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from
the former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are
not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name
from their nearness and relation to God.
Reply to Objection 2: The nearness to God designated by the name of the
"Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a more
excellent way, as above explained.
Reply to Objection 3: As above explained ([877]Q[27], A[3]), knowledge
takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love
as the lover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a
nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are
in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves. Therefore
to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the
higher things, God above all, is better than to know them.
Reply to Objection 4: A careful comparison will show that little or no
difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders
according to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name
"Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also
agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a certain
strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the execution of
the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the "Virtues"
seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius. For to work
miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; since
thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the "Archangels"
and the "Angels."
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Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?
Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast
the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:24), that Christ
will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have
delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father," and this will be in
the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will
be abolished in that state.
Objection 2: Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to
cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one
angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they
will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders
would remain for no purpose.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb. 1:14), that
"they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall
receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence it appears that the
angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to
salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the Day
of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast
the Day of Judgment.
On the contrary, It is written (Judges 5:20): "Stars remaining in their
order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore the
angels will ever remain in their orders.
I answer that, In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the
distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The
distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the
difference of grace and nature, as above explained [878](A[4]); and
these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences
of natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be
corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in them
according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of
the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the Day
of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease
accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to
their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the
attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have
different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.
Reply to Objection 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end
in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to
their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary
to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apostle,
"When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father,"
i.e. when He shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God
Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are
to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual
actions. In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are
ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we
gradually arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is
manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the
preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge,
but also as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of
this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he
can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as
he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior
angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior
angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels not
only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the
preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment
the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things,
still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior
angels.
Reply to Objection 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men will not
be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those
who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
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Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of
the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest
heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the
middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are
never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are
men transferred to the angelic orders.
Objection 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the
angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the
like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints.
Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders.
Objection 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the
demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of
bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom.
xxviii in Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the
saints will be transferred to the orders of angels.
On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the
angels of God" (Mat. 22:30). I answer that, As above explained
([879]AA[4],7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to
the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace.
Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be
assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will
always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men can
in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is
erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying that
the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven
(Lk. 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an
order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the
liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the
gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to
the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men
are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not
all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, but only virgins
or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as
it were, corresponding to the whole society of the angels. But this is
against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not
be two societies of men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude
of all is to cleave to God alone."
Reply to Objection 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to
their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above
explained [880](A[4]; [881]Q[62], A[6]). So, as the inferior angels
cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can
they be transferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can
ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The angels according to the order of nature are
between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only
human affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters.
But holy men even after this life are of the same nature with
ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer
human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the things of the living," as
Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain
special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to
exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons, or
by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis
xvi).
Reply to Objection 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are
transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that
the demons are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that
Chrysostom rejects.
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THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are orders among the demons?
(2) Whether among them there is precedence?
(3) Whether one enlightens another?
(4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?
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Whether there are orders among the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons.
For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine says
(De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But
there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the bad
angels there are no orders.
Objection 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a
hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a
holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among
the demons there are no orders.
Objection 3: Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic
orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said to
belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary
to give them the names of each of those orders. But we never find that
they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations." Therefore
on the same ground they are not to be placed in any other order.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling . . . is
against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of
this darkness."
I answer that, As explained above ([882]Q[108], AA[4],7,8), order in
the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and
according to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the
imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of
consummate glory.
If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the
perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and
never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in
that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell
away from them, according to what was said above ([883]Q[62], A[3]),
that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in
the light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders;
because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 1: Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot
exist without good ([884]Q[49], A[3]); so there is order in the demons,
as possessing a good nature.
Reply to Objection 2: If we consider the ordering of the demons on the
part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for
Himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing,
because they abuse their nature for evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of
charity; and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the
name "Dominations" imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed
to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who
sinned.
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Whether among the demons there is precedence?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no precedence among the
demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But
the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no
precedence among them.
Objection 2: Further, there is no precedence where obedience and
subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is
not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among the
proud there are always contentions" (Prov. 13:10). Therefore there is
no precedence among the demons.
Objection 3: If there be precedence among them it is either according
to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not
according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from
nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or
punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned
the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior. Therefore there
is no precedence among the demons.
On the contrary, On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: "While the world
lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over
demons."
I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a thing, where
natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each
other. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by
natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and
movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly
bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said [885](A[1]), that the
demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions
are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean
by precedence---that the action of the subject should be under the
action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons
requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees too
with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth
from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).
Reply to Objection 1: The authority of the demons is not founded on
their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.
Reply to Objection 2: The concord of the demons, whereby some obey
others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common
wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For
it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they
see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.
Reply to Objection 3: The demons are not equal in nature; and so among
them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men,
who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior,
is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment;
because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to
unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.
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Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For
enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can
manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural
knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
Objection 2: Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body
deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior
demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems
that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting,
as stated above ([886]Q[106], A[1]). But to cleanse does not befit the
demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean by the
unclean?" (Ecclus. 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.
I answer that, There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among
the demons. For, as above explained ([887]Q[107], A[2]), enlightenment
properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to
God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of
the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to
another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another
to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one demon
does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept
to another by way of speech.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is
enlightenment, but only that which is above described.
Reply to Objection 2: According to what belongs to natural knowledge,
there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels,
or in the demons, because, as above explained ([888]Q[55], A[2];
[889]Q[58], A[2]; [890]Q[79], A[2]), they know from the first all that
belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural
light in the superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten
others.
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Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over
the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected with
enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened
by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad.
Objection 2: Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence
for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil.
Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that
negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be
admitted.
Objection 3: Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of
nature, as above explained [891](A[2]). But if the demons fell from
every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to
many good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have
no precedence over all the bad angels.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous
and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just
spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the
angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers."
I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first and originally in
God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer
to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God,
have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and that
which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy
God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the demons are deprived;
and therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these
are ruled by them.
Reply to Objection 1: Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made
known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice
requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or
for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors
make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if
compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment,
forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on
the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the
fulfilment of their own wickedness.
Reply to Objection 2: The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine
wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad
angels or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good
angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
Reply to Objection 3: An angel who is inferior in the natural order
presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because
the power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is
stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among
men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15), and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the
rule and measure of all human acts."
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HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
(2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?
(3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies
locally?
(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?
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Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed
by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs
not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed
lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their actions
determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do
not need the government of angels.
Objection 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But
some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore
they need not be governed by the angels.
Objection 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are
distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were
ruled by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there
are species of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels
as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down
above ([892]Q[108], A[2]). Therefore the corporeal creature is not
governed by angels.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are
ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv, 6),
that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of
the invisible creature."
I answer that, It is generally found both in human affairs and in
natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the
universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by
the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above
([893]Q[55], A[3] ; [894]Q[108], A[1]), the superior angels who preside
over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is
manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than
the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a
form individualized by matter, and determined to the "here and now";
whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as
the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the
superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This is not
only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who
admit the existence of incorporeal substances.
Reply to Objection 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but
they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it
belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature
must be moved by a spiritual creature.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of
Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are
moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to
assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly
bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances
with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human
souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations
were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which
the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we assert
that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural
corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are
not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels
possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but
also over the inferior bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about
immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances
were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more
universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances
preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over
different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are not
the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more
universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding
over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heavenly
bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in
supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere
of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held
that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial
substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one
immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he
called the "active intelligence."
The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual
substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ.
83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power
placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): "The devil
was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order";
and Origen says on the text, "When the ass saw the angel" (Num. 22:23),
that "the world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over
the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of
all other things" (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is
not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals
than over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and
more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: the reason is
to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers
over different things. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine
orders of angels, because, as above expounded ([895]Q[108], A[2]), the
orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according
to Gregory all the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the
demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the
"virtues" do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely
corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes
performed.
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Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of
an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But
corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is
changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and
sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is
corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.
Objection 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be
done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to
corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal
matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more
efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.
Objection 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic
administration, as appears above [896](A[1]), and thus it appears that
bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is
essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is
due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to
the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal
place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of
natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that
living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. Again
the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length
the form of a bed is from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore
the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal
effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels
in receiving its form.
On the contrary, Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this
visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."
I answer that, The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p.
218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by
immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are
participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this
opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter
proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal agents
only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on
this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so
that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, as the
Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly
speaking, is the "composite": for this properly speaking, is, as it
were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that
which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither
is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to
be is nothing but the way to existence.
Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as
every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a
likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as
when fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both
matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone.
Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God, or
form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.
Reply to Objection 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and
so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the
soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite,
which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the
command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with
natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a
superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent
way; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more
excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal
matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by
moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.
Reply to Objection 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect
taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents
would not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as
neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating
the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish
that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce
matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of
a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
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Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?
Objection 1: It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local
motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms.
But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated
above [897](A[2]). Therefore neither can they cause in them local
motion.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local
motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause other
movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they
cause local motion.
Objection 3: Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the
soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle
of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle.
Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use
corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this
without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local
motion.
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has
joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second." Hence it
is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in
conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the
spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is
local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of
this is that what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to
anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic---that is, to
place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be
moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also
the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are moved locally by
the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body
first and chiefly by a local motion.
Reply to Objection 1: There are in bodies other local movements besides
those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of
the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but
from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements
result from the power of spiritual substances.
Reply to Objection 2: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first
motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing
corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to
soften iron.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of an angel is not so limited as is the
power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the
body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move
other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence it
can move locally bodies not joined to it.
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Whether angels can work miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For
Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues
by whom signs and miracles are usually done."
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians
work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice,
bad Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work
miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he says elsewhere
in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the
supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore the demons can work
miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi,
Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]
that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may
be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere." But
when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the
natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone is
cured of a fever without the operation of nature. Therefore the angels
and demons can work miracles.
Objection 4: Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an
inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore
an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to
work miracles.
On the contrary, It is written of God (Ps. 135:4): "Who alone doth
great wonders."
I answer that, A miracle properly so called is when something is done
outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if
something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for
otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards,
as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a
miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created
nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any
other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of
created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can work
miracles.
Reply to Objection 1: Some angels are said to work miracles; either
because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy
men are said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of
ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in
the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.
Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are
those things which are done outside the order of the whole created
nature. But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it
follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature
by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves.
So when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things
are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to
ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons;
and these are said to be done by "private contracts," forasmuch as
every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the
power of a private person in a city. Hence when a magician does
anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private
contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole
universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians,
so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work
miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of
public justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of
other sacred signs.
Reply to Objection 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever
happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local
movement.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the angels can do something which is
outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything
outside the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as
above explained.
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THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How
far they can change them by their own natural power; (2) How they are
sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?
(2) Whether he can change man's will?
(3) Whether he can change man's imagination?
(4) Whether he can change man's senses?
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Whether an angel can enlighten man?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man
is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes
enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is
immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved
through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God."
Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but immediately by God.
Objection 2: Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them"
(Rom. 1:19), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed
for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed
them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately
from God---that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God
enlightens man immediately.
Objection 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being
enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels.
Therefore he is not enlightened by them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of
Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But such
revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated ([898]Q[106], A[1];
[899]Q[107], A[2]). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels.
I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower
things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above
([900]Q[109], A[2]); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the
superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by
them.
The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike
and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above ([901]Q[106], A[1]),
the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two
functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened
by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the
intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed
to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes place in the
angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the
truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained
above ([902]Q[106], A[1]).
The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself
unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to
the phantasms, as above explained ([903]Q[84], A[7]). So the angels
propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible
things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is
impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded
by the variety of the sacred veils." On the other hand, the human
intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic
intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel.
Reply to Objection 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith;
first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the
will tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of
faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will;
hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this
respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that what
is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is accomplished by
man, according to Rom. 10:17, "Faith cometh by hearing"; principally,
however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men.
Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith.
Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is
to be believed; but also as regards what is to be done.
Reply to Objection 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God,
can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more
the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible
truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man
is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more
perfect knowledge of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be
understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood;
thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands
or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to
him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not
follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is,
which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner
not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is
enlightened by him.
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Whether the angels can change the will of man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of man.
For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers a
flame of fire" (Heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as
being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices." This could
not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can
change the will.
Objection 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil
does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however,
says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act
and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men" (De
Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and
kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the will.
Therefore the will is changed by them.
Objection 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the
human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which
serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive
appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a
corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he
change the will.
On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God alone, according to
Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord,
whithersoever He will He shall turn it."
I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within;
in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the
inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change
the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the
intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone
Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone,
Who causes the will.
Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can
be only in one way---by the good apprehended by the intellect. Hence in
as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an
appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God
alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the
will by way of persuasion, as above explained ([904]Q[106], A[2]).
In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in
another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite:
thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something.
In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can
move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free
to consent to, or to resist, the passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who act as God's ministers, either men or
angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of
persuasion.
Reply to Objection 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by
causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is
subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of
thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the
things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions.
Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because such a work is
accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher
principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of
the angels.
Reply to Objection 3: The human intellect in its present state can
understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can
will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion
of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.
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Whether an angel can change man's imagination?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man's
imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion
caused by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an
angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is
contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the
imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.
Objection 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual,
they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an
angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter ([905]Q[110], A[2]).
Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot
change it.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One
spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to
the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands
it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other." But it does not
seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that
the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore it
seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.
Objection 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the
similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this
there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of
deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by
changing the imagination.
On the contrary, Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by
imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears
from Mat. 1:20;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to
Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.
I answer that, Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power
can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. For
it was said above ([906]Q[110], A[3]), that corporeal nature obeys the
angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the
local movement of bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels.
Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in
us by the local movement of animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle
says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis iii.], when assigning the
cause of visions in dreams, that "when an animal sleeps, the blood
descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend
with it," that is, the impressions left from the movements are
preserved in the animal spirits, "and move the sensitive principle"; so
that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were
being then changed by the external objects themselves. Indeed, the
commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such
appearances may even occur to those who are awake, as is seen in mad
people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of
the humors, and sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily
imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done
by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from
the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation.
Reply to Objection 1: The first principle of the imagination is from
the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by
the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine
color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way
that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions
preserved within.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by
the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received
from the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color),
but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above explained.
Reply to Objection 3: The commingling of the angelic spirit with the
human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an
effect which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so
that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he
knows.
Reply to Objection 4: An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes
enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these
images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the
angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the
imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by
the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus neither
was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to the people
in parables, which He did not explain to them.
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Whether an angel can change the human senses?
Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For
the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation
does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive
operation cannot be caused by an angel.
Objection 2: Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the
nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other
natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.
Objection 3: Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible
objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature ([907]Q[110],
A[4]). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are
changed always by the sensible object.
On the contrary, The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the people of
Sodom with blindness or {aorasia}, so that they could not find the
door" (Gn. 19:11). [*It is worth noting that these are the only two
passages in the Greek version where the word {aorasia} appears. It
expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of
Sodom---namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the
Latin "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily imply.] The same is
recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kings 6:18).
I answer that, The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from
without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for
we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are
disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged with choleric
humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses.
Now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change in the senses
both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object from
without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a
body, as we have said above ([908]Q[51], A[2]). Likewise he can move
the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the
senses are changed in various ways.
Reply to Objection 1: The principle of the sensitive operation cannot
be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but
this interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior
principle, as above explained.
Reply to Objection 2: By the interior movement of the spirits and
humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the
nutritive power, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of
any other power using a corporeal organ.
Reply to Objection 3: An angel can do nothing outside the entire order
of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since
he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can
work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature.
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THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?
(2) Whether all are sent?
(3) Whether those who are sent, assist?
(4) From what orders they are sent.
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Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of
ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But
intellectual actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts
from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic actions are
intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their
own actions.
Objection 2: Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the
angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it seems
that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly.
Objection 3: Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of
wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive
wisdom" (Ecclus. 38:25). So if some angels are sent on external
ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But
the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So
if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is
unfitting.
Objection 4: Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it
is written (Lk. 22:27): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at
table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the
angels are naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent
to administer to us.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:20): "Behold I will send My
angels who shall go before thee."
I answer that, From what has been said above ([909]Q[108], A[6]), it
may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we
have already stated ([910]Q[43], A[1]), in treating of the mission of
the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from
another so as to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another way,
where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be
sent as proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new
way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before by the
presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present
everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, His power reaches
to all being, and hence He exists in all things ([911]Q[8], A[1]). An
angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the
whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to reach
another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there." But
it is clear from what was above stated ([912]Q[110], A[1]), that the
corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever an angel
has to perform any work concerning a corporeal creature, the angel
applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins
to be there afresh. Now all this takes place by Divine command. Hence
it follows that an angel is sent by God.
Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as
from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the
angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what
is meant by a minister: for a minister is an intelligent instrument;
while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to
another. Hence angels' actions are called 'ministries'; and for this
reason they are said to be sent in ministry.
Reply to Objection 1: An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In
one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an
operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says
(De Trin. iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting something
eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action is said to
be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by some
intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently have
sometimes a determinate place.
Reply to Objection 2: The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic
dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the
higher body should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank
above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the
empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven,
nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen his
dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his
dignity.
Reply to Objection 3: In ourselves the purity of contemplation is
obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action
through the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense
impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the
contrary, regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation
alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in no respect
impede his contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is
the rule and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the
other. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels do not go
abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward
contemplation."
Reply to Objection 4: In their external actions the angels chiefly
minister to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to
them, absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by
cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior to
every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 2:3): "Esteeming others
better than themselves."
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Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry.
For the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14): "All are ministering spirits, sent to
minister" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?'].
Objection 2: Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the
Seraphim, as stated above ([913]Q[108], A[6]). But a Seraph was sent to
purify the lips of the prophet (Is. 6:6,7). Therefore much more are the
inferior orders sent.
Objection 3: Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the
angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more
are even the highest angels sent.
Objection 4: Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the
external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels
execute the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as
all the angels are unequal, as stated above ([914]Q[50], A[4]), each
angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore
only the last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the
words, "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him" (Dan. 7:10).
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the
statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks
fulfil no exterior service."
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above ([915]Q[106],
A[3]; [916]Q[110], A[1]), the order of Divine Providence has so
disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe,
that inferior things are administered by the superior. But the Divine
dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards
corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as
it is suitable for the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind
was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was
accomplished immediately by God without the action of the heavenly
bodies. Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these
bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the
clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. Nor can anyone
doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of
the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior. From this
standpoint some have said that according to the general law the
superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; yet that
sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.
It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is
greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law;
in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law.
Hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides those
who were sent to give the law.
Reply to Objection 2: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the
angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior
order; but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal
sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet. It may also
be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts
whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of the inferior
angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying by fire the
prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an
inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope is said to absolve a
man when he gives absolution by means of someone else.
Reply to Objection 3: The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but
are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has
been said ([917]Q[43], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 4: A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries.
Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent
immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are
sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior
ministries.
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Whether all the angels who are sent, assist?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist.
For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "So the angels are sent, and
assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme
Spirit, God, is not limited."
Objection 2: Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet
he said, "I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the
Lord" (Tob. 12:15). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.
Objection 3: Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is.
Yet Satan assisted God, according to Job 1:6: "When the sons of God
came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them."
Therefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist.
Objection 4: Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason
is because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, but
through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine
enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is highest of all.
Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to the
text of Dan. 7:10: "Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before
Him." Therefore the angels who are sent also assist.
On the contrary, Gregory says, on Job 25:3: "Is there any numbering of
His soldiers?" (Moral. xvii): "Those powers assist, who do not go forth
as messengers to men." Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not
assist.
I answer that, The angels are spoken of as "assisting" and
"administering," after the likeness of those who attend upon a king;
some of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately;
while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by those
who are in attendance---for instance, those who are placed at the head
of the administration of various cities; these are said to administer,
not to assist.
We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine
Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister,
are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who are
sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist and
see the face of the Father." Yet not all the angels can perceive the
secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine
Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the
inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to the
highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special prerogative it is
to be enlightened immediately by God.
From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections,
which are based on the first mode of assisting.
Reply to Objection 3: Satan is not described as having assisted, but as
present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii), "though
he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to the
angels."
Reply to Objection 4: All the assistants see some things immediately in
the glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the
prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately
enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than is
seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among
those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than
another.
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Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy
are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according to
Dan. 7:10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for
they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as Dionysius
says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second
hierarchy are sent in ministry.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more
who minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the angels
of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the
angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the
"Dominations are above all subjection." But to be sent implies
subjection. Therefore the dominations are not sent to minister.
I answer that, As above stated [918](A[1]), to be sent to external
ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine
command in respect of any corporeal creature; which is part of the
execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are
manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and
therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry
whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name
"dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only
disposition and command in administering. On the other hand, the names
of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels" and
"Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; the "Virtues" and
"Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the
"Prince," according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), "be
first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders to be
sent to external ministry; not to the four superior orders.
Reply to Objection 1: The Dominations are reckoned among the
ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding
what is to be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands
to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others
are to do.
Reply to Objection 2: A twofold reason may be given in assigning the
number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that
those who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he
takes the words (Dan. 7:10) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him,"
not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of
thousands"; thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and
signifies excess; while the number of assistants is finite as in the
words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him."
This explanation rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that
the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are
in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than
multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, as
six administer and three assist.
Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of
angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the
superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable
degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal
natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and
more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the
ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way,
the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication,
to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because ten times a
hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand"
it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but since
it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to
understand that the assistants are much more numerous than the
ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number
of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all
material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together of
all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as
Dionysius remarks in the same passage.
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OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and
their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first head eight points
of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?
(2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?
(3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of
angels?
(4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?
(5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?
(6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?
(7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?
(8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their
guardianship?
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Whether men are guarded by the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For
guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, or are
not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is
able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his natural
knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel.
Objection 2: Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous.
But men are guarded by God, according to Ps. 120:4: "He shall neither
slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need to
be guarded by an angel.
Objection 3: Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the
negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "Keep
this man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" (3
Kings 20:39). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the
angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some
such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given
to their guardianship. But that is clearly false. Therefore the angels
are not the guardians of men.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 90:11): "He hath given His angels
charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways."
I answer that, According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that
in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by the
immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable
spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which are
invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards
conclusions, about which we may have various opinions, by the
principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover
manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and
affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so it was
necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in
order to regulate them and move them to good.
Reply to Objection 1: By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain
degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in
affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul.
Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature
belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a
sufficient degree; because in the application of the universal
principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in
many ways. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men
are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded
by the angels.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things are required for a good action; first,
that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the
habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the
proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher
(Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards
man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as regards the
second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose precepts
reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated ([919]Q[111],
A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: As men depart from the natural instinct of good
by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the
instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they
enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is
not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of
men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the ordinary
course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise that
miracles occur outside the order of nature.
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Whether each man is guarded by an angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel.
For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard many
men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.
Objection 2: Further, the lower things are brought to God through the
medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). But as
all the angels are unequal ([920]Q[50], A[4]), there is only one angel
between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one
angel who immediately keeps men.
Objection 3: Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater
offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than
another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the
angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x),
it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels.
On the contrary, On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (Mat.
8:10), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to
have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth."
I answer that, Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This
rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the
execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's providence
acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible
creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For
men are not only incorruptible in the common species, but also in the
proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which
cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that
the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what remains for
ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God
acts so as to order their existence to the things which are perpetual.
Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every
genus or species of things corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom.
xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the different
"genera" of things, for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons,
the "Virtues" to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is
probable that the different species are presided over by different
angels of the same order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose that
different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men.
Reply to Objection 1: A guardian may be assigned to a man for two
reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man
one guardian is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one.
Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one man is
appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to
provide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community,
such as external works, which are sources of strength or weakness to
others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible
and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in his own
regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men.
Reply to Objection 2: As above stated ([921]Q[112], A[3], ad 4), all
the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened
by God directly; but as to other things, only the superior are directly
enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same
also applies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened
in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the
one immediately above him. Thus it is possible that some one angel
enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom
he enlightens.
Reply to Objection 3: Although men are equal in nature, still
inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders
some to the greater, and others to the lesser things, according to
Ecclus. 33:11,12: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and
diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and
some of them hath He cursed and brought low." Thus it is a greater
office to guard one man than another.
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Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong
only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that the
text (Mat. 18:10), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be understood
not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels
guard men.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to
minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (Heb.
1:14); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to
the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external ministry
([922]Q[112], A[4]). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are
deputed to the guardianship of men.
Objection 3: Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially
necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the
Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work
miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are also
deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order.
On the contrary, In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is
attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. v, ix).
I answer that, As above stated [923](A[2]), man is guarded in two ways;
in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an
angel is appointed to guard him; and such guardianship belongs to the
lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to
announce the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the
angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one man.
The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied according to
the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it
is. Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of
"Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the
angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also
styled "one of the princes" (Dan. 10:13). Moreover all corporeal
creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the
"Powers," and the good spirits by the "Principalities," according to
Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in
the lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in
each order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable
that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by God for the
higher degree of glory.
Reply to Objection 2: Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship
of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship,
greater or less, as above explained.
Reply to Objection 3: Even inferior angels exercise the office of the
superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the
superiors' power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order
can coerce the demons, and work miracles.
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Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?
Objection 1: It would seem that angels are not appointed to the
guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (Phil. 2:7) that
"He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If
therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ
also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ
is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels are not appointed to
the guardianship of all men.
Objection 2: Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not
fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state of
innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels
are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.
Objection 3: Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men,
that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life,
encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of
the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain to
eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good works,
do not perform them well, for they have not a right intention: for
"faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps. 31).
Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of
Satan," as it is written (2 Thess. 2:9). Therefore angels are not
deputed to the guardianship of all men.
On the contrary, is the authority of Jerome quoted above [924](A[2]),
for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it."
I answer that, Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a
road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is
threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according
to Ps. 159:4: "In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare
for me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have to
pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as
long as he is a wayfarer. When, however, he arrives at the end of life
he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an
angel to reign with him, in hell a demon to punish him.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word
of God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as
regards His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His
passible body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right
that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a
ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is written (Mat. 4:11)
that "angels came and ministered to Him."
Reply to Objection 2: In the state of innocence man was not threatened
by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as
we have said above ([925]Q[95], AA[1],3). But peril threatened from
without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the
event. For this reason he needed a guardian angel.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even
Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason;
so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to
the whole human race---namely the guardianship of the angels. And
although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their
deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless conduce to
their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both
themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good
angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner Antichrist
will not do as much harm as he would wish.
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Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a
man from his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who shall
receive the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14).
But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are
baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man from the time
of his baptism, not of his birth.
Objection 2: Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels
enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of
instruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of
reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon as
they are born.
Objection 3: Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before
birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is
appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then
admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not
appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.
On the contrary, Jerome says (vide A, 4) that "each soul has an angel
appointed to guard it from its birth."
I answer that, as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two
opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian is
appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the
time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves (vide A, 4), and with
reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a
Christian, begin with his baptism; such as receiving the Eucharist, and
the like. But those which are conferred by God on man as a rational
being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he
receives that nature. Among the latter benefits we must count the
guardianship of angels, as we have said above ([926]AA[1],4). Wherefore
from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed
to him.
Reply to Objection 1: Angels are sent to minister, and that
efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of
salvation, if we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship,
which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the
angelic ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are
not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious,
nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.
Reply to Objection 2: Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by
instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it
has many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward
off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.
Reply to Objection 3: As long as the child is in the mother's womb it
is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is
still part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part
of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of
probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child
while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the
mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above quoted,
says.
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Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes
the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in
the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not
healed: let us forsake her." And (Is. 5:5) it is written: "I will take
away the hedge"---that is, "the guardianship of the angels"
[gloss]---"and it shall be wasted."
Objection 2: Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But
God forsakes man at times, according to Ps. 21:2: "O God, my God, look
upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does an
angel guardian forsake man.
Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3),
"When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But
sometimes they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.
On the contrary, The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1 Pet.
5:8: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking
whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good angels ever guard
us.
I answer that, As appears above [927](A[2]), the guardianship of the
angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is
evident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn
from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates
being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all
being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of
His providence, but only in so far as He allows man to suffer some
defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that
the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he
leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from
being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, according
to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the
House of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because
their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject to
tribulation.
From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.
Reply to Objection 3: Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes
locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of
his guardianship: for even when he is in heaven he knows what is
happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he
can be with man in an instant.
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Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?
Objection 1: It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those
whom they guard. For it is written (Is. 33:7): "The angels of peace
shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow.
Therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15),
"sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the loss
of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will.
Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.
Objection 3: Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is
contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as
we are told, Lk. 15:7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls
into sin.
Objection 4: Further, on Numbers 18:12: "Whatsoever first-fruits they
offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to
judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or
through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for
the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve
for men's sins.
On the contrary, Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect
happiness: wherefore it is written (Apoc. 21:4): "Death shall be no
more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are
perfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief.
I answer that, Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains
inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But
nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the
other blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering of
Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world save what is
effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply speaking,
nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called simply voluntary, which
a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having
considered all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such a
thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting
of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but
on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore
this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same
passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do
not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will
the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in
respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall
into sin.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Isaias may be understood of the
angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the
words of Rabsaces, as related Is. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal
sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are the
apostles and preachers who weep for men's sins. If according to the
anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then
the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally speaking
the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we
attribute passions to God and the angels.
The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 3: Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there
is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the
ordering of the Divine Providence.
Reply to Objection 4: The angels are brought into judgment for the sins
of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.
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Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be strife or discord among
the angels. For it is written (Job 25:2): "Who maketh peace in His high
places." But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high
angels there is no strife.
Objection 2: Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority
there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels. Therefore
there is no strife among the angels.
Objection 3: Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they
guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the
opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in the
wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder of
wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good
angels.
On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 10:13): "The prince of the kingdom
of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this prince of
the Persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom
of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus
there is strife among them.
I answer that, The raising of this question is occasioned by this
passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the
kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of
the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being
offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been
caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in
Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the
prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.
But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of
Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom.
To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must
note that the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and
various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the
angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in
various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits,
so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is
the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know
it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine
wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they consult the Divine will
concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to
resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition, since they
are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine decree; but that
the things about which they seek knowledge are in opposition.
From this the answers to the objections are clear.
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OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES)
We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?
(2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?
(3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or
temptations of the demons?
(4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men
astray?
(5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from
making further assaults?
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Whether men are assailed by the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For
angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by God:
for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the
salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail man.
Objection 2: Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set
against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are
weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not
therefore to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men
should be assailed by demons.
Objection 3: Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are
enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed
that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be
assailed by the demons.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling is not
against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against
the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of
wickedness in the high places."
I answer that, Two things may be considered in the assault of the
demons---the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault
itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to
hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine
power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of
God in their various offices minister to man's salvation. But the
ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly use
of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the
angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be
referred to God as their first author.
Reply to Objection 1: The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly
by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail
us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just
judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and thus
they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab,
King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings 22:20. For punishment is
referred to God as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who are
sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they
are sent; for they punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by
God on account of His justice.
Reply to Objection 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not
unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained
principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the
guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:16), Eliseus said to
his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them."
Reply to Objection 3: The assault of the flesh and the world would
suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for
the demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men.
But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.
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Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?
Objection 1: It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil.
For God is said to tempt, according to Gn. 22:1, "God tempted Abraham."
Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said
to tempt God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil
to tempt.
Objection 2: Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons
know what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.
Objection 3: Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in
the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as
appears from what has been said above ([928]Q[111], A[2]), it seems
that it is not in their province to tempt.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 3:5): "Lest perhaps he that
tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds, "that is,
the devil, whose office it is to tempt."
I answer that, To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of
something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something
about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But
sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired
through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to
know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or virtue,
with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is sought
with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.
From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various
ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for the sake of
knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for
man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of
God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in
order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in order to hurt by
urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper office
to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he does this as
minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He may know, in the
same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. Hence it
is written (Dt. 13:3): "The Lord your God trieth you, that it may
appear whether you love him."
The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter
of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man someone is,
according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and
according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which
things the devil also makes use in tempting.
Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: The demons know what happens outwardly among men;
but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher
of spirits" (Prov. 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more
prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to
explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to
that vice to which he is most prone.
Reply to Objection 3: Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as
stated above ([929]Q[111], A[3]), he can change the inferior powers of
man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be
forced, it can nevertheless be inclined.
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Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?
Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of
the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the multitude of
demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others."
And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "all malice and all
uncleanness have been devised by the devil."
Objection 2: Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of
the Jews (Jn. 8:44): "You are of your father the devil." But this was
in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation. Therefore
every sin is due to the devil's instigation.
Objection 3: Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are
deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the
suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne to us
by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation
of the devil.
On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): "Not all our
evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise
from the movement of our free-will."
I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another in two ways;
directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a
disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and
indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he who
dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must
admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was
who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a
proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must
take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.
But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its
action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the
cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's
instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of
the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no
devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such like
pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those
desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the
corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to
curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need
for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins
which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the
same blandishments as were our first parents," as Isidore says (De
Summo Bono ii).
Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: When man commits sin without being thereto
instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil
thereby, in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he
cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne
to man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take
part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the
demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not
sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.
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Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by
means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show itself
especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (2
Thess. 2:9), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all
power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at other
times do the demons perform lying wonders.
Objection 2: Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal
change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the
human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art
or power." Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.
Objection 3: Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways.
If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade one of
what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the
faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (Mk. 16:20): "The Lord
working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed."
On the contrary, Augustine says [930](Q[83]; [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4,
among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "Often by means of
the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by the
servants of God."
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said above ([931]Q[110],
A[4]), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work
miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in the strict
sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire
created nature, under which order every power of a creature is
contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for
whatever exceeds the human power and experience. And thus demons can
work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by
reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of
knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and
knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so that
in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.
It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which
appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes
nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the
demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. And "when fire came
down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep;
when the storm struck down his house and with it his children---these
were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xx, 19).
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in the same place, the works of
Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will deceive
men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what
he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, they will
lead those into falsehood who believe in him."
Reply to Objection 2: As we have said above ([932]Q[110], A[2]),
corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will,
so that demons be able by their power to transmute matter from one form
to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the
elements of the world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine
says (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the
transformation of corporeal things which can be produced by certain
natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can
alike be produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of
these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents
or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those
transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, cannot
in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance,
that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or that the
body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this
sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is not real
but a mere semblance of reality.
Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a
demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses,
so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above
([933]Q[111], AA[3],4). It is said indeed that this can be done
sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for
just as he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and
assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same way he can
clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear
therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "Man's
imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an
innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as it were
embodied in the semblance of some animal." This not to be understood as
though the imagination itself or the images formed therein were
identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another
man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can
offer the same picture to another man's senses.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When
magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a
different right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for
the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the latter
by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is
subject."
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Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from
making further assaults?
Objection 1: It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is
not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ
overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon
assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not
true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.
Objection 2: Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted
in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not
befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented
from further assaults.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:11): "Then the devil left Him,"
i.e. Christ Who overcame.
I answer that, Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can
no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other sin.
And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This
seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain
definite time: wherefore (Lk. 4:13) it is written: "All temptation
being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two
reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency; for as
Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus Imperfectum, among
his supposititious works], "the devil does not tempt man for just as
long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows
him to tempt for a short time, He orders him off on account of our
weakness." The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil.
As to this, Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13: "The devil is afraid of
persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat." That the devil
does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from
Mat. 12:44: "I will return into my house from whence I came out."
From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.
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OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate,
which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a body can be active?
(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?
(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by
the inferior bodies?
(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?
(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?
(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which
are subject to their influence?
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Whether a body can be active?
Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but do
not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon;
this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these
are the spiritual substances."
Objection 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in
its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not
substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the
latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings.
Therefore corporeal substance is not active.
Objection 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity.
But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it
surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from
receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in
quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore
no corporeal substance is active.
Objection 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according
to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most
composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most
simple. Therefore no bodies are active.
Objection 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is
either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a
substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any
principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and
an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause
is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an
accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject,"
as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other
qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and
power on that of which it lays hold."
I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are
active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three
errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of
Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments
mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all
the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of
some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to
him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates,
by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of
Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are
participated thereby, and determined and limited thereto; and that
separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said
that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter.
Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is
determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held
that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity, as the
principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to
any other matter: and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone,
which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on
something else.
But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but
that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is
participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is
proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is the
participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to
make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such;
wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of
its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing
owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact
that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent
limited and particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as
the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every
ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is
the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence
such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.
But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For
Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred
accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the
small," which he considered to be the first contraries, by others
considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both Plato
and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that corporeal
agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the
substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the
introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle.
And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of
which we have spoken above when treating of the creation ([934]Q[45],
A[8]).
The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes
place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while
passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the
passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i,
8,9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole,
and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its
action; which things are manifestly untrue.
We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a
body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.
Reply to Objection 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of
the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no
nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature
acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created.
Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in
potentiality to that which the other has in act.
From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be
observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a mover who is not
moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand,
there exists something moved which is purely passive," that this is to
be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure
potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of
potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.
Reply to Objection 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal
form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent,
forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject
to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the
purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as
is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that weight
retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its
movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because
action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by
something being reduced from potentiality to act.
Reply to Objection 4: A body is not that which is most distant from
God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being,
forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is
primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure
potentiality.
Reply to Objection 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental
form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat,
although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the
substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate
in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the
soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. But by its
own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an
accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in
being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its
identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained
action by an issue of atoms.
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Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in
corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual
order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only
materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is.
Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons
produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain
seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can
be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say
that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Objection 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no
active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above,
matter is not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no
seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Objection 4: Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues"
(Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the
production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for
miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal
virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal
virtues in corporeal matter.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things
which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds
lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."
I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more
perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole
corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the
word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural
things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living
things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are
generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and
the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the
word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing
in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and passive
principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which
living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the
name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and
passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and
movement.
These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders.
For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they
are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas."
Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were
produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes."
Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are
produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that
animal, as in "particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds"
produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to
further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the
first effects produced.
Reply to Objection 1: These active and passive virtues of natural
things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their
being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of
their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas
[rationes ideales].
Reply to Objection 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain
parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local
movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons
as employing seeds.
Reply to Objection 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in
the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the
female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed"
covers both active and passive principles.
Reply to Objection 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of
these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal
virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9)
that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the
world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless,
the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but not, strictly
speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate principle;
and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal
virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the
passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be
used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be
wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the
passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and
this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the
scope of seminal virtues.
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Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies her
e
below?
Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause
of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"---namely, the heavenly bodies---"are
not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of
storms and atmospheric changes."
Objection 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and
matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and
there are contrary agents---heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for
the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe
causality to the heavenly bodies.
Objection 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be
observed that everything which is produced here below is produced
through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other
such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the
heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is
more corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies:
a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one
may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not
the cause of things produced in bodies here below.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser
and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more
subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that
"the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies,
moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection."
I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since
what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is
moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the
whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore
the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of
those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all
bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally.
Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and
multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as
to their cause.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Damascene are to be understood as
denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and
corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the
heavenly bodies are gods.
Reply to Objection 2: The active principles of bodies here below are
only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the
like. If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not
diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles of
which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the
"dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these
inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But
to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those
accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial
forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act.
And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above
these material dispositions.
This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate
species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their
substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate
species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the
same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the
generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly false.
Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10),
to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or
absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior
bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates
here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument
of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man
and the sun generate man."
Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness
to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by
reason of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior
bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all things
are like God.
Reply to Objection 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are variously
received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of
matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception
is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed
sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this
as an argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the
stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various
dispositions of matter.
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Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of
human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual
substances, as stated above ([935]Q[110], A[3]), they act by virtue
thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are
superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause
impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
Objection 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform
principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it
seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly
bodies, as to their principles.
Objection 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning
the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect
and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the
heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions.
Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the
heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."
I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act
on bodies, as stated above [936](A[3]). They can act directly indeed on
those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but
accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by
obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well.
Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal
organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from
sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the
cause of human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led
by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which
there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal
organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of
heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man
has no free-will, and that he would have determinate actions, like
other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to
human habit. It must be observed, however, that indirectly and
accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the
intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will
receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to
corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently
situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior
apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or
memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of
necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of
necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for
although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain
force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of
following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of
the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be
changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause
of human actions, than on the intellect.
To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human
actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from
sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as
is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (Odyssey
xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will
are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies
be the cause of human actions.
Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly
bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly
bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening
it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above
([937]Q[111], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements
is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its
cause: so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and
the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine
intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which
are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the
heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these
passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in
the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in
particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by
his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say
that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium,
prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.
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Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons.
For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass
men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Mat. 4:24
and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the
heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.
Objection 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in
order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the
heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are
subject to them.
Objection 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior
bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely,
"herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and
figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11).
Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly
bodies.
On the contrary, The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the
heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not
subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
I answer that, There have been three opinions about the demons. In the
first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held
that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art,
is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine
(De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely,
that "on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain
effects of the stars." But this opinion is manifestly false. For we
know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the
power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for instance, that a
man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite
poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge; that
necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things.
For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are
"animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius says,
quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of
the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said that
demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said
man is subject thereto [938](A[4]). But this opinion is proved to be
false from what we have said above ([939]Q[51], A[1]): for we hold that
demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear
that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither
essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.
Reply to Objection 1: That demons harass men, according to certain
phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order
to "defame God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv,
24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because as they
are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as
stated above ([940]Q[114], A[4], ad 2) they take into account the
aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest that
"the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as
Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De
Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of
the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it is
precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the
demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's
imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.
Reply to Objection 2: Demons when summoned through certain
constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man
into the error of believing that there is some Divine power in the
stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain
constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for
which they are summoned.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the
"demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees,
animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a
spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered
to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
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Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?
Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on
things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the
effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause
of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their
movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their
effects follow of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter,
when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to
itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to
the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs.
Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in
corporeal matter.
Objection 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not
follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any
corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly
body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since
the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below.
Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows
that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below
happens of necessity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin.
per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed
in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should
not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies
take place of necessity.
I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above
[941](A[4]); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown
that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain
inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of
necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of
the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which
human action extends.
But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom
to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents.
Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of
necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who
supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the
cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things
happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi,
Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.
For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever,
the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to
their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the
majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But
that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some
hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not
to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.
Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a
being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause,
because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a
thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is) "musical" has
not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause,
because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that
a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as
to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this
cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it
is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this
clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing
cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some
terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to
the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on
the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some
heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this
matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is
accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result
of necessity.
Reply to Objection 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that
take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes,
which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite.
Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to
local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its
effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly
body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in
Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or
other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of
another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause;
nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not
reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
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ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Is there such a thing as fate?
(2) Where is it?
(3) Is it unchangeable?
(4) Are all things subject to fate?
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Whether there be such a thing as fate?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a
homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the hearts
of the faithful to think that fate is anything real."
Objection 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived
from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said
to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to
happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If
therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance
in the world.
On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius
(De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its
proper order."
I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like
as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher
cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by
their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in
regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who
had ordered it, it is directly intended.
So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the
existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De
Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about
Providence ([942]Q[22], A[2]).
On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes
place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in
human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the
heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a
disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born"
[*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9]. But this will not hold.
First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above ([943]Q[115],
A[4]) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly
bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since
it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be
directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to
all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said ([944]Q[115],
A[6]) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being,
nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing.
Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the
proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural cause can
therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a
grace finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts
after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects in this
world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of
a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below,
whether by luck or by chance.
We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in
natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining
cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which
happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise
the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave
found a treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can
it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure
is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave
there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by
luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by
the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can
change the will, as shown above ([945]Q[105], A[4]). Consequently the
ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be
ascribed to God alone.
So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to
Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken,"
we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided
the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application
to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning
thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold
his tongue." For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate:
wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck
or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if
compared to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in
the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
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Whether fate is in created things?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is
called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in
God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
Objection 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate,
as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below,
is God alone, as stated above [946](A[1]). Therefore fate is in God,
and not in creatures.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance
or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to
the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing
only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition
inherent to changeable things."
I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above ([947]Q[22],
A[3]; [948]Q[103], A[6]), Divine Providence produces effects through
mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects
in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of
the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as
being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain
effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De
Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by
certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which
obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by
the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some
of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged." Of each of these
things we have spoken above [949](A[1]; [950]Q[104], A[2]; [951]Q[110],
A[1]; [952]Q[113]; [953]Q[114]). It is therefore manifest that fate is
in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production
of their effects.
Reply to Objection 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which
Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the
nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power
or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially
fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as
the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
Reply to Objection 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that
disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it
signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this
order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus
fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to
the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet
wrote: "Thy fate draws thee."
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Whether fate is unchangeable?
Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is
to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so
is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of
Providence."
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be
moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent to
changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is
changeable.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate
happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem
principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no
contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an
unchangeable disposition.
I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can
be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes,
which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first
principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have
held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself
necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity; for this
reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must
follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above ([954]Q[115],
A[6]).
Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as
dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate
could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says
(Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the reason
that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.
We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes,
is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a
certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity.
In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: "If
God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen." Wherefore
Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly
afterwards adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable
Providence must also itself be unchangeable."
From this the answers to the objections are clear.
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Whether all things are subject to fate?
Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius
says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the
stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a
reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the
world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and
seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is
something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the
Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a
disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are
changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above
([955]Q[9], A[2]). Therefore fate is in all things.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things
subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
I answer that, As stated above [956](A[2]), fate is the ordering of
second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is
subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done
immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither
is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of
spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De
Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God have a state
of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is
clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is
involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up
with second causes.
Reply to Objection 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done
by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in
the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and
power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that
whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to
fate, as already stated.
Reply to Objection 3: Although all creatures are in some way
changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created
causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of
man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In
the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly
in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his
knowledge?
(2) Whether man can teach an angel?
(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?
(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man can teach another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the
Lord says (Mat. 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of
Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God." Therefore to
be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master
to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God.
Objection 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch
as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the
other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his
like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an
active quality just as heat is.
Objection 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and
the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of
these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause
knowledge in another man.
Objection 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple
save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by
words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to
cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are
signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If
of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already
in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the
master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn
nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man
who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no
way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): "Whereunto I am
appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in
faith and truth."
I answer that, On this question there have been various opinions. For
Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have one
passive intellect in common, as stated above ([957]Q[76], A[2]). From
this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men.
Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a
knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he
communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving
him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly
disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as
knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the
identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by
both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one
passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as
to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above
([958]Q[76], A[2]).
Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our
souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the
participation of separate forms, as stated above ([959]Q[84], AA[3],4);
but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from
the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to
this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master,
but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would
be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that
natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter
acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we
have proved above ([960]Q[79], A[2]; [961]Q[84], A[3]) that the passive
intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible
(species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).
We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the
teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from
potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order
to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an
exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as
the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas
other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes
from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man,
sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art,
sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force
of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed. First,
that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by
alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the
sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior
principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the
principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the
interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with
instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use
in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and
employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended
end.
Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as
is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an
exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For
in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the
light of the active intellect, through which certain universal
principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as
proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal
principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of
which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research
advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what
he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple
from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously
unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1):
"All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge."
Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the
unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him certain
helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the
acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain
less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able
to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some
sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or
something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led
to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, by
strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active
power as of a higher nature, as explained above ([962]Q[106], A[1];
[963]Q[111], A[1]) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human
intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he
proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by
reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw
the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says
(Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes
knowledge." In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior
help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the
principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect
is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God.
Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (Ps.
102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (Ps.
93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us"
(Ps. 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us.
Reply to Objection 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause
knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause.
Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle
by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by
which one is directed in working.
Reply to Objection 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light
in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly:
but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power
of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are
proposed to him from without.
Reply to Objection 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple
are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in
detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by
himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own
master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is
required in a master.
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Whether man can teach the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says
(Eph. 3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the
principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church."
But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things
are made known to angels through men.
Objection 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened
immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior
angels, as stated above ([964]Q[116], A[1]; [965]Q[112], A[3]). But
some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the
Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1,2:
"Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son."
Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels.
Objection 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the
superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are
taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily
(Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be
instructed by men concerning Divine things.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine
enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to
them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never
enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way
as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are
subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's words
(Mat. 11:11): "There hath not risen among them that are born of woman a
greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of
heaven is greater than he." Therefore angels are never enlightened by
men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known
to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone
to know the heart's secrets.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this
passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the
least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all
men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which
hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the
multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and powers
in the heavenly places---that is, through the Church." As though he
were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church
in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and powers who knew
it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at
first there, where after the resurrection this Church composed of men
will be gathered together."
It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by
the angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place
and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19).
Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the
apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the
angels, which were hidden from them before. In this way we can
understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)---that from the
preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is
to say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were
realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the
Gentiles were converted, of which mystery the Apostle is speaking in
the passage quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the
Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke
in His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater
than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they
have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of
beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we
might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a
small tree, though actually it is much smaller.
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Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change
corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work
miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by
prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered
to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working of miracles
a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men, by the power of
the soul, can change corporeal matter.
Objection 2: Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1): "Who hath bewitched
you, that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some
have blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially
children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could
change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by
the power of his soul.
Objection 3: Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior
bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is
changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid:
indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and
death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change
corporeal matter.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter
obeys God alone at will."
I answer that, As stated above ([966]Q[110], A[2]), corporeal matter is
not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent
composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and
form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore
of the angels also we have stated ([967]Q[110], A[2]) that they cannot
change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing
corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less
therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter,
except by means of bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power
of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the
same place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says---what
wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?"
Reply to Objection 2: Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the
fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual
substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul
is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says
is the cause of the "evil eye."
But it has been shown above ([968]Q[110], A[2]) that corporeal matter
does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone.
Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the
(corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which
change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the
more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in
contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way as a new and
clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as
Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; [*De Insomniis ii]).
Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs
mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the
countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who
have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by
God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons
co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul is united to the body as its form; and
the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as
stated above ([969]Q[81], A[3]), it is the act of a corporeal organ.
Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite
must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the
apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in
exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it,
as stated above (ad 2).
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Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?
Objection 1: It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at
least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to
local motion, as stated above (Q[110], A[5]). But the separate soul is
a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its
command.
Objection 2: Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the
narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained
power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this
soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been without
some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate
soul has the power to move bodies locally.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul
cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.
I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a
body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the
body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if
one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to
local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the
separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power the
separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by the
power of God, it can exceed those limits.
Reply to Objection 1: There are certain spiritual substances whose
powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who
are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may
obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate
substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that
substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only
one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the
lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul
is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form,
it cannot by its natural power move any other body.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom
(Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of
the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is
therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who
pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)
We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul;
secondly, as to the body.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
(2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?
(3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?
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Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted
with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not
composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence
not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save from
matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it
could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is not
composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by
generation but by creation.
Objection 2: Further, in living things the principle of generation is
the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the
vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now
nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be
caused by the animal's generating power.
Objection 3: Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form
of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But
neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in
the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some
part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of
the body, because there is not a particle of the body which is not made
from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul
is not produced through the semen.
Objection 4: Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive
of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal
is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it
would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal;
which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter
and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and
again this is impossible, for it has been proved above ([970]Q[76],
A[4]) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is
the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain,
this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its
own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot
be generated from the semen.
On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the animal seminally
generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals
produced from these elements---for instance by putrefaction. But in the
latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according
to Gn. 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having
life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are
produced by the seminal power.
I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are
created by God ([971]Q[65], A[4]). This opinion would hold if the
sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself.
For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would
needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot
be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul
would arrive at existence by creation.
But this principle is false---namely, that being and operation are
proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above ([972]Q[75],
A[3]): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since,
therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is
that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as
proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent
composites exist through them.
Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator
is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive
soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by
certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to
act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.
Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for
instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat
carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest
in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium,
but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living
bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both
without and with a medium. Without a medium---in the work of nutrition,
in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium---in the act of
generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain
active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument
derives a certain motive power from the principal agent. And as it
matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or
by the principal agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that
the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by
some seminal power derived therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive soul is not a perfect
self-subsistent substance. We have said enough ([973]Q[25], A[3]) on
this point, nor need we repeat it here.
Reply to Objection 2: The generating power begets not only by its own
virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore
the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an
animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a
more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.
Reply to Objection 3: This active force which is in the semen, and
which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a
certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of
the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or
the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there
is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is
based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is
attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a
certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue
of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the
species as stated above ([974]Q[115], A[3], ad 2). And since in this
(vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a
heavenly body, it has been said that "man and the sun generate man."
Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's
power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4).
Reply to Objection 4: In perfect animals, generated by coition, the
active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De
Gener. Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female.
In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not
as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is
in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment,
then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by
the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually
informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which
was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the
generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be
more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher
says. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active
principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts
of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the
offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by
nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen,
it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit
thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because
this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent; and the
movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been
produced.
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Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from
the semen. For it is written (Gn. 46:26): "All the souls that came out
of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from the thigh
of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is
produced from the semen.
Objection 2: Further, as shown above ([975]Q[76], A[3]), the
intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one
soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen,
as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal.
ii, 3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but
first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also
the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
Objection 3: Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is
directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the
form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual
soul is the form of the human body, which is produced by the power of
the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the
power of the semen.
Objection 4: Further, man begets his like in species. But the human
species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational
soul is from the begetter.
Objection 5: Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if
the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the sin
of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit
intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.
On the contrary, It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the
rational soul is not engendered by coition."
I answer that, It is impossible for an active power existing in matter
to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now it
is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter;
for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is
therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual
principle.
Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter
according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making
use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to
do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the
intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence
the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the
intellect alone comes from without."
Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the
body, it is subsistent, as proved above ([976]Q[75], A[2]): therefore
to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an
immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only
through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul
is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be
non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is
therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted
with the semen.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of
the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.
Reply to Objection 2: Some say that the vital functions observed in the
embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from
the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false;
for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth cannot be
from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul
is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the
sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.
Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which
existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in
addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus
there would be in man three souls of which one would be in potentiality
to another. This has been disproved above ([977]Q[76], A[3]).
Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely
vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power, becomes
a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not
indeed through the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher
agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason
the Philosopher says that the intellect comes from without. But this
will not hold. First, because no substantial form is susceptible of
more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another
species, just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of
number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to
different species. Secondly, because it would follow that the
generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding
gradually from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration.
Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an
animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a
being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the
matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to
perfection; this will imply addition of further perfection without
corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the
nature of generation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that
which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus
it must needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which
was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those
who held the existence of several souls in the body---or else it is not
subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from this it
follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body,
which cannot be admitted.
There is again another explanation, according to those who held that
all men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved
above ([978]Q[76], A[2]).
We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the
corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and in
other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is
corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of
the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that
through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate
substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is
apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We
conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created by God at the
end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive
and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds in the case of diverse agents
not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to
one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from
reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior agents
extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an
animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but the power of the
soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been said above
([979]Q[105], A[5]; [980]Q[110], A[1]) that the whole of corporeal
nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God.
Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the body from being due to a
corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal
power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of
form.
Reply to Objection 5: In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature
is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is
evil; in this God does not concur.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?
Objection 1: It would seem that human souls were created together at
the beginning of the world. For it is written (Gn. 2:2): "God rested
Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He
created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the
same time.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to
the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with
the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added
to the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the
universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Gn. 2:2, where
it is said that "God ended" all "His work."
Objection 3: Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning.
But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it
began to exist before the body.
On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the
soul is created together with the body."
I answer that, Some have maintained that it is accidental to the
intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is
of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united
to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were created
together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false.
Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if it were
accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that
man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the
soul is a man, which is false, as proved above ([981]Q[75], A[4]).
Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels,
is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown above
([982]Q[55], A[2]; [983]Q[85], A[1] ): for man understands through
receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above
([984]Q[84], AA[6],7; [985]Q[85], A[1]). For this reason the soul needs
to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of
the sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel.
Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it
is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural to it
to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is
deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God
should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did
not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a
man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body.
But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to
the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the
reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other
reason. If because the soul willed it---this seems incongruous. First,
because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to
the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would
be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not fail in
what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why,
having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should,
after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a
spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly
revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united
to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills
would have to concur---to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of
the begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural
on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent
cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting
nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that
souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these
opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not
created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are
infused into them.
Reply to Objection 1: God is said to have rested on the seventh day,
not from all work, since we read (Jn. 5:17): "My Father worketh until
now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may
not have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the
souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the
species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's
soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Something can be added every day to the
perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as
to the number of species.
Reply to Objection 3: That the soul remains without the body is due to
the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it
was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the
beginning: for as it is written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death .
. . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)
We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?
(2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is
produced from the surplus food?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that none of the food is changed into true
human nature. For it is written (Mat. 15:17): "Whatsoever entereth into
the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." But
what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature.
Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes
flesh belonging to the "species" from flesh belonging to "matter"; and
says that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food
comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging
to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature
belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true
human nature.
Objection 3: Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the
reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered,
according to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were
changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human
nature.
Objection 4: Further, if the food were changed into true human nature,
whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due only
to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to
insure himself against death in perpetuity.
Objection 5: Further, if the food is changed into true human nature,
there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what
is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If
therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end
nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning.
Consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his
life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, identity of
matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not
changed into true human nature.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily food
when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the
texture of the members." But the texture of the members belongs to true
human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human
nature.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation
of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore
that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the
constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways:
firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the
individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a
thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate matter,
and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature
considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong
to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of
Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.
Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one
individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the
matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that
the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which,
they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man.
So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by
posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human
nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.
But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of
the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude
of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to
these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food,
they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural
heat, and prevent the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead
or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire.
But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the
same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can
cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be
generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the
human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its
subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it
can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed
into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire
matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in
the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like.
Thus there would only be one individual of the human species. Thirdly,
because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than
either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so
that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the
substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of
matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude
cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity
it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must
be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being
changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either
by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some
other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly
by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in
the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a
man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child.
Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to
Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things were created together as to the
substance of matter, but not as to the specific form." Consequently the
multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food
being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man
does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative
soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not
increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished,
but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be
natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain
fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either
by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently
the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called
"natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether
inadmissible.
Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to
exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general:
but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual
the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it
is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it
never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the
individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true
human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite
quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food
into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a
quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they
state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not
required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the
quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food,
this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However,
this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of living
bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of
generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating
their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the
nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by
their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true
nature. Secondly, because the active seminal power is a certain
impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above
([986]Q[118], A[1]). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting,
than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal
power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much
more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of
human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is
needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be
needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action
of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed
from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that
which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does
that which is formed from the food.
Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really
changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the
specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as it is
potentially flesh."
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what
enters into the mouth, but "all"---because something from every kind of
food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is
generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast
aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
Reply to Objection 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have
understood that which first receives the human species, which is
derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the
individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what
is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but
as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle.
For he says there, that "just as in things which have their species in
matter"---for instance, wood or stone---"so in flesh, there is
something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter."
Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things,
which are not generated seminally, or nourished. Again, since what is
generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so
nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says
there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is
added, cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by
being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying that one
is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.
It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is
not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from
different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the
species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it
remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together
with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to
matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and
renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but
the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in
its place.
Reply to Objection 3: The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever
the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it
cannot be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the
"nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly the
specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the
like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species
remains in its root, which is not destroyed.
Reply to Objection 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by
continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the
transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform
not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth.
Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost,
and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins
decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies.
Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is
weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length
watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
Reply to Objection 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a
certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to
be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already
existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter
together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into
fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of
wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece
is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time:
because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the
same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is
renewed which was consumed by natural heat.
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Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?
Objection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the
surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature,
producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is begotten."
But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the
semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.
Objection 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that
which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is
generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive
nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never
existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or
ancestors, than to any other men.
Objection 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh
of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from
surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the
cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were
in Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of
the body." But this would not be, if the semen were produced from
surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal.
i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."
I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been
stated above [987](A[1]; [988]Q[118], A[1]). For if human nature has a
virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in
another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which
at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form
communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing
should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things
generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards
perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the proper and
determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the
generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or
the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain common
virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is
subsequently determinate to this or that part.
Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what
is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this
solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken
from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be
due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the
power of transforming something else into the likeness of that nature.
But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then,
since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have
the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but
only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution
is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature
of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and
generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as mud is
generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being
cut in two: which is inadmissible.
It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something
separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the
whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of
the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above [989](A[1];
[990]Q[108], A[1] ). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is
that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into
the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this.
In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative
power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed
as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the
Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food,
have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and
generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter
in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the
form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the
substance.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is
on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that
generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his
grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should
have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue
derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father. In like
manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in relation
to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.
Reply to Objection 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood
as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from
which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that
both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which
is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance,
is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power
of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the
production) of this man.
But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal
substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter
from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin
Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not
derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal
virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For "such a
birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary,
O. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.
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FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART (FS) (QQ[1]-114)
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TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)
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PROLOGUE
Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be
made in God's image, in so far as the image implies "an intelligent
being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have
treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came forth
from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to
treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of
his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.
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OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and
secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards this
end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is
ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is stated to
be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2)
happiness.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
(2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?
(3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?
(4) Whether there is any last end of human life?
(5) Whether one man can have several last ends?
(6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?
(7) Whether all men have the same last end?
(8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?
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Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an
end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name,
implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But
that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this
preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does
not belong to man to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an
end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
Objection 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he
acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation,
sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one
moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on
something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are derived from the
principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human
operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it
belongs to man to do everything for an end.
I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are properly called
"human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from
irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore
those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master.
Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence,
too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty and will of reason."
Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a
deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be
called actions "of a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they
are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions
proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the
nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the
good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the end be last in the order of
execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And
it is this way that it is a cause.
Reply to Objection 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be
voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action
is voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the
will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by
the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible
for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end. For the
object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color:
wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing,
because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object; so the
first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing.
Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last end, it must
be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man,
at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore whatever a man
does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does
that action in which the last end consists.
Reply to Objection 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions;
since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the
proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an
imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.
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Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to
act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, never
acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that
have no knowledge of an end; either because they are altogether without
knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend
the idea of an end as such, as irrational animals. Therefore it seems
proper to the rational nature to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an
end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to
things that lack reason.
Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will.
But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for
an end belongs to none but a rational nature.
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only
mind but also nature acts for an end."
I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a
number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the
others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes
is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive
form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces
itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out
of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some
particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another:
consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of
necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of
an end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational
nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in
other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is
called the "natural appetite."
Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its
action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to
the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as
an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer
who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are
possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have
dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the
"faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to
an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not by
themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and
consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be ordained to
an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in
comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as stated
above ([991]FP, Q[22], A[2], ad 4; [992]FP, Q[103], A[1], ad 3).
Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as
directing [agens] and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper
to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by
another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do
not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether
void of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows
the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when
he acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's
compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it is
thus with irrational creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which
directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to
that which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an
irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in
universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack
reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but
they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to
some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved
by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends the
common good, moves, by his command, all the particular departments of
the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity,
moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to
the universal good, namely by the Divine will.
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Whether human acts are specified by their end?
Objection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their
end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by
an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their
end.
Objection 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist
before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a
human act does not derive its species from the end.
Objection 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But
one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends.
Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13):
"According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds
worthy of blame or praise."
I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and
not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and
form are established in their respective species by their own forms.
And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since
movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these
receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act which is
the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus
of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than
a certain movement proceeding from heat, while heating as a passion is
nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition
that shows the specific nature. And either way, human acts, whether
they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species
from the end. For human acts can be considered in both ways, since man
moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above
[993](A[1]) that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a
deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the end.
And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as
they are human, is the end. In like manner it is their terminus: for
the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end;
thus in natural agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to
the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. super
Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking
receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as
human acts.
Reply to Objection 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act,
because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it
just this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something,
considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as
passion.
Reply to Objection 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the
intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it
is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act.
Reply to Objection 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds
once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which
it has its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of
which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an act
which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several
ends of the will: thus this act "to kill a man," which is but one act
in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as to an end, to
the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result
being that there would be several acts in different species of
morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another,
an act of vice. For a movement does not receive its species from that
which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its
"per se" terminus. Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing,
and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality.
Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered
in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered in their
moral species, and conversely.
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Whether there is one last end of human life?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but
that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds
from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other
good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has
the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends.
Objection 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied
to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same
reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number,
the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is
consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that
there is also an infinite series of ends.
Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will.
But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can
will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore
there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is no
last end of the human will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose
a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good is
that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the
nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to
fix one last end.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed
indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in
whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the
first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of
necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.
viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement,
because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can
the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first
mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends---the order
of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders
there must be something first. For that which is first in the order of
intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite;
consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to
move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is
that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be
taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the
intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the
first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, on
neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no
last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its term,
nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no
first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would begin
to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue
indefinitely.
On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that
are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for
accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that
there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the
end.
Reply to Objection 1: The very nature of good is that something flows
from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore,
good has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this
argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that from the
end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards
those things that are ordained to the end. And this would be true if we
considered but the power of the First Good, which is infinite. But,
since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to
which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a
certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the
flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods
share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does
not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wis. 11:21), God
disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."
Reply to Objection 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins
from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term.
Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no
infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process of
things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one
another. But in those things which are accidentally connected, nothing
hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is accidental
to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be
added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders the reason
from an indefinite process.
Reply to Objection 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting
on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the
fact that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself
indifferently once or several times.
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Whether one man can have several last ends?
Objection 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed
at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four
things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue."
But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place
the last end of his will in many things.
Objection 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not
exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in
opposition to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is
the last end of the will does not exclude others.
Objection 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one
thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its
last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something
else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in
pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches.
Therefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at the same
time to several things, as last ends.
On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last end, is
master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of
life. Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil. 3:19): "Whose god is their
belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the
belly. Now according to Mat. 6:24, "No man can serve two masters,"
such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is
impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained to one
another.
I answer that, It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at
the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be
assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own
perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires
as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1):
"In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so
as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be complete." It is
therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that
nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if
something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not
possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were
its perfect good.
The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the
principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the
rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which
is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to
one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational
appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to
its last end, is one.
The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their
species from the end, as stated above [994](A[3]), they must needs
receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all:
just as natural things are placed in a genus according to a common
form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong,
as such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more
because in every genus there is one first principle; and the last end
has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last
end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last
end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all
men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man
must be fixed on one last end.
Reply to Objection 1: All these several objects were considered as one
perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last
end.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible to find several things
which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a
thing's perfect good, that anything besides be required for that
thing's perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will does not extend to making
opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to
tend to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above
(ad 2).
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Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he
wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said
to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious
matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last
end.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his
Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake.
Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end.
Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last
end.
Objection 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of
that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that he
desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the
last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end
of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we
love it for its own sake."
I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he
desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First,
because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good.
And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he
must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because
the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is
clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every
beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is
achieved through the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in
the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other
movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move
save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary
objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to
the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.
Reply to Objection 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any
external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they
afford him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his
last end.
Reply to Objection 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is
desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good,
which is the ultimate end.
Reply to Objection 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end,
whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first
intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every
desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be
not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the
road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.
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Whether all men have the same last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For
before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man.
But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore
all men have not the same last end.
Objection 2: Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last
end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have
various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of
individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they
differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not
the same last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree
in desiring the last end, which is happiness.
I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways: first,
considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the
thing in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the
aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all
desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this
fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above [995](A[5]).
But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not
agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their
consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to every
taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most
pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar.
Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which
he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good
is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires
for his last end.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last
end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of
the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.
Reply to Objection 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by
reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end.
Reply to Objection 3: Although actions are of individuals, yet their
first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as
stated above [996](A[5]).
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Whether other creatures concur in that last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's
last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's
beginning---i.e. God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all
other things concur in man's last end.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all
things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's last end;
because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last
end.
Objection 3: Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the
object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all.
Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end.
On the contrary, man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible for
animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore
other things do not concur in man's last end.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is
twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing
itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition
of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty
body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as
"use"; and the end of the miser is money as "thing," or possession of
money as "use."
If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the
end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the
last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's
last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures
do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational
creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is
not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so
far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or
live, or even know.
Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness
means the acquisition of the last end.
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OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2)
what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?
(2) Whether in honor?
(3) Whether in fame or glory?
(4) Whether in power?
(5) Whether in any good of the body?
(6) Whether in pleasure?
(7) Whether in any good of the soul?
(8) Whether in any created good?
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Whether man's happiness consists in wealth?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For
since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which has
the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is
written (Eccles. 10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore man's
happiness consists in wealth.
Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness
is "a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things."
Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be a
sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires.
Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
Objection 3: Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never
fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more
than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with
riches" (Eccles. 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
On the contrary, Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than
in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines
in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas
the generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness does not
consist in wealth.
I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in
wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3),
viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as
a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars,
dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not
a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man,
for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable.
Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural
wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something
else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be
man's last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore
in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for
him, according to Ps. 8:8: "Thou hast subjected all things under his
feet."
And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of
natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its
means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently
much less can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore
it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to
consist in wealth.
Reply to Objection 1: All material things obey money, so far as the
multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods,
which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of
human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a
person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing
is palatable.
Reply to Objection 2: All things salable can be had for money: not so
spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Prov.
17:16): "What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy
wisdom."
Reply to Objection 3: The desire for natural riches is not infinite:
because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire
for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered
concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear
(Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than
the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign
good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things despised:
because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 24:29): "They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas
in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the
contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, we despise
them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words (Jn.
4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," by which temporal goods are
signified, "shall thirst again." The reason of this is that we realize
more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows
that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good does not consist
therein.
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Whether man's happiness consists in honors?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For
happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by
which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.
Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great
excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good.
But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover,
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:17): "To . . . the only God be honor and
glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor.
Objection 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness.
But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers
loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor.
Therefore happiness consists in honor.
On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the
honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the
person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore
happiness does not consist in honor.
I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For
honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and
consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in
the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, especially
to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e.
those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore
honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally
consist therein.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is
not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they
receive honor from men by way of reward, "as from those who have
nothing greater to offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness
itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor,
it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition.
Reply to Objection 2: Honor is due to God and to persons of great
excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not
that honor makes them excellent.
Reply to Objection 3: That man desires honor above all else, arises
from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as
stated above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise,
on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.
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Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For
happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the
trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the
Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy
to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us."
Therefore happiness consists in glory.
Objection 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the
knowledge of others by glory more than by anything else: since,
according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory
consists "in being well known and praised." Therefore man's happiness
consists in glory.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this
seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after
a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto
yourselves eternity, when you think of your fame in future time."
Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory.
On the contrary, Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame
or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe
their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything
be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at
their own praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame
or glory.
I answer that, Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory.
For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose
[*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is
related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for human
knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the
cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good,
which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but
rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a
fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect.
Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the
other hand, man's good depends on God's knowledge as its cause. And
therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which
man has with God; according to Ps. 90:15,16: "I will deliver him, and I
will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show
him my salvation."
Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails,
especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this
reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be
deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. 10:18):
"He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth."
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which
is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence
it is written (Mk. 8:38): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the
glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38
with Lk. 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact
that he was quoting from memory].
Reply to Objection 2: A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in
the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived
from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect
or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not
harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is
looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man
happy.
Reply to Objection 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily
ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by
accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
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Whether man's happiness consists in power?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all
things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first
beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity
of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are
called "gods" (Ex. 22:28), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods."
Therefore happiness consists in power.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest
perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those
who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
Objection 3: Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is
contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than
aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore
happiness consists in power.
On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most
imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man
cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path
of anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who is
surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom
he fears still more?"
I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and
this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle,
as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last
end. Secondly, because power has relation to good and evil: whereas
happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness
might consist in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than
in power itself.
Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists
in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, since
happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now
all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly,
because, since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as
stated in Ethic. i, 7, having gained happiness, man cannot lack any
needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may
still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom,
bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since happiness is the
perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be
said of the foregoing: for it is written (Eccles. 5:12) that "riches"
are sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said
of the other three. Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness
through principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto
naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to
external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for which reason they
are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness
nowise consists in the foregoing.
Reply to Objection 1: God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use
His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently
it is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power,
unless he become like Him in goodness also.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make
good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes
a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of
power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's
supreme good consists in power.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily
goods. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): "There is no riches above the
riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which
is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is
better than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows.
But for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary.
Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it seems that health
of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
Objection 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the
principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the
greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the
efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the
causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore,
just as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the
last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is
that which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists
most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the health of
the body.
On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard to
happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for
instance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the
stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist in goods
of the body.
I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the
goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a thing
be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in
the preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not intend as a
last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship
is ordained to something else as its end, viz. to navigation. Now just
as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer its course,
so man is given over to his will and reason; according to Ecclus.
15:14: "God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his
own counsel." Now it is evident that man is ordained to something as
his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of
man's reason and will cannot be the preservation of man's being.
Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the
preservation of man's being, it could not be said that the end of man
is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body;
and though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of
the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above ([997]FP, Q[75],
A[2]); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and
the instruments for the man that puts them into motion, that by their
means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained
to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness,
which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its
end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore
it is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external
goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good of the soul is
preferred to all bodily goods.
Reply to Objection 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection
of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself
includes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we
consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which does
not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being,
such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that being itself
together with an additional perfection is more excellent. Hence in the
same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than
things that exist, and intelligent better than living things.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this
argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in
Whom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their
proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some
as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to
few.
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Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure.
For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something
else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than
to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in
wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists
principally in pleasure and delight.
Objection 2: Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect
than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end
consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that
which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end.
Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs
man's will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods.
Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness, consists
principally in pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all
desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even
irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore
happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses
to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a
sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why
we should not say that the very beasts are happy too."
I answer that, Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the
name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13),
although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist
in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is
distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he
is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal.
We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident
resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the
reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either
in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if
indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man's happiness: and if it
is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote,
or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight,
which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but
something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.
But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that
way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power
of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to
the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For
since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that
part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a
certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul
which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way
infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a
fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is
independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is
a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through
matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter,
knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an
infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good
which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through
being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a
trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wis.
7:9) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand." And
therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper
accident of happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or
desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good:
thus it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne
downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired
for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else,
if the preposition "for" denote the final cause. But if it denote the
formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for
something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight,
and consequently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the
reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.
Reply to Objection 2: The vehemence of desire for sensible delight
arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the
principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that
sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.
Reply to Objection 3: All desire delight in the same way as they desire
good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not
conversely, as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow
that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight
results from some good, and that some delight results from that which
is the essential and supreme good.
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Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's
happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: external
goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not
consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above
([998]AA[4],5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than
the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we
desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires,
he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all
other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident
from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired.
Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however,
in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which
is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness
is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the
body, as shown above [999](A[5]). Therefore it is something belonging
to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that
which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own
sake." But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in
man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists in no
good of the soul.
I answer that, As stated above ([1000]Q[1], A[8]), the end is twofold:
namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use,
namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak
of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul
itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in
itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes
knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually
virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is
for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in
potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot
be its own last end.
In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power,
habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good
fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for
the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated
good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be
man's last end.
But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession
thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an
end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his
last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the
thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes
happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is
called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something
belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is
something outside the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that
man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or
act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in
this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness
is a good of the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned,
happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is
loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves
himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases. As
to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of
friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of
the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes
happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul,
as stated above.
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Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man's
happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom
"unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things,"
from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the
base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since
then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in
[1001]FP, Q[111], A[1], it seems that man's happiness consists in man
somehow reaching the angel.
Objection 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in
relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its
end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is
compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect
to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe
of creatures.
Objection 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural
desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good
surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include
that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man
can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good
constitutes man's happiness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is
the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it is
written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (Ps. 143:15)."
I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute
man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the
appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something
yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's
appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is
the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's
will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any
creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by
participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man,
according to the words of Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with
good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of
the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there
as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of
good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as
being the infinite and perfect good.
Reply to Objection 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a
further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole
itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man
is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to
God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good
of the universe, but God himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Created good is not less than that good of which
man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it
is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and
which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and
in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.
__________________________________________________________________
WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are
required for it.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?
(2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?
(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the
intellectual part?
(4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an
operation of the intellect, or of the will?
(5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation
of the speculative or of the practical intellect?
(6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it
consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?
(7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances
viz. angels?
(8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His
Essence?
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Whether happiness is something uncreated?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God is
happiness itself."
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to
God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme
goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will
tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an end,
but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same as God.
On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is
something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i,
3): "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore
happiness is not something uncreated.
I answer that, As stated above ([1002]Q[1], A[8];[1003] Q[2], A[7]),
our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to
attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the
attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired;
thus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money;
and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable.
In the first sense, then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely,
God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's
will. But in the second way, man's last end is something created,
existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or
enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If,
therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause or object, then it
is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of
happiness, then it is something created.
Reply to Objection 1: God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy
not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His
Essence. On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol.
iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by
participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which
man is said to be happy, is something created.
Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is called man's supreme good, because
it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same
way as the attainment of the end is called the end.
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Whether happiness is an operation?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the
Apostle says (Rom. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and
the end, life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very
being of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is
not an operation.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is
"a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But state
does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Objection 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the
happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of
operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather
something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an
operation.
Objection 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation
does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Objection 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations
are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Objection 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly.
But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or
some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an
operation.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is
an operation according to perfect virtue."
I answer that, In so far as man's happiness is something created,
existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For
happiness is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so
far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect.
Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is
evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the
Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which
has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is
potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, too,
each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore
man's happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.
Reply to Objection 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very
being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been
shown ([1004]Q[2] , A[5]) that the being of a man, no matter in what it
may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true
that His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of
the living, by which operation the principle of life is made actual:
thus we speak of active and contemplative life, or of a life of
pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as
is clear from Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee,
the only true God."
Reply to Objection 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered
happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common
good; and he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made
perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that the
state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But
Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing by what man
is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of operation.
And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic.
i, 7).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One
proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to
cut." And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation
is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the
patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that
remains in the agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will: and
such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent. And such an
operation can be happiness.
Reply to Objection 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection;
according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various
degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to
happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His very
Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the
happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by
which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of
theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their
present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an
operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can
be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is
multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present
state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore
the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i,
10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes:
"We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised us perfect
happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (Mat.
22:30).
Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails:
because in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by
one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as
far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so
do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a
participation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation
can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life,
which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the
contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the
contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged
in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and since
he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself
otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were,
continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are
evident.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the
intellective part only?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of
the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than
that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the
intellective operation depends on the sensitive: since "we cannot
understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness
consists in an operation of the senses also.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is
"a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some
goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses.
Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for
happiness.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved
in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby
in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive
operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happiness.
On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in
common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us.
Therefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1)
essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of
sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness
consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which
is his last end, as shown above [1005](A[1]): to Which man cannot be
united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because,
as shown above (Q[2], A[5]), man's happiness does not consist in goods
of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the
operation of the senses.
Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both
antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect
happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the
intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in
that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the
resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul," as Augustine says
(Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a
certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point
which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection
(SS, QQ[82] -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united
to God will not depend on the senses.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection proves that the operation of the
senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be
had in this life.
Reply to Objection 2: Perfect happiness, such as the angels have,
includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the
universal source of all good; not that it requires each individual
good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those
goods that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life.
Reply to Objection 3: In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected,
in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in
the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from
the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of th
e
intellect or of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the
will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness
consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3): "Who hath
placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the
will. Therefore man's happiness is in the will.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the
object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the
will.
Objection 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus
the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the
general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to
operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall
state further on ([1006]Q[9], AA[1],3). Therefore happiness regards the
will.
Objection 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be
man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of
the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an
operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13).
Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is
he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And a
little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well,
whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy, and such a man
already possesses some good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness
consists in an act of the will.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: that
they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last
end, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists
in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for
happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is,
as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I
say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible
for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what
has been said ([1007]AA[1],2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the
attainment of the last end. But the attainment of the end does not
consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the
end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it is delighted
by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end
is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end:
while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not
conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights
in it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must
be due to something else than an act of the will.
This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the
acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous man
would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the
moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his
hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got.
And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to attain
an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us
by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the
end when attained.
So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the
intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the
will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is
"joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of
happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though
it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and
consequent thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are
removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end:
consequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains
at peace, his desire being at rest.
Reply to Objection 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as
neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing.
Wherefore, from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as
the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as
its act.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will
does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to
the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the
end, viz. delight or enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but
knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is
known," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain
an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain
a sensible end by an act of sense.
Reply to Objection 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because
he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the
act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness,
as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among
the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an
inclination of the will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus of
its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus "quality."
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Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical
intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the
practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming
like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the
cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative intellect,
which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness
consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the
speculative.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the
practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative
intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good,
in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but not in
reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to
which we are said to be knowing or understanding. Therefore man's
happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than of
the speculative.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the
speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man;
whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to
man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's
happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather
than of the speculative.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is
promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting
perfection of our joys."
I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative
rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three
reasons. First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must
needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is that
of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest
power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which
is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect.
Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz.
in the contemplation of Divine things. And since that "seems to be each
man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7,
therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful
to him.
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought
principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is
not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very
actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the
last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the
practical intellect.
Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative
life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God
and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things
pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in
common with man, although imperfectly.
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to
come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such
as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of
the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated
in Ethic. x, 7,8.
Reply to Objection 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect
to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing
in relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the
likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union and
"information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be
answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, which is His
Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which
is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it,
viz. the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole
man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical
intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his
own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions
and passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is
something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an
operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness
consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of
the practical intellect.
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Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the
consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."
And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than three
speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which
all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore
man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
sciences.
Objection 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to
be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative
sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire
to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative
sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists
in the consideration of speculative sciences.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now
everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality
to act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration
of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration
of these sciences, man's final happiness consists.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:23): "Let not the wise man glory
in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences.
Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the consideration
of these.
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is
twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we
are to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness;
and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but
partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect
prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be done; while
imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed
of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of
prudence.
Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the
consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe
that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond
the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science
is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of
speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the
Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1),
and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the
entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than
knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is
his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For
a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the
lower partakes of something higher. Now it is evident that the form of
a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the
intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but
inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above
the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the
kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of
itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through
knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been shown
([1008]FP, Q[88], A[2]), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the
knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect.
Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the
consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible
forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the
consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of
true and perfect happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of
imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above
(A[2], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired,
but also any likeness or participation thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by
the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and
perfect act.
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Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely,
angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the
knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a
homily (xxvi in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts
of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels"; by which he
means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels
by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man's final happiness
consists in contemplating the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to
be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect
figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of
human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human
intellect consists in contemplating the angels.
Objection 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher
nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the
spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order,
are the angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect
is to be united to the angels by contemplation.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:24): "Let him that glorieth,
glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's
final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.
I answer that, As stated above [1009](A[6]), man's perfect happiness
consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some
participation, but in that which is so by its essence. Now it is
evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as
the proper formal object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper
object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of
whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with
its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same
in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); whatever are beings by
participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by
participation: because in God alone is His Being His Essence, as shown
in the [1010]FP, Q[44], A[1]. It follows that contemplation of Him
makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should
not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the
angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative
science.
Reply to Objection 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels,
by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God
Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: According to those that hold human souls to be
created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness
should consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it
were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in
[1011]FP, Q[90], A[3]. Wherefore the final perfection of the human
intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the
creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel
enlightens as a minister, as stated in the [1012]FP, Q[111], A[2], ad
2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to
happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two
ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus
man's final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation
such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the
power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in
which is found the fulness of its formal object.
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Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the
vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that
by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to
something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is
not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the
intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His
Essence.
Objection 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher
nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the
Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect
does not reach to this, but consists in something less.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear, we
shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He
is."
I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else
than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points
must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as
something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the
perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now
the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a
thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains
perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore
an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not
possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause
"what it is"; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply,
although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that
the cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it
has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know
about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and
causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i,
2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider
that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he
wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this
inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the
cause.
If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created
effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that
intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains
in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet
perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect
needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will
have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in
which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above ([1013]AA[1],7;
Q[2], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers
journeying towards happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1014]Q[1], A[8]), the end has a
twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired:
and in this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the
lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above ([1015]Q[1],
A[8]). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end
of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to
their respective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of
God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than
that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.
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OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness:
and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?
(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?
(3) Whether comprehension is required?
(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?
(5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?
(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?
(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?
(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?
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Whether delight is required for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness.
For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward of
faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the
Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides
vision is required for happiness.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all
goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs
something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of
happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above ([1016]Q[3], A[8]);
it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.
Objection 3: Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be
unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the
intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy
in truth."
I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways.
First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is
necessary for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is
necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from
without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as
something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for
fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is
caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore,
since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign
Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to
anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this
consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion
of reward.
Reply to Objection 2: The very sight of God causes delight.
Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.
Reply to Objection 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of
the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated
in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care
and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the
operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the
attention because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those
things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we
must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of
opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders
the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the
speculative intellect.
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Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?
Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before
vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). But
perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks
before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.
Objection 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is
yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the
delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those
operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual
and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations.
Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the
intellect, which is vision.
Objection 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or
enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks
before vision.
On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is
the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4),
and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the
operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before
delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that
the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness
of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an
operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the
operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus
the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved
above ([1017]Q[1], A[1], ad 2;[1018] Q[3], A[4]): but it seeks to be at
rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently
it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before
the resting of the will therein.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight
perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of
youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but
not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.
Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to
the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful.
And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in
animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the
intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which
results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather
than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the
Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the
operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply
according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according
to the order of the intellectual appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity does not seem the beloved good for the
sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in
the good gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity
as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to
charity.
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Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for
happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm.
xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to
comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is without
comprehension.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his
intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect
and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect
is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him.
Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
Objection 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But
operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal
objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to
vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for
comprehension as a third.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): "So run that you may
comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the
spiritual race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7,8): "I have fought a good
fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest
there is laid up for me a crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is
necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those
things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in
which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible
end partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through
his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end
pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is
the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real
relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be
threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and
then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is
impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. But
sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the
capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and
this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and
this relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there
are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of
the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end
corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in the end now present
results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these
three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect
knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies
presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of
the lover in the object beloved.
Reply to Objection 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the
comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by
the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended
by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the
holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs
after another is said to comprehend [*In English we should say
'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension
is necessary for Happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will,
because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards
it while not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to
the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes
therein.
Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from
vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore
even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is
the object of comprehension.
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Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary
for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of
the intellect, as stated above ([1019]Q[3], A[4]). But rectitude of the
will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not
necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine
says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O
God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to know the truth. For
it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many
truths." Therefore rectitude of the will is not necessary for
Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows.
But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will.
Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect,
does not depend on rectitude of the will.
Objection 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is
not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance,
after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of
virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness
once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of
heart; for they shall see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with
all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God."
I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both
antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the
will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in
comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to
matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be
duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly
ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without
rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above
([1020]Q[3], A[8]), final Happiness consists in the vision of the
Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will
of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he
loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not
God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common
notion of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the
will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a
right will.
Reply to Objection 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of
the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of
the intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect
which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is
required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a
right course in order to strike the target.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end,
ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves
imperfection, such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are
no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order to
the end is necessary.
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Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness.
For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of
nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the
soul, without the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is
naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while
separated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without
the body.
Objection 2: Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above
([1021]Q[3], AA[2],5). But perfect operation follows perfect being:
since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being.
Since, therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated
from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate from its
whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul,
without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the soul
separated from the body.
Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13)
"the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is
"not hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered;
because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul "has a
natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held
back, so to speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward
journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul
cannot be happy without the body.
Objection 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls
desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet
desires to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body.
Objection 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the
soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 14:13): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed']
are the dead who die in the Lord."
I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in
this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now
it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this
life. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the
intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the
intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a
bodily organ, as was shown in the [1022]FP, Q[84], AA[6],7.
Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in
a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the
vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul
separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, when
separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the
Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back again. And
this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. By
authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): "While we are in the
body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of
this absence, saying: "For we walk by faith and not by sight." Now from
this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight,
bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the
Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in
God's presence; wherefore the text continues: "But we are confident and
have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present
with the Lord." Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints,
separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of
God, wherein is true Happiness.
Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the
body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it
looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the [1023]FP, Q[84],
A[7]. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means
of phantasms, as stated in the [1024]FP, Q[12], A[3]. Wherefore, since
man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence,
it does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul
can be happy.
We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's
perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof;
thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary
for its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection
belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong
in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in
the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the
more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its
proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine,
after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness
can be ascribed to the souls of the dead separated from their bodies,"
answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the
blessed angels see It; either for some other more hidden reason, or
because they have a natural desire to rule the body."
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the
part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the
organs of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form
of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in
respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that
natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same
as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any
individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be,
when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the
animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual
being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the
whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite after
the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is
the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the composite.
Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the [1025]FP,
Q[75], A[2]. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the
body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a perfect
operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his
intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have
Happiness. Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is
said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
Reply to Objection 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways.
First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and
such a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by
way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has
not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a
hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but prevents
it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is that separation from
the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might
to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God
in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as
far as possible. And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the
fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has,
in such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its
share.
Reply to Objection 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at
rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which
suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the
desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would
wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed,
Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.
Reply to Objection 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the
effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do,"
is not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because
even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of
the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it
refers to inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the
lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever will have,
whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.
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Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary
for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily
good. But it has been shown above ([1026]Q[2]) that Happiness does not
consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body
is necessary for man's Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the
Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not part
in this operation, as shown above [1027](A[5]). Therefore no
disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the
body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the
most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be
abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a
disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is
written (Jn. 13:17): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the
reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy
God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is
written (Is. 66:14): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and
your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of
the body is necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in
this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity
required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect
virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of
the body, from every operation of virtue.
But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no
disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is
necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said
that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything
corporeal." But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the
soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of
the soul to exclude its natural perfection.
Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is
necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which
is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, that the governance thereof is
difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and
weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the
highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no
longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the
angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden."
Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an
overflow on to the body, so that this too will obtain its perfection.
Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a
powerful nature that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor
of incorruption overflows into the lower nature."
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its
object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to
Happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the body has not part in that operation
of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove
a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary,
lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires
indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body
which weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will
be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the
Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq.).
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Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for
Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs to
Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance,
food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Lk. 22:30): "That
you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (Mat. 6:20): "Lay
up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (Mat. 25:34): "Come, ye
blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external
goods are necessary for Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness
is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some
of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are necessary
for Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 5:12): "Your reward is very
great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place.
Therefore at least external place is necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 72:25): "For what have I in heaven?
and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I
desire nothing but this,"---"It is good for me to adhere to my God."
Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this
life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of
happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists
in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in
this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of
contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which
latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its
operations.
On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect
Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is that all
suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the
animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human life,
which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect
Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul
separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no
longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are
nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the
animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as
being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of action to the
likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of
these goods of the body as stated in Ethic. x, 8.
Reply to Objection 1: All those material promises contained in Holy
Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture
is wont to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal,
in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire of things
unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink
signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for
man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of God.
Reply to Objection 2: These goods that serve for the animal life, are
incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness
consists. Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of
all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, we
shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i,
5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the
saints, but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods.
Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be
appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of
a certain fitness and adornment.
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Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness.
For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the
name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the
notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for
Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius [*Seneca, Ep. 6] says that "there is no
delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it
with us." But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship
of friends is also necessary.
Objection 3: Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity
includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that
fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in
contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for
Happiness.
I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man
needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to
make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them,
since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for
the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that
he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped
by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in
the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he
needs the fellowship of friends.
But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly
Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness;
since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the
fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures
receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth,
and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from
without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and
rejoice in God, at their fellowship."
Reply to Objection 1: That glory which is essential to Happiness, is
that which man has, not with man but with God.
Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the possession
of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the
question under consideration; because man possesses in God a
sufficiency of every good.
Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness,
as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor.
Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy,
though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be
there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently,
friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man can attain Happiness?
(2) Whether one man can be happier than another?
(3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?
(4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?
(5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?
(6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher
creature?
(7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may
obtain Happiness of God?
(8) Whether every man desires Happiness?
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Whether man can attain happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just
as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is
above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in
several passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature
only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither
can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of the intellectual
nature, which is Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is
pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material
things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the
phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign
Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle.
Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is
midway between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot attain
Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:12): "Blessed is the man whom
Thou shalt instruct, O Lord."
I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good.
Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain
Happiness. Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both
because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and
because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness.
This can be proved again from the fact that man is capable of seeing
God, as stated in [1028]FP, Q[12], A[1]: in which vision, as we stated
above (Q[3], A[8]) man's perfect Happiness consists.
Reply to Objection 1: The rational exceeds the sensitive nature,
otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the
rational exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its
knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the
universal, whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the
intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing
the same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps
forthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of
reason, as was made clear in the [1029]FP, Q[58], A[3]; [1030]FP,
Q[79], A[8]. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that
which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain
Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but
otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith
after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a
time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.
Reply to Objection 2: To man in the present state of life the natural
way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after
this state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the
[1031]FP, Q[84], A[7] ; [1032]FP, Q[89], A[1].
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of
nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an
operation of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the
angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained it, he
will be perfectly happy.
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Whether one man can be happier than another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another.
For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue;
because it is written (Mat. 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard
"received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in
Evang.), "each was equally rewarded with eternal life." Therefore one
man cannot be happier than another.
Objection 2: Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can
surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed
by another's.
Objection 3: Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient
good" (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire is
not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack
nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore
either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be
greater.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): "In My Father's house there
are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in
Joan.) signify "the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal
life." But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to
merit, is Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of
Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.
I answer that, As stated above ([1033]Q[1], A[8];[1034] Q[2], A[7]),
Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the
Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As
to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one
Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one
Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But
as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier
than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he
is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his
being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this
sense one man can be happier than another.
Reply to Objection 1: The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in
its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the
divers degrees of enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is said to be the supreme good,
inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme
Good.
Reply to Objection 3: None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good;
since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all
good," as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 134). But one is said to be
happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same
good. And the addition of other goods does not increase Happiness,
since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others
besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing
Thee alone."
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Whether one can be happy in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For
it is written (Ps. 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who
walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore
one can be happy in this life.
Objection 2: Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good
does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be
happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in
this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore man
can be happy in this life.
Objection 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false:
since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature does
not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this
life, as appears from Ps. 143:15: "They have called the people happy
that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life.
Therefore one can be happy in this life.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:1): "Man born of a woman, living
for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness excludes
misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.
I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this
life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. This
may be seen from a twofold consideration.
First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a
"perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils
every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this
present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the
part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the
appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine
sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire for
good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good,
which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass
away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have,
and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death.
Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness,
viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this
life, as was shown in the [1035]FP, Q[12], A[11]. Hence it is evident
that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
Reply to Objection 1: Some are said to be happy in this life, either on
account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come,
according to Rom. 8:24: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a
certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of
the Sovereign Good.
Reply to Objection 2: The imperfection of participated Happiness is due
to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness,
which is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the
nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the part
of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in
itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the way
in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy the
true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as
stated above ([1036]Q[3], A[2]), the true nature of Happiness is taken
from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
Reply to Objection 3: Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness
to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true
Happiness. And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether happiness once had can be lost?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is
a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according
to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature,
changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in a
changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose
Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect;
and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed
to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation
whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.
Objection 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's
Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore it
seems that it has an end.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the righteous that "they
shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated
[1037](A[2]), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal
ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had
in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of
contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for
instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain
occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed
so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that happiness
principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired,
outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as
they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away
altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man
bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of
this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to
the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i,
10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose
nature is subject to change.
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this
life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following
the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after
the final Happiness.
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the
general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the "perfect and
sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude
every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he has,
and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be
troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that
he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that man
have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If
this opinion be true, it follows that he never will lose happiness: but
if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false
opinion: because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the
true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no
longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of
Happiness. For it has been shown above ([1038]Q[3], A[8]) that man's
perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it
is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see
It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without,
is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its
stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of
which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills
the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all
goodness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): "I shall be satisfied when
Thy glory shall appear"; and (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like
manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is
written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation
hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." It is thus
evident that the happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his own accord.
Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away
from him. Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment,
it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault;
and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the
will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above
([1039]Q[4], A[4]). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent.
Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other
things: and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that
union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man should
pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like
vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are subject to time
and movement.
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which
excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has
happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine
power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which
transcends all change.
Reply to Objection 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things
which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural
necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is
unable not to wish to be happy.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition
of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of
the good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the
beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from
another.
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Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural
powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing is so
necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore
this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness
by his natural powers.
Objection 2: Further, since man is more noble than irrational
creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But
irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much
more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs
to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the
imperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, is
subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own
actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i.e.
Happiness, by his natural powers.
On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his
intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints,
surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:9) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into
the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love
Him." Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be
acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in
whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on
(Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]),
consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's
Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every
creature, as was shown in the [1040]FP, Q[12], A[4]. For the natural
knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his
substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii)
that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it,
according to the mode of its substance." But every knowledge that is
according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision
of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created
substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final
Happiness by his natural powers.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries,
although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it
provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with
which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it
fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal
to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him
free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy.
"For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by
ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although
it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble
condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains
some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to
attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better
disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of
medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help
of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the
perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the
purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not
capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its
natural powers.
Reply to Objection 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same
species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow
of necessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that
can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection.
Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power,
is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's
happiness: since operation takes its species from its object.
Consequently the argument does not prove.
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Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the
action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a
twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one
another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside
the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end
(Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is
dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the
order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the
parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the
lower, as stated in the [1041]FP, Q[109], A[2]: while happiness
consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe,
i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher creature, viz.
an angel, acting on him.
Objection 2: Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be
reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is
potentially hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually
hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually
happy by an angel who is actually happy.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the
intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten
man's intellect as shown in the [1042]FP, Q[111], A[1]. Therefore an
angel can make a man happy.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace
and glory."
I answer that, Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature,
from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which
surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature.
Consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature, it is
done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring
sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been shown above
[1043](A[5]) that Happiness is a good surpassing created nature.
Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of
any creature: but by God alone is man made happy, if we speak of
perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the
same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it consists.
Reply to Objection 1: It often happens in the case of active powers
ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach
the last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of
that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of
sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a
ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the order of the
universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of his
last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto:
whereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which
is God.
Reply to Objection 2: When a form exists perfectly and naturally in
something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for
instance a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in
something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle
whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of
color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; nor indeed can
everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something else;
for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity.
But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is in God perfectly and
naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness
or participation. Consequently no creature can communicate its
Happiness to another.
Reply to Objection 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man
or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not
as to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the [1044]FP,
Q[106], A[1]: since in order to see this, all are immediately
enlightened by God.
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Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he
may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite
power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of
matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man's works,
since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause
thereof, as stated above [1045](A[6]), can be required only as
dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not require dispositions
before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.
Objection 2: Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness,
so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established
nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or
action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith
in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man
without any previous works.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:6) that Happiness is of
the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no
works of man are necessary for attaining Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:17): "If you know these things,
you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is obtained
through works.
I answer that, Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is
necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right order
of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for
obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order to
receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need
precede his Happiness: for God could make a will having a right
tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as
sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form.
But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not be thus; for
as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural
capacity for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one
movement, some by several." Now to possess the perfect good without
movement, belongs to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness
naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not
to be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since
Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can
becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby
it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in the natural order,
obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement
of a meritorious work, as was explained in the [1046]FP, Q[62], A[5];
whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called
merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9),
happiness is the reward of works of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Works are necessary to man in order to gain
Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power
which bestows Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.
Reply to Objection 2: God produced the first creatures so that they are
perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the
creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various
species, that through them nature might be propagated to their progeny.
In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through
Christ, who is God and Man, "Who," according to Heb. 2:10, "had brought
many children into glory"; therefore, from the very beginning of His
conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious
operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails
baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no
merits of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of
Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope,
which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on
account of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as
Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends
towards Happiness.
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Whether every man desires happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man
can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object
of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness
is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the
body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some in other things." Therefore
not all desire Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the
Divine Essence, as stated above ([1047]Q[3], A[8]). But some consider
it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire
it not. Therefore all men do not desire Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is
he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss." But all do not
desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to
desire such things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had
said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he
would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his
will." Therefore everyone desires to be happy.
I answer that, Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according
to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every man
desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the
perfect good, as stated above ([1048]AA[3],4). But since good is the
object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely
satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happiness is nothing else
than to desire that one's will be satisfied. And this everyone desires.
Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as
to that in which it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness;
because they know not in what thing the general notion of happiness is
found. And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it. Wherefore
the reply to the first Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the will follows the apprehension of the
intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real
distinction, there may be a distinction according to the consideration
of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired in
one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be
considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general notion
of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends
thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other
special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself, or on the
part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the
will does not tend thereto of necessity.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition of Happiness given by
some---"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every
wish is fulfilled" is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate
definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of
all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he
who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing satisfies man's
natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if we
understand it of those things that man desires according to the
apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to Happiness, to
have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to
unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things hinders man
from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason
sometimes accepts as true things that are a hindrance to the knowledge
of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that
Augustine added so as to include perfect Happiness---that he "desires
nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood,
to wit, that "happy is he who has all he desires."
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TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ[6]-21)
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we
must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what acts
we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from
obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with things
singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it
take account of things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since
it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles;
and secondly matters of detail.
In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves
for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their
principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common
to man and animals. And since Happiness is man's proper good, those
acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness
than have those which are common to man and the other animals. First,
then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly,
those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are
called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold
consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human
acts?
And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary,
because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we
must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.
First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general;
secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the
will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts
which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from
the will through the medium of the other powers.
And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to
which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider the
voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of
those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under the
first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
(2) Whether in irrational animals?
(3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?
(4) Whether violence can be done to the will?
(5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?
(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?
(7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?
(8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?
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Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human
acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself." as
Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the principle
of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since man's
appetite is moved to act, by the appetible object which is outside him,
and is as a "mover unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore there is
nothing voluntary in human acts.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in
animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from
without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal.
Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: and
therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.
Objection 3: Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But
this is not true of man; for it is written (Jn. 15:5): "Without Me you
can do nothing." Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the voluntary
is an act consisting in a rational operation." Now such are human acts.
Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
I answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human acts.
In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of
some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved;
whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a
stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the
stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this
movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an
intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every
agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated above
([1049]Q[1], A[2]); those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic
principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of
movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end,
some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or
is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the
end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only
acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no
knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of
action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved
for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the
principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing, but in
something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is
imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move
themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a
knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in
them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end.
And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit,
that they act and that they act for an end, the movements of such
things are said to be voluntary: for the word "voluntary" implies that
their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is
that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and
Damascene [*See Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as
having "a principle within" the agent, but also as implying
"knowledge." Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work,
and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every principle is a first principle.
Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the
nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or
moved by an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the
voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet
again it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be
first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things
subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration is a heavenly
body, which is nevertheless, is not the first mover simply, but is
moved locally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the
voluntary act, i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first
principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved by
an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.
Reply to Objection 2: New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a
motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by
means of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with
something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite.
Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him,
begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far as some
extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as in
the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by the
motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which is the power of
a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens that through
some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to the desire of
something. But this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as
stated above (ad 1), for such movements caused by an extrinsic
principle are of another genus of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: God moves man to act, not only by proposing the
appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also
by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or
of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not
incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the
First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it: so
it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed
from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both
natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that it is
essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.
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Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in
irrational animals. For a thing is called "voluntary" from "voluntas"
[will]. Now since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it
cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything
voluntary in them.
Objection 2: Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is
said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not
masters of their actions; for "they act not; rather are they acted
upon," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there is no
such thing as a voluntary act in irrational animals.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that "voluntary
acts lead to praise and blame." But neither praise nor blame is due to
the acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "both
children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary." The same
is said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii.].
I answer that, As stated above [1050](A[1]), it is essential to the
voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with
some knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect
and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only
apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under
the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And
such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But imperfect
knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without
knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to
the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals,
through their senses and their natural estimative power.
Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect
voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from
deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to
gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the
imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does
not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Wherefore the
voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature:
whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even
irrational animals.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is the name of the rational appetite;
and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word
"voluntary" is derived from "voluntas" [will], and can be extended to
those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of
likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to
irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some
kind of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that man is master of his actions, is
due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since the
deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the
will can be inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness
is in irrational animals, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary
act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in
irrational animals.
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Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?
Objection 1: It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any
act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing
can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of
the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act.
Objection 2: Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the
will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish. But
not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to
voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of
the will ceases.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as
stated above ([1051]AA[1],2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore
voluntariness cannot be without some act.
On the contrary, The word "voluntary" is applied to that of which we
are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to
will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will are
voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.
I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing
proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which sense
something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for
instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense
something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the
sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having ceased
to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows from
want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then
when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to
steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the
sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although it might be
due to his absence from the helm.
Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes
ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and
not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus
it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without
outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not
to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does
not will to act.
Reply to Objection 1: We apply the word "voluntary" not only to that
which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to
that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.
Reply to Objection 2: "Not to wish" is said in two senses. First, as
though it were one word, and the infinitive of "I-do-not-wish."
Consequently just as when I say "I do not wish to read," the sense is,
"I wish not to read"; so "not to wish to read" is the same as "to wish
not to read," and in this sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness.
Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of the will is
affirmed. And in this sense "not to wish" does not imply
involuntariness.
Reply to Objection 3: Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the
same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in
one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to
wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary,
so is it voluntary not to consider.
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Whether violence can be done to the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For
everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there
is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will.
Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.
Objection 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active
principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive force:
for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is
sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it is
compelled.
Objection 3: Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to
nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature;
as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to nature,
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the movement of the
will can be compelled.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is done
by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under
compulsion is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the will,
cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act.
I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate
act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an act
of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some
other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which are commanded by
the will to be executed by means of the motive power.
As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer
violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from
executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act,
violence cannot be done to the will.
The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an
inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge: just
as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior
principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from
an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the nature of the
will's own act, that it should be subject to compulsion and violence:
just as it is also contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or
movement. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but
that this violent movement be from its natural inclination is
impossible. In like manner a man may be dragged by force: but it is
contrary to the very notion of violence, that he be dragged of his own
will.
Reply to Objection 1: God Who is more powerful than the human will, can
move the will of man, according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king
is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it."
But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the
will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against
the will.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not always a violent movement, when a
passive subject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is
done against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise
every alteration and generation of simply bodies would be unnatural and
violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior
aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In like manner
when the will is moved, according to its own inclination, by the
appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary.
Reply to Objection 3: That to which the will tends by sinning, although
in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless
is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as
it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some
vicious habit.
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Whether violence causes involuntariness?
Objection 1: It would seem that violence does not cause
involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in
respect of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as shown
above [1052](A[4]). Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness.
Objection 2: Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with
grief, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic.
iii, 5) say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being
grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.
Objection 3: Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But
some violent actions proceed from the will: for instance, when a man
with a heavy body goes upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a
way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does not
cause involuntariness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 24) say that "things done under compulsion are involuntary."
I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as
likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in
common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas violence is
from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things
devoid of knowledge, violence effects something against nature: so in
things endowed with knowledge, it effects something against the will.
Now that which is against nature is said to be "unnatural"; and in like
manner that which is against the will is said to be "involuntary."
Therefore violence causes involuntariness.
Reply to Objection 1: The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now
it has been said [1053](A[4]) that not only the act, which proceeds
immediately from the will, is called voluntary, but also the act
commanded by the will. Consequently, as to the act which proceeds
immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as
stated above [1054](A[4]): wherefore violence cannot make that act
involuntary. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence:
and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.
Reply to Objection 2: As that is said to be natural, which is according
to the inclination of nature; so that is said to be voluntary, which is
according to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be
natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature as from an active
principle: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly,
according to a passive principle; because, to wit, there is in nature
an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle: thus
the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by reason of the
natural aptitude in a heavenly body to receive such movement; although
the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner an act
is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, in regard to action, for
instance, when one wishes to be passive to another. Hence when action
is brought to bear on something, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the
will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject, there is not
violence simply: for although the patient does nothing by way of
action, he does something by being willing to suffer. Consequently this
cannot be called involuntary.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4) the
movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the
natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the
body, is nevertheless somewhat natural to the animal, to which it is
natural to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is
violent, not simply but in a certain respect. The same remark applies
in the case of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary to
their natural disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect,
i.e. as to that particular limb; but not simply, i.e. as to the man
himself.
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Whether fear causes involuntariness simply?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply. For
just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the
time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But
violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes
involuntariness simply.
Objection 2: Further, that which is such of itself, remains such,
whatever be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it
remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done
through fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with the
addition of fear, it is involuntary.
Objection 3: Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is
such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any condition,
is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a condition, is
necessary in some respect: but what is necessary absolutely, is
necessary simply. But that which is done through fear, is absolutely
involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a condition, namely, in
order that the evil feared may be avoided. Therefore that which is done
through fear, is involuntary simply.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] and
the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done
through fear are "voluntary rather than involuntary."
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise
Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such
things are done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly
voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear,
considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in
this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.
But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary
rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary
in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according as it
is in act; but according as it is only in apprehension, it is not
simply, but in a certain respect. Now that which is done through fear,
is in act in so far as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with
singulars; and the singular, as such, is here and now; that which is
done is in act, in so far as it is here and now and under other
individuating circumstances. And that which is done through fear is
voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, in so far
as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was
feared; thus the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary
during the storm, through fear of the danger: wherefore it is clear
that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that what is done out of
fear is essentially voluntary, because its principle is within. But if
we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case,
and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a
consideration of the mind. And consequently what is done through fear
is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the
actual circumstances of the case.
Reply to Objection 1: Things done through fear and compulsion differ
not only according to present and future time, but also in this, that
the will does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which
is done through compulsion: whereas what is done through fear, becomes
voluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its own
sake, but on account of something else, that is, in order to avoid an
evil which is feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act are
satisfied, if it be done on account of something else voluntary: since
the voluntary is not only what we wish, for its own sake, as an end,
but also what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end. It is
clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will does
nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will does
something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xxx.] says, in order to exclude things done through fear, a violent
action is defined as not only one, "the principal whereof is from
without," but with the addition, "in which he that suffers violence
concurs not at all"; because the will of him that is in fear, does
concur somewhat in that which he does through fear.
Reply to Objection 2: Things that are such absolutely, remain such,
whatever be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white
thing: but things that are such relatively, vary according as they are
compared with different things. For what is big in comparison with one
thing, is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be
voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were absolutely; but also
for the sake of something else, as it were relatively. Accordingly,
nothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in comparison with one
thing, from becoming voluntary when compared with another.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is done through fear, is voluntary
without any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually
done: but it is involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say,
if such a fear were not threatening. Consequently, this argument proves
rather the opposite.
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Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?
Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness.
For just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes
involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so
too.
Objection 2: Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter
to that which he proposed, so does the incontinent, through
concupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent.
Therefore concupiscence does so also.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness. But
concupiscence impairs knowledge; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
5) that "delight," or the lust of pleasure, "destroys the judgment of
prudence." Therefore concupiscence causes involuntariness.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24): "The
involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done with regret."
But neither of these can be said of that which is done out of
concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness.
I answer that, Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the
contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to be
voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now
concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence.
Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be
voluntary rather than involuntary.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear regards evil, but concupiscence regards
good. Now evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good
harmonizes with the will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than
concupiscence to cause involuntariness.
Reply to Objection 2: He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of
the will to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts
from concupiscence, e.g. an incontinent man, does not retain his former
will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; for his
will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated.
Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is involuntary, to a
certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence is nowise
involuntary. For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to
that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he
desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself
he desires now.
Reply to Objection 3: If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge
altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad,
it would follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And
yet properly speaking it would not result in the act being involuntary,
because in things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor
involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done from
concupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed, because the power
of knowing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual
consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this
itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is in
the power of the will, for example "not to act" or "not to will," and
in like manner "not to consider"; for the will can resist the passion,
as we shall state later on ([1055]Q[10], A[3];[1056] Q[77], A[7]).
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Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not cause
involuntariness. For "the involuntary act deserves pardon," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But sometimes that which is done
through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to 1 Cor. 14:38:
"If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance does
not cause involuntariness.
Objection 2: Further, every sin implies ignorance; according to Prov.
14: 22: "They err, that work evil." If, therefore, ignorance causes
involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary: which
is opposed to the saying of Augustine, that "every sin is voluntary"
(De Vera Relig. xiv).
Objection 3: Further, "involuntariness is not without sadness," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But some things are done out of
ignorance, but without sadness: for instance, a man may kill a foe,
whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing a stag.
Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 1) say that "what is done through ignorance is
involuntary."
I answer that, If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is in so far as
it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of
voluntariness, as was declared above [1057](A[1]). But it is not every
ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge. Accordingly, we must
take note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of the
will: in one way, "concomitantly"; in another, "consequently"; in a
third way, "antecedently." "Concomitantly," when there is ignorance of
what is done; but, so that even if it were known, it would be done. For
then, ignorance does not induce one to wish this to be done, but it
just happens that a thing is at the same time done, and not known: thus
in the example given (OBJ 3) a man did indeed wish to kill his foe, but
killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill a stag. And ignorance of this
kind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1), does not cause
involuntariness, since it is not the cause of anything that is
repugnant to the will: but it causes "non-voluntariness," since that
which is unknown cannot be actually willed. Ignorance is "consequent"
to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance itself is voluntary: and
this happens in two ways, in accordance with the two aforesaid modes of
voluntary [1058](A[3]). First, because the act of the will is brought
to bear on the ignorance: as when a man wishes not to know, that he may
have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be withheld from sin;
according to Job 21:14: "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." And
this is called "affected ignorance." Secondly, ignorance is said to be
voluntary, when it regards that which one can and ought to know: for in
this sense "not to act" and "not to will" are said to be voluntary, as
stated above [1059](A[3]). And ignorance of this kind happens, either
when one does not actually consider what one can and ought to consider;
this is called "ignorance of evil choice," and arises from some passion
or habit: or when one does not take the trouble to acquire the
knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense, ignorance of the
general principles of law, which one to know, is voluntary, as being
due to negligence. Accordingly, if in either of these ways, ignorance
is voluntary, it cannot cause involuntariness simply. Nevertheless it
causes involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes
the movement of the will towards the act, which movement would not be,
if there were knowledge. Ignorance is "antecedent" to the act of the
will, when it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man's willing
what he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of some
circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result
being that he does that which he would not do, if he knew of that
circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may
not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots an
arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness
simply.
From this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the first
objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know. The
second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain
extent, as stated above. The third, with that ignorance which is
concomitant with the act of the will.
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OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the circumstances of human acts: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is a circumstance?
(2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human
acts?
(3) How many circumstances are there?
(4) Which are the most important of them?
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Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a
human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a circumstance is
that from "which an orator adds authority and strength to his
argument." But oratorical arguments are derived principally from things
pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition, the
genus, the species, and the like, from which also Tully declares that
an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a circumstance is not an
accident of a human act.
Objection 2: Further, "to be in" is proper to an accident. But that
which surrounds [circumstat] is rather out than in. Therefore the
circumstances are not accidents of human acts.
Objection 3: Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts
themselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents
of acts.
On the contrary, The particular conditions of any singular thing are
called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1)
calls the circumstances particular things [*{ta kath' ekasta}], i.e.
the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the circumstances are
individual accidents of human acts.
I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),
"words are the signs of what we understand," it must needs be that in
naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our
intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known to the less
known. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious things are
transferred so as to signify things less obvious: and hence it is that,
as stated in Metaph. x, 4, "the notion of distance has been transferred
from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of opposition": and in
like manner words that signify local movement are employed to designate
all other movements, because bodies which are circumscribed by place,
are best known to us. And hence it is that the word "circumstance" has
passed from located things to human acts.
Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is
outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, whatever
conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way
touch the human act, are called circumstances. Now what is outside a
thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its
accident. Wherefore the circumstances of human acts should be called
their accidents.
Reply to Objection 1: The orator gives strength to his argument, in the
first place, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the
circumstances of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable, first, through
being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently,
or from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, and so forth. And
so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly that the orator "adds
strength to his argument," as though this were something secondary.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is said to be an accident of something in
two ways. First, from being in that thing: thus, whiteness is said to
be an accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that
thing in the same subject: thus, whiteness is an accident of the art of
music, inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch one
another, as it were. And in this sense circumstances are said to be the
accidents of human acts.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 2), an accident is said to be
the accident of an accident, from the fact that they meet in the same
subject. But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two
accidents are both related to the same subject, without any relation to
one another; as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates. Secondly,
when such accidents are related to one another; as when the subject
receives one accident by means of the other; for instance, a body
receives color by means of its surface. And thus also is one accident
said to be in another; for we speak of color as being in the surface.
Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For
some circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent
otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person;
whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act, as the manner
in which the act is done.
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Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that theologians should not take note of the
circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider human
acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it
seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a thing
is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is outside it; but
by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should not take note of
the circumstances of acts.
Objection 2: Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one
thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the Philosopher
says (Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science considers accidental
being, except only the art of sophistry." Therefore the theologian has
not to consider circumstances.
Objection 3: Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the
orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not a
theologian's business to consider circumstances.
On the contrary, Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be
involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory
of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness excuses
from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian.
Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the theologian.
I answer that, Circumstances come under the consideration of the
theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian
considers human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to Happiness.
Now, everything that is directed to an end should be proportionate to
that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a
certain commensurateness, which results from the due circumstances.
Hence the theologian has to consider the circumstances. Secondly,
because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found
to be good or evil, better or worse: and this diversity depends on
circumstances, as we shall see further on ([1060]Q[18],
AA[10],11;[1061] Q[73], A[7]). Thirdly, because the theologian
considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is
proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be
voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary,
according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above
([1062]Q[6], A[8]). Therefore the theologian has to consider
circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Good directed to the end is said to be useful;
and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful."
Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according
to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that
which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and
"left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the
goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders
their being called good or bad according to their proportion to
extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.
Reply to Objection 2: Accidents which are altogether accidental are
neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity.
But such like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because
circumstances although, as stated above [1063](A[1]), they are
extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by
being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the
consideration of art.
Reply to Objection 3: The consideration of circumstances belongs to the
moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as
with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in
human acts and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in so far
as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse
or indictment. In different ways, however: because where the orator
persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian this consideration
belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are
subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and vicious acts, just as
the moralist does; and with the orator and politician he considers acts
according as they are deserving of reward or punishment.
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Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of
Ethics?
Objection 1: It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set
forth in Ethic. iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is described as
something outside the act. Now time and place answer to this
description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to wit, "when"
and "where."
Objection 2: Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing
is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore
all the circumstances are included under one, which is the "mode of
acting."
Objection 3: Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an
act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.
Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act
itself. Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about what," are
circumstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to the
final cause, and "about what" to the material cause.
On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethic. iii, 1.
I answer that, Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives
seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:
"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando---
Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when."
For in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or
"instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it, "why" he did
it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet
another, to wit, "about what," which Tully includes in the circumstance
"what."
The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a
circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the
act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways:
first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it
touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the
effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as "time"
and "place"; or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting." It
touches the effect when we consider "what" is done. It touches the
cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why"; as
to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about what"; as
to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance "who"; and as to
the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance "by what aids."
Reply to Objection 1: Time and place surround [circumstant] the act by
way of measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any
other way, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.
Reply to Objection 2: This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circumstance,
but results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a
quality of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a man
walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 3: A condition of the cause, on which the substance
of the act depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional
condition. Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of
theft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to the
substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same
applies to the other circumstances which are considered in reference to
the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a
circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act
"valiantly for the sake of" the good of the virtue or fortitude, is not
a circumstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of
the state, or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The same is to be
said with regard to the circumstance "what"; for that a man by pouring
water on someone should happen to wash him, is not a circumstance of
the washing; but that in doing so he give him a chill, or scald him;
heal him or harm him, these are circumstances.
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Whether the most important circumstances are "why" and "in what the act
consists"?
Objection 1: It would seem that these are not the most important
circumstances, namely, "why" and those "in which the act is, [*hen ois
e praxis]" as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those in which the act is
seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be the most
important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most
extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things in which the act is are
not the most important circumstances.
Objection 2: Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore
it is not the most important circumstance.
Objection 3: Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to
each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act is the
person that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it
is done. Therefore these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest
importance.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.] says
that "the most important circumstances" are "why it is done" and "what
is done."
I answer that, As stated above ([1064]Q[1], A[1]), acts are properly
called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and
object of the will is the end. Therefore that circumstance is the most
important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the
circumstance "why": and the second in importance, is that which touches
the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance "what he did." As
to the other circumstances, they are more or less important, according
as they more or less approach to these.
Reply to Objection 1: By those things "in which the act is" the
Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those circumstances that
are affixed to the act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius,
De Nat. Hom. xxxi], as though he were explaining the dictum of the
Philosopher, instead of the latter's term---"in which the act
is"---said, "what is done."
Reply to Objection 2: Although the end is not part of the substance of
the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it
moves the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by
the end.
Reply to Objection 3: The person that does the act is the cause of that
act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in
this respect that he is directed to the act; while other conditions of
the person have not such an important relation to the act. As to the
mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the
substantial form depends on the object and term or end; but it is, as
it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.
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OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first
place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being
elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the
will.
Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must
therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to
the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it
seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end;
viz. "volition," "enjoyment," and "intention"; we must consider: (1)
volition; (2) enjoyment; (3) intention. Concerning the first, three
things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By what
is the will moved? (3) How is it moved?
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is of good only?
(2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?
(3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end
and to the means, by the same movement?
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Whether the will is of good only?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the
same power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white and
black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only
of good, but also of evil.
Objection 2: Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite
purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will is
a rational power, since it is "in the reason," as is stated in De Anima
iii, 9. Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and
consequently its volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.
Objection 3: Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is
directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we
wish "not to walk," or "not to speak"; and again at times we wish for
future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not
of good only.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside
the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."
I answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is
only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is
nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing
towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and
suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch
as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every
inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all desire."
But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form,
the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of
things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or
rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an apprehended
form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in
a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is
apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it
is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be
apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that
"the end is a good, or an apparent good."
Reply to Objection 1: The same power regards opposites, but it is not
referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred
both to good and evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by shunning
it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called "volition" [*In
Latin, 'voluntas'. To avoid confusion with "voluntas" (the will) St.
Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the translation may appear
superfluous], meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is in this
sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other hand, the
shunning of evil is better described as "nolition": wherefore, just as
volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: A rational power is not to be directed to all
opposite purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper
object; for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the
object of the will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to such
opposite purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or
to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and such like: for the will
can be directed to either under the aspect of good.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is not a being in nature, is
considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations
are said to be "beings of reason." In this way, too, future things, in
so far as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as
such like are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good;
and it is thus that the will is directed to them. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered as a
good."
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Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of
the end only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition
is of the end, while choice is of the means."
Objection 2: Further, "For objects differing in genus there are
corresponding different powers of the soul" (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the
end and the means are in different genera of good: because the end,
which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus
"quality," or "action," or "passion"; whereas the good which is useful,
and is directed to and end, is in the genus "relation" (Ethic. i, 6).
Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
Objection 3: Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they
are perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical
arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the
use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of the) helmsman;
whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs
to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end,
it is not of the means.
On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a
thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus. But
the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the
end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of
the means.
I answer that, The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of
the will, sometimes its act [*See note: above A[1], Reply OBJ[1]].
Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both
to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in
which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any
way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are
in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of the
power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the
means.
If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly
speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated
from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to
understand" designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the
simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object
of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end.
Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the
other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as
referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so
far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the
end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known
in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of
understanding with regard to things known through first principles,
except in so far as we see the principles in those things. For in
morals the end is what principles are in speculative science (Ethic.
viii, 8).
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the will in
reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power
of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: There are different powers for objects that
differ in genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color
are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and
sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but are
as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to another.
Now such like objects are always referred to the same power; for
instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by which
color is seen.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that diversifies habits,
diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of
powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers
both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed
consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that
which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers
the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the
end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every
practical art there is an end proper to it and means that belong
properly to that art.
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Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to
the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic.
iii, 2) "where one thing is on account of another there is only one."
But the will does not will the means save on account of the end.
Therefore it is moved to both by the same act.
Objection 2: Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just
as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen
by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, whereby
it wills the end and the means.
Objection 3: Further, it is one and the same natural movement which
tends through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are in
comparison to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus.
Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it is directed to
the end and to the means.
On the contrary, Acts are diversified according to their objects. But
the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a
useful good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act.
I answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as
such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can be
moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot
be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end.
Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end
absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason for willing the
means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same
movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the means; and to the
means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to
the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes the other in time;
for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards
deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor
to heal him. The same happens in regard to the intellect: for at first
a man understands the principles in themselves; but afterwards he
understands them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the
conclusions on account of the principles.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds in respect of the will being
moved to the end as the reason for willing the means.
Reply to Objection 2: Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light
is seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In
like manner whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills
the end; but not the conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: In the execution of a work, the means are as the
middle space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural
movement sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus;
so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the end. But
in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) the end comes
to will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the conclusions
through the principles which are called "means." Hence it is that
sometimes the intellect understands a mean, and does not proceed thence
to the conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end,
and yet does not proceed to will the means.
The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what
has been said above (A[2], ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are
not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for
its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else:
wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the
other; but not conversely.
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OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?
(3) Whether the will moves itself?
(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?
(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?
(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic
principle?
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Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect.
For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy
justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows
sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us
not." But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect:
because movement of the movable results from motion of the mover.
Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object
to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in
representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the
imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes
our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a
picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither
does the intellect move the will.
Objection 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the
same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the
intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the
appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover
moved."
I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as
it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in
potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do
this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality
to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not
acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight
sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees
white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects,
viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination
of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is
sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part
of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every
agent acts for an end, as was shown above ([1065]Q[1], A[2]), the
principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art
which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is
concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art
of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the
nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this
respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for
we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and
perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the
will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the
universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which
belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the
leader of an army, who intends the common good---i.e. the order of the
whole army---by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the
order of one company.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the
manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are
specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is
universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect.
And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as
presenting its object to it.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect
does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the imagination of a form without
estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive
appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the
aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative
intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves the intellect as to the exercise
of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the
intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But
as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the
object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is
apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true.
It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the
same respect.
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Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the
sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to
be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the
sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the
intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect.
Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal
effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it
follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause
the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the
universal apprehension of the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not
moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal
motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the
sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite
does not move the will.
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by
his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured." But man would not
be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the
sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the
sensitive appetite moves the will.
I answer that, As stated above [1066](A[1]), that which is apprehended
as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing
appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from
the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it
is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it
depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it
is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being
fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."
Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite
man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according as man is
affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not
seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when
angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the
sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and
in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly
the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in
respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is
subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
Reply to Objection 2: Men's acts and choices are in reference to
singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is
a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that
something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the
reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible
and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as
a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic
sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can
nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and
concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing
hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
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Whether the will moves itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For
every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in
potentiality; since "movement is the act of that which is in
potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1]. Now the same is not
in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing
moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.
Objection 2: Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present.
But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved
itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.
Objection 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated
above [1067](A[1]). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would
follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers;
which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs
to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power
to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
I answer that, As stated above [1068](A[1]), it belongs to the will to
move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object.
Now, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]), the end is in things appetible, what
the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the
intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from
potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus
it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of
the end, moves itself to will the means.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not in respect of the same that the will
moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in
potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills
the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the
means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of the will is always actually present
to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not
always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.
Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise
than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object:
whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in
respect of the end.
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Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything
exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is
essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle,
just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of
the will is not from anything exterior.
Objection 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown
above ([1069]Q[6], A[4]). But the violent act is one "the principle of
which is outside the agent" [*Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1]. Therefore the
will cannot be moved by anything exterior.
Objection 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover,
needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself
sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A[1]
). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the
sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
I answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident
that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is
moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by
some exterior principle.
For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another
time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is
evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it
did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something
to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above [1070](A[3]),
in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of
willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel:
for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be
attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that
he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did
not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have
begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the
will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this
with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this
process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity,
suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the
instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter
of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).
Reply to Objection 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward
principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though
the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its
first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the
natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves nature.
Reply to Objection 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that
its principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of
him that suffers violence." This does not happen when the will is moved
by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved
by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to
the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible;
since then the will would will and not will the same thing.
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one
respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but
it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it
needs to be moved by another as first mover.
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Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly
body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their
cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved
in Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various and multiform, since
they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are
reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is
uniform according to its nature.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the
lower bodies are moved by the higher." But the movements of the human
body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the
movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were
moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
Objection 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers
foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the
will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move
man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the
heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts." But they would be, if
the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the
heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly
bodies.
I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly
bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to say, in
so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered
to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers,
are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the
human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as
to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as
stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in the reason." Now the reason is a
power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows
that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it
is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the
reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more
formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore
it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect
or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those
who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such
is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods
bring on" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom they
understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since
they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the
heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they
are.
But since it has been stated [1071](A[2]) that the intellectual
appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the
movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will;
in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the
sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The multiform movements of the human will are
reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect
and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior
immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of
the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its
cause.
Reply to Objection 2: The movements of the human body are reduced, as
to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the
disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the
influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite
is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in so far as
exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly
bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will
something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to
make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the
object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Cf. [1072]FP, Q[84], AA[6],7)
the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is
no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or
some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just
as by reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led
by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the
majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the
observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy
says (Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars"; which is a
though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will,
which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to
such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that when
the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden
inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And
since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the
lying spirits."
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Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as
exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its
superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But
there is something which is higher than the will of man and below God,
namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also,
as exterior principle.
Objection 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the
intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but
also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an
angel.
Objection 3: Further, God is not the cause of other than good things,
according to Gn. 1:31: "God saw all the things that He had made, and
they were very good." If, therefore man's will were moved by God alone,
it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby "we sin
and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9).
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in
us" [Vulg.'you'] "both to will and to accomplish."
I answer that, The movement of the will is from within, as also is the
movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to move a
natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that
alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature, can cause a
natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man,
who is not the cause of the stone's nature, but this movement is not
natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused
by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys.
vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light things.
Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something
that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an
exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is
evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the
rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated
in the [1073]FP, Q[90], A[2]. Secondly, it is evident from the fact
that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else
can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal
good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some
particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal
inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to
all forms, be created by some particular agent.
Reply to Objection 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be
the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural
forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part
of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to
man's knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a
creature from without, as stated above [1074](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to
the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this
universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself
by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good.
Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of
something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He
moves by grace, as we shall state later on ([1075]Q[109], A[2]).
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OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?
(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?
(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is
God?
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Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything
naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary
agent, as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is
not moved to anything naturally.
Objection 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as
"being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will.
Therefore no movement is natural to the will.
Objection 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the
will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing
naturally.
On the contrary, The movement of the will follows the movement of the
intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally.
Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.
I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher
also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense. For
sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In
this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in
Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even
for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing
which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of
itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong
to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs
of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking
nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever
belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard
to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are
naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements
must be something naturally willed.
Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does
each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in
the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of
demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is
all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature.
For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires,
but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man.
Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also
other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the
knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live
and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which
are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is distinguished from nature as one kind
of cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are
done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is
proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner
proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will
is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to
nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as what belongs to a
previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing,
being itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which is from
the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.
Reply to Objection 2: In the case of natural things, that which is
natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as
heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is
not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality:
because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is
"the act of that which is in potentiality" (Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1).
Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard
to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always
move upwards, but only when it is outside its own place. [*The
Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven,
i.e. the Empyrean.] And in like manner it is not necessary that the
will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills
something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it
is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure
act, is always in the act of volition.
Reply to Objection 3: To every nature there is one thing corresponding,
proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a
genus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as
species there corresponds something one specifically; and to the
individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since,
therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one
general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good; just as
to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the
true, or being, or "what a thing is." And under good in general are
included many particular goods, to none of which is the will
determined.
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Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?
Objection 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its
object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to
movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be
sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be
moved of necessity by its object.
Objection 2: Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is
the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as
stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by
its object: therefore the will also, by its object.
Objection 3: Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or
something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end
necessarily: because it is like the principle in speculative matters,
to which principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason
for willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also
necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.
On the contrary, The rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational
power, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9.
Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not moved,
of necessity, to either of the opposites.
I answer that, The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise
of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from
the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily,
for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of
it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second
manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by
another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must
consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible
moves the sight, under the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore
if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily:
unless one turns one's eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the
act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all
respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other
respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for
it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored,
and thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually colored is the
object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the
will be offered an object which is good universally and from every
point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything
at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the
will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it
will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever,
is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and
lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it:
and this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as
they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from
this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will,
which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.
Reply to Objection 1: The sufficient mover of a power is none but that
object that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that
power. If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not
move of necessity, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an
object which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by
that which may be either true or false---viz. by that which is
contingent: as we have said of the good.
Reply to Objection 3: The last end moves the will necessarily, because
it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that
end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and
"to live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be
gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as he
who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the
conclusions, without which the principles can still be true.
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Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a
passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:19): "The
good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do":
and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion.
Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, "according as a man
is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in man's power to
cast aside a passion once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to
will that to which the passion inclines him.
Objection 3: Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular
effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the universal
reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as
stated in De Anima iii, 11. But as the universal reason is to the
particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite.
Therefore the will is not moved to will something particular, except
through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite
happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will
cannot be moved in a contrary sense.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 4:7): "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The lust
thereof'] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it."
Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite.
I answer that, As stated above ([1076]Q[9], A[2]), the passion of the
sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by
its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and
such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which
he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence
of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is
wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those
who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious
or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such
like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of
such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of
necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither
movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.
Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the
passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent,
its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain
degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not
subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does
not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it.
Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and
the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the
will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the will cannot prevent the movement of
concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which
I will not, that I do---i.e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the
will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus
it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 2: Since there is in man a twofold nature,
intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in
respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly
subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is
entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although
reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains
free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion
entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by
the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed
according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him
otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good
apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense.
Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a
passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things
without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those
cases wherein reason resists passion.
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Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God.
For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God
cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is
written (Rom. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore God moves the
will of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it
wills naturally, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). But "whatever God does
in a thing is natural to it," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi,
3). Therefore the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves
it.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible
follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from
the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it:
because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it
is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it.
Therefore it wills it of necessity.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from the
beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore He
does not of necessity move man's will.
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine
providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things."
Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so
that from necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects follow of
necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently.
Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to
one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so
moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but
its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those
things to which it is moved naturally.
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine will extends not only to the doing of
something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a
way which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it
would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved
of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be
moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
Reply to Objection 2: That is natural to a thing, which God so works in
it that it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a
thing, according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish
that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for
instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be
natural to each thing---that it be subject to the Divine power.
Reply to Objection 3: If God moves the will to anything, it is
incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto.
But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that
the will is moved by God necessarily.
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OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
(2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to
irrational animals?
(3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
(4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?
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Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the
appetitive power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the
fruit. But it is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as
shown above ([1077]Q[3], A[4]), that receives the fruit of human life,
which is Happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive
power, but of the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, each power has its proper end, which is its
perfection: thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the
hearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is
its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to
the appetite.
Objection 3: Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible
delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for the
same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore
enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive power.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De Trin.
x, 10,11): "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own
sake." But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore also to
enjoy is an act of the appetitive power.
I answer that, "Fruitio" [enjoyment] and "fructus" [fruit] seem to
refer to the same, one being derived from the other; which from which,
matters not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the one
which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those things are most
manifest to us which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it seems that
the word "fruition" is derived from sensible fruits. But sensible fruit
is that which we expect the tree to produce in the last place, and in
which a certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to
have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the
longed-for term, which is the end. Now the end and the good is the
object of the appetitive power. Wherefore it is evident that fruition
is the act of the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one and the same thing from
belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly
the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good
and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition
thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive
power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards
the end and enjoying the end attained.
Reply to Objection 2: The perfection and end of every other power is
contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is
contained in the common, as stated above ([1078]Q[9], A[1]). Hence the
perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to
the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other
powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of them
reaches the end.
Reply to Objection 3: In delight there are two things: perception of
what is becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and
complacency in that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to
the appetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to
irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given to us men to
enjoy and to use." Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.
Objection 2: Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational
animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to
enjoy.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the
intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the
sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite,
it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural
appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot delight
in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy: and
accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "It is not so absurd
to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure."
I answer that, As was stated above [1079](A[1]) to enjoy is not the act
of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that
commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the
appetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of
achieving an end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy body has
a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency. Yet
the power of command in respect of the end is not in them, but in some
higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in things
endowed with knowledge, the appetite moves the other powers to their
acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge, although
they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is only for
those that are endowed with knowledge.
Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect
knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is
the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and
the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On
the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the
good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational
animals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are
moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend.
Consequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect
degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not at
all.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but
of that which each one chooses for his last end.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge;
not so the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine is speaking there of imperfect
enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that "it
is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as it
would be, if one were to say that they "use."
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Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end.
For the Apostle says (Philem. 20): "Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in
the Lord." But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in a
man. Therefore to enjoy is not only of the last end.
Objection 2: Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says
(Gal. 5:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," and
other like things, which are not in the nature of the last end.
Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.
Objection 3: Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for
I will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will:
since "it is the will with which we enjoy," as Augustine says (De Trin.
x, 10). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end of man
is not enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore
enjoyment is not only of the last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy
that which he desires for the sake of something else." But the last end
alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else.
Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.
I answer that, As stated above [1080](A[1]) the notion of fruit implies
two things: first that it should come last; second, that it should calm
the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last
either simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else;
relatively, if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that
which is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end, is
properly called fruit; and this it is that one is properly said to
enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself, but is desired, only
as referred to something else, e.g. a bitter potion for the sake of
health, can nowise be called fruit. And that which has something
delightful about it, to which a number of preceding things are
referred, may indeed by called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot
be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered perfectly to the
notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10) that "we enjoy
what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein." But its rest
is not absolute save in the possession of the last end: for as long as
something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense,
although it has reached something. Thus in local movement, although any
point between the two terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not
considered as an actual end, except when the movement stops there.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), "if
he had said, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would
seem to have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he
set his end in the Lord, he implied his desire to enjoy Him": as if we
were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as a
term but as a means.
Reply to Objection 2: Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore
it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it,
it is compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final
object of his longing and the consummation of his delight. Accordingly
these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are
certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore they are called
"fruits of the spirit": but not as though we are to enjoy them as our
last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits
because "we should desire them for their own sake": not indeed as
though they were not ordained to the last end; but because they are
such that we ought to find pleasure in them.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1081]Q[1], A[8];[1082] Q[2],
A[7]), we speak of an end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing
itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof. These are not, of course,
two ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to
something else. Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is
ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this
last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God,
another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby
we enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies to created
happiness which consists in enjoyment.
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Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to use joyfully,
with the joy, not of hope, but of possession." But so long as a thing
is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of hope. Therefore
enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1083](A[3]), enjoyment is not
properly otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest
to the appetite. But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of
the end. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end
possessed.
Objection 3: Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one
does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end.
Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
On the contrary, "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its
own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is
possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession.
Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not
possessed.
I answer that, To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the
last end, according as the will has something by way of last end. Now
an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly,
when it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality;
imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment,
therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect enjoyment is
also of the end possessed not really, but only in intention.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: The will is hindered in two ways from being at
rest. First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the
last end, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the
one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession
of it. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent
depends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or imperfect,
as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent. Therefore
enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment properly
speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of
the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but
imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed.
Reply to Objection 3: One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not
only in reality, but also in intention, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?
(2) Whether it is only of the last end?
(3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?
(4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the
means?
(5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect,
and not of the will. For it is written (Mat. 6:22): "If thy eye be
single, thy whole body shall be lightsome": where, according to
Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention.
But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive
power. Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive but of the
apprehensive power.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13)
that Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (Mat. 6:23):
"If the light that is in thee be darkness," etc. But light pertains to
knowledge. Therefore intention does too.
Objection 3: Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end.
But to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs not to
the will but to the reason.
Objection 4: Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the
means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called
volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from
which intention is distinct. Therefore it is not an act of the will.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the
intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the
images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's
inner thought." Therefore intention is an act of the will.
I answer that, Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, "to tend
to something." Now both the action of the mover and the movement of
thing moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing
moved tends to anything, is due to the action of the mover.
Consequently intention belongs first and principally to that which
moves to the end: hence we say that an architect or anyone who is in
authority, by his command moves others to that which he intends. Now
the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as shown
above ([1084]Q[9], A[1]). Wherefore it is evident that intention,
properly speaking, is an act of the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The eye designates intention figuratively, not
because intention has reference to knowledge, but because it
presupposes knowledge, which proposes to the will the end to which the
latter moves; thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with
our bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: Intention is called a light because it is
manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness
because a man knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may
be, as Augustine expounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).
Reply to Objection 3: The will does not ordain, but tends to something
according to the order of reason. Consequently this word "intention"
indicates an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason
orders something to the end.
Reply to Objection 4: Intention is an act of the will in regard to the
end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First,
absolutely; and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to
have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place
of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers
the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus
"intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have
health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by
means of something else.
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Whether intention is only of the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For
it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The
intention of the heart is a cry to God." But God is the last end of the
human heart. Therefore intention is always regards the last end.
Objection 2: Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as
stated above (A[1], ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore
intention always regards the last end.
Objection 3: Further, just as intention regards the end, so does
enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore intention
is too.
On the contrary, There is but one last end of human wills, viz.
Happiness, as stated above ([1085]Q[1], A[7]). If, therefore,
intentions were only of the last end, men would not have different
intentions: which is evidently false.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 4), intention regards the end
as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement
may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the
movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole movement.
Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the
movement, and the end or terminus of the other. Thus in the movement
from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus,
but not the last. And intention can be both. Consequently though
intention is always of the end, it need not be always of the last end.
Reply to Objection 1: The intention of the heart is called a cry to
God, not that God is always the object of intention, but because He
sees our intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention
to God, which intention has the force of a cry.
Reply to Objection 2: A terminus is something last, not always in
respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.
Reply to Objection 3: Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this
belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards
an end, not rest. Wherefore the comparison proves nothing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one can intend two things at the same time?
Objection 1: It would seem that one cannot intend several things at the
same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14,16,17)
that man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to God and to
bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither to any other
two things.
Objection 2: Further, intention designates a movement of the will
towards a terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same
direction of one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several
things at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the
intellect. But "it is not possible to understand several things at the
same time," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10). Therefore
neither is it possible to intend several things at the same time.
On the contrary, Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two purposes
by means of one instrument: thus "the tongue is for the purpose of
taste and speech" (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for the same reason, art
or reason can at the same time direct one thing to two ends: so that
one can intend several ends at the same time.
I answer that, The expression "two things" may be taken in two ways:
they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if they be
ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been said, that a
man can intend several things at the same time. For intention is not
only of the last end, as stated above [1086](A[2]), but also of an
intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same time, both the
proximate and the last end; as the mixing of a medicine and the giving
of health.
But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus
also a man can intend several things at the same time. This is evident
from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is the
better of the two. Now one of the reasons for which one thing is better
than another is that it is available for more purposes: wherefore one
thing can be chosen in preference to another, because of the greater
number of purposes for which it is available: so that evidently a man
can intend several things at the same time.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine means to say that man cannot at the
same time direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two
last ends: since, as stated above ([1087]Q[1], A[5]), one man cannot
have several last ends.
Reply to Objection 2: There can be several termini ordained to one
another, of the same movement and in the same direction; but not unless
they be ordained to one another. At the same time it must be observed
that what is not one in reality may be taken as one by the reason. Now
intention is a movement of the will to something already ordained by
the reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore where we have many
things in reality, we may take them as one term of intention, in so far
as the reason takes them as one: either because two things concur in
the integrity of one whole, as a proper measure of heat and cold
conduce to health; or because two things are included in one which may
be intended. For instance, the acquiring of wine and clothing is
included in wealth, as in something common to both; wherefore nothing
hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the
others.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [1088]FP, Q[12], A[10];
[1089]FP, Q[58], A[2]; [1090]FP, Q[85], A[4] it is possible to
understand several things at the same time, in so far as, in some way,
they are one.
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Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intention of the end and the
volition of the means are not one and the same movement. For Augustine
says (De Trin. xi, 6) that "the will to see the window, has for its end
the seeing of the window; and is another act from the will to see,
through the window, the passersby." But that I should will to see the
passersby, through the window, belongs to intention; whereas that I
will to see the window, belongs to the volition of the means. Therefore
intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct
movements of the will.
Objection 2: Further, acts are distinct according to their objects. But
the end and the means are distinct objects. Therefore the intention of
the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the
will.
Objection 3: Further, the willing of the means is called choice. But
choice and intention are not the same. Therefore intention of the end
and the willing of the means are not the same movement of the will.
On the contrary, The means in relation to the end, are as the mid-space
to the terminus. Now it is all the same movement that passes through
the mid-space to the terminus, in natural things. Therefore in things
pertaining to the will, the intention of the end is the same movement
as the willing of the means.
I answer that, The movement of the will to the end and to the means can
be considered in two ways. First, according as the will is moved to
each of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are
really two movements of the will to them. Secondly, it may be
considered accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake
of the end: and thus the movement of the will to the end and its
movement to the means are one and the same thing. For when I say: "I
wish to take medicine for the sake of health," I signify no more than
one movement of my will. And this is because the end is the reason for
willing the means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it is an
object, come under the same act; thus it is the same act of sight that
perceives color and light, as stated above ([1091]Q[8], A[3], ad 2).
And the same applies to the intellect; for if it consider principle and
conclusion absolutely, it considers each by a distinct act; but when it
assents to the conclusion on account of the principles, there is but
one act of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of
seeing, through the window, the passersby, according as the will is
moved to either absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: The end, considered as a thing, and the means to
that end, are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the end is
the formal object in willing the means, they are one and the same
object.
Reply to Objection 3: A movement which is one as to the subject, may
differ, according to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and
end, as in the case of ascent and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly,
in so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to
the end, it is called "choice": but the movement of the will to the end
as acquired by the means, it is called "intention." A sign of this is
that we can have intention of the end without having determined the
means which are the object of choice.
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Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals intend the end. For
in things void of reason nature stands further apart from the rational
nature, than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals. But
nature intends the end even in things void of reason, as is proved in
Phys. ii, 8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the
end.
Objection 2: Further, just as intention is of the end, so is enjoyment.
But enjoyment is in irrational animals, as stated above ([1092]Q[11],
A[2]). Therefore intention is too.
Objection 3: Further, to intend an end belongs to one who acts for an
end; since to intend is nothing else than to tend to something. But
irrational animals act for an end; for an animal is moved either to
seek food, or to do something of the kind. Therefore irrational animals
intend an end.
On the contrary, Intention of an end implies ordaining something to an
end: which belongs to reason. Since therefore irrational animals are
void of reason, it seems that they do not intend an end.
I answer that, As stated above [1093](A[1]), to intend is to tend to
something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According,
therefore, as that which is moved to an end by another is said to
intend the end, thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved to
its end by God, as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way,
irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to
something by natural instinct. The other way of intending an end
belongs to the mover; according as he ordains the movement of
something, either his own or another's, to an end. This belongs to
reason alone. Wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in this
way, which is to intend properly and principally, as stated above
[1094](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes intention in the sense of
being moved to an end.
Reply to Objection 2: Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one
thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.
Reply to Objection 3: Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as
though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this
belongs to one that intends; but through desiring the end by natural
instinct, they are moved to an end, moved, as it were, by another, like
other things that are moved naturally.
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OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS (SIX ARTICLES
)
We must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the means.
There are three of them: to choose, to consent, and to use. And choice
is preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice:
secondly, counsel; thirdly, consent; fourthly, use.
Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason?
(2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether choice is only the means, or sometimes also of the end?
(4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves?
(5) Whether choice is only of possible things?
(6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
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Whether choice is an act of will or of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that choice is an act, not of will but of
reason. For choice implies comparison, whereby one is given preference
to another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an
act of reason.
Objection 2: Further, it is for the same faculty to form a syllogism,
and to draw the conclusion. But, in practical matters, it is the reason
that forms syllogisms. Since therefore choice is a kind of conclusion
in practical matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3, it seems that it is
an act of reason.
Objection 3: Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but to the
cognitive power. Now there is an "ignorance of choice," as is stated in
Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to the
will but to the reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is
"the desire of things in our power." But desire is an act of will.
Therefore choice is too.
I answer that, The word choice implies something belonging to the
reason or intellect, and something belonging to the will: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice is either "intellect
influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect." Now
whenever two things concur to make one, one of them is formal in regard
to the other. Hence Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.]
says that choice "is neither desire only, nor counsel only, but a
combination of the two. For just as we say that an animal is composed
of soul and body, and that it is neither a mere body, nor a mere soul,
but both; so is it with choice."
Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act
belonging essentially to some power or habit, receives a form or
species from a higher power or habit, according as an inferior is
ordained by a superior: for if a man were to perform an act of
fortitude for the love of God, that act is materially an act of
fortitude, but formally, an act of charity. Now it is evident that, in
a sense, reason precedes the will and ordains its act: in so far as the
will tends to its object, according to the order of reason, since the
apprehensive power presents the object to the appetite. Accordingly,
that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being
good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an
act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now in such like
matters the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to the
order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore choice is substantially
not an act of the reason but of the will: for choice is accomplished in
a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen.
Consequently it is evidently an act of the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 1: Choice implies a previous comparison; not that it
consists in the comparison itself.
Reply to Objection 2: It is quite true that it is for the reason to
draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it is called "a
decision" or "judgment," to be followed by "choice." And for this
reason the conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to that
which results from it.
Reply to Objection 3: In speaking "of ignorance of choice," we do not
mean that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of
what ought to be chosen.
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Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals are able to choose.
For choice "is the desire of certain things on account of an end," as
stated in Ethic. iii, 2,3. But irrational animals desire something on
account of an end: since they act for an end, and from desire.
Therefore choice is in irrational animals.
Objection 2: Further, the very word "electio" [choice] seems to signify
the taking of something in preference to others. But irrational animals
take something in preference to others: thus we can easily see for
ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse another. Therefore
choice is in irrational animals.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vi, 12, "it is from prudence
that a man makes a good choice of means." But prudence is found in
irrational animals: hence it is said in the beginning of Metaph. i, 1
that "those animals which, like bees, cannot hear sounds, are prudent
by instinct." We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity
manifested in the works of various animals, such as bees, spiders, and
dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a crossroad, tries
by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or the second road:
and if he find that the stag has not passed there, being thus assured,
takes to the third road without trying the scent; as though he were
reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the stag must have passed
by this way, since he did not pass by the others, and there is no other
road. Therefore it seems that irrational animals are able to choose.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.]
says that "children and irrational animals act willingly but not from
choice." Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.
I answer that, Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to
another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that can
be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether
determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the difference
between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above
([1095]Q[1], A[2], ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one
particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will,
although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according
to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of
particular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will, and
not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals
have. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every desire of one thing on account of an
end is called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one
thing from another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be
moved to several things.
Reply to Objection 2: An irrational animal takes one thing in
preference to another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to
that thing. Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by
its imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is
naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any
choice. Just as fire is moved upwards and not downwards, without its
making any choice.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Phys. iii, 3 "movement is the act of
the movable, caused by a mover." Wherefore the power of the mover
appears in the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all
things moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is
evident, although the things themselves are without reason: for an
arrow through the motion of the archer goes straight towards the
target, as though it were endowed with reason to direct its course. The
same may be seen in the movements of clocks and all engines put
together by the art of man. Now as artificial things are in comparison
to human art, so are all natural things in comparison to the Divine
art. And accordingly order is to be seen in things moved by nature,
just as in things moved by reason, as is stated in Phys. ii. And thus
it is that in the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks
of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about
their actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the
Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called prudent
or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any choice about
things. This is clear from the fact that all that share in one nature,
invariably act in the same way.
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Whether choice is only of the means, or sometimes also of the end?
Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only of the means. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "virtue makes us choose
aright; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power to
direct aright those things which are to be done for its sake." But that
for the sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore choice is
of the end.
Objection 2: Further, choice implies preference of one thing to
another. But just as there can be preference of means, so can there be
preference of ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can be
of means.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition is
of the end, but choice of the means."
I answer that, As already stated (A[1], ad 2), choice results from the
decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a
practical syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical
syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the end
stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end, as such, is not a
matter of choice.
But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of
one demonstration or of one science, from being the conclusion of
another demonstration or science; while the first indemonstrable
principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration or science; so
too that which is the end in one operation, may be ordained to
something as an end. And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus in
the work of a physician health is the end: wherefore it is not a matter
of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. Now the health of
the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently with one who
has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of
choice; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:10): "For when I am weak, then
am I powerful." But the last end is nowise a matter of choice.
Reply to Objection 1: The proper ends of virtues are ordained to
Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a
matter of choice.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1096]Q[1], A[5]), there is but
one last end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be
the subject of choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end.
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Whether choice is of those things only that are done by us?
Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only in respect of human
acts. For choice regards the means. Now, not only acts, but also the
organs, are means (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore choice is not only concerned
with human acts.
Objection 2: Further, action is distinct from contemplation. But choice
has a place even in contemplation; in so far as one opinion is
preferred to another. Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts
alone.
Objection 3: Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular
or ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard.
Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "no man
chooses save what he can do himself."
I answer that, Just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard
the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing. And when the end
is a thing, some human action must intervene; either in so far as man
produces the thing which is the end, as the physician produces health
(wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of the
physician); or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses or enjoys the
thing which is the end; thus for the miser, money or the possession of
money is the end. The same is to be said of the means. For the means
must needs be either an action; or a thing, with some action
intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or
puts it to some use. And thus it is that choice is always in regard to
human acts.
Reply to Objection 1: The organs are ordained to the end, inasmuch as
man makes use of them for the sake of the end.
Reply to Objection 2: In contemplation itself there is the act of the
intellect assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior action that
is put in contradistinction to contemplation.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or
some high position in the state, he chooses to name that man to that
post. Else, if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop
or official, he would have no right to choose. Likewise, whenever we
speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, it is in
conjunction with some action of the chooser.
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Whether choice is only of possible things?
Objection 1: It would seem that choice in not only of possible things.
For choice is an act of the will, as stated above [1097](A[1]). Now
there is "a willing of impossibilities" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore
there is also a choice of impossibilities.
Objection 2: Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above
[1098](A[4]). Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing
is concerned, whether one choose that which is impossible in itself, or
that which is impossible to the chooser. Now it often happens that we
are unable to accomplish what we choose: so that this proves to be
impossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible.
Objection 3: Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it. But
the Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that if the superior command
what is impossible, it should be attempted. Therefore choice can be of
the impossible.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "there is no
choice of impossibilities."
I answer that, As stated above [1099](A[4]), our choice is always
concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us, is possible to
us. Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible things.
Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an
end. But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end. A sign of this is
that when men in taking counsel together come to something that is
impossible to them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the
business.
Again, this is evident if we examine the previous process of the
reason. For the means, which are the object of choice, are to the end,
as the conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an
impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle.
Wherefore an end cannot be possible, unless the means be possible. Now
no one is moved to the impossible. Consequently no one would tend to
the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible.
Therefore the impossible is not the object of choice.
Reply to Objection 1: The will stands between the intellect and the
external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and
the will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the
movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends
something under the universal notion of good: but the term or
perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the
action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the
movement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently the
perfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for one
to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the complete
act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and good for him
that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the
impossible; and by some is called "velleity," because, to wit, one
would will [vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an
act of the will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And
therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the object of the will is the apprehended
good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is
apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something
which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice
sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and
yet impossible to him.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason for this is that the subject should
not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is
possible; but in each case should stand by his superior's judgment.
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Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
Objection 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end
stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that
which follows from the principles, as declared in Ethic. vii, 8. But
conclusions follow of necessity from their principles. Therefore man is
moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the means).
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), choice follows the
reason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason judges of necessity
about some things: on account of the necessity of the premises.
Therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not
moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato
says (Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two
portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not
moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of
this in the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world. Now, if
that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot be chosen,
much less can that be chosen which appears as less (eligible).
Therefore if two or more things are available, of which one appears to
be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of the others.
Therefore that which appears to hold the first place is chosen of
necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to something that
seems in some way better. Therefore every choice is made necessarily.
On the contrary, Choice is an act of a rational power; which according
to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to opposites.
I answer that, Man does not choose of necessity. And this is because
that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now the reason
why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a
twofold power in man. For man can will and not will, act and not act;
again, he can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason of
this is seated in the very power of the reason. For the will can tend
to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. Now the reason can
apprehend as good, not only this, viz. "to will" or "to act," but also
this, viz. "not to will" or "not to act." Again, in all particular
goods, the reason can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of
some good, which has the aspect of evil: and in this respect, it can
apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be
avoided. The perfect good alone, which is Happiness, cannot be
apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way.
Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to
be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the end, but of
the means, as stated above [1100](A[3]); it is not of the perfect good,
which is Happiness, but of other particular goods. Therefore man
chooses not of necessity, but freely.
Reply to Objection 1: The conclusion does not always of necessity
follow from the principles, but only when the principles cannot be true
if the conclusion is not true. In like manner, the end does not always
necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the means are not
always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if they be
such, they are not always considered in that light.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason's decision or judgment of what is to
be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such
matters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that
are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally; as,
for instance, "If he runs, he is in motion."
Reply to Objection 3: If two things be proposed as equal under one
aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some
particular point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards
that one rather than towards the other.
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OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether counsel is an inquiry?
(2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means?
(3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do?
(4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do?
(5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?
(6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
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Whether counsel is an inquiry?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "an act of the
appetite." But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore counsel
is not an inquiry.
Objection 2: Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for
which reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not discursive,
as we have shown in the [1101]FP, Q[14], A[7]. But counsel is ascribed
to God: for it is written (Eph. 1:11) that "He worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will." Therefore counsel is not
inquiry.
Objection 3: Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is
given in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (1 Cor.
7:25): "Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I
give counsel." Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.]
says: "Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a
counsel."
I answer that, Choice, as stated above ([1102]Q[13], A[1], ad 2; A[3]),
follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now there
is much uncertainty in things that have to be done; because actions are
concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their
vicissitude, are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and uncertain the
reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous inquiry: wherefore
the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on
the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the "desire of what has
been already counselled."
Reply to Objection 1: When the acts of two powers are ordained to one
another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other
power: consequently each act can be denominated from either power. Now
it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to the
means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the
reason's direction, are ordained to one another. Consequently there is
to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that act of the
will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of reason,
something of the will---both as matter (since counsel is of what man
wills to do)---and as motive (because it is from willing the end, that
man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And therefore,
just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice "is intellect
influenced by appetite," thus pointing out that both concur in the act
of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is
"appetite based on inquiry," so as to show that counsel belongs, in a
way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose impulsion the
inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the inquiry.
Reply to Objection 2: The things that we say of God must be understood
without any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us
science is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects:
but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all effects in the
First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe
counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge or judgment, which
certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry
has no place in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to
God: in which sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes
not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge."
Reply to Objection 3: It may happen that things which are most
certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not
certainly good in the opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded
men. Consequently in such things counsel may be given.
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Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but
also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of
inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a
doubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since therefore
inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can
be of the end.
Objection 2: Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some
human actions are ends, as stated in Ethic. i, 1. Therefore counsel can
be of the end.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says
that "counsel is not of the end, but of the means."
I answer that, The end is the principle in practical matters: because
the reason of the means is to be found in the end. Now the principle
cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in every inquiry.
Since therefore counsel is an inquiry, it is not of the end, but only
of the means. Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard
to some things, is ordained to something else; just as also what is the
principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of another: and
consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry, may
be looked upon as the means in another; and thus it will become an
object of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is looked upon as an end, is already
fixed: consequently as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not
looked upon as an end. Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will
be counsel not about the end, but about the means.
Reply to Objection 2: Counsel is about operations, in so far as they
are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it
will not, as such, be the matter of counsel.
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Whether counsel is only of things that we do?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we
do. For counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible for
many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and are
not the result of our actions, such as the nature of various things.
Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
Objection 2: Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are
laid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those who
seek counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore
counsel is not only of things that we do.
Objection 3: Further, some are said to take consultation about future
events; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel is not
only of things that we do.
Objection 4: Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no
would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly untrue.
Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.]
says: "We take counsel of things that are within our competency and
that we are able to do."
I answer that, Counsel properly implies a conference held between
several; the very word [consilium] denotes this, for it means a sitting
together [considium], from the fact that many sit together in order to
confer with one another. Now we must take note that in contingent
particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is
necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into
consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are
considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note
of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and universal
things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and
simple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these
things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly
speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in
such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is
the knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired as
being useful towards action, because actions bear on things singular
and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about
things done by us.
Reply to Objection 1: Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but
about what is to be done, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although that which is laid down by the law is
not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs
him in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing
something.
Reply to Objection 3: Counsel is not only about what is done, but also
about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we
speak of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to
do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.
Reply to Objection 4: We seek counsel about the actions of others, in
so far as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of
affection---thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as
though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument, for
the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since
one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about what he
would do through his servant.
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Whether counsel is about all things that we do?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we
have to do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as stated
above [1103](A[1]). But choice is about all things that we do.
Therefore counsel is too.
Objection 2: Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But,
whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue
of the reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything
that we do.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "if it
appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take
counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but
if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this."
But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore
counsel takes place in all things that we do.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says
that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to science
or art."
I answer that, Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above
[1104](A[1]). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of
doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a
reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero, Topic.
ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation to human acts admits of no
doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate
ends are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in the arts
which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does
not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by
art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done
this or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder
but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks upon small
things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we
do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those
which have a fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art, with
the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine,
commerce, and the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat.
Hom. xxiv.].
Reply to Objection 1: Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its
judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is
evident without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.
Reply to Objection 2: In matters that are evident, the reason makes no
inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel
in all that is done by reason.
Reply to Objection 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one means,
but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be
accomplished by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not
only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then
there is no need of counsel.
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Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of
analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of
our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz.
from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always
proceed by way of analysis.
Objection 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason
proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according to
the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present,
and the present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel
one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is
not an analytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is not one
of analysis.
Objection 3: Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to
us, according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the question as to whether a
certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or unable
to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore the inquiry of
counsel should begin from things present.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who
takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze."
I answer that, In every inquiry one must begin from some principle. And
if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process
is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect
is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple than effects.
But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being,
the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment deals with
effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple causes. Now the
principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed
in intention, but comes afterwards into execution. Hence the inquiry of
counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from
that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives
at that which is to be done at once.
Reply to Objection 1: Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take
their reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning
about actions is contrary to the order of actions.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason begins with that which is first according
to reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.
Reply to Objection 3: We should not want to know whether something to
be done for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining
that end. Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the
end, before considering whether it be possible.
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Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite.
For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which action
is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the process of
counsel is indefinite.
Objection 2: Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only
what is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human action
can be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason.
Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely.
Objection 3: Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go
on indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are
self-evident, which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty is
not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and
uncertain. Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.
On the contrary, "No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly
reach" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the
infinite. If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one would
begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.
I answer that, The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides,
on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a twofold
principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is proper to it,
and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining to operation: this
is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted
as its principle, as stated above [1105](A[2]). The other principle is
taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in demonstrative sciences
one science postulates certain things from another, without inquiring
into them. Now these principles which are taken for granted in the
inquiry of counsel are any facts received through the senses---for
instance, that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements
known either through speculative or through practical science; for
instance, that adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live
without suitable nourishment. Of such things counsel makes no inquiry.
But the term of inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For
just as the end is considered in the light of a principle, so the means
are considered in the light of a conclusion. Wherefore that which
presents itself as to be done first, holds the position of an ultimate
conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however
prevents counsel from being infinite potentially, for as much as an
infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by
means of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only
potentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Although human action can be hindered, the
hindrance is not always at hand. Consequently it is not always
necessary to take counsel about removing the obstacle.
Reply to Objection 3: In contingent singulars, something may be taken
for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as
it concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a
necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues to
sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.
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OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES
)
We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive
power?
(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?
(4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul
only?
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Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent belongs only to the
apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12)
ascribes consent to the higher reason. But the reason is an
apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power.
Objection 2: Further, consent is "co-sense." But sense is an
apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive
power.
Objection 3: Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect
to something, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect, which
is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an
apprehensive power.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "if a man
judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no
sentence," i.e. consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive power.
Therefore consent does also.
I answer that, Consent implies application of sense to something. Now
it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the
imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the
absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while the
intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend
indifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And since
the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing
itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far
as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense,
since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which
it cleaves, in so far as it takes complacency in it. Hence it is
written (Wis. 1:1): "Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness." And on
these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 9, "the will is in the
reason." Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he takes
reason as including the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the
apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies
seeking acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 3: "Assentire" [to assent] is, to speak, "ad aliud
sentire" [to feel towards something]; and thus it implies a certain
distance from that to which assent is given. But "consentire" [to
consent] is "to feel with," and this implies a certain union to the
object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the
thing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas the intellect,
whose act does not consist in a movement towards the thing, but rather
the reverse, as we have stated in the [1106]FP, Q[16], A[1]; [1107]FP,
Q[27], A[4]; [1108]FP, Q[59], A[2], is more properly said to assent:
although one word is wont to be used for the other [*In Latin rather
than in English.]. We may also say that the intellect assents, in so
far as it is moved by the will.
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Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational
animals. For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one
thing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one
thing. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational animals.
Objection 2: Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what
follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore there
were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act
accomplished; which is clearly false.
Objection 3: Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do
something, through some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But
irrational animals act through passion. Therefore they consent.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after
judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling, and
this is called the sentence," i.e. consent. But counsel is not in
irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.
I answer that, Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational
animals. The reason of this is that consent implies an application of
the appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the
appetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to the subject
in whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is an
action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so that it touch the
stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the stick. But
irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive movement; for
this is in them through natural instinct. Hence in the irrational
animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does not
apply that movement to some particular thing. And hence it is that the
irrational animal is not properly said to consent: this is proper to
the rational nature, which has the command of the appetitive movement,
and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.
Reply to Objection 1: In irrational animals the determination of the
appetite to a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent
implies a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than
merely passive.
Reply to Objection 2: If the first be removed, then what follows is
removed, provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only.
But if something can follow from several things, it is not removed by
the fact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect
of heat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen
water is hardened by the cold), then by removing heat it does not
follow that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an act
follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the
appetite, such as is found in irrational animals.
Reply to Objection 3: The man who acts through passion is able not to
follow the passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power.
Hence the comparison fails.
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Whether consent is directed to the end or to the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent is directed to the end. Because
that on account of which a thing is such is still more such. But it is
on account of the end that we consent to the means. Therefore, still
more do we consent to the end.
Objection 2: Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just
as the act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man
consents to his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end.
Objection 3: Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above
([1109]Q[13], A[1]). If therefore consent were only directed to the
means it would nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be
false by the authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22)
that "after the approval" which he calls "the sentence," "comes the
choice." Therefore consent is not only directed to the means.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the
"sentence," i.e. the consent, takes place "when a man approves and
embraces the judgment of his counsel." But counsel is only about the
means. Therefore the same applies to consent.
I answer that, Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to
something that is already in the power of him who causes the
application. Now the order of action is this: First there is the
apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel
about the means; then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends
to the last end naturally: wherefore the application of the appetitive
movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but of
simple volition. But as to those things which come under consideration
after the last end, in so far as they are directed to the end, they
come under counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so far as
the appetitive movement is applied to the judgment resulting from
counsel. But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to
counsel: rather is counsel applied to it, because counsel presupposes
the desire of the end. On the other hand, the desire of the means
presupposes the decision of counsel. And therefore the application of
the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent, properly
speaking. Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent,
properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the
principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not
science, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent
to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not
consent but something greater, namely, volition.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight in his act, rather than the act itself,
is the end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he
consents to that act.
Reply to Objection 3: Choice includes something that consent has not,
namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is
preferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice.
For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found
conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval,
consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have
given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one meets with
approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in
our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we
approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to
those that do not meet with our approval.
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Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent to the act does not always
belong to the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and perfects
it, just as beauty perfects youth" [*oion tois akmaiois he hora}--as
youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x, 4). But consent
to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 12). Therefore consent to the act does not belong only to the
higher reason.
Objection 2: Further, an act to which we consent is said to be
voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts.
Therefore the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.
Objection 3: Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent on the
contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as Augustine says
(De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal,
but for temporal reasons, or even on account of some passion of the
soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason
alone.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is impossible
for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that mental faculty
which has the sovereign power of urging his members to, or restraining
them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its slave."
I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who holds the highest
place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as long as
judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final decision
has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher
reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we judge of
sensible things; and of things pertaining to human principles we judge
according to Divine principles, which is the function of the higher
reason. Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or
not, according to Divine principles, no judgment of the reason can be
considered in the light of a final decision. Now the final decision of
what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act
belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in which the reason
includes the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 1: Consent to delight in the work done belongs to
the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to
delight in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower
reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises
judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an
action; and in like manner on the delight that results. But in so far
as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it
belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something
else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is
ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the
master or principal art.
Reply to Objection 2: Since actions are called voluntary from the fact
that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of
each power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above
(A[1], ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.
Reply to Objection 3: The higher reason is said to consent not only
because it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but
also because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.
__________________________________________________________________
OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether use is an act of the will?
(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?
(4) Of the relation of use to choice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether use is an act of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that use is not an act of the will. For
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that "to use is to refer that
which is the object of use to the obtaining of something else." But "to
refer" something to another is an act of the reason to which it belongs
to compare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the reason and not
of the will.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that man
"goes forward to the operation, and this is called impulse; then he
makes use (of the powers) and this is called use." But operation
belongs to the executive power; and the act of the will does not follow
the act of the executive power, on the contrary execution comes last.
Therefore use is not an act of the will.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "All things that
were made were made for man's use, because reason with which man is
endowed uses all things by its judgment of them." But judgment of
things created by God belongs to the speculative reason; which seems to
be altogether distinct from the will, which is the principle of human
acts. Therefore use is not an act of the will.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "To use is to apply
to something to purpose of the will."
I answer that, The use of a thing implies the application of that thing
to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing is
called its use; thus the use of a horse is to ride, and the use of a
stick is to strike. Now we apply to an operation not only the interior
principles of action, viz. the powers of the soul or the members of the
body; as the intellect, to understand; and the eye, to see; but also
external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is evident that we do
not apply external things to an operation save through the interior
principles which are either the powers of the soul, or the habits of
those powers, or the organs which are parts of the body. Now it has
been shown above ([1110]Q[9], A[1]) that it is the will which moves the
soul's powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation.
Hence it is evident that first and principally use belongs to the will
as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other powers as
executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will which
applies them to act, as the instruments are compared to the principal
agent. Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to
the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, not to his
tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly speaking, an act of
the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason does indeed refer one thing to another;
but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something
else. And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.
Reply to Objection 2: Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it
belongs to the executive powers.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the speculative reason is applied by the
will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the
speculative reason is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the
will, in the same way as the other powers.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether use is to be found in irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that use is to be found in irrational
animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine
says (De Trin. x, 10): "We use things by referring them to something
else which we are to enjoy." But enjoyment is to be found in irrational
animals, as stated above ([1111]Q[11], A[2]). Much more, therefore, is
it possible for them to use.
Objection 2: Further, to apply the members to action is to use them.
But irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance,
their feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible
for irrational animals to use.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but a rational
animal can make use of a thing."
I answer that, as stated above [1112](A[1]), to use is to apply an
active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive
movement to the desire of something, as stated above (Q[15],
AA[1],2,3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it
to something else; and this belongs to him alone who knows how to refer
it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore none
but a rational animal consents and uses.
Reply to Objection 1: To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the
appetite to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the
appetite to something as directed to something else. If therefore we
compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is
better than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better
than that which is appetible only as directed to something else. But if
we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes
them, greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to
direct one thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend
something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Animals by means of their members do something
from natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their
members to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not
apply their members to action, nor do they use them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether use regards also the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "Whoever enjoys, uses." But man enjoys
the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.
Objection 2: Further, "to use is to apply something to the purpose of
the will" (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than anything else,
is the object of the will's application. Therefore it can be the object
of use.
Objection 3: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "Eternity is in
the Father, Likeness in the Image," i.e. in the Son, "Use in the Gift,"
i.e. in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the
last end. Therefore the last end can be the object of use.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "No one rightly uses
God, but one enjoys Him." But God alone is the last end. Therefore we
cannot use the last end.
I answer that, Use, as stated above [1113](A[1]), implies the
application of one thing to another. Now that which is applied to
another is regarded in the light of means to an end; and consequently
use always regards the means. For this reason things that are adapted
to a certain end are said to be "useful"; in fact their very usefulness
is sometimes called use.
It must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two
ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual. For since
the end, as stated above ([1114]Q[1], A[8];[1115] Q[2], A[7]),
signifies sometimes the thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or
possession of that thing (thus the miser's end is either money or the
possession of it); it is evident that, simply speaking, the last end is
the thing itself; for the possession of money is good only inasmuch as
there is some good in money. But in regard to the individual, the
obtaining of money is the last end; for the miser would not seek for
money, save that he might have it. Therefore, simply and properly
speaking, a man enjoys money, because he places his last end therein;
but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he is said to use it.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so
far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man
seeks in that end.
Reply to Objection 2: The end is applied to the purpose of the will,
that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end,
which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end.
But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only in being used
as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds
rest.
Reply to Objection 3: The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable to
rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may be
said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated above.
Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that "this love, delight,
felicity, or happiness, is called use by him."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether use precedes choice?
Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing
follows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to
the will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.
Objection 2: Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the
less relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two
relations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the other,
of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it is preferred;
whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore use precedes
choice.
Objection 3: Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it
removes them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above
([1116]Q[9], A[3]). Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to
act. But it does this when it consents. Therefore there is use in
consent. But consent precedes choice as stated above ([1117]Q[15],
A[3], ad 3). Therefore use does also.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "the will
after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards it uses
(the powers)." Therefore use follows choice.
I answer that, The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed.
One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing
subject, by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed.
Wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain
end, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus is
to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends to perfection.
And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite tend to have
the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly. This is the
second relation of the will to the thing willed.
Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the
last act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the means,
is choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing
the means fully. Use, on the other hand, belongs to the second relation
of the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization of the
thing willed. Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice; provided
that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in moving it.
But since the will, in a way, moves the reason also, and uses it, we
may take the use of the means, as consisting in the consideration of
the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use
precedes choice.
Reply to Objection 1: The motion of the will to the execution of the
work, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use belongs
to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and
execution.
Reply to Objection 2: What is essentially relative is after the
absolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need not come
after. Indeed, the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the effects
to which it has relation.
Reply to Objection 3: Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the
same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the
choice of another. And since the acts of the will react on one another,
in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice and use; so
that we may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to
consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing. And such acts as
are ordained to that which precedes, precede also.
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OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head
there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?
(2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals?
(3) Of the order between command and use
(4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?
(5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?
(6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
(7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?
(8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?
(9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?
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Whether command is an act of the reason or of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but
of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna says
that there are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by disposing, by
commanding, and by counselling." But it belongs to the will to move all
the other powers of the soul, as stated above ([1118]Q[9], A[1]).
Therefore command is an act of the will.
Objection 2: Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is
subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most free.
But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore to command
belongs to the will.
Objection 3: Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act
of the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges that a
thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is not
an act of the reason, but of the will.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] and
the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that "the appetite obeys reason."
Therefore command is an act of the reason.
I answer that, Command is an act of the reason presupposing, however,
an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note that, since the
acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one
another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing, and the will
wills to reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the
act of the will, and conversely. And since the power of the preceding
act continues in the act that follows, it happens sometimes that there
is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself something of an
act of the reason, as we have stated in reference to use and choice;
and conversely, that there is an act of the reason in so far as it
retains in itself something of an act of the will.
Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the
commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of
intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring
is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate or declare
something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is
expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when one person says to
another: "This is what you should do." Sometimes, however, the reason
intimates something to a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation
is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is said to
someone: "Do this." Now the first mover, among the powers of the soul,
to the doing of an act is the will, as stated above ([1119]Q[9], A[1]).
Since therefore the second mover does not move, save in virtue of the
first mover, it follows that the very fact that the reason moves by
commanding, is due to the power of the will. Consequently it follows
that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will,
in virtue of which the reason, by its command, moves (the power) to the
execution of the act.
Reply to Objection 1: To command is to move, not anyhow, but by
intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The root of liberty is the will as the subject
thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend
freely towards various objects, precisely because the reason can have
various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will as
being "a free judgment arising from reason," implying that reason is
the root of liberty.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that command is an act of
reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.
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Whether command belongs to irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that command belongs to irrational animals.
Because, according to Avicenna, "the power that commands movement is
the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in the muscles
and nerves." But both powers are in irrational animals. Therefore
command is to be found in irrational animals.
Objection 2: Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who
receives commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to
his master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body
is commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals, since they are
composed of soul and body.
Objection 3: Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an
action. But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals, as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found
in irrational animals.
On the contrary, Command is an act of reason, as stated above
[1120](A[1]). But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither,
therefore, is there command.
I answer that, To command is nothing else than to direct someone to do
something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the
proper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational
animals should command in any way, since they are devoid of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The appetitive power is said to command movement,
in so far as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man.
In irrational animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a
commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for motion.
Reply to Objection 2: The body of the irrational animal is competent to
obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not
competent to direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander
and commanded; but only of mover and moved.
Reply to Objection 3: Impulse to action is in irrational animals
otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the
directing reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the other
hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural
instinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the
unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to avoid.
Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do
not direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not
command.
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Whether use precedes command?
Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes command. For command is an
act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above
[1121](A[1]). But, as we have already shown (Q[16], A[1]), use is an
act of the will. Therefore use precedes command.
Objection 2: Further, command is one of those things that are ordained
to the end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the end.
Therefore it seems that use precedes command.
Objection 3: Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called
use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q[16],
A[1]). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as
stated above [1122](A[1]). Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the
common precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse to
action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command.
Therefore command precedes use.
I answer that, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as
it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as
stated above ([1123]Q[16], A[4]). Wherefore still more does it precede
command. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end,
in so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command;
because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for one
does not use a stick before doing something with the stick. But command
is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is
given: for it naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by
priority of time. Consequently it is evident that command precedes use.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every act of the will precedes this act of
the reason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz.
choice; and an act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after
counsel's decision, which is reason's judgment, the will chooses; and
after choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was
chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins to use, by
executing the command of reason; sometimes it is another's will, when
one commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when
he commands himself to do something.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as act ranks before power, so does the
object rank before the act. Now the object of use is that which is
directed to the end. Consequently, from the fact that command precedes,
rather than that it follows use.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the act of the will in using the reason
for the purpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say
that this act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a
command of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?
Objection 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the
command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves
distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command
to another; since one is the power that commands, and the other is the
power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is not one
with the command.
Objection 2: Further, whatever things can be separate from one another,
are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes the
commanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command
is given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a
distinct act from the act commanded.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things are related to one another as
precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally precedes
the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "where one
thing is by reason of another, there is but one." But there is no
commanded act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one
respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is one in
some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is
to be observed in this, that some are simply many, and one in a
particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now "one" is
predicated in the same way as "being." And substance is being simply,
whereas accident or being "of reason" is a being only in a certain
respect. Wherefore those things that are one in substance are one
simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus, in the genus substance,
the whole composed of its integral or essential parts, is one simply:
because the whole is being and substance simply, and the parts are
being and substances in the whole. But those things which are distinct
in substance, and one according to an accident, are distinct simply,
and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one people, and many
stones are one heap; which is unity of composition or order. In like
manner also many individuals that are one in genus or species are many
simply, and one in a certain respect: since to be one in genus or
species is to be one according to the consideration of the reason.
Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of
matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natural being, though he has many
parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act of a
lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of a
higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher
power moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is as the
form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident that
command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is
one, yet in its parts, many.
Reply to Objection 1: If the distinct powers are not ordained to one
another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover
of the other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since "the act of the
mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys. iii, 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that command and the commanded act can
be separated from one another shows that they are different parts.
Because the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet
they form one whole.
Reply to Objection 3: In those things that are many in parts, but one
as a whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the
soul, in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other members.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the act of the will is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded.
For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands the mind to
will, and yet it does not." But to will is the act of the will.
Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Objection 2: Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can
understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command; for
the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to understand.
Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Objection 3: Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same
reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are
commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the
will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated above
[1124](A[1]); for if that act of the will be also commanded, this
command will be precedes by another act of the reason, and so on to
infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible. Therefore the act
of the will is not commanded.
On the contrary, Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command.
But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; since all our
acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary.
Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.
I answer that, As stated above [1125](A[1]), command is nothing else
than the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something
to act. Now it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the
will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it
can direct by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an
act of the will can be commanded.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the
mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that
sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it
commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that
the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command:
wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command
perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as each of the members of the body works not
for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body
that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the
intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers;
and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too.
Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will,
commands the act of the will for himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Since command is an act of reason, that act is
commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will is
not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of
nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above ([1126]Q[9], A[4]).
Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
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Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be
commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But
it is the reason that commands, as stated above [1127](A[1]). Therefore
the act of the reason is not commanded.
Objection 2: Further, that which is essential is different from that
which is by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by
reason, is rational by participation, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
Therefore the act of that power, which is essentially rational, is not
commanded.
Objection 3: Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But
to know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always
in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.
On the contrary, That which we do of our free-will, can be done by our
command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the
free-will: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "by his
free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves." Therefore the
acts of the reason can be commanded.
I answer that, Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it directs
the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act. Consequently
its act can be commanded.
But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in
two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus,
the act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to
be attentive, and to use one's reason. Secondly, as to the object; in
respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is the
act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is not in
our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural
light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason is not in
our power, and cannot be commanded. The other act of the reason is that
whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the
reason apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g. the
first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the
like: assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is
not subject to our command. But some things which are apprehended do
not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to
assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent or dissent, on
account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is
in our power, and is subject to our command.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason commands itself, just as the will moves
itself, as stated above ([1128]Q[9], A[3]), that is to say, in so far
as each power reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to
another.
Reply to Objection 2: On account of the diversity of objects subject to
the act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating
in itself: thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the
knowledge of the conclusions.
The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is
not commanded. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:15): "For I do not that
good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts,
although he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the sensitive
appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to
our command.
Objection 2: Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect
of formal transmutation, as was shown in the [1129]FP, Q[65], A[4];
[1130]FP, Q[91], A[2]; [1131]FP, Q[110], A[2]. But the act of the
sensitive appetite is accompanied by a formal transmutation of the
body, consisting in heat or cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive
appetite is not subject to man's command.
Objection 3: Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive
appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is
not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination.
Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our
command.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] says:
"That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the
irascible," which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act
of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.
I answer that, An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is in
our power, as stated above [1132](A[5]). Consequently in order to
understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject
to the command of reason, we must consider in what manner it is in our
power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from
the intellective appetite, which is called the will, in the fact that
the sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ, whereas the
will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ,
depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of
that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of
sight, and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a
hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive appetite
depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition
of the body.
Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows
apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, being a
particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason,
which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a
universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the
sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other
hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the
command of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of
the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the
command of reason.
Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive
appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the
imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command
of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen.
Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the
irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic supremacy," which is
that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal
supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject
to command.
Reply to Objection 1: That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is
due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is
hindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence the
Apostle adds (Rom. 7:15): "I see another law in my members, fighting
against the law of my mind." This may also happen through a sudden
movement of concupiscence, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The condition of the body stands in a twofold
relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it:
thus a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his
body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a
man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is
not subject to the command of reason: since it is due either to nature,
or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once. But the
condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it
results from the local movement of the heart, which has various
movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the external sensible is necessary for the
apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend
anything by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence
of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that man can
use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle on
the part of the organ. On the other hand, the apprehension of the
imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion to the
strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable
to imagine the things that reason considers, is either because they
cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the
weakness of the imaginative power, due to some organic indisposition.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are
subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of
higher rank than the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive
soul are subject to the command of reason. Much more, therefore, are
the powers of the vegetal soul.
Objection 2: Further, man is called a "little world" [*Aristotle, Phys.
viii. 2], because the soul is in the body, as God is in the world. But
God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the world obeys
His command. Therefore all that is in man, even the powers of the
vegetal soul, obey the command of reason.
Objection 3: Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as
are subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the nutritive
and generative power, there is room for praise and blame, virtue and
vice: as in the case of gluttony and lust, and their contrary virtues.
Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the command of
reason.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] sats
that "the nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason
has no control."
I answer that, Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others from
the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent desires
an end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow from some
apprehension, as to the animal and the intellectual appetite. But the
reason commands by way of apprehensive power. Wherefore those acts that
proceed from the intellective or the animal appetite, can be commanded
by reason: but not those acts that proceed from the natural appetite.
And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa
(Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says "that generation and nutrition
belong to what are called natural powers." Consequently the acts of the
vegetal soul are not subject to the command of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it
is, and the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very
fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that
they rank lowest.
Reply to Objection 2: The comparison holds in a certain respect:
because, to wit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body.
But it does not hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the
body out of nothing, as God created the world; for which reason the
world is wholly subject to His command.
Reply to Objection 3: Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect
the acts themselves of the nutritive and generative power, i.e.
digestion, and formation of the human body; but they affect the acts of
the sensitive part, that are ordained to the acts of generation and
nutrition; for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking
food or in the act of generation, and the right or wrong use thereof.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey
reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the body
are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul.
But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above
[1133](A[8]). Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.
Objection 2: Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement.
But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason:
for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] says that "the
pulse is not controlled by reason." Therefore the movement of the
bodily members is not subject to the command of reason.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that "the
movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not
desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm
with desire, the body remains cold." Therefore the movements of the
members are not obedient to reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands
a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely
can one discern obedience from command."
I answer that, The members of the body are organs of the soul's powers.
Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of
obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect
thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of
reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of
members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the
command of reason; whereas those movements of members, that arise from
the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The members do not move themselves, but are moved
through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer
contact with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul.
Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to intellect and will, that
which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are
derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally
known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of
the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also
in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. Now the
principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart.
Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not
according to the will: for like a proper accident, it results from
life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement
of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for
which reason they are said to be moved by their generator, as the
Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 4). Wherefore this movement is called
"vital." For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xxii) says that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition does
not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement.
By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by
the pulse veins.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is
in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey
reason: in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion
against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is
transmitted to posterity.
But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our
first parent was that his nature was left to itself, through the
withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we
must consider the natural cause of this particular member's
insubmission to reason. This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot.
Animal.) who says that "the movements of the heart and of the organs of
generation are involuntary," and that the reason of this is as follows.
These members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension; in so
far as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse
the passions of the soul, of which passions these movements are a
consequence. But they are not moved at the command of the reason or
intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural
change of heat and cold, which change is not subject to the command of
reason. This is the case with these two organs in particular, because
each is as it were a separate animal being, in so far as it is a
principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the
heart is the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation
proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal.
Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because
principles must needs be natural, as stated above (Reply OBJ 2).
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OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL (ELEVEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the good and evil of human acts. First, how a
human act is good or evil; secondly, what results from the good or evil
of a human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt.
Under the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the first
will be of the good and evil of human acts, in general; the second, of
the good and evil of internal acts; the third, of the good and evil of
external acts.
Concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?
(2) Whether the good or evil of a human action is derived from its
object?
(3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance?
(4) Whether it is derived from the end?
(5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?
(6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?
(7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the
species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?
(8) Whether any action is indifferent in its species?
(9) Whether an individual action can be indifferent?
(10) Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of
good or evil?
(11) Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse,
places the moral action in the species of good or evil?
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Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that every human action is good, and that
none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not,
save in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the good.
Therefore no action is evil.
Objection 2: Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act.
Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according as
its potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality
is perfected by act, it is good, as stated in Metaph. ix, 9. Therefore
nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is good.
Therefore every action is good, and none is evil.
Objection 3: Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as
Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect
which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action is
good.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 3:20): "Every one that doth evil,
hateth the light." Therefore some actions of man are evil.
I answer that, We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and
evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that it
produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has being:
since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the [1134]FP,
Q[5], AA[1],3. But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in a
certain unity: whereas every other thing has its proper fulness of
being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it happens with some things,
that they have being in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the
fulness of being due to them. Thus the fulness of human being requires
a compound of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of
knowledge and movement: wherefore if any man be lacking in any of
these, he is lacking in something due to the fulness of his being. So
that as much as he has of being, so much has he of goodness: while so
far as he is lacking in goodness, and is said to be evil: thus a blind
man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives; and of evil,
inasmuch as he lacks sight. That, however, which has nothing of being
or goodness, could not be said to be either evil or good. But since
this same fulness of being is of the very essence of good, if a thing
be lacking in its due fulness of being, it is not said to be good
simply, but in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is a being; although
it can be called a being simply, and a non-being in a certain respect,
as was stated in the [1135]FP, Q[5], A[1], ad 1. We must therefore say
that every action has goodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it
is lacking in goodness, in so far as it is lacking in something that is
due to its fulness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for
instance if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due
place, or something of the kind.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For it
there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor
possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient,
there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient
good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a
certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient
in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the
power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is
deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he
walks.
Reply to Objection 3: An evil action can have a proper effect,
according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the
cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and
female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
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Whether the good or evil of a man's action is derived from its object?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not
derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing. But
"evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," as Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the good or evil of a human
action is not derived from their object.
Objection 2: Further, the object is compared to the action as its
matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather
from the form, which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is
not derived from their object.
Objection 3: Further, the object of an active power is compared to the
action as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not depend
on its effect; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or evil in
actions is not derived from their object.
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 9:10): "They became abominable as
those things which they loved." Now man becomes abominable to God on
account of the malice of his action. Therefore the malice of his action
is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same applies
to the goodness of his action.
I answer that, as stated above [1136](A[1]) the good or evil of an
action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its lack
of that fulness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fulness of
being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as a
natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its
species from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore just
as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form,
which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action
is derived from its suitable object: hence some call such an action
"good in its genus"; for instance, "to make use of what is one's own."
And just as, in natural things, the primary evil is when a generated
thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead of a
man, something else be generated); so the primary evil in moral actions
is that which is from the object, for instance, "to take what belongs
to another." And this action is said to be "evil in its genus," genus
here standing for species, just as we apply the term "mankind" to the
whole human species.
Reply to Objection 1: Although external things are good in themselves,
nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that
action. And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such
actions, they have not the quality of goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The object is not the matter "of which" (a thing
is made), but the matter "about which" (something is done); and stands
in relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its
species.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the human action is not always the
object of an active power. For the appetitive power is, in a way,
passive; in so far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it
is a principle of human actions. Nor again have the objects of the
active powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they are
already transformed: thus food when transformed is the effect of the
nutritive power; whereas food before being transformed stands in
relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it exercises
its operation. Now since the object is in some way the effect of the
active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and
consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement
derives its species from its term. Moreover, although the goodness of
an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is
said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect.
Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the
measure of its goodness.
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Whether man's action is good or evil from a circumstance?
Objection 1: It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a
circumstance. For circumstances stand around [circumstant] an action,
as being outside it, as stated above ([1137]Q[7], A[1]). But "good and
evil are in things themselves," as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4.
Therefore an action does not derive goodness or malice from a
circumstance.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered
principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances are
accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of art:
because "no art takes notice of what is accidental" (Metaph. vi, 2).
Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a
circumstance.
Objection 3: Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its
substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But good
and evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an
action can be good or evil in its genus as stated above [1138](A[2]).
Therefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a virtuous
man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in respect of the
other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the vicious man, in
the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or where he should
not, and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions
are good or evil according to circumstances.
I answer that, In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole
fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial
form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from
supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and the like; and
if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the
result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does
not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which
accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due
circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is requisite as a
due circumstance the action will be evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as
they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as
accidents thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are
outside the essence.
Reply to Objection 2: Every accident is not accidentally in its
subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes
notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered
in the doctrine of morals.
Reply to Objection 3: Since good and being are convertible; according
as being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good
predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in
respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things and
in moral actions.
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Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil in human actions are
not from the end. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "nothing acts
with a view to evil." If therefore an action were good or evil from its
end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly false.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness of an action is something in the
action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is not
said to be good or bad according to its end.
Objection 3: Further, a good action may happen to be ordained to an
evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely,
an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft
committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action
is not good or evil from its end.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) that "if the end
is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also is
evil."
I answer that, The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as
their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does not
depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being
absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on
something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being
in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as the being
of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness of a
thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness
does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken from
the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the goodness of which
depends on something else, have a measure of goodness from the end on
which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely.
Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action.
First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as
much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as
stated above [1139](A[1]). Secondly, it has goodness according to its
species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has
goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its
accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is
compared as to the cause of its goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: The good in view of which one acts is not always
a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent
good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in
view.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the end is an extrinsic cause,
nevertheless due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are
inherent to the action.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of
the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus
it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its
circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an
action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since
"evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete
cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
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Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not
make a difference of species. For the existence of good and evil in
actions is in conformity with their existence in things, as stated
above [1140](A[1]). But good and evil do not make a specific difference
in things; for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man.
Therefore neither do they make a specific difference in actions.
Objection 2: Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being. But
non-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes the species, it
seems that an action is not constituted in a species through being
evil. Consequently good and evil do not diversify the species of human
actions.
Objection 3: Further, acts that differ in species produce different
effects. But the same specific effect results from a good and from an
evil action: thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock.
Therefore good and evil actions do not differ in species.
Objection 4: Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from
a circumstance, as stated above [1141](A[3]). But since a circumstance
is an accident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human
actions do not differ in species on account of their goodness or
malice.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic ii. 1) "like
habits produce like actions." But a good and a bad habit differ in
species, as liberality and prodigality. Therefore also good and bad
actions differ in species.
I answer that, Every action derives its species from its object, as
stated above [1142](A[2]). Hence it follows that a difference of object
causes a difference of species in actions. Now, it must be observed
that a difference of objects causes a difference of species in actions,
according as the latter are referred to one active principle, which
does not cause a difference in actions, according as they are referred
to another active principle. Because nothing accidental constitutes a
species, but only that which is essential; and a difference of object
may be essential in reference to one active principle, and accidental
in reference to another. Thus to know color and to know sound, differ
essentially in reference to sense, but not in reference to the
intellect.
Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to the
reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "the good of man is
to be in accordance with reason," and evil is "to be against reason."
For that is good for a thing which suits it in regard to its form; and
evil, that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore
evident that the difference of good and evil considered in reference to
the object is an essential difference in relation to reason; that is to
say, according as the object is suitable or unsuitable to reason. Now
certain actions are called human or moral, inasmuch as they proceed
from the reason. Consequently it is evident that good and evil
diversify the species in human actions; since essential differences
cause a difference of species.
Reply to Objection 1: Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch
as something is according to nature, and something against nature,
diversify the natural species; for a dead body and a living body are
not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in
accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against reason,
diversify the moral species.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil implies privation, not absolute, but
affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its
species, not because it has no object at all; but because it has an
object in disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's
property. Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it
can constitute the species of an evil act.
Reply to Objection 3: The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to
reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different;
because the other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and
punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not differ
in species; and thus they have one specific effect.
Reply to Objection 4: A circumstance is sometimes taken as the
essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it
can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a
circumstance transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance
would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to
reason.
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Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil which are from the
end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their
species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the
object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not
diversify the species of an action.
Objection 2: Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the
species, as stated above [1143](A[5]). But it is accidental to an
action to be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give
alms from vainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as to
species, according to the good and evil which are from the end.
Objection 3: Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to
the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues
and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken
from the end, do not diversify the species of action.
On the contrary, It has been shown above ([1144]Q[1], A[3]) that human
actions derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in
respect of the end diversify the species of actions.
I answer that, Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are
voluntary, as stated above ([1145]Q[1], A[1]). Now, in a voluntary
action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the
will, and the external action: and each of these actions has its
object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will:
while the object of the external action, is that on which the action is
brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes its
species from the object on which it bears; so the interior act of the
will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object.
Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that
which is on the part of the external action: because the will uses the
limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of
morality, save in so far as they are voluntary. Consequently the
species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end,
but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may
commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief."
Reply to Objection 1: The end also has the character of an object, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is accidental to the external action
to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the
interior act of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as
form to matter.
Reply to Objection 3: When many actions, differing in species, are
ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the
part of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the
internal action.
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Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species
derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of goodness derived from
the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the
object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when a
man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its
species from its object, as stated above ([1146]AA[2],6). But it is
impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this
species be not contained under the proper species of that thing;
because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that
are not subordinate to one another. Therefore the species which is
taken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken from
the object.
Objection 2: Further, the last difference always constitutes the most
specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems to come
after the difference derived from the object: because the end is
something last. Therefore the species derived from the end, is
contained under the species derived from the object, as its most
specific species.
Objection 3: Further, the more formal a difference is compared to
genus, as form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is more
formal than that which is derived from the object, as stated above
[1147](A[6]). Therefore the species derived from the end is contained
under the species derived from the object, as the most specific species
is contained under the subaltern genus.
On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate differences. But an
action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained
to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to
an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived
from the end is not contained under the species derived from the
object, as under its genus.
I answer that, The object of the external act can stand in a twofold
relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained
thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly,
as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take what belongs to
another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the
differences that divide a genus, and constitute the species of that
genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12), divide that
genus essentially: and if they divide it accidentally, the division is
incorrect: as, if one were to say: "Animals are divided into rational
and irrational; and the irrational into animals with wings, and animals
without wings"; for "winged" and "wingless" are not essential
determinations of the irrational being. But the following division
would be correct: "Some animals have feet, some have no feet: and of
those that have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many":
because the latter division is an essential determination of the
former. Accordingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the
end, the specific difference derived from the object is not an
essential determination of the species derived from the end, nor is the
reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is not under the
other; but then the moral action is contained under two species that
are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that he that commits
theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty of a twofold malice in one
action. On the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the
end, one of these differences is an essential determination of the
other. Wherefore one of these species will be contained under the
other.
It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the
other. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that
the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the
more specific is the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an
agent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the
more remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it
corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the
end intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of
this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower officers.
From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the
end, is more general; and that the difference derived from an object
which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in
relation to the former. For the will, the proper object of which is the
end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul,
the proper objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.
Reply to Objection 1: One and the same thing, considered in its
substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to
the other. But in respect of those things which are superadded to the
substance, one thing can be contained under different species. Thus one
and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one species,
i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, under the species of
sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as to its
substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to the
moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two species, as
stated above ([1148]Q[1], A[3], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The end is last in execution; but first in the
intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their
species.
Reply to Objection 3: Difference is compared to genus as form to
matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the
genus is considered as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is
something more absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts
of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated
in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal cause of the
species; and so much the more formal, as it is more universal.
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Whether any action is indifferent in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that no action is indifferent in its
species. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine
(Enchiridion xi). But privation and habit are immediate contraries,
according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not
such thing as an action that is indifferent in its species, as though
it were between good and evil.
Objection 2: Further, human actions derive their species from their end
or object, as stated above [1149](A[6]; Q[1], A[3]). But every end and
every object is either good or bad. Therefore every human action is
good or evil according to its species. None, therefore, is indifferent
in its species.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above [1150](A[1]), an action is said
to be good, when it has its due complement of goodness; and evil, when
it lacks that complement. But every action must needs either have the
entire plenitude of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore
every action must needs be either good or bad in its species, and none
is indifferent.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) that
"there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done with a
good or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment." Therefore
some actions are indifferent according to their species.
I answer that, As stated above ([1151]AA[2],5), every action takes its
species from its object; while human action, which is called moral,
takes its species from the object, in relation to the principle of
human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an
action includes something in accord with the order of reason, it will
be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms
to a person in want. On the other hand, if it includes something
repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to
its species; for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what
belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action does
not include something pertaining to the order of reason; for instance,
to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the
like: and such actions are indifferent according to their species.
Reply to Objection 1: Privation is twofold. One is privation "as a
result" [privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all away:
thus blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death,
life. Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be no
medium in respect of the proper subject. The other is privation "in
process" [privari]: thus sickness is privation of health; not that it
takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the
entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of
privation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary of
the opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good, as
Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories: because it does
not take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently there can be
something between good and evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Every object or end has some goodness or malice,
at least natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or
malice, which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated above.
And it is of this that we are here treating.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything belonging to an action belongs
also to its species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature may
not contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it
is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it specifically
good. Thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor
wicked.
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Whether an individual action can be indifferent?
Objection 1: It would seem that an individual action can be
indifferent. For there is no species that does not, cannot, contain an
individual. But an action can be indifferent in its species, as stated
above [1152](A[8]). Therefore an individual action can be indifferent.
Objection 2: Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated
in Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal
disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not good,
since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect
of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are indifferent.
Objection 3: Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil
belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain a
specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore
an individual action may happen to be indifferent.
On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An idle word
is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of
just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an evil, because
"men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of judgment" (Mat.
12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious
utility, it is good. Therefore every word is either good or bad. For
the same reason every other action is either good or bad. Therefore no
individual action is indifferent.
I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in
its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And
the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above
[1153](A[3]), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it
takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its
accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of
his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his
species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance
that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the
end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that
proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is,
by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil.
But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason;
wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either
directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action
that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the
individual, must be good or bad.
If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some
act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his
hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human;
since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as
standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
Reply to Objection 1: For an action to be indifferent in its species
can be understood in several ways. First in such a way that its species
demands that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along
this line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus: since no
object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good or
evil, either through its end or through a circumstance. Secondly,
specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact that as far
as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it
can be made good or bad by something else. Thus man, as far as his
species is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a condition
of his species that he should not be black or white; but blackness or
whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than those of his
species.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher states that a man is evil,
properly speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, because
he hurts none save himself. And the same applies to all others who are
not hurtful to other men. But we say here that evil, in general, is all
that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every individual
action is either good or bad, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason,
it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some
vice. Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose of
his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct
his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to
other actions.
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Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil
?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral
action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action is
taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object.
Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species.
Objection 2: Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the
moral action, as stated above ([1154]Q[7], A[1]). But an accident does
not constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not
constitute a species of good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, one thing is not in several species. But one
action has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not
place a moral action in a species of good or evil.
On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral
action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a
holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral
action to be specifically good or bad.
I answer that, Just as the species of natural things are constituted by
their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted by
forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said
above [1155](A[5]). But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor
can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some
ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further
specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in natural things,
that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference
constituting the species. But the process of reason is not fixed to one
particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And
consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance
added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by
the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that
determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate another's property
is specified by reason of the property being "another's," and in this
respect it is placed in the species of theft; and if we consider that
action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an
additional circumstance. But since the reason can direct as to place,
time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in
relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with
reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to a holy place.
Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to
the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of all considered
as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the
object, and as itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a
circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against,
it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
Reply to Objection 1: A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an
action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated above,
and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance, so long as it is but a
circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere
accident: but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then
it does specify the action.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not every circumstance that places the
moral action in the species of good or evil; since not every
circumstance implies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently,
although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow
that it is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one
action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as said
above (A[7], ad 1;[1156] Q[1], A[3], ad 3).
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Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a
moral action in a species of good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that every circumstance relating to good or
evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific differences
of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a difference in the
goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a specific difference,
which is the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which makes
an action better or worse, makes it differ in goodness and malice.
Therefore it causes it to differ in species. Therefore every
circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a
species.
Objection 2: Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself
the character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot
make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot make
a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater evil. But
if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason
it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every circumstance
that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a new species of good
or evil.
Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is
caused by each single defect." Now every circumstance that increases
malice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a
new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance that
increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just as
every unity added to a number makes a new species of number; since the
good consists in "number, weight, and measure" ([1157]FP, Q[5], A[5]).
On the contrary, More and less do not change a species. But more and
less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. Therefore not
every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it
in a species of good or evil.
I answer that, As stated above [1158](A[10]), a circumstance gives the
species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a
special order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance
does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil,
except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which
the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take
something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the order of
reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other condition be
presupposed, from which the action takes its malice or goodness; for
instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action
to be discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another
in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin.
Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to
other evil or good actions. Consequently not every circumstance that
makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species.
Reply to Objection 1: In things which can be more or less intense, the
difference of more or less does not change the species: thus by
differing in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not
changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that which
makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make the
action differ in species.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to
the goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in
itself, but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated
above. Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds to the
goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the action.
Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not always involve a distinct
defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to
something else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add
further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for as
much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does
not always change the species of good or evil.
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OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will;
under which head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the subject?
(2) Whether it depends on the object alone?
(3) Whether it depends on reason?
(4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?
(5) Whether erring reason binds?
(6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against
the law of God?
(7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on
the intention of the end?
(8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the
degree of good or evil in the intention?
(9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the
Divine Will?
(10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good,
to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed?
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Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than to
what is good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness of the will
depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will is
good, and none bad.
Objection 2: Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the
goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is the
end, but goodness of making is never the end": because the latter is
always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the
goodness of the act of the will does not depend on any object.
Objection 3: Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to
be. But the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness of
nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will. Therefore
the moral goodness of the will does not depend on the object.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is
that habit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly,
virtue is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good will
is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness of
the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.
I answer that, Good and evil are essential differences of the act of
the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just as
truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided
essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for as much as an
opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will
are acts differing in species. Now the specific difference in acts is
according to objects, as stated above ([1159]Q[18], A[5]). Therefore
good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the
objects.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is not always directed to what is truly
good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure
of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence
it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Although an action can, in a certain way, be
man's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as
stated above ([1160]Q[1], A[1], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Good is presented to the will as its object by
the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the
moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because
the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above
([1161]Q[18], A[5]).
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Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to
the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers
derive goodness not only from the object but also from the end, as we
have shown above ([1162]Q[18] , A[4]). Therefore the act also of the
will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only
from the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above
([1163]Q[18], A[3]). But according to the diversity of circumstances
there may be diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will:
for instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as
he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not. Therefore
the goodness of the will depends not only on the object, but also on
the circumstances.
Objection 3: Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the
will, as stated above ([1164]Q[6], A[8]). But it would not be so,
unless the goodness or malice of the will depended on the
circumstances. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend on
the circumstances, and not only on the object.
On the contrary, An action does not take its species from the
circumstances as such, as stated above (Q[18], A[10], ad 2). But good
and evil are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated
above [1165](A[1]). Therefore the goodness and malice of the will
depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone.
I answer that, In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more
simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus
primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first
things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one
principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human
actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently the goodness
and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the
goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.
Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not
something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto:
because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to
its principle. Therefore the goodness of the will's act depends on that
one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and that
one thing is the object, and not the circumstances, which are
accidents, as it were, of the act.
Reply to Objection 1: The end is the object of the will, but not of the
other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness
derived from the object, does not differ from that which is derived
from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except
perhaps accidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one
act of the will on another.
Reply to Objection 2: Given that the act of the will is fixed on some
good, no circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is
said that a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not,
this can be understood in two ways. First, so that this circumstance is
referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not fixed
on something good: since to will to do something when it ought not to
be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so that the
circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is
impossible to will something good when one ought not to, because one
ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in so
far as a man by willing some particular good, is prevented from willing
at the same time another good which he ought to will at that time. And
then evil results, not from his willing that particular good, but from
his not willing the other. The same applies to the other circumstances.
Reply to Objection 3: Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the
will, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is
to say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which
he wills.
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Whether the goodness of the will depends on reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what follows.
But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason, as is
clear from what has been said above ([1166]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore the
goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the
goodness of the practical intellect is "a truth that is in conformity
with right desire." But right desire is a good will. Therefore the
goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness of the will,
rather than conversely.
Objection 3: Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved,
but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers, as
stated above ([1167]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the will
does not depend on reason.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. x): "It is an unruly will that
persists in its desires in opposition to reason." But the goodness of
the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the goodness of the
will depends on its being subject to reason.
I answer that, As stated above ([1168]AA[1],2), the goodness of the
will depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed
to it by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate
object of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate
not to the will but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend
to the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive
appetite tends only to the particular good, apprehended by the
sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason,
in the same way as it depends on the object.
Reply to Objection 1: The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible,
pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered as
true it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of goodness,
pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a good that is
not previously apprehended by reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher speaks here of the practical
intellect, in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in
this respect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means,
the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire
of a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes
on the part of reason a right apprehension of the end.
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves the reason in one way: the reason
moves the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated
above ([1169]Q[9], A[1]).
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Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not
depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule and
one measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its goodness
depends, is right reason. Therefore the goodness of the will does not
depend on the eternal law.
Objection 2: Further, "a measure is homogeneous with the thing
measured" (Metaph. x, 1). But the eternal law is not homogeneous with
the human will. Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on
which the goodness of the human will depends.
Objection 3: Further, a measure should be most certain. But the eternal
law is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which the
goodness of our will depends.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin is a
deed, word or desire against the eternal law." But malice of the will
is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is contrary to goodness,
the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.
I answer that, Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one
another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause:
since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first. Now it is from
the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that human reason is the
rule of the human will, from which the human derives its goodness.
Hence it is written (Ps. 4:6,7): "Many say: Who showeth us good things?
The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": as though to
say: "The light of our reason is able to show us good things, and guide
our will, in so far as it is the light (i.e. derived from) Thy
countenance." It is therefore evident that the goodness of the human
will depends on the eternal law much more than on human reason: and
when human reason fails we must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.
Reply to Objection 1: To one thing there are not several proximate
measures; but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to
the other.
Reply to Objection 2: A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing
measured; a remote measure is not.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the eternal law is unknown to us
according as it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known
to us somewhat, either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as
its proper image; or by some sort of additional revelation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at
variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the
human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as stated
above [1170](A[4]). But erring reason is not derived from the eternal
law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human will.
Therefore the will is not evil, if it be at variance with erring
reason.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower
authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher
authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something
that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes proposes
what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God Whose power
is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring reason does not bind.
Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance with erring
reason.
Objection 3: Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of
malice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not
reducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason
err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to do
so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will is
not evil when it is at variance with erring reason.
On the contrary, As stated in the [1171]FP, Q[79], A[13], conscience is
nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action. Now
knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when the will is at variance with
erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is evil;
for it is written (Rom. 14:23): "All that is not of faith"---i.e. all
that is against conscience---"is sin." Therefore the will is evil when
it is at variance with erring reason.
I answer that, Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for
it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the FP,
Q[19], A[13]), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at
variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire "whether an
erring conscience binds." On this matter, some distinguished three
kinds of actions: for some are good generically; some are indifferent;
some are evil generically. And they say that if reason or conscience
tell us to do something which is good generically, there is no error:
and in like manner if it tell us not to do something which is evil
generically; since it is the same reason that prescribes what is good
and forbids what is evil. On the other hand if a man's reason or
conscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in
itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then his reason
or conscience errs. In like manner if a man's reason or conscience tell
him, that what is indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw
from the ground, is forbidden or commanded, his reason or conscience
errs. They say, therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in
matters of indifference, either by commanding or by forbidding them,
binds: so that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is
evil and sinful. But they say that when reason or conscience errs in
commanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good in
itself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such
cases the will which is at variance with erring reason or conscience is
not evil.
But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will that
is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some way on
account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will
depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its
own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason
as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of the will
is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above [1172](A[3]),
from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being
evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the case
not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or
evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can received the
character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is
good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil, can
receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason
apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is
good: yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it is
proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as
an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil. Consequently the
will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in
itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended
as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe in Christ is good in
itself, and necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend
thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently
if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it
as to something evil: not as if it were evil in itself, but because it
is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9) that "properly speaking the
incontinent man is one who does not follow right reason; but
accidentally, he is also one who does not follow false reason." We must
therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance
with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the judgment of an erring reason is not
derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as
being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is
all truth.
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of Augustine holds good when it is
known that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the
command of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the
command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning
the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor.
In like manner if a man were to know that human reason was dictating
something contrary to God's commandment, he would not be bound to abide
by reason: but then reason would not be entirely erroneous. But when
erring reason proposes something as being commanded by God, then to
scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it
apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being
something contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for
some such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that species of
malice.
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Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is good when it abides by
erring reason. For just as the will, when at variance with the reason,
tends to that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with
reason, it tends to what reason judges to be good. But the will is evil
when it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore even
when it abides by erring reason, the will is good.
Objection 2: Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the
commandment of God and the eternal law. But the eternal law and God's
commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even
when it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by erring
reason.
Objection 3: Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with
erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by
erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in
conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man would be
in a dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable.
Therefore the will is good when it abides by erring reason.
On the contrary, The will of those who slew the apostles was evil. And
yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to Jn. 16:2:
"The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a
service to God." Therefore the will can be evil, when it abides by
erring reason.
I answer that, Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring
"whether an erring conscience binds"; so this question is the same as
inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses." Now this question
depends on what has been said above about ignorance. For it was said
(Q[6], A[8]) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary,
and sometimes not. And since moral good and evil consist in action in
so far as it is voluntary, as was stated above [1173](A[2]); it is
evident that when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes
away the character of moral good and evil; but not, when it does not
cause the act to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above (Q[6],
A[8]) that when ignorance is in any way willed, either directly or
indirectly, it does not cause the act to be involuntary. And I call
that ignorance "directly" voluntary, to which the act of the will
tends: and that, "indirectly" voluntary, which is due to negligence, by
reason of a man not wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated
above (Q[6], A[8]).
If then reason or conscience err with an error that is involuntary,
either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one
ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does not
excuse the will, that abides by that erring reason or conscience, from
being evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance,
and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary,
then that error of reason or conscience excuses the will, that abides
by that erring reason, from being evil. For instance, if erring reason
tell a man that he should go to another man's wife, the will that
abides by that erring reason is evil; since this error arises from
ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know. But if a man's
reason, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give
her her right when she asks for it, his will is excused from being
evil: because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which
ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary.
Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results
from the entire cause, evil from each particular defect." Consequently
in order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it
suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended
as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.
Reply to Objection 2: The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can.
Consequently the will that abides by human reason, is not always right,
nor is it always in accord with the eternal law.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one
absurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one
absurdity, others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek
vainglory, he will sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or
whether he omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter:
because he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner, suppose a
man's reason or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance, then
evil must needs result in the will. Nor is this man in a dilemma:
because he can lay aside his error, since his ignorance is vincible and
voluntary.
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Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the
intention of the end?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above
[1174](A[2]) that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone.
But as regards the means, the object of the will is one thing, and the
end intended is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the
will does not depend on the intention of the end.
Objection 2: Further, to wish to keep God's commandment, belongs to a
good will. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance, to
vainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of
temporal gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on
the intention of the end.
Objection 3: Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do
they diversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on the
malice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order to
give alms, has an evil will, although he intends a good end. Therefore
neither does the goodness of the will depend on the goodness of the end
intended.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that God rewards the
intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore the
goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.
I answer that, The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act
of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [*Leonine
edn.: 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of the will
causally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And
then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness
of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast for God's
sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good from the very
fact that it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of
the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as stated above
([1175]AA[1],2), it must, of necessity, depend on the intention of the
end.
On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is
added to a preceding act of the will; for instance, a man may will to
do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness
of the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent
intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent
intention.
Reply to Objection 1: When the intention is the cause of the act of
willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of the
goodness of the object, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if
an evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give
an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in
itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is
evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is
subsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be good: and the
intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but that
which is repeated.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have already stated (A[6], ad 1), "evil
results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire
cause." Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even
under the species of good; or to the good under the species of evil, it
will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it
must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words, it
must will the good for the sake of the good.
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Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree
of good or evil in the intention?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will
depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Mat. 12:35,
"A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that
which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good as he intends."
But the intention gives goodness not only to the external action, but
also to the act of the will, as stated above [1176](A[7]). Therefore
the goodness of a man's will is according to the goodness of his
intention.
Objection 2: Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect.
But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will.
Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good.
Objection 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his
intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous
intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same
reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good
intended.
On the contrary, The intention can be good, while the will is evil.
Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the
will less good.
I answer that, In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end,
we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the object, by
reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other,
taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts
intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view
of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does not
depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the external
act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object that is
ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for
instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not realize his
intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds.
Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to
the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to remove: for
instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which
prevent him from going. On the other hand, with regard to the interior
act of the will, this happens in only one way: because the interior
acts of the will are in our power, whereas the external actions are
not. But the will can will an object that is not proportionate to the
intended end: and thus the will that tends to that object considered
absolutely, is not so good as the intention. Yet because the intention
also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it
is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity of goodness
in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, in
so far as the will wills some great good for an end, although that by
which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that
good.
But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act,
according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the
intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the
will: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form,
as is clear from what has been said above ([1177]Q[12], A[4];[1178]
Q[18], A[6]). And yet considered materially, while the intention is
intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially
speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity
to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very
fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle,
upon the intense volition of medicine.
We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or
exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when a
man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it
does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the quantity
of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the
quantity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it is that
a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the
quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall
show later on ([1179]Q[20] , A[4];[1180] Q[114], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of
God, Who considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore
another gloss says on the same passage that "the treasure of the heart
is the intention, according to which God judges our works." For the
goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon
the goodness of the will, which makes even the external act to be
meritorious in God's sight.
Reply to Objection 2: The goodness of the intention is not the whole
cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: The mere malice of the intention suffices to make
the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention
is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated
above (ad 2).
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Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine
will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not
depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is impossible
for man's will to be conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the
word of Isa. 55:9: "As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are
My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts."
If therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity to the
Divine will, it would follow that it is impossible for man's will to be
good. Which is inadmissible.
Objection 2: Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so
does our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge
does not require to be conformed to God's knowledge; since God knows
many things that we know not. Therefore there is no need for our will
to be conformed to the Divine will.
Objection 3: Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action
cannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be
conformed to His.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as
Thou wilt": which words He said, because "He wishes man to be upright
and to tend to God," as Augustine expounds in the Enchiridion [*Enarr.
in Ps. 32, serm. i.]. But the rectitude of the will is its goodness.
Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the
Divine will.
I answer that, As stated above [1181](A[7]), the goodness of the will
depends on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human will
is the Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[3],
A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to be
ordained to the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.
Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine will,
as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any genus is the
measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover,
everything attains to rectitude and goodness, in so far as it is in
accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be
good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.
Reply to Objection 1: The human will cannot be conformed to the will of
God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner
human knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it
knows truth: and human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as
it is becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way
of equality.
From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third
Objections.
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Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be
conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be
conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we
cannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object
of the will. But in many things we know not what God wills. Therefore
the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing
willed.
Objection 2: Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about
to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his will
to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow
that a man is bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible.
Objection 3: Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial
piety. But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes be
contrary to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death of a
father: if his son were to will it also, it would be against filial
piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine
will, as to the thing willed.
On the contrary, (1) On Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," a
gloss says: "That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills."
But everyone is bound to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is
bound to will what God wills.
(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every
act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will,
it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.
(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different
things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has an
evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine
will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will.
I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above
([1182]AA[3],5), the will tends to its object, according as it is
proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways
by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, and not
good from another point of view. And therefore if a man's will wills a
thing to be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and
the will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as
it appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing
a thief to be put to death, because this is just: while the will of
another---e.g. the thief's wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to
death, inasmuch as killing is a natural evil, is also good.
Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect;
the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the more
universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in the
example given above: because the judge has care of the common good,
which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief's death, which has
the aspect of good in relation to the common estate; whereas the
thief's wife has to consider the private, the good of the family, and
from this point of view she wishes her husband, the thief, not to be
put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is that which is
apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence
whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of the common good;
this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. On
the other hand, the apprehension of a creature, according to its
nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature. Now a
thing may happen to be good under a particular aspect, and yet not good
under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above. And therefore
it comes to pass that a certain will is good from willing something
considered under a particular aspect, which thing God wills not, under
a universal aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various
wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite things, for as
much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or
not to be.
But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he
refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite
of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the
end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is
directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some
particular good with a right will, he must will that particular good
materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally. Therefore the
human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that
which is willed formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and
universal good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the
reason given above.
At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed to
the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is conformed to
the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is
conformed thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch as it
is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it
is conformed to that will considered as efficient cause; since the
proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the particular
apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing from God as its
efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that a man's will, in
this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what
God wishes him to will.
There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause,
consisting in man's willing something from charity, as God wills it.
And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is
in respect of the last end, which is the proper object of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: We can know in a general way what God wills. For
we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good.
Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will
conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed. But
we know not what God wills in particular: and in this respect we are
not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.
But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he
wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that particular
matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not
only formally, but also materially.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not will the damnation of a man,
considered precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered
precisely as death, because, "He wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim.
2:4); but He wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore
in regard to such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of
God's justice and of the natural order.
Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said
that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect of reason of
the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who conforms
his will to God's, in the point of the very thing willed; because the
will tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the
end.
To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act
are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the
object considered materially.
To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when
several people desire different things, but not under the same aspect:
but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect,
one man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is no question
of this here.
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OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)
We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under
which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in
the external action?
(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends
on the goodness of the will?
(3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as
those of the external action?
(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of
the interior act?
(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its
goodness or malice?
(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
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Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the
external action?
Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external
action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives
goodness from its object, as stated above ([1183]Q[19], AA[1],2). But
the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for
a man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in
the act of the will.
Objection 2: Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end:
since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its
relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end,
as stated above ([1184]Q[1], A[1], ad 2), the act of another power can
be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to
being in the act of the will.
Objection 3: Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation
to the external action, as stated above ([1185]Q[18], A[6]). But that
which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in
the act of the will.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will
that we sin, and that we behave aright." Therefore moral good and evil
are first in the will.
I answer that, External actions may be said to be good or bad in two
ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances connected
with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be
observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or
evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for
vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the will's proper
object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the
external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found
first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the external
action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external
action has of itself, on account of its being about due matter and its
being attended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will, but
rather from the reason. Consequently, if we consider the goodness of
the external action, in so far as it comes from reason's ordination and
apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will: but
if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the action
done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its
principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The exterior action is the object of the will,
inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good
apprehended and ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the
good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the
execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent
to the will.
Reply to Objection 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but
follows in the order of execution.
Reply to Objection 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to
matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order
of nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in
every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its
efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as
existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action.
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Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on the
goodness of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the
external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written
(Mat. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an
evil tree bring forth good fruit." But, according to the gloss, the
tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is
impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the
external action evil, or vice versa.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no
sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there
will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or
malice of the external action depends on the will.
Objection 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now
are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential
division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12).
Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that
goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are
some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good."
I answer that, As stated above [1186](A[1]), we may consider a twofold
goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter
and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And
that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on
the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or
circumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the
goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it.
Now it must be observed, as was noted above ([1187]Q[19], A[6], ad 1),
that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for
it to be good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point
only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good,
both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the
external action is good. But if the will be good from its intention of
the end, this is not enough to make the external action good: and if
the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by
reason of the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.
Reply to Objection 1: If the good tree be taken to signify the good
will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act
willed and from the end intended.
Reply to Objection 2: A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an
evil end; but also when he wills an evil act.
Reply to Objection 3: Voluntariness applies not only to the interior
act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed
from the will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and
evil is applicable to both the interior and external act.
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Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as thos
e
of the interior act?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness and malice of the interior
act of the will are not the same as those of the external action. For
the principle of the interior act is the interior apprehensive or
appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle of the external
action is the power that accomplishes the movement. Now where the
principles of action are different, the actions themselves are
different. Moreover, it is the action which is the subject of goodness
or malice: and the same accident cannot be in different subjects.
Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot be the same as that
of the external action.
Objection 2: Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and
renders its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective
virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in the
power commanded, as is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the goodness
of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is distinct
from the goodness of the external action, which belongs to the power
commanded.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since
nothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act is the
cause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as stated
above ([1188]AA[1],2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in each.
On the contrary, It was shown above ([1189]Q[18], A[6]) that the act of
the will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that
which results from the material and formal element is one thing.
Therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[4]), the interior act of the
will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act. Now it
happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has several
aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it has but one. Hence
we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act
is the same as that of the external action, and sometimes not. For as
we have already said ([1190]AA[1],2), these two goodnesses or malices,
of the internal and external acts, are ordained to one another. Now it
may happen, in things that are subordinate to something else, that a
thing is good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter draught is
good merely because it procures health. Wherefore there are not two
goodnesses, one the goodness of health, and the other the goodness of
the draught; but one and the same. On the other hand it happens
sometimes that that which is subordinate to something else, has some
aspect of goodness in itself, besides the fact of its being subordinate
to some other good: thus a palatable medicine can be considered in the
light of a pleasurable good, besides being conducive to health.
We must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness or
malice from its relation to the end only, then there is but one and the
same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards the end,
and of the external action, which regards the end through the medium of
the act of the will. But when the external action has goodness or
malice of itself, i.e. in regard to its matter and circumstances, then
the goodness of the external action is distinct from the goodness of
the will in regarding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end
passes into the external action, and the goodness of the matter and
circumstances passes into the act of the will, as stated above
([1191]AA[1],2).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that the internal and
external actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as
they are in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral
order, as stated above ([1192]Q[17], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a moral virtue is
ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were,
of that virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained
to things directed to the end. For this reason various virtues are
necessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has
no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as the
goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: When a thing is derived by one thing from
another, as from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in
both: thus when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct
from the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same
specifically. But when a thing is derived from one thing from another,
according to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in
both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived
from the healthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as applied to
urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the body of an
animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It
is in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived from
the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the order
of one to the other.
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Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the
interior act?
Objection 1: It would seem that the external action does not add any
goodness or malice to that of the interior action. For Chrysostom says
(Hom. xix in Mat.): "It is the will that is rewarded for doing good, or
punished for doing evil." Now works are the witnesses of the will.
Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, in order to know
how to judge; but for the sake of others, that all may understand how
just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated according to God's
judgment rather than according to the judgment of man. Therefore the
external action adds no goodness or malice to that of the interior act.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and
external acts are one and the same, as stated above [1193](A[3]). But
increase is the addition of one thing to another. Therefore the
external action does not add to the goodness or malice of the interior
act.
Objection 3: Further, the entire goodness of created things does not
add to the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom.
But sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived
from the goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as
stated above ([1194]AA[1],2). Therefore neither of them adds to the
goodness or malice of the other.
On the contrary, Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil. If
therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be
added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does
a good deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.
I answer that, If we speak of the goodness which the external action
derives from the will tending to the end, then the external action adds
nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will in itself is
made better in good things, or worse in evil things. This, seemingly,
may happen in three ways. First in point of number; if, for instance, a
man wishes to do something with a good or an evil end in view, and does
not do it then, but afterwards wills and does it, the act of his will
is doubled and a double good, or a double evil is the result. Secondly,
in point of extension: when, for instance, a man wishes to do something
for a good or an evil end, and is hindered by some obstacle, whereas
another man perseveres in the movement of the will until he accomplish
it in deed; it is evident that the will of the latter is more lasting
in good or evil, and in this respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in
point of intensity: for these are certain external actions, which, in
so far as they are pleasurable, or painful, are such as naturally to
make the will more intense or more remiss; and it is evident that the
more intensely the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it
is.
On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external
action derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus it stands in
relation to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds to
the goodness or malice of the will; because every inclination or
movement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term.
Wherefore the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the
opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove impossible,
as long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the operation if it
could; the lack of perfection derived from the external action, is
simply involuntary. Now just as the involuntary deserves neither
punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or evil deeds, so
neither does it lessen reward or punishment, if a man through simple
involuntariness fail to do good or evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man's
will is complete, and does not refrain from the deed save through the
impossibility of achievement.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to that goodness which the
external action derives from the will as tending to the end. But the
goodness which the external action takes from its matter and
circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end; but
it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to
which it stands in the relation of measure and cause, as stated above
([1195]AA[1],2).
From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or
malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the consequences of the external action
increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists virtually in
its cause. But the consequences result from the action as an effect
from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually in actions. Now a
thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since a
virtue "makes that which has it to be good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore
the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.
Objection 2: Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences
resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these redound
to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from Phil. 4:1: "My dearly
beloved brethren, my joy and my crown." Therefore the consequences of
an action increase its goodness or malice.
Objection 3: Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault
increases: wherefore it is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to the
measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." But the
punishment is increased on account of the consequences; for it is
written (Ex. 21:29): "But if the ox was wont to push with his horn
yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did
not shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall
be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death." But he would not
have been put to death, if the ox, although he had not been shut up,
had not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase the goodness
or malice of an action.
Objection 4: Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by
striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does not
contract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore
the consequence of an action increase its goodness or malice.
On the contrary, The consequences do not make an action that was evil,
to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if a man
give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing
a sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, in like
manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the wrongdoer is
not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences of an action doe not
increase its goodness or malice.
I answer that, The consequences of an action are either foreseen or
not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the
goodness or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow
from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom, this
shows his will to be all the more inordinate.
But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction.
Because if they follow from the nature of the action and in the
majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the
goodness or malice of that action: for it is evident that an action is
specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and
specifically worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On
the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then
they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action: because we
do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by
accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.
Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect
that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by
accident.
Reply to Objection 2: The good actions done by the hearers, result from
the preacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature.
Hence they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such
is his intention.
Reply to Objection 3: The consequences for which that man is ordered to
be punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed
to be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.
Reply to Objection 4: This argument would prove if irregularity were
the result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of
the fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.
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Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that one and the same external action can be
both good and evil. For "movement, if continuous, is one and the same"
(Phys. v, 4). But one continuous movement can be both good and bad: for
instance, a man may go to church continuously, intending at first
vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. Therefore one and the
same action can be both good and bad.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3),
action and passion are one act. But the passion may be good, as
Christ's was; and the action evil, as that of the Jews. Therefore one
and the same act can be both good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it were, of
his master, the servant's action is his master's, just as the action of
a tool is the workman's action. But it may happen that the servant's
action result from his master's good will, and is therefore good: and
from the evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore the
same action can be both good and evil.
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries.
But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be
both good and evil.
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries.
But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be
both good and evil.
I answer that, Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far as it
is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it is referred to another
genus. Thus a continuous surface is one, considered as in the genus of
quantity; and yet it is manifold, considered as to the genus of color,
if it be partly white, and partly black. And accordingly, nothing
hinders an action from being one, considered in the natural order;
whereas it is not one, considered in the moral order; and vice versa,
as we have stated above (A[3], ad 1;[1196] Q[18], A[7], ad 1). For
continuous walking is one action, considered in the natural order: but
it may resolve itself into many actions, considered in the moral order,
if a change take place in the walker's will, for the will is the
principle of moral actions. If therefore we consider one action in the
moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good and evil.
Whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral unity, it can be both
good and evil.
Reply to Objection 1: This continual movement which proceeds from
various intentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not one
in the point of moral unity.
Reply to Objection 2: Action and passion belong to the moral order, in
so far as they are voluntary. And therefore in so far as they are
voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct
things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other.
Reply to Objection 3: The action of the servant, in so far as it
proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the master's action: but
only in so far as it proceeds from the master's command. Wherefore the
evil will of the servant does not make the action evil in this respect.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE
(FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of
their goodness and malice: and under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being
good or evil?
(2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?
(3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?
(4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?
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Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil?
Objection 1: It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in so
far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature" (Phys.
ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered outside the
order of nature. Now things that are produced according to art and
reason imitate those that are produced according to nature (Phys. ii,
8). Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being inordinate
and evil.
Objection 2: Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in nature
and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained. But
the goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the
intention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore it seems that
the malice of an action does not make it sinful.
Objection 3: Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it
follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false:
since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an
action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.
On the contrary, As shown above ([1197]Q[19], A[4]), the goodness of a
human action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently
its malice consists in its being in disaccord with the Eternal Law. But
this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii,
27) that "sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal
Law." Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil.
I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good
than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an
evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain
end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end is
measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this
rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When
therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the
natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right:
since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action does not
swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an
action strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.
Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is
the human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal Law. When,
therefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of
reason and of the Eternal Law, then that action is right: but when it
turns aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it is
evident from what has been said ([1198]Q[19], AA[3],4) that every
voluntary action that turns aside from the order of reason and of the
Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord with
reason and the Eternal Law. Hence it follows that a human action is
right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result
from a sin in nature's action.
Reply to Objection 2: The end is twofold; the last end, and the
proximate end. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in
respect of the last end, which is the perfection of the thing
generated; but it does not fail in respect of any proximate end
whatever; since when nature works it forms something. In like manner,
the sin of the will always fails as regards the last end intended,
because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to happiness, which is
the last end: and yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate
end: intended and achieved by the will. Wherefore also, since the very
intention of this end is ordained to the last end, this same intention
may be right or sinful.
Reply to Objection 3: Each thing is ordained to its end by its action:
and therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to the
end, consists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment
regards the person of the sinner, as was stated in the [1199]FP, Q[48],
A[5], ad 4; A[6], ad 3.
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Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being goo
d
or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise
or blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens even in
things done by nature" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not
deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human action
does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and,
consequently, neither does it deserve praise, by reason of its being
good.
Objection 2: Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it
happen in the productions of art: because as stated in Phys. ii, 8 "it
is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give the
wrong medicine." But the artist is not blamed for making something bad:
because the artist's work is such, that he can produce a good or a bad
thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that neither is there any
reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact that it is evil.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak
and incapable." But weakness or inability either takes away or
diminishes guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from
being evil.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that
"virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue
deserve censure and blame." But good actions are virtuous; because
"virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good"
(Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore
a human action deserves praise or blame, through being good or evil.
I answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin
more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise
or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to
blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or
goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it
is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through
his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made clear
above ([1200]Q[1], AA[1],2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in
voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and in
such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural actions are not in the power of the
natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And,
therefore, although there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason stands in different relations to the
productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is
directed to a particular end, which is something devised by reason:
whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all
human life. Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end.
Since therefore sin is a departure from the order to the end, as stated
above [1201](A[1]), sin may occur in two ways, in a production of art.
First, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist:
and this sin will be proper to the art; for instance, if an artist
produce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or
produce something good, while intending to produce something bad.
Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then
he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does so
in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But this sin is not
proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently for the former
sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he is
blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we take
into consideration the order of reason to the general end of human
life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of
reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for
such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is
preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence
directs, "he is the reverse."
Reply to Objection 3: Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is
subject to man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes
guilt.
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Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is
good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or
demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak of
merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in
matters relating to another person. But good or evil actions are not
all related to another person, for some are related to the person of
the agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action is meritorious
or demeritorious.
Objection 2: Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as
he chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys what
belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs
to another. But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a man does
not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action to a good or
evil purpose.
Objection 3: Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does
not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and the
same applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and
perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action is his evil.
Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a
good or an evil deed.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 3:10,11): "Say to the just man that
it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked
unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him."
I answer that, We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to
retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according
to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something
to another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed that
every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and
member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the
member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts the
hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to
another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit in
his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the
individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in respect of
the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now when a man
ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole society,
retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society;
secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does that
which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage, then again is
retribution owed to him, in so far as this too affects the community,
forasmuch as he is a part of society: although retribution is not due
to him, in so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual,
who is identical with the agent: unless, perchance, he owe retribution
to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far as man is said to be
just to himself.
It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or
blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will: that it is right or
sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit or
demerit depends on the recompense for justice or injustice towards
another.
Reply to Objection 1: A man's good or evil actions, although not
ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless
ordained to the good or evil of another, i.e. the community.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is master of his actions; and yet, in so far
as he belongs to another, i.e. the community, of which he forms part,
he merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill:
just as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of his, in
respect of which he is bound to serve the community.
Reply to Objection 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to
himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.
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Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, accordin
g
as it is good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not
meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated
above [1202](A[3]), merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for
good or harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does no
good or harm to God; for it is written (Job 35:6,7): "If thou sin, what
shalt thou hurt Him? . . . And if thou do justly, what shalt thou give
Him?" Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or
demeritorious in the sight of God.
Objection 2: Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the
sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the instrument
belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument of the
Divine power which is the principal cause of his action; hence it is
written (Is. 10:15): "Shall the axe boast itself against him that
cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it
is drawn?" where man while acting is evidently compared to an
instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in God's sight, by
good or evil deeds.
Objection 3: Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through
being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained
to God. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or
demerit in God's sight.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 12:14): "All things that are
done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be good or evil."
Now judgment implies retribution, in respect of which we speak of merit
and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil, acquires
merit or demerit in God's sight.
I answer that, A human action, as stated above [1203](A[3]), acquires
merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by
reason of himself, or by reason of the community: and in each way, our
actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God.
On the part of God Himself, inasmuch as He is man's last end; and it is
our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated above
(Q[19], A[10]). Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, not referable
to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our last end. On the
part of the whole community of the universe, because in every
community, he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the
common good; wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such
things as are done well or ill in the community. Now God is the
governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in the [1204]FP,
Q[103], A[5]: and especially of rational creatures. Consequently it is
evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to
Him: else it would follow that human actions are no business of God's.
Reply to Objection 1: God in Himself neither gains nor losses anything
by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God,
or offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the
order instituted by God.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God, that,
at the same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained
above ([1205]Q[9], A[6], ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he
acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is not ordained to the body politic,
according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that
every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body
politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to
God: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires
merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the action itself is
concerned.
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TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ[22]-48)
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OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general;
secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four things
to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them:
(3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and goodness.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?
(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the
apprehensive part?
(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will?
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Whether any passion is in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no passion in the soul.
Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of
matter and form, as stated in the [1206]FP, Q[75], A[5]. Therefore
there is no passion in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii,
3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore
passion is not in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every
passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in Topic.
vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the
soul.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5): "When we were in the
flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our
members." Now sins are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore
passions also, which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul.
I answer that, The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a
general way, according as whatever receives something is passive,
although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is
passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to
be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper
sense, when something is received, while something else is taken away:
and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is
unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and
loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to
be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And
here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is
said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing
recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it appear to
be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated
that when a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we
have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: whereas
the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less
excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens that passions
are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of
"feeling and understanding as being a kind of passion" (De Anima i, 5).
But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect
of a bodily transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot
be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the
"composite" is passive. But here again we find a difference; because
when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of
a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more
properly a passion than joy.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way
as to lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in
those things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as
implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything
that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter
and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it
is competent to receive or to be passive, according as the act of
understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in itself
to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in
De Anima i, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of passion accompanied by
transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not
found in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is
corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.
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Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of
the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first in
any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus,
and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. ii, 1. Now passion is
found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part:
for the appetitive part is not affected unless there be a previous
passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in the
apprehensive part more than in the appetitive.
Objection 2: Further, what is more active is less passive; for action
is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than the
apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the
apprehensive part.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a
corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But passion
in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily
transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive
appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement
of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by some of our
writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer
to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)] for instance,
disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering
the Greek more accurately, call them passions." From this it is evident
that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But
affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the
apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather
than in the apprehensive part.
I answer that, As we have already stated [1207](A[1]) the word
"passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to
the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power
rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through
its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves:
hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e.
the objects of the appetitive power, "are in things themselves." On the
other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in
itself; but knows it by reason of an "intention" of the thing, which
"intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find
it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain
to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind." Consequently it is
evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive,
rather than with the apprehensive part.
Reply to Objection 1: In things relating to perfection the case is the
opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in
things relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the
approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing
approaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing
possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with
light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the
more light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity
depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding from
that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of
privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes from that
which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at
first we always find some small defect, which afterwards increases as
it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a
thing according as it is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things
that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but
little potentiality and passion: while in other things, consequently,
there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power
of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers.
Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active,
because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the
exterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive,
namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: since it
is through the external action that we come into contact with things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [1208]FP, Q[78], A[3] the organs
of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change,
in respect of which the organ receives an "intention" of the object.
And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is
the eye changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but by
receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of
another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition;
for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar
change. And whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of the
sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through
gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity of the
object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive
appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the
movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the organ;
for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the
heart." Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is more
consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of
the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal
organ.
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Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectua
l
appetite, which is called the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive
than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom.
ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction;
not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering [patiens]
them." But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since
its object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is in the
intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive appetite.
Objection 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more
intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which
is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object
of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore
passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the
sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these
are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive
appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and
the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive than
in the intellectual appetite.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while
describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive
appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a
movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil."
I answer that, As stated above [1209](A[1]) passion is properly to be
found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal
transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not
only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now
there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the
intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means
of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion is more
properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the
intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the definitions
of Damascene quoted above.
Reply to Objection 1: By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well
affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place
without any alteration in the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the
power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because
things that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty
agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has
greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the
sensitive appetite is more passive.
Reply to Objection 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to
God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite,
they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without
passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy angels
feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery
while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont
to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although they
have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to
ours."
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HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from
those of the irascible part?
(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based
on the contrariety of good and evil?
(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?
(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in
species, but not contrary to one another?
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Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of
the irascible part?
Objection 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible
and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that
the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy
or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. Therefore
all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the
irascible, others in the concupiscible part.
Objection 2: Further, on the words of Mat. 13:33, "The kingdom of
heaven is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have
prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire
of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the
concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as
is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the
concupiscible and irascible faculties.
Objection 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically
according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and
concupiscible passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the
same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species;
for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the
concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is
divided, as stated in the [1210]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore, since the
passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above
(Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically
distinct from those of the concupiscible part.
I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in species
from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers
have different objects, as stated in the [1211]FP, Q[77], A[3], the
passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different
objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different faculties
differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required
to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the species
of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of
genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter, while
diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter;
so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to different powers,
differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions
regarding different specific objects, included under the one common
object of a single power, differ as the species of that genus.
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible,
and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of
these powers. For we have stated in the [1212]FP, Q[81], A[2], that the
object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply
apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul
must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in
acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as
such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or
avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an
arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty.
Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to
the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and
such like: whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous,
through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible
faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the [1213]FP, Q[81], A[2], the
irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the
obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its
object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making
some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions
terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the
passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and
sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible
faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible
passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible
power.
Reply to Objection 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the
concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this
very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and
hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same applies
to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the
concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible
passions.
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Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the
contrariety of good and evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible
passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions,
as stated above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible
passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance,
love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to the
irascible passions.
Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects; just
as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no other
contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in
Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions, save
that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil.
Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions
other than that of good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach
and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. Now
approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the
apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what all desire" (Ethic.
i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the
soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated
in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of good
and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every
contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.
I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii,
3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of
movements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and
movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs
properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is a change "to being,"
and to corruption, which is a change "from being." The other
contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly
to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from black to white, is
contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black.
Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul:
one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the
other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same
term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to
be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the
irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of
this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above
[1214](A[1]), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good,
as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since
nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In
like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun it:
wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a
term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of
good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible
passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or
dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there
can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same
object.
On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good
or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty
or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered
as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it,
which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered
as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to
the passion of "despair." In like manner the arduous evil, considered
as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs
to the passion of "fear": but it also contains a reason for tending to
it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to
evil; and this tendency is called "daring." Consequently, in the
irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as
between hope and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a
contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or
in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above [1215](A[1]). But both
kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore
every passion of the soul has its contrary.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil
for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive
part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a
passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a
contrary.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of
approach or withdrawal, as stated above [1216](A[2]). But every
approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa.
Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.
On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set
down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore
not every passion has a contrary.
I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot
have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or
according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a
difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the
appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the
limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a
movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of
"anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil
is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary
to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.
In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good
and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which
can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor,
when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement,
except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs
to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of
anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary
thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary
to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or
privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different,
but not contrary to one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power,
specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.
For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the
objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this
distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no
passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another,
differ specifically.
Objection 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of
form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety,
as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that
are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in
approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every
difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the
difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and
withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first
two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as
stated above [1217](A[2]): whereas the third difference does not
diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be
infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power
to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the
concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another;
rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power
there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one
another.
I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes,
which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now,
the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first,
from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from
water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their
active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference
of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as
if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either
draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing
it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the
first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to
the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the
body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above.
Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover
gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest,
when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause
are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same
applies to the cause of repulsion.
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were,
a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the
first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain
inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this
belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which
is "hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet
possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment
of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or
"concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion
of "aversion" or "dislike." Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it
causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this
belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in
respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness."
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or
inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising
from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.
And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair."
In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring." But in
respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is
no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above
[1218](A[3]). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of
"anger."
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are
three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion,
joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible
faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has
not contrary passion.
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing
specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the
irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
From this the replies to the objections are evident.
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OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the
soul?
(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice
of an act?
(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
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Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good
or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals are
properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But
passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other
animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.
Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in
accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the
sensitive appetite, as stated above ([1219]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore they
have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are
neither praised nor blamed for our passions." But we are praised and
blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally
good or evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of
the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if
our love is good."
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways:
first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the
reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to
wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral
good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above
([1220]Q[18] , A[5]). If, however, they be considered as subject to the
command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them.
Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to
the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward
members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much
more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be
called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either
from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the
will.
Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are
common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they
are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called
rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i,
13).
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised
nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not
exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are
subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears or is
angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a
certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason."
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Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are
morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call
the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those
things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances
rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance
of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is
evil morally.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
"movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to
nature is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against
nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide
Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with
nature to that which is against nature." Therefore these passions are
morally evil.
Objection 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But
these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions of
sins" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these
emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they
fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they
rejoice in good works."
I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from
that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are
evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are
good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is
nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider
the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between
sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual
and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of
the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the passions of
the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of
the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement
of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a
movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following
their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of
the soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound;
and those who are unsound are wanting in sense." Hence we speak of
those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound."
On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all
the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem them
good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not
controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in
disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a
mean in the passions, when he says that "every evil, though moderate,
should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing,
is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is
not sound." For passions are not called "diseases" or "disturbances" of
the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.
Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease
in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved
more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it
derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to
deviate always from the order of natural reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are
contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as
they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.
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Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of
a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on
which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the
goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment of
reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about
matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship and
pity." Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.
Objection 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the
better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers of
God, as most dear children." But "God and the holy angels feel no anger
when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve
the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is
better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to
reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion:
for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately.
Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without passion, than he
who does with passion.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion
of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating
right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven." But
nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a
passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.
I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is
evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the
goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good
altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by
passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the
sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we
give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive
appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his
passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good is founded on
reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according
as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no one
questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good,
that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of
reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated
above ([1221]Q[17], A[7]), it belongs to the perfection of moral or
human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by
reason.
Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do
it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of
moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of
his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to
Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God":
where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by
"flesh" the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold
relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus,
since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the
moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is
more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason
than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place, consequently:
and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, to wit,
when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the
lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that
results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the
intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness.
Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his
reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more
promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a
passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.
Reply to Objection 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive
appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend
on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in
us.
Reply to Objection 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the
judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either
of the ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or
else it is a sign of its being more grievous.
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Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil
morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on
reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that
accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing
accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is
good or evil according to its species.
Objection 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their
object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its
species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is
good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that
those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as
hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no
passion is good or evil according to its species.
Objection 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be
found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no
passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a
kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that
modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or
evil according to their species.
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been
said in regard to acts ([1222]Q[18], AA[5],6;[1223] Q[20], A[1])---viz.
that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be
considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural
genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species
of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch
as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and
evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to
which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with
reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is base fear; and of
"envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to
the same species as the external act.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the passions in their
natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in
itself. But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and
evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the
appetite, but essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are
themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like
manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other
hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a
tendency to evil, are themselves evil.
Reply to Objection 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does
not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of
estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason,
there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the
soul's passions.
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OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible
passions;
(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;
(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;
(4) The four principal passions.
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Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice
versa?
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their
objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good,
which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible passions
seem to precede the concupiscible passions.
Objection 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the
irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that
which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of
removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from
enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1; [1224]FP,
Q[81], A[2] ). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover"
(Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions.
Objection 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But
joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it
produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore the
concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.
On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good,
while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult,
good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good,
it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the irascible.
I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity
than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we
find something relating to movement---e.g. desire; and something
belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible
passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which
belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a
thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous;
whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of
intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we
compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible
passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of
execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions
of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes
it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope." But the
concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes
between two irascible passions: because it follows fear; since we
become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it
precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication,
that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is
looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the
angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every
passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion
denoting rest, viz. either in joy or in sadness.
But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible
passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take
precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something
to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the
irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of
the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort,
and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous
good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain
lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those
concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and
those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it
is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and
terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object
of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous,
just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is
arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good
absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the
common precedes the proper.
Reply to Objection 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an
accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly
related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the
obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.
Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those
concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object leads to the
same conclusion.
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Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the
concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from
concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are
named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
desire takes precedence of love.
Objection 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a
"uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But
concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing
coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
Objection 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is
sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure
(Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently
love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the
passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved
object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love
is the first of the concupiscible passions.
I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible
faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of
good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are
naturally before those, the object of which is evil---that is to say,
each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the
reason for shunning the opposite evil.
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the
order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently
the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the
order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of
execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in
the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends
to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that
end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved
to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it.
And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love,
which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or
concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this
order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the
order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended
causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good,
which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as
stated above ([1225]Q[11], A[3], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for "words
are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1).
Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of
love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not
possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De
Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we
love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is
felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.
Reply to Objection 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There
is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other.
This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is
also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so
far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and
an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a
union. This union precedes the movement of desire.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes
love in the order of intention.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible
passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger.
Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic"
(cf. A[2], OBJ[1]), it seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope.
Objection 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something
arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary
evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or
an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive
simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to
overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to
be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And
consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.
Objection 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the
movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and
despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply
approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and
daring.
On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it
precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the
passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible
faculty.
I answer that, As stated above [1226](A[1]) all irascible passions
imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible
faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere
aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred,
those whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or
joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion in
the irascible, as stated above (Q[23], AA[3],4); but the presence of
evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude
to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all
the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation.
And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a
movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose
object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those
whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes
despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is
essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly; whereas
despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent
with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its
tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear,
through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and
despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this---that
as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and
despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises from
the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming.
Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is angry while seeking
vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in
the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident that hope is
the first of all the irascible passions.
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of
generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second;
hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth
and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire
precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy
precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
Reply to Objection 1: Because anger arises from the other passions, as
an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being
more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that is
the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards
good more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even
anger regards something more arduous.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the appetite is essentially and
directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement
from evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is
in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature,
which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which
removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining the end.
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Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the
four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] sqq.)
omits hope and puts desire in its place.
Objection 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the
soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation.
The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order
of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the final passions,
will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or
generation, and thus love will be the principal passion. Therefore joy
and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the four
principal passions.
Objection 3: Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is
caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be
reckoned as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and
daring, from being akin to one another.
On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four
principal passions, says:
"Banish joys: banish fears:
Away with hope: away with tears."
I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions.
Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in
them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore
they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5.
Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the
others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement
of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, movement
begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in
respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in
fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in
relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the
future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to
present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future
good, and fear, future evil.
As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future,
they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that
these four are the principal passions, because they are general
passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we
understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of
hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some
future good.
Reply to Objection 2: These are called principal passions, in the order
of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last
passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend
towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any
further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned
a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be
a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply OBJ 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this
is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil;
and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal
passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be
principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion,
because it arises from daring.
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OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1) the
passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the
irascible faculty.
The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall
consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and
sadness.
Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2)
The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
(2) Whether love is a passion?
(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?
(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love
of concupiscence?
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Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power.
For it is written (Wis. 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and
have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible power, being
a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not
apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible
power.
Objection 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every passion:
for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the object
beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is
contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is
sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed,
fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power.
Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible
power.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural
love." But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers,
which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the
concupiscible power.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in
the concupiscible power."
I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good
is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the
difference of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an
apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in some
other: and this is called the "natural appetite." Because natural
things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by
reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of
their nature, as stated in the [1227]FP, Q[6], A[1], ad 2; [1228]FP,
Q[103], A[1], ad 1,3. And there is another appetite arising from an
apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and not
from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the "sensitive
appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, in
so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following
freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And this is
the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the "will."
Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the
principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the
principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness
with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love":
thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of
its weight and may be called "natural love." In like manner the
aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is
to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or
"intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love is in the
sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual
appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards
good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the
object of the irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or
rational love.
Reply to Objection 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and
sadness, not essentially but causally.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the
vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts
of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; since
each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally
suitable to it.
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Whether love is a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is
a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine
says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but
rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the
appetite; for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle.
Therefore love is not a passion.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a
passion."
I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a
natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the
first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement
that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body
both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight,
from being the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural
to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called "natural
love." In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first,
a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that
object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object.
For "the appetitive movement is circular," as stated in De Anima iii,
10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing
itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves
towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement
ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the
appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else
than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a
movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and
lastly, there is rest which is "joy." Since, therefore, love consists
in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is
evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is
in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according
as it is in the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or
action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of
movement in the appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of
the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that
which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it
is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is
a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive
force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that
union is the work of love.
Reply to Objection 3: Although love does not denote the movement of the
appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that
movement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as
to have complacency therein.
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Whether love is the same as dilection?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is to
twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight
lines." But these have the same meaning. Therefore love and dilection
denote the same thing.
Objection 2: Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of
their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same.
Therefore these are the same.
Objection 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is
chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love to evil
things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to
either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection do not differ:
thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "it is not
one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection."
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men have
held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does."
I answer that, We find four words referring in a way, to the same
thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ,
however, in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" are
expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either
way.
Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a
wider signification than the others, since every dilection or charity
is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to
love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes:
and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in
the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition
to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that which is loved
is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [*Referring to
the Latin "carus" (dear)].
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in
so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the
same as dilection.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is more general than the
object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good
and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the
same as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of
love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that "a
right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed
love." However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible passion,
inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the difference
spoken of.
Reply to Objection 4: The reason why some held that, even when applied
to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike
than "dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so
far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes
the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by
love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can
possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature
of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike
than dilection.
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Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of
concupiscence?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided into love
of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion, while
friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5).
But habit cannot be the member of a division of passions. Therefore
love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of
friendship.
Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of
the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as
"animal." But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love,
as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a
division of love.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3)
friendship is threefold, that which is founded on "usefulness," that
which is founded on "pleasure," and that which is founded on
"goodness." But useful and pleasant friendship are not without
concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with
friendship.
On the contrary, We are said to love certain things, because we desire
them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness
which he desires"; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship
for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. Therefore
love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is to
wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold
tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or
to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly,
man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to
another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.
Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary:
since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply
and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of
concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something
else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while
that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is
convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good
simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good.
Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have
some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved,
that it may be another's good, is relative love.
Reply to Objection 1: Love is not divided into friendship and
concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence.
For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we
are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: When friendship is based on usefulness or
pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this
respect the character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers
this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that
friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with
love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship.
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OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good is the only cause of love?
(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?
(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
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Whether good is the only cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For
good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens
that evil also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6: "He that loveth
iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be good.
Therefore good is not the only cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love
those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil is the
cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good"
only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all."
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the good
alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love.
I answer that, As stated above ([1229]Q[26], A[1]), Love belongs to the
appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object
stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore
the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of
love is the good; because, as stated above ([1230]Q[26], AA[1],2), love
implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the
thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin
and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper
cause of love.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is never loved except under the aspect of
good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is
considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in so
far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is in this
way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some
good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or such like.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved,
not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a
good thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes
insincerity or hypocrisy.
Reply to Objection 3: The beautiful is the same as the good, and they
differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of
good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful
is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently
those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most
cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we
speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the
other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression
"beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful
odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to
the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means that which simply pleases
the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend.
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Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For
it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought
without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have
them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 35),
if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them.
Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, to love what we know not seems like loving
something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than
they are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but
cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of
love.
Objection 3: Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would
be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is
love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge
in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love
what he does not know."
I answer that, As stated above [1231](A[1]), good is the cause of love,
as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except
as apprehended. And therefore love demands some apprehension of the
good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12)
says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like
manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the
beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the cause of love
for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.
Reply to Objection 1: He who seeks science, is not entirely without
knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some
respect, either in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or
from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2).
But to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Something is required for the perfection of
knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For
knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish
things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a
fashion, things that are distinct, by comparing one with another.
Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know
distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and
properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which
regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the
perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in
itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is
known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly
known. This is most evident in regard to the sciences, which some love
through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they
know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others;
and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the love of
God.
Reply to Objection 3: Even natural love, which is in all things, is
caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things
themselves, but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above
(Q[26], A[1]; cf. [1232]FP, Q[6], A[1], ad 2).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether likeness is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For
the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the
cause of hatred; for it is written (Prov. 13:10) that "among the proud
there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
1) that "potters quarrel with one another." Therefore likeness is not a
cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man
loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves an
actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if
likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would
love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to
possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he
have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches.
But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them.
Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love
those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain
their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore
likeness is not a cause of love.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its
like."
I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But it
must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind of
likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for
example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be
alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having
potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has
actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its proper
place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or
again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its act; since
act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.
Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or
well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it
were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus
two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men are
one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other,
as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the
second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence, or friendship
founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality,
as such, has the desire for its act; and it takes pleasure in its
realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being.
Now it has been stated above ([1233]Q[26], A[4]), that in the love of
concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing
the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than another:
because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he
is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's
likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him
from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for
being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This
is why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one
another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud,"
because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when a man loves in another what he loves
not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as
the latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that
which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good
writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has
that which is becoming to him in respect of his art.
Reply to Objection 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to
what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the same likeness of potentiality to
its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as
he expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the
man who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is
inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on
usefulness. We might also say that although not all men have these
virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to certain
seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man
who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as being in conformity with
his own natural reason.
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Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of
love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved for
the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion.
Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we
desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship
based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no
hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at all,
even if we see how beautiful it is." Therefore hope too is a cause of
love.
On the contrary, All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
I answer that, There is no other passion of the soul that does not
presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion of
the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in
something. Now every movement towards something, or rest in something,
arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does
love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the
soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that
some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one
good is the cause of another.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it
affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure
is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes
pleasure save in that which is loved in some way.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire for a thing always presupposes love for
that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's
being loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from
whom he receives it.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of
pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, because
hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which
we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good
that is loved.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether union is an effect of love?
(2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
(3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
(4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?
(5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?
(6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?
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Whether union is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For
absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with
absence; for the Apostle says (Gal. 4:18): "Be zealous for that which
is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a
gloss), "and not only when I am present with you." Therefore union is
not an effect of love.
Objection 2: Further, every union is either according to essence, thus
form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the whole,
or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to
likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love does not cause union
of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct.
On the other hand, love does not cause union of likeness, but rather is
caused by it, as stated above ([1234]Q[27], A[3]). Therefore union is
not an effect of love.
Objection 3: Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the
intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover in act
is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge
rather than of love.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a
"unitive love."
I answer that, The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is
real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover.
The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in
relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite
follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of
concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind
of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For
when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to
our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another with the love
of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself:
wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he
wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's
"other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well
did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul."
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love
moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of
something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused
"formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this
sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital
principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit,
and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the
union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that
"it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of real union. That is
necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real
absence of the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent
or present.
Reply to Objection 2: Union has a threefold relation to love. There is
union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the
love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith
one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above
([1235]Q[27], A[3]). There is also a union which is essentially love
itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened
to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his
love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something
belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a
union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover
seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping
with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii,
1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into
one," but since "this would result in either one or both being
destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union---to live together,
speak together, and be united together in other like things.
Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being
united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is
that the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the
lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love is closer
than that which is caused by knowledge.
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Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling,
so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which is
in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and
contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the
lover be in the beloved and vice versa.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by
means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the reason,
not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are
really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
Objection 3: Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved
and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, in
the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union
itself is love, as stated above [1236](A[1]). Therefore it follows that
the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently
false. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:16): "He that abideth in
charity abideth in God, and God in him." Now charity is the love of
God. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to be
in the lover, and vice versa.
I answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as
referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power.
Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the
lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover,
according to Phil. 1:7, "For that I have you in my heart": while the
lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch
as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the
beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything
pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus
it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He
"searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God" (1 Cor. 2:10).
As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover,
inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing
him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in
the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it
with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to
the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic
cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good
to another on account of something else), but because the complacency
in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak
of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity." On the
other hand, the lover is in the beloved, by the love of concupiscence
and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of
concupiscence is not satisfied with any external or superficial
possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the
beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas,
in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he
reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and
his friend's will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the
good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is
proper to friends "to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice
at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4).
Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as
affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he
were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills
and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on his
friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover.
In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be
understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends return
love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another.
Reply to Objection 1: The beloved is contained in the lover, by being
impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency.
On the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as
the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For nothing
hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different
ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, and vice versa.
Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the reason precedes the
movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the
movement of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the third kind of mutual
indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love.
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Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For
ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always result
in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times.
Therefore love does not cause ecstasy.
Objection 2: Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to
him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes
himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were.
Objection 3: Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated
above [1237](A[1]). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in
order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover
always loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false.
Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine love
produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through
love." Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv),
every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that
every love causes ecstasy.
I answer that, To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself.
This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive
power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside
himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him. This
may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is
said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is placed outside the connatural
apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up so as to
comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to
his being cast down into a state of debasement; thus a man may be said
to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness.
As to the appetitive power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that
power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from
itself, as it were.
The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far,
namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated above
[1238](A[2]), and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from
other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love of
friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a
restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is
carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not
being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy
something outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic
good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this
movement remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love of
friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he
wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him,
for his sake.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of the first kind of
ecstasy.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to love of concupiscence,
which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.
Reply to Objection 3: He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as
he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will
the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not
follow that he loves another more than himself.
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Whether zeal is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal
is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 3:3):
"Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention,"
etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an
effect of love.
Objection 2: Further, the object of love is the good, which
communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication;
since it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the
object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous
of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others.
Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
Objection 3: Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is
there without love: for it is written (Ps. 72:3): "I had a zeal on
occasion of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an
effect of love any more than of hatred.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a
zealot, on account of his great love for all things."
I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity
of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to
anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance.
Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object loved," as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove
everything that opposes it.
But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence,
and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence he who desires
something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or
quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus that husbands are
said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a
hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like manner those
who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, as though
these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of
envy, of which it is written (Ps. 36:1): "Be not emulous of evil doers,
nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity."
On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good:
wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against
everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is
said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of
repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In
this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he
endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to
the honor or will of God; according to 3 Kings 19:14: "With zeal I have
been zealous for the Lord of hosts." Again on the words of Jn. 2:17:
"The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is
eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil he
perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it."
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the
zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the
object of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.
Reply to Objection 2: Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated
to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this
communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But
through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot,
in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the
love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not arise,
properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their
entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the
knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except perhaps
one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.
Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that a man hates whatever is
opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is
set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred.
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Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?
Objection 1: It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor
denotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor: for
it is written (Cant 2:5): "Stay me up with flowers, compass me about
with apples; because I languish with love." Therefore love is a
wounding passion.
Objection 2: Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts
that in which it is: for it is written (Cant 5:6): "My soul melted when
my beloved spoke." Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a
corruptive and a wounding passion.
Objection 3: Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which
excess has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius
(Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the
Seraphim's love, includes "hot" and "piercing" and "most fervent."
Moreover it is said of love (Cant 8:6) that "its lamps are fire and
flames." Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "everything loves
itself with a love that holds it together," i.e. that preserves it.
Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves
and perfects.
I answer that, As stated above ([1239]Q[26], AA[1],2;[1240] Q[27],
A[1]), love denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some
good. Now nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which is suitable to
it; rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing
be adapted to that which is not suitable to it, it is hurt and made
worse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and
betters the lover; but love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover,
wounds and worsens him. Wherefore man is perfected and bettered chiefly
by the love of God: but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin,
according to Osee 9:10: "They became abominable, as those things which
they loved."
And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal
element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect of the material
element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it
happens that love is hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive:
just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the
soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily organ.
In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate
effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, languor, and
fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to freezing.
For things that are frozen, are closely bound together, so as to be
hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to
receive the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the
lover, as stated above [1241](A[2]). Consequently the freezing or
hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love: while
melting denotes a softening of the heart, whereby the heart shows
itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the
beloved is present and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if
the beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz. sadness at its absence,
which is denoted by "languor" (hence Cicero in De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 11
applies the term "ailment" chiefly to sadness); and an intense desire
to possess the beloved, which is signified by "fervor." And these are
the effects of love considered formally, according to the relation of
the appetitive power to its object. But in the passion of love, other
effects ensue, proportionate to the above, in respect of a change in
the organ.
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Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?
Objection 1: It would seem that the lover does not do everything from
love. For love is a passion, as stated above ([1242]Q[26], A[2]). But
man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from
choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated in Ethic. v, 8.
Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love.
Objection 2: Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and
action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore,
whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the
appetitive faculty are superfluous.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by
contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore all
things are not done from love.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things,
whatever they do, they do for the love of good."
I answer that, Every agent acts for an end, as stated above
([1243]Q[1], A[2] ). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each
one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does
every action from love of some kind.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes love as a passion existing
in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a
general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal,
and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love
in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above [1244](A[5]; Q[27], A[4]) desire,
sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the
soul, result from love. Wherefore every act proceeds from any passion,
proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other
passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.
Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall
state further on ([1245]Q[29], A[2]).
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OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?
(2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?
(3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?
(4) Whether a man can hate himself?
(5) Whether a man can hate the truth?
(6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?
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Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of
hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore evil
be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of
something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly untrue.
Objection 2: Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence (2 Macc
3:1) some are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because
of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred of their
souls [Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil
be the object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is
commendable: and this is clearly false.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good
and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different
subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.
On the contrary, Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love
is good, as stated above ([1246]Q[26], A[1];[1247] Q[27], A[1]).
Therefore the object of hatred is evil.
I answer that, Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension
(though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural
appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural
appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which does result from
an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above ([1248]Q[26],
A[1]). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that
just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is
suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural
dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and this is natural
hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual
appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is
apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite
from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as
whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is
repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as
good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred.
Reply to Objection 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance
but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But
being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of
repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is
hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by
comparison with something else.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when
it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it
is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of
evil nor love of good is good.
Reply to Objection 3: To different things the same thing may be lovable
or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the
same thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally
unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to
water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same
thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.
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Whether love is a cause of hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For "the
opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous" (Praedic.
x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they
are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous.
Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
Objection 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the
other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the
cause of hatred.
Objection 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which
precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies a
turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good.
Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all
emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an
emotion of the soul, is caused by love.
I answer that, As stated above [1249](A[1]), love consists in a certain
agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in
a certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should consider in each
thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing
disagrees with another, through destroying or hindering that which
agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and
nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing which
is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love.
Reply to Objection 1: The opposite members of a division are sometimes
naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of
animal, or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous
logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; e.g.
the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not
simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance and accident;
for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and being is
predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a
priority of reason, because it is not predicated of accident except
inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are
naturally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore nothing
hinders love from being the cause of hatred.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered in
respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they
are not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it
amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate its
contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its
contrary.
Reply to Objection 3: In the order of execution, the turning away from
one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the
case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the
reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive movement
belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution.
Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an appetitive movement.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred is stronger than love?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee
from pain, more than he desires pleasure." But flight from pain
pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love.
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
Objection 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love
is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into
hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
Objection 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their
effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on
seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from
pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances (QQ. 83, qu. 36).
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing
except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred
and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore
love is stronger than hatred.
I answer that, It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its
cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above
stated [1250](A[2]). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be
stronger than love absolutely.
But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than
hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to the
means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining
of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul's movement in respect
of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil.
Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two
reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For,
since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression;
when once the impression has been received it is not felt so keenly as
in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though
greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever;
because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a second
nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the
object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12) that "love is felt
more keenly when we lack what we love." And for the same reason, the
unbecomingness of that which is hated is felt more keenly than the
becomingness of that which is loved. Secondly, because comparison is
made between a hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding.
Because, according to different degrees of good there are different
degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred.
Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love, moves us more
than a lesser love.
Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of
pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which
corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we
love pleasure.
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Whether a man can hate himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is
written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul." But
many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves.
Objection 2: Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But
sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who kills
himself. Therefore some men hate themselves.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes
a man hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. But
some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:29) that "no man ever hated
his own flesh."
I answer that, Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate
himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire
anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil is
outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now
to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above ([1251]Q[26],
A[4]). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is
impossible for a man to hate himself, properly speaking.
But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two
ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself. For
it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular
respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil
to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to
whom he wills good. For each thing is that which is predominant in it;
wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if the king
were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind
of man. And it happens that some men account themselves as being
principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature.
Wherefore they love themselves according to what they take themselves
to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is
contrary to reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity
hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself.
Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: No man wills and works evil to himself, except he
apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill
themselves, apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an
end to some unhappiness or pain.
Reply to Objection 3: The miser hates something accidental to himself,
but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his
sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that
avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it is
caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires
temporal goods for himself more than he should.
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Whether a man can hate the truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good,
true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither,
therefore, can he hate the truth.
Objection 2: Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as
stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics i, 1. But knowledge is only
of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But that
which is in a thing naturally, is always in it. Therefore no man can
hate the truth.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love
those who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive for
this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he
cannot hate it.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 4:16): "Am I become your enemy
because I tell you the truth?" [*St. Thomas quotes the passage,
probably from memory, as though it were an assertion: "I am become,"
etc.]
I answer that, Good, true and being are the same in reality, but differ
as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light of
something desirable, while being and true are not so considered:
because good is "what all things seek." Wherefore good, as such, cannot
be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Being
and truth in general cannot be the object of hatred: because
disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of
love; while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing
hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an object
of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant;
since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with the notion
of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good.
Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant
or hurtful to the good we love. First, according as truth is in things
as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates a particular
truth, when he wishes that what is true were not true. Secondly,
according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him from
gaining the object loved: such is the case of those who wish not to
know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person it
is said (Job 21:14): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways."
Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as
it is in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man
wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should know
the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x,
23) that men "love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it
reproves." This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself:
hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But
accidentally, the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as
it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why we love those who are
straightforward is that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of
the truth, considered in itself, is a desirable thing.
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Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of
universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive
appetite, which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the
senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an
object of universal hatred.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there
is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of
universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the
object of universal hatred.
Objection 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in
things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the
universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the
particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a universal object.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a
thing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter."
I answer that, There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first,
as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered
in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider
the universal man, and another to consider a man as man. If, therefore,
we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of
apprehension or of appetite, can attain the universal: because the
universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, on which
every sensitive power is based.
Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of
appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the
object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is
cognizant of universal color, but because the fact that color is
cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this
particular color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred in
the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this
thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual,
is hostile to the animal---for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep.
Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is
always caused by something in particular: because it is caused by some
action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals.
For this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed
to a thing in general."
But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises
from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the
universal in both ways.
Reply to Objection 1: The senses do not apprehend the universal, as
such: but they apprehend something to which the character of
universality is given by abstraction.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is common to all cannot be a reason of
hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at
variance with others, so as to be hateful to them.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the universal under the
aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive
apprehension or appetite.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?
(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?
(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?
(4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?
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Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?
Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the
sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according
to Wis. 6:21: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth
to the everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appetite can have no
tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the
sensitive appetite.
Objection 2: Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in
the sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "There
dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good."
But desire for God's commandments is an act of concupiscence, according
to Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted [concupivit] to long for thy
justifications." Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive
appetite.
Objection 3: Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of
concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul,
and not only in the sensitive appetite.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided
into the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational
part of the soul, passive and appetitive." Therefore concupiscence is
in the sensitive appetite.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is
a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold, as we
shall state later on ([1252]Q[31], AA[3],4): one is in the intelligible
good, which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to
the senses. The former pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas
the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power
seated in a bodily organ: wherefore sensible good is the good of the
whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this
latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is
implied by the Latin word "concupiscentia." Therefore, properly
speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the
concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it.
Reply to Objection 1: The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods,
is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain
likeness; or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul
being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so that
the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following
the lead of the higher appetite, the result being that the body itself
renders its service in spiritual matters, according to Ps. 83:3: "My
heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."
Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the
lower, but also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply
fellowship in craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement
towards the thing desired.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its
proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from
apprehension. But the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which
arises from apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And to
crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses,
wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible
power.
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Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific passion
of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by their
objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something
delightful to the senses; and this is also the object of concupiscence,
as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is
not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that
"covetousness is the love of transitory things": so that it is not
distinct from love. But all specific passions are distinct from one
another. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the
concupiscible faculty.
Objection 3: Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty
there is a specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above
([1253]Q[23], A[4]). But no specific passion of the concupiscible
faculty is contrary to concupiscence. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii, 12) that "good when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when
present, it gives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend makes us
fear, the evil that is present makes us sad": from which we gather that
as sadness is contrary to joy, so is fear contrary to concupiscence.
But fear is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible part.
Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible
faculty.
On the contrary, Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to
pleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Hence it is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as a
specific passion.
I answer that, As stated above [1254](A[1]; Q[23], A[1]), the good
which gives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the
concupiscible faculty. Hence the various concupiscible passions are
distinguished according to the differences of that good. Now the
diversity of this object can arise from the very nature of the object,
or from a diversity in its active power. The diversity, derived from
the nature of the active object, causes a material difference of
passions: while the difference in regard to its active power causes a
formal diversity of passions, in respect of which the passions differ
specifically.
Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs
according as it is really present, or absent: because, according as it
is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas,
according as it is absent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards
it. Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch as,
so to speak, it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it causes
concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty to
itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it makes the
faculty to find rest in itself. Accordingly, concupiscence is a passion
differing "in species" from both love and pleasure. But concupiscences
of this or that pleasurable object differ "in number."
Reply to Objection 1: Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence,
not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible,
considered as past, is the object of memory. For these particular
conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers of
the sensitive part, which regards particular things.
Reply to Objection 2: In the passage quoted we have causal, not
essential predication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but an
effect of love. We may also say that Augustine is taking covetousness
in a wide sense, for any movement of the appetite in respect of good to
come: so that it includes both love and hope.
Reply to Objection 3: The passion which is directly contrary to
concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as
concupiscence in regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the
absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope is
sometimes called covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as
though it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the appetite
in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and
evil as arduous.
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Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into
those which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence
belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the
natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. Therefore no
concupiscence is natural.
Objection 2: Further, material differences makes no difference of
species, but only numerical difference; a difference which is outside
the purview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and
some not, they differ only in respect of their objects; which amounts
to a material difference, which is one of number only. Therefore
concupiscences should not be divided into those that are natural and
those that are not.
Objection 3: Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in
Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is not
natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible: because,
since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the sensitive appetite,
and not to the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there
are no concupiscences which are not natural.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11)
distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural.
I answer that, As stated above [1255](A[1]), concupiscence is the
craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways.
First, because it is suitable to the nature of the animal; for example,
food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things
is said to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is
apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends something
as good and suitable, and consequently takes pleasure in it: and
concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and
is more wont to be called "cupidity."
Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural
concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to both is
there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in
these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) calls
them "common" and "necessary." But concupiscences of the second kind
are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and
suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are "irrational," but the
latter, "rational." And because different men reason differently,
therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) "peculiar and
acquired," i.e. in addition to those that are natural.
Reply to Objection 1: The same thing that is the object of the natural
appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is
apprehended. And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of
food, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: The difference between those concupiscences that
are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material
difference; it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a
difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite is the
apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows from
diversity of apprehension: according as a thing is apprehended as
suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural
concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet. i, 11);
or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence arise those
concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very reason the
Philosopher calls "rational" (Rhet. i, 11).
Reply to Objection 3: Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to
the intellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the
sensitive faculty, as stated in the [1256]FP, Q[78], A[4]; [1257]FP,
Q[81], A[3]: so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the
sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by the
universal reason also, through the medium of the particular
imagination.
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Whether concupiscence is infinite?
Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the
object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. But
where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore
concupiscence cannot be infinite.
Objection 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it
proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and
therefore unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.
Objection 3: Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and
thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject of
concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term.
Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight would ever ensue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since
concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things."
I answer that, As stated above [1258](A[3]), concupiscence is twofold;
one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence cannot
be actually infinite: because it is of that which nature requires; and
nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never
desires infinite meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there
is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupiscence be
infinite successively; so that, for instance, after getting food, a man
may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature
requires: because these bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for
ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (Jn. 4:13):
"Whosever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again."
But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as
stated above [1259](A[3]), it follows from the reason, and it belongs
to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may
desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich
as possible.
Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i,
3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another infinite.
Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is
desired for its own sake, e.g. health: and thus greater health is more
desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself
dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet more. On the
other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the
concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end.
Consequently those who place their end in riches have an infinite
concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of
the necessities of life, desire a finite measure of riches, sufficient
for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The
same applies to the concupiscence of any other things.
Reply to Objection 1: Every object of concupiscence is taken as
something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once
actually desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it cannot
be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that "from which,
however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken"
(Phys. iii, 6).
Reply to Objection 2: The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a
certain sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as
appears in the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the
infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact
the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense,
inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number of singulars.
Reply to Objection 3: In order that a man be delighted, there is no
need for him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the
realization of each object of his concupiscence.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four
things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The causes of
delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is a passion?
(2) Whether delight is subject to time?
(3) Whether it differs from joy?
(4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?
(5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of
the lower;
(6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;
(7) Whether any delight is non-natural?
(8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?
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Whether delight is a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene
(De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and says
that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a
movement contrary to nature." But delight is an operation, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a
passion.
Objection 2: Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in
Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in
having been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore
delight is not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who
is delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in Ethic. x,
4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being
altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima ii, 5. Therefore
delight is not a passion.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons
delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul.
I answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly
called passions, as stated above ([1260]Q[22], A[3]). Now every emotion
arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive
appetite: and this must needs be said of delight, since, according to
the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the
soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with
the nature of the thing."
In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural
things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this
happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not
occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur
all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other
natural things, that when these latter are established in the state
becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And
from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the
sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight. Accordingly by
saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its
genus. By saying that it is "an establishing in keeping with the
thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we assign
the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good. By saying
that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this establishing
is to be understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in
the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, as it
were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [*Phileb. 32,33]
maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. Lastly,
by saying that this establishing is "sensible," we exclude the
perfections of insensible things wherein there is no delight. It is
therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal
appetite arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the
soul.
Reply to Objection 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a
second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a
thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation,
delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed
above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we
designate, not its essence, but its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an
animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to
the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs
to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already
gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases,
by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive
faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it
had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For
though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the
presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite,
nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its
object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate
to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as
bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some
passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above
([1261]Q[23], AA[1],4): and in this sense delight is called a passion.
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Whether delight is in time?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a
kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all
movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in
respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore
pleasure is in time.
Objection 3: Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus.
But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes
pleasure according to time."
I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself;
secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. For
since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of
themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something
pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose,
speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are said to be in
time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which
succession is not essential, but which are subject to something
successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially something
successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or
change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human being is
subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time.
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in
time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the
term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the
delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be
altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time,
either by reason of itself or accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is
twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something
existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is
in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of
something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will
and such like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive,
nor is it of itself in time.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose,
according as it is accidentally in time.
Reply to Objection 3: Other passions have not for their object a good
obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of
the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more
to delight not to be in time.
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Whether delight differs from joy?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy.
Because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But
delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained.
Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight.
Objection 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one
and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight.
Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same.
Objection 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there
is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and
cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions
of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not differ
from delight.
On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas
we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as
delight.
I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of
delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are
natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated
above ([1262]Q[30], A[3]), so also some delights are natural, and some
are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13)
and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some
delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to the
same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire
naturally, when we get them, and in those things which we desire as a
result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight
follows reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but
only delight.
Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned
desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be
the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational
beings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since
sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing
thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight extends to more
things than does joy.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the object of the appetite of the soul is
an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to
diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also
called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called
otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to
concupiscences ([1263]Q[30], A[3], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2: A like difference is to be observed in
concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence,
while joy corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to
concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose
corresponding to the difference of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: These other names pertaining to delight are
derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is
derived from the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say
"latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward
delight, which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks
forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain
special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to
belong to joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational
beings.
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Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual
appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight is a
sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual
power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.
Objection 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the
sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive
appetite.
Objection 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational
animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we have
in common with irrational animals.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord." But
the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual
appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite.
I answer that, As stated above [1264](A[3]), a certain delight arises
from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending
something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its
application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual
appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual
appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not
bodily delight.
However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that
delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily
transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing
but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent
to the things we wish."
Reply to Objection 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses
the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception.
For he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense,
as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation." Or we
may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight has the character of passion, properly
speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in
the intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus
it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at
the end of De Coel. Hier., that "the angels are not susceptible to our
passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness of
incorruption."
Reply to Objection 3: In us there is delight, not only in common with
dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says
(De Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic
delights." Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive
appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the
intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels.
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Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and
intellectual pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are
greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek
some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more
seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures.
Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 2: Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect.
But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the state
of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore
bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 3: Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked,
by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check
spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:103): "How sweet are Thy words
to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation
of wisdom."
I answer that, As stated above [1265](A[1]), pleasure arises from union
with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of
the soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be
noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts
or perfections of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and
the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions
and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for "movement is the
act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3).
Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and intellectual
soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by
sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and
not only from their objects.
If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures,
according as we delight in the very actions, for instance in sensitive
and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are
much greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more delight
in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by
perceiving it with his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more
perfect; and because it is better known, since the intellect reflects
on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is
more beloved: for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily
sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are
deprived thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).
If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible
bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely speaking,
spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the
consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good
which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and
the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more
beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even
the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which
is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is much more
noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction
is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate, because
the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the
intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is
"what a thing is." More perfect, because the conjunction of the
sensible to the sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act:
wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some
part of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward
to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the table and
in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement:
hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once. More firm;
because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass
away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.
On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more
vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more
known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible
pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are
accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur
in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the
superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are
sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various
griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding
griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed
more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we
shall state farther on ([1266]Q[35], A[5]).
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is
because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again,
because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and
sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures,
which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to
seek those of the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily
pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive
faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered
and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which
is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and
moderate.
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Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by
the other senses?
Objection 1: It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater
than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest
pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such
is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the words of Tob.
5:12: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see
not the light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure afforded by the sight
is the greatest of sensible pleasures.
Objection 2: Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as
the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight is
loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to
be afforded by sight.
Objection 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake
of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such
friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by
sight.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the
greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.
I answer that, As stated above ([1267]Q[25], A[2], ad 1;[1268] Q[27],
A[4], ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now,
as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two reasons: for
the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore
the senses afford pleasure in both these ways. But because it is proper
to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that
the former pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which arise from
knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved
for their usefulness, are common to all animals.
If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of
knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than
any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible
pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure
is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is
gauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal's nature.
Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this
usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are
vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like.
Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as being
more closely related to the end. For this reason, too, other animals
which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness,
derive no pleasure from the other senses except as subordinated to the
sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the
smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel
pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii, 10).
Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of
usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in respect
of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that
the pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than the
pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of
sensible pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that which
is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the touch
that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union,
and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider the pleasures of
sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures
of sight are greater, forasmuch as intellectual pleasures are greater
than sensible.
Reply to Objection 1: Joy, as stated above [1269](A[3]), denotes
pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But
natural pleasure belongs principally to the touch.
Reply to Objection 2: The sight is loved most, "on account of
knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is
stated in the same passage (Metaph. i, 1).
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the
sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by
the touch, is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake
of the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a
movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the
lovable object receives an impression of its image, which entices him
to love it and to seek its delight.
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Whether any pleasure is not natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For
pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But
the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural
place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal appetite, which
is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no
pleasure is non-natural.
Objection 2: Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever
is violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which is
unnatural can give pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, the fact of being established in one's own
nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the
Philosopher's definition quoted above [1270](A[1]). But it is natural
to every thing to be established in its nature; because natural
movement tends to a natural end. Therefore every pleasure is natural.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some
things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease."
I answer that, We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord
with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken
in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal
part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has his own specific
nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to
man, which are derived from things pertaining to man in respect of his
reason: for instance, it is natural to man to take pleasure in
contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature
in man may be taken as contrasted with reason, and as denoting that
which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man
which does not obey reason. And in this sense, that which pertains to
the preservation of the body, either as regards the individual, as
food, drink, sleep, and the like, or as regards the species, as sexual
intercourse, are said to afford man natural pleasure. Under each kind
of pleasures, we find some that are "not natural" speaking absolutely,
and yet "connatural" in some respect. For it happens in an individual
that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, so
that something which is contrary to the specific nature, becomes
accidentally natural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot
water to give heat. Consequently it happens that something which is not
natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the
preservation of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on
account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this
corruption may be either on the part of the body---from some ailment;
thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem bitter, and vice
versa---or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating
earth and coals and the like; or on the part of the soul; thus from
custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural
intercourse of man and beast, or other such things, which are not in
accord with human nature.
This suffices for the answers to the objections.
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Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to
another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and
contrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the good.
Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but "good is contrary to
evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one
pleasure is not contrary to another.
Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved
in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore
pleasure is not contrary to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is
only on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure.
But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of
form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is no contrariety
between one pleasure and another.
On the contrary, Things of the same genus that impede one another are
contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some
pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some
pleasures are contrary to one another.
I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to
repose in natural bodies, as stated above ([1271]Q[23], A[4]). Now one
repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary
termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low
place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul
that one pleasure is contrary to another.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because
one vice may be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be
contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one
good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the
former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to water.
And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this is
impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that
virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one
thing---i.e. the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened
to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable
and connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose;
because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as the
place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now
natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body, and
to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, 6. Wherefore
pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since they
are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a
formal difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different.
Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in
acts and passions, as stated above ([1272]Q[23], AA[1],4;[1273] Q[30],
A[2]).
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OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?
(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?
(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
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Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first
cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11),
"pleasure consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is
requisite for pleasure, as stated above ([1274]Q[31], A[1]). But the
objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves.
Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained:
since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always an
operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore
operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work:
and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation is
not the proper cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that
"pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation."
I answer that, As stated above ([1275]Q[31], A[1]), two things are
requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good,
and knowledge of this attainment. Now each of these consists in a kind
of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the
attainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation. Moreover,
the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every
pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.
Reply to Objection 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable
save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as
when we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or
in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes
pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the
like; which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as
possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take
great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the
natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such like things is
nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is
through some operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure is
traced to some operation as its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect
of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as
possessed or effected: and this implies use or operation.
Reply to Objection 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are
proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is
finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain
measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer
proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome.
And in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to
repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results
from labor.
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Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Because, as stated above ([1276]Q[31], A[1]), the good which is
obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared
with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in
existence. Now that which is being moved towards something has it not
as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, forasmuch
as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in
Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue
in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are
not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of
pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is
the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, are
pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is
not a cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O
Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some
things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this
portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and
reconciled?" From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes
pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore movement seems to
cause pleasure.
I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e. the
one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and a
third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these
three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14
and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned,
change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable: for which
reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at
another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter
but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing good which is
united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an
agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains near the
fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being
consists in a certain measure; and therefore when the continued
presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode
of being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of
the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because man desires to
know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be
apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a thing is pleasant,
so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be
perceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not
have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou
hear the whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all
of which do not exist together, all would please collectively more than
they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively."
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the
natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of
any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its
delight at once---to such a one change will afford no delight. And the
more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being
continual.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet
perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to
have something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has
something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of
pleasure; because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are
unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so
far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes
suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds
our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by
removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude.
Reply to Objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as
it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the
movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom,
but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of
being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the
same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become pleasant.
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Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure.
Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory
is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore memory and hope do
not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries.
But hope causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: "Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding
good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned
as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope"; and
(Ps. 76:4): "I remembered God, and was delighted."
I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in
so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present
to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i.e. according as the thing
known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in reality---i.e.
according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another,
either actually or potentially. And since real conjunction is greater
than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of knowledge;
and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction:
therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises from sensation
which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place
belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein there is pleasurable
conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect
of the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable object. The third
place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction
of apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which,
absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion,
present, i.e. either according to apprehension only; or according to
apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in different
ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it
implies a present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure;
whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes
affliction.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For
everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a
kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner
every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, since
desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a
certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good, that is not
implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in preference
to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is
of that which has already passed away.
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Whether sadness causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For
nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure.
Therefore it does not cause it.
Objection 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures,
when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when
remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love.
But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, as
stated above ([1277]Q[29], A[2]). Therefore sadness does not cause
pleasure.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my bread
day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure.
Therefore tears, which arise from sadness, can give pleasure.
I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing
actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can
cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure,
inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the absence of which
causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The
recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on account of the
deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked upon as
something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been
delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so much reason
has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31
[*Gregory, Moral. iv.] that "oftentimes in joy we call to mind sad
things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without
feeling pain . . . and in proportion are the more filled with joy and
gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril
there was in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the
triumph."
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of
its contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as
stated in Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause
of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of
something pleasant.
Reply to Objection 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not
in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so
far as man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of
pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love:
i.e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating
one and the same thing.
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Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause
of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good when
conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us.
Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us.
Objection 2: Further, the action is the agent's own good. If,
therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the
same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which
is evidently untrue.
Objection 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an
innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon
the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit
existing in us." But the actions of others do not proceed from habits
existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents.
Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to the
agents themselves.
On the contrary, It is written in the second canonical epistle of John
(verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking in
truth."
I answer that, As stated above [1278](A[1]; Q[31], A[1]), two things
are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper
good, and the knowledge of having obtained it. Wherefore the action of
another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact
that we obtain some good through the action of another. And in this
way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us:
since it is pleasant to be benefited by another. Secondly, from the
fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good:
and for this reason men take pleasure in being praised or honored by
others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing
in themselves. And since this appreciation receives greater weight from
the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater pleasure in
being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to
praise, therefore flattery is pleasing to some. And as love is for
something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is
pleasant to be loved and admired by others, inasmuch as a man thus
becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through their giving
pleasure to others. Thirdly, from the fact that another's actions, if
they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by reason of the power of
love, which makes a man to regard his friend as one with himself. And
on account of hatred, which makes one to reckon another's good as being
in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an enemy becomes an object
of pleasure: whence it is written (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth
not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth."
Reply to Objection 1: Another's action may be conjoined to me, either
by its effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second
way; or by affection, as in the third way.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for the third mode, but not
for the first two.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the actions of another do not proceed
from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something
that gives pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of
mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by
love.
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Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of
pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's proper
good, as stated above ([1279]AA[1],5; Q[31], A[1]). But doing good
pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good.
Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that
"illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality." Now it is a
mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of
illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone takes
pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x,
4, it seems that doing good to others is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes.
But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such as
overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in
punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore doing
good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most
pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers."
I answer that, Doing good to another may give pleasure in three ways.
First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred on
another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by
love, we look upon their good as being our own, we take pleasure in the
good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good.
Secondly, in consideration of the end; as when a man, from doing good
to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either from God or from
man: for hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the
principle: and thus, doing good to another, can give pleasure in
respect of a threefold principle. One is the faculty of doing good: and
in this regard, doing good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it
arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof
he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their
children, and in their own works, as being things on which they bestow
a share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual
inclination to do good, by reason of which doing good becomes
connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in
giving to others. The third principle is the motive: for instance when
a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for
whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is the
principal cause of pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's
good. But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause
of sadness; for instance when it is excessive.
Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is
unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.
Reply to Objection 3: To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give
pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's
own good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is
naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man to
appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which
there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility of winning it,
afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, in
so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can
give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine himself to be
wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove
and to scold. Secondly, in so far as by scolding and reproving, one
does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as stated above. It
is pleasant to an angry man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself
to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous
hurt: for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted
thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying
back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing good to another may be
of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to another is not pleasant,
except in so far as it seems to affect one's own good.
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Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure.
Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. But
"it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," as stated in
Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause
of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But
those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather
than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, those who are satiated with certain delights,
derive not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated with
food. Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated
([1280]Q[27], A[3]): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore
likeness is a cause of pleasure.
I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is like
us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes love, as
stated above ([1281]Q[27], A[3]). And if that which is like us does not
hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for
instance one man in respect of another, one youth in relation to
another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it
causes disgust or sadness, not as being like and one with us, but as
hurtful to that which is yet more one with us.
Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own
good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, by a kind of
excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is conditioned
by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous good or any bodily
pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary to one's
own good: thus a potter dislikes other potters, not because they are
potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence or profits,
which he seeks as his own good.
Reply to Objection 1: Since ruler and subject are in communion with one
another, there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness is
conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding
pertain to the excellence of a man's own good: because they belong to
men who are wise and better than others; the result being that they
give man an idea of his own excellence. Another reason is that by
ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is pleasant.
Reply to Objection 2: That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man,
though it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is
sorrowful: because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the
sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so far as
it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures,
which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more sought than
intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall
state later on ([1282]Q[35], A[5]). And this explains why all animals
naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense and
movement. For this reason also young people are most inclined to seek
pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are subject,
while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong
desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: because his "body
is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed
measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and
consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary
to the proper good of man.
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Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of
something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is
a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it
were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of
Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than
to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7): since
in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the
former not; while pleasure arises from an operation which is
unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders
rather than causes pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed
to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant.
But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in
Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the
cause of pleasure.
I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above
([1283]Q[23], A[4]): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing
loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very
increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as
it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it
was stated above (A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a
cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge; a
desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause
either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of
understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as
it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have.
For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance things
that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which
are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul
rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one
thing with another is the proper and connatural act of the reason, as
the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more
delightful to be delivered from great danger, because it is something
wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11.
Reply to Objection 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies
ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the
cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that
the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to another
reading:---that he is other than he thought himself to be.]
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good,
and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is
more perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the
unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing
than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the
second, it happens that research is sometimes more pleasing
accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for
greater desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This
is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things
for the first time.
Reply to Objection 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do,
inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that
are of rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge,
from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in so far as
they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the mind
is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are new," as
stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation causes more perfect
pleasure.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?
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Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the Apostle
(2 Cor. 6:11): "Our heart is enlarged." Wherefore it is written (Ps.
118:96) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is
exceeding broad." But pleasure is a distinct passion from love.
Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive
more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not yet
possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to
pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But
contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that
which we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in
regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does not pertain
to pleasure.
On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written (Is. 60:5):
"Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged."
Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" as being derived
from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above ([1284]Q[31], A[3], ad
3).
I answer that, Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude:
hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save
metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards
breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things
requisite for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive
power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable good.
As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a
certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in
this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or expanded by
pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the
appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and rests
therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus
man's affection is expanded by pleasure, as though it surrendered
itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one
and the same thing from being attributed to different things according
to different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by
reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection of the
lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own
interests, but also for what concerns others. On the other hand
expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more ample
in itself so as to become more capacious.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire includes a certain expansion arising from
the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at
the presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders
itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure in it,
than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end
of desire.
Reply to Objection 3: He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast,
by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that
he may enjoy it perfectly.
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Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for
itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But
pleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as
stated above ([1285]Q[23], A[4];[1286] Q[25], A[2]). Therefore the
movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure
does not cause desire.
Objection 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure
is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since
desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure
regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause
desire for itself.
Objection 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But
pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this
water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in
Joan.), water denotes pleasures of the body.
I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as
existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst,
or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a
craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, as excluding
distaste.
Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause
thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; provided we take
thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed:
because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of something
actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is
not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of the thing
possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing
possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a
simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it
successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to
possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first part of
a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says
(Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily pleasures cause thirst
for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of
this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in pleasures of the
table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses
a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly,
but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this life, a
faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight
sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; in which sense we may
understand the words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet
thirst."
On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere
intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all
others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves.
Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their causing
an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even
when they are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the
table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in
bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another
kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed the natural
mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection
is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: except,
perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is
accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers, which tire from
protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those
words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet thirst": for,
even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is
written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they "desire to look at Him."
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as
existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to
cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that
disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is
past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that
pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the
memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.
Reply to Objection 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes
complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not
possessed, ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending
to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed
in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently
it may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in
another, as stated above.
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Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of
reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and
rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; and it is
written (Wis. 8:16): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself
with her," i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it
helps rather than hinders the use of reason.
Objection 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject though
they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in the
appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive
power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
Objection 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be
moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power moves
pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of
pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure
destroys the estimate of prudence."
I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures
increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources
are impediments to activity." Accordingly there is a certain pleasure
that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in
contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the
act of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive in doing
that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.
On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three
ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as we have just
observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the
attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in
respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and
thus if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the
use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else
it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason.
Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are
contrary to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says
that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the
speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance
that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right
angles." In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates.
Thirdly, by fettering the reason: in so far as bodily pleasure is
followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the
other passions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently
affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such
bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the
case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered.
Reply to Objection 1: Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the
appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary
to reason; but on the part of the body it always implies alteration.
And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The powers of the appetite and of apprehension
are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently
when the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered
from attending to a contrary act of the other part.
Reply to Objection 3: The use of reason requires the due use of the
imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised
through a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the
use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the
other sensitive powers.
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Whether pleasure perfects operation?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation.
For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure
hinders the use of reason, as stated above [1287](A[3]). Therefore
pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation.
Objection 2: Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But
pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its
essence or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.
Objection 3: Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so either
as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because operation is
not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated
above ([1288]Q[4], A[2]): nor as agent, because rather is it the
operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does not perfect operation,
as a habit does." Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure
perfects operation."
I answer that, Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an
end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a
thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and
completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher
says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end
added to it": that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is
operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the
repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as
agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that
"pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy,
but as health does": but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent,
through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it,
and carries it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in
Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate activities, and
hinder those that are not appropriate."
Reply to Objection 1: It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of
reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act of
reason, but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act is
intensified by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises from the
act of reason, strengthens the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be causes
of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And
in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while
pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated above.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.
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OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every pleasure is evil?
(2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?
(3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral
good and evil?
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Whether every pleasure is evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which
destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil in
itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use
of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore
"in sexual pleasures," which are the greatest of all, "it is impossible
to understand anything," as stated in Ethic. vii, 11. Moreover, Jerome
says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at
the time of conjugal intercourse, the presence of the Holy Ghost is not
vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty."
Therefore pleasure is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure
is evil.
Objection 2: Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man
lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be
avoided; because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 "the virtuous man is a kind
of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:15): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But children and dumb
animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas the man who
is master of himself does not. Therefore pleasures are evil in
themselves and should be avoided.
Objection 3: Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult
and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure.
Therefore pleasure is not something good.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord."
Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not
every pleasure is evil.
I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have maintained that
all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took
account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest;
since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did not
discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between
intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that all bodily
pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone to
immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from
pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. Because, since
none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who
teach that all pleasures are evil, are found in the act of taking
pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the
example of their works instead of listening to the doctrine of their
words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of
great weight, example moves more than words.
We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are
evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved
good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold
reason for this assertion. The first is in respect of the good in which
a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order
depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, as stated above
([1289]Q[18], A[5]): just as in the order of nature, a thing is said to
be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees.
Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a certain natural
repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature, for
instance, when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural
repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its nature,
as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a
good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which
is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite
rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of God.
The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of
which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to actions
are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in
point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good,
and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions
good, and those of evil actions evil.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[33], A[3]), it is not the
pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or
destroy prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of
the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above
(Q[33], A[3]), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in
something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally bad; or
by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the
pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on
account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the
pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason
is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for
reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times.
We must add, however, that although this fettering of the reason
through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, since
it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of
moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as
stated in the [1290]FP, Q[98], A[2] the case was different in the state
of innocence.
Reply to Objection 2: The temperate man does not shun all pleasures,
but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that
children and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all
pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural appetite,
which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.
Reply to Objection 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but
with the making of external things, as we shall state further on
([1291]Q[57], A[3]). But actions and passions, which are within us, are
more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there
is an art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art
of making arguments," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12.
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Whether every pleasure is good?
Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as
stated in the [1292]FP, Q[5], A[6] there are three kinds of good: the
virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is
good; and in like manner everything useful is good. Therefore also
every pleasure is good.
Objection 2: Further, that which is not sought for the sake of
something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But
pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems
absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is
good in itself. Now that which is predicated to a thing considered in
itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure is
good.
Objection 3: Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of
itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in Ethic. i,
1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb
animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently all
pleasure is good.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 2:14): "Who are glad when they
have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things."
I answer that, While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures
are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and that
consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred
through not discriminating between that which is good simply, and that
which is good in respect of a particular individual. That which is good
simply, is good in itself. Now that which is not good in itself, may be
good in respect of some individual in two ways. In one way, because it
is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which
disposition, however, is not natural: thus it is sometimes good for a
leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply
to the human temperament. In another way, through something unsuitable
being esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the
appetite in some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good
simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But if a
man's appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect
of that particular man, then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply,
but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain
respect, or an apparent good.
Reply to Objection 1: The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance
with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without
being good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite,
which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason.
Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order
which depends on the order of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why pleasure is not sought for the
sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end
may be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so
far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with
regard to pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: All things seek pleasure in the same way as they
seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But,
just as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself
and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good.
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Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good.
Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot
be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the
fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being established in its
own nature, as stated above ([1293]Q[31], A[1]). Therefore no pleasure
is the greatest good.
Objection 2: Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made
better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since
pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue.
Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.
Objection 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is universally
good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself is
prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure
is not universally good, as stated above [1294](A[2]). Therefore
pleasure is not the greatest good.
On the contrary, Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of
man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written
(Ps. 15:11): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy
right hand are delights even to the end."
I answer that, Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that
all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that
all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil;
yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good. But,
judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because,
from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists in a certain
movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating and the
like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and
movement: and from this, since "becoming" and movement are the acts of
something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature
of ultimate perfection. But this is seen to be evidently false as
regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in
the "becoming" of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders,
as stated above ([1295]Q[32], A[8], ad 2); but also in the act of
contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired.
Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the
supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, and
unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good;
whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things. Now the
greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated
above ([1296]Q[1], A[8];[1297] Q[2], A[7]) is twofold; namely, the
thing itself, and the use of that thing; thus the miser's end is either
money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be
said to be either God Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment
of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this
sense a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among
human goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for
some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above.
Accordingly nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good,
although every pleasure is not such.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of the greatest good
simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no
addition can make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is
universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of
another good. Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something
extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as
stated in Ethic. i, 8.
Reply to Objection 3: That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to
the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect
repose in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every
pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science
is supremely good, but not every science is.
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Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or
evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of
moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is the
measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first
thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire.
Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.
Objection 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that
movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all
movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform:
since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not
the measure and rule of morals.
Objection 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more
certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of
operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because
"those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those
are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5.
Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and
malice.
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 "The searcher of
hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the
pleasure which each one aims at achieving." And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal,
"end [*St. Thomas took "finis" as being the nominative, whereas it is
the genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the
political philosopher), "is the architect of the end."], in regard to
which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good."
I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as
stated above ([1298]Q[20], A[1]); and it is chiefly from the end that
we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be
that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every
appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be
good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since
that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of
virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule
of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to
the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of
the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which
the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Reply to Objection 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of
generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which
serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the
rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their
being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect
pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will
rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as
stated above ([1299]Q[33], A[4]); an operation cannot be perfectly
good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a
thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the
pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.
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OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must
consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its effects;
(4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?
(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation?
(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?
(8) Of the species of sorrow.
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Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul.
Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the
body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a
sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by
making evil use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain is
not a passion of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but
rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx)
that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful
body." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal
appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather
to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14):
"Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in being
punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not a passion of the
soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the
passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild
desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears."
[Translation: Conington.]
I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely,
conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also two
things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil
(which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and
perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have
not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is
conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that
something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the
pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the
appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the
appetite.
Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to
apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: since
the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an
apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension
of another, as stated in the [1300]FP, Q[103], AA[1],3. Since then
pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same
subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the intellective
or sensitive appetite.
Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as
stated above ([1301]Q[22], AA[1],3): and especially those which tend to
some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive
appetite, is most properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily
ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being
a kind of ailment.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain
is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But
the movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel
pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4).
Reply to Objection 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it
were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required
for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of
the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but
because nature desires something as good, the removal of which being
perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite.
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Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering."
But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is
not pain.
Objection 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But
sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is
sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is
quite different from pain.
Objection 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of
touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is
not pain, and extends to more objects.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2): "I have great sorrow
[Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart,"
thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.
I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension,
namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the
interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the
interior apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior
apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior
apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. Consequently
that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is
called joy, as stated above ([1302]Q[31], A[3]): and in like manner
that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called
sorrow. And just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior
apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is
caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed but not
sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of
pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the
word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily
pains, which are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.
Reply to Objection 2: External sense perceives only what is present;
but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and
future. Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future:
whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense,
can only regard something present.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in
so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also
in so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the
other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power,
but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to
the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly
cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for
their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as
referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10.
Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not
speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but
rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as
denoting bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is
contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior and
exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure
extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be taken in a wide
sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above.
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Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For
one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow can be
the cause of pleasure; for it is written (Mat. 5:5): "Blessed are they
that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore they are not
contrary to one another.
Objection 2: Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But
to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess.
iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess.
iv, 5) that "weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it sometimes pleases
us." Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other;
because contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the
matter of pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The penitent
should ever sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow." The Philosopher too
says (Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain
at having been pleased." Therefore pleasure and pain are not contrary
to one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the
volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the
volition of dissent from the things we do not wish." But consent and
dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to
one another.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a
difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a passion
or movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, since the
objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present good and present
evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure
are contrary to one another.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other
accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way,
in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the
presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something
pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a
drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, in so far
as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink
from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these
ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the comfort of the
future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or
for the delay of glory, he merits the consolation of eternity. In like
manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits
in order to obtain it.
Reply to Objection 2: Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so
far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as
it recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's
love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since
love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love,
forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this
reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the stage: in so
far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain
love for those who are there represented.
Reply to Objection 3: The will and the reason reflect on their own
acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are
considered under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be
the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but
accidentally: that is, in so far as either of them is considered under
the aspect of good or evil.
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Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure.
Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color,
so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But
whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one another.
Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.
Objection 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the
evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is
contrary to every sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But
every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic. x,
5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy
for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the same
habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that
rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" (Rom. 12:15). Therefore not
every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
I answer that, As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in
respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently
things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and
vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and injustice.
Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms,
e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things are specified in
relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which
derive their species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in those
things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species
contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their specific
nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or
fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in
the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary to one another
in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or
fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those things that are
specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species
belonging to contrary genera, are not only not contrary to one another,
but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The
reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two
contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white thing,
and to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary
relations to contrary things, implies a certain likeness, e.g. to
recede from something white, and to approach to something black. This
is most evident in the case of contradiction, which is the principle of
opposition: because opposition consists in affirming and denying the
same thing, e.g. "white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness
and likeness in the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the
other, as, if I were to say "black" and "not white."
Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their
objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary to one
another: since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of
"avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial
are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure
in respect of the same object, are specifically contrary to one
another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not
contrary but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one another,
but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of a friend,
and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be
contrary to one another, then pleasure and sorrow are not only
specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness
and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and to sorrow for evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Whiteness and blackness do not take their species
from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow
do: wherefore the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in
Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of
matter. Now it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are
generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the
subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of
pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting
what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And therefore
on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of
sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but
chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say
that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every
pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their
effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature,
while the other results in a kind of discomfort.
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Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:10): "The
sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto
salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act
is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin.
xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Objection 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If
therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other
contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation.
Objection 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object
of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of
certain things." Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Objection 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a
cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the work
of contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy
it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation
there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure.
Objection 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow.
But, as it is written (Eccles. 12:12) "much study is an affliction of
the flesh." Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its
pleasure.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her," i.e. wisdom's,
"conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but
joy and gladness." Now the conversation and company of wisdom are found
in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure
of contemplation.
I answer that, The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two
ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the
object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but
in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something
harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and
pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation be taken in
this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that
contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in
the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow is contrary to that
pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the
same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be understood as
being the case properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of
itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat
is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is no contrary to the
object of contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the
mind, are not contrary, but one is the means of knowing the other.
Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as
bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain
annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in drinking through being
troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the
pleasure of drinking ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation
is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that
contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming"
but a perfect operation, as stated above ([1303]Q[31], A[1]).
Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of
contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ,
secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of
an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as
regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a
bodily organ; either from the sensible object disagreeing with the
normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and
the smell of something foul; or from the sensible object, though
agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it
exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above
([1304]Q[33], A[2]), the result being that an apprehension which at
first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur
directly in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no
corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above
that intellectual contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor
"tediousness." Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes
use of the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is
incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly mingled
with contemplation.
Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally
mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because
pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony
with it, as is evident from what has been said above [1305](A[4]):
while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the
same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is
evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of
contemplation; nor is any sorrow connected with it save accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1: The "sorrow which is according to God," is not
caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something
which the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as
contrary to the love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are
not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are
contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed
rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one and
the same science considers contraries.
Reply to Objection 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it
is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of
the intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as
the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a
more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which
the appetite is inordinately attached.
Reply to Objection 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is
not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with
it, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation
accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.
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Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than
pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There
is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now
that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is
natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is
sought.
Objection 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and
intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," as
the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due
to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for
pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the
suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more
eagerly than pleasure is sought.
Objection 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists
according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more
virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good"
(Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of shunning
sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the
movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised." Therefore the
movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking
pleasure.
On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good
which is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of
evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the shunning
of sorrow.
I answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the
shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is
a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable
evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable without any
repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so
unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore pleasure can be
entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore desire
for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another
reason is because the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought
for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is
to be shunned as being a privation of good: and that which is by reason
of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else.
Moreover we find a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every
natural movement is more intense in the end, when a thing approaches
the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it
leaves the term that is unsuitable to its nature: as though nature were
more eager in tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what
is unsuitable. Therefore the inclination of the appetitive power is, of
itself, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.
But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than
he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of
the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is
felt more keenly, when we lack that which we love." Now from the lack
of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of
some loved good, or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure
suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in possession of it.
Since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more
the shunned, according as love is the more keenly felt on account of
that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of
sorrow or pain, which cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved
than the good in which we take pleasure. For we love the natural
well-being of the body more than the pleasure of eating: and
consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from
fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, which are
contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on the part of the
effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but
all.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned
more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And
this is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most
savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of
pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the same with movement from within and
movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is
suitable more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we
remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from without
is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing strives in
its own way to resist anything contrary to it, as aiming at its own
preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and slackens
towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive faculty is from
within: since it tends from the soul to the object. Consequently
pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned.
But the movement of the sensitive faculty is from without, as it were
from the object of the soul. Consequently the more contrary a thing is
the more it is felt. And then too, accidentally, in so far as the
senses are requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than
pleasure is sought.
Reply to Objection 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance
with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever,
but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the
dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than
pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which
latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus life is loved more
than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised for
refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning the
pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
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Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior
sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant
to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow
is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, therefore, life is
loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has
been said above [1306](A[6]), outward pain is greater than interior
sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does.
But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary;
whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a
contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain
has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain than
of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned
more than interior sorrow.
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): "The sadness of the
heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman
is all evil." Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses
all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart
surpasses every outward wound.
I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ
in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive
power, as stated above [1307](A[1]). But they differ in respect of
those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in
respect of the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect
of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil
repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward pain is a conjoined
evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an
apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from
an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason.
If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward
pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite to which both
these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly.
Because inward pain arises from something being repugnant to the
appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something being
repugnant to the appetite, through being repugnant to the body. Now,
that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of
another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpasses
outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because
the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than
the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently inward pain is,
simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is
that one willingly undergoes outward pain in order to avoid inward
pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior
appetite, it becomes in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of
inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward
pain, and then the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only
greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever is
repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and
whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended by imagination and
reason, but not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is
said expressively: "Sadness of the heart is every wound," because even
the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of
the heart.
Reply to Objection 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are
destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain
must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain;
but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain is
compared to the appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended
likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the
apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness
represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by
means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and
abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being
caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an
inward apprehension.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by
outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a
corruptive conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the
sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more
material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more
material than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above
([1308]Q[22], A[3];[1309] Q[31], A[5] ), the body undergoes a greater
change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and, in like
manner, from outward than from inward pain.
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Whether there are only four species of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14)
division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor,
distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] calls
"anxiety,"---"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary to pleasure.
But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is
incorrect to assign different species of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are
"indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
9,11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this
division is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that
are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one
another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.]
"torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that
weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for
another's wrongs." But it is possible for one to sorrow for another's
wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed down
inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is
correct.
On the contrary, stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius] and of Damascene.
I answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species that it is
something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in
two ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and
virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal." Such
an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing may be added to a
genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that
genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to "animal."
Such an addition does not make true species of the genus, according to
the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species. But sometimes
a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus, through having
something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that
genus is applicable: thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a
species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied
to a foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and
perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles
of mathematics are applied to natural matter.
In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are
reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something foreign
to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the
object, or of the effect. For the proper object of sorrow is "one's own
evil." Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either
through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus
we have "pity" which is sorrow for another's evil, considered, however,
as one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is
neither evil nor one's own, but another's good, considered, however, as
one's own evil: and thus we have "envy." The proper effect of sorrow
consists in a certain "flight of the appetite." Wherefore the foreign
element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first
part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs
on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is also
called "perplexity." If, however, the mind be weighed down so much,
that even the limbs become motionless, which belongs to "torpor," then
we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither
flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason why torpor
especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the
external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward
thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is
stated in Polit. i, 1.
Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one
meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow
is; for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the
proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species.
Jealousy and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain
later ([1310]SS, Q[36], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: This division is not according to opposite
species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the
notion of sorrow is applied, as stated above.
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OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the
presence of an evil?
(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
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Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good
rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De viii QQ.
Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods.
Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some
good.
Objection 2: Further, it was said above ([1311]Q[35], A[4]) that the
sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that
pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above
([1312]Q[23], A[4];[1313] Q[31], A[1];[1314] Q[35], A[3]). Therefore
sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9),
love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. But
the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the
loss of good rather than for an evil that is present.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of
sorrow."
I answer that, If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they
are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. For,
as stated in the [1315]FP, Q[14], A[10] and [1316]FP, Q[48], A[3], evil
is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than
the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow for
the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of
evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an
apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect of a
being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason." And in this way
evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary." Accordingly, so
far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference
which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which
is lost.
Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place
in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in natural things; the
truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements.
For if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach and
withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to
nature; while withdrawal is of itself directed to something contrary to
nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place,
and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause
of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity itself inclines
towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place,
since withdrawal from the latter is the reason for its downward
tendency.
Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind
of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or
approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its
proper object, so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the other
hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good
rather than evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the cause
of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or
pain, than the good which is lost.
Reply to Objection 1: The loss itself of good is apprehended as an
evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this
sense Augustine says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same
object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a
particular thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same
thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation
of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in
respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same thing under
a contrary aspect.
Reply to Objection 3: When many movements arise from one cause, it does
not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards
chiefly, but only the first of them. And each of the others regards
chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature.
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Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or
sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above
[1317](A[1]): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards
good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement
towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Objection 2: Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire is
something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Objection 3: Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause
of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of
things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their
way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But
ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of sorrow.
I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as
stated above [1318](A[1]), the appetitive movement is likened to the
natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause;
one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of
movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's
downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that
movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity.
Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is
the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above
[1319](A[1]) that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the
other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, is the
inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of
all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil.
Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is
the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good:
while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination of
the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or
desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest
pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[6]); hence it is that Augustine
often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was
also stated (Q[30], A[2], ad 2): and in this sense he says that desire
is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in
its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a
movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that
which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of
sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we
sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But
it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the
loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for
the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of the appetite to the possession
of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as
stated above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard
good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that regard
evil.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is desired, though really future, is,
nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may
say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance
is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope
of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through
the presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow.
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Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of
sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion,"
which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division
[*Aristotle wrote {endeian}, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin version,
read 'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'?], the cause of
sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and pleasures connected with
food." But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. Therefore the
craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion
pertains to unity, and division is the cause of multitude.
Objection 2: Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If
therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation
would be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation
of whatever is superfluous.
Objection 3: Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of
good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, since
it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore
the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving
for separation, as causing sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the
pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire
unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but
a feeling of impatience of division or corruption?"
I answer that, Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned
as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be
accounted as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in
a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the
elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists
held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything
naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and therefore,
just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the
love or craving for unity.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness,
but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence
neither does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as
some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from
the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a
man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating;
because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than
conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the
craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the
perfection of nature consists.
Reply to Objection 2: Separation can be pleasant, either because it
removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has
some union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object.
Reply to Objection 3: Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is
desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore
the desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow,
whereas the craving for unity is.
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Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned
a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent is not
present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater
power is not a cause of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt
can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power
should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the
causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something
external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul
is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the
body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body."
I answer that, As stated above [1320](A[1]), a present evil, is cause
of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause
of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or
sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the
appetite to be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to
a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action of
something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater power as
being the cause of sorrow.
But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to
transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there will
be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its
action on a heavy body, deprives it of its downward tendency, its
consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it.
Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from
the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain
or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the
contrary inclination of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine says
(De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a
stronger power": for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting,
the result would be not sorrow but pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not
potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the
corruptive evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply
greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able
to inflict some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm
at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: External agents can be the causes of appetitive
movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it
is thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
(2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
(4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other
passions of the soul?
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Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power
to learn. For it is written (Is. 26:9): "When Thou shalt do Thy
judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn
justice": and further on (verse 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring
Thy instruction was with them." But the judgments of God and
tribulation cause sorrow in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far
from destroying, increases the power of learning.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Is. 28:9): "Whom shall He teach
knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that
are weaned from the milk, that are drawn away from the breasts," i.e.
from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure;
since sorrow hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14: and
(Ecclus. 11:29) it is stated that "the affliction of an hour maketh one
forget great delights." Therefore pain, instead of taking away,
increases the faculty of learning.
Objection 3: Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated
above ([1321]Q[35], A[7]). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much
more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during
those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to
turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and
as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required
undivided attention."
I answer that, Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one
essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the
soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is
withdrawn from the action of another power: because the soul, being
one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws
upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion
thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is incompatible
therewith.
Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's
attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing to tend
wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in
natural things. It is likewise evident that in order to learn anything
new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly
stated in Prov. 2:4,5: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall
dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou understand learning"
[Vulg: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if the pain be acute, man
is prevented at the time from learning anything: indeed it can be so
acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention
even to that which he knew already. However a difference is to be
observed according to the difference of love that a man has for
learning or for considering: because the greater his love, the more
will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from
turning entirely to the pain.
Reply to Objection 1: Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to
wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard
to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus,
"in the tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt to be taught by
God.
Reply to Objection 2: Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw
upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of
consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the
moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything."
Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure
does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural
body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot water
is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes
harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce
accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an
excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be
intense, it prevents it altogether.
Reply to Objection 3: External pain arises from hurt done to the body,
so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does:
and yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain,
which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater
hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward
sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very intense, it attracts
the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for the first
time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary
on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel).
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Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden
the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:11): "Behold this self-same
thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great
carefulness it worketh in you: yea, defence, yea indignation," etc. Now
carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is
contrary to being depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of
sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of
pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression but
contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect
of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted
therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle (2 Cor.
2:7): "Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow."
But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by
something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the
consumer. Therefore depression should not be reckoned an effect of
sorrow.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] and
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow."
I answer that, The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named
metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason that
the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the
natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed to love, expansion
to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be
depressed, through being hindered in his own movement by some weight.
Now it is evident from what has been said above ([1322]Q[23],
A[4];[1323] Q[25], A[4];[1324] Q[36], A[1]) that sorrow is caused by a
present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to
the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it
from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is
the cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of
avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for the
present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the
movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand, the
strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then
even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely
hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that.
Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so that
a man becomes completely stupefied.
Reply to Objection 1: That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow
which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the
forgiveness of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: As far as the movement of the appetite is
concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: because the
soul, through being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to
outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were.
Reply to Objection 3: Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of
the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and
thus also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain
things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken literally,
appear to exclude one another.
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Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity.
Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage
of the Apostle quoted above (A[2], OBJ[1]). But carefulness conduces to
good work: wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study
to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed."
Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance to work, but helps one to work
well.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in
Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore sorrow
does too.
Objection 3: Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are
others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing is
improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are
not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure
perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it"
(Ethic. x, 5).
I answer that, As stated above [1325](A[2]), sorrow at times does not
depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal
or external; but certain movements are sometimes caused by sorrow
itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow.
First, as being the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any
action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that
which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason for this is
that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we
do something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be weakened
in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to
its principle and cause: and such action must needs be improved by
sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the
more one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a hope of
shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result from that
sorrow.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the
soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body.
For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things
which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in
the body: as is evident with regard to the images of colors, which
images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow
is not harmful to the body.
Objection 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due
to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily
transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated
above ([1326]Q[22], AA[1],3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to
the body than the other passions of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger
and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great harm,
since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair
seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow.
Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other
passions of the soul.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh age
flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (Prov.
25:20): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the
sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and (Ecclus. 38:19): "Of sadness
cometh death."
I answer that, Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to
the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's
life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in
respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other
passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement,
which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this
movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed
measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure,
it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of
quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this
movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to life in
respect of its species.
Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily
transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with
and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal
element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form.
Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in
pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as
regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its
measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these
passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be
excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions
which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are
repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but
also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such
are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by
reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future
evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the soul naturally moves the body, the
spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily
transmutation. Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because
they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not
naturally moved by the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which
is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow
implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of
reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments
deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life.
Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by
reason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the
absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives
man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow
become a prey to melancholy or madness.
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OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head
there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
(2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?
(3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
(4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?
(5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?
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Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain
or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far as it
is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic. ii, 3).
But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated above
([1327]Q[35], A[4] ). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every
sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But
some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4, "the
wicked man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore not every
pleasure assuages sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from
his country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, now
dead: "for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not
wont to see him." Hence we may gather that those things which united us
to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn
their death or absence. But nothing united us more than the pleasures
we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures become burdensome
to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages every
sorrow.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow is
driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other,
provided it be intense."
I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above
([1328]Q[23], A[4] ), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a
suitable good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the
appetite. Consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to
sorrow, what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to a
non-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain
weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore just as all
repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from
any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings relief by assuaging any
kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: Although not every pleasure is specifically
contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above
([1329]Q[35], A[4]). And consequently, on the part of the disposition
of the subject, any sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure.
Reply to Objection 2: The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of
sorrow while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so
far as wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure.
This sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures.
Reply to Objection 3: When there are two causes inclining to contrary
movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and
more persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful
by those things in which he took pleasure in common with a deceased or
absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary movements. For
the thought of the friend's death or absence, inclines him to sorrow:
whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure. Consequently each is
modified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the present
moves more strongly than the memory of the past, and since love of self
is more persistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end,
the pleasure drives out the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on
(Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that his "sorrow gave way to his former
pleasures."
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Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?
Objection 1: It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because no
effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect of
sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow,
so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy.
Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present
to the imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases
sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it
seems that tears do not assuage sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned
the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some
little refreshment."
I answer that, Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this for
two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep
it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be
allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on
outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why men,
burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their sorrow, by tears or
groans or even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, because an
action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is
always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are actions befitting a
man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to
him. Since then, as stated above [1330](A[1]), every pleasure assuages
sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping
and groans.
Reply to Objection 1: This relation of the cause to effect is opposed
to the relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing
man. For every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is
pleasant to it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him that
sorrows. Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows
in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For this reason sorrow is
assuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid contrariety.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of effect to cause is like the
relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it:
because in each case the one agrees with the other. Now every like
thing increases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter and
the other effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case,
accidentally, they lessen it.
Reply to Objection 3: The image of that which saddens us, considered in
itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very
fact that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting
according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of pleasure.
For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed
that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry for it, as having done
something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 27).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does
not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects. Now
as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice together, each
one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and inflamed one by
the other." Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it
seems that their sorrow is greater.
Objection 2: Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine
declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the
sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of
a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further cause
of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to
increase.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend,
as though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other self"
(Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the
sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he
sympathizes.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who
are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.
I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of
a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates a
twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has
a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we strive to unburden
ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow,
it seems as though others were bearing the burden with him, striving,
as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load of sorrow becomes
lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily
burdens. The second and better reason is because when a man's friends
condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords
him pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[5]). Consequently, since every
pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated above [1331](A[1]), it follows that
sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.
Reply to Objection 1: In either case there is a proof of friendship,
viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the
sorrowful. Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of
its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of
sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise
rather to pleasure.
And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.
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Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not
assuage sorrow. For it is written (Eccles. 1:18): "He that addeth
knowledge addeth also sorrow" [Vulg.: 'labor']. But knowledge pertains
to the contemplation of truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth
does not assuage sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the
speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a
principle of movement"; as stated in De Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since
joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the
contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to
the part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect.
Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that
if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should
not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me."
I answer that, As stated above (Q[3], A[5]), the greatest of all
pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure
assuages pain as stated above [1332](A[1]): hence the contemplation of
truth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one
is a lover of wisdom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations men
rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness,
according to James 1:2: "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall
fall into divers temptations": and, what is more, even in the midst of
bodily tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr Tiburtius, when he
was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I walk on
roses, in the name of Jesus Christ." [*Cf. Dominican Breviary, August
11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.]
Reply to Objection 1: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either
on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for
truth; or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that
are contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the things known,
knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth,
it causes pleasure.
Reply to Objection 2: The speculative intellect does not move the mind
on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation
itself, which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him.
Reply to Objection 3: In the powers of the soul there is an overflow
from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of
contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate
even that pain which is in the senses.
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Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?
Objection 1: It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow.
For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body.
Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from
contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with
the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow,
as stated above [1333](A[4]). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the
like.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the
body, denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies as
these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to
the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore they do not assuage
sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard that
the bath had its name [*Balneum, from the Greek {balaneion}] . . . from
the fact of its driving sadness from the mind." And further on, he
says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not a little
assuaged": and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose [*Cf. Sarum
Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, Hymn for first
Vespers], in which it is said that "Sleep restores the tired limbs to
labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow."
I answer that, As stated above ([1334]Q[37], A[4]), sorrow, by reason
of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body;
and consequently whatever restores the bodily nature to its due state
of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover such
remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal
state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure
consists, as stated above ([1335]Q[31], A[1]). Therefore, since every
pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily
remedies.
Reply to Objection 1: The normal disposition of the body, so far as it
is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages
sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1336]Q[31], A[8]), one pleasure
hinders another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently
it is not unreasonable that sorrow should be assuaged by causes which
hinder one another.
Reply to Objection 3: Every good disposition of the body reacts
somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily
movements, as stated in De Causa Mot. Animal. xi.
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OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: under
which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all sorrow is evil?
(2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?
(3) Whether it can be a useful good?
(4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?
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Whether all sorrow is evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: "All sorrow is evil, from
its very nature." Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and
everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil.
Objection 2: Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is
evil. But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in
Ethic. vii, 11, "though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet
he aims at avoiding sorrow." Therefore sorrow is evil.
Objection 3: Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of
bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow in the
soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual
sorrow is an evil of the soul.
On the contrary, Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil. But
pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain men, it
is written (Prov. 2:14), that "they were glad when they had done evil."
Therefore sorrow for evil is good.
I answer that, A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first
considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil,
because the mere fact of a man's appetite being uneasy about a present
evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of the
appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, on the
supposition of something else: thus shame is said to be good, on the
supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9.
Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or painful,
it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain on account of
this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or pain, this
could only be either because he feels it not, or because he does not
reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils.
Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, supposing an evil to
be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. Wherefore Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the
good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, he
could not be punished by the loss of good." Because, however, in the
science of Morals, we consider things individually---for actions are
concerned about individuals---that which is good on some supposition,
should be considered as good: just as that which is voluntary on some
supposition, is judged to be voluntary, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, and
likewise above ([1337]Q[6], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] is speaking of
sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of
the subject that feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of
view, all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not shun
the perception and rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily
pain: because the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the proof
of the goodness of nature.
This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that
which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he should be
troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of entering into the rest
of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners." Therefore sorrow
is not a virtuous good.
Objection 2: Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and
meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says
(2 Cor. 9:7): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with
sadness, or of necessity." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow
is concerned about those things which happen against our will." But not
to will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a will
opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence whatever is done is
subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine will is a
condition of the rectitude of the will, as stated above ([1338]Q[19],
A[9]), it seems that sorrow is incompatible with rectitude of the will,
and that consequently it is not virtuous.
On the contrary, Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is
virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from Mat. 5:5: "Blessed are
they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow is a
virtuous good.
I answer that, In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good.
For it has been said above [1339](A[1]) that sorrow is a good inasmuch
as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two things, as
regards bodily pain, are a proof of the goodness of nature, to which it
is due that the senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful
thing that causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of the
evil is sometimes due to a right judgment of reason; while the
rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well disposed and
detesting that evil. Now every virtuous good results from these two
things, the rectitude of the reason and the will. Wherefore it is
evident that sorrow may be a virtuous good.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions of the soul should be regulated
according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous
good; but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps
this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right
will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to
a perverse reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such
sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; for
instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully.
Reply to Objection 3: Some things do actually happen, not because God
wills, but because He permits them to happen---such as sins.
Consequently a will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in
another, is not discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen
actually, even by God's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude
of his will, that man should will them in themselves: but only that he
should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated above
([1340]Q[19], A[10]).
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Whether sorrow can be a useful good?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it
is written (Ecclus. 30:25): "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no
profit in it."
Objection 2: Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But
sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow is
to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii, 2).
Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.
Objection 3: Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own
operation," as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders
operation," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful
good.
On the contrary, The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But
according to Eccles. 7:5, "the heart of the wise is where there is
mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore
sorrow is useful.
I answer that, A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present
evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present evil;
and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is
present, cannot be not present. The other movement arises in the
appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil:
and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something which
ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it may be
right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in itself,
on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, sin. Wherefore
sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the
Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:9): "I am glad: not because you were made
sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance." Secondly,
a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but
because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's being attached
to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being thrown headlong
thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of temporal goods. And,
in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according to
Eccles. 7:3: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the
house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of all."
Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful,
since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because the very evil is
in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its
own sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the good.
Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more
earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.
Reply to Objection 1: This passage is to be taken as referring to
excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes
the soul, and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above
([1341]Q[37], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Just as any object of choice becomes less
eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is
still more to be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect,
sorrow is useful.
Reply to Objection 3: Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action:
but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more
earnestly.
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Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because "the
worst is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain
pleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a
certain pain is the greatest evil.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is
his last end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever he
will, and in willing naught amiss," as stated above ([1342]Q[3], A[4],
OBJ[5];[1343] Q[5], A[8], OBJ[3]). Therefore man's greatest good
consists in the fulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something
happening contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv,
6,15). Therefore pain is man's greatest evil.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are
composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body is
the inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the better
part: while the supreme evil is the greatest evil of the inferior part.
But wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst thing in
the body is pain. Therefore man's greatest good is to be wise: while
his greatest evil is to suffer pain."
On the contrary, Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was stated
in the [1344]FP, Q[48], A[6]. But sorrow or pain belongs to the
punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is an
evil of guilt. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): "What is pain
of the soul, except for the soul to be deprived of that which it was
wont to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called
evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin." Therefore sorrow or pain is
not man's greatest evil.
I answer that, It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's
greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is
truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in
reality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil cannot be the
greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not to
reckon as evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it. Again,
sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really good,
cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether
separated from that which is truly good. Hence it is impossible for any
sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in
common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right
order of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is
clear that in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal of which
they become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by
the removal of which the pleasure is better. Consequently, a pleasure
can be man's highest good, in the way above stated ([1345]Q[34], A[3]):
whereas sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil.
Reply to Objection 2: The very fact of the will being opposed to evil
is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest
evil; because it has an admixture of good.
Reply to Objection 3: That which harms the better thing is worse than
that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it
harms," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an
evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the
body. Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give
it as his own, but as taken from another [*Cornelius Celsus].
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OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2)
Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there are eight points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?
(2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty?
(3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?
(4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?
(5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?
(6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
(7) Concerning the order of hope to love;
(8) Whether love conduces to action?
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Whether hope is the same as desire of cupidity?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity.
Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions. But
Augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in
the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore hope is the same as
cupidity or desire.
Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects. But
the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire,
viz. the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.
Objection 3: If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes
the possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever
is accidental to the object does not make a different species of
passion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to a future good,
which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope
does not differ specifically from desire or cupidity.
On the contrary, To different powers belong different species of
passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or
cupidity is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically
from desire or cupidity.
I answer that, The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now,
in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it is
something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good;
in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil. Secondly,
that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and
already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy which regards
a present good. Thirdly, that it must be something arduous and
difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles,
which are in one's power to have at any time: in this respect, hope
differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good
absolutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, while hope
belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this difficult thing
is something possible to obtain: for one does not hope for that which
one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair.
It is therefore evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible
passions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, moreover, hope
presupposes desire: just as all irascible passions presuppose the
passions of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ([1346]Q[25],
A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine mentions desire instead of hope,
because each regards future good; and because the good which is not
arduous is reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend
chiefly to the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of hope is the future good considered,
not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope adds not only possibility to
the object of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong
to another power, viz. the irascible, which regards something
difficult, as stated in the [1347]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Moreover,
possibility and impossibility are not altogether accidental to the
object of the appetitive power: because the appetite is a principle of
movement; and nothing is moved to anything except under the aspect of
being possible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible
to get. Consequently hope differs from despair according to the
difference of possible and impossible.
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Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power.
Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says
(Rom. 8:25): "If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with
patience." But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, which
we exercise by "looking out." Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive
power.
Objection 2: Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence
when a man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope and to
be confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to
belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope does too.
Objection 3: Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power.
But certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the
cognitive power.
On the contrary, Hope regards good, as stated above [1348](A[1]). Now
good, as such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the
appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, but to
the appetitive power.
I answer that, Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the
appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power;
since movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite: whereas
the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the movement
of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known
are in the knower. But since the cognitive power moves the appetite, by
presenting its object to it; there arise in the appetite various
movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object. For
the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of movement in the
appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in like
manner various movements arise from the apprehension of something
present and of something future; of something considered absolutely,
and of something considered as arduous; of something possible, and of
something impossible. And accordingly hope is a movement of the
appetitive power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good,
difficult but possible to obtain; namely, a stretching forth of the
appetite to such a good.
Reply to Objection 1: Since hope regards a possible good, there arises
in man a twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him
in two ways, viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly when a
man hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is not said to wait
for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said
to await that which he hopes to get by another's help as though to
await [exspectare] implied keeping one's eyes on another [ex alio
spectare], in so far as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not
only keeps its eye on the good which man intends to get, but also on
the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; according to Ecclus.
51:10, "I looked for the succor of men." Wherefore the movement of hope
is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding inspection
of the cognitive power.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man desires a thing and reckons that he
can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will
get it; and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the
ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because the
movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that
precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better known; for the
apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only
of the sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a
stone is certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy
which the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives
from the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it.
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Whether hope is in dumb animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals.
Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb
animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and does not extend
to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.
Objection 2: Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of
attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the true and
the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states
(Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals, since they
have no mind.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that
"animals are moved by the things that they see." But hope is of things
unseen: "for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" (Rom. 8:24).
Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.
On the contrary, Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible
faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also.
I answer that, The internal passions of animals can be gathered from
their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb
animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it
makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to catch it: whereas,
if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of
catching it. Because as stated above ([1349]Q[1], A[2];[1350] Q[26],
A[1];[1351] Q[35], A[1]), the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and
likewise the natural appetite of insensible things, result from the
apprehension of an intellect, just as the appetite of the intellectual
nature, which is called the will. But there is a difference, in that
the will is moved by an apprehension of the intellect in the same
subject; whereas the movement of the natural appetite results from the
apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is the Author of nature; as
does also the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, who act from a
certain natural instinct. Consequently, in the actions of irrational
animals and of other natural things, we observe a procedure which is
similar to that which we observe in the actions of art: and in this way
hope and despair are in dumb animals.
Reply to Objection 1: Although dumb animals do not know the future, yet
an animal is moved by its natural instinct to something future, as
though it foresaw the future. Because this instinct is planted in them
by the Divine Intellect that foresees the future.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of hope is not the possible as
differentiating the true, for thus the possible ensues from the
relation of a predicate to a subject. The object of hope is the
possible as compared to a power. For such is the division of the
possible given in Metaph. v, 12, i.e. into the two kinds we have just
mentioned.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the thing which is future does not come
under the object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something
present, an animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something
future.
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Whether despair is contrary to hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not contrary to hope.
Because "to one thing there is one contrary" (Metaph. x, 5). But fear
is contrary to hope. Therefore despair is not contrary to hope.
Objection 2: Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing. But
hope and despair do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards the
good, whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of
obtaining good. Therefore hope is not contrary to despair.
Objection 3: Further, movement is contrary to movement: while repose is
in opposition to movement as a privation thereof. But despair seems to
imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary to
hope, which implies movement of stretching out towards the hoped-for
good.
On the contrary, The very name of despair [desperatio] implies that it
is contrary to hope [spes].
I answer that, As stated above ([1352]Q[23], A[2]), there is a twofold
contrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary
terms: and this contrariety alone is to be found in the concupiscible
passions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is according
to approach and withdrawal with regard to the same term; and is to be
found in the irascible passions, as stated above ([1353]Q[23], A[2]).
Now the object of hope, which is the arduous good, has the character of
a principle of attraction, if it be considered in the light of
something attainable; and thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a
kind of approach. But in so far as it is considered as unobtainable, it
has the character of a principle of repulsion, because, as stated in
Ethic. iii, 3, "when men come to an impossibility they disperse." And
this is how despair stands in regard to this object, wherefore it
implies a movement of withdrawal: and consequently it is contrary to
hope, as withdrawal is to approach.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects,
i.e. good and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the
irascible passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the
concupiscible. But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety of
approach and withdrawal.
Reply to Objection 2: Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes
however it regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good
impossible to obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good.
Reply to Objection 3: Despair implies not only privation of hope, but
also a recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed
impossible to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire;
because we neither hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire
to have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good, which is
the object of desire.
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Whether experience is a cause of hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope.
Because experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue needs
experience and time." But hope is not in the cognitive power, but in
the appetite, as stated above [1354](A[2]). Therefore experience is not
a cause of hope.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "the old
are slow to hope, on account of their experience"; whence it seems to
follow that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not
productive of opposites. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 5) that "to
have something to say about everything, without leaving anything out,
is sometimes a proof of folly." But to attempt everything seems to
point to great hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. Therefore
inexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are
hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many opponents":
which seems to pertain to experience. Therefore experience is a cause
of hope.
I answer that, As stated above [1355](A[1]), the object of hope is a
future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing may
be a cause of hope, either because it makes something possible to a
man: or because it makes him think something possible. In the first way
hope is caused by everything that increases a man's power; e.g. riches,
strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience man
acquires the faculty of doing something easily, and the result of this
is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears to do
that which he is sure of having learned well."
In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think
that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching and persuasion may
be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so
far as it makes him reckon something possible, which before his
experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way,
experience can cause a lack of hope: because just as it makes a man
think possible what he had previously thought impossible; so,
conversely, experience makes a man consider as impossible that which
hitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope in
two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say rather
that it causes hope.
Reply to Objection 1: Experience in matters pertaining to action not
only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of
custom, which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual
virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it shows
something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope.
Reply to Objection 2: The old are wanting in hope because of their
experience, in so far as experience makes them think something
impossible. Hence he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen
them."
Reply to Objection 3: Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope
accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one
to judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a
cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes lack of hope.
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Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
Objection 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of
hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so that it
is compared to an anchor (Heb. 6:19). But young men and drunkards are
wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore
youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1356](A[5]), the cause of hope
is chiefly whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness
are united to weakness. Therefore they are not causes of hope.
Objection 3: Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above
[1357](A[5]). But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause
of hope.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men
are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope."
I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the
Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be
gathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of
hope---namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated above
[1358](A[1]). For youth has much of the future before it, and little of
the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the
future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope. Again,
youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so
that their heart expands: and it is owing to the heart being expanded
that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited
and hopeful. Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had
experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing
possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles
and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing possible; and
consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those
who are in drink---viz. heat and high spirits, on account of wine, and
heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all
foolish and thoughtless persons attempt everything and are full of
hope.
Reply to Objection 1: Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness
in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think
that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for.
In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that
young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in
their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their
shortcomings.
Reply to Objection 3: Not only experience, but also lack of experience,
is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A[5], ad 3).
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Whether hope is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because,
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first of the
soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love
precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause love.
Objection 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by
love, as stated above ([1359]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore hope, too, follows
love, and consequently is not its cause.
Objection 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above
([1360]Q[32], A[3]). But pleasure is only of the good that is loved.
Therefore love precedes hope.
On the contrary, The gloss commenting on Mat. 1:2, "Abraham begot
Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and hope
begets charity." But charity is love. Therefore love is caused by hope.
I answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its
object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is
something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens
sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, not through
ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that
by which something becomes possible to us.
In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused
by love: since we do not hope save for that which we desire and love.
But in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes
possible to us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa. Because by
the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone,
we are moved towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love
him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him,
except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our
love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in
him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.
Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.
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Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to
action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence
which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above
([1361]Q[37], A[3]). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is
written (Prov. 13:12): "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul."
Therefore hope hinders action.
Objection 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above
[1362](A[4]). But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to
action; for it is written (2 Kings 2:26), that "it is dangerous to
drive people to despair." Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely,
by hindering action.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 9:10) that "he that plougheth
should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same applies to
all other actions.
I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it
more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its object,
which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being
difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that it is possible
is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man
is intent on his action. Secondly, on account of its effect. Because
hope, as stated above ([1363]Q[32], A[3]), causes pleasure; which is a
help to action, as stated above ([1364]Q[33], A[4]). Therefore hope is
conducive to action.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security
regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary
to fear rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget
negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty:
whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which
a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon as difficult.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident
that it causes sorrow, as stated above ([1365]Q[32], A[3], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a
certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight,
strive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in
this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous
to the foe.
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OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring.
With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in
itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether fear is a special passion?
(3) Whether there is a natural fear?
(4) Of the species of fear.
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Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by way of
{systole}"---i.e. of contraction---"desirous of vindicating nature."
But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 5. Therefore
fear is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of
an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something
future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is
not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the
sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses.
But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear
is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear
among the other passions of the soul.
I answer that, Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear
chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above
(Q[22] ), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a
passive power---i.e. of a power whose object is compared to it as its
active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way,
both "to feel" and "to understand" are passions. Secondly, more
properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive power; and
more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a
bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a bodily
transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are called
passions, which imply some deterioration. Now it is evident that fear,
since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself
regards good and evil. Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite:
for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation---i.e.
contraction---as Damascene says (Cf. OBJ 1). Again, it implies relation
to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore it
has most properly the character of passion; less, however, than sorrow,
which regards the present evil: because fear regards future evil, which
is not so strong a motive as present evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore,
in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are
principles of external action, they are called virtues. But the
Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the passion of a natural body is due to
the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to
the agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor
really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really
future, is present in the apprehension of the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but from
apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to
hope for a future good, or to fear a future evil.
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Whether fear is a special passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught by
fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by sickness"---i.e.
sorrow---"nor tossed about in transports of empty joys." Wherefore it
seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are removed.
Therefore fear is not a special but a general passion.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit
and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial are in
the intellect." But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as
neither is affirmation, but something common to many. Therefore neither
is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but
a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a special passion.
Objection 3: Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be
chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible:
since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of
sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is "a
power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible
faculty, as stated above ([1366]Q[23], A[4]). Therefore fear is not a
special passion, since it belongs to different powers.
On the contrary, Fear is condivided with the other passions of the
soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12,15).
I answer that, The passions of the soul derive their species from their
objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special object.
Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of
hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so the object
of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear
is a special passion of the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions of the soul arise from one
source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By
reason of this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions
of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general
passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but
avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance
be something common, yet fear is a special passion.
Reply to Objection 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it
regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be
almost unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the
passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated
above ([1367]Q[25], A[1]); hence it is that what belongs to the
concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far
as the object of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the
representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful."
In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as
hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of
evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is
evident from what has been said above ([1368]Q[25], A[2];[1369] Q[29],
A[2];[1370] Q[36], A[2]).
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Whether there is a natural fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, through the
soul refusing to be severed from the body."
Objection 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A[2], ad
1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore there is also a natural fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above
([1371]Q[40], A[4], ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident
from Rom. 4:18, where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of
nature, "he believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear
of nature.
On the contrary, That which is natural is common to things animate and
inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is no
natural fear.
I answer that, A movement is said to be natural, because nature
inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is
entirely accomplished by nature, without any operation of the
apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to
fire, and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants.
Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto,
though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as
stated above ([1372]Q[10], A[1]), the movements of the cognitive and
appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first
principle. In this way, even the acts of the apprehensive power, such
as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of
the animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural.
And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is
distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its
object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of
"corruptive evil," which nature shrinks from on account of its natural
desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a
fear of "painful evil," which is repugnant not to nature, but to the
desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In this sense we
have stated above ([1373]Q[26], A[1];[1374] Q[30], A[3];[1375] Q[31],
A[7]) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and
non-natural.
But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that
certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as love,
desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The
reason of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance, imply
a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil;
which inclination is to be found in the natural appetite also.
Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire
and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the
other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain movements,
whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due
either to the fact that perception or knowledge is essential to these
passions (thus we have said[1376], Q[31], AA[1],3;[1377] Q[35], A[1],
that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow),
wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be said to take pleasure or
to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary
to the very nature of natural inclination: for instance, despair flies
from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from
repelling a contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the
inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way
ascribed to inanimate beings.
Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.
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Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably
assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness,
shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil."
Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of
sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above
([1378]Q[35], A[8]). Therefore there should only be four species of
fear corresponding to them.
Objection 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in
our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as stated
above [1379](A[2]). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame,
which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of
fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above
([1380]AA[1], 2). But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done,"
as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore shame
is not a species of fear.
Objection 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor
regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore
amazement and stupor are not species of fear.
Objection 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek
the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads to
flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of
fear.
On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).
I answer that, As stated above [1381](A[2]), fear regards a future evil
which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is
irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either
in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold
evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature: and
hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of
too much toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the
opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is
yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness"; if, however, it be a deed
already done, there is "shame."
On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may
surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First by reason of
its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil
the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is
"amazement." Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to
wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great
in our estimation: and then there is "stupor," which is caused by the
representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being
unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind
is called "anxiety."
Reply to Objection 1: Those species of sorrow given above are not
derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of
effects, and for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need
for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear,
which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear
itself.
Reply to Objection 2: A deed considered as being actually done, is in
the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration
something connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the
doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense
that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of
fear.
Reply to Objection 3: The past deed may be the occasion of fear of
future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of
fear.
Reply to Objection 4: Not every amazement and stupor are species of
fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that
stupor which arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that,
just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement
and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and
unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and stupor
stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to
external work.
Reply to Objection 5: He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming
a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the
truth, but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor
fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore
amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a
hindrance thereto.
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OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?
(2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?
(3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
(4) Whether fear itself can be feared?
(5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?
(6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no
remedy?
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Whether the object of fear is good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what
we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for." But that
which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good as its proper
object.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power
and to be above another is a thing to be feared." But this is a good
thing. Therefore good is the object of fear.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded
to fear God, according to Ps. 33:10: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints."
Therefore even the good is an object of fear.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of
future evil.
I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it
belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in
Ethic. vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil.
Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies pursuit,
has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance,
has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since fear implies an avoidance,
in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper
object.
It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. This
can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of
good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of
some good. Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it
follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one
pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that
there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as
some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love: and so, just
as hope, as stated above ([1382]Q[40], A[7]), regards two things,
namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there
is a hope of obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two
things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by
its power, can inflict that evil. In this way God is feared by man,
inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this
way, too, we fear the power of man; especially when it has been
thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us
a harm.
In like manner one fears "to be over another," i.e. to lean on another,
so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears another,
who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of
fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take
counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen
naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not
an object of fear.
Objection 2: Further, natural defects such as death and the like are
always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object of
fear, man would needs be always in fear.
Objection 3: Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of
nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such
like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature.
Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems
that it should be.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most
terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by
the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or
painful." Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the
will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and
this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the
object of fear.
But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a
natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from
being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect
of nature; such are natural death and other like defects. But sometimes
evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death
inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of nature is feared to a
certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises
"from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes
fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as
about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account
of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to
be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very
far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near,
they heed it not." Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it
were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look
upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5)
that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing
that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no
escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of
escape for him."
Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as
future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, be apprehended as
near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.
Reply to Objection 1: The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of
nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature,
although it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be
possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about
avoiding it.
Reply to Objection 2: Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it
does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not
always feared.
Reply to Objection 3: Death and other defects of nature are the effects
of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them
as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual
nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear
when threatening in the future.
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Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of
fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. ix),
that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now nothing but
sin severs us from God; according to Is. 59:2: "Your iniquities have
divided between you and your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an
object of fear.
Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear
when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they
are present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on
account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of
sin.
Objection 3: Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue
can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4):
and the Apostle says (Gal. 5:10): "I have confidence in you in the
Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can regard
evil of sin.
Objection 4: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above
([1383]Q[41], A[4]). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an
evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils
are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow."
I answer that, As stated above ([1384]Q[40], A[1];[1385] Q[41], A[2]),
as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to
obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be
easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely
subject to our power and will, is not an object of fear; and that
nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now
human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin: and consequently
evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear.
But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause;
if this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that respect a man
may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic
cause: as when he fears to dwell in the company of wicked men, lest he
be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed,
fears the being led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper
nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this light it is not
an object of fear to him.
Reply to Objection 1: Separation from God is a punishment resulting
from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic
cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each
regards evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because
sorrow is about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly,
because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil
absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas
fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a
certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far as
a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that give
us pain when they are present, make us fear when they are yet to come,
but only some things, namely, those that are difficult.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may
obtain a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may
be of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other
hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: and
consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic
cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from an intrinsic
and from an extrinsic cause.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above ([1386]Q[41], A[4], ad 2,3),
shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or
ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic
cause.
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Whether fear itself can be feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is
feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus a man
who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If
therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear by
being afraid: which seems absurd.
Objection 2: Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from
itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to
him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear.
On the contrary, A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own
sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear.
I answer that, As stated above [1387](A[3]), nothing can be an object
of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which
ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic
cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic
cause, in so far as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of
an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the
object of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the
necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. It is
subject to the will, in so far as the lower appetite obeys reason;
wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be
the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however,
anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear cannot be
at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every fear is identically the same; there are
various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then,
prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing
another, so that the fear which he has preserves him from the fear
which he has not.
Reply to Objection 2: Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical
with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a
thing flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases.
Reply to Objection 3: On account of the various kinds of fear already
alluded to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its
object.
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Whether sudden things are especially feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not
especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is
about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in
good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those
are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and
cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more
subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be
feared.
Objection 3: Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly.
But the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous
through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that the case is
different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden
things are feared less.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at
things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes
forethought for their safety."
I answer that, As stated about [1388](A[3]; Q[41], A[2]), the object of
fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty.
Now this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or
to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness
conduce to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to
seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, the
more we consider them, the smaller they seem. Consequently, just as
sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero
states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is
diminished by thinking about it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and
suddenness increase the weakness of him that fears, in so far as they
deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide
himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking
him by surprise.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of hope is a good that is possible to
obtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature
to increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since
fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since,
therefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, as
it increases hope, so does it diminish fear.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their
anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be
foreseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their
anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot be
foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher
says that such men are feared more than others.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems
greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious
when seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes
unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his wealth on
account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand, the rich man
who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty all the more disagreeable. For
this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it seems more to be
evil. However, it may happen through some accident that the greatness
of some evil is hidden; for instance if the foe hides himself in
ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through
being much thought about.
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Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things are not more to be feared,
for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of fear, that
there be some hope of safety, as stated above [1389](A[2]). But an evil
that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things
are not feared at all.
Objection 2: Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since,
in the natural course of things, there is no return from death to life.
And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the Philosopher
says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things are not feared most, for
which there is no remedy.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "a thing
which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day: nor is
that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not
everlasting": and the same applies to evil. But things that cannot be
remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of their
lasting long or for ever. Consequently they are not therefore any worse
or more to be feared.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things
are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . .
or for which there is no help, or which are not easy."
I answer that, The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever tends
to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is
increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of
circumstances, as stated above ([1390]Q[18], A[3]). And of all the
circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have
the greatest bearing on the increase of evil. Because things that exist
in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration of time:
wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of
time, we should reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered for twice
that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an
infinite length of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to speak, an
infinite increase. Now those evils which, after they have come, cannot
be remedied at all, or at least not easily, are considered as lasting
for ever or for a long time: for which reason they inspire the greatest
fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a
future evil is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be removed,
there is an end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not
speak now of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one by which an
already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we speak now.
Reply to Objection 2: Although death be an evil without remedy, yet,
since it threatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated above
[1391](A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher is speaking there of things that
are good in themselves, i.e. good specifically. And such like good is
no better for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on its
very nature.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love is the cause of fear?
(2) Whether defect is the cause of fear?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether love is the cause of fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the cause of fear. For that
which leads to a thing is its cause. But "fear leads to the love of
charity" as Augustine says on the canonical epistle of John (Tract.
ix). Therefore fear is the cause of love, and not conversely.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those
are feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil." But the
dread of evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love
him. Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than by love.
Objection 3: Further, it has been stated above ([1392]Q[42], A[3]) that
those things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that
which we do from love, is done from our inmost heart. Therefore fear is
not caused by love.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no
doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love,
when we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for."
Therefore all fear is caused by our loving something: and consequently
love is the cause of fear.
I answer that, The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation
thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the
passions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the
aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a
cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so
whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is a cause of
the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either by way of
efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of
pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and conjoined: and its
efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the
suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension of that good thing; while
its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of
disposition by reason of which this conjoined good becomes suitable or
is apprehended as such.
Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is
something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and difficult to
avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient
cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear itself. While
that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him,
is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposition.
And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his loving a
certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to
him, and that consequently he fears it as an evil.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([1393]Q[42], A[1]), fear, of
itself and in the first place, regards the evil from which it recoils
as being contrary to some loved good: and thus fear, of itself, is born
of love. But, in the second place, it regards the cause from which that
evil ensues: so that sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love;
in so far as, for instance, through fear of God's punishments, man
keeps His commandments, and thus begins to hope, while hope leads to
love, as stated above ([1394]Q[40] , A[7]).
Reply to Objection 2: He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated
at first; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him,
we begin to love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is
feared, was loved from the beginning.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of that which is the
efficient cause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by
way of material disposition, as stated above.
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Whether defect is the cause of fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear. Because
those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is contrary to
power. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
Objection 2: Further, the defect of those who are already being
executed is extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in Rhet. ii,
5. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
Objection 3: Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But
"those who contend fear those who contend with them" (Rhet. ii, 5).
Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
On the contrary, Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But "wealth,
strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away" (Rhet. ii,
5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these.
I answer that, As stated above [1395](A[1]), fear may be set down to a
twofold cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part of
him that fears; the other is by way of efficient cause, on the part of
the person feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of itself, the
cause of fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable
easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order to cause fear,
this defect must be according to a measure. For the defect which causes
fear of a future evil, is less than the defect caused by evil present,
which is the object of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect,
if perception of the evil, or love of the good whose contrary is
feared, were entirely absent.
But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the cause
of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the cause apprehended as
harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen,
however, in this respect, that some defect causes fear accidentally, in
so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another; for
instance, by reason of injustice, either because that other has already
done him a harm, or because he fears to be harmed by him.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of the cause of fear, on
the part of the efficient cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who are already being executed, are
actually suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds
the measure of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who contend with one another are afraid,
not on account of the power which enables them to contend: but on
account of the lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of
victory.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear causes contraction?
(2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?
(3) Whether it makes one tremble?
(4) Whether it hinders action?
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Whether fear causes contraction?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For
when contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn
inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior
parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of daring, as may
be seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens in those
who are afraid. Therefore fear does not cause contraction.
Objection 2: Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital
spirits and heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out,
as may be seen in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter
nothing: on the contrary they lose their speech. Therefore fear does
not cause contraction.
Objection 3: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above
([1396]Q[41], A[4]). But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De
Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8), and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But
blushing is an indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse.
Therefore contraction is not an effect of fear.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a
power according to {systole}," i.e. contraction.
I answer that, As stated above ([1397]Q[28], A[5]), in the passions of
the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power,
while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these
are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation
assumes a resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive
movement. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies
a certain contraction: the reason of which is that fear arises from the
imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as
stated above ([1398]Q[41], A[2]). But that a thing be difficult to
repel is due to lack of power, as stated above ([1399]Q[43], A[2]): and
the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends.
Wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear there ensues a
certain contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe in one who is
dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account of the lack of power:
and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when seized with fear,
leave the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make for the inner
quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, which pertains to
the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction of heat
and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes place in regard to the
body.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3),
although in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the
inner parts of the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the
same in those who are angry and those who are afraid. For in those who
are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits,
which result from the craving for vengeance, the inward movement has an
upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and heat concentrate
around the heart: the result being that an angry man is quick and brave
in attacking. But in those who are afraid, on account of the
condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward
movement; the said cold being due to the imagined lack of power.
Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart instead of
concentrating around it: the result being that a man who is afraid is
not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away.
Reply to Objection 2: To everyone that is in pain, whether man or
animal, it is natural to use all possible means of repelling the
harmful thing that causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that
animals, when in pain, attack with their jaws or with their horns. Now
the greatest help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital
spirits: wherefore when they are in pain, their nature stores up the
heat and vital spirits within them, in order to make use thereof in
repelling the harmful object. Hence the Philosopher says (De Problem.
xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated together
within, they require to find a vent in the voice: for which reason
those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from crying aloud. On the
other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat and vital
spirits move from the heart downwards, as stated above (ad 1):
wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the
vital spirits in an upward direction through the mouth: the result
being that fear makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too,
fear "makes its subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem.
xxvii, 1,6,7).
Reply to Objection 3: Mortal perils are contrary not only to the
appetite of the soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like
fear, there is contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the
corporeal nature: for when an animal is moved by the imagination of
death, it experiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of
the body, as though it were threatened by a natural death. Hence it is
that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9). But the
evil that shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to the
appetite of the soul. Consequently there results a contraction in this
appetite, but not in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though
contracted in itself, is free to set the vital spirits and heat in
movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the body: the
result being that those who are ashamed blush.
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Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for
counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a
hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion
disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of reason.
Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel.
Objection 2: Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and
deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all
thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc.
iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it.
Objection 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to
avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas fear
is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained.
Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope is.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes
men of counsel."
I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from
his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes men
of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take
counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust ourselves." Now
things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain
magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel, and because they
are apprehended as near to us, as stated above ([1400]Q[42], A[2]).
Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid.
Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good
counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of
counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to
him greater or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he
loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more
dreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every
passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good
counsel.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the
hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear
is intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are
so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be
slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely
disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take good
counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because,
as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters
he despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii,
3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope is of
good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil
things, as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the aspect of
difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of difficulty,
especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated
above.
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Whether fear makes one tremble?
Objection 1: It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear.
Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold
person trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to
cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are
thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of
those who are being led to execution. Therefore fear does not cause
trembling.
Objection 2: Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence
laxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are often
caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently
does not cause trembling.
Objection 3: Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to
the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his outward
parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should
cause this trembling in all the external members. But such is not the
case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.
On the contrary, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is
followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth."
I answer that, As stated above [1401](A[1]), in fear there takes place
a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body,
the result being that the outer parts become cold; and for this reason
trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power
in controlling the members: which lack of power is due to the want of
heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, as
stated in De Anima ii, 4.
Reply to Objection 1: When the heat withdraws from the outer to the
inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or
nutritive parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst
ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and
urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are
due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, as the Philosopher
says (De Problem. xxii, 11).
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward
movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles,
as also those members which are connected with the breast where the
heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in their speech,
on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip,
too, and the lower jaw tremble, through their connection with the
heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth. For the same reason
the arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are
more mobile. For which reason the knees tremble in those who are
afraid, according to Is. 35:3: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and
confirm the trembling [Vulg.: 'weak'] knees."
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Whether fear hinders action?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is
hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action.
But fear disturbs reason, as stated above [1402](A[2]). Therefore fear
hinders action.
Objection 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt
to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls
through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below,
he would not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders
action.
Objection 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness
hinders action. Therefore fear does too.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): "With fear and
trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear
were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does not hinder a good
action.
I answer that, Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first
mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be
hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the
principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear,
considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on
account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of their
heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without
much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far
as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and
work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to
disturb the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul. But
of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers
a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is
pictured to his imagination.
Reply to Objection 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and
therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome,
it hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other
things conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do that
whereby a man escapes from what he fears.
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OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?
(2) How is daring related to hope?
(3) Of the cause of daring;
(4) Of its effect.
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Whether daring is contrary to fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice is
contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a
passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.
Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is
contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
Objection 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear
excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes
forethought for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear.
Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is
contrary to fear."
I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest
removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is
farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the
future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas
daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that
same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to
fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the passions
can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of
the sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus
they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this
movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names
of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: but we
are speaking of it in the first sense.
Reply to Objection 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not
several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one
thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above
([1403]Q[23], A[2];[1404] Q[40], A[4]) that the irascible passions
admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of
good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according
to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is
contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to
fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who
fears not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while
daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies
privation, so daring implies safety.
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Whether daring ensues from hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope.
Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic.
iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above ([1405]Q[40],
A[1]). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same
order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope.
Objection 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair
contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact,
despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore
daring does not result from hope.
Objection 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory.
But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult.
Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result
from it.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are
hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring ensues from
hope.
I answer that, As we have often stated ([1406]Q[22], A[2];[1407] Q[35],
A[1];[1408] Q[41], A[1]), all these passions belong to the appetitive
power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one
either of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of
something either by reason of itself or by reason of something else. By
reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object
of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object
of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; and good can be the
object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which
is by reason of something else, follows that which is by reason of
itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and
avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these four things
belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope,
avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to
daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore,
that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming
the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But despair
results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he
fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were
not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to
good, since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit;
consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues
good.
Reply to Objection 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to
evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the
pursuit of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope
precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not
always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not
always lead to daring, save only when it is strong.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to
which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is
conjoined; yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined
good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns
away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly
speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: just as despair
is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot
be a principal passion.
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Whether some defect is a cause of daring?
Objection 1: It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For
the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine are
strong and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness.
Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those
who have no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience is a
defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
Objection 3: Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be
daring; "like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. But
the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused
by a defect.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of
daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means
of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either
non-existent or far off." But anything pertaining to defect implies
either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of
something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a
cause of daring.
I answer that, As stated above ([1409]AA[1],2) daring results from hope
and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause
hope or banish fear, is a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and
hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the
appetite, and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be
considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope,
or by banishing fear; in one way, in the part of the appetitive
movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation.
On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope
that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us reckon
victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily
strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or
they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of
friends or any other means of help, especially if a man trust in the
Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it is
well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes
of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through
having harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of any imminent danger;
since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have
harmed others.
On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the
incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those things which
raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose heart is small in size, are
more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the
natural heat is unable to give the same degree of temperature to a
large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large house
as well as it does a small house." He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4),
that "those whose lungs contain much blood, are more daring, through
the heat in the heart that results therefrom." He says also in the same
passage that "lovers of wine are more daring, on account of the heat of
the wine": hence it has been said above ([1410]Q[40], A[6]) that
drunkenness conduces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear
and raises hope, by reason of the dilatation and enlargement of the
heart.
Reply to Objection 1: Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a
defect, but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man
think greatly of himself.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who have no experience of dangers are more
daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as
through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor
the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the cause of
fear gives rise to daring.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who
have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to
the assistance of those who suffer unjustly."
Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally,
i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary,
either in oneself or in another.
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Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?
Objection 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first
than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, which
is contrary to daring, as stated above [1411](A[1]; Q[44], A[3]). But
the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De
Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are not more eager at first than in
the midst of danger.
Objection 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its
object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more
lovable. But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the
greater the difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger is more
arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is
greatest.
Objection 3: Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds.
But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that
"anger makes man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger
and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring.
On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are
precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst
of dangers they stand aloof."
I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite,
follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive
faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances;
its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that it is
impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties
of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to
face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he
feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.
On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a
situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to
the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the
danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in
the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes
the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore
they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the
danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of
their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas men of daring
face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and
banishing fear, as stated above [1412](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account
of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the
body, as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the
heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it
withdraws to the inferior parts.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore if
it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is
a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil
presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much
difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement
of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does
ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to
be.
Reply to Objection 3: Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be
some kind of hope, as we shall see later on ([1413]Q[46], A[1]).
Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of
victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that if anger does
ensue, there will be greater daring.
__________________________________________________________________
OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of
anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger is a special passion?
(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?
(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?
(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of
justice?
(8) Of the species of anger.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is a special passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the
irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are several
passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one
special passion.
Objection 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary
passion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion
is contrary to anger, as stated above ([1414]Q[23], A[3]). Therefore
anger is not a special passion.
Objection 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But
anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure,
and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is
not a special passion.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special
passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).
I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by
predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals.
Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things
generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Because
just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a
likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects
according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is
produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause
remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an
effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain
generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, actually
existing therein.
Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is
condivided with the other passions, as stated above ([1415]Q[23],
A[4]). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not
a cause of the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a
general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because
love is the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above
([1416]Q[27], A[4] ). But, in a third way, anger may be called a
general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several
passions. Because the movement of anger does not arise save on account
of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge:
for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to
punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible." Consequently if
the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not
ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).
Reply to Objection 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira"
[anger], not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but
because all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these
movements, anger is the most patent.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by
contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which
is of evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has
no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no
contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a
genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion
of cause and effect.
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Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For
Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the
sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever
obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has the character
of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object.
Objection 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since
each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its
object, as stated above ([1417]Q[29], A[1]). Therefore anger does also.
Objection 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But
evil is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for
revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good:
since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is
good.
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes
pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope
and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.
I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of
the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing
in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we
understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when
we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these
ways the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a
simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows and
adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire,
hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as
when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or
being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This
is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so
far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far
as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when
a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement
of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it
desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in
it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something
contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil.
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between
anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first
difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and
hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love
wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is,
that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to
someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects
of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes
evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger
regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person,
on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat
made up of contrary passions.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of
"desire." But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger
is too.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows
into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is
inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion.
Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up of
sorrow and desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty.
Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion.
On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible
faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the
irascible would not take its name from it.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the
irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty,
in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil
absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions
are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has
been stated [1418](A[2]) that anger regards two objects: viz. the
vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and
in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the
movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about
both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught
or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is
therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the
irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of
craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is
arduous and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind
of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense,
however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though
the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by
becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it
lasts a long time engenders hatred.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and
desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its
causes: and it has been said above ([1419]Q[25], A[2]) that the
concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger requires an act of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of
reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite.
But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but
of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
Objection 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they
are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
Objection 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is
conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger
listens to reason somewhat."
I answer that, As stated above [1420](A[2]), anger is a desire for
vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to
be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to
quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated." Now
to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore
anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow
an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason
in so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason,
wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another way, it
follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger
follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that
"anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a
result of reason's denouncing the injury." Because the sensitive
appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the
will.
Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to
them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with
movements, both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as
stated above ([1421]Q[40], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens
somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted,
"but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of
reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an
act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose who are very drunk,
so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: but those
who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though
hampered, to form a judgment of reason.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is more natural than desire?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire.
Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But
"gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to
be altogether unnatural to man.
Objection 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those
things that act according to reason, are not said to act according to
nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.
Objection 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is
a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch,
viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these
things are more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is more
natural than anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is
more natural than desire."
I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as
stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a
particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without
reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as
stated above ([1422]Q[36], A[2]), may be considered in two ways: first,
on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If
then we consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the
object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of
sexual pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these
pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance.
If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject,
thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, desire is
more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered
either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to
the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the
generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal;
thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from this very
generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend
to preserve in him the life both of the species and of the individual.
If, however, we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this
man as a rational being; then anger is more natural to man than desire,
in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger
"is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to everything
to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the
nature of the individual, in respect of his particular temperament,
thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is
prone to ensue from the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or
any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which
tendencies result from a man's individual temperament. Because
disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the
humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he
that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner incensed with
anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed
with desire: and for this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6)
that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from
parent to child, than a disposition to desire.
Reply to Objection 1: We may consider in man both the natural
temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the
bodily temperament, a man, considered specifically, does not naturally
excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the
moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their
temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches to an extreme
disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of passion, such as
the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth.
On the part of reason, however, it is natural to man, both to be angry
and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by
denouncing the injury which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger,
in so far as the angry man "does not listen perfectly to the command of
reason," as stated above (A[4], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man:
wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it
follows that it is, in a manner, natural to man.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the
part of the object.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For
it is written (Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it
breaketh forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is
more grievous than hatred.
Objection 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it,
than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if the
object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not
satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved
thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is
more grievous than hatred.
Objection 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm
according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the
more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused
by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above [1423](A[1]):
whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more
grievous than hatred.
On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam,"
but anger to "a mote."
I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are taken from its
object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object
of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates,
so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But there
is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as
evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry,
not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that is, in so
far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance.
Wherefore also it has been said above [1424](A[2]) that hatred implies
application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good
to evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of
justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone. Because
to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according
to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order of
reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept
of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently it is evident that hatred
is far worse and graver than anger.
Reply to Objection 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered:
namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the
thing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred
desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no
particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for
their own sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states
(Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity,
will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil
only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when
the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the
estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils
befall, whereas the hater is never appeased."
As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than
hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through
the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can
bear the violence of one provoked?"
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to
someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now
vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature
of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and
inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that
the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know
that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the
other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he
desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, that an evil
is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence,
although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not grieve those in whom they
are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).
Reply to Objection 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more
settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause
prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause
than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due
to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a
man, by reason of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary
and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than
disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although
hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than
anger."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of
justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom
one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between man
and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational
beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a rider
strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom
one has an obligation of justice.
Objection 2: Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is
there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man is
angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin;
hence it is written (Ps. 4:5): "Be ye angry and sin not." Therefore
anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards
an entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state
injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only
towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4).
Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one
is in relation of justice or injustice.
The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii,
2,3).
I answer that, As stated above [1425](A[6]), anger desires evil as
being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those
to whom we are just or unjust: since vengeance is an act of justice,
and wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of
the cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of the
vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns
those to whom one is just or unjust.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[4], ad 2), anger, though it
follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are
devoid of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are
moved by their imagination to something like rational action. Since
then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger
can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination
denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement of
anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is
like that which occurs in animals against anything that injures them.
Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to
the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 3), "it is impossible to be angry with
insensible things, or with the dead": both because they feel no pain,
which is, above all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is
angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since
they can do us no harm.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11),
"metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice
between a man and himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible
and concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said to
be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But
properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, a man is never
angry with himself.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one
difference between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a
class, as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is
directed only towards an individual." The reason is that hatred arises
from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and
this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the
other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his action. Now
all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is
always pointed at an individual. When the whole state hurts us, the
whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf.[1426] Q[29], A[6]].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16)
unsuitably assigns three species of anger---"wrath," "ill-will" and
"rancor." For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents.
But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because "the
beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger
continue it is called ill-will {menis}; while rancor {kotos} is anger
waiting for an opportunity of vengeance." Therefore these are not
different species of anger.
Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that
"excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and
is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while
according to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek {kotos}
[rancor]. Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking
vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of
anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and
anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees
mentioned by Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his
brother" [thus implying "anger without utterance"], and then,
"whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with
utterance yet without full expression"], and lastly, "whosoever shall
say 'Thou fool'" [where we have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore
Damascene's division is imperfect, since it takes no account of
utterance.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.].
I answer that, The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of
Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This
happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and
he calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because it quickly aroused.
Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells
some time in the memory; this belongs to {menis} [ill-will] which is
derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part of that which
the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos}
[rancor] which never rests until it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: "Let all
bitterness and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you."].
Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons
{akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls
{pikroi} [bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and
some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they never rest until
they have retaliated [*Cf. [1427]SS, Q[158], A[5]].
Reply to Objection 1: All those things which give anger some kind of
perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently
nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference
thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to
pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain
quickness of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no
reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor,"
should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in
being avenged.
Reply to Objection 3: These degrees are distinguished according to
various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in
the very movement of anger.
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OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES
)
[*There is no further mention of these remedies in the text, except in A[4].]
We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the
one who is angry?
(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?
(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;
(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is
angry.
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Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is
angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always
something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning,
can do nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): "If thy
iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet God
is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, according to
Ps. 105:40: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people." Therefore
it is not always on account of something done against him, that a man
is angry.
Objection 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may
desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not
always angry on account of something done against us.
Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is
angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest
in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise
philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the
philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us
angry.
Objection 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults
him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii,
in Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm.
Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done
against him.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise
without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we
think him such."
I answer that, As stated above ([1428]Q[46], A[6]), anger is the desire
to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some
injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any
injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the
person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its
own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by
anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done
against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always
something done against him.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of
the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take
vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any
actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God
in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments.
Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; which injury
redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's
providence and protection.
Reply to Objection 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and
seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong
in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least
because of the nature we have in common.
Reply to Objection 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we
look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as
though we ourselves were despised and injured.
Reply to Objection 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he
thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a
slight is an action.
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Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole
motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are
angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury." But
one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore
a slight is not the only motive of anger.
Objection 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to
the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they
are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger,
when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore a
slight is not the sole motive of anger.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other
causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others
should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our
evils; being hindered from doing as we like." Therefore being slighted
is not the only motive for being angry.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a
desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done
unbecomingly."
I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For
slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt,"
"despiteful treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and
"insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. Two
reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's
hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance
in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only for that
which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always
something considered in the light of an injustice. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry---if they think
they have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that account;
because there is no anger at what is just." Now injury is done to
another in three ways: namely, through ignorance, through passion, and
through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he
does an injury from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as
stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those
who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some
one has done us an injury through ignorance or through passion, either
we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do
anything through ignorance or through passion takes away from the
notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and
forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who do an injury on purpose,
seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of
all. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not
angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through
anger, because they do not seem to have acted slightingly."
The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence:
because "men think little of things that are not worth much ado" (Rhet.
ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods.
Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is
derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.
Reply to Objection 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which
a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt
or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of
itself the cause of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as
such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with
anything derogatory thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of
slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the
more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a
man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this
seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show
signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care little
about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying out
his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to
care much for his friendship. Consequently all those things, in so far
as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger.
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Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of
his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2)
that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance,
the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed." But these things
seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence
makes one prone to anger.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are
very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing
or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion;
but if they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble." But
a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather
than excellence is a cause of a man being angry.
Objection 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man
agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men
are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor
when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and
well-founded hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence
makes men prone to anger.
I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be
taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus
excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the
motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above [1429](A[2]). Now
it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a
slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Consequently those
who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be slighted in
that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in
his eloquence, and so forth.
Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be
considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive
aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a
hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a
cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily
hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other
defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he
evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser
thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less
angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly
despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks
that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through
ignorance, or some other like cause.
Reply to Objection 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they
hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke
anger, because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone.
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Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?
Objection 1: It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for
being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble
themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs
bite not those who sit down." But these things savor of littleness and
defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less
angry with him.
Objection 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger
ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not
provoke anger against him.
Objection 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being
friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they
offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): "If my
enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it." Therefore a
person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man
is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like
manner the prince is angry with his subject."
I answer that, As stated above ([1430]AA[2],3) unmerited contempt more
than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency
or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase
our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised.
For just as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is
despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising.
Thus a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if
by a fool; a master, if by a servant.
If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited
contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way
those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done
wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according
to Prov. 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they
seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they
humble themselves.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the
sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and
sensation; and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom
they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have
attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who
are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of
just retaliation.
Reply to Objection 3: To be despised by one's friends seems also a
greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by
failing to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which
we are angry with those who are beneath us.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger causes pleasure?
(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?
(3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether it causes taciturnity?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because
sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with
pain." Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that
"vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for
pain": whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from
vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent
of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect
united with pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is
conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet.
ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that
anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109
[trl. Pope]).
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures,
chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: and
therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we
to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of thirst
which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has
been said ([1431]Q[47], AA[1],3), that the movement of anger arises
from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is
sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present,
pleasure ensues, and so much the greater according as the sorrow was
greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure
ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement of anger
ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to
the angry man in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry
except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above ([1432]Q[46], A[1]); in
another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that
desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what he
desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly
an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about vengeance. This
pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and
consequently anger.
Reply to Objection 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the
same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in
the thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as
its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused
by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from
ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in
taking vengeance follows from anger.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?
Objection 1: It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of
anger. For fervor, as stated above ([1433]Q[28], A[5];[1434] Q[37],
A[2]), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and
cause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more powerful than
its effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor.
Objection 2: Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor,
increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer it lasts.
But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger." Therefore fervor is not
the proper effect of anger.
Objection 3: Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor.
But "the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger,"
as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause
fervor.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that "anger is
fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of
the bile."
I answer that, As stated above ([1435]Q[44], A[1]), the bodily
transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate
to the movement of the appetite. Now it is evident that every appetite,
even the natural appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which
is contrary to it, if it be present: hence we see that hot water
freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot
object. Since then the appetitive movement of anger is caused by some
injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it follows that the
appetite tends with great force to repel the injury by the desire of
vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence and impetuosity in the
movement of anger. And because the movement of anger is not one of
recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of
prosecution, which corresponds to the action of heat, the result is
that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital
spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's
passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being so
disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in
their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) "the heart
that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body
trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes
grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the
mouth indeed he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows not what it
says."
Reply to Objection 1: "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the
absence of the beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12).
Consequently when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that
he loves, he feels his love thereof the more: the result being that his
heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object
of his love; so that anger increases the fervor of love and makes it to
be felt more.
Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is
to be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor of love has a
certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one
loves: whence it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood.
For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and
hence the saying that "love springs from the liver," because of the
blood being formed there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has a
certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be
avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to the heat of fire
and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
16) that it "results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its
name {chole}."
Reply to Objection 2: Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the
causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is
weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from
our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong done.
Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time
goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether. Moreover a wrong seems
greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is gradually
lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past.
The same applies to love, so long as the cause of love is in the memory
alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "if a
friend's absence lasts long, it seems to make men forget their
friendship." But in the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship
is continually being multiplied by time: wherefore the friendship
increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its cause
continually multiplied.
Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the
strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent having burnt
up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies
away.
Reply to Objection 3: Every power that is divided in itself is
weakened. Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes
angry with another, by this very fact his anger with the former is
weakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be
greater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will,
in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned greater, seem to
be of little or no account.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of
reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem
to hinder the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as stated
in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason.
Objection 2: Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a
man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"an angry man is not cunning but is open." Therefore anger does not
seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is
cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.).
Objection 3: Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by
juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more
clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger:
for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are more angry if they
receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be
dishonored": and so forth. Therefore the same cause increases anger,
and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does not hinder
the judgment of reason.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger "withdraws the
light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind."
I answer that, Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily
organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers
for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered
when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any
disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is
clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated
[1436](A[2]) that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in the
region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members.
Consequently, of all the passions, anger is the most manifest obstacle
to the judgment of reason, according to Ps. 30:10: "My eye is troubled
with wrath."
Reply to Objection 1: The beginning of anger is in the reason, as
regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger.
But the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as
though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the
commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the
material element of anger. In this respect it hinders the judgment of
reason.
Reply to Objection 2: An angry man is said to be open, not because it
is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly,
without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason
being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what
done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the
dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an
effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man
(Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . .
. and speaks and acts openly." Desire, on the other hand, is said to
lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable
things that are desired, savor of shame and voluptuousness, wherein man
wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and
excellence, such as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger
begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with
another facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it
increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or wealth,
suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account
of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. Consequently it causes
greater grief: just as a great good, through being received
unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the increase
of the grief that precedes, anger is increased also.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity.
Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger
conduces to speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down
by Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): where He says: "Whosoever is angry with his
brother"; and " . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'"; and
" . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool.'" Therefore
anger does not cause taciturnity.
Objection 2: Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes
breaks out into unbecoming words: hence it is written (Prov. 25:28):
"As a city that lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man
that cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking." But anger, above all,
hinders the judgment of reason, as stated above [1437](A[3]).
Consequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words.
Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 12:34): "Out of the abundance
of the heart the mouth speaketh." But anger, above all, causes a
disturbance in the heart, as stated above [1438](A[2]). Therefore above
all it conduces to speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not
vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more
fiercely."
I answer that, As stated above [1439](A[3]; Q[46], A[4]), anger both
follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both respects
it may cause taciturnity. On the part of the reason, when the judgment
of reason prevails so far, that although it does not curb the appetite
in its inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from
unbridled speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): "Sometimes
when the mind is disturbed, anger, as if in judgment, commands
silence." On the part of the impediment to reason because, as stated
above [1440](A[2]), the disturbance of anger reaches to the outward
members, and chiefly to those members which reflect more distinctly the
emotions of the heart, such as the eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, as
observed above [1441](A[2]), "the tongue stammers, the countenance
takes fire, the eyes grow fierce." Consequently anger may cause such a
disturbance, that the tongue is altogether deprived of speech; and
taciturnity is the result.
Reply to Objection 1: Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the
reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so
as to paralyze the tongue and other outward members.
And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The disturbance of the heart may sometimes
superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are
hindered by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue
taciturnity and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even
death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great, then "out of the
abundance of the heart" thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds to speak.
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TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)
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OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the
consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic
principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle
is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the FP, Q[77],
seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second
place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which
are the principles of human acts.
Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First,
the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of
their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are
distinguished from one another.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habit is a quality?
(2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?
(3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?
(4) Of the necessity of habit.
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Whether habit is a quality?
Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine
says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the verb
'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the
other categories: for we speak of ourselves as "having" quantity and
money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.
Objection 2: Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as
may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). But
one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not
a quality.
Objection 3: Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in
the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the
order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But
this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not a
quality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments
(Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change."
I answer that, This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to
have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way,
inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in
another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet]
either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard
to anything that is "had," is common to the various predicaments. And
so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so
called because they result from the various predicaments; as, for
instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among
things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there
are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that which
is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and
quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium,
but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a
companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a
medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner
of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers,
and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher
says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an
action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case
in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these
constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the
predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text.
25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is
clothed."
But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard
to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since
this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition
whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this,
either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a
habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say
that habit is a quality.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes "to have" in the general
sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes habit in the sense in which
we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is
had: and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 3: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order
of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the
Philosopher goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely,
"either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying
this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments,
"he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to
place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is the
order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all
those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived
at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when
he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are
called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.
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Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?
Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of
quality. Because, as we have said [1442](A[1]), habit, in so far as it
is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is
disposed well or ill." But this happens in regard to any quality: for a
thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and
in like manner, in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such
things. Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the
Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or
habits, just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is
not distinct from the other species of quality.
Objection 3: Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference
belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or
passion. Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a
difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a
genus," as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore,
since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not to be a
distinct species of quality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments
(Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition."
I answer that, The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor.
vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. Now
Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the
difference of these species as follows. He says "that some qualities
are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are
always there: but some are adventitious, being caused from without, and
these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those which are adventitious,
"are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or
difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, some regard a thing in the
point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the
second species of quality: while others regard a thing which is in act;
and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply
rooted, we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we
have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is the
shape of an animated being." But this distinction of the species of
quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like
qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also
many dispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health,
beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the
species, since that which is the more natural is always first.
Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and
habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, implies a
certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
iv, 3), "is that which a measure determines": wherefore it implies a
certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just
as that in accordance with which the material potentiality [potentia
materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called quality,
which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance
with the potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental
being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of
difference, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19).
Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be
taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to
action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are
matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or
determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have
the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, considered in
itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of good or
evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a
thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or slowly transitory.
But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or
passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality. And
therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with
ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them,
we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil:
because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end, whereas
good and evil are said in respect of an end.
On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard
to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality,
which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii,
text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the body, that
they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I
mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature." And since
the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause why
a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we
consider both evil and good, and also changeableness, whether easy or
difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and
movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a
"disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic.
ii, 4, he says that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference
to the passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature,
it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect
of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration in
anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of
quality.
Reply to Objection 1: Disposition implies a certain order, as stated
above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some
quality except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or
ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must consider
the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to
shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said to be well or ill disposed,
except by reason of a relation to the nature of a thing, with regard to
its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and
passion-like qualities, in so far as they are considered to be suitable
or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, belong to habits or
dispositions: for shape and color, according to their suitability to
the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to
their suitability to the nature of a thing, concern health. And in this
way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, in the first species of
quality.
Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some
give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary on the
Predicaments.
Reply to Objection 3: This difference, "difficult to change," does not
distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from
disposition. Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as
the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition of
habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided
against habit. Again, disposition, properly so called, can be divided
against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect within the
same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of
the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to be easily lost: whereas
we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost
easily. And thus a disposition becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a
man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one
subaltern genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the
first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily lost,
because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas
we call habits those qualities which, by reason of their very nature,
are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g.
sciences and virtues. And in this sense, disposition does not become
habit. The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention
of Aristotle: for in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the
common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by
reason of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident,
becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while the
contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature,
difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have a science
imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is
disposed to that science, rather than that he has the science. From
this it is clear that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness:
while the word "disposition" does not.
Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are
specific differences (of a quality), although they belong to passion
and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences,
though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless designate
differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way,
in the genus of substance we often take accidental instead of
substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential
principles are designated.
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Whether habit implies order to an act?
Objection 1: It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act.
For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher says
(De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one
is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise than before
learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle
to an act.
Objection 2: Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing,
belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put in
the definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore
to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. Now that
which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is
a principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to power. And so
habit and disposition will not be the first species of quality.
Objection 3: Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness
and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore it
is not essential to habit to be a principle of act.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is
that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator
says (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will."
I answer that, To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in
regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which
the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every
habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential to habit to imply
some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or
unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature, which is the end of
generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an
operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by
means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not only to the
very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch
as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the end. Whence also it
is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is
a disposition whereby that which is disposed, is well or ill disposed
either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to
something else, that is to the end.
But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in
which they are, imply primarily and principally relation to an act.
For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation
to the thing's nature. If therefore the nature of a thing, in which the
habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the
habit principally implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the
nature and the notion of power is that it should be a principle of act.
Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally
relation to an act.
Reply to Objection 1: Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality:
and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however,
in a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is
called first act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in De
Anima ii, text. 5.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the essence of habit to be related to
power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to
which power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a
species of quality.
Reply to Objection 3: Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual
disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as
nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to
act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), that man,
or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the
operation of a healthy man." And the same applies to other habits.
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Whether habits are necessary?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits
we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated above.
But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its
form a thing is good, even as it is a being. Therefore there is no
necessity for habits.
Objection 2: Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power
implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers,
without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no
necessity for habits.
Objection 3: Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is
habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. Given,
therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous.
On the contrary, Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But
perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the
nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be
habits.
I answer that, As we have said above ([1443]AA[2],3), habit implies a
disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or
end, by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed
thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else,
three conditions are necessary. The first condition is that which is
disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so,
that it should be related to it as potentiality is to act. Whence, if
there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act,
and whose substance is its own operation, which itself is for itself,
there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the
case in God.
The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality
in regard to something else, be capable of determination in several
ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of
potentiality in regard to something else, but in regard to that only,
there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject
from its own nature has the due relation to such an act. Wherefore if a
heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is not
in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the [1444]FP,
Q[56], A[2], there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of
the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the
heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed
movement.
The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those
things to which it is in potentiality, several things should occur,
capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject
well or ill to its form or to its operation. Wherefore the simple
qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one
single fixed way, are not called dispositions or habits, but "simple
qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as health,
beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things
which may vary in their relative adjustability. For this reason the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a
disposition": and disposition is "the order of that which has parts
either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species," as we
have said above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore, since there are many things
for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may
vary in their relative adjustability, it follows that habit is
necessary.
Reply to Objection 1: By the form the nature of a thing is perfected:
yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some
disposition. But the form itself is further ordained to operation,
which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is
limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the
form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form be such that
it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be disposed to
its operations by means of habits.
Reply to Objection 2: Power sometimes has a relation to many things:
and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power
has not a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to
determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do
not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of
themselves determined to one mode of operation.
Reply to Objection 3: The same habit has not a relation to good and
evil, as will be made clear further on ([1445]Q[54], A[3]): whereas the
same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are
necessary that the powers be determined to good.
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OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)
We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is a habit in the body?
(2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence
or in respect of its power?
(3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?
(4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?
(5) Whether there is a habit in the will?
(6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?
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Whether there is a habit in the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For,
as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby we act
when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since
they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit in the body.
Objection 2: Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But
habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily
disposition can be a habit.
Objection 3: Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change.
But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is
divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De
Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called
habits.
I answer that, As we have said above ([1446]Q[49], AA[2] seqq.), habit
is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality
either to form or to operation. Therefore in so far as habit implies
disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its
subject. For every operation of the body proceeds either from a natural
quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as
to those operations which proceed from its nature, the body is not
disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one
mode of operation; and we have already said ([1447]Q[49], A[4]) that it
is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual
disposition is required. As to the operations which proceed from the
soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and
secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion to their
operations: whence "by like acts like habits are formed" (Ethic. ii,
1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally
in the soul. But they can be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far
as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the
operations of the soul.
If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a
habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul
as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such
like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of
habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily
changeable.
On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the
Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions
of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species
of quality belonged to the soul alone. And he held that Aristotle
mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as
though they belonged to the first species of quality, but by way of
example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be
easy or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first
species, which are called habits and dispositions. But this is clearly
contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the
same way of health and sickness as examples, as of virtue and science;
and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and
health among habits.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection runs in the sense of habit as a
disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are
from nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from
the soul, and the principle of which is the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to
change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But
they may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject,
because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be
removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to
other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply difficult to
change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And
therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a
habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read in the Greek
[*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of
the soul are called habits simply.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily dispositions which are in the first
species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the
third species, in this, that the qualities of the third species consist
in some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called
passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to
perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then passed
into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary
disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third
species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas Aristotle
puts heat in the third.
Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that
passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, differ in
bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives
heat in this only that it is being heated, and not so as to be able to
give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like
quality if it is permanent. But when it has been brought to the point
that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and
if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to
change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would be a certain
intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or
disposition. But Simplicius disapproves of this, for such intensity and
remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but
on the part of the diverse participation thereof by the subject; so
that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And
therefore we must say otherwise that, as was explained above
([1448]Q[49], A[2], ad 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities
themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the
notion of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same
passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture and dryness,
there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not
occur in regard to like habits and dispositions, primarily and of
themselves.
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Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in
respect of its power?
Objection 1: It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its
essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of
dispositions and habits in relation to nature, as stated above
([1449]Q[49], A[2]). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather
than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul
is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are
in the soul in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers.
Objection 2: Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now
habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of
accident, as we have said in the [1450]FP, Q[77], A[1], ad 5. Therefore
habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers.
Objection 3: Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the
subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it is
prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is
not in a power of the soul as its subject.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in
the various powers of the soul.
I answer that, As we have said above ([1451]Q[49], AA[2],3), habit
implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If
therefore we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in
the soul---that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is
the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way,
habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its
relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the
body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a
partaker, according to 2 Pet. 1, "that we may be partakers of the
Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from
being in the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on
([1452]Q[110], A[4]).
On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is
chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in so far as the soul
is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which
is a condition for a habit, as we have said above ([1453]Q[49], A[4]).
And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers,
therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of
its powers.
Reply to Objection 1: The essence of the soul belongs to human nature,
not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as
a form and nature to which someone is disposed.
Reply to Objection 2: Accident is not of itself the subject of
accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain
order, the subject, according as it is under one accident, is conceived
as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one
accident is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of
color, in which sense power is the subject of habit.
Reply to Objection 3: Habit takes precedence of power, according as it
implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a
relation to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the
principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does
not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is
posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence of
power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act
takes precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to
potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation and
time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13.
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Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the
powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an
irrational part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits
in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to put any
habit in the powers of the sensitive part.
Objection 2: Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the
brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is no
will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above
([1454]Q[49], A[3]). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive
powers.
Objection 3: Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues:
and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it virtue
related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are
no sciences: since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers
cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in
the sensitive part.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some
virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational
part."
I answer that, The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways:
first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according
as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from
natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is;
but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be
ordained to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by
which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.
Reply to Objection 1: The powers of the nutritive part have not an
inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are
no habits in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to
obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for in
so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be
rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
Reply to Objection 2: The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act
at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such
animals act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits
ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain
dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas
by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to do things in
this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can admit
the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts, deterred by fear of
pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this
has become a custom in them, we say that they are tame and gentle." But
the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not
that power of using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the
notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no
habits in them.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to
be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57:
but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to
receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable
that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the
powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive
appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the
command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive
apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility
of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says
(De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom conduces much to a good memory":
the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the
command of the reason.
On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing
and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to their
fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the
members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the
powers which command their movements.
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Whether there is any habit in the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect.
For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above
[1455](A[1]). But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as
stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But the
intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore
the intellect is not the subject of a habit.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the
mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, is
act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality
and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential
and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is
composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is form without matter.
Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the same time as act, being
a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only
in the "conjunction," which is composed of soul and body.
Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill
disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. 25). But
that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect
is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it is stated (De
Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick
witted." Therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect,
which is separate, but in some power which is the act of some part of
the body.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science,
wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in
the intellective part of the soul.
I answer that, concerning intellective habits there have been various
opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible"
[*[1456]FP, Q[79], A[2], ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to
hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in
the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in
habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge
directly in that, which, being only one, would be common to all men.
Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men,
the habits of science, in which men differ from one another, could not
be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the
interior sensitive powers, which differ in various men.
Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of
Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational,
not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the
Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science
and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore
they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect itself.
Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when the
"possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is,
when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars by the intelligible
species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in
act; and this happens when the intellect can act of itself," i.e. by
considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not
in the same way as before learning and discovering." Therefore the
"possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by
which the intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is
able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary to
the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power
to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand and to consider
is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby
one considers is properly in the intellect itself.
Reply to Objection 1: Some said, as Simplicius reports in his
Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is
to a certain extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the
Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the
soul only, but in the "conjunctum." And from this it follows that no
habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as ran the
argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not
a disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of
the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to be in that power
which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the
power as its object.
Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body,
except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima, text. 66.
But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive
intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that the
intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and
not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And
therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the subject of
habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all,
to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the "possible" intellect is the
subject of intellectual habits.
Reply to Objection 2: As potentiality to sensible being belongs to
corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the
"possible" intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the
"possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and
perfect act.
Reply to Objection 3: Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare
their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by
the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of
the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in
a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But
principally it is in the "possible" intellect.
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Whether any habit is in the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For
the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by
means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does
not act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of
habit.
Objection 2: Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as
there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an active
power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all
the powers to their acts, as stated above ([1457]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore
there is no habit in the will.
Objection 3: Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because,
by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. But the
will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which
reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will.
On the contrary, Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it
is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v, 1).
Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.
I answer that, Every power which may be variously directed to act,
needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the
will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And
therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it
is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit,
it is clear that it is principally related to the will; inasmuch as
habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above
[1458](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Even as in the intellect there is a species which
is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive
power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its
object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain
inclination, as we have said above ([1459]Q[6], A[4];[1460] Q[22],
A[2]). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined
sufficiently by the nature of the power itself, the power needs no
quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human
life, that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to
which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has a
relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in
the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities
to incline them, and these are called habits.
Reply to Objection 2: The active intellect is active only, and in no
way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover
and moved (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison
between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to
that which is somehow in potentiality.
Reply to Objection 3: The will from the very nature of the power
inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in
many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some
fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more
promptly.
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Whether there are habits in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For
Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It is not
proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers
in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the manner of
accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject:
for accident of any kind is foreign to them." But every habit is an
accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy
dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other
things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is
prior to and more power than that which is by another [per aliud].
Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto
conformity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And this
seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage
adds: "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain
in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified of
itself."
Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But
disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that which
has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems
that there are no dispositions and habits in them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are
of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and
Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their
habits."
I answer that, Some have thought that there are no habits in the
angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence
Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their
dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, through
the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same in his
Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which is in the soul is its
habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For
everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself."
Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is
manifest from what we have said ([1461]Q[49], A[4]) that only a being
in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned
commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and that
there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account,
excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though
there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some
potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone),
therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may
habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the
potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind.
Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that:
"The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here
below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it
contains in itself."
However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with
regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the
intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible
things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and
therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But
the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of
intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this
belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and
the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we
said in the [1462]FP, Q[55], A[1], so far as it is in potentiality, so
far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible
species in regard to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act,
through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself,
and other things according to the mode of its substance, as stated in
De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it
understand.
But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are
infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to
God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits,
being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that
is to say, that by them they are made like to God.
But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in
angels, since they are immaterial.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of
material habits and accidents.
Reply to Objection 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their
essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of
themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore,
so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do
they need to have habits.
Reply to Objection 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but there
are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by
several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several
things.
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OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their
formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their
diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether any habit is from nature?
(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?
(3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?
(4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
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Whether any habit is from nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of
those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But
habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on
De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.
Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is
sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore
the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be
one.
Objection 3: Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits
are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above
([1463]Q[49], A[4]). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems
that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is
clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.
On the contrary, In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to
understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature:
wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally.
I answer that, One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First
in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is
natural to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency.
Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to
Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in
accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in respect of
both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first,
because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly
from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when
a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but
when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from
nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.
Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in
relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the
foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by
the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this
disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since
such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different
grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of
the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from
nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle,
as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.
But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is
a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]), may be natural
whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the
individual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of
the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the
specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the
part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way
does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be
entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since
they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which
cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in the [1464]FP,
Q[55], A[2]; [1465]FP, Q[84], A[3].
There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their
existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle: in
one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the
appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a
natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific
nature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with
regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the
understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is
owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once
grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive
that every whole is larger than its part: and in like manner with
regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a
part---this he cannot know except through the intelligible species
which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the
Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge
of principles comes to us from the senses.
But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is
natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition
of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well,
since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect.
In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its
beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the
habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the
principles of common law are called the "nurseries of virtue." The
reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which
seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but
rather to the very nature of the powers.
But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there
are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For some are
disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or
such like.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes nature as divided against
reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of
man.
Reply to Objection 2: Something may be added even naturally to the
nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For
instance, with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the
intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it
would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone.
Because that by which something is known, must needs be the actual
likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of
the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act
of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels'
intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of
things understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and
not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those
things which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything
belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the
various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some
not, as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some
habits are natural, therefore all are natural.
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Whether any habit is caused by acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit
is a quality, as we have said above ([1466]Q[49], A[1]). Now every
quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity.
Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather
gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its
own acts.
Objection 2: Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to
that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled:
whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as
may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were
caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would
be mover and moved, active and passive: which is impossible, as stated
in Physics iii, 8.
Objection 3: Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause.
But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as is
clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore
habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits
of virtue and vice are caused by acts.
I answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active
principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active
principle of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by
its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed
or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is
to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive
principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the
appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved
by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the
intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as
it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Wherefore
by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with
regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle
of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is
passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent;
wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the
power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just
as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers,
according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science
are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first
propositions.
Reply to Objection 1: The agent, as agent, does not receive anything.
But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives
something from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.
Reply to Objection 2: The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot
be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by
itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text.
28,29.
Reply to Objection 3: The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it
comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent
principle than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a
more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the
appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first
principles is a more excellent principle than the science of
conclusions.
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Whether a habit can be caused by one act?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For
demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of
one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be
caused by one act.
Objection 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so
do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by
multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it
can be the generating cause of a habit.
Objection 3: Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens
that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act can
cause a habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one
swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short
time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an operation in
respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). Therefore a
habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused
by one act.
I answer that, As we have said already [1467](A[2]), habit is caused by
act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in
order that some quality be caused in that which is passive the active
principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that
because fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not
enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so
that by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. Now
it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely
overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power
is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a
single act, what should be willed in regard to various aspects and
circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely
overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the
majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue.
Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by
many.
But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two
passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See [1468]FP, Q[79], A[2]
ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De
Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular reason,"
that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard
then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain
active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its
passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the
intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a
probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs
to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the
"possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a
single act of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is
concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same
acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed
on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that
"meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused
by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for
instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.
Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.
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Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For
God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, He
would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.
Objection 2: Further, God works in all things according to the mode
which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence
to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are
naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above [1469](A[2]).
Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.
Objection 3: Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can
by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit is
caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the
same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this
seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in
the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God.
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 15:5): "God filled him with the
spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding are
habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God.
I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two
reasons.
The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is
disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature,
namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above
([1470]Q[5], A[5]). And since habits need to be in proportion with that
to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those
habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human
nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine
infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.
The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second
causes, without these second causes, as we have said in the [1471]FP,
Q[105], A[6]. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His
power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature
could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His
power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a
natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the
Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by
custom, but not so perfectly.
Reply to Objection 1: God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to
all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive,
gives certain things to some, which He does not give to others.
Reply to Objection 2: That God works in all according to their mode,
does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows
from this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to
nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a
habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies
of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind
of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habits increase?
(2) Whether they increase by addition?
(3) Whether each act increases the habit?
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Whether habits increase?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase
concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the genus
quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of
habits.
Objection 2: Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18).
But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it
cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.
Objection 3: Further, those things which can be more or less are
subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more
hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is
proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits cannot increase.
On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the
disciples said to our Lord (Lk. 17:5): "Lord, increase our faith."
Therefore habits increase.
I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is
transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on
account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal
things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities,
a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of
quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in
man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms,
we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the
nature of perfection, therefore "in things which are great, but not in
quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says
(De Trin. vi, 8).
Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation
of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of
a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be
"little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science.
But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the
participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or
"less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this
distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a
being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to
consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to
consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.
In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers
concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius
relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the
other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were
susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and
so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of
matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of
themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things
affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect of
the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not
more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in
the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the
Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held that
some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for
instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The fourth
opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms
are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are.
In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe
that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be
something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for
whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and
whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more
or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text.
10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or
subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at
all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect
of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in
itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more
nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are
not denominated from a relation to something else: and much more so,
substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive
their species from something to which they are related, can be
diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and
nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness
of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their
species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more
remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the
oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same
thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according
as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which
various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore
variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health
remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself
may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it
always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may
decrease and still remain health."
Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of
excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the
most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or
less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or
decrease of itself, and how it cannot.
But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by
the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are
susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the
cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be
susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And
therefore every form which is participated substantially by its
subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus
of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity
is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore
is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less.
Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing
receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made.
But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are
connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less,
in respect of their participation by the subject.
Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity.
For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must
remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible.
Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated
more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect
of that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated
more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10)
that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is
in the species of substance," that is, in respect of its participation
of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter,"
i.e. in respect of material dispositions, "more or less are found in
substance."
Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially
indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs
participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do
not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or
less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible
unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity,
which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long,
three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble,
and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.
This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of
more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle
or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to wit, because
indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever
participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility.
It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in
respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two
ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and
dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for
instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science,
which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of
participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is
participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse
aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and
disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they
essentially imply indivisibility.
We shall say further on ([1472]Q[66], A[1]) how it is with the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: As the word "great" is taken from corporeal
quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so
also is the word "growth," the term of which is something great.
Reply to Objection 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a
perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term
giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a
habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers.
Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more
or less.
Reply to Objection 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities
of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the
first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there
follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like
manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive
appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration
follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether habits increases by addition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of
addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred to
forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is
no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is
said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing."
Therefore in habits also there is no increase without addition.
Objection 2: Further, habit is not increased except by means of some
agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for
instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated.
Therefore there is no increase without addition.
Objection 3: Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to
be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more
white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the
addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made
more white, except by an added whiteness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which
is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot,
that was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in like
manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase.
I answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have
said above [1473](A[1]). For we said that increase and decrease in
forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way
not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through the
diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase
of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to
form; but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and
the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is
made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as
though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text.
32, so, by an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot,
as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though
something were added to the form.
For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition,
this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it
be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated
[1474](A[1]) that such an addition or subtraction would change the
species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from
being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be
understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either
because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not
previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who, after being
cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because
some other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot
thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in
either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing,
but a greater white or hot thing.
Since, however, as stated above [1475](A[1]), certain accidents are of
themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find
increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to
the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species
remains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement
increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e. in so
far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or
readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition;
thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same
specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science
increases, as to the subject's participation thereof, in intensity, in
so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering
the same conclusions.
As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive
increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply
healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be
brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in
the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in
intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them.
How this question affects virtues we shall state further on
([1476]Q[66], A[1] ).
Reply to Objection 1: Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First,
by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living
things. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such
is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Phys.
iv, text. 63.
Reply to Objection 2: The cause that increases a habit, always effects
something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject
to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form
to extend further.
Reply to Objection 3: What is not already white, is potentially white,
as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a
new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in
potentiality to those forms, since it has them already actually: but it
is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it
receives through the agent's action.
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Whether every act increases its habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when
the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of
habits, as stated above ([1477]Q[51], A[2]). Therefore a habit
increases when its acts are multiplied.
Objection 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed.
But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike
(Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act
should increase it.
Objection 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like
the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause.
But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they
proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not
every act that increases a habit.
I answer that, "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now
things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being
the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different
mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white,
but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from
less white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as
stated in Phys. v, text. 52.
But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above
([1478]Q[50], A[5]); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or
may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing
an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.
Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to
the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either
increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak
of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For
not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's size as
neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the
multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So,
too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls
short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an
increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
From this it is clear how to solve the objections.
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HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?
(2) Whether it can be diminished?
(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?
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Whether a habit can be corrupted?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit
is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to
act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted.
Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject
remains.
Objection 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either
to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases
through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now
science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its
subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance
that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like manner, neither
can it be lost through the action of its contrary: since intelligible
species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52).
Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost.
Objection 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But
the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a
direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved
directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the
body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the
intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect
independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which
reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or
through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same
reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are
in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 10),
"virtue is more lasting than learning."
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
"forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." Moreover,
by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are
engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary;
indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore a habit
has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be
corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits---for
instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an
incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are,
however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible
subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such
is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the "possible"
intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as
stated above ([1479]Q[50], A[3], ad 3). Consequently the habit of
science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible"
intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted
directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the
part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted
directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly.
Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the
"possible" intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect,
which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in
the "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the
active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and
indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both
speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any
forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about
prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost by being forgotten."
There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the
reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to
the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the
part of those very propositions which are the starting point of the
reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the
assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the
process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is contrary
to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a
false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of
science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception
is the corruption of science." As to virtues, some of them are
intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and
to these applies what we have said of science and opinion. Some,
however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the
soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of
the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to
be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice,
may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is
contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or
deliberate choice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a
second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while
the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a
habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible
species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process
of reason, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the
body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may
prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in
its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by
corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can
corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the
habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless
when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must
be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act:
because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas
the use of learning does not.
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Whether a habit can diminish?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a
habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed
either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it
cannot diminish.
Objection 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by
reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not
become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow
that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. And
if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject,
it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, proper thereto
and not common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has
something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate,
as stated in De Anima i, text. 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a
separable form; which is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any
accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined
with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become
more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its inherence in its
subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense.
On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the
same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore a
habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.
I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as
we have already explained ([1480]Q[52], A[1]). And since they increase
through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they
diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them: since the
diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even
as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of
its increase.
Reply to Objection 1: A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form.
It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the
different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to
the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its
being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a
greater or a smaller number of things.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold, if the essence itself
of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but
that a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not
in the habit, but in its subject.
Reply to Objection 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very
notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if
we take an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject,
which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject:
for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in
defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as
though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but we
give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say
that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose." But if we take accidents
in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in
the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the
accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness."
Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we place the subject as
the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a
"simum" is a "snub-nose." Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident
on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence of the
accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the
concrete. Such are increase and decrease in certain accidents:
wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to
a white thing. The same applies to habits and other qualities; save
that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits
increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we have already clearly
explained ([1481]Q[52], A[2]).
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Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished
through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than
passion-like qualities, as we have explained above ([1482]Q[49], A[2],
ad 3;[1483] Q[50], A[1]). But passion-like qualities are neither
corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not
lessened through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to
make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or
corrupted through cessation from act.
Objection 2: Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now
nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation
from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit
can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
Objection 3: Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the
intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above
time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither,
therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of
time, if one fails for long to exercise them.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of
science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse
has dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other habits of virtue
are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.
I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of
movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement
by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly,
indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this
latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results
through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we cease from
exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened
that habit. For it has been stated [1484](A[1]) that habits are
destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency.
Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary
agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those
habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation
from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue.
For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to
choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use
of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds,
the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe
the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the sensitive
appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed
or lessened through cessation from act. The same applies to the
intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those
things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to
make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in
opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those
fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his
intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and
sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus the
intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation
from act.
Reply to Objection 1: Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to
give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat
were to increase.
Reply to Objection 2: Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive
of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual part of the soul, considered in
itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and
therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of
the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence
the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
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OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether many habits can be in one power?
(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
(3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
(4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?
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Whether many habits can be in one power?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one
power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the same
thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and
powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts
and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore
there cannot be many habits in one power.
Objection 2: Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple
subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is the
cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can
proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in
one power.
Objection 3: Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is
a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the
same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed
at the same time by many habits. Therefore several habits cannot be at
the same time in one power.
On the contrary, The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are
the habits of various sciences.
I answer that, As stated above ([1485]Q[49], A[4]), habits are
dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to
nature, or to operation, which is the end of nature. As to those habits
which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in
one same subject: since in one subject we may take parts in various
ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are
various habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts of the human
body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we
have the habit or disposition of health: while, if we take like parts,
such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect
of nature is strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e.
the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion to
nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in
the same subject.
If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to
operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, there may be
several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of
a habit is a passive power, as stated above ([1486]Q[51], A[2]): for it
is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was
clearly shown above ([1487]Q[51], A[2]). Now a passive power is
compared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to form:
because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so,
too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object
to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move
one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several
acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are qualities or
forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a
determinate species. Consequently several habits, even as several
specifically different acts, can belong to one power.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as in natural things, diversity of species
is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter,
as stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter
belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity of objects
entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in
Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ generically belong to
different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of
objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of
habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in species, but not
vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in
species: but it does not follow that different habits are in different
powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may
be included in one genus, and several species be contained in one
species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and
powers.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a power is simple as to its essence, it
is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically
different acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many
superficially different habits from being in one power.
Reply to Objection 3: A body is informed by its shape as by its own
terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a
power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate
term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same
time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another;
just as neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one
shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided figure. For
the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time
"actually"; and yet it can know several things at the same time
"habitually."
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Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their
objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of
science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the
unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects
specifically distinct.
Objection 2: Further, different sciences are different habits. But the
same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the
physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in
Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by their
objects.
Objection 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the
same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if it
be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be
done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in
order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object
can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits does
not follow diversity of objects.
On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of
their objects, as stated above ([1488]Q[18], A[5]). But habits are
dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according
to the diversity of objects.
I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific
distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms
differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is
proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another
in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every
agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to
something: and all things that imply order to something, are
distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they
are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order:
viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature.
Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three
things. First, in respect of the active principles of such
dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of
specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.
Reply to Objection 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must
consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which
may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction
between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they are both
known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And
consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of
cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.
Reply to Objection 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by one
means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means
of mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the
sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the
movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the
whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism producing
science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And
consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect
of which the habits of science are distinguished.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89;
Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is
in speculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a
diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does.
Moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above
all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said
([1489]Q[18], A[6];[1490] Q[19], A[2], ad 1;[1491] Q[34], A[4]).
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Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and
bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards
contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are
not divided into good and bad.
Objection 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it
is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the
Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation
and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits
cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one same
object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of
concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for
instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philosopher
clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into
good and bad.
On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to
vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits.
I answer that, As stated above [1492](A[2]), habits are specifically
distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles,
but also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways.
First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In
this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since
a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's
nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable
to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since
they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from
human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that
habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and
bad.
Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact
that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature,
while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And
thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is
distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act
befitting some higher nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so far
as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it
happen that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of
habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided
into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another
bad; but not by reason of one habit being something good, and another
about something bad.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the good which is common to every
being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but
some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate,
viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a
difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate
repugnant to a determinate nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Several good habits about one same specific thing
are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as
stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are
distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in
keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are
contrary to one virtue.
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Whether one habit is made up of many habits?
Objection 1: It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits.
For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems to
be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once,
but little by little out of several acts, as stated above ([1493]Q[51],
A[3]). Therefore one habit is made up of several.
Objection 2: Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts
are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude,
temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
Objection 3: Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a
habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one
science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one
habit is made up of many.
On the contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But
nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made up
of many.
I answer that, A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly
concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every
perfection should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence,
just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so far as
they have something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, so
also a habit extends to many things, in so far as they are related to
one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to one nature,
or to one principle, as was clearly stated above ([1494]AA[2],3).
If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall
find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this multiplicity is
directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it
is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed to several habits,
even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to
many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.
Reply to Objection 1: That a habit is engendered little by little, is
due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact
that the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly
changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins by being
imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same
applies to other qualities.
Reply to Objection 2: The parts which are assigned to each cardinal
virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but
subjective or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57],
A[6], ad 4; [1495]SS, Q[48]).
Reply to Objection 3: In any science, he who acquires, by
demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit
indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the
scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is
engendered in him: but the habit which was in him previously is
perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the
conclusions and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one
flows from another.
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TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i.e. VIRTUES
(QQ[55]-70)
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OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since
habits, as we have said ([1496]Q[54], A[3]), are divided into good and
bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are
virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts,
Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of
vices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1)
the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of virtue; (4)
the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human virtue is a habit?
(2) Whether it is an operative habit?
(3) Whether it is a good habit?
(4) Of the definition of virtue.
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Whether human virtue is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue
is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit of
anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as
a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is
reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix;
cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will." But
use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an
act.
Objection 3: Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our
actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep.
But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but
acts.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue
is the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering
which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and
using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, denominates either
an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action
or a relation.
Objection 5: Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there
natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers.
Neither therefore are human virtues habits.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and
virtue are habits.
I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a
thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the
end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according
as it is determinate to its act.
Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their
acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these
natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational
powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular
action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are
determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have
said above ([1497]Q[49], A[4] ). Therefore human virtues are habits.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to
which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its
act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or
to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When
therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken
for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can
reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a
hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say
'strength,' which is the original signification of the Latin 'virtus':
thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its
'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the
objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power.
Reply to Objection 2: Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in
the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to
which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is
nothing else than the good use of free-will.
Reply to Objection 3: We are said to merit by something in two ways.
First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and
thus we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as
by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive
power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say that virtue is the order or ordering
of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us
love is set in order by virtue.
Reply to Objection 5: Natural powers are of themselves determinate to
one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as
we have said.
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Whether human virtue is an operative habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to
be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health and
beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health
and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue.
Objection 2: Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in
reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from the
Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while
some have a virtue to be not always, but at some definite time. Now as
natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational
beings. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only to act, but
also to being.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that
virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best."
Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God
Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. 3, 6, 14) to Whom the
soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that
virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to God, likening it, as it
were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, therefore,
an operative habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a
thing is that which makes its work good."
I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some
perfection of power, as we have said above [1498](A[1]). Wherefore,
since power [*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality'
in the first case, and 'power' in the second] is of two kinds, namely,
power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the
perfection of each of these is called virtue. But power in reference to
being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power
in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle
of action, since everything acts in so far as it is in act.
Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the
soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other
animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to
the soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul,
namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human
virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but
belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human
virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act.
Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.
Reply to Objection 1: Mode of action follows on the disposition of the
agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since
virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs
pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding
disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue
itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit, the
powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that
which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable
disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are suitable
dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a
principle of operation.
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue which is referred to being is not proper
to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason,
which are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 3: As God's substance is His act, the highest
likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as
we have said above ([1499]Q[3], A[2]), happiness or bliss by which man
is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human
life, consists in an operation.
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Whether human virtue is a good habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it
should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But
there is a virtue even of sin; according to 1 Cor. 15:56: "The virtue
[Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not always
a good habit.
Objection 2: Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not
only referred to good, but also to evil: according to Is. 5: "Woe to
you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness."
Therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue
[Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is an
evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also to evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can
doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good,
and his work good likewise."
I answer that, As we have said above [1500](A[1]), virtue implies a
perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the
limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of any power must needs
be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div.
Hom. ii) that every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue
of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human
virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good
works.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be
perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief
or robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains
(Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is applied to evil
things: so that the "virtue" of sin is said to be law, in so far as
occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so as to attain to the
limit of its possibility.
Reply to Objection 2: The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink,
consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens
that, together with this falling away from reason, some lower power is
perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in
direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But
the perfection of that power, since it is compatible with a falling
away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect,
according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness
of the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which
is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect in infirmity," not
of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers.
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Whether virtue is suitably defined?
Objection 1: It would seem that the definition, usually given, of
virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind,
by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which
God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, since
virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to
be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore unsuitable to
describe virtue as a "good quality."
Objection 2: Further, no difference is more common than its genus;
since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than
quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should
not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference of quality.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we
come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the
field, it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues
even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10).
Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind."
Objection 4: Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence
the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It
is therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue,
when we say that virtue is that "by which we live righteously."
Objection 5: Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it.
But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that
"pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is
untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of virtue."
Objection 6: Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine
commenting on Jn. 15:11: "He shall do greater things than these," says
[*Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. Ap. 11]: "He who created
thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore
unsuitable to say that "God works virtue in us, without us."
On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine from whose words
this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii,
19.
I answer that, This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential
notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is
gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all
the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything,
is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a
good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the
difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for
"quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.
Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has
any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned,
and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about
which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included
in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a
certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in
general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is
mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it
must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to
evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good,
sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true
and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred
to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are
always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live
righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes
directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one
makes bad use."
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this
definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God works
in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the
definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or
infused.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is first seized by the intellect is
being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and
consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being.
Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that
oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But
this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for
everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of
white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and
non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had
being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or
one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them
something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it
something is good.
Reply to Objection 2: Good, which is put in the definition of virtue,
is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which
extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with
regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the
soul is to be in accord with reason."
Reply to Objection 3: Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the
soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i,
13). And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of
virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Justice has a righteousness of its own by which
it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are
the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q[60], A[2];
[1501]SS, Q[58], A[8]). But the righteousness which denotes order to a
due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as
stated above (Q[19], A[4]), is common to all virtues.
Reply to Objection 5: One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for
instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or
by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as
principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil.
Reply to Objection 6: Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any
action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of
the words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which
are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our
part, for He works in every will and in every nature.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?
(2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?
(3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?
(4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the
subject of virtue?
(5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of
virtue?
(6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?
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Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of
the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue is that
by which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the soul,
and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a power, but in
the essence of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue
is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise."
But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by
the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power,
any more than to the essence of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, power is in the second species of quality. But
virtue is a quality, as we have said above ([1502]Q[55], A[4]): and
quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is
not the subject of virtue.
On the contrary, "Virtue is the limit of power" (De Coelo ii). But the
limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a
power of the soul.
I answer that, It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a
power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of
virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that
which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative
habit, as we have said above ([1503]Q[55], A[2]): for all operation
proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that
virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which
is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation
proceeding from the thing's power. Therefore a power of the soul is the
subject of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it
is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it
belongs to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence
in the living thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for the operation
of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously,
inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions.
Reply to Objection 2: Good is either the end, or something referred to
the end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the
work, this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to
the work, and consequently, to the power.
Reply to Objection 3: One accident is said to be the subject of
another, not as though one accident could uphold another; but because
one accident inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the
body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject
of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of
virtue.
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Whether one virtue can be in several powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers.
For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various way
from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as
directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive power as
executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three
things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to work
steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to will"
belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several powers.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right
reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in the
will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi,
12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers.
On the contrary, The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the
same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue
cannot be in several powers of the soul.
I answer that, It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in
two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way it
is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of
powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity
of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever
there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits; but not
vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or more,
not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue
can belong to several powers, so that it is in one chiefly, while it
extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition,
in so far as one power is moved by another, and one power receives from
another.
Reply to Objection 1: One act cannot belong to several powers equally,
and in the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in
various degrees.
Reply to Objection 2: "To know" is a condition required for moral
virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But
moral virtue is essentially in the appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it
presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see
further on [1504](A[3]; Q[57], A[4]).
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Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of
virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is
love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive
power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what
has been said above ([1505]Q[55], A[3]). Now good is not the object of
the intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of
virtue is not the intellect, but the appetitive power.
Objection 3: Further, virtue is that "which makes its possessor good,"
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects
the intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said
to be a good man on account of his science or his art. Therefore the
intellect is not the subject of virtue.
On the contrary, The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the
subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above
given, of virtue ([1506]Q[55], A[4]). Therefore the intellect is the
subject of virtue.
I answer that, As we have said above ([1507]Q[55], A[3]), a virtue is a
habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act
in two ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an aptness
to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the
aptness to speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man always
speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make
a solecism: and the case is the same with other sciences and arts.
Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the
right use of that aptness: for instance, justice not only gives man the
prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.
And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply,
in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of what it is actually:
therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to
do good, and to be good; for instance, because he is just, or
temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since
virtue is that "which makes its possessor good, and his work good
likewise," these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they
make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the
first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: because they do not
make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they
make their possessor good simply. For through being gifted in science
or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for
instance, a good grammarian or a good smith. And for this reason
science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times
they are called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2).
Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative
sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical intellect, but
also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the
Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that science, wisdom and
understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject
of a habit which is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or
some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this
is, that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are
in some way rational, as we have said above (Q[9], A[1]; Q[17],
AA[1],5; [1508]FP, Q[82], A[4]): and therefore if man do well actually,
this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a
man to do well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well,
must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved by the
will.
Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the
other powers: for a man considers something actually, because he wills
to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate
to the will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And in
this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of
Faith: for the intellect is moved by the command of the will to assent
to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will"
[*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the
subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right reason of things
to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in
regard to the principles of this reason of things to be done, that is
in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the
rectitude of the will, just as to the principles of speculative truth
he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect.
And therefore as the subject of science, which is the right reason of
speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to the
active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect
in its relation to the right will.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood of
virtue simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that
it depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will,
whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above (Q[25],
AA[1],2,3; Q[27], A[4]; [1509]FP, Q[20], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: The good of each thing is its end: and therefore,
as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act
of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in
regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative or practical, is
a virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers virtue simply so called.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers
cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to us and
dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since
for this reason it is called human virtue. It is therefore impossible
for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which
are parts of the sensitive appetite, as we have said in the [1510]FP,
Q[81], A[2].
Objection 2: Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use
of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's body:
for the Apostle says (Rom. 7): "I know that good does not dwell in my
flesh." Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue
is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body is
ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man
make good use of his body: "For instance, if my coachman, through
obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving;
this is all due to me." But just as the soul rules the body, so also
does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the
irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due
to the rational powers. Now "virtue is that by which we live rightly,"
as we have said above ([1511]Q[55], A[4]). Therefore virtue is not in
the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational
powers.
Objection 4: Further, "the principal act of moral virtue is choice"
(Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and
concupiscible powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above
([1512]Q[13], A[2]). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and
concupiscible powers, but in the reason.
On the contrary, Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and
temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic.
iii, 10) says that "these virtues belong to the irrational part of the
soul."
I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered
in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of the
sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the
subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered as participating in
the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey
reason. And thus the irascible or concupiscible power can be the
subject of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in the
reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must
needs assign virtues.
For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and
concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from one power
according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless
both powers be well disposed to the act: for instance, the act of a
craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his
instrument be well disposed to act. Therefore in the matter of the
operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they
are moved by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in
respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the irascible and
concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of the power which
moves through being moved, depends on its conformity with the power
that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and
concupiscible powers is nothing else but a certain habitual conformity
of these powers to reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The irascible and concupiscible powers considered
in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and
dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and
are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this way
they can be the subject of human virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of
virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being
moved by reason, we "yield our members to serve justice"; so also, the
irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, have not the
good of virtue, but rather the infection of the "fomes": whereas,
inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, the good of reason is
begotten in them.
Reply to Objection 3: The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible
and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the
body obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things
in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: whence the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "soul rules the body with a
despotic command" as the master rules his slave: wherefore the entire
movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this reason virtue is
not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible
powers do not obey the reason blindly; on the contrary, they have their
own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason,
whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "reason rules the
irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command" such as that
by which free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their
own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in the
irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well
disposed to act.
Reply to Objection 4: In choice there are two things, namely, the
intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the
preferential choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to
prudence (Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible
powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of
the soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers. And therefore
those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are in the
irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the
interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite
can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the
interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: for the powers
of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. [1513]FP, Q[78],
A[4]] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can
be virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can
be hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so also
can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers
mentioned above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in the interior
powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers
of apprehension.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent.
Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the power of
memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior
sensitive powers of apprehension.
On the contrary, All virtues are either intellectual or moral (Ethic.
ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the
intellectual virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from
Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive
powers of apprehension.
I answer that, In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there
are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the
Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that "in remembering one thing after
another, we become used to it; and use is a second nature." Now a habit
of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto
nature. Wherefore Tully says of virtue in his Rhetoric that "it is a
habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Yet, in man, that
which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of
apprehension, is not a habit properly so called, but something annexed
to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above
([1514]Q[50], A[4], ad 3).
Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be
virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens that
anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power
which consummates the good act. But the knowledge of truth is not
consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers
prepare the way to the intellective knowledge. And therefore in these
powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these are
rather in the intellect or reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive appetite is related to the will,
which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And
therefore the act of the appetitive power is consummated in the
sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the
subject of virtue. Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are
related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason that
the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight
(De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is
terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive
virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason.
And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is
of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one
of the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a
fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part.
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Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue.
Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power by
reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is
of the very essence of the will, according to the Philosopher (De Anima
iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And
to this good every virtue is ordered, since everything naturally
desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his Rhetoric,
is a "habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore the
will is not the subject of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral
(Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the
intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is
subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational
by participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will.
Objection 3: Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained,
are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of
some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in
respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue
in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same
act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot be the subject
of virtue.
On the contrary, Greater perfection is required in the mover than in
the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers.
Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the
irascible and concupiscible powers.
I answer that, Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act,
then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which
habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not suffice
for the purpose.
Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object.
Since, therefore, as we have said above ([1515]Q[19], A[3]), the object
of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect
of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it. But if man's
will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as
regards the whole human species, such as Divine good, which transcends
the limits of human nature, or as regards the individual, such as the
good of one's neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore
such virtues as those which direct man's affections to God or to his
neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection is true of those virtues which are
ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude,
which are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear
from what we have said ([1516]Q[35], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 2: Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers
are rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether,"
i.e. in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the
appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be
a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on
([1517]Q[62], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: Some virtues are directed to the good of
moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in
these cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of
the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need exists
only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the
intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological
virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?
(2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?
(3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?
(4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?
(5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?
(6) Whether "eubulia," "synesis" and "gnome" are virtues annexed to
prudence?
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Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect
are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have said
above ([1518]Q[55], A[2]). But speculative habits are not operative:
for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative
matter. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are not
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made
happy or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic. i,
9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human
goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather things pertaining to
nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues.
Objection 3: Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and
virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not
subalternate, as the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore
speculative habits are not virtues.
On the contrary, The speculative habits alone consider necessary things
which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic.
vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul
which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than they
are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues.
I answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated
above ([1519]Q[55], A[3]), a habit, as we have already observed
([1520]Q[56], A[3]), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first,
because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides
aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above
stated ([1521]Q[55], A[3]), belongs to those habits alone which affect
the appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive
power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses.
Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the
appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective
part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer
aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth (since this is
the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the
second way, as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit.
For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does not follow
that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider
the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge: that
he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his
will. Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or
justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this
way too there can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done
out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the "contemplative
life has greater merit than the active life."
Reply to Objection 1: Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior.
Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with
the speculative faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the
speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior
act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it
is an operative habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In
the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these
speculative virtues are not about those things whereby man is made
happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word "whereby" indicates the
efficient cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the
supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to be about
its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those
things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these
virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because they are a
kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation
of truth, as we have already stated ([1522]Q[3], A[7]).
Reply to Objection 3: Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the
second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty.
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Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz.
wisdom, science and understanding?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of
the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.
Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7.
Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the
intellectual virtues.
Objection 2: Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in
respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of
these objects, as we have already explained ([1523]FP, Q[77], A[3]).
Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material
objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now the principle
of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is
known. Therefore the understanding of principles should not be set down
as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions.
Objection 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in
the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason
employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it
employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the
result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual
virtue, so also should opinion be.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three
alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and
understanding.
I answer that, As already stated [1524](A[1]), the virtues of the
speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect
for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work. Now a truth
is subject to a twofold consideration---as known in itself, and as
known through another. What is known in itself, is as a "principle,"
and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that
perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called
"understanding," which is the habit of principles.
On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is
understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason's
inquiry, and is as a "term." This may happen in two ways: first, so
that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is
the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since "things that are
knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in
their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with
respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and
chiefly in its nature. And about these is "wisdom," which considers the
highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly
judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no
perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes.
But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable
matter, it is "science" which perfects the intellect. Wherefore
according to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are
different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one
wisdom.
Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has
that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate
conclusions from principles. But since it has something proper to
itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not
only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles,
therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science.
Reply to Objection 2: When the formal aspect of the object is referred
to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit
or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object:
thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, and
light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is
seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles
of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion
being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with the
conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them.
Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to
science, which considers the conclusions also: while to consider the
principles in themselves belongs to understanding.
Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are
distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a certain
order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part
is more perfect than another; for instance, the rational soul is more
perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal.
For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of
higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the
highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and
science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the
principles on which they are based.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1525]Q[55], AA[3],4), a
virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to
evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its
evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues,
whereby we tell the truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and
suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in
Ethic. vi, 3, they are not intellectual virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no one makes bad use of
virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work
badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a
virtue of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
art is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But
just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are
speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would
have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a
virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues,
which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul.
I answer that, Art is nothing else but "the right reason about certain
works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends, not on
man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the
goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as such, is commendable,
not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the
work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet
it has something in common with the speculative habits: since the
quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern
to them also, but not how the human appetite may be affected towards
that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it
matters not how his appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be
joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we
have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as
the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither art nor
speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit,
which is the property of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only
as regards the aptness to work well.
Reply to Objection 1: When anyone endowed with an art produces bad
workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary
to the art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words
are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. Wherefore,
just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (A[2],
ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this reason that it is called a
virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect virtue, because it
does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something
further is requisite: although there cannot be a good use without the
art.
Reply to Objection 2: In order that man may make good use of the art he
has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for
this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely,
a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral
virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice,
which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in speculative matters there is something by
way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or
the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained
to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of
comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to
distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the
body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in
servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free
[liber]. On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to
any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if
the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that the notion of
art is more applicable to them.
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Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from
art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity of
works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various
arts about works widely different. Since therefore prudence is also
right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, prudence has more in common with art than the
speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters
that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some
speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should
prudence be called an art.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel"
(Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, as
stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship,
and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from art.
On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art
(Ethic. vi, 5).
I answer that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different
kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above [1526](A[1]; Q[56], A[3])
that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring
aptness for a good work: while some habits are virtues, not only
through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring
the use. But art confers the mere aptness for good work; since it does
not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not only aptness for
a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it
presupposes the rectitude thereof.
The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of
things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason of things to
be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in Metaph. ix,
text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing into outward matter,
e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is an action
abiding in the agent, e.g. "to see," "to will," and the like.
Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human
actions, consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to
outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the things with
which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in
speculative matters, depend on the principles from which reason argues;
just as we have said above (A[2], ad 2) that science depends on and
presupposes understanding, which is the habit of principles. Now in
human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters,
as stated in Ethic. vii, 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence,
which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well
disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of
his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue,
which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good things made by
art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of those things
themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the
appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to a craftsman
who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it
is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, since
rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art.
Accordingly it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.
Reply to Objection 1: The various kinds of things made by art are all
external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue.
But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a
distinct kind of virtue, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Prudence has more in common with art than a
speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for
they are both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that
may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues,
then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear
from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is of good counsel about matters
regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some
arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those
arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters
of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots,
but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good
counsel about all the concerns of life.
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Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to
lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it is
the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of
which we judge of a man's life: for prudence is the right reason about
these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in
things that are made, save in order that they be made, but not after
they have been made. Neither, therefore is prudence necessary to man in
order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps
only in order that he may become virtuous.
Objection 2: Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel,"
as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, but
also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence
in order to lead a good life, but it is enough that he follow the
counsels of prudent men.
Objection 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always
tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem to be
the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking
counsel about what is to be done; since human actions are about things
that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14):
"The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain."
Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned an intellectual
virtue.
On the contrary, It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human
life, when it is written (Wis. 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth
temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such
things as men can have nothing more profitable in life."
I answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For
a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it
matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that
he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. And,
since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of
choice requires two things: namely, the due end, and something suitably
ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end
by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object
of which is the good and the end. And to that which is suitably
ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in
his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained
to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue
is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably
affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is
prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good
life.
Reply to Objection 1: The good of an art is to be found, not in the
craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason
about things to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into
external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing
made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is
concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good of
prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its perfection:
for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above
[1527](A[4]). Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that
his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it be
necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should
carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were proper to such
things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not
dominion over their actions. Wherefore the craftsman needs art, not
that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and
have it in good keeping: whereas prudence is necessary to man, that he
may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man does a good deed, not of his own
counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite
perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in
moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well
simply; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same
for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth
of the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the
intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly
in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary
matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an
intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things. On the
other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity
with right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters,
which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent
matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of
interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only
about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the
practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and
prudence, as regards things to be done.
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Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence?
[*{euboulia, synesis, gnome}]
Objection 1: It would seem that "{euboulia, synesis}, and {gnome}" are
unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For "{euboulia}"
is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it
"belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic. vi, 9).
Therefore "{euboulia}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather
is prudence itself.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The
highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is
judgment. Now "{synesis}" enables us to judge well. Therefore
"{synesis}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a
principal virtue.
Objection 3: Further, just as there are various matters to pass
judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take
counsel. But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel.
Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there is no
need, besides "{synesis}" of the virtue of "{gnome}."
Objection 4: Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three
other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of the
present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn.
Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," and the like.
Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to
prudence.
On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence.
I answer that, Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another,
that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now
there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the
first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command.
The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect,
which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but
the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far as this is
ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things
that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man, the
chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate.
Consequently, that virtue which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as
obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it,
viz. "{eustochia}," which perfects counsel; and "{synesis}" and
"{gnome}," which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, and of
whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as
though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but
because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue,
viz. "{euboulia}."
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment about what is to be done is directed to
something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a
man's judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does
not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded
aright in the point of what has to be done.
Reply to Objection 3: Judgment of anything should be based on that
thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper
principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need
no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only
one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two
virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on common
but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative matters,
there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters;
whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ
according to their different objects. "{Synesis}" and "{gnome}" differ
in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for
"{synesis}" judges of actions according to the common law; while
"{gnome}" bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where
the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on
([1528]SS, Q[51], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 4: Memory, understanding and foresight, as also
caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from
prudence: but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as
they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover,
subjective parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political
economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion,
potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as
secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them
later (SS, Q[48], seqq.).
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OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the
difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their
distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3)
of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others.
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?
(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?
(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual
virtue?
(4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?
(5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral
virtue?
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Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because
moral virtue is so called from the Latin "mos," i.e. custom. Now, we
can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every
virtue is a moral virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral
virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue is
a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from
choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational
mean in some way, as we shall explain further on ([1529]Q[64],
AA[1],2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is
a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since every
human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with
reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees with his
reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is
a moral virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a
man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he
is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are
not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated above
([1530]Q[57], A[2]). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue.
I answer that, In order to answer this question clearly, we must
consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able
to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning.
For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts 15:1):
"Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you
cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural
inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is
applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2) that "rushing
violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are
in the habit of doing], they slew them": and the word is used in the
same sense in Ps. 67:7, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner
[moris] to dwell in a house." For both these significations there is
but one word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for
each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes with a long, and
sometimes a short "e".
Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or
quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other
meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom
becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a
natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs
properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the
powers to their acts, as explained above ([1531]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore
not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the
appetitive faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes "mos" in the sense of
"custom."
Reply to Objection 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but
no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive
part of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of
the appetitive faculty ([1532]Q[13], A[1]). Wherefore a habit of
choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is
that habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although the
acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice.
Reply to Objection 3: "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii,
text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of
the appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by
consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the
appetitive faculty.
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Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from
intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that
virtue is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual virtue.
Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.
Objection 2: Further, some authors put science in the definition of
virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit regarding
those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and holiness as "a
science which makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to God." Now
science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be
distinguished from intellectual virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is
the rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the
intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral
virtue does not differ from intellectual.
Objection 4: Further, a thing does not differ from that which is
included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the
definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6)
that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason
as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that fixes
the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as stated
in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from
intellectual.
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that "there are two kinds
of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral."
I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and
whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason
somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without
any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, provided
they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the
hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit.
i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. as a master
rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that
all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way.
If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason
be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in
view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the
reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was
the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of prudence,"
as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is
in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins,
does so through ignorance.
Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive
faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of
opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason
commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power," whereby a man
rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of
opposition. Hence Augustine says on Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that "sometimes
we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at
all," in so far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty
cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And in
this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as
a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however,
that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this
individual act of choice.
Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that
his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue;
but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of
moral virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as
the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the
principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are
moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in
conformity with reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any
form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the
right reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason
about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue is the
art of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to
other virtues, by participation, for as much as they are directed by
prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were
based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what
we have said about art (ad 1).
The same applies to the Third Objection.
Reply to Objection 4: Right reason which is in accord with prudence is
included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence,
but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral
virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of prudence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?
Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into
moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral
and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual
virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by all among the four
cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on
([1533]Q[61], A[1]). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into
intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.
Objection 2: Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not
reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral
virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are
consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not
adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
Objection 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they
are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz.
science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above
([1534]Q[57], AA[2] ,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they
are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral
virtue. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual
and moral.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is
twofold, intellectual and moral."
I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his
doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human
actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are
the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text.
48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one
of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or
practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an
intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a
moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue is either
intellectual or moral.
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue.
But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common
with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done,
as stated above ([1535]Q[57], A[4]). It is in this sense that it is
reckoned with the moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Contingency and perseverance are not perfections
of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions
abound in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the
case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it
conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however,
perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest
reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since
intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect
of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so that it
may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on
which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent and
persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles
be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by the habit
corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal
agent employing an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if
the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive
faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect;
however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action will
be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be
a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting from pleasures,
and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something
less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9).
Reply to Objection 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues:
for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual
virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is
"a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature
may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no
need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is
evident of natural things devoid of knowledge. Therefore in a man there
may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining him to consent to
his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains
perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous
and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason.
Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.
Objection 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works.
But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural
inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without
intellectual virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues,
unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues."
But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ([1536]Q[57],
A[5]). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.
I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual
virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding
and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a
habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a
choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be
directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines
the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which
is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have
reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel,
judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the
virtues annexed to it, as stated above ([1537]Q[57], AA[5],6).
Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and
consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by
the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both
in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right
reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally
known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so
also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of nature in things devoid of
reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of
necessity require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with
choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires
that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: A man may be virtuous without having full use of
reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those
things which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men
have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through
lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Mat.
10:16: "Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple
as doves."
Reply to Objection 3: The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a
kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the
stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be,
unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of
fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind,
the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more
grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be
not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to
right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according
to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.];
but also it needs to be "joined with right reason," as Aristotle
declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
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Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral
virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the
perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive
appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of the
reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the
appetitive faculty; and can be without it.
Objection 2: Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things
makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper
matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the
moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most
akin to the moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good
counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having
the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.
On the contrary, To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral
virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral
virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi,
5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.
I answer that, Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be
without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right
reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but
also in particular); about which things actions are. Now right reason
demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason
argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also
particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is
rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he
understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical
science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright
about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid
universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is
destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed
by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire
seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his
reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of
science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal
principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with
regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs
to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it
were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue:
for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such
a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently
the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man
to have moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the
appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as
arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of
prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of
principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is
based.
Reply to Objection 2: It does not depend on the disposition of our
appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it
does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters:
in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does
not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel,
but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the
impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of
prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another.
And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ
accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the
relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue
in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?
(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?
(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
(4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?
(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
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Whether moral virtue is a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the
mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean
between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.
Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another,
are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such
as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.
Objection 3: Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for
another's ills, as stated above ([1538]Q[35], A[8]). Now "Cicero the
renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine
states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue.
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are
neither virtues nor vices."
I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for
three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive
appetite, as stated above ([1539]Q[22], A[3]): whereas moral virtue is
not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite,
being a kind of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in themselves
good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to
reason: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable
both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with
reason. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is
referable to good alone, as stated above ([1540]Q[55], A[3]). Thirdly,
because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good
only, or to evil only; even then the movement of passion, as passion,
begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite
tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of
virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the
appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the
definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit of
choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint
it."
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason
of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it
establishes the mean between passions.
Reply to Objection 2: If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil
deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to
mean sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a
vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so
far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of
virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason";
viz. "when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor
are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he
bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from
being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions.
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Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion.
For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who is
not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not
give way." The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all
moral virtues are without passion.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as
health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue
is a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv).
But the soul's passions are "the soul's diseases," as he says in the
same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither
is passion compatible with virtue.
Objection 3: Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even
in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the
judgment of prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that "when they,"
i.e. the soul's passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to
grasp the truth." Therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is
perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but
if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy."
But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore
moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with
them.
I answer that, The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as
Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the
soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the
Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral
virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.
This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of
words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not
discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and
the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and
concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the
passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of
their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other
emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the
intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions
being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These
emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose
deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man,
if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [*Noct.
Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in
our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and
when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind
of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed
with sorrow," in so far as "these passions forestall the use of reason
without his approving of such things or consenting thereto."
Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they
cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately;
as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any
movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in
so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic.
ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from
passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion
should be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from
those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time."
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many
other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his
own mind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the
passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher
rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not
freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that when he says "a
gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand this of inordinate
passion.
Reply to Objection 2: This and all similar arguments which Tully brings
forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of
reason's command.
Reply to Objection 3: When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason,
so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel
and the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as
through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of
reason's command.
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Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. 8:7:
"She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and
justice, and fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom "hath no
bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is
incompatible with virtue also.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is
incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De
Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue,
which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to
virtue and is incompatible with it.
On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in
Him, for He said (Mat. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death."
Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held
that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i.e.
"three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead
of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; instead of fear,
"caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could
be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.
First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they
held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought that, just
as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so
man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But this is
unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever
conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not
his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which
is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him
moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man can be without grave
sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins,
according to 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive
ourselves." A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not
actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to
be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to 2 Cor. 7:10: "The
sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto
salvation." Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily sorrow for
another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the
same way as the other passions are when moderated by reason.
Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about
evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is
about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the
enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one
possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the
mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary
to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is
unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous
man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by reason.
Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by
sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates.
Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to
reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an
object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for
avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake
of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.
Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue
is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the
other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no
matter how.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted proves that the wise man is
not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders
wisdom. Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in
whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful:
but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but
moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to
the present state of life.
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Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the
passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is
about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are
passions, as stated above ([1541]Q[23], A[4];[1542] Q[31], A[1];[1543]
Q[35], AA[1], 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the
passions.
Objection 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty
which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above
([1544]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore every moral virtue is about the
passions.
Objection 3: Further, some passion is to be found in every moral
virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some
are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in
Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the
passions.
On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the
passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq.
I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by
directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by
reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently
there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's
direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of
the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective
appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as
stated above ([1545]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore not all the moral virtues
are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations.
Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and
sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting
from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of
virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the
words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now
every action and passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in
this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as about
something that results from virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the
subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the
will, where there are no passions, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper
matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for
all cases.
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Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion.
For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the
passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether
without passion.
Objection 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from
its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the
passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom.
7:5) they are called "passions of sins." Therefore perfect virtue is
altogether without passion.
Objection 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as
Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all
things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is
without any passion.
On the contrary, "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as
stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot
be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.
I answer that, If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as
the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is
without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of
the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about
the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.
The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue
makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the
function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their
proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by
exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the
bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the
sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.
Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but
about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice:
because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion.
Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the
will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased
through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive
appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the
higher, as stated above ([1546]Q[17], A[7];[1547] Q[24], A[3]).
Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue
is, the more does it cause passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces
ordinate passion.
Reply to Objection 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that
leads to sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of
its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels,
as there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels
is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the
good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the
body's help.
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HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another:
under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?
(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are
distinct from those which are about passions?
(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?
(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of
the passions?
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Whether there is only one moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because
just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the
subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong
to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is
only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence.
Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts
their respective inclinations.
Objection 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material
objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the
formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one
thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is
but one moral virtue.
Objection 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by
their end, as stated above ([1548]Q[1], A[3]). Now there is but one
common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and
proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves
are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.
On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above
(Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive
part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in
the [1549]FP, Q[80], A[2]; [1550]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore there
cannot be only one moral virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([1551]Q[58], AA[1],2,3), the moral
virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ
specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as
stated above ([1552]Q[54], A[2]). Again, the species of the object of
appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it
receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the
passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it
receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the
agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if
the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a
form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity
something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter
receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically
as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation:
thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received
into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the
adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for
instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of
various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various
adaptability of matter.
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of
commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved.
But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so
to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation
(Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of
reason belong to various species, according to their various relations
to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species
and are not one only.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all
moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one
kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such
matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appetitive
power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its
various relations to reason, the directing power.
Reply to Objection 2: This formal element is one generically, on
account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account
of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from
the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they
be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
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Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are
about passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into
those which are about operations and those which are about passions.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an
operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or
sorrow." Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above
([1553]Q[31], A[1];[1554] Q[35], A[1]). Therefore the same virtue which
is about passions is also about operations, since it is an operative
habit.
Objection 2: Further, the passions are principles of external action.
If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a
consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues
are about both passions and operations.
Objection 3: Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill
towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive
appetite are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about
operations are also about passions.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to be about
operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions
(Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).
I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to
virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has
some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow
which are passions, as stated above ([1555]Q[59], A[4], ad 1).
Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about
which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which
are about operations must needs differ from those which are about
passions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain
operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no
matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and
evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In
operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the
operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such
operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to
another. For this reason justice and its parts are properly about
operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some
operations, good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent.
Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in
which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like
operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which
are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with
temperance, fortitude and the like.
It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that
the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate passion
of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due
measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is
destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure.
Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed
in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate
anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first
considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two
consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in
some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about
passions, for the reason given above.
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Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about
operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to
belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is
but one virtue about operations.
Objection 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are
directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the
other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause
diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good,
does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man's
actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not
cause a diversity of moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various
operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of
operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of
justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and
again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there
are not different virtues about different operations.
On the contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both
of which are about operations.
I answer that, All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in
one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to
another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The
reason for this is that in external operations, the order of reason is
established, as we have stated [1556](A[2]), not according as how man
is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness
of the thing itself; from which becomingness we derive the notion of
something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it
pertains to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such
virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of
justice. But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these
virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in
another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt
differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor
already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt
there are various virtues: e.g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to
God; "Piety," whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country;
"Gratitude," whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice properly so called is one special virtue,
whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent.
But the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which
something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: That justice which seeks the common good is
another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an
individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and
Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man
to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the
common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it
directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common
good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice,
receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save
logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical
difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that
is active through the command of another virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: There is the same kind of due in all the
operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the
same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it
may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative
justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ([1557]SS, Q[61],
A[1]).
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Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues
about different passions. For there is but one habit about things that
concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of
sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and
they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated
above ([1558]Q[25], AA[1],2,4;[1559] Q[27], A[4]). Therefore there is
but one moral virtue about all the passions.
Objection 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about
different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral
virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is
one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear
and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is
no need for different moral virtues about different passions.
Objection 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of
different species, as stated above ([1560]Q[23], A[4]). Now there is
but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there
are not different moral virtues about different passions.
On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about
desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.
I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue
about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power
as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the
concupiscible faculty, as stated above ([1561]Q[23], A[1]).
On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily
suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some passions
are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear
and daring, and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition to
one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral
virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands
in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but
one mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly,
because there are different passions contradicting reason in the same
manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by
withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the
different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require
different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in
a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the
attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love
proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the
same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or
dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible
passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different
things: for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and
despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome
something contrary which has wrought harm. Consequently there are
different virtues about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the
concupiscible passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity,
about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions concur in one common principle
and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not
suffice for the unity of moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle
causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as
in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too
between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a
second nature, consents to reason's dictates.
Reply to Objection 3: Those three passions are directed to the same
object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the
same virtue.
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Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the
passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ
according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects
of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral
virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the
objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a
house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore
neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ according
to the objects of those passions.
Objection 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the
sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate
habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the
species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so
that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and
the same applies to the other passions.
Objection 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various
objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less
pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of
virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same
applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according
to the objects of the passions.
Objection 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good.
But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus
temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia"
[*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be
different virtues about fears of evils.
On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about
pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games.
I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason;
whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.
Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their
relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the
appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are
variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different
species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason,
they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason
is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore nothing
hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions,
without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about
several passions, as stated above [1562](A[4]); and again, a difference
of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference
of passions, since several virtues are directed about one passion, e.g.
pleasure.
And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong
to diverse virtues, as stated above [1563](A[4]); therefore a
difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always
causes a specific difference of virtues---for instance the difference
between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good
and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules man's lower
powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence,
one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by
sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to
the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason,
and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues.
Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and
pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the
inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to
man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's
good in relation to other men. And every such difference, being
differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the
sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life
either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of
the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of
"temperance." As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are
not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence
there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is
about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3).
On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner
power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the
former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body,
while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods
again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern
the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which
way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has
no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base
condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in
common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money
considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or
love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult
to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence"
[*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken
absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia"
[*{philotimia}], i.e. "love of honor": while if we consider it as hard
to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity."
Wherefore liberality and "philotimia" seem to be in the concupiscible
part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.
As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard
to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the
concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his
behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to
wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions,
viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the
same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards
another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in
his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue
which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may
be rendered "affability." Secondly, one man behaves towards another by
being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another
virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For
frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters
than play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games,
which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. iv, 8).
It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten
moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance,
liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness,
friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in
respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we
add "justice," which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.
Reply to Objection 1: All objects of the same specific operation have
the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same
specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the
passions do.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same rule
as virtues are, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: More and less do not cause a difference of
species, unless they bear different relations to reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil: because
evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to
reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there
being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion.
Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and,
again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the other
hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be
not a great good in that particular kind of passion. Consequently there
are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal
virtues?
(2) Of their number;
(3) Which are they?
(4) Whether they differ from one another?
(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting,
perfect, and exemplar virtues?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called
cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division
are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal
rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the
division of the genus "virtue." Therefore none of them should be called
principal.
Objection 2: Further, the end is principal as compared to the means.
But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues
are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the
moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.
Objection 3: Further, that which is essentially so is principal in
comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual
virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral
virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated
above ([1564]Q[58] , A[3]). Therefore the intellectual virtues are
principal, rather than the moral virtues.
On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor
in spirit" (Lk. 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal
virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these
are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.
I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to
speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ([1565]Q[56],
A[3]), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which
requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only
confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done.
On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers
imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of
the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well
without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the
perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues
which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues.
Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual
virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly
shown above ([1566]Q[57], A[4]). Consequently, those virtues which are
called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral
virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its
species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the
generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one
species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect
of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is
applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another,
nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of
the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance
principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue
into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not
found in the same way in all things.
Reply to Objection 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated
above ([1567]Q[58], A[3], ad 3). Hence they should properly be called
not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in
prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject,
they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards
good, which is the object of the appetite.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are four cardinal virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues.
For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as
is clear from what has been said above ([1568]Q[58], A[4]). But that
which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone
is a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral
virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical
reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore
there are only two cardinal virtues.
Objection 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher
than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to
rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that
there are many more principal virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of
good works is built on four virtues."
I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal
principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either
way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as
defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as
existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal
virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according as the reason puts its
order into something else; either into operations, and then we have
"Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need
of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their
thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions
inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a
curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions withdrawing
us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. through fear of danger or
toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason
dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude."
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of
virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz.
the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by
"Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is
threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty,
subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of
"Fortitude."
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues
simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.
Reply to Objection 2: That part of the soul which is rational by
participation is threefold, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks
before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject
and as to the formal principle.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?
Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called
principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the
principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all
the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any
be called a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should
above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for
Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues
without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind."
Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.
Objection 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal.
But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: "Patience hath a
perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal
virtue.
On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De
Invent. Rhet. ii).
I answer that, As stated above [1569](A[2]), these four are reckoned as
cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as
we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain
acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is
found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its
judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined by
reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found
chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person,
and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found
chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the
pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good
defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in
perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.
First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they
are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all
the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in
reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue
that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice;
every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called
temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any
passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as
also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this
way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the
objections fail.
Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated,
each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus
they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are
called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of
the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which
commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between
equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against
dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other
virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called
principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse
and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1):
"There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no
perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound
fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice,
without prudence, fortitude and temperance." But this would not be so,
if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the
different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore
the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the
function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of
temperance is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic.
xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself,
and is not weakened and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he
says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in
all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that these
virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the
necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should have
knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular
end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness
and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to belong to prudence
which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i.e.
choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on
the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man
should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude,
which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and
steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is
general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct
from one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are
four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he
applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same
four virtues are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above [1570](A[3]), these four virtues are
understood differently by various writers. For some take them as
signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in
all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain
rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a
certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any
matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions
or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a
disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in
accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil
involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this
way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct
virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from
the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a certain
firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said,
belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a "virtue," it is
directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this,
we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a
"moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in
all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to
belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion,
which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction
from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to
reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way
of a kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations.
According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct
from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one
another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit,
and virtue, and moral virtue.
Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according
as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter,
in which special commendation is given to that general condition from
which the virtue's name is taken as stated above [1571](A[3]). In this
way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits,
differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the
first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues
qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of
prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are
directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest,
for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less
difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of
touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to
do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of
death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense
fortitude is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be
brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far,
to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers
of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to
remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De
Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear,
and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust,
after showing himself to be unconquered by toil."
From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance
observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by
the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are
taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense
that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down
by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may,
however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues,
perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly
divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and
social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the
"exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God." Now the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice,
fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God." Therefore these virtues
cannot be exemplar.
Objection 2: Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without
any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul
that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it
has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the
passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above
([1572]Q[59], A[5]) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without
passions. Therefore there is no such thing as "perfect" virtue.
Objection 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs
and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it seems
wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is
not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he
despises what most men admire, viz. power and office." Therefore there
are no "perfecting" virtues.
Objection 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their
country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice
that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social."
On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus,
together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The
four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social*
virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae:
literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect
[*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul]
virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf. Chrysostom's
fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the
modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds
within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and
suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common
weal."]
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs
to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is
God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar
of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist
the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as
existing originally in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so
that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while
temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is
that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His
unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in
His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).
Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on
Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him
according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues;
since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the
conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been
speaking of these virtues until now.
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to
Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as
Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as
your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48), we must needs place some
virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues
which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of
movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way
and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called
"perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of
God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the
thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows,
neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being
afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and
justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow
the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who
have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the
"perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of
God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of
passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto
by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the
Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues
according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about
buying and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires;
for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.
Reply to Objection 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men
living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues
of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence
Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social
virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean;
"the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; "the
third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is
impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind,"
viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking
of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.
Reply to Objection 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids
is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little
earlier: "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of
their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also
to those who have retired from public life on account of failing
health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded
to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with what
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a
hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this
burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of
truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the
pressure of charity."
Reply to Objection 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal
directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into
the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v,
1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we
understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but
also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or
even towards one individual.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?
(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual
and moral virtues?
(3) How many, and which are they?
(4) Of their order.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are any theological virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues.
For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a
perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which
is disposed according to nature." But that which is Divine is above
man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a
man.
Objection 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But
the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ([1573]Q[61], A[5]),
which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are
not virtues of man.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because
they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all
things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed
to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any
habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now
the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and
charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord
believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him."
Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God.
Therefore they are theological virtues.
I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he
is directed to happiness, as was explained above ([1574]Q[5], A[7]).
Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ([1575]Q[5],
A[5]). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which
man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a
happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the
power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about
which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers
of the Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the
capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to
act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to
this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God
some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural
happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of
his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like
principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their
object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly,
because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these
virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained
in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain
thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological
virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as
kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion,
man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that
these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of
which he is made a partaker.
Reply to Objection 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though
God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us
virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but
exemplate virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to
God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in
proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their
nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the
object of supernatural happiness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and mora
l
virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not
distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological
virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as
to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues
which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the
virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore,
the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us
to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs
us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it
considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not
distinct from the intellectual virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the
four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity,
which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not
distinct from the theological.
On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinct from that
which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above
man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in
proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ([1576]Q[58], A[3]).
Therefore they are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above ([1577]Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits are
specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal
difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues
is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge
of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and
moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore
the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's
intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the
theological virtues, supernaturally.
Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7)
reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as
they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on
the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always
charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of
love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of
the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called,
then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each
cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and
cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; Q[28], A[6], ad
2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of
charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity
essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way,
as we shall show further on (Q[65], AA[2],5; [1578]SS, Q[23], A[7]).
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Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological
virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not
fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological
virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural
inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues
directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz.
the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one
theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the
intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the
intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is
imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral
virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion.
Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God.
Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective
part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be
only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other,
the will.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain
faith, hope, charity, these three."
I answer that, As stated above [1579](A[1]), the theological virtues
direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural
inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter
happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or
intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles
which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which
are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in practical
matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends
naturally to good as defined by reason.
But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness,
according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither
hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared
for them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above
things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to
direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man
receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of a
Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith.
Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that end as
something attainable---and this pertains to hope---and as to a certain
spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into
that end---and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is
moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement
is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellect requires intelligible species
whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in
addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it
to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the
end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power
is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be
directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was
need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection:
since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed.
Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall
short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are
above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in
proportion to man, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of God is
stronger than men."
Reply to Objection 3: Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement
to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there
must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely,
hope and charity.
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Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is
not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes
that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues,
according to Eph. 3:17: "Being rooted and founded in charity."
Therefore charity precedes the others.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man
cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and
loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping." Therefore it seems that
faith precedes charity, and charity hope.
Objection 3: Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as
stated above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a
passion, as stated above ([1580]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore charity, which
is love, precedes hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now
there remain faith, hope, charity."
I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of
perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes
form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith
precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits are
all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to
anything, either by hoping or loving, unless that thing be apprehended
by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith that the intellect
apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of
generation, faith precedes hope and charity. In like manner a man loves
a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact
that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone, he
looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the
very reason that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so
that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their
respective acts.
But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope:
because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive from
charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the
mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of
them all, as we shall state further on ([1581]SS, Q[23], A[8]).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man
hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this
belongs to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible
for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not already
possessed, but which he hopes to possess.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1582]Q[40], A[7]), in treating
of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object,
viz. the good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes
hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope
also regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some
good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though
afterwards hope is increased by love. Because from the fact that a man
thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love
him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in
him.
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OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?
(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
(3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?
(4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as
infused virtue?
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Whether virtue is in us by nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and
are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the monks:
"If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow nature it
is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on Mat. 4:23, "Jesus went about," etc.,
says: "He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice,
humility, which man possesses naturally."
Objection 2: Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason,
as was clearly shown above ([1583]Q[55], A[4], ad 2). But that which
accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's
nature. Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
Objection 3: Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be
natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written
(Job 31:18): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out
with me from my mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and
is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts
remain, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all
men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.
I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained
by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, who
upheld the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf. [1584]FP, Q[45],
A[8]; Q[65], A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without,
those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated from
some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly
from within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially in matter; and
partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the
agent.
In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they
are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would
pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and
virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body, are
removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being
polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said that they
are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active
intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and
virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but
not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher
(Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth.
To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in
which something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to his
specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And,
since each thing derives its species from its form, and its
individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational
soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in respect
of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific
nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular
temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of his individual
nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body,
considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the
soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular
soul.
In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in
respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be
found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both
knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral
virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for
good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the
individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in the body,
some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to
wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of the body,
according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or
hindered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the
rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In
this way one man has a natural aptitude for science, another for
fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual
and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively,
but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while the
perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of
action, but on various modes, in respect of the various matters, which
constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various
circumstances.
It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according
to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the
theological virtues, which are entirely from without.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two
argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature, inasmuch
as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the
sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body has from
birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately,
another for some other virtue.
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Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
Objection 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by
habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi
cvi.] commenting on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin,"
says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good
without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking,
virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now faith cannot
be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by God, according to
Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith." Therefore no acquired
virtue can be in us by habituation.
Objection 2: Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are
incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God,
according to Wis. 8:21: "I knew that I could not otherwise be
continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be
caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God.
Objection 3: Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the
perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its
cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more
efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much
more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.
I answer that, We have spoken above ([1585]Q[51], AA[2],3) in a general
way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a
special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note
that, as stated above ([1586]Q[55], AA[3],4), man's virtue perfects him
in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode,
species, and order," as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in
"number, weight, and measure," as expressed in Wis. 11:21, man's good
must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is
twofold, as stated above ([1587]Q[19], AA[3],4), viz. human reason and
Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more
things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the
Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.
It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined
according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts:
inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the
aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs
man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason,
cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but
is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in
giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which
God works in us without us" (Super Ps. 118, Serm. xxvi). It is also of
these virtues that the First Objection holds good.
Reply to Objection 2: Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused
virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But
actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue;
because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated
above ([1588]Q[49], A[3]): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit
of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is
directly contrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal
sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered
from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in
the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason.
There are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without
grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological
virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will
be more fully explained later ([1589]Q[109], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above [1590](A[1]; Q[51], A[1]),
certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by
nature. These principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired
through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more
excellent than the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of
the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite
which results through the appetite partaking of reason, which
rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so
far as they proceed from higher principles, can cause acquired human
virtues.
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Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?
Objection 1: It would seem that no virtues besides the theological
virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself,
save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by
second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), "it is God's
rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and
moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as stated above
[1591](A[2]). Therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused
in us by infusion.
Objection 2: Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works
than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to
direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other
supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God.
Objection 3: Further, nature does not employ two means where one
suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our
souls, according to a gloss on Heb. 1 [*Cf. Jerome on Gal. 1: 15,16].
Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means
of infusion.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and
prudence and justice and fortitude."
I answer that, Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and
principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired
by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in
us, as above stated [1592](A[1]; Q[51], A[1]): instead of which natural
principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are
directed to a supernatural end, as stated (Q[62], A[1]). Wherefore we
need to receive from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion,
to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological
virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural
principles of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be
caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the
theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from
God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to
our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately.
But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard
to other things, yet in relation to God.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of those naturally instilled principles
does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs
in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his
supernatural end.
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Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue
?
Objection 1: It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in
species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues,
according to what has been said [1593](A[3]), do not differ seemingly,
save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are
specified, not by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the
infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of
infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires
of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.
Objection 3: Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which
is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a
creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man
begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as
one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that
acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species.
On the contrary, Any change introduced into the difference expressed in
a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of
infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in us without us,"
as stated above ([1594]Q[55], A[4]). Therefore acquired virtue, to
which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused
virtue.
I answer that, There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The
first, as stated above ([1595]Q[54], A[2];[1596] Q[56], A[2];[1597]
Q[60], A[1]), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their
objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that
virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in
respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The
formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in
these concupiscences: while the material element is something on the
part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is
appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human
reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed
according to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the
mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of
the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the
Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring it into
subjection" (1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like.
It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in
species; and the same applies to the other virtues.
The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to
which they are directed: for a man's health and a horse's are not of
the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to
which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the
Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues
according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government. In
the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men behave well
in respect of their being "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the
household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God" (Eph. 2:19), differ from the
acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.
Reply to Objection 1: Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in
relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper
objects, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Both acquired and infused temperance moderate
desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated:
wherefore their respective acts are not identical.
Reply to Objection 3: God gave the man born blind an eye for the same
act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently
it was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give
a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts.
But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.
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OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of
virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues,
(4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?
(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational
mean?
(3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?
(4) Whether the theological virtues do?
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Whether moral virtues observe the mean?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean.
For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme.
Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated
in De Coelo i that "virtue is the limit of power." Therefore moral
virtue does not observe the mean.
Objection 2: Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues
tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, and
magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3.
Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.
Objection 3: Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe
the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the
contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some
moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus
virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the
extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to the poor
is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is
not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue
is a habit of choosing the mean."
I answer that, As already explained ([1598]Q[55], A[3]), the nature of
virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is
properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to
some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive
movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good of
that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its
rule: thus the good things made by art is that they follow the rule of
art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance
from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by their
exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly
the case in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the
good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason.
Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality
or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue observes the
mean.
Reply to Objection 1: Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of
reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If
therefore we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that
which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz.
conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other
extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of
its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes
the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state," in so
far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is
an extreme in reference to the 'best' and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to
its conformity with reason.
Reply to Objection 2: In actions and passions the mean and the extremes
depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from
being extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the
same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through being
in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and
magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity of the respective
objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and a maximum:
but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances,
then it has the character of a mean: since these virtues tend to this
maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. "where" it is
right, "when" it is right, and for an "end" that is right. There will
be excess, if one tends to this maximum "when" it is not right, or
"where" it is not right, or for an undue "end"; and there will be
deficiency if one fails to tend thereto "where" one ought, and "when"
one aught. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
3) that the "magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, but the
mean in the right mode of his action."
Reply to Objection 3: The same is to be said of virginity and poverty
as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and
poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e.
according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if this
be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, or again
for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done when it
ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by
deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or
poverty.
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Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the
rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists
in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8,
is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real
mean.
Objection 2: Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral
virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a mean
between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is
not the rational, but the real mean.
Objection 3: Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical
or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of
justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue
is not the rational, but the real mean.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue
observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason."
I answer that, The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First,
according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as
though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this
sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, but the act
of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational
mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as that which the
reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every mean of
moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated [1599](A[1]),
moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right
reason.
But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean:
in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, for instance,
in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the
real mean, but is considered in relation to us: and such is the mean in
all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is
about operations, which deal with external things, wherein the right
has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above
([1600]Q[60], A[2]): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same
as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his
due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with
interior passions wherein the right cannot be established in the same
way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions;
hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the passions,
with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the passions.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two
arguments take the rational mean as being in the very act of reason,
while the third argues from the mean of justice.
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Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe
the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming to the
rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so
that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore the intellectual
virtues do not observe the mean.
Objection 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an
intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that "virtue
observes the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint
it." If therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, this mean
will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there
would be an indefinite series of virtues.
Objection 3: Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries,
as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there seems
to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as
they are in the intellect, are not in opposition to one another, but
are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick.
Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues.
On the contrary, Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean
in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes the
mean.
I answer that, The good of anything consists in its observing the mean,
by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may happen
to be excessive or deficient, as stated above [1601](A[1]). Now
intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as
stated above (Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue
consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a
measure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true; in the case
of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi,
2); in the case of practical virtue, it is the true in conformity with
a right appetite.
Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely,
is measured by things; since things are the measure of our intellect,
as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we
think or say, according as the thing is so or not. Accordingly the good
of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way
of conformity with things themselves, in so far as the intellect
expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are
not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be
excess if something false is affirmed, as though something were, which
in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is
falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas in reality it is.
The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in
relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; so that both
in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists
in conformity with things. But if we consider it in relation to the
appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the
rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of
prudence---of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as
ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between
excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases.
Reply to Objection 1: Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as
stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that
measure.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no need for an indefinite series of
virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not
another kind of virtue, but things themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: The things themselves that are contrary have no
contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the
other: nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of
affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end of
Peri Hermenias. For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in contrary,
but in contradictory opposition to one another, so long as we consider
their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we have
"being" and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet if we refer
them to the act of the mind, there is something positive in both cases.
Hence "to be" and "not to be" are contradictory: but the opinion
stating that "good is good" is contrary to the opinion stating that
"good is not good": and between two such contraries intellectual virtue
observes the mean.
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Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?
Objection 1: It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean.
For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. Now
the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much
more does theological virtue observe the mean.
Objection 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite
being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists
in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue
perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above ([1602]Q[62],
A[3]). Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean.
Objection 3: Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean
between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course
between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii):
thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we observe
the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence
of two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches, who held to
one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue observes the
mean.
On the contrary, Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to
sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by
excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is
written (Ecclus. 43:33): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you
can: for He is above all praise." Therefore theological virtue does not
observe the mean.
I answer that, As stated above [1603](A[1]), the mean of virtue depends
on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may
exceed or fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological
virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and
thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because
our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to His
goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His omnipotence and
loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power: so that never
can we love God as much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope
in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in
such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a
mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit.
The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with
us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought,
yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving,
according to the measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible
to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in
reference to us.
Reply to Objection 1: The good of intellectual and moral virtues
consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be
exceeded: whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue,
considered in itself, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our
intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule;
whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an
uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope observes the mean between presumption and
despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be
presumptuous, through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of
his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which
according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no
excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. In
like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not
by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe
too much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a middle position
between contrary opinions, as was explained above.
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OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there
are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?
(2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?
(3) Whether charity can be without them?
(4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?
(5) Whether charity can be without them?
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Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected
with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the
exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise
himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the
acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral
virtue without another.
Objection 2: Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues.
Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or
magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man
cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other virtues; and (Ethic.
iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth,
is modest, but not magnanimous." Therefore the moral virtues are not
connected with one another.
Objection 3: Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part
of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective
part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we
may have one science, without having another. Neither, therefore, are
the moral virtues connected with one another.
Objection 4: Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this
can only be because they are united together in prudence. But this does
not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one
may be prudent about things to be done in relation to one virtue,
without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one
may have the art of making certain things, without the art of making
certain others. Now prudence is right reason about things to be done.
Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one
another.
On the contrary, Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20: "The virtues are connected
and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several":
and Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in
the human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory
says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of
no account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc.
ii): "If you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs
be that you have none at all."
I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as
imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or
fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good
deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If
we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we
find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are prompt
in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds of
chastity.
But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good
deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that
they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two
reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of assigning the
distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above
([1604]Q[61], AA[3],4), some distinguish them according to certain
general properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying that
discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to
temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we
consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the
connection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as
virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and
so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by
Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" as
a virtue, "if isolated from the others: for there can be no true
prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues
to speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf.[1605] Q[61], A[4],
OBJ[1]). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4).
Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their
matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for
their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above
([1606]Q[58], A[4]), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it
is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective
habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end,
which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also
correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by
prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that are
directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one
has the moral virtues: since prudence is "right reason about things to
be done," and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to
be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence,
just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the
understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence
without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly that the
moral virtues are connected with one another.
Reply to Objection 1: Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his
general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have
to be done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise
himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he
exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire
the habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by good
deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for
instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of
concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining
his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the
absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In
the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character
of virtue, if prudence be lacking.
But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some
eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since it does
not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such
virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues,
without actually having the habits of these virtues---provided we speak
of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired those
other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because
when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and
expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would
acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a
geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires scientific knowledge
about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind
before. Now we speak of having a thing when we are on the point of
having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text.
56): "That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all."
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual virtues are about divers matters
having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the
various sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the
connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about
passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For
all the passions have their rise in certain initial passions, viz. love
and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure and sorrow.
In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue
are related to one another, and to the passions. Hence the whole matter
of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence.
Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles.
And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on the
understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral
virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal principles which
are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not
depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other
intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence,
because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason
the appetite, as stated above ([1607]Q[9], A[1];[1608] Q[58], A[5], ad
1).
Reply to Objection 4: Those things to which the moral virtues incline,
are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not
the principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though
reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet
in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any
principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle, "A
whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the science of
geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his
conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are related to one another, but not
things "made," as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of
prudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a
deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not
occur in things to be made.
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Whether moral virtues can be without charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity.
For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every virtue
save charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can be in
none except the good," as stated in the same book. Therefore the other
virtues can be had without charity.
Objection 2: Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human
acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had
otherwise than by infusion, according to Rom. 5:5: "The charity of God
is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us."
Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without charity.
Objection 3: Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through
depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed,
it surpasses prudence, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ,
which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral virtues are not
connected with charity, and can be without it.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:14): "He that loveth not,
abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues,
since it is "by them" that "we lead a good life," as Augustine states
(De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of
charity.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), it is possible by means
of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good
works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of
man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even
as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce
good works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the
character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by
human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be
without charity. For it has been stated above [1609](A[1]; Q[58],
AA[4],5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and
that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because these latter
make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of
the procedure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is
much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end,
which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in
respect of other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in
speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first
indemonstrable principle, that "contradictories cannot both be true at
the same time." It is therefore evident that neither can infused
prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral
virtues, since they cannot be without prudence.
It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused
virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since
they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those,
namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not
simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some
particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply.
Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on the
words, "All that is not of faith is sin" (Rom. 14:23), says: "He that
fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct
be good."
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect
virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes
its possessor good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds good of virtue in the sense
of acquired virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Though charity surpasses science and prudence,
yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all
the infused moral virtues.
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Whether charity can be without moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem possible to have charity without the moral
virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is
superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the
fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from 1 Cor. 13:4,
seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if
one has charity, other virtues are superfluous.
Objection 2: Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the
works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their own
sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. ii,
3). Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they
find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing
to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. Therefore
many have charity without the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet
there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says
(on Lk. 17:10) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not
having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have.
Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that
he has all the moral virtues.
On the contrary, The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is
written (Rom. 13:8): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the
Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having
all the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts
of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that has charity,
has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis.
clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de Temp.] that charity contains all
the cardinal virtues.
I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused together with charity.
The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works of
grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find
that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has
also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are
provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls
empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it
directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works
that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues
must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them
that man performs each different kind of good work.
It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not
only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, again, that
whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused
moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: In order that the act of a lower power be
perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in
the lower power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect
action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed.
Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the
end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also
those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to the
end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving
principle in respect of those things that are referred to the end.
Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with
charity.
Reply to Objection 2: It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit,
finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and
consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account
of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit
of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or
unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience
difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary dispositions
remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect
of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which they are
acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain saints are said not to have certain
virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those
virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all
the virtues.
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Whether faith and hope can be without charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith and hope are never without
charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be
more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused
moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith
and hope be without charity.
Objection 2: Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says
(Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection
thereof, as stated above ([1610]Q[62], A[3]). Therefore faith cannot be
without charity.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can
be no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this love
that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.
On the contrary, A gloss on Mat. 1:2 says that "faith begets hope, and
hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be
without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without
charity.
I answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be
considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as
complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good
works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a
perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good,
but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well
done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit
that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of
virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is good:
but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well,
i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which
reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.
Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without
charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without
charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to
believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will: to will not as
one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is
the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every right
movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a
perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be without
prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in
looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it is based on
the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to
expect future bliss through merits which one has not yet, but which one
proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and
this is possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be
without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly
so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should
not only do what is good, but also that we should do it well (Ethic.
ii, 6).
Reply to Objection 1: Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even
infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for
this involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the
ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend
either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity,
although they are not virtues without charity, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of faith considered as a
perfect virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby
we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and
this is not without charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity can be without faith and hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope.
For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God
naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss.
Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.
Objection 2: Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according
to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now the root is
sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without
faith and hope, and the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He
had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as
we shall explain further on ([1611]TP, Q[7], AA[3],4). Therefore
charity can be without faith and hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to charity,
according to Prov. 8:17: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by
hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above ([1612]Q[62],
A[4]). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and
hope.
I answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a
certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain
mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in
Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 Jn.
4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," and
from 1 Cor. 1:9, where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom you are
called unto the fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship of man with
God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun
here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life,
by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and hope. Wherefore
just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one
disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or
familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is
impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and
colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore
charity is quite impossible without faith and hope.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that
love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which
object we are directed by faith and hope.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far
as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such
are the precursors of charity, as stated above ([1613]Q[62], A[4]), and
so charity is impossible without them.
Reply to Objection 3: In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on
account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had
manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See
above[1614], Q[4], A[3]]: so that in Him was perfect charity.
__________________________________________________________________
OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?
(2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?
(3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;
(4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;
(5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;
(6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less
than another. For it is written (Apoc. 21:16) that the sides of the
city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the
virtues. Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot
be greater than another.
Objection 2: Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a
maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in a
maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher states
(De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that
"virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil
purpose." Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less
than another.
Objection 3: Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the
power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God
Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue
cannot be greater than another.
On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance,
there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and
increase: for it is written (Mat. 5:20): "Unless your justice abound
more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into
the kingdom of heaven": and (Prov. 15:5): "In abundant justice there is
the greatest strength [virtus]." Therefore it seems that a virtue can
be greater or less than another.
I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than
another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying to
virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue
is greater than another; since a cause is always more excellent than
its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most
excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said ([1615]Q[18],
A[5];[1616] Q[61], A[2]) that the cause and root of human good is the
reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness
the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far
as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better than another,
according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice,
which is in the will, excels the remaining moral virtues; and
fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance,
which is in the concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6.
The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of
the same species. In this way, according to what was said above
([1617]Q[52], A[1] ), when we were treating of the intensity of habits,
virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself;
secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider
it in itself, we shall call it greater or little, according to the
things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a virtue, e.g.
temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But
this does not apply to science and art: for every grammarian does not
know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said
rightly, as Simplicius states in his Commentary on the Predicaments,
that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the
nature of virtue consists in a maximum.
If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then
be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in
different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to
attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and
this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural
disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a
greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the
measure of the giving of Christ," as stated in Eph. 4:9. And here the
Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous,
unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because the
nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of
right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics
thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated
in Ethic. ii, 6. Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more
nearly and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when
several arches aim at a fixed target.
Reply to Objection 1: This equality is not one of absolute quantity,
but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately,
as we shall see further on [1618](A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have
the character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways explained
above: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.
Reply to Objection 3: God does not work by necessity of nature, but
according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various
measures of virtue, according to Eph. 4:7: "To every one of you [Vulg.:
'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all
equally intense. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:7): "Everyone hath his
proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that."
Now one gift would not be more proper than another to a man, if God
infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that
the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.
Objection 2: Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one
and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another in one
virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not
the case: since various saints are specially praised for different
virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith (Rom. 4), Moses for his meekness (Num.
7:3), Job for his patience (Tob. 2:12). This is why of each Confessor
the Church sings: "There was not found his like in keeping the law of
the most High," [*See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)],
since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the
virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.
Objection 3: Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's
pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows that a
man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of
another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same
man.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those who are
equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance," and so on.
Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal.
Therefore all virtues are equal in one man.
I answer that, As explained above [1619](A[1]), the comparative
greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring
to their specific nature: and in this way there is no doubt that in a
man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than
faith and hope. Secondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree of
participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or
remiss in its subject. In this sense all the virtues in one man are
equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man
is equal: thus the fingers are unequal in size, but equal in
proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another.
Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as
the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues is their
connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above ([1620]Q[65],
A[1]) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first
is according to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues
to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found
together with the other in any matter. In this way virtues cannot be
said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties
equal. Augustine alludes to this kind of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when
he says: "If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is
more prudent than the other; it follows that the fortitude of the
latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in
fortitude, since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will find
that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all in the
same way."
The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of
those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective
matters ([1621]Q[65] , AA[1],2). In this way the connection among moral
virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from
charity, and not from the inclination, which is on the part of the
subject, as stated above ([1622]Q[65], A[1]). Accordingly the nature of
the equality among virtues can also be considered on the part of
prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues:
for in one and the same man, so long as his reason has the same degree
of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to
right reason in each matter of virtue.
But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the
inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform the act
of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from
nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of God.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer
to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are
all of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it
refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one man
has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account
of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in which all
the infused virtues are connected.
Reply to Objection 2: One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue,
another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable
readiness for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the
intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting,
is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the
sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover,
they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable
to the intellectual virtues.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its
possessor good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue,
and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of
prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But
according to Ethic. vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of the
end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore moral
virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual
virtue that regards moral matters.
On the contrary, Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is
rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the
essentially rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by
essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore
intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.
I answer that, A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways:
first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from
being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better
relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle, Topic. iii.].
Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific
nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as
explained above ([1623]Q[54], A[2];[1624] Q[60], A[1]). Hence, speaking
simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent
object. Now it is evident that the object of the reason is more
excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends
things in the universal, while the appetite tends to things themselves,
whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking
simply, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more
excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the appetite.
But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue,
which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to move the other
powers to act, as stated above ([1625]Q[9], A[1]), is more excellent.
And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for
it is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of
virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the
intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, simply speaking.
Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues are more lasting than the
intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining
to the life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the
sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the
objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of
action. That the moral virtues are more necessary for human life,
proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively.
Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that
they are not referred to something else, as a useful thing is referred
to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we
have a kind of beginning of that happiness which consists in the
knowledge of truth, as stated above ([1626]Q[3], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why man is said to be good simply, in
respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is
because the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated
above ([1627]Q[56], A[3]). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely
that moral virtue is better relatively.
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in
the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of
each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that
virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of
prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral
virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what is due.
Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore
liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice.
Objection 2: Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that
in which it is most perfect. Now, according to Jam. 1:4, "Patience hath
a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than
justice.
Objection 3: Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every
virtue," as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even
justice. Therefore it is greater than justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is
the most excellent of the virtues."
I answer that, A virtue considered in its species may be greater or
less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater
simply, whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above
[1628](A[1]). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the
moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by
considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is
the will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above (Q[8],
A[1]; Q[26], A[1]): its object or matter, because it is about
operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also
in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of virtues"
(Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues, which are about the
passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive
movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the rational
good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all
is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which
subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters of life and
death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about
the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the
most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man
and the just man are honored more than others; because the former,"
i.e. fortitude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both
in war and in peace." After fortitude comes temperance, which subjects
the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one
individual, or in the one species, viz. in matters of food and of sex.
And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called
principal virtues, in excellence also.
A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or
adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is more excellent simply
than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more
excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in some
accidental mode of being.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of liberality needs to be founded on an
act of justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of
his own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from
justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas justice can
be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality,
as being more universal, and as being its foundation: while liberality
is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to
justice.
Reply to Objection 2: Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by
enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is
also excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by
charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also
inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is
more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this matter.
It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues simply.
Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but
also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient;
but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude.
Reply to Objection 3: There can be no magnanimity without the other
virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as
their ornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others,
but not simply.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the
intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one
commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in
Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic.
vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to
which of these each individual should devote himself, and to what
extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that
prudence is greater than wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man
to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing to
that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is
"right reason about things to be done," whereby man is brought to
happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man
attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it
seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs,
which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the
object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De Trin.
xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to Job
26:26: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore
science is a greater virtue than wisdom.
Objection 4: Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than
knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from
indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of
understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a
greater virtue than wisdom.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is
"the head" among "the intellectual virtues."
I answer that, As stated above [1629](A[3]), the greatness of a virtue,
as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom
surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom
considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning
of the Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an
effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects;
hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the other
intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them
all.
Reply to Objection 1: Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom
about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater
virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the
greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, as stated in the
same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice
versa: because "the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he himself is
judged by no man" (1 Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no business with
supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers
things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore
prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom;
for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper
for the king.
Reply to Objection 2: Prudence considers the means of acquiring
happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the
Supreme Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were
perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in
the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect
in respect of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the
act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future happiness, so
that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1),
"one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a
higher object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be
equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which possesses
more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a
higher and better object, is preferable to that which is more certain
about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De
Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know
something about celestial beings, though it be based on weak and
probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is
better to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean
things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is
beyond the reach of man, especially in this life, so as to be his
possession: for this "belongs to God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet
this little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is
preferable to all other knowledge.
Reply to Objection 4: The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable
principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know
what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole
is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and
non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being,
which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted,
is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper effect
of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of
indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not
only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also
by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those
who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than
understanding.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the
theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while
hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is
compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now
intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident
above ([1630]Q[62], A[3]). Therefore faith is greater than hope and
charity.
Objection 2: Further, when two things are added together, the result is
greater than either one. Now hope results from something added to
charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii),
and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved.
Therefore hope is greater than charity.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith
and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Mat. 1:3 says that
"faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are
greater than charity.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain
faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is
charity."
I answer that, As stated above [1631](A[3]), the greatness of a virtue,
as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three
theological virtues look at God as their proper object, it cannot be
said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its
having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches
nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater
than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, imply a
certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen,
and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of charity is of
that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in
the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the
beloved; hence it is written (1 Jn. 4:16): "He that abideth in charity,
abideth in God, and God in him."
Reply to Objection 1: Faith and hope are not related to charity in the
same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First,
because the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human
soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath
man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent
than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in
the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the
beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than
in man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of the
container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man.
Secondly, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements
pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the
appetitive movement tending to God, which movement belongs to the
theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive
movement towards its object surpasses human knowledge, according to
Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge."
Reply to Objection 2: Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes
to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who
desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other
hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope,
as stated above ([1632]Q[62], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: An efficient cause is more noble than its effect:
but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more
noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in
this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to
wit, that one is a disposition to the other.
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OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under
which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?
(2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?
(3) Whether faith remains?
(4) Whether hope remains?
(5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?
(6) Whether charity remains?
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Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain after
this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels,
according to Mat. 22:30. But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the
angels [*"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of
the gods" (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither
in man will there be moral virtues after this life.
Objection 2: Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But
the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says
(Moral. iv, 18): "The works of the active life pass away from the
body." Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this life.
Objection 3: Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral
virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are
corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily
organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after
this life.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:15) that "justice is perpetual
and immortal."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that
the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life men are made happy
by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is better or
more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others."
Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in the future
life, but after a different manner.
In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there
is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. The material element
in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the
passions and operations according to a certain mode: and since this
mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of
reason.
Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the
future life, as regards their material element. For in the future life
there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and
sex; nor fear and daring about dangers of death; nor distributions and
commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards
the formal element, they will remain most perfect, after this life, in
the Blessed, in as much as each one's reason will have most perfect
rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state
of life: and his appetitive power will be moved entirely according to
the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) that "prudence will be there without
any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with
evil; temperance, without the rebellion of the desires: so that
prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will
adhere to Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who
knows no imperfection." As to justice, it is yet more evident what will
be its act in that life, viz. "to be subject to God": because even in
this life subjection to a superior is part of justice.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral
virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as
regards "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters
of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires."
The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern
the active life, belong to the material element of the virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold state after this life; one
before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from
the body; the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be
reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational
powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it
will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, and temperance
in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be perfectly
disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the
resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the soul actually,
but only radically in its essence, as stated in the [1633]FP, Q[77],
A[8]. Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only in
their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain nurseries
of these virtues, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]). Justice, however, will
remain because it is in the will. Hence of justice it is specially said
that it is "perpetual and immortal"; both by reason of its subject,
since the will is incorruptible; and because its act will not change,
as stated.
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Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain
after this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8,9) that "knowledge
shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be because "we know in
part." Now just as the knowledge of science is in part, i.e. imperfect;
so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as
this life lasts. Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease
after this life.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since
science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is not
easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no
bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore science and the
other intellectual virtues do not remain after death.
Objection 3: Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so
that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be no act
of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing
without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life, the
phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the
body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life.
On the contrary, The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is
more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the
knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for
instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, according to
Lk. 16:25: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy
life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore,
does the knowledge of universal and necessary things remain, which
belong to science and the other intellectual virtues.
I answer that, As stated in the [1634]FP, Q[79], A[6] some have held
that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect
except when it actually understands; and that so long as actual
consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the
sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of
imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is
corrupted: and consequently, according to this opinion, neither science
nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once
the body is corrupted.
But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De
Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is in act when it is
identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in
potentiality to consider it actually." It is also contrary to reason,
because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" intellect
immovably, according to the mode of their container. Hence the
"possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De Anima
iii) because it preserves the intelligible species.
And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this
life, by applying the intelligible species to them as stated in the
[1635]FP, Q[84], A[7]; [1636]FP, Q[85], A[1], ad 5, cease as soon as
the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned,
which are the quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues, these
latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the
intelligible species, which are in the "possible" intellect, the
intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal
element of the intellectual virtues. Therefore these remain after this
life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated
concerning the moral virtues [1637](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as
referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of
understanding; because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when
the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the
phantasms.
Reply to Objection 2: Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its
material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible
species, which are in the "possible" intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [1638]FP, Q[89], A[1] the
separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to
the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet not as to the same
mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues
[1639](A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether faith remains after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because
faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after this
life, as stated above [1640](A[2]). Therefore faith remains also.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 3:11): "Other foundation no
man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. faith
in Jesus Christ. Now if the foundation is removed, that which is built
upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this
life, no other virtue remains.
Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory
differ as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible
with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be "evening" and
"morning" knowledge [*Cf. [1641]FP, Q[58], A[6]]; and a man can have
science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion
through a probable syllogism, about one same conclusion. Therefore
after this life faith also is compatible with the knowledge of glory.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6,7): "While we are in the
body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by
sight." But those who are in glory are not absent from the Lord, but
present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the
life of glory.
I answer that, Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing
being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things
are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and
negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect of contrary
forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we find
opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: wherefore in
alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as when a
thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And
since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, it is
impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at
the same time.
Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing's
very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack of reason belongs
to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so
long as it remains the same identically, cannot pass from one species
to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the
species of that thing is changed: even as it would no longer be an ox
or a horse, were it to be rational. Sometimes, however, the
imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental
to the individual by reason of something else; even as sometimes lack
of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, or because he
is drunk, or for some like reason; and it is evident, that if such an
imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially.
Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of
faith: for it is included in its definition; faith being defined as
"the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that
appear not" (Heb. 11:1). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.):
"Where is faith? Believing without seeing." But it is an imperfect
knowledge that is of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently
imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: therefore it
is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain
identically the same.
But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect
knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect
knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we
must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways: first, on
the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium;
thirdly, on the part of the subject. The difference of perfect and
imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the
"morning" and "evening" knowledge of the angels: for the "morning"
knowledge is about things according to the being which they have in the
Word, while the "evening" knowledge is about things according as they
have being in their own natures, which being is imperfect in comparison
with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect
knowledge are exemplified in the knowledge of a conclusion through a
demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium. On the part of the
subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to
opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion that we
assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so
that our adhesion is not firm: to science it is essential to have firm
adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude
which results from the understanding of principles: while faith holds a
middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is
firm, but falls short of science in so far as it lacks vision.
Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the
same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect and imperfect can
be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing.
Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect on the part of the object is
quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but
they are compatible with one another in respect of the same medium or
the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at one and the
same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and imperfect
knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, e.g.
about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge that
is perfect on the part of the medium is incompatible with imperfect
knowledge through one and the same medium: but nothing hinders them
being about the same subject or in the same subject: for one man can
know the same conclusions through a probable and through a
demonstrative medium. Again, knowledge that is perfect on the part of
the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same
subject. Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the
part of the subject, viz. that the believer sees not what he believes:
whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of
the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that which makes them happy, as
stated above ([1642]Q[3], A[8]). Hence it is manifest that faith and
bliss are incompatible in one and the same subject.
Reply to Objection 1: Faith is more excellent than science, on the part
of the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a
more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with
vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the mode of faith is
incompatible.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith is the foundation in as much as it is
knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the
foundation will be perfected also.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state
of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent
manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this
life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much more then
does hope remain.
Objection 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after
this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever---in the
lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can
remain.
Objection 3: Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now
in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory of
the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the soul, according to
Ecclus. 24:29: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink
me, shall yet thirst," and 1 Pet. 1:12: "On Whom the angels desire to
look." Therefore it seems that there can be hope in the Blessed after
this life is past.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why
doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object of
hope, viz. God. Therefore they do not hope.
I answer that, As stated above [1643](A[3]), that which, in its very
nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the
opposite perfection in that subject. Thus it is evident that movement
of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is
"the act of that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so that
as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement ceases;
for a thing does not continue to become white, when once it is made
white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed,
as is clear from what we have said above about the passion of hope
(Q[40], AA[1],2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for,
viz. the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its
object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not
incompatible with the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is;
except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do
not remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect
of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something which is in
our actual possession.
Reply to Objection 2: Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall
state further on ([1644]SS, Q[19], A[2]). Servile fear regards
punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there
will no longer be possibility of being punished. Filial fear has two
acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act,
it remains: the other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God,
and as regards this act, it does not remain. Because separation from
God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there,
according to Prov. 1:33: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear
of evils." Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil,
as stated above (Q[23], A[2]; Q[40], A[1] ), and therefore the fear
which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there
can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed.
Because in the lost there will be a succession of punishments, so that
the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of
fear: but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its
being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither
past nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking,
neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q[42], A[2]),
fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such
hope. Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except speaking
in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called
fear.
Reply to Objection 3: As to the glory of the soul, there can be no
desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future,
for the reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to
be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is
said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there
can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly
speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object is God,
and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the
object of hope is something difficult, as stated above ([1645]Q[40],
A[1]): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not
compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money is not,
properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like
manner those who have the glory of the soul are not, properly speaking,
said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?
Objection 1: It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in
glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there
remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that "if you
take away rational, there remains living, and when you remove living,
there remains being." Now in faith there is something that it has in
common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: and there is something proper to
it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. Therefore,
the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains.
Objection 2: Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according
to Eph. 1:17,18: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the
knowledge of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the
light of glory, of which it is written (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we
shall see light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light
supervenes: for a candle is not extinguished when the sun's rays
appear. Therefore it seems that the light of faith itself remains with
the light of glory.
Objection 3: Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through
the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of
liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the
act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore
when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still
remain.
On the contrary, Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either
withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does not
remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above [1646](A[3]), it
seems that it is withdrawn entirely.
I answer that, Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but
that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains
in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be
understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically but
generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus,
viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other hand, hope is not
of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to the
enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement.
But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith
remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. Because
when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does
not remain identically the same: thus if you remove the difference
constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain
identically the same, as though the identical color were at one time
whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not
related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the
genus remains identically the same, when the difference is removed, as
the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is
changed: for genus and difference are not the parts of a species, else
they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species
denotes the whole, i.e. the compound of matter and form in material
things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus
denotes the whole by signifying that which is material; the difference,
by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying both.
Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual
nature, and animal is predicated of that which has a sensitive nature,
rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that
which has both. So that the one same whole is denoted by these three,
but not under the same aspect.
It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference
is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, the substance of
the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not
remain, if another kind of soul constitute the animal. Hence it is
impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure,
to become clear vision. It is therefore evident that, in heaven,
nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the same,
but only generically.
Reply to Objection 1: If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining
"living" thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to
the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject:
whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are
opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently they
are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the
air.
Reply to Objection 3: He that loses his money does not therefore lose
the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the
habit of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is
the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even
its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss:
and so such a habit would remain to no purpose.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not remain after this
life, in glory. Because according to 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that which is
perfect is come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is imperfect,
"shall be done away." Now the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect.
Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is
attained.
Objection 2: Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their
objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore
the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of
the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same in both cases.
Objection 3: Further, things of the same kind can advance from
imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of
the wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven,
however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of
the wayfarer does not remain in heaven.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8): "Charity never falleth
away."
I answer that, As stated above [1647](A[3]), when the imperfection of a
thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to
hinder the identical thing passing from imperfection to perfection,
even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now
charity is love, the nature of which does not include imperfection,
since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed,
either seen or not seen. Therefore charity is not done away by the
perfection of glory, but remains identically the same.
Reply to Objection 1: The imperfection of charity is accidental to it;
because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now
although that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the
substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away,
charity itself is not done away.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if
it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the
charity of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the
same, viz. God Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot
attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on
the part of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in
Ethic. ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we
love Him.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?
(2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?
(3) Whether the Gifts are habits?
(4) Which, and how many are they?
(5) Whether the Gifts are connected?
(6) Whether they remain in heaven?
(7) Of their comparison with one another;
(8) Of their comparison with the virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the
virtues. For Gregory commenting on Job 1:2, "There were born to him
seven sons," says (Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when
through the conception of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the
Holy Ghost take birth in us": and he quotes the words of Is. 11:2,3:
"And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.
where the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the
seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine commenting on Mat. 12:45, "Then he
goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest.
Evang. i, qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of
the Holy Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are
opposed to the seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts
do not differ from the virtues commonly so called.
Objection 3: Further, things whose definitions are the same, are
themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts;
for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good
life," etc. [*Cf.[1648] Q[55], A[4]]. Likewise the definition of a gift
can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable
giving," according to the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the
virtues and gifts do not differ from one another.
Objection 4: Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are
virtues: for, as stated above ([1649]Q[57], A[2]), wisdom,
understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains
to prudence, piety to a kind of justice, and fortitude is a moral
virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the
virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts,
which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three
theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three
daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven gifts
from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the
four corners of the house.
I answer that, If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion
conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between them.
Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in
relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers to the cause from
which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from
one as a gift should not perfect another in well-doing: especially as
we have already stated ([1650]Q[63], A[3]) that some virtues are
infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot
differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently some have held that the
gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But there remains
no less a difficulty for them to solve; for they must explain why some
virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there
are some, fear, for instance, that are not reckoned virtues.
Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as
being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a suitable
reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either
to all the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice versa. For,
seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom,
knowledge, understanding and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz.
fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the
free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues
perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed only two
virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others
being in the appetitive power or the affections. If this distinction
were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all
the gifts in the reason.
Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of
the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with prudence,
temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it
against every kind of temptation by His sevenfold gift," said that the
virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we
may resist temptation. But neither is this distinction sufficient.
Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the
sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists
its contrary: which is especially clear with regard to charity, of
which it is written (Cant 8:7): "Many waters cannot quench charity."
Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as
having been in Christ, according to Is. 11:2,3, said that the virtues
are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to
conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was
then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither
does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord
Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly in humility and
meekness, according to Mat. 11:29: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and
humble of heart," and in charity, according to Jn. 15:12: "Love one
another, as I have loved you." Moreover, these virtues were especially
resplendent in Christ's Passion.
Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we
must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses itself, for we
find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For
thus it is written (Is. 11:2,3): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of
understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we are
clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as
being in us by Divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion from
without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle
of movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to
him, viz. God, as stated above ([1651]Q[9], AA[4],6): moreover the
Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem.
vii, 8).
Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its
mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists in a
disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence
the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition
whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that
a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order to receive a
higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues
perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his
reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet
higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These
perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God,
but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the
Divine inspiration, according to Is. 50:5: "The Lord . . . hath opened
my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back." Even the
Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8)
that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there is no need to
take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner
promptings, since they are moved by a principle higher than human
reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for
acts which are higher than acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the
broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and
above the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are
Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of
"heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike kai theia}]," in respect of
which some men are called "divine."
Reply to Objection 2: The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far
as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are
opposed to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine
instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason,
whose light flows from God.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition applies to virtue taken in its
general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as
distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we
lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is
measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from
infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to
His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the
promptings of God.
Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far
as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift,
according as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same
applies to the other virtues.
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Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for
salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing
the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's
salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary
standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the
precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to
man for salvation.
Objection 2: Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave
well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's
behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues;
and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts are
not necessary to man for salvation.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost
gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel
against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance,
piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride." But a
sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues.
Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.
On the contrary, Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and
fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since of
wisdom it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him that
dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without
fear cannot be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed
between these are also necessary for salvation.
I answer that, As stated above [1652](A[1]), the gifts are perfections
of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings
of God. Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not
sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost,
there is, in consequence, need for a gift.
Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its
natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly, with
a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated
above ([1653]Q[62], A[1]). And, though this latter perfection is
greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more
perfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his full
possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love
and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a
nature or a form or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work according to
them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly
in every nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a
nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless
it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly,
can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has the nature of light
imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows
the medical art perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is
not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive
instructions from him.
Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's
connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If,
however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special
promptings from God, this will be out of God's superabundant goodness:
hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the
acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in
matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves
him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the
theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it
receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost,
according toRom. 8:14, 17: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God,
they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and Ps. 142:10:
"Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit,
none can receive the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he
be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to
accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the
Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the
virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the
commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man
being moved by a higher principle.
Reply to Objection 2: By the theological and moral virtues, man is not
so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual
need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for
the reason already given.
Reply to Objection 3: Whether we consider human reason as perfected in
its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it
does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is
unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection.
God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by
His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind
and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given
as remedies to these defects.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not
habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as
"a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy
Ghost rest in Him, as stated in Is. 11:2,3: "He upon Whom thou shalt
see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that
baptizeth"; on which words Gregory comments as follows (Moral. ii, 27):
"The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He
dwells always in the Mediator." Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are not habits.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according
as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above ([1654]AA[1],2).
But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like
an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is
befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.
Objection 3: Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine
inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit:
for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as
Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the gifts
of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His
disciples (Jn. 14:17): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you."
Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His
gifts abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but
abiding habits.
I answer that, As stated above [1655](A[1]), the gifts are perfections
of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy
Ghost. Now it is evident from what has been already said (Q[56], A[4];
Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power
according as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as
it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason.
Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy
Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in
comparison with the reason, are related to the appetitive power. Now
the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are
disposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by
saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the
Holy Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts."
Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above
[1656](A[2]). Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever
abides in holy men.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds, in the case of an instrument
which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man
is not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy
Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will.
Therefore he needs a habit.
Reply to Objection 3: Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the
manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence
the comparison fails.
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Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are
unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down
corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding,
knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing
is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual
virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to justice, viz.
piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of
fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance.
Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently.
Objection 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of
fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself.
Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us
to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by
God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological
virtues, should have been included.
Objection 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of
love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions
condivided with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so
ought the other three.
Objection 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding;
counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore,
some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear.
Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Holy Writ (Is. 11:2,3).
I answer that, As stated above [1657](A[3]), the gifts are habits
perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy
Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that
they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive
powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all
the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior
power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the principles of human
actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues;
and such powers are the reason and appetite.
Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the
apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and
judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of
truth, the speculative reason is perfected by "understanding"; the
practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the
speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom"; the practical reason by
"knowledge." The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's
relations to another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching
himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers;
and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to
Prov. 15:27: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil,"
and Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid
of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all
those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend.
Reply to Objection 1: The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in
matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such
matters, but to external things that can be made, since art is the
right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made
(Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of
the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the
principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He
moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance:
for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, to restrain
man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason,
so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man from evil
pleasures through fear of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Justice is so called from the rectitude of the
reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the
name of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to
our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is
also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore
the gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all,
is fittingly called piety.
Reply to Objection 3: The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost,
unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not
moved by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of
union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith,
hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to
the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to
these three virtues, as being derived therefrom.
Reply to Objection 4: Love, hope and joy have good for their object.
Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions
are transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On
the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to
God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from
certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its
name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from
evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does.
Reply to Objection 5: Wisdom directs both the intellect and the
affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to
wisdom as their directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the
gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear.
Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a
consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the
word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the
same Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of
the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to
divers men, and are not connected together in the same man.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of
the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some of
the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it
seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and
the same man.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small
account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless
if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the
strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very
weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it
hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lack
the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has these
virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action":
from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift without
another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.
On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the
following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons,
that by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of whom he is
speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.
I answer that, The true answer to this question is easily gathered from
what has been already set down. For it has been stated [1658](A[3])
that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as
regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are
disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. 5:5: "The charity
of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to
us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as
the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that whoever has
charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one
possess without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way
as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the
knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct
the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the
Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he
mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge.
They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and
thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human
mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the
knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that
these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while
expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is
referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous
grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it is one
thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the
blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another, to
know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against the
ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper
name of knowledge."
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is
proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by
another, as stated above ([1659]Q[65], A[1]); so Gregory wishes to
prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that
one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed
that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless
one virtue lend its support to another." We are therefore not to
understand that one gift can be without another; but that if
understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as
temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not
remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of His
sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all
temptations." Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according to
Is. 11:9: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy
mountain." Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in
heaven.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated
above [1660](A[3]). But habits are of no use, where their acts are
impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for
Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the
truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . . .
fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the
inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of which are incompatible with
the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state
of glory.
Objection 3: Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the
contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the
active life, e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with
this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the
Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of
God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly
river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who,
proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in
those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly
virtue."
I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to
their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may
be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for
this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable
to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in
heaven, where God will be "all in all" (1 Cor. 15:28), and man entirely
subject unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the
matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life
they have an operation about a matter, in respect of which they will
have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they
will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the
case with regard to the cardinal virtues ([1661]Q[67], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according
as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they
afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of
glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good
by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something
that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in
the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with
the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, hope passes,
and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates
the truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness,"
of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach no more every
man . . . his brother" (Jer. 31:3,4); but the enlightening of the mind
remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous,"
which is necessary in the present life; and also that "it makes the
mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of
fortitude he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in
the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands of
confidence," which remains also in the future life. With regard to
knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void
of ignorance," which refers to the present state. When, however, he
adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the
fulness of knowledge, which belongs to the future state. Of piety he
says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy." These
words taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward
regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost heart," belongs also
to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but
fellowship of joy. Of fear he say that "it oppresses the mind, lest it
pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and
that "it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the future," which
also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer
to the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope
are here, and obtain there.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the gifts as to their
matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active
life; but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things
pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly
bliss.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in
their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that
which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of
man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is written (Dt. 10:12):
"And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that
thou fear the Lord thy God?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a
master, where is My fear?" Therefore it seems that fear, which is
mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts.
Objection 2: Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is
profitable to all things." Now a common good is preferable to
particular goods. Therefore piety, which is given the last place but
one, seems to be the most excellent gift.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel
pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry.
Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it
is set down as being below it.
Objection 4: Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while
science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than
the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than
fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the
gifts are not set down in their order of dignity.
On the contrary, Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It
seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which
Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we
read in Mat. 5:3]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz.
in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here,
with the lower gifts."
I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways:
first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding
from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to
their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they
follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with
another; because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul's
powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above [1662](A[4]). Hence, as
the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and
among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the
active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet
so that wisdom stands before understanding, and understanding before
science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the
gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent
than piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels
fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and
fortitude temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and
counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel are
concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard
ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds
with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and
understanding are given the preference to the others, their excellence
is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are
preferred to knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to their
matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation,
so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the
Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as
though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of
generation, man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov. 16:16),
before doing good works, and which result from the other gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is
not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of
which he had said it "is profitable to little."
Reply to Objection 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by
reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its
matter: for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty
(Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all
matters.
Reply to Objection 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason
are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in
relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason
transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on
the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive
power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because
counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while
knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel
together with fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the
preference to knowledge and piety.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the
gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity:
"No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of
eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but,
without charity, they avail nothing." But charity is a virtue.
Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more
excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for
Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the
mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude,
temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven
virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly to bestow wisdom;
against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against
fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of
heart, piety; against piety, fear." Therefore the virtues are more
excellent than the gifts.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the
virtues cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make
evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up
the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding,
while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it
multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it gives
confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and
yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from
the right line, may become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly
alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues
are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to
remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so
that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the
gifts are more excellent than the virtues.
I answer that, As was shown above ([1663]Q[58], A[3];[1664] Q[62],
A[1]), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some
intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby
man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby
reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which
perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other
hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to
be amenable to the Divine motion.
Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues,
by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as
the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which
perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues.
Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral
virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent
than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never
attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all they do be done in
faith, hope, and charity."
But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and
moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the
gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their
Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the
other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more
exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing
moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect
than the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we
grant to be more perfect than the gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes
another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God
precedes love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the
intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The
other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's
neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this way
moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through
being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly
subordinate to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts
of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which
"dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and
understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as
they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the
perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory
means to say.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?
(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?
(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;
(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the
virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns
the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy
Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq., ascribes the
beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
Objection 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the
reason and the eternal law, as stated above ([1665]Q[19], A[3];[1666]
Q[21], A[1]). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while
the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost,
as is clear from what has been said ([1667]Q[68], AA[1],3, seqq.).
Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of
the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes
do not differ from them.
Objection 3: Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness,
justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that
are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace.
Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.
I answer that, As stated above ([1668]Q[2], A[7];[1669] Q[3], A[1]),
happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the
end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are
full of hope"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "We are saved by
hope." Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved
towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action.
And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of
virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal
happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be
moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may
obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the
virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to
the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts
are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above
([1670]Q[68], A[8]). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes
propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas
Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples
on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them
to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that no other habits,
besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.
Reply to Objection 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of
meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these
might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts,
because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues
perfect him, as stated above ([1671]Q[68], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes
do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because
they hope for a reward, as stated above [1672](A[1]). Now the object of
hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to
come.
Objection 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to
the beatitudes, Lk. 6:25, where we read: "Woe to you that are filled;
for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn
and weep." Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because
frequently men are not punished in this life, according to Job 21:13:
"They spend their days in wealth." Therefore neither do the rewards of
the beatitudes refer to this life.
Objection 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the
reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant
fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps.
16:15: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall
appear." Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see God,
and that our Divine sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 Jn.
3:2: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we
shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him,
because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore these rewards refer to
the future life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These
promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been
fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete
change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us
after this life."
I answer that, Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of
these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all
these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; and Chrysostom
in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and
some to the present life.
In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future
happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of our having
a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by
way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future
happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope
that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and
another, when we see the first signs of the fruit.
Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the
beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness,
either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards,
may be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or
some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have
attained perfection, in which case they refer to the present life.
Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues
and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as
a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards future happiness as the last end:
yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to
that end, according to Ps. 27:7: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I
have been helped."
Reply to Objection 2: Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo
temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment.
Hence Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so,
Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment." The
Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is
divided against itself . . . one part pulls this way, another that";
and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a man so
miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice." In like manner,
although, on the other hand, the good sometimes do not receive material
rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in
this life, according to Mat. 19:29, and Mk. 10:30: "Ye shall receive a
hundred times as much" even "in this time."
Reply to Objection 3: All these rewards will be fully consummated in
the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in
this life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote the beginning
of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men.
The "possession" of the land denotes the well-ordered affections of the
soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal
inheritance, signified by "the land." They are "comforted" in this
life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called the "Paraclete," i.e.
the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food
of which Our Lord said (Jn. 4:34): "My meat is to do the will of Him
that sent Me." Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy." Again,
the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to
speak, "see God." Likewise, in this life, those who are the
"peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and
are called "the children of God." Nevertheless these things will be
more perfectly fulfilled in heaven.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably
enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated
above (A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and
understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is
assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters
connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the
active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge and
counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with
the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently indicated.
Objection 3: Further, among the executive gifts connected with the
active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety
seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included
directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 4: Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ.
Thus, it is written (Job 5:17): "Blessed is the man whom God
correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in
the counsel of the ungodly"; and (Prov. 3:13): "Blessed is the man that
findeth wisdom." Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently
enumerated.
Objection 5: On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned.
For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes
are indicated.
Objection 6: Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth
chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matthew 5
are too many.
I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make
this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to
consist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual
life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life [*See
Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations
to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy.
Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an
obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a
disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if
perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is
a beginning thereof.
And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as
removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure
consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods,
whether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn---by a virtue so
that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent
way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is:
"Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the
contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from
humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of
one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the
irascible passions man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that they are
kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a
gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's will,
is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is:
"Blessed are the meek." From following the concupiscible passions, man
is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in
moderation---and by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside
altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice
of sorrow [*Cf.[1673] Q[35], A[3]]; hence the third beatitude is:
"Blessed are they that mourn."
Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor,
either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former
we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty
to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and by a gift, so that we
do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with
an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with
eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice." With regard to spontaneous favors we
are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we
should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains
to the virtue of liberality--and by a gift, so that, through reverence
for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our
gratuitous bounty: hence it is written (Lk. 14:12,13): "When thou
makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren," etc
. . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc.; which, properly, is
to have mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: "Blessed are the
merciful."
Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final
beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are
included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the
effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative
life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active
life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in
himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by
the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of
heart." But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected
in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace,
according to Is. 32:17: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the
seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers."
Reply to Objection 1: The acts of the gifts which belong to the active
life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining
to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason
given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift of
understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God,"
corresponds to the gift of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to the active life,
knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of
operation, as even the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And
therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes
do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active
life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to
counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but,
on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts
have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and
mercy in respect of counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may
consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the
first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to
their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed among the
executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and
mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations to
others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Lk. 6:22: "It is the
business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation,"
fortitude being about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to
the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of
the world.
Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this
way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the
principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to
piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows
his failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. 1:18:
"He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]." The
principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude
of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel,
according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king
[Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy
iniquities with works of mercy to the poor." It is thus that Augustine
assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4).
Reply to Objection 4: All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be
reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because
they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life.
Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom the Lord
correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we
read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the
ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we read,
"Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the
reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that
can be adduced.
Reply to Objection 5: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and
declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that
a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it
follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the
eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.
Reply to Objection 6: Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to
the multitude (Lk. 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according
to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than
pleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our
Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The
first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by
saying: "Blessed are ye poor." The second is that man be well off as to
his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying
in the second place: "Blessed are ye that hunger." The third is that it
should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts
aside by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now." The fourth is the
outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: "Blessed
shall you be, when men shall hate you." And as Ambrose says on Lk.
6:20, "poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved by delights;
hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through
compassion gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable
things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude."
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Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are
unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal
life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of
heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.
Objection 2: Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward,
both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same
ground it should have been assigned to all.
Objection 3: Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending
order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the
rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess
the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of heaven." Therefore
these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these
rewards.
I answer that, These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering
the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of
happiness indicated above [1674](A[3]). For the first three beatitudes
concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual
happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object
of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in
temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards of the first
three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find
in earthly happiness. For men seek in external things, viz. riches and
honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied
in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and
abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of
heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by
wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security
for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful
possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of
eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of
the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our
Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.
Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are
the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor:
from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of
their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards in
correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For
there are some who recede from acts of justice, and instead of
rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may
abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger
after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again, recede
from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery.
Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy, and
be delivered from all misery.
The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude:
hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the dispositions
included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see
clearly: hence the clean of heart are promised that they shall see God.
Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to
be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a
reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, consisting in
perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.
Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these
rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human
intellect cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means
of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion to the
merits to which those rewards are assigned.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of
all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes.
Hence it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other
rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according to
Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor
in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer
persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the glory of the
body.
Reply to Objection 3: The rewards are also arranged in ascending order.
For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply
to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly
and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than
to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of
which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill
than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies abundance of
comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more
than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God,
even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees
the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace
belongs to the king's son.
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OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?
(2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?
(3) Of their number?
(4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.
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Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5)
are acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost,
enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23), are not acts. For that which
bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on
indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it is written (Wis.
3:15): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and (Jn. 4:36): "He that
reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting."
Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.
Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy
[*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the
English 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing
in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their own
sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits.
Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle
numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity.
Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above ([1675]Q[55],
A[1]). Therefore the fruits are not actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:33): "By the fruit the tree is
known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain
the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits.
I answer that, The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material
to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the
product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain
sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree that produces
it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in
spiritual matters, we may take the word "fruit" in two ways: first, so
that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that which he
produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers.
Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and
gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet these
are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which
man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In this sense
man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment.
If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human
actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act of the
operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's
operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be
the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a
higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's
operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine
seed, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God,
committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him."
Reply to Objection 1: Since fruit is something last and final, nothing
hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate
to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the
Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are
referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called
flowers: hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:23): "My flowers are the
fruits of honor and riches."
Reply to Objection 2: When the will is said to delight in a thing for
its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the
expression "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and
in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last
end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way,
a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason of its form.
Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, for its own sake,
as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something
tasty; and in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for
the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must
delight in God for His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous
deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent
goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De
Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they
refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight."
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to
their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to
believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity
is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor." It is thus
that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the
beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated
above ([1676]Q[69], A[1], ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as
he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are
fruits of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future
beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the
present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on
hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future
beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.
Objection 3: Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and
delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above
([1677]Q[3], A[1];[1678] Q[4], A[1]). Therefore fruit and beatitude
have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from
one another.
On the contrary, Things divided into different species, differ from one
another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, as
is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the
fruits differ from the beatitudes.
I answer that, More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit.
Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and
delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and
excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice
versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights:
whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason
of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to the
virtues, as already stated ([1679]Q[69], A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits,
but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.
Reply to Objection 2: The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect
simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other
hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and
perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes.
Reply to Objection 3: More is required for a beatitude than for a
fruit, as stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by
the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is
only one fruit of the present life; according to Rom. 6:22: "You have
your fruit unto sanctification." Moreover it is written (Is. 27:9):
"This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away."
Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits.
Objection 2: Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated
(A[1] ). But Our Lord mentions (Mat. 13:23) a threefold fruit as
growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold,
sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold." Therefore one should not reckon twelve
fruits.
Objection 3: Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something
ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits
mentioned by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply
a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but rather
something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are
enumerated.
Objection 4: On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated
insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated [1680](A[2])
that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned
here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of
many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are
insufficiently enumerated.
I answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the
Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the
twelve fruits of which it is written (Apoc. 22:2): "On both sides of
the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits." Since, however, a fruit
is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root, the
difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways
in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us: which process consists in this,
that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to
itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it; thirdly, in
regard to things that are below it.
Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has
a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things. Now the
first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by
love, which is the first of our emotions and the root of them all, as
stated above ([1681]Q[27], A[4]). Wherefore among the fruits of the
Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a
special manner, as in His own likeness, since He Himself is love. Hence
it is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." The necessary result of
the love of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being
united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in God
Whom it loves, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity,
abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is
"joy." Now the perfection of joy is peace in two respects. First, as
regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to
rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the
enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at
peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he
accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written (Ps. 118:165):
"Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no
stumbling-block," because, to wit, external things do not disturb them
in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the
restless desire: for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not
satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two
things, namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and that
our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and
joy, "peace" is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a
good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being
disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience";
secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed;
which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of
evil" (Ethic. v, 3).
Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his
neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this belongs
"goodness." Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this
belongs "benignity," for the benign are those in whom the salutary
flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to
their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils
his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs
anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our
neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or deceit. To
this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we
take it for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man is directed
thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect
and, consequently, all that is his, to God.
Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards
external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe the "mode" in all our
words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and
"chastity": whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man
from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because
the continent man is subject to concupiscence, but is not led away;
whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from them.
Reply to Objection 1: Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by
which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there
in the singular, on account of its being generically one, though
divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits.
Reply to Objection 2: The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits
do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various
degrees of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the
married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; the
contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency,
by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways in which holy
men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the three degrees
of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of
anything is considered with respect to its beginning, its middle, and
its end.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact of not being disturbed by painful things
is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the
foundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as
much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith,
which is certainly about the unseen."
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says on Gal. 5:22,23, "the Apostle
had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or
fruits of the Spirit] there are; but to show how the former should be
avoided, and the latter sought after." Hence either more or fewer
fruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the
gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of
fittingness, in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct
the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of
wisdom and of any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy
and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that
these imply either enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils,
which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh
?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not
contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates (Gal.
5:19, seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works
of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit
are not contrary to them.
Objection 2: Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle
mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore
the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to
one another.
Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place
is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication,
uncleanness, and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the
flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not
contrary to the works of the flesh.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth
against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh."
I answer that, The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may
be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits of
the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the
flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to that which is in
accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas
the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite draws man to sensible goods
which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and downward are
contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works
of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Spirit.
Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered
singly, each according to its specific nature. And in this they are not
of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad
4), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the works, whether
spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine,
commenting on Gal. 5:22,23, contrasts the fruits with the carnal works,
each to each. Thus "to fornication, which is the love of satisfying
lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul
is wedded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must
understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these
the joy of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war
was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against
witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels,
there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils inflicted on
us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those
evils; and goodness, to forgive them. In contrast to heresy there is
faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency."
Reply to Objection 1: That which proceeds from a tree against the
tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And
since works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are
contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue are called
fruits, but not so works of vice.
Reply to Objection 2: "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of
ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many
vices are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works
of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)
OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)
We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six
points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in
themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one
another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect
of sin.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?
(2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?
(3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?
(4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?
(5) Whether every sin includes action?
(6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust.
xxii): "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vice is contrary to virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one
thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now sin and
malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it:
since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of
any things whatever.
Objection 2: Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But
vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is not
contrary to virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is
the soul's health." Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is
opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is
a quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a
quality which makes its subject good," as was shown above ([1682]Q[55],
AA[3],4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in virtue---the essence of
virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue
we may consider something directly, and we may consider something
consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby the
subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore
the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is a
disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I
mean that which is disposed according to its nature." That which virtue
implies "consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness: because the
goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to
the mode of its nature. That to which virtue is directed is a good act,
as was shown above ([1683]Q[56], A[3]).
Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of
these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which
virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate
act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of
that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of
goodness, the contrary of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that
which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is
"vice": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being
disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine says (De Lib.
Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be
called a vice."
Reply to Objection 1: These three things are contrary to virtue, but
not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the
latter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a
kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the
principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The
reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act:
so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good
work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease
and sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body "he
calls it" disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with
fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease is attended
with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well
compacted together." And although at times there may be disease in the
body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden complaint
without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; "yet, in
the soul," as he says, "these two things are indistinguishable, except
in thought." For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some
inordinate affection, he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his
duties: since "a tree is known by its fruit," i.e. man by his works,
according to Mat. 12:33. But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De
Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a habit or affection of the soul discordant and
inconsistent with itself through life": and this is to be found even
without disease and sickness, e.g. when a man sins from weakness or
passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease;
even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is
reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is
reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or
disease.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vice is contrary to nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because
vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above [1684](A[1]). Now virtue is
in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above
(Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that
which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated to
upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to
vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in
the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is
found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Mat. 7:13):
"Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who
go in thereat." Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as
stated above [1685](A[1]). Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or
desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust.
xxii, 27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say
that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice,
simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature."
I answer that, As stated above [1686](A[1]), vice is contrary to
virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed
in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above [1687](A[1]). Hence
the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not
befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing "vituperated,"
which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb.
iii, 14).
But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form
from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species
from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the
order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man,
as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the
nature of man, as man. Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason,
and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good,
is in accord with man's nature, for as much as it accords with his
reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is
contrary to the order of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the virtues are not caused by nature as
regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which
accords with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De
Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a
second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in
accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary to
nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing
being against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary
to "being from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is
contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense
virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they
incline us to that which is suitable to nature.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold nature in man, rational
nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation
of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are
more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who
follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a
business than achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and
sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his
sensitive nature against the order of his reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is
unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is
compared to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art.
Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the
order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law.
Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every nature, as such,
is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the
Divine art whereby it was made."
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Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a
sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better it
is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit
is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a
vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
Objection 2: Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one.
But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a
vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a
habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their
badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in
goodness and in badness.
On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not
for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious
action is worse than a vicious habit.
I answer that, A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is
evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated in
Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well,
and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able
to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in
badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so that, to wit,
even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in
goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act.
This is also made clear from the fact that a habit is not called good
or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a
habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its
act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since
"the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so."
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one thing from standing above
another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed
above another simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to
both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses
it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from
the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in
goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more lasting
than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are
both found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action, and
whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply
excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in a certain respect.
Reply to Objection 2: A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a
certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that
habit precedes act simply, both in goodness and in badness.
Reply to Objection 3: Habit causes act by way of efficient causality:
but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we
consider the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit
both in goodness and in badness.
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Whether sin is compatible with virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is
incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same
subject. Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above
[1688](A[1]). Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue.
Objection 2: Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil
habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither,
therefore, can sin.
Objection 3: Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in
voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in
natural things, except through some corruption of the natural power;
thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in the
seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary
matters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: so
that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that "virtue is
engendered and corrupted by contrary causes." Now one virtuous act does
not cause a virtue, as stated above ([1689]Q[51], A[3]): and,
consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they
can be together in the same subject.
I answer that, Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit.
Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a
form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of
necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is
incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible
with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward movement (except
perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): whereas the habit
that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its
operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently man, while
possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a
contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin.
And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt
virtue, if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since,
just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed
by one act as stated above ([1690]Q[63], A[2], ad 2). But if we compare
the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for
some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is
contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as
virtues; and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal
sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled "as virtues."
And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain unquickened
after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other
hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to charity, nor banishes it,
as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the
acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin.
Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but
is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin is compatible with
virtues, whether infused or acquired.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of
itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the
act, but not with the habit, of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin
to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts
of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so
long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the
other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of
necessity; hence the comparison fails.
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Whether every sin includes an action?
Objection 1: It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as
merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now
there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there
be sin without action.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De
Vera Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that,
unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be
voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin implies
an act.
Objection 3: Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that
a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never
does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he
ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this is
untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.
On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who knoweth
to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to do" does
not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act.
I answer that, The reason for urging this question has reference to the
sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For some
say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or
exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not to go to church," when he
is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is
bound to go to church (or even before), occupies himself in such a way
that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the
same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible
with this other, wills, consequently, to go without this other: unless,
perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will
hinder him from that which he is bound to do, in which case he might be
deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin
of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of
not doing what one is bound to do is a sin.
Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of
omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin
consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act,
as when a man wills "not to go to church": while sometimes it will be
without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at
the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going or
not going to church.
If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or
occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity
include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what
we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can
do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either
united with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in
man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone omits
going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be
subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and such cause, in so far
as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the
interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears directly on the
omission, as when a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too
much trouble; and in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to
the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of
itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin.
Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something
else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something
else be united with the omission, as when a man wills to play at the
time he ought to go to church---or, precede the omission, as when a man
wills to sit up late at night, the result being that he does not go to
church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is
accidental to the omission, since the omission follows outside the
intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be
accidental (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then
the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding the
omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission.
Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper
to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently it is
truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial
acts and occasions would be essential to other actual sins.
Reply to Objection 1: More things are required for good than for evil,
since "good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results
from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that
sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing
what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly
what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act,
whereas there can be sin without act.
Reply to Objection 2: The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that
on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which
we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence
even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it in
his power to will, and not to will.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative
precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to
act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept
binds him to act.
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Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the
eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying:
"Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." Because
"Word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin
implies an act, as stated above [1691](A[5]). Therefore this definition
does not include every sin.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the
will to retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now will is comprised
under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite.
Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary to the
eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed."
Objection 3: Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from
the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to the
end as explained above ([1692]Q[1], A[3];[1693] Q[18], AA[4],6;[1694]
Q[20], AA[2],3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in
reference to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to
neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he
says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using
what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use." Now the
definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due
end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin.
Objection 4: Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is
contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden,
but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general
should not be defined as being against the law of God.
Objection 5: Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained
above [1695](A[1]). Now man's evil is to be against reason, as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to
say that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the
eternal law.
On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust.
xxii, 27).
I answer that, As was shown above [1696](A[1]), sin is nothing else
than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its
being voluntary, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary,
as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being
commanded by the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or
operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with
its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a
rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there
are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz.
the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law,
which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra
Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one,
pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so
to speak, of sin, when he says "word," "deed," or "desire"; the other,
pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of
sin, when he says, "contrary to the eternal law."
Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same
genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to
the genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so
"word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is not said,
what is done and what is not done.
Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of sin is in the will, which
commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and
hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the
will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of
sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in
defining sin to include something referring to external action.
Reply to Objection 3: The eternal law first and foremost directs man to
his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to
things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary to
the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end and all other forms
of inordinateness.
Reply to Objection 4: When it is said that not every sin is evil
through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by
positive law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural
law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily
in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through
being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely
because it is inordinate.
Reply to Objection 5: The theologian considers sin chiefly as an
offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary
to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being
"contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference to
its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs
us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of faith.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head
there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?
(2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;
(3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?
(4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?
(5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?
(6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?
(7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?
(8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?
(9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not differ in species,
according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in
relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above ([1697]Q[1],
A[3];[1698] Q[18], AA[4],6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad
human act, as stated above ([1699]Q[71], A[1]), it seems that sins
should differ specifically according to their ends rather than
according to their objects.
Objection 2: Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically
according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil in
the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according
to their opposites rather than according to their objects.
Objection 3: Further, if sins differed specifically according to their
objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with
diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about
things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 18); and
avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not
differ in species according to their objects.
On the contrary, "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law."
Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their
various objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above
([1700]Q[18], A[2] ). Therefore sins, also differ in species according
to their objects.
I answer that, As stated above ([1701]Q[71], A[6]), two things concur
in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness,
which consists in departing from God's law. Of these two, one is
referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in
such and such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the
act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no
one acts intending evil," as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it
is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is
essential and not from that which is accidental: because what is
accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ
specifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the
inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species
according to their objects, as was proved above ([1702]Q[18], A[2]).
Therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by
their objects.
Reply to Objection 1: The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end:
and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of
the will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to
the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived
of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their
objects of their acts rather than according to their opposites,
although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their
opposite virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ
specifically according to their objects, as stated above ([1703]Q[60],
A[5]).
Reply to Objection 3: In various things, differing in species or genus,
nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which
aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence
in reference to various things; and avarice seeks abundance of things
adapted to human use.
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Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly
distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The
works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness,
immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. from which it seems
that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are
called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not be
distinguished from spiritual sins.
Objection 2: Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as
stated in Rom. 8:13: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall
die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall
live." Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to
the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be
distinguished from spiritual sins.
Objection 3: Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or
reason, is called the spirit, according to Eph. 4:23: "Be renewed in
the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to
a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the
flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful
act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on
([1704]Q[74], A[7]). Therefore the same sins are both carnal and
spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one
another.
Objection 4: Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this,
seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against
his own body. But, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "every sin
that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth
fornication, sinneth against his own body." Therefore fornication would
be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (Eph. 5:3) reckons
covetousness with the carnal sins.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven
capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal."
I answer that, As stated above [1705](A[1]), sins take their species
from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some
mutable good, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the
possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained
above (Q[31], A[3]), pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and
is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in
accordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual pleasure,
e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other
pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized in bodily touch, and
this can also be called carnal pleasure.
Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called
spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure, are
called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of
the table; and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures. Hence the
Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all
defilement of the flesh and of the spirit."
Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices
are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal
pleasure; but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to
the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the
human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act,
viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are
named, is carnal pleasure.
Reply to Objection 4: As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the
soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of
sinning it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of
gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It
may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also,
for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is man said
specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, which is
reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the
unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again, it may be said that the
thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and
in this respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins: but the
pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit,
wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference
to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it
derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes.
Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they differ
specifically in reference to their causes.
Objection 2: Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to
have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like
its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically
according to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in
reference to their other causes.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set
on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear
inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor." For
it is written (1 Jn. 2:16) that "all that is in the world, is the
concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence of the
eyes, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the pride of life." Now a thing is said to be
in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers
of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory, too
(Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven
capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes of sins.
Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the
diversity of their causes.
On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would belong to one
species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (Ecclus.
10:15) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and (1 Tim. 6:10) that
"the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is evident that
there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ
specifically according to their different causes.
I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, they are
attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and
the "material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and
consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and form,
both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly
movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations differ
specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however,
because the natural active principles are always determined to the same
acts; so that the different species of natural acts are taken not only
from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also
from their active principles: thus heating and cooling are specifically
distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active
principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not
determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active
or motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from
fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, or murder, or
to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may
proceed from love enkindling to undue ardor. Hence it is evident that
sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or
motive causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause,
which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above
([1706]Q[1], A[3];[1707] Q[18], AA[4],6) that human acts take their
species from the end.
Reply to Objection 1: The active principles in voluntary acts, not
being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human
acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end,
as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and consequently
sin derives both its being and its species from the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Objects, in relation to external acts, have the
character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act
of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this
that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as
the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which
movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. x, 4); yet even
terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has the
character of end.
Reply to Objection 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as
distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and
against one's neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin
against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that
which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the
division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it
is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as
stated above ([1708]Q[66], A[6]). Therefore sin against God should not
be reckoned a part of the division of sin.
Objection 2: Further, every division should consist of things in
opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed
to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against
himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into
these three.
Objection 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external.
But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not
distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is
unfittingly divided according to these three.
On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of
sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and
against his neighbor."
I answer that, As stated above ([1709]Q[71], AA[1],6), sin is an
inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in
relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and
passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order
is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be
directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal,
this twofold order would suffice. But since man is naturally a civic
and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is
necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom
he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and
surpasses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of
reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things
are comprised under the order of God, which surpass the human reason,
such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he that
sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy,
is said to sin against God. In like manner, the first order includes
the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are
directed in reference to our neighbor, we need to be directed according
to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to
reason, in relation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our
neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against
himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But
when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin
against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the
things whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are
diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their
objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and
consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different
species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed,
differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from
what has been said ([1710]Q[62], AA[1],2,3) that by the theological
virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to
himself; and by justice to his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: To sin against God is common to all sins, in so
far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as
order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a
special kind of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: When several things, of which one includes
another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood
to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which
one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers
and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure
not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that
in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers
three and four.
Reply to Objection 3: Although God and our neighbor are external to the
sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are
related to it as to its object.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment
diversifies their species?
Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to their
debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is
divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely
apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus.
But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal
punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin;
and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the
fault, according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin
shall the measure be also of the stripes be." Therefore venial and
mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong
to the same species.
Objection 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species
[*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and
adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle
word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ
specifically.
Objection 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its
reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is
the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin.
Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above
(A[1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according
to the debt of punishment.
On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to
the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as
the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according
to the debt of punishment.
I answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold
difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be
found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational,"
"animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is consequent to
specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to
specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within the same
species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific
diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the
one species of man.
We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal
sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment,
cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is
accidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the agent's
intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that
punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is
accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it
is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the
judge, who imposes various punishments according to the various manners
of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment,
may be consequent to the specific diversity of sins, but cannot
constitute it.
Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the
diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin.
For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of
order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order,
implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus,
in an animal's body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital
principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, on
the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in
the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the
entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation
to matters of action, as the indemonstrable principle does to matters
of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so
disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz. God, to Whom
it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered
without turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the
body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction of the
principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the
disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the vital principle
being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in
speculative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs in the
principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be
brought back to the truth by means of the principles. Likewise in
practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if
we consider the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is
said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a
man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin,
his disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not
destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he
does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally.
Reply to Objection 1: Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as
regards what they "turn away from," not as regards what they "turn to,"
viz. the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same
species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the
species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle
word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of
its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows
that this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins,
not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even
in things of the same species, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The reward is intended by him that merits or acts
virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but,
on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ
specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one another
(Eph. 2:1), where it is written: "When you were dead in your offenses
and sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: "'Offenses,' by
omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was
forbidden." Whence it is evident that "offenses" here denotes sins of
omission; while "sin" denotes sins of commission. Therefore they differ
specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different
species.
Objection 2: Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law,
for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said
([1711]Q[71], A[6]). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts,
against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative
precepts, against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of
omission and commission differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and
negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species,
since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor
difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text.
67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same
species.
On the contrary, Omission and commission are found in the same species
of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which
is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should
give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and commission do
not differ specifically.
I answer that, There is a twofold difference in sins; a material
difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be
observed in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal
difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which is
also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one
another in the material specific difference, which are nevertheless
formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed to the
one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one
species of murder, although the actions themselves differ specifically
according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the
material species in sins of omission and commission, they differ
specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and
privation may have a species. But if we refer to the formal species of
sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically,
because they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same
motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs, and
omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to
satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the prescribed
fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is
always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, is its cause. Hence
in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives
forth heat, and that it does not give forth cold.
Reply to Objection 1: This division in respect of commission and
omission, is not according to different formal species, but only
according to material species, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: In God's law, the necessity for various
affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led
to virtue, first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the
negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are
induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and
negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different
degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not of necessity, opposed
to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that
from which it turns away, because in this respect it is a negation or
privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act.
Consequently sins do not differ specifically according to the various
precepts of the Law.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers the material diversity
of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly
speaking, negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species
by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins
of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes
three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal sense
offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second stage is
reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; and
the third stage, "when consent is given to the deed." Now these three
belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to reckon sin
of thought as one kind of sin.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of
sin; the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second,
"when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a habit";
and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume on God's mercy or
to give himself up to despair": where no distinction is made between
sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees of sin are added.
Therefore the first division was unfitting.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there
precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ
specifically. Therefore they should not be condivided with one another.
On the contrary, Jerome in commenting on Ezech. 43:23: "The human race
is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by
thought, or word, or deed."
I answer that, Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each
has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically:
secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of
degree in generation or movement: thus the building is the complete
generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the
setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the generation of
animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of
thought, word, and deed, not as into various complete species: for the
consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the
complete species; but the first beginning of sin is its foundation, as
it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word,
in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his
thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the
deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees
of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to the one
complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For
the angry man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in
thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on
to wrongful deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin.
Reply to Objection 1: All sins of thought have the common note of
secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however,
divided into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.
Reply to Objection 2: Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and
for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head:
whereas Jerome (in commenting on Ezech. 43:23) distinguishes between
them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which
is intended principally; while in sins of deed, it is the consummation
of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward
manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages
following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow
the complete generation of a man.
Reply to Objection 3: Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct
from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when
each is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct
from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but only when
there is a break in the movement.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify
the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect of
more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a species.
Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.
Objection 2: Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to
straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative
matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the
species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the
reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by
straying more or less from the rectitude of reason.
Objection 3: Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as
Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and
deficiency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and
wasteful---illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, by
excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of
sins.
On the contrary, Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety is a
difference of form," as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14. Now vices
that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one
another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they differ
specifically.
I answer that, While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself
and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order
of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from
its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention, as stated
above [1712](A[1]), but one the contrary, from the act itself as
terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed.
Consequently wherever we find a different motive inclining the
intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is
evident that the motive for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same
as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are
contrary to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance
is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of
insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only
differ specifically, but are contrary to one another.
Reply to Objection 1: Although "more" and "less" do not cause diversity
of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference,
in so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say
that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
1) that "those who held that there are no different species of
friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by
insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to fall short
thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they
result from different motives.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the sinner's intention to depart from
reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind
through departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand,
sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth,
wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or
less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the
intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to
tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of
falsehood, as is evident of the "boaster," who exceeds in telling
untruths for the sake of fame, and the "cheat," who tells less than the
truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. This also explains how
some false opinions are contrary to one another.
Reply to Objection 3: One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to
different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. [1713]SS,
Q[119], A[1], ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders
contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?
Objection 1: It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of
different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil
results from each single defect." Now individual defects are
corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption
of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin.
Objection 2: Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes
take their species from circumstances, as stated above ([1714]Q[18],
A[10]). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different
circumstances are corrupted.
Objection 3: Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony,
according to the words contained in the following verse:
'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.' Now these pertain
to various circumstances, for "hastily" means sooner than is right;
"too much," more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore
the species of sin is diversified according to the various
circumstances.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that
"every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not";
and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species
of sins are not diversified in this respect.
I answer that, As stated above [1715](A[8]), wherever there is a
special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin,
because the motive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it
happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted,
there is but one motive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive,
takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought,
and so on with the circumstances, since he does this through an
inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption
of different circumstances does not diversify the species of sins, but
belongs to one and the same species.
Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises
from different motives: for instance that a man eat hastily, may be due
to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account
of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he desire too
much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire
choice meats, is due to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence
in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances entails
different species of sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has
different species in respect of the thing which the subject is
deprived, even as other privations. But sin does not take its species
from the privation or aversion, as stated above [1716](A[1]), but from
turning to the object of the act.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance never transfers an act from one
species to another, save when there is another motive.
Reply to Objection 3: In the various species of gluttony there are
various motives, as stated.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under
which head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?
(2) Whether all are equal?
(3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?
(4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is
opposed?
(5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?
(6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?
(7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?
(8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?
(9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?
(10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the
person sinning?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all sins are connected with one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is
written (James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend
in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of
transgressing all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all
sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a
transgression of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly
commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all.
Objection 2: Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now
whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above
([1717]Q[65], A[1]). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of
all the virtues. Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all
sins.
Objection 3: Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a
principle in common, as stated above ([1718]Q[65], AA[1],2). Now as the
virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of
God, which builds the city of God, is the beginning and root of all the
virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of
all sins, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all
vices and sins are also connected so that whoever has one, has them
all.
On the contrary, Some vices are contrary to one another, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in
the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to
be connected with one another.
I answer that, The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in
pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the sinner
in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man
acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore
the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that
all the virtues are connected together in the right reason of things to
be done, viz. prudence, as stated above ([1719]Q[65], A[1]). But the
intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from
the path of reason; rather is it directed to tend to some appetible
good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the
sinner's intention is directed when departing from reason, are of
various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes
contrary to one another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their
species from that to which they turn, it is evident that, in respect of
that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one
another. For sin does not consist in passing from the many to the one,
as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in
forsaking the one for the many.
Reply to Objection 1: James is speaking of sin, not as regards the
thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as
stated above ([1720]Q[72] , A[1]), but as regards that from which sin
turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment
of the law. Now all the commandments of the law are from one and the
same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is
despised in every sin; and in this sense he says that whoever "offends
in one point, is become guilty of all," for as much as, by committing
one sin, he incurs the debt of punishment through his contempt of God,
which is the origin of all sins.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1721]Q[71], A[4]), the opposite
virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not
destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, by turning
man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy
the habit of acquired virtue; though if such acts be repeated so as to
engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed,
the destruction of which entails the loss of prudence, since when man
acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without
which no moral virtue is possible, as stated above ([1722]Q[58],
A[4];[1723] Q[65], A[1]). Consequently all the moral virtues are
destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have
in so far as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the
inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not
virtues. Nevertheless it does not follow that for this reason man
contracts all vices of sins---first, because several vices are opposed
to one virtue, so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them,
without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly
opposed to virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as
stated above ([1724]Q[71], A[1]). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous
inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices
or sins.
Reply to Objection 3: The love of God is unitive, in as much as it
draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues,
which flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love
disunites man's affections among different things, in so far as man
loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are
various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, which arise from
self-love, are not connected together.
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Whether all sins are equal?
Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to
do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and
the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the
same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of
reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal
things. Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But
passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go
a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of
more or less. Therefore all sins are equal.
Objection 3: Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are
equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are equal.
On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate (Jn. 19:11): "He that hath
delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is evident that
Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is greater than
another.
I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the
book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from
which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold
all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of hell are
equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics
arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the side of the
privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from reason;
wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less,
they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider the matter
carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For
there is a simple and pure privation, which consists, so to speak, in
"being" corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is
privation of light. Such like privations do not admit of more or less,
because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less
dead on the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days,
than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, in like
manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several
shades, than if it were covered by a single shade shutting out all the
light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but
retains something of the opposite habit; it consists in "becoming"
corrupted rather than in "being" corrupted, like sickness which is a
privation of the due commensuration of the humors, yet so that
something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease
to live: and the same applies to deformity and the like. Such
privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the
contrary habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether
one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors or
members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the
privation of the due commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy
the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself,
as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance of the act, or the
affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of
the order of reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin
whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and
accordingly we must say that sins are not all equal.
Reply to Objection 1: To commit sin is lawful on account of some
inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater
inordinateness are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument looks upon sin as though it were a
pure privation.
Reply to Objection 3: Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the
same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according
to its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in
the same species of virtue, as stated above ([1725]Q[66], AA[1],2).
Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices
are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not.
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Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary
according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to
its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin.
Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various
objects.
Objection 2: Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its
malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to
which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that
which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary
according to their various objects.
Objection 3: Further, sins that have different objects are of different
kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one
another, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin
is not graver than another by reason of the difference of objects.
On the contrary, Sins take their species from their objects, as was
shown above ([1726]Q[72], A[1]). But some sins are graver than others
in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore
the gravity of sins varies according to their objects.
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said ([1727]Q[71], A[5]),
the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver
than another: for just as the good of health consists in a certain
commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so
the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human
act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the
higher the principle the disorder of which causes the disorder in the
humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the
human body from the heart, which is the principle of life, or from some
neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so
much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher
in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason directs all
things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches
to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. Now the object of an act is
its end, as stated above ([1728]Q[72], A[3], ad 2); and consequently
the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is
clear that external things are directed to man as their end, while man
is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about
the very substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is
about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin committed
directly against God, e.g. unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in
each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another
according as it is about a higher or lower principle. And forasmuch as
sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity
which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting
from the species.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the object is the matter about which an
act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the
intention of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above ([1729]Q[72],
A[3], ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was
shown above ([1730]Q[72], A[6];[1731] Q[18], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that man turns unduly to some
mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good,
which aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees
of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those things to
which man turns.
Reply to Objection 3: All the objects of human acts are related to one
another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far
as they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all
sins from being compared with one another.
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Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to
which they are opposed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary
according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed,
so that, to wit, the graver the sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
For, according to Prov. 15:5, "In abundant justice there is the
greatest strength." Now, as Our Lord says (Mat. 5:20, seqq.) abundant
justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder,
which less abundant justice restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin
is opposed to the greatest virtue.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "virtue is
about the difficult and the good": whence it seems to follow that the
greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less
grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what is less
difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope (1
Cor. 13:13). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous
sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope.
Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the "worst is
opposed to the best." Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue;
and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin
is opposed to the greatest virtue.
I answer that, A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first,
principally and directly; that sin, to with, which is about the same
object: because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the
more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: because,
just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also
does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and virtue take their
species from the object, as shown above ([1732]Q[60], A[5];[1733]
Q[72], A[1]). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed
to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in the same
genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in
respect of a certain extension of the virtue in checking sin. For the
greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin,
so that it withdraws man not only from that sin, but also from whatever
leads to it. And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the
more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more
perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And
in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue, on
the part of the latter's effect.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the opposition which
consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even
minor sins.
Reply to Objection 2: The greater virtue that is about a more difficult
good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult
evil. For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will
is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not being overcome
by the difficulty.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of
God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the
hatred of God, which is the most grievous of all sins.
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Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than
spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: for
it is written (Prov. 6:30, 32): "The fault is not so great when a man
has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his
heart shall destroy his own soul." Now theft belongs to covetousness,
which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a
carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins are of greater guilt than spiritual
sins.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus
[*The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil
rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the
greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that the
carnal sins are of most guilt.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it
is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." But anger is
a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust
pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than
spiritual sin.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins are
of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins.
I answer that, Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins:
yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt than
each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between
spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous than carnal
sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this.
The first is on the part of the subject: because spiritual sins belong
to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to turn away
from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of
the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs to turn to goods of the body;
so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a "turning to" something, and
for that reason, implies a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin
denotes more a "turning from" something, whence the notion of guilt
arises; and for this reason it involves greater guilt. A second reason
may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is committed:
because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner's own body, which he
ought to love less, in the order of charity, than God and his neighbor,
against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual
sins, as such, are of greater guilt. A third reason may be taken from
the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous
the sin, as we shall state further on [1734](A[6]). Now carnal sins
have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate concupiscence of the flesh.
Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.
Reply to Objection 1: Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but
also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under
the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on Eph. 5:5. "No
fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery is
so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves his wife more than his
chattels.
Reply to Objection 2: The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin
of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with
difficulty be withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is
insatiable," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12).
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6),
the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in
anger, is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he
says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy of
reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us
and irrational minds": hence, by these sins man is, so to speak,
brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that
they are more shameful.
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Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on
its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly it
moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is
lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; for it denotes
weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that
is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not
derive its gravity from its cause.
Objection 2: Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin;
wherefore a gloss on Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known concupiscence,"
says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids
all evils." Now the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome,
the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished
by the greatness of its cause.
Objection 3: Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a
virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. Now
the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so
much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused from
sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore
the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause.
On the contrary, If the cause be increased, the effect is increased.
Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin.
I answer that, In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes
may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, and
is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to
its fruit, as a gloss observes on Mat. 7:18, "A good tree cannot bring
forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the more grievous
will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more grievously
does man sin.
The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being
those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must
make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord
with the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the proper
object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous,
because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the
intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will to sin,
against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is
to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason.
Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g.
ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the will, (e.g.
weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin,
even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much so, that if the
act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the extrinsic moving
cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause
diminishes the sin, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: If concupiscence be understood to include the
movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there
is a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion,
which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater
concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of
the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, being
stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous
temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if
concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason,
and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the
graver the sin: because sometimes the movement of concupiscence is
redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the cause which renders
the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as
stated.
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Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a
sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance
does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the
gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance.
Objection 2: Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is
evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil,
it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise
aggravates a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning
away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the object
to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice.
On the contrary, Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who
sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven
(Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance
aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue
(Ethic. ii, 1,2), "it is natural for a thing to be increased by that
which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in
some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs from the order
of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his
action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be
aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in three ways.
First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to
another: thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with one who is
not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter
is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz.
injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this
respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a
circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus,
but only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives
both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits
the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to
whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin is more grievous;
even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the
body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. iii) that "in taking his father's
life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who
fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his
position in the republic." Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by
adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another
circumstance: thus, taking another's property constitutes the sin of
theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of
another's property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself,
to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act.
Reply to Objection 1: Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as
stated above ([1735]Q[18], A[10]). Nevertheless a circumstance which
does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the
goodness of a thing is weighed, not only in reference to its species,
but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is
measured, not only according to the species of that act, but also
according to a circumstance.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way.
For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's
species; because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same
species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin
in relation to the malice of another circumstance.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason should direct the action not only as
regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore
one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any
single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought
not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason
suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of
reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought to
be united by right reason.
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Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of
its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to
the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or
malice, as stated above ([1736]Q[20], A[5]). Therefore a sin is not
aggravated on account of its causing more harm.
Objection 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor.
Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God,
according to Job 35:6, 8: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt
thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like
thee." If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm,
it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than
sins against God or oneself.
Objection 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving
him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because
the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man
ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace. Now,
speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication
deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If
therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its causing a greater
harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more
grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is
not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is
contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it
diminishes the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the
integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as
it does more harm.
I answer that, Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because
sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as
when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer
or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin
directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin.
Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when a
man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he
knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to
do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the
quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in
so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to
sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another,
a harm which he would not wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is
neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with
the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on
account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, a man
is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be
unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly from the
sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates
the sin directly, because whatever is directly consequent to a sin,
belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if
a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that many are
scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it
perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly.
But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself
incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act,
and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor
does it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for instance, if a man
in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand,
this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it
be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make
greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the
infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing
about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of
murder than for a sin of theft: but his sin is not aggravated on
account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in
the case of a believer, who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the
very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy
his desire to sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole
gravity of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have already stated ([1737]Q[20], A[5]), in
treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of
an action if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of
an act.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does
not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is
inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm
itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the
act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be
inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are the
most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found
against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits
against himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do God
any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things
concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things,
which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and
freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this
be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from
some anxiety.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument does not prove, for two reasons:
first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his
neighbors; whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to
harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and
sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the
sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, because no man dies
spiritually except by sinning of his own will.
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Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person agains
t
whom it is committed?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the
condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this were
the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a
just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin: because a
virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the
wrong done him, than others, who, through being scandalized, are also
hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against whom a sin
is committed does not aggravate the sin.
Objection 2: Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the
sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin,
because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave
sins once: he that takes his father's life sins many times." But the
kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin,
because every man is most akin to himself; and yet it is less grievous
to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than another's
horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of
the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
Objection 3: Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a
sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according to Wis.
6:7: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and Lk. 12:47: "The
servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall
be beaten with many stripes." Therefore, in like manner, on the part of
the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of
his position and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous
sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor
man, since "there is no respect of persons with God" (Col. 3:25),
according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore
the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
On the contrary, Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are
committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (3 Kings
19:14): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets
with the sword." Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed
by a man against those who are akin to him, according to Micah 7:6:
"the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her
mother." Furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are
expressly condemned: thus it is written (Job 34:18): "Who saith to the
king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly." Therefore
the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the sin.
I answer that, The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of
the sin. Now it has been stated above [1738](A[3]) that the primary
gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to
be so much the more grave, as its object is a more principal end. But
the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his
neighbor: for whatever we do, it is on account of one of these that we
do it; although one of them is subordinate to the other. Therefore the
greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned
against, may be considered on the part of these three.
First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as
he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that an injury inflicted
on such a person redounds on to God according to Zech. 2:8: "He that
toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye." Wherefore a sin is the
more grievous, according as it is committed against a person more
closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official
station. On the part of man himself, it is evident that he sins all the
more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more
united to him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or
any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the
other, and, for this very reason, sins all the more grievously,
according to Ecclus. 14:5: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he
be good?" On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously,
according as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin committed
against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the
place of the whole people, is more grievous than a sin committed
against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited (Ex. 22:28):
"The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse." In like manner it
would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, is all the
more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would
cause among many people.
Reply to Objection 1: He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person,
so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but
that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness,
which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer.
Reply to Objection 2: The injury which a man inflicts on himself in
those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for
instance his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on
another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things that
are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and
spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself:
for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since,
however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the
dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect of
injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in
their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, or give his
approval.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no respect for persons if God punishes
more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this
is done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many.
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Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning
does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving
to God, according to Ecclus. 25:13: "How great is he that findeth
wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the
Lord." Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to
him: for it is written (2 Paral. 30: 18,19): "The Lord Who is good will
show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the
God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not
sanctified." Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the
person sinning.
Objection 2: Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" (Rom.
2:11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one
and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence
of the person sinning.
Objection 3: Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he
would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his
goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence
of the person sinning.
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is deemed
so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent
person."
I answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares
on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are less
imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in
checking those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does not allow
us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from
deliberation: and these sins are all the more imputed to man according
as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned for this. First,
because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and
virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said (Lk. 12:47)
that the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not .
. . shall be beaten with many stripes." Secondly, on account of
ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of
God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: and in this respect any
excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a sin, according to Wis.
6:7: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented." Thirdly, on account of
the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence of the
person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice,
whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to
be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on
account of the example or scandal; because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i,
2): "Sin becomes much more scandalous, when the sinner is honored for
his position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and
men are wont to bear them with more indignation.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted alludes to those things which
are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not respect persons in punishing the
great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity
of their sin, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The man who excels in anything reaps
disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse
thereof.
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OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there
are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?
(2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
(3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?
(4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?
(5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?
(6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected
in the higher reason?
(7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the
higher reason?
(8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?
(9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?
(10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to
its proper object?
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Whether the will is a subject of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will and
the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot
be in the will.
Objection 2: Further, the will is directed either to the good or to
what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does
not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good,
points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will.
Therefore sin is nowise in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and
efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause
do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient
cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the will, as
Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the
subject of sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will
that we sin, and live righteously."
I answer that, Sin is an act, as stated above ([1739]Q[71], AA[1],6).
Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. "to cut" and "to burn":
and such acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which
the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18)
that "movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover." On
the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter,
but remain in the agent, e.g. "to desire" and "to know": and such are
all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper
subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle of the
act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as
stated above ([1740]Q[1], A[1] ;[1741] Q[18], A[6]), it follows that
the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts,
and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins. Therefore it
follows that sin is in the will as its subject.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is said to be outside the will, because the
will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil
is an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this
sense is in the will.
Reply to Objection 2: If the defect in the apprehensive power were
nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will,
or in the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance
is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in the
apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect
also is deemed a sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument applies to those efficient causes
whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move
themselves, but move other things; the contrary of which is to be
observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove.
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Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin.
For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except by
the will." Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin.
Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.
Objection 2: Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and
evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore
the will alone is the subject of sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as
Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so
true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it
is no sin at all." Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary,
except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this
suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the
external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a
subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is
the subject of sin.
On the contrary, Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about
one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are
the subject of virtues, as stated above ([1742]Q[56]). Therefore the
will is not the only subject of sin.
I answer that, As was shown above [1743](A[1]), whatever is the a
principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts
are not only those which are elicited by the will, but also those which
are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating
of voluntariness. Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin,
but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or
restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same powers are the
subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to
the same subject.
Reply to Objection 1: We do not sin except by the will as first mover;
but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper
objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils,
by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in
so far as they partake of will and reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The members of the body are not principles but
merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which
moves them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other
hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free
agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in
Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions
that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is
inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.
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Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality.
For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. Now
sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot
be in the sensuality.
Objection 2: Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as
Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the
movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality
ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life;
wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De
Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality
is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed
to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we
do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the
deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 7:19): "The good which I will I do
not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine
explains (Contra Julian. iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as
referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of
the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.
I answer that, As stated above ([1744]AA[2],3), sin may be found in any
power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the
nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality, or
sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will.
Wherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality.
Reply to Objection 1: Although some of the powers of the sensitive part
are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have
a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we
surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the
powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the [1745]FP,
Q[78], A[4]. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of
other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in its
natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the
principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the subject of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The continual corruption of the sensuality is to
be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely
destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes,
its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes" does not
hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate
movements, if he be presentient to them, for instance by turning his
thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to
something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus
when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his
thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science,
sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise.
Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the
aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a
voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one.
Reply to Objection 3: Man does not do perfectly himself what he does
without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man
does nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and
consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is
something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the
sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is
something imperfect in the genus of sin.
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Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?
Objection 1: It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality.
Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to commit
a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal
pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so
that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can
be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the
irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10).
Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about the same
subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now
disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial
sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin
can be there also.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate
movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even
be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin
is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality
is not a mortal sin.
I answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the
body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys
the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual
death, which is mortal sin, as stated above ([1746]Q[72], A[5]). Now it
belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order
anything to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can only belong
to the power whose function it is to order others to the end. Wherefore
mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of the sensuality can concur towards a
mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its
being an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to
whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is
imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it
is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an
act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of
moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act
of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always
accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power;
and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: A disposition may be related in three ways to
that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in
the same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect
science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same
thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is
neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things
which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can arrive
at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a
disposition to science which is in the intellect. In this way the
venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal
sin, which is in the reason.
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Whether sin can be in the reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the
sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason is
not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from
sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
Objection 2: Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated
above [1747](A[1]). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it.
Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no sin except about things which are
under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among
those things which are under our control: since by nature some are
mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in the
reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the
lower and in the higher reason.
I answer that, The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have
clearly shown ([1748]AA[1],2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is
its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of
knowing the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the
other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason.
First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is
imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in ignorance or error about
what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands
the inordinate movements of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to
check them.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the defect in the proper
act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to
the case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is
unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and
excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen.
If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is
able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, and the
defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the
act of directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason as a
sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper
act.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1749]Q[17], A[1]), when we were
treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and
precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the
will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called
rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is
found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the
reason, or through the reason being the principle of the will's act.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad
1).
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Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in
the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power,
as stated above ([1750]Q[31], A[1]). But the appetitive power is
distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore
morose delectation is not in the reason.
Objection 2: Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs,
since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object.
Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not
about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose delectation
is not in the reason.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin
'mora'---delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time is
no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore
morose delectation does not belong to the reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent
to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of the
pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken
of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes the lower reason, as
he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose
delectation is in the reason.
I answer that, As stated [1751](A[5]), sin may be in the reason, not
only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its
directing human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not only
external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason
fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the
reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now it
fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: first, when it
commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately
provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it
fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a
man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion
is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] upon
it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose
delectation is said to be in the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as
its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in
accordance with what has been stated above [1752](A[1]), viz. that
actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their
principles.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason has its proper elicited act about its
proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of
those lower powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly
delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay
of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur]
thereon, and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning
over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind,"
as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).
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Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in
the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as
stated above ([1753]Q[15], A[1]): whereas the reason is an apprehensive
power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher
reason.
Objection 2: Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and
consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
[*'Rationes aeternae,' cf. [1754]FP, Q[15], AA[2],[3] where as in
similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,'
because St. Thomas was speaking of the Divine 'idea' as the archetype
of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is
identified with the eternal law, (cf. A[8], OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But
sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal
law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he
consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not
always in the higher reason.
Objection 3: Further, just as man can regulate his external actions
according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures
or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to
fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine states
(De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be
sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.
Objection 4: Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so
does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to
act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any
deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves
his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may
consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to
the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, so
far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation
by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden
fruit to her husband."
I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which
consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and
delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical
reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must
observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence
belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in speculative
matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by
referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a
yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted to it:
wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not
being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that human acts can be
regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the
created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the
rule of the Divine law, as stated above ([1755]Q[19], A[4]).
Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it
follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally
pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal
types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several points, the
final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts,
the action itself comes last, and the delectation which is the
inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent
to an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the
preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the
lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the
higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever is
subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the
judgment of the higher court, but not conversely.
Reply to Objection 1: Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not
absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and
judging, as stated above ([1756]Q[15], A[3]). Because the fact that the
consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will
tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment.
Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The higher reason is said to consent, from the
very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine
law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of
God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it
by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always
proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a
sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of
moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it
become the servant or slave of the evil deed."
Reply to Objection 3: The higher reason, by considering the eternal
law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can
direct or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the
judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while
deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes
approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation
belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal
law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then
belong to the higher reason.
Reply to Objection 4: The apprehension of the power of imagination is
sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the
higher or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the
lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the
higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation
it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly by imputed to
it.
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Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal
sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which does
not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently
does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turning
away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above
([1757]Q[71], A[6]). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing
to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being
such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing
to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But
delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin.
Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice,
according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward
deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation
consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice
from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward thought differs
from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference of
consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor
is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither is the consent to
the delectation.
Objection 4: Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a
mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found also
in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act
itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does not, for this
reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems
not to sin mortally.
Objection 5: Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple
fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation
resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a
mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of
fornication.
Objection 6: Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the
remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii).
Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by
means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "this
sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed:
wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we should
strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our trespasses.'" Therefore
consent to delectation is a venial sin.
On the contrary, Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be
altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be
forgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since
without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them."
But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to
delectation is a mortal sin.
I answer that, There have been various opinions on this point, for some
have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only a
venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this
opinion is more common and more probable. For we must take note that
since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic.
x, 4, and again, that since every delectation may be compared to two
things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to the object
in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as
a thing, is an object of delectation, because the action itself can be
considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in
it, rests. Sometimes the action itself, which results in delectation,
is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to
which it belongs to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the
action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and delights
in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other
times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. a thought, has for its
object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his
thought proceeds from the inclination of the appetite, not indeed to
the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is
thinking of fornication, may delight in either of two things: first, in
the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the
delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the
appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not in itself a
mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man
thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at
all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he
may wish to preach or dispute about it. Consequently such affection or
delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal
sin in virtue of its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes
no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such
a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true.
But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act
thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this act. Wherefore
the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing
less than a consent to the inclination of his appetite to fornication:
for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with
his appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses
that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin.
Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a
mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains.
Reply to Objection 1: Consent to delectation may be not only in the
lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above
[1758](A[7]). Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the
eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating
according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is
intent on them, as being regulated according to them: and by turning
from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even the acts of
the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so
far as the direction of the higher reason fails in directing them
according to the eternal types.
Reply to Objection 2: Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is
itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent
to take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial
sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, in its genus,
a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given,
is accidental, viz. on account of the incompleteness of the act: which
incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent has been given, so
that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the delectation which has
the thought for its object.
Reply to Objection 4: The delectation which has an external act for its
object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even
though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition
of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, and
consequently the delectation will be inordinate also.
Reply to Objection 5: The consent to delectation, resulting from
complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but
not the consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the
thought of murder.
Reply to Objection 6: The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we
may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin.
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Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower
powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the
higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a
sinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the "higher
reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal law." But
mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it
seems that there can be no other than mortal sin in the higher reason.
Objection 2: Further, the higher reason is the principle of the
spiritual life, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of
the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are
mortal.
Objection 3: Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done
out of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial
sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the
higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of the
eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account
of the contempt of the Divine law.
On the contrary, Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason,
as stated above [1759](A[7]). But consent to an act of venial sin is
itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher
reason.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher reason
"is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law"; it
contemplates it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and
directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the fact
that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act
or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the inordinateness of the
act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law, in the
same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the
last end, but is beside that law, as an act of venial sin is. Therefore
when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not
turn away from the eternal law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but
venially.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in
the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency,
and such a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the
heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or of the
parts surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal.
In like manner there is mortal sin in the higher reason whenever the
order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is the
eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched,
the sin is not mortal but venial.
Reply to Objection 3: Deliberate consent to a sin does not always
amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary
to the Divine law.
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Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher
reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of a
power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed
with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the
eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without
mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason
as such.
Objection 2: Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there
can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate
movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal
sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.
Objection 3: Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us
unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin,
through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher
good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when
the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act,
considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more
grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is
contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to
any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement that
takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent
deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false. Therefore
there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.
On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it
belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial
sin in the higher reason as such.
I answer that, The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than
the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason.
For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so
far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it does not
regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what
is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; and consequently
the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of the lower powers
to which it consents are mortal sins.
With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple
"intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again consults
the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple
intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine things, as
when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although
unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of
unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be
contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles
of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other
aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or
can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly
apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and
rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended it, before he has had
time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in
accordance with the Divine law. If, however, the movement of unbelief
remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in
sudden movements, the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its
proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin
mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to
the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things which are mortal
sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their
genus.
Reply to Objection 1: A sin which is against the eternal law, though it
be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the
incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: In matters of action, the simple intuition of the
principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as
well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it
belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions:
consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.
Reply to Objection 3: One and the same thing may be the subject of
different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus
the existence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known
by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which
is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the
higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is reducible
to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that which in the
sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of
the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher
consideration, as was explained above.
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OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in
particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sin has a cause?
(2) Whether it has an internal cause?
(3) Whether it has an external cause?
(4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?
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Whether sin has a cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the
nature of evil, as stated above ([1760]Q[71], A[6]). But evil has no
cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause.
Objection 2: Further, a cause is that from which something follows of
necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for
every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause.
Objection 3: Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or
evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for "a
good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18). Likewise neither
can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a
sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore sin
has no cause.
On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to Job
5:6, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is something
done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God."
Therefore sin has a cause.
I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is
an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, so far
as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or
privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be assigned to a
negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e.
the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation in
itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the removal of
the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In
the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which a negation is a
sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by
causing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently causes a
privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple
negation. But, since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not
a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought
naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental
efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought to be in a
thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And
accordingly we are wont to say that evil, which consists in a certain
privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now
every accidental cause is reducible to the direct cause. Since then
sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient
cause, and on the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows
that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act.
Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason
and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act
of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and
beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the
lack of direction in the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin signifies not only the privation of good,
which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the
subject of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this
evil has a cause, has been explained.
Reply to Objection 2: If this definition is to be verified in all
cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient
and not impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of
something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on
account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all
things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. vi, text. 5.
Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is a
necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the will in failing to apply the
rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact
of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in
itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it
is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of
the first sin, but some good lacking some other good.
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Whether sin has an internal cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that
which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an
internal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the
effect follows.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal
movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is within man is either natural or
voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for
sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3;
iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is already
a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i,
9) that "the will is the cause of sin."
I answer that, As stated above [1761](A[1]), the direct cause of sin
must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a
twofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other proximate.
The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will,
in respect of which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the
apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite.
For just as it is due to the judgment of reason, that the will is moved
to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of
the senses that the sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which
inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall
explain further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause
of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason and
will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive
appetite.
But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some
apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz. the rule of
reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good,
appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the appetite; while
the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is
to consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary sinful act
appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the
conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is within a thing as its natural
power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal
act of the appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now
the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual
by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first
place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is
proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is
inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so
that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements
that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually
sinning.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not true that all the internal acts belong
to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of
the will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself.
Reply to Objection 3: That which causes sin, as a power produces its
act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from
which sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone
sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from
the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with
his nature, ought to observe.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin has an external cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a
voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are within
us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external
cause.
Objection 2: Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the
will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal
cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of
some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can arise
from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external
cause.
Objection 3: Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is
multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements
to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin.
Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 21:16): "Are not these they, that
deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you
transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore something
external can be a cause of sin.
I answer that, As stated above [1762](A[2]), the internal cause of sin
is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as
lacking the due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin.
Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways,
either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the reason,
or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6];
Q[10], A[4]), none can move the will inwardly save God alone, who
cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]).
Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of sin, except by
moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving
the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it. Yet
neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in
matters of action, nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move
the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto in a
certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity,
move the reason and will. Therefore something external can be a cause
moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the
will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being
accomplished.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that the external motive
causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it
follows that it remains in our power to sin or not to sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that sin has an internal cause does not
prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause
of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: If the external causes inclining to sin be
multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the
sinful act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless
the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being
voluntary and in our power.
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Whether one sin is a cause of another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another.
For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with one
sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which
is inconsistent with sin, which has the character of evil. In like
manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an
efficient cause, but is weak and powerless," as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have no place
except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form.
Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause.
Objection 2: Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing,"
as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially
something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another.
Objection 3: Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the
same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we
go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause
of another.
On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not
quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin."
I answer that, Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of
sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the same
way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one
sin may be the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes.
First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly
and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which removes an impediment is
called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, by one sinful act,
loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him
from sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the first sin is
the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful
act, man is disposed to commit more readily another like act: because
acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly,
after the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another,
by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for
strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together.
Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in
so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his
end; as when a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or
fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form
to moral matters, as stated above ([1763]Q[1], A[3];[1764] Q[18],
AA[4],6), it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of another:
because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft,
the former is material while the latter is formal.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the
character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at
least apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being
inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another
sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it
has its form from its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of
another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin is something imperfect on account of its
moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as
an act it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of
another sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so
there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin
which is not caused by another sin.
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OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The
internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which are
the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above
[1765](A[2]), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the
first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on
the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the
cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice,
which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?
(2) Whether ignorance is a sin?
(3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?
(4) Whether it diminishes sin?
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Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin:
because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a
non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is
not a cause of sin.
Objection 2: Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of
sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above ([1766]Q[75],
A[1]). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something.
Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will
does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the
good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin
through ignorance."
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving
cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that moves
by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and
light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes an
impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this
way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act; because it is a
privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act of
sin, in so far as it directs human acts.
Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance
with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in
conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the
conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an
operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of
a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular
proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except
through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is
restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong
to kill one's father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance
about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle
which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could
cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not every kind of
ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the
knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. Consequently if a man's
will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of
parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about
his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is
concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through
ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii,
1).
Reply to Objection 1: Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything:
but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an
impediment.
Reply to Objection 2: As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance,
regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this
respect of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment.
Reply to Objection 3: The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely
unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in
another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause
of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing is a
man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a
certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.
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Whether ignorance is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a
word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above
([1767]Q[71], A[5]). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either
internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to
knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment
resulting from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge
is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far
as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary,
it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will,
rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a
sin, but rather a result of sin.
Objection 4: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does
any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act.
Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its
guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a sin,
unless perchance it be original sin.
Objection 5: Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be
sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual
in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be
continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance would be a
most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance
deserves punishment, according to 1 Cor. 14:38: "If any man know not,
he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance is a sin.
I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience
denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge
about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense
Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the other
hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge
of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know. Some of these
we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without the
knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly.
Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and
the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know
matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there are other things
which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to
know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and contingent
particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that
whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a
sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one is
bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if
he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance of
such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome
by study. For this reason such like ignorance, not being voluntary,
since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore
it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand,
vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to
know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([1768]Q[71], A[6], ad 1), when
we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite
negations, by reason of which omissions have the character of sin; so
that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the
above definition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one ought,
or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to
acquire the knowledge which we ought to have.
Reply to Objection 2: Although privation of grace is not a sin in
itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it
may have the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even
here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by his
acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin
consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed,
which is commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the
act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in
some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack
of consideration is a sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Although when the guilt has passed away through
repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of
knowledge, nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of
which the ignorance is said to be a sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Just as in other sins of omission, man sins
actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding,
so is it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually
indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring the
knowledge that he ought to have.
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Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary. Now
ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ([1769]Q[6], A[8]).
Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
Objection 2: Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done
accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown.
Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human
acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore
nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed
sinful or virtuous.
Objection 3: Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as
he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which
perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some
things done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things
alone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done
through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether
excuse from sin.
I answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it
causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated ([1770]AA[1],2) that
ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would
have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be
contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If,
however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not have
prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will thereto,
the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not
willing, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is
not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not
make the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same
applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or
accompanies the sinful act.
On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it
makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin,
because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse
altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of
the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in
so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen that a
person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which
circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the
substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is
sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if
a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which suffices for it
to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father,
(which is a circumstance constituting another species of sin); or,
suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike
him back, and that if he had known this, he would not have struck him
(which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though
this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused,
because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. Secondly, this
may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this
ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set
purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more
freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other
occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him
from sin. For such like negligence renders the ignorance itself
voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and
able to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse
from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely
involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of
matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from
sin altogether.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as
stated above ([1771]Q[6], A[8]). Hence not every ignorance excuses from
sin altogether.
Reply to Objection 2: So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant
person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect,
his sin is not accidental.
Reply to Objection 3: If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of
reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with
madmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes
the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.
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Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For
that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance
is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that
"every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does not diminish
sin.
Objection 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But
ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above [1772](A[2]). Therefore it
does not diminish a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and
diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on
Rom. 2:4, "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to
penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not."
Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
Objection 4: Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this
would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which
removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does
not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore
ignorance does not diminish sin.
On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven,
diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 1 Tim. 1:13: "I
obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore
ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.
I answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish
sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not
render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is
evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through
making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does
away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the
cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither
diminishes nor increases the sin.
Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such
as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from
the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance
is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely
ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems
rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is
through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt
of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however,
the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not
directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is
unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is
ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result
being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance
diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when
a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to
the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there
is less contempt, and therefore less sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The ignorance whereby "every evil man is
ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something
resulting from that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to
sin.
Reply to Objection 2: One sin is added to another makes more sins, but
it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins
do not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first
diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same gravity
as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if
committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk,
although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness
diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own
gravity implies.
Reply to Objection 3: The words of Ambrose may be understood as
referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a
species of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that
man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an
allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation
of the spiritual edifice.
Reply to Objection 4: The drunken man deserves a "double punishment"
for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which
results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the
ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and more,
perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above
(ad 2). It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an
ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be
more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to
the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since
more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher
observes (Polit. ii).
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OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive
appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin:
and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the
will?
(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?
(3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?
(4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?
(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 Jn. 2:16: "Concupiscence of the
eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life."
(6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?
(7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?
(8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
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Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of
the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its
object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it
is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in
general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the
will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good defined by
the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive appetite does not
move the will.
Objection 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus
the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational
appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a
lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that "the
rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the
heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another." Therefore the will cannot
be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is
material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use
a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima
iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force,
since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the
sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective appetite.
On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 13:56): "Lust hath perverted thy
heart."
I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move
the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways.
First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers
are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity
that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes
remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all
energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary,
through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to
several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain
attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less
attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction,
when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of
any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite or
will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.
Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is
good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of
reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension
of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in
those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the
apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative
power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict
of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we
observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn
their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result
being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the
sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it
also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment
of the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is
not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in
the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the
lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.
The Third Objection is solved in like manner.
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Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a
passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the
weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest
thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is
weak and soon passes away.
Objection 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the
apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is
really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge;
and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really,
it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears
to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore a passion
never influences the reason against its knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its
knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a
particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular
proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g. "Every
man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one another,
they are contrary to one another, as stated in Peri Herm. ii. If
therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce
an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary
opinions at the same time, which is impossible.
Objection 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the
particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who
knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is
sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i,
text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that "no
fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition to contain, for
example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of fornication."
Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.
Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),
"words express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that
man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is
an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even
in particular.
Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its
universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal
knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my
members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the
law of sin." Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of
which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a
passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its
knowledge.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion
of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion;
wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin
a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the
object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to
an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to
the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there
were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written (Prov.
14:22): "They err that work evil."
Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that
they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the
words of Lk. 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . .
. and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of James
4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it
is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is
necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction.
Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge,
viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to
hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as stated above
(Q[76], A[1]). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in
general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet he does not know
in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done;
and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal knowledge of
the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing
which is known habitually from not being considered actually: so that
it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general
but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually:
and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter
to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails
to consider in particular what he knows habitually, may happen through
mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not
attend to the consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is
ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider
actually what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance
supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity;
and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider
in particular what he knows in general, in so far as the passions
hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways.
First, by way of distraction, as explained above [1773](A[1]).
Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to
something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of
bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow
fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or
drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the
use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from
the fact that sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses
the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds
through excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws
the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has
in general.
Reply to Objection 1: Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does
not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge,
since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing
that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal
knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that something appears good in
particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion:
and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge
of the reason.
Reply to Objection 3: It is impossible for anyone to have an actual
knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition,
and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative
proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true
habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and
actually a false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is
directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act.
Reply to Objection 4: He that has knowledge in a universal, is
hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal,
so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal
proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his
conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that
the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, two
particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g. No
fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to
be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from
arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the
passions lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second.
Reply to Objection 5: Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance
to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to
judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state
of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so,
yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii,
3.
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Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness
?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sin committed through passion should
not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement
of the sensitive appetite, as stated above [1774](A[1]). Now vehemence
of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore
a sin committed through passion, should not be called a sin of
weakness.
Objection 2: Further, weakness in man regards that which is most
fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (Ps.
77:39): "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness
should be those which result from bodily defects, rather than those
which are due to a passion.
Objection 3: Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things
which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, whether
he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according
to Gn. 4:7: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: 'The lust
thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion over it."
Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness.
On the contrary, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions
diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease.
Therefore a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of
weakness.
I answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which,
chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way of
likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be
weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper
action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors
and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and
motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when it cannot do the
work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see
clearly, as the Philosopher states (De Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore
weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its
proper action on account of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts
of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with
the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be
inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for the
reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the
concupiscible or irascible power is affected by any passion contrary to
the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the
aforesaid manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of
weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the
incontinent man to an epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary
to his intention.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as in the body the stronger the movement
against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the
stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the
greater the weakness of the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which
is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body
may have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as
stated above [1775](A[1]). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we
refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of
soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a
condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us
through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ.
Reply to Objection 3: It is in the will's power to give or refuse its
consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that
our appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of
the will is hindered in the way already explained [1776](A[1]).
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Whether self-love is the source of every sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that self-love is not the source of every
sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause
of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore
man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself (Lev. 19:18).
Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8): "Sin taking occasion
by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which
words a gloss says that "the law is good, since by forbidding
concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that
concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a
distinct passion from love, as stated above ([1777]Q[3], A[2];[1778]
Q[23], A[4]). Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine in commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set
on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love
arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility."
Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin.
Objection 4: Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of
self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor.
Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love,
amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon." Now every
sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of
every sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([1779]Q[75], A[1]), the proper and
direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to
a mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from
inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone
desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves
himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him.
Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of
every sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a
fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate
self-love, leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv,
28) reckons to be the cause of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for
himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is said to love both the good he desires for
himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is
directed to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or
money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil:
for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or
from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is reduced to
self-love, since it is through loving himself that man either desires
good things, or avoids evil things.
Reply to Objection 4: A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix):
wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems
to be committed through self-love.
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Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of
life are fittingly described as causes of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh,
concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described
as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:10),
"covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all
evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. Therefore it
should not be reckoned among the causes of sin.
Objection 2: Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by
what is seen by the eyes, according to Dan. 13:56: "Beauty hath
deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be
condivided with concupiscence of the flesh.
Objection 3: Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated
above ([1780]Q[30], A[2]). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not
only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore
"concupiscence of the hearing" and of the other senses should also have
been mentioned.
Objection 4: Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate
desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of
evil things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned
here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are
insufficiently described.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:16): "All that is in the world
is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of life." Now a
thing is said to be "in the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is
written (1 Jn. 5:19): "The whole world is seated in wickedness."
Therefore these three are causes of sin.
I answer that, As stated above [1781](A[4]), inordinate self-love is
the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of
good: for a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident
that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is,
in two ways, the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the
passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as it
is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the aspect of
difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as
stated above (Q[23], A[1]). Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated
above (Q[30], A[3]). One is natural, and is directed to those things
which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards the
preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or
as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and
the inordinate appetite of such things is called "concupiscence of the
flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those
things which do not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the
fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or
imagination, or some similar mode of perception; such are money,
apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called
"concupiscence of the eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the
sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote
curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the
concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, so as
to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others.
The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of
life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we shall
state further on (Q[84], A[2]; [1782]SS, Q[162], A[1]).
It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can
be reduced to these three: since all the passions of the concupiscible
part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to
the third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible
passions conform to spiritual concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 1: "Pride of life" is included in covetousness
according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of
good. How covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of
"avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on
([1783]Q[84], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here
the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but
only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of
touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.
Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight is the most excellent of all
the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so
its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner
apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. xxxiii).
Reply to Objection 4: Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for
good, as stated above ([1784]Q[25], A[2];[1785] Q[39], A[2]); and so
those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the
causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil.
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Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of
passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing
causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is
a cause of sin, as stated [1786](A[5]). Therefore the more intense the
passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin,
but increases it.
Objection 2: Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to
merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases
merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a
greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also
increases rather than diminishes a sin.
Objection 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according
as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the
will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore
passion aggravates a sin.
On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of
the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the
less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12).
I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will,
which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement
of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to
the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according
as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or
will, as stated above ([1787]AA[1],2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently,
in so far as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the
lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything
intensely, without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite.
Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must
needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is
voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our
control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason
and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse
of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this
respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its
voluntariness.
On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but
increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit,
as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it
is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which
anyone sins, the greater the sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that
to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the
part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his
turning to something else---accidentally, i.e. beside his intention.
Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental
cause, but of its direct cause.
Reply to Objection 2: A good passion consequent to the judgment of
reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do
well, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a
passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the movement of the will incited by the
passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement,
as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.
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Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether.
For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin
altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes
an act to be involuntary, according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth
against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would."
Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.
Objection 2: Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a
particular matter, as stated above [1788](A[2]; Q[76], A[3]). But
ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated
above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.
Objection 3: Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the
body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of
mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of
the soul.
On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 7:5) speaks of the passions as
"passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which
would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore
passion does not excuse from sin altogether.
I answer that, An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused
from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary.
Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act
wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does
not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be
observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either "in itself," as
when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause," when the
will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the
case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is
considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk.
Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary
"directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it;
indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did not.
Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is
sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in
the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a
passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin,
because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to
drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for
instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such
a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered
wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes,
however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason
altogether; and then reason can drive the passion away, by turning to
other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since
the members are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as
stated above ([1789]Q[17], A[9]): wherefore such a passion does not
excuse from sin altogether.
Reply to Objection 1: The words, "So that you do not the things that
you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner
movement of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil,
in which sense we are to understand the words of Rom. 7:19: "The evil
which I will not, that I do." Or again they may be referred to the will
as preceding the passion, as is the case with the incontinent, who act
counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 2: The particular ignorance which excuses
altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to
know even after taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of
law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being
applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive
away, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a
comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about
drunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease.
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Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be
mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin
committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for
pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through passion is a sin
of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But
passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the
sensuality, as stated above ([1790]Q[74], A[4]). Therefore a sin
committed through passion cannot be mortal.
Objection 3: Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained
above ([1791]AA[1],2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or
to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore
a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5) that "the passions of the
sins . . . work [Vulg.: 'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit
unto death." Now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto
death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal.
I answer that, Mortal sin, as stated above ([1792]Q[72], A[5]),
consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion
pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to
direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last
end can happen not to be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating
reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden
movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or to
a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the
deliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive the
passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated
above: wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal
sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are
committed through passion.
Reply to Objection 1: A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through
its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause
lessens the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or
ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every
sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam].
Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is the only kind of
venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection regards
the first kind.
Reply to Objection 2: Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to
something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which
follows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1):
hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: Passion does not always hinder the act of reason
altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its
free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however,
the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either
mortal or venial.
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OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz.
malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice,
i.e. purposely?
(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain
malice?
(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through
habit?
(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than
through passion?
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Whether anyone sins through certain malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through
certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain
malice. Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22): "They err that work
evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works
intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the
intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia"
(malice) from "malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not
denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore
no one sins through malice.
Objection 3: Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a
cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely,
which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 34:27): "[Who] as it were on
purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not understand
all His ways." Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin
purposely or through certain malice.
I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for
the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to
corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is
thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the
principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both
rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in
human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone
sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive
appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur
through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is
out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence
of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its
regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man,
even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life
which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some
temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason
or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that
it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may
obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the
privation of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil,
which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in
order to possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through
certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.
Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge
that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through
ignorance: sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action
is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: and
sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be
suffered for the sake of possessing a particular good, but not the
simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that a man is ignorant,
when he sins through certain malice.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own
sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or
obtaining another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would
choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering
loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a
pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before him to
choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's anger, to
being deprived of the pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: The malice through which anyone sins, may be
taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good
habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through
malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also
denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of
evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as he
sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean
some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when
anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this
imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is the cause
of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not
indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous sin,
which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above
([1793]Q[75], A[4], ad 3).
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Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every one who sins through habit,
sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain
malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man
commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle word.
Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through
certain malice.
Objection 2: Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by
which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts which
precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice.
Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed through
certain malice.
Objection 3: Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice,
he is glad after having done it, according to Prov. 2:14: "Who are glad
when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this,
because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do those
actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who
sin through habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin: because "bad
men," i.e. those who have a vicious habit, "are full of remorse"
(Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed
through certain malice.
On the contrary, A sin committed through certain malice is one that is
done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to
which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard
to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed
through certain malice.
I answer that, There is a difference between a sin committed by one who
has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary to
use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that
habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something we use when we will,"
as stated above ([1794]Q[50], A[1]). And thus, even as it may happen
that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act,
because a bad habit does not corrupt reason altogether, something of
which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some
works which are generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that
one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through the
uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses
the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain malice: because to
anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of
that habit, has the aspect of something lovable, since it thereby
becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are
a second nature. Now the very thing which befits a man in respect of a
vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result
being that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain
possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is to
sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins
through habit, sins through certain malice.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good,
consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not
simply, but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof
is not a simple but a relative evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Acts proceeding from habits are of like species
as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from
them as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin
committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion.
Reply to Objection 3: He that sins through habit is always glad for
what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he
is able not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means
of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that
while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the
habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his sin not
because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account of his
reaping some disadvantage from the sin.
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Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice,
sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an
unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it," i.e. through
choice, "unless it be done through habit." Now to sin through certain
malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above
[1795](A[1]). Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he
has the habit of sin.
Objection 2: Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not
suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little."
But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through
certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice,
not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a
habit.
Objection 3: Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his
will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by
the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good.
Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something
supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through
passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, as
stated ([1796]Q[77], A[3]). Therefore whenever anyone sins through
certain malice, he sins through habit.
On the contrary, The good habit stands in the same relation to the
choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something
evil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of
a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue.
Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may
choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.
I answer that, The will is related differently to good and to evil.
Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the
rational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be
contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to
some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in
fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when
anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the
impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion.
Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain malice; for then
alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to
evil of its own accord. This may happen in two ways. First, through his
having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect
of that disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to
him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends,
as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to
that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt disposition is
either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of
the body, as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain
sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the
will, of its own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal of
some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not
through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of
eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear
to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being
freed from the bridle, as it were.
It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice,
always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, however, is not
always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins
through certain malice, that he sins through habit.
Reply to Objection 1: To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not
only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them
with pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of
reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit.
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into
sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this
something is not always a habit, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: That which inclines the will to evil, is not
always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover,
there is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because
evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be perfect
without the evil of fault.
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Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through
passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through
certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses from sin
either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins
through certain malice, than in one who sins through passion; since he
that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of
ignorance, which according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is
ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the end, which
is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse
for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who sins through
passion.
Objection 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less
grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown
headlong into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through
certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger
than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous
than to sin through passion.
Objection 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through
choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil.
Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain
malice.
On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very
reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26: "He hath
struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on
purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment is not increased
except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being
done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice.
I answer that, A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a
sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, as
sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other
things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the
movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is
committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will,
which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is
committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by
something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the
very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the
more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being
committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is
stronger. Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to sin,
soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to
his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a
permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in
his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the
intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick man who suffers
from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins
through passion, to one who suffers intermittently. Thirdly, because he
who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end
itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and so the defect
is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion,
whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted
on account of the passion, for the time being. Now the worst of all
defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin
committed through malice is more grievous than one committed through
passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance of choice, to which the objection
refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above
([1797]Q[76], A[4]). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the
kind make a sin to be less grave.
Reply to Objection 2: The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due
to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is
inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: It is one thing to sin while choosing, and
another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins
while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not
for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the
passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the
passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice,
chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained
([1798]AA[2],3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is
the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin
"through" choosing.
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OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of
God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a cause of sin?
(2) Whether the act of sin is from God?
(3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of
heart?
(4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are
blinded or hardened?
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Whether God is a cause of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle
says of certain ones (Rom. 1:28): "God delivered them up to a reprobate
sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient'],"
and a gloss comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts,
by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to
evil." Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a
will inclined to evil. Therefore God is to man a cause of sin.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 14:11): "The creatures of God
are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men."
But a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin. Since therefore
creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the [1799]FP,
Q[44], A[1], it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to
sin.
Objection 3: Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the
effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the
cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.
Objection 4: Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not
contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment;
since of this evil it is written (Is. 45:7) that God creates evil, and
(Amos 3:6): "Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: 'the
Lord'] hath not done?" Therefore it is not incompatible with God's
goodness that He should cause the evil of fault.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:25): "Thou . . . hatest none of
the things which Thou hast made." Now God hates sin, according to Wis.
14:9: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful." Therefore God
is not a cause of sin.
I answer that, Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of
another's sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another's
will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone
from sinning. Hence (Ezech. 3:18) it is said to the watchman: "If thou
say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: "If, when I say
to the wicked, 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him."] .
. . I will require his blood at thy hand." Now God cannot be directly
the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a
departure from the order which is to God as the end: whereas God
inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should
be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from the
order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of
sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens
that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin,
which assistance were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all
this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself
is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to
Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not
said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship,
unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore
evident that God is nowise a cause of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is
clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense,
it follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what
was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate
sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that
reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a person to danger if we
do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xxi,
whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that "God inclines
men's wills to good and evil," is to be understood as meaning that He
inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does
not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even this is due as being
deserved through a previous sin.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said the "creatures of God are turned
'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the
preposition "to" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made
clear by the Douay Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem"
admits of the translation "were made to be an abomination," which might
imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures that they might
be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, wherefore the
text goes on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to
wit, in their folly, use creatures for a purpose other than that for
which they were made.
Reply to Objection 3: The effect which proceeds from the middle cause,
according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that
first cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it
goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that
first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's
orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause
thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits against the
commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause.
Reply to Objection 4: Punishment is opposed to the good of the person
punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is
opposed to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly
opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison
between fault and punishment.
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Whether the act of sin is from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For
Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not a
thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin
is not from God.
Objection 2: Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except
because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending
evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of
sin, as stated above [1800](A[1]). Therefore God is not the cause of
the act of sin.
Objection 3: Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their
species, as was shown above (Q[18], AA[2],8). Now whatever is the cause
of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If
therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin,
which is false, as was proved above [1801](A[1]). Therefore God is not
the cause of the act of sin.
On the contrary, The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now
"the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares
(De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of
sin.
I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both
respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its
being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something existing in
act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act;
and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. God, as to its
cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the cause of every
action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an
action with a defect: and this defect is from the created cause, viz.
the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz.
God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but
to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked
leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless
causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is
the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin,
because He does not cause the act to have a defect.
Reply to Objection 1: In this passage Augustine calls by the name of
"thing," that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this
sense the act of sin is not a thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced
to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to
Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally.
Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the
act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect
accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of the sin.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1802]Q[72], A[1]), acts and
habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein
consists the nature of evil, but from some object, to which that
privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being
from God, belongs to the species of the act consequently, and not as a
specific difference.
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Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual
blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is
made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore God
is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
Objection 2: Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "God
does not punish what He causes." Now God punishes the hardened heart,
according to Ecclus. 3:27: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last."
Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart.
Objection 3: Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary
causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice
of man, according to Wis. 2:21: "For their own malice blinded them,"
and again, according to 2 Cor. 4:4: "The god of this world hath blinded
the minds of unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to God.
Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of
heart.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 6:10): "Blind the heart of this
people, and make their ears heavy," and Rom. 9:18: "He hath mercy on
whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth."
I answer that, Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two
things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and
turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the
cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is not
the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the
result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God to see
aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as regards
this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the
enlightening of souls, according to Jn. 1:9: "That was the true light
which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even as the
sun is the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies, though not in
the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas
God works freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the
sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all bodies, yet if it be
encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as
happens to a house whose window-shutters are closed, although the sun
is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not
act of its own accord in failing to light up the interior of the house;
and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the
other hand, God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in
whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being withheld is
not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His
own accord, withholds His grace. In this way, God is the cause of
spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart.
These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which
both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the
affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in
rendering service to the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, of which
the former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," hence it is
that spiritual "blindness" corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the
ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections.
Reply to Objection 1: Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the
withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect,
they make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin
that he incurs them, even as other punishments.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers hardheartedness in so far
as it is a sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness,
just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil
is said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin.
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Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of
those who are blinded and hardened?
Objection 1: It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are
always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened.
For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He
would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could draw some good from
every evil." Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the
evil of which He Himself is the cause. Now God is the cause of
blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above [1803](A[3]).
Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded
and hardened.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 1:13) that "God hath no
pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not
death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living.']."
Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not
turn their blindness to their profit: just as a physician would seem to
take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal
the invalid when he prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore God
turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded.
Objection 3: Further, "God is not a respecter of persons" (Acts 10:34).
Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case
of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not to believe in Christ,
and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized
with compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine (De Quaest.
Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare
of those who are blinded.
Objection 4: On the other hand, according to Rom. 3:8, evil should not
be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God
does not blind some for the sake of their welfare.
I answer that, Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a
twofold relation---to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's
damnation---to another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz.
that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall
into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and
converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). Therefore
blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those
who are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of
reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is directed
medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This
mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded, but
only to the predestinated, to whom "all things work together unto good"
(Rom. 8:28). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their
healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine says
(De Quaest. Evang. iii).
Reply to Objection 1: Every evil that God does, or permits to be done,
is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom
the evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole
universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the
martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as
regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good
that ensues from the loss.
Reply to Objection 3: That God directs the blindness of some to their
spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of
others is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He
vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God a
respecter of persons, as explained in the [1804]FP, Q[23], A[5], ad 3.
Reply to Objection 4: Evil of fault must not be done, that good may
ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good.
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OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?
(2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?
(3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?
(4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?
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Whether the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning?
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of
man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. Now
Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends
with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says that the
devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono
ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills men's hearts with secret lusts."
Therefore the devil is directly the cause of sin.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is
the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil." But God
is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the
cause of our sins.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein
Ethics (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle of
human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but
also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good
counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take
evil counsel, and consequently is directly the cause of sin.
On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing
else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire." Now
man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin.
Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's own will
alone.
I answer that, Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the
cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an
action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper
principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the
will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be
directly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act.
Now the will, as stated above ([1805]Q[9], AA[3],4,6), can be moved by
two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible
is said to move the appetite: secondly by that agent which moves the
will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or
God, as was shown above ([1806]Q[9], AA[3],4,6). Now God cannot be the
cause of sin, as stated above ([1807]Q[79], A[1]). Therefore it follows
that in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his
sin.
As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in
three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the will:
thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that
proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the will
that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a
fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or apparent
good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible things,
which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second
and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either by
offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the
reason. But in none of these three ways can anything be the direct
cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any
object except the last end, as stated above ([1808]Q[10], AA[1],2).
Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that
proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin.
Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither directly
nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of
appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: All these, and other like authorities, if we meet
with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man
to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him
objects of appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: This comparison is true in so far as the devil is
somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the
cause of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of
causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will
inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way.
Reply to Objection 3: God is the universal principle of all inward
movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil
counsel, is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as
persuading or offering the object of appetite.
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Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by
internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul are
vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an
intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which are the
lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to
evil through his internal movements.
Objection 2: Further, all the internal movements arise from the
external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God
alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the
[1809]FP, Q[110], A[4]. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in
man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are
perceived by the external senses.
Objection 3: Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand
and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either
of these, because, as stated in the [1810]FP, Q[111], AA[2],3, ad 2,
the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it
seem possible for him to produce imaginary species, since imaginary
forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in
sensible matter, which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to produce,
as is clear from what we have said in the [1811]FP, Q[110], A[2];
[1812]FP, Q[111], AA[2],3, ad 2. Therefore the devil cannot through
man's internal movements induce him to sin.
On the contrary, In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless
he appeared visibly; which is evidently false.
I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and
sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the
will. As regards the will, we have already stated [1813](A[1];
[1814]FP, Q[111], A[1]) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the
intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in
the knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in
man's regard; rather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent
to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive
appetite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined
to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he
can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting
certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the
sensitive appetite to some passion or other.
The reason of this is, that as stated in the [1815]FP, Q[110], A[3],
the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the
spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which
can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be
restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to the
imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher
says (De Somno et Vigil.) [*De Insomn. iii, iv.] that "when an animal
sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and
the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action
of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of
sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so
that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being
affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital
spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or
wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play.
In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions
according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital
spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through
certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is
that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is
brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle,
since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn.
iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an
apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing of a
passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being
something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a passion,
whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil
induces man inwardly to sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Although vital functions are always from an
intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them,
even as external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal
soul, that food may be more easily digested.
Reply to Objection 2: This apparition of imaginary forms is not
altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command
alone, but according to local movement, as explained above.
Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these
forms are received originally from the senses.
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Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of
necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said of
the devil (Job 41:24) that "there is no power on earth that can compare
with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the
earth.
Objection 2: Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of
things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented to
the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and
we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30. 39).
Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above [1816](A[2]);
and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12)
that "this evil," of which, to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends
gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to
shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor."
Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there
is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the devil
can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the
way explained above [1817](A[2]). Therefore he can induce man to sin of
necessity.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 5:8): "Your adversary the devil,
as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Now it
would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man were under
the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce
man to sin of necessity.
Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): "Be subject . . . to God,
but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said
neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any
way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist
him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel
to sin.
I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by
God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but
he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from
the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except
by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether,
by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as is the case
with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being thus fettered,
whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however,
the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free,
it can resist sin, as stated above ([1818]Q[77], A[7]). It is
consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every power that is greater than man, can
move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above ([1819]Q[9],
A[6]).
Reply to Objection 2: That which is apprehended by the senses or the
imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has
the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when
the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the
exercise of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's
power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning.
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Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the
devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd
of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to
others."
Objection 2: Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the
devil, according to Jn. 8:34: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave
[Douay: 'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same
also he is the slave" (2 Pet. 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a sin,
has been overcome by the devil.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil
is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore,
if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion
from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly
false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion.
On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our
evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a
movement of the free-will."
I answer that, the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all
our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of
whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin:
even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who dried the
wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the
direct cause of all the sins of men, as though each were the result of
his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from the fact
that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire
for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which desire might be
inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is
subject to the free-will.
Reply to Objection 1: The crowd of demons are the cause of all our
evils, as regards their original cause, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: A man becomes another's slave not only by being
overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously:
it is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of
the devil.
Reply to Objection 3: The devil's sin was irremediable, not only
because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was
not already prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be
said of no sin of man.
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OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while
man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, by outward
suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of
origin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration
of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its
essence; (3) of its subject.
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his
descendants?
(2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other
parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin?
(3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of
Adam by way of seminal generation?
(4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from
some part of the human body?
(5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and
not the man, had sinned?
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Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants,
by way of origin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is
not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (Ezech.
18:20): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he
would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one
contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin.
Objection 2: Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin,
unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pass
from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject
of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in the
[1820]FP, Q[118], A[2]. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by
way of origin.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin,
is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because it
lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin.
Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin.
Objection 4: Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more
powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united to
it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it
is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can the semen infect the
soul.
Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one
finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who are
so through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are
said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their origin. Therefore
nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered
into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be understood as
denoting imitation or suggestion, since it is written (Wis. 2:24): "By
the envy of the devil, death came into this world." It follows
therefore that through origin from the first man sin entered into the
world.
I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold
that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants,
by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized
soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed from some
uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear
from Augustine in many of his books [*For instance, Retract. i, 9; De
Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono Persev. xi,
xii.]
In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be
transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various writers have
gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject
of sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is
transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to
produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as erroneous,
endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be
transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted,
from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to
child---thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the
father of a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption, although
this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is
proportionate to the soul, and since the soul's defects redound into
the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect
of the soul is passed on to the child, through the transmission of the
semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt.
But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some
bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to child,
and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in
consequence, on account of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the case
of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by
the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is
essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the rational
soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's
soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding
its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
5), "no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity on him."
Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men
born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one
common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in
civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one
body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says
(Praedic., De Specie) that "by sharing the same species, many men are
one man." Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many
members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the
hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by
the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a
murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the
hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it
as something belonging to man and moved by man's first moving
principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of
Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first
parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate
from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their
actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to
his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from
the soul into the bodily members is called "actual." And just as the
actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of
that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for
which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin
of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from
his first parent, for which reason it is called the "sin of nature,"
according to Eph. 2:3: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath."
Reply to Objection 1: The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his
father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he
share in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is
transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even as actual sin
is transmitted through being imitated.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is not transmitted, because the
power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless
the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the
rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits the human
nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which
infects it: for he that is born is associated with his first parent in
his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature from him by a
kind of movement which is that of generation.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the guilt is not actually in the semen,
yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt.
Reply to Objection 4: The semen is the principle of generation, which
is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence
the soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is
already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person.
Reply to Objection 5: A man is not blamed for that which he has from
his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider
him as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus
a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on account of a
crime committed by one of his forbears.
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Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are
transmitted to their descendants?
Objection 1: It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first
parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants.
For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by
the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate parents, according
to Ex. 20:5: "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of
the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation."
Furthermore, according to human law, the children of those who are
guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer
ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants.
Objection 2: Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which
he has of himself, than that which he has received from another: thus
fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his
children, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has from Adam. Much
more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of
himself.
Objection 3: Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our
first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our
nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer
ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it be corrupt,
can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to Apoc. 22:11: "He that is
filthy, let him be filthier still." Therefore children contract, by the
way of origin, the sins of their nearer ancestors, even as they
contract the sin of their first parent.
On the contrary, Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits
of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much
less therefore are their sins.
I answer that, Augustine puts this question in the Enchiridion xlvi,
xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully
we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer
ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first parent to
be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his
like in species but not in individual. Consequently those things that
pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and
matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their
children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the knowledge
of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand,
those things that concern the nature of the species, are transmitted by
parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a
man with eyes begets a son having eyes, unless nature fails. And if
nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining
to natural disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness
of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those that
are purely personal, as stated above.
Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also
something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the
nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature,
and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original
justice, as stated in the [1821]FP, Q[100], A[1], was a gift of grace,
conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the
first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice
together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity,
so also was its disorder. Other actual sins, however, whether of the
first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but
only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to
sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus
[*Ep. ad Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual
punishment on account of their parents, unless they share in their
guilt, either in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul is
God's immediate property, as stated in Ezech. 18:4. Sometimes, however,
by Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on
their parents' account, inasmuch as the child, as to its body, is part
of its father.
Reply to Objection 2: A man can more easily transmit that which he has
of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our
nearer ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely
personal, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The first sin infects nature with a human
corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a
corruption pertaining only to the person.
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Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, t
o
all men?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not
transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a
punishment consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are
born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still
living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be
gathered from 1 Thess. 4:14: "We who are alive . . . unto the coming of
the Lord, shall not prevent them who have slept." Therefore they do not
contract original sin.
Objection 2: Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now
a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he does not
transmit it to his children.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of
Adam, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 5:15, seqq). But the gift of Christ
is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "Death passed upon all
men in whom all have sinned."
I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe
that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract
original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf.
Translator's note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through Christ;
and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what
has been stated [1822](A[1]), viz. that original sin, in virtue of the
sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his posterity, just as, from
the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body,
through their being moved by the will. Now it is evident that actual
sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude
to be moved by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all
those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation.
Reply to Objection 1: It is held with greater probability and more
commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will
die, and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP
([1823]XP, Q[78], A[1], OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others
hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among
others in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body---Ep.
cxix), then we must say in reply to the objection, that although they
are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that
the punishment of death will be remitted by God, since He can also
forgive the punishment due for actual sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the
guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind.
Nevertheless original sin remains in its effect as regards the "fomes,"
which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the body
itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his
power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized transmit
original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, but
as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are
born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all
that are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this,
not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but also unto
the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory.
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Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously
from human flesh?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a
person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on Gn. 4:1
says that "Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because
they were not severed from him in the place of life, before he sinned,
but in the place of exile after he had sinned." But if a man were to be
formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh would be severed in the place
of exile. Therefore it would contract original sin.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being
infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted.
Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin,
from whatever part of the flesh it was formed.
Objection 3: Further, original sin comes upon all from our first
parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who
might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore
they would contract original sin.
On the contrary, They would not have been in Adam "according to seminal
virtue," which alone is the cause of the transmission of original sin,
as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.).
I answer that, As stated above ([1824]AA[1],3), original sin is
transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they
are moved by him through generation, even as the members are moved by
the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except
by the active power of generation: so that those alone contract
original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of
generation originally derived from Adam, i.e. who are descended from
him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than
the active power of generation. But if anyone were to be formed by God
out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be
derived from Adam. Consequently he would not contract original sin:
even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not
by the man's will, but by some external power.
Reply to Objection 1: Adam was not in the place of exile until after
his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but
on account of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to
whom his active generation extends.
Reply to Objection 2: The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so
far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated.
Reply to Objection 3: If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he
would have been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression
is St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica [1825]TP,
Q[31], A[6], Reply to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as
stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have
contracted original sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their
children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract
original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them,
according to the word of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): "In whom all have
sinned." Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father.
Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from his mother's
sin as well as from his father's.
Objection 2: Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children
would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is "the
mother" that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher
states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and liability to
suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to
suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin.
Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would
contract original sin.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the
Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born
without original sin) "purifying her." But this purification would not
have been necessary, if the infection of original sin were not
contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is
contracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her children
would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered
into this world." Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin
to her children, he should have said that it entered by two, since both
of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned
first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by
the mother, but by the father.
I answer that, The solution of this question is made clear by what has
been said. For it has been stated [1826](A[1]) that original sin is
transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the
begetting of his children: wherefore it has been said [1827](A[4]) that
if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not
contract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of
philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the father,
while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is
contracted, not from the mother, but from the father: so that,
accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not
contract original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they
would contract it.
Reply to Objection 1: The child pre-exists in its father as in its
active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive
principle. Consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned,
their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been
subject to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that
are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the mother,
not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems
unreasonable. Because, as stated in the [1828]FP, Q[97], AA[1], 2, ad
4, immortality and impassibility, in the original state, were a result,
not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the
body was subjected to the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to
God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore,
supposing Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been
transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that
the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and
consequently they would not have been liable to suffer and subject to
the necessity of dying.
Reply to Objection 3: This prevenient purification in the Blessed
Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but
because it behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest
purity" [*Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy
to receive God unless it be pure, according to Ps. 92:5: "Holiness
becometh Thy House, O Lord."
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OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether original sin is a habit?
(2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?
(3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?
(4) Whether original sin is equally in all?
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Whether original sin is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For
original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De
Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But
privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
Objection 2: Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than
original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of
actual sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a
man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit
has the nature of a fault.
Objection 3: Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because
evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not
preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants
(De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin
little children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not
the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore original
sin is a habit.
I answer that, As stated above ([1829]Q[49], A[4];[1830] Q[50], A[1]),
habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an
act: thus science and virtue are called habits. In this way original
sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a
complex nature, whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to
something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second
nature, as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense original
sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the
destruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice,
even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, by
reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to
health. Hence it is that original sin is called the "languor of nature"
[*Cf. Augustine, In Ps. 118, serm. iii].
Reply to Objection 1: As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so
far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and
partly something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately
disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original
justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of
the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act:
whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate
disposition of nature, and has the character of fault through being
transmitted from our first parent, as stated above ([1831]Q[81], A[1]).
Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas
the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and for this reason
original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers the habit which inclines
a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit.
Nevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow
from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of
the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate
movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements
results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says
that original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except
by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): but it is a
habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin.
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Whether there are several original sins in one man?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are many original sins in one
man. For it is written (Ps. 1:7): "Behold I was conceived in
iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in
which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several
original sins in man.
Objection 2: Further, one and the same habit does not incline its
subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of
nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man,
inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not
one habit; but several.
Objection 3: Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now
the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown
above ([1832]Q[74]). Since then one sin cannot be in different
subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God,
behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for
the employment of the singular is that the "sin of the world" is
original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.
I answer that, In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be
assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original
sin. For it has been stated ([1833]Q[81], A[2]), that the first sin
alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore
in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in
proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason
may be taken from the very essence of original sin. Because in every
inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while
the unity of number is derived from the subject. For example, take
bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different
causes, e.g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung
or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in number.
Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin,
is one only, viz. the privation of original justice, removing the
subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is
specifically one, and, in one man, can be only one in number; while, in
different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is
numerically many.
Reply to Objection 1: The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be
explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of
the plural for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the life
of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist
in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by
the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of our first
parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth; or by several
parts of the soul being infected by original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one
habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason
why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the
removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is
destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner,
when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers
of the soul have various opposite tendencies.
Reply to Objection 3: Original sin infects the different parts of the
soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original
justice held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there
is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one man,
although the various parts of the body are affected.
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Whether original sin is concupiscence?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For
every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is
the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power.
Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.
Objection 2: Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are
in us, according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:5). Now there are several other
passions besides concupiscence, as stated above ([1834]Q[23], A[4]).
Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another
passion.
Objection 3: Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are
disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is the
highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7).
Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the
guilt of original sin."
I answer that, Everything takes its species from its form: and it has
been stated [1835](A[2]) that the species of original sin is taken from
its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be
considered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have
contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered
with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it.
Now the whole order of original justice consists in man's will being
subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will,
whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated
above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God, all
the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the
privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to
God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder
of the soul's powers, is a kind of material element in respect of
original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul
consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; which
inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence.
Hence original sin is concupiscence, materially, but privation of
original justice, formally.
Reply to Objection 1: Since, in man, the concupiscible power is
naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far
natural to man, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in
so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man,
contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1836]Q[25], A[1]), all the
irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding
the principle place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous
in moving, and is felt most, as stated above ([1837]Q[25], A[2], ad 1).
Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief
passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion.
Reply to Objection 3: As, in good things, the intellect and reason
stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul
is found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as
stated above ([1838]Q[77], AA[1],2;[1839] Q[80], A[2]). Hence original
sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance
is comprised among the material defects of original sin.
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Whether original sin is equally in all?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all.
Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above
[1840](A[3]). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence.
Therefore original sin is not equally in all.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the
soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But
sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to
degrees.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that
"lust transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation
may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may
be greater in one than in another.
On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above
([1841]Q[81], A[1]). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original
sin is too.
I answer that, There are two things in original sin: one is the
privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this
privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted
to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has no
degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and
privations that remove something entirely, such as death and darkness,
cannot be more or less, as stated above ([1842]Q[73], A[2]). In like
manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are
related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from
which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations
cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident that original sin
cannot be more in one than in another.
Reply to Objection 1: Through the bond of original justice being
broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain
order, each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the
more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the
soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of
the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more
prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to
original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in
all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to themselves
equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same
species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be
caused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or
less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause
of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not the actual lust that transmits original
sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate
lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we
must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive
appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original
justice. This lust is equally in all.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the
soul?
(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through
its powers?
(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of
original sin?
(4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the
generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than
in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises
from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is
seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another
law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore
original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect:
thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the
soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal
semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, we contract original sin from our first parent,
in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls
were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not
in the soul, but in the flesh.
Objection 4: Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into
the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it
would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus
God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's
creation and fusion.
Objection 5: Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a
vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the
rational soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul,
by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of
original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul
into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by the
flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh.
On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or
sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of
virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "I know that there dwelleth
not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore
the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul.
I answer that, One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in
its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its
subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as
in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom.
5:12): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as
in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen
that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the
child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but
only in the soul.
The reason for this is that, as stated above ([1843]Q[81], A[1]),
original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this
posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as
actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now
in this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from
the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can
in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its
instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to
gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty,
and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so
far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin.
But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the
internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the
will, does not bear the character of guilt.
Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the
flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to
the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of
guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of
guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of
original sin, and not the flesh.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man
already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to
punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh."
Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt,
but of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin is caused by the semen as
instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the
instrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause:
and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it
had the nature of actual sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in
respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle,
but as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is
transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational
soul, but disposes the matter for it.
Reply to Objection 4: The corruption of original sin is nowise caused
by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal
generation. And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to
God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being
created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God
infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with
regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained
through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it
is infused.
Reply to Objection 5: The common good takes precedence of private good.
Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general
order of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a
body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more that
the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its
infusion into the body, as stated in the [1844]FP, Q[90], A[4];
[1845]FP, Q[118], A[3]. And it is better for the soul to be thus,
according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can
avoid damnation, by means of grace.
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Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the
powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of
the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be
the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the
will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only
as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according
to its essence, but only according to the powers.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now
original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the
subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the
soul, rather than in its essence.
Objection 3: Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as
from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But
original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is
more in the powers than in the essence of the soul.
Objection 4: Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as
stated ([1846]Q[82], A[3]). But concupiscence is in the powers of the
soul. Therefore original sin is also.
On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated
above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body,
in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated
in the [1847]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul is the subject of
original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.
I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to
which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the
motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the
concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that
the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is
evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently
that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the
primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the
term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and this
belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the
[1848]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence,
is the primary subject of original sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As the motion of the will of an individual
reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of
the will of the first generator, through the channel of generation,
reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Even original justice pertained radically to the
essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to
which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the
powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the principles
of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins,
which are the sins of the person.
Reply to Objection 3: The body is related to the soul as matter to
form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless
comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of
the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper
accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation
and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds
the position of matter and effect, as stated above ([1849]Q[82], A[3]).
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Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin does not infect the will
before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by
whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the
generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative power
more than to the others.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal
semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than
the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers,
which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than
in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object
of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin
infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all
infect the intellect, as preceding the others.
On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation to the will,
because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep.
Virg. iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a
prior relation to the will.
I answer that, Two things must be considered in the infection of
original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect
it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above [1850](A[2]).
In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in
this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore regard
first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to
commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above (Q[74], AA[1],2).
Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in man, is not caused by the
generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental
generative power. Consequently, it does not follow that the child's
generative power is the subject of original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh
to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former
follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of
perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers,
are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher
power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of
original sin reaches it first.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by
proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the
intellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.
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Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more
infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to
pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of
sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore
that power is most infected by original sin.
Objection 2: Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except
in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey
reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is
not the most infected by original sin.
Objection 3: Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual
and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number of
things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all
in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that
the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the
members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those
members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein
there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive
to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin regards these
three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and
the sense of touch.
I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious,
which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to
another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the
like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is
transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above ([1851]Q[81],
A[1]). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said
to be infected. Now this act serves the generative power, in as much as
it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch,
which is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty.
Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted
by original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and
infected.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual
sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above [1852](A[3]). But in
so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the
aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely.
Reply to Objection 2: The infection of actual sin belongs only to the
powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of
original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but
through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power.
Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Sight is not related to the act of generation
except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible
species is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in
the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch
rather than to the sight.
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OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the
cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
(2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
(3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides
pride and covetousness?
(4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?
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Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all
sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is
opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of
all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins.
Objection 2: Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for
the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are
not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i,
5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds
from some deeper root.
Objection 3: Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another
name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires
money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it
is not the root of all sins.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): "The desire of money
is the root of all evil."
I answer that, According to some, covetousness may be understood in
different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and
thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for
any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising all sins, because
every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated
above ([1853]Q[72], A[2]). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a
corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods inordinately: and they say
that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it
to the root of a tree, which draws its sustenance from earth, just as
every sin grows out of the love of temporal things.
Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of
the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the root of all sins.
For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they
"will become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the
devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils." Hence it is
evident that he is speaking of covetousness as denoting the inordinate
desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as
denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to
the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the whole tree. For we
see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin
whatever, and of sating his desire for any sin whatever, since money
helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to Eccles.
10:19: "All things obey money": so that in this desire for riches is
the root of all sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source.
For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the
desire of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is
called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for the
immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is
called the root of the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and
founded in charity."
Reply to Objection 2: The desire of money is said to be the root of
sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the
last end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any
temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than a
particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods,
which along with many others can be procured by means of money.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in natural things we do not ask what
always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that
the nature of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to
act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what happens
in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason
that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say that
covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no other
evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise
therefrom, for the reason given.
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Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every
sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning of a
sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the
root of every sin, as stated above [1854](A[1]). Therefore it is also
the beginning of every sin, and not pride.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of
the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God." But
apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore another sin is the beginning of
pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin.
Objection 3: Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that
which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which,
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of
Babylon." Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning of every
sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin."
I answer that, Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as
denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin.
Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not
being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic
sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the
corruption of nature; and in this sense they say that it is the
beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, because
covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which
sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, for which reason
covetousness is called the "root"; whereas pride regards sin as turning
away from God, to Whose commandment man refuses to be subject, for
which reason it is called the "beginning," because the beginning of
evil consists in turning away from God.
Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind
of the wise man who said (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of
all sin." For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting
inordinate desire to excel, as is clear from what follows (verse 17):
"God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; indeed this is the
point of nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride,
even as denoting a special sin, is the beginning of every sin. For we
must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a
twofold order, of intention, and of execution. In the former order, the
principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1],
ad 1; Q[18], A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man's end
in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he may
have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of
view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is said to be the
"beginning" of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution,
the first place belongs to that which by furnishing the opportunity of
fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such
are riches; so that, from this point of view, covetousness is said to
be the "root" of all evils, as stated above [1855](A[1]).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning
of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from
the fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he
desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. Wherefore,
in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special
sin, but rather that general condition of every sin, consisting in its
turning away from God. It may also be said that apostasy from God is
said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of
pride. For it is characteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject
to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is
unduly lifted up, in respect of the other species of pride.
Reply to Objection 3: In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to
love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself.
Consequently it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or
self-love as the beginning of every evil.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called
capital?
Objection 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride
and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to be to
an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii,
text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is
called the "root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other
sin, should be called a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the
other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the
head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the
character of head: so that no sins should be called capital.
Objection 3: Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital
punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished
thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special
vices under the name of capital.
I answer that, The word capital is derived from "caput" [a head]. Now
the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which is
the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically
speaking, every principle is called a head, and even men who direct and
govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so
called, in the first place, from "head" taken in the proper sense, and
thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for which capital punishment
is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of
capital sins, but in another sense, in which the term "capital" is
derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of
others. In this way a capital vice is one from which other vices arise,
chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated
above ([1856]Q[72], A[6]). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the
principle of others, but is also their director and, in a way, their
leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always
the principle and the commander in matters concerning the means. Hence
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the "leaders
of an army."
Reply to Objection 1: The term "capital" is taken from "caput" and
applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as
having some property thereof, but not as being the head taken
literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which
have the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called
the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but also those
which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several
sins.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from
God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to
Augustine (De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and
order." But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it regards
some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers capital sin as so called
from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it
here.
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Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital
vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony,
lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal
virtues, as stated above ([1857]Q[61], A[2]). Therefore there are only
four principal or capital vices.
Objection 2: Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as
stated above ([1858]Q[77]). But there are four principal passions of
the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the
above sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and
sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and
sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly
enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it
should not be placed among the principal vices.
Objection 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of
sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above [1859](A[2]).
But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride
also should be placed among the capital vices.
Objection 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused
through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through
ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals
in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are
insufficiently enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in
this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).
I answer that, As stated above [1860](A[3]), the capital vices are
those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now
this kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of
the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong
inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently
goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under
the consideration of art, because man's particular dispositions are
infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of
the ends to one another: and it is in this way that most frequently one
vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under
the consideration of art.
Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have
certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is in
respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are
differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First,
directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek
it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it.
Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus
one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good
on account of some attendant evil.
Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a
certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility,
merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and
praise, and this good is sought inordinately by "vainglory." Secondly,
there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation
of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is pursued
inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e.g.
sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust."
Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness"
is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary
evils.
Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some
property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first
place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good,
to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by "pride" or
"vainglory." Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks
in riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure,
without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x,
6,7,[8] and this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue.
On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil
occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one's own
good, and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual
good, on account of the attendant bodily labor: or else it happens in
respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination,
belongs to "envy," which is sadness about another's good as being a
hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination
with a view to vengeance, it is "anger." Again, these same vices seek
the contrary evils.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way:
since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason,
or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the
appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the principal
vices to be contrary to the principal virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the
passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible
part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow.
Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital
sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above
([1861]Q[25], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it
has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a
special kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination
against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. of the
right to vengeance.
Reply to Objection 4: Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin,
in the order of the end, as stated above [1862](A[2]): and it is in the
same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal.
Wherefore pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the
others, but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states
(Moral. xxxi, 27). But covetousness is said to be the root from another
point of view, as stated above ([1863]AA[1],2).
Reply to Objection 5: These vices are called capital because others,
most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins
from arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all
the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which
pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual
goods on account of the attendant labor; for the ignorance that can
cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above ([1864]Q[76], A[2]).
That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to
ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should not be done that
good may come of it.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE
(SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the
good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of punishment.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?
(2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?
(3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is
stricken in consequence of sin.
(4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?
(5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?
(6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?
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Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of
nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good
remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature.
Objection 2: Further, when that which follows is changed, that which
precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its
accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action.
Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature is
not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished.
Objection 3: Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion.
Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although it
is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards
another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the good
of his nature.
Objection 4: Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that
which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to
an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But
sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin
does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act.
On the contrary, "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho
(Lk. 10:30), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts,
and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the Glossa
Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the
good of nature.
I answer that, The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are
the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that
flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly,
since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above
([1865]Q[60], A[1];[1866] Q[63], A[1]), this inclination to virtue is a
good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the
whole of human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a
good of nature.
Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed
nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed
through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature,
viz. the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. Because
human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above
([1867]Q[50], A[1]). Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined
to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other contrary must
needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the
very fact that a man sins, there results a diminution of that good of
nature, which is the inclination to virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good
of nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as
anyone may see who reads the context.
Reply to Objection 2: Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it
has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is
not changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is
the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its
term.
Reply to Objection 3: A voluntary action proceeds from various powers,
active and passive. The result is that through voluntary actions
something is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have
stated when treating of the production of habits ([1868]Q[51], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 4: An accident does not act effectively on its
subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say
that whiteness makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to
hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as
sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an
inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness of the
agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the fact
that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive
element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive appetite, and the
sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above
([1869]Q[77], AA[1], 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not
as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the
object acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out
of order.
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Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be
destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since human
nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away,
if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature
can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can
be entirely taken away.
Objection 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts
are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all
bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform.
Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that
the whole can also be taken away by sin.
Objection 3: Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is
aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some on
account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more
than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of
nature entirely.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not
exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good
of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it
must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it
entirely.
I answer that, As stated above [1870](A[1]), the good of nature, that
is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is
befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it
is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is
to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact
that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of
sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be
destroyed entirely.
Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished
by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use of the example
of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely
destroyed. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a
finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity,
it will at last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite
length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, however, the
subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the
same quantity, it may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a
quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be
possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided that what is subtracted
in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not
apply to the question at issue, since a subsequent sin does not
diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more,
if it be a more grievous sin.
We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the
aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between two
others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and
tends to the good of virtue, as to its term and end. Consequently its
diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its
rood, secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not
diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated
above [1871](A[1]). But it is diminished in the second way, in so far
as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were
diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at
last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed. Since, however,
it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is place against its
attaining its term, it is evident that it can be diminished
indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, inasmuch as
man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be
destroyed entirely, because the root of this inclination always
remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which
has an inclination to receive light, from the very fact that it is
transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part
of supervening clouds, although it always remains rooted in the nature
of the body.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection avails when diminution is made by
subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and
this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform:
nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its
term, in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on
the one hand, and not on the other.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in the lost the natural inclination to
virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it
is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by
Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in
the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally
endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the
lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ requisite
for sight.
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Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned
as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and
concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature
consequent upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of
the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears
from what has been said above ([1872]Q[76], A[1];[1873] Q[77],
AA[3],5;[1874] Q[78], A[1]). Therefore they should not be reckoned as
effects of sin.
Objection 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should
have no place among the effects of sin.
Objection 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is
an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not
be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be
reckoned a wound of nature.
Objection 4: Further, it has been stated ([1875]Q[77], A[3]) that to
sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence
is a passion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons
"two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz.
ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which
four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that
one or the other reckoning is incomplete.
On the contrary, The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known].
I answer that, As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect
hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was
perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original
justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already
stated ([1876]Q[81], A[2]); so that all the powers of the soul are
left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are
naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of
nature.
Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of
virtue, as stated above ([1877]Q[61], A[2]), viz. the reason, where
prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the
subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance.
Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true,
there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of
its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the
irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound
of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its
order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of
concupiscence.
Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human
nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the inclination
to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of
actual sin, as was explained above ([1878]AA[1], 2), these four wounds
are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the
reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened
to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more
impetuous.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin
should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning
once, is more easily inclined to sin again.
Reply to Objection 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a
certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gn.
8:21: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The
imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his
youth.'].
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1879]Q[82], A[3], ad 1),
concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason:
whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is
unnatural to man.
Reply to Objection 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be
called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and
clogs the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as
contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible.
Reply to Objection 5: The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book
of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive
powers, viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing
to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good.
"Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed
through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence.
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Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is
not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) that
"where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less,
there is less good; where they are not, there is no good at all." But
sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy
mode, species and order.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the
"privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De Natura
Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the
effect of sin.
Objection 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now
since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding
privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result
of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species and order is
not the effect of each sin.
On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body,
according to Ps. 6:3, "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now
weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order.
I answer that, As stated in the [1880]FP, Q[5], A[5], mode, species and
order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon
every being. Because every being and every good as such depends on its
form from which it derives its "species." Again, any kind of form,
whether substantial or accidental, of anything whatever, is according
to some measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the
forms of things are like numbers," so that a form has a certain "mode"
corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has
a relation of "order" to something else.
Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order,
corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good
belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode,
species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin.
There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its
mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above
([1881]AA[1] ,2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the
good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and
is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in
the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order,
the privation of which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how
sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or
diminishes mode, species and order.
This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.
Reply to Objection 3: Mode, species and order follow one from the
other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished
together.
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Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not
the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now these
defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others,
whereas original sin, from which especially these defects seem to
result, is equal in all, as stated above ([1882]Q[82], A[4]). Therefore
death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin.
Objection 2: Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed.
But these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism
or Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin.
Objection 3: Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt
than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of the
body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does
original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects are not the
result of sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12), "By one man sin entered
into this world, and by sin death."
I answer that, One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason
of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing is
the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power
of its nature or form, the result being that the effect is directly
intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are
beside the intention of the sinner, it is evident that sin is not, of
itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one thing is the
cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is
stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that "by displacing a pillar a man
moves accidentally the stone resting thereon." In this way the sin of
our first parent is the cause of death and all such like defects in
human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original
justice was taken away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the
soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder
whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to
the soul, without any defect, as stated in the [1883]FP, Q[97], A[1].
Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our
first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the soul by the
disorder among the powers, as stated above [1884](A[3]; Q[82], A[3]),
so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the
body.
Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment,
even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all
consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although
the defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are
ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as
punishments.
Reply to Objection 1: Causes that produce their effects of themselves,
if equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or
diminished, the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of
an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing
a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow
that the movements of the stones resting on them will be equal; but
that one will move with greater velocity, which has the greater weight
according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the
obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, when original justice
is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that
according to diverse natural temperaments, some men's bodies are
subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal
in all.
Reply to Objection 2: Both original and actual sin are removed by the
same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (Rom.
8:11): "He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His
Spirit that dwelleth in you": but each is done according to the order
of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should
first of all be conformed to Christ's sufferings, before attaining to
the immortality and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and
by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should
remain, for a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit
the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: Two things may be considered in actual sin, the
substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance
of the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and
die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us
of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the
soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the body, as original
justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those defects, as
original sin does.
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Whether death and other defects are natural to man?
Objection 1: It would seem that death and such like defects are natural
to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically"
(Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals
which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally
corruptible.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally
corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But such
is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible.
Objection 3: Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now
human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the
vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated
in De Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and such like defects are
natural to man.
On the contrary, (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now
"God made not death" (Wis. 1:13). Therefore death is not natural to
man.
(2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment
or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable to it. But
death and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as
stated above [1885](A[5]). Therefore they are not natural to man.
(3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its
end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated above (Q[2],
A[7]; Q[5] , AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational
soul, as was proved in the [1886]FP, Q[75], A[6]. Therefore the human
body is naturally incorruptible.
I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways;
first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its
particular nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of
action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every
corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii,
text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation of the
thing to which it belongs.
On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some
universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or
again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said
by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature." This force intends the
good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate
generation and corruption in things are requisite: and in this respect
corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the
inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection,
but as regards the inclination of matter which is allotted
proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of
the universal agent. And although every form intends perpetual being as
far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own
perpetuity, except the rational soul; for the reason that the latter is
not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an
immaterial operation of its own, as stated in the [1887]FP, Q[75],
A[2]. Consequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to
man than to other corruptible things. But since that very form has a
matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter
there results corruptibility in the whole. In this respect man is
naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to
itself, but not as regards the nature of his form.
The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the
other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore in order to solve
them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul,
in respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its end, which is
everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible,
considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form,
and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold condition in
any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not
chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition of matter. Thus, a
smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and
flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting, and in
respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but
that iron be breakable and inclined to rust, results from the natural
disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron,
indeed he would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposition
of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the purpose
of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by
nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, in order that it
may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive
and motive powers. Whereas the fact that it is corruptible is due to a
condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would
choose an incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every
nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature, and by
the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility,
as was stated in the [1888]FP, Q[97], A[1]. It is in this sense that it
is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment of
sin.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?
(2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?
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Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a
higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: hence
the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as
Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the human soul is of a
much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning.
Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by sinning.
Objection 2: Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above
([1889]Q[74], AA[1],2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De
Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by
considering anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby.
Therefore neither is the will stained by sin.
Objection 3: Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either
something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive,
it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that
nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither disposition nor
habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a
disposition or habit; for instance, in a man who after committing a
mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin of the
opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in
the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation. Because all sins agree
on the part of aversion and privation of grace: and so it would follow
that there is but one stain caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is
not the effect of sin.
On the contrary, It was said to Solomon (Ecclus. 47:22): "Thou hast
stained thy glory": and it is written (Eph. 5:27): "That He might
present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle":
and in each case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain
is the effect of sin.
I answer that, A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a
comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body,
e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is
ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's soul has a
twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of
reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; the other, from the
refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby man
is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions.
Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of
contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things,
against the light of reason and of the Divine law, as shown above
([1890]Q[71], A[6]). Wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by
this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by
their own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the
soul, by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them
inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law.
Reply to Objection 2: The action of the intellect is accomplished by
the intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of
the intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by
them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in a movement
towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing
loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, when it cleaves
inordinately, according to Osee 9:10: "They . . . became abominable as
those things were which they loved."
Reply to Objection 3: The stain is neither something positive in the
soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of
the soul's brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore
diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the
privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which
varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies.
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Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul
after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the soul
except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or
disposition, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the stain does
not remain in the soul after the act of sin.
Objection 2: Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the
body, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain when
the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul
when the act of sin is past.
Objection 3: Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause
of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is no
longer there, neither is the stain in the soul.
On the contrary, It is written (Jos. 22:17): "Is it a small thing to
you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime
remaineth in you [Vulg.: 'us'] to this day?"
I answer that, The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act
of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above
(A[1] ), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of
its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the Divine law. And
therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin
remains in him: but as soon as, moved by grace, he returns to the
Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. For
although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of
reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once return to the state
in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a
movement contrary to the previous movement. Thus if one man be parted
from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to
him as soon as the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him
and to return by a contrary movement.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing positive remains in the soul after the
act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain
something private, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light.
Reply to Objection 2: After the interposed body has passed by, the
transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards
the illuminating body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the
sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and
so there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of sin parts man from God, which parting
causes the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local
parting. Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not
removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain removed.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the
debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the
punishment due to them.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?
(2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?
(3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
(4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in
quantity?
(5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?
(6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?
(7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?
(8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?
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Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect
of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does not
seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is
accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention of the
sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin.
Objection 2: Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is
good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect
of sin, which is evil.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every
inordinate affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not
incur a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on
indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 2:9): "Tribulation and anguish
upon every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to sin.
Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the words
"tribulation and anguish."
I answer that, It has passed from natural things to human affairs that
whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment
therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary
supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which reason "hot
water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we
find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise
up against him. Now it is evident that all things contained in an
order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that
order. Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by
that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an
inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense
against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that
same order, which repression is punishment.
Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment
corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject.
In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own
reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who
governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member
either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to
the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders
is disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and
against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold
punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience;
another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.
Reply to Objection 1: Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an
evil by reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is
accidental to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is
the debt of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Further, a just punishment may be inflicted
either by God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect
of sin, not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man
deserving of punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment
is." Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly
the effect of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is
due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs
a further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or
human law.
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Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of
virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not
bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite
direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin.
Objection 2: Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice.
Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
Objection 3: Further, the nature of punishment is to be something
against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above
([1891]Q[74], AA[1] ,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
On the contrary, Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are
punishments of others.
I answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence,
as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as such
can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its
essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that
it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially
something against the will, as stated in the [1892]FP, Q[48], A[5].
Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise
be the punishment of sin.
On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in
three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing an
impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the
like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace
which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of
grace is a punishment, and is from God, as stated above ([1893]Q[79],
A[3]), the result is that the sin which ensues from this is also a
punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks
(Rom. 1:24) when he says: "Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of
their heart," i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when men are
deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their
passions. In this way sin is always said to be the punishment of a
preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which
is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior act, as is clearly
the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with
one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to achieve a
sinful act, according to Wis. 5:7: "We wearied ourselves in the way of
iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said
to be a punishment by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin
is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with
regard to itself.
Reply to Objection 1: Even when God punishes men by permitting them to
fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed
it is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise
from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the
amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the
more fearful of sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is
evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment,
since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a
nature to withdraw man from sin.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection considers sin essentially as such:
and the same answer applies to the Third Objection.
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Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice
is equality: wherefore it is written (Is. 27:8): "In measure against
measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is
temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment.
Objection 2: Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii,
3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an
end, and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the
Philosopher states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be
infinite.
Objection 3: Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in
it for its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction of
men" [Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal
punishment on man.
Objection 4: Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is
accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. Therefore
it cannot be of infinite duration.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46): "These shall go into
everlasting punishment"; and (Mk. 3:29): "He that shall blaspheme
against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be
guilty of an everlasting sin."
I answer that, As stated above [1894](A[1]), sin incurs a debt of
punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long
as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order
remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance
of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a
defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the
principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that
principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight
cannot be restored except by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of
sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of
sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order
there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently
if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is
subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in
itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power
of God. Now the principle of this order is the last end, to which man
adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so
as to destroy charity, considered in themselves, incur a debt of
eternal punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of
severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment,
however, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for
punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that
adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a
momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes by
imprisonment or banishment for life---sometimes even by death; wherein
account is not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the
expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the living,
so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of
punishment inflicted by God. Now according to Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it
is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should
be punished in God's eternity. A man is said to have sinned in his own
eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole
life, but also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in
sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says
(Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that
they might abide in their sins for ever."
Reply to Objection 2: Even the punishment that is inflicted according
to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is
punished, but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged,
this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that at
least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment,
according to Prov. 19:25: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool
shall be wiser." Accordingly the eternal punishments inflicted by God
on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from
sin through the thought of those punishments, according to Ps. 59:6:
"Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee
from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered."
Reply to Objection 3: God does not delight in punishments for their own
sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires
them.
Reply to Objection 4: Although punishment is related indirectly to
nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of
the order, and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance
lasts, the punishment endures.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment
infinite in quantity. For it is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O
Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to
nothing." Now God's anger or fury signifies metaphorically the
vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an
infinite punishment, even as to make a thing out of nothing denotes
infinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance, sin is awarded
a punishment infinite in quantity.
Objection 2: Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of
fault, according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin
shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is committed
against God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases
according to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a
more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual),
and God's greatness is infinite. Therefore an infinite punishment is
due for a sin committed against God.
Objection 3: Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration,
and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore
it is infinite in quantity also.
On the contrary, If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal
sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another.
I answer that, Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises
two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good,
which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite.
Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. In this
respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite,
and because the movement of turning towards it is finite, since the
acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin
consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment
is the "pain of loss," which also is infinite, because it is the loss
of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately
to something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of sense,"
which is also finite.
Reply to Objection 1: It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for
the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be
incompatible with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice
requires, as stated above [1895](A[3]). The expression "to be brought
to nothing" is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods,
according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing."
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sin as turning away from
something, for it is thus that man sins against God.
Reply to Objection 3: Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of
fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for
as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment
corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And a fault which is
irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it
incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite as regards the
thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it does not incur
punishment of infinite quantity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment. Because punishment, as stated above [1896](A[4]), is
proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely
from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs
infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot
be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur a debt of everlasting
punishment, as stated above [1897](A[4]), it seems that no sin incurs a
debt of mere temporal punishment.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore
Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment is
incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But
original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children who have
died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the
kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words (Jn. 3:3): " Unless a man
be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Much more, therefore,
will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting.
Objection 3: Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through
being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its
punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if
it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is
no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal
punishment. Therefore temporal punishment is not due for any sin.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter
sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished
eternally.
I answer that, As stated above [1898](A[3]), a sin incurs a debt of
eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in
the order of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very
principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in
some sins there is disorder indeed, but such as not to involve
contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things
referable to the end, in so far as one is too much or too little intent
on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for
instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would not
offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments.
Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but only temporal
punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in
respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the
substance of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect
of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist in
turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things
referable to the end: and the last end differs infinitely from the
things that are referred to it.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not
on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the
subject, viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is
no remission of sin.
The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin.
Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of
the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above [1899](A[3]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment
after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin
is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is
removed, the debt of punishment ceases also.
Objection 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a
virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when sin
is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains.
Objection 3: Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii,
3). But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease.
Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Kings xii. 13,14): "David said to
Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The
Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die. Nevertheless
because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to
blaspheme . . . the child that is born to thee shall die." Therefore a
man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt
of punishment remains, when the sin has been removed.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and
the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, when
the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin
makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the
order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some
sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of
justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who has
been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments,
suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he
would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal
compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to one's fellow
men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act
has ceased there still remains the debt of punishment.
But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident
that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the soul
being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that
it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as
stated above ([1900]Q[86], A[1]). Now man is united to God by his will.
Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will
accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say, unless either of
his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or
bear patiently the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both
ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is
satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the
nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although
satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will,
nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular purpose,
it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary
in a certain respect, as we have explained when speaking of the
voluntary and the involuntary ([1901]Q[6], A[6]). We must, therefore,
say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a
debt of punishment, not indeed of punishment simply, but of
satisfactory punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the
stain remains, as stated above ([1902]Q[86], A[2]), so the debt of
punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the
debt of punishment does not remain in the same way, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment
simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue
demands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or
man.
Reply to Objection 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is
healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order
that the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so
disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be
remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment
is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove
the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at the
sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of
David quoted above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a
sin. For it is written (Jn. 9:3, 2) about the man born blind: "Neither
hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born
blind." In like manner we see that many children, those also who have
been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance,
diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them
after they have been baptized. Moreover before they are baptized, there
is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer
such things. Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
Objection 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent
should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these
is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the
wicked (Ps. 72:5): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall
they be scourged like other men"; and (Job 21:7): "[Why then do] the
wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches"
(?)[*The words in brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and (Hab.
1:13): "Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do
unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppresseth
[Vulg.: 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than himself?"
Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pet. 2:22) that "He
did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said (1
Pet. 2:21) that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not
always inflicted by God for sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): "Who ever perished
innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen
those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and
Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is
inflicted for a sin."
I answer that, As already stated [1903](A[6]), punishment can be
considered in two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A
satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who
differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of
love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the
punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the
debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of punishment
simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a
relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a relation to
actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed
by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and this, either
principally or consequently---principally, the punishment of original
sin is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original
justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result from this
defect in human nature.
Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and
yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as
stated in the [1904]FP, Q[48], A[5]. Now evil is privation of good. And
since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body,
and external goods, it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a
lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers
loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these,
for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases
the loss is an evil to man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it
does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal
punishment, because a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his
patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are
not punishments properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as
their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact that
human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the
corruption of nature which is itself the punishment of original sin.
For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises
in order to make progress in virtue; so that whatever is penal in the
exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause.
Reply to Objection 1: Such like defects of those who are born with
them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the
punishments of original sin, as stated above ([1905]Q[85], A[5]); and
they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above
([1906]Q[85], A[5], ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due
to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above
([1907]Q[85], A[5], ad 1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine
providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of
others who are admonished by their means---and also to the glory of
God.
Reply to Objection 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of
man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's
chief goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give
spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal
goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude of the
virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact that others receive
temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the
psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath held them
fast."
Reply to Objection 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for
His, but for our sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin.
For it is written (Ex. 20:5): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting
the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and
fourth generation of them that hate Me"; and (Mat. 23:35): "That upon
you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth."
Objection 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now,
according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their
parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to
Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin.
Objection 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not
for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his
father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than
of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes
they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for
their own sins, but for those of their parents.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear
the iniquity of the father."
I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one
takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, in
so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above [1908](A[7]). If,
however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch
as it is penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, because
the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment
that is medicinal, in this way it does happen that one is punished for
another's sin. For it has been stated [1909](A[7]) that ills sustained
in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments
intended for the health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why
one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for
another's sin, either by God or by man; e.g. on children for their
parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their
property so to speak; in such a way, however, that, if the children or
the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of
punishment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is
punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the
character of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is
borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely
medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin),
since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it
patiently.
With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal,
because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good.
Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some
fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad
Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for
another's sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the
father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying
(Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine."
Reply to Objection 1: Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be
referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are
the property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers.
Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must be
understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus
these words are added, "Of them that hate Me," and in the chapter
quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure of
your fathers." The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their
children, because the latter are the more prone to sin through being
brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to
them, and by imitating their parents' example, conforming to their
authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if,
seeing the punishment of their parents, they fail to mend their ways.
The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are
wont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so
that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate
them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to
grieve for them.
Reply to Objection 2: The punishments which human justice inflicts on
one for another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies
or medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are
punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who are near of kin are said to be
punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because
the punishment of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as
stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and
because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own
household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought up amid
the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is
not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more
obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)
In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of
the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider
venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider
venial sin in itself.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
(2) Whether they differ generically?
(3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
(4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
(5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating
circumstance?
(6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
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Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided
with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin is a
word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of
being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently
every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Whether you eat
or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now
whoever sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for God's
glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal
sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves
either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good
as using it: because he does not refer it to that good which gives us
happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine
(De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable
good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," as
Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since
"perverseness" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to overthrow, to destroy,
hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin,
it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
Objection 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact
turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable
good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he
sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is
one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But a
crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly
condivided with mortal sin.
I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if
taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken
metaphorically: thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if
we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and
fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if
mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it
does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. But
if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to
that which is venial.
For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above ([1910]Q[71],
A[1], ad 3;[1911] Q[72], A[5];[1912] Q[74], A[9], ad 2), is said to be
mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal,
through causing an irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a
principle, as stated above ([1913]Q[72], A[5]). Now the principle of
the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order
to the last end, as stated above ([1914]Q[72], A[5];[1915] Q[87],
A[3]): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any
intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated above
([1916]Q[87], A[3]), because disorders in things referred to the end,
are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be
repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order
to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher
principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such
sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins
which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to the
end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called
venial: because a sin receives its acquittal [veniam] when the debt of
punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as
explained above ([1917]Q[87], A[6]).
Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and
irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle,
but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of
the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided
with mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not
a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the
generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its
parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other
afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine
gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called a
sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to
mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to
substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not
"against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law
forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts
"beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the
law intends.
Reply to Objection 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and
so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not
actually refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore
act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each
time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is
enough to refer oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now
venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human act to God's
glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity,
which refers man to God habitually. Therefore it does not follow that
he who sins venially, sins mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good,
not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using
it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually.
Reply to Objection 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in
contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed
therein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of
finality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some
generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically
good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above
([1918]Q[18], A[2]). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed
in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good,
either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God,
which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1919](A[1]; Q[72], A[5]; Q[87],
A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it
can be repaired. Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of
malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability
belongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are
remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed
through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or
ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause,
as stated above (Q[77], A[8], ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do
not differ generically.
Objection 3: Further, it was stated above ([1920]Q[74], A[3], ad 3;
A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason
are venial sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin.
Therefore no sins are generically venial.
On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm.
xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic
mortal sins.
I answer that, Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon].
Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has
been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial":
and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly, a sin is called
venial because it does not contain anything either partially or
totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin
contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through
weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause":
totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it
deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial
sin that we wish to speak now.
For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no
determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can
have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically,
and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an
act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a
thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to
his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently
it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of
God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of
one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such
sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the
sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain
inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and one's
neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such
sins are venial by reason of their genus.
Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and
malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of
the agent, as stated above ([1921]Q[18], AA[4],6), it happens sometimes
that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes
mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end
therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in
its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the
commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of
the agent, that a sin generically mortal becomes venial, by reason of
the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the
proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to
sudden movements of unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that
is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of
God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence
it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary
to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are
mortal by reason of their genus.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers those sins which are
venial from their cause.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers those sins which are
venial by reason of the imperfection of the act.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to
mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial
and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated
above [1922](A[1]). Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species,
wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like
dispositions and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial sin
differ in genus or species, as stated above [1923](A[2]). Therefore
venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to
mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial
sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine
says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies in wait for good works
that it may destroy them." Therefore even good works would be venial
sins, which is absurd.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): "He that contemneth
small things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins
venially seems to contemn small things. Therefore by little and little
he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin.
I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is
a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition.
For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the
effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves
indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is
said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an act of sin
disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it
disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically
venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin
generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this
same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin
which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or
habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin, that the lust
of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin:
since the end for one who has a habit, as such, is to work according to
that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often
venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act
disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this way a
sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because
he that commits a sin generically venial, turns aside from some
particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to
the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will
even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a
mortal sin in its genus.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in
contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus,
as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with
substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial
form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal.
Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but
it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order,
albeit in different ways, as stated ([1924]AA[1],2).
Reply to Objection 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to
mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin
accidentally; whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to
mortal sin, as stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin.
For Augustine in explaining the words of Jn. 3:36: "He that believeth
not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan.): "The
slightest," i.e. venial, "sins kill if we make little of them." Now a
sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul.
Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
Objection 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent
of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as
stated above ([1925]Q[74], A[8], ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can
become mortal.
Objection 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and
incurable disease, as stated above [1926](A[1]). But a curable disease
may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.
Objection 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin
is a disposition to mortal, as stated [1927](A[3]). Therefore a venial
sin can become mortal.
I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be
understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at
first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a
sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so
that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the
act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it
is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.
Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial,
becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in
that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated
above [1928](A[2]).
Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins
constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many
venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because
all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment
equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the
duration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as
stated above ([1929]Q[87], AA[3],5). It is also evident as regards the
pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the
privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as
Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as regards
the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the
pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one
another.
If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one
mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above [1930](A[3])
with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial
sin disposes to mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial
sins making one mortal sin dispositively.
Reply to Objection 2: The same movement of the sensuality which
preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the
movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding
disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may
undergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which
cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an
imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being
perfected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a
disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident
which disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin
mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm.
xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be
frequent, they become mortal sins." But anger and drunkenness are not
mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal
sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that
delectation, if morose [*See[1931] Q[74], A[6]], is a mortal sin, but
that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a
circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Objection 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal
sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a
good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much
more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.
On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity
cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus,
because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act
be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of
an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the
quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said
([1932]Q[72], A[5], ad 1;[1933] Q[87], A[5], ad 1).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; AA[10]
,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such,
is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to
be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses
its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral
act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of
another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his
wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this
other be another man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed
to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and
accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as
adultery.
It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin
become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For it
has been stated above [1934](A[1]) that the deformity of a venial sin
consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end,
whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the
last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a
venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only
when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were,
the specific difference of the moral act.
Reply to Objection 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a
sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by
something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new
species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something
supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g.
disobedience, contempt, or the like.
We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is
a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if the
angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such
as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and
if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act,
in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it
last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent
of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement
tends, is a sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry
with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that
would hurt him a little, the anger will not be mortal sin, however long
it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give
rise to great scandal or something of the kind.
With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason
of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere
lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is
directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary
to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or
weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of
his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in
that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the
excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance
no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way
to drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore
the sin returns to its specific nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in
those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if
the delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through
imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1):
because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on
account of the approval of the deliberating reason.
Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be
evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated
above ([1935]Q[18], A[5] , ad 4).
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Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
Objection 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because
venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from
venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above
[1936](A[5]). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.
Objection 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this,
that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who
sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that
a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less
than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple
fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits
the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to
refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting
counter to the love of God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and
accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more
distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is
evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of
justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore
can a mortal sin become venial.
On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal
sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal
punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.
I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the
genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can
become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial
sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to
the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the
purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become
imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by
the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for
the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter
an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.
Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by
reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not
completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a
deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said
above [1937](A[2]). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of
deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from
deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species
of the act is destroyed.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from
perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man
and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin
altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that
commits fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either
mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the
ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the
love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby
he can safeguard himself in the love of God.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those
things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good
end." Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be
well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), the judge
who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of
the common weal, are not murderers.
__________________________________________________________________
OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?
(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay,"
"stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12);
(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?
(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?
(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that if
venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as
to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of
sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial
sins cause a stain in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account
of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But,
in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the
affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a
temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above ([1938]Q[86],
A[1]). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing
through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the
soul.
On the contrary, it is written, (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present it
to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the
gloss says: "i.e., some grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to
mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.
I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of
comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal
matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way
of similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness,
one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors,
the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the
soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak,
intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial
sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual
comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of
charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on
([1939]SS, Q[24], A[10]; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their
acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the
thing stained, wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual
rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial
sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated
anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in
so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many
venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they
would not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse.
Reply to Objection 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act
destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a
temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace,
which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last
end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not
cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.
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Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated
as "wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are said
( 1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins
are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions
are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not
suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble.
Objection 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be
saved yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who
commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man
dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial
sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who
build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our
neighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay,
and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do
good works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins
are not suitably designated by these three.
Objection 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and
degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under
these three.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds
up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that
he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of
temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above
([1940]Q[87], A[5]). Therefore these three signify venial sins.
I answer that, Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith,
upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and
precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to
them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves
of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says
(Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the
kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says
that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by
fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote
mortal sins.
Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are
indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial
sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a
good thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his
possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so
that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do
anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be
reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the
love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are designated by
"gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by
"wood," "hay," and "stubble."
We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate
themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are
designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a
house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be
burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in
a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers
fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after
this life, and yet he is saved for ever.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the
spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but
because they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written
(Ps. 136:1): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters":
because venial sins do not destroy the edifice.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay
and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon"
the "foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have
esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. 3:17:
"Rooted and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal
sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not built
upon the spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as
by fire.
Reply to Objection 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of
temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight
venial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of
charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these do
not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy
about earthly remain longer, because they are unable to have such
frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove them.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2),
"all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the
end." Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz.
to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," which is burnt
up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins
are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or
less attached to them.
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Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?
Objection 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the
state of innocence. Because on 1 Tim. 2:14, "Adam was not seduced," a
gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was
possible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done
was a venial sin." But he would not have thought this unless he could
have committed a venial sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin
without sinning mortally.
Objection 2: Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not
suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all
there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should
have been checked." Now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat,
which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be
nothing more than a venial sin. In like manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of making the
experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken
the forbidden fruit." Again there seems to have been a certain movement
of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as
appears from her saying (Gn. 3:3): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these
apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin
before he committed a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of
the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally
notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could
also sin venially.
On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal
was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive
him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change man's
state. Therefore he could not sin venially.
I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could not commit a
venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be
understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin
which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had
committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that
aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species,
unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or
vow or the like, which does not apply to the question in point.
Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into mortal
by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore
understand this to mean that he could not sin venially, because it was
impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before
losing the integrity of the original state by sinning mortally.
The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through
the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements, in a
genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things
referred to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded. Now
each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of
the lower powers not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden
rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality
not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a
movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution
of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which
proceeds from a higher good, as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that
the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end,
the due order of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the
things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end,
which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in
matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q[10], AA[1],2, ad 3;
Q[72], A[5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the
[1941]FP, Q[95], A[1], there was an unerring stability of order, so
that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as
man remained subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13).
Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all the
highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal
sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of innocence, man could
not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the
same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is
easily forgiven.
Reply to Objection 2: This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was
his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall
into the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man,
by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for
she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention
the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.
Reply to Objection 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the
original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial
sin cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is
incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the
first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
Objection 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially.
Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which
is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in
Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels." But man can
commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel
can commit a venial sin also.
Objection 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel
could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning
mortally. Therefore he could also love a creature less than God
inordinately, by sinning venially.
Objection 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial
sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like
frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal
sin to be venial as stated above [1942](A[3]), unless there is a
special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel
can sin venially.
On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man
in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive
state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.
I answer that, An angel's intellect, as stated above in the [1943]FP,
Q[58], A[3]; [1944]FP, Q[79], A[8], is not discursive, i.e. it does not
proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both
separately, as we do. Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect
considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its
principles. Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8],
A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], A[5]), ends are like principles, while the
means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed
to the means, except as they stand under the order to the end.
Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness
in respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an
inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. Now
good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the
due end which is God: wherefore all their acts are acts of charity, so
that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are
moved to nothing except in subordination to the end which is their sin
of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of
their own will. This does not apply to the appetite for the natural
good, which appetite we have stated to be in them ([1945]FP, Q[63],
A[4]; Q[64], A[2], ad 5).
Reply to Objection 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind
or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God,
without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end,
or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: The demons incite man to all such things which
seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to
mortal sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on
account of the end they have in view.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin
?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality
in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:1) that
"there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who
walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking there of the
concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rom. 7).
Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation
to those who walk not according to the flesh, i.e. by consenting to
concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are
not in Christ Jesus. Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of
condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal
sins.
Objection 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those
who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow
the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh."
But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels
the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it
seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are
mortal sins.
Objection 3: Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man
was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this
liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which
the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an
unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts
against his duty.
On the contrary, It is stated in Acts 10:34 that "God is not a
respecter of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto
condemnation, what He does not impute to another. But he does not
impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither
therefore does He impute them to unbelievers.
I answer that, It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of
unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This is
evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not
be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above ([1946]Q[79], A[4]). Now
the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers.
Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality
in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. Secondly, from the state of the
sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes
sin, but, on the contrary, increases it, as stated above ([1947]Q[73],
A[10]). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an
unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever are more
deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to 1
Tim. 1:13: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in
my unbelief": whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on
account of the sacraments of grace, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much
more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath
esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was
sanctified?"
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due
to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus
Christ, although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the
fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign
of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.
In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore
the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 3: This freedom from liability to concupiscence was
a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such
liability pertains, not to actual but to original sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with
original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is a
disposition to mortal sin, as stated above ([1948]Q[88], A[3]).
Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted,
venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have
venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins.
Objection 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less
connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But
an unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin
without committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin
without committing a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child
is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that
time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal
sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible
for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short
it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin
alone and without mortal sin.
On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in the children's
limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on
(SS, Q[69], A[6]): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than
mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be
punished for venial sin with no other than original sin.
I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with
original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is
because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years
hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore,
much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which
is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he
is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the
first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate
about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will,
by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he
does not then direct himself to the due end, and as far as he is
capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for
through not doing that which is in his power to do. Accordingly
thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until
afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a
necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes
disposes to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.
Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is prevented from being with original
sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on
account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The child that is beginning to have the use of
reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not
free from the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon
as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has
discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to
himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the
intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's
affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (Zech. 1:3):
"Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you."
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON LAW (QQ 90-108)
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the
extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose
temptations we have spoken in the [1949]FP, Q[114]. But the extrinsic
principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His
Law, and assists us by His Grace: wherefore in the first place we must
speak of law; in the second place, of grace.
Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its
parts. Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our
consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The
effects of law.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
(2) Concerning the end of law;
(3) Its cause;
(4) The promulgation of law.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that law is not something pertaining to
reason. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my
members," etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members;
since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is
not something pertaining to reason.
Objection 2: Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power,
habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like
manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason
are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above
([1950]Q[57]). Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would
cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are
asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.
Objection 3: Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act
aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is
evident from what has been said above ([1951]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore law
pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words of
the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth
the sovereign, has force of law."
On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it
belongs to reason to command, as stated above ([1952]Q[17], A[1]).
Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.
I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is
induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived
from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and
measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of
human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above ([1953]Q[1],
A[1], ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which
is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus,
is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus
of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements.
Consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may
be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and
rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this
way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured
and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to
something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a
law, may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it
were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is
called "the law of the members."
Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in external action, we may consider the
work and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house
built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of
reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced by
this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all
the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or
argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a syllogism
in respect of the work to be done, as stated above ([1954]Q[13],
A[3];[1955] Q[76], A[1]) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic.
vii, 3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the
same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative
intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like
universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to
actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes
under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in
the reason by means of a habit.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason has its power of moving from the will, as
stated above ([1956]Q[17], A[1]): for it is due to the fact that one
wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things
ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is
commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with
some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying
that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the
sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law.
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Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?
Objection 1: It would seem that the law is not always directed to the
common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to
forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods.
Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good.
Objection 2: Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human
actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is
directed to some particular good.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based
on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason is
the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but
also of that which is directed private good. Therefore the law is not
only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an
individual.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for
no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens."
I answer that, As stated above [1957](A[1]), the law belongs to that
which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and
measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason
itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the
rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be
referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the
object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of
human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[3],
A[1]). Consequently the law must needs regard principally the
relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to
the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the
perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship
to universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above
definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body
politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters
"just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its
parts for the body politic": since the state is a perfect community, as
he says in Polit. i, 1.
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle
of the others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination to
that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of
heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they
have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained
to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual
work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it
regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common
good.
Reply to Objection 1: A command denotes an application of a law to
matters regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at
which the law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way
commands are given even concerning particular matters.
Reply to Objection 2: Actions are indeed concerned with particular
matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good,
not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause,
according as the common good is said to be the common end.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the
speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first
indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the
practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the
common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the
nature of a law.
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Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to
make laws. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "when the Gentiles,
who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law . .
. they are a law to themselves." Now he says this of all in general.
Therefore anyone can make a law for himself.
Objection 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), "the
intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man can
lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to
make laws.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the
state, so every father of a family governs his household. But the
sovereign of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every
father of a family can make laws for his household.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): "A law is an ordinance of
the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with
the Commonalty."
I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the
order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good,
belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent
of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either
to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole
people: since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end
concerns him to whom the end belongs.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 1), a law is in a
person not only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in
one that is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in
so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules
him. Hence the same text goes on: "Who show the work of the law written
in their hearts."
Reply to Objection 2: A private person cannot lead another to virtue
efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken,
it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to
prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or
in some public personage, to whom it belongs to inflict penalties, as
we shall state further on (Q[92], A[2], ad 3; [1958]SS, Q[64], A[3]).
Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone.
Reply to Objection 3: As one man is a part of the household, so a
household is a part of the state: and the state is a perfect community,
according to Polit. i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is not
the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the good of
one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a
perfect community. Consequently he that governs a family, can indeed
make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have properly
the force of law.
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Whether promulgation is essential to a law?
Objection 1: It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law.
For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the natural
law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that
it be promulgated.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or
not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not
only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others.
Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law.
Objection 3: Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the
future, since "laws are binding in matters of the future," as the
jurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et constit. leg. vii). But
promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is not
essential to a law.
On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that "laws
are established when they are promulgated."
I answer that, As stated above [1959](A[1]), a law is imposed on others
by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being
applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in
order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it
must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such
application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation.
Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force.
Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be
gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the
common good, made by him who has care of the community, and
promulgated.
Reply to Objection 1: The natural law is promulgated by the very fact
that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him
naturally.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who are not present when a law is
promulgated, are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified
or can be notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated.
Reply to Objection 3: The promulgation that takes place now, extends to
future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which
means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3;
ii, 10) that "lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] because it is
written."
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OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is an eternal law?
(2) Whether there is a natural law?
(3) Whether there is a human law?
(4) Whether there is a Divine law?
(5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several?
(6) Whether there is a law of sin?
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Whether there is an eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every
law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on
whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity.
Therefore no law is eternal.
Objection 2: Further, promulgation is essential to law. But
promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to
whom it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be
eternal.
Objection 3: Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing
ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal.
Therefore no law is eternal.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "That Law which is
the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than
unchangeable and eternal."
I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; [1960]AA[3],4), a
law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from
the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted
that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the
[1961]FP, Q[22], AA[1],2, that the whole community of the universe is
governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of
things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And
since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time
but is eternal, according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it is that this kind
of law must be called eternal.
Reply to Objection 1: Those things that are not in themselves, exist
with God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him,
according to Rom. 4:17: "Who calls those things that are not, as those
that are." Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the
character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the
government of things foreknown by Him.
Reply to Objection 2: Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in
writing; and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both
the Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But
the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature
that hears or reads.
Reply to Objection 3: The law implies order to the end actively, in so
far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively---that
is to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end---except
accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which
end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine
government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself.
Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.
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Whether there is in us a natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because
man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine says (De
Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that
all things should be most orderly." But nature does not abound in
superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law
is natural to man.
Objection 2: Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the
end, as stated above ([1962]Q[90], A[2]). But the directing of human
acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in
irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural
appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore
no law is natural to man.
Objection 3: Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the
law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his
free-will, with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since
therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is
man subject to a natural law.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 2:14: "When the Gentiles, who have not
the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," comments as
follows: "Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural
law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what
is evil."
I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 1), law, being a rule
and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that
rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and
measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes
of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine
providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated
above [1963](A[1]); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of
the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on
them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts
and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to
Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes
of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for
others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has
a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation
of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law.
Hence the Psalmist after saying (Ps. 4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of
justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds:
"Many say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he
says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus
implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is
good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is
nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore
evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational
creature's participation of the eternal law.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if the natural law were
something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a
participation thereof, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Every act of reason and will in us is based on
that which is according to nature, as stated above ([1964]Q[10], A[1]):
for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known
naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived
from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the
first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the
natural law.
Reply to Objection 3: Even irrational animals partake in their own way
of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because
the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational
manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational
creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining
to reason, as stated above ([1965]Q[90], A[1]). Irrational creatures,
however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there
is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of
similitude.
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Whether there is a human law?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a human law. For the
natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above
[1966](A[2]). Now through the eternal law "all things are most
orderly," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the
natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs.
Consequently there is no need for a human law.
Objection 2: Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated
above ([1967]Q[90], A[1]). But human reason is not a measure of things,
but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can
emanate from human reason.
Objection 3: Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in
Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of
conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. 9:14: "The thoughts of mortal
men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore no law can
emanate from human reason.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds
of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.
I answer that, As stated above ([1968]Q[90], A[1], ad 2), a law is a
dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same
procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason:
for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De
Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the
speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we
draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is
not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so
too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and
indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to
the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular
determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws,
provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated
above ([1969]Q[90], AA[2],3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence
certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards
these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom,
were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."
Reply to Objection 1: The human reason cannot have a full participation
of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and
imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by
a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge
of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single
truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part
of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal
law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the
particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however,
contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to
proceed further to sanction them by law.
Reply to Objection 2: Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of
things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules
and measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the
natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure
of things that are from nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The practical reason is concerned with practical
matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary
things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human
laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated
conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be
altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its
own particular genus.
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Whether there was any need for a Divine law?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law.
Because, as stated above [1970](A[2]), the natural law is a
participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine
law, as stated above [1971](A[1]). Therefore there was no need for a
Divine law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived
therefrom.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:14) that "God left man
in the hand of his own counsel." Now counsel is an act of reason, as
stated above (Q[14], A[1]). Therefore man was left to the direction of
his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated
above [1972](A[3]). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed
also by a Divine law.
Objection 3: Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than
irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law
besides the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less,
therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in addition
to the natural law.
On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying
(Ps. 118:33): "Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O
Lord."
I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary
for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for
four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to
perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man were
ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his
natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further
direction of the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human
law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of
eternal happiness which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty, as
stated above ([1973]Q[5], A[5]), therefore it was necessary that,
besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his
end by a law given by God.
Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment,
especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form
different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary
laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt
what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for
man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is
certain that such a law cannot err.
Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is
competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior
movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and
yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct
himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not
sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for
this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.
Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law
cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing
away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would
hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human
intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden
and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene,
whereby all sins are forbidden.
And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, where it is said:
"The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin;
"converting souls," because it directs not only exterior, but also
interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the
certainty of what is true and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by
directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.
Reply to Objection 1: By the natural law the eternal law is
participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to
his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way.
Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more
perfectly in the eternal law.
Reply to Objection 2: Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must
proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from
principles imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural
law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain
additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law.
Reply to Objection 3: Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end
higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers:
consequently the comparison fails.
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Whether there is but one Divine law?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because,
where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the
whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps.
46:8: "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one
Divine law.
Objection 2: Further, every law is directed to the end which the
lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends
one and the same thing for all men; since according to 1 Tim. 2:4: "He
will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the
truth." Therefore there is but one Divine law.
Objection 3: Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the
eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the
revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge.
Therefore much more is the Divine law but one.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): "The priesthood being
translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the
law." But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage,
viz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore
the Divine law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New Law.
I answer that, As stated in the [1974]FP, Q[30], A[3], distinction is
the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways.
First, as those things that are altogether specifically different, e.g.
a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same
species, e.g. a boy and a man: and in this way the Divine law is
divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24,25) compares the
state of man under the Old Law to that of a child "under a pedagogue";
but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is
"no longer under a pedagogue."
Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in
connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated
above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the
common good as to its end, as stated above ([1975]Q[90], A[2]). This
good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to
this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the very
outset of the law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of
the Chananaeans (Ex. 3:8, 17). Again it may be an intelligible and
heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore,
at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the
kingdom of heaven, saying (Mat. 4:17): "Do penance, for the kingdom of
heaven is at hand." Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv) that
"promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testament, for
which reason it is called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs
to the New Testament."
Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the
order of righteousness [1976](A[4]): wherein also the New Law surpasses
the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Mat.
5:20: "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and
Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence the
saying that "the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls
the mind" ( Sentent. iii, D, xl).
Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its
commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: but the
New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of
Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence
Augustine says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is
little difference [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words
'timor' and 'amor'---'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the
Gospel---fear and love."
Reply to Objection 1: As the father of a family issues different
commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God,
in His one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect,
and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been
led to a greater capacity for Divine things.
Reply to Objection 2: The salvation of man could not be achieved
otherwise than through Christ, according to Acts 4:12: "There is no
other name . . . given to men, whereby we must be saved." Consequently
the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the
coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the
people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain
rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them to
receive Him.
Reply to Objection 3: The natural law directs man by way of certain
general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect:
wherefore it is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs
man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and
imperfect do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for
the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained.
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Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin.
For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." But the
"fomes" of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore
the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.
Objection 2: Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not
obey it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor,
from not following the instigations of the "fomes"; but rather from his
following them. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.
Objection 3: Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated
above ([1977]Q[90], A[2]). But the "fomes" inclines us, not to the
common, but to our own private good. Therefore the "fomes" has not the
nature of sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my
members, fighting against the law of my mind."
I answer that, As stated above [1978](A[2]; Q[90], A[1], ad 1), the
law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by
way of participation, in that which is ruled and measured; so that
every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to
the law, is called a law by participation, as stated above [1979](A[2];
Q[90], A[1] , ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a
twofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly
inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different subjects
to different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law
and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; thus by the very fact that
a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into
another order, so as to be under another law, as it were: thus if a
soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of
mercantile legislation.
Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various
natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is
against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a
way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek
animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is
allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is that he
should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective in
the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could
take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under
the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one
individually, the more he deviates from the path of reason, so that,
after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the
impulse of sensuality, according to Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in
honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts,
and made like to them."
So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the
"fomes," in other animals has simply the nature of a law (yet only in
so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a
direct inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this
way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the
just sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and his
reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is
led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law
depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as
an incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law,
as stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the
Divine law: it is as though we were to say that the law allows a
nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers law in the light of a
rule or measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from
the law become transgressors. But the "fomes" is not a law in this
respect, but by a kind of participation, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the "fomes" as to its
proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the
inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus
it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of
nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in
so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called "fomes" in
so far as it strays from the order of reason.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good?
(2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit,
and to punish, as the Jurist states?
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Whether an effect of law is to make men good?
Objection 1: It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good.
For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii,
6 is "that which makes its subject good." But virtue is in man from God
alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without us," as we stated
above ([1980]Q[55], A[4]) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore
the law does not make men good.
Objection 2: Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But
the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good.
Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law
does not make men good.
Objection 3: Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated
above ([1981]Q[90], A[2]). But some behave well in things regarding the
community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it
is not the business of the law to make men good.
Objection 4: Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his subjects,
but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men
good.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the
"intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens."
I answer that, as stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; AA[3],4), a law is
nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects
are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate thing consists in its
being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see
that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists
in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly "the virtue of every
subject consists in his being well subjected to his ruler," as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i). But every law aims at being obeyed by
those who are subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper
effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since
virtue is "that which makes its subject good," it follows that the
proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either
simply or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the
lawgiver is fixed on true good, which is the common good regulated
according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is
to make men good simply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is
fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to
himself, or in opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make
men good simply, but in respect to that particular government. In this
way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man
is called a good robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to
his end.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is twofold, as explained above
([1982]Q[63], A[2]), viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact of being
accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in different ways; for
it causes the acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and
preserves and fosters it when it already exists. And since law is given
for the purpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce
to virtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore the Philosopher
says in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers
make men good by habituating them to good works."
Reply to Objection 2: It is not always through perfect goodness of
virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of
punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is a
beginning of virtue, as stated above ([1983]Q[63], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: The goodness of any part is considered in
comparison with the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that
"unseemly is the part that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then
every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good,
unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole
be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it.
Consequently the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the
citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern.
But it is enough for the good of the community, that the other citizens
be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence
the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "the virtue of a sovereign is
the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen is
not the same as that of a good man."
Reply to Objection 4: A tyrannical law, through not being according to
reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of
law; and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it
aims at the citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature of a law
consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects,
and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make them good, not
simply, but with respect to that particular government.
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Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably
assigned as consisting in "command," "prohibition," "permission" and
"punishment." For "every law is a general precept," as the jurist
states. But command and precept are the same. Therefore the other three
are superfluous.
Objection 2: Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to
be good, as stated above [1984](A[1]). But counsel aims at a higher
good than a command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather
than to command.
Objection 3: Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so
does reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, so
also is to reward.
Objection 4: Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good,
as stated above [1985](A[1]). But he that obeys the law, merely through
fear of being punished, is not good: because "although a good deed may
be done through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done
well," as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore
punishment is not a proper effect of law.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either permits
something, as: 'A brave man may demand his reward'": or forbids
something, as: "No man may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage": or
punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put to death."
I answer that, Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting
something, so is a law a dictate of reason, commanding something. Now
it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Wherefore
just as, in demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us from certain
principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means
to assent to the precept of the law.
Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law
directs, as stated above ([1986]Q[90], AA[1],2;[1987] Q[91], A[4]).
Again there are three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above
([1988]Q[18], A[8]), some acts are good generically, viz. acts of
virtue; and in respect of these the act of the law is a precept or
command, for "the law commands all acts of virtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some
acts are evil generically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect of these
the law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect
of these the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly
good or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent. And it is the
fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure obedience:
in which respect punishment is an effect of law.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so
a prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in
a wide sense, every law is a kind of precept.
Reply to Objection 2: To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be
within the competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law.
Wherefore too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel (1 Cor. 7:12)
says: "I speak, not the Lord." Consequently it is not reckoned as an
effect of law.
Reply to Objection 3: To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to
punish pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority
the pain is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of
law, but only to punish.
Reply to Objection 4: From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and
fulfill what is good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led
on to do so likewise, with delight and of one's own accord.
Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ETERNAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2)
The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; (5) The new law,
which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of
the "fomes," suffice what we have said when treating of original sin.
Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(1) What is the eternal law?
(2) Whether it is known to all?
(3) Whether every law is derived from it?
(4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?
(5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?
(6) Whether all human things are subject to it?
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Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type [*Ratio] existing in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type
existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there are many
types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii,
qu. 46) that God "made each thing according to its type." Therefore the
eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind.
Objection 2: Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated
by word, as stated above (Q[90], A[4]). But Word is a Personal name in
God, as stated in the [1989]FP, Q[34], A[1]: whereas type refers to the
Essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a
law above our minds, which is called truth." But the law which is above
our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But
the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the
eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal
law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform."
I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of
the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there
must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be
done by those who are subject to his government. And just as the type
of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of
the products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts
of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the other
conditions be present which we have mentioned above (Q[90]). Now God,
by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in relation to which He
stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the
[1990]FP, Q[14], A[8]. Moreover He governs all the acts and movements
that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the
[1991]FP, Q[103], A[5]. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom,
inasmuch as by It all things are created, has the character of art,
exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to
their due end, bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law
is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all
actions and movements.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the
ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and
consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality,
according to their different relations to things, as stated in the
[1992]FP, Q[15], A[2]. But law is said to direct human acts by
ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). And
things, which are in themselves different, may be considered as one,
according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the
eternal law is one since it is the type of this order.
Reply to Objection 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points may
be considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the
word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and
expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies
to the human mental word, which is nothing else that something
conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts mentally. So
then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the
name of a Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge,
whether they refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to the works of
God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv,
14). And among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law
itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is
a Personal name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account
of the kinship between type and word.
Reply to Objection 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in
the same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For
the human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is
not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with
things, since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to
the reality." But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: since
each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine
intellect, as was stated in the [1993]FP, Q[16], A[1]. Consequently the
Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the eternal law is known to all?
Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all.
Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), "the things that are of God
no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a type
existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God
alone.
Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the
eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most
orderly." But all do not know how all things are most orderly.
Therefore all do not know the eternal law.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the
eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man." But according to
Ethic. i, "any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore the
eternal law is not known to us.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of
the eternal law is imprinted on us."
I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself;
secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found:
thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its
rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself,
except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational
creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For every
knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the
eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De
Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at
least as to the common principles of the natural law: and as to the
others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, some less;
and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.
Reply to Objection 1: We cannot know the things that are of God, as
they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects,
according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly
seen, being understood by the things that are made."
Reply to Objection 2: Although each one knows the eternal law according
to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can
comprehend it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects.
Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in
the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they
are most orderly.
Reply to Objection 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two ways.
First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according
to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him
that eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of judgment that the
Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he
knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In
another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind
of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not.
And thus none can judge of the eternal law.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every law is derived from the
eternal law. For there is a law of the "fomes," as stated above
([1994]Q[91], A[6]), which is not derived from that Divine law which is
the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh,"
of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7), that "it cannot be subject to the
law of God." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.
Objection 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal
law, because, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]), "the eternal law is that,
according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly."
But some laws are unjust, according to Is. 10:1: "Woe to them that make
wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law
which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things
which are punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine
providence is the eternal law, as stated above [1995](A[1]). Therefore
not even every good law is derived from the eternal law.
On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign,
and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the
eternal law, as stated above [1996](A[1]). Therefore all laws proceed
from the eternal law.
I answer that, As stated above ([1997]Q[90], AA[1],2), the law denotes
a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are
movers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must
needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second
mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first.
Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan
of government is derived by secondary governors from the governor in
chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the
king's command to his inferior administrators: and again in things of
art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief
craftsman to the under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since
then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor,
all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived
from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all
other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as
they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is
nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law."
Reply to Objection 1: The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so
far as it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this
respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in
so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine
law, and has not the nature of law, as stated above ([1998]Q[91],
A[6]).
Reply to Objection 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it
partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is
derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason,
it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of
violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some
appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in power, is
derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God,
according to Rom. 13:1.
Reply to Objection 3: Human law is said to permit certain things, not
as approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things
are directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct,
because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause.
Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it
cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It would
be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns.
Consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the
eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect equality with it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are
subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to
reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it
is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine
reason. Therefore God's will is subject to the eternal law. But God's
will is eternal. Therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to
the eternal law.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to
the King's law. Now the Son, according to 1 Cor. 15:28,24, "shall be
subject . . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered
up the Kingdom to Him." Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject
to the eternal law.
Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type.
But many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for
instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly
bodies. Therefore even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and
consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order
to restrain them from evil, as explained above ([1999]Q[92], A[2]).
Therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.
I answer that, As stated above [2000](A[1]), the eternal law is the
type of the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the
Divine government, is subject to the eternal law: while if anything is
not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the
eternal law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by
looking around us. For those things are subject to human government,
which can be done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is not
subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a soul,
hands, or feet. Accordingly all that is in things created by God,
whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law:
while things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject
to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself.
Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as
to the will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it
is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law,
but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of
God's will, as to the things themselves that God wills about creatures;
which things are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they are
planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things God's will is
said to be reasonable [rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should
rather be called their type [ratio].
Reply to Objection 2: God the Son was not made by God, but was
naturally born of God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine
providence or to the eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law
by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig.
xxxi). But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His
human nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be greater
than He.
The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary
things that are created.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6),
some necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they
derive from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And
this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is
restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do
otherwise than it is allowed to.
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Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to
the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated
above ([2001]Q[90], A[4]). But a law cannot be promulgated except to
rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement.
Therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law;
and consequently natural contingents are not.
Objection 2: Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of
reason," as stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme
type, as stated above [2002](A[1]). Since then natural contingents do
not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it
seems that they are not subject to the eternal law.
Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural
contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the
eternal law.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 8:29): "When He compassed the sea
with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass
their limits."
I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the
eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only to
rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law
directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of
someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own
actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things
subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving those things,
for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by
others, as stated above ([2003]Q[1], A[2]). Consequently man cannot
impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to
him. But he can impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so
far as by his command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on
their minds a rule which is a principle of action.
Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward
principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God imprints
on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in
this way, God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Ps.
148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." And thus
all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the
eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are subject to the
eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as
rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine commandment.
Reply to Objection 1: The impression of an inward active principle is
to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law,
by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human
actions, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are
obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason
by obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more
things than human reason does. And as the members of the human body are
moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since
they have no apprehension subordinate to reason; so too irrational
creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, being rational.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the defects which occur in natural
things are outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside
the order of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God,
from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the [2004]FP,
Q[22], A[2]. And since the eternal law is the type of Divine
providence, as stated above [2005](A[1]), hence the defects of natural
things are subject to the eternal law.
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Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to
the eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:18): "If you are led by
the spirit you are not under the law." But the righteous who are the
sons of God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to
Rom. 8:14: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons
of God." Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7): "The prudence
[Vulg.: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not
subject to the law of God." But many are those in whom the prudence of
the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal
law which is the law of God.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the
eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a
life of blessedness." But those who are already blessed, and those who
are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not
under the eternal law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades
the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of
the universe is administered."
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the
eternal law, as explained above [2006](A[5]): first, by partaking of
the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and
passion, i.e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward
motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are
subject to the eternal law, as stated above [2007](A[5]). But since the
rational nature, together with that which it has in common with all
creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational,
consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because
while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as
stated above [2008](A[2]), it also has a natural inclination to that
which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted
to the recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1).
Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed,
in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is
corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of
good is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both
ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural
knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom;
and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added
motive of grace and virtue.
Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as
always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the
eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their
knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but
this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of
passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees
concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that
law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the
righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud.
xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God
knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with most
suitable laws."
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in
two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through
being pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on
the same passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who refrains
from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and
not from love of virtue." In this way the spiritual man is not under
the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is
poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood
as meaning that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are
the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the
Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above
(A[4], ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the
Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when
he says (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
liberty."
Reply to Objection 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to
the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary
to the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards
passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of
Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh
dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and
consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in accordance
with the eternal law. For we have seen above ([2009]Q[85], A[2]) that
sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved
towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a
heavy body rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved
thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law
that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the
eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an
unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under
the eternal law.
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OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the natural law?
(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?
(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?
(5) Whether it is changeable?
(6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?
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Whether the natural law is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in the
soul: power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one of the
soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going
through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Objection 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says
that the conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which can
only apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was
shown in the [2010]FP, Q[79], A[12]. Therefore the natural law is a
habit.
Objection 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be
shown further on [2011](A[6]). But man's reason, which the law regards,
does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law
is not an act, but a habit.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is
that whereby something is done when necessary." But such is not the
natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by
it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.
I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First,
properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For
it has been stated above ([2012]Q[90], A[1], ad 2) that the natural law
is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of
reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he
does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since
then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly
and essentially.
Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a
habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And
accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes
considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason
only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit.
Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the
habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles
the habit of which we possess.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the
genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of
action, he mentions only those things which are principles of human
acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in
the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the
one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover its own
natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.
Reply to Objection 2: "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind,
because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which
are the first principles of human actions.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held
habitually; and this is granted.
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes
a man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, on
account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable
to use the habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of
his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles,
or the natural law, which is in him habitually.
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Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several
precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above
([2013]Q[92], A[2]). If therefore there were many precepts of the
natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws.
Objection 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature.
But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is
manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of
nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are
many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result
would be that even things relating to the inclination of the
concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated
above ([2014]Q[90], A[1]). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore
there is only one precept of the natural law.
On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in
relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of
demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles.
Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.
I answer that, As stated above ([2015]Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the
natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of
demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are
self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two
ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is
said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the
notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of
the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident.
For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its
very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational
being": and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is
not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.),
certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and
such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every
whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same
are equal to one another." But some propositions are self-evident only
to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such
propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body,
it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place:
but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended
universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under
apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things
whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable
principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the
same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being":
and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv,
text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the
apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the
apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action:
since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good.
Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on
the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek
after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the
natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason
naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of
the natural law as something to be done or avoided.
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of
a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a
natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good,
and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil,
and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural
inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because
in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with
the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as
every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to
its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of
preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the
natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that
pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in
common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those
things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught
to all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual
intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in
man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason,
which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to
know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect,
whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for
instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one
has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
Reply to Objection 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the
character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of
human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far
as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced
to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the
natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common
foundation.
Reply to Objection 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs
all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is
contained under the law of reason.
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Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed
by the natural law. Because, as stated above ([2016]Q[90], A[2]) it is
essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some
acts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual, as
is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not
all acts of virtue are the subject of natural law.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If
therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it
seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies
to certain special sins.
Objection 3: Further, those things which are according to nature are
common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a thing
is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of
virtue are prescribed by the natural law.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues
are natural." Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural
law.
I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under
the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in
their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as
virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has
been stated [2017](A[2]) that to the natural law belongs everything to
which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is
inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to
its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the
rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a
natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act
according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue
are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally
dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts,
considered in themselves, i.e. in their proper species, thus not all
virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are
done virtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which,
through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive
to well-living.
Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of
food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the
natural common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the
moral common good.
Reply to Objection 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is
proper to man---and in this sense all sins, as being against reason,
are also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or
we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and
in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus
contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is
unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural
crime.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For
it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are
virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while
they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.
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Whether the natural law is the same in all men?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all.
For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is
that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not
common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), "all do not
obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.
Objection 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are said
to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book
that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in
regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in
all men.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([2018]AA[2],3), to the natural
law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his
nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things;
some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and
other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for
all.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common
to all nations."
I answer that, As stated above ([2019]AA[2],3), to the natural law
belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among
these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason.
Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated
in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in
this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative
reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be
otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal
principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on
the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human
actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in
the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the
more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative
matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to
conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the
conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common
notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not
the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general
principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail,
it is not equally known to all.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether
of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same
for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of
the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not
equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of
a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not
known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason,
neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is
the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all
to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a
proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored
to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may
happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore
unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are
claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this
principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend
further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust
should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such
a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater
the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not
right to restore or not to restore.
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general
principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to
knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions,
as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the
majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in
some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain
obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in
some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since
in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil
disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly
contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the
Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).
Reply to Objection 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that
whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural
law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that
whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them.
Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is
contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of example,
"by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done
by."
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood
of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as
conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases,
but failing in a few.
Reply to Objection 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other
powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers
must needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally
right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed
according to reason.
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Whether the natural law can be changed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because
on Ecclus. 17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the
gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to
correct the law of nature." But that which is corrected is changed.
Therefore the natural law can be changed.
Objection 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft
are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God:
as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22:2); and
when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the
Egyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a
wife of fornications" (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be
changed.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the possession of
all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural
law." But these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore
it seems that the natural law is subject to change.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural
law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary
according to time, but remains unchangeable."
I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two
ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the
natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of
human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the
Divine law and by human laws.
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of
subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law,
ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether
unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles,
which, as we have said [2020](A[4]), are certain detailed proximate
conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not
changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it
may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through
some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as
stated above [2021](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: The written law is said to be given for the
correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was
wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in
the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed
those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in
need of correction.
Reply to Objection 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the
death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God
on account of original sin, according to 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord killeth
and maketh alive." Consequently, by the command of God, death can be
inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice
whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife;
who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently
intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery
nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the taking of
another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to
Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner,
whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human
things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural
things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in
the [2022]FP, Q[105], A[6], ad 1.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in
two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should
not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the
contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural
law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In
this sense, "the possession of all things in common and universal
freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the
distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature,
but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly
the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.
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Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from
the heart of man. Because on Rom. 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not
the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin
had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by
grace." But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore
the law of nature can be blotted out.
Objection 2: Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law
of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more
therefore can the law of nature be blotted out.
Objection 3: Further, that which is established by law is made just.
But many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of
nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of
man.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in
the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not." But the law
which is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the
natural law cannot be blotted out.
I answer that, As stated above ([2023]AA[4],5), there belong to the
natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to
all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which
are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles.
As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can
nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the
case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from
applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on
account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Q[77],
A[2]). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural
law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil
persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of
necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as
among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states
(Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin blots out the law of nature in particular
cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary
precepts of the natural law, in the way stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although grace is more efficacious than nature,
yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the secondary precepts
of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain
enactments which are unjust.
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OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself;
(2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Its utility.
(2) Its origin.
(3) Its quality.
(4) Its division.
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Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed
by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good
thereby, as stated above ([2024]Q[92], A[1]). But men are more to be
induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against
their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame
laws.
Objection 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have
recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice is
better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it
would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to
the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.
Objection 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human
actions, as is evident from what has been stated above ([2025]Q[90],
AA[1],2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are
infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions
cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who
looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for
human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the
framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in
fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence
might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of
punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But these things
are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human
laws should be made.
I answer that, As stated above ([2026]Q[63], A[1];[2027] Q[94], A[3]),
man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue
must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we
observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for
instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from
nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full
complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency
of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice
for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of
virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to
which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more
capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this
training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue.
And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by
their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of
God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since
some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily
amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil
by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from
evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by
being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what
hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of
training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline
of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it
was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in
virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and
righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of
satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable
to do.
Reply to Objection 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to
virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are
evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is
better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by
judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to
find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the
many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case.
Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what
laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced
as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by
taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one
solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of
future events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things present,
towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of
cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man,
and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever
possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few
matters to be left to the decision of men.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered
by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the
Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning
something that has happened or not happened," and the like.
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Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from the
natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal
just is that which originally was a matter of indifference." But those
things which arise from the natural law are not matters of
indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived
from the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as
stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But
those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of
the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above
([2028]Q[94], A[4]). Therefore that which is established by human law
does not belong to the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which is
equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived from
the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all:
which is clearly false.
Objection 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which
are derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give the
reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist
says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.].
Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from
nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and
reverence for the laws."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not
just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends
on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to
be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the
first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has
been stated above ([2029]Q[91], A[2], ad 2). Consequently every human
law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the
law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature,
it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.
But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law
in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of
determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by
which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the
principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the
arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the
craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some
particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general
principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that "one
must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that
"one should do harm to no man": while some are derived therefrom by way
of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer
should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a
determination of the law of nature.
Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But
those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human
law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from
the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second
way, have no other force than that of human law.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments
which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of
the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for those things that are
derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.
Reply to Objection 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot
be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety
of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among
various people.
Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as
referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of
the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and
prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they
see at once what is the best thing to decide.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we
ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and
opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as
to their demonstrations."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate
?
Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of
positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law shall
be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the
country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly
expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed
for no private benefit, but for the common good." Because he had
previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying
that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster
religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal."
Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these.
Objection 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De
Offic. vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous to add
"just."
Objection 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according
to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the
definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country."
Objection 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be
necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is
necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore
human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing
may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as
usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and
"useful."
On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.
I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be
determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as
to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that
is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and
measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it
is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or
measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz.
the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above [2030](A[2];
Q[93], A[3] ). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the
jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. iii; De Leg. et
Senat.]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down,
at first, three conditions; viz. that it "foster religion," inasmuch as
it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to
discipline," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and
that it "further the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to
the utility of mankind.
All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three.
For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes
on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the
customs of the country, adapted to place and time," he implies that it
should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first
on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying "just": secondly,
it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be
adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account
the ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on
children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since
man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it
depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted
to place and time." The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean
that law should further the common weal: so that "necessity" refers to
the removal of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good;
"clearness of expression," to the need of preventing any harm ensuing
from the law itself. And since, as stated above ([2031]Q[90], A[2]),
law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part
of the description.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?
Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes
or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes the
"law of nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations
use it." But as he says, "natural law is that which is common to all
nations." Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive
human law, but rather under natural law.
Objection 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to
differ not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of the
commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym.
v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they do not differ, except
materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may
go on to infinity. Therefore this division of human laws is not
appropriate.
Objection 3: Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests
and soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems
that, as this division includes "military law," and "public law,"
referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should include other
laws pertaining to other offices of the state.
Objection 4: Further, those things that are accidental should be passed
over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that
man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names
of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian" law, another the
"Falcidian" law, etc.
On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (OBJ[1]) suffices.
I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something
contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational or
irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal
is divided properly and of itself in respect of its being rational or
irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are
entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law,
many things are contained, in respect of any of which human law can be
divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to
the notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as
explained above [2032](A[2]). In this respect positive law is divided
into the "law of nations" and "civil law," according to the two ways in
which something may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above
[2033](A[2]). Because, to the law of nations belong those things which
are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g.
just buyings and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live
together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature
a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But those things which
are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination,
belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is
best for itself.
Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the
common good of the state. In this respect human law may be divided
according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for
the common good: e.g. priests, by praying to God for the people;
princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety
of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to
these men.
Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that
one who governs the community of the state, as shown above
([2034]Q[90], A[3]). In this respect, there are various human laws
according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to
the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is "monarchy," i.e. when the state
is governed by one; and then we have "Royal Ordinances." Another form
is "aristocracy," i.e. government by the best men or men of highest
rank; and then we have the "Authoritative legal opinions" [Responsa
Prudentum] and "Decrees of the Senate" [Senatus consulta]. Another form
is "oligarchy," i.e. government by a few rich and powerful men; and
then we have "Praetorian," also called "Honorary," law. Another form of
government is that of the people, which is called "democracy," and
there we have "Decrees of the commonalty" [Plebiscita]. There is also
tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which, therefore,
has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made
up of all these, and which is the best: and in this respect we have law
sanctioned by the "Lords and Commons," as stated by Isidore (Etym. v,
4, seqq.).
Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human
actions. In this respect, according to the various matters of which the
law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named
after their authors: thus we have the "Lex Julia" about adultery, the
"Lex Cornelia" concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this
way, not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters to
which they refer.
Reply to Objection 1: The law of nations is indeed, in some way,
natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is
derived from the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very
remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto.
Nevertheless it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is
distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals.
The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been
said.
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OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?
(2) Whether human law should repress all vices?
(3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?
(4) Whether it binds man in conscience?
(5) Whether all men are subject to human law?
(6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of
the law?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the
individual?
Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for the
community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says
(Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular acts
of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject of
decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed
about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for the
community, but also for the individual.
Objection 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated
above ([2035]Q[90], AA[1],2). But human acts are about individual
matters. Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community,
but rather for the individual.
Objection 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as
stated above ([2036]Q[90], AA[1],2). But a measure should be most
certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since therefore in human acts no
general proposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual
cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for
individual cases.
On the contrary, The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit. iii,
art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that "laws should be made to suit the
majority of instances; and they are not framed according to what may
possibly happen in an individual case."
I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that
end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore says
(Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private benefit,
but for the common good of all the citizens." Hence human laws should
be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises many
things. Wherefore law should take account of many things, as to
persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the community of the
state is composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many
actions; nor is it established to endure for only a short time, but to
last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another, as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21; xxii, 6).
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal
just, i.e. positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid
down simply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these
he says that "the legal is that which originally was a matter of
indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer": as the fixing
of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the community in one
respect, and individuals in another. These are called "privileges,"
i.e. "private laws," as it were, because they regard private persons,
although their power extends to many matters; and in regard to these,
he adds, "and further, all particular acts of legislation." Other
matters are legal, not through being laws, but through being
applications of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees
which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he adds "all
matters subject to decrees."
Reply to Objection 2: A principle of direction should be applicable to
many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all
things belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the
principle in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures as
there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use,
since their use consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law
would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one single
act. Because the decrees than to one single act. Because the decrees of
prudent men are made for the purpose of directing individual actions;
whereas law is a general precept, as stated above ([2037]Q[92], A[2],
OBJ[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: "We must not seek the same degree of certainty in
all things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as
natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as
being true in the greater number of instances, though at times and less
frequently it fail.
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Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices?
Objection 1: It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all
vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in order
that, in fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check." But it
would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were
repressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all evils.
Objection 2: Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the
citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from
all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all
vices.
Objection 3: Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as
stated above ([2038]Q[95], A[2]). But all vices are contrary to the law
of nature. Therefore human law should repress all vices.
On the contrary, We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: "It seems to me that the
law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits
these things, and that Divine providence punishes them." But Divine
providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human law rightly
allows some vices, by not repressing them.
I answer that, As stated above ([2039]Q[90], AA[1],2), law is framed as
a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous
with that which it measures, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since
different things are measured by different measures. Wherefore laws
imposed on men should also be in keeping with their condition, for, as
Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be "possible both according to
nature, and according to the customs of the country." Now possibility
or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or disposition: since
the same thing is not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as
is possible to one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a child as
to a full-grown man: for which reason the law for children is not the
same as for adults, since many things are permitted to children, which
in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In
like manner many things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue,
which would be intolerable in a virtuous man.
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of
whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all
vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous
vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and
chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition
of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law
prohibits murder, theft and such like.
Reply to Objection 1: Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of
others. Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's
neighbor is injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The purpose of human law is to lead men to
virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the
multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already
virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these
imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out
into yet greater evils: thus it is written (Ps. 30:33): "He that
violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood"; and (Mat. 9:17) that
if "new wine," i.e. precepts of a perfect life, "is put into old
bottles," i.e. into imperfect men, "the bottles break, and the wine
runneth out," i.e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from
contempt, break into evils worse still.
Reply to Objection 3: The natural law is a participation in us of the
eternal law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "The law which is framed for the
government of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are
punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do
everything, is this a reason why it should be blamed for what it does."
Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit everything that is
forbidden by the natural law.
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Whether human law prescribes acts of all the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of
all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. But
human law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above [2040](A[2]).
Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue
is the end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come under
a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated
above ([2041]Q[90], A[2]). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to
the common good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not
prescribe all acts of virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law
"prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the
acts of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in
like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing the
former, forbidding the latter."
I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished by their
objects, as explained above ([2042]Q[54], A[2];[2043] Q[60],
A[1];[2044] Q[62], A[2]). Now all the objects of virtues can be
referred either to the private good of an individual, or to the common
good of the multitude: thus matters of fortitude may be achieved either
for the safety of the state, or for upholding the rights of a friend,
and in like manner with the other virtues. But law, as stated above
([2045]Q[90], A[2]) is ordained to the common good. Wherefore there is
no virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless
human law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue:
but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common
good---either immediately, as when certain things are done directly for
the common good---or mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain
things pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in
the upholding of the common good of justice and peace.
Reply to Objection 1: Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by
the obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of
virtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes
some acts of each virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: An act is said to be an act of virtue in two
ways. First, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the
act of justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do
brave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue.
Secondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way
in which a virtuous man does it. Such an act always proceeds from
virtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is the end at
which every lawgiver aims.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to
the common good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately.
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Whether human law binds a man in conscience?
Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not bind man in
conscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of
higher power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is beneath
the Divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept in a
Divine court, such as is the court of conscience.
Objection 2: Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the
commandments of God. But sometimes God's commandments are made void by
human laws, according to Mat. 15:6: "You have made void the commandment
of God for your tradition." Therefore human law does not bind a man in
conscience.
Objection 3: Further, human laws often bring loss of character and
injury on man, according to Is. 10:1 et seqq.: "Woe to them that make
wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor
in judgment, and do violence to the cause of the humble of My people."
But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore
human laws do not bind man in conscience.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 2:19): "This is thankworthy, if
for conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully."
I answer that, Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be
just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the eternal
law whence they are derived, according to Prov. 8:15: "By Me kings
reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Now laws are said to be just,
both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the common
good---and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made
does not exceed the power of the lawgiver---and from their form, when,
to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of
proportion and with a view to the common good. For, since one man is a
part of the community, each man in all that he is and has, belongs to
the community; just as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole;
wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, in order to save the
whole: so that on this account, such laws as these, which impose
proportionate burdens, are just and binding in conscience, and are
legal laws.
On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being
contrary to human good, through being opposed to the things mentioned
above---either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on
his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but
rather to his own cupidity or vainglory---or in respect of the author,
as when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to
him---or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally
on the community, although with a view to the common good. The like are
acts of violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine says (De Lib.
Arb. i, 5), "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all."
Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order
to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even
yield his right, according to Mat. 5:40,41: "If a man . . . take away
thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever will force thee
one mile, go with him other two."
Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good:
such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to anything else
contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must nowise be
observed, because, as stated in Acts 5:29, "we ought to obey God rather
than man."
Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1,2), all human
power is from God . . . "therefore he that resisteth the power," in
matters that are within its scope, "resisteth the ordinance of God"; so
that he becomes guilty according to his conscience.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of laws that are contrary
to the commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power.
Wherefore in such matters human law should not be obeyed.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of a law that inflicts
unjust hurt on its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not
extend to this: wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to obey
the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous
hurt.
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Whether all are subject to the law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For
those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:9): "The law is not made for the just man."
Therefore the just are not subject to the law.
Objection 2: Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]:
"He that is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound by
the public law." Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of
the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of God, of whom it is said (Rom.
8:14): "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of
God." Therefore not all men are subject to human law.
Objection 3: Further, the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit.
3, De Leg. et Senat.] that "the sovereign is exempt from the laws." But
he that is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all
are subject to the law.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "Let every soul be
subject to the higher powers." But subjection to a power seems to imply
subjection to the laws framed by that power. Therefore all men should
be subject to human law.
I answer that, As stated above ([2046]Q[90], AA[1],2; A[3], ad 2), the
notion of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human
acts; secondly, that it has coercive power. Wherefore a man may be
subject to law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the
regulator: and, in this way, whoever is subject to a power, is subject
to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two ways that one
is not subject to a power. In one way, by being altogether free from
its authority: hence the subjects of one city or kingdom are not bound
by the laws of the sovereign of another city or kingdom, since they are
not subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a yet
higher law; thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his
command, but not in those matters in which the subject receives his
orders from the emperor: for in these matters, he is not bound by the
mandate of the lower authority, since he is directed by that of a
higher. In this way, one who is simply subject to a law, may not be a
subject thereto in certain matters, in respect of which he is ruled by
a higher law.
Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is
subject to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous are not
subject to the law, but only the wicked. Because coercion and violence
are contrary to the will: but the will of the good is in harmony with
the law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it.
Wherefore in this sense the good are not subject to the law, but only
the wicked.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of subjection by way of
coercion: for, in this way, "the law is not made for the just men":
because "they are a law to themselves," since they "show the work of
the law written in their hearts," as the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14,15).
Consequently the law does not enforce itself upon them as it does on
the wicked.
Reply to Objection 2: The law of the Holy Ghost is above all law framed
by man: and therefore spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the
law of the Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters that
are inconsistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless the
very fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is due to the leading
of the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Pet. 2:13: "Be ye subject . . . to
every human creature for God's sake."
Reply to Objection 3: The sovereign is said to be "exempt from the
law," as to its coercive power; since, properly speaking, no man is
coerced by himself, and law has no coercive power save from the
authority of the sovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be
exempt from the law, because none is competent to pass sentence on him,
if he acts against the law. Wherefore on Ps. 50:6: "To Thee only have I
sinned," a gloss says that "there is no man who can judge the deeds of
a king." But as to the directive force of law, the sovereign is subject
to the law by his own will, according to the statement (Extra, De
Constit. cap. Cum omnes) that "whatever law a man makes for another, he
should keep himself. And a wise authority [*Dionysius Cato, Dist. de
Moribus] says: 'Obey the law that thou makest thyself.'" Moreover the
Lord reproaches those who "say and do not"; and who "bind heavy burdens
and lay them on men's shoulders, but with a finger of their own they
will not move them" (Mat. 23:3,4). Hence, in the judgment of God, the
sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to its directive force; but he
should fulfil it to his own free-will and not of constraint. Again the
sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when it is expedient, he can
change the law, and dispense in it according to time and place.
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Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law?
Objection 1: It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act
beside the letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31):
"Although men judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when
once they are made they must pass judgment not on them, but according
to them." But if anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that he
observes the intention of the lawgiver, he seems to pass judgment on
the law. Therefore it is not right for one who is under the law to
disregard the letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of
the lawgiver.
Objection 2: Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who
can make the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make the
law. Therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the
lawgiver, but should always act according to the letter of the law.
Objection 3: Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention
by words. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise: for
Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just
things." Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver
otherwise than by the words of the law.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The meaning of what is
said is according to the motive for saying it: because things are not
subject to speech, but speech to things." Therefore we should take
account of the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his very words.
I answer that, As stated above [2047](A[4]), every law is directed to
the common weal of men, and derives the force and nature of law
accordingly. Hence the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit.
3, De Leg. et Senat.]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it
allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those
useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." Now it
happens often that the observance of some point of law conduces to the
common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is
very hurtful. Since then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single
case, he shapes the law according to what happens most frequently, by
directing his attention to the common good. Wherefore if a case arise
wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the general
welfare, it should not be observed. For instance, suppose that in a
besieged city it be an established law that the gates of the city are
to be kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a general rule:
but, it were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit of certain
citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would be a great loss to
the city, if the gates were not opened to them: and so in that case the
gates ought to be opened, contrary to the letter of the law, in order
to maintain the common weal, which the lawgiver had in view.
Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law
according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk needing
instant remedy, it is not competent for everyone to expound what is
useful and what is not useful to the state: those alone can do this who
are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the
power to dispense from the laws. If, however, the peril be so sudden as
not to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to
authority, the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since
necessity knows no law.
Reply to Objection 1: He who in a case of necessity acts beside the
letter of the law, does not judge the law; but of a particular case in
which he sees that the letter of the law is not to be observed.
Reply to Objection 2: He who follows the intention of the lawgiver,
does not interpret the law simply; but in a case in which it is
evident, by reason of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended
otherwise. For if it be a matter of doubt, he must either act according
to the letter of the law, or consult those in power.
Reply to Objection 3: No man is so wise as to be able to take account
of every single case; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express
in words all those things that are suitable for the end he has in view.
And even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases into
consideration, he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid
confusion: but should frame the law according to that which is of most
common occurrence.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CHANGE IN LAWS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human law is changeable?
(2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better
occurs?
(3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the
force of law?
(4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by
dispensation of those in authority?
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Whether human law should be changed in any way?
Objection 1: It would seem that human law should not be changed in any
way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as
stated above ([2048]Q[95], A[2]). But the natural law endures
unchangeably. Therefore human law should also remain without any
change.
Objection 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure
should be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human
acts, as stated above ([2049]Q[90], AA[1],2). Therefore it should
remain without change.
Objection 3: Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right,
as stated above ([2050]Q[95], A[2]). But that which is right once is
right always. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "A temporal law,
however just, may be justly changed in course of time."
I answer that, As stated above ([2051]Q[91], A[3]), human law is a
dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be
two causes for the just change of human law: one on the part of reason;
the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause
on the part of reason is that it seems natural to human reason to
advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in
speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early
philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by
those who succeeded them. So also in practical matters: for those who
first endeavored to discover something useful for the human community,
not being able by themselves to take everything into consideration, set
up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these
were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might
prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal.
On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be
rightly changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom
different things are expedient according to the difference of his
condition. An example is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "If
the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are most
careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law
allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the
government of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same
people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the
government to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing
their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and the
choice devolves to a few good men."
Reply to Objection 1: The natural law is a participation of the eternal
law, as stated above ([2052]Q[91], A[2]), and therefore endures without
change, owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine
Reason, the Author of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and
imperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover the natural
law contains certain universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas
human law contains certain particular precepts, according to various
emergencies.
Reply to Objection 2: A measure should be as enduring as possible. But
nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to
change. And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.
Reply to Objection 3: In corporal things, right is predicated
absolutely: and therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always
remains right. But right is predicated of law with reference to the
common weal, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as
stated above: wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether human law should always be changed, whenever something better
occurs?
Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever
something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human
reason, like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former
times give place to others, if something better occurs. Therefore the
same should apply to human laws.
Objection 2: Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the
future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found
possible to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued;
because the laws of old were crude in many points. Therefore it seems
that laws should be changed, whenever anything better occurs to be
enacted.
Objection 3: Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man.
But we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except by
experience, which "requires time," as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore it
seems that as time goes on it is possible for something better to occur
for legislation.
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, 5): "It is
absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer those traditions
to be changed which we have received from the fathers of old."
I answer that, As stated above [2053](A[1]), human law is rightly
changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal. But,
to a certain extent, the mere change of law is of itself prejudicial to
the common good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws,
seeing that what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight
matters, is looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed,
the binding power of the law is diminished, in so far as custom is
abolished. Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in some
way or other, the common weal be compensated according to the extent of
the harm done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either from
some very great and every evident benefit conferred by the new
enactment; or from the extreme urgency of the case, due to the fact
that either the existing law is clearly unjust, or its observance
extremely harmful. Wherefore the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i,
ff., tit. 4, De Constit. Princip.] that "in establishing new laws,
there should be evidence of the benefit to be derived, before departing
from a law which has long been considered just."
Reply to Objection 1: Rules of art derive their force from reason
alone: and therefore whenever something better occurs, the rule
followed hitherto should be changed. But "laws derive very great force
from custom," as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently
they should not be quickly changed.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that laws ought to be
changed: not in view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great
benefit or in a case of great urgency, as stated above. This answer
applies also to the Third Objection.
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Whether custom can obtain force of law?
Objection 1: It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, nor
abolish a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law and
from the Divine law, as stated above ([2054]Q[93], A[3];[2055] Q[95],
A[2]). But human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the
Divine law. Therefore neither can it change human law.
Objection 2: Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first
acted against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such acts,
nothing good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is a
rule of human acts. Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so that
the mere custom should obtain force of law.
Objection 3: Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men
whose business it is to govern the community; wherefore private
individuals cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private
individuals. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to
abolish the law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): "The customs
of God's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to be
considered as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of the
Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of God."
I answer that, All law proceeds from the reason and will of the
lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God;
the human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now just as
human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest by
speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man
chooses as good that which he carries into execution. But it is evident
that by human speech, law can be both changed and expounded, in so far
as it manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason.
Wherefore by actions also, especially if they be repeated, so as to
make a custom, law can be changed and expounded; and also something can
be established which obtains force of law, in so far as by repeated
external actions, the inward movement of the will, and concepts of
reason are most effectually declared; for when a thing is done again
and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason.
Accordingly, custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the
interpreter of law.
Reply to Objection 1: The natural and Divine laws proceed from the
Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a
custom proceeding from the will of man, but only by Divine authority.
Hence it is that no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws:
for Isidore says (Synon. ii, 16): "Let custom yield to authority: evil
customs should be eradicated by law and reason."
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2056]Q[96], A[6]), human laws
fail in some cases: wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside
the law; namely, in a case where the law fails; yet the act will not be
evil. And when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in
man, then custom shows that the law is no longer useful: just as it
might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary.
If, however, the same reason remains, for which the law was useful
hitherto, then it is not the custom that prevails against the law, but
the law that overcomes the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for
the law seeming useless, be that it is not "possible according to the
custom of the country" [*[2057]Q[95], A[3]], which has been stated to
be one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set aside the
custom of a whole people.
Reply to Objection 3: The people among whom a custom is introduced may
be of two conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own
laws, the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far
more in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority of
the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as
representing the people. Wherefore although each individual cannot make
laws, yet the whole people can. If however the people have not the free
power to make their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher
authority; nevertheless with such a people a prevailing custom obtains
force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs
to make laws for that people: because by the very fact that they
tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is introduced by custom.
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Whether the rulers of the people can dispense from human laws?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot
dispense from human laws. For the law is established for the "common
weal," as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not be
set aside for the private convenience of an individual: because, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), "the good of the nation is more godlike
than the good of one man." Therefore it seems that a man should not be
dispensed from acting in compliance with the general law.
Objection 2: Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as
follows (Dt. 1:17): "You shall hear the little as well as the great;
neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the judgment
of God." But to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to
all, seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the rulers of a
community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is against a
precept of the Divine law.
Objection 3: Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord
with the natural and Divine laws: else it would not "foster religion,"
nor be "helpful to discipline," which is requisite to the nature of
law, as laid down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man can dispense from
the Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from
the human law.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:17): "A dispensation is
committed to me."
I answer that, Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out
to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household is
called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he
distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure.
Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very
fact that he directs how some general precept is to be fulfilled by
each individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is
conducive to the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a
particular individual, or in some particular case, either because it
would hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of
some evil, as explained above ([2058]Q[96], A[6]). But it would be
dangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual, except
perhaps by reason of an evident and sudden emergency, as stated above
([2059]Q[96], A[6]). Consequently he who is placed over a community is
empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority, so
that, when the law fails in its application to persons or
circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed.
If however he grant this permission without any such reason, and of his
mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser:
unfaithful, if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if he
ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says
(Lk. 12:42): "Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser
[Douay: steward], whom his lord setteth over his family?"
Reply to Objection 1: When a person is dispensed from observing the
general law, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the
intention of benefiting, the common good.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not respect of persons if unequal measures
are served out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the
condition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive
special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object of
special favor.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural law, so far as it contains general
precepts, which never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other
precepts, however, which are as conclusions of the general precepts,
man sometimes grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan should
not be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something similar.
But to the Divine law each man stands as a private person to the public
law to which he is subject. Wherefore just as none can dispense from
public human law, except the man from whom the law derives its
authority, or his delegate; so, in the precepts of the Divine law,
which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to whom He
may give special power for that purpose.
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OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law
itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether the Old Law was good?
(2) Whether it was from God?
(3) Whether it came from Him through the angels?
(4) Whether it was given to all?
(5) Whether it was binding on all?
(6) Whether it was given at a suitable time?
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Whether the Old Law was good?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is
written (Ezech. 20:25): "I gave them statutes that were not good, and
judgments in which they shall not live." But a law is not said to be
good except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it
contains. Therefore the Old Law was not good.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it
conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the
Old Law was not salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For the
Apostle says (Rom. 7:8, seqq.): "Without the law sin was dead. And I
lived some time without the law. But when the commandment came sin
revived; and I died." Again he says (Rom. 5:20): "Law entered in that
sin might abound." Therefore the Old Law was not good.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it
should be possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according
to human custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said (Acts
15:10): "Why tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the
disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?"
Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:12): "Wherefore the law
indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good."
I answer that, Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as a
doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right
reason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now
the Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it repressed
concupiscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the
commandment, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods" (Ex. 20:17).
Moreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin; and these too are
contrary to reason. Consequently it is evident that it was a good law.
The Apostle argues in the same way (Rom. 7): "I am delighted," says he
(verse 22), "with the law of God, according to the inward man": and
again (verse 16): "I consent to the law, that is good."
But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good, and an imperfect
good. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a
thing is such that it is sufficient in itself to conduce to the end:
while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in
attaining the end, but is not sufficient for the realization thereof.
Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a man; but it
is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able to bring him
back to health. Again it must be observed that the end of human law is
different from the end of Divine law. For the end of human law is the
temporal tranquillity of the state, which end law effects by directing
external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the
peaceful condition of the state. On the other hand, the end of the
Divine law is to bring man to that end which is everlasting happiness;
which end is hindered by any sin, not only of external, but also of
internal action. Consequently that which suffices for the perfection of
human law, viz. the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice
for the perfection of the Divine law: but it is requisite that it
should make man altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness. Now
this cannot be done save by the grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby
"charity" which fulfilleth the law . . . "is spread abroad in our
hearts" (Rom. 5:5): since "the grace of God is life everlasting" (Rom.
6:23). But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for this was
reserved to Christ; because, as it is written (Jn. 1:17), the law was
given "by Moses, grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently
the Old Law was good indeed, but imperfect, according to Heb. 7:19:
"The law brought nothing to perfection."
Reply to Objection 1: The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts;
which are said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto
the remission of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man
confessed himself a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, "and judgments
in which they shall not live"; i.e. whereby they are unable to obtain
life; and so the text goes on: "And I polluted them," i.e. showed them
to be polluted, "in their own gifts, when they offered all that opened
the womb, for their offenses."
Reply to Objection 2: The law is said to have been deadly, as being not
the cause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection:
in so far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is
prescribed, and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not
given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom.
5:11): "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by it
killed me." In the same sense when it is said that "the law entered in
that sin might abound," the conjunction "that" must be taken as
consecutive and not final: in so far as men, taking occasion from the
law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more grievous after
law had forbidden it, and because concupiscence increased, since we
desire a thing the more from its being forbidden.
Reply to Objection 3: The yoke of the law could not be borne without
the help of grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written
(Rom. 9:16): "It is not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth,"
viz. that he wills and runs in the commandments of God, "but of God
that showeth mercy." Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:32): "I have run
the way of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart," i.e. by
giving me grace and charity.
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Whether the Old Law was from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it is
written (Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." But the Law was
imperfect, as stated above [2060](A[1]). Therefore the Old Law was not
from God.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned
that all the works which God hath made continue for ever." But the Old
Law does not continue for ever: since the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18):
"There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of
the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Therefore the Old Law was
not from God.
Objection 3: Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only evil, but
also the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion of sin, as
stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the giving of such a law does not
pertain to God, to Whom "none is like among the lawgivers" (Job 36:22).
Objection 4: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 2:4) that God "will have
all men to be saved." But the Old Law did not suffice to save man, as
stated above [2061](A[1]). Therefore the giving of such a law did not
appertain to God. Therefore the Old Law was not from God.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 15:6) while speaking to the Jews,
to whom the Law was given: "You have made void the commandment of God
for your tradition." And shortly before (verse 4) He had said: "Honor
thy father and mother," which is contained expressly in the Old Law
(Ex. 20:12; Dt. 5:16). Therefore the Old Law was from God.
I answer that, The Old Law was given by the good God, Who is the Father
of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to Christ in two
ways. First by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He Himself says
(Lk. 24:44): "All things must needs be fulfilled, which are written in
the law . . . and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning Me":
and (Jn. 5:46): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me
also; for he wrote of Me." Secondly, as a kind of disposition, since by
withdrawing men from idolatrous worship, it enclosed [concludebat] them
in the worship of one God, by Whom the human race was to be saved
through Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 3:23): "Before the
faith came, we were kept under the law shut up [conclusi], unto that
faith which was to be revealed." Now it is evident that the same thing
it is, which gives a disposition to the end, and which brings to the
end; and when I say "the same," I mean that it does so either by itself
or through its subjects. For the devil would not make a law whereby men
would be led to Christ, Who was to cast him out, according to Mat.
12:26: "If Satan cast out Satan, his kingdom is divided" [Vulg.: 'he is
divided against himself']. Therefore the Old Law was given by the same
God, from Whom came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents a thing being not perfect
simply, and yet perfect in respect of time: thus a boy is said to be
perfect, not simply, but with regard to the condition of time. So, too,
precepts that are given to children are perfect in comparison with the
condition of those to whom they are given, although they are not
perfect simply. Hence the Apostle says (Gal. 3:24): "The law was our
pedagogue in Christ."
Reply to Objection 2: Those works of God endure for ever which God so
made that they would endure for ever; and these are His perfect works.
But the Old Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace;
not as though it were evil, but as being weak and useless for this
time; because, as the Apostle goes on to say, "the law brought nothing
to perfection": hence he says (Gal. 3:25): "After the faith is come, we
are no longer under a pedagogue."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2062]Q[79], A[4]), God
sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby
be humbled. So also did He wish to give such a law as men by their own
forces could not fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers,
they might find themselves to be sinners, and being humbled might have
recourse to the help of grace.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the Old Law did not suffice to save man,
yet another help from God besides the Law was available for man, viz.
faith in the Mediator, by which the fathers of old were justified even
as we were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him insufficient
aids to salvation.
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Whether the Old Law was given through the angels?
Objection 1: It seems that the Old Law was not given through the
angels, but immediately by God. For an angel means a "messenger"; so
that the word "angel" denotes ministry, not lordship, according to Ps.
102:20,21: "Bless the Lord, all ye His Angels . . . you ministers of
His." But the Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord: for it
is written (Ex. 20:1): "And the Lord spoke . . . these words," and
further on: "I am the Lord Thy God." Moreover the same expression is
often repeated in Exodus, and the later books of the Law. Therefore the
Law was given by God immediately.
Objection 2: Further, according to Jn. 1:17, "the Law was given by
Moses." But Moses received it from God immediately: for it is written
(Ex. 33:11): "The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to
speak to his friend." Therefore the Old Law was given by God
immediately.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law,
as stated above ([2063]Q[90], A[3]). But God alone is Sovereign as
regards the salvation of souls: while the angels are the "ministering
spirits," as stated in Heb. 1:14. Therefore it was not meet for the Law
to be given through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation
of souls.
On the contrary, The Apostle said (Gal. 3:19) that the Law was "given
[Vulg.: 'ordained'] by angels in the hand of a Mediator." And Stephen
said (Acts 7:53): "(Who) have received the Law by the disposition of
angels."
I answer that, The Law was given by God through the angels. And besides
the general reason given by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz. that "the
gifts of God should be brought to men by means of the angels," there is
a special reason why the Old Law should have been given through them.
For it has been stated ([2064]AA[1],2) that the Old Law was imperfect,
and yet disposed man to that perfect salvation of the human race, which
was to come through Christ. Now it is to be observed that wherever
there is an order of powers or arts, he that holds the highest place,
himself exercises the principal and perfect acts; while those things
which dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by him through
his subordinates: thus the ship-builder himself rivets the planks
together, but prepares the material by means of the workmen who assist
him under his direction. Consequently it was fitting that the perfect
law of the New Testament should be given by the incarnate God
immediately; but that the Old Law should be given to men by the
ministers of God, i.e. by the angels. It is thus that the Apostle at
the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews (1:2) proves the excellence
of the New Law over the Old; because in the New Testament "God . . .
hath spoken to us by His Son," whereas in the Old Testament "the word
was spoken by angels" (Heb. 2:2).
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals
(Praef. chap. i), "the angel who is described to have appeared to
Moses, is sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an
angel, in truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the
external delivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director within,
Who supported the effectual power of speaking." Hence also it is that
the angel spoke as personating the Lord.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is
stated in Exodus that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face"; and
shortly afterwards we read, "Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived
what he saw and he desired what he saw not." Hence he did not see the
very Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him
immediately. Accordingly when Scripture states that "He spoke to him
face to face," this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of
the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to
mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means of a subordinate
creature, i.e. an angel and a cloud. Again we may say that this vision
"face to face" means some kind of sublime and familiar contemplation,
inferior to the vision of the Divine Essence.
Reply to Objection 3: It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by
his own authority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it
through others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He
promulgated it through the angels.
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Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have been given
to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the salvation which
was to come through Christ, as stated above ([2065]AA[2],3). But that
salvation was to come not to the Jews alone but to all nations,
according to Is. 49:6: "It is a small thing that thou shouldst be my
servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to convert the dregs of
Israel. Behold I have given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that
thou mayest be My salvation, even to the farthest part of the earth."
Therefore the Old Law should have been given to all nations, and not to
one people only.
Objection 2: Further, according to Acts 10:34,35, "God is not a
respecter of persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and
worketh justice, is acceptable to Him." Therefore the way of salvation
should not have been opened to one people more than to another.
Objection 3: Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated
above [2066](A[3]). But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the
angels not to the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written
(Ecclus. 17:14): "Over every nation He set a ruler." Also on all
nations He bestows temporal goods, which are of less account with God
than spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law also to
all peoples.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 3:1,2): "What advantage then hath
the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words of God
were committed to them": and (Ps. 147:9): "He hath not done in like
manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest
unto them."
I answer that, It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given
to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish people alone
remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the others turned
away to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy to receive the
Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs.
But this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to
idolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was more grievous, as
is clear from Ex. 32 and from Amos 5:25,26: "Did you offer victims and
sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But
you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the image of your idols,
the star of your god, which you made to yourselves." Moreover it is
stated expressly (Dt. 9:6): "Know therefore that the Lord thy God
giveth thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices, for
thou art a very stiff-necked people": but the real reason is given in
the preceding verse: "That the Lord might accomplish His word, which He
promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob."
What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says (Gal. 3:16)
that "to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not,
'And to his seeds,' as of many: but as of one, 'And to thy seed,' which
is Christ." And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other special boons
to that people, on account of the promised made to their fathers that
Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people, of
whom Christ was to be born, should be signalized by a special
sanctification, according to the words of Lev. 19:2: "Be ye holy,
because I . . . am holy." Nor again was it on account of the merit of
Abraham himself that this promise was made to him, viz. that Christ
should be born of his seed: but of gratuitous election and vocation.
Hence it is written (Is. 41:2): "Who hath raised up the just one form
the east, hath called him to follow him?"
It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election
that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the people sprung
from them received the law; according to Dt. 4:36, 37: "Ye did [Vulg.:
'Thou didst'] hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He
loved thy fathers, and chose their seed after them." And if again it
asked why He chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be
born thereof; a fitting answer is given by Augustine (Tract. super
Joan. xxvi): "Why He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou
to judge, if thou wish not to err."
Reply to Objection 1: Although the salvation, which was to come through
Christ, was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ
should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged
above other peoples; according to Rom. 9:4: "To whom," namely the Jews,
"belongeth the adoption as of children (of God) . . . and the
testament, and the giving of the Law . . . whose are the fathers, and
of whom is Christ according to the flesh."
Reply to Objection 2: Respect of persons takes place in those things
which are given according to due; but it has no place in those things
which are bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity,
gives of his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter of
persons: but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were
not to distribute them according to personal merits, he would be a
respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation on the
human race gratuitously: wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if
He gives them to some rather than to others. Hence Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. viii): "All whom God teaches, he teaches out of pity;
but whom He teaches not, out of justice He teaches not": for this is
due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the first
parent.
Reply to Objection 3: The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on
account of sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are
the ministries of the angels, which the very order of various natures
demands, viz. that the lowest beings be governed through the
intermediate beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not
only to men, but also to beasts, according to Ps. 35:7: "Men and beasts
Thou wilt preserve, O Lord."
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Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old
Law. Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject to
his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is "King of all the
earth" (Ps. 46:8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were
bound to observe the Law.
Objection 2: Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the
Old Law: for it is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth not
in the words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work." If
therefore other men could be saved without the observance of the Old
Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men.
Objection 3: Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual
and to the observances of the Law: for it is written (Ex. 12:48): "If
any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of
the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he
celebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is
born in the land." But it would have been useless to admit strangers to
the legal observances according to Divine ordinance, if they could have
been saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be
saved without observing the Law.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the
Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that
the Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved
without observing the Law.
I answer that, The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural
law, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those
precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to
observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but
because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts
which were added by the Old Law, they were not binding on save the
Jewish people alone.
The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above
[2067](A[4]), was given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a
prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born of
that people. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special
sanctification of certain ones, are binding on them alone: thus clerics
who are set aside for the service of God are bound to certain
obligations to which the laity are not bound; likewise religious are
bound by their profession to certain works of perfection, to which
people living in the world are not bound. In like manner this people
was bound to certain special observances, to which other peoples were
not bound. Wherefore it is written (Dt. 18:13): "Thou shalt be perfect
and without spot before the Lord thy God": and for this reason they
used a kind of form of profession, as appears from Dt. 26:3: "I profess
this day before the Lord thy God," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to
observe his law which he makes for all in general. But if he orders
certain things to be observed by the servants of his household, others
are not bound thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: The more a man is united to God, the better his
state becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the
worship of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence
it is written (Dt. 4:8): "What other nation is there so renowned that
hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?" In like manner,
from this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of
the laity, and the state of religious than that of folk living in the
world.
Reply to Objection 3: The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly
and more securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere
natural law: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the
laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular persons
to those of the religious, although they can be saved without this.
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Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at
the time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation
which was to come through Christ, as stated above ([2068]AA[2],3). But
man needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned.
Therefore the Law should have been given immediately after sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of
those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning the
"seed, which is Christ" (Gal. 3:16) was first made to Abraham, as
related in Gn. 12:7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once
at the time of Abraham.
Objection 3: Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended
from Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He born
of no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the
promise was renewed, according to 2 Kings 23:1: "The man to whom it was
appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said."
Therefore the Old Law should have been given after David, just as it
was given after Abraham.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set
because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made
the promise, being ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator":
ordained, i.e. "given in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains.
Therefore it was fitting that the Old Law should be given in this order
of time.
I answer that, It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the time
of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in respect
of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is
imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law
restrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through being
instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil what they desire to do.
Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as
would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was
proud of two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He was proud of
his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for
salvation: and accordingly, in order that his pride might be overcome
in this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason without the
help of a written law: and man was able to learn from experience that
his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had
fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices. Wherefore,
after those times, it was necessary for a written law to be given as a
remedy for human ignorance: because "by the Law is the knowledge of
sin" (Rom. 3:20). But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his
pride was convinced of his weakness, through his being unable to fulfil
what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes (Rom. 8:3,4), "what the
Law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sent
[Vulg.: 'sending'] His own Son . . . that the justification of the Law
might be fulfilled in us."
With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which was
most needed by the people, at the time when the natural law began to be
obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that
this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner, so that they
might be led from imperfection to perfection; wherefore it was becoming
that the Old Law should be given between the law of nature and the law
of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at
once after the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident
in his own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law;
because as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by
habitual sinning.
Reply to Objection 2: A law should not be given save to the people,
since it is a general precept, as stated above ([2069]Q[90], AA[2],3);
wherefore at the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as
it were, household precepts: but when Abraham's descendants had
multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from
slavery, it was fitting that they should be given a law; for "slaves
are not that part of the people or state to which it is fitting for the
law to be directed," as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2,4,5).
Reply to Objection 3: Since the Law had to be given to the people, not
only those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole
people, who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the
sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed,
according to Rom. 4:11: hence even before David, the Law had to be
given to that people as soon as they were collected together.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are
distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. Under the
first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?
(2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?
(3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral
precepts?
(4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?
(5) Whether it contains any others besides these?
(6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts.
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Whether the Old Law contains only one precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept.
Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above
([2070]Q[90], AA[2],3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it
contains but one precept.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:9): "If there be any
other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself." But this is only one commandment. Therefore the
Old Law contained but one commandment.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): "All things . . .
whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them.
For this is the Law and the prophets." But the whole of the Old Law is
comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old
Law contains but one commandment.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 2:15): "Making void the Law of
commandments contained in decrees": where he is referring to the Old
Law, as the gloss comments, on the passage. Therefore the Old Law
comprises many commandments.
I answer that, Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something
which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from the
necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in
its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as
being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to
be necessary or expedient to an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be
given about various things as being ordained to one end. Consequently
we must say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of
their relation to one end: and yet they are many in respect of the
diversity of those things that are ordained to that end.
Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained
to one end: yet it comprises various precepts, according to the
diversity of the things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art
of building is one according to the unity of its end, because it aims
at the building of a house: and yet it contains various rules,
according to the variety of acts ordained thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the
commandment is charity"; since every law aims at establishing
friendship, either between man and man, or between man and God.
Wherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, "Thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," as expressing the end of all
commandments: because love of one's neighbor includes love of God, when
we love our neighbor for God's sake. Hence the Apostle put this
commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of
one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): "On these two
commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. ix, 8, "friendship towards
another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks
on another as on himself. Hence when it is said, "All things whatsoever
you would that men should do to you, do you also to them," this is an
explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the
words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself": so that it is an
explanation of this commandment.
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Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts.
For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated above
([2071]Q[91], AA[4],5;[2072] Q[98], A[5]). But the moral precepts
belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old
Law.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's
assistance where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to
things that are of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason
seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts
do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law.
Objection 3: Further, the Old Law is said to be "the letter that
killeth" (2 Cor. 3:6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken,
according to Ps. 118:93: "Thy justifications I will never forget, for
by them Thou hast given me life." Therefore the moral precepts do not
belong to the Old Law.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover, He gave them
discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an
inheritance." Now discipline belongs to morals; for this gloss on Heb.
12:11: "Now all chastisement [disciplina]," etc., says: "Discipline is
an exercise in morals by means of difficulties." Therefore the Law
which was given by God comprised moral precepts.
I answer that, The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is evident
fromEx. 20:13, 15: "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." This
was reasonable: because, just as the principal intention of human law
is to created friendship between man and man; so the chief intention of
the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with God. Now since
likeness is the reason of love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: "Every
beast loveth its like"; there cannot possibly be any friendship of man
to God, Who is supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it is
written (Lev. 19:2; 11:45): "You shall be holy, for I am holy." But the
goodness of man is virtue, which "makes its possessor good" (Ethic. ii,
6). Therefore it was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts
about acts of virtue: and these are the moral precepts of the Law.
Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not
as being altogether different from it, but as something added thereto.
For just as grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose
the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: It was fitting that the Divine law should come to
man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is
insufficient, but also in those things in which human reason may happen
to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as
to the universal principles of the natural law; but through being
habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of things to be done
in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which are like
conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, the
reason of many men went astray, to the extend of judging to be lawful,
things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the
authority of the Divine law to rescue man from both these defects. Thus
among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to
which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also
those to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the
Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is
liable.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv),
even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to
the moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good,
without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise
ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man
is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are
called moral, as stated above ([2073]Q[1], A[3]). Therefore it seems
that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral
precepts.
Objection 2: Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to
refer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of a virtue,
viz. religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) "offers worship and
ceremony to the Godhead." Since, then, the moral precepts are about
acts of virtue, as stated above [2074](A[2]), it seems that the
ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral.
Objection 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which
signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr.
Christ. ii, 3,4), "of all signs employed by men words hold the first
place." Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain ceremonial
precepts about certain figurative actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13,14): "Ten words . . . He wrote
in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should
teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do." But the ten
commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral
precepts there are others which are ceremonial.
I answer that, As stated above [2075](A[2]), the Divine law is
instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is
instituted chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another.
Hence human laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of
anything relating to Divine worship except as affecting the common good
of mankind: and for this reason they have devised many institutions
relating to Divine matters, according as it seemed expedient for the
formation of human morals; as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles.
On the other hand the Divine law directed men to one another according
to the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God, which
order was the chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not
only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love,
but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his
subjection to God: and it is these works that are said to belong to the
Divine worship. This worship is called "ceremony" [the munia, i.e.
gifts] of Ceres (who was the goddess of fruits), as some say: because,
at first, offerings were made to God from the fruits: or because, as
Valerius Maximus states [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word
"ceremony" was introduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine
worship, being derived from a town near Rome called "Caere": since,
when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans
were taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those
precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine worship are specially
called ceremonial.
Reply to Objection 1: Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and
therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these
matters also.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2076]Q[91], A[3]), the precepts
of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they
are determined both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these
very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of
natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of the precepts of
the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the
moral precepts which belong to the natural law. Wherefore to worship
God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the
determination of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by
such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the
ceremonial precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct
from the moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of
God cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible
similitudes. Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not
only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the
things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes
expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical expressions; but
also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains to
the ceremonial precepts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also judicial
precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in
addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For
Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are
"precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding
the life that is foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have to
lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that is
foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of
precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, "I have not declined from
Thy judgments," says, i.e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for
me." But a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the
judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral
precepts.
Objection 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according
to Ps. 93:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment." But acts of
justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts.
Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and
consequently should not be held as distinct from them.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral
precepts" antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts
besides moral and ceremonial precepts.
I answer that, As stated above ([2077]AA[2],3), it belongs to the
Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these
belongs in the abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which
dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to
be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known
principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters.
Accordingly just as the determination of the universal principle about
Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the
determination of the general precepts of that justice which is to be
observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts.
We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law;
viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural law;
"ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship;
and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be
maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom. 7:12) after saying
that the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy,
and good": "just," in respect of the judicial precepts; "holy," with
regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word
"sanctus"---"holy"---is applied to that which is consecrated to God);
and "good," i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at
the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised
under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts
of the life we have to lead.
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an
application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way.
Hence the judicial precepts have something in common with the moral
precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in common
with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of
general precepts. This explains why sometimes "judgments" comprise both
judicial and moral precepts, as in Dt. 5:1: "Hear, O Israel, the
ceremonies and judgments"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial
precepts, as in Lev. 18:4: "You shall do My judgments, and shall
observe My precepts," where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while
"judgments" refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the
moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act
belongs to the judicial precepts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and
ceremonial precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the
moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts
belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the
ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is
worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz.
temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated above
([2078]Q[60], A[5]). Therefore besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old
Law should comprise others.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 11:1): "Love the Lord thy God,
and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and
commandments." Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above
[2079](A[4]). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial
precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments."
[*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this
article are not to be confused with the Commandments (praecepta) in the
ordinary acceptance of the word.]
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Dt. 6:17): "Keep the precepts of
the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have
[Vulg.: 'He hath'] commanded thee." Therefore in addition to the above,
the Law comprises "testimonies."
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): "Thy justifications
(i.e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget." Therefore
in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial
precepts, but also others, called "justifications."
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you."
And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all
the precepts of the Law are included under them.
I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept;
other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now
the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their
fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the authority of
the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which
benefit consists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or
virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was
necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to
indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e.g. Dt. 6:4: "Hear, O
Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and Gn. 1:1: "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth": and these are called "testimonies."
Again it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be
appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who
transgress; as it may be seen in Dt. 28: "If thou wilt hear the voice
of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the
nations," etc.: and these are called "justifications," according as God
punishes or rewards certain ones justly.
The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in
so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one
according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a
law which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a
twofold just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).
Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be
done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue
would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of
the order of virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are
expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not
kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these are properly called "precepts."
Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but
as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments";
because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an
example whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a
garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in
other like cases. Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.)
says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments."
Duty as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards
human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters.
Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and
rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the
Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled
"justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore the
commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those
things be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and those
things "commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as
the very word seems to denote.
From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either
moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the
character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the
precepts, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the
notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in
so far as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part,
as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be
anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.
The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its
precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men
to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and
threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by
fear and love: hence it is written (Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel, what
doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy
God, and walk in His ways, and love Him?" But the desire for temporal
goods leads man away from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity." Therefore temporal
promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a
lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher
declares (Polit. ii, 6).
Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law.
Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher
the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law
employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the
Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means.
Objection 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of
guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But
as stated in Eccles. 9:2, "all" temporal "things equally happen to the
just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to
the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth
sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set
forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the Divine law.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 1:19,20): "If you be willing, and
will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if
you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour
you."
I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent
to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every
law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments
and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences,
the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil:
wherefore the process of argument in sciences should be ordered
becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more
generally known. And thus also he who would persuade a man to the
observance of any precepts, needs to move him at first by things for
which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do
something, by means of little childish gifts. Now it has been said
above ([2080]Q[98], AA[1],2,3) that the Old Law disposed men to (the
coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the
perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect in
comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ's coming:
and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still
under a pedagogue (Gal. 3:24). But the perfection of man consists in
his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is
clear from the words of the Apostle (Phil. 3:13, 15): "Forgetting the
things that are behind, I stretch [Vulg.: 'and stretching'] forth
myself to those that are before . . . Let us therefore, as many as are
perfect, be thus minded." Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal
goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas the perverse place their
end in temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should
conduct men to God by means of temporal goods for which the imperfect
have an affection.
Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness whereby man places his end in
temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal
goods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the
imperfect to the love of God, according to Ps. 48:19: "He will praise
Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him."
Reply to Objection 2: Human law persuades men by means of temporal
rewards or punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law
persuades men by meas of rewards or punishments to be received from
God. In this respect it employs higher means.
Reply to Objection 3: As any one can see, who reads carefully the story
of the Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the
Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the
precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. But certain
individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law, met with
misfortunes---either because they had already become spiritual (so that
misfortune might withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal
things, and that their virtue might be tried)---or because, while
outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart was altogether
fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, according to Is.
29:13 (Mat. 15:8): "This people honoreth Me with their lips; but their
hearts is far from Me."
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OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the
moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the judicial precepts.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of
nature?
(2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all
the virtues?
(3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the
ten precepts of the decalogue?
(4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one
another?
(5) Their number;
(6) Their order;
(7) The manner in which they were given;
(8) Whether they are dispensable?
(9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of
the Law?
(10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?
(11) The distinction of other moral precepts;
(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
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Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to
the law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover He gave
them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But
instruction is in contradistinction to the law of nature; since the law
of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore
not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law.
But human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those that
belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the
natural law is the same in all men, while these moral institutions are
various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why
the Divine law should add to the law of nature, ordinances pertaining
to good morals.
Objection 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in
certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal. 5:6) that
faith "worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of
nature; since that which is of faith is above nature. Therefore not all
the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles, who
have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which
must be understood of things pertaining to good morals. Therefore all
the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.
I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and
judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature to
good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason,
which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are called
good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are
discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason
proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every
judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally,
as stated above ([2081]Q[94], AA[2],4): from which principles one may
proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters
connected with human actions are so evident, that after very little
consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by
means of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be
the subject of judgment without much consideration of the various
circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only
those who are wise: just as it is not possible for all to consider the
particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed
in philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of which man cannot
judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles
of faith.
It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters
which concern good morals; and since good morals are those which are in
accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must
needs by derived in some way from natural reason; it follows, of
necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but
not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the natural
reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done
or not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou
shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these belong to the law of
nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more
careful consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law
of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching
the less wise: e.g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the
person of the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, to
judge of which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are
taught about the things of God: e.g. "Thou shalt not make to thyself a
graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the
name of the Lord thy God in vain."
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not
about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of the Old
Law is called justification, according to Ps. 118:8: "I will keep Thy
justifications." But justification is the execution of justice.
Therefore the moral precepts are only about acts of justice.
Objection 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the
character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone
and to none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice
consists in rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts of
the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only
about the acts of justice.
Objection 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore
says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards the
common good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral
precepts are only about the acts of justice.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a
transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments
of heaven." But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue.
Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue.
I answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common
good, as stated above ([2082]Q[90], A[2]), the precepts of the Law must
needs be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence
the Philosopher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in
a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a
state which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the
state. Now human law is ordained for one kind of community, and the
Divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the
civil community, implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men
are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live in
communion with one another. This life in common of man with man
pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the
human community. Wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of
justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this is only in so
far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains
(Ethic. v, 1).
But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men
in relation to God, either in this life or in the life to come. And
therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters
whereby men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is
united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore
the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby human
reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the
virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of
the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues set in good order the
acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior
actions. It is therefore evident that the Divine law fittingly proposes
precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain
matters, without which the order of virtue, which is the order of
reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept; while
other matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come
under an admonition of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law,
even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the
character of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey
God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man
should be subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty of
one man to another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the
lower powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the
Philosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about
the different kinds of community.
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Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten
precepts of the decalogue?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old
Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the first
and principal precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated in Mat. 22:37,39.
But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue.
Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of
the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the
ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of
the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy
the Sabbath-day." Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all
the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of
virtue. But among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard
acts of justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore
the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts.
On the contrary, The gloss on Mat. 5:11: "Blessed are ye when they
shall revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten
precepts, set them out in detail." Therefore all the precepts of the
Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other
precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have given
the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to
the people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes those
precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are
those which with but slight reflection can be gathered at once from the
first general principles: and those also which become known to man
immediately through divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of
precepts are not reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue: viz.
first general principles, for they need no further promulgation after
being once imprinted on the natural reason to which they are
self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and
other similar principles: and again those which the careful reflection
of wise men shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive
these principles from God, through being taught by wise men.
Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of
the decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first general principles
are contained in them, as principles in their proximate conclusions;
while those which are known through wise men are contained, conversely,
as conclusions in their principles.
Reply to Objection 1: Those two principles are the first general
principles of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason,
either through nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of
the decalogue are referred to these, as conclusions to general
principles.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in
one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the
things of God, according to Ps. 45:11: "Be still and see that I am
God." In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue:
but not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a
ceremonial precept.
Reply to Objection 3: The notion of duty is not so patent in the other
virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the
other virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts
about acts of justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come
under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of
the Law.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one
another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
unsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue
distinct from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But
that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt not
have strange gods before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is
added, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing," etc. belongs to
worship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (Qq.
in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two.
Objection 2: Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct
from the negative precepts; e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother,"
and, "Thou shalt not kill." But this, "I am the Lord thy God," is
affirmative: and that which follows, "Thou shalt not have strange gods
before Me," is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not,
as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:7): "I had not known
concupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet.'" Hence
it seems that this precept, "Thou shalt not covet," is one precept;
and, therefore, should not be divided into two.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting
on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as
referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by
different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Lev. 26:26, "Ten
women shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its
observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he
distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first being, "I am
the Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before
Me," (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his
commentary on Osee 10:10, "On thy" [Vulg.: "their"] "two iniquities");
the third precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself
any graven thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the
Lord thy God in vain." He states that there are six precepts pertaining
to our neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the
second, "Thou shalt not kill"; the third, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery"; the fourth, "Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt
not bear false witness"; the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet."
But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue,
if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is
written (Mat. 6:24), "No man can serve two masters," the two
statements, "I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange
gods before Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept.
Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod.) who also distinguishes four precepts
as referring to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in
the second place, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as
third, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and
as fourth, "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." The other
six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius.
Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything
is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as
gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg.: Cherubim] to
be made and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Ex.
25:18---Augustine more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have
strange gods before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven
thing," into one precept. Likewise to covet another's wife, for the
purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh;
whereas, to covet other things, which are desired for the purpose of
possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore
Augustine reckons as distinct precepts, that which forbids the coveting
of another's goods, and that which prohibits the coveting of another's
wife. Thus he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and
seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is better.
Reply to Objection 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith:
wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct
from those about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about
worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith is
presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of
charity. For just as the first general principles of the natural law
are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no
promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident
principle to a subject possessed of faith: "for he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is" (Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other
promulgation that the infusion of faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the
negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should
honor his parents does not include that he should not kill another man;
nor does the latter include the former. But when an affirmative precept
is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two
distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one precept saying that
"Thou shalt not steal," and another binding one to keep another's
property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same way there
are not different precepts about believing in God, and about not
believing in strange gods.
Reply to Objection 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and
therefore the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as
though it were one. But because there are various special kinds of
covetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions
against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of
the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 5).
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso
viii), is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the
commandments of heaven." But sins are distinguished according as man
sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the
decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in his relations
to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God and
himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently
enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to
the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities,
and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept
about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others
also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite.
Objection 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury,
so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the
teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt
not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Therefore there should
be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false
doctrine.
Objection 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his
parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of
charity extends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue
are ordained unto charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the
commandment is charity." Therefore as there is a precept referring to
parents, so should there have been some precepts referring to children
and other neighbors.
Objection 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in
thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and
adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt
not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct from the
prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not
covet thy neighbor's goods," and, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's
wife." Therefore the same should have been done in regard to the sins
of homicide and false witness.
Objection 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the
concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the
irascible part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when
it is said, "Thou shalt not covet." Therefore the decalogue should have
included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible
faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
unfittingly enumerated.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13): "He shewed you His covenant,
which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two
tablets of stone."
I answer that, As stated above [2083](A[2]), just as the precepts of
human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the
precepts of the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community
or commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell
aright in a community, two things are required: the first is that he
behave well to the head of the community; the other is that he behave
well to those who are his fellows and partners in the community. It is
therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the first
place precepts ordering man in his relations to God; and in the second
place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who
are his neighbors and live with him under God.
Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first,
fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master
consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the
sense of the first commandment, in the words "Thou shalt not have
strange gods." Reverence to his master requires that he should do
nothing injurious to him: and this is conveyed by the second
commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
vain." Service is due to the master in return for the benefits which
his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third
commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the
creation of all things.
To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in
general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying
his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about
honoring one's parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to
none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done
to one's neighbor---sometimes in his person, i.e. as to his personal
existence; and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill":
sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of
offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the
aforesaid; and with this regard to this it is said, "Thou shalt not
steal." Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not
bear false witness against thy neighbor": harm done by thought is
forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt not covet."
The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also
be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to deeds;
wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the
second, to words; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not take the name
of the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the
sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept,
requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In Ps.
32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the
First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the third, His
goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last
end.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection may be answered in two ways.
First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the
precepts of charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept
about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural
law had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of
loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its
vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love of
God and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing
oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those
precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God.
Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are
those which the people received from God immediately; wherefore it is
written (Dt. 10:4): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had
written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you." Hence the
precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand
at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is easy for a
man, especially for a believer, to understand that, of necessity, he
owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters
which regard himself and not another, man has, of necessity, certain
duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it
seems that everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And
therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to
himself, reach the people through the instruction of men who are versed
through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters; and,
consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were
instituted in celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of
past favors, or in sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the
sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine
favors to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was
called to mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; wherefore the
reason for this precept is given in Ex. 20:11: "In six days the Lord
made heaven and earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and
final was the repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life,
by grace, or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also
foreshadowed in the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written
(Is. 58:13): "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing
thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the
holy of the Lord glorious." Because these favors first and chiefly are
borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities
were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and
transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in memory of the
past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future
Passion of Christ, which though temporal and transitory, brought us to
the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone,
and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the
precepts of the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), "men swear by
one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of
all their controversy." Hence, since oaths are common to all,
inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept
of the decalogue. According to one interpretation, however, the words,
"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a
prohibition of false doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus: "Thou
shalt not say that Christ is a creature."
Reply to Objection 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an
immediate dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts
that forbid the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an
immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in
return for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a
son's debt to his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it
by denying it: since the father is the principle of generation and
being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue
does not prescribe deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone
except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be
indebted to their children for any favors received, but rather the
reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and
"parents love their children as being a part of themselves," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue
contains no ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself, so, for the
same reason, it includes no precept about loving one's children.
Reply to Objection 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of
wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful
good, are of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they
needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But
murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it
is natural for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and are desired
only for the sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins
of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of
thought, but only sins of deed.
Reply to Objection 6: As stated above ([2084]Q[25], A[1]), all the
passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the
concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it
were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of
the irascible passions, but only of the concupiscible passions.
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Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly
previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than
God is; according to 1 Jn. 4:20: "He that loveth not his brother, whom
he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" But the first three
precepts belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to
the love of our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are
not set in proper order.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the
affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative
precepts. But according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories
[*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before virtues are
sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the
negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative.
Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions.
But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed.
Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts,
are unsuitably placed last in order.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "The things that are of
God, are well ordered" [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God'].
But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by God, as
stated above [2085](A[3]). Therefore they are arranged in becoming
order.
I answer that, As stated above ([2086]AA[3],5, ad 1), the precepts of
the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once.
Now it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by
the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason.
Moreover, it is clear, since the order of reason begins with the end,
that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is
supremely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life and society is
God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue,
first of all, to direct man to God; since the contrary to this is most
grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to the commander as
to its end, it is requisite first that the soldier should be subject to
the commander, and the opposite of this is most grievous; and secondly
it is requisite that he should be in coordination with the other
soldiers.
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is
that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in
common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him
reverence: the third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an
army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a
compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his commander: and this
last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of
service to him.
As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his
neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a more
grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons
to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that
direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given
to that one which regards his parents. Among the other precepts we
again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin. For it is
more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word;
and by word than by thought. And among sins of deed, murder which
destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery,
which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery is more grave
than theft, which regards external goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Although our neighbor is better known than God by
the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for
the love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on ([2087]SS,
Q[25], A[1]; [2088]SS, Q[26], A[2]). Hence the precepts ordaining man
to God demanded precedence of the others.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God is the universal principle of being
in respect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in
respect of his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was
fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds
in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of
deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. For although in
the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues are
sown, according to Ps. 33:15: "Turn away from evil, and do good," and
Is. 1:16,17: "Cease to do perversely; learn to do well"; yet, in the
order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because "the crooked line is
known by the straight" (De Anima i): and "by the law is the knowledge
of sin" (Rom. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmation precept demanded the
first place. However, this is not the reason for the order, but that
which is given above. Because in the precepts regarding God, which
belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last,
since its transgression implies a less grievous sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the order
of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order
of reason.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
unsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to
acts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of
vice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one
another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a
precept of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a
negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts
should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in others.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is
based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the
Divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each
precept, and not only in the first and third.
Objection 3: Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be
rewarded by God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the
precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each
precept, and not only in the second and fourth.
Objection 4: Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear," in so
far as it induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat
of punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old
Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in
each, and not only in the first and second.
Objection 5: Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in
the memory: for it is written (Prov. 3:3): "Write them in the tables of
thy heart." Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory
should be made in the third commandment only. Consequently it seems
that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:21) that "God made all things,
in measure, number and weight." Much more therefore did He observe a
suitable manner in formulating His Law.
I answer that, The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the
Divine law: wherefore it is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of nations." Now it belongs to wisdom to
arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be
evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth.
Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation of one thing always leads to the
denial of its opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always
lead to the affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is
white, it is not black: but it does not follow that if it is not black,
it is white: because negation extends further than affirmation. And
hence too, that one ought not to do harm to another, which pertains to
the negative precepts, extends to more persons, as a primary dictate of
reason, than that one ought to do someone a service or kindness.
Nevertheless it is a primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in
the point of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he has
received kindness, if he has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two
whose favors no man can sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father,
as stated in Ethic. viii, 14. Therefore it is that there are only two
affirmative precepts; one about the honor due to parents, the other
about the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor.
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons for the purely moral precepts are
manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the
precepts include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general
moral precept; thus the first precept includes the determination, "Thou
shalt not make a graven thing"; and in the third precept the
Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state the reason
in each case.
Reply to Objection 3: Generally speaking, men direct their actions to
some point of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it
seemed that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might
be hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. And since
parents are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is
expected from them: wherefore a promise of reward is added to the
precept about honoring one's parents. The same applies to the precept
forbidding idolatry: since thereby it seemed that men were hindered
from receiving the apparent benefit which they think they can get by
entering into a compact with the demons.
Reply to Objection 4: Punishments are necessary against those who are
prone to evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. Wherefore a threat of
punishment is only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade
evils to which men were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason
of the general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury
on account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence it is that a threat is
affixed to the first two precepts.
Reply to Objection 5: The commandment about the Sabbath was made in
memory of a past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is
made therein. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a
determination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural law,
wherefore this precept needed a special admonition.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural
law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like
human nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure of
law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation,
as stated above ([2089]Q[96], A[6];[2090] Q[97], A[4]). Therefore a
dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as
God does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law
made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are
ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our
superiors are God's viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2 Cor.
2:10): "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your
sakes have I done it in the person of Christ." Therefore superiors can
dispense with the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one
forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in
this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of human
law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
Objection 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a
precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this
precept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:4): "And they determined in that
day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the
Sabbath-day, we will fight against him." Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue are dispensable.
On the contrary, are the words of Is. 24:5, where some are reproved for
that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting
covenant"; which, seemingly, apply principally to the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by
dispensation.
I answer that, As stated above ([2091]Q[96], A[6];[2092] Q[97], A[4]),
precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in
which, if the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the
lawgiver is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed
first and chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice
and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If
therefore there by any precepts which contain the very preservation of
the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts
contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable.
For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, such as
this---that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth,
or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man should do anything
unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if
other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and determining
certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit
of dispensation, in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain
cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the
intention of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the
commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that from each ward some men
should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed
from this on account of some greater utility.
Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the
lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct
us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which
is God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of
justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone,
and that each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are
to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently the precepts of the
decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural
law which contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing
principle that "justice should be preserved." But he is speaking in
reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to
apply in certain cases.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), "God
continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself
if He were to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He
is justice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be
lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to
His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one
another.
Reply to Objection 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the
decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue: for
in this sense the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human
law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not
undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this
is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and such a killing is
no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine observes (De Lib.
Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man's property is taken from him, if
it be due that he should lose it, this is not theft or robbery as
forbidden by the decalogue.
Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away
the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to
them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay
his son, he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be
slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it
is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and
ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be the
executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer
any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife
of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of
adultery or of fornication: because he took unto himself one who was
his by command of God, Who is the Author of the institution of
marriage.
Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the
essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to any
determination by application to individual actions---for instance, that
this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not---in this point they
admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such
matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage and the
like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters as are
subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the
place of God: and yet not in all respects.
Reply to Objection 4: This determination was an interpretation rather
than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he
does something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Mat.
12:3, seqq.).
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Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the
precept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice
should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely,
and in like manner as to the other virtues. But it is commanded (Dt.
26:20) that "thou shalt follow justly after that which is just."
Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept.
Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to the intention of the
lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the
lawgiver is directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in Ethic.
ii: and it belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the
mode of virtue falls under the precept.
Objection 3: Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in
working willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept of
the Divine law, for it is written (Ps. 99:2): "Serve ye the Lord with
gladness"; and (2 Cor. 9:7): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God
loveth a cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do
gladly; and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully,
it is done in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of virtue falls
under the precept of the law.
On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has
the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8).
Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished.
Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue, would
deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the
intention of the law, which aims at leading man to virtue, by
habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not
fall under the precept.
I answer that, As stated above ([2093]Q[90], A[3], ad 2), a precept of
law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law
is brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law. Now
the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9,
because that properly falls under the precept of the law, for which the
penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are
differently situated as to the appointment of penalties; since the
penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under
the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with
the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to
judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those things that
appear," according to 1 Kings 16:7: while God alone, the framer of the
Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills,
according to Ps. 7:10: "The searcher of hearts and reins is God."
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some
sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it is
regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way,
it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode
of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic.
ii. The first is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject
to the judgment of both Divine and human law; because what a man does
in ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and
Divine law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be
punishable or pardonable.
The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i.e. "from
choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake"; wherein a
twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention,
about which we have spoken above (QQ[8], 12): and concerning these two,
Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human
law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas
the Divine law does, according to Mat. 5:22: "Whosoever is angry with
his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment."
The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable
principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies
that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode
of virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of human
law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the
law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of
filial piety.
Reply to Objection 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls
under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but
not that they be done from the habit of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His
aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of
the law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear
on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something leading or
disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept
and the matter of the precept are not the same: just as neither in
other things is the end the same as that which conduces to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: That works of virtue should be done without
sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works
with sadness works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e.
joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in
so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbor
(which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: and in
another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as pleasure
ensues from a habit; for "pleasure taken in a work proves the existence
of a habit," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For an act may give pleasure
either on account of its end, or through its proceeding from a becoming
habit.
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Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the
precept of the Divine law. For it is written (Mat. 19:17): "If thou
wilt enter into life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow
that the observance of the commandments suffices for entrance into
life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they
be done from charity: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my
body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."
Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment.
Objection 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in
doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God." Therefore
the mode of charity falls under the precept.
Objection 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the
precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without
having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done
without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore one can
fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of
Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii). Therefore the
mode of charity is included in the commandment.
On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If
therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that
whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has
not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows
that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does,
however good this may be in itself: which is absurd.
I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some
have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept;
and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this
precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity from God.
Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins
mortally whenever he does something good of its kind: because it is an
affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding
not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of
charity. On the other hand, some have said that the mode of charity is
altogether outside the precept.
Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of
charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself: and
thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes
it, viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor." In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not
impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity;
since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses
it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as
being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, i.e. inasmuch as the
acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of
the commandment," as stated in 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above
([2094]Q[12], A[4]) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of
the act ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true
in saying that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept,
that is to say that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean
that a man must honor his father from charity, but merely that he must
honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity,
does not break this precept: although he does break the precept
concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be
punished.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into
life, keep one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among
which is included the commandment concerning the love of God and our
neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction
that God should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all
things would be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the
precept of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore
he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from
charity, not in virtue of the precept, "Honor thy father and mother,"
but in virtue of the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with
thy whole heart." And since these are two affirmative precepts, not
binding for all times, they can be binding, each one at a different
time: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honoring
his father and mother, without at the same time breaking the precept
concerning the omission of the mode of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law,
unless he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without
charity. Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for
man to fulfil the law without grace.
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Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides
the decalogue?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral
precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord
declared (Mat. 22:40), "on these two commandments" of charity
"dependeth the whole law and the prophets." But these two commandments
are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there
is no need for other moral precepts.
Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial
and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But the
determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and
ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts are contained in
the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated
above [2095](A[3]). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral
precepts besides the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the
virtues, as stated above [2096](A[2]). Therefore, as the Law contains,
besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion,
liberality, mercy, and chastity; so there should have been added some
precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude,
sobriety, and so forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore
unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides those
of the decalogue.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:8): "The law of the Lord is
unspotted, converting souls." But man is preserved from the stain of
sin, and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides
those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include
other moral precepts.
I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99],
AA[3],4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from
their institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed
of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the
moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural
reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these there
are three grades: for some are most certain, and so evident as to need
no promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our
neighbor, and others like these, as stated above [2097](A[3]), which
are, as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can
have an erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts are more detailed,
the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet
they need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few
instances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these are the
precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of
which is not so evident to everyone, but only the wise; these are moral
precepts added to the decalogue, and given to the people by God through
Moses and Aaron.
But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we
know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to
the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so
many corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids
the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts
forbidding things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written (Dt.
18:10,11): "Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall
expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . .
. neither let there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that
consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the
truth from the dead." The second commandment forbids perjury. To this
is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the
prohibition of false doctrine (Dt. 13). To the third commandment are
added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment
prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about
honoring the aged, according to Lev. 19:32: "Rise up before the hoary
head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and likewise all the
precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our betters,
or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth
commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred
and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according to
Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor":
likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother (Lev. 19:17):
"Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." To the sixth
commandment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition about
whoredom, according to Dt. 23:17: "There shall be no whore among the
daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel"; and the
prohibition against unnatural sins, according to Lev. 28:22,23: "Thou
shalt not lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any
beast." To the seventh commandment which prohibits theft, is added the
precept forbidding usury, according to Dt. 23:19: "Thou shalt not lend
to thy brother money to usury"; and the prohibition against fraud,
according to Dt. 25:13: "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy
bag"; and universally all prohibitions relating to peculations and
larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is
added the prohibition against false judgment, according to Ex. 23:2:
"Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part,
to stray from the truth"; and the prohibition against lying (Ex. 23:7):
"Thou shalt fly lying," and the prohibition against detraction,
according to Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a
whisperer among the people." To the other two commandments no further
precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all kinds of evil
desires.
Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the
love of God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty
towards them; but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining
thereto less evidently.
Reply to Objection 2: It is in virtue of their institution that the
ceremonial and judicial precepts "are determinations of the precepts of
the decalogue," not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of
the superadded moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of a law are ordained for the common
good, as stated above ([2098]Q[90], A[2]). And since those virtues
which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to the common
good, as also does the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative
act conduces to the common good of the species; hence precepts bearing
directly on these virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in
addition thereto. As to the act of fortitude there are the order to be
given by the commanders in the war, which is undertaken for the common
good: as is clear from Dt. 20:3, where the priest is commanded (to
speak thus): "Be not afraid, do not give back." In like manner the
prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since
it is contrary to the good of the household; hence it is said (Dt.
21:20) in the person of parents: "He slighteth hearing our admonitions,
he giveth himself to revelling, and to debauchery and banquetings."
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Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law
justified man. Because the Apostle says (Rom. 2:13): "For not the
hearers of the Law are justified before God, but the doers of the Law
shall be justified." But the doers of the Law are those who fulfil the
precepts of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the
Law was a cause of justification.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 18:5): "Keep My laws and My
judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." But the spiritual
life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of the
precepts of the Law was a cause of justification.
Objection 3: Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human
law. But human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice
consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of
the Law justified man.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter killeth":
which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), refers even to
the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts did not cause justice.
I answer that, Just as "healthy" is said properly and first of that
which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign
or a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly the
causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it
may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be
taken in the last two ways, it is evident that it was conferred by the
precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed men to the
justifying grace of Christ, which they also signified, because as
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 24), "even the life of that people
foretold and foreshadowed Christ."
But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must
notice that it can be considered as in the habit or as in the act: so
that accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First,
according as man is made just, by becoming possessed of the habit of
justice: secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in
this sense justification is nothing else than the execution of justice.
Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or
the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated ([2099]Q[63],
A[4]). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue
is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter is true justice,
of which we are speaking now, and in this respect of which a man is
said to be just before God, according to Rom. 4:2: "If Abraham were
justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God."
Hence this justice could not be caused by moral precepts, which are
about human actions: wherefore the moral precepts could not justify man
by causing justice.
If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of
justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified man, but in various
ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained
something just in itself, in so far as they aimed at offering worship
to God; whereas taken individually they contained that which is just,
not in itself, but by being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it
is said of these precepts that they did not justify man save through
the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them. On the
other hand the moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also
in particular, contained that which is just in itself: but the moral
precepts contained that which is just in itself according to that
"general justice" which is "every virtue" according to Ethic. v, 1:
whereas the judicial precepts belonged to "special justice," which is
about contracts connected with the human mode of life, between one man
and another.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle takes justification for the execution
of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is
said to live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death,
which the Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle
quotes this passage (Gal. 3:12).
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of human law justify man by acquired
justice: it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about
that justice which is before God.
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OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must
consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, their
duration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;
(2) Whether they are figurative?
(3) Whether there should have been many of them?
(4) Of their various kinds.
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Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their pertaining
to the worship of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts
does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because, in
the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from
food (Lev. 11); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes,
e.g. (Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two
sorts"; and again (Num. 15:38): "To make to themselves fringes in the
corners of their garments." But these are not moral precepts; since
they do not remain in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts;
since they do not pertain to the pronouncing of judgment between man
and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no
way to pertain to the worship of God. Therefore the nature of the
ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to Divine
worship.
Objection 2: Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those
which pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from the
"cerei" [candles] which are lit up on those occasions. But many other
things besides solemnities pertain to the worship of God. Therefore it
does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their
pertaining to the Divine worship.
Objection 3: Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are
patterns, i.e. rules, of salvation: because the Greek {chaire} is the
same as the Latin "salve." But all the precepts of the Law are rules of
salvation, and not only those that pertain to the worship of God.
Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are
called ceremonial.
Objection 4: Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the
ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason. But
there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of
God; such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover
and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is
set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts are not those
which pertain to the worship of God.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 18:19,20): "Be thou to the people
in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the people the
ceremonies and the manner of worshipping."
I answer that, As stated above ([2100]Q[99], A[4]), the ceremonial
precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is
directed to God, just as the judicial precepts are determinations of
the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is
directed to God by the worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are
properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. The
reason for their being so called was given above ([2101]Q[99], A[3]),
when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the
other precepts.
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices
and the like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also
those things whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him:
thus too in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes
under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts
of the Law which regard the clothing and food of God's worshippers, and
other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of the ministers,
with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who
administer to a king make use of certain special observances.
Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial precepts.
Reply to Objection 2: The alleged explanation of the name does not seem
very probable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of
the lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the
Candlestick were furnished with "oil of olives," as stated in Lev.
24:2. Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the Divine
worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals: so that all
ceremonial precepts may be included under the observance of
solemnities.
Reply to Objection 3: Neither does this explanation of the name appear
to be very much to the point, since the word "ceremony" is not Greek
but Latin. We may say, however, that, since man's salvation is from
God, those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation, which
direct man to God: and accordingly those which refer to Divine worship
are called ceremonial precepts.
Reply to Objection 4: This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a
certain amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial
precisely because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind
of consequence. For, since the precepts referring to the Divine worship
must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on [2102](A[2]),
the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident.
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Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not
figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in
such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr.
Christ. iv, 4,10) and this seems very necessary in the framing of a
law: because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which
reason a law should be manifest, as Isidore declares (Etym. v, 21). If
therefore the precepts of the Law were given as figures of something,
it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these precepts
without explaining what they signified.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should
be entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions in
representation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the
drama: because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to
represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things
should not be done for the worship of God. But the ceremonial precepts
are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above [2103](A[1]).
Therefore they should not be figurative.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that "God is
worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity." But the precepts of
faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial
precepts should not be figurative.
Objection 4: Further, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and
they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But a
figure is not the very truth: in fact one is condivided with the other.
Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship,
should not be figurative.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17): "Let no man . . .
judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of
the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to
come."
I answer that, As stated above [2104](A[1]; Q[99], AA[3],4), the
ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now
the Divine worship is twofold: internal, and external. For since man is
composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the
worship of God; the soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward
worship: hence it is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God." And as the body is ordained to God through
the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the internal worship.
Now interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the
intellect and affections. Wherefore according to the various ways in
which the intellect and affections of the man who worships God are
rightly united to God, his external actions are applied in various ways
to the Divine worship.
For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the
Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship will not consist
in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding
from the inward knowledge and affection, according to Is. 51:3: "Joy
and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of
praise."
But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine
Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us
under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states (Coel.
Hier. i); in various ways, however, according to the various states of
human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth
manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that manifestation as
yet opened out, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:8). Hence the external
worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future
truth to be manifested in our heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who
is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. But under the New
Law this way is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer to
be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds as
something past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is
not yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This is what the
Apostle says (Heb. 11:1): "The Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of
the good things to come, not the very image of the things": for a
shadow is less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law,
but the shadow to the Old.
Reply to Objection 1: The things of God are not to be revealed to man
except in proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of
downfall, were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more
beneficial that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured
people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at least
implicitly by using those figures to the honor of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical
expressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail
to grasp Divine things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of the
truth they contain: and therefore in both cases there is need of signs
by means of sensible figures.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking there of internal worship;
to which, however, external worship should be ordained, as stated
above.
The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were
taught by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual worship of God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been many
ceremonial precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should be
proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above
([2105]AA[1],2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the
foreshadowing of Christ. Now "there is but one God, of Whom are all
things . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things" (1 Cor.
8:6). Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.
Objection 2: Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was
an occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter (Acts
15:10): "Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the
disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?"
Now the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's
salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce to man's
salvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it seems that the ceremonial
precepts should not have been given in great number.
Objection 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward
and bodily worship of God, as stated above [2106](A[2]). But the Law
should have lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to
Christ, Who taught them to worship God "in spirit and in truth," as
stated in Jn. 4:23. Therefore there should not have been many
ceremonial precepts.
On the contrary, (Osee 8:12): "I shall write to them [Vulg.: 'him'] My
manifold laws"; and (Job 11:6): "That He might show thee the secrets of
His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold."
I answer that, As stated above ([2107]Q[96], A[1]), every law is given
to a people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to
evil, who have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as stated
above ([2108]Q[95], A[1]); some, inclined to good, either from nature
or from custom, or rather from grace; and the like have to be taught
and improved by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with
regard to both kinds of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds
of men it was expedient that the Old Law should contain many ceremonial
precepts. For in that people there were many prone to idolatry;
wherefore it was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial
precepts from the worship of idols to the worship of God. And since men
served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the other hand to devise
many means of repressing every single one: and again, to lay many
obligations on such like men, in order that being burdened, as it were,
by their duties to the Divine worship, they might have no time for the
service of idols. As to those who were inclined to good, it was again
necessary that there should be many ceremonial precepts; both because
thus their mind turned to God in many ways, and more continually; and
because the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed by these
ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the world, and afforded men
many considerations, which needed to be signified by various
ceremonies.
Reply to Objection 1: When that which conduces to an end is sufficient
to conduce thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one
remedy, if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to
health, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that
which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be
multiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick man, when one is not
enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak and
imperfect, both for representing the mystery of Christ, on account of
its surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men's minds to God.
Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18,19): "There is a setting aside of the
former commandment because of the weakness and unprofitableness
thereof, for the law brought nothing to perfection." Consequently these
ceremonies needed to be in great number.
Reply to Objection 2: A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser
transgressions, that the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in
order to avoid the sin of idolatry, and the pride which would arise in
the hearts of the Jews, were they to fulfil all the precepts of the
Law, the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of
disobedience did not prevent God from giving them many ceremonial
precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways.
Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any
person. Many such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily
worship; as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. iii).
Nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God so
much as to allow men to fall away into the worship of idols.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into sacrifices,
sacred things, sacraments, and observances?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are
unsuitably divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and
observances." For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ.
But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the
sacrifice in which Christ "delivered Himself an oblation and a
sacrifice to God" (Eph. 5:2). Therefore none but the sacrifices were
ceremonies.
Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the
New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in the
Old Law there should be no distinction between "sacrifices" and
"sacraments."
Objection 3: Further, a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God:
in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be
consecrated. But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the
worship of God, as stated above [2109](A[1]). Therefore all ceremonies
were sacred things. Therefore "sacred things" should not be taken as a
part of the ceremonies.
Objection 4: Further, "observances" are so called from having to be
observed. But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for it is
written (Dt. 8:11): "Observe [Douay: 'Take heed'] and beware lest at
any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments and
judgments and ceremonies." Therefore the "observances" should not be
considered as a part of the ceremonies.
Objection 5: Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the
ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come (Col. 2:16,17):
and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from
the words of the Apostle (Heb. 9:9): and yet these do not seem to be
inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division
of ceremonies is unsuitable.
On the contrary, In the Old Law each of the above is called a ceremony.
For the sacrifices are called ceremonies (Num. 15:24): "They shall
offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the
ceremonies require." Of the sacrament of Order it is written (Lev.
7:35): "This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies."
Of sacred things also it is written (Ex. 38:21): "These are the
instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony . . . in the ceremonies
of the Levites." And again of the observances it is written (3 Kings
9:6): "If you . . . shall turn away from following Me, and will not
observe [Douay: 'keep'] My . . . ceremonies which I have set before
you."
I answer that, As stated above ([2110]AA[1],2), the ceremonial precepts
are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider
the worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of worship.
The worship consists specially in "sacrifices," which are offered up in
honor of God. The instruments of worship refer to the "sacred things,"
such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard to the
worshippers two points may be considered. The first point is their
preparation for Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of
consecration either of the people or of the ministers; and to this the
"sacraments" refer. The second point is their particular mode of life,
whereby they are distinguished from those who do not worship God: and
to this pertain the "observances," for instance, in matters of food,
clothing, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered
both in some certain place and by some certain men: and all this
pertained to the worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices
signified Christ the victim, so too their sacraments and sacred things
of the New Law; while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life
of the people under the New Law: all of which things pertain to Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist,
contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He
sanctified "the people by His own blood" (Heb. 13:12). Hence this
Sacrifice is also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did
not contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him; hence they are not called
sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments
apart from the sacrifices of the Old Law, which sacraments were figures
of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to certain consecrations
certain sacrifices were united.
Reply to Objection 3: The sacrifices and sacraments were of course
sacred things. But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated
to the Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments:
wherefore they retained the common designation of sacred things.
Reply to Objection 4: Those things which pertained to the mode of life
of the people who worshipped God, retained the common designation of
observances, in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were
not called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection with
the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by
a sort of consequence they were matters of ceremony, in so far as they
affected the fitness of the people who worshipped God.
Reply to Objection 5: Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed
place, so were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn
festivals seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations
and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle
says (Heb. 5:1): "Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained
for men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and
sacrifices."
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OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which
head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?
(2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or
figurative?
(3) The causes of the sacrifices;
(4) The causes of the sacrifices;
(5) The causes of the sacred things;
(6) The causes of the observances.
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Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial
precepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, "Making void the law of the
commandments," the gloss says, (i.e.) "making void the Old Law as to
the carnal observances, by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical
precepts, which are based on reason." But if the observances of the Old
Law were based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by
the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no reason
for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law.
Objection 2: Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in
the law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason
save that man's obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. viii, 6,13), concerning the prohibition about the tree of life.
Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the
purpose of testing man's obedience, having no reason in themselves.
Objection 3: Further, man's works are called moral according as they
proceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the
ceremonial precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. It
seems therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts:
for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:9): "The commandment of the Lord
is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." But the ceremonial precepts are
commandments of God. Therefore they are lightsome: and yet they would
not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial
precepts have a reasonable cause.
I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), it
is the function of a "wise man to do everything in order," those things
which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the
Apostle states (Rom. 13:1). Now there are two conditions required for
things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained to their due
end, which is the principle of the whole order in matters of action:
since those things that happen by chance outside the intention of the
end, or which are not done seriously but for fun, are said to be
inordinate. Secondly, that which is done in view of the end should be
proportionate to the end. From this it follows that the reason for
whatever conduces to the end is taken from the end: thus the reason for
the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting, which is its end, as
stated in Phys. ii, 9. Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts,
like all the other precepts of the Law, were institutions of Divine
wisdom: hence it is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of nations." Consequently we must needs say
that the ceremonial precepts were ordained to a certain end, wherefrom
their reasonable causes can be gathered.
Reply to Objection 1: It may be said there was no reason for the
observances of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in
the very nature of the thing done: for instance that a garment should
not be made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for them in
relation to something else: namely, in so far as something was
signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the decrees of the
New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are
reasonable from the very nature of the act.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason for the prohibition concerning the
tree of knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally
evil: and yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to
something else, in as much as it signified something. And so also the
ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account of their
relation to something else.
Reply to Objection 3: The moral precepts in their very nature have
reasonable causes: as for instance, "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt
not steal." But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in
their relation to something else, as stated above.
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Whether the ceremonial precepts have a literal cause or merely a figurative
cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a
literal, but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial
precepts, the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal
lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: because each
was given as a sign. For it is written (Gn. 17:11): "You shall
circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the
covenant between Me and you": and of the celebration of the Passover it
is written (Ex. 13:9): "It shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a
memorial before thy eyes." Therefore much more did the other ceremonial
precepts have none but a figurative reason.
Objection 2: Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all
the ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above ([2111]Q[101],
A[2]). Therefore they have no other than a figurative cause.
Objection 3: Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a
certain thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or
not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain
points in the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be a matter of
indifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another: for
instance, the number of animals to be offered, and other such
particular circumstances. Therefore there is no literal cause for the
precepts of the Old Law.
On the contrary, Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed Christ,
so did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written (1 Cor.
10:11) that "all (these things) happened to them in figure." Now in the
stories of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, there
is the literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also
literal, besides their figurative causes.
I answer that, As stated above [2112](A[1]), the reason for whatever
conduces to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the
ceremonial precepts was twofold: for they were ordained to the Divine
worship, for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ;
just as the words of the prophets regarded the time being in such a way
as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as Jerome says on
Osee 1:3. Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the
Old Law can be taken in two ways. First, in respect of the Divine
worship which was to be observed for that particular time: and these
reasons are literal: whether they refer to the shunning of idolatry; or
recall certain Divine benefits; or remind men of the Divine excellence;
or point out the disposition of mind which was then required in those
who worshipped God. Secondly, their reasons can be gathered from the
point of view of their being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus
their reasons are figurative and mystical: whether they be taken from
Christ Himself and the Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense;
or to the morals of the Christian people, which pertains to the moral
sense; or to the state of future glory, in as much as we are brought
thereto by Christ, which refers to the anagogical sense.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in
Scripture belongs to the literal sense, because the words are employed
in order to convey that particular meaning; so also the meaning of
those legal ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine benefits, on
account of which they were instituted, and of others similar which
belonged to that time, does not go beyond the order of literal causes.
Consequently when we assert that the cause of the celebration of the
Passover was its signification of the delivery from Egypt, or that
circumcision was a sign of God's covenant with Abraham, we assign the
literal cause.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would avail if the ceremonial
precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come, and not
for the purpose of worshipping God then and there.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have stated when speaking of human laws
([2113]Q[96], AA[1] ,6), there is a reason for them in the abstract,
but not in regard to particular conditions, which depend on the
judgment of those who frame them; so also many particular
determinations in the ceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause,
but only a figurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a
literal cause.
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Whether a suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies which pertained
to sacrifices?
Objection 1: It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for
the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which were
offered in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining
human life: such as certain animals and certain loaves. But God needs
no such sustenance; according to Ps. 49:13: "Shall I eat the flesh of
bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?" Therefore such
sacrifices were unfittingly offered to God.
Objection 2: Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in
sacrifice to God, viz. oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally the
turtledove and the dove; but specially, in the cleansing of a leper, an
offering was made of sparrows. Now many other animals are more noble
than these. Since therefore whatever is best should be offered to God,
it seems that not only of these three should sacrifices have been
offered to Him.
Objection 3: Further, just as man has received from God the dominion
over birds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes.
Consequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine
sacrifices.
Objection 4: Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded
to be offered up. Since then the young of the dove are commanded to be
offered, so also should the young of the turtledove.
Objection 5: Further, God is the Author of life, not only of men, but
also of animals, as is clear from Gn. 1:20, seqq. Now death is opposed
to life. Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain
animals should be offered to God, especially as the Apostle admonishes
us (Rom. 12:1), to present our bodies "a living sacrifice, holy,
pleasing unto God."
Objection 6: Further, if none but slain animals were offered in
sacrifice to God, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain.
Therefore it was unfitting that the manner of immolation should be
determined, especially as regards birds (Lev. 1:15, seqq.).
Objection 7: Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards
corruption and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to God,
it was unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g.
a lame, or a blind, or otherwise defective animal.
Objection 8: Further, those who offer victims to God should partake
thereof, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:18): "Are not
they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" It was
therefore unbecoming for the offerers to be denied certain parts of the
victims, namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right
shoulder.
Objection 9: Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of
God, so also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female
animals was offered up to God as a holocaust, although holocausts were
offered of both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it was inconsistent
that female animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and
sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds should not be offered up in
peace-offerings.
Objection 10: Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind.
Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so that it
was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the
following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh of other
peace-offerings, as laid down in Lev. 7:15, seqq.
Objection 11: Further, all sins agree in turning us from God.
Therefore, in order to reconcile us to God, one kind of sacrifice
should have been offered up for all sins.
Objection 12: Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice,
were offered up in one way, viz. slain. Therefore it does not seem to
be suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various
ways; for sometimes an offering was made of ears of corn, sometimes of
flour, sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven,
sometimes in a pan, sometimes on a gridiron.
Objection 13: Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should be
recognized as coming from God. It was therefore unbecoming that besides
animals, nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt should be
offered to God.
Objection 14: Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice of
the heart, whereby man offers his soul to God. But in the inward
sacrifice, the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpasses the
pungency which salt represents; for it is written (Ecclus. 24:27): "My
spirit is sweet above honey." Therefore it was unbecoming that the use
of honey, and of leaven which makes bread savory, should be forbidden
in a sacrifice; while the use was prescribed, of salt which is pungent,
and of incense which has a bitter taste. Consequently it seems that
things pertaining to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no
reasonable cause.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 1:13): "The priest shall offer it
all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and most sweet
savor to the Lord." Now according to Wis. 7:28, "God loveth none but
him that dwelleth with wisdom": whence it seems to follow that whatever
is acceptable to God is wisely done. Therefore these ceremonies of the
sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable causes.
I answer that, As stated above [2114](A[2]), the ceremonies of the Old
Law had a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, according as they were
intended for Divine worship; and a figurative or mystical cause,
according as they were intended to foreshadow Christ: and on either
hand the ceremonies pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a
fitting cause.
For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for
the divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can be taken in two
ways. First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of
the mind to God, to which the offerer of the sacrifice was stimulated.
Now in order to direct his mind to God aright, man must recognize that
whatever he has is from God as from its first principle, and direct it
to God as its last end. This was denoted in the offerings and
sacrifices, by the fact that man offered some of his own belongings in
honor of God, as though in recognition of his having received them from
God, according to the saying of David (1 Paral. xxix, 14): "All things
are Thine: and we have given Thee what we received of Thy hand."
Wherefore in offering up sacrifices man made protestation that God is
the first principle of the creation of all things, and their last end,
to which all things must be directed. And since, for the human mind to
be directed to God aright, it must recognize no first author of things
other than God, nor place its end in any other; for this reason it was
forbidden in the Law to offer sacrifice to any other but God, according
to Ex. 22:20: "He that sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save
only to the Lord." Wherefore another reasonable cause may be assigned
to the ceremonies of the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men
were withdrawn from offering sacrifices to idols. Hence too it is that
the precepts about the sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people
until after they had fallen into idolatry, by worshipping the molten
calf: as though those sacrifices were instituted, that the people,
being ready to offer sacrifices, might offer those sacrifices to God
rather than to idols. Thus it is written (Jer. 7:22): "I spake not to
your fathers and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them
out of the land of Egypt, concerning the matter of burnt-offerings and
sacrifices."
Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had
fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son; wherefore it is
written (Jn. 3:16): "God so loved the world, as to give His
only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, but
may have life everlasting." Consequently the chief sacrifice is that
whereby Christ Himself "delivered Himself . . . to God for an odor of
sweetness" (Eph. 5:2). And for this reason all the other sacrifices of
the Old Law were offered up in order to foreshadow this one individual
and paramount sacrifice---the imperfect forecasting the perfect. Hence
the Apostle says (Heb. 10:11) that the priest of the Old Law "often"
offered "the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but"
Christ offered "one sacrifice for sins, for ever." And since the reason
of the figure is taken from that which the figure represents, therefore
the reasons of the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken
from the true sacrifice of Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: God did not wish these sacrifices to be offered
to Him on account of the things themselves that were offered, as though
He stood in need of them: wherefore it is written (Is. 1:11): "I desire
not holocausts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and
lambs and buckgoats." But, as stated above, He wished them to be
offered to Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in order to signify the
right ordering of man's mind to God; and in order to represent the
mystery of the Redemption of man by Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: In all the respects mentioned above (ad 1), there
was a suitable reason for these animals, rather than others, being
offered in sacrifice to God. First, in order to prevent idolatry.
Because idolaters offered all other animals to their gods, or made use
of them in their sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the people
had been dwelling) considered it abominable to slay these animals,
wherefore they used not to offer them in sacrifice to their gods. Hence
it is written (Ex. 8:26): "We shall sacrifice the abominations of the
Egyptians to the Lord our God." For they worshipped the sheep; they
reverenced the ram (because demons appeared under the form thereof);
while they employed oxen for agriculture, which was reckoned by them as
something sacred.
Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man's
mind to God: and in two ways. First, because it is chiefly by means of
these animals that human life is sustained: and moreover they are most
clean, and partake of a most clean food: whereas other animals are
either wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men: or, if they be
tame, they have unclean food, as pigs and geese: and nothing but what
is clean should be offered to God. These birds especially were offered
in sacrifice because there were plenty of them in the land of promise.
Secondly, because the sacrificing of these animals represented purity
of heart. Because as the gloss says on Lev. 1, "We offer a calf, when
we overcome the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when we restrain our
unreasonable motions; a goat, when we conquer wantonness; a turtledove,
when we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when we feast on the unleavened
bread of sincerity." And it is evident that the dove denotes charity
and simplicity of heart.
Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be offered, that they
might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the gloss observes, "Christ is
offered in the calf, to denote the strength of the cross; in the lamb,
to signify His innocence; in the ram, to foreshadow His headship; and
in the goat, to signify the likeness of 'sinful flesh' [*An allusion to
Col. 2:11 (Textus Receptus)]. The turtledove and dove denoted the union
of the two natures"; or else the turtledove signified chastity; while
the dove was a figure of charity. "The wheat-flour foreshadowed the
sprinkling of believers with the water of Baptism."
Reply to Objection 3: Fish through living in water are further removed
from man than other animals, which, like man, live in the air. Again,
fish die as soon as they are taken out of water; hence they could not
be offered in the temple like other animals.
Reply to Objection 4: Among turtledoves the older ones are better than
the young; while with doves the case is the reverse. Wherefore, as
Rabbi Moses observes (Doct. Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves
are commanded to be offered, because nothing should be offered to God
but what is best.
Reply to Objection 5: The animals which were offered in sacrifice were
slain, because it is by being killed that they become useful to man,
forasmuch as God gave them to man for food. Wherefore also they were
burnt with fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made fit
for human consumption. Moreover the slaying of the animals signified
the destruction of sins: and also that man deserved death on account of
his sins; as though those animals were slain in man's stead, in order
to betoken the expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these animals
signified the slaying of Christ.
Reply to Objection 6: The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the
sacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways of killing, whereby
idolaters sacrificed animals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi Moses says
(Doct. Perplex. iii), "the Law chose that manner of slaying which was
least painful to the slain animal." This excluded cruelty on the part
of the offerers, and any mangling of the animals slain.
Reply to Objection 7: It is because unclean animals are wont to be held
in contempt among men, that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice
to God: and for this reason too they were forbidden (Dt. 23:18) to
offer "the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of . .
. God." For the same reason they did not offer animals before the
seventh day, because such were abortive as it were, the flesh being not
yet firm on account of its exceeding softness.
Reply to Objection 8: There were three kinds of sacrifices. There was
one in which the victim was entirely consumed by fire: this was called
"a holocaust, i.e. all burnt." For this kind of sacrifice was offered
to God specially to show reverence to His majesty, and love of His
goodness: and typified the state of perfection as regards the
fulfilment of the counsels. Wherefore the whole was burnt up: so that
as the whole animal by being dissolved into vapor soared aloft, so it
might denote that the whole man, and whatever belongs to him, are
subject to the authority of God, and should be offered to Him.
Another sacrifice was the "sin-offering," which was offered to God on
account of man's need for the forgiveness of sin: and this typifies the
state of penitents in satisfying for sins. It was divided into two
parts: for one part was burnt; while the other was granted to the use
of the priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by God
through the ministry of His priests. When, however, this sacrifice was
offered for the sins of the whole people, or specially for the sin of
the priest, the whole victim was burnt up. For it was not fitting that
the priests should have the use of that which was offered for their own
sins, to signify that nothing sinful should remain in them. Moreover,
this would not be satisfaction for sin: for if the offering were
granted to the use of those for whose sins it was offered, it would
seem to be the same as if it had not been offered.
The third kind of sacrifice was called the "peace-offering," which was
offered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the welfare and
prosperity of the offerers, in acknowledgment of benefits already
received or yet to be received: and this typifies the state of those
who are proficient in the observance of the commandments. These
sacrifices were divided into three parts: for one part was burnt in
honor of God; another part was allotted to the use of the priests; and
the third part to the use of the offerers; in order to signify that
man's salvation is from God, by the direction of God's ministers, and
through the cooperation of those who are saved.
But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not allotted
to the use either of the priests or of the offerers: the blood being
poured out at the foot of the altar, in honor of God, while the fat was
burnt upon the altar (Lev. 9:9,10). The reason for this was, first, in
order to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the blood
and eat the fat of the victims, according to Dt. 32:38: "Of whose
victims they eat the fat, and drank the wine of their drink-offerings."
Secondly, in order to form them to a right way of living. For they were
forbidden the use of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of
human blood; wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:4,5): "Flesh with blood you
shall not eat: for I will require the blood of your lives": and they
were forbidden to eat the fat, in order to withdraw them from
lasciviousness; hence it is written (Ezech. 34:3): "You have killed
that which was fat." Thirdly, on account of the reverence due to God:
because blood is most necessary for life, for which reason "life" is
said to be "in the blood" (Lev. 17:11, 14): while fat is a sign of
abundant nourishment. Wherefore, in order to show that to God we owe
both life and a sufficiency of all good things, the blood was poured
out, and the fat burnt up in His honor. Fourthly, in order to
foreshadow the shedding of Christ's blood, and the abundance of His
charity, whereby He offered Himself to God for us.
In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right shoulder were
allotted to the use of the priest, in order to prevent a certain kind
of divination which is known as "spatulamantia," so called because it
was customary in divining to use the shoulder-blade [spatula], and the
breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these things
were taken away from the offerers. This is also denoted the priest's
need of wisdom in the heart, to instruct the people---this was
signified by the breast-bone, which covers the heart; and his need of
fortitude, in order to bear with human frailty---and this was signified
by the right shoulder.
Reply to Objection 9: Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind
of sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust:
because the female is an imperfect animal. The offering of turtledoves
and doves was on account of the poverty of the offerers, who were
unable to offer bigger animals. And since peace-victims were offered
freely, and no one was bound to offer them against his will, hence
these birds were offered not among the peace-victims, but among the
holocausts and victims for sin, which man was obliged to offer at
times. Moreover these birds, on account of their lofty flight, while
befitting the perfection of the holocausts: and were suitable for
sin-offerings because their song is doleful.
Reply to Objection 10: The holocaust was the chief of all the
sacrifices: because all were burnt in honor of God, and nothing of it
was eaten. The second place in holiness, belongs to the sacrifice for
sins, which was eaten in the court only, and on the very day of the
sacrifice (Lev. 7:6, 15). The third place must be given to the
peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day, but
anywhere in Jerusalem. Fourth in order were the "ex-voto"
peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten even on the morrow.
The reason for this order is that man is bound to God, chiefly on
account of His majesty; secondly, on account of the sins he has
committed; thirdly, because of the benefits he has already received
from Him; fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to receive from
Him.
Reply to Objection 11: Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of
the sinner, as stated above ([2115]Q[73], A[10]): wherefore different
victims are commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a
prince, or of some other private individual. "But," as Rabbi Moses says
(Doct. Perplex. iii), "we must take note that the more grievous the
sin, the lower the species of animals offered for it. Wherefore the
goat, which is a very base animal, was offered for idolatry; while a
calf was offered for a priest's ignorance, and a ram for the negligence
of a prince."
Reply to Objection 12: In the matter of sacrifices the Law had in view
the poverty of the offerers; so that those who could not have a
four-footed animal at their disposal, might at least offer a bird; and
that he who could not have a bird might at least offer bread; and that
if a man had not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn.
The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ Who is the
"living bread" (Jn. 6:41, 51). He was indeed an ear of corn, as it
were, during the state of the law of nature, in the faith of the
patriarchs; He was like flour in the doctrine of the Law of the
prophets; and He was like perfect bread after He had taken human
nature; baked in the fire, i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven of
the virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He suffered
in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross as on a gridiron.
Reply to Objection 13: The products of the soil are useful to man,
either as food, and of these bread was offered; or as drink, and of
these wine was offered; or as seasoning, and of these oil and salt were
offered; or as healing, and of these they offered incense, which both
smells sweetly and binds easily together.
Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and the wine, His
blood, whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens the grace of Christ;
salt, His knowledge; incense, His prayer.
Reply to Objection 14: Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to God,
both because it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols; and
in order to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure
from those who intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not offered, to
denote the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont to be
offered in the sacrifices to idols.
Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the corruption of
putrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God should be incorrupt.
Moreover, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom, or again,
mortification of the flesh.
Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which is necessary
in the offerer; and again, to signify the odor of a good name: for
incense is composed of matter, both rich and fragrant. And since the
sacrifice "of jealousy" did not proceed from devotion, but rather from
suspicion, therefore incense was not offered therein (Num. 5:15).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to
holy things?
Objection 1: It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned
for the ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For Paul
said (Acts 17:24): "God Who made the world and all things therein; He
being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by hands."
It was therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a tabernacle or temple
should be set up for the worship of God.
Objection 2: Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed except
by Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the state of the Old Law.
Therefore it should not have been changed by the building of a temple.
Objection 3: Further, the Divine Law, more than any other indeed,
should lead man to the worship of God. But an increase of divine
worship requires multiplication of altars and temples; as is evident in
regard to the New Law. Therefore it seems that also under the Old Law
there should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many.
Objection 4: Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the
worship of God. But in God we should worship above all His unity and
simplicity. Therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple
to be divided by means of veils.
Objection 5: Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e. God, appears
first of all in the east, for it is in that quarter that the first
movement begins. But the tabernacle was set up for the worship of God.
Therefore it should have been built so as to point to the east rather
than the west.
Objection 6: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:4) that they should
"not make . . . a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything." It was
therefore unfitting for graven images of the cherubim to be set up in
the tabernacle or temple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory,
the candlestick, the table, the two altars, seem to have been placed
there without reasonable cause.
Objection 7: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:24): "You shall make
an altar of earth unto Me": and again (Ex. 20:26): "Thou shalt not go
up by steps unto My altar." It was therefore unfitting that
subsequently they should be commanded to make an altar of wood laid
over with gold or brass; and of such a height that it was impossible to
go up to it except by steps. For it is written (Ex. 27:1,2): "Thou
shalt make also an altar of setim wood, which shall be five cubits
long, and as many broad . . . and three cubits high . . . and thou
shalt cover it with brass": and (Ex. 30:1, 3): "Thou shalt make . . .
an altar to burn incense, of setim wood . . . and thou shalt overlay it
with the purest gold."
Objection 8: Further, in God's works nothing should be superfluous; for
not even in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be found.
But one cover suffices for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was
unbecoming to furnish the tabernacle with many coverings, viz.
curtains, curtains of goats' hair, rams' skins dyed red, and
violet-colored skins (Ex. 26).
Objection 9: Further, exterior consecration signifies interior
holiness, the subject of which is the soul. It was therefore unsuitable
for the tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated, since they were
inanimate things.
Objection 10: Further, it is written (Ps. 33:2): "I will bless the Lord
at all times, His praise shall always be in my mouth." But the solemn
festivals were instituted for the praise of God. Therefore it was not
fitting that certain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals;
so that it seems that there was no suitable cause for the ceremonies
relating to holy things.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 8:4) that those who "offer
gifts according to the law . . . serve unto the example and shadow of
heavenly things. As it was answered to Moses, when he was to finish the
tabernacle: See, says He, that thou make all things according to the
pattern which was shown thee on the mount." But that is most
reasonable, which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore the
ceremonies relating to holy things had a reasonable cause.
I answer that, The chief purpose of the whole external worship is that
man may give worship to God. Now man's tendency is to reverence less
those things which are common, and indistinct from other things;
whereas he admires and reveres those things which are distinct from
others in some point of excellence. Hence too it is customary among men
for kings and princes, who ought to be reverenced by their subjects, to
be clothed in more precious garments, and to possess vaster and more
beautiful abodes. And for this reason it behooved special times, a
special abode, special vessels, and special ministers to be appointed
for the divine worship, so that thereby the soul of man might be
brought to greater reverence for God.
In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed above [2116](A[2];
Q[100] , A[12]; Q[101], A[2]), was instituted that it might foreshadow
the mystery of Christ. Now that which foreshadows something should be
determinate, so that it may present some likeness thereto.
Consequently, certain special points had to be observed in matters
pertaining to the worship of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine worship regards two things: namely,
God Who is worshipped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who
is worshipped, is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no
need, on His part, for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men,
who worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for their sake there was
need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for the worship of
God, for two reasons. First, that through coming together with the
thought that the place was set aside for the worship of God, they might
approach thither with greater reverence. Secondly, that certain things
relating to the excellence of Christ's Divine or human nature might be
signified by the arrangement of various details in such temple or
tabernacle.
To this Solomon refers (3 Kings 8:27) when he says: "If heaven and the
heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house which
I have built" for Thee? And further on (3 Kings 8:29, 20) he adds:
"That Thy eyes may be open upon this house . . . of which Thou hast
said: My name shall be there; . . . that Thou mayest hearken to the
supplication of Thy servant and of Thy people Israel." From this it is
evident that the house of the sanctuary was set up, not in order to
contain God, as abiding therein locally, but that God might be made
known there by means of things done and said there; and that those who
prayed there might, through reverence for the place, pray more
devoutly, so as to be heard more readily.
Reply to Objection 2: Before the coming of Christ, the state of the Old
Law was not changed as regards the fulfilment of the Law, which was
effected in Christ alone: but it was changed as regards the condition
of the people that were under the Law. Because, at first, the people
were in the desert, having no fixed abode: afterwards they were engaged
in various wars with the neighboring nations; and lastly, at the time
of David and Solomon, the state of that people was one of great peace.
And then for the first time the temple was built in the place which
Abraham, instructed by God, had chosen for the purpose of sacrifice.
For it is written (Gn. 22:2) that the Lord commanded Abraham to "offer"
his son "for a holocaust upon one of the mountains which I will show
thee": and it is related further on (Gn. 22:14) that "he calleth the
name of that place, The Lord seeth," as though, according to the Divine
prevision, that place were chosen for the worship of God. Hence it is
written (Dt. 12:5,6): "You shall come to the place which the Lord your
God shall choose . . . and you shall offer . . . your holocausts and
victims."
Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by the building of
the temple before the aforesaid time; for three reasons assigned by
Rabbi Moses. First, lest the Gentiles might seize hold of that place.
Secondly, lest the Gentiles might destroy it. The third reason is lest
each tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and strifes and
quarrels be the result. Hence the temple was not built until they had a
king who would be able to quell such quarrels. Until that time a
portable tabernacle was employed for divine worship, no place being as
yet fixed for the worship of God. This is the literal reason for the
distinction between the tabernacle and the temple.
The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that they signify a
twofold state. For the tabernacle, which was changeable, signifies the
state of the present changeable life: whereas the temple, which was
fixed and stable, signifies the state of future life which is
altogether unchangeable. For this reason it is said that in the
building of the temple no sound was heard of hammer or saw, to signify
that all movements of disturbance will be far removed from the future
state. Or else the tabernacle signifies the state of the Old Law; while
the temple built by Solomon betokens the state of the New Law. Hence
the Jews alone worked at the building of the tabernacle; whereas the
temple was built with the cooperation of the Gentiles, viz. the Tyrians
and Sidonians.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason for the unity of the temple or
tabernacle may be either literal or figurative. The literal reason was
the exclusion of idolatry. For the Gentiles put up various times to
various gods: and so, to strengthen in the minds of men their belief in
the unity of the Godhead, God wished sacrifices to be offered to Him in
one place only. Another reason was in order to show that bodily worship
is not acceptable of itself: and so they restrained from offering
sacrifices anywhere and everywhere. But the worship of the New Law, in
the sacrifice whereof spiritual grace is contained, is of itself
acceptable to God; and consequently the multiplication of altars and
temples is permitted in the New Law.
As to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of God,
consisting in the teaching of the Law and the Prophets, there were,
even under the Old Law, various places, called synagogues, appointed
for the people to gather together for the praise of God; just as now
there are places called churches in which the Christian people gather
together for the divine worship. Thus our church takes the place of
both temple and synagogue: since the very sacrifice of the Church is
spiritual; wherefore with us the place of sacrifice is not distinct
from the place of teaching. The figurative reason may be that hereby is
signified the unity of the Church, whether militant or triumphant.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as the unity of the temple or tabernacle
betokened the unity of God, or the unity of the Church, so also the
division of the tabernacle or temple signified the distinction of those
things that are subject to God, and from which we arise to the worship
of God. Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was called
the "Holy of Holies," and was placed to the west; the other was called
the "Holy Place" [*Or 'Sanctuary'. The Douay version uses both
expressions], which was situated to the east. Moreover there was a
court facing the tabernacle. Accordingly there are two reasons for this
distinction. One is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained to the
worship of God. Because the different parts of the world are thus
betokened by the division of the tabernacle. For that part which was
called the Holy of Holies signified the higher world, which is that of
spiritual substances: while that part which is called the Holy Place
signified the corporeal world. Hence the Holy Place was separated from
the Holy of Holies by a veil, which was of four different colors
(denoting the four elements), viz. of linen, signifying earth, because
linen, i.e. flax, grows out of the earth; purple, signifying water,
because the purple tint was made from certain shells found in the sea;
violet, signifying air, because it has the color of the air; and
scarlet twice dyed, signifying fire: and this because matter composed
of the four elements is a veil between us and incorporeal substances.
Hence the high-priest alone, and that once a year, entered into the
inner tabernacle, i.e. the Holy of Holies: whereby we are taught that
man's final perfection consists in his entering into that (higher)
world: whereas into the outward tabernacle, i.e. the Holy Place, the
priests entered every day: whereas the people were only admitted to the
court; because the people were able to perceived material things, the
inner nature of which only wise men by dint of study are able to
discover.
But regard to the figurative reason, the outward tabernacle, which was
called the Holy Place, betokened the state of the Old Law, as the
Apostle says (Heb. 9:6, seqq.): because into that tabernacle "the
priests always entered accomplishing the offices of sacrifices." But
the inner tabernacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, signified
either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the New Law to
come. To the latter state Christ brought us; and this was signified by
the high-priest entering alone, once a year, into the Holy of Holies.
The veil betokened the concealing of the spiritual sacrifices under the
sacrifices of old. This veil was adorned with four colors: viz. that of
linen, to designate purity of the flesh; purple, to denote the
sufferings which the saints underwent for God; scarlet twice dyed,
signifying the twofold love of God and our neighbor; and violet, in
token of heavenly contemplation. With regard to the state of the Old
Law the people and the priests were situated differently from one
another. For the people saw the mere corporeal sacrifices which were
offered in the court: whereas the priests were intent on the inner
meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith in the mysteries of
Christ was more explicit. Hence they entered into the outer tabernacle.
This outer tabernacle was divided from the court by a veil; because
some matters relating to the mystery of Christ were hidden from the
people, while they were known to the priests: though they were not
fully revealed to them, as they were subsequently in the New Testament
(cf. Eph. 3:5).
Reply to Objection 5: Worship towards the west was introduced in the
Law to the exclusion of idolatry: because all the Gentiles, in
reverence to the sun, worshipped towards the east; hence it is written
(Ezech. 8:16) that certain men "had their backs towards the temple of
the Lord, and their faces to the east, and they adored towards the
rising of the sun." Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the
tabernacle had the Holy of Holies to westward, that they might adore
toward the west. A figurative reason may also be found in the fact that
the whole state of the first tabernacle was ordained to foreshadow the
death of Christ, which is signified by the west, according to Ps. 67:5:
"Who ascendeth unto the west; the Lord is His name."
Reply to Objection 6: Both literal and figurative reasons may be
assigned for the things contained in the tabernacle. The literal reason
is in connection with the divine worship. And because, as already
observed (ad 4), the inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies,
signified the higher world of spiritual substances, hence that
tabernacle contained three things, viz. "the ark of the testament in
which was a golden pot that had manna, and the rod of Aaron that had
blossomed, and the tables" (Heb. 9:4) on which were written the ten
commandments of the Law. Now the ark stood between two "cherubim" that
looked one towards the other: and over the ark was a table, called the
"propitiatory," raised above the wings of the cherubim, as though it
were held up by them; and appearing, to the imagination, to be the very
seat of God. For this reason it was called the "propitiatory," as
though the people received propitiation thence at the prayers of the
high-priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by the cherubim, in
obedience, as it were, to God: while the ark of the testament was like
the foot-stool to Him that sat on the propitiatory. These three things
denote three things in that higher world: namely, God Who is above all,
and incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no likeness of Him was set
up; to denote His invisibility. But there was something to represent
his seat; since, to wit, the creature, which is beneath God, as the
seat under the sitter, is comprehensible. Again in that higher world
there are spiritual substances called angels. These are signified by
the two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show that they are
at peace with one another, according to Job 25:2: "Who maketh peace in
. . . high places." For this reason, too, there was more than one
cherub, to betoken the multitude of heavenly spirits, and to prevent
their receiving worship from those who had been commanded to worship
but one God. Moreover there are, enclosed as it were in that spiritual
world, the intelligible types of whatsoever takes place in this world,
just as in every cause are enclosed the types of its effects, and in
the craftsman the types of the works of his craft. This was betokened
by the ark, which represented, by means of the three things it
contained, the three things of greatest import in human affairs. These
are wisdom, signified by the tables of the testament; the power of
governing, betokened by the rod of Aaron; and life, betokened by the
manna which was the means of sustenance. Or else these three things
signified the three Divine attributes, viz. wisdom, in the tables;
power, in the rod; goodness, in the manna---both by reason of its
sweetness, and because it was through the goodness of God that it was
granted to man, wherefore it was preserved as a memorial of the Divine
mercy. Again, these three things were represented in Isaias' vision.
For he "saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated"; and the
seraphim standing by; and that the house was filled with the glory of
the Lord; wherefrom the seraphim cried out: "All the earth is full of
His glory" (Is. 6:1, 3). And so the images of the seraphim were set up,
not to be worshipped, for this was forbidden by the first commandment;
but as a sign of their function, as stated above.
The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present world, also contained
three things, viz. the "altar of incense," which was directly opposite
the ark; the "table of proposition," with the twelve loaves of
proposition on it, which stood on the northern side; and the
"candlestick," which was placed towards the south. These three things
seem to correspond to the three which were enclosed in the ark; and
they represented the same things as the latter, but more clearly:
because, in order that wise men, denoted by the priests entering the
temple, might grasp the meaning of these types, it was necessary to
express them more manifestly than they are in the Divine or angelic
mind. Accordingly the candlestick betokened, as a sensible sign
thereof, the wisdom which was expressed on the tables (of the Law) in
intelligible words. The altar of incense signified the office of the
priest, whose duty it was to bring the people to God: and this was
signified also by the rod: because on that altar the sweet-smelling
incense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people acceptable to
God: for it is written (Apoc. 8:3) that the smoke of the sweet-smelling
spices signifies the "justifications of the saints" (cf. Apoc. 19:8).
Moreover it was fitting that the dignity of the priesthood should be
denoted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the outer tabernacle, by the
altar of incense: because the priest is the mediator between God and
the people, governing the people by Divine power, denoted by the rod;
and offering to God the fruit of His government, i.e. the holiness of
the people, on the altar of incense, so to speak. The table signified
the sustenance of life, just as the manna did: but the former, a more
general and a coarser kind of nourishment; the latter, a sweeter and
more delicate. Again, the candlestick was fittingly placed on the
southern side, while the table was placed to the north: because the
south is the right-hand side of the world, while the north is the
left-hand side, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii; and wisdom, like
other spiritual goods, belongs to the right hand, while temporal
nourishment belongs on the left, according to Prov. 3:16: "In her left
hand (are) riches and glory." And the priestly power is midway between
temporal goods and spiritual wisdom; because thereby both spiritual
wisdom and temporal goods are dispensed.
Another literal signification may be assigned. For the ark contained
the tables of the Law, in order to prevent forgetfulness of the Law,
wherefore it is written (Ex. 24:12): "I will give thee two tables of
stone, and the Law, and the commandments which I have written: that
thou mayest teach them" to the children of Israel. The rod of Aaron was
placed there to restrain the people from insubordination to the
priesthood of Aaron; wherefore it is written (Num. 17:10): "Carry back
the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be
kept there for a token of the rebellious children of Israel." The manna
was kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred by God on
the children of Israel in the desert; wherefore it is written (Ex.
16:32): "Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept unto generations to
come hereafter, that they may know the bread wherewith I fed you in the
wilderness." The candlestick was set up to enhance the beauty of the
temple, for the magnificence of a house depends on its being well
lighted. Now the candlestick had seven branches, as Josephus observes
(Antiquit. iii, 7,8), to signify the seven planets, wherewith the whole
world is illuminated. Hence the candlestick was placed towards the
south; because for us the course of the planets is from that quarter.
The altar of incense was instituted that there might always be in the
tabernacle a sweet-smelling smoke; both through respect for the
tabernacle, and as a remedy for the stenches arising from the shedding
of blood and the slaying of animals. For men despise evil-smelling
things as being vile, whereas sweet-smelling things are much
appreciated. The table was place there to signify that the priests who
served the temple should take their food in the temple: wherefore, as
stated in Mat. 12:4, it was lawful for none but the priests to eat the
twelve loaves which were put on the table in memory of the twelve
tribes. And the table was not placed in the middle directly in front of
the propitiatory, in order to exclude an idolatrous rite: for the
Gentiles, on the feasts of the moon, set up a table in front of the
idol of the moon, wherefore it is written (Jer. 7:18): "The women knead
the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven."
In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holocausts, on
which sacrifices of those things which the people possessed were
offered to God: and consequently the people who offered these
sacrifices to God by the hands of the priest could be present in the
court. But the priests alone, whose function it was to offer the people
to God, could approach the inner altar, whereon the very devotion and
holiness of the people was offered to God. And this altar was put up
outside the tabernacle and in the court, to the exclusion of idolatrous
worship: for the Gentiles placed altars inside the temples to offer up
sacrifices thereon to idols.
The figurative reason for all these things may be taken from the
relation of the tabernacle to Christ, who was foreshadowed therein. Now
it must be observed that to show the imperfection of the figures of the
Law, various figures were instituted in the temple to betoken Christ.
For He was foreshadowed by the "propitiatory," since He is "a
propitiation for our sins" (1 Jn. 2:2). This propitiatory was fittingly
carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written (Heb. 1:6): "Let all
the angels of God adore Him." He is also signified by the ark: because
just as the ark was made of setim-wood, so was Christ's body composed
of most pure members. More over it was gilded: for Christ was full of
wisdom and charity, which are betokened by gold. And in the ark was a
golden pot, i.e. His holy soul, having manna, i.e. "all the fulness of
the Godhead" (Col. 2:9). Also there was a rod in the ark, i.e. His
priestly power: for "He was made a . . . priest for ever" (Heb. 6:20).
And therein were the tables of the Testament, to denote that Christ
Himself is a lawgiver. Again, Christ was signified by the candlestick,
for He said Himself (Jn. 8:12): "I am the Light of the world"; while
the seven lamps denoted the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also
betokened in the table, because He is our spiritual food, according
toJn. 6:41, 51: "I am the living bread": and the twelve loaves
signified the twelve apostles, or their teaching. Or again, the
candlestick and table may signify the Church's teaching, and faith,
which also enlightens and refreshes. Again, Christ is signified by the
two altars of holocausts and incense. Because all works of virtue must
be offered to us to God through Him; both those whereby we afflict the
body, which are offered, as it were, on the altar of holocausts; and
those which, with greater perfection of mind, are offered to God in
Christ, by the spiritual desires of the perfect, on the altar of
incense, as it were, according to Heb. 13:15: "By Him therefore let us
offer the sacrifice of praise always to God."
Reply to Objection 7: The Lord commanded an altar to be made for the
offering of sacrifices and gifts, in honor of God, and for the upkeep
of the ministers who served the tabernacle. Now concerning the
construction of the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was at
the beginning of the Law (Ex. 20:24, seqq.) when the Lord commanded
them to make "an altar of earth," or at least "not of hewn stones"; and
again, not to make the altar high, so as to make it necessary to "go
up" to it "by steps." This was in detestation of idolatrous worship:
for the Gentiles made their altars ornate and high, thinking that there
was something holy and divine in such things. For this reason, too, the
Lord commanded (Dt. 16:21): "Thou shalt plant no grove, nor any tree
near the altar of the Lord thy God": since idolaters were wont to offer
sacrifices beneath trees, on account of the pleasantness and shade
afforded by them. There was also a figurative reason for these
precepts. Because we must confess that in Christ, Who is our altar,
there is the true nature of flesh, as regards His humanity---and this
is to make an altar of earth; and again, in regard to His Godhead, we
must confess His equality with the Father---and this is "not to go up"
to the altar by steps. Moreover we should not couple the doctrine of
Christ to that of the Gentiles, which provokes men to lewdness.
But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the honor of God,
there was no longer reason to fear these occasions of idolatry.
Wherefore the Lord commanded the altar of holocausts to be made of
brass, and to be conspicuous to all the people; and the altar of
incense, which was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so
precious as to give the people an occasion for idolatry.
Since, however, the reason for the precept, "Thou shalt not go up by
steps unto My altar" (Ex. 20:26) is stated to have been "lest thy
nakedness be discovered," it should be observed that this too was
instituted with the purpose of preventing idolatry, for in the feasts
of Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their nakedness before the people.
But later on the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for the
sake of decency: so that without any danger the altar could be placed
so high that the priests when offering sacrifices would go up by steps
of wood, not fixed but movable.
Reply to Objection 8: The body of the tabernacle consisted of boards
placed on end, and covered on the inside with curtains of four
different colors, viz. twisted linen, violet, purple, and scarlet twice
dyed. These curtains, however, covered the sides only of the
tabernacle; and the roof of the tabernacle was covered with
violet-colored skins; and over this there was another covering of rams'
skins dyed red; and over this there was a third curtain made of goats'
hair, which covered not only the roof of the tabernacle, but also
reached to the ground and covered the boards of the tabernacle on the
outside. The literal reason of these coverings taken altogether was the
adornment and protection of the tabernacle, that it might be an object
of respect. Taken singly, according to some, the curtains denoted the
starry heaven, which is adorned with various stars; the curtain (of
goats' skin) signified the waters which are above the firmament; the
skins dyed red denoted the empyrean heaven, where the angels are; the
violet skins, the heaven of the Blessed Trinity.
The figurative meaning of these things is that the boards of which the
tabernacle was constructed signify the faithful of Christ, who compose
the Church. The boards were covered on the inner side by curtains of
four colors: because the faithful are inwardly adorned with the four
virtues: for "the twisted linen," as the gloss observes, "signifies the
flesh refulgent with purity; violet signifies the mind desirous of
heavenly things; purple denotes the flesh subject to passions; the
twice dyed scarlet betokens the mind in the midst of the passions
enlightened by the love of God and our neighbor." The coverings of the
building designate prelates and doctors, who ought to be conspicuous
for their heavenly manner of life, signified by the violet colored
skins: and who should also be ready to suffer martyrdom, denoted by the
skins dyed red; and austere of life and patient in adversity, betokened
by the curtains of goats' hair, which were exposed to wind and rain, as
the gloss observes.
Reply to Objection 9: The literal reason for the sanctification of the
tabernacle and vessels was that they might be treated with greater
reverence, being deputed, as it were, to the divine worship by this
consecration. The figurative reason is that this sanctification
signified the sanctification of the living tabernacle, i.e. the
faithful of whom the Church of Christ is composed.
Reply to Objection 10: Under the Old Law there were seven temporal
solemnities, and one continual solemnity, as may be gathered from Num.
28, 29. There was a continual feast, since the lamb was sacrificed
every day, morning and evening: and this continual feast of an abiding
sacrifice signified the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of the temporal
feasts the first was that which was repeated every week. This was the
solemnity of the "Sabbath," celebrated in memory of the work of the
creation of the universe. Another solemnity, viz. the "New Moon," was
repeated every month, and was observed in memory of the work of the
Divine government. For the things of this lower world owe their variety
chiefly to the movement of the moon; wherefore this feast was kept at
the new moon: and not at the full moon, to avoid the worship of
idolaters who used to offer sacrifices to the moon at that particular
time. And these two blessings are bestowed in common on the whole human
race; and hence they were repeated more frequently.
The other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and they
commemorated the benefits which had been conferred especially on that
people. For there was the feast of the "Passover" in the first month to
commemorate the blessing of being delivered out of Egypt. The feast of
"Pentecost" was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the blessing of
the giving of the Law. The other three feasts were kept in the seventh
month, nearly the whole of which was solemnized by them, just as the
seventh day. For on the first of the seventh month was the feast of
"Trumpets," in memory of the delivery of Isaac, when Abraham found the
ram caught by its horns, which they represented by the horns which they
blew. The feast of Trumpets was a kind of invitation whereby they
prepared themselves to keep the following feast which was kept on the
tenth day. This was the feast of "Expiation," in memory of the blessing
whereby, at the prayer of Moses, God forgave the people's sin of
worshipping the calf. After this was the feast of "Scenopegia" or of
"Tents," which was kept for seven days, to commemorate the blessing of
being protected and led by God through the desert, where they lived in
tents. Hence during this feast they had to take "the fruits of the
fairest tree," i.e. the citron, "and the trees of dense foliage"
[*Douay and A. V. and R. V. read: 'Boughs of thick trees'], i.e. the
myrtle, which is fragrant, "and the branches of palm-trees, and willows
of the brook," which retain their greenness a long time; and these are
to be found in the Land of promise; to signify that God had brought
them through the arid land of the wilderness to a land of delights. On
the eighth day another feast was observed, of "Assembly and
Congregation," on which the people collected the expenses necessary for
the divine worship: and it signified the uniting of the people and the
peace granted to them in the Land of promise.
The figurative reason for these feasts was that the continual sacrifice
of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity of Christ, Who is the "Lamb of
God," according to Heb. 13:8: "Jesus Christ yesterday and today, and
the same for ever." The Sabbath signified the spiritual rest bestowed
by Christ, as stated in Heb. 4. The Neomenia, which is the beginning of
the new moon, signified the enlightening of the primitive Church by
Christ's preaching and miracles. The feast of Pentecost signified the
Descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles. The feast of Trumpets
signified the preaching of the apostles. The feast of Expiation
signified the cleansing of the Christian people from sins: and the
feast of Tabernacles signified their pilgrimage in this world, wherein
they walk by advancing in virtue. The feast of Assembly or Congregation
foreshadowed the assembly of the faithful in the kingdom of heaven:
wherefore this feast is described as "most holy" (Lev. 23:36). These
three feasts followed immediately on one another, because those who
expiate their vices should advance in virtue, until they come to see
God, as stated in Ps. 83:8.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there can be any suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no suitable cause for the
sacraments of the Old Law. Because those things that are done for the
purpose of divine worship should not be like the observances of
idolaters: since it is written (Dt. 12:31): "Thou shalt not do in like
manner to the Lord thy God: for they have done to their gods all the
abominations which the Lord abhorreth." Now worshippers of idols used
to knive themselves to the shedding of blood: for it is related (3
Kings 18:28) that they "cut themselves after their manner with knives
and lancets, till they were all covered with blood." For this reason
the Lord commanded (Dt. 14:1): "You shall not cut yourselves nor make
any baldness for the dead." Therefore it was unfitting for circumcision
to be prescribed by the Law (Lev. 12:3).
Objection 2: Further, those things which are done for the worship of
God should be marked with decorum and gravity; according to Ps. 34:18:
"I will praise Thee in a grave [Douay: 'strong'] people." But it seems
to savor of levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore it was
unfittingly commanded (Ex. 12:11) that they should eat the Paschal lamb
"in haste." Other things too relative to the eating of the lamb were
prescribed, which seem altogether unreasonable.
Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the
sacraments of the New Law. Now the Paschal lamb signified the sacrament
of the Eucharist, according to 1 Cor. 5:7: "Christ our Pasch is
sacrificed." Therefore there should also have been some sacraments of
the Old Law to foreshadow the other sacraments of the New Law, such as
Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, and so forth.
Objection 4: Further, purification can scarcely be done except by
removing something impure. But as far as God is concerned, no bodily
thing is reputed impure, because all bodies are God's creatures; and
"every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is
received with thanksgiving" (1 Tim. 4:4). It was therefore unfitting
for them to be purified after contact with a corpse, or any similar
corporeal infection.
Objection 5: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 34:4): "What can be made
clean by the unclean?" But the ashes of the red heifer [*Cf. Heb. 9:13]
which was burnt, were unclean, since they made a man unclean: for it is
stated (Num. 19:7, seqq.) that the priest who immolated her was
rendered unclean "until the evening"; likewise he that burnt her; and
he that gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed
there that the unclean should be purified by being sprinkled with those
cinders.
Objection 6: Further, sins are not something corporeal that can be
carried from one place to another: nor can man be cleansed from sin by
means of something unclean. It was therefore unfitting for the purpose
of expiating the sins of the people that the priest should confess the
sins of the children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it might
carry them away into the wilderness: while they were rendered unclean
by the other, which they used for the purpose of purification, by
burning it together with the calf outside the camp; so that they had to
wash their clothes and their bodies with water (Lev. 16).
Objection 7: Further, what is already cleansed should not be cleansed
again. It was therefore unfitting to apply a second purification to a
man cleansed from leprosy, or to a house; as laid down in Lev. 14.
Objection 8: Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed by
material water or by shaving the hair. Therefore it seems unreasonable
that the Lord ordered (Ex. 30:18, seqq.) the making of a brazen laver
with its foot, that the priests might wash their hands and feet before
entering the temple; and that He commanded (Num. 8:7) the Levites to be
sprinkled with the water of purification, and to shave all the hairs of
their flesh.
Objection 9: Further, that which is greater cannot be cleansed by that
which is less. Therefore it was unfitting that, in the Law, the higher
and lower priests, as stated in Lev. 8 [*Cf. Ex. 29], and the Levites,
according to Num. 8, should be consecrated with any bodily anointing,
bodily sacrifices, and bodily oblations.
Objection 10: Further, as stated in 1 Kings 16:7, "Man seeth those
things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." But those things
that appear outwardly in man are the dispositions of his body and his
clothes. Therefore it was unfitting for certain special garments to be
appointed to the higher and lower priests, as related in Ex. 28 [*Cf.
Lev. 8:7, seqq.]. It seems, moreover, unreasonable that anyone should
be debarred from the priesthood on account of defects in the body, as
stated in Lev. 21:17, seqq.: "Whosoever of thy seed throughout their
families, hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God . . . if
he be blind, if he be lame," etc. It seems, therefore, that the
sacraments of the Old Law were unreasonable.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 20:8): "I am the Lord that
sanctify you." But nothing unreasonable is done by God, for it is
written (Ps. 103:24): "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Therefore
there was nothing without a reasonable cause in the sacraments of the
Old Law, which were ordained to the sanctification of man.
I answer that, As stated above ([2117]Q[101], A[4]), the sacraments
are, properly speaking, things applied to the worshippers of God for
their consecration so as, in some way, to depute them to the worship of
God. Now the worship of God belonged in a general way to the whole
people; but in a special way, it belonged to the priests and Levites,
who were the ministers of divine worship. Consequently, in these
sacraments of the Old Law, certain things concerned the whole people in
general; while others belonged to the ministers.
In regard to both, three things were necessary. The first was to be
established in the state of worshipping God: and this institution was
brought about---for all in general, by circumcision, without which no
one was admitted to any of the legal observances---and for the priests,
by their consecration. The second thing required was the use of those
things that pertain to divine worship. And thus, as to the people,
there was the partaking of the paschal banquet, to which no
uncircumcised man was admitted, as is clear from Ex. 12:43, seqq.: and,
as to the priests, the offering of the victims, and the eating of the
loaves of proposition and of other things that were allotted to the use
of the priests. The third thing required was the removal of all
impediments to divine worship, viz. of uncleannesses. And then, as to
the people, certain purifications were instituted for the removal of
certain external uncleannesses; and also expiations from sins; while,
as to the priests and Levites, the washing of hands and feet and the
shaving of the hair were instituted.
And all these things had reasonable causes, both literal, in so far as
they were ordained to the worship of God for the time being, and
figurative, in so far as they were ordained to foreshadow Christ: as we
shall see by taking them one by one.
Reply to Objection 1: The chief literal reason for circumcision was in
order that man might profess his belief in one God. And because Abraham
was the first to sever himself from the infidels, by going out from his
house and kindred, for this reason he was the first to receive
circumcision. This reason is set forth by the Apostle (Rom. 4:9, seqq.)
thus: "He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of
the faith which he had, being uncircumcised"; because, to wit, we are
told that "unto Abraham faith was reputed to justice," for the reason
that "against hope he believed in hope," i.e. against the hope that is
of nature he believed in the hope that is of grace, "that he might be
made the father of many nations," when he was an old man, and his wife
an old and barren woman. And in order that this declaration, and
imitation of Abraham's faith, might be fixed firmly in the hearts of
the Jews, they received in their flesh such a sign as they could not
forget, wherefore it is written (Gn. 17:13): "My covenant shall be in
your flesh for a perpetual covenant." This was done on the eighth day,
because until then a child is very tender, and so might be seriously
injured; and is considered as something not yet consolidated: wherefore
neither are animals offered before the eighth day. And it was not
delayed after that time, lest some might refuse the sign of
circumcision on account of the pain: and also lest the parents, whose
love for their children increases as they become used to their presence
and as they grow older, should withdraw their children from
circumcision. A second reason may have been the weakening of
concupiscence in that member. A third motive may have been to revile
the worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to that part of the
body. The Lord's prohibition extended only to the cutting of oneself in
honor of idols: and such was not the circumcision of which we have been
speaking.
The figurative reason for circumcision was that it foreshadowed the
removal of corruption, which was to be brought about by Christ, and
will be perfectly fulfilled in the eighth age, which is the age of
those who rise from the dead. And since all corruption of guilt and
punishment comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of our
first parent, therefore circumcision was applied to the generative
member. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:11): "You are circumcised" in
Christ "with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of
the flesh, but in the circumcision of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ."
Reply to Objection 2: The literal reason of the paschal banquet was to
commemorate the blessing of being led by God out of Egypt. Hence by
celebrating this banquet they declared that they belonged to that
people which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they were
delivered from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb's blood
on the transoms of their house doors, as though declaring that they
were averse to the rites of the Egyptians who worshipped the ram.
Wherefore they were delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of the blood
of the lamb on the door-posts, from the danger of extermination which
threatened the Egyptians.
Now two things are to be observed in their departure from Egypt:
namely, their haste in going, for the Egyptians pressed them to go
forth speedily, as related in Ex. 12:33; and there was danger that
anyone who did not hasten to go with the crowd might be slain by the
Egyptians. Their haste was shown in two ways. First by what they ate.
For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a sign "that it
could not be leavened, the Egyptians pressing them to depart"; and to
eat roast meat, for this took less time to prepare; and that they
should not break a bone thereof, because in their haste there was no
time to break bones. Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is
written: "You shall gird your reins, and you shall have shoes on your
feet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall eat in haste": which
clearly designates men at the point of starting on a journey. To this
also is to be referred the command: "In one house shall it be eaten,
neither shall you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the house":
because, to wit, on account of their haste, they could not send any
gifts of it.
The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted by the wild
lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, because the sacrifice of
the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ according to 1 Cor.
5:7: "Christ our pasch is sacrificed." The blood of the lamb, which
ensured deliverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled on the
transoms, signified faith in Christ's Passion, in the hearts and on the
lips of the faithful, by which same Passion we are delivered from sin
and death, according to 1 Pet. 1:18: "You were . . . redeemed . . .
with the precious blood . . . of a lamb unspotted." The partaking of
its flesh signified the eating of Christ's body in the Sacrament; and
the flesh was roasted at the fire to signify Christ's Passion or
charity. And it was eaten with unleavened bread to signify the
blameless life of the faithful who partake of Christ's body, according
to 1 Cor. 5:8: "Let us feast . . . with the unleavened bread of
sincerity and truth." The wild lettuces were added to denote repentance
for sins, which is required of those who receive the body of Christ.
Their loins were girt in sign of chastity: and the shoes of their feet
are the examples of our dead ancestors. The staves they were to hold in
their hands denoted pastoral authority: and it was commanded that the
paschal lamb should be eaten in one house, i.e. in a catholic church,
and not in the conventicles of heretics.
Reply to Objection 3: Some of the sacraments of the New Law had
corresponding figurative sacraments in the Old Law. For Baptism, which
is the sacrament of Faith, corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is
written (Col. 2:11,12): "You are circumcised . . . in the circumcision
of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ: buried with Him in Baptism." In the New Law
the sacrament of the Eucharist corresponds to the banquet of the
paschal lamb. The sacrament of Penance in the New Law corresponds to
all the purifications of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders
corresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the priests. To
the sacrament of Confirmation, which is the sacrament of the fulness of
grace, there would be no corresponding sacrament of the Old Law,
because the time of fulness had not yet come, since "the Law brought no
man [Vulg.: 'nothing'] to perfection" (Heb. 7:19). The same applies to
the sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is an immediate preparation for
entrance into glory, to which the way was not yet opened out in the Old
Law, since the price had not yet been paid. Matrimony did indeed exist
under the Old Law, as a function of nature, but not as the sacrament of
the union of Christ with the Church, for that union was not as yet
brought about. Hence under the Old Law it was allowable to give a bill
of divorce, which is contrary to the nature of the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 4: As already stated, the purifications of the Old
Law were ordained for the removal of impediments to the divine worship:
which worship is twofold; viz. spiritual, consisting in devotion of the
mind to God; and corporal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations, and so
forth. Now men are hindered in the spiritual worship by sins, whereby
men were said to be polluted, for instance, by idolatry, murder,
adultery, or incest. From such pollutions men were purified by certain
sacrifices, offered either for the whole community in general, or also
for the sins of individuals; not that those carnal sacrifices had of
themselves the power of expiating sin; but that they signified that
expiation of sins which was to be effected by Christ, and of which
those of old became partakers by protesting their faith in the
Redeemer, while taking part in the figurative sacrifices.
The impediments to external worship consisted in certain bodily
uncleannesses; which were considered in the first place as existing in
man, and consequently in other animals also, and in man's clothes,
dwelling-place, and vessels. In man himself uncleanness was considered
as arising partly from himself and partly from contact with unclean
things. Anything proceeding from man was reputed unclean that was
already subject to corruption, or exposed thereto: and consequently
since death is a kind of corruption, the human corpse was considered
unclean. In like manner, since leprosy arises from corruption of the
humors, which break out externally and infect other persons, therefore
were lepers also considered unclean; and, again, women suffering from a
flow of blood, whether from weakness, or from nature (either at the
monthly course or at the time of conception); and, for the same reason,
men were reputed unclean if they suffered from a flow of seed, whether
due to weakness, to nocturnal pollution, or to sexual intercourse.
Because every humor issuing from man in the aforesaid ways involves
some unclean infection. Again, man contracted uncleanness by touching
any unclean thing whatever.
Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for these
uncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from the reverence due to
those things that belong to the divine worship: both because men are
not wont, when unclean, to touch precious things: and in order that by
rarely approaching sacred things they might have greater respect for
them. For since man could seldom avoid all the aforesaid uncleannesses,
the result was that men could seldom approach to touch things belonging
to the worship of God, so that when they did approach, they did so with
greater reverence and humility. Moreover, in some of these the literal
reason was that men should not be kept away from worshipping God
through fear of coming in contact with lepers and others similarly
afflicted with loathsome and contagious diseases. In others, again, the
reason was to avoid idolatrous worship: because in their sacrificial
rites the Gentiles sometimes employed human blood and seed. All these
bodily uncleannesses were purified either by the mere sprinkling of
water, or, in the case of those which were more grievous, by some
sacrifice of expiation for the sin which was the occasion of the
uncleanness in question.
The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that they were
figures of various sins. For the uncleanness of any corpse signifies
the uncleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The uncleanness
of leprosy betokened the uncleanness of heretical doctrine: both
because heretical doctrine is contagious just as leprosy is, and
because no doctrine is so false as not to have some truth mingled with
error, just as on the surface of a leprous body one may distinguish the
healthy parts from those that are infected. The uncleanness of a woman
suffering from a flow of blood denotes the uncleanness of idolatry, on
account of the blood which is offered up. The uncleanness of the man
who has suffered seminal loss signifies the uncleanness of empty words,
for "the seed is the word of God." The uncleanness of sexual
intercourse and of the woman in child-birth signifies the uncleanness
of original sin. The uncleanness of the woman in her periods signifies
the uncleanness of a mind that is sensualized by pleasure. Speaking
generally, the uncleanness contracted by touching an unclean thing
denotes the uncleanness arising from consent in another's sin,
according to 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go out from among them, and be ye separate .
. . and touch not the unclean thing."
Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was contracted even
by inanimate objects; for whatever was touched in any way by an unclean
man, became itself unclean. Wherein the Law attenuated the superstition
of the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness was contracted not only by
touch, but also by speech or looks, as Rabbi Moses states (Doct.
Perplex. iii) of a woman in her periods. The mystical sense of this was
that "to God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike" (Wis.
14:9).
There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things considered in
themselves, such as the uncleanness of leprosy in a house or in
clothes. For just as leprosy occurs in men through a corrupt humor
causing putrefaction and corruption in the flesh; so, too, through some
corruption and excess of humidity or dryness, there arises sometimes a
kind of corruption in the stones with which a house is built, or in
clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption by the name of leprosy,
whereby a house or a garment was deemed to be unclean: both because all
corruption savored of uncleanness, as stated above, and because the
Gentiles worshipped their household gods as a preservative against this
corruption. Hence the Law prescribed such houses, where this kind of
corruption was of a lasting nature, to be destroyed; and such garments
to be burnt, in order to avoid all occasion of idolatry. There was also
an uncleanness of vessels, of which it is written (Num. 19:15): "The
vessel that hath no cover, and binding over it, shall be unclean." The
cause of this uncleanness was that anything unclean might easily drop
into such vessels, so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this command
aimed at the prevention of idolatry. For idolaters believed that if
mice, lizards, or the like, which they used to sacrifice to the idols,
fell into the vessels or into the water, these became more pleasing to
the gods. Even now some women let down uncovered vessels in honor of
the nocturnal deities which they call "Janae."
The figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the leprosy of a
house signified the uncleanness of the assembly of heretics; the
leprosy of a linen garment signified an evil life arising from
bitterness of mind; the leprosy of a woolen garment denoted the
wickedness of flatterers; leprosy in the warp signified the vices of
the soul; leprosy on the woof denoted sins of the flesh, for as the
warp is in the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has
neither cover nor binding, betokens a man who lacks the veil of
taciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity of discipline.
Reply to Objection 5: As stated above (ad 4), there was a twofold
uncleanness in the Law; one by way of corruption in the mind or in the
body; and this was the graver uncleanness; the other was by mere
contact with an unclean thing, and this was less grave, and was more
easily expiated. Because the former uncleanness was expiated by
sacrifices for sins, since all corruption is due to sin, and signifies
sin: whereas the latter uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling
of a certain water, of which water we read in Num. 19. For there God
commanded them to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had
committed in worshipping a calf. And a cow is mentioned rather than a
calf, because it was thus that the Lord was wont to designate the
synagogue, according to Osee 4:16: "Israel hath gone astray like a
wanton heifer": and this was, perhaps, because they worshipped heifers
after the custom of Egypt, according to Osee 10:5: "(They) have
worshipped the kine of Bethaven." And in detestation of the sin of
idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp; in fact, whenever
sacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude of sins, it was
all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in order to show that this
sacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins, "the priest" dipped
"his finger in her blood," and sprinkled "it over against the door of
the tabernacle seven times"; for the number seven signified
universality. Further, the very sprinkling of blood pertained to the
detestation of idolatry, in which the blood that was offered up was not
poured out, but was collected together, and men gathered round it to
eat in honor of the idols. Likewise it was burnt by fire, either
because God appeared to Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from the
midst of fire; or to denote that idolatry, together with all that was
connected therewith, was to be extirpated altogether; just as the cow
was burnt "with her skin and her flesh, her blood and dung being
delivered to the flames." To this burning were added "cedar-wood, and
hyssop, and scarlet twice dyed," to signify that just as cedar-wood is
not liable to putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not easily lose
its color, and hyssop retains its odor after it has been dried; so also
was this sacrifice for the preservation of the whole people, and for
their good behavior and devotion. Hence it is said of the ashes of the
cow: "That they may be reserved for the multitude of the children of
Israel." Or, according to Josephus (Antiq. iii, 8,9,10), the four
elements are indicated here: for "cedar-wood" was added to the fire, to
signify the earth, on account of its earthiness; "hyssop," to signify
the air, on account of its smell; "scarlet twice dyed," to signify
water, for the same reason as purple, on account of the dyes which are
taken out of the water: thus denoting the fact that this sacrifice was
offered to the Creator of the four elements. And since this sacrifice
was offered for the sin of idolatry, both "he that burned her," and "he
that gathered up the ashes," and "he that sprinkled the water" in which
the ashes were placed, were deemed unclean in detestation of that sin,
in order to show that whatever was in any way connected with idolatry
should be cast aside as being unclean. From this uncleanness they were
purified by the mere washing of their clothes; nor did they need to be
sprinkled with the water on account of this kind of uncleanness,
because otherwise the process would have been unending, since he that
sprinkled the water became unclean, so that if he were to sprinkle
himself he would remain unclean; and if another were to sprinkle him,
that one would have become unclean, and in like manner, whoever might
sprinkle him, and so on indefinitely.
The figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red cow signified
Christ in respect his assumed weakness, denoted by the female sex;
while the color of the cow designated the blood of His Passion. And the
"red cow was of full age," because all Christ's works are perfect, "in
which there" was "no blemish"; "and which" had "not carried the yoke,"
because Christ was innocent, nor did He carry the yoke of sin. It was
commanded to be taken to Moses, because they blamed Him for
transgressing the law of Moses by breaking the Sabbath. And it was
commanded to be delivered "to Eleazar the priest," because Christ was
delivered into the hands of the priests to be slain. It was immolated
"without the camp," because Christ "suffered outside the gate" (Heb.
13:12). And the priest dipped "his finger in her blood," because the
mystery of Christ's Passion should be considered and imitated.
It was sprinkled "over against . . . the tabernacle," which denotes the
synagogue, to signify either the condemnation of the unbelieving Jews,
or the purification of believers; and this "seven times," in token
either of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, or of the seven days
wherein all time is comprised. Again, all things that pertain to the
Incarnation of Christ should be burnt with fire, i.e. they should be
understood spiritually; for the "skin" and "flesh" signified Christ's
outward works; the "blood" denoted the subtle inward force which
quickened His external deeds; the "dung" betokened His weariness, His
thirst, and all such like things pertaining to His weakness. Three
things were added, viz. "cedar-wood," which denotes the height of hope
or contemplation; "hyssop," in token of humility or faith; "scarlet
twice dyed," which denotes twofold charity; for it is by these three
that we should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes of this burning
were gathered by "a man that is clean," because the relics of the
Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles, who were not guilty
of Christ's death. The ashes were put into water for the purpose of
expiation, because Baptism receives from Christ's Passion the power of
washing away sins. The priest who immolated and burned the cow, and he
who burned, and he who gathered together the ashes, were unclean, as
also he that sprinkled the water: either because the Jews became
unclean through putting Christ to death, whereby our sins are expiated;
and this, until the evening, i.e. until the end of the world, when the
remnants of Israel will be converted; or else because they who handle
sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others contract certain
uncleannesses, as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 5); and this until the
evening, i.e. until the end of this life.
Reply to Objection 6: As stated above (ad 5), an uncleanness which was
caused by corruption either of mind or of body was expiated by
sin-offerings. Now special sacrifices were wont to be offered for the
sins of individuals: but since some were neglectful about expiating
such sins and uncleannesses; or, through ignorance, failed to offer
this expiation; it was laid down that once a year, on the tenth day of
the seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for the
whole people. And because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 7:28), "the Law
maketh men priests, who have infirmity," it behooved the priest first
of all to offer a calf for his own sins, in memory of Aaron's sin in
fashioning the molten calf; and besides, to offer a ram for a
holocaust, which signified that the priestly sovereignty denoted by the
ram, who is the head of the flock, was to be ordained to the glory of
God. Then he offered two he-goats for the people: one of which was
offered in expiation of the sins of the multitude. For the he-goat is
an evil-smelling animal; and from its skin clothes are made having a
pungent odor; to signify the stench, uncleanness and the sting of sin.
After this he-goat had been immolated, its blood was taken, together
with the blood of the calf, into the Holy of Holies, and the entire
sanctuary was sprinkled with it; to signify that the tabernacle was
cleansed from the uncleanness of the children of Israel. But the
corpses of the he-goat and calf which had been offered up for sin had
to be burnt, to denote the destruction of sins. They were not, however,
burnt on the altar: since none but holocausts were burnt thereon; but
it was prescribed that they should be burnt without the camp, in
detestation of sin: for this was done whenever sacrifice was offered
for a grievous sin, or for the multitude of sins. The other goat was
let loose into the wilderness: not indeed to offer it to the demons,
whom the Gentiles worshipped in desert places, because it was unlawful
to offer aught to them; but in order to point out the effect of the
sacrifice which had been offered up. Hence the priest put his hand on
its head, while confessing the sins of the children of Israel: as
though that goat were to carry them away into the wilderness, where it
would be devoured by wild beasts, because it bore the punishment of the
people's sins. And it was said to bear the sins of the people, either
because the forgiveness of the people's sins was signified by its being
let loose, or because on its head written lists of sins were fastened.
The figurative reason of these things was that Christ was foreshadowed
both by the calf, on account of His power; and by the ram, because He
is the Head of the faithful; and by the he-goat, on account of "the
likeness of sinful flesh" (Rom. 8:3). Moreover, Christ was sacrificed
for the sins of both priests and people: since both those of high and
those of low degree are cleansed from sin by His Passion. The blood of
the calf and of the goat was brought into the Holies by the priest,
because the entrance to the kingdom of heaven was opened to us by the
blood of Christ's Passion. Their bodies were burnt without the camp,
because "Christ suffered without the gate," as the Apostle declares
(Heb. 13:12). The scape-goat may denote either Christ's Godhead Which
went away into solitude when the Man Christ suffered, not by going to
another place, but by restraining His power: or it may signify the base
concupiscence which we ought to cast away from ourselves, while we
offer up to Our Lord acts of virtue.
With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who burnt these
sacrifices, the reason is the same as that which we assigned (ad 5) to
the sacrifice of the red heifer.
Reply to Objection 7: The legal rite did not cleanse the leper of his
deformity, but declared him to be cleansed. This is shown by the words
of Lev. 14:3, seqq., where it was said that the priest, "when he shall
find that the leprosy is cleansed," shall command "him that is to be
purified": consequently, the leper was already healed: but he was said
to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest restored him to
the society of men and to the worship of God. It happened sometimes,
however, that bodily leprosy was miraculously cured by the legal rite,
when the priest erred in his judgment.
Now this purification of a leper was twofold: for, in the first place,
he was declared to be clean; and, secondly, he was restored, as clean,
to the society of men and to the worship of God, to wit, after seven
days. At the first purification the leper who sought to be cleansed
offered for himself "two living sparrows . . . cedar-wood, and scarlet,
and hyssop," in such wise that a sparrow and the hyssop should be tied
to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so that the cedar-wood was
like the handle of an aspersory: while the hyssop and sparrow were that
part of the aspersory which was dipped into the blood of the other
sparrow which was "immolated . . . over living waters." These things he
offered as an antidote to the four defects of leprosy: for cedar-wood,
which is not subject to putrefaction, was offered against the
putrefaction; hyssop, which is a sweet-smelling herb, was offered up
against the stench; a living sparrow was offered up against numbness;
and scarlet, which has a vivid color, was offered up against the
repulsive color of leprosy. The living sparrow was let loose to fly
away into the plain, because the leper was restored to his former
liberty.
On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship, and was restored
to the society of men; but only after having shaved all the hair of his
body, and washed his clothes, because leprosy rots the hair, infects
the clothes, and gives them an evil smell. Afterwards a sacrifice was
offered for his sin, since leprosy was frequently a result of sin: and
some of the blood of the sacrifice was put on the tip of the ear of the
man that was to be cleansed, "and on the thumb of his right hand, and
the great toe of his right foot"; because it is in these parts that
leprosy is first diagnosed and felt. In this rite, moreover, three
liquids were employed: viz. blood, against the corruption of the blood;
oil, to denote the healing of the disease; and living waters, to wash
away the filth.
The figurative reason was that the Divine and human natures in Christ
were denoted by the two sparrows, one of which, in likeness of His
human nature, was offered up in an earthen vessel over living waters,
because the waters of Baptism are sanctified by Christ's Passion. The
other sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, remained living,
because the Godhead cannot die: hence it flew away, for the Godhead
could not be encompassed by the Passion. Now this living sparrow,
together with the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop, i.e.
faith, hope and charity, as stated above (ad 5), was put into the water
for the purpose of sprinkling, because we are baptized in the faith of
the God-Man. By the waters of Baptism or of his tears man washes his
clothes, i.e. his works, and all his hair, i.e. his thoughts. The tip
of the right ear of the man to be cleansed is moistened with some the
blood and oil, in order to strengthen his hearing against harmful
words; and the thumb and toe of his right hand and foot are moistened
that his deeds may be holy. Other matters pertaining to this
purification, or to that also of any other uncleannesses, call for no
special remark, beyond what applies to other sacrifices, whether for
sins or for trespasses.
Reply OBJ 8 and 9: Just as the people were initiated by circumcision to
the divine worship, so were the ministers by some special purification
or consecration: wherefore they are commanded to be separated from
other men, as being specially deputed, rather than others, to the
ministry of the divine worship. And all that was done touching them in
their consecration or institution, was with a view to show that they
were in possession of a prerogative of purity, power and dignity. Hence
three things were done in the institution of ministers: for first, they
were purified; secondly, they were adorned [*'Ornabantur.' Some
editions have 'ordinabantur'---'were ordained': the former reading is a
reference to Lev. 8:7-9] and consecrated; thirdly, they were employed
in the ministry. All in general used to be purified by washing in
water, and by certain sacrifices; but the Levites in particular shaved
all the hair of their bodies, as stated in Lev. 8 (cf. Num. 8).
With regard to the high-priests and priests the consecration was
performed as follows. First, when they had been washed, they were
clothed with certain special garments in designation of their dignity.
In particular, the high-priest was anointed on the head with the oil of
unction: to denote that the power of consecration was poured forth by
him on to others, just as oil flows from the head on to the lower parts
of the body; according to Ps. 132:2: "Like the precious ointment on the
head that ran down upon the beard, the beard of Aaron." But the Levites
received no other consecration besides being offered to the Lord by the
children of Israel through the hands of the high-priest, who prayed for
them. The lesser priests were consecrated on the hands only, which were
to be employed in the sacrifices. The tip of their right ear and the
thumb of their right hand, and the great toe of their right foot were
tinged with the blood of the sacrificial animal, to denote that they
should be obedient to God's law in offering the sacrifices (this is
denoted by touching their right ear); and that they should be careful
and ready in performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the
moistening of the right foot and hand). They themselves and their
garments were sprinkled with the blood of the animal that had been
sacrificed, in memory of the blood of the lamb by which they had been
delivered in Egypt. At their consecration the following sacrifices were
offered: a calf, for sin, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the
molten calf; a ram, for a holocaust, in memory of the sacrifice of
Abraham, whose obedience it behooved the high-priest to imitate; again,
a ram of consecration, which was a peace-offering, in memory of the
delivery form Egypt through the blood of the lamb; and a basket of
bread, in memory of the manna vouchsafed to the people.
In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the fat of the
ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder were placed on their
hands, to show that they received the power of offering these things to
the Lord: while the Levites were initiated to the ministry by being
brought into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined to the
ministry touching the vessels of the sanctuary.
The figurative reason of these things was that those who are to be
consecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ, should be first of all
purified by the waters of Baptism, and by the waters of tears, in their
faith in Christ's Passion, which is a sacrifice both of expiation and
of purification. They have also to shave all the hair of their body,
i.e. all evil thoughts. They should, moreover, be decked with virtues,
and be consecrated with the oil of the Holy Ghost, and with the
sprinkling of Christ's blood. And thus they should be intent on the
fulfilment of their spiritual ministry.
Reply to Objection 10: As already stated [2118](A[4]), the purpose of
the Law was to induce men to have reverence for the divine worship: and
this in two ways; first, by excluding from the worship of God whatever
might be an object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the
divine worship all that seemed to savor of reverence. And, indeed, if
this was observed in regard to the tabernacle and its vessels, and in
the animals to be sacrificed, much more was it to be observed in the
very ministers. Wherefore, in order to obviate contempt for the
ministers, it was prescribed that they should have no bodily stain or
defect: since men so deformed are wont to be despised by others. For
the same reason it was also commanded that the choice of those who were
to be destined to the service of God was not to be made in a broadcast
manner from any family, but according to their descent from one
particular stock, thus giving them distinction and nobility.
In order that they might be revered, special ornate vestments were
appointed for their use, and a special form of consecration. This
indeed is the general reason of ornate garments. But the high-priest in
particular had eight vestments. First, he had a linen tunic. Secondly,
he had a purple tunic; round the bottom of which were placed "little
bells" and "pomegranates of violet, and purple, and scarlet twice
dyed." Thirdly, he had the ephod, which covered his shoulders and his
breast down to the girdle; and it was made of gold, and violet and
purple, and scarlet twice dyed and twisted linen: and on his shoulders
he bore two onyx stones, on which were graven the names of the children
of Israel. Fourthly, he had the rational, made of the same material; it
was square in shape, and was worn on the breast, and was fastened to
the ephod. On this rational there were twelve precious stones set in
four rows, on which also were graven the names of the children of
Israel, in token that the priest bore the burden of the whole people,
since he bore their names on his shoulders; and that it was his duty
ever to think of their welfare, since he wore them on his breast,
bearing them in his heart, so to speak. And the Lord commanded the
"Doctrine and Truth" to be put in the rational: for certain matters
regarding moral and dogmatic truth were written on it. The Jews indeed
pretend that on the rational was placed a stone which changed color
according to the various things which were about to happen to the
children of Israel: and this they call the "Truth and Doctrine."
Fifthly, he wore a belt or girdle made of the four colors mentioned
above. Sixthly, there was the tiara or mitre which was made of linen.
Seventhly, there was the golden plate which hung over his forehead; on
it was inscribed the Lord's name. Eighthly, there were "the linen
breeches to cover the flesh of their nakedness," when they went up to
the sanctuary or altar. Of these eight vestments the lesser priests had
four, viz. the linen tunic and breeches, the belt and the tiara.
According to some, the literal reason for these vestments was that they
denoted the disposition of the terrestrial globe; as though the
high-priest confessed himself to be the minister of the Creator of the
world, wherefore it is written (Wis. 18:24): "In the robe" of Aaron
"was the whole world" described. For the linen breeches signified the
earth out of which the flax grows. The surrounding belt signified the
ocean which surrounds the earth. The violet tunic denoted the air by
its color: its little bells betoken the thunder; the pomegranates, the
lightning. The ephod, by its many colors, signified the starry heaven;
the two onyx stones denoted the two hemispheres, or the sun and moon.
The twelve precious stones on the breast are the twelve signs of the
zodiac: and they are said to have been placed on the rational because
in heaven, are the types [rationes] of earthly things, according to Job
38:33: "Dost thou know the order of heaven, and canst thou set down the
reason [rationem] thereof on the earth?" The turban or tiara signified
the empyrean: the golden plate was a token of God, the governor of the
universe.
The figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains or defects
wherefrom the priests had to be immune, signify the various vices and
sins from which they should be free. Thus it is forbidden that he
should be blind, i.e. he ought not to be ignorant: he must not be lame,
i.e. vacillating and uncertain of purpose: that he must have "a little,
or a great, or a crooked nose," i.e. that he should not, from lack of
discretion, exceed in one direction or in another, or even exercise
some base occupation: for the nose signifies discretion, because it
discerns odors. It is forbidden that he should have "a broken foot" or
"hand," i.e. he should not lose the power of doing good works or of
advancing in virtue. He is rejected, too, if he have a swelling either
in front or behind [Vulg.: 'if he be crook-backed']: by which is
signified too much love of earthly things: if he be blear-eyed, i.e. if
his mind is darkened by carnal affections: for running of the eyes is
caused by a flow of matter. He is also rejected if he had "a pearl in
his eye," i.e. if he presumes in his own estimation that he is clothed
in the white robe of righteousness. Again, he is rejected "if he have a
continued scab," i.e. lustfulness of the flesh: also, if he have "a dry
scurf," which covers the body without giving pain, and is a blemish on
the comeliness of the members; which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is
rejected "if he have a rupture" or hernia; through baseness rending his
heart, though it appear not in his deeds.
The vestments denote the virtues of God's ministers. Now there are four
things that are necessary to all His ministers, viz. chastity denoted
by the breeches; a pure life, signified by the linen tunic; the
moderation of discretion, betokened by the girdle; and rectitude of
purpose, denoted by the mitre covering the head. But the high-priests
needed four other things in addition to these. First, a continual
recollection of God in their thoughts; and this was signified by the
golden plate worn over the forehead, with the name of God engraved
thereon. Secondly, they had to bear with the shortcomings of the
people: this was denoted by the ephod which they bore on their
shoulders. Thirdly, they had to carry the people in their mind and
heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which they wore the
rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a godly life by performing works
of perfection; and this was signified by the violet tunic. Hence little
golden bells were fixed to the bottom of the violet tunic, which bells
signified the teaching of divine things united in the high-priest to
his godly mode of life. In addition to these were the pomegranates,
signifying unity of faith and concord in good morals: because his
doctrine should hold together in such a way that it should not rend
asunder the unity of faith and peace.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there was any reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no reasonable cause for the
ceremonial observances. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:4),
"every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is
received with thanksgiving." It was therefore unfitting that they
should be forbidden to eat certain foods, as being unclean according to
Lev. 11 [*Cf. Dt. 14].
Objection 2: Further, just as animals are given to man for food, so
also are herbs: wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:3): "As the green herbs
have I delivered all" flesh "to you." But the Law did not distinguish
any herbs from the rest as being unclean, although some are most
harmful, for instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems
that neither should any animals have been prohibited as being unclean.
Objection 3: Further, if the matter from which a thing is generated be
unclean, it seems that likewise the thing generated therefrom is
unclean. But flesh is generated from blood. Since therefore all flesh
was not prohibited as unclean, it seems that in like manner neither
should blood have been forbidden as unclean; nor the fat which is
engendered from blood.
Objection 4: Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28; cf. Lk. 12:4), that
those should not be feared "that kill the body," since after death they
"have no more that they can do": which would not be true if after death
harm might come to man through anything done with his body. Much less
therefore does it matter to an animal already dead how its flesh be
cooked. Consequently there seems to be no reason in what is said, Ex.
23:19: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam."
Objection 5: Further, all that is first brought forth of man and beast,
as being most perfect, is commanded to be offered to the Lord (Ex. 13).
Therefore it is an unfitting command that is set forth in Lev. 19:23:
"when you shall be come into the land, and shall have planted in it
fruit trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision [*'Praeputia,'
which Douay version renders 'first fruits'] of them," i.e. the first
crops, and they "shall be unclean to you, neither shall you eat of
them."
Objection 6: Further, clothing is something extraneous to man's body.
Therefore certain kinds of garments should not have been forbidden to
the Jews: for instance (Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not wear a garment
that is woven of two sorts": and (Dt. 22:5): "A woman shall not be
clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel":
and further on (Dt. 22:11): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is
woven of woolen and linen together."
Objection 7: Further, to be mindful of God's commandments concerns not
the body but the heart. Therefore it is unsuitably prescribed (Dt. 6:8,
seqq.) that they should "bind" the commandments of God "as a sign" on
their hands; and that they should "write them in the entry"; and (Num.
15:38, seqq.) that they should "make to themselves fringes in the
corners of their garments, putting in them ribands of blue . . . they
may remember . . . the commandments of the Lord."
Objection 8: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9) that God does not
"take care for oxen," and, therefore, neither of other irrational
animals. Therefore without reason is it commanded (Dt. 22:6): "If thou
find, as thou walkest by the way, a bird's nest in a tree . . . thou
shalt not take the dam with her young"; and (Dt. 25:4): "Thou shalt not
muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn"; and (Lev. 19:19): "Thou
shalt not make thy cattle to gender with beasts of any other kind."
Objection 9: Further, no distinction was made between clean and unclean
plants. Much less therefore should any distinction have been made about
the cultivation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed
(Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds"; and
(Dt. 22:9, seqq.): "Thou shalt sow thy vineyard with divers seeds";
and: "Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together."
Objection 10: Further, it is apparent that inanimate things are most of
all subject to the power of man. Therefore it was unfitting to debar
man from taking silver and gold of which idols were made, or anything
they found in the houses of idols, as expressed in the commandment of
the Law (Dt. 7:25, seqq.). It also seems an absurd commandment set
forth in Dt. 23:13, that they should "dig round about and . . . cover
with earth that which they were eased of."
Objection 11: Further, piety is required especially in priests. But it
seems to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of one's friends:
wherefore Tobias is commended for so doing (Tob. 1:20, seqq.). In like
manner it is sometimes an act of piety to marry a loose woman, because
she is thereby delivered from sin and infamy. Therefore it seems
inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to priests (Lev. 21).
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:14): "But thou art otherwise
instructed by the Lord thy God": from which words we may gather that
these observances were instituted by God to be a special prerogative of
that people. Therefore they are not without reason or cause.
I answer that, The Jewish people, as stated above [2119](A[5]), were
specially chosen for the worship of God, and among them the priests
themselves were specially set apart for that purpose. And just as other
things that are applied to the divine worship, need to be marked in
some particular way so that they be worthy of the worship of God; so
too in that people's, and especially the priests', mode of life, there
needed to be certain special things befitting the divine worship,
whether spiritual or corporal. Now the worship prescribed by the Law
foreshadowed the mystery of Christ: so that whatever they did was a
figure of things pertaining to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: "All
these things happened to them in figures." Consequently the reasons for
these observances may be taken in two ways, first according to their
fittingness to the worship of God; secondly, according as they
foreshadow something touching the Christian mode of life.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[5], ad 4,5), the Law
distinguished a twofold pollution or uncleanness; one, that of sin,
whereby the soul was defiled; and another consisting in some kind of
corruption, whereby the body was in some way infected. Speaking then of
the first-mentioned uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean, or can
defile a man, by reason of its nature; wherefore we read (Mat. 15:11):
"Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but what cometh
out of the mouth, this defileth a man": which words are explained (Mat.
15:17) as referring to sins. Yet certain foods can defile the soul
accidentally; in so far as man partakes of them against obedience or a
vow, or from excessive concupiscence; or through their being an
incentive to lust, for which reason some refrain from wine and
flesh-meat.
If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consisting in some kind of
corruption, the flesh of certain animals is unclean, either because
like the pig they feed on unclean things; or because their life is
among unclean surroundings: thus certain animals, like moles and mice
and such like, live underground, whence they contract a certain
unpleasant smell; or because their flesh, through being too moist or
too dry, engenders corrupt humors in the human body. Hence they were
forbidden to eat the flesh of flat-footed animals, i.e. animals having
an uncloven hoof, on account of their earthiness; and in like manner
they were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that have many clefts
in their feet, because such are very fierce and their flesh is very
dry, such as the flesh of lions and the like. For the same reason they
were forbidden to eat certain birds of prey the flesh of which is very
dry, and certain water-fowl on account of their exceeding humidity. In
like manner certain fish lacking fins and scales were prohibited on
account of their excessive moisture; such as eels and the like. They
were, however, allowed to eat ruminants and animals with a divided
hoof, because in such animals the humors are well absorbed, and their
nature well balanced: for neither are they too moist, as is indicated
by the hoof; nor are they too earthly, which is shown by their having
not a flat but a cloven hoof. Of fishes they were allowed to partake of
the drier kinds, of which the fins and scales are an indication,
because thereby the moist nature of the fish is tempered. Of birds they
were allowed to eat the tamer kinds, such as hens, partridges, and the
like. Another reason was detestation of idolatry: because the Gentiles,
and especially the Egyptians, among whom they had grown up, offered up
these forbidden animals to their idols, or employed them for the
purpose of sorcery: whereas they did not eat those animals which the
Jews were allowed to eat, but worshipped them as gods, or abstained,
for some other motive, from eating them, as stated above (A[3], ad 2).
The third reason was to prevent excessive care about food: wherefore
they were allowed to eat those animals which could be procured easily
and promptly.
With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to partake of those
of any animals whatever without exception. Blood was forbidden, both in
order to avoid cruelty, that they might abhor the shedding of human
blood, as stated above (A[3], ad 8); and in order to shun idolatrous
rite whereby it was customary for men to collect the blood and to
gather together around it for a banquet in honor of the idols, to whom
they held the blood to be most acceptable. Hence the Lord commanded the
blood to be poured out and to be covered with earth (Lev. 17:13). For
the same reason they were forbidden to eat animals that had been
suffocated or strangled: because the blood of these animals would not
be separated from the body: or because this form of death is very
painful to the victim; and the Lord wished to withdraw them from
cruelty even in regard to irrational animals, so as to be less inclined
to be cruel to other men, through being used to be kind to beasts. They
were forbidden to eat the fat: both because idolaters ate it in honor
of their gods; and because it used to be burnt in honor of God; and,
again, because blood and fat are not nutritious, which is the cause
assigned by Rabbi Moses (Doct. Perplex. iii). The reason why they were
forbidden to eat the sinews is given in Gn. 32:32, where it is stated
that "the children of Israel . . . eat not the sinew . . . because he
touched the sinew of" Jacob's "thing and it shrank."
The figurative reason for these things is that all these animals
signified certain sins, in token of which those animals were
prohibited. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faustum iv, 7): "If the swine
and lamb be called in question, both are clean by nature, because all
God's creatures are good: yet the lamb is clean, and the pig is unclean
in a certain signification. Thus if you speak of a foolish, and of a
wise man, each of these expressions is clean considered in the nature
of the sound, letters and syllables of which it is composed: but in
signification, the one is clean, the other unclean." The animal that
chews the cud and has a divided hoof, is clean in signification.
Because division of the hoof is a figure of the two Testaments: or of
the Father and Son: or of the two natures in Christ: of the distinction
of good and evil. While chewing the cud signifies meditation on the
Scriptures and a sound understanding thereof; and whoever lacks either
of these is spiritually unclean. In like manner those fish that have
scales and fins are clean in signification. Because fins signify the
heavenly or contemplative life; while scales signify a life of trials,
each of which is required for spiritual cleanness. Of birds certain
kinds were forbidden. In the eagle which flies at a great height, pride
is forbidden: in the griffon which is hostile to horses and men,
cruelty of powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds on very
small birds, signifies those who oppress the poor. The kite, which is
full of cunning, denotes those who are fraudulent in their dealings.
The vulture, which follows an army, expecting to feed on the carcases
of the slain, signifies those who like others to die or to fight among
themselves that they may gain thereby. Birds of the raven kind signify
those who are blackened by their lusts; or those who lack kindly
feelings, for the raven did not return when once it had been let loose
from the ark. The ostrich which, though a bird, cannot fly, and is
always on the ground, signifies those who fight God's cause, and at the
same time are taken up with worldly business. The owl, which sees
clearly at night, but cannot see in the daytime, denotes those who are
clever in temporal affairs, but dull in spiritual matters. The gull,
which flies both in the air and swims in the water, signifies those who
are partial both to Circumcision and to Baptism: or else it denotes
those who would fly by contemplation, yet dwell in the waters of
sensual delights. The hawk, which helps men to seize the prey, is a
figure of those who assist the strong to prey on the poor. The
screech-owl, which seeks its food by night but hides by day, signifies
the lustful man who seeks to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness. The
cormorant, so constituted that it can stay a long time under water,
denotes the glutton who plunges into the waters of pleasure. The ibis
is an African bird with a long beak, and feeds on snakes; and perhaps
it is the same as the stork: it signifies the envious man, who
refreshes himself with the ills of others, as with snakes. The swan is
bright in color, and by the aid of its long neck extracts its food from
deep places on land or water: it may denote those who seek earthly
profit though an external brightness of virtue. The bittern is a bird
of the East: it has a long beak, and its jaws are furnished with
follicules, wherein it stores its food at first, after a time
proceeding to digest it: it is a figure of the miser, who is
excessively careful in hoarding up the necessaries of life. The coot
[*Douay: 'porphyrion.' St. Thomas' description tallies with the coot or
moorhen: though of course he is mistaken about the feet differing from
one another.] has this peculiarity apart from other birds, that it has
a webbed foot for swimming, and a cloven foot for walking: for it swims
like a duck in the water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks
only when it bites, since it dips all its food in water: it is a figure
of a man who will not take advice, and does nothing but what is soaked
in the water of his own will. The heron [*Vulg.: 'herodionem'],
commonly called a falcon, signifies those whose "feet are swift to shed
blood" (Ps. 13:3). The plover [*Here, again, the Douay translators
transcribed from the Vulgate: 'charadrion'; 'charadrius' is the generic
name for all plovers.], which is a garrulous bird, signifies the
gossip. The hoopoe, which builds its nest on dung, feeds on foetid
ordure, and whose song is like a groan, denotes worldly grief which
works death in those who are unclean. The bat, which flies near the
ground, signifies those who being gifted with worldly knowledge, seek
none but earthly things. Of fowls and quadrupeds those alone were
permitted which have the hind-legs longer than the forelegs, so that
they can leap: whereas those were forbidden which cling rather to the
earth: because those who abuse the doctrine of the four Evangelists, so
that they are not lifted up thereby, are reputed unclean. By the
prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, we are to understand the
forbidding of cruelty, lust, and bravery in committing sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Men were wont to eat plants and other products of
the soil even before the deluge: but the eating of flesh seems to have
been introduced after the deluge; for it is written (Gn. 9:3): "Even as
the green herbs have I delivered . . . all" flesh "to you." The reason
for this was that the eating of the products of the soil savors rather
of a simple life; whereas the eating of flesh savors of delicate and
over-careful living. For the soil gives birth to the herb of its own
accord; and such like products of the earth may be had in great
quantities with very little effort: whereas no small trouble is
necessary either to rear or to catch an animal. Consequently God being
wishful to bring His people back to a more simple way of living,
forbade them to eat many kinds of animals, but not those things that
are produced by the soil. Another reason may be that animals were
offered to idols, while the products of the soil were not.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said (ad
1).
Reply to Objection 4: Although the kid that is slain has no perception
of the manner in which its flesh is cooked, yet it would seem to savor
of heartlessness if the dam's milk, which was intended for the
nourishment of her offspring, were served up on the same dish. It might
also be said that the Gentiles in celebrating the feasts of their idols
prepared the flesh of kids in this manner, for the purpose of sacrifice
or banquet: hence (Ex. 23) after the solemnities to be celebrated under
the Law had been foretold, it is added: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in
the milk of its dam." The figurative reason for this prohibition is
this: the kid, signifying Christ, on account of "the likeness of sinful
flesh" (Rom. 8:3), was not to be seethed, i.e. slain, by the Jews, "in
the milk of its dam," i.e. during His infancy. Or else it signifies
that the kid, i.e. the sinner, should not be boiled in the milk of its
dam, i.e. should not be cajoled by flattery.
Reply to Objection 5: The Gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits,
which they held to bring them good luck: or they burnt them for the
purpose of secrecy. Consequently (the Israelites) were commanded to
look upon the fruits of the first three years as unclean: for in that
country nearly all the trees bear fruit in three years' time; those
trees, to wit, that are cultivated either from seed, or from a graft,
or from a cutting: but it seldom happens that the fruit-stones or seeds
encased in a pod are sown: since it would take a longer time for these
to bear fruit: and the Law considered what happened most frequently.
The fruits, however, of the fourth year, as being the firstlings of
clean fruits, were offered to God: and from the fifth year onward they
were eaten.
The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact that after
the three states of the Law (the first lasting from Abraham to David,
the second, until they were carried away to Babylon, the third until
the time of Christ), the Fruit of the Law, i.e. Christ, was to be
offered to God. Or again, that we must mistrust our first efforts, on
account of their imperfection.
Reply to Objection 6: It is said of a man in Ecclus. 19:27, that "the
attire of the body . . . " shows "what he is." Hence the Lord wished
His people to be distinguished from other nations, not only by the sign
of the circumcision, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain
difference of attire. Wherefore they were forbidden to wear garments
woven of woolen and linen together, and for a woman to be clothed with
man's apparel, or vice versa, for two reasons. First, to avoid
idolatrous worship. Because the Gentiles, in their religious rites,
used garments of this sort, made of various materials. Moreover in the
worship of Mars, women put on men's armor; while, conversely, in the
worship of Venus men donned women's attire. The second reason was to
preserve them from lust: because the employment of various materials in
the making of garments signified inordinate union of sexes, while the
use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an incentive to evil
desires, and offers an occasion of lust. The figurative reason is that
the prohibition of wearing a garment woven of woolen and linen
signified that it was forbidden to unite the simplicity of innocence,
denoted by wool, with the duplicity of malice, betokened by linen. It
also signifies that woman is forbidden to presume to teach, or perform
other duties of men: or that man should not adopt the effeminate
manners of a woman.
Reply to Objection 7: As Jerome says on Mat. 23:6, "the Lord commanded
them to make violet-colored fringes in the four corners of their
garments, so that the Israelites might be distinguished from other
nations." Hence, in this way, they professed to be Jews: and
consequently the very sight of this sign reminded them of their law.
When we read: "Thou shalt bind them on thy hand, and they shall be ever
before thy eyes [Vulg.: 'they shall be and shall move between thy
eyes'], the Pharisees gave a false interpretation to these words, and
wrote the decalogue of Moses on a parchment, and tied it on their
foreheads like a wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes":
whereas the intention of the Lord in giving this commandment was that
they should be bound in their hands, i.e. in their works; and that they
should be before their eyes, i.e. in their thoughts. The violet-colored
fillets which were inserted in their cloaks signify the godly intention
which should accompany our every deed. It may, however, be said that,
because they were a carnal-minded and stiff-necked people, it was
necessary for them to be stirred by these sensible things to the
observance of the Law.
Reply to Objection 8: Affection in man is twofold: it may be an
affection of reason, or it may be an affection of passion. If a man's
affection be one of reason, it matters not how man behaves to animals,
because God has subjected all things to man's power, according to Ps.
8:8: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet": and it is in this
sense that the Apostle says that "God has no care for oxen"; because
God does not ask of man what he does with oxen or other animals.
But if man's affection be one of passion, then it is moved also in
regard to other animals: for since the passion of pity is caused by the
afflictions of others; and since it happens that even irrational
animals are sensible to pain, it is possible for the affection of pity
to arise in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now it is
evident that if a man practice a pitiful affection for animals, he is
all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men: wherefore it is
written (Prov. 11:10): "The just regardeth the lives of his beasts: but
the bowels of the wicked are cruel." Consequently the Lord, in order to
inculcate pity to the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, wished
them to practice pity even with regard to dumb animals, and forbade
them to do certain things savoring of cruelty to animals. Hence He
prohibited them to "boil a kid in the milk of its dam"; and to "muzzle
the ox that treadeth out the corn"; and to slay "the dam with her
young." It may, nevertheless, be also said that these prohibitions were
made in hatred of idolatry. For the Egyptians held it to be wicked to
allow the ox to eat of the grain while threshing the corn. Moreover
certain sorcerers were wont to ensnare the mother bird with her young
during incubation, and to employ them for the purpose of securing
fruitfulness and good luck in bringing up children: also because it was
held to be a good omen to find the mother sitting on her young.
As to the mingling of animals of divers species, the literal reason may
have been threefold. The first was to show detestation for the idolatry
of the Egyptians, who employed various mixtures in worshipping the
planets, which produce various effects, and on various kinds of things
according to their various conjunctions. The second reason was in
condemnation of unnatural sins. The third reason was the entire removal
of all occasions of concupiscence. Because animals of different species
do not easily breed, unless this be brought about by man; and movements
of lust are aroused by seeing such things. Wherefore in the Jewish
traditions we find it prescribed as stated by Rabbi Moses that men
shall turn away their eyes from such sights.
The figurative reason for these things is that the necessities of life
should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth the corn, i.e. from
the preacher bearing the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle states (1
Cor. 9:4, seqq.). Again, we should not take the dam with her young:
because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual senses, i.e.
the offspring, and set aside the observance of the letter, i.e. the
mother, for instance, in all the ceremonies of the Law. It is also
forbidden that beast of burden, i.e. any of the common people, should
be allowed to engender, i.e. to have any connection, with animals of
another kind, i.e. with Gentiles or Jews.
Reply to Objection 9: All these minglings were forbidden in
agriculture; literally, in detestation of idolatry. For the Egyptians
in worshipping the stars employed various combinations of seeds,
animals and garments, in order to represent the various connections of
the stars. Or else all these minglings were forbidden in detestation of
the unnatural vice.
They have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohibition: "Thou
shalt not sow thy field with different seeds," is to be understood, in
the spiritual sense, of the prohibition to sow strange doctrine in the
Church, which is a spiritual vineyard. Likewise "the field," i.e. the
Church, must not be sown "with different seeds," i.e. with Catholic and
heretical doctrines. Neither is it allowed to plough "with an ox and an
ass together"; thus a fool should not accompany a wise man in
preaching, for one would hinder the other.
Reply to Objection 10: [*The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in
the codices. The solution given here is found in some editions, and was
supplied by Nicolai.] Silver and gold were reasonably forbidden (Dt. 7)
not as though they were not subject to the power of man, but because,
like the idols themselves, all materials out of which idols were made,
were anathematized as hateful in God's sight. This is clear from the
same chapter, where we read further on (Dt. 7:26): "Neither shalt thou
bring anything of the idol into thy house, lest thou become an anathema
like it." Another reason was lest, by taking silver and gold, they
should be led by avarice into idolatry to which the Jews were inclined.
The other precept (Dt. 23) about covering up excretions, was just and
becoming, both for the sake of bodily cleanliness; and in order to keep
the air wholesome; and by reason of the respect due to the tabernacle
of the covenant which stood in the midst of the camp, wherein the Lord
was said to dwell; as is clearly set forth in the same passage, where
after expressing the command, the reason thereof is at once added, to
wit: "For the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, to deliver
thee, and to give up thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be holy
[i.e. clean], and let no uncleanness appear therein." The figurative
reason for this precept, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), is that
sins which are the fetid excretions of the mind should be covered over
by repentance, that we may become acceptable to God, according to Ps.
31:1: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins
are covered." Or else according to a gloss, that we should recognize
the unhappy condition of human nature, and humbly cover and purify the
stains of a puffed-up and proud spirit in the deep furrow of
self-examination.
Reply to Objection 11: Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use, in
their rites, of the bones and flesh of dead men. Wherefore, in order to
extirpate the customs of idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that
the priests of inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the
temple, should not "incur an uncleanness at the death" of anyone except
of those who were closely related to them, viz. their father or mother,
and others thus near of kin to them. But the high-priest had always to
be ready for the service of the sanctuary; wherefore he was absolutely
forbidden to approach the dead, however nearly related to him. They
were also forbidden to marry a "harlot" or "one that has been put
away," or any other than a virgin: both on account of the reverence due
to the priesthood, the honor of which would seem to be tarnished by
such a marriage: and for the sake of the children who would be
disgraced by the mother's shame: which was most of all to be avoided
when the priestly dignity was passed on from father to son. Again, they
were commanded to shave neither head nor beard, and not to make
incisions in their flesh, in order to exclude the rites of idolatry.
For the priests of the Gentiles shaved both head and beard, wherefore
it is written (Bar 6:30): "Priests sit in their temples having their
garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven." Moreover, in
worshipping their idols "they cut themselves with knives and lancets"
(3 Kings 18:28). For this reason the priests of the Old Law were
commanded to do the contrary.
The spiritual reason for these things is that priests should be
entirely free from dead works, i.e. sins. And they should not shave
their heads, i.e. set wisdom aside; nor should they shave their beards,
i.e. set aside the perfection of wisdom; nor rend their garments or cut
their flesh, i.e. they should not incur the sin of schism.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under
which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law?
(2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had
any power of justification?
(3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of
Christ?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Law were in
existence before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts were ceremonies
of the Old Law, as stated above ([2120]Q[101], A[4]). But sacrifices
and holocausts preceded the Law: for it is written (Gn. 4:3,4) that
"Cain offered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the Lord," and that
"Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock, and of their fat." Noe
also "offered holocausts" to the Lord (Gn. 18:20), and Abraham did in
like manner (Gn. 22:13). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law
preceded the Law.
Objection 2: Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar were
part of the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded the
Law. For we read (Gn. 13:18) that "Abraham . . . built . . . an altar
to the Lord"; and (Gn. 28:18) that "Jacob . . . took the stone . . .
and set it up for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it." Therefore
the legal ceremonies preceded the Law.
Objection 3: Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to have
been circumcision. But circumcision preceded the Law, as appears from
Gn. 17. In like manner the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is
written (Gn. 14:18) that "Melchisedech . . . was the priest of the most
high God." Therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law.
Objection 4: Further, the distinction of clean from unclean animals
belongs to the ceremonies of observances, as stated above (Q[100], 2,
A[6], ad 1). But this distinction preceded the Law; for it is written
(Gn. 7:2,3): "Of all clean beasts take seven and seven . . . but of the
beasts that are unclean, two and two." Therefore the legal ceremonies
preceded the Law.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies . . . which the Lord your God commanded that I should teach
you." But they would not have needed to be taught about these things,
if the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence. Therefore
the legal ceremonies did not precede the Law.
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said ([2121]Q[101],
A[2];[2122] Q[102] , A[2]), the legal ceremonies were ordained for a
double purpose; the worship of God, and the foreshadowing of Christ.
Now whoever worships God must needs worship Him by means of certain
fixed things pertaining to external worship. But the fixing of the
divine worship belongs to the ceremonies; just as the determining of
our relations with our neighbor is a matter determined by the judicial
precepts, as stated above ([2123]Q[99], A[4]). Consequently, as among
men in general there were certain judicial precepts, not indeed
established by Divine authority, but ordained by human reason; so also
there were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any law, but
according to the will and devotion of those that worship God. Since,
however, even before the Law some of the leading men were gifted with
the spirit of prophecy, it is to be believed that a heavenly instinct,
like a private law, prompted them to worship God in a certain definite
way, which would be both in keeping with the interior worship, and a
suitable token of Christ's mysteries, which were foreshadowed also by
other things that they did, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: "All . . .
things happened to them in figure." Therefore there were some
ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal ceremonies, because
they were not as yet established by legislation.
Reply to Objection 1: The patriarchs offered up these oblations,
sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain
devotion of their own will, according as it seemed proper to them to
offer up in honor of God those things which they had received from Him,
and thus to testify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and
end of all.
Reply to Objection 2: They also established certain sacred things,
because they thought that the honor due to God demanded that certain
places should be set apart from others for the purpose of divine
worship.
Reply to Objection 3: The sacrament of circumcision was established by
command of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of
the Law as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as an
observance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said (Jn. 7:20) that
circumcision was "not of Moses, but of his fathers." Again, among those
who worshipped God, the priesthood was in existence before the Law by
human appointment, for the Law allotted the priestly dignity to the
firstborn.
Reply to Objection 4: The distinction of clean from unclean animals was
in vogue before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is
written (Gn. 9:3): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for
you": but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used only
certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they did make any
distinction in regard to eating; it was not that it was considered
illegal to eat such animals, since this was not forbidden by any law,
but from dislike or custom: thus even now we see that certain foods are
looked upon with disgust in some countries, while people partake of
them in others.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, at the time of the Law, the ceremonies of the Old Law had any powe
r
of justification?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the
power of justification at the time of the Law. Because expiation from
sin and consecration pertains to justification. But it is written (Ex.
39:21) that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by the
sprinkling of blood and the anointing of oil; and (Lev. 16:16) that, by
sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expiated "the sanctuary
from the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and from their
transgressions and . . . their sins." Therefore the ceremonies of the
Old Law had the power of justification.
Objection 2: Further, that by which man pleases God pertains to
justification, according to Ps. 10:8: "The Lord is just and hath loved
justice." But some pleased God by means of ceremonies, according to
Lev. 10:19: "How could I . . . please the Lord in the ceremonies,
having a sorrowful heart?" Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law had
the power of justification.
Objection 3: Further, things relating to the divine worship regard the
soul rather than the body, according to Ps. 18:8: "The Law of the Lord
is unspotted, converting souls." But the leper was cleansed by means of
the ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated in Lev. 14. Much more
therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul by
justifying it.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2) [*The first words of the
quotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory,
substituted them for 2:21, which runs thus: 'If justice be by the Law,
then Christ died in vain.']: "If there had been a law given which could
justify [Vulg.: 'give life'], Christ died in vain," i.e. without cause.
But this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did
not confer justice.
I answer that, As stated above ([2124]Q[102], A[5], ad 4), a twofold
uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. One was spiritual and is
the uncleanness of sin. The other was corporal, which rendered a man
unfit for divine worship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion,
was said to be unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but a kind of
irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies of the Old
Law had the power to cleanse: because they were ordered by the Law to
be employed as remedies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses
which were contracted in consequence of the prescription of the Law.
Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 9:13) that "the blood of goats and of
oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are
defiled, to the cleansing of the flesh." And just as this uncleanness
which was washed away by such like ceremonies, affected the flesh
rather than the soul, so also the ceremonies themselves are called by
the Apostle shortly before (Heb. 9:10) justices of the flesh: "justices
of the flesh," says he, "being laid on them until the time of
correction."
On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of
the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness of sin. The reason of this was that
at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through Christ,
"Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world" (Jn. 1:29). And
since the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion had not yet
really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Law could not really
contain in themselves a power flowing from Christ already incarnate and
crucified, such as the sacraments of the New Law contain. Consequently
they could not cleanse from sin: thus the Apostle says (Heb. 10:4) that
"it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be
taken away"; and for this reason he calls them (Gal. 4:9) "weak and
needy elements": weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but
this weakness results from their being needy, i.e. from the fact that
they do not contain grace within themselves.
However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for the minds of the
faithful, to be united by faith to Christ incarnate and crucified; so
that they were justified by faith in Christ: of which faith the
observance of these ceremonies was a sort of profession, inasmuch as
they foreshadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices were
offered up for sins, not as though the sacrifices themselves washed
sins away, but because they were professions of faith which cleansed
from sin. In fact, the Law itself implies this in the terms employed:
for it is written (Lev. 4:26; 5:16) that in offering the sacrifice for
sin "the priest shall pray for him . . . and it shall be forgiven him,"
as though the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of the sacrifices, but
through the faith and devotion of those who offered them. It must be
observed, however, that the very fact that the ceremonies of the Old
Law washed away uncleanness of the body, was a figure of that expiation
from sins which was effected by Christ.
It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the
ceremonies had no power of justification.
Reply to Objection 1: That sanctification of priests and their sons,
and of their apparel or of anything else belonging to them, by
sprinkling them with blood, had no other effect but to appoint them to
the divine worship, and to remove impediments from them, "to the
cleansing of the flesh," as the Apostle states (Heb. 9:13) in token of
that sanctification whereby "Jesus" sanctified "the people by His own
blood" (Heb. 13:12). Moreover, the expiation must be understood as
referring to the removal of these bodily uncleannesses, not to the
forgiveness of sin. Hence even the sanctuary which could not be the
subject of sin is stated to be expiated.
Reply to Objection 2: The priests pleased God in the ceremonies by
their obedience and devotion, and by their faith in the reality
foreshadowed; not by reason of the things considered in themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: Those ceremonies which were prescribed in the
cleansing of a leper, were not ordained for the purpose of taking away
the defilement of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these
ceremonies were not applied to a man until he was already healed: hence
it is written (Lev. 14:3,4) that the priest, "going out of the camp,
when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him that
is to be purified to offer," etc.; whence it is evident that the priest
was appointed the judge of leprosy, not before, but after cleansing.
But these ceremonies were employed for the purpose of taking away the
uncleanness of irregularity. They do say, however, that if a priest
were to err in his judgment, the leper would be cleansed miraculously
by the power of God, but not in virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it
was by miracle that the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she
had drunk the water "on which" the priest had "heaped curses," as
stated in Num. 5:19-27.
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Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law ceased at the coming of Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not
cease at the coming of Christ. For it is written (Bar 4:1): "This is
the book of the commandments of God, and the law that is for ever." But
the legal ceremonies were part of the Law. Therefore the legal
ceremonies were to last for ever.
Objection 2: Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed
was a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper, who has
been cleansed, to make this offering (Mat. 8:4). Therefore the
ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at Christ's coming.
Objection 3: Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect remains.
But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasonable causes,
inasmuch as they were ordained to the worship of God, besides the fact
that they were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore the
ceremonies of the Old Law should not have ceased.
Objection 4: Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of
Abraham's faith: the observance of the sabbath, to recall the blessing
of creation: and other solemnities, in memory of other Divine favors,
as state above ([2125]Q[102], A[4], ad 10; A[5], ad 1). But Abraham's
faith is ever to be imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation
and other Divine favors should never be forgotten. Therefore at least
circumcision and the other legal solemnities should not have ceased.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17): "Let no man . . .
judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of
the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to
come": and (Heb. 8:13): "In saying a new (testament), he hath made the
former old: and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its end."
I answer that, All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were ordained
to the worship of God as stated above ([2126]Q[101], AA[1],2). Now
external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship, which
consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently exterior worship had
to be subject to variations according to the variations in the internal
worship, in which a threefold state may be distinguished. One state was
in respect of faith and hope, both in heavenly goods, and in the means
of obtaining them---in both of these considered as things to come. Such
was the state of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of
interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly
goods as things to come; but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods,
as in things present or past. Such is the state of the New Law. The
third state is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein
nothing is believed in as lacking, nothing hoped for as being yet to
come. Such is the state of the Blessed.
In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to worship of God
will be figurative; there will be naught but "thanksgiving and voice of
praise" (Is. 51:3). Hence it is written concerning the city of the
Blessed (Apoc. 21:22): "I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God
Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb." Proportionately,
therefore, the ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which
foreshadowed the second and third states, had need to cease at the
advent of the second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced
which would be in keeping with the state of divine worship for that
particular time, wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but
the Divine favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a thing of
the present.
Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is said to be "for ever" simply and
absolutely, as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the
ceremonial precepts it lasts for even in respect of the reality which
those ceremonies foreshadowed.
Reply to Objection 2: The mystery of the redemption of the human race
was fulfilled in Christ's Passion: hence Our Lord said then: "It is
consummated" (Jn. 19:30). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law
must have ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled.
As a sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ "the veil of
the temple was rent" (Mat. 27:51). Hence, before Christ's Passion,
while Christ was preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel
were concurrent, since the mystery of Christ had already begun, but was
not as yet consummated. And for this reason Our Lord, before His
Passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies.
Reply to Objection 3: The literal reasons already given ([2127]Q[102])
for the ceremonies refer to the divine worship, which was founded on
faith in that which was to come. Hence, at the advent of Him Who was to
come, both that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring thereto.
Reply to Objection 4: The faith of Abraham was commended in that he
believed in God's promise concerning his seed to come, in which all
nations were to blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to
come, it was necessary to make profession of Abraham's faith by means
of circumcision. But now that it is consummated, the same thing needs
to be declared by means of another sign, viz. Baptism, which, in this
respect, took the place of circumcision, according to the saying of the
Apostle (Col. 2:11, 12): "You are circumcised with circumcision not
made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the
circumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism."
As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its
place is taken by the "Lord's Day," which recalls the beginning of the
new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. In like manner other
solemnities of the Old Law are supplanted by new solemnities: because
the blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favors
granted us by Christ. Hence the feast of the Passover gave place to the
feast of Christ's Passion and Resurrection: the feast of Pentecost when
the Old Law was given, to the feast of Pentecost on which was given the
Law of the living spirit: the feast of the New Moon, to Lady Day, when
appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e. Christ, by the fulness of
grace: the feast of Trumpets, to the feasts of the Apostles: the feast
of Expiation, to the feasts of Martyrs and Confessors: the feast of
Tabernacles, to the feast of the Church Dedication: the feast of the
Assembly and Collection, to feast of the Angels, or else to the feast
of All Hallows.
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Whether since Christ's Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without
committing mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that since Christ's Passion the legal
ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin. For we must
not believe that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving the
Holy Ghost: since by His fulness they were "endued with power from on
high" (Lk. 24:49). But the apostles observed the legal ceremonies after
the coming of the Holy Ghost: for it is stated (Acts 16:3) that Paul
circumcised Timothy: and (Acts 21:26) that Paul, at the advice of
James, "took the men, and . . . being purified with them, entered into
the temple, giving notice of the accomplishment of the days of
purification, until an oblation should be offered for every one of
them." Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since the Passion
of Christ without mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning
the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of the Church complied
with this observance; for it is stated (Gal. 2:12) that, "when" certain
men "had come" to Antioch, Peter "withdrew and separated himself" from
the Gentiles. Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since
Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, the commands of the apostles did not lead men
into sin. But it was commanded by apostolic decree that the Gentiles
should observe certain ceremonies of the Law: for it is written (Acts
15:28,29): "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no
further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you abstain
from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things
strangled, and from fornication." Therefore the legal ceremonies can be
observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): "If you be circumcised,
Christ shall profit you nothing." But nothing save mortal sin hinders
us from receiving Christ's fruit. Therefore since Christ's Passion it
is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe the other legal
ceremonies.
I answer that, All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the
interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his
inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either profession,
if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now, though our faith
in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they
came before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the same faith is
expressed in different words, by us and by them. For by them was it
said: "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son," where the verbs
are in the future tense: whereas we express the same by means of verbs
in the past tense, and say that she "conceived and bore." In like
manner the ceremonies of the Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to
be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments signify Him as already
born and having suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal
sin now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say that Christ
is yet to be born, which the fathers of old said devoutly and
truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin now to observe those
ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and
fidelity. Such is the teaching Augustine (Contra Faust. xix, 16), who
says: "It is no longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and
rise again, truths of which their sacraments were a kind of image: but
it is declared that He is already born, has suffered and risen again;
of which our sacraments, in which Christians share, are the actual
representation."
Reply to Objection 1: On this point there seems to have been a
difference of opinion between Jerome and Augustine. For Jerome (Super
Galat. ii, 11, seqq.) distinguished two periods of time. One was the
time previous to Christ's Passion, during which the legal ceremonies
were neither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate in their
own fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful to observe them. But
immediately after Christ's Passion they began to be not only dead, so
as no longer to be either effectual or binding; but also deadly, so
that whoever observed them was guilty of mortal sin. Hence he
maintained that after the Passion the apostles never observed the legal
ceremonies in real earnest; but only by a kind of pious pretense, lest,
to wit, they should scandalize the Jews and hinder their conversion.
This pretense, however, is to be understood, not as though they did not
in reality perform those actions, but in the sense that they performed
them without the mind to observe the ceremonies of the Law: thus a man
might cut away his foreskin for health's sake, not with the intention
of observing legal circumcision.
But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid
scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth of life and
doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense, in things
pertaining to the salvation of the faithful; therefore Augustine
(Epist. lxxxii) more fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One
was the time that preceded the Passion of Christ, during which the
legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another period was after
the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies are
both dead and deadly. The third is a middle period, viz. from the
Passion of Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which the
legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because they had neither effect nor
binding force; but were not deadly, because it was lawful for the
Jewish converts to Christianity to observe them, provided they did not
put their trust in them so as to hold them to be necessary unto
salvation, as though faith in Christ could not justify without the
legal observances. On the other hand, there was no reason why those who
were converted from heathendom to Christianity should observe them.
Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who was born of a Jewish mother; but
was unwilling to circumcise Titus, who was of heathen nationality.
The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be
debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies, while converted
heathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom, was in
order to show that there is a difference between these rites. For
heathenish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as
prohibited by God for all time; whereas the legal ceremonial ceased as
being fulfilled through Christ's Passion, being instituted by God as a
figure of Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from
the Gentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to the Jews,
of whom he was the Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus.
On the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense of blaming him,
in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose Apostle he was. But
Augustine disapproves of this solution: because in the canonical
Scripture (viz. Gal. 2:11), wherein we must not hold anything to be
false, Paul says that Peter "was to be blamed." Consequently it is true
that Peter was at fault: and Paul blamed him in very truth and not with
pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by observing the legal
ceremonial for the time being; because this was lawful for him who was
a converted Jew. But he did sin by excessive minuteness in the
observance of the legal rites lest he should scandalize the Jews, the
result being that he gave scandal to the Gentiles.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have held that this prohibition of the
apostles is not to be taken literally, but spiritually: namely, that
the prohibition of blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the
prohibition of things strangled, that of violence and rapine; the
prohibition of things offered to idols, that of idolatry; while
fornication is forbidden as being evil in itself: which opinion they
gathered from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in a
mystical sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were held to be
unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give
this special commandment to those who were converted to Christ from
heathendom. Hence others maintain that those foods were forbidden
literally, not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in
order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says on Ezech. 44:31 ("The
priest shall not eat of anything that is dead"): "He condemns those
priests who from gluttony did not keep these precepts."
But since certain foods are more delicate than these and more conducive
to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should have been forbidden
more than the others.
We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold that these foods
were forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing compliance
with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the union of
Gentiles and Jews living side by side. Because blood and things
strangled were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while the Jews
might have suspected the Gentiles of relapse into idolatry if the
latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these things were
prohibited for the time being, during which the Gentiles and Jews were
to become united together. But as time went on, with the lapse of the
cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the Gospel teaching
was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught that "not that which entereth
into the mouth defileth a man" (Mat. 15:11); and that "nothing is to be
rejected that is received with thanksgiving" (1 Tim. 4:4). With regard
to fornication a special prohibition was made, because the Gentiles did
not hold it to be sinful.
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OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall
consider them in general; in the second place we shall consider their
reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is meant by the judicial precepts?
(2) Whether they are figurative?
(3) Their duration;
(4) Their division.
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Whether the judicial precepts were those which directed man in relation to
his neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those
which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial
precepts take their name from "judgment." But there are many things
that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to
judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed
man in his relations to his neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral
precepts, as stated above ([2128]Q[99], A[4]). But there are many moral
precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the case
with the seven precepts of the second table. Therefore the judicial
precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
Objection 3: Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do
the judicial precepts relate to one's neighbor, as stated above
([2129]Q[99], A[4];[2130] Q[101], A[1]). But among the ceremonial
precepts there are some which concern man himself, such as observances
in matter of food and apparel, of which we have already spoken
([2131]Q[102], A[6], ad 1,6). Therefore the judicial precepts are not
so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
On the contrary, It is reckoned (Ezech. 18:8) among other works of a
good and just man, that "he hath executed true judgment between man and
man." But judicial precepts are so called from "judgment." Therefore it
seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the
relations between man and man.
I answer that, As is evident from what we have stated above
([2132]Q[95], A[2] ;[2133] Q[99], A[4]), in every law, some precepts
derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because
natural reason dictates that something ought to be done or to be
avoided. These are called "moral" precepts: since human morals are
based on reason. At the same time there are other precepts which derive
their binding force, not from the very dictate of reason (because,
considered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something
due or undue); but from some institution, Divine or human: and such are
certain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the moral
precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to man's
subordination to God, they are called "ceremonial" precepts: but when
they refer to man's relations to other men, they are called "judicial"
precepts. Hence there are two conditions attached to the judicial
precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man's relations to other men;
secondly, that they derive their binding force not from reason alone,
but in virtue of their institution.
Reply to Objection 1: Judgments emanate through the official
pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in
whom the judicial power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at
the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also
voluntary contracts which are concluded between man and man, and
whatever matters concern the community at large and the government
thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which
concern actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the
ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject
to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds in respect of those precepts
which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their
binding force from the mere dictate of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in those precepts which direct us to God,
some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is
quickened by faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped.
There are also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force except
in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only
with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but also with whatever
relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and worship
Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it
concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of ceremonial precept, that
man should show some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand,
man is not ordained to his neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be
disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the
relationship of a slave to his master, since a slave "is his master's
in all that he is," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence there
are no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such precepts
are moral: because the reason, which is the principal in moral matters,
holds the same position, in man, with regard to things that concern
him, as a prince or judge holds in the state. Nevertheless we must take
note that, since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject
to reason than the relations of man to God, there are more precepts
whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby
he is directed to God. For the same reason there had to be more
ceremonial than judicial precepts in the Law.
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Whether the judicial precepts were figurative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not
figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be
instituted as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial
precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the
judicial and ceremonial precepts.
Objection 2: Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to
the Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples.
But the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative,
but stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that neither were
the judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything.
Objection 3: Further, those things which relate to the divine worship
had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God are
above our reason, as stated above ([2134]Q[101], A[2], ad 2). But
things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the
judicial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor should
not have been figurative.
On the contrary, The judicial precepts are expounded both in the
allegorical and in the moral sense (Ex. 21).
I answer that, A precept may be figurative in two ways. First,
primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted principally
that it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial
precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for the very
purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of
God and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts are figurative, not
primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the judicial
precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted
for the purpose of being figurative, but in order that they might
regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity.
Nevertheless they did foreshadow something consequently: since, to wit,
the entire state of that people, who were directed by these precepts,
was figurative, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: "All . . . things happened
to them in figure."
Reply to Objection 1: The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the
same way as the judicial precepts, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ
might be born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had
to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust.
xxii, 24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that were given
to this people were more figurative that those which were given to
other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds of this people are
expounded in the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the
Assyrians or Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of
men.
Reply to Objection 3: In this people the direction of man in regard to
his neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so
far as it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and
in this respect it was figurative.
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Whether the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law
bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of
justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now
"justice is perpetual and immortal" (Wis. 1:15). Therefore the judicial
precepts bind for ever.
Objection 2: Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human
institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for ever.
Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18) that "there is a
setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and
unprofitableness thereof." Now this is true of the ceremonial precept,
which "could [Vulg.: 'can'] not, as to the conscience, make him perfect
that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and
justices of the flesh," as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:9,10). On the
other hand, the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in
respect of the purpose for which they were instituted, viz. to
establish justice and equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts
of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12) that "the priesthood
being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the
Law." But the priesthood was transferred from Aaron to Christ.
Therefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial
precepts are no longer in force.
I answer that, The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were
annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the
ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far
as to be not only "dead," but also deadly to those who observe them
since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the
Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed,
because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a
sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his
kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or
ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force
through being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly sin
to intend to observe them thus.
The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said
above [2135](A[2]). For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts
are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly
for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On
the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that they
might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people
who were directed to Christ. Consequently, when the state of that
people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost
their binding force: for the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to
Christ, as stated in Gal. 3:24. Since, however, these judicial precepts
are instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the
performance of certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial
to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though
one were bound by the Law, is prejudicial to the truth of faith:
because it would follow that the former state of the people still
lasts, and that Christ has not yet come.
Reply to Objection 1: The obligation of observing justice is indeed
perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just,
according to human or Divine institution, must needs be different,
according to the different states of mankind.
Reply to Objection 2: The judicial precepts established by men retain
their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government
remains the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of
government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is
government by the people, demands different laws from those of
oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows
(Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, the
judicial precepts had to be changed also.
Reply to Objection 3: Those judicial precepts directed the people to
justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But
after the coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of
that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile
and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial
precepts needed to be changed also.
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Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial
precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct
division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts direct
men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to
be directed, as pertaining to the relationship between man and man, and
which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, since they
are infinite in number. Therefore it is not possible to assign a
distinct division of the judicial precepts.
Objection 2: Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral
matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division,
except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial
precepts.
Objection 3: Further, because there is a distinct division of the
ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing
some as "sacrifices," others as "observances." But the Law contains no
allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore it seems
that they have no distinct division.
On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must needs be division.
But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts,
since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary
that they should have a distinct division.
I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or
ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division
in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct
division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless by
confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old
Law, whereby men were directed in their relations to one another, are
subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is
directed.
Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the
people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among
themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of
members of the same household, such as the order of the father to his
son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and
according to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of
judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down
concerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office,
and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial
precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his
fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling, judgments and
penalties: this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again,
certain precepts are enjoined with regard to foreigners: for instance,
about wars waged against their foes, and about the way to receive
travelers and strangers: this is the third part of the judicial
precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given relating to home life: for
instance, about servants, wives and children: this is the fourth part
of the judicial precepts.
Reply to Objection 1: Things pertaining to the ordering of relations
between one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are
reducible to certain distinct heads, according to the different
relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the decalogue held the first
place in the moral order, as stated above ([2136]Q[100], A[3]): and
consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be
distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial and ceremonial
precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural
reason, but from their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct
reason for distinguishing them.
Reply to Objection 3: The Law alludes to the division of the judicial
precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the
judicial precepts of the Law.
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OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under which
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the
rulers;
(2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another;
(3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners;
(4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters.
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Whether the Old Law enjoined fitting precepts concerning rulers?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts
concerning rulers. Because, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4),
"the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler." But the
Law contains no precept relating to the institution of the chief ruler;
and yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior rulers:
firstly (Ex. 18:21): "Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.:
'able'] men," etc.; again (Num. 11:16): "Gather unto Me seventy men of
the ancients of Israel"; and again (Dt. 1:13): "Let Me have from among
you wise and understanding men," etc. Therefore the Law provided
insufficiently in regard to the rulers of the people.
Objection 2: Further, "The best gives of the best," as Plato states
(Tim. ii). Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to be
ruled by a king: because this kind of government approaches nearest in
resemblance to the Divine government, whereby God rules the world from
the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king over the
people, and they should not have been allowed a choice in the matter,
as indeed they were allowed (Dt. 17:14,15): "When thou . . . shalt say:
I will set a king over me . . . thou shalt set him," etc.
Objection 3: Further, according to Mat. 12:25: "Every kingdom divided
against itself shall be made desolate": a saying which was verified in
the Jewish people, whose destruction was brought about by the division
of the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to
the general well-being of the people. Therefore it should have
forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings: nor should this
have been introduced even by Divine authority; as we read of its being
introduced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite (3 Kings
11:29, seqq.).
Objection 4: Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of
the people in things concerning God, as stated in Heb. 5:1; so are
rulers set up for the benefit of the people in human affairs. But
certain things were allotted as a means of livelihood for the priests
and Levites of the Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many
like things. Therefore in like manner certain things should have been
determined for the livelihood of the rulers of the people: the more
that they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated in
Ex. 23:8: "You shall not [Vulg.: 'Neither shalt thou'] take bribes,
which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just."
Objection 5: Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so
is tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king, He
established a tyrannical law; for it is written (1 Kings 8:11): "This
will be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take
your sons," etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting provision with regard
to the institution of rulers.
On the contrary, The people of Israel is commended for the beauty of
its order (Num. 24:5): "How beautiful are thy tabernacles, O Jacob, and
thy tents." But the beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right
establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision for
the people with regard to its rulers.
I answer that, Two points are to be observed concerning the right
ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take
some share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures
peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring,
as stated in Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect
of the kinds of government, or the different ways in which the
constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as the
Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first place is
held by the "kingdom," where the power of government is vested in one;
and "aristocracy," which signifies government by the best, where the
power of government is vested in a few. Accordingly, the best form of
government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to
preside over all; while under him are others having governing powers:
and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all
are eligible to govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For
this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is
one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of
persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e. government by the
people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the
people have the right to choose their rulers.
Such was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For
Moses and his successors governed the people in such a way that each of
them was ruler over all; so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover,
seventy-two men were chosen, who were elders in virtue: for it is
written (Dt. 1:15): "I took out of your tribes wise and honorable, and
appointed them rulers": so that there was an element of aristocracy.
But it was a democratical government in so far as the rulers were
chosen from all the people; for it is written (Ex. 18:21): "Provide out
of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.; and, again, in so
far as they were chosen by the people; wherefore it is written (Dt.
1:13): "Let me have from among you wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.
Consequently it is evident that the ordering of the rulers was well
provided for by the Law.
Reply to Objection 1: This people was governed under the special care
of God: wherefore it is written (Dt. 7:6): "The Lord thy God hath
chosen thee to be His peculiar people": and this is why the Lord
reserved to Himself the institution of the chief ruler. For this too
did Moses pray (Num. 27:16): "May the Lord the God of the spirits of
all the flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude." Thus by
God's orders Josue was set at the head in place of Moses; and we read
about each of the judges who succeeded Josue that God "raised . . . up
a saviour" for the people, and that "the spirit of the Lord was" in
them (Judges 3:9, 10, 15). Hence the Lord did not leave the choice of a
king to the people; but reserved this to Himself, as appears from Dt.
17:15: "Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose."
Reply to Objection 2: A kingdom is the best form of government of the
people, so long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a
king is so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom
this power is given be a very virtuous man: for it is only the virtuous
man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity, as the
Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect virtue is to be found
in few: and especially were the Jews inclined to cruelty and avarice,
which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the very first
the Lord did not set up the kingly authority with full power, but gave
them judges and governors to rule them. But afterwards when the people
asked Him to do so, being indignant with them, so to speak, He granted
them a king, as is clear from His words to Samuel (1 Kings 8:7): "They
have not rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them."
Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He did establish
the manner of election from the very beginning (Dt. 17:14, seqq.): and
then He determined two points: first, that in choosing a king they
should wait for the Lord's decision; and that they should not make a
man of another nation king, because such kings are wont to take little
interest in the people they are set over, and consequently to have no
care for their welfare: secondly, He prescribed how the king after his
appointment should behave, in regard to himself; namely, that he should
not accumulate chariots and horses, nor wives, nor immense wealth:
because through craving for such things princes become tyrants and
forsake justice. He also appointed the manner in which they were to
conduct themselves towards God: namely, that they should continually
read and ponder on God's Law, and should ever fear and obey God.
Moreover, He decided how they should behave towards their subjects:
namely, that they should not proudly despise them, or ill-treat them,
and that they should not depart from the paths of justice.
Reply to Objection 3: The division of the kingdom, and a number of
kings, was rather a punishment inflicted on that people for their many
dissensions, specially against the just rule of David, than a benefit
conferred on them for their profit. Hence it is written (Osee 13:11):
"I will give thee a king in My wrath"; and (Osee 8:4): "They have
reigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and I knew not."
Reply to Objection 4: The priestly office was bequeathed by succession
from father to son: and this, in order that it might be held in greater
respect, if not any man from the people could become a priest: since
honor was given to them out of reverence for the divine worship. Hence
it was necessary to put aside certain things for them both as to tithes
and as to first-fruits, and, again, as to oblations and sacrifices,
that they might be afforded a means of livelihood. On the other hand,
the rulers, as stated above, were chosen from the whole people;
wherefore they had their own possessions, from which to derive a
living: and so much the more, since the Lord forbade even a king to
have superabundant wealth to make too much show of magnificence: both
because he could scarcely avoid the excesses of pride and tyranny,
arising from such things, and because, if the rulers were not very
rich, and if their office involved much work and anxiety, it would not
tempt the ambition of the common people; and would not become an
occasion of sedition.
Reply to Objection 5: That right was not given to the king by Divine
institution: rather was it foretold that kings would usurp that right,
by framing unjust laws, and by degenerating into tyrants who preyed on
their subjects. This is clear from the context that follows: "And you
shall be his slaves [Douay: 'servants']": which is significative of
tyranny, since a tyrant rules is subjects as though they were his
slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter them from asking for a
king; since the narrative continues: "But the people would not hear the
voice of Samuel." It may happen, however, that even a good king,
without being a tyrant, may take away the sons, and make them tribunes
and centurions; and may take many things from his subjects in order to
secure the common weal.
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Whether the judicial precepts were suitably framed as to the relations of
one man with another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not suitably
framed as regards the relations of one man with another. Because men
cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what belongs to
another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law: since it is
written (Dt. 23:24): "Going into thy neighbor's vineyard, thou mayest
eat as many grapes as thou pleasest." Therefore the Old Law did not
make suitable provisions for man's peace.
Objection 2: Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states
has been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. ii, 6). But this was introduced by the Old Law; for it is
written (Num. 27:8): "When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance
shall pass to his daughter." Therefore the Law made unsuitable
provision for the welfare of the people.
Objection 3: Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of human
society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying and
selling, as stated in Polit. i. But the Old Law took away the force of
sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year of the jubilee all
that is sold shall return to the vendor (Lev. 25:28). Therefore in this
matter the Law gave the people an unfitting command.
Objection 4: Further, man's needs require that men should be ready to
lend: which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the
pledges: hence it is written (Ecclus. 29:10): "Many have refused to
lend, not out of wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded
without cause." And yet this was encouraged by the Law. First, because
it prescribed (Dt. 15:2): "He to whom any thing is owing from his
friend or neighbor or brother, cannot demand it again, because it is
the year of remission of the Lord"; and (Ex. 22:15) it is stated that
if a borrowed animal should die while the owner is present, the
borrower is not bound to make restitution. Secondly, because the
security acquired through the pledge is lost: for it is written (Dt.
24:10): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor any thing that he oweth
thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge"; and
again (Dt. 24:12,13): "The pledge shall not lodge with thee that night,
but thou shalt restore it to him presently." Therefore the Law made
insufficient provision in the matter of loans.
Objection 5: Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited
with a fraudulent depositary: wherefore great caution should be
observed in such matters: hence it is stated in 2 Mac. 3:15 that "the
priests . . . called upon Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning
things given to be kept, that He would preserve them safe, for them
that had deposited them." But the precepts of the Old Law observed
little caution in regard to deposits: since it is prescribed (Ex.
22:10,11) that when goods deposited are lost, the owner is to stand by
the oath of the depositary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision
in this matter.
Objection 6: Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire, so do
men let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the tenant to pay
his rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an
unnecessarily hard prescription (Lev. 19:13) that "the wages of him
that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morning."
Objection 7: Further, since there is often pressing need for a judge,
it should be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore unfitting
that the Law (Dt. 17:8,9) should command them to go to a fixed place to
ask for judgment on doubtful matters.
Objection 8: Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or
more, should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably stated
(Dt. 19:15) that "in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word
shall stand."
Objection 9: Further, punishment should be fixed according to the
gravity of the fault: for which reason also it is written (Dt. 25:2):
"According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the
stripes be." Yet the Law fixed unequal punishments for certain faults:
for it is written (Ex. 22:1) that the thief "shall restore five oxen
for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Moreover, certain slight
offenses are severely punished: thus (Num. 15:32, seqq.) a man is
stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath day: and (Dt. 21:18, seqq.)
the unruly son is commanded to be stoned on account of certain small
transgressions, viz. because "he gave himself to revelling . . . and
banquetings." Therefore the Law prescribed punishments in an
unreasonable manner.
Objection 10: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "Tully
writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment, indemnity,
prison, stripes, retaliation, public disgrace, exile, death, slavery."
Now some of these were prescribed by the Law. "Indemnity," as when a
thief was condemned to make restitution fivefold or fourfold. "Prison,"
as when (Num. 15:34) a certain man is ordered to be imprisoned.
"Stripes"; thus (Dt. 25:2), "if they see that the offender be worthy of
stripes; they shall lay him down, and shall cause him to be beaten
before them." "Public disgrace" was brought on to him who refused to
take to himself the wife of his deceased brother, for she took "off his
shoe from his foot, and" did "spit in his face" (Dt. 25:9). It
prescribed the "death" penalty, as is clear from (Lev. 20:9): "He that
curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die." The Law also
recognized the "lex talionis," by prescribing (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for
eye, tooth for tooth." Therefore it seems unreasonable that the Law
should not have inflicted the two other punishments, viz. "exile" and
"slavery."
Objection 11: Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But
dumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable
in punishing them (Ex. 21:29): "If the ox . . . shall kill a man or a
woman," it "shall be stoned": and (Lev. 20:16): "The woman that shall
lie under any beast, shall be killed together with the same." Therefore
it seems that matters pertaining to the relations of one man with
another were unsuitably regulated by the Law.
Objection 12: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 21:12) a murderer to be
punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of much
less account than the slaying of a man. Hence murder cannot be
sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it is
unfittingly prescribed (Dt. 21:1, 4) that "when there shall be found .
. . the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is guilty of the
murder . . . the ancients" of the nearest city "shall take a heifer of
the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor ploughed the ground, and
they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley, that never was
ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall strike off the head of the
heifer."
On the contrary, It is recalled as a special blessing (Ps. 147:20) that
"He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His judgments He
hath not made manifest to them."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), quoting Tully,
"a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the law and by
community of welfare." Consequently it is of the essence of a nation
that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered by just laws. Now
the relations of one man with another are twofold: some are effected
under the guidance of those in authority: others are effected by the
will of private individuals. And since whatever is subject to the power
of an individual can be disposed of according to his will, hence it is
that the decision of matters between one man and another, and the
punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction of those in authority,
to whom men are subject. On the other hand, the power of private
persons is exercised over the things they possess: and consequently
their dealings with one another, as regards such things, depend on
their own will, for instance in buying, selling, giving, and so forth.
Now the Law provided sufficiently in respect of each of these relations
between one man and another. For it established judges, as is clearly
indicated in Dt. 16:18: "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in
all its [Vulg.: 'thy'] gates . . . that they may judge the people with
just judgment." It is also directed the manner of pronouncing just
judgments, according to Dt. 1:16,17: "Judge that which is just, whether
he be one of your own country or a stranger: there shall be no
difference of persons." It also removed an occasion of pronouncing
unjust judgment, by forbidding judges to accept bribes (Ex. 23:8; Dt.
16:19). It prescribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and
it appointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we shall state
farther on (ad 10).
But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the
Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should be
distinct, and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly
granted to others by the will of the possessors. These three points
were provided for by the Law. Because, in the first place, the
possessions themselves were divided among individuals: for it is
written (Num. 33:53,54): "I have given you" the land "for a possession:
and you shall divide it among you by lot." And since many states have
been ruined through want of regulations in the matter of possessions,
as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 6); therefore the Law provided
a threefold remedy against the regularity of possessions. The first was
that they should be divided equally, wherefore it is written (Num.
33:54): "To the more you shall give a larger part, and to the fewer, a
lesser." A second remedy was that possessions could not be alienated
for ever, but after a certain lapse of time should return to their
former owner, so as to avoid confusion of possessions (cf. ad 3). The
third remedy aimed at the removal of this confusion, and provided that
the dead should be succeeded by their next of kin: in the first place,
the son; secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the
father's brother; fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order
to preserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that heiresses
should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in Num. 36:6.
Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things
should belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards the care of them;
for it was prescribed (Dt. 22:1-4): "Thou shalt not pass by, if thou
seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt bring
them back to thy brother," and in like manner as to other things.
Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on entering a
friend's vineyard to eat of the fruit, but not to take any away. And,
specially, with respect to the poor, it was prescribed that the
forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of grapes and fruit, should be left
behind for them (Lev. 19:9; Dt. 24:19). Moreover, whatever grew in the
seventh year was common property, as stated in Ex. 23:11 and Lev. 25:4.
Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner.
There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written (Dt.
14:28,29): "The third day thou shalt separate another tithe . . . and
the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow .
. . shall come and shall eat and be filled." And there was a transfer
for a consideration, for instance, by selling and buying, by letting
out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all of which we
find that the Law made ample provision. Consequently it is clear that
the Old Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual relations of
one man with another.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8), "he that loveth
his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law": because, to wit, all the precepts
of the Law, chiefly those concerning our neighbor, seem to aim at the
end that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love that
men give their own goods to others: because, as stated in 1 Jn. 3:17:
"He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his
bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?" Hence the
purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to others
readily: thus the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:18) commands the rich "to give
easily and to communicate to others." Now a man does not give easily to
others if he will not suffer another man to take some little thing from
him without any great injury to him. And so the Law laid down that it
should be lawful for a man, on entering his neighbor's vineyard, to eat
of the fruit there: but not to carry any away, lest this should lead to
the infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a disturbance of the
peace: for among well-behaved people, the taking of a little does not
disturb the peace; in fact, it rather strengthens friendship and
accustoms men to give things to one another.
Reply to Objection 2: The Law did not prescribe that women should
succeed to their father's estate except in default of male issue:
failing which it was necessary that succession should be granted to the
female line in order to comfort the father, who would have been sad to
think that his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law
observed due caution in the matter, by providing that those women who
succeeded to their father's estate, should marry within their own
tribe, in order to avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in
Num. 36:7,8.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 4), the
regulation of possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state
or nation. Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by
the law in some of the heathen states, "that anyone should sell his
possessions, except to avoid a manifest loss." For if possessions were
to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen to come into the hands
of a few: so that it might become necessary for a state or country to
become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to remove this
danger, ordered things in such a way that while provision was made for
men's needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to avail for a certain
period, at the same time the said danger was removed, by prescribing
the return of those possessions after that period had elapsed. The
reason for this law was to prevent confusion of possessions, and to
ensure the continuance of a definite distinction among the tribes.
But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates, therefore
the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like movable goods.
Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas there was
a fixed limit to the amount of estates, which could not be exceeded,
while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On the other
hand, houses situated not in a town, but "in a village that hath no
walls," could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses are built
merely with a view to the cultivation and care of possessions;
wherefore the Law rightly made the same prescription in regard to both
(Lev. 25).
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of the Law
was to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one
another's assistance: because this is a very great incentive to
friendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in the
matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of
mutual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more frequent
and benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for this
purpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that men should be
ready to lend, and that they should not be less inclined to do so as
the year of remission drew nigh, as stated in Dt. 15:7, seqq. Secondly,
by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant a loan,
either by exacting usury, or by accepting necessities of life in
security; and by prescribing that when this had been done they should
be restored at once. For it is written (Dt. 23:19): "Thou shalt not
lend to thy brother money to usury": and (Dt. 24:6): "Thou shalt not
take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge; for he hath pledged
his life to thee": and (Ex. 22:26): "If thou take of thy neighbor a
garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset."
Thirdly, by forbidding them to be importunate in exacting payment.
Hence it is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to any of my
people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard
upon them as an extortioner." For this reason, too, it is enacted (Dt.
24:10,11): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor anything that he
oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge, but
thou shalt stand without, and he shall bring out to thee what he hath":
both because a man's house is his surest refuge, wherefore it is
offensive to a man to be set upon in his own house; and because the Law
does not allow the creditor to take away whatever he likes in security,
but rather permits the debtor to give what he needs least. Fourthly,
the Law prescribed that debts should cease together after the lapse of
seven years. For it was probable that those who could conveniently pay
their debts, would do so before the seventh year, and would not defraud
the lender without cause. But if they were altogether insolvent, there
was the same reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there
was for renewing the loan on account of their need.
As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through
the neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they perished or
deteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if
they perished or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper
care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if they
were hired for a consideration: because they might have died or
deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of the
lender, so that if the animal had been saved through being lent, the
lender would have gained something by the loan which would no longer
have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed when
animals were hired for a consideration: because then the owner received
a certain price for the use of the animals; wherefore he had no right
to any profit, by receiving indemnity for the animal, unless the person
who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, of animals
not hired for a consideration, equity demanded that he should receive
something by way of restitution at least to the value of the hire of
the animal that had perished or deteriorated.
Reply to Objection 5: The difference between a loan and a deposit is
that a loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the
person to whom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the
benefit of the depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter
obligation of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit.
Because the latter might be lost in two ways. First, unavoidably: i.e.
either through a natural cause, for instance if an animal held in
deposit were to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic
cause, for instance, if it were taken by an enemy, or devoured by a
beast (in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the owner
what was left of the animal thus slain): whereas in the other cases
mentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only to take
an oath in order to clear himself of suspicion. Secondly, the goods
deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for instance by
theft: and then the depositary was bound to restitution on account of
his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held an animal on
loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were absent when it
depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for less
negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case of
theft.
Reply to Objection 6: Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are poor
men who toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law commanded
wisely that they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food.
But they who offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be rich: nor
are they in such need of their price in order to gain a livelihood: and
consequently the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 7: The purpose for which judges are appointed among
men, is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now
a matter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded
people: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was prescribed
(Dt. 16:18) that "judges and magistrates" should be appointed in each
tribe, "to judge the people with just judgment." Secondly, a matter may
be doubtful even among experts: and therefore, in order to remove
doubts of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should foregather in
some chief place chosen by God, where there would be both the
high-priest, who would decide doubtful matters relating to the
ceremonies of divine worship; and the chief judge of the people, who
would decide matters relating to the judgments of men: just as even now
cases are taken from a lower to a higher court either by appeal or by
consultation. Hence it is written (Dt. 17:8,9): "If thou perceive that
there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment . . . and
thou see that the words of the judges within thy gates do vary; arise
and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou
shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that
shall be at that time." But such like doubtful matters did not often
occur for judgment: wherefore the people were not burdened on this
account.
Reply to Objection 8: In the business affairs of men, there is no such
thing as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content
with a certain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator
employs to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible for
two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy
nor probable that they succeed in so doing: wherefore their testimony
is taken as being true, especially if they do not waver in giving it,
or are not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might
not easily depart from the truth, the Law commanded that they should be
most carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful
should be severely punished, as stated in Dt. 19:16, seqq.
There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in
token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons, Who are sometimes
mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two
Persons; and sometimes as three: as Augustine observes on Jn. 8:17: "In
your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true."
Reply to Objection 9: A severe punishment is inflicted not only on
account of the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First,
on account of the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other
things being equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on account
of a habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin
except by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account of a great desire for
or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily deterred from
such sins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account of the
facility of committing a sin and of concealing it: for such like sins,
when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to deter
others from committing them.
Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be
observed, even in respect of one single deed. The first is when a sin
is committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether
involuntary, man is altogether excused from punishment; for it is
written (Dt. 22:25, seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a
field is not guilty of death, because "she cried, and there was no man
to help her." But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, and yet
through weakness, as for instance when a man sins from passion, the sin
is diminished: and the punishment, according to true judgment, should
be diminished also; unless perchance the common weal requires that the
sin be severely punished in order to deter others from committing such
sins, as stated above. The second degree is when a man sins through
ignorance: and then he was held to be guilty to a certain extent, on
account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge: yet he was not
punished by the judges but expiated his sin by sacrifices. Hence it is
written (Lev. 4:2): "The soul that sinneth through ignorance," etc.
This is, however, to be taken as applying to ignorance of fact; and not
to ignorance of the Divine precept, which all were bound to know. The
third degree was when a man sinned from pride, i.e. through deliberate
choice or malice: and then he was punished according to the greatness
of the sin [*Cf. Dt. 25:2]. The fourth degree was when a man sinned
from stubbornness or obstinacy: and then he was to be utterly cut off
as a rebel and a destroyer of the commandment of the Law [*Cf. Num.
15:30,31].
Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft,
the Law considered what would be likely to happen most frequently (Ex.
22:1-9): wherefore, as regards theft of other things which can easily
be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice their value.
But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief, because they graze
in the fields: wherefore it happened more frequently that sheep were
stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law inflicted a heavier penalty,
by ordering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As to
cattle, they were yet more difficult to safeguard, because they are
kept in the fields, and do not graze in flocks as sheep do; wherefore a
yet more heavy penalty was inflicted in their regard, so that five oxen
were to be restored for one ox. And this I say, unless perchance the
animal itself were discovered in the thief's possession: because in
that case he had to restore only twice the number, as in the case of
other thefts: for there was reason to presume that he intended to
restore the animal, since he kept it alive. Again, we might say,
according to a gloss, that "a cow is useful in five ways: it may be
used for sacrifice, for ploughing, for food, for milk, and its hide is
employed for various purposes": and therefore for one cow five had to
be restored. But the sheep was useful in four ways: "for sacrifice, for
meat, for milk, and for its wool." The unruly son was slain, not
because he ate and drank: but on account of his stubbornness and
rebellion, which was always punished by death, as stated above. As to
the man who gathered sticks on the sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker
of the Law, which commanded the sabbath to be observed, to testify the
belief in the newness of the world, as stated above ([2137]Q[100],
A[5]): wherefore he was slain as an unbeliever.
Reply to Objection 10: The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the
more grievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed against God,
and for murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one's parents,
adultery and incest. In the case of thief of other things it inflicted
punishment by indemnification: while in the case of blows and
mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation; and likewise for
the sin of bearing false witness. In other faults of less degree it
prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace.
The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases.
First, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail himself of the
privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in the
seventh year of remission: wherefore he was punished by remaining a
slave for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not wherewith
to make restitution, as stated in Ex. 22:3.
The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law: because
God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas all other nations were
given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from that people
absolutely, he would be in danger of falling into idolatry. For this
reason it is related (1 Kings 26:19) that David said to Saul: "They are
cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have case me out this day, that I
should not dwell in the inheritance of the Lord, saying: Go, serve
strange gods." There was, however, a restricted sort of exile: for it
is written in Dt. 19:4 [*Cf. Num. 35:25] that "he that striketh [Vulg.:
'killeth'] his neighbor ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred
against him, shall flee to one of the cities" of refuge and "abide
there until the death of the high-priest." For then it became lawful
for him to return home, because when the whole people thus suffered a
loss they forgot their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the
slain were not so eager to kill the slayer.
Reply to Objection 11: Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not on
account of any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their owners,
who had not safeguarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the
owner was more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone "yesterday
or the day before" (in which case steps might have been taken to
butting suddenly). Or again, the animal was slain in detestation of the
sin; and lest men should be horrified at the sight thereof.
Reply to Objection 12: The literal reason for this commandment, as
Rabbi Moses declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the slayer was
frequently from the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of the calf was
a means of investigating the hidden murder. This was brought about in
three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore that they
had taken every measure for safeguarding the roads. Secondly, the owner
of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of his beast, and if the
murder was previously discovered, the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the
place, where the heifer was slain, remained uncultivated. Wherefore, in
order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of the city would readily
make known the murderer, if they knew who he was: and it would seldom
happen but that some word or sign would escape about the matter. Or
again, this was done in order to frighten people, in detestation of
murder. Because the slaying of a heifer, which is a useful animal and
full of strength, especially before it has been put under the yoke,
signified that whoever committed murder, however useful and strong he
might be, was to forfeit his life; and that, by a cruel death, which
was implied by the striking off of its head; and that the murderer, as
vile and abject, was to be cut off from the fellowship of men, which
was betokened by the fact that the heifer after being slain was left to
rot in a rough and uncultivated place.
Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of
Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no sin; nor did
it plough the ground, i.e. it never knew the stain of revolt. The fact
of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated valley signified the
despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the
devil is shown to be the arch-murderer.
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Whether the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were framed in a suitabl
e
manner?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding
foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said (Acts 10:34,35):
"In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but in
every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh justice is acceptable to
Him." But those who are acceptable to God should not be excluded from
the Church of God. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Dt. 23:3) that
"the Ammonite and the Moabite, even after the tenth generation, shall
not enter into the church of the Lord for ever": whereas, on the other
hand, it is prescribed (Dt. 23:7) to be observed with regard to certain
other nations: "Thou shalt not abhor the Edomite, because he is thy
brother; nor the Egyptian because thou wast a stranger in his land."
Objection 2: Further, we do not deserve to be punished for those things
which are not in our power. But it is not in man's power to be an
eunuch, or born of a prostitute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded
(Dt. 23:1,2) that "an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not
enter into the church of the Lord."
Objection 3: Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers to be
molested: for it is written (Ex. 22:21): "Thou shalt not molest a
stranger, nor afflict him; for yourselves also were strangers in the
land of Egypt": and (Ex. 23:9): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, for
you know the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in the
land of Egypt." But it is an affliction to be burdened with usury.
Therefore the Law unsuitably permitted them (Dt. 23:19,20) to lend
money to the stranger for usury.
Objection 4: Further, men are much more akin to us than trees. But we
should show greater care and love for these things that are nearest to
us, according to Ecclus. 13:19: "Every beast loveth its like: so also
every man him that is nearest to himself." Therefore the Lord
unsuitably commanded (Dt. 20:13-19) that all the inhabitants of a
captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-trees should
not be cut down.
Objection 5: Further, every one should prefer the common good of virtue
to the good of the individual. But the common good is sought in a war
which men fight against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably
commanded (Dt. 20:5-7) that certain men should be sent home, for
instance a man that had built a new house, or who had planted a
vineyard, or who had married a wife.
Objection 6: Further, no man should profit by his own fault. But it is
a man's fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: since this is contrary
to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore the timid and faint-hearted are
unfittingly excused from the toil of battle (Dt. 20:8).
On the contrary, Divine Wisdom declares (Prov. 8:8): "All my words are
just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them."
I answer that, Man's relations with foreigners are twofold: peaceful,
and hostile: and in directing both kinds of relation the Law contained
suitable precepts. For the Jews were offered three opportunities of
peaceful relations with foreigners. First, when foreigners passed
through their land as travelers. Secondly, when they came to dwell in
their land as newcomers. And in both these respects the Law made kind
provision in its precepts: for it is written (Ex. 22:21): "Thou shalt
not molest a stranger [advenam]"; and again (Ex. 22:9): "Thou shalt not
molest a stranger [peregrino]." Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to
be admitted entirely to their fellowship and mode of worship. With
regard to these a certain order was observed. For they were not at once
admitted to citizenship: just as it was law with some nations that no
one was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 1). The reason for this was that if
foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon
as they settled down in its midst, many dangers might occur, since the
foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart might attempt
something hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the Law prescribed
in respect of certain nations that had close relations with the Jews
(viz., the Egyptians among whom they were born and educated, and the
Idumeans, the children of Esau, Jacob's brother), that they should be
admitted to the fellowship of the people after the third generation;
whereas others (with whom their relations had been hostile, such as the
Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be admitted to citizenship; while
the Amalekites, who were yet more hostile to them, and had no
fellowship of kindred with them, were to be held as foes in perpetuity:
for it is written (Ex. 17:16): "The war of the Lord shall be against
Amalec from generation to generation."
In like manner with regard to hostile relations with foreigners, the
Law contained suitable precepts. For, in the first place, it commanded
that war should be declared for a just cause: thus it is commanded (Dt.
20:10) that when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first
make an offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined that when once they had
entered on a war they should undauntedly persevere in it, putting their
trust in God. And in order that they might be the more heedful of this
command, it ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should
hearten them by promising them God's aid. Thirdly, it prescribed the
removal of whatever might prove an obstacle to the fight, and that
certain men, who might be in the way, should be sent home. Fourthly, it
enjoined that they should use moderation in pursuing the advantage of
victory, by sparing women and children, and by not cutting down
fruit-trees of that country.
Reply to Objection 1: The Law excluded the men of no nation from the
worship of God and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul:
for it is written (Ex. 12:48): "If any stranger be willing to dwell
among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first
be circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner,
and he shall be as that which is born in the land." But in temporal
matters concerning the public life of the people, admission was not
granted to everyone at once, for the reason given above: but to some,
i.e. the Egyptians and Idumeans, in the third generation; while others
were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation of their past offense, i.e.
the peoples of Moab, Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one man is punished
for a sin committed by him, in order that others seeing this may be
deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one nation or city be
punished for a crime, that others may refrain from similar crimes.
Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted
to citizenship on account of some act of virtue: thus it is related
(Judith 14:6) that Achior, the captain of the children of Ammon, "was
joined to the people of Israel, with all the succession of his
kindred." The same applies to Ruth the Moabite who was "a virtuous
woman" (Ruth 3:11): although it may be said that this prohibition
regarded men and not women, who are not competent to be citizens
absolutely speaking.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3), a man is
said to be a citizen in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in a
restricted sense. A man is a citizen simply if he has all the rights of
citizenship, for instance, the right of debating or voting in the
popular assembly. On the other hand, any man may be called citizen,
only in a restricted sense, if he dwells within the state, even common
people or children or old men, who are not fit to enjoy power in
matters pertaining to the common weal. For this reason bastards, by
reason of their base origin, were excluded from the "ecclesia," i.e.
from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation. The same
applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive the honor due to
a father, especially among the Jews, where the divine worship was
continued through carnal generation: for even among the heathens, those
who had many children were marked with special honor, as the
Philosopher remarks (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters pertaining
to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from others, as
neither were strangers, as already stated: for it is written (Isa.
56:3): "Let not the son of the stranger that adhereth to the Lord
speak, saying: The Lord will divide and separate me from His people.
And let not the eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree."
Reply to Objection 3: It was not the intention of the Law to sanction
the acceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it on
account of the proneness of the Jews to avarice; and in order to
promote an amicable feeling towards those out of whom they made a
profit.
Reply to Objection 4: A distinction was observed with regard to hostile
cities. For some of them were far distant, and were not among those
which had been promised to them. When they had taken these cities, they
killed all the men who had fought against God's people; whereas the
women and children were spared. But in the neighboring cities which had
been promised to them, all were ordered to be slain, on account of
their former crimes, to punish which God sent the Israelites as
executor of Divine justice: for it is written (Dt. 9:5) "because they
have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy coming in." The
fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched, for the use of the
people themselves, to whom the city with its territory was destined to
be subjected.
Reply to Objection 5: The builder of a new house, the planter of a
vineyard, the newly married husband, were excluded from fighting, for
two reasons. First, because man is wont to give all his affection to
those things which he has lately acquired, or is on the point of
having, and consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above
other things. Wherefore it was likely enough that on account of this
affection they would fear death all the more, and be so much the less
brave in battle. Secondly, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii,
5), "it is a misfortune for a man if he is prevented from obtaining
something good when it is within his grasp." And so lest the surviving
relations should be the more grieved at the death of these men who had
not entered into the possession of the good things prepared for them;
and also lest the people should be horror-stricken at the sight of
their misfortune: these men were taken away from the danger of death by
being removed from the battle.
Reply to Objection 6: The timid were sent back home, not that they
might be the gainers thereby; but lest the people might be the losers
by their presence, since their timidity and flight might cause others
to be afraid and run away.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Old Law set forth suitable precepts about the members of the
household?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable
precepts about the members of the household. For a slave "is in every
respect his master's property," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i,
2). But that which is a man's property should be his always. Therefore
it was unfitting for the Law to command (Ex. 21:2) that slaves should
"go out free" in the seventh year.
Objection 2: Further, a slave is his master's property, just as an
animal, e.g. an ass or an ox. But it is commanded (Dt. 22:1-3) with
regard to animals, that they should be brought back to the owner if
they be found going astray. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Dt.
23:15): "Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is fled
to thee."
Objection 3: Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy more even
than the human law. But according to human laws those who ill-treat
their servants and maidservants are severely punished: and the worse
treatment of all seems to be that which results in death. Therefore it
is unfittingly commanded (Ex. 21:20,21) that "he that striketh his
bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they die under his hands . . . if
the party remain alive a day . . . he shall not be subject to the
punishment, because it is his money."
Objection 4: Further, the dominion of a master over his slave differs
from that of the father over his son (Polit. i, 3). But the dominion of
master over slave gives the former the right to sell his servant or
maidservant. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to allow a man to
sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid (Ex. 21:7).
Objection 5: Further, a father has power over his son. But he who has
power over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses.
Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Dt. 21:18, seqq.) that a father
should bring his son to the ancients of the city for punishment.
Objection 6: Further, the Lord forbade them (Dt. 7:3, seqq.) to make
marriages with strange nations; and commanded the dissolution of such
as had been contracted (1 Esdras 10). Therefore it was unfitting to
allow them to marry captive women from strange nations (Dt. 21:10,
seqq.).
Objection 7: Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain
degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to Lev. 18. Therefore
it was unsuitably commanded (Dt. 25:5) that if any man died without
issue, his brother should marry his wife.
Objection 8: Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man
and wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this is
impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was
unfitting for the Lord to allow (Dt. 24:1-4) a man to put his wife
away, by writing a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not take
her again to wife.
Objection 9: Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her husband,
so can a slave be to his master, and a son to his father. But the Law
did not command any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate the
injury done by a servant to his master, or by a son to his father.
Therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe
the "sacrifice of jealousy" in order to investigate a wife's adultery
(Num. 5:12, seqq.). Consequently it seems that the Law put forth
unsuitable judicial precepts about the members of the household.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The judgments of the Lord
are true, justified in themselves."
I answer that, The mutual relations of the members of a household
regard everyday actions directed to the necessities of life, as the
Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1). Now the preservation of man's life
may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of
view of the individual, i.e. in so far as man preserves his
individuality: and for the purpose of the preservation of life,
considered from this standpoint, man has at his service external goods,
by means of which he provides himself with food and clothing and other
such necessaries of life: in the handling of which he has need of
servants. Secondly man's life is preserved from the point of view of
the species, by means of generation, for which purpose man needs a
wife, that she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual relations
of the members of a household admit of a threefold combination: viz.
those of master and servant, those of husband and wife, and those of
father and son: and in respect of all these relationships the Old Law
contained fitting precepts. Thus, with regard to servants, it commanded
them to be treated with moderation---both as to their work, lest, to
wit, they should be burdened with excessive labor, wherefore the Lord
commanded (Dt. 5:14) that on the Sabbath day "thy manservant and thy
maidservant" should "rest even as thyself"---and also as to the
infliction of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed their
servants, to set them free (Ex. 21:26,27). Similar provision was made
in favor of a maidservant when married to anyone (Ex. 21:7, seqq.).
Moreover, with regard to those servants in particular who were taken
from among the people, the Law prescribed that they should go out free
in the seventh year taking whatever they brought with them, even their
clothes (Ex. 21:2, seqq.): and furthermore it was commanded (Dt. 15:13)
that they should be given provision for the journey.
With regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions as to those who
were to be taken in marriage: for instance, that they should marry a
wife from their own tribe (Num. 36:6): and this lest confusion should
ensue in the property of various tribes. Also that a man should marry
the wife of his deceased brother when the latter died without issue, as
prescribed in Dt. 25:5,6: and this in order that he who could not have
successors according to carnal origin, might at least have them by a
kind of adoption, and that thus the deceased might not be entirely
forgotten. It also forbade them to marry certain women; to wit, women
of strange nations, through fear of their losing their faith; and those
of their near kindred, on account of the natural respect due to them.
Furthermore it prescribed in what way wives were to be treated after
marriage. To wit, that they should not be slandered without grave
reason: wherefore it ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who
falsely accused his wife of a crime (Dt. 22:13, seqq.). Also that a
man's hatred of his wife should not be detrimental to his son (Dt.
21:15, seqq.). Again, that a man should not ill-use his wife through
hatred of her, but rather that he should write a bill of divorce and
send her away (Dt. 24:1). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love
from the very outset, it was prescribed that no public duties should be
laid on a recently married man, so that he might be free to rejoice
with his wife.
With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by
instructing them in the faith: hence it is written (Ex. 12:26, seqq.):
"When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning of this
service? You shall say to them: It is the victim of the passage of the
Lord." Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of right
conduct: wherefore it is written (Dt. 21:20) that the parents had to
say: "He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to
revelling and to debauchery."
Reply to Objection 1: As the children of Israel had been delivered by
the Lord from slavery, and for this reason were bound to the service of
God, He did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is
written (Lev. 25:39, seqq.): "If thy brother, constrained by poverty,
sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of
bondservants: but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner . . . for
they are My servants, and I brought them out of the land of Egypt: let
them not be sold as bondmen": and consequently, since they were slaves,
not absolutely but in a restricted sense, after a lapse of time they
were set free.
Reply to Objection 2: This commandment is to be understood as referring
to a servant whom his master seeks to kill, or to help him in
committing some sin.
Reply to Objection 3: With regard to the ill-treatment of servants, the
Law seems to have taken into consideration whether it was certain or
not: since if it were certain, the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming,
the penalty was forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered to be given
his liberty: while for slaying, the punishment was that of a murderer,
when the slave died under the blow of his master. If, however, the hurt
was not certain, but only probable, the Law did not impose any penalty
as regards a man's own servant: for instance if the servant did not die
at once after being struck, but after some days: for it would be
uncertain whether he died as a result of the blows he received. For
when a man struck a free man, yet so that he did not die at once, but
"walked abroad again upon his staff," he that struck him was quit of
murder, even though afterwards he died. Nevertheless he was bound to
pay the doctor's fees incurred by the victim of his assault. But this
was not the case if a man killed his own servant: because whatever the
servant had, even his very person, was the property of his master.
Hence the reason for his not being subject to a pecuniary penalty is
set down as being "because it is his money."
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above (ad 1), no Jew could own a Jew as
a slave absolutely: but only in a restricted sense, as a hireling for a
fixed time. And in this way the Law permitted that through stress of
poverty a man might sell his son or daughter. This is shown by the very
words of the Law, where we read: "If any man sell his daughter to be a
servant, she shall not go out as bondwomen are wont to go out."
Moreover, in this way a man might sell not only his son, but even
himself, rather as a hireling than as a slave, according to Lev.
25:39,40: "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to
thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants: but
he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner."
Reply to Objection 5: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9), the
paternal authority has the power only of admonition; but not that of
coercion, whereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be compelled.
Hence in this case the Lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished
by the rulers of the city.
Reply to Objection 6: The Lord forbade them to marry strange women on
account of the danger of seduction, lest they should be led astray into
idolatry. And specially did this prohibition apply with respect to
those nations who dwelt near them, because it was more probable that
they would adopt their religious practices. When, however, the woman
was willing to renounce idolatry, and become an adherent of the Law, it
was lawful to take her in marriage: as was the case with Ruth whom Booz
married. Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law (Ruth 1:16): "Thy
people shall be my people, and thy God my God." Accordingly it was not
permitted to marry a captive woman unless she first shaved her hair,
and pared her nails, and put off the raiment wherein she was taken, and
mourned for her father and mother, in token that she renounced idolatry
for ever.
Reply to Objection 7: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii super Matth.),
"because death was an unmitigated evil for the Jews, who did everything
with a view to the present life, it was ordained that children should
be born to the dead man through his brother: thus affording a certain
mitigation to his death. It was not, however, ordained that any other
than his brother or one next of kin should marry the wife of the
deceased, because" the offspring of this union "would not be looked
upon as that of the deceased: and moreover, a stranger would not be
under the obligation to support the household of the deceased, as his
brother would be bound to do from motives of justice on account of his
relationship." Hence it is evident that in marrying the wife of his
dead brother, he took his dead brother's place.
Reply to Objection 8: The Law permitted a wife to be divorced, not as
though it were just absolutely speaking, but on account of the Jews'
hardness of heart, as Our Lord declared (Mat. 19:8). Of this, however,
we must speak more fully in the treatise on Matrimony (SP, Q[67]).
Reply to Objection 9: Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery,
both easily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since "the eye of
the adulterer observeth darkness" (Job 24:15). But this does not apply
to a son in respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his
master: because the latter infidelity is not the result of the lust of
pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden like the
infidelity of an adulterous woman.
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OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FOUR
ARTICLES)
In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel which
is called the New Law: and in the first place we must consider it in
itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we shall
treat of those things that are contained in the New Law. Under the
first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it instilled
in the heart?
(2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify?
(3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of the
world?
(4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will
another law take its place?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the New Law is a written law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is a written law. For the
New Law is just the same as the Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth in
writing, according to Jn. 20:31: "But these are written that you may
believe." Therefore the New Law is a written law.
Objection 2: Further, the law that is instilled in the heart is the
natural law, according to Rom. 2:14,15: "(The Gentiles) do by nature
those things that are of the law . . . who have [Vulg.: 'show'] the
work of the law written in their hearts." If therefore the law of the
Gospel were instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from the
law of nature.
Objection 3: Further, the law of the Gospel is proper to those who are
in the state of the New Testament. But the law that is instilled in the
heart is common to those who are in the New Testament and to those who
are in the Old Testament: for it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine
Wisdom "through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh
the friends of God and prophets." Therefore the New Law is not
instilled in our hearts.
On the contrary, The New Law is the law of the New Testament. But the
law of the New Testament is instilled in our hearts. For the Apostle,
quoting the authority ofJeremiah 31:31, 33: "Behold the days shall
come, saith the Lord; and I will perfect unto the house of Israel, and
unto the house of Judah, a new testament," says, explaining what this
statement is (Heb. 8:8, 10): "For this is the testament which I will
make to the house of Israel . . . by giving [Vulg.: 'I will give'] My
laws into their mind, and in their heart will I write them." Therefore
the New Law is instilled in our hearts.
I answer that, "Each thing appears to be that which preponderates in
it," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 8). Now that which is
preponderant in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its
efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given
through faith in Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace
itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe in
Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle who says (Rom. 3:27):
"Where is . . . thy boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of works?
No, but by the law of faith": for he calls the grace itself of faith "a
law." And still more clearly it is written (Rom. 8:2): "The law of the
spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the law of sin
and of death." Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxiv) that "as
the law of deeds was written on tables of stone, so is the law of faith
inscribed on the hearts of the faithful": and elsewhere, in the same
book (xxi): "What else are the Divine laws written by God Himself on
our hearts, but the very presence of His Holy Spirit?"
Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to
receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and pertaining to the use of that
grace: such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in the New
Law; and the faithful need to be instructed concerning them, both by
word and writing, both as to what they should believe and as to what
they should do. Consequently we must say that the New Law is in the
first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that secondarily
it is a written law.
Reply to Objection 1: The Gospel writings contain only such things as
pertain to the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing us thereto,
or by directing us to the use thereof. Thus with regard to the
intellect, the Gospel contains certain matters pertaining to the
manifestation of Christ's Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by
means of faith through which we receive the grace of the Holy Ghost:
and with regard to the affections, it contains matters touching the
contempt of the world, whereby man is rendered fit to receive the grace
of the Holy Ghost: for "the world," i.e. worldly men, "cannot receive"
the Holy Ghost (Jn. 14:17). As to the use of spiritual grace, this
consists in works of virtue to which the writings of the New Testament
exhort men in divers ways.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which a thing may be
instilled into man. First, through being part of his nature, and thus
the natural law is instilled into man. Secondly, a thing is instilled
into man by being, as it were, added on to his nature by a gift of
grace. In this way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by
indicating to him what he should do, but also by helping him to
accomplish it.
Reply to Objection 3: No man ever had the grace of the Holy Ghost
except through faith in Christ either explicit or implicit: and by
faith in Christ man belongs to the New Testament. Consequently whoever
had the law of grace instilled into them belonged to the New Testament.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the New Law justifies?
Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law does not justify. For no
man is justified unless he obeys God's law, according to Heb. 5:9:
"He," i.e. Christ, "became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal
salvation." But the Gospel does not always cause men to believe in it:
for it is written (Rom. 10:16): "All do not obey the Gospel." Therefore
the New Law does not justify.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle to the Romans
that the Old Law did not justify, because transgression increased at
its advent: for it is stated (Rom. 4:15): "The Law worketh wrath: for
where there is no law, neither is there transgression." But much more
did the New Law increase transgression: since he who sins after the
giving of the New Law deserves greater punishment, according to Heb.
10:28,29: "A man making void the Law of Moses dieth without any mercy
under two or three witnesses. How much more, do you think, he deserveth
worse punishments, who hath trodden underfoot the Son of God," etc.?
Therefore the New Law, like the Old Law, does not justify.
Objection 3: Further, justification is an effect proper to God,
according to Rom. 8:33: "God that justifieth." But the Old Law was from
God just as the New Law. Therefore the New Law does not justify any
more than the Old Law.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 1:16): "I am not ashamed of the
Gospel: for it is in the power of God unto salvation to everyone that
believeth." But there is no salvation but to those who are justified.
Therefore the Law of the Gospel justifies.
I answer that, As stated above [2138](A[1]), there is a twofold element
in the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, viz. the grace of
the Holy Ghost bestowed inwardly. And as to this, the New Law
justifies. Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xvii): "There," i.e.
in the Old Testament, "the Law was set forth in an outward fashion,
that the ungodly might be afraid"; "here," i.e. in the New Testament,
"it is given in an inward manner, that they may be justified." The
other element of the Evangelical Law is secondary: namely, the
teachings of faith, and those commandments which direct human
affections and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does not
justify. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6) "The letter killeth, but
the spirit quickeneth": and Augustine explains this (De Spir. et Lit.
xiv, xvii) by saying that the letter denotes any writing external to
man, even that of the moral precepts such as are contained in the
Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel would kill, unless
there were the inward presence of the healing grace of faith.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds true of the New Law, not as
to its principal, but as to its secondary element: i.e. as to the
dogmas and precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in
writing.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the grace of the New Testament helps man
to avoid sin, yet it does not so confirm man in good that he cannot
sin: for this belongs to the state of glory. Hence if a man sin after
receiving the grace of the New Testament, he deserves greater
punishment, as being ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not using
the help given to him. And this is why the New Law is not said to "work
wrath": because as far as it is concerned it gives man sufficient help
to avoid sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The same God gave both the New and the Old Law,
but in different ways. For He gave the Old Law written on tables of
stone: whereas He gave the New Law written "in the fleshly tables of
the heart," as the Apostle expresses it (2 Cor. 3:3). Wherefore, as
Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xviii), "the Apostle calls this letter
which is written outside man, a ministration of death and a
ministration of condemnation: whereas he calls the other letter, i.e.
the Law of the New Testament, the ministration of the spirit and the
ministration of justice: because through the gift of the Spirit we work
justice, and are delivered from the condemnation due to transgression."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law should have been given from
the beginning of the world. "For there is no respect of persons with
God" (Rom. 2:11). But "all" men "have sinned and do need the glory of
God" (Rom. 3:23). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have been
given from the beginning of the world, in order that it might bring
succor to all.
Objection 2: Further, as men dwell in various places, so do they live
in various times. But God, "Who will have all men to be saved" (1 Tim.
2:4), commanded the Gospel to be preached in all places, as may be seen
in the last chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the Law of the
Gospel should have been at hand for all times, so as to be given from
the beginning of the world.
Objection 3: Further, man needs to save his soul, which is for all
eternity, more than to save his body, which is a temporal matter. But
God provided man from the beginning of the world with things that are
necessary for the health of his body, by subjecting to his power
whatever was created for the sake of man (Gn. 1:26-29). Therefore the
New Law also, which is very necessary for the health of the soul,
should have been given to man from the beginning of the world.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was not first
which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But the New Law is
highly spiritual. Therefore it was not fitting for it to be given from
the beginning of the world.
I answer that, Three reasons may be assigned why it was not fitting for
the New Law to be given from the beginning of the world. The first is
because the New Law, as stated above [2139](A[1]), consists chiefly in
the grace of the Holy Ghost: which it behoved not to be given
abundantly until sin, which is an obstacle to grace, had been cast out
of man through the accomplishment of his redemption by Christ:
wherefore it is written (Jn. 7:39): "As yet the Spirit was not given,
because Jesus was not yet glorified." This reason the Apostle states
clearly (Rom. 8:2, seqq.) where, after speaking of "the Law of the
Spirit of life," he adds: "God sending His own Son, in the likeness of
sinful flesh, of sin* hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the
justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." [*St. Thomas,
quoting perhaps from memory, omits the "et" (and), after "sinful
flesh." The text quoted should read thus: "in the likeness of sinful
flesh, and a sin offering ({peri hamartias}), hath," etc.]
A second reason may be taken from the perfection of the New Law.
Because a thing is not brought to perfection at once from the outset,
but through an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a boy,
and then a man. And this reason is stated by the Apostle (Gal.
3:24,25): "The Law was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be
justified by faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer under
a pedagogue."
The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law is the law of
grace: wherefore it behoved man first of all to be left to himself
under the state of the Old Law, so that through falling into sin, he
might realize his weakness, and acknowledge his need of grace. This
reason is set down by the Apostle (Rom. 5:20): "The Law entered in,
that sin might abound: and when sin abounded grace did more abound."
Reply to Objection 1: Mankind on account of the sin of our first
parents deserved to be deprived of the aid of grace: and so "from whom
it is withheld it is justly withheld, and to whom it is given, it is
mercifully given," as Augustine states (De Perfect. Justit. iv) [*Cf.
Ep. ccvii; De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. ii, 19]. Consequently it does not
follow that there is respect of persons with God, from the fact that He
did not offer the Law of grace to all from the beginning of the world,
which Law was to be published in due course of time, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The state of mankind does not vary according to
diversity of place, but according to succession of time. Hence the New
Law avails for all places, but not for all times: although at all times
there have been some persons belonging to the New Testament, as stated
above (A[1], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Things pertaining to the health of the body are
of service to man as regards his nature, which sin does not destroy:
whereas things pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to
grace, which is forfeit through sin. Consequently the comparison will
not hold.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the New Law will last till the end of the world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law will not last until the end
of the world. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10), "when that
which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away."
But the New Law is "in part," since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:9): "We
know in part and we prophesy in part." Therefore the New Law is to be
done away, and will be succeeded by a more perfect state.
Objection 2: Further, Our Lord (Jn. 16:13) promised His disciples the
knowledge of all truth when the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, should come.
But the Church knows not yet all truth in the state of the New
Testament. Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein all
truth will be revealed by the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, just as the Father is distinct from the Son and
the Son from the Father, so is the Holy Ghost distinct from the Father
and the Son. But there was a state corresponding with the Person of the
Father, viz. the state of the Old Law, wherein men were intent on
begetting children: and likewise there is a state corresponding to the
Person of the Son: viz. the state of the New Law, wherein the clergy
who are intent on wisdom (which is appropriated to the Son) hold a
prominent place. Therefore there will be a third state corresponding to
the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual men will hold the first place.
Objection 4: Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:14): "This Gospel of the
kingdom shall be preached in the whole world . . . and then shall the
consummation come." But the Gospel of Christ is already preached
throughout the whole world: and yet the consummation has not yet come.
Therefore the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom, but
another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is to come yet, like unto
another Law.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:34): "I say to you that this
generation shall not pass till all (these) things be done": which
passage Chrysostom (Hom. lxxvii) explains as referring to "the
generation of those that believe in Christ." Therefore the state of
those who believe in Christ will last until the consummation of the
world.
I answer that, The state of the world may change in two ways. In one
way, according to a change of law: and thus no other state will succeed
this state of the New Law. Because the state of the New Law succeeded
the state of the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less perfect one. Now
no state of the present life can be more perfect that the state of the
New Law: since nothing can approach nearer to the last end than that
which is the immediate cause of our being brought to the last end. But
the New Law does this: wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 10:19-22):
"Having therefore, brethren, a confidence in the entering into the
Holies by the blood of Christ, a new . . . way which He hath dedicated
for us . . . let us draw near." Therefore no state of the present life
can be more perfect than that of the New Law, since the nearer a thing
is to the last end the more perfect it is.
In another way the state of mankind may change according as man stands
in relation to one and the same law more or less perfectly. And thus
the state of the Old Law underwent frequent changes, since at times the
laws were very well kept, and at other times were altogether unheeded.
Thus, too, the state of the New Law is subject to change with regard to
various places, times, and persons, according as the grace of the Holy
Ghost dwells in man more or less perfectly. Nevertheless we are not to
look forward to a state wherein man is to possess the grace of the Holy
Ghost more perfectly than he has possessed it hitherto, especially the
apostles who "received the firstfruits of the Spirit, i.e. sooner and
more abundantly than others," as a gloss expounds on Rom. 8:23.
Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), there is a
threefold state of mankind; the first was under the Old Law; the second
is that of the New Law; the third will take place not in this life, but
in heaven. But as the first state is figurative and imperfect in
comparison with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state
figurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly state, with
the advent of which the present state will be done away as expressed in
that very passage (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner; but then face to face."
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 31),
Montanus and Priscilla pretended that Our Lord's promise to give the
Holy Ghost was fulfilled, not in the apostles, but in themselves. In
like manner the Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes
whom they held to be the Paraclete. Hence none of the above received
the Acts of the Apostles, where it is clearly shown that the aforesaid
promise was fulfilled in the apostles: just as Our Lord promised them a
second time (Acts 1:5): "You shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not
many days hence": which we read as having been fulfilled in Acts 2.
However, these foolish notions are refuted by the statement (Jn. 7:39)
that "as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet
glorified"; from which we gather that the Holy Ghost was given as soon
as Christ was glorified in His Resurrection and Ascension. Moreover,
this puts out of court the senseless idea that the Holy Ghost is to be
expected to come at some other time.
Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in respect of matters
necessary for salvation; those things, to wit, that we are bound to
believe and to do. But He did not teach them about all future events:
for this did not regard them according to Acts 1:7: "It is not for you
to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own
power."
Reply to Objection 3: The Old Law corresponded not only to the Father,
but also to the Son: because Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Law.
Hence Our Lord said (Jn. 5:46): "If you did believe Moses, you would
perhaps believe me also; for he wrote of Me." In like manner the New
Law corresponds not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost;
according to Rom. 8:2: "The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,"
etc. Hence we are not to look forward to another law corresponding to
the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 4: Since Christ said at the very outset of the
preaching of the Gospel: "The kingdom of heaven is at hand" (Mat.
4:17), it is most absurd to say that the Gospel of Christ is not the
Gospel of the kingdom. But the preaching of the Gospel of Christ may be
understood in two ways. First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the
knowledge of Christ: and thus the Gospel was preached throughout the
world even at the time of the apostles, as Chrysostom states (Hom. lxxv
in Matth.). And in this sense the words that follow---"and then shall
the consummation come," refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, of which
He was speaking literally. Secondly, the preaching of the Gospel may be
understood as extending throughout the world and producing its full
effect, so that, to wit, the Church would be founded in every nation.
And in these sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius (Epist. cxcix),
the Gospel is not preached to the whole world yet, but, when it is, the
consummation of the world will come.
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OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under which
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?
(2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?
(3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?
(4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law?
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Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is not distinct from the
Old. Because both these laws were given to those who believe in God:
since "without faith it is impossible to please God," according to Heb.
11:6. But the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, as the
gloss says on Mat. 21:9. Therefore the law is the same also.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Adamant. Manich. discip.
xvii) that "there is little difference between the Law and Gospel"
[*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' and
'amor']---"fear and love." But the New and Old Laws cannot be
differentiated in respect of these two things: since even the Old Law
comprised precepts of charity: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor" (Lev.
19:18), and: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" (Dt. 6:5). In like
manner neither can they differ according to the other difference which
Augustine assigns (Contra Faust. iv, 2), viz. that "the Old Testament
contained temporal promises, whereas the New Testament contains
spiritual and eternal promises": since even the New Testament contains
temporal promises, according to Mk. 10:30: He shall receive "a hundred
times as much . . . in this time, houses and brethren," etc.: while in
the Old Testament they hoped in promises spiritual and eternal,
according to Heb. 11:16: "But now they desire a better, that is to say,
a heavenly country," which is said of the patriarchs. Therefore it
seems that the New Law is not distinct from the Old.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish both laws by
calling the Old Law "a law of works," and the New Law "a law of faith"
(Rom. 3:27). But the Old Law was also a law of faith, according to Heb.
11:39: "All were [Vulg.: 'All these being'] approved by the testimony
of faith," which he says of the fathers of the Old Testament. In like
manner the New Law is a law of works: since it is written (Mat. 5:44):
"Do good to them that hate you"; and (Lk. 22:19): "Do this for a
commemoration of Me." Therefore the New Law is not distinct from the
Old.
On the contrary, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): "The priesthood being
translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law."
But the priesthood of the New Testament is distinct from that of the
Old, as the Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore the Law is also
distinct.
I answer that, As stated above ([2140]Q[90], A[2];[2141] Q[91], A[4]),
every law ordains human conduct to some end. Now things ordained to an
end may be divided in two ways, considered from the point of view of
the end. First, through being ordained to different ends: and this
difference will be specific, especially if such ends are proximate.
Secondly, by reason of being closely or remotely connected with the
end. Thus it is clear that movements differ in species through being
directed to different terms: while according as one part of a movement
is nearer to the term than another part, the difference of perfect and
imperfect movement is assessed.
Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in two
ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from the fact that they
are ordained to diverse ends: thus a state-law ordained to democratic
government, would differ specifically from a law ordained to government
by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be distinguished from one
another, through one of them being more closely connected with the end,
and the other more remotely: thus in one and the same state there is
one law enjoined on men of mature age, who can forthwith accomplish
that which pertains to the common good; and another law regulating the
education of children who need to be taught how they are to achieve
manly deeds later on.
We must therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law is
not distinct from the Old Law: because they both have the same end,
namely, man's subjection to God; and there is but one God of the New
and of the Old Testament, according to Rom. 3:30: "It is one God that
justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith."
According to the second way, the New Law is distinct from the Old Law:
because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of children, as the Apostle
says (Gal. 3:24), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since
it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says (Col. 3:14) that it
is "the bond of perfection."
Reply to Objection 1: The unity of faith under both Testaments
witnesses to the unity of end: for it has been stated above
([2142]Q[62], A[2]) that the object of the theological virtues, among
which is faith, is the last end. Yet faith had a different state in the
Old and in the New Law: since what they believed as future, we believe
as fact.
Reply to Objection 2: All the differences assigned between the Old and
New Laws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection.
For the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the
imperfect, who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are
directed in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those who are
perfected by the possession of virtuous habits are directed in another
way. For those who as yet are not endowed with virtuous habits, are
directed to the performance of virtuous acts by reason of some outward
cause: for instance, by the threat of punishment, or the promise of
some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the like. Hence the
Old Law, which was given to men who were imperfect, that is, who had
not yet received spiritual grace, was called the "law of fear,"
inasmuch as it induced men to observe its commandments by threatening
them with penalties; and is spoken of as containing temporal promises.
On the other hand, those who are possessed of virtue, are inclined to
do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not on account of some
extrinsic punishment or reward. Hence the New Law which derives its
pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled into our hearts, is
called the "Law of love": and it is described as containing spiritual
and eternal promises, which are objects of the virtues, chiefly of
charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined of themselves to those
objects, not as to something foreign but as to something of their own.
For this reason, too, the Old Law is described as "restraining the
hand, not the will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]; since when a
man refrains from some sins through fear of being punished, his will
does not shrink simply from sin, as does the will of a man who refrains
from sin through love of righteousness: and hence the New Law, which is
the Law of love, is said to restrain the will.
Nevertheless there were some in the state of the Old Testament who,
having charity and the grace of the Holy Ghost, looked chiefly to
spiritual and eternal promises: and in this respect they belonged to
the New Law. In like manner in the New Testament there are some carnal
men who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New Law; and
these it was necessary, even under the New Testament, to lead to
virtuous action by the fear of punishment and by temporal promises.
But although the Old Law contained precepts of charity, nevertheless it
did not confer the Holy Ghost by Whom "charity . . . is spread abroad
in our hearts" (Rom. 5:5).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2143]Q[106], AA[1],2), the New
Law is called the law of faith, in so far as its pre-eminence is
derived from that very grace which is given inwardly to believers, and
for this reason is called the grace of faith. Nevertheless it consists
secondarily in certain deeds, moral and sacramental: but the New Law
does not consist chiefly in these latter things, as did the Old Law. As
to those under the Old Testament who through faith were acceptable to
God, in this respect they belonged to the New Testament: for they were
not justified except through faith in Christ, Who is the Author of the
New Testament. Hence of Moses the Apostle says (Heb. 11:26) that he
esteemed "the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasure of
the Egyptians."
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Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?
Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law does not fulfil the Old.
Because to fulfil and to void are contrary. But the New Law voids or
excludes the observances of the Old Law: for the Apostle says (Gal.
5:2): "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing."
Therefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old.
Objection 2: Further, one contrary is not the fulfilment of another.
But Our Lord propounded in the New Law precepts that were contrary to
precepts of the Old Law. For we read (Mat. 5:27-32): You have heard
that it was said to them of old: . . . "Whosoever shall put away his
wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. But I say to you that
whosoever shall put away his wife . . . maketh her to commit adultery."
Furthermore, the same evidently applies to the prohibition against
swearing, against retaliation, and against hating one's enemies. In
like manner Our Lord seems to have done away with the precepts of the
Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods (Mat. 15:11): "Not
that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man: but what cometh out
of the mouth, this defileth a man." Therefore the New Law is not a
fulfilment of the Old.
Objection 3: Further, whoever acts against a law does not fulfil the
law. But Christ in certain cases acted against the Law. For He touched
the leper (Mat. 8:3), which was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems
to have frequently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of
Him (Jn. 9:16): "This man is not of God, who keepeth not the sabbath."
Therefore Christ did not fulfil the Law: and so the New Law given by
Christ is not a fulfilment of the Old.
Objection 4: Further, the Old Law contained precepts, moral,
ceremonial, and judicial, as stated above ([2144]Q[99], A[4]). But Our
Lord (Mat. 5) fulfilled the Law in some respects, but without
mentioning the judicial and ceremonial precepts. Therefore it seems
that the New Law is not a complete fulfilment of the Old.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 5:17): "I am not come to destroy,
but to fulfil": and went on to say (Mat. 5:18): "One jot or one tittle
shall not pass of the Law till all be fulfilled."
I answer that, As stated above [2145](A[1]), the New Law is compared to
the Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect fulfils
that which is lacking in the imperfect. And accordingly the New Law
fulfils the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law.
Now two things of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous, as
was stated above ([2146]Q[92], A[1]): and consequently the end of the
Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not
accomplish this: but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and
promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils the Old
by justifying men through the power of Christ's Passion. This is what
the Apostle says (Rom. 8:3,4): "What the Law could not do . . . God
sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh . . . hath
condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be
fulfilled in us." And in this respect, the New Law gives what the Old
Law promised, according to 2 Cor. 1:20: "Whatever are the promises of
God, in Him," i.e. in Christ, "they are 'Yea'." [*The Douay version
reads thus: "All the promises of God are in Him, 'It is'."] Again, in
this respect, it also fulfils what the Old Law foreshadowed. Hence it
is written (Col. 2:17) concerning the ceremonial precepts that they
were "a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ"; in other
words, the reality is found in Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called
the law of reality; whereas the Old Law is called the law of shadow or
of figure.
Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and
in His doctrine. In His works, because He was willing to be circumcised
and to fulfil the other legal observances, which were binding for the
time being; according to Gal. 4:4: "Made under the Law." In His
doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways. First, by
explaining the true sense of the Law. This is clear in the case of
murder and adultery, the prohibition of which the Scribes and Pharisees
thought to refer only to the exterior act: wherefore Our Lord fulfilled
the Law by showing that the prohibition extended also to the interior
acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by
prescribing the safest way of complying with the statutes of the Old
Law. Thus the Old Law forbade perjury: and this is more safely avoided,
by abstaining altogether from swearing, save in cases of urgency.
Thirdly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law, by adding some
counsels of perfection: this is clearly seen in Mat. 19:21, where Our
Lord said to the man who affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of
the Old Law: "One thing is wanting to thee: If thou wilt be perfect,
go, sell whatsoever thou hast," etc. [*St. Thomas combines Mat. 19:21
with Mk. 10:21].
Reply to Objection 1: The New Law does not void observance of the Old
Law except in the point of ceremonial precepts, as stated above
([2147]Q[103], AA[3],4). Now the latter were figurative of something to
come. Wherefore from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were
fulfilled when those things were accomplished which they foreshadowed,
it follows that they are no longer to be observed: for it they were to
be observed, this would mean that something is still to be accomplished
and is not yet fulfilled. Thus the promise of a future gift holds no
longer when it has been fulfilled by the presentation of the gift. In
this way the legal ceremonies are abolished by being fulfilled.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), those
precepts of Our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Old Law.
For what Our Lord commanded about a man not putting away his wife, is
not contrary to what the Law prescribed. "For the Law did not say: 'Let
him that wills, put his wife away': the contrary of which would be not
to put her away. On the contrary, the Law was unwilling that a man
should put away his wife, since it prescribed a delay, so that
excessive eagerness for divorce might cease through being weakened
during the writing of the bill. Hence Our Lord, in order to impress the
fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, allowed no exception
save in the case of fornication." The same applies to the prohibition
about swearing, as stated above. The same is also clear with respect to
the prohibition of retaliation. For the Law fixed a limit to revenge,
by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably: whereas Our Lord
deprived them of vengeance more completely by commanding them to
abstain from it altogether. With regard to the hatred of one's enemies,
He dispelled the false interpretation of the Pharisees, by admonishing
us to hate, not the person, but his sin. As to discriminating between
various foods, which was a ceremonial matter, Our Lord did not forbid
this to be observed: but He showed that no foods are naturally unclean,
but only in token of something else, as stated above ([2148]Q[102],
A[6], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: It was forbidden by the Law to touch a leper;
because by doing so, man incurred a certain uncleanness of
irregularity, as also by touching the dead, as stated above
([2149]Q[102], A[5], ad 4). But Our Lord, Who healed the leper, could
not contract an uncleanness. By those things which He did on the
sabbath, He did not break the sabbath in reality, as the Master Himself
shows in the Gospel: both because He worked miracles by His Divine
power, which is ever active among things; and because He worked
miracles by His Divine power, which is ever active among things; and
because His works were concerned with the salvation of man, while the
Pharisees were concerned for the well-being of animals even on the
sabbath; and again because on account of urgency He excused His
disciples for gathering the ears of corn on the sabbath. But He did
seem to break the sabbath according to the superstitious interpretation
of the Pharisees, who thought that man ought to abstain from doing even
works of kindness on the sabbath; which was contrary to the intention
of the Law.
Reply to Objection 4: The reason why the ceremonial precepts of the Law
are not mentioned in Mat. 5 is because, as stated above (ad 1), their
observance was abolished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial
precepts He mentioned that of retaliation: so that what He said about
it should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept, He
taught that the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be
sought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out of
revengeful spite, which He forbade, admonishing man to be ready to
suffer yet greater insults; and this remains still in the New Law.
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Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?
Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is not contained in the
Old. Because the New Law consists chiefly in faith: wherefore it is
called the "law of faith" (Rom. 3:27). But many points of faith are set
forth in the New Law, which are not contained in the Old. Therefore the
New Law is not contained in the Old.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss says on Mat. 5:19, "He that shall break
one of these least commandments," that the lesser commandments are
those of the Law, and the greater commandments, those contained in the
Gospel. Now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser. Therefore
the New Law is not contained in the Old.
Objection 3: Further, who holds the container holds the contents. If,
therefore, the New Law is contained in the Old, it follows that whoever
had the Old Law had the New: so that it was superfluous to give men a
New Law when once they had the Old. Therefore the New Law is not
contained in the Old.
On the contrary, As expressed in Ezech. 1:16, there was "a wheel in the
midst of a wheel," i.e. "the New Testament within the Old," according
to Gregory's exposition.
I answer that, One thing may be contained in another in two ways.
First, actually; as a located thing is in a place. Secondly, virtually;
as an effect in its cause, or as the complement in that which is
incomplete; thus a genus contains its species, and a seed contains the
whole tree, virtually. It is in this way that the New Law is contained
in the Old: for it has been stated [2150](A[1]) that the New Law is
compared to the Old as perfect to imperfect. Hence Chrysostom,
expounding Mk. 4:28, "The earth of itself bringeth forth fruit, first
the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the ear,"
expresses himself as follows: "He brought forth first the blade, i.e.
the Law of Nature; then the ear, i.e. the Law of Moses; lastly, the
full corn, i.e. the Law of the Gospel." Hence then the New Law is in
the Old as the corn in the ear.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatsoever is set down in the New Testament
explicitly and openly as a point of faith, is contained in the Old
Testament as a matter of belief, but implicitly, under a figure. And
accordingly, even as to those things which we are bound to believe, the
New Law is contained in the Old.
Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the New Law are said to be
greater than those of the Old Law, in the point of their being set
forth explicitly. But as to the substance itself of the precepts of the
New Testament, they are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says
(Contra Faust. xix, 23,28) that "nearly all Our Lord's admonitions or
precepts, where He expressed Himself by saying: 'But I say unto you,'
are to be found also in those ancient books. Yet, since they thought
that murder was only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord declared
to them that every wicked impulse to hurt our brother is to be looked
on as a kind of murder." And it is in the point of declarations of this
kind that the precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than those
of the Old. Nothing, however, prevents the greater from being contained
in the lesser virtually; just as a tree is contained in the seed.
Reply to Objection 3: What is set forth implicitly needs to be declared
explicitly. Hence after the publishing of the Old Law, a New Law also
had to be given.
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Whether the New Law is more burdensome than the Old?
Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is more burdensome than the
Old. For Chrysostom (Opus Imp. in Matth., Hom. x [*The work of an
unknown author]) say: "The commandments given to Moses are easy to
obey: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery: but the
commandments of Christ are difficult to accomplish, for instance: Thou
shalt not give way to anger, or to lust." Therefore the New Law is more
burdensome than the Old.
Objection 2: Further, it is easier to make use of earthly prosperity
than to suffer tribulations. But in the Old Testament observance of the
Law was followed by temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from Dt.
28:1-14; whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who observe the
New Law, as stated in 2 Cor. 6:4-10: "Let us exhibit ourselves as the
ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulation, in necessities, in
distresses," etc. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the
Old.
Objection 3: The more one has to do, the more difficult it is. But the
New Law is something added to the Old. For the Old Law forbade perjury,
while the New Law proscribed even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man
to cast off his wife without a bill of divorce, while the New Law
forbade divorce altogether; as is clearly stated in Mat. 5:31, seqq.,
according to Augustine's expounding. Therefore the New Law is more
burdensome than the Old.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 11:28): "Come to Me, all you that
labor and are burdened": which words are expounded by Hilary thus: "He
calls to Himself all those that labor under the difficulty of observing
the Law, and are burdened with the sins of this world." And further on
He says of the yoke of the Gospel: "For My yoke is sweet and My burden
light." Therefore the New Law is a lighter burden than the Old.
I answer that, A twofold difficult may attach to works of virtue with
which the precepts of the Law are concerned. One is on the part of the
outward works, which of themselves are, in a way, difficult and
burdensome. And in this respect the Old Law is a much heavier burden
than the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies prescribed
many more outward acts than the New Law, which, in the teaching of
Christ and the apostles, added very few precepts to those of the
natural law; although afterwards some were added, through being
instituted by the holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says that
moderation should be observed, lest good conduct should become a burden
to the faithful. For he says in reply to the queries of Januarius (Ep.
lv) that, "whereas God in His mercy wished religion to be a free
service rendered by the public solemnization of a small number of most
manifest sacraments, certain persons make it a slave's burden; so much
so that the state of the Jews who were subject to the sacraments of the
Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of man, was more tolerable."
The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts:
for instance, that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude and
pleasure. It is this difficulty that virtue solves: because to act thus
is difficult for a man without virtue: but through virtue it becomes
easy for him. In this respect the precepts of the New Law are more
burdensome than those of the Old; because the New Law prohibits certain
interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly forbidden in
the Old Law in all cases, although they were forbidden in some,
without, however, any punishment being attached to the prohibition. Now
this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even the
Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9) that it is easy to do what a righteous
man does; but that to do it in the same way, viz. with pleasure and
promptitude, is difficult to a man who is not righteous. Accordingly we
read also (1 Jn. 5:3) that "His commandments are not heavy": which
words Augustine expounds by saying that "they are not heavy to the man
that loveth; whereas they are a burden to him that loveth not."
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks expressly of the
difficulty of the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of interior
movements.
Reply to Objection 2: The tribulations suffered by those who observe
the New Law are not imposed by the Law itself. Moreover they are easily
borne, on account of the love in which the same Law consists: since, as
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes light and
nothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our power."
Reply to Objection 3: The object of these additions to the precepts of
the Old Law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed, as
Augustine states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17,21; xix, 23,26].
Accordingly this does not prove that the New Law is more burdensome,
but rather that it is a lighter burden.
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OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law:
under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward
works?
(2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and
forbidding external acts?
(3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently?
(4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts?
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Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or prohibit any external acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or
prohibit any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the
kingdom, according to Mat. 24:14: "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be
preached in the whole world." But the kingdom of God consists not in
exterior, but only in interior acts, according to Lk. 17:21: "The
kingdom of God is within you"; and Rom. 14:17: "The kingdom of God is
not meat and drink; but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost."
Therefore the New Law should not prescribe or forbid any external acts.
Objection 2: Further, the New Law is "the law of the Spirit" (Rom.
8:2). But "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor.
3:17). Now there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid certain
external acts. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe or forbid any
external acts.
Objection 3: Further, all external acts are understood as referable to
the hand, just as interior acts belong to the mind. But this is
assigned as the difference between the New and Old Laws that the "Old
Law restrains the hand, whereas the New Law curbs the will" [*Peter
Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]. Therefore the New Law should not contain
prohibitions and commands about exterior deeds, but only about interior
acts.
On the contrary, Through the New Law, men are made "children of light":
wherefore it is written (Jn. 12:36): "Believe in the light that you may
be the children of light." Now it is becoming that children of the
light should do deeds of light and cast aside deeds of darkness,
according to Eph. 5:8: "You were heretofore darkness, but now light in
the Lord. Walk . . . as children of the light." Therefore the New Law
had to forbid certain external acts and prescribe others.
I answer that, As stated above ([2151]Q[106], AA[1],2), the New Law
consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth
by faith that worketh through love. Now men become receivers of this
grace through God's Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first,
and thence flowed forth to us. Hence it is written (Jn. 1:14): "The
Word was made flesh," and afterwards: "full of grace and truth"; and
further on: "Of His fulness we all have received, and grace for grace."
Hence it is added that "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ."
Consequently it was becoming that the grace flows from the incarnate
Word should be given to us by means of certain external sensible
objects; and that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh is
subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue.
Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. In
the first place, as leading in some way to grace. Such are the
sacramental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the
Eucharist, and the like.
In the second place there are those external acts which ensue from the
promptings of grace: and herein we must observe a difference. For there
are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in opposition to
inward grace consisting in faith that worketh through love. Such
external works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law; thus
confession of faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is forbidden;
for it is written (Mat. 10:32,33) "(Every one) that shall confess Me
before men, I will also confess him before My Father . . . But he that
shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him before My Father." On
the other hand, there are works which are not necessarily opposed to,
or in keeping with faith that worketh through love. Such works are not
prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by virtue of its primitive
institution; but have been left by the Lawgiver, i.e. Christ, to the
discretion of each individual. And so to each one it is free to decide
what he should do or avoid; and to each superior, to direct his
subjects in such matters as regards what they must do or avoid.
Wherefore also in this respect the Gospel is called the "law of
liberty" [*Cf. Reply OBJ[2]]: since the Old Law decided many points and
left few to man to decide as he chose.
Reply to Objection 1: The kingdom of God consists chiefly in internal
acts: but as a consequence all things that are essential to internal
acts belong also to the kingdom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is
internal righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external acts
that are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, are
in opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently should be
forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those things
that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance, to eat of
this or that food, are not part of the kingdom of God; wherefore the
Apostle says before the words quoted: "The kingdom of God is not meat
and drink."
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), what
is "free is cause of itself." Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his
own accord. Now man does of his own accord that which he does from a
habit that is suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines one as a
second nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature, man
would not act according to his nature, but according to some corruption
affecting that nature. Since then the grace of the Holy Ghost is like
an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright, it
makes us do freely those things that are becoming to grace, and shun
what is opposed to it.
Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects.
First, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain things,
except such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and
come under the prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly,
because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and
prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through the promptings of grace. It
is for these two reasons that the New Law is called "the law of perfect
liberty" (James 1:25).
Reply to Objection 3: The New Law, by restraining the mind from
inordinate movements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate
acts, which ensue from inward movements.
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Whether the New Law made sufficient ordinations about external acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law made insufficient
ordinations about external acts. Because faith that worketh through
charity seems chiefly to belong to the New Law, according to Gal. 5:6:
"In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor
uncircumcision: but faith that worketh through charity." But the New
Law declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set
forth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance, belief in the Trinity.
Therefore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds, which
were not fixed in the Old Law.
Objection 2: Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments
instituted, but also certain sacred things, as stated above
([2152]Q[101], A[4];[2153] Q[102], A[4]). But in the New Law, although
certain sacraments are instituted by Our Lord; for instance, pertaining
either to the sanctification of a temple or of the vessels, or to the
celebration of some particular feast. Therefore the New Law made
insufficient ordinations about external matters.
Objection 3: Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain
observances pertaining to God's ministers, so also were there certain
observances pertaining to the people: as was stated above when we were
treating of the ceremonial of the Old Law ([2154]Q[101], A[4];[2155]
Q[102], A[6]). Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have been
prescribed to the ministers of God; as may be gathered from Mat. 10:9:
"Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses," nor other
things which are mentioned here and Lk. 9, 10. Therefore certain
observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted
in the New Law.
Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and ceremonial
precepts, there were certain judicial precepts. But in the New Law
there are no judicial precepts. Therefore the New Law made insufficient
ordinations about external works.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 7:24): "Every one . . . that
heareth these My words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man
that built his house upon a rock." But a wise builder leaves out
nothing that is necessary to the building. Therefore Christ's words
contain all things necessary for man's salvation.
I answer that, as stated above [2156](A[1]), the New Law had to make
such prescriptions or prohibitions alone as are essential for the
reception or right use of grace. And since we cannot of ourselves
obtain grace, but through Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself
instituted the sacraments whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism,
Eucharist, Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institution
of the apostles and seventy-two disciples, Penance, and indissoluble
Matrimony. He promised Confirmation through the sending of the Holy
Ghost: and we read that by His institution the apostles healed the sick
by anointing them with oil (Mk. 6:13). These are the sacraments of the
New Law.
The right use of grace is by means of works of charity. These, in so
far as they are essential to virtue, pertain to the moral precepts,
which also formed part of the Old Law. Hence, in this respect, the New
Law had nothing to add as regards external action. The determination of
these works in their relation to the divine worship, belongs to the
ceremonial precepts of the Law; and, in relation to our neighbor, to
the judicial precepts, as stated above ([2157]Q[99], A[4]). And
therefore, since these determinations are not in themselves necessarily
connected with inward grace wherein the Law consists, they do not come
under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the decision of man;
some relating to inferiors---as when a precept is given to an
individual; others, relating to superiors, temporal or spiritual,
referring, namely, to the common good.
Accordingly the New Law had no other external works to determine, by
prescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments, and those moral
precepts which have a necessary connection with virtue, for instance,
that one must not kill, or steal, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: Matters of faith are above human reason, and so
we cannot attain to them except through grace. Consequently, when grace
came to be bestowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in the
number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it is through
human reason that we are directed to works of virtue, for it is the
rule of human action, as stated above ([2158]Q[19], A[3];[2159] Q[63],
A[2]). Wherefore in such matters as these there was no need for any
precepts to be given besides the moral precepts of the Law, which
proceed from the dictate of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: In the sacraments of the New Law grace is
bestowed, which cannot be received except through Christ: consequently
they had to be instituted by Him. But in the sacred things no grace is
given: for instance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar or the
like, or, again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord left
the institution of such things to the discretion of the faithful, since
they have not of themselves any necessary connection with inward grace.
Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts not as
ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes: and they can be
understood in two ways. First, following Augustine (De Consensu Evang.
30), as being not commands but permissions. For He permitted them to
set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so on, since they were
empowered to accept their livelihood from those to whom they preached:
wherefore He goes on to say: "For the laborer is worthy of his hire."
Nor is it a sin, but a work of supererogation for a preacher to take
means of livelihood with him, without accepting supplies from those to
whom he preaches; as Paul did (1 Cor. 9:4, seqq.).
Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy men, they may be
considered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles for the time
during which they were sent to preach in Judea before Christ's Passion.
For the disciples, being yet as little children under Christ's care,
needed to receive some special commands from Christ, such as all
subjects receive from their superiors: and especially so, since they
were to be accustomed little by little to renounce the care of
temporalities, so as to become fitted for the preaching of the Gospel
throughout the whole world. Nor must we wonder if He established
certain fixed modes of life, as long as the state of the Old Law
endured and the people had not as yet achieved the perfect liberty of
the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly before His Passion, as
though the disciples had by their means become sufficiently practiced.
Hence He said (Lk. 22:35,36) "When I sent you without purse and scrip
and shoes, did you want anything? But they said: Nothing. Then said He
unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise
a scrip." Because the time of perfect liberty was already at hand, when
they would be left entirely to their own judgment in matters not
necessarily connected with virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Judicial precepts also, are not essential to
virtue in respect of any particular determination, but only in regard
to the common notion of justice. Consequently Our Lord left the
judicial precepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual
or temporal charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of
the Old Law, some of them He explained, because they were misunderstood
by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on (A[3], ad 2).
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Whether the New Law directed man sufficiently as regards interior actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law directed man insufficiently
as regards interior actions. For there are ten commandments of the
decalogue directing man to God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly
fulfilled only three of them: as regards, namely, the prohibition of
murder, of adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it seems that, by
omitting to fulfil the other precepts, He directed man insufficiently.
Objection 2: Further, as regards the judicial precepts, Our Lord
ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing of
wife, of punishment by retaliation, and of persecuting one's enemies.
But there are many other judicial precepts of the Old Law, as stated
above ([2160]Q[104], A[4];[2161] Q[105]). Therefore, in this respect,
He directed human life insufficiently.
Objection 3: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial, there
were ceremonial precepts about which Our Lord made no ordination.
Therefore it seems that He ordained insufficiently.
Objection 4: Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed,
man should do no good deed for any temporal whatever. But there are
many other temporal goods besides the favor of man: and there are many
other good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and prayer. Therefore Our
Lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these three works, and
of no other earthly goods ought we to shun the glory of human favor.
Objection 5: Further, solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood
is by nature instilled into man, and this solicitude even other animals
share with man: wherefore it is written (Prov. 6:6, 8): "Go to the ant,
O sluggard, and consider her ways . . . she provideth her meat for
herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest." But
every command issued against the inclination of nature is an unjust
command, forasmuch as it is contrary to the law of nature. Therefore it
seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade solicitude about food and
raiment.
Objection 6: Further, no act of virtue should be the subject of a
prohibition. Now judgment is an act of justice, according to Ps. 18:15:
"Until justice be turned into judgment." Therefore it seems that Our
Lord unbecomingly forbade judgment: and consequently that the New Law
directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior acts.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1): We
should take note that, when He said: "'He that heareth these My words,'
He indicates clearly that this sermon of the Lord is replete with all
the precepts whereby a Christian's life is formed."
I answer that, As is evident from Augustine's words just quoted, the
sermon, contains the whole process of forming the life of a Christian.
Therein man's interior movements are ordered. Because after declaring
that his end is Beatitude; and after commending the authority of the
apostles, through whom the teaching of the Gospel was to be
promulgated, He orders man's interior movements, first in regard to man
himself, secondly in regard to his neighbor.
This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, corresponding to
man's two interior movements in respect of any prospective action, viz.
volition of what has to be done, and intention of the end. Wherefore,
in the first place, He directs man's will in respect of the various
precepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should refrain not merely
from those external works that are evil in themselves, but also from
internal acts, and from the occasions of evil deeds. In the second
place He directs man's intention, by teaching that in our good works,
we should seek neither human praise, nor worldly riches, which is to
lay up treasures on earth.
Afterwards He directs man's interior movement in respect of his
neighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, to judge him rashly,
unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on the other, to entrust him too
readily with sacred things if he be unworthy.
Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the Gospel; viz. by
imploring the help of God; by striving to enter by the narrow door of
perfect virtue; and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil
influences. Moreover, He declares that we must observe His
commandments, and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, or
to work miracles, or merely to hear His words.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those
precepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand:
and this affected chiefly those precepts of the decalogue. For they
thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered the
external act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this
opinion about murder and adultery rather than about theft and false
witness, because the movement of anger tending to murder, and the
movement of desire tending to adultery, seem to be in us from nature
somewhat, but not the desire of stealing or bearing false witness. They
held a false opinion about perjury, for they thought that perjury
indeed was a sin; but that oaths were of themselves to be desired and
to be taken frequently, since they seem to proceed from reverence to
God. Hence Our Lord shows that an oath is not desirable as a good
thing; and that it is better to speak without oaths, unless necessity
forces us to have recourse to them.
Reply to Objection 2: The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the
judicial precepts in two ways. First, because they considered certain
matters contained in the Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right
in themselves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from
strangers. Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife (Mat.
5:32); and to receive usury (Lk. 6:35), when He said: "Lend, hoping for
nothing thereby."
In another way they erred by thinking that certain things which the Old
Law commanded to be done for justice's sake, should be done out of
desire for revenge, or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of hatred
of one's enemies; and this in respect of three precepts. For they
thought that desire for revenge was lawful, on account of the precept
concerning punishment by retaliation: whereas this precept was given
that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge.
Wherefore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches that man
should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more if necessary. They
thought that movements of covetousness were lawful on account of those
judicial precepts which prescribed restitution of what had been
purloined, together with something added thereto, as stated above
([2162]Q[105], A[2], ad 9); whereas the Law commanded this to be done
in order to safeguard justice, not to encourage covetousness. Wherefore
Our Lord teaches that we should not demand our goods from motives of
cupidity, and that we should be ready to give yet more if necessary.
They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, on account of the
commandments of the Law about the slaying of one's enemies: whereas the
Law ordered this for the fulfilment of justice, as stated above
([2163]Q[105], A[3], ad 4), not to satisfy hatred. Wherefore Our Lord
teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and to be ready to do
good to them if necessary. For these precepts are to be taken as
binding "the mind to be prepared to fulfil them," as Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19).
Reply to Objection 3: The moral precepts necessarily retained their
force under the New Law, because they are of themselves essential to
virtue: whereas the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to
bind in exactly the same way as had been fixed by the Law: this was
left to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed us
becomingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts. On the other
hand, the observance of the ceremonial precepts was totally abolished
by the advent of the reality; wherefore in regard to these precepts He
commanded nothing on this occasion when He was giving the general
points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear that the
entire bodily worship which was fixed by the Law, was to be changed
into spiritual worship: as is evident from Jn. 4:21,23, where He says:
"The hour cometh when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in
Jerusalem adore the Father . . . but . . . the true adorers shall adore
the Father in spirit and in truth."
Reply to Objection 4: All worldly goods may be reduced to
three---honors, riches, and pleasures; according to 1 Jn. 2:16: "All
that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh," which refers
to pleasures of the flesh, "and the concupiscence of the eyes," which
refers to riches, "and the pride of life," which refers to ambition for
renown and honor. Now the Law did not promise an abundance of carnal
pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them. But it did promise exalted
honors and abundant riches; for it is written in reference to the
former (Dt. 28:1): "If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . .
. He will make thee higher than all the nations"; and in reference to
the latter, we read a little further on (Dt. 28:11): "He will make thee
abound with all goods." But the Jews so distorted the true meaning of
these promises, as to think that we ought to serve God, with these
things as the end in view. Wherefore Our Lord set this aside by
teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should not be done for
human glory. And He mentions three works, to which all others may be
reduced: since whatever a man does in order to curb his desires, comes
under the head of fasting; and whatever a man does for the love of his
neighbor, comes under the head of alms-deeds; and whatever a man does
for the worship of God, comes under the head of prayer. And He mentions
these three specifically, as they hold the principal place, and are
most often used by men in order to gain glory. In the second place He
taught us that we must not place our end in riches, when He said: "Lay
not up to yourselves treasures on earth" (Mat. 6:19).
Reply to Objection 5: Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate
solicitude. Now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in
temporal matters. First, we must not place our end in them, nor serve
God for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore He
says: "Lay not up for yourselves," etc. Secondly, we must not be so
anxious about temporal things, as to despair of God's help: wherefore
Our Lord says (Mat. 6:32): "Your Father knoweth that you have need of
all these things." Thirdly, we must not add presumption to our
solicitude; in other words, we must not be confident of getting the
necessaries of life by our own efforts without God's help: such
solicitude Our Lord sets aside by saying that a man cannot add anything
to his stature (Mat. 6:27). We must not anticipate the time for
anxiety; namely, by being solicitous now, for the needs, not of the
present, but of a future time: wherefore He says (Mat. 6:34): "Be not .
. . solicitous for tomorrow."
Reply to Objection 6: Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice,
without which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy. But
he forbade inordinate judgment, as stated above.
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Whether certain definite counsels are fittingly proposed in the New Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that certain definite counsels are not
fittingly proposed in the New Law. For counsels are given about that
which is expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of
counsel ([2164]Q[14] , A[2]). But the same things are not expedient for
all. Therefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all.
Objection 2: Further, counsels regard a greater good. But there are no
definite degrees to the greater good. Therefore definite counsels
should not be given.
Objection 3: Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection. But
obedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore it was
unfitting that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the
Gospel.
Objection 4: Further, many matters pertaining to the life of perfection
are found among the commandments, as, for instance, "Love your enemies"
(Mat. 5:44), and those precepts which Our Lord gave His apostles (Mat.
10). Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New Law: both
because they are not all mentioned; and because they are not
distinguished from the commandments.
On the contrary, The counsels of a wise friend are of great use,
according to Prov. (27:9): "Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart:
and the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul." But Christ is our
wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are supremely useful
and becoming.
I answer that, The difference between a counsel and a commandment is
that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left to the
option of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New Law,
which is the law of liberty, counsels are added to the commandments,
and not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We must therefore
understand the commandments of the New Law to have been given about
matters that are necessary to gain the end of eternal bliss, to which
end the New Law brings us forthwith: but that the counsels are about
matters that render the gaining of this end more assured and
expeditious.
Now man is placed between the things of this world, and spiritual goods
wherein eternal happiness consists: so that the more he cleaves to the
one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he
that cleaves wholly to the things of this world, so as to make them his
end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does, falls
away altogether from spiritual goods. Hence this disorder is removed by
the commandments. Nevertheless, for man to gain the end aforesaid, he
does not need to renounce the things of the world altogether: since he
can, while using the things of this world, attain to eternal happiness,
provided he does not place his end in them: but he will attain more
speedily thereto by giving up the goods of this world entirely:
wherefore the evangelical counsels are given for this purpose.
Now the goods of this world which come into use in human life, consist
in three things: viz. in external wealth pertaining to the
"concupiscence of the eyes"; carnal pleasures pertaining to the
"concupiscence of the flesh"; and honors, which pertain to the "pride
of life," according to 1 Jn. 2:16: and it is in renouncing these
altogether, as far as possible, that the evangelical counsels consist.
Moreover, every form of the religious life that professes the state of
perfection is based on these three: since riches are renounced by
poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity; and the pride of life
by the bondage of obedience.
Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the
counsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one of them in a
particular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense,
namely, as applying to that particular case. For instance, when anyone
gives an alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows the
counsels in that particular case. In like manner, when a man for some
fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may give himself to
prayer, he follows the counsel for that particular time. And again,
when a man follows not his will as to some deed which he might do
lawfully, he follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance,
if he do good to his enemies when he is not bound to, or if he forgive
an injury of which he might justly seek to be avenged. In this way,
too, all particular counsels may be reduced to these three general and
perfect counsels.
Reply to Objection 1: The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves,
are expedient to all; but owing to some people being ill-disposed, it
happens that some of them are inexpedient, because their disposition is
not inclined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing the
evangelical counsels, always makes mention of man's fitness for
observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual poverty
(Mat. 19:21), He begins with the words: "If thou wilt be perfect," and
then He adds: "Go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast." In like manner
when He gave the counsel of perpetual chastity, saying (Mat. 19:12):
"There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of
heaven," He adds straightway: "He that can take, let him take it." And
again, the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:35), after giving the counsel of
virginity, says: "And this I speak for your profit; not to cast a snare
upon you."
Reply to Objection 2: The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the
individual; but those which are simply and absolutely the greater good
in general are fixed: and to these all the above particular goods may
be reduced, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the counsel of obedience is understood to
have been given by Our Lord in the words: "And [let him] follow Me."
For we follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying
His commandments, according to Jn. 10:27: "My sheep hear My voice . . .
and they follow Me."
Reply to Objection 4: Those things which Our Lord prescribed about the
true love of our enemies, and other similar sayings (Mat. 5; Lk. 6),
may be referred to the preparation of the mind, and then they are
necessary for salvation; for instance, that man be prepared to do good
to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is need. Hence
these things are placed among the precepts. But that anyone should
actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there is no
special need, is to be referred to the particular counsels, as stated
above. As to those matters which are set down in Mat. 10 and Lk. 9 and
10, they were either disciplinary commands for that particular time, or
concessions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Hence they are not set down
among the counsels.
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TREATISE ON GRACE (QQ[109]-114)
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OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God, in
so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do right: and, first,
we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause; thirdly, its
effects.
The first point of consideration will be threefold: for we shall
consider (1) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as to its
essence; (3) its division.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether without grace man can know anything?
(2) Whether without God's grace man can do or wish any good?
(3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things?
(4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law?
(5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life?
(6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace?
(7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin?
(8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin?
(9) Whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin without
any further Divine help?
(10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good?
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Whether without grace man can know any truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man can know no truth.
For, on 1 Cor. 12:3: "No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy
Ghost," a gloss says: "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the
Holy Ghost." Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we
cannot know truth without grace.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Solil. i, 6) that "the most
certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen.
Now God Himself is He Whom sheds the light. And reason is in the mind
as sight is in the eye. And the eyes of the mind are the senses of the
soul." Now the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any visible
object, without the sun's light. Therefore the human mind, however
perfect, cannot, by reasoning, know any truth without Divine light: and
this pertains to the aid of grace.
Objection 3: Further, the human mind can only understand truth by
thinking, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). But the Apostle
says (2 Cor. 3:5): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of
ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God." Therefore
man cannot, of himself, know truth without the help of grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 4): "I do not approve
having said in the prayer, O God, Who dost wish the sinless alone to
know the truth; for it may be answered that many who are not sinless
know many truths." Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according to
Ps. 50:12: "Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit
within my bowels." Therefore without grace man of himself can know
truth.
I answer that, To know truth is a use or act of intellectual light,
since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13): "All that is made manifest
is light." Now every use implies movement, taking movement broadly, so
as to call thinking and willing movements, as is clear from the
Philosopher (De Anima iii, 4). Now in corporeal things we see that for
movement there is required not merely the form which is the principle
of the movement or action, but there is also required the motion of the
first mover. Now the first mover in the order of corporeal things is
the heavenly body. Hence no matter how perfectly fire has heat, it
would not bring about alteration, except by the motion of the heavenly
body. But it is clear that as all corporeal movements are reduced to
the motion of the heavenly body as to the first corporeal mover, so all
movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple
First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or
spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless
it be moved by God; but this motion is according to the plan of His
providence, and not by necessity of nature, as the motion of the
heavenly body. Now not only is every motion from God as from the First
Mover, but all formal perfection is from Him as from the First Act. And
thus the act of the intellect or of any created being whatsoever
depends upon God in two ways: first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it
has the form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him
to act.
Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a
determined act, which it can bring about in proportion to its own
proper endowment; and beyond which it is powerless, except by a
superadded form, as water can only heat when heated by the fire. And
thus the human understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light, which
of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things, viz.
those we can come to know through the senses. Higher intelligible
things of the human intellect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a
stronger light, viz. the light of faith or prophecy which is called the
"light of grace," inasmuch as it is added to nature.
Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man
needs Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act.
But he does not need a new light added to his natural light, in order
to know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his
natural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some by
His grace in things that can be known by natural reason, even as He
sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do.
Reply to Objection 1: Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy
Ghost as bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and
speak the truth, but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as
bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this only takes
place with regard to certain truths that are known and spoken, and
especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of which the Apostle
speaks.
Reply to Objection 2: The material sun sheds its light outside us; but
the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural
light bestowed upon the soul is God's enlightenment, whereby we are
enlightened to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this
there is required no further knowledge, but only for such things as
surpass natural knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: We always need God's help for every thought,
inasmuch as He moves the understanding to act; for actually to
understand anything is to think, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin.
xiv, 7).
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Whether man can wish or do any good without grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can wish and do good without grace.
For that is in man's power, whereof he is master. Now man is master of
his acts, and especially of his willing, as stated above ([2165]Q[1],
A[1];[2166] Q[13], A[6]). Hence man, of himself, can wish and do good
without the help of grace.
Objection 2: Further, man has more power over what is according to his
nature than over what is beyond his nature. Now sin is against his
nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30); whereas deeds of
virtue are according to his nature, as stated above ([2167]Q[71],
A[1]). Therefore since man can sin of himself he can wish and do good.
Objection 3: Further, the understanding's good is truth, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). Now the intellect can of itself know
truth, even as every other thing can work its own operation of itself.
Therefore, much more can man, of himself, do and wish good.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:16): "It is not of him that
willeth," namely, to will, "nor of him that runneth," namely to run,
"but of God that showeth mercy." And Augustine says (De Corrept. et
Gratia ii) that "without grace men do nothing good when they either
think or wish or love or act."
I answer that, Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its
integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is
corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states
human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any
good whatsoever, as stated above [2168](A[1]). But in the state of
integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by
his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his
nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good,
as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man
falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to
fulfil it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not
altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good,
even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural
endowments, work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant
vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it,
so as to fall short in nothing; just as a sick man can of himself make
some movements, yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of
one in health, unless by the help of medicine he be cured.
And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength
superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz. in order to do and
wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt
nature, viz. in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry
out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this,
in both states man needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act
well.
Reply to Objection 1: Man is master of his acts and of his willing or
not willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one
side or another. And although he is master of his deliberating or not
deliberating, yet this can only be by a previous deliberation; and
since it cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that
man's free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the
human mind, to wit by God, as the Philosopher proves in the chapter "On
Good Fortune" (Ethic. Eudem. vii). Hence the mind of man still
unweakened is not so much master of its act that it does not need to be
moved by God; and much more the free-will of man weakened by sin,
whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of the nature.
Reply to Objection 2: To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good
which belongs to any being according to its nature. Now as every
created thing has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is
nothing, so does it need to be preserved by another in the good which
pertains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of
itself it can fall into non-existence, unless it is upheld by God.
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot even know truth without Divine help,
as stated above [2169](A[1]). And yet human nature is more corrupt by
sin in regard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge
of truth.
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Whether by his own natural powers and without grace man can love God above
all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man cannot love God above
all things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all things
is the proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself
possess charity, since the "charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," as is said Rom. 5:5.
Therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above all
things.
Objection 2: Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God
above all things is to tend above oneself. Therefore without the help
of grace no created nature can love God above itself.
Objection 3: Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the best
love, which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace man
is not capable of giving God the best love, which is His due; otherwise
it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace and with his
natural powers alone, cannot love God above all things.
On the contrary, As some maintain, man was first made with only natural
endowments; and in this state it is manifest that he loved God to some
extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or less than
himself, otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above
himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can love God more
than himself and above all things.
I answer that, As was said above ([2170]FP, Q[60], A[5]), where the
various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set
forth, man in a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power, do
the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift,
though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God above
all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but
irrational, and even to inanimate nature according to the manner of
love which can belong to each creature. And the reason of this is that
it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are
naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since "all things act according
as they are naturally fit" as stated in Phys. ii, 8. Now it is manifest
that the good of the part is for the good of the whole; hence
everything, by its natural appetite and love, loves its own proper good
on account of the common good of the whole universe, which is God.
Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God leads everything to love
of Himself." Hence in the state of perfect nature man referred the love
of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to its end;
and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things. But in
the state of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of
his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God's grace, follows
its private good, on account of the corruption of nature. And hence we
must say that in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift
of grace added to his natural endowments, in order to love God above
all things naturally, although he needed God's help to move him to it;
but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help
of grace to heal his nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity loves God above all things in a higher
way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as
He is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves
Him, as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a
spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of
God a certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of
virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason
of a man who has not the habit of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that nature cannot rise above
itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any
object above itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural
knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural
knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to
an act exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God above
all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every creature, as
was said above.
Reply to Objection 3: Love is said to be best, both with respect to
degree of love, and with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode
of love. And thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity
loves God as the giver of beatitude, as was said above.
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Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfil the
commandments of the Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that man without grace, and by his own
natural powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law. For the Apostle
says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature
those things that are of the Law." Now what a man does naturally he can
do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfil the commandments of
the Law without grace.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fide [*Symboli
Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome:
now ascribed to Pelagius]) that "they are anathema who say God has laid
impossibilities upon man." Now what a man cannot fulfil by himself is
impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil all the commandments of
himself.
Objection 3: Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest
is this, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart" (Mat.
27:37). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command by
loving God above all things, as stated above [2171](A[3]). Therefore
man can fulfil all the commandments of the Law without grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres. lxxxviii) that it is part
of the Pelagian heresy that "they believe that without grace man can
fulfil all the Divine commandments."
I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the
Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man does
works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man
in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments of the
Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state, since to
sin is nothing else than to transgress the Divine commandments. But in
the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfil all the Divine
commandments without healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the
law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the substance of the act,
but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e. their being done out of
charity. And in this way, neither in the state of perfect nature, nor
in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the
law without grace. Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having
stated that "without grace men can do no good whatever," adds: "Not
only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do
lovingly what they know." Beyond this, in both states they need the
help of God's motion in order to fulfil the commandments, as stated
above ([2172]AA[2],3).
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxvii), "do
not be disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that
are of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore
in us the image of God, after which we were naturally made."
Reply to Objection 2: What we can do with the Divine assistance is not
altogether impossible to us; according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
3): "What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by
ourselves." Hence Jerome [*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the
supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius] concedes
that "our will is in such a way free that we must confess we still
require God's help."
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments,
fulfil the precept of the love of God, as stated above [2173](A[3]).
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Whether man can merit everlasting life without grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can merit everlasting life without
grace. For Our Lord says (Mat. 19:17): "If thou wilt enter into life,
keep the commandments"; from which it would seem that to enter into
everlasting life rests with man's will. But what rests with our will,
we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can merit everlasting
life of himself.
Objection 2: Further, eternal life is the wage of reward bestowed by
God on men, according to Mat. 5:12: "Your reward is very great in
heaven." But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to
his works, according to Ps. 61:12: "Thou wilt render to every man
according to his works." Hence, since man is master of his works, it
seems that it is within his power to reach everlasting life.
Objection 3: Further, everlasting life is the last end of human life.
Now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end.
Much more, therefore, may man attain to life everlasting by his natural
endowments, without grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God is
life everlasting." And as a gloss says, this is said "that we may
understand that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life."
I answer that, Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the
end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and
hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring
about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such as is
proportionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceeding
the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said
above ([2174]Q[5], A[5]). Hence man, by his natural endowments, cannot
produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life; and for
this a higher force is needed, viz. the force of grace. And thus
without grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can perform
works conducing to a good which is natural to man, as "to toil in the
fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends," and the like, as
Augustine says in his third Reply to the Pelagians [*Hypognosticon iii,
among the spurious works of St. Augustine].
Reply to Objection 1: Man, by his will, does works meritorious of
everlasting life; but as Augustine says, in the same book, for this it
is necessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God.
Reply to Objection 2: As the gloss upon Rom. 6:23, "The grace of God is
life everlasting," says, "It is certain that everlasting life is meter
to good works; but the works to which it is meted, belong to God's
grace." And it has been said [2175](A[4]), that to fulfil the
commandments of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may
be meritorious, requires grace.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection has to do with the natural end of
man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of
grace to a higher end, which lower natures can nowise reach; even as a
man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better
disposed to health than one who can nowise recover it, as the
Philosopher observes (De Coelo ii, 12).
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Whether a man, by himself and without the external aid of grace, can prepar
e
himself for grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that man, by himself and without the
external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing
impossible is laid upon man, as stated above (A[4], ad 1). But it is
written (Zech. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." Now
to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it
seems that man of himself, and without the external help of grace, can
prepare himself for grace.
Objection 2: Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is
in him to do, since if man does what is in him to do, God will not deny
him grace, for it is written (Mat. 7:11) that God gives His good Spirit
"to them that ask Him." But what is in our power is in us to do.
Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace.
Objection 3: Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for
grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the
first grace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems
that we must not go beyond what was said first, viz. that man, of
himself and without grace, can prepare himself for grace.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 16:1) that "it is the part
of man to prepare the soul." Now an action is said to be part of a man,
when he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can
prepare himself for grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:44): "No man can come to Me
except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him." But if man could
prepare himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man
cannot prepare himself without the help of grace.
I answer that, The preparation of the human will for good is twofold:
the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy God;
and this preparation of the will cannot take place without the habitual
gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious works, as stated
above [2176](A[5]). There is a second way in which the human will may
be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in
order that man prepare himself to receive this gift, it is not
necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul,
otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we must presuppose a
gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the
good wish. For in these two ways do we need the Divine assistance, as
stated above ([2177]AA[2],3). Now that we need the help of God to move
us, is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause
must direct is effect to its end, and hence since the order of ends is
according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to the
last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate end by
the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the spirit of the
soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the leader
of the army---and towards following the standard of a regiment by the
motion of the standard-bearer. And thus since God is the First Mover,
simply, it is by His motion that everything seeks to be likened to God
in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all
to Himself." But He directs righteous men to Himself as to a special
end, which they seek, and to which they wish to cling, according to Ps.
72:28, "it is good for Me to adhere to my God." And that they are
"turned" to God can only spring from God's having "turned" them. Now to
prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God; just as,
whoever has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun, prepares
himself to receive the sun's light, by turning his eyes towards the
sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the
light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him
inwardly.
Reply to Objection 1: Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus
man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can only be turned
to God, when God turns it, according to Jer. 31:18: "Convert me and I
shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God"; and Lam. 5:21:
"Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted."
Reply to Objection 2: Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according
to Jn. 15:5: "Without Me, you can do nothing." Hence when a man is said
to do what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according
as he is moved by God.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection regards habitual grace, for which
some preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition
in that which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be
moved by God, no further motion is presupposed since God is the First
Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity.
Reply to Objection 4: It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since
he does this by his free-will. And yet he does not do this without the
help of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above.
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Whether man can rise from sin without the help of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can rise from sin without the help
of grace. For what is presupposed to grace, takes place without grace.
But to rise to sin is presupposed to the enlightenment of grace; since
it is written (Eph. 5:14): "Arise from the dead and Christ shall
enlighten thee." Therefore man can rise from sin without grace.
Objection 2: Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as
stated above ([2178]Q[71], A[1], ad 3). Now, man, by force of his
nature, can rise from illness to health, without the external help of
medicine, since there still remains in him the principle of life, from
which the natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal
reason, man may be restored by himself, and return from the state of
sin to the state of justice without the help of external grace.
Objection 3: Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the
act befitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural
coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural
movement. Now a sin is an act against nature, as is clear from
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30). Hence it seems that man by himself
can return from sin to the state of justice.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2:21; Cf. Gal. 3:21): "For if
there had been a law given which could give life---then Christ died in
vain," i.e. to no purpose. Hence with equal reason, if man has a
nature, whereby he can he justified, "Christ died in vain," i.e. to no
purpose. But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself he
cannot be justified, i.e. he cannot return from a state of sin to a
state of justice.
I answer that, Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the
help of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding in
its guilt, as stated above ([2179]Q[87], A[6]), to rise from sin is not
the same as to cease the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that
man has restored to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a
triple loss by sinning, as was clearly shown above ([2180]Q[85],
A[1];[2181] Q[86], A[1];[2182] Q[87], A[1]), viz. stain, corruption of
natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he
forfeits the lustre of grace through the deformity of sin. Natural good
is corrupted, inasmuch as man's nature is disordered by man's will not
being subject to God's; and this order being overthrown, the
consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered.
Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by sinning man
deserves everlasting damnation.
Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by
God. For since the lustre of grace springs from the shedding of Divine
light, this lustre cannot be brought back, except God sheds His light
anew: hence a habitual gift is necessary, and this is the light of
grace. Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, i.e. man's
will can only be subject to God when God draws man's will to Himself,
as stated above [2183](A[6]). So, too, the guilt of eternal punishment
can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offense was committed
and Who is man's Judge. And thus in order that man rise from sin there
is required the help of grace, both as regards a habitual gift, and as
regards the internal motion of God.
Reply to Objection 1: To man is bidden that which pertains to the act
of free-will, as this act is required in order that man should rise
from sin. Hence when it is said, "Arise, and Christ shall enlighten
thee," we are not to think that the complete rising from sin precedes
the enlightenment of grace; but that when man by his free-will, moved
by God, strives to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying
grace.
Reply to Objection 2: The natural reason is not the sufficient
principle of the health that is in man by justifying grace. This
principle is grace which is taken away by sin. Hence man cannot be
restored by himself; but he requires the light of grace to be poured
upon him anew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its
resurrection.
Reply to Objection 3: When nature is perfect, it can be restored by
itself to its befitting and proportionate condition; but without
exterior help it cannot be restored to what surpasses its measure. And
thus human nature undone by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer
perfect, but corrupted, as stated above ([2184]Q[85]); nor can it be
restored, by itself, to its connatural good, much less to the
supernatural good of justice.
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Whether man without grace can avoid sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man can avoid sin.
Because "no one sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine says (De
Duab. Anim. x, xi; De Libero Arbit. iii, 18). Hence if a man in mortal
sin cannot avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning he does not sin,
which is impossible.
Objection 2: Further, men are corrected that they may not sin. If
therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem
to be given to no purpose; which is absurd.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:18): "Before man is
life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be
given him." But by sinning no one ceases to be a man. Hence it is still
in his power to choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without
grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect Just. xxi): "Whoever denies
that we ought to say the prayer 'Lead us not into temptation' (and they
deny it who maintain that the help of God's grace is not necessary to
man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the human
will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be
anathematized by the tongues of all."
I answer that, We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state of
perfect nature; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in the
state of perfect nature, man, without habitual grace, could avoid
sinning either mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else than
to stray from what is according to our nature---and in the state of
perfect nature man could avoid this. Nevertheless he could not have
done it without God's help to uphold him in good, since if this had
been withdrawn, even his nature would have fallen back into
nothingness.
But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature
in order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present life
this healing is wrought in the mind---the carnal appetite being not yet
restored. Hence the Apostle (Rom. 7:25) says in the person of one who
is restored: "I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with
the flesh, the law of sin." And in this state man can abstain from all
mortal sin, which takes its stand in his reason, as stated above
([2185]Q[74], A[5]); but man cannot abstain from all venial sin on
account of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man
can, indeed, repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinful
and voluntary), but not all, because whilst he is resisting one,
another may arise, and also because the reason is always alert to avoid
these movements, as was said above ([2186]Q[74], A[3], ad 2).
So, too, before man's reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by
justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for a time, since
it is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning. But it
cannot be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin. Hence
Gregory says (Super Ezech. Hom. xi) that " a sin not at once taken away
by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins": and this
because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason, so
should the reason be subject to God, and should place in Him the end of
its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts ought to be
regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason that the
movements of the lower appetite should be regulated. And thus, even as
inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help occurring
since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so likewise, since
man's reason is not entirely subject to God, the consequence is that
many disorders occur in the reason. For when man's heart is not so
fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted from Him for the sake of
finding any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for the
achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God and breaks His
commandments, and thus sins mortally: especially since, when surprised,
a man acts according to his preconceived end and his pre-existing
habits, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii); although with
premeditation of his reason a man may do something outside the order of
his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But because a
man cannot always have this premeditation, it cannot help occurring
that he acts in accordance with his will turned aside from God, unless,
by grace, he is quickly brought back to the due order.
Reply to Objection 1: Man can avoid each but every act of sin, except
by grace, as stated above. Nevertheless, since it is by his own
shortcoming that he does not prepare himself to have grace, the fact
that he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Correction is useful "in order that out of the
sorrow of correction may spring the wish to be regenerate; if indeed he
who is corrected is a son of promise, in such sort that whilst the
noise of correction is outwardly resounding and punishing, God by
hidden inspirations is inwardly causing to will," as Augustine says (De
Corr. et Gratia vi). Correction is therefore necessary, from the fact
that man's will is required in order to abstain from sin; yet it is not
sufficient without God's help. Hence it is written (Eccles. 7:14):
"Consider the works of God that no man can correct whom He hath
despised."
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the
spurious works of St. Augustine]), this saying is to be understood of
man in the state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave of
sin. Hence he was able to sin and not to sin. Now, too, whatever a man
wills, is given to him; but his willing good, he has by God's
assistance.
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Whether one who has already obtained grace, can, of himself and without
further help of grace, do good and avoid sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that whoever has already obtained grace, can
by himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin.
For a thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfil what it was
given for. Now grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from
sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that grace is
either useless or imperfect.
Objection 2: Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according
to 1 Cor. 3:16: "Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that
the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Now since the Spirit of God is
omnipotent, He is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us
from sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above two
things without any further assistance of grace.
Objection 3: Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid
of grace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin, with
equal reason, will he need yet another grace, even though he has
obtained this first help of grace. Therefore we must go on to infinity;
which is impossible. Hence whoever is in grace needs no further help of
grace in order to do righteously and to keep free from sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxvi) that "as the
eye of the body though most healthy cannot see unless it is helped by
the brightness of light, so, neither can a man, even if he is most
righteous, live righteously unless he be helped by the eternal light of
justice." But justification is by grace, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being
justified freely by His grace." Hence even a man who already possesses
grace needs a further assistance of grace in order to live righteously.
I answer that, As stated above [2187](A[5]), in order to live
righteously a man needs a twofold help of God---first, a habitual gift
whereby corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is
lifted up so as to work deeds meritoriously of everlasting life, which
exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace
in order to be moved by God to act.
Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further
help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of
grace in another way, i.e. in order to be moved by God to act
righteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason
that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the
Divine motion. Secondly, for this special reason---the condition of the
state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet
it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves "the
law of sin," Rom. 7:25. In the intellect, too, there seems the darkness
of ignorance, whereby, as is written (Rom. 8:26): "We know not what we
should pray for as we ought"; since on account of the various turns of
circumstances, and because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we
cannot fully know what is for our good, according to Wis. 9:14: "For
the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain."
Hence we must be guided and guarded by God, Who knows and can do all
things. For which reason also it is becoming in those who have been
born again as sons of God, to say: "Lead us not into temptation," and
"Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven," and whatever else is
contained in the Lord's Prayer pertaining to this.
Reply to Objection 1: The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given
to us that we may no longer need the Divine help; for every creature
needs to be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence if after
having received grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot be
concluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect,
since man will need the Divine help even in the state of glory, when
grace shall be fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent
imperfect, inasmuch as it does not completely heal man, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: The operation of the Holy Ghost, which moves and
protects, is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which it
causes in us; but beyond this effect He, together with the Father and
the Son, moves and protects us.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument merely proves that man needs no
further habitual grace.
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Whether man possessed of grace needs the help of grace in order to
persevere?
Objection 1: It would seem that man possessed of grace needs no help to
persevere. For perseverance is something less than virtue, even as
continence is, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7,9). Now
since man is justified by grace, he needs no further help of grace in
order to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he need the help
of grace to have perseverance.
Objection 2: Further, all the virtues are infused at once. But
perseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it seems that, together
with grace, perseverance is given to the other infused virtues.
Objection 3: Further, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:20) more was restored
to man by Christ's gift, than he had lost by Adam's sin. But Adam
received what enabled him to persevere; and thus man does not need
grace in order to persevere.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. ii): "Why is perseverance
besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it not a mocking
request to seek what we know He does not give, and what is in our power
without His giving it?" Now perseverance is besought by even those who
are hallowed by grace; and this is seen, when we say "Hallowed be Thy
name," which Augustine confirms by the words of Cyprian (De Correp. et
Grat. xii). Hence man, even when possessed of grace, needs perseverance
to be given to him by God.
I answer that, Perseverance is taken in three ways. First, to signify a
habit of the mind whereby a man stands steadfastly, lest he be moved by
the assault of sadness from what is virtuous. And thus perseverance is
to sadness as continence is to concupiscence and pleasure, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7). Secondly, perseverance may be called
a habit, whereby a man has the purpose of persevering in good unto the
end. And in both these ways perseverance is infused together with
grace, even as continence and the other virtues are. Thirdly,
perseverance is called the abiding in good to the end of life. And in
order to have this perseverance man does not, indeed, need another
habitual grace, but he needs the Divine assistance guiding and guarding
him against the attacks of the passions, as appears from the preceding
article. And hence after anyone has been justified by grace, he still
needs to beseech God for the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he
may be kept from evil till the end of his life. For to many grace is
given to whom perseverance in grace is not given.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection regards the first mode of
perseverance, as the second objection regards the second.
Hence the solution of the second objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xliii)
[*Cf. De Correp. et Grat. xii]: "in the original state man received a
gift whereby he could persevere, but to persevere was not given him.
But now, by the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace
whereby they may persevere, and the further gift of persevering," and
thus Christ's gift is greater than Adam's fault. Nevertheless it was
easier for man to persevere, with the gift of grace in the state of
innocence in which the flesh was not rebellious against the spirit,
than it is now. For the restoration by Christ's grace, although it is
already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, as it
will be in heaven, where man will not merely be able to persevere but
will be unable to sin.
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OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether grace implies something in the soul?
(2) Whether grace is a quality?
(3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue?
(4) Of the subject of grace.
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Whether grace implies anything in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace does not imply anything in the
soul. For man is said to have the grace of God even as the grace of
man. Hence it is written (Gn. 39:21) that the Lord gave to Joseph
"grace [Douay: 'favor'] in the sight of the chief keeper of the
prison." Now when we say that a man has the favor of another, nothing
is implied in him who has the favor of the other, but an acceptance is
implied in him whose favor he has. Hence when we say that a man has the
grace of God, nothing is implied in his soul; but we merely signify the
Divine acceptance.
Objection 2: Further, as the soul quickens the body so does God quicken
the soul; hence it is written (Dt. 30:20): "He is thy life." Now the
soul quickens the body immediately. Therefore nothing can come as a
medium between God and the soul. Hence grace implies nothing created in
the soul.
Objection 3: Further, on Rom. 1:7, "Grace to you and peace," the gloss
says: "Grace, i.e. the remission of sins." Now the remission of sin
implies nothing in the soul, but only in God, Who does not impute the
sin, according to Ps. 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath
not imputed sin." Hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul.
On the contrary, Light implies something in what is enlightened. But
grace is a light of the soul; hence Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia
xxii): "The light of truth rightly deserts the prevaricator of the law,
and those who have been thus deserted become blind." Therefore grace
implies something in the soul.
I answer that, According to the common manner of speech, grace is
usually taken in three ways. First, for anyone's love, as we are
accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king,
i.e. the king looks on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for any
gift freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act of
grace. Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given
"gratis," inasmuch as we are said to be "grateful" for benefits. Of
these three the second depends on the first, since one bestows
something on another "gratis" from the love wherewith he receives him
into his good "graces." And from the second proceeds the third, since
from benefits bestowed "gratis" arises "gratitude."
Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies something
in him who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; secondly, the
acknowledgment of the gift. But as regards the first, a difference must
be noted between the grace of God and the grace of man; for since the
creature's good springs from the Divine will, some good in the creature
flows from God's love, whereby He wishes the good of the creature. On
the other hand, the will of man is moved by the good pre-existing in
things; and hence man's love does not wholly cause the good of the
thing, but pre-supposes it either in part or wholly. Therefore it is
clear that every love of God is followed at some time by a good caused
in the creature, but not co-eternal with the eternal love. And
according to this difference of good the love of God to the creature is
looked at differently. For one is common, whereby He loves "all things
that are" (Wis. 11:25), and thereby gives things their natural being.
But the second is a special love, whereby He draws the rational
creature above the condition of its nature to a participation of the
Divine good; and according to this love He is said to love anyone
simply, since it is by this love that God simply wishes the eternal
good, which is Himself, for the creature.
Accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of God, there is
signified something bestowed on man by God. Nevertheless the grace of
God sometimes signifies God's eternal love, as we say the grace of
predestination, inasmuch as God gratuitously and not from merits
predestines or elects some; for it is written (Eph. 1:5): "He hath
predestinated us into the adoption of children . . . unto the praise of
the glory of His grace."
Reply to Objection 1: Even when a man is said to be in another's good
graces, it is understood that there is something in him pleasing to the
other; even as anyone is said to have God's grace---with this
difference, that what is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed to
his love, but whatever is pleasing to God in a man is caused by the
Divine love, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: God is the life of the soul after the manner of
an efficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body after the
manner of a formal cause. Now there is no medium between form and
matter, since the form, of itself, "informs" the matter or subject;
whereas the agent "informs" the subject, not by its substance, but by
the form, which it causes in the matter.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine says (Retract. i, 25): "When I said
that grace was for the remission of sins, and peace for our
reconciliation with God, you must not take it to mean that peace and
reconciliation do not pertain to general peace, but that the special
name of grace signifies the remission of sins." Not only grace,
therefore, but many other of God's gifts pertain to grace. And hence
the remission of sins does not take place without some effect divinely
caused in us, as will appear later ([2188]Q[113], A[2]).
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Whether grace is a quality of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not a quality of the soul. For
no quality acts on its subject, since the action of a quality is not
without the action of its subject, and thus the subject would
necessarily act upon itself. But grace acts upon the soul, by
justifying it. Therefore grace is not a quality.
Objection 2: Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality. But grace
is nobler than the nature of the soul, since we can do many things by
grace, to which nature is not equal, as stated above ([2189]Q[109],
AA[1],2,3). Therefore grace is not a quality.
Objection 3: Furthermore, no quality remains after it has ceased to be
in its subject. But grace remains; since it is not corrupted, for thus
it would be reduced to nothing, since it was created from nothing;
hence it is called a "new creature"(Gal. 6:15).
On the contrary, on Ps. 103:15: "That he may make the face cheerful
with oil"; the gloss says: "Grace is a certain beauty of soul, which
wins the Divine love." But beauty of soul is a quality, even as beauty
of body. Therefore grace is a quality.
I answer that, As stated above [2190](A[1]), there is understood to be
an effect of God's gratuitous will in whoever is said to have God's
grace. Now it was stated (Q[109], A[1]) that man is aided by God's
gratuitous will in two ways: first, inasmuch as man's soul is moved by
God to know or will or do something, and in this way the gratuitous
effect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the soul; for "motion
is the act of the mover in the moved." Secondly, man is helped by God's
gratuitous will, inasmuch as a habitual gift is infused by God into the
soul; and for this reason, that it is not fitting that God should
provide less for those He loves, that they may acquire supernatural
good, than for creatures, whom He loves that they may acquire natural
good. Now He so provides for natural creatures, that not merely does He
move them to their natural acts, but He bestows upon them certain forms
and powers, which are the principles of acts, in order that they may of
themselves be inclined to these movements, and thus the movements
whereby they are moved by God become natural and easy to creatures,
according to Wis. 8:1: "she . . . ordereth all things sweetly." Much
more therefore does He infuse into such as He moves towards the
acquisition of supernatural good, certain forms or supernatural
qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly to
acquire eternal good; and thus the gift of grace is a quality.
Reply to Objection 1: Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the
soul, not after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner
of a formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just.
Reply to Objection 2: Every substance is either the nature of the thing
whereof it is the substance or is a part of the nature, even as matter
and form are called substance. And because grace is above human nature,
it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is an accidental
form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God, becomes accidental
in the soul participating the Divine goodness, as is clear in the case
of knowledge. And thus because the soul participates in the Divine
goodness imperfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, which
is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul
subsists in itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is the expression or
participation of the Divine goodness, it is nobler than the nature of
the soul, though not in its mode of being.
Reply to Objection 3: As Boethius [*Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist]
says, the "being of an accident is to inhere." Hence no accident is
called being as if it had being, but because by it something is; hence
it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being (Metaph. vii,
text. 2). And because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is,
properly speaking, no accident comes into being or is corrupted, but is
said to come into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject
begins or ceases to be in act with this accident. And thus grace is
said to be created inasmuch as men are created with reference to it,
i.e. are given a new being out of nothing, i.e. not from merits,
according to Eph. 2:10, "created in Jesus Christ in good works."
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Whether grace is the same as virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For
Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that "operating grace is faith
that worketh by charity." But faith that worketh by charity is a
virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined. But
the definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace,
since "it makes its subject good, and his work good," and "it is a good
quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously," etc. Therefore grace
is virtue.
Objection 3: Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the
"fourth" species of quality; viz. "form" which is the "abiding figure
of things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the
"third," since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like quality," which
is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and
grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the "second" species,
which is "natural power" or "impotence"; since grace is above nature
and does not regard good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it
must be in the "first" species which is "habit" or "disposition." Now
habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue
after a manner, as stated above ([2191]Q[57], AA[1],2). Therefore grace
is the same as virtue.
On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be
one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor
hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity,
since "grace foreruns charity," as Augustine says in his book on the
Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi). Therefore grace is
not virtue.
I answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were identical in
essence, and differed only logically---in the sense that we speak of
grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given
gratuitously---and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly.
And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27).
But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot hold,
since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. 17), "virtue is
disposition of what is perfect---and I call perfect what is disposed
according to its nature." Now from this it is clear that the virtue of
a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that
everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature. But it
is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke
above (Q[55], seqq.) are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly
disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man; whereas
infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher
end, and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in
relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pet.
1:4: "He hath given us most great and most precious promises; that by
these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature." And it is in
respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons
of God.
And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the
acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the
light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is
something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are
ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:8): "For you
were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as
children of the light." For as the acquired virtues enable a man to
walk, in accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the infused
virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine calls "faith that worketh by charity"
grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the
first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested.
Reply to Objection 2: Good is placed in the definition of virtue with
reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or
participated. Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but
as to the root of goodness in man, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Grace is reduced to the first species of quality;
and yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition
which is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and
root.
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Whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, or in one of
the powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the
soul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says
(Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]) that
grace is related to the will or to the free will "as a rider to his
horse." Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated above
([2192]FP, Q[83], A[2]). Hence grace is in a power of the soul, as in a
subject.
Objection 2: Further, "Man's merit springs from grace" as Augustine
says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which
proceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a
power of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject
of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of
grace. But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would
be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the
proper subject of grace.
Objection 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers.
Now what is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it
follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we suppose
no part or power of the soul---viz. neither the will, nor the
intellect, nor anything else; which is impossible.
On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of God. But generation
terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore grace is in
the soul's essence prior to being in the powers.
I answer that, This question depends on the preceding. For if grace is
the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as
in a subject; since the soul's powers are the proper subject of virtue,
as stated above ([2193]Q[56], A[1]). But if grace differs from virtue,
it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace,
since every perfection of the soul's powers has the nature of virtue,
as stated above ([2194]Q[55], A[1];[2195] Q[56], A[1]). Hence it
remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to
the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For
as man in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge
through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in
the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of
the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of
a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.
Reply to Objection 1: As from the essence of the soul flows its powers,
which are the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the
powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace.
And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which
is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse---but not as
an accident to a subject.
And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For grace
is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues, as
the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds through the
medium of the powers.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the
species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not classed
in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural
properties of the soul following upon the species. Hence the soul
differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb
animals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that, if the
essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may be
the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul,
inasmuch as it is of such a species.
Reply to Objection 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural
properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them.
Yet, granted that it was without them, the soul would still be called
intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually
have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species,
from which these powers naturally flow.
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OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and
sanctifying grace?
(2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace;
(3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace;
(4) Of the division of gratuitous grace;
(5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace.
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Whether grace is fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous
grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into
sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a gift of God, as
is clear from what has been already stated ([2196]Q[110], A[1]). But
man is not therefore pleasing to God because something is given him by
God, but rather on the contrary; since something is freely given by
God, because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying
grace.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is not given on account of preceding
merits is given gratis. Now even natural good is given to man without
preceding merit, since nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore nature
itself is given gratuitously by God. But nature is condivided with
grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down as
a difference of grace, since it is found outside the genus of grace.
Objection 3: Further, members of a division are mutually opposed. But
even sanctifying grace, whereby we are justified, is given to us
gratuitously, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely [gratis]
by His grace." Hence sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against
gratuitous grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle attributes both to grace, viz. to sanctify
and to be gratuitously given. For with regard to the first he says
(Eph. 1:6): "He hath graced us in His beloved son." And with regard to
the second (Rom. 2:6): "And if by grace, it is not now by works,
otherwise grace is no more grace." Therefore grace can be distinguished
by its having one only or both.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "those things that are
of God are well ordered [Vulg.: 'those that are, are ordained by God]."
Now the order of things consists in this, that things are led to God by
other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And hence since grace
is ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so
that some are led to God by others.
And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united to
God, and this is called "sanctifying grace"; the other is that whereby
one man cooperates with another in leading him to God, and this gift is
called "gratuitous grace," since it is bestowed on a man beyond the
capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. But whereas
it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may
cooperate in the justification of another, it is not called sanctifying
grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:7): "And the
manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility," i.e.
of others.
Reply to Objection 1: Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently
but formally, i.e. because thereby a man is justified, and is made
worthy to be called pleasing to God, according to Col. 1:21: "He hath
made us worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light."
Reply to Objection 2: Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given,
excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways: first,
as arising from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do
meritorious works, according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the
reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt." The
second debt regards the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a
man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet in
neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to
His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be subject to God,
that the Divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a
certain nature should have certain conditions or properties, and that
by doing certain works it should attain to something further. And hence
natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but in the second.
Hence they especially merit the name of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of
gratuitous grace something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it
makes man pleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do
this keeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus
the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and
non-sanctifying grace.
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Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into
operating and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated
above ([2197]Q[110], A[2]). Now no accident can act upon its subject.
Therefore no grace can be called operating.
Objection 2: Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly
brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For
Augustine says, on Jn. 14:12, "the works that I do he also shall do,"
says (Serm. clxix): "He Who created thee without thyself, will not
justify thee without thyself." Therefore no grace ought to be called
simply operating.
Objection 3: Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior
agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than
free-will, according to Rom. 9:16: "It is not of him that willeth, nor
of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." Therefore no grace
ought to be called cooperating.
Objection 4: Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to
operate and to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing
can both operate and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly
divided into operating and cooperating.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii): "God
by cooperating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us,
since He who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing, beings
by operating that they may will." But the operations of God whereby He
moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided
into operating and cooperating.
I answer that, As stated above ([2198]Q[110], A[2]) grace may be taken
in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby God moves us to will and
to act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us.
Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and
cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the
thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is
moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the
operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that
we speak of "operating grace." But in that effect in which our mind
both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God,
but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of
"cooperating grace." Now there is a double act in us. First, there is
the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a
thing moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will, which
hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God
moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But
there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will,
as was shown above ([2199]Q[17], A[9]) the operation of this act is
attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by
strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by
granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to
this that we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid
words Augustine subjoins: "He operates that we may will; and when we
will, He cooperates that we may perfect." And thus if grace is taken
for God's gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it
is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace.
But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a
double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of which
is "being," and the second, "operation"; thus the work of heat is to
make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus habitual
grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it
pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the
principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, it is
called cooperating grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental
quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as
whiteness makes a surface white.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not justify us without ourselves,
because whilst we are being justified we consent to God's justification
[justitiae] by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this movement
is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation
pertains to grace.
Reply to Objection 3: One thing is said to cooperate with another not
merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when
it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the
good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, the end being
already intended, grace cooperates with us.
Reply to Objection 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same
grace; but are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain
from what has been said.
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Whether grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into
prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the Divine love.
But God's love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to
1 Jn. 4:10: "Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first
loved us." Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and
subsequent.
Objection 2: Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since
it is sufficient, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for
thee." But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace
is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.
Objection 3: Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an
infinite number of effects---one preceding another. Hence it with
regard to these, grace must be divided into prevenient and subsequent,
it would seem that there are infinite species of grace. Now no art
takes note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly
divided into prevenient and subsequent.
On the contrary, God's grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both are
said in Ps. 58:11: "His mercy shall prevent me," and again, Ps. 22:6:
"Thy mercy will follow me." Therefore grace is fittingly divided into
prevenient and subsequent.
I answer that, As grace is divided into operating and cooperating, with
regard to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into prevenient
and subsequent, howsoever we consider grace. Now there are five effects
of grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second,
to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the
fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory. And hence
grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, is called
prevenient with respect to the second, and inasmuch as it causes the
second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first effect. And
as one effect is posterior to this effect, and prior to that, so may
grace be called prevenient and subsequent on account of the same effect
viewed relatively to divers others. And this is what Augustine says (De
Natura et Gratia xxxi): "It is prevenient, inasmuch as it heals, and
subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we are strengthened; it is
prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and subsequent, inasmuch as we
are glorified."
Reply to Objection 1: God's love signifies something eternal; and hence
can never be called anything but prevenient. But grace signifies a
temporal effect, which can precede and follow another; and thus grace
may be both prevenient and subsequent.
Reply to Objection 2: The division into prevenient and subsequent grace
does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was
already said of operating and cooperating grace. For subsequent grace,
inasmuch as it pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct from
prevenient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even as the
charity of the earth is not voided in heaven, so must the same be said
of the light of grace, since the notion of neither implies
imperfection.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the effects of grace may be infinite in
number, even as human acts are infinite, nevertheless all reduced to
some of a determinate species, and moreover all coincide in this---that
one precedes another.
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Whether gratuitous grace is rightly divided by the Apostle?
Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is not rightly divided
by the Apostle. For every gift vouchsafed to us by God, may be called a
gratuitous grace. Now there are an infinite number of gifts freely
bestowed on us by God as regards both the good of the soul and the good
of the body---and yet they do not make us pleasing to God. Hence
gratuitous graces cannot be contained under any certain division.
Objection 2: Further, gratuitous grace is distinguished from
sanctifying grace. But faith pertains to sanctifying grace, since we
are justified by it, according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore
by faith." Hence it is not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous
graces, especially since the other virtues are not so placed, as hope
and charity.
Objection 3: Further, the operation of healing, and speaking divers
tongues are miracles. Again, the interpretation of speeches pertains
either to wisdom or to knowledge, according to Dan. 1:17: "And to these
children God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and
wisdom." Hence it is not correct to divide the grace of healing and
kinds of tongues against the working of miracles; and the
interpretation of speeches against the word of wisdom and knowledge.
Objection 4: Further, as wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the Holy
Ghost, so also are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear,
as stated above ([2200]Q[68], A[4]). Therefore these also ought to be
placed amongst the gratuitous gifts.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8, 9, 10): "To one indeed
by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of
knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, the working of
miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits;
to another divers kinds of tongues; to another interpretation of
speeches."
I answer that, As was said above [2201](A[1]), gratuitous grace is
ordained to this, viz. that a man may help another to be led to God.
Now no man can help in this by moving interiorly (for this belongs to
God alone), but only exteriorly by teaching or persuading. Hence
gratuitous grace embraces whatever a man needs in order to instruct
another in Divine things which are above reason. Now for this three
things are required: first, a man must possess the fullness of
knowledge of Divine things, so as to be capable of teaching others.
Secondly, he must be able to confirm or prove what he says, otherwise
his words would have no weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of
fittingly presenting to his hearers what he knows.
Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be seen in
human teaching. For whoever would teach another in any science must
first be certain of the principles of the science, and with regard to
this there is "faith," which is certitude of invisible things, the
principles of Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves the teacher to
know the principal conclusions of the science, and hence we have the
word of "wisdom," which is the knowledge of Divine things. Thirdly, he
ought to abound with examples and a knowledge of effects, whereby at
times he needs to manifest causes; and thus we have the word of
"knowledge," which is the knowledge of human things, since "the
invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made" (Rom. 1:20).
Now the confirmation of such things as are within reason rests upon
arguments; but the confirmation of what is above reason rests on what
is proper to the Divine power, and this in two ways: first, when the
teacher of sacred doctrine does what God alone can do, in miraculous
deeds, whether with respect to bodily health---and thus there is the
"grace of healing," or merely for the purpose of manifesting the Divine
power; for instance, that the sun should stand still or darken, or that
the sea should be divided---and thus there is the "working of
miracles." Secondly, when he can manifest what God alone can know, and
these are either future contingents---and thus there is "prophecy," or
also the secrets of hearts---and thus there is the "discerning of
spirits."
But the capability of speaking can regard either the idiom in which a
person can be understood, and thus there is "kinds of tongues"; or it
can regard the sense of what is said, and thus there is the
"interpretation of speeches."
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [2202](A[1]), not all the
benefits divinely conferred upon us are called gratuitous graces, but
only those that surpass the power of nature---e.g. that a fisherman
should be replete with the word of wisdom and of knowledge and the
like; and such as these are here set down as gratuitous graces.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith is enumerated here under the gratuitous
graces, not as a virtue justifying man in himself, but as implying a
super-eminent certitude of faith, whereby a man is fitted for
instructing others concerning such things as belong to the faith. With
regard to hope and charity, they belong to the appetitive power,
according as man is ordained thereby to God.
Reply to Objection 3: The grace of healing is distinguished from the
general working of miracles because it has a special reason for
inducing one to the faith, since a man is all the more ready to believe
when he has received the gift of bodily health through the virtue of
faith. So, too, to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches
have special efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are set down as
special gratuitous graces.
Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom and knowledge are not numbered among the
gratuitous graces in the same way as they are reckoned among the gifts
of the Holy Ghost, i.e. inasmuch as man's mind is rendered easily
movable by the Holy Ghost to the things of wisdom and knowledge; for
thus they are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated above ([2203]Q[68],
AA[1],4). But they are numbered amongst the gratuitous graces, inasmuch
as they imply such a fullness of knowledge and wisdom that a man may
not merely think aright of Divine things, but may instruct others and
overpower adversaries. Hence it is significant that it is the "word" of
wisdom and the "word" of knowledge that are placed in the gratuitous
graces, since, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1), "It is one thing
merely to know what a man must believe in order to reach everlasting
life, and another thing to know how this may benefit the godly and may
be defended against the ungodly."
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Whether gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is nobler than
sanctifying grace. For "the people's good is better than the individual
good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2). Now sanctifying grace is
ordained to the good of one man alone, whereas gratuitous grace is
ordained to the common good of the whole Church, as stated above
([2204]AA[1],4). Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying
grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater power that is able to act upon
another, than that which is confined to itself, even as greater is the
brightness of the body that can illuminate other bodies, than of that
which can only shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. v, 1) "that justice is the most excellent of the virtues,"
since by it a man bears himself rightly towards others. But by
sanctifying grace a man is perfected only in himself; whereas by
gratuitous grace a man works for the perfection of others. Hence
gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.
Objection 3: Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than what is
common to all; thus to reason, which is proper to man is nobler than to
feel, which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is common
to all members of the Church, but gratuitous grace is the proper gift
of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence gratuitous grace is
nobler than sanctifying grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:31), having enumerated the
gratuitous graces adds: "And I shew unto you yet a more excellent way";
and as the sequel proves he is speaking of charity, which pertains to
sanctifying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble than
gratuitous grace.
I answer that, The higher the good to which a virtue is ordained, the
more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is always greater than the
means. But sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union with
his last end, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is
preparatory to the end; i.e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth, men
are induced to unite themselves to their last end. And hence
sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text. 52),
a multitude, as an army, has a double good; the first is in the
multitude itself, viz. the order of the army; the second is separate
from the multitude, viz. the good of the leader---and this is better
good, since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is
ordained to the common good of the Church, which is ecclesiastical
order, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common
good, which is God. Hence sanctifying grace is the nobler.
Reply to Objection 2: If gratuitous grace could cause a man to have
sanctifying grace, it would follow that the gratuitous grace was the
nobler; even as the brightness of the sun that enlightens is more
excellent than that of an object that is lit up. But by gratuitous
grace a man cannot cause another to have union with God, which he
himself has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain dispositions
towards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be the more excellent,
even as in fire, the heat, which manifests its species whereby it
produces heat in other things, is not more noble than its substantial
form.
Reply to Objection 3: Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an end; and
thus, to reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary; for what is
proper is ordained to what is common as to an end. Hence there is no
comparison.
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OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace?
(2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the
recipient, by an act of free-will?
(3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity?
(4) Whether grace is equal in all?
(5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace?
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Whether God alone is the cause of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace.
For it is written (Jn. 1:17): "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ."
Now, by the name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely the Divine
Nature assuming, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature
may be the cause of grace.
Objection 2: Further, there is this difference between the sacraments
of the New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law
cause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it.
Now the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements.
Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii, iv, vii,
viii), "Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and
men." Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened, and perfected
by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace
and glory."
I answer that, Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must
always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace
surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short
of a partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other nature.
And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it
is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a partaking of
the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is impossible that
anything save fire should enkindle.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's humanity is an "organ of His Godhead,"
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19). Now an instrument does not
bring forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but in
virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ's humanity does not cause
grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature joined to
it, whereby the actions of Christ's humanity are saving actions.
Reply to Objection 2: As in the person of Christ the humanity causes
our salvation by grace, the Divine power being the principal agent, so
likewise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from
Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and
principally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments,
according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy
Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."
Reply to Objection 3: Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or
men, by instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "this cleansing and enlightenment
and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of Divine
knowledge."
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Whether any preparation and disposition for grace is required on man's part
?
Objection 1: It would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace
is required on man's part, since, as the Apostle says (Rom. 4:4), "To
him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but
according to debt." Now a man's preparation by free-will can only be
through some operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of
grace.
Objection 2: Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not preparing
himself to have grace. But to some who are going on sinning grace is
given, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he
was "breathing our threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of
the Lord" (Act 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is required on
man's part.
Objection 3: Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition
in matter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in
creation, to which grace is compared, which is called "a new creature"
(Gal. 6:15). But only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as
stated above (A[1] ). Hence no preparation is required on man's part to
obtain grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Amos 4:12): "Be prepared to meet thy
God, O Israel," and (1 Kings 7:3): "Prepare your hearts unto the Lord."
I answer that, As stated above ([2205]Q[111], A[2]), grace is taken in
two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from
God, Who moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in the first sense, a
certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can only
be in disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help
from God to move us to good, no preparation is required on man's part,
that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help, but rather, every
preparation in man must be by the help of God moving the soul to good.
And thus even the good movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is
prepared for receiving the gift of grace is an act of the free-will
moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself, according to
Prov. 16:1: "It is the part of man to prepare the soul"; yet it is
principally from God, Who moves the free-will. Hence it is said that
man's will is prepared by God, and that man's steps are guided by God.
Reply to Objection 1: A certain preparation of man for grace is
simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation is
meritorious, not indeed of grace, which is already possessed---but of
glory which is not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect
preparation, which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace,
and yet it is from God's motion. But it does not suffice for merit,
since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only arise from
grace, as will be seen further on ([2206]Q[114], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace
unless God prevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether
anyone arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step.
For it is written (Ecclus. 11:23): "It is easy in the eyes of God on a
sudden to make the poor man rich." Now it sometimes happens that God
moves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this preparation
precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to
good, and man receives grace suddenly, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every
one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." And
thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly when he was in the midst of
sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come;
and hence he received grace suddenly.
Reply to Objection 3: An agent of infinite power needs no matter or
disposition of matter, brought about by the action of something else;
and yet, looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause,
in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the
form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation
is required which He Himself does not bring about.
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Whether grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for it, or t
o
whoever does what he can?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever
prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, on
Rom. 5:1, "Being justified . . . by faith, let us have peace," etc. the
gloss says: "God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would
be injustice with Him." But it is impossible for injustice to be with
God. Therefore it is impossible for God not to welcome whoever flies to
Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. iii) that the
reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not
wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it. But if the cause be removed,
the effect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing
to receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good of grace is better than the good
of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to disposed
matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on
whoever prepares himself for grace.
On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to the potter,
according to Jer. 18:6: "As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are
you in My hand." But however much the clay is prepared, it does not
necessarily receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a
man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God.
I answer that, As stated above [2207](A[2]), man's preparation for
grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence
the preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from
free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace,
since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But
it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus
it has a necessity---not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility---as
regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot
fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the
Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that "by God's good
gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated." Hence if God
intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain
to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to Jn. 6:45:
"Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to
Me."
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a
meritorious act of their free-will, already "informed" with grace; for
if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice which He
Himself established. Or if it refers to the movement of free-will
before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man's flight to God is
by a Divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail.
Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of the defect of grace is on our
part; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's
according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is
only in Me."
Reply to Objection 3: Even in natural things, the form does not
necessarily ensue the disposition of the matter, except by the power of
the agent that causes the disposition.
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Whether grace is greater in one than in another?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in
another. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated above
([2208]Q[110], A[1]). Now it is written (Wis. 6:8): "He made the little
and the great and He hath equally care of all." Therefore all obtain
grace from Him equally.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more
or less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our
last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is not
greater in one than in another.
Objection 3: Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above
([2209]Q[110], A[1], ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life.
Hence, neither is there in grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:7): "But to every one of us is
given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." Now what
is given in measure, is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an
equal grace.
I answer that, As stated above ([2210]Q[52], AA[1],2;[2211] Q[56],
AA[1],2), habits can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end
or object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being
ordained to a greater good; the other on the part of the subject, which
more or less participates in the habit inhering to it.
Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater
or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the Highest Good,
which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or
less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than
another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who
prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared for grace,
receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the first
cause of this diversity, since man prepares himself, only inasmuch as
his free-will is prepared by God. Hence the first cause of this
diversity is to be sought on the part of the God, Who dispenses His
gifts of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection of
the Church may result from these various degree; even as He instituted
the various conditions of things, that the universe might be perfect.
Hence after the Apostle had said (Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is
given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ," having
enumerated the various graces, he adds (Eph. 4:12): "For the perfecting
of the saints . . . for the edifying of the body of Christ."
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine care may be looked at in two ways:
first, as regards the Divine act, which is simple and uniform; and thus
His care looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers
great things and little. But, "secondly," it may be considered in those
things which come to be considered by the Divine care; and thus,
inequality is found, inasmuch as God by His care provides greater gifts
to some, and lesser gifts for others.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection is based on the first kind of
magnitude of grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a
greater good, but inasmuch as it more or less ordains to a greater or
less participation of the same good. For there may be diversity of
intensity and remissness, both in grace and in final glory as regards
the subjects' participation.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural life pertains to man's substance, and
hence cannot be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace
accidentally, and hence man may possess it more or less.
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Whether man can know that he has grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For
grace by its physical reality is in the soul. Now the soul has most
certain knowledge of those things that are in it by their physical
reality, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). Hence grace
may be known most certainly by one who has grace.
Objection 2: Further, as knowledge is a gift of God, so is grace. But
whoever receives knowledge from God, knows that he has knowledge,
according to Wis. 7:17: The Lord "hath given me the true knowledge of
the things that are." Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives grace
from God, knows that he has grace.
Objection 3: Further, light is more knowable than darkness, since,
according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13), "all that is made manifest is
light," Now sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with
certainty by one that is in sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, which
is spiritual light, be known.
Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have
received not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God;
that we may know the things that are given us from God." Now grace is
God's first gift. Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit,
by the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him.
Objection 5: Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham (Gn. 22:12):
"Now I know that thou fearest God," i.e. "I have made thee know." Now
He is speaking there of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace.
Hence a man may know that he has grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 9:1): "Man knoweth not whether
he be worthy of love or hatred." Now sanctifying grace maketh a man
worthy of God's love. Therefore no one can know whether he has
sanctifying grace.
I answer that, There are three ways of knowing a thing: first, by
revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a
special privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the joy
of safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they may carry
on toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear
the evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul (2 Cor.
12:9): "My grace is sufficient for thee."
Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and with certainty;
and in this way no one can know that he has grace. For certitude about
a thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper
principle. Thus it is by undemonstrable universal principles that
certitude is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no one
can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if he does not know its
principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God, Who by
reason of His very excellence is unknown to us, according to Job 36:26:
"Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." And hence His presence
in us and His absence cannot be known with certainty, according to Job
9:11: "If He come to me, I shall not see Him; if He depart I shall not
understand." And hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has
grace, according to 1 Cor. 4:3,4: "But neither do I judge my own self .
. . but He that judgeth me is the Lord."
Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and thus anyone may
know he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting in God, and of
despising worldly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any
mortal sin. And thus it is written (Apoc. 2:17): "To him that
overcometh I will give the hidden manna . . . which no man knoweth, but
he that receiveth it," because whoever receives it knows, by
experiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does not receive it,
does not experience. Yet this knowledge is imperfect; hence the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 4:4): "I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I
not hereby justified," since, according to Ps. 18:13: "Who can
understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from those
of others spare Thy servant."
Reply to Objection 1: Those things which are in the soul by their
physical reality, are known through experimental knowledge; in so far
as through acts man has experience of their inward principles: thus
when we wish, we perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise the
functions of life, we observe that there is life in us.
Reply to Objection 2: It is an essential condition of knowledge that a
man should have certitude of the objects of knowledge; and again, it is
an essential condition of faith that a man should be certain of the
things of faith, and this, because certitude belongs to the perfection
of the intellect, wherein these gifts exist. Hence, whoever has
knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. But it is otherwise
with grace and charity and such like, which perfect the appetitive
faculty.
Reply to Objection 3: Sin has for its principal object commutable good,
which is known to us. But the object or end of grace is unknown to us
on account of the greatness of its light, according to 1 Tim. 6:16:
"Who . . . inhabiteth light inaccessible."
Reply to Objection 4: The Apostle is here speaking of the gifts of
glory, which have been given to us in hope, and these we know most
certainly by faith, although we do not know for certain that we have
grace to enable us to merit them. Or it may be said that he is speaking
of the privileged knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence he adds
(1 Cor. 2:10): "But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit."
Reply to Objection 5: What was said to Abraham may refer to
experimental knowledge which springs from deeds of which we are
cognizant. For in the deed that Abraham had just wrought, he could know
experimentally that he had the fear of God. Or it may refer to a
revelation.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the effect of grace; (1) the justification of
the ungodly, which is the effect of operating grace; and (2) merit,
which is the effect of cooperating grace. Under the first head there
are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is the justification of the ungodly?
(2) Whether grace is required for it?
(3) Whether any movement of the free-will is required?
(4) Whether a movement of faith is required?
(5) Whether a movement of the free-will against sin is required?
(6) Whether the remission of sins is to be reckoned with the foregoing?
(7) Whether the justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is
sudden?
(8) Of the natural order of the things concurring to justification;
(9) Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work?
(10) Whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous?
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Whether the justification of the ungodly is the remission of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not
the remission of sins. For sin is opposed not only to justice, but to
all the other virtues, as stated above ([2212]Q[71], A[1]). Now
justification signifies a certain movement towards justice. Therefore
not even remission of sin is justification, since movement is from one
contrary to the other.
Objection 2: Further, everything ought to be named from what is
predominant in it, according to De Anima ii, text. 49. Now the
remission of sins is brought about chiefly by faith, according to Acts
15:9: "Purifying their hearts by faith"; and by charity, according to
Prov. 10:12: "Charity covereth all sins." Therefore the remission of
sins ought to be named after faith or charity rather than justice.
Objection 3: Further, the remission of sins seems to be the same as
being called, for whoever is called is afar off, and we are afar off
from God by sin. But one is called before being justified according to
Rom. 8:30: "And whom He called, them He also justified." Therefore
justification is not the remission of sins.
On the contrary, On Rom. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also
justified," the gloss says i.e. "by the remission of sins." Therefore
the remission of sins is justification.
I answer that, Justification taken passively implies a movement towards
heat. But since justice, by its nature, implies a certain rectitude of
order, it may be taken in two ways: first, inasmuch as it implies a
right order in man's act, and thus justice is placed amongst the
virtues---either as particular justice, which directs a man's acts by
regulating them in relation to his fellowman---or as legal justice,
which directs a man's acts by regulating them in their relation to the
common good of society, as appears from Ethic. v, 1.
Secondly, justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a certain
rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a man, in so far as
what is highest in man is subject to God, and the inferior powers of
the soul are subject to the superior, i.e. to the reason; and this
disposition the Philosopher calls "justice metaphorically speaking"
(Ethic. v, 11). Now this justice may be in man in two ways: first, by
simple generation, which is from privation to form; and thus
justification may belong even to such as are not in sin, when they
receive this justice from God, as Adam is said to have received
original justice. Secondly, this justice may be brought about in man by
a movement from one contrary to the other, and thus justification
implies a transmutation from the state of injustice to the aforesaid
state of justice. And it is thus we are now speaking of the
justification of the ungodly, according to the Apostle (Rom. 4:5): "But
to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth the
ungodly," etc. And because movement is named after its term "whereto"
rather than from its term "whence," the transmutation whereby anyone is
changed by the remission of sins from the state of ungodliness to the
state of justice, borrows its name from its term "whereto," and is
called "justification of the ungodly."
Reply to Objection 1: Every sin, inasmuch as it implies the disorder of
a mind not subject to God, may be called injustice, as being contrary
to the aforesaid justice, according to 1 Jn. 3:4: "Whosoever committeth
sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity." And thus the
removal of any sin is called the justification of the ungodly.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith and charity imply a special directing of
the human mind to God by the intellect and will; whereas justice
implies a general rectitude of order. Hence this transmutation is named
after justice rather than after charity or faith.
Reply to Objection 3: Being called refers to God's help moving and
exciting our mind to give up sin, and this motion of God is not the
remission of sins, but its cause.
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Whether the infusion of grace is required for the remission of guilt, i.e.
for the justification of the ungodly?
Objection 1: It would seem that for the remission of guilt, which is
the justification of the ungodly, no infusion of grace is required. For
anyone may be moved from one contrary without being led to the other,
if the contraries are not immediate. Now the state of guilt and the
state of grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the middle
state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt. Hence a
man may be pardoned his guilt without his being brought to a state of
grace.
Objection 2: Further, the remission of guilt consists in the Divine
imputation, according to Ps. 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord
hath not imputed sin." Now the infusion of grace puts something into
our soul, as stated above ([2213]Q[110], A[1]). Hence the infusion of
grace is not required for the remission of guilt.
Objection 3: Further, no one can be subject to two contraries at once.
Now some sins are contraries, as wastefulness and miserliness. Hence
whoever is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously
subject to the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen that he has been
subject to it hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of wastefulness
he is freed from the sin of miserliness. And thus a sin is remitted
without grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 3:24): "Justified freely by His
grace."
I answer that, by sinning a man offends God as stated above
([2214]Q[71], A[5] ). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when
the soul of the offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is
remitted to us, when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists
in the love whereby God loves us. Now God's love, considered on the
part of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as
regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted,
inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now
the effect of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is
grace, whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin
shuts him out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt,
without the infusion of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: More is required for an offender to pardon an
offense, than for one who has committed no offense, not to be hated.
For it may happen amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves
another. But if the other offends him, then the forgiveness of the
offense can only spring from a special goodwill. Now God's goodwill is
said to be restored to man by the gift of grace; and hence although a
man before sinning may be without grace and without guilt, yet that he
is without guilt after sinning can only be because he has grace.
Reply to Objection 2: As God's love consists not merely in the act of
the Divine will but also implies a certain effect of grace, as stated
above ([2215]Q[110], A[1]), so likewise, when God does not impute sin
to a man, there is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is
not imputed; for it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is not
imputed to a man by God.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 26), if
to leave off sinning was the same as to have no sin, it would be enough
if Scripture warned us thus: "'My son, hast thou sinned? do so no
more?' Now this is not enough, but it is added: 'But for thy former
sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.'" For the act of sin
passes, but the guilt remains, as stated above ([2216]Q[87], A[6]).
Hence when anyone passes from the sin of one vice to the sin of a
contrary vice, he ceases to have the act of the former sin, but he does
not cease to have the guilt, hence he may have the guilt of both sins
at once. For sins are not contrary to each other on the part of their
turning from God, wherein sin has its guilt.
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Whether for the justification of the ungodly is required a movement of the
free-will?
Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will is
required for the justification of the ungodly. For we see that by the
sacrament of Baptism, infants and sometimes adults are justified
without a movement of their free-will: hence Augustine says (Confess.
iv) that when one of his friends was taken with a fever, "he lay for a
long time senseless and in a deadly sweat, and when he was despaired
of, he was baptized without his knowing, and was regenerated"; which is
effected by sanctifying grace. Now God does not confine His power to
the sacraments. Hence He can justify a man without the sacraments, and
without any movement of the free-will.
Objection 2: Further, a man has not the use of reason when asleep, and
without it there can be no movement of the free-will. But Solomon
received from God the gift of wisdom when asleep, as related in 3 Kings
3 and 2 Paral 1. Hence with equal reason the gift of sanctifying grace
is sometimes bestowed by God on man without the movement of his
free-will.
Objection 3: Further, grace is preserved by the same cause as brings it
into being, for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "so ought
man to turn to God as he is ever made just by Him." Now grace is
preserved in man without a movement of his free-will. Hence it can be
infused in the beginning without a movement of the free-will.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:45): "Every one that hath heard
of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now to learn cannot be
without a movement of the free-will, since the learner assents to the
teacher. Hence, no one comes to the Father by justifying grace without
a movement of the free-will.
I answer that, The justification of the ungodly is brought about by God
moving man to justice. For He it is "that justifieth the ungodly"
according to Rom. 4:5. Now God moves everything in its own manner, just
as we see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is light are
moved differently, on account of their diverse natures. Hence He moves
man to justice according to the condition of his human nature. But it
is man's proper nature to have free-will. Hence in him who has the use
of reason, God's motion to justice does not take place without a
movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift of justifying
grace that at the same time He moves the free-will to accept the gift
of grace, in such as are capable of being moved thus.
Reply to Objection 1: Infants are not capable of the movement of their
free-will; hence it is by the mere infusion of their souls that God
moves them to justice. Now this cannot be brought about without a
sacrament; because as original sin, from which they are justified, does
not come to them from their own will, but by carnal generation, so also
is grace given them by Christ through spiritual regeneration. And the
same reason holds good with madmen and idiots that have never had the
use of their free-will. But in the case of one who has had the use of
his free-will and afterwards has lost it either through sickness or
sleep, he does not obtain justifying grace by the exterior rite of
Baptism, or of any other sacrament, unless he intended to make use of
this sacrament, and this can only be by the use of his free-will. And
it was in this way that he of whom Augustine speaks was regenerated,
because both previously and afterwards he assented to the Baptism.
Reply to Objection 2: Solomon neither merited nor received wisdom
whilst asleep; but it was declared to him in his sleep that on account
of his previous desire wisdom would be infused into him by God. Hence
it is said in his person (Wis. 7:7): "I wished, and understanding was
given unto me."
Or it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but was the sleep of
prophecy, according to Num. 12:6: "If there be among you a prophet of
the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a
dream." In such cases the use of free-will remains.
And yet it must be observed that the comparison between the gift of
wisdom and the gift of justifying grace does not hold. For the gift of
justifying grace especially ordains a man to good, which is the object
of the will; and hence a man is moved to it by a movement of the will
which is a movement of free-will. But wisdom perfects the intellect
which precedes the will; hence without any complete movement of the
free-will, the intellect can be enlightened with the gift of wisdom,
even as we see that things are revealed to men in sleep, according to
Job 33:15,16: "When deep sleep falleth upon men and they are sleeping
in their beds, then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching,
instructeth them in what they are to learn."
Reply to Objection 3: In the infusion of justifying grace there is a
certain transmutation of the human soul, and hence a proper movement of
the human soul is required in order that the soul may be moved in its
own manner. But the conservation of grace is without transmutation: no
movement on the part of the soul is required but only a continuation of
the Divine influx.
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Whether a movement of faith is required for the justification of the
ungodly?
Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of faith is required for
the justification of the ungodly. For as a man is justified by faith,
so also by other things, viz. by fear, of which it is written (Ecclus.
1:27): "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is without
fear cannot be justified"; and again by charity, according to Lk. 7:47:
"Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much"; and again by
humility, according to James 4:6: "God resisteth the proud and giveth
grace to the humble"; and again by mercy, according to Prov. 15:27: "By
mercy and faith sins are purged away." Hence the movement of faith is
no more required for the justification of the ungodly, than the
movements of the aforesaid virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the act of faith is required for justification
only inasmuch as a man knows God by faith. But a man may know God in
other ways, viz. by natural knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence
no act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.
Objection 3: Further, there are several articles of faith. Therefore if
the act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, it
would seem that a man ought to think on every article of faith when he
is first justified. But this seems inconvenient, since such thought
would require a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an act of faith
is not required for the justification of the ungodly.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:1): "Being justified therefore
by faith, let us have peace with God."
I answer that, As stated above [2217](A[3]) a movement of free-will is
required for the justification of the ungodly, inasmuch as man's mind
is moved by God. Now God moves man's soul by turning it to Himself
according to Ps. 84:7 (Septuagint): "Thou wilt turn us, O God, and
bring us to life." Hence for the justification of the ungodly a
movement of the mind is required, by which it is turned to God. Now the
first turning to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that
cometh to God must believe that He is." Hence a movement of faith is
required for the justification of the ungodly.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is
quickened by charity; hence in the justification of the ungodly, a
movement of charity is infused together with the movement of faith. Now
free-will is moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an act of
filial fear and an act of humility also concur. For it may happen that
one and the same act of free-will springs from different virtues, when
one commands and another is commanded, inasmuch as the act may be
ordained to various ends. But the act of mercy counteracts sin either
by way of satisfying for it, and thus it follows justification; or by
way of preparation, inasmuch as the merciful obtain mercy; and thus it
can either precede justification, or concur with the other virtues
towards justification, inasmuch as mercy is included in the love of our
neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: By natural knowledge a man is not turned to God,
according as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of
justification. Hence such knowledge does not suffice for justification.
But the gift of wisdom presupposes the knowledge of faith, as stated
above ([2218]Q[68], A[4], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Rom. 4:5), "to him that . .
. believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is reputed to
justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God." Hence it is
clear that in the justification of the ungodly an act of faith is
required in order that a man may believe that God justifies man through
the mystery of Christ.
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Whether for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement o
f
the free-will towards sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will towards
sin is required for the justification of the ungodly. For charity alone
suffices to take away sin, according to Prov. 10:12: "Charity covereth
all sins." Now the object of charity is not sin. Therefore for this
justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will towards sin
is required.
Objection 2: Further, whoever is tending onward, ought not to look
back, according to Phil. 3:13,14: "Forgetting the things that are
behind, and stretching forth myself to those that are before, I press
towards the mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation." But whoever
is stretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him. Hence he
ought to forget them, and not stretch forth to them by a movement of
his free-will.
Objection 3: Further, in the justification of the ungodly one sin is
not remitted without another, for "it is irreverent to expect half a
pardon from God" [*Cap., Sunt. plures: Dist. iii, De Poenit.]. Hence,
in the justification of the ungodly, if man's free-will must move
against sin, he ought to think of all his sins. But this is unseemly,
both because a great space of time would be required for such thought,
and because a man could not obtain the forgiveness of such sins as he
had forgotten. Hence for the justification of the ungodly no movement
of the free-will is required.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 31:5): "I will confess against
myself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness
of my sin."
I answer that, As stated above [2219](A[1]), the justification of the
ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by God
from the state of sin to the state of justice. Hence it is necessary
for the human mind to regard both extremes by an act of free-will, as a
body in local movement is related to both terms of the movement. Now it
is clear that in local movement the moving body leaves the term
"whence" and nears the term "whereto." Hence the human mind whilst it
is being justified, must, by a movement of its free-will withdraw from
sin and draw near to justice.
Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, in an act of
free-will, means detestation and desire. For Augustine says on the
words "the hireling fleeth," etc. (Jn. 10:12): "Our emotions are the
movements of our soul; joy is the soul's outpouring; fear is the soul's
flight; your soul goes forward when you seek; your soul flees, when you
are afraid." Hence in the justification of the ungodly there must be
two acts of the free-will---one, whereby it tends to God's justice; the
other whereby it hates sin.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to the same virtue to seek one
contrary and to avoid the other; and hence, as it belongs to charity to
love God, so likewise, to detest sin whereby the soul is separated from
God.
Reply to Objection 2: A man ought not to return to those things that
are behind, by loving them; but, for that matter, he ought to forget
them, lest he be drawn to them. Yet he ought to recall them to mind, in
order to detest them; for this is to fly from them.
Reply to Objection 3: Previous to justification a man must detest each
sin he remembers to have committed, and from this remembrance the soul
goes on to have a general movement of detestation with regard to all
sins committed, in which are included such sins as have been forgotten.
For a man is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry even
for those he does not remember, if they were present to his memory; and
this movement cooperates in his justification.
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Whether the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things
required for justification?
Objection 1: It would seem that the remission of sins ought not to be
reckoned amongst the things required for justification. For the
substance of a thing is not reckoned together with those that are
required for a thing; thus a man is not reckoned together with his body
and soul. But the justification of the ungodly is itself the remission
of sins, as stated above [2220](A[1]). Therefore the remission of sins
ought not to be reckoned among the things required for the
justification of the ungodly.
Objection 2: Further, infusion of grace and remission of sins are the
same; as illumination and expulsion of darkness are the same. But a
thing ought not to be reckoned together with itself; for unity is
opposed to multitude. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be
reckoned with the infusion of grace.
Objection 3: Further, the remission of sin follows as effect from
cause, from the free-will's movement towards God and sin; since it is
by faith and contrition that sin is forgiven. But an effect ought not
to be reckoned with its cause; since things thus enumerated together,
and, as it were, condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the
remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things required for
the justification of the ungodly.
On the contrary, In reckoning what is required for a thing we ought not
to pass over the end, which is the chief part of everything. Now the
remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly; for
it is written (Is. 27:9): "This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof
should be taken away." Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned
amongst the things required for justification.
I answer that, There are four things which are accounted to be
necessary for the justification of the ungodly, viz. the infusion of
grace, the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the movement
of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The reason for
this is that, as stated above [2221](A[1]), the justification of the
ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved by God from a state of
sin to a state of justice. Now in the movement whereby one thing is
moved by another, three things are required: first, the motion of the
mover; secondly, the movement of the moved; thirdly, the consummation
of the movement, or the attainment of the end. On the part of the
Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace; on the part of the
free-will which is moved, there are two movements---of departure from
the term "whence," and of approach to the term "whereto"; but the
consummation of the movement or the attainment of the end of the
movement is implied in the remission of sins; for in this is the
justification of the ungodly completed.
Reply to Objection 1: The justification of the ungodly is called the
remission of sins, even as every movement has its species from its
term. Nevertheless, many other things are required in order to reach
the term, as stated above [2222](A[5]).
Reply to Objection 2: The infusion of grace and the remission of sin
may be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the substance of
the act, and thus they are the same; for by the same act God bestows
grace and remits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on the part of
the objects; and thus they differ by the difference between guilt,
which is taken away, and grace, which is infused; just as in natural
things generation and corruption differ, although the generation of one
thing is the corruption of another.
Reply to Objection 3: This enumeration is not the division of a genus
into its species, in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous;
but it is division of the things required for the completion of
anything; and in this enumeration we may have what precedes and what
follows, since some of the principles and parts of a composite thing
may precede and some follow.
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Whether the justification of the ungodly takes place in an instant or
successively?
Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does
not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already
stated [2223](A[3]), for the justification of the ungodly, there is
required a movement of free-will. Now the act of the free-will is
choice, which requires the deliberation of counsel, as stated above
(Q[13], A[1]). Hence, since deliberation implies a certain reasoning
process, and this implies succession, the justification of the ungodly
would seem to be successive.
Objection 2: Further, the free-will's movement is not without actual
consideration. But it is impossible to understand many things actually
and at once, as stated above ([2224]FP, Q[85], A[4]). Hence, since for
the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the
free-will towards several things, viz. towards God and towards sin, it
would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to be in an
instant.
Objection 3: Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g.
blackness or whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now
grace may be greater or less, as stated above ([2225]Q[112], A[4]).
Hence it is not received suddenly by its subject. Therefore, seeing
that the infusion of grace is required for the justification of the
ungodly, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be
in an instant.
Objection 4: Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates in
justification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from grace,
without which there is no merit, as we shall state further on
([2226]Q[114], A[2]). Now a thing receives its form before operating by
this form. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is
moved towards God and to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at
once.
Objection 5: Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be
an instant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin is
forgiven there must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it cannot
be the same instant, otherwise opposites would be in the same
simultaneously. Hence they must be two successive instants; between
which there must be time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1).
Therefore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at once,
but successively.
On the contrary, The justification of the ungodly is caused by the
justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to men's
minds suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: "And suddenly there came a sound
from heaven as of a mighty wind coming," upon which the gloss says that
"the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts." Hence the
justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous.
I answer that, The entire justification of the ungodly consists as to
its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that free-will
is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace takes place in
an instant and without succession. And the reason of this is that if a
form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it is either because
that subject is not disposed, or because the agent needs time to
dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the matter is
disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial form accrues to the
matter; thus because the atmosphere of itself is disposed to receive
light, it is suddenly illuminated by a body actually luminous. Now it
was stated ([2227]Q[112], A[2]) that God, in order to infuse grace into
the soul, needs no disposition, save what He Himself has made. And
sometimes this sufficient disposition for the reception of grace He
makes suddenly, sometimes gradually and successively, as stated above
([2228]Q[112], A[2], ad 2). For the reason why a natural agent cannot
suddenly dispose matter is that in the matter there is a resistant
which has some disproportion with the power of the agent; and hence we
see that the stronger the agent, the more speedily is the matter
disposed. Therefore, since the Divine power is infinite, it can
suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to its form; and much more man's
free-will, whose movement is by nature instantaneous. Therefore the
justification of the ungodly by God takes place in an instant.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the free-will, which concurs in
the justification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest sin, and to
draw near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes,
indeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the
substance of justification, but a way of justification; as local
movement is a way of illumination, and alteration to generation.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2229]FP, Q[85], A[5]), there is
nothing to prevent two things being understood at once, in so far as
they are somehow one; thus we understand the subject and predicate
together, inasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation.
And in the same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once
in so far as one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's movement
towards sin is ordained to the free-will's movement towards God, since
a man detests sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to cling.
Hence in the justification of the ungodly the free-will simultaneously
detests sin and turns to God, even as a body approaches one point and
withdraws from another simultaneously.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why a form is not received
instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more
or less; for thus the light would not be suddenly received in the air,
which can be illumined more or less. But the reason is to be sought on
the part of the disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: The same instant the form is acquired, the thing
begins to operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is generated
moves upwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it would be
terminated in the same instant. Now to will and not to will---the
movements of the free-will---are not successive, but instantaneous.
Hence the justification of the ungodly must not be successive.
Reply to Objection 5: The succession of opposites in the same subject
must be looked at differently in the things that are subject to time
and in those that are above time. For in those that are in time, there
is no last instant in which the previous form inheres in the subject;
but there is the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent
form inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the reason, that in
time we are not to consider one instant, since neither do instants
succeed each other immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is
proved in Physic. vi, 1. But time is terminated by an instant. Hence in
the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving towards its
form, it is under the opposite form; but in the last instant of this
time, which is the first instant of the subsequent time, it has the
form which is the term of the movement.
But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be any
succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (as in the
angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time, but by
discrete time, even as the things measured are not continuous, as
stated above ([2230]FP, Q[53], AA[2],3). In these, therefore, there is
a last instant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which
the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in between, since there is no
continuity of time, which this would necessitate.
Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time, but
is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with
continuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it
considers the intelligible species, as stated above ([2231]FP, Q[85],
AA[1],2). We must, therefore, decide from this about its change as
regards the condition of temporal movements, i.e. we must say that
there is no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time; whereas
there is a first instant that grace inheres; and in all the time
previous sin inhered.
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Whether the infusion of grace is naturally the first of the things required
for the justification of the ungodly?
Objection 1: It would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is
naturally required first for the justification of the ungodly. For we
withdraw from evil before drawing near to good, according to Ps. 33:15:
"Turn away from evil, and do good." Now the remission of sins regards
the turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace regards the
turning to good. Hence the remission of sin is naturally before the
infusion of grace.
Objection 2: Further, the disposition naturally precedes the form to
which it disposes. Now the free-will's movement is a disposition for
the reception of grace. Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of
grace.
Objection 3: Further, sin hinders the soul from tending freely to God.
Now a hindrance to movement must be removed before the movement takes
place. Hence the remission of sin and the free-will's movement towards
sin are naturally before the infusion of grace.
On the contrary, The cause is naturally prior to its effect. Now the
infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the
justification of the ungodly, as stated above [2232](A[7]). Therefore
it is naturally prior to it.
I answer that, The aforesaid four things required for the justification
of the ungodly are simultaneous in time, since the justification of the
ungodly is not successive, as stated above [2233](A[7]); but in the
order of nature, one is prior to another; and in their natural order
the first is the infusion of grace; the second, the free-will's
movement towards God; the third, the free-will's movement towards sin;
the fourth, the remission of sin.
The reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover
is naturally first; the disposition of the matter, or the movement of
the moved, is second; the end or term of the movement in which the
motion of the mover rests, is last. Now the motion of God the Mover is
the infusion of grace, as stated above [2234](A[6]); the movement or
disposition of the moved is the free-will's double movement; and the
term or end of the movement is the remission of sin, as stated above
[2235](A[6]). Hence in their natural order the first in the
justification of the ungodly is the infusion of grace; the second is
the free-will's movement towards God; the third is the free-will's
movement towards sin, for he who is being justified detests sin because
it is against God, and thus the free-will's movement towards God
naturally precedes the free-will's movement towards sin, since it is
its cause and reason; the fourth and last is the remission of sin, to
which this transmutation is ordained as to an end, as stated above
([2236]AA[1],6).
Reply to Objection 1: The withdrawal from one term and approach to
another may be looked at in two ways: first, on the part of the thing
moved, and thus the withdrawal from a term naturally precedes the
approach to a term, since in the subject of movement the opposite which
is put away is prior to the opposite which the subject moved attains to
by its movement. But on the part of the agent it is the other way
about, since the agent, by the form pre-existing in it, acts for the
removal of the opposite form; as the sun by its light acts for the
removal of darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumination is
prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of the atmosphere to
be illuminated, to be freed from darkness is, in the order of nature,
prior to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in time. And
since the infusion of grace and the remission of sin regard God Who
justifies, hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior
to the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part of the
man justified, it is the other way about, since in the order of nature
the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of justifying grace.
Or it may be said that the term "whence" of justification is sin; and
the term "whereto" is justice; and that grace is the cause of the
forgiveness of sin and of obtaining of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The disposition of the subject precedes the
reception of the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows the
action of the agent, whereby the subject is disposed. And hence the
free-will's movement precedes the reception of grace in the order of
nature, and follows the infusion of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9), in
movements of the soul the movement toward the speculative principle or
the practical end is the very first, but in exterior movements the
removal of the impediment precedes the attainment of the end. And as
the free-will's movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of
nature it moves towards God as to its end, before removing the
impediment of sin.
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Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work?
Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not
God's greatest work. For it is by the justification of the ungodly that
we attain the grace of a wayfarer. Now by glorification we receive
heavenly grace, which is greater. Hence the glorification of angels and
men is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly.
Objection 2: Further, the justification of the ungodly is ordained to
the particular good of one man. But the good of the universe is greater
than the good of one man, as is plain from Ethic. i, 2. Hence the
creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification
of the ungodly.
Objection 3: Further, to make something from nothing, where there is
nought to cooperate with the agent, is greater than to make something
with the cooperation of the recipient. Now in the work of creation
something is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate with
the agent; but in the justification of the ungodly God makes something
from something, i.e. a just man from a sinner, and there is a
cooperation on man's part, since there is a movement of the free-will,
as stated above [2237](A[3]). Hence the justification of the ungodly is
not God's greatest work.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are
over all His works," and in a collect [*Tenth Sunday after Pentecost]
we say: "O God, Who dost show forth Thine all-mightiness most by
pardoning and having mercy," and Augustine, expounding the words,
"greater than these shall he do" (Jn. 14:12) says that "for a just man
to be made from a sinner, is greater than to create heaven and earth."
I answer that, A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the
part of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the
greatest work, wherein something is made from nothing; secondly, a work
may be called great on account of what is made, and thus the
justification of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of a
share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and earth,
which terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence, Augustine, after
saying that "for a just man to be made from a sinner is greater than to
create heaven and earth," adds, "for heaven and earth shall pass away,
but the justification of the ungodly shall endure."
Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great in two ways:
first, in an absolute quantity, and thus the gift of glory is greater
than the gift of grace that sanctifies the ungodly; and in this respect
the glorification of the just is greater than the justification of the
ungodly. Secondly, a thing may be said to be great in proportionate
quantity, and thus the gift of grace that justifies the ungodly is
greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, for the gift of
grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly, who are worthy of
punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the
just, who by the fact of their justification are worthy of glory. Hence
Augustine says: "Let him that can, judge whether it is greater to
create the angels just, than to justify the ungodly. Certainly, if they
both betoken equal power, one betokens greater mercy."
And thus the reply to the first is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: The good of the universe is greater than the
particular good of one, if we consider both in the same genus. But the
good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole
universe.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection rests on the manner of acting, in
which way creation is God's greatest work.
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Whether the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work?
Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a
miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous.
Now the justification of the ungodly is greater than the other
miraculous works, as is clear from the quotation from Augustine
[2238](A[9]). Hence the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous
work.
Objection 2: Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the
natural inclination in natural things. But when God works in natural
things against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous
work, as when He gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the
will of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a
man moves him to good, it would seem that the justification of the
ungodly is miraculous.
Objection 3: Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice.
Now it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God
without study. Therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be
justified by God.
On the contrary, Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the
justification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power; for Augustine
says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that "to be capable of having faith and to be
capable of having charity belongs to man's nature; but to have faith
and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful." Therefore the
justification of the ungodly is not miraculous.
I answer that, In miraculous works it is usual to find three things:
the first is on the part of the active power, because they can only be
performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous, since their
cause is hidden, as stated above ([2239]FP, Q[105], A[7]). And thus
both the justification of the ungodly and the creation of the world,
and, generally speaking, every work that can be done by God alone, is
miraculous.
Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form
introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as in the
resurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a
body. And thus the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous,
because the soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having
been made to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace, as
Augustine says, in the above quotation.
Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and
customary order of causing an effect, as when a sick man suddenly and
beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect
health; and thus the justification of the ungodly is sometimes
miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and wonted course of
justification is that God moves the soul interiorly and that man is
converted to God, first by an imperfect conversion, that it may
afterwards become perfect; because "charity begun merits increase, and
when increased merits perfection," as Augustine says (In Epist. Joan.
Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it
reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took place in the
conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same time by a
miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion of Paul is
commemorated in the Church as miraculous.
Reply to Objection 1: Certain miraculous works, although they are less
than the justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are
beyond the wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the
nature of a miracle.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural
thing is moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be
miraculous for water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards;
but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper
cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save God can
justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat water. Hence
the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in this
respect.
Reply to Objection 3: A man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge
from God by his own talent and study. Hence it is miraculous when a man
is made wise or learned outside this order. But a man does not
naturally acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God's.
Hence there is no parity.
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OF MERIT (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace;
and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man can merit anything from God?
(2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life?
(3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly?
(4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that
grace is the principle of merit?
(5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself?
(6) Whether he may merit it for someone else?
(7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin?
(8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity?
(9) Whether he can merit final perseverance?
(10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man may merit anything from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For
no one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all the
good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet more is
His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). Hence it is
written (Lk. 17:10): "When you have done all these things that are
commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that
which we ought to do." Therefore a man can merit nothing from God.
Objection 2: Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God,
by what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting
well, a man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is
written (Job 35:7): "If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or
what shall He receive of thy hand." Hence a man can merit nothing from
God.
Objection 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him
his debtor; for a man's wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one's
debtor; hence it is written (Rom. 11:35): "Who hath first given to Him,
and recompense shall be made to him?" Hence no one can merit anything
from God.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 31:16): "There is a reward for thy
work." Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit. Hence
it would seem that a man may merit from God.
I answer that, Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward means
something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price for it.
Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for anything
received from another, so also is it an act of justice to make a return
for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from
the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is simply between
those that are simply equal; but where there is no absolute equality
between them, neither is there absolute justice, but there may be a
certain manner of justice, as when we speak of a father's or a master's
right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says. And hence where there is
justice simply, there is the character of merit and reward simply. But
where there is no simple right, but only relative, there is no
character of merit simply, but only relatively, in so far as the
character of justice is found there, since the child merits something
from his father and the slave from his lord.
Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest
inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from
God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and
God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after
their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man
from God. Hence man's merit with God only exists on the presupposition
of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a reward of
his operation, what God gave him the power of operation for, even as
natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to
which they were ordained by God; differently, indeed, since the
rational creature moves itself to act by its free-will, hence its
action has the character of merit, which is not so in other creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by
his free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a
debt would not be meritorious.
Reply to Objection 2: God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory,
i.e. the manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in His
own works. Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by our
worship of Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works anything
accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory.
Reply to Objection 3: Since our action has the character of merit, only
on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow that
God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right
that His will should be carried out.
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Whether anyone without grace can merit eternal life?
Objection 1: It would seem that without grace anyone can merit eternal
life. For man merits from God what he is divinely ordained to, as
stated above [2240](A[1]). Now man by his nature is ordained to
beatitude as his end; hence, too, he naturally wishes to be blessed.
Hence man by his natural endowments and without grace can merit
beatitude which is eternal life.
Objection 2: Further, the less a work is due, the more meritorious it
is. Now, less due is that work which is done by one who has received
fewer benefits. Hence, since he who has only natural endowments has
received fewer gifts from God, than he who has gratuitous gifts as well
as nature, it would seem that his works are more meritorious with God.
And thus if he who has grace can merit eternal life to some extent,
much more may he who has no grace.
Objection 3: Further, God's mercy and liberality infinitely surpass
human mercy and liberality. Now a man may merit from another, even
though he has not hitherto had his grace. Much more, therefore, would
it seem that a man without grace may merit eternal life.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God, life
everlasting."
I answer that, Man without grace may be looked at in two states, as was
said above ([2241]Q[109], A[2]): the first, a state of perfect nature,
in which Adam was before his sin; the second, a state of corrupt
nature, in which we are before being restored by grace. Therefore, if
we speak of man in the first state, there is only one reason why man
cannot merit eternal life without grace, by his purely natural
endowments, viz. because man's merit depends on the Divine
pre-ordination. Now no act of anything whatsoever is divinely ordained
to anything exceeding the proportion of the powers which are the
principles of its act; for it is a law of Divine providence that
nothing shall act beyond its powers. Now everlasting life is a good
exceeding the proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its
knowledge and desire, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "Eye hath not seen, nor
ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man." And hence it
is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act
meritorious of eternal life, unless there is added a supernatural gift,
which we call grace. But if we speak of man as existing in sin, a
second reason is added to this, viz. the impediment of sin. For since
sin is an offense against God, excluding us from eternal life, as is
clear from what has been said above ([2242]Q[71], A[6];[2243] Q[113],
A[2]), no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit eternal life
unless first he be reconciled to God, through his sin being forgiven,
which is brought about by grace. For the sinner deserves not life, but
death, according to Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death."
Reply to Objection 1: God ordained human nature to attain the end of
eternal life, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace; and in
this way its act can be meritorious of eternal life.
Reply to Objection 2: Without grace a man cannot have a work equal to a
work proceeding from grace, since the more perfect the principle, the
more perfect the action. But the objection would hold good, if we
supposed the operations equal in both cases.
Reply to Objection 3: With regard to the first reason adduced, the case
is different in God and in man. For a man receives all his power of
well-doing from God, and not from man. Hence a man can merit nothing
from God except by His gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly saying
(Rom. 11:35): "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be
made to him?" But man may merit from man, before he has received
anything from him, by what he has received from God.
But as regards the second proof taken from the impediment of sin, the
case is similar with man and God, since one man cannot merit from
another whom he has offended, unless he makes satisfaction to him and
is reconciled.
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Whether a man in grace can merit eternal life condignly?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man in grace cannot merit eternal
life condignly, for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): "The sufferings of
this time are not worthy [condignae] to be compared with the glory to
come, that shall be revealed in us." But of all meritorious works, the
sufferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious. Therefore no
works of men are meritorious of eternal life condignly.
Objection 2: Further, on Rom. 6:23, "The grace of God, life
everlasting," a gloss says: "He might have truly said: 'The wages of
justice, life everlasting'; but He preferred to say 'The grace of God,
life everlasting,' that we may know that God leads us to life
everlasting of His own mercy and not by our merits." Now when anyone
merits something condignly he receives it not from mercy, but from
merit. Hence it would seem that a man with grace cannot merit life
everlasting condignly.
Objection 3: Further, merit that equals the reward, would seem to be
condign. Now no act of the present life can equal everlasting life,
which surpasses our knowledge and our desire, and moreover, surpasses
the charity or love of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature.
Therefore with grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly.
On the contrary, What is granted in accordance with a fair judgment,
would seem a condign reward. But life everlasting is granted by God, in
accordance with the judgment of justice, according to 2 Tim. 4:8: "As
to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the
Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day." Therefore man
merits everlasting life condignly.
I answer that, Man's meritorious work may be considered in two ways:
first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from the
grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the substance
of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can
be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But there is
congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it would seem
congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should reward him
according to the excellence of his power.
If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds
from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is
meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its
merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life
everlasting according to Jn. 4:14: "Shall become in him a fount of
water springing up into life everlasting." And the worth of the work
depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker
of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the
inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: "If
sons, heirs also."
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these
sufferings.
Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the first
cause of our reaching everlasting life, viz. God's mercy. But our merit
is a subsequent cause.
Reply to Objection 3: The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at
present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as
the seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by
grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause of
life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the "pledge" of our
inheritance.
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Whether grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than the
other virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit
through charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to
work, according to Mat. 20:8: "Call the laborers and pay them their
hire." Now every virtue is a principle of some operation, since virtue
is an operative habit, as stated above ([2244]Q[55], A[2]). Hence every
virtue is equally a principle of merit.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8): "Every man shall
receive his own reward according to his labor." Now charity lessens
rather than increases the labor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis
Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and
next to nothing." Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than
any other virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be
the one whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith and
patience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious, as appears
in the martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even
till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle of merit than
charity.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall
be loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest Myself to
him." Now everlasting life consists in the manifest knowledge of God,
according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee,
the only true" and living "God." Hence the merit of eternal life rests
chiefly with charity.
I answer that, As we may gather from what has been stated above
[2245](A[1]), human acts have the nature of merit from two causes:
first and chiefly from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said
to merit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the
part of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the
power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both these ways
does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we must bear in mind that
everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the human mind's
movement to the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act of
charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this
end, since all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence the
merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and secondly, to
the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity. So,
likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of love we do most
willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness,
merit is chiefly attributed to charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for
object, moves the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end
pertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as was
said above ([2246]Q[9], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways:
first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the
work pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not
lessen the toil---rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils,
"for it does great things, if it exists," as Gregory says (Hom. in
Evang. xxx). Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not
done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and this
toil lessens merit and is removed by charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of faith is not meritorious unless "faith
. . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). So, too, the acts of patience and
fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity,
according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I should deliver my body to be burned,
and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."
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Whether a man may merit for himself the first grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first
grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), "faith merits
justification." Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore a
man may merit the first grace.
Objection 2: Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one
is said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly.
Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly.
Objection 3: Further, with men we may merit a gift already received.
Thus if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good
use of it in his master's service. Now God is much more bountiful than
man. Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the
first grace already received from God.
On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works,
according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not
reckoned according to grace but according to debt." Now a man merits
what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works.
Hence a man may not merit the first grace.
I answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: first
in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all
merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6), "if
by grace, it is not now by works." Secondly, it may be considered as
regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come
under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the
proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state
of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. sin. But when anyone
has grace, the grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since
reward is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all our
good works, as stated above ([2247]Q[109]). But of anyone merits a
further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not
be the first grace. Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for
himself the first grace.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was
deceived on this point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to
be from us, and its consummation to be granted us by God; and this he
here retracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of
faith as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a
truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from God, the
first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of
the first grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though
man, by believing, were to merit justification, but that, he believes,
whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is
required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above
([2248]Q[113], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not
that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them
worthy, Who alone "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean
seed" (Job 14:4).
Reply to Objection 3: Man's every good work proceeds from the first
grace as from its principle; but not from any gift of man.
Consequently, there is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts
of men.
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Whether a man can merit the first grace for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for
another. Because on Mat. 9:2: "Jesus seeing their faith," etc. a gloss
says: "How much is our personal faith worth with God, Who set such a
price on another's faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and
outwardly!" Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man
can merit the first grace for another.
Objection 2: Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but
efficacious, according to James 5:16: "The continued prayer of a just
man availeth much." Now he had previously said: "Pray one for another,
that you may be saved." Hence, since man's salvation can only be
brought about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for another his
first grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends
of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive
you into everlasting dwellings." Now it is through grace alone that
anyone is received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does
anyone merit everlasting life as stated above [2249](A[2]; Q[109],
A[5]). Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel shall
stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people" ---yet they had
great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one can merit the first
grace for another.
I answer that, As shown above ([2250]AA[1],3,4), our works are
meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and
thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from
free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have
congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use
of his power God should by His super-excellent power work still higher
things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit condignly for
another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each one of us is
moved by God to reach life everlasting through the gift of grace; hence
condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ's soul is
moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach the glory of life
everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as He is the Head
of the Church, and the Author of human salvation, according to Heb.
2:10: "Who hath brought many children into glory [to perfect] the
Author of their salvation."
But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a
man in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous and in harmony
with friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation
of another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part
of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense
that the passage from Jeremias speaks.
Reply to Objection 1: A man's faith avails for another's salvation by
congruous and not by condign merit.
Reply to Objection 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas
condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things
from the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice,
according to Dan. 9:18: "For it is not for our justifications that we
present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy
tender mercies."
Reply to Objection 3: The poor who receive alms are said to receive
others into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their
forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works,
or materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy,
exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting
dwellings.
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Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself
restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he may
justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than to be
restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super Ps.
lxx.], according to Ps. 70:9: "When my strength shall fail, do not Thou
forsake me." Hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall.
Objection 2: Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another.
Now a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after
a fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Objection 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life
everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above [2251](A[2];
Q[109], A[5]). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is
restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself
restoration.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man turn
himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his justices
which he hath done shall not be remembered." Therefore his previous
merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
I answer that, No one can merit for himself restoration after a future
fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for himself
condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of
Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin;
hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he is
restored, do not fall under merit---the motion of the preceding grace
not extending to them. Again, congruous merit, whereby one merits the
first grace for another, is prevented from having its effect on account
of the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much more,
therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which
is in him who merits, and in him for whom it is merited; for both these
are in the same person. And therefore a man can nowise merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Reply to Objection 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after
a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration
is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that
it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.
Reply to Objection 2: Anyone may congruously merit for another his
first grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of
him who merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice
after the merit of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that no one "absolutely" merits
life everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only
"conditionally," i.e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say
this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less
meritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of
illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal
life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to
the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its effect; just as
natural causes fail of their effects on account of a supervening
impediment.
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Whether a man may merit the increase of grace or charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of grace
or charity. For when anyone receives the reward he merited no other
reward is due to him; thus it was said of some (Mat. 6:2): "They have
received their reward." Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of
charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace has been
increased, he could not expect any further reward, which is unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But the
principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown above
([2252]AA[2], 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace or charity
than he has.
Objection 3: Further, what falls under merit a man merits by every act
flowing from grace or charity, as by every such act a man merits life
everlasting. If, therefore, the increase of grace or charity falls
under merit, it would seem that by every act quickened by charity a man
would merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he
infallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subsequent sin; for it
is written (2 Tim. 1:12): "I know Whom I have believed, and I am
certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him."
Hence it would follow that grace or charity is increased by every
meritorious act; and this would seem impossible since at times
meritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suffice for the
increase of charity. Therefore the increase of charity does not come
under merit.
On the contrary, Augustine says (super Ep. Joan.; cf. Ep. clxxxvi) that
"charity merits increase, and being increased merits to be perfected."
Hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit.
I answer that, As stated above ([2253]AA[6],7), whatever the motion of
grace reaches to, falls under condign merit. Now the motion of a mover
extends not merely to the last term of the movement, but to the whole
progress of the movement. But the term of the movement of grace is
eternal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase of
charity or grace according to Prov. 4:18: "But the path of the just as
a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect day,"
which is the day of glory. And thus the increase of grace falls under
condign merit.
Reply to Objection 1: Reward is the term of merit. But there is a
double term of movement, viz. the last, and the intermediate, which is
both beginning and term; and this term is the reward of increase. Now
the reward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their
end in it; hence such as these receive no other reward.
Reply to Objection 2: The increase of grace is not above the virtuality
of the pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity, even as a
tree is not above the virtuality of the seed, although above its
quantity.
Reply to Objection 3: By every meritorious act a man merits the
increase of grace, equally with the consummation of grace which is
eternal life. But just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its
own time, so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time,
viz. when a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.
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Whether a man may merit perseverance?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit perseverance. For what
a man obtains by asking, can come under the merit of anyone that is in
grace. Now men obtain perseverance by asking it of God; otherwise it
would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions of the Lord's
Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. ii). Therefore perseverance
may come under the merit of whoever has grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is more not to be able to sin than not to sin.
But not to be able to sin comes under merit, for we merit eternal life,
of which impeccability is an essential part. Much more, therefore, may
we merit not to sin, i.e. to persevere.
Objection 3: Further, increase of grace is greater than perseverance in
the grace we already possess. But a man may merit an increase of grace,
as was stated above [2254](A[8]). Much more, therefore, may he merit
perseverance in the grace he has already.
On the contrary, What we merit, we obtain from God, unless it is
hindered by sin. Now many have meritorious works, who do not obtain
perseverance; nor can it be urged that this takes place because of the
impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and
thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit him to
fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come under merit.
I answer that, Since man's free-will is naturally flexible towards good
and evil, there are two ways of obtaining from God perseverance in
good: first, inasmuch as free-will is determined to good by consummate
grace, which will be in glory; secondly, on the part of the Divine
motion, which inclines man to good unto the end. Now as explained above
([2255]AA[6],7,8), that which is related as a term to the free-will's
movement directed to God the mover, falls under human merit; and not
what is related to the aforesaid movement as principle. Hence it is
clear that the perseverance of glory which is the term of the aforesaid
movement falls under merit; but perseverance of the wayfarer does not
fall under merit, since it depends solely on the Divine motion, which
is the principle of all merit. Now God freely bestows the good of
perseverance, on whomsoever He bestows it.
Reply to Objection 1: We impetrate in prayer things that we do not
merit, since God hears sinners who beseech the pardon of their sins,
which they do not merit, as appears from Augustine [*Tract. xliv in
Joan.] on Jn. 11:31, "Now we know that God doth not hear sinners,"
otherwise it would have been useless for the publican to say: "O God,
be merciful to me a sinner," Lk. 18:13. So too may we impetrate of God
in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or for others,
although it does not fall under merit.
Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance which is in heaven is compared
as term to the free-will's movement; not so, the perseverance of the
wayfarer, for the reason given in the body of the article.
In the same way may we answer the third objection which concerns the
increase of grace, as was explained above.
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Whether temporal goods fall under merit?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods fall under merit. For
what is promised to some as a reward of justice, falls under merit.
Now, temporal goods were promised in the Old Law as the reward of
justice, as appears from Dt. 28. Hence it seems that temporal goods
fall under merit.
Objection 2: Further, that would seem to fall under merit, which God
bestows on anyone for a service done. But God sometimes bestows
temporal goods on men for services done for Him. For it is written (Ex.
1:21): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses"; on
which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that "life everlasting
might have been awarded them as the fruit of their goodwill, but on
account of their sin of falsehood they received an earthly reward." And
it is written (Ezech. 29:18): "The King of Babylon hath made his army
to undergo hard service against Tyre . . . and there hath been no
reward given him," and further on: "And it shall be wages for his army
. . . I have given him the land of Egypt because he hath labored for
me." Therefore temporal goods fall under merit.
Objection 3: Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit. But on
account of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal
punishments, as appears from the Sodomites, Gn. 19. Hence temporal
goods fall under merit.
Objection 4: On the contrary, What falls under merit does not come upon
all alike. But temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike;
according to Eccles. 9:2: "All things equally happen to the just and
the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the
unclean, to him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth
sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit.
I answer that, What falls under merit is the reward or wage, which is a
kind of good. Now man's good is twofold: the first, simply; the second,
relatively. Now man's good simply is his last end (according to Ps.
72:27: "But it is good for men to adhere to my God") and consequently
what is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall simply under
merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is what is good to
him now, or what is a good to him relatively; and this does not fall
under merit simply, but relatively.
Hence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are
useful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, they fall
directly and simply under merit, even as increase of grace, and
everything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude after the first
grace. For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal goods
to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these temporal
goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:10): "For there is
no want to them that fear Him," and again, Ps. 36:25: "I have not seen
the just forsaken," etc.
But if these temporal goods are considered in themselves, they are not
man's good simply, but relatively, and thus they do not fall under
merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch as men are moved by God to do
temporal works, in which with God's help they reach their purpose. And
thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the works of justice
in relation to the Divine motion, as stated above ([2256]AA[3],6), so
have temporal goods, considered in themselves, the nature of reward,
with respect to the Divine motion, whereby men's wills are moved to
undertake these works, even though, sometimes, men have not a right
intention in them.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv, 2), "in
these temporal promises were figures of spiritual things to come. For
the carnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life;
and not merely their speech but even their life was prophetic."
Reply to Objection 2: These rewards are said to have been divinely
brought about in relation to the Divine motion, and not in relation to
the malice of their wills, especially as regards the King of Babylon,
since he did not besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather in
order to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a good will
with regard to saving the children, yet their will was not right,
inasmuch as they framed falsehoods.
Reply to Objection 3: Temporal evils are imposed as a punishment on the
wicked, inasmuch as they are not thereby helped to reach life
everlasting. But to the just who are aided by these evils they are not
punishments but medicines as stated above ([2257]Q[87], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 4: All things happen equally to the good and the
wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as
regards the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude
by them.
And now enough has been said regarding morals in general.
__________________________________________________________________
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (SS) (QQ[1]-189)
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TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ[1]-46)
__________________________________________________________________
OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.
The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the
corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite
vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3)
the habit of faith.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i.e.
whether it is a thing or a proposition?
(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?
(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?
(5) Whether it can be anything known?
(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain
number of articles?
(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?
(8) Of the number of articles;
(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;
(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
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Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First
Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed
to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead,
i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also
things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the
Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith
is not only the First Truth.
Objection 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since
they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things
contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is
considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things
contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning
man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the
First Truth, but also created truth.
Objection 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above
([2258]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now by charity we love not only God, who is
the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of
Faith is not only the First Truth.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about
the simple and everlasting truth." Now this is the First Truth.
Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.
I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things:
first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so
to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal
aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions
are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is
the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.
Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object,
it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are
speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by
God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If,
however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they
include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless,
do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation
to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine
operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God.
Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a
way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in
relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for
it considers nothing save in relation to health.
Reply to Objection 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the
sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith,
in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we
assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things
contained in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of
God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show
further on ([2259]Q[25] , A[1]).
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Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something
complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First
Truth, as stated above [2260](A[1]). Now the First Truth is something
simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.
Objection 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the
symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for
it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God .
. . almighty." Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a
thing.
Objection 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor.
13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known."
But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is
the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.
On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the
mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and
opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about
propositions; so that its object is something complex.
I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode
of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know
the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the [2261]FP, Q[85],
A[5]. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the
intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other
hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that
are complex in themselves.
Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First,
as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of
faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have
faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the
object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the object of faith on
the part of the thing believed.
Reply to Objection 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith
is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is
evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the
believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in
science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge
about things through their means, so is it in faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the
First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We know that when
He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as
He is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by
way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not
apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison
fails.
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Whether anything false can come under faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith.
For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can
come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not
obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being
good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be
the object of faith.
Objection 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born,
according to Jn. 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see
My day: he saw it, and was glad." But after the time of Abraham, God
might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He
did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false.
Therefore the object of faith can be something false.
Objection 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of
Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the
preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He
began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore
something false can come under faith.
Objection 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe
that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the
altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated,
and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but only bread.
Therefore something false can come under faith.
On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to
the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the
intellect, as we shall show further on ([2262]Q[4], AA[2],5). Therefore
nothing false can come under it.
I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through
the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated [2263](A[1]) that the
formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that
nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the
First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can
non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows
therefore that nothing false can come under faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but
not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect
the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the
nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other
hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not
entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance
with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one
is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and
charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.
Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man
hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be
an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he
perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be;
so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual
whom we love for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in
itself was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it
stands in God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of
infallibility, as explained in the [2264]FP, Q[14], AA[13],15: and it
is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under
faith, it cannot be false.
Reply to Objection 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to
believe in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the
time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a
human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false
opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a
false opinion to be the outcome of faith.
Reply to Objection 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such
and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of
Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly
consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow
that anything false comes under faith.
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Whether the object of faith can be something seen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something seen.
For Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me,
Thomas, thou hast believed." Therefore vision and faith regard the same
object.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of
faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner." Therefore what is believed is seen.
Objection 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen
under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
Objection 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine
states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,
according to Rom. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing." Therefore
faith is of things seen.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
evidence of things that appear not."
I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is
believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either
by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the
habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in
the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science).
Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being
sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an
act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to
the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite
side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear
of the other side, there will be faith.
Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the
intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident
that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the
senses or by the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another"
[*St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him
to be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my
God."
Reply to Objection 2: Those things which come under faith can be
considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be
seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in
general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this
way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on
the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought
to be believed.
Reply to Objection 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe.
For just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is
becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith,
the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to
a right faith, and not to assent to others.
Reply to Objection 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith,
but not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not
follow that these things are seen.
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Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science [*Scienc
e
is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration]?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be
an object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance,
since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance
of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things
savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in
unbelief." Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of
science.
Objection 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred
writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore
such things can be an object of science.
Objection 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of
science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science."
Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the
philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.
Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
Objection 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is,
since faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion
and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in
Poster. i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object
also.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a thing
is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception."
Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception,
whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception.
Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of
science.
I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore
"seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a
fashion, seen.
Now as stated above [2265](A[4]), it is impossible that one and the
same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is
equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of
science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that
a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by
another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe about the
Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a
dark manner; but then face to face": which vision the angels possess
already; so that what we believe, they see. In like manner it may
happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one
man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of
faith, because he does not know it by demonstration.
Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is
equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things
which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about
the same things.
Reply to Objection 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are
of faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do
they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know
them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes
them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A[4], ad
2,3).
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things
that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive
arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible,
or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from
the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii).
Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of
the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in
the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at
the outset of this work ([2266]FP, Q[1], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are
reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed
simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration
must know them first of all by faith.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and
opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we
have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one
and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing
relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same
respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same
object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner,
one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith,
the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same
object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either
opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is
incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason
that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be
otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should
be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of
faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible
to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about
the same object and in the same respect is because the object of
science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as
stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain
articles?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should
not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy
Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude,
cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous
to distinguish certain articles of faith.
Objection 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied
indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the
formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated
above [2267](A[1]), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith
cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no
notice should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into
articles.
Objection 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of
Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth
concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief." Now belief is a
voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), "no man
believes against his will." Therefore it seems that matters of faith
should not be divided into articles.
On the contrary, Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine
truth, tending thereto." Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth
by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in
our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into
articles.
I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek;
for the Greek {arthron} [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which
the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct
parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are
called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar,
articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their
gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit
together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is
composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your
passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes."
Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles,
in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the
object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated
above [2268](A[4]). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason,
is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known
or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various
articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God
suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead,
wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article
of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the
same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to
accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.
Reply to Objection 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in
themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but
only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions
are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in
order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists
in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb. 11:2: "Faith is
the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows that those things
are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life.
Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition
reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc.], the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of
faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to
our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation
of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that
a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like,
which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the
Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not
form distinct articles.
Reply to Objection 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be
taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus
there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First
Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.
Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from
our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is
that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are
various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition of an article is taken from an
etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in
accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it
does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that
although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since
belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of
end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and
"without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle declares
(Heb. 11:6).
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Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not
increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1),
"faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Now the same things
are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same
things are to be believed.
Objection 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised
by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered
them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of
faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated
in Eph. 2:8: "It is the gift of God." Since then there can be no lack
of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith was
perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time went on.
Objection 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly
fashion no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a
beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii).
Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect
things, so that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it
most perfectly.
Objection 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us
through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of
faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later,
according to Dt. 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee."
Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for
"they received them more fully than others, even as they received them
earlier," as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: "Ourselves also who have the
first fruits of the Spirit." Therefore it seems that knowledge of
matters of faith has not increased as time went on.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that "the knowledge
of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they
were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they received the
mysteries of salvation."
I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the
doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on
natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so
that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are
reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same thing
cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as the Philosopher
states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the articles are
contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God's
existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to
Heb. 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a
rewarder to them that seek Him." For the existence of God includes all
that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness
consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things
which God dispenses in time, for man's salvation, and which are the way
to that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which
follow from these are contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption
of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion
and so forth.
Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the
articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on:
since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained,
albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But
there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly,
since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly
which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence
the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): "I am the God of Abraham, the God
of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg.: 'I am the Lord that appeared to
Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and My name Adonai I did not
show them": David also said (Ps. 118:100): "I have had understanding
above ancients": and the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5) that the mystery of
Christ, "in other generations was not known, as it is now revealed to
His holy apostles and prophets."
Reply to Objection 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped
for from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through
Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the
further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the Apostle
says (Heb. 11:13): "All these died according to faith, not having
received the promises, but beholding them afar off." Now the further
off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were
nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good
things to be hoped for.
Reply to Objection 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First,
on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in
knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes
place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner;
thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver
it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not
be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's
capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men
made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the
Apostle (Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament to
childhood.
Reply to Objection 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation
can take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the
active cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way
nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is
not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in
existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the
imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the
imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the
active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is
likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action. Hence, among
men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from imperfection to
perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of active
causes, through being doctors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation
of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good, according to 1
Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted to the Fathers
who were instructors in the faith, so far as was necessary at the time
for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures.
Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected
by Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of
fulness [*Vulg.: 'fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were
nearest to Christ, wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after,
like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith;
for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of
manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more perfect,
whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his youth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably
formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do
not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above
(A[5] ). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God;
hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many
other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there
is one God" should not be set down as an article of faith.
Objection 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should
believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to
be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points
some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should
have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His
omnipotence.
Objection 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know
the Son, according to Jn. 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father
also." Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and
Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.
Objection 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the
Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several
articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the
Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about the
Person of the Father.
Objection 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation,
of the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too
is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His
Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work
appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets."
Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated
to the Son in respect of His Godhead.
Objection 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special
difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have
been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that
there is not a sufficient number of articles.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the
articles thus.
I answer that, As stated above ([2269]AA[4],6), to faith those things
in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal
life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are
proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the
Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the sons
of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is
eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus
Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Wherefore the first distinction in matters
of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others
pertain to the mystery of Christ's human nature, which is the "mystery
of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16).
Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are
proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the
first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which
three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly,
the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order
of nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is
proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to
which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in
one article; while the third refers to the order of glory, and in
relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the
resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven
articles referring to the Godhead.
In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven
articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or
conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His
Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the
fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh,
to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen
articles.
Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the
Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the
three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the
three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of
glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the
glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into
one article.
Reply to Objection 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the
philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance
His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped,
all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of
watching over things, as stated in the [2270]FP, Q[13], A[8]. Now in
beings having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and
knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal
knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills
in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His providence
over them.
Reply to Objection 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article
refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the
relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way,
include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a
Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of view,
there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the
three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain
points have to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error,
looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the
three Persons. For Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of
the Father, but did not believe the Son to be co-equal and
consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for an article about the
Person of the Son in order to settle this point. In like manner it was
necessary to appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy
Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way Christ's conception and
birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can from one
point of view be united together in one article, in so far as they are
ordained to one end; while, from another point of view, they can be
distinct articles, in as much as each one separately presents a special
difficulty.
Reply to Objection 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent
to sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be
believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons of
the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is
never sent, as we stated in the [2271]FP, Q[43], A[4].
Reply to Objection 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and
its consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity,
which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom,
which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by
appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of
the Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this
respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is
that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it is
included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which are
ascribed to God's almighty power.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol
?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of
faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of
faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since
it is written (Dt. 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to
you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it was unlawful to
make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been
published.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but
"one faith." Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it is
not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.
Objection 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in
the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all
competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith.
Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed in
the words: "I believe in one God."
Objection 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of
faith, as stated above [2272](A[8]). But the descent into hell is not
mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is
expressed inadequately.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the
passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (Jn. 14:1) says: "We
believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God." Since
then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting
to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church."
Objection 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of
faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that
publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers,
should be sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the
articles of faith in a symbol.
On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed
by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord's
promise to His disciples (Jn. 16:13): "When He, the Spirit of truth, is
come, He will teach you all truth." Now the symbol is published by the
authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing
defective.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), "he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is." Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be
proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of
faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be
proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through
ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims of
faith that the symbol [*The Greek {symballein}] takes its name.
Reply to Objection 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ,
diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely,
so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one
needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who
require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for
study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather
together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed
to the belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but
something taken from it.
Reply to Objection 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the
symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about
the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded
persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave rise to the
necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one
another, save that on account of the obstinacy of heretics, one
contains more explicitly what another contains implicitly.
Reply to Objection 3: The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol
in the person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united
together by faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since
such is the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not
only outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is
expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living
faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they
should endeavor to acquire it.
Reply to Objection 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen
among heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that
point. For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the Fathers,
but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the Apostles. For a
subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather does it
expound it, as stated above (ad 2).
Reply to Objection 5: If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this
must be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the
Holy Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe
in the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church." But it is better and more in
keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the
holy Catholic Church," as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.]
observes.
Reply to Objection 6: Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation
of the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was
already spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it is
sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the
Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the
faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as
though it were against the darkness of past and future errors.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign
Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol
becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as stated
above [2273](A[9]). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith
were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of
faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as stated
above [2274](A[7]). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of
the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more and
more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the authority of
the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol.
Objection 2: Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden
under pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden
under pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition
of the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of
Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council
had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to
utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined by
the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and this
under pain of anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by
Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as
the "Latrocinium" and condemned by the Pope.] The same was repeated in
the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it
seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new
edition of the symbol.
Objection 3: Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but
patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung in
the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign
Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of the
symbol.
On the contrary, The symbol was drawn us by a general council. Now such
a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of the
Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5].
Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw
up a symbol.
I answer that, As stated above (OBJ 1), a new edition of the symbol
becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may arise.
Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to that
authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so
that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs to
the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more important and
more difficult questions that arise in the Church are referred," as
stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence our Lord said to
Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (Lk. 22:32): "I have prayed for
thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted,
confirm thy brethren." The reason of this is that there should be but
one faith of the whole Church, according to 1 Cor. 1:10: "That you all
speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you": and this
could not be secured unless any question of faith that may arise be
decided by him who presides over the whole Church, so that the whole
Church may hold firmly to his decision. Consequently it belongs to the
sole authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to publish a new edition of the
symbol, as do all other matters which concern the whole Church, such as
to convoke a general council and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in
the teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Pet.
3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching
and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was
necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly against
the errors which arose.
Reply to Objection 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was
intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide
matters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not take
away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edition of
the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the same faith with
greater explicitness. For every council has taken into account that a
subsequent council would expound matters more fully than the preceding
council, if this became necessary through some heresy arising.
Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, by whose authority
the council is convoked, and its decision confirmed.
Reply to Objection 3: Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not
under the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of
doctrine, as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained
briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of
the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ACT OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2)
the external act.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith?
(2) In how many ways is it expressed?
(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above
natural reason?
(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable
by natural reason?
(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things
explicitly?
(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?
(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation?
(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity
explicitly?
(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?
(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to believe is to think with assent?
Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with assent.
Because the Latin word "cogitatio" [thought] implies a research, for
"cogitare" [to think] seems to be equivalent to "coagitare," i.e. "to
discuss together." Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that faith is
"an assent without research." Therefore thinking has no place in the
act of faith.
Objection 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show
further on (Q[4], A[2]). Now to think is an act of the cogitative
power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the
[2275]FP, Q[78], A[4]. Therefore thought has nothing to do with faith.
Objection 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its
object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect,
but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above ([2276]FS, Q[15],
A[1], ad 3). Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.
On the contrary, This is how "to believe" is defined by Augustine (De
Praedest. Sanct. ii).
I answer that, "To think" can be taken in three ways. First, in a
general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as
Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): "By understanding I mean now the
faculty whereby we understand when thinking." Secondly, "to think" is
more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which is
accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect's
arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of
sight. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of
God is not called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought
realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it becomes our word.
Hence the Word of God must be understood without any thinking on the
part of God, for there is nothing there that can take form, or be
unformed." In this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of
the mind while yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear
sight of truth. Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one
of deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the
intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the
sensitive part, hence it is that "to think" is taken secondly for an
act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the
cogitative power.
Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according to the first
sense, then "to think with assent," does not express completely what is
meant by "to believe": since, in this way, a man thinks with assent
even when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is certain
knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.], or
understands. If, on the other hand, "to think" be understood in the
second way, then this expresses completely the nature of the act of
believing. For among the acts belonging to the intellect, some have a
firm assent without any such kind of thinking, as when a man considers
the things that he knows by science, or understands, for this
consideration is already formed. But some acts of the intellect have
unformed thought devoid of a firm assent, whether they incline to
neither side, as in one who "doubts"; or incline to one side rather
than the other, but on account of some slight motive, as in one who
"suspects"; or incline to one side yet with fear of the other, as in
one who "opines." But this act "to believe," cleaves firmly to one
side, in which respect belief has something in common with science and
understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of
clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence
it is proper to the believer to think with assent: so that the act of
believing is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect,
which are about the true or the false.
Reply to Objection 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason
which demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things
whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things have
been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.
Reply to Objection 2: "To think" is not taken here for the act of the
cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to
one object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is
taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by
the will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God,
believing in a God and believing in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably
distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in
God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is
one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three
acts of faith.
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should
not be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now "to believe
God" is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the
First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from
certain other acts of faith.
Objection 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be
called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a
God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.
Objection 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will,
whose object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of
the will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe in God," which
implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species of
that act.
On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes this
distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi---Tract. xxix in Joan.).
I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends on the relation of
that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the
intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
(A[1], ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part
of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.
If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can
be observed in the object of faith, as stated above ([2277]Q[1], A[1]).
One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of
faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as stated above ([2278]Q[1],
A[1]) nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is
referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it
is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of
faith; and thus an act of faith is "to believe God," since, as stated
above ([2279]Q[1], A[1]) the formal object of faith is the First Truth,
to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent to Its sake to
whatever he believes.
Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the
intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in God."
For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect
of an end.
Reply to Objection 1: These three do not denote different acts of
faith, but one and the same act having different relations to the
object of faith.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a God"
as we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not
believe that God exists under the conditions that faith determines;
hence they do not truly believe in a God, since, as the Philosopher
observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things defectively is
not to know them at all."
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above ([2280]FS, Q[9], A[1]) the will
moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in
this respect an act of faith is "to believe in God."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural
reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe
anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of
a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now
matters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since they are things
unseen as stated above ([2281]Q[1], A[4]). Therefore to believe seems
unnecessary for salvation.
Objection 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters,
wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true
or false, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words?" Now
a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he
cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our judgments
are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters.
Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps.
36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord." Now "the
invisible things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according
to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the
understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not
necessary for man's salvation, that he should believe certain things.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
impossible to please God."
I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find
that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one
of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement, while the
other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus water by
its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while
according to the movement of the moon, it moves round the centre by ebb
and flow. In like manner the planets have their proper movements from
west to east, while in accordance with the movement of the first
heaven, they have a movement from east to west. Now the created
rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to God, since other
creatures do not attain to the universal, but only to something
particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness either in "being"
only, as inanimate things, or also in "living," and in "knowing
singulars," as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature, in as
much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is
immediately related to the universal principle of being.
Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only
in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which
it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness.
Hence it was said above ([2282]FS, Q[3], A[8]) that man's ultimate
happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man
cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every
one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me." Now
man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by
little and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one
who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire
science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De
Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it behooves a learner to believe."
Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly
happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes the
master who is teaching him.
Reply to Objection 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher
nature, natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some
supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the
natural light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of
virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way,
by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to
matters of faith and not to those which are against faith. Consequently
"there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that are in Christ
Jesus," and whom He has enlightened by faith.
Reply to Objection 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible
things of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to
God from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many
things are shown to thee above the understandings of man."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by
natural reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which
can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's
works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is
superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.
Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can
be known by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the
object of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object,
as stated above ([2283]Q[1], AA[4],5). Since therefore all things that
can be known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that
there is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is
certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of
them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the others
should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is not
necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural
reason.
On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that God is one and
incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.
I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only
things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by
reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive
more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to
whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of
all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other
sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that man would
arrive at the knowledge of God. The second reason is, in order that the
knowledge of God may be more general. For many are unable to make
progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or
through having a number of occupations, and temporal needs, or even
through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived
of
the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were brought to their
knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is for the sake of
certitude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning God.
A sign of this is that philosophers in their researches, by natural
investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and
have disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men
might have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was
necessary for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith,
being told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.
Reply to Objection 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice
mankind for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be
proved by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be
believed.
Reply to Objection 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject
and about the same object: but what is an object of science for one,
can be an object of faith for another, as stated above ([2284]Q[1],
A[5]).
Reply to Objection 3: Although all things that can be known by science
are of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to
beatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything
explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it
is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written
(Rom. 10:14,15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not
heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they
preach unless they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe
anything explicitly.
Objection 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are
we by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity,
and it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the
precept of Our Lord (Mat. 5:39): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg.:
'thy right'] cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the
same kind, according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything explicitly,
and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God proposes to be
believed.
Objection 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience,
according to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Now
the virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed
precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according to
Ps. 118:60: "I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy
commandments." Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man
should be ready to believe whatever God may propose, without his
believing anything explicitly.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God,
must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him."
I answer that, The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to fulfil,
concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining salvation. Now
an act of virtue, as stated above ([2285]FS, Q[60], A[5]) depends on
the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things may be
considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is the
proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is accidental
and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it belongs
properly and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the dangers
of death, and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself, for the sake
of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be armed, or strike
another with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to the object of
fortitude, but indirectly.
Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of a
precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate in
its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of
the precept does not require that a virtuous act should terminate in
those things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the
proper and direct object of that virtue, except in certain places and
at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the direct object of
faith is that whereby man is made one of the Blessed, as stated above
([2286]Q[1], A[8]): while the indirect and secondary object comprises
all things delivered by God to us in Holy Writ, for instance that
Abraham had two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and so forth.
Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is
bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to
other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but
only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he is
prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures.
Then alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is
clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of faith.
Reply to Objection 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a
man's power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are
bound to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing
grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe
the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for
this help "to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully given;
and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a punishment of
a previous, or at least of original, sin," as Augustine states (De
Corr. et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct. viii.]).
Reply to Objection 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable
things which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely,
God and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity
which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly
speaking, in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to
authority, suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper
and direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental
or consequent to that proper and direct object.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that all are equally bound to have explicit
faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary for
salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is
necessary for salvation that certain things should be believed
explicitly. Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith.
Objection 2: Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he
is not bound to believe. But simple reasons are sometimes tested in
reference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are bound
to believe everything explicitly.
Objection 3: Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but
only implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith of
the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the
learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have
explicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have
explicit faith.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 1:14): "The oxen were ploughing,
and the asses feeding beside them," because, as Gregory expounds this
passage (Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified by the asses,
ought, in matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who are denoted by
the oxen.
I answer that, The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of
Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason. Now
Divine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are
over them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the
angels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius
explains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding
of faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher
degree. Consequently, just as the higher angels, who enlighten those
who are below them, have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the
lower angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of
higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under
obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to believe
them more explicitly.
Reply to Objection 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not
equally necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher
degree, whose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe
explicitly more things than others are.
Reply to Objection 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test
about subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having
been corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple
people in such questions. If, however, it is found that they are free
from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to
their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.
Reply to Objection 3: The simple have no faith implied in that of the
learned, except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine teaching.
Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of me, as I also
am of Christ." Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine truth
that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned stray from this
rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple ones, who think that the
learned believe aright; unless the simple hold obstinately to their
individual errors, against the faith of the universal Church, which
cannot err, since Our Lord said (Lk. 22:32): "I have prayed for thee,"
Peter, "that thy faith fail not."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary for the salvation of all, that they should believe
explicitly in the mystery of Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation
of all that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.
For man is not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are ignorant
about: since the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine revelation,
which reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above [2287](A[6];
[2288]FP, Q[111], A[1]). Now even the angels were in ignorance of the
mystery of the Incarnation: hence, according to the commentary of
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who ask (Ps. 23:8): "Who is
this king of glory?" and (Is. 63:1): "Who is this that cometh from
Edom?" Therefore men were not bound to believe explicitly in the
mystery of Christ's Incarnation.
Objection 2: Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of
the teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him (Mat. 11:11)
that "there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater
than" he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the
mystery of Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Mat. 11:3): "Art
Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?" Therefore even the
teachers were not bound to explicit faith in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the
ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it
would seem that the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith in
Christ, since they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that it
was not necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly in the
mystery of Christ.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc): "Our
faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is delivered
from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except by the one
Mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ."
I answer that, As stated above [2289](A[5]; Q[1], A[8]), the object of
faith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man
obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion
is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written (Acts
4:12): "There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we
must be saved." Therefore belief of some kind in the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation was necessary at all times and for all persons,
but this belief differed according to differences of times and persons.
The reason of this is that before the state of sin, man believed,
explicitly in Christ's Incarnation, in so far as it was intended for
the consummation of glory, but not as it was intended to deliver man
from sin by the Passion and Resurrection, since man had no
foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however, seem to have had
foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the fact that he said
(Gn. 2:24): "Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall
cleave to his wife," of which the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32) that "this
is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the Church," and it is
incredible that the first man was ignorant about this sacrament.
But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the
Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the
human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else,
have foreshadowed Christ's Passion by certain sacrifices both before
and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the
learned explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those
sacrifices, believed them to be ordained by God in reference to
Christ's coming, and thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so
to speak. And, as stated above ([2290]Q[1], A[7]), the nearer they were
to Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ's mysteries.
After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound
to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards those
which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed, such
as the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of which we have spoken
above ([2291]Q[1], A[8]). As to other minute points in reference to the
articles of the Incarnation, men have been bound to believe them more
or less explicitly according to each one's state and office.
Reply to Objection 1: The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not
entirely hidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v,
19), yet certain aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ
revealed them to them.
Reply to Objection 2: It was not through ignorance that John the
Baptist inquired of Christ's advent in the flesh, since he had clearly
professed his belief therein, saying: "I saw, and I gave testimony,
that this is the Son of God" (Jn. 1:34). Hence he did not say: "Art
Thou He that hast come?" but "Art Thou He that art to come?" thus
saying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it is not to be
believed that he was ignorant of Christ's future Passion, for he had
already said (Jn. 1:39): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh
away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world," thus foretelling His future
immolation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as may be seen
especially in Isaias 53. We may therefore say with Gregory (Hom. xxvi
in Evang.) that he asked this question, being in ignorance as to
whether Christ would descend into hell in His own Person. But he did
not ignore the fact that the power of Christ's Passion would be
extended to those who were detained in Limbo, according to Zech. 9:11:
"Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners
out of the pit, wherein there is no water"; nor was he bound to believe
explicitly, before its fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither
Himself.
It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on
Lk. 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from
devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he
inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his
disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the
latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing
to the signs of His works.
Reply to Objection 3: Many of the gentiles received revelations of
Christ, as is clear from their predictions. Thus we read (Job 19:25):
"I know that my Redeemer liveth." The Sibyl too foretold certain things
about Christ, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover,
we read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine
Augustus and his mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a man
on whose breast was a golden plate with the inscription: "Christ shall
be born of a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the lifetime
of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again" [*Cf. Baron, Annal.,
A.D. 780]. If, however, some were saved without receiving any
revelation, they were not saved without faith in a Mediator, for,
though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless,
have implicit faith through believing in Divine providence, since they
believed that God would deliver mankind in whatever way was pleasing to
Him, and according to the revelation of the Spirit to those who knew
the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: "Who teacheth us more than the
beasts of the earth."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to
believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6):
"He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to
them that seek Him." Now one can believe this without believing in the
Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the
Trinity.
Objection 2: Further our Lord said (Jn. 17:5,6): "Father, I have
manifested Thy name to men," which words Augustine expounds (Tract.
cvi) as follows: "Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the
name whereby Thou art called My Father," and further on he adds: "In
that He made this world, God is known to all nations; in that He is not
to be worshipped together with false gods, 'God is known in Judea';
but, in that He is the Father of this Christ, through Whom He takes
away the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name of His,
which hitherto they knew not." Therefore before the coming of Christ it
was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the Godhead: and so
the Trinity was not believed explicitly.
Objection 3: Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of
God is the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly
happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in God,
without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not necessary to
believe explicitly in the Trinity.
On the contrary, In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is
expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is
written in manifestation of the Trinity: "Let us make man to Our image
and likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was
necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity.
I answer that, It is impossible to believe explicitly in the mystery of
Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of Christ
includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the world
through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was conceived
by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of
Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but implicitly and under
a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too was it with the mystery of
the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace had been revealed, all
were bound to explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity: and all who
are born again in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the invocation
of the Trinity, according to Mat. 28:19: "Going therefore teach ye all
nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and
of the Holy Ghost."
Reply to Objection 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary
at all times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times
and for all people.
Reply to Objection 2: Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity lay
hidden in the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles
it was shown to the world.
Reply to Objection 3: God's sovereign goodness as we understand it now
through its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of Persons:
but as understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it cannot be
understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the mission of the
Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to believe is meritorious?
Objection 1: It would seem that to believe in not meritorious. For the
principle of all merit is charity, as stated above ([2292]FS, Q[114],
A[4]). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore,
just as an act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by
our natural gifts, so neither is an act of faith.
Objection 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific
knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known [*Science
is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not meritorious,
nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is not meritorious.
Objection 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a
sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a sufficient
motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any merit on his
part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to believe: whereas
if he has not a sufficient motive for believing, this is a mark of
levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: "He that is hasty to give credit, is
light of heart," so that, seemingly, he gains no merit thereby.
Therefore to believe is by no means meritorious.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the saints "by faith .
. . obtained promises," which would not be the case if they did not
merit by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious.
I answer that, As stated above ([2293]FS, Q[114], AA[3],4), our actions
are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will moved with
grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from the free-will,
if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of believing
is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command
of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the
free-will in relation to God; and consequently the act of faith can be
meritorious.
Reply to Objection 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the
principle of merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to
charity as the disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is
evident that the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the
form, nor can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form:
but after the advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding
disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle of
action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial form
of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor faith can, without charity,
produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity, the act of
faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of nature, and a
natural act of the free-will.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things may be considered in science: namely
the scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of
that fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will,
because the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the
demonstration, wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the
actual consideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to
his free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider.
Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred to
the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good of our
neighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these things
are subject to the free-will so that in both respects the act of faith
can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no firm
assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes
(Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect act
of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent, it does not
appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the actual
consideration.
Reply to Objection 3: The believer has sufficient motive for believing,
for he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by
miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine
invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however,
sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose the
merit.
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Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe
lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that
"there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason." If,
therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith
is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human
reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes the merit of
believing.
Objection 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens
the amount of merit, since "happiness is the reward of virtue," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to diminish
the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential to faith to
be about the unseen, as stated above ([2294]Q[1], AA[4],5). Now the
more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen. Therefore
human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the merit of
faith.
Objection 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an
inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether
it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man
to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so.
Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): "Being ready always to
satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: 'Of
that hope which is in you.' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken
from Bede.] and hope which is in you." Now the Apostle would not give
this advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith.
Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.
I answer that, As stated above [2295](A[9]), the act of faith can be
meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to the
use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of what we
believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the believer.
First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man
either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, unless he be
moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason diminishes the
merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above ([2296]FS, Q[24],
A[3], ad 1; Q[77], A[6], ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which
precedes choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just as a
man ought to perform acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment
of his reason, and not on account of a passion, so ought he to believe
matters of faith, not on account of human reason, but on account of the
Divine authority. Secondly, human reasons may be consequent to the will
of the believer. For when a man's will is ready to believe, he loves
the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever
reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human reason
does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit.
Thus again, in moral virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more
prompt will, as stated above ([2297]FS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1). We have an
indication of this in the words of the Samaritans to the woman, who is
a type of human reason: "We now believe, not for thy saying" (Jn.
4:42).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has
no will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons.
But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the
authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration
of some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith
is not, for that reason, lost or diminished.
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support
of the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring
intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not cease
to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what
faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do not
diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand, though
demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith [*The
Leonine Edition reads: 'in support of matters of faith which are
however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,' etc.], but not
of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith, since they
make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not diminish the
measure of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them, even if
they were unseen; and so the measure of merit is not diminished.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it
consist in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the
merit of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and
firm in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through
not renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have
greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account
of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in
opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to
faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe,
and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.
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OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith:
under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?
(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
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Whether confession is an act of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith. For
the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession
belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act of
faith.
Objection 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of
confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph. 6:19)
asks for prayers that it may be granted him "with confidence, to make
known the mystery of the gospel." Now it belongs to fortitude, which
moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from doing good on
account of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that confession is not
an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or constancy.
Objection 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess
one's faith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good
works, for it is written (Gal. 5:6) that "faith . . . worketh by
charity." But other external works are not reckoned acts of faith.
Therefore neither is confession an act of faith.
On the contrary, A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, "and the
work of faith in power" as referring to "confession which is a work
proper to faith."
I answer that, Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to whose
end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred
specifically to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh, and
consequently it is an act of abstinence.
Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred
specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according to
2 Cor. 4:13: "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe, and
therefore we speak also." For the outward utterance is intended to
signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought of
matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the outward
confession of them.
Reply to Objection 1: A threefold confession is commended by the
Scriptures. One is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a
proper act of faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated
above. Another is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is
an act of "latria," for its purpose is to give outward honor to God,
which is the end of "latria." The third is the confession of sins,
which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end of
penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.
Reply to Objection 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct,
but an indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4).
Hence fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith,
viz. fear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession,
but an indirect cause so to speak.
Reply to Objection 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all
outward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding, but
not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession as its
proper act, without the help of any other virtue.
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Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary
for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if
it is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of
faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can be
realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of faith
is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his
faith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have
to instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple
folk are not bound to confess the faith.
Objection 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb
others, is not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
10:32): "Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the
Church of God." Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance
among unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10): "With the heart we
believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto
salvation."
I answer that, Things that are necessary for salvation come under the
precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is something
affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept. Hence its
necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an affirmative
precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as stated above
([2298]FS, Q[71], A[5], ad 3; [2299]FS, Q[88], A[1], ad 2) do not bind
for always, although they are always binding; but they bind as to place
and time according to other due circumstances, in respect of which
human acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of virtue.
Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at
all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain
times, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of due
honor, or our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him: for
instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to remain
silent, so as to make people believe either that he is without faith,
or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from the
faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is necessary for
salvation.
Reply to Objection 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues,
must be referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and
our neighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good
demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to God's
truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly.
Reply to Objection 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger,
every one is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good
example and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check the
attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty of all
the faithful to instruct others in the faith.
Reply to Objection 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public
confession of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among
unbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the faithful.
Hence Our Lord said (Mat. 7:6): "Give not that which is holy to dogs,
neither cast ye your pearls before swine . . . lest turning upon you,
they tear you." Yet, if there is hope of profit to the faith, or if
there be urgency, a man should disregard the disturbance of
unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it is written (Mat.
15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord that "the Pharisee,
when they heard this word, were scandalized," He answered: "Let them
alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind."
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first
place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the cause
of faith; fourthly, its effects.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is faith?
(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?
(3) Whether its form is charity?
(4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are
one identically?
(5) Whether faith is a virtue?
(6) Whether it is one virtue?
(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;
(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual
virtues.
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Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: "Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not?"
Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting
definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance
of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." For
no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a
theological virtue, as stated above ([2300]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore
it is not a substance.
Objection 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now
things to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should
not be included in a definition of faith, as though they were its
object.
Objection 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by
hope, since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on
[2301](A[3]). Therefore the definition of faith should have included
the thing to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.
Objection 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different
genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and
neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to
state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence."
Objection 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for
which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth
is already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to
speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is
unfittingly defined.
On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices.
I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are
not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this
definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can
be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of
a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the
syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are
known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit,
should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object.
Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q[2], AA[2],3),
which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the
will's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of
the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the
intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a
theological virtues, as stated above ([2302]FS, Q[62], A[2]), has one
same thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity,
be in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Q[1],
AA[1],4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and
whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the
aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the act
of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the
Apostle (Rom. 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not": because to
see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has
already, but for what one has not, as stated above ([2303]FS, Q[67],
A[4]). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is
the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." For we are wont to call by the
name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the
whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first beginning;
for instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are
the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us
the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained
in them virtually. In this way then faith is said to be the "substance
of things to be hoped for," for the reason that in us the first
beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of
faith, which contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we
hope to be made happy through seeing the unveiled truth to which our
faith cleaves, as was made evident when we were speaking of happiness
([2304]FS, Q[3], A[8]; [2305]FS, Q[4], A[3]).
The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect,
considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, "evidence
of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for the result of
evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth,
wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth
of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another reading has
"conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the believer is
convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not.
Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a
definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the mind, whereby
eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is
non-apparent."
In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to
the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish it
from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect
adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that appear
not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of
which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the substance
of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of faith from
faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we
hope for.
Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this
one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.:
QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we believe what
we do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that
"faith is an assent without research," and when others say that "faith
is that certainty of the mind about absent things which surpasses
opinion but falls short of science," these all amount to the same as
the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear not"; and when
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid foundation of
the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the
truth in him," comes to the same as "substance of things to be hoped
for."
Reply to Objection 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme
genus condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to
substance which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in
a genus contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance
thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as
commanded by the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the
objects of those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope,
as we shall prove further on ([2306]Q[18], A[1]). For this reason the
definition of faith includes the object of hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the
present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so
adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of
the absent and the unseen.
Reply to Objection 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the
definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor
different acts, but different relationships of one act to different
objects, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a
thing, make it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority
does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence
referred to in the definition of faith.
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Whether faith resides in the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the intellect.
For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith resides in the
believer's will." Now the will is a power distinct from the intellect.
Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds
from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its
praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is
in the will, and not in the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical.
Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not
concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in De Anima
iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas "faith . .
. worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the
practical intellect, the object of which is some true, contingent
thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith is the Eternal
Truth, as was shown above ([2307]Q[1], A[1]). Therefore faith does not
reside in the intellect.
On the contrary, Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision, according
to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then
face to face." Now vision is in the intellect. Therefore faith is
likewise.
I answer that, Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be perfect.
Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active
principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not
possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the
art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the
soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well
is a habit, as stated above ([2308]FS, Q[49], A[4], ad 1,2,3).
Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected
by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it has been stated above
(Q[2], AA[1],2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch as
the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will and
the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be perfected in
this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be perfect, there
needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the intellect: even as
there needs to be the habit of prudence in the reason, besides the
habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty, in order that the act
of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is immediately an act of
the intellect, because the object of that act is "the true," which
pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently faith, which is the
proper principle of that act, must needs reside in the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which
is described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his
intellect assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey
but also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command
of the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well
disposed in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to
be a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the
assenting intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as
evidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First
Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves
(De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as "the
speculative intellect becomes practical by extension" (De Anima iii,
10).
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Whether charity is the form of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith. For
each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two things
are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of the
other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of a
division, as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore
charity is not the form of faith.
Objection 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are
in one subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in
the intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not
the form of faith.
Objection 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now
obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of believing,
on the part of the will, according to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the
faith in all nations." Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the
form of faith.
On the contrary, Each thing works through its form. Now faith works
through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above ([2309]FS,
Q[1], A[3]; [2310]FS, Q[18], A[6]), voluntary acts take their species
from their end which is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing
its species, is after the manner of a form in natural things. Wherefore
the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which that
act is directed, both because it takes its species therefrom, and
because the mode of an action should correspond proportionately to the
end. Now it is evident from what has been said [2311](A[1]), that the
act of faith is directed to the object of the will, i.e. the good, as
to its end: and this good which is the end of faith, viz. the Divine
Good, is the proper object of charity. Therefore charity is called the
form of faith in so far as the act of faith is perfected and formed by
charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it
quickens the act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being
quickened by different habits, so as to be reduced to various species
in a certain order, as stated above ([2312]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7;
[2313]FS, Q[61], A[2]) when we were treating of human acts in general.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But
it is not thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that
it quickens the act of faith, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever
other virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity,
as we shall show further on ([2314]Q[23], A[8]), and consequently
charity is spoken of as the form of faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless?
Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become living,
or living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that
which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away."
Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living faith.
Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that
they are not one identical habit.
Objection 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now
lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works
is dead." Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.
Objection 3: Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in
a believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it
causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who
hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of
faith in him.
Objection 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents
cannot be altered." Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same faith
cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless.
On the contrary, A gloss on the words, "Faith without works is dead"
(James 2:20) adds, "by which it lives once more." Therefore faith which
was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and living.
I answer that, There have been various opinions on this question. For
some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that
living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living
faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner,
when a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of
lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting that
grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and that a
gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal sin.
Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have
said that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but
that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless faith
is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit of
living faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable that
the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person having
living faith.
We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are
one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated by
that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a
perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which
pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not
pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit
of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in
respect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in
respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and
lifeless faith are not distinct habits.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those
imperfect things from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when
the perfect comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the
advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially
"of the things that appear not." When, however, imperfection is not
inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which
was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man
and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes a
man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental
thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes
living.
Reply to Objection 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable
from an animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul:
consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living
and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which
gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith.
Hence there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins
anew to be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been
said above ([2315]FP, Q[104], A[1]; [2316]FS, Q[109], A[9]) that God is
always working man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting
up the air. Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a
believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith in
both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter by
creating it anew.
We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the
disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one who
has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin does
not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a previous
mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not
changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith without
charity, and at another time, with charity.
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Whether faith is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue is
directed to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject good,"
as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is directed to the
true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired
virtue. Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among
the acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
vi, 3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.
Objection 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species,
as stated above [2317](A[4]). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since
it is not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living
faith a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct
from the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces (1
Cor. 12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore faith
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Man is justified by the virtues, since "justice is all
virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is justified
by faith according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore by faith let
us have peace," etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.
I answer that, As shown above, it is by human virtue that human acts
are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle of a
good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living faith.
For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth
at the command of the will, two things are required that this act may
be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should infallibly tend
to its object, which is the true; while the other is that the will
should be infallibly directed to the last end, on account of which it
assents to the true: and both of these are to be found in the act of
living faith. For it belongs to the very essence of faith that the
intellect should ever tend to the true, since nothing false can be the
object of faith, as proved above ([2318]Q[1], A[3]): while the effect
of charity, which is the form of faith, is that the soul ever has its
will directed to a good end. Therefore living faith is a virtue.
On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though the
act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the intellect, it
has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as if temperance
be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the rational part,
temperance is not a virtue, as stated above ([2319]FS, Q[65], A[1]),
because the act of temperance requires both an act of reason, and an
act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of faith requires an
act of the will, and an act of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect,
since it is its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to
some good in so far as it directs the intellect to the true.
Furthermore, it has a relation to the good considered as the object of
the will, inasmuch as it is formed by charity.
Reply to Objection 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is
based on human reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of
necessity, from its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence
such like faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which
we are speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and
consequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of this
kind can be a virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ
specifically, as though they belonged to different species. But they
differ as perfect and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless
faith, being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect
virtue, for "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 18).
Reply to Objection 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the
gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason,
since the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are
not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle
says: "There are diversities of graces," and again, "To one is given"
this grace and "to another" that. Now lifeless faith is common to all
members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part of its
substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore,
say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain excellency of faith,
for instance, "constancy in faith," according to a gloss, or the "word
of faith."
Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain
pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss on
the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are enumerated,
explains faith as being "certainty about the unseen."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether faith is one virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith is
a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge are
numbered among God's gifts according to Is. 11:2. Now wisdom and
knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and
knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii,
14,15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about some
temporal things, it seems that faith is not one virtue, but divided
into several parts.
Objection 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above
([2320]Q[3], A[1]). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for
all: since what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet
to come, as appears from Is. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive."
Therefore faith is not one.
Objection 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But
one accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one
faith.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Lord, one faith."
I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in two
ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one faith.
Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by adhering to
which we believe whatever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the
part of the subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it
is in various subjects. Now it is evident that faith, just as any other
habit, takes its species from the formal aspect of its object, but is
individualized by its subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit
whereby we believe, it is one specifically, but differs numerically
according to its various subjects.
If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, then,
again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one same
thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in believing, be
diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to one.
Reply to Objection 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be
believed, do not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to
something eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above ([2321]Q[1],
A[1]). Hence there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It
is different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and
eternal matters under their respective aspects.
Reply to Objection 2: This difference of past and future arises, not
from any difference in the thing believed, but from the different
relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we have
mentioned above ([2322]FS, Q[103], A[4]; [2323]FS, Q[107], A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of
faith.
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Whether faith is the first of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues.
For a gloss on Lk. 12:4, "I say to you My friends," says that fortitude
is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that which is
founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, "Be not emulous," says that
hope "leads on to faith." Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state
further on ([2324]Q[17], A[1]). Therefore faith is not the first of the
virtues.
Objection 3: Further, it was stated above [2325](A[2]) that the
intellect of the believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent
to matters of faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is
not the first virtue.
Objection 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation,
as a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.].
Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above [2326](A[3]). Therefore
it is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is
the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the first
part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.
Objection 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of
acts. Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected
by charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by
faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity
precedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." Now the substance of a thing is
that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.
I answer that, One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by its
very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature, precedes
all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in matters of
action, as stated above ([2327]FS, Q[13], A[3]; [2328]FS, Q[34], A[4],
ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last end,
must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of
necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the will,
since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far as it
is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is present in
the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first
of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith, because natural
knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly bliss, which is
the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards Him.
On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an
accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which
removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be
said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles
to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that hinders
faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to submit himself
to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some other virtues,
although there are no real virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as
Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one
cannot hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this
possible, since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above
([2329]FS, Q[40], A[1]). It is, however, possible for one to be led by
hope to persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in
this sense that hope is said to lead to faith.
Reply to Objection 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes
the inclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way
it is not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue;
since all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law, as
stated above ([2330]FS, Q[100], A[2]); and thus it is requisite for
faith. In another way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the
commandments considered as a duty. In this way it is a special virtue,
and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his superior when he
obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby man knows that God
is his superior, Whom he must obey.
Reply to Objection 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to
come first, but also to be connected with the other parts of the
building: since the building would not be founded on it unless the
other parts adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual
edifice is charity, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things
have charity which is the bond of perfection." Consequently faith
without charity cannot be the foundation: and yet it does not follow
that charity precedes faith.
Reply to Objection 5: Some act of the will is required before faith,
but not an act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act
presupposes faith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect
love, unless the intellect possesses right faith about Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual
virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than science
and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to certitude,
wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain, through being less
doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less it has of an
admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also wisdom are free
of any doubt about their objects; whereas the believer may sometimes
suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about matters of faith. Therefore
faith is no more certain than the intellectual virtues.
Objection 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But "faith is
through hearing" according to Rom. 10:17; whereas understanding,
science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore
science and understanding are more certain than faith.
Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more perfect is the
more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than faith, since faith
is the way to understanding, according to another version [*The
Septuagint] of Is. 7:9: "If you will not believe, you shall not
understand [Vulg.: 'continue']": and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1)
that "faith is strengthened by science." Therefore it seems that
science or understanding is more certain than faith.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): "When you had
received of us the word of the hearing," i.e. by faith . . . "you
received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of
God." Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore
science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.
I answer that, As stated above ([2331]FS, Q[57], A[4], ad 2) two of the
intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and
art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of
its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change,
whereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science [*In
English the corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and
understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above ([2332]FS,
Q[57], A[5], ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and
understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual virtues,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3); secondly, for the gifts
of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first way, we must note
that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First, on the part of its
cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain cause, is itself more
certain. In this way faith is more certain than those three virtues,
because it is founded on the Divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three
virtues are based on human reason. Secondly, certitude may be
considered on the part of the subject, and thus the more a man's
intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this way,
faith is less certain, because matters of faith are above the human
intellect, whereas the objects of the aforesaid three virtues are not.
Since, however, a thing is judged simply with regard to its cause, but
relatively, with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject,
it follows that faith is more certain simply, while the others are more
certain relatively, i.e. for us. Likewise if these three be taken as
gifts received in this present life, they are related to faith as to
their principle which they presuppose: so that again, in this way,
faith is more certain.
Reply to Objection 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of
faith, but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of
faith with our intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain
than hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear
greatly surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain
than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what he
hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is
apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man
certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than
about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.
Reply to Objection 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more
perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater
clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the
whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises
from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of
conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far as
science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they are
based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the
certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original
state?
(2) Whether the demons have faith?
(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in
others?
(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no faith, either in the
angels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh St. Victor says in
his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that "man cannot see God or things
that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation." Now the
angels, in their original state, before they were either confirmed in
grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes opened to contemplation,
since "they saw things in the Word," according to Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the state of innocence,
seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for Hugh St. Victor says
(De Sacram. i, 6) that "in his original state man knew his Creator, not
by the mere outward perception of hearing, but by inward inspiration,
not as now believers seek an absent God by faith, but by seeing Him
clearly present to their contemplation." Therefore there was no faith
in the angels and man in their original state.
Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure,
according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner." Now in their original state there was not obscurity either in
the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore
there could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original
state.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 10:17) that "faith . . .
cometh by hearing." Now this could not apply to angels and man in their
original state; for then they could not hear anything from another.
Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man or in the
angels.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God,
must believe." Now the original state of angels and man was one of
approach to God. Therefore they had need of faith.
I answer that, Some say that there was no faith in the angels before
they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he
sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of Divine
things. Since, however, "faith is the evidence of things that appear
not," according to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since "by faith we
believe what we see not," according to Augustine (Tract. xl in Joan.;
QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes faith, which
renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith. Now the
principal object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of which gives
the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith. Consequently, as
the angels before their confirmation in grace, and man before sin, did
not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in His Essence, it is
evident that the knowledge they possessed was not such as to exclude
faith.
It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be
explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith.
And if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as
some [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold, perhaps one might hold
that there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in
grace, or in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses
not only a man's but even an angel's natural knowledge about God.
Since, however, we stated in the [2333]FP, Q[62], A[3]; [2334]FP,
Q[95], A[1] that man and the angels were created with the gift of
grace, we must needs say that there was in them a certain beginning of
hoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet
consummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope and
charity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above (Q[4], A[7]).
Consequently we must hold that the angels had faith before they were
confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe that
in the object of faith, there is something formal, as it were, namely
the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a creature, and
something material, namely, the thing to which we assent while adhering
to the First Truth. With regard to the former, before obtaining the
happiness to come, faith is common to all who have knowledge of God, by
adhering to the First Truth: whereas with regard to the things which
are proposed as the material object of faith, some are believed by one,
and known manifestly by another, even in the present state, as we have
shown above (Q[1], A[5]; Q[2], A[4], ad 2). In this respect, too, it
may be said that the angels before being confirmed, and man, before
sin, possessed manifest knowledge about certain points in the Divine
mysteries, which now we cannot know except by believing them.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the words of Hugh of St. Victor are
those of a master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be
said that the contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly
contemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence.
Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were
confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their contemplation was of
a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached nearer to
God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and
mysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them so
that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light of
wisdom He was more present to them than He is to us, although He was
not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of glory.
Reply to Objection 2: There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the
original state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural
obscurity in the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every
creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine
light: and this obscurity suffices for faith.
Reply to Objection 3: In the original state there was no hearing
anything from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring
inwardly: thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9: "I
will hear what the Lord God will speak in me."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the demons there is faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that the demons have no faith. For Augustine
says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith depends on the believer's
will": and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to believe in
God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good, as stated
above ([2335]FP, Q[64], A[2], ad 5), it seems that in the demons there
is no faith.
Objection 2: Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to
Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the
gift of God." Now, according to a gloss on Osee 3:1, "They look to
strange gods, and love the husks of the grapes," the demons lost their
gifts of grace by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons
after they sinned.
Objection 3: Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins,
as Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on Jn. 15:22, "If I had
not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have
no excuse for their sin." Now the sin of unbelief is in some men.
Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty of a
sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore
in the demons there is no faith.
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . believe
and tremble."
I answer that, As stated above ([2336]Q[1], A[4];[2337] Q[2], A[1]),
the believer's intellect assents to that which he believes, not because
he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident
principles, but because his will commands his intellect to assent. Now,
that the will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two causes.
First, through the will being directed to the good, and in this way, to
believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the intellect is
convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though that conviction
is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a prophet, while preaching
the word of God, were to foretell something, and were to give a sign,
by raising a dead person to life, the intellect of a witness would be
convinced so as to recognize clearly that God, Who lieth not, was
speaking, although the thing itself foretold would not be evident in
itself, and consequently the essence of faith would not be removed.
Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in
the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons, but
only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby they
recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although they do
not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for instance
that there are three Persons in God, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe,
by the evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for
their belief.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to
believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when that
faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have, is not
a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through their
natural intellectual acumen.
Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so
evident, that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to
them, so that their malice is by no means diminished by their believe.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith
in the other articles?
Objection 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article
of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the
natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a
catholic. Now a catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of faith
in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems
that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of
lifeless faith.
Objection 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one
science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may possess
the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be
ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe some
articles of faith without believing the others.
Objection 3: Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles
of faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a
man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can
believe some articles, and disbelieve others.
On the contrary, Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is
disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does
not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith,
after a man disbelieves one article.
I answer that, Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic
who disbelieves one article of faith.
The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the
formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit
cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as
manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds
from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an
infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which
proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the
habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by
faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion
without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but
merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to
the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to
whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the
Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses
to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an
infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a
heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not
prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he
is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error.
Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article
has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in
accordance with his own will.
Reply to Objection 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of
faith, about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the
faithful does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because
in order to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he
holds the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: The various conclusions of a science have their
respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without
another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without
knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles
of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First Truth
proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the Church
who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever abandons this
mean is altogether lacking in faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred
either to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept
without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience
to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment,
according to James 2:10: "Whosoever shall . . . offend in one point is
become guilty of all."
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Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man than
in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its object. Now
whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith, since by
failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as stated above
[2338](A[3]). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in one
than in another.
Objection 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme
cannot be "more" or "less." Now faith consists in something supreme,
because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above all
things. Therefore faith cannot be "more" or "less."
Objection 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the
understanding of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles
of faith are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown
above ([2339]Q[1], A[7]). Now the understanding of principles is
possessed in equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in
equal degree by all the faithful.
On the contrary, Wherever we find great and little, there we find more
or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little, for Our
Lord said to Peter (Mat. 14:31): "O thou of little faith, why didst
thou doubt?" And to the woman he said (Mat. 15: 28): "O woman, great is
thy faith!" Therefore faith can be greater in one than in another.
I answer that, As stated above ([2340]FS, Q[52], AA[1],2; [2341]FS,
Q[112], A[4]), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two
points of view: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part
of its participation by the subject.
Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material
object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of faith
is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above ([2342]Q[1],
A[1]). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among
believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above
([2343]Q[4], A[6]). But the things which are proposed as the matter of
our belief are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in
this respect one man can believe explicitly more things than another,
so that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more
explicit.
If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of its
participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the act
of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as stated
above ([2344]Q[2], AA[1],2;[2345] Q[4], A[2]). Consequently a man's
faith may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his
intellect, on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in
another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater
promptitude, devotion, or confidence.
Reply to Objection 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is
of faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not
explicitly believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that
habit. In this respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the
part of the object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the
first place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some
submit to it with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in
this way faith is greater in one than in another.
Reply to Objection 3: The understanding of principles results from
man's very nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith
results from the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as
explained above ([2346]FS, Q[112], A[4]). Hence the comparison fails.
Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to
another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?
(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
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Whether faith is infused into man by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us, and
nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which science
begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith
does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.
Objection 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing,
seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing
miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (Jn.
4:53): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus
said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole
house"; and (Rom. 10:17) it is said that "faith is through hearing."
Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.
Objection 3: Further, that which depends on a man's will can be
acquired by him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according
to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired
by man.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 2:8,9): "By grace you are saved
through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man may glory .
. . for it is the gift of God."
I answer that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the
things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary
in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing
requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which
are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith
must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass
human reason, hence they do not come to man's knowledge, unless God
reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as
those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to
some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith,
according to Rom. 10:15: "How shall they preach, unless they be sent?"
As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of
faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such
as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the
faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see
the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some
do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man
inwardly to assent to matters of faith.
The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's
free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is
from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to
assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith
is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this
is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised
above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural
principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as
regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving
man inwardly by grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of
external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause
of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument again refers to the cause that
proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to
believe by words or deeds.
Reply to Objection 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the
believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in
order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as
stated above ([2347]Q[2] , A[3]).
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Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God.
For it is written (Dt. 32:4) that "the works of God are perfect." Now
lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of
God.
Objection 2: Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through
lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless [informis] when
it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not from
God, as stated above ([2348]FS, Q[79], A[2], ad 2). Therefore neither
is lifeless faith from God.
Objection 3: Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is
written (Jn. 7:23): "If a man receive circumcision on the sabbath-day,
that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry at Me because I
have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?" Now faith heals man from
unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God the gift of faith, is at
the same time healed from all his sins. But this is not done except by
living faith. Therefore living faith alone is a gift of God: and
consequently lifeless faith is not from God.
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that "the faith which
lacks charity is a gift of God." Now this is lifeless faith. Therefore
lifeless faith is a gift of God.
I answer that, Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted that
privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas sometimes it
is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of its proper
species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the humors is
essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not essential
to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since, therefore, when we
assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign the cause of that
thing as existing in its proper species, it follows that what is not
the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the cause of the thing to
which that privation belongs as being essential to its species. For we
cannot assign as the cause of a sickness, something which is not the
cause of a disturbance in the humors: though we can assign as cause of
a diaphanous body, something which is not the cause of the darkness,
which is not essential to the diaphanous body.
Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of faith,
since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic form,
as stated above (Q[4], A[4]). Consequently the cause of lifeless faith
is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this is
God, as stated above [2349](A[1]). It follows, therefore, that lifeless
faith is a gift of God.
Reply to Objection 1: Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect
with the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a
perfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The deformity of an act is essential to the act's
species, considered as a moral act, as stated above ([2350]FP, Q[48],
A[1], ad 2; [2351]FS, Q[18], A[5]): for an act is said to be deformed
through being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due
commensuration of the act's circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God
is the cause of a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its
deformity, though He is the cause of the act as such.
We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a due
form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is compared
to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act
is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as lifeless faith is
from God, so too, acts that are good generically, though not quickened
by charity, as is frequently the case in sinners, are from God.
Reply to Objection 3: He who receives faith from God without charity,
is healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous
unbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing
from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that a
man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to
desist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the
instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is granted
by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the gift of
charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given to some
without charity.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there are
two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?
(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?
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Whether fear is an effect of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For an
effect does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it is
written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him."
Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries.
Now fear and hope are contraries, as stated above ([2352]FS, Q[23],
A[2]): and faith begets hope, as a gloss observes on Mat. 1:2.
Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the
object of faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object
of fear is an evil, as stated above ([2353]FS, Q[42], A[1]). Again,
acts take their species from the object, according to what was stated
above ([2354]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . believe
and tremble."
I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as stated
above ([2355]FS, Q[41], A[1]). Now the principle of all appetitive
movements is the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the
principle of fear and of every appetitive movement must be an
apprehension. Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension
of certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with the
Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the fear
whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear.
It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be separated
from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to Him, and
holds Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate God as an
unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the greatest
evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of the first
fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while living
faith is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it makes
man adhere to God and to be subject to Him by charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith,
because if we knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and
punishments, concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear
Him. If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain articles
of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then reverential fear
follows, the result of which is that man submits his intellect to God,
so as to believe in all the Divine promises. Hence the text quoted
continues: "And your reward shall not be made void."
Reply to Objection 2: The same thing in respect of contraries can be
the cause of contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith
begets hope, in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which
God awards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it
makes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on
sinners.
Reply to Objection 3: The primary and formal object of faith is the
good which is the First Truth; but the material object of faith
includes also certain evils; for instance, that it is an evil either
not to submit to God, or to be separated from Him, and that sinners
will suffer penal evils from God: in this way faith can be the cause of
fear.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For
purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith
is in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying
the heart.
Objection 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible
with impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may
be seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not
purify the heart.
Objection 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any
way, it would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not
purify the intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge.
Therefore faith nowise purifies the heart.
On the contrary, Peter said (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by
faith."
I answer that, A thing is impure through being mixed with baser things:
for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which betters
it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that the
rational creature is more excellent than all transient and corporeal
creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting itself to
transient things by loving them. From this impurity the rational
creature is purified by means of a contrary movement, namely, by
tending to that which is above it, viz. God. The first beginning of
this movement is faith: since "he that cometh to God must believe that
He is," according to Heb. 11:6. Hence the first beginning of the
heart's purifying is faith; and if this be perfected through being
quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly purified thereby.
Reply to Objection 1: Things that are in the intellect are the
principles of those which are in the appetite, in so far as the
apprehended good moves the appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity
which is contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the
human intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself, through
wishing to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible objects. But
when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible with any kind
of impurity, because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12).
Reply to Objection 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the
impurity of sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human
intellect, according to the present state of life.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gifts of understand and knowledge, which
respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of
understanding there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person?
(3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is
only speculative, or practical also?
(4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of
understanding?
(5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace?
(6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other
gifts;
(7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift?
(8) Which of the fruits?
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Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the Holy
Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of nature,
since they are given in addition to the latter. Now understanding is a
natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident principles are known,
as stated in Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among
the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures
according to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv). Now the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply
(which is a sign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign
of reason), as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine
knowledge which is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason
rather than a gift of understanding.
Objection 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is
condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9,10). Now no gift of the Holy
Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost
should receive the name of understanding.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding."
I answer that, Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for
"intelligere" [to understand] is the same as "intus legere" [to read
inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between
intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned with
external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge penetrates
into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the intellect
is "what a thing is," as stated in De Anima iii, 6.
Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find
which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under
the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under
words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth
they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed
within as compared with the sensible world, which is perceived
externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa.
Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all these things.
Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things as it
were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the understanding,
the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. Now the natural
light of our understanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach
to a certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernatural light
in order to penetrate further still so as to know what it cannot know
by its natural light: and this supernatural light which is bestowed on
man is called the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 1: The natural light instilled within us, manifests
only certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since
man is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[3];
[2356]FS, Q[3] , A[8]), man needs to reach to certain higher truths,
for which he requires the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an
understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by
proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of
reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we
ignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something previously
understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the light of
nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore this addition
is not called "reason" but "understanding," since the additional light
is in comparison with what we know supernaturally, what the natural
light is in regard to those things which we known from the first.
Reply to Objection 3: "Will" denotes simply a movement of the appetite
without indicating any excellence; whereas "understanding" denotes a
certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of
things. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding
rather than after the will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is
incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15) that
"the thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension of him
who understands it." But the thing which is believed is not
comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippians
3:12: "Not as though I had already comprehended [Douay: 'attained'], or
were already perfect." Therefore it seems that faith and understanding
are incompatible in the same subject.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the
understanding. But faith is of things that appear not, as stated above
([2357]Q[1], A[4];[2358] Q[4], A[1]). Therefore faith is incompatible
with understanding in the same subject.
Objection 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science. But
science and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated above
([2359]Q[1], AA[4],5). Much less, therefore, can understanding and
faith be in the same subject.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding
enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard." Now one who
has faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard;
thus it is written (Lk. 24:27, 32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures
to His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore
understanding is compatible with faith.
I answer that, We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on the
side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.
On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain things,
of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery to three
Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son; whereas other
things come under faith, through being subordinate, in one way or
another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that is contained
in the Divine Scriptures.
On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that
there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way,
we understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the essence
of the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in itself of
the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the state of faith
lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the direct object of
faith: although certain other things that are subordinate to faith can
be understood even in this way.
In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of a
thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity or
mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward
appearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we
understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the
sake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the
state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those things
which are the direct object of faith.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three
argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to
the understanding of matters subordinate to faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical?
Objection 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of
the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according
to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more
exalted things." But the practical intellect is occupied, not with
exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions
are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not
practical.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more
excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the
intellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but
necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much
more, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but
necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary
things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and
which may result from man's activity. Therefore the gift of
understanding is not practical.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in
matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with which
the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural reason,
which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was made
clear above ([2360]FS, Q[58], A[2]; [2361]FS, Q[71], A[6]). Therefore
the gift of understanding is not practical.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 110:10): "A good understanding to
all that do it."
I answer that, As stated above [2362](A[2]), the gift of understanding
is not only about those things which come under faith first and
principally, but also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good
actions have a certain relationship to faith: since "faith worketh
through charity," according to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift
of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these
were its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions is
the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by the
gift of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting it, as
Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: The things with which human actions are concerned
are not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred
to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness,
they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.
Reply to Objection 2: The excellence of the gift of understanding
consists precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not
only as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is
the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.
Reply to Objection 3: The rule of human actions is the human reason and
the eternal law, as stated above ([2363]FS, Q[71], A[6]). Now the
eternal law surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human
actions, as ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and
requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in all
who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the
gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness of mind."
Now many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of mind.
Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of
grace.
Objection 2: Further, of all the things that are connected with
knowledge, faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by
faith Christ dwells in our hearts, according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift
of understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who
have faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not necessary
for salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in a state of
grace.
Objection 3: Further, those things which are common to all who are in a
state of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of
understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself
profitably, for, at times, "when the mind is puffed up with
understanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base and
vile things," as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the gift
of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 81:5): "They have not known or
understood, they walk on in darkness." But no one who is in a state of
grace walks in darkness, according to Jn. 8:12: "He that followeth Me,
walketh not in darkness." Therefore no one who is in a state of grace
is without the gift of understanding.
I answer that, In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs be
rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good,
according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will
cannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some
knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good
understood, as stated in De Anima iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy Ghost
directs man's will by the gift of charity, so as to move it directly to
some supernatural good; so also, by the gift of understanding, He
enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some supernatural truth, to
which the right will needs to tend.
Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have
sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 1: Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer
dulness of mind with regard to things that are not necessary for
salvation; but with regard to those that are necessary for salvation,
they are sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Jn.
2:27: "His unction teacheth you of all things."
Reply to Objection 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully
the things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that
they ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from
them.
Reply to Objection 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation,
the gift of understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in
order that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw
sometimes with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to
penetrate all things clearly.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not
sanctifying grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is found also
in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in expounding
the words of Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy
justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will is
weak and slow to follow." But in all who have sanctifying grace, the
will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of
understanding can be in those who have not sanctifying grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of
understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is no
prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be prophecy
without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Mat. 7:22, where those who
say: "We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg.: 'Have we not prophesied
in Thy name?]," are answered with the words: "I never knew you."
Therefore the gift of understanding can be without sanctifying grace.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue
of faith, according to Is. 7:9, following another reading [*The
Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand." Now
faith can be without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of
understanding can be without it.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 6:45): "Every one that hath heard
of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now it is by the
intellect, as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn or
understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of
understanding, cometh to Christ, which is impossible without
sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be
without sanctifying grace.
I answer that, As stated above ([2364]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) the gifts of
the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the
motion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of
grace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's
understanding is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of
which movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore
unless the human intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to have
a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of
understanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in
regard to other truths that are preambles to the faith.
Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in
error about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest
good: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in
moral matters a man has a right estimate about the end through a habit
of virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without
sanctifying grace.
Reply to Objection 1: By understanding Augustine means any kind of
intellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions
of a gift, unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a
right estimate about the end.
Reply to Objection 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy,
is a kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things
revealed to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind
with regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to
the gift of understanding.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed
but understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which
perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the
end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between understanding
and faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not
distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between
things whose opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to
folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to
rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states
(Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between
folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does
understanding differ from the other gifts.
Objection 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs
from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be
about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not
about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first
principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally
self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as
are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first principles
in supernatural knowledge, as stated above ([2365]Q[1], A[7]).
Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other
intellectual gifts.
Objection 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative
or practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as
stated above [2366](A[3]). Therefore it is not distinct from the other
intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.
On the contrary, When several things are enumerated together they must
be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction is the
origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated together
with the other gifts, as appears from Is. 11:2. Therefore the gift of
understanding is distinct from the other gifts.
I answer that, The difference between the gift of understanding and
three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident, since
the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while the
three belong to the appetitive power.
But the difference between this gift of understanding and the remaining
three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also belong to the
cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.
Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of understanding differs from
the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in that these two belong to
practical knowledge, while the gift of understanding belongs to
speculative knowledge; and that it differs from the gift of wisdom,
which also belongs to speculative knowledge, in that wisdom is
concerned with judgment, while understanding renders the mind apt to
grasp the things that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very
heart. And in this sense we have assigned the number of the gifts,
above ([2367]FS, Q[68], A[4]).
But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is
concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters,
as stated above [2368](A[3]), and likewise, the gift of knowledge
regards both matters, as we shall show further on (Q[9], A[3]), and
consequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For all
these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which, in us,
takes its foundation from faith. Now "faith is through hearing" (Rom.
10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be believed by man, not
as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by faith. But faith, first
and principally, is about the First Truth, secondarily, about certain
considerations concerning creatures, and furthermore extends to the
direction of human actions, in so far as it works through charity, as
appears from what has been said above (Q[4], A[2], ad 3).
Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief, two
things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated or
grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of
understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these
things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these
things, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with
regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard
to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its
application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts
is clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which
Gregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to
sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp, when
it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are proposed
to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind unable to
pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a fool if he
judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore folly is
properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright about the
universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind, even about any
particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to knowledge, which
gives man a right judgment about particular causes, viz. about
creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby man does not
proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The gift of understanding is about the first
principles of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise
than faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it
belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the things
that are said.
Reply to Objection 3: The gift of understanding is related to both
kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the
judgment, but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart," etc.,
responds to the gift of understanding?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the
clean of heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the gift
of understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to
the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the
appetite, but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the aforesaid
beatitude does not respond to the gift of understanding.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their
hearts by faith." Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart being
purified. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to the virtue of
faith rather than to the gift of understanding.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the
present state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the
present life, since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed, as
stated above ([2369]FS, Q[3], A[8]). Therefore the sixth beatitude
which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of
understanding.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to
the clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye
hath not seen."
I answer that, Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as also
in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the other
by way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above ([2370]FS,
Q[69], AA[2] ,4), and each of these, in some way, responds to the gift
of understanding.
For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to seeing
God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate affections:
and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and gifts
belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart is a
kind of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of the
mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the
truths which are proposed to it about God, no longer by way of
corporeal phantasms, nor infected with heretical misrepresentations:
and this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding.
Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's
Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not
what God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more perfectly
do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses
all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God belongs to
the gift of understanding; the first, to the gift of understanding in
its state of perfection, as possessed in heaven; the second, to the
gift of understanding in its state of inchoation, as possessed by
wayfarers.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two
arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers
to the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in
this life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above
([2371]FS, Q[69], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding?
Objection 1: It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not
respond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit of
faith, since it is written (Is. 7:9) according to another reading [*The
Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand," where
our version has: "If you will not believe, you shall not continue."
Therefore fruit is not the fruit of understanding.
Objection 2: Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what
follows. But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the
foundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above
([2372]Q[4], AA[1],7). Therefore faith is not the fruit of
understanding.
Objection 3: Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the
appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect;
namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite. Therefore
faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more than to
wisdom, knowledge or counsel.
On the contrary, The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of
understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith,
which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says that
the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen." Therefore
faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding.
I answer that, The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above ([2373]FS,
Q[70], A[1]), when we were discussing them, are so called because they
are something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of
the Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an
end, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that
which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be,
after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to the
other powers.
Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a
power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same
power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will. In
this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to the
gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while the
fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the
will.
Reply to Objection 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a
virtue. But we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind
of certitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of
understanding.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding,
for it would be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to
be believed, without understanding it in some way. However, the
perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which
perfection of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty
of faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist
in that very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for
its own sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand,
speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is
the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which
belongs only to practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of its
own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge, which can
belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one corresponding
fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith. The reason why
there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive faculty, is
because, as already stated, the character of end, which the word fruit
implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the intellective
part.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?
(2) Whether it is about Divine things?
(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(4) Which beatitude responds to it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether knowledge is a gift?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts
of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies an
effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that
a "demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge." Therefore
knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all
holy persons, as stated above (Q[8], A[4]; [2374]FS, Q[68], A[5]). Now
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack
knowledge though they have faith." Therefore knowledge is not a gift.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as
stated above ([2375]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Therefore one gift suffices for
the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds to
the virtue of faith, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]). Therefore the gift
of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to
which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are
perfections of virtues, as stated above ([2376]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2), it
seems that knowledge is not a gift.
On the contrary, Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Is.
11:2).
I answer that, Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, does
not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature. Now,
when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to some
truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth: first,
because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment on it.
Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human intellect
may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of these is that he
should have a sound grasp of the things that are proposed to be
believed, and this pertains to the gift of understanding, as stated
above ([2377]Q[8], A[6]): while the other is that he should have a sure
and right judgment on them, so as to discern what is to be believed,
from what is not to be believed, and for this the gift of knowledge is
required.
Reply to Objection 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures,
according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms a
sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason:
and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning.
On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without
any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was stated in the
[2378]FP, Q[14], A[7]; wherefore God's knowledge is not discursive, or
argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is
likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated
likeness thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of
belief. One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning
things to be believed from things not to be believe: in this way
knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a
knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what one
ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to induce
others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This knowledge
is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not given to all,
but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted, adds: "It is one
thing for a man merely to know what he ought to believe, and another to
know how to dispense what he believes to the godly, and to defend it
against the ungodly."
Reply to Objection 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and
intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the
theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the
perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is not
unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine
things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets,
nourishes and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things,
because its object is the First Truth, as stated above ([2379]Q[1],
A[1]). Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than
acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine
things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore
is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.
Objection 3: Further, according to Rom. 1:20, "the invisible things of
God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made." If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems
that there is also knowledge of Divine things.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge of
Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human
affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge."
I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its
cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order
of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so
ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed through the
first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any
other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed through the first
cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.
Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common
name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of
the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect
thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms,
that which signifies "what a thing is," is given the special name of
"definition," but the convertible terms which fall short of this,
retain the common name, and are called "proper" terms.
Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as
stated above [2380](A[1]), if this certitude of the judgment is derived
from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is
wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the
highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of all
matters by that cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who knows
the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the knowledge
of Divine things is called "wisdom," while the knowledge of human
things is called "knowledge," this being the common name denoting
certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment which is formed
through second causes. Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way,
it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of
knowledge is only about human or created things.
Reply to Objection 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal,
yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer.
Hence to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of
knowledge, but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a
kind of union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the
gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to
God.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic
acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special
gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through
created things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2381]Q[1], A[1]), every
cognitive habit regards formally the mean through which things are
known, and materially, the things that are known through the mean. And
since that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those
sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from mathematical
principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical sciences,
though, as to their matter they have more in common with physical
sciences: and for this reason it is stated in Phys. ii, 2 that they are
more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God through His
creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to which it belongs
formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs materially: and,
conversely, when we judge of creatures according to Divine things, this
pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered among
the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii,
14) that "knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we make use
of external things." But the knowledge which is concerned about actions
is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is practical.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought
if it hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it
lacks the discernment of knowledge." Now it follows from this authority
that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a speculative
science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but
practical.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the
righteous, as stated above (Q[9], A[5]). But speculative knowledge can
be also in the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: "To him . . . who
knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Therefore the
gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own day
prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in the
mind." Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of
knowledge is both speculative and practical.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[9], A[8]), the gift of knowledge,
like the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of faith.
Now faith consists primarily and principally in speculation, in as much
as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also
the last end for the sake of which our works are done, hence it is that
faith extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6: "Faith . . . worketh by
charity."
The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and
principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what he
ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works, since we
are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of faith, and
of conclusions drawn therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge,
in so far as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge,
yet not action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have already stated ([2382]Q[8], A[5])
about the gift of understanding, not everyone who understands, has the
gift of understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of
grace: and so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge,
that they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about
matters of faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as
never to wander from the straight path of justice. This is the
knowledge of holy things, according to Wis. 10:10: "She conducted the
just . . . through the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of
holy things."
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Whether the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," etc. correspond
s
to the gift of knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they
that mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even as
evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now
knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter is
known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and the
crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does
not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge.
Now there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there
joy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no
bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness."
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with the
gift of knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation,
before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow
does not correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is not
concerned about things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii, 9).
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to
correspond with the gift of knowledge.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): "Knowledge
befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the
evil which he coveted as though it were good."
I answer that, Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to
knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God is
occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned to an
abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of those,
namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the
perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last
end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment
of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be
the occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of
knowledge.
Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of
knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except
in so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper
cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy
correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge
there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in
consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs
creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in
this beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the
reward; which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to
come.
Reply to Objection 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth;
yet he may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he
considers: it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far
as it consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in
considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude
does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in
well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude
of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is not
ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are about
Divine things.
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OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief,
which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to
confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are
contrary to knowledge and understanding.
As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy;
(3) apostasy from the faith.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?
(5) Of the species of unbelief;
(6) Of their comparison, one with another;
(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?
(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?
(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?
(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?
(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?
(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against
their parents' will?
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Whether unbelief is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin is
contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now
unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. v) that "to be capable to having faith, just as to be
capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have
faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful."
Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a
sin.
Objection 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since
every sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid
unbelief, for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the
Apostle says (Rom. 10:14): "How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they
have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?" Therefore
unbelief does not seem to be a sin.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([2383]FS, Q[84], A[4]), there
are seven capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief
does not seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is
not a sin.
On the contrary, Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, and
unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.
I answer that, Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure
negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has
not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to
the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises
it, according to Is. 53:1: "Who hath believed our report?" It is this
that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that
unbelief is a sin.
If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those
who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of
sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is
a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are
damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away
without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief. Hence Our
Lord said (Jn. 15:22) "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they
would not have sin"; which Augustine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.)
as "referring to the sin whereby they believed not in Christ."
Reply to Objection 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature,
but it is part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his
inner instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this
way, unbelief is contrary to nature.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure
negation.
Reply to Objection 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from
pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the
rules of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumptuous innovations arise
from vainglory."
It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not
reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices
opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital
vices.
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Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as its
subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De
Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above
[2384](A[1]). Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the
intellect.
Objection 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the
preaching of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore
unbelief is in the will.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Cor.
11:14 "Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light," says
that if "a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for a
good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does or
says what is becoming to a good angel." This seems to be because of the
rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his
intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin of unbelief
seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, consequently, it
does not reside in the intellect.
On the contrary, Things which are contrary to one another are in the
same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in the
intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.
I answer that, As stated above ([2385]FS, Q[74], AA[1],2), sin is said
to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a
sinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal
principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will,
because every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act
is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act:
thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust, wherefore
these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now dissent, which is
the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the intellect, moved, however,
by the will, just as assent is.
Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate
subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which
way every sin is said to be in the will.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's
dissent, which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of
unbelief is in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one,
does not dissent from a matter of faith, because "his bodily senses are
deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right
judgment" as the gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But,
according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to
invite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): "I should hesitate
to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a
heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact
that he is a heretic." But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we
ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.
Objection 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not,
seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes
sin: for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): "I . . . before was a
blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . .
mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore
unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
Objection 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment,
according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the
measure also of the stripes be." Now a greater punishment is due to
believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much more,
do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under
foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the testament
unclean, by which he was sanctified?" Therefore unbelief is not the
greatest of sins.
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Jn. 15:22, "If I had not
come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin," says (Tract. lxxxix
in Joan.): "Under the general name, He refers to a singularly great
sin. For this," viz. infidelity, "is the sin to which all others may be
traced." Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.
I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as
stated above ([2386]FS, Q[71], A[6]; [2387]FS, Q[73], A[3]). Hence the
more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than
ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true
knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach
Him, but is severed from Him.
Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him
in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.
Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin
that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the
sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated
further on ([2388]Q[20], A[3];[2389] Q[34], A[2], ad 2;[2390] Q[39],
A[2], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its
genus from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence
Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not
sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more grave
generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the
sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be aggravated.
Reply to Objection 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory
thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect
it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this ignorance, it has
a certain reason for excuse, especially when a man sins not from
malice, as was the case with the Apostle.
Reply to Objection 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his
sin of unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we
consider the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g.
adultery, committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer,
other things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both
on account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account
of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and which
he insults by committing sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin.
Because a gloss on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says:
"The whole life of unbelievers is a sin." Now the life of unbelievers
consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a
sin.
Objection 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no
good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among
unbelievers, no action can be good.
Objection 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which
follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of all
the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers,
they can do no good work, but sin in every action of theirs.
On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever (Acts
10:4, 31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not every
action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are good.
I answer that, As stated above ([2391]FS, Q[85], AA[2],4) mortal sin
takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of
nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are
without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them.
Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works
which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a
certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature
suffices.
Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but
whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For
even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even
mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an
unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to
the end of his unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either
that the life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no
sin is taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin.
Hence the same authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts
according to his unbelief, sins grievously."
Reply to Objection 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the
supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct
the intention in respect of a connatural good.
Reply to Objection 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural
reason in unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in
them, whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With
regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not an
unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom
none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the truth
of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to
give him fuller instruction in the faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are several species of unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of
unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another,
they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is
the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter
contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also
is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves
are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends not
on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not several
species of unbelief, according to the various points which the
unbeliever disbelieves.
Objection 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith
in an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of
unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to
follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and
consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of our
consideration.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different
species. Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different
points of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a
diversity of species of unbelief: and so there are not several species
of unbelief.
On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue,
because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways," according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith
is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it.
I answer that, As stated above ([2392]FS, Q[55], A[4]; [2393]FS, Q[64],
A[1]), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge
or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter,
whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices
are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are opposed
to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with regard to
their different relations to the virtue: and in this way there are
determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral
virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and another, by
falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed
to one virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of the
various conditions required for that virtue. In this way an infinite
number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g. temperance or
fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in which the
various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that the
rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans held
evil to be infinite.
Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to
faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number.
For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this
may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been
accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the
Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this either
in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the very
manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we
may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of unbelief.
If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the
various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not
determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied
indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).
Reply to Objection 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in
two ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which
case the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his
sin, and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may
be considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken
is the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its
species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must
therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth
considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect,
considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that
it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its
various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it adheres to
the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of vice opposed to
charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by turning to various
temporal goods, and also in respect of various inordinate relations to
God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one First
Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because unbelievers
follow many false opinions.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the various species of
unbelief according to various points in which errors occur.
Reply to Objection 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many
things in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many
things, be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet
nothing hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief,
even as one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily
diseases.
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Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?
Objection 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is
graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according
as it endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so
does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which
holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is most
important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which the
heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their unbelief is
the gravest of all.
Objection 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those
which contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important
points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more
detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ
from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more
numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since they
do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the
gravest.
Objection 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some
good in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from
God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New
Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who
receive neither Testament.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better for
them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known
it, to turn back." Now the heathens have not known the way of justice,
whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some
way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2394](A[5]), two things may be
considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from
this point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins
more grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having
accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins
more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way the
unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and
resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of
the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, however,
they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they
corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more
grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not
accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.
The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of
matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points
than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of
heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of
the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the
Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do.
Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of
view of guilt; since, as stated above [2395](A[1]) unbelief has the
character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere
absence of faith, for the latter as was stated [2396](A[1]) seems
rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely,
the unbelief of heretics is the worst.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with
unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not
in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the
hearers." But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly
without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute
publicly with unbelievers.
Objection 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the
canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus:
"It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone
ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which have once
been judged and disposed of." Now all matters of faith have been
decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the
councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public
about matters of faith.
Objection 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments.
But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas
things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter
of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters of
faith.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 9:22, 29) that "Saul increased
much more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that "he spoke . .
. to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks."
I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things must be
observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of
his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his
intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the
faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though
he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as
being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is
praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or
for practice.
On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the
disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and
wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith,
there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence.
But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because
either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance,
Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or
else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, as in those
countries where there are not unbelievers. In the first case it is
necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those
who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors; since in
this way simple people are strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers
are deprived of the opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to
withstand the perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would
tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as
a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence
leave those in error who might have been instructed." On the other
hand, in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the
faith, in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very
reason is more firm, that they have never heard anything differing from
what they believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what
unbelievers have to say against the faith.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid
disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious
words rather than of sound speeches.
Reply to Objection 2: That law forbade those public disputations about
the faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are
for the safeguarding thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not
as though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known,
and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is
necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by defending
the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: "Being ready always to satisfy
everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in
you [*Vulg.: 'Of that hope which is in you' St. Thomas' reading is
apparently taken from Bede]." Sometimes again, it is necessary, in
order to convince those who are in error, according to Titus 1:9: "That
he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the
gainsayers."
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Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be
compelled to the faith. For it is written (Mat. 13:28) that the
servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked
him: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?" and that he answered:
"No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also
together with it": on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in
Matth.): "Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of men. For it
is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will necessarily
slay many innocent persons." Therefore it seems that for the same
reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.
Objection 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De
Judaeis): "The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for
the future, none are to be compelled to believe." Therefore, in like
manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that "it is
possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot
believe unless he is willing." Therefore it seems that unbelievers
ought not to be compelled to the faith.
Objection 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]):
"I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: 'of him that dieth']."
Now we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above
([2397]FS, Q[19], AA[9],10). Therefore we should not even wish
unbelievers to be put to death.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 14:23): "Go out into the highways
and hedges; and compel them to come in." Now men enter into the house
of God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be
compelled to the faith.
I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some who have never received
the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means
to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because
to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled
by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder
the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even
by their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ's
faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of
forcing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and
take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if
they will, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of
Christ.
On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted
the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such
should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil
what they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to
forbid, not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears
from the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent.
xciii) of himself: "It was once my opinion that none should be
compelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight
with arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of
contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was
so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our
chains asunder." Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's words, "Suffer
both to grow until the harvest," must be gathered from those which
precede, "lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root the wheat also
together with it." For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2)
"these words show that when this is not to be feared, that is to say,
when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he
has no defenders, or none such as might cause a schism, the severity of
discipline should not slacken."
Reply to Objection 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith,
ought not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they
have received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated
in the same chapter.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and
keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a
matter of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has
received it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be
compelled to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface
(Ep. clxxxv): "What do these people mean by crying out continually: 'We
may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ compel?'
They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards
taught Him."
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us
wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to
have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he
had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers
together some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her
maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations."
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Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with
unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): "If any of them that
believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that
is set before you." And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad
Heb.): "If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without any
reservation." Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate with
him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to
do to judge them that are without?" Now unbelievers are without. When,
therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with certain
people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate
with unbelievers.
Objection 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he
communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his
servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews,
or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully
communicate with them.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 7:2,3): "Thou shalt make no league
with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make marriages
with them": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, "The woman who at the return of
the month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we
should not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples, nor have
any dealings with them."
I answer that, Communication with a particular person is forbidden to
the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with
whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of
those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can be
gathered from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had
pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know
you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump?" and afterwards
he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the
sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge
them that are within?"
Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful
to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the
Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the
right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal
judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are
guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some
temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a
punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those
unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by
corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith,
as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication
on both.
With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish
according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time.
For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their
communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the
latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith.
These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have
not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be
some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people
and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared
as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with
unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or
to communicate with them without necessity.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against
unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them:
but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of
temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church,
for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication
with certain unbelievers.
Reply to Objection 3: There is more probability that a servant who is
ruled by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his
master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the
faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however,
the master were in danger, through communicating with such a servant,
he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command (Mat. 18:8):
"If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee."
With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives
this solution before the Reply OBJ 2] sense the reply is that the Lord
gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory
the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry,
so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those
nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes
on (Dt. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son from following Me."
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Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or
dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1):
"Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters
worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of
unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing
masters, let them not despise them." Moreover it is written (1 Pet.
2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to
the good and gentle, but also to the froward." Now this command would
not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could
have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers
can have authority over the faithful.
Objection 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his
subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes'
households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): "All
the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar's household,"
referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can
have authority over the faithful.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a
slave is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life,
even as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning
the working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject
to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore
unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.
On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on
those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce
judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any
of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the
unjust," i.e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints?" Therefore it
seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.
I answer that, That this question may be considered in two ways. First,
we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful
as of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no
means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the
faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply
with their commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover
unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall
away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an
unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to
acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority over them in any
capacity whatever.
Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force:
and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions
of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers
arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of
grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural
reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers,
considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of
unbelievers over the faithful.
Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done
away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the
authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve
to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted into
children of God.
This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those
unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church
and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew
became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without
paying any price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i.e. born in slavery;
and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his
service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be
offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in
this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church,
she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes have
enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in favor of
liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the above law to
those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her members, in
temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: and this, in
order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Mat. 17:25,26) that He
could be excused from paying the tribute, because "the children are
free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in order to avoid giving
scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that servants should honor their
masters, adds, "lest the name of the Lord and His doctrine be
blasphemed."
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction
of faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the
conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that
there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household, that
they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian
encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and, the while,
remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace of Diocletian.
Reply to Objection 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their
whole lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything:
whereas the craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special
works. Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have
dominion or authority over the faithful, than that they should be
allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits
Christians to work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail
their living together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre
to send master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6.
Yet, if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by
such communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.
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Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be
tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their
rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent
therein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: "Not only they that do them,
but they also that consent to them that do them." Therefore it is a sin
to tolerate their rites.
Objection 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry,
because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of
bondage," says: "The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of
idolatry." But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the
rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the
temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as
Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that
even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.
Objection 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above
(A[3] ). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not
tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites
of unbelievers to be tolerated.
On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist. xlv,
can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be allowed
to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers
have for ages observed them."
I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government,
and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely
good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the
universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods
might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human
government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain
evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be
incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If you do away with
harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust." Hence, though
unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on
account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil
avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which,
of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there
follows this good---that our very enemies bear witness to our faith,
and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this
reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.
On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither
truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except
perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance
that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if
they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For
this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of
heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized
against their parents' will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other
unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the
bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over
children, since the right of parental authority can be made to cease,
when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be
severed by man, according to Mat. 19:6: "What . . . God hath joined
together let no man put asunder." And yet the marriage bond is broken
on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15): "If the
unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under
servitude in such cases": and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima, and
Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if the unbelieving partner is unwilling
to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, then the
other partner is not bound to cohabitation." Much more, therefore, does
unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents' authority over
their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against
their parents' will.
Objection 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in
danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal
death. Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal
death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews
and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they
be left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it
seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and
instructed in the faith.
Objection 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves
bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen
of kings and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently
kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish
children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them
against their parents' wishes.
Objection 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has
his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body.
Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their
parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism.
Objection 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching
does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of
punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through
not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to
the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the sword coming and
sounds not the trumpet." Much more therefore, if Jewish children are
lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who
could have baptized them and did not.
On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an
injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their
will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their
children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not
be baptized against their parents' will.
I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and
ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine
of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we
ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an
Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the
custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the
will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very
powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom
most holy bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with
Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have
failed to obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable.
It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the
children of Jews should be baptized against their parents' wishes, in
contradiction to the Church's custom observed hitherto.
There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger
to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason,
afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by
their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this
would be detrimental to the faith.
The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is
by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from
its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its
mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of
its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like
a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he
differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse
belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when
he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a
son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care.
Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before
coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents'
custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish. As soon,
however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to
belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters
concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be
induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it
can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its
parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it
is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in
the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it
is the parents' duty to look after the salvation of their children,
especially before they come to the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have
the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the
other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to
the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has
come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.
Reply to Objection 2: No one should be snatched from natural death
against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned
by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence:
hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a
child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the
danger of everlasting death.
Reply to Objection 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage,
which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.
Reply to Objection 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he
can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the
natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason,
under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of
the child in all matters relating to God.
Reply to Objection 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of
preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of
preaching. Hence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made
thee a watchman to the children [Vulg.: 'house'] of Israel." On the
other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of
unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the
danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their
children fail to obtain salvation.
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OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?
(2) Of the matter about which it is;
(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?
(4) Whether converts should be received?
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Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief.
For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q[10], A[2]).
Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather
to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf. Decretals
xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are manifest: Heresy is
derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby a man makes choice of
that school which he deems best." But choice is an act of the
appetitive power, as stated above ([2398]FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore
heresy is not a species of unbelief.
Objection 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end;
hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery
that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer." Now the end of
heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong
to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util.
Credendi i) that "a heretic is one who either devises or follows false
and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit, especially that
he may lord and be honored above others." Therefore heresy is a species
of pride rather than of unbelief.
Objection 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would
seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of
the flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh
are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the
others, he adds, "dissensions, sects," which are the same as heresies.
Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.
On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is one
who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is
opposed to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it is
a species of unbelief.
I answer that, The word heresy as stated in the first objection denotes
a choosing. Now choice as stated above ([2399]FS, Q[13], A[3]) is about
things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in matters
of faith, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper good, as was
shown above (Q[4], A[3]): wherefore that which is the chief truth, has
the character of last end, while those which are secondary truths, have
the character of being directed to the end.
Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every
form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to
hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by
holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place.
Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his
will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine.
Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the
rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to
assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in
respect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in
pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to
Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents
to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the
suggestions of his own mind.
Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who
profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.
Reply to Objection 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the
will regards faith, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Vices take their species from their proximate
end, while, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause.
Thus in the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is
the species of adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the
ultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the
theft, and is included under it, as an effect under its cause, or a
species under its genus, as appears from what we have said about acts
in general ([2400]FS, Q[18], A[7]). Wherefore, as to the case in point
also, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one's own false
opinion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote end
reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a
choosing [*From the Greek {airein} [hairein], to cut off], so does sect
derive its name from its being a cutting off [secando], as Isidore
states (Etym. viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing,
and each belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the
act itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by
reason of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in
which way it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second
objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to
error, as the Philosopher states in Metaph. iv; Ed. Did. iii, 5), for
this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as much as its
act is independent on a bodily organ.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters of
faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians, so
were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes (Etym.
viii, 3,4,5). Now their dissensions were not about matters of faith.
Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though they were its
proper matter.
Objection 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now
heresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about
interpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that
"whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy
Ghost by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though he may
not have left the Church": and elsewhere he says that "heresies spring
up from words spoken amiss." [*St. Thomas quotes this saying elsewhere,
in Sent. iv, D, 13, and [2401]TP, Q[16], A[8], but it is not to be
found in St. Jerome's works.] Therefore heresy is not properly about
the matter of faith.
Objection 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about
matters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on
the question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet this
was without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not properly
about the matter of faith.
On the contrary, Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ. Dei
xviii, 51]: "In Christ's Church, those are heretics, who hold
mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may
think soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing
to mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending
them." Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which are
contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby "the just man liveth" (Rom.
1:17). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its proper
matter.
I answer that, We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a corruption
of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption of the
Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that are not
of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and so forth, which
cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a person has a
false opinion about things belonging to the faith.
Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above ([2402]FP,
Q[32], A[4]; [2403]FS, Q[1], A[6], ad 1; [2404]FS, Q[2], A[5]), in one
way, directly and principally, e.g. the articles of faith; in another
way, indirectly and secondarily, e.g. those matters, the denial of
which leads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may
be heresy in either way, even as there can be faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees
were about opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies
among Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another
sense than that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the
meaning of Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has
revealed. Hence it is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets:
"They have persisted to confirm what they have said," viz. by false
interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by the
words that he utters, since confession is an act of faith, as stated
above ([2405]Q[3], A[1] ). Wherefore inordinate words about matters of
faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that Pope
Leo says in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: "The enemies
of Christ's cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so that, if
we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us mendaciously
of agreeing with Nestorius."
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it
stated in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): "By no
means should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse
their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the
truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have
found the truth," because, to wit, they do not make a choice in
contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly, certain
doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding of which in
this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or
even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church;
although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after they had been
defined by the authority of the universal Church, he would be deemed a
heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For
we read [*Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]: "Whenever a question of
faith is in dispute, I think, that all our brethren and fellow bishops
ought to refer the matter to none other than Peter, as being the source
of their name and honor, against whose authority neither Jerome nor
Augustine nor any of the holy doctors defended their opinion." Hence
Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol [*Among the supposititious works of St.
Jerome]): "This, most blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been
taught in the Catholic Church. If anything therein has been incorrectly
or carelessly expressed, we beg that it may be set aright by you who
hold the faith and see of Peter. If however this, our profession, be
approved by the judgment of your apostleship, whoever may blame me,
will prove that he himself is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a
catholic but a heretic."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether heretics ought to be tolerated?
Objection 1: It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the
Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:24,25): "The servant of the Lord must not
wrangle . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if
peradventure God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they
may recover themselves from the snares of the devil." Now if heretics
are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of
repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle's command.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be
tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 11:19): "There must be . . . heresies, that they . . . who
are reproved, may be manifest among you." Therefore it seems that
heretics should be tolerated.
Objection 3: Further, the Master commanded his servants (Mat. 13:30) to
suffer the cockle "to grow until the harvest," i.e. the end of the
world, as a gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle
denotes heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:10,11): "A man that is a
heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that he,
that is such an one, is subverted."
I answer that, With regard to heretics two points must be observed:
one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their
own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be
separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed
from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the
faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports
temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are
forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason
is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be
not only excommunicated but even put to death.
On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the
conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but
"after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: after
that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his
conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him
and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the
secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death.
For Jerome commenting on Gal. 5:9, "A little leaven," says: "Cut off
the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole
house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish,
rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was
not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame."
Reply to Objection 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should
be admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to
retract, he must be reckoned as already "subverted," as we may gather
from the words of the Apostle quoted above.
Reply to Objection 2: The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the
intention of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the faithful
being put to the test, and "makes us shake off our sluggishness, and
search the Scriptures more carefully," as Augustine states (De Gen.
cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the corruption of the
faith, which is to inflict very great harm indeed. Consequently we
should consider what they directly intend, and expel them, rather than
what is beside their intention, and so, tolerate them.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can.
Notandum), "to be excommunicated is not to be uprooted." A man is
excommunicated, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his "spirit may
be saved in the day of Our Lord." Yet if heretics be altogether
uprooted by death, this is not contrary to Our Lord's command, which is
to be understood as referring to the case when the cockle cannot be
plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as we explained above
([2406]Q[10], A[8], ad 1), when treating of unbelievers in general.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to
receive those who return from heresy. For it is written (Jer. 3:1) in
the person of the Lord: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers;
nevertheless return to Me saith the Lord." Now the sentence of the
Church is God's sentence, according to Dt. 1:17: "You shall hear the
little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man's
person, because it is the judgment of God." Therefore even those who
are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief which is spiritual
prostitution, should be received all the same.
Objection 2: Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (Mat. 18:22) to forgive
his offending brother "not" only "till seven times, but till seventy
times seven times," which Jerome expounds as meaning that "a man should
be forgiven, as often as he has sinned." Therefore he ought to be
received by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back into
heresy.
Objection 3: Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other
unbelievers who wish to be converted are received by the Church.
Therefore heretics also should be received.
On the contrary, The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix)
says that "those who are found to have relapsed into the error which
they had already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal."
Therefore they should not be received by the Church.
I answer that, In obedience to Our Lord's institution, the Church
extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who
persecute her, according to Mat. 5:44: "Love your enemies; do good to
them that hate you." Now it is part of charity that we should both wish
and work our neighbor's good. Again, good is twofold: one is spiritual,
namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the object of
charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for one another.
Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who return after
falling no matter how often, are admitted by the Church to Penance
whereby the way of salvation is opened to them.
The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz.
temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good
repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by
charity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal
salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of these
goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal salvation in
many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a good to that
person, rather should we desire him to be without it, both because
eternal salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and because the
good of the many is to be preferred to the good of one. Now if heretics
were always received on their return, in order to save their lives and
other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial to the salvation of
others, both because they would infect others if they relapsed again,
and because, if they escaped without punishment, others would feel more
assured in lapsing into heresy. For it is written (Eccles. 8:11): "For
because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the
children of men commit evils without any fear."
For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who return
from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their lives, and
sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the ecclesiastical
dignities which they may have had before, should their conversion
appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently been done
for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after having been
received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in faith, wherefore
when they return again, they are admitted to Penance, but are not
delivered from the pain of death.
Reply to Objection 1: In God's tribunal, those who return are always
received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who
return in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for she
presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are not
sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the way of
salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence of
death.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed
against oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and spare
our brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied to sins
committed against one's neighbor or against God, for it is not left to
our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says on Mat. 18:15,
"If thy brother shall offend against thee." Yet even in this matter the
law prescribes limits according as God's honor or our neighbor's good
demands.
Reply to Objection 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received
the faith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy
in faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
OF APOSTASY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are
absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
For that which is the origin of all sins, does not, seemingly, pertain
to unbelief, since many sins there are without unbelief. Now apostasy
seems to be the origin of every sin, for it is written (Ecclus. 10:14):
"The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off']
from God," and further on, (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of
all sin." Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
Objection 2: Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas
apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance, or
even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Prov. 6:12-14):
"A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh with a perverse
mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the foot, speaketh with
the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil, and at all times he
soweth discord." Moreover if anyone were to have himself circumcised,
or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would be deemed an apostate.
Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
Objection 3: Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a
determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to
unbelief, it would follow that it is a determinate species of unbelief,
which does not seem to agree with what has been said ([2407]Q[10],
A[5]). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:67): "Many of his disciples went
back," i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously (Jn.
6:65): "There are some of you that believe not." Therefore apostasy
pertains to unbelief.
I answer that, Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may happen
in various ways according to the different kinds of union between man
and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by faith;
secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying His
commandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to
supererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or Holy
Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that which precedes,
remains, but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man may
apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to which he
was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he had received:
and this is called "apostasy from religious life" or "Orders." A man
may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his mind against the
Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize in both the above
ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.
But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God
altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that
whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of
perfidy." In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection refers to the second kind of
apostasy, which denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's
commandments, an act that is to be found in every mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to faith not only that the heart
should believe, but also that external words and deeds should bear
witness to the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this
way too, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far
as they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said itself
to be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be understood as
referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies most truly to an
apostate from the faith. For since faith is the first foundation of
things to be hoped for, and since, without faith it is "impossible to
please God"; when once faith is removed, man retains nothing that may
be useful for the obtaining of eternal salvation, for which reason it
is written (Prov. 6:12): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable
man": because faith is the life of the soul, according to Rom. 1:17:
"The just man liveth by faith." Therefore, just as when the life of the
body is taken away, man's every member and part loses its due
disposition, so when the life of justice, which is by faith, is done
away, disorder appears in all his members. First, in his mouth, whereby
chiefly his mind stands revealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in
the instrument of movement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil.
The result is that "he sows discord," endeavoring to sever others from
the faith even as he severed himself.
Reply to Objection 3: The species of a quality or form are not
diversified by the fact of its being the term "wherefrom" or "whereto"
of movement: on the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species
from the terms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term "whereto" of
the movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not
imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance
thereof, according to 2 Pet. 2:21: "It had been better for them not to
know the truth [Vulg.: 'the way of justice'], than after they had known
it, to turn back."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a prince forfeits his dominion over his subjects, on account of
apostasy from the faith, so that they no longer owe him allegiance?
Objection 1: It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his
dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, that
they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine, Super
Ps. 124:3] says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate,
nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to
them, "Fall into line for the defense of the republic," were bound to
obey. Therefore subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to
their prince on account of his apostasy.
Objection 2: Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now
we find that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph
served Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served
Assuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects
from allegiance to their sovereign.
Objection 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns
away from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of
apostasy from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command
those of their subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it
on account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we
ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his
apostatizing from the faith.
On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): "Holding to the
institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic authority,
absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or through the sacred
bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated persons: and we
absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance to such persons,
until these shall have made amends." Now apostates from the faith, like
heretics, are excommunicated, according to the Decretal [*Extra, De
Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore princes should not be obeyed
when they have apostatized from the faith.
I answer that, As stated above ([2408]Q[10], A[10]), unbelief, in
itself, is not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device
of the law of nations which is a human law: whereas the distinction
between believers and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not
annul human right. Nevertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be
sentenced to the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on
account of other sins.
Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief in
those who have never received the faith, according to the saying of the
Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that are
without?" She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the unbelief
of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that they
should be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their
subjects: for this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption of
the faith, since, as was stated above (A[1], OBJ[2]), "a man that is an
apostate . . . with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and . . . soweth
discord," in order to sever others from the faith. Consequently, as
soon as sentence of excommunication is passed on a man on account of
apostasy from the faith, his subjects are "ipso facto" absolved from
his authority and from the oath of allegiance whereby they were bound
to him.
Reply to Objection 1: At that time the Church was but recently
instituted, and had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes;
and so she allowed the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters
that were not contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet
greater danger.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the article, it is not a question of
those unbelievers who have never received the faith.
Reply to Objection 3: Apostasy from the faith severs man from God
altogether, as stated above [2409](A[1]), which is not the case in any
other sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the
confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy
which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?
(2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?
(3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin?
(4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the
confession of faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or
insult against the Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God
rather than to unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the
confession of faith.
Objection 2: Further, on Eph. 4:31, "Let blasphemy . . . be put away
from you," a gloss says, "that which is committed against God or the
saints." But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other things
than those pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith. Therefore
blasphemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith.
Objection 3: Further, according to some, there are three kinds of
blasphemy. The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed
of God; the second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and the
third, when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so that,
seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His
creatures. Now the object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not
opposed to confession of faith.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): "I . . . before was
a blasphemer and a persecutor," and afterwards, "I did it ignorantly
in" my "unbelief." Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains to unbelief.
I answer that, The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement of
some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness. Hence
whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does not
befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is His
Essence. Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting God, or
affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine goodness.
Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen merely
in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way this
opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections, even as,
on the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him.
Accordingly this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in the
intellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought only,
it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself outwardly in
speech it is blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith.
Reply to Objection 1: He that speaks against God, with the intention of
reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of
the falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of
his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due to
God, and this is perfect blasphemy.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far
as praise is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does
blasphemy against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.
Reply to Objection 3: Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in
this way divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things,
or to deny fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and
negation. For this diversity does not cause distinct species of habits,
since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made known by the
same knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs in either way,
since negatives are proved by affirmatives, according to Poster. i, 25.
Again to ascribe to creatures things that are proper to God, seems to
amount to the same as affirming something unfitting of Him, since
whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and to ascribe to a creature,
that which is proper to God, is to assert that God is the same as a
creature.
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Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin.
Because a gloss on the words, "Now lay you also all away," etc. (Col.
3:8) says: "After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins":
and yet among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy is
comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.
Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the
precepts of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to
any of them. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not
mortal: hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede
the deliberation of the reason, as was shown above ([2410]FS, Q[74],
AA[3],10). Now blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the
reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 24:16): "He that blasphemeth the
name of the Lord, dying let him die." Now the death punishment is not
inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([2411]FS, Q[72], A[5]), a mortal sin is
one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual
life, which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever things
are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their genus. Now
blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, because, as
stated above [2412](A[1]), it disparages the Divine goodness, which is
the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal sin, by
reason of its genus.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is not to be understood as meaning
that all the sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those
mentioned previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned
afterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more
grievous sins are included.
Reply to Objection 2: Since, as stated above [2413](A[1]), blasphemy is
contrary to the confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under
the prohibition of unbelief, expressed by the words: "I am the Lord thy
God," etc. (Ex. 20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . God in vain" (Ex. 20:7). Because he
who asserts something false about God, takes His name in vain even more
than he who uses the name of God in confirmation of a falsehood.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur
unawares and without deliberation. In the first way, by a man failing
to advert to the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen
through his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out into
words suggested by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of
those words: this is a venial sin, and is not a blasphemy properly so
called. In the second way, by adverting to the meaning of his words,
and to their blasphemous nature: in which case he is not excused from
mortal sin, even as neither is he who, in a sudden movement of anger,
kills one who is sitting beside him.
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Whether the sin of blasphemy is the greatest sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the
greatest sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing is
said to be evil because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since it
destroys a man's life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy, which
can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is more grievous
than that of blasphemy.
Objection 2: Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a
falsehood, and thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every
blasphemer goes so far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury
is a more grievous sin than blasphemy.
Objection 3: Further, on Ps. 74:6, "Lift not up your horn on high," a
gloss says: "To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all."
Therefore blasphemy is not the greatest sin.
On the contrary, On Is. 18:2, "To a terrible people," etc. a gloss
says: "In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight."
I answer that, As stated above [2414](A[1]), blasphemy is opposed to
the confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief:
while the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added thereto,
and yet more, if it breaks out into words, even as love and confession
add to the praise of faith.
Therefore, since, as stated above ([2415]Q[10], A[3]), unbelief is the
greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy
also is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as
unbelief and being an aggravated form of that sin.
Reply to Objection 1: If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the
objects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin
committed directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a
sin against one's neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them in
respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for
murder does more harm to one's neighbor, than blasphemy does to God.
Since, however, the gravity of a sin depends on the intention of the
evil will, rather than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above
([2416]FS, Q[73], A[8]), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends to
do harm to God's honor, absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously
that the murderer. Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to
punishment, among sins committed against our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: A gloss on the words, "Let . . . blasphemy be put
away from you" (Eph. 4:31) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury." The
reason is that the perjurer does not say or think something false about
God, as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a
falsehood, not that he deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as
it were, that God will not testify to the matter by some evident sign.
Reply to Objection 3: To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that
aggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the most
grievous sin, for as much as it makes every sin more grievous.
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Whether the damned blaspheme?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because
some wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of the
fear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these
punishments, so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more are
they restrained from blaspheming.
Objection 2: Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is
most demeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of
meriting or demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Eccles. 11:3) that "the tree . . .
in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be": whence it
clearly follows that, after this life, man acquires neither merit nor
sin, which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be
damned who were not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, will
they blaspheme in the life to come.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 16:9): "The men were scorched
with great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power
over these plagues," and a gloss on these words says that "those who
are in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will
nevertheless complain that God is so powerful as to torture them thus."
Now this would be blasphemy in their present state: and consequently it
will also be in their future state.
I answer that, As stated above ([2417]AA[1],3), detestation of the
Divine goodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy. Now those who
are in hell retain their wicked will which is turned away from God's
justice, since they love the things for which they are punished, would
wish to use them if they could, and hate the punishments inflicted on
them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins which they have
committed, not because they hate them, but because they are punished
for them. Accordingly this detestation of the Divine justice is, in
them, the interior blasphemy of the heart: and it is credible that
after the resurrection they will blaspheme God with the tongue, even as
the saints will praise Him with their voices.
Reply to Objection 1: In the present life men are deterred from
blasphemy through fear of punishment which they think they can escape:
whereas, in hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in
despair, they are borne towards whatever their wicked will suggests to
them.
Reply to Objection 2: Merit and demerit belong to the state of a
wayfarer, wherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is
demeritorious. In the blessed, on the other hand, good is not
meritorious, but is part of their blissful reward, and, in like manner,
in the damned, evil is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment
of damnation.
Reply to Objection 3: Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will
that detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in
this respect there can be blasphemy in him.
__________________________________________________________________
OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost:
under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as
the sin committed through certain malice?
(2) Of the species of this sin;
(3) Whether it can be forgiven?
(4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost
before committing other sins?
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Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed
through certain malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not
the same as the sin committed through certain malice. Because the sin
against the Holy Ghost is the sin of blasphemy, according to Mat.
12:32. But not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of
blasphemy: since many other kinds of sin may be committed through
certain malice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the
same as the sin committed through certain malice.
Objection 2: Further, the sin committed through certain malice is
condivided with sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed
through weakness: whereas the sin against the Holy Ghost is condivided
with the sin against the Son of Man (Mat. 12:32). Therefore the sin
against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through
certain malice, since things whose opposites differ, are themselves
different.
Objection 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is itself a
generic sin, having its own determinate species: whereas sin committed
through certain malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition or
general circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at all.
Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin
committed through certain malice.
On the contrary, The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) that "to sin against
the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in the malice of sin for its own
sake." Now this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore it seems
that the sin committed through certain malice is the same as the sin
against the Holy Ghost.
I answer that, Three meanings have been given to the sin against the
Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. Athanasius (Super Matth. xii,
32), Hilary (Can. xii in Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc. xii, 10), Jerome
(Super Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in Matth.), say that the
sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to utter a blasphemy against
the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we understand the essential
name applicable to the whole Trinity, each Person of which is a Spirit
and is holy, or the personal name of one of the Persons of the Trinity,
in which sense blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is distinct from the
blasphemy against the Son of Man (Mat. 12:32), for Christ did certain
things in respect of His human nature, by eating, drinking, and such
like actions, while He did others in respect of His Godhead, by casting
out devils, raising the dead, and the like: which things He did both by
the power of His own Godhead and by the operation of the Holy Ghost, of
Whom He was full, according to his human nature. Now the Jews began by
speaking blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Mat. 11:19)
that He was "a glutton . . . a wine drinker," and a "friend of
publicans": but afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when
they ascribed to the prince of devils those works which Christ did by
the power of His own Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy
Ghost.
Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), says that blasphemy or
the sin against the Holy Ghost, is final impenitence when, namely, a
man perseveres in mortal sin until death, and that it is not confined
to utterance by word of mouth, but extends to words in thought and
deed, not to one word only, but to many. Now this word, in this sense,
is said to be uttered against the Holy Ghost, because it is contrary to
the remission of sins, which is the work of the Holy Ghost, Who is the
charity both of the Father and of the Son. Nor did Our Lord say this to
the Jews, as though they had sinned against the Holy Ghost, since they
were not yet guilty of final impenitence, but He warned them, lest by
similar utterances they should come to sin against the Holy Ghost: and
it is in this sense that we are to understand Mark 3:29,30, where after
Our Lord had said: "But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy
Ghost," etc. the Evangelist adds, "because they said: He hath an
unclean spirit."
But others understand it differently, and say that the sin of blasphemy
against the Holy Ghost, is a sin committed against that good which is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost: because goodness is appropriated to the
Holy Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the Father, and wisdom to
the Son. Hence they say that when a man sins through weakness, it is a
sin "against the Father"; that when he sins through ignorance, it is a
sin "against the Son"; and that when he sins through certain malice,
i.e. through the very choosing of evil, as explained above ([2418]FS,
Q[78], AA[1] ,3), it is a sin "against the Holy Ghost."
Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of the very
inclination of a vicious habit which we call malice, and, in this way,
to sin through malice is not the same as to sin against the Holy Ghost.
In another way it happens that by reason of contempt, that which might
have prevented the choosing of evil, is rejected or removed; thus hope
is removed by despair, and fear by presumption, and so on, as we shall
explain further on (QQ[20],21). Now all these things which prevent the
choosing of sin are effects of the Holy Ghost in us; so that, in this
sense, to sin through malice is to sin against the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the confession of faith consists in a
protestation not only of words but also of deeds, so blasphemy against
the Holy Ghost can be uttered in word, thought and deed.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the third interpretation, blasphemy
against the Holy Ghost is condivided with blasphemy against the Son of
Man, forasmuch as He is also the Son of God, i.e. the "power of God and
the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense, the sin
against the Son of Man will be that which is committed through
ignorance, or through weakness.
Reply to Objection 3: Sin committed through certain malice, in so far
as it results from the inclination of a habit, is not a special sin,
but a general condition of sin: whereas, in so far as it results from a
special contempt of an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the
character of a special sin. According to this interpretation the sin
against the Holy Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according to
the first interpretation: whereas according to the second, it is not a
species of sin, because final impenitence may be a circumstance of any
kind of sin.
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Whether it is fitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy
Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish six kinds of sin
against the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, presumption, impenitence,
obstinacy, resisting the known truth, envy of our brother's spiritual
good, which are assigned by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny
God's justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a man
rejects God's mercy, and by presumption, His justice. Therefore each of
these is a kind of unbelief rather than of the sin against the Holy
Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, impenitence, seemingly, regards past sins, while
obstinacy regards future sins. Now past and future time do not
diversify the species of virtues or vices, since it is the same faith
whereby we believe that Christ was born, and those of old believed that
He would be born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not be
reckoned as two species of sin against the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (Jn.
1:17). Therefore it seem that resistance of the known truth, and envy
of a brother's spiritual good, belong to blasphemy against the Son
rather than against the Holy Ghost.
Objection 4: Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et Praecept. xi) that
"to refuse to obey is to resist the Holy Ghost." Moreover a gloss on
Lev. 10:16, says that "a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the
Holy Ghost." Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to the Holy
Ghost by Whom the Church is united together. Therefore it seems that
the species of sins against the Holy Ghost are insufficiently
enumerated.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] (De Fide ad Petrum iii) says
that "those who despair of pardon for their sins, or who without merits
presume on God's mercy, sin against the Holy Ghost," and (Enchiridion
lxxxiii) that "he who dies in a state of obstinacy is guilty of the sin
against the Holy Ghost," and (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that
"impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte xxii), that "to resist fraternal goodness with the brands of envy
is to sin against the Holy Ghost," and in his book De unico Baptismo
(De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 35) he says that "a man who spurns the
truth, is either envious of his brethren to whom the truth is revealed,
or ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the Church is taught," and
therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy Ghost.
I answer that, The above species are fittingly assigned to the sin
against the Holy Ghost taken in the third sense, because they are
distinguished in respect of the removal of contempt of those things
whereby a man can be prevented from sinning through choice. These
things are either on the part of God's judgment, or on the part of His
gifts, or on the part of sin. For, by consideration of the Divine
judgment, wherein justice is accompanied with mercy, man is hindered
from sinning through choice, both by hope, arising from the
consideration of the mercy that pardons sins and rewards good deeds,
which hope is removed by "despair"; and by fear, arising from the
consideration of the Divine justice that punishes sins, which fear is
removed by "presumption," when, namely, a man presumes that he can
obtain glory without merits, or pardon without repentance.
God's gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are two: one is the
acknowledgment of the truth, against which there is the "resistance of
the known truth," when, namely, a man resists the truth which he has
acknowledged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the
assistance of inward grace, against which there is "envy of a brother's
spiritual good," when, namely, a man is envious not only of his
brother's person, but also of the increase of Divine grace in the
world.
On the part of sin, there are two things which may withdraw man
therefrom: one is the inordinateness and shamefulness of the act, the
consideration of which is wont to arouse man to repentance for the sin
he has committed, and against this there is "impenitence," not as
denoting permanence in sin until death, in which sense it was taken
above (for thus it would not be a special sin, but a circumstance of
sin), but as denoting the purpose of not repenting. The other thing is
the smallness or brevity of the good which is sought in sin, according
to Rom. 6:21: "What fruit had you therefore then in those things, of
which you are now ashamed?" The consideration of this is wont to
prevent man's will from being hardened in sin, and this is removed by
"obstinacy," whereby man hardens his purpose by clinging to sin. Of
these two it is written (Jer. 8:6): "There is none that doth penance
for his sin, saying: What have I done?" as regards the first; and,
"They are all turned to their own course, as a horse rushing to the
battle," as regards the second.
Reply to Objection 1: The sins of despair and presumption consist, not
in disbelieving in God's justice and mercy, but in contemning them.
Reply to Objection 2: Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in
respect of past and future time, but also in respect of certain formal
aspects by reason of the diverse consideration of those things which
may be considered in sin, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: Grace and truth were the work of Christ through
the gifts of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men.
Reply to Objection 4: To refuse to obey belongs to obstinacy, while a
feigned repentance belongs to impenitence, and schism to the envy of a
brother's spiritual good, whereby the members of the Church are united
together.
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Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be
forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi): "We should
despair of no man, so long as Our Lord's patience brings him back to
repentance." But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible to
despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can
be forgiven.
Objection 2: Further, no sin is forgiven, except through the soul being
healed by God. But "no disease is incurable to an all-powerful
physician," as a gloss says on Ps. 102:3, "Who healeth all thy
diseases." Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
Objection 3: Further, the free-will is indifferent to either good or
evil. Now, so long as man is a wayfarer, he can fall away from any
virtue, since even an angel fell from heaven, wherefore it is written
(Job 4:18,19): "In His angels He found wickedness: how much more shall
they that dwell in houses of clay?" Therefore, in like manner, a man
can return from any sin to the state of justice. Therefore the sin
against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:32): "He that shall speak
against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this
world, nor in the world to come": and Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte i, 22) that "so great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot
submit to the humiliation of asking for pardon."
I answer that, According to the various interpretations of the sin
against the Holy Ghost, there are various ways in which it may be said
that it cannot be forgiven. For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost we
understand final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since in
no way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a man perseveres
until death will not be forgiven in the life to come, since it was not
remitted by repentance in this life.
According to the other two interpretations, it is said to be
unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, but because,
considered in itself, it deserves not to be pardoned: and this in two
ways. First, as regards the punishment, since he that sins through
ignorance or weakness, deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins
through certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his
punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the Son of Man before
His Godhead was revealed, could have some excuse, on account of the
weakness of the flesh which they perceived in Him, and hence, they
deserved less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against His very
Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works of the Holy Ghost, had no
excuse in diminution of their punishment. Wherefore, according to
Chrysostom's commentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews are said not to
be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in the world to come,
because they were punished for it, both in the present life, through
the Romans, and in the life to come, in the pains of hell. Thus also
Athanasius adduces the example of their forefathers who, first of all,
wrangled with Moses on account of the shortage of water and bread; and
this the Lord bore with patience, because they were to be excused on
account of the weakness of the flesh: but afterwards they sinned more
grievously when, by ascribing to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who
had brought them out of Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against
the Holy Ghost, saying (Ex. 32:4): "These are thy gods, O Israel, that
have brought thee out of the land of Egypt." Therefore the Lord both
inflicted temporal punishment on them, since "there were slain on that
day about three and twenty thousand men" (Ex. 32:28), and threatened
them with punishment in the life to come, saying, (Ex. 32:34): "I, in
the day of revenge, will visit this sin . . . of theirs."
Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: thus a disease
is said to be incurable in respect of the nature of the disease, which
removes whatever might be a means of cure, as when it takes away the
power of nature, or causes loathing for food and medicine, although God
is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the Holy Ghost
is said to be unpardonable, by reason of its nature, in so far as it
removes those things which are a means towards the pardon of sins. This
does not, however, close the way of forgiveness and healing to an
all-powerful and merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so to
speak, restores spiritual health to such men.
Reply to Objection 1: We should despair of no man in this life,
considering God's omnipotence and mercy. But if we consider the
circumstances of sin, some are called (Eph. 2:2) "children of despair"
[*'Filios diffidentiae,' which the Douay version renders 'children of
unbelief.'].
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the question on the part
of God's omnipotence, not on that of the circumstances of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In this life the free-will does indeed ever
remain subject to change: yet sometimes it rejects that whereby, so far
as it is concerned, it can be turned to good. Hence considered in
itself this sin is unpardonable, although God can pardon it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man can sin first of all against the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot sin first of all against
the Holy Ghost, without having previously committed other sins. For the
natural order requires that one should be moved to perfection from
imperfection. This is evident as regards good things, according to
Prov. 4:18: "The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards
and increases even to perfect day." Now, in evil things, the perfect is
the greatest evil, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. v, text. 21).
Since then the sin against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it
seems that man comes to commit this sin through committing lesser sins.
Objection 2: Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through
certain malice, or through choice. Now man cannot do this until he has
sinned many times; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6,9) that
"although a man is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once
do them as an unjust man does," viz. from choice. Therefore it seems
that the sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be committed except after
other sins.
Objection 3: Further, repentance and impenitence are about the same
object. But there is no repentance, except about past sins. Therefore
the same applies to impenitence which is a species of the sin against
the Holy Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presupposes
other sins.
On the contrary, "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make a
poor man rich" (Ecclus. 11:23). Therefore, conversely, it is possible
for a man, according to the malice of the devil who tempts him, to be
led to commit the most grievous of sins which is that against the Holy
Ghost.
I answer that, As stated above [2419](A[1]), in one way, to sin against
the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice. Now one may sin
through certain malice in two ways, as stated in the same place: first,
through the inclination of a habit; but this is not, properly speaking,
to sin against the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to commit this sin
all at once, in as much as sinful acts must precede so as to cause the
habit that induces to sin. Secondly, one may sin through certain
malice, by contemptuously rejecting the things whereby a man is
withdrawn from sin. This is, properly speaking, to sin against the Holy
Ghost, as stated above [2420](A[1]); and this also, for the most part,
presupposes other sins, for it is written (Prov. 18:3) that "the wicked
man, when he is come into the depth of sins, contemneth."
Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sinful act, to sin
against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both on account of his free-will,
and on account of the many previous dispositions, or again, through
being vehemently moved to evil, while but feebly attached to good.
Hence never or scarcely ever does it happen that the perfect sin all at
once against the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen says (Peri Archon. i, 3):
"I do not think that anyone who stands on the highest step of
perfection, can fail or fall suddenly; this can only happen by degrees
and bit by bit."
The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be taken literally
for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For such blasphemy as Our Lord
speaks of, always proceeds from contemptuous malice.
If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) we understand
the sin against the Holy Ghost to denote final impenitence, it does not
regard the question in point, because this sin against the Holy Ghost
requires persistence in sin until the end of life.
Reply to Objection 1: Movement both in good and in evil is made, for
the most part, from imperfect to perfect, according as man progresses
in good or evil: and yet in both cases, one man can begin from a
greater (good or evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from
which a man begins can be perfect in good or evil according to its
genus, although it may be imperfect as regards the series of good or
evil actions whereby a man progresses in good or evil.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the sin which is
committed through certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination
of a habit.
Reply to Objection 3: If by impenitence we understand with Augustine
(De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) persistence in sin until the end, it is
clear that it presupposes sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we
take it for habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against
the Holy Ghost, it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is
possible for a man who has never sinned to have the purpose either of
repenting or of not repenting, if he should happen to sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and understanding.
Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which is opposed to
knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins ([2421]FS,
Q[76]), we must now inquire about blindness of mind and dulness of
sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin?
(2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?
(3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh?
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Whether blindness of mind is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin.
Because, seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin.
Now blindness of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (Jn. 9:41):
"If you were blind, you should not have sin." Therefore blindness of
mind is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of
mind is a punishment as appears from Is. 6:10, "Blind the heart of this
people," for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it
not a punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine
(De Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since, as
Augustine says (Confess. x), "all love to know the resplendent truth,"
and as we read in Eccles. 11:7, "the light is sweet and it is
delightful for the eyes to see the sun." Therefore blindness of mind is
not a sin.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of mind
among the vices arising from lust.
I answer that, Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the
principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of the
principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a threefold
principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light, since it
pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never forfeit from the
soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from exercising its proper
act, through being hindered by the lower powers which the human
intellect needs in order to understand, for instance in the case of
imbeciles and madmen, as stated in the [2422]FP, Q[84], AA[7],8.
Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light
superadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes
forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a
punishment, in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a
punishment. Hence it is written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): "Their own
malice blinded them."
A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle,
through which a man understands other things; to which principle a man
may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens in
two ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man's will is
deliberately turned away from the consideration of that principle,
according to Ps. 35:4, "He would not understand, that he might do
well": whereas sometimes it is due to the mind being more busy about
things which it loves more, so as to be hindered thereby from
considering this principle, according to Ps. 57:9, "Fire," i.e. of
concupiscence, "hath fallen on them and they shall not see the sun." In
either of these ways blindness of mind is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The blindness that excuses from sin is that which
arises from the natural defect of one who cannot see.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the second kind of
blindness which is a punishment.
Reply to Objection 3: To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by
all; and yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a
man is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.
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Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?
Objection 1: It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin from
blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now dulness is
opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory (Moral. ii,
49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding denotes a
principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness
of mind.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness
describes it as "dullness of sense in respect of understanding." Now
dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as a
defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind. Therefore
dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.
Objection 3: Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in
the fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above
[2423](A[1]), while dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural
defect is not a sin: so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not
be a sin, which is contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45),
where he reckons it among the sins arising from gluttony.
On the contrary, Different causes produce different effects. Now
Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from
gluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these others
are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also.
I answer that, Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be
sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through
being obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of
metaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its
object from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to perceive
the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence in corporeal
things the senses are said to be acute when they can perceive a
sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent, while on the
other hand they are said to be dull, through being unable to perceive,
except sensible objects that are near at hand, or of great power.
Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in
connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of
certain primals and extremes, as stated in Ethic. vi, even as the
senses are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of
knowledge. Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does
not perceive its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but
through certain other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a
thing's essence through a property thereof, and the cause through its
effect. Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in connection
with his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a property or
effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the thing itself, and
if he can succeed in perceiving its slightest details: whereas a man is
said to have a dull sense in connection with his understanding, if he
cannot arrive at knowing the truth about a thing, without many
explanations; in which case, moreover, he is unable to obtain a perfect
perception of everything pertaining to the nature of that thing.
Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes a
certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual
goods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the
knowledge of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of
understanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending
them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost nature. This dulness
has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that is, in so
far as it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to his affection
for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful consideration of
spiritual things.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether blindness of mind and dulness of sense arise from sins of the flesh
?
Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of sense
do not arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i, 4)
retracts what he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, "God Who didst wish
none but the clean to know the truth," and says that one might reply
that "many, even those who are unclean, know many truths." Now men
become unclean chiefly by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness of
mind and dulness of sense are not caused by sins of the flesh.
Objection 2: Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are
defects in connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas
carnal sins pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does
not act on the soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the
flesh do not cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.
Objection 3: Further, all things are more passive to what is near them
than to what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind than
carnal vices are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are
caused by spiritual rather than by carnal vices.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense
arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.
I answer that, The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in an
abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man's
intellect is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it be
able to consider things intelligible, and to set in order all things
sensible. Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to be
"detached" in order to command, and that the agent must have power over
matter, in order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that pleasure
fixes a man's attention on that which he takes pleasure in: wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4,5) that we all do best that which we
take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do them either not
at all, or in a faint-hearted fashion.
Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with
pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most
impetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices
cause man's attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so
that in consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things is
weakened, more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as sexual
pleasures are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore lust
gives rise to blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely the
knowledge of spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from
gluttony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible
things. On the other hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and
chastity, dispose man very much to the perfection of intellectual
operation. Hence it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to these children" on
account of their abstinence and continency, "God gave knowledge and
understanding in every book, and wisdom."
Reply to Objection 1: Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices
are at times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible
things, on account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of
some habit superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the
pleasures of the body, it must needs happen that their attention is
frequently withdrawn from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the
unclean can know some truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their
knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not
by altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid
manner.
Reply to Objection 3: It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are
further removed from the mind, that they distract the mind's attention
to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind's contemplation all
the more.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and
under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) The precepts concerning faith;
(2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the Old Law there should have been given precepts of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Old Law, there should have been
given precepts of faith. Because a precept is about something due and
necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should believe,
according to Heb. 11:6, "Without faith it is impossible to please God."
Therefore there was very great need for precepts of faith to be given.
Objection 2: Further, the New Testament is contained in the Old, as the
reality in the figure, as stated above ([2424]FS, Q[107], A[3]). Now
the New Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance Jn.
14:1: "You believe in God; believe also in Me." Therefore it seems that
some precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law also.
Objection 3: Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the
same as to forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many
precepts forbidding unbelief: thus (Ex. 20:3): "Thou shalt not have
strange gods before Me," and (Dt. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to hear
the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them away
from their faith in God. Therefore precepts of faith should have been
given in the Old Law also.
Objection 4: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above
([2425]Q[3], A[1]). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the
confession and the promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (Ex.
12:27) that, when their children should ask them, they should tell them
the meaning of the paschal observance, and (Dt. 13:9) they were
commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doctrine contrary to faith.
Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.
Objection 5: Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained
in the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (Jn. 15:25) that it was written
in the Law: "They have hated Me without cause," although this is found
written in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that
fear the Lord, believe Him." Therefore the Old Law should have
contained precepts of faith.
On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 3:27) calls the Old Law the "law of
works" which he contrasts with the "law of faith." Therefore the Old
Law ought not to have contained precepts of faith.
I answer that, A master does not impose laws on others than his
subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone who
receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the primary
subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that
cometh to God, must believe that He is." Hence faith is presupposed to
the precepts of the Law: for which reason (Ex. 20:2) that which is of
faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the words, "I am the
Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of Egypt," and, likewise
(Dt. 6:4), the words, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy [Vulg.: 'our'] God
is one," precede the recording of the precepts.
Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith
whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all
articles of faith, as stated above ([2426]Q[1], AA[1],7), it follows
that, if we presuppose faith in God, whereby man's mind is subjected to
Him, it is possible for precepts to be given about other articles of
faith. Thus Augustine expounding the words: "This is My commandment"
(Jn. 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that we have received many
precepts of faith. In the Old Law, however, the secret things of faith
were not to be set before the people, wherefore, presupposing their
faith in one God, no other precepts of faith were given in the Old Law.
Reply to Objection 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of
spiritual life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the
Law.
Reply to Objection 2: Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of
faith, namely belief in one God, when He said: "You believe in God,"
and commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one
Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith
of the New Testament, wherefore He added: "Believe also in Me."
Reply to Objection 3: The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which
corrupt virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as
stated above ([2427]FS, Q[18], A[4], ad 3; [2428]FS, Q[19], A[6], ad 1,
A[7], ad 3). Therefore faith in one God being presupposed, prohibitive
precepts had to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned
off those particular defects whereby their faith might be corrupted.
Reply to Objection 4: Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also
presuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law could
contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of faith,
rather than to faith itself.
Reply to Objection 5: In this passage again that faith is presupposed
whereby we believe that God is; hence it begins, "Ye that fear the
Lord," which is not possible without faith. The words which
follow---"believe Him"---must be referred to certain special articles
of faith, chiefly to those things which God promises to them that obey
Him, wherefore the passage concludes---"and your reward shall not be
made void."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were fittingl
y
set down in the Old Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge and
understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For knowledge
and understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition precedes and
directs action. Therefore the precepts referring to knowledge and
understanding should precede the precepts of the Law referring to
action. Since, then, the first precepts of the Law are those of the
decalogue, it seems that precepts of knowledge and understanding should
have been given a place among the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn
from another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains
precepts about teaching---both affirmative precepts as, for example,
(Dt. 4:9), "Thou shalt teach them to thy sons"---and prohibitive
precepts, as, for instance, (Dt. 4:2), "You shall not add to the word
that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it
seems that man ought to have been given also some precepts directing
him to learn.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary
to a priest than to a king, wherefore it is written (Malachi 2:7): "The
lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at
his mouth," and (Osee 4:6): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I
will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood to
Me." Now the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law (Dt.
17:18,19). Much more therefore should the Law have commanded the
priests to learn the Law.
Objection 4: Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on
things pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is
hindered by extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly
commanded (Dt. 6:7): "Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy
house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising." Therefore the
precepts relating to knowledge and understanding are unfittingly set
down in the Law.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): "That, hearing all these
precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people."
I answer that, Three things may be considered in relation to knowledge
and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly, the use; and
thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of knowledge or
understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and both are
prescribed in the Law. For it is written (Dt. 6:6): "These words which
I command thee . . . shall be in thy heart." This refers to learning,
since it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind to what is said,
while the words that follow---"and thou shalt tell them to thy
children"---refer to teaching.
The use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those
things which one knows or understands. In reference to this, the text
goes on: "thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house," etc.
Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this, the
text continues---"and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand, and
they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write
them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house." Thus the continual
remembrance of God's commandments is signified, since it is impossible
for us to forget those things which are continually attracting the
notice of our senses, whether by touch, as those things we hold in our
hands, or by sight, as those things which are ever before our eyes, or
to which we are continually returning, for instance, to the house door.
Moreover it is clearly stated (Dt. 4:9): "Forget not the words that thy
eyes have seen and let them not go out of thy heart all the days of thy
life."
We read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New
Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in that of the
apostles.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Dt. 4:6, "this is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of the nations." By this we are given to
understand that the wisdom and understanding of those who believe in
God consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the
Law had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know and
understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid precepts
should be placed among the precepts of the decalogue which take the
first place.
Reply to Objection 2: There are also in the Law precepts relating to
learning, as stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more
expressly than learning, because it concerned the learned, who were not
under any other authority, but were immediately under the law, and to
them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other hand learning
concerned the people of lower degree, and these the precepts of the Law
have to reach through the learned.
Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with
the priestly office that being charged with the office implies being
charged to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts
to be given about the training of the priests. On the other hand, the
doctrine of God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office,
because a king is placed over his people in temporal matters: hence it
is especially commanded that the king should be instructed by the
priests about things pertaining to the law of God.
Reply to Objection 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man
should meditate on God's law of sleeping, but during sleep, i.e. that
he should meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep,
because this leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so
far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of
sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we
are commanded to meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not that
we are bound to be always actually thinking about the Law, but that we
should regulate all our actions according to it.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2)
the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding
precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold
consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is a virtue?
(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?
(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's
happiness?
(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?
(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?
(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?
(7) Of its relation to faith;
(8) Of its relation to charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man makes
ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But
one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, like the other
passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works
virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.
xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master
(Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing"
(Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect
thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. Therefore hope
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters
of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore
hope is a virtue.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the virtue
of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good
likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must
correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled,
the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat
is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper
measurement. But, as we stated above (Q[8], A[3], ad 3) human acts have
a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the reason,
while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every
human act is good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of
hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For, as we have already stated
([2429]FS, Q[40], A[1]), when we were treating of the passion of hope,
the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain.
Now a thing is possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves;
secondly, by means of others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore, in so
far as we hope for anything as being possible to us by means of the
Divine assistance, our hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it
leans. It is therefore evident that hope is a virtue, since it causes a
human act to be good and to attain its due rule.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on
right reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of
virtue. Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's
attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot
make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill use
of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus is to
make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now,
is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on
[2430](A[5]; Q[18], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the
thing hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of
grace and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit
itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from
our merits, but from grace alone.
Reply to Objection 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to
that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect,
in so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose
help he leans.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether eternal happiness is the proper object of hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper
object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses every
movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now
eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered into the heart of
man." Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Objection 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is
written (Ps. 36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and
He will do it." Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for
eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual,
of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's Prayer, to be
delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happiness.
Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Objection 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now
many things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore
eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope "which
entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil," i.e.
into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a
gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal
happiness.
I answer that, As stated above [2431](A[1]), the hope of which we speak
now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped
for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore
the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is
the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine
helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an
infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the
enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing less
than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His
creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper and
principal object of hope is eternal happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart
of man perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know
its nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect
good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in
this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle
says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within the veil,"
because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak.
Reply to Objection 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods,
except in reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal
happiness chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards
secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards
God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to
God, as stated above ([2432]Q[1], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser
things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness,
nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as
compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things besides
may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in
reference to its principal object.
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Whether one man may hope for another's eternal happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal
happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this
very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it
unto the day of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will be
eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's eternal
happiness.
Objection 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from
Him. But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to
James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore we
can hope for another's eternal happiness.
Objection 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now
it is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else
Augustine would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi)
that we should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one
can also hope for another's eternal salvation.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is only
of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them."
I answer that, We can hope for something in two ways: first,
absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and
pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for
something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way
its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to
explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that
love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a
movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous good.
Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly
regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, looking upon him
as his other self: whereas movement is always towards its own term
which is proportionate to the subject moved. Therefore hope regards
directly one's own good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet if
we presuppose the union of love with another, a man can hope for and
desire something for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he
can hope for another eternal's life, inasmuch as he is united to him by
love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves
God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope,
whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether a man can lawfully hope in man?
Objection 1: It wold seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the
object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain
eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says
(Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints' prayers."
Therefore one may hope in man.
Objection 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought
not to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope
in him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4:
"Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any
brother of his." Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.
Objection 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above
(A[2], OBJ[2]). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something.
Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that
trusteth in man."
I answer that, Hope, as stated above [2433](A[1]; [2434]FS, Q[40],
A[7]), regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain,
and the help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man
hopes to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by
which one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient
cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a
secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the
secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the
principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary
efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope
regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as
the first cause leading to happiness.
Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature,
as though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is,
however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary
and instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods
that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the
saints, and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this
reason some are blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether hope is a theological virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a
theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for
its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain
from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two
vices, as stated above ([2435]FS, Q[64], A[4]). But hope is a mean
between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a
species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it
seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it
belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the
arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and
charity, which are theological virtues.
I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide
a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we
must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Now it has been stated above [2436](A[1]) that hope has the character
of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human
actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as
much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as
much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is
evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that
has God for its object, as stated above ([2437]FS, Q[62], A[1]), it is
evident that hope is a theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes
for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient
cause, as stated above [2438](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in
the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these
things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow
the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological
virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and
that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a
theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the
mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with regard to
something that is referred to its principal object. Thus faith can have
no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in
which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the
things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one
truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or
extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is impossible to
trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may have a mean and
extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as
he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of things of which
he is capable.
Reply to Objection 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the
definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which
belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine
assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Reply to Objection 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the
hope of obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its
proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as
a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above [2439](A[1]).
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Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other
theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as
stated above ([2440]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the object of hope is the
same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not
distinct from the other theological virtues.
Objection 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make
profession of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and
the life of the world to come." Now expectation of future happiness
belongs to hope, as stated above [2441](A[5]). Therefore hope is not
distinct from faith.
Objection 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs
properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
On the contrary, There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope
is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says
(Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.
I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from having God for
the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two
ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is
attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His
own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a
principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God
both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us
is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the
Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: God is the object of these virtues under
different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the
object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above
([2442]FS, Q[54], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith,
not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of
hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on
[2443](A[7]). Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be
obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity,
properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to
Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
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Whether hope precedes faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on
Ps. 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance
to faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is by faith
whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should
precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in
the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of things
to be hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to
receive fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope
precedes faith.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," i.e.
"Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object
of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order,
therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to
be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way,
eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as
explained above [2444](A[2]; A[6], ad 3): and both of these are
proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to
obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is
ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to God, must
believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." Therefore
it is evident that faith precedes hope.
Reply to Objection 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is
called "the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by
hope we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is
called the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be
established and perfected in faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the
definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something
not apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a
circumlocution by something resulting from faith.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but
it suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
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Whether charity precedes hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says
on Lk. 27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc.:
"Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity." But faith precedes
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good
emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity." Now to
hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul.
Therefore it flows from charity.
Objection 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope
proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but
also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience," i.e.
"from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.
I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of
matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the
other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the
perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order
hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and
all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above
([2445]FS, Q[27], A[4]; [2446]FS, Q[28], A[6], ad 2; [2447]FS, Q[40],
A[7]) in the treatise on the passions.
Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that
whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some
good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is
that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he
may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The
first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own
sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes,
intends to obtain possession of something for himself.
Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a
man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for his
sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too,
hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be
rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments.
On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally
precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more
perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense
that Ambrose states (OBJ[1]) that charity flows from hope: so that this
suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed
from some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not
every kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of
living hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as
from a friend.
Reply to Objection 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is
naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether it is in the blessed?
(3) Whether it is in the damned?
(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
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Whether hope is in the will as its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject.
For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (Q[17],
A[1]; [2448]FS, Q[40], A[1]). Now the arduous is the object, not of the
will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in
the irascible.
Objection 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add
another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is
the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at
the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things
simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act
of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so
that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards
the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares
(De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for
its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the
intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is
in the will as its subject.
I answer that, As shown above ([2449]FP, Q[87], A[2]), habits are known
by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive
faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold
appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible
and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as
stated in the [2450]FP, Q[82], A[5], those movements which occur in the
lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite
are without passion, as shown above ([2451]FP, Q[87], A[2], ad 1;
[2452]FS, Q[22], A[3], ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot
belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal
object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore
hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the
lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous
sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous
intelligible, or rather superintelligible.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with
regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is
required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is
that of hoping.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity
are mutually related, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]). Hence there is
no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the
same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the
same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the [2453]FP,
Q[85], A[4].
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Whether in the blessed there is hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For
Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His
conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of
Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person.
Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
Objection 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous
good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men
hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can
hope to continue in its possession.
Objection 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for
happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above
([2454]Q[17], A[3]). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the
happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there
can be hope in them.
Objection 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only
glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the
saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10;
Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be
hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why
doth he hope for?" Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore
hope has no place in them.
I answer that, If what gives a thing its species be removed, the
species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as
when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same
specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object,
even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q[17], AA[5],6;
[2455]FS, Q[54], A[2]): and its principal object is eternal happiness
as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above
(Q[17], A[2]).
Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except
in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is
no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of
hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither
of them can be in the blessed.
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore
blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same
time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was
still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of
impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope, the
principal object of which is not the glory of the body but the
enjoyment of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal
life, because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were,
of God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of
happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence
the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as
regards this there is no future), but are in actual possession thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the
same hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of
others. But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for
their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet
not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so,
he that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor,
without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.
Reply to Objection 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for
its object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which
consists in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body.
Moreover, although the glory of the body is something arduous in
comparison with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the
glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small
thing as compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has
the glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of
the body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is in the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the
devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Mat. 25:41:
"Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for
the devil and his angels." But the devil has hope, according to Job
40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him." Therefore it seems that the
damned have hope.
Objection 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is
hope. But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according
to James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore it
seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.
Objection 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or
demerit that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree
fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall,
there shall it be." Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and
never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
On the contrary, Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12, "Rejoicing
in hope." Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according
to Is. 65:14, "My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and
you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit."
Therefore no hope is in the damned.
I answer that, Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will
should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what
is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which
is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will:
wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could
not be perfectly happy in their first state before their confirmation,
or unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge of what
would happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one
should be certain of being happy for ever, else the will would not
rest.
In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary
condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly penal
unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they
were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it
belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that
they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain happiness.
Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not that he may
return from darkness to light." It is, therefore, evident that they
cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither can the
blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope
either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, hope can be
in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either
case they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said
of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or,
if it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope
whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just
before (Job 40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his
mouth": this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is
about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or
another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and
concerning oneself." Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in
the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them
future possible things, but far removed from them.
Reply to Objection 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their
demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase
their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their
respective states.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a
wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not to
the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.
Objection 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated
above (Q[17], A[1]). Now it is impossible in this life to know for
certain that we are in a state of grace, as stated above ([2456]FS,
Q[112], A[5]). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a
wayfarer.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may
fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore
wayfarer's hope has no certainty.
On the contrary, "Hope is the certain expectation of future happiness,"
as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be gathered from
2 Tim. 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is
able to keep that which I have committed to Him."
I answer that, Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, essentially
and by participation. It is found essentially in the cognitive power;
by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to its end by the
cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works with certainty,
since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything with
certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral virtues are said to
work with greater certainty than art, in as much as, like a second
nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason: and thus too, hope
tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing in the certainty of
faith which is in the cognitive faculty.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already
received, but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has
not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever
has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.
Reply to Objection 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness,
is due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but
not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places its
trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is to be feared?
(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;
(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?
(4) Whether servile fear is good?
(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?
(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?
(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?
(11) Whether it remains in heaven?
(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can be feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object of
fear is a future evil, as stated above ([2457]FS, Q[41], AA[2],3). But
God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore God
cannot be feared.
Objection 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God.
Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear
those things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not from
God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy
own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me." Therefore God is not to be
feared.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear Thee, O
King of nations?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where is My
fear?"
I answer that, Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future
good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is someone's
help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too,
fear may have two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man
shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil may come.
Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness itself, cannot be an
object of fear; but He can be an object of fear in the second way, in
so far as there may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation
to Him.
From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not
absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good.
Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an
end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the
order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of
fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in
so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely
speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.
In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated
from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers the object of fear as
being the evil which a man shuns.
Reply to Objection 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in
respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect
of which He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives
rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so
that, accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under
different aspects.
Reply to Objection 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author
but from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment
is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good,
since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly;
although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is
written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with
works and words have called it to them."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly
fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into
filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness,
shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above ([2458]FS, Q[41],
A[4]), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.
Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But
there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,
since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . .
believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mk.
14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the aforesaid
division of fear is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that
of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now
filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is
distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in comparison
with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the
wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all
these other fears.
Objection 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do
initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made
between them.
Objection 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is
fear about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the
desire for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the
flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore "worldly
fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from
"human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).
I answer that, We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us
turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object of
fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man
withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes, on
account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. This
latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of fault.
Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear of
committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child to
fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both, it
will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to whether
it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated
above ([2459]FS, Q[42], A[3]) when we were considering the passion of
fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul:
whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God,
while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore
all the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good.
Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is
not numbered among these kinds of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the
power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the
contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her
husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he
submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to whom
she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste fear
amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes our
Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of
adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]"; and by this same
charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have
espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin
to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these, since it
does not include charity in its definition.
Reply to Objection 4: These three fears regard punishment but in
different ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which
turns man away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or
threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby
men are drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God.
Servile fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear
regards it secondarily.
Reply to Objection 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away
from God through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of
forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to
the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of
different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins,
all of which alike however lead man away from God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether worldly fear is always evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil.
Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are
blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of
whom we read (Lk. 18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded man."
Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.
Objection 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the
punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments
incite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be
afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise
from the same." Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not
evil, since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to
fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby the
present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not
always evil.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that
kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is
evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.
I answer that, As shown above ([2460]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2461]FS, Q[18],
A[1]; [2462]FS, Q[54], A[2]) moral acts and habits take their name and
species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's
movement is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive
movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone
were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on
account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the
covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he
seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the
desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly
love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world
as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of
love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from
worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is
always evil.
Reply to Objection 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in
so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in
this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may
have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is
praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias
or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince."
Reply to Objection 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in
order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister,
according to Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to
execute wrath upon him that doth evil." To fear the secular power in
this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to
his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which
no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to
suffer any punishment whatever.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear is good?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the
use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of
servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man
do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well
done." Therefore servile fear is not good.
Objection 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile
fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11,
"Why did I not die in the womb?" Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a
man dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer
loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of
pride, not of humility." Therefore servile fear is evil.
Objection 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of
charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But
mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.
On the contrary, Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear
is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "You have not
received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit
that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear." Therefore
servile fear is not evil.
I answer that, It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be
evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free
is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as
cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever
does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it
is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is
contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from love.
Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so that if
servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil simply,
even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it contrary
to charity belongs to its very species.
This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile
fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless
faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the
object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by
accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, is
loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared
as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid of
charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and
that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is the
case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not
destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end.
Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is
evil.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a
man who does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves
not justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of
pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to
subject his affections to the yoke of justice.
Reply to Objection 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for
the sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity,
so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its
substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be
feared as the principal evil.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the same
as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same apparently
as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is accompanied by
mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are
substantially the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are
substantially the same.
Objection 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the
same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they both
fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.
Objection 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain
favors from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be
punished by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God,
and to receive other favors from Him, as stated above ([2463]Q[17],
A[2], ad 2). Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from
God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.
On the contrary, Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says that
there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.
I answer that, The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts and
habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above ([2464]FS,
Q[54], A[2] ), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear
correspond to different kinds of evil.
Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs
specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown
above [2465](A[2]). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear
are not the same substantially but differ specifically.
Reply to Objection 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards
the object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but
in respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of
charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand,
servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God in
the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the
infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as
the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks
to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz.
God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural
movements differ specifically according to their different
relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not
specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of
the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This cannot
be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear remains with charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with
charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that
"when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had
prepared a place for it."
Objection 2: Further, "The charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Now "where
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then
freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away
when charity comes.
Objection 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as
punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away
self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of God unto the contempt of self
builds up the city of God." Therefore it seems that servile fear is
driven out when charity comes.
On the contrary, Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated
above [2466](A[4]). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not forfeited
through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us.
Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity comes.
I answer that, Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is fear
of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the fear of
punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as self-love is:
because it comes to the same that a man love his own good and that he
fear to be deprived of it.
Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In one
way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the love of
his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when a man
loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, it is
indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when a
man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet not so as
to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have another
special love for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity which is
founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness,
consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is
referable to charity.
Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity,
because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns
exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it is
contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that is
opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in opposition
to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear of
punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of
punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when, to
wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from God,
but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place
his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil as being
the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent with charity;
but it is not called servile, except when punishment is dreaded as a
principal evil, as explained above ([2467]AA[2],4). Hence fear
considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the substance
of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love can remain
with charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as
servile: and such is the sense of the two other objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a part
of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom
is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning
of wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of
the Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems
that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something
is prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that
fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
On the contrary, It is written in the Ps. 110:10: "The fear of the Lord
is the beginning of wisdom."
I answer that, A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two
ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to its
essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art
as to its essence consists in the principles from which that art
proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that
wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the
beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is
where the builder begins his work.
Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall state
further on ([2468]Q[45], A[1]), it is considered by us in one way, and
in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is ordained
to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according to a
participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace,
wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of
God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing human
conduct; since this is directed not only by the human law, but also by
the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the
beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles
of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said
to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning
of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way
fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one way, and
filial fear, in another. For servile fear is like a principle disposing
a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through
fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom,
according to Ecclus. 1:27, "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin." On
the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as
being the first effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human
conduct by the Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a
beginning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself to Him:
for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that fear is not the
beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life
that is ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is
written (Ecclus. 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for
[Vulg.: 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived." Consequently, as
the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said
to be wisdom.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of wisdom
in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 25:16):
"The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning of faith
is to be fast joined to it."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially from
filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear is the
beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, "The fear of God is the
beginning of love." Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial
fear.
Objection 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the
object of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to
be the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore
initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.
Objection 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the
extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial fear.
Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.
On the contrary, Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the substance
of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect of perfection
and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan.
Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from
filial fear.
I answer that, Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning
[initium]. Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in some
way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, initial.
It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial
fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in
the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in
whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning of
charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial fear,
because they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity.
Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to filial fear as
imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity differ,
not as to essence but as to state. Therefore we must conclude that
initial fear, as we understand it here, does not differ essentially
from filial fear.
Reply to Objection 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile
fear, which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces
the thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if
it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of
love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its
proper object, but as having something of servile fear connected with
it: for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with
charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with
imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not
only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment,
though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which
"casteth out fear," according to 1 Jn. 4:18.
Reply to Objection 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial
fear, not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect
is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph.
ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being, while it
differs altogether from non-being.
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Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also
from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to
Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear
is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God
for its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is
feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.
Objection 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a
theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, being
connected with the same matter, as it were.
Objection 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is
bestowed as a remedy against pride." But the virtue of humility is
opposed to pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.
Objection 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues,
since they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says
(Moral. ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards
good, while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should
not be said that fear is a gift.
On the contrary, The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts
of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:3).
I answer that, Fear is of several kinds, as stated above [2469](A[2]).
Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib.
Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of God"---for it was by this fear that
Peter denied Christ---but that fear of which it was said (Mat. 10:28):
"Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell."
Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De
Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as they
are inseparable from charity, as stated above ([2470]FS, Q[68], A[5]).
It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among
the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it was
stated above ([2471]FS, Q[68], AA[1],3) that the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby
these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as,
by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to
the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of a
certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a
non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the movable
subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what filial or
chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid separating
ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it were, among the
gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and the last place, in
the descending order.
Reply to Objection 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope:
since thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain
by God's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore
filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.
Reply to Objection 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the
evil shunned, and in this way, as stated above [2472](A[1]), God cannot
be an object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and
the other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust
in God's help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to
obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies
to the other theological virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it
does not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from
charity which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the
emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of
different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, because
love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by reason of
its own nature, as was shown above ([2473]FS, Q[55], AA[3],4); for
which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear
principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes, wherefore
it is something less than a theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the
pride of man is to fall off from God," that is to refuse submission to
God, and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear
cuts off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a
remedy against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the
virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as
stated above ([2474]FS, Q[68], A[4]), while the theological virtues are
the origin of the gifts, as stated above ([2475]FS, Q[69], A[4], ad 3).
This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear decreases when charity increases?
Objection 1: It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For
Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): "The more charity
increases, the more fear decreases."
Objection 2: Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity
increases when hope increases, as stated above ([2476]Q[17], A[8]).
Therefore fear decreases when charity increases.
Objection 3: Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies
separation. Now separation decreases when union increases. Therefore
fear decreases when the love of charity increases.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "the fear of
God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love God above
all things, and our neighbor as ourselves."
I answer that, Fear is twofold, as stated above ([2477]AA[2],4); one is
filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be
separated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears
punishment.
Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as an
effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one loves
a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated from him.
On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely
cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains as
to its substance, as stated above [2478](A[6]). This fear decreases as
charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man
loves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks less
of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, because, the
faster he clings, the more confident he is of the reward, and,
consequently the less fearful of punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope
increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases,
because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by another's
help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated from him.
Reply to Objection 3: Filial fear does not imply separation from God,
but submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet,
in a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal
oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be
observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than
himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of
charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of
fear.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear remains in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For it
is written (Prov. 1:33): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without fear
of evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who already
enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some
evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above ([2479]AA[2],5;
[2480]FS, Q[42], A[1]). Therefore there will be no fear in heaven.
Objection 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according
to 1 Jn. 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But God
fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.
Objection 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope
regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore
neither will there be fear in heaven.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The fear of the Lord is
holy, enduring for ever and ever."
I answer that, Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no means be
in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security which is
essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above ([2481]FS, Q[5],
A[4]).
But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of
charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in
heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object of
fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a
possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of avoidance,
fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for little evils
inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its staying in its
own order, so a thing's evil consists in forsaking its order. Again,
the order of a rational creature is that it should be under God and
above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a rational
creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too is it an evil
for it, if it submit not to God, by presumptuously revolt against Him
or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a rational creature
considered as to its nature on account of the natural flexibility of
the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason
of the perfection of glory. Therefore the avoidance of this evil that
consists in non-subjection to God, and is possible to nature, but
impossible in the state of bliss, will be in heaven; while in this life
there is avoidance of this evil as of something altogether possible.
Hence Gregory, expounding the words of Job (26:11), "The pillars of
heaven tremble, and dread at His beck," says (Moral. xvii, 29): "The
heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing, tremble while
contemplating: but their awe, lest it should be of a penal nature, is
one not of fear but of wonder," because, to wit, they wonder at God's
supereminence and incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv,
9) in this sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the
question doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for
ever and ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that
is afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds
fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which we
have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is
allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because chaste
fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we avoid
sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and possess
ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no kind of fear
is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for ever and ever,
because that which fear will lead us to, will be everlasting."
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the
fear that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear
which is accompanied by security.
Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things
are both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable
imitation of the Inimitable"---that is, because, so far as they can,
they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly---"they are unlike
because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short
infinitely and immeasurably." Hence, if there be no fear in God (since
there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not follow
that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in perfect
subjection to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the
futurity of happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas
fear implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is
infinitely distant from God, and this defect will remain even in
heaven. Hence fear will not be cast out altogether.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of
fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the beatitude
corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the beginning of the
spiritual life, as explained above [2482](A[7]): whereas poverty
belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to Mat.
19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to
the poor." Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to the gift
of fear.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): "Pierce Thou my
flesh with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear
to restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong
rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of
mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude of
poverty.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of
hope, as stated above (A[9], ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is,
"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of
God," seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to Rom.
5:2, "we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God."
Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than
poverty of spirit.
Objection 4: Further, it was stated above ([2483]FS, Q[70], A[2]) that
the fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits
correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the
beatitudes.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed
are the poor in spirit."
I answer that, Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Because,
since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and submission to
God, whatever results from this submission belongs to the gift of fear.
Now from the very fact that a man submits to God, it follows that he
ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks it
only in God. For that would be inconsistent with perfect subjection to
God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): "Some trust in chariots and
some in horses; but we will call upon the name of . . . our God." It
follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he does not, by pride, seek
greatness either in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and
riches. In either case, this proceeds from poverty of spirit, in so far
as the latter denotes either the voiding of a puffed up and proud
spirit, according to Augustine's interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
i, 4), or the renunciation of worldly goods which is done in spirit,
i.e. by one's own will, through the instigation of the Holy Spirit,
according to the expounding of Ambrose on Lk. 6:20 and Jerome on Mat.
5:3.
Reply to Objection 1: Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue,
all the beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this
perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a
perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly
goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts.
Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of
temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial
fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent with
the perfection of wisdom, as stated above ([2484]AA[7],10).
Reply to Objection 2: The undue exaltation of man either in himself or
in another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is
the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in
consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject to
Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless, pleasure
is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous character of a
thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of poverty corresponds
to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning, consequently.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of
tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation
of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the
term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of
ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal
from external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly
corresponds to fear.
Reply to Objection 4: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things
correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of
temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty,
continency and chastity.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DESPAIR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether despair is a sin?
(2) Whether it can be without unbelief?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether it arises from sloth?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether despair is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin
includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from the
immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair
includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no
sin, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18).
Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from
horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for
the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault
but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to
wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.
On the contrary, That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be a
sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the Apostle
says of certain men (Eph. 4:19): "Who, despairing, have given
themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness
and [Vulg.: 'unto'] covetousness." Therefore despair is not only a sin
but also the origin of other sins.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2) affirmation
and negation in the intellect correspond to search and avoidance in the
appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect correspond to good
and evil in the appetite. Consequently every appetitive movement which
is conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself, while every
appetitive movement which is conformed to a false intellect is evil in
itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of the intellect about God is
that from Him comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners,
according to Ezech. 18:23, "I desire not the death of the sinner, but
that he should be converted, and live" [*Vulg.: 'Is it My will that a
sinner should die . . . and not that he should be converted and live?'
Cf. Ezech. 33:11]: while it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon
to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself by
sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is in
conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the
contrary movement of despair, which is in conformity with the false
opinion about God, is vicious and sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: In every mortal sin there is, in some way,
aversion from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but
not always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have
God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as
hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion
from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to a
mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God, must
necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist
principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in
aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not
to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which
is that he departs from God.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two
ways: first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an
act proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a
virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii,
18,19) that "no man makes evil use of virtue." Secondly, a thing
proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and in
this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus sometimes
men pride themselves of their virtues, according to Augustine (Ep.
ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for good works that they may die." In this
way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may lead to despair, in so
far as man makes evil use of those good things, by allowing them to be
an occasion of despair.
Reply to Objection 3: The damned are outside the pale of hope on
account of the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not
imputed to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their
damnation. Even so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of
obtaining that which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which
was not due to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to
despair of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever
becoming rich.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there can be despair without unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no despair without
unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so long
as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a man
cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his faith be
removed.
Objection 2: Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy and
goodness, is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy, and so
savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to the
Divine mercy and goodness, according to Gn. 4:13: "My iniquity is
greater than that I may deserve pardon." Therefore whoever despairs, is
an unbeliever.
Objection 3: Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an
unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned heresy,
viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon for sins
after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is an
unbeliever.
On the contrary, If we remove that which follows, that which precedes
remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above ([2485]Q[17], A[7]).
Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not everyone
who despairs, is an unbeliever.
I answer that, Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to the
appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the appetite is
moved in connection with particulars, since the appetitive movement is
from the soul towards things, which, in themselves, are particular. Now
it may happen that a man, while having a right opinion in the
universal, is not rightly disposed as to his appetitive movement, his
estimate being corrupted in a particular matter, because, in order to
pass from the universal opinion to the appetite for a particular thing,
it is necessary to have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just
as it is impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal
proposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition.
Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal,
fails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his
particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as
the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this
particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter,
although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith,
viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the same way, a man while
retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that there
is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a movement of
despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state, there is no hope
of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter. In this
way there can be despair, just as there can be other mortal sins,
without belief.
Reply to Objection 1: The effect is done away, not only when the first
cause is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence
the movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the
universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of
the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular
estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.
Reply to Objection 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's
mercy is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs
judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some
particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.
The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians
denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether despair is the greatest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins.
For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above
[2486](A[2]). But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it
overthrows the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair
is not the greatest of sins.
Objection 2: Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than
hope, according to 1 Cor. 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater
sin than despair.
Objection 3: Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but
inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only
inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion.
Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other
sins.
On the contrary, An incurable sin seems to be most grievous, according
to Jer. 30:12: "Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very grievous."
Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jer. 15:18: "My wound
is desperate so as to refuse to be healed." [*Vulg.: 'Why is my wound,'
etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.
I answer that, Those sins which are contrary to the theological virtues
are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since the
theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are
opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now
every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact
of its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a
mutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it
would not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its
very nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous among mortal
sins.
Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the theological
virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and unbelief to
despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in respect of
their proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief is due to a
man not believing God's own truth; while the hatred of God arises from
man's will being opposed to God's goodness itself; whereas despair
consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of God's goodness. Hence
it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are against God as He is in
Himself, while despair is against Him, according as His good is
partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly speaking it is more grievous sin
to disbelieve God's truth, or to hate God, than not to hope to receive
glory from Him.
If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point
of view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from
evils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is
given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good
works. Wherefore a gloss on Prov. 24:10, "If thou lose hope being weary
in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished," says:
"Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it loses
his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and, what is
worse, in the battle of faith." And Isidore says (De Sum. Bono ii, 14):
"To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair is to fall into
hell."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether despair arises from sloth?
Objection 1: It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth.
Because different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now
despair of the future life arises from lust, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it does not arise from sloth.
Objection 2: Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth
contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope,
according to Rom. 12:12, "rejoicing in hope." Therefore sloth arises
from despair, and not vice versa.
Objection 3: Further, contrary effects have contrary causes. Now hope,
the contrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the
consideration of Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10): "Nothing was so necessary to raise
our hope, than that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what
greater proof could we have of this than that God's Son should deign to
unite Himself to our nature?" Therefore despair arises rather from the
neglect of the above consideration than from sloth.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among the
effects of sloth.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[1]; [2487]FS, Q[40], A[1]),
the object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by
oneself or by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining happiness may
be lacking in a person in two ways: first, through his not deeming it
an arduous good; secondly, through his deeming it impossible to obtain
either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact that spiritual goods
taste good to us no more, or seem to be goods of no great account, is
chiefly due to our affections being infected with the love of bodily
pleasures, among which, sexual pleasures hold the first place: for the
love of those pleasures leads man to have a distaste for spiritual
things, and not to hope for them as arduous goods. In this way despair
is caused by lust.
On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good impossible
to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his being over
downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his affections, it
seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any good. And since
sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in this way despair is
born of sloth.
Now this is the proper object of hope---that the thing is possible,
because the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence
despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise
from lust, for the reason given above.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just
as hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater
hope: and, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily
into despair, according to 2 Cor. 2:7: "Lest . . . such an one be
swallowed up by overmuch sorrow." Yet, since the object of hope is
good, to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not
naturally but only on account of some supervening obstacle, it follows
that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the contrary
despair is born of sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: This very neglect to consider the Divine favors
arises from sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he
considers chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a
man who is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful
things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his
thoughts away from sadness.
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OF PRESUMPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the object in which presumption trusts?
(2) Whether presumption is a sin?
(3) To what is it opposed?
(4) From what vice does it arise?
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Whether presumption trusts in God or in our own power?
Objection 1: It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against the
Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the lesser
the power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it too much.
But man's power is less than God's. Therefore it is a more grievous sin
to presume on human power than to presume on the power of God. Now the
sin against the Holy Ghost is most grievous. Therefore presumption,
which is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts to
human rather than to Divine power.
Objection 2: Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy
Ghost, for this sin is called malice which is a source from which sins
arise. Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby man
presumes on himself rather than from the presumption whereby he
presumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems that presumption
which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human power.
Objection 3: Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a
mutable good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from
turning to human power, which is a mutable good, rather than from
turning to the power of God, which is an immutable good.
On the contrary, Just as, through despair, a man despises the Divine
mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he despises the
Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice is in God even
as mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in aversion from God,
so presumption consists in inordinate conversion to Him.
I answer that, Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the
object of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible to
a man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power of
God alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption owing to
lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on his own
power, there is presumption if he tends to a good as though it were
possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according to Judith
6:15: "Thou humblest them that presume of themselves." This presumption
is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to the mean in
this kind of hope.
But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there may
be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends to
some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of God,
whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to obtain
pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. This presumption is,
properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to wit, by presuming
thus a man removes or despises the assistance of the Holy Spirit,
whereby he is withdrawn from sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[20], A[3]; [2488]FS, Q[73],
A[3]) a sin which is against God is, in its genus, graver than other
sins. Hence presumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately, is a
more grievous sin than the presumption of trusting in one's own power,
since to rely on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to
God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is a
graver sin to detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate one's
own.
Reply to Objection 2: The presumption whereby a man presumes
inordinately on God, includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good
inordinately. For when we desire a thing very much, we think we can
easily procure it through others, even though we cannot.
Reply to Objection 3: Presumption on God's mercy implies both
conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it arises from an inordinate
desire of one's own good, and aversion from the immutable good, in as
much as it ascribes to the Divine power that which is unbecoming to it,
for thus man turns away from God's power.
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Whether presumption is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is not a sin. For no sin is
a reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption some
are heard by God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): "Hear me a poor
wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy."
Therefore presumption on God's mercy is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, presumption denotes excessive hope. But there
cannot be excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and
mercy are infinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for
the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that "Adam sinned less, because he
sinned in the hope of pardon," which seems to indicate presumption.
Therefore presumption is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy
Ghost.
I answer that, As stated above ([2489]Q[20], A[1]) with regard to
despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false
intellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now presumption is an
appetitive movement, since it denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it
is conformed to a false intellect, just as despair is: for just as it
is false that God does not pardon the repentant, or that He does not
turn sinners to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness
to those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory to those
who cease from good works: and it is to this estimate that the movement
of presumption is conformed.
Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair, since,
on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God to have
mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes God in
Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason of our sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because
even the right hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it
be measured according to man's estate: yet it is not, if we look at the
immensity of the goodness of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as
though man hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from
God something unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too
little in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; as stated
above (A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: To sin with the intention of persevering in sin
and through the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does
not diminish, but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of
obtaining pardon some time, and with the intention of refraining from
sin and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin,
because this seems to indicate a will less hardened in sin.
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Whether presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear
than to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now
presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written
(Wis. 17:10): "A troubled conscience always presumes [Douay:
'forecasteth'] grievous things," and (Wis. 17:11) that "fear is a help
to presumption [*Vulg.: 'Fear is nothing else but a yielding up of the
succours from thought.']." Therefore presumption is opposed to fear
rather than to hope.
Objection 2: Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now
presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because
presumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas
fear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary
to fear rather than to hope.
Objection 3: Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it
does not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope. Since
therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that presumption is
contrary to fear rather than to hope.
On the contrary, When two vices are opposed to one another they are
contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to
fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of
despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that
presumption also is more directly opposed to hope.
I answer that, As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "every
virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as
temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice,
alike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning is
opposed to prudence." This agrees with the Philosopher who says (Ethic.
ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of the
contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with insensibility,
and fortitude with audacity.
Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear,
especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from
God's justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a
kind of false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes an
inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed when
they belong to the same genus, than when they belong to different
genera, it follows that presumption is more directly opposed to hope
than to fear. For they both regard and rely on the same object, hope
inordinately, presumption inordinately.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and
properly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in this
way that inordinate fear is called presumption.
Reply to Objection 2: Contraries are things that are most distant from
one another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a
movement of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or inordinate.
Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear, since
it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific difference, as an
inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is opposed to fear, in
respect of its generic difference, which is the movement of hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic
contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety. Hence
presumption excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas it does
not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by excluding its
ordinateness.
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Whether presumption arises from vainglory?
Objection 1: It would seem that presumption does not arise from
vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine
mercy. Now mercy [misericordia] regards unhappiness [miseriam] which is
contrary to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from vainglory.
Objection 2: Further, presumption is opposed to despair. Now despair
arises from sorrow, as stated above ([2490]Q[20], A[4], ad 2). Since
therefore opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to
arise from pleasure, and consequently from sins of the flesh, which
give the most absorbing pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to
some impossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing to
ignorance that one deems an impossible thing to be possible. Therefore
presumption arises from ignorance rather than from vainglory.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumption of
novelties is a daughter of vainglory."
I answer that, As stated above [2491](A[1]), presumption is twofold;
one whereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something
beyond his power, as though it were possible to him. Such like
presumption clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great
desire for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, and
especially novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory
states explicitly that presumption of novelties is a daughter of
vainglory.
The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or
power, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without merits, or
pardon without repentance. Such like presumption seems to arise
directly from pride, as though man thought so much of himself as to
esteem that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory, however
much he might be a sinner.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under
which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) The precepts relating to hope;
(2) The precepts relating to fear.
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Whether there should be a precept of hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given relating to
the virtue of hope. For when an effect is sufficiently procured by one
cause, there is no need to induce it by another. Now man is
sufficiently induced by his natural inclination to hope for good.
Therefore there is no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to do
this.
Objection 2: Further, since precepts are given about acts of virtue,
the chief precepts are about the acts of the chief virtues. Now the
chief of all the virtues are the three theological virtues, viz. hope,
faith and charity. Consequently, as the chief precepts of the Law are
those of the decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated
above ([2492]FS, Q[100], A[3]), it seems that if any precept of hope
were given, it should be found among the precepts of the decalogue. But
it is not to be found there. Therefore it seems that the Law should
contain no precept of hope.
Objection 3: Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is equivalent to a
prohibition of the act of the opposite vice. Now no precept is to be
found forbidding despair which is contrary to hope. Therefore it seems
that the Law should contain no precept of hope.
On the contrary, Augustine says on Jn. 15:12, "This is My commandment,
that you love one another" (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.): "How many things
are commanded us about faith! How many relating to hope!" Therefore it
is fitting that some precepts should be given about hope.
I answer that, Among the precepts contained in Holy Writ, some belong
to the substance of the Law, others are preambles to the Law. The
preambles to the Law are those without which no law is possible: such
are the precepts relating to the act of faith and the act of hope,
because the act of faith inclines man's mind so that he believes the
Author of the Law to be One to Whom he owes submission, while, by the
hope of a reward, he is induced to observe the precepts. The precepts
that belong to the substance of the Law are those which relate to right
conduct and are imposed on man already subject and ready to obey:
wherefore when the Law was given these precepts were set forth from the
very outset under form of a command.
Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given under the form
of a command, since, unless man already believed and hoped, it would be
useless to give him the Law: but, just as the precept of faith had to
be given under the form of an announcement or reminder, as stated above
([2493]Q[16], A[1]), so too, the precept of hope, in the first
promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form of a promise.
For he who promises rewards to them that obey him, by that very fact,
urges them to hope: hence all the promises contained in the Law are
incitements to hope.
Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it is for a wise man
to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but also, and much
more, to safeguard the foundation of the Law, therefore, after the
first promulgation of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many
inducements to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not merely
by way of promise, as in the Law; for instance, in the Ps. 61:9: "Hope
[Douay: 'Trust'] in Him all ye congregation of the people," and in many
other passages of the Scriptures.
Reply to Objection 1: Nature inclines us to hope for the good which is
proportionate to human nature; but for man to hope for a supernatural
good he had to be induced by the authority of the Divine law, partly by
promises, partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there was
need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even for those things
to which natural reason inclines us, such as the acts of the moral
virtues, for sake of insuring a greater stability, especially since the
natural reason of man was clouded by the lusts of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the law of the decalogue belong
to the first promulgation of the Law: hence there was no need for a
precept of hope among the precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough
to induce men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in the
case of the first and fourth commandments.
Reply to Objection 3: In those observances to which man is bound as
under a duty, it is enough that he receive an affirmative precept as to
what he has to do, wherein is implied the prohibition of what he must
avoid doing: thus he is given a precept concerning the honor due to
parents, but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by the
law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor their parents. And
since in order to be saved it is man's duty to hope in God, he had to
be induced to do so by one of the above ways, affirmatively, so to
speak, wherein is implied the prohibition of the opposite.
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Whether there should have been given a precept of fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Law, there should not have been
given a precept of fear. For the fear of God is about things which are
a preamble to the Law, since it is the "beginning of wisdom." Now
things which are a preamble to the Law do not come under a precept of
the Law. Therefore no precept of fear should be given in the Law.
Objection 2: Further, given the cause, the effect is also given. Now
love is the cause of fear, since "every fear proceeds from some kind of
love," as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the
precept of love, it would have been superfluous to command fear.
Objection 3: Further, presumption, in a way, is opposed to fear. But
the Law contains no prohibition against presumption. Therefore it seems
that neither should any precept of fear have been given.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel, what doth
the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?"
But He requires of us that which He commands us to do. Therefore it is
a matter of precept that man should fear God.
I answer that, Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now just as man is
induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe precepts of law, so too is
he induced thereto by the fear of punishment, which fear is servile.
And just as according to what has been said [2494](A[1]), in the
promulgation of the Law there was no need for a precept of the act of
hope, and men were to be induced thereto by promises, so neither was
there need for a precept, under form of command, of fear which regards
punishment, and men were to be induced thereto by the threat of
punishment: and this was realized both in the precepts of the
decalogue, and afterwards, in due sequence, in the secondary precepts
of the Law.
Yet, just as wise men and the prophets who, consequently, strove to
strengthen man in the observance of the Law, delivered their teaching
about hope under the form of admonition or command, so too did they in
the matter of fear.
On the other hand filial fear which shows reverence to God, is a sort
of genus in respect of the love of God, and a kind of principle of all
observances connected with reverence for God. Hence precepts of filial
fear are given in the Law, even as precepts of love, because each is a
preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and to which the
precepts of the decalogue refer. Hence in the passage quoted in the
argument, "On the contrary," man is required "to have fear, to walk in
God's ways," by worshipping Him, and "to love Him."
Reply to Objection 1: Filial fear is a preamble to the Law, not as
though it were extrinsic thereto, but as being the beginning of the
Law, just as love is. Hence precepts are given of both, since they are
like general principles of the whole Law.
Reply to Objection 2: From love proceeds filial fear as also other good
works that are done from charity. Hence, just as after the precept of
charity, precepts are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the same
time precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity, just as, in
demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down the first
principles, unless the conclusions also are given which follow from
them proximately or remotely.
Reply to Objection 3: Inducement to fear suffices to exclude
presumption, even as inducement to hope suffices to exclude despair, as
stated above (A[1], ad 3).
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OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself;
(2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration will be
fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its acts;
(4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto.
The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity,
considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation
to its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether charity is friendship?
(2) Whether it is something created in the soul?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is a special virtue?
(5) Whether it is one virtue?
(6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?
(7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it?
(8) Whether it is the form of the virtues?
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Whether charity is friendship?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not friendship. For nothing
is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's friend,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man
towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay: 'conversation'] is
not with men" (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is not friendship.
Objection 2: Further, there is no friendship without return of love
(Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies, according
to Mat. 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is not friendship.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3)
there are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the
delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the
friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his letter
to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: "True
friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together, not by
household interests, not by mere bodily presence, not by crafty and
cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the study of the Divine
Scriptures." No more is it friendship for the virtuous, since by
charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship based on the virtuous
is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii). Therefore charity is not
friendship.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 15:15): "I will not now call you
servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by reason of
nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2,3) not
every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is
together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish
good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish
its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or
the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of
concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for
wine or for a horse.
Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain
mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and
friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.
Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God,
inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of
friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it
is written (1 Cor. 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto
the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this
communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the
friendship of man for God.
Reply to Objection 1: Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life
in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to
this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God or
the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his mind,
and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both
God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of life,
wherefore it is written (Phil. 3:20): "Our conversation is in heaven."
But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when "His servants
shall serve Him, and they shall see His face" (Apoc. 22:3,4). Therefore
charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.
Reply to Objection 2: Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first
in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to
one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another,
as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he
loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected
with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for
their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate
us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our
enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the
friendship of charity is chiefly directed.
Reply to Objection 3: The friendship that is based on the virtuous is
directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for
his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not
virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on
the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for
God's sake.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is something created in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in the
soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his
neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love. Therefore
it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he says (De
Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God
is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in the soul,
but is God Himself.
Objection 2: Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as
the soul is the life of the body, according to Dt. 30:20: "He is thy
life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God quickens
the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 Jn.
3:14: "We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love
the brethren." Therefore God is charity itself.
Objection 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the
contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed it
is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings the
human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not something
created in the soul.
On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By charity
I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for His
own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in the soul.
Therefore charity is something created in the soul.
I answer that, The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q[17]
of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something created
in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor
does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love God is
the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Ghost
without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from
the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance
the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said on
account of the excellence of charity.
But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary,
detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind
the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a way
that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle of
this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive power.
For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle
needs to be in itself, as stated above ([2495]FS, Q[6], A[1]): so that
it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a
contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the
will.
Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will in
such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an instrument,
for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has
not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease
to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated above
([2496]FS, Q[114], A[4]) that the love of charity is the root of merit:
and, given that the will is moved by the Holy Ghost to the act of love,
it is necessary that the will also should be the efficient cause of
that act.
Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be
connatural to that power of reason of some form which is the principle
of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to their due ends,
bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end
appointed to it by Him; and in this way He "ordereth all things
sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the act of charity
surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore,
unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to
the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural
acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and
pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue
has such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any
virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. Therefore it is most
necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be
in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining
that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and
pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It
is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with
the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since
the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation of Divine
goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of
Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love our
neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of
speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine
was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to some an
occasion of error.
Reply to Objection 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul by
charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life
of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body. Consequently we
may conclude from this that just as the soul is immediately united to
the body, so is charity to the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a
form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form,
wherefore it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it
produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites
it to God, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the
author of charity.
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Whether charity is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity is
a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a
virtue, as may be gathered from Ethic. viii, 1; nor is it numbered
among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is
charity a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo
et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies
rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a
virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity
is not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the
soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject.
Therefore charity is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is a
virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to
God, for by it we love Him."
I answer that, Human acts are good according as they are regulated by
their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the
principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of
human acts, which is twofold, as stated above ([2497]Q[17], A[1]), viz.
human reason and God.
Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with
right reason," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so too, the nature of virtue
consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to faith,
([2498]Q[4], A[5]) and hope ([2499]Q[17], A[1]). Wherefore, it follows
that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites us
to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that
friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or with
a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue about works done
in respect of another person, but under a different aspect from
justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another person,
under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship considers the
aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous
favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13). Nevertheless it
may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of itself from the
other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and virtuousness are derived
merely from its object, in so far, to wit, as it is based on the moral
goodness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not every
friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the case of friendship
based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore friendship for the virtuous is
something consequent to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is
no comparison with charity since it is not founded principally on the
virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and
to rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above
([2500]FS, Q[25], A[2]) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love
is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love. And
when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean that it
is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of excess, just
as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.
Reply to Objection 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we
consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an
accident has its being in another: but considered as to its species, an
accident which results from the principles of its subject is inferior
to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an
accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is
superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher
nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way
charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation of
the Holy Ghost.
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Whether charity is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For
Jerome says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby
we love God" [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that "virtue
is the order of love." Now no special virtue is included in the
definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot
be a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue,
according to 1 Cor. 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed
it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: "Let all
your things be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue.
Now Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, "Thou shalt
love" is "a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a
general prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue.
On the contrary, Nothing general is enumerated together with what is
special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues, viz.
hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "And now there remain faith,
hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special virtue.
I answer that, Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as shown
above ([2501]FS, Q[18], A[2]; [2502]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the proper
object of love is the good, as stated above ([2503]FS, Q[27], A[1]), so
that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special
kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of
happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of charity,
which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love. Therefore
charity is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is included in the definition of every
virtue, not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue
depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on ([2504]AA[7],8).
In this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral
virtues, as explained in Ethic. ii, vi, from the fact that they depend
on prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the
last end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other
ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of
horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object
the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows that
it extends to the acts of a man's whole life, by commanding them, not
by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The precept of love is said to be a general
command, because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their
end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is one virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits
are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of
charity---God and our neighbor---which are infinitely distant from one
another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
Objection 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a
habit, even though that object be one in reality, as shown above
(Q[17], A[6]; [2505]FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1). Now there are many aspects
under which God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His
love by reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor.
But the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii,
3,11,12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into a
number of various species.
On the contrary, Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the
object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of
the Divine truth, according to Eph. 4:5: "One faith." Therefore charity
also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine goodness.
I answer that, Charity, as stated above [2506](A[1]) is a kind of
friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship are
differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end, and in
this way there are three species of friendship, namely friendship for
the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous; secondly, in
respect of the different kinds of communion on which friendships are
based; thus there is one species of friendship between kinsmen, and
another between fellow citizens or fellow travellers, the former being
based on natural communion, the latter on civil communion or on the
comradeship of the road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).
Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its
end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of
everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also one.
Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not divided
into several species.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor
were equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the
principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity
for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 2: God is loved by charity for His own sake:
wherefore charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness,
namely God's goodness, which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1:
"Give glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us
with love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary
and result from the first.
Reply to Objection 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats
has various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply
to charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is the most excellent of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of
the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as it
has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will,
since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the intellect,
is more excellent than charity which is in the will.
Objection 2: Further, the thing by which another works seems the less
excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is
beneath his master. Now "faith . . . worketh by charity," according to
Gal. 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.
Objection 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems
to be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something
additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the
object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent
than charity.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): "The greater of these is
charity."
I answer that, Since good, in human acts, depends on their being
regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which is
a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human acts.
Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above [2507](A[3]),
namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, even
human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological virtues,
which consist in attaining this first rule, since their object is God,
are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual virtues, which
consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that among the
theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to that which
attains God most.
Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by
another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive
from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas
charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that
something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent
than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues, just
as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent than the
other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it appoints the
mean in human operations or passions.
Reply to Objection 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by
the thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the
excellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the
measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will
and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of the
appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of the
appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is the
object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the soul
are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves, because a
thing is contained according to the mode of the container (De Causis
xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul, are more
excellent in themselves than they are in the soul. Consequently it is
better to know than to love the things that are beneath us; for which
reason the Philosopher gave the preference to the intellectual virtues
over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7,8): whereas the love of the things
that are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowledge of
such things. Therefore charity is more excellent than faith.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a
master by his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument
does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: The same good is the object of charity and of
hope: but charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies
distance therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being
arduous, as hope does, since what is already united has not the
character of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than
hope.
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Whether any true virtue is possible without charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without
charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those
who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the
naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is
possible without charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it
comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now,
in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their
concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore true
virtue is possible without charity.
Objection 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to Ethic.
vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore
true virtue can be without charity.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to
be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." And yet true
virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore no
true virtue is possible without charity.
I answer that, Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above
([2508]FS, Q[55] , A[4]). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things
directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the
end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the
proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and
universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and
principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps. 72:28:
"It is good for me to adhere to God," and to this good man is ordered
by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good may be
twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it can be
directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while the other
is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from the
final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true virtue is that
which is directed to man's principal good; thus also the Philosopher
says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the disposition of a perfect
thing to that which is best": and in this way no true virtue is
possible without charity.
If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end,
then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as
it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good is
not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is
ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine
says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser, whereby he
devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the miser's
justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through fear of
severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he curbs his
desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude, whereby as
Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through
fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, on the
other hand, this particular good be a true good, for instance the
welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue,
imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final and perfect
good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two
kinds; one is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does
something that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an
act is always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the
actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always
sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and
directs it to his unbelief as end.
There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in
accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his
possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even
his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as stated
above (Q[10], A[4]; [2509]FS, Q[85], A[2]). In this way it is possible
for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not perfectly
good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the
principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly
true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle
be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or chastity,
without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by charity,
however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.
Reply to Objection 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a
relation to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human
life, as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated
above ([2510]FS, Q[56] , A[3]). Hence the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is the form of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the true form of the
virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential.
Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it
would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as charity:
nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since then it would
not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way the form of the
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their
root and foundation, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in
charity." Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the
matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making. Therefore
charity is not the form of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not
coincide with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end
and the mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their
form.
On the contrary, Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that charity
is the form of the virtues.
I answer that, In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from the
end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is the
will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the form of
an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently, in
morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give
the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has been
said [2511](A[7]), that it is charity which directs the acts of all
other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives the
form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this sense
that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are called
virtues in relation to "informed" acts.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues
not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way
of efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the
aforesaid manner.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in
so far as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment
therefrom, and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the
character of a material cause.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity is said to be the end of other virtues,
because it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother
is one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called
the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it
conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which
head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine
infusion?
(3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural
gifts?
(4) Whether it increases in the person who has it?
(5) Whether it increases by addition?
(6) Whether it increases by every act?
(7) Whether it increases indefinitely?
(8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect?
(9) Of the various degrees of charity;
(10) Whether charity can diminish?
(11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed?
(12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?
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Whether the will is the subject of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of charity.
For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the Philosopher
(Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part. Therefore charity is
also in the concupiscible and not in the will.
Objection 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated
above ([2512]Q[23], A[6]). But the reason is the subject of virtue.
Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.
Objection 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1
Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Now the principle
of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that charity is
chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the will.
On the contrary, The object of charity is the good, which is also the
object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its subject.
I answer that, Since, as stated in the [2513]FP, Q[80], A[2], the
appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective which
is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in different
ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good apprehended by
sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite or will is good
under the universal aspect of good, according as it can be apprehended
by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not a sensible good, but
the Divine good which is known by the intellect alone. Therefore the
subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the intellective appetite,
i.e. the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not
of the intellective appetite, as proved in the [2514]FP, Q[81], A[2]:
wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of
sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good which
is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the
concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9),
the will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from
the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by
the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and transcends
the rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of
Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Hence it is not in the reason,
either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its rule, like justice
and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship of the will to the
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [2515]FP, Q[83], A[4], the
free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not in
the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose. For
choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of the end
itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the last end,
should be described as residing in the will rather than in the
free-will.
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Whether charity is caused in us by infusion?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not caused in us by
infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man
naturally. Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the "Divine
good", which is the object of charity, "is for all an object of
dilection and love." Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by
infusion.
Objection 2: Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to
love it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good.
Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no
infused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do we
need one in order to love God.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an
unfeigned faith." Now these three have reference to human acts.
Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from
infusion.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us."
I answer that, As stated above ([2516]Q[23], A[1]), charity is a
friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting
happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of
gratuitous gifts, for, according to Rom. 6:23, "the grace of God is
life everlasting": wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural
facilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be
natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect does
not transcend its cause.
Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through
acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy
Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the participation
of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above ([2517]Q[23], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which
is founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all
naturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural
fellowship, so the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet
not to us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on
sensible things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as
much as He is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable
to us in this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite
towards visible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God
above all things in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused
into our hearts.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that in us charity proceeds from
"a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," this
must be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these
things. Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man
to receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the
saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): "Fear leads to
charity," and of a gloss on Mat. 1:2: "Faith begets hope, and hope
charity."
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Whether charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is infused according to the
capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written (Mat. 25:15) that "He
gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: 'proper
ability']." Now, in man, none but natural virtue precedes charity,
since there is no virtue without charity, as stated above ([2518]Q[23],
A[7]). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure
of his natural virtue.
Objection 2: Further, among things ordained towards one another, the
second is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things
that the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous gifts,
that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a
perfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as
second to first. Therefore it seems that charity is infused according
to the capacity of nature.
Objection 3: Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to
the same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Mat.
22:30 and Lk. 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are
bestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the
Master teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently applies
to man.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:8): "The Spirit breatheth where
He will," and (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one and the same Spirit
worketh, dividing to every one according as He will." Therefore charity
is given, not according to our natural capacity, but according as the
Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.
I answer that, The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause of
that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater effect.
Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature, as stated
above [2519](A[2]) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on the
sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the
quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on
the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy Ghost
Who "divides" His gifts "according as He will." Hence the Apostle says
(Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according to the measure
of the giving of Christ."
Reply to Objection 1: The virtue in accordance with which God gives His
gifts to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort
of the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this
disposition or effort, by moving man's mind either more or less,
according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:12): "Who hath
made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light."
Reply to Objection 2: The form does not surpass the proportion of the
matter. In like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus,
for grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity
and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison
fails.
Reply to Objection 3: The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is
consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly
whithersoever he is borne, as stated in the FP, Q[61], A[6]. Hence
there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good in those
who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and consequently those
of the higher angels who remained steadfast became better than the
others, and those who fell became worse. But man's is a rational
nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in potentiality and
sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily borne wholly
whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater natural gifts
there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the comparison fails.
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Whether charity can increase?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing
increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely
dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a
spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in
respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest charity
loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore charity does
not increase.
Objection 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives
no increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the
greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good.
Therefore charity cannot increase.
Objection 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore
wherever there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase
of essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of
essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity
cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or
corrupted, which is unreasonable.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. Ep.
clxxxv.] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit
perfection."
I answer that, The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are
called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the
last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to
God, Who is approached, "not by steps of the body but by the affections
of the soul" [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and this approach
is the result of charity, since it unites man's mind to God.
Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that it can
increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the way would
cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he says (1 Cor.
12:31): "I show unto you yet a more excellent way."
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to
virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of
objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater
excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a
thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual
quantity of charity increases.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its
object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it
follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not
every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the
act.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in
its essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according
to its fervor.
But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since
charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an
essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet
more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its subject.
Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that
an essential increase of charity implies ability to produce an act of
more fervent love. Hence charity increases essentially, not by
beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject, as the objection
imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in its subject.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity increases by addition?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases by addition. For just
as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be
according to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity results
from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that "increase
is addition to pre-existing magnitude." Therefore the increase of
charity which is according to virtual quantity is by addition.
Objection 2: Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul,
according to 1 Jn. 2:10: "He that loveth his brother abideth in the
light." Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in a
house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also
increases in the soul by addition.
Objection 3: Further, the increase of charity is God's work, even as
the causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: "He will increase the
growth of the fruits of your justice." Now when God first infuses
charity, He puts something in the soul that was not there before.
Therefore also, when He increases charity, He puts something there
which was not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.
On the contrary, Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater results
from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved in Phys.
iii, text. 59, and Metaph. ii, 4. Therefore charity does not increase
by addition.
I answer that, Every addition is of something to something else: so
that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things
added together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if
charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as
distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a
distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For
God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which
did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which
magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless capable
of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is added.
Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose the
distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.
Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric. Specific
distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while numeric
distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a habit may
receive increase through extending to objects to which it did not
extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one who
acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored hitherto.
But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest charity
extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the addition
which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as though the
added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically from that to
which it is added.
It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must
presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a
distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one
white thing is added to another, although such an increase does not
make a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in
point, since the subject of charity is none other than the rational
mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place by
one rational mind being added to another; which is impossible.
Moreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater
lover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity
can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity, as some
have held to be the case.
Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of charity
more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of increase
in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a form consists
wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently, since the
magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a form is
greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject, and not
that another form is added to it: for this would be the case if the
form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with its
subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its
subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not by
charity being added to charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and
something else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity, it
is distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this way we
have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in animals.
But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is distinguishable only
in respect of its subject, and in this way it has its proper increase,
like other accidental forms, by way of intensity in its subject, for
instance in things subject to rarefaction, as is proved in Phys. iv, 9.
In like manner science, as a habit, has its quantity from its objects,
and accordingly it increases by addition, when a man knows more things;
and again, as an accidental form, it has a certain quantity through
being in its subject, and in this way it increase in a man who knows
the same scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In
the same way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that
which it has from its object, it does not increase, as stated above:
hence it follows that it increases solely by being intensified.
Reply to Objection 2: The addition of light to light can be understood
through the light being intensified in the air on account of there
being several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not
apply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary shedding
forth the light of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The infusion of charity denotes a change to the
state of "having" charity from the state of "not having it," so that
something must needs come which was not there before. On the other
hand, the increase of charity denotes a change to "more having" from
"less having," so that there is need, not for anything to be there that
was not there before, but for something to be more there that
previously was less there. This is what God does when He increases
charity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and
the likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by the
soul.
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Whether charity increases through every act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases through every act of
charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less. But
every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more than
a simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection of
charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase
charity.
Objection 2: Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are
engendered by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act
of charity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of
virtue. Therefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces to the
increase of charity.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.]
says that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back." Now no man
goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore whoever is
moved by an act of charity goes forward in the way to God. Therefore
charity increases through every act of charity.
On the contrary, The effect does not surpass the power of its cause.
But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or slackness.
Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity, rather does
it dispose one to a lower degree.
I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like the
increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is not a
continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so much in so
much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part of that
time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space of time
nature works by disposing for the increase, without causing any actual
increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which it had
disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In like
manner charity does not actually increase through every act of charity,
but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity, in so far
as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again according to
charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out into an act of
more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity, and then his
charity increases actually.
Reply to Objection 1: Every act of charity merits everlasting life,
which, however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper
time. In like manner every act of charity merits an increase of
charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we
strive for that increase.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered,
each act does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces
towards that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is
the most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it,
reduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a
stone.
Reply to Objection 3: Man advances in the way to God, not merely by
actual increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that
increase.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity increases indefinitely?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not increase indefinitely.
For every movement is towards some end and term, as stated in Metaph.
ii, text. 8,9. But the increase of charity is a movement. Therefore it
tends to an end and term. Therefore charity does not increase
indefinitely.
Objection 2: Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject.
But the capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity
is finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.
Objection 3: Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase,
attain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater,
unless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the
Philosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an
indefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them
indefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive at any definite
quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we
subtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But this
does not occur in the case in point: because there is no need for the
second increase of charity to be less than the first, since rather is
it probable that it would be equal or greater. As, therefore, the
charity of the blessed is something finite, if the charity of the
wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow that the charity of
the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is absurd. Therefore the
wayfarer's charity cannot increase indefinitely.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had
already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I
may, by any means apprehend," on which words a gloss says: "Even if he
has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough.' For
whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his destination."
Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more and more.
I answer that, A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in three
ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed measure, and
when this has been reached it is no longer possible to go any further
in that form, but if any further advance is made, another form is
attained. And example of this is paleness, the bounds of which may, by
continual alteration, be passed, either so that whiteness ensues, or so
that blackness results. Secondly, on the part of the agent, whose power
does not extend to a further increase of the form in its subject.
Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which is not capable of ulterior
perfection.
Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of man's
charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity itself
considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a
participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In like
manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is possessed of
infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject, no limit to
this increase can be determined, because whenever charity increases,
there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a further
increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to fix any
limits to the increase of charity in this life.
Reply to Objection 1: The increase of charity is directed to an end,
which is not in this, but in a future life.
Reply to Objection 2: The capacity of the rational creature is
increased by charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according
to 2 Cor. 6:11: "Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains
capable of receiving a further increase.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds good in those things which
have the same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different
kinds: thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the
quantity of a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity
which follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the
quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision.
Hence the argument does not prove.
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Whether charity can be perfect in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this life.
For this would have been the case with the apostles before all others.
Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though
I had already attained, or were already perfect." Therefore charity
cannot be perfect in this life.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that
"whatever kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is
perfect, cupidity is done away altogether." But this cannot be in this
world, wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 Jn.
1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now all sin
arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be
perfect in this life.
Objection 3: Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any
more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above
[2520](A[7]). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)
"Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been
brought to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to be
with Christ.'" Now this is possible in this life, as in the case of
Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.
I answer that, The perfection of charity may be understood in two ways:
first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to the
person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is perfect,
if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is as lovable
as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He is infinitely
lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since all created
power is finite. Consequently no creature's charity can be perfect in
this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He loves Himself.
On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he loves
as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a man's
whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the
perfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this life,
wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is impossible to
think always actually of God, and to be moved by love towards Him.
Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give his time to God
and Divine things, while scorning other things except in so far as the
needs of the present life demand. This is the perfection of charity
that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not common to all who have
charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his whole heart to God
habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring anything contrary to
the love of God; and this perfection is common to all who have charity.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of
heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that "he was a
perfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which the
way leads."
Reply to Objection 2: This is said on account of venial sins, which are
contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are
incompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of
heaven.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfection of the way is not perfection
simply, wherefore it can always increase.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is rightly distinguished into three degrees, beginning,
progress, and perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of
charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many
degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection.
Therefore it is not right to put only one.
Objection 2: Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins
to be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as
progressing and as beginning.
Objection 3: Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity
may be, it can increase, as stated above [2521](A[7]). Now for charity
to increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be
distinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees
are unsuitably assigned to charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) "As
soon as charity is born it takes food," which refers to beginners,
"after taking food, it waxes strong," which refers to those who are
progressing, "and when it has become strong it is perfected," which
refers to the perfect. Therefore there are three degrees of charity.
I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity may be considered in
respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For
although this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it has
certain fixed divisions according to those particular actions or
pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak of
a man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after which we
distinguish another state of man wherein he begins to speak and to use
his reason, while there is again a third state, that of puberty when he
begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he arrives
at perfection.
In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished
according to the different pursuits to which man is brought by the
increase of charity. For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy
himself chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting his concupiscences,
which move him in opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in
whom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the
second place man's chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and
this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to strengthen
their charity by adding to it: while man's third pursuit is to aim
chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God: this belongs to the perfect
who "desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ."
In like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is
withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term, and thirdly,
rest in this term.
Reply to Objection 1: All these distinct degrees which can be discerned
in the increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even
as every division of continuous things is included in these three---the
beginning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher states (De Coelo
i, 1).
Reply to Objection 2: Although those who are beginners in charity may
progress, yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins
which disturb them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they
come to feel this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection with
greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and with the other
holding the sword as related in 2 Esdr 4:17 about those who built up
Jerusalem.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet
this is not their chief care, but their aim is principally directed
towards union with God. And though both the beginner and the proficient
seek this, yet their solicitude is chiefly about other things, with the
beginner, about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing in
virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity can decrease?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries by
their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease are
contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above [2522](A[4]),
it seems that it can also decrease.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) "He
loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee": and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
36) he says that "what kindles charity quenches cupidity." For this it
seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity quenches
charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides God, can
increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) "God
makes the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the
man turns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine
operation." From this we may gather that when God preserves charity in
man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity into
him. Now at the first infusion of charity God infuses less charity into
him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in preserving charity,
He preserves less charity in him that prepares himself less. Therefore
charity can decrease.
On the contrary, In Scripture, charity is compared to fire, according
to Cant 8:6: "The lamps thereof," i.e. of charity, "are fire and
flames." Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts. Therefore as
long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot descend, i.e.
decrease.
I answer that, The quantity which charity has in comparison with its
proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase, as
stated above (A[4], ad 2).
Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in
comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it
can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be
either through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true
that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease
altogether through cessation from act, as stated above ([2523]FS,
Q[53], A[3]). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to
friendship (Ethic. viii, 5) "that want of intercourse," i.e. the
neglect to call upon or speak with one's friends, "has destroyed many a
friendship." Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on
its cause, and the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when
human acts cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last
ceases altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is
not the result of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated
above [2524](A[2]). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it
does not for this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the
cessation involves a sin.
The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except
either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by
God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace
in punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by way
of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.
It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this
decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But mortal
sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but destroys it
entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is contrary to
charity, as we shall state further on [2525](A[12]), and by way of
merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against charity, he
deserves that God should withdraw charity from him.
In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either
effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not
touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial sin
is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love for
the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act as
regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people sometimes,
though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to their diet:
and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false opinions that are
derived from the principles, do not diminish the certitude of the
principles. So too, venial sin does not merit diminution of charity;
for when a man offends in a small matter he does not deserve to be
mulcted in a great matter. For God does not turn away from man, more
than man turns away from Him: wherefore he that is out of order in
respect of things directed to the end, does not deserve to be mulcted
in charity whereby he is ordered to the last end.
The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we
speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption may
be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are venial
sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that
subject stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in
equal relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of
increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument does
not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his
end in creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its
poison, as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less
(i.e. less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by
diminishing charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we
must understand the saying: "He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside
Thee," for he adds these words, "which he loveth not for Thee." This
does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that which
we love in venial sin, is loved for God's sake habitually though not
actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin, which is
always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot diminish
charity, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the
infusion of charity, as stated above ([2526]FS, Q[113], A[3]).
Wherefore that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces
dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the
other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the
safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain inn us while we
sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on the
part of the intensity of the free-will's movement.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we can lose charity when once we have it?
Objection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we
have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who
has charity cannot sin, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is
born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he
cannot sin, because he is born of God." But none save the children of
God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of
God from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love
be not true, it should not be called love." Now, as he says again in a
letter to Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true." [*The
quotation is from De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam comitem, vii.,
among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly known as Paul the
Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.] Therefore it was no charity at all.
Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot lose it.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang.
xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to
work it is not charity." Now no man loses charity by doing great
things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.
Objection 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by
some motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning,
both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity
cannot be lost.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 2:4): "I have somewhat against
thee, because thou hast left thy first charity."
I answer that, The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown above
[2527](A[2]; QQ[23],24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in three
ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love
God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the
power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do.
Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same
time---that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to an act
of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the
gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby
"whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered," as Augustine says
in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De Dono Persev. xiv).
Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable
of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin at
all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).
Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which is
changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be
compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of form
in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view of habit
as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in its
subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not entirely
fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the forms of things
generated and corrupted, because the matter of such things receives one
form in such a way, that it retains the potentiality to another form,
as though its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one
form. Hence the one form may be lost by the other being received. On
the other hand the form of a celestial body which entirely fills the
potentiality of its matter, so that the latter does not retain the
potentiality to another form, is in its subject inseparably.
Accordingly the charity of the blessed, because it entirely fills the
potentiality of the rational mind, since every actual movement of that
mind is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably:
whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality
of its subject, because the latter is not always actually directed to
God: so that when it is not actually directed to God, something may
occur whereby charity is lost.
It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs to
a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem
good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste judges
of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human mind
judge of things to be done, according to its habitual disposition.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as a man is, so
does the end appear to him." Accordingly charity is inseparable from
its possessor, where that which pertains to charity cannot appear
otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God is seen in His
Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. Therefore the charity
of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity of the way can, because
in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which is the essence of
goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view
of the power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He
wills to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.
Reply to Objection 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is
no true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only
for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent
with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the changeableness
of the subject, and against the purpose of charity included in its act,
this is not contrary to true charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The love of God ever works great things in its
purpose, which is essential to charity; but it does not always work
great things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.
Reply to Objection 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every
motive for sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting
actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for
sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is lost through one mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not lost through one mortal
sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "When a man who has mounted to
the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that he will
become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so gradually
and by little and little." But man falls away by losing charity.
Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (60)
addresses Peter thus: "Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not
an averted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never
failed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the
fount of charity." From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De Nat.
et Dig. Amoris. vi.] drew his assertion that "charity in Peter was not
quenched, but cooled." But Peter sinned mortally in denying Christ.
Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now
a habit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act.
Much less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.
Objection 4: Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor.
Now, seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of
God and one's neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things
directed to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated
above (A[10] ). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there
be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some temporal good.
Objection 5: Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last
end. Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not
done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless.
Therefore charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin has
been committed.
On the contrary, By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal death,
according to Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death." On the other hand
whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it is written
(Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father: and I
will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him," in which manifestation
everlasting life consists, according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal
life; that they may know Thee the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom
Thou hast sent." Now no man can be worthy, at the same time, of eternal
life and of eternal death. Therefore it is impossible for a man to have
charity with a mortal sin. Therefore charity is destroyed by one mortal
sin.
I answer that, That one contrary is removed by the other contrary
supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very
nature, which consists in man's loving God above all things, and
subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to
God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God
as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the
rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His
commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its
very nature is capable of destroying charity.
If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of its
subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin, for act
is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the endurance of a
habit in its subject does not require the endurance of its act, so that
when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is not at once done
away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends on the action of God
Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the infusion and safekeeping
of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion of light in the air, as
stated above (A[10], OBJ 3). Consequently, just as the light would
cease at once in the air, were an obstacle placed to its being lit up
by the sun, even so charity ceases at once to be in the soul through
the placing of an obstacle to the outpouring of charity by God into the
soul.
Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to
God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of charity,
since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to God's
friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it follows
that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "man is enlightened by
God's presence, but he is darkened at once by God's absence, because
distance from Him is effected not by change of place but by aversion of
the will."
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Origen may be understood, in one
way, that a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go
so far as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some
previous negligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be
dispositions to mortal sin, as stated above ([2528]FS, Q[88], A[3]).
Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin if
he commits it.
Since, however, he adds: "If some slight slip should occur, and he
recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether," we may
reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied and
falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin through
malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly,
by actual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity.
Secondly, indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity, through
some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against charity in
this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered it.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: Not every inordinate affection for things
directed to the end, i.e., for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin,
but only such as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the
inordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated.
Reply to Objection 5: Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and
hope do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as
stated above (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every moral sin is
contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain
determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even as
charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that
charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form
regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above
([2529]Q[23], A[8]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will be
twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The order
in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there are twelve
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we love
our neighbor also?
(2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity?
(3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity?
(4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity?
(5) Whether one's own body?
(6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity?
(7) Whether sinners love themselves?
(8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity?
(9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship?
(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?
(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?
(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the love of charity stops at God, or extends to our neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and
does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe
Him fear, according Dt. 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy
God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?" Now the
fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is
distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either
servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above
([2530]Q[10], A[2]). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is
distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be
loved is to be honored." Now the honor due to God, which is known as
"latria," is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as
"dulia." Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct
from that with which we love our neighbor.
Objection 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Mat.
1:2. Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man,
according to Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man."
Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This commandment we have
from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother."
I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[6]; Q[19], A[3]; [2531]FS,
Q[54], A[3]) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of
different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the same
habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its object,
considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is
specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and
that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is specifically the
same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby we see the color
under the aspect of light.
Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since
what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence
it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God,
and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity
extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our
neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love
him, in two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him,
as when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by
reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human
fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love.
Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of God;
as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising the
ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for its
justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God, as
neither is such like love.
Reply to Objection 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor
regards the honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in
recognition of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated
specifically on account of the various degrees of goodness in various
persons, so long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas
honor is distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals.
Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity,
in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which is
God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according to
each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular honor
of latria on account of His singular virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the
principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us
ministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man
loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved
him for God's sake; and this is what charity does.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we should love charity out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity need not be loved out of
charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in the
two precepts of charity (Mat. 22:37-39): and neither of them includes
charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore
charity need not be loved out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of
happiness, as stated above ([2532]Q[23], A[1]). But charity cannot
participate in happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of
charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2533]Q[23], A[1]). But no man can have friendship for charity or for
an accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is
essential to friendship, as stated in Ethic. viii. Therefore charity
need not be loved out of charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves his
neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself." But we love our
neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also is
loved out of charity.
I answer that, Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature of
the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for
since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the
aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to
will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the
intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands,
because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason of
its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is a
spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore from
the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love.
Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as
stated above ([2534]Q[23], A[1]). Now by friendship a thing is loved in
two ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom
we wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend.
It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved out
of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all those
whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and to the
other virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we are
friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we love
both God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and our
neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual
life, whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good
which we desire for all whom we love out of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers friendship as referred to
those with whom we are friends.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be
loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are
conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity,
for He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He loves,
He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should love
irrational creatures out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity is referred to God principally, and
extends to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational
creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance of
image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they bear
the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. [2535]FP, Q[45], A[7]]. Therefore
charity extends also to irrational creatures.
Objection 3: Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the
object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we
believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes and
birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that walk, and
plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to irrational
creatures.
On the contrary, The love of charity extends to none but God and our
neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational
creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life.
Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.
I answer that, According to what has been stated above ([2536]Q[13],
A[1]) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is
twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our friendship
is given, secondly, the love for those good things which we desire for
our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can be
loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer
in a general way to friendship, which cannot have an irrational
creature for its object: first because friendship is towards one to
whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good
things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly
speaking, to possess good, this being proper to the rational creature
which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good
it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not
speak of good or evil befalling such like things, except
metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship is based on some
fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to friendship as to
live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. viii, 5). Now
irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human life which is
regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is
impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third reason is proper
to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship of everlasting
happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we
cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature.
Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we
regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, to
wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's use;
thus too does God love them out of charity.
Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the
capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does: and
so the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true,
whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have a
natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to love himself out of
charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that there "can
be no charity between less than two." Therefore no man has charity
towards himself.
Objection 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual
love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which cannot be of one man
towards himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2537]Q[23], A[1]). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards
himself.
Objection 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be
blameworthy, since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now
a man deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2
Tim. 3:1,2): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be
lovers of themselves." Therefore a man cannot love himself out of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy
friend as thyself." Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore
we should love ourselves too out of charity.
I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2538]Q[23], A[1]), we may consider charity from two standpoints:
first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must
hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but
something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas a
man is one with himself which is more than being united to another.
Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which
a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if we have
friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto
ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix, 4,8, that "the origin of
friendly relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves."
Thus too with regard to principles we have something greater than
science, namely understanding.
Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature,
namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and,
consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man himself
who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of
charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself out of
charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the general
notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the
same sense.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so
far as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which
they humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's
rational nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which
pertain to the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is
through charity that a man loves himself.
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Whether a man ought to love his body out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out of
charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to
associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body,
according to Rom. 7:24: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this
death?" and Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with
Christ." Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship
in the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that
enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.
Objection 3: Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is
towards those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot
love us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of
charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23,26) that there
are four things that we should love out of charity, and among them he
reckons our own body.
I answer that, Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of sin
and its punishment.
Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as
the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's
service, according to Rom. 6:13: "Present . . . your members as
instruments of justice unto God." Consequently, out of the love of
charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but
we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of
punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for the
removal of such things.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle did not shrink from the society of
his body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he
was loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: "We would not
be unclothed, but clothed over." He did, however, wish to escape from
the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from the
corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to hinder it
from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: "From the body of this
death."
Reply to Objection 2: Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by
knowing and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body,
we are able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the
enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the
body, viz., "the flush of health and incorruption," as Augustine states
(Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a fashion, a
share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Mutual love is found in the friendship which is
for another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in
respect of his soul, or in respect of his body.
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Whether we ought to love sinners out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of
charity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113): "I have hated the unjust."
But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated rather
than loved, out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, "love is proved by deeds" as Gregory says in a
homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the
unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of
hate, according to Ps. 100:8: "In the morning I put to death all the
wicked of the land": and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt
not suffer to live." Therefore sinners should not be loved out of
charity.
Objection 3: Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire
and wish good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity,
desire evil things for the wicked, according to Ps. 9:18: "May the
wicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V.: 'The wicked shall be,'
etc. See Reply to this Objection.]." Therefore sinners should not be
loved out of charity.
Objection 4: Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will
the same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will,
nor to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary.
Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.
Objection 5: Further, it is proper to friends to associate together,
according to Ethic. viii. But we ought not to associate with sinners,
according to 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go ye out from among them." Therefore we
should not love sinners out of charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that "when it
is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that we ought to
look upon every man as our neighbor." Now sinners do not cease to be
men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought to love
sinners out of charity.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in the sinner: his nature
and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a
capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as
stated above [2539](A[3]; Q[23], AA[1],5), wherefore we ought to love
sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.
On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle to
happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are
opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or
mother or kindred, according to Lk. 12:26. For it is our duty to hate,
in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man
capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, for
God's sake.
Reply to Objection 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the
object of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such
hatred is perfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): "I have hated
them with a perfect hatred." Now hatred of a person's evil is
equivalent to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs
to charity.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when
our friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of
friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and
we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover
money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than money
to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great wickedness, and
become incurable, we ought no longer to show them friendliness. It is
for this reason that both Divine and human laws command such like
sinners to be put to death, because there is greater likelihood of
their harming others than of their mending their ways. Nevertheless the
judge puts this into effect, not out of hatred for the sinners, but out
of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the public good
to the life of the individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the
judge profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of his
crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to put an end to
the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any
more.
Reply to Objection 3: Such like imprecations which we come across in
Holy Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of
prediction, not by way of wish, so that the sense is: "May the wicked
be," that is, "The wicked shall be, turned into hell." Secondly, by way
of wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the
man's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to Ps.
57:11: "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge," since,
according to Wis. 1:13, not even God "hath pleasure in the destruction
of the wicked [Vulg.: 'living']" when He punishes them, but He rejoices
in His justice, according to Ps. 10:8: "The Lord is just and hath loved
justice." Thirdly, so that this desire is referred to the removal of
the sin, and not to the punishment itself, to the effect, namely, that
the sin be destroyed, but that the man may live.
Reply to Objection 4: We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will
what they will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make
them will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is
written (Jer. 15:19): "They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt not
to be turned to them."
Reply to Objection 5: The weak should avoid associating with sinners,
on account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by
them. But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there
is no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them. For
thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by Mat.
9:11-13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards
fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 Cor. 6:17): "Go out
from among them . . . and touch not the unclean thing," i.e. by
consenting to sin.
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Whether sinners love themselves?
Objection 1: It would seem that sinners love themselves. For that which
is the principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love of self
is the principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28)
that it "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore sinners most of all
love themselves.
Objection 2: Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping
with nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even
irrational creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance, the
preservation of their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love
themselves.
Objection 3: Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div.
Nom. iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good. Therefore many
sinners love themselves.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth iniquity,
hateth his own soul."
I answer that, Love of self is common to all, in one way; in another
way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to the
wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks
himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: first, in
respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all think themselves
to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and body. In this way
too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, in so far as they
love their own preservation.
Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some
predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the
state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In
this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the
reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive and
corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the
Apostle calls the "inward man," and the latter, the "outward man" (2
Cor. 4:16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the inward
man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way they think
themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon
their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward man, to hold the
first place. Wherefore, since they know not themselves aright, they do
not love themselves aright, but love what they think themselves to be.
But the good know themselves truly, and therefore truly love
themselves.
The Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to
friendship. For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to
be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he
does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company;
fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost
the same things. In this way the good love themselves, as to the inward
man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its integrity, they
desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods, indeed they do
their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in entering into
their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts in the present,
the memory of past good, and the hope of future good, all of which are
sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no clashing of wills,
since their whole soul tends to one thing.
On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the
integrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual goods for
him, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in their
own company by entering into their own hearts, because whatever they
find there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor do they
agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of conscience,
according to Ps. 49:21: "I will reprove thee and set before thy face."
In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves, as
regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not love
themselves thus.
Reply to Objection 1: The love of self which is the principle of sin is
that which is proper to the wicked, and reaches "to the contempt of
God," as stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire
external goods as to despise spiritual goods.
Reply to Objection 2: Although natural love is not altogether forfeited
by wicked men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The wicked have some share of self-love, in so
far as they think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true
but apparent: and even this is not possible in those who are very
wicked.
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Whether charity requires that we should love our enemies?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not require us to love our
enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that "this great
good," namely, the love of our enemies, is "not so universal in its
application, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive us our
trespasses." Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity,
because, according to Prov. 10:12, "charity covereth all sins."
Therefore charity does not require that we should love our enemies.
Objection 2: Further, charity does not do away with nature. Now
everything, even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary, as
a lamb hates a wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not make us
love our enemies.
Objection 3: Further, charity "doth nothing perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4).
Now it seems perverse to love one's enemies, as it would be to hate
one's friends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Kings 19:6):
"Thou lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee."
Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 4:44): "Love your enemies."
I answer that, Love of one's enemies may be understood in three ways.
First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is perverse,
and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that which is evil in
another.
Secondly love of one's enemies may mean that we love them as to their
nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we
should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor,
we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor
in general.
Thirdly, love of one's enemies may be considered as specially directed
to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of love towards
our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely, because it does
not require that we should have a special movement of love to every
individual man, since this would be impossible. Nevertheless charity
does require this, in respect of our being prepared in mind, namely,
that we should be ready to love our enemies individually, if the
necessity were to occur. That man should actually do so, and love his
enemy for God's sake, without it being necessary for him to do so,
belongs to the perfection of charity. For since man loves his neighbor,
out of charity, for God's sake, the more he loves God, the more does he
put enmities aside and show love towards his neighbor: thus if we loved
a certain man very much, we would love his children though they were
unfriendly towards us. This is the sense in which Augustine speaks in
the passage quoted in the First Objection, the Reply to which is
therefore evident.
Reply to Objection 2: Everything naturally hates its contrary as such.
Now our enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself
should be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They are
not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness: and it
is as such that we are bound to love them.
Reply to Objection 3: It is wrong to love one's enemies as such:
charity does not do this, as stated above.
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Whether it is necessary for salvation that we should show our enemies the
signs and effects of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his
enemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:18):
"Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth." Now
a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects of
love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such signs
and effects of love.
Objection 2: Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (Mat. 5:44):
"Love your enemies," and, "Do good to them that hate you." Now charity
demands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we
should "do good to them."
Objection 3: Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object
of charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx),
that "love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great
things, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer love." Hence charity
towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But charity
requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though he be an
enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and effects of
love towards our enemies.
On the contrary, A gloss on Mat. 5:44, "Do good to them that hate you,"
says: "To do good to one's enemies is the height of perfection"
[*Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to do
that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not
require us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies.
I answer that, The effects and signs of charity are the result of
inward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely
necessary, for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly
love our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards
the mind being prepared to do so, as explained above [2540](A[8]).
We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and signs
of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to our
neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or for a
whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole community: and
the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show such like
favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we did not so, it
would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to what is written
(Lev. 19:18): "Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy
citizens." But there are other favors or signs of love, which one shows
to certain persons in particular: and it is not necessary for salvation
that we show our enemies such like favors and signs of love, except as
regards being ready in our minds, for instance to come to their
assistance in a case of urgency, according to Prov. 25:21: "If thy
enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give him . . . drink."
Outside cases of urgency, to show such like favors to an enemy belongs
to the perfection of charity, whereby we not only beware, as in duty
bound, of being overcome by evil, but also wish to overcome evil by
good [*Rom. 12:21], which belongs to perfection: for then we not only
beware of being drawn into hatred on account of the hurt done to us,
but purpose to induce our enemy to love us on account of our
kindliness.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels out
of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity is a
twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of the
angels is not contained in the love of God, since they are created
substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of our
neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common species.
Therefore we are not bound to love them out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the
angels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do.
But we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above
[2541](A[3]). Neither, therefore, have we towards the angels.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship
with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our
companions; we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give
them the friendship of charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): "If the name
of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those who pity
us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our neighbor
includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many merciful
favors."
I answer that, As stated above ([2542]Q[23], A[1]), the friendship of
charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in
which men share in common with the angels. For it is written (Mat.
22:30) that "in the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of
God in heaven." It is therefore evident that the friendship of charity
extends also to the angels.
Reply to Objection 1: Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us
in a common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the
blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter
fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded.
Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate
genus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers of
everlasting happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of our
rational mind wherein we associate with the angels.
Reply to Objection 3: The companionship of the angels does not consist
in outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive
nature; it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in
this life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above ([2543]Q[23], A[1],
ad 1).
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Whether we are bound to love the demons out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of
charity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their fellowship
with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in our fellowship
thus, since natural gifts, such as life and understanding, remain in
them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore we ought
to love the demons out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the
matter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves
the sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also
out of charity.
Objection 3: Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our
neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the
passage of Augustine quoted above [2544](A[9]). Now the demons are
useful to us in many things, for "by tempting us they work crowns for
us," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love
the demons out of charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 28:18): "Your league with death
shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not stand." Now
the perfection of a peace and covenant is through charity. Therefore we
ought not to have charity for the demons who live in hell and compass
death.
I answer that, As stated above [2545](A[6]), in the sinner, we are
bound, out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the
name of demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore
demons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying
stress on the word, the question as to whether the spirits called
demons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in accordance
with the statement made above ([2546]AA[2],3), that a thing may be
loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as the
person who is the object of friendship, and thus we cannot have the
friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential part
of friendship that one should be a well-wisher towards one's friend;
and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the good of
everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those spirits whom
God has condemned eternally, since this would be in opposition to our
charity towards God whereby we approve of His justice.
Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be enduring
as another's good. In this way we love irrational creatures out of
charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory to God and
be useful to man, as stated above [2547](A[3]): and in this way too we
can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as much as we
desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts, unto God's
glory.
Reply to Objection 1: The possession of everlasting happiness is not
impossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon;
consequently the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship
of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of nature, is
possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons.
Reply to Objection 2: In this life, men who are in sin retain the
possibility of obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are
lost in hell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons.
Reply to Objection 3: That the demons are useful to us is due not to
their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this
leads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their
perverse intention to our profit.
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Whether four things are rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, viz
.
God, our neighbor, our body and ourselves?
Objection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly
reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor, our
body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan.
lxxxiii), "he that loveth not God, loveth not himself." Hence love of
oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is
not distinct from the love of God.
Objection 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole.
But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be
condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.
Objection 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor.
Since then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct
from the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a
man loves his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct from the love with
which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not
rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): "There are
four things to be loved; one which is above us," namely God, "another,
which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us," namely our neighbor,
"and a fourth which is beneath us," namely our own body.
I answer that, As stated above ([2548]Q[23], AA[1],5), the friendship
of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this
fellowship, one thing is considered as the principle from which
happiness flows, namely God; a second is that which directly partakes
of happiness, namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which
happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body.
Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its
being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness,
can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being
identified with ourselves, or through being associated with us in
partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to be
loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his
neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: The different relations between a lover and the
various things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly,
since the relation between the human lover and God is different from
his relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of
love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other, so
that the former love being removed the latter is taken away.
Reply to Objection 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind that
can be capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach
directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable mind
which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves himself
in one way, and his own body in another.
Reply to Objection 3: Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and
as to his body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness.
Wherefore, on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for
loving him; and our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special object
of love.
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OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are
thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is an order in charity?
(2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor?
(3) Whether more than himself?
(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?
(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?
(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?
(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one who
is more closely united to him?
(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or
one who is united to him by other ties?
(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his
father ?
(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?
(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?
(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those
whom we are kind to?
(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
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Whether there is order in charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order in charity. For
charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues.
Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.
Objection 2: Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth,
so is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is
appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither,
therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs,
not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be
ascribed to charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Cant 2:4): "He brought me into the
cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me."
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the terms
"before" and "after" are used in reference to some principle. Now order
implies that certain things are, in some way, before or after. Hence
wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also order of some
kind. But it has been said above ([2549]Q[23], A[1];[2550] Q[25],
A[12]) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of
happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is
based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved out
of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of that
love, which is God.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity tends towards the last end considered as
last end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above
([2551]Q[23], A[6] ). Now the end has the character of principle in
matters of appetite and action, as was shown above ([2552]Q[23], A[7],
ad 2; FS, A[1], ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation
to the First Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find
an order in reference to the First Principle.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose
operation depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other
hand, charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in
the soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in
things themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order
is more appropriate to charity than to faith.
And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly
about God, and secondarily about things referred to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Order belongs to reason as the faculty that
orders, and to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered.
It is in this way that order is stated to be in charity.
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Whether God ought to be loved more than our neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than our
neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 4:20): "He that loveth not his
brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" Whence
it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lovable it
is, since loving begins with seeing, according to Ethic. ix, 5,12. Now
God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is less lovable,
out of charity, than our neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19:
"Every beast loveth its like." Now man bears more likeness to his
neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of charity,
more than he loves God.
Objection 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God,
according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27). Now God is not
greater in Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more
to be loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to
love God more than our neighbor.
On the contrary, A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be
hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's sake,
if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Lk. 14:26: "If
any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, end
children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be My disciple."
Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more than our neighbor.
I answer that, Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject in
which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that
friendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler of
the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends; hence
to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now the
friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness, which
consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it flows to
all who are capable of happiness.
Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of charity:
for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our neighbor is
loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness from Him.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as
being the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love,
since each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness.
Secondly, a thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in
this way that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were
lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we
are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more visible
is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with it before
others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's argument. For, since our
neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet
with, because "the soul learns, from those things it knows, to love
what it knows not," as Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi). Hence
it can be argued that, if any man loves not his neighbor, neither does
he love God, not because his neighbor is more lovable, but because he
is the first thing to demand our love: and God is more lovable by
reason of His greater goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness we have to God precedes and causes
the likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that
we share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we
become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we ought
to love God more than we love our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 3: Considered in His substance, God is equally in
all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in
anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess God's goodness equally
with God, for God has it essentially, and our neighbor by
participation.
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Whether out of charity, man is bound to love God more than himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to
love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8)
that "a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly
relations with himself." Now the cause is stronger than its effect.
Therefore man's friendship towards himself is greater than his
friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more
than God.
Objection 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own
good. Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing
itself which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are
the reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves
himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not
love God more than himself.
Objection 3: Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God.
But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this is
the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not
bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): "If thou
oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of Him
in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take offense
if him also thou lovest for God's sake." Now "the cause of a thing
being such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to love God more than
himself.
I answer that, The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of
nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods
bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of
which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves God
above all things and more than himself, but also every single creature,
each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by a rational,
or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones do, for
instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each part
naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own
particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the
principal inclination of each part is towards common action conducive
to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues whereby
sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own property and
persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much more is this
realized with regard to the friendship of charity which is based on the
fellowship of the gifts of grace.
Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common
good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the
universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share of
that happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations
towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of
friendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly
relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.
Reply to Objection 2: The part does indeed love the good of the whole,
as becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to
itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.
Reply to Objection 3: That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that
love of God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the
love of friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because
the Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in
enjoying Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than
himself.
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Whether our of charity, man ought to love himself more than his neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to
love himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of
charity is God, as stated above [2553](A[2]; Q[25], AA[1],12). Now
sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to God than we are
ourselves. Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.
Objection 2: Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid
injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his
neighbor's sake, according to Prov. 12:26: "He that neglecteth a loss
for the sake of a friend, is just." Therefore a man ought, out of
charity, to love his neighbor more than himself.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) "charity seeketh not
its own." Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek
most. Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than
his neighbor.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18, Mat. 22:39): "Thou shalt
love thy neighbor (Lev. 19:18: 'friend') as thyself." Whence it seems
to follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love for
another. But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of charity, a
man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.
I answer that, There are two things in man, his spiritual nature and
his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason of
his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated above
([2554]Q[25], A[7]): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of charity,
to love himself more than he loves any other person.
This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated above
([2555]Q[25], AA[1],12), God is loved as the principle of good, on
which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, loves
himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and
loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good. Now
fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain union in
relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, the fact that
man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for
loving than that another should be a partner with him in that share.
Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than his
neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any evil of
sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may
free his neighbor from sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The love of charity takes its quantity not only
from its object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man
that has charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some
way on the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to
God, yet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this
man is to himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his
neighbor more than himself.
Reply to Objection 2: A man ought to bear bodily injury for his
friend's sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as
regards his spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of
virtue, which is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man
ought not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor
from sin, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the
saying, "'charity seeks not her own,' means that it prefers the common
to the private good." Now the common good is always more lovable to the
individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is more
lovable to the part, than the latter's own partial good, as stated
above [2556](A[3]).
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Whether a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to love his neighbor
more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his neighbor's body.
If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body,
it follows that he ought to love his neighbor's body more than his own.
Objection 2: Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his
neighbor's, as stated above [2557](A[4]). Now a man's own body is
nearer to his soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our
body more than our neighbor.
Objection 3: Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the
sake of what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his
own body for his neighbor's safety: this belongs to the perfect,
according to Jn. 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man
lay down his life for his friends." Therefore a man is not bound, out
of charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "we
ought to love our neighbor more than our own body."
I answer that, Out of charity we ought to love more that which has more
fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above
[2558](A[2]; Q[25], A[12]). Now fellowship in the full participation of
happiness which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a greater
reason for loving, than the participation of happiness by way of
overflow, which is the reason for loving one's own body. Therefore, as
regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more than
our own body.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a
thing seems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say
that we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers
to his soul, which is his predominant part.
Reply to Objection 2: Our body is nearer to our soul than our neighbor,
as regards the constitution of our own nature: but as regards the
participation of happiness, our neighbor's soul is more closely
associated with our own soul, than even our own body is.
Reply to Objection 3: Every man is immediately concerned with the care
of his own body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps in
cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a man
to imperil his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a case
where he is under obligation to do so and if a man of his own accord
offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection of
charity.
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Whether we ought to love one neighbor more than another?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor more
than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "One ought
to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to all, we
ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any
other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely united to
us." Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than another.
Objection 2: Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving
several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and
the same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is God, as
Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to love
all our neighbors equally.
Objection 3: Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an
equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our
neighbors equally.
On the contrary, One's obligation to love a person is proportionate to
the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love. Now it
is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain neighbors,
than against the love of others. Hence the commandment (Lev. 10:9), "He
that curseth his father or mother, dying let him die," which does not
apply to those who cursed others than the above. Therefore we ought to
love some neighbors more than others.
I answer that, There have been two opinions on this question: for some
have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our neighbors
equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the outward
effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood as
applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who are
connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and not
to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all
including our enemies.
But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the
inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite,
which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from
Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural
inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement that
is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the inclination
of gravity is greater than in water, because it is becoming to earth to
be beneath water. Consequently the inclination also of grace which is
the effect of charity, must needs be proportionate to those actions
which have to be performed outwardly, so that, to wit, the affection of
our charity be more intense towards those to whom we ought to behave
with greater kindness.
We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought to
love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the
principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be
that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to
one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above
[2559](A[1]), wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation
to that principle.
Reply to Objection 1: Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the
part of the good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men
equally out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good,
namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater
through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not to
love all equally.
Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two
ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As regards
beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because we cannot
do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not to be thus
unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some more than
others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter inequality,
but the former, as is evident from what he says of beneficence.
Reply to Objection 2: Our neighbors are not all equally related to God;
some are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those
we ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near
to Him.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the quantity of love on
the part of the good which we wish our friends.
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Whether we ought to love those who are better more those who are more
closely united us?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love those who are better
more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is in
no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for some
reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black mixed
with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for some
reason, according to Lk. 14:26: "If any man come to Me, and hate not
his father," etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful for any
reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who are better
more than those who are more closely connected with us.
Objection 2: Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But
God loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity,
ought to love the better man more than one who is more closely united
to him.
Objection 3: Further, in every friendship that ought to be loved most
which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by
natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by
nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship
of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has more
to do with better men than with those who are more closely united to
us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men more than
those who are more closely connected with us.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not care
of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the
faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now the inward affection of
charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity
regards those who are nearer to us before those who are better.
I answer that, Every act should be proportionate both to its object and
to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while, from the
power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus movement
has its species from the term to which it tends, while the intensity of
its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved and the power
of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from its object, but
its intensity is due to the lover.
Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover.
Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance
with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his
relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater good
to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity wishes
to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it has
various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it
belongs to charity to wish God's justice to be maintained, in
accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness. And
this regards the species of love; for there are different species of
love according to the different goods that we wish for those whom we
love.
On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to the
man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more closely
united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for
them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater good he
wishes for them.
Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors
are connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which
cannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are.
But the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come and
go, increase and decrease, as was shown above ([2560]Q[24],
AA[4],10,11). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish
this man who is more closely united to one, to be better than another,
and so reach a higher degree of happiness.
Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we love
more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love them in
more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us we have no
other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are connected with
us, we have certain other friendships, according to the way in which
they are connected. Now since the good on which every other friendship
of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to its end, to the good on
which charity is based, it follows that charity commands each act of
another friendship, even as the art which is about the end commands the
art which is about the means. Consequently this very act of loving
someone because he is akin or connected with us, or because he is a
fellow-countryman or for any like reason that is referable to the end
of charity, can be commanded by charity, so that, out of charity both
eliciting and commanding, we love in more ways those who are more
nearly connected with us.
Reply to Objection 1: We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not
their kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us
and God. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according
to Micah 7:6: "A men's enemies are they of his own household."
Reply to Objection 2: Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by
making man comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards
what is His. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as
becoming to us which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to
will them, as stated above ([2561]FS, Q[19], A[10]), when we were
treating of the goodness of the will.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity elicits the act of love not only as
regards the object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The
result is that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.
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Whether we ought to love more those who are connected with us by ties of
blood?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love more those who are
more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written (Prov.
18:24): "A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than a
brother." Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv 7):
"The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to the ties
of blood." Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that as to the
latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract the former
by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to
love more than others those who are united to us by ties of blood.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less
you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in
wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace." Surely we
ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than
those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not
love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.
Objection 3: Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states
(Hom. in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others
than our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather
than his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of
all.
On the contrary, The commandments of the decalogue contain a special
precept about the honor due to our parents (Ex. 20:12). Therefore we
ought to love more specially those who are united to us by ties of
blood.
I answer that, As stated above [2562](A[7]), we ought out of charity to
love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our
love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for
loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and
beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different persons
according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is more loved
in matters touching that particular union in respect of which he is
loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should compare one
union with another. Accordingly we must say that friendship among blood
relations is based upon their connection by natural origin, the
friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic fellowship, and the
friendship of those who are fighting side by side on the comradeship of
battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to nature we should love our
kindred most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we
should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield our
fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is
our duty to render to each class of people such respect as is natural
and appropriate. This is in fact the principle upon which we seem to
act, for we invite our relations to a wedding . . . It would seem to be
a special duty to afford our parents the means of living . . . and to
honor them."
The same applies to other kinds of friendship.
If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union
arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all
others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas
other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the
friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be
stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.
Reply to Objection 1: In as much as the friendship of comrades
originates through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence
of the love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose,
for instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is
more stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in
matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in
the providing of necessaries.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors
respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in
this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom he
has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom he
is bound to support in bodily sustenance.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that in the battle a man obeys his
officer rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less,
not simply relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on
fellowship in battle.
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Whether a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his
father?
Objection 1: It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his
children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to whom
we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good to our
children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:14):
"Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the parents
for the children." Therefore a man ought to love his children more than
his parents.
Objection 2: Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love
their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more than
his parents.
Objection 3: Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity.
But God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also
ought to love our children more than our parents.
On the contrary, Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "We ought to
love God first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly those
of our household."
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1; A[7]), the degrees of love
may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the object.
In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to God, the
more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love his father
more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as his
principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good and more like
God.
Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of
the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more
closely connected with him, in which way a man's children are more
lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of
themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the love
of a father for his children, is more like a man's love for himself.
Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is their child
than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to their parents,
as being part of them, than their parents are to them to whom they
stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because parents have
loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at once, whereas
the child begins to love his father after a lapse of time; and the
longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to Ecclus. 9:14:
"Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be like to him."
Reply to Objection 1: The debt due to a principle is submission of
respect and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence
and care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly
in honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of
care.
Reply to Objection 2: It is natural for a man as father to love his
children more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but
if we consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves
his father more.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God
loves us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is
related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to the
father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to be
provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless in
cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received to
provide for his parents before all.
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Whether a man ought to love his mother more than his father?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more
than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i,
20), "the female produces the body in generation." Now man receives his
soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in the
[2563]FP, Q[90], A[2]; Q[118]. Therefore a man receives more from his
mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to love her more
than him.
Objection 2: Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due.
Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for
their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she
knows more surely than the father who are her children."
Objection 3: Further, love should be more fond towards those who have
labored for us more, according to Rom. 16:6: "Salute Mary, who hath
labored much among you." Now the mother labors more than the father in
giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written
(Ecclus. 7:29): "Forget not the groanings of thy mother." Therefore a
man ought to love his mother more than his father.
On the contrary, Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that "man ought to love
God the Father of all, and then his own father," and mentions the
mother afterwards.
I answer that, In making such comparisons as this, we must take the
answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether the
father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as mother. The
reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such like
matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, as the
Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii
in Cant.] says: "Good servants should be preferred to wicked children."
Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the
mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural
origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the
mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a
passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the
father is to be loved more.
Reply to Objection 1: In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the
formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through
the formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though this
power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter of
the body to receive that form.
Reply to Objection 2: This applies to another kind of love. For the
friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the
friendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are
speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother
through being begotten of them.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
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Whether a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more than
his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another unless he
love the latter more. Now it is written (Gn. 2:24) that "a man shell
leave father and mother" on account of his wife. Therefore a man ought
to love his wife more than his father and mother.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33) that a husband
should "love his wife as himself." Now a man ought to love himself more
than his parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than
his parents.
Objection 2: Further, love should be greater where there are more
reasons for loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the
friendship of a man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
viii, 12) that "in this friendship there are the motives of utility,
pleasure, and also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous."
Therefore a man's love for his wife ought to be greater than his love
for his parents.
On the contrary, According to Eph. 5:28, "men ought to love their wives
as their own bodies." Now a man ought to love his body less than his
neighbor, as stated above [2564](A[5]): and among his neighbors he
should love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents
more than his wife.
I answer that, As stated above [2565](A[9]), the degrees of love may be
taken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those
who love. On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man
should love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as
his principles and considered as a more exalted good.
But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more, because
she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to Mat. 19:6:
"Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh." Consequently a man
loves his wife more intensely, but his parents with greater reverence.
Reply to Objection 1: A man does not in all respects leave his father
and mother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought
to succor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all
his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal
connection and co-habitation.
Reply to Objection 2: The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man
ought to love his wife equally with himself, but that a man's love for
himself is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with
him.
Reply to Objection 3: There are also several reasons for a man's love
for his father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards
good, are more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife;
although the latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the
union.
As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in
the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality of love but
the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife
is her being united to him in the flesh.
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Whether a man ought to love more his benefactor than one he has benefited?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor more
than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv):
"Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love him
first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses to
love, but declines to return love already given." Now a man's
benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore we
ought to love our benefactors above all.
Objection 2: Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a
man or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is
a more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against
him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly
actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those to
whom we are kind.
Objection 3: Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most,
and then one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25].
Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should
be loved above all others.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that "benefactors
seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather than vice versa."
I answer that, As stated above ([2566]AA[9],11), a thing is loved more
in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent
good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we
ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle of
good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more
excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father
[2567](A[9]).
In the second way, however, we love those more who have received
benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by four
arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the handiwork
of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: "He was made by
so and so." Now it is natural to a man to love his own work (thus it is
to be observed that poets love their own poems): and the reason is that
we love "to be" and "to live," and these are made manifest in our
"action." Secondly, because we all naturally love that in which we see
our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor has some good of his
in the recipient of his benefaction, and the recipient some good in the
benefactor; but the benefactor sees his virtuous good in the recipient,
while the recipient sees his useful good in the benefactor. Now it
gives more pleasure to see one's virtuous good than one's useful good,
both because it is more enduring for usefulness quickly flits by, and
the pleasure of calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of
having it present and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous
goods than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is
it the lover's part to act, since he wills and works the good of the
beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so
that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love
is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more difficult
to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of things which
have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what comes easy to
us.
Reply to Objection 1: It is some thing in the benefactor that incites
the recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient,
not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of
his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do
through another.
Reply to Objection 2: The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is
more of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other
hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more
spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.
Reply to Objection 3: God also loves us more than we love Him, and
parents love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not
follow that we love all who have received good from us, more than any
of our benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our
parents, from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on
whom we have bestowed lesser benefits.
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Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity does not endure in
heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): "Perfect charity
consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods less." Now
charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will love those who
are better more than either himself or those who are connected with
him.
Objection 2: Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good.
Now each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more
good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's will:
and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in heaven each
one loves more those who are better, and consequently he loves others
more than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one
who is.
Objection 3: Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake,
for then will be fulfilled the words of 1 Cor. 15:28: "That God may be
all in all." Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so that
a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is not
connected with him, more than one who is.
On the contrary, Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory. Now
the order of charity given above ([2568]AA[2],3,4) is derived from
nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others.
Therefore this order of charity will endure in heaven.
I answer that, The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as
regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized
simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order
between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be
necessary, because, as we stated above ([2569]AA[7],9), the degrees of
love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man
desires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. In
the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those
who are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the perfect
conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will
desire everyone to have what is due to him according to Divine justice.
Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of merit to a yet
greater reward, as happens now while it is possible for a man to desire
both the virtue and the reward of a better man, whereas then the will
of each one will rest within the limits determined by God. But in the
second way a man will love himself more than even his better neighbors,
because the intensity of the act of love arises on the part of the
person who loves, as stated above ([2570]AA[7],9). Moreover it is for
this that the gift of charity is bestowed by God on each one, namely,
that he may first of all direct his mind to God, and this pertains to a
man's love for himself, and that, in the second place, he may wish
other things to be directed to God, and even work for that end
according to his capacity.
As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply
love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because
the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to
God, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with
respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be nearer
to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will no longer
succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein each man
has to succor those who are closely connected with him rather than
those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their distress:
hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of charity,
loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he is under a
greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of charity. It will
however be possible in heaven for a man to love in several ways one who
is connected with him, since the causes of virtuous love will not be
banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet all these reasons are
incomparably surpassed by that which is taken from nighness to God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument should be granted as to those who
are connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love
himself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect,
since perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man's charity
directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the order of charity in
respect of the degree of good one wills the person one loves.
Reply to Objection 3: God will be to each one the entire reason of his
love, for God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible
supposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's reason
for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should love
himself more than all else after God.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRINCIPLE ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of
charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow
from that act.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?
(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as
goodwill?
(3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake?
(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
(5) Whether God can be loved wholly?
(6) Whether the love of God is according to measure?
(7) Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy? (8)
Which is the better, to love God, or one's neighbor?
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Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be
loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those who
are themselves better. But those who are better should be more loved.
Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.
Objection 2: Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems
to be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "many would rather be loved
than love, and lovers of flattery always abound." Therefore it is
better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in keeping
with charity.
Objection 3: Further, "the cause of anything being such is yet more
so." Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De
Catech. Rud. iv) that "nothing incites another more to love you than
that you love him first." Therefore charity consists in being loved
rather than in loving.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that friendship
consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity is a kind of
friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than in being loved.
I answer that, To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since
charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its
proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the person
loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent to him as
coming under the common notion of good, in so far as another tends
towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is clear that to love
is more proper to charity than to be loved: for that which befits a
thing by reason of itself and its essence is more competent to it than
that which is befitting to it by reason of something else. This can be
exemplified in two ways. First, in the fact that friends are more
commended for loving than for being loved, indeed, if they be loved and
yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly, because a mother, whose love
is the greatest, seeks rather to love than to be loved: for "some
women," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their
children to a nurse; they do love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved
in return, if they happen not to be loved."
Reply to Objection 1: A better man, through being better, is more
lovable; but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves
more, however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man
does not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved:
whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much as
he ought to be loved.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men
wish to be loved in as much as they wish to be honored." For just as
honor is bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which
is in him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since
good alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be
honored, for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good
which is in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity
seek to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the
good of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good.
Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be
loved.
Reply to Objection 3: Some love on account of being loved, not so that
to be loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way
leading a man to love.
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Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?
Objection 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of
charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is goodwill.
Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.
Objection 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit.
Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above
([2571]Q[24], A[1]). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the
will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the
act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to
friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should wish
his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and to live;
the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the fourth,
that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, that he
should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain to
goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill is
neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship." Now
charity is friendship, as stated above ([2572]Q[23], A[1]). Therefore
goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.
I answer that, Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will
whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from
actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but
also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which
is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its
object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused
suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved;
wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and
the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not
imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager
inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one
man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous
acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to
us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to
win. But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs
from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between
the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as
somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him.
On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we
wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of
the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of
charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of
affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that
"goodwill is a beginning of friendship."
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does
not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in
which the act of love is chiefly manifested.
Reply to Objection 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to
the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is
not denoted by goodwill.
Reply to Objection 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong
to friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he
says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in
respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this
belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
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Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for
Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a
homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to
love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the
intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the
objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of
something else.
Objection 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through
something else, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."
Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for
Himself.
Objection 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Mat.
1:1, and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his
commentary on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon.
Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God,
while fear shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it
seems that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or
some evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to enjoy
is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be enjoyed"
as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.
I answer that, The preposition "for" denotes a relation of causality.
Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal, efficient, and
material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though
it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four
different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In respect
of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, for health; in
respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to
wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in
respect of the efficient cause, we love certain men because, for
instance, they are the sons of such and such a father; and in respect
of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of a material cause,
we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it,
e.g. we love a man for the favors received from him, although after we
have begun to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors,
but for his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we
love God, not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not
directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of
all things; nor does He require to receive any form in order to be
good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the
exemplar of all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to
Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In the fourth
way, however, He can be loved for something else, because we are
disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by
favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or
even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.
Reply to Objection 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love
what it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason
for its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or
efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man
to love the unknown.
Reply to Objection 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other
things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but
through Himself, according to Jn. 4:42: "We now believe, not for thy
saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed
the Saviour of the world."
Reply to Objection 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain
disposition, as was shown above ([2573]Q[17], A[8];[2574] Q[19],
AA[4],7,10).
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Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this
life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De Trin. x,
1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since "we see now
through a glass, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Neither, therefore,
do we love Him immediately.
Objection 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is
more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is
joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But man
cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him
immediately.
Objection 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Is.
59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Now sin
is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able
to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.
On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be
"enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor. 13:12. But
charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage (1 Cor.
13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.
I answer that, As stated above ([2575]FP, Q[82], A[3]; Q[84], A[7]),
the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in
the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the
appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows
that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in respect
of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows
the mode of the knower.
Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable
and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness
itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to
us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are
knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of
knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.
Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the
appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and
flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God
immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, with
regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other
things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of
pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf.
[2576]FP, Q[12], A[12]).
Reply to Objection 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not
follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love,
since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin
at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known
through another thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Since to love God is something greater than to
know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God
presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest
in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love begins
there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to
speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to God, and love
begins with God as the last end, and passes on to creatures.
Reply to Objection 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin,
is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by
loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of
spiritual union.
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Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q[184], A[2]]
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love
follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this
would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved
by us.
Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div.
Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God, because
"God is greater than our heart" (1 Jn. 3:20). Therefore God cannot be
loved wholly.
Objection 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be
loved wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves
Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved
by a creature.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart."
I answer that, Since love may be considered as something between lover
and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the question
may be understood in three ways, first so that the qualification
"wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God is to be loved
wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.
Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the lover:
and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought to love
God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love of God,
according to Dt. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart."
Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to the
thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the thing
loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in proportion
to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is
infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of
creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is finite.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first
three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the
last takes it in the second sense.
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Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving
God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as
Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the
best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things,
have charity." Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee,
tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the
desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought." But it would be
useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one.
Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the
measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode." Now the measure
of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore
just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the
exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: "Your reasonable
service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the cause
of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure."
I answer that, As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above (OBJ
3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to
be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the
same way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a measure
is of itself the determining and modifying rule of other things;
whereas in the things measured, it is found relatively, that is in so
far as they attain to the measure. Hence there can be nothing
unmodified in the measure whereas the thing measured is unmodified if
it fails to attain to the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess.
Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end,
because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be taken
from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the
end has a mode by itself, while the means take their mode from being
proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Polit.
i, 3), "in every art, the desire for the end is endless and unlimited,"
whereas there is a limit to the means: thus the physician does not put
limits to health, but makes it as perfect as he possibly can; but he
puts a limit to medicine, for he does not give as much medicine as he
can, but according as health demands so that if he give too much or too
little, the medicine would be immoderate.
Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God,
whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above
([2577]Q[23], A[6]), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be
taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little, but
as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the
more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love
God the better our love is.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence
of that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the
measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the
goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something
else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands
before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured .
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine adds in the same passage, "the
measure of our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart," that
is to love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode
which is proper to the measure.
Reply to Objection 3: An affection, whose object is subject to reason's
judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the Divine
love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not
measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity between the
interior act and external acts of charity. For the interior act of
charity has the character of an end, since man's ultimate good consists
in his soul cleaving to God, according to Ps. 72:28: "It is good for me
to adhere to my God"; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the
end, and so have to be measured both according to charity and according
to reason.
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Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend?
Objection 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to
love a friend. For it is written (Mat. 5:46): "If you love them that
love you, what reward shall you have?" Therefore it is not deserving of
reward to love one's friend: whereas, as the same passage proves, to
love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more
meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.
Objection 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding
from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God
to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity
love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's
enemy than to love one's friend.
Objection 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems
to be more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward
according to his own labor" (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a
greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it is
more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's enemy
than to love one's friend.
On the contrary, The better an action is, the more meritorious it is.
Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love a
better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy who
hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend than
to love one's enemy.
I answer that, God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of
charity, as stated above ([2578]Q[25], A[1]). When therefore it is
asked which is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or
one's enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the
part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the reason
for which we love him.
In the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy,
because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so that
he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of love
that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its opposite is
worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.
In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than one's
friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible to love
one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the only
reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose that
both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the
stronger through carrying a man's affections to things which are
furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the
power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it throws
its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is proved to
be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the things we
accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so much the
stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable matter.
Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near than
on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor those who
are united to us than those who are far removed; and in this respect
the love of friends, considered in itself, is more ardent and better
than the love of one's enemy.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their
strict sense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in
God's sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and
this would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way
that we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends
is meritorious, if we love them for God's sake, and not merely because
they are our friends.
The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said in
the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the reason
for loving, while the last considers the question on the part of those
who are loved.
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Whether it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's
neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem to
be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of
our neighbor to the love of God, according to Rom. 9:3: "I wished
myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren." Therefore it is
more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.
Objection 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less
meritorious to love one's friend, as stated above [2579](A[7]). Now God
is our chief friend, since "He hath first loved us" (1 Jn. 4:10).
Therefore it seems less meritorious to love God.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more
virtuous and meritorious since "virtue is about that which is difficult
and good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love
one's neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because
there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's
neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than
to love God.
On the contrary, That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more
so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by reason
of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God is more
meritorious than the love of our neighbor.
I answer that, This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by
considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love of
God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its own
sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom the
movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to him
that loves God (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My
Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him." Secondly, the
comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the
one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other.
In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of
God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be
between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, and
inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this commandment we have
from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother" (1 Jn. 4:21).
Reply to Objection 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not
desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he
was in a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a
state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.
We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in
Ep. ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his
neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he
wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which pertains
to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in his
neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less
meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall
short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God.
Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit,
but is the entire reason for merit.
Reply to Objection 3: The "good" has, more than the "difficult," to do
with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that
whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more
difficult, and at the same time better.
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OF JOY (FOUR ARTICLES)
WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of
charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the exterior
effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy,
(2) Peace, (3) Mercy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?
(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?
(3) Whether this joy can be full?
(4) Whether it is a virtue?
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Whether joy is effected in us by charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity.
For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But God,
Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this
state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent from the
Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than
joy.
Objection 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit
happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among
those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Mat. 5:5:
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore
sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown
above ([2580]Q[17], A[6]). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to
Rom. 12:12: "Rejoicing in hope." Therefore it is not the effect of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." But
joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 14:17: "The
kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in
the Holy Ghost." Therefore charity is a cause of joy.
I answer that, As stated above ([2581]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2,3), when we
were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in
contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the presence
of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved
exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the
love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his
friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from love,
either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the loved
object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with
some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable,
since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He
is in those who love Him by His most excellent effect, according to 1
Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him."
Therefore spiritual joy, which is about God, is caused by charity.
Reply to Objection 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be
"absent from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He is
present to some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle goes on
to say (2 Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight."
Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him,
by the indwelling of His grace.
Reply to Objection 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about
those things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to
the same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy
about God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to
grieve for things that are contrary to it.
Reply to Objection 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways.
First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself;
secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The
former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the
latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward to enjoy
the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether perfect or
imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with a
n
admixture of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from
charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to
charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, 6:
"Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the
truth." But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow,
according to Rom. 12:15: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with
them that weep." Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible
with an admixture of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv),
"penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again
those we have deplored." But there is no true penance without charity.
Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with
Christ according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to
be with Christ." Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain
sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is
prolonged!" Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of
sorrow.
On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now
such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: "Her
conversation hath no bitterness." Therefore the joy of charity is
incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), a twofold joy in God
arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and
with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This
joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the
good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil:
hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always."
The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good
as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything
contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is
compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for
that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us
or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.
Reply to Objection 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of
some evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the
sovereign good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far
as he is hindered from participating in the Divine good.
Reply to Objection 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to
Is. 59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins,
or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from participating
in the Divine good.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate,
after a fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the
unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in
the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the
delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of
the Divine good.
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Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled?
Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from
charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is
our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is
meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is
infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy
in God can never be filled.
Objection 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the
joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is greater
than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a creature.
Objection 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the
fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature is
finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be
comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God
can be filled.
On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:11): "That My
joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled."
I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on
the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as
it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy alone in
Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is condignly due to
the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be
finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the part of the
one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement,
as stated above ([2582]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), when we were treating of
the passions: and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence
joy is full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as
we are in this world, the movement of desire does not cease in us,
because it still remains possible for us to approach nearer to God by
grace, as was shown above (Q[24], AA[4],7). When once, however, perfect
happiness has been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because
then there will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain
whatever he had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to
Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Hence desire
will be at rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so
that the joy of the blessed is full to perfection---indeed over-full,
since they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for
"neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath
prepared for them that love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by
the words of Lk. 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken
together, and running over shall they give into your bosom." Yet, since
no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it follows that
this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on the contrary,
man enters into it, according to Mat. 25:21: "Enter into the joy of thy
Lord."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in
reference to the thing in which we rejoice.
Reply to Objection 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach
the term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further
will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some
will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy will be
full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at
rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account of a
fuller participation of the Divine happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in
respect of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be.
There is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just
as we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That
you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and
spiritual understanding."
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Whether joy is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary
to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth
and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of
which is "good," so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be
virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4:
"Rejoice in the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue.
On the contrary, It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor
among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from
what has been said above (FS, QQ[57],60,62).
I answer that, As stated above ([2583]FS, Q[55], AA[2],4), virtue is an
operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to
a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed
several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from
another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous
habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is
defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those
other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we
have said about the passions ([2584]FS, Q[25], AA[2],4) that love is
the first affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy
follow from it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and
desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love
is the first of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy,
nor from desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not
a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for
which reason it is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by
inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general
source of the vices, as stated above ([2585]FS, Q[77], A[4]); so that
it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special
vices, because they do not arise from a special, but from a general
vice. On the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue,
namely charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as
stated above (here and A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but
hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.
"difficult," and "possible to obtain"; for which reason it is accounted
a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any
special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of
charity, albeit not its first act.
__________________________________________________________________
OF PEACE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?
(2) Whether all things desire peace?
(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?
(4) Whether peace is a virtue?
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Whether peace is the same as concord?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well ordered
concord." Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men.
Therefore peace is the same as concord.
Objection 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of
peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi)
that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is
the same as concord.
Objection 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are
themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and
peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "God is not
the God of dissension but of peace." Therefore peace is the same as
concord.
On the contrary, There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But
"there is no peace to the wicked" (Is. 48:22). Therefore peace is not
the same as concord.
I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence
wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever
there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.
For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so
far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the
same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse
things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse
appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that
which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Gal. 5:17: "The
flesh lusteth against the spirit." Secondly, in so far as one and the
same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it
cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a
clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such
movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace,
so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there
still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at
the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to
concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various
persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of
the appetites even in one man.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which
is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord,
not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through
one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both
of them . For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord,
but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that
besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each
concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring
cause. For this reason he premises that "peace is tranquillity of
order," which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in
one man being set at rest together.
Reply to Objection 2: If one man consent to the same thing together
with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to
himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in
agreement.
Reply to Objection 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely
dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man
and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all things desire peace?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But
there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of
knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.
Objection 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at
the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do
not desire peace.
Objection 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a
certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said
(Mat. 10:34): "I came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not
desire peace.
Objection 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the
sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace,
since it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly
command (Mk. 9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not
desire peace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12,14) that "all
things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).
I answer that, From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it
follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence,
to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man
may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary
desire either of his own or of some other, and both are removed by
peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that whoever
desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires anything,
desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that
which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine
defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order."
Reply to Objection 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective
or rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which
consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius
says that "peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness," where
"consent" denotes the union of appetites proceeding from knowledge, and
"connaturalness," the union of natural appetites.
Reply to Objection 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire
nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we
stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man
counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war
to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that
they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence
all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that
which they had heretofore.
Reply to Objection 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now
just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is
good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There
can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is
truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as
to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many defects,
which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. Hence true
peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the
wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is
written (Wis. 14:22): "Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance,
they call so many and so great evils peace."
Reply to Objection 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as
the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so
there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the
perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires
by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational
creature, according to Ps. 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in thy
borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world,
for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there
are certain things within and without which disturb the peace.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether peace is the proper effect of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of
charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But
some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes
have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.
Objection 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its
contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is
contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even
holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of their
opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one
another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the effect of
charity.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of
different things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Is.
32:17: "And the work of justice shall be peace." Therefore it is not
the effect of charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they
that love Thy Law."
I answer that, Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above
[2586](A[1]). The first is the result of one's own appetites being
directed to one object; while the other results from one's own appetite
being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is
effected by charity---the first, in so far as man loves God with his
whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires
tend to one object---the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as
ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's will
as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if
people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says
(De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same things" (Sallust,
Catilin.)
Reply to Objection 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of
sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him
place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave
chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence,
without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends
need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life,
and especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small
matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those
who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an
obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which
precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if there
be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some
that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such a
dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man
thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension,
belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that
it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight matters
and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace,
wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; but
it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer.
Reply to Objection 3: Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so
far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of
charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes
peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether peace is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a
matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are
precepts about keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you" (Mk.
9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it
is meritorious to keep peace, according to Mat. 5:9: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Therefore
peace is a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions,
which are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20).
Therefore peace is a virtue.
On the contrary, Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto. But
peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([2587]Q[28], A[4]), when a number of
acts all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other,
they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue
from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For,
though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not two
powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction: and fire
produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.
Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God and
of our neighbor, as shown above [2588](A[3]), there is no other virtue
except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in
reference to joy (Q[28], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an
act of charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence
it is placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as
stated above ([2589]FS, Q[69], AA[1],3). It is also numbered among the
fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in
respect of its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to
charity, in respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy,
in respect of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.
__________________________________________________________________
OF MERCY (FOUR ARTICLES) [*The one Latin word "misericordia" signifies either
pity or mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may stand eithe
r
for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for the virtue.]
We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person
pitied?
(2) To whom does it belong to pity?
(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether evil is properly the motive of mercy?
Objection 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the
motive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q[19], A[1]; [2590]FS, Q[79],
A[1], ad 4; [2591]FP, Q[48] , A[6]), fault is an evil rather than
punishment. Now fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore
evil does not excite mercy.
Objection 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils.
Now the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call
for pity but drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the
motive of mercy.
Objection 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of
evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8).
Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is a
kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is the
motive of mercy.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is
heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him
if we can. For mercy takes its name "misericordia" from denoting a
man's compassionate heart [miserum cor] for another's unhappiness. Now
unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to beatitude
or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for, according to
Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has whatever he desires,
and desires nothing amiss." Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to
unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not.
Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural appetite;
thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a man wishes a
thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in
itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat what is bad for
him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.
Accordingly the motive of "mercy," being something pertaining to
"misery," is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's natural
appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the contrary of which
man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8)
that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or
distressing." Secondly, such like evils are yet more provocative of
pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our pity "when it is
the result of an accident, as when something turns out ill, whereas we
hoped well of it." Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are
entirely contrary to the will, as when evil befalls a man who has
always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8)
that "we pity most the distress of one who suffers undeservedly."
Reply to Objection 1: It is essential to fault that it be voluntary;
and in this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since,
however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having something
connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it may, in this
respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and
commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in Evang.
xxxiv) that "true godliness is not disdainful but compassionate," and
again it is written (Mat. 9:36) that Jesus "seeing the multitudes, had
compassion on them: because they were distressed, and lying like sheep
that have no shepherd."
Reply to Objection 2: Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it
is directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself,
except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered to
have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus. 30:24):
"Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" [*Cf.[2592] Q[106], A[3], ad
1].
Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself,
but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in ourselves,
so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to us, as to be
part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents, we do not pity
their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense the
Philosopher says that "harshness drives pity away."
Reply to Objection 3: Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of
good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the recollection
of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are present to the
senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so far as they
represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the reason for taking pity is a defect in the person who pities?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a
defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be
merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are
over all His works." But there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect
cannot be the reason for taking pity.
Objection 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those
in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is
false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in a
desperate state are pitiless." Therefore it seems that the reason for
taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.
Objection 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective.
But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to
contumely are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a
defect in the person who pities.
On the contrary, Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the reason
of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to sorrow
more easily, as we shall say further on ([2593]Q[35], A[1], ad 2).
Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.
I answer that, Since pity is grief for another's distress, as stated
above [2594](A[1]), from the very fact that a person takes pity on
anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since
sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for
another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as
one's own.
Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections,
which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks upon
his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his own, so
that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt himself.
Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with one's
friend" as being one of the signs of friendship, and the Apostle says
(Rom. 12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that
weep."
Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's
evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them,
and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may happen to
themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who consider
that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous
persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves
happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of
suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.
Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either
because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being
united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in
the same way.
Reply to Objection 1: God takes pity on us through love alone, in as
much as He loves us as belonging to Him.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do
not fear to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like
manner this applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are
so intent on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the
suffering of others.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether
through having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others,
are incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse
the human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man
think that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while
they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Prov.
27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." For the
same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others,
and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering
deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
xxxiv) that "false godliness," i.e. of the proud, "is not compassionate
but disdainful."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether mercy is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief
part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5). Now
choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii,
2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called a virtue. But
mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.):
"All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free
from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the mind does not easily see
aright, when these things stand in the way." Therefore mercy is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But
nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9),
and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore mercy is
not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because
they result from charity, as stated above ([2595]Q[28], A[4];[2596]
Q[29], A[4]). Now mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of
charity that we weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that
rejoice. Therefore mercy is not a special virtue.
Objection 4: Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it
is not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its
object, neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral
virtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to
justice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of
the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore
mercy is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "Cicero in
praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at once
more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when he
says: 'Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful than
thy mercy.'" Therefore mercy is a virtue.
I answer that, Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now this
grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive appetite, in
which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas, in another
way, it may denote a movement of the intellective appetite, in as much
as one person's evil is displeasing to another. This movement may be
ruled in accordance with reason, and in accordance with this movement
regulated by reason, the movement of the lower appetite may be
regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "this movement
of the mind" (viz. mercy) "obeys the reason, when mercy is vouchsafed
in such a way that justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy
or forgive the repentant." And since it is essential to human virtue
that the movements of the soul should be regulated by reason, as was
shown above ([2597]FS, Q[59], AA[4],5), it follows that mercy is a
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Sallust are to be understood as
applying to the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for
thus it impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from
justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and
nemesis, considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to
one another on the part of their respective estimation of another's
evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to
suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it esteems
someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well with the
undeserving: "both of these are praiseworthy and come from the same
disposition of character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it
is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state further on
([2598]Q[36], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good
which is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other
virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect,
namely the misery of the person pitied.
Reply to Objection 4: Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue
having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called
nemesis, because "they both proceed from the same character" (Rhet. ii,
9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but as
passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet nothing
prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in which case
they assume the character of a virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether mercy is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues.
For the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is
preferred before the worship of God, according to Osee 6:6 and Mat.
12:7: "I have desired mercy and not sacrifice." Therefore mercy is the
greatest virtue.
Objection 2: Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: "Godliness is
profitable to all things," a gloss says: "The sum total of a
Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and godliness." Now the
Christian rule of life embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total
of all virtues is contained in mercy.
Objection 3: Further, "Virtue is that which makes its subject good,"
according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man
like God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for being
more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since of God is
it said (Ps. 144:9) that "His tender mercies are over all His works,"
and (Lk. 6:36) Our Lord said: "Be ye . . . merciful, as your Father
also is merciful." Therefore mercy is the greatest of virtues.
On the contrary, The Apostle after saying (Col. 3:12): "Put ye on . . .
as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy," etc., adds (Col. 3:14):
"Above all things have charity." Therefore mercy is not the greatest of
virtues.
I answer that, A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways:
first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In itself,
mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be
bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their
wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is
accounted as being proper to God: and therein His omnipotence is
declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth Sunday after
Pentecost].
On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the
greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others,
surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone
above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to
supply the defect of that which is beneath. [*"The quality of mercy is
not strained./'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The throned
monarch better than his crown." Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i.].
Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity which unites him
to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his
neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is
the greatest, even as its act surpasses all others, since it belongs to
one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in so far
as the latter is deficient.
Reply to Objection 1: We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts,
not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For
He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in
order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy,
whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to
Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being, according
to Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such
sacrifices God's favor is obtained."
Reply to Objection 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists
in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity,
whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy for
our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in
the bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God
as regards similarity of works.
__________________________________________________________________
OF BENEFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, (1)
Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence, (3)
Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity ?
(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?
(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more
closely united to us?
(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
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Whether beneficence is an act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity.
For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God,
according to Job 35:7: "What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He
receive of thy hand?" Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.
Objection 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But
this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of
liberality and not of charity.
Objection 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due,
or as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice
while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this
respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is either
an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an act of
charity.
On the contrary, Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2599]Q[23] , A[1]). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of
friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) "doing good," i.e. being beneficent, "to
one's friends." Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to others.
I answer that, Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This
good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of
good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of
friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love
includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated above
([2600]Q[23], A[1];[2601] Q[27] , A[2]). Now the will carries into
effect if possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the
result of an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend.
Therefore beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of
friendship or charity.
But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some
special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special
character and will belong to some special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "love
moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the
inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the superior
to watch over the inferior:" and in this respect beneficence is an
effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to honor Him
by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to bestow good
things on us.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of
gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward
passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to
liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive
desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part
with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet
desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the
other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence belongs
in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract from a
man's friendship, if, through love, he give his friend something he
would like to I keep for himself; rather does this prove the perfection
of his friendship.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the
benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see
therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of
distress or defect.
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Whether we ought to do good to all?
Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all. For
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable to do good
to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to the impossible.
Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) "Give to the good,
and receive not a sinner." But many men are sinners. Therefore we need
not do good to all.
Objection 3: Further, "Charity dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4).
Now to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were
to do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to
an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding
communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of charity,
we ought not to do good to all.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we have time,
let us work good to all men."
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 1), beneficence is an effect
of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the
inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels,
because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior in
one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since the
love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should extend to all,
but according as time and place require: because all acts of virtue
must be modified with a view to their due circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good
to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be
bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds
us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind
to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good
that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in
general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for the
faithful.
Reply to Objection 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and
his nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the
maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this
would be to do evil rather than good.
Reply to Objection 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the common
weal are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them
from doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor
lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in
danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like distress,
unless this be according to the order of justice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to
us?
Objection 1: It would seem that we are nor bound to do good to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Lk.
14:12): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends,
nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen." Now these are the most closely
united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather who
are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers and to those
who are in want: hence the text goes on: "But, when thou makest a
feast, call the poor, the maimed," etc.
Objection 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very
great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help a
fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe.
Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the
preference to those who are most closely united to us.
Objection 3: Further, we should pay what is due before conferring
gratuitous favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to those who have
been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our benefactors
rather than to those who are closely united to us.
Objection 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his
children, as stated above ([2602]Q[26], A[9]). Yet a man ought to be
more beneficent to his children, since "neither ought the children to
lay up for the parents," according to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are
not bound to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to
us.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "Since one
cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason
of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more
closely united to us."
I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is
established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that
every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on
the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next
to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first
and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as
Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is
an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most
beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.
Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to
the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the
intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens
is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and
so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various ways
according to these various connections, because we ought in preference
to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the matter in which,
speaking simply, he is most closely connected with us. And yet this may
vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or matter in
hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to succor a
stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one's own father, if he is
not in such urgent need.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite
our friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they
may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity but
of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather to
invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be
understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor those
rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one be
more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not
possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to help
rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want as well
as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a prudent
man.
Reply to Objection 2: The common good of many is more Godlike than the
good of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to
endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the
temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage
together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the
soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as a
private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country as a
whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be
preferred to one who is a blood relation.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is one
which should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather
as belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may
have another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he
has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in deposit
or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what he owes,
rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless perchance the
case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take another's
property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet, again, this
would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: in which case,
however, the claims on either side would have to be weighed with regard
to such other conditions as a prudent man would take into
consideration, because, on account of the different particular cases,
as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is impossible to lay down
a general rule.
The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the
debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not
because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral equity,
as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor confers a
benefit equal to that which a man receives from his parents: wherefore
in paying back benefits received, we should give the first place to our
parents before all others, unless, on the other side, there be such
weightier motives, as need or some other circumstance, for instance the
common good of the Church or state. In other cases we must take to
account the connection and the benefit received; and here again no
general rule can laid down.
Reply to Objection 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a parent's
love tends to conferring benefits, while the children's love tends to
honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it would
be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's parents, to
abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the obligation we
lie under towards them for the benefits we have received from them, as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).
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Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For
precepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make men
virtuous (Ethic. i 9,13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are
prescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written (Mat. 4:44):
"Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you." Therefore
beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.
Objection 2: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are
opposed to beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on our
neighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore
beneficence is a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, charity is not divided into several species:
whereas there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according
to the various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct
virtue from charity.
On the contrary, The internal and the external act do not require
different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as external
and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of goodwill.
Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from charity, so neither
is beneficence.
I answer that, Virtues differ according to the different aspects of
their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of
beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect of
good, as explained above [2603](A[1]). Wherefore beneficence is not a
distinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Precepts are given, not about habits but about
acts of virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction,
not of habits, but of acts.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor,
if we consider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced
to love, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are
to be traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things under
certain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to
certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there are
various kinds of benefits.
Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
__________________________________________________________________
OF ALMSDEEDS (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?
(2) Of the different kinds of alms;
(3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal?
(4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect?
(5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept?
(6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need?
(7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods?
(8) Who can give alms?
(9) To whom should we give alms?
(10) How should alms be given ?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity.
For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible
to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I
should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not
charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore almsgiving is not an act
of charity.
Objection 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of
satisfaction, according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms."
Now satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act
of justice and not of charity.
Objection 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of
religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to
Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such
sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Therefore almsgiving is not an act
of charity, but of religion.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, l) that to give
for a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true
of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.
On the contrary, It is written 2 Jn. 3:17: "He that hath the substance
of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his
bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?"
I answer that, External acts belong to that virtue which regards the
motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to
relieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being
"a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion and
for God's sake," which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above
([2604]Q[30], AA[1],2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly
speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for in Greek
{eleemosyne} it is derived from having mercy {eleein} even as the Latin
"miseratio" is. And since mercy is an effect of charity, as shown above
([2605]Q[30], A[2], A[3], OBJ[3] ), it follows that almsgiving is an
act of charity through the medium of mercy.
Reply to Objection 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first
materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an
act of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having the
habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light of reason,
or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak of a thing
being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of justice is to do
what is just, in the same way as a just man, i.e. with readiness and
delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be without the virtue.
Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give
alms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and readiness, and
altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one
virtue being commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing
it to this other virtue's end. It is in this way that almsgiving is
reckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in
distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far as
it is directed to placate God, it has the character of a sacrifice, and
thus it is commanded by religion.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 4: Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as
liberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from
excessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to
them more than one ought.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the different kinds of almsdeeds are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds are
unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds, namely,
to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked,
to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, to
bury the dead; all of which are expressed in the following verse: "To
visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe, harbor or bury."
Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct the ignorant,
to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to reprove the
sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who trouble and annoy
us, and to pray for all, which are all contained in the following
verse: "To counsel, reprove, console, to pardon, forbear, and to pray,"
yet so that counsel includes both advice and instruction.
And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
For the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor. But a dead man
profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not have spoken
truly when He said (Mat. 10:28): "Be not afraid of them who kill the
body, and after that have no more that they can do." [*The quotation is
from Lk. 12:4.] This explains why Our Lord, in enumerating the works of
mercy, made no mention of the burial of the dead (Mat. 25:35,36).
Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [2606](A[1]), the purpose of
giving alms is to relieve our neighbor's need. Now there are many needs
of human life other than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind
man needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man
needs riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of
the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy.
Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.
Objection 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a
defect. But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or
other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who is
ignorant of what he knows himself.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that hath
understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath
abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him
who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share his skill and
profit with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking
with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned for retaining his talent,
if when he has the chance he plead not with him the cause of the poor."
Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are suitably enumerated in respect of
those things whereof men have abundance or insufficiency.
I answer that, The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably taken
from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect the soul,
and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others affect the body,
and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal need occurs either
during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life, it is
either a common need in respect of things needed by all, or it is a
special need occurring through some accident supervening. In the first
case, the need is either internal or external. Internal need is
twofold: one which is relieved by solid food, viz. hunger, in respect
of which we have "to feed the hungry"; while the other is relieved by
liquid food, viz. thirst, and in respect of this we have "to give drink
to the thirsty." The common need with regard to external help is
twofold; one in respect of clothing, and as to this we have "to clothe
the naked": while the other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as
to this we have "to harbor the harborless." Again if the need be
special, it is either the result of an internal cause, like sickness,
and then we have "to visit the sick," or it results from an external
cause, and then we have "to ransom the captive." After this life we
give "burial to the dead."
In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two
ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have
"prayer," whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human
assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a
deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in
the speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by "instructing," and
if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by "counselling."
Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the appetitive
power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by "comforting."
Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate act; and this may
be the subject of a threefold consideration. First, in respect of the
sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his inordinate will, and thus
the remedy takes the form of "reproof." Secondly, in respect of the
person sinned against; and if the sin be committed against ourselves,
we apply the remedy by "pardoning the injury," while, if it be
committed against God or our neighbor, it is not in our power to
pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii, 15). Thirdly, in
respect of the result of the inordinate act, on account of which the
sinner is an annoyance to those who live with him, even beside his
intention; in which case the remedy is applied by "bearing with him,"
especially with regard to those who sin out of weakness, according to
Rom. 15:1: "We that are stronger, ought to bear the infirmities of the
weak," and not only as regards their being infirm and consequently
troublesome on account of their unruly actions, but also by bearing any
other burdens of theirs with them, according to Gal. 6:2: "Bear ye one
another's burdens."
Reply to Objection 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as though his
body could be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord
said that those who kill the body "have no more that they can do"; and
for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with the
other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly necessary.
Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is done with his body:
both that he may live in the memory of man whose respect he forfeits if
he remain without burial, and as regards a man's fondness for his own
body while he was yet living, a fondness which kindly persons should
imitate after his death. It is thus that some are praised for burying
the dead, as Tobias, and those who buried Our Lord; as Augustine says
(De Cura pro Mort. iii).
Reply to Objection 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for
blindness and lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the
blind, and to support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick.
In like manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an
extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the
wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the purpose
of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason for special
mention of this particular need.
Reply to Objection 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of
the act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as
to the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the
evil of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to
Prov. 27:6: "Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful
kisses of an enemy."
Reply to Objection 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only when
it is about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to
supply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should
observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in
other virtuous acts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more account than
spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to one who
is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised because it
relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is relieved by corporal
alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit which is relieved by
spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of more account.
Objection 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if
the kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (Lk. 14:12): "When
thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are rich,
lest perhaps they also invite thee again. Now there is always
compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another,
profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: "My prayer shall be turned
into my bosom: and he who teaches another, makes progress in knowledge,
which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore corporal
almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.
Objection 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is
comforted by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): "If his sides
have not blessed me," and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7): "The
bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother." Now a
corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a spiritual
alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual
almsdeeds.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on the
words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (Mat. 5:42): "You should give
so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when you refuse what
another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of justice, and send
him away empty; at times indeed you will give what is better than what
is asked for, if you reprove him that asks unjustly." Now reproof is a
spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual almsdeeds are preferable to
corporal almsdeeds.
I answer that, There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds. First,
simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the first place,
for three reasons. First, because the offering is more excellent, since
it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal gift, according to
Prov. 4:2: "I will give you a good gift, forsake not My Law." Secondly,
on account of the object succored, because the spirit is more excellent
than the body, wherefore, even as a man in looking after himself, ought
to look to his soul more than to his body, so ought he in looking after
his neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the
acts themselves by which our neighbor is succored, because spiritual
acts are more excellent than corporal acts, which are, in a fashion,
servile.
Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case, when
some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a man in
hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher
observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man "money is better than
philosophy," although the latter is better simply.
Reply to Objection 1: It is better to give to one who is in greater
want, other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better,
and is in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is
thus in the case in point.
Reply to Objection 2: Compensation does not detract from merit and
praise if it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended,
does not detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.),
that "the less he sought fame, the more he became famous": and thus it
is with spiritual almsdeeds.
Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not detract
from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.
Reply to Objection 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in
which the will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in
which it rests when it is inordinate.
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Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a spiritual
effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual goods exceed
corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
Objection 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal
for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one ought
not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.
Objection 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect.
If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater
the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what
we read (Lk. 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the
treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all."
Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a man . .
. shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye."
I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways.
First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have merely
a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's corporal
needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their cause, in
so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his
neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual fruit,
according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy brother . . .
place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall
bring thee more profit than gold."
Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have a
spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a
corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the above
text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the poor,
and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to
their substance.
Reply to Objection 2: He who gives an alms does rot intend to buy a
spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual
things infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a
spiritual fruit through the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in
proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence
corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
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Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving is a
matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be
acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: 'to thee, and'] redeem thou thy sins
with alms." Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what
is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is
lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter of
precept.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the
transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because
positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if
almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to
some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an
alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can always
be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in some
other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be needful
to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it seems that
almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of
the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what
is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for
omitting to give alms, as is clear from Mat. 25:41-43. Therefore
almsgiving is a matter of precept.
I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever
is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter of
precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only
should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his well-doers,
according to 1 Jn. 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but
in deed, and in truth." And in order to be a person's well-wisher and
well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done by almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.
Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all
almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary to
virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right
reason demands that we should take into consideration something on the
part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the
part of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus,
according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms." This surplus
is to be taken in reference not only to himself, so as to denote what
is unnecessary to the individual, but also in reference to those of
whom he has charge (in which case we have the expression "necessary to
the person" [*The official necessities of a person in position] taking
the word "person" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must
first of all look after himself and then after those over whom he has
charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others.
Thus nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for
the upkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the
formation of another by the power of generation.
On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in need,
else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it is not
possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not
bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not be
succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of
Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou hast not fed him,
thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence the words,
as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our
surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is extreme: otherwise
almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to
God's Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he
did not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been
speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter of
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours
as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us
alone but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we
have over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii,
18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming
from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are
you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the
merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot,
the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you
injure as many as you might help." Ambrose expresses himself in the
same way.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit
to give alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is
evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored
otherwise---on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,
which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with
probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly occur in
the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, which Our Lord
forbade us to do (Mat. 6:34), but he should judge what is superfluous
and what necessary, according as things probably and generally occur.
Reply to Objection 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to
the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle
interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay:
'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life
that now is, and of that which is to come," and he says this because
the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that thou
mayest be longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness
comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*"Pietas," whence our English word
"Piety." Cf. also inf.[2607] Q[101], A[2].]
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Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of what
one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only as
regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our interior
affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of charity, because
this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of charity
requires that a man should love himself more than his neighbor, it
seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of what he needed, in
order to succor his neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself,
squanders his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done.
Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have
not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now if a man gives of
what he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from
the care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems
that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect,
go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Now he that gives all
he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but also what he
needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he needs.
I answer that, A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because without
it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to give alms out
of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance, if a man found
himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely sufficient
to support himself and his children, or others under his charge, he
would be throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give
away in alms, what was then necessary to him. Yet I say this without
prejudice to such a case as might happen, supposing that by depriving
himself of necessaries a man might help a great personage, and a
support of the Church or State, since it would be a praiseworthy act to
endanger one's life and the lives of those who are under our charge for
the delivery of such a person, since the common good is to be preferred
to one's own.
Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it
live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or
those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus is not an
invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's property,
and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much
from him, and he would still have sufficient for the decencies of life
in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is good to give alms
of this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not of precept but of
counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of one's own, in
order to give to others to such an extent that the residue would be
insufficient for one to live in keeping with one's station and the
ordinary occurrences of life: for no man ought to live unbecomingly.
There are, however, three exceptions to the above rule. The first is
when a man changes his state of life, for instance, by entering
religion, for then he gives away all his possessions for Christ's sake,
and does the deed of perfection by transferring himself to another
state. Secondly, when that which he deprives himself of, though it be
required for the decencies of life, can nevertheless easily be
recovered, so that he does not suffer extreme inconvenience. Thirdly,
when he is in presence of extreme indigence in an individual, or great
need on the part of the common weal. For in such cases it would seem
praiseworthy to forego the requirements of one's station, in order to
provide for a greater need.
The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.
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Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten
goods. For it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the
mammon of iniquity." Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is
lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of
ill-gotten riches.
Objection 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the
profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden (Dt.
23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God: "Thou shalt
not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of . . . thy God."
In like manner gains from games of chance are ill-gotten, for, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "we take such like gains from our
friends to whom we ought rather to give." And most of all are the
profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby the Holy Ghost is
wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is lawful to give alms.
Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods.
Objection 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser
evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than to
commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who
is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf.
Canon Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken):
"Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast
slain him". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of
ill-gotten goods.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give alms
from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not to
hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from interest
and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the Body of
Christ."
I answer that, A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the first
place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from whom it is
gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained possession
of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of such things a
man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.
Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it,
and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it,
because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly.
This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene the
justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not to the
giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar cases of
illegal giving and receiving.
Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful,
but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case of
a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so
called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the Law
of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in taking the
money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in alms what is
thus acquired by an unlawful action.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some have
misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's property
and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are fulfilling the
commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be amended. Yet all
riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De Quaest. Ev. ii,
34, because "riches are not unjust save for those who are themselves
unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or, according to Ambrose in
his commentary on Lk. 16:9, "Make unto yourselves friends," etc., "He
calls mammon unjust, because it draws our affections by the various
allurements of wealth." Or, because "among the many ancestors whose
property you inherit, there is one who took the property of others
unjustly, although you know nothing about it," as Basil says in a
homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all riches are styled riches "of
iniquity," i.e., of "inequality," because they are not distributed
equally among all, one being in need, and another in affluence.
Reply to Objection 2: We have already explained how alms may be given
out of the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not
made therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and
through reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out
of the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid,
indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of
chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary to
the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his
property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with
the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play, and
wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to restitution,
and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms. Then again there
would seem to be something unlawful as being against the positive civil
law, which altogether forbids any such profits. Since, however, a civil
law does not bind all, but only those who are subject to that law, and
moreover may be abrogated through desuetude, it follows that all such
as are bound by these laws are bound to make restitution of such gains,
unless perchance the contrary custom prevail, or unless a man win from
one who enticed him to play, in which case he is not bound to
restitution, because the loser does not deserve to be paid back: and
yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has won, so long as that positive
law is in force, wherefore in this case he ought to give it away in
alms.
Reply to Objection 3: All things are common property in a case of
extreme necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take
another's goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who
is willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain
what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take something
if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in need. If
however this be possible without danger, he must ask the owner's
consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme necessity.
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Whether one who is under another's power can give alms?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can
give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to whom
they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to give
alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as Ambrose
[*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to
ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim. 4:8:
"'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things': The
sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty by
all," and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms.
Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms.
Objection 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gn. 3:16).
But a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it
is related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge
of her betrothed [*"Sponsus" The matrimonial institutions of the Romans
were so entirely different from ours that "sponsus" is no longer
accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed."] Therefore a
person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under another's
power.
Objection 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is
founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): "Children,
obey your parents in the Lord." But, apparently, children may give alms
out of their parents' property. For it is their own, since they are the
heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily use, it
seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to profit
their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power can give
alms.
Objection 4: Further, servants are under their master's power,
according to Titus 2:9: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their
masters." Now they may lawfully do anything that will profit their
masters: and this would be especially the case if they gave alms for
them. Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.
On the contrary, Alms should not be given out of another's property;
and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his own labor
as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who are subject
to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of another's property.
Therefore those who are under another's power cannot give alms.
I answer that, Anyone who is under another's power must, as such, be
ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the natural
order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to its
superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is subject
to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the superior's
permission.
Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of
anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in so
far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has
something in respect of which he is not under the power of his
superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being
independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms
therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned
by his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monaster, in
accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such
dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms
without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some
probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would
be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor does
it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated in De
Eccles. Dogm. lxxi, "it is a good thing to give one's property to the
poor little by little, but it is better still to give all at once in
order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to be needy with
Christ."
Reply to Objection 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry
which is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that
property be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means,
can give alms, out of that property, without asking her husband's
permission: yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too
much she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms
without the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases
of necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply.
For though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet in
matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a
betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her
mother's consent.
Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the
father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small
quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless,
perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any particular
property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth
Objection is clear.
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Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united
to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus.
12:4, 6): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do good
to the humble and give not to the ungodly." Now it happens sometimes
that those who are closely united to us are sinful and ungodly.
Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to others.
Objection 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an
eternal reward in return, according to Mat. 6:18: "And thy Father Who
seeth in secret, will repay thee." Now the eternal reward is gained
chiefly by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Lk.
16:9: "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you
shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings, which
passage Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have
everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that
shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who succor
them in their needs? Therefore alms should be given to the more holy
persons rather than to those who are more closely united to us.
Objection 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man
cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound
to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
the faith, and is worse than an infidel."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it falls
to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of those who
are more closely united to us." Nevertheless in this matter we must
employ discretion, according to the various degrees of connection,
holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much
holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful to the common
weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to us, especially
if the latter be not very closely united, and has no special claim on
our care then and there, and who is not in very urgent need.
Reply to Objection 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by
encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an
eternal reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this
respect an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order
of charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should,
in preference, help those who are more closely connected with us.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "It is with commendable
liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be in
need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own family,
who would be ashamed to beg help from others." Secondly, almsdeeds
deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the recipient,
who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that Augustine is
speaking.
Reply to Objection 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man
does not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of
comparison, as stated above ([2608]Q[30], AA[1],2), so too, properly
speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another's
person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take
something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when he
gives to others.
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Whether alms should be given in abundance?
Objection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in abundance.
For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most closely
connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a way that
they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says (De Officiis
i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to others.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We should not
lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by
degrees." But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms
should not be given in abundance.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): "Not that others
should be eased," i.e. should live on you without working themselves,
"and you burthened," i.e. impoverished. But this would be the result if
alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms
abundantly.
On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:93): "If thou have much, give
abundantly."
I answer that, Alms may be considered abundant in relation either to
the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when that
which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give thus is
praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Lk. 21:3,4) commended the widow
because "of her want, she cast in all the living that she had."
Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down
when we spoke of giving alms out of one's necessary goods [2609](A[9]).
On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways;
first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is
praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than
sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to give
to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3):
"If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which words a gloss
comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms, and to
give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit many."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as
exceeding the needs of the recipient.
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on
the part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to
lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of
life, wherefore he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus who slew
his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household cares
might keep him back" (3 Kings 19:21).
Reply to Objection 3: In the passage quoted the words, "not that others
should be eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms which
surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not
that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief.
Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on account
of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more daintily
nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose says (De
Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a man, you should take into
consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the shame which
proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has fallen from
riches to indigence through no fault of his own."
With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened," they refer to
abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the same
passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to give in
abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes them so
to give that they lack not for themselves."
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OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?
(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?
(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?
(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through
being corrected?
(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?
(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?
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Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of
charity. For a gloss on Mat. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend
against thee," says that "a man should reprove his brother out of zeal
for justice." But justice is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore
fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of justice.
Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret
admonition. Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of
prudence, for a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi,
5). Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue.
Now it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal.
6:2: "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of
Christ," which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the
correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with him,
is not an act of charity.
On the contrary, To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed. But
almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above ([2610]Q[32], A[1]).
Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.
I answer that, The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which should
be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be considered in
two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing
to the harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by being
detrimental to the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by
that man's sin.
Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which
applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner
himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is
directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone's
evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's good
is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well.
Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because
thereby we drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of which
pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external loss, or of
a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of virtue is more akin
to charity than the good of the body or of external things. Therefore
fraternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing of a
bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily need. There is
another correction which applies a remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer,
considered as hurtful to others, and especially to the common good.
This correction is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard
the rectitude of justice between one man and another.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of the second correction which
is an act of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it
takes justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further
on ([2611]Q[58] , A[5]), in which sense again all "sin is iniquity" (1
Jn. 3:4), through being contrary to justice.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12),
prudence regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things
counsel and choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by
prudence, we perform some action aright which is directed to the end of
some virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs
chiefly to the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since, then, the
admonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the
removal of a brother's sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is
evident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which virtue
commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence, which
executes and directs the action.
Reply to Objection 3: Fraternal correction is not opposed to
forbearance with the weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a
man bears with a sinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him,
and retains his goodwill towards him: the result being that he strives
to make him do better.
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Whether fraternal correction is a matter of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter of
precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according to
the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: "Accursed be
he who says that God has commanded any. thing impossible." Now it is
written (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can
correct whom He hath despised." Therefore fraternal correction is not a
matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to
the precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come
under any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of
precept.
Objection 3: Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin,
which has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are found
to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9):
"Not only those of low degree, but also those of high position, refrain
from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity, not by the claims of
charity." Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due.
If, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due
to our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man owes
anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he must
not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek him
out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go seeking
for those who need correction, in order that we might correct them;
which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great number
of sinners, for whose correction one man could not suffice, and because
religious would have to leave the cloister in order to reprove men,
which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal correction is not a
matter of precept.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): "You become
worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him." But this would not
be so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept.
Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.
I answer that, Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must
observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid
sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now sinful
acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter how, or
when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature they are
connected with an evil end, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore
negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the other hand,
acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing the due
circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be virtuous;
namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be done. And
since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end depends on the
formal aspect of the end, the chief of these circumstances of a
virtuous act is this aspect of the end, which in this case is the good
of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be omitted from a virtuous
act, as entirely takes away the good of virtue, such an act is contrary
to a precept. If, however, the circumstance omitted from a virtuous act
be such as not to destroy the virtue altogether, though it does not
perfectly attain the good of virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence
the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 9) says that if we depart but little from
the mean, it is not contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much
from the mean virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction
is directed to a brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of
precept, in so far as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we
have to correct our erring brother at all places and times.
Reply to Objection 1: In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious
without the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his
power. Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we ignore
who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our
feelings, that we wish all to be saved." Consequently we ought to do
our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's
help.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2612]Q[32], A[5], ad 4), all
the precepts about rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the
precept about the honor due to parents.
Reply to Objection 3: Fraternal correction may be omitted in three
ways.
First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct someone.
For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man refrains from chiding
and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable time for so
doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may become worse,
or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others who are weak
and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and virtue, this does
not seem to result from covetousness, but to be counselled by charity."
Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one
commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in the same passage)
"one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous pain
or death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by such
things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity." This
would seem to be the case when a man reckons that he might probably
withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so, through fear
or covetousness.
Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or
covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults, and yet
not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw him
from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or
covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to
these things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to correct
wrongdoers.
Reply to Objection 4: We are bound to pay that which is due to some
fixed and certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good,
without waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to
find him. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should
seek him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he
that has spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in
order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound to
seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any
certain person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those
favors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow
them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance. For this
reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that "Our Lord warns us not to be
listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by being on the
lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting what we see": else
we should become spies on the lives of others, which is against the
saying of Prov. 24:19: "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in
the house of the just, nor spoil his rest." It is evident from this
that there is no need for religious to leave their cloister in order to
rebuke evil-doers.
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Whether fraternal correction belongs only to prelates?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to
prelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: "Let
priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother
sin against thee,'" etc. Now prelates having charge of others were
usually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that
fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.
Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms. Now
corporal almsgiving belongs to those who are placed above others in
temporal matters, i.e. to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction
belongs to those who are placed above others in spiritual matters, i.e.
to prelates.
Objection 3: Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his
rebuke to something better. Now in the physical order the inferior is
moved by the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which
follows the order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct
inferiors.
On the contrary, It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can. Tam
Sacerdotes): "Both priests and all the rest of the faithful should be
most solicitous for those who perish, so that their reproof may either
correct their sinful ways. or, if they be incorrigible, cut them off
from the Church."
I answer that, As stated above [2613](A[1]), correction is twofold. One
is an act of charity, which seeks in a special way the recovery of an
erring brother by means of a simple warning: such like correction
belongs to anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate.
But there is another correction which is an act of justice purposing
the common good, which is procured not only by warning one's brother,
but also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may, through fear,
desist from sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose
business it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by means of
punishments.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as regards that fraternal correction which
is common to all, prelates have a grave responsibility, as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "for just as a man ought to bestow temporal
favors on those especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought
he to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and the
like, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual care." Therefore
Jerome does not mean that the precept of fraternal correction concerns
priests only, but that it concerns them chiefly.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as he who has the means wherewith to give
corporal assistance is rich in this respect, so he whose reason is
gifted with a sane judgment, so as to be able to correct another's
wrong-doing, is, in this respect, to be looked on as a superior.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in the physical order certain things act
mutually on one another, through being in some respect higher than one
another, in so far as each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in
potentiality with regard to another. In like manner one man can correct
another in so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter wherein the
other sins, though he is not his superior simply.
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Whether a mann is bound to correct his prelate?
Objection 1: It would seem that no man is bound to correct his prelate.
For it is written (Ex. 19:12): "The beast that shall touch the mount
shall be stoned," [*Vulg.: 'Everyone that shall touch the mount, dying
he shall die.'] and (2 Kings 6:7) it is related that the Lord struck
Oza for touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark signify our
prelates. Therefore prelates should not be corrected by their subjects.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Gal. 2:11, "I withstood him to the
face," adds: "as an equal." Therefore, since a subject is not equal to
his prelate, he ought not to correct him.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that "one ought
not to presume to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one thinks
better of oneself." But one ought not to think better of oneself than
of one's prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct one's prelate.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his Rule: "Show mercy not only to
yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position among
you, is therefore in greater danger." But fraternal correction is a
work of mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.
I answer that, A subject is not competent to administer to his prelate
the correction which is an act of justice through the coercive nature
of punishment: but the fraternal correction which is an act of charity
is within the competency of everyone in respect of any person towards
whom he is bound by charity, provided there be something in that person
which requires correction.
Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to whatever is
contained under the object of that power or habit: thus vision extends
to all things comprised in the object of sight. Since, however, a
virtuous act needs to be moderated by due circumstances, it follows
that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do so in a
becoming manner, not with impudence and harshness, but with gentleness
and respect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): "An ancient man
rebuke not, but entreat him as a father." Wherefore Dionysius finds
fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for rebuking a priest with
insolence, by striking and turning him out of the church.
Reply to Objection 1: It would seem that a subject touches his prelate
inordinately when he upbraids him with insolence, as also when he
speaks ill of him: and this is signified by God's condemnation of those
who touched the mount and the ark.
Reply to Objection 2: To withstand anyone in public exceeds the mode of
fraternal correction, and so Paul would not have withstood Peter then,
unless he were in some way his equal as regards the defense of the
faith. But one who is not an equal can reprove privately and
respectfully. Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colossians (4:17)
tells them to admonish their prelate: "Say to Archippus: Fulfil thy
ministry [*Vulg.: 'Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received
in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.' Cf. 2 Tim. 4:5]." It must be
observed, however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought
to rebuke his prelate even publicly. Hence Paul, who was Peter's
subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the imminent danger of
scandal concerning faith, and, as the gloss of Augustine says on Gal.
2:11, "Peter gave an example to superiors, that if at any time they
should happen to stray from the straight path, they should not disdain
to be reproved by their subjects."
Reply to Objection 3: To presume oneself to be simply better than one's
prelate, would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but there is no
presumption in thinking oneself better in some respect, because, in
this life, no man is without some fault. We must also remember that
when a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not follow that he
thinks himself any better, but merely that he offers his help to one
who, "being in the higher position among you, is therefore in greater
danger," as Augustine observes in his Rule quoted above.
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Whether a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer.
For no man is excused from obeying a precept by having committed a sin.
But fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as stated above
[2614](A[2]). Therefore it seems that a man ought not to forbear from
such like correction for the reason that he has committed a sin.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than
corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from
administering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account
of a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we say that we
have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore if, on account of a sin,
a man is hindered from reproving his brother, there will be none to
reprove the wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable:
therefore the former is also.
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): "He that is
subject to vice should not correct the vices of others." Again it is
written (Rom. 2:1): "Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest
thyself. For thou dost the same things which thou judgest."
I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 2), to correct a wrongdoer
belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with right
judgment. Now sin, as stated above ([2615]FS, Q[85], AA[1],2), does not
destroy the good of nature so as to deprive the sinner's reason of all
right judgment, and in this respect he may be competent to find fault
with others for committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin proves
somewhat of a hindrance to this correction, for three reasons. First
because this previous sin renders a man unworthy to rebuke another; and
especially is he unworthy to correct another for a lesser sin, if he
himself has committed a greater. Hence Jerome says on the words, "Why
seest thou the mote?" etc. (Mat. 7:3): "He is speaking of those who,
while they are themselves guilty of mortal sin, have no patience with
the lesser sins of their brethren."
Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the
scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector's sin be well known,
because it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more
for the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Mat. 7:4, "How sayest
thou to thy brother?" etc. are expounded by Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in
the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] thus:
"That is---'With what object?' Out of charity, think you, that you may
save your neighbor?" No, "because you would look after your own
salvation first. What you want is, not to save others, but to hide your
evil deeds with good teaching, and to seek to be praised by men for
your knowledge."
Thirdly, on account of the rebuker's pride; when, for instance, a man
thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart, sets himself
above his neighbor, judging the latter's sins with harsh severity, as
though he himself were just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte ii, 19): "To reprove the faults of others is the duty of good and
kindly men: when a wicked man rebukes anyone, his rebuke is the
latter's acquittal." And so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
ii, 19): "When we have to find fault with anyone, we should think
whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must remember that
we are men, and might have been guilty of it; or that we once had it on
our conscience, but have it no longer: and then we should bethink
ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our reproof may be the
outcome, not of hatred, but of pity. But if we find that we are guilty
of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but groan with him, and invite
him to repent with us." It follows from this that, if a sinner reprove
a wrongdoer with humility, he does not sin, nor does he bring a further
condemnation on himself, although thereby he proves himself deserving
of condemnation, either in his brother's or in his own conscience, on
account of his previous sin.
Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
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Whether one ought to forbear from correcting someone, through fear lest he
become worse?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to forbear from
correcting someone through fear lest he become worse. For sin is
weakness of the soul, according to Ps. 6:3: "Have mercy on me, O Lord,
for I am weak." Now he that has charge of a sick person, must not cease
to take care of him, even if he be fractious or contemptuous, because
then the danger is greater, as in the case of madmen. Much more,
therefore should one correct a sinner, no matter how badly he takes it.
Objection 2: Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not to be
foregone on account of scandal. Now God's commandments are vital
truths. Since, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept,
as stated above [2616](A[2]), it seems that it should not be foregone
for fear of scandalizing the person to be corrected.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. 3:8) we should not
do evil that good may come of it. Therefore, in like manner, good
should not be omitted lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a
good thing. Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person
corrected become worse.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 9:8): "Rebuke not a scorner lest
he hate thee," where a gloss remarks: "You must not fear lest the
scorner insult you when you rebuke him: rather should you bear in mind
that by making him hate you, you may make him worse." Therefore one
ought to forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may make a
man worse.
I answer that, As stated above [2617](A[3]) the correction of the
wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed
to the common good, has coercive force. Such correction should not be
omitted lest the person corrected be disturbed, both because if he is
unwilling to amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made to
cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be incorrigible,
the common good is safeguarded in this way, since the order of justice
is observed, and others are deterred by one being made an example of.
Hence a judge does not desist from pronouncing sentence of condemnation
against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his friends.
The other fraternal correction is directed to the amendment of the
wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely admonishes. Consequently
when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take the warning,
and will become worse, such fraternal correction should be foregone,
because the means should be regulated according to the requirements of
the end.
Reply to Objection 1: The doctor uses force towards a madman, who is
unwilling to submit to his treatment; and this may be compared with the
correction administered by prelates, which has coercive power, but not
with simple fraternal correction.
Reply to Objection 2: Fraternal correction is a matter of precept, in
so far as it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous act in so
far as it is proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever it is a
hindrance to the end, for instance when a man becomes worse through it,
it is longer a vital truth, nor is it a matter precept.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is directed to end, becomes good through
being directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction hinders
the end, namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer good, so
that when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted lest evil
should befall.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the precept of fraternal correction demands that a private
admonition should precede denunciation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of fraternal correction
does not demand that a private admonition should precede denunciation.
For, in works of charity, we should above all follow the example of
God, according to Eph. 5:1,2: "Be ye followers of God, as most dear
children, and walk in love." Now God sometimes punishes a man for a
sin, without previously warning him in secret. Therefore it seems that
there is no need for a private admonition to precede denunciation.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn
from the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the commandments
of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find that a hidden sin
is publicly denounced, without any previous admonition in private. Thus
we read (Gn. 37:2) that "Joseph accused his brethren to his father of a
most wicked crime": and (Acts 5:4, 9) that Peter publicly denounced
Ananias and Saphira who had secretly "by fraud kept back the price of
the land," without beforehand admonishing them in private: nor do we
read that Our Lord admonished Judas in secret before denouncing him.
Therefore the precept does not require that secret admonition should
precede public denunciation.
Objection 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce.
Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without
previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the Decretal
(Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that "nothing else need precede
accusation except inscription." [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to
endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this
endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he
failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the
accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore it seems that
the precept does not require that a secret admonition should precede
public denunciation.
Objection 4: Further, it does not seem probable that the customs
observed by religious in general are contrary to the precepts of
Christ. Now it is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or
that one for a fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore
it seems that this admonition is not required by the precept.
Objection 5: Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a
prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in
particular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires
correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to tell them
this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does not
require secret admonition before public denunciation.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the words,
"Rebuke him between thee and him alone" (Mat. 18:15): "Aiming at his
amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from shame he
might begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to make a
better man, you make worse." Now we are bound by the precept of charity
to beware lest our brother become worse. Therefore the order of
fraternal correction comes under the precept.
I answer that, With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is
necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or
secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for
the sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who know of
his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should be
denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim.
5:20): "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have
fear," which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as
Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).
On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord
seem to apply (Mat. 18:15): "If thy brother shall offend against thee,"
etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others, he no
longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he
'disturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense even at
his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further distinction.
For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor either in his body
or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots secretly to betray
his country to its enemies, or when a heretic secretly turns other men
away from the faith. And since he that sins thus in secret, sins not
only against you in particular, but also against others, it is
necessary to take steps to denounce him at once, in order to prevent
him doing such harm, unless by chance you were firmly persuaded that
this evil result would be prevented by admonishing him secretly. On the
other hand there are other sins which injure none but the sinner, and
the person sinned against, either because he alone is hurt by the
sinner, or at least because he alone knows about his sin, and then our
one purpose should be to succor our sinning brother: and just as the
physician of the body restores the sick man to health, if possible,
without cutting off a limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a
limb which is least indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the
whole body, so too he who desires his brother's amendment should, if
possible, so amend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good
name.
For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not only
in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he lose his
good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are restrained
from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man finds his
honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome says on Mat.
18:15: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke him in private,
lest he persist in his sin if he should once become shameless or
unabashed." Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning brother's good
name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the dishonor of others,
according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii):
"When a few of those who bear a name for holiness are reported falsely
or proved in truth to have done anything wrong, people will seek by
busily repeating it to make it believed of all": and also because when
one man's sin is made public others are incited to sin likewise.
Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name,
Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so
deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his good
name. Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret
admonition to precede public denunciation.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore
hidden sins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to
the judgment of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by
secretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration,
either while they wake or while they sleep, according to Job 33:15-17:
"By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men . .
. then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in
what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a man from the things he
is doing."
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though
it were public, wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He
did not, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The
sin of Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's
executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to
Joseph it is probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture
does not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to
his brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused "his
brethren."
Reply to Objection 3: When there is danger to a great number of people,
those words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not
sin against thee alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Proclamations made in the chapter of religious
are about little faults which do not affect a man's good name,
wherefore they are reminders of forgotten faults rather than
accusations or denunciations. If, however, they should be of such a
nature as to injure our brother's good name, it would be contrary to
Our Lord's precept, to denounce a brother's fault in this manner.
Reply to Objection 5: A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a
Divine precept, according to Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather
then men." Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him
anything that he knows to need correction, the command rightly
understood supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal
correction, whether the command be addressed to all in general, or to
some particular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate were to
issue a command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our
Lord, both would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as
disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not to be obeyed,
because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but God alone is,
wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of hidden
matters, except in so far as they are made known through certain signs,
as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a prelate can command
just as a judge, whether secular or ecclesiastical, can bind a man
under oath to tell the truth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether before the public denunciation witnesses ought to be brought
forward?
Objection 1: It would seem that before the public denunciation
witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not to
be made known to others, because by so doing "a man would betray his
brother's sins instead of correcting them," as Augustine says (De Verb.
Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known a
brother's sin to others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one ought
not to bring witnesses forward before the public denunciation.
Objection 2: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no
man brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore
ought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our
brother.
Objection 3: Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something.
But witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore it is
useless to bring witnesses forward in such cases.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says in his Rule that "before bringing
it to the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before the
superior." Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to
tell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward
before the public denunciation.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 18:16): "Take with thee one or two
more, that in the mouth of two," etc.
I answer that, The right way to go from one extreme to another is to
pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning of
fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects another
between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end to be
public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church. Consequently
it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be placed between
the two extremes, so that at first the brother's sin be indicated to a
few, who will be of use without being a hindrance, and thus his sin be
amended without dishonoring him before the public.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have understood the order of fraternal
correction to demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother
secretly, and that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and
his sin be altogether hidden, they say that we should go no further in
the matter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of
several by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, according
to Our Lord's command. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in
his Rule that "we are bound to reveal" a brother's sin, if it "will
cause a worse corruption in the heart." Wherefore we must say otherwise
that when the secret admonition has been given once or several times,
as long as there is probable hope of his amendment, we must continue to
admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to judge with any
probability that the secret admonition is of no avail, we must take
further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call witnesses,
unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would not conduce to
our brother's amendment, and that he would become worse: because on
that account one ought to abstain altogether from correcting him, as
stated above [2618](A[6]).
Reply to Objection 2: A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his
own sin: yet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother's sin.
Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: There may be three reasons for citing witnesses.
First, to show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says:
secondly, to prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine
says (in his Rule): thirdly, "to prove that the man who rebuked his
brother, has done what he could," as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth.
lx).
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine means that the matter ought to be made
known to the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as
the prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than
others, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as
holding the position of judge.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must how consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which is
opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy of
charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4)
offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal
correction.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible to hate God?
(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
(3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?
(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
(6) From what capital sin does it arise?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible for anyone to hate God?
Objection 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an object of love
and dilection to all." But God is goodness and beauty itself. Therefore
He is hated by none.
Objection 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36, 39 it
is written that "all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well
like of her works." Now God is the very truth according to Jn. 14:6.
Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him.
Objection 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore none
can hate Him.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
hate Thee ascendeth continually," and (Jn. 15:24): "But now they have
both seen and hated both Me and My Father."
I answer that, As shown above ([2619]FS, Q[29], A[1]), hatred is a
movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion save
by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in two
ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence; secondly,
in His effects, when, to wit, "the invisible things" of God . . . "are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.
1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which no man can
hate---for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible
for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.
Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be contrary
to the human will, since "to be, to live, to understand," which are
effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore again God
cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the Author of such
like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are contrary to an
inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, and the
prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are repugnant
to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration of them, God
may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they look upon Him as
forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of those who see God's
Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true in so far as God is
apprehended as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of
all, among which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.
Reply to Objection 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He
is the source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend
to be like God, Who is Being itself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of
sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost,
since it cannot be forgiven, according to Mat. 12:32. Now hatred of God
is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost,
as may be seen from what has been said above ([2620]Q[14], A[2]).
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now
an unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further
away from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless
knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than
the sin of hatred against God.
Objection 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of
those of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which
is punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin.
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
On the contrary, The best is opposite to the worst, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to the
love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God is
man's worst sin.
I answer that, The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God, as
stated above ([2621]Q[10], A[3]): and this aversion would not have the
character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt
consists in a voluntary aversion from God.
Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the hatred
of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly. For just as
the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it directly shun
what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is directly averted
from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, a man turns
away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in so far, namely, as he
desires an inordinate pleasure, to which aversion from God is
connected. Now that which is so by itself, always takes precedence of
that which is so by another. Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous
than other sins.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one
thing not to do good things, end another to hate the giver of good
things, even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to
sin deliberately." This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good
things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy
Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin against
the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a
special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin
against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found in every kind
of that sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be
voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful.
Now it becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is
proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its
sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and
hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of God is a
greater sin than unbelief.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God
the author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on
them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine
justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God commands us to
bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other hand, to break
out into hatred of God when He inflicts those punishments, is to hate
God's very justice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes it is more grievous to love sin
than to do it, so is it more wicked to hate justice than, not to have
done it."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not always
a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according to Prov.
8:8: "All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in
them." Now, it is written (Lk. 14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate
not his father and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple." Therefore
hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin.
Objection 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But
it is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is
written (Rom. 1:30): "Detractors, hateful to God." Therefore it is
possible to hate certain people without committing a sin.
Objection 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a
"wandering away from what is according to nature," according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a
thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing.
Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:9): "He that . . . hateth his
brother, is in darkness." Now spiritual darkness is sin. Therefore
there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.
I answer that, Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above ([2622]FS,
Q[29], A[2]); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love
of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of
what he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in
respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in respect
of sin and lack of justice.
Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and
whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate
our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love
for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him,
since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his evil.
Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it simply, is
always sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must
honor our parents---as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must
hate them in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the
perfection of Divine justice.
Reply to Objection 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not
his nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods
which they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we
should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show
hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we
should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are
hostile to us.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our
neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most
grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:15):
"Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." Now murder is the most
grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.
Objection 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we
give our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to
love. Therefore hatred is the worst.
On the contrary, A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as
Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a man
hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and
adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.
Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed
to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Mat. 5:19, "He that shall break
one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments of Moses,
Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little
in their reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the
other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou shalt not be angry,
Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in their reward, but little
in the transgression." Now hatred is an internal movement like anger
and desire. Therefore hatred of one's brother is a less grievous sin
than murder.
I answer that, Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two
counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins,
secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned against.
On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than external actions
that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man's will,
which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of sin, so that
if a man's outward actions were to be inordinate, without any disorder
in his will, they would not be sinful, for instance, if he were to kill
a man, through ignorance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be
anything sinful in a man's outward sins against his neighbor, it is all
to be traced to his inward hatred.
On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a
man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred is a capital sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is
directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the
virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of
the capital sins, and the origin of all others.
Objection 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations
of our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: "The passions of sins . . . did
work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now all other
passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown
above ([2623]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned
one of the capital sins.
Objection 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil
more than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should
be reckoned a capital sin.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among the
seven capital sins.
I answer that, As stated above ([2624]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital
vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is
contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and
when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it
is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail
in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in
that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is first
in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first and
foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good, and
especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good.
Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but
the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and
therefore it is not a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, "the virtue of
a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its
nature." Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first
and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the
foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first
among the vices, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's
natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of
one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be
first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of an
already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.
Reply to Objection 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the
reason that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred
of such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is,
however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which,
namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on
account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil
must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred arises from envy?
Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is
sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for,
on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate.
Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our
neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above ([2625]Q[25],
A[1];[2626] Q[26], A[2]). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred
to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for
we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those
who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore
hatred does not arise from envy.
Objection 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is
caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows into
hatred." Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy
cometh hatred."
I answer that, As stated above [2627](A[5]), hatred of his neighbor is
a man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love
which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from
that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is
naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids
sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred
arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us
pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of
good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for
this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy
is sorrow for our neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good
becomes hateful to us, so that "out of envy cometh hatred."
Reply to Objection 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive
power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of
circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so
according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement, love
gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained
what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the
good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love.
And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for
the object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures,
wherefore love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor
afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in
God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been
stated above [2628](A[1]), that God is not an object of hatred, except
in so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and
consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed
to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred
of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred
towards God.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various
causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from
anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which
looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore
hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at
first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a
certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of
vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes
so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is
part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy
formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by
anger.
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OF SLOTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy
is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or
about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we
must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sloth is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special vice?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
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Whether sloth is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a kind of sorrow,
according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above
([2629]FS, Q[35], A[8] ). Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a
sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x,
[*De Institutione Caeobiorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth
chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and
inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at regular
and fixed intervals." Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is,
seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian
says (De Instit. Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we
sigh at being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other
monasteries and those which are a long way off are much better than the
one we dwell in": all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore
sloth is not a sin.
Objection 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus.
21:2: "Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent." Now Cassian says
(De Instit. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth
is not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance."
Therefore sloth is not a sin.
On the contrary, Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now such
is sloth [acedia]: for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): "Bow down thy
shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not grieved
[acedieris] with her bands." Therefore sloth is a sin.
I answer that, Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) is
an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind, that he
wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth
implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on Ps.
106:18, "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the
definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind
which neglects to begin good."
Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its
effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is
apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand,
pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in
truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth,
sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also
which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses
man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Apostle (2
Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed up with
overmuch sorrow."
Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow for
spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in point
of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil
movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said above
(Q[10], A[2]; [2630]FS, Q[74], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they
are blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just
as they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good.
Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame:
whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for
good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in
this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may either
be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal sin. And
since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows that on
account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to commit some
particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may become more
insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring at certain
fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose one to
sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by sloth
towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and to be
parched by the sun's heat.
Reply to Objection 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think
too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man
contemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from being
a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such like
contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we reckon
evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the goods of
others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have received
ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.
Reply to Objection 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of
sin should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance;
by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin, as
in lust; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): "Fly
fornication"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought
diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some
trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more we
think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us, and
forthwith sloth dies away.
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Whether sloth is a special vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that
which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of
vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite spiritual
good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of continence,
and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is
sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above [2631](A[1]), it seems that
sloth is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed
to joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth
should not be reckoned a special vice.
Objection 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object,
which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special
virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now nothing,
seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this be a special
vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that they
are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of weariness: while dislike of
toil, and love of bodily repose seem to be due to the same cause, viz.
idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing but laziness, which seems
untrue, for idleness is opposed to carefulness, whereas sloth is
opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not a special vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from the
other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.
I answer that, Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take
spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice,
because, as stated above ([2632]FS, Q[71], A[1]), every vice shuns the
spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that
sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as
toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's
pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices,
whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.
Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual
goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each
virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good,
about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper
to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists in
its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to have that
spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In like manner
the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in
each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but to every
vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which charity rejoices,
belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth. This suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
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Whether sloth is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every
mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth seems
contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the precepts of
the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less
grievous than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain
in deed from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a
mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal
sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore
sloth is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man.
But sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit.
Caenob. x, l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a most
vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit." Therefore sloth is not
always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): "The sorrow of the world
worketh death." But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow "according to
God," which is contrasted with sorrow of the world. Therefore it is a
mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([2633]FS, Q[88], AA[1],2), mortal sin
is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the effect
of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which by its
very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason of its
genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity is joy
in God, as stated above (Q[28], A[1]), while sloth is sorrow about
spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore sloth is a
mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be observed with regard
to all sins that are mortal in respect of their genus, that they are
not mortal, save when they attain to their perfection. Because the
consummation of sin is in the consent of reason: for we are speaking
now of human sins consisting in human acts, the principle of which is
the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a mere beginning of sin in the
sensuality alone, without attaining to the consent of reason, it is a
venial sin on account of the imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus
of adultery, the concupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality
is a venial sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a
mortal sin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the
sensuality alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the
spirit, and then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to
the reason, which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of
the Divine good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the
spirit. In this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing
the Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept,
implicitly commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind
about the Divine good is contrary thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any
spiritual good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged
to adhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do
acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of sloth;
but when he is sorry to have to do something for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 3: Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in
holy men, but they do not reach to the consent of reason.
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Whether sloth should be accounted a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a
capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful
acts, as stated above ([2634]Q[34], A[5]). Now sloth does not move one
to action, but on the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it
should not be accounted a capital sin.
Objection 2: Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are
assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to sloth,
viz. "malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness in regard
to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful things." Now
these do not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For "spite" is,
seemingly the same as hatred, which arises from envy, as stated above
([2635]Q[34], A[6]); "malice" is a genus which contains all vices, and,
in like manner, a "wandering" of the mind after unlawful things is to
be found in every vice; "sluggishness" about the commandments seems to
be the same as sloth, while "faint-heartedness" and "despair" may arise
from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly accounted a capital sin.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the
vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man
shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is sorrow,
and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth: and of
sorrow he says that it gives rise to "spite, faint-heartedness,
bitterness, despair," whereas he states that from sloth seven things
arise, viz. "idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of the mind, restlessness
of the body, instability, loquacity, curiosity." Therefore it seems
that either Gregory or Isidore has wrongly assigned sloth as a capital
sin together with its daughters.
On the contrary, The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that sloth
is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.
I answer that, As stated above ([2636]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital
vice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final
cause. Now just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in
order to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the
impulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow,
either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing
something under pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of
sorrow, as stated above [2637](A[2]; FS, Q[85], A[8]), it is fittingly
reckoned a capital sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from
doing things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do
certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such as
weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth.
For since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5,6) "no man can
be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant," it
follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man
shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other things
that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in spiritual
pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order
observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and
secondly he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now
spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both
end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of "despair," while
avoidance of those goods which are the means to the end, in matters of
difficulty which come under the counsels, is the effect of
"faint-heartedness," and in matters of common righteousness, is the
effect of "sluggishness about the commandments." The struggle against
spiritual goods that cause sorrow is sometimes with men who lead others
to spiritual goods, and this is called "spite"; and sometimes it
extends to the spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to
detest them, and this is properly called "malice." In so far as a man
has recourse to eternal objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is
called "wandering after unlawful things." From this it is clear how to
reply to the objections against each of the daughters: for "malice"
does not denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be
understood as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as synonymous with
hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same
applies to the others.
Reply to Objection 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also
given by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly
(Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated
above [2638](A[2]), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man
shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of any
other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on account of
the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to sloth; since sloth
seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the
things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are
reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for "bitterness" which Isidore
states to be the result of sorrow, is an effect of "spite." "Idleness"
and "drowsiness" are reduced to "sluggishness about the precepts": for
some are idle and omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and
fulfil them with negligence. All the other five which he reckons as
effects of sloth, belong to the "wandering of the mind after unlawful
things." This tendency to wander, if it reside in the mind itself that
is desirous of rushing after various things without rhyme or reason, is
called "uneasiness of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative
power, it is called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is called
"loquacity"; and in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it
is called "restlessness of the body," when, to wit, a man shows the
unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of his
body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to another, it
is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote changeableness of
purpose.
__________________________________________________________________
OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) What is envy?
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether envy is a kind of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the
object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the
envious man that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which
is racked by the prosperity of another." Therefore envy is not a kind
of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of
pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus, in
knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation." Therefore envy is
not a kind of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who
are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above ([2639]FS,
Q[47], A[3]) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack
little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are envious,
according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy is not a
kind of sorrow.
Objection 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite
effects have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the
recollection of goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated
above ([2640]FS, Q[32], A[3]) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it
is a cause of envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "we
envy those who have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or
which we possessed at some time." Therefore sloth is not a kind of
sorrow.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a species
of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's good."
I answer that, The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it may
happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and in
this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in two
ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so far as it
threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man grieves
for his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some harm: such
like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).
Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in so
far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or
excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good: and
consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name
consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the
Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being
reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for sorrow
to be about good, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Since envy is about another's good name in so far
as it diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a
man is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in
reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed from
one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors to
rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a
commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner whom
he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed
from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who are near
him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is against our
will that these should be in better repute than we are, and that gives
rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes pleasure in so far
as it is in agreement with the will.
Reply to Objection 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters
where he is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses
him in such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems
to him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort;
wherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation
surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be
honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are
envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may
befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in
something great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the
little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that "we can envy those
only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves."
Reply to Objection 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we have
had them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes
sorrow; and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that,
above all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much
in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending
little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that
others have acquired goods.
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Whether envy is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to
Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): "Let her have
companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and be
nettled when they are praised." But no one should be advised to commit
a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin
Objection 1: Further, "Envy is sorrow for another's good," as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes praiseworthy: for it
is written (Prov. 29:2): "When the wicked shall bear rule, the people
shall mourn." Therefore envy is not always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good
zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up."
Therefore envy is not always a sin.
Objection 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is
a kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "When the foul
sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself
shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes
the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed,
while the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is
gnashing with the teeth." Therefore envy is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made
desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another."
I answer that, As stated above [2641](A[1]), envy is sorrow for
another's good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First,
when a man grieves for another's good, through fear that it may cause
harm either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not
envy, as stated above [2642](A[1]), and may be void of sin. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 11): "It very often happens that without
charity being lost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and
again his glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he
falls, we believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he
prospers, we dread lest many suffer unjustly."
Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it, but
because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly
speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this
zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor.
14:1: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about temporal
goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may grieve over
another's good, because he who happens to have that good is unworthy of
it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods, which
make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher states, is about riches,
and those things which can accrue to the worthy and the unworthy; and
he calls this sorrow {nemesis} [*The nearest equivalent is
"indignation." The use of the word "nemesis" to signify "revenge" does
not represent the original Greek.], saying that it belongs to good
morals. But he says this because he considered temporal goods in
themselves, in so far as they may seem great to those who look not to
eternal goods: whereas, according to the teaching of faith, temporal
goods that accrue to those who are unworthy, are so disposed according
to God's just ordinance, either for the correction of those men, or for
their condemnation, and such goods are as nothing in comparison with
the goods to come, which are prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of
this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: "Be not
emulous of evil doers, nor envy them that work iniquity," and elsewhere
(Ps. 72:2,3): "My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the
wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: 'because I had a
zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners']."
Fourthly, we grieve over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses
ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over
what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good.
Reply to Objection 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought
to strive to progress with those who are better than we are.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sorrow for another's good
in the first sense given above.
Reply to Objection 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a
certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.
Reply to Objection 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal
accidentally, as stated above ([2643]FS, Q[87], A[2]) when we were
treating of sins.
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Whether envy is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since
envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason,
as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. [2644]FS, Q[74], A[4]].
Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy
can be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have seen
and known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale
and looked bitterly on its foster-brother." Therefore envy is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But
envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to {nemesis}, which is a passion,
according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy is not a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the little
one." Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore envy
is a mortal sin.
I answer that, Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For the
genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to the
aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives
its spiritual life, according to 1 Jn. 3:14: "We know that we have
passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Now the
object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by
contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good,
while envy grieves over it, as stated above [2645](A[1]). Therefore it
is evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.
Nevertheless, as stated above (Q[35], A[4]; [2646]FS, Q[72], A[5], ad
1), in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in
the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of
concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of
anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find
sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are venial
sins.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion
of the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts,
the principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not
a mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have
not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is
manifest.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy
is contrary both to {nemesis} and to pity, but for different reasons.
For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being
contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his
neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's
evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same
passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is
contrary to {nemesis} on the part of the man whose good grieves the
envious man, for {nemesis} is sorrow for the good of the undeserving
according to Ps. 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the
prosperity of sinners" [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion of
the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners'], whereas the envious
grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is
clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now
pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is
contrary to pity and charity.
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Whether envy is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the
capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the
daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that
"those who love honor and glory are more envious." Therefore envy is
not a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the
other vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45):
"The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived mind under
some kind of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the soul to
all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their wild outcry." Now
envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46):
"Though in every evil thing that is done, the venom of our old enemy is
infused into the heart of man, yet in this wickedness the serpent stirs
his whole bowels and discharges the bane of spite fitted to enter deep
into the mind." Therefore envy is not a capital sin.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly
assigned by Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy arise
"hatred, tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor's misfortunes,
and grief for his prosperity." For joy at our neighbor's misfortunes
and grief for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears
from what has been said above [2647](A[3]). Therefore these should not
be assigned as daughters of envy.
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who
states that envy is a capital sin and assigns the aforesaid daughters
thereto.
I answer that, Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good, so
envy is grief for our neighbor's good. Now it has been stated above
([2648]Q[35], A[4]) that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that it
incites man to do certain things, with the purpose either of avoiding
sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is accounted a
capital vice for the same reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), "the capital
vices are so closely akin to one another that one springs from the
other. For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by
corrupting the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves for
the power of an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should
acquire that power." Consequently the notion of a capital vice does not
exclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it
should have some principal reason for being itself the origin of
several kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy manifestly
arises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by
Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v, 1).
Reply to Objection 2: It does not follow from the passage quoted that
envy is the greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to
envy, he is enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart,
for as quoted further on in the same passage, "by the envy of the
devil, death came into the world" (Wis. 2:24).
There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most
grievous sins, viz. envy of another's spiritual good, which envy is a
sorrow for the increase of God's grace, and not merely for our
neighbor's good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost,
because thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who
is glorified in His works.
Reply to Objection 3: The number of envy's daughters may be understood
for the reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something
by way of beginning, something by way of middle, and something by way
of term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another's
reputation, and this either secretly, and then we have "tale-bearing,"
or openly, and then we have "detraction." The middle consists in the
fact that when a man aims at defaming another, he is either able to do
so, and then we have "joy at another's misfortune," or he is unable,
and then we have "grief at another's prosperity." The term is hatred
itself, because just as good which delights causes love, so does sorrow
cause hatred, as stated above ([2649]Q[34], A[6]). Grief at another's
prosperity is in one way the very same as envy, when, to Wit, a man
grieves over another's prosperity, in so far as it gives the latter a
good name, but in another way it is a daughter of envy, in so far as
the envious man sees his neighbor prosper notwithstanding his efforts
to prevent it. On the other hand, "joy at another's misfortune" is not
directly the same as envy, but is a result thereof, because grief over
our neighbor's good which is envy, gives rise to joy in his evil.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall
consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is
on the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz. schism,
quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the first head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether discord is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
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Whether discord is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a sin. For to disaccord
with man is to sever oneself from another's will. But this does not
seem to be a sin, because God's will alone, and not our neighbor's, is
the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, whoever induces another to sin, sins also
himself. But it appears not to be a sin to incite others to discord,
for it is written (Acts 23:6) that Paul, knowing that the one part were
Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council: "Men
brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope
and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he had
so said, there arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the
Sadducees." Therefore discord is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not to be found in
a holy man. But discord is to be found even among holy men, for it is
written (Acts 15:39): "There arose a dissension" between Paul and
Barnabas, "so that they departed one from another." Therefore discord
is not a sin. and least of all a mortal sin.
On the contrary, "Dissensions," that is, discords, are reckoned among
the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), of which it is said afterwards
(Gal. 5:21) that "they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom
of God." Now nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from the kingdom of
God. Therefore discord is a mortal sin.
I answer that, Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above
([2650]Q[29], AA[1],3) concord results from charity, in as much as
charity directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the
Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord
is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord.
But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in
two ways: first, directly; secondly, accidentally. Now, human acts and
movements are said to be direct when they are according to one's
intention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor, when
he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and his
neighbor's good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal sin in
respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity, although the
first movements of such discord are venial sins by reason of their
being imperfect acts.
The accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the intention.
Hence when several intend a good pertaining to God's honor, or our
neighbor's profit, while one deems a certain thing good, and another
thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case accidentally contrary
to the Divine good or that of our neighbor. Such like discord is
neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be accompanied by an
error about things necessary to salvation, or by undue obstinacy, since
it has also been stated above ([2651]Q[29], AA[1],3, ad 2) that the
concord which is an effect of charity, is union of wills not of
opinions. It follows from this that discord is sometimes the sin of one
party only, for instance, when one wills a good which the other
knowingly resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both parties, as
when each dissents from the other's good, and loves his own.
Reply to Objection 1: One man's will considered in itself is not the
rule of another man's will; but in so far as our neighbor's will
adheres to God's will, it becomes in consequence, a rule regulated
according to its proper measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord
with such a will, because by that very fact one disaccords with the
Divine rule.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as a man's will that adheres to God is a
right rule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man's will that
is opposed to God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good.
Hence to cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from charity
is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is written (Prov. 6:16):
"Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul
detesteth," which seventh is stated (Prov. 6:19) to be "him that soweth
discord among brethren." On the other hand, to arouse a discord whereby
an evil concord (i.e. concord in an evil will) is destroyed, is
praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for sowing discord
among those who concorded together in evil, because Our Lord also said
of Himself (Mat. 10:34): "I came not to send peace, but the sword."
Reply to Objection 3: The discord between Paul and Barnabas was
accidental and not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one
thought one thing good, while the other thought something else, which
was owing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not about
things necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine
providence, on account of the good which would ensue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether discord is a daughter of vainglory?
Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a daughter of vainglory.
For anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord is apparently
the daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15:18: "A passionate man
stirreth up strifes." Therefore it is not a daughter of vainglory.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine expounding the words of Jn. 7:39, "As
yet the Spirit was not given," says (Tract. xxxii) "Malice severs,
charity unites." Now discord is merely a separation of wills. Therefore
discord arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from vainglory.
Objection 3: Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to
be a capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on
Mat. 12:25, "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made
desolate," says: "Just as concord makes small things thrive, so discord
brings the greatest things to ruin." Therefore discord should itself be
reckoned a capital vice, rather than a daughter of vainglory.
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
I answer that, Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so far,
to wit, as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the other
man's will holds fast to something else. Now if a man's will holds fast
to its own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers what is his
own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it
is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord, whereby a man holds
to his own way of thinking, and departs from that of others, is
reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory.
Reply to Objection 1: Strife is not the same as discord, for strife
consists in external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should
arise from anger, which incites the mind to hurt one's neighbor;
whereas discord consists in a divergence in the movements of wills,
which arises from pride or vainglory, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 2: In discord we may consider that which is the term
"wherefrom," i.e. another's will from which we recede, and in this
respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is
the term "whither," i.e. something of our own to which we cling, and in
this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment the
term "whither" is more important than the term "wherefrom" (because the
end is of more account than the beginning), discord is accounted a
daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from
both for different reasons, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why concord makes small things thrive,
while discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because "the more united
a force is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the
weaker it becomes" (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is
part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills, and
in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as though it
were a capital vice.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CONTENTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether contention is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For
there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be
found in them, according to Lk. 22:24: "And there was also a strife
amongst" the disciples of Jesus, "which of them should . . . be the
greatest." Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his
neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Phil. 1:17): "Some
out of contention preach Christ," and afterwards he says (Phil. 1:18):
"In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice." Therefore contention
is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, it happens that people contend either in the
courts or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a
good intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with
heretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Kings 14:1, "It came to pass one day,"
etc. says: "Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless
they are first challenged to dispute." Therefore contention is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 4: Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according
to Job 39:32: "Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily
silenced?" And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord
said of him (Job 42:7): "You have not spoken the thing that is right
before me, as my servant Job hath." Therefore contention is not always
a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is against the precept of the Apostle who says (2
Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words." Moreover (Gal. 5:20) contention is
included among the works of the flesh, and as stated there (Gal. 5:21)
"they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Now
whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God and is against a
precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a mortal sin.
I answer that, To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore just
as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention signifies
contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts various
contrary things in a speech, this is called "contentio," which Tully
calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. iv), where he
says that "it consists in developing a speech from contrary things,"
for instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most bitter
end."
Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with
regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with regard
to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must consider
whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or
against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the manner, we
must consider whether his manner of contending is in keeping with the
persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy,
hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that "contention is a sharp
speech suitable for proof and refutation"---or whether it exceeds the
demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which case it is
blameworthy.
Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth
and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose [*Cf. Gloss.
Ord. in Rom. i, 29] defines contention: "Contention is a disclaimer of
the truth with clamorous confidence." If, however, contention denote a
disavowal of what is false, with the proper measure of acrimony, it is
praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together
with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless the
contention be conducted so inordinately, as to give scandal to others.
Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words,"
adds, "for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers."
Reply to Objection 1: The disciples of Christ contended together, not
with the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up
for what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their
contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought not
to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were not
spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and for this
reason Our Lord checked them.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who preached Christ "out of contention,"
were to be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of
faith, but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact
that they thought they would "raise affliction" to the Apostle who was
preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their
contention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that
Christ would be made known---since evil is sometimes the occasion of
good results.
Reply to Objection 3: Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when,
in contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or
in a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense
Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when,
whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. in respect
of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For
Job had said (13:3): "I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to
reason with God": yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to
defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be
inordinate in mind or in speech.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether contention is a daughter of vainglory?
Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a daughter of
vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1
Cor. 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and
contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men?" Now zeal
pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy.
Objection 2: Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the
voice. But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares
(Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.
Objection 3: Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the
matter of pride and vainglory, according to 1 Cor. 8:1: "Knowledge
puffeth up." Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by
knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore contention
is not a daughter of vainglory.
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).
I answer that, As stated above ([2652]Q[37], A[2]), discord is a
daughter of vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings
to his own opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is
proper to pride and vainglory to seek one's own glory. And just as
people are discordant when they hold to their own opinion in their
hearts, so are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by
words. Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for
the same reason as discord.
Reply to Objection 1: Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so
far as a man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or
with whom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to
something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he
clings to his own opinion, as stated above ([2653]Q[37], A[2], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 2: The contention of which we are speaking puts on a
loud voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not
the chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention
arises from the same source as the raising of the voice.
Reply to Objection 3: Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by
goods even those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is
proud of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does so
not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one
contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why the
"per se" and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not result
from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of pride.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SCHISM (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to
deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first place,
then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether schism is a special sin?
(2) Whether it is graver than unbelief?
(3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;
(4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether schism is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that schism is not a special sin. For
"schism," as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat.),
"denotes a division." But every sin causes a division, according to Is.
59:: "Your sins have divided between you and your God." Therefore
schism is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys
the Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the
Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) "is
disobedience against the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is
a schism.
Objection 3: Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of
faith. If, therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem
not to differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief.
On the contrary, Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon. ii, 4)
distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a "schismatic
is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same worship, as
others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the community,
whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that of the
Catholic Church." Therefore schism is not a generic sin.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its name
"from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to unity.
Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and essentially
opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical order, the
species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the
moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and that which
results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental. Hence the sin
of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the
schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity which is the effect
of charity: because charity unites not only one person to another with
the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole Church in unity of
spirit.
Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully and
intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church; for
this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several
individuals among themselves is subordinate to the unity of the Church,
even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural body is
subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the unity of the Church
consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection or communion
of the members of the Church, and again in the subordination of all the
members of the Church to the one head, according to Col. 2:18,19:
"Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the Head, from
which the whole body, by joints and bands, being supplied with
nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God." Now this
Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent in the Church is the Sovereign
Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are those who refuse to submit to the
Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with those members of the
Church who acknowledge his supremacy.
Reply to Objection 1: The division between man and God that results
from sin is not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention
as a result of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is
not schism properly so called.
Reply to Objection 2: The essence of schism consists in rebelliously
disobeying the commandments: and I say "rebelliously," since a
schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, and
refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do this,
wherefore not every sin is a schism.
Reply to Objection 3: Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of
those things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For
heresy is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially
opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith
and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks
charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although whoever
is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This is what
Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians [*In Ep.
ad Tit. iii, 10]: "I consider the difference between schism and heresy
to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man from
the Church." Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is the road to
the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: "From which things," i.e.
charity and the like, "some going astray, are turned aside into vain
babbling," so too, schism is the road to heresy. Wherefore Jerome adds
(In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that "at the outset it is possible, in a
certain respect, to find a difference between schism and heresy: yet
there is no schism that does not devise some heresy for itself, that it
may appear to have had a reason for separating from the Church."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether schism is a graver sin than unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Dt.
25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of
the stripes be." Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely
than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex. 32:28) that
some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of
idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16:30): "If the
Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them down,
and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into hell,
you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God." Moreover the
ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from the rule of
David were most severely punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore the sin of
schism is graver than the sin of unbelief.
Objection 2: Further, "The good of the multitude is greater and more
godlike than the good of the individual," as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude,
namely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the
particular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual.
Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
Objection 3: Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed
to charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is
opposed, as shown above ([2654]Q[10], A[2];[2655] Q[23], A[6]).
Therefore schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
On the contrary, That which results from an addition to something else
surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy results from
something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as
Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore
schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief.
I answer that, The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways:
first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to its
circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in
number, so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways:
wherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the
graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity derived
from the sin's genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is taken from
its object, as shown above ([2656]FS, Q[72], A[1]; [2657]FS, Q[73],
A[3]). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is, in
respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed
against God is graver than a sin committed against one's neighbor.
Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God Himself,
according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith is founded;
whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which is a
participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore it is
manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous than the
sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular schismatic sins
more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either because his
contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of greater danger,
or for some similar reason.
Reply to Objection 1: It had already been declared to that people by
the law which they had received that there was one God, and that no
other God was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed
among them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for
those who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be
punished in an unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be
punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well known
among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it behooved
those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in a miraculous
and unwonted manner.
We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more
severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to
seditions and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): "This city
since days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and
wars were raised therein [*Vulg.: 'This city is a rebellious city, and
hurtful to the kings and provinces, and . . . wars were raised therein
of old']." Now sometimes a more severe punishment is inflicted for an
habitual sin (as stated above, [2658]FS, Q[105], A[2], ad 9), because
punishments are medicines intended to keep man away from sin: so that
where there is greater proneness to sin, a more severe punishment ought
to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes, they were punished not only
for the sin of schism, but also for that of idolatry as stated in the
passage quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the good of the multitude is greater than
the good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic
good to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank in
the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like
manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, is
less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity has two objects; one is its principal
object and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object
and is our neighbor's good. Now schism and other sins against our
neighbor, are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good,
which is less than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so
these sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred
of God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object,
is not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins committed
by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem to be the
greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude.
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Whether schismatics have any power?
Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics have some power. For
Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): "Just as those who come back to
the Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who
return after being ordained, are not ordained again." Now Order is a
kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they retain
their Orders.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra
Donat. vi, 5]): "One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as he
can have it." But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very great
power. Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church, have a
spiritual power.
Objection 3: Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf.
Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: "We command that persons
consecrated by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to the
Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the Roman
Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders should be
acknowledged, when they return to the unity of the Church, provided
they be of commendable life and knowledge." But this would not be so,
unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics. Therefore
schismatics have spiritual power.
On the contrary, Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu. 1,
can. Novatianus): "He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the
concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church, and
from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power or
honor."
I answer that, Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the
other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is
conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of
the Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as
appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated, is
not consecrated again unless it has been broken up. Consequently such a
power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has received
it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall into schism or
heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he come back to the
Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however, the lower power
ought not to exercise its act, except in so far as it is moved by the
higher power, as may be seen also in the physical order, it follows
that such persons lose the use of their power, so that it is not lawful
for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this power has its effect in
sacramental acts, because therein man acts only as God's instrument, so
that sacramental effects are not precluded on account of any fault
whatever in the person who confers the sacrament.
On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is conferred
by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not adhere to
the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in heretics and
schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor excommunicate,
nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and if they do, it
is invalid.
Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual
power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second power,
or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to the
essence of the power, but to its lawful use.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether it is right that schismatics should be punished with
excommunication?
Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished
with excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a
share in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5) that
"Baptism can be received from a schismatic." Therefore it seems that
excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics.
Objection 2: Further, it is the duty of Christ's faithful to lead back
those who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain
persons (Ezech. 34:4): "That which was driven away you have not brought
again, neither have you sought that which was lost." Now schismatics
are more easily brought back by such as may hold communion with them.
Therefore it seems that they ought not to be excommunicated.
Objection 3: Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and
the same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: "God will not judge the same
twice" [*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment
for the sin of schism, according to[2659] Q[23], A[5], where it is
stated: "Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who are
severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must be
punished by the secular power." Therefore they ought not to be punished
with excommunication.
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 16:26): "Depart from the tents of
these wicked men," those, to wit, who had caused the schism, "and touch
nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins."
I answer that, According to Wis. 11:11, "By what things a man sinneth,
by the same also he should be punished" [Vulg.: 'he is tormented']. Now
a schismatic, as shown above [2660](A[1]), commits a twofold sin: first
by separating himself from communion with the members of the Church,
and in this respect the fitting punishment for schismatics is that they
be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse submission to the head of the
Church, wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the
Church's spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled by
the secular power.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a
schismatic, save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man
to quit this life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom
he may receive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that
mark, which is bestowed in Baptism.
Reply to Objection 2: Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse
whereby a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the
Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation
brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their
separation, they are sometimes led to do penance
Reply to Objection 3: The punishments of the present life are
medicinal, and therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel
a man, another is added: just as physicians employ several body
medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when
excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs the
compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment suffices,
another should not be employed.
__________________________________________________________________
OF WAR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?
(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?
(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?
(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
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Whether it is always sinful to wage war?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war.
Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage
war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Mat.
26:52: "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword." Therefore
all wars are unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a
sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Mat.
5:39): "But I say to you not to resist evil"; and (Rom. 12:19): "Not
revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath."
Therefore war is always sinful.
Objection 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of
virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.
Objection 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful,
as is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take
place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are
slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore
it seems that war is a sin in itself.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the centurion
[*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion forbade war
altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather
have been counselled to cast aside their arms, and to give up
soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: 'Do violence to
no man . . . and be content with your pay' [*Lk. 3:14]. If he commanded
them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering."
I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are
necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the
war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual
to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the
tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private
individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in
wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who
are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of
the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful
for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal
against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according
to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in
vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him
that doth evil"; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the
sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies.
Hence it is said to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the
poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for
this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order
conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and
counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme
authority."
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked,
should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.
Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): "A just war
is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or
state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs
inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly."
Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful
intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the
avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words
quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud.
Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars
that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with
the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting
the good." For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate
authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a
wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): "The
passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an
unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of
power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war."
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To
take the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone,
without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority." On
the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by
the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public person)
through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is
not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by another,
wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make
sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they
always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they
are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.
Reply to Objection 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of
mind, so that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain
from resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes
for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of
those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin.
cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is
necessary to handle in many ways against their will. For when we are
stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be
vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of
sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like an
internal enemy."
Reply to Objection 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so
they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord
"came not to send upon earth" (Mat. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep.
ad Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we
go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring,
so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to
the prosperity of peace."
Reply to Objection 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not
all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in
slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no
such danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or
"bloodless wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference incorrect:
cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i].
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Whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight.
For, as stated above [2661](A[1]), wars are lawful and just in so far
as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at
the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of
prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon the
sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are
faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and was
not, leaveth the sheep, end flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt
him, and dares not stand up against his injustice." Therefore it is
lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.
Objection 2: Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur):
"As untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some
said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and
covertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather together,
and ordered them to go down to the seashore." Therefore it is lawful
for bishops to fight.
Objection 3: Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man
does a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another,
according to Rom. 1:32: "They who do such things, are worthy of death,
and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that
do them." Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce
others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce
others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that
Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of
Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is
lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and
meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni
timore) that if "a man die for the true faith, or to save his country,
or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward."
Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.
On the contrary, It was said to Peter as representing bishops and
clerics (Mat. 16:52): "Put up again thy sword into the scabbard [Vulg.:
'its place'] [*"Scabbard" is the reading in Jn. 18:11]." Therefore it
is not lawful for them to fight.
I answer that, Several things are requisite for the good of a human
society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a number
of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 1),
while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another, that
they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore those
who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy themselves
with things of small importance. Thus according to human laws, soldiers
who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce
[*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.].
Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a
bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general
one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they
hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine things, the
praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the duties
of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises are forbidden to
clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so too are warlike
pursuits, according to 2 Tim. 2:4: "No man being a soldier to God,
entangleth himself with secular business." The second reason is a
special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are directed to
the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ is
represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: "As often as you
shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death
of the Lord, until He come." Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to
slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should be ready to
shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed what they
portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been decreed that
those who shed blood, even without sin, become irregular. Now no man
who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully do that which renders
him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for
clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood.
Reply to Objection 1: Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who
brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the
oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse
themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons,
according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): "The weapons of
our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God." Such are salutary
warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the
sentence of excommunication.
Reply to Objection 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of
their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms
themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly,
by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps.
Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded to
sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that
bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the front: and it is an
abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2662]Q[23], A[4], ad 2) every
power, art or virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is
directed to the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be
considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which
clerics are deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and
counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to
take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an
occupation is unbecoming their personality.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war,
nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their
being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act
may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have
vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war.
For it is written (Dt. 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after that
which is just." But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem
to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even
in a just war.
Objection 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to
faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith
with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra
Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy,
as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is
unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): "Whatsoever you would
that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to
observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is
our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to
be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by
laying ambushes.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos):
"Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be
carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the authority
of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai
(Joshua 8:2).
I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the
enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two ways.
First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a
promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy
in this way, for there are certain "rights of war and covenants, which
ought to be observed even among enemies," as Ambrose states (De
Officiis i).
Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not
declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to
do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be
concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according
to Mat. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs." Wherefore much
more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For this
reason among other things that a soldier has to learn is the art of
concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's knowledge, as stated
in the Book on Strategy [*Stratagematum i, 1] by Frontinus. Such like
concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully
employed in a just war.
Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they
contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an
inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything
from him
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy
days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God.
Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex.
20:8: for "sabbath" is interpreted "rest." But wars are full of unrest.
Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.
Objection 2: Further, certain persons are reproached (Is. 58:3) because
on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of
strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it
unlawful to fight on holy days.
Objection 3: Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal
harm. But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed.
Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of
avoiding temporal harm.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Mac. 2:41): The Jews rightly
determined . . . saying: "Whosoever shall come up against us to fight
on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him."
I answer that, The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those
things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body. Hence
Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (Jn. 7:23): "Are you angry at Me
because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?" Hence
physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days. Now
there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal (whereby
many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal
and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual.
Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common weal of the
faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days, provided there
be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt God, if
notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain from
fighting.
However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on
a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF STRIFE (TWO ARTICLES) [*Strife here denotes fighting between individuals]
We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether strife is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether strife is always a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For strife
seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that the word
"rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu] of a dog,
because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he delights in
brawling, and provokes contention." Now contention is not always a sin.
Neither, therefore, is strife.
Objection 2: Further, it is related (Gn. 26:21) that the servants of
Isaac "digged" another well, "and for that they quarrelled likewise."
Now it is not credible that the household of Isaac quarrelled publicly,
without being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin. Therefore
strife is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But
war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin.
On the contrary, Strifes [*The Douay version has 'quarrels'] are
reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and "they who do
such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Therefore strifes are
not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins.
I answer that, While contention implies a contradiction of words,
strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on
Gal. 5:20 says that "strifes are when persons strike one another
through anger." Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it takes
place between private persons, being declared not by public authority,
but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife is always sinful. In
fact it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks another unjustly, for it
is not without mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the
deed be done by the hands. But in him who defends himself, it may be
without sin, or it may sometimes involve a venial sin, or sometimes a
mortal sin; and this depends on his intention and on his manner of
defending himself. For if his sole intention be to withstand the injury
done to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is no sin,
and one cannot say properly that there is strife on his part. But if,
on the other hand, his self-defense be inspired by vengeance and
hatred, it is always a sin. It is a venial sin, if a slight movement of
hatred or vengeance obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed
moderation in defending himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for
his assailant with the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting
grievous harm on him.
Reply to Objection 1: Strife is not just the same as contention: and
there are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which
express the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is
always ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever ready
to contradict," that is to say, whether the other man says or does well
or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the passage
proceeds, "and delights in brawling." Thirdly, "he" provokes others to
quarrel, wherefore it goes on, "and provokes contention."
Reply to Objection 1: The sense of the text is not that the servants of
Isaac quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled
with them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who
bore the calumny [*Cf. Gn. 26:20].
Reply to Objection 3: In order for a war to be just it must be declared
by authority of the governing power, as stated above ([2663]Q[40],
A[1]); whereas strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or
hatred. For if the servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their
public authority, attack certain men and these defend themselves, it is
not the former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who
resist the public authority. Hence it is not the assailants in this
case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those who defend
themselves inordinately.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether strife is a daughter of anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger. For
it is written (James 4:1): "Whence are wars and contentions? Are they
not . . . from your concupiscences, which war in your members?" But
anger is not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a
daughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth
and puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels." Now strife is apparently
the same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of
pride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): "The lips of a fool
intermeddle with strife." Now folly differs from anger, for it is
opposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife
is not a daughter of anger.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): "Hatred stirreth up
strifes." But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral.
xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy.
Objection 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): "He that studieth
discords, soweth [Vulg.: 'loveth'] quarrels." But discord is a daughter
of vainglory, as stated above ([2664]Q[37], A[2]). Therefore strife is
also.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that "anger gives rise
to strife"; and it is written (Prov. 15:18; 29:22): "A passionate man
stirreth up strifes."
I answer that, As stated above [2665](A[1]), strife denotes an
antagonism extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another.
Now there are two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. In
one way it is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which
in this case is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is
directed to the hurt of one's enemy either openly or secretly. In
another way a man intends to hurt another who knows and withstands his
intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly to
anger which is the desire of vengeance: for the angry man is not
content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him to
feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what he
has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the
passion of anger ([2666]FS, Q[46], A[6], ad 2). Therefore, properly
speaking, strife arises from anger.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2667]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), all
the irascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty,
so that whatever is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from
concupiscence as from its first root.
Reply to Objection 2: Boasting and puffing up of self which are the
result of anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional
cause of quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being
preferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in
quarrel and strife.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger, as stated above ([2668]FS, Q[48], A[3])
hinders the judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to
folly. Hence they have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in
the reason that a man designs to hurt another inordinately.
Reply to Objection 4: Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it
is not the proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it
is beside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner,
since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees
himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel.
But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the
reason given above.
Reply to Objection 5: Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the
hearts of those who are guilty of strife, and so he that "studies,"
i.e., intends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among
themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by
directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that strife
is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SEDITION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a special sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sedition is a special sin distinct from other sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not a special sin distinct
from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a seditious man
is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets discord." Now, by
provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no other kind of sin
than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems that sedition is not a
special sin distinct from discord.
Objection 2: Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism
takes its name from scission, as stated above ([2669]Q[39], A[1]).
Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that of
schism.
Objection 3: Further, every special sin that is distinct from other
sins, is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now
sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those
vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where
both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a special
sin, distinct from other sins.
On the contrary, Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other sins (2
Cor. 12:20).
I answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having something in common
with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something
in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and
it differs from them in two points. First, because war and strife
denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be said
to denote either actual aggression, or the preparation for such
aggression. Hence a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:20 says that "seditions are
tumults tending to fight," when, to wit, a number of people make
preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly, they differ in
that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being
as it were between one people and another, whereas strife is between
one individual and another, or between few people on one side and few
on the other side, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between
mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state
rises in tumult against another part. Wherefore, since sedition is
opposed to a special kind of good, namely the unity and peace of a
people, it is a special kind of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: A seditious man is one who incites others to
sedition, and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that
a seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but
between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only
in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one another
inordinately.
Reply to Objection 2: Sedition differs from schism in two respects.
First, because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the
multitude, viz. ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to
the temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city
or kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a
material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent.
Reply to Objection 3: Sedition, like schism, is contained under
discord, since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but
between the parts of a multitude.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sedition is always a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin.
For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the
gloss quoted above [2670](A[1]). But fighting is not always a mortal
sin, indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Q[40],
A[1]). Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above
(A[1], ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes
without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.
Objection 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a
tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension
in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to retain the
tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore there can be
sedition without mortal sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle forbids seditions together with other
things that are mortal sins (2 Cor. 12:20).
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), sedition is contrary to
the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom. Now
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the word
people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those
who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the
common good." Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which sedition
is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it follows
manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common good.
Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity
will be all the greater according as the common good which it assails
surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.
Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors,
who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by
them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the common
good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves seditious,
even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends
himself, as stated above ([2671]Q[41], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the
common good, as stated above ([2672]Q[40], A[1]). But sedition runs
counter to the common good of the multitude, so that it is always a
mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be
without sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without
sin: and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the
unity of the multitude, which is a manifest good.
Reply to Objection 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it
is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the
ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10).
Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this
kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately,
that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance
than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather that
is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among
his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is
tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the
injury of the multitude.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SCANDAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to
beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, those,
to wit, whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal seems to
be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here consider
scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is scandal?
(2) Whether scandal is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a special sin?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized?
(6) Whether they can give scandal?
(7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal?
(8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether scandal is fittingly defined as being something less rightly said o
r
done that occasions spiritual downfall?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as
"something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual
downfall." For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on
[2673](A[2]). Now, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a
sin is a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God." Therefore
the definition given above is insufficient, since it omits "thought" or
"desire."
Objection 2: Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more
virtuous or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect
rectitude would not seem to be a "less" right one. If, therefore,
scandal is something "less" rightly said or done, it follows that every
virtuous act except the best of all, is a scandal.
Objection 3: Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing
accidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify the
thing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say
that it is an "occasion."
Objection 4: Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of
another's spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are
indeterminate. Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions
another's spiritual downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and
this seems unreasonable.
Objection 5: Further, a man occasions his neighbor's spiritual downfall
when he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with offense
and weakness, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): "It is good not to eat
flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is
offended or scandalized, or weakened." Therefore the aforesaid
definition of scandal is unfitting.
On the contrary, Jerome in expounding Mat. 15:12, "Dost thou know that
the Pharisees, when they heard this word," etc. says: "When we read
'Whosoever shall scandalize,' the sense is 'Whosoever shall, by deed or
word, occasion another's spiritual downfall.'"
I answer that, As Jerome observes the Greek {skandalon} may be rendered
offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For when a body,
while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it may happen to
stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such an obstacle is a
{skandalon}.
In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be
disposed to a spiritual downfall by another's word or deed, in so far,
to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves
another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called.
Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall,
except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly
right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his
downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as "something less
rightly done or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall."
Reply to Objection 1: The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the
heart, wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an
obstacle conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come
under the head of scandal.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is said to be less right, not because
something else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack
of rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or
through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were
to "sit at meat in the idol's temple" (1 Cor. 8:10), though this is not
sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention, yet,
since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of
worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man's spiritual
downfall. Hence the Apostle says (1 Thess. 5:22): "From all appearance
of evil refrain yourselves." Scandal is therefore fittingly described
as something done "less rightly," so as to comprise both whatever is
sinful in itself, and all that has an appearance of evil.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2674]FS, Q[75], AA[2],3;
[2675]FS, Q[80], A[1]), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man's
spiritual downfall, which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another
man's words or deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat
to that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a
cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an
accidental cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions
should not make mention of things that are accidental, since what is
accidental to one, may be proper to something else: thus the accidental
cause is mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5).
Reply to Objection 4: Another's words or deed may be the cause of
another's sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a
man either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into
sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature as
to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly commits a
sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. In this case he
that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an occasion of
another's spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called "active
scandal." One man's word or deed is the accidental cause of another's
sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does what is of
a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one, through being
ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy of another's
good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not, so far as he
is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's downfall, but it is
this other one who takes the occasion according to Rom. 7:8: "Sin
taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of
concupiscence." Wherefore this is "passive," without "active scandal,"
since he that acts rightly does not, for his own part, afford the
occasion of the other's downfall. Sometimes therefore it happens that
there is active scandal in the one together with passive scandal in the
other, as when one commits a sin being induced thereto by another;
sometimes there is active without passive scandal, for instance when
one, by word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does not
consent; and sometimes there is passive without active scandal, as we
have already said.
Reply to Objection 5: "Weakness" denotes proneness to scandal; while
"offense" signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin,
which resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and
"scandal" is the stumbling that results in downfall.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether scandal is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not
occur from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above
([2676]FS, Q[74], AA[1],2). Now it is written (Mat. 18:7): "It must
needs be that scandals come." Therefore scandal is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness,
because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18). But
scandal may come from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to
Peter (Mat. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal unto Me," in reference to which
words Jerome says that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of
dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil." Therefore
scandal is not always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles
does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall, can
be without sin.
On the contrary, Scandal is "something less rightly said or done." Now
anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is always
with sin.
I answer that, As already said (A[1], ad 4), scandal is of two kinds,
passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal in the
person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual downfall.
Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person scandalized;
for he is not scandalized except in so far as he succumbs to a
spiritual downfall, and that is a sin.
Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the person
whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance, when a person
is scandalized at another's good deed. In like manner active scandal is
always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either what he does
is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it should always be
left undone out of that love for our neighbor which binds each one to
be solicitous for his neighbor's spiritual welfare; so that if he
persist in doing it he acts against charity.
Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person
scandalized, as stated above (A[1], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 1: These words, "It must needs be that scandals
come," are to be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the
conditional necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that
whatever God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken
conjointly with such foreknowledge, as explained in the [2677]FP,
Q[14], A[13], ad 3; [2678]FP, Q[23], A[6], ad 2.
Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity
of end, because they are useful in order that "they . . . who are
reproved may be made manifest" (1 Cor. 11:19).
Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails to
shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man partaking of
unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs injure his health,
which is to be understood on the condition that he does not change his
diet. In like manner it must needs be that scandals come, so long as
men fail to change their evil mode of living.
Reply to Objection 2: In that passage scandal denotes any kind of
hindrance: for Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion out of a sense
of dutifulness towards Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept
back somewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a
venial sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether scandal is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For
scandal is "something said or done less rightly." But this applies to
every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and consequently,
scandal is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind
of injustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated in
Ethic. v, 3,5. But scandal is not to be found separately from other
sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.
Objection 3: Further, every special sin is constituted by something
which specifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists in
its being something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a
sin being committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance,
does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal is
not a special sin.
On the contrary, A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it. But
scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is written
(Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou
walkest not now according to charity." Therefore scandal is a special
sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2679](A[2]), scandal is twofold, active
and passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through
another's word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the
fact that a man takes occasion to sin from another's word or deed, does
not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply a
special deformity in opposition to a special virtue.
On the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways,
directly and accidently. The scandal is accidental when it is beside
the agent's intention, as when a man does not intend, by his inordinate
deed or word, to occasion another's spiritual downfall, but merely to
satisfy his own will. In such a case even active scandal is not a
special sin, because a species is not constituted by that which is
accidental.
Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word or
deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes a special kind of
sin on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because moral
actions take their species from their end, as stated above ([2680]FS,
Q[1], A[3]; [2681]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6). Hence, just as theft and murder
are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention of
doing a special injury to one's neighbor: so too, scandal is a special
kind of sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to his
neighbor, and it is directly opposed to fraternal correction, whereby a
man intends the removal of a special kind of harm.
Reply to Objection 1: Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but
it may derive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Active scandal can be found separate from other
sins, as when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a
sin in itself, but has an appearance of evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Scandal does not derive the species of a special
sin from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the
end, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether scandal is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. For every sin
that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q[24],
A[12]; Q[35] , A[3]). But scandal is contrary to charity, as stated
above ([2682]AA[2],3). Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves the punishment
of eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal
damnation, according to Mat. 18:6: "He that shall scandalize one of
these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a
mill-stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be
drowned in the depth of the sea." For, as Jerome says on this passage,
"it is much better to receive a brief punishment for a fault, than to
await everlasting torments." Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin committed against God is a mortal sin,
because mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a sin
against God, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): "When you wound the
weak conscience of the brethren [*Vulg.: 'When you sin thus against the
brethren and wound their weak conscience'], you sin against Christ."
Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It may be a venial sin to lead a person into venial
sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal may be a
venial sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2683](A[1]), scandal denotes a
stumbling whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall.
Consequently passive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it
consists in a stumbling and nothing more; for instance, when a person
is disturbed by a movement of venial sin occasioned by another's
inordinate word or deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin, when the
stumbling results in a downfall, for instance, when a person goes so
far as to commit a mortal sin through another's inordinate word or
deed.
Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be a venial sin; for
instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either commits
a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself, but has
some appearance of evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a mortal
sin, either because a person commits a mortal sin, or because he has
such contempt for his neighbor's spiritual welfare that he declines,
for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing what he wishes to do. But
in the case of active direct scandal, as when a person intends to lead
another into sin, if he intends to lead him into mortal sin, his own
sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he intends by committing a
mortal sin himself, to lead another into venial sin; whereas if he
intends, by committing a venial sin, to lead another into venial sin,
there will be a venial sin of scandal.
And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether passive scandal may happen even to the perfect?
Objection 1: It would seem that passive scandal may happen even to the
perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to Peter
(Mat. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal to Me." Much more therefore can other
perfect men suffer scandal.
Objection 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a
person's spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their
progress along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: "We would
have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath
hindered us." Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.
Objection 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins,
according to 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive
ourselves." Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is
sometimes venial, as stated above [2684](A[4]). Therefore passive
scandal may be found in perfect men.
On the contrary, Jerome, in commenting on Mat. 18:6, "He that shall
scandalize one of these little ones," says: "Observe that it is the
little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take scandal."
I answer that, Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person who
takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man can be
unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The elders, i.e.
the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is unchangeable, for
though they adhere to their superiors, they do so only in so far as
these adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16: "Be ye followers of
me, as I also am of Christ." Wherefore, however much others may appear
to them to conduct themselves ill in word or deed, they themselves do
not stray from their righteousness, according to Ps. 124:1: "They that
trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for
ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem." Therefore scandal is not found in
those who adhere to God perfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165:
"Much peace have they that love Thy law, and to them there is no
stumbling-block [scandalum]."
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[2], ad 2), in this passage,
scandal is used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance.
Hence Our Lord said to Peter: "Thou art a scandal to Me," because he
was endeavoring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of
external actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of
others, from tending to God in the internal acts of the will, according
to Rom. 8:38,39: "Neither death, nor life . . . shall be able to
separate us from the love of God."
Reply to Objection 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins
through the weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking
scandal in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although
there can be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: "My
feet were almost moved."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether active scandal can be found in the perfect?
Objection 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the
perfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are scandalized
passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according to Mat.
15:12: "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word,
were scandalized?" Therefore active scandal can be found in the
perfect.
Objection 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the
state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for
it is written (Gal. 2:14): "When I saw that they walked not uprightly
unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas," i.e. Peter, "before
them all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the gentiles,
and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles to live as do
the Jews?" Therefore active scandal can be in the perfect.
Objection 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But
venial sins may be in perfect men. Therefore active scandal may be in
perfect men.
On the contrary, Active scandal is more opposed to perfection, than
passive scandal. But passive scandal cannot be in the perfect. Much
less, therefore, can active scandal be in them.
I answer that, Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a man
says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion
another's spiritual downfall, and that is only when what he says or
does is inordinate. Now it belongs to the perfect to direct all their
actions according to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40:
"Let all things be done decently and according to order"; and they are
careful to do this in those matters chiefly wherein not only would they
do wrong, but would also be to others an occasion of wrongdoing. And if
indeed they fail in this moderation in such words or deeds as come to
the knowledge of others, this has its origin in human weakness wherein
they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not fall short so far as to
stray far from the order of reason, but only a little and in some
slight matter: and this is not so grave that anyone can reasonably take
therefrom an occasion for committing sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Passive scandal is always due to some active
scandal; yet this active scandal is not always in another, but in the
very person who is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes
himself.
Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of Augustine (Ep. xxviii, xl,
lxxxii) and of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed, in
withdrawing from the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the
Jews, because he did this somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles
who had been converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless
Peter's action was not so grave a sin as to give others sufficient
ground for scandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while
there was no active scandal in Peter.
Reply to Objection 3: The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in
sudden movements, which being hidden cannot give scandal. If, however,
they commit any venial sins even in their external words or deeds,
these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to give
scandal.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual goods should be foregone on account of scandal?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual goods ought to be foregone on
account of scandal. For Augustine (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) teaches
that "punishment for sin should cease, when the peril of schism is
feared." But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since it is an act
of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone on account of
scandal.
Objection 2: Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing.
Yet one ought to desist therefrom on account of scandal, according to
Mat. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your
pearls before swine lest . . . turning upon you, they tear you."
Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.
Objection 3: Further, since fraternal correction is an act of charity,
it is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in
order to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes (De Civ.
Dei i, 9). Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of
scandal.
Objection 4: Further, Jerome [*Hugh de S. Cher., In Matth. xviii; in
Luc. xvii, 2] says that in order to avoid scandal we should forego
whatever it is possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold
truth, i.e. "the truth of life, of justice and of doctrine." Now the
observance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be
omitted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else
whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such things
are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works should
be omitted on account of scandal.
Objection 5: Further, the avoidance of any sin is a spiritual good,
since any sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that
one ought sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid
scandalizing one's neighbor, for instance, when by sinning venially,
one would prevent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because
one is bound to hinder the damnation of one's neighbor as much as one
can without prejudice to one's own salvation, which is not precluded by
a venial sin. Therefore one ought to forego a spiritual good in order
to avoid scandal.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. vii): "If people are
scandalized at the truth, it is better to allow the birth of scandal,
than to abandon the truth." Now spiritual goods belong, above all
others, to the truth. Therefore spiritual goods are not to be foregone
on account of scandal.
I answer that, Whereas scandal is twofold, active and passive, the
present question does not apply to active scandal, for since active
scandal is "something said or done less rightly," nothing ought to be
done that implies active scandal. The question does, however, apply to
passive scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be
foregone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must be made in
spiritual goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and
cannot be foregone without mortal sin: and it is evident that no man
ought to commit a mortal sin, in order to prevent another from sinning,
because according to the order of charity, a man ought to love his own
spiritual welfare more than another's. Therefore one ought not to
forego that which is necessary for salvation, in order to avoid giving
scandal.
Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual things which are
not necessary for salvation: because the scandal which arises from such
things sometimes proceeds from malice, for instance when a man wishes
to hinder those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This is the
"scandal of the Pharisees," who were scandalized at Our Lord's
teaching: and Our Lord teaches (Mat. 15:14) that we ought to treat such
like scandal with contempt. Sometimes scandal proceeds from weakness or
ignorance, and such is the "scandal of little ones." In order to avoid
this kind of scandal, spiritual goods ought to be either concealed, or
sometimes even deferred (if this can be done without incurring
immediate danger), until the matter being explained the scandal cease.
If, however, the scandal continue after the matter has been explained,
it would seem to be due to malice, and then it would no longer be right
to forego that spiritual good in order to avoid such like scandal.
Reply to Objection 1: In the infliction of punishment it is not the
punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal properties
in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of
justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident that the
infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and more grievous
sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a
part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking, when,
to wit, the excommunication of a few threatens to bring about the
danger of a schism, for in that case it would be contrary to the truth
of justice to pronounce excommunication.
Reply to Objection 2: With regard to a man's doctrine two points must
be considered, namely, the truth which is taught, and the act of
teaching. The first of these is necessary for salvation, to wit, that
he whose duty it is to teach should no' teach what is contrary to the
truth, and that he should teach the truth according to the requirements
of times and persons: wherefore on no account ought he to suppress the
truth and teach error in order to avoid any scandal that might ensue.
But the act itself of teaching is one of the spiritual almsdeeds, as
stated above ([2685]Q[32], A[2]), and so the same is to be said of it
as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall speak further on (ad
4).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2686]Q[33], A[1]), fraternal
correction aims at the correction of a brother, wherefore it is to be
reckoned among spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained,
which is not the case if the brother be scandalized through being
corrected. And so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid
scandal, no spiritual good is foregone.
Reply to Objection 4: The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice
comprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also
whatever is a means of obtaining salvation more perfectly, according to
1 Cor. 12:31: "Be zealous for the better gifts." Wherefore neither the
counsels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted in
order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or
deferred, on account of the scandal of the little ones, as stated
above. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the
fulfilment of the works of mercy are necessary for salvation. This may
be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels, and
of those whose duty it is to relieve the wants of others, either in
temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual matters
(as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties arise from their
being enjoined as in the case of prelates, or from the need on the part
of the person in want; and then the same applies to these things as to
others that are necessary for salvation.
Reply to Objection 5: Some have said that one ought to commit a venial
sin in order to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since
if it ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin
cannot be a matter of choice. It may happen however that, on account of
some circumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be
were it not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a venial sin,
when it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a reasonable
cause, it is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not
deprive a man of grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far
as it disposes him to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether temporal goods should be foregone on account of scandal?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods should be foregone on
account of scandal. For we ought to love our neighbor's spiritual
welfare which is hindered by scandal, more than any temporal goods
whatever. But we forego what we love less for the sake of what we love
more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in order to avoid
scandalizing our neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, according to Jerome's rule [*Cf. A[7], OBJ[4]],
whatever can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth,
should be omitted in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can be
foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they
should be foregone in order to avoid scandal.
Objection 3: Further, no temporal good is more necessary than food. But
we ought to forego taking food on account of scandal, according to Rom.
14:15: "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died." Much more
therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on account of
scandal.
Objection 4: Further, the most fitting way of safeguarding and
recovering temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful
to have recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues: for it is
written (Mat. 5:40): "If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and
take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him"; and (1 Cor. 6:7):
"Already indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have
lawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather take wrong? why do you
not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore it seems that
we ought to forego temporal goods on account of scandal.
Objection 5: Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego least of all those
temporal goods which are connected with spiritual goods: and yet we
ought to forego them on account of scandal. For the Apostle while
sowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he
"should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ" as we read 1 Cor.
9:12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain
countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we to
forego other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
On the contrary, Blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded the restitution
of Church property, notwithstanding that the king took scandal from his
doing so.
I answer that, A distinction must be made in temporal goods: for either
they are ours, or they are consigned to us to take care of them for
someone else; thus the goods of the Church are consigned to prelates,
and the goods of the community are entrusted to all such persons as
have authority over the common weal. In this latter case the care of
such things (as of things held in deposit) devolves of necessity on
those persons to whom they are entrusted, wherefore, even as other
things that are necessary for salvation, they are not to be foregone on
account of scandal. On the other hand, as regards those temporalities
of which we have the dominion, sometimes, on account of scandal, we are
bound to forego them, and sometimes we are not so bound, whether we
forego them by giving them up, if we have them in our possession, or by
omitting to claim them, if they are in the possession of others. For if
the scandal arise therefrom through the ignorance or weakness of others
(in which case, as stated above, A[7], it is scandal of the little
ones) we must either forego such temporalities altogether, or the
scandal must be abated by some other means, namely, by some kind of
admonition. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20): "Thou
shouldst give so as to injure neither thyself nor another, as much as
thou canst lend, and if thou refusest what is asked, thou must yet be
just to him, indeed thou wilt give him something better than he asks,
if thou reprove him that asks unjustly." Sometimes, however, scandal
arises from malice. This is scandal of the Pharisees: and we ought not
to forego temporal goods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of
this kind, for this would both be harmful to the common good, since it
would give wicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be injurious
to the plunderers themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they
were in possession of another's property. Hence Gregory says (Moral.
xxxi, 13): "Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our
temporalities, while sometimes we should resist them, as far as equity
allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our property, but
also lest those who take what is not theirs may lose themselves."
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: If it were permissible for wicked men to rob
other people of their property, this would tend to the detriment of the
truth of life and justice. Therefore we are not always bound to forego
our temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.
Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle had no intention of counselling total
abstinence from food on account of scandal, because our welfare
requires that we should take food: but he intended to counsel
abstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal,
according to 1 Cor. 8:13: "I will never eat flesh, lest I should
scandalize my brother."
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i,
19) this precept of Our Lord is to be understood of the preparedness of
the mind, namely, that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to
suffer being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But sometimes
it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The same applies to the
saying of the Apostle.
Reply to Objection 5: The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from
an error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it
behooved him to forego it for the time being, so that they might be
taught first of all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason
the Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it
is not customary to pay them.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?
(2) Whether there should be one or two?
(3) Whether two suffice?
(4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with
thy whole heart"?
(5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc.?
(6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?
(7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself";
(8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any precept should be given about charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about
charity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it
is the form of the virtues as stated above ([2687]Q[23], A[8]), while
the precepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the
common saying, the mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no
precepts should be given about charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of
the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that
arises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a
necessity. Therefore no precept should be given about charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to
which the precepts are directed, as shown above ([2688]FS, Q[90], A[2];
[2689]FS, Q[100], A[9]). If, therefore, any precepts were given about
charity, they should have a place among the chief precepts which are
those of the decalogue. But they have no place there. Therefore no
precepts should be given about charity.
On the contrary, Whatever God requires of us is included in a precept.
Now God requires that man should love Him, according to Dt. 10:12.
Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the love of charity,
which is the love of God.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[16], A[1]; [2690]FS, Q[99], A[1]), a
precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a matter
of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is due in two
ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. In every
affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake, because it has the
character of a good for its own sake: while that which is directed to
the end is due for the sake of something else: thus for a physician, it
is due for its own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the
sake of something else that he should give a medicine in order to heal.
Now the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, and
this union is effected by charity, while all things pertaining to the
spiritual life are ordained to this union, as to their end. Hence the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from
a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all
the virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed
either to the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the
passions---such are the virtues that regulate the passions---or at
least to the possession of a good conscience---such are the virtues
that regulate operations---or to the having of a right faith---such are
those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three things are
required of man that he may love God. For an impure heart is withdrawn
from loving God, on account of the passion that inclines it to earthly
things; an evil conscience gives man a horror for God's justice,
through fear of His punishments; and an untrue faith draws man's
affections to an untrue representation of God, and separates him from
the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is for its own sake
takes precedence of that which is for the sake of another, wherefore
the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in Mat. 22:39.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2691]FS, Q[100], A[10]) when we
were treating of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under
those precepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for instance,
this precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother," does not prescribe
that this should be done out of charity. The act of love does, however,
fall under special precepts.
Reply to Objection 2: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to
liberty, except in one whose mind is averted from that which is
prescribed, as may be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear
alone. But the precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own
will, wherefore it is not opposed to charity.
Reply to Objection 3: All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to
the love of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of
charity had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue,
since they are included in all of them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there should have been given two precepts of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two
precepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to
virtue, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Now charity is one virtue, as
shown above ([2692]Q[33], A[5]). Therefore only one precept of charity
should have been given.
Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27),
charity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently
directed to love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God." Therefore there was no need to add the precept about loving our
neighbor.
Objection 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts.
But it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided we
put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Lk. 15:26): "If
any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he cannot
be My disciple." Therefore the precept of the love of God is not
distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.
Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8): "He that loveth his
neighbor hath fulfilled the Law." But a law is not fulfilled unless all
its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included in
the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love
of our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two precepts of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This commandment we have
from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother."
I answer that, As stated above ([2693]FS, Q[91], A[3]; [2694]FS, Q[94],
A[2]) when we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to
the Law what propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these
latter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first
principles. Hence whoever knows the principles as to their entire
virtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately
before him. Since, however, some who know the principles are unable to
consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary, for
their sake, that scientific conclusions should be traced to their
principles. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law
direct us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above
(Q[23], A[7], ad 2; Q[26], A[1], ad 1): and the love of God is the end
to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it behooved us
to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also of the love of
our neighbor, on account of those who are less intelligent, who do not
easily understand that one of these precepts is included in the other.
Reply to Objection 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two
acts, one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts
are given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts
of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved
in that which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an
explicit precept about both, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: The means derive their goodness from their
relation to the end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives
its malice from the same source and from no other
Reply to Objection 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the
end is included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each
precept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether two precepts of charity suffice?
Objection 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not suffice.
For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished
by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love four things out of
charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as shown
above ([2695]Q[25], A[12];[2696] Q[26]), it seems that there ought to
be four precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.
Objection 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also
joy, peace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts
of the virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.
Objection 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also
in avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good,
and by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to
have been not only positive, but also negative precepts about charity;
and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): "On these two commandments
dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."
I answer that, Charity, as stated above ([2697]Q[23], A[1]), is a kind
of friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another,
wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible
between less than two": and it has been explained how one may love
oneself out of charity ([2698]Q[25], A[4]). Now since good is the
object of dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a
means, it is fitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one
whereby we are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we
are led to love our neighbor for God's sake, as for the sake of our end
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23),
"though four things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need
of a precept as regards the second and fourth," i.e. love of oneself
and of one's own body. "For however much a man may stray from the
truth, the love of himself and of his own body always remains in him."
And yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that
he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and this
is done by his loving God and his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2699]Q[28], A[4];[2700] Q[29],
A[3]), the other acts of charity result from the act of love as effects
from their cause. Hence the precepts of love virtually include the
precepts about the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of
the laggards, special precepts were given about each act---about joy
(Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always"---about peace (Heb. 12:14):
"Follow peace with all men"---about beneficence (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we
have time, let us work good to all men"---and Holy Writ contains
precepts about each of the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by
anyone who considers the matter carefully.
Reply to Objection 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and
therefore the positive precepts virtually include the negative
precepts. Nevertheless we find explicit precepts against the vices
contrary to charity: for, against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17):
"Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Ecclus.
6:26): "Be not grieved with her bands"; against envy (Gal. 5:26): "Let
us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying
one another"; against discord (1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the
same thing, and that there be no schisms among you"; and against
scandal (Rom. 14:13): "That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal
in your brother's way."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is fittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole
heart?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man
should love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act is
not a matter of precept, as shown above (A[1], ad 1; [2701]FS, Q[100],
A[9]). Now the words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the
love of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should love
God with his whole heart.
Objection 2: Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks
nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that
God be loved with the whole heart, whoever does something not
pertaining to the love of God, acts counter to the precept, and
consequently sins mortally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the
love of God. Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd.
Objection 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to
perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64),
"to be whole is to be perfect." But that which belongs to perfection is
not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought
not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart."
I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is
a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is
requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own
matter, but also that it should be endued with its due circumstances,
whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the
last end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some kind
of totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the
love of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue
does not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and
higher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own
proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy whole
heart."
Reply to Objection 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold
signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always
actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly,
in the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God, so
that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the
perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this latter
perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, since it
does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of
charity.
Reply to Objection 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels
are directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding
reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal
things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind and
hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart," it was fitting to add "and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole
strength"?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with
thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (Dt. 6:5). For heart does
not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily
action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual sense.
Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part
of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both heart and
soul.
Objection 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal
depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with
all thy strength."
Objection 3: Further, in Mat. 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which
words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is
unfittingly worded in Dt. 6.
On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, This precept is differently worded in various places:
for, as we said in the first objection, in Dt. 6 three points are
mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with
thy whole strength." In Mat. 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz.
"with thy whole heart" and "with thy whole soul," while "with thy whole
strength" is omitted, but "with thy whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark
12 we find all four, viz. "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole
soul," and "with thy whole mind," and "with thy whole force" which is
the same as "strength." Moreover, these four are indicated in Luke 10,
where in place of "strength" or "force" we read "with all thy might."
[*St. Thomas is explaining the Latin text which reads "ex tota
fortitudine tua" (Dt.), "ex tota virtue tua" (Mk.), and "ex omnibus
tuis" (Lk.), although the Greek in all three cases has {ex holes tes
ischyos}, which the Douay renders "with thy whole strength."]
Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of
them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We must
therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted
by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the principle of
all the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards
the intention of the last end which is the object of charity, is the
principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are three
principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect
which is signified by "the mind," the lower appetitive power, signified
by "the soul"; and the exterior executive power signified by
"strength," "force" or "might." Accordingly we are commanded to direct
our whole intention to God, and this is signified by the words "with
thy whole heart"; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed
in the words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate our appetite according
to God, in the words "with thy whole soul"; and to obey God in our
external actions, and this is to love God with our whole "strength,"
"force" or "might."
Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished
work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in
Chrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in the
contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers "heart"
to the thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to the
intellect. Again some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting the
intellect, "with thy whole soul" as signifying the will, "with thy
mind" as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory of
Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), "heart" signifies the vegetative soul,
"soul" the sensitive, and "mind" the intellective soul, because our
nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by
us to God.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil
this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius,
Exposit. Cath. Fid.] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded
anything impossible." But God gave this commandment, as is clear from
Dt. 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life.
Objection 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally,
since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than "a
transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly
commandments." If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by
wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal
sin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8): "(Who
also) will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Tim. 3:10):
"Let them minister, having no crime."
Objection 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the
way of salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord
is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." Now it is useless to direct
anyone to what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill
this precept in this life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the
fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence
remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot love God with
all his heart.
I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and
imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended by
the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly
however, when although the end intended by its author is not reached,
nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the
commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his command will be
perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the foe, which is the
commander's intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by
those who fight without gaining the victory, provided they do nothing
contrary to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that
man should be entirely united to Him, and this will be realized in
heaven, when God will be "all in all," according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence
this precept will be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is
fulfilled, though imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one
man will fulfil it more perfectly than another, and so much the more,
as he approaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that the precept can be
fulfilled after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately
without conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this,
so too he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does
nothing against the love of God, does not sin mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii),
"why should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man
attains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows
whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it
out."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor
is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men,
even to our enemies, as may be seen in Mat. 5:44. But the word
"neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist
towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly
expressed.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the
origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to
ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin
of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than
that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his
neighbor as himself.
Objection 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor,
naturally. Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to
love his neighbor as himself.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:39): "The second" commandment
"is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."
I answer that, This precept is fittingly expressed, for it indicates
both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason for loving
is indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason why we ought to
love others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to
the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory. Nor does it
matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother" according to 1 Jn. 4:21,
or "friend," according to Lev. 19:18, because all these words express
the same affinity.
The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does not
mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like
manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end,
namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as he
loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is a
"holy" love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man
should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good things,
even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so that his
love for his neighbor may be a "righteous" love. Thirdly, as regards
the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his neighbor, not
for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of wishing his
neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that his love for his
neighbor may be a "true" love: since when a man loves his neighbor for
his own profit or pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly, but
loves himself.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity is not included in
the precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But if
man loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man more,
he wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept.
Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently
delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was given
above ([2702]Q[26]) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is
not included in the precept.
Objection 3: Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the
love of our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the
words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore the order
of charity is not included in the precept.
On the contrary, Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches us
first of all by His Law, according to Jer. 31:33: "I will give My Law
in their heart [*Vulg.: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in their
heart']." Now God causes in us the order of charity, according to Cant
2:4: "He set in order charity in me." Therefore the order of charity
comes under the precept of the Law.
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1), the mode which is
essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes
that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue,
since it is based on the proportion of love to the thing beloved, as
shown above ([2703]Q[25], A[12];[2704] Q[26], AA[1],2). It is therefore
evident that the order of charity must come under the precept.
Reply to Objection 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so
that if he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to
gratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an
injustice to the one he ought to love more.
Reply to Objection 2: The order of those four things we have to love
out of charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to
love God with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we
must love Him above all things. When we are commanded to love our
neighbor "as ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our
neighbor. In like manner where we are commanded (1 Jn. 3:16) "to lay
down our souls," i.e. the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we
are given to understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than
his own body; and again when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to "work good
. . . especially to those who are of the household of the faith," and
when a man is blamed (1 Tim. 5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and
especially of those of his house," it means that we ought to love most
those of our neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely united to
us.
Reply to Objection 3: It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love
thy neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity;
and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the
first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy
Ghost?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?
(4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?
(5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?
(6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among
the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the
virtues, as stated above ([2705]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now virtue is
directed to the good alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii,
19) that "no man makes bad use of the virtues." Much more therefore are
the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is
directed to evil also, for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain
wisdom is "earthly, sensual, devilish." Therefore wisdom should not be
reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom
is the knowledge of Divine things." Now that knowledge of Divine things
which man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wisdom
which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural knowledge of
Divine things belongs to faith which is a theological virtue, as
explained above (Q[4], A[5]; [2706]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore wisdom
should be called a virtue rather than a gift.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): "Behold the fear of
the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is
understanding." And in this passage according to the rendering of the
Septuagint which Augustine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read:
"Behold piety, that is wisdom." Now both fear and piety are gifts of
the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts
of the Holy Ghost, as though it were distinct from the others.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding."
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it belongs
to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we are
able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, and according
thereto all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause may be
understood in two ways, either simply or in some particular genus.
Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any particular genus,
and by its means is able to judge and set in order all the things that
belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in
medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor. 3:10: "As a wise
architect, I have laid a foundation." On the other hand, he who knows
the cause that is simply the highest, which is God, is said to be wise
simply, because he is able to judge and set in order all things
according to Divine rules.
Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1
Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated in
the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea
the deep things of God." Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a gift
of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first
in the sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a
kind of likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good
or a perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21).
And just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find a
highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by
knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things
something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to a
last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing,
according to Jer. 4:22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good they
have no knowledge." Now whoever turns away from his due end, must needs
fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end. Wherefore, if
he fixes his end in external earthly things, his "wisdom" is called
"earthly," if in the goods of the body, it is called "sensual wisdom,"
if in some excellence, it is called "devilish wisdom" because it
imitates the devil's pride, of which it is written (Job 41:25): "He is
king over all the children of pride."
Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy
Ghost, differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for
the latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is
"descending from above" (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from
faith, since faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it
belongs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth.
Hence the gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because "a man judges well
what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of
God is a manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of
faith by worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this
reason piety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same
reason, because if a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a
right judgment about Divine things.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its
subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of
God." Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the
intellect, as stated above ([2707]Q[24], A[1]). Therefore wisdom is not
in the intellect as its subject.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): "The wisdom of
doctrine is according to her name," for wisdom [sapientia] may be
described as "sweet-tasting science [sapida scientia]," and this would
seem to regard the appetite, to which it belongs to taste spiritual
pleasure or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite rather than
in the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected
by the gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two
things where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in
the intellect.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "wisdom is contrary
to folly." But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.
I answer that, As stated above [2708](A[1]), wisdom denotes a certain
rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of
judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason,
secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about
which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after
inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the
science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges of
such matters by a kind of connaturality.
Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to
pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its
inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge
aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for
he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things."
Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of
charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is
joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom which is a
gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its
essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above
([2709]FS, Q[14], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause,
whence also wisdom [sapientia] takes its name, in so far as it denotes
a certain sweetness [saporem]. Hence the Reply to the Second Objection
is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text quoted.
For, apparently this is not the case, because such an exposition of the
text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom, whereas it does not
apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other languages. Hence it would
seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine,
for which it is praised by all.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception
and judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of
wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of
knowledge, according to human ideas.
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Whether wisdom is merely speculative, or practical also?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely
speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom
which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue,
is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a gift,
speculative and not practical.
Objection 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of
operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things which
are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in
contemplation we seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we
labor under a mighty bundle of wants." Now wisdom regards the vision of
Divine things, in which there is no toiling under a load, since
according to Wis. 8:16, "her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her
company any tediousness." Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and
not practical or active.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with wisdom towards
them that are without." Now this pertains to action. Therefore wisdom
is not merely speculative, but also practical.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher part of
the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is the
domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same
authority (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and
consultation of the heavenly," i.e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. [2710]FP,
Q[79], A[9]; [2711]FS, Q[74], A[7]]; it considers them, in so far as it
contemplates Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so
far as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human acts
according to Divine rules.
Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also
practical.
Reply to Objection 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of
things to which it extends, as stated in De Causis, prop. x, xvii.
Wherefore from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent
than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more
intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to
direct us not only in contemplation but also in action.
Reply to Objection 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in
themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are
the subject-matter of human actions.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is considered in itself before being
compared with something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all
contemplation which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the
direction of human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from the
direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in human
acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to make the bitter sweet,
and labor a rest.
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Whether wisdom can be without grace, and with mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with
mortal sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are incompatible
with mortal sin, according to 2 Cor. 1:12: "Our glory is this, the
testimony of our conscience." Now one ought not to glory in one's
wisdom, according to Jer. 9:23: "Let not the wise man glory in his
wisdom." Therefore wisdom can be without grace and with mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as
stated above [2712](A[1]). Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of
the Divine truth, according to Rom. 1:18: "(Those men that) detain the
truth of God in injustice." Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking
of charity: "Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone that
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of
eternal perdition." But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it
does not divide the children of the kingdom from the children of
perdition. Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter into
a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins."
I answer that, The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated
above [2713](A[1]), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or of
other things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain
connaturalness or union with Divine things, which is the effect of
charity, as stated above [2714](A[2]; Q[23], A[5]). Hence the wisdom of
which we are speaking presupposes charity. Now charity is incompatible
with mortal sin, as shown above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore it follows
that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot be together with mortal
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: These words are to be understood as referring to
worldly wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human
reasons. In such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov.
30:2: "The wisdom of men is not with Me": But they do glory in Divine
wisdom according to 1 Cor. 1:30: "(Who) of God is made unto us wisdom."
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers, not the wisdom of which
we speak but that which is acquired by the study and research of
reason, and is compatible with mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it
presupposes it, and for that very reason divides the children of
perdition from the children of the kingdom.
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Whether wisdom is in all who have grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace.
For it is more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only for
the perfect to hear wisdom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: "We speak wisdom
among the perfect." Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it
seems that much less all who have grace have wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, "The wise man sets things in order," as the
Philosopher states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (James 3:17) that
the wise man "judges without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom that is
from above . . . is . . . without judging, without dissimulation']".
Now it is not for all that have grace, to judge, or put others in
order, but only for those in authority. Therefore wisdom is not in all
that have grace.
Objection 3: Further, "Wisdom is a remedy against folly," as Gregory
says (Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish,
for instance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty
of mortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all that
have grace.
On the contrary, Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God;
since he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that
love Him (Prov. 8:17). Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that "God loveth
none but him that dwelleth with wisdom." Therefore wisdom is in all
those who have charity and are without mortal sin.
I answer that, The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above
[2715](A[4]), denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the
contemplation and consultation of Divine things, and as to both of
these men obtain various degrees of wisdom through union with Divine
things. For the measure of right judgment attained by some, whether in
the contemplation of Divine things or in directing human affairs
according to Divine rules, is no more than suffices for their
salvation. This measure is wanting to none who is without mortal sin
through having sanctifying grace, since if nature does not fail in
necessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore it is written (1 Jn.
2:27): "(His) unction teacheth you of all things."
Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as
to the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing more exalted
mysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to
the direction of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being able
to direct not only themselves but also others according to those
rules). This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have
sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which
the Holy Ghost dispenses as He will, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: "To one
indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending
to the hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (2
Cor. 1:7): "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is
hidden."
Reply to Objection 2: Although it belongs to those alone who are in
authority to direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to
direct and judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad
Demophil.).
Reply to Objection 3: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the
habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not
the act, on account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of
reason in them.
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Whether the seventh beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom?
Objection 1: It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond to
the gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Now both
these things belong to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps.
118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy law," and, as the Apostle
says (Rom. 5:5), "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," and Who is "the Spirit of adoption
of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]" (Rom. 8:15). Therefore the
seventh beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity rather than to
wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect
rather than by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom
seems to be charity, according to Wis. 7:27: "Through nations she
conveyeth herself into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and
prophets": whereas peace and the adoption of sons seem to be remote
effects, since they result from charity, as stated above ([2716]Q[29],
A[3]). Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be
determined in respect of the love of charity rather than in respect of
peace.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 3:17): "The wisdom, that is
from above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to be
persuaded, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits,
judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'without judging, without
dissimulation']." Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom
should not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of heavenly
wisdom.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that
"wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of
rebellion, but only obedience to reason."
I answer that, The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the gift
of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit is
denoted in the words, "Blessed are the peacemakers." Now a peacemaker
is one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others: and in both
cases this is the result of setting in due order those things in which
peace is established, for "peace is the tranquillity of order,"
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it belongs to wisdom
to set things in order, as the Philosopher declares (Metaph. i, 2),
wherefore peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to wisdom. The reward is
expressed in the words, "they shall be called the children of God." Now
men are called the children of God in so far as they participate in the
likeness of the only-begotten and natural Son of God, according to Rom.
8:29, "Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of
His Son," Who is Wisdom Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of
wisdom, man attains to the sonship of God.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it
belongs to wisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise
the Holy Ghost is called the "Spirit of adoption" in so far as we
receive from Him the likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten
Wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which
in the first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and
consequently reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is
infused wisdom. Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the
cause but the effect of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above [2717](A[3]) it belongs to
wisdom, as a gift, not only to contemplate Divine things, but also to
regulate human acts. Now the first thing, to be effected in this
direction of human acts is the removal of evils opposed to wisdom:
wherefore fear is said to be "the beginning of wisdom," because it
makes us shun evil, while the last thing is like an end, whereby all
things are reduced to their right order; and it is this that
constitutes peace. Hence James said with reason that "the wisdom that
is from above" (and this is the gift of the Holy Ghost) "first indeed
is chaste," because it avoids the corruption of sin, and "then
peaceable," wherein lies the ultimate effect of wisdom, for which
reason peace is numbered among the beatitudes. As to the things that
follow, they declare in becoming order the means whereby wisdom leads
to peace. For when a man, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin,
the first thing he has to do is, as far as he can, to be moderate in
all things, and in this respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly,
in those matters in which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be
guided by the advice of others, and as to this we are told further that
wisdom is "easy to be persuaded." These two are conditions required
that man may be at peace with himself. But in order that man may be at
peace with others it is furthermore required, first that he should not
be opposed to their good; this is what is meant by "consenting to the
good." Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor's deficiencies,
sympathy in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted
by the words "full of mercy and good fruits." Thirdly, he should strive
in all charity to correct the sins of others, and this is indicated by
the words "judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom that is
from above . . . is . . . without judging, without dissimulation'],"
lest he should purpose to sate his hatred under cover of correction.
__________________________________________________________________
OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
(2) Whether folly is a sin?
(3) To which capital sin is it reducible?
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Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For
seemingly unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not
seem to be the same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about
Divine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and human
things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the
other. But folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1
Cor. 3:18): "If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let
him become a fool, that he may be wise." Therefore folly is not opposed
to wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But
wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jer. 10:14): "Every
man is become a fool for knowledge," and wisdom is a kind of knowledge.
Moreover, it is written (Is. 47:10): "Thy wisdom and thy knowledge,
this hath deceived thee." Now it belongs to folly to be deceived.
Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
Objection 4: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that
"a fool is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is
unconcerned when he is injured." But this pertains to spiritual wisdom,
according to Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not opposed to
wisdom.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of wisdom
is given as a remedy against folly."
I answer that, Stultitia [Folly] seems to take its name from "stupor";
wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter of S): "A fool is one
who through dullness [stuporem] remains unmoved." And folly differs
from fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that folly
implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while fatuity
denotes entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore folly is
fittingly opposed to wisdom.
For "sapiens" [wise] as Isidore says (Etym. x) "is so named from sapor
[savor], because just as the taste is quick to distinguish between
savors of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and causes."
Wherefore it is manifest that "folly" is opposed to "wisdom" as its
contrary, while "fatuity" is opposed to it as a pure negation: since
the fatuous man lacks the sense of judgment, while the fool has the
sense, though dulled, whereas the wise man has the sense acute and
penetrating.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Isidore (Etym. x), "unwisdom is
contrary to wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense";
so that unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear
to be a fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that
judgment, which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails
in judgment about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason called
a fool.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above
([2718]Q[45], A[1], ad 1), called "worldly wisdom," because it takes
for the highest cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a
good folly opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly
things: and it is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.
Reply to Objection 3: It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and
makes us foolish in God's sight, as is evident from the Apostle's words
(1 Cor. 3:19).
Reply to Objection 4: To be unconcerned when one is injured is
sometimes due to the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but
only for heavenly things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to
Divine wisdom, as Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it
is the result of a man's being simply stupid about everything, as may
be seen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious to them, and
this belongs to folly simply.
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Whether folly is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not a sin. For no sin arises
in us from nature. But some are fools naturally. Therefore folly is not
a sin.
Objection 2: Further, "Every sin is voluntary," according to Augustine
(De Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is not voluntary. Therefore it is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine precept. But
folly is not contrary to any precept. Therefore folly is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 1:32): "The prosperity of fools
shall destroy them." But no man is destroyed save for sin. Therefore
folly is a sin.
I answer that, Folly, as stated above [2719](A[1]), denotes dullness of
sense in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is
the last end and the sovereign good. Now a man may in this respect
contract dullness in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural
indisposition, as in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no sin.
Secondly, by plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his sense
is rendered incapable of perceiving Divine things, according to 1 Cor.
2:14, "The sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the
Spirit of God," even as sweet things have no savor for a man whose
taste is infected with an evil humor: and such like folly is a sin.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Though no man wishes to be a fool, yet he wishes
those things of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his
sense from spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things. The
same thing happens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires
pleasure, without which there is no sin, although he does not desire
sin simply, for he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Folly is opposed to the precepts about the
contemplation of truth, of which we have spoken above ([2720]Q[16])
when we were treating of knowledge and understanding.
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Whether folly is a daughter of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among which
however he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not proceed
from lust.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:19): "The wisdom of
this world is foolishness with God." Now, according to Gregory (Moral.
x, 29) "the wisdom of this world consists in covering the heart with
crafty devices;" and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a
daughter of duplicity rather than of lust.
Objection 3: Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness
in some persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises
from anger rather than from lust.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 7:22): "Immediately he followeth
her," i.e. the harlot . . . "not knowing that he is drawn like a fool
to bonds."
I answer that, As already stated [2721](A[2]), folly, in so far as it
is a sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be
incapable of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is plunged into
earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of
pleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore
the folly which is a sin, arises chiefly from lust.
Reply to Objection 1: It is part of folly that a man should have a
distaste for God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of
lust, pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God" and "despair of the
life to come"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.
Reply to Objection 2: These words of the Apostle are to be understood,
not causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is
folly with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to
worldly wisdom, is a cause of this folly.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above
([2722]FS, Q[48] , AA[2],3,4), produces a great change in the nature of
the body, wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which results
from a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is caused
by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into earthly
things, arises chiefly from lust, as stated above.
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TREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ[47]-170)
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OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)
After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence
consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider
prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding
gift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning
prudence.
Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason?
(2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also in
the speculative reason?
(3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars?
(4) Whether it is virtue?
(5) Whether it is a special virtue?
(6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues?
(7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues?
(8) Whether its proper act is command?
(9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence?
(10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many?
(11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same in
species as that which regards the common good?
(12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?
(13) Whether prudence is in the wicked?
(14) Whether prudence is in all good men?
(15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?
(16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness ?
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Whether prudence is in the cognitive or in the appetitive faculty?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but in
the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv):
"Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and
those that hinder." Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the
appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.
Objection 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it
belongs to prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the
appetitive faculty, as stated above ([2723]FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore
prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art
it is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case
of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues, of
which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas art
is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than
in the rational faculty.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is the
knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid."
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who
sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the
event of uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to
the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs
directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by
the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself
to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge
of the present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to
the reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows
therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2724]FP, Q[82], A[4]) the will
moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the
appetitive faculty is love, as stated above ([2725]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2).
Accordingly prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in
so far as love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes
on to say that "prudence is love discerning aright that which helps
from that which hinders us in tending to God." Now love is said to
discern because it moves the reason to discern.
Reply to Objection 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so
far as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be
done at the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which
prudence considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to
the end. Now of those things that are directed to the end there is
counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two,
counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states
(Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as
choice presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been
already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be
ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs
the choice by means of counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought
merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the
practical reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most
contrary to prudence, since, the end being of most import in
everything, it follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst
of all. Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that
prudence is "something more than a merely rational habit," such as art
is, since, as stated above ([2726]FS, Q[57] , A[4]) it includes
application to action, which application is an act of the will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the
speculative reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the
practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written (Prov.
10:23): "Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom consists chiefly in
contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is
concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of
fuller knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative reason.
Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the
same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical
but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore
prudence also is both practical and speculative.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is
right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the
practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a prudent
man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now counsel is about
things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that
deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence
it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2727]Q[45], AA[1],3), wisdom
considers the absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of
the highest cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that
genus. Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common
end of all human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well
for the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be
prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so
he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said
to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom
about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about
the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good, and this is
not the best thing of all. And so it is stated significantly that
"prudence is wisdom for man," but not wisdom absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take
the word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether
speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act
itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a
matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes
under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards its
specification in relation to its object which is the "necessary true,"
it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Every application of right reason in the work of
production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application
of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is
no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since
then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms,
propositions and the like, wherein the process follows certain and
fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is possible to
have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so we find such a
thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative prudence.
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Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above
([2728]AA[1],2). But "reason deals with universals," according to Phys.
i, 5. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.
Objection 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason
cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence
which is right reason, is not about singulars.
Objection 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence
is not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are
devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence
does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of
singulars also."
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), to prudence belongs not
only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to
action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can
conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing
to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions
are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to
know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about
which actions are concerned.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with
universals, and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular
cases: hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but
also particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends
to matter, as stated in De Anima iii.
Reply to Objection 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars
cannot be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are
uncertain" (Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of
singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and
the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence
does not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible
objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and
experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not
mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle
subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application
it extends to this sense.
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Whether prudence is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine
says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of what to
desire and what to avoid." Now science is condivided with virtue, as
appears in the Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a
virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art
is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2
Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort of
graving, and to devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be
need of in the work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is
immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds
to thy prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence,
temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.
I answer that, As stated above ([2729]FS, Q[55], A[3]; [2730]FS, Q[56],
A[1]) when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that
which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good
may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing
that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under
the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any
habits rectify the consideration of reason, without regarding the
rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue
since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing
which is good, but without considering it under the aspect of good. On
the other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the
appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because they consider the
good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they
consider that which is good under the aspect of good.
Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]) to apply
right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite.
Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other
intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it,
among which virtues it is enumerated.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense
for any kind of right reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of
art, because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore
in order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a
virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to
do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a particular
end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of
comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in matters of art.
Moreover in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means
for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in
the arts of medicine and navigation, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that
prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed
on other things according to prudence.
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Whether prudence is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For
no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general,
since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that follows
a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man
decides." Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, as
stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the
effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that of
prudence, right action as regards the means." Now in every virtue
certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore prudence
is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But
prudence has not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to
action" (Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore
prudence is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is distinct from and numbered among the other
virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and
prudence, justice and fortitude."
I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species from their
objects, as shown above ([2731]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2732]FS, Q[18], A[2];
[2733]FS, Q[54], A[2] ), any habit that has a corresponding special
object, distinct from other objects, must needs be a special habit, and
if it be a good habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is
called special, not merely according to the consideration of its
matter, but rather according to its formal aspect, as explained above
([2734]FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the
subject matter of the acts of different habits, and also of different
powers, according to its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater
difference of object is requisite for a difference of powers than for a
difference of habits, since several habits are found in the same power,
as stated above ([2735]FS, Q[54], A[1]). Consequently any difference in
the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will "a
fortiori" require a difference of habits.
Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated
above [2736](A[2]), it is differentiated from the other intellectual
virtues by a material difference of objects. "Wisdom," "knowledge" and
"understanding" are about necessary things, whereas "art" and
"prudence" are about contingent things, art being concerned with
"things made," that is, with things produced in external matter, such
as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with
"things done," that is, with things that have their being in the doer
himself, as stated above ([2737]FS, Q[57], A[4]). On the other hand
prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a formal
aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power, wherein is
prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral virtue. Hence it
is evident that prudence is a special virtue, distinct from all other
virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general,
but of moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an
intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in
common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue
is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the aspect of
virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the
virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove
that it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus
from containing a species which is operative in every other species of
that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in
so far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true:
but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the
object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.
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Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral
virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in the
appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as
reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive
power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues.
Objection 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason,
but he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other
parts of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to
irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures,
according to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are
directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is "right reason
applied to action," as stated above [2738](A[2]). Therefore all actions
are directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the
end to all moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is
concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are
concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral
virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral
virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while
prudence ensures the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not
belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to
regulate the means.
I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of
the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity
pre-exist in the reason.
Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things
naturally known, about which is "understanding," and certain things of
which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which
is "science," so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as
naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues,
since the end is in practical matters what principles are in
speculative matters, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; [2739]FS,
Q[13], A[3]); while certain things are in the practical reason by way
of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather from the ends
themselves. About these is prudence, which applies universal principles
to the particular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it
does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but
only to regulate the means.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural reason known by the name of "synderesis"
appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above ([2740]FP, Q[79],
A[12]): but prudence does not do this for the reason given above.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though
they appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is
appointed by natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence, which
prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows
that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them:
yet "synderesis" moves prudence, just as the understanding of
principles moves science.
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Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find
the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the end
of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral
virtues, as shown above [2741](A[6]). Therefore it does not find the
mean in them.
Objection 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to
have no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said
to have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs
to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as
shown above (A[5], OBJ[1]). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean
in moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But
moral virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as
Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a
second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not
appoint the mean to moral virtues.
On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue (A[5],
OBJ[1]) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by reason . . .
even as a wise man decides."
I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely
in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should
not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude,
that he should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear
or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural
reason, since natural reason dictates to each one that he should act
according to reason.
But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and
by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For
though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet
this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are
directed to the end.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in
matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to belong
to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations,
and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends
to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in
all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of
nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this
purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.
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Whether command is the chief act of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of
prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De
Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid ambushes."
Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the
prudent man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to command"
seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been said above
([2742]FS, Q[57], A[6]). Therefore command is not the chief act of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to
rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other
powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason.
Therefore command is not an act of prudence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence
commands."
I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated
above [2743](A[2]). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in
regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are
three such acts. The first is "to take counsel," which belongs to
discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above ([2744]FS,
Q[14], A[1]). The second act is "to judge of what one has discovered,"
and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practical reason,
which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is "to
command," which act consists in applying to action the things
counselled and judged. And since this act approaches nearer to the end
of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the
practical reason, and consequently of prudence.
In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in
judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily
against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so
involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment,
and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the
reverse in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more
imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief
act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of
good and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the
avoidance of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act
of prudence that does not continue in heaven.
Reply to Objection 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good
things discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs
to prudence which takes good counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command
denotes motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act
of the reason, as stated above ([2745]FS, Q[17], A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.
For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that
"a solicitous man is a restless man." Now motion belongs chiefly to the
appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence is not
in the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated above
[2746](A[1]). Therefore solicitude does not belong to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to
solicitude, wherefore it is related (1 Kings 9:20) that Samuel said to
Saul: "As for the asses which were lost three days ago, be not
solicitous, because they are found." Now the certainty of truth belongs
to prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude
is in opposition to prudence rather than belonging to it.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the
"magnanimous man is slow and leisurely." Now slowness is contrary to
solicitude. Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for
"good is not opposed to good," as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it
would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and
watch in prayers." But watchfulness is the same as solicitude.
Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence.
I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be
solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far
as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do
whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act
is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in
matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one
should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking
counsel." Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and
for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that "prudence
keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived
unawares by evil counsel."
Reply to Objection 1: Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to
the principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction
and command of reason, wherein solicitude consists.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3),
"equal certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter
according to its proper mode." And since the matter of prudence is the
contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty of
prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.
Reply to Objection 3: The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and
leisurely" not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he
is not over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters
where he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them:
for over-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since
fear makes us take counsel, as stated above ([2747]FS, Q[44], A[2])
when we were treating of the passion of fear.
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Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the
governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good
is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is
not directed to the common good.
Objection 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good
for himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their
own. Therefore they are not prudent.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance
and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only to
a man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou, is a
faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath
appointed over his family?"
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have
held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the
good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not
bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to
charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13:5): wherefore the
Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): "Not seeking that which is
profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved." Moreover it
is contrary to right reason, which judges the common good to be better
than the good of the individual.
Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge,
and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident
that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but
also the common good of the multitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral
virtue. Now just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common
good is called "legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the
common good is called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in
the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to
moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in
consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the
individual good is impossible without the common good of the family,
state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict. Memor.
iv, 6] of the ancient Romans that "they would rather be poor in a rich
empire than rich in a poor empire." Secondly, because, since man is a
part of the home and state, he must needs consider what is good for him
by being prudent about the good of the many. For the good disposition
of parts depends on their relation to the whole; thus Augustine says
(Confess. iii, 8) that "any part which does not harmonize with its
whole, is offensive."
Reply to Objection 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to
the common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as
stated in Ethic. v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since
these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the
universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.
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Whether prudence about one's own good is specifically the same as that whic
h
extends to the common good?
Objection 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same
specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and prudence
are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same."
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue
is the same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now political prudence
is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since
then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and
political prudence are the same habit.
Objection 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence
by things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular
good, which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the
common good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence
and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.
On the contrary, "Political prudence," which is directed to the common
good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things as relate
to the common good of the household or family, and "monastic economy"
which is concerned with things affecting the good of one person, are
all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different
kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above differences of matter.
I answer that, As stated above [2748](A[5]; Q[54], A[2], ad 1), the
species of habits differ according to the difference of object
considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things
directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above (FS,
Prolog.; [2749]FS, Q[102], A[1]), wherefore the species of habits
differ by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good,
the good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are
different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of
prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is
"prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good;
another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of
the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the
common good of the state or kingdom.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher means, not that political
prudence is substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but
that it is the same as the prudence which is directed to the common
good. This is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of
prudence, i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is
called "political," as being directed to the common good.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it
belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well,"
wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good ruler.
Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs specifically,
even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same
authority (Polit. iii, 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate
to the other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance,
habits directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ
specifically although their ends are subordinate to one another. In
like manner, though the good of the individual is subordinate to the
good of the many, that does not prevent this difference from making the
habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is
directed to the last end is above the other habits and commands them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only in
their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "prudence
alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues are common
to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue
but a true opinion."
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that "a slave is not
competent to take counsel." But prudence makes a man take good counsel
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects.
Objection 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above
[2750](A[8]). But command is not in the competency of slaves or
subjects but only of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but
only in rulers.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two
kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and belongs
to rulers, while the other "retains the common name political," and is
about "individual actions." Now it belongs also to subjects to perform
these individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but
also in subjects.
I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing
belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to
reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and
governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave
as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled
and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave,
nor of a subject as subject.
Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share
in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately
competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is
in the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but in
the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft."
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood
strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such.
Reply to Objection 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so
far as he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but
he does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.
Reply to Objection 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but
also himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower
powers.
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Whether prudence can be in sinners?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For
our Lord said (Lk. 16:8): "The children of this world are more prudent
[Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light." Now
the children of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in
sinners.
Objection 2: Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence.
But there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence
also.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, "we say that to be of
good counsel is the work of prudent man especially." Now many sinners
can take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it is
impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good." Now no inner is a
good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.
I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which
takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent
man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a
good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an
evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end,
is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called "a good
robber," and in this way may speak of "a prudent robber," by way of
similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This
is the prudence of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:6): "The prudence
[Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is death," because, to wit, it places
its ultimate end in the pleasures of the flesh.
The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting
ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold
source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the
common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when
a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship,
he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly,
because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes
counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning
life as a whole, but fails to make an effective command.
The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel,
judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole
life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in
sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while
imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that
which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since
that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is
only in the wicked.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of
the first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent
absolutely, but that they are prudent in "their generation."
Reply to Objection 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity
with the appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On
the other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First
because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such
ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue,
which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there
is no prudence, as shown above ([2751]FS, Q[58], A[5]); secondly
because prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless
the appetite be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object
is more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is
more opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or
for some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel
for the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel
into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good
only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12)
there is "cleverness," [*{deinotike}] i.e. natural diligence which may
be directed to both good and evil; or "cunning," [*{panourgia}] which
is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be "false
prudence" or "prudence of the flesh."
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Whether prudence is in all who have grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace.
Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to be
done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not
all who have grace have prudence.
Objection 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as
stated above (A[8], OBJ[2]; A[13], OBJ[3]). Yet many have grace who do
not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others.
Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young
people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace.
Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace.
On the contrary, No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can
be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that
"the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect
prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have grace
have prudence.
I answer that, The virtues must needs be connected together, so that
whoever has one has all, as stated above ([2752]FS, Q[65], A[1]). Now
whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other
virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above
[2753](A[4]), he must, of necessity, have prudence also.
Reply to Objection 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient
with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is
given to all who have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things"
(1 Jn. 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than
sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself
and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also
in all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is not
in all who have grace.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of
others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves in
this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and can
discern good from evil counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of
acts, wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic.
ii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act.
On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion.
Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the
use of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even as
in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it is
also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by
practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the other
virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong meat is for
the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the
discerning of good and evil."
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Whether prudence is in us by nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The
Philosopher says that things connected with prudence "seem to be
natural," namely "synesis, gnome" [*{synesis} and {gnome}, Cf.
[2754]FS, Q[57], A[6]] and the like, but not those which are connected
with speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have
the same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.
Objection 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now
prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In the ancient is
wisdom, and in length of days prudence." Therefore prudence is natural.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature
than with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain
natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De
Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual
virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore
demands experience and time." Now prudence is an intellectual virtue,
as stated above [2755](A[4]). Therefore prudence is in us, not by
nature, but by teaching and experience.
I answer that, As shown above [2756](A[3]), prudence includes knowledge
both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which
prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards the
knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of
speculative science, because the primary universal principles of either
are known naturally, as shown above [2757](A[6]): except that the
common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the
Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the
speculative reason is better than that which is according to man":
whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the speculative
or of the practical reason, are not inherited from nature, but are
acquired by discovery through experience, or through teaching.
On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are
the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this
matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right
ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural
inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above
([2758]FS, Q[51], A[1]; [2759]FS, Q[63], A[1]) that some, from a
natural inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to
right ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment
about such like ends.
But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are
of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and affairs.
Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed,
the knowledge of those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by
reason of his natural disposition, one man has a greater aptitude than
another in discerning them, just as it happens with regard to the
conclusions of speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not about
the ends, but about the means, as stated above [2760](A[6]; [2761]FS,
Q[57], A[5]), it follows that prudence is not from nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things
relating to prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore
he had said before (Ethic. vi, 5,11) that "they are the principles of
the {ou heneka}" [*Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are the means)],
namely, the end; and so he does not mention {euboulia} among them,
because it takes counsel about the means.
Reply to Objection 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because
their natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions,
but also because of their long experience.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of
obtaining an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same
species act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account
of his reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently
extends to an infinity of singulars.
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Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through
forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is more
certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of action. But
science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence.
Objection 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same
things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now
the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of
many memories," as he states at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i,
1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems that
prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.
Objection 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of
universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through
forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that
"forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence."
I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can
forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they
belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but
also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above [2762](A[8]),
its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the
knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. Hence
prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is
corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that
"pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence": wherefore it is
written (Dan. 13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath
subverted thy heart," and (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt thou take bribes
which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise']."
Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the
latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.
Reply to Objection 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the
comparison fails, as stated above [*Cf. [2763]FS, Q[53], A[1]].
Reply to Objection 2: The experience required by prudence results not
from memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge
of universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above
[2764](A[3]). Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not
destroy the principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as
stated above.
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OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Which are the parts of prudence?
(2) Of its integral parts;
(3) Of its subjective parts;
(4) Of its potential parts.
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Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned
unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of
prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight." Macrobius
(In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes to
prudence six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding,"
"circumspection," "foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle says
(Ethic. vi, 9,10,11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and "gnome" belong
to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he mentions "conjecture,"
"shrewdness," "sense" and "understanding." And another Greek
philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q[80], OBJ[4]] says that ten things are
connected with prudence, namely, "good counsel," "shrewdness,"
"foresight," "regnative [*Regnativa]," "military," "political" and
"domestic prudence," "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics." Therefore
it seems that one or the other enumeration is either excessive or
deficient.
Objection 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science.
But politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences.
Therefore they are not parts of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the
intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility, belong
not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits. Therefore
they should not be set down as parts of prudence.
Objection 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are
acts of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above
([2765]FS, Q[16], A[1] ). Therefore, just as "eubulia" which refers to
counsel, is connected with prudence, and "synesis" and "gnome" which
refer to judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned
corresponding to use.
Objection 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above
([2766]Q[47], A[9]). Therefore solicitude also should have been
mentioned among the parts of prudence.
I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, "integral," as wall,
roof, and foundations are parts of a house; "subjective," as ox and
lion are parts of animal; and "potential," as the nutritive and
sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be
assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral
parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of a
virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all
the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of prudence,
namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition of a seventh,
viz. "memory" mentioned by Tully; and {eustochia} or "shrewdness"
mentioned by Aristotle. For the "sense" of prudence is also called
"understanding": wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "Of
such things one needs to have the sense, and this is understanding." Of
these eight, five belong to prudence as a cognitive virtue, namely,
"memory," "reasoning," "understanding," "docility" and "shrewdness":
while the three others belong thereto, as commanding and applying
knowledge to action, namely, "foresight," "circumspection" and
"caution." The reason of their difference is seen from the fact that
three things may be observed in reference to knowledge. In the first
place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of the past, is called
"memory," if of the present, whether contingent or necessary, is called
"understanding" or "intelligence." Secondly, the acquiring of
knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to which pertains
"docility," or by "discovery," and to this belongs to {eustochia}, i.e.
"a happy conjecture," of which "shrewdness" is a part, which is a
"quick conjecture of the middle term," as stated in Poster. i, 9.
Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things
known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this belongs to
"reasoning." And the reason, in order to command aright, requires to
have three conditions. First, to order that which is befitting the end,
and this belongs to "foresight"; secondly, to attend to the
circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs to
"circumspection"; thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to
"caution."
The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way
the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence
whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a
multitude, which differ specifically as stated above ([2767]Q[47],
A[11]). Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided
into various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There
is the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose;
thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that
governs this is called "military." There is also the multitude that is
united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home
or family, and this is ruled by "domestic prudence": and such again is
the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is
"regnative prudence" in the ruler, and "political prudence," simply so
called, in the subjects.
If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also
speculative knowledge, as stated above ([2768]Q[47], A[2], ad 2) then
its parts include "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics," according to
three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the
attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to "physics" (if
physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The
second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises, and
this belongs to "dialectics." The third method is to employ conjectures
in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and
this belongs to "rhetoric." It may be said, however, that these three
belong also to prudence properly so called, since it argues sometimes
from necessary premises, sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes
from conjectures.
The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it,
which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as
it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the parts
of prudence are "good counsel," which concerns counsel, "synesis,"
which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, and "gnome,"
which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the law: while
"prudence" is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.
Reply to Objection 1: The various enumerations differ, either because
different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is
mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another
enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circumspection" under
"foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under
"understanding."
Reply to Objection 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be
taken as sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the
reply may be gathered from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence,
not by taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with
things pertaining to prudence.
Reply to Objection 4: Right command and right use always go together,
because the reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of
the lower powers, which pertain to use.
Reply to Objection 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.
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OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Memory;
(2) Understanding or Intelligence;
(3) Docility;
(4) Shrewdness;
(5) Reason;
(6) Foresight;
(7) Circumspection;
(8) Caution.
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Whether memory is a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For
memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the
sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience,
whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards
future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated
in Ethic. vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among
the parts of prudence.
I answer that, Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated
above ([2769]Q[47], A[5]). Now in such like matters a man can be
directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but
by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must
be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be concluded from
like" (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need experience to
discover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is engendered
and fostered by experience and time." Now experience is the result of
many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence
requires the memory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted
a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2770]Q[47], AA[3],6), prudence
applies universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense:
hence many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite
for prudence, and memory is one of them.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature,
while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully
says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24], memory not
only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.
There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a
man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet
somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us
more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the
mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were
children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these
illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions
easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some
corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible
objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of
the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he
must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily
from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et
Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason
being that we pass quickly from the one to the other." Thirdly, we must
be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because
the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to
slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de
Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the figures of images entire."
Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that "reflection preserves
memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria ii) "custom is a second
nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly
call it to mind, through passing from one thing to another by a kind of
natural order.
Reply to Objection 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the
future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in
order to take good counsel for the future.
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Whether understanding* is a part of prudence? [*Otherwise intuition;
Aristotle's word is {nous}]
Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of
prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part of
the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and
prudence, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not
be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q[8], AA[1],8).
But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has
been said above (Q[4], A[8]; [2771]FS, Q[62], A[2]). Therefore
understanding does not pertain to prudence.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action
(Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and
immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a
part of prudence.
On the contrary, Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts
"intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8]
mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.
I answer that, Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power,
but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as
self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of
demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain
statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of
reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since
prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of
prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that
understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a
conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated
above ([2772]Q[47], AA[3],6), it applies the knowledge of some
universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a
universal and a singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of
prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is
cognizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is
an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative
principles, but also practical universal principles, such as "One
should do evil to no man," as shown above ([2773]Q[47], A[6]). The
other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is cognizant of an
extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent practical matter,
viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the syllogism
of prudence, as stated above ([2774]Q[47], AA[3],6). Now this primary
singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place. Wherefore
the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right estimate of
some particular end.
Reply to Objection 2: The understanding which is a gift of the Holy
Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things, as shown above
([2775]Q[8], AA[1],2). It is in another sense that it is accounted a
part of prudence, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The right estimate about a particular end is
called both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle,
and "sense," in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the
Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we need
to have the sense, and this is understanding." But this is to be
understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know
proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a
particular.
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Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a part
of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every
intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But
docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it
should not be accounted a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our
power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are praised
or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this is
befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it is
not a part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence,
since it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are
also called "preceptors." Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the opinion
of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 1;[2776] Q[47], A[3]) prudence
is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters
are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently;
nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in
matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by
others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding
of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right to pay no less attention to the
undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such persons as are
experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to their
demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into
principles." Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not on thy own
prudence," and (Ecclus. 6:35): "Stand in the multitude of the ancients"
(i.e. the old men), "that are wise, and join thyself from thy heart to
their wisdom." Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught:
and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence
Reply to Objection 1: Although docility is useful for every
intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason
given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as
for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for
much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully,
frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the
learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them
through pride.
Reply to Objection 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for
others, but also for himself, as stated above ([2777]Q[47], A[12], ad
3). Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place
for prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned
should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether
self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.
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Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence.
For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for
demonstrations, as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of
prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies.
Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to
Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness
[*Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of {eustochia}, i.e. "a
happy conjecture": for the latter is "unreasoning and rapid," whereas
counsel needs to be slow, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore
shrewdness should not be accounted a part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, shrewdness as stated above ([2778]Q[48]) is a
"happy conjecture." Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of
conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to
prudence.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one who
is shrewd and alert [solers citus]." But solicitude belongs to
prudence, as stated above ([2779]Q[47], A[9]). Therefore shrewdness
does also.
I answer that, Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of
action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both
in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it
oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility
consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from
another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right
estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for {eustochia},
of which it is a part. For {eustochia} is a happy conjecture about any
matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding
the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher
[*Andronicus; Cf. Q[48], OBJ[1]] who calls shrewdness a part of
prudence, takes it for {eustochia}, in general, hence he says:
"Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered rapidly."
Reply to Objection 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the
middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical
syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends they
are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says
(Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic.
vi, 9) to prove that {euboulia}, i.e. good counsel, is not {eustochia},
which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man
may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, and yet
this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in taking good
counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for instance,
something has to be done without warning. It is for this reason that
shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters,
wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and
prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense
in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable to all
matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.
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Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of
prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. But
prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be
reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should
be reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason
is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and
science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should
not be reckoned a part of prudence
Objection 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially
from the intelligence, as stated above ([2780]FP, Q[79], A[8]). If
therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is
superfluous to add reason.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion
of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.
I answer that, The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated
in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain
things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is
requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since
the things required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite
or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be
numbered among these parts.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but
its good use.
Reply to Objection 2: The certitude of reason comes from the intellect.
Yet the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those
things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need
for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as
do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of action,
wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of things
intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less certain and
fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are nevertheless
more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there is no room for
counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.
Hence, although in certain other intellectual virtues reason is more
certain than in prudence, yet prudence above all requires that man be
an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly apply universals to
particulars, which latter are various and uncertain.
Reply to Objection 3: Although intelligence and reason are not
different powers, yet they are named after different acts. For
intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the
truth [*Cf. [2781]SS, Q[8], A[1]], while reason is so called from being
inquisitive and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as
explained above [2782](A[2]; Q[47], A[2] ,3).
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Whether foresight* should be accounted a part of prudence? [*"Providentia,"
which may be translated either "providence" or "foresight."]
Objection 1: It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a
part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to
be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a
prudent man is one who sees from afar [porro videns]": and this is also
the derivation of "providentia [foresight]," according to Boethius (De
Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may
be also speculative, because "seeing," whence we have the word "to
foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore
foresight is not a part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while
its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these
seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not
part of prudence.
On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number
foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above ([2783]Q[48]).
I answer that, As stated above ([2784]Q[47], A[1], ad 2, AA[6],13),
prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is
to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are
necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet
nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters of
actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a
kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. In like
manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is
necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.
Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by
man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of
these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the
notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present
has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity,
one of them must needs be the principal to which all the others are
subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and
predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the
principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required
for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular thing may be
rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of prudence
is taken from foresight [providentia] as from its principal part.
Reply to Objection 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary
things, which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are
everywhere and always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we
fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to
speculative, but only to practical matters.
Reply to Objection 3: Right order to an end which is included in the
notion of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and
command, without which no right order to the end is possible.
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Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of
prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's
surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be
considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection
should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral
virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote
nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection
apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.
Objection 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see
things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant
things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part of
prudence in addition to foresight.
On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above
([2785]Q[48]).
I answer that, As stated above [2786](A[6]), it belongs to prudence
chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done
aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.
Since, however, prudence, as stated above ([2787]Q[47], A[3]) is about
singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of
circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable
to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by
reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love
to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse
love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his
heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need
of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the
circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the number of possible circumstances be
infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment
of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in
number
Reply to Objection 2: Circumstances are the concern of prudence,
because prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the
concern of moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by
the fixing of circumstances.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that
which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to
circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of
the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own,
and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. Now
no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb.
ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs
the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the
same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health.
Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to
avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of
prudence, distinct from foresight.
Objection 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no
man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution
does not belong to prudence.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk
cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']."
I answer that, The things with which prudence is concerned, are
contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with
true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of
these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and
evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so
that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be
on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of
acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to
avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is
different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they
both belong to the one virtue of prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of
frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against
them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether,
or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and
by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be
grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them,
although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the
surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence.
And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules
himself (Q[47], seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species of
prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence?
(4) Whether military prudence is?
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Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a
species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the
preservation of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is
the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to
justice rather than to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a
kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of
prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are
"aristocracy," "polity," also called "timocracy" [*Cf. Ethic. viii,
10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and "democracy." Therefore neither should a
regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom.
Objection 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to
certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according
to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part
of prudence to be "legislative." Therefore it is not becoming to
substitute regnative prudence in its place.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that "prudence
is a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a special kind of
prudence is regnative.
I answer that, As stated above ([2788]Q[47], AA[8],10), it belongs to
prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find
a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind
of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind
of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the
perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the
more perfect according as it is more universal, extends to more
matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and
most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the
government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence
is reckoned to be regnative.
Reply to Objection 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to
prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with
prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated
above (Q[47], A[5], ad 1; [2789]FS, Q[58], A[2], ad 4). For this reason
also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common
good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of
prudence. Hence these two virtues---prudence and justice---belong most
properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign and
shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth."
Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to
his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence
which is directive, rather than to justice which is executive.
Reply to Objection 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as
stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be
denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under
regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse
forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not
pertain to prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after
the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this
applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as
they have a share of kingly government.
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Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly
accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political
prudence, as stated above [2790](A[1]). But a part should not be
reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should
not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their
various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what
the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the
subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from
regnative prudence.
Objection 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each
individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly
so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence
called political.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the
prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a
master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the
common name political, and deals with individuals."
I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his
ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate
beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate
beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion,
since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own
actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their
power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are
slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in
such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some
kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may
direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that
species of prudence which is called political.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect
species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls
short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political
prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the
essence of a thing retains the name of "proper."
Reply to Objection 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the
species of a habit, as stated above ([2791]Q[47], A[5]). Now the same
actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as
by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various
departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political
prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.
Reply to Objection 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so
called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of
which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.
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Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?
Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "prudence
is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic prudence is
directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1.
Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([2792]Q[47], A[13]) prudence is
only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked
people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household.
Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and
subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like
political is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal
corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence.
Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of
prudence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are
various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one of
which is domestic, another legislative, and another political."
I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in respect of
universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality,
diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of
virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a
household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom,
since just as the individual is part of the household, so is the
household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence
commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from
political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from both.
Reply to Objection 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as
its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the
other hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general"
as regards the conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher
speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example
and in accordance with the opinion of many.
Reply to Objection 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters
of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in
regard to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the
household, for which above all a virtuous life is required.
Reply to Objection 3: The father has in his household an authority like
that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full
power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a
distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.
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Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be
reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art,
according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of
warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore
military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, just as military business is contained under
political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of
tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of
prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore
should any be assigned to military business.
Objection 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in
warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than
to prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due
ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels." Now
it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need
in warfare for that species of prudence which is called "military."
I answer that, Whatever things are done according to art or reason,
should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature,
and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold
tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand
outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has
provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they
are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with
the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant.
Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason,
there should be not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a
suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a
"military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled.
Reply to Objection 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it
has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as
arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it
belongs rather to prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the
profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed
to the service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of
the entire common good.
Reply to Objection 3: The execution of military service belongs to
fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the
commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with
prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether {euboulia}, is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?
(3) Whether {synesis} is a special virtue?
(4) Whether {gnome} is a special virtue?
[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of
deliberating well {euboulia}, of judging well according to common law
{synesis}, and of judging well according to general law {gnome},
respectively.]
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Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a
virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) "no man
makes evil use of virtue." Now some make evil use of {euboulia}
(deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty
counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in
order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may
give alms. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii.
But {euboulia} (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which
implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection.
Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above ([2793]FS, Q[65]). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not
connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel,
and many godly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore {euboulia}
(deliberating well) is not a virtue.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) {euboulia}
(deliberating well) "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of
virtue consists in right reason. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating
well) is a virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([2794]Q[47], A[4]) the nature of a
human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of
man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research
of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human
life consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in
Ethic. x. But {euboulia} (deliberating well) signifies goodness of
counsel, for it is derived from the {eu}, good, and {boule}, counsel,
being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel."
Hence it is evident that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a human
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating
for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end,
even as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in
coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from
false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both
the aforesaid processes are contrary to {euboulia} (deliberating well),
as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).
Reply to Objection 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it
does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies
perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts,
and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel is
one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive appetite, which
are still more imperfect.
It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to
the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with
certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which
are contingent.
Reply to Objection 3: In no sinner as such is {euboulia} (deliberating
well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel.
For good counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit
means for the end, but also other circumstances. Such are suitable
time, so that one be neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel,
and the mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel
taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners fail to observe
when they sin. On the other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel
in those things which are directed to the end of virtue, although
perhaps he does not take good counsel in other particular matters, for
instance in matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.
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Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from
prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a
distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vi, 5), the "prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good
counsel." Now this belongs to {euboulia} (deliberating well) as stated
above. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not distinct from
prudence.
Objection 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed,
are specified chiefly by their end, as stated above ([2795]FS, Q[1],
A[3]; [2796]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) and
prudence are directed to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not
indeed to some particular end, but to the common end of all life.
Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision
belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to
the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to
{euboulia} (deliberating well), while decision belongs to prudence.
There {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from
prudence.
On the contrary, Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10.
But this does not apply to {euboulia} (deliberating well). Therefore
{euboulia} (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence.
I answer that, As stated above [2797](A[1]), virtue is properly
directed to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must
differ according to different acts, especially when there is a
different kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained
the same kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus
the goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all
these belong to the same virtue of charity.
Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor
have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different
causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good
command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another.
Consequently {euboulia} (deliberating well) which makes man take good
counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man
command well. And since counsel is directed to command as to that which
is principal, so {euboulia} (deliberating well) is directed to prudence
as to a principal virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all,
even as neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other
virtues without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by
commanding it, to {euboulia} (deliberating well) by eliciting it.
Reply to Objection 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees
to the one end which is "a good life in general" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for
counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last
named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the other two
acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain
proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the discovery of
what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty. Hence this
proves not that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue
from prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a
principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science
of dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct
from demonstrative science, which decides the truth.
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Whether {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that {synesis} is not a virtue. Virtues are
not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But {synesis} (judging
well according to common law) is natural to some, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), {synesis}
(judging well according to common law) is nothing but "a faculty of
judging." But judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since
then virtue is only in the good, it seems that {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there
be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for
it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore {synesis}
(judging well according to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed to
good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other virtue
directed to good command: and consequently prudence would be
superfluous, which is not reasonable. Therefore {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But {euboulia},
or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is {synesis}
(judging well according to common law) a virtue, as being good
judgment.
I answer that, {synesis} (judging well according to common law)
signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but
about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence
in Greek some, in respect of {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) are said to be {synetoi}, i.e. "persons of sense," or
{eusynetoi}, i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand, those
who lack this virtue are called {asynetoi}, i.e. "senseless."
Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must
correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of
counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause,
for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to
judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research,
through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another
(which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination,
which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons
sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the
intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common
sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, besides
{euboulia} (deliberating well), for another virtue, which judges well,
and this is called {synesis} (judging well according to common law).
Reply to Objection 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power
apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the
right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well
disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are,
whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and
misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive
things just as they are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as
to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this
in two ways. First directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself,
for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true
and correct ideas: this belongs to {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly
indirectly, through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the
result being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus
a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but
this judgment is about the ends, whereas {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) is rather about the means.
Reply to Objection 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a
universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the
particular matter of action, as stated above ([2798]Q[47], A[13]).
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to
execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue
which judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal
virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.
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Whether {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue
?
Objection 1: It would seem that {gnome} (judging well according to
general law) is not a special virtue distinct from {synesis} (judging
well according to common law). For a man is said, in respect of
{synesis} (judging well according to common law), to have good
judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge
aright in all things. Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) extends to all matters of judgment, and consequently there
is no other virtue of good judgment called {gnome} (judging well
according to general law).
Objection 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept.
Now there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. {euboulia}
(deliberating well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence.
Therefore there is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. {synesis}
(judging well according to common law).
Objection 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart
from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and
with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now
all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is
no intellectual virtue about such matters.
On the contrary, The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that {gnome}
(judging well according to general law) is a special virtue.
I answer that cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower
principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher
principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from
it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that
what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes
reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of
animals are beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they
come under the order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body,
or higher still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active
seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judgment on such
monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we consider Divine
Providence.
Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not
covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the
enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his
deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of
such matters according to higher principles than the common laws,
according to which {synesis} (judging according to common law) judges:
and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a
higher virtue of judgment, which is called {gnome} (judging according
to general law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in
judgment.
Reply to Objection 1: {Synesis} (judging well according to common law)
judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules:
but certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the
proper principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also
common principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics
which aims at research proceeds from common principles; while
demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles.
Hence {euboulia} (deliberating well) to which the research of counsel
belongs is one for all, but not so {synesis} (judging well according to
common law) whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the
one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider
all things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand,
among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such
things by his reason: this belongs to {gnome} (judging well according
to general law), which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.
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OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost?
(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?
(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?
(4) Whether the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc.
corresponds to the gift of counsel?
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Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among
the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as a
help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for the
purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the virtue
of prudence, or even of {euboulia} (deliberating well), as is evident
from what has been said ([2799]Q[47], A[1], ad 2;[2800] Q[51],
AA[1],2). Therefore counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of
the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are
not given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But
counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy
Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65: "Behold
. . . your brother Simon is a man of counsel." Therefore counsel should
be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven
gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:14): "Whosoever are led by
the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." But counselling is not
consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who "have received the
spirit of adoption of sons," it would seem that counsel should not be
numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "(The Spirit of the Lord)
shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude."
I answer that, As stated above ([2801]FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable
to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according to
the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature
through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but
not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22).
Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the
research of reason to perform any particular action, and this research
is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational
creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among the
gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence or {euboulia} (deliberating well),
whether acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel
according to principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or
{euboulia} (deliberating well) makes man take good counsel either for
himself or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp
the singular and contingent things which may occur, the result is that
"the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain"
(Wis. 9:14). Hence in the research of counsel, man requires to be
directed by God who comprehends all things: and this is done through
the gift of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled by
God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to take counsel
for themselves, seek counsel from those who are wiser.
Reply to Objection 2: That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel
others, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be counselled
by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is
common to all holy persons.
Reply to Objection 3: The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost
according to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which is
the "faculty of will and reason" [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly the
gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far as the
reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do.
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Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly
correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest point of that
which is underneath touches that which is above," as Dionysius observes
(Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in
respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the
gifts, as stated above ([2802]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Since, then, counsel is
the first and lowest act of prudence, while command is its highest act,
and judgment comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to
prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of judgment or command.
Objection 2: Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the
higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now
prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only
speculative but also practical, as shown above ([2803]Q[9], A[3]).
Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as
stated above (Q[47], A[8]). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that
man should be directed by God, as stated above [2804](A[1]). Therefore
the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.
On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for
the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore
they correspond to one another.
I answer that, A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is
perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, as a
body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the
rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a lower
motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme
rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which denotes
rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being
ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of
counsel, as stated above [2805](A[1]). Therefore the gift of counsel
corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.
Reply to Objection 1: To judge and command belongs not to the thing
moved, but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a
mover, as stated above [2806](A[1]; [2807]FS, Q[68], A[1]), it follows
that it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence
by the name of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is
possible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another
counselling it.
Reply to Objection 2: The gift of knowledge does not directly
correspond to prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by
a kind of extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel
corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the
same things.
Reply to Objection 3: The mover that is moved, moves through being
moved. Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by
the Holy Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others.
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Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain in
heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of an
end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end,
since there man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of counsel
is not in heaven.
Objection 2: Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take
counsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there is
no counsel in heaven.
Objection 3: Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God,
according to 1 Jn. 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to
Him." But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Rom. 11:34, "Who
hath been His counsellor?" Therefore neither to the saints in heaven is
the gift of counsel becoming.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): "When either the guilt
or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate of the
heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have won in the
conflict, or not to have won."
I answer that, As stated above [2808](A[2]; [2809]FS, Q[68], A[1]), the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational
creature by God. Now we must observe two points concerning the motion
of the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which is
moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition when it is
in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle of the
movement alone, when the movement ceases, the action of the mover
ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached the
term of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases being
built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is cause not
only of the movement, but also of the form to which the movement tends,
then the action of the mover does not cease even after the form has
been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even after it is
lightened. In this way, then, God causes in us virtue and knowledge,
not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as we persevere
in them: and it is thus that God causes in the blessed a knowledge of
what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant, but by continuing
that knowledge in them.
Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or men,
do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but concern
the government of things according to Divine Providence. As regards
these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God moves the
mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the wayfarer, in
another. For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in matters of action,
by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt; whereas there is simple
nescience in the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not
know. From this nescience the angel's mind is cleansed, according to
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does there precede in them any
research of doubt, for they simply turn to God; and this is to take
counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) "the angels
take counsel of God about things beneath them": wherefore the
instruction which they receive from God in such matters is called
"counsel."
Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God
preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them in
their nescience of what has to be done.
Reply to Objection 1: Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an
end, or resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such
as the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which
they themselves have attained, for example the ministrations of the
angels, and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of
counsel finds a place in them.
Reply to Objection 2: Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present
state of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven.
Even so neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in
heaven as on the way thither.
Reply to Objection 3: Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving
it: and the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the
source whence they receive.
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Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the gif
t
of counsel?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of
mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the
beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above ([2810]FS, Q[69], A[1]).
Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the
fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel.
Objection 2: Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for
salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not necessary
for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation, according to James
2:13, "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy." On the
other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but belongs to the
life of perfection, according to Mat. 19:21. Therefore the beatitude of
poverty corresponds to the gift of counsel, rather than to the
beatitude of mercy.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they
denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of
virtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as
appears from Gal. 5:22, 23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of
mercy correspond to the gift of counsel.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is
befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from
evils so great, to pardon, and to give."
I answer that, Counsel is properly about things useful for an end.
Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all
correspond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1
Tim. 4:8, "Godliness [*'Pietas,' which our English word 'pity,' which
is the same as mercy; see note on [2811]SS, Q[30], A[1]] is profitable
to all things." Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds
to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy.
Reply to Objection 1: Although counsel directs in all the acts of
virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason
given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost
guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life
whether they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work
of mercy is necessary for salvation.
Reply to Objection 3: Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the
ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an
action which is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical
knowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as pertain
to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among these we
find "goodness" and "benignity" which correspond to mercy.
__________________________________________________________________
OF IMPRUDENCE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine says
(Contra Julian. iv, 3): "There are vices opposed to every virtue, not
only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is
opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of kinship and
not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to
prudence we have craftiness."
Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in
evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a defect
either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for prudence,
and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to prudence,
those namely which are due to abuse of the things required for
prudence. And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of these
considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of negligence
which is opposed to solicitude.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) Of precipitation or temerity;
(4) Of thoughtlessness;
(5) Of inconstancy;
(6) Concerning the origin of these vices.
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Whether imprudence is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every sin
is voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv]; whereas
imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent.
Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, none but original sin comes to man with his
birth. But imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young
are imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to
original justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But
imprudence is not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is not
a sin.
On the contrary, The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away save
by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to Prov. 21:20,
"There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the
just, and the imprudent [Douay: 'foolish'] man shall spend it."
Therefore imprudence is a sin.
I answer that, Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a
privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken
as a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for
this can be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes
lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this
sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving
to have prudence.
Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act of
reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the right
reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises
counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which require
consideration in the act of prudence. In this way imprudence is a sin
in respect of prudence considered under its proper aspect, since it is
not possible for a man to act against prudence, except by infringing
the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. Wherefore, if
this should happen through aversion from the Divine Law, it will be a
mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately through contempt and
rejection of the Divine teaching: whereas if he act beside the Law and
without contempt, and without detriment to things necessary for
salvation, it will be a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but
the rash man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act
precipitately. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "he who
sins willingly against prudence is less to be commended."
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes imprudence in the negative
sense. It must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any
other virtue is included in the lack of original justice which
perfected the entire soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be
ascribed to original sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus
the lack of this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored
as to the habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein
properly speaking the sin of imprudence consists.
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Whether imprudence is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For
whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But
imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above
[2812](A[1]). Therefore imprudence is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than
knowledge is. But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned
one of the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence
be reckoned among those causes.
Objection 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the
circumstances of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
"evil results from each single defect." Now many things are requisite
for prudence; for instance, reason, intelligence docility, and so on,
as stated above (QQ[48],49). Therefore there are many species of
imprudence, so that it is not a special sin.
On the contrary, Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above
[2813](A[1]). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence
too is one special vice.
I answer that, A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways; first,
absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all sins;
secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices, which are
its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be general on two
counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated of all sins: and
in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is prudence a
general virtue: since it is concerned with special acts, namely the
very acts of reason: secondly, by participation; and in this way
imprudence is a general sin: for, just as all the virtues have a share
of prudence, in so far as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a
share of imprudence, because no sin can occur, without some defect in
an act of the directing reason, which defect belongs to imprudence.
If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in some
particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin, then
imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in three
ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of prudence,
for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the individual,
from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above ([2814]Q[48];
Q[50], A[7] ), so also we distinguish various kinds of imprudence.
Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of prudence, which
are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of
reason. Thus, by defect of "counsel" to which {euboulia} (deliberating
well) corresponds, "precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of
imprudence; by defect of "judgment," to which {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) and {gnome} (judging well according to general
law) refer, there is "thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy" and
"negligence" correspond to the "command" which is the proper act of
prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things
which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts of
prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the direction
of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all the opposite
defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above. Thus
incautiousness and incircumspection are included in "thoughtlessness";
lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable to "precipitation";
improvidence, lack of intelligence and of shrewdness, belong to
"negligence" and "inconstancy."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers generality by
participation.
Reply to Objection 2: Since knowledge is further removed from morality
than prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it
follows that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but
on account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent
result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of
sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a moral
vice; and for this reason it can be called a special sin.
Reply to Objection 3: When various circumstances are corrupted for the
same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same
species of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and
when one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are
various species: for instance, if one man were to take another's
property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this
would constitute the species called sacrilege, while if another were to
take another's property when he ought not, merely through the lust of
possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack of
those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute a
diversity of species, except in so far as they are directed to
different acts of reason, as stated above.
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Whether precipitation is a sin included in imprudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included in
imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence; whereas
precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to Gregory,
who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of "counsel is given as a remedy
to precipitation." Therefore precipitation is not a sin contained under
imprudence.
Objection 2: Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now
rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore
precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence.
Objection 3: Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste.
Now sin happens in counselling not only through being over hasty but
also through being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes
by, and through corruption of other circumstances, as stated in Ethic.
vi, 9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning precipitation as a
sin contained under imprudence, rather than slowness, or something else
of the kind pertaining to inordinate counsel.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:19): "The way of the wicked is
darksome, they know not where they fall." Now the darksome ways of
ungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to
fall or to be precipitate.
I answer that, Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of the
soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is said to
be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is brought down
from above by the impulse either of its own movement or of another's,
and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit of the soul is
the reason, and the base is reached in the action performed by the
body; while the steps that intervene by which one ought to descend in
orderly fashion are "memory" of the past, "intelligence" of the
present, "shrewdness" in considering the future outcome, "reasoning"
which compares one thing with another, "docility" in accepting the
opinions of others. He that takes counsel descends by these steps in
due order, whereas if a man is rushed into action by the impulse of his
will or of a passion, without taking these steps, it will be a case of
precipitation. Since then inordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it
is evident that the vice of precipitation is contained under
imprudence.
Reply to Objection 1: Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of
counsel and to the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as
stated above ([2815]Q[52], A[2]), and consequently precipitation is
opposed to both.
Reply to Objection 2: Things are said to be done rashly when they are
not directed by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through
the impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of
the directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly
speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride,
which refuses to submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers
to both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, although
precipitation refers rather to the first.
Reply to Objection 3: Many things have to be considered in the research
of reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one
should be slow in taking counsel." Hence precipitation is more directly
opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for the latter
bears a certain likeness to right counsel.
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Whether thoughtlessness is a special sin included in prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin
included in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any
sin, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted"; and yet
it incites us to be thoughtless, according to Mat. 10:19, "Take no
thought how or what to speak." Therefore thoughtlessness is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to
many things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and
therefore to a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is contained
under thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is not a
special sin.
Objection 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical
reason, viz. "counsel," "judgment" about what has been counselled, and
"command" [*Cf.[2816] Q[47], A[8]]. Now thought precedes all these
acts, since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore
thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:25): "Let thy eyes look
straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this
pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness.
Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.
I answer that, Thought signifies the act of the intellect in
considering the truth about. something. Now just as research belongs to
the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in
speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise
judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research
by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles.
Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack
of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to
wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those
things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore evident that
thoughtlessness is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when
we have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the
words quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no
opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or
through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God alone,
because "as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to God,"
according to 2 Paral 20:12: else if man, instead of doing what he can,
were to be content with awaiting God's assistance, he would seem to
tempt God.
Reply to Objection 2: All thought about those things of which counsel
takes cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment,
wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently
thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment.
Reply to Objection 3: Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation
to a determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more
things have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than
in speculative matters, because actions are about singulars.
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Whether inconstancy is a vice contained under prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained
under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of
perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult
matters belongs to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to
fortitude rather than to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (James 3:16): "Where jealousy
[Douay: 'envy'] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every
evil work." But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy
pertains not to imprudence but to envy.
Objection 3: Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to
persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of
"incontinency" in pleasurable matters, and of "effeminacy" or
"squeamishness" in unpleasant matters, according to Ethic. vii, 1.
Therefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence.
On the contrary, It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to
the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to
imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to
imprudence.
I answer that, Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good
purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a
man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account
of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal
completed except through a defect of reason, which is deceived in
rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since it can resist
the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it is due to its
own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived;
hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a defect in the
reason. Now just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in
some degree to prudence, so all lack of that rectitude belongs to
imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs to
imprudence. And just as precipitation is due to a defect in the act of
counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so
inconstancy arises from a defect in the act of command. For a man is
stated to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding what has
been counselled and judged.
Reply to Objection 1: The good of prudence is shared by all the moral
virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral
virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater
impulse to the contrary.
Reply to Objection 2: Envy and anger, which are the source of
contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which
power the origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the
appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers evil
concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which
points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands firm, in
the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the persevering man,
against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance seem to be species of
constancy which pertains to reason; and to this power inconstancy
pertains also.
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Whether the aforesaid vices arise from lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from
lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (A[5], ad 2).
But envy is a distinct vice from lust.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (James 1:8): "A double-minded man
is inconstant in all his ways." Now duplicity does not seem to pertain
to lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of
covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the
aforesaid vices do not arise from lust.
Objection 3: Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some
defect of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than
carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices
rather than from carnal vices.
On the contrary, Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the aforesaid
vices arise from lust.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) "pleasure above
all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly sexual pleasure
which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight. Now the
perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue consists in
abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid vices
involve a defect of prudence and of the practical reason, as stated
above ([2817]AA[2],5), it follows that they arise chiefly from lust.
Reply to Objection 1: Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away
the reason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by
destroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 6) that "the man who is incontinent through anger listens
to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent through
lust does not listen to it at all."
Reply to Objection 2: Duplicity also is something resulting from lust,
just as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of
the mind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1,
sc. 1) that "love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce."
Reply to Objection 3: Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so
much the more as they lead us away from reason.
__________________________________________________________________
OF NEGLIGENCE (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether negligence is a special sin?
(2) To which virtue is it opposed?
(3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin?
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Whether negligence is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For
negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in every
virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to every sin is not a
special sin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins
neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in
sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not a
special sin.
Objection 3: Further, every special sin had a determinate matter. But
negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither
about evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence
if he omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done
negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that
negligence is not a special vice.
On the contrary, Sins committed through negligence, are distinguished
from those which are committed through contempt.
I answer that, Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every
lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence is
a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin
according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain
sins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is about
sexual matters, while some vices are special on account of their having
a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of matter, and such
are all vices affecting an act of reason, since every act of reason
extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then solicitude is a special
act of reason, as stated above ([2818]Q[47], A[9]), it follows that
negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a special sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude,
because the more we love [diligimus] a thing the more solicitous are we
about it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for
every virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every
virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: In every sin there must needs be a defect
affecting an act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the
like. Hence just as precipitation is a special sin on account of a
special act of reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may
be found in any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account
of the lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it
is found more or less in all sins.
Reply to Objection 3: Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a
good that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done
negligently, but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of
goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of
solicitude, or some due circumstance be omitted.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether negligence is opposed to prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not opposed to prudence.
For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or laziness, which
belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Now sloth is
not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated above ([2819]Q[35],
A[3]). Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to
negligence. But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to
the executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But
negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is
"precipitation," nor a defect of judgment, since that is
"thoughtlessness," nor a defect of command, because that is
"inconstancy." Therefore negligence does not pertain to imprudence.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): "He that feareth
God, neglecteth nothing." But every sin is excluded by the opposite
virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to
prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): "A babbler and a fool
[imprudens] will regard no time." Now this is due to negligence.
Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence.
I answer that, Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now
solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to
prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to imprudence.
This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore observes (Etym. x)
"a negligent man is one who fails to choose [nec eligens]": and the
right choice of the means belongs to prudence. Therefore negligence
pertains to imprudence.
Reply to Objection 1: Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to
which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote
slowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in setting
about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the execution
itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from sloth,
which is "an oppressive sorrow," i.e. hindering, the mind from action
[*Cf. Q[35], A[1]; [2820]FS, Q[35], A[8]].
Reply to Objection 2: Omission regards the external act, for it
consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is opposed
to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the execution of a
just deed is the effect of right reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Negligence regards the act of command, which
solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this
act otherwise than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in
commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the
negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will.
Reply to Objection 4: The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins,
because according to Prov. 15:27, "by the fear of the Lord everyone
declineth from evil." Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as
though negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear
incites man to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above
([2821]FS, Q[44], A[2]) when we were treating of the passions, that
"fear makes us take counsel."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether negligence can be a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin. For
a gloss of Gregory [*Moral. ix. 34] on Job 9:28, "I feared all my
works," etc. says that "too little love of God aggravates the former,"
viz. negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love of God is
done away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, "For thy negligences
purify thyself with a few," says: "Though the offering be small it
cleanses the negligences of many sins." Now this would not be, if
negligence were a mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed
for mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no
sacrifice was prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 19:16): "He that neglecteth his
own life [Vulg.: 'way'] shall die."
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 3), negligence arises out of a
certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of solicitude
on the part of the reason in commanding what it should command, or as
it should command. Accordingly negligence may happen to be a mortal sin
in two ways. First on the part of that which is omitted through
negligence. If this be either an act or a circumstance necessary for
salvation, it will be a mortal sin. Secondly on the part of the cause:
for if the will be so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away
altogether from the charity of God, such negligence is a mortal sin,
and this is the case chiefly when negligence is due to contempt.
But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance
that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial
sin, provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some
lack of fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle.
Reply to Objection 1: Man may be said to love God less in two ways.
First through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the
negligence that is a venial sin: secondly through lack of charity
itself, in which sense we say that a man loves God less when he loves
Him with a merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is
a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the same authority (gloss), a small
offering made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man not
only from venial but also from mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: When negligence consists in the omission of that
which is necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more
manifest genus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward
actions, are more hidden, wherefore no special sacrifices were
prescribed for them in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a
kind of public confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not be
confessed in public.
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OF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a
resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether craftiness is a special sin?
(4) Of guile;
(5) Of fraud;
(6) Of solicitude about temporal things;
(7) Of solicitude about the future;
(8) Of the origin of these vices.
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Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin. For
prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it
governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither
therefore is any prudence a sin.
Objection 2: Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which
it is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, "for no man
ever hated his own flesh" (Eph. 5:29). Therefore prudence of the flesh
is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he
tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or of
the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of
the flesh be accounted among sins.
On the contrary, No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness
according to Wis. 14:9, "To God the wicked and his wickedness are
hateful alike." Now it is written (Rom. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.:
'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God." Therefore prudence of the
flesh is a sin.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[13]), prudence regards things
which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence prudence of the
flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal
goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a
sin, because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last
end, which does not consist in the goods of the body, as stated above
([2822]FS, Q[2], A[5]). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice and temperance include in their very
nature that which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the
curbing of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. On
the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing [providendo], as
stated above ([2823]Q[47], A[1];[2824] Q[49], A[6]), which can extend
to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken simply in a
good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken in a bad sense:
and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is
on account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal
agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good
of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in a good
of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it is thus
that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 3: The devil tempts us, not through the good of the
appetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence
implies direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence
of the devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is the
aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as
worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak of
"carnal" and again of "worldly" prudence, according to Lk. 16:8, "The
children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their
generation," etc. The Apostle includes all in the "prudence of the
flesh," because we covet the external things of the world on account of
the flesh.
We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called
"wisdom," as stated above ([2825]Q[47], A[2], ad 1), we may distinguish
a threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation.
Hence it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is
"earthly, sensual and devilish," as explained above ([2826]Q[45], A[1],
ad 1), when we were treating of wisdom.
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Whether prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since this
implies contempt of God. Now "the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the
flesh . . . is not subject to the law of God" (Rom. 8:7). Therefore
prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin.
Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for
"it cannot be subject to the law of God" (Rom. 8:7), and so it seems to
be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the Holy
Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest
good, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is
opposed to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues.
Therefore prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it
is itself a mortal sin.
On the contrary, That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the
nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining
to the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence,
diminishes sin [*Cf. Prov. 6:30]. Therefore prudence of the flesh has
not of itself the nature of a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[2], ad 1; A[13]), a man is
said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to the
end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to some
particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or
something else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be
taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so
that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the
flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so doing,
since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above ([2827]FS,
Q[1], A[5]).
If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding
to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it happens sometimes
that a man has an inordinate affection for some pleasure of the flesh,
without turning away from God by a mortal sin; in which case he does
not place the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply
oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to
prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers the care of the
flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about one's food in order
to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence of the flesh, because
then one uses the care of the flesh as a means to an end.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence
whereby a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the
flesh, and this is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin
against the Holy Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be
subject to the law of God," this does not mean that he who has prudence
of the flesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but
that carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God's law, even as
neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is
hot may become cold.
Reply to Objection 3: Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as
prudence is shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every
sin opposed to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to
prudence in some very grave matter.
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Whether craftiness is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For
the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they induce
us to be crafty, according to Prov. 1:4, "To give craftiness [Douay:
'subtlety'] to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 13:16): "The crafty [Douay:
'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so
either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no
sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to
carnal or worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin
distinct from prudence of the flesh.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, "The
simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29):
"The wisdom of this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to
conceal one's meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make
out the truth to be false," and further on he adds: "This prudence is
acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the
above things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not
distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems not
to be a special sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 4:2): "We renounce the hidden
things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the
word of God." Therefore craftiness is a sin.
I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," just as
science is "right reason applied to knowledge." In speculative matters
one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when
the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be true; in
another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, that appear
to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion. Even so a sin
may be against prudence, through having some resemblance thereto, in
two ways. First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end
which is good not in truth but in appearance, and this pertains to
prudence of the flesh; secondly, when, in order to obtain a certain
end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but
fictitious and counterfeit, and this belongs to the sin of craftiness.
This is consequently a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from
prudence of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just
as prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is
craftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of
their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is
taken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. vi, 12.
Reply to Objection 2: Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end
and for an evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are
false and counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a
sin if it be directed to a good end.
Reply to Objection 3: Under "worldly prudence" Gregory included
everything that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises
craftiness also.
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Whether guile is a sin pertaining to craftiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to
craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men.
Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Cor. 12:16,
"Being crafty I caught you by guile." Therefore guile is not always a
sin.
Objection 2: Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue,
according to Ps. 5:11, "They dealt deceitfully with their tongues." Now
craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore guile
does not pertain to craftiness.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:20): "Guile [Douay:
'Deceit'] is in the heart of them that think evil things." But the
thought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness. Therefore
guile does not seem to belong to craftiness.
On the contrary, Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to Eph.
4:14, "By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive": and
guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to craftiness.
I answer that, As stated above [2828](A[3]), it belongs to craftiness
to adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in
order to attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of such
ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the
process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly to craftiness,
even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs to prudence.
Secondly the adopting of such like ways may be considered with regard
to their actual execution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence
guile denotes a certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly
belongs thereto.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad
sense, and improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the
execution of craftiness.
Reply to Objection 2: The execution of craftiness with the purpose of
deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the
chief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to
another man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence guile
is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in deeds,
according to Ps. 104:25, "And to deal deceitfully with his servants."
Guile is also in the heart, according to Ecclus. 19:23, "His interior
is full of deceit," but this is to devise deceits, according to Ps.
37:13: "They studied deceits all the day long."
Reply to Objection 3: Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs
devise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part he
devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end.
Nevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by
violence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult,
it is of less frequent occurrence.
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Whether fraud pertains to craftiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness.
For a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be deceived,
which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves praise for
allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Cor. 6:1, "Why do you
not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore fraud does not
belong to craftiness.
Objection 2: Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or
receiving external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that "a certain
man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by
fraud kept back part of the price of the land." Now it pertains to
injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain external
things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness which is
opposed to prudence.
Objection 3: Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But
the frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Prov.
1:18) concerning some "that they practice frauds [Douay: 'deceits']
against their own souls." Therefore fraud does not belong to
craftiness.
On the contrary, The object of fraud is to deceive, according to Job
13:9, "Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent [Douay:
'deceitful'] dealings?" Now craftiness is directed to the same object.
Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness.
I answer that, Just as "guile" consists in the execution of craftiness,
so also does "fraud." But they seem to differ in the fact that "guile"
belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, whether this be
effected by words, or by deeds, whereas "fraud" belongs more properly
to the execution of craftiness by deeds.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be
deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of being
deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.
Reply to Objection 2: The execution of craftiness may be carried out by
another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and
accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or
illiberality.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who commit frauds, do not design anything
against themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just
judgment that what they plot against others, recoils on themselves,
according to Ps. 7:16, "He is fallen into the hole he made."
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Whether it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal
matters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects,
according to Rom. 12:8, "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now
according to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things,
according to Ps. 8:8, "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet,"
etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things.
Objection 2: Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he
works. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things
whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10):
"If any man will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is lawful
to be solicitous about temporal things.
Objection 3: Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy,
according to 2 Tim. 1:17, "When he was come to Rome, he carefully
sought me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes connected
with works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch
over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore solicitude
about temporal things is not unlawful.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 6:31): "Be not solicitous . . .
saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall
we be clothed?" And yet such things are very necessary.
I answer that, Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain
something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when
there is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when success
is assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may be
unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude;
that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says (De
Operibus Monach. xxvi): "When Our Lord said: 'Be not solicitous,' etc.
. . . He intended to forbid them either to make such things their end,
or for the sake of these things to do whatever they were commanded to
do in preaching the Gospel." Secondly, solicitude about temporal things
may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain
temporal things, the result being that a man is drawn away from
spiritual things which ought to be the chief object of his search,
wherefore it is written (Mat. 13:22) that "the care of this world . . .
chokes up the word." Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a
man fears to lack necessary things if he do what he ought to do. Now
our Lord gives three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on
account of the yet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently
of his solicitude, viz. his body and soul (Mat. 6:26); secondly, on
account of the care with which God watches over animals and plants
without the assistance of man, according to the requirements of their
nature; thirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of
which the gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all
others. Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of
all about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be
granted us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do.
Reply to Objection 1: Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may
use them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them
and be over solicitous about them.
Reply to Objection 2: The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by
bodily labor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on
Mat. 6:31, "Be not solicitous," that "labor is necessary, but
solicitude must be banished," namely superfluous solicitude which
unsettles the mind.
Reply to Objection 3: In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal
things is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful,
unless it be superfluous.
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Whether we should be solicitous about the future?
Objection 1: It would seem that we should be solicitous about the
future. For it is written (Prov. 6:6-8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard,
and consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no
guide, nor master . . . provideth her meat for herself in the summer,
and gathereth her food in the harvest." Now this is to be solicitous
about the future. Therefore solicitude about the future is
praiseworthy.
Objection 2: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is
chiefly about the future, since its principal part is "foresight of
future things," as stated above ([2829]Q[49], A[6], ad 1). Therefore it
is virtuous to be solicitous about the future.
Objection 3: Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for
the morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (Jn. 12:6) that
Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and (Acts
4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had been
laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about the
future.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 6:34): "Be not . . . solicitous
for tomorrow"; where "tomorrow" stands for the future, as Jerome says
in his commentary on this passage.
I answer that, No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with its
due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to
Eccles. 8:6, "There is a time and opportunity for every business";
which applies not only to external deeds but also to internal
solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus
solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and solicitude
about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly if a man were
solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be needlessly
forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time. Hence Our Lord
forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying: "Be . . . not
solicitous for tomorrow," wherefore He adds, "for the morrow will be
solicitous for itself," that is to say, the morrow will have its own
solicitude, which will be burden enough for the soul. This is what He
means by adding: "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof," namely,
the burden of solicitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it
is this that is proposed for our example.
Reply to Objection 2: Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence.
But it would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future,
if a man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms "past" and
"future" apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the
needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for
solicitude.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
17), "when we see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these
needful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow,
since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, and we
read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the necessary means
of livelihood in view of the future on account of a threatened famine.
Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who according to human custom,
provide themselves with such things, but those who oppose themselves to
God for the sake of these things."
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Whether these vices arise from covetousness?
Objection 1: It would seem that these vices do not arise from
covetousness. As stated above ([2830]Q[43], A[6]) lust is the chief
cause of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed
to right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from
lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "Venus
is full of guile and her girdle is many colored" and that "he who is
incontinent in desire acts with cunning."
Objection 2: Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to
prudence, as stated above ([2831]Q[47], A[13]). Now, since prudence is
in the reason, the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto,
such as pride and vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to
arise from pride rather than from covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying
hold of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former
of which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use
of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the
aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a
daughter of covetousness.
I answer that, As stated above [2832](A[3]; Q[47], A[13]), carnal
prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain
resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among
all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason
appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the
undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice,
the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise
chiefly from covetousness.
Reply to Objection 1: On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of
concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its
act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit
inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. When the
Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is referring to a
certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away suddenly, just
as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means of craftiness but
rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure; wherefore he
adds that "Venus doth cozen the wits of the wisest man" [*Cf. Iliad
xiv, 214-217].
Reply to Objection 2: To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to
pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes
magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use of
fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from
covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by excellence.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with
precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the
aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use
stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from
hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2,3) [*Cf. Ethic. vii, 6].
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OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which
head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) The precepts of prudence;
(2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of
prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue should
have included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts should
include a precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are those
of the decalogue. Since then prudence is the chief of the moral
virtues, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have
included a precept of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the teaching of the Gospel contains the Law
especially with regard to the precepts of the decalogue. Now the
teaching of the Gospel contains a precept of prudence (Mat. 10:16): "Be
ye . . . prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents." Therefore the precepts
of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, the other lessons of the Old Testament are
directed to the precepts of the decalogue: wherefore it is written
(Malach. 4:4): "Remember the law of Moses My servant, which I commanded
him in Horeb." Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include
precepts of prudence; for instance (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not upon thy own
prudence"; and further on (Prov. 4:25): "Let thine eyelids go before
thy steps." Therefore the Law also should have contained a precept of
prudence, especially among the precepts of the decalogue.
The contrary however appears to anyone who goes through the precepts of
the decalogue.
I answer that, As stated above ([2833]FS, Q[100], A[3]; A[5], ad 1)
when we were treating of precepts, the commandments of the decalogue
being given to the whole people, are a matter of common knowledge to
all, as coming under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost among
the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of human life, which
are to the practical order what naturally known principles are to the
speculative order, as shown above (Q[47], A[6]). Now prudence is not
about the end, but about the means, as stated above (Q[47], A[6]).
Hence it was not fitting that the precepts of the decalogue should
include a precept relating directly to prudence. And yet all the
precepts of the decalogue are related to prudence, in so far as it
directs all virtuous acts.
Reply to Objection 1: Although prudence is simply foremost among all
the moral virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its
object under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary
condition for a precept, as stated above (Q[44], A[1]; [2834]FS, Q[99],
AA[1],5). Hence it behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which are
those of the decalogue, to refer to justice rather than to prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of
perfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all
matters relating to right conduct, whether ends or means: wherefore it
behooved the Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old
Testament is directed to the precepts of the decalogue as its end, so
it behooved man to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old
Testament about the act of prudence which is directed to the means.
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Whether the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence
are fittingly propounded in the Old Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the prohibitive precepts relating to
the vices opposed to prudence are unfittingly propounded in the Old
Law. For such vices as imprudence and its parts which are directly
opposed to prudence are not less opposed thereto, than those which bear
a certain resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and vices
connected with it. Now the latter vices are forbidden in the Law: for
it is written (Lev. 19:13): "Thou shalt not calumniate thy neighbor,"
and (Dt. 25:13): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a
greater and a less." Therefore there should have also been prohibitive
precepts about the vices directly opposed to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in
buying and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud solely
in buying and selling.
Objection 3: Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act
of virtue as for prohibiting the act of a contrary vice. But acts of
prudence are not prescribed in the Law. Therefore neither should any
contrary vices have been forbidden in the Law.
The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of the Law which are
quoted in the first objection.
I answer that, As stated above [2835](A[1]), justice, above all,
regards the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for
a precept, because justice tends to render that which is due to
another, as we shall state further on (Q[58], A[2]). Now craftiness, as
to its execution, is committed chiefly in matters of justice, as stated
above (Q[55], A[8]): and so it was fitting that the Law should contain
precepts forbidding the execution of craftiness, in so far as this
pertains to injustice, as when a man uses guile and fraud in
calumniating another or in stealing his goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Those vices that are manifestly opposed to
prudence, do not pertain to injustice in the same way as the execution
of craftiness, and so they are not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and
guile are, which latter pertain to injustice
Reply to Objection 2: All guile and fraud committed in matters of
injustice, can be understood to be forbidden in the prohibition of
calumny (Lev. 19:13). Yet fraud and guile are wont to be practiced
chiefly in buying and selling, according to Ecclus. 26:28, "A huckster
shall not be justified from the sins of the lips": and it is for this
reason that the Law contained a special precept forbidding fraudulent
buying and selling.
Reply to Objection 3: All the precepts of the Law that relate to acts
of justice pertain to the execution of prudence, even as the precepts
prohibitive of stealing, calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to the
execution of craftiness.
__________________________________________________________________
OF RIGHT (FOUR ARTICLES)
After considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice,
the consideration of which will be fourfold:
(1) Of justice;
(2) Of its parts;
(3) Of the corresponding gift;
(4) Of the precepts relating to justice.
Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2)
Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether right is the object of justice?
(2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive right?
(3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right?
(4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species?
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Whether right is the object of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice. For
the jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that "right
is the art of goodness and equality." Now art is not the object of
justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore right is
not the object of justice.
Objection 2: Further, "Law," according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), "is a
kind of right." Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence,
wherefore the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons "legislative" as one
of the parts of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of justice.
Objection 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving God
alone, and consequently governing aright all things subject to man."
Now right [jus] does not pertain to Divine things, but only to human
affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "'fas' is the Divine law,
and 'jus,' the human law." Therefore right is not the object of
justice.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "'jus' [right] is so
called because it is just." Now the "just" is the object of justice,
for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "all are agreed in
giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men capable of
doing just actions."
I answer that, It is proper to justice, as compared with the other
virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it denotes
a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say
that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in
reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other
virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit him in relation
to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the works of the other
virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue tends as to its
proper object, depends on its relation to the agent only, whereas the
right in a work of justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set
up by its relation to others. Because a man's work is said to be just
when it is related to some other by way of some kind of equality, for
instance the payment of the wage due for a service rendered. And so a
thing is said to be just, as having the rectitude of justice, when it
is the term of an act of justice, without taking into account the way
in which it is done by the agent: whereas in the other virtues nothing
is declared to be right unless it is done in a certain way by the
agent. For this reason justice has its own special proper object over
and above the other virtues, and this object is called the just, which
is the same as "right." Hence it is evident that right is the object of
justice.
Reply to Objection 1: It is usual for words to be distorted from their
original signification so as to mean something else: thus the word
"medicine" was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a
sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this is
done. In like manner the word "jus" [right] was first of all used to
denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to
designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to
denote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to
appear "in jure" [*In English we speak of a court of law, a barrister
at law, etc.], and yet further, we say even that a man, who has the
office of exercising justice, administers the jus even if his sentence
be unjust.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the
craftsman an expression of the things to be made externally by his
craft, which expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there
pre-exists in the mind an expression of the particular just work which
the reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this
rule be expressed in writing it is called a "law," which according to
Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is "a written decree": and so law is not the same
as right, but an expression of right.
Reply to Objection 3: Since justice implies equality, and since we
cannot offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a
perfectly just repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not
properly called "jus" but "fas," because, to wit, God is satisfied if
we accomplish what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man repay
God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether right is fittingly divided into natural right and positive right?
Objection 1: It would seem that right is not fittingly divided into
natural right and positive right. For that which is natural is
unchangeable, and is the same for all. Now nothing of the kind is to be
found in human affairs, since all the rules of human right fail in
certain cases, nor do they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there is
no such thing as natural right.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is called "positive" when it proceeds
from the human will. But a thing is not just, simply because it
proceeds from the human will, else a man's will could not be unjust.
Since then the "just" and the "right" are the same, it seems that there
is no positive right.
Objection 3: Further, Divine right is not natural right, since it
transcends human nature. In like manner, neither is it positive right,
since it is based not on human, but on Divine authority. Therefore
right is unfittingly divided into natural and positive.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "political
justice is partly natural and partly legal," i.e. established by law.
I answer that, As stated above [2836](A[1]) the "right" or the "just"
is a work that is adjusted to another person according to some kind of
equality. Now a thing can be adjusted to a man in two ways: first by
its very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive equal
value in return, and this is called "natural right." In another way a
thing is adjusted or commensurated to another person, by agreement, or
by common consent, when, to wit, a man deems himself satisfied, if he
receive so much. This can be done in two ways: first by private
agreement, as that which is confirmed by an agreement between private
individuals; secondly, by public agreement, as when the whole community
agrees that something should be deemed as though it were adjusted and
commensurated to another person, or when this is decreed by the prince
who is placed over the people, and acts in its stead, and this is
called "positive right."
Reply to Objection 1: That which is natural to one whose nature is
unchangeable, must needs be such always and everywhere. But man's
nature is changeable, wherefore that which is natural to man may
sometimes fail. Thus the restitution of a deposit to the depositor is
in accordance with natural equality, and if human nature were always
right, this would always have to be observed; but since it happens
sometimes that man's will is unrighteous there are cases in which a
deposit should not be restored, lest a man of unrighteous will make
evil use of the thing deposited: as when a madman or an enemy of the
common weal demands the return of his weapons.
Reply to Objection 2: The human will can, by common agreement, make a
thing to be just provided it be not, of itself, contrary to natural
justice, and it is in such matters that positive right has its place.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "in the case of the legal
just, it does not matter in the first instance whether it takes one
form or another, it only matters when once it is laid down." If,
however, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the human
will cannot make it just, for instance by decreeing that it is lawful
to steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is written (Is. 10:1): "Woe to
them that make wicked laws."
Reply to Objection 3: The Divine right is that which is promulgated by
God. Such things are partly those that are naturally just, yet their
justice is hidden to man, and partly are made just by God's decree.
Hence also Divine right may be divided in respect of these two things,
even as human right is. For the Divine law commands certain things
because they are good, and forbids others, because they are evil, while
others are good because they are prescribed, and others evil because
they are forbidden.
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Whether the right of nations is the same as the natural right?
Objection 1: It would seem that the right of nations is the same as the
natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is natural
to them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the jurist
[*Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] "the right of nations is
that which is in use among all nations." Therefore the right of nations
is the natural right.
Objection 2: Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are
naturally slaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2). Now
"slavery belongs to the right of nations," as Isidore states (Etym. v,
4). Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.
Objection 3: Further, right as stated above [2837](A[2]) is divided
into natural and positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive
right, since all nations never agreed to decree anything by common
agreement. Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that "right is either
natural, or civil, or right of nations," and consequently the right of
nations is distinct from natural right.
I answer that, As stated above [2838](A[2]), the natural right or just
is that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with
another person. Now this may happen in two ways; first, according as it
is considered absolutely: thus a male by its very nature is
commensurate with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent is
commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is
naturally commensurate with another person, not according as it is
considered absolutely, but according to something resultant from it,
for instance the possession of property. For if a particular piece of
land be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should
belong to one man more than to another, but if it be considered in
respect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of
the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one and
not of another man, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii, 2).
Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend a
thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is common
to us and other animals according to the first kind of commensuration.
But the right of nations falls short of natural right in this sense, as
the jurist [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says because "the latter
is common to all animals, while the former is common to men only." On
the other hand to consider a thing by comparing it with what results
from it, is proper to reason, wherefore this same is natural to man in
respect of natural reason which dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius
says (Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i, 9): "whatever natural reason
decrees among all men, is observed by all equally, and is called the
right of nations." This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Considered absolutely, the fact that this
particular man should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not
on natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful
to this man to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be helped
by the former, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). Wherefore
slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in the second
way, but not in the first.
Reply to Objection 3: Since natural reason dictates matters which are
according to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality, it
follows that they need no special institution, for they are instituted
by natural reason itself, as stated by the authority quoted above
__________________________________________________________________
Whether paternal right and right of dominion should be distinguished as
special species?
Objection 1: It would seem that "paternal right" and "right of
dominion" should not be distinguished as special species. For it
belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose states
(De Offic. i, 24). Now right is the object of justice, as stated above
[2839](A[1]). Therefore right belongs to each one equally; and we ought
not to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as distinct
species.
Objection 2: Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as
stated above (A[1], ad 2). Now a law looks to the common good of a city
or kingdom, as stated above ([2840]FS, Q[90], A[2]), but not to the
private good of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there
is no need for a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the
master and the father pertain to a household, as stated in Polit. i, 2.
Objection 3: Further, there are many other differences of degrees among
men, for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are
princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to
them.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes right of
dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from civil
right.
I answer that, Right or just depends on commensuration with another
person. Now "another" has a twofold signification. First, it may denote
something that is other simply, as that which is altogether distinct;
as, for example, two men neither of whom is subject to the other, and
both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and between these
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is the "just" simply.
Secondly a thing is said to be other from something else, not simply,
but as belonging in some way to that something else: and in this way,
as regards human affairs, a son belongs to his father, since he is part
of him somewhat, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12, and a slave belongs to
his master, because he is his instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 2
[*Cf. Ethic. viii, 11]. Hence a father is not compared to his son as to
another simply, and so between them there is not the just simply, but a
kind of just, called "paternal." In like manner neither is there the
just simply, between master and servant, but that which is called
"dominative." A wife, though she is something belonging to the husband,
since she stands related to him as to her own body, as the Apostle
declares (Eph. 5:28), is nevertheless more distinct from her husband,
than a son from his father, or a slave from his master: for she is
received into a kind of social life, that of matrimony, wherefore
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for
justice between husband and wife than between father and son, or master
and slave, because, as husband and wife have an immediate relation to
the community of the household, as stated in Polit. i, 2,5, it follows
that between them there is "domestic justice" rather than "civic."
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to justice to render to each one his
right, the distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a
man gives himself his due, this is not strictly called "just." And
since what belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs to the
slave is his master's, it follows that properly speaking there is not
justice of father to son, or of master to slave.
Reply to Objection 2: A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a
slave, as such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man,
is something having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence
in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in a
way: and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the
relations of father to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in so
far as each is something belonging to another, the perfect idea of
"right" or "just" is wanting to them.
Reply to Objection 3: All other differences between one person and
another in a state, have an immediate relation to the community of the
state and to its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the
perfect sense of justice. This "just" however is distinguished
according to various offices, hence when we speak of "military," or
"magisterial," or "priestly" right, it is not as though such rights
fell short of the simply right, as when we speak of "paternal" right,
or right of "dominion," but for the reason that something proper is due
to each class of person in respect of his particular office.
__________________________________________________________________
OF JUSTICE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points
of inquiry:
(1) What is justice?
(2) Whether justice is always towards another?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is in the will as its subject?
(5) Whether it is a general virtue?
(6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every
virtue?
(7) Whether there is a particular justice?
(8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own?
(9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only?
(10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?
(11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own?
(12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant
will to render to each one his right?
Objection 1: It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined
justice as being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each one
his right" [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a man
"capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and in
intention." Now "will" denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore
justice is unfittingly defined as being a will.
Objection 2: Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if
the will were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is
unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is
rectitude. Therefore justice is not the will.
Objection 3: Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore
justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is
unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say that
it is both "perpetual" and "constant."
Objection 5: Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his
right. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows that
it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that
"justice is love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to
each one his right.
I answer that, The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if
understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the
principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the
good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the proper
matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our
intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on [2841](A[2]).
Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is
indicated in the words, "Rendering to each one his right," since, as
Isidore says (Etym. x), "a man is said to be just because he respects
the rights [jus] of others."
Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous,
it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs
first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be done "by choice,"
and "for a due end," thirdly to be done "immovably." Now the first of
these is included in the second, since "what is done through ignorance
is involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1). Hence the definition of justice
mentions first the "will," in order to show that the act of justice
must be voluntary; and mention is made afterwards of its "constancy"
and "perpetuity" in order to indicate the firmness of the act.
Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the
act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from
that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would
reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that
"justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a
constant and perpetual will": and this is about the same definition as
that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice is a
habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions in
accordance with his choice."
Reply to Objection 1: Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it
is customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus
Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that "faith is to believe what one
sees not."
Reply to Objection 2: Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially
but causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.
Reply to Objection 3: The will may be called perpetual in two ways.
First on the part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus
God's will alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject,
because, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always. and this is
a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the
conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some
particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find a
man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that one
should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all cases.
Reply to Objection 4: Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of
the act of the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while
the "perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always,
"constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.
Reply to Objection 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him,
by way of command and direction, because a judge is the
"personification of justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian"
(Ethic. v, 4). On the other hand, the subjects render to each one what
belongs to him, by way of execution.
Reply to Objection 6: Just as love of God includes love of our
neighbor, as stated above ([2842]Q[25], A[1]), so too the service of
God includes rendering to each one his due.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether justice is always towards one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards another.
For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that "the justice of God is by faith
of Jesus Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of one man
with another. Neither therefore does justice.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it
belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his
authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive
appetite is subject to man, according to Gn. 4:7, where it is written:
"The lust thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and thou shalt
have dominion over it." Therefore it belongs to justice to have
dominion over one's own appetite: so that justice is towards oneself.
Objection 3: Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else
is co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards
another.
Objection 4: Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified
no less than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are
rectified by justice, according to Prov. 11:5, "The justice of the
upright shall make his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our
dealings not only with others, but also with ourselves.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of
justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse." Now
this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore justice is
concerned only about our dealings with others.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[57], A[1]) since justice by its name
implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for a
thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it
belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q[57], A[1];
[2843]FS, Q[113], A[1]) this otherness which justice demands must needs
be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits
[*Cf. [2844]FP, Q[29], A[2]] and wholes and, properly speaking, not to
parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the hand
strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but
fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically.
Hence, justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits,
and consequently is only in one man towards another. Nevertheless in
one and the same man we may speak metaphorically of his various
principles of action such as the reason, the irascible, and the
concupiscible, as though they were so many agents: so that
metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to be justice in
so far as the reason commands the irascible and concupiscible, and
these obey reason; and in general in so far as to each part of man is
ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11)
calls this "metaphorical justice."
Reply to Objection 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that
whereby the ungodly is justified it consists in the due coordination of
the parts of the soul, as stated above ([2845]FS, Q[113], A[1]) where
we were treating of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs
to metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all
by himself.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: God's justice is from eternity in respect of the
eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice
consists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since
nothing is co-eternal with God.
Reply to Objection 4: Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently
rectified by the rectification of the passions by the other moral
virtues. But his dealings with others need a special rectification, not
only in relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to
whom they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special
virtue, and this is justice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether justice is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is
written (Lk. 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that
are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that
which we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous
deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a profit that
is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of
godliness." Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a virtuous
deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not
meritorious. But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice
requires, is of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is
by virtuous actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action.
Now those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning
behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to
justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems
that justice is not a moral virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire
structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance,
prudence, fortitude and justice
I answer that, A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and man
himself good" [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice. For
a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is
the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice
regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man's
operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men
are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says again
(De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all in justice."
Reply to Objection 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain
to the person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from
doing him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does
what he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act
virtuously. Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in
life."
Reply to Objection 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from
"constraint," and this removes merit, since it runs counter to the
will. The other arises from the obligation of a "command," or from the
necessity of obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve
the end of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter
necessity does not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which
is necessary in this way. It does however exclude the credit of
supererogation, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it
is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me."
Reply to Objection 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not
by making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our
dealings with other men.
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Whether justice is in the will as its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its
subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in the
will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will as its
subject.
Objection 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it
belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another.
Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.
Objection 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it
is not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral
virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is
"rational by participation," viz. the irascible and the concupiscible,
as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in
the will as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible.
On the contrary, Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is rectitude
of the will observed for its own sake."
I answer that, The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that
virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act
of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing
something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or
reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just
through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of
action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in some
appetitive power as its subject.
Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason
and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension, and
is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in the
[2846]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Again the act of rendering his due to each man
cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive
apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation
of one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore
justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but
only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice
by an act of the will, as may be seen above [2847](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Since the will is the rational appetite, when the
rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will
on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name
of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of
truth.
Reply to Objection 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently
on the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one
thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation
to another, and this belongs to justice.
Reply to Objection 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts
are "rational by participation," but the entire "appetitive" faculty,
as stated in Ethic. i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason.
Now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can
be the subject of moral virtue.
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Whether justice is a general virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For
justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7,
"She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now
the "general" is not specified or reckoned together with the species
contained under the same "general." Therefore justice is not a general
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are
temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is
reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in
any way be reckoned a general virtue.
Objection 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above
(A[2] ). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a general
sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself.
Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is
every virtue."
I answer that, Justice, as stated above [2848](A[2]) directs man in his
relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as
regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his
relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a
community, serves all those who are included in that community.
Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to
another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are
included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts
to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever
is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It
follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue
direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other
individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice
directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far
as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice
is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct
to the common good, as stated above ([2849]FS, Q[90], A[2]), it follows
that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal
justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs
the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other
virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state
further on ([2850]AA[7],12).
Reply to Objection 2: Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive
appetite, viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are
appetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are
cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the
intellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal good
as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence
justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude.
Reply to Objection 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to
another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal
justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a
general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general
sin; hence it is written (1 Jn. 3:4) that all "sin is iniquity."
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Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue
?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is
essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
1) that "virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but
differ in their mode of being." Now things that differ merely in their
mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice
is essentially the same as every virtue.
Objection 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as
all virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of virtue."
Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through
that virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of
temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be directed
to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all
the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the common good of the
multitude, which transcends the good of one single individual.
Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all virtue.
Objection 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good
of the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without
use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be
so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that
does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good;
and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all
virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are able
to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be
virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2) that "the
virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the
good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice,
whereby a man Is directed to the common good. Therefore general justice
is not the same as virtue in general, and it is possible to have one
without the other.
I answer that, A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First, by
"predication": thus "animal" is general in relation to man and horse
and the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be
essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general,
for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species,
and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said to be
general "virtually"; thus a universal cause is general in relation to
all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that
are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in this sense there is
no need for that which is "general" to be essentially the same as those
things in relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are
not essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according
to what has been said [2851](A[5]), legal justice is said to be a
general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other
virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by
its command; for just as charity may be called a general virtue in so
far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so
too is legal justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the
virtues to the common good. Accordingly, just as charity which regards
the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in respect of
its essence, so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its
essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object.
And thus it is in the sovereign principally and by way of a
mastercraft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his
subjects.
However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so
far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid
legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless
virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially
the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in
this sense that the Philosopher speaks.
Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the
virtue commanded by legal justice.
Reply to Objection 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act to
that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a
further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue
considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to
that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially
distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the
common good; and this virtue is legal justice.
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Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a
general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as
neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man
sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is no
need for a particular justice.
Objection 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according
to "one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in
matters relating to the multitude, as shown above ([2852]AA[5],6).
Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man to
another in matters relating to the individual.
Objection 3: Further, between the individual and the general public
stands the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general
justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual,
for the same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to
the common good of a household: and yet this is not the case. Therefore
neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice.
On the contrary, Chrysostom in his commentary on Mat. 5:6, "Blessed are
they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. xv in Matth.):
"By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular
virtue which is opposed to covetousness."
I answer that, As stated above [2853](A[6]), legal justice is not
essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which
directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other
virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular
goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another
individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice
there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to
himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice
there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to
other individuals.
Reply to Objection 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently
in his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so
immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so
mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a
man immediately to the good of another individual.
Reply to Objection 2: The common good of the realm and the particular
good of the individual differ not only in respect of the "many" and the
"few," but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the "common"
good differs from the aspect of the "individual" good, even as the
aspect of "whole" differs from that of "part." Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who maintain that
the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and not
specifically."
Reply to Objection 3: The household community, according to the
Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold
fellowship; namely "of husband and wife, father and son, master and
slave," in each of which one person is, as it were, part of the other.
Wherefore between such persons there is not justice simply, but a
species of justice, viz. "domestic" justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 6.
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Whether particular justice has a special matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special
matter. Because a gloss on Gn. 2:14, "The fourth river is Euphrates,"
says: "Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated through what
country it flows, because justice pertains to all the parts of the
soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice had a special matter,
since every special matter belongs to a special power. Therefore
particular justice has no special matter.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the
soul has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz.
temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;" and he says that "the
fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." Therefore
particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no
special matter.
Objection 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters
relating to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters
relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and
not special.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular
justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life.
I answer that, Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of
moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify
not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external actions,
and also those external things of which man can make use. And yet it is
in respect of external actions and external things by means of which
men can communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to
another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal
passions that we consider man's rectitude in himself. Consequently,
since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter
of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, under a
certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related
to another through them.
Reply to Objection 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to
one part of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is
the will which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul;
and accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not
directly but by a kind of diffusion.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2854]FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), the
cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues,
each having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of
virtue. In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted:
for he says that "prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and
avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures,
fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice
is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues,
that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between one
man and another."
Reply to Objection 3: A man's internal passions which are a part of
moral matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which
belongs to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e.
external actions, are capable of being directed to another man.
Consequently it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether justice is about the passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is about the passions. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about pleasure
and pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, as stated
above [*[2855]FS, Q[23], A[4]; [2856]FS, Q[31], A[1]; [2857]FS, Q[35],
A[1]] when we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a
moral virtue, is about the passions.
Objection 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's
operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot
be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is owing to
disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the aforesaid
operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of
money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the
passions.
Objection 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another
person so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions,
else it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are
evidently about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is
about operations.
I answer that, The true answer to this question may be gathered from a
twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will,
whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above ([2858]FS,
Q[22], A[3]; [2859]FS, Q[59], A[4]), for it is only the sensitive
appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not
about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the
irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter,
because justice is about man's relations with another, and we are not
directed immediately to another by the internal passions. Therefore
justice is not about the passions.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain
as its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but
every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be
acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure and
pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an
evil, and that a good": and in this way too they belong to justice,
since "a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions" (Ethic. i,
8).
Reply to Objection 2: External operations are as it were between
external things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which
are their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in
one of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may
steal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing, but
through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet
another's property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the
directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external things,
belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the passions, it
belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the passions. Hence
justice hinders theft of another's property, in so far as stealing is
contrary to the, equality that should be maintained in external things,
while liberality hinders it as resulting from an immoderate desire for
wealth. Since, however, external operations take their species, not
from the internal passions but from external things as being their
objects, it follows that, external operations are essentially the
matter of justice rather than of the other moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: The common good is the end of each individual
member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each
part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end of
another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to the
common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions
whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than
particular justice which is directed to the good of another individual:
although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of
their external operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law commands us
to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the actions of a
temperate person . . . and the actions of a gentle person" (Ethic. v,
5).
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Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real
mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now moral
virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which
observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice
observes the rational and not the real mean.
Objection 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither
excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is
clearly the case with the virtues, according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now
justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in Ethic. v.
Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.
Objection 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to
observe the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case
the mean varies according to different persons, since what is too much
for one is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the
case in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same
punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice
also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the
mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical" proportion,
so that it is the real mean.
I answer that, As stated above [2860](A[9]; [2861]FS, Q[59], A[4]), the
other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the
regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very
man who is the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and
desire are vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean
in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to
another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so
that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our
regard.
On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so
far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly
proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists
in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the
external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and
less, as stated in Metaph. x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4]:
wherefore justice observes the real mean.
Reply to Objection 1: This real mean is also the rational mean,
wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two
ways. First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are
good; and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good
simply in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply
through being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may
become evil through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in
the like it is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards
men who can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice
is about things that are good simply.
Reply to Objection 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion
to a prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore
each injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way:
and this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.
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Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render to
each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice
the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them
what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice does not
consist in rendering to each one his own.
Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence
which we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice." Now it
pertains to liberality to give to another of one's own, not of what is
his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each
one his own.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute
things duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder,
adultery and so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his
seems to belong solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act
of justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in
rendering to each one his own.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "It is justice that
renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's property; it
disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity."
I answer that, As stated above ([2862]AA[8],10), the matter of justice
is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by
it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by
justice. Now each man's own is that which is due to him according to
equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is nothing
else than to render to each one his own.
Reply to Objection 1: Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other
secondary virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected
with it, as we shall state further on ([2863]Q[80], A[1]). Wherefore to
succor the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally
beneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction
ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in
matters of justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is
excessive, and whatever is deficient is called "loss." The reason for
this is that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in
voluntary interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein
those expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred
to all other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to
each one of what is his own.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among
all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to each
one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of one's own,
and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue
than justice.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than
itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all the
virtues, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more
excellent than justice.
Objection 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and
"good," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But fortitude is about more
difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death,
according to Ethic. iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent than
justice.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most
resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man."
I answer that, If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it
stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common
good transcends the individual good of one person. In this sense the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent of the
virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the
evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of particular
justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first
reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more
excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas
the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto
appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral virtues.
The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues
are commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person
himself, whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous
person being well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat
the good of another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be
those which are most profitable to other persons, because virtue is a
faculty of doing good to others. For this reason the greatest honors
are accorded the brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others
in warfare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time
of peace."
Reply to Objection 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he
does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own
virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through
consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards
all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which
gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each
man what is his.
Reply to Objection 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases
the latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a
virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult
things, it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare,
whereas justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF INJUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether injustice is a special vice?
(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?
(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?
(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether injustice is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it
is written (1 Jn. 3:4): "All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'Whosoever
committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity']." Now
iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a
kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as
inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues.
But injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery
it is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness,
and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is
not a special sin.
Objection 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the
will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus
Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
On the contrary, Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a
special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.
I answer that, Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice
which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special
vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good
which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as regards the
intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of
sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the common good, have
the character of injustice, as though they arose from injustice, in
accord with what has been said above about justice ([2864]Q[58],
AA[5],6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an inequality
between one person and another, when one man wishes to have more goods,
riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses,
and thus injustice has a special matter and is a particular vice
opposed to particular justice.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as legal justice is referred to human common
good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to which all
sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity.
Reply to Objection 2: Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to
all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both
to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways
as stated above ([2865]Q[58], A[9], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: The will, like the reason, extends to all moral
matters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to
another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in
the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and
the same applies to injustice.
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Whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing an
unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated
above ([2866]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the proper object of justice is the
just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man
should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through
doing an unjust thing.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they
hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do
suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of
doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be
false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust.
Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an
unjust thing.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its
proper act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever
does what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever
does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may do
an unjust thing without being unjust."
I answer that, Even as the object of justice is something equal in
external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal,
through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him.
To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of its
proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in
two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on
account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and its
proper object. For the operation takes its species and name from its
direct and not from its indirect object: and in things directed to an
end the direct is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is
beside the intention. Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without
intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he do it through
ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, properly speaking he does
an unjust thing, not directly, but only indirectly, and, as it were,
doing materially that which is unjust: hence such an operation is not
called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack of
proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may
sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and
sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the
direct object of one's complacency. In the latter case properly
speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit,
whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly,
to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the
unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of
injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through
passion, without having the habit of injustice.
Reply to Objection 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct
and formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing
from choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for
the sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).
Reply to Objection 3: The object of temperance is not something
established externally, as is the object of justice: the object of
temperance, i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to
the man himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional
cannot be said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like
manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there
is dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as
regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is similarity
in all respects.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For
injustice is inequality, as stated above [2867](A[2]). Now a man by
injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another.
Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. But
whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a
man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by
himself.
Objection 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for
having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished
according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable
burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can
do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man
suffers injustice voluntarily.
Objection 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers
that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one
who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is
worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.
On the contrary, To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are
contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on
the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.
I answer that, Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent,
whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in
the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys.
iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will,
wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily,
and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against
his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a principle in
himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather than passive.
Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man
can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save
involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so to speak, it is
possible for that which is unjust in itself either to be done
involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally), or to be
suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more
than he owes him).
Reply to Objection 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that
which he does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality.
For a man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion
if he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by
another's action.
Reply to Objection 2: An individual person may be considered in two
ways. First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury
on himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin,
intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because
injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person.
Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the State
as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and image; and
thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but
to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with
both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of
the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): "If any man violate the temple of God,
him shall God destroy."
Reply to Objection 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now
in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is
that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above
[2868](A[2]), and the formal and essential element is on the part of
the will of agent and patient, as stated above [2869](A[2]).
Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and
injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the
material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an
injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other
man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and
on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an
injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury
unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?
Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins
mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes
a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in
reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they do not merely in
ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter." Therefore not
everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.
Objection 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter,
departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant
and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice
sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues"
[*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary
thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to
the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal
sin to do an injustice.
On the contrary, Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal
sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the
law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to
murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on
(Q[64], seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.
I answer that, As stated above ([2870]FS, Q[12], A[5]), when we were
treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is
contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury
inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which
moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always
consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that
to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls "ignorance
of particular circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which deserves
pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he
who does an injustice through ignorance, does no injustice except
accidentally, as stated above [2871](A[2])
Reply to Objection 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls
short of the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does
may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who
suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such
thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is
not hurt or displeased.
Reply to Objection 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues
are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder
affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
OF JUDGMENT (SIX ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?
(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?
(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?
(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?
(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written
law?
(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether judgment is an act of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice. The
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what he
knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty.
Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. Therefore judgment
belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which is in the will, as
stated above ([2872]Q[58], A[4]).
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual
man judgeth all things." Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the
virtue of charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy
Ghost Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to
charity rather than to justice.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its
proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in
everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore
judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral
virtues.
Objection 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But
the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then judges
are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the proper act
of justice.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be turned
into judgment."
I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such.
Now a judge [judex] is so called because he asserts the right [jus
dicens] and right is the object of justice, as stated above
([2873]Q[57], A[1]). Consequently the original meaning of the word
"judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to
decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from
the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about matters
relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a right
decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For this
reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that "men have recourse to a
judge as to one who is the personification of justice."
Reply to Objection 1: The word "judgment," from its original meaning of
a right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a
right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a
right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the
virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is an
act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or define.
The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which depends
his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice,
judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of fortitude, it
proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in
so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in so
far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) which belongs to prudence is said to "judge
rightly," as stated above ([2874]Q[51], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of
charity, has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to
the Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces
judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces
judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of
the law.
Reply to Objection 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself,
whereas justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown
above ([2875]Q[58], A[2]). Now man is master in things concerning
himself, but not in matters relating to others. Consequently where the
other virtues are in question, there is no need for judgment other than
that of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as
explained above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further
need for the judgment of a superior, who is "able to reprove both, and
to put his hand between both" [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more
specifically to justice than to any other virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue
[*Cf.[2876] Q[58], A[6]], commanding and prescribing what is just;
while it is in the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue.
Hence judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to
justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to judge?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished
except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with
punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Mat.
7:1, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged." Therefore it is unlawful
to judge.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that
judgest another man's servant. To his own lord he standeth or falleth."
Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.
Objection 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 Jn. 1:8, "If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now it is unlawful for
a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable, O man,
whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another,
thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou
judgest." Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint judges
and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the people
with just judgment."
I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice.
Now it follows from what has been stated above (A[1], ad 1,3) that
three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice:
first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that
it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced
according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be
lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is
contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is called "perverted"
or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has
no authority, and this is called judgment "by usurpation": thirdly,
when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid
motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it
is called judgment by "suspicion" or "rash" judgment.
Reply to Objection 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment
which is about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as
Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids
judgment about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply
believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary
on Mat. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in
the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross], He
forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from
bitterness of heart.
Reply to Objection 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore
it is written (Dt. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on
(Dt. 1:17), "because it is the judgment of God."
Reply to Objection 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should
not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as
Chrysostom [*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Mat. 7:1, "Judge not."
Above all does this hold when such sins are public, because there would
be an occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however
they are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for
the judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove
or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte ii, 19): "If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as
another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to
strive against it together with us." And yet it is not through acting
thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned once
again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be equally
deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment
from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion about
an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion
is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have any
but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. Since then human
judgment is about human acts, which are about singular and contingent
matters, it seems that no judgment would be lawful, if it were not
lawful to judge from suspicions.
Objection 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him
unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a man's
opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of
another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to
an injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above
[2877](A[1]). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its
genus, as stated above (Q[59], A[4]). Therefore a judgment based on
suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this
is false, because "we cannot avoid suspicions," according to a gloss of
Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the
time." Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to be
unlawful.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross] in comment on
the words of Mat. 7:1, "Judge not," etc., says: "By this commandment
our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly
motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his
own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on
mere suspicion."
I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion denotes
evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to three
causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this very
fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think
evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, "The fool when he walketh in
the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools."
Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards another: for
when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of
him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because
everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this is due to long
experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "old
people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults
of others." The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote
perversity of the affections, while the third diminishes the nature of
suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty which is
contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently suspicion denotes a
certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it
is.
Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a
man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications. This
is a venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation
without which no man can go through this life," according to a gloss on
1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time." The second degree is when a
man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as
certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it
cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes
on to say: "If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are human,
we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from forming a
definite and fixed opinion." The third degree is when a judge goes so
far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains directly to
injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts,
not indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting
the matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable
witnesses.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of
another without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore
does him an injury.
Reply to Objection 3: Since justice and injustice are about external
operations, as stated above ([2878]Q[58], AA[8],10,11;[2879] Q[59],
A[1], ad 3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice
when it is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as
stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as
it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the
external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or
anger to murder.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?
Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for
the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most part.
But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the number
of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and thought
of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gn. 8:21). Therefore
doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he
leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and
turns neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a
doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should
not be done.
Objection 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with
regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the
worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works." Therefore it
seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be
interpreted for the worst.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him not
judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in the best
sense."
I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 2), things from the very fact
that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures
and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure
another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have
evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him
good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.
Reply to Objection 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best,
may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err
frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less
frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the
latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.
Reply to Objection 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to
judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the
good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will
take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but
there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge
truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is the
good of the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in Ethic.
vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord
with things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the
good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the
person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy of
honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of
contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this
kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident
proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in
thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the
evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the
intellect's perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in
themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for
the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when
we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's,
in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure,
it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be
efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a
lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for
the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of
things we should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and
when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated
above.
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Whether we should always judge according to the written law?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge according
to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging unjustly. But
written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to Is. 10:1, "Woe
to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice."
Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law.
Objection 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual
happenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual
happening, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it
seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written
law.
Objection 3: Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's
intention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if the
lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore we
ought not always to judge according to the written law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "In these
earthly laws, though men judge about them when they are making them,
when once they are established and passed, the judges may judge no
longer of them, but according to them."
I answer that, As stated above [2880](A[1]), judgment is nothing else
but a decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes
just in two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is
called "natural right," secondly by some agreement between men, and
this is called "positive right," as stated above (Q[57], A[2]). Now
laws are written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but
in different ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural
right, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its force,
not from the law but from nature: whereas the written law both contains
positive right, and establishes it by giving it force of authority.
Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else
judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive
right.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the written law does not give force to
the natural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force,
because neither can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law
contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has
no binding force. For positive right has no place except where "it
matters not," according to the natural right, "whether a thing be done
in one way or in another"; as stated above (Q[57], A[2], ad 2).
Wherefore such documents are to be called, not laws, but rather
corruptions of law, as stated above ([2881]FS, Q[95], A[2]): and
consequently judgment should not be delivered according to them.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as unjust laws by their very nature are,
either always or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so
too laws that are rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they
were observed they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in
such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to the letter of
the law, but according to equity which the lawgiver has in view. Hence
the jurist says [*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque consult. 25]: "By no
reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret
harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been
enacted for the welfare of man." In such cases even the lawgiver
himself would decide otherwise; and if he had foreseen the case, he
might have provided for it by law.
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
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Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?
Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by
being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now truth
is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from the
person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses nothing,
no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is meant by
judgment.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is
related to the praise of some that they punished sins without having
authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the
Egyptian (Ex. 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri
the son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14), and "it was reputed to him unto
justice" (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not to
injustice.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now
prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters
concerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not
unlawful.
Objection 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to
judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown
above (A[1], ad 1,3; A[2]). But a judgment is not described as unjust,
if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge of the
law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation, i.e.
without authority.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest
another man's servant?"
I answer that, Since judgment should be pronounced according to the
written law, as stated above [2882](A[5]), he that pronounces judgment,
interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some
particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to
interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by
public authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by
public authority, which extends over those who are subject to the
community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force
another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority, so
too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment that
is pronounced by other than the public authority.
Reply to Objection 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation
to accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes.
On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is
unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority.
Reply to Objection 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by
authority received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to
follow from Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that "striking the Egyptian
. . . he thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand
would save Israel [Vulg.: 'them']." Or it may be replied that Moses
slew the Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked,
without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence. Wherefore
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward off a blow
from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the striker"; and
he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with Augustine (QQ.
Exod. qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just as "the soil gives
proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs before the useful
seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful although it gave a
sign of great fertility," in so far, to wit, as it was a sign of the
power whereby he was to deliver his people.
With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for
God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest, he
was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his
concern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex. 22:20;
Lev. 20; Dt. 13, 17].
Reply to Objection 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual,
even as the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is
not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal
matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have been
committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.
Reply to Objection 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are
perfections of the individual, and consequently their absence does not
make a judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority
which gives a judgment its coercive force.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts,
which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative
justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts,
i.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will
be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And
since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we
must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive
justice; (2) restitution.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and
commutative?
(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?
(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?
(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as
counter-passion?
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Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative and
distributive?
Objection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are
unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is
hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is
directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of
the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many,
both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and because
the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii,
15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to expect that
he will receive again." Therefore distribution does not belong to any
species of justice.
Objection 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what
is his own, as stated above ([2883]Q[58], A[2]). But when things are
distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed
of something which belonged to the community. Therefore this does not
pertain to justice.
Objection 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in
the subject, as stated above ([2884]Q[58], A[6]). But it belongs
exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does
not always belong to justice.
Objection 4: Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods"
(Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal
justice. Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular,
but of legal justice.
Objection 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a
virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one
person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to
many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and says
(Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other,
commutations."
I answer that, As stated above ([2885]Q[58], AA[7],8), particular
justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the
community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be considered
in relation to a part. In the first place there is the order of one
part to another, to which corresponds the order of one private
individual to another. This order is directed by commutative justice,
which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two persons. In
the second place there is the order of the whole towards the parts, to
which corresponds the order of that which belongs to the community in
relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive
justice, which distributes common goods proportionately. Hence there
are two species of justice, distributive and commutative.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as a private individual is praised for
moderation in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought
moderation to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein
distributive justice directs.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so
too that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part
also: so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a
number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his
own.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of distributing the goods of the
community, belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those
goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom
those goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just
distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made
not to the state but to the members of a family, and such distribution
can be made by authority of a private individual.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement takes its species from the term
"whereunto." Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common
good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the
contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to
particular individuals by way of distribution.
Reply to Objection 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not
only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of
different kinds of due: because common property is due to an individual
in one way, and his personal property in another way.
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Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in
commutative justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to
be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of
these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above [2886](A[1]).
Now the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or
fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way
in both distributive and commutative justice.
Objection 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing
the mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then,
one virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the
same.
Objection 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive
justice we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a
person's deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for
instance, in punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished
more than one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is
observed in the same way in both kinds of justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in
distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical proportion,"
whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical proportion."
I answer that, As stated above [2887](A[1]), in distributive justice
something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs
to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is
proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect
of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person receives
all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more
prominent position in the community. This prominence in an aristocratic
community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to
wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways
according to various forms of community. Hence in distributive justice
the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and
thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: in such
a way that even as one person surpasses another, so that which is given
to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in the latter case
follows "geometrical proportion," wherein equality depends not on
quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 is
to 2, because in either case the proportion equals 1-1/2; since the
greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half: whereas the
equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6 exceeds 4 by 2,
while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.
On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on
account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen
chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found
primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that
the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has
become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of
this will be equality according to the "arithmetical mean" which is
gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean
between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the
former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, and
one of them receives 1 out of the other's belongings, the one that is
the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with 4: and so
there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1 being
taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for then both
will have 5 which is the mean.
Reply to Objection 1: In the other moral virtues the rational, not the
real mean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean;
wherefore the mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things.
Reply to Objection 2: Equality is the general form of justice, wherein
distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find equality
of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find equality of
arithmetical proportion.
Reply to Objection 3: In actions and passions a person's station
affects the quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a
prince than a private person. Hence in distributive justice a person's
station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is
considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things.
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Whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a different matter for
both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of virtue,
as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if distributive
and commutative justice have different matters, it would seem that they
are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.
Objection 2: Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive
justice is one of "wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be
distributed among the members of the community" (Ethic. v, 2), which
very things are the subject matter of commutations between one person
and another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the
matters of distributive and commutative justice are not distinct.
Objection 3: Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs
from that of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ
specifically, where there is no specific difference, there ought to be
no diversity of matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons
commutative justice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of
matter. Therefore the matter of these species of justice is, seemingly,
not of many kinds.
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. v, 2 that "one kind of justice
directs distributions, and another commutations."
I answer that, As stated above (Q[51], AA[8],10), justice is about
certain external operations, namely distribution and commutation. These
consist in the use of certain externals, whether things, persons or
even works: of things, as when one man takes from or restores to
another that which is his; of persons, as when a man does an injury to
the very person of another, for instance by striking or insulting him,
or even by showing respect for him; and of works, as when a man justly
exacts a work of another, or does a work for him. Accordingly, if we
take for the matter of each kind of justice the things themselves of
which the operations are the use, the matter of distributive and
commutative justice is the same, since things can be distributed out of
the common property to individuals, and be the subject of commutation
between one person and another; and again there is a certain
distribution and payment of laborious works.
If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the
principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things,
and works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For
distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice
directs commutations that can take place between two persons. Of these
some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when anyone
uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will, and this
may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In either case
the offence may be committed against the other man's chattel or person,
or against a person connected with him. If the offence is against his
chattel and this be taken secretly, it is called "theft," if openly, it
is called "robbery." If it be against another man's person, it may
affect either the very substance of his person, or his dignity. If it
be against the substance of his person, a man is injured secretly if he
is treacherously slain, struck or poisoned, and openly, if he is
publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or maimed. If it be against his
personal dignity, a man is injured secretly by false witness,
detractions and so forth, whereby he is deprived of his good name, and
openly, by being accused in a court of law, or by public insult. If it
be against a personal connection, a man is injured in the person of his
wife, secretly (for the most part) by adultery, in the person of his
slave, if the latter be induced to leave his master: which things can
also be done openly. The same applies to other personal connections,
and whatever injury may be committed against the principal, may be
committed against them also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to
leave his master are properly injuries against the person; yet the
latter, since a slave is his master's chattel, is referred to theft.
Voluntary commutations are when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel
to another person. And if he transfer it simply so that the recipient
incurs no debt, as in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice
but of liberality. A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as
it includes the notion of debt, and this may occur in many ways. First
when one man simply transfers his thing to another in exchange for
another thing, as happens in selling and buying. Secondly when a man
transfers his thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it
with the obligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the use
of a thing gratuitously, it is called "usufruct" in things that bear
fruit; and simply "borrowing" on "loan" in things that bear no fruit,
such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even the use is granted
gratis, it is called "letting" or "hiring." Thirdly, a man transfers
his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the purpose of
its use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a "deposit," or under some
obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when one man stands
security for another. In all these actions, whether voluntary or
involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the
equality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same
species of justice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether the just is absolutely the same as retaliation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as
retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the
judgment of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with his
deeds, according to Mat. 7:2: "With what measure you judge, you shall
be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you
again." Therefore the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.
Objection 2: Further, in either kind of justice something is given to
someone according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice this
equality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly
on what a person has done for the good of the community; while in
commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has suffered
loss. Now in respect of either equality there is retaliation in respect
of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the just is
absolutely the same as retaliation.
Objection 3: Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based
on the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who
does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary
and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the
mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on us.
Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as
retaliation.
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just is
not always the same as retaliation.
I answer that, Retaliation [contrapassum] denotes equal passion repaid
for previous action; and the expression applies most properly to
injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of his
neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back. This
kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23,24): "He shall render
life for life, eye for eye," etc. And since also to take away what
belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that secondly
retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes loss to
another, should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss is also
found in the Law (Ex. 22:1): "If any man steal an ox or a sheep, and
kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and four sheep
for one sheep." Thirdly retaliation is transferred to voluntary
commutations, where action and passion are on both sides, although
voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion, as stated above
([2888]Q[59], A[3]).
In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of
equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely
that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not
always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action.
Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one
who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species
that he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not only
struck back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner when a
man despoils another of his property against the latter's will, the
action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that thing,
because the man who caused another's loss, himself would lose nothing,
and so he is punished by making restitution several times over, because
not only did he injure a private individual, but also the common weal,
the security of whose protection he has infringed. Nor again would
there be equality of passion in voluntary commutations, were one always
to exchange one's chattel for another man's, because it might happen
that the other man's chattel is much greater than our own: so that it
becomes necessary to equalize passion and action in commutations
according to a certain proportionate commensuration, for which purpose
money was invented. Hence retaliation is in accordance with commutative
justice: but there is no place for it in distributive justice, because
in distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing
and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression
'contrapassum'), but according to proportion between things and
persons, as stated above [2889](A[2]).
Reply to Objection 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance
with the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are
apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man who has served the community is paid
for his services, this is to be referred to commutative, not
distributive, justice. Because distributive justice considers the
equality, not between the thing received and the thing done, but
between the thing received by one person and the thing received by
another according to the respective conditions of those persons.
Reply to Objection 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the
injury is aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing.
Hence it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a
difference, not on part, but on the part of the thing.
__________________________________________________________________
OF RESTITUTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight
points of inquiry:
(1) of what is it an act?
(2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what one
has taken away?
(3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away?
(4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away?
(5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from whom
something has been taken?
(6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to restore
it?
(7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution?
(8) Whether one is bound to restore at once?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether restitution is an act of commutative justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not an act of
commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due. Now
one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due. Therefore
restitution is not the act of any part of justice.
Objection 2: Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot
be restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and
passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution
would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.
Objection 3: Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away.
Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation, but
also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man less
than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of commutative
than of distributive justice.
On the contrary, Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is an
act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another.
Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs
commutations.
I answer that, To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a
person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in
restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment
of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice.
Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one
person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for
instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or
theft.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is not due to another is not his
properly speaking, although it may have been his at some time:
wherefore it is a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone
renders to another what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like
a restitution, since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is
not the same in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which
considers that thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is
not restitution properly so called.
Reply to Objection 2: In so far as the word restitution denotes
something done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it
would seem originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which
can pass from one person to another, since they remain the same both
substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as the
term "commutation" has passed from such like things to those actions
and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit on
another person, so too the term "restitution" is applied, to things
which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in their effect;
whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt by being struck,
or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or dishonored by
injurious words.
Reply to Objection 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to the
man to whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with
thing, when the latter receives so much the more according as he
received less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative
justice.
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Whether restitution of what has been taken away is necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what has
been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary for
salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has been
taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does not seem
necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.
Objection 2: Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for
salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is
impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one
has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it
is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from
another.
Objection 3: Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a
man loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that
which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it is
not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
Objection 4: Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing
is seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to lack
little is almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the
Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from
obtaining a benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore
the benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is
not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): "Unless a man
restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven."
I answer that, Restitution as stated above [2890](A[1]) is an act of
commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore
restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it is
by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it be
taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need
for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since therefore the
safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it
is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly.
Reply to Objection 1: When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it
suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God and
our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Wherefore
when that which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent,
compensation should be made as far as possible: for instance if one man
has deprived another of a limb, he must make compensation either in
money or in honor, the condition of either party being duly considered
according to the judgment of a good man.
Reply to Objection 2: There are three ways in which one may take away
another's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly, as
when a man reveals another's sin, while observing the right order of so
doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by saying
what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore that man's
good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly, by saying
what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another's sin
contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound to
restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an
untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed
him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must
compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above
(ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: The action of the man who has defamed another
cannot be undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo
its effect, viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in
the opinion of other men.
Reply to Objection 4: There are several ways of preventing a man from
obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view
the honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its being
conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation
whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if
the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, through hatred,
revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has been
definitely assigned to anyone, one prevents its being conferred on a
worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on him, one is
bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the
circumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a
prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man
had not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many
ways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had already
been assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some undue cause
procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had deprived a man
of what he already possessed, and consequently he would be bound to
compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his means.
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Whether it suffices to restore the exact amount taken?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the
exact amount taken. For it is written (Ex. 22:1): "If a man shall steal
an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for
one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Now everyone is bound to keep
the commandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is bound to
restore four- or fivefold.
Objection 2: Further, "What things soever were written, were written
for our learning" (Rom. 15:4). Now Zachaeus said (Lk. 19:8) to our
Lord: "If I have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold."
Therefore a man is bound to restore several times over the amount he
has taken unjustly.
Objection 3: Further, no one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not
bound to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the
amount of his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is
bound to pay it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the
exact amount.
On the contrary, Restitution re-establishes equality where an unjust
taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by repaying the
exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to restore more
than the exact amount taken.
I answer that, When a man takes another's thing unjustly, two things
must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the thing,
which inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the case in
loans. The other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent with
equality on the part of the thing, as when a person intends to use
violence but fails.
As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution,
since thereby equality is re-established; and for this it is enough
that a man restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But as
regards the sin, the remedy is applied by punishment, the infliction of
which belongs to the judge: and so, until a man is condemned by the
judge, he is not bound to restore more than he took, but when once he
is condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty.
Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: because this law
fixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. Nor is this
commandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ no man
is bound to keep the judicial precepts, as stated above ([2891]FS,
Q[104], A[3]). Nevertheless the same might be determined by human law,
and then the same answer would apply.
Reply to Objection 2: Zachaeus said this being willing to do more than
he was bound to do; hence he had said already: "Behold . . . the half
of my goods I give to the poor."
Reply to Objection 3: By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact
more by way of damages; and yet this was not due before the sentence.
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Whether a man is bound to restore what he has not taken?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has
not taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to remove
that loss. Now it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is greater
than the thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man's seeds, you
inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest, and thus you
would seem to be bound to make restitution accordingly. Therefore a man
is bound to restore what he has not taken.
Objection 2: Further, he who retains his creditor's money beyond the
stated time, would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible
profits from that money, and yet he does not really take them.
Therefore it seems that a man is bound to restore what he did not take.
Objection 3: Further, human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now
a man is bound to restore to God more than he has received from Him,
according to Mat. 25:26, "Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not, and
gather where I have not strewed." Therefore it is just that one should
restore to a man also, something that one has not taken.
On the contrary, Restitution belongs to justice, because it
re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not
take, there would not be equality. Therefore it is not just to make
such a restitution.
I answer that, Whoever brings a loss upon another person, seemingly,
takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so called from a man having "less"*
than his due. [*The derivation is more apparent in English than in
Latin, where 'damnum' stands for 'loss,' and 'minus' for 'less.'
Aristotle merely says that to have more than your own is called 'gain,'
and to have less than you started with is called 'loss.'] Therefore a
man is bound to make restitution according to the loss he has brought
upon another.
Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of what
he actually has; and a loss of this kind is always to be made good by
repayment in equivalent: for instance if a man damnifies another by
destroying his house he is bound to pay him the value of the house.
Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from obtaining
what he was on the way to obtain. A loss of this kind need not be made
good in equivalent; because to have a thing virtually is less than to
have it actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it
merely virtually or potentially, and so were he to be indemnified by
receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not the exact value
taken from him, but more, and this is not necessary for salvation, as
stated above. However he is bound to make some compensation, according
to the condition of persons and things.
From this we see how to answer the First and Second Objections: because
the sower of the seed in the field, has the harvest, not actually but
only virtually. In like manner he that has money has the profit not yet
actually but only virtually: and both may be hindered in many ways.
Reply to Objection 3: God requires nothing from us but what He Himself
has sown in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing
either the shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he had
received nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects from us
the fruit of His gifts, which fruit is from Him and from us, although
the gifts themselves are from God without us.
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Whether restitution must always be made to the person from whom a thing has
been taken?
Objection 1: It would seem that restitution need not always be made to
the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful to
injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man himself,
or to others, were one to restore to him what has been taken from him;
if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword. Therefore
restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has
been taken.
Objection 2: Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does
not deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that
which another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and
receiver who are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always necessary
to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken something.
Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it
is sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a
thing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too
far away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need
not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.
Objection 4: Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have
received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from
others (our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor.
Therefore sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather than
make restitution to one from whom we have taken something.
Objection 5: Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to
the restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken
something from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it
reverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of the Church's
property. Therefore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom he
has taken: and so restitution should not always be made to the person
from whom something has been taken away
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 13:7): "Render . . . to all men
their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom."
I answer that, Restitution re-establishes the equality of commutative
justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of thing to thing,
as stated above [2892](A[2]; Q[58], A[10]). Now this equalizing of
things is impossible, unless he that has less than his due receive what
is lacking to him: and for this to be done, restitution must be made to
the person from whom a thing has been taken.
Reply to Objection 1: When the thing to be restored appears to be
grievously injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to
some other, it should not be restored to him there and then, because
restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made,
since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who
retains another's property must not appropriate it, but must either
reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over
to another to keep it more securely.
Reply to Objection 2: A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways.
First through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as
is the case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves
to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to him:
and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he must not
retain the price, but must use it for some pious object. Secondly a man
gives unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful purpose, albeit the
giving itself is not unlawful, as when a woman receives payment for
fornication: wherefore she may keep what she has received. If, however,
she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit, she would be bound to
restitution.
Reply to Objection 3: If the person to whom restitution is due is
unknown altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for
instance by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be
dead or living): but not without previously making a careful inquiry
about his person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead,
restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one with
him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent to him,
especially if it be of great value and can easily be sent: else it
should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and the owner
should be advised of the fact.
Reply to Objection 4: A man is bound, out of his own property, to
succor his parents, or those from whom he has received greater
benefits; but he ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what
belongs to others; and he would be doing this if he were to compensate
one with what is due to another. Exception must be made in cases of
extreme need, for then he could and should even take what belongs to
another in order to succor a parent.
Reply to Objection 5: There are three ways in which a prelate can rob
the Church of her property. First by laying hands on Church property
which is committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a
bishop appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case it is
clear that he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those who
are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person (for
instance a relative or a friend) Church property committed to himself:
in which case he must make restitution to the Church, and have it under
his own care, so as to hand it over to his successor. Thirdly, a
prelate may lay hands on Church property, merely in intention, when, to
wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his own and not in the name
of the Church: in which case he must make restitution by renouncing his
intention.
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Whether he that has taken a thing is always bound to restitution?
Objection 1: It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not always
bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality of
justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him that
has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that which
belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed into
another's hands. Therefore it should be restored, not by the person
that took it, but by the one that has it.
Objection 2: Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by
making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the
case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always bound
to restitution.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing should not be restored several
times. Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and
one of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a
thing is not always bound to restitution.
On the contrary, He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now
restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a
thing is bound to restore it.
I answer that, With regard to a man who has taken another's property,
two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the taking. By
reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as long as he has
it in his possession, since the thing that he has in addition to what
is his, should be taken away from him, and given to him who lacks it
according to the form of commutative justice. On the other hand, the
taking of the thing that is another's property, may be threefold. For
sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of the owner, as in
theft and robbery: in which case the thief is bound to restitution not
only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the injurious
action, even though the thing is no longer in his possession. For just
as a man who strikes another, though he gain nothing thereby, is bound
to compensate the injured person, so too he that is guilty of theft or
robbery, is bound to make compensation for the loss incurred, although
he be no better off; and in addition he must be punished for the
injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes another's property for his
own profit but without committing an injury, i.e. with the consent of
the owner, as in the case of a loan: and then, the taker is bound to
restitution, not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the
taking, even if he has lost the thing: for he is bound to compensate
the person who has done him a favor, and he would not be doing so if
the latter were to lose thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another's
property without injury to the latter or profit to himself, as in the
case of a deposit; wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no
obligation on account of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a
favor; but he is bound to restitution on account of the thing taken.
Consequently if this thing be taken from him without any fault on his
part, he is not bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were
to lose the thing through a grievous fault on his part.
Reply to Objection 1: The chief end of restitution is, not that he who
has more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less
than his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for
restitution in those things which one man may receive from another
without loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from
another's candle. Consequently although he that has taken something
from another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having
transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what is
his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing, on account
of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of the thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime
to other men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so
he may make restitution of another's property through the priest to
whom he confesses.
Reply to Objection 3: Since restitution is chiefly directed to the
compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing has
been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has received
sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound to any
further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund the
person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse them
from so doing.
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Whether restitution is binding on those who have not taken?
Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not binding on those who
have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now none
should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound
to restitution save the one who has taken.
Objection 2: Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's
property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who takes
a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way
whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer,
both because he would receive restitution many times over, and because
sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken away from
someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore the others
are not bound to restitution.
Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in
order to safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would expose
himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand
him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not betraying
or withstanding a thief.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:32): "They who do such things
are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also they that
consent to them that do them." Therefore in like manner they that
consent are bound to restitution.
I answer that, As stated above [2893](A[6]), a person is bound to
restitution not only on account of someone else's property which he has
taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever is
cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in two
ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to
take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the taking, by
moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel, or consent,
or by praising a man for his courage in thieving. Secondly, on the part
of the taker, by giving him shelter or any other kind of assistance.
Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by taking part in the theft or
robbery, as a fellow evil-doer. Indirectly, when a man does not prevent
another from evil-doing (provided he be able and bound to prevent him),
either by omitting the command or counsel which would hinder him from
thieving or robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him,
or by sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as
follows:
"By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by
participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing."
It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the
cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of
command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is
bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent;
namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place.
Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver of
thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of
participation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty.
Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do
so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard
justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their neglect thieves
prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of their
preserving justice here below.
In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to
restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the
efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is
bound to restitution, only when it may be judged with probability that
the unjust taking resulted from such causes.
Reply to Objection 1: Not only is he bound to restitution who commits
the sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by
counselling, or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.
Reply to Objection 2: He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the
principal in the deed; first of all, the "commander"; secondly, the
"executor," and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of
them make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to the
same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who took
possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those who have already
made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that does not
follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is chiefly to
restore the property of the person who has been unjustly injured.
Reply to Objection 3: He that fails to denounce a thief or does not
withstand or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only
when he is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case
of earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they
are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain
justice.
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Whether a man is bound to immediate restitution, or may he put it off?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate
restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative
precepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making
restitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a man
is not bound to immediate restitution.
Objection 2: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it
is sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore no man
is bound to immediate restitution.
Objection 3: Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice.
Now time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts. Since
then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of virtue,
but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it seems
that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a man be
bound to restore at once.
On the contrary, All matters of restitution seem to come under one
head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not delay
compensation, as appears from Lev. 19:13, "The wages of him that hath
been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning."
Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of restitution, to
delay, and restitution should be made at once.
I answer that, Even as it is a sin against justice to take another's
property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold the property
of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him of the use of
what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is clear that it
is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and one is bound to
renounce one's sin at once, according to Ecclus. 21:2, "Flee from sin
as from the face of a serpent." Consequently one is bound to immediate
restitution, if possible, or to ask for a respite from the person who
is empowered to grant the use of the thing.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the precept about the making of
restitution is affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept
forbidding us to withhold another's property.
Reply to Objection 2: When one is unable to restore at once, this very
inability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is
altogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable
to make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another to
ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a remission or
a respite.
Reply to Objection 3: Whenever the omission of a circumstance is
contrary to virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as
determinate, and we are bound to observe it: and since delay of
restitution involves a sin of unjust detention which is opposed to just
detention, it stands to reason that the time is determinate in the
point of restitution being immediate.
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VICES OPPOSED TO DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (Q[63])
OF RESPECT OF PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of
justice. First we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed to
distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the vices opposed to
commutative justice.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether respect of persons is a sin?
(2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities?
(3) Whether it takes place in showing honor?
(4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences?
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Whether respect of persons is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For
the word "person" includes a reference to personal dignity [*Cf.
[2894]FP, Q[29], A[3], ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to
consider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance
than things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not
conversely. But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore,
is respect of persons.
Objection 3: Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems
to respect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes
upraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to Mat.
24:40: "Two shall be in a bed [Vulg.: 'field' [*'Bed' is the reading of
Luk. 17:34], one shall be taken, and one shall be left." Therefore
respect of persons is not a sin.
On the contrary, Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law. Now
respect of persons is forbidden, Dt. 1:17: "Neither shall you respect
any man's person." Therefore respect of persons is a sin.
I answer that, Respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice.
For the equality of distributive justice consists in allotting various
things to various persons in proportion to their personal dignity.
Accordingly, if one considers that personal property by reason of which
the thing allotted to a particular person is due to him, this is
respect not of the person but of the cause. Hence a gloss on Eph. 6:9,
"There is no respect of persons with God [Vulg.: 'Him']," says that "a
just judge regards causes, not persons." For instance if you promote a
man to a professorship on account of his having sufficient knowledge,
you consider the due cause, not the person; but if, in conferring
something on someone, you consider in him not the fact that what you
give him is proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this
particular man (e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the
person, since you give him something not for some cause that renders
him worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any
circumstance that does not amount to a reason why this man be worthy of
this gift, is to be referred to his person: for instance if a man
promote someone to a prelacy or a professorship, because he is rich or
because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may
happen, however, that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as
regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus consanguinity makes
a man worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be chosen
for a position of ecclesiastical authority: wherefore consideration of
the same circumstance of person will amount to respect of persons in
one matter and not in another. It follows, accordingly, that respect of
persons is opposed to distributive justice in that it fails to observe
due proportion. Now nothing but sin is opposed to virtue: and therefore
respect of persons is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: In distributive justice we consider those
circumstances of a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in
respect of persons we consider circumstances that do not so result.
Reply to Objection 2: Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy
of things which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things
pertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions ought
to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the persons
themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though it were;
and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy, absolutely
speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold giving. one belongs to
justice, and occurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings
respect of persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality,
when one gives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is the
bestowal of the gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In
such a giving there is no place for respect of persons, because anyone
may, without injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom
he will, according to Mat. 20:14,15, "Is it not lawful for me to do
what I will? . . . Take what is thine, and go thy way."
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Whether respect of persons takes place in the dispensation of spiritual
goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take place
in the dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to savor of
respect of persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity or benefice
on account of consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a cause whereby
a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. Yet this
apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are wont to do so.
Therefore the sin of respect of persons does not take place in the
conferring of spiritual goods.
Objection 2: Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a
poor man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to James
2:2,3. Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees are
more readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others. Therefore
the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in the
dispensation of spiritual goods.
Objection 3: Further, according to jurists [*Cap. Cum dilectus.] it
suffices to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one choose
the better man. But it would seem to savor of respect of persons to
choose one who is less good for a higher position. Therefore respect of
persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.
Objection 4: Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum
dilectus.) the person to be chosen should be "a member of the flock."
Now this would seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more
competent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore respect of
persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:1): "Have not the faith of our
Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons." On these words a
gloss of Augustine says: "Who is there that would tolerate the
promotion of a rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the
exclusion of a poor man more learned and holier?" [*Augustine, Ep. ad
Hieron. clxvii.]
I answer that, As stated above [2895](A[1]), respect of persons is a
sin, in so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter
in which justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin: so that,
spiritual things being of greater import than temporal, respect of
persons is a more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in
dispensing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when
something is allotted to a person out of proportion to his deserts, it
must be observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in two
ways. First, simply and absolutely: and in this way the man who abounds
the more in the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. Secondly,
in relation to the common good; for it happens at times that the less
holy and less learned man may conduce more to the common good, on
account of worldly authority or activity, or something of the kind. And
since the dispensation of spiritualities is directed chiefly to the
common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, "The manifestation of the Spirit
is given to every man unto profit," it follows that in the dispensation
of spiritualities the simply less good are sometimes preferred to the
better, without respect of persons, just as God sometimes bestows
gratuitous graces on the less worthy.
Reply to Objection 1: We must make a distinction with regard to a
prelate's kinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely
speaking, and in relation to the common good: and then if they are
preferred to the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in
the dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical
superior is not the owner, with power to give them away as he will, but
the dispenser, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of us as
of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of
God." Sometimes however the prelate's kinsfolk are as worthy as others,
and then without respect of persons he can lawfully give preference to
his kindred since there is at least this advantage, that he can trust
the more in their being of one mind with him in conducting the business
of the Church. Yet he would have to forego so doing for fear of
scandal, if anyone might take an example from him and give the goods of
the Church to their kindred without regard to their deserts.
Reply to Objection 2: Dispensations for contracting marriage came into
use for the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is
more necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing,
so that there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more
readily to such persons.
Reply to Objection 3: In order that an election be not rebutted in a
court of law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to
elect the better man, because otherwise every election might have a
flaw. But as regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to
elect one who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to
the common good. For if it is possible to have one who is more
competent for a post, and yet another be preferred, it is necessary to
have some cause for this. If this cause have anything to do with the
matter in point, he who is elected will, in this respect, be more
competent; and if that which is taken for cause have nothing to do with
the matter, it will clearly be respect of persons.
Reply to Objection 4: The man who is taken from among the members of a
particular Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the
common good, since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought up.
For this reason it was commanded (Dt. 17:15): "Thou mayest not make a
man of another nation king, who is not thy brother."
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Whether respect of persons takes place in showing honor and respect?
Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take place
in showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing else than
"reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes should be
honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of whom it is
written (Ex. 20:12): "Honor thy father and thy mother." Again masters,
though they be wicked, should be honored by their servants, according
to 1 Tim. 6:1: "Whoever are servants under the yoke, let them count
their masters worthy of all honor." Therefore it seems that it is not a
sin to respect persons in showing honor.
Objection 2: Further, it is commanded (Lev. 19:32): "Rise up before the
hoary head, and, honor the person of the aged man." But this seems to
savor of respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not virtuous;
according to Dan. 13:5: "Iniquity came out from the ancients of the
people [*Vulg.: 'Iniquity came out of Babylon from the ancient judges,
that seemed to govern the people.']." Therefore it is not a sin to
respect persons in showing honor.
Objection 3: Further, on the words of James 2:1, "Have not the faith .
. . with respect of persons," a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. ad Hieron.
clxvii.] says: "If the saying of James, 'If there shall come into your
assembly a man having a golden ring,' etc., refer to our daily
meetings, who sins not here, if however he sin at all?" Yet it is
respect of persons to honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory says
in a homily (xxviii in Evang.): "Our pride is blunted, since in men we
honor, not the nature wherein they are made to God's image, but
wealth," so that, wealth not being a due cause of honor, this will
savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a sin to respect
persons in showing honor.
On the contrary, A gloss on James 2:1, says: "Whoever honors the rich
for their riches, sins," and in like manner, if a man be honored for
other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this savors of
respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect persons in showing
honor.
I answer that, To honor a person is to recognize him as having virtue,
wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being honored. Now
it is to be observed that a person may be honored not only for his own
virtue, but also for another's: thus princes and prelates, although
they be wicked, are honored as standing in God's place, and as
representing the community over which they are placed, according to
Prov. 26:8, "As he that casteth a stone into the heap of Mercury, so is
he that giveth honor to a fool." For, since the gentiles ascribed the
keeping of accounts to Mercury, "the heap of Mercury" signifies the
casting up of an account, when a merchant sometimes substitutes a
pebble [*'Lapillus' or 'calculus' whence the English word 'calculate']
for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool honored if he stand in God's
place or represent the whole community: and in the same way parents and
masters should be honored, on account of their having a share of the
dignity of God Who is the Father and Lord of all. The aged should be
honored, because old age is a sign of virtue, though this sign fail at
times: wherefore, according to Wis. 4:8,9, "venerable old age is not
that of long time, nor counted by the number of years; but the
understanding of a man is gray hairs, and a spotless life is old age."
The rich ought to be honored by reason of their occupying a higher
position in the community: but if they be honored merely for their
wealth, it will be the sin of respect of persons.
Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
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Whether the sin of respect of persons takes place in judicial sentences?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does not
take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is opposed to
distributive justice, as stated above [2896](A[1]): whereas judicial
sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice. Therefore
respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
Objection 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence.
Now it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since
a heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a
prince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore respect
of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): "In judging be
merciful to the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the
person of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of persons
is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 18:5): "It is not good to accept
the person in judgment [*Vulg.: 'It is not good to accept the person of
the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.']."
I answer that, As stated above ([2897]Q[60], A[1]), judgment is an act
of justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of
justice, those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now
respect of persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as
something is allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in
which the equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that
judgment is rendered corrupt by respect of persons.
Reply to Objection 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First,
in view of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to
commutative and distributive justice: because it may be decided by
judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and how
one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him.
Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment, in as
much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and
gives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. In this way
respect of persons may take place in any judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: When a person is more severely punished on
account of a crime committed against a greater person, there is no
respect of persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in
that case, a diversity of things, as stated above ([2898]Q[58], A[10],
ad 3;[2899] Q[61], A[2], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the
needy as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the
saying of Ex. 23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in
judgment."
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OF MURDER (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative
justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in relation
to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed with regard
to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation to
involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one's neighbor against
his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word.
By deed when one's neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in
a person connected with him, or in his possessions.
We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first
place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the greatest
injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?(2) Whether
it is lawful to kill a sinner?
(3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public
person only?
(4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?
(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?
(6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?
(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
(8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?
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Whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the
Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): "They that resist the ordinance of God
purchase to themselves damnation [*Vulg.: 'He that resisteth the power,
resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase
themselves damnation.']." Now Divine providence has ordained that all
living things should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8,9, "Who
maketh grass to grow on the mountains . . . Who giveth to beasts their
food." Therefore it seems unlawful to take the life of any living
thing.
Objection 2: Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of
life. Now life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same
reason it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants.
Objection 3: Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not
appointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be inflicted,
according to the Divine law, on one who killed another man's ox or
sheep (Ex. 22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals is a sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "When we hear it
said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not take it as referring to trees,
for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because they have no
fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, 'Thou shalt not
kill' refer to the killing of a man."
I answer that, There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for
which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for
the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds from
imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the generation
of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and lastly a
man, so too things, like the plants, which merely have life, are all
alike for animals, and all animals are for man. Wherefore it is not
unlawful if man use plants for the good of animals, and animals for the
good of man, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).
Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that
animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be
done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to
take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the
use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of God
Himself: for it is written (Gn. 1:29,30): "Behold I have given you
every herb . . . and all trees . . . to be your meat, and to all beasts
of the earth": and again (Gn. 9:3): "Everything that moveth and liveth
shall be meat to you."
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Divine ordinance the life of
animals and plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), "by a most just ordinance of the
Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use."
Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of
reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it were
by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they
are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others.
Reply to Objection 3: He that kills another's ox, sins, not through
killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property.
Wherefore this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of
theft or robbery.
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Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For
our Lord in the parable (Mat. 13) forbade the uprooting of the cockle
which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is
forbidden by God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.
Objection 2: Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now
according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance,
according to Ezech. 33:11, "I desire not the death of the wicked, but
that the wicked turn from his way and live." Therefore it seems
altogether unjust to kill sinners.
Objection 3: Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to
do that which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac.
vii) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in
itself, since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and "we
wish our friends to live and to exist," according to Ethic. ix, 4.
Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt not
suffer to live"; and (Ps. 100:8): "In the morning I put to death all
the wicked of the land."
I answer that, As stated above [2900](A[1]), it is lawful to kill dumb
animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man's use, as the
imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed to the
whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for
the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of
the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being
decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both
praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual
person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore
if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of
some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in
order to safeguard the common good, since "a little leaven corrupteth
the whole lump" (1 Cor. 5:6).
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting
the cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when
the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them,
either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they
have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to
the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord
teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that
vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that
the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the
good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying
of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the order of His wisdom, God
sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas
sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is
expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate according
to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others,
while it allows time for repentance to those who sin without grievously
harming others.
Reply to Objection 3: By sinning man departs from the order of reason,
and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far
as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the
slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is
useful to others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in
honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts,
and made like to them," and Prov. 11:29: "The fool shall serve the
wise." Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he
preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned,
even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and
is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1 and Ethic. vii,
6).
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Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a
man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine
law. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded
(Ex. 32:27): "Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and
neighbor." Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a
sinner.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), man, on account of
sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private
individual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful. Therefore
for the same reason, it is lawful for any private individual to kill a
man who has sinned.
Objection 3: Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves
praise for doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying of
evildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above [2901](A[2]).
Therefore it is deserving of praise if even private individuals kill
evil-doers.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [*Can. Quicumque
percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: "A man who, without exercising public
authority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and
all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not
given him."
I answer that, As stated above [2902](A[2]), it is lawful to kill an
evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole
community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the
community's welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a
decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health of
the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to persons
of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private
individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.
Reply to Objection 1: The person by whose authority a thing is done
really does the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "He slays not who owes his
service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the
instrument to him that wields it." Wherefore those who, at the Lord's
command, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem not to have done
this themselves, but rather He by whose authority they acted thus: just
as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his sovereign, and the
executioner slays the robber by the authority of the judge.
Reply to Objection 2: A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore
in the case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill
it; whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is
required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss. On
the other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good
men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to
death for the common good.
Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for any private individual to do
anything for the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be
harmful to some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the
judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be
taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole.
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Whether it is lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers. For
clerics especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle (1 Cor.
4:16): "Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ," whereby we are
called upon to imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we
worship puts evildoers to death, according to Ps. 135:10, "Who smote
Egypt with their firstborn." Again Moses made the Levites slay
twenty-three thousand men on account of the worship of the calf (Ex.
32), the priest Phinees slew the Israelite who went in to the woman of
Madian (Num. 25), Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec (1 Kings 15), Elias
slew the priests of Baal (3 Kings 18), Mathathias killed the man who
went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 Mac. 2); and, in the New
Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira (Acts 5). Therefore it
seems that even clerics may kill evil-doers.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and
is more united to God. Now the secular power as "God's minister"
lawfully puts evil-doers to death, according to Rom. 13:4. Much more
therefore may clerics, who are God's ministers and have spiritual
power, put evil-doers to death.
Objection 3: Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may
lawfully exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the
princely office to slay evildoers, as stated above [2903](A[3]).
Therefore those clerics who are earthly princes may lawfully slay
malefactors.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 3:2,3): "It behooveth . . . a
bishop to be without crime [*Vulg.: 'blameless.' 'Without crime' is the
reading in Tit. 1:7] . . . not given to wine, no striker."
I answer that, It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons.
First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon
is represented the Passion of Christ slain "Who, when He was struck did
not strike [Vulg.: 'When He suffered, He threatened not']" (1 Pet.
2:23). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for
ministers should imitate their master, according to Ecclus. 10:2, "As
the judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers." The
other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the
New Law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is
appointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order that
they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament.
Reply to Objection 1: God works in all things without exception
whatever is right, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore
everyone should imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him.
Hence, though God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow
that all should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put
Ananias and Saphira to death by his own authority or with his own hand,
but published their death sentence pronounced by God. The Priests or
Levites of the Old Testament were the ministers of the Old Law, which
appointed corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for them to slay
with their own hands.
Reply to Objection 2: The ministry of clerics is concerned with better
things than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to
spiritual welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with
minor matters.
Reply to Objection 3: Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of
earthly princes, not that they may inflict capital punishment
themselves, but that this may be carried into effect by others in
virtue of their authority.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For murder
is a sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man can do an
injustice to himself, as is proved in Ethic. v, 11. Therefore no man
sins by killing himself.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public
authority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority is
sometimes an evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself.
Objection 3: Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a
lesser danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a man
to cut off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his whole
body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater evil,
for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a man may
kill himself.
Objection 4: Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16,
and yet he is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is
lawful for a man to kill himself.
Objection 5: Further, it is related (2 Mac. 14:42) that a certain
Razias killed himself, "choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into
the hands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble
birth." Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful.
Therefore suicide is not unlawful.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "Hence it follows
that the words 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a
man---not another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills
himself, kills nothing else than a man."
I answer that, It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three
reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result
being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists
corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the
inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love
himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the
natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as such,
belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so,
as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he
injures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11).
Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to His
power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life,
sins against God, even as he who kills another's slave, sins against
that slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a
matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce
sentence of death and life, according to Dt. 32:39, "I will kill and I
will make to live."
Reply to Objection 1: Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary
to justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man
should have towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in
relation to oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is
sinful, by reason also of its opposition to justice.
Reply to Objection 2: One who exercises public authority may lawfully
put to death an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no
man is judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who
exercises public authority to put himself to death for any sin
whatever: although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of
others.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is made master of himself through his
free-will: wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those
matters which pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will.
But the passage from this life to another and happier one is subject
not to man's free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful
for man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor
that he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life,
because the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon
oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to
adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is
unlawful to take one's own life on account of one's having committed a
sin, both because by so doing one does oneself a very great injury, by
depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because it is
not lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public
authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself lest she be
violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the very great sin
of suicide, to avoid the lesser sir; of another. For she commits no sin
in being violated by force, provided she does not consent, since
"without consent of the mind there is no stain on the body," as the
Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that fornication and adultery
are less grievous sins than taking a man's, especially one's own, life:
since the latter is most grievous, because one injures oneself, to whom
one owes the greatest love. Moreover it is most dangerous since no time
is left wherein to expiate it by repentance. Again it is not lawful for
anyone to take his own life for fear he should consent to sin, because
"evil must not be done that good may come" (Rom. 3:8) or that evil may
be avoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain
event, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future time consent
to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from sin under any
temptation whatever.
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "not even
Samson is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his
enemies under the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had
wrought many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him to do
this." He assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women,
who at the time of persecution took their own lives, and who are
commemorated by the Church.
Reply to Objection 5: It belongs to fortitude that a man does not
shrink from being slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue,
and that he may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to
avoid penal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which
reason some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to
act from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a
weakness of soul unable to bear penal evils, as the Philosopher (Ethic.
iii, 7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei 22,23) declare.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to kill the innocent?
Objection 1: It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill the
innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on the
contrary "the fear of the Lord driveth out sin" (Ecclus. 1:27). Now
Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing
to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin, kill an
innocent person.
Objection 2: Further, among those sins that are committed against one's
neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous
injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a
greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the
latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life to
the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to kill a
sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a righteous
person.
Objection 3: Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice
is not a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of
justice, to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is
bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man whom
he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses; and
again the executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to death the
man who has been unjustly sentenced.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:7): "The innocent and just
person thou shalt not put to death."
I answer that, An individual man may be considered in two ways: first,
in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider a
man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in every man
though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made,
and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above
[2904](A[2]) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the
common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other hand the life of
righteous men preserves and forwards the common good, since they are
the chief part of the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to
slay the innocent.
Reply to Objection 1: God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree
both the sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command
kills an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he
executes: indeed his obedience to God's commands is a proof that he
fears Him.
Reply to Objection 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider
the essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just
man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first,
because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in
opposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man
who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to
justice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater good:
fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Lk. 10:16, "He
that despiseth you despiseth Me." On the other hand it is accidental to
the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be received by God
into glory.
Reply to Objection 3: If the judge knows that man who has been
convicted by false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine
the witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting
the innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment
by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he
pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he
that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be
guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has condemned
an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, he
should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions of
the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest injustice, he does not
has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he who
slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
Objection 1: It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in
self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "I do not
agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by
him; unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one
does it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so,
provided it be in keeping with one's person." Now he who kills a man in
self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this would
seem to be unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "How are they free
from sin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a
man's life for the sake of these contemptible things?" Now among
contemptible things he reckons "those which men may forfeit
unwillingly," as appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the
chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful for
any man to take another's life for the sake of the life of his own
body.
Objection 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his
clericis] says in the Decretals: "Concerning the clerics about whom you
have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in
self-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may
return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know that in
no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any circumstances
whatever." Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral
precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in
self-defense.
Objection 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or
adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery
or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since the
spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no
man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in order to save
his own life.
Objection 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according
to Mat. 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according
to Rom. 12:19: "Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my
dearly beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man,
is also unlawful.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:2): "If a thief be found
breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die;
he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is much more
lawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a
man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.
I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only
one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now
moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not
according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as
explained above (Q[43], A[3]; [2905]FS, Q[12], A[1]). Accordingly the
act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's
life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act,
since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful,
seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as
far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an
act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end.
Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence,
it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his
defense will be lawful, because according to the jurists [*Cap.
Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it is lawful to repel
force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless
defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of
moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since
one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But
as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public authority
acting for the common good, as stated above [2906](A[3]), it is not
lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for
such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in
self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a
soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge
struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by
private animosity.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case
when one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The
passage quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the same
sense. Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things," whereby
he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to the Second
Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless
of taking a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly
condemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man
in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but
to defend himself.
Reply to Objection 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not
necessarily directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the
act whence sometimes results the taking of a man's life.
Reply to Objection 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that
which comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending
yourselves---that is, not striking your enemy back."
Whether one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance?
Objection 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing
someone by chance. For we read (Gn. 4:23,24) that Lamech slew a man in
mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does not say so, but
this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gn. 4:23], and that he
was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one incurs the guilt of
murder through killing a man by chance.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If . . . one strike a
woman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue
thereupon, he shall render life for life." Yet this may happen without
any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder
through killing someone by chance.
Objection 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons
prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not
due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs the
guilt of murder.
On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "When we do a
thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally
cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us." Now it
sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of
something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is
not accounted guilty.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) "chance is a
cause that acts beside one's intention." Hence chance happenings,
strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary. And since every
sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv) it
follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.
Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly
voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally,
according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental
cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide
results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of
voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes
another's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which he
ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care. Hence,
according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and take due
care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is not guilty
of that person's death: whereas if he be occupied with something
unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due care, he does
not escape being guilty of murder, if his action results in someone's
death.
Reply to Objection 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid
taking a man's life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of
homicide.
Reply to Objection 2: He that strikes a woman with child does something
unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or
of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, especially
seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the canons a penalty, is inflicted
on those who cause death unintentionally, through doing something
unlawful, or failing to take sufficient care.
__________________________________________________________________
OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The mutilation of members;
(2) Blows;
(3) Imprisonment;
(4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are
aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with others?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in some cases it may be lawful to maim anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim
anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists in
departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is
contrary to nature." Now according to nature it is appointed by God
that a man's body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary
to nature that it should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems
that it is always a sin to maim a person.
Objection 2: Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are
the parts of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it
is unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by
public authority. Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone, except
perhaps by public authority.
Objection 3: Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the
welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself for
the sake of the soul's welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P. I,
sect. 4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they
might preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other
reason to maim a person.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."
I answer that, Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is
for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a
member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is
expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself
useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen
to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to
the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and retains
its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury to the
whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end to the
whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above
([2907]Q[61], A[1];[2908] Q[64], AA[2],5), it may happen that although
the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may
nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as it
is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of restraining
sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of
life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so is he
deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. But this is not
lawful for a private individual, even with the consent of the owner of
the member, because this would involve an injury to the community, to
whom the man and all his parts belong. If, however, the member be
decayed and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body, then it
is lawful with the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the
member for the welfare of the whole body, since each one is entrusted
with the care of his own welfare. The same applies if it be done with
the consent of the person whose business it is to care for the welfare
of the person who has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether
unlawful to maim anyone.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a
particular nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus
death and corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the
particular nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping
with universal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary
to the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is
nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common
good.
Reply to Objection 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to
something belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is
directed to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to
take anyone's life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted
the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be
directed to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases can
pertain to him.
Reply to Objection 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of
the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to
further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further
one's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, because
sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no case is it
allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever. Hence
Chrysostom, in his exposition on Mat. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in Matth.),
"There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of
heaven," says: "Not by maiming themselves, but by destroying evil
thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself, since they are
murderers who do such things." And further on he says: "Nor is lust
tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more importunate, for the
seed springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an incontinent
purpose and a careless mind: and temptation is curbed not so much by
cutting off a member as by curbing one's thoughts."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their
slaves?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their
children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4):
"You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on
(Eph. 9:6): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg.:
'to them'] forbearing threatenings." Now some are provoked to anger by
blows, and become more troublesome when threatened. Therefore neither
should parents strike their children, nor masters their slaves.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a
father's words are admonitory and not coercive." Now blows are a kind
of coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their
children.
Objection 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for
this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above ([2909]Q[32],
A[2]). If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children
for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for
any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same
conclusion follows.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod
hateth his son," and further on (Prov. 23:13): "Withhold not correction
from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he shall not die.
Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul from hell."
Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): "Torture and fetters are for a
malicious slave."
I answer that, Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as when
it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while a blow
merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm
than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a person a harm,
except by way of punishment in the cause of justice. Again, no man
justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction.
Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have
some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject
to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a
parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that
instruction may be enforced by correction.
Reply to Objection 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is
aroused chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to
provoke their children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking
their children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows
on them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear
from threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that
they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of
correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their
threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness
temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: The greater power should exercise the greater
coercion. Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of
a city has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable
punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the father
and the master who preside over the family household, which is an
imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is exercised
by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows, which do not
inflict irreparable harm.
Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a
willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to
those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by
blows.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to imprison a man?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which
deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above
([2910]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter
for imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is
unlawful to imprison a man.
Objection 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice.
Now according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God left man in the hand of his own
counsel." Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by
chains or prisons.
Objection 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from
doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from doing
this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order to
restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a
man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion
follows.
On the contrary, We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for the
sin of blasphemy.
I answer that, In the goods three things may be considered in due
order. First, the substantial integrity of the body, and this is
injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses,
and to this striking or anything causing a sense of pain is opposed.
Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by
binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.
Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless
it be done according to the order of justice, either in punishment, or
as a measure of precaution against some evil.
Reply to Objection 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him
deserves to lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the
free use of his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the order of His wisdom God
sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to Job
5:12: "Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so that
their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes He
allows them to do what they will." In like manner, according to human
justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain ones.
Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a
time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man
prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from
striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in
general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong
primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him
from doing not only evil but also good deeds.
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Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are
perpetrated on those who are connected with others?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact
that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected
with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character from
inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil
inflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that
which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an injury
inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous.
Objection 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do
injuries to orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17):
"He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when
she poureth out her complaint." Now the widow and the orphan are not
connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated
through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others.
Objection 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own
just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary
for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the
case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now these
injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary
commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 28:32) as though indicating an
aggravating circumstance: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall be given to
another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg.: 'May thy sons and thy
daughters be given,' etc.]."
I answer that, Other things being equal, an injury is a more grievous
sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is that it is a
more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in authority than a
private individual, because it conduces to the injury of the whole
community, as stated above ([2911]FS, Q[73], A[9]). Now when an injury
is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with another, that
injury affects two persons, so that, other things being equal, the sin
is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen, however, that in view
of certain circumstances, a sin committed against one who is not
connected with any other person, is more grievous, on account of either
the dignity of the person, or the greatness of the injury.
Reply to Objection 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with
others is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than
if it were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view
it is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the
person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man is
guilty through injuring the other one in himself.
Reply to Objection 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more
insisted upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the
same injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they
have no one to turn to for relief.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to
the adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is
concerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed
her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her
husband, since "the wife hath not power of her own body; but the
husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. of adultery,
however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to chastity, we
shall speak in the treatise on Temperance ([2912]Q[154], A[8]).
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OF THEFT AND ROBBERY (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures
his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.
Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?
(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?
(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property?
(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?
(5) Whether every theft is a sin?
(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?
(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?
(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?
(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?
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Whether it is natural for man to possess external things?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess
external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is
God's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God, according
to Ps. 23:1, "The earth is the Lord's," etc. Therefore it is not
natural for man to possess external things.
Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man
(Lk. 12:18), "I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my
goods," says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: "Tell me: which are thine? where
did you take them from and bring them into being?" Now whatever man
possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does
not naturally possess external things.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad
Gratianum, i, 1]) "dominion denotes power." But man has no power over
external things, since he can work no change in their nature. Therefore
the possession of external things is not natural to man.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 8:8): "Thou hast subjected all
things under his feet."
I answer that, External things can be considered in two ways. First, as
regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but
only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as
regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion over
external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use
them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the
imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above
([2913]Q[64], A[1]). It is by this argument that the Philosopher proves
(Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external things is natural to man.
Moreover, this natural dominion of man over other creatures, which is
competent to man in respect of his reason wherein God's image resides,
is shown forth in man's creation (Gn. 1:26) by the words: "Let us make
man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the
fishes of the sea," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and
He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the
sustenance of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion
over things, as regards the power to make use of them.
Reply to Objection 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external
things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received them
from another, namely from God.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the dominion over
external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to God
alone, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his
own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now
according to the natural law all things are common property: and the
possession of property is contrary to this community of goods.
Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing
to himself.
Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man
quoted above (A[1], OBJ[2]), says: "The rich who deem as their own
property the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who
by going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and
appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use." Now it
would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of common
goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what belongs
to the community.
Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his
words are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: "Let
no man call his own that which is common property": and by "common" he
means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it seems
unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): "The
'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves
that name, because they do not admit into their communion persons who
are married or possess anything of their own, such as both monks and
clerics who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic
Church." Now the reason why these people are heretics was because
severing themselves from the Church, they think that those who enjoy
the use of the above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope
of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful
for a man to possess property.
I answer that, Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior
things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this
regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is
necessary to human life for three reasons. First because every man is
more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is
common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and
leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where
there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs
are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with
taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be
confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately.
Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is
contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise
more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed.
The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external
things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external
things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to
communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1
Tim. 6:17,18): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to
communicate to others," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural
law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be
possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own:
but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural
law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive
law, as stated above ([2914]Q[57], AA[2],3). Hence the ownership of
possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto
devised by human reason.
Reply to Objection 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going
beforehand to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts
unlawfully if by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner
a rich man does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking
possession of something which at first was common property, and gives
others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from
using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are you rich
while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a
good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?"
Reply to Objection 3: When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that
which is common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore
he adds: "He who spends too much is a robber."
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Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another's thing secretly?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take
another's thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not,
apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends
to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as
indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some (Is. 3:9):
"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid
it." Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in
taking another's thing secretly.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A[2],
OBJ[3], Can. Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals
[*Dist. xlvii]: "It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than
to refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off." Therefore
just as theft consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist in
keeping it back.
Objection 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that
which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with
another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it is
not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's thing
secretly.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Fur' [thief] is derived from
'furvus' and so from 'fuscus' [dark], because he takes advantage of the
night."
I answer that, Three things combine together to constitute theft. The
first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to
each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take
possession of what is another's. The second thing belongs to theft as
distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such
as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be
about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not as a
possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as
a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his daughter
or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third
difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in
a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs properly
to theft that it consists in "taking another's thing secretly."
Reply to Objection 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a
man employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and
guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a species
of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is merely a
circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is a
sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.
Reply to Objection 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the
same kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust
detention is included in an unjust taking.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person
simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit
belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is
the depositary's, and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply, but
as regards its custody.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of
different species. For theft and robbery differ as "secret" and
"manifest": because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery
is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of
sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically. Therefore
theft and robbery are not different species of sin.
Objection 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as
stated above ([2915]FS, Q[1], A[3]; Q[18], A[6]). Now theft and robbery
are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another's
property. Therefore they do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of
possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore
Isidore says (Etym. x) that "he who commits a rape is called a
corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted." Now it
is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or
secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by
force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and
robbery do not differ.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft from
robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that robbery is
done openly.
I answer that, Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in as
much as one man does another an injustice. Now "no man suffers an
injustice willingly," as stated in Ethic. v, 9. Wherefore theft and
robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being
involuntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken. Now
the involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through
ignorance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect of
robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ
specifically.
Reply to Objection 1: In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is
not derived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to
justice: and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there
is a different species of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The remote end of robbery and theft is the same.
But this is not enough for identity of species, because there is a
difference of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing
by his own power, but the thief, by cunning.
Reply to Objection 3: The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the
part of the woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as
regards the others from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery
remains on the part of the woman to whom violence is done.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether theft is always a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin
is commanded by God, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): "He hath
commanded no man to do wickedly." Yet we find that God commanded theft,
for it is written (Ex. 12:35,36): "And the children of Israel did as
the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: 'as Moses had commanded']. . . and
they stripped the Egyptians." Therefore theft is not always a sin.
Objection 2: Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes
it, he seems to commit a theft, for he takes another's property. Yet
this seems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold.
[*See loc. cit. in Reply.] Therefore it seems that theft is not always
a sin.
Objection 3: Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to
sin, because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy
its equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his
own property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another.
Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:15): "Thou shalt not steal."
I answer that, If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will find
that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its opposition to
justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that for this reason
theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking of what belongs to
another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the
thief, by laying hands on another's property secretly and cunningly.
Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: It is no theft for a man to take another's
property either secretly or openly by order of a judge who has
commanded him to do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact
that it is adjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still
less was it a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the
Egyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done on
account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians without
any cause: wherefore it is written significantly (Wis. 10:19): "The
just took the spoils of the wicked."
Reply to Objection 2: With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must
be made. For some there are that were never in anyone's possession, for
instance precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such
the finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst.
II, i, De rerum divis.]. The same applies to treasure hidden
underground long since and belonging to no man, except that according
to civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the land,
if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst. II, i,
39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable of the Gospel (Mat.
13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden in a field that
he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to acquire the right of
possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land the treasure-trove may
be nearly in someone's possession: and then if anyone take it with the
intention, not of keeping it but of returning it to the owner who does
not look upon such things as unappropriated, he is not guilty of theft.
In like manner if the thing found appears to be unappropriated, and if
the finder believes it to be so, although he keep it, he does not
commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47]. In any other case the sin of theft
is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De acquirend, rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II,
i, 48]: wherefore Augustine says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb.
Apost.): "If thou hast found a thing and not returned it, thou hast
stolen it" (Dig. xiv, 5, can. Si quid invenisti).
Reply to Objection 3: He who by stealth takes his own property which is
deposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound either
to restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is clearly
guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his burden. On
the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property, if this be
unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; yet not because he
burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to restitution or
compensation: but he sins against general justice by disregarding the
order of justice and usurping judgment concerning his own property.
Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor to allay whatever
scandal he may have given his neighbor by acting this way.
Whether theft is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is
written (Prov. 6:30): "The fault is not so great when a man hath
stolen." But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is not
a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death.
But in the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity,
according to Ex. 22:1, "If any man steal an ox or a sheep . . . he
shall restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep."
Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great
things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with eternal
death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a quill.
Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save for a
mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to Zech. 5:3,
"This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the earth; for
every thief shall be judged as is there written." Therefore theft is a
mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[59], A[4]; [2916]FS, Q[72], A[5]), a
mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life of
the soul. Now charity consists principally in the love of God, and
secondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing
and doing him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our neighbor
in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another habitually, human
society would be undone. Therefore theft, as being opposed to charity,
is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault is
in view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through
necessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we
shall show further on [2917](A[7]). Hence the text continues: "For he
stealeth to fill his hungry soul." Secondly, theft is stated not to be
a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is
punished with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that
"if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . . but he that is an
adulterer . . . shall destroy his own soul."
Reply to Objection 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal rather
than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment
which is pronounced against sinners "according to truth" (Rom. 2:2).
Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death
punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such as
inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible
deformity. Hence according to the present judgment the pain of death is
not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an irreparable harm,
except when it is aggravated by some grave circumstance, as in the case
of sacrilege which is the theft of a sacred thing, of peculation, which
is theft of common property, as Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super
Joan.), and of kidnaping which is stealing a man, for which the pain of
death is inflicted (Ex. 21:16).
Reply to Objection 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is little:
so that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters:
and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not
against the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very
little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet
if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a
mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be
through consent in a mere thought.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need.
For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is
stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): "If anyone, through stress of
hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do penance
for three weeks." Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress of
need.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "there
are some actions whose very name implies wickedness," and among these
he reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done
for a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to
remedy a need.
Objection 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now,
according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal in
order to succor one's neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither
is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one's own needs.
On the contrary, In cases of need all things are common property, so
that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property, for
need has made it common.
I answer that, Things which are of human right cannot derogate from
natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order
established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for the
purpose of succoring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the division
and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not
preclude the fact that man's needs have to be remedied by means of
these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in superabundance
is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For this
reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit., A[2], OBJ[3]] says, and his words are
embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut ii): "It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
store away, the money that you bury in the earth is the price of the
poor man's ransom and freedom."
Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible
for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is
entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them
he may come to the aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the
need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present
need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a
person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible
remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of
another's property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this
properly speaking theft or robbery.
Reply to Objection 1: This decretal considers cases where there is no
urgent need.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not theft, properly speaking, to take
secretly and use another's property in a case of extreme need: because
that which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own
property by reason of that need.
Reply to Objection 3: In a case of a like need a man may also take
secretly another's property in order to succor his neighbor in need.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether robbery may be committed without sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin.
For spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the
essence of robbery, according to what has been said [2918](A[4]). Now
it is lawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De
Patriarch. 4 [*De Abraham i, 3]): "When the conqueror has taken
possession of the spoils, military discipline demands that all should
be reserved for the sovereign," in order, to wit, that he may
distribute them. Therefore in certain cases robbery is lawful.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his.
Now the things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine
says (Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii.): "You falsely call things your
own, for you do not possess them justly, and according to the laws of
earthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them." Therefore it seems
that one may lawfully rob unbelievers.
Objection 3: Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from
their subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem a
grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that case
nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases robbery is
lawful.
On the contrary, Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God in
sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds of
robbery, according to Is. 61:8, "I am the Lord that love judgment, and
hate robbery in a holocaust." Therefore it is not lawful to take
anything by robbery.
I answer that, Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion employed
in taking unjustly from a man that which is his. Now in human society
no man can exercise coercion except through public authority: and,
consequently, if a private individual not having public authority takes
another's property by violence, he acts unlawfully and commits a
robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes, the public power is
entrusted to them that they may be the guardians of justice: hence it
is unlawful for them to use violence or coercion, save within the
bounds of justice---either by fighting against the enemy, or against
the citizens, by punishing evil-doers: and whatever is taken by
violence of this kind is not the spoils of robbery, since it is not
contrary to justice. On the other hand to take other people's property
violently and against justice, in the exercise of public authority, is
to act unlawfully and to be guilty of robbery; and whoever does so is
bound to restitution.
Reply to Objection 1: A distinction must be made in the matter of
spoils. For if they who take spoils from the enemy, are waging a just
war, such things as they seize in the war become their own property.
This is no robbery, so that they are not bound to restitution.
Nevertheless even they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking
spoils through cupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit,
they fight chiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augustine says
(De Verb. Dom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that "it is a sin to fight for
booty." If, however, those who take the spoil, are waging an unjust
war, they are guilty of robbery, and are bound to restitution.
Reply to Objection 2: Unbelievers possess their goods unjustly in so
far as they are ordered by the laws of earthly princes to forfeit those
goods. Hence these may be taken violently from them, not by private but
by public authority.
Reply to Objection 3: It is no robbery if princes exact from their
subjects that which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common
good, even if they use violence in so doing: but if they extort
something unduly by means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary
is. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): "If justice be
disregarded, what is a king but a mighty robber? since what is a robber
but a little king?" And it is written (Ezech. 22:27): "Her princes in
the midst of her, are like wolves ravening the prey." Wherefore they
are bound to restitution, just as robbers are, and by so much do they
sin more grievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with
greater and more universal danger to public justice whose wardens they
are.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether theft is a more grievous sin than robbery?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft is a more grievous sin than
robbery. For theft adds fraud and guile to the taking of another's
property: and these things are not found in robbery. Now fraud and
guile are sinful in themselves, as stated above ([2919]Q[55], AA[4],5).
Therefore theft is a more grievous sin than robbery.
Objection 2: Further, shame is fear about a wicked deed, as stated in
Ethic. iv, 9. Now men are more ashamed of theft than of robbery.
Therefore theft is more wicked than robbery.
Objection 3: Further, the more persons a sin injures the more grievous
it would seem to be. Now the great and the lowly may be injured by
theft: whereas only the weak can be injured by robbery, since it is
possible to use violence towards them. Therefore the sin of theft seems
to be more grievous than the sin of robbery.
On the contrary, According to the laws robbery is more severely
punished than theft.
I answer that, Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated above
([2920]AA[4],6), on account of the involuntariness on the part of the
person from whom something is taken: yet so that in theft the
involuntariness is due to ignorance, whereas in robbery it is due to
violence. Now a thing is more involuntary through violence than through
ignorance, because violence is more directly opposed to the will than
ignorance. Therefore robbery is a more grievous sin than theft. There
is also another reason, since robbery not only inflicts a loss on a
person in his things, but also conduces to the ignominy and injury of
his person, and this is of graver import than fraud or guile which
belong to theft. Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: Men who adhere to sensible things think more of
external strength which is evidenced in robbery, than of internal
virtue which is forfeit through sin: wherefore they are less ashamed of
robbery than of theft.
Reply to Objection 3: Although more persons may be injured by theft
than by robbery, yet more grievous injuries may be inflicted by robbery
than by theft: for which reason also robbery is more odious.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice, that
consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider (1)
those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and (2) injurious
words uttered extra-judicially.
Under the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The
injustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice of the prosecutor in
accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself; (4)
The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence; (5) The injustice of
the advocate in defending.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject?
(2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to
deliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is known to him?
(3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused?
(4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is not
subject to his jurisdiction. For it is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel
sentenced the ancients who were convicted of bearing false witness. But
these ancients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were judges of
the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that is not subject
to his jurisdiction.
Objection 2: Further, Christ was no man's subject, indeed He was "King
of kings and Lord of lords" (Apoc. 19:16). Yet He submitted to the
judgment of a man. Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge one
that is not subject to his jurisdiction.
Objection 3: Further, according to the law [*Cap. Licet ratione, de
Foro Comp.] a man is tried in this or that court according to his kind
of offense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject of the man
whose business it is to judge in that particular place, for instance
when the defendant belongs to another diocese or is exempt. Therefore
it seems that a man may judge one that is not his subject.
On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, epist. 64] in commenting on Dt.
23:25, "If thou go into thy friend's corn," etc. says: "Thou mayest not
put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is entrusted to another."
I answer that, A judge's sentence is like a particular law regarding
some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law should have
coercive power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9), so too the
sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby either party is
compelled to comply with the judge's sentence; else the judgment would
be of no effect. Now coercive power is not exercised in human affairs,
save by those who hold public authority: and those who have this
authority are accounted the superiors of those over whom they preside
whether by ordinary or by delegated authority. Hence it is evident that
no man can judge others than his subjects and this in virtue either of
delegated or of ordinary authority.
Reply to Objection 1: In judging those ancients Daniel exercised an
authority delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated where
it is said (Dan. 13:45) that "the Lord raised up the . . . spirit of a
young boy."
Reply to Objection 2: In human affairs a man may submit of his own
accord to the judgment of others although these be not his superiors,
an example of which is when parties agree to a settlement by
arbitrators. Wherefore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be
upheld by a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising
authority in the case, have not of themselves full power of coercion.
Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own accord submit to human
judgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [*Leo IV] submit to the judgment of
the emperor [*Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, qu. 7].
Reply to Objection 3: The bishop of the defendant's diocese becomes the
latter's superior as regards the fault committed, even though he be
exempt: unless perchance the defendant offend in a matter exempt from
the bishop's authority, for instance in administering the property of
an exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a theft, or a
murder or the like, he may be justly condemned by the ordinary.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth
that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment
against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the
contrary. For it is written (Dt. 17:9): "Thou shalt come to the priests
of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time; and
thou shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth of the
judgment." Now sometimes certain things are alleged against the truth,
as when something is proved by means of false witnesses. Therefore it
is unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment according to what is
alleged and proved in opposition to the truth which he knows.
Objection 2: Further, in pronouncing judgment a man should conform to
the Divine judgment, since "it is the judgment of God" (Dt. 1:17). Now
"the judgment of God is according to the truth" (Rom. 2:2), and it was
foretold of Christ (Is. 11:3,4): "He shall not judge according to the
sight of the eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of the ears.
But He shall judge the poor with justice, and shall reprove with equity
for the meek of the earth." Therefore the judge ought not to pronounce
judgment according to the evidence before him if it be contrary to what
he knows himself.
Objection 3: Further, the reason why evidence is required in a court of
law, is that the judge may have a faithful record of the truth of the
matter, wherefore in matters of common knowledge there is no need of
judicial procedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, "Some men's sins are
manifest, going before to judgment." Consequently, if the judge by his
personal knowledge is aware of the truth, he should pay no heed to the
evidence, but should pronounce sentence according to the truth which he
knows.
Objection 4: Further, the word "conscience" denotes application of
knowledge to a matter of action as stated in the [2921]FP, Q[79],
A[13]. Now it is a sin to act contrary to one's knowledge. Therefore a
judge sins if he pronounces sentence according to the evidence but
against his conscience of the truth.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm. 20] says in
his commentary on the Psalter: "A good judge does nothing according to
his private opinion but pronounces sentence according to the law and
the right." Now this is to pronounce judgment according to what is
alleged and proved in court. Therefore a judge ought to pronounce
judgment in accordance with these things, and not according to his
private opinion.
I answer that, As stated above [2922](A[1]; Q[60], AA[2],6) it is the
duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as much as he exercises public
authority, wherefore his judgment should be based on information
acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a private individual, but
from what he knows as a public person. Now the latter knowledge comes
to him both in general and in particular ---in general through the
public laws, whether Divine or human, and he should admit no evidence
that conflicts therewith---in some particular matter, through documents
and witnesses, and other legal means of information, which in
pronouncing his sentence, he ought to follow rather than the
information he has acquired as a private individual. And yet this same
information may be of use to him, so that he can more rigorously sift
the evidence brought forward, and discover its weak points. If,
however, he is unable to reject that evidence juridically, he must, as
stated above, follow it in pronouncing sentence.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why, in the passage quoted, it is
stated that the judges should first of all be asked their reasons, is
to make it clear that the judges ought to judge the truth in accordance
with the evidence.
Reply to Objection 2: To judge belongs to God in virtue of His own
power: wherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He Himself
knows, and not on knowledge imparted by others: the same is to be said
of Christ, Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges do not
judge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle refers to the case where something is
well known not to the judge alone, but both to him and to others, so
that the guilty party can by no means deny his guilt (as in the case of
notorious criminals), and is convicted at once from the evidence of the
fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the judge, but not to
others, or to others, but not to the judge, then it is necessary for
the judge to sift the evidence.
Reply to Objection 4: In matters touching his own person, a man must
form his conscience from his own knowledge, but in matters concerning
the public authority, he must form his conscience in accordance with
the knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a judge may condemn a man who is not accused?
Objection 1: It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man who
is not accused. For human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now
God judges the sinner even though there be no accuser. Therefore it
seems that a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even though
there be no accuser.
Objection 2: Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure in
order that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the
crime may come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation;
for instance, by denunciation, or by evil report, or through the judge
himself being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a man
without there being an accuser.
Objection 3: Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in Holy
Writ, as models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same time the
accuser and the judge of the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it is
not contrary to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while
being at the same time his accuser.
On the contrary, Ambrose in his commentary on 1 Cor. 5:2, expounding
the Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that "a judge should not
condemn without an accuser, since our Lord did not banish Judas, who
was a thief, yet was not accused."
I answer that, A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to one
who is the personification of justice." Now, as stated above
([2923]Q[58], A[2] ), justice is not between a man and himself but
between one man and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between two
parties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor, and the other
the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases the judge cannot sentence a
man unless the latter has an accuser, according to Acts 25:16: "It is
not the custom of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he who is
accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to make his answer,
to clear himself of the crimes" of which he is accused.
Reply to Objection 1: God, in judging man, takes the sinner's
conscience as his accuser, according to Rom. 2:15, "Their thoughts
between themselves accusing, or also defending one another"; or again,
He takes the evidence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according
to Gn. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the
earth."
Reply to Objection 2: Public disgrace takes the place of an accuser.
Hence a gloss on Gn. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood," etc.
says: "There is no need of an accuser when the crime committed is
notorious." In a case of denunciation, as stated above ([2924]Q[33],
A[7]), the amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended:
wherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is done against
him, but for him, so that no accuser is required. The punishment that
is inflicted is on account of his rebellion against the Church, and
since this rebellion is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser. The
fact that the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not authorize him
to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the order of judicial
procedure.
Reply to Objection 3: God, in judging man, proceeds from His own
knowledge of the truth, whereas man does not, as stated above
[2925](A[2]). Hence a man cannot be accuser, witness and judge at the
same time, as God is. Daniel was at once accuser and judge, because he
was the executor of the sentence of God, by whose instinct he was
moved, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the judge can lawfully remit the punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judge can lawfully remit the
punishment. For it is written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy"
shall be done "to him that hath not done mercy." Now no man is punished
for not doing what he cannot do lawfully. Therefore any judge can
lawfully do mercy by remitting the punishment.
Objection 2: Further, human judgment should imitate the Divine
judgment. Now God remits the punishment to sinners, because He desires
not the death of the sinner, according to Ezech. 18:23. Therefore a
human judge also may lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents.
Objection 3: Further, it is lawful for anyone to do what is profitable
to some one and harmful to none. Now the remission of his punishment
profits the guilty man and harms nobody. Therefore the judge can
lawfully loose a guilty man from his punishment.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 13:8,9) concerning anyone who would
persuade a man to serve strange gods: "Neither let thy eye spare him to
pity and conceal him, but thou shalt presently put him to death": and
of the murderer it is written (Dt. 19:12,13): "He shall die. Thou shalt
not pity him."
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said
([2926]AA[2],3), with regard to the question in point, two things may
be observed in connection with a judge. One is that he has to judge
between accuser and defendant, while the other is that he pronounces
the judicial sentence, in virtue of his power, not as a private
individual but as a public person. Accordingly on two counts a judge is
hindered from loosing a guilty person from his punishment. First on the
part of the accuser, whose right it sometimes is that the guilty party
should be punished---for instance on account of some injury committed
against the accuser---because it is not in the power of a judge to
remit such punishment, since every judge is bound to give each man his
right. Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part of the commonwealth,
whose power he exercises, and to whose good it belongs that evil-doers
should be punished.
Nevertheless in this respect there is a difference between judges of
lower degree and the supreme judge, i.e. the sovereign, to whom the
entire public authority is entrusted. For the inferior judge has no
power to exempt a guilty man from punishment against the laws imposed
on him by his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting on John
19:11, "Thou shouldst not have any power against Me," says (Tract. cxvi
in Joan.): "The power which God gave Pilate was such that he was under
the power of Caesar, so that he was by no means free to acquit the
person accused." On the other hand the sovereign who has full authority
in the commonwealth, can lawfully remit the punishment to a guilty
person, provided the injured party consent to the remission, and that
this do not seem detrimental to the public good.
Reply to Objection 1: There is a place for the judge's mercy in matters
that are left to the judge's discretion, because in like matters a good
man is slow to punish as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But in
matters that are determined in accordance with Divine or human laws, it
is not left to him to show mercy.
Reply to Objection 2: God has supreme power of judging, and it concerns
Him whatever is done sinfully against anyone. Therefore He is free to
remit the punishment, especially since punishment is due to sin chiefly
because it is done against Him. He does not, however, remit the
punishment, except in so far as it becomes His goodness, which is the
source of all laws.
Reply to Objection 3: If the judge were to remit punishment
inordinately, he would inflict an injury on the community, for whose
good it behooves ill-deeds to be punished, in order that. men may avoid
sin. Hence the text, after appointing the punishment of the seducer,
adds (Dt. 13:11): "That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do no more
anything like this." He would also inflict harm on the injured person;
who is compensated by having his honor restored in the punishment of
the man who has injured him.
__________________________________________________________________
OF MATTERS CONCERNING UNJUST ACCUSATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man is bound to accuse?
(2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing?
(3) How is an accusation vitiated?
(4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man is bound to accuse?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For no
man is excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept,
since he would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are
disqualified from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of
evil fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet proved
to be innocent [*1 Tim. 1:5]. Therefore a man is not bound by a Divine
precept to accuse.
Objection 2: Further, every duty depends on charity which is "the end
of the precept" [*Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1]:
wherefore it is written (Rom. 13:8): "Owe no man anything, but to love
one another." Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that man owes
to all both of high and of low degree, both superiors and inferiors.
Since therefore subjects should not accuse their superiors, nor persons
of lower degree, those of a higher degree, as shown in several chapters
(Decret. II, qu. vii), it seems that it is no man's duty to accuse.
Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity which
he owes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what he would
not have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary
to the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Prov.
11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but he that is
faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend."
Therefore a man is not bound to accuse.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 5:1): "If any one sin, and hear
the voice of one swearing, and is a witness either because he himself
hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his
iniquity."
I answer that, As stated above ([2927]Q[33], AA[6],7;[2928] Q[67],
A[3], ad 2), the difference between denunciation and accusation is that
in denunciation we aim at a brother's amendment, whereas in accusation
we intend the punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this life
are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the final time
of retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducing either to
the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth whose
calm is ensured by the punishment of evil-doers. The former of these is
intended in denunciation, as stated, whereas the second regards
properly accusation. Hence in the case of a crime that conduces to the
injury of the commonwealth, a man is bound to accusation, provided he
can offer sufficient proof, since it is the accuser's duty to prove:
as, for example, when anyone's sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual
corruption of the community. If, however, the sin be not such as to
affect the community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is
not bound to attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he
cannot duly accomplish.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from
doing what men are under an obligation to do: for instance from
meriting eternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the Church.
Nor does a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to
fail to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are perfections
of man.
Reply to Objection 2: Subjects are debarred from accusing their
superiors, "if it is not the affection of charity but their own
wickedness that leads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their
superiors" [*Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7]
---or again if the subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself
guilty of crime [*Decret. II, qu. vii, can. Praesumunt.]. Otherwise,
provided they be in other respects qualified to accuse, it is lawful
for subjects to accuse their superiors out of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets
to the injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the good of
the community, which should always be preferred to a private good.
Hence it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the common
good: and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient
witnesses to prove it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary for the accusation to be made in writing?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for the accusation to be made in
writing. For writing was devised as an aid to the human memory of the
past. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore the
accusation needs not to be made in writing.
Objection 2: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Per
scripta) that "no man may accuse or be accused in his absence." Now
writing seems to be useful in the fact that it is a means of notifying
something to one who is absent, as Augustine declares (De Trin. x, 1).
Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all the more that
the canon declares that "no accusation in writing should be accepted."
Objection 3: Further, a man's crime is made known by denunciation, even
as by accusation. Now writing is unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore
it is seemingly unnecessary in accusation.
On the contrary, It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can.
Accusatorum) that "the role of accuser must never be sanctioned without
the accusation be in writing."
I answer that, As stated above ([2929]Q[67], A[3]), when the process in
a criminal case goes by way of accusation, the accuser is in the
position of a party, so that the judge stands between the accuser and
the accused for the purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it
behooves one to proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since
however verbal utterances are apt to escape one's memory, the judge
would be unable to know for certain what had been said and with what
qualifications, when he comes to pronounce sentence, unless it were
drawn up in writing. Hence it has with reason been established that the
accusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure, should be
put into writing.
Reply to Objection 1: Words are so many and so various that it is
difficult to remember each one. A proof of this is the fact that if a
number of people who have heard the same words be asked what was said,
they will not agree in repeating them, even after a short time. And
since a slight difference of words changes the sense, even though the
judge's sentence may have to be pronounced soon afterwards, the
certainty of judgment requires that the accusation be drawn up in
writing.
Reply to Objection 2: Writing is needed not only on account of the
absence of the person who has something to notify, or of the person to
whom something is notified, but also on account of the delay of time as
stated above (ad 1). Hence when the canon says, "Let no accusation be
accepted in writing" it refers to the sending of an accusation by one
who is absent: but it does not exclude the necessity of writing when
the accuser is present.
Reply to Objection 3: The denouncer does not bind himself to give
proofs: wherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this
reason writing is unnecessary in a denunciation: and it suffices that
the denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in
virtue of her office, to the correction of the brother.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an accusation is rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion?
Objection 1: It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust by
calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu. iii
[*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], "calumny consists in
falsely charging a person with a crime." Now sometimes one man falsely
accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which excuses him.
Therefore it seems that an accusation is not always rendered unjust
through being slanderous.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated by the same authority that
"collusion consists in hiding the truth about a crime." But seemingly
this is not unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime,
as stated above [2930](A[1]; Q[33], A[7]). Therefore it seems that an
accusation is not rendered unjust by collusion.
Objection 3: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "evasion
consists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation." But this can be
done without injustice: for it is stated there also: "If a man repent
of having made a wicked accusation and inscription* in a matter which
he cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the innocent party
whom he has accused, let them acquit one another." [*The accuser was
bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation.
The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser
bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same
punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.]
Therefore evasion does not render an accusation unjust.
On the contrary, It is stated by the same authority: "The rashness of
accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of
calumny, or of collusion, or of evasion."
I answer that, As stated above [2931](A[1]), accusation is ordered for
the common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of the
crime. Now no man ought to injure a person unjustly, in order to
promote the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when
making an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the
accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e.
by calumniating him; secondly, on the part of the commonwealth, whose
good is intended chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked
intent hinders a sin being punished. This again happens in two ways:
first by having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This
belongs to collusion [prevaricatio] for "he that is guilty of collusion
is like one who rides astraddle [varicator], because he helps the other
party, and betrays his own side" [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem
poenituerit.]. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from the accusation.
This is evasion [tergiversatio] for by desisting from what he had begun
he seems to turn his back [tergum vertere].
Reply to Objection 1: A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of
what he is quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place.
Yet he who falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator
unless he gives utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it
happens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to accuse
someone, because he believes too readily what he hears, and this
pertains to rashness; while, on the other hand sometimes a man is led
to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is not to
blame. All these things must be weighed according to the judge's
prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of calumny,
who through levity of mind or an error for which he is not to be blamed
has uttered a false accusation.
Reply to Objection 2: Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is
guilty of collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter about
which he makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant,
dissembling his proofs, and admitting false excuses.
Reply to Objection 3: Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from
the accusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow,
but inordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may
rightly desist from accusing without committing a sin ---in one way, in
the very process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the
matter of his accusation is false, and then by mutual consent the
accuser and the defendant acquit one another---in another way, if the
accusation be quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of the
common good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation.
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Whether an accuser who fails to prove his indictment is bound to the
punishment of retaliation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the accuser who fails to prove his
indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. For sometimes
a man is led by a just error to make an accusation, in which case the
judge acquit the accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu. iii. [*Append.
Grat., ad can. Si quem poenituerit.] Therefore the accuser who fails to
prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation.
Objection 2: Further, if the punishment of retaliation ought to be
inflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this will be on account of
the injury he has done to someone---but not on account of any injury
done to the person of the accused, for in that case the sovereign could
not remit this punishment, nor on account of an injury to the
commonwealth, because then the accused could not acquit him. Therefore
the punishment of retaliation is not due to one who has failed to prove
his accusation.
Objection 3: Further, the one same sin does not deserve a twofold
punishment, according to Nahum 1:9 [*Septuagint version]: "God shall
not judge the same thing a second time." But he who fails to prove his
accusation, incurs the punishment due to defamation [*Can. Infames,
caus. vi, qu. 1], which punishment even the Pope seemingly cannot
remit, according to a statement of Pope Gelasius [*Callist. I, Epist.
ad omn. Gall. episc.]: "Although we are able to save souls by Penance,
we are unable to remove the defamation." Therefore he is not bound to
suffer the punishment of retaliation.
On the contrary, Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): "He that fails to
prove his accusation, must himself suffer the punishment which his
accusation inferred."
I answer that, As stated above [2932](A[2]), in a case, where the
procedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds the position of a
party aiming at the punishment of the accused. Now the duty of the
judge is to establish the equality of justice between them: and the
equality of justice requires that a man should himself suffer whatever
harm he has intended to be inflicted on another, according to Ex.
21:24, "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Consequently it is just that he
who by accusing a man has put him in danger of being punished severely,
should himself suffer a like punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5) justice
does not always require counterpassion, because it matters considerably
whether a man injures another voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury
deserves punishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when the
judge becomes aware that a man has made a false accusation, not with a
mind to do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance or a just error,
he does not impose the punishment of retaliation.
Reply to Objection 2: He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the
person of the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is
punished on both counts. This is the meaning of what is written (Dt.
19:18-20): "And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find
that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother: then shall
render to him as he meant to do to his brother," and this refers to the
injury done to the person: and afterwards, referring to the injury done
to the commonwealth, the text continues: "And thou shalt take away the
evil out of the midst of thee, that others hearing may fear, and may
not dare to do such things." Specially, however, does he injure the
person of the accused, if he accuse him falsely. Wherefore the accused,
if innocent, may condone the injury done to himself, particularly if
the accusation were made not calumniously but out of levity of mind.
But if the accuser desist from accusing an innocent man, through
collusion with the latter's adversary, he inflicts an injury on the
commonwealth: and this cannot be condoned by the accused, although it
can be remitted by the sovereign, who has charge of the commonwealth.
Reply to Objection 3: The accuser deserves the punishment of
retaliation in compensation for the harm he attempts to inflict on his
neighbor: but the punishment of disgrace is due to him for his
wickedness in accusing another man calumniously. Sometimes the
sovereign remits the punishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he
removes the disgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can remove this
disgrace. When Pope Gelasius says: "We cannot remove the disgrace," he
may mean either the disgrace attaching to the deed [infamia facti], or
that sometimes it is not expedient to remove it, or again he may be
referring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian
states (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.).
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OF SINS COMMITTED AGAINST JUSTICE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT (FOUR ARTICLES
)
We must now consider those sins which are committed against justice on
the part of the defendant. Under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to
one's condemnation?
(2) Whether it is lawful to defend oneself with calumnies?
(3) Whether it is lawful to escape condemnation by appealing?
(4) Whether it is lawful for one who has been condemned to defend
himself by violence if he be able to do so?
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Whether one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to
one's condemnation?
Objection 1: It would seem one can, without a mortal sin, deny the
truth which would lead to one's condemnation. For Chrysostom says (Hom.
xxxi super Ep. ad Heb.): "I do not say that you should lay bare your
guilt publicly, nor accuse yourself before others." Now if the accused
were to confess the truth in court, he would lay bare his guilt and be
his own accuser. Therefore he is not bound to tell the truth: and so he
does not sin mortally if he tell a lie in court.
Objection 2: Further, just as it is an officious lie when one tells a
lie in order to rescue another man from death, so is it an officious
lie when one tells a lie in order to free oneself from death, since one
is more bound towards oneself than towards another. Now an officious
lie is considered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the
accused denies the truth in court, in order to escape death, he does
not sin mortally.
Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as
stated above ([2933]Q[24], A[12]). But that the accused lie by denying
himself to be guilty of the crime laid to his charge is not contrary to
charity, neither as regards the love we owe God, nor as to the love due
to our neighbor. Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Whatever is opposed to the glory of God is a mortal
sin, because we are bound by precept to "do all to the glory of God" (1
Cor. 10:31). Now it is to the glory of God that the accused confess
that which is alleged against him, as appears from the words of Josue
to Achan, "My son, give glory to the Lord God of Israel, and confess
and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not" (Joshua 7:19). Therefore
it is a mortal sin to lie in order to cover one's guilt.
I answer that, Whoever acts against the due order of justice, sins
mortally, as stated above ([2934]Q[59], A[4]). Now it belongs to the
order of justice that a man should obey his superior in those matters
to which the rights of his authority extend. Again, the judge, as
stated above ([2935]Q[67] , A[1]), is the superior in relation to the
person whom he judges. Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell
the judge the truth which the latter exacts from him according to the
form of law. Hence if he refuse to tell the truth which he is under
obligation to tell, or if he mendaciously deny it, he sins mortally.
If, on the other hand, the judge asks of him that which he cannot ask
in accordance with the order of justice, the accused is not bound to
satisfy him, and he may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise: but
it is not lawful for him to lie.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man is examined by the judge according to
the order of justice, he does not lay bare his own guilt, but his guilt
is unmasked by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed on
him by one whom he is bound to obey.
Reply to Objection 2: To lie, with injury to another person, in order
to rescue a man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an
admixture of the pernicious lie: and when a man lies in court in order
to exculpate himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound to
obey, since he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth.
Reply to Objection 3: He who lies in court by denying his guilt, acts
both against the love of God to whom judgment belongs, and against the
love of his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge, to whom
he refuses his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished if
he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written (Ps. 140:4):
"Incline not my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins": on which
words a gloss says: "Shameless men are wont by lying to deny their
guilt when they have been found out." And Gregory in expounding Job
31:33, "If as a man I have hid my sin," says (Moral. xxii, 15): "It is
a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to hide the sin
that has been committed, and when convicted to aggravate the sin by
defending oneself."
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Whether it is lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself
with calumnies. Because, according to civil law (Cod. II, iv, De
transact. 18), when a man is on trial for his life it is lawful for him
to bribe his adversary. Now this is done chiefly by defending oneself
with calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his life does
not sin if he defend himself with calumnies.
Objection 2: Further, an accuser who is guilty of collusion with the
accused, is punishable by law (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem
poenit.). Yet no punishment is imposed on the accused for collusion
with the accuser. Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to
defend himself with calumnies.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth
and declineth from evil, the fool leapeth over and is confident." Now
what is done wisely is no sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines
from evil, he does not sin.
On the contrary, In criminal cases an oath has to be taken against
calumnious allegations (Extra, De juramento calumniae, cap.
Inhaerentes): and this would not be the case if it were lawful to
defend oneself with calumnies. Therefore it is not lawful for the
accused to defend himself with calumnies.
I answer that, It is one thing to withhold the truth, and another to
utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is not
bound to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and must
require of him according to the order of justice; as, for instance,
when the accused is already disgraced through the commission of some
crime, or certain indications of his guilt have already been
discovered, or again when his guilt is already more or less proven. On
the other hand it is never lawful to make a false declaration.
As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can employ either lawful
means, and such as are adapted to the end in view, which belongs to
prudence; or he can use unlawful means, unsuitable to the proposed end,
and this belongs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and guile,
as shown above ([2936]Q[55], AA[3], seqq.). His conduct in the former
case is praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Accordingly it is lawful
for the accused to defend himself by withholding the truth that he is
not bound to avow, by suitable means, for instance by not answering
such questions as he is not bound to answer. This is not to defend
himself with calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is unlawful for
him, either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth that he is
bound to avow, or to employ guile or fraud, because fraud and guile
have the force of a lie, and so to use them would be to defend oneself
with calumnies.
Reply to Objection 1: Human laws leave many things unpunished, which
according to the Divine judgment are sins, as, for example, simple
fornication; because human law does not exact perfect virtue from man,
for such virtue belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a number
of people as human law has to direct. That a man is sometimes unwilling
to commit a sin in order to escape from the death of the body, the
danger of which threatens the accused who is on trial for his life, is
an act of perfect virtue, since "death is the most fearful of all
temporal things" (Ethic. iii, 6). Wherefore if the accused, who is on
trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins indeed by inducing
him to do what is unlawful, yet the civil law does not punish this sin,
and in this sense it is said to be lawful.
Reply to Objection 2: If the accuser is guilty of collusion with the
accused and the latter is guilty, he incurs punishment, and so it is
evident that he sins. Wherefore, since it is a sin to induce a man to
sin, or to take part in a sin in any way---for the Apostle says (Rom.
1:32), that "they . . . are worthy of death . . . that consent" to
those who sin---it is evident that the accused also sins if he is
guilty of collusion with his adversary. Nevertheless according to human
laws no punishment is inflicted on him, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: The wise man hides himself not by slandering
others but by exercising prudence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for the accused to escape judgment
by appealing. The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "Let every soul be subject
to the higher powers." Now the accused by appealing refuses to be
subject to a higher power, viz. the judge. Therefore he commits a sin.
Objection 2: Further, ordinary authority is more binding than that
which we choose for ourselves. Now according to the Decretals (II, qu.
vi, cap. A judicibus) it is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen
by common consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from
ordinary judges.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is lawful once is always lawful. But it
is not lawful to appeal after the tenth day [*Can. Anteriorum, caus.
ii, qu. 6], nor a third time on the same point [*Can. Si autem, caus.
ii, qu. 6]. Therefore it would seem that an appeal is unlawful in
itself.
On the contrary, Paul appealed to Caesar (Acts 25).
I answer that, There are two motives for which a man appeals. First
through confidence in the justice of his cause, seeing that he is
unjustly oppressed by the judge, and then it is lawful for him to
appeal, because this is a prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid
down (Decret. II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): "All those who are
oppressed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the judgment of the
priests, and no man may stand in their way." Secondly, a man appeals in
order to cause a delay, lest a just sentence be pronounced against him.
This is to defend oneself calumniously, and is unlawful as stated above
[2937](A[2]). For he inflicts an injury both on the judge, whom he
hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary, whose
justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is laid down (II,
qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): "Without doubt a man should be punished
if his appeal be declared unjust."
Reply to Objection 1: A man should submit to the lower authority in so
far as the latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the
lower authority departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to
submit to it, for instance "if the proconsul order one thing and the
emperor another," according to a gloss on Rom. 13:2. Now when a judge
oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order of
the higher authority, whereby he is obliged to judge justly. Hence it
is lawful for a man who is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to the
authority of the higher power, by appealing either before or after
sentence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed that there
is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is unlawful for a
Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge, according to Decretals II,
qu. vi, can. Catholicus: "The Catholic who appeals to the decision of a
judge of another faith shall be excommunicated, whether his case be
just or unjust." Hence the Apostle also rebuked those who went to law
before unbelievers (1 Cor. 6:6).
Reply to Objection 2: It is due to a man's own fault or neglect that,
of his own accord, he submits to the judgment of one in whose justice
he has no confidence. Moreover it would seem to point to levity of mind
for a man not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is
with reason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing from the
decision of judges of our own choice, who have no power save by virtue
of the consent of the litigants. On the other hand the authority of an
ordinary judge depends, not on the consent of those who are subject to
his judgment, but on the authority of the king or prince who appointed
him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust oppression, the law allows
one to have recourse to appeal, so that even if the judge be at the
same time ordinary and chosen by the litigants, it is lawful to appeal
from his decision, since seemingly his ordinary authority occasioned
his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor is it to be imputed as a fault to
the man who consented to his being arbitrator, without adverting to the
fact that he was appointed ordinary judge by the prince.
Reply to Objection 3: The equity of the law so guards the interests of
the one party that the other is not oppressed. Thus it allows ten days
for appeal to be made, this being considered sufficient time for
deliberating on the expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand there
were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of judgment would
ever be in suspense, so that the other party would suffer an injury.
The reason why it is not allowed to appeal a third time on the same
point, is that it is not probable that the judges would fail to judge
justly so many times.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he
can?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man who is condemned to death may
lawfully defend himself if he can. For it is always lawful to do that
to which nature inclines us, as being of natural right, so to speak.
Now, to resist corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men
and animals but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he can do
so, the accused, after condemnation, may lawfully resist being put to
death.
Objection 2: Further, just as a man, by resistance, escapes the death
to which he has been condemned, so does he by flight. Now it is lawful
seemingly to escape death by flight, according to Ecclus. 9:18, "Keep
thee far from the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]"
[*The words in the brackets are not in the Vulgate]. Therefore it is
also lawful for the accused to resist.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that
are led to death: and those that are drawn to death forbear not to
deliver." Now a man is under greater obligation to himself than to
another. Therefore it is lawful for a condemned man to defend himself
from being put to death.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): "He that resisteth the
power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase
to themselves damnation." Now a condemned man, by defending himself,
resists the power in the point of its being ordained by God "for the
punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good" [*1 Pet.
2:14]. Therefore he sins in defending himself.
I answer that, A man may be condemned to death in two ways. First
justly, and then it is not lawful for the condemned to defend himself,
because it is lawful for the judge to combat his resistance by force,
so that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently without any
doubt he sins.
Secondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such a sentence is like the
violence of robbers, according to Ezech. 22:21, "Her princes in the
midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood."
Wherefore even as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in a
like case, to resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to avoid
scandal, whence some grave disturbance might be feared to arise.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason was given to man that he might ensue those
things to which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in
accordance with the order of reason. Hence not all self-defense is
lawful, but only such as is accomplished with due moderation.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man is condemned to death, he has not to
kill himself, but to suffer death: wherefore he is not bound to do
anything from which death would result, such as to stay in the place
whence he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those who
lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for him
to suffer. Even so, if a man were condemned to die of hunger, he does
not sin if he partakes of food brought to him secretly, because to
refrain from taking it would be to kill himself.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the wise man does not direct that
one should deliver a man from death in opposition to the order of
justice: wherefore neither should a man deliver himself from death by
resisting against justice.
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OF INJUSTICE WITH REGARD TO THE PERSON OF THE WITNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider injustice with regard to the person of the
witness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man is bound to give evidence?
(2) Whether the evidence of two or three witnesses suffices?
(3) Whether a man's evidence may be rejected without any fault on his
part?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to bear false witness?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man is bound to give evidence?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to give evidence.
Augustine say (QQ. Gn. 1:26) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 33,34], that
when Abraham said of his wife (Gn. 20:2), "She is my sister," he wished
the truth to be concealed and not a lie be told. Now, by hiding the
truth a man abstains from giving evidence. Therefore a man is not bound
to give evidence.
Objection 2: Further, no man is bound to act deceitfully. Now it is
written (Prov. 11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully revealeth secrets,
but he that is faithful concealeth the thing committed to him by his
friend." Therefore a man is not always bound to give evidence,
especially on matters committed to him as a secret by a friend.
Objection 3: Further, clerics and priests, more than others, are bound
to those things that are necessary for salvation. Yet clerics and
priests are forbidden to give evidence when a man is on trial for his
life. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to give evidence.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3, cap.
Falsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55] says: "Both he who conceals
the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty, the former because he is
unwilling to do good, the latter because he desires to hurt."
I answer that, We must make a distinction in the matter of giving
evidence: because sometimes a certain man's evidence is necessary, and
sometimes not. If the necessary evidence is that of a man subject to a
superior whom, in matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to obey,
without doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points which are
required of him in accordance with the order of justice, for instance
on manifest things or when ill-report has preceded. If however he is
required to give evidence on other points, for instance secret matters,
and those of which no ill-report has preceded, he is not bound to give
evidence. On the other hand, if his evidence be required by authority
of a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must make a distinction:
because if his evidence is required in order to deliver a man from an
unjust death or any other penalty, or from false defamation, or some
loss, in such cases he is bound to give evidence. Even if his evidence
is not demanded, he is bound to do what he can to declare the truth to
someone who may profit thereby. For it is written (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue
the poor, and deliver the needy from the hand of the sinner"; and
(Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that are led to death"; and (Rom. 1:32):
"They are worthy of death, not only they that do them, but they also
that consent to them that do them," on which words a gloss says: "To be
silent when one can disprove is to consent." In matters pertaining to a
man's condemnation, one is not bound to give evidence, except when one
is constrained by a superior in accordance with the order of justice;
since if the truth of such a matter be concealed, no particular injury
is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens the accuser, it
matters not since he risked the danger of his own accord: whereas it is
different with the accused, who incurs the danger against his will.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of concealment of the truth
in a case when a man is not compelled by his superior's authority to
declare the truth, and when such concealment is not specially injurious
to any person.
Reply to Objection 2: A man should by no means give evidence on matters
secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such things,
not as man but as God's minister: and the sacrament is more binding
than any human precept. But as regards matters committed to man in some
other way under secrecy, we must make a distinction. Sometimes they are
of such a nature that one is bound to make them known as soon as they
come to our knowledge, for instance if they conduce to the spiritual or
corporal corruption of the community, or to some grave personal injury,
in short any like matter that a man is bound to make known either by
giving evidence or by denouncing it. Against such a duty a man cannot
be obliged to act on the plea that the matter is committed to him under
secrecy, for he would break the faith he owes to another. On the other
hand sometimes they are such as one is not bound to make known, so that
one may be under obligation not to do so on account of their being
committed to one under secrecy. In such a case one is by no means bound
to make them known, even if the superior should command; because to
keep faith is of natural right, and a man cannot be commanded to do
what is contrary to natural right.
Reply to Objection 3: It is unbecoming for ministers of the altar to
slay a man or to cooperate in his slaying, as stated above
([2938]Q[64], A[4]); hence according to the order of justice they
cannot be compelled to give evidence when a man is on trial for his
life.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the evidence of two or three persons suffices?
Objection 1: It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons is
not sufficient. For judgment requires certitude. Now certitude of the
truth is not obtained by the assertions of two or three witnesses, for
we read that Naboth was unjustly condemned on the evidence of two
witnesses (3 Kings 21). Therefore the evidence of two or three
witnesses does not suffice.
Objection 2: Further, in order for evidence to be credible it must
agree. But frequently the evidence of two or three disagrees in some
point. Therefore it is of no use for proving the truth in court.
Objection 3: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. iv, can.
Praesul.): "A bishop shall not be condemned save on the evidence of
seventy-two witnesses; nor a cardinal priest of the Roman Church,
unless there be sixty-four witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the
Roman Church, unless there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon,
an acolyte, an exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without seven
witnesses." Now the sin of one who is of higher dignity is more
grievous, and consequently should be treated more severely. Therefore
neither is the evidence of two or three witnesses sufficient for the
condemnation of other persons.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 17:6): "By the mouth of two or
three witnesses shall he die that is to be slain," and further on (Dt.
19:15): "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall
stand."
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "we must not
expect to find certitude equally in every matter." For in human acts,
on which judgments are passed and evidence required, it is impossible
to have demonstrative certitude, because they a about things contingent
and variable. Hence the certitude of probability suffices, such as may
reach the truth in the greater number, cases, although it fail in the
minority. No it is probable that the assertion of sever witnesses
contains the truth rather than the assertion of one: and since the
accused is the only one who denies, while several witness affirm the
same as the prosecutor, it is reasonably established both by Divine and
by human law, that the assertion of several witnesses should be upheld.
Now all multitude is comprised of three elements, the beginning, the
middle and the end. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo
i, 1), "we reckon 'all' and 'whole' to consist of three parts." Now we
have a triple voucher when two agree with the prosecutor: hence two
witnesses are required; or for the sake of greater certitude three,
which is the perfect number. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 4:12): "A
threefold cord is not easily broken": and Augustine, commenting on Jn.
8:17, "The testimony of two men is true," says (Tract. xxxvi) that
"there is here a mystery by which we are given to understand that
Trinity wherein is perpetual stability of truth."
Reply to Objection 1: No matter how great a number of witnesses may be
determined, the evidence might sometimes be unjust, since is written
(Ex. 23:2): "Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil." And yet
the fact that in so many it is not possible to have certitude without
fear of error, is no reason why we should reject the certitude which
can probably be had through two or three witnesses, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: If the witnesses disagree certain principal
circumstances which change the substance of the fact, for instance in
time, place, or persons, which are chiefly in question, their evidence
is of no weight, because if they disagree in such things, each one
would seem to be giving distinct evidence and to be speaking of
different facts. For instance, one say that a certain thing happened at
such and such a time or place, while another says it happened at
another time or place, they seem not to be speaking of the same event.
The evidence is not weakened if one witness says that he does not
remember, while the other attests to a determinate time or place And if
on such points as these the witness for prosecution and defense
disagree altogether, and if they be equal in number on either side, and
of equal standing, the accused should have the benefit of the doubt,
because the judge ought to be more inclined to acquit than to condemn,
except perhaps in favorable suits, such as a pleading for liberty and
the like. If, however, the witnesses for the same side disagree, the
judge ought to use his own discretion in discerning which side to
favor, by considering either the number of witnesses, or their
standing, or the favorableness of the suit, or the nature of the
business and of the evidence
Much more ought the evidence of one witness to be rejected if he
contradict himself when questioned about what he has seen and about
what he knows; not, however, if he contradict himself when questioned
about matters of opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer
differently according to the different things he has seen and heard.
On the other hand if there be discrepancy of evidence in circumstances
not touching the substance of the fact, for instance, whether the
weather were cloudy or fine, whether the house were painted or not, or
such like matters, such discrepancy does not weaken the evidence,
because men are not wont to take much notice of such things, wherefore
they easily forget them. Indeed, a discrepancy of this kind renders the
evidence more credible, as Chrysostom states (Hom. i in Matth.),
because if the witnesses agreed in every point, even in the minutest of
details, they would seem to have conspired together to say the same
thing: but this must be left to the prudent discernment of the judge.
Reply to Objection 3: This passage refers specially to the bishops,
priests, deacons and clerics of the Roman Church, on account of its
dignity: and this for three reasons. First because in that Church those
men ought to be promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence of more
weight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because those who have to
judge other men, often have many opponents on account of their justice,
wherefore those who give evidence against them should not be believed
indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly, because the
condemnation of any one of them would detract in public opinion from
the dignity and authority of that Church, a result which would be more
fraught with danger than if one were to tolerate a sinner in that same
Church, unless he were very notorious and manifest, so that a grave
scandal would arise if he were tolerated.
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Whether a man's evidence can be rejected without any fault of his?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man's evidence ought not to be
rejected except on account of some fault. For it a penalty on some that
their evidence is inadmissible, as in the case of those who are branded
with infamy. Now a penalty must not be inflicted save for a fault.
Therefore it would seem that no man's evidence ought to be rejected
save on account of a fault.
Objection 2: Further, "Good is to be presumed of every one, unless the
contrary appear" [*Cap. Dudum, de Praesumpt.]. Now it pertains to a
man's goodness that he should give true evidence. Since therefore there
can be no proof of the contrary, unless there be some fault of his, it
would seem that no man's evidence should be rejected save for some
fault.
Objection 3: Further, no man is rendered unfit for things necessary for
salvation except by some sin. But it is necessary for salvation to give
true evidence, as stated above [2939](A[1]). Therefore no man should be
excluded from giving evidence save for some fault.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. xiii, 44): "As to the bishop who
is said to have been accused by his servants, you are to know that they
should by no means have been heard": which words are embodied in the
Decretals II, qu. 1, can. Imprimis.
I answer that, As stated above [2940](A[2]), the authority of evidence
is not infallible but probable; and consequently the evidence for one
side is weakened by whatever strengthens the probability of the other.
Now the reliability of a person's evidence is weakened, sometimes
indeed on account of some fault of his, as in the case of unbelievers
and persons of evil repute, as well as those who are guilty of a public
crime and who are not allowed even to accuse; sometimes, without any
fault on his part, and this owing either to a defect in the reason, as
in the case of children, imbeciles and women, or to personal feeling,
as in the case of enemies, or persons united by family or household
ties, or again owing to some external condition, as in the case of poor
people, slaves, and those who are under authority, concerning whom it
is to be presumed that they might easily be induced to give evidence
against the truth.
Thus it is manifest that a person's evidence may be rejected either
with or without some fault of his.
Reply to Objection 1: If a person is disqualified from giving evidence
this is done as a precaution against false evidence rather than as a
punishment. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: Good is to be presumed of everyone unless the
contrary appear, provided this does not threaten injury to another:
because, in that case, one ought to be careful not to believe everyone
readily, according to 1 Jn. 4:1: "Believe not every spirit."
Reply to Objection 3: To give evidence is necessary for salvation,
provided the witness be competent, and the order of justice observed.
Hence nothing hinders certain persons being excused from giving
evidence, if they be considered unfit according to law.
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Whether it is always a mortal sin to give false evidence?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always a mortal sin to give
false evidence. For a person may happen to give false evidence, through
ignorance of fact. Now such ignorance excuses from mortal sin.
Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, a lie that benefits someone and hurts no man is
officious, and this is not a mortal sin. Now sometimes a lie of this
kind occurs in false evidence, as when a person gives false evidence in
order to save a man from death, or from an unjust sentence which
threatens him through other false witnesses or a perverse judge.
Therefore in such cases it is not a mortal sin to give false evidence.
Objection 3: Further, a witness is required to take an oath in order
that he may fear to commit a mortal sin of perjury. But this would not
be necessary, if it were already a mortal sin to give false evidence.
Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 19:5): "A false witness shall not
be unpunished."
I answer that, False evidence has a threefold deformity. The first is
owing to perjury, since witnesses are admitted only on oath and on this
count it is always a mortal sin. Secondly, owing to the violation of
justice, and on this account it is a mortal sin generically, even as
any kind of injustice. Hence the prohibition of false evidence by the
precept of the decalogue is expressed in this form when it is said (Ex.
20:16), "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." For
one does nothing against a man by preventing him from doing someone an
injury, but only by taking away his justice. Thirdly, owing to the
falsehood itself, by reason of which every lie is a sin: on this
account, the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: In giving evidence a man ought not to affirm as
certain, as though he knew it, that about which he is not certain and
he should confess his doubt in doubtful terms, and that which he is
certain about, in terms of certainty. Owing however to the frailty of
the human memory, a man sometimes thinks he is certain about something
that is not true; and then if after thinking over the matter with due
care he deems himself certain about that false thing, he does not sin
mortally if he asserts it, because the evidence which he gives is not
directly an intentionally, but accidentally contrary to what he
intends.
Reply to Objection 2: An unjust judgment is not a judgment, wherefore
the false evidence given in an unjust judgment, in order to prevent
injustice is not a mortal sin by virtue of the judgment, but only by
reason of the oath violated.
Reply to Objection 3: Men abhor chiefly those sin that are against God,
as being most grievous and among them is perjury: whereas they do not
abhor so much sins against their neighbor. Consequently, for the
greater certitude of evidence, the witness is required to take a oath.
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OF INJUSTICE IN JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on the
part of counsel, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?
(2) Whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the
office of advocate?
(3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?
(4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit?
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Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?
Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the
suits of the poor. For it is written (Ex. 23:5): "If thou see the ass
of him that hateth thee lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not pass
by, but shall lift him up with him." Now no less a danger threatens the
poor man whose suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than if his ass were
to lie underneath its burden. Therefore an advocate is bound to defend
the suits of the poor.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix in Evang.): "Let him
that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him
that hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful
bounty; let him who is a servant to art share his skill with his
neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy
plead the cause of the poor: for the slightest gift you have received
will be reputed a talent." Now every man is bound, not to hide but
faithfully to dispense the talent committed to him; as evidenced by the
punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his talent (Mat. 25:30).
Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor.
Objection 3: Further, the precept about performing works of mercy,
being affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is
chiefly in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the
suit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in such
a case an advocate is bound to defend the poor man's suit.
On the contrary, He that lacks food is no less in need than he that
lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always bound
to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always bound to
defend the suits of the poor.
I answer that, Since defense of the poor man's suit belongs to the
works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one given
above with regard to the other works of mercy ([2941]Q[32], AA[5],9).
Now no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those who
need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "since
one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by
reason of place, time, or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance
are more closely united to us." He says "by reason of place," because
one is not bound to search throughout the world for the needy that one
may succor them; and it suffices to do works of mercy to those one
meets with. Hence it is written (Ex. 23:4): "If thou meet thy enemy's
ass going astray, bring it back to him." He says also "by reason of
time," because one is not bound to provide for the future needs of
others, and it suffices to succor present needs. Hence it is written (1
Jn. 3:17): "He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall put
up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?"
Lastly he says, "or any other circumstance," because one ought to show
kindness to those especially who are by any tie whatever united to us,
according to 1 Tim. 5:8, "If any man have not care of his own, and
especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith and is worse
than an infidel."
It may happen however that these circumstances concur, and then we have
to consider whether this particular man stands in such a need that it
is not easy to see how he can be succored otherwise, and then one is
bound to bestow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is easy to
see how he can be otherwise succored, either by himself, or by some
other person still more closely united to him, or in a better position
to help him, one is not bound so strictly to help the one in need that
it would be a sin not to do so: although it would be praiseworthy to do
so where one is not bound to. Therefore an advocate is not always bound
to defend the suits of the poor, but only when the aforesaid
circumstances concur, else he would have to put aside all other
business, and occupy himself entirely in defending the suits of poor
people. The same applies to a physician with regard to attendance on
the sick.
Reply to Objection 1: So long as the ass lies under the burden, there
is no means of help in this case, unless those who are passing along
come to the man's aid, and therefore they are bound to help. But they
would not be so bound if help were possible from another quarter.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is bound to make good use of the talent
bestowed on him, according to the opportunities afforded by time,
place, and other circumstances, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Not every need is such that it is one's duty to
remedy it, but only such as we have stated above.
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Whether it is fitting that the law should debar certain persons from the
office of advocate?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain
persons from the office of advocate. For no man should be debarred from
doing works of mercy. Now it belongs to the works of mercy to defend a
man's suit, as stated above [2942](A[1]). Therefore no man should be
debarred from this office.
Objection 2: Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the same
effect. Now to be busy with Divine things and to be busy about sin are
contrary to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some should be
debarred from the office of advocate, on account of religion, as monks
and clerics, while others are debarred on account of sin, as persons of
ill-repute and heretics.
Objection 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now it
is a duty of love for an advocate to plead a person's cause. Therefore
it is unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from pleading
the cause of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own
cause.
On the contrary, According to Decretals III, qu. vii, can. Infames,
many persons are debarred from the office of advocate.
I answer that, In two ways a person is debarred from performing a
certain act: first because it is impossible to him, secondly because it
is unbecoming to him: but, whereas the man to whom a certain act is
impossible, is absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom an
act is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may do
away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some are debarred from the
office of advocate because it is impossible to them through lack of
sense---either interior, as in the case of madmen and minors---or
exterior, as in the case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs to
have both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the justice of
the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing, that he may speak
and hear what is said to him. Consequently those who are defective in
these points, are altogether debarred from being advocates either in
their own or in another's cause. The becomingness of exercising this
office is removed in two ways. First, through a man being engaged in
higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting that monks or priests should
be advocates in any cause whatever, or that clerics should plead in a
secular court, because such persons are engaged in Divine things.
Secondly, on account of some personal defect, either of body (for
instance a blind man whose attendance in a court of justice would be
unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill becomes one who has disdained to be
just himself, to plead for the justice of another. Wherefore it is
unbecoming that persons of ill repute, unbelievers, and those who have
been convicted of grievous crimes should be advocates. Nevertheless
this unbecomingness is outweighed by necessity: and for this reason
such persons can plead either their own cause or that of persons
closely connected with them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the
cause of their own church, and monks in the cause of their own
monastery, if the abbot direct them to do so.
Reply to Objection 1: Certain persons are sometimes debarred by
unbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of mercy:
for not all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons: thus it ill
becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as virtue is destroyed by "too much" and
"too little," so does a person become incompetent by "more" and "less."
For this reason some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from
pleading in causes, because they are above such an office; and others
because they are less than competent to exercise it, such as persons of
ill-repute and unbelievers.
Reply to Objection 3: The necessity of pleading the causes of others is
not so pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own cause, because
others are able to help themselves otherwise: hence the comparison
fails.
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Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending
an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing a
desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can
defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a
desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but ought
to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.
Objection 2: Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a
sin. Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. II,
qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by
defending an unjust cause, when once he has undertaken its defense.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate
to use unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing false
witnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an unjust cause,
since the former is a sin against the form, the latter against the
matter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make
use of such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to lay
ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an advocate does not
sin by defending an unjust cause.
On the contrary, It is said (2 Paralip. 19:2): "Thou helpest the
ungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . . the wrath of the
Lord." Now an advocate by defending an unjust cause, helps the ungodly.
Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord.
I answer that, It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by
counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or
assist an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says (Rom.
1:32) that "they . . . are worthy of death, not only they that do" a
sin, "but they also that consent to them that do" it. Hence it was
stated above ([2943]Q[62], A[7]), that all such are bound to
restitution. Now it is evident that an advocate provides both
assistance and counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if
knowingly he defends an unjust cause, without doubt he sins grievously,
and is bound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the other
party by reason of the assistance he has provided. If, however, he
defends an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be
excused according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable.
Reply to Objection 1: The physician injures no man by undertaking to
heal a desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an
unjust cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads
unjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to deserve
praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by reason of
injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for an evil end.
Reply to Objection 2: If an advocate believes from the outset that the
cause is just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding
that it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as
to help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to
the other party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his
client to give way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the
opposing party.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2944]Q[40], A[3]), it is lawful
for a soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently
concealing what he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent
falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says
(De offic. iii, 29). Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending
his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue,
but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood.
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Whether it is lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for
pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human
remuneration, according to Lk. 14:12, "When thou makest a dinner or a
supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich: lest
perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to thee."
Now it is a work of mercy to plead another's cause, as stated above
(A[1] ). Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take payment in
money for pleading.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with
temporal things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a spiritual
good since it consists in using one's knowledge of law. Therefore it is
not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading.
Objection 3: Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs
towards the pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the
judge and of the witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad
Macedon.), "the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness
true evidence." Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that "an
advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice."
I answer that, A man may justly receive payment for granting what he is
not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not always
bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's causes.
Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act against
justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a sick person
to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, however, they take a
moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the matter in
hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the country. If,
however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they sin against
justice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that "it is
customary to demand from them restitution of what they have extorted by
a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them in accordance with
a commendable custom."
Reply to Objection 1: Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he
can do from motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell anything,
since anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when a man does
give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but a Divine
reward. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads the cause
of a poor man, should have in view not a human but a Divine meed; and
yet he is not always bound to give his services gratuitously.
Reply to Objection 2: Though knowledge of law is something spiritual,
the use of that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body:
hence it is lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no
craftsman would be allowed to make profit by his art.
Reply to Objection 3: The judge and witnesses are common to either
party, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the
witness to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to
one side rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive out
of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive
their expenses (not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for
their labor) either from both parties or from the party by whom they
are adduced, because no man "serveth as a soldier at any time at his
own charge [*Vulg.: 'Who serveth as a soldier,']" (1 Cor. 9:7). On the
other hand an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully
accept fee from the party he assists.
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OF REVILING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered
extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting, (3)
tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is reviling?
(2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether one ought to check revilers?
(4) Of the origin of reviling.
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Whether reviling consists in words?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not consist in words.
Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is a
kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's
neighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore
reviling does not consist in words.
Objection 2: Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can
be dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore it
seems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds.
Objection 3: Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing
or a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt.
Therefore reviling does not consist in words.
On the contrary, Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing. Now
reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jer. 20:10, "I heard
reviling [Douay: 'contumelies'] on every side." Therefore reviling
consists in words.
I answer that, Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and this
happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence, one
person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the excellence for
which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed, whereof we have
spoken above (Q[64], seqq.). Secondly, when a man publishes something
against another's honor, thus bringing it to the knowledge of the
latter and of other men. This reviling properly so called, and is done
I some kind of signs. Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ.
ii, 3), "compared with words all other signs are very few, for words
have obtained the chief place among men for the purpose of expressing
whatever the mind conceives." Hence reviling, properly speaking
consists in words: wherefore, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a reviler
[contumeliosus] "is hasty and bursts out [tumet] in injurious words."
Since, however, things are also signified by deeds, which on this
account have the same significance as words, it follows that reviling
in a wider sense extends also to deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Rom. 1:30,
"contumelious, proud," says: "The contumelious are those who by word or
deed revile and shame others."
Reply to Objection 1: Our words, if we consider them in their essence,
i.e. as audible sound injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the
ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs
conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many kinds
of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his honor,
or of the respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling is greater
if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and yet there may
still be reviling if he reproach him by himself. in so far as the
speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the hearer.
Reply to Objection 2: One man slights another by deeds in so far as
such deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man's
honor. In the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some
other kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above (QQ[64],65,66):
where as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds have
the significant force of words.
Reply to Objection 3: Railing and taunts consist in words, even as
reviling, because by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the
detriment of his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is
the fault of guilt, which is exposed by "reviling" words. Secondly,
there is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by
"taunts" [convicium], because "vice" is commonly spoken of in
connection with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man
says spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not
revile him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only
taunts but also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his
inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for any
kind of excellence. This is done by "upbraiding" words, and properly
speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one has
succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 20:15):
"He will give a few things and upbraid much." Nevertheless these terms
are sometimes employed one for the other.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal
sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of a
virtue, viz. of wittiness {eutrapelia} [*Cf. [2945]FS, Q[60], A[5]] to
which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and
yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the
Apostle says (Gal. 3:1): "O senseless Galatians!," and our Lord said
(Lk. 24:25): "O foolish and slow of heart to believe!" Therefore
railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of
its genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its
genus cannot become venial, as stated above ([2946]FS, Q[88], AA[4],6).
Hence if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance
to railing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin.
But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who
utters a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger.
Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its
genus.
On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal punishment
of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment of hell,
according to Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever shall say to his brother . . . Thou
fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." Therefore railing or reviling
is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2947](A[1]), words are injurious to
other persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification
depends on the speaker's inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it
seems that we ought to consider with what intention the words are
uttered. Since then railing or reviling essentially denotes a
dishonoring, if the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other
man, this is properly and essentially to give utterance to railing or
reviling: and this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since
a man loves his honor no less than his possessions. If, on the other
hand, a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the
intention, not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting him
or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not formally
and essentially, but accidentally and materially, in so far to wit as
he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence this may be
sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at all.
Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, and one
should use such words with moderation, because the railing might be so
grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the person
against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit a mortal
sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other man: just as
were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking him in
fun, he would not be without blame.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight
mockery, not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the
object of the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and
this may be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. On the
other hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object
of his witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful,
as stated in the passage quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or
damnify him in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too,
for the purpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person
whom one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples
"foolish," and the Apostle called the Galatians "senseless." Yet, as
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), "seldom and only when
it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then so
as to urge God's service, not our own."
Reply to Objection 3: Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on
the intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it
be a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and
be uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the
fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by such
a word to give but little pain.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be
reviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the
reviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to
suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.
Objection 2: Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now
one ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written
(Prov. 26:10): "He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger."
Therefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled.
Objection 3: Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it
is said: "Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay" [*Heb. 10:30]. Now
by submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to
Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.): "If thou wilt be revenged, be
silent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow." Therefore one ought not by
silence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 37:13): "They that sought evils to
me spoke vain things," and afterwards (Ps. 37:14) he says: "But I as a
deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth."
I answer that, Just as we need patience in things done against us, so
do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of patience in
those things done against us refer to the preparedness of the mind,
according to Augustine's (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) exposition on
our Lord's precept, "If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him
also the other" [*The words as quoted by St. Thomas are a blending of
Mat. 5:39 and Lk. 6:29]: that is to say, a man ought to be prepared to
do so if necessary. But he is not always bound to do this actually:
since not even did our Lord do so, for when He received a blow, He
said: "Why strikest thou Me?" (Jn. 18:23). Consequently the same
applies to the reviling words that are said against us. For we are
bound to hold our minds prepared to submit to be reviled, if it should
be expedient. Nevertheless it sometimes behooves us to withstand
against being reviled, and this chiefly for two reasons. First, for the
good of the reviler; namely, that his daring may be checked, and that
he may not repeat the attempt, according to Prov. 26:5, "Answer a fool
according to his folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise." Secondly,
for the good of many who would be prevented from progressing in virtue
on account of our being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super
Ezech.): "Those who are so placed that their life should be an example
to others, ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their
preaching be not heard by those who could have heard it, and they
continue their evil conduct through contempt of a good life."
Reply to Objection 1: The daring of the railing reviler should be
checked with moderation, i.e. as a duty of charity, and not through
lust for one's own honor. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:4): "Answer not
a fool according to his folly, lest thou be like him."
Reply to Objection 2: When one man prevents another from being reviled
there is not the danger of lust for one's own honor as there is when a
man defends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to
proceed from a sense of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: It would be an act of revenge to keep silence
with the intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be
praiseworthy to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 8:4): "Strive not with a man that is full of tongue,
and heap not wood upon his fire."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether reviling arises from anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger. For
it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where pride is, there shall also be
reviling [Douay: 'reproach']." But anger is a vice distinct from pride.
Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): "All fools are
meddling with revilings [Douay: 'reproaches']." Now folly is a vice
opposed to wisdom, as stated above ([2948]Q[46], A[1]); whereas anger
is opposed to meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
Objection 3: Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of
reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it is
a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger.
Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "anger gives rise
to revilings."
I answer that, While one sin may arise from various causes, it is
nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which it
is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected with
its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's end, which is
revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take revenge on
another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises chiefly from anger.
Reply to Objection 1: Reviling is not directed to the end of pride
which is excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride.
Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who
think themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and inflict
injuries on them, because they are more easily angered, through deeming
it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done against their
will.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6)
"anger listens imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers a
defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence
reviling arises from folly on account of the latter's kinship with
anger.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) "an
angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about
this." Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger
rather than to hatred.
__________________________________________________________________
OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction] (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) What is backbiting?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Of its comparison with other sins;
(4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another's
character by secret words?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some
[*Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.], "the blackening of
another's good name by words uttered in secret." For "secretly" and
"openly" are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a sin,
because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by few.
Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin, does not
belong to its essence, and should not be included in its definition.
Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting that it
should be done by secret words.
Objection 2: Further, the notion of a good name implies something known
to the public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by
backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered
openly.
Objection 3: Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish
something already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is
blackened, even without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when
one reveals the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore
not every blackening of a good name is backbiting.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 10:11): "If a serpent bite in
silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth."
I answer that, Just as one man injures another by deed in two
ways---openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence---and
secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures
another by words in two ways---in one way, openly, and this is done by
reviling him, as stated above ([2949]Q[72], A[1])---and in another way
secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one
man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think
little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that
reviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the
other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect
rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor but
his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he, for
his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the person
against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends and aims
at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting differs from
reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the words are
uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and the backbiter
secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i.e. as regards the injury
inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the backbiter injuring
his good name.
Reply to Objection 1: In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced
all injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the
kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and
"openly," because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and
by ignorance, as stated above (Q[65], A[4]; [2950]FS, Q[6], AA[5],8).
Reply to Objection 2: The words of a backbiter are said to be secret,
not altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said,
because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On
the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore
if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is a case
of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he alone be present:
although if a man speak ill of an absent person to one man alone, he
destroys his good name not altogether but partly.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to backbite [detrehere] another,
not because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good
name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly,
in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about him; secondly,
by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by revealing
something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his good deeds to a
bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by gainsaying his good,
or by maliciously concealing it, or by diminishing it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether backbiting is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For no
act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin, which
pertains to backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), is an act of the
virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin in order
that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby a man
accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, "Have nothing to do with
detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice."
But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many
refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in
all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory
[*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a
slight sin "to speak ill without hesitation or forethought." But this
pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:30): "Backbiters, hateful to
God," which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be
deemed a slight sin because it consists in words."
I answer that, As stated above ([2951]Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should
be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by
its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore,
properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in
order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to
blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's good
name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is hindered from
doing many things well. For this reason it is written (Ecclus. 41:15):
"Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than
a thousand treasures precious and great." Therefore backbiting,
properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless it happens sometimes
that a man utters words, whereby someone's good name is tarnished, and
yet he does not intend this, but something else. This is not backbiting
strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and accidentally as
it were. And if such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some
necessary good, and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not
a sin and cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of
lightness of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal
sin, unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to
cause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters
pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of the
words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man his
good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from him, in the
manner stated above ([2952]Q[62], A[2]) when we were treating of
restitution.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a
man's hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or
accuse him for the good of public justice.
Reply to Objection 2: This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to
be found throughout the whole of mankind, but "almost," both because
"the number of fools is infinite," [*Eccles. 1:15] and few are they
that walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. Mat. 7:14] and because there
are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of
heart, so as to injure someone's good name at least slightly, for it is
written (James 3:2): "If any man offend not in word, the same is a
perfect man."
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is referring to the case when a man
utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but
through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's
neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins
committed against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on Ps. 108:4,
"Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me," a gloss
says: "Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of
future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that
was soon to rise again." From this it seems to follow that backbiting
is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to
kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the
other sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore
backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all.
Objection 2: Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than
reviling, because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret
backbiting. Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery,
because adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling
severs utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more
grievous than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against
his neighbor, adultery is most grave.
Objection 3: Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting
arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a
graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than
reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
Objection 4: Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity
of the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous
defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2):
"What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into
their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the less they
see of the truth?" Therefore backbiting is the most grievous sin
committed against one's neighbor.
On the contrary, It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word. But
backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft are sins
of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other sins
committed against one's neighbor.
I answer that, The essential gravity of sins committed against one's
neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him, since it is
thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the greater the good
taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's good is threefold,
namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the good of
external things; the good of the soul, which is the greatest of all,
cannot be taken from him by another save as an occasional cause, for
instance by an evil persuasion, which does not induce necessity. On the
other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external
things, can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods of the
body excel the goods of external things, those sins which injure a
man's body are more grievous than those which injure his external
things. Consequently, among other sins committed against one's
neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since it deprives man of the
life which he already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is
contrary to the right order of human generation, whereby man enters
upon life. In the last place come external goods, among which a man's
good name takes precedence of wealth because it is more akin to
spiritual goods, wherefore it is written (Prov. 22:1): "A good name is
better than great riches." Therefore backbiting according to its genus
is a more grievous sin than theft, but is less grievous than murder or
adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or
extenuating circumstances.
The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to the
sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if he
sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of word
have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur through a
slip of the tongue, and without much forethought.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith
of His members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our
faith. Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.
Reply to Objection 2: Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting,
in as much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as
robbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above ([2953]Q[66],
A[9]). Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the
gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of bodies,
but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the reviler is
not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man, but is only
the occasional cause of division among those who were united, in so
far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he for his own part
severs that man from the friendship of other men, though they are not
forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a backbiter is a murderer
"occasionally," since by his words he gives another man an occasion for
hating or despising his neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the
Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. i], that "backbiters are murderers,"
i.e. occasionally; because "he that hateth his brother is a murderer"
(1 Jn. 3:15).
Reply to Objection 3: Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes
place in secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but
rather of envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's
glory. Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous
than reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just
as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin
depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on the thing to which the
sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away
from.
Reply to Objection 4: Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his
mouth" (Prov. 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves
and believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his
neighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less.
This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to hate
of one's neighbor.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter?
Objection 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter
does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations to
others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his
own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): "Just as we
ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so
ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited by
their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater."
Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who
backbite others.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): "In no wise speak
against the truth." Now sometimes a person tells the truth while
backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore it seems that one
is not always bound to withstand a backbiter.
Objection 3: Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to
others. Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten:
for Pope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus.
vi, qu. 1]: "Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good
persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted
through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are
humbled by backbiting." Therefore one ought not to withstand
backbiters.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Take care not to
have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract
others nor listen to backbiters."
I answer that, According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32), they "are worthy
of death . . . not only they that" commit sins, "but they also that
consent to them that do them." Now this happens in two ways. First,
directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin
is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does not
withstand him when he might do so, and this happens sometimes, not
because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of some human fear.
Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to backbiting without
resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he becomes
a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite, or at
least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his hatred of
the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes
more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): "It is difficult to
say which is the more to be condemned the backbiter or he that listens
to backbiting." If however the sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails
to withstand the backbiter, through fear negligence, or even shame, he
sins indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule venially.
Sometimes too this may be a mortal sin, either because it is his
official duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or by reason of some
consequent danger; or on account of the radical reason for which human
fear may sometimes be a mortal sin, as stated above ([2954]Q[19],
A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: No man hears himself backbitten, because when a
man is spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly
speaking, but reviling, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Yet it is
possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his
knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his
discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name,
unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above ([2955]Q[72],
A[3]). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as
he suffers patiently being detracted himself. But it is not left to his
discretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name, hence
he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for the same
reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's ass lying
"underneath his burden," as commanded in Dt. 21:4 [*Ex. 23:5].
Reply to Objection 2: One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by
endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows that
he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with words,
for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our pained
demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting, because
according to Prov. 25:23, "the north wind driveth away rain, as doth a
sad countenance a backbiting tongue."
Reply to Objection 3: The profit one derives from being backbitten is
due, not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God
Who produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less
withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even
though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.
__________________________________________________________________
OF TALE-BEARING [*'Susurratio,' i.e. whispering] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
(2) Which of the two is the more grievous?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
Objection 1: It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from
backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): "The susurro [tale-bearer] takes
his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks disparagingly not
to the face but into the ear." But to speak of another disparagingly
belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing is not a distinct sin
from backbiting.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): "Thou shalt not be an
informer [Douay: 'a detractor'] nor a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']
among the people." But an informer is apparently the same as a
backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from backbiting.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer
[Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed." But a
double-tongued man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a
backbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with
another in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a
backbiter.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 1:29,30, "Tale-bearers, backbiters
[Douay: 'whisperers, detractors']" says: "Tale-bearers sow discord
among friends; backbiters deny or disparage others' good points."
I answer that, The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter, and
also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil secretly
of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are sometimes used
one for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, "Be not called a
tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']" says: "i.e. a backbiter." They differ
however in end, because the backbiter intends to blacken his neighbor's
good name, wherefore he brings forward those evils especially about his
neighbor which are likely to defame him, or at least to depreciate his
good name: whereas a tale-bearer intends to sever friendship, as
appears from the gloss quoted above and from the saying of Prov. 26:20,
"Where the tale-bearer is taken away, contentions shall cease." Hence
it is that a tale-bearer speaks such ill about his neighbors as may
stir his hearer's mind against them, according to Ecclus. 28:11, "A
sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst
of them that are at peace."
Reply to Objection 1: A tale-bearer is called a backbiter in so far as
he speaks ill of another; yet he differs from a backbiter since he
intends not to speak ill as such, but to say anything that may stir one
man against another, though it be good simply, and yet has a semblance
of evil through being unpleasant to the hearer.
Reply to Objection 2: An informer differs from a tale-bearer and a
backbiter, for an informer is one who charges others publicly with
crimes, either by accusing or by railing them, which does not apply to
a backbiter or tale-bearer.
Reply to Objection 3: A double-tongued person is properly speaking a
tale-bearer. For since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer
strives to sever friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double
tongue towards two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other:
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer [Douay:
'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed," and then it is added,
"for he hath troubled many that were peace."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than
tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a
backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for such
things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name: whereas a
tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently evil, because
to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore backbiting is a
graver sin than tale-bearing.
Objection 2: Further, he that deprives. a man of his good name,
deprives him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is
minded to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is
reproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip
19:2): "Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord."
But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore backbiting
is a graver sin than tale-bearing.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): "He that backbiteth
[Douay:,'detracteth'] his brother . . . detracteth the law," and
consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting
seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated above
(Q[20], A[3]; [2956]FS, Q[73], A[3]). On the other hand the sin of
tale-bearing is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of backbiting
is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): "An evil mark of
disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay:
'whisperer'] hatred, and enmity, and reproach."
I answer that, As stated above (Q[73], A[3]; [2957]FS, Q[73], A[8]),
sins against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they
inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the greater,
according to the greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all
one's external goods a friend takes the first place, since "no man can
live without friends," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 1).
Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): "Nothing can be compared to a
faithful friend." Again, a man's good name whereof backbiting deprives
him, is most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship.
Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or even
reviling, because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved is
better than to be honored, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii).
Reply to Objection 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the
end rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its
end, tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the
backbiter says worse things.
Reply to Objection 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and
a bad name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short
of the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to
a disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what
conduces directly to enmity.
Reply to Objection 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract
the law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one's
neighbor: while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more
directly against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially
against God, because "God is charity" (1 Jn. 4:16), and for this reason
it is written (Prov. 6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord
hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," and the seventh is "he
(Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren."
__________________________________________________________________
OF DERISION [*Or mockery] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins
whereby one's neighbor is injured by words?
(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned?
Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct
from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently the
same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore
derision would seem not to differ from reviling.
Objection 2: Further, no man is derided except for something
reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they
be imputed to a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if
privately, it amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision
is not distinct from the foregoing vices.
Objection 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury
they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by
derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is detrimental
to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the
foregoing.
On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described as
"making fun." Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in jest.
Therefore derision differs from all of them.
I answer that, As stated above ([2958]Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should
be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these
sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those
who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure the
honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good name,
and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider intends
to shame the person he derides. And since this end is distinct from the
others, it follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the
foregoing sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the
end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i.e.
by words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the
nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall
laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the
species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs
from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as
Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).
Reply to Objection 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both
respect and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the
glory of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is
this, the testimony of our conscience." Hence, on the other hand, for
doing a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor
and good name in the eyes of others---and for this purpose the reviler
and the backbiter speak of another person---while in his own eyes, he
loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at
reprehensible deeds being imputed to him---and for this purpose the
derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision
agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to the
end.
Reply to Objection 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good,
according to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast."
Wherefore he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him
inflicts a special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of
sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether derision can be a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin. Every
mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem contrary
to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends,
wherefore it is known as "making fun." Therefore derision cannot be a
mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that
which is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal
sin when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin
to relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore
says (De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has
repented of, is a derider and not a penitent." It would likewise follow
that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 15) "the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who derides the
horse, i.e. the just man, and his rider, i.e. God." Therefore derision
is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins
than derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest.
But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore
is derision a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:34): "He derideth [Vulg.:
'shall scorn'] the scorners." But God's derision is eternal punishment
for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth
in heaven shall laugh at them." Therefore derision is a mortal sin.
I answer that, The object of derision is always some evil or defect.
Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but seriously:
consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule (whence the
terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it is considered to be
slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first,
in itself, secondly, in relation to the person. When anyone makes game
or fun of another's evil or defect, because it is a slight evil in
itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its genus. on the other hand
this defect may be considered as a slight evil in relation to the
person, just as we are wont to think little of the defects of children
and imbeciles: and then to make game or fun of a person, is to scorn
him altogether, and to think him so despicable that his misfortune
troubles us not one whit, but is held as an object of derision. In this
way derision is a mortal sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is
also done openly: because the reviler would seem to take another's evil
seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, and so would seem the
more to despise and dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense,
derision is a grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a
greater respect is due to the person derided.
Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the
things of God, according to Is. 37:23, "Whom hast thou reproached, and
whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy
voice?" and he replies: "Against the Holy One of Israel." In the second
place comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written (Prov.
30:17): "The eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the
labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick
it out, and the young eagles eat it." Further, the derision of good
persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue, and against
this it is written (Job 12:4): "The simplicity of the just man is
laughed to scorn." Such like derision does very much harm: because it
turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14),
"Who when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts of
others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a mischievous
reviling."
Reply to Objection 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in
relation to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something
against charity in relation to the person who is the object of the
jest, on account of contempt, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he
has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly,
in so far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that
to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but
only dispositively and imperfectly.
Reply to Objection 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous
than backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but
jest. Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling
does, as stated above, and then it is a grave sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CURSING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?
(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?
(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
(4) Of its comparison with other sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to curse anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is unlawful
to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according
to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14), "Bless and curse not."
Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.
Objection 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan.
3:82, "O ye sons of men, bless the Lord." Now the same mouth cannot
both bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James.
Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man.
Objection 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him
some evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be
a kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone,
indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil.
Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse.
Objection 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his
obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it
lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): "While the
ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul." Much less
therefore is it lawful to curse a man.
Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, "How shall I curse whom God
hath not cursed?" says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a
sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments." Now one man cannot know
another man's sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore no
man may lawfully curse another.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth
not in the words of this law." Moreover Eliseus cursed the little boys
who mocked him (4 Kings 2:24).
I answer that, To curse [maledicere] is the same as to speak ill [malum
dicere]. Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the thing spoken.
First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is expressed in the
indicative mood: in this way "maledicere" signifies simply to tell
someone of another's evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore
tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called backbiters. Secondly,
speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way of cause, and this
belongs to God first and foremost, since He made all things by His
word, according to Ps. 32:9, "He spoke and they were made"; while
secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his word, commands others and
thus moves them to do something: it is for this purpose that we employ
verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, "speaking" is related to the
thing spoken by expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which
is expressed in words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the
optative mood.
Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way
of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds. And here
we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on
one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown above
([2959]FS, Q[20], A[3]). Hence in these two ways of evil speaking, by
way of command and by way of desire, there is the same aspect of
lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or desires another's
evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will
be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is meant by cursing. On the
other hand if a man commands or desires another's evil under the aspect
of good, it is lawful; and it may be called cursing, not strictly
speaking, but accidentally, because the chief intention of the speaker
is directed not to evil but to good.
Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the aspect
of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and thus a judge
lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the
Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the same way the prophets in
the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners, as though
conforming their will to Divine justice, although such like imprecation
may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the
aspect of useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or
hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself reform, or at least
that he may cease from harming others.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called
with an evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second
Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of
good, is not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good
simply, in fact rather is it in conformity therewith.
Reply to Objection 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be
considered. His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful
to curse it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed,
according to Job 3:8, "Let them curse it who curse the day." Yet when a
sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same reason he
judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he is said to
curse his own soul.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be
perceived in themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest
sin, which has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to
know whom God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to
know who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational
creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to
punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either
of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them.
Objection 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but
the nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the
devil, as stated above [2960](A[1]). Therefore it is nowise lawful to
curse an irrational creature.
Objection 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as
bodies, or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral.
iv, 2), "it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to
curse what exists." Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an
irrational creature.
On the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Mat.
21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1.
I answer that, Benediction and malediction, properly speaking, regard
things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational creatures: while
good and evil are said to happen to irrational creatures in relation to
the rational creature for whose sake they are. Now they are related to
the rational creature in several ways. First by way of ministration, in
so far as irrational creatures minister to the needs of man. In this
sense the Lord said to man (Gn. 3:17): "Cursed is the earth in thy
work," so that its barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also
David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding
(Moral. iv, 3). Again the irrational creature is related to the
rational creature by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the
fig tree in signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is
related to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by
way of time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on
account of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on
account of the consequent penalties. In this sense also we may
understand David to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in
2 Kings 1:21, namely on account of the people slaughtered there.
But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a
sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is idle
and vain and consequently unlawful.
From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For
Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the
appendix of St. Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins.
But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a
venial Sin.
Objection 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the
mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing
sometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil
deeds are not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom
of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God, according to 1
Cor. 6:10, "Nor cursers [Douay: 'railers'], nor extortioners shall
possess the kingdom of God." Therefore cursing is a mortal sin.
I answer that, The evil words of which we are speaking now are those
whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or desire.
Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil by
commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby we
love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a mortal
sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, as the person whom
we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect. Hence it is
written (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let
him die."
It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial sin
either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in cursing
him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters the
curse; because he may say such words through some slight movement, or
in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word should be weighed
chiefly with regard to the speaker's intention, as stated above
([2961]Q[72], A[2]).
From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting?
Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than
backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied in
the canonical epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that "when
Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended about the
body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of blasphemy
[Douay: 'railing speech']," where blasphemy stands for cursing,
according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver sin than backbiting.
Therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting.
Objection 2: Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as
stated above ([2962]Q[73], A[3]). But cursing is on a par with the sin
of murder; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth.): "When thou
sayest: 'Curse him down with his house, away with everything,' you are
no better than a murderer." Therefore cursing is graver than
backbiting.
Objection 3: Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But
the curser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter merely
signifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more
grievously than the backbiter.
On the contrary, It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas
cursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what has
been said [2963](A[1]). Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing.
I answer that, As stated in the [2964]FP, Q[48], A[5], evil is twofold,
evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil of fault is
the worse ([2965]FP, Q[48], A[6]). Hence to speak evil of fault is
worse than to speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of speaking
be the same. Accordingly it belongs to the reviler, the tale-bearer,
the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault, whereas it
belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to speak evil of
punishment, and not evil of fault except under the aspect of
punishment. But the mode of speaking is not the same, for in the case
of the four vices mentioned above, evil of fault is spoken by way of
assertion, whereas in the case of cursing evil of punishment is spoken,
either by causing it in the form of a command, or by wishing it. Now
the utterance itself of a person's fault is a sin, in as much as it
inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, and it is more grievous to
inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, other things being
equal.
Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin than
the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the cursing which is
expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a cause, will
be more or less grievous than backbiting, according as it inflicts an
injury more or less grave than the blackening of a man's good name.
Moreover this must be taken as applying to these vices considered in
their essential aspects: for other accidental points might be taken
into consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate the aforesaid
vices.
Reply to Objection 1: To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God,
and thus accidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one
curse a creature on account of its fault: and the same applies to
backbiting.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above [2966](A[3]), cursing, in one
way, includes the desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil
of another's violent death, he does not differ, in desire, from a
murderer, but he differs from him in so far as the external act adds
something to the act of the will.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers cursing by way of
command.
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(D) BY SINS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (Q[77])
OF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary commutations.
First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed in buying and
selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which occurs in loans. In
connection with the other voluntary commutations no special kind of sin
is to be found distinct from rapine and theft.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is lawful
to sell a thing for more than its worth?
(2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold;
(3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold?
(4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price
than was paid for it?
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Whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more
than its worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws determine
that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just for buyer
and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend.
8,15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing for more than its
worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than its worth. Therefore
it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to all would seem to be
natural and not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a
certain jester was accepted by all, "You wish to buy for a song and to
sell at a premium," which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, "It is
naught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away, then
he will boast." Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than
its worth.
Objection 3: Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty
demands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on utility, the
amount of the recompense for a favor received should depend on the
utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility sometimes is worth
more than the thing given, for instance if the receiver be in great
need of that thing, whether for the purpose of avoiding a danger, or of
deriving some particular benefit. Therefore, in contracts of buying and
selling, it is lawful to give a thing in return for more than its
worth.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 7:12): "All things . . .
whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them."
But no man wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore no
man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.
I answer that, It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit in
order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this is to
deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says (De Offic.
iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from double-dealing: the
seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the buyer upon one that
bids against him."
But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two ways.
First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of view, buying
and selling seem to be established for the common advantage of both
parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to the other, and vice
versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). Now whatever is
established for the common advantage, should not be more of a burden to
one party than to another, and consequently all contracts between them
should observe equality of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a
thing that comes into human use is measured by the price given for it,
for which purpose money was invented, as stated in Ethic. v, 5.
Therefore if either the price exceed the quantity of the thing's worth,
or, conversely, the thing exceed the price, there is no longer the
equality of justice: and consequently, to sell a thing for more than
its worth, or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust
and unlawful.
Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as accidentally
tending to the advantage of one party, and to the disadvantage of the
other: for instance, when a man has great need of a certain thing,
while an other man will suffer if he be without it. In such a case the
just price will depend not only on the thing sold, but on the loss
which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will be lawful to sell
a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though the price paid be
not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the one man derive a
great advantage by becoming possessed of the other man's property, and
the seller be not at a loss through being without that thing, the
latter ought not to raise the price, because the advantage accruing to
the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a circumstance affecting
the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not his, though he may charge
for the loss he suffers.
On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from
something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller
something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2967]FS, Q[96], A[2]) human law
is given to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it
is not given to the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to
forbid all that is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to
prohibit whatever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats
other matters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but
by not punishing them. Accordingly, if without employing deceit the
seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer
obtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as
licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be
too great, because then even human law demands restitution to be made,
for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half the
amount of the just price of a thing [*Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend.
2,8].
On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is
contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is reckoned
unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in buying and
selling: and he who has received more than he ought must make
compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be
considerable. I add this condition, because the just price of things is
not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of
estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to
destroy the equality of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says "this jester, either by looking
into himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are
inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since in
reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that
justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination." And then
he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book to a
man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is evident
that this common desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it
is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In commutative justice we consider chiefly real
equality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we consider
equality of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend on the
usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to the thing
bought.
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Whether a sale is rendered unlawful through a fault in the thing sold?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and
unlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For less account should be
taken of the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its
substance. Yet the sale of a thing does not seem to be rendered
unlawful through a fault in its substance: for instance, if a man sell
instead of the real metal, silver or gold produced by some chemical
process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which silver and
gold are necessary, for instance in the making of vessels and the like.
Much less therefore will it be an unlawful sale if the thing be
defective in other ways.
Objection 2: Further, any fault in the thing, affecting the quantity,
would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in equality.
Now quantity is known by being measured: and the measures of things
that come into human use are not fixed, but in some places are greater,
in others less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7). Therefore just
as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of the thing sold, it
seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful through the thing sold being
defective.
Objection 3: Further, the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a
fitting quality. But in order to know the quality of a thing, much
knowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers. Therefore a sale
is not rendered unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold).
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): "It is manifestly a
rule of justice that a good man should not depart from the truth, nor
inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any connection with
fraud."
I answer that, A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the thing
which is sold. One, in respect of the thing's substance: and if the
seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling, he is guilty of
a fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful. Hence we find
it written against certain people (Is. 1:22), "Thy silver is turned
into dross, thy wine is mingled with water": because that which is
mixed is defective in its substance.
Another defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being
measured: wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty measure in
selling, he is guilty of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it is
written (Dt. 25:13,14): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag,
a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a greater
bushel and a less," and further on (Dt. 25:16): "For the Lord . . .
abhorreth him that doth these things, and He hateth all injustice."
A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, if a man
sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: and if anyone do this
knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, and the sale, in
consequence, is illicit.
In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale, but
he is also bound to restitution. But if any of the foregoing defects be
in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about this, the seller does not
sin, because he does that which is unjust materially, nor is his deed
unjust, as shown above ([2968]Q[59], A[2]). Nevertheless he is bound to
compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his knowledge. Moreover
what has been said of the seller applies equally to the buyer. For
sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his goods to be
specifically of lower value, as when a man sells gold instead of
copper, and then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it unjustly and
is bound to restitution: and the same applies to a defect in quantity
as to a defect in quality.
Reply to Objection 1: Gold and silver are costly not only on account of
the usefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them, but
also on account of the excellence and purity of their substance. Hence
if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the true specific
nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent and unjust,
especially as real gold and silver can produce certain results by their
natural action, which the counterfeit gold and silver of alchemists
cannot produce. Thus the true metal has the property of making people
joyful, and is helpful medicinally against certain maladies. Moreover
real gold can be employed more frequently, and lasts longer in its
condition of purity than counterfeit gold. If however real gold were to
be produced by alchemy, it would not be unlawful to sell it for the
genuine article, for nothing prevents art from employing certain
natural causes for the production of natural and true effects, as
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things produced by the art of the
demons.
Reply to Objection 2: The measures of salable commodities must needs be
different in different places, on account of the difference of supply:
because where there is greater abundance, the measures are wont to be
larger. However in each place those who govern the state must determine
the just measures of things salable, with due consideration for the
conditions of place and time. Hence it is not lawful to disregard such
measures as are established by public authority or custom.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price
of things salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at
times a horse fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on
their usefulness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or
buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but
only of such as render the thing adapted to man's use, for instance,
that the horse be strong, run well and so forth. Such qualities the
seller and buyer can easily discover.
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Whether the seller is bound to state the defects of the thing sold?
Objection 1: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the
defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer to
buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods offered for
sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that thing belong to
the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable to the seller if
the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be hurried into buying a
thing without carefully inquiring into its condition.
Objection 2: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents
him carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods
he has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic.
iii, 13) pictures a man as saying: "Could anything be more absurd than
for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: 'I offer this
unhealthy horse for sale?'" Therefore the seller is not bound to state
the defects of the thing sold.
Objection 3: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to
know the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to
offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters pertaining
to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is false. Much less
therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of what he offers for
sale, as though he were counseling the buyer.
Objection 4: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one
offers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now
sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without any
defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat to a
place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will come
after him carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they would
give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not give the buyer
this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he tell him
the faults of the goods he is selling.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): "In all contracts
the defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and unless the
seller make them known, although the buyer has already acquired a right
to them, the contract is voided on account of the fraudulent action."
I answer that, It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of
danger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help or
counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in
certain fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject to him, or
when he is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers
goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the
very fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may
occasion loss or danger to the buyer---loss, if, by reason of this
defect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing off the price
on that account---danger, if this defect either hinder the use of the
goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a lame for a
fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or poisonous food
for wholesome. Wherefore if such like defects be hidden, and the seller
does not make them known, the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, and
the seller will be bound to compensation for the loss incurred.
On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse
have but one eye, or if the goods though useless to the buyer, be
useful to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought
from the price, he is not bound to state the defect of the goods, since
perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to allow a
greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller may look to his own
indemnity, by withholding the defect of the goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is
manifest: for "a man judges of what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if
the defects of the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them
is not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made
known to him. The case would be different if the defects were manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no need to publish beforehand by the
public crier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because
if he were to begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be
frightened to buy, through ignorance of other qualities that might
render the thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated
to each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be able to
compare the various points one with the other, the good with the bad:
for nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being
useful in many others.
Reply to Objection 3: Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to
tell everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is
so bound in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would
endanger another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this case.
Reply to Objection 4: The defect in a thing makes it of less value now
than it seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to
be of less value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other
merchants, which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the seller,
since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him, does not
seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is going to
happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his price, it
would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does not seem to
be bound to do this as a debt of justice.
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Whether, in trading, it is lawful to sell a thing at a higher price than
what was paid for it?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell a
thing for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom [*Hom.
xxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom] says on Mat. 21:12: "He that buys a thing in order that he
may sell it, entire and unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who is
cast out of God's temple." Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in his
commentary on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have not known learning, or
trading" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "What is
trade," says he, "but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of
retailing at a higher price?" and he adds: "Such were the tradesmen
whom Our Lord cast out of the temple." Now no man is cast out of the
temple except for a sin. Therefore such like trading is sinful.
Objection 2: Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a
higher price than their worth, or to buy them for less than their
value, as shown above [2969](A[1]). Now if you sell a thing for a
higher price than you paid for it, you must either have bought it for
less than its value, or sell it for more than its value. Therefore this
cannot be done without sin.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Shun, as you
would the plague, a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy, or
who, from being a nobody has become a celebrity." Now trading would net
seem to be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness.
Therefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to sell at
a higher price.
On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have not
known learning," [*Cf. OBJ 1] says: "The greedy tradesman blasphemes
over his losses; he lies and perjures himself over the price of his
wares. But these are vices of the man, not of the craft, which can be
exercised without these vices." Therefore trading is not in itself
unlawful.
I answer that, A tradesman is one whose business consists in the
exchange of things. According to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3),
exchange of things is twofold; one, natural as it were, and necessary,
whereby one commodity is exchanged for another, or money taken in
exchange for a commodity, in order to satisfy the needs of life. Such
like trading, properly speaking, does not belong to tradesmen, but
rather to housekeepers or civil servants who have to provide the
household or the state with the necessaries of life. The other kind of
exchange is either that of money for money, or of any commodity for
money, not on account of the necessities of life, but for profit, and
this kind of exchange, properly speaking, regards tradesmen, according
to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3). The former kind of exchange is
commendable because it supplies a natural need: but the latter is
justly deserving of blame, because, considered in itself, it satisfies
the greed for gain, which knows no limit and tends to infinity. Hence
trading, considered in itself, has a certain debasement attaching
thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it does not imply a virtuous
or necessary end. Nevertheless gain which is the end of trading, though
not implying, by its nature, anything virtuous or necessary, does not,
in itself, connote anything sinful or contrary to virtue: wherefore
nothing prevents gain from being directed to some necessary or even
virtuous end, and thus trading becomes lawful. Thus, for instance, a
man may intend the moderate gain which he seeks to acquire by trading
for the upkeep of his household, or for the assistance of the needy: or
again, a man may take to trade for some public advantage, for instance,
lest his country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an
end, but as payment for his labor.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Chrysostom refers to the trading
which seeks gain as a last end. This is especially the case where a man
sells something at a higher price without its undergoing any change.
For if he sells at a higher price something that has changed for the
better, he would seem to receive the reward of his labor. Nevertheless
the gain itself may be lawfully intended, not as a last end, but for
the sake of some other end which is necessary or virtuous, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: Not everyone that sells at a higher price than he
bought is a tradesman, but only he who buys that he may sell at a
profit. If, on the contrary, he buys not for sale but for possession,
and afterwards, for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade
transaction even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this,
either because he has bettered the thing, or because the value of the
thing has changed with the change of place or time, or on account of
the danger he incurs in transferring the thing from one place to
another, or again in having it carried by another. In this sense
neither buying nor selling is unjust.
Reply to Objection 3: Clerics should abstain not only from things that
are evil in themselves, but even from those that have an appearance of
evil. This happens in trading, both because it is directed to worldly
gain, which clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so
many vices, since "a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips"
[*'A merchant is hardly free from negligence, and a huckster shall not
be justified from the sins of the lips'] (Ecclus. 26:28). There is also
another reason, because trading engages the mind too much with worldly
cares, and consequently withdraws it from spiritual cares; wherefore
the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:4): "No man being a soldier to God
entangleth himself with secular businesses." Nevertheless it is lawful
for clerics to engage in the first mentioned kind of exchange, which is
directed to supply the necessaries of life, either by buying or by
selling.
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(E) BY SINS COMMITTED IN LOANS (Q[78])
OF THE SIN OF USURY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent, which
is to receive usury?
(2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of
consideration, by way of payment for the loan?
(3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money
taken in usury?
(4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is a sin to take usury for money lent?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for money
lent. For no man sins through following the example of Christ. But Our
Lord said of Himself (Lk. 19:23): "At My coming I might have exacted
it," i.e. the money lent, "with usury." Therefore it is not a sin to
take usury for lending money.
Objection 2: Further, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is
unspotted," because, to wit, it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is
allowed in the Divine law, according to Dt. 23:19,20: "Thou shalt not
fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but to
the stranger": nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the
observance of the Law, according to Dt. 28:12: "Thou shalt fenerate* to
many nations, and shalt not borrow of any one."
[*'Faeneraberis'---'Thou shalt lend upon usury.' The Douay version has
simply 'lend.' The objection lays stress on the word 'faeneraberis':
hence the necessity of rendering it by 'fenerate.'] Therefore it is not
a sin to take usury.
Objection 3: Further, in human affairs justice is determined by civil
laws. Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to be
lawful.
Objection 4: Further, the counsels are not binding under sin. But,
among other counsels we find (Lk. 6:35): "Lend, hoping for nothing
thereby." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.
Objection 5: Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept
a price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is
not bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is
lawful for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it.
Objection 6: Further, silver made into coins does not differ
specifically from silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept
a price for the loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to
accept a price for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore usury is not in
itself a sin.
Objection 7: Further, anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its
owner freely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan, freely gives the
usury. Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to any
of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be
hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with usuries."
I answer that, To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself,
because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads
to inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this
evident, we must observe that there are certain things the use of which
consists in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for
drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore in such
like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart from the
thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing, is granted
the thing itself and for this reason, to lend things of this kin is to
transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell wine
separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling the same thing
twice, or he would be selling what does not exist, wherefore he would
evidently commit a sin of injustice. In like manner he commits an
injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz.
one, the return of the thing in equal measure, the other, the price of
the use, which is called usury.
On the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist
in their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to
destroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for instance,
one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house while
reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, he may
grant the use of the house, while retaining the ownership. For this
reason a man may lawfully make a charge for the use of his house, and,
besides this, revendicate the house from the person to whom he has
granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a house.
Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3) was
invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently the
proper and principal use of money is its consumption or alienation
whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful
to take payment for the use of money lent, which payment is known as
usury: and just as a man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods, so
is he bound to restore the money which he has taken in usury.
Reply to Objection 1: In this passage usury must be taken figuratively
for the increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us, for He
wishes us ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and
this is for our own profit not for His.
Reply to Objection 2: The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their
brethren, i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand that
to take usury from any man is evil simply, because we ought to treat
every man as our neighbor and brother, especially in the state of the
Gospel, whereto all are called. Hence it is said without any
distinction in Ps. 14:5: "He that hath not put out his money to usury,"
and (Ezech. 18:8): "Who hath not taken usury [*Vulg.: 'If a man . . .
hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase . . . he is just.']."
They were permitted, however, to take usury from foreigners, not as
though it were lawful, but in order to avoid a greater evil, lest, to
wit, through avarice to which they were prone according to Is. 56:11,
they should take usury from the Jews who were worshippers of God.
Where we find it promised to them as a reward, "Thou shalt fenerate to
many nations," etc., fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense for
lending, as in Ecclus. 29:10, where we read: "Many have refused to
fenerate, not out of wickedness," i.e. they would not lend. Accordingly
the Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth, so that they
would be able to lend to others.
Reply to Objection 3: Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on
account of the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be
deprived of many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and
punishments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted
usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but
lest the advantage of many should be hindered. Hence it is that in
civil law [*Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu] it is stated that "those things
according to natural reason and civil law which are consumed by being
used, do not admit of usufruct," and that "the senate did not (nor
could it) appoint a usufruct to such things, but established a
quasi-usufruct," namely by permitting usury. Moreover the Philosopher,
led by natural reason, says (Polit. i, 3) that "to make money by usury
is exceedingly unnatural."
Reply to Objection 4: A man is not always bound to lend, and for this
reason it is placed among the counsels. Yet it is a matter of precept
not to seek profit by lending: although it may be called a matter of
counsel in comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some
kinds of usury to be lawful, just as love of one's enemies is a matter
of counsel. Or again, He speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain,
but of the hope which is put in man. For we ought not to lend or do any
good deed through hope in man, but only through hope in God.
Reply to Objection 5: He that is not bound to lend, may accept
repayment for what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is
repaid according to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he
lent. Wherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has
no other use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of
something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.
Reply to Objection 6: The principal use of a silver vessel is not its
consumption, and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining one's
ownership of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver money is
sinking it in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its use and at
the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent. It must be
observed, however, that the secondary use of silver vessels may be an
exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. In like manner there
may be some secondary use of silver money; for instance, a man might
lend coins for show, or to be used as security.
Reply to Objection 7: He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily
simply, but under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow
money which the owner is unwilling to lend without usury.
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Whether it is lawful to ask for any other kind of consideration for money
lent?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may ask for some other kind of
consideration for money lent. For everyone may lawfully seek to
indemnify himself. Now sometimes a man suffers loss through lending
money. Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact something else
besides the money lent.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. v, 5, one is in duty bound by
a point of honor, to repay anyone who has done us a favor. Now to lend
money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for which he should
be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by a natural
debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful to bind oneself
to an obligation of the natural law. Therefore it is not unlawful, in
lending money to anyone, to demand some sort of compensation as
condition of the loan.
Objection 3: Further, just as there is real remuneration, so is there
verbal remuneration, and remuneration by service, as a gloss says on
Is. 33:15, "Blessed is he that shaketh his hands from all bribes
[*Vulg.: 'Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? . . . He
that shaketh his hands from all bribes.']." Now it is lawful to accept
service or praise from one to whom one has lent money. Therefore in
like manner it is lawful to accept any other kind of remuneration.
Objection 4: Further, seemingly the relation of gift to gift is the
same as of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money
given. Therefore it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for
a loan granted.
Objection 5: Further, the lender, by transferring his ownership of a
sum of money removes the money further from himself than he who
entrusts it to a merchant or craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive
interest for money entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore it
is also lawful to receive interest for money lent.
Objection 6: Further, a man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use
of which pledge he might sell for a price: as when a man mortgages his
land or the house wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to receive
interest for money lent.
Objection 7: Further, it sometimes happens that a man raises the price
of his goods under guise of loan, or buys another's goods at a low
figure; or raises his price through delay in being paid, and lowers his
price that he may be paid the sooner. Now in all these cases there
seems to be payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to be
manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems to be lawful to expect or exact
some consideration for money lent.
On the contrary, Among other conditions requisite in a just man it is
stated (Ezech. 18:17) that he "hath not taken usury and increase."
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), a thing is
reckoned as money "if its value can be measured by money."
Consequently, just as it is a sin against justice, to take money, by
tacit or express agreement, in return for lending money or anything
else that is consumed by being used, so also is it a like sin, by tacit
or express agreement to receive anything whose price can be measured by
money. Yet there would be no sin in receiving something of the kind,
not as exacting it, nor yet as though it were due on account of some
agreement tacit or expressed, but as a gratuity: since, even before
lending the money, one could accept a gratuity, nor is one in a worse
condition through lending.
On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan, in
respect of such things as are not appreciated by a measure of money,
for instance, benevolence, and love for the lender, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: A lender may without sin enter an agreement with
the borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he
ought to have, for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid a
loss. It may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss than
the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the lender with
what he has gained. But the lender cannot enter an agreement for
compensation, through the fact that he makes no profit out of his
money: because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be
prevented in many ways from having.
Reply to Objection 2: Repayment for a favor may be made in two ways. In
one way, as a debt of justice; and to such a debt a man may be bound by
a fixed contract; and its amount is measured according to the favor
received. Wherefore the borrower of money or any such thing the use of
which is its consumption is not bound to repay more than he received in
loan: and consequently it is against justice if he be obliged to pay
back more. In another way a man's obligation to repayment for favor
received is based on a debt of friendship, and the nature of this debt
depends more on the feeling with which the favor was conferred than on
the greatness of the favor itself. This debt does not carry with it a
civil obligation, involving a kind of necessity that would exclude the
spontaneous nature of such a repayment.
Reply to Objection 3: If a man were, in return for money lent, as
though there had been an agreement tacit or expressed, to expect or
exact repayment in the shape of some remuneration of service or words,
it would be the same as if he expected or exacted some real
remuneration, because both can be priced at a money value, as may be
seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which they
exercise by work or by tongue. If on the other hand the remuneration by
service or words be given not as an obligation, but as a favor, which
is not to be appreciated at a money value, it is lawful to take, exact,
and expect it.
Reply to Objection 4: Money cannot be sold for a greater sum than the
amount lent, which has to be paid back: nor should the loan be made
with a demand or expectation of aught else but of a feeling of
benevolence which cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which can
be the basis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to lend in
return at some future time is repugnant to such a feeling, because
again an obligation of this kind has its pecuniary value. Consequently
it is lawful for the lender to borrow something else at the same time,
but it is unlawful for him to bind the borrower to grant him a loan at
some future time.
Reply to Objection 5: He who lends money transfers the ownership of the
money to the borrower. Hence the borrower holds the money at his own
risk and is bound to pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not
exact more. On the other hand he that entrusts his money to a merchant
or craftsman so as to form a kind of society, does not transfer the
ownership of his money to them, for it remains his, so that at his risk
the merchant speculates with it, or the craftsman uses it for his
craft, and consequently he may lawfully demand as something belonging
to him, part of the profits derived from his money.
Reply to Objection 6: If a man in return for money lent to him pledges
something that can be valued at a price, the lender must allow for the
use of that thing towards the repayment of the loan. Else if he wishes
the gratuitous use of that thing in addition to repayment, it is the
same as if he took money for lending, and that is usury, unless perhaps
it were such a thing as friends are wont to lend to one another gratis,
as in the case of the loan of a book.
Reply to Objection 7: If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price
than that which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it
is manifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of
the price has the character of a loan, so that whatever he demands
beyond the just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price
for a loan, which pertains to usury. In like manner if a buyer wishes
to buy goods at a lower price than what is just, for the reason that he
pays for the goods before they can be delivered, it is a sin of usury;
because again this anticipated payment of money has the character of a
loan, the price of which is the rebate on the just price of the goods
sold. On the other hand if a man wishes to allow a rebate on the just
price in order that he may have his money sooner, he is not guilty of
the sin of usury.
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Whether a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money
gotten by usury?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever
profits he has made out of money gotten by usury. For the Apostle says
(Rom. 11:16): "If the root be holy, so are the branches." Therefore
likewise if the root be rotten so are the branches. But the root was
infected with usury. Therefore whatever profit is made therefrom is
infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore it.
Objection 2: Further, it is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the
Decretal: 'Cum tu sicut asseris'): "Property accruing from usury must
be sold, and the price repaid to the persons from whom the usury was
extorted." Therefore, likewise, whatever else is acquired from usurious
money must be restored.
Objection 3: Further, that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury
is due to him by reason of the money he paid for it. Therefore he has
no more right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid. But he
was bound to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he is
also bound to restore what he acquired with it.
On the contrary, A man may lawfully hold what he has lawfully acquired.
Now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is sometimes
lawfully acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully retained.
I answer that, As stated above [2970](A[1]), there are certain things
whose use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct,
according to law (ibid., ad 3). Wherefore if such like things be
extorted by means of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and so
forth, the lender is not bound to restore more than he received (since
what is acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing but of
human industry), unless indeed the other party by losing some of his
own goods be injured through the lender retaining them: for then he is
bound to make good the loss.
On the other hand, there are certain things whose use is not their
consumption: such things admit of usufruct, for instance house or land
property and so forth. Wherefore if a man has by usury extorted from
another his house or land, he is bound to restore not only the house or
land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since they are the
fruits of things owned by another man and consequently are due to him.
Reply to Objection 1: The root has not only the character of matter, as
money made by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an
active cause, in so far as it administers nourishment. Hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Further, Property acquired from usury does not
belong to the person who paid usury, but to the person who bought it.
Yet he that paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he
has on the other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that
such property should be assigned to the persons who paid usury, since
the property is perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury, but it
is commanded that the property be sold, and the price be restored, of
course according to the amount taken in usury.
Reply to Objection 3: The proceeds of money taken in usury are due to
the person who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as
instrumental cause, but on account of his own industry as principal
cause. Wherefore he has more right to the goods acquired with usurious
money than to the usurious money itself.
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Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money under
a condition of usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that they "are
worthy of death . . . not only they that do" these sins, "but they also
that consent to them that do them." Now he that borrows money under a
condition of usury consents in the sin of the usurer, and gives him an
occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also.
Objection 2: Further, for no temporal advantage ought one to give
another an occasion of committing a sin: for this pertains to active
scandal, which is always sinful, as stated above ([2971]Q[43], A[2]).
Now he that seeks to borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin.
Therefore he is not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage.
Objection 3: Further, it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit
one's money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems
altogether unlawful to deposit one's money with a usurer, even as it
would be unlawful to deposit one's sword with a madman, a maiden with a
libertine, or food with a glutton. Neither therefore is it lawful to
borrow from a usurer.
On the contrary, He that suffers injury does not sin, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore justice is not a mean between two
vices, as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer sins by doing
an injury to the person who borrows from him under a condition of
usury. Therefore he that accepts a loan under a condition of usury does
not sin.
I answer that, It is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet it
is lawful to make use of another's sin for a good end, since even God
uses all sin for some good, since He draws some good from every evil as
stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked whether it
were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing by false
gods (which is a manifest sin, for he gives Divine honor to them)
Augustine (Ep. xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a bad but for
a good purpose, the oath of a man that swears by false gods, is a
party, not to his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good compact
whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce him to swear by
false gods, he would sin.
Accordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is by
no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of usury: yet
it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready to do so and
is a usurer by profession; provided the borrower have a good end in
view, such as the relief of his own or another's need. Thus too it is
lawful for a man who has fallen among thieves to point out his property
to them (which they sin in taking) in order to save his life, after the
example of the ten men who said to Ismahel (Jer. 41:8): "Kill us not:
for we have stores in the field."
Reply to Objection 1: He who borrows for usury does not consent to the
usurer's sin but makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer's acceptance of
usury that pleases him, but his lending, which is good.
Reply to Objection 2: He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an
occasion, not for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who
finds an occasion of sin in the malice of his heart. Hence there is
passive scandal on his part, while there is no active scandal on the
part of the person who seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a
reason why the other person should desist from borrowing if he is in
need, since this passive scandal arises not from weakness or ignorance
but from malice.
Reply to Objection 3: If one were to entrust one's money to a usurer
lacking other means of practising usury; or with the intention of
making a greater profit from his money by reason of the usury, one
would be giving a sinner matter for sin, so that one would be a
participator in his guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom
one entrusts one's money has other means of practising usury, there is
no sin in entrusting it to him that it may be in safer keeping, since
this is to use a sinner for a good purpose.
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OF THE QUASI-INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are "to
do good," and "to decline from evil," and the opposite vices. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether these two are parts of justice?
(2) Whether transgression is a special sin?
(3) Whether omission is a special sin?
(4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression.
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Whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good are
not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a good
deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the whole.
Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be reckoned
parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, "Turn away from evil and do
good," says: "The former," i.e. to turn away from evil, "avoids sin,
the latter," i.e. to do good, "deserves the life and the palm." But any
part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to decline
from evil is not a part of justice.
Objection 3: Further, things that are so related that one implies the
other, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining
from evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good at
the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing good are not
parts of justice.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that
"declining from evil and doing good" belong to the justice of the law.
I answer that, If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs to
every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they
cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the
sense of "all virtue" [*Cf.[2972] Q[58], A[5]]. And yet even if justice
be taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good;
namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.
On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good
as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special
justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid
the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor;
while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the
community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.
Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of
special justice, because each is required for the perfect act of
justice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our
relations with others, as shown above ([2973]Q[58], A[2]): and it
pertains to the same cause to establish and to preserve that which it
has established. Now a person establishes the equality of justice by
doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves the
already established equality of justice by declining from evil, that is
by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: Good and evil are here considered under a special
aspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why these
two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and
evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral virtue, is
that the other moral virtues are concerned with the passions wherein to
do good is to observe the mean, which is the same as to avoid the
extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding evil come to the
same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other hand justice is
concerned with operations and external things, wherein to establish
equality is one thing, and not to disturb the equality established is
another.
Reply to Objection 2: To decline from evil, considered as a part of
justice, does not denote a pure negation, viz."not to do evil"; for
this does not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it
implies a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term
"decline" shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person resists
against an instigation to do evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Doing good is the completive act of justice, and
the principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more
imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a.
material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the
formal and completive part.
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Whether transgression is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that transgression is not a special sin. For
no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now
transgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose
says (De Parad. viii) that sin is "a transgression of the Divine law."
Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.
Objection 2: Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus.
But transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a
"word, deed or desire against the law of God," according to Augustine
(Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature,
or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.
Objection 3: Further, no species contains all the parts into which its
genus is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the
capital vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed. Therefore
transgression is not a special sin.
On the contrary, It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice.
I answer that, The term transgression is derived from bodily movement
and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to transgress in
bodily movement, when he steps [graditur] beyond [trans] a fixed
boundary---and it is a negative precept that fixes the boundary that
man must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore to transgress,
properly speaking, is to act against a negative precept.
Now materially considered this may be common to all the species of sin,
because man transgresses a Divine precept by any species of mortal sin.
But if we consider it formally, namely under its special aspect of an
act against a negative precept, it is a special sin in two ways. First,
in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin that are opposed to
the other virtues: for just as it belongs properly to legal justice to
consider a precept as binding, so it belongs properly to a
transgression to consider a precept as an object of contempt. Secondly,
in so far as it is distinct from omission which is opposed to an
affirmative precept.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as legal justice is "all virtue"
([2974]Q[58], A[5]) as regards its subject and matter, so legal
injustice is materially "all sin." It is in this way that Ambrose
defined sin, considering it from the point of view of legal injustice.
Reply to Objection 2: The natural inclination concerns the precepts of
the natural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a precept;
since as Augustine says in an epistle On the Fast of the Sabbath (Ep.
xxxvi), "a custom of God's people should be looked upon as law." Hence
both sin and transgression may be against a laudable custom and against
a natural inclination.
Reply to Objection 3: All these species of sin may include
transgression, if we consider them not under their proper aspects, but
under a special aspect, as stated above. The sin of omission, however,
is altogether distinct from the sin of transgression.
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Whether omission is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that omission is not a special sin. For
every sin is either original or actual. Now omission is not original
sin, for it is not contracted through origin nor is it actual sin, for
it may be altogether without act, as stated above ([2975]FS, Q[71],
A[5]) when we were treating of sins in general. Therefore omission is
not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is voluntary. Now omission sometimes is
not voluntary but necessary, as when a woman is violated after taking a
vow of virginity, or when one lose that which one is under an
obligation to restore, or when a priest is bound to say Mass, and is
prevented from doing so. Therefore omission is not always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time when any special
sin begins. But this is not possible in the case of omission, since one
is not altered by not doing a thing, no matter when the omission
occurs, and yet the omission is not always sinful. Therefore omission
is not a special sin.
Objection 4: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue.
But it is not possible to assign any special virtue to which omission
is opposed, both because the good of any virtue can be omitted, and
because justice to which it would seem more particularly opposed,
always requires an act, even in declining from evil, as stated above
(A[1], ad 2), while omission may be altogether without act. Therefore
omission is not a special sin.
On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who knoweth
to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin."
I answer that, omission signifies the non-fulfilment of a good, not
indeed of any good, but of a good that is due. Now good under the
aspect of due belongs properly to justice; to legal justice, if the
thing due depends on Divine or human law; to special justice, if the
due is something in relation to one's neighbor. Wherefore, in the same
way as justice is a special virtue, as stated above ([2976]Q[58],
AA[6],7), omission is a special sin distinct from the sins which are
opposed to the other virtues; and just as doing good, which is the
opposite of omitting it, is a special part of justice, distinct from
avoiding evil, to which transgression is opposed, so too is omission
distinct from transgression.
Reply to Objection 2: Omission is not original but actual sin, not as
though it had some act essential to it, but for as much as the negation
of an act is reduced to the genus of act, and in this sense non-action
is a kind of action, as stated above ([2977]FS, Q[71], A[6], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 2: Omission, as stated above, is only of such good
as is due and to which one is bound. Now no man is bound to the
impossible: wherefore no man sins by omission, if he does not do what
he cannot. Accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, is
guilty of an omission, not through not having virginity, but through
not repenting of her past sin, or through not doing what she can to
fulfil her vow by observing continence. Again a priest is not bound to
say Mass, except he have a suitable opportunity, and if this be
lacking, there is no omission. And in like manner, a person is bound to
restitution, supposing he has the wherewithal; if he has not and cannot
have it, he is not guilty of an omission, provided he does what he can.
The same applies to other similar cases.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the sin of transgression is opposed to
negative precepts which regard the avoidance of evil, so the sin of
omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, which regard the doing of
good. Now affirmative precepts bind not for always, but for a fixed
time, and at that time the sin of omission begins. But it may happen
that then one is unable to do what one ought, and if this inability is
without any fault on his part, he does not omit his duty, as stated
above (ad 2; [2978]FS, Q[71], A[5]). On the other hand if this
inability is due to some previous fault of his (for instance, if a man
gets drunk at night, and cannot get up for matins, as he ought to),
some say that the sin of omission begins when he engages in an action
that is illicit and incompatible with the act to which he is bound. But
this does not seem to be true, for supposing one were to rouse him by
violence and that he went to matins, he would not omit to go, so that,
evidently, the previous drunkenness was not an omission, but the cause
of an omission. Consequently, we must say that the omission begins to
be imputed to him as a sin, when the time comes for the action; and yet
this is on account of a preceding cause by reason of which the
subsequent omission becomes voluntary.
Reply to Objection 4: Omission is directly opposed to justice, as
stated above; because it is a non-fulfilment of a good of virtue, but
only under the aspect of due, which pertains to justice. Now more is
required for an act to be virtuous and meritorious than for it to be
sinful and demeritorious, because "good results from an entire cause,
whereas evil arises from each single defect" [*Dionysius, De Div. Nom.
iv]. Wherefore the merit of justice requires an act, whereas an
omission does not.
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Whether a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous than
a sin of transgression. For "delictum" would seem to signify the same
as "derelictum" [*Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx], and therefore is
seemingly the same as an omission. But "delictum" denotes a more
grievous offence than transgression, because it deserves more expiation
as appears from Lev. 5. Therefore the sin of omission is more grievous
than the sin of transgression.
Objection 2: Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater good,
as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to do good is a more
excellent part of justice, than to decline from evil, to which
transgression is opposed, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore
omission is a graver sin than transgression.
Objection 3: Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or
mortal. But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they are
opposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to be
a graver sin than transgression.
Objection 4: Further, the pain of loss which consists in being deprived
of seeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a greater
punishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of
transgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now
punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of omission is
graver than the sin of transgression.
On the contrary, It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to
accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain from
an evil deed, i.e. "to transgress," than not to accomplish a good deed,
which is "to omit."
I answer that, The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from
virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to
Metaph. x [*Didot. ed. ix, 4]. Wherefore a thing is further removed
from its contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is further
removed from white than not-white is, since every black is not-white,
but not conversely. Now it is evident that transgression is contrary to
an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation thereof: for
instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to give one's parents due
reverence, while it is a sin of transgression to revile them or injure
them in any way. Hence it is evident that, simply and absolutely
speaking, transgression is a graver sin than omission, although a
particular omission may be graver than a particular transgression.
Reply to Objection 1: "Delictum" in its widest sense denotes any kind
of omission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of
something concerning God, or for a man's intentional and as it were
contemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity,
for which reason it demands a greater expiation.
Reply to Objection 2: The opposite of "doing good" is both "not doing
good," which is an omission, and "doing evil," which is a
transgression: but the first is opposed by contradiction, the second by
contrariety, which implies greater remoteness: wherefore transgression
is the more grievous sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as omission is opposed to affirmative
precepts, so is transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore
both, strictly speaking, have the character of mortal sin.
Transgression and omission, however, may be taken broadly for any
infringement of an affirmative or negative precept, disposing to the
opposite of such precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they may
be venial sins.
Reply to Objection 4: To the sin of transgression there correspond both
the pain of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the pain of
sense, on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In
like manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the
pain of sense, according to Mat. 7:19, "Every tree that bringeth not
forth good fruit shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire";
and this on account of the root from which it grows, although it does
not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the virtues
annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of
consideration:
(1) What virtues are annexed to justice?
(2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the virtues annexed to justice are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are
unsuitably enumerated Tully [*De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six, viz.
"religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth." Now revenge
is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is taken
for injuries inflicted, as stated above ([2979]Q[61], A[4]). Therefore
it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to justice.
Objection 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven,
viz. "innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection,
humanity," several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the virtues
annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz.
"obedience" in respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with regard to
inferiors, "equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and "truthfulness"
towards all; and of these "truthfulness" alone is mentioned by Tully.
Therefore he would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues
annexed to justice.
Objection 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus]
reckons nine parts annexed to justice viz. "liberality, kindliness,
revenge, commonsense, [*{eugnomosyne}] piety, gratitude, holiness, just
exchange" and "just lawgiving"; and of all these it is evident that
Tully mentions none but "revenge." Therefore he would appear to have
made an incomplete enumeration.
Objection 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions {epieikeia} as
being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any
of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice
are insufficiently enumerated.
I answer that, Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to
a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something in
common with the principal virtue; and the second is that in some
respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly
since justice is of one man to another as stated above ([2980]Q[58],
A[2]), all the virtues that are directed to another person may by
reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the essential
character of justice consists in rendering to another his due according
to equality, as stated above ([2981]Q[58], A[11]). Wherefore in two
ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the
perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of
equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For certain
virtues there are which render another his due, but are unable to
render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man renders to God
is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered to God as much
as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, "What shall I render to the
Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?" In this respect
"religion" is annexed to justice since, according to Tully (De invent.
ii, 53), it consists in offering service and ceremonial rites or
worship to "some superior nature that men call divine." Secondly, it is
not possible to make to one's parents an equal return of what one owes
to them, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus
"piety" is annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent.
ii, 53), a man "renders service and constant deference to his kindred
and the well-wishers of his country." Thirdly, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed for
virtue, and thus "observance" is annexed to justice, consisting
according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53) in the "deference and honor
rendered to those who excel in worth."
A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a
twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which
one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is
chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the
other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of
the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind
of due has two degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it
moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character
of due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point of view of
the debtor, and in this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man
represent himself to others just as he is, both in word and deed.
Wherefore to justice is annexed "truth," whereby, as Tully says (De
invent. ii, 53), present, past and future things are told without
perversion. It may also be considered from the point of view of the
person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward he receives with what
he has done---sometimes in good things; and then annexed to justice we
have "gratitude" which "consists in recollecting the friendship and
kindliness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back," as Tully
states (De invent. ii, 53)---and sometimes in evil things, and then to
justice is annexed "revenge," whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii,
53), "we resist force, injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance
or by self-defense." [*St. Thomas read 'obscurum,' and explains it as
meaning 'derogatory,' infra[2982] Q[108], A[2]. Cicero, however, wrote
'obfuturum,' i.e. 'hurtful.']
There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to
greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. This
due is the concern of "liberality," "affability" or "friendship," or
the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because
there is little of the nature of anything due in them.
Reply to Objection 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power,
in accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice:
whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not
against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, belongs
to the virtue annexed to justice.
Reply to Objection 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two
integral parts of justice, namely, "declining from evil," to which
"innocence" belongs, and "doing good," to which the six others belong.
Of these, two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely,
"friendship" in the external conduct and "concord" internally; two
regard our relations toward superiors, namely, "piety" to parents, and
"religion" to God; while two regard our relations towards inferiors,
namely, "condescension," in so far as their good pleases us, and
"humanity," whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore says
(Etym. x) that a man is said to be "humane, through having a feeling of
love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity whereby we
uphold one another." In this sense "friendship" is understood as
directing our external conduct towards others, from which point of view
the Philosopher treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6. "Friendship" may also be
taken as regarding properly the affections, and as the Philosopher
describes it in Ethic. viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain
to friendship, namely, "benevolence" which is here called "affection";
"concord," and "beneficence" which is here called "humanity." These
three, however, are omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they
have little of the nature of a due.
Reply to Objection 3: "Obedience" is included in observance, which
Tully mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to
persons who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his
words" [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in
"truthfulness" as to the observance of one's promises: yet
"truthfulness" covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on
([2983]Q[109], AA[1],3). "Discipline" is not due as a necessary duty,
because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a
superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors,
according to Mat. 24:45, "A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord
hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is omitted by
Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by Macrobius;
and equity under {epieikeia} or under "friendship."
Reply to Objection 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true
justice. To particular justice belongs "justice of exchange," which he
describes as "the habit of observing equality in commutations." To
legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes
"legislative justice," which he describes as "the science of political
commutations relating to the community." As regards things which have
to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions
"common sense" or "good judgment*," which is our guide in such like
matters, as stated above ([2984]Q[51], A[4]) in the treatise on
prudence: wherefore he says that it is a "voluntary justification,"
because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his
judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas indicates
the Greek derivation: {eugnomosyne} quasi 'bona {gnome}.'] These two
are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice as their
executor. {Eusebeia} [piety] means "good worship" and consequently is
the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is the science of "the
service of God" (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said that
'all the virtues are sciences') [*Aristotle, Ethic. vi, 13]: and
"holiness" comes to the same, as we shall state further on
([2985]Q[81], A[8]). {Eucharistia} (gratitude) means "good
thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says
(Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do
good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that
"kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence." "Liberality" would
seem to pertain to "humanity."
Reply to Objection 5: {Epieikeia} is annexed, not to particular but to
legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the
name of {eugnomosyne} [common sense].
__________________________________________________________________
OF RELIGION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our
present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3)
observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8)
liberality, (9) {epieikeia}. Of the other virtues that have been
mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of
concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for
instance, of right commutations and of innocence. of legislative
justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.
Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in
itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?
(2) Whether religion is a virtue?
(3) Whether religion is one virtue?
(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?
(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?
(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
(7) Whether religion has any external actions?
(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion directs man to God alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to God
alone. It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before
God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their
tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world." Now "to
visit the fatherless and widows" indicates an order between oneself and
one's neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" belongs
to the order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply
order to God alone.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in
speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere
wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and
relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie,
that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine
worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is
nothing else but the worship of God." Therefore religion signifies a
relation not only to God but also to our kindred.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly "latria" pertains to religion. Now
"latria signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor,
according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another."
Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also.
Objection 4: Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to
worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying of
Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Worship thy parents."
Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to
God.
Objection 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are
subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called
religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and
observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion
seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists in
offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men
call divine."
I answer that, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a man
is said to be religious from 'religio,' because he often ponders over,
and, as it were, reads again [relegit], the things which pertain to the
worship of God," so that religion would seem to take its name from
reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we
ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to
Prov. 3:6, "In all thy ways think on Him." According to Augustine (De
Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that "we ought
to seek God again, whom we had lost by our neglect" [*St. Augustine
plays on the words 'reeligere,' i.e. to choose over again, and
'negligere,' to neglect or despise.]. Or again, religion may be derived
from "religare" [to bind together], wherefore Augustine says (De Vera
Relig. 55): "May religion bind us to the one Almighty God." However,
whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a
repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being
a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to Whom we
ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our
choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we
lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him
and confessing our faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its
proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is
directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like.
But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of the
virtues which it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because
the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which
are concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and
widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and
an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from this
world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of
some similar virtue as eliciting.
Reply to Objection 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits
to one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense,
but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the
passage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems to
denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God."
Reply to Objection 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord,
wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a
special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God
in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has
supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is
due to Him, which is known as "latria" in Greek; and therefore it
belongs to religion.
Reply to Objection 4: We are said to worship those whom we honor, and
to cultivate [*In the Latin the same word 'colere' stands for 'worship'
and 'cultivate']: a man's memory or presence: we even speak of
cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer [agricola] is one
who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant [incola] is one who
cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is
due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is due a
special kind of worship, which in Greek is {Eusebeia} or {Theosebeia},
as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
Reply to Objection 5: Although the name "religious" may be given to all
in general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those
who consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing
from human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is applied, not
to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to
contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man's sake
but for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Gal. 4:14),
"You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it
belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an act of
fear which is a gift, as stated above ([2986]Q[19], A[9]). Therefore
religion is not a virtue but a gift
Objection 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will,
wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit"
[*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A[1], ad 3) "latria" belongs to
religion, and "latria" denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion
is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is
in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the
dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer
ceremonial worship to the Godhead" [*Cf. A[1]], and ceremonial matters,
as stated above ([2987]FS, Q[99], A[3], ad 2; [2988]FS, Q[101])
, do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is
not a virtue.
On the contrary, It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears
from what has been said above ([2989]Q[80]).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[58], A[3]; [2990]FS, Q[55], AA[3],4)
"a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good
likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a
virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect
of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes suitably
proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner.
But order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species,
according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to
religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is evident
that religion is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of
fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence
for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of
fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent;
for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated
above (Q[9], A[1], ad 3; [2991]FS, Q[68], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his
master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad
Furiam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due
service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so
voluntarily.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that
man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should
do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of
natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion is one virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion
directs us to God, as stated above [2992](A[1]). Now in God there are
three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least
logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object
suffices for a difference of virtue, as stated above (Q[50], A[2], ad
2). Therefore religion is not one virtue.
Objection 2: Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since
habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of
religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to
sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.
Objection 3: Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is
paid to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God
Himself. Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it
would seem that religion is not one virtue.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:5): "One God [Vulg.: 'Lord'],
one faith." Now true religion professes faith in one God. Therefore
religion is one virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([2993]FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits
are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now
it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect,
namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of
things. Wherefore He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): "If . . . I be a
father, where is My honor?" For it belongs to a father to beget and to
govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The three Divine Persons are the one principle of
the creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one
religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the
aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and governs
them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion
is one virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: By the one same act man both serves and worships
God, for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is
due: while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition,
is under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong
all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness
to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God, either by
offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine.
Reply to Objection 3: The worship of religion is paid to images, not as
considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to
God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the
image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither "latria"
nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious
worship is paid to the images of Christ.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion is a special virtue, distinct from the others?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a special virtue
distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "Any
action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true
sacrifice." But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous
deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a special
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the
glory of God." Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence
of God, as stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2]). Therefore religion is not a
special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct
from the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to Ethic.
viii, 8 "to be honored is almost to be loved." Therefore the religion
whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from observance,
or "dulia," or piety whereby we honor our neighbor. Therefore religion
is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from the
other parts.
I answer that, Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there is
a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the good
to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God. Again,
honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a
singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all
things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special honor
due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is due to
different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father, another
to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in
so far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove
that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other
virtues, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 2: Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's
honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those
belong to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God
by reason of their specific character.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of love is the good, but the object of
honor and reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is
communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is
not. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the
charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby God
is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our neighbor.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion is a theological virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue.
Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith, hope
and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion
to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its
object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to God
alone, as stated above [2994](A[1]). Therefore religion is a
theological virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or
intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (FS,
QQ[57],58,62). Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual
virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of
truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing
the mean between too much and too little. for one cannot worship God
too much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as
much as you can; for He is above all praise." Therefore it remains that
it is a theological virtue.
On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral
virtue.
I answer that, As stated above [2995](A[4]) religion pays due worship
to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that
which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and
object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz.
God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped
do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we reach out to
Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q[1], AA[1],2,4) that
God is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but
because we believe God.
Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God
is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done
out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to
religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion
is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral
virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.
Reply to Objection 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an
end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with
matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope
and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object:
wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which
performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God
is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Religion directs man to God not as its object but
as its end.
Reply to Objection 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an
intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and
observes a mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God,
by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality,"
I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God
as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability
and God's acceptance.
And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine
worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as regards
other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not
due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other
circumstance.
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Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the
other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in its
observing the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion fails to
observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal
to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more
praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater
need: wherefore it is written (Is. 57:7): "Deal thy bread to the
hungry." But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to Ps.
15:2, "I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my
goods." Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other
virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.
Objection 3: Further, the greater. the obligation to do a thing, the
less praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the
Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me." Now the more
a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then,
what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it
would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human
virtues.
On the contrary, The precepts pertaining to religion are given
precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of
precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts
of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of
the moral virtues.
I answer that, Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from
being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the
better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above [2996](A[5]; Q[4],
A[7]), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And
religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so
far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of
God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not
because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality
which is the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue
deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of
his will.
Reply to Objection 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its
usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the
offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God
not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory,
and on account of its usefulness to us.
Reply to Objection 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it
loses the luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue,
provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.
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Whether religion has an external act?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion has not an external act. It is
written (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must
adore Him in spirit and in truth." Now external acts pertain, not to
the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration
belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.
Objection 2: Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and
honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one
were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since
then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed
properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior
creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in showing reverence
to God.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca
for finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are
wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals
is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to
the true God, Who is "exalted above all gods" [*Ps. 94:3]. Therefore it
would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore religion
has no bodily actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God." Now just as internal actions belong to the
heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh.
Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal
but also by external actions.
I answer that, We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake
(because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add
anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we
revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its
perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to
its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by
the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the human
mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the sensible
world, since "invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made," as the Apostle says (Rom. 1:20).
Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of
corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, as by signs,
to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God. Therefore
the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong
to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and
subordinate to the internal acts.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord is speaking of that which is most
important and directly intended in the worship of God.
Reply to Objection 2: These external things are offered to God, not as
though He stood in need of them, according to Ps. 49:13, "Shall I eat
the flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?" but as
signs of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves
acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "The
visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible
sacrifice."
Reply to Objection 3: Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols
things pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain
spiritual things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to
the idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.
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Whether religion is the same as sanctity?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity.
Religion is a special virtue, as stated above [2997](A[4]): whereas
sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and fulfil
our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus [*De Affectibus].
Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
Objection 2: Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all
uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity." Now
purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels
bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would
seem that sanctity is not the same as religion.
Objection 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division
are not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above
(Q[80], ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct
from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:74,75): "That . . . we may serve
Him . . . in holiness and justice." Now, "to serve God" belongs to
religion, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3], ad 2). Therefore religion
is the same as sanctity.
I answer that, The word "sanctity" seems to have two significations. In
one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the
Greek, for {hagios} means "unsoiled." In another way it denotes
firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was applied to
such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a
thing is said to be sacred [sancitum] when it is ratified by law.
Again, in Latin, this word "sanctus" may be connected with purity, if
it be resolved into "sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who
wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim's blood,"
according to Isidore (Etym. x). In either case the signification
requires sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to
the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the temple, vessels
and such like things are said to be sanctified through being applied to
the worship of God. For purity is necessary in order that the mind be
applied to God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior
things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things,
for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the
mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from
inferior things: and hence it is that without purity the mind cannot be
applied to God. Wherefore it is written (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace
with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God." Again,
firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for it is
applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things
must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. 8:38,39): "I
am sure that neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [*Vulg.:
'shall be able to separate us'] from the love of God."
Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and
its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but
only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives
God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship,
such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called
sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but also the
works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of certain
good works disposes himself to the worship of God
Reply to Objection 1: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its
essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion.
But it has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs
the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice
is said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all
the virtues to the common good.
Reply to Objection 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to
have the character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of
virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored
not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God."
Reply to Objection 3: Sanctity differs from religion as explained
above, not really but logically.
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OF DEVOTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the
interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts;
secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The
interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer.
Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether devotion is a special act?
(2) Whether it is an act of religion?
(3) Of the cause of devotion?
(4) Of its effect?
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Whether devotion is a special act?
Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That
which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now devotion
seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip 29:31): "All
the multitude offered victims, and praises, and holocausts with a
devout mind." Therefore devotion is not a special act.
Objection 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various
genera of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts,
namely, corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate
devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a special
act.
Objection 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive
or to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as
may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either
faculty, as enumerated above (FP, QQ[78], seqq.; [2998]FS, Q[23],
A[4]). Therefore devotion is not a special act.
On the contrary, Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (FS,
Q[21], AA[34]). But devotion has a special reason for merit. Therefore
devotion is a special act.
I answer that, Devotion is derived from "devote" [*The Latin 'devovere'
means 'to vow']; wherefore those persons are said to be "devout" who,
in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject themselves wholly
to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a devotee was one who
vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety of his army, as Livy
relates of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x, 28). Hence devotion is
apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself readily to things
concerning the service of God. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 35:20,21)
that "the multitude of the children of Israel . . . offered
first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind." Now it is
evident that the will to do readily what concerns the service of God is
a special kind of act. Therefore devotion is a special act of the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of
the thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to
their acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both
itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above ([2999]FS,
Q[9], A[3]). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a
man offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, it
follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they
be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts of
the other powers that are moved by the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of
acts, not as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover
is found virtually in the movements of the things moved.
Reply to Objection 3: Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the
soul, and is a movement of the will, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether devotion is an act of religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion.
Devotion, as stated above [3000](A[1]), consists in giving oneself up
to God. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "the Divine love produces ecstasy, for it
takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved."
Therefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion.
Objection 2: Further, charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to
precede charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented by
fire, while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of
fire [*Cant. 8:6; Ps. 52:6]. Therefore devotion is not an act of
religion.
Objection 3: Further, by religion man is directed to God alone, as
stated above ([3001]Q[81], A[1]). But devotion is directed also to men;
for we speak of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects
are said to be devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says [*Serm.
viii, De Pass. Dom.] that the Jews "out of devotion to the Roman laws,"
said: "We have no king but Caesar." Therefore devotion is not an act of
religion.
On the contrary, Devotion is derived from "devovere," as stated
[3002](A[1]). But a vow is an act of religion. Therefore devotion is
also an act of religion.
I answer that, It belongs to the same virtue, to will to do something,
and to have the will ready to do it, because both acts have the same
object. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1): "It is
justice whereby men both will end do just actions." Now it is evident
that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God, belongs
properly to religion, as stated above ([3003]Q[81]). Wherefore it
belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such things, and
this is to be devout. Hence it is evident that devotion is an act of
religion.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs immediately to charity that man should
give himself to God, adhering to Him by a union of the spirit; but it
belongs immediately to religion, and, through the medium of religion,
to charity which is the principle of religion, that man should give
himself to God for certain works of Divine worship.
Reply to Objection 2: Bodily fatness is produced by the natural heat in
the process of digestion, and at the same time the natural heat
thrives, as it were, on this fatness. In like manner charity both
causes devotion (inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one's
friend) and feeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded
and increased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds.
Reply to Objection 3: Devotion to God's holy ones, dead or living, does
not terminate in them, but passes on to God, in so far as we honor God
in His servants. But the devotion of subjects to their temporal masters
is of another kind, just as service of a temporal master differs from
the service of God.
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Whether contemplation or meditation is the cause of devotion?
Objection 1: It would seem that contemplation or meditation is not the
cause of devotion. No cause hinders its effect. But subtle
considerations about abstract matters are often a hindrance to
devotion. Therefore contemplation or meditation is not the cause of
devotion.
Objection 2: Further, if contemplation were the proper and essential
cause of devotion, the higher objects of contemplation would arouse
greater devotion. But the contrary is the case: since frequently we are
urged to greater devotion by considering Christ's Passion and other
mysteries of His humanity than by considering the greatness of His
Godhead. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.
Objection 3: Further, if contemplation were the proper cause of
devotion, it would follow that those who are most apt for
contemplation, are also most apt for devotion. Yet the contrary is to
be noticed, for devotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and
members of the female sex, who are defective in contemplation.
Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire
shall flame out." But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore
meditation is the cause of devotion.
I answer that, The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of
Whom Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 9:55, says that "God calls whom He
deigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane
Samaritans, had He so willed, He would have made devout." But the
intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or contemplation.
For it was stated above [3004](A[1]) that devotion is an act of the
will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the service
of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some consideration,
since the object of the will is a good understood. Wherefore Augustine
says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that "the will arises from the
intelligence." Consequently meditation must needs be the cause of
devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives the thought of
surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a twofold consideration
leads him thereto. The one is the consideration of God's goodness and
loving kindness, according to Ps. 72:28, "It is good for me to adhere
to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God": and this consideration
wakens love [*'Dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf. Q[27]] which
is the proximate cause of devotion. The other consideration is that of
man's own shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean on God,
according to Ps. 120:1,2, "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains,
from whence help shall come to me: my help is from the Lord, Who made
heaven and earth"; and this consideration shuts out presumption whereby
man is hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on His
strength.
Reply to Objection 1: The consideration of such things as are of a
nature to awaken our love [*'Dilectio,' the interior act of charity;
cf. Q[27]] of God, causes devotion; whereas the consideration of
foreign matters that distract the mind from such things is a hindrance
to devotion.
Reply to Objection 2: Matters concerning the Godhead are, in
themselves, the strongest incentive to love ['dilectio,' the interior
act of charity; cf. Q[27]] and consequently to devotion, because God is
supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it
needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also to the love
of Divine things by means of certain sensible objects known to us.
Chief among these is the humanity of Christ, according to the words of
the Preface [*Preface for Christmastide], "that through knowing God
visibly, we may be caught up to the love of things invisible."
Wherefore matters relating to Christ's humanity are the chief incentive
to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding hand, although devotion
itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead.
Reply to Objection 3: Science and anything else conducive to greatness,
is to man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly
surrender himself to God. The result is that such like things sometimes
occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and women
devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man perfectly
submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this very fact
his devotion is increased.
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Whether joy is an effect of devotion?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As
stated above (A[3], ad 2), Christ's Passion is the chief incentive to
devotion. But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the
soul, according to Lam. 3:19, "Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood
and the gall," which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam. 3:20)
it is said: "I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall languish
within me." Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of devotion.
Objection 2: Further, devotion consists chiefly in an interior
sacrifice of the spirit. But it is written (Ps. 50:19): "A sacrifice to
God is an afflicted spirit." Therefore affliction is the effect of
devotion rather than gladness or joy.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Homine xii) [*Orat.
funebr. de Placilla Imp.] that "just as laughter proceeds from joy, so
tears and groans are signs of sorrow." But devotion makes some people
shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of devotion.
On the contrary, We say in the Collect [*Thursday after fourth Sunday
of Lent]: "That we who are punished by fasting may be comforted by a
holy devotion."
I answer that, The direct and principal effect of devotion is the
spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and indirect
effect. For it has been stated [3005](A[3]) that devotion is caused by
a twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of God's
goodness, because this consideration belongs to the term, as it were,
of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and the
direct result of this consideration is joy, according to Ps. 76:4, "I
remembered God, and was delighted"; but accidentally this consideration
causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy God fully,
according to Ps. 41:3, "My soul hath thirsted after the strong living
God," and afterwards it is said (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my
bread," etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated [3006](A[3]), by
the consideration of one's own failings; for this consideration regards
the term from which man withdraws by the movement of his devout will,
in that he trusts not in himself, but subjects himself to God. This
consideration has an opposite tendency to the first: for it is of a
nature to cause sorrow directly (when one thinks over one's own
failings), and joy accidentally, namely, through hope of the Divine
assistance. It is accordingly evident that the first and direct effect
of devotion is joy, while the secondary and accidental effect is that
"sorrow which is according to God" [*2 Cor. 7:10].
Reply to Objection 1: In the consideration of Christ's Passion there is
something that causes sorrow, namely, the human defect, the removal of
which made it necessary for Christ to suffer [*Lk. 24:25]; and there is
something that causes joy, namely, God's loving-kindness to us in
giving us such a deliverance.
Reply to Objection 2: The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on
account of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is
rejoiced, by the consideration of God's goodness, and by the hope of
the Divine help.
Reply to Objection 3: Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but
also through a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when
one considers something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are
wont to shed tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover
their children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this
way tears arise from devotion.
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OF PRAYER (SEVENTEEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive
power?
(2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God?
(3) Whether prayer is an act of religion?
(4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone?
(5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?
(6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray?
(7) Whether we ought to pray for others?
(8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?
(9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer;
(10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?
(11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?
(12) Whether prayer should be vocal?
(13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer?
(14) Whether prayer should last a long time?
(15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16]
(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? [*Art. 15]
(17) of the different kinds of prayer.
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Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power?
Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive
power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is
heard by God, according to Ps. 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire of
the poor." Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the
appetitive power: and therefore prayer is also.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to
begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves to
God and unite ourselves to Him." Now union with God is effected by love
which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs to the
appetitive power.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that
there are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first
is "the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend
what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "analysis,"
whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may be
added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from the known to the
unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations.
Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the
appetitive power.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "to pray is to speak." Now
speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not of the
appetitive, but of the intellective power.
I answer that, According to Cassiodorus [*Comment. in Ps. 38:13]
"prayer [oratio] is spoken reason [oris ratio]." Now the speculative
and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely
apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends
but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two ways: first
perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the
effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause; secondly
imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the
effect is not wholly subject to the power of the cause. Accordingly in
this way the reason is cause of certain things in two ways: first, by
imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs to reason, to command
not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but also human
subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; secondly, by leading up
to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this sense the
reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it,
whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now both of these, namely,
to command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that
man proposes something to be effected by something else, wherefore they
pertain to the reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this
reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us
to do what is best."
Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last
paragraph refers to the Latin word 'oratio' [prayer] which originally
signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from 'os,'
'oris' (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which
sense Augustine [*Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom.) that
"prayer is a petition," and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii, 24)
that "to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Accordingly it is
evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor,
either because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition
is like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily
they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God
hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of Is.
65:24, "And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will hear."
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3007]FP, Q[82], A[4]; [3008]FS,
Q[9], A[1], ad 3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore
nothing hinders the act of reason, under the motion of the will, from
tending to an end such as charity which is union with God. Now prayer
tends to God through being moved by the will of charity, as it were,
and this in two ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition,
because when we pray we ought principally to ask to be united to God,
according to Ps. 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I
seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of
my life." Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to
approach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when he
petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God. Hence Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call upon God in our prayers, we
unveil our mind in His presence": and in the same sense Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up of the mind to
God."
Reply to Objection 3: These three acts belong to the speculative
reason, but to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause
something by way of command or of petition, as stated above.
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Whether it is becoming to pray?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer seems
to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to the person
to whom we pray. But according to Mat. 6:32, "Your Father knoweth that
you have need of all these things." Therefore it is not becoming to
pray to God.
Objection 2: Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom
we pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God's mind is
unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kings 15:29, "But the
Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to
repentance." Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God.
Objection 3: Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not,
than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii, 1),
"nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers." But
God is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to
God.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 18:1): "We ought always to pray,
and not to faint."
I answer that, Among the ancients there was a threefold error
concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by Divine
providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray and to
worship God at all: of these it is written (Malach. 3:14): "You have
said: He laboreth in vain that serveth God." Another opinion held that
all things, even in human affairs, happen of necessity, whether by
reason of the unchangeableness of Divine providence, or through the
compelling influence of the stars, or on account of the connection of
causes: and this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer. There was
a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are indeed ruled
by Divine providence, and that they do not happen of necessity; yet
they deemed the disposition of Divine providence to be changeable, and
that it is changed by prayers and other things pertaining to the
worship of God. All these opinions were disproved in the [3009]FP,
Q[19], AA[7],8; [3010]FP, Q[22], AA[2],4; [3011]FP, Q[115], A[6];
[3012]FP, Q[116]. Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the
utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs
subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part
of the Divine disposition.
In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine
providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also
from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now
among other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects.
Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions, not that thereby they
may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions they may
achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine
disposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is it
with regard to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the Divine
disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has disposed to
be fulfilled by our prayers in other words "that by asking, men may
deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity has disposed to
give," as Gregory says (Dial. i, 8)
Reply to Objection 1: We need to pray to God, not in order to make
known to Him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded
of the necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, our motive in praying is, not
Divine disposition, we may change the Divine disposition, but that, by
our prayers, we may obtain what God has appointed.
Reply to Objection 3: God bestows many things on us out of His
liberality, even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to
bestow certain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good,
namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and
that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence Chrysostom
says [*Implicitly [Hom. ii, de Orat.: Hom. xxx in Genes. ]; Cf. Caten.
Aur. on Lk. 18]: "Think what happiness is granted thee, what honor
bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with God in prayer, when thou
talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt, whatever thou
desirest."
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Whether prayer is an act of religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion. Since
religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its
subject. But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above
[3013](A[1]). Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but
of the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God.
Objection 2: Further, the act of "latria" falls under a necessity of
precept. But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of precept,
but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else than a
petition for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not an act of
religion.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers
worship end ceremonial rites to the Godhead" [*Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53].
But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to. ask to obtain
something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 140:2): "Let my prayer be directed
as incense in Thy sight": and a gloss on the passage says that "it was
to signify this that under the old Law incense was said to be offered
for a sweet smell to the Lord." Now this belongs to religion. Therefore
prayer is an act of religion.
I answer that, As stated above ([3014]Q[81], AA[2],4), it belongs
properly to religion to show honor to God, wherefore all those things
through which reverence is shown to God, belong to religion. Now man
shows reverence to God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects
himself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the
Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an act
of religion.
Reply to Objection 1: The will moves the other powers of the soul to
its end, as stated above ([3015]Q[82], A[1], ad 1), and therefore
religion, which is in the will, directs the acts of the other powers to
the reverence of God. Now among the other powers of the soul the
intellect is the highest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently
after devotion which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the
intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it
religion directs man's intellect to God.
Reply to Objection 2: It is a matter of precept not only that we should
ask for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to
desire comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a
precept of religion, which precept is expressed in Mat. 7:7, where it
is said: "Ask and ye shall receive" [*Vulg.: 'Ask and it shall be given
you.'].
Reply to Objection 3: By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since
he subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to
Him, as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A[1],
OBJ[2]). Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things,
whether bodily members, or those external things that are employed for
God's service, so too, prayer surpasses other acts of religion.
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Whether we ought to pray to God alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer
is an act of religion, as stated above [3016](A[3]). But God alone is
to be worshiped by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone.
Objection 2: Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of
the prayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one's prayer, both
because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God alone
knows, rather than by words, according to the saying of the Apostle (1
Cor. 14:15), "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the
understanding": and again because, as Augustine says (De Cura pro
mortuis xiii) the "dead, even the saints, know not what the living,
even their own children, are doing." Therefore we ought to pray to God
alone.
Objection 3: Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only
because they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, or
even some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace, and
yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to the
saints who are in Paradise.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1), "Call . . . if there be any
that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints."
I answer that, Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as to
be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. In the
first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers ought to
be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God alone
gives, according to Ps. 83:12, "The Lord will give grace and glory."
But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels or men, not
that God may through them know our petitions, but that our prayers may
be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence it is written
(Apoc. 8:4) that "the smoke of the incense," namely "the prayers of the
saints ascended up before God." This is also clear from the very style
employed by the Church in praying: since we beseech the Blessed Trinity
"to have mercy on us," while we ask any of the saints "to pray for us."
Reply to Objection 1: To Him alone do we offer religious worship when
praying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so
doing we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those
whom we call upon as our advocates in God's presence.
Reply to Objection 2: The dead, if we consider their natural condition,
do not know what takes place in this world, especially the interior
movements of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral. xii,
21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what happens
to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart, is made
known to them in the Word: and it is most becoming to their exalted
position that they should know the petitions we make to them by word or
thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to them are
known to them through Divine manifestation.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do
not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we
think or say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to
them, but ask it of the living by speaking to them.
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Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything
definite when we pray to God. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
iii, 24), "to pray is to ask becoming things of God"; wherefore it is
useless to pray for what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, "You
ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss." Now according to Rom.
8:26, "we know not what we should pray for as we ought." Therefore we
ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray.
Objection 2: Further, those who ask another person for something
definite strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves.
But we ought not to endeavor to make God will what we will; on the
contrary, we ought to strive to will what He wills, according to a
gloss on Ps. 32:1, "Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just." Therefore we ought
not to ask God for anything definite when we pray.
Objection 3: Further, evil things are not to be sought from God; and as
to good things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless
to ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we
ought not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers.
On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 6 and Lk. 11) taught His disciples to
ask definitely for those things which are contained in the petitions of
the Lord's Prayer.
I answer that, According to Valerius Maximus [*Fact. et Dict. Memor.
vii, 2], "Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods for
nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because they at
any rate know what is good for each one whereas when we pray we
frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain." This
opinion is true to a certain extent, as to those things which may have
an evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as "riches, by
which," as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2),
"many have come to an evil end; honors, which have ruined many; power,
of which we frequently witness the unhappy results; splendid marriages,
which sometimes bring about the total wreck of a family." Nevertheless
there are certain goods which man cannot ill use, because they cannot
have an evil result. Such are those which are the object of beatitude
and whereby we merit it: and these the saints seek absolutely when they
pray, as in Ps. 79:4, "Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved," and
again in Ps. 118:35, "Lead me into the path of Thy commandments."
Reply to Objection 1: Although man cannot by himself know what he ought
to pray for, "the Spirit," as stated in the same passage, "helpeth our
infirmity," since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask
for what is right. Hence our Lord said (Jn. 4:24) that true adorers
"must adore . . . in spirit and in truth."
Reply to Objection 2: When in our prayers we ask for things concerning
our salvation, we conform our will to God's, of Whom it is written (1
Tim. 2:4) that "He will have all men to be saved."
Reply to Objection 3: God so invites us to take good things, that we
may approach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires
and devout prayers.
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Whether man ought to ask God for temporal things when he prays?
Objection 1: It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal
things when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we should
not seek for temporal things, for it is written (Mat. 6:33): "Seek ye .
. . first the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all these things
shall be added unto you," that is to say, temporal things, which, says
He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to what we seek.
Therefore temporal things are not to be asked of God in prayer.
Objection 2: Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous
about. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things,
according to the saying of Mat. 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your life,
what you shall eat." Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things
when we pray.
Objection 3: Further, by prayer our mind should be raised up to God.
But by asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it,
against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18), "While we look not at
the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For
the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not
seen are eternal." Therefore man ought not to ask God for temporal
things when he prays.
Objection 4: Further, man ought not to ask of God other than good and
useful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are
harmful, not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense.
Therefore we should not ask God for them in our prayers.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 30:8): "Give me only the
necessaries of life."
I answer that, As Augustine says (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx,
12): "It is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire." Now it is
lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally, by placing
our end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in tending
towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means of
supporting the life of the body, and are of service to us as
instruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine too says the same to Proba (ad Probam,
de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 6,7) when he states that "it is not
unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood, and no more;
for this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for the
welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed in a way
befitting one's station, so as not to be out of keeping with those
among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought to pray that we may
keep these things if we have them, and if we have them not, that we may
gain possession of them."
Reply to Objection 1: We should seek temporal things not in the first
but in the second place. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
ii, 16): "When He says that this" (i.e. the kingdom of God) "is to be
sought first, He implies that the other" (i.e. temporal goods) "is to
be sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this as being our
good, the other as our need."
Reply to Objection 2: Not all solicitude about temporal things is
forbidden, but that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated
above ([3017]Q[55], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 3: When our mind is intent on temporal things in
order that it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when
it is intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is
not lowered by them, but raises them to a higher level.
Reply to Objection 4: From the very fact that we ask for temporal
things not as the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate
to something else, we ask God for them in the sense that they may be
granted to us in so far as they are expedient for salvation.
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Whether we ought to pray for others?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for others. In
praying we ought to conform to the pattern given by our Lord. Now in
the Lord's Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others; thus
we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," etc. Therefore we should
not pray for others.
Objection 2: Further, prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one
of the conditions required for prayer that it may be heard is that one
pray for oneself, wherefore Augustine in commenting on Jn. 16:23, "If
you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you," says
(Tract. cii): "Everyone is heard when he prays for himself, not when he
prays for all; wherefore He does not say simply 'He will give it,' but
'He will give it you. '" Therefore it would seem that we ought not to
pray for others, but only for ourselves.
Objection 3: Further, we are forbidden to pray for others, if they are
wicked, according to Jer. 7:16, "Therefore do not then pray for this
people . . . and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee." On the
other hand we are not bound to pray for the good, since they are heard
when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we ought
not to pray for others.
On the contrary, It is written (James 5:16): "Pray one for another,
that you may be saved."
I answer that, As stated above [3018](A[6]), when we pray we ought to
ask for what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things not
only for ourselves, but also for others: for this is essential to the
love which we owe to our neighbor, as stated above (Q[25], AA[1],12;
Q[27], A[2]; Q[31], A[1]). Therefore charity requires us to pray for
others. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.) [*Opus Imperfectum,
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "Necessity binds us to pray
for ourselves, fraternal charity urges us to pray for others: and the
prayer that fraternal charity proffers is sweeter to God than that
which is the outcome of necessity."
Reply to Objection 1: As Cyprian says (De orat. Dom.), "We say 'Our
Father' and not 'My Father,' 'Give us' and not 'Give me,' because the
Master of unity did not wish us to pray privately, that is for
ourselves alone, for He wished each one to pray for all, even as He
Himself bore all in one."
Reply to Objection 2: It is a condition of prayer that one pray for
oneself: not as though it were necessary in order that prayer be
meritorious, but as being necessary in order that prayer may not fail
in its effect of impetration. For it sometimes happens that we pray for
another with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to his
salvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some obstacle on the
part of the person we are praying for, according to Jer. 15:1, "If
Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this
people." And yet the prayer will be meritorious for the person who
prays thus out of charity, according to Ps. 34:13, "My prayer shall be
turned into my bosom, i.e. though it profit them not, I am not deprived
of my reward," as the gloss expounds it.
Reply to Objection 3: We ought to pray even for sinners, that they may
be converted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance in
holiness. Yet those who pray are heard not for all sinners but for
some: since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those who
are foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the
brethren, has an effect in the predestined but not in the reprobate,
according to Eccles. 7:14, "No man can correct whom God hath despised."
Hence it is written (1 Jn. 5:16): "He that knoweth his brother to sin a
sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him,
who sinneth not to death." Now just as the benefit of correction must
not be refused to any man so long as he lives here below, because we
cannot distinguish the predestined from the reprobate, as Augustine
says (De Correp. et Grat. xv), so too no man should be denied the help
of prayer.
We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons: First, because
the prayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore a gloss on
Rom. 15:30, "Help me in your prayers," says: "The Apostle rightly tells
the lesser brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if they be
united together in one mind, become great, and it is impossible for the
prayers of a multitude not to obtain" that which is possible to be
obtained by prayer. Secondly, that many may thank God for the graces
conferred on the just, which graces conduce to the profit of many,
according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 1:11). Thirdly, that the more perfect
may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they need the prayers of
the less perfect.
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Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for our enemies.
According to Rom. 15:4, "what things soever were written, were written
for our learning." Now Holy Writ contains many imprecations against
enemies; thus it is written (Ps. 6:11): "Let all my enemies be ashamed
and be . . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled very
speedily [*Vulg.: 'Let them be turned back and be ashamed.']."
Therefore we too should pray against rather than for our enemies.
Objection 2: Further, to be revenged on one's enemies is harmful to
them. But holy men seek vengeance of their enemies according to Apoc.
6:10, "How long . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them
that dwell on earth?" Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their
enemies, according to Ps. 57:11, "The just shall rejoice when he shall
see the revenge." Therefore we should not pray for our enemies, but
against them.
Objection 3: Further, man's deed should not be contrary to his prayer.
Now sometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else all wars would be
unlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above ([3019]Q[40],
A[1]). Therefore we should not pray for our enemies.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:44): "Pray for them that
persecute and calumniate you."
I answer that, To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated
above [3020](A[7]). Wherefore we are bound to pray for our enemies in
the same manner as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained
above in the treatise on charity (Q[25], AA[8],9), how we are bound to
love our enemies, namely, that we must love in them their nature, not
their sin. and that to love our enemies in general is a matter of
precept, while to love them in the individual is not a matter of
precept, except in the preparedness of the mind, so that a man must be
prepared to love his enemy even in the individual and to help him in a
case of necessity, or if his enemy should beg his forgiveness. But to
love one's enemies absolutely in the individual, and to assist them, is
an act of perfection.
In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we should not exclude
our enemies from the general prayers which we offer up for others: but
it is a matter of perfection, and not of obligation, to pray for them
individually, except in certain special cases.
Reply to Objection 1: The imprecations contained in Holy Writ may be
understood in four ways. First, according to the custom of the prophets
"to foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation," as Augustine
states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21]. Secondly, in the sense that
certain temporal evils are sometimes inflicted by God on the wicked for
their correction. Thirdly, because they are understood to be
pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the kingdom of
sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the correction of
men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our will to the Divine justice
with regard to the damnation of those who are obstinate in sin.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine states in the same book (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i, 22), "the martyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of the
kingdom of sin, because they suffered so much while it reigned": or as
he says again (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), "their prayer for
vengeance is expressed not in words but in their minds, even as the
blood of Abel cried from the earth." They rejoice in vengeance not for
its own sake, but for the sake of Divine justice.
Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful to attack one's enemies, that they
may be restrained from sin: and this is for their own good and for the
good of others. Consequently it is even lawful in praying to ask that
temporal evils be inflicted on our enemies in order that they may mend
their ways. Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one another.
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Whether the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer are fittingly assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the seven petitions of the Lord's
Prayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless to ask for that to be
hallowed which is always holy. But the name of God is always holy,
according to Lk. 1:49, "Holy is His name." Again, His kingdom is
everlasting, according to Ps. 144:13, "Thy kingdom is a kingdom of all
ages." Again, God's will is always fulfilled, according to Isa 46:10,
"All My will shall be done." Therefore it is useless to ask for "the
name of God to be hallowed," for "His kingdom to come," and for "His
will to be done."
Objection 2: Further, one must withdraw from evil before attaining
good. Therefore it seems unfitting for the petitions relating to the
attainment of good to be set forth before those relating to the removal
of evil.
Objection 3: Further, one asks for a thing that it may be given to one.
Now the chief gift of God is the Holy Ghost, and those gifts that we
receive through Him. Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly
assigned, since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 4: Further, according to Luke, only five petitions are
mentioned in the Lord's Prayer, as appears from the eleventh chapter.
Therefore it was superfluous for Matthew to mention seven.
Objection 5: Further, it seems useless to seek to win the benevolence
of one who forestalls us by his benevolence. Now God forestalls us by
His benevolence, since "He first hath loved us" ( 1 Jn. 4:19).
Therefore it is useless to preface the petitions with the words our
"Father Who art in heaven," which seem to indicate a desire to win
God's benevolence.
On the contrary, The authority of Christ, who composed this prayer,
suffices.
I answer that, The Lord's Prayer is most perfect, because, as Augustine
says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), "if we pray rightly and fittingly, we
can say nothing else but what is contained in this prayer of our Lord."
For since prayer interprets our desires, as it were, before God, then
alone is it right to ask for something in our prayers when it is right
that we should desire it. Now in the Lord's Prayer not only do we ask
for all that we may rightly desire, but also in the order wherein we
ought to desire them, so that this prayer not only teaches us to ask,
but also directs all our affections. Thus it is evident that the first
thing to be the object of our desire is the end, and afterwards
whatever is directed to the end. Now our end is God towards Whom our
affections tend in two ways: first, by our willing the glory of God,
secondly, by willing to enjoy His glory. The first belongs to the love
whereby we love God in Himself, while the second belongs to the love
whereby we love ourselves in God. Wherefore the first petition is
expressed thus: "Hallowed be Thy name," and the second thus: "Thy
kingdom come," by which we ask to come to the glory of His kingdom.
To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one way, by its
very nature, in another way, accidentally. Of its very nature the good
which is useful for an end directs us to that end. Now a thing is
useful in two ways to that end which is beatitude: in one way, directly
and principally, according to the merit whereby we merit beatitude by
obeying God, and in this respect we ask: "Thy will be done on earth as
it is in heaven"; in another way instrumentally, and as it were helping
us to merit, and in this respect we say: "Give us this day our daily
bread," whether we understand this of the sacramental Bread, the daily
use of which is profitable to man, and in which all the other
sacraments are contained, or of the bread of the body, so that it
denotes all sufficiency of food, as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep.
cxxx, 11), since the Eucharist is the chief sacrament, and bread is the
chief food: thus in the Gospel of Matthew we read, "supersubstantial,"
i.e. "principal," as Jerome expounds it.
We are directed to beatitude accidentally by the removal of obstacles.
Now there are three obstacles to our attainment of beatitude. First,
there is sin, which directly excludes a man from the kingdom, according
to 1 Cor. 6:9,10, "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, etc., shall
possess the kingdom of God"; and to this refer the words, "Forgive us
our trespasses." Secondly, there is temptation which hinders us from
keeping God's will, and to this we refer when we say: "And lead us not
into temptation," whereby we do not ask not to be tempted, but not to
be conquered by temptation, which is to be led into temptation.
Thirdly, there is the present penal state which is a kind of obstacle
to a sufficiency of life, and to this we refer in the words, "Deliver
us from evil."
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 5),
when we say, "Hallowed be Thy name, we do not mean that God's name is
not holy, but we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing," and this
pertains to the diffusion of God's glory among men. When we say, "Thy
kingdom come, we do not imply that God is not reigning now," but "we
excite in ourselves the desire for that kingdom, that it may come to
us, and that we may reign therein," as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep.
cxxx, 11). The words, "Thy will be done rightly signify, 'May Thy
commandments be obeyed' on earth as in heaven, i.e. by men as well as
by angels" (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 6). Hence these three petitions
will be perfectly fulfilled in the life to come; while the other four,
according to Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the needs of the
present life
Reply to Objection 2: Since prayer is the interpreter of desire, the
order of the petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution,
but of desire or intention, where the end precedes the things that are
directed to the end, and attainment of good precedes removal of evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11) adapts
the seven petitions to the gifts and beatitudes. He says: "If it is
fear God whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God's
name be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby
blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that we
become meek and no longer resist Him. If it is knowledge whereby
blessed are they that mourn, let us pray that His will be done, for
thus we shall mourn no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere
they that hunger, let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If
it is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the
trespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If it is
understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, let us pray lest
we have a double heart by seeking after worldly things which ere the
occasion of our temptations. If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the
peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God, let us pray
to be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that very
fact become the free children of God."
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Enchiridion cxvi), "Luke
included not seven but five petitions in the Lord's Prayer, for by
omitting it, he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition
of the two that precede, and thus helps us to understand it"; because,
to wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this---that we come to the
knowledge of His holiness and to reign together with Him. Again the
last petition mentioned by Matthew, "Deliver us from evil," is omitted
by Luke, so that each one may know himself to be delivered from evil if
he be not led into temptation.
Reply to Objection 5: Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend
Him, but that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which
confidence is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His charity
in our regard, whereby he wills our good---wherefore we say: "Our
Father"; and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil
it---wherefore we say: "Who art in heaven."
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Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not proper to the rational
creature. Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject.
But receiving is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and
Holy Ghost. Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son said
(Jn. 14:16): "I will ask My [Vulg.: 'the'] Father," and the Apostle
says of the Holy Ghost (Rom. 8:26): "The Spirit . . . asketh for us."
Objection 2: Angels are above rational creatures, since they are
intellectual substances. Now prayer is becoming to the angels,
wherefore we read in the Ps. 96:7: "Adore Him, all you His angels."
Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creature.
Objection 3: Further, the same subject is fitted to pray as is fitted
to call upon God, since this consists chiefly in prayer. But dumb
animals are fitted to call upon God, according to Ps. 146:9, "Who
giveth to beasts their food and to the young ravens that call upon
Him." Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creatures.
On the contrary, Prayer is an act of reason, as stated above
[3021](A[1]). But the rational creature is so called from his reason.
Therefore prayer is proper to the rational creature.
I answer that, As stated above [3022](A[1]) prayer is an act of reason,
and consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is an act of
reason, whereby an inferior is directed to something. Accordingly
prayer is properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have
reason, and a superior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the
Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Therefore prayer
is unbecoming both the Divine Persons and dumb animals, and it is
proper to the rational creature.
Reply to Objection 1: Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in
respect of their nature, whereas prayer belongs to one who receives
through grace. The Son is said to ask or pray in respect of His
assumed, i.e. His human, nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and
the Holy Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the [3023]FP, Q[79], A[8], intellect
and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the
perfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual creatures which are the
angels are distinct from rational creatures, and sometimes are included
under them. In this sense prayer is said to be proper to the rational
creature.
Reply to Objection 3: The young ravens are said to call upon God, on
account of the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way,
desire to attain the Divine goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to
obey God, on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by
God.
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Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?
Objection 1: It would seem that the saints in heaven do not pray for
us. A man's action is more meritorious for himself than for others. But
the saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, neither do they pray
for themselves, since they are already established in the term. Neither
therefore do they pray for us.
Objection 2: Further, the saints conform their will to God perfectly,
so that they will only what God wills. Now what God wills is always
fulfilled. Therefore it would be useless for the saints to pray for us.
Objection 3: Further, just as the saints in heaven are above, so are
those in Purgatory, for they can no longer sin. Now those in Purgatory
do not pray for us, on the contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither
do the saints in heaven pray for us.
Objection 4: Further, if the saints in heaven pray for us, the prayers
of the higher saints would be more efficacious; and so we ought not to
implore the help of the lower saints' prayers but only of those of the
higher saints.
Objection 5: Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the
souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated from
their bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul,
to pray for us: yet the Church does the contrary. The saints therefore
do not pray for us, at least before the resurrection.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): "This is . . . he that
prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the
prophet of God."
I answer that, As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), the error of
Vigilantius consisted in saying that "while we live, we can pray one
for another; but that after we are dead, none of our prayers for others
can be heard, seeing that not even the martyrs' prayers are granted
when they pray for their blood to be avenged." But this is absolutely
false, because, since prayers offered for others proceed from charity,
as stated above ([3024]AA[7],8), the greater the charity of the saints
in heaven, the more they pray for wayfarers, since the latter can be
helped by prayers: and the more closely they are united to God, the
more are their prayers efficacious: for the Divine order is such that
lower beings receive an overflow of the excellence of the higher, even
as the air receives the brightness of the sun. Wherefore it is said of
Christ (Heb. 7:25): "Going to God by His own power . . . to make
intercession for us" [*Vulg.: 'He is able to save for ever them that
come to God by Him, always living to make intercession for us.']. Hence
Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): "If the apostles and martyrs while yet
in the body and having to be solicitous for themselves, can pray for
others, how much more now that they have the crown of victory and
triumph."
Reply to Objection 1: The saints in heaven, since they are blessed,
have no lack of bliss, save that of the body's glory, and for this they
pray. But they pray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss:
and their prayers are efficacious in impetrating through their previous
merits and through God's acceptance.
Reply to Objection 2: The saints impetrate what ever God wishes to take
place through their prayers: and they pray for that which they deem
will be granted through their prayers according to God's will.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who are in Purgatory though they are above
us on account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the
pains which they suffer: and in this respect they are not in a
condition to pray, but rather in a condition that requires us to pray
for them.
Reply to Objection 4: It is God's will that inferior beings should be
helped by all those that are above them, wherefore we ought to pray not
only to the higher but also to the lower saints; else we should have to
implore the mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime that
prayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more efficacious,
either because he is implored with greater devotion, or because God
wishes to make known his sanctity.
Reply to Objection 5: It is because the saints while living merited to
pray for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were
known in this life, and by which they are better known to us: and also
in order to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the
saying of Ex. 3:6, "I am the God of Abraham," etc.
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Whether prayer should be vocal?
Objection 1: It would seem that prayer ought not to be vocal. As stated
above [3025](A[4]), prayer is addressed chiefly to God. Now God knows
the language of the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ vocal
prayer.
Objection 2: Further, prayer should lift man's mind to God, as stated
above (A[1], ad 2). But words, like other sensible objects, prevent man
from ascending to God by contemplation. Therefore we should not use
words in our prayers.
Objection 3: Further, prayer should be offered to God in secret,
according to Mat. 6:6, "But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy
chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret." But
prayer loses its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer
should not be vocal.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 141:2): "I cried to the Lord with
my voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord."
I answer that, Prayer is twofold, common and individual. Common prayer
is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church
representing the body of the faithful: wherefore such like prayer
should come to the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is
offered: and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer.
Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of the Church
should say these prayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come to
the knowledge of all.
On the other hand individual prayer is that which is offered by any
single person, whether he pray for himself or for others; and it is not
essential to such a prayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the voice
is employed in such like prayers for three reasons. First, in order to
excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person praying is
raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether of words or
of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards apprehension, and
consequently also as regards the affections. Hence Augustine says (ad
Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9) that "by means of words and other signs we arouse
ourselves more effectively to an increase of holy desires." Hence then
alone should we use words and such like signs when they help to excite
the mind internally. But if they distract or in any way impede the mind
we should abstain from them; and this happens chiefly to those whose
mind is sufficiently prepared for devotion without having recourse to
those signs. Wherefore the Psalmist (Ps. 26:8) said: "My heart hath
said to Thee: 'My face hath sought Thee,'" and we read of Anna (1 Kings
1:13) that "she spoke in her heart." Secondly, the voice is used in
praying as though to pay a debt, so that man may serve God with all
that he has from God, that is to say, not only with his mind, but also
with his body: and this applies to prayer considered especially as
satisfactory. Hence it is written (Osee 14:3): "Take away all iniquity,
and receive the good: and we will render the calves of our lips."
Thirdly, we have recourse to vocal prayer, through a certain overflow
from the soul into the body, through excess of feeling, according to
Ps. 15:9, "My heart hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced."
Reply to Objection 1: Vocal prayer is employed, not in order to tell
God something He does not know, but in order to lift up the mind of the
person praying or of other persons to God.
Reply to Objection 2: Words about other matters distract the mind and
hinder the devotion of those who pray: but words signifying some object
of devotion lift up the mind, especially one that is less devout.
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "Our Lord forbids
one to pray in presence of others in order that one may be seen by
others. Hence when you pray, do nothing strange to draw men's
attention, either by shouting so as to be heard by others, or by openly
striking the heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many.
And yet, "according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 3), "it is
not wrong to be seen by men, but to do this or that in order to be seen
by men."
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Whether attention is a necessary condition of prayer?
Objection 1: It would seem that attention is a necessary condition of
prayer. It is written (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore
Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But prayer is not in spirit
unless it be attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of
prayer.
Objection 2: Further, prayer is "the ascent of the mind to God"
[*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24]. But the mind does not ascend to
God if the prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary
condition of prayer.
Objection 3: Further, it is a necessary condition of prayer that it
should be altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander
while praying he is not free of sin, for he seems to make light of God;
even as if he were to speak to another man without attending to what he
was saying. Hence Basil says [*De Constit. Monach. i] that the "Divine
assistance is to be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind wandering
hither and thither: because he that prays thus not only will not obtain
what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to anger." Therefore it
would seem a necessary condition of prayer that it should be attentive.
On the contrary, Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of the
mind when they pray, according to Ps. 39:13, "My heart hath forsaken
me."
I answer that, This question applies chiefly to vocal prayer.
Accordingly we must observe that a thing is necessary in two ways.
First, a thing is necessary because thereby the end is better obtained:
and thus attention is absolutely necessary for prayer. Secondly, a
thing is said to be necessary when without it something cannot obtain
its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. The first is an
effect which is common to all acts quickened by charity, and this is
merit. In order to realize this effect, it is not necessary that prayer
should be attentive throughout; because the force of the original
intention with which one sets about praying renders the whole prayer
meritorious, as is the case with other meritorious acts. The second
effect of prayer is proper thereto, and consists in impetration: and
again the original intention, to which God looks chiefly, suffices to
obtain this effect. But if the original intention is lacking, prayer
lacks both merit and impetration: because, as Gregory [*Hugh St.
Victor, Expos. in Reg. S. Aug. iii] says, "God hears not the prayer of
those who pay no attention to their prayer." The third effect of prayer
is that which it produces at once; this is the spiritual refreshment of
the mind, and for this effect attention is a necessary condition:
wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 14:14): "If I pray in a tongue . . . my
understanding is without fruit."
It must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention
that can be brought to vocal prayer: one which attends to the words,
lest we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the
words, and a third, which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God,
and to the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is
most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it. Moreover this
attention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is sometimes so strong
that the mind forgets all other things, as Hugh of St. Victor states
[*De Modo Orandi ii].
Reply to Objection 1: To pray in spirit and in truth is to set about
praying through the instigation of the Spirit, even though afterwards
the mind wander through weakness.
Reply to Objection 2: The human mind is unable to remain aloft for long
on account of the weakness of nature, because human weakness weighs
down the soul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that
when, while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, of a
sudden it wanders off through weakness.
Reply to Objection 3: Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer
is sinful and hinders the prayer from having fruit. It is against this
that Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "When you pray God with
psalms and hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips
pronounce." But to wander in mind unintentionally does not deprive
prayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (De Constit. Monach. i): "If you
are so truly weakened by sin that you are unable to pray attentively,
strive as much as you can to curb yourself, and God will pardon you,
seeing that you are unable to stand in His presence in a becoming
manner, not through negligence but through frailty."
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Whether prayer should last a long time?
Objection 1: It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is
written (Mat. 6:7): "When you are praying, speak not much." Now one who
prays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal
prayer. Therefore prayer should not last a long time.
Objection 2: Further, prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all
the holier according as it is centered on one thing, according to Ps.
26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after."
Therefore the shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to be wrong to transgress the limits
fixed by God, especially in matters concerning Divine worship,
according to Ex. 19:21: "Charge the people, lest they should have a
mind to pass the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of
them should perish." But God has fixed for us the limits of prayer by
instituting the Lord's Prayer (Mat. 6). Therefore it is not right to
prolong our prayer beyond its limits.
Objection 4: On the contrary, It would seem that we ought to pray
continually. For our Lord said (Lk. 18:1): "We ought always to pray,
and not to faint": and it is written (1 Thess. 5:17): "Pray without
ceasing."
I answer that, We may speak about prayer in two ways: first, by
considering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in its cause. The
not cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought
to arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, either
actually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in
whatever we do out of charity; and we ought to "do all things to the
glory of God" (1 Cor. 10:31). From this point of view prayer ought to
be continual: wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9):
"Faith, hope and charity are by themselves a prayer of continual
longing." But prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual,
because we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine says
(ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), "we pray to God with our lips at certain
intervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves by means of such
like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that desire,
and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof." Now the
quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for instance
the quantity of the dose should be commensurate with health. And so it
is becoming that prayer should last long enough to arouse the fervor of
the interior desire: and when it exceeds this measure, so that it
cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness, it should be
discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx): "It is
said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent but very short prayers,
rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and erect attention
which is so necessary in prayer slacken and languish, through the
strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it sufficiently clear not
only that this attention must not be forced if we are unable to keep it
up, but also that if we are able to continue, it should not be broken
off too soon." And just as we must judge of this in private prayers by
considering the attention of the person praying, so too, in public
prayers we must judge of it by considering the devotion of the people.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), "to pray
with many words is not the same as to pray long; to speak long is one
thing, to be devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord
passed the whole night in prayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' in
order to set us an example." Further on he says: "When praying say
little, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to say
much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words: whereas to
pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the continuous and
devout clamor of the heart. Indeed this business is frequently done
with groans rather than with words, with tears rather than with
speech."
Reply to Objection 2: Length of prayer consists, not in praying for
many things, but in the affections persisting in the desire of one
thing.
Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord instituted this prayer, not that we
might use no other words when we pray, but that in our prayers we might
have none but these things in view, no matter how we express them or
think of them.
Reply to Objection 4: One may pray continually, either through having a
continual desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain fixed
times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect, whether in the
person who prays---because he remains more devout even after praying,
or in some other person---as when by his kindness a man incites another
to pray for him, even after he himself has ceased praying.
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Whether prayer is meritorious?
Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit
proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes grace, since even grace is
obtained by means of prayer according to Lk. 11:13, "(How much more)
will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask
Him!" Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
Objection 2: Further, if prayer merits anything, this would seem to be
chiefly that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always merit
this, because even the saints' prayers are frequently not heard; thus
Paul was not heard when he besought the sting of the flesh to be
removed from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
Objection 3: Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith, according to
James 1:6, "But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering." Now faith is
not sufficient for merit, as instanced in those who have lifeless
faith. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 34:13, "My prayer shall be
turned into my bosom," explains them as meaning, "if my prayer does not
profit them, yet shall not I be deprived of my reward." Now reward is
not due save to merit. Therefore prayer is meritorious.
I answer that, As stated above [3026](A[13]) prayer, besides causing
spiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a twofold efficacy in
respect of a future effect, namely, efficacy in meriting and efficacy
in impetrating. Now prayer, like any other virtuous act, is efficacious
in meriting, because it proceeds from charity as its root, the proper
object of which is the eternal good that we merit to enjoy. Yet prayer
proceeds from charity through the medium of religion, of which prayer
is an act, as stated above [3027](A[3]), and with the concurrence of
other virtues requisite for the goodness of prayer, viz. humility and
faith. For the offering of prayer itself to God belongs to religion,
while the desire for the thing. that we pray to be accomplished belongs
to charity. Faith is necessary in reference to God to Whom we pray;
that is, we need to believe that we can obtain from Him what we seek.
Humility is necessary on the part of the person praying, because he
recognizes his neediness. Devotion too is necessary: but this belongs
to religion, for it is its first act and a necessary condition of all
its secondary acts, as stated above (Q[82], AA[1],2).
As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace
of God to Whom we pray, and Who instigates us to pray. Wherefore
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cv, 1): "He would not urge us to
ask, unless He were willing to give"; and Chrysostom [*Cf. Catena Aurea
of St. Thomas on Lk. 18. The words as quoted are not to be found in the
words of Chrysostom] says: "He never refuses to grant our prayers,
since in His loving-kindness He urged us not to faint in praying."
Reply to Objection 1: Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is
meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which
impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a
gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is "a gift of God," as
Augustine states (De Persever. xxiii).
Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly
something distinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief
object of merit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition
of prayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated above
([3028]AA[6],7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for
ourselves be not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and
sometimes by asking for and desiring such things we lose merit for
instance if we ask of God the accomplishment of some sin, which would
be an impious prayer. And sometimes it is not necessary for salvation,
nor yet manifestly contrary thereto; and then although he who prays may
merit eternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he
asks for. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii):
"He who faithfully prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both
mercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the physician knows
better than the sick man what is good for the disease." For this
reason, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the removal of the
sting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, we
pray for something that is useful for our beatitude, through being
conducive to salvation, we merit it not only by praying, but also by
doing other good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what we
ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: "since certain things are not
denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a suitable
time," according to Augustine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and again this may
be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it. Wherefore Basil says
(De Constit. Monast. i): "The reason why sometimes thou hast asked and
not received, is because thou hast asked amiss, either inconsistently,
or lightly, or because thou hast asked for what was not good for thee,
or because thou hast ceased asking." Since, however, a man cannot
condignly merit eternal life for another, as stated above ([3029]FS,
Q[114], A[6]), it follows that sometimes one cannot condignly merit for
another things that pertain to eternal life. For this reason we are not
always heard when we pray for others, as stated above (A[7], ad 2,3).
Hence it is that four conditions are laid down; namely, to ask---"for
ourselves---things necessary for salvation---piously---perseveringly";
when all these four concur, we always obtain what we ask for.
Reply to Objection 3: Prayer depends chiefly on faith, not for its
efficacy in meriting, because thus it depends chiefly on charity, but
for its efficacy in impetrating, because it is through faith that man
comes to know of God's omnipotence and mercy, which are the source
whence prayer impetrates what it asks for.
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Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by their prayers?
Objection 1: It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing from God by
their prayers. It is written (Jn. 9:31): "We know that God doth not
hear sinners"; and this agrees with the saying of Prov. 28:9, "He that
turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an
abomination." Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from God.
Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God.
Objection 2: Further, the just impetrate from God what they merit, as
stated above (A[15], ad 2). But sinners cannot merit anything since
they lack grace and charity which is the "power of godliness,"
according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of
godliness, but denying the power thereof." and so their prayer is
impious, and yet piety it required in order that prayer may be
impetrative, as stated above (A[15], ad 2). Therefore sinners impetrate
nothing by their prayers.
Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "The Father is unwilling
to hear the prayer which the Son has not inspired." Now in the prayer
inspired by Christ we say: "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive
them that trespass against us": and sinners do not fulfil this.
Therefore either they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy to be
heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because they do
not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super Joan.): "If God
were not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord, be
merciful to me a sinner"; and Chrysostom [*Hom. xviii of the same Opus
Imperfectum] says: "Everyone that asketh shall receive, that is to say
whether he be righteous or sinful."
I answer that, In the sinner, two things are to be considered: his
nature which God loves, and the sin which He hates. Accordingly when a
sinner prays for something as sinner, i.e. in accordance with a sinful
desire, God hears him not through mercy but sometimes through vengeance
when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For "God refuses
in mercy what He grants in anger," as Augustine declares (Tract. lxxiii
in Joan.). On the other hand God hears the sinner's prayer if it
proceed from a good natural desire, not out of justice, because the
sinner does not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy [*Cf. A[15],
ad 1], provided however he fulfil the four conditions given above,
namely, that he beseech for himself things necessary for salvation,
piously and perseveringly.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine states (Tract. xliv super Joan.),
these words were spoken by the blind man before being anointed, i.e.
perfectly enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there
is truth in the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which sense
also the sinner's prayer is said to be an abomination.
Reply to Objection 2: There can be no godliness in the sinner's prayer
as though his prayer were quickened by a habit of virtue: and yet his
prayer may be godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to
godliness. Even so a man who has not the habit of justice is able to
will something just, as stated above ([3030]Q[59], A[2]). And though
his prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, because merit
depends on justice, whereas impetration rests on grace.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[7], ad 1) the Lord's Prayer is
pronounced in the common person of the whole Church: and so if anyone
say the Lord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor's
trespasses, he lies not, although his words do not apply to him
personally: for they are true as referred to the person of the Church,
from which he is excluded by merit, and consequently he is deprived of
the fruit of his prayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is prepared to
forgive those who have trespassed against him, wherefore his prayers
are heard, according to Ecclus. 28:2, "Forgive thy neighbor if he hath
hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to thee when thou
prayest."
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Whether the parts of prayer are fittingly described as supplications,
prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings?
Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prayer are unfittingly
described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings.
Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration. Yet, according to
Origen (Super Matth. Tract. xxxv), "a man who wishes to live according
to the gospel need not adjure another, for if it be unlawful to swear,
it is also unlawful to adjure." Therefore supplication is unfittingly
reckoned a part of prayer.
Objection 2: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24),
"to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Therefore it is unfitting
to distinguish "prayers" from "intercessions."
Objection 3: Further, thanksgivings regard the past, while the others
regard the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore
thanksgivings are unfittingly placed after the others.
On the contrary, suffices the authority of the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:1).
I answer that, Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First, that
the person who prays should approach God Whom he prays: this is
signified in the word "prayer," because prayer is "the raising up of
one's mind to God." The second is that there should be a petition, and
this is signified in the word "intercession." In this case sometimes
one asks for something definite, and then some say it is "intercession"
properly so called, or we may ask for some thing indefinitely, for
instance to be helped by God, or we may simply indicate a fact, as in
Jn. 11:3, "Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick," and then they call it
"insinuation." The third condition is the reason for impetrating what
we ask for: and this either on the part of God, or on the part of the
person who asks. The reason of impetration on the part of God is His
sanctity, on account of which we ask to be heard, according to Dan.
9:17,18, "For Thy own sake, incline, O God, Thy ear"; and to this
pertains "supplication" [obsecratio] which means a pleading through
sacred things, as when we say, "Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O
Lord." The reason for impetration on the part of the person who asks is
"thanksgiving"; since "through giving thanks for benefits received we
merit to receive yet greater benefits," as we say in the collect
[*Ember Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a
Confessor Bishop]. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:1 says that "in the Mass,
the consecration is preceded by supplication," in which certain sacred
things are called to mind; that "prayers are in the consecration
itself," in which especially the mind should be raised up to God; and
that "intercessions are in the petitions that follow, and thanksgivings
at the end."
We may notice these four things in several of the Church's collects.
Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, "Almighty eternal God"
belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, "Who hast given
to Thy servants," etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words, "grant, we
beseech Thee," belong to intercession; and the words at the end,
"Through Our Lord," etc. belong to supplication.
In the "Conferences of the Fathers" (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) we read:
"Supplication is bewailing one's sins; prayer is vowing something to
God; intercession is praying for others; thanksgiving is offered by the
mind to God in ineffable ecstasy." The first explanation, however, is
the better.
Reply to Objection 1: "Supplication" is an adjuration not for the
purpose of compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore
mercy.
Reply to Objection 2: "Prayer" in the general sense includes all the
things mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it
denotes properly the ascent to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Among things that are diverse the past precedes
the future; but the one and same thing is future before it is past.
Hence thanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one
and the same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it has been
received, we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer
whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer is preceded by
supplication, whereby through the consideration of God's goodness we
dare approach Him.
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OF ADORATION (THREE ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in
the first place, adoration whereby one uses one's body to reverence
God; secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to
God; thirdly, those acts whereby something belonging to God is assumed.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether adoration is an act of latria?
(2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act?
(3) Whether adoration requires a definite place?
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Whether adoration is an act of latria or religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that adoration is not an act of latria or
religion. The worship of religion is due to God alone. But adoration is
not due to God alone: since we read (Gn. 18:2) that Abraham adored the
angels; and (3 Kings 1:23) that the prophet Nathan, when he was come in
to king David, "worshiped him bowing down to the ground." Therefore
adoration is not an act of religion.
Objection 2: Further, the worship of religion is due to God as the
object of beatitude, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3): whereas
adoration is due to Him by reason of His majesty, since a gloss on Ps.
28:2, "Adore ye the Lord in His holy court," says: "We pass from these
courts into the court where we adore His majesty." Therefore adoration
is not an act of latria.
Objection 3: Further, the worship of one same religion is due to the
three Persons. But we do not adore the three Persons with one
adoration, for we genuflect at each separate invocation of Them [*At
the adoration of the Cross, on Good Friday]. Therefore adoration is nol
an act of latria.
On the contrary, are the words quoted Mat. 4:10: "The Lord thy God
shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve."
I answer that, Adoration is directed to the reverence of the person
adored. Now it is evident from what we have said ([3031]Q[81], AA[2],4)
that it is proper to religion to show reverence to God. Hence the
adoration whereby we adore God is an act of religion.
Reply to Objection 1: Reverence is due to God on account of His
excellence, which is communicated to certain creatures not in equal
measure, but according to a measure of proportion; and so the reverence
which we pay to God, and which belongs to latria, differs from the
reverence which we pay to certain excellent creatures; this belongs to
dulia, and we shall speak of it further on ([3032]Q[103]). And since
external actions are signs of internal reverence, certain external
tokens significative of reverence are offered to creatures of
excellence, and among these tokens the chief is adoration: yet there is
one thing which is offered to God alone, and that is sacrifice. Hence
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 4): "Many tokens of Divine worship are
employed in doing honor to men, either through excessive humility, or
through pernicious flattery; yet so that those to whom these honors are
given are recognized as being men to whom we owe esteem and reverence
and even adoration if they be far above us. But who ever thought it his
duty to sacrifice to any other than one whom he either knew or deemed
or pretended to be a God?" Accordingly it was with the reverence due to
an excellent creature that Nathan adored David; while it was the
reverence due to God with which Mardochai refused to adore Aman fearing
"lest he should transfer the honor of his God to a man" (Esther 13:14).
Again with the reverence due to an excellent creature Abraham adored
the angels, as did also Josue (Jos. 5:15): though we may understand
them to have adored, with the adoration of latria, God Who appeared and
spoke to them in the guise of an angel. It was with the reverence due
to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel (Apoc. 22:9), both to
indicate the dignity which he had acquired through Christ, whereby man
is made equal to an angel: wherefore the same text goes on: "I am thy
fellow-servant and of thy brethren"; as also to exclude any occasion of
idolatry, wherefore the text continues: "Adore God."
Reply to Objection 2: Every Divine excellency is included in His
majesty: to which it pertains that we should be made happy in Him as in
the sovereign good.
Reply to Objection 3: Since there is one excellence of the three Divine
Persons, one honor and reverence is due to them and consequently one
adoration. It is to represent this that where it is related (Gn. 18:2)
that three men appeared to Abraham, we are told that he addressed one,
saying: "Lord, if I have found favor in thy sight," etc. The triple
genuflection represents the Trinity of Persons, not a difference of
adoration.
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Whether adoration denotes an action of the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that adoration does not denote an act of the
body. It is written (Jn. 4:23): "The true adorers shall adore the
Father in spirit and in truth." Now what is done in spirit has nothing
to do with an act of the body. Therefore adoration does not denote an
act of the body.
Objection 2: Further, the word adoration is taken from "oratio"
[prayer]. But prayer consists chiefly in an interior act, according to
1 Cor. 14:15, "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the
understanding." Therefore adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual act.
Objection 3: Further, acts of the body pertain to sensible knowledge:
whereas we approach God not by bodily but by spiritual sense. Therefore
adoration does not denote an act of the body.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ex. 20:5, "Thou shalt not adore them, nor
serve them," says: "Thou shalt neither worship them in mind, nor adore
them outwardly."
I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 12), since we are
composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, we offer God a
twofold adoration; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in the
internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which consists
in an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts of latria
that which is without is referred to that which is within as being of
greater import, it follows that exterior adoration is offered on
account of interior adoration, in other words we exhibit signs of
humility in our bodies in order to incite our affections to submit to
God, since it is connatural to us to proceed from the sensible to the
intelligible.
Reply to Objection 1: Even bodily adoration is done in spirit, in so
far as it proceeds from and is directed to spiritual devotion.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as prayer is primarily in the mind, and
secondarily expressed in words, as stated above ([3033]Q[83], A[12]),
so too adoration consists chiefly in an interior reverence of God, but
secondarily in certain bodily signs of humility; thus when we genuflect
we signify our weakness in comparison with God, and when we prostrate
ourselves we profess that we are nothing of ourselves.
Reply to Objection 3: Though we cannot reach God with the senses, our
mind is urged by sensible signs to approach God.
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Whether adoration requires a definite place?
Objection 1: It would seem that adoration does not require a definite
place. It is written (Jn. 4:21): "The hour cometh, when you shall
neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father"; and the
same reason seems to apply to other places. Therefore a definite place
is not necessary for adoration.
Objection 2: Further, exterior adoration is directed to interior
adoration. But interior adoration is shown to God as existing
everywhere. Therefore exterior adoration does not require a definite
place.
Objection 3: Further, the same God is adored in the New as in the Old
Testament. Now in the Old Testament they adored towards the west,
because the door of the Tabernacle looked to the east (Ex. 26:18
seqq.). Therefore for the same reason we ought now to adore towards the
west, if any definite place be requisite for adoration.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 56:7): "My house shall be called
the house of prayer," which words are also quoted (Jn. 2:16).
I answer that, As stated above [3034](A[2]), the chief part of
adoration is the internal devotion of the mind, while the secondary
part is something external pertaining to bodily signs. Now the mind
internally apprehends God as not comprised in a place; while bodily
signs must of necessity be in some definite place and position. Hence a
definite place is required for adoration, not chiefly, as though it
were essential thereto, but by reason of a certain fittingness, like
other bodily signs.
Reply to Objection 1: By these words our Lord foretold the cessation of
adoration, both according to the rite of the Jews who adored in
Jerusalem, and according to the rite of the Samaritans who adored on
Mount Garizim. For both these rites ceased with the advent of the
spiritual truth of the Gospel, according to which "a sacrifice is
offered to God in every place," as stated in Malach. 1:11.
Reply to Objection 2: A definite place is chosen for adoration, not on
account of God Who is adored, as though He were enclosed in a place,
but on account of the adorers; and this for three reasons. First,
because the place is consecrated, so that those who pray there conceive
a greater devotion and are more likely to be heard, as may be seen in
the prayer of Solomon (3 Kings 8). Secondly, on account of the sacred
mysteries and other signs of holiness contained therein. Thirdly, on
account of the concourse of many adorers, by reason of which their
prayer is more likely to be heard, according to Mat. 18:20, "Where
there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the
midst of them."
Reply to Objection 3: There is a certain fittingness in adoring towards
the east. First, because the Divine majesty is indicated in the
movement of the heavens which is from the east. Secondly, because
Paradise was situated in the east according to the Septuagint version
of Gn. 2:8, and so we signify our desire to return to Paradise.
Thirdly, on account of Christ Who is "the light of the world" [*Jn.
8:12; 9:5], and is called "the Orient" (Zech. 6:12). Who mounteth above
the heaven of heavens to the east (Ps. 67:34), and is expected to come
from the east, according to Mat. 24:27, "As lightning cometh out of the
east, and appeareth even into the west; so shall also the coming of the
Son of Man be."
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OF SACRIFICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider those acts whereby external things are
offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration: (1) Of
things given to God by the faithful; (2) Of vows, whereby something is
promised to Him.
Under the first head we shall consider sacrifices, oblations,
first-fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?
(2) Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?
(3) Whether the offering of a sacrifice is a special act of virtue?
(4) Whether all are bound to offer sacrifice?
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Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of
the natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among
all men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of some,
e.g. Melchisedech (Gn. 14:18), offering bread and wine in sacrifice,
and of certain animals being offered by some, and others by others.
Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, things that are of the natural law were observed
by all just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor
that Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. 10:2) that
wisdom "brought him out of his sin." Therefore the offering of
sacrifice is not of the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5,19) that
sacrifices are offered in signification of something. Now words which
are chief among signs, as he again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3),
"signify, not by nature but by convention," according to the
Philosopher (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the
natural law.
On the contrary, At all times and among all nations there has always
been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by all is
seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of the
natural law.
I answer that, Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a higher
being, on account of the defects which he perceives in himself, and in
which he needs help and direction from someone above him: and whatever
this superior being may be, it is known to all under the name of God.
Now just as in natural things the lower are naturally subject to the
higher, so too it is a dictate of natural reason in accordance with
man's natural inclination that he should tender submission and honor,
according to his mode, to that which is above man. Now the mode
befitting to man is that he should employ sensible signs in order to
signify anything, because he derives his knowledge from sensibles.
Hence it is a dictate of natural reason that man should use certain
sensibles, by offering them to God in sign of the subjection and honor
due to Him, like those who make certain offerings to their lord in
recognition of his authority. Now this is what we mean by a sacrifice,
and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of the natural law.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3035]FS, Q[95], A[2]), certain
things belong generically to the natural law, while their determination
belongs to the positive law; thus the natural law requires that
evildoers should be punished; but that this or that punishment should
be inflicted on them is a matter determined by God or by man. In like
manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the natural
law, and consequently all are agreed on this point, but the
determination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and this
is the reason for their difference.
Reply to Objection 2: Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice
to God in a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according
to Gregory, who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden times original sin
was remitted through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture
mention all the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have
something special connected with them. Perhaps the reason why we read
of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that, as the origin of sin
is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification ought not to be
represented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being
himself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should
be represented as offering a sacrifice.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural to man to express his ideas by
signs, but the determination of those signs depends on man's pleasure.
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Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrifice should not be offered to the
most high God alone. Since sacrifice ought to be offered to God, it
would seem that it ought to be offered to all such as are partakers of
the Godhead. Now holy men are made "partakers of the Divine nature,"
according to 2 Pet. 1:4; wherefore of them is it written (Ps. 81:6): "I
have said, You are gods": and angels too are called "sons of God,"
according to Job 1:6. Thus sacrifice should be offered to all these.
Objection 2: Further, the greater a person is the greater the honor due
to him from man. Now the angels and saints are far greater than any
earthly princes: and yet the subjects of the latter pay them much
greater honor, by prostrating before them, and offering them gifts,
than is implied by offering an animal or any other thing in sacrifice.
Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice to the angels and saints.
Objection 3: Further, temples and altars are raised for the offering of
sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised to angels and saints.
Therefore sacrifices also may be offered to them.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:20): "He that sacrificeth to
gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord."
I answer that, As stated above [3036](A[1]), a sacrifice is offered in
order that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is
offered outwardly represents the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby
the soul offers itself to God according to Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to
God is an afflicted spirit," since, as stated above (Q[81], A[7];
Q[84], A[2]), the outward acts of religion are directed to the inward
acts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God as its beginning
by creation, and its end by beatification: and according to the true
faith God alone is the creator of our souls, as stated in the [3037]FP,
Q[90], A[3]; FS, Q[118], A[2], while in Him alone the beatitude of our
soul consists, as stated above ([3038]FS, Q[1], A[8]; [3039]FS, Q[2],
A[8]; [3040]FS, Q[3], AA[1],7,8). Wherefore just as to God alone ought
we to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward
sacrifices to Him alone: even so "in our prayers and praises we proffer
significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the things
which we designate thereby," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 19).
Moreover we find that in every country the people are wont to show the
sovereign ruler some special sign of honor, and that if this be shown
to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore, in the Divine
law, the death punishment is assigned to those who offer Divine honor
to another than God.
Reply to Objection 1: The name of the Godhead is communicated to
certain ones, not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither
is equal honor due to them.
Reply to Objection 2: The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by
the value of the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is
done in honor of the sovereign Ruler of the whole universe. Wherefore,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), "the demons rejoice, not in the
stench of corpses, but in receiving divine honors."
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 19), "we do
not raise temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but
their God is our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer sacrifice
to thee, Peter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their triumphs,
and urge ourselves to imitate them."
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Whether the offering of sacrifice is a special act of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a
special act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "A true
sacrifice is any work done that we may cleave to God in holy
fellowship." But not every good work is a special act of some definite
virtue. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a
definite virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the mortification of the body by fasting belongs
to abstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom belongs
to fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the offering
of sacrifice, according to Rom. 12:1, "Present your bodies a living
sacrifice." Again the Apostle says (Heb. 13:16): "Do not forget to do
good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained."
Now it belongs to charity, mercy and liberality to do good and to
impart. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a
definite virtue.
Objection 3: Further, a sacrifice is apparently anything offered to
God. Now many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer,
tithes, first-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice
does not appear to be a special act of a definite virtue.
On the contrary, The law contains special precepts about sacrifices, as
appears from the beginning of Leviticus.
I answer that, As stated above ([3041]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7), where an act
of one virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it partakes
somewhat of its species; thus when a man thieves in order to commit
fornication, his theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of
fornication, so that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it would
be a sin from the very fact that it was directed to fornication.
Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of praise in that it
is done out of reverence for God; and for this reason it belongs to a
definite virtue, viz. religion. But it happens that the acts of the
other virtues are directed to the reverence of God, as when a man gives
alms of his own things for God's sake, or when a man subjects his own
body to some affliction out of reverence for God; and in this way the
acts also of other virtues may be called sacrifices. On the other hand
there are acts that are not deserving of praise save through being done
out of reverence for God: such acts are properly called sacrifices, and
belong to the virtue of religion.
Reply to Objection 1: The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a
spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently
the act of any virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through
being done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's good is threefold. There is first his
soul's good which is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by
devotion, prayer and other like interior acts: and this is the
principal sacrifice. The second is his body's good, which is, so to
speak, offered to God in martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The
third is the good which consists of external things: and of these we
offer a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our possession to God
immediately, and indirectly when we share them with our neighbor for
God's sake.
Reply to Objection 3: A "sacrifice," properly speaking, requires that
something be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance
animals were slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed. The
very word signifies this, since "sacrifice" is so called because a man
does something sacred [facit sacrum]. On the other hand an "oblation"
is properly the offering of something to God even if nothing be done
thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at the altar, and yet
nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is an oblation, but not
conversely. "First-fruits" are oblations, because they were offered to
God, according to Dt. 26, but they are not a sacrifice, because nothing
sacred was done to them. "Tithes," however, are neither a sacrifice nor
an oblation, properly speaking, because they are not offered
immediately to God, but to the ministers of Divine worship.
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Whether all are bound to offer sacrifices?
Objection 1: It would seem that all are not bound to offer sacrifices.
The Apostle says (Rom. 3:19): "What things soever the Law speaketh, it
speaketh to them that are in the Law." Now the law of sacrifices was
not given to all, but only to the Hebrew people. Therefore all are not
bound to offer sacrifices.
Objection 2: Further, sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify
something. But not everyone is capable of understanding these
significations. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.
Objection 3: Further, priests [*'Sacerdotes': Those who give or
administer sacred things (sacra dantes): cf. 1 Cor. 4:1] are so called
because they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore
not all are bound to offer sacrifices.
On the contrary, The offering of sacrifices of is of the natural law,
as stated above [3042](A[1]). Now all are bound to do that which is of
the natural law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God.
I answer that, Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above [3043](A[2]). The
first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to
offer, since all are obliged to offer to God a devout mind. The other
is the outward sacrifice, and this again is twofold. There is a
sacrifice which is deserving of praise merely through being offered to
God in protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation of
offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under the New or the
Old Law, as for those who were not under the Law. For those who are
under the Law are bound to offer certain definite sacrifices according
to the precepts of the Law, whereas those who were not under the Law
were bound to perform certain outward actions in God's honor, as became
those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely to this or that action.
The other outward sacrifice is when the outward actions of the other
virtues are performed out of reverence for God; some of which are a
matter of precept; and to these all are bound, while others are works
of supererogation, and to these all are not bound.
Reply to Objection 1: All were not bound to offer those particular
sacrifices which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to
some sacrifices inward or outward, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Though all do not know explicitly the power of
the sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit
faith, as stated above (Q[2], AA 6,7).
Reply to Objection 3: The priests offer those sacrifices which are
specially directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but
also for others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can offer
to God for himself as explained above ([3044]AA[2],3).
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OF OBLATIONS AND FIRST-FRUITS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept?
(2) To whom are oblations due?
(3) of what things they should be made?
(4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer
them?
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Whether men are under a necessity of precept to make oblations?
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to make
oblations. Men are not bound, at the time of the Gospel, to observe the
ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above ([3045]FS, Q[103],
AA[3] ,4). Now the offering of oblations is one of the ceremonial
precepts of the Old Law, since it is written (Ex. 23:14): "Three times
every year you shall celebrate feasts with Me," and further on (Ex.
23:15): "Thou shalt not appear empty before Me." Therefore men are not
now under a necessity of precept to make oblations.
Objection 2: Further, before they are made, oblations depend on man's
will, as appears from our Lord's saying (Mat. 5:23), "If . . . thou
offer thy gift at the altar," as though this were left to the choice of
the offerer: and when once oblations have been made, there is no way of
offering them again. Therefore in no way is a man under a necessity of
precept to make oblations.
Objection 3: Further, if anyone is bound to give a certain thing to the
Church, and fails to give it, he can be compelled to do so by being
deprived of the Church's sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to
refuse the sacraments of the Church to those who refuse to make
oblations according to a decree of the sixth council [*Can. Trullan,
xxiii], quoted I, qu. i, can. Nullus: "Let none who dispense Holy
Communion exact anything of the recipient, and if they exact anything
let them be deposed." Therefore it is not necessary that men should
make oblations.
On the contrary, Gregory says [*Gregory VII; Concil. Roman. v, can.
xii]: "Let every Christian take care that he offer something to God at
the celebration of Mass."
I answer that, As stated above ([3046]Q[85], A[3], ad 3), the term
"oblation" is common to all things offered for the Divine worship, so
that if a thing be offered to be destroyed in worship of God, as though
it were being made into something holy, it is both an oblation and a
sacrifice. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 29:18): "Thou shalt offer the
whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an oblation to the
Lord, a most sweet savor of the victim of the Lord"; and (Lev. 2:1):
"When anyone shall offer an oblation of sacrifice to the Lord, his
offering shall be of fine flour." If, on the other hand, it be offered
with a view to its remaining entire and being deputed to the worship of
God or to the use of His ministers, it will be an oblation and not a
sacrifice. Accordingly it is essential to oblations of this kind that
they be offered voluntarily, according to Ex. 25:2, of "every man that
offereth of his own accord you shall take them." Nevertheless it may
happen in four ways that one is bound to make oblations. First, on
account of a previous agreement: as when a person is granted a portion
of Church land, that he may make certain oblations at fixed times,
although this has the character of rent. Secondly, by reason of a
previous assignment or promise; as when a man offers a gift among the
living, or by will bequeaths to the Church something whether movable or
immovable to be delivered at some future time. Thirdly, on account of
the need of the Church, for instance if her ministers were without
means of support. Fourthly, on account of custom; for the faithful are
bound at certain solemn feasts to make certain customary oblations. In
the last two cases, however, the oblation remains voluntary, as
regards, to wit, the quantity or kind of the thing offered.
Reply to Objection 1: Under the New Law men are not bound to make
oblations on account of legal solemnities, as stated in Exodus, but on
account of certain other reasons, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Some are bound to make oblations, both before
making them, as in the first, third, and. fourth cases, and after they
have made them by assignment or promise: for they are bound to offer in
reality that which has been already offered to the Church by way of
assignment.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who do not make the oblations they are
bound to make may be punished by being deprived of the sacraments, not
by the priest himself to whom the oblations should be made, lest he
seem to exact, something for bestowing the sacraments, but by someone
superior to him.
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Whether oblations are due to priests alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that oblations are not due to priests alone.
For chief among oblations would seem to be those that are deputed to
the sacrifices of victims. Now whatever is given to the poor is called
a "victim in Scripture according to Heb. 13:16, "Do not forget to do
good and to impart, for by such victims [Douay: 'sacrifices'] God's
favor is obtained. Much more therefore are oblations due to the poor.
Objection 2: Further, in many parishes monks have a share in the
oblations. Now "the case of clerics is distinct from the case of
monks," as Jerome states [*Ep. xiv, ad Heliod.]. Therefore oblations
art not due to priests alone.
Objection 3: Further, lay people with the consent of the Church buy
oblations such as loaves and so forth, and they do so for no other
reason than that they may make use thereof themselves. Therefore
oblations may have reference to the laity.
On the contrary, A canon of Pope Damasus [*Damasus I] quoted X, qu. i
[*Can. Hanc consuetudinem], says: "None but the priests whom day by day
we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the oblations which are
offered within the precincts of the Holy Church: because in the Old
Testament the Lord forbade the children of Israel to eat the sacred
loaves, with the exception of Aaron and his sons" (Lev. 24:8,9).
I answer that, The priest is appointed mediator and stands, so to
speak, "between" the people and God, as we read of Moses (Dt. 5:5),
wherefore it belongs to him to set forth the Divine teachings and
sacraments before the people; and besides to offer to the Lord things
appertaining to the people, their prayers, for instance, their
sacrifices and oblations. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): "Every high
priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that
appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins."
Hence the oblations which the people offer to God concern the priests,
not only as regards their turning them to their own use, but also as
regards the faithful dispensation thereof, by spending them partly on
things appertaining to the Divine worship, partly on things touching
their own livelihood (since they that serve the altar partake with the
altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13), and partly for the good of the poor,
who, as far as possible, should be supported from the possessions of
the Church: for our Lord had a purse for the use of the poor, as Jerome
observes on Mat. 17:26, "That we may not scandalize them."
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is given to the poor is not a sacrifice
properly speaking; yet it is called a sacrifice in so far as it is
given to them for God's sake. In like manner, and for the same reason,
it can be called an oblation, though not properly speaking, since it is
not given immediately to God. Oblations properly so called fall to the
use of the poor, not by the dispensation of the offerers, but by the
dispensation of the priests.
Reply to Objection 2: Monks or other religious may receive oblations
under three counts. First, as poor, either by the dispensation of the
priests, or by ordination of the Church; secondly, through being
ministers of the altar, and then they can accept oblations that are
freely offered; thirdly, if the parishes belong to them, and they can
accept oblations, having a right to them as rectors of the Church.
Reply to Objection 3: Oblations when once they are consecrated, such as
sacred vessels and vestments, cannot be granted to the use of the
laity: and this is the meaning of the words of Pope Damasus. But those
which are unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk by
permission of the priests, whether by way of gift or by way of sale.
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Whether a man may make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man may not make oblations of
whatever he lawfully possesses. According to human law [*Dig. xii, v,
de Condict. ob. turp. vel iniust. caus. 4] "the whore's is a shameful
trade in what she does but not in what she takes," and consequently
what she takes she possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for her to
make an oblation with her gains, according to Dt. 23:18, "Thou shalt
not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of the Lord thy
God." Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever one
possesses lawfully.
Objection 2: Further, in the same passage it is forbidden to offer "the
price of a dog" in the house of God. But it is evident that a man
possesses lawfully the price of a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore
it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever we possess lawfully.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Malachi 1:8): "If you offer the
lame and the sick, is it not evil?" Yet an animal though lame or sick
is a lawful possession. Therefore it would seem that not of every
lawful possession may one make an oblation.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:9): "Honor the Lord with thy
substance." Now whatever a man possesses lawfully belongs to his
substance. Therefore he may make oblations of whatever he possesses
lawfully.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. cxiii), "shouldst
thou plunder one weaker than thyself and give some of the spoil to the
judge, if he should pronounce in thy favor, such is the force of
justice that even thou wouldst not be pleased with him: and if this
should not please thee, neither does it please thy God." Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 34:21): "The offering of him that sacrificeth of a
thing wrongfully gotten is stained." Therefore it is evident that an
oblation must not be made of things unjustly acquired or possessed. In
the Old Law, however, wherein the figure was predominant, certain
things were reckoned unclean on account of their signification, and it
was forbidden to offer them. But in the New Law all God's creatures are
looked upon as clean, as stated in Titus 1:15: and consequently
anything that is lawfully possessed, considered in itself, may be
offered in oblation. But it may happen accidentally that one may not
make an oblation of what one possesses lawfully; for instance if it be
detrimental to another person, as in the case of a son who offers to
God the means of supporting his father (which our Lord condemns, Mat.
15:5), or if it give rise to scandal or contempt, or the like.
Reply to Objection 1: In the Old Law it was forbidden to make an
offering of the hire of a strumpet on account of its uncleanness, and
in the New Law, on account of scandal, lest the Church seem to favor
sin if she accept oblations from the profits of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Law, a dog was deemed an unclean
animal. Yet other unclean animals were redeemed and their price could
be offered, according to Lev. 27:27, "If it be an unclean animal, he
that offereth it shall redeem it." But a dog was neither offered nor
redeemed, both because idolaters used dogs in sacrifices to their
idols, and because they signify robbery, the proceeds of which cannot
be offered in oblation. However, this prohibition ceased under the New
Law.
Reply to Objection 3: The oblation of a blind or lame animal was
declared unlawful for three reasons. First, on account of the purpose
for which it was offered, wherefore it is written (Malach. 1:8): "If
you offer the blind in sacrifice, is it not evil?" and it behooved
sacrifices to be without blemish. Secondly, on account of contempt,
wherefore the same text goes on (Malach. 1:12): "You have profaned" My
name, "in that you say: The table of the Lord is defiled and that which
is laid thereupon is contemptible." Thirdly, on account of a previous
vow, whereby a man has bound himself to offer without blemish whatever
he has vowed: hence the same text says further on (Malach. 1:14):
"Cursed is the deceitful man that hath in his flock a male, and making
a vow offereth in sacrifice that which is feeble to the Lord." The same
reasons avail still in the New Law, but when they do not apply the
unlawfulness ceases.
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Whether men are bound to pay first-fruits?
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to pay first-fruits.
After giving the law of the first-born the text continues (Ex. 13:9):
"It shall be as a sign in thy hand," so that, apparently, it is a
ceremonial precept. But ceremonial precepts are not to be observed in
the New Law. Neither therefore ought first-fruits to be paid.
Objection 2: Further, first-fruits were offered to the Lord for a
special favor conferred on that people, wherefore it is written (Dt.
26:2,3): "Thou shalt take the first of all thy fruits . . . and thou
shalt go to the priest that shall be in those days, and say to him: I
profess this day before the Lord thy God, that I am come into the land,
for which He swore to our fathers, that He would give it us." Therefore
other nations are not bound to pay first-fruits.
Objection 3: That which one is bound to do should be something
definite. But neither in the New Law nor in the Old do we find mention
of a definite amount of first-fruits. Therefore one is not bound of
necessity to pay them.
On the contrary, It is laid down (16, qu. vii, can. Decimas): "We
confirm the right of priests to tithes and first-fruits, and everybody
must pay them."
I answer that, First-fruits are a kind of oblation, because they are
offered to God with a certain profession (Dt. 26); where the same
passage continues: "The priest taking the basket containing the
first-fruits from the hand of him that bringeth the first-fruits, shall
set it before the altar of the Lord thy God," and further on (Dt.
26:10) he is commanded to say: "Therefore now I offer the first-fruits
of the land, which the Lord hath given me." Now the first-fruits were
offered for a special reason, namely, in recognition of the divine
favor, as though man acknowledged that he had received the fruits of
the earth from God, and that he ought to offer something to God in
return, according to 1 Paral 29:14, "We have given Thee what we
received of Thy hand." And since what we offer God ought to be
something special, hence it is that man was commanded to offer God his
first-fruits, as being a special part of the fruits of the earth: and
since a priest is "ordained for the people "in the things that
appertain to God" (Heb. 5:1), the first-fruits offered by the people
were granted to the priest's use." Wherefore it is written (Num. 18:8):
"The Lord said to Aaron: Behold I have given thee the charge of My
first-fruits." Now it is a point of natural law that man should make an
offering in God's honor out of the things he has received from God, but
that the offering should be made to any particular person, or out of
his first-fruits, or in such or such a quantity, was indeed determined
in the Old Law by divine command; but in the New Law it is fixed by the
declaration of the Church, in virtue of which men are bound to pay
first-fruits according to the custom of their country and the needs of
the Church's ministers.
Reply to Objection 1: The ceremonial observances were properly speaking
signs of the future, and consequently they ceased when the foreshadowed
truth was actually present. But the offering of first-fruits was for a
sign of a past favor, whence arises the duty of acknowledgment in
accordance with the dictate of natural reason. Hence taken in a general
sense this obligation remains.
Reply to Objection 2: First-fruits were offered in the Old Law, not
only on account of the favor of the promised land given by God, but
also on account of the favor of the fruits of the earth, which were
given by God. Hence it is written (Dt. 26:10): "I offer the
first-fruits of the land which the Lord hath given me," which second
motive is common among all people. We may also reply that just as God
granted the land of promise to the Jews by a special favor, so by a
general favor He bestowed the lordship of the earth on the whole of
mankind, according to Ps. 113:24, "The earth He has given to the
children of men."
Reply to Objection 3: As Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezech. 45:13,14; cf.
Cap. Decimam, de Decim. Primit. et Oblat.]: "According to the tradition
of the ancients the custom arose for those who had most to give the
priests a fortieth part, and those who had least, one sixtieth, in lieu
of first-fruits." Hence it would seem that first-fruits should vary
between these limits according to the custom of one's country. And it
was reasonable that the amount of first-fruits should not be fixed by
law, since, as stated above, first-fruits are offered by way of
oblation, a condition of which is that it should be voluntary.
__________________________________________________________________
OF TITHES (FOUR ARTICLES)
Next we must consider tithes, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes?
(2) Of what things ought tithes to be paid?
(3) To whom ought they to be paid?
(4) Who ought to pay tithes?
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Whether men are bound to pay tithes under a necessity of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to pay
tithes. The commandment to pay tithes is contained in the Old Law (Lev.
27:30), "All tithes of the land, whether of corn or of the fruits of
trees, are the Lord's," and further on (Lev. 27:32): "Of all the tithes
of oxen and sheep and goats, that pass under the shepherd's rod, every
tenth that cometh shall be sanctified to the Lord." This cannot be
reckoned among the moral precepts, because natural reason does not
dictate that one ought to give a tenth part, rather than a ninth or
eleventh. Therefore it is either a judicial or a ceremonial precept.
Now, as stated above ([3047]FS, Q[103], A[3]; [3048]FS, Q[104], A[3]),
during the time of grace men are hound neither to the ceremonial nor to
the judicial precepts of the Old Law. Therefore men are not bound now
to pay tithes.
Objection 2: Further, during the time of grace men are bound only to
those things which were commanded by Christ through the Apostles,
according to Mat. 28:20, "Teaching them to observe all things
whatsoever I have commanded you"; and Paul says (Acts 20:27): "I have
not spared to declare unto you all the counsel of God." Now neither in
the teaching of Christ nor in that of the apostles is there any mention
of the paying of tithes: for the saying of our Lord about tithes (Mat.
23:23), "These things you ought to have done" seems to refer to the
past time of legal observance: thus Hilary says (Super Matth. can.
xxiv): "The tithing of herbs, which was useful in foreshadowing the
future, was not to be omitted." Therefore during the time of grace men
are not bound to pay tithes.
Objection 3: Further, during the time of grace, men are not more bound
to the legal observances than before the Law. But before the Law tithes
were given, by reason not of a precept but of a vow. For we read (Gn.
28:20, 22) that Jacob "made a vow" saying: "If God shall be with me,
and shall keep me in the way by which I walk . . . of all the things
that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee." Neither,
therefore, during the time of grace are men bound to pay tithes.
Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law men were bound to pay three kinds
of tithe. For it is written (Num. 18:23,24): "The sons of Levi . . .
shall . . . be content with the oblation of tithes, which I have
separated for their uses and necessities." Again, there were other
tithes of which we read (Dt. 14:22,23): "Every year thou shalt set
aside the tithes of all thy fruits, that the earth bringeth forth year
by year; and thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God in the place which
He shall choose." And there were yet other tithes, of which it is
written (Dt. 14:28): "The third year thou shalt separate another tithe
of all things that grow to thee at that time, and shalt lay it up
within thy gates. And the Levite that hath no other part nor possession
with thee, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, that
are within thy gates, shall . . . eat and be filled." Now during the
time of grace men are not bound to pay the second and third tithes.
Neither therefore are they bound to pay the first.
Objection 5: Further, a debt that is due without any time being fixed
for its payment, must be paid at once under pain of sin. Accordingly if
during the time of grace men are bound, under necessity of precept, to
pay tithes in those countries where tithes are not paid, they would all
be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the ministers of the
Church for dissembling. But this seems unreasonable. Therefore during
the time of grace men are not bound under necessity of precept to pay
tithes.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Append. Serm. cclxxcii], whose words are
quoted 16, qu. i [*Can. Decimae], says: "It is a duty to pay tithes,
and whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to another."
I answer that, In the Old Law tithes were paid for the sustenance of
the ministers of God. Hence it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring all
the tithes into My [Vulg.: 'the'] store-house that there may be meat in
My house." Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was partly
moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly judicial,
deriving its force from its divine institution. Because natural reason
dictates that the people should administer the necessaries of life to
those who minister the divine worship for the welfare of the whole
people even as it is the people's duty to provide a livelihood for
their rulers and soldiers and so forth. Hence the Apostle proves this
from human custom, saying (1 Cor. 9:7): "Who serveth as a soldier at
any time at his own charge? Who planteth a vineyard and eateth not of
the fruit thereof?" But the fixing of the proportion to be offered to
the ministers of divine worship does not belong to the natural law, but
was determined by divine institution, in accordance with the condition
of that people to whom the law was being given. For they were divided
into twelve tribes, and the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was
engaged exclusively in the divine ministry and had no possessions
whence to derive a livelihood: and so it was becomingly ordained that
the remaining eleven tribes should give one-tenth part of their
revenues to the Levites [*Num. 18:21] that the latter might live
respectably; and also because some, through negligence, would disregard
this precept. Hence, so far as the tenth part was fixed, the precept
was judicial, since all institutions established among this people for
the special purpose of preserving equality among men, in accordance
with this people's condition, are called "judicial precepts."
Nevertheless by way of consequence these institutions foreshadowed
something in the future, even as everything else connected with them,
according to 1 Cor. 12, "All these things happened to them in figure."
In this respect they had something in common with the "ceremonial
precepts," which were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of
the future. Hence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed
something in the future. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number
(being the first numerical limit, since the figures do not go beyond
ten but begin over again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth,
which is the sign of perfection, reserving the nine other parts for
himself, acknowledged by a sign that imperfection was his part, and
that the perfection which was to come through Christ was to be hoped
for from God. Yet this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a judicial
precept, as stated above.
There is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts
of the Law, as we stated above ([3049]FS, Q[104], A[3]), that it is
unlawful to observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the New Law,
whereas there is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during the
time of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are bound to
be observed by some, if they be ordained by the authority of those who
have power to make laws. Thus it was a judicial precept of the Old Law
that he who stole a sheep should restore four sheep (Ex. 22:1), and if
any king were to order this to be done his subjects would be bound to
obey. In like manner during the time of the New Law the authority of
the Church has established the payment of tithe; thus showing a certain
kindliness, lest the people of the New Law should give less to the
ministers of the New Testament than did the people of the Old Law to
the ministers of the Old Testament; for the people of the New Law are
under greater obligations, according to Mat. 5:20, "Unless your justice
abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter
into the kingdom of heaven," and, moreover, the ministers of the New
Testament are of greater dignity than the ministers of the Old
Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor. 3:7,8).
Accordingly it is evident that man's obligation to pay tithes arises
partly from natural law, partly from the institution of the Church;
who, nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and
persons might ordain the payment of some other proportion.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept about paying tithes, in so far as it
was a moral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when He said
(Mat. 10:10) [*The words as quoted are from Lk. 10:7: Matthew has
'meat' instead of 'hire']: "The workman is worthy of his hire," and the
Apostle says the same (1 Cor. 9:4 seqq.). But the fixing of the
particular proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church.
Reply to Objection 3: Before the time of the Old Law the ministry of
the divine worship was not entrusted to any particular person; although
it is stated that the first-born were priests, and that they received a
double portion. For this very reason no particular portion was directed
to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but when they met
with one, each man of his own accord gave him what he deemed right.
Thus Abraham by a kind of prophetic instinct gave tithes to
Melchisedech, the priest of the Most High God, according to Gn. 14:20,
and again Jacob made a vow to give tithes [*Gn. 28:20], although he
appears to have vowed to do so, not by paying them to ministers, but
for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance for the fulfilling
of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: "I will offer tithes to
Thee."
Reply to Objection 4: The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for
the offering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the
legal victims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to
eat with the poor, is increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded
us to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus,
according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms." Moreover the
tithes that are given to the ministers of the Church should be
dispensed by them for the use of the poor.
Reply to Objection 5: The ministers of the Church ought to be more
solicitous for the increase of spiritual goods in the people, than for
the amassing of temporal goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to
make use of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his livelihood
from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he should occasion a
hindrance to the Gospel of Christ [*1 Cor. 9:12]. Nor did they sin who
did not contribute to his upkeep, else the Apostle would not have
omitted to reprove them. In like manner the ministers of the Church
rightly refrain from demanding the Church's tithes, when they could not
demand them without scandal, on account of their having fallen into
desuetude, or for some other reason. Nevertheless those who do not give
tithes in places where the Church does not demand them are not in a
state of damnation, unless they be obstinate, and unwilling to pay even
if tithes were demanded of them.
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Whether men are bound to pay tithes of all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of all
things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the Old Law.
Now the Old Law contains no precept about personal tithes, viz. those
that are payable on property acquired by one's own act, for instance by
commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to pay tithes on such
things.
Objection 2: Further, it is not right to make oblations of that which
is ill-gotten, as stated above ([3050]Q[86], A[3]). Now oblations,
being offered to God immediately, seem to be more closely connected
with the divine worship than tithes which are offered to the ministers.
Therefore neither should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods.
Objection 3: Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus (30,32) the
precept of paying tithes refers only to "corn, fruits of trees" and
animals "that pass under the shepherd's rod." But man derives a revenue
from other smaller things, such as the herbs that grow in his garden
and so forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound to pay
tithes.
Objection 4: Further, man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a
man does not always remain in possession of all his profit from land
and stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery; sometimes
they are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes they are due
to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and wages due to
workmen. Therefore one ought not to pay tithes on such like things.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 28:22): "Of all things that Thou
shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee."
I answer that, In judging about a thing we should look to its
principle. Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt
whereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things,
according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:11), "If we have sown
unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal
things?" [thus implying that on the contrary "it is no great matter if
we reap your carnal things"] [*The phrase in the brackets is omitted in
the Leonine edition]. For this debt is the principle on which is based
the commandment of the Church about the payment of tithes. Now whatever
man possesses comes under the designation of carnal things. Therefore
tithes must be paid on whatever one possesses.
Reply to Objection 1: In accordance with the condition of that people
there was a special reason why the Old Law did not include a precept
about personal tithes; because, to wit, all the other tribes had
certain possessions wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient
livelihood for the Levites who had no possessions, but were not
forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations as the other
Jews did. On the other hand the people of the New Law are spread abroad
throughout the world, and many of them have no possessions, but live by
trade, and these would contribute nothing to the support of God's
ministers if they did not pay tithes on their trade profits. Moreover
the ministers of the New Law are more strictly forbidden to occupy
themselves in money-making trades, according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man
being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business."
Wherefore in the New Law men are bound to pay personal tithes,
according to the custom of their country and the needs of the
ministers: hence Augustine, whose words are quoted 16, qu. 1, cap.
Decimae, says [*Append. Serm. cclxxvii]: "Tithes must be paid on the
profits of soldiering, trade or craft."
Reply to Objection 2: Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because
the getting itself was unjust: such, for instance, are things gotten by
robbery, theft or usury: and these a man is bound to restore, and not
to pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought with the profits
of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce, because the
latter is not gotten usuriously but given by God. On the other hand
certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because they are gotten of a
shameful cause, for instance of whoredom or stage-playing, and the
like. Such things a man is not bound to restore, and consequently he is
bound to pay tithes on them in the same way as other personal tithes.
Nevertheless the Church must not accept the tithe so long as those
persons remain in sin, lest she appear to have a share in their sins:
but when they have done penance, tithes may be accepted from them on
these things.
Reply to Objection 3: Things directed to an end must be judged
according to their fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is
due not for its own sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose
dignity it is unbecoming that they should demand minute things with
careful exactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2). Hence the Old Law did not order the payment
of tithes on such like minute things, but left it to the judgment of
those who are willing to pay, because minute things are counted as
nothing. Wherefore the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect
justice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things: nor are
they reproved by our Lord on that account, but only because they
despised greater, i.e. spiritual, precepts; and rather did He show them
to be deserving of praise in this particular, when He said (Mat.
23:23): "These things you ought to have done," i.e. during the time of
the Law, according to Chrysostom's [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commentary. This also seems to
denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore now too men are
not bound to pay tithes on such minute things, except perhaps by reason
of the custom of one's country.
Reply to Objection 4: A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has
lost by theft or robbery, before he recovers his property: unless he
has incurred the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the
Church ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat that
has not been tithed, the Church can command the tithes due to her, both
from the buyer who has a thing due to the Church, and from the seller,
because so far as he is concerned he has defrauded the Church: yet if
one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on the fruits of the
earth, in so far as these fruits are the gift of God. Wherefore tithes
do not come under a tax, nor are they subject to workmen's wages. Hence
it is not right to deduct one's taxes and the wages paid to workmen,
before paying tithes: but tithes must be paid before anything else on
one's entire produce.
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Whether tithes should be paid to the clergy?
Objection 1: It would seem that tithes should not be paid to the
clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because
they had no portion in the people's possessions, according to Num.
18:23,24. But in the New Testament the clergy have possessions not only
ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover they receive
first-fruits, and oblations for the living and the dead. Therefore it
is unnecessary to pay tithes to them.
Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that a man dwells in one
parish, and farms in another; or a shepherd may take his flock within
the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the
bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the bounds
of another parish during the other part of the year; or he may have his
sheepfold in one parish, and graze the sheep in another. Now in all
these and similar cases it seems impossible to decide to which clergy
the tithes ought to be paid. Therefore it would seem that no fixed
tithe ought to be paid to the clergy.
Objection 3: Further, it is the general custom in certain countries for
the soldiers to hold the tithes from the Church in fee; and certain
religious receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only
to those of the clergy who have care of souls.
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 18:21): "I have given to the sons
of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the ministry
wherewith they serve Me in the Tabernacle." Now the clergy are the
successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament. Therefore tithes
are due to the clergy alone.
I answer that, Two things have to be considered with regard to tithes:
namely, the right to receive tithes, and the things given in the name
of tithes. The right to receive tithes is a spiritual thing, for it
arises from the debt in virtue of which the ministers of the altar have
a right to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal things are due
to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns none but the
clergy who have care of souls, and so they alone are competent to have
this right.
On the other hand the things given in the name of tithes are material,
wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and thus it is that they
fall into the hands of the laity.
Reply to Objection 1: In the Old Law, as stated above (A[1], ad 4),
special tithes were earmarked for the assistance of the poor. But in
the New Law the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own
support, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor.
Hence they are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations and
first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for this same purpose.
Reply to Objection 2: Personal tithes are due to the church in whose
parish a man dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to
belong to the church within whose bounds the land is situated. The law,
however, prescribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained for
a long time must be observed [*Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad apostolicae,
de Decimis, etc.]. The shepherd who grazes his flock at different
seasons in two parishes, should pay tithe proportionately to both
churches. And since the fruit of the flock is derived from the pasture,
the tithe of the flock is due to the church in whose lands the flock
grazes, rather than to the church on whose land the fold is situated.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the Church can hand over to a layman the
things she receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him
to receive tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being
reserved to the ministers of the Church. The motive may be either the
need of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers through
being granted to them in fee by the Church, or it may be the succoring
of the poor; thus certain tithes have been granted by way of alms to
certain lay religious, or to those that have no care of souls. Some
religious, however, are competent to receive tithes, because they have
care of souls.
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Whether the clergy also are bound to pay tithes?
Objection 1: It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes.
By common law [*Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc.] the parish church
should receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory. Now
it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands of their own on
the territory of some parish church, or that one church has
ecclesiastical property on the territory of another. Therefore it would
seem that the clergy are bound to pay predial tithes.
Objection 2: Further, some religious are clerics; and yet they are
bound to pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they
cultivate even with their own hands [*Cap. Ex parte, and Cap. Nuper.].
Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune from the payment
of tithes.
Objection 3: Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26,28), it
is prescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from the
people, but also that they should themselves pay tithes to the
high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the
Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to
the clergy.
Objection 4: Further, tithes should serve not only for the support of
the clergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore, if the
clergy are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the
latter is not true. Therefore the former is false.
On the contrary, A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: "It is
a new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the clergy"
[*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc.].
I answer that, The cause of giving cannot be the cause of receiving, as
neither can the cause of action be the cause of passion; yet it happens
that one and the same person is giver and receiver, even as agent and
patient, on account of different causes and from different points of
view. Now tithes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar
and sowers of spiritual things among the people. Wherefore those
members of the clergy as such, i.e. as having ecclesiastical property,
are not bound to pay tithes; whereas from some other cause through
holding property in their own right, either by inheriting it from their
kindred, or by purchase, or in any other similar manner, they are bound
to the payment of tithes.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy
like anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own lands to the
parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church,
because to possess a thing as one's private property is not the same as
possessing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even though
they be within the boundaries of another parish.
Reply to Objection 2: Religious who are clerics, if they have care of
souls, and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to
pay tithes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other
religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the
people; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay tithes,
but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions granted
by the Apostolic See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad audientiam,
de Decimis, etc.].
Reply to Objection 3: In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the
priests, and tithes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below
the priests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the
high-priest "the tenth part of the tenth" [*Num. 18:26] instead of
first-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now to
pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For natural
reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate of a
multitude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be able to
carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare.
Reply to Objection 4: Tithes should be employed for the assistance of
the poor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have
no reason for accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them.
__________________________________________________________________
SERVICE BY PROMISE (Q[88])
OF VOWS (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God. Under
this head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) What is a vow?
(2) What is the matter of a vow?
(3) Of the obligation of vows;
(4) Of the use of taking vows;
(5) Of what virtue is it an act?
(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than
without a vow?
(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;
(8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows?
(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?
(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?
(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of
continence?
(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation
from a vow?
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Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose
of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III,
xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], "a vow is a
conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind,
whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain
thing." But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may consist
in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere
purpose of the will.
Objection 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from
"voluntas" [will], for one is said to do a thing "proprio voto" [by
one's own vow] when one does it voluntarily. Now to "purpose" is an act
of the will, while to "promise" is an act of the reason. Therefore a
vow consists in a mere act of the will.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 9:62): "No man putting his
hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God."
Now from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts
his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from
his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. Therefore by a
mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even without making a
promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow consists in a mere
purpose of the will.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth Him." Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow is
a promise.
I answer that, A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular
thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise,
which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct.
For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what
others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is
to do for another. Now a promise between man and man can only be
expressed in words or any other outward signs; whereas a promise can be
made to God by the mere inward thought, since according to 1 Kings
16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the
heart." Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, either to arouse
ourselves, as was stated above with regard to prayer ([3051]Q[83],
A[12]), or to call others to witness, so that one may refrain from
breaking the vow, not only through fear of God, but also through
respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing
something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act
of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are essential to a vow:
the first is deliberation. the second is a purpose of the will; and the
third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow.
Sometimes, however, two other things are added as a sort of
confirmation of the vow, namely, pronouncement by word of mouth,
according to Ps. 65:13, "I will pay Thee my vows which my lips have
uttered"; and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master says (Sent.
iv, D, 38) that a vow is "the witnessing of a spontaneous promise and
ought to be made to God and about things relating to God": although the
"witnessing" may strictly refer to the inward protestation.
Reply to Objection 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed
by the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a
promise.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's will moves the reason to promise something
relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from
the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.
Reply to Objection 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does
something already; while he that merely purposes to do something does
nothing so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about
doing, although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that
puts his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he
stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a vow should always be about a better good?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a better
good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation. But vows
are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about matters of
salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil and his pomps,
and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye, and
pay to the Lord your God"; and Jacob vowed (Gn. 28:21) that the Lord
should be his God. Now this above all is necessary for salvation.
Therefore vows are not only about a better good.
Objection 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb. 11:32).
Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges 11).
Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better good,
but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not only
about a better good, but also about something unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or
that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good.
Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend
to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent matters
and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not always
about a better good.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 23:22): "If thou wilt not promise
thou shalt be without sin."
I answer that, As stated above [3052](A[1]), a vow is a promise made to
God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for
someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say that
one would do something against someone. In like manner it would be
futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore, as
every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God unless
it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or indifferent, but
only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow
denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity excludes voluntariness,
whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to be or not to be, can
nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be foolish to vow that one
would die or that one would not fly.
On the other hand, if a thing be necessary. not absolutely but on the
supposition of an end---for instance if salvation be unattainable
without it---it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done
voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it.
But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the
supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most
properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good in
comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation.
Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good.
Reply to Objection 1: Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the
faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these
things are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation.
The same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be
explained that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by
giving Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for
instance by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the
same passage.
Reply to Objection 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their
result; such are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking,
the matter of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as
those things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the
matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and as
such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result, in
which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of
Jephte, who as related in Judges 11:30,31, "made a vow to the Lord,
saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands,
whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and
shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a
holocaust to the Lord." For this could have an evil result if, as
indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be
unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome
says [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii:
Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist.
Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and
in keeping his vow he was wicked." Yet it is premised (Judges 11:29)
that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith and
devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy Ghost;
and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also by reason
of the victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that he
repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless foreshadowed something
good.
Reply to Objection 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance
by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it
is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due
discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening
nature. on this condition such things may be the matter of a vow. Hence
the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), "Present your bodies a living
sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," adds, "your reasonable service."
Since, however, man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning
himself, such vows as these are more fittingly kept or disregarded
according to the judgment of a superior, yet so that, should a man find
that without doubt he is seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and
should he be unable to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it.
As to vows about vain and useless things they should be ridiculed
rather than kept.
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Whether all vows are binding?
Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man needs
things that are done by another, more than God does, since He has no
need for our goods (Ps. 15:2). Now according to the prescription of
human laws [*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple promise made to a
man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed on account of the
changeableness of the human will. Much less binding therefore is a
simple promise made to God, which we call a vow.
Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now
sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either
because it depends on another's decision, as when, for instance, a man
vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive him: or
on account of some defect arising, for instance when a woman vows
virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a man vows to give a
sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always
binding.
Objection 3: Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so
at once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if
it be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore
a vow is not always binding.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3,4): "Whatsoever thou hast
vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not
to perform the things promised."
I answer that, For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's
promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. xxxii, 2: De Mendac.
xx] faith takes its name "from a man's deed agreeing with his word"
[*'Fides . . . fiunt dicta' Cicero gives the same etymology (De Offic.
i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all, both on account
of God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he has received from
God. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made to
God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God. On the other
hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon
gives the reason why vows should be paid to God, because "an unfaithful
. . . promise displeaseth Him" [*Eccles. 5:3].
Reply to Objection 1: Honesty demands that a man should keep any
promise he makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the
natural law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a
promise he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God
needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so
that a vow made to Him is most binding.
Reply to Objection 2: If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible
to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he
have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed
to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power to be
received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself to
enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this
particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most
agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received
there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal
intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life,
or to this particular place, because the one or the other pleases him
in some special way, he is not bound to enter another religious house,
if they are unwilling to receive him into this particular one. on the
other hand, if he be rendered incapable of fulfilling his vow through
his own fault, he is bound over and above to do penance for his past
fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards violated,
she is bound not only to observe what is in her power, namely,
perpetual continency, but also to repent of what she has lost by
sinning.
Reply to Objection 3: The obligation of a vow is caused by our own will
and intention, wherefore it is written (Dt. 23:23): "That which is once
gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast
promised to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will and
with thy own mouth." Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's
intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound
to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain
time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate
fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to
bind oneself, for it is written (Dt. 23:21): "When thou hast made a vow
to the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord
thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee
for a sin."
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Whether it is expedient to take vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is
not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God has
given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man is
liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in
a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take vows.
Objection 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But
whoever takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before
taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger
to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine
says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Since thou hast vowed, thou
hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what
thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou
not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good:
whereas now if thou breakest faith with God (which God forbid) thou art
the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hadst thou kept
thy vow." Therefore it is not expedient to take vows.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers
of me, as I also am of Christ." But we do not read that either Christ
or the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to
take vows.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye and pay to the Lord
your God."
I answer that, As stated above ([3053]AA[1],2), a vow is a promise made
to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God
under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own
profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and
that we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that
service: whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own
profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "He
is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our
payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him." And just as
what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since "what is given
Him is added to the giver," as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment.
et Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does
not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but it
conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills
immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to
take vows.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one
being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will
firmly fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God
and the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a
certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence,
Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that "happy is the
necessity that compels us to do the better things."
Reply to Objection 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this
deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a
tottering bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the
deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient
to mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the
horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that
may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles.
11:4): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that
considereth the clouds shall never reap." Now a man incurs danger, not
from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind by
breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et
Paulin.): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that
thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy
detriment."
Reply to Objection 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very
nature, to take a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man,
His will was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a "comprehensor."
By a kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps.
21:26): "I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when
He is speaking of His body, which is the Church.
The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the
state of perfection when "they left all things and followed Christ."
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Whether a vow is an act of latria or religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or
religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem to
pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a
vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially.
Objection 2: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs
to religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes
a vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it.
Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
Objection 3: Further, religious worship should be offered to none but
God. But a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and to
one's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their
profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 19:21): "(The Egyptians) shall
worship Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to
the Lord, and perform them." Now, the worship of God is properly the
act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or
religion.
I answer that, As stated above ([3054]Q[81], A[1], ad 1), every act of
virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as it
is directed to the reverence of God which is the proper end of latria.
Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the
commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the
direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the proper
act of latria.
Now, it is evident from what has been said above ([3055]AA[1],2) that a
vow is a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than a
directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise is
made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship or
service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is properly an
act of latria or religion.
Reply to Objection 1: The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of
another virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing
continency; while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a
sacrifice or praying. But promising either of them to God belongs to
religion, for the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some
vows belong to religion by reason only of the promise made to God,
which is the essence of a vow, while others belong thereto by reason
also of the thing promised, which is the matter of the vow.
Reply to Objection 2: He who promises something gives it already in as
far as he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made
when its cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in
its cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who
promises to give.
Reply to Objection 3: A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may
be made to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is fore
made to a man, may be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a
virtuous act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow
something to the saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made
to the saints or to one's superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far
as one vows to God to fulfil what one has promised to the saints or
one's superiors.
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Whether it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do something in
fulfilment of a vow, than without a vow?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and meritorious
to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow. Prosper says
(De Vita Contempl. ii): "We should abstain or fast without putting
ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that which we are free
to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." Now he who vows to
fast puts himself under the necessity of fasting. Therefore it would be
better for him to fast without taking the vow.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): "Everyone as he
hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for
God loveth a cheerful giver." Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they
have vowed: and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the
vow, for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to Metaph. v [*Ed.
Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a vow,
than in fulfilment of a vow.
Objection 3: Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the
will on that which is vowed, as stated above [3056](A[4]). But the will
cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that thing.
Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow than
without a vow.
On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye and pay,"
says: "Vows are counseled to the will." But a counsel is about none but
a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in fulfilment of a
vow than without a vow: since he that does it without a vow fulfils
only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it
with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to vow and the
counsel to do it.
I answer that, For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to
do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because to
vow, as stated above [3057](A[5]) is an act of religion which is the
chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the
better and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior
virtue is the better the more meritorious for being commanded by a
superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being commanded by it,
just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be commanded by
charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues (for instance,
fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being continent, which is
an act of chastity) are better and more meritorious, if they be done in
fulfilment of a vow, since thus they belong to the divine worship,
being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virg. viii)
that "not even is virginity honorable as such, but only when it is
consecrated to God, and cherished by godly continence."
Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects himself
to God more than he that only does it; for he subjects himself to God
not only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in future he
cannot do something else. Even so he gives more who gives the tree with
its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm [*Eadmer]
observes (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we thank even those who
promise, as stated above (A[5], ad 2).
Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do
anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the perfection
of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), just as to sin
with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is called a sin against
the Holy Ghost, as stated above ([3058]Q[14], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted should be understood as
referring to necessity of coercion which causes an act to be
involuntary and excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: "Lest that
which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." On
the other hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the
immobility of the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases
devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher, necessity of
coercion, in so far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But
the necessity resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in
so far as it strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence
Augustine says (Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): "Repent not of thy
vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what
thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment." If, however, the
very deed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and
involuntary after one has taken the vow, the will to fulfil it
remaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it were done
without the vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of religion
which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act.
Reply to Objection 3: He who does something without having vowed it has
an immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at
the time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether fixed
for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow: for the
latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did that
particular deed, and perchance to do it many times.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a vow is solemnized by the reception of holy orders, and by the
profession of a certain rule?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the
reception of holy orders and by the profession of a certain rule. As
stated above [3059](A[1]), a vow is a promise made to God. Now external
actions pertaining to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but to
men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and consequently
a solemnization of this kind is not a proper circumstance of a vow.
Objection 2: Further, whatever belongs to the condition of a thing,
would seem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now
many things may be the subject of a vow, which have no connection
either with holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man vows
a pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization
that takes place in the reception of holy orders or in the profession
of a certain rule does not belong to the condition of a vow.
Objection 3: Further, a solemn vow seems to be the same as a public
vow. Now many other vows may be made in public besides that which is
pronounced in receiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule;
which latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not only
these vows are solemn.
On the contrary, These vows alone are an impediment to the contract of
marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted, which is the effect
of a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third Part of this
work [*[3060]XP, Q[53], A[2]].
I answer that, The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on its
nature [conditio]: thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes the fact
in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and arms and a
concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in another way,
namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the gathering of
their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to God: wherefore, the
solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual pertaining to
God; i.e. in some spiritual blessing or consecration which, in
accordance with the institution of the apostles, is given when a man
makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the second degree
after the reception of holy orders, as Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier.
vi). The reason of this is that solemnization is not wont to be
employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to some particular
thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only when the marriage
is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom mutually deliver the
power over their bodies to one another. In like manner a vow is
solemnized when a man devotes himself to the divine ministry by
receiving holy orders, or embraces the state of perfection by
renouncing the world and his own will by the profession of a certain
rule.
Reply to Objection 1: This kind of solemnization regards not only men
but also God in so far as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration
or blessing, of which God is the author, though man is the minister,
according to Num. 6:27, "They shall invoke My name upon the children of
Israel, and I will bless them." Hence a solemn vow is more binding with
God than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more
grievously. When it is said that a simple vow is no less binding than a
solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either
commits a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not customary to solemnize particular acts,
but the embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a
man vows particular deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast,
such a vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as the vow
whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or
service: and yet many particular works are included under this vow as
under a universal.
Reply to Objection 3: Through being pronounced in public vows may have
a certain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as
the aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few
persons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who are subject to another's power are hindered from taking
vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another's
power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed
by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a
lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God.
Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered
from taking vows.
Objection 2: Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet
children may make religious profession even without the consent of
their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, through
being subject to another's power.
Objection 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who
are under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to
say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore
seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.
Objection 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But
subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this
forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.
On the contrary, It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow any
thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in age,"
she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the same is
said there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in
like manner other persons that are subject to another's power cannot
bind themselves by vow.
I answer that, As stated above [3061](A[1]), a vow is a promise made to
God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in
another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power.
Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is
subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it
depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent of
his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those matters
wherein he is subject to another.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject
of a promise made to God, as stated above [3062](A[2]). Now it is
contrary to virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to
another, as stated above (Q[86], A[3]). Hence the conditions necessary
for a vow are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's
power vows that which is in that other's power, except under the
condition that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.
Reply to Objection 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman
he is in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for
instance with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or
with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as
regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he
cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his
father.
A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his
personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since
this would withdraw him from his master's service.
Reply to Objection 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his
actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even
though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not
being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there is
no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a
religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does
the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his consent;
nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to
another's power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom
he is subject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood
to contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his
superior approve or do not gainsay it.
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Whether children can bind themselves by vow to enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by vow
to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind, it is
fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason. But
this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen. Therefore
just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to anything by vow,
so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves by vow to enter
religion.
Objection 2: Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be
annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or girl
before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or guardian
(20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or girl cannot
validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.
Objection 3: Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [*Ch.
58] and a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to
those who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation
of the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation,
for children to be bound by vow to enter religion.
On the contrary, That which is not done aright is invalid without being
annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even before
attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her
parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore even before
attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be bound by a
vow to enter religion.
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said above
[3063](A[7]), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as
stated in the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a
spiritual blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of
the Church, it follows that it comes under the Church's dispensation.
Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind,
whereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an
obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through defect
of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind themselves by
vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or imbecility.
Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to another's power,
as stated above [3064](A[8]). Now these two circumstances concur in
children before the age of puberty, because in most instances they are
lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under the care of their
parents, or guardians in place of their parents: wherefore in both
events their vows are without force. It happens, however, through a
natural disposition which is not subject to human laws, that the use of
reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said
to be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for this reason, exempt
in any way from the care of their parents; for this care is subject to
human law, which takes into account that which is of most frequent
occurrence.
Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the
years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise
bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of
reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their own
part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by their
parents, under whose care they are still subject.
Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of
puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account of
the Church's decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt.
ad Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But after the years
of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves by religious
vows, simple or solemn, without the consent of their parents.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument avails in the case of children who
have not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are
invalid, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The vows of persons subject to another's power
contain an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the
superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be
fulfilled, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows
which are taken in profession.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vows admit of dispensation?
Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation.
It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping it.
But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9,10, "A beast that
may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy, and
cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a worse for a
better." Much less, therefore, do vows admit of dispensation.
Objection 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters
concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially those
of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of God, which
is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a vow is a
matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine law, as shown
above [3065](A[3]), and belongs to the precepts of the First Table
since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of
dispensation.
Objection 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity
which a man owes to God, as stated above [3066](A[3]). But no man can
dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one
grant a dispensation from a vow.
On the contrary, That which proceeds from the common will of many has
apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the
individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its force
from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it
seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.
I answer that, The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same
sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law because, as
stated above ([3067]FS, Q[96], A[6]; [3068]FS, Q[97], A[4]), a law is
made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances.
But since, in certain cases this is not good, there is need for someone
to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be observed.
This is properly speaking to dispense in the law: for a dispensation
would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or application of some
common thing to those that are contained under it, in the same way as a
person is said to dispense food to a household.
In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it
were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the
majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some particular
case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a greater good:
and this is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a vow,
as is clear from what has been said above [3069](A[2]). Therefore it is
necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow is not to be
observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular vow is not
to be observed, this is called a "dispensation" from that vow; but if
some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which was to have been
observed, the vow is said to be "commuted." Hence it is less to commute
a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however, are in the power of
the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was
deemed holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow,
being, as it were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason
it could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange for
something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be already
consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house. On the other hand, an animal
that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful matter of a
sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law requires. Even
so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has intervened.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine
precept to fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to
obey the law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed
from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that
human law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the Divine
command; but it amounts to this---that what was law is not law in this
particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a dispensation, that
which was contained under a vow is by his authority no longer so
contained, in so far as he decides that in this case such and such a
thing is not fitting matter for a vow. Consequently when an
ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a vow, he does not
dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural or of the Divine
law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to which a man had bound
himself of his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider every
circumstance.
Reply to Objection 3: The fidelity we owe to God does not require that
we fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which
would be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation
from that vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not
contrary to the fidelity due to God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a
solemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a
dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good. But
a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle to a
greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the good of
an individual. Now one man's continency may be an obstacle to the good
of the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if certain
persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of their
country might be procured. Therefore it seems that it is possible to be
dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency.
Objection 2: Further, religion is a more excellent virtue than
chastity. Now if a man vows an act of religion, e.g. to offer sacrifice
to God he can be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he
be dispensed from the vow of continency which is about an act of
chastity.
Objection 3: Further, just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may
be a source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a
vow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be
dispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body.
Therefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of
continency.
Objection 4: Further, just as the vow of continency is part of the
religious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the
vows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed from
the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who are
appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems that it
is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of
a continent soul."
Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach.) at the end of the Decretal, Cum ad
Monasterium it is stated that the "renouncing of property, like the
keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that not
even the Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance."
I answer that, Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of
continency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency; secondly,
the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds himself by vow
to the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the solemnity of the
vow. Accordingly, some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III. vii. 1, qu.
5] say that the solemn vow cannot be a matter of dispensation, on
account of the continency itself for which no worthy price can be
found, as is stated by the authority quoted above. The reason for this
is assigned by some to the fact that by continency man overcomes a foe
within himself, or to the fact that by continency man is perfectly
conformed to Christ in respect of purity of both body and soul. But
this reason does not seem to be cogent since the goods of the soul,
such as contemplation and prayer, far surpass the goods of the body and
still more conform us to God, and yet one may be dispensed from a vow
of prayer or contemplation. Therefore, continency itself absolutely
considered seems no reason why the solemn vow thereof cannot be a
matter of dispensation; especially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor.
7:34) exhorts us to be continent on account of contemplation, when he
says that the unmarried woman . . . "thinketh on the things of God
[Vulg.: 'the Lord']," and since the end is of more account than the
means.
Consequently others [*Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38] find the reason
for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow. For they
assert that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by something
altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any vow. But this
is evidently false, because just as the practice of carnal intercourse
is contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or drinking wine contrary
to abstinence from such things, and yet these latter vows may be a
matter for dispensation.
For this reason others [*Innocent IV, on the above decretal] maintain
that one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for the
sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the example
given above (OBJ[1]), of a country being restored to peace through a
certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal quoted says
explicitly that "not even the Sovereign Pontiff can dispense a monk
from keeping chastity," it follows seemingly, that we must maintain
that, as stated above (A[10], ad 1; cf.Lev. 27:9, 10, 28), whatsoever
has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to any other use.
For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is sanctified to lose
its consecration, not even though it be something inanimate, for
instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated, so long as it
remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate make a man that is
consecrated to God cease to be consecrated, so long as he lives. Now
the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of consecration or blessing
of the person who takes the vow, as stated above [3070](A[7]). Hence no
prelate of the Church can make a man, who has pronounced a solemn vow,
to be quit of that to which he was consecrated, e.g. one who is a
priest, to be a priest no more, although a prelate may, for some
particular reason, inhibit him from exercising his order. In like
manner the Pope cannot make a man who has made his religious profession
cease to be a religious, although certain jurists have ignorantly held
the contrary.
We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up
with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized. because if not, the
solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of
continency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that for
which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing continency
is connected with Holy orders, not essentially but by the institution
of the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can grant a
dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the reception of
Holy Orders. on the other hand the obligation of observing; continency
is an essential condition of the religious state, whereby a man
renounces the world and binds himself wholly to God's service, for this
is incompatible with matrimony, in which state a man is under the
obligation of taking to himself a wife, of begetting children, of
looking after his household, and of procuring whatever is necessary for
these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:33) that "he that
is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may
please his wife; and he is divided." Hence the "monk" takes his name
from "unity" [*The Greek {monos}] in contrast with this division. For
this reason the Church cannot dispense from a vow solemnized by the
religious profession; and the reason assigned by the Decretal is
because "chastity is bound up with the monastic rule."
Reply to Objection 1: Perils occasioned by human affairs should be
obviated by human means, not by turning divine things to a human use.
Now a professed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so
he must not be called back to the human life on the pretext of any
human contingency.
Reply to Objection 2: A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of
dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal
abstinence. But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a vow
of continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being an act
of chastity, but because through the religious profession it is already
an act of religion.
Reply to Objection 3: Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the
person, therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger
to the person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of
dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly ordered
to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore to
abstain from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the
person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the
person, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance
by abstinence, or other corporal remedies.
Reply to Objection 4: A religious who is made a bishop is no more
absolved from his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since
he must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the
dispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither is
he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he is
not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as the abbot of a
monastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of obedience.
The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary
sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the of
the flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency, which
is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares (De
Sanct. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly "of a continent
soul," not "of a continent body."
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Whether the authority of a prelate is required for commutation or the
dispensation of a vow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not
required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may
enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by
entering religion one is absolved from the vows he made in the world,
even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [*Cap.
Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.]. Therefore the commutation or
dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior
prelate.
Objection 2: Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in
deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the
prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does
not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a
dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows,
as stated above (A[10], ad 2; A[11]). Likewise, when anyone rightly
determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be
kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if it
have an evil result (A[2], ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a prelate
is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow.
Objection 3: Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant
dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all
prelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow.
Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense from
vows.
On the contrary, A vow binds one to do something, even as a law does.
Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation from a
precept of the law, as stated above ([3071]FS, Q[96], A[6]; [3072]FS,
Q[97], A[4]). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from
a vow.
I answer that, As stated above ([3073]AA[1],2), a vow is a promise made
to God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise something
to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what you
promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place. Therefore
a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the authority of a
prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable to God,
according to 2 Cor. 2:10: "For . . . have pardoned . . . for your sakes
. . . in the person of Christ." And he says significantly "for your
sakes," since whenever we ask a prelate for a dispensation we should do
so to honor Christ in Whose person he dispenses, or to promote the
interests of the Church which is His Body.
Reply to Objection 1: All other vows are about some particular works,
whereas by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's
service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a
Decretal [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.] says that "a man
is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for the
perpetual service of religion." And yet a man who enters religion is
not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or the
like, which he made when in the world, because by entering religion he
dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the religious life
that each one should have his own observances, and because the burden
of religion is onerous enough without requiring the addition of other
burdens.
Reply to Objection 2: Some have held that prelates can dispense from
vows at their will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a
condition that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated
above [3074](A[8]) that the vow of a subject, e.g. of a slave or a son,
supposes this condition, if "the father or master consent," or "does
not dissent." And thus a subject might break his vow without any
remorse of conscience, whenever his superior tells him to.
But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual
prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given "unto
edification, not for destruction" (2 Cor. 10:8), and consequently, just
as he cannot command that which is in itself displeasing to God,
namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in itself pleasing to
God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely speaking man can vow
them. But it does belong to a prelate to decide what is the more
virtuous and the more acceptable to God. Consequently in matters
presenting no difficulty, the prelate's dispensation would not excuse
one from sin: for instance, if a prelate were to dispense a person from
a vow to enter the religious life, without any apparent cause to
prevent him from fulfilling his vow. But if some cause were to appear,
giving rise, at least, to doubt, he could hold to the prelate's
decision whether of commutation or of dispensation. He could not,
however, follow his own judgment in the matter, because he does not
stand in the place of God; except perhaps in the case when the thing he
has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he is unable to have recourse to the
prelate.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of
Christ throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of
dispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and
inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those vows
that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in order
that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the vows of
pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et Voti redempt.), fasting and
the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the
Sovereign Pontiff [*Cap. Ex multa].
__________________________________________________________________
OF OATHS (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby something
Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or the Name of
God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament will be in the
Third Part of this work: of the taking of God's Name we shall treat
now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways. First, by way of
oath in order to confirm one's own assertion: secondly, by way of
adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of invocation
for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must first treat of
oaths: and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is an oath?
(2) Whether it is lawful?
(3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath?
(4) Of what virtue is it an act?
(5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as
something useful and good?
(6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature?
(7) Whether an oath is binding?
(8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow?
(9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation?
(10) Who may lawfully swear, and when?
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Whether to swear is to call God to witness?
Objection 1: It would seem that to swear is not to call God to witness.
Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to witness, since
it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if to swear is to
call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of Holy Writ would
swear. But this is false Therefore the antecedent is false also.
Objection 2: Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling
him to witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him for it
is written (Mat. 5:33): "Thou shall pay [Douay: 'perform'] thy oaths to
the Lord"; and Augustine says [*Serm. clxxx] that to swear [jurare] is
"to pay the right [jus reddere] of truth to God." Therefore to swear is
not to call God to witness.
Objection 3: Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a
witness, as shown above (QQ[67],70). Now sometimes a man, by swearing,
implores the Divine judgment, according to Ps. 7:5, "If I have rendered
to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before my
enemies." Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm. clxxx):
"When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that God is his
witness?"
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), oaths are taken for the
purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive
confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known
naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts
regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore
propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by
witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such matters
for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth, for many
give way to lying, according to Ps. 16:10, "Their mouth hath spoken
lies [Vulg.: 'proudly']." Secondly, on account of this lack of
knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret thoughts,
nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things, and our
everyday life requires that we should have some certitude about them.
Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for neither can
God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness is
named "jurare" [to swear] because it is established as though it were a
principle of law [jure] that what a man asserts under the invocation of
God as His witness should be accepted as true. Now sometimes God is
called to witness when we assert present or past events, and this is
termed a "declaratory oath"; while sometimes God is called to witness
in confirmation of something future, and this is termed a "promissory
oath." But oaths are not employed in order to substantiate necessary
matters, and such as come under the investigation of reason; for it
would seem absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one's
point by an oath.
Reply to Objection 1: It is one thing to employ a Divine witness
already given, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and
another to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he
performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he
calls upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal
knowledge and unerring truth.
Reply to Objection 3: A person is called to give witness, in order that
he may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two
ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or
not. In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward
inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what
was hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the lying witness, and
then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar He
makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple
contestation of God, as when a man says "God is my witness," or, "I
speak before God," or, "By God," which has the same meaning, as
Augustine states [*See argument On the contrary]; the other is by
cursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to
punishment if what is alleged be not true.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to swear?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing
forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden (Mat.
5:34), "But I say to you not to swear at all"; and (James 5:12), "Above
all things, my brethren, swear not." Therefore swearing is unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful,
because according to Mat. 7:18, "neither can an evil tree bring forth
good fruit." Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written (Mat.
5:37): "But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that which is
over and above these is of evil." Therefore swearing is apparently
unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt
God, and this is altogether unlawful, according to Dt. 6:16, "Thou
shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." Now he that swears seems to seek a
sign of Divine Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this
must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is
altogether unlawful.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord
thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name."
I answer that, Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and yet
becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof unbecomingly:
thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that receives it
"unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself" (1 Cor. 11:29).
Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be stated that
an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is proved from its
origin and from its end. From its origin, because swearing owes its
introduction to the faith whereby man believes that God possesses
unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of all things: and
from its end, since oaths are employed in order to justify men, and to
put an end to controversy (Heb. 6:16).
Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of it,
that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if a man
calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would seemingly
prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he would not
treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of
committing perjury, because man easily offends in words, according to
James 3:2, "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man."
Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:9): "Let not thy mouth be
accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls."
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome, commenting on Mat. 5:34, says: "Observe
that our Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and
earth. For it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of
swearing by the elements." Yet this answer does not suffice, because
James adds, "nor by any other oath." Wherefore we must reply that, as
Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), "when the Apostle employs an oath in
his epistles, he shows how we are to understand the saying, 'I say to
you, not to swear at all'; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear
easily and from swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from
swearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he swore
only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids hasty
words."
Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i.
17): "If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the
infirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an
evil. Accordingly He did not say: 'That which is over and above is
evil,' but 'is of evil.' For you do no evil; since you make good use of
swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: yet it 'comes of
the evil' of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to swear."
Reply to Objection 3: He who swears tempts not God, because it is not
without usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine
assistance. Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be
unwilling to bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear
witness at some future time, when He "will bring to light the hidden
things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts" (1
Cor. 4:5). And this witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither
for nor against him.
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Whether three accompanying conditions of an oath are suitably assigned,
namely, justice, judgment, and truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are
unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things
should not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the other.
Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a part of
justice, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and judgment is
an act of justice, as stated above ([3075]Q[60], A[1]). Therefore the
three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably assigned.
Objection 2: Further, many other things are required for an oath,
namely, devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all
things and cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath
are insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed:
since he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without
judgment, according to 1 Tim. 5:21, "Do nothing without prejudice,"
i.e. without previous judgment [*Vulg.: 'Observe these things without
prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side.']. Therefore
these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with
other human actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 4:2): "Thou shalt swear: As the
Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice": which words
Jerome expounds, saying: "Observe that an oath must be accompanied by
these conditions, truth, judgment and justice."
I answer that, As stated above [3076](A[2]), an oath is not good except
for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for
the good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous, but
for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires judgment or
discretion on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as regards
the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be neither false, nor
unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that one employ an oath in
order to confirm what is true, and justice, so that one confirm what is
lawful. A rash oath lacks judgment, a false oath lacks truth, and a
wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice.
Reply to Objection 1: Judgment does not signify here the execution of
justice, but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is truth
here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition of
speech.
Reply to Objection 2: Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for
the right manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two
regard the things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that
justice regards the reason for swearing.
Reply to Objection 3: There is great danger in swearing, both on
account of the greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and
on account of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are
confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an
oath than for other human actions.
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Whether an oath is an act of religion or latria?
Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or
latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths
are employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle declares
(Heb. 6:16). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers nothing
to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an
act of religion or latria.
Objection 3: Further, the end of religion or latria is to show
reverence to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the
confirmation of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of
religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord
thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His name."
Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is
an act of religion.
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above [3077](A[1]),
he that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says.
Now nothing is confirmed save by what is more certain and more
powerful. Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he
acknowledges God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth
and His universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to
God. For this reason the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16) that "men swear by
one greater than themselves," and Jerome commenting on Mat. 5:34, says
that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he
swears." The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that "to swear is
to give very great honor." Now to show reverence to God belongs to
religion or latria. wherefore it is evident that an oath is an act of
religion or latria.
Reply to Objection 1: Two things may be observed in an oath. The
witness adduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or
that which makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human.
Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, and
not of the latter.
Reply to Objection 2: In the very fact that a man takes God as witness
by way of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains
to the reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God,
namely, reverence and honor.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of
God: wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man,
we show reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in
God's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since God
also works for His own glory and for our good.
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Whether oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful
and good?
Objection 1: It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used
frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of
religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious to
do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated above
([3078]Q[88], A[5]). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a
thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are
desirable as being good essentially.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome, commenting on Mat. 5:34, says that "he
who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." Now
reverence and love of God are desirable as something good essentially.
Therefore swearing is also.
Objection 3: Further, swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming
or assuring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion.
Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 23:12): "A man that sweareth
much shall be filled with iniquity": and Augustine says (De Mendacio
xv) that "the Lord forbade swearing, in order that for your own part
you might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking occasions of
swearing, as though it were a good thing."
I answer that, Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an infirmity
or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are desirable for
their own sake, but among those that are necessary: this is clear in
the case of medicine which is required as a remedy for sickness. Now an
oath is required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some man's lack of
belief in another man. Wherefore an oath is not to be reckoned among
those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those
that are necessary for this life; and such things are used unduly
whenever they are used outside the bounds of necessity. For this reason
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17): "He who understands that
swearing is not to be held as a good thing," i.e. desirable for its own
sake, "restrains himself as far as he can from uttering oaths, unless
there be urgent need."
Reply to Objection 1: There is no parity between a vow and an oath:
because by a vow we direct something to the honor of God, so that for
this very reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an
oath reverence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a
promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason,
become an act of religion, since moral acts take their species from the
end.
Reply to Objection 2: He who swears does indeed make use of his
reverence or love for the person by whom he swears: he does not,
however, direct his oath to the reverence or love of that person, but
to something else that is necessary for the present life.
Reply to Objection 3: Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and
yet, the stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken
unduly, so too an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet
the greater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless
it be employed aright; for, as it is written (Ecclus. 23:13), "if he
make it void," i.e. if he deceive his brother, "his sin shall be upon
him: and if he dissemble it," by swearing falsely, and with
dissimulation, "he offendeth double," [because, to wit, "pretended
equity is a twofold iniquity," as Augustine [*Enarr. in Ps. lxiii, 7]
declares]: "and if he swear in vain," i.e. without due cause and
necessity, "he shall not be justified."
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Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by creatures.
It is written (Mat. 5:34-36): "I say to you not to swear at all,
neither by heaven . . . nor by the earth . . . nor by Jerusalem . . .
nor by thy head": and Jerome, expounding these words, says: "Observe
that the Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but by heaven and
earth," etc.
Objection 2: Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now a
punishment is appointed for one who swears by creatures: for it is
written (22, qu. i, can. Clericum): "If a cleric swears by creatures he
must be very severely rebuked: and if he shall persist in this vicious
habit we wish that he be excommunicated." Therefore it is unlawful to
swear by creatures.
Objection 3: Further, an oath is an act of religion, as stated above
[3079](A[4]). But religious worship is not due to any creature,
according to Rom. 1:23, 25. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a
creature.
On the contrary, Joseph swore "by the health of Pharaoh" (Gn. 42:16).
Moreover it is customary to swear by the Gospel, by relics, and by the
saints.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), there are two kinds of
oath. One is uttered a simple contestation or calling God as witness:
and this kind of oath, like faith, is based on God's truth. Now faith
is essentially and chiefly about God Who is the very truth, and
secondarily about creatures in which God's truth is reflected, as
stated above ([3080]Q[1], A[1]). In like manner an oath is chiefly
referred to God Whose testimony is invoked; and secondarily an appeal
by oath is made to certain creatures considered, not in themselves, but
as reflecting the Divine truth. Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e. by
God Whose truth is made known in the Gospel; and by the saints who
believed this truth and kept it.
The other way of swearing is by cursing and in this kind of oath a
creature is adduced that the judgment of God may be wrought therein.
Thus a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some
other thing that he loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Cor. 1:23),
saying: "I call God to witness upon my soul."
As to Joseph's oath by the health of Pharaoh this may be understood in
both ways: either by way of a curse, as though he pledged Pharao's
health to God; or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to the
truth of God's justice which the princes of the earth are appointed to
execute.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures so as
to give them the reverence due to God. Hence Jerome adds that "the
Jews, through swearing by the angels and the like, worshipped creatures
with a Divine honor."
In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the canons (22,
qu. i, can. Clericum, OBJ[2]), for swearing by a creature, for this
savors of the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter, it is
said: "If any one swears by God's hair or head, or otherwise utter
blasphemy against God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be
degraded."
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Religious worship is shown to one whose testimony
is invoked by oath: hence the prohibition (Ex. 23:13): "By the name of
strange gods you shall not swear." But religious worship is not given
to creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned above.
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Whether an oath has a binding force?
Objection 1: It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath
is employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when a
person makes an assertion about the future his assertion is true,
though it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Cor. 1:15, seqq.)
though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 Cor. 16:5).
Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue (Categ. viii,
22). Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above [3081](A[4]). But
it would sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if
one were to fulfil what one has sworn to do: for instance, if one were
to swear to commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action.
Therefore an oath is not always binding.
Objection 3: Further, sometimes a man is compelled against his will to
promise something under oath. Now, "such a person is loosed by the
Roman Pontiffs from the bond of his oath" (Extra, De Jurejur., cap.
Verum in ea quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding.
Objection 4: Further, no person can be under two opposite obligations.
Yet sometimes the person who swears and the person to whom he swears
have opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:33): "Thou shalt perform thy
oaths to the Lord."
I answer that, An obligation implies something to be done or omitted;
so that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath (which is
about something present or past), nor such oaths as are about something
to be effected by some other cause (as, for example, if one were to
swear that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as are about things
to be done by the person who swears.
Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the
present, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath which is about
something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a difference:
since, in the oath that is about the past or present, this obligation
affects, not the thing that already has been or is, but the action of
the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what is or was already
true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is made about
something to be done by us, the obligation falls on the thing
guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he has sworn,
else his oath lacks truth.
Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is
lacking in judgment of discretion: unless perchance what was possible
when he swore become impossible to him through some mishap. as when a
man swore to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from him
by force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from fulfilling
his oath, although he is bound to do what he can, as, in fact, we have
already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow ([3082]Q[88],
A[3], ad 2). If, on the other hand, it be something that he can do, but
ought not to, either because it is essentially evil, or because it is a
hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in justice: wherefore an
oath must not be kept when it involves a sin or a hindrance to good.
For in either case "its result is evil" [*Cf. Bede, Homil. xix, in
Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.]
Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is
bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always
that the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely, judgment
and justice.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not the same with a simple assertion, and
with an oath wherein God is called to witness: because it suffices for
the truth of an assertion, that a person say what he proposes to do,
since it is already true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the doer.
But an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about which one is
firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man employ an oath, he is
bound, as far as he can, to make true what he has sworn, through
reverence of the Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to an evil
result, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways.
First, because from the very outset it has an evil result, either
through being evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to
commit adultery), or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if
a man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric,
or that he would not accept a prelacy, supposing it would be expedient
for him to accept, or in similar cases. For oaths of this kind are
unlawful from the outset: yet with a difference: because if a man swear
to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in keeping his oath:
whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater good, which he is not
bound to do withal, he sins indeed in swearing (through placing an
obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is the inspirer of good purposes), yet
he does not sin in keeping his oath, though he does much better if he
does not keep it.
Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and
unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who swore to
the damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she
would ask of him. For this oath could be lawful from the outset,
supposing it to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the damsel
asked what it was right to grant. but the fulfilment of the oath was
unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 50): "Sometimes it is
wrong to fulfil a promise, and to keep an oath; as Herod, who granted
the slaying of John, rather than refuse what he had promised."
Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold obligation in the oath which a
man takes under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the person
to whom he promises something; and this obligation is cancelled by the
compulsion, because he that used force deserves that the promise made
to him should not be kept. The other is an obligation whereby a man is
beholden to God, in virtue of which he is bound to fulfil what he has
promised in His name. This obligation is not removed in the tribunal of
conscience, because that man ought rather to suffer temporal loss, than
violate his oath. He can, however, seek in a court of justice to
recover what he has paid, or denounce the matter to his superior even
if he has sworn to the contrary, because such an oath would lead to
evil results since it would be contrary to public justice. The Roman
Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of this kind, did not pronounce
such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed the obligation for some just
cause.
Reply to Objection 4: When the intention of the swearer is not the same
as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due to the
swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the sound
understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence Isidore
says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): "However artful a man may be in wording
his oath, God Who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as
understood by the person to whom it is made." And that this refers to
the deceitful oath is clear from what follows: "He is doubly guilty who
both takes God's name in vain, and tricks his neighbor by guile." If,
however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with his
own intention. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 7): "The human ear
takes such like words in their natural outward sense, but the Divine
judgment interprets them according to our inward intention."
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Whether an oath is more binding than a vow?
Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A
vow is a simple promise: whereas an oath includes, besides a promise,
an appeal to God as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a
vow.
Objection 2: Further, the weaker is wont to be confirmed by the
stronger. Now a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an
oath is stronger than a vow.
Objection 3: Further, the obligation of a vow arises from the
deliberation of the mind, a stated above ([3083]Q[88], A[1]); while the
obligation of an oath results from the truth of God Whose testimony is
invoked. Since therefore God's truth is something greater than human
deliberation, it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than
that of a vow.
On the contrary, A vow binds one to God while an oath sometimes binds
one to man. Now one is more bound to God than to man. Therefore a vow
is more binding than an oath.
I answer that, The obligation both of vow and of an oath arises from
something Divine; but in different ways. For the obligation of a vow
arises from the fidelity we owe God, which binds us to fulfil our
promises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises
from the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we
promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes an
irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity of a subject to
his lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by its
very nature is more binding than an oath.
Reply to Objection 1: A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise
made to God; and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous.
Reply to Objection 2: An oath is added to a vow not because it is more
stable, but because greater stability results from "two immutable
things" [*Heb. 6:18].
Reply to Objection 3: Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its
stability, on the part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a
greater cause of stability on the part of God, to Whom the vow is
offered.
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Whether anyone can dispense from an oath?
Objection 1: It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath. Just
as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the past or
the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath, which is
about the future. Now no one can dispense a man from swearing to the
truth about present or past things. Therefore neither can anyone
dispense a man from making truth that which he has promised by oath to
do in the future.
Objection 2: Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the
person to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot release
the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the reverence of
God. Much less therefore can a dispensation from this oath be granted
by anyone.
Objection 3: Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow,
except certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above
([3084]Q[88], A[12], ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits
of dispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet
seemingly this is to be against the law [*Caus. XV, qu. 6, can.
Auctoritatem, seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando]. Therefore it would
seem that an oath does not admit of dispensation.
On the contrary, A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated above
[3085](A[8]). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath
does also.
I answer that, As stated above ([3086]Q[88], A[10]), the necessity of a
dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact that
something which is useful and morally good in itself and considered in
general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular
emergency: and such a case comes under neither law nor vow. Now
anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with the matter of an
oath: for if it be morally evil it is opposed to justice, and if it be
hurtful it is contrary to judgment. Therefore an oath likewise admits
of dispensation.
Reply to Objection 1: A dispensation from an oath does not imply a
permission to do anything against the oath: for this is impossible,
since the keeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does
not admit of dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under
an oath no longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath,
just as we have said with regard to vows ([3087]Q[88], A[10], ad 2).
Now the matter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or
present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become
unchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter but
the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be
directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the matter
of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of change, so
that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful or hurtful,
and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a promissory oath
admits of dispensation, since such dispensation regards the matter of
an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine precept about the keeping of
oaths.
Reply to Objection 2: One man may promise something under oath to
another in two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit:
for instance, if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and
from such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made
it: for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when
he acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises
another something pertaining to God's honor or to the benefit of
others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he will
enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this case the
person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made the
promise, because it was made principally not to him but to God: unless
perchance it included some condition, for instance, "provided he give
his consent" or some such like condition.
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes that which is made the matter of a
promissory oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is
a sin, as when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an
obstacle to a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter a
religion: and such an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former
case a man is bound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is
lawful for him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (A[7],
ad 2). Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong,
useful or harmful, either in itself or under the circumstance. In this
case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is
promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of
this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation, when
there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in which
case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope,
who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute relaxation,
for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all matters regarding
the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to
any man to cancel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that
come under his authority: for instance, a father may annul his
daughter's oath, and a husband his wife's (Num. 30:6, seqq.), as stated
above with regard to vows ([3088]Q[88], AA[8],9).
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Whether an oath is voided by a condition of person or time?
Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of
person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Heb. 6:16), is
employed for the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to anyone
to confirm his assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would seem that
an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time.
Objection 2: Further, to swear by God is more than to swear by the
Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "If there is a reason
for swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great thing
to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be said:
Nonsense! the Scriptures were made for God's sake, not God for the sake
of the Scriptures." Now men of all conditions and at all times are wont
to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to swear by the
Gospels.
Objection 3: Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary
causes, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are
debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children,
for instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have already
committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person ought not to
be debarred from swearing either on account of his dignity, as clerics,
or on account of the solemnity of the time.
Objection 4: Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity
to an angel: for it is written (Mat. 11:11) that "he that is the lesser
in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he," namely than John the
Baptist, while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it
is written (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel "swore by Him that liveth for
ever and ever." Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing, on
account of his dignity.
On the contrary, It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter): "Let
a priest be examined 'by his sacred consecration,' instead of being put
on his oath": and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): "Let no one in
ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman."
I answer that, Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is on
the part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect we
should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason children
before the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths [*Caus. XXII,
qu. 5, can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear, because they
have not yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as to be able to
take a oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are debarred from taking
an oath, because it is presumed from their antecedents that they will
not treat an oath with the reverence due to it. For this same reason,
in order that oaths might be treated with due reverence the law says
(22, qu. v, can. Honestum): "It is becoming that he who ventures to
swear on holy things should do so fasting, with all propriety and fear
of God."
The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose
assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man's assertion needs no
confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates
from a person's dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what
he says, wherefore "it becomes not persons of great dignity to swear."
For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter) that
"priests should not swear for trifling reasons." Nevertheless it is
lawful for them to swear if there be need for it, or if great good may
result therefrom. Especially is this the case in spiritual affairs,
when moreover it is becoming that they should take oath on days of
solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves to spiritual
matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths temporal matters,
except perhaps in cases grave necessity.
Reply to Objection 1: Some are unable to confirm their own assertions
on account of their own defect: and some there are whose words should
be so certain that they need no confirmation.
Reply to Objection 2: The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and
the more binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states
(Ad Public., Ep. xlvii): and accordingly is a graver matter to swear by
God than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account of
the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might be
taken with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by God frivolously
and without deliberation.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out
of contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this
way that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great
authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are of
such little authority that their oaths have no standing.
Reply to Objection 4: The angel's oath is adduced not on account of any
defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word,
but in order to show that the statement made issues from God's
infallible disposition. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by
Scripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of His
word, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:17).
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OF THE TAKING OF GOD'S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the taking of God's name by way of adjuration:
under which head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?
(2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?
(3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?
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Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man.
Origen says (Tract. xxxv super Matth.): "I deem that a man who wishes
to live according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For if,
according to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to swear, it
is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and consequently it is
manifest that the high-priest unlawfully adjured Jesus by the living
God."
Objection 2: Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a
fashion. But it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore
seemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man.
Objection 3: Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it
belongs to man's superior to induce him to swear, for the superior
imposes an oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure their
superiors.
On the contrary, Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain holy
things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful "by the mercy of God"
(Rom. 12:1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration. Therefore it is
lawful to adjure.
I answer that, A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his
reverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of his
promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so orders
himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man can order
himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others, by
beseeching his superiors, or by commanding his inferiors, as stated
above ([3089]Q[83], A[1]). Accordingly when either of these orderings
is confirmed by something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet there is this
difference between them, that man is master of his own actions but not
of those of others; wherefore he can put himself under an obligation by
invoking the Divine name, whereas he cannot put others under such an
obligation unless they be his subjects, whom he can compel on the
strength of the oath they have taken.
Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing,
intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an
obligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind
himself by oath, such an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps over
another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their
inferiors by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it.
If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name or
of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without
putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully
employed in respect of anyone.
Reply to Objection 1: Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man
intends to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he would
bind himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to adjure
our Lord Jesus Christ [*Mat. 26:63].
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the adjuration which
imposes an obligation.
Reply to Objection 3: To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to
employ terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a
certain thing.
Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we
adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence
for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of
God Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through
His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness.
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Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says
(Tract. xxxv, super Matth.): "To adjure the demons is not accordance
with the power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice."
Now rather than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the power
given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.
Objection 2: Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when
invoking the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration.
Therefore, if it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make
use of necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore
the antecedent is false also.
Objection 3: Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact
associates himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship
with the demons, according to 1 Cor. 10:20, "I would not that you
should be made partakers with devils." Therefore it is not lawful to
adjure the demons.
On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:17): "In My name they shall cast
out devils." Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the sake of
God's name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons.
I answer that, As stated in the preceding article, there are two ways
of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through reverence of
some holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. In the first way it is
not lawful to adjure the demons because such a way seems to savor of
benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear towards the
demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which is by compulsion, we
may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not for others. For during
the course of this life the demons are our adversaries: and their
actions are not subject to our disposal but to that of God and the holy
angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), "the rebel spirit
is ruled by the just spirit." Accordingly we may repulse the demons, as
being our enemies, by adjuring them through the power of God's name,
lest they do us harm of soul or body, in accord with the Divine power
given by Christ, as recorded by Lk. 10:19: "Behold, I have given you
power to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and upon all the power of
the enemy: and nothing shall hurt you."
It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning
something from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this
would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when
certain holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use of
the demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we read of
the Blessed James [*the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist. Certam.
Apost. vi, 19] that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to him, by the
instrumentality of the demons.
Reply to Objection 1: Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not
authoritatively by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly
appeal.
Reply to Objection 2: Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in
order to obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as
stated above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord's words to
the unclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), "Speak no more, and go out of the man,"
says: "A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the
demons, however much they speak the truth."
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the adjuration whereby
the demon's help is besought in doing or learning something: for this
savors of fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the
demons by adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.
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Whether it is lawful to adjure an irrational creature?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.
An adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to
one that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore it
is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible,
swearing is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an
irrational creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ
adjuration towards one.
Objection 3: Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained
above ([3090]AA[1],2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be
employed towards irrational creatures, since they are not masters of
their own actions. The other kind of adjuration is by way of
compulsion: and, seemingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards
them, because we have not the power to command irrational creatures,
but only He of Whom it was said (Mat. 8:27): "For the winds and the sea
obey Him." Therefore in no way, apparently, is it lawful to adjure
irrational creatures.
On the contrary, Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons and
to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [*From the
apocryphal Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19.]
I answer that, Irrational creatures are directed to their own actions
by some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and moved is
also the action of the director and mover: thus the movement of the
arrow is an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation of the
irrational creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and chiefly to
God, Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also ascribed to
the devil, who, by God's permission, makes use of irrational creatures
in order to inflict harm on man.
Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two
kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational
creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an
irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director
and mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of
this kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to
God, and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God:
secondly, by way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses
the irrational creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration
used in the exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons is
expelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to adjure
the demons by beseeching them to help us.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF PRAISE
(TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of
invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken
(Q[83] ). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there
are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God should be praised with the lips?
(2) Whether God should be praised with song?
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Whether God should be praised with the lips?
Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with the
lips. The Philosopher says (Ethic. 1,12): "The best of men ere accorded
not praise, but something greater." But God transcends the very best of
all things. Therefore God ought to be given, not praise, but something
greater than praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus. 43:33) to be "above
all praise."
Objection 2: Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it
is an act of religion. Now God is worshiped with the mind rather than
with the lips: wherefore our Lord quoted against certain ones the words
of Is. 29:13, "This people . . . honors [Vulg.: 'glorifies'] Me with
their lips, but their heart is far from Me." Therefore the praise of
God lies in the heart rather than on the lips.
Objection 3: Further, men are praised with the lips that they may be
encouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked
proud, so does it incite the good to better things. Wherefore it is
written (Prov. 27:21): "As silver is tried in the fining-pot . . . so a
man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth." But God is not incited
to better things by man's words, both because He is unchangeable, and
because He is supremely good, and it is not possible for Him to grow
better. Therefore God should not be praised with the lips.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 62:6): "My mouth shall praise Thee
with joyful lips."
I answer that, We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason, and in
speaking to man, for another reason. For when speaking to man we use
words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to him.
Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or others may
learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in consequence we may
incite him to yet better things; and that we may induce others, who
hear him praised, to think well of him, to reverence him, and to
imitate him. On the other hand we employ words, in speaking to God, not
indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who is the searcher of hearts,
but that we may bring ourselves and our hearers to reverence Him.
Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His
sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is
aroused towards Him, according to Ps. 49:23: "The sacrifice of praise
shall glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the
salvation of God." And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends in
his affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed
to God, according to Is. 48:9, "For My praise I will bridle thee lest
thou shouldst perish." The praise of the lips is also profitable to
others by inciting their affections towards God, wherefore it is
written (Ps. 33:2): "His praise shall always be in my mouth," and
farther on: "Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with
me."
Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of God in two ways. First, with
regard to His essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and
ineffable, He is above all praise. In this respect we owe Him reverence
and the honor of latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in
his Psalter [*Translated from the Hebrew]: "Praise to Thee is
speechless, O God," as regards the first, and as to the second, "A vow
shall be paid to Thee." Secondly, we may speak of God as to His effects
which are ordained for our good. In this respect we owe Him praise;
wherefore it is written (Is. 63:7): "I will remember the tender mercies
of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things that the Lord
hath bestowed upon us." Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Thou wilt
find that all the sacred hymns," i.e. divine praises "of the sacred
writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed Processions of the
Thearchy," i.e. of the Godhead, "showing forth and praising the names
of God."
Reply to Objection 2: It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if
one praise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God's praises when
it fervently recalls "the glorious things of His works" [*Cf. Ecclus.
17:7,8]. Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the inward
fervor of those who praise, and to incite others to praise God, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours
as stated.
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Whether God should be praised with song?
Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with song.
For the Apostle says (Col. 3:16): "Teaching and admonishing one another
in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles." Now we should employ nothing
in the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on the authority of
Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising God, we should
employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. 5:19, "Singing
and making melody in your hearts to the Lord," says: "Listen, young men
whose duty it is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung not
with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like play-actors,
ease your throat and jaws with medicaments, and make the church resound
with theatrical measures and airs." Therefore God should not be praised
with song.
Objection 3: Further, the praise of God is competent to little and
great, according to Apoc. 14, "Give praise to our God, all ye His
servants; and you that fear Him, little and great." But the great, who
are in the church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep.
44): "I hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred
altar must not sing" (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. In sancta Romana
Ecclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises.
Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law God was praised with musical
instruments and human song, according to Ps. 32:2,3: "Give praise to
the Lord on the harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument of
ten strings. Sing to Him a new canticle." But the Church does not make
use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the divine
praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in like
manner neither should song be used in the divine praises.
Objection 5: Further, the praise of the heart is more important than
the praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by
singing, both because the attention of the singers is distracted from
the consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all
their attention to the chant, and because others are less able to
understand the thing that are sung than if they were recited without
chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises.
On the contrary, Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church of
Milan, a Augustine relates (Confess. ix).
I answer that, As stated above [3091](A[1]), the praise of the voice is
necessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards God. Wherefore
whatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted in
the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved in
various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the Philosopher
state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica, prologue). Hence
the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary institution, that
the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion.
Wherefore Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): "I am inclined to approve of
the usage of singing in the church, that so by the delight of the ears
the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of devotion": and he says of
himself (Confess. ix, 6): "I wept in Thy hymns and canticles, touched
to the quick by the voices of Thy sweet-attuned Church."
Reply to Objection 1: The name of spiritual canticle may be given not
only to those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that
are sung outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles
arouse spiritual devotion.
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but
reproves those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse
devotion, but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence
Augustine says (Confess. x, 33): "When it befalls me to be more moved
by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have sinned penally,
and then had rather not hear the singer."
Reply to Objection 3: To arouse men to devotion by teaching and
preaching is a more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons
and prelates, whom it becomes to incite men's minds towards God by
means of preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing,
lest thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says
(Regist. iv, ep. 44): "It is a most discreditable custom for those who
have been raised to the diaconate to serve as choristers, for it
behooves them to give their whole time to the duty of preaching and to
taking charge of the alms."
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6),
"Teaching should not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial
instrument such as the harp or anything else of this kind: but only
with such things as make good hearers." For such like musical
instruments move the soul to pleasure rather than create a good
disposition within it. In the Old Testament instruments of this
description were employed, both because the people were more coarse and
carnal---so that they needed to be aroused by such instruments as also
by earthly promises---and because these material instruments were
figures of something else.
Reply to Objection 5: The soul is distracted from that which is sung by
a chant that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the
singer chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what
he says, both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as
Augustine remarks (Confess. x, 33), "each affection of our spirit,
according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure in the voice,
and singing, by some hidden correspondence wherewith it is stirred."
The same applies to the hearers, for even if some of them understand
not what is sung, yet they understand why it is sung, namely, for God's
glory: and this is enough to arouse their devotion.
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OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to
religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in
giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which
are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those
things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the
head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly
we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and
afterwards irreligion and its parts.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion?
(2) Whether it has several parts or species?
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Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary to
religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other.
But religion is included in the definition of superstition: for the
latter is defined as being "immoderate observance of religion,"
according to a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have indeed a show of
wisdom in superstition." Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary
to religion.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): "Cicero [*De Natura
Deorum ii, 28] states that the superstitious were so called because
they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their
children might survive [superstites] them." But this may be done even
in accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is
not a vice opposed to religion.
Objection 3: Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But
religion admits of no excess, since, as stated above ([3092]Q[81],
A[5], ad 3), there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion,
the equal of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice
contrary to religion.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): "Thou
strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of
superstition hath fallen." Now the worship of one God belongs to
religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[5]), religion is a moral
virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above
([3093]FS, Q[64], A[1]). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral
virtue. One by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again,
the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the
circumstance called "how much," but also with regard to other
circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and
magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to
something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less, and
yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom
it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards other
circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,2,3).
Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not
that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but
because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a
manner it ought not.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among
evil things---thus we speak of a good thief---so too sometimes the
names of the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense.
Thus prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Lk.
16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in
their generation than the children of light." It is in this way that
superstition is described as religion.
Reply to Objection 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning.
For its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of
signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is
applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ
sometimes: for "lapis" [a stone] takes its name from hurting the foot
[laedere pedem], but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts
the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow that
"superstition" means that from which the word is derived.
Reply to Objection 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of
absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of
proportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in
divine worship that ought not to be done.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are various species of superstition?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of
superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), "if one
contrary includes many kinds, so does the other." Now religion, to
which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but
all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has
superstition various species.
Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion,
to which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we
are directed to God, as stated above ([3094]Q[81], A[1]). Therefore
superstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified according
to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances of certain
human actions.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have . . . a
show of wisdom in superstition," adds: "that is to say in a
hypocritical religion." Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a
species of superstition.
On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various species of superstition
(De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).
I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion consist in going
beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances
[3095](A[1]). For as we have stated ([3096]FS, Q[72], A[9]), not every
diversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a sin,
but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends:
since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified
specifically, as stated above ([3097]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3098]FS, Q[18],
AA[2],6).
Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on
the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the
divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given,
namely, to the true God, but "in an undue mode," and this is the first
species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely,
to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superstition,
divided into many species in respect of the various ends of divine
worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first place to give
reverence to God, and in this respect the first species of this genus
is "idolatry," which unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The
second end of religion is that man may be taught by God Whom he
worships; and to this must be referred "divinatory" superstition, which
consults the demons through compacts made with them, whether tacit or
explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship is a certain direction of
human acts according to the precepts of God the object of that worship:
and to this must be referred the superstition of certain "observances."
Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he
says that "anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols is
superstitious," and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on
to say, "or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the
purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens," which refers to the
second species; and a little further on he adds: "To this kind belong
all sorts of amulets and such like," and this refers to the third
species.
Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results
from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each
single defect." Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as
stated above [3099](A[1]; Q[10], A[5]). The saying of the Philosopher
is true of opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.
Reply to Objection 2: Divinations and certain observances come under
the head of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions
of the demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.
Reply to Objection 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for "religion
as applied to human observances," as the gloss goes on to explain.
Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than worship given
to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time
of grace, to wish to worship God according to the rite of the Old Law.
It is of religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.
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OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of
the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true
God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory
superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true
God?
(2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?
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Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious in
the worship of the true God. It is written (Joel 2:32): "Everyone that
shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." Now whoever
worships God calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of God is
conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.
Objection 2: Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just
in any age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just
worshiped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing
mortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special
kind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no
worship of God is pernicious.
Objection 3: Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church.
Yet the Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore
Gregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, ep.
64), who stated that there existed in the churches various customs in
the celebration of Mass, wrote: "I wish you to choose carefully
whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God, whether in the
Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in any part of the
Church." Therefore no way of worshiping God is pernicious.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp.
August. Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted in
a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says that "after the Gospel truth had been
preached the legal observances became deadly," and yet these
observances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be
something deadly in the divine worship.
I answer that, As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), "a most
pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to
Christian religion." Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that
which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by
word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that
the outward worship of religion consists, as shown above ([3100]Q[81],
A[7]). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship,
this worship will be pernicious.
Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the
part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something
discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, the
mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to
make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of
Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be
pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In the
second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of the
worshiper, and especially in common worship which is offered by
ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be
guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer
things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the guilt
of falsehood who, on the part of the Church, gives worship to God
contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine authority,
and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose [*Comment. in 1
ad1 Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard] says: "He is
unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ delivered
it." For this reason, too, a gloss on Col. 2:23 says that superstition
is "the use of human observances under the name of religion."
Reply to Objection 1: Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship
Him in spirit and truth, according to Jn. 4:23. Hence a worship that
contains falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God.
Reply to Objection 2: Before the time of the Law the just were
instructed by an inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and
others followed them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward
precepts about this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.
Reply to Objection 3: The various customs of the Church in the divine
worship are in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe
them, and to disregard them is unlawful.
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Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship
of God. It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): "Glorify the Lord as much as
ever you can, for He will yet far exceed." Now the divine worship is
directed to the glorification of God. Therefore there can be no excess
in it.
Objection 2: Further, outward worship is a profession of inward
worship, "whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity," as
Augustine says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in faith,
hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the worship of
God.
Objection 3: Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what
we have received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God.
Therefore if we do all that we possibly can for God's honor, there will
be no excess in the divine worship.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) "that the
good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies, from Holy
Writ." But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there can be
superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God.
I answer that, A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First, with
regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be excess in
the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than he owes God.
Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion,
through not being proportionate to its end. Now the end of divine
worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit to Him in mind
and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do conducing to God's glory,
and subjecting his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate
curbing of the concupiscences, is not excessive in the divine worship,
provided it be in accordance with the commandments of God and of the
Church, and in keeping with the customs of those among whom he lives.
On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive to
God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate
concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the
commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the
general custom---which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep.
xxxvi], "has the force of law"---all this must be reckoned excessive
and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals,
it has no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence Augustine
(De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Lk. 17:21, "The kingdom of God
is within you," against the "superstitious," those, to wit, who pay
more attention to externals.
Reply to Objection 1: The glorification of God implies that what is
done is done for God's glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by
superstition.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God,
so that there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with
external acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers excess by way of absolute
quantity.
__________________________________________________________________
OF IDOLATRY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) Whether it is the gravest sin?
(4) Of the cause of this sin.
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Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition?
Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a
species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are
idolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above
([3101]Q[11], A[1]). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief
and not of superstition.
Objection 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to
which superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally
applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion. For
just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and of
the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of
the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry, and of the worship
of the true God, which is the latria of true religion. Therefore
idolatry is not a species of superstition.
Objection 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of
any genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says
(1 Cor. 8:4): "We know that an idol is nothing in the world," and
further on (1 Cor. 10:19): "What then? Do I say that what is offered in
sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?" implying
an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols belongs
properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to nothing, it
cannot be a species of superstition.
Objection 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor
to whom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just
as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are
reproached (Rom. 1:25) for that they "worshipped and served the
creature rather than the Creator." Therefore this species of
superstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be named
"worship of creatures."
On the contrary, It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited
Silas and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him seeing
the whole city given to idolatry," and further on (Acts 17:22) he says:
"Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too
superstitious." Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.
I answer that, As stated above ([3102]Q[92], A[2]), it belongs to
superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done
chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be given.
Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone, as stated
above ([3103]Q[81], A[1]) when we were treating of religion. Therefore
it is superstition to give worship to any creature whatsoever.
Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by
means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so
too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or
shape, which is called an "idol." Yet divine worship was given to idols
in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed
images which produced certain effects by the power of the demons:
wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained something
God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to them. This
was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep],
as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine
worship not to the images, but to the creatures represented thereby.
The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rom. 1:23, 25). For, as regards
the former, he says: "They changed the glory of the incorruptible God
into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and
of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things," and of the latter he
says: "Who worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator."
These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain
men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those men:
for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the
whole world to be one god, not by reason of its material substance, but
by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, for they held God
to be nothing else than a soul governing the world by movement and
reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect not of his body but
of his soul. Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given
to the whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water, and to all
such things: and to these they referred the names of their gods, as
Varro asserted, and Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly,
others, namely, the Platonists, said that there is one supreme god, the
cause of all things. After him they placed certain spiritual substances
created by the supreme god. These they called "gods," on account of
their having a share of the godhead; but we call them "angels." After
these they placed the souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these
the demons which they stated to be certain animal denizens of the air,
and beneath these again they placed human souls, which they believed to
be taken up into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason
of the merit of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as
Augustine relates (De Civ . . Dei xviii, 14).
The last two opinions were held to belong to "natural theology" which
the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in
the schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was said
to belong to "mythical theology" which was wont to be represented on
the stage according to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion
relating to images was held to belong to "civil theology," which was
celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [*De Civ. Dei vi, 5].
Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): "Anything invented
by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving Divine worship
to a creature or any part of a creature, is superstitious."
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confession
of faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief
by external worship. Such a confession is signified by the term
idolatry, but not by the term heresy, which only means a false opinion.
Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of
superstition.
Reply to Objection 2: The term latria may be taken in two senses. In
one sense it may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God:
and then its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown,
because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not included
in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, whether to
true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax is
univocally the same, whether it is paid to the true or to a false king.
In another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then, since
it is a virtue, it is essential thereto that divine worship be given to
whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied
equivocally to the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as
prudence is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and
to that which is carnal.
Reply to Objection 3: The saying of the Apostle that "an idol is
nothing in the world" means that those images which were called idols,
were not animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes
maintained, as though they were composed of spirit and body. In the
same sense we must understand the saying that "what is offered in
sacrifice to idols is not anything," because by being thus sacrificed
the sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles
thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held.
Reply to Objection 4: It was owing to the general custom among the
Gentiles of worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images
that the term "idolatry" was used to signify any worship of a creature,
even without the use of images.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether idolatry is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a sin
that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true faith
employs images for the divine worship: since both in the Tabernacle
were there images of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25, and in the
Church are images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore
idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But
the angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it
will be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the
like.
Objection 3: Further, the most high God should be honored with an
inward worship, according to Jn. 4:24, "God . . . they must adore . . .
in spirit and in truth": and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that
"God is worshipped by faith, hope and charity." Now a man may happen to
worship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith
inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly
without prejudice to the divine worship.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:5): "Thou shalt not adore them,"
i.e. outwardly, "nor serve them," i.e. inwardly, as a gloss explains
it: and it is a question of graven things and images. Therefore it is a
sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly.
I answer that, There has been a twofold error in this matter. For some
[*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and other
things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the others
aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that divine honor
should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer to God. But
this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all superiors, yet
the same reverence is not due to them all: and something special is due
to the most high God Who excels all in a singular manner: and this is
the worship of latria.
Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that "these visible
sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the most
high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices, namely,
the service of a pure mind, should be offered" [*Augustine, as quoted
below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19),
"external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible words are
signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter
significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the things
they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize that we
should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him Whose
invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts."
Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to
idols, not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but
as being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ.
Dei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: "We shall adore," says he, "in
such a way as to remember that our worship ss in accordance with custom
rather than with the reality": and (De Vera Relig. v) Augustine says
that "we must not seek religion from the philosophers, who accepted the
same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the
schools to various and contrary opinions about the nature of their
gods, and the sovereign good." This error was embraced also by certain
heretics [*The Helcesaitae], who affirmed that it is not wrong for one
who is seized in time of persecution to worship idols outwardly so long
as he keeps the faith in his heart.
But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of the
inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary of
what one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked
falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the sentiments
of one's heart. Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi,
10) in that "his worship of idols was so much the more infamous
forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by him that the
people believed him to act honestly."
Reply to Objection 1: Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old
Law, nor again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of
latria may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in
order that belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be
impressed and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the
image of Christ, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as
we shall state in the [3104]TP, Q[25], A[3].
The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what
has been said above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins.
The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior
worship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than
external worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, which
are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, which
is opposed to external worship.
Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous
it is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by
blaspheming, or denying the faith, than by giving God's worship to
another, which pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial of
the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with
greater evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin
against nature, as stated in Rom. 1:26. Therefore the sin against
nature is a graver sin than idolatry.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): "Neither do
we say that you," viz. the Manichees, "are pagans, or a sect of pagans,
but that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many
gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship things
that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you worship
things that exist not at all." Therefore the vice of heretical
depravity is more grievous than idolatry.
Objection 5: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, "How turn you
again to the weak and needy elements?" says: "The observance of the
Law, to which they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the
worship of idols, to which they had been given before their
conversion." Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin.
On the contrary, A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, about the
uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: "Every
sin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry."
I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways.
First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most
grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly
commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to another
than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs the
whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are committed against
God, which indeed are the greater sins, the greatest of all seems to be
for a man to give God's honor to a creature, since, so far as he is
concerned, he sets up another God in the world, and lessens the divine
sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity of a sin may be considered on the
part of the sinner. Thus the sin of one that sins knowingly is said to
be graver than the sin of one that sins through ignorance: and in this
way nothing hinders heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which
they have received, from sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin
through ignorance. Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on
account of greater contempt on the part of the sinner.
Reply to Objection 1: Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to
this it adds undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without
internal unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated
above [3105](A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch
as it deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the
faith by deeds.
Reply to Objection 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be
against the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be
more manifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to
himself and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in
this way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of
idolatry. But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting
punishment of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man
abuses the order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he
may suffer confusion from the abuse of his own nature.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean
heresy is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is
more derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in
opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies
about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their
belief in one God and worship Him alone.
Reply to Objection 5: The observance of the Law during the time of
grace is not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but
almost equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the
part of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or
guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man's
nature, since rather does man's natural reason dictate that there is
one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to
inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in
man on the part of virtue, since "a good tree cannot bring forth evil
fruit," according to Mat. 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of
guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, "the worship of abominable
idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil." Therefore
idolatry has no cause on the part of man.
Objection 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found
among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated
[*Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated
either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, or
by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped.
Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus
was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael
was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a
great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the
part of man.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "It was not
possible to learn, for the first time, except from their" (i.e. the
demons') "teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what
name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and
their professors": and the same observation seems to apply to idolatry.
Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:14): "By the vanity of men
they," i.e. idols, "came into the world."
I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive
cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on
account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men
divine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This
cause is assigned (Wis. 14:15): "A father being afflicted with bitter
grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken
away: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a god."
The same passage goes on to say (Wis. 14:21) that "men serving either
their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name [Vulg.:
'names']," i.e. of the Godhead, "to stones and wood." Secondly, because
man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as the Philosopher
observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human
images skillfully fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave
them divine worship; hence it is written (Wis. 13:11-17): "If an
artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree, proper for his use, in the
wood . . . and by the skill of his art fashioneth it, and maketh it
like the image of a man . . . and then maketh prayer to it, inquiring
concerning his substance, and his children, or his marriage." Thirdly,
on account of their ignorance of the true God, inasmuch as through
failing to consider His excellence men gave divine worship to certain
creatures, on account of their beauty or power, wherefore it is written
(Wis. 13:1,2): "All men . . . neither by attending to the works have
acknowledged who was the workman, but have imagined either the fire, or
the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great
water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world."
The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part of
the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by giving
answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed marvelous.
Hence it is written (Ps. 95:5): "All the gods of the Gentiles are
devils."
Reply to Objection 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the
part of man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his
intellect, or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this
pertains to guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning
and end of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does
not produce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin
by causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a
beginning or as an end, in so far as certain sins were employed in the
worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth.
Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to
the recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still
retained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age
idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who
triumphed over the devil.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of
idolatry.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether divination is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a species of superstition?
(3) Of the species of divination;
(4) Of divination by means of demons;
(5) Of divination by the stars;
(6) Of divination by dreams;
(7) Of divination by auguries and like observances;
(8) Of divination by lots.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether divination is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination is
derived from something "divine": and things that are divine pertain to
holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not
a sin.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): "Who dares to
say that learning is an evil?" and again: "I could nowise admit that
intelligence can be an evil." But some arts are divinatory, as the
Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to
pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that
divination is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because
nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek
to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore
divination is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be
found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or
fortune tellers": and it is stated in the Decretals (26, qu. v, can.
Qui divinationes): "Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a
penance of five years' duration, according to the fixed grades of
penance."
I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The
future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in
itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce
their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects
can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their
causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes
produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most
part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future
effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of
conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow
and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians,
concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in
themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the
rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to the
Philosopher [*Metaph. viii, 2,5,8]. Such like effects, as also those
which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority of
instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their causes,
because these causes have no determinate inclination to produce these
effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be foreknown unless they
be considered in themselves. Now man cannot consider these effects in
themselves except when they are present, as when he sees Socrates
running or walking: the consideration of such things in themselves
before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the
future as though it were present, as stated in the [3106]FP, Q[14],
A[13]; [3107]FP, Q[57], A[3]; [3108]FP, Q[86], A[4]. Hence it is
written (Is. 41:23): "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and
we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore if anyone presume to
foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever,
except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God.
It is for this reason that certain men are called divines: wherefore
Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): "They are called divines, as though they
were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and
by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men."
Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things that
happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the like can
be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows other
contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then he does
not divine, i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives something
divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps to himself,
in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and this is
manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin; and for this
reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq. that
"divination is always taken in an evil sense."
Reply to Objection 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly
ordered share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation
thereof, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of
future events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not
pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the
knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the
devil's deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).
Reply to Objection 3: Man has a natural inclination to know the future
by human means, but not by the undue means of divination.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether divination is a species of superstition?
Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a species of
superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. Now
divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to Augustine
(De Vera Relig. xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,24; De Divin.
Daem. 3]. Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of superstition.
Objection 2: Further, just as religion is due worship, so is
superstition undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to
undue worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition.
Objection 3: Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true
religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to
divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition.
On the contrary, Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is from
his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: "There is an operation of
the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly,
under the head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved
themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the observance of
shadows. I doubt not that all these things are done by the operation of
the demons." Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20,23),
"whatever results from fellowship between demons and men is
superstitious." Therefore divination is a species of superstition.
I answer that, As stated above [3109](A[1]; QQ[92],94), superstition
denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of
God in two ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a
sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it is
something divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an
oath (Q[89], A[4], ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only
idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the help
of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But all
divination results from the demons' operation, either because the
demons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or
because the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the
future, in order to entangle men's minds with vain conceits. Of this
kind of vanity it is written (Ps. 39:5): "Who hath not regard to
vanities and lying follies." Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the
future, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be
foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of
superstition.
Reply to Objection 1: Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to
the end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind
of superstition as regards the mode of operation.
Reply to Objection 2: This kind of divination pertains to the worship
of the demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express
with the demons.
Reply to Objection 3: In the New Law man's mind is restrained from
solicitude about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no
institution for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters.
On the other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises,
there were consultations about the future in connection with religious
matters. Hence where it is written (Is. 8:19): "And when they shall say
to you: Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their
enchantments," it is added by way of answer: "Should not the people
seek of their God, a vision for the living and the dead? [*Vulg.: 'seek
of their God, for the living of the dead?']"
In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit
of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.
In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit
of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination?
Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish several
species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there
are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality of
sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into compact
with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are not
several species of divination.
Objection 2: Further, a human act takes it species from its end, as
stated above ([3110]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3111]FS, Q[18], A[6]). But all
divination is directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the
future. Therefore all divinations are of one species.
Objection 3: Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for
whether one detracts by word writing or gestures, it is the same
species of sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the
various signs whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived.
Therefore there are not several species of divination.
On the contrary, Isidore enumerates various species of divination
(Etym. viii, 9).
I answer that, As stated above [3112](A[2]), all divinations seek to
acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and
help of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his help,
or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell certain
future things unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as have
been explained in the [3113]FP, Q[57], A[3]. When demons are expressly
invoked, they are wont to foretell the future in many ways. Sometimes
they offer themselves to human sight and hearing by mock apparitions in
order to foretell the future: and this species is called
"prestigiation" because man's eyes are blindfolded [praestringuntur].
Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is called "divination by
dreams": sometimes they employ apparitions or utterances of the dead,
and this species is called "necromancy," for as Isidore observes (Etym.
viii) in Greek, {nekron} "means dead and {manteia} divination, because
after certain incantations and the sprinkling of blood, the dead seem
to come to life, to divine and to answer questions." Sometimes they
foretell the future through living men, as in the case of those who are
possessed: this is divination by "pythons," of whom Isidore says that
"pythons are so called from Pythius Apollo, who was said to be the
inventor of divination." Sometimes they foretell the future by means of
shapes or signs which appear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear
in some earthly body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called
"geomancy," if in water "hydromancy," if in the air "aeromancy," if in
fire "pyromancy," if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the
altars of demons, "aruspicy."
The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the
demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain
knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of
certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the
position and movements of the stars, this belongs to "astrologers," who
are also called "genethliacs," because they take note of the days on
which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of birds
or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of
limbs, this belongs in general to "augury," which is so called from the
chattering of birds [avium garritu], just as "auspice" is derived from
watching birds [avium inspectione]. These are chiefly wont to be
observed in birds, the former by the ear, the latter by the eye. If,
however, these observations have for their object men's words uttered
unintentionally, which someone twist so as to apply to the future that
he wishes to foreknow, then it is called an "omen": and as Valerius
Maximus [*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5] remarks, "the observing of omens
has a touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be
founded not on a chance movement, but on divine providence. It was thus
that when the Romans were deliberating whether they would change their
position, a centurion happened to exclaim at the time:
'Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best stand here': and on
hearing these words they took them as an omen, and abandoned their
intention of advancing further." If, however, the observation regards
the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of figures in certain bodies,
there will be another species of divination: for the divination that is
taken from observing the lines of the hand is called "chiromancy," i.e.
divination of the hand (because {cheir} is the Greek for hand): while
the divination which is taken from signs appearing in the
shoulder-blades of an animal is called "spatulamancy."
To this second species of divination, which is without express
invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by observing
certain things done seriously by men in the research of the occult,
whether by drawing lots, which is called "geomancy"; or by observing
the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or by
observing which of several sheets of paper, with or without writing
upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holding out several
unequal sticks and noting who takes the greater or the lesser. or by
throwing dice, and observing who throws the highest score; or by
observing what catches the eye when one opens a book, all of which are
named "sortilege."
Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The
first is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes under the head
of "necromancy"; the second is merely an observation of the disposition
or movement of some other being, and this belongs to "augury"; while
the third consists in doing something in order to discover the occult;
and this belongs to "sortilege." Under each of these many others are
contained, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 1: In all the aforesaid there is the same general,
but not the same special, character of sin: for it is much more
grievous to invoke the demons than to do things that deserve the
demons' interference.
Reply to Objection 2: Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the
ultimate end whence divination takes its general formality. But the
various species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters,
according as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things.
Reply to Objection 3: The things observed by diviners are considered by
them, not as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in
detraction, but as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that
diversity of principles diversifies the species, even in demonstrative
sciences.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the
demons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to 1
Pet. 2:22, "Who did no sin." Yet our Lord asked the demon: "What is thy
name?" and the latter replied: "My name is Legion, for we are many"
(Mk. 5:9). Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons about the
occult.
Objection 2: Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those
who ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter
inquired of the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue
of the coming war (1 Kings 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that
consists in questioning demons is not unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who
knows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know
what is hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in the
discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons is not
unlawful.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be
found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . . nor . .
. that consulteth pythonic spirits."
I answer that, All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for two
reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination, which
is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking
him. This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written against
certain persons (Is. 28:15): "You have said: We have entered into a
league with death, and we have made a covenant with hell." And still
more grievous would it be if sacrifice were offered or reverence paid
to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result.
For the demon who intends man's perdition endeavors, by his answers,
even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom men to believe
him, and so to lead him on to something prejudicial to the salvation of
mankind. Hence Athanasius, commenting on the words of Lk. 4:35, "He
rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace," says: "Although the demon
confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his speech, lest together
with the truth he should publish his wickedness and accustom us to care
little for such things, however much he may seem to speak the truth.
For it is wicked, while we have the divine Scriptures, to seek
knowledge from the demons."
Reply to Objection 1: According to Bede's commentary on Lk. 8:30, "Our
Lord inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease,
which he tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might
shine forth more graciously." Now it is one thing to question a demon
who comes to us of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times
for the good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the
power of God, to tell the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order
to gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us.
Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3),
"there is nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man,
being about to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted
to appear to him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some
occult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or
else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest, but
some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the
devil, and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the
images of things are wont to be called by the names of those things."
Reply to Objection 3: No temporal utility can compare with the harm to
spiritual health that results from the research of the unknown by
invoking the demon.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether divination by the stars is unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that divination by the stars is not
unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes:
thus a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease.
Now the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place in the world,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by the
stars is not unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, human science originates from experiments,
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered
through many experiments that the observation of the stars is a means
whereby some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would
seem not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.
Objection 3: Further, divination is declared to be unlawful in so far
as it is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the
stars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of God's
creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of divination is
not unlawful.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): "Those astrologers
whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without scruple; because
they seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their
divinations which art, however, Christian and true piety rejects and
condemns."
I answer that, As stated above ([3114]AA[1],2), the operation of the
demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false
and vain opinions, in order that man's mind may become entangled in
vanity and falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion if,
by observing the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot
be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what things can
be foreknown by observing the stars: and it is evident that those
things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this mean,: even
so astrologers forecast a future eclipse.
However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired by
observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some have
stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things foretold by
means of their observation. But this is an unreasonable statement:
since every corporeal sign is either the effect of that for which it
stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused), or it proceeds
from the same cause, so that by signifying the cause, in consequence it
signifies the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair
weather, in so far as its cause is the cause of fair weather). Now it
cannot be said that the dispositions and movements of the heavenly
bodies are the effect of future events; nor again can they be ascribed
to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature, although they are
referable to a common higher cause, which is divine providence. on the
contrary the appointment of the movements and positions of the heavenly
bodies by divine providence is on a different principle from the
appointment of the occurrence of future contingencies, because the
former are appointed on a principle of necessity, so that they always
occur in the same way, whereas the latter are appointed on a principle
of contingency, so that the manner of their occurrence is variable.
Consequently it is impossible to acquire foreknowledge of the future
from an observation of the stars, except in so far as effects can be
foreknown from their causes.
Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In
the first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human
affairs or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in Metaph. vi
[*Ed. Did. v, 3], an accidental being has no cause, least of all a
natural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what
occurs accidentally, neither is a "being" properly speaking, nor is
"one"---for instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or
that a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave---for these and
like occurrences are not one thing, but are simply several things.
Whereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its term,
just as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form of a
natural thing.
In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of
will and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the
intellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and
consequently neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the
Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 4,9). Now no body can make an
impression on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible for
heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and will:
for this would be to deny the difference between intellect and sense,
with which position Aristotle reproaches (De Anima iii, 3) those who
held that "such is the will of man, as is the day which the father of
men and of gods," i.e. the sun or the heavens, "brings on" [*Odyssey
xviii, 135].
Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the free-will's
operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause of an
inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an impression
on the human body, and consequently on the sensitive powers which are
acts of bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since,
however, the sensitive powers obey reason, as the Philosopher shows (De
Anima iii, 11; Ethic. i, 13), this does not impose any necessity on the
free-will, and man is able, by his reason, to act counter to the
inclination of the heavenly bodies.
Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to
foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with certitude
future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and vain opinion;
and so the operation of the demon introduces itself therein, wherefore
it will be a superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand
if one were to apply the observation of the stars in order to foreknow
those future things that are caused by heavenly bodies, for instance,
drought or rain and so forth, it will be neither an unlawful nor a
superstitious divination.
Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the
truth by observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First,
because a great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that
their actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the
inclination of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely, the
wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The result
is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth, especially in
public occurrences which depend on the multitude. Secondly, because of
the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii,
17): "When astrologers tell the truth, it must be allowed that this is
due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies hidden in his mind. And
since this happens through the action of unclean and lying spirits who
desire to deceive man for they are permitted to know certain things
about temporal affairs." Wherefore he concludes: "Thus a good Christian
should beware of astrologers, and of all impious diviners, especially
of those who tell the truth, lest his soul become the dupe of the
demons and by making a compact of partnership with them enmesh itself
in their fellowship."
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful.
It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are
instructed by God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15,16): "By a
dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they
are sleeping in their beds, then He," God to wit, "openeth the ears of
men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn."
Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of divination by dreams.
Objection 2: Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking,
make use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting
dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of
his chief baker (Gn. 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king
of Babylon (Dan. 2, 4). Therefore divination by dreams is not unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences
of men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative
of the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams
for the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): "Neither let there be found
among you any one that . . . observeth dreams."
I answer that, As stated above ([3115]AA[2],6), divination is
superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion.
Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing
the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future
occurrences; for instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious through
what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid
something: while sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, in so
far as they are referable to some common cause of both dreams and
future occurrences, and in this way the future is frequently known from
dreams. We must, then, consider what is the cause of dreams, and
whether it can be the cause of future occurrences, or be cognizant of
them.
Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes
in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams is twofold:
one regards the soul, in so far as those things which have occupied a
man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagination
while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future
occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to
future occurrences, and if at any time they concur it will be by
chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body:
because the inward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a
movement in the imagination consistent with that disposition; thus a
man in whom there is abundance of cold humors dreams that he is in the
water or snow: and for this reason physicians say that we should take
note of dreams in order to discover internal dispositions.
In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and
spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper's imagination is
affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a
heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in keeping
with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is
sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their
dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Num. 12:6, "If there be
among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I
will speak to him in a dream." Sometimes, however, it is due to the
action of the demons that certain images appear to persons in their
sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain future things
to those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them.
Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making
use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as those
dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause inward or
outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will
be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a
revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, whether
explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit,
through the divination extending beyond its possible limits.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external
things is unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by
like observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were
unlawful holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph
that he paid attention to auguries, for it is related (Gn. 44:5) that
Joseph's steward said: "The cup which you have stolen is that in which
my lord drinketh and in which he is wont to divine [augurari]": and he
himself afterwards said to his brethren (Gn. 44:15): "Know you not that
there is no one like me in the science of divining?" Therefore it is
not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.
Objection 2: Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding
future occurrences of the seasons, according to Jer. 8:7, "The kite in
the air hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork
have observed the time of their coming." Now natural knowledge is
infallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to make
use of the birds' knowledge in order to know the future, and this is
divination by augury.
Objection 3: Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11:32).
Yet Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and
interpreting of a dream (Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham's servant,
acted in like manner (Gn. 24). Therefore it seems that this kind of
divination is not unlawful.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): "Neither let there be found
among you anyone . . . that observeth omens."
I answer that, The movements or cries of birds, and whatever
dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the
cause of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known therefrom
as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything future can be
known from them, it will be because the causes from which they proceed
are also the causes of future occurrences or are cognizant of them. Now
the cause of dumb animals' actions is a certain instinct whereby they
are inclined by a natural movement, for they are not masters of their
actions. This instinct may proceed from a twofold cause. In the first
place it may be due to a bodily cause. For since dumb animals have
naught but a sensitive soul, every power of which is the act of a
bodily organ, their soul is subject to the disposition of surrounding
bodies, and primarily to that of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing
prevents some of their actions from being signs of the future, in so
far as they are conformed to the dispositions of the heavenly bodies
and of the surrounding air, to which certain future events are due. Yet
in this matter we must observe two things: first, that such
observations must not be applied to the foreknowledge of future things
other than those which can be foreknown from the movements of heavenly
bodies, as stated above ([3116]AA[5],6): secondly, that they be not
applied to other matters than those which in some way may have
reference to these animals (since they acquire through the heavenly
bodies a certain natural knowledge and instinct about things necessary
for their life---such as changes resulting from rain and wind and so
forth).
In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause,
namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon
Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and
vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb
animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems
to be true of all such like things; except omens, because human words
which are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the
stars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence and
sometimes according to the action of the demons.
Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are
superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set
according to the order of nature or of divine providence.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine [*QQ. in Genes., qu.
cxlv], when Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science
of divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to
the common opinion about him: in this sense also spoke his steward.
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that
birds have about things concerning them; and in order to know these
things it is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus
from the frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon.
Reply to Objection 3: Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation
of a dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for
his instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel's words,
having previously prayed to God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not
unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. 30:16, "My lots are in
Thy hands," says: "It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of
ascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt."
Objection 2: There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances
which the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now both in
the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the
casting of lots. For it is related (Jos. 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at the
Lord's command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had stolen of
the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing lots, found that his son Jonathan
had eaten honey (1 Kings 14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when fleeing from the
face of the Lord, was discovered and thrown into the sea (Jonah 1:7,
sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense (Lk. 1:9): and the
apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the apostleship (Acts
1:26). Therefore it would seem that divination by lots is not unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, fighting with the fists, or "monomachy," i.e.
single combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are
called "popular" trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege,
because something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices
seem to be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single
combat with the Philistine (1 Kings 17:32, sqq.). Therefore it would
seem that divination by lot is not unlawful.
On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can.
Sortes): "We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make
up your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have
condemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason
we wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be
mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under
pain of anathema."
I answer that, As stated above [3117](A[3]), sortilege consists,
properly speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one
may come to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one
seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a possession,
an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or other, it is
called "sortilege of allotment"; if one seeks to know what ought to be
done, it is called "sortilege of consultation"; if one seeks to know
what is going to happen, it is called "sortilege of divination." Now
the actions of man that are required for sortilege and their results
are not subject to the dispositions of the stars. Wherefore if anyone
practicing sortilege is so minded as though the human acts requisite
for sortilege depended for their result on the dispositions of the
stars, his opinion is vain and false, and consequently is not free from
the interference of the demons, so that a divination of this kind is
superstitious and unlawful.
Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must
needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If
we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in "sortilege of
allotment," it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as in
the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the division of
something or other, are willing to draw lots for its division, thus
leaving to chance what portion each is to receive.
If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual
cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezech. 21:21)
that "the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of two
ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the idols,
and consulted entrails": sortilege of this kind is unlawful, and
forbidden by the canons.
Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Prov.
16:33, "Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the
Lord": sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine
declares [*Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. OBJ[1]].
Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have
recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount
to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Lk. 1:8,
says: "He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men."
Secondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to
lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says
(Super Act. Apost. i): "But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks
that he ought, after the apostles' example, to consult God by casting
lots, let him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so,
except after calling together the assembly of the brethren and pouring
forth prayer to God." Thirdly, if the Divine oracles be misapplied to
earthly business. Hence Augustine says (ad inquisit. Januar. ii; Ep.
lv): "Those who tell fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be
hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to consulting the
demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that anyone should wish
to apply the Divine oracles to worldly matters and to the vain things
of this life." Fourthly, if anyone resort to the drawing of lots in
ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried out by the
inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says (Super Act.
Apost. i): "Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias was decided by
lot," because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was not yet poured
forth into the Church: "whereas the same deacons were ordained not by
lot but by the choice of the disciples." It is different with earthly
honors, which are directed to the disposal of earthly things: in
elections of this kind men frequently have recourse to lots, even as in
the distribution of earthly possessions.
If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the divine
judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed. Hence
Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), "If, at a time of persecution,
the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is to remain at
his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to flee, lest all
die and the Church be forsaken, should there be no other means of
coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they must be chosen by
lot." Again he says (De Doctr. Christ. xxviii): "If thou aboundest in
that which it behooves thee to give to him who hath not, and which
cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of whom
surpasses the other either in need or in some claim on thee, thou
couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot to whom thou shalt
give that which thou canst not give to both."
This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections.
Reply to Objection 3: The trial by hot iron or boiling water is
directed to the investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of
something done by a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of
lots. But in so far as a miraculous result is expected from God, it
surpasses the common generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial
is rendered unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of
the occult, which is reserved to the divine judgment, and because such
like trials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a
decree of Pope Stephen V [*II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i]: "The sacred
canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone by means of
the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one must presume, by a
superstitious innovation, to practice what is not sanctioned by the
teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable that public crimes
should be judged by our authority, after the culprit has made
spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have been approved, with due
regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown crimes must be left
to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children of men." The same
would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, save that it
approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since no miraculous
effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be very unequal in
strength or skill.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by the
magic art;
(2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies;
(3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling;
(4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the
observances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two
ways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft:
secondly, through being directed to an evil end, as when a person gives
an alms for the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the magic art
are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist in certain
fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are directed to a good end,
namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore it is not unlawful to
practice these observances.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children"
who abstained, "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book,
and wisdom." Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain
fasts and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its
results through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practice
it.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly, as stated above [3118](A[1]), the
reason why it is wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future
is because they have no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to
God. Yet the demons know scientific truths: because sciences are about
things necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to human
knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of demons, who are of keener
intellect, as Augustine says [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin. Daemon.
3,4]. Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic art, even
though it achieve its result through the demons.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be
found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh the truth from the
dead": which search relies on the demons' help. Now through the
observances of the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought "by
means of certain signs agreed upon by compact with the demons"
[*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above[3119] Q[92], A[2]].
Therefore it is unlawful to practice the notary art.
I answer that, The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is
unlawful, because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have not
in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do in
gazing certain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so
forth. Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as causes,
but as signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are the
sacramental signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty signs,
and consequently a kind of "agreement or covenant made with the demons
for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens" [*Augustine,
De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above Q[92], A[2]]. Wherefore the magic
art is to be absolutely repudiated and avoided by Christian, even as
other arts of vain and noxious superstition, as Augustine declares (De
Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). This art is also useless for the acquisition of
science. For since it is not intended by means of this art to acquire
science in a manner connatural to man, namely, by discovery and
instruction, the consequence is that this effect is expected either
from God or from the demons. Now it is certain that some have received
wisdom and science infused into them by God, as related of Solomon (3
Kings 3 and 2 Paralip 1). Moreover, our Lord said to His disciples (Lk.
21:15): "I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries
shall not be able to resist and gainsay." However, this gift is not
granted to all, or in connection with any particular observance, but
according to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated in 1 Cor. 12:8, "To
one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the
word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit," and afterwards it is
said (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one and the same Spirit worketh,
dividing to everyone according as He will." On the other hand it does
not belong to the demons to enlighten the intellect, as stated in the
[3120]FP, Q[109], A[3]. Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is
effected by the enlightening of the intellect, wherefore never did
anyone acquire knowledge by means of the demons. Hence Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei x, 9): "Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is
in no way cleansed by theurgic inventions," i.e. the operations "of the
demons, so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern what is true,"
such as are all scientific conclusions. The demons may, however, be
able by speaking to men to express in words certain teachings of the
sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic.
Reply to Objection 1: It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it
is not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that
the magic art tends.
Reply to Objection 2: The abstinence of these children was not in
accordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but according to
the authority of the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the
meat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they received
knowledge from God, according to Ps. 118:100, "I have had understanding
above the ancients, because I have sought Thy commandments."
Reply to Objection 3: To seek knowledge of the future from the demons
is a sin not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on
account of the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies to
the case in point.
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Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpos
e
of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the alteration
of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the like, are
lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of bodies in
order to produce their proper effects. Now in the physical order things
have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to
assign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and many like
instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei xxi, 5,7).
Therefore it would seem lawful to employ such like forces for the
alteration of bodies.
Objection 2: Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly
bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire certain
occult forces resulting from their species through the influence of the
heavenly bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g. images, also acquire
from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force for the production of
certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of them and
of such like things.
Objection 3: Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many
ways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8,9). But their power is from
God. Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the purpose
of producing these alterations.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "to
superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and nostrums
condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of incantations or
of certain cyphers which they call characters, or of any kind of thing
worn or fastened on."
I answer that, In things done for the purpose of producing some bodily
effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that effect
naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since it is
lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their proper
effects. But, if they seem unable to produce those effects naturally,
it follows that they are employed for the purpose of producing those
effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that they come under the
head of "compact by tokens entered into with the demons" [*Augustine,
De Doctr. Christ.; see above[3121] Q[92], A[2]]. Wherefore Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "The demons are allured by means of
creatures, which were made, not by them, but by God. They are enticed
by various objects differing according to the various things in which
they delight, not as animals by meat, but as spirits by signs, such as
are to each one's liking, by means of various kinds of stones, herbs,
trees, animals, songs and rites."
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in
employing natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain
effects such as they are thought to have the natural power of
producing. But if in addition there be employed certain characters,
words, or any other vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by
nature, it will be superstitious and unlawful.
Reply to Objection 2: The natural forces of natural bodies result from
their substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of
heavenly bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire
certain active forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial bodies
result from the conception of the craftsman; and since they are nothing
else but composition, order and shape, as stated in Phys. i, 5, they
cannot have a natural active force. Consequently, no force accrues to
them from the influence of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are
artificial, but only in respect of their natural matter. Hence it is
false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11),
that "by herbs, stones, animals, certain particular sounds, words,
shapes and devices, or again by certain movements of the stars observed
in the course of the heavens it is possible for men to fashion on earth
forces capable of carrying into effect the various dispositions of the
stars," as though the results of the magic arts were to be ascribed to
the power of the heavenly bodies. In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ.
Dei x, 11), "all these things are to be ascribed to the demons, who
delude the souls that are subject to them."
Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy
from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is requisite
to inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce to any
effect naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural action. Yet
astronomical images differ from necromantic images in this, that the
latter include certain explicit invocations and trickery, wherefore
they come under the head of explicit agreements made with the demons:
whereas in the other images there are tacit agreements by means of
tokens in certain shapes or characters.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty,
to Whom the demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever
purpose He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the
demons, to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the contrary,
it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons. Hence in no
way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons' help by compacts
either tacit or express.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are unlawful
?
Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the purpose of
fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the misfortunes
that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms,
which the physician observes. Therefore it seems not unlawful to
observe such like signs.
Objection 2: Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly
everybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain
times, or places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or animals,
uncanny or ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to come.
Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things.
Objection 3: Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by
divine providence in a certain order: and this order seems to require
that precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences:
wherefore, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:6), the things that
happened to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in
our time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds
from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to
observe these presages.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "a
thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts
entered into with the demons: for instance, the twitching of a limb; a
stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together; kicking
the door-post when anyone passes in front of one's house; to go back to
bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes; to return home
if you trip when going forth; when the rats have gnawed a hole in your
clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil rather than to regret
the actual damage."
I answer that, Men attend to all these observances, not as causes but
as signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them as
signs given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on
divine authority, but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of
the malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men's minds with such
like trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all these observances are
superstitious and unlawful: they are apparently remains of idolatry,
which authorized the observance of auguries, of lucky and unlucky days
which is allied to divination by the stars, in respect of which one day
differentiated from another: except that these observances are devoid
of reason and art, wherefore they are yet more vain and superstitious.
Reply to Objection 1: The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they
produce certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully
observe. Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future
events as proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging
when he sees his master's anger. Possibly the same might be said if one
were to fear for child lest it take harm from the evil eye, of which we
have spoken in the [3122]FP, Q[117], A[3], ad 2. But this does not
apply to this kind of observances.
Reply to Objection 2: That men have at first experienced a certain
degree of truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards
when a man begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind,
many things occur in connection with them through the trickery of the
demons, "so that men, through being entangled in these observances,
become yet more curious, and more and more embroiled in the manifold
snares of a pernicious error," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii,
23).
Reply to Objection 3: Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be
born, not only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states
(Contra Faust. iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply those
deeds to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all things,
however, that occur through divine providence are ordered so as to be
signs of the future. Hence the argument does not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to wear divine words
at the neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written than
when uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the purpose of
producing certain effects; (for instance, in order to heal the sick),
such as the "Our Father" or the "Hail Mary," or in any way whatever to
call on the Lord's name, according to Mk. 16:17,18, "In My name they
shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall
take up serpents." Therefore it seems to be lawful to wear sacred words
at one's neck, as a remedy for sickness or for any kind of distress.
Objection 2: Further, sacred words are no less efficacious on the human
body than on the bodies of serpents and other animals. Now certain
incantations are efficacious in checking serpents, or in healing
certain other animals: wherefore it is written (Ps. 57:5): "Their
madness is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp
that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the charmers,
nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely." Therefore it is lawful to wear
sacred words as a remedy for men.
Objection 3: Further, God's word is no less holy than the relics of the
saints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L. Hom. xxvi) that "God's word
is of no less account than the Body of Christ." Now it is lawful for
one to wear the relics of the saints at one's neck, or to carry them
about one in any way for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it
is equally lawful to have recourse to the words of Holy Writ, whether
uttered or written, for one's protection.
Objection 4: On the other hand, Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth.)
[*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works,
and falsely ascribed to him]: "Some wear round their necks a passage in
writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel read in church and heard
by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good to have the
Gospels in his ears, will he find salvation by wearing them round his
neck? Moreover, where is the power of the Gospel? In the shapes of the
letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in the shapes, you do
well to wear them round your neck; if in the understanding, you will
then do better to bear them in your heart than to wear them round your
neck."
I answer that, In every incantation or wearing of written words, two
points seem to demand caution. The first is the thing said or written,
because if it is connected with invocation of the demons it is clearly
superstitious and unlawful. In like manner it seems that one should
beware lest it contain strange words, for fear that they conceal
something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says [*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in
Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works, falsely ascribed to him] that
"many now after the example of the Pharisees who enlarged their
fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels, and fasten them to
their persons. Such things seem fearsome to those who do not understand
them." Again, one should take care lest it contain anything false,
because in that case also the effect could not be ascribed to God, Who
does not bear witness to a falsehood.
In the second place, one should beware lest besides the sacred words it
contain something vain, for instance certain written characters, except
the sign of the Cross; or if hope be placed in the manner of writing or
fastening, or in any like vanity, having no connection with reverence
for God, because this would be pronounced superstitious: otherwise,
however, it is lawful. Hence it is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu.
v, cap. Non liceat Christianis): "In blending together medicinal herbs,
it is not lawful to make use of observances or incantations, other than
the divine symbol, or the Lord's Prayer, so as to give honor to none
but God the Creator of all."
Reply to Objection 1: It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine words, or
to invoke the divine name, if one do so with a mind to honor God alone,
from Whom the result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in
connection with any vain observance.
Reply to Objection 2: Even in the case of incantations of serpents or
any animals whatever, if the mind attend exclusively to the sacred
words and to the divine power, it will not be unlawful. Such like
incantations, however, often include unlawful observances, and rely on
the demons for their result, especially in the case of serpents,
because the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil in
order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage quoted says: "Note
that Scripture does not commend everything whence it draws its
comparisons, as in the case of the unjust judge who scarcely heard the
widow's request."
Reply to Objection 3: The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if
they be worn out of confidence in God, and in the saints whose relics
they are, it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this
matter of some vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be
three-cornered, or the like, having no bearing on the reverence due to
God and the saints), it would be superstitious and unlawful.
Reply to Objection 4: Chrysostom is speaking the case in which more
attention is paid the written characters than to the understanding of
the words.
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OF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through
lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that
they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which
pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. Accordingly
we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for
God; (2) Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy things. With regard
to the first we shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted,
and perjury, whereby God's name is taken with irreverence. Under the
first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) In what the temptation of God consists;
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) To what virtue it is opposed;
(4) Of its comparison with other vices.
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Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds, wherein the
expected result is ascribed to the power of God alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God does not consist
in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the power of God
alone. Just as God is tempted by man so is man tempted by God, man, and
demons. But when man is tempted the result is not always expected from
his power. Therefore neither is God tempted when the result is expected
from His power alone.
Objection 2: Further, all those who work miracles by invoking the
divine name look for an effect due to God's power alone. Therefore, if
the temptation of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work
miracles would tempt God.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to man's perfection that he
should put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence
Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 9:3, "Take nothing for your journey," etc.
says: "The Gospel precept points out what is required of him that
announces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not depend on
worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he
should hold himself to be the more able to provide for himself, the
less he seeks these things." And the Blessed Agatha said: "I have never
treated my body with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus Christ, Who
restores all things by His mere word." [*Office of St. Agatha, eighth
Responsory (Dominican Breviary).] But the temptation of God does not
consist in anything pertaining to perfection. Therefore the temptation
of God does not consist in such like deeds, wherein the help of God
alone is expected.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 36): "Christ who
gave proof of God's power by teaching and reproving openly, yet not
allowing the rage of His enemies to prevail against Him, nevertheless
by fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest it should dare
to tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that which it needs
to avoid." From this it would seem that the temptation of God consists
in omitting to do what one can in order to escape from danger, and
relying on the assistance of God alone.
I answer that, Properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person
tempted. Now we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By
words, that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether he
can and will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe
another's prudence, will or power. Either of these may happen in two
ways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself a tempter: thus
Samson (Judges 14:12) proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order to
tempt them. In the second place it may be done with cunning and by
stealth, as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Mat. 22:15,
sqq. Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends,
by word or deed, to put some person to the test; and sometimes
implicitly, when, to wit, though he does not intend to test a person,
yet that which he does or says can seemingly have no other purpose than
putting him to a test.
Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds. Now
we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence a man tempts God
explicitly in his prayers when he asks something of God with the
intention of probing God's knowledge, power or will. He tempts God
explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to experiment
on God's power, good will or wisdom. But He will tempt God implicitly,
if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on God, yet he asks
for or does something which has no other use than to prove God's power,
goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his horse to gallop in
order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving the horse a trial:
but if he make the horse gallop with out any useful purpose, it seems
to be nothing else than a trial of the horse's speed; and the same
applies to all other things. Accordingly when a man in his prayers or
deeds entrusts himself to the divine assistance for some urgent or
useful motive, this is not to tempt God: for it is written (2 Paralip
20:12): "As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee."
But if this be done without any useful or urgent motive, this is to
tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a gloss on Dt. 6:16, "Thou shalt not
tempt the Lord thy God," says: "A man tempts God, if having the means
at hand, without reason he chooses a dangerous course, trying whether
he can be delivered by God."
Reply to Objection 1: Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds,
to test his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same
deeds.
Reply to Objection 2: When saints work miracles by their prayers, they
are moved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which
is an effect of the divine power.
Reply to Objection 3: The preachers of God's kingdom dispense with
temporal aids, so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God:
wherefore if they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they
tempt God. But if they were to neglect human assistance without any
useful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine
(Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that "Paul fled, not through ceasing to
believe in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to flee when
he had the means of flight." The Blessed Agatha had experience of God's
kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such sickness
as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself suddenly cured by
God.
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Whether it is a sin to tempt God?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God
has not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the
same as to tempt, Him: for it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring all the
tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; and try
Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the flood-gates of
heaven." Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt God.
Objection 2: Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his
knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will. Now
it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is written
(Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet," and (Rom. 12:2):
"That you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the
perfect will of God." Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.
Objection 3: Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from
sin, but rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when
the Lord said: "Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God," he replied: "I
will not ask, and I will not tempt the Lord," and then it was said to
him: "Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are
grievous to my God also?" (Is. 7:11-13). And we read of Abraham (Gn.
15:8) that he said to the Lord: "Whereby may I know that I shall
possess it?" namely, the land which God had promised him. Again Gedeon
asked God for a sign of the victory promised to him (Judges 6:36,
sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is not a sin
to tempt God.
On the contrary, It is forbidden in God's Law, for it is written (Dt.
6:10): "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."
I answer that, As stated above [3123](A[1]), to tempt a person is to
put him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain.
Wherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, either
in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its
qualities), or in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove
it to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it
is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which pertains to God's
perfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in
order that the tempter himself may know God's power.
On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the
divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it to
others: this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of
urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite
conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be
wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in order,
to wit, that Christ's power might be made manifest to unbelievers.
Reply to Objection 1: The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law,
as stated above ([3124]Q[87], A[1]). Hence there was a motive of
urgency to pay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive
of usefulness, as stated in the text quoted---"that there may be meat
in God's house": wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The
words that follow, "and try Me," are not to be understood causally, as
though they had to pay tithes in order to try if "God would open the
flood-gates of heaven," but consecutively, because, to wit, if they
paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which God would
shower upon them.
Reply to Objection 2: There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or
will. One is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to
prove whether God's will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other
knowledge of God's will or goodness is effective or experimental and
thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God's sweetness, and
complacency in God's will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div. Nom.
ii) that "he learnt divine thing through experience of them." It is in
this way that we are told to prove God's will, and to taste His
sweetness.
Reply to Objection 3: God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him
alone, but for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was
reproved because, by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the
common welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both because
he would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it
was a matter relating to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign
through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to
have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to be
excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just as Zachary sinned in saying
to the angel (Lk. 1:18): "Whereby shall I know this?" so that he was
punished for his unbelief.
It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God for
a sign: first in order to test God's power or the truth of His word,
and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God.
Secondly, in order to be instructed as to what is God's pleasure in
some particular matter; and this nowise comes under the head of
temptation of God.
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Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed to
the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a man
doubts God, as stated above [3125](A[2]). Now doubt about God comes
under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore
temptation of God is opposed to faith rather than to religion.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23): "Before prayer
prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man,"
that is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, "prays for what
God taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him to
do." Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope.
Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, "And they tempted God in
their hearts," says that "to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully,
with simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts." Now deceit
is opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is
opposed, not to religion, but to truth.
On the contrary, According to the gloss quoted above "to tempt God is
to pray to Him inordinately." Now to pray to God becomingly is an act
of religion as stated above ([3126]Q[83], A[15]). Therefore to tempt
God is a sin opposed to religion.
I answer that, As clearly shown above ([3127]Q[81], A[5]), the end of
religion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains
directly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is
evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since
no one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it
is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3128]Q[81], A[7]), it belongs
to religion to declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of
reverence towards God. Consequently it belongs to irreligion that,
through doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence
towards God. To tempt God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of
irreligion.
Reply to Objection 2: He that prepares not his soul before prayer by
forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way
disposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by
God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this
implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or
indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and
without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence towards
Him. For it is written (1 Pet. 5:6): "Be you humbled . . . under the
mighty hand of God," and (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study to present
thyself approved unto God." Therefore also this kind of temptation is a
species of irreligion.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in
relation to God, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to
man. Wherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and
consequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed
to the truth.
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Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin
than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment. Now
the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews than was
the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of
superstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their
number were slain, as related in Ex. 32:28 [*Septuagint version. The
Vulgate has "twenty-three thousand."], whereas for the sin of
temptation they all without exception perished in the desert, and
entered not into the land of promise, according to Ps. 94:9, "Your
fathers tempted Me," and further on, "so I swore in My wrath that they
should not enter into My rest." Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin
than superstition.
Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it
would seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a
species, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition
which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a
graver sin than superstition.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave
disrespectfully to one's parents, than to pay others the respect we owe
to our parents. Now God should be honored by us as the Father of all
(Malach. 1:6). Therefore. temptation of God whereby we behave
irreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby
we give to a creature the honor we owe to God.
On the contrary, A gloss on Dt. 17:2, "When there shall be found among
you," etc. says: "The Law detests error and idolatry above all: for it
is a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that belongs to the
Creator."
I answer that, Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is
that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is
less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine
excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For just
as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his error, than
if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more against the
reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an error contrary to
the divine excellence, than if he expresses a doubt. Now the
superstitious man professes an error, as shown above (Q[94], A[1], ad
1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt of
the divine excellence, as stated above [3129](A[2]). Therefore the sin
of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting God.
Reply to Objection 1: The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above
manner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more
severe punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is
written (Ex. 32:34): "And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin
also of theirs."
Reply to Objection 2: Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as
regards the material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as
regards the end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of
God, since it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs essentially to the divine excellence
that it is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine
reverence to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine
excellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents,
which can without sin be given to others.
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OF PERJURY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury?
(2) Whether perjury is always a sin?
(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be
false?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that
the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above ([3130]Q[89],
A[3]), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less
than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of
truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one
swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears to
something unjust.
Objection 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the
thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more
weighty than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is
confirmed by calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to
consist in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the
human statement which is confirmed on oath.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm.
clxxx): "Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are
deceived themselves"; and he gives three examples. The first is:
"Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true,
whereas it is false"; the second is: "Take the instance of another who
knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it were
true"; and the third is: "Take another, who thinks his statement false,
and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true," of whom he
says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a perjurer
while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not necessary for
perjury.
On the contrary, Perjury is defined "a falsehood confirmed by oath"
[*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5].
I answer that, As stated above ([3131]Q[92], A[2]), moral acts take
their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the
confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is
opposed: since an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be
true; and this cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood
directly annuls the end of an oath: and for this reason, that
perversity in swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species
chiefly from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury.
Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, "whichever of these
three be lacking, there is perjury," but in different order. For first
and chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated
in the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for
in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very
reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to do
the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking, since
by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger
of lapsing into falsehood.
Reply to Objection 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight,
since they are in the position of active principle, as stated in Phys.
ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than
the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man
swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that
kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its end, by
swearing what is false.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is
the apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it
will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If
something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both
materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false,
it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each of these
cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in some way,
on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which is
formal in anything is of greater importance than that which is
material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much
of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it false. For
Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It depends how
the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty
except the mind be guilty."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all perjury is sinful?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever does
not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet
sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful (adultery, for
instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If therefore
he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would follow that he is
perplexed.
Objection 2: Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes
by committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not
to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore
not all perjury is sinful.
Objection 3: Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to
be guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that
he sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter
order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly
not all perjury is sinful.
Objection 4: Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a
declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation
of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus a state may
swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come on
the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may swear to keep the
statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new statutes are made.
Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. cxxx),
in speaking of perjury: "See how you should detest this horrible beast
and exterminate it from all human business."
I answer that, As stated above ([3132]Q[89], A[1]), to swear is to call
God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness
to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that God ignores
the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a falsehood.
Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it
belongs to show reverence to God.
Reply to Objection 1: He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby
guilty of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep
his oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which
he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath.
Reply to Objection 2: A person who swears not to enter religion, or not
to give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of
judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of
perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is
doing could not be a matter of an oath.
Reply to Objection 3: When one man swears or promises to do another's
will, there is to be understood this requisite condition---that the
thing commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or
immoderate.
Reply to Objection 4: An oath is a personal act, and so when a man
becomes a citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil
whatever the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of
fidelity, the nature of which obligation is that he should take his
share of the state's burdens if he takes a share of its goods.
The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some
particular "college" is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be
made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, past
and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the
statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as
stated above ([3133]FS, Q[96], A[4]).
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Whether all perjury is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is
laid down (Extra, De Jurejur, cap. Verum): "Referring to the question
whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to
safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind than that
which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have had, and
who absolved such persons from the obligations of their oath.
Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid
occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to keep their
oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for this reason to
be punished as for a mortal sin." Therefore not all perjury is a mortal
sin.
OBJ 2. Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on
St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is a
greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels." Now it is not
always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance,
if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue in
the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it always
a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the
Gospels.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through
committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that
infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed
in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury [*Cap. Cum
dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.]. Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a
mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is
written (Lev. 19:12): "Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name."
Therefore it is a mortal sin.
I answer that, According to the teaching of the Philosopher (Poster. i,
2), "that which causes a thing to be such is yet more so." Now we know
that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or
even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of
God. Wherefore any action that of its nature, implies contempt of God
is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very nature implies contempt of
God, since, as stated above [3134](A[2]), the reason why it is sinful
is because it is an act of irreverence towards God. Therefore it is
manifest that perjury, of its very nature, is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3135]Q[89], A[7], ad 3),
coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as
regards that which can be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to
fulfil an oath which he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and
sins mortally. Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his
authority, absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, especially
if the latter should have been coerced into taking the oath through
such fear as may overcome a high-principled man.
When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished as
for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of mortal
sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them.
Reply to Objection 2: He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless
irreverent to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is
not excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of
tongue, if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is
swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither
is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not advert to
this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and consequently
is excused from the sin of perjury.
It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels,
than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of
scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we consider
them equally in comparison with one another, it is more grievous to
commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the Gospels.
Reply to Objection 3: Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of
the law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory
oath be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been
so declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he
has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy rather
to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he still has
it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his oath, which is
not the case in a declaratory oath.
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Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer?
Objection 1: It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer
commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that
he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for
him to demand an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for his
own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should one
enjoin an oath on another person.
Objection 2: Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to
impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath
from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then
seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to
impose an oath on one who swears falsely.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lev. 5:1): "If anyone sin, and
hear the voice of one swearing falsely [*'Falsely' is not in the
Vulgate'], and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is
privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity." Hence
it would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he
is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an oath
of such a man.
Objection 4: On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so
is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an
oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public.
Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who
swears falsely.
I answer that, As regards a person who demands an oath from another, a
distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he demands the oath
on his own account and of his own accord, or he demands it on account
of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man demands an oath on
his own account as a private individual, we must make a distinction, as
does Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm. clxxx): "For if he knows not that
the man will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly: 'Swear to me'
in order that he may be credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human
temptation" (because, to wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting
whether the man will speak the truth). "This is the evil whereof Our
Lord says (Mat. 5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil.
But if he knows the man to have done so," i.e. the contrary of what he
swears to, "and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the
other destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand
of the slayer."
If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in
accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a
third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of
a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because
seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose
instance he demands it.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument avails in the case of one who
demands an oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that
the other will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about
the fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an
oath in order that he may be more certain.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii),
"though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read
in the Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others."
Hence he that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of
his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear
falsely.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses
in the passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce
another's perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter had
to be denounced "to those who would do the perjurer good rather than
harm." Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was
to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order should be followed, if
the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend
to another person's injury: because if it did, the Gospel order would
not apply to the case, as stated above ([3136]Q[33], A[7];[3137] Q[68],
A[1]).
Reply to Objection 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake
of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil.
Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to
swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by
false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears
falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of
faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by
false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Hence when a man
swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to lack any good that one
may use lawfully.
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OF SACRILEGE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby
sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider (1)
Sacrilege; (2) Simony.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is sacrilege?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) Of the species of sacrilege;
(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.
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Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing?
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a
sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can. Si
quis suadente]): "They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the
sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the
sovereign be worthy of honor." Now this seems to have no connection
with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation
of something sacred.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on
can. Constituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public
offices, "he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege." Yet
public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it
seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing.
Objection 3: Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred
things receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot
be violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the
violation of a sacred thing.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a man is said to be
sacrilegious because he selects," i.e. steals, "sacred things."
I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[5]; [3138]FS, Q[101], A[4]), a
thing is called "sacred" through being deputed to the divine worship.
Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to
a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being
deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is due to
it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to
irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and comes under the
head of sacrilege.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the
common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times
the rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the
ministers of divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, "Being ministers
of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly." Hence by an extension of
the term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as
disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow it,
is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness.
Reply to Objection 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the
sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "But you are washed,
but you are sanctified." Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:9): "You are
a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased
people." Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for
instance that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an
irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.
Reply to Objection 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or
dishonor. Now as "honor is in the person who honors and not in the one
who is honored" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the person
who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the object of his
irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the sacred
thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.
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Whether sacrilege is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege not a special sin. It is
stated (XVII, qu. iv) "They are guilty of sacrilege who through
ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it by
their negligence." But this is done in every sin, because sin is "a
word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God," according to
Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general
sin.
Objection 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds
of sin. Now sacrilege comprised under different kinds of sin, for
instance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the
violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place
under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a
special sin.
Objection 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other
sins as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic.
v, 11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other
sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as
stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.
On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special
sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, to
which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore
sacrilege is a special sin.
I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there
must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is derived
chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now
in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the
violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it is a
special sin.
Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De
Fide Orth. iv, 3), "When the purple has been made into a royal robe, we
pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to
death," as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man
violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the
reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.
Reply to Objection 1: Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the
divine law who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do. These
are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of sacrilege,
through perverting the words of the divine law.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being
found in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are
directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues
commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man
acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege
formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin materially.
Reply to Objection 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other
sins, through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a
sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a
sacred place for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred
things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not
distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does
not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now
there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations
of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of matter.
Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished thereby.
Objection 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging
to the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now
murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin.
Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and
consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished
in accordance with the species of other sins, and not according to the
various sacred things.
Objection 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned.
If, therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a
sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred
person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the
sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according
to the sacred things.
On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects.
Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above
[3139](A[1]). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished
according to the sacred things.
I answer that, As stated above [3140](A[1]), the sin of sacrilege
consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence
is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently
the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the
different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated
irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing
that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege.
Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who
are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to
certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to
the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is
written (2 Macc. 5:19): "God did not choose the people for the place's
sake, but the place for the people's sake." Hence sacrilege committed
against a sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed
against a sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees
of sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places.
In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed
against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the
differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to
the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the
sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore
the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest
of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessels
consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also sacred
images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons of the
saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these come
things connected with the apparel of the Church and its ministers; and
those things, whether movable or immovable, that are deputed to the
upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any one of the
aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege.
Reply to Objection 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all
the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a
material, but also a formal difference.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one
species in one respect, and to different species in another respect.
Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, "animal," but differ
in the species "colored thing," if one be white and the other black. In
like manner it is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to
their material acts, and to belong to the same species as regards the
one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance, the violation of a nun by
blows or by copulation.
Reply to Objection 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a
sacrilege materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The
quotation is from St. Bernard, De Consideration, ii, 13] says that "a
trifle on a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy." But formally
and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege
only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a
virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is to
be said of other instances.
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Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary?
Objection 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not
be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted for a
criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is
punished by capital sentence according to civil law [*Dig. xlviii, 13;
Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not be
awarded a pecuniary punishment.
Objection 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double
punishment, according to Nahum 1:9, "There shall not rise a double
affliction." But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major
excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or
destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges.
Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:5): "Neither have we
taken an occasion of covetousness." But it seems to involve an occasion
of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the
violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a
fitting punishment of sacrilege.
On the contrary, It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis contumax]:
"If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped
slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi":
and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis inventus, can. 21):
"Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried
purest silver."
I answer that, In the award of punishments two points must be
considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just,
and that "by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be
tormented" (Wis. 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of one
guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is
excommunication [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis contumax, quoted
above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to
be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines,
that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem
that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not
sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from
him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws
he is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of
the Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary
punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from
sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments.
Reply to Objection 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the body,
but excommunication in its stead.
Reply to Objection 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a
man from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was
necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to
the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise
spiritual things.
Reply to Objection 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause,
this would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is
exacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest utility,
and consequently involves no occasion of avarice.
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ON SIMONY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) What is simony?
(2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments?
(3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions?
(4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals?
(5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or
also oral remuneration or remuneration by service?
(6) Of the punishment of simony.
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Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or
connected with a spiritual thing?
Objection 1: It would seem that simony is not "an express will to buy
or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing."
Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per
pecunias.]): "The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with
him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who
are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained that
the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God,
whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For
every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether it be his
slave or any other of his possessions." But unbelief, like faith, is an
act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above ([3141]Q[10],
A[2]). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of the will.
Objection 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice,
and this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an
intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against
the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of
heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory says
in a homily (v, in Ev.): "The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you
possess." Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy something
spiritual.
Objection 4: Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of
whom we read (Acts 8:18,19) that "he offered the apostles money" that
he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, "that on whomsoever
he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost." But we do not
read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony is not the will
to sell a spiritual thing.
Objection 5: Further, there are many other voluntary commutations
besides buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind
of legal compromise---Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that
simony is defined insufficiently.
Objection 6: Further, anything connected with spiritual things is
itself spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add "or connected with
spiritual things."
Objection 7: Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony:
yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not the
will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual
thing.
On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Regist. [*Caus. I, qu. i, can.
Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare]): "None of the faithful is ignorant
that buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the heresy
of simony."
I answer that, As stated above ([3142]FS, Q[18], A[2]) an act is evil
generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is
undue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because a
spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is
said concerning wisdom (Prov. 3:15), "she is more precious than all
riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared with
her": and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of Simon
in its very source, said (Acts 8:20): "Keep thy money to thyself to
perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be
purchased with money."
Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor
is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted
(OBJ[1]). Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers
of spiritual things, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of
us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers
of God."
Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things,
since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord
said (Mat. 10:8): "Freely have you received, freely give."
Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God and
divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of
irreligion.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion consists in a kind of
protestation of faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one's heart,
so too the vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of
unbelief without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly
simony is said to be a "heresy," as regards the outward protestation,
since by selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, in a way,
that he is the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It
must, however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the
apostles to sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, said that the
world was not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore
states (Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason simoniacs are reckoned
with other heretics, as appears from Augustine's book on heretics.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3143]Q[58], A[4]), justice,
with all its parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the
will as its subject. Hence simony is fittingly defined from its
relation to the will. This act is furthermore described as "express,"
in order to signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the
principal part in virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the
Holy Ghost that sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through
contempt of those things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin,
as stated above ([3144]Q[14], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a
man gives what he has for God's sake. But this is to employ the term
"buying" in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it
reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither "the
sufferings of this time," nor any gift or deed of ours, "are worthy to
be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us" (Rom.
8:18), and because merit consists chiefly, not in an outward gift,
action or passion, but in an inward affection.
Reply to Objection 4: Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual
power in order that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I,
qu. iii [*Can. Salvator]), that "Simon the magician wished to buy the
gift of the Holy Ghost, in order that he might make money by selling
the signs to be wrought by him." Hence those who sell spiritual things
are likened in intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish to
buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate, in
act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read (4 Kings 5:20-24)
that he received money from the leper who was healed: wherefore the
sellers of spiritual things may be called not only "simoniacs" but also
"giezites."
Reply to Objection 5: The terms "buying" and "selling" cover all kinds
of non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the
exchange or agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made
by authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing
simony, as laid down by law [*Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.; cap.
Super, de Transact.]. Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of his
office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or necessary
reasons.
Reply to Objection 6: Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body
lives through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are
spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while
others are called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence
(I, qu. iii, cap. Siquis objecerit) it is stated that "spiritual things
do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has no bodily
life without the body."
Reply to Objection 7: The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony,
like any other man, since the higher a man's position the more grievous
is his sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as
dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore,
were he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for a
spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of
simony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a
layman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church.
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Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give money
for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as we shall
state in the [3145]TP, Q[68], A[6]; [3146]TP, Q[73], A[3]. But
seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism, for
instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child without
being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the
sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist,
which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend or
money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or
sell the other sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament
consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money
when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always
unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to
be not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that "it
was no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom." Now
it is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration
of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange
for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that it
is not unlawful.
Objection 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously
hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But
it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is
lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a
like ecclesiastical dignity.
Objection 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is
given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament.
On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]):
"Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from
the priesthood."
I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most
spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on which
no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with a
non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the
ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support,
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), "Know you not,
that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the
holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar?"
Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual
grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be excused
by any custom whatever, since "custom does not prevail over natural or
divine law" [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. [3147]FS, Q[97],
A[3]]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a pecuniary
value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the other hand, to
receive anything for the support of those who administer the
sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved
customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a
price of goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of
Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the priests that rule well," says: "They
should look to the people for a supply to their need, but to the Lord
for the reward of their ministry."
Reply to Objection 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And
since nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize
without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest
available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the
child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be
baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water from
the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it were an
adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the priest
were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if
possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have
recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and
should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism
of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for
consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would be
simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not
the price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a
punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, "custom does not prevail over
natural or divine law" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the
custom, if such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a
spiritual thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is
manifestly simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person
unwilling to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend
recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no
intention of buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary,
and especially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these
cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of
simony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess.
5:22), "From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves."
Reply to Objection 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition
of one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any
dignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since
this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing.
But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust opposition,
after one has already acquired that right.
Reply to Objection 6: Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de
Simonia] say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no
grace is conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we
shall state in the Third Part of the work [*[3148]XP, Q[42], A[3]].
Wherefore we must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the
Church, but also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give
money for Matrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if
it be considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the
law [*Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand
anything for the Nuptial Blessing.
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Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions?
Objection 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for
spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But
something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears
from 1 Kings 9:7,8, and 3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that it
is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action.
Objection 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most
spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to
obtain the assistance of their prayers, according to Lk. 16:9, "Make
unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity." To preachers also, who sow
spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1
Cor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the
divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions: and
sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful
to receive something for spiritual actions.
Objection 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it
is lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may
sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master
the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem
lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiritual
power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and so forth.
Objection 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection.
Now in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are
received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for
spiritual things.
On the contrary, It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid invisibilis]):
"It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by
the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by
seeking any kind of return whatever." Now all these spiritual things
are acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to
charge a price or return for them.
I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because
they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are called
spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose thereto.
And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of men,
according to 1 Cor. 9:7, "Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his
own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the
flock?" Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is spiritual
in such like actions; but to receive or give something for the support
of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with the statutes
of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that
there be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure be
brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by withholding
spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then there would be
an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual things have been
freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary offerings and other
dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, if
the superior authorize this to be done.
Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9,
certain gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their
livelihood, but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of
prophecy. Wicked prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding
payment for it.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to
obtain from them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the
intent of buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence
inspire the poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of
charity. Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his
support, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1
Tim. 5:11, "Let the priests that rule well," says: "Their need allows
them to receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this
should be given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a
livelihood the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this
purpose, they sell a great thing for a contemptible price." In like
manner temporal things are given to those who praise God by celebrating
the divine office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a
price but as a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled
when alms are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is
simoniacal to do such things by contract, or with the intention of
buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were
decreed in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral
unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance
would preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The
ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed
that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms,
because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover,
the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the
latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration.
Reply to Objection 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted
is bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him
in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory
payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood.
Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his
spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which he
is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has accepted),
but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this reason it is
unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or
for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his
subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other hand it is
lawful for him to receive "procurations," when he visits his subjects,
not as a price for correcting them, but as a means of livelihood. He
that is possessed of science, without having taken upon himself the
obligation of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive a
price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale of truth or
science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other hand, he be so bound
by virtue of his office, this would amount to a sale of the truth, and
consequently he would sin grievously. For instance, those who in
certain churches are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church
and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical
benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything in return,
either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting any feasts.
Reply to Objection 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as
price for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries,
that are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while
entrance to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support
of those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its
revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier in
admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for that
monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other hand, it
is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery by means of
temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the
monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or receive
something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual
things?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed
to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to
spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake
of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is
annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything
temporal, and this is clearly false.
Objection 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to
spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a
chalice for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic.
ii, 28). Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual
things.
Objection 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right
of burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right
of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised the
priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought
from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gn. 23:8, sqq.), and
Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gn. 25:31, sqq.).
Again the right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and
is granted "in fee." Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be
redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the revenues of
prebends of which they have the presentation, although a prebend is
something annexed to a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell
things annexed to spiritual things.
On the contrary, Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii, cap.
Si quis objecerit): "Whoever sells one of two such things, that the one
is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. Wherefore let
no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical."
I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways.
First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have to
spiritual things, because it is not competent save to those who hold a
clerical office. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from
spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such
things, because the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual.
Other things are annexed to spiritual things through being directed
thereto, for instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the
presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred
vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore
such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede
them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as
annexed to spiritual things.
Reply to Objection 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual
things, as to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal
things, but their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of
a lawful sale.
Reply to Objection 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual
things as to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold.
Yet their material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the
poor provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over
them, since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer
sacred vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made
out of the same material they would have to be consecrated again.
Reply to Objection 3: We have no authority for supposing that the
double cave which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for
that purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used
for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be
lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a
church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places are
looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price as
payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did
not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary plot
of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy
land on which there has previously been a church, as we have also said
with regard to sacred vessels (Reply OBJ[2]). Or again, Abraham is to
be excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For although
Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed that he
could not accept it gratis without prejudice to himself.
The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's choice,
according to Malach. 1:2,3, "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."
Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not
in buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of his
grievance.
The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can
it be granted "in fee," but is transferred with the property sold or
granted.
The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, but
merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of tithe,
as stated above ([3149]Q[87], A[3]).
With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be observed,
that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a person to a
benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of
the benefice in question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on
the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that
benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as
though he demanded payment from him, and he would not escape the guilt
of simony.
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Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent
of service, or for an oral remuneration?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things
in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral remuneration.
Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): "It is right that those who serve
the interests of the Church should be rewarded." Now an equivalent of
service denotes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it seems
lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for services received.
Objection 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service
received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so on
account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it
implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former
simoniacal.
Objection 3: Further, that which is done only at another's request
would seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve
simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration
denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person's
request. Therefore this is not simoniacal.
Objection 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that
they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral remuneration:
and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral
remuneration does not entail simony.
On the contrary, Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says:
"Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose
for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in consideration
of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service rendered or
money received, is guilty of simony."
I answer that, As stated above [3150](A[2]), the term "money" denotes
"anything that can have a pecuniary value." Now it is evident that a
man's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a
pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage.
Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be
rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or
promised, at which that service could be valued. If likewise, to grant
a person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to
some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as
a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any eternal
thing which comes under the head of "real remuneration," so too does he
contract it, by receiving "oral remuneration" or an "equivalent in
service rendered."
Reply to Objection 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service,
directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or
benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical
benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the service,
as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case
of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has in mind. But
if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things (e.g. a
service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his kindred, or the
increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a case of
remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony.
Reply to Objection 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a
person by reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and
carnal, but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return,
wherefore it does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which
simony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice
with the understanding or intention that he provide for one's kindred
from the revenue is manifest simony.
Reply to Objection 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that
pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby
man's favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend
this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an
unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention
wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made for
a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is based
on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is granted to
the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there may be
simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of the
person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for himself,
that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption renders him
unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy person. But, if
one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical
benefice without the cure of souls.
Reply to Objection 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for
the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false
pretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that
seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being
deprived of what they have acquired by simony?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not
fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by
simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for
a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when once
acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a consecration.
Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person to be deprived of
what he has acquired simoniacally.
Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained
the episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders
from him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church
tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the
power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if
he has acquired it by simony.
Objection 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done
without his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin
which is voluntary, as was shown above ([3151]FS, Q[74], AA[1],2;
[3152]FS, Q[77], A[7]). Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires
something spiritual, which others have procured for him without his
knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not be punished by being
deprived of what has been bestowed on him.
Objection 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a
person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to
restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit
of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate
and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that
which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored.
Objection 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a
monastery by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But
no one should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a
fault he has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the
monastic state which he has acquired by simony.
Objection 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not
inflicted for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is
the judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will,
wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above
(A[1], ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what
he has acquired by simony.
Objection 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less
than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those
who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater
dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have
received.
On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): "He
that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or
promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the
dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money."
I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired
against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to give some
of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will and orders,
the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our Lord,
Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered
spiritual things to be given gratis, according to Mat. 10:8, "Freely
have you received, freely give." Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual
things in return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them.
Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying
spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced
to other punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be
clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap.
Si quis Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas].
Reply to Objection 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally,
receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the
sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the
Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, and
against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by
virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should not
busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others, namely,
that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his Order,
whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which
he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it.
Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders
simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a
benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal
transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the
law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret
he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself alone, and not
as regards others.
Reply to Objection 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one
knows to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his
command or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders
from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they
are ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a
dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive Orders
in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of
simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order without a
dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, because no one
should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an
unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law, suspended as
regards both himself and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore
no one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders from him for
any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one
ought not to give credence to another's sin, and so one ought with a
good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been
guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and the fact
be a secret, one can receive Orders from him because he is not
suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated
above (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not
only the punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of
acquiring unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot
sell it. Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives
Orders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he
deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his
order, and resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom,
but also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with
infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually
acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful
possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits,
allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits),
excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the
Church.
On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by
others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of
his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with
fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he
has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be
made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an
enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he
is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the
transaction, by paying what was promised.
Reply to Objection 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received,
must be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their
transfer, notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the
chapter of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the
losers by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the
guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire
chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of
superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church.
Reply to Objection 5: If there are any persons who have been
simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the
simony was committed with their knowledge since the holding of the
General Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent
III], they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of
return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some
house of the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however,
this took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses
of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into
monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they wander
about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former rank,
and must be assigned a lower place.
On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their
knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting
they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.
Reply to Objection 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty
of simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is
not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to
repent of his evil intention.
Reply to Objection 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one
who has knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases
the bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all
renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive
either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the
laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to
retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater dispensation,
allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor orders; or a
full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the
same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.
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OF PIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)
After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will
render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of inquiry
arise with regard to piety:
(1) To whom does piety extend?
(2) What does piety make one offer a person?
(3) Whether piety is a special virtue?
(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of
religion?
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Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?
Objection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human
individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes,
properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by
the term {eusebeia}. But the worship of God does not denote relation to
man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to
certain human individuals.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): "Piety, on her day,
provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart
with works of mercy." Now the works of mercy are to be done to all,
according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not
extend definitely to certain special persons.
Objection 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual
relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), and on each of them is founded a kind of
friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a
gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of piety [Douay:
'godliness']." Therefore piety extends not only to one's kindred and
fellow-citizens.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by piety
that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country
and render them faithful service."
I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways,
according to their various excellence and the various benefits received
from them. on both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely
excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government.
In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our
parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment.
Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country,
after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to
God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship
to one's parents and one's country.
The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our
kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same
parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship
given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to
all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to
these.
Reply to Objection 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the
worship due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a
particular. Hence it is written (Malach. 1:6): "If I be a father, where
is My honor?" Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine
worship.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "the term
piety is often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language
of the common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact
that God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him
than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word
'pious' to God Himself."
Reply to Objection 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and
fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than
other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether piety provides support for our parents?
Objection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our
parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, "Honor thy
father and mother," belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the
giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide
support for one's parents.
Objection 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is
bound to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), "neither
ought the children to lay up for the parents." Therefore piety does not
oblige them to support their parents.
Objection 3: Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also
to other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above
[3153](A[1]). But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and
fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's
parents.
On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for
hindering children from supporting their parents.
I answer that, We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to
say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that
which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's superior
through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence
and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him
to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if
he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to
his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him;
and so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service
due. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "piety gives both duty
and homage": "duty" referring to service, and "homage" to reverence or
honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "we are said to give
homage to those whose memory or presence we honor."
Reply to Objection 1: According to our Lord's interpretation (Mat.
15:3-6) the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe
them; and the reason for this is that support is given to one's father
because it is due to him as to one greater.
Reply to Objection 2: Since a father stands in the relation of
principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a
principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son:
and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but
for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son
to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising from some
momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay
by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the
successors of their children, but children of their parents.
Reply to Objection 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), "we offer
homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our
country"; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and
to others according to our means and their personal claims.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from
other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds
from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct
virtue from charity.
Objection 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God.
But piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ.
Dei x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.
Objection 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and
duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common
good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as a
part of justice.
I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object under a
special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in
rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of
something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing is
indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural principle of
being and government. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it
pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those who are
related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope
and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety
is a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and
country.
Reply to Objection 2: God is the principle of our being and government
in a far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence
religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety,
which pays homage to our parents and country. But things relating to
creatures are transferred to God as the summit of excellence and
causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, by way of
excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, by way of
excellence, is called "Our Father."
Reply to Objection 3: Piety extends to our country in so far as the
latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the
good of our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal
justice has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the
sake of religion?
Objection 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents
should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Lk.
14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother,
and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life
also, he cannot be My disciple." Hence it is said in praise of James
and John (Mat. 4:22) that they left "their nets and father, and
followed" Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites (Dt. 33:9):
"Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do not know you; and
to his brethren: I know you not; and their own children they have not
known. These have kept Thy word." Now a man who knows not his parents
and other kinsmen, or who even hates them, must needs omit the duties
of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake
of religion.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lk. 9:59,60) that in answer to him
who said: "Suffer me first to go and bury my father," Our Lord replied:
"Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the kingdom of
God." Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety
to bury one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for
the sake of religion.
Objection 3: Further, God is called "Our Father" by excellence. Now
just as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do
we worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be
omitted for the sake of the worship of religion.
Objection 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not
break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with
those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, both
on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on
the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister without
the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of piety towards
one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion.
On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees (Mat. 15:3-6) who
taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying
one's parents the honor we owe them.
I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is
opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his
book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos.), "good is not opposed to good."
Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one
another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other.
Now, as stated above ([3154]FS, Q[7], A[2]; [3155]FS, Q[18], A[3]), the
act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if
it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of vice.
Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's parents
according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that man should
tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Lk.
12:52, "the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of
kindred."
Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the
worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to
one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad
Heliod.): "Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy
mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the
cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter."
Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents
should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God.
If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not
withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and
there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says
(Hom. xxxvii in Ev.) that "when we find our parents to be a hindrance
in our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from
them." For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the
service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them.
It is in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their
kindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the
idolaters (Ex. 32). James and John are praised for leaving their
parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to
evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another means
of livelihood, if they followed Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father
because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth.), "Our Lord by
so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries and
other things that one anticipates under these circumstances. For after
the burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and
so forth: but chiefly, because there were others who could see to the
funeral." Or, according to Cyril's commentary on Lk. 9, "this
disciple's request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that
he might support a yet living father in the latter's old age, until at
length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord did not grant, because
there were others, bound by the duties of kindred, to take care of
him."
Reply to Objection 3: Whatever we give our parents out of piety is
referred by us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform
with regard to any of our neighbors are offered to God, according to
Mat. 25:40: "As long as you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you
did it to Me." Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our
assistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided they
incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for the sake
of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to their service without
sin, or if they can be supported without our assistance, it is lawful
to forego their service, so as to give more time to religion.
Reply to Objection 4: We must speak differently of one who is yet in
the world, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he
that is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support without
him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because he would be
breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of parents. Some say,
however, that even then he might abandon them, and leave them in God's
care. But this, considered aright, would be to tempt God: since, while
having human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents to danger,
in the hope of God's assistance. on the other hand, if the parents can
find means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to abandon
them and enter religion, because children are not bound to support
their parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He that
has already made his profession in religion is deemed to be already
dead to the world: wherefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting
his parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ, and
busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound,
saving his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state withal,
to make points efforts for his parents' support.
__________________________________________________________________
OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of
which will manifest the contrary vices.
Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other
virtues?
(2) What does observance offer?
(3) Of its comparison with piety.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue, distinct
from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. But
the object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety: for
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by observance that we pay
worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity." But
worship and honor are paid also by piety to our parents, who excel in
dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct virtue from piety.
Objection 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that
are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel
in science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay
honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore
observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in
dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a
position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law,
according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute to
whom tribute is due," etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of
the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice. Therefore
observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from other
virtues.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance along
with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.
I answer that, As explained above ([3156]Q[101], AA[1],3;[3157] Q[80]),
according to the various excellences of those persons to whom something
is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of virtues in a
descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character
of principle in a particular way, which character is found in God in a
universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence
in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular
way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of
learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life:
while a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle of
government with regard to certain things: for instance, the governor of
a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of
warfare, a professor in matters of learning, and so forth. Hence it is
that all such persons are designated as "fathers," on account of their
being charged with like cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him
(4 Kings 5:13): "Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great
thing," etc.
Therefore, just as, in a manner, religion, whereby worship is given to
find piety, whereby we worship our so under piety we find observance,
whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3158]Q[101], A[3], ad 2),
religion goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although
piety properly so called is distinct from religion; and in the same way
piety can be called observance by way of excellence, although
observance properly speaking is distinct from piety.
Reply to Objection 2: By the very fact of being in a position of
dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a
certain power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he
should be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of
others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of
science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in
relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself.
Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and
honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as science,
virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity,
the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence
whatever belongs to the same virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking,
to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot
be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their
position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our
parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and
not to special justice, which is a principal virtue.
Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above
([3159]Q[58], A[6]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are
in positions of dignity?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay
worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons whom we
hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the same.
Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and
honor to persons in positions of dignity.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe:
wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of
justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in
positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us.
Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and honor
to all.
Objection 3: Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity
who are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of
remuneration, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their
dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to
whom fear; honor to whom honor." Moreover, we owe them reverence and
subjection, according to Heb. 13:17, "Obey your prelates, and be
subject to them." Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as
paying worship and honor.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by
observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some
kind of dignity."
I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern
subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: thus
a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a
certain excellence and power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a
person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration:
first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together with a
certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the exercise of his
government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honor,
which is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in respect of
the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting
in rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him,
according to one's faculty, for the benefits we received from him.
Reply to Objection 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also
whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations
between man and man.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3160]Q[80]), debt is twofold.
One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man
owes honor and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are
placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a
certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honor to
persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.
Reply to Objection 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in
positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is
due to them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the
exercise of their government there is due both obedience, whereby
subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes,
which are a repayment of their labor.
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Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?
Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety.
For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a
father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular
governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the
state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is
greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance
is a greater virtue than piety.
Objection 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the
common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we
ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to
expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common good.
Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in positions
of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays worship to one's
kindred.
Objection 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the
first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the virtuous
by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore
observance takes the first place after religion.
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Now,
immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the first
table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers to
piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the order
of excellence.
I answer that, Something may be paid to persons in positions of dignity
in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when one serves
them in the administration of the affairs of the state. This no longer
belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays worship not only to
one's father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that which is paid
to persons in positions of dignity refers specially to their personal
usefulness or renown, and this belongs properly to observance, as
distinct from piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we
must needs take into consideration the different relations in which
other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both virtues regard.
Now it is evident that the persons of our parents and of our kindred
are more substantially akin to us than persons in positions of dignity,
since birth and education, which originate in the father, belong more
to one's substance than external government, the principle of which is
seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety
takes precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons
more akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.
Reply to Objection 1: The prince is compared to the father as a
universal to a particular power, as regards external government, but
not as regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this
way the father should be compared with the divine power from which all
things derive their being.
Reply to Objection 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are
related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to
observance, but to piety, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be
proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered
in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore,
though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of
honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a
greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received from
their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay worship and
honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are not of their
kindred.
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OF DULIA (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1)
dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto to
those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey
their commands.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?
(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?
(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are above
us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?
(4) Whether it contains several species?
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Whether honor denotes something corporal?
Objection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal.
For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be
gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is
something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated above
([3161]Q[81], A[2], ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3),
"honor is the reward of virtue." Now, since virtue consists chiefly of
spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the reward
is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not consist of
corporal things.
Objection 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from
glory. Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor
consists of things internal and spiritual.
On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, "Honor widows
that are widows indeed," and (1 Tim. 5:17), "let the priests that rule
well be esteemed worthy of double honor" etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch.):
"Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for remuneration." Now both
of these pertain to spiritual things. Therefore honor consists of
corporal things.
I answer that, Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence.
Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their
excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now
witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is
the searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices.
wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere
internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges
either God's excellence or another man's excellence before God. But, as
regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs, either by
words, as when one proclaims another's excellence by word of mouth, or
by deeds, for instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by
external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like.
Accordingly honor consists of signs, external and corporal.
Reply to Objection 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the
one hand it is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one
man honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the
other hand, it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in
order that he may be held in reverence by others.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3),
honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and
corporal things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things
themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling virtue.
It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be
made known, according to Mat. 5:15, "Neither do men light a candle, and
put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all
that are in the house." In this sense honor is said to be the reward of
virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways.
First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor
consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor.
Secondly, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a
person's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear
witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise one that
works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even to the
best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived at the
end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).
Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our
bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes
clear to the knowledge of many. The word "glory" signifies this, for
"glory" is the same as {kleria}, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom.
16:27 observes that glory is "clear knowledge together with praise."
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Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us?
Objection 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are
above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to Mat.
11:11, "He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John
the Baptist." Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honor
him (Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to those who are above
us.
Objection 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his
virtue, as stated above [3162](A[1]; Q[63], A[3]). But sometimes those
who are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them,
as neither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in
the order of nature.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 12:10): "With honor
preventing one another," and we read (1 Pet. 2:17): "Honor all men."
But this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are above
us. Therefore honor is not due properly to those who are above us.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that Tobias "had ten
talents of silver of that which he had been honored by the king": and
we read (Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered it
to be proclaimed in his presence: "This honor is he worthy of whom the
king hath a mind to honor." Therefore honor is paid to those also who
are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not due
properly to those who are above us.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that "honor is due
to the best."
I answer that, As stated above [3163](A[1]), honor is nothing but an
acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's
excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor
him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in
itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is
always due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority.
For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those who
honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some
others, or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in
some respect and not simply.
Reply to Objection 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind
of honor, but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God.
Or again, he forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to
indicate the dignity of John himself, for which Christ equaled him to
the angels "according to the hope of glory of the children of God":
wherefore he refused to be honored by him as though he were superior to
him.
Reply to Objection 2: A wicked superior is honored for the excellence,
not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and
because the honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which
he presides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and
should be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor.
Reply to Objection 3: In every man is to be found something that makes
it possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3,
"In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves," and thus,
too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another.
Reply to Objection 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by
kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity but on
account of some excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and
Mardochaeus were honored by kings.
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Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria?
Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct from
latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I put my
trust," says: "Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by
creation, to Whom we owe latria." Now the virtue directed to God as
Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as God.
Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8),
"to be loved is like being honored." Now the charity with which we love
God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia
whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria with
which we honor God.
Objection 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an
image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the
thing represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being
made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis.
2:22,23) that "they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God
created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made
him." Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God
is honored.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage due
to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey
their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from
latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God."
I answer that, According to what has been stated above ([3164]Q[101],
A[3]), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there
must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is
due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is
competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has
absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly,
which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a
certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a
particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays
due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, which
pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a species of
observance, because by observance we honor all those who excel in
dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for
their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of
excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so
again latria is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is
our Lord by way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the
power to create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this
gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of
creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in respect
of lordship, which is communicated to a creature.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since
that which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone.
Wherefore the charity with which we love God is the same as that with
which we love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct
from charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved.
In like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another
for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and
dulia are not the same virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to
the thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an
image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the
movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to the
thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulia
regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in respect of
that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in
showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God
actually.
Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion,
towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be
towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of
God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence
that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether dulia has various species?
Objection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we
show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under
different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in
the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is
divided into specifically different virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes,
as pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a
mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having
a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being
the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species
of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia.
Objection 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the
image of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational
creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted
by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we
must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more
since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for instance,
to the wood of the Holy Cross.
On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not
divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia.
I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be
taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account
of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance,
and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken
in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one
another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting
the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies servitude,
as stated above [3165](A[3]). Taken in this sense it is not divided
into different species, but is one of the species of observance,
mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason that a servant
reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer
under another, the disciple his master under another, and so on in
similar cases.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken
in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a
man by reason of his having an affinity to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an
irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are
naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay
to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's
robe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).
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OF OBEDIENCE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?
(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?
(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;
(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?
(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man is bound to obey another?
Objection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For
nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has so
ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus.
15:14, "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of
his own counsel." Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.
Objection 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would
have to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his
rule of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule
of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.
Objection 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it
acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous.
Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good
deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less
acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is
not bound to obey another.
On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): "Obey your prelates and
be subject to them."
I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things proceed from
natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In
natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their
actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God:
and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their
will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by
reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the
divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be
subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in
virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to
obey their superiors.
Reply to Objection 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not
as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because,
unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity
to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from
his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in
doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his
superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give way to
another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts."
Reply to Objection 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all
rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more
than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will
of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will
of this other man who obeys him.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In
one way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not
bound to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he
does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous,
praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the
will. Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt
will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially before
God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether obedience is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For
disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general
sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey the
divine law." Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or
moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not
comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since
it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more
obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a
special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own." But
every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its
own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Objection 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their
objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a
superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are
degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue,
comprising many special virtues.
On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice,
as stated above ([3166]Q[80]).
I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have
a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to render
a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the
divinely established order of things, as shown above [3167](A[1]), and
therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order,
as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. [3168]FP, Q[5], A[5]].
Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of
its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their
superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands
out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue,
and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the
superior's will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a
man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by
obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his
superior's will.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object
from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues
correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils
both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good end,
and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord.
Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in
acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts
of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above ([3169]FS, Q[96],
A[3]). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and
pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil
except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in
its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect
of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special
sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one perform
an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of
fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept
with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a
wide sense for the performance of any action that may be a matter of
precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any
intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, and
disobedience a general sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its
direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether
expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior,
indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly,
according to Titus 3:1, "Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to
obey at a word," etc.
It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it
observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is
measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in so
far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he
ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion
([3170]Q[92], A[2]). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in
the person who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person
who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v,
4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of
him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in
fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior,
who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be
a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning
justice ([3171]Q[58], A[10]).
Reply to Objection 3: Obedience, like every virtue requires the will to
be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is
repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and
this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience make a man's
will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of
the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for
its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable
matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to
comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will.
But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but,
considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as happens in
disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled
except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that
"obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable
matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems to tend principally,
not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfilment of
one's own desire; but that "it increases in disagreeable or difficult
matters," because there one's own will tends to nothing beside the
precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances:
for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of God, Who searches
the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience,
while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the will
of him that obeys tend no less devotedly [*Cf.[3172] Q[82], A[2]] to
the fulfilment of the precept.
Reply to Objection 4: Reverence regards directly the person that
excels: wherefore it admits a various species according to the various
aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the
precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one
aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account of
reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one species,
though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): "Obedience is better than
sacrifices." Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which
is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above ([3173]Q[81],
A[6]). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when
ingrafted." Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore
obedience is greater than all the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "evil should
never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience
we should lay aside the good we are doing." Now one does not lay aside
a thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose
sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other
virtues.
On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from
charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be
practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not
through fear of punishment, but through love of justice." Therefore
charity is a greater virtue than obedience.
I answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemning God and adhering
to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man
contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is
greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man
contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue
derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from his
contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological,
virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the
moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order
to adhere to God.
Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns
that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are three
kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The lowest of
these are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place,
and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief,
in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes use of all
other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience,
whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy
than the other moral virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of
God.
Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is rightly preferred
to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas by
obedience we slay our own will." Wherefore even any other acts of
virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of
obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to
give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to
the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to
obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if
they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from
obedience. For it is written (1 Jn. 2:4,5): "He who saith that he
knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he
that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is
perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.
Reply to Objection 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays
worship and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained
under different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding
the aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far
as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a
way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence
for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it
proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains
to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore from
this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer
sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice we slay another's body,
whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as Gregory says (Moral.
xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been
better for Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals
of the Amalekites against the commandment of God.
Reply to Objection 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under
a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue
act causally or dispositively towards their generation and
preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And
yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues
absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of virtue
come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue
without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be
any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue
is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith,
whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine authority, by
reason of which the power to command is competent to God. Secondly,
because infusion of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of
time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all
virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to
which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so
forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of
obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of
necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake
of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to
do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), "he
who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many
others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from
starvation, through being deprived of every good." Thus the loss of one
good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.
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Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things?
Objection 1: It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For it
is written (Mat. 9:30,31) that our Lord after healing the two blind men
commanded them, saying: "See that no man know this. But they going out
spread His fame abroad in all that country." Yet they are not blamed
for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey God in
all things.
Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to
virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to
virtue: thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22);
and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which
things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who
was an adulteress (Osee 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore
God is not to be obeyed in all things.
Objection 3: Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine
will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to
conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as stated
above ([3174]FS, Q[19], A[10]). Therefore man is not bound to obey God
in all things.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 24:7): "All things that the Lord
hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient."
I answer that, As stated above [3175](A[1]), he who obeys is moved by
the command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by
their motive causes. Now just a God is the first mover of all things
that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as
shown above ([3176]FS, Q[9], A[6]). Therefore just as all natural
things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too
all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the
divine command.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the
miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine
precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), "gave an example to His
servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and
yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that
others might profit by their example."
Reply to Objection 2: Even as God does nothing contrary to nature
(since "the nature of a thing is what God does therein," according to a
gloss on Rom. 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted
course of nature; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue
since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity
with God's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary
to the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to
Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God
is the author of life an death. Nor again was it contrary to justice
that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians,
because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was
it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress,
because God Himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right
manner of intercourse with woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is
evident that the persons aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying God
or by willing to obey Him.
Reply to Objection 3: Though man is not always bound to will what God
wills, yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This
comes to man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man
is bound to obey God's commands in all things.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
Objection 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors
in all things. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:20): "Children, obey your
parents in all things," and farther on (Col. 3:22): "Servants, obey in
all things your masters according to the flesh." Therefore in like
manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.
Objection 2: Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects,
according to Dt. 5:5, "I was the mediator and stood between the Lord
and you at that time, to show you His words." Now there is no going
from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between.
Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of
God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 4:14): "You . . . received me as
an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus" and (1 Thess. 2:13): "When you
had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not
as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God." Therefore
as man is bound to obey God in all things, so is he bound to obey his
superiors.
Objection 3: Further, just as religious in making their profession take
vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a
religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things.
Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 5:29): "We ought to obey God
rather than men." Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior are
against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all things.
I answer that, As stated above ([3177]AA[1],4), he who obeys is moved
at the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity
of justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its
mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by its
mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising
from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not burnt by
fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of
order in the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is
subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is not subject
thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the
action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as regards being dried
up or consumed. In like manner there are two reasons, for which a
subject may not be bound to obey his superior in all things. First on
account of the command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on Rom.
13:2, "They that resist [Vulg.: 'He that resisteth'] the power, resist
the ordinance of God" (cf. St. Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). "If a
commissioner issue an order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to
the bidding of the proconsul? Again if the proconsul command one thing,
and the emperor another, will you hesitate, to disregard the former and
serve the latter? Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God
another, you must disregard the former and obey God." Secondly, a
subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to
do something wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De
Beneficiis iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the
whole man: for the better part of him is excepted." His body is
subjected and assigned to his master but his soul is his own.
Consequently in matters touching the internal movement of the will man
is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.
Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to
be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature all
men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching
the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support
of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are
not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the
question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of
virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of
actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior
within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey
his general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters
touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father
in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the
household; and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: When the Apostle says "in all things," he refers
to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is subject to God simply as regards all
things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him
in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their
superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular
way, in respect of which the superior stands between God and his
subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is
immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or by
the written law.
Reply to Objection 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular
mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors:
wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong
to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation.
If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to
the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not
contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case
would be unlawful.
Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient
for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey:
secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly,
indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.
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Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers?
Objection 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular
power. For a gloss on Mat. 17:25, "Then the children are free," says:
"If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that
kingdom are free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway are
all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom." Now Christians, by
their faith in Christ, are made children of God, according to Jn. 1:12:
"He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in
His name." Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 7:4): "You . . . are become
dead to the law by the body of Christ," and the law mentioned here is
the divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are
subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law of
the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become members
of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby
they were under the power of secular princes.
Objection 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress
them with violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): "Without
justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?" Since therefore
the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with
injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that
Christians ought not to obey secular princes.
On the contrary, It is written (Titus 3:1): "Admonish them to be
subject to princes and powers," and (1 Pet. 2:13,14): "Be ye subject .
. . to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the king
as excelling, or to governors as sent by him."
I answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice,
according to Rom. 3:22, "The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ:"
wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of justice, but
strengthens it." Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey
their superiors, else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence
faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of
obeying secular princes.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3178](A[5]), subjection whereby
one man is bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which
retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the
grace of Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the
body, as the Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that in
his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin.
Wherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from
the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby
they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on 1 Tim.
6:1, "Whosoever are servants under the yoke," etc.
Reply to Objection 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament,
and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the
comparison with human law does not stand because thereby one man is
subject to another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his
fellow-man.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as
this is required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's
authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust,
his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in
order to avoid scandal or danger.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DISOBEDIENCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
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Whether disobedience is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every
sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition given above
([3179]Q[104], A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore if disobedience were a mortal
sin, every sin would be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is
born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore
is disobedience.
Objection 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does
not fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many
commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them. Therefore
if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot
avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned (Rom.
1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[24], A[12]; [3180]FS, Q[72], A[5];
[3181]FS, Q[88], A[1]), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity
which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and
our neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His
commandments, as stated above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore to be
disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is
contrary to the love of God.
Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to
superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior is
a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to Rom.
13:2, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." It
is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws from the
superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due.
Reply to Objection 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal
sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not
disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it.
Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially,
but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their
species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept,
not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not
a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to
another species of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And
since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject
to another's command, it follows that disobedience arises from
vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out
of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.
Reply to Objection 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore
if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects,
so that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin.
Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins?
Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): "It is like the sin of witchcraft to
rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey." But idolatry
is the most grievous of sins, as stated above ([3182]Q[94], A[3]).
Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
Objection 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that
removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above ([3183]Q[14], A[2]). Now
disobedience makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything,
prevents a man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against
the Holy Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the
disobedience of one man, many were made sinners." Now the cause is
seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a
more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.
On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than
contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of
the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is
not the most grievous of sins.
I answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one
disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the
part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take
every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a
higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower
authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher
authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more
grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey
God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the
person commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of all his
commands: since every such person desires above all the end, and that
which is nearest to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more
grievous, according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the
intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it
is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more grievous the
disobedience of that commandment, because since God's will is
essentially directed to the good, the greater the good the more does
God wish it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the
commandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one who
disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the other
hand, man's will is not always directed to the greater good: hence,
when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is more grievous, not
through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that
which is more in the intention of the person commanding.
Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with
the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which
there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of
disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart
from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this because
whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's commandment.
And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin
is still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a
man's precept is less grievous than the sin which contemns the man who
made the precept, because reverence for the person commanding should
give rise to reverence for his command. In like manner a sin that
directly involves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is
more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedience from the
sin) than would be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone.
Reply to Objection 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality
but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God
just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy
Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the
contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy
Ghost, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy
Ghost, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin
against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which
lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins.
Reply to Objection 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin
was transmitted to a men, was not disobedience considered as a special
sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the
Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to
every sin.
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OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude.
Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other
virtues?
(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?
(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?
(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?
(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor
received or the disposition of the giver?
(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue,
distinct from other virtue. For we have received the greatest benefits
from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in
return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we
repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore
thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues.
Objection 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative
justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of
giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which
belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not
a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for
the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues,
since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore
thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors
received, is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice
(De Invent. Rhet. ii).
I answer that, As stated above ([3184]FS, Q[60], A[3]), the nature of
the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving
rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser.
Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He
is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our
father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and
upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that excels in dignity,
from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is found in a benefactor,
from whom we have received particular and private favors, on account of
which we are under particular obligation to him.
Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person
excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from
whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after
religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship
our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in
dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give thanks to
our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as
each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short
thereof.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is
it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God
was reckoned above ([3185]Q[83], A[17]) among things pertaining to
religion.
Reply to Objection 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative
justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is
contracted that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that
belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral
debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful
when compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii).
Reply to Objection 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue,
whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to
friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to
friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors,
although repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of
gratitude.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent?
Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to
God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from
God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of
innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems
that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the
penitent.
Objection 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes
him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing
his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to
his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had
less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn
to Thee?" And farther on he says: "And for this let him love Thee as
much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered
from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from
the like torpor of sin preserved." Therefore the innocent is also more
bound to give thanks than the penitent.
Objection 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the
greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is
more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine
says (Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that
Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe
also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not have
done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what
evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance
committed not." Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks
than the penitent.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 7:43): "To whom more is forgiven,
he loveth more [*Vulg.: 'To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less' Lk.
7:47]." Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater
thanksgiving.
I answer that, Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the recipient
corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so that when there is
greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the
part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed "gratis":
wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two
counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this
way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a
greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous
gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be said to be
greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the
penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what
he receives from God is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was
deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the
gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet
the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even
as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great
gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in
matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now,
rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iii) in treating of the voluntary and the involuntary.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor?
Objection 1: It seems that the a man is not bound to give thanks to
every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm
himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to
whom will he be good?" But a man cannot thank himself, since
thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore
thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.
Objection 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But
some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and
grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a
benefactor.
Objection 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own
profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit.
Therefore thanks are not due to them.
Objection 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is
belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his
master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor .
Objection 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably
and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is very
well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a
favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor
from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem
equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be a poor
man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man is not
always bound to repayment for favors received.
Objection 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is
inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment
of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore
favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): "In all things give
thanks."
I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to Himself
because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be
directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor,
as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires
that he who has received a favor should, by repaying the favor, turn to
his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as stated above with
regard to a father ([3186]Q[31], A[3];[3187] Q[101], A[2]), a man owes
his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the latter stands
to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally he owes him
assistance or support, if he need it.
Reply to Objection 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a
man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who
forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his
own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor on
himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves him to
resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable." Wherefore in
things that one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or
ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping
it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in relation to
others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the
Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11), in so far, to wit,
as the various parts of man are considered as though they were various
persons.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good
rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as he
ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason
withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favor had
been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as Seneca
remarks (De Benef. ii.) "promptness enhances, delay discounts a favor."
Reply to Objection 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters
much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for
ours, or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and
benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a
man who seeks fodder for his cattle." And farther on: "If he has done
it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am
ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was
profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of
malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has
been the loser thereby."
Reply to Objection 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave
does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service:
when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as
soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be
his motive, it is no longer called service." Wherefore gratitude is due
even to a slave, when he does more than his duty.
Reply to Objection 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does
what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the
deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De
Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun to pay
it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should be shown
by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but
everywhere." From this it is evident that however well off a man may
be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him
reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14):
"He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want should
be repaid with money": and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi): "There are
many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe
them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant
conversation without flattery." Therefore there is no need for a man to
desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his
kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), "it were inhuman to
desire this in one from whom you have received no favor; how much more
so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor!"
If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he
should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue
if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart
has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as
heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness he
has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix,
3).
Reply to Objection 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a
favor depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore
repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If,
however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental to
him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca
observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back
and safeguard my repayment."
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Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once?
Objection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once. For
we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be fixed.
Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet
this repayment is a duty, as stated above [3188](A[3]). Therefore a man
is bound to repay a favor at once.
Objection 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more
praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now
earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay.
Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.
Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that "it is proper to
a benefactor to act freely and quickly." Now repayment ought to equal
the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. iv): "He that hastens to repay,
is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of indebtedness."
I answer that, Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be
considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also
must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the
affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore
Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it
graciously." As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time
as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of
choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for
favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained repayment.
For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), "he that wishes to repay too
soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful."
Reply to Objection 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the
equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's
property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of
the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as
the rectitude of virtue demands.
Reply to Objection 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it
be regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall
the proper time through earnestness.
Reply to Objection 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient
time and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and
the same is to be observed in repaying favors.
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Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor's disposition or
at the deed?
Objection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at the
benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to
beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself
denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed.
Objection 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part
of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking.
Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather
than the disposition of the benefactor.
Objection 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now
God alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to
repay a favor according to the benefactor's disposition.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. i): "We are sometimes under a
greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and
has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly."
I answer that, The repayment of a favor may belong to three virtues,
namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when
the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the
like: and in such cases repayment must be made according to the
quantity received.
On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different
ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it has
the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we
have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship
that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the
usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in the friendship
based on virtue repayment should be made with regard for the choice or
disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue,
as stated in Ethic. viii, 13. And likewise, since gratitude regards the
favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the
disposition of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a favor
depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect.
Reply to Objection 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a
kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of
gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and
chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): "A kindly action
consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or
doer."
Reply to Objection 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a
species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of
justice, as stated above ([3189]Q[80]). Hence it does not follow that
we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but
in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is
thus that a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he
does the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and
readily.
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Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received?
Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of
gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to make
even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the
impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to something
yet greater.
Objection 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has
received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his
turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which
in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first
conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on
indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since "the
indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Therefore
repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor received.
Objection 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is
excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue,
it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and
opposed to justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should repay
those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return," and
this is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore
gratitude should incline to do something greater.
I answer that, As stated above [3190](A[5]), gratitude regards the
favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be
deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis
without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a
moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not
seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the
favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he
would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has
received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to
pay back something more.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[3], ad 5; A[5]), in repaying
favors we must consider the disposition rather than the deed.
Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son
receives from his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot
make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14).
But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is
possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as
Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do so,
the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude.
Reply to Objection 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which
the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, "Owe no
man anything, but to love one another." Wherefore it is not
unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit.
Reply to Objection 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we
consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of
wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will
gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the
beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.
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OF INGRATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
(2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
(3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?
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Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For Seneca
says (De Benef. iii) that "he who does not repay a favor is
ungrateful." But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without
sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin.
Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that
ingratitude is not always a sin.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who
commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract.
i), "no man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now sometimes it is not in
the power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has
not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and
yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that "to forget a kindness is the
height of ingratitude." Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being
unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), "Owe
no man anything." Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca
declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim. 3:2),
where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked." etc.
I answer that, As stated above ([3191]Q[106], A[4], ad 1, A[6]) a debt
of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin
from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident
that every ingratitude is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that
helps another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and
so no thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good
will, supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help
him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the
repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin,
because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is contrary
to gratitude.
Reply to Objection 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through
inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for
the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above ([3192]Q[106],
A[6], ad 1).
Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed
the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not
subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as
Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when forgetfulness of favors lays
hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their
repayment."
Reply to Objection 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of
love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that
anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of
love for his benefactor.
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Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For
whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this
pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds
of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin,
for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against
a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
Objection 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): "It is ungrateful
to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but
it is the height of ingratitude to forget it." Now these do not seem to
belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a
special sin.
On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness,
which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin.
I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue,
because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is more
opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to
the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to
show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner
than it is due, as stated above ([3193]Q[106], A[4]). But still more
opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude,
because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above ([3194]Q[106], A[6]),
inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly
denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now every deficiency
or privation takes its species from the opposite habit: for blindness
and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing.
Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so
also is ingratitude one special sin.
It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the
things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the
favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks,
and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time according
to one's means. And since what is last in the order of generation is
first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first degree of
ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the second when he
declines to notice or indicate that he has received a favor, while the
third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception
of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover,
since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that it
belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to
the second to find fault with a favor received, and to the third to
esteem kindness as though it were unkindness.
Reply to Objection 1: In every sin there is material ingratitude to
God, inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude.
But formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this
is a special sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special
sin from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this
way the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: These three are not different species but
different degrees of one special sin.
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Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For one
ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful to God
by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of
ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin.
Objection 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to
charity, as stated above ([3195]Q[24], A[12]). But ingratitude is
contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that
virtue, as stated above ([3196]Q[106], A[1], ad 3; A[6], ad 2).
Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Between the giver
and the receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should
forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget
having received." Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should
forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should
the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that
if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a
mortal sin.
Objection 4: On the contrary, No one should be put in the way of
committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii),
"sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives
assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he
has received." But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of
ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin.
I answer that, As appears from what we have said above [3197](A[2]), a
man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for
instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express his
appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not
always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q[106], A[6]), the debt
of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, however,
he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin
mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises either
from some kind of negligence or from some disinclination to virtue in
him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by
reason either of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing withheld,
this being needful to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of
necessity.
Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay the
debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes
mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that
is done.
It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a
mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it
arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character.
Reply to Objection 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful
to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but
there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it
removes a virtuous act of obedience to God.
Reply to Objection 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not
contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of
charity, but excludes some act thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): "When we say
that a man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a
mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a
thing so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we
mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it."
Reply to Objection 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is
not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do
so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object
of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid
vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly,
wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the
greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on whom
he is conferring the favor.
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Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful?
Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful.
For it is written (Wis. 16:29): "The hope of the unthankful shall melt
away as the winter's ice." But this hope would not melt away unless
favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from
the ungrateful.
Objection 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of
committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an
occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the
ungrateful.
Objection 3: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also
he is tormented" (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he
receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be
deprived of the favor.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:35) that "the Highest . . . is
kind to the unthankful, and to the evil." Now we should prove ourselves
His children by imitating Him (Lk. 6:36). Therefore we should not
withhold favors from the ungrateful.
I answer that, There are two points to be considered with regard to an
ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it
is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is,
what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not
easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef.
iii), "a man is often grateful although he repays not," because perhaps
he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he
should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he
does not achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a
second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favors, the more
ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing
his favors upon him.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful
man deserves to suffer.
Reply to Objection 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person
affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if
the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not
to be imputed to the bestower.
Reply to Objection 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the
part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly
physician, by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors.
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OF VENGEANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether vengeance is lawful?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;
(4) On whom should vengeance be taken?
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Whether vengeance is lawful?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps
what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is written
(Dt. 32:35, Rom. 12:19): "Revenge to Me, and I will repay." Therefore
all vengeance is unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear
with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant
2:2, "As the lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that
cannot bear with a wicked one." Therefore we should not take vengeance
on the wicked.
Objection 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment,
which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of
fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii).
Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.
Objection 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes
revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful
even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom
[*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St.
Chrysostom] says: "Let us learn after Christ's example to bear our own
wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not even by
listening to them." Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.
Objection 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the
sin of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5-7): "Of three things
my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the
gathering together of the people, and a false calumny." But vengeance
should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Mat.
13:29,30, "Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both
to grow," says that "a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor
should the sovereign." Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful.
On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save what is good
and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for
it is written (Lk. 18:7): "Will not God revenge His elect who cry to
Him day and night?" as if to say: "He will indeed." Therefore vengeance
is not essentially evil and unlawful.
I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on
one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must
consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed
chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests
there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take
pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the
charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that
he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as
neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may
not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned
against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden
by the Apostle, who says (Rom. 12:21): "Be not overcome by evil, but
overcome evil by good."
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good,
to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned
(for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be
restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and
God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due
circumstances be observed.
Reply to Objection 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping
with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes
use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of
the earthly prince that "he is God's minister, an avenger to execute
wrath upon him that doeth evil." If, however, a man takes vengeance
outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and
therefore sins.
Reply to Objection 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring
patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from
them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they
inflict on God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus
Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom]
says: "It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to
overlook God's wrongs is most wicked."
Reply to Objection 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and
therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong
to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but
only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they
belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on
God and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge
the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come
to seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked
him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him
into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong
inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if
this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood
as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i).
Reply to Objection 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be
taken on them, either in respect of the whole multitude---thus the
Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the
children of Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely
destroyed (Gn. 19)---or as regards part of the multitude, as may be
seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf.
Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the
severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the
principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord
(Num 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin
of the multitude.
On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the
multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the
innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that
this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude should
be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the sovereign,
whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it
cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: unless indeed his
sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either
spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to
arise from his punishment.
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Whether vengeance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct
virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are
the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good
does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative
justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a
special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for
an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues.
Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to
avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special
virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance.
Therefore it is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
justice.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to
virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us
through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that
virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural
inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every
definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now
there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which
reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the
concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs,
lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already
been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of
removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and
in general whatever is obscure" [*'Obscurum' Cicero wrote 'obfuturum'
but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the parenthesis]
"(i.e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it."
Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to
commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from the
bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so
too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public
justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is
concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is
resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.
Reply to Objection 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an
obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting
the fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far
as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because
charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue
proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom.
xxvii in Ev.), "there are no green leaves on the bough of good works,
unless charity be the root."
Reply to Objection 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of
excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the
measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency
and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written
(Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son." But the virtue
of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with
regard to all the circumstances.
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Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among
men?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of
punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to uproot
him. But our Lord forbade (Mat. 13:29) the uprooting of the cockle,
whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners
should not be put to death.
Objection 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the
same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with
death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death:
and this is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to
publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the
multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for
sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not be
inflicted for a sin.
On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine law as
appears from what we have said above ([3198]FS, Q[105], A[2]).
I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to
the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive of
virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing those
things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else
fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin
should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the
things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom,
and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name.
Wherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi), "Tully
writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment": namely,
"death," whereby man is deprived of life; "stripes," "retaliation," or
the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety;
"slavery," and "imprisonment," whereby he is deprived of freedom;
"exile" whereby he is banished from his country; "fines," whereby he is
mulcted in his riches; "ignominy," whereby he loses his good name.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle,
when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But
sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger,
but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the
punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.
Reply to Objection 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal
death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the
truth of the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more
of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is
inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of
others.
Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of
death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same
time as the sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of
punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have
sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from the
will of another. Yet one man is punished for another, according to Ex.
20:5, "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the
fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation." Thus
for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was curse (Gn. 9:25) and for the
sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck with leprosy (4 Kings 5).
Again the blood of Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the
ban of punishment, for they said (Mat. 27:25): "His blood be upon us
and upon our children." Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the people of
Israel were delivered into the hands of their enemies for the sin of
Achan, and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on
account of the sin of the sons of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person
is to be punished without having deserved it voluntarily.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's
power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power;
thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on account
of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal
see on account of the depravity or evil of the people. Therefore
vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.
Objection 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance
is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of
Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their
parents (Gn. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their
children were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover, dumb
animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain on
account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore vengeance
is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But
a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by
fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those
who have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 5: Further Ambrose says on Lk. 5 that "the ship in which
Judas was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the
security of his own merits, was in distress about those of others." But
Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes
punished without having voluntarily deserved it.
On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i). Therefore
vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it
voluntarily.
I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, under
the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due save
for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is
restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his
own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore,
since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as stated
above ([3199]FS, Q[81], A[1]), it follows that no one is punished in
this way, except for something done voluntarily. Secondly, punishment
may be considered as a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but
also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and in this
way a person is sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet
not without cause.
It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater
good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body never
blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it is
harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of greater
consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence,
while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a person is
punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own. Such are
many of the punishments inflicted by God in this present life for our
humiliation or probation. But no one is punished in spiritual goods
without any fault on his part, neither in this nor in the future life,
because in the latter punishment is not medicinal, but a result of
spiritual condemnation.
Reply to Objection 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual
punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects
the soul, in respect of which each man is master of himself. But
sometimes a man is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the
sin of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may
be the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in
punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a
belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their master.
Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another, either by
"imitation," as children copy the sins of their parents, and slaves the
sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater daring; or by way of
"merit," as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior, according to
Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins
of the people?" Hence the people of Israel were punished for David's
sin in numbering the people (2 Kings 24). This may also happen through
some kind of "consent" or "connivance": thus sometimes even the good
are punished in temporal matters together with the wicked, for not
having condemned their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9).
Thirdly, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one
man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to
inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all,
as though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin
of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, "Visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth
generation," seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He
does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in
order that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the
wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to
take vengeance on them.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human
judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest,
and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment
cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby He punishes
certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since
man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments so as to know
what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore according to human
judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an
inflictive punishment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man
may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of
forfeiture, even without any fault on his part, but not without cause:
and this in three ways.
First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his,
disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being
infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the
Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man
is hindered from receiving sacred orders.
Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own
but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a
certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to
the good of the clerics.
Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of
another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance
through the sin of his parent.
Reply to Objection 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in
temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a
possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also in
their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they be
spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve
to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on dumb
animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way their
owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.
Reply to Objection 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not
involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated
above ([3200]FS, Q[6], AA[5],6).
Reply to Objection 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin
of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of
one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply OBJ[1],2).
__________________________________________________________________
OF TRUTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning
truth there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is a part of justice?
(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?
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Whether truth is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of
virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object precedes
the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, but
something prior to virtue.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it
belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to
be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always
praiseworthy---neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2,
"Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth"---nor even in evil
things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Is.
3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have
not hid it." Therefore truth is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or
intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because
its object is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent.
Rhet. ii) that by "truth we faithfully represent things as they are
were, or will be." Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues,
but their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean
between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the
better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second and in the Fourth
Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues.
I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by
reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a
virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this way,
truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but a
certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing
understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as
stated in the [3201]FP, Q[16], A[1]; [3202]FP, Q[21], A[2]. Secondly,
truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which
sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs
be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and virtue is
"that which makes its possessor good, and renders his action good."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense.
Reply to Objection 2: To state that which concerns oneself, in so far
as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this
does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite
for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due
circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful.
Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for
that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by
praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it
uselessly.
Reply to Objection 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain
signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either
words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of
things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the
latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far as
this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore truth
is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue. And
it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways. First, on the
part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On the part of
the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality,
and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason
that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the mean
between one that says more than the truth about himself, and one that
says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean
is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess consists
in making known one's own affairs out of season, and deficiency in
hiding them when one ought to make them known.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether truth is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the true
and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special virtue, in
fact every virtue is goodness, because "it makes its possessor good."
Therefore truth is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act
of truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue,
since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore
truth is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives
aright, and of which it is written (Is. 38:3): "I beseech Thee . . .
remember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect
heart." Now one lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the
definition of virtue given above ([3203]FS, Q[55], A[4]). Therefore
truth is not a special virtue.
Objection 4: Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since
hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue,
since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every virtue.
Therefore neither is truth a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic. ii,
7).
I answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in making a man's
deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of goodness
in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto by a
special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii)
good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good will
be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special order
whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered in
relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto man is
perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that truth is
a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The true and the good are convertible as to
subject, since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true.
But considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the
intellect and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands
the will and many things besides, and the will desires things
pertaining to the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the "true"
considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a
particular good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner
the "good" considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite
is something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since
virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to be
a special virtue, just as the "true" is a special good; yet it is not
possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather, considered
logically, it is the genus of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their species
from what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental
and beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns
himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly
intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and
beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act
bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a
consequence beside his principal intention.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is
true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else
is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure,
namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity
to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to
duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while
having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this
virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since this
belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man
pretends one thing and intends another.
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Whether truth is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it seems
proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling the
truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the case in
all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of
justice.
Objection 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice
is in the will, as stated above ([3204]Q[58], A[4]). Therefore truth is
not a part of justice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely,
"truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine." But none
of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues,
as stated above (A[2], ad 3): truth of justice is the same as justice,
so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs
rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of
justice.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among the
parts of justice.
I answer that, As stated above ([3205]Q[80]), a virtue is annexed to
justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something
in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue
thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice.
In the first place it is directed to another, since the manifestation,
which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another,
inasmuch as one person manifests to another the things that concern
himself. In the second place, justice sets up a certain equality
between things, and this the virtue of truth does also, for it equals
signs to the things which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls
short of the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for
this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, but
rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one man owes
another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore truth is a part of
justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary virtue to its principal.
Reply to Objection 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally
owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human
society. Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless
they believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence
the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.
Reply to Objection 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But
man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters
external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the
manifestation of the truth is an act of the will.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs
from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding A[2], ad 3.
We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to
the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according
to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice
differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man
lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes
the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to another man:
and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth
of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of life. In another way
the truth of justice may be understood as referring to the fact that,
out of justice, a man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man
confesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. This
truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain directly to
this truth of which we are now speaking, because, to wit, in this
manifestation of the truth a man's chief intention is to give another
man his due. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing
this virtue: "We are not speaking of one who is truthful in his
agreements, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or
injustice is questioned."
The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths
relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain
to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in
speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern
him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are.
Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something
concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of
doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth
whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.
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Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less?
Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that
which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so does one
by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, than that
four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be
avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the
virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to
that which is greater.
Objection 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather
than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is
nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer
to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to one
extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of
equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more
incline to that which is less.
Objection 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems
to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract
therefrom; and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to
amount to an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant
to truth than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible
with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition.
Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is greater
rather than to that which is less.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this
virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is
less."
I answer that, There are two ways of declining from the truth to that
which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the
whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so forth.
This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained
in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less.
For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this seems to be more
prudent because exaggerations give annoyance." For those who represent
themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoyance to
others, since they seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who
make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since they
seem to defer to others by their moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2
Cor. 12:6): "Though I should have a mind to glory, I shall not be
foolish: for I will say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should
think of me above that which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from
me."
Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say that
what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this virtue to
incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood. And yet
this would be less repugnant to the truth, not indeed as regards the
proper aspect of truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which
should be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught with
greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is more repugnant to
prudence to think or boast that one has what one has not, than to think
or say that one has not what one has.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2)
dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice.
Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth?
(2) Of the species of lying;
(3) Whether lying is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
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Whether lying is always opposed to truth?
Objection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For
opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible
with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies,
according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.
Objection 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but
also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by
this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life.
But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii)
that "a lie is a false signification by words." Accordingly, it seems
that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the
"liar's sin is the desire to deceive." But this is not opposed to
truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt
that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a
false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie." But
this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.
I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its
object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is
the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its
own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and
stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to
formal, as stated above ([3206]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7).
Now it has been said above ([3207]Q[109], A[1], ad 3) that the virtue
of truth---and consequently the opposite vices---regards a
manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or
statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified;
because every representation consists in comparison, which is the
proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest
something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do
something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But
when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be
voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper
object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And
the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is
that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a
false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.
Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is
said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to
deceive, then there is falsehood---materially, since what is said is
false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and
effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.
However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood,
from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false;
wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its being in
opposition to the "mind." Consequently if one says what is false,
thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally,
because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it
is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is
accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on
the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through having the will
to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a
voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth
accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.
That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by
deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to
perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its
species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking;
for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come
down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is
evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it
formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it
materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth,
considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of
telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of
telling the truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words
hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a
lie is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every
kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false
by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
Reply to Objection 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection
of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to
the species of its cause.
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Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and
mischievous lies?
Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into
"officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should be
made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its
nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part.
Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from
a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that
act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act.
Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for
a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an "officious" lie for
some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in order to injure
someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds
of lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie
that profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party
so as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying
and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the
sixth "injures no one, and profits /someone in saving his money"; the
seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death";
the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from
defilement of the body." Therefore it seems that the first division of
lies is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into
"boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which falls
short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not
contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it
seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak
a lie," says "that there are three kinds of lies; for some are told for
the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is another kind of
lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of
malice." The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a
jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided
into these three kinds.
I answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with respect
to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential division
of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and
this belongs to "boasting," and the lie which stops short of the truth,
and this belongs to "irony." This division is an essential division of
lying itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated in
the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equality, to which more
and less are in essential opposition.
Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and
with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of
lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is
aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this is
called a "mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it
be directed to some good---either of pleasure and then it is a "jocose"
lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the "officious" lie, whereby it
is intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured.
In this way lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid.
Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their
relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish their
gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated
in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are contained under
"mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and then we have the
lie "in religious doctrine," or against man, and this either with the
sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second kind of lie,
which "profits no one, and injures someone"; or with the intention of
injuring one and at the same time profiting another, and this is the
third kind of lie, "which profits one, and injures another." Of these
the first is the most grievous, because sins against God are always
more grievous, as stated above ([3208]FS, Q[73], A[3]): and the second
is more grievous than the third, since the latter's gravity is
diminished by the intention of profiting another.
After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a fourth,
which has its own measure of gravity without addition or diminution;
and this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of lying and
deceiving." This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 7) that "the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in
lying."
The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. For
the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told "with a desire to
please": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie,
wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness
regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie,
which "profits someone in saving his money"; or his body, and this is
the seventh kind, which "saves a man from death"; or the morality of
his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which "saves him from unlawful
defilement of his body."
Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the
sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration
of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated
in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the
pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue than the
life of the body.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether every lie is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident
that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet they
seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the words of
Christ and of others often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly
one of them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie
is a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the
midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that
"God built them houses" (Ex. 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ
that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very
holy men that they lied. Thus (Gn. 12 and 20) we are told that Abraham
said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said
that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gn. 27:27-29). Again,
Judith is commended (Judith 15:10,11) although she lied to Holofernes.
Therefore not every lie is a sin.
Objection 4: Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to
avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole
body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a
person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man
may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another
from being killed.
Objection 5: Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised.
Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says
(Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill." Therefore
not every lie is a sin.
Objection 6: Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we
deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi):
"Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin
deceives himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when
he deceives others." Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since
no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are
told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the sake
of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in
Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): "Be not willing to make
any manner of lie."
I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus
can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be
good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a
complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius
asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus,
since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are
naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for
anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "lying is in itself evil and to be
shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise." Therefore
every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).
Reply to Objection 1: It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion
is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or
that the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be
deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ.
That the words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel
and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine
says (De Consens. Evang. ii): "He that has the wit to understand that
in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will
conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what
words that sense is expressed." Hence it is evident, as he adds (De
Consens. Evang. ii), that "we must not judge that someone is lying, if
several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words
a thing which they remember to have seen or heard."
Reply to Objection 2: The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie,
but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led
them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): "And
because the midwives feared God, He built them houses." But the
subsequent lie was not meritorious.
Reply to Objection 3: In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De
Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of
perfect virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars.
If, however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must
understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence
Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe that whatever is
related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as being
worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically." As to
Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the
truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was
the daughter of his father," Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi;
Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself said
(Gn. 20:12): "She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and
not the daughter of my mother," being related to him on his father's
side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's first-born, was
spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter's birthright
was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode of speech being
moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to signify a mystery, namely,
that the younger people, i.e. the Gentiles, should supplant the
first-born, i.e. the Jews.
Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of
perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that it
was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do
certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying
to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which end she
exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that her words
contain truth in some mystical sense.
Reply to Objection 4: A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's
neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in
this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate
in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it
lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of
necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to
tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever.
Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it
back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).
Reply to Objection 5: A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to
do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has
in mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without
faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two
reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful,
because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind.
Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the
business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be
bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to remain
unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising---since he
promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for
granted---nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because
circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did
not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. 1), did not
lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.
Reply to Objection 6: An action may be considered in two ways. First,
in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose
lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive;
although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor
does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in
the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we
meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v), "it is
not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement
must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said
figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it
to signify."
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Whether every lie is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is written
(Ps. 6:7): "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," and (Wis. 1:11):
"The mouth that belieth killeth the soul." Now mortal sin alone causes
destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is
a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: "Thou
shalt not bear false witness." Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): "Every
liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person to
whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with
him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of
iniquity." Now no one is said to break his faith or "to be guilty of
iniquity," for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.
Objection 4: Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal
sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for a
temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that "we learn from the
reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the reward
which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have
received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of
the lie of which they were guilty." Therefore even an officious lie,
such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies,
is a mortal sin.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that "it is a
precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish
to lie." Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. Therefore
every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a
lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than
others.
On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy," etc.:
"There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not
devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake of our
neighbor's good." But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose
and officious lies are not mortal sins.
I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is contrary
to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as stated above
([3209]Q[24], A[12];[3210] Q[35], A[3]). Now a lie may be contrary to
charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of the
evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.
A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false
signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to
the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so
that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity,
but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it is a most
grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be
about something the knowledge of which affects a man's good, for
instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral
conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one's
neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion, wherefore it is
contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, and
consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion
engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of
no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one's
neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent
particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this kind,
considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.
As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through
being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a
mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one's
neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and this
also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's
neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of
committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to
charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a
mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure
is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of one's
neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by
reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus
again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred
through scandal from lying publicly.
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie,
as a gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that
speak a lie."
Reply to Objection 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are
directed to the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q[44],
A[1], ad 3; [3211]FS, Q[100], A[5], ad 1), a lie is contrary to a
precept of the decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of
God and our neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false
witness against our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 3: Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity" in a
broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore
it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): "Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'And sin is
iniquity.']." It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.
Reply to Objection 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in two
ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews,
and their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous
disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore
Jerome (in his exposition of Is. 65:21, 'And they shall build houses')
explains that God "built them spiritual houses." Secondly, it may be
considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they
could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed,
the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of their
lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an eternal
reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words of
Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal
reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding
kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean.
Reply to Objection 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a
mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance
causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to
another species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin
to another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to
that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot
apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a jocose
lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps accidentally on
account of scandal. We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine
that "it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but not
even to wish to lie": although Augustine says this not positively but
dubiously, for he begins by saying: "Unless perhaps it is a precept,"
etc. Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to safeguard
the truth: because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of
their office in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters
their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow that they sin
mortally when they lie in other matters.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY (FOUR ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
(2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation?
(3) Whether it is opposed to truth?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
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Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is
written (Lk. 24:28) that our Lord "pretended [Douay: 'made as though']
he would go farther"; and Ambrose in his book on the Patriarchs (De
Abraham i) says of Abraham that he "spoke craftily to his servants,
when he said" (Gn. 22:5): "I and the boy will go with speed as far as
yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to you." Now to
pretend and to speak craftily savor of dissimulation: and yet it is not
to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham. Therefore not all
dissimulation is a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in
his commentary on Gal. 2:11, "When Peter [Vulg.: 'Cephas'] was come to
Antioch:---The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest of
Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us that
dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed"; and David
"changed his countenance before" Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings 21:13).
Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.
Objection 3: Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil
to simulate good, it is good to simulate evil.
Objection 4: Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people
(Is. 3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they
have not hid it." Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one's sin.
Therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is
never reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a sin.
On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 16:14, "In three years," etc., says:
"Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness."
But to sin openly is always a sin. Therefore dissimulation is always a
sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3212]Q[109], A[3];[3213] Q[110],
A[1]), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by
outward signs to be such as one is. Now outward signs are not only
words, but also deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to
signify by words something different from that which is in one's mind,
so also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to
signify the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is
properly denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is
properly a lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not
whether one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above
([3214]Q[110], A[1], OBJ[2]). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as
stated above ([3215]Q[110], A[3]), it follows that also all
dissimulation is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), "To pretend
is not always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification,
then it is a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some
signification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth." And
he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is "pretended,"
for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a figure of
something else that we wish to say. In this way our Lord "pretended He
would go farther," because He acted as if wishing to go farther; in
order to signify something figuratively either because He was far from
their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.); or, as Augustine
says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, "as He was about to go farther away
from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on
earth by their hospitality."
Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i) says
that Abraham "foretold what he knew not": for he intended to return
alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord expressed
what He was about to do. It is evident therefore that neither
dissembled.
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome employs the term "simulation" in a broad
sense for any kind of pretense. David's change of countenance was a
figurative pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title of
Ps. 33, "I will bless the Lord at all times." There is no need to
excuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked
man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kings
10:29,31). And yet he is praised withal and received an earthly reward
from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in destroying the
worship of Baal.
Reply to Objection 3: Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked,
because no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do
evil deeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man
might pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has
some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil,
both because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although he
is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the wickedness he
simulates. And because dissimulation is evil in itself, its sinfulness
is not derived from the thing simulated, whether this be good or evil.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that
which he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is,
for this is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by
outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not, yet
he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one may hide
one's sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus that we
must understand the saying of Jerome on the words of Isa. 3:9, that the
"second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one's sin," lest, to wit,
others be scandalized thereby.
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Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation?
Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.
For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But there may be
hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly, according to
Mat. 6:2, "When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee,
as the hypocrites do." Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as
dissimulation.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): "Some there are
who wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of
perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks of
the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and another
to sin from malice." Now those who wear the habit of holiness, without
attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, since the outward
habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore dissimulation is not the
same as hypocrisy.
Objection 3: Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our
Lord says of hypocrites (Mat. 23:5) that "all their works they do for
to be seen of men": and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that "they never
consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action they
may please men." But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention,
but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13, "Dissemblers
and crafty men prove the wrath of God," says that "the dissembler
simulates one thing and does another: he pretends chastity, and
delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse."
Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Hypocrite' is a Greek word
corresponding to the Latin 'simulator,' for whereas he is evil within,"
he "shows himself outwardly as being good; {hypo} denoting falsehood,
and {krisis}, judgment."
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), "the word hypocrite is
derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a
disguised face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to
imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under
the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to
deceive the people in their acting." Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. ii) that "just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the
parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon
is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and
in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is
not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just without being so in
reality."
We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not,
however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person simulates
another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man.
Reply to Objection 1: The outward deed is a natural sign of the
intention. Accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their
genus to the service of God, and seeks by their means to please, not
God but man, he simulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore
Gregory says (Moral.) that "hypocrites make God's interests subservient
to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly conduct they
seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves the applause of
their approval:" and so they make a lying pretense of having a good
intention, which they have not, although they do not pretend to do a
good deed without doing it.
Reply to Objection 2: The habit of holiness, for instance the religious
or the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to
perform works of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of
holiness, with the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he
fail through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because
he is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of
holiness. If, however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in order
to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a
dissembler.
Reply to Objection 3: In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two
things: one by way of sign, the other by way of thing signified.
Accordingly the evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing
signified, which does not tally with the sign: and the outward words,
or deeds, or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation
and lie as a sign.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of truth?
Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of
truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing
signified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be
opposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any virtue,
and by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms
deeds, as stated in Mat. 6:1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially
opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 2: Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile,
wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to prudence
as above stated ([3216]Q[55], A[4]). Therefore, hypocrisy which is
dissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or
simplicity.
Objection 3: Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their
end. Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory:
wherefore a gloss on Job 27:8, "What is the hope of the hypocrite, if
through covetousness he take by violence," says: "A hypocrite or, as
the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through
desire of being honored for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he
steals praise for a life which is not his." [*The quotation is from St.
Gregory's Moralia, Bk XVIII.] Therefore since covetousness or vainglory
is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is hypocrisy or
dissimulation.
On the contrary, All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above
[3217](A[1]). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore
dissimulation or hypocrisy is also.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text. 13, 24, x),
"contrariety is opposition as regards form," i.e. the specific form.
Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may be
opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another way
indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be considered
with regard to the very species of the act, and this species depends on
that act's proper object. Wherefore since hypocrisy is a kind of
dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a character which is not his, as
stated in the preceding article, it follows that it is directly opposed
to truth whereby a man shows himself in life and speech to be what he
is, as stated in Ethic. iv, 7.
The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered
in relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an
instrument of action, or anything else of that kind.
Reply to Objection 1: The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it
as his end, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to
have it, but in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have
it. Hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth,
inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And he
performs acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own sake,
but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his hypocrisy
has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3218]Q[55], AA[3],4,5), the
vice directly opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to
discover ways of achieving a purpose, that are apparent and not real:
while it accomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in
deeds: and it stands in relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to
simplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception, and
sometimes secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly to
simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this way the virtue
of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated above
([3219]Q[109], A[2], ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical
difference between them, because by truth we mean the concordance
between sign and thing signified, while simplicity indicates that one
does not tend to different things, by intending one thing inwardly, and
pretending another outwardly.
Reply to Objection 3: Gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler
as also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species from this end,
but from the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one is.
Wherefore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things of
himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as also we have said above with
regard to lying ([3220]Q[110], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For Jerome
says on Is. 16:14: "Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to
simulate holiness": and a gloss on Job 1:21 [*St. Augustine on Ps.
63:7], "As it hath pleased the Lord," etc., says that "pretended
justice is no justice, but a twofold sin": and again a gloss on Lam.
4:6, "The iniquity . . . of my people is made greater than the sin of
Sodom," says: "He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into
hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom." Now the
sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin
out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin
against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion
from seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is
deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, "Dissemblers and
crafty men prove the wrath of God": and the hypocrite is excluded from
seeing God, according to Job 13:16, "No hypocrite shall come before His
presence." Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of
dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed.
Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.
Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But this
is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself a
mortal sin.
Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is
hypocrisy.
I answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, and
simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person
whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely, who cares
not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture
is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin:
for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through mortal sin.
But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate holiness,
which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin,
whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation
itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This
will depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love of
God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal sin: for instance if he
were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine, or
that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, or that
he may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end. If, however,
the end intended be not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin,
as for instance when a man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of
such a man it is said in Ethic. iv, 7 that "he would seem to be vain
rather than evil"; for the same applies to simulation as to a lie.
It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of
holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of
this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated
with mortal sin.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF BOASTING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head,
namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) To which virtue is it opposed?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth?
Objection 1: It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of
truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast even
without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence. Thus
it is written (Esther 1:3,4) that Assuerus "made a great feast . . .
that he might show the riches of the glory" and "of his kingdom, and
the greatness and boasting of his power." Therefore boasting is not
opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 2: Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4)
to be one of the four species of pride, "when," to wit, "a man boasts
of having what he has not." Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29,30): "We
have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness,
and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I
know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is
not according to it." Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that
boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed to
the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth,
but to humility.
Objection 3: Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches;
wherefore it is written (Wis. 5:8): "What hath pride profited us? or
what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us?" Now excess of
riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to
justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that
boasting is opposed to truth.
I answer that, "Jactantia" [boasting] seems properly to denote the
uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw [jactare] a
thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift oneself, properly
speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself [*Or 'tall-talking' as we
should say in English]. This happens in two ways. For sometimes a man
speaks of himself, not above what he is in himself, but above that
which he is esteemed by men to be: and this the Apostle declines to do
when he says (2 Cor. 12:6): "I forbear lest any man should think of me
above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me." In
another way a man uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself
above that which he is in reality. And since we should judge of things
as they are in themselves, rather than as others deem them to be, it
follows that boasting denotes more properly the uplifting of self above
what one is in oneself, than the uplifting of self above what others
think of one: although in either case it may be called boasting. Hence
boasting properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes boasting as exceeding men's
opinion.
Reply to Objection 2: The sin of boasting may be considered in two
ways. First, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is
opposed to truth; as stated (in the body of the article and[3221]
Q[110], A[2]). Secondly, with regard to its cause, from which more
frequently though not always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride
as its inwardly moving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted
inwardly by arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of
great things about himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting,
not from arrogance, but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein,
because he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is an
uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not the
same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason Gregory
reckons boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the boaster
frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, and so,
according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its end.
Reply to Objection 3: Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First,
as an occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches.
Hence (Prov. 8:18) "riches" are significantly described as "proud"
[Douay: 'glorious']. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since
according to Ethic. iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of glory,
but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories about
themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for instance, they pretend to
be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether boasting is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is written
(Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth, and puffeth himself, stirreth up
quarrels." Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels, since God hates
those that sow discord, according to Prov. 6:19. Therefore boasting is
a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is forbidden in God's law is a mortal
sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, "Extol not thyself in the thoughts of
thy soul," says: "This is a prohibition of boasting and pride."
Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an
officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying; for
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), "the boaster pretends to
something greater than he is, sometimes for no further purpose,
sometimes for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the sake of
money." Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious nor a jocose
lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie. Therefore seemingly
it is always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin, but is
sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For Gregory
says (Moral. viii, 30) that "it belongs to the very perfect, by outward
deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are not inwardly
uplifted by the praise awarded them." Therefore boasting is not always
a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3222]Q[110], A[4]), a mortal sin is
one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered
in two ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a
mortal, and sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man
boasts of that which is contrary to God's glory---thus it is said in
the person of the king of Tyre (Ezech. 28:2): "Thy heart is lifted up,
and thou hast said: I am God"---or contrary to the love of our
neighbor, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into
invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee who said (Lk.
18:11): "I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers,
as also is this publican." Sometimes it is a venial sin, when, to wit,
a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor his neighbor.
Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, namely, pride,
or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then if it proceeds from
pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin, then the boasting will
also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes,
however, a man breaks out into boasting through desire of gain, and for
this very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and injury
of his neighbor: wherefore boasting of this kind is more likely to be a
mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "a man who
boasts for the sake of gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake
of glory or honor." Yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain
may be such as not to injure another man.
Reply to Objection 1: To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal
sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels,
not intentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not
be a mortal sin on that account.
Reply to Objection 2: This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from
pride that is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Boasting does not always involve a mischievous
lie, but only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor,
either in itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere
pleasure in boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher
remarks (Ethic. iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless
perchance he were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn
God's commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be
against the charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in
its last end.
To boast for the sake of glory or gain seen to involve an officious
lie: provided it be do without injury to others, for then it would once
become a mischievous lie.
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IRONY* (TWO ARTICLES) [*Irony here must be given the signification of the
Greek {eironia}, whence it is derived: dissimulation of one's own good
points.]
We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether irony is a sin?
(2) Of its comparison with boasting.
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Whether irony is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that irony, which consists in belittling oneself,
is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's being strengthened by God:
and yet this leads one to belittle oneself, according to Prov. 30:1,2:
"The vision which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who being
strengthened by God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of
men." Also it is written (Amos 7:14): "Amos answered . . . I am not a
prophet." Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles himself in words, is
not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of
the English (Regist. xii): "It is the mark of a well-disposed mind to
acknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty." But all sin is
inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But "some belittle
themselves in words, so as to avoid pride," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. xxix): "If thou
liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before lying,
thou hast become one by lying."
I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two
ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the
greater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of
himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle
oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in
respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its
circumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the
truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the
existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying
something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself to
possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly.
For there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly
folly annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18, "If any man among you
seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be
wise." But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same
text goes on to say, "is foolishness with God." Accordingly, he that is
strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the
estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which
human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, "and the wisdom of
men is not with me," and farther on, "and I have known the science of
the saints" [*Vulg.: 'and I have not known the science of the saints'].
It may also be replied that "the wisdom of men" is that which is
acquired by human reason, while the "wisdom of the saints" is that
which is received by divine inspiration.
Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not
of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, "nor am I the son of a
prophet."
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man
tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty,
not only if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a
sin, but also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which
sometimes is not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does
not acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.
Reply to Objection 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid
another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid
pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): "Shun not
arrogance so as to forsake truth": and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3)
that "it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting?
Objection 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than
boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is a
kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any
more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin
than boasting.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony
is not a less grievous sin than boasting.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): "When he shall speak
low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart."
Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold
wickedness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): "Those who speak
with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in
their manners."
I answer that, As stated above ([3223]Q[110], AA[2],4), one lie is more
grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is
about---thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most
grievous---and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a
mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now
irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by
any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: so
that in this respect they are equal.
But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely,
the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man's
averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by
uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
7) that "boasting is a more grievous sin than irony."
Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some
other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then
irony is more grievous.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting,
according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account
of its matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.
Reply to Objection 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the
other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by
outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for
instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind,
and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual
excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Mat. 6:16) that "they
disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast." Wherefore
such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in
different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is "the practice of
boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little
of themselves": and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that
he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too
shabby, because by both do men seek glory.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, "There
is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of
deceit," and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who,
through deceitful humility, "speaks low" wickedly.
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OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and
the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning
friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a special virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
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Whether friendliness is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship is
that which is on account of virtue." Now any virtue is the cause of
friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as Dionysius states
(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a
consequence of every virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind
of friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from those
he loves and from those who are not his friends." Now it seems to
pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to
those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue.
Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man
decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): "The heart of
the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there
is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of
pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), "is essentially desirous of sharing
pleasures, but fears to give pain." Therefore this kind of friendliness
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now
it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the congregation
of the poor." Therefore affability, which is what we mean by
friendship, is a special virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[109], A[2]; [3224]FS, Q[55], A[3]),
since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of
good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists
in order, as stated above (Q[109], A[2]). And it behooves man to be
maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their
mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so
that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the
need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order:
and this virtue is called friendliness.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in
his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves
another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in
treating of charity ([3225]Q[23], A[1], A[3], ad 1; QQ[25],26), what
things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has
not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness
thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those
with whom he is in contact.
Reply to Objection 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a
certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that "every
beast loveth its like." This love is signified by signs of friendship,
which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are
strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this:
because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not
treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to us by
special friendship.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise is
where there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his
neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat,
thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity": but
that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus.
7:38, "Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them
that mourn." Again, "the heart of fools is where there is mirth," not
that they may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness.
Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with
those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns,
but honest pleasures, according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how
pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity."
Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of
some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the
virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those
among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): "Although I
made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on (2
Cor. 7:9), "I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because
you were made sorrowful unto repentance." For this reason we should not
show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we
may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way
encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:26):
"Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy
countenance gay towards them."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of
justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this
virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably
towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part
of justice.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this
virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in
fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest
pleasures, as stated above ([3226]FS, Q[60], A[5]; [3227]FS, Q[61],
A[3]). Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is
contrary to justice, as stated above ([3228]Q[59], AA[1],2). Now,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in
like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers." Therefore
this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a
part of justice.
I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to it as
to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is directed to
another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of the notion of
justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is
bound to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to pay,
or by some debt arising out of a favor received. For it regards merely
a certain debt of equity, namely, that we behave pleasantly to those
among whom we dwell, unless at times, for some reason, it be necessary
to displease them for some good purpose.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([3229]Q[109], A[3], ad 1),
because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the
manifestation of truth without which human society could not last. Now
as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not
without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one
could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a
certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his
fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for
their good.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the
senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which have
their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves becomingly
towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they
were noisome.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that
one ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and
strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to
please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way."
This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all in
a fitting manner.
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OF FLATTERY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1)
Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether flattery is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
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Whether flattery is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists
in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is
not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov. 31:28, "Her children
rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her."
Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1
Cor. 10:33, "I . . . in all things please all men." Therefore flattery
is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise.
But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise
good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore
Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against
flattery. "It must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful
moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions
but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the
flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble." But
detraction is an evil, as stated above ([3230]Q[73], AA[2],3).
Therefore flattery is a good.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, "Woe to them that sew
cushions under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery."
Therefore flattery is a sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3231]Q[114], A[1], ad 3), although the
friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends
chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not
fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or
of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always
to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing,
and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere
intention of pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of
making some gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer" or "adulator."
As a rule, however, the term "flattery" is wont to be applied to all
who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or
deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows.
Reply to Objection 1: One may praise a person both well and ill,
according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while
observing other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person
by praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive
to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of
friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a
person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since perhaps
they are evil, according to Ps. 9:24, "The sinner is praised in the
desires of his soul"; or they may be uncertain, according to Ecclus.
27:8, "Praise not a man before he speaketh," and again (Ecclus. 11:2),
"Praise not a man for his beauty"; or because there may be fear lest
human praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written,
(Ecclus. 11:30), "Praise not any man before death." Again, in like
manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity,
so that he may make spiritual progress therein. But it would be sinful
to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, or to please
them in something evil, according to Ps. 52:6, "God hath scattered the
bones of them that please men," and according to the words of the
Apostle (Gal. 1:10), "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant
of Christ."
Reply to Objection 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due
circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one
another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is
contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards
the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas
the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at
times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether flattery is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to
Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is harmful."
But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, "For the sinner is
praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The
sinner hath provoked the Lord." Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant):
"Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery": and a gloss on
Ps. 69:4, "Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that
say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says: "The tongue of the flatterer
harms more than the sword of the persecutor." Therefore flattery is a
most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less
than others: wherefore it is written (Ps. 36:15): "Let their sword
enter into their own hearts." Now he that flatters another induces him
to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, "Let not the oil of the
sinner fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer
softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders
it susceptive of vice." Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in
himself.
Objection 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3):
"The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and
treachery shall be degraded from his office." Now such a punishment as
this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis)
reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any person of
higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of necessity."
I answer that, As stated above ([3232]Q[112], A[2]), a mortal sin is
one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to
charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways.
First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's
sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he
speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to
sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Is. 5:20. "Woe to you
that call evil good." Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one
man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in
body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written
(Prov. 27:6): "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful
kisses of an enemy." Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of
a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an
occasion of sin. In this case it is necessary to consider, whether the
occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall,
as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal
([3233]Q[43], AA[3],4). If, however, one man flatters another from the
mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or
to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to
charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who
praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than
the sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of
greater consequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so
efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively,
being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be
a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q[43],
A[1], ad 3; [3234]FS, Q[73], A[8], ad 3; [3235]FS, Q[80], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to one that flatters with
the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than
others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning,
whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.
Reply to Objection 3: The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters
another treacherously, in order to deceive him.
__________________________________________________________________
OF QUARRELING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?
(2) Of its comparison with flattery?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?
Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of
friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord,
just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated
above ([3236]Q[37], A[1]). Therefore quarreling is also.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): "An angry man
stirreth up strife." Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife
or quarreling is also.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:1): "From whence are wars
and quarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from
your concupiscences which war in your members?" Now it would seem
contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it
seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship
(Ethic. iv, 6).
I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, one
person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be observed in
this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of
the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him
from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to
pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times
contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom
someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarreling,
which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it
belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "those who are opposed to
everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody,
are said to be peevish and quarrelsome."
Reply to Objection 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction
of discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the
intention of displeasing.
Reply to Objection 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices
depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from many
causes, but on the species of their acts. And although quarreling
arises at times from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence
it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness.
Reply to Objection 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as
a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says:
"The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all
evil."
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Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery?
Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the
contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does
the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than
quarreling, for it is written (Is. 3:12): "O My people, they that call
thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps."
Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.
Objection 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in
flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another:
whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts
openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin
than quarreling.
Objection 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a flatterer
than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous sin than
flattery.
On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual
state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be
more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim.
3:2,3) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome"; and (2
Tim. 3:24): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle." Therefore
quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.
I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In one
way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more a vice
is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now
the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to
displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving
displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who
exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as
regards certain external motives, and thus flattery sometimes more
grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue
honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for
instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the
speaker to contempt.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving
secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly.
Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person
openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a
more grievous sin than theft, as stated above ([3237]Q[66], A[9]).
Reply to Objection 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not always
the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his
reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the
reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since
they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are
committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise
from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason,
although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a
greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by deceit,
seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding from
greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards the
vileness of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more
grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more
ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more
grievous.
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OF LIBERALITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely,
covetousness and prodigality.
Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether liberality is a virtue?
(2) What is its matter?
(3) Of its act;
(4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take?
(5) Whether liberality is a part of justice?
(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.
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Whether liberality is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is
contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for
one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to
the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to
himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things." Therefore
liberality is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth
contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.
Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the
liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic.
iv, 1) that "he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but
to give it away."
Objection 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But
liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues: since
many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to give;
and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise.
Therefore liberality is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel contains
many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated." Now in the
Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore
liberality is a virtue.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), "it belongs to
virtue to use well the things that we can use ill." Now we may use both
well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the
powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are without,
such as the things of this world that are granted us for our
livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these
things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and
Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to
some, in order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship.
But it suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal
man commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we
are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in
which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And
yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to
attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those
belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "It is a
commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them
to be in want."
Reply to Objection 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give
away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the
wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is
acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the liberal
man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain
people"; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "Our Lord does not wish a
man to pour out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he
do as Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might
not be bound by any household cares." For this belongs to the state of
perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q[184][3238], Q[186],
A[3]).
It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's
possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is directed
to happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "those
who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal"; and
likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence
Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "If you assist to rob others of their
possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your
liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than of
pity." Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend much
on certain evil works, are not liberal.
Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses,
without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform works of
other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not in the
same way as virtuous people, as stated above ([3239]FS, Q[65], A[1]).
In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal,
although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1):
"Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance," i.e. his means,
"for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the
giver": and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "it is the heart that makes
a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value."
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Whether liberality is about money?
Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not about money. For every
moral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to
justice to be about operations, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Therefore,
since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is about passions
and not about money.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any
kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial
riches, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5,6). Therefore
liberality is not chiefly about money.
Objection 3: Further, different virtues have different matter, since
habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are the
matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they are not
the matter of liberality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "liberality
seems to be a mean in the matter of money."
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it belongs
to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called
open-handedness [largitas], because that which is open does not
withhold things but parts of them. The term "liberality" seems also to
allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it
[liberat], so to speak, from his keeping and ownership, and shows his
mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things which are the
subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are the goods he
possesses, which are denoted by the term "money." Therefore the proper
matter of liberality is money.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 3), liberality depends
not on the quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart
of the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire,
and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things
given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of
liberality, while exterior money is the object of those same passions.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in his book De Disciplina
Christi (Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth,
and whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of "'pecunia' [money], because
in olden times men's possessions consisted entirely of 'pecora'
[flocks]." And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "We give the name
of money to anything that can be valued in currency."
Reply to Objection 3: Justice establishes equality in external things,
but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of
internal passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of
liberality, and in another way of justice.
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Whether using money is the act of liberality?
Objection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality.
For different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming
to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. Therefore it is not
the proper act of liberality.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but
also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be
connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be
unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality.
Objection 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it
but also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the
spender, and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says
(De Benef. v): "A man is not liberal by giving to himself." Therefore
not every use of money belongs to liberality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "In whatever
matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter:
Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the
best use of riches." Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good
use of money is the act of liberality.
I answer that, The species of an act is taken from its object, as
stated above ([3240]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now the object or matter of
liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the
foregoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with its
object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is
consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful goods,
since all external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the proper
act of liberality is making use of money or riches.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to liberality to make good use of
riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On
the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under
another aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing is
due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches
under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for the
fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in relation to
liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall explain
farther on ([3241]Q[134]).
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make
good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide opportunities
for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's fortitude not only to
wield his sword against the foe, but also to sharpen his sword and keep
it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use
money, but also to keep it in preparation and safety in order to make
fitting use of it.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated (A[2], ad 1), the internal passions
whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of
liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man should
not be prevented from making any due use of money through an inordinate
affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one consists in
applying it to one's own use, and would seem to come under the
designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in
devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts.
Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an
immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from
making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving
and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). The saying
of Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving: for a man is not said
to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man chiefly
to give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is regulated by
prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence that a man
should keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1)
that "those who have not earned money, but have received the money
earned by others, spend it more liberally, because they have not
experienced the want of it." Therefore it seems that giving does not
chiefly belong to the liberal man.
Objection 2: Further, no man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to
do, nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes
sorry for what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in
Ethic. iv, 1. Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to
give.
Objection 3: Further, in order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a
man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar, as
the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he might
provide himself with the means of giving to others. Therefore it seems
that he does not chiefly aim at giving.
Objection 4: Further, man is bound to look after himself rather than
others. But by spending he looks after himself, whereas by giving he
looks after others. Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend
rather than to give.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "it belongs
to a liberal man to surpass in giving."
I answer that, It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the use
of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of money is
like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money, in so far
as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a habit. Now
in parting with a thing ---for instance, when we throw something---the
farther we put it away the greater the force [virtus] employed. Hence
parting with money by giving it to others proceeds from a greater
virtue than when we spend it on ourselves. But it is proper to a virtue
as such to tend to what is more perfect, since "virtue is a kind of
perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). Therefore a liberal man is
praised chiefly for giving.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be
stolen or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but
more prudent than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be
considered in money's use, which is likened to movement, than in its
keeping, which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received
money that others have earned, spend it more liberally, through not
having experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole
cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of
liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely removes the
impediment to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to
act liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want that results
from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired money from
using it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise the love they
have for it as being their own effect, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 1).
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in this and the preceding Article, it
belongs to liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to
give it in a fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every
virtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids
whatever hinders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable
giving; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given, and giving
something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at both: but
especially at the former, since it is more opposed to his proper act.
For this reason, too, he does not give to all: since his act would be
hindered were he to give to everyone: for he would not have the means
of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him to give.
Reply to Objection 3: Giving and receiving are related to one another
as action and passion. Now the same thing is not the principle of both
action and passion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving,
it does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and still
less to beg. Hence the verse:
'In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many Should give often,
take seldom, ask never.' But he makes provision in order to give
certain things according as liberality requires; such are the fruits of
his own possessions, for he is careful about realizing them that he may
make a liberal use thereof.
Reply to Objection 4: To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature;
hence to spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether liberality is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. For
justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the less
liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of justice,
but is incompatible with it.
Objection 2: Further, justice is about operation as stated above
(Q[58], A[9]; [3242]FS, Q[60], AA[2],3): whereas liberality is chiefly
about the love and desire of money, which are passions. Therefore
liberality seems to belong to temperance rather than to justice.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to give
becomingly, as stated [3243](A[4]). But giving becomingly belongs to
beneficence and mercy, which pertain to charity, as state above
(QQ[30],31). Therefore liberality is a part of charity rather than of
justice.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Justice has to do with
the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is divided into
two parts, justice and beneficence, also called liberality or
kind-heartedness." Therefore liberality pertains to justice.
I answer that, Liberality is not a species of justice, since justice
pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another what is one's
own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees with justice:
first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as justice is; secondly,
that it is concerned with external things, and so is justice, albeit
under a different aspect, a stated in this Article and above (A[2], ad
3). Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to be a part of
justice, being annexed thereto as to a principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Although liberality does no consider the legal
due that justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due
is based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it
answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree.
Reply to Objection 2: Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of
the body. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable
to the body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly
pertain to temperance.
Reply to Objection 3: The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from
the fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom
he gives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But
the giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a
certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so
that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also to
those whom he knows not. Hence it belong not to charity, but to
justice, which is about external things.
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Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues.
For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man
is likened chiefly by liberality to God, "Who giveth to all men
abundantly, and upbraideth not" (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is
the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "in
things that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best."
Now the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since
"the good is self-communicative," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice reclines to
severity, liberality to goodness." Therefore liberality is the greatest
of virtues.
Objection 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue.
Now Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "bounty above all makes a man
famous": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "among the
virtuous the liberal are the most beloved." Therefore liberality is the
greatest of virtues.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice seems to be
more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more pleasing."
The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave and just men are
honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal."
I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the greater
virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now liberality
tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own
nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of its very nature
it tends to set in order one's own affection towards the possession and
use of money. In this way temperance, which moderates desires and
pleasures relating to one's own body, takes precedence of liberality:
and so do fortitude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to
the common good, one in time of peace, the other in time of war: while
all these are preceded by those virtues which are directed to the
Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses all manner of human good;
and among human goods the public good surpasses the good of the
individual; and of the last named the good of the body surpasses those
goods that consist of external things. Again, liberality is ordained to
a good consequently, and in this way it is directed to all the
aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not being a lover of money, it
follows that a man readily makes use of it, whether for himself. Or for
the good of others, or for God's glory. Thus it derives a certain
excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, however, we should
judge of things according to that which is competent to them primarily
and in respect of their nature, rather than according to that which
pertains to them consequently, it remains to be said that liberality is
not the greatest of virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: God's giving proceeds from His love for those to
whom He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives,
wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues,
rather than to liberality.
Reply to Objection 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by
giving forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are
better than money which liberality gives forth.
Reply to Objection 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved
is not that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than
others, but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful
in external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the
same reason he becomes famous.
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OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF COVETOUSNESS
(EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and (1)
covetousness; (2) prodigality.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) To which virtue it is opposed;
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?
(7) Whether it is a capital vice?
(8) Of its daughters.
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Whether covetousness is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not aa sin. For covetousness
[avaritia] denotes a certain greed for gold [aeris aviditas*], because,
to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external
goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for covetousness "avaritia" is
derived from "aveo" to desire; but the Greek {philargyria} signifies
literally "love of money": and it is to this that St. Thomas is
alluding (cf. A[2], OBJ[2])]. Now it is not a sin to desire external
goods: since man desires them naturally, both because they are
naturally subject to man, and because by their means man's life is
sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his substance).
Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is against either God, or one's
neighbor, or oneself, as stated above ([3244]FS, Q[72], A[4]). But
covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is
opposed neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which
man is directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this
pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1
Cor. 6:18): "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own
body." In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's
neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own.
Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now
covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is
not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:5): "Let your manners be
without covetousness, contented with such things as you have."
I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a due measure, evil
must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that measure.
Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in a certain
measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be
commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate
with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External goods
come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated above
(Q[117], A[3]; [3245]FS, Q[2] , A[1]). Hence it must needs be that
man's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other
words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have external
riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in keeping with
his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed
this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately. This is
what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as "immoderate love of
possessing." It is therefore evident that covetousness is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as
means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as
it is held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But
covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about
external things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the
acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires or
keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly against
one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external riches,
without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot be
possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify
immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches when,
for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in them,
immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against himself,
because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in his body as
do the sins of the flesh.
As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all mortal
sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of temporal
things.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated
according to reason, which is the governing power in human nature.
Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid of external things,
just as everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they
are not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with
regard to riches.
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Whether covetousness is a special sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in Greek is
called {philargyria}, applies not only to silver or money, but also to
anything that is desired immoderately." Now in every sin there is
immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away
from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as state above
([3246]FS, Q[71], A[6], OBJ[3]). Therefore covetousness is a general
sin.
Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "the covetous
[avarus] man" is so called because he is "greedy for brass [avidus
aeris]," i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called
{philargyria}, i.e. "love of silver." Now silver, which stands for
money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be measured
by money, as stated above ([3247]Q[117], A[2], ad 2). Therefore
covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently seems
to be a general sin.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known
concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding
concupiscence, it forbids all evil." Now the law seems to forbid
especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written (Ex.
20:17): "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods." Therefore the
concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is a
general sin.
On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with other special
sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written: "Being filled with all iniquity,
malice, fornication, covetousness" [Douay: 'avarice'], etc.
I answer that, Sins take their species from their objects, as stated
above ([3248]FS, Q[72], A[1]). Now the object of a sin is the good
towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a
special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind of
sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good.
And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since they are
desired under the aspect of being useful to man. Consequently
covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an immoderate love of
having possessions, which are comprised under the name of money, whence
covetousness [avaritia] is denominated.
Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been originally
employed in connection with possessions whereof we are absolute
masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said to have
health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in De Praedicamentis),
consequently the term "covetousness" has been amplified to denote all
immoderate desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says in a
homily (xvi in Ev.) that "covetousness is a desire not only for money,
but also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is immoderately
sought after." In this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in
this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in
the First Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First
Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: All those external things that are subject to the
uses of human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch as
they have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external
goods that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so
forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire
for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it is
a special vice.
Reply to Objection 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence
for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is
forbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to covet
those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.
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Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
For Chrysostom, commenting on Mat. 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger
and thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that there are two
kinds of justice, one general, and the other special, to which
covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. v,
2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
Objection 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's
exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is
appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to
justice and not to liberality.
Objection 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean
between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; iv,
1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to
liberality.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:9): "A covetous man shall not
be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no fruits
from them." Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it
inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in the
desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.
I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches
in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and
keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by
stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to justice,
and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. 22:27): "Her
princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed
blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness." Secondly, it
denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches; for
instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too
much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In this way
covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these
affections, as stated above ([3249]Q[117], A[2], ad 3, A[3], ad 3,
A[6]). In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. 9:5): "That they
would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a
blessing, not as covetousness," where a gloss observes: "Lest they
should regret what they had given, and give but little."
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of
covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is
called illiberality [*{aneleutheria}] by the Philosopher.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the
measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view
of legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's
property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally in
the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and
keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these
proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from the
point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which latter
depends on the rule of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has no
opposite vice: since it consists in having more than one ought
according to justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one
ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as
opposed to liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For no
one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy of
death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying (Rom.
1:29): "Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication, covetousness
[Douay: 'avarice']," etc. adds (Rom. 1:32): "They who do such things
are worthy of death." Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to
one's own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil
says (Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): "It is the hungry man's bread that
thou keepest back, the naked man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy
man's money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou
mightest succor."
Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is
contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all
covetousness a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save
through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace.
But, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. Chrysostom], "Lust for money brings darkness on the
soul." Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal
sin.
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, "If any man build upon this
foundation," says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that "he
builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world, how
he may please the world," which pertains to the sin of covetousness.
Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially,
for it is said of him that "he shall be saved, yet so as by fire."
Therefore covetousness is some times a venial sin.
I answer that, As stated above [3250](A[3]) covetousness is twofold. In
one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in
respect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the
unjust taking or retaining of another's property, and this belongs to
theft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q[66],
AA[6],8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by
reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q[66], A[6], ad 3),
when we were treating of theft.
In another way covetousness may be take as opposed to liberality: in
which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the
love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in such
wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the
love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mortal sin.
If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love stops short of
this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he does not prefer
the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling for the sake of
riches to do anything in opposition to God or his neighbor, then
covetousness is a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness is numbered together with mortal
sins, by reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is
bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through
fear of their want or on account of his having too much.
Reply to Objection 3: Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings
darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by
preferring the love of riches to the love of God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For it
is written (Ecclus. 10:9): "Nothing is more wicked than a covetous
man," and the text continues: "There is not a more wicked thing than to
love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale." Tully
also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, 'True magnanimity is based
chiefly on two things'): "Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to
love money." But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness
is the most grievous of sins.
Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more
grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for
Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36) that "greed is the bane of charity."
Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins.
Objection 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being
incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be most
grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an incurable
sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "old age and
helplessness of any kind make men illiberal." Therefore covetousness is
the most grievous of sins.
Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5) that covetousness is
"a serving of idols." Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous
sins. Therefore covetousness is also.
On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, according
to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness. Therefore
covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.
I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil,
consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so far
as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good.
Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on
the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the
greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that
is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is
committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin against
external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this seems to
belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered
on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately
subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin:
for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good.
Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it
is less than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of
the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point of view
the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even
to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, however,
corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while
conversion to a mutable good is the material element, the gravity of
the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted,
rather than from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected.
Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous
of sins.
Reply to Objection 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the
part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus.
10:10) it is given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own
soul to sale"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul---that is, his
life---to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues:
"Because while he liveth he hath cast away"---that is, despised---"his
bowels," in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of
a "narrow mind," namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference
to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness:
because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as
a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal
good.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in
one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is
incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns
God's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man's
sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the
greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is
incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature
ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one
seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one gives
way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication
not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more
dangerous.
Reply to Objection 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account
of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man,
like the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not
in the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external
creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects
himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use,
not for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as
grievous a sin as idolatry.
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Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For
spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of
covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore
covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the
flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results
from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who,
through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore
covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
Objection 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is
disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "He
that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." Now
covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom.
xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed
by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness
seems not to be a spiritual sin.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among
spiritual vices.
I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the
affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and
sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures
are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are
consummated in the carnal senses---for instance, the pleasures of the
table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those which
are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins
of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while
spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without
pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes
pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches.
Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks
the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man
takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is
not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a
mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in
respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and
purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a
bodily object.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement takes its species from the term
"whereto" and not from the term "wherefrom." Hence a vice of the flesh
is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from
its originating in some defect of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who
was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the
flesh in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since
while the possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself,
the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For
covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality
as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor
prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be
reckoned a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([3251]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), those
vices are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends
of other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness:
since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something
directed to an end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is
not a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness
arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those
who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses,
allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who,
wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people's
property." Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of
being a capital vice in respect of other vices.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one
which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when
an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man
sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most
desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human
life, as stated above ([3252]FS, Q[1], AA[4],7,8): wherefore the more a
thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more desirable
it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be
self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appetite at rest, as the
last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of taking
possession of something," and again it is written (Eccles. 10:19): "All
things obey money." Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money,
is a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason,
but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the
sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong
chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that
principal vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although
liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the
principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice,
because it regards money, which occupies a principal place among
sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article.
On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is
desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of
reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal man
is a fool rather than a knave."
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that money is directed to something
else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all
sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it
has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising
sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q[36], A[4], ad 1;
[3253]FS, Q[84], A[4]), provided that itself be frequently the source
of others.
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Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and
insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as
commonly stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury,
restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy." For covetousness
is opposed to liberality, as stated above [3254](A[3]). Now treachery,
fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion,
restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object,
violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have
no connection with covetousness.
Objection 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to
the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore they
should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine
daughters of covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury,
greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity,
rapacity." Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many
kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls
illiberality, for he speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted,
skinflints [*{kyminopristes}], misers [*{kimbikes}], who do illiberal
deeds," and of those who "batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers,
despoilers of the dead, and robbers." Therefore it seems that the
aforesaid enumeration is insufficient.
Objection 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects.
But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy
cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal," i.e.
covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of
covetousness.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the
daughters mentioned above.
I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise
therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since
covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two
things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this
respect covetousness gives rise to "insensibility to mercy," because,
to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with
his riches [*See[3255] Q[30], A[1]]. In the second place it belongs to
covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness
may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought [affectu]. In
this way it gives rise to "restlessness," by hindering man with
excessive anxiety and care, for "a covetous man shall not be satisfied
with money" (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be considered in the
execution [effectu]. In this way the covetous man, in acquiring other
people's goods, sometimes employs force, which pertains to "violence,"
sometimes deceit, and then if he has recourse to words, it is
"falsehood," if it be mere words, "perjury" if he confirm his statement
by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we
have "fraud"; if persons, then we have "treachery," as in the case of
Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital
sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind
allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end;
seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another
for it to have species.
Reply to Objection 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the
Article.
Reply to Objection 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid.
For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since
false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special
kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of
filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under
violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as
insensibility to mercy.
Reply to Objection 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species
rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be
said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he
gives but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is
"tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be
{kyminopristes} [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, because he
makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is
said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and
this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful
means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of
illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such as
whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have
given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to make
little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, whether
by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the
dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.
Reply to Objection 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of
money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by
violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.
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OF PRODIGALITY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?
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Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at
the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not
opposite to covetousness.
Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But
covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions
whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not
seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected
towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality
is not opposite to covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as
stated above ([3256]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now prodigality seems always to
be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal
squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore
it is stated (Lk. 15:13) of the prodigal son that he "wasted his
substance living riotously." Therefore it seems that prodigality is
opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and
liberality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that
prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we
give here the name of covetousness.
I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue
in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality
differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards
affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than
he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of
them than he ought: and as regards external action, prodigality implies
excess in giving, but deficiency in retaining and acquiring, while
covetousness, on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess
in acquiring and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is
opposed to covetousness.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same
subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from
what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes
the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and
retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard
principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be
"prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be
"covetous." Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving,
without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv,
1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in
giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in
receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since
while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he
is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it
may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good
purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence or how he
receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money,
not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.
Reply to Objection 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for
the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes
through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on
account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to
intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he
becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the
concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no
pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) "that many a prodigal ends in
becoming intemperate."
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Whether prodigality is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle
says (1 Tim. 6:10): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the
root of all evils." But it is not the root of prodigality, since this
is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18): "Charge the
rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others." Now
this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is
not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and
to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming
to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Mat. 6:34), "Be not .
. . solicitous for tomorrow," and (Mat. 19:21), "Sell all [Vulg.:
'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor." Therefore prodigality is not
a sin.
On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality.
I answer that, As stated above [3257](A[1]), the opposition between
prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of
which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful
through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that
prodigality is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as
referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual
covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the "fomes" [*Cf. [3258]FS,
Q[81], A[3], ad 2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is
speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and
in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from
covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good
inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to
satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage
correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the
desire of riches, for he had said previously (1 Tim. 6:9): "They that
will become rich," etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be "the
root of all evils," not that all evils always arise from covetousness,
but because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from
covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of covetousness,
as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in order to curry
favor with certain persons from whom he may receive riches.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and
communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does
not do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), "his
giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought
to be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor,
namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give
nothing."
Reply to Objection 3: The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not
in the total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought
to be given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the
prodigal man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those
who give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ,
and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are not
prodigal but perfectly liberal.
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Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not
communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures
himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the wasting
of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of
his very being." Now he that injures himself sins more grievously,
according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he
be good?" Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness.
Objection 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable
circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is
sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of
those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to
accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied
by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe
prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as
stated above (Q[56], A[1], ad 1; [3259]FS, Q[61], A[2], ad 1). Now
prodigality is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is
written (Prov. 21:20): "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in
the dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it": and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "it is the mark of a fool to give
too much and receive nothing." Therefore prodigality is a more grievous
sin than covetousness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "the prodigal
seems to be much better than the illiberal man."
I answer that, Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous sin
than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because
covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving,
wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving
or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the
prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous
man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in Ethic. iv,
6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the
prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but he
is easily reduced to a state of want, since much useless spending
impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover,
prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness
thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for
the reason given above ([3260]Q[118], A[5], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: The difference between the prodigal and the
covetous man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter
against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending that
which is his, and his means of support, and against others by spending
the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who
are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to the poor whom
they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like manner the covetous
man sins against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins
against himself, through deficiency in spending: wherefore it is
written (Eccles. 6:2): "A man to whom God hath given riches . . . yet
doth not give him the power to eat thereof." Nevertheless the prodigal
man exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet so as
to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor
himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his own profit.
Reply to Objection 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them
according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality
we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to
covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend too much
for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional sins,
wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in Ethic. iv,
1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs
to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on
account of the motive for which he does so it calls for blame, since he
is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others.
Reply to Objection 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all
virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to
prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.
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OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider "epikeia," under which head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether "epikeia" is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
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Whether "epikeia" [*{epieikeia}] is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that "epikeia" is not a virtue. For no virtue
does away with another virtue. Yet "epikeia" does away with another
virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and
seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore "epikeia" is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "With
regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when
they make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge
must pronounce judgment not on them but according to them." But
seemingly "epikeia" pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems that
the law should not be observed in some particular case. Therefore
"epikeia" is a vice rather than a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, apparently it belongs to "epikeia" to consider
the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v,
10). But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention
of the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the Codex of Laws and
Constitutions, under Law i: "It is fitting and lawful that We alone
should interpret between equity and law." Therefore the act of
"epikeia" is unlawful: and consequently "epikeia" is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a
virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([3261]FS, Q[96], A[6]), when we were
treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned,
are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their
diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would
apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what
commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain cases it
will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to the common
good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be
restored, because in the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens
sometimes to be injurious---for instance, if a madman were to put his
sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness,
or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to fight
against his country. In these and like cases it is bad to follow the
law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow
the dictates of justice and the common good. This is the object of
"epikeia" which we call equity. Therefore it is evident that "epikeia"
is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: "Epikeia" does not set aside that which is just
in itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it
opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it ought
to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought not to be
followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the Codex of Laws and
Constitutions under Law v: "Without doubt he transgresses the law who
by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of
the lawgiver."
Reply to Objection 2: It would be passing judgment on a law to say that
it was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to
be observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law,
but on some particular contingency.
Reply to Objection 3: Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases
where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the
interpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there is
need, not of interpretation, but of execution.
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Whether "epikeia" is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that "epikeia" is not a part of justice. For, as
stated above ([3262]Q[58], A[7]), justice is twofold, particular and
legal. Now "epikeia" is not a part of particular justice, since it
extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner,
neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside
that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that "epikeia" is
not a part of justice.
Objection 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the
part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as
being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now
"epikeia" seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied
by its name: for it is derived from {epi}, i.e. "above," and {dikaion},
i.e. "just." Therefore "epikeia" is not a part of justice.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that "epikeia" is the same as modesty.
For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to
all men," the Greek has {epieikeia} [*{to epieikes}]. Now, according to
Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore
"epikeia" is not a part of justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "epikeia is a
kind of justice."
I answer that, As stated above ([3263]Q[48]), a virtue has three kinds
of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one
of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the
whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is
predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and
sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and
posteriority, as "being" of substance and accident.
Accordingly, "epikeia" is a part of justice taken in a general sense,
for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10).
Wherefore it is evident that "epikeia" is a subjective part of justice;
and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of
legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of
"epikeia." Hence "epikeia" is by way of being a higher rule of human
actions.
Reply to Objection 1: Epikeia corresponds properly to legal justice,
and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it.
For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether
as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the
lawgiver, which is of more account, then "epikeia" is the more
important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely
that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then
"epikeia" is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general
acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10),
"epikeia is better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which
observes the letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of
justice, it is not better than all justice.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to "epikeia" to moderate something,
namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is
reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life---for
instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term
{epieikeia} is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of
moderation.
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OF PIETY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely,
piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?
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Whether piety is a gift?
Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ
from the virtues, as stated above ([3264]FS, Q[68], A[1]). But piety is
a virtue, as stated above (Q[101], A[3]). Therefore piety is not a
gift.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues,
above all the moral virtues, as above ([3265]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now
among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if
any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion
should be a gift rather than piety.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as
stated above ([3266]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of piety cannot
remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the
inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy": and so there will be
no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q[30],
A[1]]. Therefore piety is not a gift.
On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter
of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: 'godliness'] [*"Pietas," whence our English
word "pity," which is the same as mercy.]
I answer that, As stated above ([3267]FS, Q[68], A[1]; [3268]FS, Q[69],
AA[1],3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the
soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial
affection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the
spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)." And since
it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father,
it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay
worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father
in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God
as Father.
Reply to Objection 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion
does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the
flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as
Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and
Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the
gift of piety is greater than religion.
Reply to Objection 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and
worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his
kindred on account of their being related to his father so by the gift
of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men
on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to
honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one
understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii).
Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness.
And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day
of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to
revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that this
act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, "Behold how they are
numbered among the children of God." The saints will also mutually
honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints
have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.
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Whether the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," corresponds to the
gift of piety?
Objection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, "Blessed are the
meek," does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift
corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude,
"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," or the fifth
beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," since as stated above (A[1],
OBJ[3]), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second
beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of
knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Is.
11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since,
then, the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," corresponds
to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude
corresponds to piety.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and
gifts, as stated above ([3269]FS, Q[70], A[2]). Now among the fruits,
goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness,
which pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not
correspond to the gift of piety.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety is
becoming to the meek."
I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold
congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they
are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he
assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the
second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on. Another
congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each
gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the
gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and
fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the second. Yet
the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as
meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to
their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to
knowledge and piety: but taking them according to their order,
different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity
may be observed, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be
directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it
removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.
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OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;
(3) Of the second;
(4) Of the third;
(5) Of the fourth;
(6) Of the other six.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not
precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the
citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii,
1. Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, "the law prescribes about all
acts of all virtues." Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first.
principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.
Objection 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially
the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as
stated above ([3270]FS, Q[99], A[4]). But the precepts of the decalogue
are moral precepts, as stated above ([3271]FS, Q[100], A[3]). Therefore
the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.
Objection 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of
justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers
and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not
properly belong to justice.
Objection 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into
two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our
neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.
On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are
directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts
of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore
all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles
of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at once, as to
principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the
notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice,
which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate
to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and
that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it
appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another
that which is his due. Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs
pertain to justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts
of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is
about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six
remaining are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among
equals.
Reply to Objection 1: The intention of the law is to make all men
virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them
precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the
moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just
as the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in
so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are
contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the
precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.
Reply to Objection 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be
administered in different ways according to the difference of men.
Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the
decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.
Reply to Objection 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity
as their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, "The end of the commandment is
charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer
immediately to acts of justice.
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Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father
in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, "How much more shall we [Vulg.:
'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and live?" Now the
precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed
affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy mother." Much
more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, whereby all
honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is
naturally prior to negation.
Objection 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to
religion, as stated above [3272](A[1]). Now religion, since it is one
virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden:
since we read first: "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me";
secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing"; and
thirdly, "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them." Therefore the
first precept is unfittingly expressed.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the
first precept forbids the sin of superstition." But there are many
wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above ([3273]Q[92],
A[2]). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it
behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the
order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now two
things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that
the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the
generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and
in building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and
in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the
result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness.
Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end.
Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law,
the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of
religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is the last end of
man's will.
The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in
the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the
farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according
to Jer. 4:3, "Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon
thorns." Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in
religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief
obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, according to
Mat. 6:24, "You cannot serve God and mammon." Therefore in the first
precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded.
Reply to Objection 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept
about religion, namely: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day."
Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their
means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though
affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of
generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as
stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning
God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our
insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).
Reply to Objection 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For
some served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to
images. Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans
worshiped gods without using images: and this worship is first
forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Among
others the worship of false gods was observed by using certain images:
and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words,
"Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing," as also the worship
of those same images, by the words, "Thou shalt not adore them," etc.
Reply to Objection 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some
compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood
to be forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the name
of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7: "Thou
shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature," so that it forbids an
error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Dt. 5:11, "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, " adds, i.e. "by
giving the name of God to wood or stone," as though they forbade a
false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief.
Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion.
Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, whereby
superstition is forbidden.
Objection 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes ---for
instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking
in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col. 3:17, "All
whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the name of the
Lord." Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of God's name in
vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding
superstition, and thus should have preceded it.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, by swearing
to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing,
that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which is
without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much
more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden
them.
Objection 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult
to God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and
other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.
Objection 5: Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not
have been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy
God in vain."
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue it is necessary
to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in true
religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First,
by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to
others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition.
Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is
contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above
(Q[97], in the preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now
superstition hinders religion by preventing man from acknowledging God
so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue
worship, he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, according
to Is. 28:20, "The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out," i.e.
either the true God or a false god must fall out from man's heart, "and
a short covering cannot cover both." On the other hand, irreligion
hinders religion by preventing man from honoring God after he has
acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view
to worship, before honoring Him we have acknowledged.
For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before
the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.
Reply to Objection 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal
explanation is that which is given Dt. 5:11: "Thou shalt not take the
name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, "by swearing on that which is
not [*Vulg.: 'for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon
a vain thing']."
Reply to Objection 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the
name of God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a
man's word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name
more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in
consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by
this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the
explanation quoted in the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which
is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called
perjury, as stated above ([3274]Q[98], A[1], ad 3). For when a man
swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it
is not supported by the truth. on the other hand, when a man swears
without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no
vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the
swearer.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science,
we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law,
which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the
decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by
prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common
occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the
decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more frequent
occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the
latter sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part
of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the
signifying words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the
singular: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain":
since it matters not in which of God's names perjury is committed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the
Sabbath, is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue,
concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. For
this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in
commenting on Lk. 13:14, "The ruler of the synagogue being angry that
He had healed on the Sabbath," says (Comment. iv): "The Law forbids,
not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works," i.e. "to
burden oneself with sin." Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept,
for it is written (Ex. 31:13): "See that you keep My Sabbath: because
it is a sign between Me and you in your generations." Now the precepts
of the decalogue are both spiritual and moral. Therefore it is
unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain
"sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances," as stated
above ([3275]FS, Q[101], A[4]). Now sacred things comprised not only
sacred days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on.
Moreover, there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore
it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to
mention only that of the Sabbath.
Objection 3: Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins.
But in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did
not sin---for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth
day, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also
Elias (3 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of God,
Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who carried
the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Josue 7, must be
understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Lk.
13:15): "Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or
his ass . . . and lead them to water?" Therefore it is unfittingly
placed among the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed
also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not
observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord's
day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many like
things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is
unfittingly expressed.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being removed by the
first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above
([3276]AA[2],3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby
man is established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give
worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior
worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is external
worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And since for
the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, consisting in
prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a
precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior worship that
consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so
to speak, first and common principles of the Law, and consequently the
third precept of the decalogue describes the exterior worship of God as
the sign of a universal boon that concerns all. This universal boon was
the work of the Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to
have rested on the seventh day: and sign of this we are commanded to
keep holy seventh day---that is, to set it aside as a day to be given
to God. Hence after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath the
reason for it is given: "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth
. . . and rested on the seventh day."
Reply to Objection 1: The precept about hallowing the Sabbath,
understood literally, is partly oral and partly ceremonial. It is a
moral precept in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to
be given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to
set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refreshment
of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of
reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual refreshment, by
which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have a certain time
set aside for occupying oneself with Divine things is the matter of a
moral precept. But, in so far as this precept specializes the time as a
sign representing the Creation of the world, it is a ceremonial
precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical
signification, as representative of Christ's rest in the tomb on the
seventh day: also in its moral signification, as representing cessation
from all sinful acts, and the mind's rest in God, in which sense, too,
it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its
analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in
heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is placed among
the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral, but not as a ceremonial
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of
certain particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is
representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all
creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the
general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial
precept of the Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of
the Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy
himself with Divine things, and is signified in the words: "Remember
that thou keep holy the Sabbath day." For in the Law those things are
said to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other
thing is cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Ex.
20:11), "On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work." The kind of
work meant appears from Lev. 23:3, "You shall do no servile work on
that day [*Vulg.: 'You shall do no work on that day']." Now servile
work is so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One,
whereby man is the servant of sin, according to Jn. 8:34, "Whosoever
committeth sin is the servant of sin," and in this sense all sinful
acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves another.
Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his body, as
stated above ([3277]Q[104], AA[5],6, ad 1). Wherefore in this respect
those works are called servile whereby one man serves another. The
third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work of worship,
which pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work. In
this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because
that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance: since man
abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in order that he may
occupy himself with works connected with God's service. For this
reason, according to Jn. 7:23, "a man [*Vulg.: 'If a man,' etc.]
receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not
be broken": and for this reason too we read (Mat. 12:5), that "on the
Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath," i.e. do
corporal works on the Sabbath, "and are without blame." Accordingly,
the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break the
precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner it is not contrary to
the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as
teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss on Num 28 says that
"smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or
teacher of the Divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes
not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath,
and are without blame." On the other hand, those works that are called
servile in the first or second way are contrary to the observance of
the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder man from applying himself to
Divine things. And since man is hindered from applying himself to
Divine things rather by sinful than by lawful albeit corporal works, it
follows that to sin on a feast day is more against this precept than to
do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says (De decem
chord. iii): "It would be better if the Jew did some useful work on his
farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre: and their
womenfolk would do better to be making linen on the Sabbath than to be
dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the new moon." It is not,
however, against this precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because
venial sin does not destroy holiness.
Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of God,
are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to servants;
while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they are common to
those who serve and those who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he
servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both for himself and
for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the
well-being of the body, according to Prov. 24:11, "Deliver them that
are led to death": secondarily as regards avoiding damage to one's
property, according to Dt. 22:1, "Thou shalt not pass by if thou seest
thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back
to thy brother." Hence a corporal work pertaining to the preservation
of one's own bodily well-being does not profane the Sabbath: for it is
not against the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as
preserve the health of the body. For this reason the Machabees did not
profane the Sabbath when they fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day
(1 Macc. 2), nor Elias when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the
Sabbath. For this same reason our Lord (Mat. 12:3) excused His
disciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need which
they suffered. In like manner a bodily work that is directed to the
bodily well-being of another is not contrary to the observance of the
Sabbath: wherefore it is written (Jn. 7:23): "Are you angry at Me
because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath day?" And again, a
bodily work that is done to avoid an imminent damage to some external
thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says (Mat.
12:11): "What man shall there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if
the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on
it and lift it up?"
Reply to Objection 4: In the New Law the observance of the Lord's day
took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the
precept but by the institution of the Church and the custom of
Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the
observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work
on the Lord' day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works
are permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on the Sabbath,
such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again in the New Law,
dispensation is more easily granted than in the Old, in the matter of
certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity, because the
figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to
omit even in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are
changeable in point of place and time.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one's parents, is fittingly
expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one's
parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining
to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance,
gratitude, and others of which we have spoken (QQ[101],102, seq.).
Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special
precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.
Objection 2: Further, piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but
also to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the
well-wishers of our country, as stated above ([3278]Q[101], AA[1],2).
Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the
honoring of one's father and mother.
Objection 3: Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also
support. Therefore the mere honoring of one's parents is unfittingly
prescribed.
Objection 4: Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die
young, and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time.
Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the promise,
"That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth."
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love
of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our neighbors,
we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately after the
precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing
us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just
as God is the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain
affinity to the precepts of the First Table.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3279]Q[101], A[2]), piety
directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common
to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are general
precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety rather than to
the other parts of justice, which regard some special debt.
Reply to Objection 2: The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to
one's kindred and country since it is because we are born of our
parents that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the
precepts of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they
direct man to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred.
Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood to
command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as
secondary matter included in the principal matter.
Reply to Objection 3: Reverential honor is due to one's parents as
such, whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for
instance, because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as stated
above ([3280]Q[101], A[2] ). And since that which belongs to a thing by
nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among the
first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue,
there is a special precept of honoring our parents: and this honor, as
a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and whatever
else is due to our parents.
Reply to Objection 4: A long life is promised to those who honor their
parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present
life, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety
[Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the
life that now is and of that which is to come." And with reason.
Because the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain
congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and he who is
ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of
bodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honors his
parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful
for that favor: while he that honors not his parents deserves to be
deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However,
present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except
in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above (FS,
Q[114], A[12]). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the hidden
design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future reward,
some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner deprived of life,
while others, who are undutiful to their parents, live longer.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue are
unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation that one
refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required that one pay
one's debts, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their
dues." Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's
neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed.
Objection 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing
and bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on
one's neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above
(QQ[72], seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are
unfittingly expressed.
Objection 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as
denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, "The desire
[concupiscentia] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom":
secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1, "From
whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . . from your
concupiscences which war in your members?" Now the concupiscence of the
sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise
first movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against a
precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will
forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore it is unfitting
for the precepts of the decalogue to include some that forbid
concupiscence.
Objection 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or
theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder.
Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the desire
of theft and of adultery.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that which is
due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for some special
reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays that which is due
to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to
religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after the fourth
precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his
parents---which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any
special reason---it was necessary in due sequence to give certain
precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all
indifferently what is due to them.
Reply to Objection 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general to
inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the
doing of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to
be given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the
decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are
paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behoove to
include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts of
the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our
neighbor are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts,
as taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance.
For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are
understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the
principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with
one's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be
forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of
damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with
theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as detractions,
insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden together with the
bearing of false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice.
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not
include the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do
not go farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of
their prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed
or pleasure.
Reply to Objection 4: Murder in itself is an object not of
concupiscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of
good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of
good, i.e. of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good,
i.e. of something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of
something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and adultery
had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the concupiscence of
murder.
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ[123]-170)
__________________________________________________________________
OF FORTITUDE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude.
We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts; (3)
the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it.
Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude
itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3) the vices opposed to
fortitude.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?
(4) Whether it is only about fear of death?
(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?
(6) Whether endurance is its chief act?
(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?
(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?
(9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?
(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?
(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?
(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.
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Whether fortitude is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle
says (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue is perfected in infirmity." But fortitude
is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological,
intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the
theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be
gathered from what we have said above ([3281]FS, Q[57], A[2]; [3282]FS,
Q[62], A[3]). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral
virtues, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7,8): "Some
seem to be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as
soldiers," both of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to
moral virtue, "and some are called brave on account of certain
passions"; for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor,
or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does
not act from passion but from choice, as stated above ([3283]FS, Q[55],
A[4]). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since
it is a "good quality of the mind," as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7,8).
But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from
the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not a
virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers
fortitude among the virtues.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "virtue is
that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good." Hence
human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes a man
good, and renders his work good. Now man's good is to be in accordance
with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). Wherefore it
belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his work accord with
reason. This happens in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself,
and this is done by the intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing
the rectitude of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice;
thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this
rectitude in human affairs. Now the human will is hindered in two ways
from following the rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by
some object of pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of
reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of
temperance. Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that
which is in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that
presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind
is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as a man,
by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.
Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it
conforms man to reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the
infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the
Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear
bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue
of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity,
and this belongs to the perfection that is called humility.
Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a
virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than
virtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in
which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through
performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be
done in three ways. First, because they tend to that which is difficult
as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in three ways,
for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the
greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the fact that one is
hopeful of overcoming dangers---when, for instance, one has often
experienced escape from danger; and sometimes this is owing to a
certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, through skill
and practice in the use of arms, think little of the dangers of battle,
as they reckon themselves capable of defending themselves against them;
thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), "No man fears to do what he is
confident of having learned to do well." Secondly, a man performs an
act of fortitude without having the virtue, through the impulse of a
passion, whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast off, or again of
anger. Thirdly, through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some
temporal advantage to be obtained, such as honor, pleasure, or gain, or
of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.
Reply to Objection 3: The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a
virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called
from its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with
the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to
virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above ([3284]FS,
Q[63], A[1]).
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Whether fortitude is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it is
written (Wis. 7:7): "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and
justice, and fortitude," where the text has "virtue" for "fortitude."
Since then the term "virtue" is common to all virtues, it seems that
fortitude is a general virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is not
lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues and
guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on all
vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled against
pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity
that weakens virtue"; and he says the same further on in connection
with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special virtue.
Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from
firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in
Ethic. ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other
virtues.
I answer that, As stated above ([3285]FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), the term
"fortitude" can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a
certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue, or
rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and
immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in
bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to
be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore Tully says (Rhet.
ii), that "fortitude is deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of
toils." In this sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because
it has a special matter.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116)
the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural
power is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in
another sense is a principle of action, as stated in Metaph. v, 17. And
since this latter meaning is the more common, the term "virtue," as
denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for
virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby
one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the first
sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special virtue,
namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds
of assaults.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as
denoting firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds.
Nevertheless even as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it
helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm
in things that are most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence,
to resist those which are less difficult.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection takes fortitude in the first
sense.
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Whether fortitude is about fear and dying?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring. For
Gregory says (Moral. vii): "The fortitude of the just man is to
overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts
of the present life." Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures
rather than about fear and daring.
Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs
to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has
nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a
man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not
about fear and daring.
Objection 3: Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to
fear, as stated above ([3286]FS, Q[45], A[1], ad 2) in the treatise on
passions. Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more than
about hope.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that
fortitude is about fear and daring.
I answer that, As stated above [3287](A[1]), it belongs to the virtue
of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from
following the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult
belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil
that entails difficulty, as stated above ([3288]FS, Q[42], AA[3],5) in
the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of
difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the
reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the assault of
these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to
withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them altogether
in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which seems to come
under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is about fear and
daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude of the
just man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of
all mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted,
and then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude as a special
virtue, by saying: "To love the trials of this life for the sake of an
eternal reward."
Reply to Objection 2: Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from
the course of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear.
Hence fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but
mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those
passions.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the
object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the
same object, and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal,
as stated above ([3289]FS, Q[45], A[1]). And since fortitude properly
regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears
from Tully's definition quoted in the Second Objection, it follows that
fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not about hope, except
in so far as it is connected with daring, as stated above ([3290]FS,
Q[45], A[2]).
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Whether fortitude is only about dangers of death?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of
death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude is love
bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved": and
(Music. vi) he says that fortitude is "the love which dreads no
hardship, not even death." Therefore fortitude is not only about danger
of death, but also about other afflictions.
Objection 2: Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced
to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears
to a mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but
also about other fears.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is
about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in
Ethic. iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of
death.
On the contrary, Andronicus says that "fortitude is a virtue of the
irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death."
I answer that, As stated above [3291](A[3]), it belongs to the virtue
of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of
reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold firmly
the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good
is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude of soul must
be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason in face of
the greatest evils: because he that stands firm against great things,
will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely.
Moreover it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard
something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death,
since it does away all bodily goods. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Morib. Eccl. xxii) that "the soul is shaken by its fellow body, with
fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and harassed with fear
of death lest it be done away and destroyed." Therefore the virtue of
fortitude is about the fear of dangers of death.
Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of
adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any
kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest
evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a
restricted sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that
moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the
fear of contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of
money, as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same
is the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own
life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue modifying
the fear of death.
Reply to Objection 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding
right reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance
with reason is not contrary to virtue.
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Whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of
death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their
fortitude. But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle.
Therefore fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude is
applicable both to warlike and to civil matters": and Tully (De Offic.
i), under the heading, "That it pertains to fortitude to excel in
battle rather than in civil life," says: "Although not a few think that
the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of civil
life, this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge the
matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more
important and more glorious than those connected with war." Now greater
fortitude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not properly
concerned with death in battle.
Objection 3: Further, war is directed to the preservation of a
country's temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that
"wars are waged in order to insure peace." Now it does not seem that
one ought to expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal
peace of one's country, since this same peace is the occasion of much
license in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude is
not about the danger of death in battle.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fortitude is
chiefly about death in battle.
I answer that, As stated above [3292](A[4]), fortitude strengthens a
man's mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now
fortitude is a virtue; and it is essential to virtue ever to tend to
good; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not
fly from the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of
sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not
seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. on the other
hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly
on account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the common
good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is
the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle;
secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even private
individual does not refrain from giving a just judgment through fear of
the impending sword, or any other danger though it threaten death.
Hence it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers of
death, not only such as arise in a general battle, but also such as
occur in singular combat, which may be called by the general name of
battle. Accordingly it must be granted that fortitude is properly about
dangers of death occurring in battle.
Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other kind
of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of death on
account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend
through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey
with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck or robbers.
Reply to Objection 1: Martyrs face the fight that is waged against
their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is
God; wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside
the genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason
they are said to have been valiant in battle. [*Office of Martyrs, ex.
Heb. xi. 34.]
Reply to Objection 2: Personal and civil business is differentiated
from the business of war that regards general wars. However, personal
and civil affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain
conflicts which are private wars, and so with regard to these also
there may be fortitude properly so called.
Reply to Objection 3: The peace of the state is good in itself, nor
does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For
there are many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented
by it, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those
which are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the
flesh.
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Whether endurance is the chief act of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that endurance is not the chief act of fortitude.
For virtue "is about the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it
is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore endurance is not
the chief act of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue
greater power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to
act on another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then
fortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to
fortitude to attack rather than to endure.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than
its mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to
attack denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies
pursuit. Since then fortitude above all withdraws the mind from fear,
it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "certain
persons are" said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction.
I answer that, As stated above [3293](A[3]), and according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), "fortitude is more concerned to allay
fear, than to moderate daring." For it is more difficult to allay fear
than to moderate daring, since the danger which is the object of daring
and fear, tends by its very nature to check daring, but to increase
fear. Now to attack belongs to fortitude in so far as the latter
moderates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of fear.
Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand
immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.
Reply to Objection 1: Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for
three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is
being attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that
one is attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is more
difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly,
because he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas
the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and it is more
difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly,
because endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is
consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain
unmoved for a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something
arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some hurry to
meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the
behavior of a brave man."
Reply to Objection 2: Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body,
but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely [fortissime] to
good, the result being that it does not yield to the threatening
passion of the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body.
Reply to Objection 3: He that endures fears not, though he is
confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to
the aggressor.
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Whether the brave man acts for the sake of the good of his habit?
Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of
the good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though first
in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude, in the
order of execution, follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is
impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his
habit.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We love virtues
for the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be
virtuous," namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own
sake, "without loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor, we
shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer love
that for the sake of which alone we love virtue." But fortitude is a
virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to fortitude but
to happiness.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that
"fortitude is love ready to bear all things for God's sake." Now God is
not the habit of fortitude, but something better, since the end must
needs be better than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave
man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "to the
brave man fortitude itself is a good": and such is his end.
I answer that, An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the
proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that agent's
form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is to
introduce the likeness of its heat into some passive matter, and the
end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his art.
Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be called the
remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made, external matter is
fashioned by art, so in things done, human deeds are fashioned by
prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the brave man intends as
his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for
he intends to act in accordance with his habit: but his remote end is
happiness or God.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First
Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its end,
instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The other two
objections consider the ultimate end.
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Whether the brave man delights in his act?
Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For
"delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic. x,
4,6,8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after the
manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his act.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, "But the fruit
of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that deeds of virtue are
called "fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure
delight." Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes
pleasure in his act.
Objection 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the
brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own
body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight in
the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently the
brave man does all things with pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "the brave
man seems to have no delight in his act."
I answer that, As stated above ([3294]FS, Q[31], AA[3],4,5) where we
were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily,
resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from
an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results
from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason. Now
the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain things
that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul---for instance, the loss
of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a natural
good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and things
connected with them---but also to endure things unpleasant in respect
of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on
one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as regards
spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end thereof:
while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual sorrow, in
the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence we read (2
Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: "I suffer grievous pains in body: but in
soul am well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee."
Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual
delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's grace, which
has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which it
delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed
Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he
felt as though he were walking on roses.
Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely
overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual
sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the
body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for a brave man to
delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not to
be sad."
Reply to Objection 1: The vehemence of the action or passion of one
power hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his
senses hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its
proper operation.
Reply to Objection 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account
of their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is
principally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 9) that "to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in all
virtues, except in so far as one attains the end."
Reply to Objection 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by
the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the
sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that
spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the
presence of great bodily pain.
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Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden
occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when they are
unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "fortitude is the
deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil." Therefore fortitude
does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "The brave man is not
unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures
beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so as
to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say
afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly
happen." But it is not possible to be prepared for the future in the
case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not
concerned with sudden happenings.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the
"brave man is of good hope." But hope looks forward to the future,
which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation
of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "fortitude
is chiefly about sudden dangers of death."
I answer that, Two things must be considered in the operation of
fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not
about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think
beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to
withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory
(Hom. xxv in Evang.), "the blow that is foreseen strikes with less
force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are
forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge." The other thing to be
considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of the
virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden
occurrences, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the
habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a
habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person without forethought
does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account of
some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that habitual fortitude
is firmly seated in his mind.
Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fortitude, to
prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same way as
a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
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Whether the brave man makes use of anger in his action?
Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his
action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that
which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to
take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says
(De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does not rest
at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not employ
anger for his action.
Objection 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself,
he should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more
imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of
fortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira i):
"Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action but
also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than for reason
to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid, the trusty
from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?" Therefore a brave
man should not make use of anger.
Objection 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of
fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or
desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild beasts
are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and adulterous
persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now fortitude employs
neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore in like manner it
should not employ anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "anger helps
the brave."
I answer that, As stated above ([3295]FS, Q[24], A[2]), concerning
anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion between
the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded anger and all
other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man: whereas
the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous
men both anger and the other passions of the soul albeit modified by
reason. And possibly they differed not in reality but in their way of
speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated above ([3296]FS, Q[24],
A[2]), gave the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive
appetite, however they may comport themselves. And since the sensitive
appetite is moved by the command of reason, so that it may cooperate by
rendering action more prompt, they held that virtuous persons should
employ both anger and the other passions of the soul, modified
according to the dictate of reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave
the name of passions to certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive
appetite, wherefore they called them sicknesses or diseases, and for
this reason severed them altogether from virtue.
Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but
not immoderate anger.
Reply to Objection 1: Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason
is subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will,
which would not be the case were it immoderate.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason employs anger for its action, not as
seeking its assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as
an instrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it
unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the principal
agent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover,
Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed by
him directly at Aristotle.
Reply to Objection 3: Whereas fortitude, as stated above [3297](A[6]),
has two acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not
for the act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this
act, but for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather
than the other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the
cause of sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in
attacking. On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to
the thing that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression,
either as being the cause of anger, as stated above ([3298]FS, Q[47],
A[3]), or as making a person expose himself to danger in order to
escape from sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to
a pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand
danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far as
one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "Of all the cases in which fortitude
arises from a passion, the most natural is when a man is brave through
anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose," i.e. for a due end;
"this is true fortitude."
Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For, as
stated above [3299](A[10]), anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now
anger is not accounted a principal passion; nor is daring which belongs
to fortitude. Therefore neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct
object of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil
and toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fortitude is
not a cardinal virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon
which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a hinge
[cardine]. But fortitude is about dangers of death which are of rare
occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude should not be reckoned a
cardinal or principal virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary on
Lk. 6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fortitude among
the four cardinal or principal virtues.
I answer that, As stated above ([3300]FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), those
virtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have a foremost
claim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other
conditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to "act
steadfastly," according to Ethic. ii, 4. Now fortitude above all lays
claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm is so
much the more praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall or
recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in accordance
with reason, both by the pleasing good and the displeasing evil. But
bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine says
(QQ[83], qu. 36): "There is none that does not shun pain more than he
desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the most untamed beasts are
deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain." And among
the pains of the mind and dangers those are mostly feared which lead to
death, and it is against them that the brave man stands firm. Therefore
fortitude is a cardinal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Daring and anger do not cooperate with fortitude
in its act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly
commended: for it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which
is a principal passion, as stated above ([3301]FS, Q[25], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it
behooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude is
directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands, and
to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard.
Reply to Objection 3: Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence,
yet the occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account
of justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds,
man encounters mortal adversaries.
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Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues.
For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is higher, so to speak, than
the rest."
Objection 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good.
But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the
greatest of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his
possessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is this that
a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue: whereas
justice and the other moral virtues are about other and external
things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues.
Objection 4: On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i): "Justice is the
most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man."
Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): "Those
virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others."
Now liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is
a greater virtue.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), "In things that are
great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good": wherefore the
better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a
perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects
this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of reason
in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this good,
inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away from
reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude holds the first
place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest power to make
man recede from the good of reason: and after fortitude comes
temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in hindering
the good of reason. Now to be a thing essentially ranks before
effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by removing
obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks
first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance fourth, and after
these the other virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Ambrose places fortitude before the other
virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is
useful both in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life.
Hence he begins by saying (De Offic. i): "Now we come to treat of
fortitude, which being higher so to speak than the others, is
applicable both to warlike and to civil matters."
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather than
the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to
its goodness rather than its difficulty.
Reply to Objection 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers of
death except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise
awarded to fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says
(De Offic. i) that "fortitude without justice is an occasion of
injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress
the weaker."
The Fourth argument is granted.
Reply to Objection 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain
particular favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to
fortitude, since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most
beloved, because they are most useful in war and peace."
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OF MARTYRDOM (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?
(2) Of what virtue is it the act?
(3) Concerning the perfection of this act;
(4) The pain of martyrdom;
(5) Its cause.
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Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all
acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not voluntary,
as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for Christ's sake, and
of whom Hillary says (Super Matth. i) that "they attained the ripe age
of eternity through the glory of martyrdom." Therefore martyrdom is not
an act of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is
unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above ([3302]Q[64], A[5]), and yet
martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i)
that "during persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from
those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and
so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is honored in the Catholic
Church with most solemn veneration." Therefore martyrdom is not an act
of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act
of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather would
it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act
of virtue.
On the contrary, The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of
virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Mat. 5:10):
"Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for theirs
is the kingdom of heaven." Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([3303]Q[123], AA[1],3), it belongs to
virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason
consists in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its
proper effect, as shown above ([3304]Q[109], AA[1],2;[3305] Q[123],
A[12]). And martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth
and justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident
that martyrdom is an act of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that in the case of the Innocents
the use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they
suffered martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture contains
no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in being slain
obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire by
their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for Christ's sake takes
the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the case of baptized
children the merit of Christ is conducive to the acquisition of glory
through the baptismal grace, so in those who were slain for Christ's
sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of
the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De
Diversis lxvi), as though he were addressing them: "A man that does not
believe that children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt
of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough
to believe in Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein
you could endure suffering of Christ Who was to suffer."
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "possibly the
Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority
thus to honor the memory of those holy women [*Cf.[3306] Q[64], A[1],
ad 2]."
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
Now it has been stated ([3307]FS, Q[108], A[1], ad 4) that some of the
precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the
preparation of the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared to
do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way certain
things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation of the
mind, so that in such and such a case a man should act according to
reason. And this observation would seem very much to the point in the
case of martyrdom, which consists in the right endurance of sufferings
unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of
acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to endure it in
moderation.
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Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For
the Greek {martyr} signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the
faith of Christ. according to Acts 1:8, "You shall be witnesses unto
Me," etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: "The mother of martyrs is the
Catholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their
blood." Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of
fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue
which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the
act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom:
Thus Maximus says in a sermon: "The charity of Christ is victorious in
His martyrs." Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of
martyrdom, according to Jn. 15:13, "Greater love than this no man hath,
that a man lay down his life for his friends." Moreover without charity
martyrdom avails nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, "If I should
deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me
nothing." Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity rather than of
fortitude.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: "It is
easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great thing
to imitate his faith and patience." Now that which calls chiefly for
praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is the act.
Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude.
On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "Blessed
martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors, how
shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage?" Now a
person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs.
Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above ([3308]Q[123], A[1], seqq.), it belongs
to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially
against dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all
against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom
man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to
faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the
imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of particular contest with
his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf.
ii): "The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, and
Christ's servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls
unmoved, and strength divine." Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom
is an act of fortitude; for which reason the Church reads in the office
of Martyrs: They "became valiant in battle" [*Heb. 11:34].
Reply to Objection 1: Two things must be considered in the act of
fortitude. one is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and
this is the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby
a man does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from achieving
that good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as
civic fortitude strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for the
safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous
fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good of Divine justice, which
is "through faith in Christ Jesus," according to Rom. 3:22. Thus
martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened,
but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as
its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it,
whereas fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause,
being the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity
as commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it
manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious,
like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not without
charity.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3309]Q[123], A[6]), the chief
act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act,
which is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves
fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is
that martyrs are also praised for their patience.
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Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection?
Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest
perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not of
precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not necessary
for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is necessary for
salvation, since the Apostle says (Rom. 10:10), "With the heart we
believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto
salvation," and it is written (1 Jn. 3:16), that "we ought to lay down
our lives for the brethren." Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to
perfection.
Objection 2: Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a
man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give
God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says
(Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is preferable to all sacrifices."
Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to
maintain oneself in good, since the "good of the nation is better than
the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i,
2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, whereas he
that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teaching and
guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of martyrdom.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers martyrdom
to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore martyrdom seems to
belong to perfection in the highest degree.
I answer that, We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First,
with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue
proximately eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in the
due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts,
because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in
so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of virtue,
such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue being the
end is better.
A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its
first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in this
respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since,
as the Apostle says (Col. 3:14), that "charity . . . is the bond of
perfection." Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof
of the perfection of charity: since a man's love for a thing is proved
to be so much the greater, according as that which he despises for its
sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its
sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all the goods of the
present life man loves life itself most, and on the other hand he hates
death more than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the
pains of bodily torment, "from fear of which even dumb animals refrain
from the greatest pleasures," as Augustine observes (QQ[83], qu. 36).
And from this point of view it is clear that martyrdom is the most
perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the
greatest charity, according to Jn. 15:13: "Greater love than this no
man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends."
Reply to Objection 1: There is no act of perfection, which is a matter
of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being
necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug.
xiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency,
through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary
to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary for
salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for salvation
to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal
for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to martyrdom of
their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be understood as
referring to the preparation of the mind.
Reply to Objection 2: Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of
obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Phil.
2:8) that He became "obedient unto death." Hence it is evident that
martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered
absolutely.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers martyrdom according to
the proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all
other virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than all
virtues.
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Whether death is essential to martyrdom?
Objection 1: It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For
Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et
Eustoch.): "I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin
and martyr, although she ended her days in peace": and Gregory says
(Hom. iii in Evang.): "Although persecution has ceased to offer the
opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom, since
even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we
slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit."
Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.
Objection 2: Further, we read of certain women as commended for
despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh:
wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the life
of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been
forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith,
as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of
martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity of the
flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if she were to
forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy said: "If thou
causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will gain me a
twofold crown."
Objection 3: Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs
to fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as
Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships
besides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith, namely
imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in
Heb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint
Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is not
essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.
Objection 4: Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above
(A[2], ad 1; A[3]). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death.
Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential
to martyrdom.
On the contrary, Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that "in dying
for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living
without faith."
I answer that As stated above [3310](A[2]), a martyr is so called as
being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise
things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb. 11.
Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the
faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in order
to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the
life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all things
relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred
and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose
life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): "Skin for skin, and
all that a man hath he will give for his soul" [Douay: 'life'] i.e. for
the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom
requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.
Reply to Objection 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may
meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.
Reply to Objection 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh,
or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it
is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the
Christian faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in
the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and
consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of
God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a
reward, as Lucy said.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3311]Q[123], AA[4],5),
fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers
consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr merely for
suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except
in so far as these result in death.
Reply to Objection 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in
the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person
willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however,
that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for
Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other
kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death
ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this
state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.
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Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom?
Objection 1: It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For
it is written (1 Pet. 4:15,16): "Let none of you suffer as a murderer,
or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's things. But if as
a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this
name." Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith
of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom
to those who suffer.
Objection 2: Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is
borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing
witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth,
otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a
truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems
ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
Objection 3: Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most
account which are directed to the common good, since "the good of the
nation is better than the good of the individual," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause of
martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die
for the defense of their country. Yet this is not consistent with
Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of those who
die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:10): "Blessed are they that
suffer persecution for justice' sake," which pertains to martyrdom,
according to a gloss, as well as Jerome's commentary on this passage.
Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice.
Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.
I answer that, As stated above [3312](A[4]), martyrs are so called as
being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear
witness to the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which
is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ:
wherefore Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the
truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of
faith.
But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also
outward profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one
confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that he
has faith, according to James 2:18, "I will show thee, by works, my
faith." Hence it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): "They
profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him." Thus all
virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are professions
of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires these works of
us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can be the cause of
martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the martyrdom of
Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny
the faith, but for reproving adultery.
Reply to Objection 1: A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person
is said to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but
also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ,
according to Rom. 8:9, "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is
none of His"; and again because in imitation of Christ he is dead to
sins, according to Gal. 5:24, "They that are Christ's have crucified
their flesh with the vices and concupiscences." Hence to suffer as a
Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is
done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for
avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all comes under the
head of witnessing to the faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The truth of other sciences has no connection
with the worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according
to godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to
be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as
stated above ([3313]Q[110], AA[3],4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever
truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a
lie is a sin against the Divine Law.
Reply to Objection 3: The good of one's country is paramount among
human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of
martyrdom, is of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since
human good may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God,
it follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may
be the cause of martyrdom.
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OF FEAR* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently 'fear' or
'timidity.' The translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account
of the connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise 'cowardice' would be a
better rendering.]
We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2)
Fearlessness; (3) Daring.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?
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Whether fear is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, as
stated above ([3314]FS, Q[23], A[4]; Q[42]). Now we are neither praised
nor blamed for passions, as stated in Ethic. ii. Since then every sin
is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a
sin: since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is
commanded in God's law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): "Servants, be
obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear
and trembling." Therefore fear is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for
sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii).
Now fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
7) that "a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not
even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear." Therefore fear
is not a sin. .
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that
kill the body," and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): "Fear not, neither be
thou afraid of their words."
I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being
inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as
stated above ([3315]Q[109], A[2];[3316] Q[114], A[1]). Now this due
order requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason.
And reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some
sought after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to
be shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that
some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a good
is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The
result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to be sought
after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accordingly when the
appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we should endure rather
than forfeit others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate
and sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun
what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate
nor sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance
in general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or
evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the
Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame,
because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or
afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate
manner.
Reply to Objection 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in
accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be
lacking in the service they owe their masters.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils
that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us
nothing. Hence there is no sin in fearing them.
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Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to
fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated above
([3317]Q[123], AA[4],5). But the sin of fear is not always connected
with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, "Blessed are all they
that fear the Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we dread to
suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods." Again a gloss on Mat.
27:44, "He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word," says that
"evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of
contempt." Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for
fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now
sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or
shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not
to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of
fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed
thereto.
Objection 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is
opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q[20], A[1];
[3318]FS, Q[40], A[4]). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to
fortitude.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that
timidity is opposed to fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[19], A[3]; [3319]FS, Q[43], A[1]),
all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to
something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular kind of
virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since
every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while
inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate love gives
use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate fear is
included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money,
the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest
fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object, as we
find proved in Ethic. iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear
is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of death. For this reason
timidity is said to be antonomastically* opposed to fortitude.
[*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general
for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so
timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote
inordinate fear of the danger of death.]
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in
its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference
to the end, as stated above ([3320]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3321]FS, Q[18],
A[6]): and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of
death for the sake of a good. But a man who exposes himself to danger
of death in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by
fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 7), that "to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or
something disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for
to shun hardships is a mark of effeminacy."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3322]FS, Q[45], A[2]), fear is
the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring.
Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation
presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind
of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair results
from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. Now
the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another kind, namely
to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards
dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated
above ([3323]FS, Q[23], A[1]), fear is in the irascible faculty which
is a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the
sensuality, as stated above ([3324]FS, Q[74], A[4]). Therefore fear is
not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God.
But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, "Whosoever is
fearful," etc., says that "a man is fearful when he trembles at the
very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart,
but that he can rally and take courage." Therefore fear is not a mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection
but also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a
precept, but only from perfection; for a gloss on Dt. 20:8, "What man
is there that is fearful and fainthearted?" says: "We learn from this
that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual
warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches."
Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and yet
this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, "But the fearful
and unbelieving and the abominable," etc., "shall have their portion in
the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second death."
Therefore fear is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above [3325](A[1]), fear is a sin through
being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be
shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear
is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of the
rational appetite's consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a
venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the
rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately shuns
something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of
fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man
through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so
disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by
the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the
sensuality.
Reply to Objection 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to
the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may
reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes
his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may
happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one
cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins
mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from
accomplishing what he purposed doing.
Reply to Objection 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man
aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a
precept, but for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a
mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for
instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear excuses from sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is a
sin, as stated above [3326](A[1]). But sin does not excuse from sin,
rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
Objection 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would
this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a
courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse,
because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to
be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
Objection 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or
spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because
instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of
temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), "one should not fear poverty, nor
sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one's own wickedness."
Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q[1], Cap.
Constat.): "A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by
heretics, has an ostensible excuse."
I answer that, As stated above [3327](A[3]), fear is sinful in so far
as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain
evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to
shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to
be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the
loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if
through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a robber,
and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather
than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the other
hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to
reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to
reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin,
because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul
are more to be feared than the evils of the body. and evils of the body
more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur
evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body,
such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of
money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to avoid
loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet one's sin
would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less
voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain
necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
1) says that these things that are done through fear are not simply
voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness,
but in the point of its involuntariness.
Reply to Objection 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet
the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object
of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held
temporal goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that
temporal evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise
to be feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these
temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was also the
opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be
feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that
which is good according to virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
OF FEARLESSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there
are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
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Whether fearlessness is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is
reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written in
praise of the just man (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a lion, shall
be without dread." Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death,
according to Mat. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body," etc.,
nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Is. 51:12, "Who
art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?" Therefore it
is not a sin to be fearless.
Objection 3: Further, fear is born of love, as stated above
([3328]Q[125], A[2]). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to
love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv),
"the love of God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the
heavenly city." Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing
earthly.
On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge (Lk. 18:2) that "he
feared not God nor regarded man."
I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge
alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby
one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal
goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his own
life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure,
that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein, but as
things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is contrary to
the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving
them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely from this
love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the
Apostle says (Eph. 5:29): "No man ever hated his own flesh." Wherefore
even those that slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh,
which they desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen that
a man fears death and other temporal evils less than he ought, for the
reason that he loves them* less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary
goods. One would expect 'se' instead of 'ea.' We should then read: For
the reason that he loves himself less than he ought.] But that he fear
none of these things cannot result from an entire lack of love, but
only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted
by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the
result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising others,
according to the saying of Job 41:24,25: "He [Vulg.: 'who'] was made to
fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing": and sometimes it happens
through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
7) that the "Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing." [*"A
man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were
nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as
is said to be the case with the Celts."] It is therefore evident that
fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of
soul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin
if it be invincible.
Reply to Objection 1: The just man is praised for being without fear
that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for
it is written (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be
justified."
Reply to Objection 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by
mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice:
but they are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as
regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others.
Hence it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth
from evil."
Reply to Objection 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us
from loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be
feared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): "He that feareth the
Lord shall tremble at nothing." But temporal goods are not to be
despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain
those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.
For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is
hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both
brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not
opposed to fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of
due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of
due love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and
folly to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not
opposed to fortitude.
Objection 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the
mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then
fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the
other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness to
be opposed to fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above ([3329]Q[123], A[3]), fortitude is
concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the
rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it
belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to
reason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought,
and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by excess
or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to fortitude by
excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought not, and as he
ought not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by deficiency of
fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to fear.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of fortitude is to endure death without
fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this
the fearless man does not do.
Reply to Objection 2: Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the
mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But
in respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other
virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by
excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude
imposes the mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable
in its having different extremes in different respects.
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OF DARING [*Excessive daring or foolhardiness] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether daring is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
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Whether daring is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written (Job
39:21) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory (Moral.
xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that "he goeth forth boldly to
meet armed men [*Vulg.: 'he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet
armed men']." But no vice redounds to a man's praise. Therefore it is
not a sin to be daring.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), "one
should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been
counseled." But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore daring
is not sinful but praiseworthy.
Objection 3: Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated
above ([3330]FS, Q[45], A[2]) when we were treating of the passions.
But hope is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should
daring be accounted a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not on the way with
a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils." Now no man's
fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring is
a sin.
I answer that, Daring, as stated above ([3331]FS, Q[23], A[1]; Q[55]),
is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to reason,
and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by deficiency,
and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the
passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess, thus we speak
of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which case it is
sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is accounted a
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is
moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of
fortitude.
Reply to Objection 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking
counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before
taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act
rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above
([3332]Q[58], A[3]). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is
so far praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some
virtues, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4,5,6). Hence
the names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and
virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the names
of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the case of
hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good for this
object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether daring is opposed to fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For
excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But
presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore
daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in
so far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts
himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with
daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to injustice.
Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude
but to justice.
Objection 3: Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as
stated above ([3333]Q[123], A[3]). Now since timidity is opposed to
fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice
opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is
opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will
likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring. But
there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be accounted a
vice in opposition to fortitude.
On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books of
Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above ([3334]Q[126], A[2]), it belongs to a
moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which it
is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation in
the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as immoderate
to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies excess
of passion, and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it is
evident that it is opposed to the virtue of fortitude which is
concerned about fear and daring, as stated above ([3335]Q[122], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not
depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species.
Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same virtue
as presumption which is its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not
depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the
harm done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the
opposition of daring depend on this.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of daring consists in a man taking
the offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature
inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is
hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the vice
which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only timidity.
Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of timidity, for
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the daring are precipitate
and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is present," namely
through fear.
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OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider
what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each
part.
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Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably
assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to
fortitude, namely "magnificence," "confidence," "patience," and
"perseverance." Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since
both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must needs be
liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is
a part of justice, as stated above ([3336]Q[117], A[5]). Therefore
magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But
hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by
itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of
fortitude.
Objection 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of
danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any
relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts
of fortitude.
Objection 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience
denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude.
Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof.
Objection 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should
not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is
required in every virtue: for it is written (Mat. 24:13): "He that
shall persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance
should not be accounted a part of fortitude.
Objection 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts
of fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence,
constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven
virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength of
will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore it
seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete.
Objection 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of
fortitude. The first is "civic" fortitude, which produces brave deeds
through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is "military"
fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or
experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds
resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude
which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the
fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being
unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not comprised
under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of
the parts of fortitude are unfitting.
I answer that, As stated above ([3337]Q[48]), a virtue can have three
kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude,
taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is
not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about
a very special matter.
However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it:
integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is
requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what
fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers
of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor
hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary
virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above ([3338]Q[123],
AA[3],6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance.
Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first
regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind
ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions "confidence," of
which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much
assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings." The
second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not
failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect
Tully mentions "magnificence," which he describes as being "the
discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and lofty
undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind," so as to
combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two
be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of
death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them
there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters
involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct
from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal:
thus "magnificence" is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great
expenses, and "magnanimity," which seems to be the same as confidence,
to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the other act of
fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by
sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of
threatening evil. In this respect he mentions "patience," which he
describes as "the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and
difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that
by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to
lose courage, according to Heb. 12:3, "That you be not wearied,
fainting in your minds." In this respect he mentions "perseverance,"
which accordingly he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence
in a well considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper
matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if
they be referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct
from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a
certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty
which is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly
by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a
theological virtue, as stated above (Q[17], A[5]; [3339]FS, Q[62],
A[3]). But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude,
man hopes in himself, yet under God withal.
Reply to Objection 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve
danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore
although magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment
of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain
connection with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.
Reply to Objection 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with
which fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any
other hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue
annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an
integral part thereof.
Reply to Objection 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good
deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is
reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the
Article.
Reply to Objection 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by
Tully, namely "confidence, magnificence, forbearance," which he puts in
the place of patience, and "firmness," which he substitutes for
perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely "magnanimity" and
"security," are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But
Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence
denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything
presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and
this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above ([3340]FS,
Q[40], A[2]) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped
for.
A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of
hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for.
Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes
one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided
on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to
hope, as stated above, ([3341]FS, Q[40], A[4], ad 1). Hence Macrobius
adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy,
which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of
magnificence one needs to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully
says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things,
but also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also
pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through
not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting
on account of any other obstacles.
Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as
the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions "perseverance" and
"magnificence," and with Macrobius, "magnanimity." "Strength of will"
is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that "strength of
will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be
attempted, and to endure what reason says should be endured"---i.e.
good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as
"strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose." Manliness is
apparently the same as confidence, for he says that "manliness is a
habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue." Besides magnificence
he mentions {andragathia}, i.e. manly goodness which we may render
"strenuousness." For magnificence consists not only in being constant
in the accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but
also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that
accomplishment, and this belongs to {andragathia}, strenuousness:
wherefore he says that {andragathia} is the virtue of a man, whereby he
thinks out profitable works.
Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the
four principal parts mentioned by Tully.
Reply to Objection 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the
true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude,
they differ as to motive, as stated above ([3342]Q[123], A[1], ad 2);
wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.
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OF MAGNANIMITY* (EIGHT ARTICLES) [*Not in the ordinary restricted sense but a
s
explained by the author]
We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including,
however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the
exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of
which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider (1) Magnanimity;
(2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first
we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices. Under the
first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?
(2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is a special virtue?
(5) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(6) Of its relation to confidence;
(7) Of its relation to assurance;
(8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.
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Whether magnanimity is about honors?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For
magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since
"magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes the
irascible part, as appears from De Anima iii, 42, where the Philosopher
says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind," i.e. the
concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a concupiscible good
since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity
is not about honors.
Objection 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must
needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about
operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows
that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore
magnanimity is not about honors.
Objection 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit
rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he
tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring
honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about
honors.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "magnanimity
is about honor and dishonor."
I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of
the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two
things, first to the matter about which is the field of its activity,
secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use of such
matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act,
a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some
great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways: in one way
proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called great
proportionately, even if it consist in the use of some small or
ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it: but
an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best use
of the greatest thing.
The things which come into man's use are external things, and among
these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to
virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated
above ([3343]Q[103], AA[1],2); and because it is offered to God and to
the best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid
shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be
magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and simply,
just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are
difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about
honors.
Reply to Objection 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the
concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is
added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity
regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something
great or difficult.
Reply to Objection 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an
operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends
to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the
passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even
so, we have stated ([3344]Q[123], AA[4],5) with regard to fortitude
that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of
fear and daring.
Reply to Objection 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in
such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor
have too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise
honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be
deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the
sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so
as to think much of the honor accorded by man.
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Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great
honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated above
[3345](A[1]). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore
it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.
Objection 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is
meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about
either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to
magnanimity to be about great honor.
Objection 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than
is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor,
and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not
only about great honors.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity
is about great honors.
I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue
is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a
power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated
in De Coelo i, 116. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in
every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or
difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary
and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about
the difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3.
Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of
virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point
of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish
the rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is
found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The
other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a
certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to
be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral
virtues, which are about the passions, because the passions resist
reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4).
Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of
this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from
the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the
objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of
resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite,
which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to reason.
Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only
that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very
great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the
greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On
the other hand, some passions have great power of resistance to reason
arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of
those passions: such are the love or desire of money or of honor. And
for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that
which is greatest in those passions, but also about that which is
ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little, are
very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to
the desire of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little
sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of
money, namely "magnificence."
In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary
honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes,
which are {philotimia}, i.e. love of honor, and {aphilotimia}, i.e.
without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving
honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as
both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great
honors there is "magnanimity." Wherefore we must conclude that the
proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man
tends to such things as are deserving of honor.
Reply to Objection 1: Great and little are accidental to honor
considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their
relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed in the use of
honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in
little honors.
Reply to Objection 2: In anger and other matters only that which is
greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there
any need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are
things existing outside the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: He that makes good use of great things is much
more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the
magnanimous man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is
worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to
wit, man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored
by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not
deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as
are ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor,
but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.
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Whether magnanimity is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral
virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean but the
greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself worthy of
the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated
above ([3346]FS, Q[65], A[1]). But one may have a virtue without having
magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whosoever
is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of them, is
temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated
above ([3347]FS, Q[55], A[4]). But magnanimity implies certain
dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of "a
magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his
utterance calm." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But
magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems
himself worthy of great things, and despises others," according to
Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy.
But magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the
first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is
remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Q[113]]
towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly,
because he holds to the barren things rather than to those that are
fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc.
15:18): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the
greatness of courage [animi magnitudinem] with which they fought for
their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now, only
deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which
consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.
I answer that, The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the
good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good. Now
among external human things honors take precedence of all others, as
stated above [3348](A[1]; [3349]FS, Q[11], A[2], OBJ[3]). Therefore
magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3),
"the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as
he tends to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he
follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest things according to
reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth"
(Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.
Reply to Objection 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not
apply to their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the
acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not
becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men. on the other
hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace,
all virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together
in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition
thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is
not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed
to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his
state.
Reply to Objection 3: The movements of the body are differentiated
according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And
so it happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents
by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a
man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish,
whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few
and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement.
Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who
are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the
magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these
dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man
according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are
naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found naturally.
Reply to Objection 4: There is in man something great which he
possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which
accrues to him through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity
makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the
gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue,
magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same is
to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or external
fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of
himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and magnanimity makes
him despise others in so far as they fall away from God's gifts: since
he does not think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their
sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than
ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's gifts in them. Hence it is
written of the just man (Ps. 14:4): "In his sight a vile person is
contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is brought to nothing, but he
glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the contempt of magnanimity, "but
he honoreth them that fear the Lord," which points to the reverential
bearing of humility. It is therefore evident that magnanimity and
humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem to tend in
contrary directions, because they proceed according to different
considerations.
Reply to Objection 5: These properties in so far as they belong to a
magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in
the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of
those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that he
takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them
with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in
the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts of other
virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is remiss and
slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, but
because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with
great works, such as are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third
place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to
say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great
things that are true, but because he does not disclose all his
greatness, especially to the large number of those who are beneath him,
since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "it belongs to a
magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence,
and unassuming towards the middle class." In the fourth place, it is
said that he cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at
home with others than his friends: because he altogether shuns flattery
and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of mind. But he associates
with all, both great and little, according as he ought, as stated above
(ad 1). It is also said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren
things, not indeed any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he
prefers the virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful
is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with
magnanimity.
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Whether magnanimity is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no
special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher states
(Ethic. iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the
magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to
any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to
the magnanimous man. For it is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that "it belongs
to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which is an act of prudence),
"nor to act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that he is ready
to do favors" (which is an act of charity), "that he gives his services
readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he is truthful" (which
is an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not given to complaining"
(which is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul,
according to the saying of Is. 61:10, "He hath clothed me with the
garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride adorned
with her jewels." But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues,
as stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from
the other virtues.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[2]), it belongs to a special
virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now
magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter,
namely honors, as stated above ([3350]AA[1],2): and honor, considered
in itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in
itself is a special virtue.
Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above
([3351]Q[103], A[1], ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it
regards all the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but
great honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a
great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on
doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to
what is worthy of great honors.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it
follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain
excellence, and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of
excellence that a man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore
he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts
of the other virtues. on the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that
a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their
sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again,
all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be
the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a
defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external
evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under
a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his excellence or
greatness.
Reply to Objection 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain
luster or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further
adornment results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through
magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.
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Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For
a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be the same
as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If magnanimity,
which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in
great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a man is brave we
expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from
deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a
magnanimous man is not {philokindynos}, that is, a lover of danger. But
it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore
magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a
part thereof.
Objection 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be
hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared
or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity
is a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part
thereof.
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon
magnanimity as a part of fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above ([3352]FS, Q[61], A[3]), a principal
virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue
in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue is
firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every
virtue," according to Ethic. ii. And this is chiefly commended in those
virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult
to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to stand firm
in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which
makes the mind firm in that matter.
Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein
fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the
greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as
man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of
death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity
agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult
matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about
a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is
reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as
secondary to principal.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1,3), "to lack
evil is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a
grievous evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it
were the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude,
and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity
may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference
as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it
follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes
himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who
thinks "many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a
magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the
sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are
truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to
danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even as
in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not {mikrokindynos}, i.e.
endangering himself for small things, but {megalokindynos}, i.e.
endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat.
Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers
like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes the
soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."
Reply to Objection 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has
to withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer
an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be
desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit,
as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now
that which is so essentially is always of more account than that which
is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things is always
more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things.
Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue of
magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil, evil
is of more import in this particular respect.
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Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity.
For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another,
according to 2 Cor. 3:4,5, "Such confidence we have, through Christ
towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves,
as of ourselves." But this seems inconsistent with the idea of
magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according
to Is. 12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be
without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also
belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward
is due to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we
are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of
hope unto the end." Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from
magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius
enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).
On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute
confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question
(ad 6) and in the prologue to this.
I answer that, Confidence takes its name from "fides" [faith]: and it
belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence
belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have confidence,
hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence apparently denotes
chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who
promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong
opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about
something, not only on account of another's statement, but also on
account of something we observe in another, it follows that confidence
may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through
observing something either in oneself---for instance, through observing
that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in
another, for instance, through observing that another is friendly to
him and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help from
him.
Now it has been stated above (A[1], ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly
about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence
denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which
gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it
follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it
belongs to the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the
deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man,
hence he adds "or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to need
nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance,
secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a social
animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life.
Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous
man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of excellence
in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of
service to him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a
magnanimous man to be confident in himself.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3353]FS, Q[23], A[2]; [3354]FS,
Q[40], A[4]), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly
opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely
good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear,
because the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain
strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is.
Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of
evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows
that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude.
Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows
in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude.
Reply to Objection 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain
mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion.
Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the
act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to
a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking,
confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions
of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of
fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with
magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as
stated in the preceding Question.
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Whether security belongs to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For
security, as stated above (Q[128], ad 6), denotes freedom from the
disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively.
Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude
does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither
therefore does security belong to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be
secure because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary to
virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim.
2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God." Therefore
security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all
the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is
accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14,18, "If thou
wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being
buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore security does not belong to
magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading:
"Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity
to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune."
But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to
magnanimity.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a man
take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears.
Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which
fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the
mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as
hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards
fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity,
so security belongs immediately to fortitude.
It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so
is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of
the passion ([3355]FS, Q[45], A[2]). Wherefore as confidence belongs
indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so
security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes
despair.
Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it
banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a
firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is
not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only
when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should
not fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of
magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to,
and participation of, future happiness, as stated above ([3356]FS,
Q[5], AA[3],7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a
condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's
reward.
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Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to
magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi):
"virtue suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue great,
as stated above (A[4], ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce
to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him.
But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune:
for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists
of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising external
things." Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.
Objection 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a
great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from
his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle
says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at
misfortune." Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of
fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him.
Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune
seems to conduce to magnanimity."
I answer that, As stated above [3357](A[1]), magnanimity regards two
things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great
as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For
since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but
also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest
esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess
goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or
instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by
means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of
fortune conduce to magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself,
because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them
in order to act more expeditiously.
Reply to Objection 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods,
inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do
anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but
that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.
Reply to Objection 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is
neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it.
Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external
goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if
he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.
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OF PRESUMPTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first
place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three,
namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall
consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether presumption is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether presumption is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle
says: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.:
'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before." But it seems
to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself.
Therefore presumption is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not
listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we
are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish
those that make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that man should pursue
divine things as far as possible." Now divine and immortal things are
seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially in
tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is
something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): "Not that we are
sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." If then
presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not
sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of
anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): "O wicked presumption,
whence camest thou?" and a gloss answers: "From a creature's evil
will." Now all that comes of the root of an evil will is a sin.
Therefore presumption is a sin.
I answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the
Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is done in
accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in
general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now it is
established throughout all natural things, that every action is
commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does any natural agent
strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful,
as being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to
do what is above his power: and this is what is meant by presumption,
as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders that which is above the active
power of a natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that
same thing: thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of
which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of
fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be
sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue
to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect
virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to
advance towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched
himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually
advancing forward.
Reply to Objection 2: Divine and immortal things surpass man according
to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely
the intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things.
In this respect the Philosopher says that "man ought to pursue immortal
and divine things," not that he should do what it becomes God to do,
but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "what we
can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense." Hence
since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not
altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to
attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be
presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in
God's assistance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by
excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against the
Holy Ghost, as stated above ([3358]Q[14], A[2];[3359] Q[21], A[1]). But
the sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to
charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem
oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous
even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his
ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as
little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "on
account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others,
because they deem external goods as something great." Therefore
presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by
deficiency.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the
"vain man," i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a
presumptuous man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess."
I answer that, As stated above ([3360]Q[129], A[3], ad 1), magnanimity
observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it
tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to
anything greater than is becoming to us.
Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not
exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he
does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous
man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed
to magnanimity by excess.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a
sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine
justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter
kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it
implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather
to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in so far as
this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability, it can be
opposed to magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to
something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man
presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If,
however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is
not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary
honor, as stated above ([3361]Q[129], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: No one attempts what is above his ability, except
in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may
err in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks
he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has.
Secondly, as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself
great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not
make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things
without virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things,
nor are rightly called magnanimous."
Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his
ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the
case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has
exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not simply,
but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes,
despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of magnanimity,
not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat.
Virtut.) that "when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man
high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on excelling in all
things, whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of
virtue." Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man sometimes falls
short of the magnanimous in reality, although in appearance he
surpasses him.
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OF AMBITION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ambition is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes
the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and the
greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for honor are
reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something
deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired.
Objection 2: Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to
him as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor is
not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which heartens a man to do good and
disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men
to do good and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8)
that "with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave
in honor": and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "honor fosters the
arts." Therefore ambition is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:5) that "charity is not
ambitious, seeketh not her own." Now nothing is contrary to charity,
except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3362]Q[103], AA[1],2), honor denotes
reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two
things have to be considered with regard to man's honor. The first is
that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this
is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor
is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls
for observation is that the thing in which man excels is given to him
by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far
to be pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this
enables him to profit others.
Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a
man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is to
desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor
for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's appetite
rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others.
Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident
that it is always a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The desire for good should be regulated according
to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it
is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now
those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason's
dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.
Reply to Objection 2: Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the
virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward:
since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But
it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have
nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which honor
derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to virtue.
Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as stated in
Ethic. iv, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as some are heartened to do good and
disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be
desired in due measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may
become to man an occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man
cares not by what means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says
(Catilin.) that "the good as well as the wicked covet honors for
themselves, but the one," i.e. the good, "go about it in the right
way," whereas "the other," i.e. the wicked, "through lack of the good
arts, make use of deceit and falsehood." Yet they who, merely for the
sake of honor, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they
who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by
excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one
side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated
above ([3363]Q[130], A[2]). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by
excess.
Objection 2: Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition
seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Macc. 4:7)
that "Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood." Therefore ambition
is not opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is
written (Acts 25:27) that "Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great pomp
[ambitione]. . . had entered into the hall of audience" [*'Praetorium.'
The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is the same], and (2
Para. 16:14) that when Asa died they "burned spices and . . . ointments
over his body" with very great pomp [ambitione]. But magnanimity is not
about outward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) that "the more a man exceeds
in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate others."
But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of
magnanimity.
I answer that, As stated above [3364](A[1]), ambition signifies
inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes use
of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that ambition is
opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered.
Reply to Objection 1: Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as
its end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man
attempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is
opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts
great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity
regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right use: and in
this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is it
impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Honor is due to those who are in a position of
dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and
accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to
ambition. For if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position
of dignity, not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use
of a dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but
presumptuous.
Reply to Objection 3: The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind
of honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is
signified by the words of James 2:2,3: "If there shall come into your
assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and you . .
. shall say to him: Sit thou here well," etc. Wherefore ambition does
not regard outward worship, except in so far as this is a kind of
honor.
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OF VAINGLORY (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether desire of glory is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital vice?
(5) Of its daughters.
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Whether the desire of glory is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no one
sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Eph. 5:1): "Be
ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children." Now by seeking glory
man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it is
written (Is. 43:6,7): "Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from
the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth on My name, I have
created him for My glory." Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, that which incites a mar to do good is apparently
not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully
says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "glory inflames every man to strive his
utmost": and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, according
to Rom. 2:7: "To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work .
. . glory and honor" [*Vulg.: 'Who will render to every man according
to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and honor and
incorruption, eternal life.']. Therefore the desire for glory is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is
"consistent good report about a person, together with praise": and this
comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz.
that glory is, "as it were, clear knowledge with praise." Now it is no
sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for
praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, "Take care of a good name," and
Rom. 12:17, "Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but
also in the sight of all men." Therefore the desire of vainglory is not
a sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): "He is better advised
who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful."
I answer that, Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore Augustine
says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that to be "glorified is the
same as to be clarified." Now clarity and comeliness imply a certain
display: wherefore the word glory properly denotes the display of
something as regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it
be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is clear
simply can be seen by many, and by those who are far away, it follows
that the word glory properly denotes that somebody's good is known and
approved by many, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.) [*The
quotation is from Livy: Hist., Lib. XXII C, 39]: "I must not boast
while I am addressing one man."
But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists
in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few, or of one,
or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good as being
worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve one's own
good: for it is written (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the
spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God that we may know
the things that are given us from God." Likewise it is not a sin to be
willing to approve one's own good works: for it is written (Mat. 5:16):
"Let your light shine before men." Hence the desire for glory does not,
of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes
a sin: for it is sinful to desire anything vain, according to Ps. 4:3,
"Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?"
Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the
thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that
which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something
frail and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks
glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly, on the
part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the
desire of his own glory to a due end, such as God's honor, or the
spiritual welfare of his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says on Jn. 13:13, "You call Me
Master and Lord; and you say well" (Tract. lviii in Joan.):
"Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of
pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself,
does not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His: nor
does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows." It is
therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but for
ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good
of others, according to Mat. 5:16, "That they may see your good works,
and glorify your Father Who is in heaven."
Reply to Objection 2: That which we receive from God is not vain but
true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good
works, and of which it is written (2 Cor. 10:17,18): "He that glorieth
let him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is
approved, but he whom God commendeth." It is true that some are
heartened to do works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as
also through the desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly
virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as
Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v).
Reply to Objection 3: It is requisite for man's perfection that he
should know himself; but not that he should be known by others,
wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be
desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be
glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good
they know to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the
testimony of others' praise the good which is in him, may himself
strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is
praiseworthy that a man should "take care of his good name," and that
he should "provide good things in the sight of God and men": but not
that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise.
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Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
For, as stated above [3365](A[1]), vainglory consists in glorying in
things that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and
perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony
of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now
these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not
opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to
magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with
vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way
presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above
([3366]Q[130], A[2];[3367] Q[131], A[2]): and these differ from
vainglory. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, "Let nothing be done
through contention, neither by vainglory," says: "Some among them were
given to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for
the sake of vainglory." But contention [*Cf. Q[38]] is not opposed to
magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading,
"Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for
glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever
strive to keep untrammeled." Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.
I answer that, As stated above ([3368]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), glory is an
effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is
praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the
knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated
above ([3369]Q[129], AA[1],2), it follows that it also is about glory:
seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory in
moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to
magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: To think so much of little things as to glory in
them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the
magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him. In
like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for
honor's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent
with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is said
of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth than
for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to
glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this
something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic.
iv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon
little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from
being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth
fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the
magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply. But
if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by
way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great in
his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3370]Q[127], A[2], ad 2), the
opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless
contention, if done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no
one contends save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious,
because nothing is great in his estimation.
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Whether vainglory is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing
precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory
precludes the eternal reward: for it is written (Mat. 6:1): "Take heed,
that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise
you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in heaven." Therefore
vainglory is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is
proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man
appropriates to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written
(Is. 42:8): "I will not give My glory to another," and (1 Tim. 1:17):
"To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore vainglory is a
mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most
dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a
gloss of Augustine on 1 Thess. 2:4, "God, Who proveth our hearts,"
says: "Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not
perceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to
desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to
take pleasure in it, when it is given." Chrysostom also says (Hom. xix
in Matth.) that "vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of
all our inward possessions." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "while other vices find
their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds a place even
in the servants of Christ." Yet in the latter there is no mortal sin.
Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3371]Q[24], A[12];[3372] Q[110],
A[4];[3373] Q[112], A[2] ), a sin is mortal through being contrary to
charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem
to be contrary to charity as regards the love of one's neighbor: yet as
regards the love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In
one way, by reason of the matter about which one glories: for instance
when one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we
owe God, according to Ezech. 28:2, "Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou
hast said: I am God," and 1 Cor. 4:7, "What hast thou that thou hast
not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if
thou hadst not received it?" Or again when a man prefers to God the
temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jer.
9:23,24): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the
strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his
riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth
and knoweth Me." Or again when a man prefers the testimony of man to
God's; thus it is written in reproval of certain people (Jn. 12:43):
"For they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God."
In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of the
one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his last
end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to
obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is against God. In
this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v,
14) that "this vice," namely the love of human praise, "is so hostile
to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory more than it fears or
loves God, that our Lord said (Jn. 5:44): How can you believe, who
receive glory one from another, and the glory which is from God alone,
you do not seek?"
If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not
inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in,
nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal but
a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: No man, by sinning, merits eternal life:
wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it
be done for the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a
mortal sin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward
simply through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act,
vainglory is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every man that is desirous of vainglory,
desires the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to
God alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man.
Reply to Objection 3: Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not
only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to
grave sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too
self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward
goods.
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Whether vainglory is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a vice
that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital. But
vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a
capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for
this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor is
not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.
Objection 3: Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But
vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it is
not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since
human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something outside man
himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the
seven capital vices.
I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some
reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory
among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), reckons pride
to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate
offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without
reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on ([3374]Q[152],
AA[1],2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever good
one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence
therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of
pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the
other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of
vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that are the
means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most conducive
to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of a man's
goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all. Wherefore,
just as by the glory which is in God's sight man acquires honor in
Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of man he
acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its close
connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it follows that
it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate
desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise
from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and
[3375]FS, Q[84], A[2]) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.
Reply to Objection 2: Praise and honor, as stated above [3376](A[2]),
stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so
that glory is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man
loves to be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a
certain renown in the knowledge of others.
Reply to Objection 3: Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of
desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to
be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital
vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin,
inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.
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Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience
,
boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and love of
novelties?
Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably
reckoned to be "disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention,
obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [*Praesumptio novitatum, literally
'presumption of novelties']." For according to Gregory (Moral. xxiii)
boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not
arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as Gregory says
(Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the
daughters of vainglory.
Objection 2: Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome
chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with
vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of
vainglory.
Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that
vainglory is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy.
And yet this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men.
Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter
of vainglory.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who
there assigns the above daughters to vainglory.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[34], A[5]; Q[35], A[4]; [3377]FS,
Q[84], AA[3],4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be
directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its
daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own
excellence, as stated above ([3378]AA[1],4): and to this end a man may
tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is
boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for
astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at
most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man
strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior
to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and
thus we have "obstinacy," by which a man is too much attached to his
own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is better. Secondly,
as regards the will, and then we have "discord," whereby a man is
unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as
regards "speech," and then we have "contention," whereby a man quarrels
noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this is
"disobedience," whereby a man refuses to carry out the command of his
superiors.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3379]Q[112], A[1], ad 2),
boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause,
which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according to Ethic. iv, is
directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and thus
it is the result of vainglory.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger is not the cause of discord and contention,
except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a
glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.
Reply to Objection 3: Vainglory is reproved in connection with
almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers
vainglory to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter
for the sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to
give alms as though this were something novel.
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OF PUSILLANIMITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?
(2) To what virtue is it opposed?
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Whether pusillanimity is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin
makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a
fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a
fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet
does not deem himself worthy of them." Now no one is worthy of great
goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says (Ethic.
iv, 3), "none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor." Therefore
the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently pusillanimity is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (Ecclus.
10:15). But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud
man sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws
from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he who
deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted." Now
sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for
instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose
them for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer. 1:6).
Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin.
Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Col. 3:21):
"Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be
discouraged." Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.
I answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin,
because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a natural
inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its
power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or
inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is
proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so
pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his
power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto.
Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is
that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received from
his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, was
punished by his master (Mat. 25; Lk. 19).
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their
neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil,
because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what
might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if
"they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged
strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they
might have done had they been less retiring."
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit
from sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and
with loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a
man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing
certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through
not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially,
sometimes mortally.
Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great things
in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he derives
either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or from
external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for virtue, he
becomes guilty of pusillanimity.
Reply to Objection 3: Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result
of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion,
whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is
competent. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:16): "The sluggard is wiser in
his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences." For nothing
hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and having a high
opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of
Moses that "perchance he would have been proud, had he undertaken the
leadership of a numerous people without misgiving: and again he would
have been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his Creator."
Reply to Objection 4: Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to
which they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine
grace: yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness,
demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that "the fainthearted man knows
not himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is
worthy, if he knew himself." Now ignorance of self seems opposed to
prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence.
Objection 2: Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who
through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be
slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of
prudence, as stated above ([3380]Q[47], A[9]). Therefore pusillanimity
is not opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate
fear: hence it is written (Is. 35:4): "Say to the fainthearted: Take
courage and fear not." It also seems to proceed from inordinate anger,
according to Col. 3:21, "Fathers, provoke not your children to
indignation, lest they be discouraged." Now inordinate fear is opposed
to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity
is not opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 4: Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular
virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue.
Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is.
Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that
it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the
saying of Ecclus. 37:3, "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?"
Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.
On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness and
littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and little
are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity.
I answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways. First, in
itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed to
magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little differ in
connection with the same subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends
to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man
shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Secondly, it may
be considered in reference to its cause, which on the part of the
intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification, and on the part of
the appetite is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed
one's ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference to its
effect, which is to shrink from the great things of which one is
worthy. But, as stated above ([3381]Q[132], A[2], ad 3), opposition
between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective species than
on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is directly opposed to
magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers pusillanimity as
proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said
properly that it is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause:
because ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but
from laziness in considering one's own ability, according to Ethic. iv,
3, or in accomplishing what is within one's power.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers pusillanimity from the
point of view of its effect.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the point of view of
cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the
dangers of death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint
that pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we
consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is
roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which
disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however,
we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby
the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to
pusillanimity.
Reply to Objection 4: According to its proper species pusillanimity is
a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good
things, which is a very great evil according to Ethic. iv. Presumption,
however, is stated to be "wicked" on account of pride whence it
proceeds.
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OF MAGNIFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With
regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) What is its matter?
(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
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Whether magnificence is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever
has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above ([3382]FS, Q[65],
A[1]). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence:
because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every liberal man
is magnificent." Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to
Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean, for
it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are
opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is "equal," as
stated in Metaph. x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the
extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination,
but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above ([3383]Q[108],
A[2];[3384] Q[117], A[1], OBJ[1]). Now according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 2) the "magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and
this is opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after
oneself. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act
is right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence is about
things to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence= magna
facere---i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather than
a virtue.
On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But
magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to Ps.
47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds." Therefore
magnificence is a virtue.
I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, "we speak of virtue in
relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards the
limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very
nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something
great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very
notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards
his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent
deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence,
either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as
explained above (Q[129], A[3], ad 2), as also ([3385]FS, Q[65], A[1])
when we were treating of the connection of virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that magnificence observes the
extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes
the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls
short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity
([3386]Q[129], A[3], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great.
But that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that
which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at
large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be
lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but
because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding
himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it
magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a
wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it
belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable
dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there
must needs be a virtue of act," i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the
appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is
what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.
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Whether magnificence is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For
magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it may
belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as
in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a
great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special
virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same
as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to
something great, as stated above ([3387]Q[129], AA[1],2). Therefore it
belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore
magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it
is written (Ex. 15:11): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness,"
and (Ps. 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His
sanctuary." Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above
([3388]Q[81], A[8]). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as
religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the
others.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues
(Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).
I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something
great, as its name implies [magnificence= magna facere---i.e. to make
great things]. Now "facere" may be taken in two ways, in a strict
sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly "facere" means to work something
in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the
kind; in a broad sense "facere" is employed to denote any action,
whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in
the agent, as to understand or will.
Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something
great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict sense, it is
then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use
of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness,
namely that the work produced [factum] by the act is something great,
namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence
does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.
If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something
great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad sense, it is not
a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do
something great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" [facere] be
taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is
proper to magnificence.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to
something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either
by making [faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv,
3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of
great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something
great, direct their principal intention, not to something great, but to
that which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing
done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue.
On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something
great, "doing" [facere] being taken in the strict sense, but also to
tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De
Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing and
administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and
noble purpose of mind, discussion" referring to the inward intention,
and "administration" to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as
magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that
magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in
external matter [factibili].
Reply to Objection 3: The intention of magnificence is the production
of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no
end of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore
magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine
honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most
commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine
sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this
reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect
is directed to religion or holiness.
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Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure?
Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great
expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But
liberality is about expenditure, as stated above ([3389]Q[117], A[2]).
Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.
Objection 2: Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv,
2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.
Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about
gifts.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external
work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing
an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending
presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of
magnificence.
Objection 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure.
But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do
not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for
themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore
magnificence is not about great expenditure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "magnificence
does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but
only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale."
Therefore it is only about great expenditure.
I answer that, As stated above [3390](A[2]), it belongs to magnificence
to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work,
proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be
produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to
spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in
becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a
magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal," i.e.
proportionate, "expenditure." Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of
money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love
money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both
this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a
great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great
expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent
man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3391]Q[129], A[2]), those
virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty
arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is
concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of
that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money
and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in
general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use
of money.
Reply to Objection 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one
way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man,
inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money;
wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the
obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to
liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in
relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is
impossible without expenditure or outlay.
Reply to Objection 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents,
as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather
under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some
work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do
something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he
brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.
Reply to Objection 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and
a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man
may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments
to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot
accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great
simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are
great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in
itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its
genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says
(De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).
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Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For
magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above
[3392](A[3]). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of
justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But
magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with
expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to
pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the
magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in
common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should
not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn.
Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.
I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue,
cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not
agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a
part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.
In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things
are necessary, as stated above ([3393]Q[80]). The one is that the
secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in
some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with
fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and
difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated,
like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of
fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives
its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the
arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from
the dispossession of one's property, which is of much less account than
danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of
fortitude.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as
viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and
magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of
the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure
in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the
concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving
and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other
hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by
attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a
determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like
magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.
Reply to Objection 2: Although magnificence does not agree with
fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter:
since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure,
even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something
great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the
reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason
by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This
is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those
things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the
risk of a great loss.
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OF MEANNESS* (TWO ARTICLES) [*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as
"magnificentia" is doing great things.]
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which
head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether meanness is a vice?
(2) Of the vice opposed to it.
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Whether meanness is a vice?
Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice
moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore
both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence
is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a
vice.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful
reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy,
since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean
man is loth to spend money." But this belongs to covetousness or
illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the
others.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a
special vice opposed to magnificence.
I answer that, As stated above ([3394]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3395]FS, Q[18],
A[6]), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many
cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to
be mean [parvificus] because he intends to do something little
[parvum]. Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad
aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a
mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in
relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in
two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another
as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends
principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the
greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may
produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4)
that "the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more
magnificent result." On the other hand, the mean man intends
principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
2) that "he seeks how he may spend least." As a result of this he
intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from
producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the
Philosopher says that "the mean man after going to great expense
forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he is
unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to
observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and
work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what
is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a
vice.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the
rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the
Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but
for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little
things: hence meanness is a vice.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear
makes us take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his
reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods,
even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy,
but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his
affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his
reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common
with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with
pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous
man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that
illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great
expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore
meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 2) that "although meanness and its contrary vice are
sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm
one's neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful."
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Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?
Objection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For
great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a
virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
Objection 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated
above [3396](A[1]), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness,
it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend
much, where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought
to spend much, according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something
of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.
Objection 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as
stated above [3397](A[1]). Now those who spend excessively, do so in
order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But
this belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated
above (Q[131], A[2] ). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic.
ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.
I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are
relative terms, as stated above [3398](A[1]). Now just as expenditure
may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in
comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason
requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest
that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his
work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion between his
expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man
exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to
his work. This vice is called in Greek {banausia}, so called from the
Greek {baunos}, because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes
everything. It is also called {apyrokalia}, i.e. lacking good fire,
since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in
Latin it may be called "consumptio" [waste].
Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work
done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for
this belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness.
Reply to Objection 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue
which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the
vice of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure
the value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend
little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great
work, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as when
it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.
Reply to Objection 3: Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very
species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas
meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being
directed to the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.
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OF PATIENCE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether patience is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?
(3) Whether it can be had without grace?
(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?
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Whether patience is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues
are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet
patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according
to Is. 49:10 and Apoc. 7:16, "They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither
shall the heat nor the sun strike them." Therefore patience is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since
virtue it is "that makes its possessor good." Yet patience is sometimes
found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils
patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16, "All
the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in
misery and in sorrow." Therefore patience is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated
above ([3399]FS, Q[70], A[1], ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the
fruits (Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of the
soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even
preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us."
I answer that, As stated above ([3400]Q[123], A[1]), the moral virtues
are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason
against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is
strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. 7:10, "The
sorrow of the world worketh death," and Ecclus. 30:25, "Sadness hath
killed many, and there is no profit in it." Hence the necessity for a
virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give
way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an
equal mind," i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, "lest he abandon
with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better
things." It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as
regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to
the goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but
they will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven.
Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling
and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in
the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience,
in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the
goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv) that "patience itself will not be in heaven, since there
is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet that which
we shall obtain by patience will be eternal."
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly
speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without
inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those
who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither
marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel
at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3401]FS, Q[11], A[1]), the very
notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure
in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues
are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is
a virtue. but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned
a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from
being overcome by sorrow.
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Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For
in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now "patience
hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of
the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the
soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written
(Lk. 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls." Therefore
patience is the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause
of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory
(Hom. xxxv in Evang.) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the
virtues." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which
Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call
principal.
I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For
it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's
work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority
and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it
inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues
which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than
those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good:
and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that
which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity
/are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a
check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the
one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of
death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which
temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of
hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not
the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the
theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly
establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which
withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.
Reply to Objection 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in
bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is
moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by
meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to
unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the
principle is the most perfect.
Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect,
that it is more perfect simply.
Reply to Objection 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership;
wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it
removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and
disturb the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of
all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly,
but merely because it removes their obstacles.
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Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?
Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without
grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it
possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more
reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of
evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and
without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that
"men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love
sinfully." Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the
help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be
truly patient.
Objection 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more
abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens
are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their
country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient.
Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the
help of grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much
trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health
of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like
manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the
health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i.e. from God,
"is my patience."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of
desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly
undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which
gives pleasure." The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of
themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to
suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence
it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure
evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which
causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man
prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may
cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all
things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by
charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient."
But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through
grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in
our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is
clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human
nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination
of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is
more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the
concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake
of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet
it is this that pertains to true patience.
Reply to Objection 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. [3402]FS,
Q[61], A[5]] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the
human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet
not without the help of God's grace [*Cf. [3403]FS, Q[109], A[2]]. On
the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot
tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man
bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man
naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between
this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.
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Whether patience is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a
thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as
fortitude: because, as stated above ([3404]Q[123], A[6]), the proper
act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For
it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from
St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that "patience consists in enduring
evils inflicted by others." Therefore patience is not a part of
fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated
above ([3405]Q[123], A[3]), and thus it is in the irascible. But
patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in
the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore
if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without
patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently,
but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience
is not a part of fortitude.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
fortitude.
I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because
it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs
to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by
others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now of those
evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to
endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about
these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this
matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to
that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed
to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper
calls patience brave (Sent. 811).
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything
indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of
death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding
fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not
failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is
in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude
is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude
avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be
patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a
praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here
and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them.
Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the
concupiscible faculty.
Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because
the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the
matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part
of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because
temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of
touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex:
whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons.
Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides
their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man
forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however
great they be.
Reply to Objection 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain
respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a
man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it
is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it
inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up
against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v.
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says
on Mat. 4:10, "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient
under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most
wicked": and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii)
that "the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the
commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our
enemies." But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is
annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.
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Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [*Longsuffering. It is
necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with
magnanimity.]
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For
Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God, not
as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked,
that they may be converted." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4):
"The Most High is a patient rewarder." Therefore it seems that patience
is the same as longanimity.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But
impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for
one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it
seems that patience is the same as longanimity.
Objection 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured,
so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of
place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time,
in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from
patience.
Objection 4: On the contrary, a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom.
ii] on Rom. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and
patience, and longsuffering?" says: "It seems that longanimity differs
from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of
set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take
a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently."
I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great
things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long
way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good,
rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object,
so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with
magnanimity than with patience.
Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two
reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils
for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is
easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult.
Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a
nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul." Hence there may be patience in bearing
this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity
and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the
delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil
which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which
regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous
evil.
For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says
that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and
difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By saying "arduous"
he refers to constancy in good; when he says "difficult" he refers to
the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and
by adding "continued" or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in
so far as it has something in common with patience.
This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though
distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that
which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails.
Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the
point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time
coming to us.
We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason
for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear
with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long
time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with
longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be
unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to
be borne with patience.
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OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under
the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(3) Of its relation to constancy;
(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?
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Whether perseverance is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater than
perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv,
9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority
(De Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living,
unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should
persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic.
ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and continued
persistence in a well-considered purpose." Therefore perseverance is
not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.
On the contrary, Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that
"perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand,
and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are
indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to
omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue is
about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special kind
of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous
deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the
act's very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object
of that act: secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long
in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence to persist
long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special
virtue.
Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for
the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of
itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in
connection with dangers of death (which also is something difficult in
itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in
enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as
necessity requires.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as
it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to
endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And
evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured
for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not
on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among
other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch,
because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the
lack of food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now
it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who
grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as
in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not
violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly
affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that
moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this
sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imperfect in the genus
of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long
persistence in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who
has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to
persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like
perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from
the aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same
name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe
without seeing." Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without
performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence
without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the
habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for
instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it.
Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes
used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes
for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of
perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by
persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not
persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the
work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs
to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for
instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the
magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are, however,
some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such
as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the
entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are the principal
virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of
life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as
denoting the consummate act of perseverance.
Reply to Objection 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue
in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to
that virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end,
belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as
its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to
its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every
virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to change."
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Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude.
For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance is
about pains of touch." But these belong to temperance. Therefore
perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain
passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply
moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the
more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason.
Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue,
but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can
lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore
perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal
virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part
of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a
part of fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[2]; [3406]FS, Q[61],
AA[3],4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed
something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it
practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most
difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been stated
(Q[123], A[2]) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it
observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand
firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity
that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance of
something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to
principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in
accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor
is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore
perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues
depends not only on the matter [*Cf.[3407] Q[136], A[4], ad 2], but
also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than
matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have
more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it
has more in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm
against the difficulty arising from length of time.
Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks
(Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely
in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered
as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or
failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is
in the irascible.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as
denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the
end, according to Mat. 24:13, "He that shall persevere to the end, he
shall be saved." Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance
for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.
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Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?
Objection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance.
For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q[137], A[5]): and
patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not
pertain to perseverance.
Objection 2: Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good." Now
it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in
great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy
pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.
Objection 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would
seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of
unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i)
condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance,
as stated above (Q[128] , A[6]). Therefore constancy does not pertain
to perseverance.
On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one stands to a
thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as
appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy
belongs to perseverance.
I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it
belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to
those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the
virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good,
against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the
act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against
difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence
perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude,
because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more
intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external
obstacles.
Reply to Objection 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are
especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as
stated above ([3408]Q[136], A[1]). Hence constancy agrees with
perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those
things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account:
wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.
Reply to Objection 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds:
yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any
length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which
magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which
perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.
Reply to Objection 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as
it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the
point of their difference, as stated in the Article.
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Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[10]]
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of
grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above [3409](A[1]). Now
according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner
of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for
perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the
harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now
"before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what
he had received," as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more
therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ,
persevere without the help of a further grace.
Objection 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than
deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis.
5:7): "We . . . have walked through hard ways." Now some persevere in
sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also
persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that
perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in
Christ."
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2], ad 3), perseverance
has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of
perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of
habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be
taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in
this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous
help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated
above ([3410]FS, Q[109], A[10]), when we were treating of grace.
Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which
changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed
in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit
repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its
power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to
accomplish.
Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is
concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a
habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who
has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it
was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to
persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human
nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of
Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of
persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no
man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening
God, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding
sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy,
have persevered in faith."
Reply to Objection 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he
cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by
falling into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be
persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the other
hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good,
because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of
grace for that end.
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OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which
head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Of effeminacy;
(2) Of pertinacity.
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Whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance? [*Mollities, literally
'softness']
Objection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.
For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9,10, "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor
liers with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate---i.e.
obscene, given to unnatural vice." But this is opposed to chastity.
Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that
"delicacy is a kind of effeminacy." But to be delicate seems akin to
intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but
to temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the
man who is fond of amusement is effeminate." Now immoderate fondness of
amusement is opposed to {eutrapelia}, which is the virtue about
pleasures of play, as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is
not opposed to perseverance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the
persevering man is opposed to the effeminate."
I answer that, As stated above ([3411]Q[137], AA[1],2), perseverance is
deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on
account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly
opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on
account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we
understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be "soft" if it
readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft
through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram.
Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy
blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no
wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or
sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them." Now it
is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of
pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading "True
magnanimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is
not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved
himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure." Moreover, pleasure
itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of
pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure
privation. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7),
properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on
account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a
weak motion.
Reply to Objection 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one
way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is
more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by
natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering
through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared
to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who
are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish
themselves, as it were.
Reply to Objection 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it
is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the
delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that
diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Dt. 28:56): "The tender and
delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her
foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']." Thus delicacy is a kind
of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of
pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for
instance toil or the like.
Reply to Objection 3: In play two things may be considered. In the
first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play
is opposed to {eutrapelia}. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or
rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to
effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs
thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.
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Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?
Objection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance.
For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory.
But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as
stated above ([3412]Q[132], A[2]). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed
to perseverance.
Objection 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so
either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess:
because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow,
since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they rejoice when
they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected." And if it
be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is
clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance.
Objection 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good
against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against
pleasures, the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But
pertinacity is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is
not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is
to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is
opposed to religion, as stated above ([3413]Q[92], A[1]). Therefore
pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be
pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious."
"Pervicacious" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man
"perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients
called 'vicia' what we call victory." These the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 9) calls {ischyrognomones}, that is "head-strong," or
{idiognomones}, that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by their
opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less
than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear
that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while
pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for
falling short of it.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own
opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own
excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now
it has been stated above ([3414]Q[127], A[2], ad 1;[3415] Q[133],
A[2]), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause,
but on their species.
Reply to Objection 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting
inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a
certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man.
Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too
much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or
effeminate man.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the other virtues persist against the
onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the
same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise
seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is
directly opposed to perseverance.
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OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is
the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?
(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
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Whether fortitude is a gift?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues
differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should
not be reckoned a gift.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated
above ([3416]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of fortitude does not remain
in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the
fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from
heaven." Therefore fortitude is not a gift.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is
a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures
of the passing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the
concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that
fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.
On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the
Holy Ghost (Is. 11:2).
I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]; [3417]FS, Q[61], A[3]): and this firmness of mind
is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with
regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his
proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these
respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties,
whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil.
In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]).
Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he
may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may
threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a
man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or
dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy
Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is
the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain
confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who
expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is
reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above
([3418]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind
by the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the
endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give
confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude
that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on
the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the
end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from
toil and evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of
fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also
inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore
the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems
to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.
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Whether the fourth beatitude: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst afte
r
justice," corresponds to the gift of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift of
fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude
corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after
justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude
corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire
for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of
wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above
([3419]Q[45]). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of
fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes,
since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8. Now
the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore
neither does any beatitude correspond to it.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fortitude
becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true
goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must
toil."
I answer that, As stated above ([3420]Q[121], A[2]), Augustine makes
the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which
they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness
between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning
the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely
fortitude.
Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A[1]
), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not
merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of
works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire,
which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.
Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may
understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which
is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein
whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts,
as stated above (Q[23], A[8], ad 3; [3421]FS, Q[68], A[4], ad 3). Hence
whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond
sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards
the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay
and accomplishment of goods.
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OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:
(1) The precepts of fortitude itself;
(2) The precepts of its parts.
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Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?
Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably
given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old
Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Dt. 20). Therefore
precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.
Objection 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than
negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not
vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain
none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.
Objection 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as
stated above (Q[123], A[2]; [3422]FS, Q[61], A[2]). Now the precepts
are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be
proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should have
been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief
precepts of the Law.
On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.
I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the
lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various
ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even
in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and
others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law
is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine Law contains
precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to
directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written (Dt. 20:3,4):
"Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you,
and will fight for you against your enemies."
As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among
them we find precepts of fortitude according to the requirements of
those goods.
Reply to Objection 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises,
while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal,
according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there
was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily
contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New
Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of
eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Mat. 11:12, "The
kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away."
Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. 5:8,9): "Your adversary the devil, as a
roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye,
strong in faith," as also James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he will fly
from you." Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be
withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to
be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely endure temporal
evils, according to Mat. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body."
Reply to Objection 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts.
But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like
the things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the
precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3423]Q[122], A[1]), the
precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles,
which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts
of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which
the notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude,
because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear
dangers of death.
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Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the
Divine Law?
Objection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are
unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and
perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence,
magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above ([3424]Q[128]). Now we
find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance.
Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and
magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is
the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
xxxv). Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore
patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.
Objection 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude,
as stated above ([3425]Q[128];[3426] Q[136], A[4];[3427] Q[137], A[2]).
Now the precepts of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as
stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and
perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative.
The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by
Holy Writ.
I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things
as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man
needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and
annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only
about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the
secondary and annexed virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the
genus of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of
greatness which they regard in their respective matters. Now things
pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather
than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of
counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity.
On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain
to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable
in them, but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the
need of precepts of patience and perseverance.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3428]Q[3], A[2]), although
affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for
always, but according to place and time. Wherefore just as the
affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to
the preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to
fulfil them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be
understood in the same way.
Reply to Objection 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and
perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed
with caution; nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in
particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about
minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in
determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such cases.
__________________________________________________________________
OF TEMPERANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself;
(2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must
consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?
(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?
(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind
of touch?
(6) What is the rule of temperance?
(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?
(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues ?
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Whether temperance is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue
goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a natural
aptitude for virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance
withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according to
Ethic. ii, 3,8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above ([3429]FS, Q[65], A[1]). But some people have temperance without
having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet
covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as
appears from what we have said above ([3430]FS, Q[68], A[4]). But
seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have
been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ[8],9,19,45,52, 71,139).
Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the
name of a virtue."
I answer that, As stated above ([3431]FS, Q[55], A[3]), it is essential
to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in
accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human
virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with
reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very
name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes.
Therefore temperance is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is
becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are
becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it
follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in
accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not
withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it
is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human
nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the
inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of
perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all
who are in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being
subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a
virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural
disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural
to man, as stated above ([3432]FS, Q[63], A[1]), or acquired by
habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected
by reason, as stated above ([3433]FS, Q[65], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely,
fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh,
according to Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The
gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids
offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as
stated above ([3434]Q[19], A[9], ad 1). But it may have for its
secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God.
Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun
those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of
temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.
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Whether temperance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For
Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance to
preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake."
But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a
special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we
observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this
is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot
separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just
is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance,
according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore
temperance is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a
special virtue.
I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common term
in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things to
which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used
antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of
speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g.
The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word "temperance" has a
twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common
signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general
virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain temperateness
or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions:
and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical
difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both
as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which
seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to
endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the
good of reason.
On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as
withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to
man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special
matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those
things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine
law. Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can,
like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and
secondly in a sense of excellence.
Reply to Objection 2: The things about which temperance is concerned
have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are
natural to man, as we shall state further on ([3435]AA[4],5). Hence
tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence,
although it is a common property of all the virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it
is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons.
First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists
in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we
understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold
the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his
animal nature, as we shall state further on ([3436]AA[4],5; Q[142],
A[4]), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In
consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above
all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty
must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral
goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute of
temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who has
no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is most
applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most
dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q[142], A[4]).
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Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that
"temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other
wanton emotions of the mind." Now all the passions of the soul are
called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not
only about desires and pleasures.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good"
[*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially
with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and
pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers,
according to Augustine (QQ[83], qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the
virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace
of moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27)
that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the
mind and to enforce moderation." Now moderation is needed, not only in
desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains
to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about desires and
pleasures.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not occur
in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, and De
Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and desire are
kept under control."
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[136], A[1]), it
belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the
passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's
passions is twofold, as stated above ([3437]FS, Q[23], A[2]), when we
were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite
pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from
sensible and bodily evils.
The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against
reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily
goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason,
but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to
attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to
the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in
accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral
virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.
On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying
from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being
immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man
flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the
good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason.
Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to
remain firm in the good of reason.
Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature
bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. fear,
which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring,
which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good,
so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly
concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz.
desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from
the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects
of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the
aforesaid pleasures.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3438]FS, Q[23], AA[1],2;
[3439]FS, Q[25], A[1]), when we were treating of the passions, those
passions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions
pertaining to the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible
presuppose the passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance
directly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards
good, as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch
as moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the
passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is
moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the things
he desires.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards
the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to
temperance. on the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind
from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which
fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and
fortitude about fears.
Reply to Objection 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions
of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of
the internal passions.
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Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that
"the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which
draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from
the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it is
the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular
praise." Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire
for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the
other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and
again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is
written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*'Cupiditas,' which is the Douay
version following the Greek {philargyria} renders 'desire of money'] is
the root of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires
of pleasures of touch.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who
is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is
temperate, but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or
great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of
touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only
about desires for pleasures of touch.
Objection 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to
pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect. Now
all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they
all equally belong to the matter of temperance.
Objection 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the
pleasures of the body, as stated above ([3440]FS, Q[31], A[5]) in the
treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the
state of virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance,
through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised
man knowledge, saying (Gn. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and
evil." Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.
Objection 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of
temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of
touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur
in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of
temperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "temperance
is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."
I answer that, As stated above [3441](A[3]), temperance is about
desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and
daring. Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the
greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers
of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about
desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a
natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results
from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural
operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by
means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of
the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and
drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense
of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of
touch.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes
temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as
concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and
this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply
that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he
control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to
temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily
other pleasures.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting
moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which
is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's
emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.
Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a
different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals
pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to
sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to
hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives
pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason, but also on
account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore
temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to
pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while in so far
as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of
their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized
sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature.
Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can be
referred to them antonomastically.
Reply to Objection 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature
greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the
senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive
appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by
moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly
speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no
control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a
hindrance to another greater and more binding.
Reply to Objection 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the
preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that
temperance is about all pleasures of touch.
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Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to
the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which
are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which regard
the touch. But according to what has been said [3442](A[4]), temperance
is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life.
Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than
about those proper to the touch.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than
about things themselves. Now, according to De Anima ii, 3, "the touch
is the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food,
whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the
pleasing quality of the food." Therefore temperance is about the taste
rather than about the touch.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7: "temperance and
intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and
incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy
pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors
which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about
pleasures proper to the taste.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "seemingly
temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the
taste."
I answer that, As stated above [3443](A[4]), temperance is about the
greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life
either in the species or in the individual. In these matters certain
things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary. The
principal thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman
who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food and
drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual: while
the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure
annexed thereto.
In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use
more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing
savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the
pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these
necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch.
Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures
of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of
these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things
that have relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to
the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more
about the taste than about the other senses.
Reply to Objection 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially
results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold,
wet or dry." To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make
the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being
suitable for nourishment.
Reply to Objection 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional,
so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the
use of food and drink.
Reply to Objection 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the
food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in
which it is served.
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Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend
on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated
according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is
above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not
depend on the needs of the body.
Objection 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the
needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin
against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required
by nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem
unreasonable.
Objection 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the
need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin in
using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the
sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the
body is not the rule of temperance.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both
Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding
him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable
for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of those things
with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so far
as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station."
I answer that, As stated above [3444](A[1]; Q[109], A[2]; Q[123],
A[12]), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of
reason: because "man's good is to be in accord with reason," as
Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is
that by which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good
of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of
end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now
all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed to
some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes
the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which
it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life
requires.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the need of this life is
regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed
that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work,
thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes
the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of
temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it
makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for
life is subordinate.
Reply to Objection 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways.
First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term
"necessary" to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food
is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something
without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not
only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires
pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound
condition of body." Other things that are not necessary for this
purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to
health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not
use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others
are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses
moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping
with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant things,"
those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of
body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these things."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need
according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the
requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external
things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements
of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the
temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not only they
be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition, but also
that they be not inconsistent with good," i.e. good conduct, nor
"beyond his substance," i.e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib.
Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man considers the need" not only "of
this life" but also "of his station."
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Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue.
For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is about
those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about
pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in Ethic. iii,
10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it
to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be
more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it
is written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it
breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one
provoked?" Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence
of desire and concupiscence, as stated above ([3445]FS, Q[25], A[4]).
But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore,
seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which
controls concupiscence.
On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues
(Moral. ii, 49).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[11]; Q[61], A[3]), a
principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost
claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite
for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite
in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch,
with which temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are
most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them,
and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more
necessary to the present life, as stated above [3446](A[4]). For this
reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The longer the range of its operation, the
greater is the agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the very
fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are
furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power. This
is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an
accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes,
although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of
the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause,
wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its
control regards a more principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of
desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the
irascible. But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the
appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore
temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal
virtue.
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Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the
virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and
seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and
the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves praise for being
honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the
virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of
touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to
temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater
virtue than justice.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more
necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of death
which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur
every day; so that temperance is in more general use than fortitude.
Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the "greatest
virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason
we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just."
I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good of
the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,"
wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it
is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than
temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man
and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are
endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the
desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident
that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance:
while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still.
Reply to Objection 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to
temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to
temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from
which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the
lower animals.
Reply to Objection 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good,
the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good,
wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein
temperance excels.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is general because it regards the many
conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general
because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way,
temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although
in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than
fortitude but also than justice.
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OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether insensibility is a sin?
(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;
(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?
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Whether insensibility is a vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For those
are called insensible who are deficient with regard to pleasures of
touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether
deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan. 10:2,3): "In those
days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread,
and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth, neither was I anointed
with ointment." Therefore insensibility is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, "man's good is to be in accord with reason,"
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all
pleasures of touch is most conducive to man's progress in the good of
reason: for it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who took
pulse for their food (Dan. 1:12), "God gave knowledge, and
understanding in every book and wisdom." Therefore insensibility, which
rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful.
Objection 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding
sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in
avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if we deny ourselves
pleasures we are less liable to sin." Therefore there is nothing
vicious in insensibility.
On the contrary, Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now
insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a vice.
I answer that, Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious.
Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are
necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man
should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for
man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual
or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to reject pleasure to
the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature's
preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature.
And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.
It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and
even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures
as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's
health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex;
as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and
soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to fulfil
their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to recover
health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind
of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to
contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal
things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of
insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through
any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some
praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of
contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the text
goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately
afterwards.
Reply to Objection 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his
sensitive powers. which need a bodily organ. as stated in the [3447]FP,
Q[84], AA[7],8, man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use
his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that
afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he
abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of the
body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less the
powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is
commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to
contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind
of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures,
but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and
carnal procreation.
Reply to Objection 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned,
not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity
requires.
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Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin. For
Jerome in commenting on Mat. 18:3, "Unless you be converted, and become
as little children," says that "a child persists not in anger, is
unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman,"
all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not
a childish sin.
Objection 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in
respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish
sin.
Objection 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished:
whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is
concerned, are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col.
3:5, "Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . .
concupiscence" [*Vulg.: 'your members which are upon the earth,
fornication . . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a
childish sin.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we apply
the term intemperance* to childish faults." [*{Akolasia} which
Aristotle refers to {kolazo} to punish, so that its original sense
would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint.']
I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. First,
because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean
that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. Secondly. by
way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are
said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked
concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. First, as
rewards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence
desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing
is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Tully
says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness is twofold," that
"the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man's excellence in so
far as his nature differs from other animals." Now a child does not
attend to the order of reason; and in like manner "concupiscence does
not listen to reason," according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly, they are
alike as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes
more self-willed: hence it is written (Ecclus. 30:8): "A horse not
broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become
headstrong." So, too, concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength:
wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a
custom, and custom not resisted became necessity." Thirdly, as to the
remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by being
restrained; hence it is written (Prov. 23:13,14): "Withhold not
correction from a child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and
deliver his soul from Hell." In like manner by resisting concupiscence
we moderate it according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates
this when he says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to
spiritual things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom,"
i.e. carnal concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is
gradually weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though
not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it."
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to
live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the
concupiscible to accord with reason."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as
denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the
sin of intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways.
First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance
are about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and
sex, which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a
desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing
that nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does
not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for
nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin
in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to
quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to
natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and
these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity [*Cf.
Q[167]], such as the nice [curiosa] preparation of food, or the
adornment of women. And though children do not affect these things
much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given
above.
Reply to Objection 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and
fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in
them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cowardice* is a greater vice than intemperance? [*Cf. Q[125]]
Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than
intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the
good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more
excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above [3448](A[2]; Q[141],
A[8]). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the
less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable,
if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains."
Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other
passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3, that "it is more
difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would
seem to be stronger than fear." Therefore intemperance, which is
overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is
overcome by fear.
Objection 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now
cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires to
be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, which
pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous sin than
intemperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that
"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice."
Therefore it is more sinful.
I answer that, one may be compared with another in two ways. First,
with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man
who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than
cowardice.
First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to
avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving life.
On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire of which
is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because, as stated
above (A[2], ad 2), intemperance is more about certain annexed
pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures. Now the
more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin. Wherefore
intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the
object or motive matter.
In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for
three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the more
grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are
demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death,
stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of
intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the graver it
is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice
has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions done
through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external agent,
so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic.
iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are simply
voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an intemperate
man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary generically. For
no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual
pleasures which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the most
effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the
consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in matters
relating to cowardice: because the particular action that imposes
itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his
shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary,
for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is more
voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes place,
is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more
voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it is
easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since
pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of
everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by
frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas dangers
of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to
encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.
Reply to Objection 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with
temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard
to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is directed
to the common good more than temperance is. And from this point of view
cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, since by
cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common good. Secondly,
with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure
dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and from
this point of view there is no need for cowardice to take precedence of
intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that does not
succumb to a stronger force, so on the other hand to be overcome by a
stronger force is proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker
force, is the proof of a greater vice.
Reply to Objection 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which
one shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures
whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of
life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of
death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: although
the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow, and fear,
occasioned by certain other evils.
Reply to Objection 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a
general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases we
have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to
sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance
murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins.
Objection 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are
seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now
sins of intemperance are most common, because they are about things
connected with the common use of human life, and in which many happen
to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most
disgraceful.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance
and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain
desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and
pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not the
most disgraceful of sins.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices."
I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now
honor is due to excellence, as stated above ([3449]Q[103], A[1]), and
glory denotes clarity ([3450]Q[103], A[1], ad 3). Accordingly
intemperance is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is
most repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common
to us and the lower animals, as stated above ([3451]Q[141], AA[2],3).
Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): "Man, when he was in honor, did
not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made
like to them." Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's clarity
or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of
intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and
beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as
being most slavish.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12], "the sins
of the flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance,
although less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that
culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while
disgrace regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the
unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner.
Reply to Objection 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the
shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as
regards the nature of the vices themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: When we say that intemperance is most
disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely,
that are connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in
conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of
human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are
apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of excess:
for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in committing
the unnatural vice.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these
same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to
be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to
be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is
comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of
temperance.
Objection 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But
temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as
stated above ([3452]Q[141], A[4]). Therefore mildness is not a part of
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the
Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now
external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above
([3453]Q[58], A[8]). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than
of temperance.
Objection 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more
parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty,
shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness,
sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the
companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity,
refinement, method, contentment." [*'Per-se-sufficientiam' which could
be rendered 'self-sufficiency,' but for the fact that this is taken in
a bad sense. See[3454] Q[169], A[1].] Therefore it seems that Tully
insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above (QQ[48],128), a cardinal virtue may have
three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The
integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which
are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral
parts of temperance, "shamefacedness," whereby one recoils from the
disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and "honesty," whereby one
loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above ([3455]Q[141],
A[2], ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a
certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in
disgrace.
The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a
virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter
or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two
kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards
meat, there is "abstinence," and as regards drink properly there is
"sobriety." Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation,
and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of
procreation, there is "chastity," and as to the pleasures incidental to
the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling,
we have "purity."
The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues:
for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal
matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation
is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures
of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue
that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains
the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part
of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.
This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul;
secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; thirdly, in
outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which
temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements
towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement
of the will when stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement
is restrained by "continence," the effect of which is that, although a
man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to
them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of
hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained
by "humility." The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards
revenge, and this is restrained by "meekness" or "mildness."
With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint
is the effect of "modesty," which, according to Andronicus, has three
parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what
not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we
do: this he assigns to "method." The second is that a man observe
decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to "refinement." The
third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between
a man and his friends, and this is called "gravity."
With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be
observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius
assigns "lowliness," and Andronicus "contentment"; secondly, we must
not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes
"moderation," Andronicus "simplicity."
Reply to Objection 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue,
just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on
([3456]Q[165], A[1]); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue.
Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since
it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of
restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.
Reply to Objection 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of
temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree
as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of external action justice
considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but
only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice
but of temperance.
Reply to Objection 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to
the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the
moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the
first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty.
With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
(2) What is its object?
(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?
(4) What kind of people are ashamed?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper
to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is clear
from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness
observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii,
7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or
something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.
But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since
it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of
justice. since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas
justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude,
because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while
it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it
a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas
shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows
that shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible
according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of
honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is the
companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a
stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support
of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful." Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain
vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and
inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to
Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore
from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds
is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that
shamefacedness is not a virtue.
I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a
broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in Phys.
vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection,
though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now
shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear
of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of a base
action." Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is
fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above ([3457]FS,
Q[40], A[1]; [3458]FS, Q[41], A[2]; [3459]FS, Q[42], A[3]), when we
were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous
habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to
do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to
avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of
disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue,
since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.
Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and
praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way /shamefacedness
is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the
notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in
virtue's definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it
be "an elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now
shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its
movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it
falls short of the notion of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of
baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated ([3460]Q[142], A[4]) that
the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore
shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by
reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according
to the species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as
the vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful,
shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that
which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of
honesty.
Reply to Objection 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is
sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow
that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every
vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence
shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of
disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.
Reply to Objection 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an
acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the
object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their
regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would
be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?
Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a
disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that
"shamefacedness is fear of disgrace." Now sometimes those who do
nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For thy sake I
have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face." Therefore
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Objection 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is
sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance
when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Objection 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most
beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to
do virtuous deeds, according to Lk. 9:26, "He that shall be ashamed of
Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed," etc.
Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action.
Objection 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a
disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the
action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more
ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most
grievous, according to Ps. 51:3, "Why dost thou glory in malice?"
Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear of
doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done."
I answer that, As stated above ([3461]FS, Q[41], A[2]; [3462]FS, Q[42],
A[3]), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an
arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is
twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the
deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the
character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone
does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability: wherefore it is
not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.
The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the
reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory
consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the
character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an
arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first
and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due
to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness
regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those defects which are
not the result of any fault of his own."
Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains
from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a man while
doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of
reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius,
De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the latter we say
that he is "ashamed." Hence he says that "the man who is ashamed acts
in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced."
Reply to Objection 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due
to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 6) that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the
cause." Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is
subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the
Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it
said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they (the apostles) went from
the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy
to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus." It is owing to imperfection
of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he
suffers on account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the
more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is
written (Is. 51:7): "Fear ye not the reproach of men."
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3463]Q[63], A[3]), though honor
is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain
excellence: and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly
due to sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind
of defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and
the like.
Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as
such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either
because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or
because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical
for doing virtuous deeds.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful,
either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in
comparison with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain
abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of
cowardice than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a
semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with
him?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who
are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6
that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire
approbation." Now men desire this especially from people of the better
sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not
more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who
perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those
whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet.
ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself."
Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely
connected with him.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take
more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as
jokers and fable-tellers." But those who are more closely connected
with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame
chiefly from them.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done
nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time;
by those whose friends they wish to become." Now these are less closely
connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who
are more closely united to him.
On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most
ashamed by those who are to be continually with him."
I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor
denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the excellence
which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is
shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect, especially
that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person's
attestation is considered to be, the more does he make another person
ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered as being more
weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its
effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's attestations for
two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in
the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous of
being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame.
Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by
reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge
of the matter attested, because "everyone judges well of what is known
to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we are more liable to be made
ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted
with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely unknown to us,
who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.
An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some
advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous
of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more
liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm.
And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with
us make us more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their
society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the
harm that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.
Reply to Objection 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the
same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because
just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since
they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments
hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we
live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail.
Reply to Objection 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are
connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that
they look upon our defect as disgraceful.
Reply to Objection 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the
harm they do by making many think ill of us.
Reply to Objection 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make
us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to
wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again
because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems
greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom
he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful. The
reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something
for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to
suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our request, or by failing
to become their friends.
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Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?
Objection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For
contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness are
not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, "Thou hadst a harlot's forehead,
thou wouldst not blush." Therefore those who are virtuous are more
inclined to be ashamed.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this
happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.
Objection 3: Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv,
9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if
they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. Therefore
a virtuous man can be ashamed.
Objection 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated
above ([3464]Q[143]). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since
then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is
also.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a "virtuous
man is not shamefaced."
I answer that, As stated above ([3465]AA[1],2) shamefacedness is fear
of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not
feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because one
reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to
avoid.
Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First,
because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him
to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are
without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of
them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to
themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous
are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were
anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shame is in the virtuous
hypothetically."
Reply to Objection 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst
men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average
men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet
are not altogether free from evil.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only
vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1
Thess. 5:22, "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." The
Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should
avoid "not only what is really evil, but also those things that are
regarded as evil."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 1) the virtuous man
despises ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve,
wherefore he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain
extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as
though it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it:
wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness lays the
first foundation of temperance," by inspiring man with the horror of
whatever is disgraceful.
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OF HONESTY* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense a
s
synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum.]
We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous;
(2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral
goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty];
(3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant;
(4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?
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Whether honesty is the same as virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is
desired for its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake,
but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9)
that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore honesty
is not the same as virtue.
Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an
honorable state." Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, since
"it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12).
Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior
choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems
to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40, "Let
all things be done decently [honeste] and according to order" among
you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
Objection 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth.
According to Ecclus. 11:14, "good things and evil, life and death
[poverty and riches] are from God" [*The words in brackets are omitted
in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has 'honestas']. But
virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not
the same as virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty
into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided.
Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable
state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy
of honor. Now honor, as stated above ([3466]Q[144], A[2], ad 2), is due
to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according
to his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly
speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of
those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for
their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as
happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only for
their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in
themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but
also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to
some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for
their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that
"some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own
worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge." And this suffices to give a
thing the character of honest.
Reply to Objection 2: Some of the things which are honored besides
virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and
such like things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue
which we practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the
name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in
so far as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank,
power, and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iv, 3) that these things "are honored by some people, but in truth it
is only the good man who is worthy of honor." Now a man is good in
respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the
latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is due
to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the
character of honesty.
Reply to Objection 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which
honor is due. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as
stated above ([3467]Q[103], AA[1],2). But one attests only to what one
knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external
actions. Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so
far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists
radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the
external conduct.
Reply to Objection 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is
commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes
the name of honesty is given to external prosperity.
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Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?
Objection 1: It would seem that the honest is not the same as the
beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since
the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent.
Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty of vision
to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the
honest.
Objection 2: Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is
characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then
honor and glory differ, as stated above ([3468]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), it
seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.
Objection 3: Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above
[3469](A[1]). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it
is written (Ezech. 16:15): "Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the
harlot because of thy renown." Therefore the honest is not the same as
the beautiful.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23,24): "Those that are
our uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have more abundant comeliness
[honestatem], but our comely [honesta] parts have no need." Now by
uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the
beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are
apparently the same.
I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div.
Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity
and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as
being "the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe." Hence the
beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well
proportioned, together with a certain clarity of color. In like manner
spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or actions being well
proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is
what is meant by honesty, which we have stated [3470](A[1]) to be the
same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all
that is connected with man. Wherefore "honesty is the same as spiritual
beauty." Hence Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 30): "By honesty I mean
intelligible beauty, which we properly designate as spiritual," and
further on he adds that "many things are beautiful to the eye, which it
would be hardly proper to call honest."
Reply to Objection 1: The object that moves the appetite is an
apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon
as it is apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good.
Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the beautiful and the good
are beloved by all." Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies
spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully
says (De Offic. i, 5): "Thou perceivest the form and the features, so
to speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as
Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom."
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3471]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), glory
is the effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a
person acquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the
same thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing
honest and beautiful.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body:
although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to
play the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to Ezech.
28:17, "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy
wisdom in thy beauty."
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Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?
Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the
useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its
own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired
for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes
to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the
honest does not differ from the pleasant.
Objection 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful
good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing that
attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very
nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility": and "that is
money." Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written
(Ecclus. 11:14): "Poverty and riches [honestas] are from God," and
(Ecclus. 13:2): "He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship
with one more honorable," i.e. richer, "than himself." Therefore the
honest differs not from the useful.
Objection 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can
be useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De
Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Q[83], qu. 30): "The honest is that
which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies reference to
something else."
I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful
and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as stated
above [3472](A[2]), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it has a
certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is
regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man.
Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is
becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to man:
and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue (Ethic.
i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing may be
becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. A
pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects his
nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred to
something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly the honest the
useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.
Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest as
having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its
spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to
desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant,
however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since
whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the
converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).
Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired
for its own sake by the rational appetite. which tends to that which is
in accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it
is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the
opinion of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to
be the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing
incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it
follows that it is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in
accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some
respect, with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say
that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that are
honest.
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Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part
of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole
in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of honesty,"
according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is not
a part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that "wine . . .
makes all thoughts honest." But the use of wine, especially in excess,
in which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains
to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a
part of temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor.
Now "it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according to
the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to
temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said
as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: "I suffer an honorable [honesta] death, for
the most venerable and most holy laws."
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a part
of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as
pertaining especially to temperance.
I answer that, As stated above [3473](A[2]), honesty is a kind of
spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and
opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty
belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is
most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. Hence by
its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason to
which it belongs to moderate and temper evil desires. Accordingly
honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is
reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed
virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto.
Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of
honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is
reckoned a part of temperance.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his
thoughts honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems
himself great and deserving of honor [*Cf.[3474] Q[148], A[6]].
Reply to Objection 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude
than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good:
yet greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it
holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above.
Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule
given by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he says that "our uncomely
parts have more abundant comeliness," which, namely, destroys whatever
is uncomely.
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OF ABSTINENCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those
which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about
pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence,
which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically
about drink.
With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1)
Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice
which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
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Whether abstinence is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power
[virtute]." Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for
the Apostle says (Rom. 14:17): "The kingdom of God is not meat and
drink," where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11]
observes that "justice consists neither in abstaining nor in eating."
Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing
himself to God: "This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to
take food as physic." Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical
art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one's
food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue "observes the mean," as stated in
Ethic. ii, 6,7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but
to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is
not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence
excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "impatience
not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its peaceful
seclusion." Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "sometimes the sin
of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer," so that abstinence
excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:5,6): "Join with your faith
virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence";
where abstinence is numbered among other virtues. Therefore abstinence
is a virtue.
I answer that, Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of
food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as
denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies
neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent.
Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies
either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of
Peter's words quoted above, where he says that we ought "to join
abstinence with knowledge," namely that in abstaining from food a man
should act with due regard for those among whom he lives, for his own
person, and for the requirements of health.
Reply to Objection 1: The use of and abstinence from food, considered
in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 8:8): "Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we
eat not [*Vulg.: 'Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not'], shall we
have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more," i.e.
spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in so
far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The regulation of food, in the point of quantity
and quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of
the body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the
good of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ.
Evang. ii, qu. 11): "It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or
how much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for
the people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the
requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and
uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to
abstain."
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures
which are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to
strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of
reason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a
certain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their name,
so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which all its
parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part of
temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the mean, in
so far as it is in accord with right reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Those vices result from abstinence in so far as
it is not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one
abstain as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end,
i.e. for God's glory and not one's own.
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Whether abstinence is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue. For
every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not
praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "the
virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other virtues."
Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet.
xlii) that "the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any
creature of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body." Now
this belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore
abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chastity.
Objection 3: Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so
should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Tim. 6:8,
"Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be
[Vulg.: 'are'] content." Now there is no special virtue in being
content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in
abstinence which moderates food.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons abstinence as
a special part of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above ([3475]Q[136], A[1];[3476] Q[141], A[3])
moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the
passions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion departs
from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now
pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of
reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary
to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above
all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtues are of necessity connected together, as
stated above ([3477]FS, Q[65], A[1]). Wherefore one virtue receives
help and commendation from another, as justice from fortitude.
Accordingly in this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation
on account of the other virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not
only against the allurements of lust, but also against those of
gluttony: since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the
onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to
them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue
through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.
Reply to Objection 3: The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas
the use of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a
special virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of
clothing.
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OF FASTING (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?
(2) Of what virtue is it the act?
(3) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept?
(5) The time of fasting;
(6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once?
(7) The hour of eating for those who fast;
(8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fasting is an act of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For
every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always
acceptable to God, according to Is. 58:3, "Why have we fasted and Thou
hast not regarded?" Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now
fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of abstinence
takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of nature,
whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else those who do
not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore fasting is
not an act of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, that which is competent to all, both good and
evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is
fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
On the contrary, It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts (2
Cor. 6:5,6) where the Apostle says: "In fasting, in knowledge, in
chastity, etc. [Vulg.: 'in chastity, in knowledge']."
I answer that, An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to
some virtuous [honestum] [*Cf.[3478] Q[145], A[1]] good. Now this is
consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold
purpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore
the Apostle says (2 Cor. 6:5,6): "In fasting, in chastity," since
fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome [*Contra
Jov. ii.] "Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there," that is
to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Secondly, we
have recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely
to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence it is related (Dan. 10)
of Daniel that he received a revelation from God after fasting for
three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is
written (Joel 2:12): "Be converted to Me with all your heart, in
fasting and in weeping and in mourning." The same is declared by
Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm. lxxii (ccxxx, de
Tempore)]): "Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one's
flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble, scatters
the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of lust, kindles the
true light of chastity."
Reply to Objection 1: An act that is virtuous generically may be
rendered vicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence
the text goes on to say: "Behold in the day of your fast your own will
is founded," and a little further on (Is. 58:4): "You fast for debates
and strife and strike with the fist wickedly." These words are
expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: "The will indicates
joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the flesh restrained if the
mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be wrecked by vice." And
Augustine says (in the same sermon) that "fasting loves not many words,
deems wealth superfluous, scorns pride, commends humility, helps man to
perceive what is frail and paltry."
Reply to Objection 2: The mean of virtue is measured not according to
quantity but according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Now
reason judges it expedient, on account of some special motive, for a
man to take less food than would be becoming to him under ordinary
circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or in order to
perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and much more does
reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and the pursuit
of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much from one's
food as to refuse nature its necessary support: thus Jerome says:* "It
matters not whether thou art a long or a short time in destroying
thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately, whether by excessive
lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping too little, is to offer a
sacrifice of stolen goods." [*The quotation is from the Corpus of Canon
Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there
ascribes the quotation to St. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the
saint's works.] In like manner right reason does not retrench so much
from a man's food as to render him incapable of fulfilling his duty.
Hence Jerome says (in the same reference) "Rational man forfeits his
dignity, if he sets fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before
the well-being of his senses."
Reply to Objection 3: The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man
is said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure
negation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only
the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a
reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting
[jejunium jejunii] [*Literally the 'fast of fasting']: while the latter
is called the faster's fast, because he fasts for a purpose.
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Whether fasting is an act of abstinence?
Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence.
For Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the
reference is lacking] commenting on Mat. 17:20, "This kind of devil"
says: "To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all
manner of lusts." Now this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting
is not exclusively an act of abstinence.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.)
that "the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year." Now paying tithes
is an act of religion, as stated above ([3479]Q[87], A[1]). Therefore
fasting is an act of religion and not of abstinence.
Objection 3: Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated
above (QQ[143],146, A[1], ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with
fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems very
applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of abstinence.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "fasting is frugality
of fare and abstinence from food."
I answer that, Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every
virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that
appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food,
wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident
that fasting is an act of abstinence.
Reply to Objection 1: Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining
from food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from
anything harmful, and such especially is sin.
We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence
from all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), an act
ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging
to another virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that
virtue, as explained above ([3480]Q[32], A[1], ad 2;[3481] Q[85],
A[3]). Accordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act
of religion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to
endure, not any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the
danger of death. To endure hardships resulting from privation of
pleasure of touch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such are
the hardships of fasting.
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Whether fasting is a matter of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept. For
precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a matter
of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it would have
to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore fasting is
not a matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin.
Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast
would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that "the
Wisdom of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of
freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the
community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude,
should be bound together in subjection to one God." Now the liberty of
the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number of
observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For Augustine
says (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) that "whereas God in His mercy wished
our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the evidence and
small number of its solemn sacraments, some people render it oppressive
with slavish burdens." Therefore it seems that the Church should not
have made fasting a matter of precept.
On the contrary, Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting says:
"Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands
of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles." Therefore
fasting is a matter of precept.
I answer that, Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make
legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal in
temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to
prescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the
faithful in spiritual goods.
Now it has been stated above [3482](A[1]) that fasting is useful as
atoning for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual
things. And everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to
practice fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes.
Wherefore fasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law,
while the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and
profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of positive
law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is the Church
fast, the former is the fast prescribed by nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Fasting considered in itself denotes something
not eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is
useful to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding
under precept, but it is binding under precept to each one that stands
in need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this
remedy, both because "in many things we all offend" (James 3:2), and
because "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal. 5:17), it was
fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by all
in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a matter
of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of
general obligation.
Reply to Objection 2: Those commandments which are given under the form
of a general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but
subject to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It
will be a mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the
lawgiver's authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate
the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to
keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially
if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were present.
Hence it is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the Church, sin
mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking there of those things "that
are neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found
among the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the
custom of the universal Church." On the other hand, the fasts that are
of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are
sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. Nor are they opposed
to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in hindering the
slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is
written (Gal. 5:13): "You, brethren, have been called unto liberty;
only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh."
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Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church?
Objection 1: It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of the
Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as the
commandments of God, according to Lk. 10:16, "He that heareth you
heareth Me." Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God.
Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts appointed by
the Church.
Objection 2: Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from
fasting, on account of their age: for it is written (Joel 2:15):
"Sanctify a fast," and further on (Joel 2:16): "Gather together the
little ones, and them that suck the breasts." Much more therefore are
all others bound to keen the fasts.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal,
and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily works
are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to
spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since
fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing
by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of the Church
ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or bodily works.
Objection 4: Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through
necessity, as stated in 2 Cor. 9:7. Now the poor are wont to fast
through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought
they to fast willingly.
On the contrary, It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast. For
the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to
Christ's teaching. But our Lord said (Lk. 5:34) that "the children of
the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them [*Vulg.:
'Can you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst the
bridegroom is with them?']." Now He is with all the righteous by
dwelling in them in a special manner [*Cf. [3483]FP, Q[8], A[3]],
wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 28:20): "Behold I am with you . . . even
to the consummation of the world." Therefore the righteous are not
bound by the commandment of the Church to fast.
I answer that, As stated above ([3484]FS, Q[90], A[2]; [3485]FS, Q[98],
AA[2],6), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of
the many. Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver considers what
happens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the
precept to be binding on a person in whom for some special reason there
is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet
discretion must be brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be
evident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting to
fulfil the precept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it be
difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority. on the other
hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to the
superior who has power to grant a dispensation in such cases. And this
must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all are
bound in general, unless there be some special obstacle to this
observance.
Reply to Objection 1: The commandments of God are precepts of the
natural law, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the
commandments of the Church are about matters which are necessary for
salvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the
Church. Hence there may be certain obstacles on account of which
certain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question.
Reply to Objection 2: In children there is a most evident reason for
not fasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which
they need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and because
they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth, which
results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as the
stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until they have completed
the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep the Church
fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time they should
exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in accordance with their
age. Nevertheless when some great calamity threatens, even children are
commanded to fast, in sign of more severe penance, according to Jonah
3:7, "Let neither men nor beasts . . . taste anything . . . nor drink
water."
Reply to Objection 3: Apparently a distinction should be made with
regard to pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or
laborious work can be conveniently deferred or lessened without
detriment to the bodily health and such external conditions as are
necessary for the upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no
reason for omitting the fasts of the Church. But if one be under the
necessity of starting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long
stages, or of doing much work, either for one's bodily livelihood, or
for some need of the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the same
time to keep the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because
in ordering fasts the Church would not seem to have intended to prevent
other pious and more necessary undertakings. Nevertheless, in such
cases one ought seemingly, to seek the superior's dispensation; except
perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since when
superiors are silent they would seem to consent.
Reply to Objection 4: Those poor who can provide themselves with
sufficient for one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from
keeping the fasts of the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to
be exempt who beg their food piecemeal, since they are unable at any
one time to have a sufficiency of food.
Reply to Objection 5: This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three
ways. First, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says
that "the disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as
yet of a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an old
garment." Hence while Christ was with them in body they were to be
fostered with kindness rather than drilled with the harshness of
fasting. According to this interpretation, it is fitting that
dispensations should be granted to the imperfect and to beginners,
rather than to the elders and the perfect, according to a gloss on Ps.
130:2, "As a child that is weaned is towards his mother." Secondly, we
may say with Jerome [*Bede, Comment. in Luc. v] that our Lord is
speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law. Wherefore
our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be held back by the
old observances, since they were to be filled with the newness of
grace. Thirdly, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), who
states that fasting is of two kinds. one pertains to those who are
humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting perfect men, for they
are called "children of the bridegroom"; hence when we read in Luke:
"The children of the bridegroom cannot fast [*Hom. xiii, in Matth.],"
we read in Mat. 9:15: "The children of the bridegroom cannot mourn
[*Vulg.: 'Can the children of the bridegroom mourn?']." The other
pertains to the mind that rejoices in adhering to spiritual things: and
this fasting is befitting the perfect.
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Whether the times for the Church fast are fittingly ascribed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the times for the Church fast are
unfittingly appointed. For we read (Mat. 4) that Christ began to fast
immediately after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate Christ,
according to 1 Cor. 4:16, "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of
Christ." Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the Epiphany when
Christ's baptism is celebrated.
Objection 2: Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to observe the
ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the Old
Law to fast in certain particular months: for it is written (Zech.
8:19): "The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the fifth, and the
fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall be to the house of
Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities." Therefore the fast of
certain months, which are called Ember days, are unfittingly kept in
the Church.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii,
27), just as there is a fast "of sorrow," so is there a fast "of joy."
Now it is most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in
Christ's Resurrection. Therefore during the five weeks which the Church
solemnizes on account of Christ's Resurrection, and on Sundays which
commemorate the Resurrection, fasts ought to be appointed.
On the contrary, stands the general custom of the Church.
I answer that, As stated above ([3486]AA[1],3), fasting is directed to
two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to
heavenly things. Wherefore fasting ought to be appointed specially for
those times, when it behooves man to be cleansed from sin, and the
minds of the faithful to be raised to God by devotion: and these things
are particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when sins are
loosed by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on Easter-eve, on which
day our Lord's burial is commemorated, because "we are buried together
with Christ by baptism unto death" (Rom. 6:4). Moreover at the Easter
festival the mind of man ought to be devoutly raised to the glory of
eternity, which Christ restored by rising from the dead, and so the
Church ordered a fast to be observed immediately before the Paschal
feast; and for the same reason, on the eve of the chief festivals,
because it is then that one ought to make ready to keep the coming
feast devoutly. Again it is the custom in the Church for Holy orders to
be conferred every quarter of the year (in sign whereof our Lord fed
four thousand men with seven loaves, which signify the New Testament
year as Jerome says [*Comment. in Marc. viii]): and then both the
ordainer, and the candidates for ordination, and even the whole people,
for whose good they are ordained, need to fast in order to make
themselves ready for the ordination. Hence it is related (Lk. 6:12)
that before choosing His disciples our Lord "went out into a mountain
to pray": and Ambrose [*Exposit. in Luc.] commenting on these words
says: "What shouldst thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some
pious work, since Christ prayed before sending His apostles?"
With regard to the forty day's fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi in
Evang.) there are three reasons for the number. First, "because the
power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the Holy
Gospels: since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four." Or
"because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body through
whose lusts we transgress the Lord's commandments which are delivered
to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should punish that
same body forty times. or, because, just as under the Law it was
commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive to pay God
a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three hundred and
sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves for thirty-six days" (namely,
the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) "we pay God a tithe of
our year." According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 16) a fourth
reason may be added. For the Creator is the "Trinity," Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost: while the number "three" refers to the invisible creature,
since we are commanded to love God, with our whole heart, with our
whole soul, and with our whole mind: and the number "four" refers to
the visible creature, by reason of heat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the
number "ten" [*Ten is the sum of three, three, and four] signifies all
things, and if this be multiplied by four which refers to the body
whereby we make use of things, we have the number forty.
Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of
the number of months in each season: or on account of the number of
Holy orders which are conferred at these times.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but
in order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him
to fast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to
fast before our baptism.
Reply to Objection 2: The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the
very same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted
in July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the
first), because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai
broke the tables of the Law (Ex. 32), and that, according to Jer. 39:2,
"the walls of the city were first broken through." In the fifth month,
which we call August, they fasted because they were commanded not to go
up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on account of the
spies (Num. 14): also in this month the temple of Jerusalem was burnt
down by Nabuchodonosor (Jer. 52) and afterwards by Titus. In the
seventh month which we call October, Godolias was slain, and the
remnants of the people were dispersed (Jer. 51). In the tenth month,
which we call January, the people who were with Ezechiel in captivity
heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezech. 4).
Reply to Objection 3: The "fasting of joy" proceeds from the
instigation of the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore
this fasting should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts
appointed by the commandment of the Church are rather "fasts of sorrow"
which are inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not
ordered by the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on
Sundays: and if anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to
the custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi)
"is to be considered as law," or even through some erroneous opinion
(thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of
obligation)---he would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting
considered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote (Ad
Lucin., Ep. lxxi): "Would that we might fast always."
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Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that
one eat but once. For, as stated above [3487](A[2]), fasting is an act
of the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not
less than the number of meals. Now the quantity of food is not limited
for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of meals be
limited.
Objection 2: Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by
drink: wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot
receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink
at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should not be
forbidden to eat several times.
Objection 3: Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take
them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to
fasting to take only one meal.
On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Christian people.
I answer that, Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to bridle
concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one meal is
seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is able to
satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from concupiscence by
minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by the
Church, in her moderation, that those who fast should take one meal in
the day.
Reply to Objection 1: It was not possible to fix the same quantity of
food for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result
being that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for
the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal.
Reply to Objection 2: Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A[1], ad 3]. One is
the natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This
is broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not
lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another kind
and is called the "fasting of the faster," and this is not broken save
by such things as the Church intended to forbid in instituting the
fast. Now the Church does not intend to command abstinence from drink,
for this is taken more for bodily refreshment, and digestion of the
food consumed, although it nourishes somewhat. It is, however, possible
to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink:
as also by eating immoderately at one meal.
Reply to Objection 3: Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not
taken chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not
break one's fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were
to take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and
by way of food.
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Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster's meal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed
for the faster's meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect
than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted
until evening, for it is written (Lev. 23:32): "It is a sabbath . . .
you shall afflict your souls," and then the text continues: "From
evening until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths." Much more
therefore under the New Testament should the fast be ordered until the
evening.
Objection 2: Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all.
But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore it seems
that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the
commandment to fast.
Objection 3: Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as
stated above [3488](A[2]). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply
in the same way to all, since what is much for one is little for
another, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should not
be fixed for those who fast.
On the contrary, The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the
Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and is
said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De
Consecratione] says: "During Lent those are by no means to be credited
with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Vespers,"
which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour. Therefore we
ought to fast until the ninth hour.
I answer that, As stated above ([3489]AA[1],3,5), fasting is directed
to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add something
to the common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now
the right and common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour:
both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural heat being
withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the surrounding cold of
the night), and the humor spread about through the limbs (to which
result the heat of the day conduces until the sun has reached its
zenith), and again because it is then chiefly that the nature of the
human body needs assistance against the external heat that is in the
air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in order that those who
fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for their sins, the ninth hour
is suitably fixed for their meal.
Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion, which
was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when "bowing His head, He
gave up the ghost" (Jn. 19:30): because those who fast by punishing
their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to Gal.
5:24, "They that are Christ's, have crucified their flesh with the
vices and concupiscences."
Reply to Objection 1: The state of the Old Testament is compared to the
night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day,
according to Rom. 13:12, "The night is passed and the day is at hand."
Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the
New Testament.
Reply to Objection 2: Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a
strict calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be
about the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.
Reply to Objection 3: A little more or a little less cannot do much
harm. Now it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which
men for the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is
fixed for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do
much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however this
were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of sickness, age, or
some similar reason, he should be dispensed from fasting, or be allowed
to forestall the hour by a little.
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Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from
flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be
bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has
been stated above [3490](A[6]) that fasting was instituted as a curb on
the concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by
drinking wine more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, "Wine
is a luxurious thing," and Eph. 5:18, "Be not drunk with wine, wherein
is luxury." Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine,
it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh meat.
Objection 2: Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh
of certain animals. Now "concupiscence is desire of the delectable," as
stated above ([3491]FS, Q[30], A[1]). Therefore since fasting which was
instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating
of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.
Objection 3: Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs
and cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the
Lenten fast.
On the contrary, stands the common custom of the faithful.
I answer that, As stated above [3492](A[6]), fasting was instituted by
the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which
regard pleasures of touch in connection with food and sex. Wherefore
the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which both
afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great
incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest
on the earth, and of those that breathe the air and their products,
such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds.
For, since such like animals are more like man in body, they afford
greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body, so
that from their consumption there results a greater surplus available
for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great incentive to
lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to abstain especially
from these foods.
Reply to Objection 1: Three things concur in the act of procreation,
namely, heat, spirit [*Cf. P. I., Q. 118, A[1], ad 3], and humor. Wine
and other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat:
flatulent foods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital
spirit: but it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most
productive of nourishment, that conduces to the production of humor.
Now the alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital
spirits are of short duration, whereas the substance of the humor
remains a long time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of
flesh meat rather than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.
Reply to Objection 2: In the institution of fasting, the Church takes
account of the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating
flesh meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not
always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh
meat, rather than to eat fish.
Reply to Objection 3: Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who
fast, for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with
flesh: wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the
prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the most
solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ, and
because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our
redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is forbidden in
every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on
eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the latter things in other fasts
the custom varies among different people, and each person is bound to
conform to that custom which is in vogue with those among whom he is
dwelling. Hence Jerome says [*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii, 18; cf. De
Nat. et Grat. lxvii]: "Let each province keep to its own practice, and
look upon the commands of the elders as though they were the laws of
the apostles."
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OF GLUTTONY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether gluttony is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Its species;
(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
(6) Its daughters.
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Whether gluttony is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord
said (Mat. 15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a
man." Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore, since
every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid" [*Ep. lxxi,
ad Lucin.]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid
this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "Since in eating pleasure and
necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of necessity
and the seduction of pleasure," and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31):
"Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more than necessary?"
Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin.
But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and
thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that "unless we first
tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we
have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat." But man's
inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.
I answer that, Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking,
but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through
leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists:
and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue.
Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: That which goes into man by way of food, by
reason of its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually.
But the Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees
deemed certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their
signification, but by reason of their nature [*Cf. [3493]FS, Q[102],
A[6], ad 1]. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man
spiritually.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not
regard the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being
regulated by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not
from desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this
pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a
case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in
eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.
Reply to Objection 3: The appetite is twofold. There is the natural
appetite, which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these
powers virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to
reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the
powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and
thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the sensitive
appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite that the vice
of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of gluttony denotes
inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this is not without sin.
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Whether gluttony is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For every
mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this,
apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as
stated above ([3494]Q[132], A[3]). But gluttony is not opposed to
charity, neither as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of
one's neighbor. Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf.
Append. to St. Augustine's works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]:
"Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should
know that this is one of the lesser sins." But this pertains to
gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that is to
say venial, sins.
Objection 4: On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "As long
as the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done
valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is
unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught." But virtue is not done away
save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above [3495](A[1]), the vice of gluttony
properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of reason
in regulating the concupiscence may be considered from two points of
view. First, with regard to things directed to the end, inasmuch as
they may be incommensurate and consequently improportionate to the end;
secondly, with regard to the end itself, inasmuch as concupiscence
turns man away from his due end. Accordingly, if the inordinate
concupiscence in gluttony be found to turn man away from the last end,
gluttony will be a mortal sin. This is the case when he adheres to the
pleasure of gluttony as his end, for the sake of which he contemns God,
being ready to disobey God's commandments, in order to obtain those
pleasures. On the other hand, if the inordinate concupiscence in the
vice of gluttony be found to affect only such things as are directed to
the end, for instance when a man has too great a desire for the
pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do anything
contrary to God's law, it is a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by
turning man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of
reduction, it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which
commands us to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all
directly opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which
contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain
specially to justice and its parts, as stated above ([3496]Q[122],
A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: In so far as it turns man away from his last end,
gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our last
end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a mortal
sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as
denoting inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed
to the end.
Reply to Objection 4: Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not
so much on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from
it. For Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): "When the belly is distended by
gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust."
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Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For
the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the
punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for
Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in Matth.]: "Gluttony turned Adam out of
Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of
Noah." According to Ezech. 16:49, "This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy
sister . . . fulness of bread," etc. Therefore the sin of gluttony is
the greatest of all.
Objection 2: Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful.
Now gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Ps.
135:10, "Who smote Egypt with their first-born," says: "Lust,
concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony." Therefore
gluttony is the greatest of sins.
Objection 3: Further, man should love himself in the first place after
God, as stated above ([3497]Q[25], A[4]). Now man, by the vice of
gluttony, inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Ecclus.
37:34): "By surfeiting many have perished." Therefore gluttony is the
greatest of sins, at least excepting those that are against God.
On the contrary, The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is
reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).
I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways.
First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is
committed: and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine
things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the
greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment of
the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who
sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished
rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking
food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and
moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the
result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity,
inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.
Reply to Objection 1: These punishments are to be referred to the vices
that resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang,
rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from
Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of
gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom
were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection argues from the standpoint of the
sins that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more
powerful, unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct
cause but the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other
vices.
Reply to Objection 3: The glutton intends, not the harm to his body,
but the pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is
accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of
gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur
some bodily injury through taking too much food.
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Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished?
Objection 1: It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly
distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): "The vice of
gluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of
need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food
to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of refreshment
by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of an immoderate
appetite"---which are contained in the following verse: "Hastily,
sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily."
For the above are distinguished according to diversity of circumstance.
Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do not differentiate
its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are not distinguished
according to the aforesaid.
Objection 2: Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then
gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that there
should likewise be others in respect of place and other circumstances.
Objection 3: Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so
do the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the
other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various
circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony
distinguished thus.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.
I answer that, As stated above [3498](A[1]), gluttony denotes
inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered
in eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly,
the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with
regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or
species of food a man seeks "sumptuous"---i.e. costly food; as regards
its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely---i.e. "daintily"; and
as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating "too much."
Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the
consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time for
eating, which is to eat "hastily," or one fails to observe the due
manner of eating, by eating "greedily."
Isidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under
one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in "what" he eats,
or in "how much," "how" or "when he eats."
Reply to Objection 1: The corruption of various circumstances causes
the various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by
reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in
him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the very
species of the food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is
disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 2: Place and other circumstances include no special
motive connected with eating, that can cause a different species of
gluttony.
Reply to Objection 3: In all other vices, whenever different
circumstances correspond to different motives, the difference of
circumstances argues a specific difference of vice: but this does not
apply to all circumstances, as stated above ([3499]FS, Q[72], A[9]).
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Whether gluttony is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For
capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause,
other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has
not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but
for the body's nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain
pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which,
in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that
it is most akin to what is in respect of its genus, is apparently the
least gluttony is not a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, sin results from a man forsaking the food of
virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing
to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there
is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly,
there would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this
is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony, and is about greater
pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3500]FS, Q[84], A[3]), a capital vice
denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a
most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring
that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered
most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness which
is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to
happiness, according to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3,7,8. Therefore the vice of
gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among
other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices.
Reply to Objection 1: It is true that food itself is directed to
something as its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of
life, is most desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without
food, it follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all
the toil of man's life is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7,
"All the labor of man is for his mouth." Yet gluttony seems to be about
pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), "with such food as is good for
the worthless body, men desire to be fed," wherein namely the pleasure
consists, "rather than to be filled: since the whole end of that desire
is this---not to thirst and not to hunger."
Reply to Objection 2: In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the
conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the
aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has
the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.
Reply to Objection 3: That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself:
and consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital
vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is
useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something else:
wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of
desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such
things.
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Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony?
Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned
to gluttony, to wit, "unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness,
loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding." For
unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14, "Who are
glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things."
Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin, according to
Prov. 14:22, "They err that work evil." Therefore they are unfittingly
reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.
Objection 2: Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result
of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Is.
28:8, "All tables were full of vomit and filth." But this seems to be
not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of
counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, "If thou hast been forced to eat
much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee." Therefore
it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as
a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the
daughters of gluttony.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to
gluttony.
I answer that, As stated above ([3501]AA[1],2,3), gluttony consists
properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore
those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the
results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for
either on the part of the soul or on the part of the body. on the part
of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards the
reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat and drink, and in
this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, "dullness of sense in
the understanding," on account of the fumes of food disturbing the
brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the
penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles. 2:3, "I thought in my
heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in
wisdom." Secondly, as regards the. appetite, which is disordered in
many ways by immoderation in eating and drinking, as though reason were
fast asleep at the helm, and in this respect "unseemly joy" is
reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions are directed to joy
or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying
of 3 Esdra 3:20, that "wine . . . gives every one a confident and
joyful mind." Thirdly, as regards inordinate words, and thus we have
"loquaciousness," because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), "unless
gluttons were carried away by immoderate speech, that rich man who is
stated to have feasted sumptuously every day would not have been so
tortured in his tongue." Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in
this way we have "scurrility," i.e. a kind of levity resulting from
lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also
to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:4, "Or foolish
talking or scurrility," says that "fools call this geniality---i.e.
jocularity, because it is wont to raise a laugh." Both of these,
however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful,
either by reason of excess which belongs to "loquaciousness," or by
reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to "scurrility."
On the part of the body, mention is made of "uncleanness," which may
refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities,
or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:3,
"But fornication and all uncleanness," says: "That is, any kind of
incontinence that has reference to lust."
Reply to Objection 1: Joy in the act or end of sin results from every
sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random
riotous joy which is described as "unseemly" arises chiefly from
immoderate partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that
dullness of sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin,
whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from
gluttony, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it does one good to vomit after eating
too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by
immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as
a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.
Reply to Objection 3: Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and
not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may
be referred to either vice.
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OF SOBRIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely
drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of sobriety?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether the use of wine is lawful?
(4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?
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Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?
Objection 1: It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to
sobriety. For it is written (Rom. 12:3): "Not to be more wise than it
behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Therefore sobriety
is also about wisdom, and not only about drink.
Objection 2: Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis.
8:7) that "she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence,
and justice, and fortitude," where sobriety stands for temperance. Now
temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual
matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.
Objection 3: Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from
"measure" [*'Bria,' a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's
Lexicon]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things
appertaining to us: for it is written (Titus 2:12): "We should live
soberly and justly and godly," where a gloss remarks: "Soberly, in
ourselves"; and (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in decent apparel, adorning
themselves with modesty and sobriety." Consequently it would seem that
sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things
appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter
proper to sobriety.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): "Wine taken with
sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt
be sober."
I answer that, When a virtue is denominated from some condition common
to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which
it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of
virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance about
pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from "measure," for a
man is said to be sober because he observes the "bria," i.e. the
measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that matter wherein
/the observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter
is the drinking of intoxicants, because the measured use thereof is
most profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since
it hinders the use of reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it
is written (Ecclus. 31:37,38): "Sober drinking is health to soul and
body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many
ruins." For this reason sobriety is especially concerned with drink,
not any kind of drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is
liable to disturb the brain, such as wine and all intoxicants.
Nevertheless, sobriety may be employed in a general sense so as to
apply to any matter, as stated above ([3502]Q[123], A[2];[3503] Q[141],
A[2]) with regard to fortitude and temperance.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to
his body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is
said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its
delight, according to Ps. 22:5, "My chalice which inebriateth me, how
goodly is it!" Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in
speaking of the contemplation of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance
are necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful.
Wherefore it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This
is the business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to
designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than
in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with drink.
Reply to Objection 3: Although a measure is needful in all things,
sobriety is not properly employed in connection with all things, but
only in those wherein there is most need for a measure.
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Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special
virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now there
is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which
is about drink, a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of
touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make
food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment.
Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment,
drink is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats
and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue,
seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each
different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it
would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety to
be a special part of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above ([3504]Q[146], A[2]), it belongs to
moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which
may hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason,
there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating
drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch as
it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove this
hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is requisite.
Reply to Objection 1: Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the
good of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and
in this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But
intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above,
wherefore it requires a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink,
considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does not
follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of
food.
Reply to Objection 3: In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of
hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks bears
an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does not call
for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the difference of
meats.
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Whether the use of wine is altogether unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that the use of wine is altogether unlawful.
For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of salvation: since it
is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with
wisdom," and further on (Wis. 9:19): "By wisdom they were healed,
whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the beginning." Now the use
of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, for it is written (Eccles. 2:3): "I
thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn
my mind to wisdom." Therefore wine-drinking is altogether unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): "It is good not to
eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is
offended or scandalized, or made weak." Now it is sinful to forsake the
good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one's brethren. Therefore it
is unlawful to make use of wine.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i] that "after the
deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last of
the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning."
Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:23): "Do not still drink
water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thy frequent
infirmities"; and it is written (Ecclus. 31:36): "Wine drunken with
moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart."
I answer that, No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful,
according to Mat. 15:11, "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth
a man." Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may
become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a circumstance
on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily the worse for
taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to drink wine:
sometimes it results from the mode of drinking, because to wit he
exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of
others who would be scandalized thereby.
Reply to Objection 1: A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a
general way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this
way it is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain
altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use.
Secondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in
this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for
certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this
depends on circumstances of certain persons and places.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle does not declare simply that it is
good to abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this
would give scandal to certain people.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ withdraws us from some things as being
altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to perfection.
It is in the latter way that he withdraws some from the use of wine,
that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and the like.
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Whether sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing?
Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons
of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing;
wherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to Lev.
19:32, "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged
man." Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should be
exhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2, "That the aged man be
sober." Therefore sobriety is most requisite in persons of standing.
Objection 2: Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church:
and the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 1 Tim. 3:2, "It
behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife,
sober, prudent," etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in persons
of high standing.
Objection 3: Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine
is forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs:
while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction,
according to Prov. 31:4, "Give not wine to kings," and further on
(Prov. 31:6), "Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them
that are grieved in mind." Therefore sobriety is more requisite in
persons of standing.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:11): "The women in like
manner, chaste . . . sober," etc., and (Titus 2:6) "Young men in like
manner exhort that they be sober."
I answer that, Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the
contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads.
Accordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons
for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the
concupiscences which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the vices
which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most
requisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence of pleasure
thrives in the young on account of the heat of youth, while in women
there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist concupiscence.
Hence, according to Valerius Maximus [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1] among
the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly, sobriety is more
requisite in certain persons, as being more necessary for the
operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of wine is a notable
obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety is specially
prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be vigorous in instructing
others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church, who should fulfil
their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and to kings, who should
rule their subjects with wisdom.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DRUNKENNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether drunkenness is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the most grievous sin?
(4) Whether it excuses from sin?
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Whether drunkenness is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin. For every sin
has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to daring,
and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to drunkenness.
Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is voluntary [*Augustine, De Vera
Relig. xiv]. But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be
deprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself.
Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a sin
to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would seem very
hard.
Objection 4: Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is
not applied to drunkards: for Gregory [*Cf. Canon Denique, dist. 4
where Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of
Canterbury] says that "we must forbear with their ways, lest they
become worse if they be compelled to give up the habit." Therefore
drunkenness is not a sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:13): "Not in rioting and
drunkenness."
I answer that, Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it may
signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking much
wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. In this
sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect resulting from
a fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by which a man incurs
this defect. This act may cause drunkenness in two ways. In one way,
through the wine being too strong, without the drinker being cognizant
of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin,
especially if it is not through his negligence, and thus we believe
that Noah was made drunk as related in Gn. 9. In another way
drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine:
in this way it is accounted a sin, and is comprised under gluttony as a
species under its genus. For gluttony is divided into "surfeiting
[Douay:,'rioting'] and drunkenness," which are forbidden by the Apostle
(Rom. 13:13).
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11),
insensibility which is opposed to temperance "is not very common," so
that like its species which are opposed to the species of intemperance
it has no name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and
yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of
molesting nature grievously, he would not be free from sin.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection regards the resulting defect which
is involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is
in this that the sin consists.
Reply to Objection 3: Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows
not the strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to
drink excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind
of person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be
lacking neither is excused from sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be
foregone, as stated above ([3505]Q[33], A[6]). Hence Augustine says in
a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), "Meseems, such things are cured
not by bitterness, severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than
commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be
followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should
be treated with severity."
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Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For
Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to
St. Augustine's works] that "drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is
a mortal sin." Now assiduity denotes a circumstance which does not
change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate a sin
infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as shown above
([3506]FS, Q[88], A[5]). Therefore if drunkenness /is not a mortal sin
for some other reason, neither is it for this.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St.
Augustine's works]: "Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is
necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins." Now the
lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is caused
by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.
Objection 3: Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of
medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician, that
they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink
drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli,
xlii): "A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or
gambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a
subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either give
them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity." Now such
punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins. Therefore
drunkenness is a mortal sin.
I answer that, The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing
Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. Now
this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows not the
drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness may be
without sin, as stated above [3507](A[1]). Secondly, so that he
perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be
intoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly,
it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate and
intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from drink.
Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals take their
species not from things that occur accidentally and beside the
intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way
drunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly
deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs virtuous
deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running the risk of
falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i.]):
"We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which prevents us from
avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when sober, we
unknowingly commit through drunkenness." Therefore drunkenness,
properly speaking, is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on
account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is impossible
for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to
drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many times
experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to drunkenness.
Reply to Objection 2: To take more meat or drink than is necessary
belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but
knowingly to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a
mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Drunkenness is far
from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full
feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3508]Q[141], A[6]), meat and
drink should be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's
health. Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink
which are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so
too it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man
is moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or
drinks much at the physician's advice in order to provoke vomiting, he
is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There is,
however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting,
since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore this is no
sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.
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Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. For
Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that "nothing gains the devil's
favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices."
And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante omnia):
"Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by the clergy,
for it foments and fosters all the vices."
Objection 2: Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good
of reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of
drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.
Objection 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of
its punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely;
for Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that "there would be no
slavery, were there no drunkards." Therefore drunkenness is the
greatest of sins.
On the contrary, According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), spiritual
vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one of the
carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.
I answer that, A thing is said to be evil because it removes a good.
Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver the evil.
Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a human good.
Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are graver than the
sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human
reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Man is most prone to sins of intemperance,
because such like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us,
and for this reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the
devil, not for being graver than other sins, but because they occur
more frequently among men.
Reply to Objection 2: The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in
one way by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which
takes away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has
more the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of
reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by
drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue,
which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are always
good.
Reply to Objection 3: Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery,
in so far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants,
for having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But
slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.
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Whether drunkenness excuses from sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "the drunkard deserves
double punishment." Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of
excusing from it.
Objection 2: Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases
it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as
man's reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But
concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is
drunkenness.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43), Lot
was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.
I answer that, Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as stated
above [3509](A[1]), namely the resulting defect and the preceding act.
on the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is
fettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes
an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of the
preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if the
drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the subsequent
sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case of Lot. If,
however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not altogether
excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered
voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch as
it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into the
subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished, even as
the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore Augustine says
(Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that "Lot's guilt is to be measured, not by
the incest, but by his drunkenness."
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard
deserves more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment
for his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the
law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered
"those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished than
if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than one."
In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), "he seems to have
considered the advantage," namely of the prevention of wrong, "rather
than the leniency which one should have for drunkards," seeing that
they are not in possession of their faculties.
Reply to Objection 2: Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the
point of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that
results from it, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the
reason, as drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to
make a man insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin,
because it is less grievous to sin through weakness than through
malice.
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OF CHASTITY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: (2)
virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the contrary
vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether chastity is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a general virtue?
(3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?
(4) Of its relation to purity.
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Whether chastity is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we
are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs
to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a
certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore
chastity is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is "a voluntary habit," as stated in
Ethic. ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can
be taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore
it seems that chastity is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some
unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But
chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore chastity
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de
Tempore]): "Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since
chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust,
while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious."
I answer that, Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason
"chastises" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue
consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above
([3510]FS, Q[64], A[1]). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its
subject, though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity
that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the
judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), "so long
as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy
even in body, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her
body of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering
continency." He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "in the mind there
is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved
to suffer any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil."
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "it is
impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it
possible to be just unless one live by faith." Whence he argues that in
unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue,
because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds
(Contra Julian. iv, 3) "virtues are distinguished from vices not by
their functions," i.e. their acts, "but by their ends."
Reply to Objection 4: Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in
accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is
reckoned among the fruits.
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Whether chastity is a general virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For
Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that "chastity of the mind is the
well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to
the greater things." But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore
chastity is a general virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement"
[*Cf. A[1] ]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be
chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some
movement of the appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.
Objection 3: Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But
fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written
(Ps. 72:27): "Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: 'hast destroyed'] all them
that go awhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee." Therefore
chastity is a general virtue.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be a
part of temperance.
I answer that, The word "chastity" is employed in two ways. First,
properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter,
namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the
word "chastity" is employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of
bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of
chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the spiritual union of
the mind with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the matter
of a spiritual chastity metaphorically speaking, as well as of a
spiritual fornication likewise metaphorically so called. For if the
human mind delight in the spiritual union with that to which it
behooves it to be united, namely God, and refrains from delighting in
union with other things against the requirements of the order
established by God, this may be called a spiritual chastity, according
to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present
you as a chaste virgin to Christ." If, on the other hand, the mind be
united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the
Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to
Jer. 3:1, "But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers." Taking
chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue
withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful
things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists principally
in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the human mind is
united to God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical
sense.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above [3511](A[1]; Q[142], A[2]), the
concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a
child, because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially
of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature.
Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by
consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child
left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these pleasures
stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently chastity
is applied antonomastically to such like concupiscences, even as
fortitude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need
of strength of mind.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers spiritual fornication
metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, as
stated.
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Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue from
abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, one
virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same
sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which
are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the
matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity is not
a distinct virtue from abstinence.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices
of intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now "chastity"
takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary vices. Since then
certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is
chastity.
Objection 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern
of temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are
the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the
matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the
matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf.
Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on Titus 1:7, "Not given to wine, no
striker," etc.: "The belly and the organs of generation are neighbors,
that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in
vice." Therefore abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues.
On the contrary, The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5,6) reckons "chastity" together
with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.
I answer that, As stated above ([3512]Q[141], A[4]), temperance is
properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that
where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different
virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate to
the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5:
and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food whereby
the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically from
actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the nature
of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is about
venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which is
about pleasures of the palate.
Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch,
not as regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch.
which judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but
as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in Ethic. iii,
10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in
character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though they
regard the one sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are
more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and
therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since
if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and
weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i,
10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its
heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which
belong to the married state."
Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain
to the maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are
directed to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such
pleasures there is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the
pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal
pleasures, are essentially directed to the preservation of man's life:
wherefore by their very nature they have a special virtue, although
this virtue which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as
its end.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?
Objection 1: It would seem that purity does not belong especially to
chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity is a
virtue of the soul." Therefore it is not something belonging to
chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.
Objection 2: Further, "pudicitia" [purity] is derived from "pudor,"
which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De
Fide Orth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to
all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to
the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "every
kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach." Now it would seem
to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach.
Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not
especially to chastity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): "We must give
praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a
lawful use the organs intended for procreation." Now the use of these
organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity belongs
properly to chastity.
I answer that, As stated above (OBJ[2]), "pudicitia" [purity] takes its
name from "pudor," which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs be
properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are
most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei xiv,
18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the
honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and this
because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject to the
command of reason, as are the movements of the other external members.
Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the
signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). Consequently
purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially the signs
thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the
latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather these
external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore
purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but
as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless the one is
sometimes used to designate the other.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is here speaking of purity as
designating chastity.
Reply to Objection 2: Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the
vices of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above
([3513]Q[142], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins
are most deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination
of the genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason
is absorbed.
__________________________________________________________________
OF VIRGINITY (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five
points of inquiry:
(1) In what does virginity consist?
(2) Whether it is lawful?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;
(5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.
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Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity does not consist in integrity
of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) [*The quotation
is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "virginity is the continual
meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh." But meditation does
not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not situated in the
flesh.
Objection 2: Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the soul." Therefore
virginity is not incorruption of the flesh.
Objection 3: Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist
in the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken
without loss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that
"those organs may be injured through being wounded by mischance.
Physicians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes
one shudder to see: and a midwife has been known to destroy by touch
the proof of virginity that she sought." And he adds: "Nobody, I think,
would be so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even
bodily sanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ."
Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.
Objection 4: Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in
resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation,
whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost
without copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that "virginal
integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse
is the portion of angels." Therefore virginity does not consist in
incorruption of the flesh.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "virginity is
continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and
observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh."
I answer that, Virginity takes its name apparently from "viror"
[freshness], and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining
its freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too,
virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared by the
heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the greatest
bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence, Ambrose
says (De Virgin. i, 5) that "virginal chastity is integrity free of
pollution."
Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first
is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of
virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the soul
and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of the
semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part of
the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of these three
the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such must be
considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the relation
of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions are the matters
of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of form and
complement, because the essence of morality is perfected in that which
concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in freedom from the
aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity of the bodily organ
is accidental to virginity; while freedom from pleasure in resolution
of the semen is related thereto materially; and the purpose of
perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and completive
element in virginity.
Reply to Objection 1: This definition of Augustine's expresses directly
that which is formal in virginity. For "meditation" denotes reason's
purpose; and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a virgin must
always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in
mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is
expressed indirectly by the words "on incorruption in a corruptible
body." This is added to show the difficulty of virginity: for if the
flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a
perpetual meditation on incorruption.
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in
the soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same
with virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that
"although virginity resides in the flesh," and for this reason is a
bodily quality, "yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency
fosters and preserves."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ
is accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely
abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily
organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other
way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of a
hand or foot.
Reply to Objection 4: Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may
arise in two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it
destroys virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine,
however, mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the
ordinary and natural result thereof. In another way this may happen
beside the purpose of the mind, either during sleep, or through
violence and without the mind's consent, although the flesh derives
pleasure from it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case
of those who are subject to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is
not forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity
which excludes virginity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity is unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is
contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as the
words of Gn. 2:16, "Of every tree" that is in "paradise, thou shalt
eat," indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the
preservation of the individual, so also the words of Gn. 1:28,
"Increase and multiply, and fill the earth," express a precept of the
natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species. Therefore
just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this would be to
act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a sin to
abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to act
against the good of the species.
Objection 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is
apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue,
since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 2), that "he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains
from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from all is
loutish and insensible." Therefore virginity is something sinful.
Objection 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in
olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius
Maximus asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to Augustine
(De Vera Relig. iii) Plato "is said to have sacrificed to nature, in
order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as though it
were a sin." Therefore virginity is a sin.
On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But virginity is
a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor. 7:25):
"Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give
counsel." Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.
I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which are against right
reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end should
be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man's good is
threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things,
for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third,
consisting in the goods of the soul among which the goods of the
contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life, as
the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord declared (Lk.
10:42), "Mary hath chosen the better part." Of these goods those that
are external are directed to those which belong to the body, and those
which belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the
soul; and furthermore those which belong to the active life are
directed to those which belong to the life of contemplation.
Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use external goods in a
measure proportionate to the body, and in like manner as regards the
rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing certain things (which
otherwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of his body's
good, or of the contemplation of truth, this is not sinful, but in
accord /with right reason. In like manner if a man abstain from bodily
pleasures, in order more freely to give himself to the contemplation of
truth, this is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy
virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to
have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
7:34): "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of
the Lord: that she may be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that
is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her
husband." Therefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful
is worthy of praise.
Reply to Objection 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above
([3514]Q[122], A[1]). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the
duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind
cannot be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by
the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding
on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many obligations
which cannot be discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one
person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of
natural law which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each
individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other
hand, the precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men,
which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance
spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human
multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while
others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of
Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus
too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and
others fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the
multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.
Reply to Objection 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right
reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for
pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does
not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal:
and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now
the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to
right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the
magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of quantity he goes to the
extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows the mean."
Reply to Objection 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more
frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained
from all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth:
as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through
thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but "because he yielded
to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen," as Augustine remarks
(De Vera Relig. iii).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no
virtue is in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now
virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born.
Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated
above ([3515]FS, Q[65], A[1]). Yet some have other virtues without
having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom
without virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would
involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But
virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii
ad Eustoch.]: "Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the
virgin after her downfall." Therefore seemingly virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is
lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and
conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity
moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we
should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree."
I answer that, As stated above [3516](A[1]), the formal and completive
element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal
pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far,
to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things:
while the material element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free
of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a
good action has a special matter through having a special excellence,
there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is
about great expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct
from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to
keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an
excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself
free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a
special virtue being related to chastity as magnificence to liberality.
Reply to Objection 1: Men have from their birth that which is material
in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal
experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely
the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake, which
purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says
(De Virgin. xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but,
because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency."
Reply to Objection 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that
which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as
stated above ([3517]Q[129], A[3], ad 2), but not by reason of that
which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from
providing the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another
virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of
magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues
lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the
flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity, his
mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this
same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so:
even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose of
being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so:
or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind as to purpose
bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the
mind no man can be virtuous.
Reply to Objection 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards
that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material
therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does
not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person
who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of
virginity but the purpose of virginity.
As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be
miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which
we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else
which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has
experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For
God cannot make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in
the [3518]FP, Q[25] , A[4].
Reply to Objection 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose,
confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says
(De Virgin. viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed,
consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and
flesh." Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely
because it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence
attaches to it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however,
adds something to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that
which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal
pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity alone is
accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned
above liberality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than
marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): "Continence was
equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who
begot children." Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore
virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.
Objection 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his
virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence, it
would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any
married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not
preferable to marriage.
Objection 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private
good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is
directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi):
"What food is to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to the
welfare of the human race." On the other hand, virginity is ordered to
the individual good, namely in order to avoid what the Apostle calls
the "tribulation of the flesh," to which married people are subject (1
Cor. 7:28). Therefore virginity is not greater than conjugal
continence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): "Both solid reason
and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful,
nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to
that of widowhood."
I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of
Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to
marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who
both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and
by the teaching of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels virginity as the
greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good
takes precedence of a human good, and because the good of the soul is
preferable to the good of the body, and again because the good of the
contemplative life is better than that of the active life. Now
virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the
contemplative life, which consists in thinking "on the things of God"
[Vulg.: 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is directed to the good of the
body, namely the bodily increase of the human race, and belongs to the
active life, since the man and woman who embrace the married life have
to think "on the things of the world," as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to conjugal
continence.
Reply to Objection 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action,
but still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so
disposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in
keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal
continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of
John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the
accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both
"the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought Christ's
battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John was
continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in habit."
Reply to Objection 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal
continence, a married person may be better than a virgin for two
reasons. First, on the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married
person is more prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be
expedient, than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De
Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: "I am no better than
Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity
of marriage." Further on he gives the reason for this: "For what I do
now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him to do it
then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved me now to do
it." Secondly, because perhaps the person who is not a virgin has some
more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. xliv):
"Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to the Lord, however
solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account of some mental
fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom she
delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink the chalice of
the Lord?"
Reply to Objection 3: The common good takes precedence of the private
good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good
is better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is
consecrated to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence
Augustine says (De Virgin. ix): "It must be confessed that the
fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those women who in these times seek
naught else from marriage but children in order to make them servants
of Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues.
For Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg.]): "We address ourselves
now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less exalted is
their vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing, the pride and
ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion of Christ's
flock."
Objection 2: Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue.
Now the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold
fruit, according to a gloss on Mat. 13:23. Therefore virginity is the
greatest of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the
greater it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is
declared in the Apocalypse 14:4 that virgins "follow the Lamb
whithersoever He goeth," and (Apoc. 14:3) that they sing "a new
canticle," which "no" other "man" could say. Therefore virginity is the
greatest of the virtues.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks,
would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom," and (De Virgin. xlv): "The
authority of the Church informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so
that they know in what place the martyrs and the holy virgins who have
departed this life are commemorated in the Sacrament of the Altar." By
this we are given to understand that martyrdom, and also the monastic
state, are preferable to virginity.
I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some
particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely in the
genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood
and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to chastity
antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to
chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): "Can anyone esteem
any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is beloved of her King,
approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God?"
Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in this way
virginity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the end
always excels that which is directed to the end; and the more
effectively a thing is directed to the end, the better it is. Now the
end which renders virginity praiseworthy is that one may have leisure
for Divine things, as stated above [3519](A[4]). Wherefore the
theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion, the acts of
which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are preferable to
virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in order to cleave to
God---since for this end they hold their own life in contempt; and
those who dwell in monasteries---since for this end they give up their
own will and all that they may possess---than virgins who renounce
venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore virginity is not
simply the greatest of virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Virgins are "the more honored portion of Christ's
flock," and "their glory more sublime" in comparison with widows and
married women.
Reply to Objection 2: The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity,
according to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its
superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and
to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according
to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), "the hundredfold fruit is given to
martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to married
persons." Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is simply the
greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other degrees of
chastity.
Reply to Objection 3: Virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,"
because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but also
of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they
follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they follow
more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more closely
by imitation of the mind. The "new hymn" which virgins alone sing, is
their joy at having preserved integrity of the flesh.
__________________________________________________________________
OF LUST (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity:
(1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of lust?
(2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?
(3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether lust is a capital vice?
(5) Concerning its daughters.
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Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal
desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "lust
affects to be called surfeit and abundance." But surfeit regards meat
and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not
properly about venereal desires and pleasures.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): "Wine is a lustful
[Douay: 'luxurious'] thing." Now wine is connected with pleasure of
meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.
Objection 3: Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton
pleasure" [*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton
pleasure regards not only venereal matters but also many others.
Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.
On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii
[*Written by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the
flesh shall reap corruption." Now the sowing of the flesh refers to
venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who is
debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a
man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like
pleasures.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies
to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is
referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal
pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a
man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining
to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says "lust is any kind of
surfeit."
Reply to Objection 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the
sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because
the use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other
matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal
pleasures, to which also wantonness is specially applicable, as
Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15,16).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether no venereal act can be without sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For
nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is
a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I
consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as
the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts." Therefore,
seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.
Objection 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of
reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and
"deficiency" as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there
is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is
incompatible with the act of understanding," as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; Cf.
Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of the
prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy.
Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
Objection 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now
original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which
no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup.
i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a
sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin
is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a
commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between
the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every
venereal act is a sin.
I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order
of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything
to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the
dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and
order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be
something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature
of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the preservation of the
nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of
food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is
the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole
human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is
to a man's well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the
whole human race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without
sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the
welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without
sin, provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping
with the end of human procreation.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways.
First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing
but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect
degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which
is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts
down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, i.e. the perfection
of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. viii): "Just as that
was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better
still that which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we
praise the good of Susanna's conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good
of the widow Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary."
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[152], A[2], ad 2; [3520]FS,
Q[64], A[2]), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on
conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure
attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not
opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with
the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this
depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the
interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that
the act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free
act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the
aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of
reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in
accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to
set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not
subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the
punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling
against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the
child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence
(which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of
sin." Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but
that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a
sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is
the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i,
18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other
superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.
Objection 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of
what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own,
except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in
venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly,
no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.
On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine
is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle
(Eph. 5:18), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay:
'luxury']." Therefore lust is forbidden.
Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19 [Douay:
'luxury'].
I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one
to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful
it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal
acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the
common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there
is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this
matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the
dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists
essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of
venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De
Gener. Anim. i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed." For it is
said to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of
the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative
power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to
be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one
observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the emission
of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end
for which it is needed.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking
against lust, "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God
in your body." Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a
man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine
says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): "God Who thus
governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and
commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which
thou hast begun to be."
Reply to Objection 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since
men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised
under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for
sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether lust is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is
apparently the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on Eph. 5:3
(Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony,
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital
vice.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as
pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind
safeguard the chastity of the flesh." Now it is seemingly contrary to
the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust
is not a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph.
4:19, "Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness." But
despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of
sloth, as stated above ([3521]Q[35], A[4], ad 2). Much less, therefore,
is lust a capital vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[148], A[5]; [3522]FS, Q[84],
AA[3],4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that
through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of
which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now
the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore
this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both
on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because such like
concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust
is a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3523]Q[148], A[6]), according
to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a
certain uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the
point. If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply
that it is caused by gluttony materially---in so far as gluttony
provides the bodily matter of lust---and not under the aspect of final
cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the
cause of others.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3524]Q[132], A[4], ad 1), when
we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of
all sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures
chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by
despair, so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle
thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary
for a capital vice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?
Objection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly
reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy,
rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence
or despair of a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness
and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin,
even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be
reckoned especially as daughters of lust.
Objection 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as
stated above (Q[128], ad 6;[3525] Q[137], A[3]). But lust is contrary,
not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a
daughter of lust.
Objection 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is
the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).
Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.
Objection 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four,
namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking." There
the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their
objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and
disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that
the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent
on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the
vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the
reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.
Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is
simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act
is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived
thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart." In this respect we have
"blindness of mind." The second act is counsel about what is to be done
for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence
of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1), speaking of
lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation,
thou canst not control it by counseling." In this respect there is
"rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above
([3526]Q[53], A[3]). The third act is judgment about the things to be
done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful
old men (Dan. 13:9): "They perverted their own mind . . . that they
might not . . . remember just judgments." In this respect there is
"thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's command about the
thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as
through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from
doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" must
be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine
edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who
declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear will
undo those words."
On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is
the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which regards
the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand
there is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the desired
pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the
end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose pleasures
a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is "despair of a
future world," because through being held back by carnal pleasures he
cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to
him.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5),
intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices
opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal
species of intemperance.
Reply to Objection 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude
regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from
pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as
stated above ([3527]Q[143]). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed
thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the
first named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter
enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee
4:11, "Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay:
'understanding']." Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the
less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death."
Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters
of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf.[3528] Q[35], A[4], ad
2;[3529] Q[118], A[8], ad 1;[3530] Q[148], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man
desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the
special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned
a daughter of lust.
Reply to Objection 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate
external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a
fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this
we refer "obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart
the mouth speaketh" (Mat. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full
of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly,
on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and
rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or
giving a thought to his words. which are described as "scurrilous."
Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks
pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to
"wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his
words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's
sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for instance, by
expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PARTS OF LUST (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are
twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Into what parts is lust divided?
(2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like
seduction?
(5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?
(6) Of seduction;
(7) Of rape;
(8) Of adultery;
(9) Of incest;
(10) Of sacrilege;
(11) Of the sin against nature;
(12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to
lust, namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape,
and the unnatural vice." For diversity of matter does not diversify the
species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of
matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is
married or a virgin, or of some other condition. Therefore it seems
that the species of lust are diversified in this way.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not
differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does
not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having
intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an injustice.
Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of
lust.
Objection 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with
a woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that
a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow.
Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as
adultery is.
Objection 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another
woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter sin
is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the
species thereof.
Objection 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): "Lest again,
when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them /that
sinned before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and
fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed." Therefore it
seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned
species of lust, as well as fornication.
Objection 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its
parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is
written (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are
fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']." Therefore
it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.
On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36,
qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].
I answer that As stated above ([3531]Q[153], A[3]), the sin of lust
consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right
reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter
wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due
matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a
circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is
derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the
species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.
Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways.
First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. In
this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the "vice
against nature," which attaches to every venereal act from which
generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and
advancement of the child when born, there is "simple fornication,"
which is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman.
Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be
discordant with right reason in relation to other persons; and this in
two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man has
connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to her; and thus
there is "incest," which consists in the misuse of a woman who is
related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with regard to the
person under whose authority the woman is placed: and if she be under
the authority of a husband, it is "adultery," if under the authority of
her father, it is "seduction," in the absence of violence, and "rape"
if violence be employed.
These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than
of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is by
way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been
stated above (OBJ[1]) that the aforesaid species are assigned with
regard to a difference of matter.
Reply to Objection 1: The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected
with a formal difference of object, which difference results from
different modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3532]FS, Q[18], A[7]), nothing
hinders the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act,
and in this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is
this deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the
lust that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is
thereby shown to be more grievous.
Reply to Objection 3: Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a
spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the
violation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, the
other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced to
other species of lust.
Reply to Objection 4: The sin of a husband with his wife is not
connected with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not
constitute the species of a moral act, as stated above ([3533]FS,
Q[18], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 5: As a gloss says on this passage, "uncleanness"
stands for lust against nature, while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse
of boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also
reply that "lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial to
the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 6: According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there
signifies any kind of excess.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a par with
one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that
are not mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29): "That you abstain
from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things
strangled, and from fornication." But there is not mortal sin in these
observances, according to 1 Tim. 4:4, "Nothing is rejected that is
received with thanksgiving." Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept.
But the Lord commanded (Osee 1:2): "Go take thee a wife of
fornications, and have of her children of fornications." Therefore
fornication is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without
disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without
disapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we
read (Gn. 16:4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and further
on (Gn. 30:5, 9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of
his wives; and again (Gn. 38:18) that Juda was with Thamar whom he
thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal
sin.
Objection 4: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But
simple fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the
love of God, since it is not a sin directly against. God, nor as
regards the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured.
Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
Objection 5: Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But
simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose
[*The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to
St. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8,
"Godliness is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of Christian
teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man conforms to
this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the flesh,
doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish." Therefore
simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what
food is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to
the welfare of the human race." But inordinate use of food is not
always a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual
intercourse; and this would seem to apply especially to simple
fornication, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid species.
On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:13): "Take heed to keep thyself
. . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a
crime." Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all
intercourse with other than one's wife is a mortal sin.
Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But
fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal.
5:21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds:
"They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God."
Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can.
Praedicandum): "They should know that the same penance is to be
enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder
and other criminal offenses." Therefore simple fornication is a
criminal or mortal sin.
I answer that, Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be
a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in
Deut., qu. 37] on Dt. 23:17, says: "This is a prohibition against going
with whores, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial" it
should be "venal," since such is the wanton's trade. In order to make
this evident, we must take note that every sin committed directly
against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an
inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be
born of this union. For we find in all animals where the upbringing of
the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these come
together not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female,
whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on the
other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for
the offspring's upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as in the case
of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a
human child requires not only the mother's care for his nourishment,
but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under
whom he progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence human
nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands
that a man should be united to a determinate woman and should abide
with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in
the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of
offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and
this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.
This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for
the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however,
the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole
human race, and common goods depend on the law for their determination,
as stated above ([3534]FS, Q[90], A[2]
), it follows that this union of man and woman, which is called
matrimony, is determined by some law. What this determination is for us
will be stated in the Third Part of this work (XP, Q[50], seqq.), where
we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since
fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as something
incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child's
upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin.
Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication,
make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a
matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged
according to what happens in general, and not according to what may
happen in a particular case.
Reply to Objection 1: Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these
things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the
matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between
Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For
among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of
the corruption of natural reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the
Divine law, considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned
were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into
their daily life. Hence the Apostles forbade these things to the
Gentiles, not as though they were unlawful in themselves, but because
they were loathsome to the Jews, as stated above ([3535]FS, Q[103],
A[4], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is
contrary to right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as it is
ruled by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that
which a man does by God's will and in obedience to His command, is not
contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general
order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the Divine
power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the usual
course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in being
willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed God, although
considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason in general,
so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by God's command.
Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication, though it
be so called in reference to the general course of things. Hence
Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "When God commands a thing to be done
against the customs or agreement of any people, though it were never
done by them heretofore, it is to be done"; and afterwards he adds:
"For as among the powers of human society, the greater authority is
obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God in preference to all."
Reply to Objection 3: Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens
with no purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we
treat of matrimony ([3536]XP, Q[65], A[5], ad 2). As to Juda there is
no need to excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.
Reply to Objection 4: Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our
neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as
we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a
manner disadvantageous to the future child.
Reply to Objection 5: A person, who, while given to works of piety,
yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in
so far as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and
because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy;
but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal
inconstancy impenitent until death.
Reply to Objection 6: One copulation may result in the begetting of a
man, wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the
future child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not
only as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one
meal does not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the act
of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would,
however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a food
which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with
Adam.
Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised
under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure
is a lesser sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of
sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds
from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is
in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the "flame of
sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust." Therefore it seems that
fornication is the gravest of sins.
Objection 2: Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed
against a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more
grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now
according to 1 Cor. 6:18, "He that committeth fornication sinneth
against his own body," which is most intimately connected with a man.
Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.
Objection 3: Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to
be the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is
seemingly opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from
what was said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ,
according to 1 Cor. 6:15, "Shall I . . . take the members of Christ,
and make them the members of a harlot?" Therefore fornication is the
most grievous of sins.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of the
flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.
I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first
with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some
accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin
itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to the
good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the
good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to its
species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods, such as
theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those which are
directly against God, and sins that are injurious to the life of one
already born, such as murder.
Reply to Objection 1: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is
that which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure
that is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the
less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a
greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure
is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [*Serm.
ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine's works]) that of
all a Christian's conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of
chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and
Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to
the devil by carnal lust more than by anything else," because, to wit,
the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.
Reply to Objection 2: The fornicator is said to sin against his own
body, not merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in
the flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts
against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement
thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from
this that fornication is the most grievous sin, because in man reason
is of greater value than the body, wherefore if there be a sin more
opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of
the human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual
begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an
actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the
species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point of
view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind of
lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human species.
Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and
therefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous.
Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though the
fornicator intended to offend God, but consequently, in the same way as
all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are Christ's
members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to 1 Cor.
6:17, "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." Wherefore also
spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and
kisses. For the Apostle says (Eph. 5:3): "Fornication and all
uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you,
as becometh saints," then he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a gloss refers
to "kissing and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft speeches"),
"or scurrility" (which "fools call geniality---i.e. jocularity"), and
afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5): "For know ye this and understand
that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is the
serving of idols), hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of
God," thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of
foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins.
Objection 2: Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being
prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and upbringing.
But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments.
Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.
Objection 3: Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can
never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done
sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in
themselves.
On the contrary, A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a
kiss. But according to Mat. 5:28, "Whosoever shall look on a woman to
lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart."
Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal
sins.
Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), "By their very
intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces, those
who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honor nor shame,
acknowledge their disgrace and crime." Therefore by doing these things
a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.
I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal works. /sin in two ways.
First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or
touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is
possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being
the custom of one's country, or on account of some obligation or
reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by
reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead
someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt intention.
Now it has been stated above ([3537]FS, Q[74], A[8]), that it is a
mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the delectation
of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal sin, and much
more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in such like sins not
only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure is a mortal
sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this
delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and only in this way
are they said to be lustful. Therefore in so far as they are lustful,
they are mortal sins.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle makes no further mention of these
three because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he
had mentioned before.
Reply to Objection 2: Although kisses and touches do not by their very
nature hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust,
which is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are
mortally sinful.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that such things are not
mortal sins in their species.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the
same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit
while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep
obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kings 3:2, Par. 1).
Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution
would seem to be a sin.
Objection 2: Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man
has the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently
discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing,
or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that
nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing
that it is a sin according to its genus.
Objection 3: Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who
cannot act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is
instructed and reproved by God, according to Job 33:15,16, "By a dream
in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men
[*Vulg.: 'When deep sleep falleth upon men.' St. Thomas is apparently
quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly above[3538],
Q[95], A[6], OBJ[1]] . . . Then He openeth the ears of men, and
teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore a man,
while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and this is
to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that nocturnal
pollution is a sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the same
image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the mind
of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the
imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved,
with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as
little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about
such things while one is awake."
I answer that, Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways.
First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every
sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of
the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far as it can be
suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason's judgment,
there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment.
For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the
images formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated
above in the [3539]FP, Q[84], A[8], ad 2. Wherefore what a man does
while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's judgment, is not imputed to
him as a sin, as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.
Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its
cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there is
excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated
either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance, the
sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this
excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing happens when nature is
cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the
discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination.
Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause (for
instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the
character of sin from its cause: whereas if the excess or
disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause,
nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.
A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and
the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account
of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was
awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks
about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while
sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of
concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to
arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such
pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul,
so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to
acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as certain movements in some degree
pass" from the waking state to the state of sleep, "the dreams of good
men are better than those of any other people": and Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that "even during sleep, the soul may have
conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition." Thus it is
evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its
cause. on the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues
after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were speculative, or
accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself
nor in its cause.
The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the
work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce
the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous sin,
namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil. Hence the
words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no
uncleanness know" [*Translation W. K. Blount].
On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part, and
through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the
Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer
from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil brought this
about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it
is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes
the result of a previous sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God
while he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It
is for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to
God (3 Kings 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).
Reply to Objection 2: The use of reason is more or less hindered in
sleep, according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less
overcome by sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the
evaporations. Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be
unable to elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the [3540]FP,
Q[84], A[8], ad 2. Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as
a sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason's apprehension is not hindered during
sleep to the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by
reason turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of
human thought. Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from
apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his
previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through
Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a
species of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a
virgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad
can. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried man and an
unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction
should not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct from fornication.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]):
"Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery." Now a
species is not contained under another that is differentiated in
opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it
seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.
Objection 3: Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to
injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to
another, namely the violated maiden's father, who "can take the injury
as personal to himself" [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue the
seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a
species of lust.
On the contrary, Seduction consists properly in the venereal act
whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about
venereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.
I answer that, When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, we
must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust is a
sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above ([3541]Q[153],
A[1]). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin
who is under her father's care: both on the part of the maid, who
through being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both
hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to a
wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal
of virginity: and on the part of the father, who is her guardian,
according to Ecclus. 42:11, "Keep a sure watch over a shameless
daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a laughing-stock to thy
enemies." Therefore it is evident that seduction which denotes the
unlawful violation of a virgin, while still under the guardianship of
her parents, is a determinate species of lust.
Reply to Objection 1: Although a virgin is free from the bond of
marriage, she is not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal
of virginity is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication,
in that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not
simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots,
women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2 Cor.
12:, "And have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication,"
etc.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as
applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in
the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man and
any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: "Nor is
it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not." In this sense,
too, we are to understand the words of Num. 5:13: "If [Vulg.: 'But']
the adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by witnesses, because
she was not found in adultery [stupro]."
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater
deformity through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust
obtains a greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the
concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains
not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice. In
fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the part of the
virgin, who, though not violated by force, is nevertheless seduced, and
thus the seducer is bound to compensation. Hence it is written (Ex.
22:16,17): "If a man seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with
her, he shall endow her and have her to wife. If the maid's father will
not give her to him, he shall give money according to the dowry, which
virgins are wont to receive." The other injury is done to the maid's
father: wherefore the seducer is bound by the Law to a penalty in his
regard. For it is written (Dt. 22:28,29): "If a man find a damsel that
is a virgin, who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the
matter come to judgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father
of the maid fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and
because he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of
his life": and this, lest he should prove to have married her in
mockery, as Augustine observes. [*QQ. in Dt., qu. xxxiv.]
__________________________________________________________________
Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction?
Objection 1: It would seem that rape is not a species of lust, distinct
from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that "seduction
[stuprum], or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and
takes its name from its causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty
of rape is a seducer." Therefore it seems that rape should not be
reckoned a species of lust distinct from seduction.
Objection 2: Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is
stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex
illa]) that "rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from
her father's house that after being violated she may be taken to wife."
But the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this essentially
regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape
should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.
Objection 3: Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is
written (1 Cor. 7:2): "For fear of fornication, let every man have his
own wife." Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was
enacted in the council of Meaux: "We decree that those who are guilty
of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not have those women
in marriage, although they should have subsequently married them with
the consent of their parents." Therefore rape is not a determinate
species of lust distinct from seduction.
Objection 4: Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married
wife without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he
take her away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal
knowledge of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate
species of lust.
On the contrary, Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore states
(Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore rape is
a species of lust.
I answer that, Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a
species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes
there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.
They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a
virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and
towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the
virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force
from her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in
another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by force from her
parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken
away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent,
whether by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the
conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed. There is
rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or one who is not a
virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [*Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can.
Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], "We abhor abductors whether of widows or of
virgins on account of the heinousness of their crime."
There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force,
violates a virgin unlawfully.
Reply to Objection 1: Since rape frequently coincides with seduction,
the one is sometimes used to signify the other.
Reply to Objection 2: The employment of force would seem to arise from
the greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not
fear to endanger himself by offering violence.
Reply to Objection 3: The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage
is to be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised.
For one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed,
who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that
is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her
father's care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her
parents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever
steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not
dissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment to
its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it
was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated. Wherefore
Jerome [*The quotation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2] declares the
contrary: "Three kinds of lawful marriage," says he, "are mentioned in
Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden given away lawfully in
her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a man finds a maiden in the
city, and by force has carnal knowledge of her. If the father be
willing, the man shall endow her according to the father's estimate,
and shall pay the price of her purity [*Cf. Dt. 22:23-29]. The third
is, when the maiden is taken away from such a man, and is given to
another at the father's will."
We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to
others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words
in the present tense.
Reply to Objection 4: The man who is just married has, in virtue of the
betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by using
violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius
says [*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: "This law of bygone
rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with regard to
whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken away by
force."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether adultery is determinate species of lust, distinct from the other
species?
Objection 1: It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species
of lust, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name
from a man having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad
alteram]," according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de
Divers. lxiii] on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be of
various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's care,
or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems that
adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not
for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the
Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an
adulterer," and in like manner one who is over enamored of any woman.
Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery
is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be reckoned a
species of lust.
Objection 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there
would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is the
same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case
a woman is violated who is under another person's authority. Therefore
adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the
others.
On the contrary, Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf.
Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that "adultery is
sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the
marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own lust, or
with the consent of the other party." Now this implies a special
deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust.
I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to another's
marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]" [*Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille
autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense
against chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by accession
to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to
the good of the upbringing of his own children. Secondly, by accession
to a woman who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders
the good of another's children. The same applies to the married woman
who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is written (Ecclus.
23:32,33): "Every woman . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be
guilty of sin. For first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the
Most High" (since there it is commanded: "Thou shalt not commit
adultery"); "and secondly, she hath offended against her husband," by
making it uncertain that the children are his: "thirdly, she hath
fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of another man," which
is contrary to the good of her offspring. The first of these, however,
is common to all mortal sins, while the two others belong especially to
the deformity of adultery. Hence it is manifest that adultery is a
determinate species of lust, through having a special deformity in
venereal acts.
Reply to Objection 1: If a married man has intercourse with another
woman, his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus
it is always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of
marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse; and
thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse
with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character of seduction,
or of some other sin, according to various conditions affecting the
woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been stated above
[3542](A[1]) that the species of lust correspond to the various
conditions of women.
Reply to Objection 2: Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of
human offspring, as stated above [3543](A[2]). But adultery is
specially opposed to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage
faith which is due between husband and wife. And since the man who is
too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if
he use her indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense
be called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a
lover of another woman.
Reply to Objection 3: The wife is under her husband's authority, as
united to him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's
authority, as one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin
of adultery is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin
of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ
specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in
the Third Part [*[3544]XP, Q[59], A[3]
; XP, QQ[60],62], when we treat of matrimony.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species of
lust. For incest [*'Incestus' is equivalent to 'in-castus = 'unchaste']
takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of
lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a
species of lust, but is lust itself in general.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf.
Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between a
man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity." Now affinity
differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several species
of lust.
Objection 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a
deformity, does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But
intercourse between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity
does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have
been lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.
On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished according to the
various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse.
Now incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman,
because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by
consanguinity or affinity as stated (OBJ[2]). Therefore incest is a
determinate species of lust.
I answer that, As stated above ([3545]AA[1],6) wherever we find
something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there
must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse
with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to
venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a
certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood
relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so
much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates
[*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed right for a son to bathe
with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now from what
has been said (Q[142], A[4]: Q[151], A[4]), it is evident that in
venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with
respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly
that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse. This reason
seems to be indicated (Lev. 18:7) where we read: "She is thy mother,
thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and the same is expressed
further on with regard to others.
The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close
touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from
venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very
frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in the
Old Law [*Lev. 18] the prohibition was apparently directed specially to
those persons who must needs live together.
The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many
friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife's
relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though
they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied
by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of
friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and
becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, but
each should have one."
Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural
that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to this
be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love
would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to lust:
and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a
determinate species of lust.
Reply to Objection 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related to
one another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of
the opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of
love, as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse
between such persons is called "incest" antonomastically.
Reply to Objection 2: Persons are related by affinity through one who
is related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the
other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of
unbecomingness.
Reply to Objection 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and
contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons
related by blood, for instance between parents and children who are
directly and immediately related to one another, since children
naturally owe their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a
horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and
threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done,
because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have
begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness attaching
to other persons who are related to one another not directly but
through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or unbecomingness
varies according to custom, and human or Divine law: because, as stated
above [3546](A[2]), sexual intercourse, being directed to the common
good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv,
16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden
times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation when religion
forbade it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust.
For the same species is not contained under different genera that are
not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of
irreligion, as stated above ([3547]Q[99], A[2]). Therefore sacrilege
cannot be reckoned a species of lust.
Objection 2: Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad
can. Lex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are
reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species
of lust.
Objection 3: Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be
done by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is
not reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice.
Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is
wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how
much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds
of morals!" Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters is
a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to
overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred
matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is a
species of lust.
I answer that, As stated above ([3548]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7), the act of a
virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice,
assumes the latter's species: thus, theft committed for the sake of
adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is evident that
as Augustine states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by
being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in
the case of those who vow and keep chastity. Wherefore it is manifest
that lust also, by violating something pertaining to the worship of
God, belongs to the species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may
be accounted a species of lust.
Reply to Objection 1: Lust, by being directed to another vice as its
end, becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be
also a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.
Reply to Objection 2: The enumeration referred to, includes those sins
which are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a
species of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its end,
and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful
intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship,
is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse with a virgin
consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of Christ, is
sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her father's
authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be employed it
will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes
more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian says [*Cod. i,
iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: "If any man dare, I will not say to rape,
but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he
shall be liable to capital punishment."
Reply to Objection 3: Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing.
Now a consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired
for sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired
for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also
come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an injury
be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a sacrilege by
partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is
ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the
observance of which certain persons are specially consecrated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of
lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the
enumeration given above (A[1], OBJ[1]). Therefore it is not a species
of lust.
Objection 2: Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is
comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under
vice, but under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii,
5). Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.
Objection 3: Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation,
as stated above ([3549]Q[153], A[2]): Whereas the unnatural vice
concerns acts from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the
unnatural vice is not a species of lust.
On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the other species of lust
(2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: "And have not done penance for the
uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss says:
"Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust."
I answer that, As stated above ([3550]AA[6],9) wherever there occurs a
special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered
unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in
two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is
common to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is
contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the
human race: and this is called "the unnatural vice." This may happen in
several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation,
for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the sin of
"uncleanness" which some call "effeminacy." Secondly, by copulation
with a thing of undue species, and this is called "bestiality."
Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female
with female, as the Apostle states (Rom. 1:27): and this is called the
"vice of sodomy." Fourthly, by not observing the natural manner of
copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and
bestial manners of copulation.
Reply to Objection 1: There we enumerated the species of lust that are
not contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.
Reply to Objection 2: Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is
opposed to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the
virtue, and therefore is reducible to the same genus.
Reply to Objection 3: The lustful man intends not human generation but
venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from
which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the
unnatural vice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the greatest
sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is contrary to
charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and rape which are
injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary to the love of
our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured.
Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest among the species of
lust.
Objection 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the
most grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since
it is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver
sin than the unnatural vice.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous
according as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin
is committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more
those persons who are united to him---and such are those whom he
defiles by incest---than persons who are not connected with him, and
whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore
incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
Objection 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more
it is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of
uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature,
since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and
patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that
uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not true.
Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins of lust.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation is
from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali,
viii.]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to lust, "that
which is against nature is the worst."
I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the
principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are
those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes
things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things
according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative
and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the
most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the
knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of
action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as
determined by nature. Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man
transgresses that which has been determined by nature with regard to
the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is
gravest of all. After it comes incest, which, as stated above
[3551](A[9]), is contrary to the natural respect which we owe persons
related to us.
With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression
merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the
presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more against
reason to make use of the venereal act not only with prejudice to the
future offspring, but also so as to injure another person besides.
Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed without injustice to
another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it
is a greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject
to another's authority as regards the act of generation, than as
regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore adultery is more grievous
than seduction. And both of these are aggravated by the use of
violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of
a wife than adultery. And all these are aggravated by coming under the
head of sacrilege, as stated above (A[10], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds
from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins
contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an
injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says
(Confess. iii, 8): "Those foul offenses that are against nature should
be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as were
those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit, they
should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God which hath
not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For even that
very intercourse which should be between God and us is violated, when
that same nature, of which He is the Author, is polluted by the
perversity of lust."
Reply to Objection 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as
stated above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity
of sacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and
more firm than any subsequently established order.
Reply to Objection 3: The nature of the species is more intimately
united to each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins
against the specific nature are more grievous.
Reply to Objection 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a
thing than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins
against nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness,
which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While
the most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due
species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gn. 37:2, "He accused his
brethren of a most wicked crime," says that "they copulated with
cattle." After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right
sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right
manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the
"vas" than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other
circumstances.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1)
continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we must
consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether continence is a virtue?
(2) What is its matter?
(3) What is its subject?
(4) Of its comparison with temperance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether continence is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For species
and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. But
continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 1,9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according
to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), "a virtue is a thing that no one
makes ill use of." Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance,
if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it.
Therefore continence is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is
lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23,
"Faith, modesty," etc., says that by continence a man refrains even
from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue.
Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that
"continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure." Therefore continence
is a virtue.
I answer that, The word "continence" is taken by various people in two
ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all
venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity (Gal.
5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first
place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to
continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above
([3552]Q[152], A[3] ) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand
continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, which
in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes continence
(Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Collat. xii, 10,11). In this way continence has something of
the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in
opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does
not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by which even the
sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions
contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "continence is not a virtue but a
mixture," inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and somewhat falls
short of virtue.
If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of
commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same
division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according
to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds [tenet se] to
that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now
whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason.
Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which
is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with
perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as
good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly
and truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining from evil
desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from
good desires: indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate
in evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first
sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from
unlawful goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser
goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?
Objection 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not
the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): "General
decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous
is restrained* in its every action." [*"Continentem" according to St.
Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote "concinentem = harmonious"].
Objection 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for
the good of right reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Now other
passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than
the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal
dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a
madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore continence does not
properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch.
Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): "It is
continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel."
Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather
than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10,
"Cupidity [Douay: 'The desire of money'] ({philargyria}), is the root
of all evils." Therefore continence is not properly about the desires
for pleasures of touch
Objection 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal
matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only
to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of
touch is not its proper matter.
Objection 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but
bestial, both as regards food---for instance, the pleasure of eating
human flesh; and as regards venereal matters---for instance the abuse
of animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as
stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are
not the proper matter of continence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "continence
and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and
intemperance." Now temperance and intemperance are about the desires
for pleasures of touch, as stated above ([3553]Q[141], A[4]). Therefore
continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.
I answer that, Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain curbing,
in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions. Hence
continence is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a
man towards the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that
reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is not properly
about those passions, such as fear and the like, which denote some kind
of withdrawal: since in these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in
pursuing what reason dictates, as stated above (Q[123], AA[3],4). Now
it is to be observed that natural inclinations are the principles of
all supervening inclinations, as stated above ([3554]FP, Q[60], A[2]).
Wherefore the more they follow the inclination of nature, the more
strongly do the passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature
inclines chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for
the maintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance
of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain
to the touch. Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to
desires for pleasures of touch.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as temperance may be used in a general sense
in connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter
wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly
speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to
contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a
general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and in
this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.
Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence
in relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude
implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the
pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the
soul---in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured
him---rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be said
to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.
Reply to Objection 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the
like, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of
choice in themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the
maintenance of nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak
of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply, but
relatively, by adding that they are continent or incontinent in regard
to wealth, or honor and so forth. Hence Tully either understood
continence in a general sense, as including relative continence, or
understood cupidity in a restricted sense as denoting desire for
pleasures of touch.
Reply to Objection 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than
pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence
and incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in
reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are
applicable to both.
Reply to Objection 5: Continence is a good of the human reason:
wherefore it regards those passions which can be connatural to man.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that "if a man were to lay
hold of a child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural
passion whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be
continent [*See A[4]], not absolutely, but relatively."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the
concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be
proportionate to the virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence, as
stated [3555](A[2]), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which
pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the
concupiscible power.
Objection 2: Further, "Opposites are referred to one same thing"
[*Categ. viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose
passions overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that
"incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by
following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason."
Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.
Objection 3: Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the
reason, or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the
concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason,
for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will,
since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor
again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the
passions of the irascible, as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Therefore it
follows that it is in the concupiscible.
On the contrary, Every virtue residing in a certain power removes the
evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil act of
the concupiscible: since "the continent man has evil desires,"
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is
not in the concupiscible power.
I answer that, Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that
subject have a different disposition from that which it has while
subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same
disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent,
since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires.
Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible as
its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both, since
both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and each of
them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow his unlawful
desires. Now the primary difference between them is to be found in
their choice: since the continent man, though subject to vehement
desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason; whereas the
incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his reason forbids.
Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the soul, whose act
it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated above ([3556]FS,
Q[13], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for
pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance
which is in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist
them. For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is
of one thing against another.
Reply to Objection 2: The will stands between reason and the
concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is
moved by the reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the
concupiscible. Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its
first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both
belong immediately to the will as their proper subject.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the passions are not in the will as
their subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus
it is that the will of the continent man resists desires.
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Whether continence is better than temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance.
For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of a continent
soul." Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the
greater the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater
reward; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned,
except he strive lawfully," and the continent man, since he is subject
to vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom
these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue
than temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the
concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is in
the concupiscible, as stated above [3557](A[3]). Therefore continence
is a greater virtue than temperance.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus [*De
Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a
principal virtue.
I answer that, As stated above [3558](A[1]), continence has a twofold
signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal
pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater than
temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said
above (Q[152], A[5]) concerning the preeminence of virginity over
chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken
as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when they are
vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than
continence, because the good of a virtue derives its praise from that
which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more
in the temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former
even the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason, being tamed by
reason so to speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite
strongly resists reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is
compared to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted may be understood in two ways.
First in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence
from all things venereal: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of
a continent soul," in the genus of chastity the fruitfulness of the
flesh is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of
virginity or of widowhood, as stated above ([3559]Q[152], AA[4],5).
Secondly it may be understood in reference to the general sense in
which continence denotes any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus
it means that "no price is worthy of a continent soul," because its
value is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable
according to weight.
Reply to Objection 2: The strength or weakness of concupiscence may
proceed from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause:
because some people by their natural temperament are more prone to
concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which
inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for
others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas
strength of concupiscence increases it. on the other hand, weakness or
strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause,
for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of reason, as in
the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of concupiscence, by
reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence
diminishes it.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is more akin to the reason than the
concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason---on account of
which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to
the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the
temperate man---is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the
will, as in the case of one who is continent.
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OF INCONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?
(2) Whether incontinence is a sin?
(3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;
(4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in
desire?
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Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul
but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from
the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described
either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains
not to the soul but to the body.
Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result
from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the
bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it
is especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper
whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire." Therefore incontinence
regards the body.
Objection 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the
vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh
lusteth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence
pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.
On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul.
Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we
ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly
on the part of the soul.
I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than
to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of
the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is
owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the
sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these
passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of
incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as
the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions.
If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of
reason altogether---as in the case of those who become insane through
the vehemence of their passions---the essential conditions of
continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the
judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent
forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is
on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason.
This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7):
first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has
given its counsel; and this is called "unbridled incontinence" or
"impetuosity": secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been
counselled, through holding weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this
kind of incontinence is called "weakness." Hence it is manifest that
incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has
certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these
organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are
accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the
intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the
senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite.
Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament,
the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds
to it weakly; although in /rare cases the opposite occurs, according to
Prov. 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman?" And since small and weak
things "are accounted as though they were not" [*Aristotle, Phys. ii,
5] the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm
judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence
he states that "we do not describe women as being continent, because
they are vacillating" through being unstable of reason, and "are easily
led" so that they follow their passions readily.
Reply to Objection 2: It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man
at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the
impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious
persons [*Cf. [3560]FS, Q[46], A[5]], or from its vehemence, as in the
melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most
vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to
that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion by
reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with
regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic
temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are
due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a
sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh
overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence
of the spirit in not resisting strongly.
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Whether incontinence is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot
avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis.
8:21, "I know [Vulg.: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be continent,
except God gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason.
But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man.
Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man
becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of divine love,
exclaimed: I live, now not I" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore incontinence is
not a sin.
On the contrary, It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim. 3:3)
where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc.
Therefore incontinence is a sin.
I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two
ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus
incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as
intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence
([3561]Q[155], A[2] ). In this way incontinence is a sin for two
reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which
is in accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful
pleasures. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that
"incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong"---that is, by
straying from reason---"but also because it is wicked"---that is, by
following evil desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is
considered, properly---inasmuch as it is a straying from reason---but
not simply; for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason
in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in
themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but
relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence
([3562]Q[155], A[2], ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from
the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to
observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of
themselves desirable.
Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but
metaphorically. for instance about the desires for things of which one
cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be
said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just as
the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a
man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason.
Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection of
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without
God's help, according to Jn. 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing."
Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be continent,
does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii,
3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves."
Reply to Objection 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the
incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but
through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in
resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically
and not properly.
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Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?
Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely
than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his
conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Lk. 12:47, "That
servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be
beaten with many stripes." Now the incontinent man would seem to act
against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to
Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the
things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the
intemperate man judges what he desires to be good. Therefore the
incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
Objection 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more
incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most
grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence
would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a
person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly
are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong,
and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate man
that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished.
Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely
than the intemperate.
Objection 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his
sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since
the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the
intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man
sins more gravely than the intemperate.
On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine
says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that "impenitence is a sin against
the Holy Ghost." Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) "the
intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his
choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance." Therefore
the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent.
I answer that, According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin is
chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live
aright" [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater
inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the
intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own
choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas in
the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And
since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a disposition difficult
to remove," the result is that the incontinent man repents at once, as
soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact
he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become
connatural to him by reason of his habit. Wherefore in reference to
such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14) that "they are glad when they
have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." Hence it follows
that "the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent," as also
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the
inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the
ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so
far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the
reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such
like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the
inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both
the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the
appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the
incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater
ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In
one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this
ignorance lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of
intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the
ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of
the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any
chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another
respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the
thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some
particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must choose
this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's ignorance is
about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order
that he may follow his desires without being curbed. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that "the incontinent man is better
than the intemperate, because he retains the best principle [*{To
beltiston, e arche}, 'the best thing, i.e. the principle']," to wit,
the right estimate of the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the
incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which
quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy
of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his
desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above
([3563]Q[142], A[2] ). By these same means the intemperate man can be
cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is
on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the
last end, which holds the same position as the principle in
demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one
who errs as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters
with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part
of the inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this
proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the
inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is
more easily suppressed.
Reply to Objection 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin,
is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained
above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is
sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin
except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins
even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate
man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm,"
i.e. slight desire. "For what would he have done if he had desired it
with passion?"
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?
Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than
the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist the
passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful, indeed it is
pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures
or pains." Now, "as Heraclitus says, it is more difficult to resist
desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3]. Therefore incontinence of desire is
less grievous than incontinence of anger.
Objection 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion
be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the
case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is
incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one
who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason somewhat,
but desire does not" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 6).
Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in
desire.
Objection 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is.
Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it
leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more
grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.
Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of
desire."
I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways.
First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of
reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence
of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the
movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher
indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because the movement of anger
partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to avenge the
injury done to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet
he does not tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due
mode of vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of desire is
altogether in accord with sense and nowise in accord with reason.
Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily
temperament owing to the quickness of the movement of the bile which
tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to
anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence
is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more often that
the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed
to anger, than that the children of those who are disposed to
concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which
results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed more
deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly,
whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by
stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works
with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as though forced by a
certain previous displeasure.
Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the
evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus
incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it
leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure
perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for
the moment it is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its
impetuousness.
Reply to Objection 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not
as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because
nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is
more disgraceful.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard
to its result.
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OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices.
Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?
(2) Whether each of them is a virtue?
(3) Whether each is a part of temperance?
(4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?
Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely
the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet.
ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior in inflicting
punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and
vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that clemency
and meekness are the same.
Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that
"clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when
unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently
clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi],
hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and
clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely the
same.
Objection 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different
virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and
clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are absolutely
the same.
On the contrary, According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca
(OBJ[1] ) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior":
whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to
everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same.
I answer that, As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue is "about
passions and actions." Now internal passions are principles of external
actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that
moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards the same effect
as virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically.
Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from theft,
whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money, which
is restrained by liberality; so that liberality concurs with justice
towards the effect, which is abstention from theft. This applies to the
case in point; because through the passion of anger a man is provoked
to inflict a too severe punishment, while it belongs directly to
clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be prevented by
excessive anger.
Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of
anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ
from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment,
while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of
vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is
applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's affections incline to the moderation of
things that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from
one man loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's
punishment in itself, but only as directed to something else, for
instance justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love
makes one quick to mitigate punishment ---and this pertains to
clemency---while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this
reason Tully says that "the mind provoked to hatred" that is to punish
too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from inflicting too severe a
punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but
punishment.
Reply to Objection 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the
passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly
concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in
punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are
called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in
punishing." Those who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake
may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling
that leads one man to love another.
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Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a
virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these
are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore
neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect"
[*Ethic. ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain
decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases
anger. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Mat. 5:4) among
the beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues
differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised
under virtue.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): "Every good man is
conspicuous for his clemency and meekness." Now it is virtue properly
that belongs to a good man, since "virtue it is that makes its
possessor good, and renders his works good also" (Ethic. ii, 6).
Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.
I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of
appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Now
this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in
mitigating punishment, "is guided by reason," according to Seneca (De
Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to
right reason, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Wherefore it is manifest that
both clemency and meekness are virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for
meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the
external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem
rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external
punishing, as stated above [3564](A[1]). Yet they are not really
opposed to one another, since they are both according to right reason.
For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right
reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according
to right reason, when and where this is requisite. Wherefore they are
not opposed to one another as they are not about the same thing.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), "the
habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is
denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name
of meekness." For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to excess,
because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done
to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since "scarcely anyone
belittles an injury done to himself," as Sallust observes [*Cf.
Q[120]]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not in respect of
that which is according to right reason, but as regards that which is
according to common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on
account of some particular consideration, it mitigates the punishment,
deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be punished any further.
Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1): "Clemency grants this, in the
first place, that those whom she sets free are declared immune from all
further punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a
pardon." Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to severity as
equity [the Greek 'epieikeia' [*Cf. Q[120]]] to legal justice, whereof
severity is a part, as regards the infliction of punishment in
accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs from equity, as we shall
state further on (A[3], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the
fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders
meekness being reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.
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Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of
temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above
[3565](A[2]). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to
equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above (Q[120], A[2]).
Therefore seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences;
whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and
vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.
Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): "A man may be
said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty." Now this
is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is
opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of
prudence rather than of temperance.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is
temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge."
Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of
temperance.
I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so far
as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence the
virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name
of justice consist in a certain "equality," those of fortitude in a
certain "strength of mind," those of temperance in a certain
"restraint," inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement concupiscences
of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist
in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while
meekness represses anger, as stated above ([3566]AA[1],2). Therefore
both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as principal
virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.
Reply to Objection 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation
of punishment. one is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance
with the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter of
the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is
a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that he does not
exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs properly to
clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "it is
temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge." This
moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition,
whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another.
Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is a certain
smoothness of the soul"; for, on the other hand, there would seem to be
a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to pain others.
Reply to Objection 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues
depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of
the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree
with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not in
matter.
Reply to Objection 3: "Unsoundness" is corruption of "soundness." Now
just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the
condition due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to
the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This
occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of
reason, and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses
that humane feeling whereby "every man is naturally friendly towards
all other men" (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes
the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes
pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, is
because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane feeling
which gives rise to clemency.
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Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest
virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs
man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness
above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is written (James
1:21): "With meekness receive the ingrafted word," and (Ecclus. 5:13):
"Be meek to hear the word" of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad
Demophil.) that "Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on
account of his great meekness." Therefore meekness is the greatest of
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according
as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to
be most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34,35): "That
which is agreeable" to God is "faith and meekness"; wherefore Christ
expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Mat. 11:29), where
He says: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart"; and
Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that "Christ dwells in us
by our meekness of soul." Again, it is most acceptable to men;
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): "My son, do thy works in
meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men": for which
reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King's "throne is
strengthened by clemency." Therefore meekness and clemency are the
greatest of virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that
"the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but
overcome evil by good." Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety
which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of
Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness']
is profitable to all things," observes that "piety is the sum total of
the Christian religion." Therefore meekness and clemency are the
greatest virtues.
On the contrary, They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are
annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest,
not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus. It
is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest
virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a
man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more
perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those virtues like
faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which direct
one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and
meekness.
Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain
restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations.
For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its
impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free judgment of truth:
wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 10:31): "My son, keep thy soul in meekness." Yet the
concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass
more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned
as a principal virtue. as stated above ([3567]Q[141], A[7], ad 2). As
to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to
approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby
we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by
removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man
self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly,
because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the
words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To be meek is not
to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our
evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and
have a clearer insight of the truth."
Reply to Objection 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God
and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the
virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
neighbor's evils.
Reply to Objection 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and
clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation
of our neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For
piety relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for
instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil,
because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon it
as affecting oneself, as stated above ([3568]Q[30], A[2]): and this
results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the
same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to
vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far
as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.
__________________________________________________________________
OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to
meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning anger
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?
(2) Whether anger is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(5) Of its species;
(6) Whether anger is a capital vice?
(7) Of its daughters;
(8) Whether it has a contrary vice?
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Whether it is lawful to be angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For
Jerome in his exposition on Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his
brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause.' However, in the
genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden
altogether." Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.
Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's
evil is to be without reason." Now anger is always without reason: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen
perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "when anger
sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by
its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From whatever
cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the
mind." Therefore it is always evil to be angry.
Objection 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle,
Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate
thy brother in thy heart." Now it would seem unlawful to desire
vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Dt. 32:35,
"Revenge is Mine." Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always
an evil.
Objection 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is
evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God
judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry
is always an evil.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry without cause,
shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in
danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments
unstable, crimes unchecked." Therefore to be angry is not always an
evil.
I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive
appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above
([3569]FS, Q[46], A[1]) when we were treating of the passions. Now with
regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may
be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion's very
species, which is derived from the passion's object. Thus envy, in
respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at
another's good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason:
wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention
of envy denotes something evil." Now this does not apply to anger,
which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well
and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the
passion's quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and
thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or
less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with
right reason, one's anger is deserving of praise.
Reply to Objection 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other
passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly
they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above
([3570]FS, Q[24], A[2] ) when we were treating of the passions. It is
in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger
whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing him
a wrong.---But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion
Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of
the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be
moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not
always evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason.
First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its
rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly,
consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is
directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is
good, and is called "zealous anger." Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v,
45): "We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of
virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead
of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey."
This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason
in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason.
Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger troubles the eye
of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it." Nor is it incompatible with
virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution
of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its
act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having
to act.
Reply to Objection 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as
evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire
vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to
this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto
by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order
of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to punish "is
God's minister," as stated in Rom. 13:4.
Reply to Objection 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire
for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our
desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the
movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v,
45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows
to the command of reason."
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Whether anger is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by
sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we
incur blame thereby," as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no
passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above ([3571]FS,
Q[46], A[1]) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a
sin.
Objection 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable
good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a
person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as
Augustine asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger,
for a gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "The movement
of anger is not in our power." Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "the angry man acts with displeasure." Now displeasure is
contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Objection 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene
[*De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature to be
angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible;
wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that "to
be angry is the property of man." Therefore it is not a sin to be
angry.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): "Let all indignation and
anger [*Vulg.: 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from you."
I answer that, Anger, as stated above [3572](A[1]), is properly the
name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so
far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the
order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may
be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the
appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore
if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of
reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called "zealous
anger" [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire the
taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of
reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not
deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order
prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of
justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will
be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.
Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in
relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger
should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally;
and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even
though just vengeance be desired.
Reply to Objection 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not
regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely
does not include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame.
But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and
deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by
reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he who is angry in a
certain way, that is praised or blamed."
Reply to Objection 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not
for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his
appetite turns as to a mutable good.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment
of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that
judgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. so
that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each one,
if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not
in man's power, to the extent namely that no such movement arise. Yet
since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely
sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that "the
angry man acts with displeasure," means that he is displeased, not with
his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done to himself:
and through this displeasure he is moved to seek vengeance.
Reply to Objection 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject
to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is
in accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is
contrary to man's nature.
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Whether all anger is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is
written (Job 5:2): "Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg.: 'Anger
indeed killeth the foolish']," and he speaks of the spiritual killing,
whence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal
condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord
said (Mat. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in
danger of the judgment": and a gloss on this passage says that "the
three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and hell-fire,
signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state of eternal
damnation corresponding to various sins." Therefore anger is a mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal
sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares in
his commentary on Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his brother,"
etc. where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor.
Therefore anger is a mortal sin.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says:
"Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action."
I answer that, The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in
two ways, as stated above [3573](A[2]). First, on the part of the
appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is
a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to
charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a
venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfection
is considered either in relation to the subject desirous of vengeance,
as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or
in relation to the desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in
a trifling matter, which should be deemed of no account, so that even
if one proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance
by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some other like action.
Secondly, the movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being
angry, for instance, if one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one
exceed in the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal
sin in the point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin,
for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away
from the love of God and his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: It does not follow from the passage quoted that
all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually
by anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their
reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God or
by doing injury to their neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition
to the words of the Law: "Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of
the judgment" (Mat. 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of
the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave
injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to
this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity,
it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we
have said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is the most grievous sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For
Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that "nothing is more repulsive
than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless*
face, and most of all than a cruel soul." [*'Severo'. The correct text
is 'Si vero.' The translation would then run thus . . . 'and nothing
uglier.' And if his 'face is ugly, how much uglier is his soul!'].
Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would
seem to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing
is said to be evil because it hurts." Now anger is most hurtful,
because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself;
for Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that "anger differs in no
way from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome
than one harassed by a demon." Therefore anger is the most grievous
sin.
Objection 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their
outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most
grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.
On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam;
for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow into hatred
and a mote become a beam." Therefore anger is not the most grievous
sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3574]AA[1],2), the inordinateness of
anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an
undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to
the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least
of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some person,
under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the
evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those sins which
desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred; but while
hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the envious man
desires another's evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man
desires another's evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it
is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy than anger:
since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as a good; and to
desire evil as an external good such as honor or glory, than under the
aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the good, under the
aspect of which the angry man desires an evil, anger concurs with the
sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this respect again,
absolutely speaking. the sin of anger is apparently less grievous than
that of concupiscence, according as the good of justice, which the
angry man desires, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which
is desired by the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "the incontinent in desire is more
disgraceful than the incontinent in anger."
On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of
being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on account
of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to Prov. 27:4,
"Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear
the violence of one provoked?" Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "The
heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles,
the tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged
and fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes
sounds indeed, but there is no sense in its utterance."
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of
the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement
of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than
from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the
aspect of justice, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably
assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some
angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered" or
"stern." According to him, a person is said to be "sullen" whose anger
"is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time." But this
apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems
that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the
other circumstances.
Objection 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or
"stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge,
or punishment." Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of
anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He
says (Mat. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in
danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca,
shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his
brother, "Thou fool." But these degrees are not referable to the
aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger
is not fitting.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi] says
"there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger which is
called wrath [*'Fellea,' i.e. like gall. But in [3575]FS, Q[46], A[8],
St. Thomas quoting the same authority has {Cholos} which we render
'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind, and
"rancour." Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid.
For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning and movement," and the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons:
"ill-will" he describes as "an anger that endures and grows old," and
this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes
"rancour" as "reckoning the time for vengeance," which tallies with the
Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered." The same division is
given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid
division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.
I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the
passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when
treating of the passions ([3576]FS, Q[46], A[8]) how it is to be
applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly
what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have
to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin
of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.
For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two
things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards
"choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause.
Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures
too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the
cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a
man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting
displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to himself. In
another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks
with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or "stern"
people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted
punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger,
or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration
in the aforesaid species.
Reply to Objection 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a
long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person
has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he
holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the
outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he
of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away
with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of
"ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense
desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be
quelled only by revenge.
Reply to Objection 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not
refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course
of the human act [*Cf. [3577]FS, Q[46], A[8], OBJ[3]]. For the first
degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says:
"Whosoever is angry with his brother." The second degree is when the
anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into
effect; and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his
brother, Raca!" which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when
the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the effect of
anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of
hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to
this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool!"
Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the
third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal sin, in the
case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A[3], ad 2), much more
so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned as
corresponding to each one of them. In the first case "judgment" is
assigned, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says [*Serm.
Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be delivered, there is an
opportunity for defense": in the second case "council" is assigned,
"whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be
inflicted": to the third case is assigned "hell-fire," i.e. "decisive
condemnation."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the
capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known
by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital
vice.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it
should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, "An angry [Douay:
'passionate'] man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to all
vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues; if
it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime." Now no capital vice
is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore
anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3578]FS, Q[84], A[3],4), a capital
vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two
reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the
part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so
far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*, which is
attractive by its excellence, as stated above [3579](A[4]). [*Honesty
must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral
goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q[145], A[1]]. The
second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the
mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that
anger is a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the
most part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results
from an injury inflicted.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[118], A[7]; Q[148], A[5];
Q[153], A[4]; [3580]FS, Q[84], A[4]), it belongs to the notion of a
capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are
committed through the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil
under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has,
since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger
is more a capital vice than hatred is.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices
accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the
judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however,
directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called its
daughters.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned
to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor,
indignation and blasphemy." For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*QQ.
in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not
be accounted a daughter of anger.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his
rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of
anger.
Objection 3: Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as
pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all
vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the
mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to
anger.
I answer that, Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as
consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. one is on
the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems
unworthy [indignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is called
"indignation." The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so
far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like
thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, "Will a wise man . . .
fill his stomach with burning heat?" And thus we have "swelling of the
mind."
Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a
twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his
anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A[5], ad 3) of the man
who says to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor," which
denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a
man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against God, it is
"blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely."
Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger
gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all manner of
injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.
Reply to Objection 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out
deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up
against God: since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the
pride of man is to fall off from God," i.e. to fall away from reverence
for Him is the first part of pride [*Cf.[3581] Q[162], A[7], ad 2]; and
this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks
out through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.
Reply to Objection 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it
has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely
displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now
through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to
hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from
sloth rather than from anger.
Reply to Objection 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as
identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to
take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that there. is not a vice opposed to anger,
resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now by
being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges
"with tranquillity" (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice
to be altogether without anger.
Objection 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether
useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca
proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it
seems that lack of anger is not a vice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's
evil is to be without reason." Now the judgment of reason remains
unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of
anger amounts to a vice.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who is
not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience
is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not
only the wicked but even the good to do wrong."
I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a
simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not
through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus
without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger
is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth.,
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom):
"Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger,
properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and when a man is
angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is
said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a
movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting
from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in
man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily
follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an
obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot
be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether
lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a
vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment
by the judgment of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought
to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's
punishing by judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of
the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more
prompt execution [*Cf. [3582]FS, Q[24], A[3]] of reason's dictate:
else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas
"nature does nothing without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].
Reply to Objection 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his
reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of
the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just
as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so
the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For
Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel who
exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is
reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): "They are cruel, and
will have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now
mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above ([3583]Q[157], A[4],
ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
Objection 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of
punishment, as stated above ([3584]Q[157], A[1]): whereas cruelty
applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17,
"But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred." Therefore
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the opposite of
clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in
exacting punishment."
I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from "cruditas"
[rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have
an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and
bitter taste. Now it has been stated above ([3585]Q[157], A[3], ad 1;
A[4], ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of
soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is
directly opposed to clemency.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate
punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which
inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing,
as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards
the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment,
belongs to cruelty.
Reply to Objection 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun
and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it
belongs to mercy [*Cf.[3586] Q[30], A[1]] to relieve another's
unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to
mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And
since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more
directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the
mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for
mercilessness.
Reply to Objection 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which
is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of
beneficence is in itself a punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?
Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or
brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue.
Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess.
Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it
were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without
attending to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that
mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by
piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A[1], ad 1).
Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.
Objection 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by
way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency,
which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to
the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency
is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity.
For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but not that which
enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal
without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency."
Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who is
angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not
said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage."
I answer that, "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a
likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals
of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for
some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason
alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to
those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the
person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's
torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under
bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and
resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature,
as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only
regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of
punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as
human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.
Reply to Objection 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly
opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But
savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is
directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which
according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift
of piety.
Reply to Objection 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage,
because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards
the truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not
inclined to mitigate punishment.
Reply to Objection 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it
disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on
account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand,
cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of
punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.
__________________________________________________________________
OF MODESTY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of
its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?
(2) What is the matter of modesty?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether modesty is a part of temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance.
For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every
virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to
Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order."
Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be
reckoned a part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise
chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name.
Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.
Objection 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of
our neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24,25, "The servant of the Lord
must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty
admonishing them that resist the truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers is
an act of justice or of charity, as stated above ([3587]Q[33], A[1]).
Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of
temperance.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a
part of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above ([3588]Q[141], A[4];[3589] Q[157],
A[3]), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is
most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures
of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of
very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of
lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the
virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above
([3590]Q[134], A[3], ad 1), that while magnificence is about great
expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is
concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue
to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult.
This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its
principal.
Reply to Objection 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes
appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel
is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode
which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated
to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.
Reply to Objection 2: Some things need tempering on account of their
strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in
all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong
passions, and modesty about weaker passions.
Reply to Objection 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general
moderation which is necessary in all virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether modesty is only about outward actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions.
For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other
persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be
known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.
Objection 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are
distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is
seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will
not be concerned with inward passions.
Objection 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things
pertaining to the appetite---which is proper to the moral virtues---and
about things pertaining to knowledge---which is proper to the
intellectual virtues---and again about things pertaining to the
irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one
virtue, it cannot be about all these things.
On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary to observe the
"mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of
them.
I answer that, As stated above [3591](A[1]), modesty differs from
temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint
is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less
difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about
modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special
difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of
modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all
that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty:
wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty.
In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of
punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held
modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require
moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of
the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by "humility."
The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is
moderated by "studiousness" which is opposed to curiosity. The third
regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done
becomingly and honestly [*Cf.[3592] Q[145], A[1]], whether we act
seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in
dress and the like.
To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain
special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions "meekness,
simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which we have
spoken above (Q[143]); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned
{eutrapelia} to pleasures in games, as stated above ([3593]FS, Q[60],
A[5]). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully;
and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also inward
actions.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding
externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by
certain outward signs.
Reply to Objection 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities
are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from
regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so
great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is
between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is
about passions, because in actions and passions that present no great
difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of
moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of
moderation.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HUMILITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride
which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, Curiosity;
(3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting
outward attire.
Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether humility is a virtue?
(2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?
(3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?
(4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?
(5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;
(6) Of the degrees of humility.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether humility is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue
conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, "They
humbled his feet in fetters." Therefore humility is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now
humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23):
"There is one that humbleth himself wickedly." Therefore humility is
not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But
humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims
at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem
that humility is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is
perfect" (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the
imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be
subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions,
according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the
Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it
comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would seem
not to be a virtue.
On the contrary, Origen commenting on Lk. 1:48, "He hath regarded the
humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc.): "One of the
virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our
Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.'"
I answer that, As stated above ([3594]FS, Q[23], A[2]) when we were
treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive
to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something
repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In
respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in respect
of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above
([3595]FS, Q[61], A[2]) that for those appetitive movements which are a
kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and
restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a kind of recoil,
there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to
strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary
with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and restrain the
mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the
virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the mind against despair,
and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right
reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility
is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is
so called because he is, as it were, 'humo acclinis'" [*Literally,
'bent to the ground'], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may
happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance
when one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment.
Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done
sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own failings,
assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abraham said to
the Lord (Gn. 18:27), "I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and
ashes." In this way humility is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may
be ill-done, for instance when man, "not understanding his honor,
compares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to them" (Ps.
48:13).
Reply to Objection 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a
virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the
lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and
pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine says
in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to wit, it
would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is
done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, properly
speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not
consist externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the mind, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
Reply to Objection 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at
great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to
great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that
magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this,
that each is according to right reason.
Reply to Objection 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First
absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor
in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To Him
humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as
regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect
in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature or state
or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in comparison with
God his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of Is.
40:17, "All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all." In
this way humility may be competent to every man.
Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as
directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is
defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a
matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue,
regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles
himself by subjecting himself to others.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether humility has to do with the appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite but
the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now pride
concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral.
xxxiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is first
of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written (Ps. 130:1), "Lord,
my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty." Now eyes are the chief
aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem that humility is chiefly
concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost
the whole of Christian teaching is humility." Consequently nothing
contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now
Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according
to 1 Cor. 12:31, "Be zealous for the better gifts." Therefore it
belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things but
the estimate thereof.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain
excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive
withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul
against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against
the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore
if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow
that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is
evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire
but with the estimate of great things.
Objection 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to
outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding
excessive expenditure and parade." Therefore it is not concerned with
the movement of the appetite.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that "the
humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord,
rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners." But choice concerns the
appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite rather than
with the estimative power.
I answer that, As stated above [3596](A[1]), it belongs properly to
humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that
which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion to
that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own
deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite.
Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and
consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking,
moderates the movement of the appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it
excludes respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are
especially wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare
themselves with others. But it does not follow from this that humility
is essentially concerned with knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater
things through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater
things through confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility;
especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is one
exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "It
is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise oneself up
against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He raiseth up; he
that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth down."
Reply to Objection 3: In fortitude there is the same reason for
restraining daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since
the reason in both cases is that man should set the good of reason
before dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous
hope which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for
strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for
strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's
proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good
which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing
presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man
ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him according
to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore humility would
seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to God; and for this
reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes humility, which
he understands by poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man
reveres God. Hence it follows that the relation of fortitude to daring
differs from that of humility to hope. Because fortitude uses daring
more than it suppresses it: so that excess of daring is more like
fortitude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility
suppresses hope or confidence in self more than it uses it; wherefore
excessive self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of
confidence is.
Reply to Objection 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont
to be done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility.
Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as
signs of the inward movement of the appetite.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to subject
oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), humility
consists chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought not to offer
to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with all acts of
religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject
oneself to man.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv):
"Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood." Now some
men are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject
themselves to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to
subject oneself to all men.
Objection 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the
detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself
to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he
subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other.
Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest through excessive
humility the superior lose his authority." Therefore a man ought not,
by humility, to subject himself to all.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:3): "In humility, let each
esteem others better than themselves."
I answer that, We may consider two things in man, namely that which is
God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is man's:
but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is God's,
according to the saying of Osee 13:9, "Destruction is thy own, O
Israel; thy help is only in Me." Now humility, as stated above (A[1],
ad 5; A[2], ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is
subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his
own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that
which the latter has of God's: but humility does not require a man to
subject what he has of God's to that which may seem to be God's in
another. For those who have a share of God's gifts know that they have
them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: "That we may know the things that are
given us from God." Wherefore without prejudice to humility they may
set the gifts they have received from God above those that others
appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5):
"(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it is now
revealed to His holy apostles." In like manner. humility does not
require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his
neighbor has of man's: otherwise each one would have to esteem himself
a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle says without
prejudice to humility (Gal. 2:15): "We by nature are Jews, and not of
the Gentiles, sinners." Nevertheless a man may esteem his neighbor to
have some good which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil
which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject himself to
him with humility.
Reply to Objection 1: We must not only revere God in Himself, but also
that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of
reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with
humility to all our neighbors for God's sake, according to 1 Pet. 2:13,
"Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake"; but to
God alone do we owe the worship of latria.
Reply to Objection 2: If we set what our neighbor has of God's above
that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a
gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on Phil. 2:3, "Esteem
others better than themselves," says: "We must not esteem by pretending
to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for another person
to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we
are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be
not hidden."
Reply to Objection 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly
inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul,
may subject himself to another, without giving the other man an
occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine
means in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "With fear, the superior should prostrate
himself at your feet in the sight of God." On the other hand, due
moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as of
other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If,
however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an occasion
of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since he
does not give scandal, although others take it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or
temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is
subject to God, as stated above [3597](A[3]). Now it belongs to a
theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility
should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of
temperance or modesty.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas
humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is
opposed to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore
apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
Objection 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same
object, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a
part, not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above
([3598]Q[129], A[5]). Therefore it would seem that humility is not a
part of temperance or modesty.
On the contrary, Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If thou wilt hear
the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers,
know that humility which God regards is the same as what they called
{metriotes}, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this evidently pertains
to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or
temperance.
I answer that, As stated above ([3599]Q[137], A[2], ad 1;[3600] Q[157],
A[3], ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the
likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of
temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or
suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues
restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of
the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness
suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the
movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great
things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of
temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a
man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not
magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble.
Moreover, for the reason given above ([3601]Q[160], A[2]), among the
various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised
is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch
as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it
is written (1 Pet. 3:4): "In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek
spirit."
Reply to Objection 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last
end, which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the
causes of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused
by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty
or temperance.
Reply to Objection 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by
reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as
stated above ([3602]Q[137], A[2], ad 1;[3603] Q[157], A[3], ad 2).
Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it
is assigned as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.
Reply to Objection 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to
matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is
reckoned a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the
virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the
publican (Lk. 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that "if
humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it
overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it
not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the angels
by the judgment seat of God." Hence it is clear that humility is set
above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all the
virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10,
C[1]]): "Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality?
Attend first of all to the foundation of humility." Now this would seem
to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore
apparently it is greater than the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward.
Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that humbleth
himself shall be exalted" (Lk. 14:11). Therefore humility is the
greatest of virtues.
Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16),
"Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the
human nature which He assumed." Now He especially proposed His humility
for our example, saying (Mat. 11:29): "Learn of Me, because I am meek
and humble of heart." Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the
"lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility
of God." Therefore humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues.
On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues, according to
Col. 3:14, "Above all . . . things have charity." Therefore humility is
not the greatest of virtues.
I answer that, The good of human virtue pertains to the order of
reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end:
wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have
the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered
in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance,
as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but by
participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and this
ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now
humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and in
all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special
matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the intellectual
virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially
legal justice, humility stands before all others.
Reply to Objection 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before
that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue;
even so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is
said of the publican (Lk. 18:14) that through the merit of his humility
"he went down into his house justified." Hence Chrysostom says [*De
incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in
the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin with humility: and
you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength,
but by that of humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not
by the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride."
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by
reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that
which is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the
foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now
the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in
the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way
of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place,
inasmuch as it expels pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man
submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence
it is written (James 4:6): "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace
to the humble." In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of
the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues
directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first step
towards God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to God
must believe." In this sense faith is the foundation in a more
excellent way than humility.
Reply to Objection 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly
things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who
despise earthly riches, according to Mat. 6:19,20, "Lay not up to
yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves treasures
in heaven." Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to those who
despise worldly joys, according to Mat. 4:5, "Blessed are they that
mourn, for they shall be comforted." In the same way spiritual
uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone merits it,
but because it is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore
Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]): "Think not that he who
humbles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: 'He shall
be exalted.' And do not imagine that his exaltation in men's eyes is
effected by bodily uplifting."
Reply to Objection 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility
to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's
spiritual welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual
things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly
things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual
welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that outward
exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were, a
disposition to man's untrammeled access to spiritual and divine goods.
Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so charity, and
other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are greater than
humility.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the Rule
of the Blessed Benedict?
Objection 1: It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that are
set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives these
degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict] are
unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be "humble not only in
heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on
the ground"; the second is "to speak few and sensible words, and not to
be loud of voice"; the third is "not to be easily moved, and disposed
to laughter"; the fourth is "to maintain silence until one is asked";
the fifth is "to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common
rule of the monastery"; the sixth is "to believe and acknowledge
oneself viler than all"; the seventh is "to think oneself worthless and
unprofitable for all purposes"; the eighth is "to confess one's sin";
the ninth is "to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and
contrary circumstances"; the tenth is "to subject oneself to a
superior"; the eleventh is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own
desires"; the twelfth is "to fear God and to be always mindful of
everything that God has commanded." For among these there are some
things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience and patience.
Again there are some that seem to involve a false opinion---and this is
inconsistent with any virtue---namely to declare oneself more
despicable than all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in
all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these are unfittingly
placed among the degrees of humility.
Objection 2: Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do
other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which concern
outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which pertain to
inward actions.
Objection 3: Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees
of humility, the first of which is "to acknowledge oneself
contemptible"; the second, "to grieve for this"; the third, "to confess
it"; the fourth, "to convince others of this, that is to wish them to
believe it"; the fifth, "to bear patiently that this be said of us";
the sixth, "to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt"; the
seventh, "to love being thus treated." Therefore the aforesaid degrees
would seem to be too numerous.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Mat. 3:15 says: "Perfect humility has
three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are above
us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is sufficient. The
second is to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our
inferiors; this is called abundant humility. The third degree is to
subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness."
Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "The measure
of humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is
imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to
be entrapped." Now the measure of a man's greatness cannot be fixed
according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem that
it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility.
I answer that, As stated above [3604](A[2]) humility has essentially to
do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of
his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in
the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above
what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the
reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of humility leads
to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest
that which is hidden within, as happens also with the other virtues.
For "a man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him,
by his countenance" (Ecclus. 19:26). Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of
humility include something regarding the root of humility, namely the
twelfth degree, "that a man fear God and bear all His commandments in
mind."
Again, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest
one aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is done in three
ways. First, by not following one's own will, and this pertains to the
eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating it according to one's superior
judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by not being
deterred from this on account of the difficulties and hardships that
come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree.
Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man forms
in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways. First by
acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the
eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great things,
and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in this respect
one should put others before oneself, and this belongs to the sixth
degree.
Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of
these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should not depart
from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others
have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to
speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not
immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The others have to do
with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, which
regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs
of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.
Reply to Objection 1: It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and
avow oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults
which we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which
others have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): "Bethink you that
some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although outwardly
you are better than they." Again, without falsehood one may avow and
believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of
one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency to God,
according to 2 Cor. 3:5, "Not that we are sufficient to think anything
of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God." And
there is nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those things that
pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises from another,
so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act
of another.
Reply to Objection 2: Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and
chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the
outward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of all
restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking out the
inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees of humility
are here enumerated.
Reply to Objection 3: All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible
to knowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement. For the first
degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency; but since it
would be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this is excluded by
the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal of
one's own deficiency; namely that not merely one simply assert one's
failing, but that one convince another of it. The other three degrees
have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excellence, but
outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity, whether it consist of
words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist. ii, 10, Ep. 36), "there is
nothing great in being humble towards those who treat us with regard,
for even worldly people do this: but we should especially be humble
towards those who make us suffer," and this belongs to the fifth and
sixth degrees: or the appetite may even go so far as lovingly to
embrace external abasement, and this pertains to the seventh degree; so
that all these degrees are comprised under the sixth and seventh
mentioned above.
Reply to Objection 4: These degrees refer, not to the thing itself,
namely the nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are
either of higher or lower or of equal degree.
Reply to Objection 5: This argument also considers the degrees of
humility not according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which
the aforesaid degrees are assigned, but according to the various
conditions of men.
__________________________________________________________________
OF PRIDE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first
man's sin, which we hold to have been pride. Under the first head there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pride is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special vice?
(3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject?
(4) Of its species;
(5) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins?
(7) Of its relation to other sins;
(8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?
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Whether pride is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the
object of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will do;
and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the Divine
promises: for it is written (Is. 60:15): "I will make thee to be an
everlasting pride [Douay: 'glory'], a joy unto generation and
generation." Therefore pride is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for
every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does this
become the rational creature which is made to God's image and likeness.
Now it is said in Prosper's Lib. Sent. 294, that "pride is love of
one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is supremely
excellent." Hence Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Pride imitates
exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all." Therefore
pride is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to
a contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice
is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:14): "Never suffer pride to
reign in thy mind or in thy words."
I answer that, Pride [superbia] is so called because a man thereby aims
higher [supra] than he is; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x): "A man is
said to be proud, because he wishes to appear above (super) what he
really is"; for he who wishes to overstep beyond what he is, is proud.
Now right reason requires that every man's will should tend to that
which is proportionate to him. Therefore it is evident that pride
denotes something opposed to right reason, and this shows it to have
the character of sin, because according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4),
"the soul's evil is to be opposed to reason." Therefore it is evident
that pride is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Pride [superbia] may be understood in two ways.
First, as overpassing [supergreditur] the rule of reason, and in this
sense we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate
"super-abundance"; in which sense any super-abundant thing may be
called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as significant of
super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the same passage (Is.
61:6) says that "there is a good and an evil pride"; or "a sinful pride
which God resists, and a pride that denotes the glory which He
bestows."
It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those
things in which men may take pride.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason has the direction of those things for
which man has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from
the rule of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful,
as is the case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally.
Now pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that pride is the
"desire for inordinate exaltation": and hence it is that, as he asserts
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), "pride imitates God inordinately: for
it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and wishes to usurp Hi.
dominion over our fellow-creatures."
Reply to Objection 3: Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of
humility, which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as
magnanimity, as stated above ([3605]Q[161], A[1], ad 3). Hence the vice
opposed to pride by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which
is opposed by default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to
magnanimity to urge the mind to great things against despair, so it
belongs to humility to withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of
great things against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for
a deficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to
magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind's attachment to
things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to humility by
default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In the same way,
on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity
and humility, from different points of view: to humility, inasmuch as
it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as it tends to great
things inordinately. Since, however, pride implies a certain elation,
it is more directly opposed to humility, even as pusillanimity, which
denotes littleness of soul in tending towards great things, is more
directly opposed to magnanimity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For
Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "you will find no sin that
is not labelled pride"; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2)
that "without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible."
Therefore pride is a general sin.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, "That He may withdraw man
from wickedness [*Vulg.: 'From the things that he is doing, and may
deliver him from pride']," says that "a man prides himself when he
transgresses His commandments by sin." Now according to Ambrose [*De
Parad. viii], "every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a
disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is
pride.
Objection 3: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue.
But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral.
xxxiv, 23): "Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one
virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and
like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body";
and Isidore says (Etym. [*De Summo Bono ii, 38]) that it is "the
downfall of all virtues." Therefore pride is not a special sin.
Objection 4: Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride
has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "one man
is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by mean
and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues." Therefore
pride is not a special but a general sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): "If he look
into the question carefully, he will find that, according to God's law,
pride is a very different sin from other vices." Now the genus is not
different from its species. Therefore pride is not a general but a
special sin.
I answer that, The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. First
with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of its
proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, because it has a
special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's own excellence, as
stated (A[1], ad 2). Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain
influence towards other sins. In this way it has somewhat of a generic
character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from pride, in two ways.
First directly, through other sins being directed to the end of pride
which is one's own excellence, to which may be directed anything that
is inordinately desired. Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it
were, that is by removing an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise
the Divine law which hinders him from sinning, according to Jer. 2:20,
"Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I
will not serve."
It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride
admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes,
but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For
though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin,
through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break
the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through
ignorance. and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason
Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "many things are done amiss
which are not done through pride."
Reply to Objection 1: These words are introduced by Augustine into his
book De Nat. et Grat., not as being his own, but as those of someone
with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion,
and shows that not all sins are committed through pride. We might,
however, reply that these authorities must be understood as referring
to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the
commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act of
pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not
always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, sometimes
through weakness, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but
not affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a
parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it.
Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride himself
against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.
Reply to Objection 3: A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one
way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt
every virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the
special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another way
a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and thus
pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an occasion of pride
in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to excellence.
Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Pride regards a special aspect in its object,
which aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love
of one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of pride is not the
irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A swollen mind
is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light." Now the
knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the rational
faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud
observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath them
with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride":
wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue observation. Now
observation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational faculty.
Objection 3: Further. pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible
things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it
consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus.
10:14, "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God." Now
the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot
extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in the
irascible.
Objection 4: Further, as stated in Prosper's Liber Sententiarum, sent.
294, "Pride is love of one's own excellence." But love is not in the
irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the
irascible.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift of
fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the
irascible.
I answer that, The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained
from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be
other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now
the proper object of pride is something difficult, for pride is the
desire of one's own excellence, as stated above ([3606]AA[1],2).
Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible
faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a strict
sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger,
strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Secondly,
the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to
the intellective appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed.
It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a
passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment.
Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is not
distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the [3607]FP,
Q[59], A[4]; FS, Q[82], A[5], ad 1 and 2.
Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were
merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might tend,
pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive
appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is
common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that
the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a
part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as
applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed
also to the demons.
Reply to Objection 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely
speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause.
For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may
receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Mat. 11:25, "Thou
hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i.e. from the
proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, "and hast revealed
them to little ones," i.e. to the humble.
Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written
(Ecclus. 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive
instruction." The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is
directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in
their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory
says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden truths
be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness: and
if they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence it is written
(Prov. 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom."
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3608]Q[161], AA[2], 6),
humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true
self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for
he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an
inordinate desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to
believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite
is borne towards things higher than what become him. Consequently
whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to
pride: and one of those is the observing of other people's failings,
just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17),
"holy men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others
above themselves." Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in
the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of
the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general
signification, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9),
"love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause,"
wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is
in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own excellence,"
inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority
over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory?
Objection 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly
assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four marks
by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either
when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe
it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits;
or when they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and
wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they have." For pride
is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue
from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not
received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through
his own merits. Therefore this should not be reckoned a species of
pride.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species
of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as
stated above ([3609]Q[110], A[2];[3610] Q[112]). Therefore it should
not be accounted a species of pride.
Objection 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride,
which are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that
"nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful": and
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it belongs to pride to
excuse oneself of a sin one has committed." Again, presumption whereby
one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much to do
with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not sufficiently
account for the different species of pride.
Objection 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm
[*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride,
saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of
deed." Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also reckons
twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind,
senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense
of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful
habit." Now these apparently are not comprised under the species
mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be assigned
unfittingly.
On the contrary, The authority of Gregory suffices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3611]AA[1],2,3), pride denotes
immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is
not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all
excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered
in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the
good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it.
Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has,
it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure
exceeding his competency: and thus we have the third species of pride,
namely "boasting of having what one has not."
Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as
to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of
another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another
as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is
borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of
one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus we
have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he has
from himself that which he has from God," or "when he believes that
which he has received from above to be due to his own merits."
Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it,
in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some
good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his
appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus we
have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises others
and wishes to be singularly conspicuous."
Reply to Objection 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways.
First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is
destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice,
and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication,
judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit
fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to
say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in
point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is
a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men for their
merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to
unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's own excellence, to boast
of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one's own
merits.
Reply to Objection 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as
regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what
he has not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is
reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride.
Reply to Objection 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he
has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to
ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to
the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good
of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above
one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which consists
in wishing to be preferred to others.
Reply to Objection 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the
progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in
thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.
The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of
opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken
above ([3612]Q[161], A[6]). For the first degree of humility is to "be
humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed
on the ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which consists in
looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second
degree of humility is "to speak few and sensible words, and not to be
loud of voice": to this is opposed "frivolity of mind," by which a man
is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is "not to be easily
moved and disposed to laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth."
The fourth degree of humility is "to maintain silence until one is
asked," to which is opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of humility is
"to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the
monastery," to which is opposed "singularity," whereby a man wishes to
seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe
and acknowledge oneself viler than all," to which is opposed
"arrogance," whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh
degree of humility is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for
all purposes," to which is opposed "presumption," whereby a man thinks
himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of
humility is "to confess one's sins," to which is opposed "defense of
one's sins." The ninth degree is "to embrace patience by obeying under
difficult and contrary circumstances," to which is opposed "deceitful
confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins
confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is
"obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness." The eleventh degree
of humility is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires"; to
this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in doing freely
whatever he will. The last degree of humility is "fear of God": to this
is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies contempt of God.
In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated,
but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have stated
above with regard to humility ([3613]Q[161], A[6]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss
on Ps. 7:4, "O Lord my God, if I have done this thing," says: "Namely,
the universal sin which is pride." Therefore if pride were a mortal
sin, so would every sin be.
Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But
pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of
God, nor as to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence
which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to
God's honor, or our neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride
is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as
Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by sublime
and heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "pride is a most
evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the
elect." But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins.
Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.
I answer that, Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly
regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above ([3614]Q[161],
A[1], ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in
so far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him
according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the
Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), "But we will not glory beyond our measure; but
according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us."
Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of
man is to fall off from God" because, to wit, the root of pride is
found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to God and His
rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is of its very
nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and
consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as
in other sins which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication
and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of
their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and
being without its consent), so too in the matter of pride it happens
that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not
consent to them.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3615](A[2]) pride is a general
sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all
sins may have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all
sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we
have stated to be a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of God,
inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule
as he ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor;
when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and
this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established
order among men, so that one ought to be subject to another.
Reply to Objection 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct
cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a
virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from
being the accidental cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii, 1.
Hence some are even proud of their humility.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins.
For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would
seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in
his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment
of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy
them." Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.
Objection 2: Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater
good," as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to
which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above
(Q[61], A[5]). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues,
such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are
more grievous sins than pride.
Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser
evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom.
1:28, where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men
of science were delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those things
which are not convenient." Therefore pride is not the most grievous of
sins.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 118:51, "The proud did iniquitously,"
says: "The greatest sin in man is pride."
I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a
mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from
the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and
complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for
pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets
inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the good of
virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity,
because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance
or through weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever;
whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling
to be subject to God and His rule. Hence Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de
Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that "while all vices flee from God, pride
alone withstands God"; for which reason it is specially stated (James
4:6) that "God resisteth the proud." Wherefore aversion from God and
His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins,
belongs to pride by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of
God. And since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of
greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else, it
follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because
it exceeds in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First,
on account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in
its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and "still more difficult
is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality," as
stated in Ethic. ii, 3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin
diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins the more
grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12,15).
Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being
hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes
occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A[5], ad 3). Hence Augustine
says pointedly that it "lies in wait for good deeds"; and it is written
(Ps. 141:4): "In the way wherein I walked, the proud [*Cf. Ps. 139:6,
'The proud have hidden a net for me.'] [Vulg.: 'they'] have hidden a
snare for me." Hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of
pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the
judgment of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily
avoided, both by considering one's own infirmity, according to Ecclus.
10:9, "Why is earth and ashes proud?" and by considering God's
greatness, according to Job 15:13, "Why doth thy spirit swell against
God?" as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which
man prides himself, according to Is. 40:6, "All flesh is grass, and all
the glory thereof as the flower of the field"; and farther on (Is.
64:6), "all our justices" are become "like the rag of a menstruous
woman."
Reply to Objection 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is
inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of
conversion. In this way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins,
as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the
greatest on the part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other
sins. For unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud
contempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of
ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible
conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more
evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God
punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh,
which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence
Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that "pride is the worst of all
vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest
and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous
deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. on the other hand, carnal
lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful
nature: and yet, under God's dispensation, it is less grievous than
pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls
into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he may rise from
his abasement."
From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a
wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to
contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be
more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to
fall into other sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride is the first sin of all?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For
the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not
accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De
Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done "amiss which are not done
with pride." Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the "beginning
of . . . pride is to fall off from God." Therefore falling away from
God precedes pride.
Objection 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to
the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all
virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): "Evil men and
seducers shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's
beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the
greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is
not the first sin.
Objection 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality.
Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude and
daring." Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin."
I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that which is
essential. Now it has been stated above [3616](A[6]) that aversion from
God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride
essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride
fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all
sins," as stated above ([3617]FS, Q[84], A[2]), when we were treating
of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief
part of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin,"
not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of
sin is naturally liable to arise from pride.
Reply to Objection 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning
of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being
the first part of pride. For it has been said above [3618](A[5]) that
pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in
consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be
the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that
which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore
as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to
which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7,
"Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof," says that "by
heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief," and the Apostle
says (1 Tim. 1:19) that "some rejecting a good conscience have made
shipwreck concerning the faith."
Reply to Objection 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins
because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence
pride is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to
pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed
through ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is
pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. And
as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the
withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, "I shall be cleansed from
the greatest sin," says: "Namely from the sin of pride, which is the
last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw
from God."
Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned
fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man
thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be
daring or brave.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital
vice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst.
Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.
Objection 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since
both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice.
Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "pride
begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion." Now envy is
reckoned a capital vice, as stated above ([3619]Q[36], A[4]). Much more
therefore is pride a capital vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride among
the capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3620]AA[2],5, ad 1) pride may be
considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin;
secondly, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the
capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds
of sin arise. Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of a
special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But
Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all
vices, as explained above (A[2], OBJ[3]), did not place it among the
capital vices, but held it to be the "queen and mother of all the
vices." Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "Pride, the queen of vices,
when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it
into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they
may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds."
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the
cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while
vainglory covets the outward show of excellence.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice,
arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but
that it is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his
sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin?
(2) What the first man coveted by sinning?
(3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?
(4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride was the first man's first sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man's first
sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the disobedience of one
man many were made sinners." Now the first man's first sin is the one
by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin.
Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Lk. 4:3, "And the
devil said to Him," that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same
order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to
gluttony, as appears from Mat. 4:3, where it was said to Him: "If thou
be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread." Therefore
the first man's first sin was not pride but gluttony.
Objection 3: Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the
devil in tempting man promised him knowledge (Gn. 3:5). Therefore
inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which
pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the
first sin.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 1
Tim. 2:14, "The woman being seduced was in the transgression," says:
"The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to
accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to
touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they would be
like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead .
. ." Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing. Therefore
man's first sin was unbelief and not pride.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin." Now man's first sin is the beginning of all sin, according
to Rom. 5:12, "By one man sin entered into this world." Therefore man's
first sin was pride.
I answer that, Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the
character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first
found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement
of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not
forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, among the
inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being
moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and
consequently man's first sin was where it was possible for his appetite
to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the
state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of the flesh against
the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness
in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to
which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason.
It remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human
appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good.
Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according
to his measure as established by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that
man's first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his
measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's
first sin was pride.
Reply to Objection 1: Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not
willed by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one
presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he
willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he
coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his
disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the
statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4]) that
"man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and scorned
God's commands."
Reply to Objection 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first
parents. For it is written (Gn. 3:6): "The woman saw that the tree was
good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she
took of the fruit thereof, and did eat." Yet the very goodness and
beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the
persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Gn. 3:5): "Your eyes shall
be opened and you shall be as Gods": and it was by coveting this that
the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the
sin of pride.
Reply to Objection 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first
parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent
began by saying: "You shall be as Gods," and added: "Knowing good and
evil."
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30),
"the woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were
debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already
filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud
self-presumption." This does not mean that pride preceded the
promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken
his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that
she believed the demon to have spoken truly.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the first man's pride consisted in his coveting God's likeness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist
in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that
which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness
is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gn.
1:26): "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Therefore he did
not sin by coveting God's likeness.
Objection 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in
order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the
serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil." Now
the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of
the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: "All men
naturally desire knowledge." Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's
likeness.
Objection 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first
man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, "He filled them
with the knowledge of understanding." Since then every sin consists in
a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the
first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is
impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Ex.
15:11, "Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?" Therefore the
first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps. 68],
"Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away," says:
"Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness."
I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute
equality [*Cf. [3621]FP, Q[93], A[1]]: and such a likeness to God our
first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not
conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.
The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a
creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates
somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike to God; like,
according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike,
according as an effect falls short of its cause." Now every good
existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good.
Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above
his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he
coveted God's likeness inordinately.
It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is
a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the rational
creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in
reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this
likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on
man---of whom it is written (Gn. 1:26) that God made man "to His image
and likeness"---and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezech. 28:12):
"Thou wast the seal of resemblance." Secondly, as to knowledge: and
this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore
immediately after the words just quoted, "Thou wast the seal of
resemblance," we read: "Full of wisdom." But the first man, at his
creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in
potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power of operation: and neither angel
nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his
creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby
to obtain happiness.
Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted
God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a
likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God's
likeness as regards "knowledge of good and evil," according to the
serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might
decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he
should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him.
Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards his own
power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act
so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30)
that "the woman's mind was filled with love of her own power." On the
other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's likeness, as regards
power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that "he wished to
enjoy his own power rather than God's." Nevertheless both coveted
somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on
himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature:
and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to
knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that
is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on
Ps. 70:18, "O God, who is like Thee?" says: "He who desires to be of
himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus
did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who
refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command."
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more
grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15):
"Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid
sin." Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because
they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of
our first parents was more grievous than other sins.
Objection 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin
of our first parents was most severely punished, since by it "death
entered into this world," as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12). Therefore
that sin was more grievous than other sins.
Objection 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the
greatest (Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first
parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.
On the contrary, Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: "I think that a man
who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall
suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little." Now
our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade.
Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.
I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. one
results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery is
a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results
from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity is
more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to
be grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other.
Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin was not graver than
all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though
pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet
the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the
pride whereby one covets God's likeness inordinately, such as the pride
of our first parents, as stated [3622](A[2]).
But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that
sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We must
accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not
simply.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as
resulting from the person of the sinner.
Reply to Objection 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that
first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its
species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed
the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence
brought disorder upon the whole human nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first
must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one
follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the
first sin is the greatest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's?
Objection 1: It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than
Eve's. For it is written (1 Tim. 2:14): "Adam was not seduced, but the
woman being seduced was in the transgression": and so it would seem
that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through assured
knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to Lk. 12:47,48,
"That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not according
to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not,
and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes."
Therefore Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [*Serm. ix;
xcvi de Temp.]): "If the man is the head, he should live better, and
give an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him."
Now he who ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a
sin. Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.
Objection 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be
the most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Ghost,
because while sinning he relied on God's mercy [*Cf.[3623] Q[21], A[2],
OBJ[3]. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter Lombard
quoted there], and this pertains to the sin of presumption. Therefore
it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.
On the contrary, Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was
more grievously punished than the man, as appears from Gn. 3. Therefore
she sinned more grievously than the man.
I answer that, As stated [3624](A[3]), the gravity of a sin depends on
the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we
must assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these
persons, the man's sin is the more grievous, because he was more
perfect than the woman.
As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered
to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xi, 35): "Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex, though
parity of pride."
But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more grievously,
for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up than the man.
For the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive words, namely that
God had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like
to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God's likeness by eating of the
forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain
something against God's will. On the other hand, the man did not
believe this to be true; wherefore he did not wish to attain to God's
likeness against God's will: but his pride consisted in wishing to
attain thereto by his own power. Secondly, the woman not only herself
sinned, but suggested sin to the man; wherefore she sinned against both
God and her neighbor. Thirdly, the man's sin was diminished by the fact
that, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), "he consented to the sin
out of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man
sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That
he ought not to have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine
sentence."
It is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than the
man's.
Reply to Objection 1: The woman was deceived because she was first of
all puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but
aggravated her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed
up with still greater pride.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the circumstance of
personal condition, on account of which the man's sin was more grievous
than the woman's.
Reply to Objection 3: The man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach
to contempt of God's justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy
Ghost, but as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv, 11]),
it was due to the fact that, "having had no experience of God's
severity, he thought the sin to be venial," i.e. easily forgiven [*Cf.
[3625]FS, Q[89], A[3], ad 1].
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OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this
head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common
punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.
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Whether death is the punishment of our first parents' sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that death is not the punishment of our
first parents' sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called a
punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates it.
Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the fact
that his body is composed of contraries, and because "mortal" is
included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a punishment
of our first parents' sin.
Objection 2: Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly
found in man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles. 3:19,
"The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both
equal." But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin. Therefore
neither is it so in men.
Objection 3: Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of
particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human nature.
Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our first
parents' sin.
Objection 4: Further, all are equally descended from our first parents.
Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents' sin, it
would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But this
is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more painfully, than
others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.
Objection 5: Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated
above ([3626]FP, Q[48], A[6]; [3627]FP, Q[49], A[2]). But death,
apparently, is not from God: for it is written (Wis. 1:13): "God made
not death." Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.
Objection 6: Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since
merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death is
sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death. Therefore it
would seem that death is not a punishment.
Objection 7: Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death
apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he is
dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is
not a punishment of sin.
Objection 8: Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have
followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents
lived a long time after their sin (Gn. 5:5). Therefore, seemingly,
death is not a punishment of sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered
into this world, and by sin death."
I answer that, If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of a
favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment of
that fault. Now as we stated in the [3628]FP, Q[95], A[1]; [3629]FP,
Q[97], A[1], God bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state,
that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his
soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul.
But inasmuch as through sin man's mind withdrew from subjection to God,
the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject to his
reason, whence there followed so great a rebellion of the carnal
appetite against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject to the
soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life and
soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul, as the
perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the other
hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to the lack
of the body's subjection to the soul.
It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite
against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents' sin, so also
are death and all defects of the body.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from
the principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are
form and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of
itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part of
his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of
contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and in
this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached to
the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, since it
was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch, and
consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was impossible,
were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher states (De Anima
ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not attached to the
adaptability of matter to form because, if it were possible, since the
form is incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In
the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable to its form
and action, so that its hardness may make it fit for cutting. But that
it be liable to rust is a necessary result of such a matter and is not
according to the agent's choice; for, if the craftsman were able, of
the iron he would make a saw that would not rust. Now God Who is the
author of man is all-powerful, wherefore when He first made man, He
conferred on him the favor of being exempt from the necessity resulting
from such a matter: which favor, however, was withdrawn through the sin
of our first parents. Accordingly death is both natural on account of a
condition attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the
Divine favor preserving man from death [*Cf. [3630]FS, Q[85], A[6]].
Reply to Objection 2: This likeness of man to other animals regards a
condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of
contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man's soul is
immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.
Reply to Objection 3: Our first parents were made by God not only as
particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human
nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the
Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their sin the
entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their posterity,
incurred death.
Reply to Objection 4: A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way
of a punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal
in those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that
which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that one
who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed, should
fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to the sin,
nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot foresee
chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the first
sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the withdrawal of
the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of human nature
was maintained. But the defects resulting from this withdrawal are
death and other penalties of the present life. Wherefore these
punishments need not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally
appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all future events, Divine
providence has so disposed that these penalties are apportioned in
different ways to various people. This is not on account of any merits
or demerits previous to this life, as Origen held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]:
for this is contrary to the words of Rom. 9:11, "When they . . . had
not done any good or evil"; and also contrary to statements made in the
[3631]FP, Q[90], A[4]; [3632]FP, Q[118], A[3], namely that the soul is
not created before the body: but either in punishment of their parents'
sins, inasmuch as the child is something belonging to the father,
wherefore parents are often punished in their children; or again it is
for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare of the person who
suffers these penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned away from
his sins, or lest he take pride in his virtues, and that he may be
crowned for his patience.
Reply to Objection 5: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an
evil of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect
befalling man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good,
namely as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore
Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death,
except in so far as it is a punishment.
Reply to Objection 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), "just as
the wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the
righteous make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence
it is that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is
good, while good men die well, although death is an evil." Wherefore
inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them
meritorious.
Reply to Objection 7: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as
the privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the
privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of sense
but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting the
corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak of
corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as being the
term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which life
departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has no
pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including the
previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in motion
towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, while in
motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death may
be painful.
Reply to Objection 8: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. [*De Pecc.
Mer. et Rem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32]), "although our first
parents lived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when
they heard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably
appointed in Scripture?
Objection 1: It would seem that the particular punishments of our first
parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which would
have occurred even without sin should not be described as a punishment
for sin. Now seemingly there would have been "pain in child-bearing,"
even had there been no sin: for the disposition of the female sex is
such that offspring cannot be born without pain to the bearer. Likewise
the "subjection of woman to man" results from the perfection of the
male, and the imperfection of the female sex. Again it belongs to the
nature of the earth "to bring forth thorns and thistles," and this
would have occurred even had there been no sin. Therefore these are
unsuitable punishments of the first sin.
Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to a person's dignity does
not, seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the "multiplying of
conceptions" pertains to a woman's dignity. Therefore it should not be
described as the woman's punishment.
Objection 3: Further, the punishment of our first parents' sin is
transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death
[3633](A[1]). But all "women's conceptions" are not "multiplied," nor
does "every man eat bread in the sweat of his face." Therefore these
are not suitable punishments of the first sin.
Objection 4: Further, the place of paradise was made for man. Now
nothing in the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore it
would seem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable
punishment of man.
Objection 5: Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said to be
naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other obstacles
in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the cherubim, and the
"flaming sword turning every way."
Objection 6: Further, immediately after his sin man was subject to the
necessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality by
the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid him to
eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words of Gn. 3:22: "See,
lest perhaps he . . . take . . . of the tree of life . . . and live for
ever."
Objection 7: Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy
and clemency, which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture,
according to Ps. 144:9, "His tender mercies are over all His works."
Therefore God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents,
already reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of Gn.
3:22, "Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil."
Objection 8: Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food,
according to 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered,
with these we are content." Therefore just as food was appointed to our
first parents before their sin, so also should clothing have been
ascribed to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable to say
that God made for them garments of skin.
Objection 9: Further, the punishment inflicted for a sin should
outweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin: else the punishment
would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our first parents
gained in this, that their eyes were opened, according to Gn. 3:7. But
this outweighs in good all the penal evils which are stated to have
resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting from our first
parents' sin are unsuitably described.
On the contrary, These punishments were appointed by God, Who does all
things, "in number, weight, and measure [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast ordered all
things in measure, and number, and weight.']" (Wis. 11:21).
I answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, on account of their
sin, our first parents were deprived of the Divine favor, whereby the
integrity of human nature was maintained in them, and by the withdrawal
of this favor human nature incurred penal defects. Hence they were
punished in two ways. In the first place by being deprived of that
which was befitting the state of integrity, namely the place of the
earthly paradise: and this is indicated (Gn. 3:23) where it is stated
that "God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure." And since he was
unable, of himself, to return to that state of original innocence, it
was fitting that obstacles should be placed against his recovering
those things that were befitting his original state, namely food (lest
he should take of the tree of life) and place; for "God placed before .
. . paradise . . . Cherubim, and a flaming sword." Secondly, they were
punished by having appointed to them things befitting a nature bereft
of the aforesaid favor: and this as regards both the body and the soul.
With regard to the body, to which pertains the distinction of sex, one
punishment was appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the
woman punishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of
which she is united to the man; and these are the begetting of
children, and community of works pertaining to family life. As regards
the begetting of children, she was punished in two ways: first in the
weariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after
conception, and this is indicated in the words (Gn. 3:16), "I will
multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions"; secondly, in the pain which
she suffers in giving birth, and this is indicated by the words (Gn.
3:16), "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth." As regards family life she
was punished by being subjected to her husband's authority, and this is
conveyed in the words (Gn. 3:16), "Thou shalt be under thy husband's
power."
Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in
matters relating to the family life, so it belongs to the husband to
provide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished
in three ways. First, by the barrenness of the earth, in the words (Gn.
3:17), "Cursed is the earth in thy work." Secondly, by the cares of his
toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the earth; hence the
words (Gn. 3:17), "With labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof all the
days of thy life." Thirdly, by the obstacles encountered by the tillers
of the soil, wherefore it is written (Gn. 3:18), "Thorns and thistles
shall it bring forth to thee."
Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the
soul. First, by reason of the confusion they experienced at the
rebellion of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written (Gn.
3:7): "The eyes of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived
themselves to be naked." Secondly, by the reproach for their sin,
indicated by the words (Gn. 3:22), "Behold Adam is become as one of
Us." Thirdly, by the reminder of their coming death, when it was said
to him (Gn. 3:19): "Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return." To
this also pertains that God made them garments of skin, as a sign of
their mortality.
Reply to Objection 1: In the state of innocence child-bearing would
have been painless: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Just as,
in giving birth, the mother would then be relieved not by groans of
pain, but by the instigations of maturity, so in bearing and conceiving
the union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire but of
deliberate action" [*Cf. [3634]FP, Q[98], A[2]].
The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as
inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship (since
even before sin the man was the "head" and governor "of the woman"),
but as to her having now to obey her husband's will even against her
own.
If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and
thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish man, because
their growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the
soil, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 18). Alcuin [*Interrog. et
Resp. in Gen. lxxix], however, holds that, before sin, the earth
brought forth no thorns and thistles, whatever: but the former opinion
is the better.
Reply to Objection 2: The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed
as a punishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of
children, for this would have been the same even before sin, but on
account of the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject,
through carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly
stated: "I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions."
Reply to Objection 3: These punishments affect all somewhat. For any
woman who conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child
with pain: except the Blessed Virgin, who "conceived without
corruption, and bore without pain" [*St. Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf.
oct. Assum. B. V. M.], because her conceiving was not according to the
law of nature, transmitted from our first parents. And if a woman
neither conceives nor bears, she suffers from the defect of barrenness,
which outweighs the aforesaid punishments. Likewise whoever tills the
soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his brow: while those who
do not themselves work on the land, are busied with other labors, for
"man is born to labor" (Job 5:7): and thus they eat the bread for which
others have labored in the sweat of their brow.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the place of the earthly paradise avails
not man for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows
himself deprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the
things that have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed
in things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is
prepared for man by Christ.
Reply to Objection 5: Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual
interpretation, this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on
account of the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the
nighness of the sun. This is denoted by the "flaming sword," which is
described as "turning every way," as being appropriate to the circular
movement that causes this heat. And since the movements of corporal
creatures are set in order through the ministry of the angels,
according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4), it was fitting that, besides
the sword turning every way, there should be cherubim "to keep the way
of the tree of life." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 40): "It
is to be believed that even in the visible paradise this was done by
heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery guard set there by
the ministry of angels."
Reply to Objection 6: After sin, if man had ate of the tree of life, he
would not thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that
beneficial food he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words
"And live for ever," "for ever" signifies "for a long time." For it was
not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this life.
Reply to Objection 7: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 39),
"these words of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a
deterrent to others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest
they be proud likewise, because Adam not only failed to become that
which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he was made."
Reply to Objection 8: Clothing is necessary to man in his present state
of unhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in
respect of external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold.
Secondly, to hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those members
wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most manifest.
Now these two motives do not apply to the primitive state. because then
man's body could not be hurt by any outward thing, as stated in the
[3635]FP, Q[97], A[2], nor was there in man's body anything shameful
that would bring confusion on him. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23): "And
they were both naked, to wit Adam and his wife, and were not ashamed."
The same cannot be said of food, which is necessary to entertain the
natural heat, and to sustain the body.
Reply to Objection 9: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 31), "We must
not imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed,
especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was
fair, and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so that
they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their minds
before, this was a mutual concupiscence such as they had not hitherto."
__________________________________________________________________
OF OUR FIRST PARENTS' TEMPTATION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider our first parents' temptation, concerning which
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?
(2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.
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Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be
tempted by the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to the
angels' sin and to man's, according to Mat. 25:41, "Go [Vulg.: 'Depart
from Me'] you cursed into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the
devil and his angels." Now the angels' first sin did not follow a
temptation from without. Therefore neither should man's first sin have
resulted from an outward temptation.
Objection 2: Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through
the demon's temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew full
well that it was not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it
would seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to savor of punishment that anyone
should have an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation of an
assault is akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault.
Therefore it was unfitting for man to be tempted before he sinned.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 34:11): "He that hath not been
tempted [Douay: 'tried'], what manner of things doth he know?"
I answer that, God's wisdom "orders all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1),
inasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is befitting
it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "it
belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain, nature." Now it
is a condition attaching to human nature that one creature can be
helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it was fitting that God should
both allow man in the state of innocence to be tempted by evil angels,
and should cause him to be helped by good angels. And by a special
favor of grace, it was granted him that no creature outside himself
could harm him against his own will, whereby he was able even to resist
the temptation of the demon.
Reply to Objection 1: Above the human nature there is another that
admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above
the angelic nature. Now only one that is already become evil through
sin can tempt by leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting that
by an evil angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according to the
order of nature he is moved forward to perfection by means of a good
angel. An angel could be perfected in good by something above him,
namely by God, but he could not thus be led into sin, because according
to James 1:13, "God is not a tempter of evils."
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God knew that man, through being tempted,
would fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his free
will, to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man's
nature required that he should be left to his own will, according to
Ecclus. 15:14, "God left" man "in the hand of his own counsel." Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 4): "It seems to me that man would
have had no prospect of any special praise, if he were able to lead a
good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an evil
life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his power he had
the will, not to consent to the persuader."
Reply to Objection 3: An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist
it: but, in the state of innocence, man was able, without any
difficulty, to resist temptation. Consequently the tempter's assault
was not a punishment to man.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting?
Objection 1: It would seem that the manner and order of the first
temptation was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the
angel was above man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came upon
man through an angel: therefore in like manner it should have come upon
the woman through the man; in other words the woman should have been
tempted by the man, and not the other way about.
Objection 2: Further, the temptation of our first parents was by
suggestion. Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without
making use of an outward sensible creature. Since then our first
parents were endowed with a spiritual mind, and adhered less to
sensible than to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting
for man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead of an outward,
temptation.
Objection 3: Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except
through some apparent good. But many other animals have a greater
appearance of good than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly
tempted by the devil through a serpent.
Objection 4: Further, the serpent is an irrational animal. Now wisdom,
speech, and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal.
Therefore the serpent is unfittingly described (Gn. 3:1) as "more
subtle than any of the beasts of the earth," or as "the most prudent of
all beasts" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: and
likewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to have
been punished by God.
On the contrary, That which is first in any genus should be
proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind of
sin we find the same order as in the first temptation. For, according
to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12), it begins with the concupiscence of
sin in the sensuality, signified by the serpent; extends to the lower
reason, by pleasure, signified by the woman; and reaches to the higher
reason by consent in the sin, signified by the man. Therefore the order
of the first temptation was fitting.
I answer that, Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective and
sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a twofold
incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by promising the
Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge which man
naturally desires to have; the other on the part of sense. This he did
by having recourse to those sensible things, which are most akin to
man, partly by tempting the man through the woman who was akin to him
in the same species; partly by tempting the woman through the serpent,
who was akin to them in the same genus; partly by suggesting to them to
eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin to them in the proximate
genus.
Reply to Objection 1: In the act of tempting the devil was by way of
principal agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of
temptation in bringing about the downfall of the man, both because the
woman was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable to be
deceived, and because, on account of her union with man, the devil was
able to deceive the man especially through her. Now there is no parity
between principal agent and instrument, because the principal agent
must exceed in power, which is not requisite in the instrumental agent.
Reply to Objection 2: A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something
to man spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than
outward suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least, man's
imagination is changed by the devil [*Cf. [3636]FP, Q[91], A[3]];
whereas by an outward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on an
outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power against man
before sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt him by inward suggestion,
but only by outward suggestion.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 3), "we
are not to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of
temptation; but as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could
only do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose."
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29),
"the serpent is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the
cunning of the devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of a
prudent or cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a prudent or
cunning man in advising something prudently or cunningly. Nor indeed
(Gen. ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent understand the sounds which were
conveyed through it to the woman; nor again are we to believe that its
soul was changed into a rational nature, since not even men, who are
rational by nature, know what they say when a demon speaks in them.
Accordingly (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29) the serpent spoke to man, even as the
ass on which Balaam sat spoke to him, except that the former was the
work of a devil, whereas the latter was the work of an angel. Hence
(Gen. ad lit. xi, 36) the serpent was not asked why it had done this,
because it had not done this in its own nature, but the devil in it,
who was already condemned to everlasting fire on account of his sin:
and the words addressed to the serpent were directed to him who wrought
through the serpent."
Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. contra Manich. ii,
17,18), "his, that is, the devil's, punishment mentioned here is that
for which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is
reserved till the last judgment. For when it was said to him: 'Thou art
cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth,' the cattle are set
above him, not in power, but in the preservation of their nature, since
the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had it, but
they continue to live in the nature which they received." It is also
said to him: "'Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,'" according
to another version [*The Septuagint] "Here the breast signifies pride,
because it is there that the impulse of the soul dominates, while the
belly denotes carnal desire, because this part of the body is softest
to the touch: and on these he creeps to those whom he wishes to
deceive." The words, "'Earth shalt thou eat all the days of thy life'
may be understood in two ways. Either 'Those shall belong to thee, whom
thou shalt deceive by earthly lust,' namely sinners who are signified
under the name of earth, or a third kind of temptation, namely
curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat earth is to look
into things deep and dark." The putting of enmities between him and the
woman "means that we cannot be tempted by the devil, except through
that part of the soul which bears or reflects the likeness of a woman.
The seed of the devil is the temptation to evil, the seed of the woman
is the fruit of good works, whereby the temptation to evil is resisted.
Wherefore the serpent lies in wait for the woman's heel, that if at any
time she fall away towards what is unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of
her: and she watches his head that she may shut him out at the very
outset of the evil temptation."
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OF STUDIOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity.
Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of studiousness?
(2) Whether it is a part of temperance?
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Whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of
studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies
study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every
matter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore seemingly
knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness.
Objection 2: Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now
curiosity, which is derived from "cura" [care], may also refer to
elegance of apparel and other such things, which regard the body;
wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 13:14): "Make not provision [curam]
for the flesh in its concupiscences."
Objection 3: Further it is written (Jer. 6:13): "From the least of them
even to the greatest, all study [Douay: 'are given to'] covetousness."
Now covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but rather about the
possession of wealth, as stated above ([3637]Q[118], A[2]). Therefore
studiousness, which is derived from "study," is not properly about
knowledge.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 27:11): "Study wisdom, my son,
and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him that
reproacheth." Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the same as
that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is properly about
"knowledge."
I answer that, Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of the
mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except by
knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind's application to knowledge
precedes its application to those things to which man is directed by
his knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and as
a result it regards any other things the working of which requires to
be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that matter
about which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned
about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch.
Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing can be done aright as regards other
matters, except in so far as is previously directed by the knowing
reason. Hence studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a
prior regard for knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's mind is drawn, on account of his
affections, towards the things for which he has an affection, according
to Mat. 6:21, "Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also." And
since man has special affection for those things which foster the
flesh, it follows that man's thoughts are concerned about things that
foster his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best sustain his
body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be about things pertaining
to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and
for this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things.
Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to
covetousness.
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Whether studiousness is a part of temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that studiousness is not a part of
temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his
studiousness. Now all virtuous persons without exception are called
studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the term
"studious" ({spoudaios}) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4,8,9). [*In the
same sense Aristotle says in Ethic. iii, 2, that "every vicious person
is ignorant of what he ought to do."] Therefore studiousness is a
general virtue, and not a part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, studiousness, as stated [3638](A[1]), pertains to
knowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues which
are in the appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to the
intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore
solicitude is an act of prudence as stated above (Q[47], A[9]).
Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.
Objection 3: Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal
virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not
resemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name from
being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the vice
that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from being the
application of the mind to something, so that it would seem to be
opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of study,
rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity.
wherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore says
(Etym. x) that "a studious man is one who is curious to study."
Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "We are forbidden
to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance bestows." Now
curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness. Therefore studiousness
is a part of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above ([3639]Q[141], AA[3],4,5), it belongs to
temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend
excessively to that which is desired naturally. Now just as in respect
of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures of food and
sex, so, in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to know
something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his
Metaphysics i, 1: "All men have a natural desire for knowledge."
The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness;
wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of
temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue.
Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the reason given above
([3640]Q[160], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the complement of all the moral
virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Consequently, in so far as the
knowledge of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term
"studiousness," which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the
virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the
appetitive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above
([3641]FS, Q[9], A[1]). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One
is connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains
to the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate
about each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the appetitive
power, and consists in man's appetite being directed aright in applying
the cognitive power in this or that way to this or that thing. And this
belongs to the virtue of seriousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among
the moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order
to be virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most
naturally inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us. chiefly
to fear dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude
is chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such
dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the
flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For on
the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things; and
so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire,
lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of his bodily
nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge.
Accordingly, as regards the first inclination studiousness is a kind of
restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of
temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its
praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of
things; and from this it takes its name. The former is more essential
to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly
regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the
trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is
regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an
obstacle.
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OF CURIOSITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge?
(2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?
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Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about intellective
knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), there
can be no mean and extremes in things which are essentially good. Now
intellective knowledge is essentially good: because man's perfection
would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced from potentiality
to act, and this is done by the knowledge of truth. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that "the good of the human soul is to be in accordance
with reason," whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. Therefore
the vice of curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he
receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge is
from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, "All wisdom is from the Lord God,"
and Wis. 7:17, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are,
to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the
elements," etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to God,
since "all things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13), and "the
Lord is a God of all knowledge" (1 Kings 2:3). Therefore however
abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the
desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be
about the intellective knowledge of truth.
Objection 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of
intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical
sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for
Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): "Those who refused to partake of the
king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had
considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful,
would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful": and
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philosophers
made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from
unjust possessors." Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge
cannot be sinful.
On the contrary, Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says: "Is
it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic
art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens,
walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?" Now vanity of
understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity
about intellective sciences may be sinful.
I answer that, As stated above ([3642]Q[166], A[2], ad 2) studiousness
is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study
in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the
knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit
of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly
speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some
result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, according
to 1 Cor. 8:1, "Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses the
knowledge of truth in order to sin.
On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of
truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to the
knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for
instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in
their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "Some there
are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the
majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they are
doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they
explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So great a
pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very
heavens about which they argue." In like manner, those who study to
learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful study,
according to the saying of Jer. 9:5, "They have taught their tongue to
speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity."
Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed
to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this in four
ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a
study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says
[*Epist. xxi ad Damas]: "We see priests forsaking the gospels and the
prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love songs of pastoral
idylls." Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it is
unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the
future through the demons. This is superstitious curiosity, of which
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): "Maybe, the philosophers were
debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity in seeking knowledge
from the demons."
Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without
referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God.
Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that "in studying creatures,
we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we should
ever mount towards immortal and abiding things."
Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of
his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error:
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:22): "Seek not the things that are
too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . .
and in many of His works be not curious," and further on (Ecclus.
3:26), "For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath
detained their minds in vanity."
Reply to Objection 1: Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth;
yet man's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth,
but in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. x, 7,8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of
certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not
directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth, wherein
supreme happiness consists.
Reply to Objection 2: Although this argument shows that the knowledge
of truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing
the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the
knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good should
be regulated in due manner.
Reply to Objection 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and
commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired
through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since,
however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the
faith, the Apostle says (Col. 2:8): "Beware lest any man cheat you by
philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . . and
not according to Christ": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of
certain philosophers that "they make an unholy use of divine things
against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy
the worship of God."
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Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about
sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense of
sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and taste.
Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not
curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the vice
of curiosity about things known by the sight.
Objection 2: Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games;
wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when "a fall occurred in
the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, and
overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes." But it does not seem to
be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on account of the
representation, wherein man takes a natural delight, as the Philosopher
states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity is not about the
knowledge of sensible objects.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire
into our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 1 Jn.
2:16]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of
others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, God "gave to every one of
them commandment concerning his neighbor." Therefore the vice of
curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular
sensible objects.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that "concupiscence
of the eyes makes men curious." Now according to Bede (Comment. in 1
Jn. 2:16) "concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of
magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and
dispraise of our neighbor's faults," and all these are particular
objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the eves is a sin,
even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are members
of the same division (1 Jn. 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity
is about the knowledge of sensible things.
I answer that, The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two
things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it is
directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this kind,
man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek those
things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the second
place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to intellective
knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly to employ
study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two
ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something
useful, but turns man away from some useful consideration. Hence
Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), "I go no more to see a dog coursing a
hare in the circus; but in the open country, if I happen to be passing,
that coursing haply will distract me from some weighty thought, and
draw me after it . . . and unless Thou, having made me see my weakness,
didst speedily admonish me, I become foolishly dull." Secondly, when
the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful, as
looking on a woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into
other people's actions is directed to detraction. on the other hand, if
one be ordinately intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason
of the necessity of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of
intelligible truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible
things is virtuous.
Reply to Objection 1: Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising
from the use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures
arising from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According
to Augustine (Confess. x, 35) "it is called concupiscence of the eyes"
because "the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge,
so that all sensible things are said to be seen," and as he says
further on: "By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein
pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for
pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory, soft;
but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of these,
not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of
experiment and knowledge."
Reply to Objection 2: Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a
man prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees
represented. Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such
sights make men adulterers and shameless.
Reply to Objection 3: One may watch other people's actions or inquire
into them, with a good intent, either for one's own good---that is in
order to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our
neighbor---or for our neighbor's good---that is in order to correct
him, if he do anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the
duty of one's position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. 10:24,
"Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works." But
to observe our neighbor's faults with the intention of looking down
upon them, or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose than
that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov. 24:15),
"Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just,
nor spoil his rest."
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OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements of
the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of
the body that are done seriously?
(2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions?
(3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play;
(4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.
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Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that no virtue regards the outward movements
of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty of the
soul, according to Ps. 44:14, "All the glory of the king's daughter is
within," and a gloss adds, "namely, in the conscience." Now the
movements of the body are not within, but without. Therefore there can
be no virtue about them.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtues are not in us by nature," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are in
man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some slow
of movement, and the same applies to other differences of outward
movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of this kind.
Objection 3: Further, every moral virtue is either about actions
directed to another person, as justice, or about passions, as
temperance and fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed
to another person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is
connected with them.
Objection 4: Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue,
as stated above ([3643]Q[166], A[1], OBJ[1]; A[2], ad 1). Now it is
censurable to apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements:
for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "A becoming gait is one that
reflects the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the
foot-print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor
affectation, but natural and artless movement." Therefore seemingly
there is no virtue about the style of outward movements.
On the contrary, The beauty of honesty [*Cf.[3644] Q[145], A[1]]
pertains to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the
beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "The sound of
the voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether
they be unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be
our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of
honesty." Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward
movement.
I answer that, Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man
being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward
movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are
set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that there
is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements.
Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold
standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly,
in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or
place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Beauty of conduct
consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex
and person," and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds:
"This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish
becoming to every action."
Hence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these outward
movements: namely "taste" [ornatus] which regards what is becoming to
the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of what is
becoming in movement and behavior; and "methodicalness" [bona
ordinatio] which regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and
to one's surroundings, wherefore he calls it "the practical knowledge
of separation," i.e. of the distinction of "acts."
Reply to Objection 1: Outward movements are signs of the inward
disposition, according to Ecclus. 19:27, "The attire of the body, and
the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is";
and Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "the habit of mind is seen in
the gesture of the body," and that "the body's movement is an index of
the soul."
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is from natural disposition that a
man is inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless
what is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason.
Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let nature guide the movement:
and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the
defect."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 1) outward movements are
indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the
passions of the soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that
"from these things," i.e. the outward movements, "the man that lies
hidden in our hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful,
or impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from
blemish." It is moreover from our outward movements that other men form
their judgment about us, according to Ecclus. 19:26, "A man is known by
his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his
countenance." Hence moderation of outward movements is directed
somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in his
Rule (Ep. ccxi), "In all your movements, let nothing be done to offend
the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the holiness of
your state." Wherefore the moderation of outward movements may be
reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher mentions in Ethic. iv,
6,7. For, in so far as by outward movements we are directed to other
persons, the moderation of our outward movements belongs to
"friendliness or affability" [*Cf.[3645] Q[114], A[1]]. This regards
pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference to
others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so far as outward
movements are signs of our inward disposition, their moderation belongs
to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q[9]], whereby a man, by word and
deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.
Reply to Objection 4: It is censurable to study the style of one's
outward movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they
do not agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves
one to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may
be corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let them be
without artifice, but not without correction."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there can be a virtue about games?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games.
For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to you who
laugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not only
excessive, games should be avoided." Now that which can be done
virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a
virtue about games.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without
us," as stated above ([3646]FS, Q[55], A[4]). Now Chrysostom says
[*Hom. vi in Matth.]: "It is not God, but the devil, that is the author
of fun. Listen to what happened to those who played: 'The people sat
down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.'" Therefore there can
be no virtue about games.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that "playful
actions are not directed to something else." But it is a requisite of
virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his action to
something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore
there can be no virtue about games.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray thee, spare
thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high
pressure of his attention to work." Now this relaxation of the mind
from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a
wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times.
Moreover the Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8] assigns to games the
virtue of {eutrapelia}, which we may call "pleasantness."
I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's
refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is
finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it with
his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of
work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work,
he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when the soul
works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the intellective soul
employs forces that operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods
are connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul arises above
sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there
results in consequence a certain weariness of soul, whether the
operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of
the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater if the soul be
occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby it is raised
higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain outward works of
the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. In either case,
however, one man is more soul-wearied than another, according as he is
more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as weariness of
the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul
must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul's rest is
pleasure, as stated above ([3647]FS, Q[25], A[2]; [3648]FS, Q[31],
A[1], ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs
consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening the tension
of the reason's study. Thus in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21,
it is related of Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people
were scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples, he
is said to have told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow.
And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether
he could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued
doing it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the
inference that in like manner man's mind would break if its tension
were never relaxed.
Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the
soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is necessary
at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the
soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of
rest that is associated with games": and consequently it is sometimes
necessary to make use of such things.
Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points
which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the
pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious
deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one kind
of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another thing
to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind
altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware
lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony
which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i, 29),
that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in
their games, but only that which is consistent with good behavior, so
our very fun should reflect something of an upright mind." Thirdly, we
must be careful, as in all other human actions, to conform ourselves to
persons, time, and place, and take due account of other circumstances,
so that our fun "befit the hour and the man," as Tully says (De Offic.
i, 29).
Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a
habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there can
be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness
({eutrapelia}), and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy
turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn:
and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is
comprised under modesty. [*{Eutrapelia} is derived from {trepein} = 'to
turn'].
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, fun should fit with business and
persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that "when the
audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something
novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the
gravity of the subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with
things of the greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, "Hear, for I
will speak of great things." Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether
exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he
begins by saying: "Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant,
nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since
how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy
Writ?"
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the
inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of
games their end; of whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): "They have
accounted our life a pastime." Against these Tully says (De Offic. i,
29): "We are so begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for
play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater
gravity and moment."
Reply to Objection 3: Playful actions themselves considered in their
species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such
actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and
accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use
of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to
make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to
sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty by
grave and serious matters."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there can be sin in the excess of play?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of
play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful. Now
play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be grave
sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they be done in fun, are
either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there is
no sin in excessive play.
Objection 2: Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven
capital vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play
does not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would
seem not to be a sin.
Objection 3: Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in
play, since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if
excess of play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin;
moreover all those who employ them, as well as those who make them any
payment, would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem
untrue; for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii.
63) that is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain
jester would be with him in the life to come.
On the contrary, A gloss on Prov. 14:13, "Laughter shall be mingled
with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy," remarks: "A
mourning that will last for ever." Now there is inordinate laughter and
inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin
therein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.
I answer that, In all things dirigible according to reason, the
excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which
falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated [3649](A[2])
that playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to
reason. Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of
reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very
species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of
jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be
"discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene," when to wit a man,
for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such as
are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins.
And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.
Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due
circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue times
or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This
may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to
play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love
of God, so as to be willing to disobey a commandment of God or of the
Church rather than forego, such like amusements. Sometimes, however, it
is a venial sin, for instance where a man is not so attached to
amusement as to be willing for its sake to do anything in disobedience
to God.
Reply to Objection 1: Certain things are sinful on account of the
intention alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such
an intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of
which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from sin,
or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to their
species, such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is no
excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene.
Reply to Objection 2: Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is
written (Ex. 32:6): "The people sat down to eat and drink, and they
rose up to play."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated [3650](A[2]), play is necessary for the
intercourse of human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse
may have a lawful employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation
of play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is
not unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that
their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or
deeds in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into undue
matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have no other
occupation in reference to other men, nevertheless in reference to
themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both serious and
virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation of their own passions and
operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor. Wherefore those
who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act justly, by rewarding
them for their services. on the other hand, if a man spends too much on
such persons, or maintains those comedians who practice unlawful mirth,
he sins as encouraging them in their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract.
c. in Joan.) that "to give one's property to comedians is a great sin,
not a virtue"; unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme need,
in which case one would have to assist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic.
[*Quoted in Canon Pasce, dist. 86]): "Feed him that dies of hunger; for
whenever thou canst save a man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed
him, thou hast slain him."
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Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For
no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a
penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: "Let him
refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to obtain
the grace of a full pardon." Therefore there is no sin in lack of
mirth.
Objection 2: Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy
men. But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth; for
it is written (Jer. 15:17): "I sat not in the assembly of jesters," and
(Tobias 3:17): "Never have I joined myself with them that play; neither
have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness."
Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.
Objection 3: Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the
virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives nor
receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack
of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the lack
of mirth to be a vice.
I answer that, In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin.
Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by
offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment.
Wherefore Seneca [*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De
Continentia] says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): "Let your
conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude, or
despise you as a cad." Now a man who is without mirth, not only is
lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he
is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are vicious,
and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
iv, 8).
Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and pleasures
it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are not in
quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as stated in
Ethic. x, 6, it follows that "lack of mirth is less sinful than excess
thereof." Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): "We should make
few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but little sweetness
suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for our meat."
Reply to Objection 1: Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is
called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in
default, because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in
accordance with reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the
times, the state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he
adds: "I sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats." The
words of Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from
his adding: "Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in
lightness."
Reply to Objection 3: Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all
pleasures, but only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it
would seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
6) calls "friendliness," or {eutrapelia}, otherwise wittiness.
Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement
with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.
__________________________________________________________________
OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel, and
under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward
apparel?
(2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in
connection with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not belong
to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different times and
places. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12) that "among
the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a cloak with
sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is scandalous for
anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without them." Now
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us a natural
aptitude for the virtues. Therefore there is no virtue or vice about
such things.
Objection 2: Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with
outward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess in
outward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of
the altar use most precious vestments in the sacred ministry. Likewise
it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it is said in
praise of certain people (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered about in
sheepskins and in goatskins." Therefore it seems that there cannot be
virtue and vice in this matter.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or
intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with matter
of this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge of
truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected therewith, since
that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues
enumerated by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it.
Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection
with this kind of attire.
On the contrary, Honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] pertains to virtue. Now a
certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says
(De Offic. i, 19): "The body should be bedecked naturally and without
affectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than nicety, not
with costly and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that
nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing be added to
increase its beauty." Therefore there can be virtue and vice in the
outward attire.
I answer that, It is not in the outward things themselves which man
uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them
immoderately. This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in
comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore
Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "Those offenses which are contrary to
the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs
generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by
custom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the lawless
pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part, which
harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive." Secondly, the lack of
moderation in the use of these things may arise from the inordinate
attachment of the user, the result being that a man sometimes takes too
much pleasure in using them, either in accordance with the custom of
those among whom he dwells or contrary to such custom. Hence Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "We must avoid excessive pleasure in
the use of things, for it leads not only wickedly to abuse the customs
of those among whom we dwell, but frequently to exceed their bounds, so
that, whereas it lay hidden, while under the restraint of established
morality, it displays its deformity in a most lawless outbreak."
In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways.
First when a man seeks glory from excessive attention to dress; in so
far as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence Gregory
says (Hom. xl in Ev.): "There are some who think that attention to
finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were no fault, the
word of God would not say so expressly that the rich man who was
tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine linen. No one,
forsooth, seeks costly apparel" (such, namely, as exceeds his estate)
"save for vainglory." Secondly, when a man seeks sensuous pleasure from
excessive attention to dress, in so far as dress is directed to the
body's comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too solicitous [*Cf.[3651]
Q[55], A[6]] in his attention to outward apparel.
Accordingly Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons three virtues in
connection with outward attire; namely "humility," which excludes the
seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is "the habit of
avoiding excessive expenditure and parade"; "contentment" [*Cf. Q[143],
OBJ[4]], which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure, wherefore he
says that "contentedness is the habit that makes a man satisfied with
what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is becoming in his
manner of life" (according to the saying of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:8):
"Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these let us be
content;"---and "simplicity," which excludes excessive solicitude about
such things, wherefore he says that "simplicity is a habit that makes a
man contented with what he has."
In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two
ways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite study or
trouble to the use of outward apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is a mark of effeminacy to let one's cloak
trail on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up." Secondly,
by seeking glory from the very lack of attention to outward attire.
Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "not only the
glare and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the weeds of
mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as
being a decoy under the guise of God's service"; and the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "both excess and inordinate defect are a
subject of ostentation."
Reply to Objection 1: Although outward attire does not come from
nature, it belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are
naturally inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates
outward raiment.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or
again the ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel
than others, not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the
excellence of their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this is
not sinful in them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12):
"Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to exceed the bounds
observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either signifies
something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he uses these
things for sensual pleasure or ostentation."
Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is not
always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people. For, if this be
done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself above
others, it is a sin of superstition; whereas, if this be done to tame
the flesh, or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue of
temperance. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "Whoever
uses transitory things with greater restraint than is customary with
those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or superstitious."
Especially, however, is the use of coarse raiment befitting to those
who by word and example urge others to repentance, as did the prophets
of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. Wherefore a
gloss on Mat. 3:4, says: "He who preaches penance, wears the garb of
penance."
Reply to Objection 3: This outward apparel is an indication of man's
estate; wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable
to the virtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7)
assigns to deeds and words, which are indications of something
connected with man's estate.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid of
mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine law is
a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a precept of
the Divine law; for it is written (1 Pet. 3:3): "Whose," namely
women's, "adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the hair, or
the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel." Wherefore a gloss
of Cyprian says: "Those who are clothed in silk and purple cannot
sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with gold and pearls
and trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind and body." Now this
is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women
cannot be devoid of mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): "I hold that not
only virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without
exception, should be admonished that nowise should they deface God's
work and fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of yellow
pigments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that alters
the natural features." And afterwards he adds: "They lay hands on God,
when they strive to reform what He has formed. This is an assault on
the Divine handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou shalt not be able
to see God, having no longer the eyes that God made, but those the
devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on whose account thou art
bedecked." But this is not due except to mortal sin. Therefore the
adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear
man's clothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself
inordinately. Now the former is a sin, for it is written (Dt. 22:5): "A
woman shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use
woman's apparel." Therefore it seems that also the excessive adornment
of women is a mortal sin.
Objection 4: On the contrary, If this were true it would seem that the
makers of these means of adornment sin mortally.
I answer that, As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in mind
the general statements made above [3652](A[1]) concerning outward
apparel, and also something special, namely that a woman's apparel may
incite men to lust, according to Prov. 7:10, "Behold a woman meeteth
him in harlot's attire, prepared to deceive souls."
Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest through
despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written (1 Cor. 7:34)
that the woman "that is married thinketh on the things of the world,
how she may please her husband." Wherefore if a married woman adorn
herself in order to please her husband she can do this without sin.
But those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are in
a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot without sin desire
to give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because this is to
incite them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves with this
intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; whereas if
they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for the sake of ostentation,
it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the same applies to
men in this respect. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "I do
not wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing of gold or costly
attire except in the case of those who being neither married nor
wishful to marry, should think how they may please God: whereas the
others think on the things of the world, either husbands how they may
please their wives, or wives how they may please their husbands, except
that it is unbecoming for women though married to uncover their hair,
since the Apostle commands them to cover the head." Yet in this case
some might be excused from sin, when they do this not through vanity
but on account of some contrary custom: although such a custom is not
to be commended.
Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss says on this passage, "The wives of
those who were in distress despised their husbands, and decked
themselves that they might please other men": and the Apostle forbids
this. Cyprian is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid
married women to adorn themselves in order to please their husbands,
lest the latter be afforded an occasion of sin with other women. Hence
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in ornate [Douay: 'decent']
apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with
plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire": whence we are
given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves
soberly and moderately but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and
immodestly.
Reply to Objection 2: Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves:
this is a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin.
Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "To dye oneself with
paints in order to have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying
counterfeit. I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be
deceived by it, by whom alone" (i.e. the husbands) "are they to be
permitted, but not ordered, to adorn themselves." However, such
painting does not always involve a mortal sin, but only when it is done
for the sake of sensuous pleasure or in contempt of God, and it is to
like cases that Cyprian refers.
It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a
beauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement arising from
some cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since
according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23), "such as we think to be the
less honorable members of the body, about these we put more abundant
honor."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the foregoing Article, outward
apparel should be consistent with the estate of the person, according
to the general custom. Hence it is in itself sinful for a woman to wear
man's clothes, or vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of
sensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Dt. 22)
because the Gentiles used to practice this change of attire for the
purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this may be done
sometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order to
hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of other clothes, or for
some similar motive.
Reply to Objection 4: In the case of an art directed to the production
of goods which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen
sin in making such things, as directly affording others an occasion of
sin; for instance, if a man were to make idols or anything pertaining
to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the products of which
may be employed by man either for a good or for an evil use, such as
swords, arrows, and the like, the practice of such an art is not
sinful. These alone should be called arts; wherefore Chrysostom says
[*Hom. xlix super Matth.]: "The name of art should be applied to those
only which contribute towards and produce necessaries and mainstays of
life." In the case of an art that produces things which for the most
part some people put to an evil use, although such arts are not
unlawful in themselves, nevertheless, according to the teaching of
Plato, they should be extirpated from the State by the governing
authority. Accordingly, since women may lawfully adorn themselves,
whether to maintain the fitness of their estate, or even by adding
something thereto, in order to please their husbands, it follows that
those who make such means of adornment do not sin in the practice of
their art, except perhaps by inventing means that are superfluous and
fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says (Super Matth.) that "even the
shoemakers' and clothiers' arts stand in need of restraint, for they
have lent their art to lust, by abusing its needs, and debasing art by
art."
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OF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the precepts of temperance:
(1) The precepts of temperance itself;
(2) The precepts of its parts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the precepts of temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of temperance are
unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater
virtue than temperance, as stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[141], A[8];
[3653]FS, Q[66], A[4] ). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the
precepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the
precepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the
precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of adultery, which is
contrary to temperance, as stated above (Q[154], AA[1],8).
Objection 2: Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters,
but also about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the
decalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of
meat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore,
should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to
venereal pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, in the lawgiver's intention inducement to virtue
precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in order
that obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts of the
decalogue are the most important in the Divine law. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept
directly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather than a negative
precept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue
(Ex. 20:14, 17).
I answer that, As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the
commandment is charity," which is enjoined upon us in the two precepts
concerning the love of God and of our neighbor. Wherefore the decalogue
contains those precepts which tend more directly to the love of God and
of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery
would seem most of all opposed to the love of our neighbor, since
thereby a man lays hold of another's property for his own use, by
abusing his neighbor's wife. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue
include a special prohibition of adultery, not only as committed in
deed, but also as desired in thought.
Reply to Objection 1: Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude
there is not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our
neighbor as adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to
temperance. And yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude,
is wont to be sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one
of the precepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go
not on the way with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils."
Reply to Objection 2: Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of
our neighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust,
for a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over whom
he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of his
wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body [*1 Cor.
7:4].
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3654]Q[122], AA[1],4) the
precepts of the decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law;
hence they need to be common precepts. Now it was not possible to give
any common affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of
temperance varies according to different times, as Augustine remarks
(De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and
customs.
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Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably give
n
in the Divine law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the virtues annexed to
temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the precepts of
the Decalogue, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), are certain universal
principles of the whole Divine law. Now "pride is the beginning of all
sin," according to Ecclus. 10:15. Therefore among the precepts of the
Decalogue there should have been one forbidding pride.
Objection 2: Further, a place before all should have been given in the
decalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced to
fulfil the Law, because these would seem to be the most important. Now
since humility subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to
dispose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience is
accounted one of the degrees of humility, as stated above
([3655]Q[161], A[6]); and the same apparently applies to meekness, the
effect of which is that a man does not contradict the Divine
Scriptures, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7). Therefore
it seems that the Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility
and meekness.
Objection 3: Further, it was stated in the foregoing Article that
adultery is forbidden in the decalogue, because it is contrary to the
love of our neighbor. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is
contrary to modesty, is opposed to neighborly love: wherefore Augustine
says in his Rule (Ep. ccxii): "In all your movements let nothing be
done to offend the eye of any person whatever." Therefore it seems that
this kind of inordinateness should also have been forbidden by a
precept of the Decalogue.
On the contrary, suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered in
two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, in their effects. Considered
in themselves they have no direct connection with the love of God or of
our neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation of things
pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects, they may
regard the love of God or of our neighbor: and in this respect the
decalogue contains precepts that relate to the prohibition of the
effects of the vices opposed to the parts of temperance. Thus the
effect of anger, which is opposed to meekness, is sometimes that a man
goes on to commit murder (and this is forbidden in the Decalogue), and
sometimes that he refuses due honor to his parents, which may also be
the result of pride, which leads many to transgress the precepts of the
first table.
Reply to Objection 1: Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden
in the heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common.
Hence there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of the
Decalogue, which are like first self-evident principles.
Reply to Objection 2: Those precepts which are essentially an
inducement to the observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be
already given, wherefore they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as
to have a place in the Decalogue.
Reply to Objection 3: Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to
one's neighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder,
adultery, and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only as
being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above ([3656]Q[168],
A[1], ad 1,3).
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TREATISE ON GRATUITOUS GRACES (QQ[171]-182)
__________________________________________________________________
OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)
After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain
to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those things
which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple
difference between men as regards things connected with the soul's
habits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous graces,
according to 1 Cor. 12:4, 7: "There are diversities of graces . . . and
to one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the
word of knowledge," etc. Another difference arises from the diversities
of life, namely the active and the contemplative life, which correspond
to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it is stated (1 Cor. 12:4,
7) that "there are diversities of operations." For the purpose of
operation in Martha, who "was busy about much serving," which pertains
to the active life, differed from the purpose of operation in Mary,
"who sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Lk. 10:39,40),
which pertains to the contemplative life. A third difference
corresponds to the various duties and states of life, as expressed in
Eph. 4:11, "And He gave some apostles; and some prophets; and other
some evangelists; and other some pastors and doctors": and this
pertains to diversity of ministries, of which it is written (1 Cor.
12:5): "There are diversities of ministries."
With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be
considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to knowledge,
some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things pertaining to
knowledge may be comprised under "prophecy," since prophetic revelation
extends not only to future events relating to man, but also to things
relating to God, both as to those which are to be believed by all and
are matters of "faith," and as to yet higher mysteries, which concern
the perfect and belong to "wisdom." Again, prophetic revelation is
about things pertaining to spiritual substances, by whom we are urged
to good or evil; this pertains to the "discernment of spirits."
Moreover it extends to the direction of human acts, and this pertains
to "knowledge," as we shall explain further on ([3657]Q[177]).
Accordingly we must first of all consider prophecy, and rapture which
is a degree of prophecy.
Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence; (2)
its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division of
prophecy.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?
(2) Whether it is a habit?
(3) Whether it is only about future contingencies?
(4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy?
(5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the gift
of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit?
(6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy?
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Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.
For it is written (Ecclus. 48:14) that after death the body of Eliseus
prophesied, and further on (Ecclus. 49:18) it is said of Joseph that
"his bones were visited, and after death they prophesied." Now no
knowledge remains in the body or in the bones after death. Therefore
prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 14:3): "He that
prophesieth, speaketh to men unto edification." Now speech is not
knowledge itself, but its effect. Therefore it would seem that prophecy
does not pertain to knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, every cognitive perfection excludes folly and
madness. Yet both of these are consistent with prophecy; for it is
written (Osee 9:7): "Know ye, O Israel, that the prophet was foolish
and mad [*Vulg.: 'the spiritual man was mad']." Therefore prophecy is
not a cognitive perfection.
Objection 4: Further, just as revelation regards the intellect, so
inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a
kind of motion. Now prophecy is described as "inspiration" or
"revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prolog. super Psalt. i].
Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to the intellect
more than to the affections.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Kings 9:9): "For he that is now
called a prophet, in time past was called a seer." Now sight pertains
to knowledge. Therefore prophecy pertains to knowledge.
I answer that, Prophecy first and chiefly consists in knowledge,
because, to wit, prophets know things that are far [procul] removed
from man's knowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name
from {phanos}, "apparition," because things appear to them from afar.
Wherefore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), "in the Old Testament,
they were called Seers, because they saw what others saw not, and
surveyed things hidden in mystery." Hence among heathen nations they
were known as "vates, on account of their power of mind [vi mentis],"
[*The Latin 'vates' is from the Greek {phates}, and may be rendered
'soothsayer'] (Etym. viii, 7).
Since, however, it is written (1 Cor. 12:7): "The manifestation of the
Spirit is given to every man unto profit," and further on (1 Cor.
14:12): "Seek to abound unto the edification of the Church," it follows
that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far as the prophets
declare for the instruction of others, the things they know through
being taught of God, according to the saying of Is. 21:10, "That which
I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have declared
unto you." Accordingly, as Isidore says (Etym. viii, 7), "prophets" may
be described as "proefatores [foretellers], because they tell from afar
[porro fantur]," that is, speak from a distance, "and foretell the
truth about things to come."
Now those things above human ken which are revealed by God cannot be
confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards the operation
of the Divine power, according to Mk. 16:20, "They . . . preached
everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs
that followed." Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned with the working
of miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic utterances.
Wherefore it is written (Dt. 34:10,11): "There arose no more a prophet
in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the
signs and wonders."
Reply to Objection 1: These passages speak of prophecy in reference to
the third point just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the prophetic
utterances.
Reply to Objection 3: Those prophets who are described as foolish and
mad are not true but false prophets, of whom it is said (Jer. 3:16):
"Hearken not to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and
deceive you; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the
mouth of the Lord," and (Ezech. 13:3): "Woe to the foolish prophets,
that follow their own spirit, and see nothing."
Reply to Objection 4: It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of
the mind be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is
written (Ezech. 2:1): "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will
speak to thee." This raising of the intention is brought about by the
motion of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: "And the
Spirit entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet." After the
mind's intention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the
things of God; hence the text continues: "And I heard Him speaking to
me." Accordingly inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards the
raising of the mind, according to Job 32:8, "The inspiration of the
Almighty giveth understanding": while revelation is necessary, as
regards the very perception of Divine things, whereby prophecy is
completed; by its means the veil of darkness and ignorance is removed,
according to Job 12:22, "He discovereth great things out of darkness."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prophecy is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For according to
Ethic. ii, 5, "there are three things in the soul, power, passion, and
habit." Now prophecy is not a power, for then it would be in all men,
since the powers of the soul are common to them. Again it is not a
passion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as stated
above ([3658]FS, Q[22] , A[2]); whereas prophecy pertains principally
to knowledge, as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore prophecy is
a habit.
Objection 2: Further, every perfection of the soul, which is not always
in act, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul; and it is
not always in act, else a prophet could not be described as asleep.
Therefore seemingly prophecy is a habit.
Objection 3: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces.
Now grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit, as
stated above ([3659]FS, Q[110], A[2]). Therefore prophecy is a habit.
On the contrary, A habit is something "whereby we act when we will," as
the Commentator [*Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198] says (De Anima
iii). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when he will, as appears in
the case of Eliseus (4 Kings 3:15), "who on Josaphat inquiring of him
concerning the future, and the spirit of prophecy failing him, caused a
minstrel to be brought to him, that the spirit of prophecy might come
down upon him through the praise of psalmody, and fill his mind with
things to come," as Gregory observes (Hom. i super Ezech.). Therefore
prophecy is not a habit.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13), "all that is made
manifest is light," because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the
material sight takes place through material light, so too the
manifestation of intellectual sight takes place through intellectual
light. Accordingly manifestation must be proportionate to the light by
means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate to
its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowledge that surpasses
natural reason, as stated above [3660](A[1]), it follows that prophecy
requires an intellectual light surpassing the light of natural reason.
Hence the saying of Micah 7:8: "When I sit in darkness, the Lord is my
light." Now light may be in a subject in two ways: first, by way of an
abiding form, as material light is in the sun, and in fire; secondly,
by way of a passion, or passing impression, as light is in the air. Now
the prophetic light is not in the prophet's intellect by way of an
abiding form, else a prophet would always be able to prophesy, which is
clearly false. For Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "Sometimes the
spirit of prophecy is lacking to the prophet, nor is it always within
the call of his mind, yet so that in its absence he knows that its
presence is due to a gift." Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4
Kings 4:27): "Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me,
and hath not told me." The reason for this is that the intellectual
light that is in a subject by way of an abiding and complete form,
perfects the intellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle
of the things manifested by that light; thus by the light of the active
intellect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all
things known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to
supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God
Himself, Whom the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is
seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an
abiding and complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we
shall see light."
It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's soul
by way of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated Ex.
33:22: "When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of the
rock," etc., and 3 Kings 19:11: "Go forth and stand upon the mount
before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is that
even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too the
prophet's mind is always in need of a fresh revelation; thus a disciple
who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to have every
detail explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Is. 1:4): "In the
morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a master." This
is also indicated by the very manner in which prophecies are uttered:
thus it is stated that "the Lord spake to such and such a prophet," or
that "the word of the Lord," or "the hand of the Lord was made upon
him."
But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, properly
speaking, prophecy is not a habit.
Reply to Objection 1: This division of the Philosopher's does not
comprise absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be
principles of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion,
sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of
those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before
having the habit of that action.
However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand
passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense the Philosopher
says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is, in a way, to be
passive." For just as, in natural knowledge, the possible intellect is
passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic
knowledge the human intellect is passive to the enlightening of the
Divine light.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as in corporeal things, when a passion
ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the
passion---thus wood once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too
in the prophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased,
there remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew---thus when the mind
has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its
former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9)
that our prayers need to be frequent, "lest devotion be extinguished as
soon as it is kindled."
We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even while
his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of his
being deputed by God, according to Jer. 1:5, "And I made thee a prophet
unto the nations."
Reply to Objection 3: Every gift of grace raises man to something above
human nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the
substance of the act---for instance, the working of miracles, and the
knowledge of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom---and for
such acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a
thing is above human nature as to the mode but not the substance of the
act---for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror of His
creatures---and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is only about future
contingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that
"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue
of things with unchangeable truth." Now issues pertain to future
contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future
contingencies alone.
Objection 2: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of prophecy is
differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things;
and from the discernment of spirits, which is about created spirits;
and from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts
are differentiated by their objects, as stated above ([3661]FS, Q[54],
A[2]). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected
with any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future
contingencies alone.
Objection 3: Further, difference of object causes difference of
species, as stated above ([3662]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Therefore, if one
prophecy is about future contingencies, and another about other things,
it would seem to follow that these are different species of prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that some
prophecies are "about the future, for instance (Is. 7:14), 'Behold a
virgin shall conceive, and bear a son'"; some are "about the past, as
(Gn. 1:1), 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'"; some are
"about the present," as (1 Cor. 14:24,25), "If all prophesy, and there
come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart are made
manifest." Therefore prophecy is not about future contingencies alone.
I answer that, A manifestation made by means of a certain light can
extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the
body's sight extends to all colors, and the soul's natural knowledge
extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect.
Now prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is
possible to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and
corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them
all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation concerning
the perfections of God and the angels was made to Is. 6:1, where it is
written, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated."
Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to natural bodies,
according to the words of Is. 40:12, "Who hath measured the waters in
the hollow of His hand," etc. It also contains matters relating to
human conduct, according to Is. 58:1, "Deal thy bread to the hungry,"
etc.; and besides this it contains things pertaining to future events,
according to Is. 47:9, "Two things shall come upon thee suddenly in one
day, barrenness and widowhood."
Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge, it
must be observed that the more remote things are from our knowledge the
more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things there are three
degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the knowledge, either
sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, but not from the
knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by sense things
present to him locally, which another man does not know by human sense,
since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what
his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4 Kings 5:26), and in like
manner the secret thoughts of one man are manifested prophetically to
another, according to 1 Cor. 14:25; and again in this way what one man
knows by demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically.
The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge of
all men without exception, not that they are in themselves unknowable,
but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as the mystery of
the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim saying: "Holy, Holy,
Holy," etc. (Is. 6:3).
The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all men,
through being in themselves unknowable; such are future contingencies,
the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that which is predicated
universally and by its very nature, takes precedence of that which is
predicated in a limited and relative sense, it follows that revelation
of future events belongs most properly to prophecy, and from this
prophecy apparently takes its name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i super
Ezech.): "And since a prophet is so called because he foretells the
future, his name loses its significance when he speaks of the past or
present."
Reply to Objection 1: Prophecy is there defined according to its proper
signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from
the other gratuitous graces.
Reply to Objection 2: This is evident from what has just been said. We
might also reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy
have the common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine
revelation; whereas those that are the matter of "wisdom," "knowledge,"
and the "interpretation of speeches," can be known by man through
natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through the
enlightening of the Divine light. As to "faith," although it is about
things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of the
things believed, but with a man's certitude of assent to things known
by others.
Reply to Objection 3: The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the
Divine light, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy,
although the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are
diverse.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known
prophetically?
Objection 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet
knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (Amos
3:7): "The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His
servants the prophets." Now whatever is revealed prophetically is
something done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is
revealed to the prophet.
Objection 2: Further, "God's works are perfect" (Dt. 32:4). Now
prophecy is a "Divine revelation," as stated above [3663](A[3]).
Therefore it is perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible
matters of prophecy were revealed prophetically, since "the perfect is
that which lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible
matters of prophecy are revealed to the prophet.
Objection 3: Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more
powerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human
science. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains
to that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar.
Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that "sometimes the
spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's mind and
nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but to
the future." Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of
prophecy.
I answer that, Things which differ from one another need not exist
simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are
connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above
([3664]FS, Q[65], AA[1],2) that all the virtues must needs exist
simultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things
that are known through some principle are connected in that principle
and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as
regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all
that can be known through that principle; whereas if the common
principle is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not
follow that one knows all those things at the same time, but each of
them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of them
may be known, and some not.
Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested by
the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not see in
itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible
matters of prophecy; but each one knows some of them according to the
special revelation of this or that matter.
Reply to Objection 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that
are necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every
one, but some to one, and some to another.
Reply to Objection 2: Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect
in the genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:8)
that "prophecies shall be made void," and that "we prophesy in part,"
i.e. imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its
perfection in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor.
113:10): "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part
shall be done away." Consequently it does not follow that nothing is
lacking to prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things
to which prophecy is directed.
Reply to Objection 3: He who has a science knows the principles of that
science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends;
wherefore to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know whatever
is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle of prophetic
knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy; wherefore the
comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit fro
m
what he says by the prophetic spirit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what
he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit.
For Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said "she could,
through a certain feeling, which in words she could not express,
discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her own soul."
Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above [3665](A[3]).
Therefore the prophet always distinguishes what he says by the spirit
of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.
Objection 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome
[*Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]
says. Now the prophets were commanded (Jer. 23:28): "The prophet that
hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him
speak My word with truth." Therefore the prophet can distinguish what
he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.
Objection 3: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is
greater than that which results from the light of natural reason. Now
he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain
that he has it. Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is
much more certain that he has it.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "It must be
observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter
certain things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to
prophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit."
I answer that, The prophet's mind is instructed by God in two ways: in
one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most mysterious
instinct to "which the human mind is subjected without knowing it," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the prophet has the
greatest certitude about those things which he knows by an express
revelation, and he has it for certain that they are revealed to him by
God; wherefore it is written (Jer. 26:15): "In truth the Lord sent me
to you, to speak all these words in your hearing." Else, were he not
certain about this, the faith which relies on the utterances of the
prophet would not be certain. A sign of the prophet's certitude may be
gathered from the fact that Abraham being admonished in a prophetic
vision, prepared to sacrifice his only-begotten son, which he nowise
would have done had he not been most certain of the Divine revelation.
On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by
instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully
whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own
spirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all
manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something
imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to
understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to
error, "they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For instance,
cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq.], and from Him they hear the truth, so that they
reproach themselves for having said what was untrue," as Gregory adds
(Hom. i super Ezech.).
The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation that
is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the
objections is clear.
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Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false?
Objection 1: It would seem that things known or declared prophetically
can be false. For prophecy is about future contingencies, as stated
above (A[3] ). Now future contingencies may possibly not happen; else
they would happen of necessity. Therefore the matter of prophecy can be
false.
Objection 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (Is. 38:1):
"Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not
live," and yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kings 20:6).
Again the Lord said (Jer. 18:7,8): "I will suddenly speak against a
nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to
destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of
their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do
them." This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites, according to
Jn. 3:10: "The Lord [Vulg.: 'God'] had mercy with regard to the evil
which He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not."
Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.
Objection 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the
antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely
necessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands
in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the
premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary
always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in I Poster.
6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the following
conditional proposition must needs be true: "If a thing has been
prophesied, it will be." Now the antecedent of this conditional
proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past.
Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is
unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies.
Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false.
On the contrary, Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that "prophecy
is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things
with invariable truth." Now the truth of prophecy would not be
invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false can
come under prophecy.
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said
([3666]AA[1],3,5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the
form of teaching on the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation. Now
the truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the
knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the
teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is a
likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense when
he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that "prophecy is the seal of the
Divine foreknowledge." Consequently the same truth must needs be in
prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge, under
which nothing false can possibly come, as stated in the [3667]FP,
Q[16], A[8]. Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the [3668]FP, Q[14], A[13] the
certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency
of future singular events, because that knowledge regards the future as
present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also,
which is an "impressed likeness" or "seal of the Divine foreknowledge,"
does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the contingency of future
things.
Reply to Objection 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in
two ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it
sees them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes,
inasmuch as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects.
And though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are
determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they are
not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again, though
this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine intellect, it is
not always united in the prophetic revelation, because an imprint made
by an active cause is not always on a par with the virtue of that
cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic revelation is an imprinted
likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far as the latter regards
future contingencies in themselves: and such things happen in the same
way as foretold, for example this saying of Is. 7:14: "Behold a virgin
shall conceive." Sometimes, however, the prophetic revelation is an
imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge as knowing the order of
causes to effects; and then at times the event is otherwise than
foretold. Yet the prophecy does not cover a falsehood, for the meaning
of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether they be natural causes
or human acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a result. In this way
we are to understand the saying of Is. 38:1: "Thou shalt die, and not
live"; in other words, "The disposition of thy body has a tendency to
death": and the saying of Jonah 3:4, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall
be destroyed," that is to say, "Its merits demand that it should be
destroyed." God is said "to repent," metaphorically, inasmuch as He
bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by "changing His
sentence, although He changes not His counsel" [*Cf. [3669]FP, Q[19],
A[7], ad 2].
Reply to Objection 3: Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as
the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional
proposition: "If this was prophesied, it will be," is true in the same
way as the proposition: "If this was foreknown, it will be": for in
both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the
consequent is necessary, considered, not as something future in our
regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in
the [3670]FP, Q[14], A[13], ad 2.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prophecy is natural?
(2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels?
(3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?
(4) Whether a good life is requisite?
(5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons?
(6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prophecy can be natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory
says (Dial. iv, 26) that "sometimes the mere strength of the soul is
sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things": and Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is
withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future
[*Cf. [3671]FP, Q[86], A[4], ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy.
Therefore the soul can acquire prophecy naturally.
Objection 2: Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while
one wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally
foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De
Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted]). Much more
therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.
Objection 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb
animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things that
concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident
from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain commences;
and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be gathered
from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm. Much more
therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns themselves, and of
such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from nature.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): "When prophecy shall
fail, the people shall be scattered abroad"; wherefore it is evident
that prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now
"nature does not fail in necessaries" [*Aristotle, de Anima iii, 9].
Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:21): "For prophecy came not by
the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by
the Holy Ghost." Therefore prophecy comes not from nature, but through
the gift of the Holy Ghost.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[171], A[6], ad 2) prophetic
foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as they
are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes. Now, to
foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper to the
Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated
in the [3672]FP, Q[14], A[13]. Wherefore such like foreknowledge of the
future cannot come from nature, but from Divine revelation alone. On
the other hand, future things can be foreknown in their causes with a
natural knowledge even by man: thus a physician foreknows future health
or death in certain causes, through previous experimental knowledge of
the order of those causes to such effects. Such like knowledge of the
future may be understood to be in a man by nature in two ways. In one
way that the soul, from that which it holds, is able to foreknow the
future, and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "Some have
deemed the human soul to contain a certain power of divination." This
seems to be in accord with the opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit.
vi], who held that our souls have knowledge of all things by
participating in the ideas; but that this knowledge is obscured in them
by union with the body; yet in some more, in others less, according to
a difference in bodily purity. According to this it might be said that
men, whose souls are not much obscured through union with the body, are
able to foreknow such like future things by their own knowledge.
Against this opinion Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "How is it
that the soul cannot always have this power of divination, since it
always wishes to have it?"
Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of Aristotle,
that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated in the
[3673]FP, Q[84], A[6], it is better to have recourse to another
explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge of the
future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience, wherein
they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends on the
perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of his
understanding.
Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two
ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First,
because the former can be about any events whatever, and this
infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had
naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may
extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is "according to the
unchangeable truth" [*[3674]Q[171], A[3], OBJ[1]], while the latter is
not, and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not
the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above
([3675]Q[171], A[3]), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally
surpass human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy
strictly so called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine
revelation.
Reply to Objection 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things,
it becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual
substances [*Cf. FP, Q[88], A[4], ad 2], and also is more inclined to
receive the subtle motions which take place in the human imagination
through the impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from
receiving them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says
(Dial. iv, 26) that "the soul, at the approach of death, foresees
certain future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature,"
inasmuch as it is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it
knows future things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own
power, because according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), "if this
were so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed,"
which is clearly false.
Objection 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either
from the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause,
as stated above ([3676]Q[95], A[6]), when we were treating of
divination. Now both these causes are more applicable to a person while
asleep than while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied
with external sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle
impressions either of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes;
although as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more
alert in waking than in sleeping.
Reply to Objection 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future
events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their
imagination is moved more than man's, because man's imagination,
especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than
according to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects much
more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes effects
in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy assists man
still more.
Reply to Objection 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction
of human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government
of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this
nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come
through the angels. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom
"conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God,
and the prophets." Now wisdom makes the friends of God immediately.
Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the
medium of the angels.
Objection 2: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces.
But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor.
12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." Therefore
the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.
Objection 3: Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that
prophecy is a "Divine revelation": whereas if it were conveyed by the
angels, it would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is
not bestowed by means of the angels.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "Our glorious fathers
received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers"; and he is
speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic revelation is
conveyed by means of the angels.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "Things that are of God
are well ordered [*Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God.']." Now
the Divine ordering, according to Dionysius [*Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl.
Hier. v], is such that the lowest things are directed by middle things.
Now the angels hold a middle position between God and men, in that they
have a greater share in the perfection of the Divine goodness than men
have. Wherefore the Divine enlightenments and revelations are conveyed
from God to men by the angels. Now prophetic knowledge is bestowed by
Divine enlightenment and revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is
conveyed by the angels.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a
perfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression;
whereas prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel
also can form an impression, as stated in the [3677]FP, Q[111], A[1],
wherefore the comparison fails between the two.
Reply to Objection 2: The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy
Ghost as their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men
by means of the angels.
Reply to Objection 3: The work of the instrument is ascribed to the
principal agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a
minister is like an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed
by the ministry of the angels, is said to be Divine.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?
Objection 1: It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite for
prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to the
disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2, "The
Lord will roar from Sion," says: "Anyone who wishes to make a
comparison naturally turns to those things of which he has experience,
and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors compare their
enemies to the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck. In like manner
Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is
inspired by the lion's roar." Now that which is received by a thing
according to the mode of the recipient requires a natural disposition.
Therefore prophecy requires a natural disposition.
Objection 2: Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty
than those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the
considerations of acquired science, since many are prevented by natural
indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations of science.
Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for the
contemplation of prophecy.
Objection 3: Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle
than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are
hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary
on Matthew [*The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at
the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy Ghost will not
be vouchsafed, even though it be a prophet that fulfils the duty of
procreation." Much more therefore does a natural indisposition hinder
prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good natural disposition is
requisite for prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.):
"He," namely the Holy Ghost, "fills the boy harpist and makes him a
Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a
prophet." Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition, but
depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is written (1
Cor. 12:2): "All these things, one and the same Spirit worketh,
dividing to every one according as He will."
I answer that, As stated above [3678](A[1]), prophecy in its true and
exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes from
a natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative sense. Now
we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient cause
requires neither previous matter nor previous disposition of matter in
His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant to bring into
being matter and disposition and form, so neither does He require a
previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is able to produce
both the spiritual effect and at the same time the fitting disposition
as requisite according to the order of nature. More than this, He is
able at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so as to
dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic grace, at the
very instant of its creation.
Reply to Objection 1: It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons
the thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no
change in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him
incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.
Reply to Objection 2: The considerations of science proceed from a
natural cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in
matter. This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 3: A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be
an obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were
altogether deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man might
be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion,
whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by any other
passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is removed by the
Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy?
Objection 1: It would seem that a good life is requisite for prophecy.
For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wisdom of God "through nations
conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and
prophets." Now there can be no holiness without a good life and
sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without a good life and
sanctifying grace.
Objection 2: Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend,
according to Jn. 15:15, "But I have called you friends, because all
things whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you."
Now God reveals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore it
would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is
impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be
without charity; and charity is impossible without sanctifying grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:15): "Beware of false
prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they
are ravening wolves." Now all who are without grace are likened
inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false
prophets. Therefore no man is a true prophet except he be good by
grace.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De
Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that "if
interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be
bestowed on any but the best." Now it is evident that the gift of
prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only
to the best men.
On the contrary, To those who had said, "Lord, have we not prophesied
in Thy name?" this reply is made: "I never knew you" (Mat. 7:22,23).
Now "the Lord knoweth who are His" (2 Tim. 2:19). Therefore prophecy
can be in those who are not God's by grace.
I answer that, A good life may be considered from two points of view.
First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying grace.
Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and the
outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order that
man's soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Trin. xv, 18): "A man is not transferred from the left side to the
right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a lover of
God and of his neighbor." Hence whatever can be without charity can be
without sanctifying grace, and consequently without goodness of life.
Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is clear on two counts.
First, on account of their respective acts: for prophecy pertains to
the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the will, which power is
perfected by charity. For this reason the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) reckons
prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect, that can be had
without charity. Secondly, on account of their respective ends. For
prophecy like other gratuitous graces is given for the good of the
Church, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, "The manifestation of the Spirit is
given to every man unto profit"; and is not directly intended to unite
man's affections to God, which is the purpose of charity. Therefore
prophecy can be without a good life, as regards the first root of this
goodness.
If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of
the soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life is
an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be raised
very high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this is
hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external
things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings 4:38) that
they "dwelt together with [Vulg.: 'before']" Eliseus, leading a
solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should be a
hindrance to the gift of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man
both for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind;
and such are those whom Divine wisdom, "conveying itself" by
sanctifying grace to their minds, "maketh the friends of God, and
prophets." Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the
good of others. Hence Jerome commenting on Mat. 7:22, says: "Sometimes
prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are
accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but either to
the invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of those who
invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear."
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev.] expounding this
passage [*Jn. 15:15] says: "Since we love the lofty things of heaven as
soon as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love
is to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because
having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of
perfect love." In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed
to prophets.
Reply to Objection 3: Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only
those whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus
Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom,
and falsely ascribed to him] that "Catholic teachers, though they be
sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves,
because they do not purpose the destruction of Christians." And since
prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such
are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God.
Reply to Objection 4: God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who
are simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best
as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants
the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to.
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Whether any prophecy comes from the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons. For
prophecy is "a Divine revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prol. in
Psalt. i]. But that which is done by a demon is not Divine. Therefore
no prophecy can be from a demon.
Objection 2: Further, some kind of enlightenment is requisite for
prophetic knowledge, as stated above (Q[171], AA[2],3). Now the demons
do not enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the FP,
Q[119], A[3]. Therefore no prophecy can come from the demons.
Objection 3: Further, a sign is worthless if it betokens contraries.
Now prophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss on
Rom. 12:6, "Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of faith,"
says: "Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with prophecy,
which is the first proof of the reasonableness of our faith; since
believers, after receiving the Spirit, prophesied." Therefore prophecy
cannot be bestowed by the demons.
On the contrary, It is written (3 Kings 18:19): "Gather unto me all
Israel unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and
fifty, and the prophets of the grove four hundred, who eat at Jezebel's
table." Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it would seem
that there is also a prophecy from the demons.
I answer that, As stated above ([3679]Q[171], A[1]), prophecy denotes
knowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that an
intellect of a higher order can know some things that are far removed
from the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human
intellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also the
intellects of good and bad angels according to the order of nature.
Hence the demons, even by their natural knowledge, know certain things
remote from men's knowledge, which they can reveal to men: although
those things which God alone knows are remote simply and most of all.
Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine
revelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the demons may
be called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom
something is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures as
prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as "false
prophets," or "prophets of idols." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
xii, 19): "When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes as
these," namely visions, "he makes him either devilish, or possessed, or
a false prophet."
Reply to Objection 1: Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in its
proper and simple acceptation.
Reply to Objection 2: The demons reveal what they know to men, not by
enlightening the intellect, but by an imaginary vision, or even by
audible speech; and in this way this prophecy differs from true
prophecy.
Reply to Objection 3: The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished
from Divine prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence
Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to
St. John Chrysostom] that "some prophesy by the spirit of the devil,
such as diviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil
sometimes utters what is false, the Holy Ghost never." Wherefore it is
written (Dt. 18:21,22): "If in silent thought thou answer: How shall I
know the word that the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this sign:
Whatsoever that same prophet foretelleth in the name of the Lord, and
it come not to pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken."
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Whether the prophets of the demons ever foretell the truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets of the demons never
foretell the truth. For Ambrose [*Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster) on 1
Cor. 12:3] says that "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the
Holy Ghost." Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from the Holy
Ghost, because "there is no concord between Christ and Belial [*'What
concord hath Christ with Belial?']" (2 Cor. 6:15). Therefore it would
seem that they never foretell the truth.
Objection 2: Further, just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit
of truth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit of
untruth, according to 3 Kings 22:22, "I will go forth, and be a lying
spirit in the mouth of all his prophets." Now the prophets inspired by
the Holy Ghost never speak false, as stated above (Q[111], A[6]).
Therefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth.
Objection 3: Further, it is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44) that "when he
speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and
the father thereof," i.e. of lying. Now by inspiring his prophets, the
devil speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God's minister to
declare the truth, since "light hath no fellowship with darkness
[*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath light with darkness?']" (2 Cor. 6:14).
Therefore the prophets of the demons never foretell the truth.
On the contrary, A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that "Balaam was a
diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons and
the magic art." Now he foretold many true things, for instance that
which is to be found in Num. 24:17: "A star shall rise out of Jacob,
and a scepter shall spring up from Israel." Therefore even the prophets
of the demons foretell the truth.
I answer that, As the good is in relation to things, so is the true in
relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one that
is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for any
knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture of truth. Hence Bede
says [*Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, 40]
that "no teaching is so false that it never mingles truth with
falsehood." Hence the teaching of the demons, with which they instruct
their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is rendered acceptable.
For the intellect is led astray to falsehood by the semblance of truth,
even as the will is seduced to evil by the semblance of goodness.
Wherefore Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "The devil is allowed sometimes to
speak true things, in order that his unwonted truthfulness may gain
credit for his lie."
Reply to Objection 1: The prophets of the demons do not always speak
from the demons' revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This
was evidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke
to him (Num. 22:12), though he was a prophet of the demons, because God
makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He
foretells certain truths even by the demons' prophets, both that the
truth may be rendered more credible, since even its foes bear witness
to it, and also in order that men, by believing such men, may be more
easily led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true
things about Christ.
Yet even when the demons' prophets are instructed by the demons, they
foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own nature, the author
of which is the Holy Ghost, and sometimes by revelation of the good
spirits, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): so that even
then this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit
of truth, in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore He never says what
is not true; whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the
spirit of untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even the
very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes false,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Those things are called the demons' own, which
they have of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of
themselves but of God, those things which belong to them by nature: and
it is by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell the
truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to make
known the truth which is to be accomplished through them, by revealing
Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already stated (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 19; [3680]FP, Q[109], A[4], ad 1).
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OF THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is
conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the prophets see God's very essence?
(2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of
certain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone?
(3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction
from the sense?
(4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things
prophesied?
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Whether the prophets see the very essence of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets see the very essence of
God, for a gloss on Is. 38:1, "Take order with thy house, for thou
shalt die and not live," says: "Prophets can read in the book of God's
foreknowledge in which all things are written." Now God's foreknowledge
is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God's very essence.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7) that "in that
eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we see with the
mind's eye the type both of our being and of our actions." Now, of all
men, prophets have the highest knowledge of Divine things. Therefore
they, especially, see the Divine essence.
Objection 3: Further, future contingencies are foreknown by the
prophets "with unchangeable truth." Now future contingencies exist thus
in God alone. Therefore the prophets see God Himself.
On the contrary, The vision of the Divine essence is not made void in
heaven; whereas "prophecy is made void" (1 Cor. 13:8). Therefore
prophecy is not conveyed by a vision of the Divine essence.
I answer that, Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge as existing afar off.
Wherefore it is said of the prophets (Heb. 11:13) that "they were
beholding . . . afar off." But those who are in heaven and in the state
of bliss see, not as from afar off, but rather, as it were, from near
at hand, according to Ps. 139:14, "The upright shall dwell with Thy
countenance." Hence it is evident that prophetic knowledge differs from
the perfect knowledge, which we shall have in heaven, so that it is
distinguished therefrom as the imperfect from the perfect, and when the
latter comes the former is made void, as appears from the words of the
Apostle (1 Cor. 13:10).
Some, however, wishing to discriminate between prophetic knowledge and
the knowledge of the blessed, have maintained that the prophets see the
very essence of God (which they call the "mirror of eternity") [*Cf. De
Veritate, xii, 6; Sent. II, D, XI, part 2, art. 2, ad 4], not, however,
in the way in which it is the object of the blessed, but as containing
the types [*Cf. FP, Q[15]] of future events. But this is altogether
impossible. For God is the object of bliss in His very essence,
according to the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Happy whoso
knoweth Thee, though he know not these," i.e. creatures. Now it is not
possible to see the types of creatures in the very essence of God
without seeing It, both because the Divine essence is Itself the type
of all things that are made---the ideal type adding nothing to the
Divine essence save only a relationship to the creature---and because
knowledge of a thing in itself---and such is the knowledge of God as
the object of heavenly bliss---precedes knowledge of that thing in its
relation to something else---and such is the knowledge of God as
containing the types of things. Consequently it is impossible for
prophets to see God as containing the types of creatures, and yet not
as the object of bliss. Therefore we must conclude that the prophetic
vision is not the vision of the very essence of God, and that the
prophets do not see in the Divine essence Itself the things they do
see, but that they see them in certain images, according as they are
enlightened by the Divine light.
Wherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking of prophetic visions,
says that "the wise theologian calls that vision divine which is
effected by images of things lacking a bodily form through the seer
being rapt in divine things." And these images illumined by the Divine
light have more of the nature of a mirror than the Divine essence:
since in a mirror images are formed from other things, and this cannot
be said of God. Yet the prophet's mind thus enlightened may be called a
mirror, in so far as a likeness of the truth of the Divine
foreknowledge is formed therein, for which reason it is called the
"mirror of eternity," as representing God's foreknowledge, for God in
His eternity sees all things as present before Him, as stated above
([3681]Q[172], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: The prophets are said to read the book of God's
foreknowledge, inasmuch as the truth is reflected from God's
foreknowledge on the prophet's mind.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to see in the First Truth the type of
his existence, in so far as the image of the First Truth shines forth
on man's mind, so that he is able to know himself.
Reply to Objection 3: From the very fact that future contingencies are
in God according to unalterable truth, it follows that God can impress
a like knowledge on the prophet's mind without the prophet seeing God
in His essence.
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Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on th
e
prophet's mind, or merely a new light?
Objection 1: It would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species
of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, but only a new light.
For a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2 says that "prophets draw comparisons
from things with which they are conversant." But if prophetic vision
were effected by means of species newly impressed, the prophet's
previous experience of things would be inoperative. Therefore no new
species are impressed on the prophet's soul, but only the prophetic
light.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "it
is not imaginative but intellective vision that makes the prophet";
wherefore it is declared (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of
understanding in a vision." Now intellective vision, as stated in the
same book (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6) is not effected by means of images, but
by the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that prophetic
revelation is not effected by impressing species on the soul.
Objection 3: Further, by the gift of prophecy the Holy Ghost endows man
with something that surpasses the faculty of nature. Now man can by his
natural faculties form all kinds of species of things. Therefore it
would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things are
impressed, but merely an intellectual light.
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied" their
"visions, and I have used similitudes, by the ministry of the
prophets." Now multiplicity of visions results, not from a diversity of
intellectual light, which is common to every prophetic vision, but from
a diversity of species, whence similitudes also result. Therefore it
seems that in prophetic revelation new species of things are impressed,
and not merely an intellectual light.
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "prophetic
knowledge pertains most of all to the intellect." Now two things have
to be considered in connection with the knowledge possessed by the
human mind, namely the acceptance or representation of things, and the
judgment of the things represented. Now things are represented to the
human mind under the form of species: and according to the order of
nature, they must be represented first to the senses, secondly to the
imagination, thirdly to the passive intellect, and these are changed by
the species derived from the phantasms, which change results from the
enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in the imagination
there are the forms of sensible things not only as received from the
senses, but also transformed in various ways, either on account of some
bodily transformation (as in the case of people who are asleep or out
of their senses), or through the coordination of the phantasms, at the
command of reason, for the purpose of understanding something. For just
as the various arrangements of the letters of the alphabet convey
various ideas to the understanding, so the various coordinations of the
phantasms produce various intelligible species of the intellect.
As to the judgment formed by the human mind, it depends on the power of
the intellectual light.
Now the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind something which
surpasses the natural faculty in both these respects, namely as to the
judgment which depends on the inflow of intellectual light, and as to
the acceptance or representation of things, which is effected by means
of certain species. Human teaching may be likened to prophetic
revelation in the second of these respects, but not in the first. For a
man represents certain things to his disciple by signs of speech, but
he cannot enlighten him inwardly as God does.
But it is the first of these two that holds the chief place in
prophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowledge. Wherefore if
certain things are divinely represented to any man by means of
imaginary likenesses, as happened to Pharaoh (Gn. 41:1-7) and to
Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:1-2), or even by bodily likenesses, as happened
to Balthasar (Dan. 5:5), such a man is not to be considered a prophet,
unless his mind be enlightened for the purpose of judgment; and such an
apparition is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy. Wherefore
some [*Rabbi Moyses, Doct. Perplex. II, xxxvi] have called this
"prophetic ecstasy," and such is divination by dreams. And yet a man
will be a prophet, if his intellect be enlightened merely for the
purpose of judging of things seen in imagination by others, as in the
case of Joseph who interpreted Pharaoh's dream. But, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "especially is he a prophet who excels in both
respects, so," to wit, "as to see in spirit likenesses significant of
things corporeal, and understand them by the quickness of his
intellect."
Now sensible forms are divinely presented to the prophet's mind,
sometimes externally by means of the senses---thus Daniel saw the
writing on the wall (Dan. 5:25)---sometimes by means of imaginary
forms, either of exclusively Divine origin and not received through the
senses (for instance, if images of colors were imprinted on the
imagination of one blind from birth), or divinely coordinated from
those derived from the senses---thus Jeremiah saw the "boiling caldron
. . . from the face of the north" (Jer. 1:13)---or by the direct
impression of intelligible species on the mind, as in the case of those
who receive infused scientific knowledge or wisdom, such as Solomon or
the apostles.
But intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the human
mind---sometimes for the purpose of judging of things seen by others,
as in the case of Joseph, quoted above, and of the apostles whose
understanding our Lord opened "that they might understand the
scriptures" (Lk. 24:45); and to this pertains the "interpretation of
speeches"---sometimes for the purpose of judging according to Divine
truth, of the things which a man apprehends in the ordinary course of
nature---sometimes for the purpose of discerning truthfully and
efficaciously what is to be done, according to Is. 63:14, "The Spirit
of the Lord was their leader."
Hence it is evident that prophetic revelation is conveyed sometimes by
the mere infusion of light, sometimes by imprinting species anew, or by
a new coordination of species.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, sometimes in prophetic
revelation imaginary species previously derived from the senses are
divinely coordinated so as to accord with the truth to be revealed, and
then previous experience is operative in the production of the images,
but not when they are impressed on the mind wholly from without.
Reply to Objection 2: Intellectual vision is not effected by means of
bodily and individual images, but by an intelligible image. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 11) that "the soul possesses a certain
likeness of the species known to it." Sometimes this intelligible image
is, in prophetic revelation, imprinted immediately by God, sometimes it
results from pictures in the imagination, by the aid of the prophetic
light, since a deeper truth is gathered from these pictures in the
imagination by means of the enlightenment of the higher light.
Reply to Objection 3: It is true that man is able by his natural powers
to form all kinds of pictures in the imagination, by simply considering
these pictures, but not so that they be directed to the representation
of intelligible truths that surpass his intellect, since for this
purpose he needs the assistance of a supernatural light.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the
senses?
Objection 1: It would seem that the prophetic vision is always
accompanied by abstraction from the senses. For it is written (Num.
12:6): "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to
him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." Now a gloss says
at the beginning of the Psalter, "a vision that takes place by dreams
and apparitions consists of things which seem to be said or done." But
when things seem to be said or done, which are neither said nor done,
there is abstraction from the senses. Therefore prophecy is always
accompanied by abstraction from the senses.
Objection 2: Further, when one power is very intent on its own
operation, other powers are drawn away from theirs; thus men who are
very intent on hearing something fail to see what takes place before
them. Now in the prophetic vision the intellect is very much uplifted,
and intent on its act. Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision is
always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot, at the same time, tend in
opposite directions. Now in the prophetic vision the mind tends to the
acceptance of things from above, and consequently it cannot at the same
time tend to sensible objects. Therefore it would seem necessary for
prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by abstraction from the
senses.
Objection 4: On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 14:32): "The
spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets." Now this were
impossible if the prophet were not in possession of his faculties, but
abstracted from his senses. Therefore it would seem that prophetic
vision is not accompanied by abstraction from the senses.
I answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, the prophetic
revelation takes place in four ways: namely, by the infusion of an
intelligible light, by the infusion of intelligible species, by
impression or coordination of pictures in the imagination, and by the
outward presentation of sensible images. Now it is evident that there
is no abstraction from the senses, when something is presented to the
prophet's mind by means of sensible species---whether these be divinely
formed for this special purpose, as the bush shown to Moses (Ex. 3:2),
and the writing shown to Daniel (Dan. 5:)---or whether they be produced
by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine providence to
be prophetically significant of something, as, for instance, the Church
was signified by the ark of Noah.
Again, abstraction from the external senses is not rendered necessary
when the prophet's mind is enlightened by an intellectual light, or
impressed with intelligible species, since in us the perfect judgment
of the intellect is effected by its turning to sensible objects, which
are the first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the [3682]FP,
Q[84], A[6].
When, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by images in the
imagination, abstraction from the senses is necessary lest the things
thus seen in imagination be taken for objects of external sensation.
Yet this abstraction from the senses is sometimes complete, so that a
man perceives nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is incomplete,
so that he perceives something with his senses, yet does not fully
discern the things he perceives outwardly from those he sees in
imagination. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "Those images
of bodies which are formed in the soul are seen just as bodily things
themselves are seen by the body, so that we see with our eyes one who
is present, and at the same time we see with the soul one who is
absent, as though we saw him with our eyes."
Yet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophets
without subverting the order of nature, as is the case with those who
are possessed or out of their senses; but is due to some well-ordered
cause. This cause may be natural---for instance, sleep---or
spiritual---for instance, the intenseness of the prophets'
contemplation; thus we read of Peter (Acts 10:9) that while he was
praying in the supper-room [*Vulg.: 'the house-top' or 'upper-chamber']
"he fell into an ecstasy"---or he may be carried away by the Divine
power, according to the saying of Ezechiel 1:3: "The hand of the Lord
was upon him."
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted refers to prophets in whom
imaginary pictures were formed or coordinated, either while asleep,
which is denoted by the word "dream," or while awake, which is
signified by the word "vision."
Reply to Objection 2: When the mind is intent, in its act, upon distant
things which are far removed from the senses, the intensity of its
application leads to abstraction from the senses; but when it is
intent, in its act, upon the coordination of or judgment concerning
objects of sense, there is no need for abstraction from the senses.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the prophetic mind results not
from its own power, but from a power acting on it from above. Hence
there is no abstraction from the senses when the prophet's mind is led
to judge or coordinate matters relating to objects of sense, but only
when the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more lofty
things.
Reply to Objection 4: The spirit of the prophets is said to be subject
to the prophets as regards the prophetic utterances to which the
Apostle refers in the words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in
declaring what they have seen speak their own mind, and are not thrown
off their mental balance, like persons who are possessed, as Priscilla
and Montanus maintained. But as regards the prophetic revelation
itself, it would be more correct to say that the prophets are subject
to the. spirit of prophecy, i.e. to the prophetic gift.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prophets always know the things which they prophesy?
Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets always know the things
which they prophesy. For, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9),
"those to whom signs were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses of
bodily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless the mind was
brought into action, so that those signs were also understood by them."
Now what is understood cannot be unknown. Therefore the prophet is not
ignorant of what he prophesies.
Objection 2: Further, the light of prophecy surpasses the light of
natural reason. Now one who possesses a science by his natural light,
is not ignorant of his scientific acquirements. Therefore he who utters
things by the prophetic light cannot ignore them.
Objection 3: Further, prophecy is directed for man's enlightenment;
wherefore it is written (2 Pet. 1:19): "We have the more firm
prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that
shineth in a dark place." Now nothing can enlighten others unless it be
lightsome in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is first
enlightened so as to know what he declares to others.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 11:51): "And this he" (Caiphas)
"spoke, not of himself, but being the High Priest of that year, he
prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation," etc. Now Caiphas knew
this not. Therefore not every prophet knows what he prophesies.
I answer that, In prophetic revelation the prophet's mind is moved by
the Holy Ghost, as an instrument that is deficient in regard to the
principal agent. Now the prophet's mind is moved not only to apprehend
something, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes indeed to
all these three together, sometimes to two, sometimes to one only, and
in each case there may be a defect in the prophet's knowledge. For when
the prophet's mind is moved to think or apprehend a thing, sometimes he
is led merely to apprehend that thing, and sometimes he is further led
to know that it is divinely revealed to him.
Again, sometimes the prophet's mind is moved to speak something, so
that he understands what the Holy Ghost means by the words he utters;
like David who said (2 Kings 23:2): "The Spirit of the Lord hath spoken
by me"; while, on the other hand, sometimes the person whose mind is
moved to utter certain words knows not what the Holy Ghost means by
them, as was the case with Caiphas (Jn. 11:51).
Again, when the Holy Ghost moves a man's mind to do something,
sometimes the latter understands the meaning of it, like Jeremias who
hid his loin-cloth in the Euphrates (Jer. 13:1-11); while sometimes he
does not understand it---thus the soldiers, who divided Christ's
garments, understood not the meaning of what they did.
Accordingly, when a man knows that he is being moved by the Holy Ghost
to think something, or signify something by word or deed, this belongs
properly to prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his knowing it,
this is not perfect prophecy, but a prophetic instinct. Nevertheless it
must be observed that since the prophet's mind is a defective
instrument, as stated above, even true prophets know not all that the
Holy Ghost means by the things they see, or speak, or even do.
And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections, since the
arguments given at the beginning refer to true prophets whose minds are
perfectly enlightened from above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head
there are six points of inquiry:
(1) The division of prophecy into its species;
(2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without
imaginative vision?
(3) The various degrees of prophecy;
(4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?
(5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet?
(6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on?
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Whether prophecy is fittingly divided into the prophecy of divine
predestination, of foreknowledge, and of denunciation?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is unfittingly divided
according to a gloss on Mat. 1:23, "Behold a virgin shall be with
child," where it is stated that "one kind of prophecy proceeds from the
Divine predestination, and must in all respects be accomplished so that
its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the one in
question. Another prophecy proceeds from God's foreknowledge: and into
this our will enters. And another prophecy is called denunciation,
which is significative of God's disapproval." For that which results
from every prophecy should not be reckoned a part of prophecy. Now all
prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge, since the prophets
"read in the book of foreknowledge," as a gloss says on Is. 38:1.
Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to foreknowledge should
not be reckoned a species of prophecy.
Objection 2: Further, just as something is foretold in denunciation, so
is something foretold in promise, and both of these are subject to
alteration. For it is written (Jer. 18:7,8): "I will suddenly speak
against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down,
and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall
repent of their evil, I also will repent"---and this pertains to the
prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text continues in
reference to the prophecy of promise (Jer. 18:9,10): "I will suddenly
speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant it. If it
shall do evil in My sight . . . I will repent of the good that I have
spoken to do unto it." Therefore as there is reckoned to be a prophecy
of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of promise.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): "There are seven
kinds of prophecy. The first is an ecstasy, which is the transport of
the mind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all
manner of beasts therein. The second kind is a vision, as we read in
Isaias, who says (Is. 6:1): 'I saw the Lord sitting,' etc. The third
kind is a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind
is from the midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth kind
is a voice from heaven, as that which called to Abraham saying (Gn.
22:11): 'Lay not thy hand upon the boy.' The sixth kind is taking up a
parable, as in the example of Balaam (Num. 23:7; 24:15). The seventh
kind is the fullness of the Holy Ghost, as in the case of nearly all
the prophets." Further, he mentions three kinds of vision; "one by the
eyes of the body, another by the soul's imagination, a third by the
eyes of the mind." Now these are not included in the aforesaid
division. Therefore it is insufficient.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss above
quoted is ascribed.
I answer that, The species of moral habits and acts are distinguished
according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy is something
known by God and surpassing the faculty of man. Wherefore, according to
the difference of such things, prophecy is divided into various
species, as assigned above. Now it has been stated above (Q[71], A[6],
ad 2) that the future is contained in the Divine knowledge in two ways.
First, as in its cause: and thus we have the prophecy of
"denunciation," which is not always fulfilled. but it foretells the
relation of cause to effect, which is sometimes hindered by some other
occurrence supervening. Secondly, God foreknows certain things in
themselves---either as to be accomplished by Himself, and of such
things is the prophecy of "predestination," since, according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30), "God predestines things which are not
in our power"---or as to be accomplished through man's free-will, and
of such is the prophecy of "foreknowledge." This may regard either good
or evil, which does not apply to the prophecy of predestination, since
the latter regards good alone. And since predestination is comprised
under foreknowledge, the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns
only two species to prophecy, namely of "foreknowledge," and of
"denunciation."
Reply to Objection 1: Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes
precognition of future events in themselves, and in this sense it is
reckoned a species of prophecy. But in so far as it is used in
connection with future events, whether as in themselves, or as in their
causes, it is common to every species of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 2: The prophecy of promise is included in the
prophecy of denunciation, because the aspect of truth is the same in
both. But it is denominated in preference from denunciation, because
God is more inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised
blessings.
Reply to Objection 3: Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner
of prophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of
prophesying---either according to man's cognitive powers, which are
sense, imagination, and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of
vision mentioned both by him and by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii,
6,7)---or according to the different ways in which the prophetic
current is received. Thus as regards the enlightening of the intellect
there is the "fullness of the Holy Ghost" which he mentions in the
seventh place. As to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he
mentions three, namely "dreams," to which he gives the third place;
"vision," which occurs to the prophet while awake and regards any kind
of ordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and
"ecstasy," which results from the mind being uplifted to certain lofty
things, and to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible
signs he reckons three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign
is---either a corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as
"a cloud," which he mentions in the fourth place---or a "voice"
sounding from without and conveyed to man's hearing---this he puts in
the fifth place---or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something
under a similitude, and this pertains to the "parable" to which he
assigns the sixth place.
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Whether the prophecy which is accompanied by intellective and imaginative
vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellective
vision alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the prophecy which has intellective and
imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied by
intellective vision alone. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9):
"He is less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing but the signs
representative of things, by means of the images of things corporeal:
he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed with the understanding of
these signs; but most of all is he a prophet, who excels in both ways,"
and this refers to the prophet who has intellective together with
imaginative vision. Therefore this kind of prophecy is more excellent.
Objection 2: Further, the greater a thing's power is, the greater the
distance to which it extends. Now the prophetic light pertains chiefly
to the mind, as stated above ([3683]Q[173], A[2]). Therefore apparently
the prophecy that extends to the imagination is greater than that which
is confined to the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) distinguishes the
"prophets" from the "sacred writers." Now all those whom he calls
prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, and the like) had intellective
together with imaginative vision: but not those whom he calls sacred
writers, as writing by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost (such as Job,
David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore it would seem more proper to
call prophets those who had intellective together with imaginative
vision, than those who had intellective vision alone.
Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is
impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, except as screened round
about by the many-colored sacred veils." Now the prophetic revelation
is conveyed by the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore it seems that
it cannot be without the veils of phantasms.
On the contrary, A gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter that "the
most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by the mere
inspiration of the Holy Ghost, apart from any outward assistance of
deed, word, vision, or dream."
I answer that, The excellence of the means is measured chiefly by the
end. Now the end of prophecy is the manifestation of a truth that
surpasses the faculty of man. Wherefore the more effective this
manifestation is, the more excellent the prophecy. But it is evident
that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare
contemplation of the truth itself, is more effective than that which is
conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it approaches
nearer to the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in God's
essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a supernatural
truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent than that in
which a supernatural truth is manifested by means of the similitudes of
corporeal things in the vision of the imagination.
Moreover the prophet's mind is shown thereby to be more lofty: even as
in human teaching the hearer, who is able to grasp the bare
intelligible truth the master propounds, is shown to have a better
understanding than one who needs to be taken by the hand and helped by
means of examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in
commendation of David's prophecy (2 Kings 23:3): "The strong one of
Israel spoke to me," and further on (2 Kings 23:4): "As the light of
the morning, when the sun riseth, shineth in the morning without
clouds."
Reply to Objection 1: When a particular supernatural truth has to be
revealed by means of corporeal images, he that has both, namely the
intellectual light and the imaginary vision, is more a prophet than he
that has only one, because his prophecy is more perfect; and it is in
this sense that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the
prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is revealed is greater
than all.
Reply to Objection 2: The same judgment does not apply to things that
are sought for their own sake, as to things sought for the sake of
something else. For in things sought for their own sake, the agent's
power is the more effective according as it extends to more numerous
and more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more of, if he
is able to heal more people, and those who are further removed from
health. on the other hand, in things sought only for the sake of
something else, that agent would seem to have greater power, who is
able to achieve his purpose with fewer means and those nearest to hand:
thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to heal a sick
person by means of fewer and more gentle remedies. Now, in the
prophetic knowledge, imaginary vision is required, not for its own
sake, but on account of the manifestation of the intelligible truth.
Wherefore prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it
less.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that a particular predicate is
applicable to one thing and less properly to another, does not prevent
this latter from being simply better than the former: thus the
knowledge of the blessed is more excellent than the knowledge of the
wayfarer, although faith is more properly predicated of the latter
knowledge, because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In like
manner prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and remoteness from the
intelligible truth; wherefore the name of prophet is more properly
applied to those who see by imaginary vision. And yet the more
excellent prophecy is that which is conveyed by intellectual vision,
provided the same truth be revealed in either case. If, however, the
intellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he may
know some supernatural things, but that he may be able to judge, with
the certitude of divine truth, of things that can be known by human
reason, such intellectual prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed by
an imaginary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this kind
of prophecy that all those had who are included in the ranks of the
prophets, who moreover were called prophets for the special reason that
they exercised the prophetic calling officially. Hence they spoke as
God's representatives, saying to the people: "Thus saith the Lord": but
not so the authors of the "sacred writings," several of whom treated
more frequently of things that can be known by human reason, not in
God's name, but in their own, yet with the assistance of the Divine
light withal.
Reply to Objection 4: In the present life the enlightenment by the
divine ray is not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because
according to his present state of life it is unnatural to man not to
understand without a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to
have phantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any
imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic vision is said
to be without imaginary vision.
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Whether the degrees of prophecy can be distinguished according to the
imaginary vision?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy cannot be
distinguished according to the imaginary vision. For the degrees of a
thing bear relation to something that is on its own account, not on
account of something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual vision is
sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on account of something
else, as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Therefore it would seem that the
degrees of prophecy are distinguished not according to imaginary, but
only according to intellectual, vision.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly for one prophet there is one degree of
prophecy. Now one prophet receives revelation through various imaginary
visions. Therefore a difference of imaginary visions does not entail a
difference of prophecy.
Objection 3: Further, according to a gloss [*Cassiodorus, super Prolog.
Hieron. in Psalt.], prophecy consists of words, deeds, dreams, and
visions. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should not be distinguished
according to imaginary vision, to which vision and dreams pertain,
rather than according to words and deeds.
On the contrary, The medium differentiates the degrees of knowledge:
thus science based on direct [*"Propter quid"] proofs is more excellent
than science based on indirect [*"Quia"] premises or than opinion,
because it comes through a more excellent medium. Now imaginary vision
is a kind of medium in prophetic knowledge. Therefore the degrees of
prophecy should be distinguished according to imaginary vision.
I answer that, As stated above ([3684]Q[173], A[2]), the prophecy
wherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural truth is revealed
through an imaginary vision, holds the mean between the prophecy
wherein a supernatural truth is revealed without imaginary vision, and
that wherein through the intelligible light and without an imaginary
vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining to human
conduct. Now knowledge is more proper to prophecy than is action;
wherefore the lowest degree of prophecy is when a man, by an inward
instinct, is moved to perform some outward action. Thus it is related
of Samson (Judges 15:14) that "the Spirit of the Lord came strongly
upon him, and as the flax [*'Lina.' St. Thomas apparently read 'ligna'
('wood')] is wont to be consumed at the approach of fire, so the bands
with which he was bound were broken and loosed." The second degree of
prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an inward light so as to know
certain things, which, however, do not go beyond the bounds of natural
knowledge: thus it is related of Solomon (3 Kings 4:32,33) that "he
spoke . . . parables . . . and he treated about trees from the cedar
that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that cometh out of the wall, and he
discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and of creeping things and of
fishes": and all of this came from divine inspiration, for it was
stated previously (3 Kings 4:29): "God gave to Solomon wisdom and
understanding exceeding much."
Nevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy properly so called,
because they do not attain to supernatural truth. The prophecy wherein
supernatural truth is manifested through imaginary vision is
differentiated first according to the difference between dreams which
occur during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is awake. The
latter belongs to a higher degree of prophecy, since the prophetic
light that draws the soul away to supernatural things while it is awake
and occupied with sensible things would seem to be stronger than that
which finds a man's soul asleep and withdrawn from objects of sense.
Secondly the degrees of this prophecy are differentiated according to
the expressiveness of the imaginary signs whereby the intelligible
truth is conveyed. And since words are the most expressive signs of
intelligible truth, it would seem to be a higher degree of prophecy
when the prophet, whether awake or asleep, hears words expressive of an
intelligible truth, than when he sees things significative of truth,
for instance "the seven full ears of corn" signified "seven years of
plenty" (Gn. 41:22, 26). In such like signs prophecy would seem to be
the more excellent, according as the signs are more expressive, for
instance when Jeremias saw the burning of the city under the figure of
a boiling cauldron (Jer. 1:13). Thirdly, it is evidently a still higher
degree of prophecy when a prophet not only sees signs of words or
deeds, but also, either awake or asleep, sees someone speaking or
showing something to him, since this proves the prophet's mind to have
approached nearer to the cause of the revelation. Fourthly, the height
of a degree of prophecy may be measured according to the appearance of
the person seen: for it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he who
speaks or shows something to the waking or sleeping prophet be seen by
him under the form of an angel, than if he be seen by him under the
form of man: and higher still is it, if he be seen by the prophet
whether asleep or awake, under the appearance of God, according to Is.
6:1, "I saw the Lord sitting."
But above all these degrees there is a third kind of prophecy, wherein
an intelligible and supernatural truth is shown without any imaginary
vision. However, this goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so
called, as stated above (A[2], ad 3); and consequently the degrees of
prophecy are properly distinguished according to imaginary vision.
Reply to Objection 1: We are unable to know how to distinguish the
intellectual light, except by means of imaginary or sensible signs.
Hence the difference in the intellectual light is gathered from the
difference in the things presented to the imagination.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3685]Q[171], A[2]), prophecy is
by way, not of an abiding habit, but of a transitory passion; wherefore
there is nothing inconsistent if one and the same prophet, at different
times, receive various degrees of prophetic revelation.
Reply to Objection 3: The words and deeds mentioned there do not
pertain to the prophetic revelation, but to the announcement, which is
made according to the disposition of those to whom that which is
revealed to the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by
words, sometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and the working of
miracles, are something consequent upon prophecy, as stated above
([3686]Q[171], A[1]).
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Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?
Objection 1: It would seem that Moses was not the greatest of the
prophets. For a gloss at the beginning of the Psalter says that "David
is called the prophet by way of excellence." Therefore Moses was not
the greatest of all.
Objection 2: Further, greater miracles were wrought by Josue, who made
the sun and moon to stand still (Josh. 10:12-14), and by Isaias, who
made the sun to turn back (Is. 38:8), than by Moses, who divided the
Red Sea (Ex. 14:21). In like manner greater miracles were wrought by
Elias, of whom it is written (Ecclus. 48:4,5): "Who can glory like to
thee? Who raisedst up a dead man from below." Therefore Moses was not
the greatest of the prophets.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 11:11) that "there hath not
risen, among them that are born of women, a greater than John the
Baptist." Therefore Moses was not greater than all the prophets.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 34:10): "There arose no more a
prophet in Israel like unto Moses."
I answer that, Although in some respect one or other of the prophets
was greater than Moses, yet Moses was simply the greatest of all. For,
as stated above [3687](A[3]; Q[171], A[1]), in prophecy we may consider
not only the knowledge, whether by intellectual or by imaginary vision,
but also the announcement and the confirmation by miracles. Accordingly
Moses was greater than the other prophets. First, as regards the
intellectual vision, since he saw God's very essence, even as Paul in
his rapture did, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27). Hence
it is written (Num. 12:8) that he saw God "plainly and not by riddles."
Secondly, as regards the imaginary vision, which he had at his call, as
it were, for not only did he hear words, but also saw one speaking to
him under the form of God, and this not only while asleep, but even
when he was awake. Hence it is written (Ex. 33:11) that "the Lord spoke
to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend."
Thirdly, as regards the working of miracles which he wrought on a whole
nation of unbelievers. Wherefore it is written (Dt. 34:10,11): "There
arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew
face to face: in all the signs and wonders, which He sent by him, to do
in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to his
whole land."
Reply to Objection 1: The prophecy of David approaches near to the
vision of Moses, as regards the intellectual vision, because both
received a revelation of intelligible and supernatural truth, without
any imaginary vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent as
regards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more fully knew and
expressed the mysteries of Christ's incarnation.
Reply to Objection 2: These signs of the prophets mentioned were
greater as to the substance of the thing done; yet the miracles of
Moses were greater as regards the way in which they were done, since
they were wrought on a whole people.
Reply to Objection 3: John belongs to the New Testament, whose
ministers take precedence even of Moses, since they are spectators of a
fuller revelation, as stated in 2 Cor. 3.
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Whether there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is a degree of prophecy in the
blessed. For, as stated above [3688](A[4]), Moses saw the Divine
essence, and yet he is called a prophet. Therefore in like manner the
blessed can be called prophets.
Objection 2: Further, prophecy is a "divine revelation." Now divine
revelations are made even to the blessed angels. Therefore even blessed
angels can be prophets.
Objection 3: Further, Christ was a comprehensor from the moment of His
conception; and yet He calls Himself a prophet (Mat. 13:57), when He
says: "A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country."
Therefore even comprehensors and the blessed can be called prophets.
Objection 4: Further, it is written of Samuel (Ecclus. 46:23): "He
lifted up his voice from the earth in prophecy to blot out the
wickedness of the nation." Therefore other saints can likewise be
called prophets after they have died.
On the contrary, The prophetic word is compared (2 Pet. 1:19) to a
"light that shineth in a dark place." Now there is no darkness in the
blessed. Therefore they cannot be called prophets.
I answer that, Prophecy denotes vision of some supernatural truth as
being far remote from us. This happens in two ways. First, on the part
of the knowledge itself, because, to wit, the supernatural truth is not
known in itself, but in some of its effects; and this truth will be
more remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal things, than
if it be known in its intelligible effects; and such most of all is the
prophetic vision, which is conveyed by images and likenesses of
corporeal things. Secondly, vision is remote on the part of the seer,
because, to wit, he has not yet attained completely to his ultimate
perfection, according to 2 Cor. 5:6, "While we are in the body, we are
absent from the Lord."
Now in neither of these ways are the blessed remote; wherefore they
cannot be called prophets.
Reply to Objection 1: This vision of Moses was interrupted after the
manner of a passion, and was not permanent like the beatific vision,
wherefore he was as yet a seer from afar. For this reason his vision
did not entirely lose the character of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 2: The divine revelation is made to the angels, not
as being far distant, but as already wholly united to God; wherefore
their revelation has not the character of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ was at the same time comprehensor and
wayfarer [*Cf. TP, QQ[9], seqq.]. Consequently the notion of prophecy
is not applicable to Him as a comprehensor, but only as a wayfarer.
Reply to Objection 4: Samuel had not yet attained to the state of
blessedness. Wherefore although by God's will the soul itself of Samuel
foretold to Saul the issue of the war as revealed to him by God, this
pertains to the nature of prophecy. It is not the same with the saints
who are now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference that this is
stated to have been brought about by the demons' art, because although
the demons are unable to evoke the soul of a saint, or to force it to
do any particular thing, this can be done by the power of God, so that
when the demon is consulted, God Himself declares the truth by His
messenger: even as He gave a true answer by Elias to the King's
messengers who were sent to consult the god of Accaron (4 Kings 1).
It might also be replied [*The Book of Ecclesiasticus was not as yet
declared by the Church to be Canonical Scripture; Cf. [3689]FP, Q[89],
A[8], ad 2] that it was not the soul of Samuel, but a demon
impersonating him; and that the wise man calls him Samuel, and
describes his prediction as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts
of Saul and the bystanders who were of this opinion.
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Whether the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy change as time
goes on. For prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine things, as
stated above [3690](A[2]). Now according to Gregory (Hom. in Ezech.),
"knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on." Therefore
degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to the process of
time.
Objection 2: Further, prophetic revelation is conveyed by God speaking
to man; while the prophets declared both in words and in writing the
things revealed to them. Now it is written (1 Kings 3:1) that before
the time of Samuel "the word of the Lord was precious," i.e. rare; and
yet afterwards it was delivered to many. In like manner the books of
the prophets do not appear to have been written before the time of
Isaias, to whom it was said (Is. 8:1): "Take thee a great book and
write in it with a man's pen," after which many prophets wrote their
prophecies. Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree
of prophecy made progress.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 11:13): "The prophets and the
law prophesied until John"; and afterwards the gift of prophecy was in
Christ's disciples in a much more excellent manner than in the prophets
of old, according to Eph. 3:5, "In other generations" the mystery of
Christ "was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His
holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit." Therefore it would seem that
in course of time the degree of prophecy advanced.
On the contrary, As stated above [3691](A[4]), Moses was the greatest
of the prophets, and yet he preceded the other prophets. Therefore
prophecy did not advance in degree as time went on.
I answer that, As stated above [3692](A[2]), prophecy is directed to
the knowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not
only instructed in faith, but also guided in our actions, according to
Ps. 42:3, "Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted me."
Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the true
knowledge of God, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to God must
believe that He is"; secondly, in the mystery of Christ's incarnation,
according to Jn. 14:1, "You believe in God, believe also in Me."
Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the Godhead as its
end, it progressed according to three divisions of time, namely before
the law, under the law, and under grace. For before the law, Abraham
and the other patriarchs were prophetically taught things pertinent to
faith in the Godhead. Hence they are called prophets, according to Ps.
104:15, "Do no evil to My prophets," which words are said especially on
behalf of Abraham and Isaac. Under the Law prophetic revelation of
things pertinent to faith in the Godhead was made in a yet more
excellent way than hitherto, because then not only certain special
persons or families but the whole people had to be instructed in these
matters. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): "I am the Lord that
appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God
almighty, and My name Adonai I did not show to them"; because
previously the patriarchs had been taught to believe in a general way
in God, one and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the
simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Ex. 3:14):
"I am Who am"; and this name is signified by Jews in the word "Adonai"
on account of their veneration for that unspeakable name. Afterwards in
the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by the Son of
God Himself, according to Mat. 28:19: "Going . . . teach ye all
nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and
of the Holy Ghost."
In each state, however, the most excellent revelation was that which
was given first. Now the first revelation, before the Law, was given to
Abraham, for it was at that time that men began to stray from faith in
one God by turning aside to idolatry, whereas hitherto no such
revelation was necessary while all persevered in the worship of one
God. A less excellent revelation was made to Isaac, being founded on
that which was made to Abraham. Wherefore it was said to him (Gn.
26:24): "I am the God of Abraham thy father," and in like manner to
Jacob (Gn. 28:13): "I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the God of
Isaac." Again in the state of the Law the first revelation which was
given to Moses was more excellent, and on this revelation all the other
revelations to the prophets were founded. And so, too, in the time of
grace the entire faith of the Church is founded on the revelation
vouchsafed to the apostles, concerning the faith in one God and three
Persons, according to Mat. 16:18, "On this rock," i.e. of thy
confession, "I will build My Church."
As to the faith in Christ's incarnation, it is evident that the nearer
men were to Christ, whether before or after Him, the more fully, for
the most part, were they instructed on this point, and after Him more
fully than before, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 3:5).
As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic revelation varied
not according to the course of time, but according as circumstances
required, because as it is written (Prov. 29:18), "When prophecy shall
fail, the people shall be scattered abroad." Wherefore at all times men
were divinely instructed about what they were to do, according as it
was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the elect.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Gregory is to be referred to the
time before Christ's incarnation, as regards the knowledge of this
mystery.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 27), "just
as in the early days of the Assyrian kingdom promises were made most
explicitly to Abraham, so at the outset of the western Babylon," which
is Rome, "and under its sway Christ was to come, in Whom were to be
fulfilled the promises made through the prophetic oracles testifying in
word and writing to that great event to come," the promises, namely,
which were made to Abraham. "For while prophets were scarcely ever
lacking to the people of Israel from the time that they began to have
kings, it was exclusively for their benefit, not for that of the
nations. But when those prophetic writings were being set up with
greater publicity, which at some future time were to benefit the
nations, it was fitting to begin when this city," Rome to wit, "was
being built, which was to govern the nations."
The reason why it behooved that nation to have a number of prophets
especially at the time of the kings, was that then it was not
over-ridden by other nations, but had its own king; wherefore it
behooved the people, as enjoying liberty, to have prophets to teach
them what to do.
Reply to Objection 3: The prophets who foretold the coming of Christ
could not continue further than John, who with his finger pointed to
Christ actually present. Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage,
"This does not mean that there were no more prophets after John. For we
read in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the four maidens,
daughters of Philip, prophesied." John, too, wrote a prophetic book
about the end of the Church; and at all times there have not been
lacking persons having the spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the
declaration of any new doctrine of faith, but for the direction of
human acts. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 26) that "the emperor
Theodosius sent to John who dwelt in the Egyptian desert, and whom he
knew by his ever-increasing fame to be endowed with the prophetic
spirit: and from him he received a message assuring him of victory."
__________________________________________________________________
OF RAPTURE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?
(2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive
power?
(3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God?
(4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses?
(5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from his
body?
(6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away to
things divine. For some define rapture as "an uplifting by the power of
a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to that which
is above nature" [*Reference unknown; Cf. De Veritate xiii, 1]. Now it
is in accordance with man's nature that he be uplifted to things
divine; for Augustine says at the beginning of his Confessions: "Thou
madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is restless, till it rest
in Thee." Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that "God's
justice is seen in this that He treats all things according to their
mode and dignity." But it is not in accordance with man's mode and
worth that he be raised above what he is according to nature. Therefore
it would seem that man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
Objection 3: Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God
rules us not by violence or force, as Damascene says [*De Fide Orth.
ii, 30]. Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:2): "I know a man in
Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven." On which words a gloss
says: "Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to nature."
I answer that, Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above
(OBJ[3]); and "the violent is that which has its principle without, and
in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all" (Ethic. iii, 1).
Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in accordance with its
proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural. Wherefore he who is
carried away by some external agent, must be carried to something
different from that to which his inclination tends. This difference
arises in two ways: in one way from the end of the inclination---for
instance a stone, which is naturally inclined to be borne downwards,
may be thrown upwards; in another way from the manner of tending---for
instance a stone may be thrown downwards with greater velocity than
consistent with its natural movement.
Accordingly man's soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold
manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as regards
the term of transport---as when it is carried away to punishment,
according to Ps. 49:22, "Lest He snatch you away, and there be none to
deliver you"; in another way, as regards the manner connatural to man,
which is that he should understand the truth through sensible things.
Hence when he is withdrawn from the apprehension of sensibles, he is
said to be carried away, even though he be uplifted to things whereunto
he is directed naturally: provided this be not done intentionally, as
when a man betakes himself to sleep which is in accordance with nature,
wherefore sleep cannot be called rapture, properly speaking.
This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold
cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer
abstraction from the senses through weakness: secondly, by the power of
the demons, as in those who are possessed: thirdly, by the power of
God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a man
is uplifted by the spirit of God to things supernatural, and withdrawn
from his senses, according to Ezech. 8:3, "The spirit lifted me up
between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of God
into Jerusalem."
It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be
carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but
also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was attending,
as when a person's mind wanders contrary to his purpose. But this is to
use the expression in a less proper signification.
Reply to Objection 1: It is natural to man to tend to divine things
through the apprehension of things sensible, according to Rom. 1:20,
"The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made." But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted
to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to man's mode and dignity that he be
uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to God's
image. And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty of man
in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance which is
bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not contrary to
nature, but above the faculty of nature that man's mind be thus
uplifted in rapture by God.
Reply to Objection 3: The saying of Damascene refers to those things
which a man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond
the scope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger
operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we
consider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to
which man is directed both by nature and by his intention.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive rather than to the appetitive
power?
Objection 1: It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive
rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
"The Divine love causes ecstasy." Now love pertains to the appetitive
power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that "he who fed the
swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life; whereas
Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into ecstasy, was
not beside himself, but above himself." Now the prodigal son sank into
the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who are carried up
into the heights it is the appetite that is affected.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, "In Thee, O Lord, have I
hoped, let me never be confounded," says in explaining the title [*Unto
the end, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy]: "{Ekstasis} in Greek
signifies in Latin 'excessus mentis,' an aberration of the mind. This
happens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or through
the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this lower
world." Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appetite. Therefore
rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in opposition to
this dread, also pertains to the appetite.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 115:2, "I said in my excess: Every man
is a liar," says: "We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders
through fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of revelation."
Now revelation pertains to the intellective power. Therefore ecstasy or
rapture does also.
I answer that, We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with regard
to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture cannot
pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power. For it was
stated [3693](A[1]) that rapture is outside the inclination of the
person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power is an
inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking, in
desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself.
Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and thus
it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive power. For from the
very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards something, it
may happen, owing to the violence of his affection, that a man is
carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an effect on the
appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in the things to
which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was rapt, not only "to
the third heaven"---which pertains to the contemplation of the
intellect---but also into "paradise," which pertains to the appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy
means simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's
proper order [*Cf. [3694]FS, Q[28], A[3]]; while rapture denotes a
certain violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the
appetitive power, as when a man's appetite tends to something outside
him, and in this sense Dionysius says that "the Divine love causes
ecstasy," inasmuch as it makes man's appetite tend to the object loved.
Hence he says afterwards that "even God Himself, the cause of all
things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside
Himself in His providence for all beings." But even if this were said
expressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause of
rapture.
Reply to Objection 2: There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the
intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive
appetite known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his
lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher
move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the
appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man's intellective appetite
tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things
whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that "Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of Divine
love" exclaimed: "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me."
In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the
lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is thus
that "he who fed the swine debased himself"; and this latter kind of
going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin than the
former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite is more
proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower appetite a
man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite, it is more a
case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to him. Yet, because
there is no violence therein, since the will is able to resist the
passion, it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance
the passion be so strong that it takes away entirely the use of reason,
as happens to those who are mad with anger or love.
It must be observed. however, that both these excesses affecting the
appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because the
mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through being
drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up into some
imaginary vision or fanciful apparition.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as love is a movement of the appetite with
regard to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to
evil. Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind;
and all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Paul, when in rapture, saw the essence of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, did not see the
essence of God. For just as we read of Paul that he was rapt to the
third heaven, so we read of Peter (Acts 10:10) that "there came upon
him an ecstasy of mind." Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not God's
essence but an imaginary vision. Therefore it would seem that neither
did Paul see the essence of God.
Objection 2: Further, the vision of God is beatific. But Paul, in his
rapture, was not beatified; else he would never have returned to the
unhappiness of this life, but his body would have been glorified by the
overflow from his soul, as will happen to the saints after the
resurrection, and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when in
rapture saw not the essence of God.
Objection 3: Further, according to 1 Cor. 13:10-12, faith and hope are
incompatible with the vision of the Divine essence. But Paul when in
this state had faith and hope. Therefore he saw not the essence of God.
Objection 4: Further, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7),
"pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary vision." Now Paul is
stated (2 Cor. 12:2, 4) to have seen certain pictures in his rapture,
for instance of the "third heaven" and of "paradise." Therefore he
would seem to have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to the
vision of the Divine essence.
On the contrary, Augustine (Ep. CXLVII, 13; ad Paulin., de videndo
Deum) concludes that "possibly God's very substance was seen by some
while yet in this life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in
rapture heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto man to
utter."
I answer that, Some have said that Paul, when in rapture, saw "not the
very essence of God, but a certain reflection of His clarity." But
Augustine clearly comes to an opposite decision, not only in his book
(De videndo Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28 (quoted in a gloss
on 2 Cor. 12:2). Indeed the words themselves of the Apostle indicate
this. For he says that "he heard secret words, which it is not granted
unto man to utter": and such would seem to be words pertaining to the
vision of the blessed, which transcends the state of the wayfarer,
according to Is. 64:4, "Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what
things Thou hast prepared for them that love [Vulg.: 'wait for'] Thee"
[*1 Cor. 2:9]. Therefore it is more becoming to hold that he saw God in
His essence.
Reply to Objection 1: Man's mind is rapt by God to the contemplation of
divine truth in three ways. First, so that he contemplates it through
certain imaginary pictures, and such was the ecstasy that came upon
Peter. Secondly, so that he contemplates the divine truth through its
intelligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said (Ps.
115:11): "I said in my excess: Every man is a liar." Thirdly, so that
he contemplates it in its essence. Such was the rapture of Paul, as
also of Moses [*Cf. Q[174], A[4]]; and not without reason, since as
Moses was the first Teacher of the Jews, so was Paul the first "Teacher
of the gentiles" [*Cf. [3695]FP, Q[68], A[4]].
Reply to Objection 2: The Divine essence cannot be seen by a created
intellect save through the light of glory, of which it is written (Ps.
35:10): "In Thy light we shall see light." But this light can be shared
in two ways. First by way of an abiding form, and thus it beatifies the
saints in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory passion, as stated
above ([3696]Q[171] , A[2]) of the light of prophecy; and in this way
that light was in Paul when he was in rapture. Hence this vision did
not beatify him simply, so as to overflow into his body, but only in a
restricted sense. Consequently this rapture pertains somewhat to
prophecy.
Reply to Objection 3: Since, in his rapture, Paul was beatified not as
to the habit, but only as to the act of the blessed, it follows that he
had not the act of faith at the same time, although he had the habit.
Reply to Objection 4: In one way by the third heaven we may understand
something corporeal, and thus the third heaven denotes the empyrean [*1
Tim. 2:7; Cf. [3697]FP, Q[12], A[11], ad 2], which is described as the
"third," in relation to the aerial and starry heavens, or better still,
in relation to the aqueous and crystalline heavens. Moreover Paul is
stated to be rapt to the "third heaven," not as though his rapture
consisted in the vision of something corporeal, but because this place
is appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence the gloss on 2
Cor. 12 says that the "third heaven is a spiritual heaven, where the
angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation of God: and when Paul
says that he was rapt to this heaven he means that God showed him the
life wherein He is to be seen forevermore."
In another way the third heaven may signify a supra-mundane vision.
Such a vision may be called the third heaven in three ways. First,
according to the order of the cognitive powers. In this way the first
heaven would indicate a supramundane bodily vision, conveyed through
the senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall (Dan.
5:5); the second heaven would be an imaginary vision such as Isaias
saw, and John in the Apocalypse; and the third heaven would denote an
intellectual vision according to Augustine's explanation (Gen. ad lit.
xii, 26,28,34). Secondly, the third heaven may be taken according to
the order of things knowable, the first heaven being "the knowledge of
heavenly bodies, the second the knowledge of heavenly spirits, the
third the knowledge of God Himself." Thirdly, the third heaven may
denote the contemplation of God according to the degrees of knowledge
whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees belongs to the angels
of the lowest hierarchy [*Cf. [3698]FP, Q[108], A[1]], the second to
the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the angels of the
highest hierarchy, according to the gloss on 2 Cor. 12.
And since the vision of God cannot be without delight, he says that he
was not only "rapt to the third heaven" by reason of his contemplation,
but also into "Paradise" by reason of the consequent delight.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Paul, when in rapture, was withdrawn from his senses?
Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, was not
withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28):
"Why should we not believe that when so great an apostle, the teacher
of the gentiles, was rapt to this most sublime vision, God was willing
to vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to take the
place of the present life?" Now in that future life after the
resurrection the saints will see the Divine essence without being
withdrawn from the senses of the body. Therefore neither did such a
withdrawal take place in Paul.
Objection 2: Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, and also enjoyed an
uninterrupted vision of the Divine essence, without, however, being
withdrawn from His senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be
withdrawn from his senses in order for him to see the essence of God.
Objection 3: Further, after seeing God in His essence, Paul remembered
what he had seen in that vision; hence he said (2 Cor. 12:4): "He heard
secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter." Now the memory
belongs to the sensitive faculty according to the Philosopher (De Mem.
et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while seeing the essence of
God, was not withdrawn from his senses.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27): "Unless a man
in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his
body or by turning away and withdrawing from his carnal senses, so that
he truly knows not as the Apostle said, whether he be in the body or
out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that vision.*" [*The
text of St. Augustine reads: "when he is rapt," etc.]
I answer that, The Divine essence cannot be seen by man through any
cognitive power other than the intellect. Now the human intellect does
not turn to intelligible objects except by means of the phantasms [*Cf.
[3699]FP, Q[84], A[7]] which it takes from the senses through the
intelligible species; and it is in considering these phantasms that the
intellect judges of and coordinates sensible objects. Hence in any
operation that requires abstraction of the intellect from phantasms,
there must be also withdrawal of the intellect from the senses. Now in
the state of the wayfarer it is necessary for man's intellect, if it
see God's essence, to be withdrawn from phantasms. For God's essence
cannot be seen by means of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created
intelligible species [*Cf. [3700]FP, Q[12], A[2]], since God's essence
infinitely transcends not only all bodies, which are represented by
phantasms, but also all intelligible creatures. Now when man's
intellect is uplifted to the sublime vision of God's essence, it is
necessary that his mind's whole attention should be summoned to that
purpose in such a way that he understand naught else by phantasms, and
be absorbed entirely in God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a
wayfarer to see God in His essence without being withdrawn from his
senses.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[3], OBJ[2]), after the
resurrection, in the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be
an overflow from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the
body. Hence it is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision
that the soul will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But
there is no such overflow in those who are raptured, as stated (A[3],
OBJ[2], ad 2), and consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect of Christ's soul was glorified by
the habit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the Divine essence much
more fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on
account of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He was
"made a little lower than the angels" (Heb. 2:9), by dispensation, and
not on account of any defect on the part of His intellect. Hence there
is no comparison between Him and other wayfarers.
Reply to Objection 3: Paul, after seeing God in His essence, remembered
what he had known in that vision, by means of certain intelligible
species that remained in his intellect by way of habit; even as in the
absence of the sensible object, certain impressions remain in the soul
which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so this was the
knowledge that he was unable wholly to think over or express in words.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, while in this state, Paul's soul was wholly separated from his
body?
Objection 1: It would seem that, while in this state, Paul's soul was
wholly separated from his body. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6,7):
"While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by
faith, and not by sight" [*'Per speciem,' i.e. by an intelligible
species]. Now, while in that state, Paul was not absent from the Lord,
for he saw Him by a species, as stated above [3701](A[3]). Therefore he
was not in the body.
Objection 2: Further, a power of the soul cannot be uplifted above the
soul's essence wherein it is rooted. Now in this rapture the intellect,
which is a power of the soul, was withdrawn from its bodily
surroundings through being uplifted to divine contemplation. Much more
therefore was the essence of the soul separated from the body.
Objection 3: Further, the forces of the vegetative soul are more
material than those of the sensitive soul. Now in order for him to be
rapt to the vision of God, it was necessary for him to be withdrawn
from the forces of the sensitive soul, as stated above [3702](A[4]).
Much more, therefore, was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the
forces of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces cease to operate,
the soul is no longer in any way united to the body. Therefore it would
seem that in Paul's rapture it was necessary for the soul to be wholly
separated from the body.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad Paulin.; de videndo
Deum): "It is not incredible that this sublime revelation" (namely,
that they should see God in His essence) "was vouchsafed certain
saints, without their departing this life so completely as to leave
nothing but a corpse for burial." Therefore it was not necessary for
Paul's soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated from his body.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], OBJ[1]), in the rapture of which
we are speaking now, man is uplifted by God's power, "from that which
is according to nature to that which is above nature." Wherefore two
things have to be considered: first, what pertains to man according to
nature; secondly, what has to be done by God in man above his nature.
Now, since the soul is united to the body as its natural form, it
belongs to the soul to have a natural disposition to understand by
turning to phantasms; and this is not withdrawn by the divine power
from the soul in rapture, since its state undergoes no change, as
stated above (A[3], ad 2,3). Yet, this state remaining, actual
conversion to phantasms and sensible objects is withdrawn from the
soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which transcends
all phantasms, as stated above [3703](A[4]). Therefore it was not
necessary that his soul in rapture should be so separated from the body
as to cease to be united thereto as its form; and yet it was necessary
for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms and the perception of
sensible objects.
Reply to Objection 1: In this rapture Paul was absent from the Lord as
regards his state, since he was still in the state of a wayfarer, but
not as regards the act by which he saw God by a species, as stated
above (A[3], ad 2,3).
Reply to Objection 2: A faculty of the soul is not uplifted by the
natural power above the mode becoming the essence of the soul; but it
can be uplifted by the divine power to something higher, even as a body
by the violence of a stronger power is lifted up above the place
befitting it according to its specific nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The forces of the vegetative soul do not operate
through the soul being intent thereon, as do the sensitive forces, but
by way of nature. Hence in the case of rapture there is no need for
withdrawal from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose operations
would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective knowledge.
__________________________________________________________________
Did Paul know whether his soul were separated from his body?
Objection 1: It would seem that Paul was not ignorant whether his soul
were separated from his body. For he says (2 Cor. 12:2): "I know a man
in Christ rapt even to the third heaven." Now man denotes something
composed of soul and body; and rapture differs from death. Seemingly
therefore he knew that his soul was not separated from his body by
death, which is the more probable seeing that this is the common
opinion of the Doctors.
Objection 2: Further, it appears from the same words of the Apostle
that he knew whither he was rapt, since it was "to the third heaven."
Now this shows that he knew whether he was in the body or not, for if
he knew the third heaven to be something corporeal, he must have known
that his soul was not separated from his body, since a corporeal thing
cannot be an object of sight save through the body. Therefore it would
seem that he was not ignorant whether his soul were separated from his
body.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28) that "when
in rapture, he saw God with the same vision as the saints see Him in
heaven." Now from the very fact that the saints see God, they know
whether their soul is separated from their body. Therefore Paul too
knew this.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 12:3): "Whether in the body, or
out of the body, I know not, God knoweth."
I answer that, The true answer to this question must be gathered from
the Apostle's very words, whereby he says he knew something, namely
that he was "rapt even to the third heaven," and that something he knew
not, namely "whether" he were "in the body or out of the body." This
may be understood in two ways. First, the words "whether in the body or
out of the body" may refer not to the very being of the man who was
rapt (as though he knew not whether his soul were in his body or not),
but to the mode of rapture, so that he ignored whether his body besides
his soul, or, on the other hand, his soul alone, were rapt to the third
heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated (Ezech. 8:3) to have been "brought in
the vision of God into Jerusalem." This was the explanation of a
certain Jew according to Jerome (Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says
that "lastly our Apostle" (thus said the Jew) "durst not assert that he
was rapt in his body, but said: 'Whether in the body or out of the
body, I know not.'"
Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation (Gen. ad lit. xii,
3 seqq.) for this reason that the Apostle states that he knew he was
rapt even to the third heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really the
third heaven to which he was rapt, and not an imaginary likeness of the
third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third heaven to an
imaginary third heaven, in the same way he might state that he was rapt
in the body, meaning, by body, an image of his body, such as appears in
one's dreams. Now if he knew it to be really the third heaven, it
follows that either he knew it to be something spiritual and
incorporeal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he knew it
to be something corporeal, and then his soul could not be rapt thither
without his body, unless it were separated from his body. Consequently
we must explain the matter otherwise, by saying that the Apostle knew
himself to be rapt both in soul and body, but that he ignored how his
soul stood in relation to his body, to wit, whether it were accompanied
by his body or not.
Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say that the Apostle
knew his soul to be united to his body as its form, but ignored whether
it were abstracted from its senses, or again whether it were abstracted
from the operations of the vegetative soul. But he could not but know
that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that he knew himself to
be rapt; and as to his being abstracted from the operation of the
vegetative soul, this was not of such importance as to require him to
be so careful in mentioning it. It follows, then, that the Apostle
ignored whether his soul were united to his body as its form, or
separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this say that the
Apostle did not consider the matter while he was in rapture, because he
was wholly intent upon God, but that afterwards he questioned the
point, when taking cognizance of what he had seen. But this also is
contrary to the Apostle's words, for he there distinguishes between the
past and what happened subsequently, since he states that at the
present time he knows that he was rapt "fourteen years ago," and that
at the present time he knows not "whether he was in the body or out of
the body."
Consequently we must assert that both before and after he ignored
whether his soul were separated from his body. Wherefore Augustine
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 5), after discussing the question at length,
concludes: "Perhaps then we must infer that he ignored whether, when he
was rapt to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the same way
as the soul is in the body, when we speak of a living body either of a
waking or of a sleeping man, or of one that is withdrawn from his
bodily senses during ecstasy), or whether his soul went out of his body
altogether, so that his body lay dead."
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes by the figure of synecdoche a part of
man, especially the soul which is the principal part, denotes a man. or
again we might take this to mean that he whom he states to have been
rapt was a man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen years
afterwards: for he says "I know a man," not "I know a rapt man." Again
nothing hinders death brought about by God being called rapture; and
thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3): "If the Apostle doubted the
matter, who of us will dare to be certain about it?" Wherefore those
who have something to say on this subject speak with more conjecture
than certainty.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle knew that either the heaven in
question was something incorporeal, or that he saw something
incorporeal in that heaven; yet this could be done by his intellect,
even without his soul being separated from his body.
Reply to Objection 3: Paul's vision, while he was in rapture, was like
the vision of the blessed in one respect, namely as to the thing seen;
and, unlike, in another respect, namely as to the mode of seeing,
because he saw not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 36): "Although, when the Apostle was
rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he lacked that full
and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels, in that he knew
not whether he was in the body, or out of the body, this will surely
not be lacking after reunion with the body in the resurrection of the
dead, when this corruptible will put on incorruption."
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OF THE GRACE OF TONGUES (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider those gratuitous graces that pertain to speech,
and (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of the word of wisdom and
knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the knowledge of all
languages?
(2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace of prophecy.
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Whether those who received the gift of tongues spoke in every language?
Objection 1: It seems that those who received the gift of tongues did
not speak in every language. For that which is granted to certain
persons by the divine power is the best of its kind: thus our Lord
turned the water into good wine, as stated in Jn. 2:10. Now those who
had the gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since a
gloss on Heb. 1, says that "it is not surprising that the epistle to
the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the other epistles, since it
is natural for a man to have more command over his own than over a
strange language. For the Apostle wrote the other epistles in a
foreign, namely the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the Hebrew
tongue." Therefore the apostles did not receive the knowledge of all
languages by a gratuitous grace.
Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one is
sufficient; and much less does God Whose work is more orderly than
nature's. Now God could make His disciples to be understood by all,
while speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts 2:6, "Every man heard
them speak in his own tongue," says that "they spoke in every tongue,
or speaking in their own, namely the Hebrew language, were understood
by all, as though they spoke the language proper to each." Therefore it
would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in all languages.
Objection 3: Further, all graces flow from Christ to His body, which is
the Church, according to Jn. 1:16, "Of His fullness we all have
received." Now we do not read that Christ spoke more than one language,
nor does each one of the faithful now speak save in one tongue.
Therefore it would seem that Christ's disciples did not receive the
grace to the extent of speaking in all languages.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 2:4) that "they were all filled
with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers tongues,
according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak"; on which passage a
gloss of Gregory [*Hom. xxx in Ev.] says that "the Holy Ghost appeared
over the disciples under the form of fiery tongues, and gave them the
knowledge of all tongues."
I answer that, Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order
that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His
faith everywhere, according to Mat. 28:19, "Going . . . teach ye all
nations." Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to teach
others should need to be taught by others, either as to how they should
speak to other people, or as to how they were to understand those who
spoke to them; and all the more seeing that those who were being sent
were of one nation, that of Judea, according to Is. 27:6, "When they
shall rush out from Jacob [*Vulg.: 'When they shall rush in unto
Jacob,' etc.] . . . they shall fill the face of the world with seed."
Moreover those who were being sent were poor and powerless; nor at the
outset could they have easily found someone to interpret their words
faithfully to others, or to explain what others said to them,
especially as they were sent to unbelievers. Consequently it was
necessary, in this respect, that God should provide them with the gift
of tongues; in order that, as the diversity of tongues was brought upon
the nations when they fell away to idolatry, according to Gn. 11, so
when the nations were to be recalled to the worship of one God a remedy
to this diversity might be applied by the gift of tongues.
Reply to Objection 1: As it is written (1 Cor. 12:7), "the
manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and
consequently both Paul and the other apostles were divinely instructed
in the languages of all nations sufficiently for the requirements of
the teaching of the faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of
style which human art adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in
his own, but not in a foreign tongue. Even so they were sufficiently
instructed in wisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching
the faith, but not as to all things known by acquired science, for
instance the conclusions of arithmetic and geometry.
Reply to Objection 2: Although either was possible, namely that, while
speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they
should speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should speak
in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection of their
knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also to
understand what was said by others. Whereas if their one language were
intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the knowledge
of those who understood their speech, or it would have amounted to an
illusion, since a man's words would have had a different sound in
another's ears, from that with which they were uttered. Hence a gloss
says on Acts 2:6 that "it was a greater miracle that they should speak
all kinds of tongues"; and Paul says (1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I
speak with all your tongues."
Reply to Objection 3: Christ in His own person purposed preaching to
only one nation, namely the Jews. Consequently, although without any
doubt He possessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there
was no need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore, as
Augustine says (Tract. xxxii in Joan.), "whereas even now the Holy
Ghost is received, yet no one speaks in the tongues of all nations,
because the Church herself already speaks the languages of all nations:
since whoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost."
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Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent
than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper to
better persons, according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now the
gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing in the
sequence of Pentecost [*The sequence: 'Sancti Spiritus adsit nobis
gratia' ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author of the
'Veni Sancte Spiritus.' Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI]: "On this day
Thou gavest Christ's apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to all time":
whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament, according to
Heb. 1:1, "God Who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times
past to the fathers by the prophets." Therefore it would seem that the
gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy.
Objection 2: Further, that whereby we are directed to God is seemingly
more excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by the
gift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is
directed to man; for it is written (1 Cor. 14:2,3): "He that speaketh
in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but he that
prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification." Therefore it would
seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of
prophecy.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of tongues abides like a habit in the
person who has it, and "he can use it when he will"; wherefore it is
written (1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I speak with all your tongues."
But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above
([3704]Q[171], A[2]). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be
more excellent than the gift of prophecy.
Objection 4: Further, the "interpretation of speeches" would seem to be
contained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded by the
same Spirit from Whom they originated. Now the interpretation of
speeches is placed after "divers kinds of tongues" (1 Cor. 12:10).
Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the
gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part of the latter.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:5): "Greater is he that
prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues."
I answer that, The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues, in
three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the utterance of
certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and this again is
signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary vision;
wherefore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift of tongues
to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has been stated above
([3705]Q[173], A[2]) that the gift of prophecy consists in the mind
itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth.
Wherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment is more excellent than the
imaginary vision, as stated above ([3706]Q[174], A[2]), so also is
prophecy more excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself.
Secondly, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge of things,
which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which the gift
of tongues pertains.
Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable. The Apostle
proves this in three ways (1 Cor. 14); first, because prophecy is more
profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose he that
speaketh in tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation follow (1
Cor. 14:4,5). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself, for if he be
enabled to speak in divers tongues without understanding them, which
pertains to the gift of prophecy, his own mind would not be edified (1
Cor. 14:7-14). Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose especial benefit
the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since perchance they
might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (1 Cor. 14:23), for
instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the latter spoke in
various tongues (Acts 2:13): whereas by prophecies the unbeliever is
convinced, because the secrets of his heart are made manifest (Acts
2:25).
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3707]Q[174], A[3], ad 1), it
belongs to the excellence of prophecy that a man is not only
enlightened by an intelligible light, but also that he should perceive
an imaginary vision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the
Holy Ghost's operation, not only to fill the mind with the prophetic
light, and the imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in
the Old Testament, but also to endow the tongue with external
erudition, in the utterance of various signs of speech. All this is
done in the New Testament, according to 1 Cor. 14:26, "Every one of you
hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation," i.e.
a prophetic revelation.
Reply to Objection 2: By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in
his mind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his
tongue. "He that speaketh in a tongue "is said to speak "not unto men,"
i.e. to men's understanding or profit, but unto God's understanding and
praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is directed both to God
and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect gift.
Reply to Objection 3: Prophetic revelation extends to the knowledge of
all things supernatural; wherefore from its very perfection it results
that in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by way
of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. on the other hand,
the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular knowledge,
namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent with the
imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly and by way
of habit.
Reply to Objection 4: The interpretation of speeches is reducible to
the gift of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to
understand and explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a
difficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered being
unknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan.
5:16, "I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure things,
and resolve difficult things." Hence the interpretation of speeches is
more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from the saying of
the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:5), "Greater is he that prophesieth than he that
speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he interpret." Yet the
interpretation of speeches is placed after the gift of tongues, because
the interpretation of speeches extends even to the interpretation of
divers kinds of tongues.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of
which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit is
given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge." Under
this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?
(2) To whom is the grace becoming?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?
Objection 1: It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to
words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of
nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a
man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade, as Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the grace of
words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is not a
gratuitous grace.
Objection 2: Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech, but
in power." Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with words.
Objection 3: Further, no grace is given through merit, since "if by
grace, it is not now of works" (Rom. 11:6). But the word is sometimes
given to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in
explanation of Ps. 118:43, "Take not Thou the word of truth utterly out
of my mouth" that "the word of truth is that which Almighty God gives
to them that do it, and takes away from them that do it not." Therefore
it would seem that the gift of the word is not a gratuitous grace.
Objection 4: Further, it behooves man to declare in words things
pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to the
gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom and the
word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of faith
should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 6:5): "A gracious tongue in a
good man shall abound [Vulg.: 'aboundeth']." Now man's goodness is by
grace. Therefore graciousness in words is also by grace.
I answer that, The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of
others, as stated above ([3708]FS, Q[111], AA[1],4). Now the knowledge
a man receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by
means of speech. And since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything
that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members
of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only speaks so
as to be understood by different people, which pertains to the gift of
tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains to the grace
"of the word."
This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the intellect,
and this is the case when a man speaks so as "to teach." Secondly, in
order to move the affections, so that a man willingly hearkens to the
word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as "to please" his
hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order to draw
them to listen to God's word. Thirdly, in order that men may love that
which is signified by the word, and desire to fulfill it, and this is
the case when a man so speaks as "to sway" his hearers. In order to
effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the human tongue as of an
instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work within. Hence Gregory
says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in Ev.): "Unless the Holy
Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain does the voice of the
teacher resound in the ears of the body."
Reply to Objection 1: Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a
more excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the
Holy Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which
art can effect in a less efficient manner.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the word that
relies on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost.
Wherefore he says just before (1 Cor. 4:19): "I . . . will know, not
the speech of them that are puffed up, but the power": and of himself
he had already said (1 Cor. 2:4): "My speech and my preaching was not
in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the
spirit and power."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the grace of the word is given
to a man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes
through the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the
speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this grace
directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying grace
also is withdrawn on account of a person's fault, and yet he does not
merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the obstacles to
grace.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, the grace of the word is
directed to the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith
to others this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "to know how faith may profit the
godly and be defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the
Apostle means by knowledge." Hence it was not necessary for him to
mention the word of faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the
word of knowledge and of wisdom.
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Whether the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming to women?
Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and
knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to this
grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to a
woman to teach; for it is written (Prov. 4:3,4): "I was an only son in
the sight of my mother, and she taught me [*Vulg.: 'I was my father's
son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother. And he
taught me.']." Therefore this grace is becoming to women.
Objection 2: Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace
of the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than its
utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah
(Judges 4:4), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4 Kings
22:14), and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9). Moreover the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:5): "Every woman praying or prophesying," etc.
Much more therefore would it seem that the grace of the word is
becoming to a woman.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 4:10): "As every man hath
received grace ministering the same one to another." Now some women
receive the grace of wisdom and knowledge, which they cannot minister
to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the
word is becoming to women.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34): "Let women keep
silence in the churches," and (1 Tim. 2:12): "I suffer not a woman to
teach." Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word.
Therefore the grace of the word is not becoming to women.
I answer that, Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way
privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this
respect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another way,
publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is not
permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the condition
attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be subject to man, as
appears from Gn. 3:16. Now teaching and persuading publicly in the
church belong not to subjects but to the prelates (although men who are
subjects may do these things if they be so commissioned, because their
subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it is with women,
but of some thing supervening by accident). Secondly, lest men's minds
be enticed to lust, for it is written (Ecclus. 9:11): "Her conversation
burneth as fire." Thirdly, because as a rule women are not perfected in
wisdom, so as to be fit to be intrusted with public teaching.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks of private teaching
whereby a father instructs his son.
Reply to Objection 2: The grace of prophecy consists in God
enlightening the mind, on the part of which there is no difference of
sex among men, according to Col. 3:10,11, "Putting on the new" man,
"him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that
created him, where there is neither male nor female [*Vulg.: 'Neither
Gentile nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor
Scythian, bond nor free.' Cf. [3709]FP, Q[93], A[6], ad 2 footnote]."
Now the grace of the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom
the difference of sex is found. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: The recipients of a divinely conferred grace
administer it in different ways according to their various conditions.
Hence women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can
administer it by teaching privately but not publicly.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there are
two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
(2) To whom is it becoming?
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Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that no gratuitous grace is directed to the
working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one to whom
it is given (Cf. [3710]FS, Q[90], A[1]). Now the working of miracles
puts nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles are
wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we read (4 Kings 13:21)
that "some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus. And when
it had touched the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life, and stood
upon his feet." Therefore the working of miracles does not belong to a
gratuitous grace.
Objection 2: Further, the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost,
according to 1 Cor. 12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the
same Spirit." Now the working of miracles is effected even by the
unclean spirit, according to Mat. 24:24, "There shall arise false
Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders."
Therefore it would seem that the working of miracles does not belong to
a gratuitous grace.
Objection 3: Further, miracles are divided into "signs," "wonders" or
"portents," and "virtues." [*Cf. 2 Thess. 2:9, where the Douay version
renders 'virtus' by 'power.' The use of the word 'virtue' in the sense
of a miracle is now obsolete, and the generic term 'miracle' is
elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 1 Cor. 12:10, 28; Heb. 2:4; Acts
2:22]. Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the "working of miracles"
a gratuitous grace, any more than the "working of signs" and "wonders."
Objection 4: Further, the miraculous restoring to health is done by the
power of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be
distinguished from the working of miracles.
Objection 5: Further, the working of miracles results from
faith---either of the worker, according to 1 Cor. 13:2, "If I should
have all faith, so that I could remove mountains," or of other persons
for whose sake miracles are wrought, according to Mat. 13:58, "And He
wrought not many miracles there, because of their unbelief." Therefore,
if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in
addition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9,10) says that among other
gratuitous graces, "to another" is given "the grace of healing . . . to
another, the working of miracles."
I answer that, As stated above ([3711]Q[177], A[1]), the Holy Ghost
provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto
salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now
just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be brought
to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and the grace of
the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed in order that
it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of miracles,
according to Mk. 16:20, "And confirming the word with signs that
followed": and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the
intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just as man
led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some knowledge of God
through His natural effects, so is he brought to a certain degree of
supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by certain supernatural
effects which are called miracles. Therefore the working of miracles
belongs to a gratuitous grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known
supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that
can be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence
which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is impossible
for the principle of working miracles to be a quality abiding as a
habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the prophet's mind is
moved by divine inspiration to know something supernaturally, so too is
it possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do
something resulting in the miraculous effect which God causes by His
power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when Peter raised to
life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40): sometimes without any previous
prayer being expressed, as when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias
and Saphira delivered them to death (Acts 5:4, 9). Hence Gregory says
(Dial. ii, 30) that "the saints work miracles, sometimes by authority,
sometimes by prayer." In either case, however, God is the principal
worker, for He uses instrumentally either man's inward movement, or his
speech, or some outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a
dead body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively (Josh.
10:12): "Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon," it is said afterwards (Josh.
10:14): "There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying
the voice of a man."
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be
wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2 Thess.
2:9) that the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of
Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." To quote the words
of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), "it is a matter of debate whether
they are called signs and lying wonders, because he will deceive the
senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he will seem to do what
he does not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will seduce
into falsehood them that believe." They are said to be real, because
the things themselves will be real, just as Pharaoh's magicians made
real frogs and real serpents; but they will not be real miracles,
because they will be done by the power of natural causes, as stated in
the [3712]FP, Q[114], A[4]; whereas the working of miracles which is
ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is done by God's power for man's
profit.
Reply to Objection 3: Two things may be considered in miracles. One is
that which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature,
and in this respect miracles are called "virtues." The other thing is
the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation of
something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly called
"signs": but on account of some excellence they receive the name of
"wonder" or "prodigy," as showing something from afar [procul].
Reply to Objection 4: The "grace of healing" is mentioned separately,
because by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on
man in addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely
the bringing of men to the knowledge of God.
Reply to Objection 5: The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for
two reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of
faith, secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which
faith relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the
grace of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the
faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be
confirmed in their faith.
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Whether the wicked can work miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For
miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now
the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to Jn. 9:31, "We know
that God doth not hear sinners," and Prov. 28:9, "He that turneth away
his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination."
Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles.
Objection 2: Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Mat.
17:19, "If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to
this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove." Now
"faith without works is dead," according to James 2:20, so that,
seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would
seem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work
miracles.
Objection 3: Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to
Heb. 2:4, "God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and
divers miracles": wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain
persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear
witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men cannot
work miracles.
Objection 4: Further, the good are more closely united to God than the
wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do
the wicked.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should have all
faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am
nothing." Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because "this gift
alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from
the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18).
Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work miracles.
I answer that, Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, because
they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while others
are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true miracle,
because they are done by the power of some natural cause. Both of these
can be done by the demons, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God
works them for man's benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for the
confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a person's
holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of virtue. In the
first way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the true
faith and calls upon Christ's name, as even the wicked do sometimes. In
this way even the wicked can work miracles. Hence Jerome commenting on
Mat. 7:22, "Have not we prophesied in Thy name?" says: "Sometimes
prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are
accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but to the
invoking of Christ's name, that men may honor God, by invoking Whom
such great miracles are wrought."
In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, since
it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought during their
lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by others. For we read
(Acts 19:11,12) that "God wrought by the hand of Paul . . . miracles"
and "even there were brought from his body to the sick, handkerchiefs .
. . and the diseases departed from them." In this way indeed there is
nothing to prevent a sinner from working miracles by invoking a saint;
but the miracle is ascribed not to him, but to the one in proof of
whose holiness such things are done.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3713]Q[83], A[16]) when we were
treating of prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but
on God's mercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers
even of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says
(Tract. xliv in Joan.) that "the blind man spoke these words before he
was anointed," that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; "since God
does hear sinners." When it is said that the prayer of one who hears
not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the
sinner's merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for
the spiritual welfare of the one who prays---as the publican was heard
(Lk. 18:14)---or for the good of others and for God's glory.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as
regards the believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace.
But nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead
instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while
employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner.
Reply to Objection 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose
for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine
never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although
sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which they invoke,
and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach
a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as confirming their
teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness. Hence Augustine says
(QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): "Magicians work miracles in one way, good
Christians in another, wicked Christians in another. Magicians by
private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest
righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness."
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), "the
reason why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most
baneful error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply
greater gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is
obtained."
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OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration
will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into active and
contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life;
(4) Of the comparison between the active and the contemplative life.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
(2) Whether this is an adequate division?
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Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into
active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by its
essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in living
things to live is to be." Now the soul is the principle of action and
contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not
fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is
unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and
contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of the
intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to
understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the
vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in
rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I enter into my house, I shall
repose myself with her." Therefore it would seem that life is
unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): "There is a
twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the
active life and the contemplative."
I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose
movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is
proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is
most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives
proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to
which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist
in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and
movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting
according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would
seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most
intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate with his friends"
(Ethic. ix, 12).
Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the
contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external
actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided into active
and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: Each thing's proper form that makes it actually
"to be" is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence "to
live" is, in living things, "to be," because living things through
having "being" from their form, act in such and such a way.
Reply to Objection 2: Life in general is not divided into active and
contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having
an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and
human life.
Reply to Objection 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from
external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of
the intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement;
in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation
and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is
defined "the act of a perfect thing." In this way Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely,
"straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf.[3714] Q[180], A[6]].
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Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into
active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that
there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure,"
the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the
"contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and
contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1,2,3,19) mentions
three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains to the
contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and a
third "composed of both." Therefore it would seem that life is
inadequately divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers
actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two
occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should
be divided into more kinds than the active and the contemplative.
On the contrary, These two lives are signified by the two wives of
Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the
two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the
active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv in
Ezech.]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were
more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active
and contemplative.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), this division applies to
the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is
divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective
knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to
the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to
the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately
divided into active and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures
of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. Ethic. i, 5), it is the life "of a beast."
Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into
active and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it
is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in
white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that
which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the
simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the
contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.
Reply to Objection 3: All the occupations of human actions, if directed
to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason,
belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the
present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand,
they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of
pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. Those human
occupations that are directed to the consideration of truth belong to
the contemplative life.
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OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or
also to the affections?
(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in
several?
(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the
contemplative life?
(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to
the vision of God?
(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv);
(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;
(8) Of the duration of contemplation.
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Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and
pertains wholly to the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to
do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the
Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end
of contemplation is truth." Now truth pertains wholly to the intellect.
Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the
intellect.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.)
that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or
rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from {rah} and {irzn};
Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative life." Now the
vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the
contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs
to the contemplative life, "to rest from external action." Now the
affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore
it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the
appetitive power.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God
and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now desire
and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above
([3715]FS, Q[25], A[2]; [3716]FS, Q[26], A[2]). Therefore the
contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or
appetitive power.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[179], A[1]) theirs is said to be the
contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now
intention is an act of the will, as stated above ([3717]FS, Q[12],
A[1]), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will.
Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the
action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of
the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the
other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above
([3718]FP, Q[82], A[4]; [3719]FS, Q[9], A[1]).
Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the
senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen
because, as it is written (Mat. 6:21), "where thy treasure is, there is
thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one
acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative life
to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as through loving God we are
aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he
obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life
terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the
result being that love also becomes more intense.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of
contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and
delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 2: We are urged to the vision of the first
principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life tramples on all cares
and longs to see the face of its Creator."
Reply to Objection 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily
members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice
the act of contemplation, as stated above.
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Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the
contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor with
the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are
prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God
and of our neighbor, for "love . . . is the fulfilling of the Law"
(Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues belong to
the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the
contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its
Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart,
which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf.[3720] Q[8], A[7]]. For it is
written (Mat. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see
God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness,
without which no man shall see God." Therefore it would seem that the
moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is signified
by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gn. 29:17) that she was "of a beautiful
countenance." Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues,
especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43,45,46).
Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative
life.
On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to external actions.
Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. A[1], OBJ[3]])
that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from external
action." Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the
contemplative life.
I answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two
ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to
the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the
contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the
consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues":
wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to
active but not to contemplative happiness.
On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life
dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative
life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the
passions which withdraw the soul's intention from intelligible to
sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues
curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the disturbance of
outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the
contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3721](A[1]), the contemplative
life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this
respect the love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the
contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of
a thing, but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that
the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the
virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of
the reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations,
according to Is. 32:17, "The work of justice shall be peace": since he
who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and
disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative
life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.
Reply to Objection 3: Beauty, as stated above ([3722]Q[145], A[2]),
consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is
found radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty
seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to
reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the
reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore
it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I became a
lover of her beauty."
On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in
so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially is it
in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially
darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity
most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures
most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says
(Soliloq. i, 10).
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Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to
the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl.
i, 3,4] distinguishes between "contemplation," "meditation," and
"cogitation." Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation.
Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to
the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): "But we . . .
beholding [speculantes] the glory of the Lord with open face, are
transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg.: 'into the same image from
glory to glory.']." Now this belongs to the contemplative life.
Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision [speculatio]
belongs to the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first
and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty." Now according
to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear.
Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the
contemplative life.
Objection 4: Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of
St. Victor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the
contemplative life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative life:
since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is
signified) "sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Lk.
10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the
contemplative life.
On the contrary, Life signifies here the operation on which a man is
chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the
contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative
lives.
I answer that, We are now speaking of the contemplative life as
applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between
man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the
truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of
a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then,
the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed,
namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its
unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some
of these pertain to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds
to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from
the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which is sought; and the
last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation"
would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a
person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may
comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of
certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the reason's
discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the
truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7),
cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect.
"Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from certain
principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and
"consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De Consid.
ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every
operation of the intellect may be called "consideration." But
"contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth;
wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that
"contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of
its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in
searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is
prone to wander."
Reply to Objection 2: According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of
Augustine on this passage, "beholding" [speculatio] denotes "seeing in
a mirror [speculo], not from a watch-tower [specula]." Now to see a
thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness
is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible to
meditation.
Reply to Objection 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the
apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results
from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above
[3723](A[1]) that contemplation terminates in the affections.
Reply to Objection 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways.
First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as
regards the things he receives from God, he needs "prayer," according
to Wis. 7:7, "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon
me": while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs
"hearing," in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and
"reading," in so far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ.
Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he
requires "meditation."
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Whether the contemplative life consists in the mere contemplation of God, o
r
also in the consideration of any truth whatever?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not
only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any
truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): "Wonderful are Thy works, and my
soul knoweth right well." Now the knowledge of God's works is effected
by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it
pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only the divine
truth, but also any other.
Objection 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that
"contemplation consists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly
of His judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises."
Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the
other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life
consists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also in
the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.
Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6]
distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to "the
imagination alone," and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The
second is in "the imagination guided by reason," and consists in
considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third is
in "the reason based on the imagination"; when, to wit, from the
consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is in
"the reason and conducted by the reason," when the mind is intent on
things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The fifth
is "above the reason," but not contrary to reason, when by divine
revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be comprehended by
the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and contrary to reason";
when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know things that seem
contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the
Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine
truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth regards not only the divine
truth, but also that which is considered in creatures.
Objection 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of
truth is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a
perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life
consists in the contemplation of any truth.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we
seek the principle which is God."
I answer that, As stated above [3724](A[2]), a thing may belong to the
contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or
dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative life
is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is
the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8)
that "the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of all
our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys." This
contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see
God face to face, wherefore it will make us perfectly happy: whereas
now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us
imperfectly, namely "through a glass" and "in a dark manner" (1 Cor.
13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which
begins now and will be continued in the life to come; wherefore the
Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's ultimate happiness in the
contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.
Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation of
God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, "The invisible things of God . . .
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," it
follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to
the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the
knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix) that "in
the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and futile
curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things
unperishable and everlasting."
Accordingly it is clear from what has been said ([3725]AA[1],2,3) that
four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life;
first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of
contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly,
the complement of all which is the contemplation of the divine truth
itself.
Reply to Objection 1: David sought the knowledge of God's works, so
that he might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps.
142:5,6): "I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of
Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee."
Reply to Objection 2: By considering the divine judgments man is guided
to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the
divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's
mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be
vouchsafed.
Reply to Objection 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by
means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step
consists in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step
consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the
third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible
things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible
objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is
the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable
by means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the sixth
step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can
neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation
of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected.
Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is
the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to
the divine truth.
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Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to th
e
vision of the Divine essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the present state of life the
contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence. For,
as stated in Gn. 32:30, Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face, and
my soul has been saved." Now the vision of God's face is the vision of
the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life
one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His essence.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "contemplative
men withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things,
nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if
these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous of
seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of
their limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is above
them, they overcome that which they are." Now man is not hindered from
seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible light, save by
the necessity of turning to corporeal phantasms. Therefore it would
seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the
vision of the incomprehensible light in its essence.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): "All creatures are
small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of
God," the blessed Benedict, to wit, "saw a fiery globe in the tower and
angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such things
by the light of God." Now the blessed Benedict was still in this life.
Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend to the
vision of the essence of God.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "As long as we live
in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of contemplation as
to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible
light."
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), "no one seeing
God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have their play:
and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether
out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not
caught up into that vision." This has been carefully discussed above
(Q[175], AA[4],5), where we spoke of rapture, and in the [3726]FP,
Q[12], A[2], where we treated of the vision of God.
Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways.
First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of the
bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can nowise
attain to the vision of God's essence. Secondly, one may be in this
life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when the
soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to make use
neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination, as happens
in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the present life can
attain to the vision of the Divine essence. Consequently the highest
degree of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in
rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the present life and
the life to come.
Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach.), "if
anyone seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but
something belonging to God." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "By
no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees something of
lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that afterwards it may attain
to the glory of vision." Accordingly the words of Jacob, "I saw God
face to face" do not imply that he saw God's essence, but that he saw
some shape [*Cf. [3727]FP, Q[12], A[11], ad 1], imaginary of course,
wherein God spoke to him. Or, "since we know a man by his face, by the
face of God he signified his knowledge of Him," according to a gloss of
Gregory on the same passage.
Reply to Objection 2: In the present state of life human contemplation
is impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see
the intelligible species in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states
(De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the
phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of
the intelligible truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but
also in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. i) that "the Divine glory shows us the angelic hierarchies under
certain symbolic figures, and by its power we are brought back to the
single ray of light," i.e. to the simple knowledge of the intelligible
truth. It is in this sense that we must understand the statement of
Gregory that "contemplatives do not carry along with them the shadows
of things corporeal," since their contemplation is not fixed on them,
but on the consideration of the intelligible truth.
Reply to Objection 3: By these words Gregory does not imply that the
blessed Benedict, in that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes
to show that because "all creatures are small to him that sees God," it
follows that all things can easily be seen through the enlightenment of
the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: "For however little he may see of
the Creator's light, all created things become petty to him."
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Whether the operation of contemplation is fittingly divided into a threefol
d
movement, circular, straight and oblique?
Objection 1: It would seem that the operation of contemplation is
unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, "circular," "straight,"
and "oblique" (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains exclusively to
rest, according to Wis. 8:16, "When I go into my house, I shall repose
myself with her." Now movement is opposed to rest. Therefore the
operations of the contemplative life should not be described as
movements.
Objection 2: Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to
the intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes
these movements as being different in the angels from what they are in
the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "circular" movement in
the angel is "according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and the
good." On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the soul
to several things: the first of which is the "withdrawal of the soul
into itself from externals"; the second is "a certain concentration of
its powers, whereby it is rendered free of error and of outward
occupation"; and the third is "union with those things that are above
it." Again, he describes differently their respective straight
movements. For he says that the straight movement of the angel is that
by which he proceeds to the care of those things that are beneath him.
On the other hand, he describes the straight movement of the soul as
being twofold: first, "its progress towards things that are near it";
secondly, "its uplifting from external things to simple contemplation."
Further, he assigns a different oblique movement to each. For he
assigns the oblique movement of the angels to the fact that "while
providing for those who have less they remain unchanged in relation to
God": whereas he assigns the oblique movement of the soul to the fact
that "the soul is enlightened in Divine knowledge by reasoning and
discoursing." Therefore it would seem that the operations of
contemplation are unfittingly assigned according to the ways mentioned
above.
Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5)
mentions many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the
air. "For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another
swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the
right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag
behind many times; others fly in a circle now more now less extended;
and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place." Therefore
it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
I answer that, As stated above ([3728]Q[119], A[1], ad 3), the
operation of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists,
is called a movement, in so far as movement is the act of a perfect
thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since, however,
it is through sensible objects that we come to the knowledge of
intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take place
without movement, the result is that even intelligible operations are
described as movements, and are differentiated in likeness to various
movements. Now of bodily movements, local movements are the most
perfect and come first, as proved in Phys. viii, 7; wherefore the
foremost among intelligible operations are described by being likened
to them. These movements are of three kinds; for there is the
"circular" movement, by which a thing moves uniformly round one point
as center, another is the "straight" movement, by which a thing goes
from one point to another; the third is "oblique," being composed as it
were of both the others. Consequently, in intelligible operations, that
which is simply uniform is compared to circular movement; the
intelligible operation by which one proceeds from one point to another
is compared to the straight movement; while the intelligible operation
which unites something of uniformity with progress to various points is
compared to the oblique movement.
Reply to Objection 1: External bodily movements are opposed to the
quiet of contemplation, which consists in rest from outward
occupations: but the movements of intellectual operations belong to the
quiet of contemplation.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is like the angels in intellect generically,
but the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man.
Consequently these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in
different ways, according as they are differently related to
uniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two
respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from
the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands the
truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple
intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires
intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a
certain discoursing of the reason.
Wherefore Dionysius assigns the "circular" movement of the angels to
the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having
neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither
beginning nor end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the
part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack of
uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the
variety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing
from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the
circular movement of the soul is "the soul's withdrawal into itself
from external objects." Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires
to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discoursing of
reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the
simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated
by his saying in the second place that "the soul's intellectual powers
must be uniformly concentrated," in other words that discoursing must
be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one
simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, even as
there is clearly no error in the understanding of first principles
which we know by simple intuition. Afterwards these two things being
done, he mentions thirdly the uniformity which is like that of the
angels, for then all things being laid aside, the soul continues in the
contemplation of God alone. This he expresses by saying: "Then being
thus made uniform unitedly," i.e. conformably, "by the union of its
powers, it is conducted to the good and the beautiful." The "straight"
movement of the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to
another by considering them, but only to the order of his providence,
namely to the fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels
through the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he
says: "The angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to
the care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things
are direct," i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct order.
Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the soul's
proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of intelligible
objects. The "oblique" movement in the angels he describes as being
composed of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their care
for those beneath them is in accordance with their contemplation of
God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul he also declares to be
partly straight and partly circular, in so far as in reasoning it makes
use of the light received from God.
Reply to Objection 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from
the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and
backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either
straight and oblique movement, because they all denote discursions of
reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from
the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to below:
if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to left; if from
the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be
about accidents that surround a thing near at hand or far remote, the
movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason from sensible to
intelligible objects, if it be according to the order of natural
reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if it be according to the
Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the oblique movement as
explained above (ad 2). That alone which he describes as immobility
belongs to the circular movement.
Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of
contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.
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Whether there is delight in contemplation?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.
For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation
resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is
no delight in contemplation.
Objection 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to
delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory
says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when the soul strives to contemplate
God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes,
because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the
incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs, because
even while tasting, it fails." Therefore there is no delight in
contemplation.
Objection 3: Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as
stated in Ethic. x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12, "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner." Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative
life.
Objection 4: Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight.
Now contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated
(Gn. 32) that after Jacob had said (Gn. 32:30), "'I have seen God face
to face' . . . he halted on his foot (Gn. 32:31) . . . because he
touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank" (Gn. 32:32). Therefore
seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.
On the contrary, It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis.
8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any
tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable."
I answer that, There may be delight in any particular contemplation in
two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. [3729]FS, Q[3],
A[5]], because each individual delights in the operation which befits
him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the
truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the
result being that "all men naturally desire to know," so that
consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more
delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom
and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without
difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of
its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even as
bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in
itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the
contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, of
which charity is the motive, as stated above ([3730]AA[1],2, ad 1), it
follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by
reason of the contemplation itself, but also by reason of the Divine
love.
In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, both
because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated
above ([3731]FS, Q[31], A[5]), when we were treating of the passions,
and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all
love. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is
sweet."
Reply to Objection 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly
in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since
it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God.
And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the
term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the
appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very
delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore
Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when we see one whom we love,
we are so aflame as to love him more." And this is the ultimate
perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be
not only seen but also loved.
Reply to Objection 2: Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of
an external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights
not in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he
strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he delights
yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that "the more
peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the triumph." But
there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the part of the
truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part of our
defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags us down to
lower things, according to Wis. 9:15, "The corruptible body ss a load
upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that
museth upon many things." Hence it is that when man attains to the
contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, while he hates the more
his own deficiency and the weight of his corruptible body, so as to say
with the Apostle (Rom. 7:24): "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver
me from the body of this death?" Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in
Ezech.): "When God is once known by desire and understanding, He
withers all carnal pleasure in us."
Reply to Objection 3: The contemplation of God in this life is
imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like
manner the delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as
compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is
written (Ps. 35:9): "Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy
pleasure." Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to
be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other
contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that
which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. i,
5): "We may happen to have our own little theories about those sublime
beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but feebly,
nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us more
delight than any of those things that are round about us": and Gregory
says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The contemplative life is
sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above
itself, it opens heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes
of the mind."
Reply to Objection 4: After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot,
"because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax
strong in the love of God," as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.). "Thus
when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound while
the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on
that foot which is sound."
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Whether the contemplative life is continuous?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not
continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things
pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of
this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8, "Whether
prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge
shall be destroyed." Therefore the contemplative life is made void.
Objection 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by
snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says (Confess.
x, 40), "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost
soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous weight I
sink down again." Again, Gregory commenting on the words of Job 4:15,
"When a spirit passed before me," says (Moral. v, 33): "The mind does
not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for
it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the
light." Therefore the contemplative life is not continuous.
Objection 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be
continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. x, 7), "is better than the life which is according to man."
Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the best
part, which shall not be taken away from her," since as Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech.), "the contemplative life begins here so that it
may be perfected in our heavenly home."
I answer that, A thing may be described as continuous in two ways:
first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is
evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for
two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable
things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there is nothing
contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in Topic. i, 13.
But even in our regard contemplative life is continuous---both because
it is competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of the soul,
namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure after this life---and
because in the works of the contemplative life we work not with our
bodies, so that we are the more able to persevere in the works thereof,
as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. x, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: The manner of contemplation is not the same here
as in heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of
charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks
in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The contemplative life begins
here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the fire of
love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater love when
we see Him Whom we love."
Reply to Objection 2: No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now
the highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine
contemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier. iii], and as we
have stated above (A[6], ad 2). Hence although contemplation cannot
last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the
other contemplative acts.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher declares the contemplative life
to be above man, because it befits us "so far as there is in us
something divine" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is
incorruptible and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure
longer.
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OF THE ACTIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the active life, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active
life?
(2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life?
(3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life?
(4) Of the duration of the active life.
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Whether all the actions of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not
all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards
only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech.) that "the active life is to give bread to the hungry," and
after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other
people he adds finally, "and to give to each and every one whatever he
needs." Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all the
acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its parts, as
stated above (Q[58], AA[2],8; [3732]FS, Q[60], AA[2],3). Therefore the
acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who
was blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being
occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor
both by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous
offspring of good deeds." Now this would seem to belong to charity,
whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues.
Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the
active life.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([3733]Q[180], A[2]), the moral
virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and
perfection belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the
moral virtues do not pertain to the active life.
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the active
life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice of good
works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye being
purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine light." Now
all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues.
Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active life.
I answer that, As stated above ([3734]Q[179], A[1]) the active and the
contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men
intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the consideration
of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the
other is external work to which the active life is directed.
Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not to
the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of little or no
avail." Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong essentially to
the active life; for which reason the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 8)
subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: The chief of the moral virtues is justice by
which one man is directed in his relations towards another, as the
Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described
with reference to our relations with other people, because it consists
in these things, not exclusively, but principally.
Reply to Objection 2: It is possible, by the acts of all the moral
virtues, for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this
is what Gregory here ascribes to the active life.
Reply to Objection 3: Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of
another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter
virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the
active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are
comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we
practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves,
and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues
belong to the active life.
It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a disposition
to the contemplative life.
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Whether prudence pertains to the active life?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the active
life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the cognitive
power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. Now prudence
belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore
prudence does not belong to the active life.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the
"active life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is
signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes,
so that one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems
that prudence does not pertain to the active life.
Objection 3: Further, prudence stands between the moral and the
intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the
active life, as stated above [3735](A[1]), so do the intellectual
virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that
prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative life,
but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention
(De Civ. Dei xix, 2,3,19).
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence
pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3; [3736]FS, Q[18], A[6]), if
one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially in
moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is directed: for
instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather
than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it
is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of
the moral virtues as its end, since it is "right reason applied to
action" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of the moral virtues are the
principles of prudence, as the Philosopher says in the same book.
Accordingly, as it was stated above (A[1], ad 3) that the moral virtues
in one who directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the
contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself
directed to the works of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the
active life, provided we take prudence in its proper sense as the
Philosopher speaks of it.
If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind
of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part thereof,
belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5)
says that "the man who is able most clearly and quickly to grasp the
truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered most prudent
and wise."
Reply to Objection 1: Moral works take their species from their end, as
stated above ([3737]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6), wherefore the knowledge
pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the
very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through
having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the active
life.
Reply to Objection 2: External occupation makes a man see less in
intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with
which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the
external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more
clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence,
both on account of experience, and on account of the mind's attention,
since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust observes
[*Bell. Catilin., LI].
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is said to be intermediate between the
intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same
subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter
as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate
between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things
about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the
contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal things.
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Whether teaching is a work of the active or of the contemplative life?
Objection 1: It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active
but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that
"the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least
through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they
inflame with love for their hidden beauty." But this pertains to
teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the
same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the
Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an
indication of knowledge." Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain
to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to
the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of
the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another,
belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it
belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching
him, of the truth we have meditated.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life is
to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of
wisdom."
I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching
is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior
concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of
the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes
to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the
active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be
directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the
contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the
consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De
Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the better
part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with the word,
long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary
knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the
contemplative life.
The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and
thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all
doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.
Reply to Objection 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine
as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration
and love of truth.
Reply to Objection 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this
argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it
pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in
so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to
bring another man to understand the truth.
Reply to Objection 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the
man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible
truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by
external action. Hence the comparison fails.
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Whether the active life remains after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life remains after this
life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as
stated above [3738](A[1]). But the moral virtues endure after this life
according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life
remains after this life.
Objection 2: Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as
stated above [3739](A[3]). But in the life to come when "we shall be
like the angels," teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is
in the angels of whom one "enlightens, cleanses, and perfects" [*Coel.
Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the "receiving of knowledge,"
according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem that
the active life remains after this life.
Objection 3: Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more
is it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly
more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "we
can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to
maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life." Therefore the
active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after
this life.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life
ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to be
perfected in our heavenly home."
I answer that, As stated above [3740](A[1]), the active life has its
end in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of
contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative
life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external
actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at all, these
will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says
at the end of De Civitate Dei xxii, 30, "there we shall rest and we
shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and praise." And he had
said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "there God will be seen without
end, loved without wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the
occupation of all, the common love, the universal activity."
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3741]Q[136], A[1], ad 1), the
moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the
means, but as to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are
those that conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words
quoted above Augustine denotes by "rest," and this rest excludes not
only outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the
passions.
Reply to Objection 2: The contemplative life, as stated above
([3742]Q[180], A[4]), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and
as to this, one angel does not teach another, since according to Mat.
18:10, "the little ones' angels," who belong to the lower order,
"always see the face of the Father"; and so, in the life to come, no
man will teach another of God, but "we shall" all "see Him as He is" (1
Jn. 3:2). This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: "They
shall teach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord:
for all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest."
But as regards things pertaining to the "dispensation of the mysteries
of God," one angel teaches another by cleansing, enlightening, and
perfecting him: and thus they have something of the active life so long
as the world lasts, from the fact that they are occupied in
administering to the creatures below them. This is signified by the
fact that Jacob saw angels "ascending" the ladder---which refers to
contemplation---and "descending" ---which refers to action.
Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), "they do not wander
abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the joys of
inward contemplation." Hence in them the active life does not differ
from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the works of the
active life are a hindrance to contemplation.
Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the
administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by
reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of
our seeing God.
Reply to Objection 3: That the durability of the active life in the
present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life arises
not from any property of either life considered in itself, but from our
own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of contemplation
by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. ii, 3) that "the
mind through its very weakness being repelled from that immense height
recoils on itself."
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OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the active life in comparison with the
contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence?
(2) Which of them has the greater merit?
(3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?
(4) Of their order.
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Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent than
the contemplative. For "that which belongs to better men would seem to
be worthier and better," as the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the
active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely prelates, who are
placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "in our actions we must not love honor or power
in this life." Therefore it would seem that the active life is more
excellent than the contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the
more important; thus the military art, being the more important,
directs the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to
the active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears
from the words addressed to Moses (Ex. 19:21), "Go down and charge the
people, lest they should have a mind to pass the" fixed "limits to see
the Lord." Therefore the active life is more excellent than the
contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing
in order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1
Cor. 12:31): "Be zealous for the better gifts." Now some are taken away
from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the
active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state
of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more
excellent than the contemplative.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the best
part, which shall not be taken away from her." Now Mary figures the
contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more excellent
than the active.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent in
themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect.
Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more
excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight
reasons (Ethic. x, 7,8). The first is, because the contemplative life
becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the
intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things
intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals. Hence
Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is interpreted
"the vision of the principle," [*Or rather, 'One seeing the principle,'
if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.] whereas as
Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is signified by Lia who
was blear-eyed. The second reason is because the contemplative life can
be more continuous, although not as regards the highest degree of
contemplation, as stated above ([3743]Q[180], A[8], ad 2;[3744] Q[181],
A[4], ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative life is
signified, is described as "sitting" all the time "at the Lord's feet."
Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more delightful than the
active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) that
"Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted." Fourthly, because in the
contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since he needs fewer
things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Lk. 10:41): "Martha,
Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things." Fifthly,
because the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake, while
the active life is directed to something else. Hence it is written (Ps.
36:4): "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after,
that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, that
I may see the delight of the Lord." Sixthly, because the contemplative
life consists in leisure and rest, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still
and see that I am God." Seventhly, because the contemplative life is
according to Divine things, whereas active life is according to human
things; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): "'In the
beginning was the Word': to Him was Mary hearkening: 'The Word was made
flesh': Him was Martha serving." Eighthly, because the contemplative
life is according to that which is most proper to man, namely his
intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower powers
also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore
(Ps. 35:7) after the words, "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O
Lord," that which is special to man is added (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light
we shall see light."
Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Lk. 10:42) when He says: "Mary hath
chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," which
words Augustine (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: "Not---Thou
hast chosen badly but---She has chosen better. Why better?
Listen---because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden of
necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the sweetness of
truth is eternal."
Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer
the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too
the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): "It is better to be wise than to
be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich . . ."
Reply to Objection 1: Not only the active life concerns prelates, they
should also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says
(Pastor. ii, 1): "A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted
than others in contemplation."
Reply to Objection 2: The contemplative life consists in a certain
liberty of mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the
contemplative life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not
of temporal but of eternal things." And Boethius says (De Consol. v,
2): "The soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze
on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things."
Wherefore it is evident that the active life does not directly command
the contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life
as dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly serves
rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says (Hom. iii in
Ezech.) that "the active life is bondage, whereas the contemplative
life is freedom."
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes a man is called away from the
contemplative life to the works of the active life, on account of some
necessity of the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake
contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19):
"The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity
undertake an honest toil," the work namely of the active life. "If no
one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the
research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we
must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must
not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves
of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us." Hence it is clear that
when a person is called from the contemplative life to the active life,
this is done by way not of subtraction but of addition.
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Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit
than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed is
due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, "Every man shall receive his own
reward according to his own labor." Now labor is ascribed to the active
life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech.): "Whosoever is converted to God must first of all sweat from
labor, i.e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the
embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle." Therefore the active
life is of greater merit than the contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the
happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on Jn. 21:22, "So I
will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.):
"This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me
conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun
here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall come."
And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "contemplation begins here,
so as to be perfected in our heavenly home." Now the life to come will
be a state not of meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits.
Therefore the contemplative life would seem to have less of the
character of merit than the active, but more of the character of
reward.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that "no
sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls." Now by the
zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life.
Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater
merit than the active.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the merits of
the active life, but greater still those of the contemplative."
I answer that, As stated above ([3745]FS, Q[114], A[4]), the root of
merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q[25], A[1]), charity
consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by
itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above
(Q[27], A[8]). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love
of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains
directly to the love of our neighbor for God's sake. Now the
contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of
God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the
Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative life,
for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as
stated above (Q[181], A[4], ad 2). On the other hand, the active life
is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, because it is
"busy about much serving" (Lk. 10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life
is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover
asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "The contemplative life
surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the
stress of present work," by reason of the necessity of assisting our
neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of
the coming rest," i.e. the contemplation of God.
Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the
active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For
instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer
separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time
being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus the
Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): "I wished myself to be an anathema from
Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom expounds as follows
(De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.]): "His mind was
so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired above all to
be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ."
Reply to Objection 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the
accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the
essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor
borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign
thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this
life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.
Reply to Objection 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived
at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and
if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the
greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without
some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it
does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on
account of the practice of greater Divine charity.
Reply to Objection 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when
something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially
accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in sacrifice.
Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul,
according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God";
in the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc. 22:17, "He
that heareth, let him say: Come." And the more closely a man unites his
own or another's soul to God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to
God; wherefore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one's own
soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action.
Consequently the statement that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God
than zeal for souls," does not mean that the merit of the active life
is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is
more meritorious to offer to God one's own soul and the souls of
others, than any other external gifts.
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Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by
the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain
stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still, and see that I am
God"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to Lk.
10:41, "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many
things." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, clearness of vision is a requisite for the
contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear vision; for
Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it "is blear-eyed and fruitful,
because the active life, being occupied with work, sees less."
Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary hinders the other. Now the active
and the contemplative life are apparently contrary to one another,
since the active life is busy about many things, while the
contemplative life attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore they
differ in opposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the
contemplative life is hindered by the active.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold
the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the camp of
action."
I answer that, The active life may be considered from two points of
view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external
works: and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the
contemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with
external action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine
contemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting and
directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point of
view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter
is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of
contemplation must first of all train in the camp of action. Thus after
careful study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their
neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the wrongs their neighbors
do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the
presence of temporal goods, nor cast down with too great a sorrow when
those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will known when they
withdraw within themselves, in order to explore spiritual things,
whether they no longer carry with them the shadows of the things
corporeal, or, if these follow them, whether they prudently drive them
away." Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative,
by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms
whereby contemplation is hindered.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments
consider the occupation itself of external actions, and not the effect
which is the quelling of the passions.
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Whether the active life precedes the contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the
contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the love
of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our neighbor. Now
the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor, since we love our
neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the contemplative life
also precedes the active life.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "It should be
observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to
contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the
contemplative to the active life." Therefore the active is not simply
prior to the contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any
order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the
active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects;
for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who were able to
contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when
pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live
advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures are
killed by the sword of their inaction."
I answer that, A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with
regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes
the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and
are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active life.
For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is compared to
the lower reason which is assigned to action, and the husband is
compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband, as Augustine
says (De Trin. xii, 3,7,12).
Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first in
the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the
contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above
[3746](A[1]; Q[181], A[1], ad 3); and, in the order of generation,
disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and
according to its nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The contemplative life is directed to the love of
God, not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the
active life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor.
Hence Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "Without the contemplative
life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit
not the good actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein
without the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do."
From this it is also evident that the active precedes the contemplative
life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the order of
generation, that which is proper to the perfect.
Reply to Objection 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative
life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from
the contemplative life to the active is according to the order of
direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the
contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired
habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in Ethic. ii, 7.
Reply to Objection 3: He that is prone to yield to his passions on
account of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life
by reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37)
that "there be some so restless that when they are free from labor they
labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for thought, the
worse interior turmoil they have to bear." Others, on the contrary,
have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they are apt for
contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly to action,
this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. vi,
37) that "some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to have any
hard work to do they give way at the very outset." Yet, as he adds
further on, "often . . . love stimulates slothful souls to work, and
fear restrains souls that are disturbed in contemplation." Consequently
those who are more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves
for the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while none
the less, those who are more adapted to the contemplative life can take
upon themselves the works of the active life, so as to become yet more
apt for contemplation.
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TREATISE ON THE STATES OF LIFE (QQ[183]-189)
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OF MAN'S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider man's various states and duties. We shall
consider (1) man's duties and states in general; (2) the state of the
perfect in particular.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What constitutes a state among men?
(2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties?
(3) Of the diversity of duties;
(4) Of the diversity of states.
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Whether the notion of a state denotes a condition of freedom or servitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not denote a
condition of freedom or servitude. For "state" takes its name from
"standing." Now a person is said to stand on account of his being
upright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): "To fall by speaking
harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness." But a
man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to God;
wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," says:
"The upright are those who direct their heart according to God's will."
Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine commandments
suffices alone for the notion of a state.
Objection 2: Further, the word "state" seems to denote immobility
according to 1 Cor. 15:48, "Be ye steadfast [stabiles] and immovable";
wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech.): "The stone is foursquare,
and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will make it fall." Now
it is virtue that enables us "to act with immobility," according to
Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore it would seem that a state is acquired by every
virtuous action.
Objection 3: Further, the word "state" seems to indicate height of a
kind; because to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is made
higher than another by various duties; and in like manner men are
raised upwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore
the mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a
difference of states.
On the contrary, It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II, qu. vi,
can. Si Quando): "Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where life or
state is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his own
person"; and "state" here has reference to freedom or servitude.
Therefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a man's state,
except that which refers to freedom or servitude.
I answer that, "State," properly speaking, denotes a kind of position,
whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a manner
according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his head
should be directed upwards, his feet set firmly on the ground, and his
other intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and this is not
the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only when he stands
upright: nor again is he said to stand, if he move, but only when he is
still. Hence it is again that even in human acts, a matter is said to
have stability [statum] in reference to its own disposition in the
point of a certain immobility or restfulness. Consequently matters
which easily change and are extrinsic to them do not constitute a state
among men, for instance that a man be rich or poor, of high or low
rank, and so forth. Wherefore in the civil law [*Dig. I, IX, De
Senatoribus] (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus) it is said that if a man
be removed from the senate, he is deprived of his dignity rather than
of his state. But that alone seemingly pertains to a man's state, which
regards an obligation binding his person, in so far, to wit, as a man
is his own master or subject to another, not indeed from any slight or
unstable cause, but from one that is firmly established; and this is
something pertaining to the nature of freedom or servitude. Therefore
state properly regards freedom or servitude whether in spiritual or in
civil matters.
Reply to Objection 1: Uprightness as such does not pertain to the
notion of state, except in so far as it is connatural to man with the
addition of a certain restfulness. Hence other animals are said to
stand without its being required that they should be upright; nor again
are men said to stand, however upright their position be, unless they
be still.
Reply to Objection 2: Immobility does not suffice for the notion of
state; since even one who sits or lies down is still, and yet he is not
said to stand.
Reply to Objection 3: Duty implies relation to act; while grades denote
an order of superiority and inferiority. But state requires immobility
in that which regards a condition of the person himself.
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Whether there should be different duties or states in the Church?
Objection 1: It would seem that there should not be different duties or
states in the Church. For distinction is opposed to unity. Now the
faithful of Christ are called to unity according to Jn. 17:21,22: "That
they . . . may be one in Us . . . as We also are one." Therefore there
should not be a distinction of duties and states in the Church.
Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one
suffices. But the working of grace is much more orderly than the
working of nature. Therefore it were more fitting for things pertaining
to the operations of grace to be administered by the same persons, so
that there would not be a distinction of duties and states in the
Church.
Objection 3: Further, the good of the Church seemingly consists chiefly
in peace, according to Ps. 147:3, "Who hath placed peace in thy
borders," and 2 Cor. 13:11, "Have peace, and the God of peace . . .
shall be with you." Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for peace
would seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. 13:19, "Every
beast loveth its like," while the Philosopher says (Polit. vii, 5) that
"a little difference causes dissension in a state." Therefore it would
seem that there ought not to be a distinction of states and duties in
the Church.
On the contrary, It is written in praise of the Church (Ps. 44:10) that
she is "surrounded with variety": and a gloss on these words says that
"the Queen," namely the Church, "is bedecked with the teaching of the
apostles, the confession of martyrs, the purity of virgins, the
sorrowings of penitents."
I answer that, The difference of states and duties in the Church
regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of
the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection,
which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created
universe except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the fulness
of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to His
members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the Church.
This is the meaning of the Apostle's words (Eph. 4:11,12): "He gave
some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other
some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of the saints." Secondly,
it regards the need of those actions which are necessary in the Church.
For a diversity of actions requires a diversity of men appointed to
them, in order that all things may be accomplished without delay or
confusion; and this is indicated by the Apostle (Rom. 12:4,5), "As in
one body we have many members, but all the members have not the same
office, so we being many are one body in Christ." Thirdly, this belongs
to the dignity and beauty of the Church, which consist in a certain
order; wherefore it is written (3 Kings 10:4,5) that "when the queen of
Saba saw all the wisdom of Solomon . . . and the apartments of his
servants, and the order of his ministers . . . she had no longer any
spirit in her." Hence the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:20) that "in a great
house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood
and of earth."
Reply to Objection 1: The distinction of states and duties is not an
obstacle to the unity of the Church, for this results from the unity of
faith, charity, and mutual service, according to the saying of the
Apostle (Eph. 4:16): "From whom the whole body being compacted," namely
by faith, "and fitly joined together," namely by charity, "by what
every joint supplieth," namely by one man serving another.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as nature does not employ many means where
one suffices, so neither does it confine itself to one where many are
required, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If
the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing?" Hence there
was need in the Church, which is Christ's body, for the members to be
differentiated by various duties, states, and grades.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in the natural body the various members
are held together in unity by the power of the quickening spirit, and
are dissociated from one another as soon as that spirit departs, so too
in the Church's body the peace of the various members is preserved by
the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the Church, as
stated in Jn. 6:64. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:3): "Careful to keep
the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." Now a man departs from
this unity of spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an earthly
kingdom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his own. Besides,
the peace both of mind and of an earthly commonwealth is the better
preserved by a distinction of duties and states, since thereby the
greater number have a share in public actions. Wherefore the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 12:24,25) that "God hath tempered [the body] together that
there might be no schism in the body, but the members might be mutually
careful one for another."
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Whether duties differ according to their actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that duties do not differ according to their
actions. For there are infinite varieties of human acts both in
spirituals and in temporals. Now there can be no certain distinction
among things that are infinite in number. Therefore human duties cannot
be differentiated according to a difference of acts.
Objection 2: Further, the active and the contemplative life differ
according to their acts, as stated above ([3747]Q[179], A[1]). But the
distinction of duties seems to be other than the distinction of lives.
Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts.
Objection 3: Further, even ecclesiastical orders, states, and grades
seemingly differ according to their acts. If, then, duties differ
according to their acts it would seem that duties, grades, and states
differ in the same way. Yet this is not true, since they are divided
into their respective parts in different ways. Therefore duties do not
differ according to their acts.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "officium [duty]
takes its name from 'efficere' [to effect], as though it were instead
of 'efficium,' by the change of one letter for the sake of the sound."
But effecting pertains to action. Therefore duties differ according to
their acts.
I answer that, As stated above [3748](A[2]), difference among the
members of the Church is directed to three things: perfection, action,
and beauty; and according to these three we may distinguish a threefold
distinction among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and
thus we have the difference of states, in reference to which some
persons are more perfect than others. Another distinction regards
action and this is the distinction of duties: for persons are said to
have various duties when they are appointed to various actions. A third
distinction regards the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and thus we
distinguish various grades according as in the same state or duty one
person is above another. Hence according to a variant text [*The
Septuagint] it is written (Ps. 47:4): "In her grades shall God be
known."
Reply to Objection 1: The material diversity of human acts is infinite.
It is not thus that duties differ, but by their formal diversity which
results from diverse species of acts, and in this way human acts are
not infinite.
Reply to Objection 2: Life is predicated of a thing absolutely:
wherefore diversity of acts which are becoming to man considered in
himself. But efficiency, whence we have the word "office" (as stated
above), denotes action tending to something else according to Metaph.
ix, text. 16 [*Ed. Did. viii, 8]. Hence offices differ properly in
respect of acts that are referred to other persons; thus a teacher is
said to have an office, and so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore
Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "to have an office is to be
officious," i.e. harmful "to no one, but to be useful to all."
Reply to Objection 3: Differences of state, offices and grades are
taken from different things, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Yet these
three things may concur in the same subject: thus when a person is
appointed to a higher action, he attains thereby both office and grade,
and sometimes, besides this, a state of perfection, on account of the
sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The ecclesiastical
orders are particularly distinct according to divine offices. For
Isidore says (Etym. vi): "There are various kinds of offices; but the
foremost is that which relates to sacred and Divine things."
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Whether the difference of states applies to those who are beginning,
progressing, or perfect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the difference of states does not apply
to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect. For "diverse
genera have diverse species and differences" [*Aristotle, Categ. ii].
Now this difference of beginning, progress, and perfection is applied
to the degrees of charity, as stated above ([3749]Q[24], A[9]), where
we were treating of charity. Therefore it would seem that the
differences of states should not be assigned in this manner.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [3750](A[1]), state regards a
condition of servitude or freedom, which apparently has no connection
with the aforesaid difference of beginning, progress, and perfection.
Therefore it is unfitting to divide state in this way.
Objection 3: Further, the distinction of beginning, progress, and
perfection seems to refer to "more" and "less," and this seemingly
implies the notion of grades. But the distinction of grades differs
from that of states, as we have said above ([3751]AA[2],3). Therefore
state is unfittingly divided according to beginning, progress, and
perfection.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 11): "There are three
states of the converted, the beginning, the middle, and the
perfection"; and (Hom. xv in Ezech.): "Other is the beginning of
virtue, other its progress, and other still its perfection."
I answer that, As stated above [3752](A[1]) state regards freedom or
servitude. Now in spiritual things there is a twofold servitude and a
twofold freedom: for there is the servitude of sin and the servitude of
justice; and there is likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and from
justice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 6:20, 22),
"When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice . . .
but now being made free from sin," you are . . . "become servants to
God."
Now the servitude of sin or justice consists in being inclined to evil
by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by a habit of justice: and in
like manner freedom from sin is not to be overcome by the inclination
to sin, and freedom from justice is not to be held back from evil for
the love of justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his natural reason, is
inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to natural reason, it
follows that freedom from sin is true freedom which is united to the
servitude of justice, since they both incline man to that which is
becoming to him. In like manner true servitude is the servitude of sin,
which is connected with freedom from justice, because man is thereby
hindered from attaining that which is proper to him. That a man become
the servant of justice or sin results from his efforts, as the Apostle
declares (Rom. 6:16): "To whom you yield yourselves servants to obey,
his servants you are whom you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or
of obedience unto justice." Now in every human effort we can
distinguish a beginning, a middle, and a term; and consequently the
state of spiritual servitude and freedom is differentiated according to
these things, namely, the beginning---to which pertains the state of
beginners---the middle, to which pertains the state of the
proficient---and the term, to which belongs the state of the perfect.
Reply to Objection 1: Freedom from sin results from charity which "is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom.
5:5). Hence it is written (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord
is, there is liberty." Wherefore the same division applies to charity
as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom.
Reply to Objection 2: Men are said to be beginners, proficient, and
perfect (so far as these terms indicate different states), not in
relation to any occupation whatever, but in relation to such
occupations as pertain to spiritual freedom or servitude, as stated
above [3753](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: As already observed (A[3], ad 3), nothing hinders
grade and state from concurring in the same subject. For even in
earthly affairs those who are free, not only belong to a different
state from those who are in service, but are also of a different grade.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE STATE OF PERFECTION IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider those things that pertain to the state of
perfection whereto the other states are directed. For the consideration
of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the legislator; and in
relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the consideration of
orders of which we shall treat in the Third Part [*XP, Q[34]].
Concerning the state of the perfect, a three-fold consideration
presents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) Things
relating to the perfection of bishops; (3) Things relating to the
perfection of religious.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity?
(2) Whether one can be perfect in this life?
(3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing
the counsels or the commandments?
(4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?
(5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of
perfection?
(6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection?
(7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state?
(8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and
archdeacons.
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Whether the perfection of the Christian life consists chiefly in charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the perfection of the Christian life
does not consist chiefly in charity. For the Apostle says (1 Cor.
14:20): "In malice be children, but in sense be perfect." But charity
regards not the senses but the affections. Therefore it would seem that
the perfection of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in
charity.
Objection 2: Further,'it is written (Eph. 6:13): "Take unto you the
armor of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and to
stand in all things perfect"; and the text continues (Eph. 6:14, 16),
speaking of the armor of God: "Stand therefore having your loins girt
about with truth, and having on the breast-plate of justice . . . in
all things taking the shield of faith." Therefore the perfection of the
Christian life consists not only in charity, but also in other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, virtues like other habits, are specified by their
acts. Now it is written (James 1:4) that "patience hath a perfect
work." Therefore seemingly the state of perfection consists more
specially in patience.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 3:14): "Above all things have
charity, which is the bond of perfection," because it binds, as it
were, all the other virtues together in perfect unity.
I answer that, A thing is said to be perfect in so far as it attains
its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection thereof. Now it is
charity that unites us to God, Who is the last end of the human mind,
since "he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him" (1
Jn. 4:16). Therefore the perfection of the Christian life consists
radically in charity.
Reply to Objection 1: The perfection of the human senses would seem to
consist chiefly in their concurring together in the unity of truth,
according to 1 Cor. 1:10, "That you be perfect in the same mind
[sensu], and in the same judgment." Now this is effected by charity
which operates consent in us men. Wherefore even the perfection of the
senses consists radically in the perfection of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: A man may be said to be perfect in two ways.
First, simply: and this perfection regards that which belongs to a
thing's nature, for instance an animal may be said to be perfect when
it lacks nothing in the disposition of its members and in such things
as are necessary for an animal's life. Secondly, a thing is said to be
perfect relatively: and this perfection regards something connected
with the thing externally, such as whiteness or blackness or something
of the kind. Now the Christian life consists chiefly in charity whereby
the soul is united to God; wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 3:14): "He
that loveth not abideth in death." Hence the perfection of the
Christian life consists simply in charity, but in the other virtues
relatively. And since that which is simply, is paramount and greatest
in comparison with other things, it follows that the perfection of
charity is paramount in relation to the perfection that regards the
other virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Patience is stated to have a perfect work in
relation to charity, in so far as it is an effect of the abundance of
charity that a man bears hardships patiently, according to Rom. 8:35,
"Who . . . shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall
tribulation? Or distress?" etc.
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Whether any one can be perfect in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that none can be perfect in this life. For
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is perfect is come,
that which is in part shall be done away." Now in this life that which
is in part is not done away; for in this life faith and hope, which are
in part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life.
Objection 2: Further, "The perfect is that which lacks nothing" (Phys.
iii, 6). Now there is no one in this life who lacks nothing; for it is
written (James 3:2): "In many things we all offend"; and (Ps. 138:16):
"Thy eyes did see my imperfect being." Therefore none is perfect in
this life.
Objection 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life, as stated
[3754](A[1]), relates to charity, which comprises the love of God and
of our neighbor. Now, neither as to the love of God can one have
perfect charity in this life, since according to Gregory (Hom. xiv in
Ezech.) "the furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more
fiercely when we see Him Whom we love"; nor as to the love of our
neighbor, since in this life we cannot love all our neighbors actually,
even though we love them habitually; and habitual love is imperfect.
Therefore it seems that no one can be perfect in this life.
On the contrary, The Divine law does not prescribe the impossible. Yet
it prescribes perfection according to Mat. 5:48, "Be you . . . perfect,
as also your heavenly Father is perfect." Therefore seemingly one can
be perfect in this life.
I answer that, As stated above [3755](A[1]), the perfection of the
Christian life consists in charity. Now perfection implies a certain
universality because according to Phys. iii, 6, "the perfect is that
which lacks nothing." Hence we may consider a threefold perfection. One
is absolute, and answers to a totality not only on the part of the
lover, but also on the part of the object loved, so that God be loved
as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this is not possible to
any creature, but is competent to God alone, in Whom good is wholly and
essentially.
Another perfection answers to an absolute totality on the part of the
lover, so that the affective faculty always actually tends to God as
much as it possibly can; and such perfection as this is not possible so
long as we are on the way, but we shall have it in heaven.
The third perfection answers to a totality neither on the part of the
object served, nor on the part of the lover as regards his always
actually tending to God, but on the part of the lover as regards the
removal of obstacles to the movement of love towards God, in which
sense Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII, qu. 36) that "carnal desire is the
bane of charity; to have no carnal desires is the perfection of
charity." Such perfection as this can be had in this life, and in two
ways. First, by the removal from man's affections of all that is
contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and there can be no charity
apart from this perfection, wherefore it is necessary for salvation.
Secondly, by the removal from man's affections not only of whatever is
contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders the mind's affections
from tending wholly to God. Charity is possible apart from this
perfection, for instance in those who are beginners and in those who
are proficient.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking there of heavenly
perfection which is not possible to those who are on the way.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who are perfect in this life are said to
"offend in many things" with regard to venial sins, which result from
the weakness of the present life: and in this respect they have an
"imperfect being" in comparison with the perfection of heaven.
Reply to Objection 3: As the conditions of the present life do not
allow of a man always tending actually to God, so neither does it allow
of his tending actually to each individual neighbor; but it suffices
for him to tend to all in common and collectively, and to each
individual habitually and according to the preparedness of his mind.
Now in the love of our neighbor, as in the love of God we may observe a
twofold perfection: one without which charity is impossible, and
consisting in one's having in one's affections nothing that is contrary
to the love of one's neighbor; and another without which it is possible
to have charity. The latter perfection may be considered in three ways.
First, as to the extent of love, through a man loving not only his
friends and acquaintances but also strangers and even his enemies, for
as Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) this is a mark of the perfect
children of God. Secondly, as to the intensity of love, which is shown
by the things which man despises for his neighbor's sake, through his
despising not only external goods for the sake of his neighbor, but
also bodily hardships and even death, according to Jn. 15:13, "Greater
love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his
friends." Thirdly, as to the effect of love, so that a man will
surrender not only temporal but also spiritual goods and even himself,
for his neighbor's sake, according to the words of the Apostle (2 Cor.
12:15), "But I most gladly will spend and be spent myself for your
souls."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, in this life, perfection consists in the observance of the
commandments or of the counsels?
Objection 1: It would seem that, in this life, perfection consists in
the observance not of the commandments but of the counsels. For our
Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.:
'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me." Now
this is a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the counsels and not
the precepts.
Objection 2: Further, all are bound to the observance of the
commandments, since this is necessary for salvation. Therefore, if the
perfection of the Christian life consists in observing the
commandments, it follows that perfection is necessary for salvation,
and that all are bound thereto; and this is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life is gauged
according to charity, as stated above [3756](A[1]). Now the perfection
of charity, seemingly, does not consist in the observance of the
commandments, since the perfection of charity is preceded both by its
increase and by its beginning, as Augustine says (Super Canonic. Joan.
Tract. ix). But the beginning of charity cannot precede the observance
of the commandments, since according to Jn. 14:23, "If any one love Me,
he will keep My word." Therefore the perfection of life regards not the
commandments but the counsels.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart," and (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor [Vulg.: 'friend'] as thyself"; and these are the commandments
of which our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): "On these two commandments
dependeth the whole law and the prophets." Now the perfection of
charity, in respect of which the Christian life is said to be perfect,
consists in our loving God with our whole heart, and our neighbor as
ourselves. Therefore it would seem that perfection consists in the
observance of the precepts.
I answer that, Perfection is said to consist in a thing in two ways: in
one way, primarily and essentially; in another, secondarily and
accidentally. Primarily and essentially the perfection of the Christian
life consists in charity, principally as to the love of God,
secondarily as to the love of our neighbor, both of which are the
matter of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated above.
Now the love of God and of our neighbor is not commanded according to a
measure, so that what is in excess of the measure be a matter of
counsel. This is evident from the very form of the commandment,
pointing, as it does, to perfection---for instance in the words, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart": since "the whole" is
the same as "the perfect," according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6),
and in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," since
every one loves himself most. The reason of this is that "the end of
the commandment is charity," according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5); and
the end is not subject to a measure, but only such things as are
directed to the end, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 3); thus a
physician does not measure the amount of his healing, but how much
medicine or diet he shall employ for the purpose of healing.
Consequently it is evident that perfection consists essentially in the
observance of the commandments; wherefore Augustine says (De Perf.
Justit. viii): "Why then should not this perfection be prescribed to
man, although no man has it in this life?"
Secondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection consists in the
observance of the counsels, all of which, like the commandments, are
directed to charity; yet not in the same way. For the commandments,
other than the precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of
things contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is
incompatible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal of
things that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not contrary to
charity, such as marriage, the occupation of worldly business, and so
forth. Hence Augustine says (Enchiridion cxxi): "Whatever things God
commands, for instance, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' and whatever
are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel, for instance,
'It is good for a man not to touch a woman,' are then done aright when
they are referred to the love of God, and of our neighbor for God's
sake, both in this world and in the world to come." Hence it is that in
the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, cap. vii) the abbot Moses
says: "Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, penury and
loss of all one's wealth, these are not perfection but means to
perfection, since not in them does the school of perfection find its
end, but through them it achieves its end," and he had already said
that "we endeavor to ascend by these steps to the perfection of
charity."
Reply to Objection 1: In this saying of our Lord something is indicated
as being the way to perfection by the words, "Go, sell all thou hast,
and give to the poor"; and something else is added wherein perfection
consists, when He said, "And follow Me." Hence Jerome in his commentary
on Mat. 19:27, says that "since it is not enough merely to leave, Peter
added that which is perfect: 'And have followed Thee'"; and Ambrose,
commenting on Lk. 5:27, "Follow Me," says: "He commands him to follow,
not with steps of the body, but with devotion of the soul, which is the
effect of charity." Wherefore it is evident from the very way of
speaking that the counsels are means of attaining to perfection, since
it is thus expressed: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell," etc., as
though He said: "By so doing thou shalt accomplish this end."
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii) "the
perfection of charity is prescribed to man in this life, because one
runs not right unless one knows whither to run. And how shall we know
this if no commandment declares it to us?" And since that which is a
matter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not break a
commandment through not fulfilling it in the best way, but it is enough
to fulfil it in any way whatever. Now the perfection of Divine love is
a matter of precept for all without exception, so that even the
perfection of heaven is not excepted from this precept, as Augustine
says (De Perf. Justit. viii [*Cf. De Spir. et Lit. XXXVI]), and one
escapes transgressing the precept, in whatever measure one attains to
the perfection of Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine love is to
love nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally with God,
and whoever fails from this degree of perfection nowise fulfils the
precept. There is another degree of the Divine love, which cannot be
fulfilled so long as we are on the way, as stated above [3757](A[2]),
and it is evident that to fail from this is not to be a transgressor of
the precept; and in like manner one does not transgress the precept, if
one does not attain to the intermediate degrees of perfection, provided
one attain to the lowest.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as man has a certain perfection of his
nature as soon as he is born, which perfection belongs to the very
essence of his species, while there is another perfection which he
acquires by growth, so again there is a perfection of charity which
belongs to the very essence of charity, namely that man love God above
all things, and love nothing contrary to God, while there is another
perfection of charity even in this life, whereto a man attains by a
kind of spiritual growth, for instance when a man refrains even from
lawful things, in order more freely to give himself to the service of
God.
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Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that whoever is perfect is in the state of
perfection. For, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), just as bodily
perfection is reached by bodily growth, so spiritual perfection is
acquired by spiritual growth. Now after bodily growth one is said to
have reached the state of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after
spiritual growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfection,
one is in the state of perfection.
Objection 2: Further, according to Phys. v, 2, movement "from one
contrary to another" has the same aspect as "movement from less to
more." Now when a man is changed from sin to grace, he is said to
change his state, in so far as the state of sin differs from the state
of grace. Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when one
progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to reach the perfect
degree, one is in the state of perfection.
Objection 3: Further, a man acquires a state by being freed from
servitude. But one is freed from the servitude of sin by charity,
because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12). Now one is said to
be perfect on account of charity, as stated above [3758](A[1]).
Therefore, seemingly, whoever has perfection, for this very reason has
the state of perfection.
On the contrary, Some are in the state of perfection, who are wholly
lacking in charity and grace, for instance wicked bishops or religious.
Therefore it would seem that on the other hand some have the perfection
of life, who nevertheless have not the state of perfection.
I answer that, As stated above ([3759]Q[183], A[1]), state properly
regards a condition of freedom or servitude. Now spiritual freedom or
servitude may be considered in man in two ways: first, with respect to
his internal actions; secondly, with respect to his external actions.
And since according to 1 Kings 16:7, "man seeth those things that
appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart," it follows that with regard
to man's internal disposition we consider his spiritual state in
relation to the Divine judgment, while with regard to his external
actions we consider man's spiritual state in relation to the Church. It
is in this latter sense that we are now speaking of states, namely in
so far as the Church derives a certain beauty from the variety of
states [*Cf.[3760] Q[183], A[2]].
Now it must be observed, that so far as men are concerned, in order
that any one attain to a state of freedom or servitude there is
required first of all an obligation or a release. For the mere fact of
serving someone does not make a man a slave, since even the free serve,
according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another":
nor again does the mere fact of ceasing to serve make a man free, as in
the case of a runaway slave; but properly speaking a man is a slave if
he be bound to serve, and a man is free if he be released from service.
Secondly, it is required that the aforesaid obligation be imposed with
a certain solemnity; even as a certain solemnity is observed in other
matters which among men obtain a settlement in perpetuity.
Accordingly, properly speaking, one is said to be in the state of
perfection, not through having the act of perfect love, but through
binding himself in perpetuity and with a certain solemnity to those
things that pertain to perfection. Moreover it happens that some
persons bind themselves to that which they do not keep, and some fulfil
that to which they have not bound themselves, as in the case of the two
sons (Mat. 21:28, 30), one of whom when his father said: "Work in my
vineyard," answered: "I will not," and "afterwards . . . he went,"
while the other "answering said: I go . . . and he went not." Wherefore
nothing hinders some from being perfect without being in the state of
perfection, and some in the state of perfection without being perfect.
Reply to Objection 1: By bodily growth a man progresses in things
pertaining to nature, wherefore he attains to the state of nature;
especially since "what is according to nature is," in a way,
"unchangeable" [*Ethic. v, 7], inasmuch as nature is determinate to one
thing. In like manner by inward spiritual growth a man reaches the
state of perfection in relation to the Divine judgment. But as regards
the distinctions of ecclesiastical states, a man does not reach the
state of perfection except by growth in respect of external actions.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument also regards the interior state.
Yet when a man passes from sin to grace, he passes from servitude to
freedom; and this does not result from a mere progress in grace, except
when a man binds himself to things pertaining to grace.
Reply to Objection 3: Again this argument considers the interior state.
Nevertheless, although charity causes the change of condition from
spiritual servitude to spiritual freedom, an increase of charity has
not the same effect.
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Whether religious and prelates are in the state of perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that prelates and religious are not in the
state of perfection. For the state of perfection differs from the state
of the beginners and the proficient. Now no class of men is specially
assigned to the state of the proficient or of the beginners. Therefore
it would seem that neither should any class of men be assigned to the
state of perfection.
Objection 2: Further, the outward state should answer to the inward,
else one is guilty of lying, "which consists not only in false words,
but also in deceitful deeds," according to Ambrose in one of his
sermons (xxx de Tempore). Now there are many prelates and religious who
have not the inward perfection of charity. Therefore, if all religious
and prelates are in the state of perfection, it would follow that all
of them that are not perfect are in mortal sin, as deceivers and liars.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above [3761](A[1]), perfection is
measured according to charity. Now the most perfect charity would seem
to be in the martyrs, according to Jn. 15:13, "Greater love than this
no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends": and a gloss
on Heb. 12:4, "For you have not yet resisted unto blood," says: "In
this life no love is more perfect than that to which the holy martyrs
attained, who strove against sin even unto blood." Therefore it would
seem that the state of perfection should be ascribed to the martyrs
rather than to religious and bishops.
On the contrary, Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) ascribes perfection to
bishops as being perfecters, and (Eccl. Hier. vi) to religious (whom he
calls monks or {therapeutai}, i.e. servants of God) as being perfected.
I answer that, As stated above [3762](A[4]), there is required for the
state of perfection a perpetual obligation to things pertaining to
perfection, together with a certain solemnity. Now both these
conditions are competent to religious and bishops. For religious bind
themselves by vow to refrain from worldly affairs, which they might
lawfully use, in order more freely to give themselves to God, wherein
consists the perfection of the present life. Hence Dionysius says
(Eccl. Hier. vi), speaking of religious: "Some call them
{therapeutai}," i.e. servants, "on account of their rendering pure
service and homage to God; others call them {monachoi}" [*i.e.
solitaries; whence the English word 'monk'], "on account of the
indivisible and single-minded life which by their being wrapped in,"
i.e. contemplating, "indivisible things, unites them in a Godlike union
and a perfection beloved of God" [*Cf. Q[180], A[6]]. Moreover, the
obligation in both cases is undertaken with a certain solemnity of
profession and consecration; wherefore Dionysius adds (Eccl. Hier. vi):
"Hence the holy legislation in bestowing perfect grace on them accords
them a hallowing invocation."
In like manner bishops bind themselves to things pertaining to
perfection when they take up the pastoral duty, to which it belongs
that a shepherd "lay down his life for his sheep," according to Jn.
10:15. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:12): "Thou . . . hast
confessed a good confession before many witnesses," that is to say,
"when he was ordained," as a gloss says on this passage. Again, a
certain solemnity of consecration is employed together with the
aforesaid profession, according to 2 Tim. 1:6: "Stir up the grace of
God which is in thee by the imposition of my hands," which the gloss
ascribes to the grace of the episcopate. And Dionysius says (Eccl.
Hier. v) that "when the high priest," i.e. the bishop, "is ordained, he
receives on his head the most holy imposition of the sacred oracles,
whereby it is signified that he is a participator in the whole and
entire hierarchical power, and that not only is he the enlightener in
all things pertaining to his holy discourses and actions, but that he
also confers this on others."
Reply to Objection 1: Beginning and increase are sought not for their
own sake, but for the sake of perfection; hence it is only to the state
of perfection that some are admitted under certain obligations and with
solemnity.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who enter the state of perfection do not
profess to be perfect, but to tend to perfection. Hence the Apostle
says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had already attained, or were
already perfect; but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend":
and afterwards (Phil. 3:15): "Let us therefore as many as are perfect,
be thus minded." Hence a man who takes up the state of perfection is
not guilty of lying or deceit through not being perfect, but through
withdrawing his mind from the intention of reaching perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: Martyrdom is the most perfect act of charity. But
an act of perfection does not suffice to make the state of perfection,
as stated above [3763](A[4]).
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Whether all ecclesiastical prelates are in the state of perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that all ecclesiastical prelates are in a
state of perfection. For Jerome commenting on Titus 1:5, "Ordain . . .
in every city," etc. says: "Formerly priest was the same as bishop,"
and afterwards he adds: "Just as priests know that by the custom of the
Church they are subject to the one who is placed over them, so too,
bishops should recognize that, by custom rather than by the very
ordinance of our Lord, they are above the priests, and are together the
rightful governors of the Church." Now bishops are in the state of
perfection. Therefore those priests also are who have the cure of
souls.
Objection 2: Further, just as bishops together with their consecration
receive the cure of souls, so also do parish priests and archdeacons,
of whom a gloss on Acts 6:3, "Brethren, look ye out . . . seven men of
good reputation," says: "The apostles decided here to appoint
throughout the Church seven deacons, who were to be of a higher degree,
and as it were the supports of that which is nearest to the altar."
Therefore it would seem that these also are in the state of perfection.
Objection 3: Further, just as bishops are bound to "lay down their life
for their sheep," so too are parish priests and archdeacons. But this
belongs to the perfection of charity, as stated above (A[2], ad 3).
Therefore it would seem that parish priests and archdeacons also are in
the state of perfection.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v): "The order of pontiffs
is consummative and perfecting, that of the priests is illuminative and
light-giving, that of the ministers is cleansing and discretive." Hence
it is evident that perfection is ascribed to bishops only.
I answer that, In priests and deacons having cure of souls two things
may be considered, namely their order and their cure. Their order is
directed to some act in the Divine offices. Wherefore it has been
stated above ([3764]Q[183], A[3], ad 3) that the distinction of orders
is comprised under the distinction of offices. Hence by receiving a
certain order a man receives the power of exercising certain sacred
acts, but he is not bound on this account to things pertaining to
perfection, except in so far as in the Western Church the receiving of
a sacred order includes the taking of a vow of continence, which is one
of the things pertaining to perfection, as we shall state further on
([3765]Q[186], A[4]). Therefore it is clear that from the fact that a
man receives a sacred order a man is not placed simply in the state of
perfection, although inward perfection is required in order that one
exercise such acts worthily.
In like manner, neither are they placed in the state of perfection on
the part of the cure which they take upon themselves. For they are not
bound by this very fact under the obligation of a perpetual vow to
retain the cure of souls; but they can surrender it---either by
entering religion, even without their bishop's permission (cf. Decret.
xix, qu. 2, can. Duae sunt)---or again an archdeacon may with his
bishop's permission resign his arch-deaconry or parish, and accept a
simple prebend without cure, which would be nowise lawful, if he were
in the state of perfection; for "no man putting his hand to the plough
and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God" (Lk. 9:62). On the
other hand bishops, since they are in the state of perfection, cannot
abandon the episcopal cure, save by the authority of the Sovereign
Pontiff (to whom alone it belongs also to dispense from perpetual
vows), and this for certain causes, as we shall state further on
([3766]Q[185], A[4]). Wherefore it is manifest that not all prelates
are in the state of perfection, but only bishops.
Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of priest and bishop in two ways.
First, with regard to the name: and thus formerly bishops and priests
were not distinct. For bishops are so called "because they watch over
others," as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xix, 19); while the priests
according to the Greek are "elders." [*Referring to the Greek
{episkopos} and {presbyteros} from which the English 'bishop' and
'priest' are derived.] Hence the Apostle employs the term "priests" in
reference to both, when he says (1 Tim. 5:17): "Let the priests that
rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor"; and again he uses the
term "bishops" in the same way, wherefore addressing the priests of the
Church of Ephesus he says (Acts 20:28): "Take heed to yourselves" and
"to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to
rule the church of God."
But as regards the thing signified by these terms, there was always a
difference between them, even at the time of the apostles. This is
clear on the authority of Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), and of a gloss on
Lk. 10:1, "After these things the Lord appointed," etc. which says:
"Just as the apostles were made bishops, so the seventy-two disciples
were made priests of the second order." Subsequently, however, in order
to avoid schism, it became necessary to distinguish even the terms, by
calling the higher ones bishops and the lower ones priests. But to
assert that priests nowise differ from bishops is reckoned by Augustine
among heretical doctrines (De Heres. liii), where he says that the
Arians maintained that "no distinction existed between a priest and a
bishop."
Reply to Objection 2: Bishops have the chief cure of the sheep of their
diocese, while parish priests and archdeacons exercise an inferior
ministry under the bishops. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 12:28, "to one,
helps, to another, governments [*Vulg.: 'God hath set some in the
church . . . helps, governments,' etc.]," says: "Helps, namely
assistants to those who are in authority," as Titus was to the Apostle,
or as archdeacons to the bishop; "governments, namely persons of lesser
authority, such as priests who have to instruct the people": and
Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) that "just as we see the whole hierarchy
culminating in Jesus, so each office culminates in its respective
godlike hierarch or bishop." Also it is said (XVI, qu. i, can.
Cunctis): "Priests and deacons must all take care not to do anything
without their bishop's permission." Wherefore it is evident that they
stand in relation to their bishop as wardens or mayors to the king; and
for this reason, just as in earthly governments the king alone receives
a solemn blessing, while others are appointed by simple commission, so
too in the Church the episcopal cure is conferred with the solemnity of
consecration, while the archdeacon or parish priest receives his cure
by simple appointment; although they are consecrated by receiving
orders before having a cure.
Reply to Objection 3: As parish priests and archdeacons have not the
chief cure, but a certain ministry as committed to them by the bishop,
so the pastoral office does not belong to them in chief, nor are they
bound to lay down their life for the sheep, except in so far as they
have a share in their cure. Hence we should say that they have an
office pertaining to perfection rather than that they attain the state
of perfection.
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Whether the religious state is more perfect than that of prelates?
Objection 1: It would seem that the religious state is more perfect
than that of prelates. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be
perfect, go" and "sell" all [Vulg.: 'what'] "thou hast, and give to the
poor"; and religious do this. But bishops are not bound to do so; for
it is said (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): "Bishops, if they
wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired property,
and whatever belongs to them personally." Therefore religious are in a
more perfect state than bishops.
Objection 2: Further, perfection consists more especially in the love
of God than in the love of our neighbor. Now the religious state is
directly ordered to the love of God, wherefore it takes its name from
"service and homage to God," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi);
[*Quoted above A[5]] whereas the bishop's state would seem to be
ordered to the love of our neighbor, of whose cure he is the "warden,"
and from this he takes his name, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei.
xix, 19). Therefore it would seem that the religious state is more
perfect than that of bishops.
Objection 3: Further, the religious state is directed to the
contemplative life, which is more excellent than the active life to
which the episcopal state is directed. For Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7)
that "Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the
active life desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias, who was
fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator, exclaimed against being
sent to preach." Therefore it would seem that the religious state is
more perfect than the episcopal state.
On the contrary, It is not lawful for anyone to pass from a more
excellent to a less excellent state; for this would be to look back
[*Cf. Lk. 9:62]. Yet a man may pass from the religious to the episcopal
state, for it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that "the holy
ordination makes a monk to be a bishop." Therefore the episcopal state
is more perfect than the religious.
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), "the agent is
ever more excellent than the patient." Now in the genus of perfection
according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v, vi), bishops are in the position
of "perfecters," whereas religious are in the position of being
"perfected"; the former of which pertains to action, and the latter to
passion. Whence it is evident that the state of perfection is more
excellent in bishops than in religious.
Reply to Objection 1: Renunciation of one's possessions may be
considered in two ways. First, as being actual: and thus it is not
essential, but a means, to perfection, as stated above [3767](A[3]).
Hence nothing hinders the state of perfection from being without
renunciation of one's possessions, and the same applies to other
outward practices. Secondly, it may be considered in relation to one's
preparedness, in the sense of being prepared to renounce or give away
all: and this belongs directly to perfection. Hence Augustine says (De
QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11): "Our Lord shows that the children of wisdom
understand righteousness to consist neither in eating nor in
abstaining, but in bearing want patiently." Wherefore the Apostle says
(Phil. 4:12): "I know . . . both to abound and to suffer need." Now
bishops especially are bound to despise all things for the honor of God
and the spiritual welfare of their flock, when it is necessary for them
to do so, either by giving to the poor of their flock, or by suffering
"with joy the being stripped of" their "own goods" [*Heb. 10:34].
Reply to Objection 2: That bishops are busy about things pertaining to
the love of their neighbor, arises out of the abundance of their love
of God. Hence our Lord asked Peter first of all whether he loved Him,
and afterwards committed the care of His flock to him. And Gregory says
(Pastor. i, 5): "If the pastoral care is a proof of love, he who
refuses to feed God's flock, though having the means to do so, is
convicted of not loving the supreme Pastor." And it is a sign of
greater love if a man devotes himself to others for his friend's sake,
than if he be willing only to serve his friend.
Reply to Objection 3: As Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1), "a prelate
should be foremost in action, and more uplifted than others in
contemplation," because it is incumbent on him to contemplate, not only
for his own sake, but also for the purpose of instructing others. Hence
Gregory applies (Hom. v in Ezech.) the words of Ps. 144:7, "They shall
publish the memory . . . of Thy sweetness," to perfect men returning
after their contemplation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious?
Objection 1: It would seem that also parish priests and archdeacons are
more perfect than religious. For Chrysostom says in his Dialogue (De
Sacerdot. vi): "Take for example a monk, such as Elias, if I may
exaggerate somewhat, he is not to be compared with one who, cast among
the people and compelled to carry the sins of many, remains firm and
strong." A little further on he says: "If I were given the choice,
where would I prefer to please, in the priestly office, or in the
monastic solitude, without hesitation I should choose the former."
Again in the same book (ch. 5) he says: "If you compare the toils of
this project, namely of the monastic life, with a well-employed
priesthood, you will find them as far distant from one another as a
common citizen is from a king." Therefore it would seem that priests
who have the cure of souls are more perfect than religious.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (ad Valerium, Ep. xxi): "Let thy
religious prudence observe that in this life, and especially at these
times, there is nothing so difficult, so onerous, so perilous as the
office of bishop, priest, or deacon; while in God's sight there is no
greater blessing, if one engage in the fight as ordered by our
Commander-in-chief." Therefore religious are not more perfect than
priests or deacons.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Ep. lx, ad Aurel.): "It would be
most regrettable, were we to exalt monks to such a disastrous degree of
pride, and deem the clergy deserving of such a grievous insult," as to
assert that 'a bad monk is a good clerk,' "since sometimes even a good
monk makes a bad clerk." And a little before this he says that "God's
servants," i.e. monks, "must not be allowed to think that they may
easily be chosen for something better," namely the clerical state, "if
they should become worse thereby," namely by leaving the monastic
state. Therefore it would seem that those who are in the clerical state
are more perfect than religious.
Objection 4: Further, it is not lawful to pass from a more perfect to a
less perfect state. Yet it is lawful to pass from the monastic state to
a priestly office with a cure attached, as appears (XVI, qu. i, can. Si
quis monachus) from a decree of Pope Gelasius, who says: "If there be a
monk, who by the merit of his exemplary life is worthy of the
priesthood, and the abbot under whose authority he fights for Christ
his King, ask that he be made a priest, the bishop shall take him and
ordain him in such place as he shall choose fitting." And Jerome says
(Ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "In the monastery so live as to deserve
to be a clerk." Therefore parish priests and archdeacons are more
perfect than religious.
Objection 5: Further, bishops are in a more perfect state than
religious, as shown above [3768](A[7]). But parish priests and
archdeacons. through having cure of souls, are more like bishops than
religious are. Therefore they are more perfect.
Objection 6: Further, virtue "is concerned with the difficult and the
good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to lead a good life in
the office of parish priest or archdeacon than in the religious state.
Therefore parish priests and archdeacons have more perfect virtue than
religious.
On the contrary, It is stated (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce): "If a man while
governing the people in his church under the bishop and leading a
secular life is inspired by the Holy Ghost to desire to work out his
salvation in a monastery or under some canonical rule, since he is led
by a private law, there is no reason why he should be constrained by a
public law." Now a man is not led by the law of the Holy Ghost, which
is here called a "private law," except to something more perfect.
Therefore it would seem that religious are more perfect than
archdeacons or parish priests.
I answer that, When we compare things in the point of super-eminence,
we look not at that in which they agree, but at that wherein they
differ. Now in parish priests and archdeacons three things may be
considered, their state, their order, and their office. It belongs to
their state that they are seculars, to their order that they are
priests or deacons, to their office that they have the cure of souls
committed to them.
Accordingly, if we compare these with one who is a religious by state,
a deacon or priest by order, having the cure of souls by office, as
many monks and canons regular have, this one will excel in the first
point, and in the other points he will be equal. But if the latter
differ from the former in state and office, but agree in order, such as
religious priests and deacons not having the cure of souls, it is
evident that the latter will be more excellent than the former in
state, less excellent in office, and equal in order.
We must therefore consider which is the greater, preeminence of state
or of office; and here, seemingly, we should take note of two things,
goodness and difficulty. Accordingly, if we make the comparison with a
view to goodness, the religious state surpasses the office of parish
priest or archdeacon, because a religious pledges his whole life to the
quest of perfection, whereas the parish priest or archdeacon does not
pledge his whole life to the cure of souls, as a bishop does, nor is it
competent to him, as it is to a bishop, to exercise the cure of souls
in chief, but only in certain particulars regarding the cure of souls
committed to his charge, as stated above (A[6], ad 2). Wherefore the
comparison of their religious state with their office is like the
comparisons of the universal with the particular, and of a holocaust
with a sacrifice which is less than a holocaust according to Gregory
(Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence it is said (XIX, qu. i, can. Clerici qui
monachorum.): "Clerics who wish to take the monastic vows through being
desirous of a better life must be allowed by their bishops the free
entrance into the monastery."
This comparison, however, must be considered as regarding the genus of
the deed; for as regards the charity of the doer it happens sometimes
that a deed which is of less account in its genus is of greater merit
if it be done out of greater charity.
On the other hand, if we consider the difficulty of leading a good life
in religion, and in the office of one having the cure of souls, in this
way it is more difficult to lead a good life together with the exercise
of the cure of souls, on account of outward dangers: although the
religious life is more difficult as regards the genus of the deed, by
reason of the strictness of religious observance. If, however, the
religious is also without orders, as in the case of religious lay
brethren, then it is evident that the pre-eminence of order excels in
the point of dignity, since by holy orders a man is appointed to the
most august ministry of serving Christ Himself in the sacrament of the
altar. For this requires a greater inward holiness than that which is
requisite for the religious state, since as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.
vi) the monastic order must follow the priestly orders, and ascend to
Divine things in imitation of them. Hence, other things being equal, a
cleric who is in holy orders, sins more grievously if he do something
contrary to holiness than a religious who is not in holy orders:
although a religious who is not in orders is bound to regular
observance to which persons in holy orders are not bound.
Reply to Objection 1: We might answer briefly these quotations from
Chrysostom by saying that he speaks not of a priest of lesser order who
has the cure of souls, but of a bishop, who is called a high-priest;
and this agrees with the purpose of that book wherein he consoles
himself and Basil in that they were chosen to be bishops. We may,
however, pass this over and reply that he speaks in view of the
difficulty. For he had already said: "When the pilot is surrounded by
the stormy sea and is able to bring the ship safely out of the tempest,
then he deserves to be acknowledged by all as a perfect pilot"; and
afterwards he concludes, as quoted, with regard to the monk, "who is
not to be compared with one who, cast among the people . . . remains
firm"; and he gives the reason why, because "both in the calm end in
the storm he piloted himself to safety." This proves nothing more than
that the state of one who has the cure of souls is fraught with more
danger than the monastic state; and to keep oneself innocent in face of
a greater peril is proof of greater virtue. on the other hand, it also
indicates greatness of virtue if a man avoid dangers by entering
religion; hence he does not say that "he would prefer the priestly
office to the monastic solitude," but that "he would rather please" in
the former than in the latter, since this is a proof of greater virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: This passage quoted from Augustine also clearly
refers to the question of difficulty which proves the greatness of
virtue in those who lead a good life, as stated above (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine there compares monks with clerics as
regards the pre-eminence of order, not as regards the distinction
between religious and secular life.
Reply to Objection 4: Those who are taken from the religious state to
receive the cure of souls, being already in sacred orders, attain to
something they had not hitherto, namely the office of the cure, yet
they do not put aside what they had already. For it is said in the
Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): "With regard to those monks
who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of clerics,
we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose."
On the other hand, parish priests and archdeacons, when they enter
religion, resign their cure, in order to enter the state of perfection.
This very fact shows the excellence of the religious life. When
religious who are not in orders are admitted to the clerical state and
to the sacred orders, they are clearly promoted to something better, as
stated: this is indicated by the very way in which Jerome expresses
himself: "So live in the monastery as to deserve to be a clerk."
Reply to Objection 5: Parish priests and archdeacons are more like
bishops than religious are, in a certain respect, namely as regards the
cure of souls which they have subordinately; but as regards the
obligation in perpetuity, religious are more like a bishop, as appears
from what we have said above ([3769]AA[5],6).
Reply to Objection 6: The difficulty that arises from the arduousness
of the deed adds to the perfection of virtue; but the difficulty that
results from outward obstacles sometimes lessens the perfection of
virtue---for instance, when a man loves not virtue so much as to wish
to avoid the obstacles to virtue, according to the saying of the
Apostle (1 Cor. 9:25), "Everyone that striveth for the mastery
refraineth himself from all things": and sometimes it is a sign of
perfect virtue---for instance, when a man forsakes not virtue, although
he is hindered in the practice of virtue unawares or by some
unavoidable cause. In the religious state there is greater difficulty
arising from the arduousness of deeds; whereas for those who in any way
at all live in the world, there is greater difficulty resulting from
obstacles to virtue, which obstacles the religious has had the
foresight to avoid.
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OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE EPISCOPAL STATE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider things pertaining to the episcopal state. Under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?
(2) Whether it is lawful to refuse the office of bishop definitively?
(3) Whether the better man should be chosen for the episcopal office?
(4) Whether a bishop may pass over to the religious state?
(5) Whether he may lawfully abandon his subjects in a bodily manner?
(6) Whether he can have anything of his own?
(7) Whether he sins mortally by not distributing ecclesiastical goods
to the poor?
(8) Whether religious who are appointed to the episcopal office are
bound to religious observances?
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Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to desire the office of a
bishop. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:1): "He that desires [Vulg.: 'If
a man desire'] the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work." Now it
is lawful and praiseworthy to desire a good work. Therefore it is even
praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop.
Objection 2: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the
religious, as we have said above ([3770]Q[184], A[7]). But it is
praiseworthy to desire to enter the religious state. Therefore it is
also praiseworthy to desire promotion to the episcopal state.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 11:26): "He that hideth up
corn shall be cursed among the people; but a blessing upon the head of
them that sell." Now a man who is apt, both in manner of life and by
knowledge, for the episcopal office, would seem to hide up the
spiritual corn, if he shun the episcopal state, whereas by accepting
the episcopal office he enters the state of a dispenser of spiritual
corn. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a
bishop, and blameworthy to refuse it.
Objection 4: Further, the deeds of the saints related in Holy Writ are
set before us as an example, according to Rom. 15:4, "What things
soever were written, were written for our learning." Now we read (Is.
6:8) that Isaias offered himself for the office of preacher, which
belongs chiefly to bishops. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to
desire the office of a bishop.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The higher
place, without which the people cannot be ruled, though it be filled
becomingly, is unbecomingly desired."
I answer that, Three things may be considered in the episcopal office.
One is principal and final, namely the bishop's work, whereby the good
of our neighbor is intended, according to Jn. 21:17, "Feed My sheep."
Another thing is the height of degree, for a bishop is placed above
others, according to Mat. 24:45, "A faithful and a wise servant, whom
his lord hath appointed over his family." The third is something
resulting from these, namely reverence, honor, and a sufficiency of
temporalities, according to 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the priests that rule
well be esteemed worthy of double honor." Accordingly, to desire the
episcopal office on account of these incidental goods is manifestly
unlawful, and pertains to covetousness or ambition. Wherefore our Lord
said against the Pharisees (Mat. 23:6,7): "They love the first places
at feasts, and the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in
the market-place, and to be called by men, Rabbi." As regards the
second, namely the height of degree, it is presumptuous to desire the
episcopal office. Hence our Lord reproved His disciples for seeking
precedence, by saying to them (Mat. 20:25): "You know that the princes
of the gentiles lord it over them." Here Chrysostom says (Hom. lxv in
Matth.) that in these words "He points out that it is heathenish to
seek precedence; and thus by comparing them to the gentiles He
converted their impetuous soul."
On the other hand, to desire to do good to one's neighbor is in itself
praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless, since considered as an
episcopal act it has the height of degree attached to it, it would seem
that, unless there be manifest and urgent reason for it, it would be
presumptuous for any man to desire to be set over others in order to do
them good. Thus Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8) that "it was praiseworthy
to seek the office of a bishop when it was certain to bring one into
graver dangers." Wherefore it was not easy to find a person to accept
this burden, especially seeing that it is through the zeal of charity
that one divinely instigated to do so, according to Gregory, who says
(Pastor. i, 7) that "Isaias being desirous of profiting his neighbor,
commendably desired the office of preacher."
Nevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, desire to do such like
works if he should happen to be in that office, or to be worthy of
doing them; so that the object of his desire is the good work and not
the precedence in dignity. Hence Chrysostom* says: "It is indeed good
to desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honor is vanity.
For primacy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors one that desires it."
[*The quotation is from the Opus Imperfectum in Matth. (Hom. xxxv),
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.]
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), "when the Apostle
said this he who was set over the people was the first to be dragged to
the torments of martyrdom," so that there was nothing to be desired in
the episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix, 19) that when the Apostle said, "'Whoever desireth the
office of bishop, desireth a good work,' he wished to explain what the
episcopacy is: for it denotes work and not honor: since {skopos}
signifies 'watching.' Wherefore if we like we may render {episkopein}
by the Latin 'superintendere' [to watch over]: thus a man may know
himself to be no bishop if he loves to precede rather than to profit
others." For, as he observed shortly before, "in our actions we should
seek, not honor nor power in this life, since all things beneath the
sun are vanity, but the work itself which that honor or power enables
us to do." Nevertheless, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), "while
praising the desire" (namely of the good work) "he forthwith turns this
object of praise into one of fear, when he adds: It behooveth . . . a
bishop to be blameless," as though to say: "I praise what you seek, but
learn first what it is you seek."
Reply to Objection 2: There is no parity between the religious and the
episcopal state, for two reasons. First, because perfection of life is
a prerequisite of the episcopal state, as appears from our Lord asking
Peter if he loved Him more than the others, before committing the
pastoral office to him, whereas perfection is not a prerequisite of the
religious state, since the latter is the way to perfection. Hence our
Lord did not say (Mat. 19:21): "If thou art perfect, go, sell all
[Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast," but "If thou wilt be perfect." The reason
for this difference is because, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier.
vi), perfection pertains actively to the bishop, as the "perfecter,"
but to the monk passively as one who is "perfected": and one needs to
be perfect in order to bring others to perfection, but not in order to
be brought to perfection. Now it is presumptuous to think oneself
perfect, but it is not presumptuous to tend to perfection. Secondly,
because he who enters the religious state subjects himself to others
for the sake of a spiritual profit, and anyone may lawfully do this.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "No man is debarred
from striving for the knowledge of truth, since this pertains to a
praiseworthy ease." On the other hand, he who enters the episcopal
state is raised up in order to watch over others, and no man should
seek to be raised thus, according to Heb. 5:4, "Neither doth any man
take the honor to himself, but he that is called by God": and
Chrysostom says: "To desire supremacy in the Church is neither just nor
useful. For what wise man seeks of his own accord to submit to such
servitude and peril, as to have to render an account of the whole
Church? None save him who fears not God's judgment, and makes a secular
abuse of his ecclesiastical authority, by turning it to secular uses."
Reply to Objection 3: The dispensing of spiritual corn is not to be
carried on in an arbitrary fashion, but chiefly according to the
appointment and disposition of God, and in the second place according
to the appointment of the higher prelates, in whose person it is said
(1 Cor. 4:1): "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of
Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." Wherefore a man is
not deemed to hide spiritual corn if he avoids governing or correcting
others, and is not competent to do so, neither in virtue of his office
nor of his superior's command; thus alone is he deemed to hide it, when
he neglects to dispense it while under obligation to do so in virtue of
his office, or obstinately refuses to accept the office when it is
imposed on him. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love
of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an
honest labor. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we must devote
ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but if it be
imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us."
Reply to Objection 4: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "Isaias, who
wishing to be sent, knew himself to be already cleansed by the live
coal taken from the altar, shows us that no one should dare uncleansed
to approach the sacred ministry. Since, then, it is very difficult for
anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed, it is safer to decline
the office of preacher."
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Whether it is lawful for a man to refuse absolutely an appointment to the
episcopate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to refuse absolutely an
appointment to the episcopate. For as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7),
"Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the active
life, desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias who was fain to
hold fast to the love of his Creator by contemplation exclaimed against
being sent to preach." Now no man sins by being unwilling to forgo
better things in order to adhere to things that are not so good. Since
then the love of God surpasses the love of our neighbor, and the
contemplative life is preferable to the active, as shown above
([3771]Q[25], A[1];[3772] Q[26], A[2];[3773] Q[182], A[1]) it would
seem that a man sins not if he refuse absolutely the episcopal office.
Objection 2: Further, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "it is very
difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed: nor should
anyone uncleansed approach the sacred ministry." Therefore if a man
perceives that he is not cleansed, however urgently the episcopal
office be enjoined him, he ought not to accept it.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome (Prologue, super Marc.) says that "it is
related of the Blessed Mark* that after receiving the faith he cut off
his thumb that he might be excluded from the priesthood." [*This
prologue was falsely ascribed to St. Jerome, and the passage quoted
refers, not to St. Mark the Evangelist, but to a hermit of that name.
(Cf. Baronius, Anno Christi, 45, num. XLIV)] Likewise some take a vow
never to accept a bishopric. Now to place an obstacle to a thing
amounts to the same as refusing it altogether. Therefore it would seem
that one may, without sin, refuse the episcopal office absolutely.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. xlviii ad Eudox.): "If Mother
Church requires your service, neither accept with greedy conceit, nor
refuse with fawning indolence"; and afterwards he adds: "Nor prefer
your ease to the needs of the Church: for if no good men were willing
to assist her in her labor, you would seek in vain how we could be born
of her."
I answer that, Two things have to be considered in the acceptance of
the episcopal office: first, what a man may fittingly desire according
to his own will; secondly, what it behooves a man to do according to
the will of another. As regards his own will it becomes a man to look
chiefly to his own spiritual welfare, whereas that he look to the
spiritual welfare of others becomes a man according to the appointment
of another having authority, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Hence just
as it is a mark of an inordinate will that a man of his own choice
incline to be appointed to the government of others, so too it
indicates an inordinate will if a man definitively refuse the aforesaid
office of government in direct opposition to the appointment of his
superior: and this for two reasons.
First, because this is contrary to the love of our neighbor, for whose
good a man should offer himself according as place and time demand:
hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the demands of charity
undertake an honest labor." Secondly, because this is contrary to
humility, whereby a man submits to his superior's commands: hence
Gregory says (Pastor. i, 6): "In God's sight humility is genuine when
it does not obstinately refuse to submit to what is usefully
prescribed."
Reply to Objection 1: Although simply and absolutely speaking the
contemplative life is more excellent than the active, and the love of
God better than the love of our neighbor, yet, on the other hand, the
good of the many should be preferred to the good of the individual.
Wherefore Augustine says in the passage quoted above: "Nor prefer your
own ease to the needs of the Church," and all the more since it belongs
to the love of God that a man undertake the pastoral care of Christ's
sheep. Hence Augustine, commenting on Jn. 21:17, "Feed My sheep," says
(Tract. cxxiii in Joan.): "Be it the task of love to feed the Lord's
flock, even as it was the mark of fear to deny the Shepherd."
Moreover prelates are not transferred to the active life, so as to
forsake the contemplative; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
19) that "if the burden of the pastoral office be imposed, we must not
abandon the delights of truth," which are derived from contemplation.
Reply to Objection 2: No one is bound to obey his superior by doing
what is unlawful, as appears from what was said above concerning
obedience ([3774]Q[104], A[5]). Accordingly it may happen that he who
is appointed to the office of prelate perceive something in himself on
account of which it is unlawful for him to accept a prelacy. But this
obstacle may sometimes be removed by the very person who is appointed
to the pastoral cure---for instance, if he have a purpose to sin, he
may abandon it---and for this reason he is not excused from being bound
to obey definitely the superior who has appointed him. Sometimes,
however, he is unable himself to remove the impediment that makes the
pastoral office unlawful to him, yet the prelate who appoints him can
do so---for instance, if he be irregular or excommunicate. In such a
case he ought to make known his defect to the prelate who has appointed
him; and if the latter be willing to remove the impediment, he is bound
humbly to obey. Hence when Moses had said (Ex. 4:10): "I beseech thee,
Lord, I am not eloquent from yesterday, and the day before," the Lord
answered (Ex. 4:12): "I will be in thy mouth, and I will teach thee
what thou shalt speak." At other times the impediment cannot be
removed, neither by the person appointing nor by the one
appointed---for instance, if an archbishop be unable to dispense from
an irregularity; wherefore a subject, if irregular, would not be bound
to obey him by accepting the episcopate or even sacred orders.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not in itself necessary for salvation to
accept the episcopal office, but it becomes necessary by reason of the
superior's command. Now one may lawfully place an obstacle to things
thus necessary for salvation, before the command is given; else it
would not be lawful to marry a second time, lest one should thus incur
an impediment to the episcopate or holy orders. But this would not be
lawful in things necessary for salvation. Hence the Blessed Mark did
not act against a precept by cutting off his finger, although it is
credible that he did this by the instigation of the Holy Ghost, without
which it would be unlawful for anyone to lay hands on himself. If a man
take a vow not to accept the bishop's office, and by this intend to
bind himself not even to accept it in obedience to his superior
prelate, his vow is unlawful; but if he intend to bind himself, so far
as it lies with him, not to seek the episcopal office, nor to accept it
except under urgent necessity, his vow is lawful, because he vows to do
what it becomes a man to do.
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Whether he that is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than
others?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is appointed to the episcopate
ought to be better than others. For our Lord, when about to commit the
pastoral office to Peter, asked him if he loved Him more than the
others. Now a man is the better through loving God the more. Therefore
it would seem that one ought not to be appointed to the episcopal
office except he be better than others.
Objection 2: Further, Pope Symmachus says (can. Vilissimus I, qu. 1):
"A man is of very little worth who though excelling in dignity, excels
not in knowledge and holiness." Now he who excels in knowledge and
holiness is better. Therefore a man ought not to be appointed to the
episcopate unless he be better than others.
Objection 3: Further, in every genus the lesser are governed by the
greater, as corporeal things are governed by things spiritual, and the
lower bodies by the higher, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 3). Now a
bishop is appointed to govern others. Therefore he should be better
than others.
On the contrary, The Decretal [*Can. Cum dilectus, de Electione] says
that "it suffices to choose a good man, nor is it necessary to choose
the better man."
I answer that, In designating a man for the episcopal office, something
has to be considered on the part of the person designate, and something
on the part of the designator. For on the part of the designator,
whether by election or by appointment, it is required that he choose
such a one as will dispense the divine mysteries faithfully. These
should be dispensed for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor.
14:12, "Seek to abound unto the edifying of the Church"; and the divine
mysteries are not committed to men for their own meed, which they
should await in the life to come. Consequently he who has to choose or
appoint one for a bishop is not bound to take one who is best simply,
i.e. according to charity, but one who is best for governing the
Church, one namely who is able to instruct, defend, and govern the
Church peacefully. Hence Jerome, commenting on Titus 1:5, says against
certain persons that "some seek to erect as pillars of the Church, not
those whom they know to be more useful to the Church, but those whom
they love more, or those by whose obsequiousness they have been cajoled
or undone, or for whom some person in authority has spoken, and, not to
say worse than this, have succeeded by means of gifts in being made
clerics."
Now this pertains to the respect of persons, which in such matters is a
grave sin. Wherefore a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. clxvii ad Hieron.] on
James 2:1, "Brethren, have not . . . with respect of persons," says:
"If this distinction of sitting and standing be referred to
ecclesiastical honors, we must not deem it a slight sin to 'have the
faith of the Lord of glory with respect of persons.' For who would
suffer a rich man to be chosen for the Church's seat of honor, in
despite of a poor man who is better instructed and holier?"
On the part of the person appointed, it is not required that he esteem
himself better than others, for this would be proud and presumptuous;
but it suffices that he perceive nothing in himself which would make it
unlawful for him to take up the office of prelate. Hence although Peter
was asked by our Lord if he loved Him more than the others, he did not,
in his reply, set himself before the others, but answered simply that
he loved Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord knew that, by His own bestowal, Peter
was in other respects fitted to govern the Church: wherefore He
questioned him about his greater love, to show that when we find a man
otherwise fitted for the government of the Church, we must look chiefly
to his pre-eminence in the love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: This statement refers to the pursuits of the man
who is placed in authority. For he should aim at showing himself to be
more excellent than others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore
Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1) "the occupations of a prelate ought to
excel those of the people, as much as the shepherd's life excels that
of his flock." But he is not to be blamed and looked upon as worthless
if he excelled not before being raised to the prelacy.
Reply to Objection 3: According to 1 Cor. 12:4 seqq., "there are
diversities of graces . . . and . . . of ministries . . . and . . . of
operations." Hence nothing hinders one from being more fitted for the
office of governing, who does not excel in the grace of holiness. It is
otherwise in the government of the natural order, where that which is
higher in the natural order is for that very reason more fitted to
dispose of those that are lower.
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Whether a bishop may lawfully forsake the episcopal cure, in order to enter
religion?
Objection 1: It seems that a bishop cannot lawfully forsake his
episcopal cure in order to enter religion. For no one can lawfully pass
from a more perfect to a less perfect state; since this is "to look
back," which is condemned by the words of our Lord (Lk. 9:62), "No man
putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the
kingdom of God." Now the episcopal state is more perfect than the
religious, as shown above ([3775]Q[184], A[7]). Therefore just as it is
unlawful to return to the world from the religious state, so is it
unlawful to pass from the episcopal to the religious state.
Objection 2: Further, the order of grace is more congruous than the
order of nature. Now according to nature a thing is not moved in
contrary directions; thus if a stone be naturally moved downwards, it
cannot naturally return upwards from below. But according to the order
of grace it is lawful to pass from the religious to the episcopal
state. Therefore it is not lawful to pass contrariwise from the
episcopal to the religious state.
Objection 3: Further, in the works of grace nothing should be
inoperative. Now when once a man is consecrated bishop he retains in
perpetuity the spiritual power of giving orders and doing like things
that pertain to the episcopal office: and this power would seemingly
remain inoperative in one who gives up the episcopal cure. Therefore it
would seem that a bishop may not forsake the episcopal cure and enter
religion.
On the contrary, No man is compelled to do what is in itself unlawful.
Now those who seek to resign their episcopal cure are compelled to
resign (Extra, de Renunt. cap. Quidam). Therefore apparently it is not
unlawful to give up the episcopal cure.
I answer that, The perfection of the episcopal state consists in this
that for love of God a man binds himself to work for the salvation of
his neighbor, wherefore he is bound to retain the pastoral cure so long
as he is able to procure the spiritual welfare of the subjects
entrusted to his care: a matter which he must not neglect---neither for
the sake of the quiet of divine contemplation, since the Apostle, on
account of the needs of his subjects, suffered patiently to be delayed
even from the contemplation of the life to come, according to Phil.
1:22-25, "What I shall choose I know not, but I am straitened between
two, having a desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ, a thing by
far better. But to abide still in the flesh is needful for you. And
having this confidence, I know that I shall abide"; nor for the sake of
avoiding any hardships or of acquiring any gain whatsoever, because as
it is written (Jn. 10:11), "the good shepherd giveth his life for his
sheep."
At times, however, it happens in several ways that a bishop is hindered
from procuring the spiritual welfare of his subjects. Sometimes on
account of his own defect, either of conscience (for instance if he be
guilty of murder or simony), or of body (for example if he be old or
infirm), or of irregularity arising, for instance, from bigamy.
Sometimes he is hindered through some defect in his subjects, whom he
is unable to profit. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3): "The wicked must
be borne patiently, when there are some good who can be succored, but
when there is no profit at all for the good, it is sometimes useless to
labor for the wicked. Wherefore the perfect when they find that they
labor in vain are often minded to go elsewhere in order to labor with
fruit." Sometimes again this hindrance arises on the part of others, as
when scandal results from a certain person being in authority: for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:13): "If meat scandalize my brother, I will
never eat flesh": provided, however, the scandal is not caused by the
wickedness of persons desirous of subverting the faith or the
righteousness of the Church; because the pastoral cure is not to be
laid aside on account of scandal of this kind, according to Mat. 15:14,
"Let them alone," those namely who were scandalized at the truth of
Christ's teaching, "they are blind, and leaders of the blind."
Nevertheless just as a man takes upon himself the charge of authority
at the appointment of a higher superior, so too it behooves him to be
subject to the latter's authority in laying aside the accepted charge
for the reasons given above. Hence Innocent III says (Extra, de
Renunt., cap. Nisi cum pridem): "Though thou hast wings wherewith thou
art anxious to fly away into solitude, they are so tied by the bonds of
authority, that thou art not free to fly without our permission." For
the Pope alone can dispense from the perpetual vow, by which a man
binds himself to the care of his subjects, when he took upon himself
the episcopal office.
Reply to Objection 1: The perfection of religious and that of bishops
are regarded from different standpoints. For it belongs to the
perfection of a religious to occupy oneself in working out one's own
salvation, whereas it belongs to the perfection of a bishop to occupy
oneself in working for the salvation of others. Hence so long as a man
can be useful to the salvation of his neighbor, he would be going back,
if he wished to pass to the religious state, to busy himself only with
his own salvation, since he has bound himself to work not only for his
own but also for others' salvation. Wherefore Innocent III says in the
Decretal quoted above that "it is more easily allowable for a monk to
ascend to the episcopacy, than for a bishop to descend to the monastic
life. If, however, he be unable to procure the salvation of others it
is meet he should seek his own."
Reply to Objection 2: On account of no obstacle should a man forego the
work of his own salvation, which pertains to the religious state. But
there may be an obstacle to the procuring of another's salvation;
wherefore a monk may be raised to the episcopal state wherein he is
able also to work out his own salvation. And a bishop, if he be
hindered from procuring the salvation of others, may enter the
religious life, and may return to his bishopric should the obstacle
cease, for instance by the correction of his subjects, cessation of the
scandal, healing of his infirmity, removal of his ignorance by
sufficient instruction. Again, if he owed his promotion to simony of
which he was in ignorance, and resigning his episcopate entered the
religious life, he can be reappointed to another bishopric [*Cap. Post
translat., de Renunt.]. On the other hand, if a man be deposed from the
episcopal office for some sin, and confined in a monastery that he may
do penance, he cannot be reappointed to a bishopric. Hence it is stated
(VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy synod orders that any man
who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to the monastic life
and a place of repentance, should by no means rise again to the
episcopate."
Reply to Objection 3: Even in natural things power remains inactive on
account of a supervening obstacle, for instance the act of sight ceases
through an affliction of the eye. So neither is it unreasonable if,
through the occurrence of some obstacle from without, the episcopal
power remain without the exercise of its act.
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Whether it is lawful for a bishop on account of bodily persecution to
abandon the flock committed to his care?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful for a bishop, on account
of some temporal persecution, to withdraw his bodily presence from the
flock committed to his care. For our Lord said (Jn. 10:12) that he is a
hireling and no true shepherd, who "seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth
the sheep and flieth": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.) that "the
wolf comes upon the sheep when any man by his injustice and robbery
oppresses the faithful and the humble." Therefore if, on account of the
persecution of a tyrant, a bishop withdraws his bodily presence from
the flock entrusted to his care, it would seem that he is a hireling
and not a shepherd.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 6:1): "My son, if thou be
surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger,"
and afterwards (Prov. 6:3): "Run about, make haste, stir up thy
friend." Gregory expounds these words and says (Pastor. iii, 4): "To be
surety for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by engaging
oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an example to the
lives of others, is warned not only to watch but even to rouse his
friend." Now he cannot do this if he withdraw his bodily presence from
his flock. Therefore it would seem that a bishop should not on account
of persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his flock.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the perfection of the bishop's
state that he devote himself to the care of his neighbor. Now it is
unlawful for one who has professed the state of perfection to forsake
altogether the things that pertain to perfection. Therefore it would
seem unlawful for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the
execution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of devoting
himself to works of perfection in a monastery.
On the contrary, our Lord commanded the apostles, whose successors
bishops are (Mat. 10:23): "When they shall persecute you in this city,
flee into another."
I answer that, In any obligation the chief thing to be considered is
the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind themselves to fulfil the
pastoral office for the sake of the salvation of their subjects.
Consequently when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal
presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal
presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal
advantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his person,
since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his sheep.
On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can be sufficiently
provided for by another person in the absence of the pastor, it is
lawful for the pastor to withdraw his bodily presence from his flock,
either for the sake of some advantage to the Church, or on account of
some danger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxxviii ad
Honorat.): "Christ's servants may flee from one city to another, when
one of them is specially sought out by persecutors: in order that the
Church be not abandoned by others who are not so sought for. When,
however, the same danger threatens all, those who stand in need of
others must not be abandoned by those whom they need." For "if it is
dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship when the sea is calm, how
much more so when it is stormy," as Pope Nicholas I says (cf. VII, qu.
i, can. Sciscitaris).
Reply to Objection 1: To flee as a hireling is to prefer temporal
advantage or one's bodily welfare to the spiritual welfare of one's
neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.): "A man cannot endanger
himself for the sake of his sheep, if he uses his authority over them
not through love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore he
fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what he loves." But he
who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without endangering the
flock, does not flee as a hireling.
Reply to Objection 2: If he who is surety for another be unable to
fulfil his engagement, it suffices that he fulfil it through another.
Hence if a superior is hindered from attending personally to the care
of his subjects, he fulfils his obligation if he do so through another.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man is appointed to a bishopric, he
embraces the state of perfection as regards one kind of perfection; and
if he be hindered from the practice thereof, he is not bound to another
kind of perfection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious state.
Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention of devoting
himself to his neighbor's salvation, should an opportunity offer, and
necessity require it of him.
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Whether it is lawful for a bishop to have property of his own?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for a bishop to have
property of his own. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be
perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what] thou hast, and give to the poor . .
. and come, follow Me"; whence it would seem to follow that voluntary
poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the state of
perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for them to possess
anything as their own.
Objection 2: Further, bishops take the place of the apostles in the
Church, according to a gloss on Lk. 10:1. Now our Lord commanded the
apostles to possess nothing of their own, according to Mat. 10:9, "Do
not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses"; wherefore
Peter said for himself and the other apostles (Mat. 19:27): "Behold we
have left all things and have followed Thee." Therefore it would seem
that bishops are bound to keep this command, and to possess nothing of
their own.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): "The Greek
{kleros} denotes the Latin 'sors.' Hence clerics are so called either
because they are of the Lord's estate, or because the Lord Himself is
the estate, i.e. portion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord,
can have nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver,
possessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the Lord
does not vouchsafe to be his portion also." Therefore it would seem
that not only bishops but even clerics should have nothing of their
own.
On the contrary, It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus):
"Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or
acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally."
I answer that, No one is bound to works of supererogation, unless he
binds himself specially thereto by vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep.
cxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment.): "Since you have taken the vow, you have
already bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before you were
bound by the vow, you were free to submit." Now it is evident that to
live without possessing anything is a work of supererogation, for it is
a matter not of precept but of counsel. Wherefore our Lord after saying
to the young man: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the
commandments," said afterwards by way of addition: "If thou wilt be
perfect go sell" all "that thou hast, and give to the poor" (Mat.
19:17, 21). Bishops, however, do not bind themselves at their
ordination to live without possessions of their own; nor indeed does
the pastoral office, to which they bind themselves, make it necessary
for them to live without anything of their own. Therefore bishops are
not bound to live without possessions of their own.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3776]Q[184], A[3], ad 1) the
perfection of the Christian life does not essentially consist in
voluntary poverty, but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the
perfection of life. Hence it does not follow that where there is
greater poverty there is greater perfection; indeed the highest
perfection is compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it
was said (Gn. 17:1): "Walk before Me and be perfect," is stated to have
been rich (Gn. 13:2).
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of our Lord can be understood in
three ways. First, mystically, that we should possess neither gold nor
silver means that the preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal
wisdom and eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage.
Secondly, according to Augustine's explanation (De Consens. Ev. ii,
30), we are to understand that our Lord said this not in command but in
permission. For he permitted them to go preaching without gold or
silver or other means, since they were to receive the means of
livelihood from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: "For
the workman is worthy of his meat." And yet if anyone were to use his
own means in preaching the Gospel, this would be a work of
supererogation, as Paul says in reference to himself (1 Cor. 9:12, 15).
Thirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Rom.
xvi, 3], we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands on His
disciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to preach
to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His power,
seeing that He provided for their wants without their having means of
their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or their
successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having means of
their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. 11:8) that he "received wages"
of other churches for preaching to the Corinthians, wherefore it is
clear that he possessed something sent to him by others. And it seems
foolish to say that so many holy bishops as Athanasius, Ambrose, and
Augustine would have disobeyed these commandments if they believed
themselves bound to observe them.
Reply to Objection 3: Every part is less than the whole. Accordingly a
man has other portions together with God, if he becomes less intent on
things pertaining to God by occupying himself with things of the world.
Now neither bishops nor clerics ought thus to possess means of their
own, that while busy with their own they neglect those that concern the
worship of God.
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Whether bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the
ecclesiastical goods which accrue to them?
Objection 1: It would seem that bishops sin mortally if they distribute
not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they acquire. For
Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp., among the supposititious works
of St. Jerome] expounding Lk. 12:16, "The land of a certain . . . man
brought forth plenty of fruits," says: "Let no man claim as his own
that which he has taken and obtained by violence from the common
property in excess of his requirements"; and afterwards he adds: "It is
not less criminal to take from him who has, than, when you are able and
have plenty to refuse him who has not." Now it is a mortal sin to take
another's property by violence. Therefore bishops sin mortally if they
give not to the poor that which they have in excess.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Is. 3:14, "The spoil of the
poor is in your house," says that "ecclesiastical goods belong to the
poor." Now whoever keeps for himself or gives to others that which
belongs to another, sins mortally and is bound to restitution.
Therefore if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations or
friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would seem that they
are bound to restitution.
Objection 3: Further, much more may one take what is necessary for
oneself from the goods of the Church, than accumulate a surplus
therefrom. Yet Jerome says in a letter to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Can.
Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam; cause. xvi, qu. 1; Regul.
Monach. iv, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]: "It is right
that those clerics who receive no goods from their parents and
relations should be supported from the funds of the Church. But those
who have sufficient income from their parents and their own
possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor, they commit and
incur the guilt of sacrilege." Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim.
5:16): "If any of the faithful have widows, let him minister to them,
and let not the Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for
them that are widows indeed." Much more therefore do bishops sin
mortally if they give not to the poor the surplus of their
ecclesiastical goods.
On the contrary, Many bishops do not give their surplus to the poor,
but would seem commendably to lay it out so as to increase the revenue
of the Church.
I answer that, The same is not to be said of their own goods which
bishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. For they have real
dominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the
case they are not bound to give these things to others, and may either
keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will. Nevertheless
they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection, which leads them
either to accumulate more than they should, or not to assist others, in
accordance with the demands of charity; yet they are not bound to
restitution, because such things are entrusted to their ownership.
On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or
trustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv ad Bonif.): "If we possess
privately what is enough for us, other things belong not to us but to
the poor, and we have the dispensing of them; but we can claim
ownership of them only by wicked theft." Now dispensing requires good
faith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, "Here now it is required among the
dispensers that a man be found faithful." Moreover ecclesiastical goods
are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to the
divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said (XII,
qu. ii, can. de reditibus): "Of the Church's revenues or the offerings
of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the bishop, two
parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of suspension, for the
ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the poor; the remaining
part is to be divided among the clergy according to their respective
merits." Accordingly if the goods which are assigned to the use of the
bishop are distinct from those which are appointed for the use of the
poor, or the ministers, or for the ecclesiastical worship, and if the
bishop keeps back for himself part of that which should be given to the
poor, or to the ministers for their use, or expended on the divine
worship, without doubt he is an unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally,
and is bound to restitution.
But as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the
same apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins
through immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds
moderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others
according to the demands of charity.
On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods,
their distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or
exceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his
good faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide
precisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be
very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would
seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin. For it
is written (Mat. 24:48-51) that "if that evil servant shall say in his
heart: My lord is long a-coming," which shows contempt of God's
judgment, "and shall begin to strike his fellow-servants," which is a
sign of pride, "and shall eat and drink with drunkards," which proceeds
from lust, "the lord of that servant shall come in a day that he hopeth
not . . . and shall separate him," namely from the fellowship of good
men, "and appoint his portion with hypocrites," namely in hell.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Ambrose refers to the
administration not only of ecclesiastical things but also of any goods
whatever from which a man is bound, as a duty of charity, to provide
for those who are in need. But it is not possible to state definitely
when this need is such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal
sin, as is the case in other points of detail that have to be
considered in human acts: for the decision in such matters is left to
human prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above the goods of the Church have to
be employed not only for the use of the poor, but also for other
purposes. Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that
which is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or
others, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit, that
they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby. Hence
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "It is a commendable liberality if you
overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want; yet not so
as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the poor."
Reply to Objection 3: The goods of churches should not all be given to
the poor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (De
Offic. ii, 28), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship are
to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the poor. In
such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to maintain
himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to have a
patrimony of his own on which to support himself.
Reply to Objection 4: The goods of the churches should be employed for
the good of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there
being no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the surplus
from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays it by for some
future use connected with the Church or the needs of the poor. But if
there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by for the future
is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is forbidden by our Lord
Who said (Mat. 6:34): "Be . . . not solicitous for the morrow."
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Whether religious who are raised to the episcopate are bound to religious
observances?
Objection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the
episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said
(XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a "canonical election loosens a monk
from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession, and the
holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop." Now the regular observances
pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who are appointed
bishops are not bound to religious observances.
Objection 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is
seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower degree:
thus it was stated above ([3777]Q[88], A[12], ad 1) that a religious is
not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a religious who is
appointed to the episcopate ascends to something greater, as stated
above (Q[84], A[7]). Therefore it would seem that a bishop is not bound
to those things whereto he was bound in the state of religion.
Objection 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to
obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious who
are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of their
order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound to
poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (OBJ[1]) "when the
holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right, as the
lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance." Moreover they are
sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are they bound to
other regular observances.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De
Monachis): "With regard to those who after long residence in a
monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside
their former purpose."
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2) the religious state
pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the
episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of
perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal
state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to
perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of
perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with
perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with perfection,
it is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has become a professor
it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it becomes him to read
and meditate even more than before. Accordingly we must assert that if
there be among religious observances any that instead of being an
obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard of perfection, such
as continence, poverty, and so forth, a religious, even after he has
been made a bishop, remains bound to observe these, and consequently to
wear the habit of his order, which is a sign of this obligation.
On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious
observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for
instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or watchings
and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the episcopal
office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them, according to
the needs of his person or office, and the manner of life of those
among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious superiors dispense
themselves in such matters.
Reply to Objection 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is
loosened from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything,
but in those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: The vows of those who are living in the world are
compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal, as
stated above ([3778]Q[88], A[12], ad 1). But the vows of religion are
compared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now the
particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the
disposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained.
Reply to Objection 3: It is accidental that religious who are bishops
are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit,
they have ceased to be their subjects; even as those same religious
superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually, so
that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound to
obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of
their rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they have
any.
As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal
inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is
added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been ordained
bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed according
to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.
Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with the
sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with his
death, after which a testament comes into force according to the
Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If, however, by the Pope's permission he make a
will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but
we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his
administration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his
death.
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OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE PROPERLY CONSISTS (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which
consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider
those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly,
those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the
different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the
religious state.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the religious state is perfect?
(2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels?
(3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state?
(4) Whether continency is necessary?
(5) Whether obedience is necessary?
(6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow?
(7) Of the sufficiency of these vows;
(8) Of their comparison one with another;
(9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a
statute of his rule?
(10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more
grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person?
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Whether religion implies a state of perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of
perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not
seemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for
salvation, whether because "thereby we are bound [religamur] to the one
almighty God," as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because it
takes its name from "our returning [religimus] to God Whom we had lost
by neglecting Him" [*Cf.[3779] Q[81], A[1]], according to Augustine (De
Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote
the state of perfection.
Objection 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
53) is that "which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature."
Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain
to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of states,
as stated above ([3780]Q[40], A[2];[3781] Q[183], A[3]). Therefore it
would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.
Objection 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the
state of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also
some are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does
not denote the state of perfection.
Objection 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance; for it
is said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy
synod orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal
dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no
means rise again to the episcopate." Now a place of repentance is
opposed to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi)
places penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be
cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of
perfection.
On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i, 7) abbot
Moses speaking of religious says: "We must recognize that we have to
undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, privation,
reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these degrees to mount
to the perfection of charity." Now things pertaining to human acts are
specified and denominated from the intention of the end. Therefore
religious belong to the state of perfection.
Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are called
servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and
subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him.
I answer that, As stated above ([3782]Q[141], A[2]) that which is
applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to
that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of
"fortitude" is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of
the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of
"temperance," by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures. Now
religion as stated above ([3783]Q[81] , A[2]; A[3], ad 2) is a virtue
whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God.
Wherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give
themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust
to God. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): "Some there are who
keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their
tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess." Now
the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated
above ([3784]Q[184], A[2]), and in this sense religion denotes the
state of perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: To offer something to the worship of God is
necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one's
possessions to the worship of God belongs to perfection.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3785]Q[81], A[1], ad 1; A[4],
ad 1,2;[3786] Q[85], A[3]) when we were treating of the virtue of
religion, religion has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices
and other like things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts
of all the virtues which in so far as these are referred to God's
service and honor become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes
his whole life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to
religion, and thus by reason of the religious life that they lead,
those who are in the state of perfection are called religious.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3787]Q[184], AA[4],6) religion
denotes the state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it
does not follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already
perfect, but that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on
Mat. 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect," etc., says (Tract. viii in
Matth.) that "he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to
become perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his
goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will
begin to lead him to all the virtues." Thus all are not perfect in
religion, but some are beginners, some proficient.
Reply to Objection 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly that
we might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the
obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the
obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut
off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs to
penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the religious
state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII, qu. ii, cap.
Admonere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to enter a
monastery which is described as "better and lighter," rather than to do
public penance while remaining in the world.
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Whether every religious is bound to keep all the counsels?
Objection 1: It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all
the counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound to
observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious professes
the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound to keep all
the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that "he who
renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has
gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness." Now it
belongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it
belongs to them also to do all the good they can. and so it would seem
that each of them is bound to fulfil all the counsels.
Objection 3: Further, if it is not requisite for the state of
perfection to fulfil all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfil
some of them. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life
fulfil some of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence.
Therefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of
perfection is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and such
are the counsels.
On the contrary, one is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do works
of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to keep
all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some, others to
others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them.
I answer that, A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First,
essentially, and thus, as stated above ([3788]Q[184], A[3]) the perfect
observance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection. Secondly,
a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those things that
result from the perfection of charity, for instance to bless them that
curse you (Lk. 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like kind, which though
they be binding as regards the preparedness of the mind, so that one
has to fulfil them when necessity requires; yet are sometimes
fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through superabundance of
charity. Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection instrumentally and
dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence, and the like.
Now it has been stated [3789](A[1]) that the perfection of charity is
the end of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or
exercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach by
various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in
order to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it
is not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it
is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who
enters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but he
is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavors to have perfect
charity.
For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those things that result
from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend to
fulfil them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them,
wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them.
In like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby
perfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely
prescribed to him by the rule which he has professed.
Reply to Objection 1: He who enters religion does not make profession
to be perfect, but he professes to endeavor to attain perfection; even
as he who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to
study in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise
man, but acknowledged himself, "a lover of wisdom." Hence a religious
does not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he
despises to tend to perfection.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as, though all are bound to love God with
their whole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of perfection which
cannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be
omitted without sin ([3790]Q[184], A[2], ad 3), provided there be no
contempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious and
seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they
can, for to all without exception it is said (Eccles. 9:10):
"Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly." Yet there is a
way of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do
what one can as required by the conditions of one's state of life:
provided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt
sets the mind against spiritual progress.
Reply to Objection 3: There are some counsels such that if they be
omitted, man's whole life would be taken up with secular business; for
instance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state, or
do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of religion
themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such like
counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain particular
better actions, which can be omitted without one's life being taken up
with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for religious to be
bound to fulfil all of them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether poverty is required for religious perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious
perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently
belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful for
a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor. 8:12) lays
down the way in which the faithful are to give alms saying: "If the
will be forward, it is accepted according to that which a man hath,"
i.e. "you should keep back what you need," and afterwards he adds (2
Cor. 8:13): "For I mean not that others should be eased, and you
burthened," i.e. "with poverty," according to a gloss. Moreover a gloss
on 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered," says:
"Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing away, we must not
give up these temporal things altogether." Therefore it seems that
voluntary poverty is not requisite for religious perfection.
Objection 2: Further, whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he
who renounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself
to danger---not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, "Lest perhaps
. . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name
of my God," and Ecclus. 27:1, "Through poverty many have sinned"---but
also corporal, for it is written (Eccles. 7:13): "As wisdom is a
defense, so money is a defense," and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
1) that "the waste of property appears to be a sort of ruining of one's
self, since thereby man lives." Therefore it would seem that voluntary
poverty is not requisite for the perfection of religious life.
Objection 3: Further, "Virtue observes the mean," as stated in Ethic.
ii, 6. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty seems to go to the
extreme rather than to observe the mean. Therefore he does not act
virtuously: and so this does not pertain to the perfection of life.
Objection 4: Further, the ultimate perfection of man consists in
happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is written (Ecclus.
31:8): "Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish," and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "riches contribute instrumentally
to happiness." Therefore voluntary poverty is not requisite for
religious perfection.
Objection 5: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the
religious state. But bishops may have property, as stated above
([3791]Q[185], A[6]). Therefore religious may also.
Objection 6: Further, almsgiving is a work most acceptable to God, and
as Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. ad Hebr.) "is a most effective
remedy in repentance." Now poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it
would seem that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): "There are some of the
righteous who bracing themselves up to lay hold of the very height of
perfection, while they aim at higher objects within, abandon all things
without." Now, as stated above, ([3792]AA[1],2), it belongs properly to
religious to brace themselves up in order to lay hold of the very
height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them to abandon all
outward things by voluntary poverty.
I answer that, As stated above [3793](A[2]), the religious state is an
exercise and a school for attaining to the perfection of charity. For
this it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his affections from
worldly things; since Augustine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to God:
"Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee, which he
loveth not for Thee." Wherefore he says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that
"greater charity means less cupidity, perfect charity means no
cupidity." Now the possession of worldly things draws a man's mind to
the love of them: hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et Theras.)
that "we are more firmly attached to earthly things when we have them
than when we desire them: since why did that young man go away sad,
save because he had great wealth? For it is one thing not to wish to
lay hold of what one has not, and another to renounce what one already
has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter are cut off
as a limb." And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Matth.) that "the
possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the desire for it
becomes stronger."
Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of charity the
first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby a man lives without
property of his own, according to the saying of our Lord (Mat. 19:21),
"If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and
give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me."
Reply to Objection 1: As the gloss adds, "when the Apostle said this
(namely "not that you should be burthened," i.e. with poverty)," he did
not mean that "it were better not to give: but he feared for the weak,
whom he admonished so to give as not to suffer privation." Hence in
like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlawful to renounce
all one's temporal goods, but that this is not required of necessity.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "Our Lord does not wish,"
namely does not command us "to pour out our wealth all at once, but to
dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his oxen, and fed
the poor with that which was his own so that no household care might
hold him back."
Reply to Objection 2: He who renounces all his possessions for Christ's
sake exposes himself to no danger, neither spiritual nor corporal. For
spiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not voluntary;
because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire of
money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim. 6:9, "They that
will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the
devil." This attachment is put away by those who embrace voluntary
poverty, but it gathers strength in those who have wealth, as stated
above. Again bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on
following Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust themselves
to divine providence. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
17): "Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His justice are not
weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is necessary."
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), the
mean of virtue is taken according to right reason, not according to the
quantity of a thing. Consequently whatever may be done in accordance
with right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the
quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, be against
right reason to throw away all one's possessions through intemperance,
or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in accordance with right
reason to renounce wealth in order to devote oneself to the
contemplation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are said to have
done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin.): "The famous Theban,
Crates, once a very wealthy man, when he was going to Athens to study
philosophy, cast away a large amount of gold; for he considered that he
could not possess both gold and virtue at the same time." Much more
therefore is it according to right reason for a man to renounce all he
has, in order perfectly to follow Christ. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep.
cxxv ad Rust. Monach.): "Poor thyself, follow Christ poor."
Reply to Objection 4: Happiness or felicity is twofold. One is perfect,
to which we look forward in the life to come; the other is imperfect,
in respect of which some are said to be happy in this life. The
happiness of this life is twofold, one is according to the active life,
the other according to the contemplative life, as the Philosopher
asserts (Ethic. x, 7,8). Now wealth conduces instrumentally to the
happiness of the active life which consists in external actions,
because as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) "we do many things by
friends, by riches, by political influence, as it were by instruments."
On the other hand, it does not conduce to the happiness of the
contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle thereto, inasmuch as the
anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of the soul, which is most
necessary to one who contemplates. Hence it is that the Philosopher
asserts (Ethic. x, 8) that "for actions many things are needed, but the
contemplative man needs no such things," namely external goods, "for
his operation; in fact they are obstacles to his contemplation."
Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and since voluntary
poverty is an efficient exercise for the attaining of perfect charity,
it follows that it is of great avail in acquiring the happiness of
heaven. Wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "Go, sell all [Vulg.:
'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure
in heaven." Now riches once they are possessed are in themselves of a
nature to hinder the perfection of charity, especially by enticing and
distracting the mind. Hence it is written (Mat. 13:22) that "the care
of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choketh up the word" of
God, for as Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ev.) by "preventing the good
desire from entering into the heart, they destroy life at its very
outset." Consequently it is difficult to safeguard charity amidst
riches: wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 19:23) that "a rich man shall
hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven," which we must understand as
referring to one who actually has wealth, since He says that this is
impossible for him who places his affection in riches, according to the
explanation of Chrysostom (Hom. lxiii in Matth.), for He adds (Mat.
19:24): "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle,
than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence it is
not said simply that the "rich man" is blessed, but "the rich man that
is found without blemish, and that hath not gone after gold," and this
because he has done a difficult thing, wherefore the text continues
(Mat. 19:9): "Who is he? and we will praise him; for he hath done
wonderful things in his life," namely by not loving riches though
placed in the midst of them.
Reply to Objection 5: The episcopal state is not directed to the
attainment of perfection, but rather to the effect that, in virtue of
the perfection which he already has, a man may govern others, by
administering not only spiritual but also temporal things. This belongs
to the active life, wherein many things occur that may be done by means
of wealth as an instrument, as stated (ad 4). Wherefore it is not
required of bishops, who make profession of governing Christ's flock,
that they have nothing of their own, whereas it is required of
religious who make profession of learning to obtain perfection.
Reply to Objection 6: The renouncement of one's own wealth is compared
to almsgiving as the universal to the particular, and as the holocaust
to the sacrifice. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that those who
assist "the needy with the things they possess, by their good deeds
offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God and keep back
something for themselves; whereas those who keep nothing for themselves
offer a holocaust which is greater than a sacrifice." Wherefore Jerome
also says (Contra Vigilant.): "When you declare that those do better
who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out the fruits of
their possessions to the poor, it is not I but the Lord Who answers
you; If thou wilt be perfect," etc., and afterwards he goes on to say:
"This man whom you praise belongs to the second and third degree, and
we too commend him: provided we acknowledge the first as to be
preferred to the second and third." For this reason in order to exclude
the error of Vigilantius it is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xxxviii): "It is a
good thing to give away one's goods by dispensing them to the poor: it
is better to give them away once for all with the intention of
following the Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be poor with Christ."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether perpetual continence is required for religious perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that perpetual continence is not required
for religious perfection. For all perfection of the Christian life
began with Christ's apostles. Now the apostles do not appear to have
observed continence, as evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we
read Mat. 8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence is
not requisite for religious perfection.
Objection 2: Further, the first example of perfection is shown to us in
the person of Abraham, to whom the Lord said (Gn. 17:1): "Walk before
Me, and be perfect." Now the copy should not surpass the example.
Therefore perpetual continence is not requisite for religious
perfection.
Objection 3: Further, that which is required for religious perfection
is to be found in every religious order. Now there are some religious
who lead a married life. Therefore religious perfection does not
require perpetual continence.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse
ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit,
perfecting sanctification in the fear of God." Now cleanness of flesh
and spirit is safeguarded by continence, for it is said (1 Cor. 7:34):
"The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord
that she may be holy both in spirit and in body [Vulg.: 'both in body
and in spirit']." Therefore religious perfection requires continence.
I answer that, The religious state requires the removal of whatever
hinders man from devoting himself entirely to God's service. Now the
use of sexual union hinders the mind from giving itself wholly to the
service of God, and this for two reasons. First, on account of its
vehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases
concupiscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12): and
hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind from that perfect
intentness on tending to God. Augustine expresses this when he says
(Solil. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind
from its height as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts
which belong to the married state." Secondly, because it involves man
in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children, and his
temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence the Apostle says (1
Cor. 7:32,33): "He that is without a wife is solicitous for the things
that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he that is with a
wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his
wife."
Therefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary poverty, is
requisite for religious perfection. Wherefore just as Vigilantius was
condemned for equaling riches to poverty, so was Jovinian condemned for
equaling marriage to virginity.
Reply to Objection 1: The perfection not only of poverty but also of
continence was introduced by Christ Who said (Mat. 19:12): "There are
eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of heaven,"
and then added: "He that can take, let him take it." And lest anyone
should be deprived of the hope of attaining perfection, he admitted to
the state of perfection those even who were married. Now the husbands
could not without committing an injustice forsake their wives, whereas
men could without injustice renounce riches. Wherefore Peter whom He
found married, He severed not from his wife, while "He withheld from
marriage John who wished to marry" [*Prolog. in Joan. among the
supposititious works of St. Jerome].
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxii), "the
chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage, one of
which Abraham had in use, both of them in habit. For he lived chastely,
and he might have been chaste without marrying, but it was not
requisite then." Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had perfection
of mind together with wealth and marriage, which is a mark of the
greatness of their virtue, this is no reason why any weaker person
should presume to have such great virtue that he can attain to
perfection though rich and married; as neither does a man unarmed
presume to attack his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the
jaw-bone of an ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable to
observe continence and poverty, would have been most careful to observe
them.
Reply to Objection 3: Such ways of living as admit of the use of
marriage are not the religious life simply and absolutely speaking, but
in a restricted sense, in so far as they have a certain share in those
things that belong to the religious state.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether obedience belongs to religious perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that obedience does not belong to religious
perfection. For those things seemingly belong to religious perfection,
which are works of supererogation and are not binding upon all. But all
are bound to obey their superiors, according to the saying of the
Apostle (Heb. 13:17), "Obey your prelates, and be subject to them."
Therefore it would seem that obedience does not belong to religious
perfection.
Objection 2: Further, obedience would seem to belong properly to those
who have to be guided by the sense of others, and such persons are
lacking in discernment. Now the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong
meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses
exercised to the discerning of good and evil." Therefore it would seem
that obedience does not belong to the state of the perfect.
Objection 3: Further, if obedience were requisite for religious
perfection, it would follow that it is befitting to all religious. But
it is not becoming to all; since some religious lead a solitary life,
and have no superior whom they obey. Again religious superiors
apparently are not bound to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem
not to pertain to religious perfection.
Objection 4: Further, if the vow of obedience were requisite for
religion, it would follow that religious are bound to obey their
superiors in all things, just as they are bound to abstain from all
venery by their vow of continence. But they are not bound to obey them
in all things, as stated above ([3794]Q[104], A[5]), when we were
treating of the virtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience is
not requisite for religion.
Objection 5: Further, those services are most acceptable to God which
are done freely and not of necessity, according to 2 Cor. 9:7, "Not
with sadness or of necessity." Now that which is done out of obedience
is done of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are more
deserving of praise which are done of one's own accord. Therefore the
vow of obedience is unbecoming to religion whereby men seek to attain
to that which is better.
On the contrary, Religious perfection consists chiefly in the imitation
of Christ, according to Mat. 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell
all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow Me."
Now in Christ obedience is commended above all according to Phil. 2:8,
"He became [Vulg.: 'becoming'] obedient unto death." Therefore
seemingly obedience belongs to religious perfection.
I answer that, As stated above ([3795]AA[2],3) the religious state is a
school and exercise for tending to perfection. Now those who are being
instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain end must needs
follow the direction of someone under whose control they are instructed
or exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a master.
Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction and command of
someone as regards things pertaining to the religious life; wherefore
it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The monastic life denotes
subjection and discipleship." Now one man is subjected to another's
command and instruction by obedience: and consequently obedience is
requisite for religious perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: To obey one's superiors in matters that are
essential to virtue is not a work of supererogation, but is common to
all: whereas to obey in matters pertaining to the practice of
perfection belongs properly to religious. This latter obedience is
compared to the former as the universal to the particular. For those
who live in the world, keep something for themselves, and offer
something to God; and in the latter respect they are under obedience to
their superiors: whereas those who live in religion give themselves
wholly and their possessions to God, as stated above ([3796]AA[1],3).
Hence their obedience is universal.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1,2), by
performing actions we contract certain habits, and when we have
acquired the habit we are best able to perform the actions. Accordingly
those who have not attained to perfection, acquire perfection by
obeying, while those who have already acquired perfection are most
ready to obey, not as though they need to be directed to the
acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining themselves by this means
in that which belongs to perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: The subjection of religious is chiefly in
reference to bishops, who are compared to them as perfecters to
perfected, as Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi), where he also says
that the "monastic order is subjected to the perfecting virtues of the
bishops, and is taught by their godlike enlightenment." Hence neither
hermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedience to bishops;
and if they be wholly or partly exempt from obedience to the bishop of
the diocese, they are nevertheless bound to obey the Sovereign Pontiff,
not only in matters affecting all in common, but also in those which
pertain specially to religious discipline.
Reply to Objection 4: The vow of obedience taken by religious, extends
to the disposition of a man's whole life, and in this way it has a
certain universality, although it does not extend to all individual
acts. For some of these do not belong to religion, through not being of
those things that concern the love of God and of our neighbor, such as
rubbing one's beard, lifting a stick from the ground and so forth,
which do not come under a vow nor under obedience; and some are
contrary to religion. Nor is there any comparison with continence
whereby acts are excluded which are altogether contrary to religion.
Reply to Objection 5: The necessity of coercion makes an act
involuntary and consequently deprives it of the character of praise or
merit; whereas the necessity which is consequent upon obedience is a
necessity not of coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is
willing to obey, although perhaps he would not be willing to do the
thing commanded considered in itself. Wherefore since by the vow of
obedience a man lays himself under the necessity of doing for God's
sake certain things that are not pleasing in themselves, for this very
reason that which he does is the more acceptable to God, though it be
of less account, because man can give nothing greater to God, than by
subjecting his will to another man's for God's sake. Hence in the
Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xviii, 7) it is stated that "the
Sarabaitae are the worst class of monks, because through providing for
their own needs without being subject to superiors, they are free to do
as they will; and yet day and night they are more busily occupied in
work than those who live in monasteries."
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Whether it is requisite for religious perfection that poverty, continence,
and obedience should come under a vow?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for religious
perfection that the three aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and
obedience, should come under a vow. For the school of perfection is
founded on the principles laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in
formulating perfection (Mat. 19:21) said: "If thou wilt be perfect, go,
sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor," without any
mention of a vow. Therefore it would seem that a vow is not necessary
for the school of religion.
Objection 2: Further, a vow is a promise made to God, wherefore
(Eccles. 5:3) the wise man after saying: "If thou hast vowed anything
to God, defer not to pay it," adds at once, "for an unfaithful and
foolish promise displeaseth Him." But when a thing is being actually
given there is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for
religious perfection that one keep poverty, continence, and obedience
without. vowing them.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Ad Pollent., de Adult. Conjug. i,
14): "The services we render are more pleasing when we might lawfully
not render them, yet do so out of love." Now it is lawful not to render
a service which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if we have
vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more pleasing to God to
keep poverty, continence, and obedience without a vow. Therefore a vow
is not requisite for religious perfection.
On the contrary, In the Old Law the Nazareans were consecrated by vow
according to Num. 6:2, "When a man or woman shall make a vow to be
sanctified and will consecrate themselves to the Lord," etc. Now these
were a figure of those "who attain the summit of perfection," as a
gloss [*Cf. Moral. ii] of Gregory states. Therefore a vow is requisite
for religious perfection.
I answer that, It belongs to religious to be in the state of
perfection, as shown above (Q[174], A[5]). Now the state of perfection
requires an obligation to whatever belongs to perfection: and this
obligation consists in binding oneself to God by means of a vow. But it
is evident from what has been said ([3797]AA[3],4,5) that poverty,
continence, and obedience belong to the perfection of the Christian
life. Consequently the religious state requires that one be bound to
these three by vow. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): "When a man
vows to God all his possessions, all his life, all his knowledge, it is
a holocaust"; and afterwards he says that this refers to those who
renounce the present world.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord declared that it belongs to the
perfection of life that a man follow Him, not anyhow, but in such a way
as not to turn back. Wherefore He says again (Lk. 9:62): "No man
putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the
kingdom of God." And though some of His disciples went back, yet when
our Lord asked (Jn. 6:68,69), "Will you also go away?" Peter answered
for the others: "Lord, to whom shall we go?" Hence Augustine says (De
Consensu Ev. ii, 17) that "as Matthew and Mark relate, Peter and Andrew
followed Him after drawing their boats on to the beach, not as though
they purposed to return, but as following Him at His command." Now this
unwavering following of Christ is made fast by a vow: wherefore a vow
is requisite for religious perfection.
Reply to Objection 2: As Gregory says (Moral. ii) religious perfection
requires that a man give "his whole life" to God. But a man cannot
actually give God his whole life, because that life taken as a whole is
not simultaneous but successive. Hence a man cannot give his whole life
to God otherwise than by the obligation of a vow.
Reply to Objection 3: Among other services that we can lawfully give,
is our liberty, which is dearer to man than aught else. Consequently
when a man of his own accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of
abstaining from things pertaining to God's service, this is most
acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et
Arment.): "Repent not of thy vow; rejoice rather that thou canst no
longer do lawfully, what thou mightest have done lawfully but to thy
own cost. Happy the obligation that compels to better things."
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Whether it is right to say that religious perfection consists in these thre
e
vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not right to say that religious
perfection consists in these three vows. For the perfection of life
consists of inward rather than of outward acts, according to Rom.
14:17, "The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace
and joy in the Holy Ghost." Now the religious vow binds a man to things
belonging to perfection. Therefore vows of inward actions, such as
contemplation, love of God and our neighbor, and so forth, should
pertain to the religious state, rather than the vows of poverty,
continence, and obedience which refer to outward actions.
Objection 2: Further, the three aforesaid come under the religious vow,
in so far as they belong to the practice of tending to perfection. But
there are many other things that religious practice, such as
abstinence, watchings, and the like. Therefore it would seem that these
three vows are incorrectly described as pertaining to the state of
perfection.
Objection 3: Further, by the vow of obedience a man is bound to do
according to his superior's command whatever pertains to the practice
of perfection. Therefore the vow of obedience suffices without the two
other vows.
Objection 4: Further, external goods comprise not only riches but also
honors. Therefore, if religious, by the vow of poverty, renounce
earthly riches, there should be another vow whereby they may despise
worldly honors.
On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, de Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad
monasterium) that "the keeping of chastity and the renouncing of
property are affixed to the monastic rule."
I answer that, The religious state may be considered in three ways.
First, as being a practice of tending to the perfection of charity:
secondly, as quieting the human mind from outward solicitude, according
to 1 Cor. 7:32: "I would have you to be without solicitude": thirdly,
as a holocaust whereby a man offers himself and his possessions wholly
to God; and in corresponding manner the religious state is constituted
by these three vows.
First, as regards the practice of perfection a man is required to
remove from himself whatever may hinder his affections from tending
wholly to God, for it is in this that the perfection of charity
consists. Such hindrances are of three kinds. First, the attachment to
external goods, which is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly, the
concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which are venereal
pleasures, and these are removed by the vow of continence; thirdly, the
inordinateness of the human will, and this is removed by the vow of
obedience. In like manner the disquiet of worldly solicitude is aroused
in man in reference especially to three things. First, as regards the
dispensing of external things, and this solicitude is removed from man
by the vow of poverty; secondly, as regards the control of wife and
children, which is cut away by the vow of continence; thirdly, as
regards the disposal of one's own actions, which is eliminated by the
vow of obedience, whereby a man commits himself to the disposal of
another.
Again, "a holocaust is the offering to God of all that one has,"
according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Now man has a threefold good,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 8). First, the good of external
things, which he wholly offers to God by the vow of voluntary poverty:
secondly, the good of his own body, and this good he offers to God
especially by the vow of continence, whereby he renounces the greatest
bodily pleasures. the third is the good of the soul, which man wholly
offers to God by the vow of obedience, whereby he offers God his own
will by which he makes use of all the powers and habits of the soul.
Therefore the religious state is fittingly constituted by the three
vows.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3798](A[1]), the end whereunto
the religious vow is directed is the perfection of charity, since all
the interior acts of virtue belong to charity as to their mother,
according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Hence the
interior acts of virtue, for instance humility, patience, and so forth,
do not come under the religious vow, but this is directed to them as
its end.
Reply to Objection 2: All other religious observances are directed to
the three aforesaid principal vows; for if any of them are ordained for
the purpose of procuring a livelihood, such as labor, questing, and so
on, they are to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of which
religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other observances whereby
the body is chastised, such as watching, fasting, and the like, are
directly ordained for the observance of the vow of continence. And such
religious observances as regard human actions whereby a man is directed
to the end of religion, namely the love of God and his neighbor (such
as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, and the like), are comprised
under the vow of obedience that applies to the will, which directs its
actions to the end according to the ordering of another person. The
distinction of habit belongs to all three vows, as a sign of being
bound by them: wherefore the religious habit is given or blessed at the
time of profession.
Reply to Objection 3: By obedience a man offers to God his will, to
which though all human affairs are subject, yet some are subject to it
alone in a special manner, namely human actions, since passions belong
also to the sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain the
passions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of appetite, which
hinder the perfection of life, there was need for the vows of
continence and poverty; but for the ordering of one's own actions
accordingly as the state of perfection requires, there was need for the
vow of obedience.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), strictly
and truly speaking honor is not due save to virtue. Since, however,
external goods serve instrumentally for certain acts of virtue, the
consequence is that a certain honor is given to their excellence
especially by the common people who acknowledge none but outward
excellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection of virtue
it becomes them not to renounce the honor which God and all holy men
accord to virtue, according to Ps. 138:17, "But to me Thy friends, O
God, are made exceedingly honorable." On the other hand, they renounce
the honor that is given to outward excellence, by the very fact that
they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special vow is needed for
this.
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Whether the vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that the vow of obedience is not the chief
of the three religious vows. For the perfection of the religious life
was inaugurated by Christ. Now Christ gave a special counsel of
poverty; whereas He is not stated to have given a special counsel of
obedience. Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of
obedience.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 26:20) that "no price is
worthy of a continent soul." Now the vow of that which is more worthy
is itself more excellent. Therefore the vow of continence is more
excellent than the vow of obedience.
Objection 3: Further, the greater a vow the more indispensable it would
seem to be. Now the vows of poverty and continence "are so inseparable
from the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can allow
them to be broken," according to a Decretal (De Statu Monach., cap. Cum
ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a religious from obeying his
superior. Therefore it would seem that the vow of obedience is less
than the vow of poverty and continence.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14): "Obedience is rightly
placed before victims, since by victims another's flesh, but by
obedience one's own will, is sacrificed." Now the religious vows are
holocausts, as stated above ([3799]AA[1],3, ad 6). Therefore the vow of
obedience is the chief of all religious vows.
I answer that, The vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious
vows, and this for three reasons.
First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God something
greater, namely his own will; for this is of more account than his own
body, which he offers God by continence, and than external things,
which he offers God by the vow of poverty. Wherefore that which is done
out of obedience is more acceptable to God than that which is done of
one's own will, according to the saying of Jerome (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic
Monach.): "My words are intended to teach you not to rely on your own
judgment": and a little further on he says: "You may not do what you
will; you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess as much
as you receive, clothe yourself with what is given to you." Hence
fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done of one's own will,
according to Is. 58:3, "Behold in the day of your fast your own will is
found."
Secondly, because the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but not
vice versa: for a religious, though bound by vow to observe continence
and poverty, yet these also come under obedience, as well as many other
things besides the keeping of continence and poverty.
Thirdly, because the vow of obedience extends properly to those acts
that are closely connected with the end of religion; and the more
closely a thing is connected with the end, the better it is.
It follows from this that the vow of obedience is more essential to the
religious life. For if a man without taking a vow of obedience were to
observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he would not
therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be preferred to
virginity observed even by vow; for Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi):
"No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the monastic life." [*St.
Augustine wrote not 'monasterio' but 'martyrio'---to 'martyrdom'; and
St. Thomas quotes the passage correctly above[3800], Q[124], A[3]
and[3801] Q[152], A[5]].
Reply to Objection 1: The counsel of obedience was included in the very
following of Christ, since to obey is to follow another's will.
Consequently it is more pertinent to perfection than the vow of
poverty, because as Jerome, commenting on Mat. 19:27, "Behold we have
left all things," observes, "Peter added that which is perfect when he
said: And have followed Thee."
Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted mean that continence is to be
preferred, not to all other acts of virtue, but to conjugal chastity,
or to external riches of gold and silver which are measured by weight
[*'Pondere,' referring to the Latin 'ponderatio' in the Vulgate, which
the Douay version renders 'price.']. Or again continence is taken in a
general sense for abstinence from ali evil, as stated above
([3802]Q[155], A[4], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: The Pope cannot dispense a religious from his vow
of obedience so as to release him from obedience to every superior in
matters relating to the perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him
from obedience to himself. He can, however, exempt him from subjection
to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him from his vow of
obedience.
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Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things
contained in his rule?
Objection 1: It would seem that a religious sins mortally whenever he
transgresses the things contained in his rule. For to break a vow is a
sin worthy of condemnation, as appears from 1 Tim. 5:11,12, where the
Apostle says that widows who "will marry have [Vulg.: 'having']
damnation, because they have made void their first faith." But
religious are bound to a rule by the vows of their profession.
Therefore they sin mortally by transgressing the things contained in
their rule.
Objection 2: Further, the rule is enjoined upon a religious in the same
way as a law. Now he who transgresses a precept of law sins mortally.
Therefore it would seem that a monk sins mortally if he transgresses
the things contained in his rule.
Objection 3: Further, contempt involves a mortal sin. Now whoever
repeatedly does what he ought not to do seems to sin from contempt.
Therefore it would seem that a religious sins mortally by frequently
transgressing the things contained in his rule.
On the contrary, The religious state is safer than the secular state;
wherefore Gregory at the beginning of his Morals [*Epist. Missoria, ad
Leand. Episc. i] compares the secular life to the stormy sea, and the
religious life to the calm port. But if every transgression of the
things contained in his rule were to involve a religious in mortal sin,
the religious life would be fraught with danger of account of its
multitude of observances. Therefore not every transgression of the
things contained in the rule is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 1,2), a thing is contained in
the rule in two ways. First, as the end of the rule, for instance
things that pertain to the acts of the virtues; and the transgression
of these, as regards those which come under a common precept, involves
a mortal sin; but as regards those which are not included in the common
obligation of a precept, the transgression thereof does not involve a
mortal sin, except by reason of contempt, because, as stated above
[3803](A[2]), a religious is not bound to be perfect, but to tend to
perfection, to which the contempt of perfection is opposed.
Secondly, a thing is contained in the rule through pertaining to the
outward practice, such as all external observances, to some of which a
religious is bound by the vow of his profession. Now the vow of
profession regards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely poverty,
continence, and obedience, while all others are directed to these.
Consequently the transgression of these three involves a mortal sin,
while the transgression of the others does not involve a mortal sin,
except either by reason of contempt of the rule (since this is directly
contrary to the profession whereby a man vows to live according to the
rule), or by reason of a precept, whether given orally by a superior,
or expressed in the rule, since this would be to act contrary to the
vow of obedience.
Reply to Objection 1: He who professes a rule does not vow to observe
all the things contained in the rule, but he vows the regular life
which consists essentially in the three aforesaid things. Hence in
certain religious orders precaution is taken to profess, not the rule,
but to live according to the rule, i.e. to tend to form one's conduct
in accordance with the rule as a kind of model; and this is set aside
by contempt. Yet greater precaution is observed in some religious
orders by professing obedience according to the rule, so that only that
which is contrary to a precept of the rule is contrary to the
profession, while the transgression or omission of other things binds
only under pain of venial sin, because, as stated above (A[7], ad 2),
such things are dispositions to the chief vows. And venial sin is a
disposition to mortal, as stated above ([3804]FS, Q[88], A[3]),
inasmuch as it hinders those things whereby a man is disposed to keep
the chief precepts of Christ's law, namely the precepts of charity.
There is also a religious order, that of the Friars Preachers, where
such like transgressions or omissions do not, by their very nature,
involve sin, either mortal or venial; but they bind one to suffer the
punishment affixed thereto, because it is in this way that they are
bound to observe such things. Nevertheless they may sin venially or
mortally through neglect, concupiscence, or contempt.
Reply to Objection 2: Not all the contents of the law are set forth by
way of precept; for some are expressed under the form of ordinance or
statute binding under pain of a fixed punishment. Accordingly, just as
in the civil law the transgression of a legal statute does not always
render a man deserving of bodily death, so neither in the law of the
Church does every ordinance or statute bind under mortal sin; and the
same applies to the statutes of the rule.
Reply to Objection 3: An action or transgression proceeds from contempt
when a man's will refuses to submit to the ordinance of the law or
rule, and from this he proceeds to act against the law or rule. on the
other hand, he does not sin from contempt, but from some other cause,
when he is led to do something against the ordinance of the law or rule
through some particular cause such as concupiscence or anger, even
though he often repeat the same kind of sin through the same or some
other cause. Thus Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "not all
sins are committed through proud contempt." Nevertheless the frequent
repetition of a sin leads dispositively to contempt, according to the
words of Prov. 18:3, "The wicked man, when he is come into the depth of
sins, contemneth."
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Whether a religious sins more grievously than a secular by the same kind of
sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that a religious does not sin more
grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin. For it is written (2
Paralip 30:18,19): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them
who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers, and
will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified." Now religious
apparently follow the Lord the God of their fathers with their whole
heart rather than seculars, who partly give themselves and their
possessions to God and reserve part for themselves, as Gregory says
(Hom. xx in Ezech.). Therefore it would seem that it is less imputed to
them if they fall short somewhat of their sanctification.
Objection 2: Further, God is less angered at a man's sins if he does
some good deeds, according to 2 Paralip 19:2,3, "Thou helpest the
ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the
Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord:
but good works are found in thee." Now religious do more good works
than seculars. Therefore if they commit any sins, God is less angry
with them.
Objection 3: Further, this present life is not carried through without
sin, according to James 3:2, "In many things we all offend." Therefore
if the sins of religious were more grievous than those of seculars it
would follow that religious are worse off than seculars: and
consequently it would not be a wholesome counsel to enter religion.
On the contrary, The greater the evil the more it would seem to be
deplored. But seemingly the sins of those who are in the state of
holiness and perfection are the most deplorable, for it is written
(Jer. 23:9): "My heart is broken within me," and afterwards (Jer.
23:11): "For the prophet and the priest are defiled; and in My house I
have found their wickedness." Therefore religious and others who are in
the state of perfection, other things being equal, sin more grievously.
I answer that, A sin committed by a religious may be in three ways more
grievous than a like sin committed by a secular. First, if it be
against his religious vow; for instance if he be guilty of fornication
or theft, because by fornication he acts against the vow of continence,
and by theft against the vow of poverty; and not merely against a
precept of the divine law. Secondly, if he sin out of contempt, because
thereby he would seem to be the more ungrateful for the divine favors
which have raised him to the state of perfection. Thus the Apostle says
(Heb. 10:29) that the believer "deserveth worse punishments" who
through contempt tramples under foot the Son of God. Hence the Lord
complains (Jer. 11:15): "What is the meaning that My beloved hath
wrought much wickedness in My house?" Thirdly, the sin of a religious
may be greater on account of scandal, because many take note of his
manner of life: wherefore it is written (Jer. 23:14): "I have seen the
likeness of adulterers, and the way of lying in the Prophets of
Jerusalem; and they strengthened the hands of the wicked, that no man
should return from his evil doings."
On the other hand, if a religious, not out of contempt, but out of
weakness or ignorance, commit a sin that is not against the vow of his
profession, without giving scandal (for instance if he commit it in
secret) he sins less grievously in the same kind of sin than a secular,
because his sin if slight is absorbed as it were by his many good
works, and if it be mortal, he more easily recovers from it. First,
because he has a right intention towards God, and though it be
intercepted for the moment, it is easily restored to its former object.
Hence Origen commenting on Ps. 36:24, "When he shall fall he shall not
be bruised," says (Hom. iv in Ps. 36): "The wicked man, if he sin,
repents not, and fails to make amends for his sin. But the just man
knows how to make amends and recover himself; even as he who had said:
'I know not the man,' shortly afterwards when the Lord had looked on
him, knew to shed most bitter tears, and he who from the roof had seen
a woman and desired her knew to say: 'I have sinned and done evil
before Thee.'" Secondly, he is assisted by his fellow-religious to rise
again, according to Eccles. 4:10, "If one fall he shall be supported by
the other: woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth he hath none
to lift him up."
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to things done through
weakness or ignorance, but not to those that are done out of contempt.
Reply to Objection 2: Josaphat also, to whom these words were
addressed, sinned not out of contempt, but out of a certain weakness of
human affection.
Reply to Objection 3: The just sin not easily out of contempt; but
sometimes they fall into a sin through ignorance or weakness from which
they easily arise. If, however, they go so far as to sin out of
contempt, they become most wicked and incorrigible, according to the
word of Jer. 2:20: "Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands,
and thou hast said: 'I will not serve.' For on every high hill and
under every green tree thou didst prostitute thyself." Hence Augustine
says (Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb. Hippon.): "From the time I began to serve
God, even as I scarcely found better men than those who made progress
in monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who in the
monastery have fallen."
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OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE COMPETENT TO RELIGIOUS (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the things that are competent to religious; and
under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful for them to teach, preach, and do like things?
(2) Whether it is lawful for them to meddle in secular business?
(3) Whether they are bound to manual labor?
(4) Whether it is lawful for them to live on alms?
(5) Whether it is lawful for them to quest?
(6) Whether it is lawful for them to wear coarser clothes than other
persons?
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Whether it is lawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to teach, preach, and
the like. For it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam) in an
ordinance of a synod of Constantinople [*Pseudosynod held by Photius in
the year 879]: "The monastic life is one of subjection and
discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care." And Jerome
says (ad Ripar. et Desider. [*Contra Vigilant. xvi]): "A monk's duty is
not to teach but to lament." Again Pope Leo [*Leo I, Ep. cxx ad
Theodoret., 6, cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Adjicimus]: says "Let none dare to
preach save the priests of the Lord, be he monk or layman, and no
matter what knowledge he may boast of having." Now it is not lawful to
exceed the bounds of one's office or transgress the ordinance of the
Church. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for religious to teach,
preach, and the like.
Objection 2: Further, in an ordinance of the Council of Nicea (cf. XVI,
qu. i, can. Placuit) it is laid down as follows: "It is our absolute
and peremptory command addressed to all that monks shall not hear
confessions except of one another, as is right, that they shall not
bury the dead except those dwelling with them in the monastery, or if
by chance a brother happen to die while on a visit." But just as the
above belong to the duty of clerics, so also do preaching and teaching.
Therefore since "the business of a monk differs from that of a cleric,"
as Jerome says (Ep. xiv ad Heliod.), it would seem unlawful for
religious to preach, teach, and the like.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Regist. v, Ep. 1): "No man can
fulfil ecclesiastical duties, and keep consistently to the monastic
rule": and this is quoted XVI, qu. i, can. Nemo potest. Now monks are
bound to keep consistently to the monastic rule. Therefore it would
seem that they cannot fulfil ecclesiastical duties, whereof teaching
and preaching are a part. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for them
to preach, teach, and do similar things.
On the contrary, Gregory is quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Ex auctoritate) as
saying: "By authority of this decree framed in virtue of our apostolic
power and the duty of our office, be it lawful to monk priests who are
configured to the apostles, to preach, baptize, give communion, pray
for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from sin."
I answer that, A thing is declared to be unlawful to a person in two
ways. First, because there is something in him contrary to that which
is declared unlawful to him: thus to no man is it lawful to sin,
because each man has in himself reason and an obligation to God's law,
to which things sin is contrary. And in this way it is said to be
unlawful for a person to preach, teach, or do like things, because
there is in him something incompatible with these things, either by
reason of a precept---thus those who are irregular by ordinance of the
Church may not be raised to the sacred orders---or by reason of sin,
according to Ps. 49:16, "But to the sinner God hath said: Why dost thou
declare My justice?"
In this way it is not unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and do
like things, both because they are bound neither by vow nor by precept
of their rule to abstain from these things, and because they are not
rendered less apt for these things by any sin committed, but on the
contrary they are the more apt through having taken upon themselves the
practice of holiness. For it is foolish to say that a man is rendered
less fit for spiritual duties through advancing himself in holiness;
and consequently it is foolish to declare that the religious state is
an obstacle to the fulfilment of such like duties. This error is
rejected by Pope Boniface [*Boniface IV] for the reasons given above.
His words which are quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Sunt. nonnulli) are these:
"There are some who without any dogmatic proof, and with extreme
daring, inspired with a zeal rather of bitterness than of love, assert
that monks though they be dead to the world and live to God, are
unworthy of the power of the priestly office, and that they cannot
confer penance, nor christen, nor absolve in virtue of the power
divinely bestowed on them in the priestly office. But they are
altogether wrong." He proves this first because it is not contrary to
the rule; thus he continues: "For neither did the Blessed Benedict the
saintly teacher of monks forbid this in any way," nor is it forbidden
in other rules. Secondly, he refutes the above error from the
usefulness of the monks, when he adds at the end of the same chapter:
"The more perfect a man is, the more effective is he in these, namely
in spiritual works."
Secondly, a thing is said to be unlawful for a man, not on account of
there being in him something contrary thereto, but because he lacks
that which enables him to do it: thus it is unlawful for a deacon to
say mass, because he is not in priestly orders; and it is unlawful for
a priest to deliver judgment because he lacks the episcopal authority.
Here, however, a distinction must be made. Because those things which
are a matter of an order, cannot be deputed to one who has not the
order, whereas matters of jurisdiction can be deputed to those who have
not ordinary jurisdiction: thus the delivery of a judgment is deputed
by the bishop to a simple priest. In this sense it is said to be
unlawful for monks and other religious to preach, teach, and so forth,
because the religious state does not give them the power to do these
things. They can, however, do them if they receive orders, or ordinary
jurisdiction, or if matters of jurisdiction be delegated to them.
Reply to Objection 1: It results from the words quoted that the fact of
their being monks does not give monks the power to do these things, yet
it does not involve in them anything contrary to the performance of
these acts.
Reply to Objection 2: Again, this ordinance of the Council of Nicea
forbids monks to claim the power of exercising those acts on the ground
of their being monks, but it does not forbid those acts being delegated
to them.
Reply to Objection 3: These two things are incompatible, namely, the
ordinary cure of ecclesiastical duties, and the observance of the
monastic rule in a monastery. But this does not prevent monks and other
religious from being sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical duties
through being deputed thereto by superiors having ordinary cure;
especially members of religious orders that are especially instituted
for that purpose, as we shall say further on ([3805]Q[188], A[4]).
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Whether it is lawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular
business?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to occupy themselves
with secular business. For in the decree quoted above [3806](A[1]) of
Pope Boniface it is said that the "Blessed Benedict bade them to be
altogether free from secular business; and this is most explicitly
prescribed by the apostolic doctrine and the teaching of all the
Fathers, not only to religious, but also to all the canonical clergy,"
according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth
himself with secular business." Now it is the duty of all religious to
be soldiers of God. Therefore it is unlawful for them to occupy
themselves with secular business.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you use
your endeavor to be quiet, and that you do your own business," which a
gloss explains thus---"by refraining from other people's affairs, so as
to be the better able to attend to the amendment of your own life." Now
religious devote themselves in a special way to the amendment of their
life. Therefore they should not occupy themselves with secular
business.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome, commenting on Mat. 11:8, "Behold they
that are clothed in soft garments are in the houses of kings," says:
"Hence we gather that an austere life and severe preaching should avoid
the palaces of kings and the mansions of the voluptuous." But the needs
of secular business induce men to frequent the palaces of kings.
Therefore it is unlawful for religious to occupy themselves with
secular business.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 16:1): "I commend to you Phoebe
our Sister," and further on (Rom. 16:2), "that you assist her in
whatsoever business she shall have need of you."
I answer that, As stated above ([3807]Q[186], AA[1],7, ad 1), the
religious state is directed to the attainment of the perfection of
charity, consisting principally in the love of God and secondarily in
the love of our neighbor. Consequently that which religious intend
chiefly and for its own sake is to give themselves to God. Yet if their
neighbor be in need, they should attend to his affairs out of charity,
according to Gal. 6:2, "Bear ye one another's burthens: and so you
shall fulfil the law of Christ," since through serving their neighbor
for God's sake, they are obedient to the divine love. Hence it is
written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the
Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their
tribulation," which means, according to a gloss, to assist the helpless
in their time of need.
We must conclude therefore that it is unlawful for either monks or
clerics to carry on secular business from motives of avarice; but from
motives of charity, and with their superior's permission, they may
occupy themselves with due moderation in the administration and
direction of secular business. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals
(Dist. xxxviii, can. Decrevit): "The holy synod decrees that henceforth
no cleric shall buy property or occupy himself with secular business,
save with a view to the care of the fatherless, orphans, or widows, or
when the bishop of the city commands him to take charge of the business
connected with the Church." And the same applies to religious as to
clerics, because they are both debarred from secular business on the
same grounds, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 1: Monks are forbidden to occupy themselves with
secular business from motives of avarice, but not from motives of
charity.
Reply to Objection 2: To occupy oneself with secular business on
account of another's need is not officiousness but charity.
Reply to Objection 3: To haunt the palaces of kings from motives of
pleasure, glory, or avarice is not becoming to religious, but there is
nothing unseemly in their visiting them from motives of piety. Hence it
is written (4 Kings 4:13): "Hast thou any business, and wilt thou that
I speak to the king or to the general of the army?" Likewise it becomes
religious to go to the palaces of kings to rebuke and guide them, even
as John the Baptist rebuked Herod, as related in Mat. 14:4.
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Whether religious are bound to manual labor?
Objection 1: It would seem that religious are bound to manual labor.
For religious are not exempt from the observance of precepts. Now
manual labor is a matter of precept according to 1 Thess. 4:11, "Work
with your own hands as we commanded you"; wherefore Augustine says (De
oper. Monach. xxx): "But who can allow these insolent men," namely
religious that do no work, of whom he is speaking there, "who disregard
the most salutary admonishment of the Apostle, not merely to be borne
with as being weaker than others, but even to preach as though they
were holier than others." Therefore it would seem that religious are
bound to manual labor.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. xxi)]
on 2 Thess. 3:10, "If any man will not work, neither let him eat,"
says: "Some say that this command of the Apostle refers to spiritual
works, and not to the bodily labor of the farmer or craftsman"; and
further on: "But it is useless for them to try to hide from themselves
and from others the fact that they are unwilling not only to fulfil,
but even to understand the useful admonishments of charity"; and again:
"He wishes God's servants to make a living by working with their
bodies." Now religious especially are called servants of God, because
they give themselves entirely to the service of God, as Dionysius
asserts (Eccl. Hier. vi). Therefore it would seem that they are bound
to manual labor.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii): "I would
fain know how they would occupy themselves, who are unwilling to work
with their body. We occupy our time, say they, with prayers, psalms,
reading, and the word of God." Yet these things are no excuse, and he
proves this, as regards each in particular. For in the first place, as
to prayer, he says: "One prayer of the obedient man is sooner granted
than ten thousand prayers of the contemptuous": meaning that those are
contemptuous and unworthy to be heard who work not with their hands.
Secondly, as to the divine praises he adds: "Even while working with
their hands they can easily sing hymns to God." Thirdly, with regard to
reading, he goes on to say: "Those who say they are occupied in
reading, do they not find there what the Apostle commanded? What sort
of perverseness is this, to wish to read but not to obey what one
reads?" Fourthly, he adds in reference to preaching [*Cap. xviii]: "If
one has to speak, and is so busy that he cannot spare time for manual
work, can all in the monastery do this? And since all cannot do this,
why should all make this a pretext for being exempt? And even if all
were able, they should do so by turns, not only so that the others may
be occupied in other works, but also because it suffices that one speak
while many listen." Therefore it would seem that religious should not
desist from manual labor on account of such like spiritual works to
which they devote themselves.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Lk. 12:33, "Sell what you possess,"
says: "Not only give your clothes to the poor, but sell what you
possess, that having once for all renounced all your possessions for
the Lord's sake, you may henceforth work with the labor of your hands,
so as to have wherewith to live or to give alms." Now it belongs
properly to religious to renounce all they have. Therefore it would
seem likewise to belong to them to live and give alms through the labor
of their hands.
Objection 5: Further, religious especially would seem to be bound to
imitate the life of the apostles, since they profess the state of
perfection. Now the apostles worked with their own hands, according to
1 Cor. 4:12: "We labor, working with our own hands." Therefore it would
seem that religious are bound to manual labor.
On the contrary, Those precepts that are commonly enjoined upon all are
equally binding on religious and seculars. But the precept of manual
labor is enjoined upon all in common, as appears from 2 Thess. 3:6,
"Withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly," etc. (for
by brother he signifies every Christian, according to 1 Cor. 7:12, "If
any brother have a wife that believeth not"). Now it is written in the
same passage (2 Thess. 3:10): "If any man will not work, neither let
him eat." Therefore religious are not bound to manual labor any more
than seculars are.
I answer that, Manual labor is directed to four things. First and
principally to obtain food; wherefore it was said to the first man (Gn.
3:19): "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," and it is
written (Ps. 127:2): "For thou shalt eat the labors of thy hands."
Secondly, it is directed to the removal of idleness whence arise many
evils; hence it is written (Ecclus. 33:28,29): "Send" thy slave "to
work, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much evil."
Thirdly, it is directed to the curbing of concupiscence, inasmuch as it
is a means of afflicting the body; hence it is written (2 Cor. 6:5,6):
"In labors, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity." Fourthly, it is
directed to almsgiving, wherefore it is written (Eph. 4:28): "He that
stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him labor, working
with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have something to
give to him that suffereth need." Accordingly, in so far as manual
labor is directed to obtaining food, it comes under a necessity of
precept in so far as it is necessary for that end: since that which is
directed to an end derives its necessity from that end, being, in
effect, so far necessary as the end cannot be obtained without it.
Consequently he who has no other means of livelihood is bound to work
with his hands, whatever his condition may be. This is signified by the
words of the Apostle: "If any man will not work, neither let him eat,"
as though to say: "The necessity of manual labor is the necessity of
meat." So that if one could live without eating, one would not be bound
to work with one's hands. The same applies to those who have no other
lawful means of livelihood: since a man is understood to be unable to
do what he cannot do lawfully. Wherefore we find that the Apostle
prescribed manual labor merely as a remedy for the sin of those who
gained their livelihood by unlawful means. For the Apostle ordered
manual labor first of all in order to avoid theft, as appears from Eph.
4:28, "He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him
labor, working with his hands." Secondly, to avoid the coveting of
others' property, wherefore it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): "Work with
your own hands, as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards
them that are without." Thirdly, to avoid the discreditable pursuits
whereby some seek a livelihood. Hence he says (2 Thess. 3:10-12): "When
we were with you, this we declared to you: that if any man will not
work, neither let him eat. For we have heard that there are some among
you who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling"
(namely, as a gloss explains it, "who make a living by meddling in
unlawful things). Now we charge them that are such, and beseech them .
. . that working with silence, they would eat their own bread." Hence
Jerome states (Super epist. ad Galat. [*Preface to Bk. ii of
Commentary]) that the Apostle said this "not so much in his capacity of
teacher as on account of the faults of the people."
It must, however, be observed that under manual labor are comprised all
those human occupations whereby man can lawfully gain a livelihood,
whether by using his hands, his feet, or his tongue. For watchmen,
couriers, and such like who live by their labor, are understood to live
by their handiwork: because, since the hand is "the organ of organs"
[*De Anima iii, 8], handiwork denotes all kinds of work, whereby a man
may lawfully gain a livelihood.
In so far as manual labor is directed to the removal of idleness, or
the affliction of the body, it does not come under a necessity of
precept if we consider it in itself, since there are many other means
besides manual labor of afflicting the body or of removing idleness:
for the flesh is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and idleness is
removed by meditation on the Holy Scriptures and by the divine praises.
Hence a gloss on Ps. 118:82, "My eyes have failed for Thy word," says:
"He is not idle who meditates only on God's word; nor is he who works
abroad any better than he who devotes himself to the study of knowing
the truth." Consequently for these reasons religious are not bound to
manual labor, as neither are seculars, except when they are so bound by
the statutes of their order. Thus Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic
Monach.): "The Egyptian monasteries are wont to admit none unless they
work or labor, not so much for the necessities of life, as for the
welfare of the soul, lest it be led astray by wicked thoughts." But in
so far as manual labor is directed to almsgiving, it does not come
under the necessity of precept, save perchance in some particular case,
when a man is under an obligation to give alms, and has no other means
of having the wherewithal to assist the poor: for in such a case
religious would be bound as well as seculars to do manual labor.
Reply to Objection 1: This command of the Apostle is of natural law:
wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:6, "That you withdraw yourselves from
every brother walking disorderly," says, "otherwise than the natural
order requires," and he is speaking of those who abstained from manual
labor. Hence nature has provided man with hands instead of arms and
clothes, with which she has provided other animals, in order that with
his hands he may obtain these and all other necessaries. Hence it is
clear that this precept, even as all the precepts of the natural law,
is binding on both religious and seculars alike. Yet not everyone sins
that works not with his hands, because those precepts of the natural
law which regard the good of the many are not binding on each
individual, but it suffices that one person apply himself to this
business and another to that; for instance, that some be craftsmen,
others husbandmen, others judges, and others teachers, and so forth,
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If the whole
body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the whole were the
hearing, where would be the smelling?"
Reply to Objection 2: This gloss is taken from Augustine's De operibus
Monachorum, cap. 21, where he speaks against certain monks who declared
it to be unlawful for the servants of God to work with their hands, on
account of our Lord's saying (Mat. 6:25): "Be not solicitous for your
life, what you shall eat." Nevertheless his words do not imply that
religious are bound to work with their hands, if they have other means
of livelihood. This is clear from his adding: "He wishes the servants
of God to make a living by working with their bodies." Now this does
not apply to religious any more than to seculars, which is evident for
two reasons. First, on account of the way in which the Apostle
expresses himself, by saying: "That you withdraw yourselves from every
brother walking disorderly." For he calls all Christians brothers,
since at that time religious orders were not as yet founded. Secondly,
because religious have no other obligations than what seculars have,
except as required by the rule they profess: wherefore if their rule
contain nothing about manual labor, religious are not otherwise bound
to manual labor than seculars are.
Reply to Objection 3: A man may devote himself in two ways to all the
spiritual works mentioned by Augustine in the passage quoted: in one
way with a view to the common good, in another with a view to his
private advantage. Accordingly those who devote themselves publicly to
the aforesaid spiritual works are thereby exempt from manual labor for
two reasons: first, because it behooves them to be occupied exclusively
with such like works; secondly, because those who devote themselves to
such works have a claim to be supported by those for whose advantage
they work.
On the other hand, those who devote themselves to such works not
publicly but privately as it were, ought not on that account to be
exempt from manual labor, nor have they a claim to be supported by the
offerings of the faithful, and it is of these that Augustine is
speaking. For when he says: "They can sing hymns to God even while
working with their hands; like the craftsmen who give tongue to fable
telling without withdrawing their hands from their work," it is clear
that he cannot refer to those who sing the canonical hours in the
church, but to those who tell psalms or hymns as private prayers.
Likewise what he says of reading and prayer is to be referred to the
private prayer and reading which even lay people do at times, and not
to those who perform public prayers in the church, or give public
lectures in the schools. Hence he does not say: "Those who say they are
occupied in teaching and instructing," but: "Those who say they are
occupied in reading." Again he speaks of that preaching which is
addressed, not publicly to the people, but to one or a few in
particular by way of private admonishment. Hence he says expressly: "If
one has to speak." For according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 2:4, "Speech is
addressed privately, preaching to many."
Reply to Objection 4: Those who despise all for God's sake are bound to
work with their hands, when they have no other means of livelihood, or
of almsgiving (should the case occur where almsgiving were a matter of
precept), but not otherwise, as stated in the Article. It is in this
sense that the gloss quoted is to be understood.
Reply to Objection 5: That the apostles worked with their hands was
sometimes a matter of necessity, sometimes a work of supererogation. It
was of necessity when they failed to receive a livelihood from others.
Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 4:12, "We labor, working with our own hands,"
adds, "because no man giveth to us." It was supererogation, as appears
from 1 Cor. 9:12, where the Apostle says that he did not use the power
he had of living by the Gospel. The Apostle had recourse to this
supererogation for three motives. First, in order to deprive the false
apostles of the pretext for preaching, for they preached merely for a
temporal advantage; hence he says (2 Cor. 11:12): "But what I do, that
I will do that I may cut off the occasion from them," etc. Secondly, in
order to avoid burdening those to whom he preached; hence he says (2
Cor. 12:13): "What is there that you have had less than the other
churches, but that I myself was not burthensome to you?" Thirdly, in
order to give an example of work to the idle; hence he says (2 Thess.
3:8,9): "We worked night and day . . . that we might give ourselves a
pattern unto you, to imitate us." However, the Apostle did not do this
in places like Athens where he had facilities for preaching daily, as
Augustine observes (De oper. Monach. xviii). Yet religious are not for
this reason bound to imitate the Apostle in this matter, since they are
not bound to all works of supererogation: wherefore neither did the
other apostles work with their hands.
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Whether it is lawful for religious to live on alms?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to live on alms. For
the Apostle (1 Tim. 5:16) forbids those widows who have other means of
livelihood to live on the alms of the Church, so that the Church may
have "sufficient for them that are widows indeed." And Jerome says to
Pope Damasus [*Cf. Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam,
cause xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv among the supposititious works of
St. Jerome] that "those who have sufficient income from their parents
and their own possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor they
commit and incur the guilt of sacrilege, and by the abuse of such
things they eat and drink judgment to themselves." Now religious if
they be able-bodied can support themselves by the work of their hands.
Therefore it would seem that they sin if they consume the alms
belonging to the poor.
Objection 2: Further, to live at the expense of the faithful is the
stipend appointed to those who preach the Gospel in payment of their
labor or work, according to Mat. 10:10: "The workman is worthy of his
meat." Now it belongs not to religious to preach the Gospel, but
chiefly to prelates who are pastors and teachers. Therefore religious
cannot lawfully live on the alms of the faithful.
Objection 3: Further, religious are in the state of perfection. But it
is more perfect to give than to receive alms; for it is written (Acts
20:35): "It is a more blessed thing to give, rather than to receive."
Therefore they should not live on alms, but rather should they give
alms of their handiwork.
Objection 4: Further, it belongs to religious to avoid obstacles to
virtue and occasions of sin. Now the receiving of alms offers an
occasion of sin, and hinders an act of virtue; hence a gloss on 2
Thess. 3:9, "That we might give ourselves a pattern unto you," says:
"He who through idleness eats often at another's table, must needs
flatter the one who feeds him." It is also written (Ex. 23:8): "Neither
shalt thou take bribes which . . . blind the wise, and pervert the
words of the just," and (Prov. 22:7): "The borrower is servant to him
that lendeth." This is contrary to religion, wherefore a gloss on 2
Thess. 3:9, "That we might give ourselves a pattern," etc., says, "our
religion calls men to liberty." Therefore it would seem that religious
should not live on alms.
Objection 5: Further, religious especially are bound to imitate the
perfection of the apostles; wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 3:15):
"Let us . . . as many as are perfect, be thus minded." But the Apostle
was unwilling to live at the expense of the faithful, either in order
to cut off the occasion from the false apostles as he himself says (2
Cor. 11:12), or to avoid giving scandal to the weak, as appears from 1
Cor. 9:12. It would seem therefore that religious ought for the same
reasons to refrain from living on alms. Hence Augustine says (De oper.
Monach. 28): "Cut off the occasion of disgraceful marketing whereby you
lower yourselves in the esteem of others, and give scandal to the weak:
and show men that you seek not an easy livelihood in idleness, but the
kingdom of God by the narrow and strait way."
On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): The Blessed Benedict after
leaving his home and parents dwelt for three years in a cave, and while
there lived on the food brought to him by a monk from Rome.
Nevertheless, although he was able-bodied, we do not read that he
sought to live by the labor of his hands. Therefore religious may
lawfully live on alms.
I answer that, A man may lawfully live on what is his or due to him.
Now that which is given out of liberality becomes the property of the
person to whom it is given. Wherefore religious and clerics whose
monasteries or churches have received from the munificence of princes
or of any of the faithful any endowment whatsoever for their support,
can lawfully live on such endowment without working with their hands,
and yet without doubt they live on alms. Wherefore in like manner if
religious receive movable goods from the faithful they can lawfully
live on them. For it is absurd to say that a person may accept an alms
of some great property but not bread or some small sum of money.
Nevertheless since these gifts would seem to be bestowed on religious
in order that they may have more leisure for religious works, in which
the donors of temporal goods wish to have a share, the use of such
gifts would become unlawful for them if they abstained from religious
works, because in that case, so far as they are concerned, they would
be thwarting the intention of those who bestowed those gifts.
A thing is due to a person in two ways. First, on account of necessity,
which makes all things common, as Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. de Temp. lxiv,
among the supposititious works of St. Ambrose] asserts. Consequently if
religious be in need they can lawfully live on alms. Such necessity may
occur in three ways. First, through weakness of body, the result being
that they are unable to make a living by working with their hands.
Secondly, because that which they gain by their handiwork is
insufficient for their livelihood: wherefore Augustine says (De oper.
Monach. xvii) that "the good works of the faithful should not leave
God's servants who work with their hands without a supply of
necessaries, that when the hour comes for them to nourish their souls,
so as to make it impossible for them to do these corporal works, they
be not oppressed by want." Thirdly, because of the former mode of life
of those who were unwont to work with their hands: wherefore Augustine
says (De oper. Monach. xxi) that "if they had in the world the
wherewithal easily to support this life without working, and gave it to
the needy when they were converted to God, we must credit their
weakness and bear with it." For those who have thus been delicately
brought up are wont to be unable to bear the toil of bodily labor.
In another way a thing becomes due to a person through his affording
others something whether temporal or spiritual, according to 1 Cor.
9:11, "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter
if we reap your carnal things?" And in this sense religious may live on
alms as being due to them in four ways. First, if they preach by the
authority of the prelates. Secondly, if they be ministers of the altar,
according to 1 Cor. 9:13,14, "They that serve the altar partake with
the altar. So also the lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel
should live by the Gospel." Hence Augustine says (De oper. Monach.
xxi): "If they be gospelers, I allow, they have" (a claim to live at
the charge of the faithful): "if they be ministers of the altar and
dispensers of the sacraments, they need not insist on it, but it is
theirs by perfect right." The reason for this is because the sacrament
of the altar wherever it be offered is common to all the faithful.
Thirdly, if they devote themselves to the study of Holy Writ to the
common profit of the whole Church. Wherefore Jerome says (Contra Vigil.
xiii): "It is still the custom in Judea, not only among us but also
among the Hebrews, for those who meditate on the law of the Lord day
and night, end have no other share on earth but God alone, to be
supported by the subscriptions of the synagogues and of the whole
world." Fourthly, if they have endowed the monastery with the goods
they possessed, they may live on the alms given to the monastery. Hence
Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxv) that "those who renouncing or
distributing their means, whether ample or of any amount whatever, have
desired with pious and salutary humility to be numbered among the poor
of Christ, have a claim on the community and on brotherly love to
receive a livelihood in return. They are to be commended indeed if they
work with their hands, but if they be unwilling, who will dare to force
them? Nor does it matter, as he goes on to say, to which monasteries,
or in what place any one of them has bestowed his goods on his needy
brethren; for all Christians belong to one commonwealth."
On the other hand, in the default of any necessity, or of their
affording any profit to others, it is unlawful for religious to wish to
live in idleness on the alms given to the poor. Hence Augustine says
(De oper. Monach. xxii): "Sometimes those who enter the profession of
God's service come from a servile condition of life, from tilling the
soil or working at some trade or lowly occupation. In their case it is
not so clear whether they came with the purpose of serving God, or of
evading a life of want and toil with a view to being fed and clothed in
idleness, and furthermore to being honored by those by whom they were
wont to be despised and downtrodden. Such persons surely cannot excuse
themselves from work on the score of bodily weakness, for their former
mode of life is evidence against them." And he adds further on (De
oper. Monach. xxv): "If they be unwilling to work, neither let them
eat. For if the rich humble themselves to piety, it is not that the
poor may be exalted to pride; since it is altogether unseemly that in a
life wherein senators become laborers, laborers should become idle, and
that where the lords of the manor have come after renouncing their
ease, the serfs should live in comfort."
Reply to Objection 1: These authorities must be understood as referring
to cases of necessity, that is to say, when there is no other means of
succoring the poor: for then they would be bound not only to refrain
from accepting alms, but also to give what they have for the support of
the needy.
Reply to Objection 2: Prelates are competent to preach in virtue of
their office, but religious may be competent to do so in virtue of
delegation; and thus when they work in the field of the Lord, they may
make their living thereby, according to 2 Tim. 2:6, "The husbandman
that laboreth must first partake of the fruits," which a gloss explains
thus, "that is to say, the preacher, who in the field of the Church
tills the hearts of his hearers with the plough of God's word." Those
also who minister to the preachers may live on alms. Hence a gloss on
Rom. 15:27, "If the Gentiles have been made partakers of their
spiritual things, they ought also in carnal things to minister to
them," says, "namely, to the Jews who sent preachers from Jerusalem."
There are moreover other reasons for which a person has a claim to live
at the charge of the faithful, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Other things being equal, it is more perfect to
give than to receive. Nevertheless to give or to give up all one's
possessions for Christ's sake, and to receive a little for one's
livelihood is better than to give to the poor part by part, as stated
above ([3808]Q[186], A[3], ad 6).
Reply to Objection 4: To receive gifts so as to increase one's wealth,
or to accept a livelihood from another without having a claim to it,
and without profit to others or being in need oneself, affords an
occasion of sin. But this does not apply to religious, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: Whenever there is evident necessity for religious
living on alms without doing any manual work, as well as an evident
profit to be derived by others, it is not the weak who are scandalized,
but those who are full of malice like the Pharisees, whose scandal our
Lord teaches us to despise (Mat. 15:12-14). If, however, these motives
of necessity and profit be lacking, the weak might possibly be
scandalized thereby; and this should be avoided. Yet the same scandal
might be occasioned through those who live in idleness on the common
revenues.
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Whether it is lawful for religious to beg?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to beg. For Augustine
says (De oper. Monach. xxviii): "The most cunning foe has scattered on
all sides a great number of hypocrites wearing the monastic habit, who
go wandering about the country," and afterwards he adds: "They all ask,
they all demand to be supported in their profitable penury, or to be
paid for a pretended holiness." Therefore it would seem that the life
of mendicant religious is to be condemned.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you . . .
work with your own hands as we commanded you, and that you walk
honestly towards them that are without: and that you want nothing of
any man's": and a gloss on this passage says: "You must work and not be
idle, because work is both honorable and a light to the unbeliever: and
you must not covet that which belongs to another and much less beg or
take anything." Again a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. iii)]
on 2 Thess. 3:10, "If any man will not work," etc. says: "He wishes the
servants of God to work with the body, so as to gain a livelihood, and
not be compelled by want to ask for necessaries." Now this is to beg.
Therefore it would seem unlawful to beg while omitting to work with
one's hands.
Objection 3: Further, that which is forbidden by law and contrary to
justice, is unbecoming to religious. Now begging is forbidden in the
divine law; for it is written (Dt. 15:4): "There shall be no poor nor
beggar among you," and (Ps. 36:25): "I have not seen the just forsaken,
nor his seed seeking bread." Moreover an able-bodied mendicant is
punished by civil law, according to the law (XI, xxvi, de Valid.
Mendicant.). Therefore it is unfitting for religious to beg.
Objection 4: Further, "Shame is about that which is disgraceful," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Now Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
30) that "to be ashamed to beg is a sign of good birth." Therefore it
is disgraceful to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to
religious.
Objection 5: Further, according to our Lord's command it is especially
becoming to preachers of the Gospel to live on alms, as stated above
[3809](A[4]). Yet it is not becoming that they should beg, since a
gloss on 2 Tim. 2:6, "The husbandman, that laboreth," etc. says: "The
Apostle wishes the gospeler to understand that to accept necessaries
from those among whom he labors is not mendicancy but a right."
Therefore it would seem unbecoming for religious to beg.
On the contrary, It becomes religious to live in imitation of Christ.
Now Christ was a mendicant, according to Ps. 39:18, "But I am a beggar
and poor"; where a gloss says: "Christ said this of Himself as bearing
the 'form of a servant,'" and further on: "A beggar is one who entreats
another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for himself." Again
it is written (Ps. 69:6): "I am needy and poor"; where a gloss says:
"'Needy,' that is a suppliant; 'and poor,' that is, not having enough
for myself, because I have no worldly wealth." And Jerome says in a
letter [*Reference unknown]: "Beware lest whereas thy Lord," i.e.
Christ, "begged, thou amass other people's wealth." Therefore it
becomes religious to beg.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in reference to mendicancy.
The first is on the part of the act itself of begging, which has a
certain abasement attaching to it; since of all men those would seem
most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that they have to
receive their meat from others. In this way some deserve praise for
begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in other ways,
as being the most efficacious remedy against pride which they desire to
quench either in themselves or in others by their example. For just as
a disease that arises from excessive heat is most efficaciously healed
by things that excel in cold, so proneness to pride is most
efficaciously healed by those things which savor most of abasement.
Hence it is said in the Decretals (II, cap. Si quis semel, de
Paenitentia): "To condescend to the humblest duties, and to devote
oneself to the lowliest service is an exercise of humility; for thus
one is able to heal the disease of pride and human glory." Hence Jerome
praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean.) for that she desired "to receive
alms, having poured forth all her wealth for Christ's sake." The
Blessed Alexis acted in like manner, for, having renounced all his
possessions for Christ's sake he rejoiced in receiving alms even from
his own servants. It is also related of the Blessed Arsenius in the
Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave thanks because he was forced
by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it is enjoined to some people as a
penance for grievous sins to go on a pilgrimage begging. Since,
however, humility like the other virtues should not be without
discretion, it behooves one to be discreet in becoming a mendicant for
the purpose of humiliation, lest a man thereby incur the mark of
covetousness or of anything else unbecoming. Secondly, mendicancy may
be considered on the part of that which one gets by begging: and thus a
man may be led to beg by a twofold motive. First, by the desire to have
wealth or meat without working for it, and such like mendicancy is
unlawful; secondly, by a motive of necessity or usefulness. The motive
is one of necessity if a man has no other means of livelihood save
begging; and it is a motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish
something useful, and is unable to do so without the alms of the
faithful. Thus alms are besought for the building of a bridge, or
church, or for any other work whatever that is conducive to the common
good: thus scholars may seek alms that they may devote themselves to
the study of wisdom. In this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no
less than to seculars.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there explicitly of those
who beg from motives of covetousness.
Reply to Objection 2: The first gloss speaks of begging from motives of
covetousness, as appears from the words of the Apostle; while the
second gloss speaks of those who without effecting any useful purpose,
beg their livelihood in order to live in idleness. on the other hand,
he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully.
Reply to Objection 3: This precept of the divine law does not forbid
anyone to beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are
compelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on
able-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of
necessity.
Reply to Objection 4: Disgrace is twofold; one arises from lack of
honesty [*Cf.[3810] Q[145], A[1]], the other from an external defect,
thus it is disgraceful for a man to be sick or poor. Such like
uncomeliness of mendicancy does not pertain to sin, but it may pertain
to humility, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: Preachers have the right to be fed by those to
whom they preach: yet if they wish to seek this by begging so as to
receive it as a free gift and not as a right this will be a mark of
greater humility.
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Whether it is lawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to wear coarser
clothes than others. For according to the Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22) we
ought to "refrain from all appearance of evil." Now coarseness of
clothes has an appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Mat. 7:15):
"Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep":
and a gloss on Apoc. 6:8, "Behold a pale horse," says: "The devil
finding that he cannot succeed, neither by outward afflictions nor by
manifest heresies, sends in advance false brethren, who under the guise
of religion assume the characteristics of the black and red horses by
corrupting the faith." Therefore it would seem that religious should
not wear coarse clothes.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): "Avoid
somber," i.e. black, "equally with glittering apparel. Fine and coarse
clothes are equally to be shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the
other vainglory." Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the
use of pleasure, it would seem that religious who should aim at what is
more perfect ought to avoid coarse rather than fine clothes.
Objection 3: Further, religious should aim especially at doing works of
penance. Now in works of penance we should use, not outward signs of
sorrow, but rather signs of joy; for our Lord said (Mat. 6:16): "When
you fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad," and afterwards He added:
"But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and wash thy face."
Augustine commenting on these words (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12):
"In this chapter we must observe that not only the glare and pomp of
outward things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a subject of
ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of
God's service." Therefore seemingly religious ought not to wear coarse
clothes.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered about in
sheep-skins in goat-skins," and a gloss adds---"as Elias and others."
Moreover it is said in the Decretal XXI, qu. iv, can. Omnis jactantia:
"If any persons be found to deride those who wear coarse and religious
apparel they must be reproved. For in the early times all those who
were consecrated to God went about in common and coarse apparel."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12), "in all
external things, it is not the use but the intention of the user that
is at fault." In order to judge of this it is necessary to observe that
coarse and homely apparel may be considered in two ways. First, as
being a sign of a man's disposition or condition, because according to
Ecclus. 19:27, "the attire . . . of the man" shows "what he is." In
this way coarseness of attire is sometimes a sign of sorrow: wherefore
those who are beset with sorrow are wont to wear coarser clothes, just
as on the other hand in times of festivity and joy they wear finer
clothes. Hence penitents make use of coarse apparel, for example, the
king (Jonah 3:6) who "was clothed with sack-cloth," and Achab (3 Kings
21:27) who "put hair-cloth upon his flesh." Sometimes, however, it is a
sign of the contempt of riches and worldly ostentation. Wherefore
Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustico Monach.): "Let your somber attire
indicate your purity of mind, your coarse robe prove your contempt of
the world, yet so that your mind be not inflated withal, lest your
speech belie your habit." In both these ways it is becoming for
religious to wear coarse attire, since religion is a state of penance
and of contempt of worldly glory.
But that a person wish to signify this to others arises from three
motives. First, in order to humble himself: for just as a man's mind is
uplifted by fine clothes, so is it humbled by lowly apparel. Hence
speaking of Achab who "put hair-cloth on his flesh," the Lord said to
Elias: "Hast thou not seen Achab humbled before Me?" (3 Kings 21:29).
Secondly, in order to set an example to others; wherefore a gloss on
Mat. 3:4, "(John) had his garments of camel's hair," says: "He who
preaches penance is clothed in the habit of penance." Thirdly, on
account of vainglory; thus Augustine says (cf. OBJ[3]) that "even the
weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation."
Accordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to wear humble
apparel, but in the third way it is sinful.
Secondly, coarse and homely attire may be considered as the result of
covetousness or negligence, and thus also it is sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: Coarseness of attire has not of itself the
appearance of evil, indeed it has more the appearance of good, namely
of the contempt of worldly glory. Hence it is that wicked persons hide
their wickedness under coarse clothing. Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte ii, 24) that "the sheep should not dislike their clothing
for the reason that the wolves sometimes hide themselves under it."
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome is speaking there of the coarse attire
that is worn on account of human glory.
Reply to Objection 3: According to our Lord's teaching men should do no
deeds of holiness for the sake of show: and this is especially the case
when one does something strange. Hence Chrysostom [*Hom. xiii in Matth.
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says:
"While praying a man should do nothing strange, so as to draw the gaze
of others, either by shouting or striking his breast, or casting up his
hands," because the very strangeness draws people's attention to him.
Yet blame does not attach to all strange behavior that draws people's
attention, for it may be done well or ill. Hence Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "in the practice of the Christian
religion when a man draws attention to himself by unwonted squalor and
shabbiness, since he acts thus voluntarily and not of necessity, we can
gather from his other deeds whether his behavior is motivated by
contempt of excessive dress or by affectation." Religious, however,
would especially seem not to act thus from affectation, since they wear
a coarse habit as a sign of their profession whereby they profess
contempt of the world.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the different kinds of religious life, and under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or only one?
(2) Whether a religious order can be established for the works of the
active life?
(3) Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?
(4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and the
exercise of like works?
(5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of
science?
(6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative
life is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life?
(7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something
in common?
(8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to the
religious life of those who live in community?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is only one religious order?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one religious order. For
there can be no diversity in that which is possessed wholly and
perfectly; wherefore there can be only one sovereign good, as stated in
the [3811]FP, Q[6] , AA[2],3,4. Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx in
Ezech.), "when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his
life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust," without which there is no
religious life. Therefore it would seem that there are not many
religious orders but only one.
Objection 2: Further, things which agree in essentials differ only
accidentally. Now there is no religious order without the three
essential vows of religion, as stated above ([3812]Q[186], AA[6],7).
Therefore it would seem that religious orders differ not specifically,
but only accidentally.
Objection 3: Further, the state of perfection is competent both to
religious and to bishops, as stated above ([3813]Q[185], AA[5],7). Now
the episcopate is not diversified specifically, but is one wherever it
may be; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan.): "Wherever a bishop
is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or Reggio, he has
the same excellence, the same priesthood." Therefore in like manner
there is but one religious order.
Objection 4: Further, anything that may lead to confusion should be
removed from the Church. Now it would seem that a diversity of
religious orders might confuse the Christian people, as stated in the
Decretal de Statu Monach. et Canon. Reg. [*Cap. Ne Nimia, de Relig.
Dom.]. Therefore seemingly there ought not to be different religious
orders.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 44:10) that it pertains to the
adornment of the queen that she is "surrounded with variety."
I answer that, As stated above (Q[186], A, 7;[3814] Q[187], A[2]), the
religious state is a training school wherein one aims by practice at
the perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to
which a man may devote himself; and there are also various kinds of
exercise. Wherefore religious orders may be differentiated in two ways.
First, according to the different things to which they may be directed:
thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims, another to
visiting or ransoming captives. Secondly, there may be various
religious orders according to the diversity of practices; thus in one
religious order the body is chastised by abstinence in food, in another
by the practice of manual labor, scantiness of clothes, or the like.
Since, however, the end imports most in every matter, [*Arist., Topic.
vi 8] religious orders differ more especially according to their
various ends than according to their various practices.
Reply to Objection 1: The obligation to devote oneself wholly to God's
service is common to every religious order; hence religious do not
differ in this respect, as though in one religious order a person
retained some one thing of his own, and in another order some other
thing. But the difference is in respect of the different things wherein
one may serve God, and whereby a man may dispose himself to the service
of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The three essential vows of religion pertain to
the practice of religion as principles to which all other matters are
reduced, as stated above ([3815]Q[186], A[7]). But there are various
ways of disposing oneself to the observance of each of them. For
instance one disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence, by
solitude of place, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship, and by many
like means. Accordingly it is evident that the community of the
essential vows is compatible with diversity of religious life, both on
account of the different dispositions and on account of the different
ends, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: In matters relating to perfection, the bishop
stands in the position of agent, and the religious as passive, as
stated above ([3816]Q[184], A[7]). Now the agent, even in natural
things, the higher it is, is so much the more one, whereas the things
that are passive are various. Hence with reason the episcopal state is
one, while religious orders are many.
Reply to Objection 4: Confusion is opposed to distinction and order.
Accordingly the multitude of religious orders would lead to confusion,
if different religious orders were directed to the same end and in the
same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to prevent this
happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish a new
religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a religious order should be established for the works of the active
life?
Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order should be
established for the works of the active life. For every religious order
belongs to the state of perfection, as stated above ([3817]Q[184],
A[5];[3818] Q[186], A[1]). Now the perfection of the religious state
consists in the contemplation of divine things. For Dionysius says
(Eccl. Hier. vi) that they are "called servants of God by reason of
their rendering pure service and subjection to God, and on account of
the indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy
reflections," i.e. contemplations, "on invisible things, to the Godlike
unity and the perfection beloved of God." Therefore seemingly no
religious order should be established for the works of the active life.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly the same judgment applies to canons
regular as to monks, according to Extra, De Postul., cap. Ex parte; and
De Statu Monach., cap. Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that "they
are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks": and
the same would seem to apply to all other religious. Now the monastic
rule was established for the purpose of the contemplative life;
wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii ad Paulin.): "If you wish to be what
you are called, a monk," i.e. a solitary, "what business have you in a
city?" The same is found stated in Extra, De Renuntiatione, cap. Nisi
cum pridem; and De Regular., cap. Licet quibusdam. Therefore it would
seem that every religious order is directed to the contemplative life,
and none to the active life.
Objection 3: Further, the active life is concerned with the present
world. Now all religious are said to renounce the world; wherefore
Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): "He who renounces this world, and
does all the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and
offers sacrifice in the wilderness." Therefore it would seem that no
religious order can be directed to the active life.
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and
undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless
and widows in their tribulation." Now this belongs to the active life.
Therefore religious life can be fittingly directed to the active life.
I answer that, As stated above [3819](A[1]), the religious state is
directed to the perfection of charity, which extends to the love of God
and of our neighbor. Now the contemplative life which seeks to devote
itself to God alone belongs directly to the love of God, while the
active life, which ministers to our neighbor's needs, belongs directly
to the love of one's neighbor. And just as out of charity we love our
neighbor for God's sake, so the services we render our neighbor redound
to God, according to Mat. 25:40, "What you have done [Vulg.: 'As long
as you did it'] to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me."
Consequently those services which we render our neighbor, in so far as
we refer them to God, are described as sacrifices, according to Heb.
13:16, "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices
God's favor is obtained." And since it belongs properly to religion to
offer sacrifice to God, as stated above (Q[81], A[1], ad 1; A[4], ad
1), it follows that certain religious orders are fittingly directed to
the works of the active life. Wherefore in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the Abbot Nesteros in distinguishing the various
aims of religious orders says: "Some direct their intention exclusively
to the hidden life of the desert and purity of heart; some are occupied
with the instruction of the brethren and the care of the monasteries;
while others delight in the service of the guesthouse," i.e. in
hospitality.
Reply to Objection 1: Service and subjection rendered to God are not
precluded by the works of the active life, whereby a man serves his
neighbor for God's sake, as stated in the Article. Nor do these works
preclude singularity of life; not that they involve man's living apart
from his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man individually
devotes himself to things pertaining to the service of God; and since
religious occupy themselves with the works of the active life for God's
sake, it follows that their action results from their contemplation of
divine things. Hence they are not entirely deprived of the fruit of the
contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 2: The same judgment applies to monks and to all
other religious, as regards things common to all religious orders: for
instance as regards their devoting themselves wholly to the divine
service, their observance of the essential vows of religion, and their
refraining from worldly business. But it does not follow that this
likeness extends to other things that are proper to the monastic
profession, and are directed especially to the contemplative life.
Hence in the aforesaid Decretal, De Postulando, it is not simply stated
that "the same judgment applies to canons regular" as "to monks," but
that it applies "in matters already mentioned," namely that "they are
not to act as advocates in lawsuits." Again the Decretal quoted, De
Statu Monach., after the statement that "canons regular are not
considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks," goes on to
say: "Nevertheless they obey an easier rule." Hence it is evident that
they are not bound to all that monks are bound.
Reply to Objection 3: A man may be in the world in two ways: in one way
by his bodily presence, in another way by the bent of his mind. Hence
our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:19): "I have chosen you out of
the world," and yet speaking of them to His Father He said (Jn. 17:11):
"These are in the world, and I come to Thee." Although, then, religious
who are occupied with the works of the active life are in the world as
to the presence of the body, they are not in the world as regards their
bent of mind, because they are occupied with external things, not as
seeking anything of the world, but merely for the sake of serving God:
for "they . . . use this world, as if they used it not," to quote 1
Cor. 7:31. Hence (James 1:27) after it is stated that "religion clean
and undefiled . . . is . . . to visit the fatherless and widows in
their tribulation," it is added, "and to keep one's self unspotted from
this world," namely to avoid being attached to worldly things.
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Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?
Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order can be directed to
soldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of perfection.
Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of Christian life
(Mat. 5:39): "I say to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee
on the right cheek, turn to him also the other," which is inconsistent
with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no religious order can be
established for soldiering.
Objection 2: Further, the bodily encounter of the battlefield is more
grievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel
at law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from
the Decretal De Postulando quoted above (A[2], OBJ[2]). Therefore it is
much less seemly for a religious order to be established for
soldiering.
Objection 3: Further, the religious state is a state of penance, as we
have said above ([3820]Q[187], A[6]). Now according to the code of laws
soldiering is forbidden to penitents. for it is said in the Decretal De
Poenit., Dist. v, cap. 3: "It is altogether opposed to the rules of the
Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance." Therefore
it is unfitting for any religious order to be established for
soldiering.
Objection 4: Further, no religious order may be established for an
unjust object. But as Isidore says (Etym. xviii, 1), "A just war is one
that is waged by order of the emperor." Since then religious are
private individuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and
consequently no religious order may be established for this purpose.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad Bonifac.), "Beware of
thinking that none of those can please God who handle war-like weapons.
Of such was holy David to whom the Lord gave great testimony." Now
religious orders are established in order that men may please God.
Therefore nothing hinders the establishing of a religious order for the
purpose of soldiering.
I answer that, As stated above [3821](A[2]), a religious order may be
established not only for the works of the contemplative life, but also
for the works of the active life, in so far as they are concerned in
helping our neighbor and in the service of God, but not in so far as
they are directed to a worldly object. Now the occupation of soldiering
may be directed to the assistance of our neighbor, not only as regards
private individuals, but also as regards the defense of the whole
commonwealth. Hence it is said of Judas Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2,3) that
"he [Vulg.: 'they'] fought with cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and
he got his people great honor." It can also be directed to the upkeep
of divine worship, wherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated to have
said: "We will fight for our lives and our laws," and further on (1
Macc. 13:3) Simon said: "You know what great battles I and my brethren,
and the house of my father, have fought for the laws and the
sanctuary."
Hence a religious order may be fittingly established for soldiering,
not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the defense of divine
worship and public safety, or also of the poor and oppressed, according
to Ps. 81:4: "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of the hand of
the sinner."
Reply to Objection 1: Not to resist evil may be understood in two ways.
First, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to oneself, and thus it
may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for the
spiritual welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating
patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to imperfection,
or even to vice, if one be able to resist the wrongdoer in a becoming
manner. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 27): "The courage whereby a
man in battle defends his country against barbarians, or protects the
weak at home, or his friends against robbers is full of justice": even
so our Lord says in the passage quoted [*Lk. 6:30 "Of him that taketh
away thy goods, ask them not again"; Cf. Mat. 5:40], " . . . thy goods,
ask them not again." If, however, a man were not to demand the return
of that which belongs to another, he would sin if it were his business
to do so: for it is praiseworthy to give away one's own, but not
another's property. And much less should the things of God be
neglected, for as Chrysostom [*Hom. v in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is most
wicked to overlook the wrongs done to God."
Reply to Objection 2: It is inconsistent with any religious order to
act as counsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inconsistent
to do so at the orders of one's superior and in favor of one's
monastery, as stated in the same Decretal, or for the defense of the
poor and widows. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii,
cap. 1): "The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric is to
buy property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view
to the care of the fatherless . . . and widows." Likewise to be a
soldier for the sake of some worldly object is contrary to all
religious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for
the sake of God's service.
Reply to Objection 3: Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but
the soldiering which is directed to the service of God is imposed as a
penance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is
enjoined to take arms in defense of the Holy Land.
Reply to Objection 4: The establishment of a religious order for the
purpose of soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on
their own authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the
sovereign or of the Church.
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Whether a religious order can be established for preaching or hearing
confessions?
Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order may be established
for preaching, or hearing confessions. For it is said (VII, qu. i
[*Cap. Hoc nequaquam; Cf.[3822] Q[187], A[1], OBJ[1]]): "The monastic
life is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority,
or pastoral care," and the same apparently applies to religious. Now
preaching and hearing confessions are the actions of a pastor and
teacher. Therefore a religious order should not be established for this
purpose.
Objection 2: Further, the purpose for which a religious order is
established would seem to be something most proper to the religious
life, as stated above [3823](A[1]). Now the aforesaid actions are not
proper to religious but to bishops. Therefore a religious order should
not be established for the purpose of such actions.
Objection 3: Further, it seems unfitting that the authority to preach
and hear confessions should be committed to an unlimited number of men;
and there is no fixed number of those who are received into a religious
order. Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to be
established for the purpose of the aforesaid actions.
Objection 4: Further, preachers have a right to receive their
livelihood from the faithful of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 9. If then
the office of preaching be committed to a religious order established
for that purpose, it follows that the faithful of Christ are bound to
support an unlimited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden
on them. Therefore a religious order should not be established for the
exercise of these actions.
Objection 5: Further, the organization of the Church should be in
accordance with Christ's institution. Now Christ sent first the twelve
apostles to preach, as related in Luke 9, and afterwards He sent the
seventy-two disciples, as stated in Luke 10. Moreover, according to the
gloss of Bede on "And after these things" (Lk. 10:1), "the apostles are
represented by the bishops, the seventy-two disciples by the lesser
priests," i.e. the parish priests. Therefore in addition to bishops and
parish priests, no religious order should be established for the
purpose of preaching and hearing confessions.
On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4),
Abbot Nesteros, speaking of the various kinds of religious orders,
says: "Some choosing the care of the sick, others devoting themselves
to the relief of the afflicted and oppressed, or applying themselves to
teaching, or giving alms to the poor, have been most highly esteemed on
account of their devotion and piety." Therefore just as a religious
order may be established for the care of the sick, so also may one be
established for teaching the people by preaching and like works.
I answer that, As stated above [3824](A[2]), it is fitting for a
religious order to be established for the works of the active life, in
so far as they are directed to the good of our neighbor, the service of
God, and the upkeep of divine worship. Now the good of our neighbor is
advanced by things pertaining to the spiritual welfare of the soul
rather than by things pertaining to the supplying of bodily needs, in
proportion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal things. Hence
it was stated above (Q[32], A[3]) that spiritual works of mercy surpass
corporal works of mercy. Moreover this is more pertinent to the service
of God, to Whom no sacrifice is more acceptable than zeal for souls, as
Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.). Furthermore, it is a greater thing
to employ spiritual arms in defending the faithful against the errors
of heretics and the temptations of the devil, than to protect the
faithful by means of bodily weapons. Therefore it is most fitting for a
religious order to be established for preaching and similar works
pertaining to the salvation of souls.
Reply to Objection 1: He who works by virtue of another, acts as an
instrument. And a minister is like an "animated instrument," as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 11]). Hence if a man
preach or do something similar by the authority of his superiors, he
does not rise above the degree of "discipleship" or "subjection," which
is competent to religious.
Reply to Objection 2: Some religious orders are established for
soldiering, to wage war, not indeed on their own authority, but on that
of the sovereign or of the Church who are competent to wage war by
virtue of their office, as stated above (A[3], ad 4). In the same way
certain religious orders are established for preaching and hearing
confessions, not indeed by their own authority, but by the authority of
the higher and lower superiors, to whom these things belong by virtue
of their office. Consequently to assist one's superiors in such a
ministry is proper to a religious order of this kind.
Reply to Objection 3: Bishops do not allow these religious severally
and indiscriminately to preach or hear confessions, but according to
the discretion of the religious superiors, or according to their own
appointment.
Reply to Objection 4: The faithful are not bound by law to contribute
to the support of other than their ordinary prelates, who receive the
tithes and offerings of the faithful for that purpose, as well as other
ecclesiastical revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to the
faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and without
demanding payment as of right, the faithful are not burdened thereby
because their temporal contributions can be liberally repaid by those
men, nor are they bound by law to contribute, but by charity, and yet
not so that they be burdened thereby and others eased, as stated in 2
Cor. 8:13. If, however, none be found to devote themselves gratuitously
to services of this kind, the ordinary prelate is bound, if he cannot
suffice by himself, to seek other suitable persons and support them
himself.
Reply to Objection 5: The seventy-two disciples are represented not
only by the parish priests, but by all those of lower order who in any
way assist the bishops in their office. For we do not read that our
Lord appointed the seventy-two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but
that "He sent them two and two before His face into every city and
place whither He Himself was to come." It was fitting, however, that in
addition to the ordinary prelates others should be chosen for these
duties on account of the multitude of the faithful, and the difficulty
of finding a sufficient number of persons to be appointed to each
locality, just as it was necessary to establish religious orders for
military service, on account of the secular princes being unable to
cope with unbelievers in certain countries.
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Whether a religious order should be established for the purpose of study?
Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order should not be
established for the purpose of study. For it is written (Ps. 70:15,16):
"Because I have not known letters [Douay: 'learning'], I will enter
into the powers of the Lord," i.e. "Christian virtue," according to a
gloss. Now the perfection of Christian virtue, seemingly, pertains
especially to religious. Therefore it is not for them to apply
themselves to the study of letters.
Objection 2: Further, that which is a source of dissent is unbecoming
to religious, who are gathered together in the unity of peace. Now
study leads to dissent: wherefore different schools of thought arose
among the philosophers. Hence Jerome (Super Epist. ad Tit. 1:5) says:
"Before a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and people
said: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas," etc. Therefore it would
seem that no religious order should be established for the purpose of
study.
Objection 3: Further, those who profess the Christian religion should
profess nothing in common with the Gentiles. Now among the Gentiles
were some who professed philosophy, and even now some secular persons
are known as professors of certain sciences. Therefore the study of
letters does not become religious.
On the contrary, Jerome (Ep. liii ad Paulin.) urges him to acquire
learning in the monastic state, saying: "Let us learn on earth those
things the knowledge of which will remain in heaven," and further on:
"Whatever you seek to know, I will endeavor to know with you."
I answer that As stated above [3825](A[2]), religion may be ordained to
the active and to the contemplative life. Now chief among the works of
the active life are those which are directly ordained to the salvation
of souls, such as preaching and the like. Accordingly the study of
letters is becoming to the religious life in three ways. First, as
regards that which is proper to the contemplative life, to which the
study of letters helps in a twofold manner. In one way by helping
directly to contemplate, namely by enlightening the intellect. For the
contemplative life of which we are now speaking is directed chiefly to
the consideration of divine things, as stated above (Q[180], A[4]), to
which consideration man is directed by study; for which reason it is
said in praise of the righteous (Ps. 1:2) that "he shall meditate day
and night" on the law of the Lord, and (Ecclus. 39:1): "The wise man
will seek out the wisdom of all the ancients, and will be occupied in
the prophets." In another way the study of letters is a help to the
contemplative life indirectly, by removing the obstacles to
contemplation, namely the errors which in the contemplation of divine
things frequently beset those who are ignorant of the scriptures. Thus
we read in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. x, 3) that the Abbot
Serapion through simplicity fell into the error of the
Anthropomorphites, who thought that God had a human shape. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. vi) that "some through seeking in contemplation
more than they are able to grasp, fall away into perverse doctrines,
and by failing to be the humble disciples of truth become the masters
of error." Hence it is written (Eccles. 2:3): "I thought in my heart to
withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom and
might avoid folly."
Secondly, the study of letters is necessary in those religious orders
that are founded for preaching and other like works; wherefore the
Apostle (Titus 1:9), speaking of bishops to whose office these acts
belong, says: "Embracing that faithful word which is according to
doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to
convince the gainsayers." Nor does it matter that the apostles were
sent to preach without having studied letters, because, as Jerome says
(Ep. liii ad Paulin.), "whatever others acquire by exercise and daily
meditation in God's law, was taught them by the Holy Ghost."
Thirdly, the study of letters is becoming to religious as regards that
which is common to all religious orders. For it helps us to avoid the
lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Monach.):
"Love the science of the Scriptures and thou shalt have no love for
carnal vice." For it turns the mind away from lustful thoughts, and
tames the flesh on account of the toil that study entails according to
Ecclus. 31:1, "Watching for riches* consumeth the flesh." [*Vigilia
honestatis St. Thomas would seem to have taken 'honestas' in the sense
of virtue]. It also helps to remove the desire of riches, wherefore it
is written (Wis. 7:8): "I . . . esteemed riches nothing in comparison
with her," and (1 Macc. 12:9): "We needed none of these things," namely
assistance from without, "having for our comfort the holy books that
are in our hands." It also helps to teach obedience, wherefore
Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii): "What sort of perverseness is
this, to wish to read, but not to obey what one reads?" Hence it is
clearly fitting that a religious order be established for the study of
letters.
Reply to Objection 1: This commentary of the gloss is an exposition of
the Old Law of which the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter
killeth." Hence not to know letters is to disapprove of the
circumcision of the "letter" and other carnal observances.
Reply to Objection 2: Study is directed to knowledge which, without
charity, "puffeth up," and consequently leads to dissent, according to
Prov. 13:10, "Among the proud there are always dissensions": whereas,
with charity, it "edifieth and begets concord." Hence the Apostle after
saying (1 Cor. 1:5): "You are made rich . . . in all utterance and in
all knowledge," adds (1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the same thing,
and that there be no schisms among you." But Jerome is not speaking
here of the study of letters, but of the study of dissensions which
heretics and schismatics have brought into the Christian religion.
Reply to Objection 3: The philosophers professed the study of letters
in the matter of secular learning: whereas it becomes religious to
devote themselves chiefly to the study of letters in reference to the
doctrine that is "according to godliness" (Titus 1:1). It becomes not
religious, whose whole life is devoted to the service of God, to seek
for other learning, save in so far as it is referred to the sacred
doctrine. Hence Augustine says at the end of De Musica vi, 17: "Whilst
we think that we should not overlook those whom heretics delude by the
deceitful assurance of reason and knowledge, we are slow to advance in
the consideration of their methods. Yet we should not be praised for
doing this, were it not that many holy sons of their most loving mother
the Catholic Church had done the same under the necessity of
confounding heretics."
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Whether a religious order that is devoted to the contemplative life is more
excellent than on that is given to the active life?
Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order which is devoted to
the contemplative life is not more excellent than one which is given to
the active life. For it is said (Extra, de Regular. et Transeunt. ad
Relig., cap. Licet), quoting the words of Innocent III: "Even as a
greater good is preferred to a lesser, so the common profit takes
precedence of private profit: and in this case teaching is rightly
preferred to silence, responsibility to contemplation, work to rest."
Now the religious order which is directed to the greater good is
better. Therefore it would seem that those religious orders that are
directed to the active life are more excellent than those which are
directed to the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, every religious order is directed to the
perfection of charity, as stated above ([3826]AA[1],2). Now a gloss on
Heb. 12:4, "For you have not yet resisted unto blood," says: "In this
life there is no more perfect love than that to which the holy martyrs
attained, who fought against sin unto blood." Now to fight unto blood
is becoming those religious who are directed to military service, and
yet this pertains to the active life. Therefore it would seem that
religious orders of this kind are the most excellent.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly the stricter a religious order is, the
more excellent it is. But there is no reason why certain religious
orders directed to the active life should not be of stricter observance
than those directed to the contemplative life. Therefore they are more
excellent.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42) that the "best part" was
Mary's, by whom the contemplative life is signified.
I answer that, As stated above [3827](A[1]), the difference between one
religious order and another depends chiefly on the end, and secondarily
on the exercise. And since one thing cannot be said to be more
excellent than another save in respect of that in which it differs
therefrom, it follows that the excellence of one religious order over
another depends chiefly on their ends, and secondarily on their
respective exercises. Nevertheless each of these comparisons is
considered in a different way. For the comparison with respect to the
end is absolute, since the end is sought for its own sake; whereas the
comparison with respect to exercise is relative, since exercise is
sought not for its own sake, but for the sake of the end. Hence a
religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to an end
that is absolutely more excellent either because it is a greater good
or because it is directed to more goods. If, however, the end be the
same, the excellence of one religious order over another depends
secondarily, not on the amount of exercise, but on the proportion of
the exercise to the end in view. Wherefore in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Coll. ii, 2) Blessed Antony is quoted, as preferring
discretion whereby a man moderates all his actions, to fastings,
watchings, and all such observances.
Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold.
one proceeds from the fulness of contemplation, such as teaching and
preaching. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the words of
Ps. 144:7, "They shall publish the memory of . . . Thy sweetness,"
refer "to perfect men returning from their contemplation." And this
work is more excellent than simple contemplation. For even as it is
better to enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to give to
others the fruits of one's contemplation than merely to contemplate.
The other work of the active life consists entirely in outward
occupation, for instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the like,
which are less excellent than the works of contemplation, except in
cases of necessity, as stated above ([3828]Q[182], A[1]). Accordingly
the highest place in religious orders is held by those which are
directed to teaching and preaching, which, moreover, are nearest to the
episcopal perfection, even as in other things "the end of that which is
first is in conjunction with the beginning of that which is second," as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place belongs to those
which are directed to contemplation, and the third to those which are
occupied with external actions.
Moreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted that one religious
order excels another through being directed to higher action in the
same genus; thus among the works of the active life it is better to
ransom captives than to receive guests, and among the works of the
contemplative life prayer is better than study. Again one will excel
another if it be directed to more of these actions than another, or if
it have statutes more adapted to the attainment of the end in view.
Reply to Objection 1: This Decretal refers to the active life as
directed to the salvation of souls.
Reply to Objection 2: Those religious orders that are established for
the purpose of military service aim more directly at shedding the
enemy's blood than at the shedding of their own, which latter is more
properly competent to martyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious of
this description should not acquire the merit of martyrdom in certain
cases, and in this respect stand higher than other religious; even as
in some cases the works of the active life take precedence of
contemplation.
Reply to Objection 3: Strictness of observances, as the Blessed Antony
remarks (Conferences of the Fathers; Coll. ii, 2), is not the chief
object of commendation in a religious order; and it is written (Is.
58:5): "Is this such a fast as I have chosen, for a man to afflict his
soul for a day?" Nevertheless it is adopted in religious life as being
necessary for taming the flesh, "which if done without discretion, is
liable to make us fail altogether," as the Blessed Antony observes.
Wherefore a religious order is not more excellent through having
stricter observances, but because its observances are directed by
greater discretion to the end of religion. Thus the taming of the flesh
is more efficaciously directed to continence by means of abstinence in
meat and drink, which pertain to hunger and thirst, than by the
privation of clothing, which pertains to cold and nakedness, or by
bodily labor.
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Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in
common?
Objection 1: It would seem that religious perfection is diminished by
possessing something in common. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If
thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast and give to
the poor." Hence it is clear that to lack worldly wealth belongs to the
perfection of Christian life. Now those who possess something in common
do not lack worldly wealth. Therefore it would seem that they do not
quite reach to the perfection of Christian life.
Objection 2: Further, the perfection of the counsels requires that one
should be without worldly solicitude; wherefore the Apostle in giving
the counsel of virginity said (1 Cor. 7:32): "I would have you to be
without solicitude." Now it belongs to the solicitude of the present
life that certain people keep something to themselves for the morrow;
and this solicitude was forbidden His disciples by our Lord (Mat. 6:34)
saying: "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow." Therefore it would seem
that the perfection of Christian life is diminished by having something
in common.
Objection 3: Further, possessions held in common belong in some way to
each member of the community; wherefore Jerome (Ep. lx ad Heliod.
Episc.) says in reference to certain people: "They are richer in the
monastery than they had been in the world; though serving the poor
Christ they have wealth which they had not while serving the rich
devil; the Church rejects them now that they are rich, who in the world
were beggars." But it is derogatory to religious perfection that one
should possess wealth of one's own. Therefore it is also derogatory to
religious perfection to possess anything in common.
Objection 4: Further, Gregory (Dial. iii, 14) relates of a very holy
man named Isaac, that "when his disciples humbly signified that he
should accept the possessions offered to him for the use of the
monastery, he being solicitous for the safeguarding of his poverty,
held firmly to his opinion, saying: A monk who seeks earthly
possessions is no monk at all": and this refers to possessions held in
common, and which were offered him for the common use of the monastery.
Therefore it would seem destructive of religious perfection to possess
anything in common.
Objection 5: Further, our Lord in prescribing religious perfection to
His disciples, said (Mat. 10:9,10): "Do not possess gold, nor silver,
nor money in your purses, nor script for your journey." By these words,
as Jerome says in his commentary, "He reproves those philosophers who
are commonly called Bactroperatae [*i.e. staff and scrip bearers], who
as despising the world and valuing all things at naught carried their
pantry about with them." Therefore it would seem derogatory to
religious perfection that one should keep something whether for oneself
or for the common use.
On the contrary, Prosper [*Julianus Pomerius, among the works of
Prosper] says (De Vita Contempl. ix) and his words are quoted (XII, qu.
1, can. Expedit): "It is sufficiently clear both that for the sake of
perfection one should renounce having anything of one's own, and that
the possession of revenues, which are of course common property, is no
hindrance to the perfection of the Church."
I answer that, As stated above ([3829]Q[184], A[3], ad 1;[3830] Q[185],
A[6], ad 1), perfection consists, essentially, not in poverty, but in
following Christ, according to the saying of Jerome (Super Matth. xix,
27): "Since it is not enough to leave all, Peter adds that which is
perfect, namely, 'We have followed Thee,'" while poverty is like an
instrument or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in the
Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the abbot Moses says:
"Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, poverty, and
privation of all one's possessions are not perfection, but means of
perfection."
Now the privation of one's possessions, or poverty, is a means of
perfection, inasmuch as by doing away with riches we remove certain
obstacles to charity; and these are chiefly three. The first is the
cares which riches bring with them; wherefore our Lord said (Mat.
13:22): "That which was sown [Vulg.: 'He that received the seed'] among
thorns, is he that heareth the word, and the care of this world, and
the deceitfulness of riches, choketh up the word." The second is the
love of riches, which increases with the possession of wealth;
wherefore Jerome says (Super Matth. xix, 23) that "since it is
difficult to despise riches when we have them, our Lord did not say:
'It is impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven,' but:
'It is difficult.'" The third is vainglory or elation which results
from riches, according to Ps. 48:7, "They that trust in their own
strength, and glory in the multitude of their riches."
Accordingly the first of these three cannot be altogether separated
from riches whether great or small. For man must needs take a certain
amount of care in acquiring or keeping external things. But so long as
external things are sought or possessed only in a small quantity, and
as much as is required for a mere livelihood, such like care does not
hinder one much; and consequently is not inconsistent with the
perfection of Christian life. For our Lord did not forbid all care, but
only such as is excessive and hurtful; wherefore Augustine, commenting
on Mat. 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat,"
says (De Serm. in Monte [*The words quoted are from De Operibus Monach.
xxvi]): "In saying this He does not forbid them to procure these things
in so far as they needed them, but to be intent on them, and for their
sake to do whatever they are bidden to do in preaching the Gospel." Yet
the possession of much wealth increases the weight of care, which is a
great distraction to man's mind and hinders him from giving himself
wholly to God's service. The other two, however, namely the love of
riches and taking pride or glorying in riches, result only from an
abundance of wealth.
Nevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if riches, whether
abundant or moderate, be possessed in private or in common. For the
care that one takes of one's own wealth, pertains to love of self,
whereby a man loves himself in temporal matters; whereas the care that
is given to things held in common pertains to the love of charity which
"seeketh not her own," but looks to the common good. And since religion
is directed to the perfection of charity, and charity is perfected in
"the love of God extending to contempt of self" [*Augustine, De Civ.
Dei xiv, 28], it is contrary to religious perfection to possess
anything in private. But the care that is given to common goods may
pertain to charity, although it may prove an obstacle to some higher
act of charity, such as divine contemplation or the instructing of
one's neighbor. Hence it is evident that to have excessive riches in
common, whether in movable or in immovable property, is an obstacle to
perfection, though not absolutely incompatible with it; while it is not
an obstacle to religious perfection to have enough external things,
whether movables or immovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we
consider poverty in relation to the common end of religious orders,
which is to devote oneself to the service of God. But if we consider
poverty in relation to the special end of any religious order, then
this end being presupposed, a greater or lesser degree of poverty is
adapted to that religious order; and each religious order will be the
more perfect in respect of poverty, according as it professes a poverty
more adapted to its end. For it is evident that for the purpose of the
outward and bodily works of the active life a man needs the assistance
of outward things, whereas few are required for contemplation. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "many things are needed for
action, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions are. But
the contemplative man requires no such things for the exercise of his
act: he needs only the necessaries; other things are an obstacle to his
contemplation." Accordingly it is clear that a religious order directed
to the bodily actions of the active life, such as soldiering or the
lodging of guests, would be imperfect if it lacked common riches;
whereas those religious orders which are directed to the contemplative
life are the more perfect, according as the poverty they profess
burdens them with less care for temporal things. And the care of
temporal things is so much a greater obstacle to religious life as the
religious life requires a greater care of spiritual things.
Now it is manifest that a religious order established for the purpose
of contemplating and of giving to others the fruits of one's
contemplation by teaching and preaching, requires greater care of
spiritual things than one that is established for contemplation only.
Wherefore it becomes a religious order of this kind to embrace a
poverty that burdens one with the least amount of care. Again it is
clear that to keep what one has acquired at a fitting time for one's
necessary use involves the least burden of care. Wherefore a threefold
degree of poverty corresponds to the three aforesaid degrees of
religious life. For it is fitting that a religious order which is
directed to the bodily actions of the active life should have an
abundance of riches in common; that the common possession of a
religious order directed to contemplation should be more moderate,
unless the said religious be bound, either themselves or through
others, to give hospitality or to assist the poor; and that those who
aim at giving the fruits of their contemplation to others should have
their life most exempt from external cares; this being accomplished by
their laying up the necessaries of life procured at a fitting time.
This, our Lord, the Founder of poverty, taught by His example. For He
had a purse which He entrusted to Judas, and in which were kept the
things that were offered to Him, as related in Jn. 12:6.
Nor should it be argued that Jerome (Super Matth. xvii, 26) says: "If
anyone object that Judas carried money in the purse, we answer that He
deemed it unlawful to spend the property of the poor on His own uses,"
namely by paying the tax---because among those poor His disciples held
a foremost place, and the money in Christ's purse was spent chiefly on
their needs. For it is stated (Jn. 4:8) that "His disciples were gone
into the city to buy meats," and (Jn. 13:29) that the disciples
"thought, because Judas had the purse, that Jesus had said to him: But
those things which we have need of for the festival day, or that he
should give something to the poor." From this it is evident that to
keep money by, or any other common property for the support of
religious of the same order, or of any other poor, is in accordance
with the perfection which Christ taught by His example. Moreover, after
the resurrection, the disciples from whom all religious orders took
their origin kept the price of the lands, and distributed it according
as each one had need (Acts 4:34,35).
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3831]Q[184], A[3], ad 1), this
saying of our Lord does not mean that poverty itself is perfection, but
that it is the means of perfection. Indeed, as shown above
([3832]Q[186], A[8]), it is the least of the three chief means of
perfection; since the vow of continence excels the vow of poverty, and
the vow of obedience excels them both. Since, however, the means are
sought not for their own sake, but for the sake of the end, a thing is
better, not for being a greater instrument, but for being more adapted
to the end. Thus a physician does not heal the more the more medicine
he gives, but the more the medicine is adapted to the disease.
Accordingly it does not follow that a religious order is the more
perfect, according as the poverty it professes is more perfect, but
according as its poverty is more adapted to the end both common and
special. Granted even that the religious order which exceeds others in
poverty be more perfect in so far as it is poorer, this would not make
it more perfect simply. For possibly some other religious order might
surpass it in matters relating to continence, or obedience, and thus be
more perfect simply, since to excel in better things is to be better
simply.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord's words (Mat. 6:34), "Be not solicitous
for tomorrow," do not mean that we are to keep nothing for the morrow;
for the Blessed Antony shows the danger of so doing, in the Conferences
of the Fathers (Coll. ii, 2), where he says: "It has been our
experience that those who have attempted to practice the privation of
all means of livelihood, so as not to have the wherewithal to procure
themselves food for one day, have been deceived so unawares that they
were unable to finish properly the work they had undertaken." And, as
Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii), "if this saying of our Lord,
'Be not solicitous for tomorrow,' means that we are to lay nothing by
for the morrow, those who shut themselves up for many days from the
sight of men, and apply their whole mind to a life of prayer, will be
unable to provide themselves with these things." Again he adds
afterwards: "Are we to suppose that the more holy they are, the less do
they resemble the birds?" And further on (De oper. Monach. xxiv): "For
if it be argued from the Gospel that they should lay nothing by, they
answer rightly: Why then did our Lord have a purse, wherein He kept the
money that was collected? Why, in days long gone by, when famine was
imminent, was grain sent to the holy fathers? Why did the apostles thus
provide for the needs of the saints?"
Accordingly the saying: "Be not solicitous for tomorrow," according to
Jerome (Super Matth.) is to be rendered thus: "It is enough that we
think of the present; the future being uncertain, let us leave it to
God": according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvi in the Opus Imperfectum,
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "It is enough to endure the
toil for necessary things, labor not in excess for unnecessary things":
according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17): "When we do any
good action, we should bear in mind not temporal things which are
denoted by the morrow, but eternal things."
Reply to Objection 3: The saying of Jerome applies where there are
excessive riches, possessed in private as it were, or by the abuse of
which even the individual members of a community wax proud and wanton.
But they do not apply to moderate wealth, set by for the common use,
merely as a means of livelihood of which each one stands in need. For
it amounts to the same that each one makes use of things pertaining to
the necessaries of life, and that these things be set by for the common
use.
Reply to Objection 4: Isaac refused to accept the offer of possessions,
because he feared lest this should lead him to have excessive wealth,
the abuse of which would be an obstacle to religious perfection. Hence
Gregory adds (Dial. iii, 14): "He was as afraid of forfeiting the
security of his poverty, as the rich miser is careful of his perishable
wealth." It is not, however, related that he refused to accept such
things as are commonly necessary for the upkeep of life.
Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5,6) that bread,
wine, and the like are natural riches, while money is artificial
riches. Hence it is that certain philosophers declined to make use of
money, and employed other things, living according to nature. Wherefore
Jerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally forbade both, that
it comes to the same to have money and to possess other things
necessary for life. And though our Lord commanded those who were sent
to preach not to carry these things on the way, He did not forbid them
to be possessed in common. How these words of our Lord should be
understood has been shown above (Q[185], A[6] , ad 2; [3833]FS, Q[108],
A[2], ad 3).
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Whether the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect
than that of those who lead a solitary life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the religious life of those who live in
community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life.
For it is written (Eccles. 4:9): "It is better . . . that two should be
together, than one; for they have the advantage of their society."
Therefore the religious life of those who live in community would seem
to be more perfect.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Mat. 18:20): "Where there are two
or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of
them." But nothing can be better than the fellowship of Christ.
Therefore it would seem better to live in community than in solitude.
Objection 3: Further, the vow of obedience is more excellent than the
other religious vows; and humility is most acceptable to God. Now
obedience and humility are better observed in company than in solitude;
for Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic. Monach.): "In solitude pride
quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will, he does what
he likes"; whereas when instructing one who lives in community, he
says: "You may not do what you will, you must eat what you are bidden
to eat, you may possess so much as you receive, you must obey one you
prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your brethren, you must
fear the superior of the monastery as God, love him as a father."
Therefore it would seem that the religious life of those who live in
community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life.
Objection 4: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 11:33): "No man lighteth a
candle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor under a bushel." Now those
who lead a solitary life are seemingly in a hidden place, and to be
doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their religious
life is not more perfect.
Objection 5: Further, that which is in accord with man's nature is
apparently more pertinent to the perfection of virtue. But man is
naturally a social animal, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1).
Therefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life is not more
perfect than to lead a community life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii) that "those
are holier who keep themselves aloof from the approach of all, and give
their whole mind to a life of prayer."
I answer that, Solitude, like poverty, is not the essence of
perfection, but a means thereto. Hence in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the Abbot Moses says that "solitude," even as
fasting and other like things, is "a sure means of acquiring purity of
heart." Now it is evident that solitude is a means adapted not to
action but to contemplation, according to Osee 2:14, "I . . . will lead
her into solitude [Douay: 'the wilderness']; and I will speak to her
heart." Wherefore it is not suitable to those religious orders that are
directed to the works whether corporal or spiritual of the active life;
except perhaps for a time, after the example of Christ, Who as Luke
relates (6:12), "went out into a mountain to pray; and He passed the
whole night in the prayer of God." On the other hand, it is suitable to
those religious orders that are directed to contemplation.
It must, however, be observed that what is solitary should be
self-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one "that lacks nothing,"
and this belongs to the idea of a perfect thing [*Aristotle, Phys. iii,
6]. Wherefore solitude befits the contemplative who has already
attained to perfection. This happens in two ways: in one way by the
gift only of God, as in the case of John the Baptist, who was "filled
with the Holy Ghost even from his mother's womb" (Lk. 1:11), so that he
was in the desert even as a boy; in another way by the practice of
virtuous action, according to Heb. 5:14: "Strong meat is for the
perfect; for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the
discerning of good and evil."
Now man is assisted in this practice by the fellowship of others in two
ways. First, as regards his intellect, to the effect of his being
instructed in that which he has to contemplate; wherefore Jerome says
(ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "It pleases me that you have the
fellowship of holy men, and teach not yourself. Secondly, as regards
the affections, seeing that man's noisome affections are restrained by
the example and reproof which he receives from others; for as Gregory
says (Moral. xxx, 23), commenting on the words, "To whom I have given a
house in the wilderness" (Job 39:6), "What profits solitude of the
body, if solitude of the heart be lacking?" Hence a social life is
necessary for the practice of perfection. Now solitude befits those who
are already perfect; wherefore Jerome says (ad Rustic. Monach., Ep.
cxxv): "Far from condemning the solitary life, we have often commended
it. But we wish the soldiers who pass from the monastic school to be
such as not to be deterred by the hard noviciate of the desert, and
such as have given proof of their conduct for a considerable time.
Accordingly, just as that which is already perfect surpasses that which
is being schooled in perfection, so the life of the solitaries, if duly
practiced, surpasses the community life. But if it be undertaken
without the aforesaid practice, it is fraught with very great danger,
unless the grace of God supply that which others acquire by practice,
as in the case of the Blessed Antony and the Blessed Benedict.
Reply to Objection 1: Solomon shows that two are better than one, on
account of the help which one affords the other either by "lifting him"
up, or by "warming him," i.e. giving him spiritual heat (Eccles.
4:10,11). But those who have already attained to perfection do not
require this help.
Reply to Objection 2: According to 1 Jn. 4:16, "He that abideth in
charity abideth in God and God in him." Wherefore just as Christ is in
the midst of those who are united together in the fellowship of
brotherly love, so does He dwell in the heart of the man who devotes
himself to divine contemplation through love of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Actual obedience is required of those who need to
be schooled according to the direction of others in the attainment of
perfection; but those who are already perfect are sufficiently "led by
the spirit of God" so that they need not to obey others actually.
Nevertheless they have obedience in the preparedness of the mind.
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), "no one
is forbidden to seek the knowledge of truth, for this pertains to a
praiseworthy leisure." That a man be placed "on a candlestick," does
not concern him but his superiors, and "if this burden is not placed on
us," as Augustine goes on to say (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), "we must devote
ourselves to the contemplation of truth," for which purpose solitude is
most helpful. Nevertheless, those who lead a solitary life are most
useful to mankind. Hence, referring to them, Augustine says (De Morib.
Eccl. xxxi): "They dwell in the most lonely places, content to live on
water and the bread that is brought to them from time to time, enjoying
colloquy with God to whom they have adhered with a pure mind. To some
they seem to have renounced human intercourse more than is right: but
these understand not how much such men profit us by the spirit of their
prayers, what an example to us is the life of those whom we are
forbidden to see in the body."
Reply to Objection 5: A man may lead a solitary life for two motives.
one is because he is unable, as it were, to bear with human fellowship
on account of his uncouthness of mind; and this is beast-like. The
other is with a view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is
superhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "he who
associates not with others is either a beast or a god," i.e. a godly
man.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ENTRANCE INTO RELIGIOUS LIFE (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the entrance into religious life. Under this head
there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether those who are not practiced in the observance of the
commandments should enter religion?
(2) Whether it is lawful for a person to be bound by vow to enter
religion?
(3) Whether those who are bound by vow to enter religion are bound to
fulfil their vow?
(4) Whether those who vow to enter religion are bound to remain there
in perpetuity?
(5) Whether children should be received into religion?
(6) Whether one should be withheld from entering religion through
deference to one's parents?
(7) Whether parish priests or archdeacons may enter religion?
(8) Whether one may pass from one religious order to another?
(9) Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?
(10) Whether serious deliberation with one's relations and friends is
requisite for entrance into religion?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who are not practiced in keeping the commandments should ente
r
religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that none should enter religion but those
who are practiced in the observance of the commandments. For our Lord
gave the counsel of perfection to the young man who said that he had
kept the commandments "from his youth." Now all religious orders
originate from Christ. Therefore it would seem that none should be
allowed to enter religion but those who are practiced in the observance
of the commandments.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ezech., and Moral.
xxii): "No one comes suddenly to the summit; but he must make a
beginning of a good life in the smallest matters, so as to accomplish
great things." Now the great things are the counsels which pertain to
the perfection of life, while the lesser things are the commandments
which belong to common righteousness. Therefore it would seem that one
ought not to enter religion for the purpose of keeping the counsels,
unless one be already practiced in the observance of the precepts.
Objection 3: Further, the religious state, like the holy orders, has a
place of eminence in the Church. Now, as Gregory writes to the bishop
Siagrius [*Regist. ix, Ep. 106], "order should be observed in ascending
to orders. For he seeks a fall who aspires to mount to the summit by
overpassing the steps." [*The rest of the quotation is from Regist. v,
Ep. 53, ad Virgil. Episc.]. "For we are well aware that walls when
built receive not the weight of the beams until the new fabric is rid
of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with weight before
they are seasoned they bring down the whole building" (Dist. xlviii,
can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it would seem that one should not
enter religion unless one be practiced in the observance of the
precepts.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, "As a child that is weaned
is towards his mother," says: "First we are conceived in the womb of
Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are
nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same
elements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being
regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her
hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in
good works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while we
progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother's milk
for a father's control, that is to say, we pass from simple doctrine,
by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word that was in the
beginning with God." Afterwards it goes on to say: "For those who are
just baptized on Holy Saturday are borne in the hands of the Church as
it were and fed with milk until Pentecost, during which time nothing
arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising at midnight. Afterwards they
are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit, and being weaned so to speak,
begin to fast and keep other difficult observances. Many, like the
heretics and schismatics, have perverted this order by being weaned
before the time. Hence they have come to naught." Now this order is
apparently perverted by those who enter religion, or induce others to
enter religion, before they are practiced in the easier observance of
the commandments. Therefore they would seem to be heretics or
schismatics.
Objection 5: Further, one should proceed from that which precedes to
that which follows after. Now the commandments precede the counsels,
because they are more universal, for "the implication of the one by the
other is not convertible" [*Categor. ix], since whoever keeps the
counsels keeps the commandments, but the converse does not hold. Seeing
then that the right order requires one to pass from that which comes
first to that which comes after, it follows that one ought not to pass
to the observance of the counsels in religion, without being first of
all practiced in the observance of the commandments.
On the contrary, Matthew the publican who was not practiced in the
observance of the commandments was called by our Lord to the observance
of the counsels. For it is stated (Lk. 5:28) that "leaving all things
he . . . followed Him." Therefore it is not necessary for a person to
be practiced in the observance of the commandments before passing to
the perfection of the counsels.
I answer that, As shown above ([3834]Q[188], A[1]), the religious state
is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of the perfection of
charity. This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to
perfect charity by religious observances; and these obstacles are those
things which attach man's affections to earthly things. Now the
attachment of man's affections to earthly things is not only an
obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the loss
of charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods man
turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally. Hence it is
evident that the observances of the religious state, while removing the
obstacles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions of sin: for
instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience, and the like
withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all other manner of
sins.
Consequently it is right that not only those who are practiced in the
observance of the commandments should enter religion in order to attain
to yet greater perfection, but also those who are not practiced, in
order the more easily to avoid sin and attain to perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20) says: "The young
man lies when he says: 'All these have I kept from my youth.' For if he
had fulfilled this commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself,' why did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou hast
and give to the poor?" But this means that he lied as to the perfect
observance of this commandment. Hence Origen says (Tract. viii super
Matth.) that "it is written in the Gospel according to the Hebrews that
when our Lord had said to him: 'Go, sell all thou hast,' the rich man
began to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to him: How sayest
thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, seeing that it is
written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself? Behold
many of thy brethren, children of Abraham, are clothed in filth, and
die of hunger, whilst thy house is full of all manner of good things,
and nothing whatever hath passed thence to them. And thus our Lord
reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect, go, etc. For it is
impossible to fulfil the commandment which says, Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, especially to have such great
wealth." This also refers to the perfect fulfilment of this precept. on
the other hand, it is true that he kept the commandments imperfectly
and in a general way. For perfection consists chiefly in the observance
of the precepts of charity, as stated above ([3835]Q[184], A[3]).
Wherefore in order to show that the perfection of the counsels is
useful both to the innocent and to sinners, our Lord called not only
the innocent youth but also the sinner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His
call, and the youth obeyed not, because sinners are converted to the
religious life more easily than those who presume on their innocency.
It is to the former that our Lord says (Mat. 21:31): "The publicans and
the harlots shall go into the kingdom of God before you."
Reply to Objection 2: The highest and the lowest place can be taken in
three ways. First, in reference to the same state and the same man; and
thus it is evident that no one comes to the summit suddenly, since
every man that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of his
life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in comparison with
various states; and thus he who desires to reach to a higher state need
not begin from a lower state: for instance, if a man wish to be a
cleric he need not first of all be practiced in the life of a layman.
Thirdly, in comparison with different persons; and in this way it is
clear that one man begins straightway not only from a higher state, but
even from a higher degree of holiness, than the highest degree to which
another man attains throughout his whole life. Hence Gregory says
(Dial. ii, 1): "All are agreed that the boy Benedict began at a high
degree of grace and perfection in his daily life."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3836]Q[184], A[6]) the holy
orders prerequire holiness, whereas the religious state is a school for
the attainment of holiness. Hence the burden of orders should be laid
on the walls when these are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the
burden of religion seasons the walls, i.e. men, by drawing out the damp
of vice.
Reply to Objection 4: It is manifest from the words of this gloss that
it is chiefly a question of the order of doctrine, in so far as one has
to pass from easy matter to that which is more difficult. Hence it is
clear from what follows that the statement that certain "heretics" and
"schismatics have perverted this order" refers to the order of
doctrine. For it continues thus: "But he says that he has kept these
things, namely the aforesaid order, binding himself by an oath
[*Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking 'retributio,'
which Douay renders 'reward,' as meaning 'punishment']. Thus I was
humble not only in other things but also in knowledge, for 'I was
humbly minded'; because I was first of all fed with milk, which is the
Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of the bread of angels,
namely the Word that is in the beginning with God." The example which
is given in proof, of the newly baptized not being commanded to fast
until Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are to be laid on them
as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires them inwardly to take
upon themselves difficult things of their own choice. Hence after
Pentecost and the receiving of the Holy Ghost the Church observes a
fast. Now the Holy Ghost, according to Ambrose (Super Luc. 1:15), "is
not confined to any particular age; He ceases not when men die, He is
not excluded from the maternal womb." Gregory also in a homily for
Pentecost (xxx in Ev.) says: "He fills the boy harpist and makes him a
psalmist: He fills the boy abstainer and makes him a wise judge [*Dan.
1:8-17]," and afterwards he adds: "No time is needed to learn
whatsoever He will, for He teaches the mind by the merest touch." Again
it is written (Eccles. 8:8), "It is not in man's power to stop the
Spirit," and the Apostle admonishes us (1 Thess. 5:19): "Extinguish not
the Spirit," and (Acts 7:51) it is said against certain persons: "You
always resist the Holy Ghost."
Reply to Objection 5: There are certain chief precepts which are the
ends, so to say, of the commandments and counsels. These are the
precepts of charity, and the counsels are directed to them, not that
these precepts cannot be observed without keeping the counsels, but
that the keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance of
the precepts. The other precepts are secondary and are directed to the
precepts of charity; in such a way that unless one observe them it is
altogether impossible to keep the precepts of charity. Accordingly in
the intention the perfect observance of the precepts of charity
precedes the counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of
time. For such is the order of the end in relation to things directed
to the end. But the observance in a general way of the precepts of
charity together with the other precepts, is compared to the counsels
as the common to the proper, because one can observe the precepts
without observing the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common
observance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order of
nature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in point of time,
for a thing is not in the genus before being in one of the species. But
the observance of the precepts apart from the counsels is directed to
the observance of the precepts together with the counsels; as an
imperfect to a perfect species, even as the irrational to the rational
animal. Now the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, since
"nature," as Boethius says (De Consol. iii, 10), "begins with perfect
things." And yet it is not necessary for the precepts first of all to
be observed without the counsels, and afterwards with the counsels,
just as it is not necessary for one to be an ass before being a man, or
married before being a virgin. In like manner it is not necessary for a
person first of all to keep the commandments in the world before
entering religion; especially as the worldly life does not dispose one
to religious perfection, but is more an obstacle thereto.
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Whether one ought to be bound by vow to enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to
enter religion. For in making his profession a man is bound by the
religious vow. Now before profession a year of probation is allowed,
according to the rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according to
the decree of Innocent IV [*Sext. Decret., cap. Non solum., de Regular.
et Transeunt, ad Relig.] who moreover forbade anyone to be bound to the
religious life by profession before completing the year of probation.
Therefore it would seem that much less ought anyone while yet in the
world to be bound by vow to enter religion.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 15): Jews "should
be persuaded to be converted, not by compulsion but of their own free
will" (Dist. xlv, can. De Judaeis). Now one is compelled to fulfil what
one has vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter
religion.
Objection 3: Further, no one should give another an occasion of
falling; wherefore it is written (Ex. 21:33,34): "If a man open a pit .
. . and an ox or an ass fall into it, the owner of the pit shall pay
the price of the beasts." Now through being bound by vow to enter
religion it often happens that people fall into despair and various
sins. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to
enter religion.
On the contrary, It is written, (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye, and pay to the
Lord your God"; and a gloss of Augustine says that "some vows concern
the individual, such as vows of chastity, virginity, and the like."
Consequently Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things. But Holy
Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore it is
better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
I answer that, As stated above ([3837]Q[88], A[6]), when we were
treating of vows, one and the same work done in fulfilment of a vow is
more praiseworthy than if it be done apart from a vow, both because to
vow is an act of religion, which has a certain pre-eminence among the
virtues, and because a vow strengthens a man's will to do good; and
just as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a will obstinate
in evil, so a good work is the more praiseworthy through proceeding
from a will confirmed in good by means of a vow. Therefore it is in
itself praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
Reply to Objection 1: The religious vow is twofold. One is the solemn
vow which makes a man a monk or a brother in some other religious
order. This is called the profession, and such a vow should be preceded
by a year's probation, as the objection proves. The other is the simple
vow which does not make a man a monk or a religious, but only binds him
to enter religion, and such a vow need not be preceded by a year's
probation.
Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted from Gregory must be understood
as referring to absolute violence. But the compulsion arising from the
obligation of a vow is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of end,
because after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of salvation
unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be avoided;
indeed, as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Armentar. et Paulin.), "happy
is the necessity that compels us to better things."
Reply to Objection 3: The vow to enter religion is a strengthening of
the will for better things, and consequently, considered in itself,
instead of giving a man an occasion of falling, withdraws him from it.
But if one who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not
derogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does it derogate from
the goodness of Baptism that some sin more grievously after being
baptized.
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Whether one who is bound by a vow to enter religion is under an obligation
of entering religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter
religion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is
said in the Decretals (XVII, qu. ii, can. Consaldus): "Consaldus, a
priest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to
become a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or
abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his
benefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health
he refused to become a monk." And afterwards it is added: "We adjudge
and by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be
admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to
retain them in peace." Now this would not be if he were bound to enter
religion. Therefore it would seem that one is not bound to keep one's
vow of entering religion.
Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is not in his power.
Now it is not in a person's power to enter religion, since this depends
on the consent of those whom he wishes to join. Therefore it would seem
that a man is not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound himself
to enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one.
Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the
fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defense of the Holy Land;
and the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man
obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the
vow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not
necessarily to be fulfilled.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth him"; and a gloss on Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye, and pay to
the Lord your God," says: "To vow depends on the will: but after the
vow has been taken the fulfilment is of obligation."
I answer that, As stated above ([3838]Q[88], A[1]), when we were
treating of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in matters concerning
God. Now, as Gregory says in a letter to Boniface [*Innoc. I, Epist.
ii, Victricio Epo. Rotomag., cap. 14; Cf. can. Viduas: cause. xxvii,
qu. 1]: "If among men of good faith contracts are wont to be absolutely
irrevocable, how much more shall the breaking of this promise given to
God be deserving of punishment!" Therefore a man is under an obligation
to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something pertaining to
God.
Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains very much to
God, since thereby man devotes himself entirely to the divine service,
as stated above ([3839]Q[186], A[1]). Hence it follows that he who
binds himself to enter religion is under an obligation to enter
religion according as he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that if
he intend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as soon as
he can, through the cessation of a lawful impediment; whereas if he
intend to bind himself to a certain fixed time, or under a certain
fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion when the time comes or
the condition is fulfilled.
Reply to Objection 1: This priest had made, not a solemn, but a simple
vow. Hence he was not a monk in effect, so as to be bound by law to
dwell in a monastery and renounce his cure. However, in the court of
conscience one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter religion.
Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Per tuas) the Bishop of
Grenoble, who had accepted the episcopate after vowing to enter
religion, without having fulfilled his vow, is counseled that if "he
wish to heal his conscience he should renounce the government of his
see and pay his vows to the Most High."
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3840]Q[88], A[3], ad 2), when
we were treating of vows, he who has bound himself by vow to enter a
certain religious order is bound to do what is in his power in order to
be received in that order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to
enter the religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound to
go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only to one
particular order, he is bound only according to the measure of the
obligation to which he has engaged himself.
Reply to Objection 3: The vow to enter religion being perpetual is
greater than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which is a
temporal vow; and as Alexander III says (Extra, De Voto et Voti
Redemptione, cap. Scripturae), "he who exchanges a temporary service
for the perpetual service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking
his vow."
Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by entrance into
religion a man obtains remission of all his sins. For if by giving alms
a man may forthwith satisfy for his sins, according to Dan. 4:24,
"Redeem thou thy sins with alms," much more does it suffice to satisfy
for all his sins that a man devote himself wholly to the divine service
by entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of satisfaction,
even that of public penance, according to the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. i,
cap. Admonere) just as a holocaust exceeds a sacrifice, as Gregory
declares (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence we read in the Lives of the Fathers
(vi, 1) that by entering religion one receives the same grace as by
being baptized. And yet even if one were not thereby absolved from all
debt of punishment, nevertheless the entrance into religion is more
profitable than a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, as regards the
advancement in good, which is preferable to absolution from punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether he who has vowed to enter religion is bound to remain in religion i
n
perpetuity?
Objection 1: It would seem that he who has vowed to enter religion, is
bound in perpetuity to remain in religion. For it is better not to
enter religion than to leave after entering, according to 2 Pet. 2:21,
"It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than
after they have known it to turn back," and Lk. 9:62, "No man putting
his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of
God." But he who bound himself by the vow to enter religion, is under
the obligation to enter, as stated above [3841](A[3]). Therefore he is
also bound to remain for always.
Objection 2: Further, everyone is bound to avoid that which gives rise
to scandal, and is a bad example to others. Now by leaving after
entering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of
scandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited
to leave. Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to
fulfil a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to remain
evermore.
Objection 3: Further, the vow to enter religion is accounted a
perpetual vow: wherefore it is preferred to temporal vows, as stated
above (A[3], ad 3;[3842] Q[88], A[12], ad 1). But this would not be so
if a person after vowing to enter religion were to enter with the
intention of leaving. It seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter
religion is bound also to remain in perpetuity.
On the contrary, The vow of religious profession, for the reason that
it binds a man to remain in religion for evermore, has to be preceded
by a year of probation; whereas this is not required before the simple
vow whereby a man binds himself to enter religion. Therefore it seems
that he who vows to enter religion is not for that reason bound to
remain there in perpetuity.
I answer that, The obligation of a vow proceeds from the will: because
"to vow is an act of the will" according to Augustine [*Gloss of Peter
Lombard on Ps. 75:12]. Consequently the obligation of a vow extends as
far as the will and intention of the person who takes the vow.
Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind himself not only to enter
religion, but also to remain there evermore, he is bound to remain in
perpetuity. If, on the other hand, he intend to bind himself to enter
religion for the purpose of trial, while retaining the freedom to
remain or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound to remain. If,
however, in vowing he thought merely of entering religion, without
thinking of being free to leave, or of remaining in perpetuity, it
would seem that he is bound to enter religion according to the form
prescribed by common law, which is that those who enter should be given
a year's probation. Wherefore he is not bound to remain for ever.
Reply to Objection 1: It is better to enter religion with the purpose
of making a trial than not to enter at all, because by so doing one
disposes oneself to remain always. Nor is a person accounted to turn or
to look back, save when he omits to do that which he engaged to do:
else whoever does a good work for a time, would be unfit for the
kingdom of God, unless he did it always, which is evidently false.
Reply to Objection 2: A man who has entered religion gives neither
scandal nor bad example by leaving, especially if he do so for a
reasonable motive; and if others are scandalized, it will be passive
scandal on their part, and not active scandal on the part of the person
leaving, since in doing so, he has done what was lawful, and expedient
on account of some reasonable motive, such as sickness, weakness, and
the like.
Reply to Objection 3: He who enters with the purpose of leaving
forthwith, does not seem to fulfil his vow, since this was not his
intention in vowing. Hence he must change that purpose, at least so as
to wish to try whether it is good for him to remain in religion, but he
is not bound to remain for evermore.
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Whether children should be received in religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that children ought not to be received in
religion. Because it is said (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad
Relig., cap. Nullus): "No one should be tonsured unless he be of legal
age and willing." But children, seemingly, are not of legal age; nor
have they a will of their own, not having perfect use of reason.
Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in religion.
Objection 2: Further, the state of religion would seem to be a state of
repentance; wherefore religion is derived [*Cf.[3843] Q[81], A[1]] from
"religare" [to bind] or from "re-eligere" [to choose again], as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3 [*Cf. De Vera Relig. lv]). But
repentance does not become children. Therefore it seems that they
should not enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is like that of an oath.
But children under the age of fourteen ought not to be bound by oath
(Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap. Pueri and cap. Honestum.). Therefore it
would seem that neither should they be bound by vow.
Objection 4: Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind a person to an
obligation that can be justly canceled. Now if any persons of unripe
age bind themselves to religion, they can be withdrawn by their parents
or guardians. For it is written in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii, can.
Puella) that "if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the sacred
veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they choose, can
at once declare the deed null and void." It is therefore unlawful for
children, especially of unripe age, to be admitted or bound to
religion.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 19:14): "Suffer the little
children, and forbid them not to come to Me." Expounding these words
Origen says (Tract. vii in Matth.) that "the disciples of Jesus before
they have been taught the conditions of righteousness [*Cf. Mat.
19:16-30], rebuke those who offer children and babes to Christ: but our
Lord urges His disciples to stoop to the service of children. We must
therefore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel in wisdom
we despise the Church's little ones, as though we were great, and
forbid the children to come to Jesus."
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 1), the religious vow is
twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in a mere promise made to
God, and proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind. Such a
vow derives its efficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may
encounter a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as
in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding [*Extra, De
Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Sicut tenor]. The same applies
to children who have not reached the required use of reason, so as to
be capable of guile, which use boys attain, as a rule, at about the age
of fourteen, and girls at the age of twelve, this being what is called
"the age of puberty," although in some it comes earlier and in others
it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of nature.
Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters an obstacle, if the
person who makes a vow to God is not his own master; for instance, if a
slave, though having the use of reason, vows to enter religion, or even
is ordained, without the knowledge of his master: for his master can
annul this, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). And
since boys and girls under the age of puberty are naturally in their
father's power as regards the disposal of their manner of life, their
father may either cancel or approve their vow, if it please him to do
so, as it is expressly said with regard to a woman (Num. 30:4).
Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a child makes a
simple vow, not yet having full use of reason, he is not bound in
virtue of the vow; but if he has the use of reason before reaching the
age of puberty, he is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his vow; yet
this obligation may be removed by his father's authority, under whose
control he still remains, because the ordinance of the law whereby one
man is subject to another considers what happens in the majority of
cases. If, however, the
child has passed the age of puberty, his vow cannot be annulled by the
authority of his parents; though if he has not the full use of reason,
he would not be bound in the sight of God.
The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a religious.
Such a vow is subject to the ordinance of the Church, on account of the
solemnity attached to it. And since the Church considers what happens
in the majority of cases, a profession made before the age of puberty,
however much the person who makes profession may have the use of
reason, or be capable of guile, does not take effect so as to make him
a religious (Extra, De Regular., etc. cap. Significatum est.).
Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed before the age of
puberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received into
religion to be educated there: thus it is related of John the Baptist
(Lk. 1:80) that "the child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and was
in the deserts." Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii, 3), "the Roman
nobles began to give their sons to the blessed Benedict to be nurtured
for Almighty God"; and this is most fitting, according to Lam. 3:27,
"It is good for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth." It is
for this reason that by common custom children are made to apply
themselves to those duties or arts with which they are to pass their
lives.
Reply to Objection 1: The legal age for receiving the tonsure and
taking the solemn vow of religion is the age of puberty, when a man is
able to make use of his own will; but before the age of puberty it is
possible to have reached the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be
educated in a religious house.
Reply to Objection 2: The religious state is chiefly directed to the
attachment of perfection, as stated above ([3844]Q[186], A[1], ad 4);
and accordingly it is becoming to children, who are easily drawn to it.
But as a consequence it is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as
occasions of sin are removed by religious observances, as stated above
([3845]Q[186], A[1], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 3: Even as children are not bound to take oaths (as
the canon states), so are they not bound to take vows. If, however,
they bind themselves by vow or oath to do something, they are bound in
God's sight, if they have the use of reason, but they are not bound in
the sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen.
Reply to Objection 4: A woman who has not reached the age of puberty is
not rebuked (Num. 30:4) for taking a vow without her parents' consent:
but the vow can be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that
she does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand that she
binds herself by vow, so far as she may, without prejudice to her
parents' authority.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference
to one's parents?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought to be withdrawn from entering
religion through deference to one's parents. For it is not lawful to
omit that which is of obligation in order to do that which is optional.
Now deference to one's parents comes under an obligation of the precept
concerning the honoring of our parents (Ex. 20:12); wherefore the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:4): "If any widow have children or
grandchildren, let her learn first to govern her own house, and to make
a return of duty to her parents." But the entrance to religion is
optional. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to omit deference
to one's parents for the sake of entering religion.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly the subjection of a son to his father
is greater than that of a slave to his master, since sonship is
natural, while slavery results from the curse of sin, as appears from
Gn. 9:25. Now a slave cannot set aside the service of his master in
order to enter religion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals
(Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore can a son set aside
the deference due to his father in order to enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, a man is more indebted to his parents than to
those to whom he owes money. Now persons who owe money to anyone cannot
enter religion. For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5) that "those who
are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into a monastery,
when they seek admittance, unless first of all they withdraw from
public business" (Dist. liii, can. Legem.). Therefore seemingly much
less may children enter religion in despite of their duty to their
parents.
On the contrary, It is related (Mat. 4:22) that James and John "left
their nets and father, and followed our Lord." By this, says Hilary
(Can. iii in Matth.), "we learn that we who intend to follow Christ are
not bound by the cares of the secular life, and by the ties of home."
I answer that, As stated above ([3846]Q[101], A[2], ad 2) when we were
treating of piety, parents as such have the character of a principle,
wherefore it is competent to them as such to have the care of their
children. Hence it is unlawful for a person having children to enter
religion so as altogether to set aside the care for their children,
namely without providing for their education. For it is written (1 Tim.
5:8) that "if any man have not care of his own . . . he hath denied the
faith, and is worse than an infidel."
Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted by
their children, in so far, to wit, as they are placed in a condition of
necessity. Consequently we must say that when their parents are in such
need that they cannot fittingly be supported otherwise than by the help
of their children, these latter may not lawfully enter religion in
despite of their duty to their parents. If, however, the parents'
necessity be not such as to stand in great need of their children's
assistance, the latter may, in despite of the duty they owe their
parents, enter religion even against their parents' command, because
after the age of puberty every freeman enjoys freedom in things
concerning the ordering of his state of life, especially in such as
belong to the service of God, and "we should more obey the Father of
spirits that we may live [*'Shall we not much more obey the Father of
Spirits, and live?']," as says the Apostle (Heb. 12:9), than obey our
parents. Hence as we read (Mat. 8:22; Lk. 9:62) our Lord rebuked the
disciple who was unwilling to follow him forthwith on account of his
father's burial: for there were others who could see to this, as
Chrysostom remarks [*Hom. xxvii in Matth.].
Reply to Objection 1: The commandment of honoring our parents extends
not only to bodily but also to spiritual service, and to the paying of
deference. Hence even those who are in religion can fulfil the
commandment of honoring their parents, by praying for them and by
revering and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even those who
live in the world honor their parents in different ways as befits their
condition.
Reply to Objection 2: Since slavery was imposed in punishment of sin,
it follows that by slavery man forfeits something which otherwise he
would be competent to have, namely the free disposal of his person, for
"a slave belongs wholly to his master" [*Aristotle, Polit. i, 2]. On
the other hand, the son, through being subject to his father, is not
hindered from freely disposing of his person by transferring himself to
the service of God; which is most conducive to man's good.
Reply to Objection 3: He who is under a certain fixed obligation cannot
lawfully set it aside so long as he is able to fulfil it. Wherefore if
a person is under an obligation to give an account to someone or to pay
a certain fixed debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation in order
to enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and has not
wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he can, namely by
surrendering his goods to his creditor. According to civil law [*Cod.
IV, x, de Oblig. et Action, 12] money lays an obligation not on the
person of a freeman, but on his property, because the person of a
freeman "is above all pecuniary consideration" [*Dig. L, xvii, de div.
reg. Jur. ant. 106,176]. Hence, after surrendering his property, he may
lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain in the world in
order to earn the means of paying the debt.
On the other hand, he does not owe his father a special debt, except as
may arise in a case of necessity, as stated above.
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Whether parish priests may lawfully enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that parish priests cannot lawfully enter
religion. For Gregory says (Past. iii, 4) that "he who undertakes the
cure of souls, receives an awful warning in the words: 'My son, if thou
be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a
stranger'" (Prov. 6:1); and he goes on to say, "because to be surety
for a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the surety of
one's own behavior." Now he who is under an obligation to a man for a
debt, cannot enter religion, unless he pay what he owes, if he can.
Since then a priest is able to fulfil the cure of souls, to which
obligation he has pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for him to
lay aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion.
Objection 2: Further, what is lawful to one is likewise lawful to all.
But if all priests having cure of souls were to enter religion, the
people would be left without a pastor's care, which would be unfitting.
Therefore it seems that parish priests cannot lawfully enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, chief among the acts to which religious orders
are directed are those whereby a man gives to others the fruit of his
contemplation. Now such acts are competent to parish priests and
archdeacons, whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and
hear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a parish priest
or archdeacon to pass over to religion.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce
sunt leges.): "If a man, while governing the people in his church under
the bishop and leading a secular life, is inspired by the Holy Ghost to
desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical
rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we authorize him to go
freely."
I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 3;[3847] Q[88], A[12], ad 1),
the obligation of a perpetual vow stands before every other obligation.
Now it belongs properly to bishops and religious to be bound by
perpetual vow to devote themselves to the divine service [*Cf.[3848]
Q[184], A[5]], while parish priests and archdeacons are not, as bishops
are, bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to retain the cure of souls.
Wherefore bishops "cannot lay aside their bishopric for any pretext
whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pontiff" (Extra, De
Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet.): whereas archdeacons and
parish priests are free to renounce in the hands of the bishop the cure
entrusted to them, without the Pope's special permission, who alone can
dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it is evident that archdeacons
and parish priests may lawfully enter religion.
Reply to Objection 1: Parish priests and archdeacons have bound
themselves to the care of their subjects, as long as they retain their
archdeaconry or parish, but they did not bind themselves to retain
their archdeaconry or parish for ever.
Reply to Objection 2: As Jerome says (Contra Vigil.): "Although they,"
namely religious, "are sorely smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about
whom you argue, saying; 'If all shut themselves up and live in
solitude, who will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will
be able to urge sinners to virtue?' If this holds true, if all are
fools with thee, who can be wise? Nor will virginity be commendable,
for if all be virgins, and none marry, the human race will perish.
Virtue is rare, and is not desired by many." It is therefore evident
that this is a foolish alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest
the river run dry. [*St. Thomas gives no reply to the third objection,
which is sufficiently solved in the body of the article.]
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to pass from one religious order to another?
Objection 1: It seems unlawful to pass from one religious order to
another, even a stricter one. For the Apostle says (Heb. 10:25): "Not
forsaking our assembly, as some are accustomed"; and a gloss observes:
"Those namely who yield through fear of persecution, or who presuming
on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or of the imperfect,
that they may appear to be righteous." Now those who pass from one
religious order to another more perfect one would seem to do this.
Therefore this is seemingly unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, the profession of monks is stricter than that of
canons regular (Extra, De Statu Monach. et Canonic. Reg., cap. Quod Dei
timorem). But it is unlawful for anyone to pass from the state of canon
regular to the monastic state. For it is said in the Decretals (XIX,
qu. iii, can. Mandamus): "We ordain and without any exception forbid
any professed canon regular to become a monk, unless (which God forbid)
he have fallen into public sin." Therefore it would seem unlawful for
anyone to pass from one religious order to another of higher rank.
Objection 3: Further, a person is bound to fulfil what he has vowed, as
long as he is able lawfully to do so; thus if a man has vowed to
observe continence, he is bound, even after contracting marriage by
words in the present tense, to fulfil his vow so long as the marriage
is not consummated, because he can fulfil the vow by entering religion.
Therefore if a person may lawfully pass from one religious order to
another, he will be bound to do so if he vowed it previously while in
the world. But this would seem objectionable, since in many cases it
might give rise to scandal. Therefore a religious may not pass from one
religious order to another stricter one.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XX, qu. iv, can.
Virgines): "If sacred virgins design for the good of their soul to pass
to another monastery on account of a stricter life, and decide to
remain there, the holy synod allows them to do so": and the same would
seem to apply to any religious. Therefore one may lawfully pass from
one religious order to another.
I answer that, It is not commendable to pass from one religious order
to another: both because this frequently gives scandal to those who
remain; and because, other things being equal, it is easier to make
progress in a religious order to which one is accustomed than in one to
which one is not habituated. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers
(Coll. xiv, 5) Abbot Nesteros says: "It is best for each one that he
should, according to the resolve he has made, hasten with the greatest
zeal and care to reach the perfection of the work he has undertaken,
and nowise forsake the profession he has chosen." And further on he
adds (cap. 6) by way of reason: "For it is impossible that one and the
same man should excel in all the virtues at once, since if he endeavor
to practice them equally, he will of necessity, while trying to attain
them all, end in acquiring none of them perfectly": because the various
religious orders excel in respect of various works of virtue.
Nevertheless one may commendably pass from one religious order to
another for three reasons. First, through zeal for a more perfect
religious life, which excellence depends, as stated above
([3849]Q[188], A[6]), not merely on severity, but chiefly on the end to
which a religious order is directed, and secondarily on the discretion
whereby the observances are proportionate to the due end. Secondly, on
account of a religious order falling away from the perfection it ought
to have: for instance, if in a more severe religious order, the
religious begin to live less strictly, it is commendable for one to
pass even to a less severe religious order if the observance is better.
Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xix, 3,5,6) Abbot John
says of himself that he had passed from the solitary life, in which he
was professed, to a less severe life, namely of those who lived in
community, because the hermetical life had fallen into decline and
laxity. Thirdly, on account of sickness or weakness, the result of
which sometimes is that one is unable to keep the ordinances of a more
severe religious order, though able to observe those of a less strict
religion.
There is, however, a difference in these three cases. For in the first
case one ought, on account of humility, to seek permission: yet this
cannot be denied, provided it be certain that this other religion is
more severe. "And if there be a probable doubt about this, one should
ask one's superior to decide" (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad
Relig., cap. Licet.). In like manner the superior's decision should be
sought in the second case. In the third case it is also necessary to
have a dispensation.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who pass to a stricter religious order, do
so not out of presumption that they may appear righteous, but out of
devotion, that they may become more righteous.
Reply to Objection 2: Religious orders whether of monks or of canons
regular are destined to the works of the contemplative life. Chief
among these are those which are performed in the divine mysteries, and
these are the direct object of the orders of canons regular, the
members of which are essentially religious clerics. On the other hand,
monastic religious are not essentially clerics, according to the
Decretals (XVI, qu. i, cap. Alia causa). Hence although monastic orders
are more severe, it would be lawful, supposing the members to be lay
monks, to pass from the monastic order to an order of canons regular,
according to the statement of Jerome (Ep. cxxv, ad Rustic. Monach.):
"So live in the monastery as to deserve to become a cleric"; but not
conversely, as expressed in the Decretal quoted (XIX, qu. iii). If,
however, the monks be clerics devoting themselves to the sacred
ministry, they have this in common with canons regular coupled with
greater severity, and consequently it will be lawful to pass from an
order of canons regular to a monastic order, provided withal that one
seek the superior's permission (XIX, qu. iii; cap. Statuimus).
Reply to Objection 3: The solemn vow whereby a person is bound to a
less strict order, is more binding than the simple vow whereby a person
is bound to a stricter order. For if after taking a simple vow a person
were to be married, his marriage would not be invalid, as it would be
after his taking a solemn vow. Consequently a person who is professed
in a less severe order is not bound to fulfil a simple vow he has taken
on entering a more severe order.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that no one ought to induce others to enter
religion. For the blessed Benedict prescribes in his Rule (lviii) that
"those who seek to enter religion must not easily be admitted, but
spirits must be tested whether they be of God"; and Cassian has the
same instruction (De Inst. Caenob. iv, 3). Much less therefore is it
lawful to induce anyone to enter religion.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 23:15): "Woe to you . . .
because you go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte,
and when he is made you make him the child of hell twofold more than
yourselves." Now thus would seem to do those who induce persons to
enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy.
Objection 3: Further, no one should induce another to do what is to his
prejudice. But those who are induced to enter religion, sometimes take
harm therefrom, for sometimes they are under obligation to enter a
stricter religion. Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to induce
others to enter religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 26:3, seqq. [*St. Thomas quotes the
sense, not the words]): "Let one curtain draw the other." Therefore one
man should draw another to God's service.
I answer that, Those who induce others to enter religion not only do
not sin, but merit a great reward. For it is written (James 5:20): "He
who causeth a sinner to be converted from the error of his way, shall
save his soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins"; and
(Dan. 12:3): "They that instruct many to justice shall be as stars for
all eternity."
Nevertheless such inducement may be affected by a threefold
inordinateness. First, if one person force another by violence to enter
religion: and this is forbidden in the Decretals (XX, qu. iii, cap.
Praesens). Secondly, if one person persuade another simoniacally to
enter religion, by giving him presents: and this is forbidden in the
Decretal (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). But this does not apply to the
case where one provides a poor person with necessaries by educating him
in the world for the religious life; or when without any compact one
gives a person little presents for the sake of good fellowship.
Thirdly, if one person entices another by lies: for it is to be feared
that the person thus enticed may turn back on finding himself deceived,
and thus "the last state of that man" may become "worse than the first"
(Lk. 11:26).
Reply to Objection 1: Those who are induced to enter religion have
still a time of probation wherein they make a trial of the hardships of
religion, so that they are not easily admitted to the religious life.
Reply to Objection 2: According to Hilary (Can. xxiv in Matth.) this
saying of our Lord was a forecast of the wicked endeavors of the Jews,
after the preaching of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to
observe the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of hell,
because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former sins which they
committed while adherents of Judaism, and furthermore they incurred the
guilt of Jewish perfidy; and thus interpreted these words have nothing
to do with the case in point.
According to Jerome, however, in his commentary on this passage of
Matthew, the reference is to the Jews even at the time when it was yet
lawful to keep the legal observances, in so far as he whom they
converted to Judaism "from paganism, was merely misled; but when he saw
the wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and becoming
a pagan deserved greater punishment for his treachery." Hence it is
manifest that it is not blameworthy to draw others to the service of
God or to the religious life, but only when one gives a bad example to
the person converted, whence he becomes worse.
Reply to Objection 3: The lesser is included in the greater. Wherefore
a person who is bound by vow or oath to enter a lesser order, may be
lawfully induced to enter a greater one. unless there be some special
obstacle, such as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress in
the lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow or oath to
enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced to enter a lesser
order, except for some special and evident motive, and then with the
superior's dispensation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many
,
and previously deliberating for a long time?
Objection 1: It would not seem praiseworthy to enter religion without
taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time.
For it is written (1 Jn. 4:1): "Believe not every spirit, but try the
spirits if they be of God." Now sometimes a man's purpose of entering
religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught through his
leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts 5:38,39): "If this
counsel or this work be of God, you cannot overthrow it." Therefore it
would seem that one ought to make a searching inquiry before entering
religion.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 25:9): "Treat thy cause with
thy friend." Now a man's cause would seem to be especially one that
concerns a change in his state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought
not to enter religion without discussing the matter with one's friends.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord (Lk. 14:28) in making a comparison with
a man who has a mind to build a tower, says that he doth "first sit
down and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether he have
wherewithal to finish it," lest he become an object of mockery, for
that "this man began to build and was not able to finish." Now the
wherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Laetum
ccxliii), is nothing less than that "each one should renounce all his
possessions." Yet it happens sometimes that many cannot do this, nor
keep other religious observances; and in signification of this it is
stated (1 Kings 17:39) that David could not walk in Saul's armor, for
he was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to
enter religion without long deliberation beforehand and taking counsel
of many.
On the contrary, It is stated (Mat. 4:20) that upon our Lord's calling
them, Peter and Andrew "immediately leaving their nets, followed Him."
Here Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.): "Such obedience as this does
Christ require of us, that we delay not even for a moment."
I answer that, Long deliberation and the advice of many are required in
great matters of doubt, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3); while
advice is unnecessary in matters that are certain and fixed. Now with
regard to entering religion three points may be considered. First, the
entrance itself into religion, considered by itself; and thus it is
certain that entrance into religion is a greater good, and to doubt
about this is to disparage Christ Who gave this counsel. Hence
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. c, 2): "The East," that is Christ,
"calleth thee, and thou turnest to the West," namely mortal and
fallible man. Secondly, the entrance into religion may be considered in
relation to the strength of the person who intends to enter. And here
again there is no room for doubt about the entrance to religion, since
those who enter religion trust not to be able to stay by their own
power, but by the assistance of the divine power, according to Is.
40:31, "They that hope in the Lord shall renew their strength, they
shall take wings as eagles, they shall run and not be weary, they shall
walk and not faint." Yet if there be some special obstacle (such as
bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or the like) in such cases a man
must deliberate and take counsel with such as are likely to help and
not hinder him. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 37:12): "Treat with a man
without religion concerning holiness [*The Douay version supplies the
negative: 'Treat not . . . nor with . . . '], with an unjust man
concerning justice," meaning that one should not do so, wherefore the
text goes on (Ecclus. 37:14,15), "Give no heed to these in any matter
of counsel, but be continually with a holy man." In these matters,
however, one should not take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says
(Ep. and Paulin. liii): "Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than
loosen the rope that holds the boat to the shore." Thirdly, we may
consider the way of entering religion, and which order one ought to
enter, and about such matters also one may take counsel of those who
will not stand in one's way.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying: "Try the spirits, if they be of God,"
applies to matters admitting of doubt whether the spirits be of God;
thus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who offers
himself to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved by
hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether he be moved by
the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion there can be
no doubt but that the purpose of entering religion to which his heart
has given birth is from the spirit of God, for it is His spirit "that
leads" man "into the land of uprightness" (Ps. 142:10).
Nor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn back; since
not all that is of God is incorruptible: else corruptible creatures
would not be of God, as the Manicheans hold, nor could some who have
grace from God lose it, which is also heretical. But God's "counsel"
whereby He makes even things corruptible and changeable, is
imperishable according to Is. 46:10, "My counsel shall stand and all My
will shall be done." Hence the purpose of entering religion needs not
to be tried whether it be of God, because "it requires no further
demonstration," as a gloss says on 1 Thess. 5:21, "Prove all things."
Reply to Objection 2: Even as "the flesh lusteth against the spirit"
(Gal. 5:17), so too carnal friends often thwart our spiritual progress,
according to Mic. 7:6, "A man's enemies are they of his own household."
Wherefore Cyril expounding Lk. 9:61, "Let me first take my leave of
them that are at my house," says [*Cf. St. Thomas's Catena Aurea]: "By
asking first to take his leave of them that were at his house, he shows
he was somewhat of two minds. For to communicate with his neighbors,
and consult those who are unwilling to relish righteousness, is an
indication of weakness and turning back. Hence he hears our Lord say:
'No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for
the kingdom of God,' because he looks back who seeks delay in order to
go home and confer with his kinsfolk."
Reply to Objection 3: The building of the tower signifies the
perfection of Christian life; and the renunciation of one's possessions
is the wherewithal to build this tower. Now no one doubts or
deliberates about wishing to have the wherewithal, or whether he is
able to build the tower if he have the wherewithal, but what does come
under deliberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it need
not be a matter of deliberation whether one ought to renounce all that
one has, or whether by so doing one may be able to attain to
perfection; whereas it is a matter of deliberation whether that which
one is doing amounts to the renunciation of all that he has, since
unless he does renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot,
as the text goes on to state, be Christ's disciple, and this is to
build the tower.
The misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they may be able to
attain to perfection by entering religion is shown by many examples to
be unreasonable. Hence Augustine says (Confess. viii, 11): "On that
side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, there
appeared to me the chaste dignity of continency . . . honestly alluring
me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to receive and embrace
me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples. There were so
many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth and every age,
grave widows and aged virgins . . . And she smiled at me with a
persuasive mockery as though to say: Canst not thou what these youths
and these maidens can? Or can they either in themselves, and not rather
in the Lord their God? . . . Why standest thou in thyself, and so
standest not? Cast thyself upon Him; fear not, He will not withdraw
Himself that thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself fearlessly upon Him: He
will receive and will heal thee."
The example quoted of David is not to the point, because "the arms of
Saul," as a gloss on the passage observes, "are the sacraments of the
Law, as being burdensome": whereas religion is the sweet yoke of
Christ, for as Gregory says (Moral. iv, 33), "what burden does He lay
on the shoulders of the mind, Who commands us to shun all troublesome
desires, Who warns us to turn aside from the rough paths of this
world?"
To those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon themselves He promises
the refreshment of the divine fruition and the eternal rest of their
souls.
To which may He Who made this promise bring us, Jesus Christ our Lord,
"Who is over all things God blessed for ever. Amen."
__________________________________________________________________
THIRD PART (TP) OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA (QQ[1]-90)
__________________________________________________________________
PROLOGUE
Forasmuch as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to "save His
people from their sins" (Mat. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed
unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to
the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to
complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of
human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the
consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by
Him on the human race.
Concerning this we must consider (1) the Saviour Himself; (2) the
sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of immortal
life to which we attain by the resurrection.
Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs: the first, about
the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our
salvation; the second, about such things as were done and suffered by
our Saviour---i.e. God incarnate.
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION (QQ[1]-59)
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE FITNESS OF THE INCARNATION (SIX ARTICLES)
Concerning the first, three things occur to be considered: first, the
fitness of the Incarnation; secondly, the mode of union of the Word
Incarnate; thirdly, what follows this union.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is fitting for God to become incarnate?
(2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race?
(3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have become incarnate?
(4) Whether He became incarnate to take away original sin rather than
actual?
(5) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the
beginning of the world?
(6) Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of
the world?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for God to become
incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of goodness,
it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity. But from
all eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting
for Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting for God
to become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are
infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were
"to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head
of a man" [*Horace, Ars. Poet., line 1]. But God and flesh are
infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and flesh is most
composite---especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that
God should be united to human flesh.
Objection 3: Further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as
evil is from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God,
Who is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not
fitting that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body.
Objection 4: Further, it is not becoming that He Who surpassed the
greatest things should be contained in the least, and He upon Whom
rests the care of great things should leave them for lesser things. But
God---Who takes care of the whole world---the whole universe of things
cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfitting that "He should be
hid under the frail body of a babe in swathing bands, in comparison
with Whom the whole universe is accounted as little; and that this
Prince should quit His throne for so long, and transfer the government
of the whole world to so frail a body," as Volusianus writes to
Augustine (Ep. cxxxv).
On the contrary, It would seem most fitting that by visible things the
invisible things of God should be made known; for to this end was the
whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20):
"For the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made." But, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 1), by the mystery of the Incarnation are made known at
once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might of
God---"His goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own
handiwork; His justice, since, on man's defeat, He caused the tyrant to
be overcome by none other than man, and yet He did not snatch men
forcibly from death; His wisdom, for He found a suitable discharge for
a most heavy debt; His power, or infinite might, for there is nothing
greater than for God to become incarnate . . ."
I answer that, To each things, that is befitting which belongs to it by
reason of its very nature; thus, to reason befits man, since this
belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very nature
of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence,
what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to
the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain
from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it belongs to the essence of the
highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the
creature, and this is brought about chiefly by "His so joining created
nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three---the Word,
a soul and flesh," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii). Hence it is
manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate.
Reply to Objection 1: The mystery of the Incarnation was not completed
through God being changed in any way from the state in which He had
been from eternity, but through His having united Himself to the
creature in a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself.
But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is mutable, should
not always be in one way. And therefore, as the creature began to be,
although it had not been before, so likewise, not having been
previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him.
Reply to Objection 2: To be united to God in unity of person was not
fitting to human flesh, according to its natural endowments, since it
was above its dignity; nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason
of His infinite goodness, should unite it to Himself for man's
salvation.
Reply to Objection 3: Every mode of being wherein any creature
whatsoever differs from the Creator has been established by God's
wisdom, and is ordained to God's goodness. For God, Who is uncreated,
immutable, and incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures
for His own goodness. And so also the evil of punishment was
established by God's justice for God's glory. But evil of fault is
committed by withdrawing from the art of the Divine wisdom and from the
order of the Divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God
to assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty,
but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault.
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine replies (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii):
"The Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human
flesh as either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were,
contract within this frail body, the care of governing the universe.
This is the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal things
. . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the greatness of
His might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor, if the passing
word of a man is heard at once by many, and wholly by each, is it
incredible that the abiding Word of God should be everywhere at once?"
Hence nothing unfitting arises from God becoming incarnate.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Wor
d
of God should become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for the reparation
of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate. For
since the Word of God is perfect God, as has been said ([3850]FP, Q[4],
AA[1],2), no power was added to Him by the assumption of flesh.
Therefore, if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature. He could
also have restored it without assuming flesh.
Objection 2: Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had
fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should
satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for
God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is more
inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act of sin to
man's charge, so He ought to credit him with the contrary act.
Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature that
the Word of God should become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, to revere God pertains especially to man's
salvation; hence it is written (Mal. 1:6): "If, then, I be a father,
where is my honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear?" But men
revere God the more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far
beyond man's senses, hence (Ps. 112:4) it is written: "The Lord is high
above all nations, and His glory above the heavens"; and farther on:
"Who is as the Lord our God?" which pertains to reverence. Therefore it
would seem unfitting to man's salvation that God should be made like
unto us by assuming flesh.
On the contrary, What frees the human race from perdition is necessary
for the salvation of man. But the mystery of the Incarnation is such;
according to Jn. 3:16: "God so loved the world as to give His
only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but
may have life everlasting." Therefore it was necessary for man's
salvation that God should become incarnate.
I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two
ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary
for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained
better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In
the first way it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for
the restoration of human nature. For God with His omnipotent power
could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second
way it was necessary that God should become incarnate for the
restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 10):
"We shall also show that other ways were not wanting to God, to Whose
power all things are equally subject; but that there was not a more
fitting way of healing our misery."
Now this may be viewed with respect to our "furtherance in good."
First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing
God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): "In
order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the
Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established
and founded faith." Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby
greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "Nothing
was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply God
loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that
the Son of God should become a partner with us of human nature?"
Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this;
hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): "What greater cause is
there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for us?" And he
afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten
to love in return." Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He
set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp.):
"Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be
followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that
He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown
to man." Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the
Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and
this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a
sermon (xiii de Temp.): "God was made man, that man might be made God."
So also was this useful for our "withdrawal from evil." First, because
man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor
him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17):
"Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let
not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they
have no bodies." Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is
man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says
(De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a place human
nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a
true man." And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): "Learn,
O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature,
refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness." Thirdly,
because, "in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God
is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because "man's pride,
which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be
convinced and cured by humility so great," as Augustine says in the
same place. Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin,
which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such
a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus
Christ," and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man
could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not
bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and
man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon: "Weakness is assumed by
strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that
one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in
the other---for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He
would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not
have set an example."
And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's
apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason has to do with the first kind of
necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two
ways---first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to
make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human
nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or
persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole
of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind
of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the
greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for
condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one
satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man.
Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient,
imperfectly---i.e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it,
even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes
some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that
satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction
of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty;
and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which
is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary,
inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly
drew us to know Him.
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Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still
have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also
remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other things
are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides absolution
from sin"; and these were discussed above [3851](A[2]). Therefore if
man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power
to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect.
But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is
finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the
Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested
in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are
united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in
this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch
as the last creature---viz. man---is united to the first
principle---viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would
have become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, human nature has not been made more capable of
grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which
is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature
would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from
human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not
sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 4: Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said
of Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who was predestined the Son of God in power."
Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should
become incarnate, in order to fulfil God's predestination.
Objection 5: Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to
the first man, as is plain from Gn. 2:23. "This now is bone of my
bones," etc. which the Apostle says is "a great sacrament . . . in
Christ and in the Church," as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could
not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels
could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even
if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding
what is set down in Lk. 19:10, "For the Son of Man is come to seek and
to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had not sinned, the
Son of Man would not have come." And on 1 Tim. 1:15, "Christ Jesus came
into this world to save sinners," a gloss says, "There was no cause of
Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away
diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine."
I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For
some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have
become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent
ought rather to be given to this opinion.
For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's
due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred
Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since
everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned
as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to
say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy
for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have
been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not
existed, God could have become incarnate.
Reply to Objection 1: All the other causes which are assigned in the
preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not
sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and
would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in
order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on
deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that
God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the
remedy of salvation. Hence, on Jn. 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh,"
St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): "Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals
thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh."
Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode
of production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the
perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural
manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God
in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: A double capability may be remarked in human
nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is
always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its
natural capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine
power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak
of pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capabilities,
otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is
false, as stated above ([3852]FP, Q[105], A[6]). But there is no reason
why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after
sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good
therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace
did more abound." Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we
say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer!"
Reply to Objection 4: Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of
future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to
be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the
work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to
one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the
Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being
fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows
the cause.
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Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than
to take away original sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for
actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the
sin, the more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God became
incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the
lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says (Contra
Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed
to taking away actual sins.
Objection 2: Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but
merely pain of loss, as has been shown ([3853]FS, Q[87], A[5]). But
Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction
for sins---and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the
beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away
actual sin rather than original sin.
Objection 3: Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii,
3): "This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the
benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though
they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself
alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: 'Christ . . . loved me and
delivered Himself for me.'" But our individual sins are actual sins;
for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have this
conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual sins.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God,
behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world."
I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this world not only
to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but
also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that
all are taken away (and this is from men's fault, inasmuch as they do
not adhere to Christ, according to Jn. 3:19: "The light is come into
the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light"), but because
He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is
written (Rom. 5:15-16): "But not as the offense, so also the gift . . .
For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many
offenses unto justification."
Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ
come to blot it out. But "greater" is said in two ways: in one way
"intensively," as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and
in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more of
the nature of voluntary, as has been shown ([3854]FS, Q[81], A[1]). In
another way a thing is said to be greater "extensively," as whiteness
on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and in this way
original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater than
any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this respect
Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch as "the
good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an
individual," as is said Ethic. i, 2.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatness of
sin.
Reply to Objection 2: In the future award the pain of sense will not be
meted out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst,
death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from
original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original
sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and
the like in Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6):
"The Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's
gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but
that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does
it matter that they are given to others, if what are given to you are
as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to another than
yourself?" And hence, although a man ought to account Christ's gifts as
given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given to
others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of
the whole nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the
nature is as perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him
alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to
all ought to be accounted his own by each one.
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Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of
the human race?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was fitting that God should become
incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the
Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to
Eph. 2:4,5: "But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity
wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath
quickened us together in Christ." But charity does not tarry in
bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to
Prov. 3:28: "Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I
will give to thee, when thou canst give at present." Therefore God
ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought
thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): "Christ Jesus came
into this world to save sinners." But more would have been saved had
God become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the
various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in their
sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
Objection 3: Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the
work of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as
Boethius says (De Consol. iii). Therefore the work of Christ ought to
have been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of the
Incarnation we see the perfection of grace, according to Jn. 1:14: "The
Word was made flesh"; and afterwards it is added: "Full of grace and
truth." Therefore Christ ought to have become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): "But when the fulness of the
time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law":
upon which a gloss says that "the fulness of the time is when it was
decreed by God the Father to send His Son." But God decreed everything
by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most fitting time;
and it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
I answer that, Since the work of the Incarnation is principally
ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it
is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race before sin. For medicine is given only to
the sick. Hence our Lord Himself says (Mat. 9:12,13): "They that are in
health need not a physician, but they that are ill . . . For I am not
come to call the just, but sinners."
Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after
sin. First, on account of the manner of man's sin, which had come of
pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might be
humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the
words in Gal. 3:19, "Being ordained by angels in the hand of a
mediator," a gloss says: "With great wisdom was it so ordered that the
Son of Man should not be sent immediately after man's fall. For first
of all God left man under the natural law, with the freedom of his
will, in order that he might know his natural strength; and when he
failed in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of the
law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so that having
recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician, and beseech
the aid of grace."
Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we
proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor.
15:46,47): "Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which
is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual . . . The first man was
of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly."
Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate Word, for on the
words (Gal. 4:4), "But when the fulness of the time was come," a gloss
says: "The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous was the
band of heralds who ought to have preceded him."
Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the length of time,
for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world. Hence
(Lk. 18:8) it is written: "But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh,
shall He find think you, faith on earth?"
Reply to Objection 1: Charity does not put off bringing assistance to a
friend: always bearing in mind the circumstances as well as the state
of the persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the
very outset of the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt
rather than benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human
race the remedy of the Incarnation in the beginning, lest they should
despise it through pride, if they did not already recognize their
disease.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine replies to this (De Sex Quest. Pagan.,
Ep. cii), saying ([3855]Q[2]) that "Christ wished to appear to man and
to have His doctrine preached to them when and where He knew those were
who would believe in Him. But in such times and places as His Gospel
was not preached He foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so
bear themselves towards His preaching as not to believe in His
corporeal presence, even were He to raise the dead." But the same
Augustine, taking exception to this reply in his book (De Perseverantia
ix), says: "How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not
believe when such great wonders were wrought in their midst, or would
not have believed had they been wrought, when God Himself bears witness
that they would have done penance with great humility if these signs of
Divine power had been wrought in their midst?" And he adds in answer
(De Perseverantia xi): "Hence, as the Apostle says (Rom. 9:16), 'it is
not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that
showeth mercy'; Who (succors whom He will of) those who, as He foresaw,
would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst them, (while others)
He succors not, having judged them in His predestination secretly yet
justly. Therefore let us unshrinkingly believe His mercy to be with
those who are set free, and His truth with those who are condemned."
[*The words in brackets are not in the text of St. Augustine].
Reply to Objection 3: Perfection is prior to imperfection, both in time
and nature, in things that are different (for what brings others to
perfection must itself be perfect); but in one and the same,
imperfection is prior in time though posterior in nature. And thus the
eternal perfection of God precedes in duration the imperfection of
human nature; but the latter's ultimate perfection in union with God
follows.
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Whether the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the
world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the work of the Incarnation ought to
have been put off till the end of the world. For it is written (Ps.
91:11): "My old age in plentiful mercy"---i.e. "in the last days," as a
gloss says. But the time of the Incarnation is especially the time of
mercy, according to Ps. 101:14: "For it is time to have mercy on it."
Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of
the world.
Objection 2: Further, as has been said (A[5], ad 3), in the same
subject, perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore,
what is most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest
perfection of human nature is in the union with the Word, because "in
Christ it hath pleased the Father that all the fulness of the Godhead
should dwell," as the Apostle says (Col. 1:19, and 2:9). Therefore the
Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.
Objection 3: Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by
two. But the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was
sufficient for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not
necessary for Him to come beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the
Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.
On the contrary, It is written (Hab. 3:2): "In the midst of the years
Thou shalt make it known." Therefore the mystery of the Incarnation
which was made known to the world ought not to have been put off till
the end of the world.
I answer that, As it was not fitting that God should become incarnate
at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting that the
Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And this is
shown first from the union of the Divine and human nature. For, as it
has been said (A[5], ad 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time in
one way, and contrariwise in another way imperfection precedes
perfection. For in that which is made perfect from being imperfect,
imperfection precedes perfection in time, whereas in that which is the
efficient cause of perfection, perfection precedes imperfection in
time. Now in the work of the Incarnation both concur; for by the
Incarnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection; and in
this way it was not becoming that the Incarnation should take place at
the beginning of the human race. And the Word incarnate is the
efficient cause of the perfection of human nature, according to Jn.
1:16: "Of His fulness we have all received"; and hence the work of the
Incarnation ought not to have been put off till the end of the world.
But the perfection of glory to which human nature is to be finally
raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the end of the world.
Secondly, from the effect of man's salvation; for, as is said Qq. Vet
et Nov. Test., qu. 83, "it is in the power of the Giver to have pity
when, or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was
fitting to succor, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the
feebleness of the human race men's knowledge of God began to grow dim
and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of
the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and later on when
reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because
the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and
they who received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, God
sent His Son, to grant to all remission of their sin and to offer them,
justified, to God the Father." But if this remedy had been put off till
the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all
uprightness of morals would have been swept away from the earth.
Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine power,
which has saved men in several ways---not only by faith in some future
thing, but also by faith in something present and past.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which
leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown
the human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as
Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be
compared to the youth of the human race, "on account of the strength
and fervor of faith, which works by charity"; and to old age---i.e. the
sixth age---on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came in
the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together in a
body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account of
quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine says
elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that "it was not becoming that the
Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the
highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth." But
in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that Christ came
in the sixth age---i.e. in the old age---of the human race.
Reply to Objection 2: The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not
as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection,
but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been
said.
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says on Jn. 3:11, "For God sent not
His Son into the world to judge the world" (Hom. xxviii): "There are
two comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the
second, to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have
perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God."
Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in mercy
till the end of the world.
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OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and,
first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the
nature assumed.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature?
(2) Whether it took place in the Person?
(3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?
(4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the
Incarnation?
(5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ?
(6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally?
(7) Whether the union itself is something created?
(8) Whether it is the same as assumption?
(9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union?
(10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about
by grace?
(11) Whether any merits preceded it?
(12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?
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Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took
place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the
Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two
natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God"; and this could
not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union
of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.
Objection 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and
the flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form
a certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature.
Objection 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the
other unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the
Divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other;
for Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part
ii, act. 1) that the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory
Nazianzen says (Ep. i ad Cledon.) that the human nature is "deified,"
as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11). Therefore from two
natures one seems to have resulted.
On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Council of
Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son
of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change,
without division, without separation---the distinction of natures not
having been taken away by the union." Therefore the union did not take
place in the nature.
I answer that, To make this question clear we must consider what is
"nature." Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from
nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the
begetting of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting
forth," the word "natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura." Afterwards
this word "nature" was taken to signify the principle of this
begetting; and because in living things the principle of generation is
an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was further employed to
signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii) that "nature is the principle of motion in that in which it
is essentially and not accidentally." Now this principle is either form
or matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter.
And because the end of natural generation, in that which is generated,
is the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, this
essence of the species is called the "nature." And thus Boethius
defines nature (De Duab. Nat.): "Nature is what informs a thing with
its specific difference,"---i.e. which perfects the specific
definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the
essence, or the "what-it-is," or the quiddity of the species.
Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union of
the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of
two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which remain
in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is
composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones
brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition; and
a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and fashioned to
a figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of
confusion (which is without order) or by manner of commensuration
(which is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither
composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but accidental;
and hence it would follow that the union of the Incarnation was not
essential, but accidental, which will be disproved later on
[3856](A[6]). Secondly, because thereby we should not have an absolute
unity, but relative only, for there remain several things actually.
Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the
form of a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in
Christ, as they wish.
Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed,
as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said
that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by manner of
combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is
altogether immutable, as has been said ([3857]FP, Q[9], AA[1],2), hence
neither can it be changed into something else, since it is
incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it cannot
be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same species
with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from any of its
elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His
Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there can be no mingling
of things widely apart; for the species of one of them is absorbed,
e.g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon of wine. And hence,
since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there
could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain.
Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but
imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers
members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation.
First, because each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its
specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures
cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as
the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor
after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be
the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would
follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to
several, and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because
Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature:
since any difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is
said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).
Reply to Objection 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth
Synod (i.e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone
proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not
receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human
natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ results,
but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or substance of
the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be anathema." Hence
the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature
of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person.
Reply to Objection 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of
nature and person---results in each individual---of nature inasmuch as
the soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one
nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter
and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine
Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved ([3858]FP, Q[3],
A[8]). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there is
an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the
likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures.
Reply to Objection 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11), the
Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh
personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the
flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15,17), not
by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still
remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it
becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not
take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from
His Nature, as we said ([3859]FP, Q[39], A[1]). If, therefore, the
union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take
place in the person.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's human nature has no less dignity than
ours. But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above
([3860]FP, Q[29], A[3], ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its
proper personality, much more reason was there that Christ's should
have its proper personality.
Objection 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), a person is an
individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed an
individual human nature, for "universal human nature does not exist of
itself, but is the object of pure thought," as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its
personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the
person.
On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act. 5):
"We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into
two persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word of
God." Therefore the union took place in the person.
I answer that, Person has a different meaning from "nature." For
nature, as has been said [3861](A[1]), designates the specific essence
which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be
added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no
need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which
is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every individual
subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in
certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the
notion of the species, viz. accidents and individuating principles,
which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence
in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not
indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum
includes the nature, and in addition certain other things outside the
notion of the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole
which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and consequently
in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated
of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But
if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or
its nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really
distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called
"nature" as it is an essence, and a "suppositum" as it is subsisting.
And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in
rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than
"an individual substance of rational nature," according to Boethius.
Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person,
whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is
not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and
thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with, and
Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has
a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine
Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the Word,
and not in the nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Although in God Nature and Person are not really
distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch
as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And
because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists
in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or
change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God
took place in the person, and not in the nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity
of a thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity
and perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by
the word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something
nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of
Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us,
being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it
exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs
to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of
its union with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more
noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects.
Reply to Objection 3: The Word of God "did not assume human nature in
general, but 'in atomo'"---that is, in an individual---as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of
God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every
individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a
person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which
exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although
it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist
by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence,
too, this is signified by a "person" being defined as "an individual
substance," for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a
substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of
individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality,
because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect,
viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the
person.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or
hypostasis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not
take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): "Both the Divine and human substance are
one Son of God, but they are one thing [aliud] by reason of the Word
and another thing [aliud] by reason of the man." And Pope Leo says in
his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): "One of these is glorious with
miracles, the other succumbs under injuries." But "one" [aliud] and
"the other" [aliud] differ in suppositum. Therefore the union of the
Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum.
Objection 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a "particular
substance," as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). But it is plain that in
Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of
the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these.
Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of
the Word.
Objection 3: Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any
genus or species, as is plain from [3862]FP, Q[3], A[5]. But Christ,
inasmuch as He is made man, is contained under the species of man; for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Within the limits of our nature He came,
Who far surpasses the whole order of nature supersubstantially." Now
nothing is contained under the human species unless it be a hypostasis
of the human species. Therefore in Christ there is another hypostasis
besides the hypostasis of the Word of God; and hence the same
conclusion follows as above.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5): "In our
Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis."
I answer that, Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to
person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ, held,
nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another of man,
and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the
hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First,
because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature, viz.
rational, according to what Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), "a person is
an individual substance of rational nature"; and hence it is the same
to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a
proper person. And the holy Fathers, seeing this, condemned both in the
Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying: "If anyone seeks to
introduce into the mystery of the Incarnation two subsistences or two
persons, let him be anathema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy
Trinity, God the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of person
or subsistence." Now "subsistence" is the same as the subsisting thing,
which is proper to hypostasis, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab.
Nat.). Secondly, because if it is granted that person adds to
hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something
is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according as it
is said by some that a person is a "hypostasis distinguished by a
property pertaining to dignity." If, therefore, the union took place in
the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that the union only
took place in regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the
approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in
these terms: "If anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in
the one Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or
power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, let him be
anathema." Thirdly, because to the hypostasis alone are attributed the
operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to the
nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is
risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to be a
suppositum, because he underlies [supponitur] whatever belongs to man
and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis in
Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that whatever
pertains to man is verified of some other than the Word, e.g. that He
was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was buried. And this,
too, was condemned with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part
iii, can. 4) in these words: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or
subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic
Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or by Himself of
Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the man, taken as
distinct from the Word of God, and some of them (as if they could be
used of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be
anathema." Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by the
Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases, or two
supposita, or that the union did not take place in the hypostasis or
suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is said: "If anyone
does not confess that the Word was united to flesh in subsistence, and
that Christ with His flesh is both---to wit, God and man---let him be
anathema."
Reply to Objection 1: As accidental difference makes a thing "other"
[alterum], so essential difference makes "another thing" [aliud]. Now
it is plain that the "otherness" which springs from accidental
difference may pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created
things, since the same thing numerically can underlie different
accidents. But it does not happen in created things that the same
numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures. Hence just as
when we speak of "otherness" in regard to creatures we do not signify
diversity of suppositum, but only diversity of accidental forms, so
likewise when Christ is said to be one thing or another thing, we do
not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but diversity of
nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a letter to Chelidonius (Ep.
ci): "In the Saviour we may find one thing and another, yet He is not
one person and another. And I say 'one thing and another'; whereas, on
the contrary, in the Trinity we say one Person and another (so as not
to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing and another."
Reply to Objection 2: Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not
in every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union
with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a
hand or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is
a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or
suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz. the
whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with which
it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum.
Reply to Objection 3: In created things a singular thing is placed in a
genus or species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation,
but on account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in
composite things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say
that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature assumed,
and not by reason of the hypostasis.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether after the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ is
composite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Person of Christ is not composite.
For the Person of Christ is naught else than the Person or hypostasis
of the Word, as appears from what has been said [3863](A[2]). But in
the Word, Person and Nature do not differ, as appears from [3864]FP,
Q[39], A[1]. Therefore since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was
shown above ([3865]FP, Q[3], A[7]), it is impossible that the Person of
Christ be composite.
Objection 2: Further, all composition requires parts. But the Divine
Nature is incompatible with the notion of a part, for every part
implicates the notion of imperfection. Therefore it is impossible that
the Person of Christ be composed of two natures.
Objection 3: Further, what is composed of others would seem to be
homogeneous with them, as from bodies only a body can be composed.
Therefore if there is anything in Christ composed of the two natures,
it follows that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the
union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is contrary to
A[2].
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5), "In the
Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, but one hypostasis
composed from both."
I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two
ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even
as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or
hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the
Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one
subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of
subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as
one being subsists in two.
And thereby the solution to the first is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: This composition of a person from natures is not
so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that in
which two things concur may be said to be composed of them.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not verified in every composition, that the
thing composed is homogeneous with its component parts, but only in the
parts of a continuous thing; for the continuous is composed solely of
continuous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and body, and
neither of these is an animal.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in Christ there is any union of soul and body?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul
and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a human
hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ,
it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this was
not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal. Therefore in
Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the hypostasis of
the Word, which is contrary to [3866]AA[2],3.
Objection 2: Further, from the union of soul and body results the
nature of the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3),
that "we must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ."
Therefore there was no union of soul and body in Him.
Objection 3: Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole
purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by
the Word of God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life.
Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body.
On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated save from its
union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated, as
the Church chants: "Taking an animate body, He deigned to be born of a
Virgin" [*Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii, Lauds]. Therefore in
Christ there was a union of soul and body.
I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as
being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil. 2:7), "being
made in the likeness of a man." Now it belongs essentially to the human
species that the soul be united to the body, for the form does not
constitute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of
matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which nature
intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was
united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys
the truth of Christ's humanity.
Reply to Objection 1: This would seem to be the reason which was of
weight with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ,
viz. lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or
hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body in
mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men because the
soul and body are so united in them as to exist by themselves. But in
Christ they are united together, so as to be united to something
higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from
the union of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person
does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already
existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it therefore follow that the
union of the soul and body in Christ is of less effect than in us, for
its union with something nobler does not lessen but increases its
virtue and worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the
species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does not do so
in man, although it is of greater effect and dignity, and this because
of its union with a further and nobler perfection, viz. the rational
soul, as has been said above (A[2], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Damascene may be taken in two
ways: First, as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one
individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only
inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and
considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all
individuals. Now the Son of God did not assume human nature as it
exists in the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He would
not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said that human
nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists conceived of man
without matter. But in this way the Son of God would not have assumed
flesh, contrary to what is written (Lk. 24:39), "A spirit hath not
flesh and bones as you see Me to have." Neither can it be said that the
Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all the individuals of the
same species, otherwise He would have assumed all men. Therefore it
remains, as Damascene says further on (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He
assumed human nature "in atomo," i.e. in an individual; not, indeed, in
another individual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature,
but in the Person of the Son of God.
Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to
human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature
(viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two
natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third
something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would become
predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he adds:
"For there was not generated, neither will there ever be generated,
another Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and in the Godhead
and manhood, is perfect God and perfect man."
Reply to Objection 3: There are two principles of corporeal life: one
the effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the
principle of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for
since "in living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii, 37), just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise
the body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the
Word, Which cannot be the form of a body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human nature was united to the Word
of God accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) of the Son of
God, that He was "in habit found as a man." But habit is accidentally
associated with that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for
one of the ten predicaments or as a species of quality. Therefore human
nature is accidentally united to the Son of God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in
being comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can
come or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came
to Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it
came to Him accidentally.
Objection 3: Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the
essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a
substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the
Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not take
place in the nature, as was said above [3867](A[1]). Hence the human
nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God.
Objection 4: Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human
nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 15), that "the flesh of Christ is the instrument of
the Godhead." Therefore it seems that the human nature was united to
the Son of God accidentally.
On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates, not
substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of being. If
therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say Christ is
man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or quantity, or some
other mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope
Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): "Since Christ is perfect
God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm
that Christ as man is not a substance?"
I answer that, In evidence of this question we must know that two
heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two
natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches and
Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, so
that they confessed Christ to be "from" two natures (which were
distinct before the union), but not "in" two natures (the distinction
of nature coming to an end after the union). The second was the heresy
of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For
they held the Person of the Son of God to be distinct from the Person
of the Son of man, and said these were mutually united: first, "by
indwelling," inasmuch as the Word of God dwelt in the man, as in a
temple; secondly, "by unity of intention," inasmuch as the will of the
man was always in agreement with the will of the Word of God; thirdly,
"by operation," inasmuch as they said the man was the instrument of the
Word of God; fourthly, "by greatness of honor," inasmuch as all honor
shown to the Son of God was equally shown to the Son of man, on account
of His union with the Son of God; fifthly, "by equivocation," i.e.
communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the
Son of God. Now it is plain that these modes imply an accidental union.
But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies, through
ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in Christ, but
maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that a man,
composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his conception
assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion set down by
the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous of keeping the unity
of person, held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but
that these two were mutually separate, and were united to the Word
accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be increased. And
this is the third opinion which the Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6).
But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the
first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in
Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above
[3868](A[3]). And if stress is laid on the word "person," we must have
in mind that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the
unity of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II,
coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anathema against such a one as holds
"one person in dignity, honor and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius
foolishly wrote." But the other opinion falls into the error of
Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is no
difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the Man Christ
by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius said), or by putting on
man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; rather it says something
worse than Nestorius---to wit, that the soul and body are not united.
Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid
positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in
the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in
a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council (Constantinople
II, coll. viii, can. 5) we read: "Since the unity may be understood in
many ways, those who follow the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches,
professing the destruction of what came together" (i.e. destroying both
natures), "confess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore
and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of purpose. But
the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons,
confesses a union of the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which
is in subsistence." Therefore it is plain that the second of the three
opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which holds one
hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an
article of Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds
two hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not
to be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in
Councils.
Reply to Objection 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26):
"Examples need not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is
wholly similar is the same, and not an example, and especially in
Divine things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in
the Theology," i.e. in the Godhead of Persons, "and in the
Dispensation," i.e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the human
nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i.e. a garment, not indeed in
regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is seen by the
human nature, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch as the garment
is changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it
on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the garment.
So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word of God is ennobled,
but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 73).
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever accrues after the completion of the
being comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the
complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul
which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto the
same being, so that the body has vital being through the soul; but it
is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is other than the
being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of God from all
eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the
human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed unto one being
inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the body is assumed to the
being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch as this is of the
hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not accidentally united
to the Son of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Accident is divided against substance. Now
substance, as is plain from Metaph. v, 25, is taken in two ways: first,
for essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis---hence
the union having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that
it is not an accidental union, although the union did not take place in
the nature.
Reply to Objection 4: Not everything that is assumed as an instrument
pertains to the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is plain in the
case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is assumed into the
unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the body
of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the human nature was
assumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not into the unity of
the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that the man was
really the Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (Epist. ad
Monach. Aegyptii): "The Scripture does not affirm that this Emmanuel,"
i.e. Christ, "was assumed for the office of an instrument, but as God
truly humanized," i.e. made man. But Damascene held that the human
nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the
hypostasis.
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Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Divine and human
natures is not anything created. For there can be nothing created in
God, because whatever is in God is God. But the union is in God, for
God Himself is united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the
union is not anything created.
Objection 2: Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the
end of the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union
is terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be
judged with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is
not anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created.
Objection 3: Further, "That which is the cause of a thing being such is
still more so" (Poster. i). But man is said to be the Creator on
account of the union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing
created, but the Creator.
On the contrary, Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now this
union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the union is
something created.
I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is a relation which
we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they
come together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was said above
([3869]FP, Q[13], A[7]), every relation which we consider between God
and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the
relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but
only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in
God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is
not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human
nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is
something created.
Reply to Objection 1: This union is not really in God, but only in our
way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as
the creature is really united to God without any change in Him.
Reply to Objection 2: The specific nature of a relation, as of motion,
depends on the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere save
in a created nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a
created being.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is called Creator and is God because of the
union, inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it
does not follow that the union itself is the Creator or God, because
that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its
relation.
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Whether union is the same as assumption?
Objection 1: It would seem that union is the same as assumption. For
relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term of
assumption and union is one and the same, viz. the Divine hypostasis.
Therefore it seems that union and assumption are not different.
Objection 2: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the same thing
seems to be what unites and what assumes, and what is united and what
is assumed. But union and assumption seem to follow the action and
passion of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming and
the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as assumption.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "Union is
one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation,
and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and
humanation determine the end of copulation." But likewise assumption
does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that union
is the same as assumption.
On the contrary, The Divine Nature is said to be united, not assumed.
I answer that, As was stated above [3870](A[7]), union implies a
certain relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they
come together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are
brought about by some change; and change consists in action and
passion. Hence the "first" and principal difference between assumption
and union must be said to be that union implies the relation: whereas
assumption implies the action, whereby someone is said to assume, or
the passion, whereby something is said to be assumed. Now from this
difference another "second" difference arises, for assumption implies
"becoming," whereas union implies "having become," and therefore the
thing uniting is said to be united, but the thing assuming is not said
to be assumed. For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of
assumption unto the Divine hypostasis when man is spoken of; and hence
we can truly say that the Son of God, Who assumes human nature unto
Himself, is man. But human nature, considered in itself, i.e. in the
abstract, is viewed as assumed; and we do not say the Son of God is
human nature. From this same follows a "third" difference, which is
that a relation, especially one of equiparance, is no more to one
extreme than to the other, whereas action and passion bear themselves
differently to the agent and the patient, and to different termini. And
hence assumption determines the term whence and the term whither; for
assumption means a taking to oneself from another. But union determines
none of these things. hence it may be said indifferently that the human
nature is united with the Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature
is not said to be assumed by the human, but conversely, because the
human nature is joined to the Divine personality, so that the Divine
Person subsists in human nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Union and assumption have not the same relation
to the term, but a different relation, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: What unites and what assumes are not the same.
For whatsoever Person assumes unites, and not conversely. For the
Person of the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to
Himself; and hence He is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise
the united and the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature is
said to be united, but not assumed.
Reply to Objection 3: Assumption determines with whom the union is made
on the part of the one assuming, inasmuch as assumption means taking
unto oneself [ad se sumere], whereas incarnation and humanation
(determine with whom the union is made) on the part of the thing
assumed, which is flesh or human nature. And thus assumption differs
logically both from union and from incarnation or humanation.
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Whether the union of the two natures in Christ is the greatest of all
unions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the two natures in Christ
is not the greatest of all unions. For what is united falls short of
the unity of what is one, since what is united is by participation, but
one is by essence. Now in created things there are some that are simply
one, as is shown especially in unity itself, which is the principle of
number. Therefore the union of which we are speaking does not imply the
greatest of all unions.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the distance between things united,
the less the union. Now, the things united by this union are most
distant---namely, the Divine and human natures; for they are infinitely
apart. Therefore their union is the least of all.
Objection 3: Further, from union there results one. But from the union
of soul and body in us there arises what is one in person and nature;
whereas from the union of the Divine and human nature there results
what is one in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is
greater than that of the Divine and human natures; and hence the union
of which we speak does not imply the greatest unity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 10) that "man is in the
Son of God, more than the Son in the Father." But the Son is in the
Father by unity of essence, and man is in the Son by the union of the
Incarnation. Therefore the union of the Incarnation is greater than the
unity of the Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the greatest union;
and thus the union of the Incarnation implies the greatest unity.
I answer that, Union implies the joining of several in some one thing.
Therefore the union of the Incarnation may be taken in two ways: first,
in regard to the things united; secondly, in regard to that in which
they are united. And in this regard this union has a pre-eminence over
other unions; for the unity of the Divine Person, in which the two
natures are united, is the greatest. But it has no pre-eminence in
regard to the things united.
Reply to Objection 1: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than
numerical unity, which is the principle of number. For the unity of a
Divine Person is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity, not received
into another by participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having
in itself whatever pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it is
not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical unity, which
is a part of number, and which is shared in by the things numbered. And
hence in this respect the union of the Incarnation is higher than
numerical unity by reason of the unity of the Divine Person, and not by
reason of the human nature, which is not the unity of the Divine
Person, but is united to it.
Reply to Objection 2: This reason regards the things united, and not
the Person in Whom the union takes place.
Reply to Objection 3: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than
the unity of person and nature in us; and hence the union of the
Incarnation is greater than the union of soul and body in us.
And because what is urged in the argument "on the contrary" rests upon
what is untrue---namely, that the union of the Incarnation is greater
than the unity of the Divine Persons in Essence---we must say to the
authority of Augustine that the human nature is not more in the Son of
God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less. But the man in
some respects is more in the Son than the Son in the Father---namely,
inasmuch as the same suppositum is signified when I say "man," meaning
Christ, and when I say "Son of God"; whereas it is not the same
suppositum of Father and Son.
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Whether the union of the Incarnation took place by grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation did not
take place by grace. For grace is an accident, as was shown above
([3871]FS, Q[110], A[2]). But the union of the human nature to the
Divine did not take place accidentally, as was shown above
[3872](A[6]). Therefore it seems that the union of the Incarnation did
not take place by grace.
Objection 2: Further, the subject of grace is the soul. But it is
written (Col. 2:9): "In Christ [Vulg.: 'Him'] dwelleth all the fulness
of the Godhead corporeally." Therefore it seems that this union did not
take place by grace.
Objection 3: Further, every saint is united to God by grace. If,
therefore, the union of the Incarnation was by grace, it would seem
that Christ is said to be God no more than other holy men.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "By the same
grace every man is made a Christian, from the beginning of his faith,
as this man from His beginning was made Christ." But this man became
Christ by union with the Divine Nature. Therefore this union was by
grace.
I answer that, As was said above ([3873]FS, Q[110], A[1]), grace is
taken in two ways:--first, as the will of God gratuitously bestowing
something; secondly, as the free gift of God. Now human nature stands
in need of the gratuitous will of God in order to be lifted up to God,
since this is above its natural capability. Moreover, human nature is
lifted up to God in two ways: first, by operation, as the saints know
and love God; secondly, by personal being, and this mode belongs
exclusively to Christ, in Whom human nature is assumed so as to be in
the Person of the Son of God. But it is plain that for the perfection
of operation the power needs to be perfected by a habit, whereas that a
nature has being in its own suppositum does not take place by means of
a habit.
And hence we must say that if grace be understood as the will of God
gratuitously doing something or reputing anything as well-pleasing or
acceptable to Him, the union of the Incarnation took place by grace,
even as the union of the saints with God by knowledge and love. But if
grace be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that the human
nature is united to the Divine Person may be called a grace, inasmuch
as it took place without being preceded by any merits---but not as
though there were an habitual grace, by means of which the union took
place.
Reply to Objection 1: The grace which is an accident is a certain
likeness of the Divinity participated by man. But by the Incarnation
human nature is not said to have participated a likeness of the Divine
nature, but is said to be united to the Divine Nature itself in the
Person of the Son. Now the thing itself is greater than a participated
likeness of it.
Reply to Objection 2: Habitual grace is only in the soul; but the
grace, i.e. the free gift of God, of being united to the Divine Person
belongs to the whole human nature, which is composed of soul and body.
And hence it is said that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally
in Christ because the Divine Nature is united not merely to the soul,
but to the body also. Although it may also be said that it dwelt in
Christ corporeally, i.e. not as in a shadow, as it dwelt in the
sacraments of the old law, of which it is said in the same place (Col.
2:17) that they are the "shadow of things to come but the body is
Christ" [Vulg.: 'Christ's'], inasmuch as the body is opposed to the
shadow. And some say that the Godhead is said to have dwelt in Christ
corporeally, i.e. in three ways, just as a body has three dimensions:
first, by essence, presence, and power, as in other creatures;
secondly, by sanctifying grace, as in the saints; thirdly, by personal
union, which is proper to Christ.
Hence the reply to the third is manifest, viz. because the union of the
Incarnation did not take place by habitual grace alone, but in
subsistence or person.
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Whether any merits preceded the union of the Incarnation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation followed
upon certain merits, because upon Ps. 32:22, "Let Thy mercy, o Lord, be
upon us, as," etc. a gloss says: "Here the prophet's desire for the
Incarnation and its merited fulfilment are hinted at." Therefore the
Incarnation falls under merit.
Objection 2: Further, whoever merits anything merits that without which
it cannot be. But the ancient Fathers merited eternal life, to which
they were able to attain only by the Incarnation; for Gregory says
(Moral. xiii): "Those who came into this world before Christ's coming,
whatsoever eminency of righteousness they may have had, could not, on
being divested of the body, at once be admitted into the bosom of the
heavenly country, seeing that He had not as yet come Who, by His own
descending, should place the souls of the righteous in their
everlasting seat." Therefore it would seem that they merited the
Incarnation.
Objection 3: Further, of the Blessed Virgin it is sung that "she
merited to bear the Lord of all" [*Little Office of B. V. M., Dominican
Rite, Ant. at Benedictus], and this took place through the Incarnation.
Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "Whoever can
find merits preceding the singular generation of our Head, may also
find merits preceding the repeated regeneration of us His members." But
no merits preceded our regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: "Not by
the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He
saved us, by the laver of regeneration." Therefore no merits preceded
the generation of Christ.
I answer that, With regard to Christ Himself, it is clear from the
above [3874](A[10]) that no merits of His could have preceded the
union. For we do not hold that He was first of all a mere man, and that
afterwards by the merits of a good life it was granted Him to become
the Son of God, as Photinus held; but we hold that from the beginning
of His conception this man was truly the Son of God, seeing that He had
no other hypostasis but that of the Son of God, according to Luke 1:35:
"The Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God."
And hence every operation of this man followed the union. Therefore no
operation of His could have been meritorious of the union.
Neither could the needs of any other man whatsoever have merited this
union condignly: first, because the meritorious works of man are
properly ordained to beatitude, which is the reward of virtue, and
consists in the full enjoyment of God. Whereas the union of the
Incarnation, inasmuch as it is in the personal being, transcends the
union of the beatified mind with God, which is by the act of the soul
in fruition; and therefore it cannot fall under merit. Secondly,
because grace cannot fall under merit, for the principle of merit does
not fall under merit; and therefore neither does grace, for it is the
principle of merit. Hence, still less does the Incarnation fall under
merit, since it is the principle of grace, according to Jn. 1:17:
"Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Thirdly, because the
Incarnation is for the reformation of the entire human nature, and
therefore it does not fall under the merit of any individual man, since
the goodness of a mere man cannot be the cause of the good of the
entire nature. Yet the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation congruously
by desiring and beseeching; for it was becoming that God should harken
to those who obeyed Him.
And thereby the reply to the First Objection is manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: It is false that under merit falls everything
without which there can be no reward. For there is something
pre-required not merely for reward, but also for merit, as the Divine
goodness and grace and the very nature of man. And again, the mystery
of the Incarnation is the principle of merit, because "of His fulness
we all have received" (Jn. 1:16).
Reply to Objection 3: The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited to
bear the Lord of all; not that she merited His Incarnation, but because
by the grace bestowed upon her she merited that grade of purity and
holiness, which fitted her to be the Mother of God.
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Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of union was not natural to
the man Christ. For the union of the Incarnation did not take place in
the nature, but in the Person, as was said above [3875](A[2]). Now a
thing is denominated from its terminus. Therefore this grace ought
rather to be called personal than natural.
Objection 2: Further, grace is divided against nature, even as
gratuitous things, which are from God, are distinguished from natural
things, which are from an intrinsic principle. But if things are
divided in opposition to one another, one is not denominated by the
other. Therefore the grace of Christ was not natural to Him.
Objection 3: Further, natural is that which is according to nature. But
the grace of union is not natural to Christ in regard to the Divine
Nature, otherwise it would belong to the other Persons; nor is it
natural to Him according to the human nature, otherwise it would belong
to all men, since they are of the same nature as He. Therefore it would
seem that the grace of union is nowise natural to Christ.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "In the assumption of
human nature, grace itself became somewhat natural to that man, so as
to leave no room for sin in Him."
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), nature
designates, in one way, nativity; in another, the essence of a thing.
Hence natural may be taken in two ways: first, for what is only from
the essential principles of a thing, as it is natural to fire to mount;
secondly, we call natural to man what he has had from his birth,
according to Eph. 2:3: "We were by nature children of wrath"; and Wis.
12:10: "They were a wicked generation, and their malice natural."
Therefore the grace of Christ, whether of union or habitual, cannot be
called natural as if caused by the principles of the human nature of
Christ, although it may be called natural, as if coming to the human
nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine Nature. But these two
kinds of grace are said to be natural to Christ, inasmuch as He had
them from His nativity, since from the beginning of His conception the
human nature was united to the Divine Person, and His soul was filled
with the gift of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the union did not take place in the
nature, yet it was caused by the power of the Divine Nature, which is
truly the nature of Christ, and it, moreover, belonged to Christ from
the beginning of His nativity.
Reply to Objection 2: The union is not said to be grace and natural in
the same respect; for it is called grace inasmuch as it is not from
merit; and it is said to be natural inasmuch as by the power of the
Divine Nature it was in the humanity of Christ from His nativity.
Reply to Objection 3: The grace of union is not natural to Christ
according to His human nature, as if it were caused by the principles
of the human nature, and hence it need not belong to all men.
Nevertheless, it is natural to Him in regard to the human nature on
account of the "property" of His birth, seeing that He was conceived by
the Holy Ghost, so that He might be the natural Son of God and of man.
But it is natural to Him in regard to the Divine Nature, inasmuch as
the Divine Nature is the active principle of this grace; and this
belongs to the whole Trinity---to wit, to be the active principle of
this grace.
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OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON ASSUMING (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the union on the part of the Person assuming, and
under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether to assume is befitting to a Divine Person?
(2) Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature?
(3) Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume?
(4) Whether one Person can assume without another?
(5) Whether each Person can assume?
(6) Whether several Persons can assume one individual nature?
(7) Whether one Person can assume two individual natures?
(8) Whether it was more fitting for the Person of the Son of God to
assume human nature than for another Divine Person?
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Whether it is befitting for a Divine Person to assume?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to a Divine Person
to assume a created nature. For a Divine Person signifies something
most perfect. Now no addition can be made to what is perfect.
Therefore, since to assume is to take to oneself, and consequently what
is assumed is added to the one who assumes, it does not seem to be
befitting to a Divine Person to assume a created nature.
Objection 2: Further, that to which anything is assumed is communicated
in some degree to what is assumed to it, just as dignity is
communicated to whosoever is assumed to a dignity. But it is of the
nature of a person to be incommunicable, as was said above ([3876]FP,
Q[29], A[1]). Therefore it is not befitting to a Divine Person to
assume, i.e. to take to Himself.
Objection 3: Further, person is constituted by nature. But it is
repugnant that the thing constituted should assume the constituent,
since the effect does not act on its cause. Hence it is not befitting
to a Person to assume a nature.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii):
"This God, i.e. the only-Begotten one, took the form," i.e. the nature,
"of a servant to His own Person." But the only-Begotten God is a
Person. Therefore it is befitting to a Person to take, i.e. to assume a
nature.
I answer that, In the word "assumption" are implied two things, viz.
the principle and the term of the act, for to assume is to take
something to oneself. Now of this assumption a Person is both the
principle and the term. The principle---because it properly belongs to
a person to act, and this assuming of flesh took place by the Divine
action. Likewise a Person is the term of this assumption, because, as
was said above ([3877]Q[2], AA[1] ,2), the union took place in the
Person, and not in the nature. Hence it is plain that to assume a
nature is most properly befitting to a Person.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the Divine Person is infinite, no addition
can be made to it: Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch.
26]: "We do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be according to
addition"; just as in the union of man with God, nothing is added to
God by the grace of adoption, but what is Divine is united to man;
hence, not God but man is perfected.
Reply to Objection 2: A Divine Person is said to be incommunicable
inasmuch as It cannot be predicated of several supposita, but nothing
prevents several things being predicated of the Person. Hence it is not
contrary to the nature of person to be communicated so as to subsist in
several natures, for even in a created person several natures may
concur accidentally, as in the person of one man we find quantity and
quality. But this is proper to a Divine Person, on account of its
infinity, that there should be a concourse of natures in it, not
accidentally, but in subsistence.
Reply to Objection 3: As was said above ([3878]Q[2], A[1]), the human
nature constitutes a Divine Person, not simply, but forasmuch as the
Person is denominated from such a nature. For human nature does not
make the Son of Man to be simply, since He was from eternity, but only
to be man. It is by the Divine Nature that a Divine Person is
constituted simply. Hence the Divine Person is not said to assume the
Divine Nature, but to assume the human nature.
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Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to the Divine
Nature to assume. Because, as was said above [3879](A[1]), to assume is
to take to oneself. But the Divine Nature did not take to Itself human
nature, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said
above (Q[2], AA[1],3). Hence it is not befitting to the Divine Nature
to assume human nature.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine Nature is common to the three Persons.
If, therefore, it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume, it
consequently is befitting to the three Persons; and thus the Father
assumed human nature even as the Son, which is erroneous.
Objection 3: Further, to assume is to act. But to act befits a person,
not a nature, which is rather taken to be the principle by which the
agent acts. Therefore to assume is not befitting to the nature.
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius) says (De Fide ad Petrum ii):
"That nature which remains eternally begotten of the Father" (i.e.
which is received from the Father by eternal generation) "took our
nature free of sin from His Mother."
I answer that, As was said above [3880](A[1]), in the word assumption
two things are signified---to wit, the principle and the term of the
action. Now to be the principle of the assumption belongs to the Divine
Nature in itself, because the assumption took place by Its power; but
to be the term of the assumption does not belong to the Divine Nature
in itself, but by reason of the Person in Whom It is considered to be.
Hence a Person is primarily and more properly said to assume, but it
may be said secondarily that the Nature assumed a nature to Its Person.
And after the same manner the Nature is also said to be incarnate, not
that it is changed to flesh, but that it assumed the nature of flesh.
Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6): "Following the blessed
Athanasius and Cyril we say that the Nature of God is incarnate."
Reply to Objection 1: "Oneself" is reciprocal, and points to the same
suppositum. But the Divine Nature is not a distinct suppositum from the
Person of the Word. Hence, inasmuch as the Divine Nature took human
nature to the Person of the Word, It is said to take it to Itself. But
although the Father takes human nature to the Person of the Word, He
did not thereby take it to Himself, for the suppositum of the Father
and the Son is not one. and hence it cannot properly be said that the
Father assumes human nature.
Reply to Objection 2: What is befitting to the Divine Nature in Itself
is befitting to the three Persons, as goodness, wisdom, and the like.
But to assume belongs to It by reason of the Person of the Word, as was
said above, and hence it is befitting to that Person alone.
Reply to Objection 3: As in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the
same, so likewise in Him "what acts" and "whereby it acts" are the
same, since everything acts, inasmuch as it is a being. Hence the
Divine Nature is both that whereby God acts, and the very God Who acts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume?
Objection 1: It would seem that if we abstract the Personality by our
mind, the Nature cannot assume. For it was said above [3881](A[1]) that
it belongs to the Nature to assume by reason of the Person. But what
belongs to one by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other is
removed; as a body, which is visible by reason of color, without color
cannot be seen. Hence if the Personality be mentally abstracted, the
Nature cannot assume.
Objection 2: Further, assumption implies the term of union, as was said
above [3882](A[1]). But the union cannot take place in the nature, but
only in the Person. Therefore, if the Personality be abstracted, the
Divine Nature cannot assume.
Objection 3: Further, it has been said above ([3883]FP, Q[40], A[3])
that in the Godhead if the Personality is abstracted, nothing remains.
But the one who assumes is something. Therefore, if the Personality is
abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume.
On the contrary, In the Godhead Personality signifies a personal
property; and this is threefold, viz. Paternity, Filiation and
Procession, as was said above ([3884]FP, Q[30], A[2]). Now if we
mentally abstract these, there still remains the omnipotence of God, by
which the Incarnation was wrought, as the angel says (Lk. 1:37): "No
word shall be impossible with God." Therefore it seems that if the
Personality be removed, the Divine Nature can still assume.
I answer that, The intellect stands in two ways towards God. First, to
know God as He is, and in this manner it is impossible for the
intellect to circumscribe something in God and leave the rest, for all
that is in God is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as
regards these, if one is removed the other is taken away, since they
are distinguished by relations only which must be together at the same
time. Secondly, the intellect stands towards God, not indeed as knowing
God as He is, but in its own way, i.e. understanding manifoldly and
separately what in God is one: and in this way our intellect can
understand the Divine goodness and wisdom, and the like, which are
called essential attributes, without understanding Paternity or
Filiation, which are called Personalities. And hence if we abstract
Personality by our intellect, we may still understand the Nature
assuming.
Reply to Objection 1: Because in God "what is," and "whereby it is,"
are one, if any one of the things which are attributed to God in the
abstract is considered in itself, abstracted from all else, it will
still be something subsisting, and consequently a Person, since it is
an intellectual nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on
account of holding three personal properties, so likewise if we
mentally exclude the personal properties there will still remain in our
thought the Divine Nature as subsisting and as a Person. And in this
way It may be understood to assume human nature by reason of Its
subsistence or Personality.
Reply to Objection 2: Even if the personal properties of the three
Persons are abstracted by our mind, nevertheless there will remain in
our thoughts the one Personality of God, as the Jews consider. And the
assumption can be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in
the Person of the Word.
Reply to Objection 3: If we mentally abstract the Personality, it is
said that nothing remains by way of resolution, i.e. as if the subject
of the relation and the relation itself were distinct because all we
can think of in God is considered as a subsisting suppositum. However,
some of the things predicated of God can be understood without others,
not by way of resolution, but by the way mentioned above.
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Whether one Person without another can assume a created nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that one Person cannot assume a created
nature without another assuming it. For "the works of the Trinity are
inseparable," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxviii). But as the three
Persons have one essence, so likewise They have one operation. Now to
assume is an operation. Therefore it cannot belong to one without
belonging to another.
Objection 2: Further, as we say the Person of the Son became incarnate,
so also did the Nature; for "the whole Divine Nature became incarnate
in one of Its hypostases," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6).
But the Nature is common to the three Persons. Therefore the assumption
is.
Objection 3: Further, as the human nature in Christ is assumed by God,
so likewise are men assumed by Him through grace, according to Rom.
14:3: "God hath taken him to Him." But this assumption pertains to all
the Persons; therefore the first also.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that the mystery of the
Incarnation pertains to "discrete theology," i.e. according to which
something "distinct" is said of the Divine Persons.
I answer that, As was said above [3885](A[1]), assumption implies two
things, viz. the act of assuming and the term of assumption. Now the
act of assumption proceeds from the Divine power, which is common to
the three Persons, but the term of the assumption is a Person, as
stated above [3886](A[2]). Hence what has to do with action in the
assumption is common to the three Persons; but what pertains to the
nature of term belongs to one Person in such a manner as not to belong
to another; for the three Persons caused the human nature to be united
to the one Person of the Son.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason regards the operation, and the
conclusion would follow if it implied this operation only, without the
term, which is a Person.
Reply to Objection 2: The Nature is said to be incarnate, and to assume
by reason of the Person in Whom the union is terminated, as stated
above ([3887]AA[1],2), and not as it is common to the three Persons.
Now "the whole Divine Nature is" said to be "incarnate"; not that It is
incarnate in all the Persons, but inasmuch as nothing is wanting to the
perfection of the Divine Nature of the Person incarnate, as Damascene
explains there.
Reply to Objection 3: The assumption which takes place by the grace of
adoption is terminated in a certain participation of the Divine Nature,
by an assimilation to Its goodness, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: "That you
may be made partakers of the Divine Nature"; and hence this assumption
is common to the three Persons, in regard to the principle and the
term. But the assumption which is by the grace of union is common on
the part of the principle, but not on the part of the term, as was said
above.
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Whether each of the Divine Persons could have assumed human nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that no other Divine Person could have
assumed human nature except the Person of the Son. For by this
assumption it has been brought about that God is the Son of Man. But it
was not becoming that either the Father or the Holy Ghost should be
said to be a Son; for this would tend to the confusion of the Divine
Persons. Therefore the Father and Holy Ghost could not have assumed
flesh.
Objection 2: Further, by the Divine Incarnation men have come into
possession of the adoption of sons, according to Rom. 8:15: "For you
have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit
of adoption of sons." But sonship by adoption is a participated
likeness of natural sonship which does not belong to the Father nor the
Holy Ghost; hence it is said (Rom. 8:29): "For whom He foreknew He also
predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son."
Therefore it seems that no other Person except the Person of the Son
could have become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, the Son is said to be sent and to be begotten by
the temporal nativity, inasmuch as He became incarnate. But it does not
belong to the Father to be sent, for He is innascible, as was said
above ([3888]FP, Q[32], A[3]; [3889]FP, Q[43], A[4]). Therefore at
least the Person of the Father cannot become incarnate.
On the contrary, Whatever the Son can do, so can the Father and the
Holy Ghost, otherwise the power of the three Persons would not be one.
But the Son was able to become incarnate. Therefore the Father and the
Holy Ghost were able to become incarnate.
I answer that, As was said above ([3890]AA[1],2,4), assumption implies
two things, viz. the act of the one assuming and the term of the
assumption. Now the principle of the act is the Divine power, and the
term is a Person. But the Divine power is indifferently and commonly in
all the Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to all
the Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now
whenever a power regards several things indifferently, it can terminate
its action in any of them indifferently, as is plain in rational
powers, which regard opposites, and can do either of them. Therefore
the Divine power could have united human nature to the Person of the
Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the Person of the Son.
And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy Ghost could have
assumed flesh even as the Son.
Reply to Objection 1: The temporal sonship, whereby Christ is said to
be the Son of Man, does not constitute His Person, as does the eternal
Sonship; but is something following upon the temporal nativity. Hence,
if the name of son were transferred to the Father or the Holy Ghost in
this manner, there would be no confusion of the Divine Persons.
Reply to Objection 2: Adoptive sonship is a certain participation of
natural sonship; but it takes place in us, by appropriation, by the
Father, Who is the principle of natural sonship, and by the gift of the
Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and Son, according to Gal.
4:6: "God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts crying,
Abba, Father." And therefore, even as by the Incarnation of the Son we
receive adoptive sonship in the likeness of His natural sonship, so
likewise, had the Father become incarnate, we should have received
adoptive sonship from Him, as from the principle of the natural
sonship, and from the Holy Ghost as from the common bond of Father and
Son.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the Father to be innascible as to
eternal birth, and the temporal birth would not destroy this. But the
Son of God is said to be sent in regard to the Incarnation, inasmuch as
He is from another, without which the Incarnation would not suffice for
the nature of mission.
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Whether several Divine Persons can assume one and the same individual
nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot assume one
and the same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would
either be several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine
Nature in several Persons does not make several gods, so one human
nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor would there be
only one man, for one man is "this man," which signifies one person;
and hence the distinction of three Divine Persons would be destroyed,
which cannot be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three Persons can
take one human nature.
Objection 2: Further, the assumption is terminated in the unity of
Person, as has been said above [3891](A[2]). But the Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost are not one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot
assume one human nature.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4), and
Augustine (De Trin. i, 11,12,13), that from the Incarnation of God the
Son it follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the
Son of Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to assume one
human nature, it would follow that whatever is said of each of the
three Persons would be said of the man; and conversely, what was said
of the man could be said of each of the three Persons. Therefore what
is proper to the Father, viz. to beget the Son, would be said of the
man, and consequently would be said of the Son of God; and this could
not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three Persons should assume
one human nature.
On the contrary, The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But the
three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they can also
subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human nature be
assumed by the three Persons.
I answer that, As was said above ([3892]Q[2], A[5], ad 1), by the union
of the soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new
hypostasis, but one human nature is assumed to the Divine Person or
hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the
human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the
characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude another
from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same Person.
Hence, since in the mystery of the Incarnation "the whole reason of the
deed is the power of the doer," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum
cxxxvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the Divine
Person assuming, and not according to the quality of the human nature
assumed. Therefore it is not impossible that two or three Divine
Persons should assume one human nature, but it would be impossible for
them to assume one human hypostasis or person; thus Anselm says in the
book De Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus Homo ii, 9), that "several Persons
cannot assume one and the same man to unity of Person."
Reply to Objection 1: In the hypothesis that three Persons assume one
human nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one
man, because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say
the three Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, so
it would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human
nature. Nor would "one" imply unity of person, but unity in human
nature; for it could not be argued that because the three Persons were
one man they were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying that men,
who are many simply, are in some respect one, e.g. one people, and as
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 3): "The Spirit of God and the spirit of
man are by nature different, but by inherence one spirit results,"
according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit."
Reply to Objection 2: In this supposition the human nature would be
assumed to the unity, not indeed of one Person, but to the unity of
each Person, so that even as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with
each Person, so also the human nature would have a unity with each
Person by assumption.
Reply to Objection 3: In the mystery of the Incarnation, there results
a communication of the properties belonging to the nature, because
whatever belongs to the nature can be predicated of the Person
subsisting in that nature, no matter to which of the natures it may
apply. Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may be
predicated what belongs to the human nature and what belongs to the
Divine; and likewise of the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.
But what belongs to the Person of the Father by reason of His own
Person could not be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Ghost
on account of the distinction of Persons which would still remain.
Therefore it might be said that as the Father was unbegotten, so the
man was unbegotten, inasmuch as "man" stood for the Person of the
Father. But if one were to go on to say, "The man is unbegotten; the
Son is man; therefore the Son is unbegotten," it would be the fallacy
of figure of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is
unbegotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot conclude
that the Son is unbegotten, although He is God.
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Whether one Divine Person can assume two human natures?
Objection 1: It would seem that one Divine Person cannot assume two
human natures. For the nature assumed in the mystery of the Incarnation
has no other suppositum than the suppositum of the Divine Person, as is
plain from what has been stated above ([3893]Q[2], AA[3],6). Therefore,
if we suppose one Person to assume two human natures, there would be
one suppositum of two natures of the same species; which would seem to
imply a contradiction, for the nature of one species is only multiplied
by distinct supposita.
Objection 2: Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that the
Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not have one
human nature; neither could it be said that there were several, for
several men have distinct supposita, whereas in this case there would
be only one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is
impossible.
Objection 3: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole
Divine Nature is united to the whole nature assumed, i.e. to every part
of it, for Christ is "perfect God and perfect man, complete God and
complete man," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two human
natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the soul of one
would be united to the body of the other; and, again, two bodies would
be together, which would give rise to confusion of natures. Therefore
it is not possibly for one Divine Person to assume two human natures.
On the contrary, Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son do.
But after the Incarnation the Father can still assume a human nature
distinct from that which the Son has assumed; for in nothing is the
power of the Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of the Son.
Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can assume
another human nature distinct from the one He has assumed.
I answer that, What has power for one thing, and no more, has a power
limited to one. Now the power of a Divine Person is infinite, nor can
it be limited by any created thing. Hence it may not be said that a
Divine Person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to assume
another. For it would seem to follow from this that the Personality of
the Divine Nature was so comprehended by one human nature as to be
unable to assume another to its Personality; and this is impossible,
for the Uncreated cannot be comprehended by any creature. Hence it is
plain that, whether we consider the Divine Person in regard to His
power, which is the principle of the union, or in regard to His
Personality, which is the term of the union, it has to be said that the
Divine Person, over and beyond the human nature which He has assumed,
can assume another distinct human nature.
Reply to Objection 1: A created nature is completed in its essentials
by its form, which is multiplied according to the division of matter.
And hence, if the composition of matter and form constitutes a new
suppositum, the consequence is that the nature is multiplied by the
multiplication of supposita. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the
union of form and matter, i.e. of soul and body, does not constitute a
new suppositum, as was said above [3894](A[6]). Hence there can be a
numerical multitude on the part of the nature, on account of the
division of matter, without distinction of supposita.
Reply to Objection 2: It might seem possible to reply that in such a
hypothesis it would follow that there were two men by reason of the two
natures, just as, on the contrary, the three Persons would be called
one man, on account of the one nature assumed, as was said above (A[6],
ad 1). But this does not seem to be true; because we must use words
according to the purpose of their signification, which is in relation
to our surroundings. Consequently, in order to judge of a word's
signification or co-signification, we must consider the things which
are around us, in which a word derived from some form is never used in
the plural unless there are several supposita. For a man who has on two
garments is not said to be "two persons clothed," but "one clothed with
two garments"; and whoever has two qualities is designated in the
singular as "such by reason of the two qualities." Now the assumed
nature is, as it were, a garment, although this similitude does not fit
at all points, as has been said above ([3895]Q[2], A[6], ad 1). And
hence, if the Divine Person were to assume two human natures, He would
be called, on account of the unity of suppositum, one man having two
human natures. Now many men are said to be one people, inasmuch as they
have some one thing in common, and not on account of the unity of
suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine Persons were to assume one
singular human nature, they would be said to be one man, as stated
(A[6], ad 1), not from the unity of suppositum, but because they have
some one thing in common.
Reply to Objection 3: The Divine and human natures do not bear the same
relation to the one Divine Person, but the Divine Nature is related
first of all thereto, inasmuch as It is one with It from eternity; and
afterwards the human nature is related to the Divine Person, inasmuch
as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not indeed that the
nature is the Person, but that the Person of God subsists in human
nature. For the Son of God is His Godhead, but is not His manhood. And
hence, in order that the human nature may be assumed by the Divine
Person, the Divine Nature must be united by a personal union with the
whole nature assumed, i.e. in all its parts. Now in the two natures
assumed there would be a uniform relation to the Divine Person, nor
would one assume the other. Hence it would not be necessary for one of
them to be altogether united to the other, i.e. all the parts of one
with all the parts of the other.
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Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son rather than any othe
r
Divine Person should assume human nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not more fitting that the Son of
God should become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Ghost. For by
the mystery of the Incarnation men are led to the true knowledge of
God, according to Jn. 18:37: "For this was I born, and for this came I
into the world, to give testimony to the truth." But by the Person of
the Son of God becoming incarnate many have been kept back from the
true knowledge of God, since they referred to the very Person of the
Son what was said of the Son in His human nature, as Arius, who held an
inequality of Persons, according to what is said (Jn. 14:28): "The
Father is greater than I." Now this error would not have arisen if the
Person of the Father had become incarnate, for no one would have taken
the Father to be less than the Son. Hence it seems fitting that the
Person of the Father, rather than the Person of the Son, should have
become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, the effect of the Incarnation would seem to be,
as it were, a second creation of human nature, according to Gal. 6:15:
"For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor
uncircumcision, but a new creature." But the power of creation is
appropriated to the Father. Therefore it would have been more becoming
to the Father than to the Son to become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, the Incarnation is ordained to the remission of
sins, according to Mat. 1:21: "Thou shalt call His name Jesus. For He
shall save His people from their sins." Now the remission of sins is
attributed to the Holy Ghost according to Jn. 20:22,23: "Receive ye the
Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them."
Therefore it became the Person of the Holy Ghost rather than the Person
of the Son to become incarnate.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1): "In the mystery
of the Incarnation the wisdom and power of God are made known: the
wisdom, for He found a most suitable discharge for a most heavy debt;
the power, for He made the conquered conquer." But power and wisdom are
appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Cor. 1:24: "Christ, the power
of God and the wisdom of God." Therefore it was fitting that the Person
of the Son should become incarnate.
I answer that, It was most fitting that the Person of the Son should
become incarnate. First, on the part of the union; for such as are
similar are fittingly united. Now the Person of the Son, Who is the
Word of God, has a certain common agreement with all creatures, because
the word of the craftsman, i.e. his concept, is an exemplar likeness of
whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God, Who is His eternal
concept, is the exemplar likeness of all creatures. And therefore as
creatures are established in their proper species, though movably, by
the participation of this likeness, so by the non-participated and
personal union of the Word with a creature, it was fitting that the
creature should be restored in order to its eternal and unchangeable
perfection; for the craftsman by the intelligible form of his art,
whereby he fashioned his handiwork, restores it when it has fallen into
ruin. Moreover, He has a particular agreement with human nature, since
the Word is a concept of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man's wisdom
is derived. And hence man is perfected in wisdom (which is his proper
perfection, as he is rational) by participating the Word of God, as the
disciple is instructed by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is
said (Ecclus. 1:5): "The Word of God on high is the fountain of
wisdom." And hence for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting
that the very Word of God should be personally united to human nature.
Secondly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the end of the
union, which is the fulfilling of predestination, i.e. of such as are
preordained to the heavenly inheritance, which is bestowed only on
sons, according to Rom. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also." Hence it was
fitting that by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this
likeness of sonship by adoption, as the Apostle says in the same
chapter (Rom. 8:29): "For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be
made conformable to the image of His Son."
Thirdly, the reason for this fitness may be taken from the sin of our
first parent, for which the Incarnation supplied the remedy. For the
first man sinned by seeking knowledge, as is plain from the words of
the serpent, promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence it
was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man might be led back to
God, having wandered from God through an inordinate thirst for
knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing which human malice cannot abuse,
since it even abuses God's goodness, according to Rom. 2:4: "Or
despisest thou the riches of His goodness?" Hence, even if the Person
of the Father had become incarnate, men would have been capable of
finding an occasion of error, as though the Son were not able to
restore human nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The first creation of things was made by the
power of God the Father through the Word; hence the second creation
ought to have been brought about through the Word, by the power of God
the Father, in order that restoration should correspond to creation
according to 2 Cor. 5:19: "For God indeed was in Christ reconciling the
world to Himself."
Reply to Objection 3: To be the gift of the Father and the Son is
proper to the Holy Ghost. But the remission of sins is caused by the
Holy Ghost, as by the gift of God. And hence it was more fitting to
man's justification that the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift
the Holy Ghost is.
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OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE HUMAN NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About
which we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of
God; secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects.
Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a
threefold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature;
secondly, with regard to its parts; thirdly, with regard to the order
of the assumption.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any
other nature?
(2) Whether He assumed a person?
(3) Whether He assumed a man?
(4) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature
abstracted from all individuals?
(5) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in all
its individuals?
(6) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in any
man begotten of the stock of Adam?
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Whether human nature was more assumable by the Son of God than any other
nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that human nature is not more capable of
being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine
says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): "In deeds wrought miraculously the
whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer." Now the power of
God Who wrought the Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is
not limited to one nature, since the power of God is infinite.
Therefore human nature is not more capable of being assumed than any
other creature.
Objection 2: Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of
the Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated ([3896]Q[3],
A[8]). But as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so
in irrational creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore the
irrational creature was as capable of assumption as human nature.
Objection 3: Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect
likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib.;
xxxiv in Ev.), where he introduces Ezech. 28:12: "Thou wast the seal of
resemblance." And sin is found in angels, even as in man, according to
Job 4:18: "And in His angels He found wickedness." Therefore the
angelic nature was as capable of assumption as the nature of man.
Objection 4: Further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the
more like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole
universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human nature.
Therefore the whole universe is more capable of being assumed than
human nature.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:31) by the mouth of Begotten
Wisdom: "My delights were to be with the children of men"; and hence
there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of God with human
nature.
I answer that, A thing is said to be assumable as being capable of
being assumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken
with reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to
what transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a creature
with God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to be
assumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now this fitness
in human nature may be taken from two things, viz. according to its
dignity, and according to its need. According to its dignity, because
human nature, as being rational and intellectual, was made for
attaining to the Word to some extent by its operation, viz. by knowing
and loving Him. According to its need---because it stood in need of
restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now these two things
belong to human nature alone. For in the irrational creature the
fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature the aforesaid
fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was
assumable.
Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be "such" with reference to
their proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from
their first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not
that it cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the
proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be
not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God,
but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no
capability for this.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of image is found in human nature,
forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz. by attaining to Him through its
own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards
only a representation by Divine impression, existing in the creature,
and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a
likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For what
does not come up to the less, has no fitness for the greater; as a body
which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less
fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is
the union with God in personal being than the union by operation. And
hence the irrational creature which falls short of the union with God
by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in personal being.
Reply to Objection 3: Some say that angels are not assumable, since
they are perfect in their personality from the beginning of their
creation, inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and
corruption; hence they cannot be assumed to the unity of a Divine
Person, unless their personality be destroyed, and this does not befit
the incorruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one
assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the
creature assumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the
fitness of the angelic nature for being assumed. For God by producing a
new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in
this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was said
above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, although the
angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is
irremediable, as stated above ([3897]FP, Q[64], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 4: The perfection of the universe is not the
perfection of one person or suppositum, but of something which is one
by position or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of
assumption, as was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature
is capable of being assumed.
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Whether the Son of God assumed a person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "assumed
human nature 'in atomo,'" i.e. in an individual. But an individual in
rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.).
Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the
Son of God "assumed what He had sown in our nature." But He sowed our
personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent
III [*Paschas. Diac., De Spiritu Sanct. ii] says in a Decretal that
"the Person of God absorbed the person of man." Therefore it would seem
that the person of man existed previous to its being assumed.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii)
that "God assumed the nature, not the person, of man."
I answer that, A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch as it is taken
into another. Hence, what is assumed must be presupposed to the
assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion. Now
a person in human nature is not presupposed to assumption; rather, it
is the term of the assumption, as was said ([3898]Q[3], AA[1],2). For
if it were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted---in which
case it was useless; or it remains after the union---and thus there
would be two persons, one assuming and the other assumed, which is
false, as was shown above ([3899]Q[2], A[6]). Hence it follows that the
Son of God nowise assumed a human person.
Reply to Objection 1: The Son of God assumed human nature "in atomo,"
i.e. in an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum,
the Person of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person
was assumed.
Reply to Objection 2: Its proper personality is not wanting to the
nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the
perfection of the human nature but through the addition of something
which is above human nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person.
Reply to Objection 3: Absorption does not here imply the destruction of
anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have
been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person,
the human nature would have had its own personality; and in this way is
it said, although improperly, that the Person "absorbed the person,"
inasmuch as the Divine Person by His union hindered the human nature
from having its personality.
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Whether the Divine Person assumed a man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Divine Person assumed a man. For it
is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken
to Thee," which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (De
Agone Christ. xi): "The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore
things human."
Objection 2: Further, the word "man" signifies a human nature. But the
Son of God assumed a human nature. Therefore He assumed a man.
Objection 3: Further, the Son of God is a man. But He is not one of the
men He did not assume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any
other man. Therefore He is the man whom He assumed.
On the contrary, Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which is
quoted by the Council of Ephesus: "We believe in our Lord Jesus Christ,
born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and Word of God,
and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another
besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there be
another besides Him."
I answer that, As has been said above [3900](A[2]), what is assumed is
not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption.
Now it was said (Q[3], AA[1],2) that the individual to Whom the human
nature is assumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term
of the assumption. Now this word "man" signifies human nature, as it is
in a suppositum, because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4,11),
this word God signifies Him Who has human nature. And hence it cannot
properly be said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be, in
fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis.
But according to such as hold that there are two hypostases or two
supposita in Christ, it may fittingly and properly be said that the Son
of God assumed a man. Hence the first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D.
6, grants that a man was assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was
said above (Q[2], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 1: These phrases are not to be taken too literally,
but are to be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy
doctors; so as to say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature
was assumed; and because the assumption terminated in this---that the
Son of God is man.
Reply to Objection 2: The word "man" signifies human nature in the
concrete, inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot
say a suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed.
Reply to Objection 3: The Son of God is not the man whom He assumed,
but the man whose nature He assumed.
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Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from
all individuals?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed
human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of
human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it
is said of Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is "the Saviour of all men,
especially of the faithful." But nature as it is in individuals
withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to have
assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals.
Objection 2: Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be
attributed to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best.
Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing [per se]
man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from
its individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this.
Objection 3: Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in
the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above
[3901](A[3]). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in
individuals, as is plain from what has been said [3902](A[3]).
Therefore the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from
individuals.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "God the Word
Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought; for
this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious
Incarnation." But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from
individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since it does not exist
in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the
Son of God did not assume human nature, as it is separated from
individuals.
I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sensible thing, beyond
the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two ways: first,
as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the Platonists held;
secondly, as existing in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it
cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii,
26,27,29,51), because sensible matter belongs to the specific nature of
sensible things, and is placed in its definition, as flesh and bones in
the definition of man. Hence human nature cannot be without sensible
matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it
would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word of God.
First, because this assumption is terminated in a Person, and it is
contrary to the nature of a common form to be thus individualized in a
person. Secondly, because to a common nature can only be attributed
common and universal operations, according to which man neither merits
nor demerits, whereas, on the contrary, the assumption took place in
order that the Son of God, having assumed our nature, might merit for
us. Thirdly, because a nature so existing would not be sensible, but
intelligible. But the Son of God assumed human nature in order to show
Himself in men's sight, according to Baruch 3:38: "Afterwards He was
seen upon earth, and conversed with men."
Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of
God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other
than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be
in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of God
assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this would mean
nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human nature; and
thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a false
understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be
anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iii, 11).
Reply to Objection 1: The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of
all, not by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to
the nature separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause,
whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human
salvation.
Reply to Objection 2: Self-existing [per se] man is not to be found in
nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists
held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only
in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be
assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity.
Reply to Objection 3: Although human nature was not assumed in the
concrete, as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption,
nevertheless it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as
to be in an individual.
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Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all
individuals?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed
human nature in all individuals. For what is assumed first and by
itself is human nature. But what belongs essentially to a nature
belongs to all who exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that
human nature should be assumed by the Word of God in all its supposita.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine Incarnation proceeded from Divine
Love; hence it is written (Jn. 3:16): "God so loved the world as to
give His only-begotten Son." But love makes us give ourselves to our
friends as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to
assume several human natures, as was said above ([3903]Q[3], A[7]), and
with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to
assume human nature in all its supposita.
Objection 3: Further, a skilful workman completes his work in the
shortest manner possible. But it would have been a shorter way if all
men had been assumed to the natural sonship than for one natural Son to
lead many to the adoption of sons, as is written Gal. 4:5 (cf. Heb.
2:10). Therefore human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all
its supposita.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of
God "did not assume human nature as a species, nor did He assume all
its hypostases."
I answer that, It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by the
Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of supposita of
human nature, which are natural to it, would have been taken away. For
since we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed nature,
except the Person assuming, as was said above [3904](A[3]), if there
was no human nature except what was assumed, it would follow that there
was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the Person assuming.
Secondly, because this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the
incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of many brethren,
according to the human nature, even as He is the First-born of all
creatures according to the Divine, for then all men would be of equal
dignity. Thirdly, because it is fitting that as one Divine suppositum
is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature, so that on both
sides unity might be found.
Reply to Objection 1: To be assumed belongs to the human nature of
itself, because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it
belongs to the Divine Nature to assume by reason of the Person; not,
however, that it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its
essential principles, or as its natural property in which manner it
would belong to all its supposita.
Reply to Objection 2: The love of God to men is shown not merely in the
assumption of human nature, but especially in what He suffered in human
nature for other men, according to Rom. 5:8: "But God commendeth His
charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ
died for us," which would not have taken place had He assumed human
nature in all its supposita.
Reply to Objection 3: In order to shorten the way, which every skilful
workman does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence
it was most fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the
stock of Adam?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God
to assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says (Heb.
7:26): "For it was fitting that we should have such a high priest . . .
separated from sinners." But He would have been still further separated
from sinners had He not assumed human nature of the stock of Adam, a
sinner. Hence it seems that He ought not to have assumed human nature
of the stock of Adam.
Objection 2: Further, in every genus the principle is nobler than what
is from the principle. Hence, if He wished to assume human nature, He
ought to have assumed it in Adam himself.
Objection 3: Further, the Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews,
as a gloss says on Gal. 2:15: "For we by nature are Jews, and not of
the Gentiles, sinners." Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from
sinners, He ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than from
the stock of Abraham, who was just.
On the contrary, (Lk. 3), the genealogy of our Lord is traced back to
Adam.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 18): "God was able to
assume human nature elsewhere than from the stock of Adam, who by his
sin had fettered the whole human race; yet God judged it better to
assume human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish the
enemy of the human race." And this for three reasons: First, because it
would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends;
and hence that from the nature which he had corrupted should be assumed
that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the whole nature.
Secondly, it pertains to man's greater dignity that the conqueror of
the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the devil. Thirdly,
because God's power is thereby made more manifest, since, from a
corrupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was raised to such
might and glory.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ ought to be separated from sinners as
regards sin, which He came to overthrow, and not as regards nature
which He came to save, and in which "it behooved Him in all things to
be made like to His brethren," as the Apostle says (Heb. 2:17). And in
this is His innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed
from a mass tainted by sin, His nature was endowed with such purity.
Reply to Objection 2: As was said above (ad 1) it behooved Him Who came
to take away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin, to which
Adam was subject, whom Christ "brought out of his sin," as is written
(Wis. 10:2). For it behooved Him Who came to cleanse all, not to need
cleansing Himself; just as in every genus of motion the first mover is
immovable as regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself
unalterable. Hence it was not fitting that He should assume human
nature in Adam himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Since Christ ought especially to be separated
from sinners as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it
was fitting that between the first sinner and Christ some just men
should stand midway, in whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness
should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from whom Christ was
to be born, God appointed signs of holiness, which began in Abraham,
who was the first to receive the promise of Christ, and circumcision,
as a sign that the covenant should be kept, as is written (Gn. 17:11).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PARTS OF HUMAN NATURE WHICH WERE ASSUMED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the assumption of the parts of human nature; and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?
(2) Whether He ought to have assumed an earthly body, i.e. one of flesh
and blood?
(3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul?
(4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect?
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Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true
body. For it is written (Phil. 2:7), that He was "made in the likeness
of men." But what is something in truth is not said to be in the
likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body.
Objection 2: Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the
dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (Serm. de Nativ.) that "the
glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption
lessen the higher." But it pertains to the dignity of God to be
altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by the
assumption God was not united to a body.
Objection 3: Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But
the apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the
manifestation of Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in the
imagination, as is plain from Is. 60:1: "I saw the Lord sitting," etc.
Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of God in the world
was not in a real body, but only in imagination.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 13): "If the body of
Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us, He is
not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was not a
phantom." Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body.
I answer that, As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii). The Son of God was not
born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His body
was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the essence of
human nature to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore
granted, as already proved ([3905]Q[4], A[1]), that it was fitting for
the Son of God to assume human nature, He must consequently have
assumed a real body. The second reason is taken from what was done in
the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body was not real but
imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of those things which
the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in very truth, but only
in appearance; and hence it would also follow that the real salvation
of man has not taken place; since the effect must be proportionate to
the cause. The third reason is taken from the dignity of the Person
assuming, Whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His
work, since He is the Truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to refute
this error (Lk. 24:37, 39), when the disciples, "troubled and frighted,
supposed that they saw a spirit," and not a true body; wherefore He
offered Himself to their touch, saying: "Handle, and see; for a spirit
hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have."
Reply to Objection 1: This likeness indicates the truth of the human
nature in Christ---just as all that truly exist in human nature are
said to be like in species---and not a mere imaginary likeness. In
proof of this the Apostle subjoins (Phil. 2:8) that He became "obedient
unto death, even to the death of the cross"; which would have been
impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness.
Reply to Objection 2: By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of
God is nowise lessened. Hence Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad
Petrum ii): "He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, that He
might become a servant; yet did He not lose the fulness of the form of
God." For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as to become the
form of a body, which is repugnant to the Divine simplicity and
purity---for this would be to assume a body to the unity of the nature,
which is impossible, as is plain from what has been stated above
([3906]Q[2], A[1]): but, the natures remaining distinct, He assumed a
body to the unity of Person.
Reply to Objection 3: The figure ought to correspond to the reality as
regards the likeness and not as regards the truth of the thing. For if
they were alike in all points, it would no longer be a likeness but the
reality itself, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26). Hence it was
more fitting that the apparitions of the old Testament should be in
appearance only, being figures; and that the apparition of the Son of
God in the world should be in a real body, being the thing prefigured
by these figures. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:17): "Which are a
shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a carnal or earthly body?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ had not a carnal or earthly, but
a heavenly body. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:41): "The first man
was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly." But
the first man, i.e. Adam, was of the earth as regards his body, as is
plain from Gn. 1. Therefore the second man, i.e. Christ, was of heaven
as regards the body.
Objection 2: Further, it is said (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood shall
not [Vulg.: 'cannot'] possess the kingdom of God." But the kingdom of
God is in Christ chiefly. Therefore there is no flesh or blood in Him,
but rather a heavenly body.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is best is to be attributed to God. But
of all bodies a heavenly body is the best. Therefore it behooved Christ
to assume such a body.
On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 24:39): "A spirit hath not flesh
and bones, as you see Me to have." Now flesh and bones are not of the
matter of heavenly bodies, but are composed of the inferior elements.
Therefore the body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a carnal and
earthly body.
I answer that, By the reasons which proved that the body of Christ was
not an imaginary one, it may also be shown that it was not a heavenly
body. First, because even as the truth of the human nature of Christ
would not have been maintained had His body been an imaginary one, such
as Manes supposed, so likewise it would not have been maintained if we
supposed, as did Valentine, that it was a heavenly body. For since the
form of man is a natural thing, it requires determinate matter, to wit,
flesh and bones, which must be placed in the definition of man, as is
plain from the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 39). Secondly, because this
would lessen the truth of such things as Christ did in the body. For
since a heavenly body is impassible and incorruptible, as is proved De
Coel. i, 20, if the Son of God had assumed a heavenly body, He would
not have truly hungered or thirsted, nor would he have undergone His
passion and death. Thirdly, this would have detracted from God's
truthfulness. For since the Son of God showed Himself to men, as if He
had a carnal and earthly body, the manifestation would have been false,
had He had a heavenly body. Hence (De Eccles. Dogm. ii) it is said:
"The Son of God was born, taking flesh of the Virgin's body, and not
bringing it with Him from heaven."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said in two ways to have come down from
heaven. First, as regards His Divine Nature; not indeed that the Divine
Nature ceased to be in heaven, but inasmuch as He began to be here
below in a new way, viz. by His assumed. nature, according to Jn. 3:13:
"No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven,
the Son of Man, Who is in heaven."
Secondly, as regards His body, not indeed that the very substance of
the body of Christ descended from heaven, but that His body was formed
by a heavenly power, i.e. by the Holy Ghost. Hence Augustine,
explaining the passage quoted, says (Ad Orosium [*Dial. Qq. lxv, qu. 4,
work of an unknown author]): "I call Christ a heavenly man because He
was not conceived of human seed." And Hilary expounds it in the same
way (De Trin. x).
Reply to Objection 2: Flesh and blood are not taken here for the
substance of flesh and blood, but for the corruption of flesh, which
was not in Christ as far as it was sinful; but as far as it was a
punishment; thus, for a time, it was in Christ, that He might carry
through the work of our redemption.
Reply to Objection 3: It pertains to the greatest glory of God to have
raised a weak and earthly body to such sublimity. Hence in the General
Council of Ephesus (P. II, Act. I) we read the saying of St.
Theophilus: "Just as the best workmen are esteemed not merely for
displaying their skill in precious materials, but very often because by
making use of the poorest . . . lay and commonest earth, they show the
power of their craft; so the best of all workmen, the Word of God, did
not come down to us by taking a heavenly body of some most precious
matter, but shewed the greatness of His skill in clay."
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Whether the Son of God assumed a soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul.
For John has said, teaching the mystery of the Incarnation (Jn. 1:14):
"The Word was made flesh"---no mention being made of a soul. Now it is
not said that "the Word was made flesh" as if changed to flesh, but
because He assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to have assumed a
soul.
Objection 2: Further, a soul is necessary to the body, in order to
quicken it. But this was not necessary for the body of Christ, as it
would seem, for of the Word of God it is written (Ps. 35:10): Lord,
"with Thee is the fountain of life." Therefore it would seem altogether
superfluous for the soul to be there, when the Word was present. But
"God and nature do nothing uselessly," as the Philosopher says (De
Coel. i, 32; ii, 56). Therefore the Word would seem not to have assumed
a soul.
Objection 3: Further, by the union of soul and body is constituted the
common nature, which is the human species. But "in the Lord Jesus
Christ we are not to look for a common species," as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 3). Therefore He did not assume a soul.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxi): "Let us not
hearken to such as say that only a human body was assumed by the Word
of God; and take 'the Word was made flesh' to mean that the man had no
soul nor any other part of a man, save flesh."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 69,55), it was first of
all the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinaris that the Son of God
assumed only flesh, without a soul, holding that the Word took the
place of a soul to the body. And consequently it followed that there
were not two natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul and body
one human nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot hold, for
three reasons. First, because it is counter to the authority of
Scripture, in which our Lord makes mention of His soul, Mat. 26:38: "My
soul is sorrowful even unto death"; and Jn. 10:18: "I have power to lay
down My soul [animam meam: Douay: 'My life']." But to this Apollinaris
replied that in these words soul is taken metaphorically, in which way
mention is made in the Old Testament of the soul of God (Is. 1:14): "My
soul hateth your new moons and your solemnities." But, as Augustine
says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), the Evangelists relate how Jesus wondered,
was angered, sad, and hungry. Now these show that He had a true soul,
just as that He ate, slept and was weary shows that He had a true human
body: otherwise, if these things are a metaphor, because the like are
said of God in the Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel
story is undermined. For it is one thing that things were foretold in a
figure, and another that historical events were related in very truth
by the Evangelists. Secondly, this error lessens the utility of the
Incarnation, which is man's liberation. For Augustine [*Vigilius
Tapsensis] argues thus (Contra Felician. xiii): "If the Son of God in
taking flesh passed over the soul, either He knew its sinlessness, and
trusted it did not need a remedy; or He considered it unsuitable to
Him, and did not bestow on it the boon of redemption; or He reckoned it
altogether incurable, and was unable to heal it; or He cast it off as
worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of these reasons
imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we call Him omnipotent, if
He is unable to heal what is beyond hope? Or God of all, if He has not
made our soul. And as regards the other two reasons, in one the cause
of the soul is ignored, and in the other no place is given to merit. Is
He to be considered to understand the cause of the soul, Who seeks to
separate it from the sin of wilful transgression, enabled as it is to
receive the law by the endowment of the habit of reason? Or how can His
generosity be known to any one who says it was despised on account of
its ignoble sinfulness? If you look at its origin, the substance of the
soul is more precious than the body: but if at the sin of
transgression, on account of its intelligence it is worse than the
body. Now I know and declare that Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I
any doubt that He is most loving; and because of the first of these He
did not despise what was better and more capable of prudence; and
because of the second He protected what was most wounded." Thirdly,
this position is against the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh and
the other parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence,
if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except
equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; Metaph.
vii, 34).
Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "The Word was made flesh," "flesh"
is taken for the whole man, as if we were to say, "The Word was made
man," as Is. 40:5: "All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the
Lord hath spoken." And the whole man is signified by flesh, because, as
is said in the authority quoted, the Son of God became visible by
flesh; hence it is subjoined: "And we saw His glory." Or because, as
Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), "in all that union the Word is
the highest, and flesh the last and lowest. Hence, wishing to commend
the love of God's humility to us, the Evangelist mentioned the Word and
flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it is less than the Word and
nobler than flesh." Again, it was reasonable to mention flesh, which,
as being farther away from the Word, was less assumable, as it would
seem.
Reply to Objection 2: The Word is the fountain of life, as the first
effective cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the life of
the body, as its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence
from the presence of the Word it might rather have been concluded that
the body was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may be
concluded that the body, in which fire adheres, is warm.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary to
say that in Christ there was a nature which was constituted by the soul
coming to the body. But Damascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was
a common species, i.e. a third something resulting from the Godhead and
the humanity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Son of God assumed a human mind or intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human
mind or intellect. For where a thing is present, its image is not
required. But man is made to God's image, as regards his mind, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Hence, since in Christ there was
the presence of the Divine Word itself, there was no need of a human
mind.
Objection 2: Further, the greater light dims the lesser. But the Word
of God, Who is "the light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh
into this world," as is written Jn. 1:9, is compared to the mind as the
greater light to the lesser; since our mind is a light, being as it
were a lamp enkindled by the First Light (Prov. 20:27): "The spirit of
a man is the lamp of the Lord." Therefore in Christ Who is the Word of
God, there is no need of a human mind.
Objection 3: Further, the assumption of human nature by the Word of God
is called His Incarnation. But the intellect or human mind is nothing
carnal, either in its substance or in its act. for it is not the act of
a body, as is proved De Anima iii, 6. Hence it would seem that the Son
of God did not assume a human mind.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum xiv):
"Firmly hold and nowise doubt that Christ the Son of God has true flesh
and a rational soul of the same kind as ours, since of His flesh He
says (Lk. 24:39): 'Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and
bones, as you see Me to have.' And He proves that He has a soul, saying
(Jn. 10:17): 'I lay down My soul [Douay: 'life'] that I may take it
again.' And He proves that He has an intellect, saying (Mat. 11:29):
'Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.' And God says of
Him by the prophet (Is. 52:13): 'Behold my servant shall understand.'"
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 49,50), "the Apollinarists
thought differently from the Catholic Church concerning the soul of
Christ, saying with the Arians, that Christ took flesh alone, without a
soul; and on being overcome on this point by the Gospel witness, they
went on to say that the mind was wanting to Christ's soul, but that the
Word supplied its place." But this position is refuted by the same
arguments as the preceding. First, because it runs counter to the
Gospel story, which relates how He marveled (as is plain from Mat.
8:10). Now marveling cannot be without reason, since it implies the
collation of effect and cause, i.e. inasmuch as when we see an effect
and are ignorant of its cause, we seek to know it, as is said Metaph.
i, 2. Secondly, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation,
which is the justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not
capable of sin nor of justifying grace except through the mind. Hence
it was especially necessary for the mind to be assumed. Hence Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of God assumed a body and an
intellectual and rational soul," and adds afterwards: "The whole was
united to the whole, that He might bestow salvation on me wholly; for
what was not assumed is not curable." Thirdly, it is against the truth
of the Incarnation. For since the body is proportioned to the soul as
matter to its proper form, it is not truly human flesh if it is not
perfected by human, i.e. a rational soul. And hence if Christ had had a
soul without a mind, He would not have had true human flesh, but
irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal soul by the
mind alone. Hence Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80) that from this
error it would have followed that the Son of God "took an animal with
the form of a human body," which, again, is against the Divine truth,
which cannot suffer any fictitious untruth.
Reply to Objection 1: Where a thing is by its presence, its image is
not required to supply the place of the thing, as where the emperor is
the soldiers do not pay homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing
is required together with its presence, that it may be perfected by the
presence of the thing, just as the image in the wax is perfected by the
impression of the seal, and as the image of man is reflected in the
mirror by his presence. Hence in order to perfect the human mind it was
necessary that the Word should unite it to Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: The greater light dims the lesser light of
another luminous body; but it does not dim, rather it perfects the
light of the body illuminated---at the presence of the sun the light of
the stars is put out, but the light of the air is perfected. Now the
intellect or mind of man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light of
the Divine Word; and hence by the presence of the Word the mind of man
is perfected rather than overshadowed.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the intellective power is not the act of
a body, nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form
of the body, requires that it should be more noble, in order that it
may have the power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a
better disposed body should correspond to it.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ORDER OF ASSUMPTION (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the order of the foregoing assumption, and under
this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the
soul?
(2) Whether He assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit or
mind?
(3) Whether the soul was assumed previous to the flesh?
(4) Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word previous to
being united to the soul?
(5) Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of
the parts?
(6) Whether it was assumed through the medium of grace?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume flesh
through the medium of the soul. For the mode in which the Son of God is
united to human nature and its parts, is more perfect than the mode
whereby He is in all creatures. But He is in all creatures immediately
by essence, power and presence. Much more, therefore, is the Son of God
united to flesh without the medium of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, the soul and flesh are united to the Word of God
in unity of hypostasis or person. But the body pertains immediately to
the human hypostasis or person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human
body, since it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the hypostasis
than the soul, which is a form, since the principle of individuation,
which is implied in the word "hypostasis," would seem to be matter.
Hence the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the
soul.
Objection 3: Further, take away the medium and you separate what were
joined by the medium; for example, if the superficies be removed color
would leave the body, since it adheres to the body through the medium
of the superficies. But though the soul was separated from the body by
death, yet there still remained the union of the Word to the flesh, as
will be shown ([3907]Q[50], AA[2],3). Hence the Word was not joined to
flesh through the medium of the soul.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvi): "The
greatness of the Divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and
through it a human body, so as to raise the whole man to something
higher."
I answer that, A medium is in reference to a beginning and an end.
Hence as beginning and end imply order, so also does a medium. Now
there is a twofold order: one, of time; the other, of nature. But in
the mystery of the Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the
order of time, for the Word of God united the whole human nature to
Himself at the same time, as will appear ([3908]Q[30], A[3]). An order
of nature between things may be taken in two ways: first, as regards
rank of dignity, as we say the angels are midway between man and God;
secondly, as regards the idea of causality, as we say a cause is midway
between the first cause and the last effect. And this second order
follows the first to some extent; for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
xiii), God acts upon the more remote substances through the less
remote. Hence if we consider the rank of dignity, the soul is found to
be midway between God and flesh; and in this way it may be said that
the Son of God united flesh to Himself, through the medium of the soul.
But even as regards the second order of causality the soul is to some
extent the cause of flesh being united to the Son of God. For the flesh
would not have been assumable, except by its relation to the rational
soul, through which it becomes human flesh. For it was said above
([3909]Q[4], A[1]) that human nature was assumable before all others.
Reply to Objection 1: We may consider a twofold order between creatures
and God: the first is by reason of creatures being caused by God and
depending on Him as on the principle of their being; and thus on
account of the infinitude of His power God touches each thing
immediately, by causing and preserving it, and so it is that God is in
all things by essence, presence and power. But the second order is by
reason of things being directed to God as to their end; and it is here
that there is a medium between the creature and God, since lower
creatures are directed to God by higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.
v); and to this order pertains the assumption of human nature by the
Word of God, Who is the term of the assumption; and hence it is united
to flesh through the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: If the hypostasis of the Word of God were
constituted simply by human nature, it would follow that the body was
nearest to it, since it is matter which is the principle of
individuation; even as the soul, being the specific form, would be
nearer the human nature. But because the hypostasis of the Word is
prior to and more exalted than the human nature, the more exalted any
part of the human nature is, the nearer it is to the hypostasis of the
Word. And hence the soul is nearer the Word of God than the body is.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents one thing being the cause of the
aptitude and congruity of another, and yet if it be taken away the
other remains; because although a thing's becoming may depend on
another, yet when it is in being it no longer depends on it, just as a
friendship brought about by some other may endure when the latter has
gone; or as a woman is taken in marriage on account of her beauty,
which makes a woman's fittingness for the marriage tie, yet when her
beauty passes away, the marriage tie still remains. So likewise, when
the soul was separated, the union of the Word with flesh still endured.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Son of God assumed a soul through the medium of the spirit or
mind?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul
through the medium of the spirit or mind. For nothing is a medium
between itself and another. But the spirit is nothing else in essence
but the soul itself, as was said above ([3910]FP, Q[77], A[1], ad 1).
Therefore the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of
the spirit or mind.
Objection 2: Further, what is the medium of the assumption is itself
more assumable. But the spirit or mind is not more assumable than the
soul; which is plain from the fact that angelic spirits are not
assumable, as was said above ([3911]Q[4], A[1]). Hence it seems that
the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit.
Objection 3: Further, that which comes later is assumed by the first
through the medium of what comes before. But the soul implies the very
essence, which naturally comes before its power---the mind. Therefore
it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the
medium of the spirit or mind.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii): "The
invisible and unchangeable Truth took a soul by means of the spirit,
and a body by means of the soul."
I answer that, As stated above [3912](A[1]), the Son of God is said to
have assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, on account of the
order of dignity, and the congruity of the assumption. Now both these
may be applied to the intellect, which is called the spirit, if we
compare it with the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed
congruously only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in His
likeness: which is in respect of the mind that is called the spirit,
according to Eph. 4:23: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind." So,
too, the intellect is the highest and noblest of the parts of the soul,
and the most like to God, and hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
6) that "the Word of God is united to flesh through the medium of the
intellect; for the intellect is the purest part of the soul, God
Himself being an intellect."
Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellect is not distinct from the
soul in essence, it is distinct from the other parts of the soul as a
power; and it is in this way that it has the nature of a medium.
Reply to Objection 2: Fitness for assumption is wanting to the angelic
spirits, not from any lack of dignity, but because of the
irremediableness of their fall, which cannot be said of the human
spirit, as is clear from what has been said above ([3913]FP, Q[62],
A[8]; [3914]FP, Q[64], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: The soul, between which and the Word of God the
intellect is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of the
soul, which is common to all the powers, but for the lower powers,
which are common to every soul.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the soul was assumed before the flesh by the Son of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was assumed before
the flesh by the Word. For the Son of God assumed flesh through the
medium of the soul, as was said above [3915](A[1]). Now the medium is
reached before the end. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul
before the body.
Objection 2: Further, the soul of Christ is nobler than the angels,
according to Ps. 96:8: "Adore Him, all you His angels." But the angels
were created in the beginning, as was said above ([3916]FP, Q[46],
A[3]). Therefore the soul of Christ also (was created in the
beginning). But it was not created before it was assumed, for Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2,3,9), that "neither the soul nor the body of
Christ ever had any hypostasis save the hypostasis of the Word."
Therefore it would seem that the soul was assumed before the flesh,
which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.:
'His glory'] full of grace and truth," and it is added afterwards that
"of His fulness we have all received" (Jn. 1:16), i.e. all the faithful
of all time, as Chrysostom expounds it (Hom. xiii in Joan.). Now this
could not have been unless the soul of Christ had all fulness of grace
and truth before all the saints, who were from the beginning of the
world, for the cause is not subsequent to the effect. Hence since the
fulness of grace and truth was in the soul of Christ from union with
the Word, according to what is written in the same place: "We saw His
glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of
grace and truth," it would seem in consequence that from the beginning
of the world the soul of Christ was assumed by the Word of God.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 6): "The intellect
was not, as some untruthfully say, united to the true God, and
henceforth called Christ, before the Incarnation which was of the
Virgin."
I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8; ii, 8) maintained that all
souls, amongst which he placed Christ's soul, were created in the
beginning. But this is not fitting, if we suppose that it was first of
all created, but not at once joined to the Word, since it would follow
that this soul once had its proper subsistence without the Word; and
thus, since it was assumed by the Word, either the union did not take
place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing subsistence of the soul
was corrupted. So likewise it is not fitting to suppose that this soul
was united to the Word from the beginning, and that it afterwards
became incarnate in the womb of the Virgin; for thus His soul would not
seem to be of the same nature as ours, which are created at the same
time that they are infused into bodies. Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad
Julian. xxxv) that "Christ's flesh was not of a different nature to
ours, nor was a different soul infused into it in the beginning than
into other men."
Reply to Objection 1: As was said above [3917](A[1]), the soul of
Christ is said to be the medium in the union of the flesh with the
Word, in the order of nature; but it does not follow from this that it
was the medium in the order of time.
Reply to Objection 2: As Pope Leo says in the same Epistle, Christ's
soul excels our soul "not by diversity of genus, but by sublimity of
power"; for it is of the same genus as our souls, yet excels even the
angels in "fulness of grace and truth." But the mode of creation is in
harmony with the generic property of the soul; and since it is the form
of the body, it is consequently created at the same time that it is
infused into and united with the body; which does not happen to angels,
since they are substances entirely free from matter.
Reply to Objection 3: Of the fulness of Christ all men receive
according to the faith they have in Him; for it is written (Rom. 3:22)
that "the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon
all them that believe in Him." Now just as we believe in Him as already
born; so the ancients believed in Him as about to be born, since
"having the same spirit of faith . . . we also believe," as it is
written (2 Cor. 4:13). But the faith which is in Christ has the power
of justifying by reason of the purpose of the grace of God, according
to Rom. 4:5: "But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that
justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to
the purpose of the grace of God." Hence because this purpose is
eternal, there is nothing to hinder some from being justified by the
faith of Jesus Christ, even before His soul was full of grace and
truth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to
the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by the
Word before being united to the soul. For Augustine [*Fulgentius] says
(De Fide ad Petrum xviii): "Most firmly hold, and nowise doubt that the
flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin without the
Godhead before it was assumed by the Word." But the flesh of Christ
would seem to have been conceived before being united to the rational
soul, because matter or disposition is prior to the completive form in
order of generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ was assumed before
being united to the soul.
Objection 2: Further, as the soul is a part of human nature, so is the
body. But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being than
in other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo, quoted above
(A[3] ). Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no other
principle of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten before
the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was the same in Christ; and
thus the flesh was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul.
Objection 3: Further, as is said (De Causis), the first cause excels
the second in bringing about the effect, and precedes it in its union
with the effect. But the soul of Christ is compared to the Word as a
second cause to a first. Hence the Word was united to the flesh before
it was to the soul.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "At the same
time the Word of God was made flesh, and flesh was united to a rational
and intellectual soul." Therefore the union of the Word with the flesh
did not precede the union with the soul.
I answer that, The human flesh is assumable by the Word on account of
the order which it has to the rational soul as to its proper form. Now
it has not this order before the rational soul comes to it, because
when any matter becomes proper to any form, at the same time it
receives that form; hence the alteration is terminated at the same
instant in which the substantial form is introduced. And hence it is
that the flesh ought not to have been assumed before it was human
flesh; and this happened when the rational soul came to it. Therefore
since the soul was not assumed before the flesh, inasmuch as it is
against the nature of the soul to be before it is united to the body,
so likewise the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul,
since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul.
Reply to Objection 1: Human flesh depends upon the soul for its being;
and hence, before the coming of the soul, there is no human flesh, but
there may be a disposition towards human flesh. Yet in the conception
of Christ, the Holy Ghost, Who is an agent of infinite might, disposed
the matter and brought it to its perfection at the same time.
Reply to Objection 2: The form actually gives the species; but the
matter in itself is in potentiality to the species. And hence it would
be against the nature of a form to exist before the specific nature.
And therefore the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ's origin,
inasmuch as we are conceived before being animated, and Christ's flesh
is not, is by reason of what precedes the perfection of the nature,
viz. that we are conceived from the seed of man, and Christ is not. But
a difference which would be with reference to the origin of the soul,
would bespeak a diversity of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The Word of God is understood to be united to the
flesh before the soul by the common mode whereby He is in the rest of
creatures by essence, power, and presence. Yet I say "before," not in
time, but in nature; for the flesh is understood as a being, which it
has from the Word, before it is understood as animated, which it has
from the soul. But by the personal union we understand the flesh as
united to the soul before it is united to the Word, for it is from its
union with the soul that it is capable of being united to the Word in
Person; especially since a person is found only in the rational nature
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed the whole human
nature through the medium of its parts. For Augustine says (De Agone
Christ. xviii) that "the invisible and unchangeable Truth assumed the
soul through the medium of the spirit, and the body through the medium
of the soul, and in this way the whole man." But the spirit, soul, and
body are parts of the whole man. Therefore He assumed all, through the
medium of the parts.
Objection 2: Further, the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium
of the soul because the soul is more like to God than the body. But the
parts of human nature, since they are simpler than the body, would seem
to be more like to God, Who is most simple, than the whole. Therefore
He assumed the whole through the medium of the parts.
Objection 3: Further, the whole results from the union of parts. But
the union is taken to be the term of the assumption, and the parts are
presupposed to the assumption. Therefore He assumed the whole by the
parts.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 16): "In our Lord
Jesus Christ we do not behold parts of parts, but such as are
immediately joined, i.e. the Godhead and the manhood." Now the humanity
is a whole, which is composed of soul and body, as parts. Therefore the
Son of God assumed the parts through the medium of the whole.
I answer that, When anything is said to be a medium in the assumption
of the Incarnation, we do not signify order of time, because the
assumption of the whole and the parts was simultaneous. For it has been
shown ([3918]AA[3] ,4) that the soul and body were mutually united at
the same time in order to constitute the human nature of the Word. But
it is order of nature that is signified. Hence by what is prior in
nature, that is assumed which is posterior in nature. Now a thing is
prior in nature in two ways: First on the part of the agent, secondly
on the part of the matter; for these two causes precede the thing. On
the part of the agent---that is simply first, which is first included
in his intention; but that is relatively first, with which his
operation begins---and this because the intention is prior to the
operation. On the part of the matter---that is first which exists first
in the transmutation of the matter. Now in the Incarnation the order
depending on the agent must be particularly considered, because, as
Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii), "in such things the whole
reason of the deed is the power of the doer." But it is manifest that,
according to the intention of the doer, what is complete is prior to
what is incomplete, and, consequently, the whole to the parts. Hence it
must be said that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature,
through the medium of the whole; for even as He assumed the body on
account of its relation to the rational soul, so likewise He assumed a
body and soul on account of their relation to human nature.
Reply to Objection 1: From these words nothing may be gathered, except
that the Word, by assuming the parts of human nature, assumed the whole
human nature. And thus the assumption of parts is prior in the order of
the intellect, if we consider the operation, but not in order of time;
whereas the assumption of the nature is prior if we consider the
intention: and this is to be simply first, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: God is so simple that He is also most perfect;
and hence the whole is more like to God than the parts, inasmuch as it
is more perfect.
Reply to Objection 3: It is a personal union wherein the assumption is
terminated, not a union of nature, which springs from a conjunction of
parts.
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Whether the human nature was assumed through the medium of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed human nature
through the medium of grace. For by grace we are united to God. But the
human nature in Christ was most closely united to God. Therefore the
union took place by grace.
Objection 2: Further, as the body lives by the soul, which is its
perfection, so does the soul by grace. But the human nature was fitted
for the assumption by the soul. Therefore the Son of God assumed the
soul through the medium of grace.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 11) that the
incarnate Word is like our spoken word. But our word is united to our
speech by means of "breathing" [spiritus]. Therefore the Word of God is
united to flesh by means of the Holy Spirit, and hence by means of
grace, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor.
12:4: "Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit."
On the contrary, Grace is an accident in the soul, as was shown above
([3919]FS, Q[110], A[2]). Now the union of the Word with human nature
took place in the subsistence, and not accidentally, as was shown above
(Q[2], A[6]). Therefore the human nature was not assumed by means of
grace.
I answer that, In Christ there was the grace of union and habitual
grace. Therefore grace cannot be taken to be the medium of the
assumption of the human nature, whether we speak of the grace of union
or of habitual grace. For the grace of union is the personal being that
is given gratis from above to the human nature in the Person of the
Word, and is the term of the assumption. Whereas the habitual grace
pertaining to the spiritual holiness of the man is an effect following
the union, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of
the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth"---by which we
are given to understand that because this Man (as a result of the
union) is the Only-begotten of the Father, He is full of grace and
truth. But if by grace we understand the will of God doing or bestowing
something gratis, the union took place by grace, not as a means, but as
the efficient cause.
Reply to Objection 1: Our union with God is by operation, inasmuch as
we know and love Him; and hence this union is by habitual grace,
inasmuch as a perfect operation proceeds from a habit. Now the union of
the human nature with the Word of God is in personal being, which
depends not on any habit, but on the nature itself.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul is the substantial perfection of the
body; grace is but an accidental perfection of the soul. Hence grace
cannot ordain the soul to personal union, which is not accidental, as
the soul ordains the body.
Reply to Objection 3: Our word is united to our speech, by means of
breathing [spiritus], not as a formal medium, but as a moving medium.
For from the word conceived within, the breathing proceeds, from which
the speech is formed. And similarly from the eternal Word proceeds the
Holy Spirit, Who formed the body of Christ, as will be shown
([3920]Q[32], A[1]). But it does not follow from this that the grace of
the Holy Spirit is the formal medium in the aforesaid union.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST AS AN INDIVIDUAL MAN (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider such things as were co-assumed by the Son of God
in human nature; and first what belongs to perfection; secondly, what
belongs to defect.
Concerning the first, there are three points of consideration: (1) The
grace of Christ; (2) His knowledge; (3) His power.
With regard to His grace we must consider two things: (1) His grace as
He is an individual man; (2) His grace as He is the Head of the Church.
Of the grace of union we have already spoken ([3921]Q[2]).
Under the first head there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in the soul of Christ there was any habitual grace?
(2) Whether in Christ there were virtues?
(3) Whether He had faith?
(4) Whether He had hope?
(5) Whether in Christ there were the gifts?
(6) Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear?
(7) Whether in Christ there were any gratuitous graces?
(8) Whether in Christ there was prophecy?
(9) Whether there was the fulness of grace in Him?
(10) Whether such fulness was proper to Christ?
(11) Whether the grace of Christ was infinite?
(12) Whether it could have been increased?
(13) How this grace stood towards the union?
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Whether in the Soul of Christ there was any habitual grace?
Objection 1: It would seem there was no habitual grace in the soul
assumed by the Word. For grace is a certain partaking of the Godhead by
the rational creature, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: "By Whom He hath given
us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made
partakers of the Divine Nature." Now Christ is God not by
participation, but in truth. Therefore there was no habitual grace in
Him.
Objection 2: Further, grace is necessary to man, that he may operate
well, according to 1 Cor. 15:10: "I have labored more abundantly than
all they; yet not I, but the grace of God with me"; and in order that
he may reach eternal life, according to Rom. 6:23: "The grace of God
(is) life everlasting." Now the inheritance of everlasting life was due
to Christ by the mere fact of His being the natural Son of God; and by
the fact of His being the Word, by Whom all things were made, He had
the power of doing all things well. Therefore His human nature needed
no further grace beyond union with the Word.
Objection 3: Further, what operates as an instrument does not need a
habit for its own operations, since habits are rooted in the principal
agent. Now the human nature in Christ was "as the instrument of the
Godhead," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15). Therefore there
was no need of habitual grace in Christ.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon Him"---which (Spirit), indeed, is said to be in man by
habitual grace, as was said above ([3922]FP, Q[8], A[3]; [3923]FP,
Q[43], AA[3],6). Therefore there was habitual grace in Christ.
I answer that, It is necessary to suppose habitual grace in Christ for
three reasons. First, on account of the union of His soul with the Word
of God. For the nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more
does it partake of its influence. Now the influx of grace is from God,
according to Ps. 83:12: "The Lord will give grace and glory." And hence
it was most fitting that His soul should receive the influx of Divine
grace. Secondly, on account of the dignity of this soul, whose
operations were to attain so closely to God by knowledge and love, to
which it is necessary for human nature to be raised by grace. Thirdly,
on account of the relation of Christ to the human race. For Christ, as
man, is the "Mediator of God and men," as is written, 1 Tim. 2:5; and
hence it behooved Him to have grace which would overflow upon others,
according to Jn. 1:16: "And of His fulness we have all received, and
grace for grace."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is the true God in Divine Person and
Nature. Yet because together with unity of person there remains
distinction of natures, as stated above ([3924]Q[2], AA[1],2), the soul
of Christ. is not essentially Divine. Hence it behooves it to be Divine
by participation, which is by grace.
Reply to Objection 2: To Christ, inasmuch as He is the natural Son of
God, is due an eternal inheritance, which is the uncreated beatitude
through the uncreated act of knowledge and love of God, i.e. the same
whereby the Father knows and loves Himself. Now the soul was not
capable of this act, on account of the difference of natures. Hence it
behooved it to attain to God by a created act of fruition which could
not be without grace. Likewise, inasmuch as He was the Word of God, He
had the power of doing all things well by the Divine operation. And
because it is necessary to admit a human operation, distinct from the
Divine operation, as will be shown ([3925]Q[19], A[1]), it was
necessary for Him to have habitual grace, whereby this operation might
be perfect in Him.
Reply to Objection 3: The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the
Godhead---not, indeed, an inanimate instrument, which nowise acts, but
is merely acted upon; but an instrument animated by a rational soul,
which is so acted upon as to act. And hence the nature of the action
demanded that he should have habitual grace.
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Whether in Christ there were virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were no virtues. For
Christ had the plenitude of grace. Now grace is sufficient for every
good act, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for thee."
Therefore there were no virtues in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1),
virtue is contrasted with a "certain heroic or godlike habit" which is
attributed to godlike men. But this belongs chiefly to Christ.
Therefore Christ had not virtues, but something higher than virtue.
Objection 3: Further, as was said above ([3926]FS, Q[65], AA[1],2), all
the virtues are bound together. But it was not becoming for Christ to
have all the virtues, as is clear in the case of liberality and
magnificence, for these have to do with riches, which Christ spurned,
according to Mat. 8:20: "The Son of man hath not where to lay His
head." Temperance and continence also regard wicked desires, from which
Christ was free. Therefore Christ had not the virtues.
On the contrary, on Ps. 1:2, "But His will is in the law of the Lord,"
a gloss says: "This refers to Christ, Who is full of all good." But a
good quality of the mind is a virtue. Therefore Christ was full of all
virtue.
I answer that, As was said above ([3927]FS, Q[110], AA[3],4), as grace
regards the essence of the soul, so does virtue regard its power. Hence
it is necessary that as the powers of the soul flow from its essence,
so do the virtues flow from grace. Now the more perfect a principle is,
the more it impresses its effects. Hence, since the grace of Christ was
most perfect, there flowed from it, in consequence, the virtues which
perfect the several powers of the soul for all the soul's acts; and
thus Christ had all the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Grace suffices a man for all whereby he is
ordained to beatitude; nevertheless, it effects some of these by
itself---as to make him pleasing to God, and the like; and some others
through the medium of the virtues which proceed from grace.
Reply to Objection 2: A heroic or godlike habit only differs from
virtue commonly so called by a more perfect mode, inasmuch as one is
disposed to good in a higher way than is common to all. Hence it is not
hereby proved that Christ had not the virtues, but that He had them
most perfectly beyond the common mode. In this sense Plotinus gave to a
certain sublime degree of virtue the name of "virtue of the purified
soul" (cf. [3928]FS, Q[61] , A[5]).
Reply to Objection 3: Liberality and magnificence are praiseworthy in
regard to riches, inasmuch as anyone does not esteem wealth to the
extent of wishing to retain it, so as to forego what ought to be done.
But he esteems them least who wholly despises them, and casts them
aside for love of perfection. And hence by altogether contemning all
riches, Christ showed the highest kind of liberality and magnificence;
although He also performed the act of liberality, as far as it became
Him, by causing to be distributed to the poor what was given to
Himself. Hence, when our Lord said to Judas (Jn. 13:21), "That which
thou dost do quickly," the disciples understood our Lord to have
ordered him to give something to the poor. But Christ had no evil
desires whatever, as will be shown ([3929]Q[15], AA[1],2); yet He was
not thereby prevented from having temperance, which is the more perfect
in man, as he is without evil desires. Hence, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9), the temperate man differs from the
continent in this---that the temperate has not the evil desires which
the continent suffers. Hence, taking continence in this sense, as the
Philosopher takes it, Christ, from the very fact that He had all
virtue, had not continence, since it is not a virtue, but something
less than virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in Christ there was faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was faith in Christ. For faith is
a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, e.g. temperance and liberality.
Now these were in Christ, as stated above [3930](A[2]). Much more,
therefore, was there faith in Him.
Objection 2: Further, Christ did not teach virtues which He had not
Himself, according to Acts 1:1: "Jesus began to do and to teach." But
of Christ it is said (Heb. 12:2) that He is "the author and finisher of
our faith." Therefore there was faith in Him before all others.
Objection 3: Further, everything imperfect is excluded from the
blessed. But in the blessed there is faith; for on Rom. 1:17, "the
justice of God is revealed therein from faith to faith," a gloss says:
"From the faith of words and hope to the faith of things and sight."
Therefore it would seem that in Christ also there was faith, since it
implies nothing imperfect.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the evidence of
things that appear not." But there was nothing that did not appear to
Christ, according to what Peter said to Him (Jn. 21:17): "Thou knowest
all things." Therefore there was no faith in Christ.
I answer that, As was said above ([3931]SS, Q[1], A[4]), the object of
faith is a Divine thing not seen. Now the habit of virtue, as every
other habit, takes its species from the object. Hence, if we deny that
the Divine thing was not seen, we exclude the very essence of faith.
Now from the first moment of His conception Christ saw God's Essence
fully, as will be made clear (Q[34], A[1]). Hence there could be no
faith in Him.
Reply to Objection 1: Faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues,
seeing that it has to do with nobler matter; nevertheless, it implies a
certain defect with regard to that matter; and this defect was not in
Christ. And hence there could be no faith in Him, although the moral
virtues were in Him, since in their nature they imply no defect with
regard to their matter.
Reply to Objection 2: The merit of faith consists in this---that man
through obedience assents to what things he does not see, according to
Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations for His name." Now
Christ had most perfect obedience to God, according to Phil. 2:8:
"Becoming obedient unto death." And hence He taught nothing pertaining
to merit which He did not fulfil more perfectly Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: As a gloss says in the same place, faith is that
"whereby such things as are not seen are believed." But faith in things
seen is improperly so called, and only after a certain similitude with
regard to the certainty and firmness of the assent.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in Christ there was hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was hope in Christ. For it is
said in the Person of Christ (Ps. 30:1): "In Thee, O Lord, have I
hoped." But the virtue of hope is that whereby a man hopes in God.
Therefore the virtue of hope was in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, hope is the expectation of the bliss to come, as
was shown above ([3932]SS, Q[17], A[5], ad 3). But Christ awaited
something pertaining to bliss, viz. the glorifying of His body.
Therefore it seems there was hope in Him.
Objection 3: Further, everyone may hope for what pertains to his
perfection, if it has yet to come. But there was something still to
come pertaining to Christ's perfection, according to Eph. 4:12: "For
the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the
building up [Douay: 'edifying'] of the body of Christ." Hence it seems
that it befitted Christ to have hope.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why doth
he hope for?" Thus it is clear that as faith is of the unseen, so also
is hope. But there was no faith in Christ, as was said above
[3933](A[1]): neither, consequently, was there hope.
I answer that, As it is of the nature of faith that one assents to what
one sees not, so is it of the nature of hope that one expects what as
yet one has not; and as faith, forasmuch as it is a theological virtue,
does not regard everything unseen, but only God; so likewise hope, as a
theological virtue, has God Himself for its object, the fruition of
Whom man chiefly expects by the virtue of hope; yet, in consequence,
whoever has the virtue of hope may expect the Divine aid in other
things, even as he who has the virtue of faith believes God not only in
Divine things, but even in whatsoever is divinely revealed. Now from
the beginning of His conception Christ had the Divine fruition fully,
as will be shown ([3934]Q[34], A[4]), and hence he had not the virtue
of hope. Nevertheless He had hope as regards such things as He did not
yet possess, although He had not faith with regard to anything;
because, although He knew all things fully, wherefore faith was
altogether wanting to Him, nevertheless He did not as yet fully possess
all that pertained to His perfection, viz. immortality and glory of the
body, which He could hope for.
Reply to Objection 1: This is said of Christ with reference to hope,
not as a theological virtue, but inasmuch as He hoped for some other
things not yet possessed, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: The glory of the body does not pertain to
beatitude as being that in which beatitude principally consists, but by
a certain outpouring from the soul's glory, as was said above
([3935]FS, Q[4], A[6]). Hence hope, as a theological virtue, does not
regard the bliss of the body but the soul's bliss, which consists in
the Divine fruition.
Reply to Objection 3: The building up of the church by the conversion
of the faithful does not pertain to the perfection of Christ, whereby
He is perfect in Himself, but inasmuch as it leads others to a share of
His perfection. And because hope properly regards what is expected by
him who hopes, the virtue of hope cannot properly be said to be in
Christ, because of the aforesaid reason.
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Whether in Christ there were the gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts were not in Christ. For, as
is commonly said, the gifts are given to help the virtues. But what is
perfect in itself does not need an exterior help. Therefore, since the
virtues of Christ were perfect, it seems there were no gifts in Him.
Objection 2: Further, to give and to receive gifts would not seem to
belong to the same; since to give pertains to one who has, and to
receive pertains to one who has not. But it belongs to Christ to give
gifts according to Ps. 67:19. "Thou hast given gifts to men [Vulg.:
'Thou hast received gifts in men']." Therefore it was not becoming that
Christ should receive gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, four gifts would seem to pertain to the
contemplation of earth, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and
counsel which pertains to prudence; hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
3) enumerates these with the intellectual virtues. But Christ had the
contemplation of heaven. Therefore He had not these gifts.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 4:1): "Seven women shall take hold
of one man": on which a gloss says: "That is, the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost shall take hold of Christ."
I answer that, As was said above ([3936]FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts,
properly, are certain perfections of the soul's powers, inasmuch a[9]
these have a natural aptitude to be moved by the Holy Ghost, according
to Luke 4:1: "And Jesus, being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from
the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit into the desert." Hence it is
manifest that in Christ the gifts were in a pre-eminent degree.
Reply to Objection 1: What is perfect in the order of its nature needs
to be helped by something of a higher nature; as man, however perfect,
needs to be helped by God. And in this way the virtues, which perfect
the powers of the soul, as they are controlled by reason, no matter how
perfect they are, need to be helped by the gifts, which perfect the
soul's powers, inasmuch as these are moved by the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ is not a recipient and a giver of the
gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the same respect; for He gives them as God
and receives them as man. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the Holy
Ghost never quitted the human nature of Christ, from Whose Divine
nature He proceedeth."
Reply to Objection 3: In Christ there was not only heavenly knowledge,
but also earthly knowledge, as will be said (Q[15], A[10]). And yet
even in heaven the gifts of the Holy Ghost will still exist, in a
certain manner, as was said above ([3937]FS, Q[68], A[6]).
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Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of
fear. For hope would seem to be stronger than fear; since the object of
hope is goodness, and of fear, evil. as was said above ([3938]FS,
Q[40], A[1]; [3939]FS, Q[42], A[1]). But in Christ there was not the
virtue of hope, as was said above [3940](A[4]). Hence, likewise, there
was not the gift of fear in Him.
Objection 2: Further, by the gift of fear we fear either to be
separated from God, which pertains to "chaste" fear---or to be punished
by Him, which pertains to "servile" fear, as Augustine says (In Joan.
Tract. ix). But Christ did not fear being separated from God by sin,
nor being punished by Him on account of a fault, since it was
impossible for Him to sin, as will be said ([3941]Q[15], AA[1],2). Now
fear is not of the impossible. Therefore in Christ there was not the
gift of fear.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that "perfect charity
casteth out fear." But in Christ there was most perfect charity,
according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all
knowledge." Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:3): "And He shall be filled with
the spirit of the fear of the Lord."
I answer that, As was said above ([3942]FS, Q[42], A[1]), fear regards
two objects, one of which is an evil causing terror; the other is that
by whose power an evil can be inflicted, as we fear the king inasmuch
as he has the power of putting to death. Now whoever can hurt would not
be feared unless he had a certain greatness of might, to which
resistance could not easily be offered; for what we easily repel we do
not fear. And hence it is plain that no one is feared except for some
pre-eminence. And in this way it is said that in Christ there was the
fear of God, not indeed as it regards the evil of separation from God
by fault, nor as it regards the evil of punishment for fault; but
inasmuch as it regards the Divine pre-eminence, on account of which the
soul of Christ, led by the Holy Spirit, was borne towards God in an act
of reverence. Hence it is said (Heb. 5:7) that in all things "he was
heard for his reverence." For Christ as man had this act of reverence
towards God in a fuller sense and beyond all others. And hence
Scripture attributes to Him the fulness of the fear of the Lord.
Reply to Objection 1: The habits of virtues and gifts regard goodness
properly and of themselves; but evil, consequently; since it pertains
to the nature of virtue to render acts good, as is said Ethic. ii, 6.
And hence the nature of the gift of fear regards not that evil which
fear is concerned with, but the pre-eminence of that goodness, viz. of
God, by Whose power evil may be inflicted. on the other hand, hope, as
a virtue, regards not only the author of good, but even the good
itself, as far as it is not yet possessed. And hence to Christ, Who
already possessed the perfect good of beatitude, we do not attribute
the virtue of hope, but we do attribute the gift of fear.
Reply to Objection 2: This reason is based on fear in so far as it
regards the evil object.
Reply to Objection 3: Perfect charity casts out servile fear, which
principally regards punishment. But this kind of fear was not in
Christ.
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Whether the gratuitous graces were in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gratuitous graces were not in
Christ. For whoever has anything in its fulness, to him it does not
pertain to have it by participation. Now Christ has grace in its
fulness, according to Jn. 1:14: "Full of grace and truth." But the
gratuitous graces would seem to be certain participations, bestowed
distributively and particularly upon divers subjects, according to 1
Cor. 12:4: "Now there are diversities of graces." Therefore it would
seem that there were no gratuitous graces in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, what is due to anyone would not seem to be
gratuitously bestowed on him. But it was due to the man Christ that He
should abound in the word of wisdom and knowledge, and to be mighty in
doing wonderful works and the like, all of which pertain to gratuitous
graces: since He is "the power of God and the wisdom of God," as is
written 1 Cor. 1:24. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to have
the gratuitous graces.
Objection 3: Further, gratuitous graces are ordained to the benefit of
the faithful. But it does not seem that a habit which a man does not
use is for the benefit of others, according to Ecclus. 20:32: "Wisdom
that is hid and treasure that is not seen: what profit is there in them
both?" Now we do not read that Christ made use of these gratuitously
given graces, especially as regards the gift of tongues. Therefore not
all the gratuitous graces were in Christ.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan. cclxxxvii) that "as in
the head are all the senses, so in Christ were all the graces."
I answer that, As was said above ([3943]FS, Q[3], AA[1],4), the
gratuitous graces are ordained for the manifestation of faith and
spiritual doctrine. For it behooves him who teaches to have the means
of making his doctrine clear; otherwise his doctrine would be useless.
Now Christ is the first and chief teacher of spiritual doctrine and
faith, according to Heb. 2:3,4: "Which having begun to be declared by
the Lord was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing
them witness by signs and wonders." Hence it is clear that all the
gratuitous graces were most excellently in Christ, as in the first and
chief teacher of the faith.
Reply to Objection 1: As sanctifying grace is ordained to meritorious
acts both interior and exterior, so likewise gratuitous grace is
ordained to certain exterior acts manifestive of the faith, as the
working of miracles, and the like. Now of both these graces Christ had
the fulness. since inasmuch as His soul was united to the Godhead, He
had the perfect power of effecting all these acts. But other saints who
are moved by God as separated and not united instruments, receive power
in a particular manner in order to bring about this or that act. And
hence in other saints these graces are divided, but not in Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ is said to be the power of God and the
wisdom of God, inasmuch as He is the Eternal Son of God. But in this
respect it does not pertain to Him to have grace, but rather to be the
bestower of grace. but it pertains to Him in His human nature to have
grace.
Reply to Objection 3: The gift of tongues was bestowed on the apostles,
because they were sent to teach all nations; but Christ wished to
preach personally only in the one nation of the Jews, as He Himself
says (Mat. 15:24): "I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of
the house of Israel"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 15:8): "I say that
Christ Jesus was minister of the circumcision." And hence it was not
necessary for Him to speak several languages. Yet was a knowledge of
all languages not wanting to Him, since even the secrets of hearts, of
which all words are signs, were not hidden from Him, as will be shown
([3944]Q[10], A[2]). Nor was this knowledge uselessly possessed. just
as it is not useless to have a habit, which we do not use when there is
no occasion.
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Whether in Christ there was the gift of prophecy?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of
prophecy. For prophecy implies a certain obscure and imperfect
knowledge, according to Num. 12:6: "If there be among you a prophet of
the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a
dream." But Christ had full and unveiled knowledge, much more than
Moses, of whom it is subjoined that "plainly and not by riddles and
figures doth he see God" (Num. 6:8). Therefore we ought not to admit
prophecy in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, as faith has to do with what is not seen, and
hope with what is not possessed, so prophecy has to do with what is not
present, but distant; for a prophet means, as it were, a teller of
far-off things. But in Christ there could be neither faith nor hope, as
was said above ([3945]AA[3],4). Hence prophecy also ought not to be
admitted in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, a prophet is in an inferior order to an angel;
hence Moses, who was the greatest of the prophets, as was said above
([3946]SS, Q[174], A[4]) is said (Acts 7:38) to have spoken with an
angel in the desert. But Christ was "made lower than the angels," not
as to the knowledge of His soul, but only as regards the sufferings of
His body, as is shown Heb. 2:9. Therefore it seems that Christ was not
a prophet.
On the contrary, It is written of Him (Dt. 18:15): "Thy God will raise
up to thee a prophet of thy nation and of thy brethren," and He says of
Himself (Mat. 13:57; Jn. 4:44): "A prophet is not without honor, save
in his own country."
I answer that, A prophet means, as it were, a teller or seer of far-off
things, inasmuch as he knows and announces what things are far from
men's senses, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xvi, 18). Now we must
bear in mind that no one can be called a prophet for knowing and
announcing what is distant from others, with whom he is not. And this
is clear in regard to place and time. For if anyone living in France
were to know and announce to others living in France what things were
transpiring in Syria, it would be prophetical, as Eliseus told Giezi (4
Kings 5:26) how the man had leaped down from his chariot to meet him.
But if anyone living in Syria were to announce what things were there,
it would not be prophetical. And the same appears in regard to time.
For it was prophetical of Isaias to announce that Cyrus, King of the
Persians, would rebuild the temple of God, as is clear from Is. 44:28.
But it was not prophetical of Esdras to write it, in whose time it took
place. Hence if God or angels, or even the blessed, know and announce
what is beyond our knowing, this does not pertain to prophecy, since
they nowise touch our state. Now Christ before His passion touched our
state, inasmuch as He was not merely a "comprehensor," but a
"wayfarer." Hence it was prophetical in Him to know and announce what
was beyond the knowledge of other "wayfarers": and for this reason He
is called a prophet.
Reply to Objection 1: These words do not prove that enigmatical
knowledge, viz. by dream and vision, belongs to the nature of prophecy;
but the comparison is drawn between other prophets, who saw Divine
things in dreams and visions, and Moses, who saw God plainly and not by
riddles, and who yet is called a prophet, according to Dt. 24:10: "And
there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses." Nevertheless
it may be said that although Christ had full and unveiled knowledge as
regards the intellective part, yet in the imaginative part He had
certain similitudes, in which Divine things could be viewed, inasmuch
as He was not only a "comprehensor," but a "wayfarer."
Reply to Objection 2: Faith regards such things as are unseen by him
who believes; and hope, too, is of such things as are not possessed by
the one who hopes; but prophecy is of such things as are beyond the
sense of men, with whom the prophet dwells and converses in this state
of life. And hence faith and hope are repugnant to the perfection of
Christ's beatitude; but prophecy is not.
Reply to Objection 3: Angels, being "comprehensors," are above
prophets, who are merely "wayfarers"; but not above Christ, Who was
both a "comprehensor" and a "wayfarer."
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Whether in Christ there was the fulness of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the fulness of
grace. For the virtues flow from grace, as was said above ([3947]FS,
Q[110], A[4]). But in Christ there were not all the virtues; for there
was neither faith nor hope in Him, as was shown above ([3948]AA[3],4).
Therefore in Christ there was not the fulness of grace.
Objection 2: Further, as is plain from what was said above ([3949]FS,
Q[111], A[2]), grace is divided into operating and cooperating. Now
operating grace signifies that whereby the ungodly is justified, which
has no place in Christ, Who never lay under any sin. Therefore in
Christ there was not the fulness of grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 1:17): "Every best gift and
every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of
lights." But what comes thus is possessed partially, and not fully.
Therefore no creature, not even the soul of Christ, can have the
fulness of the gifts of grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His
glory'] full of grace and truth."
I answer that, To have fully is to have wholly and perfectly. Now
totality and perfection can be taken in two ways: First as regards
their "intensive" quantity; for instance, I may say that some man has
whiteness fully, because he has as much of it as can naturally be in
him; secondly, "as regards power"; for instance, if anyone be said to
have life fully, inasmuch as he has it in all the effects or works of
life; and thus man has life fully, but senseless animals or plants have
not. Now in both these ways Christ has the fulness of grace. First,
since He has grace in its highest degree, in the most perfect way it
can be had. And this appears, first, from the nearness of Christ's soul
to the cause of grace. For it was said above [3950](A[1]) that the
nearer a recipient is to the inflowing cause, the more it receives. And
hence the soul of Christ, which is more closely united to God than all
other rational creatures, receives the greatest outpouring of His
grace. Secondly, in His relation to the effect. For the soul of Christ
so received grace, that, in a manner, it is poured out from it upon
others. And hence it behooved Him to have the greatest grace; as fire
which is the cause of heat in other hot things, is of all things the
hottest.
Likewise, as regards the "virtue" of grace, He had grace fully, since
He had it for all the operations and effects of grace; and this,
because grace was bestowed on Him, as upon a universal principle in the
genus of such as have grace. Now the virtue of the first principle of a
genus universally extends itself to all the effects of that genus; thus
the force of the sun, which is the universal cause of generation, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), extends to all things that come under
generation. Hence the second fulness of grace is seen in Christ
inasmuch as His grace extends to all the effects of grace, which are
the virtues, gifts, and the like.
Reply to Objection 1: Faith and hope signify effects of grace with
certain defects on the part of the recipient of grace, inasmuch as
faith is of the unseen, and hope of what is not yet possessed. Hence it
was not necessary that in Christ, Who is the author of grace, there
should be any defects such as faith and hope imply; but whatever
perfection is in faith and hope was in Christ most perfectly; as in
fire there are not all the modes of heat which are defective by the
subject's defect, but whatever belongs to the perfection of heat.
Reply to Objection 2: It pertains essentially to operating grace to
justify; but that it makes the ungodly to be just is accidental to it
on the part of the subject, in which sin is found. Therefore the soul
of Christ was justified by operating grace, inasmuch as it was rendered
just and holy by it from the beginning of His conception; not that it
was until then sinful, or even not just.
Reply to Objection 3: The fulness of grace is attributed to the soul of
Christ according to the capacity of the creature and not by comparison
with the infinite fulness of the Divine goodness.
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Whether the fulness of grace is proper to Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fulness of grace is not proper to
Christ. For what is proper to anyone belongs to him alone. But to be
full of grace is attributed to some others; for it was said to the
Blessed Virgin (Lk. 1:28): "Hail, full of grace"; and again it is
written (Acts 6:8): "Stephen, full of grace and fortitude." Therefore
the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ.
Objection 2: Further, what can be communicated to others through Christ
does not seem to be proper to Christ. But the fulness of grace can be
communicated to others through Christ, since the Apostle says (Eph.
3:19): "That you may be filled unto all the fulness of God." Therefore
the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ.
Objection 3: Further, the state of the wayfarer seems to be
proportioned to the state of the comprehensor. But in the state of the
comprehensor there will be a certain fulness, since "in our heavenly
country with its fulness of all good, although some things are bestowed
in a pre-eminent way, yet nothing is possessed singularly," as is clear
from Gregory (Hom. De Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.). Therefore in the
state of the comprehensor the fulness of grace is possessed by
everyone, and hence the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ. on
the contrary, The fulness of grace is attributed to Christ inasmuch as
He is the only-begotten of the Father, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw
Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] as it were . . . the Only-begotten of the
Father, full of grace and truth." But to be the Only-begotten of the
Father is proper to Christ. Therefore it is proper to Him to be full of
grace and truth.
I answer that, The fulness of grace may be taken in two ways: First, on
the part of grace itself, or secondly on the part of the one who has
grace. Now on the part of grace itself there is said to be the fulness
of grace when the limit of grace is attained, as to essence and power,
inasmuch as grace is possessed in its highest possible excellence and
in its greatest possible extension to all its effects. And this fulness
of grace is proper to Christ. But on the part of the subject there is
said to be the fulness of grace when anyone fully possesses grace
according to his condition---whether as regards intensity, by reason of
grace being intense in him, to the limit assigned by God, according to
Eph. 4:1: "But to every one of us is given grace according to the
measure of the giving of Christ"---or "as regards power," by reason of
a man having the help of grace for all that belongs to his office or
state, as the Apostle says (Eph. 3:8): "To me, the least of all the
saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men." And this
fulness of grace is not proper to Christ, but is communicated to others
by Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: The Blessed Virgin is said to be full of grace,
not on the part of grace itself---since she had not grace in its
greatest possible excellence---nor for all the effects of grace; but
she is said to be full of grace in reference to herself, i.e. inasmuch
as she had sufficient grace for the state to which God had chosen her,
i.e. to be the mother of His Only-begotten. So, too, Stephen is said to
be full of grace, since he had sufficient grace to be a fit minister
and witness of God, to which office he had been called. And the same
must be said of others. Of these fulnesses one is greater than another,
according as one is divinely pre-ordained to a higher or lower state.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle is there speaking of that fulness
which has reference to the subject, in comparison with what man is
divinely pre-ordained to; and this is either something in common, to
which all the saints are pre-ordained, or something special, which
pertains to the pre-eminence of some. And in this manner a certain
fulness of grace is common to all the saints, viz. to have grace enough
to merit eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God. And this
is the fulness of grace which the Apostle desires for the faithful to
whom he writes.
Reply to Objection 3: These gifts which are in common in heaven, viz.:
vision, possession and fruition, and the like, have certain gifts
corresponding to them in this life which are also common to all the
saints. Yet there are certain prerogatives of saints, both in heaven
and on earth, which are not possessed by all.
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Whether the grace of Christ is infinite?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's grace is infinite. For
everything immeasurable is infinite. But the grace of Christ is
immeasurable; since it is written (Jn. 3:34): "For God doth not give
the Spirit by measure to His Son [*'To His Son' is lacking in the
Vulgate], namely Christ." Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.
Objection 2: Further, an infinite effect betokens an infinite power
which can only spring from an infinite essence. But the effect of
Christ's grace is infinite, since it extends to the salvation of the
whole human race; for He is the propitiation for our sins . . . and for
those of the whole world, as is said (1 Jn. 2:2). Therefore the grace
of Christ is infinite.
Objection 3: Further, every finite thing by addition can attain to the
quantity of any other finite thing. Therefore if the grace of Christ is
finite the grace of any other man could increase to such an extent as
to reach to an equality with Christ's grace, against what is written
(Job 28:17): "Gold nor crystal cannot equal it," as Gregory expounds it
(Moral. xviii). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.
On the contrary, Grace is something created in the soul. But every
created thing is finite, according to Wis. 11:21: "Thou hast ordered
all things in measure and number and weight." Therefore the grace of
Christ is not infinite.
I answer that, As was made clear above ([3951]Q[2], A[10]), a twofold
grace may be considered in Christ; the first being the grace of union,
which, as was said ([3952]Q[6], A[6]), is for Him to be personally
united to the Son of God, which union has been bestowed gratis on the
human nature; and it is clear that this grace is infinite, as the
Person of God is infinite. The second is habitual grace; which may be
taken in two ways: first as a being, and in this way it must be a
finite being, since it is in the soul of Christ, as in a subject, and
Christ's soul is a creature having a finite capacity; hence the being
of grace cannot be infinite, since it cannot exceed its subject.
Secondly it may be viewed in its specific nature of grace; and thus the
grace of Christ can be termed infinite, since it is not limited, i.e.
it has whatsoever can pertain to the nature of grace, and what pertains
to the nature of grace is not bestowed on Him in a fixed measure;
seeing that "according to the purpose" of God to Whom it pertains to
measure grace, it is bestowed on Christ's soul as on a universal
principle for bestowing grace on human nature, according to Eph. 1:5,6,
"He hath graced us in His beloved Son"; thus we might say that the
light of the sun is infinite, not indeed in being, but in the nature of
light, as having whatever can pertain to the nature of light.
Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that the Father "doth not give
the Spirit by measure," it may be expounded of the gift which God the
Father from all eternity gave the Son, viz. the Divine Nature, which is
an infinite gift. Hence the comment of a certain gloss: "So that the
Son may be as great as the Father is." Or again, it may be referred to
the gift which is given the human nature, to be united to the Divine
Person, and this also is an infinite gift. Hence a gloss says on this
text: "As the Father begot a full and perfect Word, it is united thus
full and perfect to human nature." Thirdly, it may be referred to
habitual grace, inasmuch as the grace of Christ extends to whatever
belongs to grace. Hence Augustine expounding this (Tract. xiv in Joan.)
says: "The division of the gifts is a measurement. For to one indeed by
the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of
knowledge." But Christ the giver does not receive by measure.
Reply to Objection 2: The grace of Christ has an infinite effect, both
because of the aforesaid infinity of grace, and because of the unity
[*Perhaps we should read 'infinity'---Ed.] of the Divine Person, to
Whom Christ's soul is united.
Reply to Objection 3: The lesser can attain by augment to the quantity
of the greater, when both have the same kind of quantity. But the grace
of any man is compared to the grace of Christ as a particular to a
universal power; hence as the force of fire, no matter how much it
increases, can never equal the sun's strength, so the grace of a man,
no matter how much it increases, can never equal the grace of Christ.
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Whether the grace of Christ could increase?
Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of Christ could increase. For
to every finite thing addition can be made. But the grace of Christ was
finite. Therefore it could increase.
Objection 2: Further, it is by Divine power that grace is increased,
according to 2 Cor. 9:8: "And God is able to make all grace abound in
you." But the Divine power, being infinite, is confined by no limits.
Therefore it seems that the grace of Christ could have been greater.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 2:52) that the child "Jesus
advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men." Therefore the
grace of Christ could increase.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His
glory'] as it were . . . the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace
and truth." But nothing can be or can be thought greater than that
anyone should be the Only-begotten of the Father. Therefore no greater
grace can be or can be thought than that of which Christ was full.
I answer that, For a form to be incapable of increase happens in two
ways: First on the part of the subject; secondly, on the part of the
form itself. On the part of the subject, indeed, when the subject
reaches the utmost limit wherein it partakes of this form, after its
own manner, e.g. if we say that air cannot increase in heat, when it
has reached the utmost limit of heat which can exist in the nature of
air, although there may be greater heat in actual existence, viz. the
heat of fire. But on the part of the form, the possibility of increase
is excluded when a subject reaches the utmost perfection which this
form can have by nature, e.g. if we say the heat of fire cannot be
increased because there cannot be a more perfect grade of heat than
that to which fire attains. Now the proper measure of grace, like that
of other forms, is determined by the Divine wisdom, according to Wis.
11:21: "Thou hast ordered all things in number, weight and measure."
And it is with reference to its end that a measure is set to every
form. as there is no greater gravity than that of the earth, because
there is no lower place than that of the earth. Now the end of grace is
the union of the rational creature with God. But there can neither be
nor be thought a greater union of the rational creature with God than
that which is in the Person. And hence the grace of Christ reached the
highest measure of grace. Hence it is clear that the grace of Christ
cannot be increased on the part of grace. But neither can it be
increased on the part of the subject, since Christ as man was a true
and full comprehensor from the first instant of His conception. Hence
there could have been no increase of grace in Him, as there could be
none in the rest of the blessed, whose grace could not increase, seeing
that they have reached their last end. But as regards men who are
wholly wayfarers, their grace can be increased not merely on the part
of the form, since they have not attained the highest degree of grace,
but also on the part of the subject, since they have not yet attained
their end.
Reply to Objection 1: If we speak of mathematical quantity, addition
can be made to any finite quantity, since there is nothing on the part
of finite quantity which is repugnant to addition. But if we speak of
natural quantity, there may be repugnance on the part of the form to
which a determined quantity is due, even as other accidents are
determined. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 41) that "there is
naturally a term of all things, and a fixed limit of magnitude and
increase." And hence to the quantity of the whole there can be no
addition. And still more must we suppose a term in the forms
themselves, beyond which they may not go. Hence it is not necessary
that addition should be capable of being made to Christ's grace,
although it is finite in its essence.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the Divine power can make something
greater and better than the habitual grace of Christ, yet it could not
make it to be ordained to anything greater than the personal union with
the Only-begotten Son of the Father; and to this union, by the purpose
of the Divine wisdom, the measure of grace is sufficient.
Reply to Objection 3: Anyone may increase in wisdom and grace in two
ways. First inasmuch as the very habits of wisdom and grace are
increased; and in this way Christ did not increase. Secondly, as
regards the effects, i.e. inasmuch as they do wiser and greater works;
and in this way Christ increased in wisdom and grace even as in age,
since in the course of time He did more perfect works, to prove Himself
true man, both in the things of God, and in the things of man.
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Whether the habitual grace of Christ followed after the union?
Objection 1: It would seem that the habitual grace did not follow after
the union. For nothing follows itself. But this habitual grace seems to
be the same as the grace of union; for Augustine says (De Praedest.
Sanct. xv): "Every man becomes a Christian from the beginning of his
belief, by the same grace whereby this Man from His beginning became
Christ"; and of these two the first pertains to habitual grace and the
second to the grace of union. Therefore it would seem that habitual
grace did not follow upon the union.
Objection 2: Further, disposition precedes perfection, if not in time,
at least in thought. But the habitual grace seems to be a disposition
in human nature for the personal union. Therefore it seems that the
habitual grace did not follow but rather preceded the union.
Objection 3: Further, the common precedes the proper. But habitual
grace is common to Christ and other men; and the grace of union is
proper to Christ. Therefore habitual grace is prior in thought to the
union. Therefore it does not follow it.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 42:1): "Behold my servant, I will
uphold Him . . . "and farther on: "I have given My Spirit upon Him";
and this pertains to the gift of habitual grace. Hence it remains that
the assumption of human nature to the unity of the Person preceded the
habitual grace of Christ.
I answer that, The union of the human nature with the Divine Person,
which, as we have said above ([3953]Q[2], A[10];[3954] Q[6], A[6]), is
the grace of union, precedes the habitual grace of Christ, not in order
of time, but by nature and in thought; and this for a triple reason:
First, with reference to the order of the principles of both. For the
principle of the union is the Person of the Son assuming human nature,
Who is said to be sent into the world, inasmuch as He assumed human
nature; but the principle of habitual grace, which is given with
charity, is the Holy Ghost, Who is said to be sent inasmuch as He
dwells in the mind by charity. Now the mission of the Son is prior, in
the order of nature, to the mission of the Holy Ghost, even as in the
order of nature the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, and love from
wisdom. Hence the personal union, according to which the mission of the
Son took place, is prior in the order of nature to habitual grace,
according to which the mission of the Holy Ghost takes place. Secondly,
the reason of this order may be taken from the relation of grace to its
cause. For grace is caused in man by the presence of the Godhead, as
light in the air by the presence of the sun. Hence it is written
(Ezech. 43:2): "The glory of the God of Israel came in by the way of
the east . . . and the earth shone with His majesty." But the presence
of God in Christ is by the union of human nature with the Divine
Person. Hence the habitual grace of Christ is understood to follow this
union, as light follows the sun. Thirdly, the reason of this union can
be taken from the end of grace, since it is ordained to acting rightly,
and action belongs to the suppositum and the individual. Hence action
and, in consequence, grace ordaining thereto, presuppose the hypostasis
which operates. Now the hypostasis did not exist in the human nature
before the union, as is clear from[3955] Q[4], A[2]. Therefore the
grace of union precedes, in thought, habitual grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine here means by grace the gratuitous will
of God, bestowing benefits gratis; and hence every man is said to be
made a Christian by the same grace whereby a Man became Christ, since
both take place by the gratuitous will of God without merits.
Reply to Objection 2: As disposition in the order of generation
precedes the perfection to which it disposes, in such things as are
gradually perfected; so it naturally follows the perfection which one
has already obtained; as heat, which was a disposition to the form of
fire, is an effect flowing from the form of already existing fire. Now
the human nature in Christ is united to the Person of the Word from the
beginning without succession. Hence habitual grace is not understood to
have preceded the union, but to have followed it; as a natural
property. Hence, as Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "Grace is in a
manner natural to the Man Christ."
Reply to Objection 3: The common precedes the proper, when both are of
the same genus; but when they are of divers genera, there is nothing to
prevent the proper being prior to the common. Now the grace of union is
not in the same genus as habitual grace; but is above all genera even
as the Divine Person Himself. Hence there is nothing to prevent this
proper from being before the common since it does not result from
something being added to the common, but is rather the principle and
source of that which is common.
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OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AS HE IS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the grace of Christ as the Head of the Church; and
under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is the Head of the Church?
(2) Whether He is the Head of men as regards their bodies or only as
regards their souls?
(3) Whether He is the Head of all men?
(4) Whether He is the Head of the angels?
(5) Whether the grace of Christ as Head of the Church is the same as
His habitual grace as an individual man?
(6) Whether to be Head of the Church is proper to Christ?
(7) Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?
(8) Whether Anti-christ can be called the head of all the wicked?
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Whether Christ is the Head of the Church?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to
be Head of the Church. For the head imparts sense and motion to the
members. Now spiritual sense and motion which are by grace, are not
imparted to us by the Man Christ, because, as Augustine says (De Trin.
i, 12; xv, 24), "not even Christ, as man, but only as God, bestows the
Holy Ghost." Therefore it does not belong to Him as man to be Head of
the Church.
Objection 2: Further, it is not fitting for the head to have a head.
But God is the Head of Christ, as man, according to 1 Cor. 11:3, "The
Head of Christ is God." Therefore Christ Himself is not a head.
Objection 3: Furthermore, the head of a man is a particular member,
receiving an influx from the heart. But Christ is the universal
principle of the whole Church. Therefore He is not the Head of the
Church.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:22): "And He . . . hath made Him
head over all the Church."
I answer that, As the whole Church is termed one mystic body from its
likeness to the natural body of a man, which in divers members has
divers acts, as the Apostle teaches (Rom. 12; 1 Cor. 12), so likewise
Christ is called the Head of the Church from a likeness with the human
head, in which we may consider three things, viz. order, perfection,
and power: "Order," indeed; for the head is the first part of man,
beginning from the higher part; and hence it is that every principle is
usually called a head according to Ezech. 16:25: "At every head of the
way, thou hast set up a sign of thy prostitution"---"Perfection,"
inasmuch as in the head dwell all the senses, both interior and
exterior, whereas in the other members there is only touch, and hence
it is said (Is. 9:15): "The aged and honorable, he is the
head"---"Power," because the power and movement of the other members,
together with the direction of them in their acts, is from the head, by
reason of the sensitive and motive power there ruling; hence the ruler
is called the head of a people, according to 1 Kings 15:17: "When thou
wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the
tribes of Israel?" Now these three things belong spiritually to Christ.
First, on account of His nearness to God His grace is the highest and
first, though not in time, since all have received grace on account of
His grace, according to Rom. 8:29: "For whom He foreknew, He also
predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He
might be the first-born amongst many brethren." Secondly, He had
perfection as regards the fulness of all graces, according to Jn. 1:14,
"We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] . . . full of grace and truth," as was
shown[3956], Q[7], A[9]. Thirdly, He has the power of bestowing grace
on all the members of the Church, according to Jn. 1:16: "Of His
fulness we have all received." And thus it is plain that Christ is
fittingly called the Head of the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: To give grace or the Holy Ghost belongs to Christ
as He is God, authoritatively; but instrumentally it belongs also to
Him as man, inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead.
And hence by the power of the Godhead His actions were beneficial, i.e.
by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently. But
Augustine denies that Christ as man gives the Holy Ghost
authoritatively. Even other saints are said to give the Holy Ghost
instrumentally, or ministerially, according to Gal. 3:5: "He . . . who
giveth to you the Spirit."
Reply to Objection 2: In metaphorical speech we must not expect a
likeness in all respects; for thus there would be not likeness but
identity. Accordingly a natural head has not another head because one
human body is not part of another; but a metaphorical body, i.e. an
ordered multitude, is part of another multitude as the domestic
multitude is part of the civil multitude; and hence the father who is
head of the domestic multitude has a head above him, i.e. the civil
governor. And hence there is no reason why God should not be the Head
of Christ, although Christ Himself is Head of the Church.
Reply to Objection 3: The head has a manifest pre-eminence over the
other exterior members; but the heart has a certain hidden influence.
And hence the Holy Ghost is likened to the heart, since He invisibly
quickens and unifies the Church; but Christ is likened to the Head in
His visible nature in which man is set over man.
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Whether Christ is the Head of men as to their bodies or only as to their
souls?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of men as to
their bodies. For Christ is said to be the Head of the Church inasmuch
as He bestows spiritual sense and the movement of grace on the Church.
But a body is not capable of this spiritual sense and movement.
Therefore Christ is not the Head of men as regards their bodies.
Objection 2: Further, we share bodies with the brutes. If therefore
Christ was the Head of men as to their bodies, it would follow that He
was the Head of brute animals; and this is not fitting.
Objection 3: Further, Christ took His body from other men, as is clear
from Mat. 1 and Luke 3. But the head is the first of the members, as
was said above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore Christ is not the Head of the
Church as regards bodies.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 3:21): "Who will reform the body
of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory."
I answer that, The human body has a natural relation to the rational
soul, which is its proper form and motor. Inasmuch as the soul is its
form, it receives from the soul life and the other properties which
belong specifically to man; but inasmuch as the soul is its motor, the
body serves the soul instrumentally. Therefore we must hold that the
manhood of Christ had the power of "influence," inasmuch as it is
united to the Word of God, to Whom His body is united through the soul,
as stated above ([3957]Q[6], A[1]). Hence the whole manhood of Christ,
i.e. according to soul and body, influences all, both in soul and body;
but principally the soul, and secondarily the body: First, inasmuch as
the "members of the body are presented as instruments of justice" in
the soul that lives through Christ, as the Apostle says (Rom. 6:13):
secondly, inasmuch as the life of glory flows from the soul on to the
body, according to Rom. 8:11: "He that raised up Jesus from the dead
shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that
dwelleth in you."
Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual sense of grace does not reach to
the body first and principally, but secondarily and instrumentally, as
was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: The body of an animal has no relation to a
rational soul, as the human body has. Hence there is no parity.
Reply to Objection 3: Although Christ drew the matter of His body from
other men, yet all draw from Him the immortal life of their body,
according to 1 Cor. 15:22: "And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ
all shall be made alive."
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Whether Christ is the Head of all men?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of all men. For
the head has no relation except to the members of its body. Now the
unbaptized are nowise members of the Church which is the body of
Christ, as it is written (Eph. 1:23). Therefore Christ is not the Head
of all men.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle writes to the Ephesians (5:25,27):
"Christ delivered Himself up for" the Church "that He might present it
to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such
thing." But there are many of the faithful in whom is found the spot or
the wrinkle of sin. Therefore Christ is not the Head of all the
faithful.
Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law are compared to
Christ as the shadow to the body, as is written (Col. 2:17). But the
fathers of the Old Testament in their day served unto these sacraments,
according to Heb. 8:5: "Who serve unto the example and shadow of
heavenly things." Hence they did not pertain to Christ's body, and
therefore Christ is not the Head of all men.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 4:10): "Who is the Saviour of
all men, especially of the faithful," and (1 Jn. 2:2): "He is the
propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of
the whole world." Now to save men and to be a propitiation for their
sins belongs to Christ as Head. Therefore Christ is the Head of all
men.
I answer that, This is the difference between the natural body of man
and the Church's mystical body, that the members of the natural body
are all together, and the members of the mystical are not all
together---neither as regards their natural being, since the body of
the Church is made up of the men who have been from the beginning of
the world until its end---nor as regards their supernatural being,
since, of those who are at any one time, some there are who are without
grace, yet will afterwards obtain it, and some have it already. We must
therefore consider the members of the mystical body not only as they
are in act, but as they are in potentiality. Nevertheless, some are in
potentiality who will never be reduced to act, and some are reduced at
some time to act; and this according to the triple class, of which the
first is by faith, the second by the charity of this life, the third by
the fruition of the life to come. Hence we must say that if we take the
whole time of the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but
diversely. For, first and principally, He is the Head of such as are
united to Him by glory; secondly, of those who are actually united to
Him by charity; thirdly, of those who are actually united to Him by
faith; fourthly, of those who are united to Him merely in potentiality,
which is not yet reduced to act, yet will be reduced to act according
to Divine predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to Him in
potentiality, which will never be reduced to act; such are those men
existing in the world, who are not predestined, who, however, on their
departure from this world, wholly cease to be members of Christ, as
being no longer in potentiality to be united to Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who are unbaptized, though not actually in
the Church, are in the Church potentially. And this potentiality is
rooted in two things---first and principally, in the power of Christ,
which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race;
secondly, in free-will.
Reply to Objection 2: To be "a glorious Church not having spot or
wrinkle" is the ultimate end to which we are brought by the Passion of
Christ. Hence this will be in heaven, and not on earth, in which "if we
say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves," as is written (1 Jn. 1:8).
Nevertheless, there are some, viz. mortal, sins from which they are
free who are members of Christ by the actual union of charity; but such
as are tainted with these sins are not members of Christ actually, but
potentially; except, perhaps, imperfectly, by formless faith, which
unites to God, relatively but not simply, viz. so that man partake of
the life of grace. For, as is written (James 2:20): "Faith without
works is dead." Yet such as these receive from Christ a certain vital
act, i.e. to believe, as if a lifeless limb were moved by a man to some
extent.
Reply to Objection 3: The holy Fathers made use of the legal
sacraments, not as realities, but as images and shadows of what was to
come. Now it is the same motion to an image as image, and to the
reality, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. ii).
Hence the ancient Fathers, by observing the legal sacraments, were
borne to Christ by the same faith and love whereby we also are borne to
Him, and hence the ancient Fathers belong to the same Church as we.
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Whether Christ is the Head of the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is not the head of the
angels. For the head and members are of one nature. But Christ as man
is not of the same nature with the angels, but only with men, since, as
is written (Heb. 2:16): "For nowhere doth He take hold of the angels,
but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold." Therefore Christ as man is
not the head of the angels.
Objection 2: Further, Christ is the head of such as belong to the
Church, which is His Body, as is written (Eph. 1:23). But the angels do
not belong to the Church. For the Church is the congregation of the
faithful: and in the angels there is no faith, for they do not "walk by
faith" but "by sight," otherwise they would be "absent from the Lord,"
as the Apostle argues (2 Cor. 5:6,7). Therefore Christ as man is not
head of the angels.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix; xxiii in Joan.), that
as "the Word" which "was in the beginning with the Father" quickens
souls, so the "Word made flesh" quickens bodies, which angels lack. But
the Word made flesh is Christ as man. Therefore Christ as man does not
give life to angels, and hence as man He is not the head of the angels.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:10), "Who is the head of all
Principality and Power," and the same reason holds good with the other
orders of angels. Therefore Christ is the Head of the angels.
I answer that, As was said above (A[1], ad 2), where there is one body
we must allow that there is one head. Now a multitude ordained to one
end, with distinct acts and duties, may be metaphorically called one
body. But it is manifest that both men and angels are ordained to one
end, which is the glory of the Divine fruition. Hence the mystical body
of the Church consists not only of men but of angels. Now of all this
multitude Christ is the Head, since He is nearer God, and shares His
gifts more fully, not only than man, but even than angels; and of His
influence not only men but even angels partake, since it is written
(Eph. 1:20-22): that God the Father set "Him," namely Christ, "on His
right hand in the heavenly places, above all Principality and Power and
Virtue and Dominion and every name that is named not only in this
world, but also in that which is to come. And He hath subjected all
things under His feet." Therefore Christ is not only the Head of men,
but of angels. Hence we read (Mat. 4:11) that "angels came and
ministered to Him."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's influence over men is chiefly with
regard to their souls; wherein men agree with angels in generic nature,
though not in specific nature. By reason of this agreement Christ can
be said to be the Head of the angels, although the agreement falls
short as regards the body.
Reply to Objection 2: The Church, on earth, is the congregation of the
faithful; but, in heaven, it is the congregation of comprehensors. Now
Christ was not merely a wayfarer, but a comprehensor. And therefore He
is the Head not merely of the faithful, but of comprehensors, as having
grace and glory most fully.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine here uses the similitude of cause and
effect, i.e. inasmuch as corporeal things act on bodies, and spiritual
things on spiritual things. Nevertheless, the humanity of Christ, by
virtue of the spiritual nature, i.e. the Divine, can cause something
not only in the spirits of men, but also in the spirits of angels, on
account of its most close conjunction with God, i.e. by personal union.
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Whether the grace of Christ, as Head of the Church, is the same as His
habitual grace, inasmuch as He is Man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the grace whereby Christ is Head of the
Church and the individual grace of the Man are not the same. For the
Apostle says (Rom. 5:15): "If by the offense of one many died, much
more the grace of God and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus
Christ, hath abounded unto many." But the actual sin of Adam is
distinct from original sin which he transmitted to his posterity. Hence
the personal grace which is proper to Christ is distinct from His
grace, inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, which flows to others
from Him.
Objection 2: Further, habits are distinguished by acts. But the
personal grace of Christ is ordained to one act, viz. the
sanctification of His soul; and the capital grace is ordained to
another, viz. to sanctifying others. Therefore the personal grace of
Christ is distinct from His grace as He is the Head of the Church.
Objection 3: Further, as was said above ([3958]Q[6], A[6]), in Christ
we distinguish a threefold grace, viz. the grace of union, capital
grace, and the individual grace of the Man. Now the individual grace of
Christ is distinct from the grace of union. Therefore it is also
distinct from the capital grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:16): "Of His fulness we all have
received." Now He is our Head, inasmuch as we receive from Him.
Therefore He is our Head, inasmuch as He has the fulness of grace. Now
He had the fulness of grace, inasmuch as personal grace was in Him in
its perfection, as was said above ([3959]Q[7], A[9]). Hence His capital
and personal grace are not distinct.
I answer that, Since everything acts inasmuch as it is a being in act,
it must be the same act whereby it is in act and whereby it acts, as it
is the same heat whereby fire is hot and whereby it heats. Yet not
every act whereby anything is in act suffices for its being the
principle of acting upon others. For since the agent is nobler than the
patient, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and the Philosopher
(De Anima iii, 19), the agent must act on others by reason of a certain
pre-eminence. Now it was said above [3960](A[1]; Q[7], A[9]) grace was
received by the soul of Christ in the highest way; and therefore from
this pre-eminence of grace which He received, it is from Him that this
grace is bestowed on others---and this belongs to the nature of head.
Hence the personal grace, whereby the soul of Christ is justified, is
essentially the same as His grace, as He is the Head of the Church, and
justifies others; but there is a distinction of reason between them.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin in Adam, which is a sin of the
nature, is derived from his actual sin, which is a personal sin,
because in him the person corrupted the nature; and by means of this
corruption the sin of the first man is transmitted to posterity,
inasmuch as the corrupt nature corrupts the person. Now grace is not
vouchsafed us by means of human nature, but solely by the personal
action of Christ Himself. Hence we must not distinguish a twofold grace
in Christ, one corresponding to the nature, the other to the person as
in Adam we distinguish the sin of the nature and of the person.
Reply to Objection 2: Different acts, one of which is the reason and
the cause of the other, do not diversify a habit. Now the act of the
personal grace which is formally to sanctify its subject, is the reason
of the justification of others, which pertains to capital grace. Hence
it is that the essence of the habit is not diversified by this
difference.
Reply to Objection 3: Personal and capital grace are ordained to an
act; but the grace of union is not ordained to an act, but to the
personal being. Hence the personal and the capital grace agree in the
essence of the habit; but the grace of union does not, although the
personal grace can be called in a manner the grace of union, inasmuch
as it brings about a fitness for the union; and thus the grace of
union, the capital, and the personal grace are one in essence, though
there is a distinction of reason between them.
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Whether it is proper to Christ to be Head of the Church?
Objection 1: It seems that it is not proper to Christ to be Head of the
Church. For it is written (1 Kings 15:17): "When thou wast a little one
in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel?"
Now there is but one Church in the New and the Old Testament. Therefore
it seems that with equal reason any other man than Christ might be head
of the Church.
Objection 2: Further, Christ is called Head of the Church from His
bestowing grace on the Church's members. But it belongs to others also
to grant grace to others, according to Eph. 4:29: "Let no evil speech
proceed from your mouth; but that which is good to the edification of
faith, that it may administer grace to the hearers." Therefore it seems
to belong also to others than Christ to be head of the Church.
Objection 3: Further, Christ by His ruling over the Church is not only
called "Head," but also "Shepherd" and "Foundation." Now Christ did not
retain for Himself alone the name of Shepherd, according to 1 Pet. 5:4,
"And when the prince of pastors shall appear, you shall receive a
never-fading crown of glory"; nor the name of Foundation, according to
Apoc. 21:14: "And the wall of the city had twelve foundations."
Therefore it seems that He did not retain the name of Head for Himself
alone.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:19): "The head" of the Church is
that "from which the whole body, by joints and bands being supplied
with nourishment and compacted groweth unto the increase of God." But
this belongs only to Christ. Therefore Christ alone is Head of the
Church.
I answer that, The head influences the other members in two ways.
First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive and
sensitive force flow from the head to the other members; secondly, by a
certain exterior guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses, which
are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now the
interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, Whose manhood,
through its union with the Godhead, has the power of justifying; but
the influence over the members of the Church, as regards their exterior
guidance, can belong to others; and in this way others may be called
heads of the Church, according to Amos 6:1, "Ye great men, heads of the
people"; differently, however, from Christ. First, inasmuch as Christ
is the Head of all who pertain to the Church in every place and time
and state; but all other men are called heads with reference to certain
special places, as bishops of their Churches. Or with reference to a
determined time as the Pope is the head of the whole Church, viz.
during the time of his Pontificate, and with reference to a determined
state, inasmuch as they are in the state of wayfarers. Secondly,
because Christ is the Head of the Church by His own power and
authority; while others are called heads, as taking Christ's place,
according to 2 Cor. 2:10, "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned
anything, for your sakes I have done it in the person of Christ," and 2
Cor. 5:20, "For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God, as it were,
exhorting by us."
Reply to Objection 1: The word "head" is employed in that passage in
regard to exterior government; as a king is said to be the head of his
kingdom.
Reply to Objection 2: Man does not distribute grace by interior influx,
but by exteriorly persuading to the effects of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xlvi in Joan.): "If the
rulers of the Church are Shepherds, how is there one Shepherd, except
that all these are members of one Shepherd?" So likewise others may be
called foundations and heads, inasmuch as they are members of the one
Head and Foundation. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (Tract. xlvii),
"He gave to His members to be shepherds; yet none of us calleth himself
the Door. He kept this for Himself alone." And this because by door is
implied the principal authority, inasmuch as it is by the door that all
enter the house; and it is Christ alone by "Whom also we have access .
. . into this grace, wherein we stand" (Rom. 5:2); but by the other
names above-mentioned there may be implied not merely the principal but
also the secondary authority.
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Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is not the head of the
wicked. For it belongs to the head to diffuse sense and movement into
the members, as a gloss says, on Eph. 1:22, "And made Him head," etc.
But the devil has no power of spreading the evil of sin, which proceeds
from the will of the sinner. Therefore the devil cannot be called the
head of the wicked.
Objection 2: Further, by every sin a man is made evil. But not every
sin is from the devil; and this is plain as regards the demons, who did
not sin through the persuasion of another; so likewise not every sin of
man proceeds from the devil, for it is said (De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxii):
"Not all our wicked thoughts are always raised up by the suggestion of
the devil; but sometimes they spring from the movement of our will."
Therefore the devil is not the head of all the wicked.
Objection 3: Further, one head is placed on one body. But the whole
multitude of the wicked do not seem to have anything in which they are
united, for evil is contrary to evil and springs from divers defects,
as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the devil cannot be called
the head of all the wicked.
On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xiv] on Job 18:17, "Let
the memory of him perish from the earth," says: "This is said of every
evil one, yet so as to be referred to the head," i.e. the devil.
I answer that, As was said above [3961](A[6]), the head not only
influences the members interiorly, but also governs them exteriorly,
directing their actions to an end. Hence it may be said that anyone is
the head of a multitude, either as regards both, i.e. by interior
influence and exterior governance, and thus Christ is the Head of the
Church, as was stated [3962](A[6]); or as regards exterior governance,
and thus every prince or prelate is head of the multitude subject to
him. And in this way the devil is head of all the wicked. For, as is
written (Job 41:25): "He is king over all the children of pride." Now
it belongs to a governor to lead those whom he governs to their end.
But the end of the devil is the aversion of the rational creature from
God; hence from the beginning he has endeavored to lead man from
obeying the Divine precept. But aversion from God has the nature of an
end, inasmuch as it is sought for under the appearance of liberty,
according to Jer. 2:20: "Of old time thou hast broken my yoke, thou
hast burst my bands, and thou saidst, 'I will not serve.'" Hence,
inasmuch as some are brought to this end by sinning, they fall under
the rule and government of the devil, and therefore he is called their
head.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the devil does not influence the
rational mind interiorly, yet he beguiles it to evil by persuasion.
Reply to Objection 2: A governor does not always suggest to his
subjects to obey his will; but proposes to all the sign of his will, in
consequence of which some are incited by inducement, and some of their
own free-will, as is plain in the leader of an army, whose standard all
the soldiers follow, though no one persuades them. Therefore in the
same way, the first sin of the devil, who "sinneth from the beginning"
(1 Jn. 3:8), is held out to all to be followed, and some imitate at his
suggestion, and some of their own will without any suggestion. And
hence the devil is the head of all the wicked, inasmuch as they imitate
Him, according to Wis. 2:24,25: "By the envy of the devil, death came
into the world. And they follow him that are of his side."
Reply to Objection 3: All sins agree in aversion from God, although
they differ by conversion to different changeable goods.
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Whether Anti-christ may be called the head of all the wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that Antichrist is not the head of the
wicked. For there are not several heads of one body. But the devil is
the head of the multitude of the wicked. Therefore Anti-christ is not
their head.
Objection 2: Further, Anti-christ is a member of the devil. Now the
head is distinguished from the members. Therefore Anti-christ is not
the head of the wicked.
Objection 3: Further, the head has an influence over the members. But
Anti-christ has no influence over the wicked who have preceded him.
Therefore Anti-christ is not the head of the wicked.
On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xv] on Job 21:29, "Ask
any of them that go by the way," says: "Whilst he was speaking of the
body of all the wicked, suddenly he turned his speech to Anti-christ
the head of all evil-doers."
I answer that, As was said above [3963](A[1]), in the head are found
three things: order, perfection, and the power of influencing. But as
regards the order of the body, Anti-christ is not said to be the head
of the wicked as if his sin had preceded, as the sin of the devil
preceded. So likewise he is not called the head of the wicked from the
power of influencing, although he will pervert some in his day by
exterior persuasion; nevertheless those who were before him were not
beguiled into wickedness by him nor have imitated his wickedness. Hence
he cannot be called the head of all the wicked in this way, but of
some. Therefore it remains to be said that he is the head of all the
wicked by reason of the perfection of his wickedness. Hence, on 2
Thess. 2:4, "Showing himself as if he were God," a gloss says: "As in
Christ dwelt the fulness of the Godhead, so in Anti-christ the fulness
of all wickedness." Not indeed as if his humanity were assumed by the
devil into unity of person, as the humanity of Christ by the Son of
God; but that the devil by suggestion infuses his wickedness more
copiously into him than into all others. And in this way all the wicked
who have gone before are signs of Anti-christ, according to 2 Thess.
2:7, "For the mystery of iniquity already worketh."
Reply to Objection 1: The devil and Anti-christ are not two heads, but
one; since Anti-christ is called the head, inasmuch as the wickedness
of the devil is most fully impressed on him. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4,
"Showing himself as if he were God," a gloss says: "The head of all the
wicked, namely the devil, who is king over all the children of pride
will be in him." Now he is said to be in him not by personal union, nor
by indwelling, since "the Trinity alone dwells in the mind" (as is said
De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxiii), but by the effect of wickedness.
Reply to Objection 2: As the head of Christ is God, and yet He is the
Head of the Church, as was said above (A[1], ad 2), so likewise
Anti-christ is a member of the devil and yet is head of the wicked.
Reply to Objection 3: Anti-christ is said to be the head of all the
wicked not by a likeness of influence, but by a likeness of perfection.
For in him the devil, as it were, brings his wickedness to a head, in
the same way that anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he
executes it.
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OF CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider Christ's knowledge; concerning which the
consideration will be twofold. First, of Christ's knowledge in general;
secondly, of each particular kind of knowledge He had.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?
(2) Whether He had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors
have?
(3) Whether He had an imprinted or infused knowledge?
(4) Whether He had any acquired knowledge?
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Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge except
the Divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be known
thereby. But by His Divine knowledge Christ knew all things. Therefore
any other knowledge would have been superfluous in Him.
Objection 2: Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the greater. But
all created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of God
is as the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in Christ
no other knowledge except the Divine.
Objection 3: Further, the union of the human nature with the Divine
took place in the Person, as is clear from[3964] Q[2], A[2]. Now,
according to some there is in Christ a certain "knowledge of the
union," whereby Christ knew what belongs to the mystery of the
Incarnation more fully than anyone else. Hence, since the personal
union contains two natures, it would seem that there are not two
knowledges in Christ, but one only, pertaining to both natures.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): "God assumed the
perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon Himself the sense
of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh." But created knowledge
pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was created
knowledge.
I answer that, As said above ([3965]Q[5]), the Son of God assumed an
entire human nature, i.e. not only a body, but also a soul, and not
only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved
Him to have created knowledge, for three reasons. First, on account of
the soul's perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is in
potentiality to knowing intelligible things. since it is like "a tablet
on which nothing is written," and yet it may be written upon through
the possible intellect, whereby it may become all things, as is said De
Anima iii, 18. Now what is in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced
to act. But it was fitting that the Son of God should assume, not an
imperfect, but a perfect human nature, since the whole human race was
to be brought back to perfection by its means. Hence it behooved the
soul of Christ to be perfected by a knowledge, which would be its
proper perfection. And therefore it was necessary that there should be
another knowledge in Christ besides the Divine knowledge, otherwise the
soul of Christ would have been more imperfect than the souls of the
rest of men. Secondly, because, since everything is on account of its
operation, as stated De Coel. ii, 17, Christ would have had an
intellective soul to no purpose if He had not understood by it; and
this pertains to created knowledge. Thirdly, because some created
knowledge pertains to the nature of the human soul, viz. that whereby
we naturally know first principles; since we are here taking knowledge
for any cognition of the human intellect. Now nothing natural was
wanting to Christ, since He took the whole human nature, as stated
above ([3966]Q[5]). And hence the Sixth Council [*Third Council of
Constantinople, Act. 4] condemned the opinion of those who denied that
in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ knew all things with the Divine knowledge
by an uncreated operation which is the very Essence of God; since God's
understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. xii,
text. 39). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ,
seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there had been
no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing;
and thus it would have been assumed to no purpose, since everything is
on account of its operation.
Reply to Objection 2: If the two lights are supposed to be in the same
order, the lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the sun
dims the light of a candle, both being in the class of illuminants. But
if we suppose two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminants
and the other in the class of illuminated, the lesser light is not
dimmed by the greater, but rather is strengthened, as the light of the
air by the light of the sun. And in this manner the light of knowledge
is not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the soul of Christ by the
light of the Divine knowledge, which is "the true light which
enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," as is written Jn.
1:9.
Reply to Objection 3: On the part of what are united we hold there is a
knowledge in Christ, both as to His Divine and as to His human nature;
so that, by reason of the union whereby there is one hypostasis of God
and man, the things of God are attributed to man, and the things of man
are attributed to God, as was said above ([3967]Q[3], AA[1],6). But on
the part of the union itself we cannot admit any knowledge in Christ.
For this union is in personal being, and knowledge belongs to person
only by reason of a nature.
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Whether Christ had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the knowledge
of the blessed or comprehensors. For the knowledge of the blessed is a
participation of Divine light, according to Ps. 35:10: "In Thy light we
shall see light." Now Christ had not a participated light, but He had
the Godhead Itself substantially abiding in Him, according to Col. 2:9:
"For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally."
Therefore in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed.
Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the blessed makes them blessed,
according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee,
the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." But this Man
was blessed through being united to God in person, according to Ps.
64:5: "Blessed is He Whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee."
Therefore it is not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed
in Him.
Objection 3: Further, to man belongs a double knowledge---one by
nature, one above nature. Now the knowledge of the blessed, which
consists in the vision of God, is not natural to man, but above his
nature. But in Christ there was another and much higher supernatural
knowledge, i.e. the Divine knowledge. Therefore there was no need of
the knowledge of the blessed in Christ.
On the contrary, The knowledge of the blessed consists in the knowledge
of God. But He knew God fully, even as He was man, according to Jn.
8:55: "I do know Him, and do keep His word." Therefore in Christ there
was the knowledge of the blessed.
I answer that, What is in potentiality is reduced to act by what is in
act; for that whereby things are heated must itself be hot. Now man is
in potentiality to the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the
vision of God; and is ordained to it as to an end; since the rational
creature is capable of that blessed knowledge, inasmuch as he is made
in the image of God. Now men are brought to this end of beatitude by
the humanity of Christ, according to Heb. 2:10: "For it became Him, for
Whom are all things, and by Whom are all things, Who had brought many
children unto glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by His
passion." And hence it was necessary that the beatific knowledge, which
consists in the vision of God, should belong to Christ pre-eminently,
since the cause ought always to be more efficacious than the effect.
Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is united to the manhood of Christ in
Person, not in essence or nature; yet with the unity of Person remains
the distinction of natures. And therefore the soul of Christ, which is
a part of human nature, through a light participated from the Divine
Nature, is perfected with the beatific knowledge whereby it sees God in
essence.
Reply to Objection 2: By the union this Man is blessed with the
uncreated beatitude, even as by the union He is God; yet besides the
uncreated beatitude it was necessary that there should be in the human
nature of Christ a created beatitude, whereby His soul was established
in the last end of human nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The beatific vision and knowledge are to some
extent above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot
reach it of its own strength; but in another way it is in accordance
with its nature, inasmuch as it is capable of it by nature, having been
made to the likeness of God, as stated above. But the uncreated
knowledge is in every way above the nature of the human soul.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ had an imprinted or infused knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was not in Christ another infused
knowledge besides the beatific knowledge. For all other knowledge
compared to the beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But
imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of perfect knowledge, as
the clear "face-to-face" vision removes the enigmatical vision of
faith, as is plain from 1 Cor. 13:10,12. Since, therefore, in Christ
there was the beatific knowledge, as stated above [3968](A[2]), it
would seem that there could not be any other imprinted knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, an imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a
more perfect, as opinion, the result of dialectical syllogisms,
disposes towards science, which results from demonstrative syllogisms.
Now, when perfection is reached, there is no further need of the
disposition, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer necessary.
Hence, since every created cognition is compared to beatific cognition,
as imperfect to perfect and as disposition to its term, it seems that
since Christ had beatific knowledge, it was not necessary for Him to
have any other knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, as corporeal matter is in potentiality to
sensible forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to
intelligible forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two forms at
once! one more perfect and the other less perfect. Therefore neither
can the soul receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and
the other less perfect; and hence the same conclusion as above.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:3) that in Christ "are hid all
the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."
I answer that, As stated above [3969](A[1]), it was fitting that the
human nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect. Now
everything in potentiality is imperfect unless it be reduced to act.
But the passive intellect of man is in potentiality to all intelligible
things. and it is reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its
completive forms, as is plain from what is said De Anima iii, 32,38.
And hence we must admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge,
inasmuch as the Word of God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is
personally united to Him, intelligible species of all things to which
the possible intellect is in potentiality; even as in the beginning of
the creation of things, the Word of God imprinted intelligible species
upon the angelic mind, as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).
And therefore, even as in the angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. iv, 22,24,30), there is a double knowledge---one the morning
knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word; the other the evening
knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures by infused
species; so likewise, besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in
Christ, there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the
Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge,
whereby He knows things in their proper nature by intelligible species
proportioned to the human mind.
Reply to Objection 1: The imperfect vision of faith is essentially
opposed to manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith
to have reference to the unseen, as was said above ([3970]SS, Q[1],
A[4]). But cognition by infused species includes no opposition to
beatific cognition. Therefore there is no parity.
Reply to Objection 2: Disposition is referred to perfection in two
ways: first, as a way leading to perfection; secondly, as an effect
proceeding from perfection; thus matter is disposed by heat to receive
the form of fire, and, when this comes, the heat does not cease, but
remains as an effect of this form. So, too, opinion caused by a
dialectical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired by
demonstration, yet, when this has been acquired, there may still remain
the knowledge gained by the dialectical syllogism, following, so to
say, the demonstrative knowledge, which is based on the cause, since he
who knows the cause is thereby enabled the better to understand the
probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms proceed. So likewise
in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge, there still remains
infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but as strengthened by
beatitude.
Reply to Objection 3: The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that
is a similitude of the Divine Essence, or of whatever is known in the
Divine Essence, as is plain from what has been said in the [3971]FP,
Q[12], A[2]; but it is a knowledge of the Divine Essence immediately,
inasmuch as the Divine Essence itself is united to the beatified mind
as an intelligible to an intelligent being; and the Divine Essence is a
form exceeding the capacity of any creature whatsoever. Hence, together
with this super-exceeding form, there is nothing to hinder from being
in the rational mind, intelligible species, proportioned to its nature.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ had any acquired knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and
acquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ, He had most
perfectly. Now Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most
perfectly, since He did not devote Himself to the study of letters, by
which knowledge is acquired in its perfection; for it is said (Jn.
7:15): "The Jews wondered, saying: How doth this Man know letters,
having never learned?" Therefore it seems that in Christ there was no
acquired knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be added to what is full. But the
power of Christ's soul was filled with intelligible species divinely
infused, as was said above (A. 3). Therefore no acquired species could
accrue to His soul.
Objection 3: Further, he who already has the habit of knowledge,
acquires no new habit, through what he receives from the senses
(otherwise two forms of the same species would be in the same thing
together); but the habit which previously existed is strengthened and
increased. Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowledge,
it does not seem that He acquired a new knowledge through what He
perceived by the senses.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:8): "Whereas . . . He was the
Son of God, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered," i.e.
"experienced," says a gloss. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ
an empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge.
I answer that, As is plain from A[1], nothing that God planted in our
nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of God. Now
it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive, but
an active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul of
Christ there was not merely a passive, but also an active intellect.
But if in other things God and nature make nothing in vain, as the
Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 31; ii, 59), still less in the soul of
Christ is there anything in vain. Now what has not its proper operation
is useless, as is said in De Coel. ii, 17. Now the proper operation of
the active intellect is to make intelligible species in act, by
abstracting them from phantasms; hence, it is said (De Anima iii, 18)
that the active intellect is that "whereby everything is made actual."
And thus it is necessary to say that in Christ there were intelligible
species received in the passive intellect by the action of the active
intellect---which means that there was acquired knowledge in Him, which
some call empiric. And hence, although I wrote differently (Sent. iii,
D, xiv, A[3]; D, xviii, A[3]), it must be said that in Christ there was
acquired knowledge, which is properly knowledge in a human fashion,
both as regards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause.
For such knowledge springs from Christ's active intellect, which is
natural to the human soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the
soul, on account of a light infused from on high, and this manner of
knowing is proportioned to the angelic nature. But the beatific
knowledge, whereby the very Essence of God is seen, is proper and
natural to God alone, as was said in the [3972]FP, Q[12], A[4].
Reply to Objection 1: Since there is a twofold way of acquiring
knowledge---by discovery and by being taught---the way of discovery is
the higher, and the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said
(Ethic. i, 4): "He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself:
yet he is good who obeys him that speaks aright." And hence it was more
fitting for Christ to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by
being taught, especially since He was given to be the Teacher of all,
according to Joel 2:23: "Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He
hath given you a Teacher of justice."
Reply to Objection 2: The human mind has two relations---one to higher
things, and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused
knowledge. The other relation is to lower things, i.e. to phantasms,
which naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active intellect.
Now it was necessary that even in this respect the soul of Christ
should be filled with knowledge, not that the first fulness was
insufficient for the human mind in itself, but that it behooved it to
be also perfected with regard to phantasms.
Reply to Objection 3: Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed
together; for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the
human mind to phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot
be again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different
nature, as coming down to the soul from on high, and not from
phantasms. And hence there is no parity between these habits.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however,
we have treated of the Divine knowledge in the FP, Q[14], it now
remains to speak of the three others: (1) of the beatific knowledge;
(2) of the infused knowledge; (3) of the acquired knowledge.
But again, because much has been said in the FP, Q[12], of the beatific
knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here
only of such things as belong properly to the soul of Christ. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine
Essence?
(2) Whether it knew all things in the Word?
(3) Whether the soul of Christ knew the infinite in the Word?
(4) Whether it saw the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did any
other creature?
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Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended and
comprehends the Word or Divine Essence. For Isidore says (De Summo Bono
i, 3) that "the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man
assumed." Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy Trinity
in that knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Trinity. Now this is
the knowledge of comprehension. Therefore the soul of Christ
comprehends the Divine Essence.
Objection 2: Further, to be united to God in personal being is greater
than to be united by vision. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
6), "the whole Godhead in one Person is united to the human nature in
Christ." Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature seen by the
soul of Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul of Christ
comprehended the Divine Essence.
Objection 3: Further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God belongs
by grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13). But to
comprehend the Divine Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God.
Therefore it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems that
the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence by grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 14): "Whatsoever
comprehends itself is finite to itself." But the Divine Essence is not
finite with respect to the soul of Christ, since It infinitely exceeds
it. Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word.
I answer that, As is plain from Q[2], AA[1],6, the union of the two
natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the
properties of both natures remained unconfused, i.e. "the uncreated
remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the
creature," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4). Now it is
impossible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, as was
shown in the [3973]FP, Q[12], AA[1],4,7, seeing that the infinite is
not comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said that the soul
of Christ nowise comprehends the Divine Essence.
Reply to Objection 1: The Man assumed is reckoned with the Divine
Trinity in the knowledge of Itself, not indeed as regards
comprehension, but by reason of a certain most excellent knowledge
above the rest of creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: Not even in the union by personal being does the
human nature comprehend the Word of God or the Divine Nature, for
although it was wholly united to the human nature in the one Person of
the Son, yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by
the human nature. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "I
would have you know that it is not the Christian doctrine that God was
united to flesh in such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the
world's government, neither did Ne narrow or reduce it when He
transferred it to that little body." So likewise the soul of Christ
sees the whole Essence of God, yet does not comprehend It; since it
does not see It totally, i.e. not as perfectly as It is knowable, as
was said in the [3974]FP, Q[12], A[7].
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Augustine is to be understood of
the grace of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of
God in His Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of
the identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son
of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His soul,
but in His Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son of Man
is the Creator.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Son of God knew all things in the Word?
Objection 2: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all
things in the Word. For it is written (Mk. 13:32): "But of that day or
hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the
Father." Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.
Objection 2: Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the
more he knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly
than the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of
Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know
all things in the Word.
Objection 3: Further, the extent depends on the number of things known.
If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word
knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would
equal the Divine knowledge, i.e. the created would equal the uncreated,
which is impossible.
On the contrary, on Apoc. 5:12, "The Lamb that was slain is worthy to
receive . . . divinity and wisdom," a gloss says, i.e. "the knowledge
of all things."
I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in
the Word, "all things" may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to
stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done,
said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it
must be said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For
every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many
more things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified
intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to
Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as
all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of
all by God, "because He is the Son of Man," as is said Jn. 5:27; and
therefore the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in
whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so
that what is said of Him (Jn. 2:25), "For He knew what was in man," can
be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of His
soul's knowledge, which it had in the Word. Secondly, "all things" may
be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act
at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never
have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the
Divine power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know
in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all that God could do,
which would be to comprehend the Divine power, and, consequently, the
Divine Essence. For every power is known from the knowledge of all it
can do. Some, however, are not only in the power of God, but also in
the power of the creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in
the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature,
and, consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that are in the
power of the creature.
Reply to Objection 1: Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of
the knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as
was said above ([3975]Q[9], A[1]), but of the Divine knowledge of the
Son, Whom they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge.
But this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God,
as is said Jn. 1:3, and, amongst other things, all times were made by
Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him.
He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the
Judgment, for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by
the apostles (Acts 1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the
contrary, we read (Gn. 22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i.e.
"Now I have made thee know." But the Father is said to know, because He
imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying but the Father, we
are given to understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine
Nature, but also in the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom.
lxxviii in Matth.), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to
judge---which is greater---much more is it given to Him to know the
less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however (in Matth. Tract.
xxx), expounds it of His body, which is the Church, which is ignorant
of this time. Lastly, some say this is to be understood of the
adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God.
Reply to Objection 2: God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly
than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all
things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is
said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself can
do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in
the [3976]FP, Q[14], A[9]. Therefore the soul of Christ knows all
things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not
all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and
thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the
number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge.
Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in
the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of
things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the
knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the
uncreated light of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created
light received by the soul of Christ; although, absolutely speaking,
the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not
only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as regards the number of
things known, as was stated above.
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Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the
infinite in the Word. For that the infinite should be known is
repugnant to the definition of the infinite which (Phys. iii, 63) is
said to be that "from which, however much we may take, there always
remains something to be taken." But it is impossible for the definition
to be separated from the thing defined, since this would mean that
contradictories exist together. Therefore it is impossible that the
soul of Christ knows the infinite.
Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the infinite is infinite. But
the knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite, because its
capacity is finite, since it is created. Therefore the soul of Christ
cannot know the infinite.
Objection 3: Further, there can be nothing greater than the infinite.
But more is contained in the Divine knowledge, absolutely speaking,
than in the knowledge of Christ's soul, as stated above [3977](A[2]).
Therefore the soul of Christ does not know the infinite.
On the contrary, The soul of Christ knows all its power and all it can
do. Now it can cleanse infinite sins, according to 1 Jn. 2:2: "He is
the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for
those of the whole world." Therefore the soul of Christ knows the
infinite.
I answer that, Knowledge regards only being, since being and truth are
convertible. Now a thing is said to be a being in two ways: First,
simply, i.e. whatever is a being in act; secondly, relatively, i.e.
whatever is a being in potentiality. And because, as is said Metaph.
ix, 20, everything is known as it is in act, and not as it is in
potentiality, knowledge primarily and essentially regards being in act,
and secondarily regards being in potentiality, which is not knowable of
itself, but inasmuch as that in whose power it exists is known. Hence,
with regard to the first mode of knowledge, the soul of Christ does not
know the infinite. Because there is not an infinite number in act, even
though we were to reckon all that are in act at any time whatsoever,
since the state of generation and corruption will not last for ever:
consequently there is a certain number not only of things lacking
generation and corruption, but also of things capable of generation and
corruption. But with regard to the other mode of knowing, the soul of
Christ knows infinite things in the Word, for it knows, as stated above
[3978](A[2]), all that is in the power of the creature. Hence, since in
the power of the creature there is an infinite number of things, it
knows the infinite, as it were, by a certain knowledge of simple
intelligence, and not by a knowledge of vision.
Reply to Objection 1: As we said in the [3979]FP, Q[8], A[1], the
infinite is taken in two ways. First, on the part of a form, and thus
we have the negatively infinite, i.e. a form or act not limited by
being received into matter or a subject; and this infinite of itself is
most knowable on account of the perfection of the act, although it is
not comprehensible by the finite power of the creature; for thus God is
said to be infinite. And this infinite the soul of Christ knows, yet
does not comprehend. Secondly, there is the infinite as regards matter,
which is taken privatively, i.e. inasmuch as it has not the form it
ought naturally to have, and in this way we have infinite in quantity.
Now such an infinite of itself, is unknown: inasmuch as it is, as it
were, matter with privation of form as is said Phys. iii, 65. But all
knowledge is by form or act. Therefore if this infinite is to be known
according to its mode of being, it cannot be known. For its mode is
that part be taken after part, as is said Phys. iii, 62,63. And in this
way it is true that, if we take something from it, i.e. taking part
after part, there always remains something to be taken. But as material
things can be received by the intellect immaterially, and many things
unitedly, so can infinite things be received by the intellect, not
after the manner of infinite, but finitely; and thus what are in
themselves infinite are, in the intellect of the knower, finite. And in
this way the soul of Christ knows an infinite number of things,
inasmuch as it knows them not by discoursing from one to another, but
in a certain unity, i.e. in any creature in whose potentiality infinite
things exist, and principally in the Word Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: There is nothing to hinder a thing from being
infinite in one way and finite in another, as when in quantities we
imagine a surface infinite in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if
there were an infinite number of men, they would have a relative
infinity, i.e. in multitude; but, as regards the essence, they would be
finite, since the essence of all would be limited to one specific
nature. But what is simply infinite in its essence is God, as was said
in the [3980]FP, Q[7], A[2]. Now the proper object of the intellect is
"what a thing is," as is said De Anima iii, 26, to which pertains the
notion of the species. And thus the soul of Christ, since it has a
finite capacity, attains to, but does not comprehend, what is simply
infinite in essence, as stated above (A[1] ). But the infinite in
potentiality which is in creatures can be comprehended by the soul of
Christ, since it is compared to that soul according to its essence, in
which respect it is not infinite. For even our intellect understands a
universal---for example, the nature of a genus or species, which in a
manner has infinity, inasmuch as it can be predicated of an infinite
number.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is infinite in every way can be but
one. Hence the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 2,3,) that, since bodies
have dimensions in every part, there cannot be several infinite bodies.
Yet if anything were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder the
existence of several such infinite things; as if we were to suppose
several lines of infinite length drawn on a surface of finite breadth.
Hence, because infinitude is not a substance, but is accidental to
things that are said to be infinite, as the Philosopher says (Phys.
iii, 37,38); as the infinite is multiplied by different subjects, so,
too, a property of the infinite must be multiplied, in such a way that
it belongs to each of them according to that particular subject. Now it
is a property of the infinite that nothing is greater than it. Hence,
if we take one infinite line, there is nothing greater in it than the
infinite; so, too, if we take any one of other infinite lines, it is
plain that each has infinite parts. Therefore of necessity in this
particular line there is nothing greater than all these infinite parts;
yet in another or a third line there will be more infinite parts
besides these. We observe this in numbers also, for the species of even
numbers are infinite, and likewise the species of odd numbers are
infinite; yet there are more even and odd numbers than even. And thus
it must be said that nothing is greater than the simply and in every
way infinite; but than the infinite which is limited in some respect,
nothing is greater in that order; yet we may suppose something greater
outside that order. In this way, therefore, there are infinite things
in the potentiality of the creature, and yet there are more in the
power of God than in the potentiality of the creature. So, too, the
soul of Christ knows infinite things by the knowledge of simple
intelligence; yet God knows more by this manner of knowledge or
understanding.
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Whether the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more clearly
than does any other creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not see the
Word more perfectly than does any other creature. For the perfection of
knowledge depends upon the medium of knowing; as the knowledge we have
by means of a demonstrative syllogism is more perfect than that which
we have by means of a probable syllogism. But all the blessed see the
Word immediately in the Divine Essence Itself, as was said in the
[3981]FP, Q[12], A[2]. Therefore the soul of Christ does not see the
Word more perfectly than any other creature.
Objection 2: Further, the perfection of vision does not exceed the
power of seeing. But the rational power of a soul such as is the soul
of Christ is below the intellective power of an angel, as is plain from
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the soul of Christ did not see
the Word more perfectly than the angels.
Objection 3: Further, God sees His Word infinitely more perfectly than
does the soul of Christ. Hence there are infinite possible mediate
degrees between the manner in which God sees His Word, and the manner
in which the soul of Christ sees the Word. Therefore we cannot assert
that the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more
perfectly than does every other creature.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that God set Christ
"on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality and
power and virtue and dominion and every name that is named not only in
this world, but also in that which is to come." But in that heavenly
glory the higher anyone is the more perfectly does he know God.
Therefore the soul of Christ sees God more perfectly than does any
other creature.
I answer that, The vision of the Divine Essence is granted to all the
blessed by a partaking of the Divine light which is shed upon them from
the fountain of the Word of God, according to Ecclus. 1:5: "The Word of
God on high is the fountain of Wisdom." Now the soul of Christ, since
it is united to the Word in person, is more closely joined to the Word
of God than any other creature. Hence it more fully receives the light
in which God is seen by the Word Himself than any other creature. And
therefore more perfectly than the rest of creatures it sees the First
Truth itself, which is the Essence of God; hence it is written (Jn.
1:14): "And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten
of the Father," "full" not only of "grace" but also of "truth."
Reply to Objection 1: Perfection of knowledge, on the part of the thing
known, depends on the medium; but as regards the knower, it depends on
the power or habit. And hence it is that even amongst men one sees a
conclusion in a medium more perfectly than another does. And in this
way the soul of Christ, which is filled with a more abundant light,
knows the Divine Essence more perfectly than do the other blessed,
although all see the Divine Essence in itself.
Reply to Objection 2: The vision of the Divine Essence exceeds the
natural power of any creature, as was said in the [3982]FP, Q[12],
A[4]. And hence the degrees thereof depend rather on the order of grace
in which Christ is supreme, than on the order of nature, in which the
angelic nature is placed before the human.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3983]Q[7], A[12]), there cannot
be a greater grace than the grace of Christ with respect to the union
with the Word; and the same is to be said of the perfection of the
Divine vision; although, absolutely speaking, there could be a higher
and more sublime degree by the infinity of the Divine power.
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OF THE KNOWLEDGE IMPRINTED OR INFUSED IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the knowledge imprinted or infused in the soul of
Christ, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ knows all things by this knowledge?
(2) Whether He could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?
(3) Whether this knowledge was collative?
(4) Of the comparison of this knowledge with the angelic knowledge;
(5) Whether it was a habitual knowledge?
(6) Whether it was distinguished by various habits?
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Whether by this imprinted or infused knowledge Christ knew all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that by this knowledge Christ did not know
all things. For this knowledge is imprinted upon Christ for the
perfection of the passive intellect. Now the passive intellect of the
human soul does not seem to be in potentiality to all things simply,
but only to those things with regard to which it can be reduced to act
by the active intellect, which is its proper motor; and these are
knowable by natural reason. Therefore by this knowledge Christ did not
know what exceeded the natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, phantasms are to the human intellect as colors to
sight, as is said De Anima iii, 18,31,39. But it does not pertain to
the perfection of the power of seeing to know what is without color.
Therefore it does not pertain to the perfection of human intellect to
know things of which there are no phantasms, such as separate
substances. Hence, since this knowledge was in Christ for the
perfection of His intellective soul, it seems that by this knowledge He
did not know separate substances.
Objection 3: Further, it does not belong to the perfection of the
intellect to know singulars. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge
the soul of Christ did not know singulars.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2) that "the Spirit of wisdom
and understanding, of knowledge and counsel shall fill Him [*Vulg.:
'The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of wisdom and
understanding, the Spirit of counsel . . . the Spirit of knowledge . .
. '; cf. Ecclus. 15:5]," under which are included all that may be
known; for the knowledge of all Divine things belongs to wisdom, the
knowledge of all immaterial things to understanding, the knowledge of
all conclusions to knowledge [scientia], the knowledge of all practical
things to counsel. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge Christ
had the knowledge of all things.
I answer that, As was said above ([3984]Q[9], A[1]), it was fitting
that the soul of Christ should be wholly perfected by having each of
its powers reduced to act. Now it must be borne in mind that in the
human soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive power: one
in comparison with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the
first agent, which can reduce any creature to a higher act than a
natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called the obediential
power of a creature. Now both powers of Christ's soul were reduced to
act by this divinely imprinted knowledge. And hence, by it the soul of
Christ knew: First, whatever can be known by force of a man's active
intellect, e.g. whatever pertains to human sciences; secondly, by this
knowledge Christ knew all things made known to man by Divine
revelation, whether they belong to the gift of wisdom or the gift of
prophecy, or any other gift of the Holy Ghost; since the soul of Christ
knew these things more fully and completely than others. Yet He did not
know the Essence of God by this knowledge, but by the first alone, of
which we spoke above ([3985]Q[10]).
Reply to Objection 1: This reason refers to the natural power of an
intellective soul in comparison with its natural agent, which is the
active intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The human soul in the state of this life, since
it is somewhat fettered by the body, so as to be unable to understand
without phantasms, cannot understand separate substances. But after the
state of this life the separated soul will be able, in a measure, to
know separate substances by itself, as was said in the [3986]FP, Q[89],
AA[1],2, and this is especially clear as regards the souls of the
blessed. Now before His Passion, Christ was not merely a wayfarer but
also a comprehensor; hence His soul could know separate substances in
the same way that a separated soul could.
Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of singulars pertains to the
perfection of the intellective soul, not in speculative knowledge, but
in practical knowledge, which is imperfect without the knowledge of
singulars, in which operations exist, as is said Ethic. vi, 7. Hence
for prudence are required the remembrance of past things, knowledge of
present things, and foresight of future things, as Tully says (De
Invent. ii). Therefore, since Christ had the fulness of prudence by the
gift of counsel, He consequently knew all singular things---present,
past, and future.
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Whether Christ could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ could not understand
by this knowledge except by turning to phantasms, because, as is stated
De Anima iii, 18,31,39, phantasms are compared to man's intellective
soul as colors to sight. But Christ's power of seeing could not become
actual save by turning to colors. Therefore His intellective soul could
understand nothing except by turning to phantasms.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's soul is of the same nature as ours.
otherwise He would not be of the same species as we, contrary to what
the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) " . . . being made in the likeness of
men." But our soul cannot understand except by turning to phantasms.
Hence, neither can Christ's soul otherwise understand.
Objection 3: Further, senses are given to man to help his intellect.
Hence, if the soul of Christ could understand without turning to
phantasms, which arise in the senses, it would follow that in the soul
of Christ the senses were useless, which is not fitting. Therefore it
seems that the soul of Christ can only understand by turning to
phantasms.
On the contrary, The soul of Christ knew certain things which could not
be known by the senses, viz. separate substances. Therefore it could
understand without turning to phantasms.
I answer that, In the state before His Passion Christ was at the same
time a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as will be more clearly shown
([3987]Q[15], A[10]). Especially had He the conditions of a wayfarer on
the part of the body, which was passible; but the conditions of a
comprehensor He had chiefly on the part of the soul. Now this is the
condition of the soul of a comprehensor, viz. that it is nowise subject
to its body, or dependent upon it, but wholly dominates it. Hence after
the resurrection glory will flow from the soul to the body. But the
soul of man on earth needs to turn to phantasms, because it is fettered
by the body and in a measure subject to and dependent upon it. And
hence the blessed both before and after the resurrection can understand
without turning to phantasms. And this must be said of the soul of
Christ, which had fully the capabilities of a comprehensor.
Reply to Objection 1: This likeness which the Philosopher asserts is
not with regard to everything. For it is manifest that the end of the
power of seeing is to know colors; but the end of the intellective
power is not to know phantasms, but to know intelligible species, which
it apprehends from and in phantasms, according to the state of the
present life. Therefore there is a likeness in respect of what both
powers regard, but not in respect of that in which the condition of
both powers is terminated. Now nothing prevents a thing in different
states from reaching its end by different ways: albeit there is never
but one proper end of a thing. Hence, although the sight knows nothing
without color; nevertheless in a certain state the intellect can know
without phantasms, but not without intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul of Christ was of the same
nature as our souls, yet it had a state which our souls have not yet in
fact, but only in hope, i.e. the state of comprehension.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the soul of Christ could understand
without turning to phantasms, yet it could also understand by turning
to phantasms. Hence the senses were not useless in it; especially as
the senses are not afforded to man solely for intellectual knowledge,
but for the need of animal life.
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Whether this knowledge is collative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not this
knowledge by way of comparison. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
14): "We do not uphold counsel or choice in Christ." Now these things
are withheld from Christ only inasmuch as they imply comparison and
discursion. Therefore it seems that there was no collative or
discursive knowledge in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, man needs comparison and discursion of reason in
order to find out the unknown. But the soul of Christ knew everything,
as was said above ([3988]Q[10], A[2]). Hence there was no discursive or
collative knowledge in Him.
Objection 3: Further, the knowledge in Christ's soul was like that of
comprehensors, who are likened to the angels, according to Mat. 22:30.
Now there is no collative or discursive knowledge in the angels, as
Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore there was no discursive or
collative knowledge in the soul of Christ.
On the contrary, Christ had a rational soul, as was shown ([3989]Q[5],
A[4]). Now the proper operation of a rational soul consists in
comparison and discursion from one thing to another. Therefore there
was collative and discursive knowledge in Christ.
I answer that, Knowledge may be discursive or collative in two ways.
First, in the acquisition of the knowledge, as happens to us, who
proceed from one thing to the knowledge of another, as from causes to
effects, and conversely. And in this way the knowledge in Christ's soul
was not discursive or collative, since this knowledge which we are now
considering was divinely infused, and not acquired by a process of
reasoning. Secondly, knowledge may be called discursive or collative in
use; as at times those who know, reason from cause to effect, not in
order to learn anew, but wishing to use the knowledge they have. And in
this way the knowledge in Christ's soul could be collative or
discursive; since it could conclude one thing from another, as it
pleased, as in Mat. 17:24,25, when our Lord asked Peter: "Of whom do
the kings of the earth receive tribute, of their own children, or of
strangers?" On Peter replying: "Of strangers," He concluded: "Then the
children are free."
Reply to Objection 1: From Christ is excluded that counsel which is
with doubt; and consequently choice, which essentially includes such
counsel; but the practice of using counsel is not excluded from Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: This reason rests upon discursion and comparison,
as used to acquire knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: The blessed are likened to the angels in the
gifts of graces; yet there still remains the difference of natures. And
hence to use comparison and discursion is connatural to the souls of
the blessed, but not to angels.
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Whether in Christ this knowledge was greater than the knowledge of the
angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that this knowledge was not greater in
Christ than in the angels. For perfection is proportioned to the thing
perfected. But the human soul in the order of nature is below the
angelic nature. Therefore since the knowledge we are now speaking of is
imprinted upon Christ's soul for its perfection, it seems that this
knowledge is less than the knowledge by which the angelic nature is
perfected.
Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of Christ's soul was in a measure
comparative and discursive, which cannot be said of the angelic
knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of Christ's soul was less than the
knowledge of the angels.
Objection 3: Further, the more immaterial knowledge is, the greater it
is. But the knowledge of the angels is more immaterial than the
knowledge of Christ's soul, since the soul of Christ is the act of a
body, and turns to phantasms, which cannot be said of the angels.
Therefore the knowledge of angels is greater than the knowledge of
Christ's soul.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 2:9): "For we see Jesus, Who
was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death,
crowned with glory and honor"; from which it is plain that Christ is
said to be lower than the angels only in regard to the suffering of
death. And hence, not in knowledge.
I answer that, The knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul may be looked
at in two ways: First, as regards what it has from the inflowing cause;
secondly, as regards what it has from the subject receiving it. Now
with regard to the first, the knowledge imprinted upon the soul of
Christ was more excellent than the knowledge of the angels, both in the
number of things known and in the certainty of the knowledge; since the
spiritual light, which is imprinted on the soul of Christ, is much more
excellent than the light which pertains to the angelic nature. But as
regards the second, the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ is
less than the angelic knowledge, in the manner of knowing that is
natural to the human soul, i.e. by turning to phantasms, and by
comparison and discursion.
And hereby the reply to the objections is made clear.
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Whether this knowledge was habitual?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no habitual
knowledge. For it has been said ([3990]Q[9], A[1]) that the highest
perfection of knowledge befitted Christ's soul. But the perfection of
an actually existing knowledge is greater than that of a potentially or
habitually existing knowledge. Therefore it was fitting for Him to know
all things actually. Therefore He had not habitual knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, since habits are ordained to acts, a habitual
knowledge which is never reduced to act would seem useless. Now, since
Christ knew all things, as was said[3991] Q[10], A[2], He could not
have considered all things actually, thinking over one after another,
since the infinite cannot be passed over by enumeration. Therefore the
habitual knowledge of certain things would have been useless to
Him---which is unfitting. Therefore He had an actual and not a habitual
knowledge of what He knew.
Objection 3: Further, habitual knowledge is a perfection of the knower.
But perfection is more noble than the thing perfected. If, therefore,
in the soul of Christ there was any created habit of knowledge, it
would follow that this created thing was nobler than the soul of
Christ. Therefore there was no habitual knowledge in Christ's soul.
On the contrary, The knowledge of Christ we are now speaking about was
univocal with our knowledge, even as His soul was of the same species
as ours. But our knowledge is in the genus of habit. Therefore the
knowledge of Christ was habitual.
I answer that, As stated above [3992](A[4]), the mode of the knowledge
impressed on the soul of Christ befitted the subject receiving it. For
the received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient. Now
the connatural mode of the human soul is that it should understand
sometimes actually, and sometimes potentially. But the medium between a
pure power and a completed act is a habit: and extremes and medium are
of the same genus. Thus it is plain that it is the connatural mode of
the human soul to receive knowledge as a habit. Hence it must be said
that the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ was habitual, for He
could use it when He pleased.
Reply to Objection 1: In Christ's soul there was a twofold
knowledge---each most perfect of its kind: the first exceeding the mode
of human nature, as by it He saw the Essence of God, and other things
in It, and this was the most perfect, simply. Nor was this knowledge
habitual, but actual with respect to everything He knew in this way.
But the second knowledge was in Christ in a manner proportioned to
human nature, i.e. inasmuch as He knew things by species divinely
imprinted upon Him, and of this knowledge we are now speaking. Now this
knowledge was not most perfect, simply, but merely in the genus of
human knowledge; hence it did not behoove it to be always in act.
Reply to Objection 2: Habits are reduced to act by the command of the
will, since a habit is that "with which we act when we wish." Now the
will is indeterminate in regard to infinite things. Yet it is not
useless, even when it does not actually tend to all; provided it
actually tends to everything in fitting place and time. And hence
neither is a habit useless, even if all that it extends to is not
reduced to act; provided that that which befits the due end of the will
be reduced to act according as the matter in hand and the time require.
Reply to Objection 3: Goodness and being are taken in two ways: First,
simply; and thus a substance, which subsists in its being and goodness,
is a good and a being; secondly, being and goodness are taken
relatively, and in this way an accident is a being and a good, not that
it has being and goodness, but that its subject is a being and a good.
And hence habitual knowledge is not simply better or more excellent
than the soul of Christ; but relatively, since the whole goodness of
habitual knowledge is added to the goodness of the subject.
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Whether this knowledge was distinguished by divers habits?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the soul of Christ there was only
one habit of knowledge. For the more perfect knowledge is, the more
united it is; hence the higher angels understand by the more universal
forms, as was said in the [3993]FP, Q[55], A[3]. Now Christ's knowledge
was most perfect. Therefore it was most one. Therefore it was not
distinguished by several habits.
Objection 2: Further, our faith is derived from Christ's knowledge;
hence it is written (Heb. 12:2): "Looking on Jesus the author and
finisher of faith." But there is only one habit of faith about all
things believed, as was said in the [3994]SS, Q[4], A[6]. Much more,
therefore, was there only one habit of knowledge in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge is distinguished by the divers
formalities of knowable things. But the soul of Christ knew everything
under one formality, i.e. by a divinely infused light. Therefore in
Christ there was only one habit of knowledge.
On the contrary, It is written (Zech. 3:9) that on "one" stone, i.e.
Christ, "there are seven eyes." Now by the eye is understood knowledge.
Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were several habits of
knowledge.
I answer that, As stated above ([3995]AA[4],5), the knowledge imprinted
on Christ's soul has a mode connatural to a human soul. Now it is
connatural to a human soul to receive species of a lesser universality
than the angels receive; so that it knows different specific natures by
different intelligible species. But it so happens that we have
different habits of knowledge, because there are different classes of
knowable things, inasmuch as what are in one genus are known by one
habit; thus it is said (Poster. i, 42) that "one science is of one
class of object." And hence the knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul
was distinguished by different habits.
Reply to Objection 1: As was said [3996](A[4]), the knowledge of
Christ's soul is most perfect, and exceeds the knowledge of angels with
regard to what is in it on the part of God's gift; but it is below the
angelic knowledge as regards the mode of the recipient. And it pertains
to this mode that this knowledge is distinguished by various habits,
inasmuch as it regards more particular species.
Reply to Objection 2: Our faith rests upon the First Truth; and hence
Christ is the author of our faith by the Divine knowledge, which is
simply one.
Reply to Objection 3: The divinely infused light is the common
formality for understanding what is divinely revealed, as the light of
the active intellect is with regard to what is naturally known. Hence,
in the soul of Christ there must be the proper species of singular
things, in order to know each with proper knowledge; and in this way
there must be divers habits of knowledge in Christ's soul, as stated
above.
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OF THE ACQUIRED OR EMPIRIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the acquired or empiric knowledge of Christ's
soul; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ knew all things by this knowledge?
(2) Whether He advanced in this knowledge?
(3) Whether He learned anything from man?
(4) Whether He received anything from angels?
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Whether Christ knew all things by this acquired or empiric knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not know everything by this
knowledge. For this knowledge is acquired by experience. But Christ did
not experience everything. Therefore He did not know everything by this
knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, man acquires knowledge through the senses. But
not all sensible things were subjected to Christ's bodily senses.
Therefore Christ did not know everything by this knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the extent of knowledge depends on the things
knowable. Therefore if Christ knew all things by this knowledge, His
acquired knowledge would have been equal to His infused and beatific
knowledge; which is not fitting. Therefore Christ did not know all
things by this knowledge.
On the contrary, Nothing imperfect was in Christ's soul. Now this
knowledge of His would have been imperfect if He had not known all
things by it, since the imperfect is that to which addition may be
made. Hence Christ knew all things by this knowledge.
I answer that, Acquired knowledge is held to be in Christ's soul, as we
have said[3997] Q[9], A[4], by reason of the active intellect, lest its
action, which is to make things actually intelligible, should be
wanting; even as imprinted or infused knowledge is held to be in
Christ's soul for the perfection of the passive intellect. Now as the
passive intellect is that by which "all things are in potentiality," so
the active intellect is that by which "all are in act," as is said De
Anima iii, 18. And hence, as the soul of Christ knew by infused
knowledge all things to which the passive intellect is in any way in
potentiality, so by acquired knowledge it knew whatever can be known by
the action of the active intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: The knowledge of things may be acquired not
merely by experiencing the things themselves, but by experiencing other
things; since by virtue of the light of the active intellect man can go
on to understand effects from causes, and causes from effects, like
from like, contrary from contrary. Therefore Christ, though He did not
experience all things, came to the knowledge of all things from what He
did experience.
Reply to Objection 2: Although all sensible things were not subjected
to Christ's bodily senses, yet other sensible things were subjected to
His senses; and from this He could come to know other things by the
most excellent force of His reason, in the manner described in the
previous reply; just as in seeing heavenly bodies He could comprehend
their powers and the effects they have upon things here below, which
were not subjected to His senses; and for the same reason, from any
other things whatsoever, He could come to the knowledge of yet other
things.
Reply to Objection 3: By this knowledge the soul of Christ did not know
all things simply, but all such as are knowable by the light of man's
active intellect. Hence by this knowledge He did not know the essences
of separate substances, nor past, present, or future singulars, which,
nevertheless, He knew by infused knowledge, as was said above
([3998]Q[11]).
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Whether Christ advanced in acquired or empiric knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not advance in this
knowledge. For even as Christ knew all things by His beatific and His
infused knowledge, so also did He by this acquired knowledge, as is
plain from what has been said [3999](A[1]). But He did not advance in
these knowledges. Therefore neither in this.
Objection 2: Further, to advance belongs to the imperfect, since the
perfect cannot be added to. Now we cannot suppose an imperfect
knowledge in Christ. Therefore Christ did not advance in this
knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 22): "Whoever
say that Christ advanced in wisdom and grace, as if receiving
additional sensations, do not venerate the union which is in
hypostasis." But it is impious not to venerate this union. Therefore it
is impious to say that His knowledge received increase.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 2:52): "Jesus advanced in wisdom
and age and grace with God and men"; and Ambrose says (De Incar. Dom.
vii) that "He advanced in human wisdom." Now human wisdom is that which
is acquired in a human manner, i.e. by the light of the active
intellect. Therefore Christ advanced in this knowledge.
I answer that, There is a twofold advancement in knowledge: one in
essence, inasmuch as the habit of knowledge is increased; the other in
effect---e.g. if someone were with one and the same habit of knowledge
to prove to someone else some minor truths at first, and afterwards
greater and more subtle conclusions. Now in this second way it is plain
that Christ advanced in knowledge and grace, even as in age, since as
His age increased He wrought greater deeds, and showed greater
knowledge and grace.
But as regards the habit of knowledge, it is plain that His habit of
infused knowledge did not increase, since from the beginning He had
perfect infused knowledge of all things; and still less could His
beatific knowledge increase; while in the [4000]FP, Q[14], A[15], we
have already said that His Divine knowledge could not increase.
Therefore, if in the soul of Christ there was no habit of acquired
knowledge, beyond the habit of infused knowledge, as appears to some
[*Blessed Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure], and
sometime appeared to me (Sent. iii, D, xiv), no knowledge in Christ
increased in essence, but merely by experience, i.e. by comparing the
infused intelligible species with phantasms. And in this way they
maintain that Christ's knowledge grew in experience, e.g. by comparing
the infused intelligible species with what He received through the
senses for the first time. But because it seems unfitting that any
natural intelligible action should be wanting to Christ, and because to
extract intelligible species from phantasms is a natural action of
man's active intellect, it seems becoming to place even this action in
Christ. And it follows from this that in the soul of Christ there was a
habit of knowledge which could increase by this abstraction of species;
inasmuch as the active intellect, after abstracting the first
intelligible species from phantasms, could abstract others, and others
again.
Reply to Objection 1: Both the infused knowledge and the beatific
knowledge of Christ's soul were the effects of an agent of infinite
power, which could produce the whole at once; and thus in neither
knowledge did Christ advance; since from the beginning He had them
perfectly. But the acquired knowledge of Christ is caused by the active
intellect which does not produce the whole at once, but successively;
and hence by this knowledge Christ did not know everything from the
beginning, but step by step, and after a time, i.e. in His perfect age;
and this is plain from what the Evangelist says, viz. that He increased
in "knowledge and age" together.
Reply to Objection 2: Even this knowledge was always perfect for the
time being, although it was not always perfect, simply and in
comparison to the nature; hence it could increase.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Damascene regards those who say
absolutely that addition was made to Christ's knowledge, i.e. as
regards any knowledge of His, and especially as regards the infused
knowledge which is caused in Christ's soul by union with the Word; but
it does not regard the increase of knowledge caused by the natural
agent.
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Whether Christ learned anything from man?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ learned something from man. For
it is written (Lk. 2:46,47) that, "They found Him in the temple in the
midst of the doctors, hearing them, and asking them questions." But to
ask questions and to reply pertains to a learner. Therefore Christ
learned something from man.
Objection 2: Further, to acquire knowledge from a man's teaching seems
more noble than to acquire it from sensible things, since in the soul
of the man who teaches the intelligible species are in act; but in
sensible things the intelligible species are only in potentiality. Now
Christ received empiric knowledge from sensible things, as stated above
[4001](A[2]). Much more, therefore, could He receive knowledge by
learning from men.
Objection 3: Further, by empiric knowledge Christ did not know
everything from the beginning, but advanced in it, as was said above
[4002](A[2]). But anyone hearing words which mean something, may learn
something he does not know. Therefore Christ could learn from men
something He did not know by this knowledge.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 45:4): "Behold, I have given Him
for a witness to the people, for a leader and a master to the
Gentiles." Now a master is not taught, but teaches. Therefore Christ
did not receive any knowledge by the teaching of any man.
I answer that, In every genus that which is the first mover is not
moved according to the same species of movement; just as the first
alterative is not itself altered. Now Christ is established by God the
Head of the Church---yea, of all men, as was said above ([4003]Q[8],
A[3]), so that not only all might receive grace through Him, but that
all might receive the doctrine of Truth from Him. Hence He Himself says
(Jn. 18:37): "For this was I born, and for this came I into the world;
that I should give testimony to the truth." And thus it did not befit
His dignity that He should be taught by any man.
Reply to Objection 1: As Origen says (Hom. xix in Luc.): "Our Lord
asked questions not in order to learn anything, but in order to teach
by questioning. For from the same well of knowledge came the question
and the wise reply." Hence the Gospel goes on to say that "all that
heard Him were astonished at His wisdom and His answers."
Reply to Objection 2: Whoever learns from man does not receive
knowledge immediately from the intelligible species which are in his
mind, but through sensible words, which are signs of intelligible
concepts. Now as words formed by a man are signs of his intellectual
knowledge; so are creatures, formed by God, signs of His wisdom. Hence
it is written (Ecclus. 1:10) that God "poured" wisdom "out upon all His
works." Hence, just as it is better to be taught by God than by man, so
it is better to receive our knowledge from sensible creatures and not
by man's teaching.
Reply to Objection 3: Jesus advanced in empiric knowledge, as in age,
as stated above [4004](A[2]). Now as a fitting age is required for a
man to acquire knowledge by discovery, so also that he may acquire it
by being taught. But our Lord did nothing unbecoming to His age; and
hence He did not give ear to hearing the lessons of doctrine until such
time as He was able to have reached that grade of knowledge by way of
experience. Hence Gregory says (Sup. Ezech. Lib. i, Hom. ii): "In the
twelfth year of His age He deigned to question men on earth, since in
the course of reason, the word of doctrine is not vouchsafed before the
age of perfection."
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Whether Christ received knowledge from the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ received knowledge from the
angels. For it is written (Lk. 22:43) that "there appeared to Him an
angel from heaven, strengthening Him." But we are strengthened by the
comforting words of a teacher, according to Job 4:3,4: "Behold thou
hast taught many and hast strengthened the weary hand. Thy words have
confirmed them that were staggering." Therefore Christ was taught by
angels.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "For I see that
even Jesus---the super-substantial substance of supercelestial
substances---when without change He took our substance upon Himself,
was subject in obedience to the instructions of the Father and God by
the angels." Hence it seems that even Christ wished to be subject to
the ordinations of the Divine law, whereby men are taught by means of
angels.
Objection 3: Further, as in the natural order the human body is subject
to the celestial bodies, so likewise is the human mind to angelic
minds. Now Christ's body was subject to the impressions of the heavenly
bodies, for He felt the heat in summer and the cold in winter, and
other human passions. Therefore His human mind was subject to the
illuminations of supercelestial spirits.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "the highest
angels question Jesus, and learn the knowledge of His Divine work, and
of the flesh assumed for us; and Jesus teaches them directly." Now to
teach and to be taught do not belong to the same. Therefore Christ did
not receive knowledge from the angels.
I answer that, Since the human soul is midway between spiritual
substances and corporeal things, it is perfected naturally in two ways.
First by knowledge received from sensible things; secondly, by
knowledge imprinted or infused by the illumination of spiritual
substances. Now in both these ways the soul of Christ was perfected;
first by empirical knowledge of sensible things, for which there is no
need of angelic light, since the light of the active intellect
suffices; secondly, by the higher impression of infused knowledge,
which He received directly from God. For as His soul was united to the
Word above the common mode, in unity of person, so above the common
manner of men was it filled with knowledge and grace by the Word of God
Himself; and not by the medium of angels, who in their beginning
received the knowledge of things by the influence of the Word, as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).
Reply to Objection 1: This strengthening by the angel was for the
purpose not of instructing Him, but of proving the truth of His human
nature. Hence Bede says (on Lk. 22:43): "In testimony of both natures
are the angels said to have ministered to Him and to have strengthened
Him. For the Creator did not need help from His creature; but having
become man, even as it was for our sake that He was sad, so was it for
our sake that He was strengthened," i.e. in order that our faith in the
Incarnation might be strengthened.
Reply to Objection 2: Dionysius says that Christ was subject to the
angelic instructions, not by reason of Himself, but by reason of what
happened at His Incarnation, and as regards the care of Him whilst He
was a child. Hence in the same place he adds that "Jesus' withdrawal to
Egypt decreed by the Father is announced to Joseph by angels, and again
His return to Judaea from Egypt."
Reply to Objection 3: The Son of God assumed a passible body (as will
be said hereafter ([4005]Q[14], A[1])) and a soul perfect in knowledge
and grace ([4006]Q[14] , A[1], ad 1; A[4]). Hence His body was rightly
subject to the impression of heavenly bodies; but His soul was not
subject to the impression of heavenly spirits.
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OF THE POWER OF CHRIST'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the power of Christ's soul; and under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether He had omnipotence simply?
(2) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to corporeal creatures?
(3) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to His own body?
(4) Whether He had omnipotence as regards the execution of His own
will?
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Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence. For
Ambrose [*Gloss, Ord.] says on Lk. 1:32: "The power which the Son of
God had naturally, the Man was about to receive in time." Now this
would seem to regard the soul principally, since it is the chief part
of man. Hence since the Son of God had omnipotence from all eternity,
it would seem that the soul of Christ received omnipotence in time.
Objection 2: Further, as the power of God is infinite, so is His
knowledge. But the soul of Christ in a manner had the knowledge of all
that God knows, as was said above ([4007]Q[10], A[2]). Therefore He had
all power; and thus He was omnipotent.
Objection 3: Further, the soul of Christ has all knowledge. Now
knowledge is either practical or speculative. Therefore He has a
practical knowledge of what He knows, i.e. He knew how to do what He
knows; and thus it seems that He can do all things.
On the contrary, What is proper to God cannot belong to any creature.
But it is proper to God to be omnipotent, according to Ex. 15:2,3: "He
is my God and I will glorify Him," and further on, "Almighty is His
name." Therefore the soul of Christ, as being a creature, has not
omnipotence.
I answer that, As was said above ([4008]Q[2], A[1];[4009] Q[10], A[1])
in the mystery of the Incarnation the union in person so took place
that there still remained the distinction of natures, each nature still
retaining what belonged to it. Now the active principle of a thing
follows its form, which is the principle of action. But the form is
either the very nature of the thing, as in simple things; or is the
constituent of the nature of the thing; as in such as are composed of
matter and form.
And it is in this way that omnipotence flows, so to say, from the
Divine Nature. For since the Divine Nature is the very uncircumscribed
Being of God, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), it has an
active power over everything that can have the nature of being; and
this is to have omnipotence; just as every other thing has an active
power over such things as the perfection of its nature extends to; as
what is hot gives heat. Therefore since the soul of Christ is a part of
human nature, it cannot possibly have omnipotence.
Reply to Objection 1: By union with the Person, the Man receives
omnipotence in time, which the Son of God had from eternity; the result
of which union is that as the Man is said to be God, so is He said to
be omnipotent; not that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct (as
neither is His Godhead) from that of the Son of God, but because there
is one Person of God and man.
Reply to Objection 2: According to some, knowledge and active power are
not in the same ratio; for an active power flows from the very nature
of the thing, inasmuch as action is considered to come forth from the
agent; but knowledge is not always possessed by the very essence or
form of the knower, since it may be had by assimilation of the knower
to the thing known by the aid of received species. But this reason
seems not to suffice, because even as we may understand by a likeness
obtained from another, so also may we act by a form obtained from
another, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Hence
there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, as it can know all
things by the similitudes of all things impressed upon it by God,
cannot do these things by the same similitudes.
It has, therefore, to be further considered that what is received in
the lower nature from the higher is possessed in an inferior manner;
for heat is not received by water in the perfection and strength it had
in fire. Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior nature
to the Divine Nature, the similitudes of things are not received in the
soul of Christ in the perfection and strength they had in the Divine
Nature. And hence it is that the knowledge of Christ's soul is inferior
to Divine knowledge as regards the manner of knowing, for God knows
(things) more perfectly than the soul of Christ; and also as regards
the number of things known, since the soul of Christ does not know all
that God can do, and these God knows by the knowledge of simple
intelligence; although it knows all things present, past, and future,
which God knows by the knowledge of vision. So, too, the similitudes of
things infused into Christ's soul do not equal the Divine power in
acting, i.e. so as to do all that God can do, or to do in the same
manner as God does, Who acts with an infinite might whereof the
creature is not capable. Now there is no thing, to know which in some
way an infinite power is needed, although a certain kind of knowledge
belongs to an infinite power; yet there are things which can be done
only by an infinite power, as creation and the like, as is plain from
what has been said in the [4010]FP, Q[45]. Hence Christ's soul which,
being a creature, is finite in might, can know, indeed, all things, but
not in every way; yet it cannot do all things, which pertains to the
nature of omnipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear it cannot
create itself.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's soul has practical and speculative
knowledge; yet it is not necessary that it should have practical
knowledge of those things of which it has speculative knowledge.
Because for speculative knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of
the knower to the thing known suffices; whereas for practical knowledge
it is required that the forms of the things in the intellect should be
operative. Now to have a form and to impress this form upon something
else is more than merely to have the form; as to be lightsome and to
enlighten is more than merely to be lightsome. Hence the soul of Christ
has a speculative knowledge of creation (for it knows the mode of God's
creation), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode, since it has
no knowledge operative of creation.
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Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation
of creatures?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with
regard to the transmutation of creatures. For He Himself says (Mat.
28:18): "All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth." Now by the
words "heaven and earth" are meant all creatures, as is plain from Gn.
1:1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore it
seems that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the
transmutation of creatures.
Objection 2: Further, the soul of Christ is the most perfect of all
creatures. But every creature can be moved by another creature; for
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "even as the denser and lower
bodies are ruled in a fixed way by the subtler and stronger bodies; so
are all bodies by the spirit of life, and the irrational spirit of life
by the rational spirit of life, and the truant and sinful rational
spirit of life by the rational, loyal, and righteous spirit of life."
But the soul of Christ moves even the highest spirits, enlightening
them, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it seems that the
soul of Christ has omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of
creatures.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's soul had in its highest degree the
"grace of miracles" or works of might. But every transmutation of the
creature can belong to the grace of miracles; since even the heavenly
bodies were miraculously changed from their course, as Dionysius proves
(Ep. ad Polycarp). Therefore Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard
to the transmutation of creatures.
On the contrary, To transmute creatures belongs to Him Who preserves
them. Now this belongs to God alone, according to Heb. 1:3: "Upholding
all things by the word of His power." Therefore God alone has
omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. Therefore
this does not belong to Christ's soul.
I answer that, Two distinctions are here needed. of these the first is
with respect to the transmutation of creatures, which is three-fold.
The first is natural, being brought about by the proper agent
naturally; the second is miraculous, being brought about by a
supernatural agent above the wonted order and course of nature, as to
raise the dead; the third is inasmuch as every creature may be brought
to nothing.
The second distinction has to do with Christ's soul, which may be
looked at in two ways: first in its proper nature and with its power of
nature or of grace; secondly, as it is the instrument of the Word of
God, personally united to Him. Therefore if we speak of the soul of
Christ in its proper nature and with its power of nature or of grace,
it had power to cause those effects proper to a soul (e.g. to rule the
body and direct human acts, and also, by the fulness of grace and
knowledge to enlighten all rational creatures falling short of its
perfection), in a manner befitting a rational creature. But if we speak
of the soul of Christ as it is the instrument of the Word united to
Him, it had an instrumental power to effect all the miraculous
transmutations ordainable to the end of the Incarnation, which is "to
re-establish all things that are in heaven and on earth" [*Eph. 1:10].
But the transmutation of creatures, inasmuch as they may be brought to
nothing, corresponds to their creation, whereby they were brought from
nothing. And hence even as God alone can create, so, too, He alone can
bring creatures to nothing, and He alone upholds them in being, lest
they fall back to nothing. And thus it must be said that the soul of
Christ had not omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of
creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says (on the text quoted): "Power is
given Him," i.e. to Christ as man, "Who a little while before was
crucified, buried in the tomb, and afterwards rose again." But power is
said to have been given Him, by reason of the union whereby it was
brought about that a Man was omnipotent, as was said above (A[1], ad
1). And although this was made known to the angels before the
Resurrection, yet after the Resurrection it was made known to all men,
as Remigius says (cf. Catena Aurea). Now, "things are said to happen
when they are made known" [*Hugh of St. Victor: Qq. in Ep. ad Philip.].
Hence after the Resurrection our Lord says "that all power is given" to
Him "in heaven and on earth."
Reply to Objection 2: Although every creature is transmutable by some
other creature, except, indeed, the highest angel, and even it can be
enlightened by Christ's soul; yet not every transmutation that can be
made in a creature can be made by a creature; since some transmutations
can be made by God alone. Yet all transmutations that can be made in
creatures can be made by the soul of Christ, as the instrument of the
Word, but not in its proper nature and power, since some of these
transmutations pertain to the soul neither in the order of nature nor
in the order of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: As was said in the [4011]SS, Q[178], A[1], ad 1,
the grace of mighty works or miracles is given to the soul of a saint,
so that these miracles are wrought not by his own, but by Divine power.
Now this grace was bestowed on Christ's soul most excellently, i.e. not
only that He might work miracles, but also that He might communicate
this grace to others. Hence it is written (Mat. 10:1) that, "having
called His twelve disciples together, He gave them power over unclean
spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all manner of diseases, and all
manner of infirmities."
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Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to His own body?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul had omnipotence with
regard to His own body. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20,23)
that "all natural things were voluntary to Christ; He willed to hunger,
He willed to thirst, He willed to fear, He willed to die." Now God is
called omnipotent because "He hath done all things whatsoever He would"
(Ps. 113:11). Therefore it seems that Christ's soul had omnipotence
with regard to the natural operations of the body.
Objection 2: Further, human nature was more perfect in Christ than in
Adam, who had a body entirely subject to the soul, so that nothing
could happen to the body against the will of the soul---and this on
account of the original justice which it had in the state of innocence.
Much more, therefore, had Christ's soul omnipotence with regard to His
body.
Objection 3: Further, the body is naturally changed by the imaginations
of the soul; and so much more changed, the stronger the soul's
imagination, as was said in the [4012]FP, Q[117], A[3], ad 3. Now the
soul of Christ had most perfect strength as regards both the
imagination and the other powers. Therefore the soul of Christ was
omnipotent with regard to His own body.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2:17) that "it behooved Him in all
things to be made like unto His brethren," and especially as regards
what belongs to the condition of human nature. But it belongs to the
condition of human nature that the health of the body and its
nourishment and growth are not subject to the bidding of reason or
will, since natural things are subject to God alone Who is the author
of nature. Therefore they were not subject in Christ. Therefore
Christ's soul was not omnipotent with regard to His own body.
I answer that, As stated above [4013](A[2]), Christ's soul may be
viewed in two ways. First, in its proper nature and power; and in this
way, as it was incapable of making exterior bodies swerve from the
course and order of nature, so, too, was it incapable of changing its
own body from its natural disposition, since the soul, of its own
nature, has a determinate relation to its body. Secondly, Christ's soul
may be viewed as an instrument united in person to God's Word; and thus
every disposition of His own body was wholly subject to His power.
Nevertheless, since the power of an action is not properly attributed
to the instrument, but to the principal agent, this omnipotence is
attributed to the Word of God rather than to Christ's soul.
Reply to Objection 1: This saving of Damascene refers to the Divine
will of Christ, since, as he says in the preceding chapter (De Fide
Orth. xix, 14,15), it was by the consent of the Divine will that the
flesh was allowed to suffer and do what was proper to it.
Reply to Objection 2: It was no part of the original justice which Adam
had in the state of innocence that a man's soul should have the power
of changing his own body to any form, but that it should keep it from
any hurt. Yet Christ could have assumed even this power if He had
wished. But since man has three states---viz. innocence, sin, and
glory, even as from the state of glory He assumed comprehension and
from the state of innocence, freedom from sin---so also from the state
of sin did He assume the necessity of being under the penalties of this
life, as will be said ([4014]Q[14], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: If the imagination be strong, the body obeys
naturally in some things, e.g. as regards falling from a beam set on
high, since the imagination was formed to be a principle of local
motion, as is said De Anima iii, 9,10. So, too, as regards alteration
in heat and cold, and their consequences; for the passions of the soul,
wherewith the heart is moved, naturally follow the imagination, and
thus by commotion of the spirits the whole body is altered. But the
other corporeal dispositions which have no natural relation to the
imagination are not transmuted by the imagination, however strong it
is, e.g. the shape of the hand, or foot, or such like.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence as regards the execution of His
will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence
as regards the execution of His own will. For it is written (Mk. 7:24)
that "entering into a house, He would that no man should know it, and
He could not be hid." Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of
His will in all things.
Objection 2: Further, a command is a sign of will, as was said in the
[4015]FP, Q[19], A[12]. But our Lord commanded certain things to be
done, and the contrary came to pass, for it is written (Mat. 9:30, 31)
that Jesus strictly charged them whose eyes had been opened, saying:
"See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad
in all that country." Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of
His will in everything.
Objection 3: Further, a man does not ask from another for what he can
do himself. But our Lord besought the Father, praying for what He
wished to be done, for it is written (Lk. 6:12): "He went out into a
mountain to pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God."
Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. 77): "It
is impossible for the will of the Saviour not to be fulfilled: nor is
it possible for Him to will what He knows ought not to come to pass."
I answer that, Christ's soul willed things in two ways. First, what was
to be brought about by Himself; and it must be said that He was capable
of whatever He willed thus, since it would not befit His wisdom if He
willed to do anything of Himself that was not subject to His will.
Secondly, He wished things to be brought about by the Divine power, as
the resurrection of His own body and such like miraculous deeds, which
He could not effect by His own power, except as the instrument of the
Godhead, as was said above [4016](A[2]).
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu.
77): "What came to pass, this Christ must be said to have willed. For
it must be remarked that this happened in the country of the Gentiles,
to whom it was not yet time to preach. Yet it would have been invidious
not to welcome such as came spontaneously for the faith. Hence He did
not wish to be heralded by His own, and yet He wished to be sought; and
so it came to pass." Or it may be said that this will of Christ was not
with regard to what was to be carried out by it, but with regard to
what was to be done by others, which did not come under His human will.
Hence in the letter of Pope Agatho, which was approved in the Sixth
Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. iv], we read: "When He,
the Creator and Redeemer of all, wished to be hid and could not, must
not this be referred only to His human will which He deigned to assume
in time?"
Reply to Objection 2: As Gregory says (Moral. xix), by the fact that
"Our Lord charged His mighty works to be kept secret, He gave an
example to His servants coming after Him that they should wish their
miracles to be hidden; and yet, that others may profit by their
example, they are made public against their will." And thus this
command signified His will to fly from human glory, according to Jn.
8:50, "I seek not My own glory." Yet He wished absolutely, and
especially by His Divine will, that the miracle wrought should be
published for the good of others.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ prayed both for things that were to be
brought about by the Divine power, and for what He Himself was to do by
His human will, since the power and operation of Christ's soul depended
on God, "Who works in all [Vulg.: 'you'], both to will and to
accomplish" (Phil. 2:13).
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OF THE DEFECTS OF BODY ASSUMED BY THE SON OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the defects Christ assumed in the human nature;
and first, of the defects of body; secondly, of the defects of soul.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Son of God should have assumed in human nature defects
of body?
(2) Whether He assumed the obligation of being subject to these
defects?
(3) Whether He contracted these defects?
(4) Whether He assumed all these defects?
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Whether the Son of God in human nature ought to have assumed defects of
body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought not to have
assumed human nature with defects of body. For as His soul is
personally united to the Word of God, so also is His body. But the soul
of Christ had every perfection, both of grace and truth, as was said
above ([4017]Q[7], A[9]; Q[9], seqq.). Hence, His body also ought to
have been in every way perfect, not having any imperfection in it.
Objection 2: Further, the soul of Christ saw the Word of God by the
vision wherein the blessed see, as was said above ([4018]Q[9], A[2]),
and thus the soul of Christ was blessed. Now by the beatification of
the soul the body is glorified; since, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios.
cxviii), "God made the soul of a nature so strong that from the fulness
of its blessedness there pours over even into the lower nature" (i.e.
the body), "not indeed the bliss proper to the beatific fruition and
vision, but the fulness of health" (i.e. the vigor of
incorruptibility). Therefore the body of Christ was incorruptible and
without any defect.
Objection 3: Further, penalty is the consequence of fault. But there
was no fault in Christ, according to 1 Pet. 2:22: "Who did no guile."
Therefore defects of body, which are penalties, ought not to have been
in Him.
Objection 4: Further, no reasonable man assumes what keeps him from his
proper end. But by such like bodily defects, the end of the Incarnation
seems to be hindered in many ways. First, because by these infirmities
men were kept back from knowing Him, according to Is. 53:2,3: "[There
was no sightliness] that we should be desirous of Him. Despised and the
most abject of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity, and
His look was, as it were, hidden and despised, whereupon we esteemed
Him not." Secondly, because the de. sire of the Fathers would not seem
to be fulfilled, in whose person it is written (Is. 51:9): "Arise,
arise, put on Thy strength, O Thou Arm of the Lord." Thirdly, because
it would seem more fitting for the devil's power to be overcome and
man's weakness healed, by strength than by weakness. Therefore it does
not seem to have been fitting that the Son of God assumed human nature
with infirmities or defects of body.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2:18): "For in that, wherein He
Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succor them also
that are tempted." Now He came to succor us. hence David said of Him
(Ps. 120:1): "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence
help shall come to me." Therefore it was fitting for the Son of God to
assume flesh subject to human infirmities, in order to suffer and be
tempted in it and so bring succor to us.
I answer that, It was fitting for the body assumed by the Son of God to
be subject to human infirmities and defects; and especially for three
reasons. First, because it was in order to satisfy for the sin of the
human race that the Son of God, having taken flesh, came into the
world. Now one satisfies for another's sin by taking on himself the
punishment due to the sin of the other. But these bodily defects, to
wit, death, hunger, thirst, and the like, are the punishment of sin,
which was brought into the world by Adam, according to Rom. 5:12: "By
one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." Hence it was
useful for the end of the Incarnation that He should assume these
penalties in our flesh and in our stead, according to Is. 53:4, "Surely
He hath borne our infirmities." Secondly, in order to cause belief in
the Incarnation. For since human nature is known to men only as it is
subject to these defects, if the Son of God had assumed human nature
without these defects, He would not have seemed to be true man, nor to
have true, but imaginary, flesh, as the Manicheans held. And so, as is
said, Phil. 2:7: "He . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a
servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a
man." Hence, Thomas, by the sight of His wounds, was recalled to the
faith, as related Jn. 20:26. Thirdly, in order to show us an example of
patience by valiantly bearing up against human passibility and defects.
Hence it is said (Heb. 12:3) that He "endured such opposition from
sinners against Himself, that you be not wearied. fainting in your
minds."
Reply to Objection 1: The penalties one suffers for another's sin are
the matter, as it were, of the satisfaction for that sin; but the
principle is the habit of soul, whereby one is inclined to wish to
satisfy for another, and from which the satisfaction has its efficacy,
for satisfaction would not be efficacious unless it proceeded from
charity, as will be explained ([4019]XP, Q[14], A[2]). Hence, it
behooved the soul of Christ to be perfect as regards the habit of
knowledge and virtue, in order to have the power of satisfying; but His
body was subject to infirmities, that the matter of satisfaction should
not be wanting.
Reply to Objection 2: From the natural relationship which is between
the soul and the body, glory flows into the body from the soul's glory.
Yet this natural relationship in Christ was subject to the will of His
Godhead, and thereby it came to pass that the beatitude remained in the
soul, and did not flow into the body; but the flesh suffered what
belongs to a passible nature; thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
15) that, "it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was
allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it."
Reply to Objection 3: Punishment always follows sin actual or original,
sometimes of the one punished, sometimes of the one for whom he who
suffers the punishment satisfies. And so it was with Christ, according
to Is. 53:5: "He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our
sins."
Reply to Objection 4: The infirmity assumed by Christ did not impede,
but greatly furthered the end of the Incarnation, as above stated. And
although these infirmities concealed His Godhead, they made known His
Manhood, which is the way of coming to the Godhead, according to Rom.
5:1,2: "By Jesus Christ we have access to God." Moreover, the ancient
Fathers did not desire bodily strength in Christ, but spiritual
strength, wherewith He vanquished the devil and healed human weakness.
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Whether Christ was of necessity subject to these defects?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not of necessity subject to
these defects. For it is written (Is. 53:7): "He was offered because it
was His own will"; and the prophet is speaking of the offering of the
Passion. But will is opposed to necessity. Therefore Christ was not of
necessity subject to bodily defects.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20): "Nothing
obligatory is seen in Christ: all is voluntary." Now what is voluntary
is not necessary. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in
Christ.
Objection 3: Further, necessity is induced by something more powerful.
But no creature is more powerful than the soul of Christ, to which it
pertained to preserve its own body. Therefore these defects were not of
necessity in Christ.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:3) that "God" sent "His own
Son in the likeness of sinful flesh." Now it is a condition of sinful
flesh to be under the necessity of dying, and suffering other like
passions. Therefore the necessity of suffering these defects was in
Christ's flesh.
I answer that, Necessity is twofold. one is a necessity of
"constraint," brought about by an external agent; and this necessity is
contrary to both nature and will, since these flow from an internal
principle. The other is "natural" necessity, resulting from the natural
principles---either the form (as it is necessary for fire to heat), or
the matter (as it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to be
dissolved). Hence, with this necessity, which results from the matter,
Christ's body was subject to the necessity of death and other like
defects, since, as was said (A[1], ad 2), "it was by the consent of the
Divine will that the flesh was allowed to do and suffer what belonged
to it." And this necessity results from the principles of human nature,
as was said above in this article. But if we speak of necessity of
constraint, as repugnant to the bodily nature, thus again was Christ's
body in its own natural condition subject to necessity in regard to the
nail that pierced and the scourge that struck. Yet inasmuch as such
necessity is repugnant to the will, it is clear that in Christ these
defects were not of necessity as regards either the Divine will, or the
human will of Christ considered absolutely, as following the
deliberation of reason; but only as regards the natural movement of the
will, inasmuch as it naturally shrinks from death and bodily hurt.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said to be "offered because it was His
own will," i.e. Divine will and deliberate human will; although death
was contrary to the natural movement of His human will, as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23,24).
Reply to Objection 2: This is plain from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing was more powerful than Christ's soul,
absolutely; yet there was nothing to hinder a thing being more powerful
in regard to this or that effect, as a nail for piercing. And this I
say, in so far as Christ's soul is considered in its own proper nature
and power.
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Whether Christ contracted these defects?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ contracted bodily defects. For
we are said to contract what we derive with our nature from birth. But
Christ, together with human nature, derived His bodily defects and
infirmities through His birth from His mother, whose flesh was subject
to these defects. Therefore it seems that He contracted these defects.
Objection 2: Further, what is caused by the principles of nature is
derived together with nature, and hence is contracted. Now these
penalties are caused by the principles of human nature. Therefore
Christ contracted them.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is likened to other men in these defects,
as is written Heb. 2:17. But other men contract these defects.
Therefore it seems that Christ contracted these defects.
On the contrary, These defects are contracted through sin, according to
Rom. 5:12: "By one man sin entered into this world and by sin, death."
Now sin had no place in Christ. Therefore Christ did not contract these
defects.
I answer that, In the verb "to contract" is understood the relation of
effect to cause, i.e. that is said to be contracted which is derived of
necessity together with its cause. Now the cause of death and such like
defects in human nature is sin, since "by sin death entered into this
world," according to Rom. 5:12. And hence they who incur these defects,
as due to sin, are properly said to contract them. Now Christ had not
these defects, as due to sin, since, as Augustine [*Alcuin in the
Gloss, Ord.], expounding Jn. 3:31, "He that cometh from above, is above
all," says: "Christ came from above, i.e. from the height of human
nature, which it had before the fall of the first man." For He received
human nature without sin, in the purity which it had in the state of
innocence. In the same way He might have assumed human nature without
defects. Thus it is clear that Christ did not contract these defects as
if taking them upon Himself as due to sin, but by His own will.
Reply to Objection 1: The flesh of the Virgin was conceived in original
sin, [*See introductory note to Q[27]] and therefore contracted these
defects. But from the Virgin, Christ's flesh assumed the nature without
sin, and He might likewise have assumed the nature without its
penalties. But He wished to bear its penalties in order to carry out
the work of our redemption, as stated above [4020](A[1]). Therefore He
had these defects---not that He contracted them, but that He assumed
them.
Reply to Objection 2: The cause of death and other corporeal defects of
human nature is twofold: the first is remote, and results from the
material principles of the human body, inasmuch as it is made up of
contraries. But this cause was held in check by original justice. Hence
the proximate cause of death and other defects is sin, whereby original
justice is withdrawn. And thus, because Christ was without sin, He is
said not to have contracted these defects, but to have assumed them.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ was made like to other men in the quality
and not in the cause of these defects; and hence, unlike others, He did
not contract them.
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Whether Christ ought to have assumed all the bodily defects of men?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought to have assumed all the
bodily defects of men. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,18):
"What is unassumable is incurable." But Christ came to cure all our
defects. Therefore He ought to have assumed all our defects.
Objection 2: Further it was said [4021](A[1]), that in order to satisfy
for us, Christ ought to have had perfective habits of soul and defects
of body. Now as regards the soul, He assumed the fulness of all grace.
Therefore as regards the body, He ought to have assumed all defects.
Objection 3: Further, amongst all bodily defects death holds the chief
place. Now Christ assumed death. Much more, therefore, ought He to have
assumed other defects.
On the contrary, Contraries cannot take place simultaneously in the
same. Now some infirmities are contrary to each other, being caused by
contrary principles. Hence it could not be that Christ assumed all
human infirmities.
I answer that, As stated above ([4022]AA[1],2), Christ assumed human
defects in order to satisfy for the sin of human nature, and for this
it was necessary for Him to have the fulness of knowledge and grace in
His soul. Hence Christ ought to have assumed those defects which flow
from the common sin of the whole nature, yet are not incompatible with
the perfection of knowledge and grace. And thus it was not fitting for
Him to assume all human defects or infirmities. For there are some
defects that are incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and
grace, as ignorance, a proneness towards evil, and a difficulty in
well-doing. Some other defects do not flow from the whole of human
nature in common on account of the sin of our first parent, but are
caused in some men by certain particular causes, as leprosy, epilepsy,
and the like; and these defects are sometimes brought about by the
fault of the man, e.g. from inordinate eating; sometimes by a defect in
the formative power. Now neither of these pertains to Christ, since His
flesh was conceived of the Holy Ghost, Who has infinite wisdom and
power, and cannot err or fail; and He Himself did nothing wrong in the
order of His life. But there are some third defects, to be found
amongst all men in common, by reason of the sin of our first parent, as
death, hunger, thirst, and the like; and all these defects Christ
assumed, which Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 11; iii, 20) calls "natural
and indetractible passions" ---natural, as following all human nature
in common; indetractible, as implying no defect of knowledge or grace.
Reply to Objection 1: All particular defects of men are caused by the
corruptibility and passibility of the body, some particular causes
being added; and hence, since Christ healed the passibility and
corruptibility of our body by assuming it, He consequently healed all
other defects.
Reply to Objection 2: The fulness of all grace and knowledge was due to
Christ's soul of itself, from the fact of its being assumed by the Word
of God; and hence Christ assumed all the fulness of knowledge and
wisdom absolutely. But He assumed our defects economically, in order to
satisfy for our sin, and not that they belonged to Him of Himself.
Hence it was not necessary for Him to assume them all, but only such as
sufficed to satisfy for the sin of the whole nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Death comes to all men from the sin of our first
parent; but not other defects, although they are less than death. Hence
there is no parity.
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OF THE DEFECTS OF SOUL ASSUMED BY CHRIST (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the defects pertaining to the soul; and under this
head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there was sin in Christ?
(2) Whether there was the "fomes" of sin in Him?
(3) Whether there was ignorance?
(4) Whether His soul was passible?
(5) Whether in Him there was sensible pain?
(6) Whether there was sorrow?
(7) Whether there was fear?
(8) Whether there was wonder?
(9) Whether there was anger?
(10) Whether He was at once wayfarer and comprehensor?
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Whether there was sin in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was sin in Christ. For it is
written (Ps. 21:2): "O God, My God . . . why hast Thou forsaken Me? Far
from My salvation are the words of My sins." Now these words are said
in the person of Christ Himself, as appears from His having uttered
them on the cross. Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were
sins.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12) that "in Adam all
have sinned"---namely, because all were in Adam by origin. Now Christ
also was in Adam by origin. Therefore He sinned in him.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 2:18) that "in that,
wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succor
them also that are tempted." Now above all do we require His help
against sin. Therefore it seems that there was sin in Him.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (2 Cor. 5:21) that "Him that knew
no sin" (i.e. Christ), "for us" God "hath made sin." But that really
is, which has been made by God. Therefore there was really sin in
Christ.
Objection 5: Further, as Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi), "in the
man Christ the Son of God gave Himself to us as a pattern of living."
Now man needs a pattern not merely of right living, but also of
repentance for sin. Therefore it seems that in Christ there ought to
have been sin, that He might repent of His sin, and thus afford us a
pattern of repentance.
On the contrary, He Himself says (Jn. 8:46): "Which of you shall
convince Me of sin?"
I answer that, As was said above ([4023]Q[14], A[1]), Christ assumed
our defects that He might satisfy for us, that He might prove the truth
of His human nature, and that He might become an example of virtue to
us. Now it is plain that by reason of these three things He ought not
to have assumed the defect of sin. First, because sin nowise works our
satisfaction; rather, it impedes the power of satisfying, since, as it
is written (Ecclus. 34:23), "The Most High approveth not the gifts of
the wicked." Secondly, the truth of His human nature is not proved by
sin, since sin does not belong to human nature, whereof God is the
cause; but rather has been sown in it against its nature by the devil,
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20). Thirdly, because by sinning
He could afford no example of virtue, since sin is opposed to virtue.
Hence Christ nowise assumed the defect of sin---either original or
actual---according to what is written (1 Pet. 2:22): "Who did no sin,
neither was guile found in His mouth."
Reply to Objection 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 25), things
are said of Christ, first, with reference to His natural and hypostatic
property, as when it is said that God became man, and that He suffered
for us; secondly, with reference to His personal and relative property,
when things are said of Him in our person which nowise belong to Him of
Himself. Hence, in the seven rules of Tichonius which Augustine quotes
in De Doctr. Christ. iii, 31, the first regards "Our Lord and His
Body," since "Christ and His Church are taken as one person." And thus
Christ, speaking in the person of His members, says (Ps. 21:2): "The
words of My sins"---not that there were any sins in the Head.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20), Christ
was in Adam and the other fathers not altogether as we were. For we
were in Adam as regards both seminal virtue and bodily substance,
since, as he goes on to say: "As in the seed there is a visible bulk
and an invisible virtue, both have come from Adam. Now Christ took the
visible substance of His flesh from the Virgin's flesh; but the virtue
of His conception did not spring from the seed of man, but far
otherwise---from on high." Hence He was not in Adam according to
seminal virtue, but only according to bodily substance. And therefore
Christ did not receive human nature from Adam actively, but only
materially---and from the Holy Ghost actively; even as Adam received
his body materially from the slime of the earth---actively from God.
And thus Christ did not sin in Adam, in whom He was only as regards His
matter.
Reply to Objection 3: In His temptation and passion Christ has succored
us by satisfying for us. Now sin does not further satisfaction, but
hinders it, as has been said. Hence, it behooved Him not to have sin,
but to be wholly free from sin; otherwise the punishment He bore would
have been due to Him for His own sin.
Reply to Objection 4: God "made Christ sin"---not, indeed, in such sort
that He had sin, but that He made Him a sacrifice for sin: even as it
is written (Osee 4:8): "They shall eat the sins of My people"---they,
i.e. the priests, who by the law ate the sacrifices offered for sin.
And in that way it is written (Is. 53:6) that "the Lord hath laid on
Him the iniquity of us all" (i.e. He gave Him up to be a victim for the
sins of all men); or "He made Him sin" (i.e. made Him to have "the
likeness of sinful flesh"), as is written (Rom. 8:3), and this on
account of the passible and mortal body He assumed.
Reply to Objection 5: A penitent can give a praiseworthy example, not
by having sinned, but by freely bearing the punishment of sin. And
hence Christ set the highest example to penitents, since He willingly
bore the punishment, not of His own sin, but of the sins of others.
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Whether there was the "fomes" of sin in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was the "fomes" of sin.
For the "fomes" of sin, and the passibility and mortality of the body
spring from the same principle, to wit, from the withdrawal of original
justice, whereby the inferior powers of the soul were subject to the
reason, and the body to the soul. Now passibility and mortality of body
were in Christ. Therefore there was also the "fomes" of sin.
Objection 2: Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19), "it
was by consent of the Divine will that the flesh of Christ was allowed
to suffer and do what belonged to it." But it is proper to the flesh to
lust after its pleasures. Now since the "fomes" of sin is nothing more
than concupiscence, as the gloss says on Rom. 7:8, it seems that in
Christ there was the "fomes" of sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is by reason of the "fomes" of sin that "the
flesh lusteth against the spirit," as is written (Gal. 5:17). But the
spirit is shown to be so much the stronger and worthier to be crowned
according as the more completely it overcomes its enemy---to wit, the
concupiscence of the flesh, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, he "is not crowned
except he strive lawfully." Now Christ had a most valiant and
conquering spirit, and one most worthy of a crown, according to Apoc.
6:2: "There was a crown given Him, and He went forth conquering that He
might conquer." Therefore it would especially seem that the "fomes" of
sin ought to have been in Christ.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:20): "That which is conceived in
her is of the Holy Ghost." Now the Holy Ghost drives out sin and the
inclination to sin, which is implied in the word "fomes." Therefore in
Christ there ought not to have been the "fomes" of sin.
I answer that, As was said above (Q[7], AA[2],9), Christ had grace and
all the virtues most perfectly. Now moral virtues, which are in the
irrational part of the soul, make it subject to reason, and so much the
more as the virtue is more perfect; thus, temperance controls the
concupiscible appetite, fortitude and meekness the irascible appetite,
as was said in the [4024]FS, Q[56], A[4]. But there belongs to the very
nature of the "fomes" of sin an inclination of the sensual appetite to
what is contrary to reason. And hence it is plain that the more perfect
the virtues are in any man, the weaker the "fomes" of sin becomes in
him. Hence, since in Christ the virtues were in their highest degree,
the "fomes" of sin was nowise in Him; inasmuch, also, as this defect
cannot be ordained to satisfaction, but rather inclined to what is
contrary to satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 1: The inferior powers pertaining to the sensitive
appetite have a natural capacity to be obedient to reason; but not the
bodily powers, nor those of the bodily humors, nor those of the
vegetative soul, as is made plain Ethic. i, 13. And hence perfection of
virtue, which is in accordance with right reason, does not exclude
passibility of body; yet it excludes the "fomes" of sin, the nature of
which consists in the resistance of the sensitive appetite to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The flesh naturally seeks what is pleasing to it
by the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite; but the flesh of man,
who is a rational animal, seeks this after the manner and order of
reason. And thus with the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite
Christ's flesh naturally sought food, drink, and sleep, and all else
that is sought in right reason, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide
Orth. iii, 14). Yet it does not therefore follow that in Christ there
was the "fomes" of sin, for this implies the lust after pleasurable
things against the order of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The spirit gives evidence of fortitude to some
extent by resisting that concupiscence of the flesh which is opposed to
it; yet a greater fortitude of spirit is shown, if by its strength the
flesh is thoroughly overcome, so as to be incapable of lusting against
the spirit. And hence this belonged to Christ, whose spirit reached the
highest degree of fortitude. And although He suffered no internal
assault on the part of the "fomes" of sin, He sustained an external
assault on the part of the world and the devil, and won the crown of
victory by overcoming them.
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Whether in Christ there was ignorance?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was ignorance in Christ. For that
is truly in Christ which belongs to Him in His human nature, although
it does not belong to Him in His Divine Nature, as suffering and death.
But ignorance belongs to Christ in His human nature; for Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 21) that "He assumed an ignorant and enslaved
nature." Therefore ignorance was truly in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, one is said to be ignorant through defect of
knowledge. Now some kind of knowledge was wanting to Christ, for the
Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:21) "Him that knew no sin, for us He hath made
sin." Therefore there was ignorance in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Is. 8:4): "For before the child
know to call his Father and his mother, the strength of Damascus . . .
shall be taken away." Therefore in Christ there was ignorance of
certain things.
On the contrary, Ignorance is not taken away by ignorance. But Christ
came to take away our ignorance; for "He came to enlighten them that
sit in darkness and in the shadow of death" (Lk. 1:79). Therefore there
was no ignorance in Christ.
I answer that, As there was the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ,
so too there was the fulness of all knowledge, as is plain from what
has been said above ([4025]Q[7], A[9];[4026] Q[9]). Now as the fulness
of grace and virtue in Christ excluded the "fomes" of sin, so the
fulness of knowledge excluded ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge.
Hence, even as the "fomes" of sin was not in Christ, neither was there
ignorance in Him.
Reply to Objection 1: The nature assumed by Christ may be viewed in two
ways. First, in its specific nature, and thus Damascene calls it
"ignorant and enslaved"; hence he adds: "For man's nature is a slave of
Him" (i.e. God) "Who made it; and it has no knowledge of future
things." Secondly, it may be considered with regard to what it has from
its union with the Divine hypostasis, from which it has the fulness of
knowledge and grace, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His
glory'] as it were the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and
truth"; and in this way the human nature in Christ was not affected
with ignorance.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ is said not to have known sin, because He
did not know it by experience; but He knew it by simple cognition.
Reply to Objection 3: The prophet is speaking in this passage of the
human knowledge of Christ; thus he says: "Before the Child" (i.e. in
His human nature) "know to call His father" (i.e. Joseph, who was His
reputed father), "and His mother" (i.e. Mary), "the strength of
Damascus . . . shall be taken away." Nor are we to understand this as
if He had been some time a man without knowing it; but "before He know"
(i.e. before He is a man having human knowledge)---literally, "the
strength of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria shall be taken away by
the King of the Assyrians"---or spiritually, "before His birth He will
save His people solely by invocation," as a gloss expounds it.
Augustine however (Serm. xxxii de Temp.) says that this was fulfilled
in the adoration of the Magi. For he says: "Before He uttered human
words in human flesh, He received the strength of Damascus, i.e. the
riches which Damascus vaunted (for in riches the first place is given
to gold). They themselves were the spoils of Samaria. Because Samaria
is taken to signify idolatry; since this people, having turned away
from the Lord, turned to the worship of idols. Hence these were the
first spoils which the child took from the domination of idolatry." And
in this way "before the child know" may be taken to mean "before he
show himself to know."
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Whether Christ's soul was passible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was not passible.
For nothing suffers except by reason of something stronger; since "the
agent is greater than the patient," as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 16), and from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). Now no
creature was stronger than Christ's soul. Therefore Christ's soul could
not suffer at the hands of any creature; and hence it was not passible;
for its capability of suffering would have been to no purpose if it
could not have suffered at the hands of anything.
Objection 2: Further, Tully (De Tusc. Quaes. iii) says that the soul's
passions are ailments [*Cf. [4027]FS, Q[24], A[2]]. But Christ's soul
had no ailment; for the soul's ailment results from sin, as is plain
from Ps. 40:5: "Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee."
Therefore in Christ's soul there were no passions.
Objection 3: Further, the soul's passions would seem to be the same as
the "fomes" of sin, hence the Apostle (Rom. 7:5) calls them the
"passions of sins." Now the "fomes" of sin was not in Christ, as was
said A[2]. Therefore it seems that there were no passions in His soul;
and hence His soul was not passible.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 87:4) in the person of Christ: "My
soul is filled with evils"---not sins, indeed, but human evils, i.e.
"pains," as a gloss expounds it. Hence the soul of Christ was passible.
I answer that, A soul placed in a body may suffer in two ways: first
with a bodily passion; secondly, with an animal passion. It suffers
with a bodily passion through bodily hurt; for since the soul is the
form of the body, soul and body have but one being; and hence, when the
body is disturbed by any bodily passion, the soul, too, must be
disturbed, i.e. in the being which it has in the body. Therefore, since
Christ's body was passible and mortal, as was said above (Q[14], A[2]),
His soul also was of necessity passible in like manner. But the soul
suffers with an animal passion, in its operations---either in such as
are proper to the soul, or in such as are of the soul more than of the
body. And although the soul is said to suffer in this way through
sensation and intelligence, as was said in the [4028]FS, Q[22], A[3];
[4029]FS, Q[41], A[1]; nevertheless the affections of the sensitive
appetite are most properly called passions of the soul. Now these were
in Christ, even as all else pertaining to man's nature. Hence Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9): "Our Lord having deigned to live in the form
of a servant, took these upon Himself whenever He judged they ought to
be assumed; for there was no false human affection in Him Who had a
true body and a true human soul."
Nevertheless we must know that the passions were in Christ otherwise
than in us, in three ways. First, as regards the object, since in us
these passions very often tend towards what is unlawful, but not so in
Christ. Secondly, as regards the principle, since these passions in us
frequently forestall the judgment of reason; but in Christ all
movements of the sensitive appetite sprang from the disposition of the
reason. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9), that "Christ assumed
these movements, in His human soul, by an unfailing dispensation, when
He willed; even as He became man when He willed." Thirdly, as regards
the effect, because in us these movements, at times, do not remain in
the sensitive appetite, but deflect the reason; but not so in Christ,
since by His disposition the movements that are naturally becoming to
human flesh so remained in the sensitive appetite that the reason was
nowise hindered in doing what was right. Hence Jerome says (on Mat.
26:37) that "Our Lord, in order to prove the reality of the assumed
manhood, 'was sorrowful' in very deed; yet lest a passion should hold
sway over His soul, it is by a propassion that He is said to have
'begun to grow sorrowful and to be sad'"; so that it is a perfect
"passion" when it dominates the soul, i.e. the reason; and a
"propassion" when it has its beginning in the sensitive appetite, but
goes no further.
Reply to Objection 1: The soul of Christ could have prevented these
passions from coming upon it, and especially by the Divine power; yet
of His own will He subjected Himself to these corporeal and animal
passions.
Reply to Objection 2: Tully is speaking there according to the opinions
of the Stoics, who did not give the name of passions to all, but only
to the disorderly movements of the sensitive appetite. Now, it is
manifest that passions like these were not in Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: The "passions of sins" are movements of the
sensitive appetite that tend to unlawful things; and these were not in
Christ, as neither was the "fomes" of sin.
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Whether there was sensible pain in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no true sensible pain in
Christ. For Hilary says (De Trin. x): "Since with Christ to die was
life, what pain may He be supposed to have suffered in the mystery of
His death, Who bestows life on such as die for Him?" And further on he
says: "The Only-begotten assumed human nature, not ceasing to be God;
and although blows struck Him and wounds were inflicted on Him, and
scourges fell upon Him, and the cross lifted Him up, yet these wrought
in deed the vehemence of the passion, but brought no pain; as a dart
piercing the water." Hence there was no true pain in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, it would seem to be proper to flesh conceived in
original sin, to be subject to the necessity of pain. But the flesh of
Christ was not conceived in sin, but of the Holy Ghost in the Virgin's
womb. Therefore it lay under no necessity of suffering pain.
Objection 3: Further, the delight of the contemplation of Divine things
dulls the sense of pain; hence the martyrs in their passions bore up
more bravely by thinking of the Divine love. But Christ's soul was in
the perfect enjoyment of contemplating God, Whom He saw in essence, as
was said above ([4030]Q[9], A[2]). Therefore He could feel no pain.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 53:4): "Surely He hath borne our
infirmities and carried our sorrows."
I answer that, As is plain from what has been said in the [4031]FS,
Q[35], A[7], for true bodily pain are required bodily hurt and the
sense of hurt. Now Christ's body was able to be hurt, since it was
passible and mortal, as above stated (Q[14], AA[1],2); neither was the
sense of hurt wanting to it, since Christ's soul possessed perfectly
all natural powers. Therefore no one should doubt but that in Christ
there was true pain.
Reply to Objection 1: In all these and similar words, Hilary does not
intend to exclude the reality of the pain, but the necessity of it.
Hence after the foregoing he adds: "Nor, when He thirsted, or hungered,
or wept, was the Lord seen to drink, or eat, or grieve. But in order to
prove the reality of the body, the body's customs were assumed, so that
the custom of our body was atoned for by the custom of our nature. Or
when He took drink or food, He acceded, not to the body's necessity,
but to its custom." And he uses the word "necessity" in reference to
the first cause of these defects, which is sin, as above stated
([4032]Q[14], AA[1],3), so that Christ's flesh is said not to have lain
under the necessity of these defects, in the sense that there was no
sin in it. Hence he adds: "For He" (i.e. Christ) "had a body---one
proper to His origin, which did not exist through the unholiness of our
conception, but subsisted in the form of our body by the strength of
His power." But as regards the proximate cause of these defects, which
is composition of contraries, the flesh of Christ lay under the
necessity of these defects, as was said above ([4033]Q[14] , A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Flesh conceived in sin is subject to pain, not
merely on account of the necessity of its natural principles, but from
the necessity of the guilt of sin. Now this necessity was not in
Christ; but only the necessity of natural principles.
Reply to Objection 3: As was said above ([4034]Q[14], A[1], ad 2), by
the power of the Godhead of Christ the beatitude was economically kept
in the soul, so as not to overflow into the body, lest His passibility
and mortality should be taken away; and for the same reason the delight
of contemplation was so kept in the mind as not to overflow into the
sensitive powers, lest sensible pain should thereby be prevented.
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Whether there was sorrow in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no sorrow. For it
is written of Christ (Is. 42:4): "He shall not be sad nor troublesome."
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:21): "Whatever shall
befall the just man, it shall not make him sad." And the reason of this
the Stoics asserted to be that no one is saddened save by the loss of
his goods. Now the just man esteems only justice and virtue as his
goods, and these he cannot lose; otherwise the just man would be
subject to fortune if he was saddened by the loss of the goods fortune
has given him. But Christ was most just, according to Jer. 23:6: "This
is the name that they shall call Him: The Lord, our just one."
Therefore there was no sorrow in Him.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 13,14) that all
sorrow is "evil, and to be shunned." But in Christ there was no evil to
be shunned. Therefore there was no sorrow in Christ.
Objection 4: Furthermore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6):
"Sorrow regards the things we suffer unwillingly." But Christ suffered
nothing against His will, for it is written (Is. 53:7): "He was offered
because it was His own will." Hence there was no sorrow in Christ.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even
unto death." And Ambrose says (De Trin. ii.) that "as a man He had
sorrow; for He bore my sorrow. I call it sorrow, fearlessly, since I
preach the cross."
I answer that, As was said above (A[5], ad 3), by Divine dispensation
the joy of contemplation remained in Christ's mind so as not to
overflow into the sensitive powers, and thereby shut out sensible pain.
Now even as sensible pain is in the sensitive appetite, so also is
sorrow. But there is a difference of motive or object; for the object
and motive of pain is hurt perceived by the sense of touch, as when
anyone is wounded; but the object and motive of sorrow is anything
hurtful or evil interiorly, apprehended by the reason or the
imagination, as was said in the [4035]FS, Q[35], AA[2],7, as when
anyone grieves over the loss of grace or money. Now Christ's soul could
apprehend things as hurtful either to Himself, as His passion and
death---or to others, as the sin of His disciples, or of the Jews that
killed Him. And hence, as there could be true pain in Christ, so too
could there be true sorrow; otherwise, indeed, than in us, in the three
ways above stated [4036](A[4]), when we were speaking of the passions
of Christ's soul in general.
Reply to Objection 1: Sorrow was not in Christ, as a perfect passion;
yet it was inchoatively in Him as a "propassion." Hence it is written
(Mat. 26:37): "He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad." For "it is
one thing to be sorrowful and another to grow sorrowful," as Jerome
says, on this text.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), "for the
three passions"---desire, joy, and fear---the Stoics held three
{eupatheias} i.e. good passions, in the soul of the wise man, viz. for
desire, will---for joy, delight---for fear, caution. But as regards
sorrow, they denied it could be in the soul of the wise man, for sorrow
regards evil already present, and they thought that no evil could
befall a wise man; and for this reason, because they believed that only
the virtuous is good, since it makes men good, and that nothing is
evil, except what is sinful, whereby men become wicked. Now although
what is virtuous is man's chief good, and what is sinful is man's chief
evil, since these pertain to reason which is supreme in man, yet there
are certain secondary goods of man, which pertain to the body, or to
the exterior things that minister to the body. And hence in the soul of
the wise man there may be sorrow in the sensitive appetite by his
apprehending these evils; without this sorrow disturbing the reason.
And in this way are we to understand that "whatsoever shall befall the
just man, it shall not make him sad," because his reason is troubled by
no misfortune. And thus Christ's sorrow was a propassion, and not a
passion.
Reply to Objection 3: All sorrow is an evil of punishment; but it is
not always an evil of fault, except only when it proceeds from an
inordinate affection. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9):
"Whenever these affections follow reason, and are caused when and where
needed, who will dare to call them diseases or vicious passions?"
Reply to Objection 4: There is no reason why a thing may not of itself
be contrary to the will, and yet be willed by reason of the end, to
which it is ordained, as bitter medicine is not of itself desired, but
only as it is ordained to health. And thus Christ's death and passion
were of themselves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although they were
voluntary as ordained to the end, which is the redemption of the human
race.
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Whether there was fear in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no fear in Christ. For it is
written (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a lion, shall be without
dread." But Christ was most just. Therefore there was no fear in
Christ.
Objection 2: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. x): "I ask those who think
thus, does it stand to reason that He should dread to die, Who by
expelling all dread of death from the Apostles, encouraged them to the
glory of martyrdom?" Therefore it is unreasonable that there should be
fear in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, fear seems only to regard what a man cannot
avoid. Now Christ could have avoided both the evil of punishment which
He endured, and the evil of fault which befell others. Therefore there
was no fear in Christ.
On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 4:33): Jesus "began to fear and to
be heavy."
I answer that, As sorrow is caused by the apprehension of a present
evil, so also is fear caused by the apprehension of a future evil. Now
the apprehension of a future evil, if the evil be quite certain, does
not arouse fear. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that we do
not fear a thing unless there is some hope of avoiding it. For when
there is no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered present, and
thus it causes sorrow rather than fear. Hence fear may be considered in
two ways. First, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite naturally shrinks
from bodily hurt, by sorrow if it is present, and by fear if it is
future; and thus fear was in Christ, even as sorrow. Secondly, fear may
be considered in the uncertainty of the future event, as when at night
we are frightened at a sound, not knowing what it is; and in this way
there was no fear in Christ, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23).
Reply to Objection 1: The just man is said to be "without dread," in so
far as dread implies a perfect passion drawing man from what reason
dictates. And thus fear was not in Christ, but only as a propassion.
Hence it is said (Mk. 14:33) that Jesus "began to fear and to be
heavy," with a propassion, as Jerome expounds (Mat. 26:37).
Reply to Objection 2: Hilary excludes fear from Christ in the same way
that he excludes sorrow, i.e. as regards the necessity of fearing. And
yet to show the reality of His human nature, He voluntarily assumed
fear, even as sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: Although Christ could have avoided future evils
by the power of His Godhead, yet they were unavoidable, or not easily
avoidable by the weakness of the flesh.
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Whether there was wonder in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no wonder. For the
Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2) that wonder results when we see an
effect without knowing its cause; and thus wonder belongs only to the
ignorant. Now there was no ignorance in Christ, as was said A[3].
Therefore there was no wonder in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that
"wonder is fear springing from the imagination of something great"; and
hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man
does not wonder." But Christ was most magnanimous. Therefore there was
no wonder in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, no man wonders at what he himself can do. Now
Christ could do whatsoever was great. Therefore it seems that He
wondered at nothing.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 8:10): "Jesus hearing this," i.e.
the words of the centurion, "marveled."
I answer that, Wonder properly regards what is new and unwonted. Now
there could be nothing new and unwonted as regards Christ's Divine
knowledge, whereby He saw things in the Word; nor as regards the human
knowledge, whereby He saw things by infused species. Yet things could
be new and unwonted with regard to His empiric knowledge, in regard to
which new things could occur to Him day by day. Hence, if we speak of
Christ with respect to His Divine knowledge, and His beatific and even
His infused knowledge, there was no wonder in Christ. But if we speak
of Him with respect to empiric knowledge, wonder could be in Him; and
He assumed this affection for our instruction, i.e. in order to teach
us to wonder at what He Himself wondered at. Hence Augustine says
(Super Gen. Cont. Manich. i, 8): "Our Lord wondered in order to show us
that we, who still need to be so affected, must wonder. Hence all these
emotions are not signs of a disturbed mind, but of a master teaching."
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was ignorant of nothing, yet new
things might occur to His empiric knowledge, and thus wonder would be
caused.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ did not marvel at the Centurion's faith as
if it was great with respect to Himself, but because it was great with
respect to others.
Reply to Objection 3: He could do all things by the Divine power, for
with respect to this there was no wonder in Him, but only with respect
to His human empiric knowledge, as was said above.
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Whether there was anger in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no anger in Christ. For it is
written (James 1:20): "The anger of man worketh not the justice of
God." Now whatever was in Christ pertained to the justice of God, since
of Him it is written (1 Cor. 1:30): "For He [Vulg.: 'Who'] of God is
made unto us . . . justice." Therefore it seems that there was no anger
in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, anger is opposed to meekness, as is plain from
Ethic. iv, 5. But Christ was most meek. Therefore there was no anger in
Him.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "anger that
comes of evil blinds the eye of the mind, but anger that comes of zeal
disturbs it." Now the mind's eye in Christ was neither blinded nor
disturbed. Therefore in Christ there was neither sinful anger nor
zealous anger.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 2:17) that the words of Ps. 58:10,
"the zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," were fulfilled in Him.
I answer that, As was said in the [4037]FS, Q[46], A[3], ad 3, and
[4038]SS, Q[158], A[2], ad 3, anger is an effect of sorrow. or when
sorrow is inflicted upon someone, there arises within him a desire of
the sensitive appetite to repel this injury brought upon himself or
others. Hence anger is a passion composed of sorrow and the desire of
revenge. Now it was said [4039](A[6]) that sorrow could be in Christ.
As to the desire of revenge it is sometimes with sin, i.e. when anyone
seeks revenge beyond the order of reason: and in this way anger could
not be in Christ, for this kind of anger is sinful. Sometimes, however,
this desire is without sin---nay, is praiseworthy, e.g. when anyone
seeks revenge according to justice, and this is zealous anger. For
Augustine says (on Jn. 2:17) that "he is eaten up by zeal for the house
of God, who seeks to better whatever He sees to be evil in it, and if
he cannot right it, bears with it and sighs." Such was the anger that
was in Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v), anger is in man in
two ways---sometimes it forestalls reason, and causes it to operate,
and in this way it is properly said to work, for operations are
attributed to the principal agent. It is in this way that we must
understand that "the anger of man worketh not the justice of God."
Sometimes anger follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument, and
then the operation, which pertains to justice, is not attributed to
anger but to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the anger which outsteps the bounds of
reason that is opposed to meekness, and not the anger which is
controlled and brought within its proper bounds by reason, for meekness
holds the mean in anger.
Reply to Objection 3: In us the natural order is that the soul's powers
mutually impede each other, i.e. if the operation of one power is
intense, the operation of the other is weakened. This is the reason why
any movement whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered by reason,
dims the mind's eye of him who contemplates. But in Christ, by control
of the Divine power, "every faculty was allowed to do what was proper
to it," and one power was not impeded by another. Hence, as the joy of
His mind in contemplation did not impede the sorrow or pain of the
inferior part, so, conversely, the passions of the inferior part
no-wise impeded the act of reason.
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Whether Christ was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not at once a wayfarer and a
comprehensor. For it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the end
of beatitude, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the
end. Now to be moving towards the end and to be resting in the end
cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be at once
wayfarer and comprehensor.
Objection 2: Further, to tend to beatitude, or to obtain it, does not
pertain to man's body, but to his soul; hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
Dios. cxviii) that "upon the inferior nature, which is the body, there
overflows, not indeed the beatitude which belongs to such as enjoy and
understand, the fulness of health, i.e. the vigor of incorruption." Now
although Christ had a passible body, He fully enjoyed God in His mind.
Therefore Christ was not a wayfarer but a comprehensor.
Objection 3: Further, the Saints, whose souls are in heaven and whose
bodies are in the tomb, enjoy beatitude in their souls, although their
bodies are subject to death, yet they are called not wayfarers, but
only comprehensors. Hence, with equal reason, would it seem that Christ
was a pure comprehensor and nowise a wayfarer, since His mind enjoyed
God although His body was mortal.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 14:8): "Why wilt Thou be as a
stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge?"
I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tending to beatitude,
and a comprehensor from having already obtained beatitude, according to
1 Cor. 9:24: "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']"; and
Phil. 3:12: "I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend [Douay:
'obtain']". Now man's perfect beatitude consists in both soul and body,
as stated in the [4040]FS, Q[4], A[6]. In the soul, as regards what is
proper to it, inasmuch as the mind sees and enjoys God; in the body,
inasmuch as the body "will rise spiritual in power and glory and
incorruption," as is written 1 Cor. 15:42. Now before His passion
Christ's mind saw God fully, and thus He had beatitude as far as it
regards what is proper to the soul; but beatitude was wanting with
regard to all else, since His soul was passible, and His body both
passible and mortal, as is clear from the above [4041](A[4]; Q[14],
AA[1],2). Hence He was at once comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the
beatitude proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, inasmuch
as He was tending to beatitude, as regards what was wanting to His
beatitude.
Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible to be moving towards the end and
resting in the end, in the same respect; but there is nothing against
this under a different respect---as when a man is at once acquainted
with what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what he
does not know.
Reply to Objection 2: Beatitude principally and properly belongs to the
soul with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say,
instrumentally, bodily goods are required for beatitude; thus the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8), that exterior goods minister
"organically" to beatitude.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no parity between the soul of a saint
and of Christ, for two reasons: first, because the souls of saints are
not passible, as Christ's soul was; secondly, because their bodies do
nothing by which they tend to beatitude, as Christ by His bodily
sufferings tended to beatitude as regards the glory of His body.
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OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO CHRIST IN HIS BEING AND BECOMING
(TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the consequences of the union; and first as to
what belongs to Christ in Himself; secondly, as to what belongs to
Christ in relation with His Father; thirdly, as to what belongs to
Christ in relation to us.
Concerning the first, there occurs a double consideration. The first is
about such things as belong to Christ in being and becoming; the second
regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether this is true: "God is man"?
(2) Whether this is true: "Man is God"?
(3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man?
(4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Son
of God, and conversely?
(5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the
Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of God of the human nature?
(6) Whether this is true: "The Son of God was made man"?
(7) Whether this is true: "Man became God"?
(8) Whether this is true: "Christ is a creature"?
(9) Whether this is true: "This man," pointing out Christ, "began to
be"? or "always was"?
(10) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is a creature"?
(11) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is God"?
(12) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is a hypostasis or person"?
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Whether this is true: "God is man"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "God is man." For every
affirmative proposition of remote matter is false. Now this
proposition, "God is man," is on remote matter, since the forms
signified by the subject and predicate are most widely apart.
Therefore, since the aforesaid proposition is affirmative, it would
seem to be false.
Objection 2: Further, the three Divine Persons are in greater mutual
agreement than the human nature and the Divine. But in the mystery of
the Incarnation one Person is not predicated of another; for we do not
say that the Father is the Son, or conversely. Therefore it seems that
the human nature ought not to be predicated of God by saying that God
is man.
Objection 3: Further, Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.) that, "as the soul
and the flesh are one man, so are God and man one Christ." But this is
false: "The soul is the body." Therefore this also is false: "God is
man."
Objection 4: Further, it was said in the [4042]FP, Q[39], A[4] that
what is predicated of God not relatively but absolutely, belongs to the
whole Trinity and to each of the Persons. But this word "man" is not
relative, but absolute. Hence, if it is predicated of God, it would
follow that the whole Trinity and each of the Persons is man; and this
is clearly false.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:6,7): "Who being in the form of
God . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in
the likeness of man, and in habit found as a man"; and thus He Who is
in the form of God is man. Now He Who is in the form of God is God.
Therefore God is man.
I answer that, This proposition "God is man," is admitted by all
Christians, yet not in the same way by all. For some admit the
proposition, but not in the proper acceptation of the terms. Thus the
Manicheans say the Word of God is man, not indeed true, but fictitious
man, inasmuch as they say that the Son of God assumed an imaginary
body, and thus God is called man as a bronze figure is called man if it
has the figure of a man. So, too, those who held that Christ's body and
soul were not united, could not say that God is true man, but that He
is figuratively called man by reason of the parts. Now both these
opinions were disproved above ([4043]Q[2], A[5];[4044] Q[5], A[1]).
Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of man, but deny
the reality on the part of God. For they say that Christ, Who is God
and man, is God not naturally, but by participation, i.e. by grace;
even as all other holy men are called gods---Christ being more
excellently so than the rest, on account of His more abundant grace.
And thus, when it is said that "God is man," God does not stand for the
true and natural God. And this is the heresy of Photinus, which was
disproved above ([4045]Q[2], AA[10],11). But some admit this
proposition, together with the reality of both terms, holding that
Christ is true God and true man; yet they do not preserve the truth of
the predication. For they say that man is predicated of God by reason
of a certain conjunction either of dignity, or of authority, or of
affection or indwelling. It was thus that Nestorius held God to be
man---nothing further being meant than that God is joined to man by
such a conjunction that man is dwelt in by God, and united to Him in
affection, and in a share of the Divine authority and honor. And into
the same error fall those who suppose two supposita or hypostases in
Christ, since it is impossible to understand how, of two things
distinct in suppositum or hypostasis, one can be properly predicated of
the other: unless merely by a figurative expression, inasmuch as they
are united in something, as if we were to say that Peter is John
because they are somehow mutually joined together. And these opinions
also were disproved above ([4046]Q[2], AA[3],6).
Hence, supposing the truth of the Catholic belief, that the true Divine
Nature is united with true human nature not only in person, but also in
suppositum or hypostasis; we say that this proposition is true and
proper, "God is man"---not only by the truth of its terms, i.e. because
Christ is true God and true man, but by the truth of the predication.
For a word signifying the common nature in the concrete may stand for
all contained in the common nature, as this word "man" may stand for
any individual man. And thus this word "God," from its very mode of
signification, may stand for the Person of the Son of God, as was said
in the [4047]FP, Q[39], A[4]. Now of every suppositum of any nature we
may truly and properly predicate a word signifying that nature in the
concrete, as "man" may properly and truly be predicated of Socrates and
Plato. Hence, since the Person of the Son of God for Whom this word
"God" stands, is a suppositum of human nature this word man may be
truly and properly predicated of this word "God," as it stands for the
Person of the Son of God.
Reply to Objection 1: When different forms cannot come together in one
suppositum, the proposition is necessarily in remote matter, the
subject signifying one form and the predicate another. But when two
forms can come together in one suppositum, the matter is not remote,
but natural or contingent, as when I say: "Something white is musical."
Now the Divine and human natures, although most widely apart,
nevertheless come together by the mystery of the Incarnation in one
suppositum, in which neither exists accidentally, but [both]
essentially. Hence this proposition is neither in remote nor in
contingent, but in natural matter; and man is not predicated of God
accidentally, but essentially, as being predicated of its
hypostasis---not, indeed, by reason of the form signified by this word
"God," but by reason of the suppositum, which is a hypostasis of human
nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The three Divine Persons agree in one Nature, and
are distinguished in suppositum; and hence they are not predicated one
of another. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the natures, being
distinct, are not predicated one of the other, in the abstract. For the
Divine Nature is not the human nature. But because they agree in
suppositum, they are predicated of each other in the concrete.
Reply to Objection 3: "Soul" and "flesh" are taken in the abstract,
even as Godhead and manhood; but in the concrete we say "animate" and
"carnal" or "corporeal," as, on the other hand, "God" and "man." Hence
in both cases the abstract is not predicated of the abstract, but only
the concrete of the concrete.
Reply to Objection 4: This word "man" is predicated of God, because of
the union in person, and this union implies a relation. Hence it does
not follow the rule of those words which are absolutely predicated of
God from eternity.
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Whether this is true: "Man is God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Man is God." For God is
an incommunicable name; hence (Wis. 13:10; 14:21) idolaters are rebuked
for giving the name of God, which is incommunicable, to wood and
stones. Hence with equal reason does it seem unbecoming that this word
"God" should be predicated of man.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is predicated of the predicate may be
predicated of the subject. But this is true: "God is the Father," or
"God is the Trinity." Therefore, if it is true that "Man is God," it
seems that this also is true: "Man is the Father," or "Man is the
Trinity." But these are false. Therefore the first is false.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ps. 80:10): "There shall be no new
God in thee." But man is something new; for Christ was not always man.
Therefore this is false: "Man is God."
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 9:5): "Of whom is Christ according
to the flesh, Who is over all things, God blessed for ever." Now
Christ, according to the flesh, is man. Therefore this is true: "Man is
God."
I answer that, Granted the reality of both natures, i.e. Divine and
human, and of the union in person and hypostasis, this is true and
proper: "Man is God," even as this: "God is man." For this word "man"
may stand for any hypostasis of human nature; and thus it may stand for
the Person of the Son of God, Whom we say is a hypostasis of human
nature. Now it is manifest that the word "God" is truly and properly
predicated of the Person of the Son of God, as was said in the
[4048]FP, Q[39], A[4]. Hence it remains that this is true and proper:
"Man is God."
Reply to Objection 1: Idolaters attributed the name of the Deity to
stones and wood, considered in their own nature, because they thought
there was something divine in them. But we do not attribute the name of
the Deity to the man in His human nature, but in the eternal
suppositum, which by union is a suppositum of human nature, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: This word "Father" is predicated of this word
"God," inasmuch as this word "God" stands for the Person of the Father.
And in this way it is not predicated of the Person of the Son, because
the Person of the Son is not the Person of the Father. And,
consequently, it is not necessary that this word "Father" be predicated
of this word "Man," of which the Word "God" is predicated, inasmuch as
"Man" stands for the Person of the Son.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the human nature in Christ is something
new, yet the suppositum of the human nature is not new, but eternal.
And because this word "God" is predicated of man not on account of the
human nature, but by reason of the suppositum, it does not follow that
we assert a new God. But this would follow, if we held that "Man"
stands for a created suppositum: even as must be said by those who
assert that there are two supposita in Christ [*Cf.[4049] Q[2],
AA[3],6].
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Whether Christ can be called a lordly man?
[*The question is hardly apposite in English. St. Thomas explains why
we can say in Latin, e.g. 'oratio dominica' (the Lord's Prayer) or
'passio dominica' (Our Lord's Passion), but not speak of our Lord as
'homo dominicus' (a lordly man)].
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ can be called a lordly man. For
Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "we are to be counseled to
hope for the goods that were in the Lordly Man"; and he is speaking of
Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ was a lordly man.
Objection 2: Further, as lordship belongs to Christ by reason of His
Divine Nature, so does manhood belong to the human nature. Now God is
said to be "humanized," as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii,
11), where he says that "being humanized manifests the conjunction with
man." Hence with like reason may it be said denominatively that this
man is lordly.
Objection 3: Further, as "lordly" is derived from "lord," so is Divine
derived from "Deus" [God]. But Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iv) calls Christ
the "most Divine Jesus." Therefore with like reason may Christ be
called a lordly man.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 19): "I do not see that we
may rightly call Jesus Christ a lordly man, since He is the Lord
Himself."
I answer that, As was said above (A[2], ad 3), when we say "the Man
Christ Jesus," we signify the eternal suppositum, which is the Person
of the Son of God, because there is only one suppositum of both
natures. Now "God" and "Lord" are predicated essentially of the Son of
God; and hence they ought not to be predicated denominatively, since
this is derogatory to the truth of the union. Hence, since we say
"lordly" denominatively from lord, it cannot truly and properly be said
that this Man is lordly, but rather that He is Lord. But if, when we
say "the Man Christ Jesus," we mean a created suppositum, as those who
assert two supposita in Christ, this man might be called lordly,
inasmuch as he is assumed to a participation of Divine honor, as the
Nestorians said. And, even in this way, the human nature is not called
"divine" by essence, but "deified"---not, indeed, by its being
converted into the Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with the
Divine Nature in one hypostasis, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11,17).
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine retracts these and the like words
(Retract. i, 19); hence, after the foregoing words (Retract. i, 19), he
adds: "Wherever I have said this," viz. that Christ Jesus is a lordly
man, "I wish it unsaid, having afterwards seen that it ought not to be
said although it may be defended with some reason," i.e. because one
might say that He was called a lordly man by reason of the human
nature, which this word "man" signifies, and not by reason of the
suppositum.
Reply to Objection 2: This one suppositum, which is of the human and
Divine natures, was first of the Divine Nature, i.e. from eternity.
Afterwards in time it was made a suppositum of human nature by the
Incarnation. And for this reason it is said to be "humanized"---not
that it assumed a man, but that it assumed human nature. But the
converse of this is not true, viz. that a suppositum of human nature
assumed the Divine Nature; hence we may not say a "deified" or "lordly"
man.
Reply to Objection 3: This word Divine is wont to be predicated even of
things of which the word God is predicated essentially; thus we say
that "the Divine Essence is God," by reason of identity; and that "the
Essence belongs to God," or is "Divine," on account of the different
way of signifying; and we speak of the "Divine Word," though the Word
is God. So, too, we say "a Divine Person," just as we say "the person
of Plato," on account of its different mode of signification. But
"lordly" is not predicated of those of which "lord" is predicated; for
we are not wont to call a man who is a lord, lordly; but whatsoever
belongs to a lord is called lordly, as the "lordly will," or the
"lordly hand," or the "lordly possession." And hence the man Christ,
Who is our Lord, cannot be called lordly; yet His flesh can be called
"lordly flesh" and His passion the "lordly passion."
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Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature cannot
be said of God. For contrary things cannot be said of the same. Now,
what belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper to God,
since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the
human nature to be created temporal and mutable. Therefore what belongs
to the human nature cannot be said of God.
Objection 2: Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems to be
derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now what
pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer,
to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human
nature can nowise be said of God.
Objection 3: Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet
it does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature
cannot be said of God.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "God
assumed the idioms," i.e. the properties, "of flesh, since God is said
to be passible, and the God of glory was crucified."
I answer that, On this question there was a difference of opinion
between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide words
predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained to human
nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as pertained to
the Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man. Hence Nestorius
said: "If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to the Word, let him
be anathema" [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 29]. But if there are
any words applicable to both natures, of them they predicated what
pertained to both natures, as "Christ" or "Lord." Hence they granted
that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity; but
they did not say that God was born of a virgin, or that the Man was
from eternity. Catholics on the other hand maintained that words which
are said of Christ either in His Divine or in His human nature may be
said either of God or of man. Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus,
Part I, ch. 26]: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or substances,"
i.e. hypostases, "such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic
Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of
Himself, and believes that some are to be applied to the Man, and
apportions some to the Word alone---let him be anathema." And the
reason of this is that, since there is one hypostasis of both natures,
the same hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus
whether we say "man" or "God," the hypostasis of Divine and human
nature is signified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs to
the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of God
may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of
human nature.
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which
something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what
the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being
predicated. Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of
Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are predicated,
since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of
Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that belong to the human nature
are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Hence Augustine says (De
Trin. i, 11): "We must distinguish what is said by Scripture in
reference to the form of God, wherein He is equal to the Father, and
what in reference to the form of a servant, wherein He is less than the
Father": and further on he says (De Trin. i, 13): "The prudent,
careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point of view of
what is said."
Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible for contraries to be predicated
of the same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being
predicated of the same in different aspects. And thus contraries are
predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.
Reply to Objection 2: If the things pertaining to defect were
attributed to God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since
it would be derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of wrong done
to God if they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a
discourse of the Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. 10] it is said:
"God accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man's salvation.
For no lowliness that He assumed for us injures that Nature which can
be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its own, to save our
nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless things do no harm to
the Divine Nature, but bring about our salvation, how dost thou
maintain that what was the cause of our salvation was the occasion of
harm to God?"
Reply to Objection 3: To be assumed pertains to human nature, not in
its suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not belong to God.
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Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of the Divine
Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature can be
said of the Divine Nature. For what belongs to the human nature is
predicated of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own Nature.
Therefore, what belongs to the human nature may be predicated of the
Divine Nature.
Objection 2: Further, the flesh pertains to human nature. But as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), "we say, after the blessed
Athanasius and Cyril, that the Nature of the Word was incarnate."
Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the
human nature may be said of the Divine Nature.
Objection 3: Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature belongs to
Christ's human nature; such as to know future things and to possess
saving power. Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what
belongs to the human may be said of the Divine Nature.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4): "When we
mention the Godhead we do not predicate of it the idioms," i.e. the
properties, "of the humanity; for we do not say that the Godhead is
passible or creatable." Now the Godhead is the Divine Nature. Therefore
what is proper to the human nature cannot be said of the Divine Nature.
I answer that, What belongs to one cannot be said of another, unless
they are both the same; thus "risible" can be predicated only of man.
Now in the mystery of the Incarnation the Divine and human natures are
not the same; but the hypostasis of the two natures is the same. And
hence what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated of the other if
they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete words stand for the
hypostasis of the nature; and hence of concrete words we may predicate
indifferently what belongs to either nature---whether the word of which
they are predicated refers to one nature, as the word "Christ," by
which is signified "both the Godhead anointing and the manhood
anointed"; or to the Divine Nature alone, as this word "God" or "the
Son of God"; or to the manhood alone, as this word "Man" or "Jesus."
Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Palaest. cxxiv): "It is of no consequence
from what substance we name Christ; because since the unity of person
remains inseparably, one and the same is altogether Son of Man by His
flesh, and altogether Son of God by the Godhead which He has with the
Father."
Reply to Objection 1: In God, Person and Nature are really the same;
and by reason of this identity the Divine Nature is predicated of the
Son of God. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is different; and
hence certain things are said of the Son of God which are not said of
the Divine Nature; thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do
not say that the Divine Nature is born; as was said in the [4050]FP,
Q[39], A[5]. So, too, in the mystery of the Incarnation we say that the
Son of God suffered, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature suffered.
Reply to Objection 2: Incarnation implies union with flesh, rather than
any property of flesh. Now in Christ each nature is united to the other
in person; and by reason of this union the Divine Nature is said to be
incarnate and the human nature deified, as stated above ([4051]Q[2],
A[1], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the Divine Nature is predicated
of the human nature---not, indeed, as it belongs essentially to the
Divine Nature, but as it is participated by the human nature. Hence,
whatever cannot be participated by the human nature (as to be uncreated
and omnipotent), is nowise predicated of the human nature. But the
Divine Nature received nothing by participation from the human nature;
and hence what belongs to the human nature can nowise be predicated of
the Divine Nature.
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Whether this is true: "God was made man"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "God was made man." For
since man signifies a substance, to be made man is to be made simply.
But this is false: "God was made simply." Therefore this is false: "God
was made man."
Objection 2: Further, to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot
be the subject of change, according to Malachi 3:6: "I am the Lord, and
I change not." Hence this is false: "God was made man."
Objection 3: Further, man as predicated of Christ stands for the Person
of the Son of God. But this is false: "God was made the Person of the
Son of God." Therefore this is false: "God was made man."
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): "The Word was made flesh":
and as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epictetum), "when he said, 'The Word was
made flesh,' it is as if it were said that God was made man."
I answer that, A thing is said to be made that which begins to be
predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated
of God, as stated above [4052](A[1]), yet in such sort that it pertains
to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of His assuming
human nature. Hence, this is true, "God was made man"; though it is
understood differently by some: even as this, "God is man," as we said
above [4053](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: To be made man is to be made simply, in all those
in whom human nature begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But
God is said to have been made man, inasmuch as the human nature began
to be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature. And
hence for God to be made man does not mean that God was made simply.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, to be made implies that
something. is newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is
predicated of another, and there is a change in that of which it is
predicated, then to be made is to be changed; and this takes place in
whatever is predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot
newly affect anything, unless it be newly changed to whiteness or
greatness. But whatever is predicated relatively can be newly
predicated of anything without its change, as a man may be made to be
on the right side without being changed and merely by the change of him
on whose left side he was. Hence in such cases, not all that is said to
be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something
else. And it is thus we say of God: "Lord, Thou art made [Douay: 'hast
been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1). Now to be man belongs to God by reason
of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly
predicated of God without any change in Him, by a change in the human
nature, which is assumed to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is
said, "God was made man," we understand no change on the part of God,
but only on the part of the human nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Man stands not for the bare Person of the Son of
God, but inasmuch as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this
is false, "God was made the Person of the Son of God," yet this is
true: "God was made man" by being united to human nature.
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Whether this is true: "Man was made God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: "Man was made God." For
it is written (Rom. 1:2,3): "Which He had promised before by His
prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to Him
of the seed of David according to the flesh." Now Christ, as man, is of
the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore man was made the
Son of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13) that "such was
this assumption, which made God man, and man God." But by reason of
this assumption this is true: "God was made man." Therefore, in like
manner, this is true: "Man was made God."
Objection 3: Further, Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): "God
was humanized and man was deified, or whatever else one may like to
call it." Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore
with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God; and thus
it is true that "Man was made God."
Objection 4: Further, when it is said that "God was made man," the
subject of the making or uniting is not God, but human nature, which
the word "man" signifies. Now that seems to be the subject of the
making, to which the making is attributed. Hence "Man was made God" is
truer than "God was made man."
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "We do not say
that man was deified, but that God was humanized." Now to be made God
is the same as to be deified. Hence this is false: "Man was made God."
I answer that, This proposition, Man was made God, may be understood in
three ways. First, so that the participle "made" absolutely determines
either the subject or the predicate; and in this sense it is false,
since neither the Man of Whom it is predicated was made, nor is God
made, as will be said ([4054]AA[8],9). And in the same sense this is
false: "God was made man." But it is not of this sense that we are now
speaking. Secondly, it may be so understood that the word "made"
determines the composition, with this meaning: "Man was made God, i.e.
it was brought about that Man is God." And in this sense both are true,
viz. that "Man was made God" and that "God was made Man." But this is
not the proper sense of these phrases; unless, indeed, we are to
understand that "man" has not a personal but a simple supposition. For
although "this man" was not made God, because this suppositum, viz. the
Person of the Son of God, was eternally God, yet man, speaking
commonly, was not always God. Thirdly, properly understood, this
participle "made" attaches making to man with relation to God, as the
term of the making. And in this sense, granted that the Person or
hypostasis in Christ are the same as the suppositum of God and Man, as
was shown ([4055]Q[2], AA[2],3), this proposition is false, because,
when it is said, "Man was made God," "man" has a personal suppositum:
because, to be God is not verified of the Man in His human nature, but
in His suppositum. Now the suppositum of human nature, of Whom "to be
God" is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of
God, Who was always God. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to
be God, or is made God, or that He was made God.
But if there were a different hypostasis of God and man, so that "to be
God" was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a certain
conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of affection or
indwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal reason might it be
said that Man was made God, i.e. joined to God, and that God was made
Man, i.e. joined to man.
Reply to Objection 1: In these words of the Apostle the relative "Who"
which refers to the Person of the Son of God ought not to be considered
as affecting the predicate, as if someone already existing of the "seed
of David according to the flesh" was made the Son of God---and it is in
this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to be taken as
affecting the subject, with this meaning---that the "Son of God was
made to Him ('namely to the honor of the Father,' as a gloss expounds
it), being of the seed of David according to the flesh," as if to say
"the Son of God having flesh of the seed of David to the honor of God."
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the
sense that by the assumption that took place in the Incarnation it was
brought about that Man is God and God is Man; and in this sense both
sayings are true as stated above.
The same is to be said in reply to the third, since to be deified is
the same as to be made God.
Reply to Objection 4: A term placed in the subject is taken materially,
i.e. for the suppositum; placed in the predicate it is taken formally,
i.e. for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that "Man was made
God," the being made is not attributed to the human nature but to the
suppositum of the human nature, Which is God from eternity, and hence
it does not befit Him to be made God. But when it is said that "God was
made Man," the making is taken to be terminated in the human nature.
Hence, properly speaking, this is true: "God was made Man," and this is
false: "Man was made God"; even as if Socrates, who was already a man,
were made white, and were pointed out, this would be true: "This man
was made white today," and this would be false; "This white thing was
made man today." Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject there is
added some word signifying human nature in the abstract, it might be
taken in this way for the subject of the making, e.g. if it were said
that "human nature was made the Son of God's."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this is true: "Christ is a creature"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: "Christ is a creature."
For Pope Leo says [*Cf. Append. Opp. August., Serm. xii de Nativ.]: "A
new and unheard of covenant: God Who is and was, is made a creature."
Now we may predicate of Christ whatever the Son of God became by the
Incarnation. Therefore this is true; Christ is a creature.
Objection 2: Further, the properties of both natures may be predicated
of the common hypostasis of both natures, no matter by what word they
are signified, as stated above [4056](A[5]). But it is the property of
human nature to be created, as it is the property of the Divine Nature
to be Creator. Hence both may be said of Christ, viz. that He is a
creature and that he is uncreated and Creator.
Objection 3: Further, the principal part of a man is the soul rather
than the body. But Christ, by reason of the body which He took from the
Virgin, is said simply to be born of the Virgin. Therefore by reason of
the soul which is created by God, it ought simply to be said that He is
a creature.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Trin. i): "Was Christ made by a word?
Was Christ created by a command?" as if to say: "No!" Hence he adds:
"How can there be a creature in God? For God has a simple not a
composite Nature." Therefore it must not be granted that "Christ is a
creature."
I answer that, As Jerome [*Gloss, Ord. in Osee 2:16] says, "words
spoken amiss lead to heresy"; hence with us and heretics the very words
ought not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance their error. Now
the Arian heretics said that Christ was a creature and less than the
Father, not only in His human nature, but even in His Divine Person.
And hence we must not say absolutely that Christ is a "creature" or
"less than the Father"; but with a qualification, viz. "in His human
nature." But such things as could not be considered to belong to the
Divine Person in Itself may be predicated simply of Christ by reason of
His human nature; thus we say simply that Christ suffered, died and was
buried: even as in corporeal and human beings, things of which we may
doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they are
observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the whole simply,
i.e. without qualification, for we do not say that the Ethiopian is
white but that he is white as regards his teeth; but we say without
qualification that he is curly, since this can only belong to him as
regards his hair.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes, for the sake of brevity, the holy
doctors use the word "creature" of Christ, without any qualifying term;
we should however take as understood the qualification, "as man."
Reply to Objection 2: All the properties of the human, just as of the
Divine Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "Christ Who God and Man, is called
created and uncreated, passible and impassible." Nevertheless things of
which we may doubt to what nature they belong, are not to be predicated
without a qualification. Hence he afterwards adds (De Fide Orth. iv, 5)
that "the one hypostasis," i.e. of Christ, "is uncreated in its Godhead
and created in its manhood": even so conversely, we may not say without
qualification, "Christ is incorporeal" or "impassible"; in order to
avoid the error of Manes, who held that Christ had not a true body, nor
truly suffered, but we must say, with a qualification, that Christ was
incorporeal and impassible "in His Godhead."
Reply to Objection 3: There can be no doubt how the birth from the
Virgin applies to the Person of the Son of God, as there can be in the
case of creation; and hence there is no parity.
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Whether this Man, i.e. Christ, began to be?
Objection 1: It would seem that this Man, i.e. Christ, began to be. For
Augustine says (Tract. cv in Joan.) that "before the world was, neither
were we, nor the Mediator of God and men---the Man Jesus Christ." But
what was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this Man, i.e. Christ,
began to be.
Objection 2: Further, Christ began to be Man. But to be man is to be
simply. Therefore this man began to be, simply.
Objection 3: Further, "man" implies a suppositum of human nature. But
Christ was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this Man
began to be.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:8): "Jesus Christ yesterday and
today: and the same for ever."
I answer that, We must not say that "this Man"---pointing to
Christ---"began to be," unless we add something. And this for a twofold
reason. First, for this proposition is simply false, in the judgment of
the Catholic Faith, which affirms that in Christ there is one
suppositum and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according to
this, when we say "this Man," pointing to Christ, the eternal
suppositum is necessarily meant, with Whose eternity a beginning in
time is incompatible. Hence this is false: "This Man began to be." Nor
does it matter that to begin to be refers to the human nature, which is
signified by this word "man"; because the term placed in the subject is
not taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is taken materially
so as to signify the suppositum, as was said (A[1], ad 4). Secondly,
because even if this proposition were true, it ought not to be made use
of without qualification; in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who,
since he pretended that the Person of the Son of God is a creature, and
less than the Father, so he maintained that He began to be, saying
"there was a time when He was not."
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be qualified, i.e. we must
say that the Man Jesus Christ was not, before the world was, "in His
humanity."
Reply to Objection 2: With this word "begin" we cannot argue from the
lower species to the higher. For it does not follow if "this began to
be white," that therefore "it began to be colored." And this because
"to begin" implies being now and not heretofore: for it does not follow
if "this was not white hitherto" that "therefore it was not colored
hitherto." Now, to be simply is higher than to be man. Hence this does
not follow: "Christ began to be Man---therefore He began to be."
Reply to Objection 3: This word "Man," as it is taken for Christ,
although it signifies the human nature, which began to be, nevertheless
signifies the eternal suppositum which did not begin to be. Hence,
since it signifies the suppositum when placed in the subject, and
refers to the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is
false: "The Man Christ began to be": but this is true: "Christ began to
be Man."
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Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is a creature"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Christ as Man is a
creature," or "began to be." For nothing in Christ is created except
the human nature. But this is false: "Christ as Man is the human
nature." Therefore this is also false; Christ as Man is a creature.
Objection 2: Further, the predicate is predicated of the term placed in
reduplication, rather than of the subject of the proposition; as when I
say: "A body as colored is visible," it follows that the colored is
visible. But as stated ([4057]AA[8],9) we must not absolutely grant
that "the Man Christ is a creature"; nor consequently that "Christ as
Man is a creature."
Objection 3: Further, whatever is predicated of a man as man is
predicated of him "per se" and simply, for "per se" is the same as
"inasmuch as itself," as is said Metaph. v, text. 23. But this is
false: "Christ as Man is per se and simply a creature." Hence this,
too, is false; "Christ as Man is a creature."
On the contrary, Whatever is, is either Creator or creature. But this
is false: "Christ as Man is Creator." Therefore this is true: "Christ
as Man is a creature."
I answer that, When we say "Christ as Man" this word "man" may be added
in the reduplication, either by reason of the suppositum or by reason
of the nature. If it be added by reason of the suppositum, since the
suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated, this
will be false: "Christ as Man is a creature." But if it be added by
reason of the human nature, it is true, since by reason of the human
nature or in the human nature, it belongs to Him to be a creature, as
was said [4058](A[8]).
It must however be borne in mind that the term covered by the
reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, since it
is added as a predicate, which is taken formally, for it is the same to
say "Christ as Man" and to say "Christ as He is a Man." Hence this is
to be granted rather than denied: "Christ as Man is a creature." But if
something further be added whereby [the term covered by the
reduplication] is attracted to the suppositum, this proposition is to
be denied rather than granted, for instance were one to say: "Christ as
'this' Man is a creature."
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ is not the human nature, He has
human nature. Now the word "creature" is naturally predicated not only
of abstract, but also of concrete things; since we say that "manhood is
a creature" and that "man is a creature."
Reply to Objection 2: Man as placed in the subject refers to the
suppositum---and as placed in the reduplication refers to the nature,
as was stated above. And because the nature is created and the
suppositum uncreated, therefore, although it is not granted that "this
man is a creature," yet it is granted that "Christ as Man is a
creature."
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to every man who is a suppositum of
human nature alone to have his being only in human nature. Hence of
every such suppositum it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is
a creature simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human
nature, but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated
being. Hence it does not follow that, if He is a creature as Man, He is
a creature simply.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ, as Man, is God. For Christ is
God by the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of union.
Therefore Christ as Man is God.
Objection 2: Further, to forgive sins is proper to God, according to
Is. 43:25: "I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake." But
Christ as Man forgives sin, according to Mat. 9:6: "But that you may
know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins," etc.
Therefore Christ as Man is God.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is not Man in common, but is this
particular Man. Now Christ, as this Man, is God, since by "this Man" we
signify the eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ
as Man is God.
On the contrary, Whatever belongs to Christ as Man belongs to every
man. Now, if Christ as Man is God, it follows that every man is
God---which is clearly false.
I answer that, This term "man" when placed in the reduplication may be
taken in two ways. First as referring to the nature; and in this way it
is not true that Christ as Man is God, because the human nature is
distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature. Secondly it may be
taken as referring to the suppositum; and in this way, since the
suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the Person of the Son of
God, to Whom it essentially belongs to be God, it is true that Christ,
as Man, is God. Nevertheless because the term placed in the
reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, as
stated above [4059](A[10]), hence this is to be denied rather than
granted: "Christ as Man is God."
Reply to Objection 1: It is not with regard to the same, that a thing
moves towards, and that it is, something; for to move belongs to a
thing because of its matter or subject---and to be in act belongs to it
because of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same, that it
belongs to Christ to be ordained to be God by the grace of union, and
to be God. For the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and the
second, in His Divine Nature. Hence this is true: "Christ as Man has
the grace of union"; yet not this: "Christ as Man is God."
Reply to Objection 2: The Son of Man has on earth the power of
forgiving sins, not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the
Divine Nature, in which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving
sins authoritatively; whereas in the human nature it resides
instrumentally and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this
passage says [*Implicitly. Hom. xxx in Matth; cf. St. Thomas, Catena
Aurea on Mk. 2:10]: "He said pointedly 'on earth to forgive sins,' in
order to show that by an indivisible union He united human nature to
the power of the Godhead, since although He was made Man, yet He
remained the Word of God."
Reply to Objection 3: When we say "this man," the demonstrative pronoun
"this" attracts "man" to the suppositum; and hence "Christ as this Man,
is God, is a truer proposition than Christ as Man is God."
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Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as Man is a hypostasis or
person. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as Man, since
He is like other men according to Phil. 2:7: "Being made in the
likeness of men." But every man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is
a person.
Objection 2: Further, Christ as Man is a substance of rational nature.
But He is not a universal substance: therefore He is an individual
substance. Now a person is nothing else than an individual substance of
rational nature; as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore Christ as
Man is a person.
Objection 3: Further, Christ as Man is a being of human nature, and a
suppositum and a hypostasis of the same nature. But every hypostasis
and suppositum and being of human nature is a person. Therefore Christ
as Man is a person.
On the contrary, Christ as Man is not an eternal person. Therefore if
Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are two
persons---one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous, as
was said above ([4060]Q[2], A[6];[4061] Q[4], A[2]).
I answer that, As was said ([4062]AA[10],11), the term "Man" placed in
the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature.
Hence when it is said: "Christ as Man is a person," if it is taken as
referring to the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man is a
person, since the suppositum of human nature is nothing else than the
Person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as referring to the
nature, it may be understood in two ways. First, we may so understand
it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person, and in this way
it is true, for whatever subsists in human nature is a person. Secondly
it may be taken that in Christ a proper personality, caused by the
principles of the human nature, is due to the human nature; and in this
way Christ as Man is not a person, since the human nature does not
exist of itself apart from the Divine Nature, and yet the notion of
person requires this.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every man to be a person, inasmuch
as everything subsisting in human nature is a person. Now this is
proper to the Man Christ that the Person subsisting in His human nature
is not caused by the principles of the human nature, but is eternal.
Hence in one way He is a person, as Man; and in another way He is not,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The "individual substance," which is included in
the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of
itself and separate from all else; otherwise, a man's hand might be
called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless,
because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it
cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human
nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and
singular.
Reply to Objection 3: As a person signifies something complete and
self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, suppositum, and
being of nature in the genus of substance, signify something that
subsists of itself. Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person
apart from the Person of the Son of God, so likewise it is not of
itself a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence in the
sense in which we deny that "Christ as Man is a person" we must deny
all the other propositions.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF BEING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider what pertains to Christ's unity in common. For, in
their proper place, we must consider what pertains to unity and
plurality in detail: thus we concluded ([4063]Q[9]) that there is not
only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter
([4064]Q[35], A[2]) that there is not only one nativity in Christ.
Hence we must consider Christ's unity (1) of being; (2) of will; (3) of
operation.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is one or two?
(2) Whether there is only one being in Christ?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ is one or two?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. For
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Because the form of God took the form
of a servant, both are God by reason of God Who assumed, yet both are
Man by reason of the man assumed." Now "both" may only be said when
there are two. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 2: Further, where there is one thing and another there are
two. Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv): "Being in the form of God . . . He took the form of
a servant . . . being both in one; but He was one of these as Word, and
the other as man." Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is not only man; for, if He were a mere
man, He would not be God. Therefore He is something else than man, and
thus in Christ there is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 4: Further, Christ is something that the Father is, and
something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is one thing and
another. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 5: Further, as in the mystery of the Trinity there are three
Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there are
two natures in one Person. But on account of the unity of the Nature,
notwithstanding the distinction of Person, the Father and Son are one,
according to Jn. 10:30: "I and the Father are one." Therefore,
notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ is two on account of the
duality of nature.
Objection 6: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text. 18) that
"one" and "two" are predicated denominatively. Now Christ has a duality
of nature. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 7: Further, as accidental form makes a thing otherwise
[alterum] so does substantial form make another thing [aliud] as
Porphyry says (Praedic.). Now in Christ there are two substantial
natures, the human and the Divine. Therefore Christ is one thing and
another. Therefore Christ is two.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "Whatever is, inasmuch
as it is, is one." But we confess that Christ is. Therefore Christ is
one.
I answer that, Nature, considered in itself, as it is used in the
abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person,
except in God, in Whom "what it is" and "whereby it is" do not differ,
as stated in the [4065]FP, Q[29], A[4], ad 1. But in Christ, since
there are two natures, viz. the Divine and the human, one of them, viz.
the Divine, may be predicated of Him both in the abstract and in the
concrete, for we say that the Son of God, Who is signified by the word
Christ, is the Divine Nature and is God. But the human nature cannot be
predicated of Christ in the abstract, but only in the concrete, i.e. as
it is signified by the suppositum. For we cannot truly say that "Christ
is human nature," because human nature is not naturally predicated of
its suppositum. But we say that Christ is a man, even as Christ is God.
Now God signifies one having the Godhead, and man signifies one having
manhood. Yet one having manhood is differently signified by the word
"man" and by the word "Jesus" or "Peter." For this word "man" implies
one having manhood indistinctly, even as the word "God" implies
indistinctly one having the Godhead; but the word "Peter" or "Jesus"
implies one having manhood distinctly, i.e. with its determinate
individual properties, as "Son of God" implies one having the Godhead
under a determinate personal property. Now the dual number is placed in
Christ with regard to the natures. Hence, if both the natures were
predicated in the abstract of Christ, it would follow that Christ is
two. But because the two natures are not predicated of Christ, except
as they are signified in the suppositum, it must be by reason of the
suppositum that "one" or "two" be predicated of Christ.
Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one Person, which, in
their opinion, would seem to be the suppositum completed with its final
completion. Hence, since they placed two supposita in Christ, they said
that God is two, in the neuter. But because they asserted one Person,
they said that Christ is one, in the masculine, for the neuter gender
signifies something unformed and imperfect, whereas the masculine
signifies something formed and perfect. on the other hand, the
Nestorians, who asserted two Persons in Christ, said that Christ is two
not only in the neuter, but also in the masculine. But since we
maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as is clear
from[4066] Q[2], AA[2],3, it follows that we say that Christ is one not
merely in the masculine, but also in the neuter.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is not to be taken as if
"both" referred to the predicate, so as to mean that Christ is both;
but it refers to the subject. And thus "both" does not stand for two
supposita, but for two words signifying two natures in the concrete.
For I can say that "both, viz. God and Man, are God" on account of God
Who assumes; and "both, viz. God and Man," are Man on account of the
man assumed.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that "Christ is one thing and
another," this saying is to be explained in this sense---"having this
nature and another." And it is in this way that Augustine explains it
(Contra Felic. xi), where, after saying, "In the mediator of God and
man, the Son of God is one thing, and the Son of Man another," he adds:
"I say another thing by reason of the difference of substance, and not
another thing by reason of the unity of person." Hence Gregory
Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): "If we must speak briefly, that of
which the Saviour is, is one thing and another; thus the invisible is
not the same as the visible; and what is without time is not the same
as what is in time. Yet they are not one and another: far from it; for
both these are one."
Reply to Objection 3: This is false, "Christ is only man"; because it
does not exclude another suppositum, but another nature, since terms
placed in the predicate are taken formally. But if anything is added
whereby it is drawn to the suppositum, it would be a true
proposition---for instance, "Christ is only that which is man."
Nevertheless, it would not follow that He is "any other thing than
man," because "another thing," inasmuch as it refers to a diversity of
substance, properly refers to the suppositum. even as all relative
things bearing a personal relation. But it does follow: "Therefore He
has another nature."
Reply to Objection 4: When it is said, "Christ is something that the
Father is"; "something" signifies the Divine Nature, which is
predicated even in the abstract of the Father and Son. But when it is
said: "Christ is something that is not the Father"; "something"
signifies, not the human nature as it is in the abstract, but as it is
in the concrete; not, indeed, in a distinct, but in an indistinct
suppositum, i.e. inasmuch as it underlies the nature and not the
individuating properties. Hence it does not follow that Christ is one
thing and another, or that He is two, since the suppositum of the human
nature in Christ, which is the Person of the Son of God, does not
reckon numerically with the Divine Nature, which is predicated of the
Father and Son.
Reply to Objection 5: In the mystery of the Divine Trinity the Divine
Nature is predicated, even in the abstract of the three Persons; hence
it may be said simply that the three Persons are one. But in the
mystery of the Incarnation both natures are not predicated in the
abstract of Christ; hence it cannot be said simply that Christ is two.
Reply to Objection 6: Two signifies what has duality, not in another,
but in the same thing of which "two" is predicated. Now what is
predicated is said of the suppositum, which is implied by the word
"Christ." Hence, although Christ has duality of nature, yet, because He
has not duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that Christ is two.
Reply to Objection 7: Otherwise implies diversity of accident. Hence
diversity of accident suffices for anything to be called "otherwise"
simply. But "another thing" implies diversity of substance. Now not
merely the nature, but also the suppositum is said to be a substance,
as is said Metaph. v, text. 15. Hence diversity of nature does not
suffice for anything to be called "another thing" simply, unless there
is diversity of suppositum. But diversity of nature makes "another
thing" relatively, i.e. in nature, if there is no diversity of
suppositum.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is only one being in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is not merely one
being, but two. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 13) that
whatever follows the nature is doubled in Christ. But being follows the
nature, for being is from the form. Hence in Christ there are two
beings.
Objection 2: Further, the being of the Son of God is the Divine Nature
itself, and is eternal: whereas the being of the Man Christ is not the
Divine Nature, but is a temporal being. Therefore there is not only one
being in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, in the Trinity, although there are three Persons,
yet on account of the unity of nature there is only one being. But in
Christ there are two natures, though there is one Person. Therefore in
Christ there is not only one being.
Objection 4: Further, in Christ the soul gives some being to the body,
since it is its form. But it does not give the Divine being, since this
is uncreated. Therefore in Christ there is another being besides the
Divine being; and thus in Christ there is not only one being.
On the contrary, Everything is said to be a being, inasmuch as it is
one, for one and being are convertible. Therefore, if there were two
beings in Christ, and not one only, Christ would be two, and not one.
I answer that, Because in Christ there are two natures and one
hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ
must be two; and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ must
be only one. Now being pertains both to the nature and to the
hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which has being---and to the
nature as to that whereby it has being. For nature is taken after the
manner of a form, which is said to be a being because something is by
it; as by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man.
Now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which
does not pertain to the personal being of the subsisting hypostasis,
this being is not said to belong to the person simply, but relatively;
as to be white is the being of Socrates, not as he is Socrates, but
inasmuch as he is white. And there is no reason why this being should
not be multiplied in one hypostasis or person; for the being whereby
Socrates is white is distinct from the being whereby he is a musician.
But the being which belongs to the very hypostasis or person in itself
cannot possibly be multiplied in one hypostasis or person, since it is
impossible that there should not be one being for one thing.
If, therefore, the human nature accrued to the Son of God, not
hypostatically or personally, but accidentally, as some maintained, it
would be necessary to assert two beings in Christ---one, inasmuch as He
is God---the other, inasmuch as He is Man; even as in Socrates we place
one being inasmuch as he is white, and another inasmuch as he is a man,
since "being white" does not pertain to the personal being of Socrates.
But being possessed of a head, being corporeal, being animated---all
these pertain to the one person of Socrates, and hence there arises
from these only the one being of Socrates. And if it so happened that
after the person of Socrates was constituted there accrued to him hands
or feet or eyes, as happened to him who was born blind, no new being
would be thereby added to Socrates, but only a relation to these, i.e.
inasmuch as he would be said to be, not only with reference to what he
had previously, but also with reference to what accrued to him
afterwards. And thus, since the human nature is united to the Son of
God, hypostatically or personally as was said above ([4067]Q[2],
AA[5],6), and not accidentally, it follows that by the human nature
there accrued to Him no new personal being, but only a new relation of
the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that
the Person is said to subsist not merely in the Divine, but also in the
human nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Being is consequent upon nature, not as upon that
which has being, but as upon that whereby a thing is: whereas it is
consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that which has being.
Hence it has unity from the unity of hypostasis, rather than duality
from the duality of the nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The eternal being of the Son of God, which is the
Divine Nature, becomes the being of man, inasmuch as the human nature
is assumed by the Son of God to unity of Person.
Reply to Objection 3: As was said in the [4068]FP, Q[50], A[2], ad 3;
[4069]FP, Q[75], A[5], ad 4, since the Divine Person is the same as the
Nature, there is no distinction in the Divine Persons between the being
of the Person and the being of the Nature, and, consequently, the three
Persons have only one being. But they would have a triple being if the
being of the Person were distinct in them from the being of the Nature.
Reply to Objection 4: In Christ the soul gives being to the body,
inasmuch as it makes it actually animated, which is to give it the
complement of its nature and species. But if we consider the body
perfected by the soul, without the hypostasis having both---this whole,
composed of soul and body, as signified by the word "humanity," does
not signify "what is," but "whereby it is." Hence being belongs to the
subsisting person, inasmuch as it has a relation to such a nature, and
of this relation the soul is the cause, inasmuch as it perfects human
nature by informing the body.
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OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF WILL (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider unity as regards the will; and under this head
there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Divine will and the human are distinct in Christ?
(2) Whether in Christ's human nature the will of sensuality is distinct
from the will of reason?
(3) Whether as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ?
(4) Whether there was free-will in Christ?
(5) Whether Christ's human will was always conformed to the Divine will
in the thing willed?
(6) Whether there was any contrariety of wills in Christ?
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Whether there are two wills in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills, one
Divine, the other human. For the will is the first mover and first
commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and commander
was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the
Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will,
viz. the Divine.
Objection 2: Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by
the will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the
instrument of His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not
moved by its own will, but by the Divine will.
Objection 3: Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs
to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature: for
natural things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary is not of
necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ.
Objection 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that "to
will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our
intellect," i.e. our personal intellect. But every will is this or that
will, since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time
in some one of its species. Therefore all will belongs to the person.
But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ
there is only one will.
On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 22:42): "Father, if Thou wilt,
remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done."
And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian (De Fide ii, 7) says:
"As He assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow;" and on Lk. 22:42 he
says: "His will, He refers to the Man---the Father's, to the Godhead.
For the will of man is temporal, and the will of the Godhead eternal."
I answer that, Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem to
have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did not
hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was
in place of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence since
"the will is in the reason," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9),
it followed that in Christ there was no human will; and thus there was
only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held one composite
nature in Christ were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius, too,
who maintained that the union of God and man was one of affection and
will, held only one will in Christ. But later on, Macarius, Patriarch
of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople and some
of their followers, held that there is one will in Christ, although
they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis;
because they believed that Christ's human nature never moved with its
own motion, but only inasmuch as it was moved by the Godhead, as is
plain from the synodical letter of Pope Agatho [*Third Council of
Constantinople, Act. 4].
And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople [*Act. 18] it was
decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the
following passage: "In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught
us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of
the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural wills in
Him and two natural operations." And this much it was necessary to say.
For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature,
as was shown above (Q[5]; Q[9], A[1]). Now the will pertains to the
perfection of human nature, being one of its natural powers, even as
the intellect, as was stated in the FP, QQ[79],80. Hence we must say
that the Son of God assumed a human will, together with human nature.
Now by the assumption of human nature the Son of God suffered no
diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs
to have a will, as was said in the [4070]FP, Q[19], A[1]. Hence it must
be said that there are two wills in Christ, i.e. one human, the other
Divine.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was
moved at the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that in
Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for
the good wills of other saints are moved by God's will, "Who worketh"
in them "both to will and to accomplish," as is written Phil. 2:13. For
although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can
be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the [4071]FP, Q[105], A[4].
And thus, too, Christ by His human will followed the Divine will
according to Ps. 39:9; "That I should do Thy will, O my God, I have
desired it." Hence Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "Where the
Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou willest,' what
do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He shows that His will
was truly subject to His Father,' as if we denied that man's will ought
to be subject to God's will?"
Reply to Objection 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the
principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its
nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by
the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument
animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a
horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rational soul is
moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved
to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2,4; Ethic. viii, 11). And hence it was in
this manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument of the
Godhead, and was moved by its own will.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will is natural, and necessarily
follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power---which
is also called will---is sometimes natural and necessary, e.g. with
respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is
neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated in
the [4072]FS, Q[10], AA[1],[2] [*Cf. [4073]FP, Q[82], A[2]]. And yet
even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is
natural. Hence besides the Divine will it is necessary to place in
Christ a human will, not merely as a natural power, or a natural
movement, but even as a rational movement.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say "to will in a certain way," we
signify a determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards
the thing of which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to the
nature, "to will in a certain way" belongs to the nature, not indeed
considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence the human
will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a
Divine hypostasis, i.e. it was always moved in accordance with the
bidding of the Divine will.
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Whether in Christ there was a will of sensuality besides the will of reason
?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no will of
sensuality besides the will of reason. For the Philosopher says (De
Anima iii, text. 42) that "the will is in the reason, and in the
sensitive appetite are the irascible and concupiscible parts." Now
sensuality signifies the sensitive appetite. Hence in Christ there was
no will of sensuality.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13) the
sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing
serpent-like in Christ; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal
without the venom, as Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i,
32). Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.
Objection 3: Further, will is consequent upon nature, as was said
[4074](A[1]). But in Christ there was only one nature besides the
Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one human will.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): "Mine is the will which
He calls His own; because as Man He assumed my sorrow." From this we
are given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of
Christ. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said in the
[4075]FS, Q[23], A[1]; [4076]FS, Q[25], A[1]. Therefore, seemingly, in
Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the will of reason.
I answer that, As was said ([4077]Q[9], A[1]), the Son of God assumed
human nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of
human nature. Now in human nature is included animal nature, as the
genus in its species. Hence the Son of God must have assumed together
with the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one of which
things is the sensitive appetite, which is called the sensuality.
Consequently it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual
appetite, or sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality
or the sensual appetite, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is said
to be "rational by participation," as is clear from the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 13). And because "the will is in the reason," as stated
above, it may equally be said that the sensuality is "a will by
participation."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on the will, essentially
so called, which is only in the intellectual part; but the will by
participation can be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys
reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The sensuality is signified by the serpent---not
as regards the nature of the sensuality, which Christ assumed, but as
regards the corruption of the "fomes," which was not in Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: "Where there is one thing on account of another,
there seems to be only one" (Aristotle, Topic. iii); thus a surface
which is visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too,
because the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of
the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ,
even as there is but one human nature.
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Whether in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as
regards the reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
there is a double will in man, viz. the natural will which is called
{thelesis}, and the rational will which is called {boulesis}. Now
Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of
human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the appetitive power is diversified in man by the
difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the
difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and
intellective appetite in man. But in the same way as regards man's
apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of
which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one
intellectual and the other rational.
Objection 3: Further, some [*Hugh of St. Victor, De Quat. Volunt.
Christ.] ascribe to Christ "a will of piety," which can only be on the
part of reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason there are
several wills.
On the contrary, In every order there is one first mover. But the will
is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one man
there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of reason.
But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one human
will.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), the will is sometimes
taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is
taken for the act, it is necessary to place two wills, i.e. two species
of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For the will,
as was said in the [4078]FS, Q[8], AA[2],3, regards both the end and
the means; and is affected differently towards both. For towards the
end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what is good in
itself; but towards the means it is borne under a certain relation, as
the goodness of the means depends on something else. Hence the act of
the will, inasmuch as it is drawn to anything desired of itself, as
health, which act is called by Damascene {thelesis}---i.e. simple will,
and by the masters "will as nature," is different from the act of the
will as it is drawn to anything that is desired only in order to
something else, as to take medicine; and this act of the will Damascene
calls {boulesis}---i.e. counseling will, and the masters, "will as
reason." But this diversity of acts does not diversify the power, since
both acts regard the one common ratio of the object, which is goodness.
Hence we must say that if we are speaking of the power of the will, in
Christ there is but one human will, essentially so called and not by
participation; but if we are speaking of the will as an act, we thus
distinguish in Christ a will as nature, which is called {thelesis}, and
a will as reason, which is called {boulesis}.
Reply to Objection 1: These two wills do not diversify the power but
only the act, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect and the reason are not distinct
powers, as was said in the [4079]FP, Q[79], A[8].
Reply to Objection 3: The "will of piety" would not seem to be distinct
from the will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks from
another's evil, absolutely considered.
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Whether there was free-will in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no free-will. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that {gnome}, i.e. opinion,
thinking or cogitation, and {proairesis}, i.e. choice, "cannot possibly
be attributed to our Lord, if we wish to speak with propriety." But in
the things of faith especially we must speak with propriety. Therefore
there was no choice in Christ and consequently no free-will, of which
choice is the act.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice
is "a desire of something after taking counsel." Now counsel does not
appear to be in Christ, because we do not take counsel concerning such
things as we are certain of. But Christ was certain of everything.
Hence there was no counsel and consequently no free-will in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, free-will is indifferent. But Christ's will was
determined to good, since He could not sin; as stated above
([4080]Q[15], AA[1] ,2). Hence there was no free-will in Christ.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 7:15): "He shall eat butter and
honey, that He may know to refuse the evil and to choose the good,"
which is an act of the free-will. Therefore there was free-will in
Christ.
I answer that, As was said above [4081](A[3]), there was a twofold act
of the will in Christ; one whereby He was drawn to anything willed in
itself, which implies the nature of an end; the other whereby His will
was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordained to
another---which pertains to the nature of means. Now, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) choice differs from will in this, that
will of itself regards the end, while choice regards the means. And
thus simple will is the same as the "will as nature"; but choice is the
same as the "will as reason," and is the proper act of free-will, as
was said in the [4082]FP, Q[83], A[3]. Hence, since "will as reason" is
placed in Christ, we must also place choice, and consequently
free-will, whose act is choice, as was said in the [4083]FP, Q[83],
A[3]; [4084]FS, Q[13], A[1].
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene excludes choice from Christ, in so far
as he considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless
doubt is not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to God Himself
to choose, according to Eph. 1:4: "He chose us in Him before the
foundation of the world," although in God there is no doubt. Yet doubt
is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We may also
say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the passage quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: Choice presupposes counsel; yet it follows
counsel only as determined by judgment. For what we judge to be done,
we choose, after the inquiry of counsel, as is stated (Ethic. iii,
2,3). Hence if anything is judged necessary to be done, without any
preceding doubt or inquiry, this suffices for choice. Therefore it is
plain that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially, but only
when it is in an ignorant nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The will of Christ, though determined to good, is
not determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even
as to the blessed, to choose with a free-will confirmed in good.
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Whether the human will of Christ was altogether conformed to the Divine wil
l
in the thing willed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will in Christ did not will
anything except what God willed. For it is written (Ps. 39:9) in the
person of Christ: "That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired
it." Now he who desires to do another's will, wills what the other
wills. Hence it seems that Christ's human will willed nothing but what
was willed by His Divine will.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's soul had most perfect charity, which,
indeed, surpasses the comprehension of all our knowledge, according to
Eph. 3:19, "the charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Now
charity makes men will what God wills; hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ix, 4) that one mark of friendship is "to will and choose the
same." Therefore the human will in Christ willed nothing else than was
willed by His Divine will.
Objection 3: Further, Christ was a true comprehensor. But the Saints
who are comprehensors in heaven will only what God wills, otherwise
they would not be happy, because they would not obtain whatever they
will, for "blessed is he who has what he wills, and wills nothing
amiss," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5). Hence in His human will
Christ wills nothing else than does the Divine will.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "When Christ
says 'Not what I will, but what Thou wilt' He shows Himself to have
willed something else than did His Father; and this could only have
been by His human heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness into
His Divine but into His human will."
I answer that, As was said ([4085]AA[2],3), in Christ according to His
human nature there is a twofold will, viz. the will of sensuality,
which is called will by participation, and the rational will, whether
considered after the manner of nature, or after the manner of reason.
Now it was said above (Q[13], A[3], ad 1; Q[14], A[1], ad 2) that by a
certain dispensation the Son of God before His Passion "allowed His
flesh to do and suffer what belonged to it." And in like manner He
allowed all the powers of His soul to do what belonged to them. Now it
is clear that the will of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible
pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, the will as nature turns from
what is against nature and what is evil in itself, as death and the
like; yet the will as reason may at time choose these things in
relation to an end, as in a mere man the sensuality and the will
absolutely considered shrink from burning, which, nevertheless, the
will as reason may choose for the sake of health. Now it was the will
of God that Christ should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not that
these of themselves were willed by God, but for the sake of man's
salvation. Hence it is plain that in His will of sensuality and in His
rational will considered as nature, Christ could will what God did not;
but in His will as reason He always willed the same as God, which
appears from what He says (Mat. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as Thou
wilt." For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be
fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by another
will.
Reply to Objection 1: By His rational will Christ willed the Divine
will to be fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement
of which does not extend to the will of God---nor by His will
considered as nature which regards things absolutely considered and not
in relation to the Divine will.
Reply to Objection 2: The conformity of the human will to the Divine
regards the will of reason: according to which the wills even of
friends agree, inasmuch as reason considers something willed in its
relation to the will of a friend.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer,
inasmuch as He was enjoying God in His mind and had a passible body.
Hence things repugnant to His natural will and to His sensitive
appetite could happen to Him in His passible flesh.
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Whether there was contrariety of wills in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was contrariety of wills in
Christ. For contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as
contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is
plain from the Philosopher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq.). Now Christ in His
different wills wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He
wished for death, from which He shrank in His human will, hence
Athanasius says [*De Incarnat. et Cont. Arianos, written against
Apollinarius]: "When Christ says 'Father, if it be possible, let this
chalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done,' and again,
'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak,' He denotes two
wills---the human, which through the weakness of the flesh shrank from
the passion---and His Divine will eager for the passion." Hence there
was contrariety of wills in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth
against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." Now when the
spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there is contrariety
of wills. But this was in Christ; for by the will of charity which the
Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the passion, according
to Is. 53:7: "He was offered because it was His own will," yet in His
flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore there was contrariety of
wills in Him.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 22:43) that "being in an
agony, He prayed the longer." Now agony seems to imply a certain
struggle [*Greek, {agonia}] in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence
it seems that there was contrariety of will in Christ.
On the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth Council [*Third Council
of Constantinople, Act. 18] it is said: "We confess two natural wills,
not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics assert, but following His
human will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather
being subject to, His Divine and omnipotent will."
I answer that, Contrariety can exist only where there is opposition in
the same and as regards the same. For if the diversity exists as
regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not suffice
for the nature of contrariety, nor even for the nature of
contradiction, e.g. if a man were well formed or healthy as regards his
hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be contrariety of
wills in anyone it is necessary, first, that the diversity of wills
should regard the same. For if the will of one regards the doing of
something with reference to some universal reason, and the will of
another regards the not doing the same with reference to some
particular reason, there is not complete contrariety of will, e.g. when
a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of the commonwealth,
and one of the latter's kindred wishes him not to be hanged on account
of a private love, there is no contrariety of wills; unless, indeed,
the desire of the private good went so far as to wish to hinder the
public good for the private good---in that case the opposition of wills
would regard the same.
Secondly, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be in
the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rational
appetite, and wishes another thing with his sensitive appetite, there
is no contrariety, unless the sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to
change or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this case
something of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite would
reach the rational will.
And hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive
will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there was
no contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither the natural will
nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which the Divine
will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the passion. For
the absolute will of Christ wished the salvation of the human race,
although it did not pertain to it to will this for the sake of
something further; but the movement of sensuality could nowise extend
so far. Secondly, because neither the Divine will nor the will of
reason in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural will or the
appetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand, neither the Divine
will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or retarded the
movement of the natural human will and the movement of the sensuality
in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in His Divine will, and in His will
of reason, that His natural will and will of sensuality should be moved
according to the order of their nature. Hence it is clear that in
Christ there was no opposition or contrariety of wills.
Reply to Objection 1: The fact of any will in Christ willing something
else than did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine will, by whose
permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper
movements, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15,18,19).
Reply to Objection 2: In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or
retarded by the desires of the flesh: this did not occur in Christ.
Hence in Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.
Reply to Objection 3: The agony in Christ was not in the rational soul,
in as far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity
of motives, as when anyone, on his reason considering one, wishes one
thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this
springs from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge which
is the best simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by His
reason He judged it best that the Divine will regarding the salvation
of the human race should be fulfilled by His passion. Nevertheless,
there was an agony in Christ as regards the sensitive part, inasmuch as
it implied a dread of coming trial, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii, 15; iii, 18,23).
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OF THE UNITY OF CHRIST'S OPERATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the unity of Christ's operation; and under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in Christ there was one or several operations of the
Godhead and Manhood?
(2) Whether in Christ there were several operations of the human
nature?
(3) Whether Christ by His human operation merited anything for Himself?
(4) Whether He merited anything for us by it?
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Whether in Christ there is only one operation of the Godhead and Manhood?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is but one operation of
the Godhead and the Manhood. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "The
most loving operation of God is made manifest to us by the
supersubstantial Word having taken flesh integrally and truly, and
having operated and suffered whatsoever befits His human and Divine
operation." But he here mentions only one human and Divine operation,
which is written in Greek {theandrike}, i.e. God-manlike. Hence it
seems that there is but one composite operation in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, there is but one operation of the principal and
instrumental agent. Now the human nature in Christ was the instrument
of the Divine, as was said above ([4086]Q[7], A[1], ad 3;[4087] Q[8],
A[1], ad 1;[4088] Q[18], A[1], ad 2). Hence the operations of the
Divine and human natures in Christ are the same.
Objection 3: Further, since in Christ there are two natures in one
hypostasis or person, whatever pertains to the hypostasis or person is
one and the same. But operation pertains to the hypostasis or person,
for it is only a subsisting suppositum that operates; hence, according
to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1), acts belong to singulars. Hence in
Christ there is only one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood.
Objection 4: Further, as being belongs to a subsisting hypostasis, so
also does operation. But on account of the unity of hypostasis there is
only one operation of the Godhead and the ([4089]Q[17], A[2]). Hence,
on account of the same unity, there is one operation in Christ.
Objection 5: Further, as being belongs to a sub-operated there is one
operation. But the same thing was operated by the Godhead and the
Manhood, as the healing of the lepers or the raising of the dead. Hence
it seems that in Christ there is but one operation of the Godhead and
the Manhood.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 8): "How can the same
operation spring from different powers? Cannot the lesser operate as
the greater? And can there be one operation where there are different
substances?"
I answer that, As was said above ([4090]Q[18], A[1]), the aforesaid
heretics who placed one will in Christ placed one operation in Christ.
Now in order better to understand their erroneous opinion, we must bear
in mind that wherever there are several mutually ordained agents, the
inferior is moved by the superior, as in man the body is moved by the
soul and the lower powers by the reason. And thus the actions and
movements of the inferior principle are things operated rather than
operations. Now what pertains to the highest principle is properly the
operation; thus we say of man that to walk, which belongs to the feet,
and to touch, which belongs to the hand, are things operated by the
man---one of which is operated by the soul through the feet, the other
through the hands. And because it is the same soul that operates in
both cases, there is only one indifferent operation, on the part of the
thing operating, which is the first moving principle; but difference is
found on the part of what is operated. Now, as in a mere man the body
is moved by the soul, and the sensitive by the rational appetite, so in
the Lord Jesus Christ the human nature is moved and ruled by the
Divine. Hence they said that there is one indifferent operation on the
part of the Godhead operating, but divers things operated, inasmuch as
the Godhead of Christ did one thing by Itself, as to uphold all things
by the word of His power---and another thing by His human nature, as to
walk in body. Hence the Sixth Council [*Third Council of
Constantinople, Act. 10] quotes the words of Severus the heretic, who
said: "What things were done and wrought by the one Christ, differ
greatly; for some are becoming to God, and some are human, as to walk
bodily on the earth is indeed human, but to give hale steps to sickly
limbs, wholly unable to walk on the ground, is becoming to God. Yet
one, i.e. the Incarnate Word, wrought one and the other---neither was
this from one nature, and that from another; nor can we justly affirm
that because there are distinct things operated there are therefore two
operating natures and forms."
But herein they were deceived, for what is moved by another has a
twofold action---one which it has from its own form---the other, which
it has inasmuch as it is moved by another; thus the operation of an axe
of itself is to cleave; but inasmuch as it is moved by the craftsman,
its operation is to make benches. Hence the operation which belongs to
a thing by its form is proper to it, nor does it belong to the mover,
except in so far as he makes use of this kind of thing for his work:
thus to heat is the proper operation of fire, but not of a smith,
except in so far as he makes use of fire for heating iron. But the
operation which belongs to the thing, as moved by another, is not
distinct from the operation of the mover; thus to make a bench is not
the work of the axe independently of the workman. Hence, wheresoever
the mover and the moved have different forms or operative faculties,
there must the operation of the mover and the proper operation of the
moved be distinct; although the moved shares in the operation of the
mover, and the mover makes use of the operation of the moved, and,
consequently, each acts in communion with the other.
Therefore in Christ the human nature has its proper form and power
whereby it acts; and so has the Divine. Hence the human nature has its
proper operation distinct from the Divine, and conversely.
Nevertheless, the Divine Nature makes use of the operation of the human
nature, as of the operation of its instrument; and in the same way the
human nature shares in the operation of the Divine Nature, as an
instrument shares in the operation of the principal agent. And this is
what Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Flavian. xxviii): "Both forms" (i.e. both
the Divine and the human nature in Christ) "do what is proper to each
in union with the other, i.e. the Word operates what belongs to the
Word, and the flesh carries out what belongs to flesh."
But if there were only one operation of the Godhead and manhood in
Christ, it would be necessary to say either that the human nature had
not its proper form and power (for this could not possibly be said of
the Divine), whence it would follow that in Christ there was only the
Divine operation; or it would be necessary to say that from the Divine
and human power there was made up one power. Now both of these are
impossible. For by the first the human nature in Christ is supposed to
be imperfect; and by the second a confusion of the natures is supposed.
Hence it is with reason that the Sixth Council (Act. 18) condemned this
opinion, and decreed as follows: "We confess two natural, indivisible,
unconvertible, unconfused, and inseparable operations in the same Lord
Jesus Christ our true God"; i.e. the Divine operation and the human
operation.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius places in Christ a theandric, i.e. a
God-manlike or Divino-human, operation not by any confusion of the
operations or powers of both natures, but inasmuch as His Divine
operation employs the human, and His human operation shares in the
power of the Divine. Hence, as he says in a certain epistle (Ad Caium
iv), "what is of man He works beyond man; and this is shown by the
Virgin conceiving supernaturally and by the unstable waters bearing up
the weight of bodily feet." Now it is clear that to be begotten belongs
to human nature, and likewise to walk; yet both were in Christ
supernaturally. So, too, He wrought Divine things humanly, as when He
healed the leper with a touch. Hence in the same epistle he adds: "He
performed Divine works not as God does, and human works not as man
does, but, God having been made man, by a new operation of God and
man."
Now, that he understood two operations in Christ, one of the Divine and
the other of the human nature, is clear from what he says, Div. Nom.
ii: "Whatever pertains to His human operation the Father and the Holy
Ghost no-wise share in, except, as one might say, by their most
gracious and merciful will," i.e. inasmuch as the Father and the Holy
Ghost in their mercy wished Christ to do and to suffer human things.
And he adds: "He is truly the unchangeable God, and God's Word by the
sublime and unspeakable operation of God, which, being made man for us,
He wrought." Hence it is clear that the human operation, in which the
Father and the Holy Ghost do not share, except by Their merciful
consent, is distinct from His operation, as the Word of God, wherein
the Father and the Holy Ghost share.
Reply to Objection 2: The instrument is said to act through being moved
by the principal agent; and yet, besides this, it can have its proper
operation through its own form, as stated above of fire. And hence the
action of the instrument as instrument is not distinct from the action
of the principal agent; yet it may have another operation, inasmuch as
it is a thing. Hence the operation of Christ's human nature, as the
instrument of the Godhead, is not distinct from the operation of the
Godhead; for the salvation wherewith the manhood of Christ saves us and
that wherewith His Godhead saves us are not distinct; nevertheless, the
human nature in Christ, inasmuch as it is a certain nature, has a
proper operation distinct from the Divine, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: To operate belongs to a subsisting hypostasis; in
accordance, however, with the form and nature from which the operation
receives its species. Hence from the diversity of forms or natures
spring the divers species of operations, but from the unity of
hypostasis springs the numerical unity as regards the operation of the
species: thus fire has two operations specifically different, namely,
to illuminate and to heat, from the difference of light and heat, and
yet the illumination of the fire that illuminates at one and the same
time is numerically one. So, likewise, in Christ there are necessarily
two specifically different operations by reason of His two natures;
nevertheless, each of the operations at one and the same time is
numerically one, as one walking and one healing.
Reply to Objection 4: Being and operation belong to the person by
reason of the nature; yet in a different manner. For being belongs to
the very constitution of the person, and in this respect it has the
nature of a term; consequently, unity of person requires unity of the
complete and personal being. But operation is an effect of the person
by reason of a form or nature. Hence plurality of operations is not
incompatible with personal unity.
Reply to Objection 5: The proper work of the Divine operation is
different from the proper work of the human operation. Thus to heal a
leper is a proper work of the Divine operation, but to touch him is the
proper work of the human operation. Now both these operations concur in
one work, inasmuch as one nature acts in union with the other.
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Whether in Christ there are several human operations?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are several human
operations. For Christ as man communicates with plants by His nutritive
soul, with the brutes by His sensitive soul, and with the angels by His
intellective soul, even as other men do. Now the operations of a plant
as plant and of an animal as animal are different. Therefore Christ as
man has several operations.
Objection 2: Further, powers and habits are distinguished by their
acts. Now in Christ's soul there were divers powers and habits;
therefore also divers operations.
Objection 3: Further, instruments ought to be proportioned to their
operations. Now the human body has divers members of different form,
and consequently fitted to divers operations. Therefore in Christ there
are divers operations in the human nature.
On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), "operation
is consequent upon the nature." But in Christ there is only one human
nature. Therefore in Christ there is only one human operation.
I answer that, Since it is by his reason that man is what he is; that
operation is called human simply, which proceeds from the reason
through the will, which is the rational appetite. Now if there is any
operation in man which does not proceed from the reason and the will,
it is not simply a human operation, but belongs to man by reason of
some part of human nature---sometimes by reason of the nature of
elementary bodies, as to be borne downwards---sometimes by reason of
the force of the vegetative soul, as to be nourished, and to
grow---sometimes by reason of the sensitive part, as to see and hear,
to imagine and remember, to desire and to be angry. Now between these
operations there is a difference. For the operations of the sensitive
soul are to some extent obedient to reason, and consequently they are
somewhat rational and human inasmuch as they obey reason, as is clear
from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). But the operations that spring
from the vegetative soul, or from the nature of elemental bodies, are
not subject to reason; consequently they are nowise rational; nor
simply human, but only as regards a part of human nature. Now it was
said [4091](A[1]) that when a subordinate agent acts by its own form,
the operations of the inferior and of the superior agent are distinct;
but when the inferior agent acts only as moved by the superior agent,
then the operation of the superior and the inferior agent is one.
And hence in every mere man the operations of the elemental body and of
the vegetative soul are distinct from the will's operation, which is
properly human; so likewise the operations of the sensitive soul
inasmuch as it is not moved by reason; but inasmuch as it is moved by
reason, the operations of the sensitive and the rational part are the
same. Now there is but one operation of the rational part if we
consider the principle of the operation, which is the reason and the
will; but the operations are many if we consider their relationship to
various objects. And there were some who called this a diversity of
things operated rather than of operations, judging the unity of the
operation solely from the operative principle. And it is in this
respect that we are now considering the unity and plurality of
operations in Christ.
Hence in every mere man there is but one operation, which is properly
called human; but besides this there are in a mere man certain other
operations, which are not strictly human, as was said above. But in the
Man Jesus Christ there was no motion of the sensitive part which was
not ordered by reason. Even the natural and bodily operations pertained
in some respects to His will, inasmuch as it was His will "that His
flesh should do and suffer what belonged to it," as stated above
([4092]Q[18], A[5]). Much more, therefore, is there one operation in
Christ, than in any other man whatsoever.
Reply to Objection 1: The operations of the sensitive and nutritive
parts are not strictly human, as stated above; yet in Christ these
operations were more human than in others.
Reply to Objection 2: Powers and habits are diversified by comparison
with their objects. Hence in this way the diversity of operations
corresponds to the divers powers and habits, as likewise to the divers
objects. Now we do not wish to exclude this diversity of operations
from Christ's humanity, nor that which springs from a diversity of
time, but only that which regards the first active principle, as was
said above.
(St. Thomas gives no reply to OBJ[3]; some codices add: Hence may be
gathered the reply to the third objection.)
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Whether the human action of Christ could be meritorious to Him?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human action of Christ could not be
meritorious to Him. For before His death Christ was a comprehensor even
as He is now. But comprehensors do not merit: because the charity of
the comprehensor belongs to the reward of beatitude, since fruition
depends upon it. Hence it does not seem to be the principle of merit,
since merit and reward are not the same. Therefore Christ before His
passion did not merit, even as He does not merit now.
Objection 2: Further, no one merits what is due to him. But because
Christ is the Son of God by nature, the eternal inheritance is due to
Him, which other men merit by their works. And hence Christ Who, from
the beginning, was the Word of God, could not merit anything for
Himself.
Objection 3: Further, whoever has the principle does not properly merit
what flows from its possession. But Christ has the glory of the soul,
whence, in the natural course, flowed the glory of the body, as
Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios cxviii); though by a dispensation it was
brought about that in Christ the glory of the soul should not overflow
to the body. Hence Christ did not merit the glory of the body.
Objection 4: Further, the manifestation of Christ's excellence is a
good, not of Christ Himself, but of those who know Him. Hence it is
promised as a reward to such as love Christ that He will be manifested
to them, according to Jn. 14:21: "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of
My Father, and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him."
Therefore Christ did not merit the manifestation of His greatness.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:8,9): "Becoming obedient
unto death . . . For which cause God also hath exalted Him." Therefore
by obeying He merited His exaltation and thus He merited something for
Himself.
I answer that, To have any good thing of oneself is more excellent than
to have it from another, for "what is of itself a cause is always more
excellent than what is a cause through another," as is said Phys. viii,
5. Now a thing is said to have, of itself, that of which it is to some
extent the cause. But of whatever good we possess the first cause by
authority is God; and in this way no creature has any good of itself,
according to 1 Cor. 4:7: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?"
Nevertheless, in a secondary manner anyone may be a cause, to himself,
of having certain good things, inasmuch as he cooperates with God in
the matter, and thus whoever has anything by his own merit has it, in a
manner, of himself. Hence it is better to have a thing by merit than
without merit.
Now since all perfection and greatness must be attributed to Christ,
consequently He must have by merit what others have by merit; unless it
be of such a nature that its want would detract from Christ's dignity
and perfection more than would accrue to Him by merit. Hence He merited
neither grace nor knowledge nor the beatitude of His soul, nor the
Godhead, because, since merit regards only what is not yet possessed,
it would be necessary that Christ should have been without these at
some time; and to be without them would have diminished Christ's
dignity more than His merit would have increased it. But the glory of
the body, and the like, are less than the dignity of meriting, which
pertains to the virtue of charity. Hence we must say that Christ had,
by merit, the glory of His body and whatever pertained to His outward
excellence, as His Ascension, veneration, and the rest. And thus it is
clear that He could merit for Himself.
Reply to Objection 1: Fruition, which is an act of charity, pertains to
the glory of the soul, which Christ did not merit. Hence if He merited
by charity, it does not follow that the merit and the reward are the
same. Nor did He merit by charity inasmuch as it was the charity of a
comprehensor, but inasmuch as it was that of a wayfarer. For He was at
once a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as was said above ([4093]Q[15],
A[10]). And therefore, since He is no longer a wayfarer, He is not in
the state of meriting.
Reply to Objection 2: Because by nature Christ is God and the Son of
God, the Divine glory and the lordship of all things are due to Him, as
to the first and supreme Lord. Nevertheless a glory is due to Him as a
beatified man; and this He has partly without merit, and partly with
merit, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 3: It is by Divine appointment that there is an
overflow of glory from the soul to the body, in keeping with human
merit; so that as man merits by the act of the soul which he performs
in the body, so he may be rewarded by the glory of the soul overflowing
to the body. And hence not only the glory of the soul, but also the
glory of the body falls under merit, according to Rom. 8:11: "He . . .
shall quicken also our [Vulg.: 'your'] mortal bodies, because of His
Spirit that dwelleth in us [Vulg.: 'you']." And thus it could fall
under Christ's merit.
Reply to Objection 4: The manifestation of Christ's excellence is His
good as regards the being which it has in the knowledge of others;
although in regard to the being which they have in themselves it
chiefly belongs to the good of those who know Him. Yet even this is
referred to Christ inasmuch as they are His members.
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Whether Christ could merit for others?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit for others. For
it is written (Ezech. 18:4): "The soul that sinneth, the same shall
die." Hence, for a like reason, the soul that meriteth, the same shall
be recompensed. Therefore it is not possible that Christ merited for
others.
Objection 2: Further, of the fulness of Christ's grace we all receive,
as is written Jn. 1:16. Now other men having Christ's grace cannot
merit for others. For it is written (Ezech. 14:20) that if "Noe and
Daniel and Job be in the city [Vulg.: 'the midst thereof'] . . . they
shall deliver neither son nor daughter; but they shall only deliver
their own souls by their justice." Hence Christ could not merit
anything for us.
Objection 3: Further, the "reward" that we merit is due "according to
justice [Vulg.: 'debt'] and not according to grace," as is clear from
Rom. 4:4. Therefore if Christ merited our salvation it follows that our
salvation is not by God's grace but by justice, and that He acts
unjustly with those whom He does not save, since Christ's merit extends
to all.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:18): "As by the offense of one,
unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all
men to justification of life." But Adam's demerits reached to the
condemnation of others. Much more, therefore, does the merit of Christ
reach others.
I answer that, As stated above ([4094]Q[8], AA[1],5), grace was in
Christ not merely as in an individual, but also as in the Head of the
whole Church, to Whom all are united, as members to a head, who
constitute one mystical person. And hence it is that Christ's merit
extends to others inasmuch as they are His members; even as in a man
the action of the head reaches in a manner to all his members, since it
perceives not merely for itself alone, but for all the members.
Reply to Objection 1: The sin of an individual harms himself alone; but
the sin of Adam, who was appointed by God to be the principle of the
whole nature, is transmitted to others by carnal propagation. So, too,
the merit of Christ, Who has been appointed by God to be the head of
all men in regard to grace, extends to all His members.
Reply to Objection 2: Others receive of Christ's fulness not indeed the
fount of grace, but some particular grace. And hence it need not be
that men merit for others, as Christ did.
Reply to Objection 3: As the sin of Adam reaches others only by carnal
generation, so, too, the merit of Christ reaches others only by
spiritual regeneration, which takes place in baptism; wherein we are
incorporated with Christ, according to Gal. 3:27, "As many of you as
have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ"; and it is by grace
that it is granted to man to be incorporated with Christ. And thus
man's salvation is from grace.
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OF CHRIST'S SUBJECTION TO THE FATHER (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider such things as belong to Christ in relation to the
Father. Some of these things are predicated of Him because of His
relation to the Father, e.g. that He was subject to Him, that He prayed
to Him, that He ministered, to Him by priesthood. And some are
predicated, or may be predicated, of Him because of the Father's
relation to Him, e.g. that the Father adopted Him and that He
predestined Him.
Hence we must consider (1) Christ's subjection to the Father; (2) His
prayer; (3) His priesthood; (4) Adoption---whether it is becoming to
Him; (5) His predestination.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is subject to the Father?
(2) Whether He is subject to Himself?
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Whether we may say that Christ is subject to the Father?
Objection 1: It would seem that we may not say that Christ was subject
to the Father. For everything subject to the Father is a creature,
since, as is said in De Eccles. Dogm. iv, "in the Trinity there is no
dependence or subjection." But we cannot say simply that Christ is a
creature, as was stated above ([4095]Q[16], A[8]). Therefore we cannot
say simply that Christ is subject to God the Father.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is said to be subject to God when it is
subservient to His dominion. But we cannot attribute subservience to
the human nature of Christ; for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 21):
"We must bear in mind that we may not call it" (i.e. Christ's human
nature) "a servant; for the words 'subservience' and 'domination' are
not names of the nature, but of relations, as the words 'paternity' and
'filiation.'" Hence Christ in His human nature is not subject to God
the Father.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:28): "And when all
things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be
subject unto Him that put all things under Him." But, as is written
(Heb. 2:8): "We see not as yet all things subject to Him." Hence He is
not yet subject to the Father, Who has subjected all things to Him.
On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jn. 14:28), "The Father is greater than
I"; and Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "It is not without reason that
the Scripture mentions both, that the Son is equal to the Father and
the Father greater than the Son, for the first is said on account of
the form of God, and the second on account of the form of a servant,
without any confusion." Now the less is subject to the greater.
Therefore in the form of a servant Christ is subject to the Father.
I answer that, Whoever has a nature is competent to have what is proper
to that nature. Now human nature from its beginning has a threefold
subjection to God. The first regards the degree of goodness, inasmuch
as the Divine Nature is the very essence of goodness as is clear from
Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) while a created nature has a participation of
the Divine goodness, being subject, so to say, to the rays of this
goodness. Secondly, human nature is subject to God, as regards God's
power, inasmuch as human nature, even as every creature, is subject to
the operation of the Divine ordinance. Thirdly, human nature is
especially subject to God through its proper act, inasmuch as by its
own will it obeys His command. This triple subjection to God Christ
professes of Himself. The first (Mat. 19:17): "Why askest thou Me
concerning good? One is good, God." And on this Jerome remarks: "He who
had called Him a good master, and had not confessed Him to be God or
the Son of God, learns that no man, however holy, is good in comparison
with God." And hereby He gave us to understand that He Himself, in His
human nature, did not attain to the height of Divine goodness. And
because "in such things as are great, but not in bulk, to be great is
the same as to be good," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8), for this
reason the Father is said to be greater than Christ in His human
nature. The second subjection is attributed to Christ, inasmuch as all
that befell Christ is believed to have happened by Divine appointment;
hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that Christ "is subject to the
ordinance of God the Father." And this is the subjection of
subservience, whereby "every creature serves God" (Judith 16:17), being
subject to His ordinance, according to Wis. 16:24: "The creature
serving Thee the Creator." And in this way the Son of God (Phil. 2:7)
is said to have taken "the form of a servant." The third subjection He
attributes to Himself, saying (Jn. 8:29): "I do always the things that
please Him." And this is the subjection to the Father, of obedience
unto death. Hence it is written (Phil. 2:8) that he became "obedient"
to the Father "unto death."
Reply to Objection 1: As we are not to understand that Christ is a
creature simply, but only in His human nature, whether this
qualification be added or not, as stated above ([4096]Q[16], A[8]), so
also we are to understand that Christ is subject to the Father not
simply but in His human nature, even if this qualification be not
added; and yet it is better to add this qualification in order to avoid
the error of Arius, who held the Son to be less than the Father.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of subservience and dominion is
based upon action and passion, inasmuch as it belongs to a servant to
be moved by the will of his master. Now to act is not attributed to the
nature as agent, but to the person, since "acts belong to supposita and
to singulars," according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1).
Nevertheless action is attributed to the nature as to that whereby the
person or hypostasis acts. Hence, although the nature is not properly
said to rule or serve, yet every hypostasis or person may be properly
said to be ruling or serving in this or that nature. And in this way
nothing prevents Christ being subject or servant to the Father in human
nature.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8): "Christ will
give the kingdom to God and the Father, when He has brought the
faithful, over whom He now reigns by faith, to the vision," i.e. to see
the essence common to the Father and the Son: and then He will be
totally subject to the Father not only in Himself, but also in His
members by the full participation of the Godhead. And then all things
will be fully subject to Him by the final accomplishment of His will
concerning them; although even now all things are subject to Him as
regards His power, according to Mat. 28:18: "All power is given to Me
in heaven and in earth."
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Whether Christ is subject to Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not subject to Himself. For
Cyril says in a synodal letter which the Council of Ephesus (Part I,
ch. xxvi) received: "Christ is neither servant nor master of Himself.
It is foolish, or rather impious, to think or say this." And Damascene
says the same (De Fide Orth. iii, 21): "The one Being, Christ, cannot
be the servant or master of Himself." Now Christ is said to be the
servant of the Father inasmuch as He is subject to Him. Hence Christ is
not subject to Himself.
Objection 2: Further, servant has reference to master. Now nothing has
a relation to itself, hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that nothing is
like or equal to itself. Hence Christ cannot be said to be the servant
of Himself, and consequently to be subject to Himself.
Objection 3: Further, "as the rational soul and flesh are one man; so
God and man are one Christ," as Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.). Now man
is not said to be subject to himself or servant to himself or greater
than himself because his body is subject to his soul. Therefore, Christ
is not said to be subject to Himself because His Manhood is subject to
His Godhead.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Truth shows in this
way" (i.e. whereby the Father is greater than Christ in human nature)
"that the Son is less than Himself."
Further, as he argues (De Trin. i, 7), the form of a servant was so
taken by the Son of God that the form of God was not lost. But because
of the form of God, which is common to the Father and the Son, the
Father is greater than the Son in human nature. Therefore the Son is
greater than Himself in human nature.
Further, Christ in His human nature is the servant of God the Father,
according to Jn. 20:17: "I ascend to My Father and to your Father to My
God and your God." Now whoever is the servant of the Father is the
servant of the Son; otherwise not everything that belongs to the Father
would belong to the Son. Therefore Christ is His own servant and is
subject to Himself.
I answer that, As was said above (A[1], ad 2), to be master or servant
is attributed to a person or hypostasis according to a nature. Hence
when it is said that Christ is the master or servant of Himself, or
that the Word of God is the Master of the Man Christ, this may be
understood in two ways. First, so that this is understood to be said by
reason of another hypostasis or person, as if there was the person of
the Word of God ruling and the person of the man serving; and this is
the heresy of Nestorius. Hence in the condemnation of Nestorius it is
said in the Council of Ephesus (Part III, ch. i, anath. 6): "If anyone
say that the Word begotten of God the Father is the God or Lord of
Christ, and does not rather confess the same to be at once God and man
as the Word made flesh, according to the Scriptures, let him be
anathema." And in this sense it is denied by Cyril and Damascene
(OBJ[1]); and in the same sense must it be denied that Christ is less
than Himself or subject to Himself. Secondly, it may be understood of
the diversity of natures in the one person or hypostasis. And thus we
may say that in one of them, in which He agrees with the Father, He
presides and rules together with the Father; and in the other nature,
in which He agrees with us, He is subject and serves, and in this sense
Augustine says that "the Son is less than Himself."
Yet it must be borne in mind that since this name "Christ" is the name
of a Person, even as the name "Son," those things can be predicated
essentially and absolutely of Christ which belong to Him by reason of
the Person, Which is eternal; and especially those relations which seem
more properly to pertain to the Person or the hypostasis. But whatever
pertains to Him in His human nature is rather to be attributed to Him
with a qualification; so that we say that Christ is simply greatest,
Lord, Ruler, whereas to be subject or servant or less is to be
attributed to Him with the qualification, in His human nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Cyril and Damascene deny that Christ is the head
of Himself inasmuch as this implies a plurality of supposita, which is
required in order that anyone may be the master of another.
Reply to Objection 2: Simply speaking it is necessary that the master
and the servant should be distinct; yet a certain notion of mastership
and subservience may be preserved inasmuch as the same one is master of
Himself in different respects.
Reply to Objection 3: On account of the divers parts of man, one of
which is superior and the other inferior, the Philosopher says (Ethic.
v, 11) that there is justice between a man and himself inasmuch as the
irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason. Hence this way a man
may be said to be subject and subservient to Himself as regards His
different parts.
To the other arguments, the reply is clear from what has been said. For
Augustine asserts that the Son is less than, or subject to, Himself in
His human nature, and not by a diversity of supposita.
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OF CHRIST'S PRAYER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider Christ's prayer; and under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is becoming that Christ should pray?
(2) Whether it pertains to Him in respect of His sensuality?
(3) Whether it is becoming to Him to pray for Himself or only for
others?
(4) Whether every prayer of His was heard?
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Whether it is becoming of Christ to pray?
Objection 1: It would seem unbecoming that Christ should pray. For, as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "prayer is the asking for
becoming things from God." But since Christ could do all things, it
does not seem becoming to Him to ask anything from anyone. Therefore it
does not seem fitting that Christ should pray.
Objection 2: Further, we need not ask in prayer for what we know for
certain will happen; thus, we do not pray that the sun may rise
tomorrow. Nor is it fitting that anyone should ask in prayer for what
he knows will not happen. But Christ in all things knew what would
happen. Therefore it was not fitting that He should ask anything in
prayer.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that
"prayer is the raising up of the mind to God." Now Christ's mind needed
no uplifting to God, since His mind was always united to God, not only
by the union of the hypostasis, but by the fruition of beatitude.
Therefore it was not fitting that Christ should pray.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:12): "And it came to pass in
those days, that He went out into a mountain, and He passed the whole
night in the prayer of God."
I answer that, As was said in the [4097]SS, Q[83], AA[1],2, prayer is
the unfolding of our will to God, that He may fulfill it. If,
therefore, there had been but one will in Christ, viz. the Divine, it
would nowise belong to Him to pray, since the Divine will of itself is
effective of whatever He wishes by it, according to Ps. 134:6:
"Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done." But because the Divine and
the human wills are distinct in Christ, and the human will of itself is
not efficacious enough to do what it wishes, except by Divine power,
hence to pray belongs to Christ as man and as having a human will.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ as God and not as man was able to carry
out all He wished, since as man He was not omnipotent, as stated above
([4098]Q[13], A[1] ). Nevertheless being both God and man, He wished to
offer prayers to the Father, not as though He were incompetent, but for
our instruction. First, that He might show Himself to be from the
Father; hence He says (Jn. 11:42): "Because of the people who stand
about I have said it" (i.e. the words of the prayer) "that they may
believe that Thou hast sent Me." Hence Hilary says (De Trin. x): "He
did not need prayer. It was for us He prayed, lest the Son should be
unknown." Secondly, to give us an example of prayer; hence Ambrose says
(on Lk. 6:12): "Be not deceived, nor think that the Son of God prays as
a weakling, in order to beseech what He cannot effect. For the Author
of power, the Master of obedience persuades us to the precepts of
virtue by His example." Hence Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.):
"Our Lord in the form of a servant could have prayed in silence, if
need be, but He wished to show Himself a suppliant of the Father, in
such sort as to bear in mind that He was our Teacher."
Reply to Objection 2: Amongst the other things which He knew would
happen, He knew that some would be brought about by His prayer; and for
these He not unbecomingly besought God.
Reply to Objection 3: To rise is nothing more than to move towards what
is above. Now movement is taken in two ways, as is said De Anima iii,
7; first, strictly, according as it implies the passing from
potentiality to act, inasmuch as it is the act of something imperfect,
and thus to rise pertains to what is potentially and not actually
above. Now in this sense, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24),
"the human mind of Christ did not need to rise to God, since it was
ever united to God both by personal being and by the blessed vision."
Secondly, movement signifies the act of something perfect, i.e.
something existing in act, as to understand and to feel are called
movements; and in this sense the mind of Christ was always raised up to
God, since He was always contemplating Him as existing above Himself.
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Whether it pertains to Christ to pray according to His sensuality?
Objection 1: It would seem that it pertains to Christ to pray according
to His sensuality. For it is written (Ps. 83:3) in the person of
Christ: "My heart and My flesh have rejoiced in the Living God." Now
sensuality is called the appetite of the flesh. Hence Christ's
sensuality could ascend to the Living God by rejoicing; and with equal
reason by praying.
Objection 2: Further, prayer would seem to pertain to that which
desires what is besought. Now Christ besought something that His
sensuality desired when He said (Mat. 26:39): "Let this chalice pass
from Me." Therefore Christ's sensuality prayed.
Objection 3: Further, it is a greater thing to be united to God in
person than to mount to Him in prayer. But the sensuality was assumed
by God to the unity of Person, even as every other part of human
nature. Much more, therefore, could it mount to God by prayer.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:7) that the Son of God in the
nature that He assumed was "made in the likeness of men." But the rest
of men do not pray with their sensuality. Therefore, neither did Christ
pray according to His sensuality.
I answer that, To pray according to sensuality may be understood in two
ways. First as if prayer itself were an act of the sensuality; and in
this sense Christ did not pray with His sensuality, since His
sensuality was of the same nature and species in Christ as in us. Now
in us the sensuality cannot pray for two reasons; first because the
movement of the sensuality cannot transcend sensible things, and,
consequently, it cannot mount to God, which is required for prayer;
secondly, because prayer implies a certain ordering inasmuch as we
desire something to be fulfilled by God; and this is the work of reason
alone. Hence prayer is an act of the reason, as was said in the
[4099]SS, Q[83], A[1].
Secondly, we may be said to pray according to the sensuality when our
prayer lays before God what is in our appetite of sensuality; and in
this sense Christ prayed with His sensuality inasmuch as His prayer
expressed the desire of His sensuality, as if it were the advocate of
the sensuality---and this, that He might teach us three things. First,
to show that He had taken a true human nature, with all its natural
affections: secondly, to show that a man may wish with his natural
desire what God does not wish: thirdly, to show that man should subject
his own will to the Divine will. Hence Augustine says in the
Enchiridion (Serm. 1 in Ps. 32): "Christ acting as a man, shows the
proper will of a man when He says 'Let this chalice pass from Me'; for
this was the human will desiring something proper to itself and, so to
say, private. But because He wishes man to be righteous and to be
directed to God, He adds: 'Nevertheless not as I will but as Thou
wilt,' as if to say, 'See thyself in Me, for thou canst desire
something proper to thee, even though God wishes something else.'"
Reply to Objection 1: The flesh rejoices in the Living God, not by the
act of the flesh mounting to God, but by the outpouring of the heart
into the flesh, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite follows the movement
of the rational appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the sensuality wished what the reason
besought, it did not belong to the sensuality to seek this by praying,
but to the reason, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The union in person is according to the personal
being, which pertains to every part of the human nature; but the
uplifting of prayer is by an act which pertains only to the reason, as
stated above. Hence there is no parity.
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Whether it was fitting that Christ should pray for Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should
pray for Himself. For Hilary says (De Trin. x): "Although His word of
beseeching did not benefit Himself, yet He spoke for the profit of our
faith." Hence it seems that Christ prayed not for Himself but for us.
Objection 2: Further, no one prays save for what He wishes, because, as
was said [4100](A[1]), prayer is an unfolding of our will to God that
He may fulfil it. Now Christ wished to suffer what He suffered. For
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi): "A man, though unwilling, is often
angry; though unwilling, is sad; though unwilling, sleeps; though
unwilling, hungers and thirsts. But He" (i.e. Christ) "did all these
things, because He wished." Therefore it was not fitting that He should
pray for Himself.
Objection 3: Further, Cyprian says (De Orat. Dom.): "The Doctor of
Peace and Master of Unity did not wish prayers to be offered
individually and privately, lest when we prayed we should pray for
ourselves alone." Now Christ did what He taught, according to Acts 1:1:
"Jesus began to do and to teach." Therefore Christ never prayed for
Himself alone.
On the contrary, our Lord Himself said while praying (Jn. 17:1):
"Glorify Thy Son."
I answer that, Christ prayed for Himself in two ways. First, by
expressing the desire of His sensuality, as stated above [4101](A[2]);
or also of His simple will, considered as a nature; as when He prayed
that the chalice of His Passion might pass from Him (Mat. 26:39).
Secondly, by expressing the desire of His deliberate will, which is
considered as reason; as when He prayed for the glory of His
Resurrection (Jn. 17:1). And this is reasonable. For as we have said
above (A[1], ad 1) Christ wished to pray to His Father in order to give
us an example of praying; and also to show that His Father is the
author both of His eternal procession in the Divine Nature, and of all
the good that He possesses in the human nature. Now just as in His
human nature He had already received certain gifts from His Father. so
there were other gifts which He had not yet received, but which He
expected to receive. And therefore, as He gave thanks to the Father for
gifts already received in His human nature, by acknowledging Him as the
author thereof, as we read (Mat. 26:27; Jn. 11:41): so also, in
recognition of His Father, He besought Him in prayer for those gifts
still due to Him in His human nature, such as the glory of His body,
and the like. And in this He gave us an example, that we should give
thanks for benefits received, and ask in prayer for those we have not
as yet.
Reply to Objection 1: Hilary is speaking of vocal prayer, which was not
necessary to Him for His own sake, but only for ours. Whence he says
pointedly that "His word of beseeching did not benefit Himself." For if
"the Lord hears the desire of the poor," as is said in the Ps. 9:38,
much more the mere will of Christ has the force of a prayer with the
Father: wherefore He said (Jn. 11:42): "I know that Thou hearest Me
always, but because of the people who stand about have I said it, that
they may believe that Thou hast sent Me."
Reply to Objection 2: Christ wished indeed to suffer what He suffered,
at that particular time: nevertheless He wished to obtain, after His
passion, the glory of His body, which as yet He had not. This glory He
expected to receive from His Father as the author thereof, and
therefore it was fitting that He should pray to Him for it.
Reply to Objection 3: This very glory which Christ, while praying,
besought for Himself, pertained to the salvation of others according to
Rom. 4:25: "He rose again for our justification." Consequently the
prayer which He offered for Himself was also in a manner offered for
others. So also anyone that asks a boon of God that he may use it for
the good of others, prays not only for himself, but also for others.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ's prayer was always heard?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's prayer was not always heard.
For He besought that the chalice of His passion might be taken from
Him, as we read (Mat. 26:39): and yet it was not taken from Him.
Therefore it seems that not every prayer of His was heard.
Objection 2: Further, He prayed that the sin of those who crucified Him
might be forgiven, as is related (Lk. 23:34). Yet not all were pardoned
this sin, since the Jews were punished on account thereof. Therefore it
seems that not every prayer of His was heard.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord prayed for them "who would believe in
Him through the word" of the apostles, that they "might all be one in
Him," and that they might attain to being with Him (Jn. 17:20, 21, 24).
But not all attain to this. Therefore not every prayer of His was
heard.
Objection 4: Further, it is said (Ps. 21:3) in the person of Christ: "I
shall cry by day, and Thou wilt not hear." Not every prayer of His,
therefore, was heard.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 5:7): "With a strong cry and
tears offering up prayers . . . He was heard for His reverence."
I answer that, As stated above [4102](A[1]), prayer is a certain
manifestation of the human will. Wherefore, then is the request of one
who prays granted, when his will is fulfilled. Now absolutely speaking
the will of man is the will of reason; for we will absolutely that
which we will in accordance with reason's deliberation. Whereas what we
will in accordance with the movement of sensuality, or even of the
simple will, which is considered as nature is willed not absolutely but
conditionally [secundum quid]---that is, provided no obstacle be
discovered by reason's deliberation. Wherefore such a will should
rather be called a "velleity" than an absolute will; because one would
will [vellet] if there were no obstacle.
But according to the will of reason, Christ willed nothing but what He
knew God to will. Wherefore every absolute will of Christ, even human,
was fulfilled, because it was in conformity with God; and consequently
His every prayer was fulfilled. For in this respect also is it that
other men's prayers are fulfilled, in that their will is in conformity
with God, according to Rom. 8:27: "And He that searcheth the hearts
knoweth," that is, approves of, "what the Spirit desireth," that is,
what the Spirit makes the saints to desire: "because He asketh for the
saints according to God," that is, in conformity with the Divine will.
Reply to Objection 1: This prayer for the passing of the chalice is
variously explained by the Saints. For Hilary (Super Matth. 31) says:
"When He asks that this may pass from Him, He does not pray that it may
pass by Him, but that others may share in that which passes on from Him
to them; So that the sense is: As I am partaking of the chalice of the
passion, so may others drink of it, with unfailing hope, with
unflinching anguish, without fear of death."
Or according to Jerome (on Mat. 26:39): "He says pointedly, 'This
chalice,' that is of the Jewish people, who cannot allege ignorance as
an excuse for putting Me to death, since they have the Law and the
Prophets, who foretold concerning Me."
Or, according to Dionysius of Alexandria (De Martyr. ad Origen 7):
"When He says 'Remove this chalice from Me,' He does not mean, 'Let it
not come to Me'; for if it come not, it cannot be removed. But, as that
which passes is neither untouched nor yet permanent, so the Saviour
beseeches, that a slightly pressing trial may be repulsed."
Lastly, Ambrose, Origen and Chrysostom say that He prayed thus "as
man," being reluctant to die according to His natural will.
Thus, therefore, whether we understand, according to Hilary, that He
thus prayed that other martyrs might be imitators of His Passion, or
that He prayed that the fear of drinking His chalice might not trouble
Him, or that death might not withhold Him, His prayer was entirely
fulfilled. But if we understand that He prayed that He might not drink
the chalice of His passion and death; or that He might not drink it at
the hands of the Jews; what He besought was not indeed fulfilled,
because His reason which formed the petition did not desire its
fulfilment, but for our instruction, it was His will to make known to
us His natural will, and the movement of His sensuality, which was His
as man.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord did not pray for all those who crucified
Him, as neither did He for all those who would believe in Him; but for
those only who were predestinated to obtain eternal life through Him.
Wherefore the reply to the third objection is also manifest.
Reply to Objection 4: When He says: "I shall cry and Thou wilt not
hear," we must take this as referring to the desire of sensuality,
which shunned death. But He is heard as to the desire of His reason, as
stated above.
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OF THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the Priesthood of Christ; and under this head
there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest?
(2) Of the victim offered by this priest;
(3) Of the effect of this priesthood;
(4) Whether the effect of His priesthood pertains to Himself, or only
to others?
(5) Of the eternal duration of His priesthood;
(6) Whether He should be called "a priest according to the order of
Melchisedech"?
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Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be a priest.
For a priest is less than an angel; whence it is written (Zech. 3:1):
"The Lord showed me the high-priest standing before the angel of the
Lord." But Christ is greater than the angels, according to Heb. 1:4:
"Being made so much better than the angels, as He hath inherited a more
excellent name than they." Therefore it is unfitting that Christ should
be a priest.
Objection 2: Further, things which were in the Old Testament were
figures of Christ, according to Col. 2:17: "Which are a shadow of
things to come, but the body is Christ's." But Christ was not descended
from the priests of the Old Law, for the Apostle says (Heb. 7:14): "It
is evident that our Lord sprang out of Judah, in which tribe Moses
spoke nothing concerning priests." Therefore it is not fitting that
Christ should be a priest.
Objection 3: Further, in the Old Law, which is a figure of Christ, the
lawgivers and the priests were distinct: wherefore the Lord said to
Moses the lawgiver (Ex. 28:1): "Take unto thee Aaron, thy brother . . .
that he [Vulg.: 'they'] may minister to Me in the priest's office." But
Christ is the giver of the New Law, according to Jer. 31:33: "I will
give My law in their bowels." Therefore it is unfitting that Christ
should be a priest.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 4:14): "We have [Vulg.: 'Having']
therefore a great high-priest that hath passed into the heavens, Jesus,
the Son of God."
I answer that, The office proper to a priest is to be a mediator
between God and the people: to wit, inasmuch as He bestows Divine
things on the people, wherefore "sacerdos" [priest] means a giver of
sacred things [sacra dans], according to Malachi 2:7: "They shall seek
the law at his," i.e. the priest's, "mouth"; and again, forasmuch as he
offers up the people's prayers to God, and, in a manner, makes
satisfaction to God for their sins; wherefore the Apostle says (Heb.
5:1): "Every high-priest taken from among men is ordained for men in
the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and
sacrifices for sins." Now this is most befitting to Christ. For through
Him are gifts bestowed on men, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: "By Whom" (i.e.
Christ) "He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by
these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature." Moreover, He
reconciled the human race to God, according to Col. 1:19,20: "In Him"
(i.e. Christ) "it hath well pleased (the Father) that all fulness
should dwell, and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself."
Therefore it is most fitting that Christ should be a priest.
Reply to Objection 1: Hierarchical power appertains to the angels,
inasmuch as they also are between God and man, as Dionysius explains
(Coel. Hier. ix), so that the priest himself, as being between God and
man, is called an angel, according to Malachi 2:7: "He is the angel of
the Lord of hosts." Now Christ was greater than the angels, not only in
His Godhead, but also in His humanity, as having the fulness of grace
and glory. Wherefore also He had the hierarchical or priestly power in
a higher degree than the angels, so that even the angels were ministers
of His priesthood, according to Mat. 4:11: "Angels came and ministered
unto Him." But, in regard to His passibility, He "was made a little
lower than the angels," as the Apostle says (Heb. 2:9): and thus He was
conformed to those wayfarers who are ordained to the priesthood.
Reply to Objection 2: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): "What
is like in every particular must be, of course, identical, and not a
copy." Since, therefore, the priesthood of the Old Law was a figure of
the priesthood of Christ, He did not wish to be born of the stock of
the figurative priests, that it might be made clear that His priesthood
is not quite the same as theirs, but differs therefrom as truth from
figure.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4103]Q[7], A[7], ad 1), other
men have certain graces distributed among them: but Christ, as being
the Head of all, has the perfection of all graces. Wherefore, as to
others, one is a lawgiver, another is a priest, another is a king; but
all these concur in Christ, as the fount of all grace. Hence it is
written (Is. 33:22): "The Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our law-giver,
the Lord is our King: He will" come and "save us."
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Whether Christ was Himself both priest and victim?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ Himself was not both priest and
victim. For it is the duty of the priest to slay the victim. But Christ
did not kill Himself. Therefore He was not both priest and victim.
Objection 2: Further, the priesthood of Christ has a greater similarity
to the Jewish priesthood, instituted by God, than to the priesthood of
the Gentiles, by which the demons were worshiped. Now in the old Law
man was never offered up in sacrifice: whereas this was very much to be
reprehended in the sacrifices of the Gentiles, according to Ps. 105:38:
"They shed innocent blood; the blood of their sons and of their
daughters, which they sacrificed to the idols of Chanaan." Therefore in
Christ's priesthood the Man Christ should not have been the victim.
Objection 3: Further, every victim, through being offered to God, is
consecrated to God. But the humanity of Christ was from the beginning
consecrated and united to God. Therefore it cannot be said fittingly
that Christ as man was a victim.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:2): "Christ hath loved us,
and hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a victim [Douay:
'sacrifice'] to God for an odor of sweetness."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "Every visible
sacrifice is a sacrament, that is a sacred sign, of the invisible
sacrifice." Now the invisible sacrifice is that by which a man offers
his spirit to God, according to Ps. 50:19: "A sacrifice to God is an
afflicted spirit." Wherefore, whatever is offered to God in order to
raise man's spirit to Him, may be called a sacrifice.
Now man is required to offer sacrifice for three reasons. First, for
the remission of sin, by which he is turned away from God. Hence the
Apostle says (Heb. 5:1) that it appertains to the priest "to offer
gifts and sacrifices for sins." Secondly, that man may be preserved in
a state of grace, by ever adhering to God, wherein his peace and
salvation consist. Wherefore under the old Law the sacrifice of
peace-offerings was offered up for the salvation of the offerers, as is
prescribed in the third chapter of Leviticus. Thirdly, in order that
the spirit of man be perfectly united to God: which will be most
perfectly realized in glory. Hence, under the Old Law, the holocaust
was offered, so called because the victim was wholly burnt, as we read
in the first chapter of Leviticus.
Now these effects were conferred on us by the humanity of Christ. For,
in the first place, our sins were blotted out, according to Rom. 4:25:
"Who was delivered up for our sins." Secondly, through Him we received
the grace of salvation, according to Heb. 5:9: "He became to all that
obey Him the cause of eternal salvation." Thirdly, through Him we have
acquired the perfection of glory, according to Heb. 10:19: "We have
[Vulg.: 'Having'] a confidence in the entering into the Holies" (i.e.
the heavenly glory) "through His Blood." Therefore Christ Himself, as
man, was not only priest, but also a perfect victim, being at the same
time victim for sin, victim for a peace-offering, and a holocaust.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ did not slay Himself, but of His own
free-will He exposed Himself to death, according to Is. 53:7: "He was
offered because it was His own will." Thus He is said to have offered
Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: The slaying of the Man Christ may be referred to
a twofold will. First, to the will of those who slew Him: and in this
respect He was not a victim: for the slayers of Christ are not
accounted as offering a sacrifice to God, but as guilty of a great
crime: a similitude of which was borne by the wicked sacrifices of the
Gentiles, in which they offered up men to idols. Secondly, the slaying
of Christ may be considered in reference to the will of the Sufferer,
Who freely offered Himself to suffering. In this respect He is a
victim, and in this He differs from the sacrifices of the Gentiles.
(The reply to the third objection is wanting in the original
manuscripts, but it may be gathered from the above.--Ed.)
[*Some editions, however, give the following reply:
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that Christ's manhood was holy from its
beginning does not prevent that same manhood, when it was offered to
God in the Passion, being sanctified in a new way---namely, as a victim
actually offered then. For it acquired then the actual holiness of a
victim, from the charity which it had from the beginning, and from the
grace of union sanctifying it absolutely.]
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Whether the effect of Christ's priesthood is the expiation of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that the effect of Christ's priesthood is
not the expiation of sins. For it belongs to God alone to blot out
sins, according to Is. 43:25: "I am He that blot out thy iniquities for
My own sake." But Christ is priest, not as God, but as man. Therefore
the priesthood of Christ does not expiate sins.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1-3) that the victims
of the Old Testament could not "make" (the comers thereunto) "perfect:
for then they would have ceased to be offered; because the worshipers
once cleansed should have no conscience of sin any longer; but in them
there is made a commemoration of sins every year." But in like manner
under the priesthood of Christ a commemoration of sins is made in the
words: "Forgive us our trespasses" (Mat. 6:12). Moreover, the Sacrifice
is offered continuously in the Church; wherefore again we say: "Give us
this day our daily bread." Therefore sins are not expiated by the
priesthood of Christ.
Objection 3: Further, in the sin-offerings of the Old Law, a he-goat
was mostly offered for the sin of a prince, a she-goat for the sin of
some private individual, a calf for the sin of a priest, as we gather
from Lev. 4:3,23,28. But Christ is compared to none of these, but to
the lamb, according to Jer. 11:19: "I was as a meek lamb, that is
carried to be a victim." Therefore it seems that His priesthood does
not expiate sins.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 9:14): "The blood of Christ,
Who by the Holy Ghost offered Himself unspotted unto God, shall cleanse
our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God." But dead
works denote sins. Therefore the priesthood of Christ has the power to
cleanse from sins.
I answer that, Two things are required for the perfect cleansing from
sins, corresponding to the two things comprised in sin---namely, the
stain of sin and the debt of punishment. The stain of sin is, indeed,
blotted out by grace, by which the sinner's heart is turned to God:
whereas the debt of punishment is entirely removed by the satisfaction
that man offers to God. Now the priesthood of Christ produces both
these effects. For by its virtue grace is given to us, by which our
hearts are turned to God, according to Rom. 3:24,25: "Being justified
freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus,
Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His
blood." Moreover, He satisfied for us fully, inasmuch as "He hath borne
our infirmities and carried our sorrows" (Is. 53:4). Wherefore it is
clear that the priesthood of Christ has full power to expiate sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was a priest, not as God, but as
man, yet one and the same was both priest and God. Wherefore in the
Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. i, anath. 10] we read: "If anyone
say that the very Word of God did not become our High-Priest and
Apostle, when He became flesh and a man like us, but altogether another
one, the man born of a woman, let him be anathema." Hence in so far as
His human nature operated by virtue of the Divine, that sacrifice was
most efficacious for the blotting out of sins. For this reason
Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 14): "So that, since four things are to be
observed in every sacrifice---to whom it is offered, by whom it is
offered, what is offered, for whom it is offered; the same one true
Mediator reconciling us to God by the sacrifice of peace, was one with
Him to Whom it was offered, united in Himself those for whom He offered
it, at the same time offered it Himself, and was Himself that which He
offered."
Reply to Objection 2: Sins are commemorated in the New Law, not on
account of the inefficacy of the priesthood of Christ, as though sins
were not sufficiently expiated by Him: but in regard to those who
either are not willing to be participators in His sacrifice, such as
unbelievers, for whose sins we pray that they be converted; or who,
after taking part in this sacrifice, fall away from it by whatsoever
kind of sin. The Sacrifice which is offered every day in the Church is
not distinct from that which Christ Himself offered, but is a
commemoration thereof. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. De. x, 20):
"Christ Himself both is the priest who offers it and the victim: the
sacred token of which He wished to be the daily Sacrifice of the
Church."
Reply to Objection 3: As Origen says (Sup. Joan. i, 29), though various
animals were offered up under the Old Law, yet the daily sacrifice,
which was offered up morning and evening, was a lamb, as appears from
Num. 38:3,4. By which it was signified that the offering up of the true
lamb, i.e. Christ, was the culminating sacrifice of all. Hence (Jn.
1:29) it is said: "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away
the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world."
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Whether the effect of the priesthood of Christ pertained not only to others
,
but also to Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that the effect of the priesthood of Christ
pertained not only to others, but also to Himself. For it belongs to
the priest's office to pray for the people, according to 2 Macc. 1:23:
"The priests made prayer while the sacrifice was consuming." Now Christ
prayed not only for others, but also for Himself, as we have said above
([4104]Q[21], A[3]), and as expressly stated (Heb. 5:7): "In the days
of His flesh, with a strong cry and tears He offered [Vulg.:
'offering'] up prayers and supplications to Him that was able to save
Him from death." Therefore the priesthood of Christ had an effect not
only in others, but also in Himself.
Objection 2: Further, in His passion Christ offered Himself as a
sacrifice. But by His passion He merited, not only for others, but also
for Himself, as stated above ([4105]Q[19], AA[3],4). Therefore the
priesthood of Christ had an effect not only in others, but also in
Himself.
Objection 3: Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was a figure of the
priesthood of Christ. But the priest of the Old Law offered sacrifice
not only for others, but also for himself: for it is written (Lev.
16:17) that "the high-priest goeth into the sanctuary to pray for
himself and his house, and for the whole congregation of Israel."
Therefore the priesthood of Christ also had an effect not merely in
others, but also in Himself.
On the contrary, We read in the acts of the Council of Ephesus [*Part
III, ch. i, anath. 10]: "If anyone say that Christ offered sacrifice
for Himself, and not rather for us alone (for He Who knew not sin
needed no sacrifice), let him be anathema." But the priest's office
consists principally in offering sacrifice. Therefore the priesthood of
Christ had no effect in Himself.
I answer that, As stated above [4106](A[1]), a priest is set between
God and man. Now he needs someone between himself and God, who of
himself cannot approach to God; and such a one is subject to the
priesthood by sharing in the effect thereof. But this cannot be said of
Christ; for the Apostle says (Heb. 7:25): "Coming of Himself to God,
always living to make intercession for us [Vulg.: 'He is able to save
for ever them that come to God by Him; always living,' etc.]." And
therefore it is not fitting for Christ to be the recipient of the
effect of His priesthood, but rather to communicate it to others. For
the influence of the first agent in every genus is such that it
receives nothing in that genus: thus the sun gives but does not receive
light; fire gives but does not receive heat. Now Christ is the
fountain-head of the entire priesthood: for the priest of the Old Law
was a figure of Him; while the priest of the New Law works in His
person, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: "For what I have pardoned, if I have
pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of
Christ." Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should receive the
effect of His priesthood.
Reply to Objection 1: Although prayer is befitting to priests, it is
not their proper office, for it is befitting to everyone to pray both
for himself and for others, according to James 5:16: "Pray for one
another that you may be saved." And so we may say that the prayer by
which Christ prayed for Himself was not an action of His priesthood.
But this answer seems to be precluded by the Apostle, who, after saying
(Heb. 5:6), "Thou art a priest for ever according to the order of
Melchisedech," adds, "Who in the days of His flesh offering up payers,"
etc., as quoted above (OBJ[1] ): so that it seems that the prayer which
Christ offered pertained to His priesthood. We must therefore say that
other priests partake in the effect of their priesthood, not as
priests, but as sinners, as we shall state farther on (ad 3). But
Christ had, simply speaking, no sin; though He had the "likeness of sin
in the flesh [Vulg.,: 'sinful flesh']," as is written Rom. 8:3. And,
consequently, we must not say simply that He partook of the effect of
His priesthood but with this qualification---in regard to the
passibility of the flesh. Wherefore he adds pointedly, "that was able
to save Him from death."
Reply to Objection 2: Two things may be considered in the offering of a
sacrifice by any priest---namely, the sacrifice itself which is
offered, and the devotion of the offerer. Now the proper effect of
priesthood is that which results from the sacrifice itself. But Christ
obtained a result from His passion, not as by virtue of the sacrifice,
which is offered by way of satisfaction, but by the very devotion with
which out of charity He humbly endured the passion.
Reply to Objection 3: A figure cannot equal the reality, wherefore the
figural priest of the Old Law could not attain to such perfection as
not to need a sacrifice of satisfaction. But Christ did not stand in
need of this. Consequently, there is no comparison between the two; and
this is what the Apostle says (Heb. 7:28): "The Law maketh men priests,
who have infirmity; but the word of the oath, which was since the Law,
the Son Who is perfected for evermore."
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Whether the priesthood of Christ endures for ever?
Objection 1: It would seem that the priesthood of Christ does not
endure for ever. For as stated above (A[4], ad 1,3) those alone need
the effect of the priesthood who have the weakness of sin, which can be
expiated by the priest's sacrifice. But this will not be for ever. For
in the Saints there will be no weakness, according to Is. 60:21: "Thy
people shall be all just": while no expiation will be possible for the
weakness of sin, since "there is no redemption in hell" (Office of the
Dead, Resp. vii). Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures not for
ever.
Objection 2: Further, the priesthood of Christ was made manifest most
of all in His passion and death, when "by His own blood He entered into
the Holies" (Heb. 9:12). But the passion and death of Christ will not
endure for ever, as stated Rom. 6:9: "Christ rising again from the
dead, dieth now no more." Therefore the priesthood of Christ will not
endure for ever.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is a priest, not as God, but as man. But
at one time Christ was not man, namely during the three days He lay
dead. Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures not for ever.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 109:4): "Thou art a priest for
ever."
I answer that, In the priestly office, we may consider two things:
first, the offering of the sacrifice; secondly, the consummation of the
sacrifice, consisting in this, that those for whom the sacrifice is
offered, obtain the end of the sacrifice. Now the end of the sacrifice
which Christ offered consisted not in temporal but in eternal good,
which we obtain through His death, according to Heb. 9:11: "Christ is
[Vulg.: 'being come'] a high-priest of the good things to come"; for
which reason the priesthood of Christ is said to be eternal. Now this
consummation of Christ's sacrifice was foreshadowed in this, that the
high-priest of the Old Law, once a year, entered into the Holy of
Holies with the blood of a he-goat and a calf, as laid down, Lev.
16:11, and yet he offered up the he-goat and calf not within the Holy
of Holies, but without. In like manner Christ entered into the Holy of
Holies---that is, into heaven---and prepared the way for us, that we
might enter by the virtue of His blood, which He shed for us on earth.
Reply to Objection 1: The Saints who will be in heaven will not need
any further expiation by the priesthood of Christ, but having expiated,
they will need consummation through Christ Himself, on Whom their glory
depends, as is written (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath
enlightened it"---that is, the city of the Saints---"and the Lamb is
the lamp thereof."
Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ's passion and death are not to be
repeated, yet the virtue of that Victim endures for ever, for, as it is
written (Heb. 10:14), "by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them
that are sanctified."
Wherefore the reply to the third objection is clear.
As to the unity of this sacrifice, it was foreshadowed in the Law in
that, once a year, the high-priest of the Law entered into the Holies,
with a solemn oblation of blood, as set down, Lev. 16:11. But the
figure fell short of the reality in this, that the victim had not an
everlasting virtue, for which reason those sacrifices were renewed
every year.
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Whether the priesthood of Christ was according to the order of Melchisedech
?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's priesthood was not according
to the order of Melchisedech. For Christ is the fountain-head of the
entire priesthood, as being the principal priest. Now that which is
principal is not . secondary in regard to others, but others are
secondary in its regard. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest
according to the order of Melchisedech.
Objection 2: Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was more akin to
Christ's priesthood than was the priesthood that existed before the
Law. But the nearer the sacraments were to Christ, the more clearly
they signified Him; as is clear from what we have said in the [4107]SS,
Q[2], A[7]. Therefore the priesthood of Christ should be denominated
after the priesthood of the Law, rather than after the order of
Melchisedech, which was before the Law.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Heb. 7:2,3): "That is 'king of
peace,' without father, without mother, without genealogy; having
neither beginning of days nor ending of life": which can be referred
only to the Son of God. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest
according to the order of Melchisedech, as of some one else, but
according to His own order.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 109:4): "Thou art a priest for ever
according to the order of Melchisedech."
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 3) the priesthood of the Law
was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, not as adequately
representing the reality, but as falling far short thereof: both
because the priesthood of the Law did not wash away sins, and because
it was not eternal, as the priesthood of Christ. Now the excellence of
Christ's over the Levitical priesthood was foreshadowed in the
priesthood of Melchisedech, who received tithes from Abraham, in whose
loins the priesthood of the Law was tithed. Consequently the priesthood
of Christ is said to be "according to the order of Melchisedech," on
account of the excellence of the true priesthood over the figural
priesthood of the Law.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said to be according to the order of
Melchisedech not as though the latter were a more excellent priest, but
because he foreshadowed the excellence of Christ's over the Levitical
priesthood.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things may be considered in Christ's
priesthood: namely, the offering made by Christ, and (our) partaking
thereof. As to the actual offering, the priesthood of Christ was more
distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of the Law, by reason of the
shedding of blood, than by the priesthood of Melchisedech in which
there was no blood-shedding. But if we consider the participation of
this sacrifice and the effect thereof, wherein the excellence of
Christ's priesthood over the priesthood of the Law principally
consists, then the former was more distinctly foreshadowed by the
priesthood of Melchisedech, who offered bread and wine, signifying, as
Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) ecclesiastical unity, which is
established by our taking part in the sacrifice of Christ [*Cf.[4108]
Q[79], A[1]]. Wherefore also in the New Law the true sacrifice of
Christ is presented to the faithful under the form of bread and wine.
Reply to Objection 3: Melchisedech is described as "without father,
without mother, without genealogy," and as "having neither beginning of
days nor ending of life," not as though he had not these things, but
because these details in his regard are not supplied by Holy Scripture.
And this it is that, as the Apostle says in the same passage, he is
"likened unto the Son of God," Who had no earthly father, no heavenly
mother, and no genealogy, according to Is. 53:8: "Who shall declare His
generation?" and Who in His Godhead has neither beginning nor end of
days.
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OF ADOPTION AS BEFITTING TO CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now come to consider whether adoption befits Christ: and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons?
(2) Whether this is fitting to God the Father alone?
(3) Whether it is proper to man to be adopted to the sonship of God?
(4) Whether Christ can be called the adopted Son?
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Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting that God should adopt
sons. For, as jurists say, no one adopts anyone but a stranger as his
son. But no one is a stranger in relation to God, Who is the Creator of
all. Therefore it seems unfitting that God should adopt.
Objection 2: Further, adoption seems to have been introduced in default
of natural sonship. But in God there is natural sonship, as set down in
the [4109]FP, Q[27], A[2]. Therefore it is unfitting that God should
adopt.
Objection 3: Further, the purpose of adopting anyone is that he may
succeed, as heir, the person who adopts him. But it does not seem
possible for anyone to succeed God as heir, for He can never die.
Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5) that "He hath predestinated
us unto the adoption of children of God." But the predestination of God
is not ineffectual. Therefore God does adopt some as His sons.
I answer that, A man adopts someone as his son forasmuch as out of
goodness he admits him as heir to his estate. Now God is infinitely
good: for which reason He admits His creatures to a participation of
good things; especially rational creatures, who forasmuch as they are
made to the image of God, are capable of Divine beatitude. And this
consists in the enjoyment of God, by which also God Himself is happy
and rich in Himself---that is, in the enjoyment of Himself. Now a man's
inheritance is that which makes him rich. Wherefore, inasmuch as God,
of His goodness, admits men to the inheritance of beatitude, He is said
to adopt them. Moreover Divine exceeds human adoption, forasmuch as
God, by bestowing His grace, makes man whom He adopts worthy to receive
the heavenly inheritance; whereas man does not make him worthy whom he
adopts; but rather in adopting him he chooses one who is already
worthy.
Reply to Objection 1: Considered in his nature man is not a stranger in
respect to God, as to the natural gifts bestowed on him: but he is as
to the gifts of grace and glory; in regard to which he is adopted.
Reply to Objection 2: Man works in order to supply his wants: not so
God, Who works in order to communicate to others the abundance of His
perfection. Wherefore, as by the work of creation the Divine goodness
is communicated to all creatures in a certain likeness, so by the work
of adoption the likeness of natural sonship is communicated to men,
according to Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable
to the image of His Son."
Reply to Objection 3: Spiritual goods can be possessed by many at the
same time; not so material goods. Wherefore none can receive a material
inheritance except the successor of a deceased person: whereas all
receive the spiritual inheritance at the same time in its entirety
without detriment to the ever-living Father.
Yet it might be said that God ceases to be, according as He is in us by
faith, so as to begin to be in us by vision, as a gloss says on Rom.
8:17: "If sons, heirs also."
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Whether it is fitting that the whole Trinity should adopt?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that the whole Trinity should
adopt. For adoption is said of God in likeness to human custom. But
among men those only adopt who can beget: and in God this can be
applied only to the Father. Therefore in God the Father alone can
adopt.
Objection 2: Further, by adoption men become the brethren of Christ,
according to Rom. 8:29: "That He might be the first-born among many
brethren." Now brethren are the sons of the same father; wherefore our
Lord says (Jn. 20:17): "I ascend to My Father and to your Father."
Therefore Christ's Father alone has adopted sons.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Gal. 4:4, 5, 6): "God sent His Son
. . . that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because you are
sons of God, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts,
crying: 'Abba' [Father]." Therefore it belongs to Him to adopt, Who has
the Son and the Holy Ghost. But this belongs to the Father alone.
Therefore it befits the Father alone to adopt.
On the contrary, It belongs to Him to adopt us as sons, Whom we can
call Father; whence it is written (Rom. 8:15): "You have received the
spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: 'Abba' [Father]." But when
we say to God, "Our Father," we address the whole Trinity: as is the
case with the other names which are said of God in respect of
creatures, as stated in the [4110]FP, Q[33], A[3], OBJ[1]; cf.
[4111]FP, Q[45], A[6]. Therefore to adopt is befitting to the whole
Trinity.
I answer that, There is this difference between an adopted son of God
and the natural Son of God, that the latter is "begotten not made";
whereas the former is made, according to Jn. 1:12: "He gave them power
to be made the sons of God." Yet sometimes the adopted son is said to
be begotten, by reason of the spiritual regeneration which is by grace,
not by nature; wherefore it is written (James 1:18): "Of His own will
hath He begotten us by the word of truth." Now although, in God, to
beget belongs to the Person of the Father, yet to produce any effect in
creatures is common to the whole Trinity, by reason of the oneness of
their Nature: since, where there is one nature, there must needs be one
power and one operation: whence our Lord says (Jn. 5:19): "What things
soever the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner."
Therefore it belongs to the whole Trinity to adopt men as sons of God.
Reply to Objection 1: All human individuals are not of one individual
nature, so that there need be one operation and one effect of them all,
as is the case in God. Consequently in this respect no comparison is
possible.
Reply to Objection 2: By adoption we are made the brethren of Christ,
as having with Him the same Father: Who, nevertheless, is His Father in
one way, and ours in another. Whence pointedly our Lord says,
separately, "My Father," and "Your Father" (Jn. 20:17). For He is
Christ's Father by natural generation; and this is proper to Him:
whereas He is our Father by a voluntary operation, which is common to
Him and to the Son and Holy Ghost: so that Christ is not the Son of the
whole Trinity, as we are.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 2), adoptive sonship is
a certain likeness of the eternal Sonship: just as all that takes place
in time is a certain likeness of what has been from eternity. Now man
is likened to the splendor of the Eternal Son by reason of the light of
grace which is attributed to the Holy Ghost. Therefore adoption, though
common to the whole Trinity, is appropriated to the Father as its
author; to the Son, as its exemplar; to the Holy Ghost, as imprinting
on us the likeness of this exemplar.
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Whether it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the rational nature
to be adopted. For God is not said to be the Father of the rational
creature, save by adoption. But God is called the Father even of the
irrational creature, according to Job 38:28: "Who is father of the
rain? Or who begot the drops of dew?" Therefore it is not proper to the
rational creature to be adopted.
Objection 2: Further, by reason of adoption some are called sons of
God. But to be sons of God seems to be properly attributed by the
Scriptures to the angels; according to Job 1:6: "On a certain day when
the sons of God came to stand before the Lord." Therefore it is not
proper to the rational creature to be adopted.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is proper to a nature, belongs to all
that have that nature: just as risibility belongs to all men. But to be
adopted does not belong to every rational nature. Therefore it is not
proper to human nature.
On the contrary, Adopted sons are the "heirs of God," as is stated Rom.
8:17. But such an inheritance belongs to none but the rational nature.
Therefore it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted.
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 3), the sonship of adoption is
a certain likeness of natural sonship. Now the Son of God proceeds
naturally from the Father as the Intellectual Word, in oneness of
nature with the Father. To this Word, therefore, something may be
likened in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not on the
part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house already built is
like the mental word of the builder in its specific form, but not in
intelligibility, because the material form of a house is not
intelligible, as it was in the mind of the builder. In this way every
creature is like the Eternal Word; since it was made through the Word.
Secondly, the creature is likened to the Word, not only as to its form,
but also as to its intelligibility: thus the knowledge which is
begotten in the disciple's mind is likened to the word in the mind of
the master. In this way the rational creature, even in its nature, is
likened to the Word of God. Thirdly, a creature is likened to the
Eternal Word, as to the oneness of the Word with the Father, which is
by reason of grace and charity: wherefore our Lord prays (Jn.
17:21,22): "That they may be one in Us . . . as We also are one." And
this likeness perfects the adoption: for to those who are thus like Him
the eternal inheritance is due. It is therefore clear that to be
adopted belongs to the rational creature alone: not indeed to all, but
only to those who have charity; which is "poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5); for which reason (Rom. 8:15) the Holy Ghost
is called "the Spirit of adoption of sons."
Reply to Objection 1: God is called the Father of the irrational
creature, not properly speaking, by reason of adoption, but by reason
of creation; according to the first-mentioned participation of
likeness.
Reply to Objection 2: Angels are called sons of God by adoptive
sonship, not that it belongs to them first; but because they were the
first to receive the adoption of sons.
Reply to Objection 3: Adoption is a property resulting not from nature,
but from grace, of which the rational nature is capable. Therefore it
need not belong to every rational nature: but every rational creature
must needs be capable of adoption.
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Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is the adopted Son of
God. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii) speaking of Christ: "The dignity of
power is not forfeited when carnal humanity [*Some editions read
'humilitas'---'the humility or lowliness of the flesh'] is adopted."
Therefore Christ as man is the adopted Son of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) that "by
the same grace that Man is Christ, as from the birth of faith every man
is a Christian." But other men are Christians by the grace of adoption.
Therefore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently He would
seem to be an adopted son.
Objection 3: Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But it is of
greater dignity to be an adopted son than to be a servant. Therefore
much more is Christ, as man, an adopted Son.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarn. viii): "We do not call an
adopted son a natural son: the natural son is a true son." But Christ
is the true and natural Son of God, according to 1 Jn. 5:20: "That we
may . . . be in His true Son, Jesus Christ." Therefore Christ, as Man,
is not an adopted Son.
I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person,
not to the nature; whence in the [4112]FP, Q[32], A[3] we have stated
that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other
than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature
to be the Son. But it has been said above (A[1], ad 2), that the
sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor
can a thing be said to participate in what it has essentially.
Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can nowise be called
an adopted Son.
But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or two
supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the adopted
Son of God.
Reply to Objection 1: As sonship does not properly belong to the
nature, so neither does adoption. Consequently, when it is said that
"carnal humanity is adopted," the expression is metaphorical: and
adoption is used to signify the union of human nature to the Person of
the Son.
Reply to Objection 2: This comparison of Augustine is to be referred to
the principle because, to wit, just as it is granted to any man without
meriting it to be a Christian, so did it happen that this man without
meriting it was Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the
term: because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son; whereas
another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. Yet habitual grace in
Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted son, but is
a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to Jn.
1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the
Father; full of grace and truth."
Reply to Objection 3: To be a creature, as also to be subservient or
subject to God, regards not only the person, but also the nature: but
this cannot be said of sonship. Wherefore the comparison does not hold.
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OF THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We shall now consider the predestination of Christ. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was predestinated?
(2) Whether He was predestinated as man?
(3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of ours?
(4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination?
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Whether it is befitting that Christ should be predestinated?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be
predestinated. For the term of anyone's predestination seems to be the
adoption of sons, according to Eph. 1:5: "Who hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children." But it is not befitting to Christ to be
an adopted Son, as stated above ([4113]Q[23], A[4]). Therefore it is
not fitting that Christ be predestinated.
Objection 2: Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human
nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is
predestinated by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is
false---"The human nature is Son of God." In like manner neither by
reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace,
but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of grace, as
stated in the [4114]FP, Q[23], AA[2],5. Therefore Christ was not
predestinated to be the Son of God.
Objection 3: Further, just as that which has been made was not always,
so also that which was predestinated; since predestination implies a
certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son of
God, it cannot be said that that Man was "made the Son of God."
Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was
"predestinated the Son of God."
On the contrary, The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who
was predestinated the Son of God in power."
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said in the [4115]FP,
Q[23], AA[1],2, predestination, in its proper sense, is a certain
Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done
in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and that God is man,
is something done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can it
be said that God has not from eternity pre-ordained to do this in time:
since it would follow that something would come anew into the Divine
Mind. And we must needs admit that the union itself of natures in the
Person of Christ falls under the eternal predestination of God. For
this reason do we say that Christ was predestinated.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle there speaks of that predestination
by which we are predestinated to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in
a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a
singular manner is He predestinated.
Reply to Objection 2: As a gloss [*From St. Augustine, De Praed. Sanct.
xv] says on Rom. 1:4, some understood that predestination to refer to
the nature and not to the Person---that is to say, that on human nature
was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of
Person.
But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two
reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a person's
nature, but of his person, as being predestinated: because to be
predestinated is to be directed towards salvation, which belongs to a
suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Secondly, for a special
reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human nature; for
this proposition is false: "The human nature is the Son of God": unless
one were to force from it such an exposition as: "Who was predestinated
the Son of God in power"---that is, "It was predestinated that the
Human nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person."
Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not,
indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as
subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying,
"Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh,"
added, "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power": so as to give
us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David
according to the flesh, He was predestinated the Son of God in power.
For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to be
the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in
the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him according to the
grace of union.
Reply to Objection 3: Origen commenting on Rom. 1:4 says that the true
reading of this passage of the Apostle is: "Who was destined to be the
Son of God in power"; so that no antecedence is implied. And so there
would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in the
participle "predestinated," not to the fact of being the Son of God,
but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way of
speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place when
they are made known; so that the sense would be---"Christ was
predestinated to be made known as the Son of God." But this is an
improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly said
to be predestinated by reason of his being directed to the end of
beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our knowledge
thereof.
It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the
participle "predestinated" is to be referred to the Person not in
Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that Person
was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that one
subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. xv): "Jesus was predestinated, so that He Who
according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be
nevertheless Son of God in power."
Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle
"predestinated," just as this participle "made," implies antecedence,
yet there is a difference. For "to be made" belongs to the thing in
itself: whereas "to be predestinated" belongs to someone as being in
the apprehension of one who pre-ordains. Now that which is the subject
of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as under that
form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely of the
Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this is
becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human nature,
because at one time it began to be true that one existing in human
nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition---"Christ was
predestinated the Son of God"---is truer than this---"Christ was made
the Son of God."
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Whether this proposition is false: "Christ as man was predestinated to be
the Son of God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this proposition is false: "Christ as
man was predestinated to be the Son of God." For at some time a man is
that which he was predestinated to be: since God's predestination does
not fail. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestinated the Son of
God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. But the
latter is false. Therefore the former is false.
Objection 2: Further, what is befitting to Christ as man is befitting
to any man; since He belongs to the same species as other men. If,
therefore, Christ, as man, was predestinated the Son of God, it will
follow that this is befitting to any other man. But the latter is
false. Therefore the former is false.
Objection 3: Further, that is predestinated from eternity which is to
take place at some time. But this proposition, "The Son of God was made
man," is truer than this, "Man was made the Son of God." Therefore this
proposition, "Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be man,"
is truer than this, "Christ as Man was predestinated to be the Son of
God."
On the contrary, Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) says: "Forasmuch as
God the Son was made Man, we say that the Lord of Glory was
predestinated."
I answer that, Two things may be considered in predestination. One on
the part of eternal predestination itself: and in this respect it
implies a certain antecedence in regard to that which comes under
predestination. Secondly, predestination may be considered as regards
its temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. Therefore
from both points of view we must say that predestination is ascribed to
Christ by reason of His human nature alone: for human nature was not
always united to the Word; and by grace bestowed an it was it united in
Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of human nature alone
can predestination be attributed to Christ. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "This human nature of ours was predestinated
to be raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a position, that it
would be impossible to raise it higher." Now that is said to belong to
anyone as man which belongs to him by reason of human nature.
Consequently, we must say that "Christ, as Man, was predestinated the
Son of God."
Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "Christ, as Man, was predestinated
the Son of God," this qualification, "as Man," can be referred in two
ways to the action signified by the participle. First, as regards what
comes under predestination materially, and thus it is false. For the
sense would be that it was predestinated that Christ, as Man, should be
the Son of God. And in this sense the objection takes it.
Secondly, it may be referred to the very nature of the action itself:
that is, forasmuch as predestination implies antecedence and gratuitous
effect. And thus predestination belongs to Christ by reason of His
human nature, as stated above. And in this sense He is said to be
predestinated as Man.
Reply to Objection 2: Something may be befitting to a man by reason of
human nature, in two ways. First, so that human nature be the cause
thereof: thus risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human
nature, being caused by its principles. In this manner predestination
is not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by reason of
human nature. This is the sense of the objection. Secondly, a thing may
be befitting to someone by reason of human nature, because human nature
is susceptible of it. And in this sense we say that Christ was
predestinated by reason of human nature; because predestination refers
to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The
Word of God assumed Man to Himself in such a singular and ineffable
manner that at the same time He may be truly and correctly called the
Son of Man, because He assumed Men to Himself; and the Son of God,
because it was the Only-begotten of God Who assumed human nature."
Consequently, since this assumption comes under predestination by
reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God was
predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was predestinated to
be the Son of God. But because grace was not bestowed on the Son of God
that He might be man, but rather on human nature, that it might be
united to the Son of God; it is more proper to say that "Christ, as
Man, was predestinated to be the Son of God," than that, "Christ, as
Son of God, was predestinated to be Man."
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Whether Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
exemplar of ours. For the exemplar exists before the exemplate. But
nothing exists before the eternal. Since, therefore, our predestination
is eternal, it seems that Christ's predestination is not the exemplar
of ours.
Objection 2: Further, the exemplar leads us to knowledge of the
exemplate. But there was no need for God to be led from something else
to knowledge of our predestination; since it is written (Rom. 8:29):
"Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated." Therefore Christ's
predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
Objection 3: Further, the exemplar is conformed to the exemplate. But
Christ's predestination seems to be of a different nature from ours:
because we are predestinated to the sonship of adoption, whereas Christ
was predestinated "Son of God in power," as is written (Rom. 1:4).
Therefore His predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The Saviour
Himself, the Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus is the most
splendid light of predestination and grace." Now He is called the light
of predestination and grace, inasmuch as our predestination is made
manifest by His predestination and grace; and this seems to pertain to
the nature of an exemplar. Therefore Christ's predestination is the
exemplar of ours.
I answer that, Predestination may be considered in two ways. First, on
the part of the act of predestination: and thus Christ's predestination
cannot be said to be the exemplar of ours: for in the same way and by
the same eternal act God predestinated us and Christ.
Secondly, predestination may be considered on the part of that to which
anyone is predestinated, and this is the term and effect of
predestination. In this sense Christ's predestination is the exemplar
of ours, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the good to which
we are predestinated: for He was predestinated to be the natural Son of
God, whereas we are predestinated to the adoption of sons, which is a
participated likeness of natural sonship. Whence it is written (Rom.
8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable
to the image of His Son." Secondly, in respect of the manner of
obtaining this good---that is, by grace. This is most manifest in
Christ; because human nature in Him, without any antecedent merits, was
united to the Son of God: and of the fulness of His grace we all have
received, as it is written (Jn. 1:16).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the aforesaid act of the
predestinator.
The same is to be said of the second objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The exemplate need not be conformed to the
exemplar in all respects: it is sufficient that it imitate it in some.
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Whether Christ's predestination is the cause of ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours. For that which is eternal has no cause. But our
predestination is eternal. Therefore Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours.
Objection 2: Further, that which depends on the simple will of God has
no other cause but God's will. Now, our predestination depends on the
simple will of God, for it is written (Eph. 1:11): "Being predestinated
according to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things according to
the counsel of His will." Therefore Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours.
Objection 3: Further, if the cause be taken away, the effect is also
taken away. But if we take away Christ's predestination, ours is not
taken away; since even if the Son of God were not incarnate, our
salvation might yet have been achieved in a different manner, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10). Therefore Christ's predestination
is. not the cause of ours.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5): "(Who) hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ."
I answer that, if we consider predestination on the part of the very
act of predestinating, then Christ's predestination is not the cause of
ours; because by one and the same act God predestinated both Christ and
us. But if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus
Christ's predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by
predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should
be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal predestination covers not
only that which is to be accomplished in time, but also the mode and
order in which it is to be accomplished in time.
Replies OBJ 1 and 2: These arguments consider predestination on the
part of the act of predestinating.
Reply to Objection 3: If Christ were not to have been incarnate, God
would have decreed men's salvation by other means. But since He decreed
the Incarnation of Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should
be the cause of our salvation.
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OF THE ADORATION OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider things pertaining to Christ in reference to us;
and first, the adoration of Christ, by which we adore Him; secondly, we
must consider how He is our Mediator with God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's Godhead and humanity are to be adored with one and
the same adoration?
(2) Whether His flesh is to be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
(3) Whether the adoration of "latria" is to be given to the image of
Christ?
(4) Whether "latria" is to be given to the Cross of Christ?
(5) Whether to His Mother?
(6) Concerning the adoration of the relics of Saints.
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Whether Christ's humanity and Godhead are to be adored with the same
adoration?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's humanity and Godhead are not
to be adored with the same adoration. For Christ's Godhead is to be
adored, as being common to Father and Son; wherefore it is written (Jn.
5:23): "That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father." But
Christ's humanity is not common to Him and the Father. Therefore
Christ's humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same
adoration.
Objection 2: Further, honor is properly "the reward of virtue," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). But virtue merits its reward by
action. Since, therefore, in Christ the action of the Divine Nature is
distinct from that of the human nature, as stated above ([4116]Q[19],
A[1]), it seems that Christ's humanity is to be adored with a different
adoration from that which is given to His Godhead.
Objection 3: Further, if the soul of Christ were not united to the
Word, it would have been worthy of veneration on account of the
excellence of its wisdom and grace. But by being united to the Word it
lost nothing of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should
receive a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the veneration
which is given to His Godhead.
On the contrary, We read in the chapters of the Fifth Council [*Second
Council of Constantinople, coll. viii, can. 9]: "If anyone say that
Christ is adored in two natures, so as to introduce two distinct
adorations, and does not adore God the Word made flesh with the one and
the same adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed down from the
beginning; let such a one be anathema."
I answer that, We may consider two things in a person to whom honor is
given: the person himself, and the cause of his being honored. Now
properly speaking honor is given to a subsistent thing in its entirety:
for we do not speak of honoring a man's hand, but the man himself. And
if at any time it happen that we speak of honoring a man's hand or
foot, it is not by reason of these members being honored of themselves:
but by reason of the whole being honored in them. In this way a man may
be honored even in something external; for instance in his vesture, his
image, or his messenger.
The cause of honor is that by reason of which the person honored has a
certain excellence. for honor is reverence given to something on
account of its excellence, as stated in the [4117]SS, Q[103], A[1]. If
therefore in one man there are several causes of honor, for instance,
rank, knowledge, and virtue, the honor given to him will be one in
respect of the person honored, but several in respect of the causes of
honor: for it is the man that is honored, both on account of knowledge
and by reason of his virtue.
Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one Person of the Divine and
human natures, and one hypostasis, and one suppositum, He is given one
adoration and one honor on the part of the Person adored: but on the
part of the cause for which He is honored, we can say that there are
several adorations, for instance that He receives one honor on account
of His uncreated knowledge, and another on account of His created
knowledge.
But if it be said that there are several persons or hypostases in
Christ, it would follow that there would be, absolutely speaking,
several adorations. And this is what is condemned in the Councils. For
it is written in the chapters of Cyril [*Council of Ephesus, Part I,
ch. 26]: "If anyone dare to say that the man assumed should be adored
besides the Divine Word, as though these were distinct persons; and
does not rather honor the Emmanuel with one single adoration, inasmuch
as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema."
Reply to Objection 1: In the Trinity there are three Who are honored,
but only one cause of honor. In the mystery of the Incarnation it is
the reverse: and therefore only one honor is given to the Trinity and
only one to Christ, but in a different way.
Reply to Objection 2: Operation is not the object but the motive of
honor. And therefore there being two operations in Christ proves, not
two adorations, but two causes of adoration.
Reply to Objection 3: If the soul of Christ were not united to the Word
of God, it would be the principal thing in that Man. Wherefore honor
would be due to it principally, since man is that which is principal in
him [*Cf. Ethic. ix, 8]. But since Christ's soul is united to a Person
of greater dignity, to that Person is honor principally due to Whom
Christ's soul is united. Nor is the dignity of Christ's soul hereby
diminished, but rather increased, as stated above ([4118]Q[2], A[2], ad
2).
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Whether Christ's humanity should be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul should not be adored with
the adoration of "latria." For on the words of Ps. 98:5, "Adore His
foot-stool for it is holy," a gloss says: "The flesh assumed by the
Word of God is rightly adored by us: for no one partakes spiritually of
His flesh unless he first adore it; but not indeed with the adoration
called 'latria,' which is due to the Creator alone." Now the flesh is
part of the humanity. Therefore Christ's humanity is not to be adored
with the adoration of "latria."
Objection 2: Further, the worship of "latria" is not to be given to any
creature: since for this reason were the Gentiles reproved, that they
"worshiped and served the creature," as it is written (Rom. 1:25). But
Christ's humanity is a creature. Therefore it should not be adored with
the adoration of "latria."
Objection 3: Further, the adoration of "latria" is due to God in
recognition of His supreme dominion, according to Dt. 6:13: "Thou shalt
adore [Vulg.: 'fear'; cf. Mat. 4:10] the Lord thy God, and shalt serve
Him only." But Christ as man is less than the Father. Therefore His
humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of "latria."
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): "On account of
the incarnation of the Divine Word, we adore the flesh of Christ not
for its own sake, but because the Word of God is united thereto in
person." And on Ps. 98:5, "Adore His foot-stool," a gloss says: "He who
adores the body of Christ, regards not the earth, but rather Him whose
foot-stool it is, in Whose honor he adores the foot-stool." But the
incarnate Word is adored with the adoration of "latria." Therefore also
His body or His humanity.
I answer that, As stated above [4119](A[1]) adoration is due to the
subsisting hypostasis: yet the reason for honoring may be something
non-subsistent, on account of which the person, in whom it is, is
honored. And so the adoration of Christ's humanity may be understood in
two ways. First, so that the humanity is the thing adored: and thus to
adore the flesh of Christ is nothing else than to adore the incarnate
Word of God: just as to adore a King's robe is nothing else than to
adore a robed King. And in this sense the adoration of Christ's
humanity is the adoration of "latria." Secondly, the adoration of
Christ's humanity may be taken as given by reason of its being
perfected with every gift of grace. And so in this sense the adoration
of Christ's humanity is the adoration not of "latria" but of "dulia."
So that one and the same Person of Christ is adored with "latria" on
account of His Divinity, and with "dulia" on account of His perfect
humanity.
Nor is this unfitting. For the honor of "latria" is due to God the
Father Himself on account of His Godhead; and the honor of "dulia" on
account of the dominion by which He rules over creatures. Wherefore on
Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I hoped," a gloss says: "Lord of
all by power, to Whom 'dulia' is due: God of all by creation, to Whom
'latria' is due."
Reply to Objection 1: That gloss is not to be understood as though the
flesh of Christ were adored separately from its Godhead: for this could
happen only, if there were one hypostasis of God, and another of man.
But since, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): "If by a subtle
distinction you divide what is seen from what is understood, it cannot
be adored because it is a creature"---that is, with adoration of
"latria." And then thus understood as distinct from the Word of God, it
should be adored with the adoration of "dulia"; not any kind of
"dulia," such as is given to other creatures, but with a certain higher
adoration, which is called "hyperdulia."
Hence appear the answers to the second and third objections. Because
the adoration of "latria" is not given to Christ's humanity in respect
of itself; but in respect of the Godhead to which it is united, by
reason of which Christ is not less than the Father.
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Whether the image of Christ should be adored with the adoration of "latria"
?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's image should not be adored
with the adoration of "latria." For it is written (Ex. 20:4): "Thou
shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of
anything." But no adoration should be given against the commandment of
God. Therefore Christ's image should not be adored with the adoration
of "latria."
Objection 2: Further, we should have nothing in common with the works
of the Gentiles, as the Apostle says (Eph. 5:11). But the Gentiles are
reproached principally for that "they changed the glory of the
incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man,"
as is written (Rom. 1:23). Therefore Christ's image is not to be adored
with the adoration of "latria."
Objection 3: Further, to Christ the adoration of "latria" is due by
reason of His Godhead, not of His humanity. But the adoration of
"latria" is not due to the image of His Godhead, which is imprinted on
the rational soul. Much less, therefore, is it due to the material
image which represents the humanity of Christ Himself.
Objection 4: Further, it seems that nothing should be done in the
Divine worship that is not instituted by God; wherefore the Apostle (1
Cor. 11:23) when about to lay down the doctrine of the sacrifice of the
Church, says: "I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered
unto you." But Scripture does not lay down anything concerning the
adoration of images. Therefore Christ's image is not to be adored with
the adoration of "latria."
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 16) quotes Basil as
saying: "The honor given to an image reaches to the prototype," i.e.
the exemplar. But the exemplar itself---namely, Christ---is to be
adored with the adoration of "latria"; therefore also His image.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. i), there
is a twofold movement of the mind towards an image: one indeed towards
the image itself as a certain thing; another, towards the image in so
far as it is the image of something else. And between these movements
there is this difference; that the former, by which one is moved
towards an image as a certain thing, is different from the movement
towards the thing: whereas the latter movement, which is towards the
image as an image, is one and the same as that which is towards the
thing. Thus therefore we must say that no reverence is shown to
Christ's image, as a thing---for instance, carved or painted wood:
because reverence is not due save to a rational creature. It follow
therefore that reverence should be shown to it, in so far only as it is
an image. Consequently the same reverence should be shown to Christ's
image as to Christ Himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the
adoration of "latria," it follows that His image should be adored with
the adoration of "latria."
Reply to Objection 1: This commandment does not forbid the making of
any graven thing or likeness, but the making thereof for the purpose of
adoration, wherefore it is added: "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve
them." And because, as stated above, the movement towards the image is
the same as the movement towards the thing, adoration thereof is
forbidden in the same way as adoration of the thing whose image it is.
Wherefore in the passage quoted we are to understand the prohibition to
adore those images which the Gentiles made for the purpose of
venerating their own gods, i.e. the demons, and so it is premised:
"Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me." But no corporeal image
could be raised to the true God Himself, since He is incorporeal;
because, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): "It is the
highest absurdity and impiety to fashion a figure of what is Divine."
But because in the New Testament God was made man, He can be adored in
His corporeal image.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle forbids us to have anything in common
with the "unfruitful works" of the Gentiles, but not with their useful
works. Now the adoration of images must be numbered among the
unfruitful works in two respects. First, because some of the Gentiles
used to adore the images themselves, as things, believing that there
was something Divine therein, on account of the answers which the
demons used to give in them, and on account of other such like
wonderful effects. Secondly on account of the things of which they were
images; for they set up images to certain creatures, to whom in these
images they gave the veneration of "latria." Whereas we give the
adoration of "latria" to the image of Christ, Who is true God, not for
the sake of the image, but for the sake of the thing whose image it is,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Reverence is due to the rational creature for its
own sake. Consequently, if the adoration of "latria" were shown to the
rational creature in which this image is, there might be an occasion of
error---namely, lest the movement of adoration might stop short at the
man, as a thing, and not be carried on to God, Whose image he is. This
cannot happen in the case of a graven or painted image in insensible
material.
Reply to Objection 4: The Apostles, led by the inward instinct of the
Holy Ghost, handed down to the churches certain instructions which they
did not put in writing, but which have been ordained, in accordance
with the observance of the Church as practiced by the faithful as time
went on. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:14): "Stand fast; and
hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word"---that is
by word of mouth---"or by our epistle"---that is by word put into
writing. Among these traditions is the worship of Christ's image.
Wherefore it is said that Blessed Luke painted the image of Christ,
which is in Rome.
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Whether Christ's cross should be worshipped with the adoration of "latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's cross should not be worshiped
with the adoration of "latria." For no dutiful son honors that which
dishonors his father, as the scourge with which he was scourged, or the
gibbet on which he was hanged; rather does he abhor it. Now Christ
underwent the most shameful death on the cross; according to Wis. 2:20:
"Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death." Therefore we should not
venerate the cross but rather we should abhor it.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's humanity is worshiped with the adoration
of "latria," inasmuch as it is united to the Son of God in Person. But
this cannot be said of the cross. Therefore Christ's cross should not
be worshiped with the adoration of "latria."
Objection 3: Further, as Christ's cross was the instrument of His
passion and death, so were also many other things, for instance, the
nails, the crown, the lance; yet to these we do not show the worship of
"latria." It seems, therefore, that Christ's cross should not be
worshiped with the adoration of "latria."
On the contrary, We show the worship of "latria" to that in which we
place our hope of salvation. But we place our hope in Christ's cross,
for the Church sings:
"Dear Cross, best hope o'er all beside,
That cheers the solemn passion-tide:
Give to the just increase of grace,
Give to each contrite sinner peace."
[*Hymn Vexilla Regis: translation of Father Aylward, O.P.]
Therefore Christ's cross should be worshiped with the adoration of
"latria."
I answer that, As stated above [4120](A[3]), honor or reverence is due
to a rational creature only; while to an insensible creature, no honor
or reverence is due save by reason of a rational nature. And this in
two ways. First, inasmuch as it represents a rational nature: secondly,
inasmuch as it is united to it in any way whatsoever. In the first way
men are wont to venerate the king's image; in the second way, his robe.
And both are venerated by men with the same veneration as they show to
the king.
If, therefore, we speak of the cross itself on which Christ was
crucified, it is to be venerated by us in both ways---namely, in one
way in so far as it represents to us the figure of Christ extended
thereon; in the other way, from its contact with the limbs of Christ,
and from its being saturated with His blood. Wherefore in each way it
is worshiped with the same adoration as Christ, viz. the adoration of
"latria." And for this reason also we speak to the cross and pray to
it, as to the Crucified Himself. But if we speak of the effigy of
Christ's cross in any other material whatever---for instance, in stone
or wood, silver or gold---thus we venerate the cross merely as Christ's
image, which we worship with the adoration of "latria," as stated above
[4121](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: If in Christ's cross we consider the point of
view and intention of those who did not believe in Him, it will appear
as His shame: but if we consider its effect, which is our salvation, it
will appear as endowed with Divine power, by which it triumphed over
the enemy, according to Col. 2:14,15: "He hath taken the same out of
the way, fastening it to the cross, and despoiling the principalities
and powers, He hath exposed them confidently, in open show, triumphing
over them in Himself." Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 1:18): "The
Word of the cross to them indeed that perish is foolishness; but to
them that are saved---that is, to us---it is the power of God."
Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ's cross was not united to the
Word of God in Person, yet it was united to Him in some other way, viz.
by representation and contact. And for this sole reason reverence is
shown to it.
Reply to Objection 3: By reason of the contact of Christ's limbs we
worship not only the cross, but all that belongs to Christ. Wherefore
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11): "The precious wood, as having
been sanctified by the contact of His holy body and blood, should be
meetly worshiped; as also His nails, His lance, and His sacred
dwelling-places, such as the manger, the cave and so forth." Yet these
very things do not represent Christ's image as the cross does, which is
called "the Sign of the Son of Man" that "will appear in heaven," as it
is written (Mat. 24:30). Wherefore the angel said to the women (Mk.
16:6): "You seek Jesus of Nazareth, Who was crucified": he said not
"pierced," but "crucified." For this reason we worship the image of
Christ's cross in any material, but not the image of the nails or of
any such thing.
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Whether the Mother of God should be worshipped with the adoration of
"latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God is to be worshiped
with the adoration of "latria." For it seems that the same honor is due
to the king's mother as to the king: whence it is written (3 Kings
2:19) that "a throne was set for the king's mother, and she sat on His
right hand." Moreover, Augustine [*Sermon on the Assumption, work of an
anonymous author] says: "It is right that the throne of God, the
resting-place of the Lord of Heaven, the abode of Christ, should be
there where He is Himself." But Christ is worshiped with the adoration
of "latria." Therefore His Mother also should be.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): "The honor
of the Mother reflects on the Son." But the Son is worshiped with the
adoration of "latria." Therefore the Mother also.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's Mother is more akin to Him than the
cross. But the cross is worshiped with the adoration of "latria."
Therefore also His Mother is to be worshiped with the same adoration.
On the contrary, The Mother of God is a mere creature. Therefore the
worship of "latria" is not due to her.
I answer that, Since "latria" is due to God alone, it is not due to a
creature so far as we venerate a creature for its own sake. For though
insensible creatures are not capable of being venerated for their own
sake, yet the rational creature is capable of being venerated for its
own sake. Consequently the worship of "latria" is not due to any mere
rational creature for its own sake. Since, therefore, the Blessed
Virgin is a mere rational creature, the worship of "latria" is not due
to her, but only that of "dulia": but in a higher degree than to other
creatures, inasmuch as she is the Mother of God. For this reason we say
that not any kind of "dulia" is due to her, but "hyperdulia."
Reply to Objection 1: The honor due to the king's mother is not equal
to the honor which is due to the king: but is somewhat like it, by
reason of a certain excellence on her part. This is what is meant by
the authorities quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: The honor given to the Mother reflects on her
Son, because the Mother is to be honored for her Son's sake. But not in
the same way as honor given to an image reflects on its exemplar:
because the image itself, considered as a thing, is not to be venerated
in any way at all.
Reply to Objection 3: The cross, considered in itself, is not an object
of veneration, as stated above ([4122]AA[4],5). But the Blessed Virgin
is in herself an object of veneration. Hence there is no comparison.
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Whether any kind of worship is due to the relics of the saints?
Objection 1: It would seem that the relics of the saints are not to be
worshiped at all. For we should avoid doing what may be the occasion of
error. But to worship the relics of the dead seems to savor of the
error of the Gentiles, who gave honor to dead men. Therefore the relics
of the saints are not to be honored.
Objection 2: Further, it seems absurd to venerate what is insensible.
But the relics of the saints are insensible. Therefore it is absurd to
venerate them.
Objection 3: Further, a dead body is not of the same species as a
living body: consequently it does not seem to be identical with it.
Therefore, after a saint's death, it seems that his body should not be
worshiped.
On the contrary, It is written (De Eccles. Dogm. xl): "We believe that
the bodies of the saints, above all the relics of the blessed martyrs,
as being the members of Christ, should be worshiped in all sincerity":
and further on: "If anyone holds a contrary opinion, he is not
accounted a Christian, but a follower of Eunomius and Vigilantius."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13): "If a father's
coat or ring, or anything else of that kind, is so much more cherished
by his children, as love for one's parents is greater, in no way are
the bodies themselves to be despised, which are much more intimately
and closely united to us than any garment; for they belong to man's
very nature." It is clear from this that he who has a certain affection
for anyone, venerates whatever of his is left after his death, not only
his body and the parts thereof, but even external things, such as his
clothes, and such like. Now it is manifest that we should show honor to
the saints of God, as being members of Christ, the children and friends
of God, and our intercessors. Wherefore in memory of them we ought to
honor any relics of theirs in a fitting manner: principally their
bodies, which were temples, and organs of the Holy Ghost dwelling and
operating in them, and are destined to be likened to the body of Christ
by the glory of the Resurrection. Hence God Himself fittingly honors
such relics by working miracles at their presence.
Reply to Objection 1: This was the argument of Vigilantius, whose words
are quoted by Jerome in the book he wrote against him (ch. ii) as
follows: "We see something like a pagan rite introduced under pretext
of religion; they worship with kisses I know not what tiny heap of dust
in a mean vase surrounded with precious linen." To him Jerome replies
(Ep. ad Ripar. cix): "We do not adore, I will not say the relics of the
martyrs, but either the sun or the moon or even the angels"---that is
to say, with the worship of "latria." "But we honor the martyrs'
relics, so that thereby we give honor to Him Whose martyrs [*The
original meaning of the word 'martyr,' i.e. the Greek {martys} is 'a
witness'] they are: we honor the servants, that the honor shown to them
may reflect on their Master." Consequently, by honoring the martyrs'
relics we do not fall into the error of the Gentiles, who gave the
worship of "latria" to dead men.
Reply to Objection 2: We worship that insensible body, not for its own
sake, but for the sake of the soul, which was once united thereto, and
now enjoys God; and for God's sake, whose ministers the saints were.
Reply to Objection 3: The dead body of a saint is not identical with
that which the saint had during life, on account of the difference of
form, viz. the soul: but it is the same by identity of matter, which is
destined to be reunited to its form.
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OF CHRIST AS CALLED THE MEDIATOR OF GOD AND MAN (TWO ARTICLES)
We have now to consider how Christ is called the Mediator of God and
man, and under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man?
(2) Whether this belongs to Him by reason of His human nature?
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Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to be the
Mediator of God and man. For a priest and a prophet seem to be
mediators between God and man, according to Dt. 5:5: "I was the
mediator and stood between God [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] and you at that
time." But it is not proper to Christ to be a priest and a prophet.
Neither, therefore, is it proper to Him to be Mediator.
Objection 2: Further, that which is fitting to angels, both good and
bad, cannot be said to be proper to Christ. But to be between God and
man is fitting to the good angels, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). It
is also fitting to the bad angels---that is, the demons: for they have
something in common with God---namely, "immortality"; and something
they have in common with men---namely, "passibility of soul" and
consequently unhappiness; as appears from what Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei ix, 13,15). Therefore it is not proper to Christ to be a Mediator
of God and man.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the office of Mediator to beseech
one of those, between whom he mediates, for the other. But the Holy
Ghost, as it is written (Rom. 8:26), "asketh" God "for us with
unspeakable groanings." Therefore the Holy Ghost is a Mediator between
God and man. Therefore this is not proper to Christ.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 2:5): "There is . . . one
Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus."
I answer that, Properly speaking, the office of a mediator is to join
together and unite those between whom he mediates: for extremes are
united in the mean [medio]. Now to unite men to God perfectively
belongs to Christ, through Whom men are reconciled to God, according to
2 Cor. 5:19: "God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself." And,
consequently, Christ alone is the perfect Mediator of God and men,
inasmuch as, by His death, He reconciled the human race to God. Hence
the Apostle, after saying, "Mediator of God and man, the man Christ
Jesus," added: "Who gave Himself a redemption for all."
However, nothing hinders certain others from being called mediators, in
some respect, between God and man, forasmuch as they cooperate in
uniting men to God, dispositively or ministerially.
Reply to Objection 1: The prophets and priests of the Old Law were
called mediators between God and man, dispositively and ministerially:
inasmuch as they foretold and foreshadowed the true and perfect
Mediator of God and men. As to the priests of the New Law, they may be
called mediators of God and men, inasmuch as they are the ministers of
the true Mediator by administering, in His stead, the saving sacraments
to men.
Reply to Objection 2: The good angels, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
ix, 13), cannot rightly be called mediators between God and men. "For
since, in common with God, they have both beatitude and immortality,
and none of these things in common with unhappy and mortal man, how
much rather are they not aloof from men and akin to God, than
established between them?" Dionysius, however, says that they do occupy
a middle place, because, in the order of nature, they are established
below God and above man. Moreover, they fulfill the office of mediator,
not indeed principally and
perfectively, but ministerially and dispositively: whence (Mat. 4:11)
it is said that "angels came and ministered unto Him"---namely, Christ.
As to the demons, it is true that they have immortality in common with
God, and unhappiness in common with men. "Hence for this purpose does
the immortal and unhappy demon intervene, in order that he may hinder
men from passing to a happy immortality," and may allure them to an
unhappy immortality. Whence he is like "an evil mediator, who separates
friends" [*Augustine, De Civ. Dei xv].
But Christ had beatitude in common with God, mortality in common with
men. Hence "for this purpose did He intervene, that having fulfilled
the span of His mortality, He might from dead men make immortal---which
He showed in Himself by rising again; and that He might confer
beatitude on those who were deprived of it---for which reason He never
forsook us." Wherefore He is "the good Mediator, Who reconciles
enemies" (De Civ. Dei xv).
Reply to Objection 3: Since the Holy Ghost is in everything equal to
God, He cannot be said to be between, or a Mediator of, God and men:
but Christ alone, Who, though equal to the Father in His Godhead, yet
is less than the Father in His human nature, as stated above
([4123]Q[20], A[1]). Hence on Gal. 3:20, "Christ is a Mediator [Vulg.:
'Now a mediator is not of one, but God is one']," the gloss says: "Not
the Father nor the Holy Ghost." The Holy Ghost, however, is said "to
ask for us," because He makes us ask.
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Whether Christ, is the Mediator of God and men?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not, as man, the Mediator of
God and men. For Augustine says (Contra Felic. x): "One is the Person
of Christ: lest there be not one Christ, not one substance; lest, the
office of Mediator being denied, He be called the Son either of God
alone, or merely the Son of a man." But He is the Son of God and man,
not as man, but as at the same time God and man. Therefore neither
should we say that, as man alone, He is Mediator of God and man.
Objection 2: Further, just as Christ, as God, has a common nature with
the Father and the Holy Ghost; so, as man, He has a common nature with
men. But for the reason that, as God, He has the same nature as the
Father and the Holy Ghost, He cannot be called Mediator, as God: for on
1 Tim. 2:5, "Mediator of God and man," a gloss says: "As the Word, He
is not a Mediator, because He is equal to God, and God 'with God,' and
at the same time one God." Therefore neither, as man, can He be called
Mediator, on account of His having the same nature as men.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is called Mediator, inasmuch as He
reconciled us to God: and this He did by taking away sin, which
separated us from God. But to take away sin belongs to Christ, not as
man, but as God. Therefore Christ is our Mediator, not as man, but as
God.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 15): "Not because He
is the Word, is Christ Mediator, since He Who is supremely immortal and
supremely happy is far from us unhappy mortals; but He is Mediator, as
man."
I answer that, We may consider two things in a mediator: first, that he
is a mean; secondly, that he unites others. Now it is of the nature of
a mean to be distant from each extreme: while it unites by
communicating to one that which belongs to the other. Now neither of
these can be applied to Christ as God, but only as man. For, as God, He
does not differ from the Father and the Holy Ghost in nature and power
of dominion: nor have the Father and the Holy Ghost anything that the
Son has not, so that He be able to communicate to others something
belonging to the Father or the Holy Ghost, as though it were belonging
to others than Himself. But both can be applied to Him as man. Because,
as man, He is distant both from God, by nature, and from man by dignity
of both grace and glory. Again, it belongs to Him, as man, to unite men
to God, by communicating to men both precepts and gifts, and by
offering satisfaction and prayers to God for men. And therefore He is
most truly called Mediator, as man.
Reply to Objection 1: If we take the Divine Nature from Christ, we
consequently take from Him the singular fulness of grace, which belongs
to Him as the Only-begotten of the Father, as it is written (Jn. 1:14).
From which fulness it resulted that He was established over all men,
and approached nearer to God.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ, as God, is in all things equal to the
Father. But even in the human nature He is above all men. Therefore, as
man, He can be Mediator, but not as God.
Reply to Objection 3: Although it belongs to Christ as God to take away
sin authoritatively, yet it belongs to Him, as man, to satisfy for the
sin of the human race. And in this sense He is called the Mediator of
God and men.
ST. THOMAS AND THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION (EDITORIAL NOTE)
The privilege of the Virgin-Mother of God and the supreme prerogative
of her Son may be seen from the following diagram:
THE LAW AND THE COURSE OF ORIGINAL SIN UNDER THE LAW . . . . . all
descendants from Adam . . . . . spring from Adam materially and
seminally . . . . . the body lies (not under the guilty, but) under the
effects of original sin . . . . . the stricken body dispositively
causes the soul to contract the guilt of original sin . . . . . all
contract both debt and stain . . . . . all need a Redeemer to destroy
the stain contracted PARTIALLY EXEMPT FROM THE LAW; PRIVILEGE OF
IMMACULATE CONCEPTION . . . . . the Blessed Virgin . . . . . springs
from Adam materially and seminally . . . . . the body lies (not under
the guilt, but) under the effects of original sin . . . . . the
stricken body would have dispositively caused the soul to contract the
guilt of original sin . . . . . the soul at the moment of union with
the body was prevented by the infusion of grace from contracting sin .
. . . . Mary contracted the debt, but not the stain . . . . . Mary
needed a Redeemer to prevent her from contracting the stain WHOLLY
EXEMPT FROM THE LAW; MIRACULOUS CONCEPTION . . . . . Our Blessed Lord .
. . . . springs from Adam materially, not seminally ([4124]Q[31], A[1])
. . . . . His body lay under neither guilt nor effects of original sin
. . . . . the body being entirely free, could not transmit the stain to
His soul . . . . . no preventive grace needed . . . . . Jesus Christ
contracted neither debt nor stain . . . . . Jesus Christ is not
redeemed, but the Redeemer
It will thus be seen how accurately St. Thomas speaks of the "flesh" or
body of our Blessed Lady. For it should be remembered that, according
to St. Thomas, the human body is animated in succession by (1) a
vegetative, (2) a sensitive, and (3) a rational soul. Hence his
assertion that "the flesh of the Blessed Virgin was conceived in
original sin" ([4125]Q[14], A[3], ad 1) means that the body of the
Blessed Virgin, being descended from Adam both materially and
seminally, contracted the bodily defects which are conveyed by seminal
generation, and are the results of the privation of original justice
([4126]Q[69], A[4], ad 3). Before animation, therefore the body of the
Blessed Virgin would not be infected with the guilt of original sin,
because privation of grace can only be in that which is the subject of
grace, viz. the rational soul. Nevertheless, before animation the body
of the Blessed Virgin, being seminally descended from Adam, was such
that it would have been the means of transmitting the taint of original
sin to the rational soul at the very first instant of animation, unless
the grace of the Redeemer intervened and sanctified her soul "in that
self-same instant," thus redeeming her and preventing her from
contracting the guilt of original sin.
Why, then, does St. Thomas say that because the Blessed Virgin was not
sanctified before animation, therefore she could be sanctified only
after animation?
Such a conclusion would hold if it were a question of the order of
Nature: "a thing must be before it is such [prius est esse quam esse
tale]"; and therefore the soul must be, before it is sanctified. But if
St. Thomas held for a posteriority of time, no matter how short, we ask
how it was that he did not perceive the fallacy of the argument, since
it might be neither before nor after, but in the very instant of,
animation.
The question is answered thus: St. Thomas as a Doctor of the Church and
in matters which were not then "de fide," is a witness to the
expression of the faith of his time. Hence his line of argument
coincides with, because it follows, that of St. Bernard, Peter Lombard,
Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure. It was not
likely that St. Thomas would differ from the great masters of his time,
who failed to understand that the grace of redemption might at the same
time be one of preservation and prevention. Nor is it likely that St.
Thomas had any reliable information about the movement* in progress at
that time towards a belief in the Immaculate Conception. [*Principally
in England, where, owing to the influence of St. Anselm (1109), the
doctrine was maintained by Eadmer (1137). Nicolas of St. Albans (1175),
Osbert of Clare (1170), Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (1253),
William of Ware (1300), who was the master of Duns Scotus (1308)]. No
doubt he knew something of it, but the names of its promoters would
have weighed little with him as against those of Bernard, Albert,
Peter, Alexander, and Bonaventure. And it must not be forgotten that
among those who upheld the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, not a
few ascribed the privilege as being absolute and not one of
preservation and Redemption. Hence it is that St. Thomas insists on two
things: (1) that the Mother of God was redeemed, and (2) that the grace
of her sanctification was a grace of preservation. And, be it remarked
in conclusion, these two points, so much insisted on by St. Thomas, are
at the very basis of the Catholic doctrine of the Immaculate
Conception.
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OF THE SANCTIFICATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN (SIX ARTICLES)
After the foregoing treatise of the union of God and man and the
consequences thereof, it remains for us to consider what things the
Incarnate Son of God did or suffered in the human nature united to Him.
This consideration will be fourfold. For we shall consider: (1) Those
things that relate to His coming into the world; (2) Those things that
relate to the course of His life in this world; (3) His departure from
this world; (4) Those things that concern His exaltation after this
life.
The first of these offers four points of consideration: (1) The
Conception of Christ; (2) His Birth; (3) His Circumcision; (4) His
Baptism. Concerning His Conception there are some points to be
considered: (1) As to the Mother who conceived Him; (2) as to the mode
of His Conception; (3) as to the perfection of the offspring conceived.
On the part of the Mother four points offer themselves to our
consideration: (1) Her sanctification. (2) her virginity; (3) her
espousals; (4) her annunciation, or preparation for conception.
Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, was sanctified before
her birth from the womb?
(2) Whether she was sanctified before animation?
(3) Whether in virtue of this sanctification the fomes of sin was
entirely taken away from her?
(4) Whether the result of this sanctification was that she never
sinned?
(5) Whether in virtue of this sanctification she received the fulness
of grace?
(6) Whether it was proper to her to be thus sanctified?
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Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before her birth from the womb?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified
before her birth from the womb. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46):
"That was not first which is spiritual but that which is natural;
afterwards that which is spiritual." But by sanctifying grace man is
born spiritually into a son of God according to Jn. 1:13: "(who) are
born of God." But birth from the womb is a natural birth. Therefore the
Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from the womb.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan.): "The
sanctification, by which we become temples of God, is only of those who
are born again." But no one is born again, who was not born previously.
Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from
the womb.
Objection 3: Further, whoever is sanctified by grace is cleansed from
sin, both original and actual. If, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was
sanctified before her birth from the womb, it follows that she was then
cleansed from original sin. Now nothing but original sin could hinder
her from entering the heavenly kingdom. If therefore she had died then,
it seems that she would have entered the gates of heaven. But this was
not possible before the Passion of Christ, according to the Apostle
(Heb. 10:19): "We have [Vulg.: 'having'] therefore a confidence in the
entering into the Holies by His blood." It seems therefore that the
Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from the womb.
Objection 4: Further, original sin is contracted through the origin,
just as actual sin is contracted through an act. But as long as one is
in the act of sinning, one cannot be cleansed from actual sin.
Therefore neither could the Blessed Virgin be cleansed from original
sin as long as she was in the act of origin, by existence in her
mother's womb.
On the contrary, The Church celebrates the feast of our Lady's
Nativity. Now the Church does not celebrate feasts except of those who
are holy. Therefore even in her birth the Blessed Virgin was holy.
Therefore she was sanctified in the womb.
I answer that, Nothing is handed down in the canonical Scriptures
concerning the sanctification of the Blessed Mary as to her being
sanctified in the womb; indeed, they do not even mention her birth. But
as Augustine, in his tractate on the Assumption of the Virgin, argues
with reason, since her body was assumed into heaven, and yet Scripture
does not relate this; so it may be reasonably argued that she was
sanctified in the womb. For it is reasonable to believe that she, who
brought forth "the Only-Begotten of the Father full of grace and
truth," received greater privileges of grace than all others: hence we
read (Lk. 1:28) that the angel addressed her in the words: "Hail full
of grace!"
Moreover, it is to be observed that it was granted, by way of
privilege, to others, to be sanctified in the womb; for instance, to
Jeremias, to whom it was said (Jer. 1:5): "Before thou camest forth out
of the womb, I sanctified thee"; and again, to John the Baptist, of
whom it is written (Lk. 1:15): "He shall be filled with the Holy Ghost
even from his mother's womb." It is therefore with reason that we
believe the Blessed Virgin to have been sanctified before her birth
from the womb.
Reply to Objection 1: Even in the Blessed Virgin, first was that which
is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual: for she was first
conceived in the flesh, and afterwards sanctified in the spirit.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks according to the common law, by
reason of which no one is regenerated by the sacraments, save those who
are previously born. But God did not so limit His power to the law of
the sacraments, but that He can bestow His grace, by special privilege,
on some before they are born from the womb.
Reply to Objection 3: The Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb
from original sin, as to the personal stain; but she was not freed from
the guilt to which the whole nature is subject, so as to enter into
Paradise otherwise than through the Sacrifice of Christ; the same also
is to be said of the Holy Fathers who lived before Christ.
Reply to Objection 4: Original sin is transmitted through the origin,
inasmuch as through the origin the human nature is transmitted, and
original sin, properly speaking, affects the nature. And this takes
place when the off-spring conceived is animated. Wherefore nothing
hinders the offspring conceived from being sanctified after animation:
for after this it remains in the mother's womb not for the purpose of
receiving human nature, but for a certain perfecting of that which it
has already received.
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Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified
before animation. Because, as we have stated [4127](A[1]), more grace
was bestowed on the Virgin Mother of God than on any saint. Now it
seems to have been granted to some, to be sanctified before animation.
For it is written (Jer. 1:5): "Before I formed thee in the bowels of
thy mother, I knew thee": and the soul is not infused before the
formation of the body. Likewise Ambrose says of John the Baptist
(Comment. in Luc. i, 15): "As yet the spirit of life was not in him and
already he possessed the Spirit of grace." Much more therefore could
the Blessed Virgin be sanctified before animation.
Objection 2: Further, as Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. xviii), "it was
fitting that this Virgin should shine with such a purity that under God
none greater can be imagined": wherefore it is written (Canticles 4:7):
"Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee." But
the purity of the Blessed Virgin would have been greater, if she had
never been stained by the contagion of original sin. Therefore it was
granted to her to be sanctified before her flesh was animated.
Objection 3: Further, as it has been stated above, no feast is
celebrated except of some saint. But some keep the feast of the
Conception of the Blessed Virgin. Therefore it seems that in her very
Conception she was holy; and hence that she was sanctified before
animation.
Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 11:16): "If the root be
holy, so are the branches." Now the root of the children is their
parents. Therefore the Blessed Virgin could be sanctified even in her
parents, before animation.
On the contrary, The things of the Old Testament were figures of the
New, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: "All things happened to them in
figure." Now the sanctification of the tabernacle, of which it is
written (Ps. 45:5): "The most High hath sanctified His own tabernacle,"
seems to signify the sanctification of the Mother of God, who is called
"God's Tabernacle," according to Ps. 18:6: "He hath set His tabernacle
in the sun." But of the tabernacle it is written (Ex. 40:31,32): "After
all things were perfected, the cloud covered the tabernacle of the
testimony, and the glory of the Lord filled it." Therefore also the
Blessed Virgin was not sanctified until after all in her was perfected,
viz. her body and soul.
I answer that, The sanctification of the Blessed Virgin cannot be
understood as having taken place before animation, for two reasons.
First, because the sanctification of which we are speaking, is nothing
but the cleansing from original sin: for sanctification is a "perfect
cleansing," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii). Now sin cannot be taken
away except by grace, the subject of which is the rational creature
alone. Therefore before the infusion of the rational soul, the Blessed
Virgin was not sanctified.
Secondly, because, since the rational creature alone can be the subject
of sin; before the infusion of the rational soul, the offspring
conceived is not liable to sin. And thus, in whatever manner the
Blessed Virgin would have been sanctified before animation, she could
never have incurred the stain of original sin: and thus she would not
have needed redemption and salvation which is by Christ, of whom it is
written (Mat. 1:21): "He shall save His people from their sins." But
this is unfitting, through implying that Christ is not the "Saviour of
all men," as He is called (1 Tim. 4:10). It remains, therefore, that
the Blessed Virgin was sanctified after animation.
Reply to Objection 1: The Lord says that He "knew" Jeremias before he
was formed in the womb, by knowledge, that is to say, of
predestination: but He says that He "sanctified" him, not before
formation, but before he "came forth out of the womb," etc.
As to what Ambrose says, viz. that in John the Baptist there was not
the spirit of life when there was already the Spirit of grace, by
spirit of life we are not to understand the life-giving soul, but the
air which we breathe out [respiratus]. Or it may be said that in him as
yet there was not the spirit of life, that is the soul, as to its
manifest and complete operations.
Reply to Objection 2: If the soul of the Blessed Virgin had never
incurred the stain of original sin, this would be derogatory to the
dignity of Christ, by reason of His being the universal Saviour of all.
Consequently after Christ, who, as the universal Saviour of all, needed
not to be saved, the purity of the Blessed Virgin holds the highest
place. For Christ did not contract original sin in any way whatever,
but was holy in His very Conception, according to Lk. 1:35: "The Holy
which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God." But the
Blessed Virgin did indeed contract original sin, but was cleansed
therefrom before her birth from the womb. This is what is signified
(Job 3:9) where it is written of the night of original sin: "Let it
expect light," i.e. Christ, "and not see it"---(because "no defiled
thing cometh into her," as is written Wis. 7:25), "nor the rising of
the dawning of the day," that is of the Blessed Virgin, who in her
birth was immune from original sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the Church of Rome does not celebrate
the Conception of the Blessed Virgin, yet it tolerates the custom of
certain churches that do keep that feast, wherefore this is not to be
entirely reprobated. Nevertheless the celebration of this feast does
not give us to understand that she was holy in her conception. But
since it is not known when she was sanctified, the feast of her
Sanctification, rather than the feast of her Conception, is kept on the
day of her conception.
Reply to Objection 4: Sanctification is twofold. one is that of the
whole nature: inasmuch as the whole human nature is freed from all
corruption of sin and punishment. This will take place at the
resurrection. The other is personal sanctification. This is not
transmitted to the children begotten of the flesh: because it does not
regard the flesh but the mind. Consequently, though the parents of the
Blessed Virgin were cleansed from original sin, nevertheless she
contracted original sin, since she was conceived by way of fleshly
concupiscence and the intercourse of man and woman: for Augustine says
(De Nup. et Concup. i): "All flesh born of carnal intercourse is
sinful."
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Whether the Blessed Virgin was cleansed from the infection of the fomes?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was not cleansed
from the infection of the fomes. For just as the fomes, consisting in
the rebellion of the lower powers against the reason, is a punishment
of original sin; so also are death and other corporeal penalties.
Therefore the fomes was not entirely removed from her.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (2 Cor. 12:9): "Power is made
perfect in infirmity," which refers to the weakness of the fomes, by
reason of which he (the Apostle) felt the "sting of the flesh." But it
was not fitting that anything should be taken away from the Blessed
Virgin, pertaining to the perfection of virtue. Therefore it was
unfitting that the fomes should be entirely taken away from her.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that "the Holy
Ghost came upon" the Blessed Virgin, "purifying her," before she
conceived the Son of God. But this can only be understood of
purification from the fomes: for she committed no sin, as Augustine
says (De Nat. et Grat. xxvi). Therefore by the sanctification in the
womb she was not absolutely cleansed from the fomes.
On the contrary, It is written (Canticles 4:7): "Thou art all fair, O
my love, and there is not a spot in thee!" But the fomes implies a
blemish, at any rate in the flesh. Therefore the fomes was not in the
Blessed Virgin.
I answer that, on this point there are various opinions. For some have
held that the fomes was entirely taken away in that sanctification
whereby the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb. Others say that
it remained as far as it causes a difficulty in doing good, but was
taken away as far as it causes a proneness to evil. Others again, that
it was taken away as to the personal corruption, by which it makes us
quick to do evil and slow to do good: but that it remained as to the
corruption of nature, inasmuch as it is the cause of transmitting
original sin to the offspring. Lastly, others say that, in her first
sanctification, the fomes remained essentially, but was fettered; and
that, when she conceived the Son of God, it was entirely taken away. In
order to understand the question at issue, it must be observed that the
fomes is nothing but a certain inordinate, but habitual, concupiscence
of the sensitive appetite. for actual concupiscence is a sinful motion.
Now sensual concupiscence is said to be inordinate, in so far as it
rebels against reason; and this it does by inclining to evil, or
hindering from good. Consequently it is essential to the fomes to
incline to evil, or hinder from good. Wherefore to say that the fomes
was in the Blessed Virgin without an inclination to evil, is to combine
two contradictory statements.
In like manner it seems to imply a contradiction to say that the fomes
remained as to the corruption of nature, but not as to the personal
corruption. For, according to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup. i.), it is
lust that transmits original sin to the offspring. Now lust implies
inordinate concupiscence, not entirely subject to reason: and
therefore, if the fomes were entirely taken away as to personal
corruption, it could not remain as to the corruption of nature.
It remains, therefore, for us to say, either that the fomes was
entirely taken away from her by her first sanctification or that it was
fettered. Now that the fomes was entirely taken away, might be
understood in this way, that, by the abundance of grace bestowed on the
Blessed Virgin, such a disposition of the soul's powers was granted to
her, that the lower powers were never moved without the command of her
reason: just as we have stated to have been the case with Christ
([4128]Q[15], A[2]), who certainly did not have the fomes of sin; as
also was the case with Adam, before he sinned, by reason of original
justice: so that, in this respect, the grace of sanctification in the
Virgin had the force of original justice. And although this appears to
be part of the dignity of the Virgin Mother, yet it is somewhat
derogatory to the dignity of Christ, without whose power no one had
been freed from the first sentence of condemnation. And though, through
faith in Christ, some were freed from that condemnation, according to
the spirit, before Christ's Incarnation, yet it does not seem fitting
that any one should be freed from that condemnation, according to the
flesh, except after His Incarnation, for it was then that immunity from
condemnation was first to appear. Consequently, just as before the
immortality of the flesh of Christ rising again, none obtained
immortality of the flesh, so it seems unfitting to say that before
Christ appeared in sinless flesh, His Virgin Mother's or anyone else's
flesh should be without the fomes, which is called "the law of the
flesh" or "of the members" (Rom. 7:23, 25).
Therefore it seems better to say that by the sanctification in the
womb, the Virgin was not freed from the fomes in its essence, but that
it remained fettered: not indeed by an act of her reason, as in holy
men, since she had not the use of reason from the very first moment of
her existence in her mother's womb, for this was the singular privilege
of Christ: but by reason of the abundant grace bestowed on her in her
sanctification, and still more perfectly by Divine Providence
preserving her sensitive soul, in a singular manner, from any
inordinate movement. Afterwards, however, at the conception of Christ's
flesh, in which for the first time immunity from sin was to be
conspicuous, it is to be believed that entire freedom from the fomes
redounded from the Child to the Mother. This indeed is signified
(Ezech. 43:2): "Behold the glory of the God of Israel came in by the
way of the east," i.e. by the Blessed Virgin, "and the earth," i.e. her
flesh, "shone with His," i.e. Christ's, "majesty."
Reply to Objection 1: Death and such like penalties do not of
themselves incline us to sin. Wherefore though Christ assumed them, He
did not assume the fomes. Consequently in order that the Blessed Virgin
might be conformed to her Son, from "whose fulness" her grace was
derived, the fomes was at first fettered and afterwards taken away:
while she was not freed from death and other such penalties.
Reply to Objection 2: The "infirmity" of the flesh, that pertains to
the fomes, is indeed to holy men an occasional cause of perfect virtue:
but not the "sine qua non" of perfection: and it is quite enough to
ascribe to the Blessed Virgin perfect virtue and abundant grace: nor is
there any need to attribute to her every occasional cause of
perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: The Holy Ghost effected a twofold purification in
the Blessed Virgin. The first was, as it were, preparatory to Christ's
conception: which did not cleanse her from the stain of sin or fomes,
but rather gave her mind a unity of purpose and disengaged it from a
multiplicity of things (Cf. Dionysius, Div. Nom. iv), since even the
angels are said to be purified, in whom there is no stain, as Dionysius
says (Eccl. Hier. vi). The second purification effected in her by the
Holy Ghost was by means of the conception of Christ which was the
operation of the Holy Ghost. And in respect of this, it may be said
that He purified her entirely from the fomes.
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Whether by being sanctified in the womb the Blessed Virgin was preserved
from all actual sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that by being sanctified in the womb the
Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all actual sin. For, as we have
already stated [4129](A[3]), after her first sanctification the fomes
remained in the Virgin. Now the motion of the fomes, even if it precede
the act of the reason, is a venial sin, albeit extremely slight, as
Augustine says in his work De Trinitate [*Cf. Sent. ii, D, 24].
Therefore there was some venial sin in the Blessed Virgin.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test. lxxiii on Lk.
2:35: "Thy own soul a sword shall pierce") says that the Blessed Virgin
"was troubled with wondering doubt at the death of our Lord." But doubt
in matters of faith is a sin. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not
preserved from all actual sin.
Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom (Hom. xlv in Matth.) expounding the
text: "Behold thy mother and thy brethren stand without, seeking thee,"
says: "It is clear that they did this from mere vain glory." Again, on
Jn. 2:3: "They have no wine," the same Chrysostom says that "she wished
to do them a favor, and raise herself in their esteem, by means of her
Son: and perchance she succumbed to human frailty, just as did His
brethren when they said: 'Manifest Thyself to the world.'" And a little
further on he says: "For as yet she did not believe in Him as she
ought." Now it is quite clear that all this was sinful. Therefore the
Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxxvi): "In the
matter of sin, it is my wish to exclude absolutely all questions
concerning the holy Virgin Mary, on account of the honor due to Christ.
For since she conceived and brought forth Him who most certainly was
guilty of no sin, we know that an abundance of grace was given her that
she might be in every way the conqueror of sin."
I answer that, God so prepares and endows those, whom He chooses for
some particular office, that they are rendered capable of fulfilling
it, according to 2 Cor. 3:6: "(Who) hath made us fit ministers of the
New Testament." Now the Blessed Virgin was chosen by God to be His
Mother. Therefore there can be no doubt that God, by His grace, made
her worthy of that office, according to the words spoken to her by the
angel (Lk. 1:30,31): "Thou hast found grace with God: behold thou shalt
conceive," etc. But she would not have been worthy to be the Mother of
God, if she had ever sinned. First, because the honor of the parents
reflects on the child, according to Prov. 17:6: "The glory of children
are their fathers": and consequently, on the other hand, the Mother's
shame would have reflected on her Son. Secondly, because of the
singular affinity between her and Christ, who took flesh from her: and
it is written ( 2 Cor. 6:15): "What concord hath Christ with Belial?"
Thirdly, because of the singular manner in which the Son of God, who is
the "Divine Wisdom" (1 Cor. 1:24) dwelt in her, not only in her soul
but in her womb. And it is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter
into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins."
We must therefore confess simply that the Blessed Virgin committed no
actual sin, neither mortal nor venial; so that what is written (Cant
4:7) is fulfilled: "Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a
spot in thee," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: After her sanctification the fomes remained in
the Blessed Virgin, but fettered; lest she should be surprised by some
sudden inordinate act, antecedent to the act of reason. And although
the grace of her sanctification contributed to this effect, yet it did
not suffice; for otherwise the result of her sanctification would have
been to render impossible in her any sensual movement not preceded by
an act of reason, and thus she would. not have had the fomes, which is
contrary to what we have said above [4130](A[3]). We must therefore say
that the above mentioned fettering (of the fomes) was perfected by
divine providence not permitting any inordinate motion to result from
the fomes.
Reply to Objection 2: Origen (Hom. xvii in Luc.) and certain other
doctors expound these words of Simeon as referring to the sorrow which
she suffered at the time of our Lord's Passion. Ambrose (in Luc. 2:35)
says that the sword signifies "Mary's prudence which took note of the
heavenly mystery. For the word of God is living and effectual, and more
piercing than any two-edged sword" (Heb. 4:12).
Others again take the sword to signify doubt. But this is to be
understood of the doubt, not of unbelief, but of wonder and discussion.
Thus Basil says (Ep. ad Optim.) that "the Blessed Virgin while standing
by the cross, and observing every detail, after the message of Gabriel,
and the ineffable knowledge of the Divine Conception, after that
wondrous manifestation of miracles, was troubled in mind": that is to
say, on the one side seeing Him suffer such humiliation, and on the
other considering His marvelous works.
Reply to Objection 3: In those words Chrysostom goes too far. They may,
however, be explained as meaning that our Lord corrected in her, not
the inordinate motion of vain glory in regard to herself, but that
which might be in the thoughts of others.
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Whether, by her sanctification in the womb, the Blessed Virgin received the
fulness of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that, by her sanctification in the womb, the
Blessed Virgin did not receive the fulness or perfection of grace. For
this seems to be Christ's privilege, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw Him
[Vulg.: 'His glory'] as the Only-Begotten [Vulg.: 'as it were of the
Only-Begotten'] full of grace and truth." But what is proper to Christ
ought not to be ascribed to some one else. Therefore the Blessed Virgin
did not receive the fulness of grace at the time of her sanctification.
Objection 2: Further, nothing remains to be added to that which is full
and perfect: for "the perfect is that which lacks nothing," as is said
Phys. iii. But the Blessed Virgin received additional grace afterwards
when she conceived Christ; for to her was it said (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy
Ghost shall come upon thee: and again, when she was assumed into
glory." Therefore it seems that she did not receive the fulness of
grace at the time of her first sanctification.
Objection 3: Further, "God does nothing useless," as is said De Coelo
et Mundo i. But it would have been useless for her to have certain
graces, for she would never have put them to use: since we do not read
that she taught which is the act of wisdom; or that she worked
miracles, which is the act of one of the gratuitous graces. Therefore
she had not the fulness of grace.
On the contrary, The angel said to her: "Hail, full of grace" (Lk.
1:28); which words Jerome expounds as follows, in a sermon on the
Assumption (cf. Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch.): "Full indeed of grace: for
to others it is given in portions; whereas on Mary the fulness of grace
was showered all at once."
I answer that, In every genus, the nearer a thing is to the principle,
the greater the part which it has in the effect of that principle,
whence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that angels, being nearer to
God, have a greater share than men, in the effects of the Divine
goodness. Now Christ is the principle of grace, authoritatively as to
His Godhead, instrumentally as to His humanity: whence (Jn. 1:17) it is
written: "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." But the Blessed Virgin
Mary was nearest to Christ in His humanity: because He received His
human nature from her. Therefore it was due to her to receive a greater
fulness of grace than others.
Reply to Objection 1: God gives to each one according to the purpose
for which He has chosen him. And since Christ as man was predestinated
and chosen to be "predestinated the Son of God in power . . . of
sanctification" (Rom. 1:4), it was proper to Him to have such a fulness
of grace that it overflowed from Him into all, according to Jn. 1:16:
"Of His fulness we have all received." Whereas the Blessed Virgin Mary
received such a fulness of grace that she was nearest of all to the
Author of grace; so that she received within her Him Who is full of all
grace; and by bringing Him forth, she, in a manner, dispensed grace to
all.
Reply to Objection 2: In natural things at first there is perfection of
disposition, for instance when matter is perfectly disposed for the
form. Secondly, there is the perfection of the form; and this is the
more excellent, for the heat that proceeds from the form of fire is
more perfect than that which disposed to the form of fire. Thirdly,
there is the perfection of the end: for instance when fire has its
qualities in the most perfect degree, having mounted to its own place.
In like manner there was a threefold perfection of grace in the Blessed
Virgin. The first was a kind of disposition, by which she was made
worthy to be the mother of Christ: and this was the perfection of her
sanctification. The second perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin
was through the presence of the Son of God Incarnate in her womb. The
third perfection of the end is that which she has in glory.
That the second perfection excels the first, and the third the second,
appears (1) from the point of view of deliverance from evil. For at
first in her sanctification she was delivered from original sin:
afterwards, in the conception of the Son of God, she was entirely
cleansed from the fomes: lastly, in her glorification she was also
delivered from all affliction whatever. It appears (2) from the point
of view of ordering to good. For at first in her sanctification she
received grace inclining her to good: in the conception of the Son of
God she received consummate grace confirming her in good; and in her
glorification her grace was further consummated so as to perfect her in
the enjoyment of all good.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no doubt that the Blessed Virgin
received in a high degree both the gift of wisdom and the grace of
miracles and even of prophecy, just as Christ had them. But she did not
so receive them, as to put them and such like graces to every use, as
did Christ: but accordingly as it befitted her condition of life. For
she had the use of wisdom in contemplation, according to Lk. 2:19: "But
Mary kept all these words, pondering them in her heart." But she had
not the use of wisdom as to teaching: since this befitted not the
female sex, according to 1 Tim. 2:12: "But I suffer not a woman to
teach." The use of miracles did not become her while she lived: because
at that time the Teaching of Christ was to be confirmed by miracles,
and therefore it was befitting that Christ alone, and His disciples who
were the bearers of His doctrine, should work miracles. Hence of John
the Baptist it is written (Jn. 10:41) that he "did no sign"; that is,
in order that all might fix their attention on Christ. As to the use of
prophecy, it is clear that she had it, from the canticle spoken by her:
"My soul doth magnify the Lord" (Lk. 1:46, etc.).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether after Christ, it was proper to the Blessed Virgin to be sanctified
in the womb?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was proper for the Blessed Virgin,
after Christ, to be sanctified in the womb. For it has been said
[4131](A[4]) that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb, in
order that she might be worthy to be the mother of God. But this is
proper to her. Therefore she alone was sanctified in the womb.
Objection 2: Further, some men seem to have been more closely connected
with Christ than Jeremias and John the Baptist, who are said to have
been sanctified in the womb. For Christ is specially called the Son of
David and of Abraham, by reason of the promise specially made to them
concerning Christ. Isaias also prophesied of Christ in the most express
terms. And the apostles were in converse with Christ Himself. And yet
these are not mentioned as having been sanctified in the womb.
Therefore it was not befitting that either Jeremias or John the Baptist
should be sanctified in the womb.
Objection 3: Further, Job says of himself (Job 31:18): "From my infancy
mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from [my mother's]
womb." Nevertheless we do not for this reason say that he was
sanctified in the womb. Neither therefore are we bound to say that
Jeremias and John the Baptist were sanctified in the womb.
On the contrary, It is written of Jeremias (Jer. 1:5): "Before thou
camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee." And of John the
Baptist it is written (Lk. 1:15): "He shall be filled with the Holy
Ghost, even from his mother's womb."
I answer that, Augustine (Ep. ad Dardan.) seems to speak dubiously of
their (Jeremias' and John the Baptist's) sanctification in the womb.
For the leaping of John in the womb "might," as he says, "signify the
great truth," viz. that the woman was the mother of God, "which was to
be made known to his elders, though as yet unknown to the infant. Hence
in the Gospel it is written, not that the infant in her womb believed,
but that it 'leaped': and our eyes are witness that not only infants
leap but also cattle. But this was unwonted because it was in the womb.
And therefore, just as other miracles are wont to be done, this was
done divinely, in the infant; not humanly by the infant. Perhaps also
in this child the use of reason and will was so far accelerated that
while yet in his mother's womb he was able to acknowledge, believe, and
consent, whereas in other children we have to wait for these things
till they grow older: this again I count as a miraculous result of the
divine power."
But since it is expressly said (of John) in the Gospel that "he shall
be filled with the Holy Ghost, even from his mother's womb"; and of
Jeremias, "Before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified
thee"; it seems that we must needs assert that they were sanctified in
the womb, although, while in the womb, they had not the use of reason
(which is the point discussed by Augustine); just as neither do
children enjoy the use of free will as soon as they are sanctified by
baptism.
Nor are we to believe that any others, not mentioned by Scripture, were
sanctified in the womb. For such privileges of grace, which are
bestowed on some, outside the common law, are ordered for the salvation
of others, according to 1 Cor. 12:7: "The manifestation of the Spirit
is given to every man unto profit," which would not result from the
sanctification of anyone unless it were made known to the Church.
And although it is not possible to assign a reason for God's judgments,
for instance, why He bestows such a grace on one and not on another,
yet there seems to be a certain fittingness in both of these being
sanctified in the womb, by their foreshadowing the sanctification which
was to be effected through Christ. First, as to His Passion, according
to Heb. 13:12: "Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His own
blood, suffered without the gate": which Passion Jeremias foretold
openly by words and by symbols, and most clearly foreshadowed by his
own sufferings. Secondly, as to His Baptism (1 Cor. 6:11): "But you are
washed, but you are sanctified"; to which Baptism John prepared men by
his baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: The blessed Virgin, who was chosen by God to be
His Mother, received a fuller grace of sanctification than John the
Baptist and Jeremias, who were chosen to foreshadow in a special way
the sanctification effected by Christ. A sign of this is that it was
granted to the Blessed Virgin thence-forward never to sin either
mortally or venially: whereas to the others who were thus sanctified it
was granted thenceforward not to sin mortally, through the protection
of God's grace.
Reply to Objection 2: In other respects these saints might be more
closely united to Christ than Jeremias and John the Baptist. But the
latter were most closely united to Him by clearly foreshadowing His
sanctification, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The mercy of which Job speaks is not the infused
virtue; but a certain natural inclination to the act of that virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VIRGINITY OF THE MOTHER OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the virginity of the Mother of God; concerning
which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether she was a virgin in conceiving?
(2) Whether she was a virgin in His Birth?
(3) Whether she remained a virgin after His Birth?
(4) Whether she took a vow of virginity?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Mother of God was a virgin in conceiving Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God was not a virgin in
conceiving Christ. For no child having father and mother is conceived
by a virgin mother. But Christ is said to have had not only a mother,
but also a father, according to Lk. 2:33: "His father and mother were
wondering at those things which were spoken concerning Him": and
further on (Lk. 2:48) in the same chapter she says: "Behold I and Thy
father [Vulg.: 'Thy father and I'] have sought Thee sorrowing."
Therefore Christ was not conceived of a virgin mother.
Objection 2: Further (Mat. 1) it is proved that Christ was the Son of
Abraham and David, through Joseph being descended from David. But this
proof would have availed nothing if Joseph were not the father of
Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ's Mother conceived Him of the
seed of Joseph; and consequently that she was not a virgin in
conceiving Him.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Gal. 4:4): "God sent His Son, made
of a woman." But according to the customary mode of speaking, the term
"woman" applies to one who is known of a man. Therefore Christ was not
conceived by a virgin mother.
Objection 4: Further, things of the same species have the same mode of
generation: since generation is specified by its terminus just as are
other motions. But Christ belonged to the same species as other men,
according to Phil. 2:7: "Being made in the likeness of men, and in
habit found as a man." Since therefore other men are begotten of the
mingling of male and female, it seems that Christ was begotten in the
same manner; and that consequently He was not conceived of a virgin
mother.
Objection 5: Further, every natural form has its determinate matter,
outside which it cannot be. But the matter of human form appears to be
the semen of male and female. If therefore Christ's body was not
conceived of the semen of male and female, it would not have been truly
a human body; which cannot be asserted. It seems therefore that He was
not conceived of a virgin mother.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 7:14): "Behold a virgin shall
conceive."
I answer that, We must confess simply that the Mother of Christ was a
virgin in conceiving for to deny this belongs to the heresy of the
Ebionites and Cerinthus, who held Christ to be a mere man, and
maintained that He was born of both sexes.
It is fitting for four reasons that Christ should be born of a virgin.
First, in order to maintain the dignity or the Father Who sent Him. For
since Christ is the true and natural Son of God, it was not fitting
that He should have another father than God: lest the dignity belonging
to God be transferred to another.
Secondly, this was befitting to a property of the Son Himself, Who is
sent. For He is the Word of God: and the word is conceived without any
interior corruption: indeed, interior corruption is incompatible with
perfect conception of the word. Since therefore flesh was so assumed by
the Word of God, as to be the flesh of the Word of God, it was fitting
that it also should be conceived without corruption of the mother.
Thirdly, this was befitting to the dignity of Christ's humanity in
which there could be no sin, since by it the sin of the world was taken
away, according to Jn. 1:29: "Behold the Lamb of God" (i.e. the Lamb
without stain) "who taketh away the sin of the world." Now it was not
possible in a nature already corrupt, for flesh to be born from sexual
intercourse without incurring the infection of original sin. Whence
Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): "In that union," viz. the
marriage of Mary and Joseph, "the nuptial intercourse alone was
lacking: because in sinful flesh this could not be without fleshly
concupiscence which arises from sin, and without which He wished to be
conceived, Who was to be without sin."
Fourthly, on account of the very end of the Incarnation of Christ,
which was that men might be born again as sons of God, "not of the will
of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (Jn. 1:13), i.e. of
the power of God, of which fact the very conception of Christ was to
appear as an exemplar. Whence Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg.): "It
behooved that our Head, by a notable miracle, should be born, after the
flesh, of a virgin, that He might thereby signify that His members
would be born, after the Spirit, of a virgin Church."
Reply to Objection 1: As Bede says on Lk. 1:33: Joseph is called the
father of the Saviour, not that he really was His father, as the
Photinians pretended: but that he was considered by men to be so, for
the safeguarding of Mary's good name. Wherefore Luke adds (Lk. 3:23):
"Being, as it was supposed, the son of Joseph."
Or, according to Augustine (De Cons. Evang. ii), Joseph is called the
father of Christ just as "he is called the husband of Mary, without
fleshly mingling, by the mere bond of marriage: being thereby united to
Him much more closely than if he were adopted from another family.
Consequently that Christ was not begotten of Joseph by fleshly union is
no reason why Joseph should not be called His father; since he would be
the father even of an adopted son not born of his wife."
Reply to Objection 2: As Jerome says on Mat. 1:18: "Though Joseph was
not the father of our Lord and Saviour, the order of His genealogy is
traced down to Joseph"---first, because "the Scriptures are not wont to
trace the female line in genealogies": secondly, "Mary and Joseph were
of the same tribe"; wherefore by law he was bound to take her as being
of his kin. Likewise, as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i), "it was
befitting to trace the genealogy down to Joseph, lest in that marriage
any slight should be offered to the male sex, which is indeed the
stronger: for truth suffered nothing thereby, since both Joseph and
Mary were of the family of David."
Reply to Objection 3: As the gloss says on this passage, the word
"'mulier,' is here used instead of 'femina,' according to the custom of
the Hebrew tongue: which applies the term signifying woman to those of
the female sex who are virgins."
Reply to Objection 4: This argument is true of those things which come
into existence by the way of nature: since nature, just as it is fixed
to one particular effect, so it is determinate to one mode of producing
that effect. But as the supernatural power of God extends to the
infinite: just as it is not determinate to one effect, so neither is it
determinate to one mode of producing any effect whatever. Consequently,
just as it was possible for the first man to be produced, by the Divine
power, "from the slime of the earth," so too was it possible for
Christ's body to be made, by Divine power, from a virgin without the
seed of the male.
Reply to Objection 5: According to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal.
i, ii, iv), in conception the seed of the male is not by way of matter,
but by way of agent: and the female alone supplies the matter.
Wherefore though the seed of the male was lacking in Christ's
conception, it does not follow that due matter was lacking.
But if the seed of the male were the matter of the fetus in animal
conception, it is nevertheless manifest that it is not a matter
remaining under one form, but subject to transformation. And though the
natural power cannot transmute other than determinate matter to a
determinate form; nevertheless the Divine power, which is infinite, can
transmute all matter to any form whatsoever. Consequently, just as it
transmuted the slime of the earth into Adam's body, so could it
transmute the matter supplied by His Mother into Christ's body, even
though it were not the sufficient matter for a natural conception.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ's Mother was a virgin in His birth?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Mother was not a virgin in His
Birth. For Ambrose says on Lk. 2:23: "He who sanctified a strange womb,
for the birth of a prophet, He it is who opened His Mother's womb, that
He might go forth unspotted." But opening of the womb excludes
virginity. Therefore Christ's Mother was not a virgin in His Birth.
Objection 2: Further, nothing should have taken place in the mystery of
Christ, which would make His body to seem unreal. Now it seems to
pertain not to a true but to an unreal body, to be able to go through a
closed passage; since two bodies cannot be in one place at the same
time. It was therefore unfitting that Christ's body should come forth
from His Mother's closed womb: and consequently that she should remain
a virgin in giving birth to Him.
Objection 3: Further, as Gregory says in the Homily for the octave of
Easter [*xxvi in Evang.], that by entering after His Resurrection where
the disciples were gathered, the doors being shut, our Lord "showed
that His body was the same in nature but differed in glory": so that it
seems that to go through a closed passage pertains to a glorified body.
But Christ's body was not glorified in its conception, but was
passible, having "the likeness of sinful flesh," as the Apostle says
(Rom. 8:3). Therefore He did not come forth through the closed womb of
the Virgin.
On the contrary, In a sermon of the Council of Ephesus (P. III, Cap.
ix) it is said: "After giving birth, nature knows not a virgin: but
grace enhances her fruitfulness, and effects her motherhood, while in
no way does it injure her virginity." Therefore Christ's Mother was a
virgin also in giving birth to Him.
I answer that, Without any doubt whatever we must assert that the
Mother of Christ was a virgin even in His Birth: for the prophet says
not only: "Behold a virgin shall conceive," but adds: "and shall bear a
son." This indeed was befitting for three reasons. First, because this
was in keeping with a property of Him whose Birth is in question, for
He is the Word of God. For the word is not only conceived in the mind
without corruption, but also proceeds from the mind without corruption.
Wherefore in order to show that body to be the body of the very Word of
God, it was fitting that it should be born of a virgin incorrupt.
Whence in the sermon of the Council of Ephesus (quoted above) we read:
"Whosoever brings forth mere flesh, ceases to be a virgin. But since
she gave birth to the Word made flesh, God safeguarded her virginity so
as to manifest His Word, by which Word He thus manifested Himself: for
neither does our word, when brought forth, corrupt the mind; nor does
God, the substantial Word, deigning to be born, destroy virginity."
Secondly, this is fitting as regards the effect of Christ's
Incarnation: since He came for this purpose, that He might take away
our corruption. Wherefore it is unfitting that in His Birth He should
corrupt His Mother's virginity. Thus Augustine says in a sermon on the
Nativity of Our Lord: "It was not right that He who came to heal
corruption, should by His advent violate integrity."
Thirdly, it was fitting that He Who commanded us to honor our father
and mother should not in His Birth lessen the honor due to His Mother.
Reply to Objection 1: Ambrose says this in expounding the evangelist's
quotation from the Law: "Every male opening the womb shall be called
holy to the Lord." This, says Bede, "is said in regard to the wonted
manner of birth; not that we are to believe that our Lord in coming
forth violated the abode of her sacred womb, which His entrance therein
had hallowed." Wherefore the opening here spoken of does not imply the
unlocking of the enclosure of virginal purity; but the mere coming
forth of the infant from the maternal womb.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ wished so to show the reality of His body,
as to manifest His Godhead at the same time. For this reason He mingled
wondrous with lowly things. Wherefore, to show that His body was real,
He was born of a woman. But in order to manifest His Godhead, He was
born of a virgin, for "such a Birth befits a God," as Ambrose says in
the Christmas hymn.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have held that Christ, in His Birth, assumed
the gift of "subtlety," when He came forth from the closed womb of a
virgin; and that He assumed the gift of "agility" when with dry feet He
walked on the sea. But this is not consistent with what has been
decided above (Q[14]). For these gifts of a glorified body result from
an overflow of the soul's glory on to the body, as we shall explain
further on, in treating of glorified bodies ([4132]XP, Q[82]): and it
has been said above (Q[13], A[3], ad 1; Q[16], A[1], ad 2) that before
His Passion Christ "allowed His flesh to do and to suffer what was
proper to it" (Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii): nor was there such an
overflow of glory from His soul on to His body.
We must therefore say that all these things took place miraculously by
Divine power. Whence Augustine says (Sup. Joan. Tract. 121): "To the
substance of a body in which was the Godhead closed doors were no
obstacle. For truly He had power to enter in by doors not open, in
Whose Birth His Mother's virginity remained inviolate." And Dionysius
says in an epistle (Ad Caium iv) that "Christ excelled man in doing
that which is proper to man: this is shown in His supernatural
conception, of a virgin, and in the unstable waters bearing the weight
of earthly feet."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ's Mother remained a virgin after His birth?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Mother did not remain a virgin
after His Birth. For it is written (Mat. 1:18): "Before Joseph and Mary
came together, she was found with child of the Holy Ghost." Now the
Evangelist would not have said this---"before they came
together"---unless he were certain of their subsequent coming together;
for no one says of one who does not eventually dine "before he dines"
(cf. Jerome, Contra Helvid.). It seems, therefore, that the Blessed
Virgin subsequently had intercourse with Joseph; and consequently that
she did not remain a virgin after (Christ's) Birth.
Objection 2: Further, in the same passage (Mat. 1:20) are related the
words of the angel to Joseph: "Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy
wife." But marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse. Therefore it
seems that this must have at some time taken place between Mary and
Joseph: and that, consequently she did not remain a virgin after
(Christ's) Birth.
Objection 3: Further, again in the same passage a little further on
(Mat. 1:24,25) we read: "And" (Joseph) "took unto him his wife; and he
knew her not till she brought forth her first-born Son." Now this
conjunction "till" is wont to designate a fixed time, on the completion
of which that takes place which previously had not taken place. And the
verb "knew" refers here to knowledge by intercourse (cf. Jerome, Contra
Helvid.); just as (Gn. 4:1) it is said that "Adam knew his wife."
Therefore it seems that after (Christ's) Birth, the Blessed Virgin was
known by Joseph; and, consequently, that she did not remain a virgin
after the Birth (of Christ).
Objection 4: Further, "first-born" can only be said of one who has
brothers afterwards: wherefore (Rom. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also
predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He
might be the first-born among many brethren." But the evangelist calls
Christ the first-born by His Mother. Therefore she had other children
after Christ. And therefore it seems that Christ's Mother did not
remain a virgin after His Birth.
Objection 5: Further, it is written (Jn. 2:12): "After this He went
down to Capharnaum, He"---that is, Christ---"and His Mother and His
brethren." But brethren are those who are begotten of the same parent.
Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin had other sons after Christ.
Objection 6: Further, it is written (Mat. 27:55,56): "There were
there"---that is, by the cross of Christ---"many women afar off, who
had followed Jesus from Galilee, ministering unto Him; among whom was
Mary Magdalen, and Mary the mother of James and Joseph, and the mother
of the sons of Zebedee." Now this Mary who is called "the mother of
James and Joseph" seems to have been also the Mother of Christ; for it
is written (Jn. 19:25) that "there stood by the cross of Jesus, Mary
His Mother." Therefore it seems that Christ's Mother did not remain a
virgin after His Birth.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 44:2): "This gate shall be shut,
it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it; because the
Lord the God of Israel hath entered in by it." Expounding these words,
Augustine says in a sermon (De Annunt. Dom. iii): "What means this
closed gate in the House of the Lord, except that Mary is to be ever
inviolate? What does it mean that 'no man shall pass through it,' save
that Joseph shall not know her? And what is this---'The Lord alone
enters in and goeth out by it'---except that the Holy Ghost shall
impregnate her, and that the Lord of angels shall be born of her? And
what means this---'it shall be shut for evermore'---but that Mary is a
virgin before His Birth, a virgin in His Birth, and a virgin after His
Birth?"
I answer that, Without any hesitation we must abhor the error of
Helvidius, who dared to assert that Christ's Mother, after His Birth,
was carnally known by Joseph, and bore other children. For, in the
first place, this is derogatory to Christ's perfection: for as He is in
His Godhead the Only-Begotten of the Father, being thus His Son in
every respect perfect, so it was becoming that He should be the
Only-begotten son of His Mother, as being her perfect offspring.
Secondly, this error is an insult to the Holy Ghost, whose "shrine" was
the virginal womb [*"Sacrarium Spiritus Sancti" (Office of B. M. V.,
Ant. ad Benedictus, T. P.)], wherein He had formed the flesh of Christ:
wherefore it was unbecoming that it should be desecrated by intercourse
with man.
Thirdly, this is derogatory to the dignity and holiness of God's
Mother: for thus she would seem to be most ungrateful, were she not
content with such a Son; and were she, of her own accord, by carnal
intercourse to forfeit that virginity which had been miraculously
preserved in her.
Fourthly, it would be tantamount to an imputation of extreme
presumption in Joseph, to assume that he attempted to violate her whom
by the angel's revelation he knew to have conceived by the Holy Ghost.
We must therefore simply assert that the Mother of God, as she was a
virgin in conceiving Him and a virgin in giving Him birth, did she
remain a virgin ever afterwards.
Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says (Contra Helvid. i): "Although this
particle 'before' often indicates a subsequent event, yet we must
observe that it not infrequently points merely to some thing previously
in the mind: nor is there need that what was in the mind take place
eventually, since something may occur to prevent its happening. Thus if
a man say: 'Before I dined in the port, I set sail,' we do not
understand him to have dined in port after he set sail: but that his
mind was set on dining in port." In like manner the evangelist says:
"Before they came together" Mary "was found with child, of the Holy
Ghost," not that they came together afterwards: but that, when it
seemed that they would come together, this was forestalled through her
conceiving by the Holy Ghost, the result being that afterwards they did
not come together.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): "The
Mother of God is called (Joseph's) wife from the first promise of her
espousals, whom he had not known nor ever was to know by carnal
intercourse." For, as Ambrose says on Lk. 1:27: "The fact of her
marriage is declared, not to insinuate the loss of virginity, but to
witness to the reality of the union."
Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that this is not to be understood
of carnal knowledge, but of acquaintance. Thus Chrysostom says [*Opus
Imperf. in Matth., Hom. 1: among the spurious works ascribed to
Chrysostom] that "Joseph did not know her, until she gave birth, being
unaware of her dignity: but after she had given birth, then did he know
her. Because by reason of her child she surpassed the whole world in
beauty and dignity: since she alone in the narrow abode of her womb
received Him Whom the world cannot contain."
Others again refer this to knowledge by sight. For as, while Moses was
speaking with God, his face was so bright "that the children of Israel
could not steadfastly behold it"; so Mary, while being "overshadowed"
by the brightness of the "power of the Most High," could not be gazed
on by Joseph, until she gave birth. But afterwards she is acknowledged
by Joseph, by looking on her face, not by lustful contact.
Jerome, however, grants that this is to be understood of knowledge by
intercourse; but he observes that "before" or "until" has a twofold
sense in Scripture. For sometimes it indicates a fixed time, as Gal.
3:19: The law "was set because of transgressions, until the seed should
come, to whom He made the promise." On the other hand, it sometimes
indicates an indefinite time, as in Ps. 122:2: "Our eyes are unto the
Lord our God, until He have mercy on us"; from which it is not to be
gathered that our eyes are turned from God as soon as His mercy has
been obtained. In this sense those things are indicated "of which we
might doubt if they had not been written down: while others are left
out to be supplied by our understanding. Thus the evangelist says that
the Mother of God was not known by her husband until she gave birth,
that we may be given to understand that still less did he know her
afterwards" (Adversus Helvid. v).
Reply to Objection 4: The Scriptures are wont to designate as the
first-born, not only a child who is followed by others, but also the
one that is born first. "Otherwise, if a child were not first-born
unless followed by others, the first-fruits would not be due as long as
there was no further produce" [*Jerome, Adversus Helvid. x]: which is
clearly false, since according to the law the first-fruits had to be
redeemed within a month (Num. 18:16).
Reply to Objection 5: Some, as Jerome says on Mat. 12:49,50, "suppose
that the brethren of the Lord were Joseph's sons by another wife. But
we understand the brethren of the Lord to be not sons of Joseph, but
cousins of the Saviour, the sons of Mary, His Mother's sister." For
"Scripture speaks of brethren in four senses; namely, those who are
united by being of the same parents, of the same nation, of the same
family, by common affection." Wherefore the brethren of the Lord are so
called, not by birth, as being born of the same mother; but by
relationship, as being blood-relations of His. But Joseph, as Jerome
says (Contra Helvid. ix), is rather to be believed to have remained a
virgin, "since he is not said to have had another wife," and "a holy
man does not live otherwise than chastely."
Reply to Objection 6: Mary who is called "the mother of James and
Joseph" is not to be taken for the Mother of our Lord, who is not wont
to be named in the Gospels save under this designation of her
dignity---"the Mother of Jesus." This Mary is to be taken for the wife
of Alphaeus, whose son was James the less, known as the "brother of the
Lord" (Gal. 1:19).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Mother of God took a vow of virginity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God did not take a vow of
virginity. For it is written (Dt. 7:14): "No one shall be barren among
you of either sex." But sterility is a consequence of virginity.
Therefore the keeping of virginity was contrary to the commandment of
the Old Law. But before Christ was born the old law was still in force.
Therefore at that time the Blessed Virgin could not lawfully take a vow
of virginity.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:25): "Concerning
virgins I have no commandment of the Lord; but I give counsel." But the
perfection of the counsels was to take its beginning from Christ, who
is the "end of the Law," as the Apostle says (Rom. 10:4). It was not
therefore becoming that the Virgin should take a vow of virginity.
Objection 3: Further, the gloss of Jerome says on 1 Tim. 5:12, that
"for those who are vowed to virginity, it is reprehensible not only to
marry, but also to desire to be married." But the Mother of Christ
committed no sin for which she could be reprehended, as stated above
([4133]Q[27], A[4]). Since therefore she was "espoused," as related by
Lk. 1:27 it seems that she did not take a vow of virginity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg. iv): "Mary answered
the announcing angel: 'How shall this be done, because I know not man?'
She would not have said this unless she had already vowed her virginity
to God."
I answer that, As we have stated in the [4134]SS, Q[88], A[6], works of
perfection are more praiseworthy when performed in fulfilment of a vow.
Now it is clear that for reasons already given ([4135]AA[1],2,3)
virginity had a special place in the Mother of God. It was therefore
fitting that her virginity should be consecrated to God by vow.
Nevertheless because, while the Law was in force both men and women
were bound to attend to the duty of begetting, since the worship of God
was spread according to carnal origin, until Christ was born of that
people; the Mother of God is not believed to have taken an absolute vow
of virginity, before being espoused to Joseph, although she desired to
do so, yet yielding her own will to God's judgment. Afterwards,
however, having taken a husband, according as the custom of the time
required, together with him she took a vow of virginity.
Reply to Objection 1: Because it seemed to be forbidden by the law not
to take the necessary steps for leaving a posterity on earth, therefore
the Mother of God did not vow virginity absolutely, but under the
condition that it were pleasing to God. When, however, she knew that it
was acceptable to God, she made the vow absolute, before the angel's
Annunciation.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the fulness of grace was in Christ
perfectly, yet some beginning of the fulness preceded in His Mother; so
also the observance of the counsels, which is an effect of God's grace,
began its perfection in Christ, but was begun after a fashion in His
Virgin Mother.
Reply to Objection 3: These words of the Apostle are to be understood
of those who vow chastity absolutely. Christ's Mother did not do this
until she was espoused to Joseph. After her espousals, however, by
their common consent she took a vow of virginity together with her
spouse.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ESPOUSALS OF THE MOTHER OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)
We now consider the espousals of God's Mother: concerning which two
points arise for inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ should have been born of an espoused virgin?
(2) Whether there was true marriage between our Lord's Mother and
Joseph?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ should have been born of an espoused virgin?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been born of an
espoused virgin. For espousals are ordered to carnal intercourse. But
our Lord's Mother never wished to have carnal intercourse with her
husband; because this would be derogatory to the virginity of her mind.
Therefore she should not have been espoused.
Objection 2: Further, that Christ was born of a virgin was miraculous,
whence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volus. cxxxvii): "This same power of God
brought forth the infant's limbs out of the virginal womb of His
inviolate Mother, by which in the vigor of manhood He passed through
the closed doors. If we are told why this happened, it will cease to be
wonderful; if another instance be alleged, it will no longer be
unique." But miracles that are wrought in confirmation of the Faith
should be manifest. Since, therefore, by her Espousals this miracle
would be less evident, it seems that it was unfitting that Christ
should be born of an espoused virgin.
Objection 3: Further, the martyr Ignatius, as Jerome says on Mat. 1:18,
gives as a reason of the espousals of the Mother of God, "that the
manner of His Birth might be hidden from the devil, who would think Him
to be begotten not of a virgin but of a wife." But this seems to be no
reason at all. First, because by his natural cunning he knows whatever
takes place in bodies. Secondly, because later on the demons, through
many evident signs, knew Christ after a fashion: whence it is written
(Mk. 1:23,24): "A man with an unclean spirit . . . cried out, saying:
What have we to do with Thee, Jesus of Nazareth? Art Thou come to
destroy us? I know . . . Thou art the Holy one of God." Therefore it
does not seem fitting that the Mother of God should have been espoused.
Objection 4: Further, Jerome gives as another reason, "lest the Mother
of God should be stoned by the Jews as an adulteress." But this reason
seems to have no weight, for if she were not espoused, she could not be
condemned for adultery. Therefore it does not seem reasonable that
Christ should be born of an espoused virgin.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:18): "When as His Mother Mary
was espoused to Joseph": and (Lk. 1:26,27): "The angel Gabriel was sent
. . . to a virgin espoused to a man whose name was Joseph."
I answer that, It was fitting that Christ should be born of an espoused
virgin; first, for His own sake; secondly, for His Mother's sake;
thirdly, for our sake. For the sake of Christ Himself, for four
reasons. First, lest He should be rejected by unbelievers as
illegitimate: wherefore Ambrose says on Lk. 1:26,27: "How could we
blame Herod or the Jews if they seem to persecute one who was born of
adultery?"
Secondly, in order that in the customary way His genealogy might be
traced through the male line. Thus Ambrose says on Lk. 3:23: "He Who
came into the world, according to the custom of the world had to be
enrolled Now for this purpose, it is the men that are required, because
they represent the family in the senate and other courts. The custom of
the Scriptures, too, shows that the ancestry of the men is always
traced out."
Thirdly, for the safety of the new-born Child: lest the devil should
plot serious hurt against Him. Hence Ignatius says that she was
espoused "that the manner of His Birth might be hidden from the devil."
Fourthly, that He might be fostered by Joseph: who is therefore called
His "father," as bread-winner.
It was also fitting for the sake of the Virgin. First, because thus she
was rendered exempt from punishment; that is, "lest she should be
stoned by the Jews as an adulteress," as Jerome says.
Secondly, that thus she might be safeguarded from ill fame. Whence
Ambrose says on Lk. 1:26,27: "She was espoused lest she be wounded by
the ill-fame of violated virginity, in whom the pregnant womb would
betoken corruption."
Thirdly, that, as Jerome says, Joseph might administer to her wants.
This was fitting, again, for our sake. First, because Joseph is thus a
witness to Christ's being born of a virgin. Wherefore Ambrose says:
"Her husband is the more trustworthy witness of her purity, in that he
would deplore the dishonor, and avenge the disgrace, were it not that
he acknowledged the mystery."
Secondly, because thereby the very words of the Virgin are rendered
more credible by which she asserted her virginity. Thus Ambrose says:
"Belief in Mary's words is strengthened, the motive for a lie is
removed. If she had not been espoused when pregnant, she would seem to
have wished to hide her sin by a lie: being espoused, she had no motive
for lying, since a woman's pregnancy is the reward of marriage and
gives grace to the nuptial bond." These two reasons add strength to our
faith.
Thirdly, that all excuse be removed from those virgins who, through
want of caution, fall into dishonor. Hence Ambrose says: "It was not
becoming that virgins should expose themselves to evil report, and
cover themselves with the excuse that the Mother of the Lord had also
been oppressed by ill-fame."
Fourthly, because by this the universal Church is typified, which is a
virgin and yet is espoused to one Man, Christ, as Augustine says (De
Sanct. Virg. xii).
A fifth reason may be added: since the Mother of the Lord being both
espoused and a virgin, both virginity and wedlock are honored in her
person, in contradiction to those heretics who disparaged one or the
other.
Reply to Objection 1: We must believe that the Blessed Virgin, Mother
of God, desired, from an intimate inspiration of the Holy Ghost, to be
espoused, being confident that by the help of God she would never come
to have carnal intercourse: yet she left this to God's discretion.
Wherefore she suffered nothing in detriment to her virginity.
Reply to Objection 2: As Ambrose says on Lk. 1:26: "Our Lord preferred
that men should doubt of His origin rather than of His Mother's purity.
For he knew the delicacy of virgin modesty, and how easily the fair
name of chastity is disparaged: nor did He choose that our faith in His
Birth should be strengthened in detriment to His Mother." We must
observe, however, that some miracles wrought by God are the direct
object of faith; such are the miracles of the virginal Birth, the
Resurrection of our Lord, and the Sacrament of the Altar. Wherefore our
Lord wished these to be more hidden, that belief in them might have
greater merit. Whereas other miracles are for the strengthening of
faith: and these it behooves to be manifest.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Trin. iii), the devil can
do many things by his natural power which he is hindered by the Divine
power from doing. Thus it may be that by his natural power the devil
could know that the Mother of God knew not man, but was a virgin; yet
was prevented by God from knowing the manner of the Divine Birth. That
afterwards the devil after a fashion knew that He was the Son of God,
makes no difficulty: because then the time had already come for Christ
to make known His power against the devil, and to suffer persecution
aroused by him. But during His infancy it behooved the malice of the
devil to be withheld, lest he should persecute Him too severely: for
Christ did not wish to suffer such things then, nor to make His power
known, but to show Himself to be in all things like other infants.
Hence Pope Leo (Serm. in Epiph. iv) says that "the Magi found the Child
Jesus small in body, dependent on others, unable to speak, and in no
way differing from the generality of human infants." Ambrose, however,
expounding Lk. 1:26, seems to understand this of the devil's members.
For, after giving the above reason---namely, that the prince of the
world might be deceived---he continues thus: "Yet still more did He
deceive the princes of the world, since the evil disposition of the
demons easily discovers even hidden things: but those who spend their
lives in worldly vanities can have no acquaintance of Divine things."
Reply to Objection 4: The sentence of adulteresses according to the Law
was that they should be stoned, not only if they were already espoused
or married, but also if their maidenhood were still under the
protection of the paternal roof, until the day when they enter the
married state. Thus it is written (Dt. 22:20,21): "If . . . virginity
be not found in the damsel . . . the men of the city shall stone her to
death, and she shall die; because she hath done a wicked thing in
Israel, to play the whore in her father's house."
It may also be said, according to some writers, that the Blessed Virgin
was of the family or kindred of Aaron, so that she was related to
Elizabeth, as we are told (Lk. 1:36). Now a virgin of the priestly
tribe was condemned to death for whoredom; for we read (Lev. 21:9): "If
the daughter of a priest be taken in whoredom, and dishonor the name of
her father, she shall be burnt with fire."
Lastly, some understand the passage of Jerome to refer to the throwing
of stones by ill-fame.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there was a true marriage between Mary and Joseph?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no true marriage between Mary
and Joseph. For Jerome says against Helvidius that Joseph "was Mary's
guardian rather than her husband." But if this was a true marriage,
Joseph was truly her husband. Therefore there was no true marriage
between Mary and Joseph.
Objection 2: Further, on Mat. 1:16: "Jacob begot Joseph the husband of
Mary," Jerome says: "When thou readest 'husband' suspect not a
marriage; but remember that Scripture is wont to speak of those who are
betrothed as husband and wife." But a true marriage is not effected by
the betrothal, but by the wedding. Therefore, there was no true
marriage between the Blessed Virgin and Joseph.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 1:19): "Joseph, her husband,
being a just man, and not willing to take her away [*Douay: 'publicly
to expose her'], i.e. to take her to his home in order to cohabit with
her, was minded to put her away privately, i.e. to postpone the
wedding," as Remigius [*Cf. Catena Aurea in Matth.] expounds.
Therefore, it seems that, as the wedding was not yet solemnized, there
was no true marriage: especially since, after the marriage contract, no
one can lawfully put his wife away.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. ii): "It cannot be
allowed that the evangelist thought that Joseph ought to sever his
union with Mary" (since he said that Joseph was Mary's husband) "on the
ground that in giving birth to Christ, she had not conceived of him,
but remained a virgin. For by this example the faithful are taught that
if after marriage they remain continent by mutual consent, their union
is still and is rightly called marriage, even without intercourse of
the sexes."
I answer that, Marriage or wedlock is said to be true by reason of its
attaining its perfection. Now perfection of anything is twofold; first,
and second. The first perfection of a thing consists in its very form,
from which it receives its species; while the second perfection of a
thing consists in its operation, by which in some way a thing attains
its end. Now the form of matrimony consists in a certain inseparable
union of souls, by which husband and wife are pledged by a bond of
mutual affection that cannot be sundered. And the end of matrimony is
the begetting and upbringing of children: the first of which is
attained by conjugal intercourse; the second by the other duties of
husband and wife, by which they help one another in rearing their
offspring.
Thus we may say, as to the first perfection, that the marriage of the
Virgin Mother of God and Joseph was absolutely true: because both
consented to the nuptial bond, but not expressly to the bond of the
flesh, save on the condition that it was pleasing to God. For this
reason the angel calls Mary the wife of Joseph, saying to him (Mat.
1:20): "Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife": on which words
Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): "She is called his wife from the
first promise of her espousals, whom he had not known nor ever was to
know by carnal intercourse."
But as to the second perfection which is attained by the marriage act,
if this be referred to carnal intercourse, by which children are
begotten; thus this marriage was not consummated. Wherefore Ambrose
says on Lk. 1:26,27: "Be not surprised that Scripture calls Mary a
wife. The fact of her marriage is declared, not to insinuate the loss
of virginity, but to witness to the reality of the union."
Nevertheless, this marriage had the second perfection, as to upbringing
of the child. Thus Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): "All the
nuptial blessings are fulfilled in the marriage of Christ's parents,
offspring, faith and sacrament. The offspring we know to have been the
Lord Jesus; faith, for there was no adultery: sacrament, since there
was no divorce. Carnal intercourse alone there was none."
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome uses the term "husband" in reference to
marriage consummated.
Reply to Objection 2: By marriage Jerome means the nuptial intercourse.
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. i super Matth. [*Opus
Imperfectum among the supposititious works ascribed to St. Chrysostom])
the Blessed Virgin was so espoused to Joseph that she dwelt in his
home: "for just as she who conceives in her husband's house is
understood to have conceived of him, so she who conceives elsewhere is
suspect." Consequently sufficient precaution would not have been taken
to safeguard the fair fame of the Blessed Virgin, if she had not the
entry of her husband's house. Wherefore the words, "not willing to take
her away" are better rendered as meaning, "not willing publicly to
expose her," than understood of taking her to his house. Hence the
evangelist adds that "he was minded to put her away privately." But
although she had the entry of Joseph's house by reason of her first
promise of espousals, yet the time had not yet come for the solemnizing
of the wedding; for which reason they had not yet consummated the
marriage. Therefore, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.): "The
evangelist does not say, 'before she was taken to the house of her
husband,' because she was already in the house. For it was the custom
among the ancients for espoused maidens to enter frequently the houses
of them to whom they were betrothed." Therefore the angel also said to
Joseph: "Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife"; that is: "Fear not
to solemnize your marriage with her." Others, however, say that she was
not yet admitted to his house, but only betrothed to him. But the first
is more in keeping with the Gospel narrative.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the Blessed Virgin's Annunciation, concerning
which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was befitting that announcement should be made to her of
that which was to be begotten of her?
(2) By whom should this announcement be made?
(3) In what manner should this announcement be made?
(4) Of the order observed in the Annunciation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was necessary to announce to the Blessed Virgin that which was t
o
be done in her?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unnecessary to announce to the
Blessed Virgin that which was to be done in her. For there seems to
have been no need of the Annunciation except for the purpose of
receiving the Virgin's consent. But her consent seems to have been
unnecessary: because the Virginal Conception was foretold by a prophecy
of "predestination," which is "fulfilled without our consent," as a
gloss says on Mat. 1:22. There was no need, therefore, for this
Annunciation.
Objection 2: Further, the Blessed Virgin believed in the Incarnation,
for to disbelieve therein excludes man from the way of salvation;
because, as the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22): "The justice of God (is) by
faith of Jesus Christ." But one needs no further instruction concerning
what one believes without doubt. Therefore the Blessed Virgin had no
need for the Incarnation of her Son to be announced to her.
Objection 3: Further, just as the Blessed Virgin conceived Christ in
her body, so every pious soul conceives Him spiritually. Thus the
Apostle says (Gal. 4:19): "My little children, of whom I am in labor
again, until Christ be formed in you." But to those who conceive Him
spiritually no announcement is made of this conception. Therefore
neither should it have been announced to the Blessed Virgin that she
was to conceive the Son of God in her womb.
On the contrary, It is related (Lk. 1:31) that the angel said to her:
"Behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth a son."
I answer that, It was reasonable that it should be announced to the
Blessed Virgin that she was to conceive Christ. First, in order to
maintain a becoming order in the union of the Son of God with the
Virgin---namely, that she should be informed in mind concerning Him,
before conceiving Him in the flesh. Thus Augustine says (De Sancta
Virgin. iii): "Mary is more blessed in receiving the faith of Christ,
than in conceiving the flesh of Christ"; and further on he adds: "Her
nearness as a Mother would have been of no profit to Mary, had she not
borne Christ in her heart after a more blessed manner than in her
flesh."
Secondly, that she might be a more certain witness of this mystery,
being instructed therein by God.
Thirdly, that she might offer to God the free gift of her obedience:
which she proved herself right ready to do, saying: "Behold the
handmaid of the Lord."
Fourthly, in order to show that there is a certain spiritual wedlock
between the Son of God and human nature. Wherefore in the Annunciation
the Virgin's consent was besought in lieu of that of the entire human
nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The prophecy of predestination is fulfilled
without the causality of our will; not without its consent.
Reply to Objection 2: The Blessed Virgin did indeed believe explicitly
in the future Incarnation; but, being humble, she did not think such
high things of herself. Consequently she required instruction in this
matter.
Reply to Objection 3: The spiritual conception of Christ through faith
is preceded by the preaching of the faith, for as much as "faith is by
hearing" (Rom. 10:17). Yet man does not know for certain thereby that
he has grace; but he does know that the faith, which he has received,
is true.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the annunciation should have been made by an angel to the Blessed
Virgin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Annunciation should not have been
made by an angel to our Blessed Lady. For revelations to the highest
angels are made immediately by God, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
vii). But the Mother of God is exalted above all the angels. Therefore
it seems that the mystery of the Incarnation should have been announced
to her by God immediately, and not by an angel.
Objection 2: Further, if in this matter it behooved the common order to
be observed, by which Divine things are announced to men by angels; in
like manner Divine things are announced to a woman by a man: wherefore
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34,35): "Let women keep silence in the
churches . . . but if they would learn anything, let them ask their
husbands at home." Therefore it seems that the mystery of the
Incarnation should have been announced to the Blessed Virgin by some
man: especially seeing that Joseph, her husband, was instructed
thereupon by an angel, as is related (Mat. 1:20,21)
Objection 3: Further, none can becomingly announce what he knows not.
But the highest angels did not fully know the mystery of the
Incarnation: wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the
question, "Who is this that cometh from Edom?" (Is. 63:1) is to be
understood as made by them. Therefore it seems that the announcement of
the Incarnation could not be made becomingly by any angel.
Objection 4: Further, greater things should be announced by messengers
of greater dignity. But the mystery of the Incarnation is the greatest
of all things announced by angels to men. It seems, therefore, if it
behooved to be announced by an angel at all, that this should have been
done by an angel of the highest order. But Gabriel is not of the
highest order, but of the order of archangels, which is the last but
one: wherefore the Church sings: "We know that the archangel Gabriel
brought thee a message from God" [*Feast of Purification B.V.M. ix
Resp. Brev. O.P.]. Therefore this announcement was not becomingly made
by the archangel Gabriel.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:26): "The angel Gabriel was sent
by God," etc.
I answer that, It was fitting for the mystery of the Incarnation to be
announced to the Mother of God by an angel, for three reasons. First,
that in this also might be maintained the order established by God, by
which Divine things are brought to men by means of the angels.
Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that "the angels were the
first to be taught the Divine mystery of the loving kindness of Jesus:
afterwards the grace of knowledge was imparted to us through them.
Thus, then, the most god-like Gabriel made known to Zachary that a
prophet son would be born to him; and, to Mary, how the Divine mystery
of the ineffable conception of God would be realized in her."
Secondly, this was becoming to the restoration of human nature which
was to be effected by Christ. Wherefore Bede says in a homily (in
Annunt.): "It was an apt beginning of man's restoration that an angel
should be sent by God to the Virgin who was to be hallowed by the
Divine Birth: since the first cause of man's ruin was through the
serpent being sent by the devil to cajole the woman by the spirit of
pride."
Thirdly, because this was becoming to the virginity of the Mother of
God. Wherefore Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption [*Ascribed to
St. Jerome but not his work]: "It is well that an angel be sent to the
Virgin; because virginity is ever akin to the angelic nature. Surely to
live in the flesh and not according to the flesh is not an earthly but
a heavenly life."
Reply to Objection 1: The Mother of God was above the angels as regards
the dignity to which she was chosen by God. But as regards the present
state of life, she was beneath the angels. For even Christ Himself, by
reason of His passible life, "was made a little lower than the angels,"
according to Heb. 2:9. But because Christ was both wayfarer and
comprehensor, He did not need to be instructed by angels, as regards
knowledge of Divine things. The Mother of God, however, was not yet in
the state of comprehension: and therefore she had to be instructed by
angels concerning the Divine Conception.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Assumption
(De Assump. B.V.M. [*Work of another author: among the works of St.
Augustine]) a true estimation of the Blessed Virgin excludes her from
certain general rules. For "neither did she 'multiply her conceptions'
nor was she 'under man's, i.e. her husband's,' power (Gn. 3:16), who in
her spotless womb conceived Christ of the Holy Ghost." Therefore it was
fitting that she should be informed of the mystery of the Incarnation
by means not of a man, but of an angel. For this reason it was made
known to her before Joseph: since the message was brought to her before
she conceived, but to Joseph after she had conceived.
Reply to Objection 3: As may be gathered from the passage quoted from
Dionysius, the angels were acquainted with the mystery of the
Incarnation: and yet they put this question, being desirous that Christ
should give them more perfect knowledge of the details of this mystery,
which are incomprehensible to any created intellect. Thus Maximus
[*Maximus of Constantinople] says that "there can be no question that
the angels knew that the Incarnation was to take place. But it was not
given to them to trace the manner of our Lord's conception, nor how it
was that He remained whole in the Father, whole throughout the
universe, and was whole in the narrow abode of the Virgin."
Reply to Objection 4: Some say that Gabriel was of the highest order;
because Gregory says (Hom. de Centum Ovibus [*34 in Evang.]): "It was
right that one of the highest angels should come, since his message was
most sublime." But this does nat imply that he was of the highest order
of all, but in regard to the angels: since he was an archangel. Thus
the Church calls him an archangel, and Gregory himself in a homily (De
Centum Ovibus 34) says that "those are called archangels who announce
sublime things." It is therefore sufficiently credible that he was the
highest of the archangels. And, as Gregory says (De Centum Ovibus 34),
this name agrees with his office: for "Gabriel means 'Power of God.'
This message therefore was fittingly brought by the 'Power of God,'
because the Lord of hosts and mighty in battle was coming to overcome
the powers of the air."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angel of annunciation should have appeared to the Virgin in a
bodily vision?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel of the Annunciation should
not have appeared to the Virgin in a bodily vision. For "intellectual
vision is more excellent than bodily vision," as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. xii), and especially more becoming to an angel: since by
intellectual vision an angel is seen in his substance; whereas in a
bodily vision he is seen in the bodily shape which he assumes. Now
since it behooved a sublime messenger to come to announce the Divine
Conception, so, seemingly, he should have appeared in the most
excellent kind of vision. Therefore it seems that the angel of the
Annunciation appeared to the Virgin in an intellectual vision.
Objection 2: Further, imaginary vision also seems to excel bodily
vision: just as the imagination is a higher power than the senses. But
"the angel . . . appeared to Joseph in his sleep" (Mat. 1:20), which
was clearly an imaginary vision. Therefore it seems that he should have
appeared to the Blessed Virgin also in an imaginary vision.
Objection 3: Further, the bodily vision of a spiritual substance
stupefies the beholder; thus we sing of the Virgin herself: "And the
Virgin seeing the light was filled with fear" [*Feast of Annunciation,
B.V.M. ii Resp. Brev. O.P.]. But it was better that her mind should be
preserved from being thus troubled. Therefore it was not fitting that
this announcement should be made in a bodily vision.
On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon (De Annunt. iii) pictures the
Blessed Virgin as speaking thus: "To me came the archangel Gabriel with
glowing countenance, gleaming robe, and wondrous step." But these
cannot pertain to other than bodily vision. Therefore the angel of the
Annunciation appeared in a bodily vision to the Blessed Virgin.
I answer that, The angel of the Annunciation appeared in a bodily
vision to the Blessed Virgin. And this indeed was fitting, first in
regard to that which was announced. For the angel came to announce the
Incarnation of the invisible God. Wherefore it was becoming that, in
order to make this known, an invisible creature should assume a form in
which to appear visibly: forasmuch as all the apparitions of the Old
Testament are ordered to that apparition in which the Son of God
appeared in the flesh.
Secondly, it was fitting as regards the dignity of the Mother of God,
who was to receive the Son of God not only in her mind, but in her
bodily womb. Therefore it behooved not only her mind, but also her
bodily senses to be refreshed by the angelic vision.
Thirdly, it is in keeping with the certainty of that which was
announced. For we apprehend with greater certainty that which is before
our eyes, than what is in our imagination. Thus Chrysostom says (Hom.
iv in Matth.) that the angel "came to the Virgin not in her sleep, but
visibly. For since she was receiving from the angel a message exceeding
great, before such an event she needed a vision of great solemnity."
Reply to Objection 1: Intellectual vision excels merely imaginary and
merely bodily vision. But Augustine himself says (De Annunt. iii) that
prophecy is more excellent if accompanied by intellectual and imaginary
vision, than if accompanied by only one of them. Now the Blessed Virgin
perceived not only the bodily vision, but also the intellectual
illumination. Wherefore this was a more excellent vision. Yet it would
have been more excellent if she had perceived the angel himself in his
substance by her intellectual vision. But it was incompatible with her
state of wayfarer that she should see an angel in his essence.
Reply to Objection 2: The imagination is indeed a higher power than the
exterior sense: but because the senses are the principle of human
knowledge, the greatest certainty is in them, for the principles of
knowledge must needs always be most certain. Consequently Joseph, to
whom the angel appeared in his sleep, did not have so excellent a
vision as the Blessed Virgin.
Reply to Objection 3: As Ambrose says on Lk. 1:11: "We are disturbed,
and lose our presence of mind, when we are confronted by the presence
of a superior power." And this happens not only in bodily, but also in
imaginary vision. Wherefore it is written (Gn. 15:12) that "when the
sun was setting, a deep sleep fell upon Abram, and a great and darksome
horror seized upon him." But by being thus disturbed man is not harmed
to such an extent that therefore he ought to forego the vision of an
angel. First because from the very fact that man is raised above
himself, in which matter his dignity is concerned, his inferior powers
are weakened; and from this results the aforesaid disturbance: thus,
also, when the natural heat is drawn within a body, the exterior parts
tremble. Secondly, because, as Origen says (Hom. iv in Luc.): "The
angel who appeared, knowing hers was a human nature, first sought to
remedy the disturbance of mind to which a man is subject." Wherefore
both to Zachary and to Mary, as soon as they were disturbed, he said:
"Fear not." For this reason, as we read in the life of Anthony, "it is
difficult to discern good from evil spirits. For if joy succeed fear,
we should know that the help is from the Lord: because security of soul
is a sign of present majesty. But if the fear with which we are
stricken persevere, it is an enemy that we see."
Moreover it was becoming to virginal modesty that the Virgin should be
troubled. Because, as Ambrose says on Lk. 1:20: "It is the part of a
virgin to be timid, to fear the advances of men, and to shrink from
men's addresses."
But others says that as the Blessed Virgin was accustomed to angelic
visions, she was not troubled at seeing this angel, but with wonder at
hearing what the angel said to her, for she did not think so highly of
herself. Wherefore the evangelist does not say that she was troubled at
seeing the angel, but "at his saying."
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Whether the Annunciation took place in becoming order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Annunciation did not take place in
becoming order. For the dignity of the Mother of God results from the
child she conceived. But the cause should be made known before the
effect. Therefore the angel should have announced to the Virgin the
conception of her child before acknowledging her dignity in greeting
her.
Objection 2: Further, proof should be omitted in things which admit of
no doubt; and premised where doubt is possible. But the angel seems
first to have announced what the virgin might doubt, and which, because
of her doubt, would make her ask: "How shall this be done?" and
afterwards to have given the proof, alleging both the instance of
Elizabeth and the omnipotence of God. Therefore the Annunciation was
made by the angel in unbecoming order.
Objection 3: Further, the greater cannot be adequately proved by the
less. But it was a greater wonder for a virgin than for an old woman to
be with child. Therefore the angel's proof was insufficient to
demonstrate the conception of a virgin from that of an old woman.
On the contrary, it is written (Rom. 13:1): "Those that are of God, are
well ordered [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God']." Now the
angel was "sent by God" to announce unto the Virgin, as is related Lk.
1:26. Therefore the Annunciation was made by the angel in the most
perfect order.
I answer that, The Annunciation was made by the angel in a becoming
manner. For the angel had a threefold purpose in regard to the Virgin.
First, to draw her attention to the consideration of a matter of such
moment. This he did by greeting her by a new and unwonted salutation.
Wherefore Origen says, commenting on Luke (Hom. vi), that if "she had
known that similar words had been addressed to anyone else, she, who
had knowledge of the Law, would never have been astonished at the
seeming strangeness of the salutation." In which salutation he began by
asserting her worthiness of the conception, by saying, "Full of grace";
then he announced the conception in the words, "The Lord is with thee";
and then foretold the honor which would result to her therefrom, by
saying, "Blessed art thou among women."
Secondly, he purposed to instruct her about the mystery of the
Incarnation, which was to be fulfilled in her. This he did by
foretelling the conception and birth, saying: "Behold, thou shalt
conceive in thy womb," etc.; and by declaring the dignity of the child
conceived, saying: "He shall be great"; and further, by making known
the mode of conception, when he said: "The Holy Ghost shall come upon
thee."
Thirdly, he purposed to lead her mind to consent. This he did by the
instance of Elizabeth, and by the argument from Divine omnipotence.
Reply to Objection 1: To a humble mind nothing is more astonishing than
to hear its own excellence. Now, wonder is most effective in drawing
the mind's attention. Therefore the angel, desirous of drawing the
Virgin's attention to the hearing of so great a mystery, began by
praising her.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose says explicitly on Lk. 1:34, that the
Blessed Virgin did not doubt the angel's words. For he says: "Mary's
answer is more temperate than the words of the priest. She says: How
shall this be? He replies: Whereby shall I know this? He denies that he
believes, since he denies that he knows this. She does not doubt
fulfilment when she asks how it shall be done."
Augustine, however, seems to assert that she doubted. For he says (De
Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. li): "To Mary, in doubt about the
conception, the angel declares the possibility thereof." But such a
doubt is one of wonder rather than of unbelief. And so the angel
adduces a proof, not as a cure for unbelief, but in order to remove her
astonishment.
Reply to Objection 3: As Ambrose says (Hexaemeron v): "For this reason
had many barren women borne children, that the virginal birth might be
credible."
The conception of the sterile Elizabeth is therefore adduced, not as a
sufficient argument, but as a kind of figurative example.: consequently
in support of this instance, the convincing argument is added taken
from the Divine omnipotence.
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OF THE MATTER FROM WHICH THE SAVIOUR'S BODY WAS CONCEIVED (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the Saviour's conception. First, as to the
matter from which His body was conceived; secondly, as to the author of
His conception; thirdly, as to the manner and order of His conception.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the flesh of Christ was derived from Adam?
(2) Whether it was derived from David?
(3) Of the genealogy of Christ which is given in the Gospels;
(4) Whether it was fitting for Christ to be born of a woman?
(5) Whether His body was formed from the purest blood of the Virgin?
(6) Whether the flesh of Christ was in the patriarchs as to something
signate?
(7) Whether the flesh of Christ in the patriarchs was subject to sin?
(8) Whether Christ paid tithes in the loins of Abraham?
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Whether the flesh of Christ was derived from Adam?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's flesh was not derived from
Adam. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:47): "The first man was of the
earth, earthly: the second man, from heaven, heavenly." Now, the first
man is Adam: and the second man is Christ. Therefore Christ is not
derived from Adam, but has an origin distinct from him.
Objection 2: Further, the conception of Christ should have been most
miraculous. But it is a greater miracle to form man's body from the
slime of the earth, than from human matter derived from Adam. It seems
therefore unfitting that Christ should take flesh from Adam. Therefore
the body of Christ should not have been formed from the mass of the
human race derived from Adam, but of some other matter.
Objection 3: Further, by "one man sin entered into this world," i.e. by
Adam, because in him all nations sinned originally, as is clear from
Rom. 5:12. But if Christ's body was derived from Adam, He would have
been in Adam originally when he sinned: therefore he would have
contracted original sin; which is unbecoming in His purity. Therefore
the body of Christ was not formed of matter derived from Adam.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 2:16): "Nowhere doth He"---that
is, the Son of God---"take hold of the angels: but of the seed of
Abraham He taketh hold." But the seed of Abraham was derived from Adam.
Therefore Christ's body was formed of matter derived from Adam.
I answer that, Christ assumed human nature in order to cleanse it of
corruption. But human nature did not need to be cleansed save in as far
as it was soiled in its tainted origin whereby it was descended from
Adam. Therefore it was becoming that He should assume flesh of matter
derived from Adam, that the nature itself might be healed by the
assumption.
Reply to Objection 1: The second man, i.e. Christ, is said to be of
heaven, not indeed as to the matter from which His body was formed, but
either as to the virtue whereby it was formed; or even as to His very
Godhead. But as to matter, Christ's body was earthly, as Adam's body
was.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([4136]Q[29], A[1], ad 2) the
mystery of Christ's Incarnation is miraculous, not as ordained to
strengthen faith, but as an article of faith. And therefore in the
mystery of the Incarnation we do not seek that which is most
miraculous, as in those miracles that are wrought for the confirmation
of faith' but what is most becoming to Divine wisdom, and most
expedient to the salvation of man, since this is what we seek in all
matters of faith.
It may also be said that in the mystery of the Incarnation the miracle
is not only in reference to the matter of the conception, but rather in
respect of the manner of the conception and birth; inasmuch as a virgin
conceived and gave birth to God.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4137]Q[15], A[1], ad 2),
Christ's body was in Adam in respect of a bodily substance---that is to
say, that the corporeal matter of Christ's body was derived from Adam:
but it was not there by reason of seminal virtue, because it was not
conceived from the seed of man. Thus it did not contract original sin,
as others who are descended from Adam by man's seed.
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Whether Christ took flesh of the seed of David?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not take flesh of the seed
of David. For Matthew, in tracing the genealogy of Christ, brings it
down to Joseph. But Joseph was not Christ's father, as shown above
([4138]Q[28], A[1], ad 1,2). Therefore it seems that Christ was not
descended from David.
Objection 2: Further, Aaron was of the tribe of Levi, as related Ex. 6.
Now Mary the Mother of Christ is called the cousin of Elizabeth, who
was a daughter of Aaron, as is clear from Lk. 1:5,36. Therefore, since
David was of the tribe of Juda, as is shown Mat. 1, it seems that
Christ was not descended from David.
Objection 3: Further, it is written of Jechonias (Jer. 22:30): "Write
this man barren . . . for there shall not be a man of his seed that
shall sit upon the throne of David." Whereas of Christ it is written
(Is. 9:7): "He shall sit upon the throne of David." Therefore Christ
was not of the seed of Jechonias: nor, consequently, of the family of
David, since Matthew traces the genealogy from David through Jechonias.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:3): "Who was made to him of the
seed of David according to the flesh."
I answer that, Christ is said to have been the son especially of two of
the patriarchs, Abraham and David, as is clear from Mat. 1:1. There are
many reasons for this. First to these especially was the promise made
concerning Christ. For it was said to Abraham (Gn. 22:18): "In thy seed
shall all the nations of the earth be blessed": which words the Apostle
expounds of Christ (Gal. 3:16): "To Abraham were the promises made and
to his seed. He saith not, 'And to his seeds' as of many; but as of
one, 'And to thy seed,' which is Christ." And to David it was said (Ps.
131:11): "Of the fruit of thy womb I will set upon thy throne."
Wherefore the Jewish people, receiving Him with kingly honor, said
(Mat. 21:9): "Hosanna to the Son of David."
A second reason is because Christ was to be king, prophet, and priest.
Now Abraham was a priest; which is clear from the Lord saying unto him
(Gn. 15:9): "Take thee [Vulg.: 'Me'] a cow of three years old," etc. He
was also a prophet, according to Gn. 20:7: "He is a prophet; and he
shall pray for thee." Lastly David was both king and prophet.
A third reason is because circumcision had its beginning in Abraham:
while in David God's election was most clearly made manifest, according
to 1 Kings 13:14: "The Lord hath sought Him a man according to His own
heart." And consequently Christ is called in a most special way the Son
of both, in order to show that He came for the salvation both of the
circumcised and of the elect among the Gentiles.
Reply to Objection 1: Faustus the Manichean argued thus, in the desire
to prove that Christ is not the Son of David, because He was not
conceived of Joseph, in whom Matthew's genealogy terminates. Augustine
answered this argument thus (Contra Faust. xxii): "Since the same
evangelist affirms that Joseph was Mary's husband and that Christ's
mother was a virgin, and that Christ was of the seed of Abraham, what
must we believe, but that Mary was not a stranger to the family of
David: and that it is not without reason that she was called the wife
of Joseph, by reason of the close alliance of their hearts, although
not mingled in the flesh; and that the genealogy is traced down to
Joseph rather than to her by reason of the dignity of the husband? So
therefore we believe that Mary was also of the family of David: because
we believe the Scriptures, which assert both that Christ was of the
seed of David according to the flesh, and that Mary was His Mother, not
by sexual intercourse but retaining her virginity." For as Jerome says
on Mat. 1:18: "Joseph and Mary were of the same tribe: wherefore he was
bound by law to marry her as she was his kinswoman. Hence it was that
they were enrolled together at Bethlehem, as being descended from the
same stock."
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory of Nazianzum answers this objection by
saying that it happened by God's will, that the royal family was united
to the priestly race, so that Christ, who is both king and priest,
should be born of both according to the flesh. Wherefore Aaron, who was
the first priest according to the Law, married a wife of the tribe of
Juda, Elizabeth, daughter of Aminadab. It is therefore possible that
Elizabeth's father married a wife of the family of David, through whom
the Blessed Virgin Mary, who was of the family of David, would be a
cousin of Elizabeth. or conversely, and with greater likelihood, that
the Blessed Mary's father, who was of the family of David, married a
wife of the family of Aaron.
Again, it may be said with Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii) that if
Joachim, Mary's father, was of the family of Aaron (as the heretic
Faustus pretended to prove from certain apocryphal writings), then we
must believe that Joachim's mother, or else his wife, was of the family
of David, so long as we say that Mary was in some way descended from
David.
Reply to Objection 3: As Ambrose says on Lk. 3:25, this prophetical
passage does not deny that a posterity will be born of the seed of
Jechonias. And so Christ is of his seed. Neither is the fact that
Christ reigned contrary to prophecy, for He did not reign with worldly
honor; since He declared: "My kingdom is not of this world."
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Whether Christ's genealogy is suitably traced by the evangelists?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's genealogy is not suitably
traced by the Evangelists. For it is written (Is. 53:8): "Who shall
declare His generation?" Therefore Christ's genealogy should not have
been set down.
Objection 2: Further, one man cannot possibly have two fathers. But
Matthew says that "Jacob begot Joseph, the husband of Mary": whereas
Luke says that Joseph was the son of Heli. Therefore they contradict
one another.
Objection 3: Further, there seem to be divergencies between them on
several points. For Matthew, at the commencement of his book, beginning
from Abraham and coming down to Joseph, enumerates forty-two
generations. Whereas Luke sets down Christ's genealogy after His
Baptism, and beginning from Christ traces the series of generations
back to God, counting in all seventy-seven generations, the first and
last included. It seems therefore that their accounts of Christ's
genealogy do not agree.
Objection 4: Further, we read (4 Kings 8:24) that Joram begot Ochozias,
who was succeeded by his son Joas: who was succeeded by his son
Amasius: after whom reigned his son Azarias, called Ozias; who was
succeeded by his son Joathan. But Matthew says that Joram begot Ozias.
Therefore it seems that his account of Christ's genealogy is
unsuitable, since he omits three kings in the middle thereof.
Objection 5: Further, all those who are mentioned in Christ's genealogy
had both a father and a mother, and many of them had brothers also. Now
in Christ's genealogy Matthew mentions only three mothers---namely,
Thamar, Ruth, and the wife of Urias. He also mentions the brothers of
Judas and Jechonias, and also Phares and Zara. But Luke mentions none
of these. Therefore the evangelists seem to have described the
genealogy of Christ in an unsuitable manner.
On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices.
I answer that, As is written (2 Tim. 3:16), "All Holy Scripture is
inspired of God [Vulg.: 'All scripture inspired of God is profitable'],
etc. Now what is done by God is done in perfect order, according to
Rom. 13:1: "Those that are of God are ordained [Vulg.: 'Those that are,
are ordained of God']. Therefore Christ's genealogy is set down by the
evangelists in a suitable order.
Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says on Mat. 1, Isaias speaks of the
generation of Christ's Godhead. Whereas Matthew relates the generation
of Christ in His humanity; not indeed by explaining the manner of the
Incarnation, which is also unspeakable; but by enumerating Christ's
forefathers from whom He was descended according to the flesh.
Reply to Objection 2: Various answers have been made by certain writers
to this objection which was raised by Julian the Apostate; for some, as
Gregory of Nazianzum, say that the people mentioned by the two
evangelists are the same, but under different names, as though they
each had two. But this will not stand: because Matthew mentions one of
David's sons---namely, Solomon; whereas Luke mentions another---namely,
Nathan, who according to the history of the kings (2 Kings 5:14) were
clearly brothers.
Wherefore others said that Matthew gave the true genealogy of Christ:
while Luke gave the supposititious genealogy; hence he began: "Being
(as it was supposed) the son of Joseph." For among the Jews there were
some who believed that, on account of the crimes of the kings of Juda,
Christ would be born of the family of David, not through the kings, but
through some other line of private individuals.
Others again have supposed that Matthew gave the forefathers according
to the flesh: whereas Luke gave these according to the spirit, that is,
righteous men, who are called (Christ's) forefathers by likeness of
virtue.
But an answer is given in the Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. [*Part i, qu. lvi;
part 2, qu. vi] to the effect that we are not to understand that Joseph
is said by Luke to be the son of Heli: but that at the time of Christ,
Heli and Joseph were differently descended from David. Hence Christ is
said to have been supposed to be the son of Joseph, and also to have
been the son of Heli as though (the Evangelist) were to say that
Christ, from the fact that He was the son of Joseph, could be called
the son of Heli and of all those who were descended from David; as the
Apostle says (Rom. 9:5): "Of whom" (viz. the Jews) "is Christ according
to the flesh."
Augustine again gives three solutions (De Qq. Evang. ii), saying:
"There are three motives by one or other of which the evangelist was
guided. For either one evangelist mentions Joseph's father of whom he
was begotten; whilst the other gives either his maternal grandfather or
some other of his later forefathers; or one was Joseph's natural
father: the other is father by adoption. Or, according to the Jewish
custom, one of those having died without children, a near relation of
his married his wife, the son born of the latter union being reckoned
as the son of the former": which is a kind of legal adoption, as
Augustine himself says (De Consensu Evang. ii, Cf. Retract. ii).
This last motive is the truest: Jerome also gives it commenting on Mat.
1:16; and Eusebius of Caesarea in his Church history (I, vii), says
that it is given by Africanus the historian. For these writers says
that Mathan and Melchi, at different times, each begot a son of one and
the same wife, named Estha. For Mathan, who traced his descent through
Solomon, had married her first, and died, leaving one son, whose name
was Jacob: and after his death, as the law did not forbid his widow to
remarry, Melchi, who traced his descent through Mathan, being of the
same tribe though not of the same family as Mathan, married his widow,
who bore him a son, called Heli; so that Jacob and Heli were uterine
brothers born to different fathers. Now one of these, Jacob, on his
brother Heli dying without issue, married the latter's widow, according
to the prescription of the law, of whom he had a son, Joseph, who by
nature was his own son, but by law was accounted the son of Heli.
Wherefore Matthew says "Jacob begot Joseph": whereas Luke, who was
giving the legal genealogy, speaks of no one as begetting.
And although Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv) says that the Blessed Virgin
Mary was connected with Joseph in as far as Heli was accounted as his
father, for he says that she was descended from Melchi: yet must we
also believe that she was in some way descended from Solomon through
those patriarchs enumerated by Matthew, who is said to have set down
Christ's genealogy according to the flesh; and all the more since
Ambrose states that Christ was of the seed of Jechonias.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii)
"Matthew purposed to delineate the royal personality of Christ; Luke
the priestly personality: so that in Matthew's genealogy is signified
the assumption of our sins by our Lord Jesus Christ": inasmuch as by
his carnal origin "He assumed 'the likeness of sinful flesh.' But in
Luke's genealogy the washing away of our sins is signified," which is
effected by Christ's sacrifice. "For which reason Matthew traces the
generations downwards, Luke upwards." For the same reason too "Matthew
descends from David through Solomon, in whose mother David sinned;
whereas Luke ascends to David through Nathan, through whose namesake,
the prophet, God expiated his sin." And hence it is also that, because
"Matthew wished to signify that Christ had condescended to our mortal
nature, he set down the genealogy of Christ at the very outset of his
Gospel, beginning with Abraham and descending to Joseph and the birth
of Christ Himself. Luke, on the contrary, sets forth Christ's genealogy
not at the outset, but after Christ's Baptism, and not in the
descending but in the ascending order: as though giving prominence to
the office of the priest in expiating our sins, to which John bore
witness, saying: 'Behold Him who taketh away the sin of the world.' And
in the ascending order, he passes Abraham and continues up to God, to
whom we are reconciled by cleansing and expiating. With reason too he
follows the origin of adoption; because by adoption we become children
of God: whereas by carnal generation the Son of God became the Son of
Man. Moreover he shows sufficiently that he does not say that Joseph
was the son of Heli as though begotten by him, but because he was
adopted by him, since he says that Adam was the son of God, inasmuch as
he was created by God."
Again, the number forty pertains to the time of our present life:
because of the four parts of the world in which we pass this mortal
life under the rule of Christ. And forty is the product of four
multiplied by ten: while ten is the sum of the numbers from one to
four. The number ten may also refer to the decalogue; and the number
four to the present life; or again to the four Gospels, according to
which Christ reigns in us. And thus "Matthew, putting forward the royal
personality of Christ, enumerates forty persons not counting Him" (cf.
Augustine, De Consensu Evang. ii). But this is to be taken on the
supposition that it be the same Jechonias at the end of the second, and
at the commencement of the third series of fourteen, as Augustine
understands it. According to him this was done in order to signify
"that under Jechonias there was a certain defection to strange nations
during the Babylonian captivity; which also foreshadowed the fact that
Christ would pass from the Jews to the Gentiles."
On the other hand, Jerome (on Mat. 1:12-15) says that there were two
Joachims---that is, Jechonias, father and son: both of whom are
mentioned in Christ's genealogy, so as to make clear the distinction of
the generations, which the evangelist divides into three series of
fourteen; which amounts in all to forty-two persons. Which number may
also be applied to the Holy Church: for it is the product of six, which
signifies the labor of the present life, and seven, which signifies the
rest of the life to come: for six times seven are forty-two. The number
fourteen, which is the sum of ten and four, can also be given the same
signification as that given to the number forty, which is the product
of the same numbers by multiplication.
But the number used by Luke in Christ's genealogy signifies the
generality of sins. "For the number ten is shown in the ten precepts of
the Law to be the number of righteousness. Now, to sin is to go beyond
the restriction of the Law. And eleven is the number beyond ten." And
seven signifies universality: because "universal time is involved in
seven days." Now seven times eleven are seventy-seven: so that this
number signifies the generality of sins which are taken away by Christ.
Reply to Objection 4: As Jerome says onMat. 1:8, 11: "Because Joram
allied himself with the family of the most wicked Jezabel, therefore
his memory is omitted down to the third generation, lest it should be
inserted among the holy predecessors of the Nativity." Hence as
Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperf. in Matth. Hom. i, falsely ascribed to
Chrysostom] says: "Just as great was the blessing conferred on Jehu,
who wrought vengeance on the house of Achab and Jezabel, so also great
was the curse on the house of Joram, through the wicked daughter of
Achab and Jezabel, so that until the fourth generation his posterity is
cut off from the number of kings, according to Ex. 20:5: I shall visit
[Vulg.: 'Visiting'] the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto
the third and fourth generations."
It must also be observed that there were other kings who sinned and are
mentioned in Christ's genealogy: but their impiety was not continuous.
For, as it is stated in the book De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. lxxxv:
"Solomon through his father's merits is included in the series of
kings; and Roboam . . . through the merits of Asa," who was son of his
(Roboam's) son, Abiam. "But the impiety of those three [*i.e. Ochozias,
Joas, and Amasias, of whom St. Augustine asks in this question lxxxv,
why they were omitted by St. Matthew] was continuous."
Reply to Objection 5: As Jerome says on Mat. 1:3: "None of the holy
women are mentioned in the Saviour's genealogy, but only those whom
Scripture censures, so that He who came for the sake of sinners, by
being born of sinners, might blot out all sin." Thus Thamar is
mentioned, who is censured for her sin with her father-in-law; Rahab
who was a whore; Ruth who was a foreigner; and Bethsabee, the wife of
Urias, who was an adulteress. The last, however, is not mentioned by
name, but is designated through her husband; both on account of his
sin, for he was cognizant of the adultery and murder; and further in
order that, by mentioning the husband by name, David's sin might be
recalled. And because Luke purposes to delineate Christ as the expiator
of our sins, he makes no mention of these women. But he does mention
Juda's brethren, in order to show that they belong to God's people:
whereas Ismael, the brother of Isaac, and Esau, Jacob's brother, were
cut off from God's people, and for this reason are not mentioned in
Christ's genealogy. Another motive was to show the emptiness of pride
of birth: for many of Juda's brethren were born of hand-maidens, and
yet all were patriarchs and heads of tribes. Phares and Zara are
mentioned together, because, as Ambrose says on Lk. 3:23, "they are the
type of the twofold life of man: one, according to the Law," signified
by Zara; "the other by Faith," of which Phares is the type. The
brethren of Jechonias are included, because they all reigned at various
times: which was not the case with other kings: or, again, because they
were alike in wickedness and misfortune.
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Whether the matter of Christ's body should have been taken from a woman?
Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of Christ's body should not
have been taken from a woman. For the male sex is more noble than the
female. But it was most suitable that Christ should assume that which
is perfect in human nature. Therefore it seems that He should not have
taken flesh from a woman but rather from man: just as Eve was formed
from the rib of a man.
Objection 2: Further, whoever is conceived of a woman is shut up in her
womb. But it ill becomes God, Who fills heaven and earth, as is written
Jer. 23:24, to be shut up within the narrow limits of the womb.
Therefore it seems that He should not have been conceived of a woman.
Objection 3: Further, those who are conceived of a woman contract a
certain uncleanness: as it is written (Job 25:4): "Can man be justified
compared with God? Or he that is born of a woman appear clean?" But it
was unbecoming that any uncleanness should be in Christ: for He is the
Wisdom of God, of whom it is written (Wis. 7:25) that "no defiled thing
cometh into her." Therefore it does not seem right that He should have
taken flesh from a woman.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): "God sent His Son, made of a
woman."
I answer that, Although the Son of God could have taken flesh from
whatever matter He willed, it was nevertheless most becoming that He
should take flesh from a woman. First because in this way the entire
human nature was ennobled. Hence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 11):
"It was suitable that man's liberation should be made manifest in both
sexes. Consequently, since it behooved a man, being of the nobler sex,
to assume, it was becoming that the liberation of the female sex should
be manifested in that man being born of a woman."
Secondly, because thus the truth of the Incarnation is made evident.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): "Thou shalt find in Christ many
things both natural, and supernatural. In accordance with nature He was
within the womb," viz. of a woman's body: "but it was above nature that
a virgin should conceive and give birth: that thou mightest believe
that He was God, who was renewing nature; and that He was man who,
according to nature, was being born of a man." And Augustine says (Ep.
ad Volus. cxxxvii): "If Almighty God had created a man formed otherwise
than in a mother's womb, and had suddenly produced him to sight . . .
would He not have strengthened an erroneous opinion, and made it
impossible for us to believe that He had become a true man? And whilst
He is doing all things wondrously, would He have taken away that which
He accomplished in mercy? But now, He, the mediator between God and
man, has so shown Himself, that, uniting both natures in the unity of
one Person, He has given a dignity to ordinary by extraordinary things,
and tempered the extraordinary by the ordinary."
Thirdly, because in this fashion the begetting of man is accomplished
in every variety of manner. For the first man was made from the "slime
of the earth," without the concurrence of man or woman: Eve was made of
man but not of woman: and other men are made from both man and woman.
So that this fourth manner remained as it were proper to Christ, that
He should be made of a woman without the concurrence of a man.
Reply to Objection 1: The male sex is more noble than the female, and
for this reason He took human nature in the male sex. But lest the
female sex should be despised, it was fitting that He should take flesh
of a woman. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): "Men, despise
not yourselves: the Son of God became a man: despise not yourselves,
women; the Son of God was born of a woman."
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine thus (Contra Faust. xxiii) replies to
Faustus, who urged this objection; "By no means," says he, "does the
Catholic Faith, which believes that Christ the Son of God was born of a
virgin, according to the flesh, suppose that the same Son of God was so
shut up in His Mother's womb, as to cease to be elsewhere, as though He
no longer continued to govern heaven and earth, and as though He had
withdrawn Himself from the Father. But you, Manicheans, being of a mind
that admits of nought but material images, are utterly unable to grasp
these things." For, as he again says (Ep. ad Volus. cxxxvii), "it
belongs to the sense of man to form conceptions only through tangible
bodies, none of which can be entire everywhere, because they must of
necessity be diffused through their innumerable parts in various places
. . . Far otherwise is the nature of the soul from that of the body:
how much more the nature of God, the Creator of soul and body! . . . He
is able to be entire everywhere, and to be contained in no place. He is
able to come without moving from the place where He was; and to go
without leaving the spot whence He came."
Reply to Objection 3: There is no uncleanness in the conception of man
from a woman, as far as this is the work of God: wherefore it is
written (Acts 10:15): "That which God hath cleansed do not thou call
common," i.e. unclean. There is, however, a certain uncleanness
therein, resulting from sin, as far as lustful desire accompanies
conception by sexual union. But this was not the case with Christ, as
shown above ([4139]Q[28], A[1]). But if there were any uncleanness
therein, the Word of God would not have been sullied thereby, for He is
utterly unchangeable. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses
v): "God saith, the Creator of man: What is it that troubles thee in My
Birth? I was not conceived by lustful desire. I made Myself a mother of
whom to be born. If the sun's rays can dry up the filth in the drain,
and yet not be defiled: much more can the Splendor of eternal light
cleanse whatever It shines upon, but Itself cannot be sullied."
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Whether the flesh of Christ was conceived of the Virgin's purest blood?
Objection 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was not conceived
of the Virgin's purest blood: For it is said in the collect (Feast of
the Annunciation) that God "willed that His Word should take flesh from
a Virgin." But flesh differs from blood. Therefore Christ's body was
not taken from the Virgin's blood.
Objection 2: Further, as the woman was miraculously formed from the
man, so Christ's body was formed miraculously from the Virgin. But the
woman is not said to have been formed from the man's blood, but rather
from his flesh and bones, according to Gn. 2:23: "This now is bone of
my bones, and flesh of my flesh." It seems therefore that neither
should Christ's body have been formed from the Virgin's blood, but from
her flesh and bones.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's body was of the same species as other
men's bodies. But other men's bodies are not formed from the purest
blood but from the semen and the menstrual blood. Therefore it seems
that neither was Christ's body conceived of the purest blood of the
Virgin.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that "the Son of
God, from the Virgin's purest blood, formed Himself flesh, animated
with a rational soul."
I answer that, As stated above [4140](A[4]), in Christ's conception His
being born of a woman was in accordance with the laws of nature, but
that He was born of a virgin was above the laws of nature. Now, such is
the law of nature that in the generation of an animal the female
supplies the matter, while the male is the active principle of
generation; as the Philosopher proves (De Gener. Animal. i). But a
woman who conceives of a man is not a virgin. And consequently it
belongs to the supernatural mode of Christ's generation, that the
active principle of generation was the supernatural power of God: but
it belongs to the natural mode of His generation, that the matter from
which His body was conceived is similar to the matter which other women
supply for the conception of their offspring. Now, this matter,
according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal.), is the woman's blood,
not any of her blood, but brought to a more perfect stage of secretion
by the mother's generative power, so as to be apt for conception. And
therefore of such matter was Christ's body conceived.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the Blessed Virgin was of the same nature
as other women, it follows that she had flesh and bones of the same
nature as theirs. Now, flesh and bones in other women are actual parts
of the body, the integrity of which results therefrom: and consequently
they cannot be taken from the body without its being corrupted or
diminished. But as Christ came to heal what was corrupt, it was not
fitting that He should bring corruption or diminution to the integrity
of His Mother. Therefore it was becoming that Christ's body should be
formed not from the flesh or bones of the Virgin, but from her blood,
which as yet is not actually a part, but is potentially the whole, as
stated in De Gener. Animal. i. Hence He is said to have taken flesh
from the Virgin, not that the matter from which His body was formed was
actual flesh, but blood, which is flesh potentially.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the [4141]FP, Q[92], A[3], ad 2,
Adam, through being established as a kind of principle of human nature,
had in his body a certain proportion of flesh and bone, which belonged
to him, not as an integral part of his personality, but in regard to
his state as a principle of human nature. And from this was the woman
formed, without detriment to the man. But in the Virgin's body there
was nothing of this sort, from which Christ's body could be formed
without detriment to His Mother's body.
Reply to Objection 3: Woman's semen is not apt for generation, but is
something imperfect in the seminal order, which, on account of the
imperfection of the female power, it has not been possible to bring to
complete seminal perfection. Consequently this semen is not the
necessary matter of conception; as the Philosopher says (De Gener.
Animal. i): wherefore there was none such in Christ's conception: all
the more since, though it is imperfect in the seminal order, a certain
concupiscence accompanies its emission, as also that of the male semen:
whereas in that virginal conception there could be no concupiscence.
Wherefore Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ's body was not
conceived "seminally." But the menstrual blood, the flow of which is
subject to monthly periods, has a certain natural impurity of
corruption: like other superfluities, which nature does not heed, and
therefore expels. Of such menstrual blood infected with corruption and
repudiated by nature, the conception is not formed; but from a certain
secretion of the pure blood which by a process of elimination is
prepared for conception, being, as it were, more pure and more perfect
than the rest of the blood. Nevertheless, it is tainted with the
impurity of lust in the conception of other men: inasmuch as by sexual
intercourse this blood is drawn to a place apt for conception. This,
however, did not take place in Christ's conception: because this blood
was brought together in the Virgin's womb and fashioned into a child by
the operation of the Holy Ghost. Therefore is Christ's body said to be
"formed of the most chaste and purest blood of the Virgin."
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Whether Christ's body was in Adam and the other patriarchs, as to something
signate?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body was in Adam and the
patriarchs as to something signate. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x)
that the flesh of Christ was in Adam and Abraham "by way of a bodily
substance." But bodily substance is something signate. Therefore
Christ's flesh was in Adam, Abraham, and the other patriarchs,
according to something signate.
Objection 2: Further, it is said (Rom. 1:3) that Christ "was made . . .
of the seed of David according to the flesh." But the seed of David was
something signate in him. Therefore Christ was in David, according to
something signate, and for the same reason in the other patriarchs.
Objection 3: Further, the human race is Christ's kindred, inasmuch as
He took flesh therefrom. But if that flesh were not something signate
in Adam, the human race, which is descended from Adam, would seem to
have no kindred with Christ: but rather with those other things from
which the matter of His flesh was taken. Therefore it seems that
Christ's flesh was in Adam and the other patriarchs according to
something signate.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that in whatever way
Christ was in Adam and Abraham, other men were there also; but not
conversely. But other men were not in Adam and Abraham by way of some
signate matter, but only according to origin, as stated in the
[4142]FP, Q[119] , A[1], A[2], ad 4. Therefore neither was Christ in
Adam and Abraham according to something signate; and, for the same
reason, neither was He in the other patriarchs.
I answer that, As stated above (A[5], ad 1), the matter of Christ's
body was not the flesh and bones of the Blessed Virgin, nor anything
that was actually a part of her body, but her blood which was her flesh
potentially. Now, whatever was in the Blessed Virgin, as received from
her parents, was actually a part of her body. Consequently that which
the Blessed Virgin received from her parents was not the matter of
Christ's body. Therefore we must say that Christ's body was not in Adam
and the other patriarchs according to something signate, in the sense
that some part of Adam's or of anyone else's body could be singled out
and designated as the very matter from which Christ's body was to be
formed: but it was there according to origin, just as was the flesh of
other men. For Christ's body is related to Adam and the other
patriarchs through the medium of His Mother's body. Consequently
Christ's body was in the patriarchs, in no other way than was His
Mother's body, which was not in the patriarchs according to signate
matter: as neither were the bodies of other men, as stated in the
[4143]FP, Q[119], A[1], A[2], ad 4.
Reply to Objection 1: The expression "Christ was in Adam according to
bodily substance," does not mean that Christ's body was a bodily
substance in Adam: but that the bodily substance of Christ's body, i.e.
the matter which He took from the Virgin, was in Adam as in its active
principle, but not as in its material principle: in other words, by the
generative power of Adam and his descendants down to the Blessed
Virgin, this matter was prepared for Christ's conception. But this
matter was not fashioned into Christ's body by the seminal power
derived from Adam. Therefore Christ is said to have been in Adam by way
of origin, according to bodily substance: but not according to seminal
virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ's body was not in Adam and the
other patriarchs, according to seminal virtue, yet the Blessed Virgin's
body was thus in them, through her being conceived from the seed of a
man. For this reason, through the medium of the Blessed Virgin, Christ
is said to be of the seed of David, according to the flesh, by way of
origin.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ and the human race are kindred, through
the likeness of species. Now, specific likeness results not from remote
but from proximate matter, and from the active principle which begets
its like in species. Thus, then, the kinship of Christ and the human
race is sufficiently preserved by His body being formed from the
Virgin's blood, derived in its origin from Adam and the other
patriarchs. Nor is this kinship affected by the matter whence this
blood is taken, as neither is it in the generation of other men, as
stated in the [4144]FP, Q[119], A[2], ad 3.
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Whether Christ's flesh in the patriarchs was infected by sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's flesh was not infected by sin
in the patriarchs. For it is written (Wis. 7:25) that "no defiled thing
cometh into" Divine Wisdom. But Christ is the Wisdom of God according
to 1 Cor. 1:24. Therefore Christ's flesh was never defiled by sin.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ
"assumed the first-fruits of our nature." But in the primitive state
human flesh was not infected by sin. Therefore Christ's flesh was not
infected either in Adam or in the other patriarchs.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that "human
nature ever had, together with the wound, the balm with which to heal
it." But that which is infected cannot heal a wound; rather does it
need to be healed itself. Therefore in human nature there was ever
something preserved from infection, from which afterwards Christ's body
was formed.
On the contrary, Christ's body is not related to Adam and the other
patriarchs, save through the medium of the Blessed Virgin's body, of
whom He took flesh. But the body of the Blessed Virgin was wholly
conceived in original sin, as stated above ([4145]Q[14], A[3], ad 1),
and thus, as far as it was in the patriarchs, it was subject to sin.
Therefore the flesh of Christ, as far as it was in the patriarchs, was
subject to sin.
I answer that, When we say that Christ or His flesh was in Adam and the
other patriarchs, we compare Him, or His flesh, to Adam and the other
patriarchs. Now, it is manifest that the condition of the patriarchs
differed from that of Christ: for the patriarchs were subject to sin,
whereas Christ was absolutely free from sin. Consequently a twofold
error may occur on this point. First, by attributing to Christ, or to
His flesh, that condition which was in the patriarchs; by saying, for
instance, that Christ sinned in Adam, since after some fashion He was
in him. But this is false; because Christ was not in Adam in such a way
that Adam's sin belonged to Christ: forasmuch as He is not descended
from him according to the law of concupiscence, or according to seminal
virtue; as stated above (A[1], ad 3, A[6], ad 1;[4146] Q[15], A[1], ad
2).
Secondly, error may occur by attributing the condition of Christ or of
His flesh to that which was actually in the patriarchs: by saying, for
instance, that, because Christ's flesh, as existing in Christ, was not
subject to sin, therefore in Adam also and in the patriarchs there was
some part of his body that was not subject to sin, and from which
afterwards Christ's body was formed; as some indeed held. For this is
quite impossible. First, because Christ's flesh was not in Adam and in
the other patriarchs, according to something signate, distinguishable
from the rest of his flesh, as pure from impure; as already stated
(A[6] ). Secondly, because since human flesh is infected by sin,
through being conceived in lust, just as the entire flesh of a man is
conceived through lust, so also is it entirely defiled by sin.
Consequently we must say that the entire flesh of the patriarchs was
subjected to sin, nor was there anything in them that was free from
sin, and from which afterwards Christ's body could be formed.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ did not assume the flesh of the human race
subject to sin, but cleansed from all infection of sin. Thus it is that
"no defiled thing cometh into the Wisdom of God."
Reply to Objection 2: Christ is said to have assumed the first-fruits
of our nature, as to the likeness of condition; forasmuch as He assumed
flesh not infected by sin, like unto the flesh of man before sin. But
this is not to be understood to imply a continuation of that primitive
purity, as though the flesh of innocent man was preserved in its
freedom from sin until the formation of Christ's body.
Reply to Objection 3: Before Christ, there was actually in human nature
a wound, i.e. the infection of original sin. But the balm to heal the
wound was not there actually, but only by a certain virtue of origin,
forasmuch as from those patriarchs the flesh of Christ was to be
propagated.
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Whether Christ paid tithes in Abraham's loins?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ "paid tithes" in Abraham's
loins. For the Apostle says (Heb. 7:6-9) that Levi, the great-grandson
of Abraham, "paid tithes in Abraham," because, when the latter paid
tithes to Melchisedech, "he was yet in his loins." In like manner
Christ was in Abraham's loins when the latter paid tithes. Therefore
Christ Himself also paid tithes in Abraham.
Objection 2: Further, Christ is of the seed of Abraham according to the
flesh which He received from His Mother. But His Mother paid tithes in
Abraham. Therefore for a like reason did Christ.
Objection 3: Further, "in Abraham tithe was levied on that which needed
healing," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x). But all flesh subject to
sin needed healing. Since therefore Christ's flesh was the subject of
sin, as stated above [4147](A[7]), it seems that Christ's flesh paid
tithes in Abraham.
Objection 4: Further, this does not seem to be at all derogatory to
Christ's dignity. For the fact that the father of a bishop pays tithes
to a priest does not hinder his son, the bishop, from being of higher
rank than an ordinary priest. Consequently, although we may say that
Christ paid tithes when Abraham paid them to Melchisedech, it does not
follow that Christ was not greater than Melchisedech.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that "Christ did not
pay tithes there," i.e. in Abraham, "for His flesh derived from him,
not the heat of the wound, but the matter of the antidote."
I answer that, It behooves us to say that the sense of the passage
quoted from the Apostle is that Christ did not pay tithes in Abraham.
For the Apostle proves that the priesthood according to the order of
Melchisedech is greater than the Levitical priesthood, from the fact
that Abraham paid tithes to Melchisedech, while Levi, from whom the
legal priesthood was derived, was yet in his loins. Now, if Christ had
also paid tithes in Abraham, His priesthood would not have been
according to the order of Melchisedech, but of a lower order.
Consequently we must say that Christ did not pay tithes in Abraham's
loins, as Levi did.
For since he who pays a tithe keeps nine parts to himself, and
surrenders the tenth to another, inasmuch as the number ten is the sign
of perfection, as being, in a sort, the terminus of all numbers which
mount from one to ten, it follows that he who pays a tithe bears
witness to his own imperfection and to the perfection of another. Now,
to sin is due the imperfection of the human race, which needs to be
perfected by Him who cleanses from sin. But to heal from sin belongs to
Christ alone, for He is the "Lamb that taketh away the sin of the
world" (Jn. 1:29), whose figure was Melchisedech, as the Apostle proves
(Heb. 7). Therefore by giving tithes to Melchisedech, Abraham
foreshadowed that he, as being conceived in sin, and all who were to be
his descendants in contracting original sin, needed that healing which
is through Christ. And Isaac, Jacob, and Levi, and all the others were
in Abraham in such a way so as to be descended from him, not only as to
bodily substance, but also as to seminal virtue, by which original sin
is transmitted. Consequently, they all paid tithes in Abraham, i.e.
foreshadowed as needing to be healed by Christ. And Christ alone was in
Abraham in such a manner as to descend from him, not by seminal virtue,
but according to bodily substance. Therefore He was not in Abraham so
as to need to be healed, but rather "as the balm with which the wound
was to be healed." Therefore He did not pay tithes in Abraham's loins.
Thus the answer to the first objection is made manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: Because the Blessed Virgin was conceived in
original sin, she was in Abraham as needing to be healed. Therefore she
paid tithes in him, as descending from him according to seminal virtue.
But this is not true of Christ's body, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's flesh is said to have been subject to
sin, according as it was in the patriarchs, by reason of the condition
in which it was in His forefathers, who paid the tithes: but not by
reason of its condition as actually in Christ, who did not pay the
tithes.
Reply to Objection 4: The levitical priesthood was handed down through
carnal origin: wherefore it was not less in Abraham than in Levi.
Consequently, since Abraham paid tithes to Melchisedech as to one
greater than he, it follows that the priesthood of Melchisedech,
inasmuch as he was a figure of Christ, was greater than that of Levi.
But the priesthood of Christ does not result from carnal origin, but
from spiritual grace. Therefore it is possible that a father pay tithes
to a priest, as the less to the greater, and yet his son, if he be a
bishop, is greater than that priest, not through carnal origin, but
through the spiritual grace which he has received from Christ.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ACTIVE PRINCIPLE IN CHRIST'S CONCEPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We shall now consider the active principle in Christ's conception:
concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Holy Ghost was the active principle of Christ's
conception?
(2) Whether it can be said that Christ was conceived of the Holy Ghost?
(3) Whether it can be said that the Holy Ghost is Christ's father
according to the flesh?
(4) Whether the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in Christ's
conception?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the accomplishment of Christ's conception should be attributed to
the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that the accomplishment of Christ's
conception should not be attributed to the Holy Ghost, because. as
Augustine says (De Trin. i), "The works of the Trinity are indivisible,
just as the Essence of the Trinity is indivisible." But the
accomplishment of Christ's conception was the work of God. Therefore it
seems that it should not be attributed to the Holy Ghost any more than
to the Father or the Son.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Gal. 4:4): "When the fulness of
time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman"; which words
Augustine expounds by saying (De Trin. iv): "Sent, in so far as made of
a woman." But the sending of the Son is especially attributed to the
Father, as stated in the [4148]FP, Q[43], A[8]. Therefore His
conception also, by reason of which He was "made of a woman," should be
attributed principally to the Father.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 9:1): "Wisdom hath built
herself a house." Now, Christ is Himself the Wisdom of God; according
to 1 Cor. 1:24: "Christ the Power of God and the Wisdom of God." And
the house of this Wisdom is Christ's body, which is also called His
temple, according to Jn. 2:21: "But He spoke of the temple of His
body." Therefore it seems that the accomplishment of Christ's
conception should be attributed principally to the Son, and not,
therefore, to the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy Ghost shall come
upon Thee."
I answer that, The whole Trinity effected the conception of Christ's
body: nevertheless, this is attributed to the Holy Ghost, for three
reasons. First, because this is befitting to the cause of the
Incarnation, considered on the part of God. For the Holy Ghost is the
love of Father and Son, as stated in the [4149]FP, Q[37], A[1]. Now,
that the Son of God took to Himself flesh from the Virgin's womb was
due to the exceeding love of God: wherefore it is said (Jn. 3:16): "God
so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son."
Secondly, this is befitting to the cause of the Incarnation, on the
part of the nature assumed. Because we are thus given to understand
that human nature was assumed by the Son of God into the unity of
Person, not by reason of its merits, but through grace alone; which is
attributed to the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: "There are
diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." Wherefore Augustine says
(Enchiridion xl): "The manner in which Christ was born of the Holy
Ghost . . . suggests to us the grace of God, whereby man, without any
merits going before, in the very beginning of his nature when he began
to exist was joined to God the Word, into so great unity of Person,
that He Himself should be the Son of God."
Thirdly, because this is befitting the term of the Incarnation. For the
term of the Incarnation was that that man, who was being conceived,
should be the Holy one and the Son of God. Now, both of these are
attributed to the Holy Ghost. For by Him men are made to be sons of
God, according to Gal. 4:6: "Because you are sons, God hath sent the
Spirit of His Son into your [Vulg.: 'our'] hearts, crying: Abba,
Father." Again, He is the "Spirit of sanctification," according to Rom.
1:4. Therefore, just as other men are sanctified spiritually by the
Holy Ghost; so as to be the adopted sons of God, so was Christ
conceived in sanctity by the Holy Ghost, so as to be the natural Son of
God. Hence, according to a gloss on Rom. 1:4, the words, "Who was
predestinated the Son of God, in power," are explained by what
immediately follows: "According to the Spirit of sanctification, i.e.
through being conceived of the Holy Ghost." And the Angel of the
Annunciation himself, after saying, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon
thee," draws the conclusion: "Therefore also the Holy which shall be
born of thee shall be called the Son of God."
Reply to Objection 1: The work of the conception is indeed common to
the whole Trinity; yet in some way it is attributed to each of the
Persons. For to the Father is attributed authority in regard to the
Person of the Son, who by this conception took to Himself (human
nature). The taking itself (of human nature) is attributed to the Son:
but the formation of the body taken by the Son is attributed to the
Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son, according to
Gal. 4:6: "God sent the Spirit of His Son." For just as the power of
the soul which is in the semen, through the spirit enclosed therein,
fashions the body in the generation of other men, so the Power of God,
which is the Son Himself, according to 1 Cor. 1:24: "Christ, the Power
of God," through the Holy Ghost formed the body which He assumed. This
is also shown by the words of the angel: "The Holy Ghost shall come
upon thee," as it were, in order to prepare and fashion the matter of
Christ's body; "and the Power of the Most High," i.e. Christ, "shall
overshadow thee---that is to say, the incorporeal Light of the Godhead
shall in thee take the corporeal substance of human nature: for a
shadow is formed by light and body," as Gregory says (Moral. xviii).
The "Most High" is the Father, whose Power is the Son.
Reply to Objection 2: The mission refers to the Person assuming, who is
sent by the Father; but the conception refers to the body assumed,
which is formed by the operation of the Holy Ghost. And therefore,
though mission and conception are in the same subject; since they
differ in our consideration of them, mission is attributed to the
Father, but the accomplishment of the conception to the Holy Ghost;
whereas the assumption of flesh is attributed to the Son.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu.
52): "This may be understood in two ways. For, first, Christ's house is
the Church, which He built with His blood. Secondly, His body may be
called His house, just as it is called His temple . . . and what is
done by the Holy Ghost is done by the Son of God, because Theirs is one
Nature and one Will."
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Whether it should be said that Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that we should not say that Christ was
conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost. Because on Rom. 11:36: "For of Him
[ex ipso] and by Him, and in Him, are all things," the gloss of
Augustine says: "Notice that he does not say, 'of Him' [de ipso], but
'of Him' [ex ipso]. For of Him [ex ipso], are heaven and earth, since
He made them: but not of Him [de ipso], since they are not made of His
substance." But the Holy Ghost did not form Christ's body of [de] His
own substance. Therefore we should not say that Christ was conceived of
[de] the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, the active principle of [de] which something is
conceived is as the seed in generation. But the Holy Ghost did not take
the place of seed in Christ's conception. For Jerome says (Expos.
Cathol. Fidei) [*Written by Pelagius]: "We do not say, as some wicked
wretches hold, that the Holy Ghost took the place of seed: but we say
that Christ's body was wrought," i.e. formed, "by the power and might
of the Creator." Therefore we should not say that Christ's body was
conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, no one thing is made of two, except they be in
some way mingled. But Christ's body was formed of [de] the Virgin Mary.
If therefore we say that Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost,
it seems that a mingling took place of the Holy Ghost with the matter
supplied by the Virgin: and this is clearly false. Therefore we should
not say that Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:18): "Before they came together,
she was found with child, of [de] the Holy Ghost."
I answer that, Conception is not attributed to Christ's body alone, but
also to Christ Himself by reason of His body. Now, in the Holy Ghost we
may observe a twofold habitude to Christ. For to the Son of God
Himself, who is said to have been conceived, He has a habitude of
consubstantiality: while to His body He has the habitude of efficient
cause. And this preposition of [de] signifies both habitudes: thus we
say that a certain man is "of [de] his father." And therefore we can
fittingly say that Christ was conceived of the Holy Ghost in such a way
that the efficiency of the Holy Ghost be referred to the body assumed,
and the consubstantiality to the Person assuming.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body, through not being consubstantial
with the Holy Ghost, cannot properly be said to be conceived "of" [de]
the Holy Ghost, but rather "from [ex] the Holy Ghost," as Ambrose says
(De Spir. Sanct. ii.): "What is from someone is either from his
substance or from his power: from his substance, as the Son who is from
the Father; from his power, as all things are from God, just as Mary
conceived from the Holy Ghost."
Reply to Objection 2: It seems that on this point there is a difference
of opinion between Jerome and certain other Doctors, who assert that
the Holy Ghost took the place of seed in this conception. For
Chrysostom says (Hom. i in Matth. [*Opus Imperf., among the
supposititious writings]): "When God's Only-Begotten was about to enter
into the Virgin, the Holy Ghost preceded Him; that by the previous
entrance of the Holy Ghost, Christ might be born unto sanctification
according to His body, the Godhead entering instead of the seed." And
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "God's wisdom and power
overshadowed her, like unto a Divine seed."
But these expressions are easily explained. Because Chrysostom and
Damascene compare the Holy Ghost, or also the Son, who is the Power of
the Most High, to seed, by reason of the active power therein; while
Jerome denies that the Holy Ghost took the place of seed, considered as
a corporeal substance which is transformed in conception.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xl), Christ is
said to be conceived or born of the Holy Ghost in one sense; of the
Virgin Mary in another---of the Virgin Mary materially; of the Holy
Ghost efficiently. Therefore there was no mingling here.
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Whether the Holy Ghost should be called Christ's father in respect of His
humanity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost should be called
Christ's father in respect of His humanity. Because, according to the
Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i): "The Father is the active principle
in generation, the Mother supplies the matter." But the Blessed Virgin
is called Christ's Mother, by reason of the matter which she supplied
in His conception. Therefore it seems that the Holy Ghost can be called
His father, through being the active principle in His conception.
Objection 2: Further, as the minds of other holy men are fashioned by
the Holy Ghost, so also was Christ's body fashioned by the Holy Ghost.
But other holy men, on account of the aforesaid fashioning, are called
the children of the whole Trinity, and consequently of the Holy Ghost.
Therefore it seems that Christ should be called the Son of the Holy
Ghost, forasmuch as His body was fashioned by the Holy Ghost.
Objection 3: Further, God is called our Father by reason of His having
made us, according to Dt. 32:6: "Is not He thy Father, that hath
possessed thee, and made thee and created thee?" But the Holy Ghost
made Christ's body, as stated above ([4150]AA[1],2). Therefore the Holy
Ghost should be called Christ's Father in respect of the body fashioned
by Him.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "Christ was born of
the Holy Ghost not as a Son, and of the Virgin Mary as a Son."
I answer that, The words "fatherhood," "motherhood," and "sonship,"
result from generation; yet not from any generation, but from that of
living things, especially animals. For we do not say that fire
generated is the son of the fire generating it, except, perhaps,
metaphorically; we speak thus only of animals in whom generation is
more perfect. Nevertheless, the word "son" is not applied to everything
generated in animals, but only to that which is generated into likeness
of the generator. Wherefore, as Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxix), we
do not say that a hair which is generated in a man is his son; nor do
we say that a man who is born is the son of the seed; for neither is
the hair like the man nor is the man born like the seed, but like the
man who begot him. And if the likeness be perfect, the sonship is
perfect, whether in God or in man. But if the likeness be imperfect,
the sonship is imperfect. Thus in man there is a certain imperfect
likeness to God, both as regards his being created to God's image and
as regards His being created unto the likeness of grace. Therefore in
both ways man can be called His son, both because he is created to His
image and because he is likened to Him by grace. Now, it must be
observed that what is said in its perfect sense of a thing should not
be said thereof in its imperfect sense: thus, because Socrates is said
to be naturally a man, in the proper sense of "man," never is he called
man in the sense in which the portrait of a man is called a man,
although, perhaps, he may resemble another man. Now, Christ is the Son
of God in the perfect sense of sonship. Wherefore, although in His
human nature He was created and justified, He ought not to be called
the Son of God, either in respect of His being created or of His being
justified, but only in respect of His eternal generation, by reason of
which He is the Son of the Father alone. Therefore nowise should Christ
be called the Son of the Holy Ghost, nor even of the whole Trinity.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ was conceived of the Virgin Mary, who
supplied the matter of His conception unto likeness of species. For
this reason He is called her Son. But as man He was conceived of the
Holy Ghost as the active principle of His conception, but not unto
likeness of species, as a man is born of his father. Therefore Christ
is not called the Son of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: Men who are fashioned spiritually by the Holy
Ghost cannot be called sons of God in the perfect sense of sonship. And
therefore they are called sons of God in respect of imperfect sonship,
which is by reason of the likeness of grace, which flows from the whole
Trinity.
But with Christ it is different, as stated above.
The same reply avails for the Third Objection.
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Whether the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in the conception of Christ'
s
body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively
in the conception of Christ's body. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iii) that "the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin, purifying her, and
bestowing on her the power to receive and to bring forth the Word of
God." But she had from nature the passive power of generation, like any
other woman. Therefore He bestowed on her an active power of
generation. And thus she cooperated actively in Christ's conception.
Objection 2: Further, all the powers of the vegetative soul are active,
as the Commentator says (De Anima ii). But the generative power, in
both man and woman, belongs to the vegetative soul. Therefore, both in
man and woman, it cooperates actively in the conception of the child.
Objection 3: Further, in the conception of a child the woman supplies
the matter from which the child's body is naturally formed. But nature
is an intrinsic principle of movement. Therefore it seems that in the
very matter supplied by the Blessed Virgin there was an active
principle.
On the contrary, The active principle in generation is called the
"seminal virtue." But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x), Christ's
body "was taken from the Virgin, only as to corporeal matter, by the
Divine power of conception and formation, but not by any human seminal
virtue." Therefore the Blessed Virgin did not cooperate actively in,
the conception of Christ's body.
I answer that, Some say that the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in
Christ's conception, both by natural and by a supernatural power. By
natural power, because they hold that in all natural matter there is an
active principle. otherwise they believe that there would be no such
thing as natural transformation. But in this they are deceived. Because
a transformation is said to be natural by reason not only of an active
but also of a passive intrinsic principle: for the Philosopher says
expressly (Phys. viii) that in heavy and light things there is a
passive, and not an active, principle of natural movement. Nor is it
possible for matter to be active in its own formation, since it is not
in act. Nor, again, is it possible for anything to put itself in motion
except it be divided into two parts, one being the mover, the other
being moved: which happens in animate things only, as is proved Phys.
viii.
By a supernatural power, because they say that the mother requires not
only to supply the matter, which is the menstrual blood, but also the
semen, which, being mingled with that of the male, has an active power
in generation. And since in the Blessed Virgin there was no resolution
of semen, by reason of her inviolate virginity, they say that the Holy
Ghost supernaturally bestowed on her an active power in the conception
of Christ's body, which power other mothers have by reason of the semen
resolved. But this cannot stand, because, since "each thing is on
account of its operation" (De Coel. ii), nature would not, for the
purpose of the act of generation, distinguish the male and female
sexes, unless the action of the male were distinct from that of the
female. Now, in generation there are two distinct operations---that of
the agent and that of the patient. Wherefore it follows that the entire
active operation is on the part of the male, and the passive on the
part of the female. For this reason in plants, where both forces are
mingled, there is no distinction of male and female.
Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was not Christ's Father, but His
Mother, it follows that it was not given to her to exercise an active
power in His conception: whether to cooperate actively so as to be His
Father, or not to cooperate at all, as some say. whence it would follow
that this active power was bestowed on her to no purpose. We must
therefore say that in Christ's conception itself she did not cooperate
actively, but merely supplied the matter thereof. Nevertheless, before
the conception she cooperated actively in the preparation of the matter
so that it should be apt for the conception.
Reply to Objection 1: This conception had three privileges---namely,
that it was without original sin; that it was not that of a man only,
but of God and man; and that it was a virginal conception. And all
three were effected by the Holy Ghost. Therefore Damascene says, as to
the first, that the Holy Ghost "came upon the Virgin, purifying
her"---that is, preserving her from conceiving with original sin. As to
the second, he says: "And bestowing on her the power to receive," i.e.
to conceive, "the Word of God." As to the third, he says: "And to give
birth" to Him, i.e. that she might, while remaining a virgin, bring Him
forth, not actively, but passively, just as other mothers achieve this
through the action of the male seed.
Reply to Objection 2: The generative power of the female is imperfect
compared to that of the male. And, therefore, just as in the arts the
inferior art gives a disposition to the matter to which the higher art
gives the form, as is stated Phys. ii, so also the generative power of
the female prepares the matter, which is then fashioned by the active
power of the male.
Reply to Objection 3: In order for a transformation to be natural,
there is no need for an active principle in matter, but only for a
passive principle, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF CHRIST'S CONCEPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the mode and order of Christ's conception,
concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's body was formed in the first instant of its
conception?
(2) Whether it was animated in the first instant of its conception?
(3) Whether it was assumed by the Word in the first instant of its
conception?
(4) Whether this conception was natural or miraculous?
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Whether Christ's body was formed in the first instant of its conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body was not formed in the
first instant of its conception. For it is written (Jn. 2:20):
"Six-and-forty years was this Temple in building"; on which words
Augustine comments as follows (De Trin. iv): "This number applies
manifestly to the perfection of our Lord's body." He says, further (QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 56): "It is not without reason that the Temple, which was
a type of His body, is said to have been forty-six years in building:
so that as many years as it took to build the Temple, in so many days
was our Lord's body perfected." Therefore Christ's body was not
perfectly formed in the first instant of its conception.
Objection 2: Further, there was need of local movement for the
formation of Christ's body in order that the purest blood of the
Virgin's body might be brought where generation might aptly take place.
Now, no body can be moved locally in an instant: since the time taken
in movement is divided according to the division of the thing moved, as
is proved Phys. vi. Therefore Christ's body was not formed in an
instant.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's body was formed of the purest blood of
the Virgin, as stated above ([4151]Q[31], A[5]). But that matter could
not be in the same instant both blood and flesh, because thus matter
would have been at the same time the subject of two forms. Therefore
the last instant in which it was blood was distinct from the first
instant in which it was flesh. But between any two instants there is an
interval of time. Therefore Christ's body was not formed in an instant,
but during a space of time.
Objection 4: Further, as the augmentative power requires a fixed time
for its act, so also does the generative power: for both are natural
powers belonging to the vegetative soul. But Christ's body took a fixed
time to grow, like the bodies of other men: for it is written (Lk.
2:52) that He "advanced in wisdom and age." Therefore it seems for the
same reason that the formation of His body, since that, too, belongs to
the generative power, was not instantaneous, but took a fixed time,
like the bodies of other men.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii): "As soon as the angel
announced it, as soon as the Spirit came down, the Word was in the
womb, within the womb the Word was made flesh."
I answer that, In the conception of Christ's body three points may be
considered: first, the local movement of the blood to the place of
generation; secondly, the formation of the body from that matter;
thirdly, the development whereby it was brought to perfection of
quantity. of these, the second is the conception itself; the first is a
preamble; the third, a result of the conception.
Now, the first could not be instantaneous: since this would be contrary
to the very nature of the local movement of any body whatever, the
parts of which come into a place successively. The third also requires
a succession of time: both because there is no increase without local
movement, and because increase is effected by the power of the soul
already informing the body, the operation of which power is subject to
time.
But the body's very formation, in which conception principally
consists, was instantaneous, for two reasons. First, because of the
infinite power of the agent, viz. the Holy Ghost, by whom Christ's body
was formed, as stated above ([4152]Q[32], A[1]). For the greater the
power of an agent, the more quickly can it dispose matter; and,
consequently, an agent of infinite power can dispose matter
instantaneously to its due form. Secondly, on the part of the Person of
the Son, whose body was being formed. For it was unbecoming that He
should take to Himself a body as yet unformed. While, if the conception
had been going on for any time before the perfect formation of the
body, the whole conception could not be attributed to the Son of God,
since it is not attributed to Him except by reason of the assumption of
that body. Therefore in the first instant in which the various parts of
the matter were united together in the place of generation, Christ's
body was both perfectly formed and assumed. And thus is the Son of God
said to have been conceived; nor could it be said otherwise.
Reply to Objection 1: Neither quotation from Augustine refers to
formation alone of Christ's body, but to its formation, together with a
fixed development up to the time of His birth. Wherefore in the
aforesaid number are foreshadowed the number of months during which
Christ was in the Virgin's womb.
Reply to Objection 2: This local movement is not comprised within the
conception itself, but is a preamble thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not possible to fix the last instant in
which that matter was blood: but it is possible to fix the last period
of time which continued without any interval up to the first instant in
which Christ's body was formed. And this instant was the terminus of
the time occupied by the local movement of the matter towards the place
of generation.
Reply to Objection 4: Increase is caused by the augmentative power of
that which is the subject of increase: but the formation of the body is
caused by the generative power, not of that which is generated, but of
the father generating from seed, in which the formative power derived
from the father's soul has its operation. But Christ's body was not
formed by the seed of man, as stated above ([4153]Q[31], A[5], ad 3),
but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the formation thereof
should be such as to be worthy of the Holy Ghost. But the development
of Christ's body was the effect of the augmentative power in Christ's
soul: and since this was of the same species as ours, it behooved His
body to develop in the same way as the bodies of other men, so as to
prove the reality of His human nature.
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Whether Christ's body was animated in the first instant of its conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body was not animated in the
first instant of its conception. For Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian.):
"Christ's flesh was not of another nature than ours: nor was the
beginning of His animation different from that of other men." But the
soul is not infused into other men at the first instant of their
conception. Therefore neither should Christ's soul have been infused
into His body in the first instant of its conception.
Objection 2: Further, the soul, like any natural form, requires
determinate quantity in its matter. But in the first instant of its
conception Christ's body was not of the same quantity as the bodies of
other men when they are animated: otherwise, if afterwards its
development had been continuous, either its birth would have occurred
sooner, or at the time of birth He would have been a bigger child than
others. The former alternative is contrary to what Augustine says (De
Trin. iv), where he proves that Christ was in the Virgin's womb for the
space of nine months: while the latter is contrary to what Pope Leo
says (Serm. iv in Epiph.): "They found the child Jesus nowise differing
from the generality of infants." Therefore Christ's body was not
animated in the first instant of its conception.
Objection 3: Further, whenever there is "before" and "after" there must
be several instants. But according to the Philosopher (De Gener.
Animal. ii) in the generation of a man there must needs be "before" and
"after": for he is first of all a living thing, and afterwards, an
animal, and after that, a man. Therefore the animation of Christ could
not be effected in the first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "At the very
instant that there was flesh, it was the flesh of the Word of God, it
was flesh animated with a rational and intellectual soul."
I answer that, For the conception to be attributed to the very Son of
God, as we confess in the Creed, when we say, "who was conceived by the
Holy Ghost," we must needs say that the body itself, in being
conceived, was assumed by the Word of God. Now it has been shown above
([4154]Q[6], AA[1] ,2) that the Word of God assumed the body by means
of the soul, and the soul by means of the spirit, i.e. the intellect.
Wherefore in the first instant of its conception Christ's body must
needs have been animated by the rational soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The beginning of the infusion of the soul may be
considered in two ways. First, in regard to the disposition of the
body. And thus, the beginning of the infusion of the soul into Christ's
body was the same as in other men's bodies: for just as the soul is
infused into another man's body as soon as it is formed, so was it with
Christ. Secondly, this beginning may be considered merely in regard to
time. And thus, because Christ's body was perfectly formed in a shorter
space of time, so after a shorter space of time was it animated.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul requires due quantity in the matter into
which it is infused: but this quantity allows of a certain latitude
because it is not fixed to a certain amount. Now the quantity that a
body has when the soul is first infused into it is in proportion to the
perfect quantity to which it will attain by development: that is to
say, men of greater stature have greater bodies at the time of first
animation. But Christ at the perfect age was of becoming and middle
stature: in proportion to which was the quantity of His body at the
time when other men's bodies are animated; though it was less than
theirs at the first instant of His conception. Nevertheless that
quantity was not too small to safeguard the nature of an animated body;
since it would have sufficed for the animation of a small man's body.
Reply to Objection 3: What the Philosopher says is true in the
generation of other men, because the body is successively formed and
disposed for the soul: whence, first, as being imperfectly disposed, it
receives an imperfect soul; and afterwards, when it is perfectly
disposed, it receives a perfect soul. But Christ's body, on account of
the infinite power of the agent, was perfectly disposed
instantaneously. Wherefore, at once and in the first instant it
received a perfect form, that is, the rational soul.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ's flesh was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's flesh was first of all
conceived, and afterwards assumed. Because what is not cannot be
assumed. But Christ's flesh began to exist when it was conceived.
Therefore it seems that it was assumed by the Word of God after it was
conceived.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's flesh was assumed by the Word of God, by
means of the rational soul. But it received the rational soul at the
term of the conception. Therefore it was assumed at the term of the
conception. But at the term of the conception it was already conceived.
Therefore it was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed.
Objection 3: Further, in everything generated, that which is imperfect
precedes in time that which is perfect: which is made clear by the
Philosopher (Metaph. ix). But Christ's body is something generated.
Therefore it did not attain to its ultimate perfection, which consisted
in the union with the Word of God, at the first instant of its
conception; but, first of all, the flesh was conceived and afterwards
assumed.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii [*Written by
Fulgentius]): "Hold steadfastly, and doubt not for a moment that
Christ's flesh was not conceived in the Virgin's womb, before being
assumed by the Word."
I answer that, As stated above, we may say properly that "God was made
man," but not that "man was made God": because God took to Himself that
which belongs to man---and that which belongs to man did not pre-exist,
as subsisting in itself, before being assumed by the Word. But if
Christ's flesh had been conceived before being assumed by the Word, it
would have had at some time an hypostasis other than that of the Word
of God. And this is against the very nature of the Incarnation, which
we hold to consist in this, that the Word of God was united to human
nature and to all its parts in the unity of hypostasis: nor was it
becoming that the Word of God should, by assuming human nature, destroy
a pre-existing hypostasis of human nature or of any part thereof. It is
consequently contrary to faith to assert that Christ's flesh was first
of all conceived and afterwards assumed by the Word of God.
Reply to Objection 1: If Christ's flesh had been formed or conceived,
not instantaneously, but successively, one of two things would follow:
either that what was assumed was not yet flesh, or that the flesh was
conceived before it was assumed. But since we hold that the conception
was effected instantaneously, it follows that in that flesh the
beginning and the completion of its conception were in the same
instant. So that, as Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum xviii]
says: "We say that the very Word of God was conceived in taking flesh,
and that His very flesh was conceived by the Word taking flesh."
From the above the reply to the Second Objection is clear. For in the
same moment that this flesh began to be conceived, its conception and
animation were completed.
Reply to Objection 3: The mystery of the Incarnation is not to be
looked upon as an ascent, as it were, of a man already existing and
mounting up to the dignity of the Union: as the heretic Photinus
maintained. Rather is it to be considered as a descent, by reason of
the perfect Word of God taking unto Himself the imperfection of our
nature; according to Jn. 6:38: "I came down from heaven."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ's conception was natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's conception was natural. For
Christ is called the Son of Man by reason of His conception in the
flesh. But He is a true and natural Son of Man: as also is He the true
and natural Son of God. Therefore His conception was natural.
Objection 2: Further, no creature can be the cause of a miraculous
effect. But Christ's conception is attributed to the Blessed Virgin,
who is a mere creature: for we say that the Virgin conceived Christ.
Therefore it seems that His conception was not miraculous, but natural.
Objection 3: Further, for a transformation to be natural, it is enough
that the passive principle be natural, as stated above ([4155]Q[32],
A[4]). But in Christ's conception the passive principle on the part of
His Mother was natural, as we have shown ([4156]Q[32], A[4]). Therefore
Christ's conception was natural.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach.): "Christ does in
a superhuman way those things that pertain to man: this is shown in the
miraculous virginal conception."
I answer that, As Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): "In this mystery thou
shalt find many things that are natural, and many that are
supernatural." For if we consider in this conception anything connected
with the matter thereof, which was supplied by the mother, it was in
all such things natural. But if we consider it on the part of the
active power, thus it was entirely miraculous. And since judgment of a
thing should be pronounced in respect of its form rather than of its
matter: and likewise in respect of its activity rather than of its
passiveness: therefore is it that Christ's conception should be
described simply as miraculous and supernatural, although in a certain
respect it was natural.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said to be a natural Son of Man, by
reason of His having a true human nature, through which He is a Son of
Man, although He had it miraculously; thus, too, the blind man to whom
sight has been restored sees naturally by sight miraculously received.
Reply to Objection 2: The conception is attributed to the Blessed
Virgin, not as the active principle thereof, but because she supplied
the matter, and because the conception took place in her womb.
Reply to Objection 3: A natural passive principle suffices for a
transformation to be natural, when it is moved by its proper active
principle in a natural and wonted way. But this is not so in the case
in point. Therefore this conception cannot be called simply natural.
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OF THE PERFECTION OF THE CHILD CONCEIVED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the perfection of the child conceived: and
concerning this there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was sanctified by grace in the first instant of His
conception?
(2) Whether in that same instant He had the use of free-will?
(3) Whether in that same instant He could merit?
(4) Whether in that same instant He was a perfect comprehensor?
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Whether Christ was sanctified in the first instant of His conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not sanctified in the first
instant of His conception. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was
not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural: afterwards
that which is spiritual." But sanctification by grace is something
spiritual. Therefore Christ received the grace of sanctification, not
at the very beginning of His conception, but after a space of time.
Objection 2: Further, sanctification seems to be a cleansing from sin:
according to 1 Cor. 6:1: "And such some of you were," namely, sinners,
"but you are washed, but you are sanctified." But sin was never in
Christ. Therefore it was not becoming that He should be sanctified by
grace.
Objection 3: Further, as by the Word of God "all things were made," so
from the Word incarnate all men who are made holy receive holiness,
according to Heb. 2:11: "Both he that sanctifieth and they who are
sanctified are all of one." But "the Word of God, by whom all things
were made, was not Himself made"; as Augustine says (De Trin. i).
Therefore Christ, by whom all are made holy, was not Himself made holy.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy which shall be
born of thee shall be called the Son of God"; and (Jn. 10:36): "Whom
the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world."
I answer that, As stated above ([4157]Q[7], AA[9],10,12), the abundance
of grace sanctifying Christ's soul flows from the very union of the
Word, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the
Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." For it has been
shown above ([4158]Q[33], AA[2],3) that in the first instant of
conception, Christ's body was both animated and assumed by the Word of
God. Consequently, in the first instant of His conception, Christ had
the fulness of grace sanctifying His body and His soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The order set down by the Apostle in this passage
refers to those who by advancing attain to the spiritual state. But the
mystery of the Incarnation is considered as a condescension of the
fulness of the Godhead into human nature rather than as the promotion
of human nature, already existing, as it were, to the Godhead.
Therefore in the man Christ there was perfection of spiritual life from
the very beginning.
Reply to Objection 2: To be sanctified is to be made holy. Now
something is made not only from its contrary, but also from that which
is opposite to it, either by negation or by privation: thus white is
made either from black or from not-white. We indeed from being sinners
are made holy: so that our sanctification is a cleansing from sin.
Whereas Christ, as man, was made holy, because He was not always thus
sanctified by grace: yet He was not made holy from being a sinner,
because He never sinned; but He was made holy from not-holy as man, not
indeed by privation, as though He were at some time a man and not holy;
but by negation---that is, when He was not man He had not human
sanctity. Therefore at the same time He was made man and a holy man.
For this reason the angel said (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy which shall be
born of thee." Which words Gregory expounds as follows (Moral. xviii):
"In order to show the distinction between His holiness and ours, it is
declared that He shall be born holy. For we, though we are made holy,
yet are not born holy, because by the mere condition of a corruptible
nature we are tied . . . But He alone is truly born holy who . . . was
not conceived by the combining of carnal union."
Reply to Objection 3: The Father creates things through the Son, and
the whole Trinity sanctifies men through the Man Christ, but not in the
same way. For the Word of God has the same power and operation as God
the Father: hence the Father does not work through the Son as an
instrument, which is both mover and moved. Whereas the humanity of
Christ is as the instrument of the Godhead, as stated above
([4159]Q[7], A[1], ad 3;[4160] Q[8], A[1], ad 1). Therefore Christ's
humanity is both sanctified and sanctifier.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ as man had the use of free-will in the first instant of His
conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man had not the use of
free-will in the first instant of His conception. For a thing is,
before it acts or operates. Now the use of free-will is an operation.
Since, therefore, Christ's soul began to exist in the first instant of
His conception, as was made clear above ([4161]Q[33], A[2]), it seems
impossible that He should have the use of free-will in the first
instant of His conception.
Objection 2: Further, the use of free-will consists in choice. But
choice presupposes the deliberation of counsel: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iii) that choice is "the desire of what has been
previously the object of deliberation." Therefore it seems impossible
that Christ should have had the use of free-will in the first instant
of His conception.
Objection 3: Further, the free-will is "a faculty of the will and
reason," as stated in the [4162]FP, Q[83], A[2], OBJ[2]: consequently
the use of free-will is an act of the will and the reason or intellect.
But the act of the intellect presupposes an act of the senses; and this
cannot exist without proper disposition of the organs---a condition
which would seem impossible in the first instant of Christ's
conception. Therefore it seems that Christ could not have the use of
free-will at the first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Trinity (Gregory:
Regist. ix, Ep. 61): "As soon as the Word entered the womb, while
retaining the reality of His Nature, He was made flesh, and a perfect
man." But a perfect man has the use of free-will. Therefore Christ had
the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception.
I answer that, As stated above [4163](A[1]), spiritual perfection was
becoming to the human nature which Christ took, which perfection He
attained not by making progress, but by receiving it from the very
first. Now ultimate perfection does not consist in power or habit, but
in operation; wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, text. 5) that
operation is a "second act." We must, therefore, say that in the first
instant of His conception Christ had that operation of the soul which
can be had in an instant. And such is the operation of the will and
intellect, in which the use of free-will consists. For the operation of
the intellect and will is sudden and instantaneous, much more, indeed,
than corporeal vision; inasmuch as to understand, to will, and to feel,
are not movements that may be described as "acts of an imperfect
being," which attains perfection successively, but are "the acts of an
already perfect being," as is said, De Anima iii, text. 28. We must
therefore say that Christ had the use of free-will in the first instant
of His conception.
Reply to Objection 1: Existence precedes action by nature, but not in
time; but at the same time the agent has perfect existence, and begins
to act unless it is hindered. Thus fire, as soon as it is generated,
begins to give heat and light. The action of heating, however, is not
terminated in an instant, but continues for a time; whereas the action
of giving light is perfected in an instant. And such an operation is
the use of free-will, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: As soon as counsel or deliberation is ended,
there may be choice. But those who need the deliberation of counsel, as
soon as this comes to an end are certain of what ought to be chosen:
and consequently they choose at once. From this it is clear that the
deliberation of counsel does not of necessity precede choice save for
the purpose of inquiring into what is uncertain. But Christ, in the
first instant of His conception, had the fulness of sanctifying grace,
and in like manner the fulness of known truth; according to Jn. 1:14:
"Full of grace and truth." Wherefore, as being possessed of certainty
about all things, He could choose at once in an instant.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's intellect, in regard to His infused
knowledge, could understand without turning to phantasms, as stated
above ([4164]Q[11], A[2]). Consequently His intellect and will could
act without any action of the senses.
Nevertheless it was possible for Him, in the first instant of His
conception, to have an operation of the senses: especially as to the
sense of touch, which the infant can exercise in the womb even before
it has received the rational soul, as is said, De Gener. Animal. ii,
3,4. Wherefore, since Christ had the rational soul in the first instant
of His conception, through His body being already fashioned and endowed
with sensible organs, much more was it possible for Him to exercise the
sense of touch in that same instant.
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Whether Christ could merit in the first instant of His conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit in the first
instant of His conception. For the free-will bears the same relation to
merit as to demerit. But the devil could not sin in the first instant
of his creation, as was shown in the [4165]FP, Q[63], A[5]. Therefore
neither could Christ's soul merit in the first instant of its
creation---that is, in the first instant of Christ's conception.
Objection 2: Further, that which man has in the first instant of his
conception seems to be natural to him: for it is in this that his
natural generation is terminated. But we do not merit by what is
natural to us, as is clear from what has been said in the [4166]FS,
Q[109], A[5]; [4167]FS, Q[114], A[2]. Therefore it seems that the use
of free-will, which Christ as man had in the first instant of His
conception, was not meritorious.
Objection 3: Further, that which a man has once merited he makes, in a
way, his own: consequently it seems that he cannot merit the same thing
again: for no one merits what is already his. If, therefore, Christ
merited in the first instant of His conception, it follows that
afterwards He merited nothing. But this is evidently untrue. Therefore
Christ did not merit in the first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Paterius, Expos. Vet. et Nov. Test. super
Ex. 40] says: "Increase of merit was absolutely impossible to the soul
of Christ." But increase of merit would have been possible had He not
merited in the first instant of His conception. Therefore Christ
merited in the first instant of His conception.
I answer that, As stated above [4168](A[1]), Christ was sanctified by
grace in the first instant of His conception. Now, sanctification is
twofold: that of adults who are sanctified in consideration of their
own act; and that of infants who are sanctified in consideration of,
not their own act of faith, but that of their parents or of the Church.
The former sanctification is more perfect than the latter: just as act
is more perfect than habit; and "that which is by itself, than that
which is by another" [*Aristotle, Phys. viii]. Since, therefore, the
sanctification of Christ was most perfect, because He was so sanctified
that He might sanctify others; consequently He was sanctified by reason
of His own movement of the free-will towards God. Which movement,
indeed, of the free-will is meritorious. Consequently, Christ did merit
in the first instant of His conception.
Reply to Objection 1: Free-will does not bear the same relation to good
as to evil: for to good it is related of itself, and naturally; whereas
to evil it is related as to a defect, and beside nature. Now, as the
Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 18): "That which is beside nature
is subsequent to that which is according to nature; because that which
is beside nature is an exception to nature." Therefore the free-will of
a creature can be moved to good meritoriously in the first instant of
its creation, but not to evil sinfully; provided, however, its nature
be unimpaired.
Reply to Objection 2: That which man has at the first moment of his
creation, in the ordinary course of nature, is natural to him. but
nothing hinders a creature from receiving from God a gift of grace at
the very beginning of its creation. In this way did Christ's soul in
the first instant of its creation receive grace by which it could
merit. And for this reason is that grace, by way of a certain likeness,
said to be natural to this Man, as explained by Augustine (Enchiridion
xl).
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents the same thing belonging to
someone from several causes. And thus it is that Christ was able by
subsequent actions and sufferings to merit the glory of immortality,
which He also merited in the first instant of His conception: not,
indeed, so that it became thereby more due to Him than before, but so
that it was due to Him from more causes than before.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ was a perfect comprehensor in the first instant of His
conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not a perfect comprehensor
in the first instant of His conception. For merit precedes reward, as
fault precedes punishment. But Christ merited in the first instant of
His conception, as stated above [4169](A[3]). Since, therefore, the
state of comprehension is the principal reward, it seems that Christ
was not a comprehensor in the first instant of His conception.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 24:26): "Ought not Christ to
have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory?" But glory
belongs to the state of comprehension. Therefore Christ was not in the
state of comprehension in the first instant of His conception, when as
yet He had not suffered.
Objection 3: Further, what befits neither man nor angel seems proper to
God; and therefore is not becoming to Christ as man. But to be always
in the state of beatitude befits neither man nor angel: for if they had
been created in beatitude, they would not have sinned afterwards.
Therefore Christ, as man, was not in the state of beatitude in the
first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou
hast chosen, end taken to Thee"; which words, according to the gloss,
refer to Christ's human nature, which "was taken by the Word of God
unto the unity of Person." But human nature was taken by the Word of
God in the first instant of His conception. Therefore, in the first
instant of His conception, Christ, as man, was in the state of
beatitude; which is to be a comprehensor.
I answer that, As appears from what was said above [4170](A[3]), it was
unbecoming that in His conception Christ should receive merely habitual
grace without the act. Now, He received grace "not by measure" (Jn.
3:34), as stated above (Q[7], A[11]). But the grace of the "wayfarer,"
being short of that of the "comprehensor," is in less measure than that
of the comprehensor. Wherefore it is manifest that in the first instant
of His conception Christ received not only as much grace as
comprehensors have, but also greater than that which they all have. And
because that grace was not without its act, it follows that He was a
comprehensor in act, seeing God in His Essence more clearly than other
creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4171]Q[19], A[3]), Christ did
not merit the glory of the soul, in respect of which He is said to have
been a comprehensor, but the glory of the body, to which He came
through His Passion.
Wherefore the reply to the Second Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 3: Since Christ was both God and man, He had, even
in His humanity, something more than other creatures---namely, that He
was in the state of beatitude from the very beginning.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CHRIST'S NATIVITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After considering Christ's conception, we must treat of His nativity.
First, as to the nativity itself; secondly, as to His manifestation
after birth.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether nativity regards the nature or the person?
(2) Whether another, besides His eternal, birth should be attributed to
Christ?
(3) Whether the Blessed Virgin is His Mother in respect of His temporal
birth?
(4) Whether she ought to be called the Mother of God?
(5) Whether Christ is the Son of God the Father and of the Virgin
Mother in respect of two filiations?
(6) Of the mode of the Nativity;
(7) Of its place;
(8) Of the time of the Nativity.
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Whether nativity regards the nature rather than the person?
Objection 1: It would seem that nativity regards the nature rather than
the person. For Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum): "The
eternal Divine Nature could not be conceived and born of human nature,
except in a true human nature." Consequently it becomes the Divine
Nature to be conceived and born by reason of the human nature. Much
more, therefore, does it regard human nature itself.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v),
"nature" is so denominated from "nativity." But things are denominated
from one another by reason of some likeness. Therefore it seems that
nativity regards the nature rather than the person.
Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, that is born which begins to
exist by nativity. But Christ's Person did not begin to exist by His
nativity, whereas His human nature did. Therefore it seems that the
nativity properly regards the nature, and not the person.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "Nativity regards
the hypostasis, not the nature."
I answer that, Nativity can be attributed to someone in two ways:
first, as to its subject; secondly, as to its terminus. To him that is
born it is attributed as to its subject: and this, properly speaking,
is the hypostasis, not the nature. For since to be born is to be
generated; as a thing is generated in order for it to be, so is a thing
born in order for it to be. Now, to be, properly speaking, belongs to
that which subsists; since a form that does not subsist is said to be
only inasmuch as by it something is: and whereas person or hypostasis
designates something as subsisting, nature designates form, whereby
something subsists. Consequently, nativity is attributed to the person
or hypostasis as to the proper subject of being born, but not to the
nature.
But to the nature nativity is attributed as to its terminus. For the
terminus of generation and of every nativity is the form. Now, nature
designates something as a form: wherefore nativity is said to be "the
road to nature," as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii): for the purpose
of nature is terminated in the form or nature of the species.
Reply to Objection 1: On account of the identity of nature and
hypostasis in God, nature fs sometimes put instead of person or
hypostasis. And in this sense Augustine says that the Divine Nature was
conceived and born, inasmuch as the Person of the Son was conceived and
born in the human nature.
Reply to Objection 2: No movement or change is denominated from the
subject moved, but from the terminus of the movement, whence the
subject has its species. For this reason nativity is not denominated
from the person born, but from nature, which is the terminus of
nativity.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature, properly speaking, does not begin to
exist: rather is it the person that begins to exist in some nature.
Because, as stated above, nature designates that by which something is;
whereas person designates something as having subsistent being.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a temporal nativity should be attributed to Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal nativity is not to be
attributed to Christ. For "to be born is a certain movement of a thing
that did not exist before it was born, which movement procures for it
the benefit of existence" [*Cf. Augustine, De Unit. Trin. xii]. But
Christ was from all eternity. Therefore He could not be born in time.
Objection 2: Further, what is perfect in itself needs not to be born.
But the Person of the Son of God was perfect from eternity. Therefore
He needs not to be born in time. Therefore it seems that He had no
temporal birth.
Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, nativity regards the person.
But in Christ there is only one person. Therefore in Christ there is
but one nativity.
Objection 4: Further, what is born by two nativities is born twice. But
this proposition is false; "Christ was born twice": because the
nativity whereby He was born of the Father suffers no interruption;
since it is eternal. Whereas interruption is required to warrant the
use of the adverb "twice": for a man is said to run twice whose running
is interrupted. Therefore it seems that we should not admit a double
nativity in Christ.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "We confess two
nativities in Christ: one of the Father---eternal; and one which
occurred in these latter times for our sake."
I answer that, As stated above [4172](A[1]), nature is compared to
nativity, as the terminus to movement or change. Now, movement is
diversified according to the diversity of its termini, as the
Philosopher shows (Phys. v). But, in Christ there is a twofold nature:
one which He received of the Father from eternity, the other which He
received from His Mother in time. Therefore we must needs attribute to
Christ a twofold nativity: one by which He was born of the Father from
all eternity; one by which He was born of His Mother in time.
Reply to Objection 1: This was the argument of a certain heretic,
Felician, and is solved thus by Augustine (Contra Felic. xii). "Let us
suppose," says he, "as many maintain, that in the world there is a
universal soul, which, by its ineffable movement, so gives life to all
seed, that it is not compounded with things begotten, but bestows life
that they may be begotten. Without doubt, when this soul reaches the
womb, being intent on fashioning the passible matter to its own
purpose, it unites itself to the personality thereof, though manifestly
it is not of the same substance; and thus of the active soul and
passive matter, one man is made out of two substances. And so we
confess that the soul is born from out the womb; but not as though,
before birth, it was nothing at all in itself. Thus, then, but in a way
much more sublime, the Son of God was born as man, just as the soul is
held to be born together with the body: not as though they both made
one substance, but that from both, one person results. Yet we do not
say that the Son of God began thus to exist: lest it be thought that
His Divinity is temporal. Nor do we acknowledge the flesh of the Son of
God to have been from eternity: lest it be thought that He took, not a
true human body, but some resemblance thereof."
Reply to Objection 2: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is thus
solved by Cyril in an epistle [*Cf. Acta Concil. Ephes., p. 1, cap.
viii]: "We do not say that the Son of God had need, for His own sake,
of a second nativity, after that which is from the Father: for it is
foolish and a mark of ignorance to say that He who is from all
eternity, and co-eternal with the Father, needs to begin again to
exist. But because for us and for our salvation, uniting the human
nature to His Person, He became the child of a woman, for this reason
do we say that He was born in the flesh."
Reply to Objection 3: Nativity regards the person as its subject, the
nature as its terminus. Now, it is possible for several transformations
to be in the same subject: yet must they be diversified in respect of
their termini. But we do not say this as though the eternal nativity
were a transformation or a movement, but because it is designated by
way of a transformation or movement.
Reply to Objection 4: Christ can be said to have been born twice in
respect of His two nativities. For just as he is said to run twice who
runs at two different times, so can He be said to be born twice who is
born once from eternity and once in time: because eternity and time
differ much more than two different times, although each signifies a
measure of duration.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Blessed Virgin can be called Christ's Mother in respect of His
temporal nativity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called
Christ's Mother in respect of His temporal nativity. For, as stated
above ([4173]Q[32], A[4]), the Blessed Virgin Mary did not cooperate
actively in begetting Christ, but merely supplied the matter. But this
does not seem sufficient to make her His Mother: otherwise wood might
be called the mother of the bed or bench. Therefore it seems that the
Blessed Virgin cannot be called the Mother of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, Christ was born miraculously of the Blessed
Virgin. But a miraculous begetting does not suffice for motherhood or
sonship: for we do not speak of Eve as being the daughter of Adam.
Therefore neither should Christ be called the Son of the Blessed
Virgin.
Objection 3: Further, motherhood seems to imply partial separation of
the semen. But, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), "Christ's body
was formed, not by a seminal process, but by the operation of the Holy
Ghost." Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin should not be called
the Mother of Christ.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:18): "The generation of Christ
was in this wise. When His Mother Mary was espoused to Joseph," etc.
I answer that, The Blessed Virgin Mary is in truth and by nature the
Mother of Christ. For, as we have said above ([4174]Q[5], A[2];[4175]
Q[31], A[5]), Christ's body was not brought down from heaven, as the
heretic Valentine maintained, but was taken from the Virgin Mother, and
formed from her purest blood. And this is all that is required for
motherhood, as has been made clear above ([4176]Q[31], A[5];[4177]
Q[32], A[4]). Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly Christ's Mother.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4178]Q[32], A[3]), not every
generation implies fatherhood or motherhood and sonship, but only the
generation of living things. Consequently when inanimate things are
made from some matter, the relationship of motherhood and sonship does
not follow from this, but only in the generation of living things,
which is properly called nativity.
Reply to Objection 2: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "The
temporal nativity by which Christ was born for our salvation is, in a
way, natural, since a Man was born of a woman, and after the due lapse
of time from His conception: but it is also supernatural, because He
was begotten, not of seed, but of the Holy Ghost and the Blessed
Virgin, above the law of conception." Thus, then, on the part of the
mother, this nativity was natural, but on the part of the operation of
the Holy Ghost it was supernatural. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is the
true and natural Mother of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4179]Q[31], A[5], ad 3;[4180]
Q[32], A[4]), the resolution of the woman's semen is not necessary for
conception; neither, therefore, is it required for motherhood.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Blessed Virgin should be called the Mother of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin should not be called
the Mother of God. For in the Divine mysteries we should not make any
assertion that is not taken from Holy Scripture. But we read nowhere in
Holy Scripture that she is the mother or parent of God, but that she is
the "mother of Christ" or of "the Child," as may be seen from Mat.
1:18. Therefore we should not say that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother
of God.
Objection 2: Further, Christ is called God in respect of His Divine
Nature. But the Divine Nature did not first originate from the Virgin.
Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of God.
Objection 3: Further, the word "God" is predicated in common of Father,
Son, and Holy Ghost. If, therefore, the Blessed Virgin is Mother of God
it seems to follow that she was the Mother of Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost, which cannot be allowed. Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not
be called Mother of God.
On the contrary, In the chapters of Cyril, approved in the Council of
Ephesus (P. 1, Cap. xxvi), we read: "If anyone confess not that the
Emmanuel is truly God, and that for this reason the Holy Virgin is the
Mother of God, since she begot of her flesh the Word of God made flesh,
let him be anathema."
I answer that, As stated above ([4181]Q[16], A[1]), every word that
signifies a nature in the concrete can stand for any hypostasis of that
nature. Now, since the union of the Incarnation took place in the
hypostasis, as above stated ([4182]Q[2], A[3]), it is manifest that
this word "God" can stand for the hypostasis, having a human and a
Divine nature. Therefore whatever belongs to the Divine and to the
human nature can be attributed to that Person: both when a word is
employed to stand for it, signifying the Divine Nature, and when a word
is used signifying the human nature. Now, conception and birth are
attributed to the person and hypostasis in respect of that nature in
which it is conceived and born. Since, therefore, the human nature was
taken by the Divine Person in the very beginning of the conception, as
stated above ([4183]Q[33], A[3]), it follows that it can be truly said
that God was conceived and born of the Virgin. Now from this is a woman
called a man's mother, that she conceived him and gave birth to him.
Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly called the Mother of God. For the
only way in which it could be denied that the Blessed Virgin is the
Mother of God would be either if the humanity were first subject to
conception and birth, before this man were the Son of God, as Photinus
said; or if the humanity were not assumed unto unity of the Person or
hypostasis of the Word of God, as Nestorius maintained. But both of
these are erroneous. Therefore it is heretical to deny that the Blessed
Virgin is the Mother of God.
Reply to Objection 1: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is
solved by saying that, although we do not find it said expressly in
Scripture that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, yet we do find
it expressly said in Scripture that "Jesus Christ is true God," as may
be seen 1 Jn. 5:20, and that the Blessed Virgin is the "Mother of Jesus
Christ," which is clearly expressed Mat. 1:18. Therefore, from the
words of Scripture it follows of necessity that she is the Mother of
God.
Again, it is written (Rom. 9:5) that Christ is of the Jews "according
to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever." But He is
not of the Jews except through the Blessed Virgin. Therefore He who is
"above all things, God blessed for ever," is truly born of the Blessed
Virgin as of His Mother.
Reply to Objection 2: This was an argument of Nestorius. But Cyril, in
a letter against Nestorius [*Cf. Acta Conc. Ephes., p. 1, cap. ii],
answers it thus: "Just as when a man's soul is born with its body, they
are considered as one being: and if anyone wish to say that the mother
of the flesh is not the mother of the soul, he says too much. Something
like this may be perceived in the generation of Christ. For the Word of
God was born of the substance of God the Father: but because He took
flesh, we must of necessity confess that in the flesh He was born of a
woman." Consequently we must say that the Blessed Virgin is called the
Mother of God, not as though she were the Mother of the Godhead, but
because she is the mother, according to His human nature, of the Person
who has both the divine and the human nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the name "God" is common to the three
Persons, yet sometimes it stands for the Person of the Father alone,
sometimes only for the Person of the Son or of the Holy Ghost, as
stated above (Q[16], A[1]; [4184]FP, Q[39], A[4]). So that when we say,
"The Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God," this word "God" stands only
for the incarnate Person of the Son.
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Whether there are two filiations in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are two filiations in Christ. For
nativity is the cause of filiation. But in Christ there are two
nativities. Therefore in Christ there are also two filiations.
Objection 2: Further, filiation, which is said of a man as being the
son of someone, his father or his mother, depends, in a way, on him:
because the very being of a relation consists "in being referred to
another"; wherefore if one of two relatives be destroyed, the other is
destroyed also. But the eternal filiation by which Christ is the Son of
God the Father depends not on His Mother, because nothing eternal
depends on what is temporal. Therefore Christ is not His Mother's Son
by temporal filiation. Either, therefore, He is not her Son at all,
which is in contradiction to what has been said above ([4185]AA[3],4),
or He must needs be her Son by some other temporal filiation. Therefore
in Christ there are two filiations.
Objection 3: Further, one of two relatives enters the definition of the
other; hence it is clear that of two relatives, one is specified from
the other. But one and the same cannot be in diverse species. Therefore
it seems impossible that one and the same relation be referred to
extremes which are altogether diverse. But Christ is said to be the Son
of the Eternal Father and a temporal mother, who are terms altogether
diverse. Therefore it seems that Christ cannot, by the same relation,
be called the Son of the Father and of His Mother Therefore in Christ
there are two filiations.
On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), things
pertaining to the nature are multiple in Christ; but not those things
that pertain to the Person. But filiation belongs especially to the
Person, since it is a personal property, as appears from what was said
in the [4186]FP, Q[32], A[3]; [4187]FP, Q[40], A[2]. Therefore there is
but one filiation in Christ.
I answer that, opinions differ on this question. For some, considering
only the cause of filiation, which is nativity, put two filiations in
Christ, just as there are two nativities. On the contrary, others,
considering only the subject of filiation, which is the person or
hypostasis, put only one filiation in Christ, just as there is but one
hypostasis or person. Because the unity or plurality of a relation is
considered in respect, not of its terms, but of its cause or of its
subject. For if it were considered in respect of its terms, every man
would of necessity have in himself two filiations---one in reference to
his father, and another in reference to his mother. But if we consider
the question aright, we shall see that every man bears but one relation
to both his father and his mother, on account of the unity of the cause
thereof. For man is born by one birth of both father and mother: whence
he bears but one relation to both. The same is said of one master who
teaches many disciples the same doctrine, and of one lord who governs
many subjects by the same power. But if there be various causes
specifically diverse, it seems that in consequence the relations differ
in species: wherefore nothing hinders several such relations being in
the same subject. Thus if a man teach grammar to some and logic to
others, his teaching is of a different kind in one case and in the
other; and therefore one and the same man may have different relations
as the master of different disciples, or of the same disciples in
regard to diverse doctrines. Sometimes, however, it happens that a man
bears a relation to several in respect of various causes, but of the
same species: thus a father may have several sons by several acts of
generation. Wherefore the
paternity cannot differ specifically, since the acts of generation are
specifically the same. And because several forms of the same species
cannot at the same time be in the same subject, it is impossible for
several paternities to be in a man who is the father of several sons by
natural generation. But it would not be so were he the father of one
son by natural generation and of another by adoption.
Now, it is manifest that Christ was not born by one and the same
nativity, of the Father from eternity, and of His Mother in time:
indeed, these two nativities differ specifically. Wherefore, as to
this, we must say that there are various filiations, one temporal and
the other eternal. Since, however, the subject of filiation is neither
the nature nor part of the nature, but the person or hypostasis alone;
and since in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person than the
eternal, there can be no other filiation in Christ but that which is in
the eternal hypostasis. Now, every relation which is predicated of God
from time does not put something real in the eternal God, but only
something according to our way of thinking, as we have said in the
[4188]FP, Q[13], A[7]. Therefore the filiation by which Christ is
referred to His Mother cannot be a real relation, but only a relation
of reason.
Consequently each opinion is true to a certain extent. For if we
consider the adequate causes of filiation, we must needs say that there
are two filiations in respect of the twofold nativity. But if we
consider the subject of filiation, which can only be the eternal
suppositum, then no other than the eternal filiation in Christ is a
real relation. Nevertheless, He has the relation of Son in regard to
His Mother, because it is implied in the relation of motherhood to
Christ. Thus God is called Lord by a relation which is implied in the
real relation by which the creature is subject to God. And although
lordship is not a real relation in God, yet is He really Lord through
the real subjection of the creature to Him. In the same way Christ is
really the Son of the Virgin Mother through the real relation of her
motherhood to Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: Temporal nativity would cause a real temporal
filiation in Christ if there were in Him a subject capable of such
filiation. But this cannot be; since the eternal suppositum cannot be
receptive of a temporal relation, as stated above. Nor can it be said
that it is receptive of temporal filiation by reason of the human
nature, just as it is receptive of the temporal nativity; because human
nature would need in some way to be the subject of filiation, just as
in a way it is the subject of nativity; for since an Ethiopian is said
to be white by reason of his teeth, it must be that his teeth are the
subject of whiteness. But human nature can nowise be the subject of
filiation, because this relation regards directly the person.
Reply to Objection 2: Eternal filiation does not depend on a temporal
mother, but together with this eternal filiation we understand a
certain temporal relation dependent on the mother, in respect of which
relation Christ is called the Son of His Mother.
Reply to Objection 3: One and being are mutually consequent, as is said
Metaph. iv. Therefore, just as it happens that in one of the extremes
of a relation there is something real, whereas in the other there is
not something real, but merely a certain aspect, as the Philosopher
observes of knowledge and the thing known; so also it happens that on
the part of one extreme there is one relation, whereas on the part of
the other there are many. Thus in man on the part of his parents there
is a twofold relation, the one of paternity, the other of motherhood,
which are specifically diverse, inasmuch as the father is the principle
of generation in one way, and the mother in another (whereas if many be
the principle of one action and in the same way---for instance, if
many. together draw a ship along---there would be one and the same
relation in all of them); but on the part of the child there is but one
filiation in reality, though there be two in aspect, corresponding to
the two relations in the parents, as considered by the intellect. And
thus in one way there is only one real filiation in Christ, which is in
respect of the Eternal Father: yet there is another temporal relation
in regard to His temporal mother.
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Whether Christ was born without His Mother suffering?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born without His Mother
suffering. For just as man's death was a result of the sin of our first
parents, according to Gn. 2:17: "In what day soever ye shall eat, ye
shall [Vulg.: 'thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt] die"; so were the
pains of childbirth, according to Gn. 3:16: "In sorrow shalt thou bring
forth children." But Christ was willing to undergo death. Therefore for
the same reason it seems that His birth should have been with pain.
Objection 2: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But
Christ ended His life in pain, according to Is. 53:4: "Surely . . . He
hath carried our sorrows." Therefore it seems that His nativity was not
without the pains of childbirth.
Objection 3: Further, in the book on the birth of our Saviour
[*Protevangelium Jacobi xix, xx] it is related that midwives were
present at Christ's birth; and they would be wanted by reason of the
mother's suffering pain. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin
suffered pain in giving birth to her Child.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Serm. de Nativ. [*Supposititious]),
addressing himself to the Virgin-Mother: "In conceiving thou wast all
pure, in giving birth thou wast without pain."
I answer that, The pains of childbirth are caused by the infant opening
the passage from the womb. Now it has been said above ([4189]Q[28],
A[2], Replies to objections), that Christ came forth from the closed
womb of His Mother, and, consequently, without opening the passage.
Consequently there was no pain in that birth, as neither was there any
corruption; on the contrary, there was much joy therein for that
God-Man "was born into the world," according to Is. 35:1,2: "Like the
lily, it shall bud forth and blossom, and shall rejoice with joy and
praise."
Reply to Objection 1: The pains of childbirth in the woman follow from
the mingling of the sexes. Wherefore (Gn. 3:16) after the words, "in
sorrow shalt thou bring forth children," the following are added: "and
thou shalt be under thy husband's power." But, as Augustine says (Serm.
de Assumpt. B. Virg., [*Supposititious]), from this sentence we must
exclude the Virgin-Mother of God; who, "because she conceived Christ
without the defilement of sin, and without the stain of sexual
mingling, therefore did she bring Him forth without pain, without
violation of her virginal integrity, without detriment to the purity of
her maidenhood." Christ, indeed, suffered death, but through His own
spontaneous desire, in order to atone for us, not as a necessary result
of that sentence, for He was not a debtor unto death.
Reply to Objection 2: As "by His death" Christ "destroyed our death"
[*Preface of the Mass in Paschal-time], so by His pains He freed us
from our pains; and so He wished to die a painful death. But the
mother's pains in childbirth did not concern Christ, who came to atone
for our sins. And therefore there was no need for His Mother to suffer
in giving birth.
Reply to Objection 3: We are told (Lk. 2:7) that the Blessed Virgin
herself "wrapped up in swaddling clothes" the Child whom she had
brought forth, "and laid Him in a manger." Consequently the narrative
of this book, which is apocryphal, is untrue. Wherefore Jerome says
(Adv. Helvid. iv): "No midwife was there, no officious women
interfered. She was both mother and midwife. 'With swaddling clothes,'
says he, 'she wrapped up the child, and laid Him in a manger.'" These
words prove the falseness of the apocryphal ravings.
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Whether Christ should have been born in Bethlehem?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been born in
Bethlehem. For it is written (Is. 2:3): "The law shall come forth from
Sion, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem." But Christ is truly the
Word of God. Therefore He should have come into the world at Jerusalem.
Objection 2: Further, it is said (Mat. 2:23) that it is written of
Christ that "He shall be called a Nazarene"; which is taken from Is.
11:1: "A flower shall rise up out of his root"; for "Nazareth" is
interpreted "a flower." But a man is named especially from the place of
his birth. Therefore it seems that He should have been born in
Nazareth, where also He was conceived and brought up.
Objection 3: Further, for this was our Lord born into the world, that
He might make known the true faith. according to Jn. 18:37: "For this
was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give
testimony to the truth." But this would have been easier if He had been
born in the city of Rome, which at that time ruled the world; whence
Paul, writing to the Romans (1:8) says: "Your faith is spoken of in the
whole world." Therefore it seems that He should not have been born in
Bethlehem.
On the contrary, It is written (Mic. 5:2): "And thou, Bethlehem,
Ephrata . . . out of thee shall He come forth unto Me, that is to be
the ruler in Israel."
I answer that, Christ willed to be born in Bethlehem for two reasons.
First, because "He was made . . . of the seed of David according to the
flesh," as it is written (Rom. 1:3); to whom also was a special promise
made concerning Christ; according to 2 Kings 23:1: "The man to whom it
was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said."
Therefore He willed to be born at Bethlehem, where David was born, in
order that by the very birthplace the promise made to David might be
shown to be fulfilled. The Evangelist points this out by saying:
"Because He was of the house and of the family of David." Secondly,
because, as Gregory says (Hom. viii in Evang.): "Bethlehem is
interpreted 'the house of bread.' It is Christ Himself who said, 'I am
the living Bread which came down from heaven.'"
Reply to Objection 1: As David was born in Bethlehem, so also did he
choose Jerusalem to set up his throne there, and to build there the
Temple of God, so that Jerusalem was at the same time a royal and a
priestly city. Now, Christ's priesthood and kingdom were "consummated"
principally in His Passion. Therefore it was becoming that He should
choose Bethlehem for His Birthplace and Jerusalem for the scene of His
Passion.
At the same time, too, He put to silence the vain boasting of men who
take pride in being born in great cities, where also they desire
especially to receive honor. Christ, on the contrary, willed to be born
in a mean city, and to suffer reproach in a great city.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ wished "to flower" by His holy life, not
in His carnal birth. Therefore He wished to be fostered and brought up
at Nazareth. But He wished to be born at Bethlehem away from home;
because, as Gregory says (Hom. viii in Evang.), through the human
nature which He had taken, He was born, as it were, in a foreign
place---foreign not to His power, but to His Nature. And, again, as
Bede says on Lk. 2:7: "In order that He who found no room at the inn
might prepare many mansions for us in His Father's house."
Reply to Objection 3: According to a sermon in the Council of Ephesus
[*P. iii, cap. ix]: "If He had chosen the great city of Rome, the
change in the world would be ascribed to the influence of her citizens.
If He had been the son of the Emperor, His benefits would have been
attributed to the latter's power. But that we might acknowledge the
work of God in the transformation of the whole earth, He chose a poor
mother and a birthplace poorer still."
"But the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that He may confound
the strong" (1 Cor. 1:27). And therefore, in order the more to show His
power, He set up the head of His Church in Rome itself, which was the
head of the world, in sign of His complete victory, in order that from
that city the faith might spread throughout the world; according to Is.
26:5,6: "The high city He shall lay low . . . the feet of the poor,"
i.e. of Christ, "shall tread it down; the steps of the needy," i.e. of
the apostles Peter and Paul.
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Whether Christ was born at a fitting time?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born at a fitting time.
Because Christ came in order to restore liberty to His own. But He was
born at a time of subjection---namely, when the whole world, as it
were, tributary to Augustus, was being enrolled, at his command as Luke
relates (2:1). Therefore it seems that Christ was not born at a fitting
time.
Objection 2: Further, the promises concerning the coming of Christ were
not made to the Gentiles; according to Rom. 9:4: "To whom belong . . .
the promises." But Christ was born during the reign of a foreigner, as
appears from Mat. 2:1: "When Jesus was born in the days of King Herod."
Therefore it seems that He was not born at a fitting time.
Objection 3: Further, the time of Christ's presence on earth is
compared to the day, because He is the "Light of the world"; wherefore
He says Himself (Jn. 9:4): "I must work the works of Him that sent Me,
whilst it is day." But in summer the days are longer than in winter.
Therefore, since He was born in the depth of winter, eight days before
the Kalends of January, it seems that He was not born at a fitting
time.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): "When the fulness of the
time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law."
I answer that, There is this difference between Christ and other men,
that, whereas they are born subject to the restrictions of time,
Christ, as Lord and Maker of all time, chose a time in which to be
born, just as He chose a mother and a birthplace. And since "what is of
God is well ordered" and becomingly arranged, it follows that Christ
was born at a most fitting time.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ came in order to bring us back from a
state of bondage to a state of liberty. And therefore, as He took our
mortal nature in order to restore us to life, so, as Bede says (Super
Luc. ii, 4,5), "He deigned to take flesh at such a time that, shortly
after His birth, He would be enrolled in Caesar's census, and thus
submit Himself to bondage for the sake of our liberty."
Moreover, at that time, when the whole world lived under one ruler,
peace abounded on the earth. Therefore it was a fitting time for the
birth of Christ, for "He is our peace, who hath made both one," as it
is written (Eph. 2:14). Wherefore Jerome says on Is. 2:4: "If we search
the page of ancient history, we shall find that throughout the whole
world there was discord until the twenty-eighth year of Augustus
Caesar: but when our Lord was born, all war ceased"; according to Is.
2:4: "Nation shall not lift up sword against nation."
Again, it was fitting that Christ should be born while the world was
governed by one ruler, because "He came to gather His own [Vulg.: 'the
children of God'] together in one" (Jn. 11:52), that there might be
"one fold and one shepherd" (Jn. 10:16).
Reply to Objection 2: Christ wished to be born during the reign of a
foreigner, that the prophecy of Jacob might be fulfilled (Gn. 49:10):
"The sceptre shall not be taken away from Juda, nor a ruler from his
thigh, till He come that is to be sent." Because, as Chrysostom says
(Hom. ii in Matth. [*Opus Imperf., falsely ascribed to Chrysostom]), as
long as the Jewish "people was governed by Jewish kings, however
wicked, prophets were sent for their healing. But now that the Law of
God is under the power of a wicked king, Christ is born; because a
grave and hopeless disease demanded a more skilful physician."
Reply to Objection 3: As says the author of the book De Qq. Nov. et
Vet. Test., "Christ wished to be born, when the light of day begins to
increase in length," so as to show that He came in order that man might
come nearer to the Divine Light, according to Lk. 1:79: "To enlighten
them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death."
In like manner He chose to be born in the rough winter season, that He
might begin from then to suffer in body for us.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE NEWLY BORN CHRIST (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the manifestation of the newly born Christ:
concerning which there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's birth should have been made known to all?
(2) Whether it should have been made known to some?
(3) To whom should it have been made known?
(4) Whether He should have made Himself known, or should He rather have
been manifested by others?
(5) By what other means should it have been made known?
(6) Of the order of these manifestations;
(7) Of the star by means of which His birth was made known;
(8) of the adoration of the Magi, who were informed of Christ's
nativity by means of the star.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ's birth should have been made known to all?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's birth should have been made
known to all. Because fulfilment should correspond to promise. Now, the
promise of Christ's coming is thus expressed (Ps. 49:3): "God shall
come manifestly. But He came by His birth in the flesh." Therefore it
seems that His birth should have been made known to the whole world.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): "Christ came into
this world to save sinners." But this is not effected save in as far as
the grace of Christ is made known to them; according to Titus 2:11,12:
"The grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men, instructing us,
that denying ungodliness and worldly desires, we should live soberly,
and justly, and godly in this world." Therefore it seems that Christ's
birth should have been made known to all.
Objection 3: Further, God is most especially inclined to mercy;
according to Ps. 144:9: "His tender mercies are over all His works."
But in His second coming, when He will "judge justices" (Ps. 70:3), He
will come before the eyes of all; according to Mat. 24:27: "As
lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west, so
shall also the coming of the Son of Man be." Much more, therefore,
should His first coming, when He was born into the world according to
the flesh, have been made known to all.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 45:15): "Thou art a hidden God, the
Holy [Vulg.: 'the God] of Israel, the Saviour." And, again (Is. 43:3):
"His look was, as it were, hidden and despised."
I answer that, It was unfitting that Christ's birth should be made
known to all men without distinction. First, because this would have
been a hindrance to the redemption of man, which was accomplished by
means of the Cross; for, as it is written (1 Cor. 2:8): "If they had
known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory."
Secondly, because this would have lessened the merit of faith, which He
came to offer men as the way to righteousness. according to Rom. 3:22:
"The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ." For if, when Christ was
born, His birth had been made known to all by evident signs, the very
nature of faith would have been destroyed, since it is "the evidence of
things that appear not," as stated, Heb. 11:1.
Thirdly, because thus the reality of His human nature would have come
into doubt. Whence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): "If He
had not passed through the different stages of age from babyhood to
youth, had neither eaten nor slept, would He not have strengthened an
erroneous opinion, and made it impossible for us to believe that He had
become true man? And while He is doing all things wondrously, would He
have taken away that which He accomplished in mercy?"
Reply to Objection 1: According to the gloss, the words quoted must be
understood of Christ's coming as judge.
Reply to Objection 2: All men were to be instructed unto salvation,
concerning the grace of God our Saviour, not at the very time of His
birth, but afterwards, in due time, after He had "wrought salvation in
the midst of the earth" (Ps. 73:12). Wherefore after His Passion and
Resurrection, He said to His disciples (Mat. 28:19): "Going . . . teach
ye all nations."
Reply to Objection 3: For judgment to be passed, the authority of the
judge needs to be known: and for this reason it behooves that the
coming of Christ unto judgment should be manifest. But His first coming
was unto the salvation of all, which is by faith that is of things not
seen. And therefore it was fitting that His first coming should be
hidden.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ's birth should have been made known to some?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's birth should not have been
made known to anyone. For, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), it befitted
the salvation of mankind that Christ's first coming should be hidden.
But Christ came to save all; according to 1 Tim. 4:10: "Who is the
Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful." Therefore Christ's
birth should not have been made known to anyone.
Objection 2: Further, before Christ was born, His future birth was made
known to the Blessed Virgin and Joseph. Therefore it was not necessary
that it should be made known to others after His birth.
Objection 3: Further, no wise man makes known that from which arise
disturbance and harm to others. But, when Christ's birth was made
known, disturbance arose: for it is written (Mat. 2:3) that "King
Herod, hearing" of Christ's birth, "was troubled, and all Jerusalem
with him." Moreover, this brought harm to others; because it was the
occasion of Herod's killing "all the male children that were in
Bethlehem . . . from two years old and under." Therefore it seems
unfitting for Christ's birth to have been made known to anyone.
On the contrary, Christ's birth would have been profitable to none if
it had been hidden from all. But it behooved Christ's birth to be
profitable: else He were born in vain. Therefore it seems that Christ's
birth should have been made known to some.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1) "what is of God is well
ordered." Now it belongs to the order of Divine wisdom that God's gifts
and the secrets of His wisdom are not bestowed on all equally, but to
some immediately, through whom they are made known to others.
Wherefore, with regard to the mystery of the Resurrection it is written
(Acts 10:40,41): "God . . . gave" Christ rising again "to be made
manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses pre-ordained by God."
Consequently, that His birth might be consistent with this, it should
have been made known, not to all, but to some, through whom it could be
made known to others.
Reply to Objection 1: As it would have been prejudicial to the
salvation of mankind if God's birth had been made known to all men, so
also would it have been if none had been informed of it. Because in
either case faith is destroyed, whether a thing be perfectly manifest,
or whether it be entirely unknown, so that no one can hear it from
another; for "faith cometh by hearing" (Rom. 10:17).
Reply to Objection 2: Mary and Joseph needed to be instructed
concerning Christ's birth before He was born, because it devolved on
them to show reverence to the child conceived in the womb, and to serve
Him even before He was born. But their testimony, being of a domestic
character, would have aroused suspicion in regard to Christ's
greatness: and so it behooved it to be made known to others, whose
testimony could not be suspect.
Reply to Objection 3: The very disturbance that arose when it was known
that Christ was born was becoming to His birth. First, because thus the
heavenly dignity of Christ is made manifest. Wherefore Gregory says
(Hom. x in Evang.): "After the birth of the King of heaven, the earthly
king is troubled: doubtless because earthly grandeur is covered with
confusion when the heavenly majesty is revealed."
Secondly, thereby the judicial power of Christ was foreshadowed. Thus
Augustine says in a sermon (30 de Temp.) on the Epiphany: "What will He
be like in the judgment-seat; since from His cradle He struck terror
into the heart of a proud king?"
Thirdly, because thus the overthrow of the devil's kingdom was
foreshadowed. For, as Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Epiphany (Serm.
v [*Opus Imperfectum in Matth., Hom. ii, falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom]): "Herod was not so much troubled in himself as the devil
in Herod. For Herod thought Him to be a man, but the devil thought Him
to be God. Each feared a successor to his kingdom: the devil, a
heavenly successor; Herod, an earthly successor." But their fear was
needless: since Christ had not come to set up an earthly kingdom, as
Pope Leo says, addressing himself to Herod: "Thy palace cannot hold
Christ: nor is the Lord of the world content with the paltry power of
thy scepter." That the Jews were troubled, who, on the contrary, should
have rejoiced, was either because, as Chrysostom says, "wicked men
could not rejoice at the coming of the Holy one," or because they
wished to court favor with Herod, whom they feared; for "the populace
is inclined to favor too much those whose cruelty it endures."
And that the children were slain by Herod was not harmful to them, but
profitable. For Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (66 de
Diversis): "It cannot be questioned that Christ, who came to set man
free, rewarded those who were slain for Him; since, while hanging on
the cross, He prayed for those who were putting Him to death."
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Whether those to whom Christ's birth was made known were suitably chosen?
Objection 1: It would seem that those to whom Christ's birth was made
known were not suitably chosen. For our Lord (Mat. 10:5) commanded His
disciples, "Go ye not into the way of the Gentiles," so that He might
be made known to the Jews before the Gentiles. Therefore it seems that
much less should Christ's birth have been at once revealed to the
Gentiles who "came from the east," as stated Mat. 2:1.
Objection 2: Further, the revelation of Divine truth should be made
especially to the friends of God, according to Job 37 [Vulg.: Job
36:33]: "He sheweth His friend concerning it." But the Magi seem to be
God's foes; for it is written (Lev. 19:31): "Go not aside after wizards
[magi], neither ask anything of soothsayers." Therefore Christ's birth
should not have been made known to the Magi.
Objection 3: Further, Christ came in order to set free the whole world
from the power of the devil; whence it is written (Malachi 1:11): "From
the rising of the sun even to the going down, My name is great among
the Gentiles." Therefore He should have been made known, not only to
those who dwelt in the east, but also to some from all parts of the
world.
Objection 4: Further, all the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of
Christ. But the sacraments of the Old Law were dispensed through the
ministry of the legal priesthood. Therefore it seems that Christ's
birth should have been made known rather to the priests in the Temple
than to the shepherds in the fields.
Objection 5: Further, Christ was born of a Virgin-Mother, and was as
yet a little child. It was therefore more suitable that He should be
made known to youths and virgins than to old and married people or to
widows, such as Simeon and Anna.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:18): "I know whom I have
chosen." But what is done by God's wisdom is done becomingly. Therefore
those to whom Christ's birth was made known were suitably chosen.
I answer that, Salvation, which was to be accomplished by Christ,
concerns all sorts and conditions of men: because, as it is written
(Col. 3:11), in Christ "there is neither male nor female, [*These words
are in reality from Gal. 3:28] neither Gentile nor Jew . . . bond nor
free," and so forth. And in order that this might be foreshadowed in
Christ's birth, He was made known to men of all conditions. Because, as
Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (32 de Temp.), "the
shepherds were Israelites, the Magi were Gentiles. The former were nigh
to Him, the latter far from Him. Both hastened to Him together as to
the cornerstone." There was also another point of contrast: for the
Magi were wise and powerful; the shepherds simple and lowly. He was
also made known to the righteous as Simeon and Anna; and to sinners, as
the Magi. He was made known both to men, and to women---namely, to
Anna---so as to show no condition of men to be excluded from Christ's
redemption.
Reply to Objection 1: That manifestation of Christ's birth was a kind
of foretaste of the full manifestation which was to come. And as in the
later manifestation the first announcement of the grace of Christ was
made by Him and His Apostles to the Jews and afterwards to the
Gentiles, so the first to come to Christ were the shepherds, who were
the first-fruits of the Jews, as being near to Him; and afterwards came
the Magi from afar, who were "the first-fruits of the Gentiles," as
Augustine says (Serm. 30 de Temp. cc.).
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany
(Serm. 30 de Temp.): "As unskilfulness predominates in the rustic
manners of the shepherd, so ungodliness abounds in the profane rites of
the Magi. Yet did this Corner-Stone draw both to Itself; inasmuch as He
came 'to choose the foolish things that He might confound the wise,'
and 'not to call the just, but sinners,'" so that "the proud might not
boast, nor the weak despair." Nevertheless, there are those who say
that these Magi were not wizards, but wise astronomers, who are called
Magi among the Persians or Chaldees.
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says [*Hom. ii in Matth. in the
Opus Imperf., among the supposititious works of Chrysostom]: "The Magi
came from the east, because the first beginning of faith came from the
land where the day is born; since faith is the light of the soul." Or,
"because all who come to Christ come from Him and through Him": whence
it is written (Zech. 6:12): "Behold a Man, the Orient is His name."
Now, they are said to come from the east literally, either because, as
some say, they came from the farthest parts of the east, or because
they came from the neighboring parts of Judea that lie to the east of
the region inhabited by the Jews. Yet it is to be believed that certain
signs of Christ's birth appeared also in other parts of the world:
thus, at Rome the river flowed with oil [*Eusebius, Chronic. II, Olymp.
185]; and in Spain three suns were seen, which gradually merged into
one [*Cf. Eusebius, Chronic. II, Olymp. 184].
Reply to Objection 4: As Chrysostom observes (Theophylact., Enarr. in
Luc. ii, 8), the angel who announced Christ's birth did not go to
Jerusalem, nor did he seek the Scribes and Pharisees, for they were
corrupted, and full of ill-will. But the shepherds were single-minded,
and were like the patriarchs and Moses in their mode of life.
Moreover, these shepherds were types of the Doctors of the Church, to
whom are revealed the mysteries of Christ that were hidden from the
Jews.
Reply to Objection 5: As Ambrose says (on Lk. 2:25): "It was right that
our Lord's birth should be attested not only by the shepherds, but also
by people advanced in age and virtue": whose testimony is rendered the
more credible by reason of their righteousness.
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Whether Christ Himself should have made His birth know?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have Himself made His
birth known. For "a direct cause is always of greater power than an
indirect cause," as is stated Phys. viii. But Christ made His birth
known through others---for instance, to the shepherds through the
angels, and to the Magi through the star. Much more, therefore, should
He Himself have made His birth known.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 20:32): "Wisdom that is
hid and treasure that is not seen; what profit is there in them both?"
But Christ had, to perfection, the treasure of wisdom and grace from
the beginning of His conception. Therefore, unless He had made the
fulness of these gifts known by words and deeds, wisdom and grace would
have been given Him to no purpose. But this is unreasonable: because
"God and nature do nothing without a purpose" (De Coelo i).
Objection 3: Further, we read in the book De Infantia Salvatoris that
in His infancy Christ worked many miracles. It seems therefore that He
did Himself make His birth known.
On the contrary, Pope Leo says (Serm. xxxiv) that the Magi found the
"infant Jesus in no way different from the generality of human
infants." But other infants do not make themselves known. Therefore it
was not fitting that Christ should Himself make His birth known.
I answer that, Christ's birth was ordered unto man's salvation, which
is by faith. But saving faith confesses Christ's Godhead and humanity.
It behooved, therefore, Christ's birth to be made known in such a way
that the proof of His Godhead should not be prejudicial to faith in His
human nature. But this took place while Christ presented a likeness of
human weakness, and yet, by means of God's creatures, He showed the
power of the Godhead in Himself. Therefore Christ made His birth known,
not by Himself, but by means of certain other creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: By the way of generation and movement we must of
necessity come to the imperfect before the perfect. And therefore
Christ was made known first through other creatures, and afterwards He
Himself manifested Himself perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Although hidden wisdom is useless, yet there is
no need for a wise man to make himself known at all times, but at a
suitable time; for it is written (Ecclus. 20:6): "There is one that
holdeth his peace because he knoweth not what to say: and there is
another that holdeth his peace, knowing the proper time." Hence the
wisdom given to Christ was not useless, because at a suitable time He
manifested Himself. And the very fact that He was hidden at a suitable
time is a sign of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 3: The book De Infantia Salvatoris is apocryphal.
Moreover, Chrysostom (Hom. xxi super Joan.) says that Christ worked no
miracles before changing the water into wine, according to Jn. 2:11:
"'This beginning of miracles did Jesus.' For if He had worked miracles
at an early age, there would have been no need for anyone else to
manifest Him to the Israelites; whereas John the Baptist says (Jn.
1:31): 'That He may be made manifest in Israel; therefore am I come
baptizing with water.' Moreover, it was fitting that He should not
begin to work miracles at an early age. For people would have thought
the Incarnation to be unreal, and, out of sheer spite, would have
crucified Him before the proper time."
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Whether Christ's birth should have been manifested by means of the angels
and the star?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's birth should not have been
manifested by means of the angels. For angels are spiritual substances,
according to Ps. 103:4: "Who maketh His [Vulg.: 'makest Thy'] angels,
spirits." But Christ's birth was in the flesh, and not in His spiritual
substance. Therefore it should not have been manifested by means of
angels.
Objection 2: Further, the righteous are more akin to the angels than to
any other, according to Ps. 33:8: "The angel of the Lord shall encamp
round about them that fear Him, and shall deliver them." But Christ's
birth was not announced to the righteous, viz. Simeon and Anna, through
the angels. Therefore neither should it have been announced to the
shepherds by means of the angels.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that neither ought it to have been
announced to the Magi by means of the star. For this seems to favor the
error of those who think that man's birth is influenced by the stars.
But occasions of sin should be taken away from man. Therefore it was
not fitting that Christ's birth should be announced by a star.
Objection 4: Further, a sign should be certain, in order that something
be made known thereby. But a star does not seem to be a certain sign of
Christ's birth. Therefore Christ's birth was not suitably announced by
a star.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are
perfect." But this manifestation is the work of God. Therefore it was
accomplished by means of suitable signs.
I answer that, As knowledge is imparted through a syllogism from
something which we know better, so knowledge given by signs must be
conveyed through things which are familiar to those to whom the
knowledge is imparted. Now, it is clear that the righteous have,
through the spirit of prophecy, a certain familiarity with the interior
instinct of the Holy Ghost, and are wont to be taught thereby, without
the guidance of sensible signs. Whereas others, occupied with material
things, are led through the domain of the senses to that of the
intellect. The Jews, however, were accustomed to receive Divine answers
through the angels; through whom they also received the Law, according
to Acts 7:53: "You [Vulg.: 'who'] . . . have received the Law by the
disposition of angels." And the Gentiles, especially astrologers, were
wont to observe the course of the stars. And therefore Christ's birth
was made known to the righteous, viz. Simeon and Anna, by the interior
instinct of the Holy Ghost, according to Lk. 2:26: "He had received an
answer from the Holy Ghost that he should not see death before he had
seen the Christ of the Lord." But to the shepherds and Magi, as being
occupied with material things, Christ's birth was made known by means
of visible apparitions. And since this birth was not only earthly, but
also, in a way, heavenly, to both (shepherds and Magi) it is revealed
through heavenly signs: for, as Augustine says in a sermon on the
Epiphany (cciv): "The angels inhabit, and the stars adorn, the heavens:
by both, therefore, do the 'heavens show forth the glory of God.'"
Moreover, it was not without reason that Christ's birth was made known,
by means of angels, to the shepherds, who, being Jews, were accustomed
to frequent apparitions of the angels: whereas it was revealed by means
of a star to the Magi, who were wont to consider the heavenly bodies.
Because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Matth.): "Our Lord deigned to
call them through things to which they were accustomed." There is also
another reason. For, as Gregory says (Hom. x in Evang.): "To the Jews,
as rational beings, it was fitting that a rational animal [*Cf.
[4190]FP, Q[51], A[1], ad 2]," viz. an angel, "should preach. Whereas
the Gentiles, who were unable to come to the knowledge of God through
the reason, were led to God, not by words, but by signs. And as our
Lord, when He was able to speak, was announced by heralds who spoke, so
before He could speak He was manifested by speechless elements." Again,
there is yet another reason. For, as Augustine [*Pope Leo] says in a
sermon on the Epiphany: "To Abraham was promised an innumerable
progeny, begotten, not of carnal propagation, but of the fruitfulness
of faith. For this reason it is compared to the multitude of stars;
that a heavenly progeny might be hoped for." Wherefore the Gentiles,
"who are thus designated by the stars, are by the rising of a new star
stimulated" to seek Christ, through whom they are made the seed of
Abraham.
Reply to Objection 1: That which of itself is hidden needs to be
manifested, but not that which in itself is manifest. Now, the flesh of
Him who was born was manifest, whereas the Godhead was hidden. And
therefore it was fitting that this birth should be made known by
angels, who are the ministers of God. Wherefore also a certain
"brightness" (Lk. 2:9) accompanied the angelic apparition, to indicate
that He who was just born was the "Brightness of" the Father's "glory."
Reply to Objection 2: The righteous did not need the visible apparition
of the angel; on account of their perfection the interior instinct of
the Holy Ghost was enough for them.
Reply to Objection 3: The star which manifested Christ's birth removed
all occasion of error. For, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. ii): "No
astrologer has ever so far connected the stars with man's fate at the
time of his birth as to assert that one of the stars, at the birth of
any man, left its orbit and made its way to him who was just born": as
happened in the case of the star which made known the birth of Christ.
Consequently this does not corroborate the error of those who "think
there is a connection between man's birth and the course of the stars,
for they do not hold that the course of the stars can be changed at a
man's birth."
In the same sense Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Matth.): "It is not an
astronomer's business to know from the stars those who are born, but to
tell the future from the hour of a man's birth: whereas the Magi did
not know the time of the birth, so as to conclude therefrom some
knowledge of the future; rather was it the other way about."
Reply to Objection 4: Chrysostom relates (Hom. ii in Matth.) that,
according to some apocryphal books, a certain tribe in the far east
near the ocean was in the possession of a document written by Seth,
referring to this star and to the presents to be offered: which tribe
watched attentively for the rising of this star, twelve men being
appointed to take observations, who at stated times repaired to the
summit of a mountain with faithful assiduity: whence they subsequently
perceived the star containing the figure of a small child, and above it
the form of a cross.
Or we may say, as may be read in the book De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test.,
qu. lxiii, that "these Magi followed the tradition of Balaam," who
said, "'A star shall rise out of Jacob.' Wherefore observing this star
to be a stranger to the system of this world, they gathered that it was
the one foretold by Balaam to indicate the King of the Jews."
Or again, it may be said with Augustine, in a sermon on the Epiphany
(ccclxxiv), that "the Magi had received a revelation through the
angels" that the star was a sign of the birth of Christ: and he thinks
it probable that these were "good angels; since in adoring Christ they
were seeking for salvation."
Or with Pope Leo, in a sermon on the Epiphany (xxxiv), that "besides
the outward form which aroused the attention of their corporeal eyes, a
more brilliant ray enlightened their minds with the light of faith."
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Whether Christ's birth was made known in a becoming order?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's birth was made known in an
unbecoming order. For Christ's birth should have been made known to
them first who were nearest to Christ, and who longed for Him most;
according to Wis. 6:14: "She preventeth them that covet her, so that
she first showeth herself unto them." But the righteous were nearest to
Christ by faith, and longed most for His coming; whence it is written
(Lk. 2:25) of Simeon that "he was just and devout, waiting for the
consolation of Israel." Therefore Christ's birth should have been made
known to Simeon before the shepherds and Magi.
Objection 2: Further, the Magi were the "first-fruits of the Gentiles,"
who were to believe in Christ. But first the "fulness of the Gentiles .
. . come in" unto faith, and afterwards "all Israel" shall "be saved,"
as is written (Rom. 11:25). Therefore Christ's birth should have been
made known to the Magi before the shepherds.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 2:16) that "Herod killed all
the male children that were in Bethlehem, and in all the borders
thereof, from two years old and under, according to the time which he
had diligently inquired from the wise men": so that it seems that the
Magi were two years in coming to Christ after His birth. It was
therefore unbecoming that Christ should be made known to the Gentiles
so long after His birth.
On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 2:21): "He changes time and ages."
Consequently the time of the manifestation of Christ's birth seems to
have been arranged in a suitable order.
I answer that, Christ's birth was first made known to the shepherds on
the very day that He was born. For, as it is written (Lk. 2:8, 15, 16):
"There were in the same country shepherds watching, and keeping the
night-watches over their flock . . . And it came to pass, after the
angels departed from them into heaven they [Vulg.: 'the shepherds']
said one to another: Let us go over to Bethlehem . . . and they came
with haste." Second in order were the Magi, who came to Christ on the
thirteenth day after His birth, on which day is kept the feast of the
Epiphany. For if they had come after a year, or even two years, they
would not have found Him in Bethlehem, since it is written (Lk. 2:39)
that "after they had performed all things according to the law of the
Lord"---that is to say, after they had offered up the Child Jesus in
the Temple---"they returned into Galilee, to their city"---namely,
"Nazareth." In the third place, it was made known in the Temple to the
righteous on the fortieth day after His birth, as related by Luke
(2:22).
The reason of this order is that the shepherds represent the apostles
and other believers of the Jews, to whom the faith of Christ was made
known first; among whom there were "not many mighty, not many noble,"
as we read 1 Cor. 1:26. Secondly, the faith of Christ came to the
"fulness of the Gentiles"; and this is foreshadowed in the Magi.
Thirdly it came to the fulness of the Jews, which is foreshadowed in
the righteous. Wherefore also Christ was manifested to them in the
Jewish Temple.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 9:30,31): "Israel, by
following after the law of justice, is not come unto the law of
justice": but the Gentiles, "who followed not after justice,"
forestalled the generality of the Jews in the justice which is of
faith. As a figure of this, Simeon, "who was waiting for the
consolation of Israel," was the last to know Christ born: and he was
preceded by the Magi and the shepherds, who did not await the coming of
Christ with such longing.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the "fulness of the Gentiles came in"
unto faith before the fulness of the Jews, yet the first-fruits of the
Jews preceded the first-fruits of the Gentiles in faith. For this
reason the birth of Christ was made known to the shepherds before the
Magi.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two opinions about the apparition of
the star seen by the Magi. For Chrysostom (Hom. ii in Matth. [*Opus
Imperf. in Matth., falsely ascribed to Chrysostom]), and Augustine in a
sermon on the Epiphany (cxxxi, cxxxii), say that the star was seen by
the Magi during the two years that preceded the birth of Christ: and
then, having first considered the matter and prepared themselves for
the journey, they came from the farthest east to Christ, arriving on
the thirteenth day after His birth. Wherefore Herod, immediately after
the departure of the Magi, "perceiving that He was deluded by them,"
commanded the male children to be killed "from two years old and
under," being doubtful lest Christ were already born when the star
appeared, according as he had heard from the Magi.
But others say that the star first appeared when Christ was born, and
that the Magi set off as soon as they saw the star, and accomplished a
journey of very great length in thirteen days, owing partly to the
Divine assistance, and partly to the fleetness of the dromedaries. And
I say this on the supposition that they came from the far east. But
others, again, say that they came from a neighboring country, whence
also was Balaam, to whose teaching they were heirs; and they are said
to have come from the east, because their country was to the east of
the country of the Jews. In this case Herod killed the babes, not as
soon as the Magi departed, but two years after: and that either because
he is said to have gone to Rome in the meanwhile on account of an
accusation brought against him, or because he was troubled at some
imminent peril, and for the time being desisted from his anxiety to
slay the child, or because he may have thought that the Magi, "being
deceived by the illusory appearance of the star, and not finding the
child, as they had expected to, were ashamed to return to him": as
Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. ii). And the reason why he killed
not only those who were two years old, but also the younger children,
would be, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Innocents, because he
feared lest a child whom the stars obey, might make himself appear
older or younger.
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Whether the star which appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system
?
Objection 1: It would seem that the star which appeared to the Magi
belonged to the heavenly system. For Augustine says in a sermon on the
Epiphany (cxxii): "While God yet clings to the breast, and suffers
Himself to be wrapped in humble swaddling clothes, suddenly a new star
shines forth in the heavens." Therefore the star which appeared to the
Magi belonged to the heavenly system.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cci):
"Christ was made known to the shepherds by angels, to the Magi by a
star. A heavenly tongue speaks to both, because the tongue of the
prophets spoke no longer." But the angels who appeared to the shepherds
were really angels from heaven. Therefore also the star which appeared
to the Magi was really a star from the heavens.
Objection 3: Further, stars which are not in the heavens but in the air
are called comets, which do not appear at the birth of kings, but
rather are signs of their approaching death. But this star was a sign
of the King's birth: wherefore the Magi said (Mat. 2:2): "Where is He
that is born King of the Jews? For we have seen His star in the east."
Therefore it seems that it was a star from the heavens.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. ii): "It was not one of
those stars which since the beginning of the creation observe the
course appointed to them by the Creator; but this star was a stranger
to the heavens, and made its appearance at the strange sight of a
virgin in childbirth."
I answer that, As Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Matth.), it is clear, for
many reasons, that the star which appeared to the Magi did not belong
to the heavenly system. First, because no other star approaches from
the same quarter as this star, whose course was from north to south,
these being the relative positions of Persia, whence the Magi came, and
Judea. Secondly, from the time [at which it was seen]. For it appeared
not only at night, but also at midday: and no star can do this, not
even the moon. Thirdly, because it was visible at one time and hidden
at another. For when they entered Jerusalem it hid itself: then, when
they had left Herod, it showed itself again. Fourthly, because its
movement was not continuous, but when the Magi had to continue their
journey the star moved on; when they had to stop the star stood still;
as happened to the pillar of a cloud in the desert. Fifthly, because it
indicated the virginal Birth, not by remaining aloft, but by coming
down below. For it is written (Mat. 2:9) that "the star which they had
seen in the east went before them, until it came and stood over where
the child was." Whence it is evident that the words of the Magi, "We
have seen His star in the east," are to be taken as meaning, not that
when they were in the east the star appeared over the country of Judea,
but that when they saw the star it was in the east, and that it
preceded them into Judea (although this is considered doubtful by
some). But it could not have indicated the house distinctly, unless it
were near the earth. And, as he [Chrysostom] observes, this does not
seem fitting to a star, but "of some power endowed with reason."
Consequently "it seems that this was some invisible force made visible
under the form of a star."
Wherefore some say that, as the Holy Ghost, after our Lord's Baptism,
came down on Him under the form of a dove, so did He appear to the Magi
under the form of a star. While others say that the angel who, under a
human form, appeared to the shepherds, under the form of a star,
appeared to the Magi. But it seems more probable that it was a newly
created star, not in the heavens, but in the air near the earth, and
that its movement varied according to God's will. Wherefore Pope Leo
says in a sermon on the Epiphany (xxxi): "A star of unusual brightness
appeared to the three Magi in the east, which, through being more
brilliant and more beautiful than the other stars, drew men's gaze and
attention: so that they understood at once that such an unwonted event
could not be devoid of purpose."
Reply to Objection 1: In Holy Scripture the air is sometimes called the
heavens---for instance, "The birds of the heavens [Douay: 'air'] and
the fishes of the sea."
Reply to Objection 2: The angels of heaven, by reason of their very
office, come down to us, being "sent to minister." But the stars of
heaven do not change their position. Wherefore there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: As the star did not follow the course of the
heavenly stars, so neither did it follow the course of the comets,
which neither appear during the daytime nor vary their customary
course. Nevertheless in its signification it has something in common
with the comets. Because the heavenly kingdom of Christ "shall break in
pieces, and shall consume all the kingdoms" of the earth, "and itself
shall stand for ever" (Dan. 2:44).
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Whether it was becoming that the Magi should come to adore Christ and pay
homage to Him?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unbecoming that the Magi should
come to adore Christ and pay homage to Him. For reverence is due to a
king from his subjects. But the Magi did not belong to the kingdom of
the Jews. Therefore, since they knew by seeing the star that He that
was born was the "King of the Jews," it seems unbecoming that they
should come to adore Him.
Objection 2: Further, it seems absurd during the reign of one king to
proclaim a stranger. But in Judea Herod was reigning. Therefore it was
foolish of the Magi to proclaim the birth of a king.
Objection 3: Further, a heavenly sign is more certain than a human
sign. But the Magi had come to Judea from the east, under the guidance
of a heavenly sign. Therefore it was foolish of them to seek human
guidance besides that of the star, saying: "Where is He that is born
King of the Jews?"
Objection 4: Further, the offering of gifts and the homage of adoration
are not due save to kings already reigning. But the Magi did not find
Christ resplendent with kingly grandeur. Therefore it was unbecoming
for them to offer Him gifts and homage.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 60:3): "[The Gentiles] shall walk
in the light, and kings in the brightness of thy rising." But those who
walk in the Divine light do not err. Therefore the Magi were right in
offering homage to Christ.
I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 1), the Magi are the
"first-fruits of the Gentiles" that believed in Christ; because their
faith was a presage of the faith and devotion of the nations who were
to come to Christ from afar. And therefore, as the devotion and faith
of the nations is without any error through the inspiration of the Holy
Ghost, so also we must believe that the Magi, inspired by the Holy
Ghost, did wisely in paying homage to Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany
(cc.): "Though many kings of the Jews had been born and died, none of
them did the Magi seek to adore. And so they who came from a distant
foreign land to a kingdom that was entirely strange to them, had no
idea of showing such great homage to such a king as the Jews were wont
to have. But they had learnt that such a King was born that by adoring
Him they might be sure of obtaining from Him the salvation which is of
God."
Reply to Objection 2: By proclaiming [Christ King] the Magi
foreshadowed the constancy of the Gentiles in confessing Christ even
until death. Whence Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth.) that, while
they thought of the King who was to come, the Magi feared not the king
who was actually present. They had not yet seen Christ, and they were
already prepared to die for Him.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany
(cc.): "The star which led the Magi to the place where the Divine
Infant was with His Virgin-Mother could bring them to the town of
Bethlehem, in which Christ was born. Yet it hid itself until the Jews
also bore testimony of the city in which Christ was to be born: so
that, being encouraged by a twofold witness," as Pope Leo says (Serm.
xxxiv), "they might seek with more ardent faith Him, whom both the
brightness of the star and the authority of prophecy revealed." Thus
they "proclaim" that Christ is born, and "inquire where; they believe
and ask, as it were, betokening those who walk by faith and desire to
see," as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxcix). But the
Jews, by indicating to them the place of Christ's birth, "are like the
carpenters who built the Ark of Noe, who provided others with the means
of escape, and themselves perished in the flood. Those who asked, heard
and went their way: the teachers spoke and stayed where they were; like
the milestones that point out the way but walk not" (Augustine, Serm.
cclxxiii). It was also by God's will that, when they no longer saw the
star, the Magi, by human instinct, went to Jerusalem, to seek in the
royal city the new-born King, in order that Christ's birth might be
publicly proclaimed first in Jerusalem, according to Is. 2:3: "The Law
shall come forth from Sion, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem";
and also "in order that by the zeal of the Magi who came from afar, the
indolence of the Jews who lived near at hand, might be proved worthy of
condemnation" (Remig., Hom. in Matth. ii, 1).
Reply to Objection 4: As Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth. [*From the
supposititious Opus Imperfectum]): "If the Magi had come in search of
an earthly King, they would have been disconcerted at finding that they
had taken the trouble to come such a long way for nothing. Consequently
they would have neither adored nor offered gifts. But since they sought
a heavenly King, though they found in Him no signs of royal
pre-eminence, yet, content with the testimony of the star alone, they
adored: for they saw a man, and they acknowledged a God." Moreover,
they offer gifts in keeping with Christ's greatness: "gold, as to the
great King; they offer up incense as to God, because it is used in the
Divine Sacrifice; and myrrh, which is used in embalming the bodies of
the dead, is offered as to Him who is to die for the salvation of all"
(Gregory, Hom. x in Evang.). And hereby, as Gregory says (Hom. x in
Evang.), we are taught to offer gold, "which signifies wisdom, to the
new-born King, by the luster of our wisdom in His sight." We offer God
incense, "which signifies fervor in prayer, if our constant prayers
mount up to God with an odor of sweetness"; and we offer myrrh, "which
signifies mortification of the flesh, if we mortify the ill-deeds of
the flesh by refraining from them."
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OF CHRIST'S CIRCUMCISION, AND OF THE OTHER LEGAL OBSERVANCES ACCOMPLISHED IN
REGARD TO THE CHILD CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider Christ's circumcision. And since the circumcision
is a kind of profession of observing the Law, according to Gal. 5:3: "I
testify . . . to every man circumcising himself that he is a debtor to
do the whole Law," we shall have at the same time to inquire about the
other legal observances accomplished in regard to the Child Christ.
Therefore there are four points of inquiry:
(1) His circumcision;
(2) The imposition of His name;
(3) His presentation;
(4) His Mother's purification.
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Whether Christ should have been circumcised?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been
circumcised. For on the advent of the reality, the figure ceases. But
circumcision was prescribed to Abraham as a sign of the covenant
concerning his posterity, as may be seen from Gn. 17. Now this covenant
was fulfilled in Christ's birth. Therefore circumcision should have
ceased at once.
Objection 2: Further, "every action of Christ is a lesson to us"
[*Innoc. III, Serm. xxii de Temp.]; wherefore it is written (Jn. 3:15):
"I have given you an example, that as I have done to you, so you do
also." But we ought not to be circumcised; according to Gal. 5:2: "If
you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." Therefore it
seems that neither should Christ have been circumcised.
Objection 3: Further, circumcision was prescribed as a remedy of
original sin. But Christ did not contract original sin, as stated above
([4191]Q[14], A[3];[4192] Q[15], A[1]). Therefore Christ should not
have been circumcised.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 2:21): "After eight days were
accomplished, that the child should be circumcised."
I answer that, For several reasons Christ ought to have been
circumcised. First, in order to prove the reality of His human nature,
in contradiction to the Manicheans, who said that He had an imaginary
body: and in contradiction to Apollinarius, who said that Christ's body
was consubstantial with His Godhead; and in contradiction to Valentine,
who said that Christ brought His body from heaven. Secondly, in order
to show His approval of circumcision, which God had instituted of old.
Thirdly, in order to prove that He was descended from Abraham, who had
received the commandment of circumcision as a sign of his faith in Him.
Fourthly, in order to take away from the Jews an excuse for not
receiving Him, if He were uncircumcised. Fifthly, "in order by His
example to exhort us to be obedient" [*Bede, Hom. x in Evang.].
Wherefore He was circumcised on the eighth day according to the
prescription of the Law (Lev. 12:3). Sixthly, "that He who had come in
the likeness of sinful flesh might not reject the remedy whereby sinful
flesh was wont to be healed." Seventhly, that by taking on Himself the
burden of the Law, He might set others free therefrom, according to
Gal. 4:4,5: "God sent His Son . . . made under the Law, that He might
redeem them who were under the Law."
Reply to Objection 1: Circumcision by the removal of the piece of skin
in the member of generation, signified "the passing away of the old
generation" [*Athanasius, De Sabb. et Circumcis.]: from the decrepitude
of which we are freed by Christ's Passion. Consequently this figure was
not completely fulfilled in Christ's birth, but in His Passion, until
which time the circumcision retained its virtue and status. Therefore
it behooved Christ to be circumcised as a son of Abraham before His
Passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ submitted to circumcision while it was yet
of obligation. And thus His action in this should be imitated by us, in
fulfilling those things which are of obligation in our own time.
Because "there is a time and opportunity for every business" (Eccl
8:6).
Moreover, according to Origen (Hom. xiv in Luc.), "as we died when He
died, and rose again when Christ rose from the dead, so were we
circumcised spiritually through Christ: wherefore we need no carnal
circumcision." And this is what the Apostle says (Col. 2:11): "In
whom," [i.e. Christ] "you are circumcised with circumcision not made by
hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision
of" our Lord Jesus "Christ."
Reply to Objection 3: As Christ voluntarily took upon Himself our
death, which is the effect of sin, whereas He had no sin Himself, in
order to deliver us from death, and to make us to die spiritually unto
sin, so also He took upon Himself circumcision, which was a remedy
against original sin, whereas He contracted no original sin, in order
to deliver us from the yoke of the Law, and to accomplish a spiritual
circumcision in us---in order, that is to say, that, by taking upon
Himself the shadow, He might accomplish the reality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether His name was suitably given to Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that an unsuitable name was given to Christ.
For the Gospel reality should correspond to the prophetic foretelling.
But the prophets foretold another name for Christ: for it is written
(Is. 7:14): "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and His
name shall be called Emmanuel"; and (Is. 8:3): "Call His name, Hasten
to take away the spoils; Make haste to take away the prey"; and (Is.
9:6): "His name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor God the Mighty,
the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace"; and (Zech.
6:12): "Behold a Man, the Orient is His name." Thus it was unsuitable
that His name should be called Jesus.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Is. 62:2): "Thou shalt be called
by a new name, which the mouth of the Lord hath named [Vulg.: 'shall
name']." But the name Jesus is not a new name, but was given to several
in the Old Testament: as may be seen in the genealogy of Christ (Lk.
3:29), "Therefore it seems that it was unfitting for His name to be
called Jesus."
Objection 3: Further, the name Jesus signifies "salvation"; as is clear
from Mat. 1:21: "She shall bring forth a son, and thou shalt call His
name Jesus. For He shall save His people from their sins." But
salvation through Christ was accomplished not only in the circumcision,
but also in uncircumcision, as is declared by the Apostle (Rom.
4:11,12). Therefore this name was not suitably given to Christ at His
circumcision.
On the contrary is the authority of Scripture, in which it is written
(Lk. 2:21): "After eight days were accomplished, that the child should
be circumcised, His name was called Jesus."
I answer that, A name should answer to the nature of a thing. This is
clear in the names of genera and species, as stated Metaph. iv: "Since
a name is but an expression of the definition" which designates a
thing's proper nature.
Now, the names of individual men are always taken from some property of
the men to whom they are given. Either in regard to time; thus men are
named after the Saints on whose feasts they are born: or in respect of
some blood relation; thus a son is named after his father or some other
relation; and thus the kinsfolk of John the Baptist wished to call him
"by his father's name Zachary," not by the name John, because "there"
was "none of" his "kindred that" was "called by this name," as related
Lk. 1:59-61. Or, again, from some occurrence; thus Joseph "called the
name of" the "first-born Manasses, saying: God hath made me to forget
all my labors" (Gn. 41:51). Or, again, from some quality of the person
who receives the name; thus it is written (Gn. 25:25) that "he that
came forth first was red and hairy like a skin; and his name was called
Esau," which is interpreted "red."
But names given to men by God always signify some gratuitous gift
bestowed on them by Him; thus it was said to Abraham (Gn. 17:5): "Thou
shalt be called Abraham; because I have made thee a father of many
nations": and it was said to Peter (Mat. 16:18): "Thou art Peter, and
upon this rock I will build My Church." Since, therefore, this
prerogative of grace was bestowed on the Man Christ that through Him
all men might be saved, therefore He was becomingly named Jesus, i.e.
Saviour: the angel having foretold this name not only to His Mother,
but also to Joseph, who was to be his foster-father.
Reply to Objection 1: All these names in some way mean the same as
Jesus, which means "salvation." For the name "Emmanuel, which being
interpreted is 'God with us,'" designates the cause of salvation, which
is the union of the Divine and human natures in the Person of the Son
of God, the result of which union was that "God is with us."
When it was said, "Call his name, Hasten to take away," etc., these
words indicate from what He saved us, viz. from the devil, whose spoils
He took away, according to Col. 2:15: "Despoiling the principalities
and powers, He hath exposed them confidently."
When it was said, "His name shall be called Wonderful," etc., the way
and term of our salvation are pointed out: inasmuch as "by the
wonderful counsel and might of the Godhead we are brought to the
inheritance of the life to come," in which the children of God will
enjoy "perfect peace" under "God their Prince."
When it was said, "Behold a Man, the Orient is His name," reference is
made to the same, as in the first, viz. to the mystery of the
Incarnation, by reason of which "to the righteous a light is risen up
in darkness" (Ps. 111:4).
Reply to Objection 2: The name Jesus could be suitable for some other
reason to those who lived before Christ---for instance, because they
were saviours in a particular and temporal sense. But in the sense of
spiritual and universal salvation, this name is proper to Christ, and
thus it is called a "new" name.
Reply to Objection 3: As is related Gn. 17, Abraham received from God
and at the same time both his name and the commandment of circumcision.
For this reason it was customary among the Jews to name children on the
very day of circumcision, as though before being circumcised they had
not as yet perfect existence: just as now also children receive their
names in Baptism. Wherefore on Prov. 4:3, "I was my father's son,
tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother," the gloss says:
"Why does Solomon call himself an only son in the sight of his mother,
when Scripture testifies that he had an elder brother of the same
mother, unless it be that the latter died unnamed soon after birth?"
Therefore it was that Christ received His name at the time of His
circumcision.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ was becomingly presented in the temple?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was unbecomingly presented in
the Temple. For it is written (Ex. 13:2): "Sanctify unto Me every
first-born that openeth the womb among the children of Israel." But
Christ came forth from the closed womb of the Virgin; and thus He did
not open His Mother's womb. Therefore Christ was not bound by this law
to be presented in the Temple.
Objection 2: Further, that which is always in one's presence cannot be
presented to one. But Christ's humanity was always in God's presence in
the highest degree, as being always united to Him in unity of person.
Therefore there was no need for Him to be presented to the Lord.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is the principal victim, to whom all the
victims of the old Law are referred, as the figure to the reality. But
a victim should not be offered up for a victim. Therefore it was not
fitting that another victim should be offered up for Christ.
Objection 4: Further, among the legal victims the principal was the
lamb, which was a "continual sacrifice" [Vulg.: 'holocaust'], as is
stated Num. 28:6: for which reason Christ is also called "the
Lamb---Behold the Lamb of God" (Jn. 1: 29). It was therefore more
fitting that a lamb should be offered for Christ than "a pair of turtle
doves or two young pigeons."
On the contrary is the authority of Scripture which relates this as
having taken place (Lk. 2:22).
I answer that, As stated above [4193](A[1]), Christ wished to be "made
under the Law, that He might redeem them who were under the Law" (Gal.
4:4,5), and that the "justification of the Law might be" spiritually
"fulfilled" in His members. Now, the Law contained a twofold precept
touching the children born. one was a general precept which affected
all---namely, that "when the days of the mother's purification were
expired," a sacrifice was to be offered either "for a son or for a
daughter," as laid down Lev. 12:6. And this sacrifice was for the
expiation of the sin in which the child was conceived and born; and
also for a certain consecration of the child, because it was then
presented in the Temple for the first time. Wherefore one offering was
made as a holocaust and another for sin.
The other was a special precept in the law concerning the first-born of
"both man and beast": for the Lord claimed for Himself all the
first-born in Israel, because, in order to deliver the Israelites, He
"slew every first-born in the land of Egypt, both men and cattle" (Ex.
12:12, 13, 29), the first-born of Israel being saved; which law is set
down Ex. 13. Here also was Christ foreshadowed, who is "the First-born
amongst many brethren" (Rom. 8:29).
Therefore, since Christ was born of a woman and was her first-born, and
since He wished to be "made under the Law," the Evangelist Luke shows
that both these precepts were fulfilled in His regard. First, as to
that which concerns the first-born, when he says (Lk. 2:22,23): "They
carried Him to Jerusalem to present Him to the Lord: as it is written
in the law of the Lord, 'Every male opening the womb shall be called
holy to the Lord.'" Secondly, as to the general precept which concerned
all, when he says (Lk. 2:24): "And to offer a sacrifice according as it
is written in the law of the Lord, a pair of turtle doves or two young
pigeons."
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory of Nyssa says (De Occursu Dom.): "It
seems that this precept of the Law was fulfilled in God incarnate alone
in a special manner exclusively proper to Him. For He alone, whose
conception was ineffable, and whose birth was incomprehensible, opened
the virginal womb which had been closed to sexual union, in such a way
that after birth the seal of chastity remained inviolate." Consequently
the words "opening the womb" imply that nothing hitherto had entered or
gone forth therefrom. Again, for a special reason is it written "'a
male,' because He contracted nothing of the woman's sin": and in a
singular way "is He called 'holy,' because He felt no contagion of
earthly corruption, whose birth was wondrously immaculate" (Ambrose, on
Lk. 2:23).
Reply to Objection 2: As the Son of God "became man, and was
circumcised in the flesh, not for His own sake, but that He might make
us to be God's through grace, and that we might be circumcised in the
spirit; so, again, for our sake He was presented to the Lord, that we
may learn to offer ourselves to God" [*Athanasius, on Lk. 2:23]. And
this was done after His circumcision, in order to show that "no one who
is not circumcised from vice is worthy of Divine regard" [*Bede, on Lk.
2:23].
Reply to Objection 3: For this very reason He wished the legal victims
to be offered for Him who was the true Victim, in order that the figure
might be united to and confirmed by the reality, against those who
denied that in the Gospel Christ preached the God of the Law. "For we
must not think," says Origen (Hom. xiv in Luc.) "that the good God
subjected His Son to the enemy's law, which He Himself had not given."
Reply to Objection 4: The law ofLev. 12:6, 8 "commanded those who
could, to offer, for a son or a daughter, a lamb and also a turtle dove
or a pigeon: but those who were unable to offer a lamb were commanded
to offer two turtle doves or two young pigeons" [*Bede, Hom. xv in
Purif.]. "And so the Lord, who, 'being rich, became poor for our
[Vulg.: 'your'] sakes, that through His poverty we [you] might be
rich," as is written 2 Cor. 8:9, "wished the poor man's victim to be
offered for Him" just as in His birth He was "wrapped in swaddling
clothes and laid in a manger" [*Bede on Lk. 1]. Nevertheless, these
birds have a figurative sense. For the turtle dove, being a loquacious
bird, represents the preaching and confession of faith; and because it
is a chaste animal, it signifies chastity; and being a solitary animal,
it signifies contemplation. The pigeon is a gentle and simple animal,
and therefore signifies gentleness and simplicity. It is also a
gregarious animal; wherefore it signifies the active life. Consequently
this sacrifice signified the perfection of Christ and His members.
Again, "both these animals, by the plaintiveness of their song,
represented the mourning of the saints in this life: but the turtle
dove, being solitary, signifies the tears of prayer; whereas the
pigeon, being gregarious, signifies the public prayers of the Church"
[*Bede, Hom. xv in Purif.]. Lastly, two of each of these animals are
offered, to show that holiness should be not only in the soul, but also
in the body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting that the Mother of God should go to the temple to be
purified?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting for the Mother of God
to go to the Temple to be purified. For purification presupposes
uncleanness. But there was no uncleanness in the Blessed Virgin, as
stated above (QQ[27],28). Therefore she should not have gone to the
Temple to be purified.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 12:2-4): "If a woman, having
received seed, shall bear a man-child, she shall be unclean seven
days"; and consequently she is forbidden "to enter into the sanctuary
until the days of her purification be fulfilled." But the Blessed
Virgin brought forth a male child without receiving the seed of man.
Therefore she had no need to come to the Temple to be purified.
Objection 3: Further, purification from uncleanness is accomplished by
grace alone. But the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer grace;
rather, indeed, did she have the very Author of grace with her.
Therefore it was not fitting that the Blessed Virgin should come to the
Temple to be purified.
On the contrary is the authority of Scripture, where it is stated (Lk.
2:22) that "the days of" Mary's "purification were accomplished
according to the law of Moses."
I answer that, As the fulness of grace flowed from Christ on to His
Mother, so it was becoming that the mother should be like her Son in
humility: for "God giveth grace to the humble," as is written James
4:6. And therefore, just as Christ, though not subject to the Law,
wished, nevertheless, to submit to circumcision and the other burdens
of the Law, in order to give an example of humility and obedience; and
in order to show His approval of the Law; and, again, in order to take
away from the Jews an excuse for calumniating Him: for the same reasons
He wished His Mother also to fulfil the prescriptions of the Law, to
which, nevertheless, she was not subject.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the Blessed Virgin had no uncleanness,
yet she wished to fulfil the observance of purification, not because
she needed it, but on account of the precept of the Law. Thus the
Evangelist says pointedly that the days of her purification "according
to the Law" were accomplished; for she needed no purification in
herself.
Reply to Objection 2: Moses seems to have chosen his words in order to
exclude uncleanness from the Mother of God, who was with child "without
receiving seed." It is therefore clear that she was not bound to fulfil
that precept, but fulfilled the observance of purification of her own
accord, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The sacraments of the Law did not cleanse from
the uncleanness of sin which is accomplished by grace, but they
foreshadowed this purification: for they cleansed by a kind of carnal
purification, from the uncleanness of a certain irregularity, as stated
in the [4194]FS, Q[102], A[5]; [4195]FS, Q[103], A[2]. But the Blessed
Virgin contracted neither uncleanness, and consequently did not need to
be purified.
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OF THE BAPTISM OF JOHN (SIX ARTICLES)
We now proceed to consider the baptism wherewith Christ was baptized.
And since Christ was baptized with the baptism of John, we shall
consider (1) the baptism of John in general; (2) the baptizing of
Christ. In regard to the former there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was fitting that John should baptize?
(2) Whether that baptism was from God?
(3) Whether it conferred grace?
(4) Whether others besides Christ should have received that baptism?
(5) Whether that baptism should have ceased when Christ was baptized?
(6) Whether those who received John's baptism had afterwards to receive
Christ's baptism?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting that John should baptize?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that John should
baptize. For every sacramental rite belongs to some law. But John did
not introduce a new law. Therefore it was not fitting that he should
introduce the new rite of baptism.
Objection 2: Further, John "was sent by God . . . for a witness" (Jn.
1:6,7) as a prophet; according to Lk. 1:76: "Thou, child, shalt be
called the prophet of the Highest." But the prophets who lived before
Christ did not introduce any new rite, but persuaded men to observe the
rites of the Law. as is clearly stated Malachi 4:4: "Remember the law
of Moses My servant." Therefore neither should John have introduced a
new rite of baptism.
Objection 3: Further, when there is too much of anything, nothing
should be added to it. But the Jews observed a superfluity of baptisms;
for it is written (Mk. 7:3,4) that "the Pharisees and all the Jews eat
not without often washing their hands . . . and when they come from the
market, unless they be washed, they eat not; and many other things
there are that have been delivered to them to observe, the washings of
cups and of pots, and of brazen vessels, and of beds." Therefore it was
unfitting that John should baptize.
On the contrary is the authority of Scripture (Mat. 3:5,6), which,
after stating the holiness of John, adds many went out to him, "and
were baptized in the Jordan."
I answer that, It was fitting for John to baptize, for four reasons:
first, it was necessary for Christ to be baptized by John, in order
that He might sanctify baptism; as Augustine observes, super Joan.
(Tract. xiii in Joan.).
Secondly, that Christ might be manifested. Whence John himself says
(Jn. 1:31): "That He," i.e. Christ, "may be made manifest in Israel,
therefore am I come baptizing with water." For he announced Christ to
the crowds that gathered around him; which was thus done much more
easily than if he had gone in search of each individual, as Chrysostom
observes, commenting on St. John (Hom. x in Matth.).
Thirdly, that by his baptism he might accustom men to the baptism of
Christ; wherefore Gregory says in a homily (Hom. vii in Evang.) that
therefore did John baptize, "that, being consistent with his office of
precursor, as he had preceded our Lord in birth, so he might also by
baptizing precede Him who was about to baptize."
Fourthly, that by persuading men to do penance, he might prepare men to
receive worthily the baptism of Christ. Wherefore Bede [*Cf. Scot.
Erig. in Joan. iii, 24] says that "the baptism of John was as
profitable before the baptism of Christ, as instruction in the faith
profits the catechumens not yet baptized. For just as he preached
penance, and foretold the baptism of Christ, and drew men to the
knowledge of the Truth that hath appeared to the world, so do the
ministers of the Church, after instructing men, chide them for their
sins, and lastly promise them forgiveness in the baptism of Christ."
Reply to Objection 1: The baptism of John was not a sacrament properly
so called [per se], but a kind of sacramental, preparatory to the
baptism of Christ. Consequently, in a way, it belonged to the law of
Christ, but not to the law of Moses.
Reply to Objection 2: John was not only a prophet, but "more than a
prophet," as stated Mat. 11:9: for he was the term of the Law and the
beginning of the Gospel. Therefore it was in his province to lead men,
both by word and deed, to the law of Christ rather than to the
observance of the Old Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Those baptisms of the Pharisees were vain, being
ordered merely unto carnal cleanliness. But the baptism of John was
ordered unto spiritual cleanliness, since it led men to do penance, as
stated above.
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Whether the baptism of John was from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the baptism of John was not from God.
For nothing sacramental that is from God is named after a mere man:
thus the baptism of the New Law is not named after Peter or Paul, but
after Christ. But that baptism is named after John, according to Mat.
21:25: "The baptism of John . . . was it from heaven or from men?"
Therefore the baptism of John was not from God.
Objection 2: Further, every doctrine that proceeds from God anew is
confirmed by some signs: thus the Lord (Ex. 4) gave Moses the power of
working signs; and it is written (Heb. 2:3,4) that our faith "having
begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that
heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders." But it
is written of John the Baptist (Jn. 10:41) that "John did no sign."
Therefore it seems that the baptism wherewith he baptized was not from
God.
Objection 3: Further, those sacraments which are instituted by God are
contained in certain precepts of Holy Scripture. But there is no
precept of Holy Writ commanding the baptism of John. Therefore it seems
that it was not from God.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:33): "He who sent me to baptize
with water said to me: 'He upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit,'" etc.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in the baptism of
John---namely, the rite of baptism and the effect of baptism. The rite
of baptism was not from men, but from God, who by an interior
revelation of the Holy Ghost sent John to baptize. But the effect of
that baptism was from man, because it effected nothing that man could
not accomplish. Wherefore it was not from God alone, except in as far
as God works in man.
Reply to Objection 1: By the baptism of the New Law men are baptized
inwardly by the Holy Ghost, and this is accomplished by God alone. But
by the baptism of John the body alone was cleansed by the water.
Wherefore it is written (Mat. 3:11): "I baptize you in water; but . . .
He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost." For this reason the baptism of
John was named after him, because it effected nothing that he did not
accomplish. But the baptism of the New Law is not named after the
minister thereof, because he does not accomplish its principal effect,
which is the inward cleansing.
Reply to Objection 2: The whole teaching and work of John was ordered
unto Christ, who, by many miracles confirmed both His own teaching and
that of John. But if John had worked signs, men would have paid equal
attention to John and to Christ. Wherefore, in order that men might pay
greater attention to Christ, it was not given to John to work a sign.
Yet when the Jews asked him why he baptized, he confirmed his office by
the authority of Scripture, saying: "I am the voice of one crying in
the wilderness," etc. as related, Jn. 1:23 (cf. Is. 40:3). Moreover,
the very austerity of his life was a commendation of his office,
because, as Chrysostom says, commenting on Matthew (Hom. x in Matth.),
"it was wonderful to witness such endurance in a human body."
Reply to Objection 3: The baptism of John was intended by God to last
only for a short time, for the reasons given above [4196](A[1]).
Therefore it was not the subject of a general commandment set down in
Sacred Writ, but of a certain interior revelation of the Holy Ghost, as
stated above.
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Whether grace was given in the baptism of John?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace was given in the baptism of John.
For it is written (Mk. 1:4): "John was in the desert baptizing and
preaching the baptism of penance unto remission of sins." But penance
and remission of sins are the effect of grace. Therefore the baptism of
John conferred grace.
Objection 2: Further, those who were about to be baptized by John
"confessed their sins," as related Mat. 3:6 and Mk. 1:5. But the
confession of sins is ordered to their remission, which is effected by
grace. Therefore grace was conferred in the baptism of John.
Objection 3: Further, the baptism of John was more akin than
circumcision to the baptism of Christ. But original sin was remitted
through circumcision: because, as Bede says (Hom. x in Circumcis.),
"under the Law, circumcision brought the same saving aid to heal the
wound of original sin as baptism is wont to bring now that grace is
revealed." Much more, therefore, did the baptism of John effect the
remission of sins, which cannot be accomplished without grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:11): "I indeed baptize you in
water unto penance." Which words Gregory thus expounds in a certain
homily (Hom. vii in Evang.): "John baptized, not in the Spirit, but in
water: because he could not forgive sins." But grace is given by the
Holy Ghost, and by means thereof sins are taken away. Therefore the
baptism of John did not confer grace.
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 2), the whole teaching and
work of John was in preparation for Christ: just as it is the duty of
the servant and of the under-craftsman to prepare the matter for the
form which is accomplished by the head-craftsman. Now grace was to be
conferred on men through Christ, according to Jn. 1:17: "Grace and
truth came through Jesus Christ." Therefore the baptism of John did not
confer grace, but only prepared the way for grace; and this in three
ways: first, by John's teaching, which led men to faith in Christ;
secondly, by accustoming men to the rite of Christ's baptism; thirdly,
by penance, preparing men to receive the effect of Christ's baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: In these words, as Bede says (on Mk. 1:4), a
twofold baptism of penance may be understood. one is that which John
conferred by baptizing, which is called "a baptism of penance," etc.,
by reason of its inducing men to do penance, and of its being a kind of
protestation by which men avowed their purpose of doing penance. The
other is the baptism of Christ, by which sins are remitted, and which
John could not give, but only preach, saying: "He will baptize you in
the Holy Ghost."
Or it may be said that he preached the "baptism of penance," i.e. which
induced men to do penance, which penance leads men on to "the remission
of sins."
Or again, it may be said with Jerome [*Another author on Mk. 1 (inter
op. Hier.)] that "by the baptism of Christ grace is given, by which
sins are remitted gratis; and that what is accomplished by the
bridegroom is begun by the bridesman," i.e. by John. Consequently it is
said that "he baptized and preached the baptism of penance unto
remission of sins," not as though he accomplished this himself, but
because he began it by preparing the way for it.
Reply to Objection 2: That confession of sins was not made unto the
remission of sins, to be realized immediately through the baptism of
John, but to be obtained through subsequent penance and through the
baptism of Christ, for which that penance was a preparation.
Reply to Objection 3: Circumcision was instituted as a remedy for
original sin. Whereas the baptism of John was not instituted for this
purpose, but was merely in preparation for the baptism of Christ, as
stated above; whereas the sacraments attain their effect through the
force of their institution.
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Whether Christ alone should have been baptized with the baptism of John?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ alone should have been baptized
with the baptism of John. For, as stated above [4197](A[1]), "the
reason why John baptized was that Christ might receive baptism," as
Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. xiii). But what is proper to Christ
should not be applicable to others. Therefore no others should have
received that baptism.
Objection 2: Further, whoever is baptized either receives something
from the baptism or confers something on the baptism. But no one could
receive anything from the baptism of John, because thereby grace was
not conferred, as stated above [4198](A[3]). On the other hand, no one
could confer anything on baptism save Christ, who "sanctified the
waters by the touch of His most pure flesh" [*Mag. Sent. iv, 3].
Therefore it seems that Christ alone should have been baptized with the
baptism of John.
Objection 3: Further, if others were baptized with that baptism, this
was only in order that they might be prepared for the baptism of
Christ: and thus it would seem fitting that the baptism of John should
be conferred on all, old and young, Gentile and Jew, just as the
baptism of Christ. But we do not read that either children or Gentiles
were baptized by the latter; for it is written (Mk. 1:5) that "there
went out to him . . . all they of Jerusalem, and were baptized by him."
Therefore it seems that Christ alone should have been baptized by John.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:21): "It came to pass, when all
the people were baptized, that Jesus also being baptized and praying,
heaven was opened."
I answer that, For two reasons it behooved others besides Christ to be
baptized with the baptism of John. First, as Augustine says (Super
Joan., Tract. iv, v), "if Christ alone had been baptized with the
baptism of John, some would have said that John's baptism, with which
Christ was baptized, was more excellent than that of Christ, with which
others are baptized."
Secondly, because, as above stated, it behooved others to be prepared
by John's baptism for the baptism of Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: The baptism of John was instituted not only that
Christ might be baptized, but also for other reasons, as stated above
[4199](A[1]). And yet, even if it were instituted merely in order that
Christ might be baptized therewith, it was still necessary for others
to receive this baptism, in order to avoid the objection mentioned
above.
Reply to Objection 2: Others who approached to be baptized by John
could not, indeed, confer anything on his baptism: yet neither did they
receive anything therefrom, save only the sign of penance.
Reply to Objection 3: This was the baptism of "penance," for which
children were not suited; wherefore they were not baptized therewith.
But to bring the nations into the way of salvation was reserved to
Christ alone, who is the "expectation of the nations," as we read Gn.
49:10. Indeed, Christ forbade the apostles to preach the Gospel to the
Gentiles before His Passion and Resurrection. Much less fitting,
therefore, was it for the Gentiles to be baptized by John.
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Whether John's baptism should have ceased after Christ was baptized?
Objection 1: It would seem that John's baptism should have ceased after
Christ was baptized. For it is written (Jn. 1:31): "That He may be made
manifest in Israel, therefore am I come baptizing in water." But when
Christ had been baptized, He was made sufficiently manifest, both by
the testimony of John and by the dove coming down upon Him, and again
by the voice of the Father bearing witness to Him. Therefore it seems
that John's baptism should not have endured thereafter.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. iv): "Christ
was baptized, and John's baptism ceased to avail." Therefore it seems
that, after Christ's baptism, John should not have continued to
baptize.
Objection 3: Further, John's baptism prepared the way for Christ's. But
Christ's baptism began as soon as He had been baptized; because "by the
touch of His most pure flesh He endowed the waters with a regenerating
virtue," as Bede asserts (Mag. Sent. iv, 3). Therefore it seems that
John's baptism ceased when Christ had been baptized.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:22,23): "Jesus . . . came into
the land of Judea . . . and baptized: and John also was baptizing." But
Christ did not baptize before being baptized. Therefore it seems that
John continued to baptize after Christ had been baptized.
I answer that, It was not fitting for the baptism of John to cease when
Christ had been baptized. First, because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxix
in Joan.), "if John had ceased to baptize" when Christ had been
baptized, "men would think that he was moved by jealousy or anger."
Secondly, if he had ceased to baptize when Christ baptized, "he would
have given His disciples a motive for yet greater envy." Thirdly,
because, by continuing to baptize, "he sent his hearers to Christ"
(Hom. xxix in Joan.). Fourthly, because, as Bede [*Scot. Erig. Comment.
in Joan.] says, "there still remained a shadow of the Old Law: nor
should the forerunner withdraw until the truth be made manifest."
Reply to Objection 1: When Christ was baptized, He was not as yet fully
manifested: consequently there was still need for John to continue
baptizing.
Reply to Objection 2: The baptism of John ceased after Christ had been
baptized, not immediately, but when the former was cast into prison.
Thus Chrysostom says (Hom. xxix in Joan.): "I consider that John's
death was allowed to take place, and that Christ's preaching began in a
great measure after John had died, so that the undivided allegiance of
the multitude was transferred to Christ, and there was no further
motive for the divergence of opinions concerning both of them."
Reply to Objection 3: John's baptism prepared the way not only for
Christ to be baptized, but also for others to approach to Christ's
baptism: and this did not take place as soon as Christ was baptized.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who had been baptized with John's baptism had to be baptized
with the baptism of Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who had been baptized with John's
baptism had not to be baptized with the baptism of Christ. For John was
not less than the apostles, since of him is it written (Mat. 11:11):
"There hath not risen among them that are born of women a greater than
John the Baptist." But those who were baptized by the apostles were not
baptized again, but only received the imposition of hands; for it is
written (Acts 8:16,17) that some were "only baptized" by Philip "in the
name of the Lord Jesus": then the apostles---namely, Peter and
John---"laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost."
Therefore it seems that those who had been baptized by John had not to
be baptized with the baptism of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the apostles were baptized with John's baptism,
since some of them were his disciples, as is clear from Jn. 1:37. But
the apostles do not seem to have been baptized with the baptism of
Christ: for it is written (Jn. 4:2) that "Jesus did not baptize, but
His disciples." Therefore it seems that those who had been baptized
with John's baptism had not to be baptized with the baptism of Christ.
Objection 3: Further, he who is baptized is less than he who baptizes.
But we are not told that John himself was baptized with the baptism of
Christ. Therefore much less did those who had been baptized by John
need to receive the baptism of Christ.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Acts 19:1-5) that "Paul . . .
found certain disciples; and he said to them: Have you received the
Holy Ghost since ye believed? But they said to him: We have not so much
as heard whether there be a Holy Ghost. And he said: In what then were
you baptized? Who said: In John's baptism." Wherefore "they were" again
"baptized in the name of our [Vulg.: 'the'] Lord Jesus Christ." Hence
it seems that they needed to be baptized again, because they did not
know of the Holy Ghost: as Jerome says on Joel 2:28 and in an epistle
(lxix De Viro unius uxoris), and likewise Ambrose (De Spiritu Sancto).
But some were baptized with John's baptism who had full knowledge of
the Trinity. Therefore these had no need to be baptized again with
Christ's baptism.
Objection 5: Further, on Rom. 10:8, "This is the word of faith, which
we preach," the gloss of Augustine says: "Whence this virtue in the
water, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart, save by the
efficacy of the word, not because it is uttered, but because it is
believed?" Whence it is clear that the virtue of baptism depends on
faith. But the form of John's baptism signified the faith in which we
are baptized; for Paul says (Acts 19:4): "John baptized the people with
the baptism of penance, saying: That they should believe in Him who was
to come after him---that is to say, in Jesus." Therefore it seems that
those who had been baptized with John's baptism had no need to be
baptized again with the baptism of Christ.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. v): "Those who
were baptized with John's baptism needed to be baptized with the
baptism of our Lord."
I answer that, According to the opinion of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 2),
"those who had been baptized by John without knowing of the existence
of the Holy Ghost, and who based their hopes on his baptism, were
afterwards baptized with the baptism of Christ: but those who did not
base their hope on John's baptism, and who believed in the Father, Son,
and Holy Ghost, were not baptized afterwards, but received the Holy
Ghost by the imposition of hands made over them by the apostles."
And this, indeed, is true as to the first part, and is confirmed by
many authorities. But as to the second part, the assertion is
altogether unreasonable. First, because John's baptism neither
conferred grace nor imprinted a character, but was merely "in water,"
as he says himself (Mat. 3:11). Wherefore the faith or hope which the
person baptized had in Christ could not supply this defect. Secondly,
because, when in a sacrament, that is omitted which belongs of
necessity to the sacrament, not only must the omission be supplied, but
the whole must be entirely renewed. Now, it belongs of necessity to
Christ's baptism that it be given not only in water, but also in the
Holy Ghost, according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be born of water and
the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Wherefore in
the case of those who had been baptized with John's baptism in water
only, not merely had the omission to be supplied by giving them the
Holy Ghost by the imposition of hands, but they had to be baptized
wholly anew "in water and the Holy Ghost."
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. v): "After
John, baptism was administered, and the reason why was because he gave
not Christ's baptism, but his own . . . That which Peter gave . . . and
if any were given by Judas, that was Christ's. And therefore if Judas
baptized anyone, yet were they not rebaptized . . . For the baptism
corresponds with him by whose authority it is given, not with him by
whose ministry it is given." For the same reason those who were
baptized by the deacon Philip, who gave the baptism of Christ, were not
baptized again, but received the imposition of hands by the apostles,
just as those who are baptized by priests are confirmed by bishops.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says to Seleucianus (Ep. cclxv), "we
deem that Christ's disciples were baptized either with John's baptism,
as some maintain, or with Christ's baptism, which is more probable. For
He would not fail to administer baptism so as to have baptized servants
through whom He baptized others, since He did not fail in His humble
service to wash their feet."
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth. [*From the
supposititious Opus Imperfectum]): "Since, when John said, 'I ought to
be baptized by Thee,' Christ answered, 'Suffer it to be so now': it
follows that afterwards Christ did baptize John." Moreover, he asserts
that "this is distinctly set down in some of the apocryphal books." At
any rate, it is certain, as Jerome says on Mat. 3:13, that, "as Christ
was baptized in water by John, so had John to be baptized in the Spirit
by Christ."
Reply to Objection 4: The reason why these persons were baptized after
being baptized by John was not only because they knew not of the Holy
Ghost, but also because they had not received the baptism of Christ.
Reply to Objection 5: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), our
sacraments are signs of present grace, whereas the sacraments of the
Old Law were signs of future grace. Wherefore the very fact that John
baptized in the name of one who was to come, shows that he did not give
the baptism of Christ, which is a sacrament of the New Law.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE BAPTIZING OF CHRIST (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the baptizing of Christ, concerning which there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ should have been baptized?
(2) Whether He should have been baptized with the baptism of John?
(3) Of the time when He was baptized;
(4) Of the place;
(5) Of the heavens being opened unto Him;
(6) Of the apparition of the Holy Ghost under the form of a dove;
(7) Whether that dove was a real animal?
(8) Of the voice of the Father witnessing unto Him.
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Whether it was fitting that Christ should be baptized?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for Christ to be
baptized. For to be baptized is to be washed. But it was not fitting
for Christ to be washed, since there was no uncleanness in Him.
Therefore it seems unfitting for Christ to be baptized.
Objection 2: Further, Christ was circumcised in order to fulfil the
law. But baptism was not prescribed by the law. Therefore He should not
have been baptized.
Objection 3: Further, the first mover in every genus is unmoved in
regard to that movement; thus the heaven, which is the first cause of
alteration, is unalterable. But Christ is the first principle of
baptism, according to Jn. 1:33: "He upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit
descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth." Therefore
it was unfitting for Christ to be baptized.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:13) that "Jesus cometh from
Galilee to the Jordan, unto John, to be baptized by him."
I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to be baptized. First,
because, as Ambrose says on Lk. 3:21: "Our Lord was baptized because He
wished, not to be cleansed, but to cleanse the waters, that, being
purified by the flesh of Christ that knew no sin, they might have the
virtue of baptism"; and, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.), "that
He might bequeath the sanctified waters to those who were to be
baptized afterwards." Secondly, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.),
"although Christ was not a sinner, yet did He take a sinful nature and
'the likeness of sinful flesh.' Wherefore, though He needed not baptism
for His own sake, yet carnal nature in others had need thereof." And,
as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix) "Christ was baptized that He
might plunge the old Adam entirely in the water." Thirdly, He wished to
be baptized, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxxxvi),
"because He wished to do what He had commanded all to do." And this is
what He means by saying: "So it becometh us to fulfil all justice"
(Mat. 3:15). For, as Ambrose says (on Lk. 3:21), "this is justice, to
do first thyself that which thou wishest another to do, and so
encourage others by thy example."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ was baptized, not that He might be
cleansed, but that He might cleanse, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: It was fitting that Christ should not only fulfil
what was prescribed by the Old Law, but also begin what appertained to
the New Law. Therefore He wished not only to be circumcised, but also
to be baptized.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ is the first principle of baptism's
spiritual effect. Unto this He was not baptized, but only in water.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting for Christ to be baptized with John's baptism?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting for Christ to be
baptized with John's baptism. For John's baptism was the "baptism of
penance." But penance is unbecoming to Christ, since He had no sin.
Therefore it seems that He should not have been baptized with John's
baptism.
Objection 2: Further, John's baptism, as Chrysostom says (Hom. de Bapt.
Christi), "was a mean between the baptism of the Jews and that of
Christ." But "the mean savors of the nature of the extremes"
(Aristotle, De Partib. Animal.). Since, therefore, Christ was not
baptized with the Jewish baptism, nor yet with His own, on the same
grounds He should not have been baptized with the baptism of John.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is best in human things should be
ascribed to Christ. But John's baptism does not hold the first place
among baptisms. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to be baptized
with John's baptism.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:13) that "Jesus cometh to the
Jordan, unto John, to be baptized by him."
I answer that, As Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. xiii): "After
being baptized, the Lord baptized, not with that baptism wherewith He
was baptized." Wherefore, since He Himself baptized with His own
baptism, it follows that He was not baptized with His own, but with
John's baptism. And this was befitting: first, because John's baptism
was peculiar in this, that he baptized, not in the Spirit, but only "in
water"; while Christ did not need spiritual baptism, since He was
filled with the grace of the Holy Ghost from the beginning of His
conception, as we have made clear above ([4200]Q[34], A[1]). And this
is the reason given by Chrysostom (Hom. de Bapt. Christi). Secondly, as
Bede says on Mk. 1:9, He was baptized with the baptism of John, that,
"by being thus baptized, He might show His approval of John's baptism."
Thirdly, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix), "by going to John to
be baptized by him, He sanctified baptism."
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [4201](A[1]), Christ wished to be
baptized in order by His example to lead us to baptism. And so, in
order that He might lead us thereto more efficaciously, He wished to be
baptized with a baptism which He clearly needed not, that men who
needed it might approach unto it. Wherefore Ambrose says on Lk. 3:21:
"Let none decline the laver of grace, since Christ did not refuse the
laver of penance."
Reply to Objection 2: The Jewish baptism prescribed by the law was
merely figurative, whereas John's baptism, in a measure, was real,
inasmuch as it induced men to refrain from sin; but Christ's baptism is
efficacious unto the remission of sin and the conferring of grace. Now
Christ needed neither the remission of sin, which was not in Him, nor
the bestowal of grace, with which He was filled. Moreover, since He is
"the Truth," it was not fitting that He should receive that which was
no more than a figure. Consequently it was more fitting that He should
receive the intermediate baptism than one of the extremes.
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is a spiritual remedy. Now, the more
perfect a thing is, the less remedy does it need. Consequently, from
the very fact that Christ is most perfect, it follows that it was
fitting that He should not receive the most perfect baptism: just as
one who is healthy does not need a strong medicine.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ was baptized at a fitting time?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was baptized at an unfitting
time. For Christ was baptized in order that He might lead others to
baptism by His example. But it is commendable that the faithful of
Christ should be baptized, not merely before their thirtieth year, but
even in infancy. Therefore it seems that Christ should not have been
baptized at the age of thirty.
Objection 2: Further, we do not read that Christ taught or worked
miracles before being baptized. But it would have been more profitable
to the world if He had taught for a longer time, beginning at the age
of twenty, or even before. Therefore it seems that Christ, who came for
man's profit, should have been baptized before His thirtieth year.
Objection 3: Further, the sign of wisdom infused by God should have
been especially manifest in Christ. But in the case of Daniel this was
manifested at the time of his boyhood; according to Dan. 13:45: "The
Lord raised up the holy spirit of a young boy, whose name was Daniel."
Much more, therefore, should Christ have been baptized or have taught
in His boyhood.
Objection 4: Further, John's baptism was ordered to that of Christ as
to its end. But "the end is first in intention and last in execution."
Therefore He should have been baptized by John either before all the
others, or after them.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:21): "It came to pass, when all
the people were baptized, that Jesus also being baptized, and praying;"
and further on (Lk. 3:23): "And Jesus Himself was beginning about the
age of thirty years."
I answer that, Christ was fittingly baptized in His thirtieth year.
First, because Christ was baptized as though for the reason that He was
about forthwith to begin to teach and preach: for which purpose perfect
age is required, such as is the age of thirty. Thus we read (Gn. 41:46)
that "Joseph was thirty" years old when he undertook the government of
Egypt. In like manner we read (2 Kings 5:4) that "David was thirty
years old when he began to reign." Again, Ezechiel began to prophesy in
"his thirtieth year," as we read Ezech. 1:1.
Secondly, because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. x in Matth.), "the law was
about to pass away after Christ's baptism: wherefore Christ came to be
baptized at this age which admits of all sins; in order that by His
observing the law, no one might say that because He Himself could not
fulfil it, He did away with it."
Thirdly, because by Christ's being baptized at the perfect age, we are
given to understand that baptism brings forth perfect men, according to
Eph. 4:13: "Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the
knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of
the age of the fulness of Christ." Hence the very property of the
number seems to point to this. For thirty is product of three and ten:
and by the number three is implied faith in the Trinity, while ten
signifies the fulfilment of the commandments of the Law: in which two
things the perfection of Christian life consists.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xl), Christ was
baptized, not "as though He needed to be cleansed, or as though some
peril threatened Him if He delayed to be baptized. But no small danger
besets any other man who departs from this life without being clothed
with the garment of incorruptibility"---namely, grace. And though it be
a good thing to remain clean after baptism, "yet is it still better,"
as he says, "to be slightly sullied now and then than to be altogether
deprived of grace."
Reply to Objection 2: The profit which accrues to men from Christ is
chiefly through faith and humility: to both of which He conduced by
beginning to teach not in His boyhood or youth, but at the perfect age.
To faith, because in this manner His human nature is shown to be real,
by its making bodily progress with the advance of time; and lest this
progress should be deemed imaginary, He did not wish to show His wisdom
and power before His body had reached the perfect age: to humility,
lest anyone should presume to govern or teach others before attaining
to perfect age.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ was set before men as an example to all.
Wherefore it behooved that to be shown forth in Him, which is becoming
to all according to the common law---namely, that He should teach after
reaching the perfect age. But, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix),
that which seldom occurs is not the law of the Church; as "neither does
one swallow make the spring." For by special dispensation, in
accordance with the ruling of Divine wisdom, it has been granted to
some, contrary to the common law, to exercise the functions of
governing or teaching. such as Solomon, Daniel, and Jeremias.
Reply to Objection 4: It was not fitting that Christ should be baptized
by John either before or after all others. Because, as Chrysostom says
(Hom. iv in Matth. [*From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum]), for
this was Christ baptized, "that He might confirm the preaching and the
baptism of John, and that John might bear witness to Him." Now, men
would not have had faith in John's testimony except after many had been
baptized by him. Consequently it was not fitting that John should
baptize Him before baptizing anyone else. In like manner, neither was
it fitting that he should baptize Him last. For as he (Chrysostom) says
in the same passage: "As the light of the sun does not wait for the
setting of the morning star, but comes forth while the latter is still
above the horizon, and by its brilliance dims its shining: so Christ
did not wait till John had run his course, but appeared while he was
yet teaching and baptizing."
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Whether Christ should have been baptized in the Jordan?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been baptized in
the Jordan. For the reality should correspond to the figure. But
baptism was prefigured in the crossing of the Red Sea, where the
Egyptians were drowned, just as our sins are blotted out in baptism.
Therefore it seems that Christ should rather have been baptized in the
sea than in the river Jordan.
Objection 2: Further, "Jordan" is interpreted a "going down." But by
baptism a man goes up rather than down: wherefore it is written (Mat.
3:16) that "Jesus being baptized, forthwith came up [Douay: 'out'] from
the water." Therefore it seems unfitting that Christ should be baptized
in the Jordan.
Objection 3: Further, while the children of Israel were crossing, the
waters of the Jordan "were turned back," as it is related Jos. 4, and
as it is written Ps. 113:3,5. But those who are baptized go forward,
not back. Therefore it was not fitting that Christ should be baptized
in the Jordan.
On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 1:9) that "Jesus was baptized by
John in the Jordan."
I answer that, It was through the river Jordan that the children of
Israel entered into the land of promise. Now, this is the prerogative
of Christ's baptism over all other baptisms: that it is the entrance to
the kingdom of God, which is signified by the land of promise;
wherefore it is said (Jn. 3:5): "Unless a man be born again of water
and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." To this
also is to be referred the dividing of the water of the Jordan by
Elias, who was to be snatched up into heaven in a fiery chariot, as it
is related 4 Kings 2: because, to wit, the approach to heaven is laid
open by the fire of the Holy Ghost, to those who pass through the
waters of baptism. Therefore it was fitting that Christ should be
baptized in the Jordan.
Reply to Objection 1: The crossing of the Red Sea foreshadowed baptism
in this---that baptism washes away sin: whereas the crossing of the
Jordan foreshadows it in this---that it opens the gate to the heavenly
kingdom: and this is the principal effect of baptism, and accomplished
through Christ alone. And therefore it was fitting that Christ should
be baptized in the Jordan rather than in the sea.
Reply to Objection 2: In baptism we "go up" by advancing in grace: for
which we need to "go down" by humility, according to James 4:6: "He
giveth grace to the humble." And to this "going down" must the name of
the Jordan be referred.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says in a sermon for the Epiphany
(x): "As of yore the waters of the Jordan were held back, so now, when
Christ was baptized, the torrent of sin was held back." Or else this
may signify that against the downward flow of the waters the river of
blessings flowed upwards.
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Whether the heavens should have been opened unto Christ at His baptism?
Objection 1: It would seem that the heavens should not have been opened
unto Christ at His baptism. For the heavens should be opened unto one
who needs to enter heaven, by reason of his being out of heaven. But
Christ was always in heaven, according to Jn. 3:13: "The Son of Man who
is in heaven." Therefore it seems that the heavens should not have been
opened unto Him.
Objection 2: Further, the opening of the heavens is understood either
in a corporal or in a spiritual sense. But it cannot be understood in a
corporal sense: because the heavenly bodies are impassible and
indissoluble, according to Job 37:18: "Thou perhaps hast made the
heavens with Him, which are most strong, as if they were of molten
brass." In like manner neither can it be understood in a spiritual
sense, because the heavens were not previously closed to the eyes of
the Son of God. Therefore it seems unbecoming to say that when Christ
was baptized "the heavens were opened."
Objection 3: Further, heaven was opened to the faithful through
Christ's Passion, according to Heb. 10:19: "We have [Vulg.: 'Having'] a
confidence in the entering into the holies by the blood of Christ."
Wherefore not even those who were baptized with Christ's baptism, and
died before His Passion, could enter heaven. Therefore the heavens
should have been opened when Christ was suffering rather than when He
was baptized.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:21): "Jesus being baptized and
praying, heaven was opened."
I answer that, As stated above [4202](A[1]; Q[38], A[1]), Christ wished
to be baptized in order to consecrate the baptism wherewith we were to
be baptized. And therefore it behooved those things to be shown forth
which belong to the efficacy of our baptism: concerning which efficacy
three points are to be considered. First, the principal power from
which it is derived; and this, indeed, is a heavenly power. For which
reason, when Christ was baptized, heaven was opened, to show that in
future the heavenly power would sanctify baptism.
Secondly, the faith of the Church and of the person baptized conduces
to the efficacy of baptism: wherefore those who are baptized make a
profession of faith, and baptism is called the "sacrament of faith."
Now by faith we gaze on heavenly things, which surpass the senses and
human reason. And in order to signify this, the heavens were opened
when Christ was baptized.
Thirdly, because the entrance to the heavenly kingdom was opened to us
by the baptism of Christ in a special manner, which entrance had been
closed to the first man through sin. Hence, when Christ was baptized,
the heavens were opened, to show that the way to heaven is open to the
baptized.
Now after baptism man needs to pray continually, in order to enter
heaven: for though sins are remitted through baptism, there still
remain the fomes of sin assailing us from within, and the world and the
devils assailing us from without. And therefore it is said pointedly
(Lk. 3:21) that "Jesus being baptized and praying, heaven was opened":
because, to wit, the faithful after baptism stand in need of prayer. Or
else, that we may be led to understand that the very fact that through
baptism heaven is opened to believers is in virtue of the prayer of
Christ. Hence it is said pointedly (Mat. 3:16) that "heaven was opened
to Him"---that is, "to all for His sake." Thus, for example, the
Emperor might say to one asking a favor for another: "Behold, I grant
this favor, not to him, but to thee"---that is, "to him for thy sake,"
as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth. [*From the supposititious Opus
Imperfectum]).
Reply to Objection 1: According to Chrysostom (Hom. iv in Matth.; from
the supposititious Opus Imperfectum), as Christ was baptized for man's
sake, though He needed no baptism for His own sake, so the heavens were
opened unto Him as man, whereas in respect of His Divine Nature He was
ever in heaven.
Reply to Objection 2: As Jerome says on Mat. 3:16,17, the heavens were
opened to Christ when He was baptized, not by an unfolding of the
elements, but by a spiritual vision: thus does Ezechiel relate the
opening of the heavens at the beginning of his book. And Chrysostom
proves this (Hom. iv in Matth.; from the supposititious Opus
Imperfectum) by saying that "if the creature"---namely, heaven---"had
been sundered he would not have said, 'were opened to Him,' since what
is opened in a corporeal sense is open to all." Hence it is said
expressly (Mk. 1:10) that Jesus "forthwith coming up out of the water,
saw the heavens opened"; as though the opening of the heavens were to
be considered as seen by Christ. Some, indeed, refer this to the
corporeal vision, and say that such a brilliant light shone round about
Christ when He was baptized, that the heavens seemed to be opened. It
can also be referred to the imaginary vision, in which manner Ezechiel
saw the heavens opened: since such a vision was formed in Christ's
imagination by the Divine power and by His rational will, so as to
signify that the entrance to heaven is opened to men through baptism.
Lastly, it can be referred to intellectual vision: forasmuch as Christ,
when He had sanctified baptism, saw that heaven was opened to men:
nevertheless He had seen before that this would be accomplished.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion is the common cause of the
opening of heaven to men. But it behooves this cause to be applied to
each one, in order that he enter heaven. And this is effected by
baptism, according to Rom. 6:3: "All we who are baptized in Christ
Jesus are baptized in His death." Wherefore mention is made of the
opening of the heavens at His baptism rather than at His Passion.
Or, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.; from the supposititious Opus
Imperfectum): "When Christ was baptized, the heavens were merely
opened: but after He had vanquished the tyrant by the cross; since
gates were no longer needed for a heaven which thenceforth would be
never closed, the angels said, not 'open the gates,' but 'Take them
away.'" Thus Chrysostom gives us to understand that the obstacles which
had hitherto hindered the souls of the departed from entering into
heaven were entirely removed by the Passion: but at Christ's baptism
they were opened, as though the way had been shown by which men were to
enter into heaven.
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Whether it is fitting to say that when Christ was baptized the Holy Ghost
came down on Him in the form of a dove?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting to say that when
Christ was baptized the Holy Ghost came down on Him in the form of a
dove. For the Holy Ghost dwells in man by grace. But the fulness of
grace was in the Man-Christ from the beginning of His conception,
because He was the "Only-begotten of the Father," as is clear from what
has been said above ([4203]Q[7], A[12];[4204] Q[34], A[1]). Therefore
the Holy Ghost should not have been sent to Him at His baptism.
Objection 2: Further, Christ is said to have "descended" into the world
in the mystery of the Incarnation, when "He emptied Himself, taking the
form of a servant" (Phil. 2:7). But the Holy Ghost did not become
incarnate. Therefore it is unbecoming to say that the Holy Ghost
"descended upon Him."
Objection 3: Further, that which is accomplished in our baptism should
have been shown in Christ's baptism, as in an exemplar. But in our
baptism no visible mission of the Holy Ghost takes place. Therefore
neither should a visible mission of the Holy Ghost have taken place in
Christ's baptism.
Objection 4: Further, the Holy Ghost is poured forth on others through
Christ, according to Jn. 1:16: "Of His fulness we all have received."
But the Holy Ghost came down on the apostles in the form, not of a
dove, but of fire. Therefore neither should He have come down on Christ
in the form of a dove, but in the form of fire.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:22): "The Holy Ghost descended in
a bodily shape as a dove upon Him."
I answer that, What took place with respect to Christ in His baptism,
as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth. [*From the supposititious Opus
Imperfectum]), "is connected with the mystery accomplished in all who
were to be baptized afterwards." Now, all those who are baptized with
the baptism of Christ receive the Holy Ghost, unless they approach
unworthily; according to Mat. 3:11: "He shall baptize you in the Holy
Ghost." Therefore it was fitting that when our Lord was baptized the
Holy Ghost should descend upon Him.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Trin. xv): "It is most
absurd to say that Christ received the Holy Ghost, when He was already
thirty years old: for when He came to be baptized, since He was without
sin, therefore was He not without the Holy Ghost. For if it is written
of John that 'he shall be filled with the Holy Ghost from his mother's
womb,' what must we say of the Man-Christ, whose conception in the
flesh was not carnal, but spiritual? Therefore now," i.e. at His
baptism, "He deigned to foreshadow His body," i.e. the Church, "in
which those who are baptized receive the Holy Ghost in a special
manner."
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. ii), the Holy Ghost
is said to have descended on Christ in a bodily shape, as a dove, not
because the very substance of the Holy Ghost was seen, for He is
invisible: nor as though that visible creature were assumed into the
unity of the Divine Person; since it is not said that the Holy Ghost
was the dove, as it is said that the Son of God is man by reason of the
union. Nor, again, was the Holy Ghost seen under the form of a dove,
after the manner in which John saw the slain Lamb in the Apocalypse
(5:6): "For the latter vision took place in the spirit through
spiritual images of bodies; whereas no one ever doubted that this dove
was seen by the eyes of the body." Nor, again, did the Holy Ghost
appear under the form of a dove in the sense in which it is said (1
Cor. 10:4): "'Now, the rock was Christ': for the latter had already a
created existence, and through the manner of its action was called by
the name of Christ, whom it signified: whereas this dove came suddenly
into existence, to fulfil the purpose of its signification, and
afterwards ceased to exist, like the flame which appeared in the bush
to Moses."
Hence the Holy Ghost is said to have descended upon Christ, not by
reason of His being united to the dove: but either because the dove
itself signified the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it "descended" when it
came upon Him; or, again, by reason of the spiritual grace, which is
poured out by God, so as to descend, as it were, on the creature,
according to James 1:17: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is
from above, coming down from the Father of lights."
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xii in Matth.): "At the
beginning of all spiritual transactions sensible visions appear, for
the sake of them who cannot conceive at all an incorporeal nature . . .
so that, though afterwards no such thing occur, they may shape their
faith according to that which has occurred once for all." And therefore
the Holy Ghost descended visibly, under a bodily shape, on Christ at
His baptism, in order that we may believe Him to descend invisibly on
all those who are baptized.
Reply to Objection 4: The Holy Ghost appeared over Christ at His
baptism, under the form of a dove, for four reasons. First, on account
of the disposition required in the one baptized---namely, that he
approach in good faith: since! as it is written (Wis. 1:5): "The holy
spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful." For the dove is an
animal of a simple character, void of cunning and deceit: whence it is
said (Mat. 10:16): "Be ye simple as doves."
Secondly, in order to designate the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost,
which are signified by the properties of the dove. For the dove dwells
beside the running stream, in order that, on perceiving the hawk, it
may plunge in and escape. This refers to the gift of wisdom, whereby
the saints dwell beside the running waters of Holy Scripture, in order
to escape the assaults of the devil. Again, the dove prefers the more
choice seeds. This refers to the gift of knowledge, whereby the saints
make choice of sound doctrines, with which they nourish themselves.
Further, the dove feeds the brood of other birds. This refers to the
gift of counsel, with which the saints, by teaching and example, feed
men who have been the brood, i.e. imitators, of the devil. Again, the
dove tears not with its beak. This refers to the gift of understanding,
wherewith the saints do not rend sound doctrines, as heretics do.
Again, the dove has no gall. This refers to the gift of piety, by
reason of which the saints are free from unreasonable anger. Again, the
dove builds its nest in the cleft of a rock. This refers to the gift of
fortitude, wherewith the saints build their nest, i.e. take refuge and
hope, in the death wounds of Christ, who is the Rock of strength.
Lastly, the dove has a plaintive song. This refers to the gift of fear,
wherewith the saints delight in bewailing sins.
Thirdly, the Holy Ghost appeared under the form of a dove on account of
the proper effect of baptism, which is the remission of sins and
reconciliation with God: for the dove is a gentle creature. Wherefore,
as Chrysostom says, (Hom. xii in Matth.), "at the Deluge this creature
appeared bearing an olive branch, and publishing the tidings of the
universal peace of the whole world: and now again the dove appears at
the baptism, pointing to our Deliverer."
Fourthly, the Holy Ghost appeared over our Lord at His baptism in the
form of a dove, in order to designate the common effect of
baptism---namely, the building up of the unity of the Church. Hence it
is written (Eph. 5:25-27): "Christ delivered Himself up . . . that He
might present . . . to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or
wrinkle, or any such thing . . . cleansing it by the laver of water in
the word of life." Therefore it was fitting that the Holy Ghost should
appear at the baptism under the form of a dove, which is a creature
both loving and gregarious. Wherefore also it is said of the Church
(Cant 6:8): "One is my dove."
But on the apostles the Holy Ghost descended under the form of fire,
for two reasons. First, to show with what fervor their hearts were to
be moved, so as to preach Christ everywhere, though surrounded by
opposition. And therefore He appeared as a fiery tongue. Hence
Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. vi): Our Lord "manifests" the Holy
Ghost "visibly in two ways"---namely, "by the dove corning upon the
Lord when He was baptized; by fire, coming upon the disciples when they
were met together . . . In the former case simplicity is shown, in the
latter fervor . . . We learn, then, from the dove, that those who are
sanctified by the Spirit should be without guile: and from the fire,
that their simplicity should not be left to wax cold. Nor let it
disturb anyone that the tongues were cloven . . . in the dove recognize
unity."
Secondly, because, as Chrysostom says (Gregory, Hom. xxx in Ev.):
"Since sins had to be forgiven," which is effected in baptism,
"meekness was required"; this is shown by the dove: "but when we have
obtained grace we must look forward to be judged"; and this is
signified by the fire.
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Whether the dove in which the Holy Ghost appeared was real?
Objection 1: It would seem that the dove in which the Holy Ghost
appeared was not real. For that seems to be a mere apparition which
appears in its semblance. But it is stated (Lk. 3:22) that the "Holy
Ghost descended in a bodily shape as a dove upon Him." Therefore it was
not a real dove, but a semblance of a dove.
Objection 2: Further, just as "Nature does nothing useless, so neither
does God" (De Coelo i). Now since this dove came merely "in order to
signify something and pass away," as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), a
real dove would have been useless: because the semblance of a dove was
sufficient for that purpose. Therefore it was not a real dove.
Objection 3: Further, the properties of a thing lead us to a knowledge
of that thing. If, therefore, this were a real dove, its properties
would have signified the nature of the real animal, and not the effect
of the Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that it was not a real dove.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxii): "Nor do we say
this as though we asserted that our Lord Jesus Christ alone had a real
body, and that the Holy Ghost appeared to men's eyes in a fallacious
manner: but we say that both those bodies were real."
I answer that, As stated above ([4205]Q[5], A[1]), it was unbecoming
that the Son of God, who is the Truth of the Father, should make use of
anything unreal; wherefore He took, not an imaginary, but a real body.
And since the Holy Ghost is called the Spirit of Truth, as appears from
Jn. 16:13, therefore He too made a real dove in which to appear, though
He did not assume it into unity of person. Wherefore, after the words
quoted above, Augustine adds: "Just as it behooved the Son of God not
to deceive men, so it behooved the Holy Ghost not to deceive. But it
was easy for Almighty God, who created all creatures out of nothing, to
frame the body of a real dove without the help of other doves, just as
it was easy for Him to form a true body in Mary's womb without the seed
of a man: since the corporeal creature obeys its Lord's command and
will, both in the mother's womb in forming a man, and in the world
itself in forming a dove."
Reply to Objection 1: The Holy Ghost is said to have descended in the
shape or semblance of a dove, not in the sense that the dove was not
real, but in order to show that He did not appear in the form of His
substance.
Reply to Objection 2: It was not superfluous to form a real dove, in
which the Holy Ghost might appear, because by the very reality of the
dove the reality of the Holy Ghost and of His effects is signified.
Reply to Objection 3: The properties of the dove lead us to understand
the dove's nature and the effects of the Holy Ghost in the same way.
Because from the very fact that the dove has such properties, it
results that it signifies the Holy Ghost.
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Whether it was becoming, when Christ was baptized that the Father's voice
should be heard, bearing witness to the Son?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unbecoming when Christ was
baptized for the Father's voice to be heard bearing witness to the Son.
For the Son and the Holy Ghost, according as they have appeared
visibly, are said to have been visibly sent. But it does not become the
Father to be sent, as Augustine makes it clear (De Trin. ii). Neither,
therefore, (does it become Him) to appear.
Objection 2: Further, the voice gives expression to the word conceived
in the heart. But the Father is not the Word. Therefore He is
unfittingly manifested by a voice.
Objection 3: Further, the Man-Christ did not begin to be Son of God at
His baptism, as some heretics have stated: but He was the Son of God
from the beginning of His conception. Therefore the Father's voice
should have proclaimed Christ's Godhead at His nativity rather than at
His baptism.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:17): "Behold a voice from
heaven, saying: This is My beloved Son in whom I am well pleased."
I answer that, As stated above [4206](A[5]), that which is accomplished
in our baptism should be manifested in Christ's baptism, which was the
exemplar of ours. Now the baptism which the faithful receive is
hallowed by the invocation and the power of the Trinity; according to
Mat. 28:19: "Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of
the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Wherefore, as
Jerome says on Mat. 3:16,17: "The mystery of the Trinity is shown forth
in Christ's baptism. our Lord Himself is baptized in His human nature;
the Holy Ghost descended in the shape of a dove: the Father's voice is
heard bearing witness to the Son." Therefore it was becoming that in
that baptism the Father should be manifested by a voice.
Reply to Objection 1: The visible mission adds something to the
apparition, to wit, the authority of the sender. Therefore the Son and
the Holy Ghost who are from another, are said not only to appear, but
also to be sent visibly. But the Father, who is not from another, can
appear indeed, but cannot be sent visibly.
Reply to Objection 2: The Father is manifested by the voice, only as
producing the voice or speaking by it. And since it is proper to the
Father to produce the Word---that is, to utter or to speak---therefore
was it most becoming that the Father should be manifested by a voice,
because the voice designates the word. Wherefore the very voice to
which the Father gave utterance bore witness to the Sonship of the
Word. And just as the form of the dove, in which the Holy Ghost was
made manifest, is not the Nature of the Holy Ghost, nor is the form of
man in which the Son Himself was manifested, the very Nature of the Son
of God, so neither does the voice belong to the Nature of the Word or
of the Father who spoke. Hence (Jn. 5:37) our Lord says: "Neither have
you heard His," i.e. the Father's, "voice at any time, nor seen His
shape." By which words, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xl in Joan.), "He
gradually leads them to the knowledge of the philosophical truth, and
shows them that God has neither voice nor shape, but is above all such
forms and utterances." And just as the whole Trinity made both the dove
and the human nature assumed by Christ, so also they formed the voice:
yet the Father alone as speaking is manifested by the voice, just as
the Son alone assumed human nature, and the Holy Ghost alone is
manifested in the dove, as Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum]
makes evident.
Reply to Objection 3: It was becoming that Christ's Godhead should not
be proclaimed to all in His nativity, but rather that It should be
hidden while He was subject to the defects of infancy. But when He
attained to the perfect age, when the time came for Him to teach, to
work miracles, and to draw men to Himself then did it behoove His
Godhead to be attested from on high by the Father's testimony, so that
His teaching might become the more credible. Hence He says (Jn. 5:37):
"The Father Himself who sent Me, hath given testimony of Me." And
specially at the time of baptism, by which men are born again into
adopted sons of God; since God's sons by adoption are made to be like
unto His natural Son, according to Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He
also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son."
Hence Hilary says (Super Matth. ii) that when Jesus was baptized, the
Holy Ghost descended on Him, and the Father's voice was heard saying:
"'This is My beloved Son,' that we might know, from what was
accomplished in Christ, that after being washed in the waters of
baptism the Holy Ghost comes down upon us from on high, and that the
Father's voice declares us to have become the adopted sons of God."
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OF CHRIST'S MANNER OF LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)
Having considered those things which relate to Christ's entrance into
the world, or to His beginning, it remains for us to consider those
that relate to the process of His life. And we must consider (1) His
manner of life; (2) His temptation; (3) His doctrine; (4) His miracles.
Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ should have led a solitary life, or have associated
with men?
(2) Whether He should have led an austere life as regards food, drink,
and clothing? Or should He have conformed Himself to others in these
respects?
(3) Whether He should have adopted a lowly state of life, or one of
wealth and honor?
(4) Whether He should have lived in conformity with the Law?
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Whether Christ should have associated with men, or led a solitary life?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have associated with
men, but should have led a solitary life. For it behooved Christ to
show by His manner of life not only that He was man, but also that He
was God. But it is not becoming that God should associate with men, for
it is written (Dan. 2:11): "Except the gods, whose conversation is not
with men"; and the Philosopher says (Polit. i) that he who lives alone
is "either a beast"---that is, if he do this from being wild---"or a
god," if his motive be the contemplation of truth. Therefore it seems
that it was not becoming for Christ to associate with men.
Objection 2: Further, while He lived in mortal flesh, it behooved
Christ to lead a most perfect life. But the most perfect is the
contemplative life, as we have stated in the [4207]SS, Q[182], AA[1],2.
Now, solitude is most suitable to the contemplative life; according to
Osee 2:14: "I will lead her into the wilderness, and I will speak to
her heart." Therefore it seems that Christ should have led a solitary
life.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's manner of life should have been uniform:
because it should always have given evidence of that which is best. But
at times Christ avoided the crowd and sought lonely places: hence
Remigius [*Cf. Catena Aurea, Matth. 5:1], commenting on Matthew, says:
"We read that our Lord had three places of refuge: the ship, the
mountain, the desert; to one or other of which He betook Himself
whenever he was harassed by the crowd." Therefore He ought always to
have led a solitary life.
On the contrary, It is written (Baruch 3:38): "Afterwards He was seen
upon earth and conversed with men."
I answer that, Christ's manner of life had to be in keeping with the
end of His Incarnation, by reason of which He came into the world. Now
He came into the world, first, that He might publish the truth. thus He
says Himself (Jn. 18:37): "For this was I born, and for this came I
into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth." Hence it
was fitting not that He should hide Himself by leading a solitary life,
but that He should appear openly and preach in public. Wherefore (Lk.
4:42,43) He says to those who wished to stay Him: "To other cities also
I must preach the kingdom of God: for therefore am I sent."
Secondly, He came in order to free men from sin; according to 1 Tim.
1:15: "Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners." And hence,
as Chrysostom says, "although Christ might, while staying in the same
place, have drawn all men to Himself, to hear His preaching, yet He did
not do so; thus giving us the example to go about and seek those who
perish, like the shepherd in his search of the lost sheep, and the
physician in his attendance on the sick."
Thirdly, He came that by Him "we might have access to God," as it is
written (Rom. 5:2). And thus it was fitting that He should give men
confidence in approaching Him by associating familiarly with them.
Wherefore it is written (Mat. 9:10): "It came to pass as He was sitting
. . . in the house, behold, many publicans and sinners came, and sat
down with Jesus and His disciples." On which Jerome comments as
follows: "They had seen the publican who had been converted from a
sinful to a better life: and consequently they did not despair of their
own salvation."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ wished to make His Godhead known through
His human nature. And therefore, since it is proper to man to do so, He
associated with men, at the same time manifesting His Godhead to all,
by preaching and working miracles, and by leading among men a blameless
and righteous life.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the [4208]SS, Q[182], A[1];
[4209]SS, Q[188], A[6], the contemplative life is, absolutely speaking,
more perfect than the active life, because the latter is taken up with
bodily actions: yet that form of active life in which a man, by
preaching and teaching, delivers to others the fruits of his
contemplation, is more perfect than the life that stops at
contemplation, because such a life is built on an abundance of
contemplation, and consequently such was the life chosen by Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's action is our instruction. And
therefore, in order to teach preachers that they ought not to be for
ever before the public, our Lord withdrew Himself sometimes from the
crowd. We are told of three reasons for His doing this. First, for the
rest of the body: hence (Mk. 6:31) it is stated that our Lord said to
His disciples: "Come apart into a desert place, and rest a little. For
there were many coming and going: and they had not so much as time to
eat." But sometimes it was for the sake of prayer; thus it is written
(Lk. 6:12): "It came to pass in those days, that He went out into a
mountain to pray; and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God."
On this Ambrose remarks that "by His example He instructs us in the
precepts of virtue." And sometimes He did so in order to teach us to
avoid the favor of men. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on Mat. 5:1,
Jesus, "seeing the multitude, went up into a mountain," says: "By
sitting not in the city and in the market-place, but on a mountain and
in a place of solitude, He taught us to do nothing for show, and to
withdraw from the crowd, especially when we have to discourse of
needful things."
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Whether it was becoming that Christ should lead an austere life in this
world?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was becoming that Christ should lead
an austere life in this world. For Christ preached the perfection of
life much more than John did. But John led an austere life in order
that he might persuade men by his example to embrace a perfect life;
for it is written (Mat. 3:4) that "the same John had his garment of
camel's hair and a leathern girdle about his loins: and his meat was
locusts and wild honey"; on which Chrysostom comments as follows (Hom.
x): "It was a marvelous and strange thing to behold such austerity in a
human frame: which thing also particularly attracted the Jews."
Therefore it seems that an austere life was much more becoming to
Christ.
Objection 2: Further, abstinence is ordained to continency; for it is
written (Osee 4:10): "They shall eat and shall not be filled; they have
committed fornication, and have not ceased." But Christ both observed
continency in Himself and proposed it to be observed by others when He
said (Mat. 19:12): "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs
for the kingdom of heaven: he that can take it let him take it."
Therefore it seems that Christ should have observed an austere life
both in Himself and in His disciples.
Objection 3: Further, it seems absurd for a man to begin a stricter
form of life and to return to an easier life: for one might quote to
his discredit that which is written, Lk. 14:30: "This man began to
build, and was not able to finish." Now Christ began a very strict life
after His baptism, remaining in the desert and fasting for "forty days
and forty nights." Therefore it seems unbecoming that, after leading
such a strict life, He should return to the common manner of living.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 11:19): "The Son of Man came
eating and drinking."
I answer that, As stated above [4210](A[1]), it was in keeping with the
end of the Incarnation that Christ should not lead a solitary life, but
should associate with men. Now it is most fitting that he who
associates with others should conform to their manner of living;
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:22): "I became all
things to all men." And therefore it was most fitting that Christ
should conform to others in the matter of eating and drinking. Hence
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xvi) that "John is described as 'neither
eating nor drinking,' because he did not take the same food as the
Jews. Therefore, unless our Lord had taken it, it would not be said of
Him, in contrast, 'eating and drinking.'"
Reply to Objection 1: In His manner of living our Lord gave an example
of perfection as to all those things which of themselves relate to
salvation. Now abstinence in eating and drinking does not of itself
relate to salvation, according to Rom. 14:17: "The kingdom of God is
not meat and drink." And Augustine (De Qq. Evang. ii, qu. 11) explains
Mat. 11:19, "Wisdom is justified by her children," saying that this is
because the holy apostles "understood that the kingdom of God does not
consist in eating and drinking, but in suffering indigence with
equanimity," for they are neither uplifted by affluence, nor distressed
by want. Again (De Doctr. Christ. iii), he says that in all such things
"it is not making use of them, but the wantonness of the user, that is
sinful." Now both these lives are lawful and praiseworthy---namely,
that a man withdraw from the society of other men and observe
abstinence; and that he associate with other men and live like them.
And therefore our Lord wished to give men an example of either kind of
life.
As to John, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvii super Matth.), "he
exhibited no more than his life and righteous conduct . . . but Christ
had the testimony also of miracles. Leaving, therefore, John to be
illustrious by his fasting, He Himself came the opposite way, both
coming unto publicans' tables and eating and drinking."
Reply to Objection 2: Just as by abstinence other men acquire the power
of self-restraint, so also Christ, in Himself and in those that are
His, subdued the flesh by the power of His Godhead. Wherefore, as we
read Mat. 9:14, the Pharisees and the disciples of John fasted, but not
the disciples of Christ. On which Bede comments, saying that "John
drank neither wine nor strong drink: because abstinence is meritorious
where the nature is weak. But why should our Lord, whose right by
nature it is to forgive sins, avoid those whom He could make holier
than such as abstain?"
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xiii super Matth.),
"that thou mightest learn how great a good is fasting, and how it is a
shield against the devil, and that after baptism thou shouldst give
thyself up, not to luxury, but to fasting---for this cause did He fast,
not as needing it Himself, but as teaching us . . . And for this did He
proceed no further than Moses and Elias, lest His assumption of our
flesh might seem incredible." The mystical meaning, as Gregory says
(Hom. xvi in Evang.), is that by Christ's example the number "forty" is
observed in His fast, because the power of the "decalogue is fulfilled
throughout the four books of the Holy Gospel: since ten multiplied by
four amounts to forty." Or, because "we live in this mortal body
composed of the four elements, and by its lusts we transgress the
commandments of the Lord, which are expressed in the decalogue." Or,
according to Augustine (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 81): "To know the Creator and
the creature is the entire teaching of wisdom. The Creator is the
Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Now the creature is
partly invisible, as the soul, to which the number three may be
ascribed, for we are commanded to love God in three ways, 'with our
whole heart, our whole soul, and our whole mind'; and partly visible,
as the body, to which the number four is applicable on account of its
being subject to heat, moisture, cold, and dryness. Hence if we
multiply ten, which may be referred to the entire moral code, by four,
which number may be applied to the body, because it is the body that
executes the law, the product is the number forty: in which,"
consequently, "the time during which we sigh and grieve is shown
forth." And yet there was no inconsistency in Christ's returning to the
common manner of living, after fasting and (retiring into the) desert.
For it is becoming to that kind of life, which we hold Christ to have
embraced, wherein a man delivers to others the fruits of his
contemplation, that he devote himself first of all to contemplation,
and that he afterwards come down to the publicity of active life by
associating with other men. Hence Bede says on Mk. 2:18: "Christ
fasted, that thou mightest not disobey the commandment; He ate with
sinners, that thou mightest discern His sanctity and acknowledge His
power."
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Whether Christ should have led a life of poverty in this world?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have led a life of
poverty in this world. Because Christ should have embraced the most
eligible form of life. But the most eligible form of life is that which
is a mean between riches and poverty; for it is written (Prov. 30:8):
"Give me neither beggary nor riches; give me only the necessaries of
life." Therefore Christ should have led a life, not of poverty, but of
moderation.
Objection 2: Further, external wealth is ordained to bodily use as to
food and raiment. But Christ conformed His manner of life to those
among whom He lived, in the matter of food and raiment. Therefore it
seems that He should have observed the ordinary manner of life as to
riches and poverty, and have avoided extreme poverty.
Objection 3: Further, Christ specially invited men to imitate His
example of humility, according to Mat. 11:29: "Learn of Me, because I
am meek and humble of heart." But humility is most commendable in the
rich; thus it is written (1 Tim. 6:11): "Charge the rich of this world
not to be high-minded." Therefore it seems that Christ should not have
chosen a life of poverty.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 8:20): "The Son of Man hath not
where to lay His head": as though He were to say as Jerome observes:
"Why desirest thou to follow Me for the sake of riches and worldly
gain, since I am so poor that I have not even the smallest
dwelling-place, and I am sheltered by a roof that is not Mine?" And on
Mat. 17:26: "That we may not scandalize them, go to the sea," Jerome
says: "This incident, taken literally, affords edification to those who
hear it when they are told that our Lord was so poor that He had not
the wherewithal to pay the tax for Himself and His apostles."
I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to lead a life of poverty in
this world. First, because this was in keeping with the duty of
preaching, for which purpose He says that He came (Mk. 1:38): "Let us
go into the neighboring towns and cities, that I may preach there also:
for to this purpose am I come." Now in order that the preachers of
God's word may be able to give all their time to preaching, they must
be wholly free from care of worldly matters: which is impossible for
those who are possessed of wealth. Wherefore the Lord Himself, when
sending the apostles to preach, said to them (Mat. 10:9): "Do not
possess gold nor silver." And the apostles (Acts 6:2) say: "It is not
reasonable that we should leave the word of God and serve tables."
Secondly, because just as He took upon Himself the death of the body in
order to bestow spiritual life on us, so did He bear bodily poverty, in
order to enrich us spiritually, according to 2 Cor. 8:9: "You know the
grace of our Lord Jesus Christ: that . . . He became poor for our
[Vulg.: 'your'] sakes that through His poverty we [Vulg.: 'you'] might
be rich."
Thirdly, lest if He were rich His preaching might be ascribed to
cupidity. Wherefore Jerome says on Mat. 10:9, that if the disciples had
been possessed of wealth, "they had seemed to preach for gain, not for
the salvation of mankind." And the same reason applies to Christ.
Fourthly, that the more lowly He seemed by reason of His poverty, the
greater might the power of His Godhead be shown to be. Hence in a
sermon of the Council of Ephesus (P. iii, c. ix) we read: "He chose all
that was poor and despicable, all that was of small account and hidden
from the majority, that we might recognize His Godhead to have
transformed the terrestrial sphere. For this reason did He choose a
poor maid for His Mother, a poorer birthplace; for this reason did He
live in want. Learn this from the manger."
Reply to Objection 1: Those who wish to live virtuously need to avoid
abundance of riches and beggary, in as far as these are occasions of
sin: since abundance of riches is an occasion for being proud; and
beggary is an occasion of thieving and lying, or even of perjury. But
forasmuch as Christ was incapable of sin, He had not the same motive as
Solomon for avoiding these things. Yet neither is every kind of beggary
an occasion of theft and perjury, as Solomon seems to add (Prov. 30:8);
but only that which is involuntary, in order to avoid which, a man is
guilty of theft and perjury. But voluntary poverty is not open to this
danger: and such was the poverty chosen by Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: A man may feed and clothe himself in conformity
with others, not only by possessing riches, but also by receiving the
necessaries of life from those who are rich. This is what happened in
regard to Christ: for it is written (Lk. 8:2,3) that certain women
followed Christ and "ministered unto Him of their substance." For, as
Jerome says on Mat. 27:55, "It was a Jewish custom, nor was it thought
wrong for women, following the ancient tradition of their nation, out
of their private means to provide their instructors with food and
clothing. But as this might give scandal to the heathens, Paul says
that he gave it up": thus it was possible for them to be fed out of a
common fund, but not to possess wealth, without their duty of preaching
being hindered by anxiety.
Reply to Objection 3: Humility is not much to be praised in one who is
poor of necessity. But in one who, like Christ, is poor willingly,
poverty itself is a sign of very great humility.
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Whether Christ conformed His conduct to the Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not conform His conduct to
the Law. For the Law forbade any work whatsoever to be done on the
Sabbath, since God "rested on the seventh day from all His work which
He had done." But He healed a man on the Sabbath, and commanded him to
take up his bed. Therefore it seems that He did not conform His conduct
to the Law.
Objection 2: Further, what Christ taught, that He also did, according
to Acts 1:1: "Jesus began to do and to teach." But He taught (Mat.
15:11) that "not" all "that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man":
and this is contrary to the precept of the Law, which declared that a
man was made unclean by eating and touching certain animals, as stated
Lev. 11. Therefore it seems that He did not conform His conduct to the
Law.
Objection 3: Further, he who consents to anything is of the same mind
as he who does it, according to Rom. 1:32: "Not only they that do them,
but they also that consent to them that do them." But Christ, by
excusing His disciples, consented to their breaking the Law by plucking
the ears of corn on the Sabbath; as is related Mat. 12:1-8. Therefore
it seems that Christ did not conform His conduct to the Law.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:17): "Do not think that I am
come to destroy the Law or the Prophets." Commenting on these words,
Chrysostom says: "He fulfilled the Law . . . in one way, by
transgressing none of the precepts of the Law; secondly, by justifying
us through faith, which the Law, in the letter, was unable to do."
I answer that, Christ conformed His conduct in all things to the
precepts of the Law. In token of this He wished even to be circumcised;
for the circumcision is a kind of protestation of a man's purpose of
keeping the Law, according to Gal. 5:3: "I testify to every man
circumcising himself, that he is a debtor to do the whole Law."
And Christ, indeed, wished to conform His conduct to the Law, first, to
show His approval of the Old Law. Secondly, that by obeying the Law He
might perfect it and bring it to an end in His own self, so as to show
that it was ordained to Him. Thirdly, to deprive the Jews of an excuse
for slandering Him. Fourthly, in order to deliver men from subjection
to the Law, according to Gal. 4:4,5: "God sent His Son . . . made under
the Law that He might redeem them who were under the Law."
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord excuses Himself from any transgression
of the Law in this matter, for three reasons. First, the precept of the
hallowing of the Sabbath forbids not Divine work, but human work: for
though God ceased on the seventh day from the creation of new
creatures, yet He ever works by keeping and governing His creatures.
Now that Christ wrought miracles was a Divine work: hence He says (Jn.
5:17): "My Father worketh until now; and I work."
Secondly, He excuses Himself on the ground that this precept does not
forbid works which are needful for bodily health. Wherefore He says
(Lk. 13:15): "Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath-day loose his ox
or his ass from the manger, and lead them to water?" And farther on
(Lk. 14:5): "Which of you shall have an ass or an ox fall into a pit,
and will not immediately draw him out on the Sabbath-day?" Now it is
manifest that the miraculous works done by Christ related to health of
body and soul.
Thirdly, because this precept does not forbid works pertaining to the
worship of God. Wherefore He says (Mat. 12:5): "Have ye not read in the
Law that on the Sabbath-days the priests in the Temple break the
Sabbath, and are without blame?" And (Jn. 7:23) it is written that a
man receives circumcision on the Sabbath-day. Now when Christ commanded
the paralytic to carry his bed on the Sabbath-day, this pertained to
the worship of God, i.e. to the praise of God's power. And thus it is
clear that He did not break the Sabbath: although the Jews threw this
false accusation in His face, saying (Jn. 9:16): "This man is not of
God, who keepeth not the Sabbath."
Reply to Objection 2: By those words Christ wished to show that man is
made unclean as to his soul, by the use of any sort of foods considered
not in their nature, but only in some signification. And that certain
foods are in the Law called "unclean" is due to some signification;
whence Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi): "If a question be raised
about swine and lambs, both are clean by nature, since 'all God's
creatures are good'; but by a certain signification lambs are clean and
swine unclean."
Reply to Objection 3: The disciples also, when, being hungry, they
plucked the ears of corn on the Sabbath, are to be excused from
transgressing the Law, since they were pressed by hunger: just as David
did not transgress the Law when, through being compelled by hunger, he
ate the loaves which it was not lawful for him to eat.
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OF CHRIST'S TEMPTATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider Christ's temptation, concerning which there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was becoming that Christ should be tempted?
(2) Of the place;
(3) Of the time;
(4) Of the mode and order of the temptation.
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Whether it was becoming that Christ should be tempted?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not becoming for Christ to be
tempted. For to tempt is to make an experiment, which is not done save
in regard to something unknown. But the power of Christ was known even
to the demons; for it is written (Lk. 4:41) that "He suffered them not
to speak, for they knew that He was Christ." Therefore it seems that it
was unbecoming for Christ to be tempted.
Objection 2: Further, Christ was come in order to destroy the works of
the devil, according to 1 Jn. 3:8: "For this purpose the Son of God
appeared, that He might destroy the works of the devil." But it is not
for the same to destroy the works of a certain one and to suffer them.
Therefore it seems unbecoming that Christ should suffer Himself to be
tempted by the devil.
Objection 3: Further, temptation is from a threefold source---the
flesh, the world, and the devil. But Christ was not tempted either by
the flesh or by the world. Therefore neither should He have been
tempted by the devil.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:1): "Jesus was led by the Spirit
into the desert to be tempted by the devil."
I answer that, Christ wished to be tempted; first that He might
strengthen us against temptations. Hence Gregory says in a homily (xvi
in Evang.): "It was not unworthy of our Redeemer to wish to be tempted,
who came also to be slain; in order that by His temptations He might
conquer our temptations, just as by His death He overcame our death."
Secondly, that we might be warned, so that none, however holy, may
think himself safe or free from temptation. Wherefore also He wished to
be tempted after His baptism, because, as Hilary says (Super Matth.,
cap. iii.): "The temptations of the devil assail those principally who
are sanctified, for he desires, above all, to overcome the holy. Hence
also it is written (Ecclus. 2): Son, when thou comest to the service of
God, stand in justice and in fear, and prepare thy soul for
temptation."
Thirdly, in order to give us an example: to teach us, to wit, how to
overcome the temptations of the devil. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.
iv) that Christ "allowed Himself to be tempted" by the devil, "that He
might be our Mediator in overcoming temptations, not only by helping
us, but also by giving us an example."
Fourthly, in order to fill us with confidence in His mercy. Hence it is
written (Heb. 4:15): "We have not a high-priest, who cannot have
compassion on our infirmities, but one tempted in all things like as we
are, without sin."
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix): "Christ was
known to the demons only so far as He willed; not as the Author of
eternal life, but as the cause of certain temporal effects," from which
they formed a certain conjecture that Christ was the Son of God. But
since they also observed in Him certain signs of human frailty, they
did not know for certain that He was the Son of God: wherefore (the
devil) wished to tempt Him. This is implied by the words of Mat. 4:2,3,
saying that, after "He was hungry, the tempter" came "to Him," because,
as Hilary says (Super Matth., cap. iii), "Had not Christ's weakness in
hungering betrayed His human nature, the devil would not have dared to
tempt Him." Moreover, this appears from the very manner of the
temptation, when he said: "If Thou be the Son of God." Which words
Ambrose explains as follows (In Luc. iv): "What means this way of
addressing Him, save that, though he knew that the Son of God was to
come, yet he did not think that He had come in the weakness of the
flesh?"
Reply to Objection 2: Christ came to destroy the works of the devil,
not by powerful deeds, but rather by suffering from him and his
members, so as to conquer the devil by righteousness, not by power;
thus Augustine says (De Trin. xiii) that "the devil was to be overcome,
not by the power of God, but by righteousness." And therefore in regard
to Christ's temptation we must consider what He did of His own will and
what He suffered from the devil. For that He allowed Himself to be
tempted was due to His own will. Wherefore it is written (Mat. 4:1):
"Jesus was led by the Spirit into the desert, to be tempted by the
devil"; and Gregory (Hom. xvi in Evang.) says this is to be understood
of the Holy Ghost, to wit, that "thither did His Spirit lead Him, where
the wicked spirit would find Him and tempt Him." But He suffered from
the devil in being "taken up" on to "the pinnacle of the Temple" and
again "into a very high mountain." Nor is it strange, as Gregory
observes, "that He allowed Himself to be taken by him on to a mountain,
who allowed Himself to be crucified by His members." And we understand
Him to have been taken up by the devil, not, as it were, by force, but
because, as Origen says (Hom. xxi super Luc.), "He followed Him in the
course of His temptation like a wrestler advancing of his own accord."
Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 4:15), Christ wished to
be "tempted in all things, without sin." Now temptation which comes
from an enemy can be without sin: because it comes about by merely
outward suggestion. But temptation which comes from the flesh cannot be
without sin, because such a temptation is caused by pleasure and
concupiscence; and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix), "it is not
without sin that 'the flesh desireth against the spirit.'" And hence
Christ wished to be tempted by an enemy, but not by the flesh.
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Whether Christ should have been tempted in the desert?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been tempted in
the desert. Because Christ wished to be tempted in order to give us an
example, as stated above [4211](A[1]). But an example should be set
openly before those who are to follow it. Therefore He should not have
been tempted in the desert.
Objection 2: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xii in Matth.): "Then most
especially does the devil assail by tempting us, when he sees us alone.
Thus did he tempt the woman in the beginning when he found her apart
from her husband." Hence it seems that, by going into the desert to be
tempted, He exposed Himself to temptation. Since, therefore, His
temptation is an example to us, it seems that others too should take
such steps as will lead them into temptation. And yet this seems a
dangerous thing to do, since rather should we avoid the occasion of
being tempted.
Objection 3: Further, Mat. 4:5, Christ's second temptation is set down,
in which "the devil took" Christ up "into the Holy City, and set Him
upon the pinnacle of the Temple": which is certainly not in the desert.
Therefore He was not tempted in the desert only.
On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 1:13) that Jesus "was in the desert
forty days and forty nights, and was tempted by Satan."
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), Christ of His own
free-will exposed Himself to be tempted by the devil, just as by His
own free-will He submitted to be killed by His members; else the devil
would not have dared to approach Him. Now the devil prefers to assail a
man who is alone, for, as it is written (Eccles. 4:12), "if a man
prevail against one, two shall withstand him." And so it was that
Christ went out into the desert, as to a field of battle, to be tempted
there by the devil. Hence Ambrose says on Lk. 4:1, that "Christ was led
into the desert for the purpose of provoking the devil. For had he,"
i.e. the devil, "not fought, He," i.e. Christ, "would not have
conquered." He adds other reasons, saying that "Christ in doing this
set forth the mystery of Adam's delivery from exile," who had been
expelled from paradise into the desert, and "set an example to us, by
showing that the devil envies those who strive for better things."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is set as an example to all through faith,
according to Heb. 12:2: "Looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of
faith." Now faith, as it is written (Rom. 10:17), "cometh by hearing,"
but not by seeing: nay, it is even said (Jn. 20:29): "Blessed are they
that have not seen and have believed." And therefore, in order that
Christ's temptation might be an example to us, it behooved that men
should not see it, and it was enough that they should hear it related.
Reply to Objection 2: The occasions of temptation are twofold. one is
on the part of man---for instance, when a man causes himself to be near
to sin by not avoiding the occasion of sinning. And such occasions of
temptation should be avoided, as it is written of Lot (Gn. 19:17):
"Neither stay thou in all the country about" Sodom.
Another occasion of temptation is on the part of the devil, who always
"envies those who strive for better things," as Ambrose says (In Luc.
iv, 1). And such occasions of temptation are not to be avoided. Hence
Chrysostom says (Hom. v in Matth. [*From the supposititious Opus
Imperfectum]): "Not only Christ was led into the desert by the Spirit,
but all God's children that have the Holy Ghost. For it is not enough
for them to sit idle; the Holy Ghost urges them to endeavor to do
something great: which is for them to be in the desert from the devil's
standpoint, for no unrighteousness, in which the devil delights, is
there. Again, every good work, compared to the flesh and the world, is
the desert; because it is not according to the will of the flesh and of
the world." Now, there is no danger in giving the devil such an
occasion of temptation; since the help of the Holy Ghost, who is the
Author of the perfect deed, is more powerful* than the assault of the
envious devil. [*All the codices read 'majus.' One of the earliest
printed editions has 'magis,' which has much to commend it, since St.
Thomas is commenting the text quoted from St. Chrysostom. The
translation would run thus: 'since rather is it (the temptation) a help
from the Holy Ghost, who,' etc.].
Reply to Objection 3: Some say that all the temptations took place in
the desert. Of these some say that Christ was led into the Holy City,
not really, but in an imaginary vision; while others say that the Holy
City itself, i.e. Jerusalem, is called "a desert," because it was
deserted by God. But there is no need for this explanation. For Mark
says that He was tempted in the desert by the devil, but not that He
was tempted in the desert only.
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Whether Christ's temptation should have taken place after His fast?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's temptation should not have
taken place after His fast. For it has been said above ([4212]Q[40],
A[2]) that an austere mode of life was not becoming to Christ. But it
savors of extreme austerity that He should have eaten nothing for forty
days and forty nights, for Gregory (Hom. xvi inn Evang.) explains the
fact that "He fasted forty days and forty nights," saying that "during
that time He partook of no food whatever." It seems, therefore, that He
should not thus have fasted before His temptation.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Mk. 1:13) that "He was in the
desert forty days and forty nights; and was tempted by Satan." Now, He
fasted forty days and forty nights. Therefore it seems that He was
tempted by the devil, not after, but during, His fast.
Objection 3: Further, we read that Christ fasted but once. But He was
tempted by the devil, not only once, for it is written (Lk. 4:13) "that
all the temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a
time." As, therefore, He did not fast before the second temptation, so
neither should He have fasted before the first.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:2,3): "When He had fasted forty
days and forty nights, afterwards He was hungry": and then "the tempter
came to Him."
I answer that, It was becoming that Christ should wish to fast before
His temptation. First, in order to give us an example. For since we are
all in urgent need of strengthening ourselves against temptation, as
stated above [4213](A[1]), by fasting before being tempted, He teaches
us the need of fasting in order to equip ourselves against temptation.
Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5, 7) reckons "fastings" together with the
"armor of justice."
Secondly, in order to show that the devil assails with temptations even
those who fast, as likewise those who are given to other good works.
And so Christ's temptation took place after His fast, as also after His
baptism. Hence since rather Chrysostom says (Hom. xiii super Matth.):
"To instruct thee how great a good is fasting, and how it is a most
powerful shield against the devil; and that after baptism thou shouldst
give thyself up, not to luxury, but to fasting; for this cause Christ
fasted, not as needing it Himself, but as teaching us."
Thirdly, because after the fast, hunger followed, which made the devil
dare to approach Him, as already stated (A[1], ad 1). Now, when "our
Lord was hungry," says Hilary (Super Matth. iii), "it was not because
He was overcome by want of food, but because He abandoned His manhood
to its nature. For the devil was to be conquered, not by God, but by
the flesh." Wherefore Chrysostom too says: "He proceeded no farther
than Moses and Elias, lest His assumption of our flesh might seem
incredible."
Reply to Objection 1: It was becoming for Christ not to adopt an
extreme form of austere life in order to show Himself outwardly in
conformity with those to whom He preached. Now, no one should take up
the office of preacher unless he be already cleansed and perfect in
virtue, according to what is said of Christ, that "Jesus began to do
and to teach" (Acts 1:1). Consequently, immediately after His baptism
Christ adopted an austere form of life, in order to teach us the need
of taming the flesh before passing on to the office of preaching,
according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:27): "I chastise my body, and bring
it into subjection, lest perhaps when I have preached to others, I
myself should become a castaway."
Reply to Objection 2: These words of Mark may be understood as meaning
that "He was in the desert forty days and forty nights," and that He
fasted during that time: and the words, "and He was tempted by Satan,"
may be taken as referring, not to the time during which He fasted, but
to the time that followed: since Matthew says that "after He had fasted
forty days and forty nights, afterwards He was hungry," thus affording
the devil a pretext for approaching Him. And so the words that follow,
and the angels ministered to Him, are to be taken in sequence, which is
clear from the words of Matthew (4:11): "Then the devil left Him," i.e.
after the temptation, "and behold angels came and ministered to Him."
And as to the words inserted by Mark, "and He was with the beasts,"
according to Chrysostom (Hom. xiii in Matth.), they are set down in
order to describe the desert as being impassable to man and full of
beasts.
On the other hand, according to Bede's exposition of Mk. 1:12,13, our
Lord was tempted forty days and forty nights. But this is not to be
understood of the visible temptations which are related by Matthew and
Luke, and occurred after the fast, but of certain other assaults which
perhaps Christ suffered from the devil during that time of His fast.
Reply to Objection 3: As Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13, the devil departed
from Christ "for a time, because, later on, he returned, not to tempt
Him, but to assail Him openly"---namely, at the time of His Passion.
Nevertheless, He seemed in this later assault to tempt Christ to
dejection and hatred of His neighbor; just as in the desert he had
tempted Him to gluttonous pleasure and idolatrous contempt of God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the mode and order of the temptation were becoming?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mode and order of the temptation
were unbecoming. For the devil tempts in order to induce us to sin. But
if Christ had assuaged His bodily hunger by changing the stones into
bread, He would not have sinned; just as neither did He sin when He
multiplied the loaves, which was no less a miracle, in order to succor
the hungry crowd. Therefore it seems that this was nowise a temptation.
Objection 2: Further, a counselor is inconsistent if he persuades the
contrary to what he intends. But when the devil set Christ on a
pinnacle of the Temple, he purposed to tempt Him to pride or vainglory.
Therefore it was inconsistent to urge Him to cast Himself thence: for
this would be contrary to pride or vainglory, which always seeks to
rise.
Objection 3: Further, one temptation should lead to one sin. But in the
temptation on the mountain he counseled two sins---namely, covetousness
and idolatry. Therefore the mode of the temptation was unfitting.
Objection 4: Further, temptations are ordained to sin. But there are
seven deadly sins, as we have stated in the [4214]FS, Q[84], A[4]. But
the tempter only deals with three, viz. gluttony, vainglory, and
covetousness. Therefore the temptation seems to have been incomplete.
Objection 5: Further, after overcoming all the vices, man is still
tempted to pride or vainglory: since pride "worms itself in stealthily,
and destroys even good works," as Augustine says (Ep. ccxi). Therefore
Matthew unfittingly gives the last place to the temptation to
covetousness on the mountain, and the second place to the temptation to
vainglory in the Temple, especially since Luke puts them in the reverse
order.
Objection 6: Further, Jerome says on Mat. 4:4 that "Christ purposed to
overcome the devil by humility, not by might." Therefore He should not
have repulsed him with a haughty rebuke, saying: "Begone, Satan."
Objection 7: Further, the gospel narrative seems to be false. For it
seems impossible that Christ could have been set on a pinnacle of the
Temple without being seen by others. Nor is there to be found a
mountain so high that all the world can be seen from it, so that all
the kingdoms of the earth could be shown to Christ from its summit. It
seems, therefore, that Christ's temptation is unfittingly described.
On the contrary is the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, The temptation which comes from the enemy takes the form
of a suggestion, as Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Evang.). Now a suggestion
cannot be made to everybody in the same way; it must arise from those
things towards which each one has an inclination. Consequently the
devil does not straight away tempt the spiritual man to grave sins, but
he begins with lighter sins, so as gradually to lead him to those of
greater magnitude. Wherefore Gregory (Moral. xxxi), expounding Job
39:25, "He smelleth the battle afar off, the encouraging of the
captains and the shouting of the army," says: "The captains are
fittingly described as encouraging, and the army as shouting. Because
vices begin by insinuating themselves into the mind under some specious
pretext: then they come on the mind in such numbers as to drag it into
all sorts of folly, deafening it with their bestial clamor."
Thus, too, did the devil set about the temptation of the first man. For
at first he enticed his mind to consent to the eating of the forbidden
fruit, saying (Gn. 3:1): "Why hath God commanded you that you should
not eat of every tree of paradise?" Secondly [he tempted him] to
vainglory by saying: "Your eyes shall be opened." Thirdly, he led the
temptation to the extreme height of pride, saying: "You shall be as
gods, knowing good and evil." This same order did he observe in
tempting Christ. For at first he tempted Him to that which men desire,
however spiritual they may be---namely, the support of the corporeal
nature by food. Secondly, he advanced to that matter in which spiritual
men are sometimes found wanting, inasmuch as they do certain things for
show, which pertains to vainglory. Thirdly, he led the temptation on to
that in which no spiritual men, but only carnal men, have a
part---namely, to desire worldly riches and fame, to the extent of
holding God in contempt. And so in the first two temptations he said:
"If Thou be the Son of God"; but not in the third, which is
inapplicable to spiritual men, who are sons of God by adoption, whereas
it does apply to the two preceding temptations.
And Christ resisted these temptations by quoting the authority of the
Law, not by enforcing His power, "so as to give more honor to His human
nature and a greater punishment to His adversary, since the foe of the
human race was vanquished, not as by God, but as by man"; as Pope Leo
says (Serm. 1, De Quadrag. 3).
Reply to Objection 1: To make use of what is needful for self-support
is not the sin of gluttony; but if a man do anything inordinate out of
the desire for such support, it can pertain to the sin of gluttony. Now
it is inordinate for a man who has human assistance at his command to
seek to obtain food miraculously for mere bodily support. Hence the
Lord miraculously provided the children of Israel with manna in the
desert, where there was no means of obtaining food otherwise. And in
like fashion Christ miraculously provided the crowds with food in the
desert, when there was no other means of getting food. But in order to
assuage His hunger, He could have done otherwise than work a miracle,
as did John the Baptist, according to Matthew (3:4); or He could have
hastened to the neighboring country. Consequently the devil esteemed
that if Christ was a mere man, He would fall into sin by attempting to
assuage His hunger by a miracle.
Reply to Objection 2: It often happens that a man seeks to derive glory
from external humiliation, whereby he is exalted by reason of spiritual
good. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12): "It must be
noted that it is possible to boast not only of the beauty and splendor
of material things, but even of filthy squalor." And this is signified
by the devil urging Christ to seek spiritual glory by casting His body
down.
Reply to Objection 3: It is a sin to desire worldly riches and honors
in an inordinate fashion. And the principal sign of this is when a man
does something wrong in order to acquire such things. And so the devil
was not satisfied with instigating to a desire for riches and honors,
but he went so far as to tempt Christ, for the sake of gaining
possession of these things, to fall down and adore him, which is a very
great crime, and against God. Nor does he say merely, "if Thou wilt
adore me," but he adds, "if, falling down"; because, as Ambrose says on
Lk. 4:5: "Ambition harbors yet another danger within itself: for, while
seeking to rule, it will serve; it will bow in submission that it may
be crowned with honor; and the higher it aims, the lower it abases
itself."
In like manner [the devil] in the preceding temptations tried to lead
[Christ] from the desire of one sin to the commission of another; thus
from the desire of food he tried to lead Him to the vanity of the
needless working of a miracle; and from the desire of glory to tempt
God by casting Himself headlong.
Reply to Objection 4: As Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13, Scripture would not
have said that "'all the temptation being ended, the devil departed
from Him,' unless the matter of all sins were included in the three
temptations already related. For the causes of temptations are the
causes of desires"---namely, "lust of the flesh, hope of glory,
eagerness for power."
Reply to Objection 5: As Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. ii): "It is
not certain which happened first; whether the kingdoms of the earth
were first shown to Him, and afterwards He was set on the pinnacle of
the Temple; or the latter first, and the former afterwards. However, it
matters not, provided it be made clear that all these things did take
place." It may be that the Evangelists set these things in different
orders, because sometimes cupidity arises from vainglory, sometimes the
reverse happens.
Reply to Objection 6: When Christ had suffered the wrong of being
tempted by the devil saying, "If Thou be the Son of God cast Thyself
down," He was not troubled, nor did He upbraid the devil. But when the
devil usurped to himself the honor due to God, saying, "All these
things will I give Thee, if, falling down, Thou wilt adore me," He was
exasperated, and repulsed him, saying, "Begone, Satan": that we might
learn from His example to bear bravely insults leveled at ourselves,
but not to allow ourselves so much as to listen to those which are
aimed at God.
Reply to Objection 7: As Chrysostom says (Hom. v in Matth.): "The devil
set Him" (on a pinnacle of the Temple) "that He might be seen by all,
whereas, unawares to the devil, He acted in such sort that He was seen
by none."
In regard to the words, "'He showed Him all the kingdoms of the world,
and the glory of them,' we are not to understand that He saw the very
kingdoms, with the cities and inhabitants, their gold and silver: but
that the devil pointed out the quarters in which each kingdom or city
lay, and set forth to Him in words their glory and estate." Or, again,
as Origen says (Hom. xxx in Luc.), "he showed Him how, by means of the
various vices, he was the lord of the world."
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OF CHRIST'S DOCTRINE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider Christ's doctrine, about which there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ should have preached to the Jews only, or to the
Gentiles also?
(2) Whether in preaching He should have avoided the opposition of the
Jews?
(3) Whether He should have preached in an open or in a hidden manner?
(4) Whether He should have preached by word only, or also by writing?
Concerning the time when He began to teach, we have spoken above when
treating of His baptism (Q[29], A[3]).
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Whether Christ should have preached not only to the Jews, but also to the
Gentiles?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have preached not only to
the Jews, but also to the Gentiles. For it is written (Is. 49:6): "It
is a small thing that thou shouldst be My servant to raise up the
tribes of Israel [Vulg.: 'Jacob'] and to convert the dregs of Jacob
[Vulg.: 'Israel']: behold, I have given thee to be the light of the
Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation even to the farthest part of
the earth." But Christ gave light and salvation through His doctrine.
Therefore it seems that it was "a small thing" that He preached to Jews
alone, and not to the Gentiles.
Objection 2: Further, as it is written (Mat. 7:29): "He was teaching
them as one having power." Now the power of doctrine is made more
manifest in the instruction of those who, like the Gentiles, have
received no tidings whatever; hence the Apostle says (Rom. 15:20): "I
have so preached the [Vulg.: 'this'] gospel, not where Christ was
named, lest I should build upon another man's foundation." Therefore
much rather should Christ have preached to the Gentiles than to the
Jews.
Objection 3: Further, it is more useful to instruct many than one. But
Christ instructed some individual Gentiles, such as the Samaritan woman
(Jn. 4) and the Chananaean woman (Mat. 15). Much more reason,
therefore, was there for Christ to preach to the Gentiles in general.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 15:24): "I was not sent but to the
sheep that are lost of the house of Israel." And (Rom. 10:15) it is
written: "How shall they preach unless they be sent?" Therefore Christ
should not have preached to the Gentiles.
I answer that, It was fitting that Christ's preaching, whether through
Himself or through His apostles, should be directed at first to the
Jews alone. First, in order to show that by His coming the promises
were fulfilled which had been made to the Jews of old, and not to the
Gentiles. Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 15:8): "I say that Christ . . .
was minister of the circumcision," i.e. the apostle and preacher of the
Jews, "for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made unto the
fathers."
Secondly, in order to show that His coming was of God; because, as is
written Rom. 13:1: "Those things which are of God are well ordered
[Vulg.: 'those that are, are ordained of God']" [*See Scriptural Index
on this passage]. Now the right order demanded that the doctrine of
Christ should be made known first to the Jews, who, by believing in and
worshiping one God, were nearer to God, and that it should be
transmitted through them to the Gentiles: just as in the heavenly
hierarchy the Divine enlightenment comes to the lower angels through
the higher. Hence on Mat. 15:24, "I was not sent but to the sheep that
are lost in the house of Israel," Jerome says: "He does not mean by
this that He was not sent to the Gentiles, but that He was sent to the
Jews first." And so we read (Is. 66:19): "I will send of them that
shall be saved," i.e. of the Jews, "to the Gentiles . . . and they
shall declare My glory unto the Gentiles."
Thirdly, in order to deprive the Jews of ground for quibbling. Hence on
Mat. 10:5, "Go ye not into the way of the Gentiles." Jerome says: "It
behooved Christ's coming to be announced to the Jews first, lest they
should have a valid excuse, and say that they had rejected our Lord
because He had sent His apostles to the Gentiles and Samaritans."
Fourthly, because it was through the triumph of the cross that Christ
merited power and lordship over the Gentiles. Hence it is written
(Apoc. 2:26, 28): "He that shall overcome . . . I will give him power
over the nations . . . as I also have received of My Father"; and that
because He became "obedient unto the death of the cross, God hath
exalted Him . . . that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow . .
." and that "every tongue should confess Him" (Phil. 2:8-11).
Consequently He did not wish His doctrine to be preached to the
Gentiles before His Passion: it was after His Passion that He said to
His disciples (Mat. 28:19): "Going, teach ye all nations." For this
reason it was that when, shortly before His Passion, certain Gentiles
wished to see Jesus, He said: "Unless the grain of wheat falling into
the ground dieth, itself remaineth alone: but if it die it bringeth
forth much fruit" (Jn. 12:20-25); and as Augustine says, commenting on
this passage: "He called Himself the grain of wheat that must be
mortified by the unbelief of the Jews, multiplied by the faith of the
nations."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ was given to be the light and salvation of
the Gentiles through His disciples, whom He sent to preach to them.
Reply to Objection 2: It is a sign, not of lesser, but of greater power
to do something by means of others rather than by oneself. And thus the
Divine power of Christ was specially shown in this, that He bestowed on
the teaching of His disciples such a power that they converted the
Gentiles to Christ, although these had heard nothing of Him.
Now the power of Christ's teaching is to be considered in the miracles
by which He confirmed His doctrine, in the efficacy of His persuasion,
and in the authority of His words, for He spoke as being Himself above
the Law when He said: "But I say to you" (Mat. 5:22,28,32,34,39,44);
and, again, in the force of His righteousness shown in His sinless
manner of life.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as it was unfitting that Christ should at
the outset make His doctrine known to the Gentiles equally with the
Jews, in order that He might appear as being sent to the Jews, as to
the first-born people; so neither was it fitting for Him to neglect the
Gentiles altogether, lest they should be deprived of the hope of
salvation. For this reason certain individual Gentiles were admitted,
on account of the excellence of their faith and devotedness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ should have preached to the Jews without offending them?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have preached to the Jews
without offending them. For, as Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi):
"In the Man Jesus Christ, a model of life is given us by the Son of
God." But we should avoid offending not only the faithful, but even
unbelievers, according to 1 Cor. 10:32: "Be without offense to the
Jews, and to the Gentiles, and to the Church of God." Therefore it
seems that, in His teaching, Christ should also have avoided giving
offense to the Jews.
Objection 2: Further, no wise man should do anything that will hinder
the result of his labor. Now through the disturbance which His teaching
occasioned among the Jews, it was deprived of its results; for it is
written (Lk. 11:53,54) that when our Lord reproved the Pharisees and
Scribes, they "began vehemently to urge Him, end to oppress His mouth
about many things; lying in wait for Him, and seeking to catch
something from His mouth, that they might accuse Him." It seems
therefore unfitting that He should have given them offense by His
teaching.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): "An ancient man
rebuke not; but entreat him as a father." But the priests and princes
of the Jews were the elders of that people. Therefore it seems that
they should not have been rebuked with severity.
On the contrary, It was foretold (Is. 8:14) that Christ would be "for a
stone of stumbling and for a rock of offense to the two houses of
Israel."
I answer that, The salvation of the multitude is to be preferred to the
peace of any individuals whatsoever. Consequently, when certain ones,
by their perverseness, hinder the salvation of the multitude, the
preacher and the teacher should not fear to offend those men, in order
that he may insure the salvation of the multitude. Now the Scribes and
Pharisees and the princes of the Jews were by their malice a
considerable hindrance to the salvation of the people, both because
they opposed themselves to Christ's doctrine, which was the only way to
salvation, and because their evil ways corrupted the morals of the
people. For which reason our Lord, undeterred by their taking offense,
publicly taught the truth which they hated, and condemned their vices.
Hence we read (Mat. 15:12, 14) that when the disciples of our Lord
said: "Dost Thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word,
were scandalized?" He answered: "Let them alone: they are blind and
leaders of the blind; and if the blind lead the blind, both fall into
the pit."
Reply to Objection 1: A man ought so to avoid giving offense, as
neither by wrong deed or word to be the occasion of anyone's downfall.
"But if scandal arise from truth, the scandal should be borne rather
than the truth be set aside," as Gregory says (Hom. vii in Ezech.).
Reply to Objection 2: By publicly reproving the Scribes and Pharisees,
Christ promoted rather than hindered the effect of His teaching.
Because when the people came to know the vices of those men, they were
less inclined to be prejudiced against Christ by hearing what was said
of Him by the Scribes and Pharisees, who were ever withstanding His
doctrine.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Apostle is to be understood of
those elders whose years are reckoned not only in age and authority,
but also in probity; according to Num. 11:16: "Gather unto Me seventy
men of the ancients of Israel, whom thou knowest to be ancients . . .
of the people." But if by sinning openly they turn the authority of
their years into an instrument of wickedness, they should be rebuked
openly and severely, as also Daniel says (Dan. 13:52): "O thou that art
grown old in evil days," etc.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ should have taught all things openly?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have taught all
things openly. For we read that He taught many things to His disciples
apart: as is seen clearly in the sermon at the Supper. Wherefore He
said: "That which you heard in the ear in the chambers shall be
preached on the housetops" [*St. Thomas, probably quoting from memory,
combines Mat. 10:27 with Lk. 12:3]. Therefore He did not teach all
things openly.
Objection 2: Further, the depths of wisdom should not be expounded save
to the perfect, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: "We speak wisdom among the
perfect." Now Christ's doctrine contained the most profound wisdom.
Therefore it should not have been made known to the imperfect crowd.
Objection 3: Further, it comes to the same, to hide the truth, whether
by saying nothing or by making use of a language that is difficult to
understand. Now Christ, by speaking to the multitudes a language they
would not understand, hid from them the truth that He preached; since
"without parables He did not speak to them" (Mat. 13:34). In the same
way, therefore, He could have hidden it from them by saying nothing at
all.
On the contrary, He says Himself (Jn. 18:20): "In secret I have spoken
nothing."
I answer that, Anyone's doctrine may be hidden in three ways. First, on
the part of the intention of the teacher, who does not wish to make his
doctrine known to many, but rather to hide it. And this may happen in
two ways---sometimes through envy on the part of the teacher, who
desires to excel in his knowledge, wherefore he is unwilling to
communicate it to others. But this was not the case with Christ, in
whose person the following words are spoken (Wis. 7:13): "Which I have
learned without guile, and communicate without envy, and her riches I
hide not." But sometimes this happens through the vileness of the
things taught; thus Augustine says on Jn. 16:12: "There are some things
so bad that no sort of human modesty can bear them." Wherefore of
heretical doctrine it is written (Prov. 9:17): "Stolen waters are
sweeter." Now, Christ's doctrine is "not of error nor of uncleanness"
(1 Thess. 2:3). Wherefore our Lord says (Mk. 4:21): "Doth a candle,"
i.e. true and pure doctrine, "come in to be put under a bushel?"
Secondly, doctrine is hidden because it is put before few. And thus,
again, did Christ teach nothing in secret: for He propounded His entire
doctrine either to the whole crowd or to His disciples gathered
together. Hence Augustine says on Jn. 18:20: "How can it be said that
He speaks in secret when He speaks before so many men? . . . especially
if what He says to few He wishes through them to be made known to
many?"
Thirdly, doctrine is hidden, as to the manner in which it is
propounded. And thus Christ spoke certain things in secret to the
crowds, by employing parables in teaching them spiritual mysteries
which they were either unable or unworthy to grasp: and yet it was
better for them to be instructed in the knowledge of spiritual things,
albeit hidden under the garb of parables, than to be deprived of it
altogether. Nevertheless our Lord expounded the open and unveiled truth
of these parables to His disciples, so that they might hand it down to
others worthy of it; according to 2 Tim. 2:2: "The things which thou
hast heard of me by many witnesses, the same command to faithful men,
who shall be fit to teach others." This is foreshadowed, Num. 4, where
the sons of Aaron are commanded to wrap up the sacred vessels that were
to be carried by the Levites.
Reply to Objection 1: As Hilary says, commenting on the passage quoted,
"we do not read that our Lord was wont to preach at night, and expound
His doctrine in the dark: but He says this because His speech is
darkness to the carnal-minded, and His words are night to the
unbeliever. His meaning, therefore, is that whatever He said we also
should say in the midst of unbelievers, by openly believing and
professing it."
Or, according to Jerome, He speaks comparatively---that is to say,
because He was instructing them in Judea, which was a small place
compared with the whole world, where Christ's doctrine was to be
published by the preaching of the apostles.
Reply to Objection 2: By His doctrine our Lord did not make known all
the depths of His wisdom, neither to the multitudes, nor, indeed, to
His disciples, to whom He said (Jn. 16:12): "I have yet many things to
say to you, but you cannot bear them now." Yet whatever things out of
His wisdom He judged it right to make known to others, He expounded,
not in secret, but openly; although He was not understood by all. Hence
Augustine says on Jn. 18:20: "We must understand this, 'I have spoken
openly to the world,' as though our Lord had said, 'Many have heard Me'
. . . and, again, it was not 'openly,' because they did not
understand."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, our Lord spoke to the multitudes
in parables, because they were neither able nor worthy to receive the
naked truth, which He revealed to His disciples.
And when it is said that "without parables He did not speak to them,"
according to Chrysostom (Hom. xlvii in Matth.), we are to understand
this of that particular sermon, since on other occasions He said many
things to the multitude without parables. Or, as Augustine says (De Qq.
Evang., qu. xvii), this means, "not that He spoke nothing literally,
but that He scarcely ever spoke without introducing a parable, although
He also spoke some things in the literal sense."
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Whether Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have committed His
doctrine to writing. For the purpose of writing is to hand down
doctrine to posterity. Now Christ's doctrine was destined to endure for
ever, according to Lk. 21:33: "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My
words shall not pass away." Therefore it seems that Christ should have
committed His doctrine to writing.
Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was a foreshadowing of Christ,
according to Heb. 10:1: "The Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of the
good things to come." Now the Old Law was put into writing by God,
according to Ex. 24:12: "I will give thee" two "tables of stone and the
law, and the commandments which I have written." Therefore it seems
that Christ also should have put His doctrine into writing.
Objection 3: Further, to Christ, who came to enlighten them that sit in
darkness (Lk. 1:79), it belonged to remove occasions of error, and to
open out the road to faith. Now He would have done this by putting His
teaching into writing: for Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. i) that
"some there are who wonder why our Lord wrote nothing, so that we have
to believe what others have written about Him. Especially do those
pagans ask this question who dare not blame or blaspheme Christ, and
who ascribe to Him most excellent, but merely human, wisdom. These say
that the disciples made out the Master to be more than He really was
when they said that He was the Son of God and the Word of God, by whom
all things were made." And farther on he adds: "It seems as though they
were prepared to believe whatever He might have written of Himself, but
not what others at their discretion published about Him." Therefore it
seems that Christ should have Himself committed His doctrine to
writing.
On the contrary, No books written by Him were to be found in the canon
of Scripture.
I answer that, It was fitting that Christ should not commit His
doctrine to writing. First, on account of His dignity: for the more
excellent the teacher, the more excellent should be his manner of
teaching. Consequently it was fitting that Christ, as the most
excellent of teachers, should adopt that manner of teaching whereby His
doctrine is imprinted on the hearts of His hearers; wherefore it is
written (Mat. 7:29) that "He was teaching them as one having power."
And so it was that among the Gentiles, Pythagoras and Socrates, who
were teachers of great excellence, were unwilling to write anything.
For writings are ordained, as to an end, unto the imprinting of
doctrine in the hearts of the hearers.
Secondly, on account of the excellence of Christ's doctrine, which
cannot be expressed in writing; according to Jn. 21:25: "There are also
many other things which Jesus did: which, if they were written
everyone, the world itself, I think, would not be able to contain the
books that should be written." Which Augustine explains by saying: "We
are not to believe that in respect of space the world could not contain
them . . . but that by the capacity of the readers they could not be
comprehended." And if Christ had committed His doctrine to writing, men
would have had no deeper thought of His doctrine than that which
appears on the surface of the writing.
Thirdly, that His doctrine might reach all in an orderly manner:
Himself teaching His disciples immediately, and they subsequently
teaching others, by preaching and writing: whereas if He Himself had
written, His doctrine would have reached all immediately.
Hence it is said of Wisdom (Prov. 9:3) that "she hath sent her maids to
invite to the tower." It is to be observed, however, that, as Augustine
says (De Consensu Evang. i), some of the Gentiles thought that Christ
wrote certain books treating of the magic art whereby He worked
miracles: which art is condemned by the Christian learning. "And yet
they who claim to have read those books of Christ do none of those
things which they marvel at His doing according to those same books.
Moreover, it is by a Divine judgment that they err so far as to assert
that these books were, as it were, entitled as letters to Peter and
Paul, for that they found them in several places depicted in company
with Christ. No wonder that the inventors were deceived by the
painters: for as long as Christ lived in the mortal flesh with His
disciples, Paul was no disciple of His."
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in the same book: "Christ is
the head of all His disciples who are members of His body.
Consequently, when they put into writing what He showed forth and said
to them, by no means must we say that He wrote nothing: since His
members put forth that which they knew under His dictation. For at His
command they, being His hands, as it were, wrote whatever He wished us
to read concerning His deeds and words."
Reply to Objection 2: Since the old Law was given under the form of
sensible signs, therefore also was it fittingly written with sensible
signs. But Christ's doctrine, which is "the law of the spirit of life"
(Rom. 8:2), had to be "written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the
living God; not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the
heart," as the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:3).
Reply to Objection 3: Those who were unwilling to believe what the
apostles wrote of Christ would have refused to believe the writings of
Christ, whom they deemed to work miracles by the magic art.
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OF THE MIRACLES WORKED BY CHRIST, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the miracles worked by Christ: (1) In general; (2)
Specifically, of each kind of miracle; (3) In particular, of His
transfiguration.
Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ should have worked miracles?
(2) Whether He worked them by Divine power?
(3) When did He begin to work miracles?
(4) Whether His miracles are a sufficient proof of His Godhead?
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Whether Christ should have worked miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have worked miracles.
For Christ's deeds should have been consistent with His words. But He
Himself said (Mat. 16:4): "A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh
after a sign; and a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas
the prophet." Therefore He should not have worked miracles.
Objection 2: Further, just as Christ, at His second coming, is to come
"with" great power and majesty, as is written Mat. 24:30, so at His
first coming He came in infirmity, according to Is. 53:3: "A man of
sorrows and acquainted with infirmity." But the working of miracles
belongs to power rather than to infirmity. Therefore it was not fitting
that He should work miracles in His first coming.
Objection 3: Further, Christ came that He might save men by faith;
according to Heb. 12:2: "Looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of
faith." But miracles lessen the merit of faith; hence our Lord says
(Jn. 4:48): "Unless you see signs and wonders you believe not."
Therefore it seems that Christ should not have worked miracles.
On the contrary, It was said in the person of His adversaries (Jn.
11:47): "What do we; for this man doth many miracles?"
I answer that, God enables man to work miracles for two reasons. First
and principally, in confirmation of the doctrine that a man teaches.
For since those things which are of faith surpass human reason, they
cannot be proved by human arguments, but need to be proved by the
argument of Divine power: so that when a man does works that God alone
can do, we may believe that what he says is from God: just as when a
man is the bearer of letters sealed with the king's ring, it is to be
believed that what they contain expresses the king's will.
Secondly, in order to make known God's presence in a man by the grace
of the Holy Ghost: so that when a man does the works of God we may
believe that God dwells in him by His grace. Wherefore it is written
(Gal. 3:5): "He who giveth to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles
among you."
Now both these things were to be made known to men concerning
Christ---namely, that God dwelt in Him by grace, not of adoption, but
of union: and that His supernatural doctrine was from God. And
therefore it was most fitting that He should work miracles. Wherefore
He Himself says (Jn. 10:38): "Though you will not believe Me, believe
the works"; and (Jn. 5:36): "The works which the Father hath given Me
to perfect . . . themselves . . . give testimony to Me."
Reply to Objection 1: These words, "a sign shall not be given it, but
the sign of Jonas," mean, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth.),
that "they did not receive a sign such as they sought, viz. from
heaven": but not that He gave them no sign at all. Or that "He worked
signs not for the sake of those whom He knew to be hardened, but to
amend others." Therefore those signs were given, not to them, but to
others.
Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ came "in the infirmity" of the
flesh, which is manifested in the passions, yet He came "in the power
of God" [*Cf. 2 Cor. 13:4], and this had to be made manifest by
miracles.
Reply to Objection 3: Miracles lessen the merit of faith in so far as
those are shown to be hard of heart who are unwilling to believe what
is proved from the Scriptures unless (they are convinced) by miracles.
Yet it is better for them to be converted to the faith even by miracles
than that they should remain altogether in their unbelief. For it is
written (1 Cor. 14:22) that signs are given "to unbelievers," viz. that
they may be converted to the faith.
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Whether Christ worked miracles by Divine power?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not work miracles by Divine
power. For the Divine power is omnipotent. But it seems that Christ was
not omnipotent in working miracles; for it is written (Mk. 6:5) that
"He could not do any miracles there," i.e. in His own country.
Therefore it seems that He did not work miracles by Divine power.
Objection 2: Further, God does not pray. But Christ sometimes prayed
when working miracles; as may be seen in the raising of Lazarus (Jn.
11:41,42), and in the multiplication of the loaves, as related Mat.
14:19. Therefore it seems that He did not work miracles by Divine
power.
Objection 3: Further, what is done by Divine power cannot be done by
the power of any creature. But the things which Christ did could be
done also by the power of a creature: wherefore the Pharisees said (Lk.
11:15) that He cast out devils "by Beelzebub the prince of devils."
Therefore it seems that Christ did not work miracles by Divine power.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 14:10): "The Father who abideth in
Me, He doth the works."
I answer that, as stated in the [4215]FP, Q[110], A[4], true miracles
cannot be wrought save by Divine power: because God alone can change
the order of nature; and this is what is meant by a miracle. Wherefore
Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Flav. xxviii) that, while there are two natures
in Christ, there is "one," viz. the Divine, which shines forth in
miracles; and "another," viz. the human, "which submits to insults";
yet "each communicates its actions to the other": in as far as the
human nature is the instrument of the Divine action, and the human
action receives power from the Divine Nature, as stated above (Q[19],
A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that "He could not do any
miracles there," it is not to be understood that He could not do them
absolutely, but that it was not fitting for Him to do them: for it was
unfitting for Him to work miracles among unbelievers. Wherefore it is
said farther on: "And He wondered because of their unbelief." In like
manner it is said (Gn. 18:17): "Can I hide from Abraham what I am about
to do?" and Gn. 19:22: "I cannot do anything till thou go in thither."
Reply to Objection 2: As Chrysostom says on Mat. 14:19, "He took the
five loaves and the two fishes, and, looking up to heaven, He blessed
and brake: It was to be believed of Him, both that He is of the Father
and that He is equal to Him . . . Therefore that He might prove both,
He works miracles now with authority, now with prayer . . . in the
lesser things, indeed, He looks up to heaven"---for instance, in
multiplying the loaves---"but in the greater, which belong to God
alone, He acts with authority; for example, when He forgave sins and
raised the dead."
When it is said that in raising Lazarus He lifted up His eyes (Jn.
11:41), this was not because He needed to pray, but because He wished
to teach us how to pray. Wherefore He said: "Because of the people who
stand about have I said it: that they may believe that Thou hast sent
Me."
Reply to Objection 3: Christ cast out demons otherwise than they are
cast out by the power of demons. For demons are cast out from bodies by
the power of higher demons in such a way that they retain their power
over the soul: since the devil does not work against his own kingdom.
On the other hand, Christ cast out demons, not only from the body, but
still more from the soul. For this reason our Lord rebuked the
blasphemy of the Jews, who said that He cast out demons by the power of
the demons: first, by saying that Satan is not divided against himself;
secondly, by quoting the instance of others who cast out demons by the
Spirit of God; thirdly, because He could not have cast out a demon
unless He had overcome Him by Divine power; fourthly, because there was
nothing in common between His works and their effects and those of
Satan; since Satan's purpose was to "scatter" those whom Christ
"gathered" together [*Cf. Mat. 12:24-30; Mk. 3:22; Lk. 11:15-32].
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Whether Christ began to work miracles when He changed water into wine at th
e
marriage feast?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not begin to work miracles
when He changed water into wine at the marriage feast. For we read in
the book De Infantia Salvatoris that Christ worked many miracles in His
childhood. But the miracle of changing water into wine at the marriage
feast took place in the thirtieth or thirty-first year of His age.
Therefore it seems that it was not then that He began to work miracles.
Objection 2: Further, Christ worked miracles by Divine power. Now He
was possessed of Divine power from the first moment of His conception;
for from that instant He was both God and man. Therefore it seems that
He worked miracles from the very first.
Objection 3: Further, Christ began to gather His disciples after His
baptism and temptation, as related Mat. 4:18 and Jn. 1:35. But the
disciples gathered around Him, principally on account of His miracles:
thus it is written (Lk. 5:4) that He called Peter when "he was
astonished at" the miracle which He had worked in "the draught of
fishes." Therefore it seems that He worked other miracles before that
of the marriage feast.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 2:11): "This beginning of miracles
did Jesus in Cana of Galilee."
I answer that, Christ worked miracles in order to confirm His doctrine,
and in order to show forth His Divine power. Therefore, as to the
first, it was unbecoming for Him to work miracles before He began to
teach. And it was unfitting that He should begin to teach until He
reached the perfect age, as we stated above, in speaking of His baptism
([4216]Q[39], A[3] ). But as to the second, it was right that He should
so manifest His Godhead by working miracles that men should believe in
the reality of His manhood. And, consequently, as Chrysostom says (Hom.
xxi in Joan.), "it was fitting that He should not begin to work wonders
from His early years: for men would have deemed the Incarnation to be
imaginary and would have crucified Him before the proper time."
Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xvii in Joan.), in
regard to the saying of John the Baptist, "'That He may be made
manifest in Israel, therefore am I come baptizing with water,' it is
clear that the wonders which some pretend to have been worked by Christ
in His childhood are untrue and fictitious. For had Christ worked
miracles from His early years, John would by no means have been
unacquainted with Him, nor would the rest of the people have stood in
need of a teacher to point Him out to them."
Reply to Objection 2: What the Divine power achieved in Christ was in
proportion to the needs of the salvation of mankind, the achievement of
which was the purpose of His taking flesh. Consequently He so worked
miracles by the Divine power as not to prejudice our belief in the
reality of His flesh.
Reply to Objection 3: The disciples were to be commended precisely
because they followed Christ "without having seen Him work any
miracles," as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. v in Evang.). And, as
Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in Joan.), "the need for working miracles
arose then, especially when the disciples were already gathered around
and attached to Him, and attentive to what was going on around them.
Hence it is added: 'And His disciples believed in Him,'" not because
they then believed in Him for the first time, but because then "they
believed with greater discernment and perfection." Or they are called
"disciples" because "they were to be disciples later on," as Augustine
observes (De Consensu Evang. ii).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the miracles which Christ worked were a sufficient proof of His
Godhead?
Objection 1: It would seem that the miracles which Christ worked were
not a sufficient proof of His Godhead. For it is proper to Christ to be
both God and man. But the miracles which Christ worked have been done
by others also. Therefore they were not a sufficient proof of His
Godhead.
Objection 2: Further, no power surpasses that of the Godhead. But some
have worked greater miracles than Christ, for it is written (Jn.
14:12): "He that believeth in Me, the works that I do, he also shall
do, and greater than these shall he do." Therefore it seems that the
miracles which Christ worked are not sufficient proof of His Godhead.
Objection 3: Further, the particular is not a sufficient proof of the
universal. But any one of Christ's miracles was one particular work.
Therefore none of them was a sufficient proof of His Godhead, by reason
of which He had universal power over all things.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 5:36): "The works which the Father
hath given Me to perfect . . . themselves . . . give testimony of Me."
I answer that, The miracles which Christ worked were a sufficient proof
of His Godhead in three respects. First, as to the very nature of the
works, which surpassed the entire capability of created power, and
therefore could not be done save by Divine power. For this reason the
blind man, after his sight had been restored, said (Jn. 9:32,33): "From
the beginning of the world it has not been heard, that any man hath
opened the eyes of one born blind. Unless this man were of God, he
could not do anything."
Secondly, as to the way in which He worked miracles---namely, because
He worked miracles as though of His own power, and not by praying, as
others do. Wherefore it is written (Lk. 6:19) that "virtue went out
from Him and healed all." Whereby it is proved, as Cyril says (Comment.
in Lucam) that "He did not receive power from another, but, being God
by nature, He showed His own power over the sick. And this is how He
worked countless miracles." Hence on Mat. 8:16: "He cast out spirits
with His word, and all that were sick He healed," Chrysostom says:
"Mark how great a multitude of persons healed, the Evangelists pass
quickly over, not mentioning one by one . . . but in one word
traversing an unspeakable sea of miracles." And thus it was shown that
His power was co-equal with that of God the Father, according to Jn.
5:19: "What things soever" the Father "doth, these the Son doth also in
like manner"; and, again (Jn. 5:21): "As the Father raiseth up the dead
and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom He will."
Thirdly, from the very fact that He taught that He was God; for unless
this were true it would not be confirmed by miracles worked by Divine
power. Hence it was said (Mk. 1:27): "What is this new doctrine? For
with power He commandeth the unclean spirits, and they obey Him."
Reply to Objection 1: This was the argument of the Gentiles. Wherefore
Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "No suitable wonders; say
they, show forth the presence of so great majesty, for the ghostly
cleansing" whereby He cast out demons, "the cure of the sick, the
raising of the dead to life, if other miracles be taken into account,
are small things before God." To this Augustine answers thus: "We own
that the prophets did as much . . . But even Moses himself and the
other prophets made Christ the Lord the object of their prophecy, and
gave Him great glory . . . He, therefore, chose to do similar things to
avoid the inconsistency of failing to do what He had done through
others. Yet still He was bound to do something which no other had done:
to be born of a virgin, to rise from the dead, and to ascend into
heaven. If anyone deem this a slight thing for God to do, I know not
what more he can expect. Having become man, ought He to have made
another world, that we might believe Him to be Him by whom the world
was made? But in this world neither a greater world could be made nor
one equal to it: and if He had made a lesser world in comparison with
this, that too would have been deemed a small thing."
As to the miracles worked by others, Christ did greater still. Hence on
Jn. 15:24: "If I had not done in [Douay: 'among'] them the works that
no other men hath done," etc., Augustine says: "None of the works of
Christ seem to be greater than the raising of the dead: which thing we
know the ancient prophets also did . . . Yet Christ did some works
'which no other man hath done.' But we are told in answer that others
did works which He did not, and which none other did . . . But to heal
with so great a power so many defects and ailments and grievances of
mortal men, this we read concerning none soever of the men of old. To
say nothing of those, each of whom by His bidding, as they came in His
way, He made whole . . . Mark saith (6:56): 'Whithersoever He entered,
into towns or into villages or into cities, they laid the sick in the
streets, and besought Him that they might touch but the hem of His
garment: and as many as touched Him were made whole.' These things none
other did in them; for when He saith 'In them,' it is not to be
understood to mean 'Among them,' or 'In their presence,' but wholly 'In
them,' because He healed them . . . Therefore whatever works He did in
them are works that none ever did; since if ever any other man did any
one of them, by His doing he did it; whereas these works He did, not by
their doing, but by Himself."
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine explains this passage of John as
follows (Tract. lxxi): "What are these 'greater works' which believers
in Him would do? That, as they passed by, their very shadow healed the
sick? For it is greater that a shadow should heal than the hem of a
garment . . . When, however, He said these words, it was the deeds and
works of His words that He spoke of: for when He said . . . 'The Father
who abideth in Me, He doth the works,' what works did He mean, then,
but the words He was speaking? . . . and the fruits of those same words
was the faith of those (who believed): but when the disciples preached
the Gospel, not some few like those, but the very nations believed . .
. (Tract. lxxii). Did not that rich man go away from His presence
sorrowful? . . . and yet afterwards, what one individual, having heard
from Him, did not, that many did when He spake by the mouth of His
disciples . . . Behold, He did greater works when spoken of by men
believing than when speaking to men hearing. But there is yet this
difficulty: that He did these 'greater works' by the apostles: whereas
He saith as meaning not only them: . . . 'He that believeth in Me' . .
. Listen! . . . 'He that believeth in Me, the works that I do, he also
shall do': first, 'I do,' then 'he also shall do,' because I do that he
may do. What works---but that from ungodly he should be made righteous?
. . . Which thing Christ worketh in him, truly, but not without him.
Yes, I may affirm this to be altogether greater than to create" [*The
words 'to create' are not in the text of St. Augustine] "heaven and
earth . . . for 'heaven and earth shall pass away'; but the salvation
and justification of the predestinate shall remain . . . But also in
the heavens . . . the angels are the works of Christ: and does that man
do greater works than these, who co-operates with Christ in the work of
his justification? . . . let him, who can, judge whether it be greater
to create a righteous being than to justify an ungodly one. Certainly
if both are works of equal power, the latter is a work of greater
mercy."
"But there is no need for us to understand all the works of Christ,
where He saith 'Greater than these shall he do.' For by 'these' He
meant, perhaps, those which He was doing at that hour: now at that time
He was speaking words of faith: . . . and certainly it is less to
preach words of righteousness, which thing He did without us, than to
justify the ungodly, which thing He so doth in us that we also do it
ourselves."
Reply to Objection 3: When some particular work is proper to some
agent, then that particular work is a sufficient proof of the whole
power of that agent: thus, since the act of reasoning is proper to man,
the mere fact that someone reasons about any particular proposition
proves him to be a man. In like manner, since it is proper to God to
work miracles by His own power, any single miracle worked by Christ by
His own power is a sufficient proof that He is God.
__________________________________________________________________
OF (CHRIST'S) MIRACLES CONSIDERED SPECIFICALLY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider each kind of miracle:
(1) The miracles which He worked in spiritual substances;
(2) The miracles which He worked in heavenly bodies;
(3) The miracles which He worked in man;
(4) The miracles which He worked in irrational creatures.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those miracles were fitting which Christ worked in spiritual
substances?
Objection 1: It would seem that those miracles were unfitting which
Christ worked in spiritual substances. For among spiritual substances
the holy angels are above the demons; for, as Augustine says (De Trin.
iii): "The treacherous and sinful rational spirit of life is ruled by
the rational, pious, and just spirit of life." But we read of no
miracles worked by Christ in the good angels. Therefore neither should
He have worked miracles in the demons.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's miracles were ordained to make known His
Godhead. But Christ's Godhead was not to be made known to the demons:
since this would have hindered the mystery of His Passion, according to
1 Cor. 2:8: "If they had known it, they would never have crucified the
Lord of glory." Therefore He should not have worked miracles in the
demons.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's miracles were ordained to the glory of
God: hence it is written (Mat. 9:8) that "the multitudes seeing" that
the man sick of the palsy had been healed by Christ, "feared, and
glorified God that gave such power to men." But the demons have no part
in glorifying God; since "praise is not seemly in the mouth of a
sinner" (Ecclus. 15:9). For which reason also "He suffered them not to
speak" (Mk. 1:34; Lk. 4:41) those things which reflected glory on Him.
Therefore it seems that it was unfitting for Him to work miracles in
the demons.
Objection 4: Further, Christ's miracles are ordained to the salvation
of mankind. But sometimes the casting out of demons from men was
detrimental to man, in some cases to the body: thus it is related (Mk.
9:24,25) that a demon at Christ's command, "crying out and greatly
tearing" the man, "went out of him; and he became as dead, so that many
said: He is dead"; sometimes also to things: as when He sent the
demons, at their own request, into the swine, which they cast headlong
into the sea; wherefore the inhabitants of those parts "besought Him
that He would depart from their coasts" (Mat. 8:31-34). Therefore it
seems unfitting that He should have worked such like miracles.
On the contrary, this was foretold (Zech. 13:2), where it is written:
"I will take away . . . the unclean spirit out of the earth."
I answer that, The miracles worked by Christ were arguments for the
faith which He taught. Now, by the power of His Godhead He was to
rescue those who would believe in Him, from the power of the demons;
according to Jn. 12:31: "Now shall the prince of this world be cast
out." Consequently it was fitting that, among other miracles, He should
also deliver those who were obsessed by demons.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as men were to be delivered by Christ from
the power of the demons, so by Him were they to be brought to the
companionship of the angels, according to Col. 1:20: "Making peace
through the blood of His cross, both as to the things on earth and the
things that are in heaven." Therefore it was not fitting to show forth
to men other miracles as regards the angels, except by angels appearing
to men: as happened in His Nativity, His Resurrection, and His
Ascension.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix): "Christ was
known to the demons just as much as He willed; and He willed just as
far as there was need. But He was known to them, not as to the holy
angels, by that which is eternal life, but by certain temporal effects
of His power." First, when they saw that Christ was hungry after
fasting they deemed Him not to be the Son of God. Hence, on Lk. 4:3,
"If Thou be the Son of God," etc., Ambrose says: "What means this way
of addressing Him? save that, though He knew that the Son of God was to
come, yet he did not think that He had come in the weakness of the
flesh?" But afterwards, when he saw Him work miracles, he had a sort of
conjectural suspicion that He was the Son of God. Hence on Mk. 1:24, "I
know who Thou art, the Holy one of God," Chrysostom [*Victor of
Antioch. Cf. Catena Aurea] says that "he had no certain or firm
knowledge of God's coming." Yet he knew that He was "the Christ
promised in the Law," wherefore it is said (Lk. 4:41) that "they knew
that He was Christ." But it was rather from suspicion than from
certainty that they confessed Him to be the Son of God. Hence Bede says
on Lk. 4:41: "The demons confess the Son of God, and, as stated farther
on, 'they knew that He was Christ.' For when the devil saw Him weakened
by His fast, He knew Him to be a real man: but when He failed to
overcome Him by temptation, He doubted lest He should be the Son of
God. And now from the power of His miracles He either knew, or rather
suspected that He was the Son of God. His reason therefore for
persuading the Jews to crucify Him was not that he deemed Him not to be
Christ or the Son of God, but because he did not foresee that he would
be the loser by His death. For the Apostle says of this mystery" (1
Cor. 2:7,8), "which is hidden from the beginning, that 'none of the
princes of this world knew it,' for if they had known it they would
never have crucified the Lord of glory."
Reply to Objection 3: The miracles which Christ worked in expelling
demons were for the benefit, not of the demons, but of men, that they
might glorify Him. Wherefore He forbade them to speak in His praise.
First, to give us an example. For, as Athanasius says, "He restrained
his speech, although he was confessing the truth; to teach us not to
care about such things, although it may seem that what is said is true.
For it is wrong to seek to learn from the devil when we have the Divine
Scripture": Besides, it is dangerous, since the demons frequently mix
falsehood with truth. Or, as Chrysostom [*Cyril of Alexandria, Comment.
in Luc.] says: "It was not meet for them to usurp the prerogative of
the apostolic office. Nor was it fitting that the mystery of Christ
should be proclaimed by a corrupt tongue" because "praise is not seemly
in the mouth of a sinner" [*Cf. Theophylact, Enarr. in Luc.]. Thirdly,
because, as Bede says, "He did not wish the envy of the Jews to be
aroused thereby" [*Bede, Expos. in Luc. iv, 41]. Hence "even the
apostles are commanded to be silent about Him, lest, if His Divine
majesty were proclaimed, the gift of His Passion should be deferred."
Reply to Objection 4: Christ came specially to teach and to work
miracles for the good of man, and principally as to the salvation of
his soul. Consequently, He allowed the demons, that He cast out, to do
man some harm, either in his body or in his goods, for the salvation of
man's soul---namely, for man's instruction. Hence Chrysostom says on
Mat. 8:32 that Christ let the demons depart into the swine, "not as
yielding to the demons, but first, to show . . . how harmful are the
demons who attack men; secondly, that all might learn that the demons
would not dare to hurt even the swine, except He allow them; thirdly,
that they would have treated those men more grievously than they
treated the swine, unless they had been protected by God's providence."
And for the same motives He allowed the man, who was being delivered
from the demons, to suffer grievously for the moment; yet did He
release him at once from that distress. By this, moreover, we are
taught, as Bede says on Mk. 9:25, that "often, when after falling into
sin we strive to return to God, we experience further and more grievous
attacks from the old enemy. This he does, either that he may inspire us
with a distaste for virtue, or that he may avenge the shame of having
been cast out." For the man who was healed "became as dead," says
Jerome, "because to those who are healed it is said, 'You are dead; and
your life is hid with Christ in God'" (Col. 3:3)
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting that Christ should work miracles in the heavenly
bodies?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting that Christ should
work miracles in the heavenly bodies. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv), "it beseems Divine providence not to destroy, but to preserve,
nature." Now, the heavenly bodies are by nature incorruptible and
unchangeable, as is proved De Coelo i. Therefore it was unfitting that
Christ should cause any change in the order of the heavenly bodies.
Objection 2: Further, the course of time is marked out by the movement
of the heavenly bodies, according to Gn. 1:14: "Let there be lights
made in the firmament of heaven . . . and let them be for signs, and
for seasons, and for days and years." Consequently if the movement of
the heavenly bodies be changed, the distinction and order of the
seasons is changed. But there is no report of this having been
perceived by astronomers, "who gaze at the stars and observe the
months," as it is written (Is. 47:13). Therefore it seems that Christ
did not work any change in the movements of the heavenly bodies.
Objection 3: Further, it was more fitting that Christ should work
miracles in life and when teaching, than in death: both because, as it
is written (2 Cor. 13:4), "He was crucified through weakness, yet He
liveth by the power of God," by which He worked miracles; and because
His miracles were in confirmation of His doctrine. But there is no
record of Christ having worked any miracles in the heavenly bodies
during His lifetime: nay, more; when the Pharisees asked Him to give "a
sign from heaven," He refused, as Matthew relates (12,16). Therefore it
seems that neither in His death should He have worked any miracles in
the heavenly bodies.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 23:44,45): "There was darkness over
all the earth until the ninth hour; and the sun was darkened."
I answer that, As stated above ([4217]Q[43], A[4]) it behooved Christ's
miracles to be a sufficient proof of His Godhead. Now this is not so
sufficiently proved by changes wrought in the lower bodies, which
changes can be brought about by other causes, as it is by changes
wrought in the course of the heavenly bodies, which have been
established by God alone in an unchangeable order. This is what
Dionysius says in his epistle to Polycarp: "We must recognize that no
alteration can take place in the order end movement of the heavens that
is not caused by Him who made all and changes all by His word."
Therefore it was fitting that Christ should work miracles even in the
heavenly bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as it is natural to the lower bodies to be
moved by the heavenly bodies, which are higher in the order of nature,
so is it natural to any creature whatsoever to be changed by God,
according to His will. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi; quoted
by the gloss on Rom. 11:24: "Contrary to nature thou wert grafted,"
etc.): "God, the Creator and Author of all natures, does nothing
contrary to nature: for whatsoever He does in each thing, that is its
nature." Consequently the nature of a heavenly body is not destroyed
when God changes its course: but it would be if the change were due to
any other cause.
Reply to Objection 2: The order of the seasons was not disturbed by the
miracle worked by Christ. For, according to some, this gloom or
darkening of the sun, which occurred at the time of Christ's passion,
was caused by the sun withdrawing its rays, without any change in the
movement of the heavenly bodies, which measures the duration of the
seasons. Hence Jerome says on Mat. 27:45: "It seems as though the
'greater light' withdrew its rays, lest it should look on its Lord
hanging on the Cross, or bestow its radiancy on the impious
blasphemers." And this withdrawal of the rays is not to be understood
as though it were in the sun's power to send forth or withdraw its
rays: for it sheds its light, not from choice, but by nature, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But the sun is said to withdraw its rays
in so far as the Divine power caused the sun's rays not to reach the
earth. On the other hand, Origen says this was caused by clouds coming
between (the earth and the sun). Hence on Mat. 27:45 he says: "We must
therefore suppose that many large and very dense clouds were massed
together over Jerusalem and the land of Judea; so that it was
exceedingly dark from the sixth to the ninth hour. Hence I am of
opinion that, just as the other signs which occurred at the time of the
Passion"---namely, "the rending of the veil, the quaking of the earth,"
etc.---"took place in Jerusalem only, so this also: . . . or if anyone
prefer, it may be extended to the whole of Judea," since it is said
that "'there was darkness over the whole earth,' which expression
refers to the land of Judea, as may be gathered from 3 Kings 18:10,
where Abdias says to Elias: 'As the Lord thy God liveth, there is no
nation or kingdom whither my lord hath not sent to seek thee': which
shows that they sought him among the nations in the neighborhood of
Judea."
On this point, however, credence is to be given rather to Dionysius,
who is an eyewitness as to this having occurred by the moon eclipsing
the sun. For he says (Ep. ad Polycarp): "Without any doubt we saw the
moon encroach on the sun," he being in Egypt at the time, as he says in
the same letter. And in this he points out four miracles. The first is
that the natural eclipse of the sun by interposition of the moon never
takes place except when the sun and moon are in conjunction. But then
the sun and moon were in opposition, it being the fifteenth day, since
it was the Jewish Passover. Wherefore he says: "For it was not the time
of conjunction."---The second miracle is that whereas at the sixth hour
the moon was seen, together with the sun, in the middle of the heavens,
in the evening it was seen to be in its place, i.e. in the east,
opposite the sun. Wherefore he says: "Again we saw it," i.e. the moon,
"return supernaturally into opposition with the sun," so as to be
diametrically opposite, having withdrawn from the sun "at the ninth
hour," when the darkness ceased, "until evening." From this it is clear
that the wonted course of the seasons was not disturbed, because the
Divine power caused the moon both to approach the sun supernaturally at
an unwonted season, and to withdraw from the sun and return to its
proper place according to the season. The third miracle was that the
eclipse of the sun naturally always begins in that part of the sun
which is to the west and spreads towards the east: and this is because
the moon's proper movement from west to east is more rapid than that of
the sun, and consequently the moon, coming up from the west, overtakes
the sun and passes it on its eastward course. But in this case the moon
had already passed the sun, and was distant from it by the length of
half the heavenly circle, being opposite to it: consequently it had to
return eastwards towards the sun, so as to come into apparent contact
with it from the east, and continue in a westerly direction. This is
what he refers to when he says: "Moreover, we saw the eclipse begin to
the east and spread towards the western edge of the sun," for it was a
total eclipse, "and afterwards pass away." The fourth miracle consisted
in this, that in a natural eclipse that part of the sun which is first
eclipsed is the first to reappear (because the moon, coming in front of
the sun, by its natural movement passes on to the east, so as to come
away first from the western portion of the sun, which was the first
part to be eclipsed), whereas in this case the moon, while returning
miraculously from the east to the west, did not pass the sun so as to
be to the west of it: but having reached the western edge of the sun
returned towards the east: so that the last portion of the sun to be
eclipsed was the first to reappear. Consequently the eclipse began
towards the east, whereas the sun began to reappear towards the west.
And to this he refers by saying: "Again we observed that the
occultation and emersion did not begin from the same point," i.e. on
the same side of the sun, "but on opposite sides."
Chrysostom adds a fifth miracle (Hom. lxxxviii in Matth.), saying that
"the darkness in this case lasted for three hours, whereas an eclipse
of the sun lasts but a short time, for it is soon over, as those know
who have seen one." Hence we are given to understand that the moon was
stationary below the sun, except we prefer to say that the duration of
the darkness was measured from the first moment of occultation of the
sun to the moment when the sun had completely emerged from the eclipse.
But, as Origen says (on Mat. 27:45), "against this the children of this
world object: How is it such a phenomenal occurrence is not related by
any writer, whether Greek or barbarian?" And he says that someone of
the name of Phlegon "relates in his chronicles that this took place
during the reign of Tiberius Caesar, but he does not say that it
occurred at the full moon." It may be, therefore, that because it was
not the time for an eclipse, the various astronomers living then
throughout the world were not on the look-out for one, and that they
ascribed this darkness to some disturbance of the atmosphere. But in
Egypt, where clouds are few on account of the tranquillity of the air,
Dionysius and his companions were considerably astonished so as to make
the aforesaid observations about this darkness.
Reply to Objection 3: Then, above all, was there need for miraculous
proof of Christ's Godhead, when the weakness of human nature was most
apparent in Him. Hence it was that at His birth a new star appeared in
the heavens. Wherefore Maximus says (Serm. de Nativ. viii): "If thou
disdain the manger, raise thine eyes a little and gaze on the new star
in the heavens, proclaiming to the world the birth of our Lord." But in
His Passion yet greater weakness appeared in His manhood. Therefore
there was need for yet greater miracles in the greater lights of the
world. And, as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxviii in Matth.): "This is the
sign which He promised to them who sought for one saying: 'An evil and
adulterous generation seeketh a sign; and a sign shall not be given it,
but the sign of Jonas the prophet,' referring to His Cross . . . and
Resurrection . . . For it was much more wonderful that this should
happen when He was crucified than when He was walking on earth."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on men?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ worked miracles unfittingly on
men. For in man the soul is of more import than the body. Now Christ
worked many miracles on bodies, but we do not read of His working any
miracles on souls: for neither did He convert any unbelievers to the
faith mightily, but by persuading and convincing them with outward
miracles, nor is it related of Him that He made wise men out of fools.
Therefore it seems that He worked miracles on men in an unfitting
manner.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([4218]Q[43], A[2]), Christ
worked miracles by Divine power: to which it is proper to work
suddenly, perfectly, and without any assistance. Now Christ did not
always heal men suddenly as to their bodies: for it is written (Mk.
8:22-25) that, "taking the blind man by the hand, He led him out of the
town; and, spitting upon his eyes, laying His hands on him, He asked
him if he saw anything. And, looking up, he said: I see men as it were
trees walking. After that again He laid His hands upon his eyes, and he
began to see, and was restored, so that he saw all things clearly." It
is clear from this that He did not heal him suddenly, but at first
imperfectly, and by means of His spittle. Therefore it seems that He
worked miracles on men unfittingly.
Objection 3: Further, there is no need to remove at the same time
things which do not follow from one another. Now bodily ailments are
not always the result of sin, as appears from our Lord's words (Jn.
9:3): "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents, that he should be
born blind." It was unseemly, therefore, for Him to forgive the sins of
those who sought the healing of the body, as He is related to have done
in the case of the man sick of the palsy (Mat. 9:2): the more that the
healing of the body, being of less account than the forgiveness of
sins, does not seem a sufficient argument for the power of forgiving
sins.
Objection 4: Further, Christ's miracles were worked in order to confirm
His doctrine, and witness to His Godhead, as stated above ([4219]Q[43],
A[4]). Now no man should hinder the purpose of his own work. Therefore
it seems unfitting that Christ commanded those who had been healed
miraculously to tell no one, as appears from Mat. 9:30 and Mk. 8:26:
the more so, since He commanded others to proclaim the miracles worked
on them; thus it is related (Mk. 5:19) that, after delivering a man
from the demons, He said to him: "Go into thy house to thy friends, and
tell them, how great things the Lord hath done for thee."
On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 7:37): "He hath done all things
well: He hath made both the deaf to hear and the dumb to speak."
I answer that, The means should be proportionate to the end. Now Christ
came into the world and taught in order to save man, according to Jn.
3:17: "For God sent not His Son into the world to judge the world, but
that the world may be saved by Him." Therefore it was fitting that
Christ, by miraculously healing men in particular, should prove Himself
to be the universal and spiritual Saviour of all.
Reply to Objection 1: The means are distinct from the end. Now the end
for which Christ's miracles were worked was the health of the rational
part, which is healed by the light of wisdom, and the gift of
righteousness: the former of which presupposes the latter, since, as it
is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul,
nor dwell in a body subject to sins." Now it was unfitting that man
should be made righteous unless he willed: for this would be both
against the nature of righteousness, which implies rectitude of the
will, and contrary to the very nature of man, which requires to be led
to good by the free-will, not by force. Christ, therefore, justified
man inwardly by the Divine power, but not against man's will. Nor did
this pertain to His miracles, but to the end of His miracles. In like
manner by the Divine power He infused wisdom into the simple minds of
His disciples: hence He said to them (Lk. 21:15): "I will give you a
mouth and wisdom" which "all your adversaries will not be able to
resist and gainsay." And this, in so far as the enlightenment was
inward, is not to be reckoned as a miracle, but only as regards the
outward action---namely, in so far as men saw that those who had been
unlettered and simple spoke with such wisdom and constancy. Wherefore
it is written (Acts 4:13) that the Jews, "seeing the constancy of Peter
and of John, understanding that they were illiterate and ignorant men .
. . wondered."---And though such like spiritual effects are different
from visible miracles, yet do they testify to Christ's doctrine and
power, according to Heb. 2:4: "God also bearing them witness by signs
and wonders and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Ghost."
Nevertheless Christ did work some miracles on the soul of man,
principally by changing its lower powers. Hence Jerome, commenting on
Mat. 9:9, "He rose up and followed Him," says: "Such was the splendor
and majesty of His hidden Godhead, which shone forth even in His human
countenance, that those who gazed on it were drawn to Him at first
sight." And on Mat. 21:12, "(Jesus) cast out all them that sold and
bought," the same Jerome says: "Of all the signs worked by our Lord,
this seems to me the most wondrous---that one man, at that time
despised, could, with the blows of one scourge, cast out such a
multitude. For a fiery and heavenly light flashed from His eyes, and
the majesty of His Godhead shone in His countenance." And Origen says
on Jn. 2:15 that "this was a greater miracle than when He changed water
into wine, for there He shows His power over inanimate matter, whereas
here He tames the minds of thousands of men." Again, on Jn. 18:6, "They
went backward and fell to the ground," Augustine says: "Though that
crowd was fierce in hate and terrible with arms, yet did that one word
. . . without any weapon, smite them through, drive them back, lay them
prostrate: for God lay hidden in that flesh." Moreover, to this must be
referred what Luke says (4:30) ---namely, that Jesus, "passing through
the midst of them, went His way," on which Chrysostom observes (Hom.
xlviii in Joan.): "That He stood in the midst of those who were lying
in wait for Him, and was not seized by them, shows the power of His
Godhead"; and, again, that which is written Jn. 8:59, "Jesus hid
Himself and went out of the Temple," on which Theophylact says: "He did
not hide Himself in a corner of the Temple, as if afraid, or take
shelter behind a wall or pillar; but by His heavenly power making
Himself invisible to those who were threatening Him, He passed through
the midst of them."
From all these instances it is clear that Christ, when He willed,
changed the minds of men by His Divine power, not only by the bestowal
of righteousness and the infusion of wisdom, which pertains to the end
of miracles, but also by outwardly drawing men to Himself, or by
terrifying or stupefying them, which pertains to the miraculous itself.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ came to save the world, not only by Divine
power, but also through the mystery of His Incarnation. Consequently in
healing the sick He frequently not only made use of His Divine power,
healing by way of command, but also by applying something pertaining to
His human nature. Hence on Lk. 4:40, "He, laying His hands on every one
of them, healed them," Cyril says: "Although, as God, He might, by one
word, have driven out all diseases, yet He touched them, showing that
His own flesh was endowed with a healing virtue." And on Mk. 8:23,
"Spitting upon his eyes, laying His hands on him," etc., Chrysostom
[*Victor of Antioch] says: "He spat and laid His hands upon the blind
man, wishing to show that His Divine word, accompanied by His
operation, works wonders: for the hand signifies operation; the spittle
signifies the word which proceeds from the mouth." Again, on Jn. 9:6,
"He made clay of the spittle, and spread the clay upon the eyes of the
blind man," Augustine says: "Of His spittle He made clay---because 'the
Word was made flesh.'" Or, again, as Chrysostom says, to signify that
it was He who made man of "the slime of the earth."
It is furthermore to be observed concerning Christ's miracles that
generally what He did was most perfect. Hence on Jn. 2:10, "Every man
at first setteth forth good wine," Chrysostom says: "Christ's miracles
are such as to far surpass the works of nature in splendor and
usefulness." Likewise in an instant He conferred perfect health on the
sick. Hence on Mat. 8:15, "She arose and ministered to them," Jerome
says: "Health restored by our Lord returns wholly and instantly."
There was, however, special reason for the contrary happening in the
case of the man born blind, and this was his want of faith, as
Chrysostom [*Victor of Antioch] says. Or as Bede observes on Mk. 8:23:
"Whom He might have healed wholly and instantly by a single word, He
heals little by little, to show the extent of human blindness, which
hardly, and that only by degrees, can come back to the light: and to
point out that each step forward in the way of perfection is due to the
help of His grace."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4220]Q[43], A[2]), Christ
worked miracles by Divine power. Now "the works of God are perfect"
(Dt. 32:4). But nothing is perfect except it attain its end. Now the
end of the outward healing worked by Christ is the healing of the soul.
Consequently it was not fitting that Christ should heal a man's body
without healing his soul. Wherefore on Jn. 7:23, "I have healed the
whole man on a Sabbath day," Augustine says: "Because he was cured, so
as to be whole in body; he believed, so as to be whole in soul." To the
man sick of the palsy it is said specially, "Thy sins are forgiven
thee," because, as Jerome observes on Mat. 9:5,6: "We are hereby given
to understand that ailments of the body are frequently due to sin: for
which reason, perhaps, first are his sins forgiven, that the cause of
the ailment being removed, health may return." Wherefore, also (Jn.
4:14), it is said: "Sin no more, lest some worse thing happen to thee."
Whence, says Chrysostom, "we learn that his sickness was the result of
sin."
Nevertheless, as Chrysostom says on Mat. 9:5: "By how much a soul is of
more account than a body, by so much is the forgiving of sins a greater
work than healing the body; but because the one is unseen He does the
lesser and more manifest thing in order to prove the greater and more
unseen."
Reply to Objection 4: On Mat. 9:30, "See that no man know this,"
Chrysostom says: "If in another place we find Him saying, 'Go and
declare the glory of God' (cf. Mk. 5:19; Lk. 8:39), that is not
contrary to this. For He instructs us to forbid them that would praise
us on our own account: but if the glory be referred to God, then we
must not forbid, but command, that it be done."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on irrational creatures?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ worked miracles unfittingly on
irrational creatures. For brute animals are more noble than plants. But
Christ worked a miracle on plants as when the fig-tree withered away at
His command (Mat. 21:19). Therefore Christ should have worked miracles
also on brute animals.
Objection 2: Further, punishment is not justly inflicted save for
fault. But it was not the fault of the fig-tree that Christ found no
fruit on it, when fruit was not in season (Mk. 11:13). Therefore it
seems unfitting that He withered it up.
Objection 3: Further, air and water are between heaven and earth. But
Christ worked some miracles in the heavens, as stated above
[4221](A[2]), and likewise in the earth, when it quaked at the time of
His Passion (Mat. 27:51). Therefore it seems that He should also have
worked miracles in the air and water, such as to divide the sea, as did
Moses (Ex. 14:21); or a river, as did Josue (Josh. 3:16) and Elias (4
Kings 2:8); and to cause thunder to be heard in the air, as occurred on
Mount Sinai when the Law was given (Ex. 19:16), and like to what Elias
did (3 Kings 18:45).
Objection 4: Further, miraculous works pertain to the work of Divine
providence in governing the world. But this work presupposes creation.
It seems, therefore, unfitting that in His miracles Christ made use of
creation: when, to wit, He multiplied the loaves. Therefore His
miracles in regard to irrational creatures seem to have been unfitting.
On the contrary, Christ is "the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24), of whom
it is said (Wis. 8:1) that "she ordereth all things sweetly."
I answer that, As stated above, Christ's miracles were ordained to the
end that He should be recognized as having Divine power, unto the
salvation of mankind. Now it belongs to the Divine power that every
creature be subject thereto. Consequently it behooved Him to work
miracles on every kind of creature, not only on man, but also on
irrational creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: Brute animals are akin generically to man,
wherefore they were created on the same day as man. And since He had
worked many miracles on the bodies of men, there was no need for Him to
work miracles on the bodies of brute animals. and so much the less
that, as to their sensible and corporeal nature, the same reason
applies to both men and animals, especially terrestrial. But fish, from
living in water, are more alien from human nature; wherefore they were
made on another day. On them Christ worked a miracle in the plentiful
draught of fishes, related Lk. 5 and Jn. 21; and, again, in the fish
caught by Peter, who found a stater in it (Mat. 17:26). As to the swine
who were cast headlong into the sea, this was not the effect of a
Divine miracle, but of the action of the demons, God permitting.
Reply to Objection 2: As Chrysostom says on Mat. 21:19: "When our Lord
does any such like thing" on plants or brute animals, "ask not how it
was just to wither up the fig-tree, since it was not the fruit season;
to ask such a question is foolish in the extreme," because such things
cannot commit a fault or be punished: "but look at the miracle, and
wonder at the worker." Nor does the Creator "inflict" any hurt on the
owner, if He choose to make use of His own creature for the salvation
of others; rather, as Hilary says on Mat. 21:19, "we should see in this
a proof of God's goodness, for when He wished to afford an example of
salvation as being procured by Him, He exercised His mighty power on
the human body: but when He wished to picture to them His severity
towards those who wilfully disobey Him, He foreshadows their doom by
His sentence on the tree." This is the more noteworthy in a fig-tree
which, as Chrysostom observes (on Mat. 21:19), "being full of moisture,
makes the miracle all the more remarkable."
Reply to Objection 3: Christ also worked miracles befitting to Himself
in the air and water: when, to wit, as related Mat. 8:26, "He commanded
the winds, and the sea, and there came a great calm." But it was not
befitting that He who came to restore all things to a state of peace
and calm should cause either a disturbance in the atmosphere or a
division of waters. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 12:18): "You are not
come to a fire that may be touched and approached [Vulg.: 'a mountain
that might be touched, and a burning fire'], and a whirlwind, and
darkness, and storm."
At the time of His Passion, however, the "veil was rent," to signify
the unfolding of the mysteries of the Law; "the graves were opened," to
signify that His death gave life to the dead; "the earth quaked and the
rocks were rent," to signify that man's stony heart would be softened,
and the whole world changed for the better by the virtue of His
Passion.
Reply to Objection 4: The multiplication of the loaves was not effected
by way of creation, but by an addition of extraneous matter transformed
into loaves; hence Augustine says on Jn. 6:1-14: "Whence He multiplieth
a few grains into harvests, thence in His hands He multiplied the five
loaves": and it is clearly by a process of transformation that grains
are multiplied into harvests.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CHRIST'S TRANSFIGURATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider Christ's transfiguration; and here there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was fitting that Christ should be transfigured?
(2) Whether the clarity of the transfiguration was the clarity of
glory?
(3) Of the witnesses of the transfiguration;
(4) Of the testimony of the Father's voice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting that Christ should be transfigured?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should
be transfigured. For it is not fitting for a true body to be changed
into various shapes [figuras], but only for an imaginary body. Now
Christ's body was not imaginary, but real, as stated above ([4222]Q[5],
A[1]). Therefore it seems that it should not have been transfigured.
Objection 2: Further, figure is in the fourth species of quality,
whereas clarity is in the third, since it is a sensible quality.
Therefore Christ's assuming clarity should not be called a
transfiguration.
Objection 3: Further, a glorified body has four gifts, as we shall
state farther on ([4223]XP, Q[82]), viz. impassibility, agility,
subtlety, and clarity. Therefore His transfiguration should not have
consisted in an assumption of clarity rather than of the other gifts.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 17:2) that Jesus "was
transfigured" in the presence of three of His disciples.
I answer that, Our Lord, after foretelling His Passion to His
disciples, had exhorted them to follow the path of His sufferings (Mat.
16:21, 24). Now in order that anyone go straight along a road, he must
have some knowledge of the end: thus an archer will not shoot the arrow
straight unless he first see the target. Hence Thomas said (Jn. 14:5):
"Lord, we know not whither Thou goest; and how can we know the way?"
Above all is this necessary when hard and rough is the road, heavy the
going, but delightful the end. Now by His Passion Christ achieved
glory, not only of His soul, not only of His soul, which He had from
the first moment of His conception, but also of His body; according to
Luke (24:26): "Christ ought [Vulg.: 'ought not Christ'] to have
suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory (?)." To which
glory He brings those who follow the footsteps of His Passion,
according to Acts 14:21: "Through many tribulations we must enter into
the kingdom of God." Therefore it was fitting that He should show His
disciples the glory of His clarity (which is to be transfigured), to
which He will configure those who are His; according to Phil. 3:21:
"(Who) will reform the body of our lowness configured [Douay: 'made
like'] to the body of His glory." Hence Bede says on Mk. 8:39: "By His
loving foresight He allowed them to taste for a short time the
contemplation of eternal joy, so that they might bear persecution
bravely."
Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says on Mat. 17:2: "Let no one suppose
that Christ," through being said to be transfigured, "laid aside His
natural shape and countenance, or substituted an imaginary or aerial
body for His real body. The Evangelist describes the manner of His
transfiguration when he says: 'His face did shine as the sun, and His
garments became white as snow.' Brightness of face and whiteness of
garments argue not a change of substance, but a putting on of glory."
Reply to Objection 2: Figure is seen in the outline of a body, for it
is "that which is enclosed by one or more boundaries" [*Euclid, bk i,
def. xiv]. Therefore whatever has to do with the outline of a body
seems to pertain to the figure. Now the clarity, just as the color, of
a non-transparent body is seen on its surface, and consequently the
assumption of clarity is called transfiguration.
Reply to Objection 3: Of those four gifts, clarity alone is a quality
of the very person in himself; whereas the other three are not
perceptible, save in some action or movement, or in some passion.
Christ, then, did show in Himself certain indications of those three
gifts---of agility, for instance, when He walked on the waves of the
sea; of subtlety, when He came forth from the closed womb of the
Virgin; of impassibility, when He escaped unhurt from the hands of the
Jews who wished to hurl Him down or to stone Him. And yet He is not
said, on account of this, to be transfigured, but only on account of
clarity, which pertains to the aspect of His Person.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this clarity was the clarity of glory?
Objection 1: It would seem that this clarity was not the clarity of
glory. For a gloss of Bede on Mat. 17:2, "He was transfigured before
them," says: "In His mortal body He shows forth, not the state of
immortality, but clarity like to that of future immortality." But the
clarity of glory is the clarity of immortality. Therefore the clarity
which Christ showed to His disciples was not the clarity of glory.
Objection 2: Further, on Lk. 9:27 "(That) shall not taste death unless
[Vulg.: 'till'] they see the kingdom of God," Bede's gloss says: "That
is, the glorification of the body in an imaginary vision of future
beatitude." But the image of a thing is not the thing itself. Therefore
this was not the clarity of beatitude.
Objection 3: Further, the clarity of glory is only in a human body. But
this clarity of the transfiguration was seen not only in Christ's body,
but also in His garments, and in "the bright cloud" which "overshaded"
the disciples. Therefore it seems that this was not the clarity of
glory.
On the contrary, Jerome says on the words "He was transfigured before
them" (Mat. 17:2): "He appeared to the Apostles such as He will appear
on the day of judgment." And on Mat. 16:28, "Till they see the Son of
Man coming in His kingdom," Chrysostom says: "Wishing to show with what
kind of glory He is afterwards to come, so far as it was possible for
them to learn it, He showed it to them in their present life, that they
might not grieve even over the death of their Lord."
I answer that, The clarity which Christ assumed in His transfiguration
was the clarity of glory as to its essence, but not as to its mode of
being. For the clarity of the glorified body is derived from that of
the soul, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Diosc. cxviii). And in like manner
the clarity of Christ's body in His transfiguration was derived from
His God. head, as Damascene says (Orat. de Transfig.) and from the
glory of His soul. That the glory of His soul did not overflow into His
body from the first moment of Christ's conception was due to a certain
Divine dispensation, that, as stated above ([4224]Q[14], A[1], ad 2),
He might fulfil the mysteries of our redemption in a passible body.
This did not, however, deprive Christ of His power of outpouring the
glory of His soul into His body. And this He did, as to clarity, in His
transfiguration, but otherwise than in a glorified body. For the
clarity of the soul overflows into a glorified body, by way of a
permanent quality affecting the body. Hence bodily refulgence is not
miraculous in a glorified body. But in Christ's transfiguration clarity
overflowed from His Godhead and from His soul into His body, not as an
immanent quality affecting His very body, but rather after the manner
of a transient passion, as when the air is lit up by the sun.
Consequently the refulgence, which appeared in Christ's body then, was
miraculous: just as was the fact of His walking on the waves of the
sea. Hence Dionysius says (Ep. ad Cai. iv): "Christ excelled man in
doing that which is proper to man: this is shown in His supernatural
conception of a virgin and in the unstable waters bearing the weight of
material and earthly feet."
Wherefore we must not say, as Hugh of St. Victor [*Innocent III, De
Myst. Miss. iv] said, that Christ assumed the gift of clarity in the
transfiguration, of agility in walking on the sea, and of subtlety in
coming forth from the Virgin's closed womb: because the gifts are
immanent qualities of a glorified body. On the contrary, whatever
pertained to the gifts, that He had miraculously. The same is to be
said, as to the soul, of the vision in which Paul saw God in a rapture,
as we have stated in the [4225]SS, Q[175], A[3], ad 2.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted prove, not that the clarity of
Christ was not that of glory, but that it was not the clarity of a
glorified body, since Christ's body was not as yet immortal. And just
as it was by dispensation that in Christ the glory of the soul should
not overflow into the body so was it possible that by dispensation it
might overflow as to the gift of clarity and not as to that of
impassibility.
Reply to Objection 2: This clarity is said to have been imaginary, not
as though it were not really the clarity of glory, but because it was a
kind of image representing that perfection of glory, in virtue of which
the body will be glorious.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the clarity which was in Christ's body
was a representation of His body's future clarity, so the clarity which
was in His garments signified the future clarity of the saints, which
will be surpassed by that of Christ, just as the brightness of the snow
is surpassed by that of the sun. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxii) that
Christ's garments became resplendent, "because in the height of
heavenly clarity all the saints will cling to Him in the refulgence of
righteousness. For His garments signify the righteous, because He will
unite them to Himself," according to Is. 49:18: "Thou shalt be clothed
with all these as with an ornament."
The bright cloud signifies the glory of the Holy Ghost or the "power of
the Father," as Origen says (Tract. iii in Matth.), by which in the
glory to come the saints will be covered. Or, again, it may be said
fittingly that it signifies the clarity of the world redeemed, which
clarity will cover the saints as a tent. Hence when Peter proposed to
make tents, "a bright cloud overshaded" the disciples.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the witnesses of the transfiguration were fittingly chosen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the witnesses of the transfiguration
were unfittingly chosen. For everyone is a better witness of things
that he knows. But at the time of Christ's transfiguration no one but
the angels had as yet any knowledge from experience of the glory to
come. Therefore the witnesses of the transfiguration should have been
angels rather than men.
Objection 2: Further, truth, not fiction, is becoming in a witness of
the truth. Now, Moses and Elias were there, not really, but only in
appearance; for a gloss on Lk. 9:30, "They were Moses and Elias," says:
"It must be observed that Moses and Elias were there neither in body
nor in soul"; but that those bodies were formed "of some available
matter. It is also credible that this was the result of the angelic
ministries, through the angels impersonating them." Therefore it seems
that they were unsuitable witnesses.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (Acts 10:43) that "all the prophets
give testimony" to Christ. Therefore not only Moses and Elias, but also
all the prophets, should have been present as witnesses.
Objection 4: Further, Christ's glory is promised as a reward to all the
faithful (2 Cor. 3:18; Phil. 3:21), in whom He wished by His
transfiguration to enkindle a desire of that glory. Therefore He should
have taken not only Peter, James, and John, but all His disciples, to
be witnesses of His transfiguration.
On the contrary is the authority of the Gospel.
I answer that, Christ wished to be transfigured in order to show men
His glory, and to arouse men to a desire of it, as stated above
[4226](A[1]). Now men are brought to the glory of eternal beatitude by
Christ---not only those who lived after Him, but also those who
preceded Him; therefore, when He was approaching His Passion, both "the
multitude that followed" and that "which went before, cried saying:
'Hosanna,'" as related Mat. 21:9, beseeching Him, as it were, to save
them. Consequently it was fitting that witnesses should be present from
among those who preceded Him---namely, Moses and Elias---and from those
who followed after Him---namely, Peter, James, and John---that "in the
mouth of two or three witnesses" this word might stand.
Reply to Objection 1: By His transfiguration Christ manifested to His
disciples the glory of His body, which belongs to men only. It was
therefore fitting that He should choose men and not angels as
witnesses.
Reply to Objection 2: This gloss is said to be taken from a book
entitled On the Marvels of Holy Scripture. It is not an authentic work,
but is wrongly ascribed to St. Augustine; consequently we need not
stand by it. For Jerome says on Mat. 17:3: "Observe that when the
Scribes and Pharisees asked for a sign from heaven, He refused to give
one; whereas here in order to increase the apostles' faith, He gives a
sign from heaven, Elias coming down thence, whither he had ascended,
and Moses arising from the nether world." This is not to be understood
as though the soul of Moses was reunited to his body, but that his soul
appeared through some assumed body, just as the angels do. But Elias
appeared in his own body, not that he was brought down from the
empyrean heaven, but from some place on high whither he was taken up in
the fiery chariot.
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says on Mat. 17:3: "Moses and Elias
are brought forward for many reasons." And, first of all, "because the
multitude said He was Elias or Jeremias or one of the prophets, He
brings the leaders of the prophets with Him; that hereby at least they
might see the difference between the servants and their Lord." Another
reason was " . . . that Moses gave the Law . . . while Elias . . . was
jealous for the glory of God." Therefore by appearing together with
Christ, they show how falsely the Jews "accused Him of transgressing
the Law, and of blasphemously appropriating to Himself the glory of
God." A third reason was "to show that He has power of death and life,
and that He is the judge of the dead and the living; by bringing with
Him Moses who had died, and Elias who still lived." A fourth reason was
because, as Luke says (9:31), "they spoke" with Him "of His decease
that He should accomplish in Jerusalem," i.e. of His Passion and death.
Therefore, "in order to strengthen the hearts of His disciples with a
view to this," He sets before them those who had exposed themselves to
death for God's sake: since Moses braved death in opposing Pharaoh, and
Elias in opposing Achab. A fifth reason was that "He wished His
disciples to imitate the meekness of Moses and the zeal of Elias."
Hilary adds a sixth reason---namely, in order to signify that He had
been foretold by the Law, which Moses gave them, and by the prophets,
of whom Elias was the principal.
Reply to Objection 4: Lofty mysteries should not be immediately
explained to everyone, but should be handed down through superiors to
others in their proper turn. Consequently, as Chrysostom says (on Mat.
17:3), "He took these three as being superior to the rest." For "Peter
excelled in the love" he bore to Christ and in the power bestowed on
him; John in the privilege of Christ's love for him on account of his
virginity, and, again, on account of his being privileged to be an
Evangelist; James on account of the privilege of martyrdom.
Nevertheless He did not wish them to tell others what they had seen
before His Resurrection; "lest," as Jerome says on Mat. 17:19, "such a
wonderful thing should seem incredible to them; and lest, after hearing
of so great glory, they should be scandalized at the Cross" that
followed; or, again, "lest [the Cross] should be entirely hindered by
the people" [*Bede, Hom. xviii; cf. Catena Aurea]; and "in order that
they might then be witnesses of spiritual things when they should be
filled with the Holy Ghost" [*Hilary, in Matth. xvii].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the testimony of the Father's voice, saying, "This is My beloved
Son," was fittingly added?
Objection 1: It would seem that the testimony of the Father's voice,
saying, "This is My beloved Son," was not fittingly added; for, as it
is written (Job 33:14), "God speaketh once, and repeateth not the
selfsame thing the second time." But the Father's voice had testified
to this at the time of (Christ's) baptism. Therefore it was not fitting
that He should bear witness to it a second time.
Objection 2: Further, at the baptism the Holy Ghost appeared under the
form of a dove at the same time as the Father's voice was heard. But
this did not happen at the transfiguration. Therefore it seems that the
testimony of the Father was made in an unfitting manner.
Objection 3: Further, Christ began to teach after His baptism.
Nevertheless, the Father's voice did not then command men to hear him.
Therefore neither should it have so commanded at the transfiguration.
Objection 4: Further, things should not be said to those who cannot
bear them, according to Jn. 16:12: "I have yet many things to say to
you, but you cannot bear them now." But the disciples could not bear
the Father's voice; for it is written (Mat. 17:6) that "the disciples
hearing, fell upon their face, and were very much afraid." Therefore
the Father's voice should not have been addressed to them.
On the contrary is the authority of the Gospel.
I answer that, The adoption of the sons of God is through a certain
conformity of image to the natural Son of God. Now this takes place in
two ways: first, by the grace of the wayfarer, which is imperfect
conformity; secondly, by glory, which is perfect conformity, according
to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared
what we shall be: we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like
to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Since, therefore, it is in
baptism that we acquire grace, while the clarity of the glory to come
was foreshadowed in the transfiguration, therefore both in His baptism
and in His transfiguration the natural sonship of Christ was fittingly
made known by the testimony of the Father: because He alone with the
Son and Holy Ghost is perfectly conscious of that perfect generation.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted are to be understood of God's
eternal speaking, by which God the Father uttered the only-begotten and
co-eternal Word. Nevertheless, it can be said that God uttered the same
thing twice in a bodily voice, yet not for the same purpose, but in
order to show the divers modes in which men can be partakers of the
likeness of the eternal Sonship.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as in the Baptism, where the mystery of the
first regeneration was proclaimed, the operation of the whole Trinity
was made manifest, because the Son Incarnate was there, the Holy Ghost
appeared under the form of a dove, and the Father made Himself known in
the voice; so also in the transfiguration, which is the mystery of the
second regeneration, the whole Trinity appears---the Father in the
voice, the Son in the man, the Holy Ghost in the bright cloud; for just
as in baptism He confers innocence, signified by the simplicity of the
dove, so in the resurrection will He give His elect the clarity of
glory and refreshment from all sorts of evil, which are signified by
the bright cloud.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ came to give grace actually, and to
promise glory by His words. Therefore it was fitting at the time of His
transfiguration, and not at the time of His baptism, that men should be
commanded to hear Him.
Reply to Objection 4: It was fitting that the disciples should be
afraid and fall down on hearing the voice of the Father, to show that
the glory which was then being revealed surpasses in excellence the
sense and faculty of all mortal beings; according to Ex. 33:20: "Man
shall not see Me and live." This is what Jerome says on Mat. 17:6:
"Such is human frailty that it cannot bear to gaze on such great
glory." But men are healed of this frailty by Christ when He brings
them into glory. And this is signified by what He says to them: "Arise,
and fear not."
__________________________________________________________________
THE PASSION OF CHRIST (TWELVE ARTICLES)
In proper sequence we have now to consider all that relates to Christ's
leaving the world. In the first place, His Passion; secondly, His
death; thirdly, His burial; and, fourthly, His descent into hell.
With regard to the Passion, there arises a threefold consideration: (1)
The Passion itself; (2) the efficient cause of the Passion; (3) the
fruits of the Passion.
Under the first heading there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for men's
deliverance?
(2) Whether there was any other possible means of delivering men?
(3) Whether this was the more suitable means?
(4) Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer on the cross?
(5) The extent of His sufferings;
(6) Whether the pain which He endured was the greatest?
(7) Whether His entire soul suffered?
(8) Whether His Passion hindered the joy of fruition?
(9) The time of the Passion;
(10) The place;
(11) Whether it was fitting for Him to be crucified with robbers?
(12) Whether Christ's Passion is to be attributed to the Godhead?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the
human race?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for Christ to
suffer for the deliverance of the human race. For the human race could
not be delivered except by God, according to Is. 45:21: "Am not I the
Lord, and there is no God else besides Me? A just God and a Saviour,
there is none besides Me." But no necessity can compel God, for this
would be repugnant to His omnipotence. Therefore it was not necessary
for Christ to suffer.
Objection 2: Further, what is necessary is opposed to what is
voluntary. But Christ suffered of His own will; for it is written (Is.
53:7): "He was offered because it was His own will." Therefore it was
not necessary for Him to suffer.
Objection 3: Further, as is written (Ps. 24:10): "All the ways of the
Lord are mercy and truth." But it does not seem necessary that He
should suffer on the part of the Divine mercy, which, as it bestows
gifts freely, so it appears to condone debts without satisfaction: nor,
again, on the part of Divine justice, according to which man had
deserved everlasting condemnation. Therefore it does not seem necessary
that Christ should have suffered for man's deliverance.
Objection 4: Further, the angelic nature is more excellent than the
human, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But Christ did not
suffer to repair the angelic nature which had sinned. Therefore,
apparently, neither was it necessary for Him to suffer for the
salvation of the human race.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:14): "As Moses lifted up the
serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up, that
whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life
everlasting."
I answer that, As the Philosopher teaches (Metaph. v), there are
several acceptations of the word "necessary." In one way it means
anything which of its nature cannot be otherwise; and in this way it is
evident that it was not necessary either on the part of God or on the
part of man for Christ to suffer. In another sense a thing may be
necessary from some cause quite apart from itself; and should this be
either an efficient or a moving cause then it brings about the
necessity of compulsion; as, for instance, when a man cannot get away
owing to the violence of someone else holding him. But if the external
factor which induces necessity be an end, then it will be said to be
necessary from presupposing such end---namely, when some particular end
cannot exist at all, or not conveniently, except such end be
presupposed. It was not necessary, then, for Christ to suffer from
necessity of compulsion, either on God's part, who ruled that Christ
should suffer, or on Christ's own part, who suffered voluntarily. Yet
it was necessary from necessity of the end proposed; and this can be
accepted in three ways. First of all, on our part, who have been
delivered by His Passion, according to John (3:14): "The Son of man
must be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but
may have life everlasting." Secondly, on Christ's part, who merited the
glory of being exalted, through the lowliness of His Passion: and to
this must be referred Lk. 24:26: "Ought not Christ to have suffered
these things, and so to enter into His glory?" Thirdly, on God's part,
whose determination regarding the Passion of Christ, foretold in the
Scriptures and prefigured in the observances of the Old Testament, had
to be fulfilled. And this is what St. Luke says (22:22): "The Son of
man indeed goeth, according to that which is determined"; and (Lk.
24:44, 46): "These are the words which I spoke to you while I was yet
with you, that all things must needs be fulfilled which are written in
the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms concerning Me:
for it is thus written, and thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to
rise again from the dead."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on the necessity of
compulsion on God's part.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument rests on the necessity of
compulsion on the part of the man Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: That man should be delivered by Christ's Passion
was in keeping with both His mercy and His justice. With His justice,
because by His Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the
human race; and so man was set free by Christ's justice: and with His
mercy, for since man of himself could not satisfy for the sin of all
human nature, as was said above ([4227]Q[1], A[2]), God gave him His
Son to satisfy for him, according to Rom. 3:24,25: "Being justified
freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus,
whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His
blood." And this came of more copious mercy than if He had forgiven
sins without satisfaction. Hence it is said (Eph. 2:4): "God, who is
rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, even
when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ."
Reply to Objection 4: The sin of the angels was irreparable; not so the
sin of the first man ([4228]FP, Q[64], A[2]).
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Whether there was any other possible way of human deliverance besides the
Passion of Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no other possible way of
human deliverance besides Christ's Passion. For our Lord says (Jn.
12:24): "Amen, amen I say to you, unless the grain of wheat falling
into the ground dieth, itself remaineth alone; but if it die, it
bringeth forth much fruit." Upon this St. Augustine (Tract. li)
observes that "Christ called Himself the seed." Consequently, unless He
suffered death, He would not otherwise have produced the fruit of our
redemption.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord addresses the Father (Mat. 26:42): "My
Father, if this chalice may not pass away but I must drink it, Thy will
be done." But He spoke there of the chalice of the Passion. Therefore
Christ's Passion could not pass away; hence Hilary says (Comm. 31 in
Matth.): "Therefore the chalice cannot pass except He drink of it,
because we cannot be restored except through His Passion."
Objection 3: Further, God's justice required that Christ should satisfy
by the Passion in order that man might be delivered from sin. But
Christ cannot let His justice pass; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:13):
"If we believe not, He continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself."
But He would deny Himself were He to deny His justice, since He is
justice itself. It seems impossible, then, for man to be delivered
otherwise than by Christ's Passion.
Objection 4: Further, there can be no falsehood underlying faith. But
the Fathers of old believed that Christ would suffer. Consequently, it
seems that it had to be that Christ should suffer.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We assert that the
way whereby God deigned to deliver us by the man Jesus Christ, who is
mediator between God and man, is both good and befitting the Divine
dignity; but let us also show that other possible means were not
lacking on God's part, to whose power all things are equally
subordinate."
I answer that, A thing may be said to be possible or impossible in two
ways: first of all, simply and absolutely; or secondly, from
supposition. Therefore, speaking simply and absolutely, it was possible
for God to deliver mankind otherwise than by the Passion of Christ,
because "no word shall be impossible with God" (Lk. 1:37). Yet it was
impossible if some supposition be made. For since it is impossible for
God's foreknowledge to be deceived and His will or ordinance to be
frustrated, then, supposing God's foreknowledge and ordinance regarding
Christ's Passion, it was not possible at the same time for Christ not
to suffer, and for mankind to be delivered otherwise than by Christ's
Passion. And the same holds good of all things foreknown and
preordained by God, as was laid down in the [4229]FP, Q[14], A[13].
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord is speaking there presupposing God's
foreknowledge and predetermination, according to which it was resolved
that the fruit of man's salvation should not follow unless Christ
suffered.
Reply to Objection 2: In the same way we must understand what is here
objected to in the second instance: "If this chalice may not pass away
but I must drink of it"---that is to say, because Thou hast so ordained
it---hence He adds: "Thy will be done."
Reply to Objection 3: Even this justice depends on the Divine will,
requiring satisfaction for sin from the human race. But if He had
willed to free man from sin without any satisfaction, He would not have
acted against justice. For a judge, while preserving justice, cannot
pardon fault without penalty, if he must visit fault committed against
another---for instance, against another man, or against the State, or
any Prince in higher authority. But God has no one higher than Himself,
for He is the sovereign and common good of the whole universe.
Consequently, if He forgive sin, which has the formality of fault in
that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no one: just as anyone
else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts
mercifully and not unjustly. And so David exclaimed when he sought
mercy: "To Thee only have I sinned" (Ps. 50:6), as if to say: "Thou
canst pardon me without injustice."
Reply to Objection 4: Human faith, and even the Divine Scriptures upon
which faith is based, are both based on the Divine foreknowledge and
ordinance. And the same reason holds good of that necessity which comes
of supposition, and of the necessity which arises of the Divine
foreknowledge and will.
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Whether there was any more suitable way of delivering the human race than b
y
Christ's Passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was some other more suitable way
of delivering the human race besides Christ's Passion. For nature in
its operation imitates the Divine work, since it is moved and regulated
by God. But nature never employs two agents where one will suffice.
Therefore, since God could have liberated mankind solely by His Divine
will, it does not seem fitting that Christ's Passion should have been
added for the deliverance of the human race.
Objection 2: Further, natural actions are more suitably performed than
deeds of violence, because violence is "a severance or lapse from what
is according to nature," as is said in De Coelo ii. But Christ's
Passion brought about His death by violence. Therefore it would have
been more appropriate had Christ died a natural death rather than
suffer for man's deliverance.
Objection 3: Further, it seems most fitting that whatsoever keeps
something unjustly and by violence, should be deprived of it by some
superior power; hence Isaias says (52:3): "You were sold gratis, and
you shall be redeemed without money." But the devil possessed no right
over man, whom he had deceived by guile, and whom he held subject in
servitude by a sort of violence. Therefore it seems most suitable that
Christ should have despoiled the devil solely by His power and without
the Passion.
On the contrary, St. Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "There was no
other more suitable way of healing our misery" than by the Passion of
Christ.
I answer that, Among means to an end that one is the more suitable
whereby the various concurring means employed are themselves helpful to
such end. But in this that man was delivered by Christ's Passion, many
other things besides deliverance from sin concurred for man's
salvation. In the first place, man knows thereby how much God loves
him, and is thereby stirred to love Him in return, and herein lies the
perfection of human salvation; hence the Apostle says (Rom. 5:8): "God
commendeth His charity towards us; for when as yet we were sinners . .
. Christ died for us." Secondly, because thereby He set us an example
of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues
displayed in the Passion, which are requisite for man's salvation.
Hence it is written (1 Pet. 2:21): "Christ also suffered for us,
leaving you an example that you should follow in His steps." Thirdly,
because Christ by His Passion not only delivered man from sin, but also
merited justifying grace for him and the glory of bliss, as shall be
shown later ([4230]Q[48], A[1];[4231] Q[49], AA[1], 5). Fourthly,
because by this man is all the more bound to refrain from sin,
according to 1 Cor. 6:20: "You are bought with a great price: glorify
and bear God in your body." Fifthly, because it redounded to man's
greater dignity, that as man was overcome and deceived by the devil, so
also it should be a man that should overthrow the devil; and as man
deserved death, so a man by dying should vanquish death. Hence it is
written (1 Cor. 15:57): "Thanks be to God who hath given us the victory
through our Lord Jesus Christ." It was accordingly more fitting that we
should be delivered by Christ's Passion than simply by God's good-will.
Reply to Objection 1: Even nature uses several means to one intent, in
order to do something more fittingly: as two eyes for seeing; and the
same can be observed in other matters.
Reply to Objection 2: As Chrysostom [*Athanasius, Orat. De Incarn.
Verb.] says: "Christ had come in order to destroy death, not His own,
(for since He is life itself, death could not be His), but men's death.
Hence it was not by reason of His being bound to die that He laid His
body aside, but because the death He endured was inflicted on Him by
men. But even if His body had sickened and dissolved in the sight of
all men, it was not befitting Him who healed the infirmities of others
to have his own body afflicted with the same. And even had He laid His
body aside without any sickness, and had then appeared, men would not
have believed Him when He spoke of His resurrection. For how could
Christ's victory over death appear, unless He endured it in the sight
of all men, and so proved that death was vanquished by the incorruption
of His body?"
Reply to Objection 3: Although the devil assailed man unjustly,
nevertheless, on account of sin, man was justly left by God under the
devil's bondage. And therefore it was fitting that through justice man
should be delivered from the devil's bondage by Christ making
satisfaction on his behalf in the Passion. This was also a fitting
means of overthrowing the pride of the devil, "who is a deserter from
justice, and covetous of sway"; in that Christ "should vanquish him and
deliver man, not merely by the power of His Godhead, but likewise by
the justice and lowliness of the Passion," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii).
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Whether Christ ought to have suffered on the cross?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought not to have suffered on
the cross. For the truth ought to conform to the figure. But in all the
sacrifices of the Old Testament which prefigured Christ the beasts were
slain with a sword and afterwards consumed by fire. Therefore it seems
that Christ ought not to have suffered on a cross, but rather by the
sword or by fire.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ
ought not to assume "dishonoring afflictions." But death on a cross was
most dishonoring and ignominious; hence it is written (Wis. 2:20): "Let
us condemn Him to a most shameful death." Therefore it seems that
Christ ought not to have undergone the death of the cross.
Objection 3: Further, it was said of Christ (Mat. 21:9): "Blessed is He
that cometh in the name of the Lord." But death upon the cross was a
death of malediction, as we read Dt. 21:23: "He is accursed of God that
hangeth on a tree." Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ to be
crucified.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:8): "He became obedient unto
death, even the death of the cross."
I answer that, It was most fitting that Christ should suffer the death
of the cross.
First of all, as an example of virtue. For Augustine thus writes (QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 25): "God's Wisdom became man to give us an example in
righteousness of living. But it is part of righteous living not to
stand in fear of things which ought not to be feared. Now there are
some men who, although they do not fear death in itself, are yet
troubled over the manner of their death. In order, then, that no kind
of death should trouble an upright man, the cross of this Man had to be
set before him, because, among all kinds of death, none was more
execrable, more fear-inspiring, than this."
Secondly, because this kind of death was especially suitable in order
to atone for the sin of our first parent, which was the plucking of the
apple from the forbidden tree against God's command. And so, to atone
for that sin, it was fitting that Christ should suffer by being
fastened to a tree, as if restoring what Adam had purloined; according
to Ps. 68:5: "Then did I pay that which I took not away." Hence
Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion [*Cf. Serm. ci De Tempore]:
"Adam despised the command, plucking the apple from the tree: but all
that Adam lost, Christ found upon the cross."
The third reason is because, as Chrysostom says in a sermon on the
Passion (De Cruce et Latrone i, ii): "He suffered upon a high rood and
not under a roof, in order that the nature of the air might be
purified: and the earth felt a like benefit, for it was cleansed by the
flowing of the blood from His side." And on Jn. 3:14: "The Son of man
must be lifted up," Theophylact says: "When you hear that He was lifted
up, understand His hanging on high, that He might sanctify the air who
had sanctified the earth by walking upon it."
The fourth reason is, because, by dying on it, He prepares for us an
ascent into heaven, as Chrysostom [*Athanasius, vide A, III, ad 2]
says. Hence it is that He says (Jn. 12:32): "If I be lifted up from the
earth, I will draw all things to Myself."
The fifth reason is because it is befitting the universal salvation of
the entire world. Hence Gregory of Nyssa observes (In Christ. Resurr.,
Orat. i) that "the shape of the cross extending out into four extremes
from their central point of contact denotes the power and the
providence diffused everywhere of Him who hung upon it." Chrysostom
[*Athanasius, vide A. III, ad 2] also says that upon the cross "He dies
with outstretched hands in order to draw with one hand the people of
old, and with the other those who spring from the Gentiles."
The sixth reason is because of the various virtues denoted by this
class of death. Hence Augustine in his book on the grace of the Old and
New Testament (Ep. cxl) says: "Not without purpose did He choose this
class of death, that He might be a teacher of that breadth, and height,
and length, and depth," of which the Apostle speaks (Eph. 3:18): "For
breadth is in the beam, which is fixed transversely above; this
appertains to good works, since the hands are stretched out upon it.
Length is the tree's extent from the beam to the ground; and there it
is planted---that is, it stands and abides---which is the note of
longanimity. Height is in that portion of the tree which remains over
from the transverse beam upwards to the top, and this is at the head of
the Crucified, because He is the supreme desire of souls of good hope.
But that part of the tree which is hidden from view to hold it fixed,
and from which the entire rood springs, denotes the depth of gratuitous
grace." And, as Augustine says (Tract. cxix in Joan.): "The tree upon
which were fixed the members of Him dying was even the chair of the
Master teaching."
The seventh reason is because this kind of death responds to very many
figures. For, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion (Serm. ci De
Tempore), an ark of wood preserved the human race from the waters of
the Deluge; at the exodus of God's people from Egypt, Moses with a rod
divided the sea, overthrew Pharaoh and saved the people of God. the
same Moses dipped his rod into the water, changing it from bitter to
sweet; at the touch of a wooden rod a salutary spring gushed forth from
a spiritual rock; likewise, in order to overcome Amalec, Moses
stretched forth his arms with rod in hand; lastly, God's law is
entrusted to the wooden Ark of the Covenant; all of which are like
steps by which we mount to the wood of the cross.
Reply to Objection 1: The altar of holocausts, upon which the
sacrifices of animals were immolated, was constructed of timbers, as is
set forth Ex. 27:, and in this respect the truth answers to the figure;
but "it is not necessary for it to be likened in every respect,
otherwise it would not be a likeness," but the reality, as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii). But. in particular, as Chrysostom
[*Athanasius, vide A, III, ad 2] says: "His head is not cut off, as was
done to John; nor was He sawn in twain, like Isaias, in order that His
entire and indivisible body might obey death, and that there might be
no excuse for them who want to divide the Church." While, instead of
material fire, there was the spiritual fire of charity in Christ's
holocaust.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ refused to undergo dishonorable sufferings
which are allied with defects of knowledge, or of grace, or even of
virtue, but not those injuries inflicted from without---nay, more, as
is written Heb. 12:2: "He endured the cross, despising the shame."
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xiv), sin is
accursed, and, consequently, so is death, and mortality, which comes of
sin. "But Christ's flesh was mortal, 'having the resemblance of the
flesh of sin'"; and hence Moses calls it "accursed," just as the
Apostle calls it "sin," saying (2 Cor. 5:21): "Him that knew no sin,
for us He hath made sin"---namely, because of the penalty of sin. "Nor
is there greater ignominy on that account, because he said: 'He is
accursed of God.'" For, "unless God had hated sin, He would never have
sent His Son to take upon Himself our death, and to destroy it.
Acknowledge, then, that it was for us He took the curse upon Himself,
whom you confess to have died for us." Hence it is written (Gal. 3:13):
"Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse
for us."
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Whether Christ endured all suffering?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did endure all sufferings,
because Hilary (De Trin. x) says: "God's only-begotten Son testifies
that He endured every kind of human sufferings in order to accomplish
the sacrament of His death, when with bowed head He gave up the ghost."
It seems, therefore, that He did endure all human sufferings.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Is. 52:13): "Behold My servant
shall understand, He shall be exalted and extolled, and shall be
exceeding high; as many as have been astonished at Him [Vulg.: 'thee'],
so shall His visage be inglorious among men, and His form among the
sons of men." But Christ was exalted in that He had all grace and all
knowledge, at which many were astonished in admiration thereof.
Therefore it seems that He was "inglorious," by enduring every human
suffering.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's Passion was ordained for man's
deliverance from sin, as stated above [4232](A[3]). But Christ came to
deliver men from every kind of sin. Therefore He ought to have endured
every kind of suffering.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 19:32): "The soldiers therefore
came: and they broke the legs of the first, and of the other who was
crucified with Him; but after they were come to Jesus, when they saw
that He was already dead, they did not break His legs." Consequently,
He did not endure every human suffering.
I answer that, Human sufferings may be considered under two aspects.
First of all, specifically, and in this way it was not necessary for
Christ to endure them all, since many are mutually exclusive, as
burning and drowning; for we are dealing now with sufferings inflicted
from without, since it was not beseeming for Him to endure those
arising from within, such as bodily ailments, as already stated
([4233]Q[14], A[4]). But, speaking generically, He did endure every
human suffering. This admits of a threefold acceptance. First of all,
on the part of men: for He endured something from Gentiles and from
Jews; from men and from women, as is clear from the women servants who
accused Peter. He suffered from the rulers, from their servants and
from the mob, according to Ps. 2:1,2: "Why have the Gentiles raged, and
the people devised vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and
the princes met together, against the Lord and against His Christ." He
suffered from friends and acquaintances, as is manifest from Judas
betraying and Peter denying Him.
Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the sufferings which a man
can endure. For Christ suffered from friends abandoning Him; in His
reputation, from the blasphemies hurled at Him; in His honor and glory,
from the mockeries and the insults heaped upon Him; in things, for He
was despoiled of His garments; in His soul, from sadness, weariness,
and fear; in His body, from wounds and scourgings.
Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to His bodily members. In His
head He suffered from the crown of piercing thorns; in His hands and
feet, from the fastening of the nails; on His face from the blows and
spittle; and from the lashes over His entire body. Moreover, He
suffered in all His bodily senses: in touch, by being scourged and
nailed; in taste, by being given vinegar and gall to drink; in smell,
by being fastened to the gibbet in a place reeking with the stench of
corpses, "which is called Calvary"; in hearing, by being tormented with
the cries of blasphemers and scorners; in sight, by beholding the tears
of His Mother and of the disciple whom He loved.
Reply to Objection 1: Hilary's words are to be understood as to all
classes of sufferings, but not as to their kinds.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness is sustained, not as to the number
of the sufferings and graces, but as to their greatness; for, as He was
uplifted above others in gifts of graces, so was He lowered beneath
others by the ignominy of His sufferings.
Reply to Objection 3: The very least one of Christ's sufferings was
sufficient of itself to redeem the human race from all sins; but as to
fittingness, it sufficed that He should endure all classes of
sufferings, as stated above.
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Whether the pain of Christ's Passion was greater than all other pains?
Objection 1: It would seem that the pain of Christ's Passion was not
greater than all other pains. For the sufferer's pain is increased by
the sharpness and the duration of the suffering. But some of the
martyrs endured sharper and more prolonged pains than Christ, as is
seen in St. Lawrence, who was roasted upon a gridiron; and in St.
Vincent, whose flesh was torn with iron pincers. Therefore it seems
that the pain of the suffering Christ was not the greatest.
Objection 2: Further, strength of soul mitigates pain, so much so that
the Stoics held there was no sadness in the soul of a wise man; and
Aristotle (Ethic. ii) holds that moral virtue fixes the mean in the
passions. But Christ had most perfect strength of soul. Therefore it
seems that the greatest pain did not exist in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, the more sensitive the sufferer is, the more
acute will the pain be. But the soul is more sensitive than the body,
since the body feels in virtue of the soul; also, Adam in the state of
innocence seems to have had a body more sensitive than Christ had, who
assumed a human body with its natural defects. Consequently, it seems
that the pain of a sufferer in purgatory, or in hell, or even Adam's
pain, if he suffered at all, was greater than Christ's in the Passion.
Objection 4: Further, the greater the good lost, the greater the pain.
But by sinning the sinner loses a greater good than Christ did when
suffering; since the life of grace is greater than the life of nature:
also, Christ, who lost His life, but was to rise again after three
days, seems to have lost less than those who lose their lives and abide
in death. Therefore it seems that Christ's pain was not the greatest of
all.
Objection 5: Further, the victim's innocence lessens the sting of his
sufferings. But Christ died innocent, according to Jer. 9:19: "I was as
a meek lamb, that is carried to be a victim." Therefore it seems that
the pain of Christ's Passion was not the greatest.
Objection 6: Further, there was nothing superfluous in Christ's
conduct. But the slightest pain would have sufficed to secure man's
salvation, because from His Divine Person it would have had infinite
virtue. Therefore it would have been superfluous to choose the greatest
of all pains.
On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 1:12) on behalf of Christ's
Person: "O all ye that pass by the way attend, and see if there be any
sorrow like unto My sorrow."
I answer that, As we have stated, when treating of the defects assumed
by Christ ([4234]Q[15], AA[5],6), there was true and sensible pain in
the suffering Christ, which is caused by something hurtful to the body:
also, there was internal pain, which is caused from the apprehension of
something hurtful, and this is termed "sadness." And in Christ each of
these was the greatest in this present life. This arose from four
causes. First of all, from the sources of His pain. For the cause of
the sensitive pain was the wounding of His body; and this wounding had
its bitterness, both from the extent of the suffering already mentioned
(A[5] ) and from the kind of suffering, since the death of the
crucified is most bitter, because they are pierced in nervous and
highly sensitive parts---to wit, the hands and feet; moreover, the
weight of the suspended body intensifies the agony. and besides this
there is the duration of the suffering because they do not die at once
like those slain by the sword. The cause of the interior pain was,
first of all, all the sins of the human race, for which He made
satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes them, so to speak, to
Himself, saying (Ps. 21:2): "The words of my sins." Secondly,
especially the fall of the Jews and of the others who sinned in His
death chiefly of the apostles, who were scandalized at His Passion.
Thirdly, the loss of His bodily life, which is naturally horrible to
human nature.
The magnitude of His suffering may be considered, secondly, from the
susceptibility of the sufferer as to both soul and body. For His body
was endowed with a most perfect constitution, since it was fashioned
miraculously by the operation of the Holy Ghost; just as some other
things made by miracles are better than others, as Chrysostom says
(Hom. xxii in Joan.) respecting the wine into which Christ changed the
water at the wedding-feast. And, consequently, Christ's sense of touch,
the sensitiveness of which is the reason for our feeling pain, was most
acute. His soul likewise, from its interior powers, apprehended most
vehemently all the causes of sadness.
Thirdly, the magnitude of Christ's suffering can be estimated from the
singleness of His pain and sadness. In other sufferers the interior
sadness is mitigated, and even the exterior suffering, from some
consideration of reason, by some derivation or redundance from the
higher powers into the lower; but it was not so with the suffering
Christ, because "He permitted each one of His powers to exercise its
proper function," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii).
Fourthly, the magnitude of the pain of Christ's suffering can be
reckoned by this, that the pain and sorrow were accepted voluntarily,
to the end of men's deliverance from sin; and consequently He embraced
the amount of pain proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit which
resulted therefrom.
From all these causes weighed together, it follows that Christ's pain
was the very greatest.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument follows from only one of the
considerations adduced---namely, from the bodily injury, which is the
cause of sensitive pain; but the torment of the suffering Christ is
much more intensified from other causes, as above stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Moral virtue lessens interior sadness in one way,
and outward sensitive pain in quite another; for it lessens interior
sadness directly by fixing the mean, as being its proper matter, within
limits. But, as was laid down in the [4235]FS, Q[64], A[2], moral
virtue fixes the mean in the passions, not according to mathematical
quantity, but according to quantity of proportion, so that the passion
shall not go beyond the rule of reason. And since the Stoics held all
sadness to be unprofitable, they accordingly believed it to be
altogether discordant with reason, and consequently to be shunned
altogether by a wise man. But in very truth some sadness is
praiseworthy, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei xiv)---namely, when it
flows from holy love, as, for instance, when a man is saddened over his
own or others' sins. Furthermore, it is employed as a useful means of
satisfying for sins, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor.
7:10): "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance, steadfast
unto salvation." And so to atone for the sins of all men, Christ
accepted sadness, the greatest in absolute quantity, yet not exceeding
the rule of reason. But moral virtue does not lessen outward sensitive
pain, because such pain is not subject to reason, but follows the
nature of the body; yet it lessens it indirectly by redundance of the
higher powers into the lower. But this did not happen in Christ's case,
as stated above (cf. Q[14], A[1], ad 2; Q[45], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: The pain of a suffering, separated soul belongs
to the state of future condemnation, which exceeds every evil of this
life, just as the glory of the saints surpasses every good of the
present life. Accordingly, when we say that Christ's pain was the
greatest, we make no comparison between His and the pain of a separated
soul. But Adam's body could not suffer, except he sinned. so that he
would become mortal, and passible. And, though actually suffering, it
would have felt less pain than Christ's body, for the reasons already
stated. From all this it is clear that even if by impassibility Adam
had suffered in the state of innocence, his pain would have been less
than Christ's.
Reply to Objection 4: Christ grieved not only over the loss of His own
bodily life, but also over the sins of all others. And this grief in
Christ surpassed all grief of every contrite heart, both because it
flowed from a greater wisdom and charity, by which the pang of
contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the one time for
all sins, according to Is. 53:4: "Surely He hath carried our sorrows."
But such was the dignity of Christ's life in the body, especially on
account of the Godhead united with it, that its loss, even for one
hour, would be a matter of greater grief than the loss of another man's
life for howsoever long a time. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii)
that the man of virtue loves his life all the more in proportion as he
knows it to be better; and yet he exposes it for virtue's sake. And in
like fashion Christ laid down His most beloved life for the good of
charity, according to Jer. 12:7: "I have given My dear soul into the
hands of her enemies."
Reply to Objection 5: The sufferer's innocence does lessen numerically
the pain of the suffering, since, when a guilty man suffers, he grieves
not merely on account of the penalty, but also because of the crime.
whereas the innocent man grieves only for the penalty: yet this pain is
more intensified by reason of his innocence, in so far as he deems the
hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved. Hence it is that even others
are more deserving of blame if they do not compassionate him. according
to Is. 57:1: "The just perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart."
Reply to Objection 6: Christ willed to deliver the human race from sins
not merely by His power, but also according to justice. And therefore
He did not simply weigh what great virtue His suffering would have from
union with the Godhead, but also how much, according to His human
nature, His pain would avail for so great a satisfaction.
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Whether Christ suffered in His whole soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in His whole
soul. For the soul suffers indirectly when the body suffers, inasmuch
as it is the "act of the body." But the soul is not, as to its every
part, the "act of the body"; because the intellect is the act of no
body, as is said De Anima iii. Therefore it seems that Christ did not
suffer in His whole soul.
Objection 2: Further, every power of the soul is passive in regard to
its proper object. But the higher part of reason has for its object the
eternal types, "to the consideration and consultation of which it
directs itself," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii). But Christ could
suffer no hurt from the eternal types, since they are nowise opposed to
Him. Therefore it seems that He did not suffer in His whole soul.
Objection 3: Further, a sensitive passion is said to be complete when
it comes into contact with the reason. But there was none such in
Christ, but only "pro-passions"; as Jerome remarks on Mat. 26:37. Hence
Dionysius says in a letter to John the Evangelist that "He endured only
mentally the sufferings inflicted upon Him." Consequently it does not
seem that Christ suffered in His whole soul.
Objection 4: Further, suffering causes pain: but there is no pain in
the speculative intellect, because, as the Philosopher says (Topic. i),
"there is no sadness in opposition to the pleasure which comes of
consideration." Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His
whole soul.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 87:4) on behalf of Christ: "My soul
is filled with evils": upon which the gloss adds: "Not with vices, but
with woes, whereby the soul suffers with the flesh; or with evils, viz.
of a perishing people, by compassionating them." But His soul would not
have been filled with these evils except He had suffered in His whole
soul. Therefore Christ suffered in His entire soul.
I answer that, A whole is so termed with respect to its parts. But the
parts of a soul are its faculties. So, then, the whole soul is said to
suffer in so far as it is afflicted as to its essence, or as to all its
faculties. But it must be borne in mind that a faculty of the soul can
suffer in two ways: first of all, by its own passion; and this comes of
its being afflicted by its proper object; thus, sight may suffer from
superabundance of the visible object. In another way a faculty suffers
by a passion in the subject on which it is based; as sight suffers when
the sense of touch in the eye is affected, upon which the sense of
sight rests, as, for instance, when the eye is pricked, or is
disaffected by heat.
So, then, we say that if the soul be considered with respect to its
essence, it is evident that Christ's whole soul suffered. For the
soul's whole essence is allied with the body, so that it is entire in
the whole body and in its every part. Consequently, when the body
suffered and was disposed to separate from the soul, the entire soul
suffered. But if we consider the whole soul according to its faculties,
speaking thus of the proper passions of the faculties, He suffered
indeed as to all His lower powers; because in all the soul's lower
powers, whose operations are but temporal, there was something to be
found which was a source of woe to Christ, as is evident from what was
said above [4236](A[6]). But Christ's higher reason did not suffer
thereby on the part of its object, which is God, who was the cause, not
of grief, but rather of delight and joy, to the soul of Christ.
Nevertheless, all the powers of Christ's soul did suffer according as
any faculty is said to be affected as regards its subject, because all
the faculties of Christ's soul were rooted in its essence, to which
suffering extended when the body, whose act it is, suffered.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellect as a faculty is not the
act of the body, still the soul's essence is the act of the body, and
in it the intellective faculty is rooted, as was shown in the [4237]FP,
Q[77], AA[6],8.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proceeds from passion on the part
of the proper object, according to which Christ's higher reason did not
suffer.
Reply to Objection 3: Grief is then said to be a true passion, by which
the soul is troubled, when the passion in the sensitive part causes
reason to deflect from the rectitude of its act, so that it then
follows the passion, and has no longer free-will with regard to it. In
this way passion of the sensitive part did not extend to reason in
Christ, but merely subjectively, as was stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: The speculative intellect can have no pain or
sadness on the part of its object, which is truth considered
absolutely, and which is its perfection: nevertheless, both grief and
its cause can reach it in the way mentioned above.
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Whether Christ's entire soul enjoyed blessed fruition during the Passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's entire soul did not enjoy
blessed fruition during the Passion. For it is not possible to be sad
and glad at the one time, since sadness and gladness are contraries.
But Christ's whole soul suffered grief during the Passion, as was
stated above [4238](A[7]). Therefore His whole soul could not enjoy
fruition.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii) that, if
sadness be vehement, it not only checks the contrary delight, but every
delight; and conversely. But the grief of Christ's Passion was the
greatest, as shown above [4239](A[6]); and likewise the enjoyment of
fruition is also the greatest, as was laid down in the first volume of
the [4240]FS, Q[34], A[3]. Consequently, it was not possible for
Christ's whole soul to be suffering and rejoicing at the one time.
Objection 3: Further, beatific "fruition" comes of the knowledge and
love of Divine things, as Augustine says (Doctr. Christ. i). But all
the soul's powers do not extend to the knowledge and love of God.
Therefore Christ's whole soul did not enjoy fruition.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): Christ's Godhead
"permitted His flesh to do and to suffer what was proper to it." In
like fashion, since it belonged to Christ's soul, inasmuch as it was
blessed, to enjoy fruition, His Passion did not impede fruition.
I answer that, As stated above [4241](A[7]), the whole soul can be
understood both according to its essence and according to all its
faculties. If it be understood according to its essence, then His whole
soul did enjoy fruition, inasmuch as it is the subject of the higher
part of the soul, to which it belongs, to enjoy the Godhead: so that as
passion, by reason of the essence, is attributed to the higher part of
the soul, so, on the other hand, by reason of the superior part of the
soul, fruition is attributed to the essence. But if we take the whole
soul as comprising all its faculties, thus His entire soul did not
enjoy fruition: not directly, indeed, because fruition is not the act
of any one part of the soul; nor by any overflow of glory, because,
since Christ was still upon earth, there was no overflowing of glory
from the higher part into the lower, nor from the soul into the body.
But since, on the contrary, the soul's higher part was not hindered in
its proper acts by the lower, it follows that the higher part of His
soul enjoyed fruition perfectly while Christ was suffering.
Reply to Objection 1: The joy of fruition is not opposed directly to
the grief of the Passion, because they have not the same object. Now
nothing prevents contraries from being in the same subject, but not
according to the same. And so the joy of fruition can appertain to the
higher part of reason by its proper act; but grief of the Passion
according to the subject. Grief of the Passion belongs to the essence
of the soul by reason of the body, whose form the soul is; whereas the
joy of fruition (belongs to the soul) by reason of the faculty in which
it is subjected.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher's contention is true because of
the overflow which takes place naturally of one faculty of the soul
into another; but it was not so with Christ, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 3: Such argument holds good of the totality of the
soul with regard to its faculties.
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Whether Christ suffered at a suitable time?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer at a suitable
time. For Christ's Passion was prefigured by the sacrifice of the
Paschal lamb: hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:7): "Christ our Pasch is
sacrificed." But the paschal lamb was slain "on the fourteenth day at
eventide," as is stated in Ex. 12:6. Therefore it seems that Christ
ought to have suffered then; which is manifestly false: for He was then
celebrating the Pasch with His disciples, according to Mark's account
(14:12): "On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they
sacrificed the Pasch"; whereas it was on the following day that He
suffered.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's Passion is called His uplifting,
according to Jn. 3:14: "So must the Son of man be lifted up." And
Christ is Himself called the Sun of Justice, as we read Mal. 4:2.
Therefore it seems that He ought to have suffered at the sixth hour,
when the sun is at its highest point, and yet the contrary appears from
Mk. 15:25: "It was the third hour, and they crucified Him."
Objection 3: Further, as the sun is at its highest point in each day at
the sixth hour, so also it reaches its highest point in every year at
the summer solstice. Therefore Christ ought to have suffered about the
time of the summer solstice rather than about the vernal equinox.
Objection 4: Further, the world was enlightened by Christ's presence in
it, according to Jn. 9:5: "As long as I am in the world I am the light
of the world." Consequently it was fitting for man's salvation that
Christ should have lived longer in the world, so that He should have
suffered, not in young, but in old, age.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:1): "Jesus, knowing that His
hour was come for Him to pass out of this world to the Father"; and
(Jn. 2:4): "My hour is not yet come." Upon which texts Augustine
observes: "When He had done as much as He deemed sufficient, then came
His hour, not of necessity, but of will, not of condition, but of
power." Therefore Christ died at an opportune time.
I answer that, As was observed above [4242](A[1]), Christ's Passion was
subject to His will. But His will was ruled by the Divine wisdom which
"ordereth all things" conveniently and "sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).
Consequently it must be said that Christ's Passion was enacted at an
opportune time. Hence it is written in De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu.
lv: "The Saviour did everything in its proper place and season."
Reply to Objection 1: Some hold that Christ did die on the fourteenth
day of the moon, when the Jews sacrificed the Pasch: hence it is stated
(Jn. 18:28) that the Jews "went not into Pilate's hall" on the day of
the Passion, "that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat
the Pasch." Upon this Chrysostom observes (Hom. lxxxii in Joan.): "The
Jews celebrated the Pasch then; but He celebrated the Pasch on the
previous day, reserving His own slaying until the Friday, when the old
Pasch was kept." And this appears to tally with the statement (Jn.
13:1-5) that "before the festival day of the Pasch . . . when supper
was done" . . . Christ washed "the feet of the disciples."
But Matthew's account (26:17) seems opposed to this; that "on the first
day of the Azymes the disciples came to Jesus, saying: Where wilt Thou
that we prepare for Thee to eat the Pasch?" From which, as Jerome says,
"since the fourteenth day of the first month is called the day of the
Azymes, when the lamb was slain, and when it was full moon," it is
quite clear that Christ kept the supper on the fourteenth and died on
the fifteenth. And this comes out more clearly from Mk. 14:12: "On the
first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch,"
etc.; and from Lk. 22:7: "The day of the unleavened bread came, on
which it was necessary that the Pasch should be killed."
Consequently, then, others say that Christ ate the Pasch with His
disciples on the proper day---that is, on the fourteenth day of the
moon---"showing thereby that up to the last day He was not opposed to
the law," as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxi in Matth.): but that the Jews,
being busied in compassing Christ's death against the law, put off
celebrating the Pasch until the following day. And on this account it
is said of them that on the day of Christ's Passion they were unwilling
to enter Pilate's hall, "that they might not be defiled, but that they
might eat the Pasch."
But even this solution does not tally with Mark, who says: "On the
first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch."
Consequently Christ and the Jews celebrated the ancient Pasch at the
one time. And as Bede says on Lk. 22:7,8: "Although Christ who is our
Pasch was slain on the following day---that is, on the fifteenth day of
the moon---nevertheless, on the night when the Lamb was sacrificed,
delivering to the disciples to be celebrated, the mysteries of His body
and blood, and being held and bound by the Jews, He hallowed the
opening of His own immolation---that is, of His Passion."
But the words (Jn. 13:1) "Before the festival day of the Pasch" are to
be understood to refer to the fourteenth day of the moon, which then
fell upon the Thursday: for the fifteenth day of the moon was the most
solemn day of the Pasch with the Jews: and so the same day which John
calls "before the festival day of the Pasch," on account of the natural
distinction of days, Matthew calls the first day of the unleavened
bread, because, according to the rite of the Jewish festivity, the
solemnity began from the evening of the preceding day. When it is said,
then, that they were going to eat the Pasch on the fifteenth day of the
month, it is to be understood that the Pasch there is not called the
Paschal lamb, which was sacrificed on the fourteenth day, but the
Paschal food---that is, the unleavened bread---which had to be eaten by
the clean. Hence Chrysostom in the same passage gives another
explanation, that the Pasch can be taken as meaning the whole feast of
the Jews, which lasted seven days.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. iii): "'It
was about the sixth hour' when the Lord was delivered up by Pilate to
be crucified," as John relates. For it "was not quite the sixth hour,
but about the sixth---that is, it was after the fifth, and when part of
the sixth had been entered upon until the sixth hour was ended---that
the darkness began, when Christ hung upon the cross. It is understood
to have been the third hour when the Jews clamored for the Lord to be
crucified: and it is most clearly shown that they crucified Him when
they clamored out. Therefore, lest anyone might divert the thought of
so great a crime from the Jews to the soldiers, he says: 'It was the
third hour, and they crucified Him,' that they before all may be found
to have crucified Him, who at the third hour clamored for His
crucifixion. Although there are not wanting some persons who wish the
Parasceve to be understood as the third hour, which John recalls,
saying: 'It was the Parasceve, about the sixth hour.' For 'Parasceve'
is interpreted 'preparation.' But the true Pasch, which was celebrated
in the Lord's Passion, began to be prepared from the ninth hour of the
night---namely, when the chief priests said: 'He is deserving of
death.'" According to John, then, "the sixth hour of the Parasceve"
lasts from that hour of the night down to Christ's crucifixion; while,
according to Mark, it is the third hour of the day.
Still, there are some who contend that this discrepancy is due to the
error of a Greek transcriber: since the characters employed by them to
represent 3 and 6 are somewhat alike.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the author of De Qq. Vet. et Nov.
Test., qu. lv, "our Lord willed to redeem and reform the world by His
Passion, at the time of year at which He had created it---that is, at
the equinox. It is then that day grows upon night; because by our
Saviour's Passion we are brought from darkness to light." And since the
perfect enlightening will come about at Christ's second coming,
therefore the season of His second coming is compared (Mat. 24:32,33)
to the summer in these words: "When the branch thereof is now tender,
and the leaves come forth, you know that summer is nigh: so you also,
when you shall see all these things, know ye that it is nigh even at
the doors." And then also shall be Christ's greatest exaltation.
Reply to Objection 4: Christ willed to suffer while yet young, for
three reasons. First of all, to commend the more His love by giving up
His life for us when He was in His most perfect state of life.
Secondly, because it was not becoming for Him to show any decay of
nature nor to be subject to disease, as stated above ([4243]Q[14],
A[4]). Thirdly, that by dying and rising at an early age Christ might
exhibit beforehand in His own person the future condition of those who
rise again. Hence it is written (Eph. 4:13): "Until we all meet into
the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a
perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ."
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Whether Christ suffered in a suitable place?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in a suitable
place. For Christ suffered according to His human nature, which was
conceived in Nazareth and born in Bethlehem. Consequently it seems that
He ought not to have suffered in Jerusalem, but in Nazareth or
Bethlehem.
Objection 2: Further, the reality ought to correspond with the figure.
But Christ's Passion was prefigured by the sacrifices of the Old Law,
and these were offered up in the Temple. Therefore it seems that Christ
ought to have suffered in the Temple, and not outside the city gate.
Objection 3: Further, the medicine should correspond with the disease.
But Christ's Passion was the medicine against Adam's sin: and Adam was
not buried in Jerusalem, but in Hebron; for it is written (Josh.
14:15): "The name of Hebron before was called Cariath-Arbe: Adam the
greatest in the land of [Vulg.: 'among'] the Enacims was laid there."
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 13:33): "It cannot be that a
prophet perish out of Jerusalem." Therefore it was fitting that He
should die in Jerusalem.
I answer that, According to the author of De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test.,
qu. lv, "the Saviour did everything in its proper place and season,"
because, as all things are in His hands, so are all places: and
consequently, since Christ suffered at a suitable time, so did He in a
suitable place.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ died most appropriately in Jerusalem.
First of all, because Jerusalem was God's chosen place for the offering
of sacrifices to Himself: and these figurative sacrifices foreshadowed
Christ's Passion, which is a true sacrifice, according to Eph. 5:2: "He
hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for
an odor of sweetness." Hence Bede says in a Homily (xxiii): "When the
Passion drew nigh, our Lord willed to draw nigh to the place of the
Passion"---that is to say, to Jerusalem---whither He came five days
before the Pasch; just as, according to the legal precept, the Paschal
lamb was led to the place of immolation five days before the Pasch,
which is the tenth day of the moon.
Secondly, because the virtue of His Passion was to be spread over the
whole world, He wished to suffer in the center of the habitable
world---that is, in Jerusalem. Accordingly it is written (Ps. 73:12):
"But God is our King before ages: He hath wrought salvation in the
midst of the earth"---that is, in Jerusalem, which is called "the navel
of the earth" [*Cf. Jerome's comment on Ezech. 5:5].
Thirdly, because it was specially in keeping with His humility: that,
as He chose the most shameful manner of death, so likewise it was part
of His humility that He did not refuse to suffer in so celebrated a
place. Hence Pope Leo says (Serm. I in Epiph.): "He who had taken upon
Himself the form of a servant chose Bethlehem for His nativity and
Jerusalem for His Passion."
Fourthly, He willed to suffer in Jerusalem, where the chief priests
dwelt, to show that the wickedness of His slayers arose from the chiefs
of the Jewish people. Hence it is written (Acts 4:27): "There assembled
together in this city against Thy holy child Jesus whom Thou hast
anointed, Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people
of Israel."
Reply to Objection 2: For three reasons Christ suffered outside the
gate, and not in the Temple nor in the city. First of all, that the
truth might correspond with the figure. For the calf and the goat which
were offered in most solemn sacrifice for expiation on behalf of the
entire multitude were burnt outside the camp, as commanded in Lev.
16:27. Hence it is written (Heb. 13:27): "For the bodies of those
beasts, whose blood is brought into the holies by the high-priest for
sin, are burned without the camp. Wherefore Jesus also, that He might
sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate."
Secondly, to set us the example of shunning worldly conversation.
Accordingly the passage continues: "Let us go forth therefore to Him
without the camp, bearing His reproach."
Thirdly, as Chrysostom says in a sermon on the Passion (Hom. i De Cruce
et Latrone): "The Lord was not willing to suffer under a roof, nor in
the Jewish Temple, lest the Jews might take away the saving sacrifice,
and lest you might think He was offered for that people only.
Consequently, it was beyond the city and outside the walls, that you
may learn it was a universal sacrifice, an oblation for the whole
world, a cleansing for all."
Reply to Objection 3: According to Jerome, in his commentary on Mat.
27:33, "someone explained 'the place of Calvary' as being the place
where Adam was buried; and that it was so called because the skull of
the first man was buried there. A pleasing interpretation indeed, and
one suited to catch the ear of the people, but, still, not the true
one. For the spots where the condemned are beheaded are outside the
city and beyond the gates, deriving thence the name of Calvary---that
is, of the beheaded. Jesus, accordingly, was crucified there, that the
standards of martyrdom might be uplifted over what was formerly the
place of the condemned. But Adam was buried close by Hebron and Arbe,
as we read in the book of Jesus Ben Nave." But Jesus was to be
crucified in the common spot of the condemned rather than beside Adam's
sepulchre, to make it manifest that Christ's cross was the remedy, not
only for Adam's personal sin, but also for the sin of the entire world.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting for Christ to be crucified with thieves?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for Christ to have been crucified
with thieves, because it is written (2 Cor. 6:14): "What participation
hath justice with injustice?" But for our sakes Christ "of God is made
unto us justice" (1 Cor. 1:30); whereas iniquity applies to thieves.
Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to be crucified with thieves.
Objection 2: Further, on Mat. 26:35, "Though I should die with Thee, I
will not deny Thee," Origen (Tract. xxxv in Matth.) observes: "It was
not men's lot to die with Jesus, since He died for all." Again, on Lk.
22:33, "I am ready to go with Thee, both into prison and death,"
Ambrose says: "Our Lord's Passion has followers, but not equals." It
seems, then, much less fitting for Christ to suffer with thieves.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 27:44) that "the thieves who
were crucified with Him reproached Him." But in Lk. 22:42 it is stated
that one of them who were crucified with Christ cried out to Him:
"Lord, remember me when Thou shalt come into Thy kingdom." It seems,
then, that besides the blasphemous thieves there was another man who
did not blaspheme Him: and so the Evangelist's account does not seem to
be accurate when it says that Christ was crucified with thieves.
On the contrary, It was foretold by Isaias (53:12): "And He was reputed
with the wicked."
I answer that, Christ was crucified between thieves from one intention
on the part of the Jews, and from quite another on the part of God's
ordaining. As to the intention of the Jews, Chrysostom remarks (Hom.
lxxxvii in Matth.) that they crucified the two thieves, one on either
side, "that He might be made to share their guilt. But it did not
happen so; because mention is never made of them; whereas His cross is
honored everywhere. Kings lay aside their crowns to take up the cross:
on their purple robes, on their diadems, on their weapons, on the
consecrated table, everywhere the cross shines forth."
As to God's ordinance, Christ was crucified with thieves, because, as
Jerome says on Mat. 27:33: "As Christ became accursed of the cross for
us, so for our salvation He was crucified as a guilty one among the
guilty." Secondly, as Pope Leo observes (Serm. iv de Passione): "Two
thieves were crucified, one on His right hand and one on His left, to
set forth by the very appearance of the gibbet that separation of all
men which shall be made in His hour of judgment." And Augustine on Jn.
7:36: "The very cross, if thou mark it well, was a judgment-seat: for
the judge being set in the midst, the one who believed was delivered,
the other who mocked Him was condemned. Already He has signified what
He shall do to the quick and the dead; some He will set on His right,
others on His left hand." Thirdly, according to Hilary (Comm. xxxiii in
Matth.): "Two thieves are set, one upon His right and one upon His
left, to show that all mankind is called to the sacrament of His
Passion. But because of the cleavage between believers and unbelievers,
the multitude is divided into right and left, those on the right being
saved by the justification of faith." Fourthly, because, as Bede says
on Mk. 15:27: "The thieves crucified with our Lord denote those who,
believing in and confessing Christ, either endure the conflict of
martyrdom or keep the institutes of stricter observance. But those who
do the like for the sake of everlasting glory are denoted by the faith
of the thief on the right; while others who do so for the sake of human
applause copy the mind and behavior of the one on the left."
Reply to Objection 1: Just as Christ was not obliged to die, but
willingly submitted to death so as to vanquish death by His power: so
neither deserved He to be classed with thieves; but willed to be
reputed with the ungodly that He might destroy ungodliness by His
power. Accordingly, Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxiv in Joan.) that "to
convert the thief upon the cross, and lead him into paradise, was no
less a wonder than to shake the rocks."
Reply to Objection 2: It was not fitting that anyone else should die
with Christ from the same cause as Christ: hence Origen continues thus
in the same passage: "All had been under sin, and all required that
another should die for them, not they for others."
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. iii): We
can understand Matthew "as putting the plural for the singular" when he
said "the thieves reproached Him." Or it may be said, with Jerome, that
"at first both blasphemed Him, but afterwards one believed in Him on
witnessing the wonders."
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Whether Christ's Passion is to be attributed to His Godhead?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion is to be attributed to
His Godhead; for it is written (1 Cor. 2:8): "If they had known it,
they would never have crucified the Lord of glory." But Christ is the
Lord of glory in respect of His Godhead. Therefore Christ's Passion is
attributed to Him in respect of His Godhead.
Objection 2: Further, the principle of men's salvation is the Godhead
Itself, according to Ps. 36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from
the Lord." Consequently, if Christ's Passion did not appertain to His
Godhead, it would seem that it could not produce fruit in us.
Objection 3: Further, the Jews were punished for slaying Christ as for
murdering God Himself; as is proved by the gravity of the punishment.
Now this would not be so if the Passion were not attributed to the
Godhead. Therefore Christ's Passion should be so attributed.
On the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): "The Word is
impassible whose Nature is Divine." But what is impassible cannot
suffer. Consequently, Christ's Passion did not concern His Godhead.
I answer that, As stated above ([4244]Q[2], AA[1],2,3,6), the union of
the human nature with the Divine was effected in the Person, in the
hypostasis, in the suppositum, yet observing the distinction of
natures; so that it is the same Person and hypostasis of the Divine and
human natures, while each nature retains that which is proper to it.
And therefore, as stated above ([4245]Q[16], A[4]), the Passion is to
be attributed to the suppositum of the Divine Nature, not because of
the Divine Nature, which is impassible, but by reason of the human
nature. Hence, in a Synodal Epistle of Cyril [*Act. Conc. Ephes., P. i,
cap. 26] we read: "If any man does not confess that the Word of God
suffered in the flesh and was crucified in the flesh, let him be
anathema." Therefore Christ's Passion belongs to the "suppositum" of
the Divine Nature by reason of the passible nature assumed, but not on
account of the impassible Divine Nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The Lord of glory is said to be crucified, not as
the Lord of glory, but as a man capable of suffering.
Reply to Objection 2: As is said in a sermon of the Council of Ephesus
[*P. iii, cap. 10], "Christ's death being, as it were, God's
death"---namely, by union in Person---"destroyed death"; since He who
suffered "was both God and man. For God's Nature was not wounded, nor
did It undergo any change by those sufferings."
Reply to Objection 3: As the passage quoted goes on to say: "The Jews
did not crucify one who was simply a man; they inflicted their
presumptions upon God. For suppose a prince to speak by word of mouth,
and that his words are committed to writing on a parchment and sent out
to the cities, and that some rebel tears up the document, he will be
led forth to endure the death sentence, not for merely tearing up a
document, but as destroying the imperial message. Let not the Jew,
then, stand in security, as crucifying a mere man; since what he saw
was as the parchment, but what was hidden under it was the imperial
Word, the Son by nature, not the mere utterance of a tongue."
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OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF CHRIST'S PASSION (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the efficient cause of Christ's Passion,
concerning which there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was slain by others, or by Himself?
(2) From what motive did He deliver Himself up to the Passion?
(3) Whether the Father delivered Him up to suffer?
(4) Whether it was fitting that He should suffer at the hands of the
Gentiles, or rather of the Jews?
(5) Whether His slayers knew who He was?
(6) Of the sin of them who slew Christ.
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Whether Christ was slain by another or by Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not slain by another, but by
Himself. For He says Himself (Jn. 10:18): "No men taketh My life from
Me, but I lay it down of Myself." But he is said to kill another who
takes away his life. Consequently, Christ was not slain by others, but
by Himself.
Objection 2: Further, those slain by others sink gradually from
exhausted nature, and this is strikingly apparent in the crucified:
for, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "Those who were crucified were
tormented with a lingering death." But this did not happen in Christ's
case, since "crying out, with a loud voice, He yielded up the ghost"
(Mat. 27:50). Therefore Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself.
Objection 3: Further, those slain by others suffer a violent death, and
hence die unwillingly, because violent is opposed to voluntary. But
Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "Christ's spirit did not quit the flesh
unwillingly, but because He willed it, when He willed it, and as He
willed it." Consequently Christ was not slain by others, but by
Himself.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 18:33): "After they have scourged
Him, they will put him to death."
I answer that, A thing may cause an effect in two ways: in the first
instance by acting directly so as to produce the effect; and in this
manner Christ's persecutors slew Him because they inflicted on Him what
was a sufficient cause of death, and with the intention of slaying Him,
and the effect followed, since death resulted from that cause. In
another way someone causes an effect indirectly---that is, by not
preventing it when he can do so; just as one person is said to drench
another by not closing the window through which the shower is entering:
and in this way Christ was the cause of His own Passion and death. For
He could have prevented His Passion and death. Firstly, by holding His
enemies in check, so that they would not have been eager to slay Him,
or would have been powerless to do so. Secondly, because His spirit had
the power of preserving His fleshly nature from the infliction of any
injury; and Christ's soul had this power, because it was united in
unity of person with the Divine Word, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv).
Therefore, since Christ's soul did not repel the injury inflicted on
His body, but willed His corporeal nature to succumb to such injury, He
is said to have laid down His life, or to have died voluntarily.
Reply to Objection 1: When we hear the words, "No man taketh away My
life from Me," we must understand "against My will": for that is
properly said to be "taken away" which one takes from someone who is
unwilling and unable to resist.
Reply to Objection 2: In order for Christ to show that the Passion
inflicted by violence did not take away His life, He preserved the
strength of His bodily nature, so that at the last moment He was able
to cry out with a loud voice: and hence His death should be computed
among His other miracles. Accordingly it is written (Mk. 15:39): "And
the centurion who stood over against Him, seeing that crying out in
this manner, He had given up the ghost, said: Indeed, this man was the
Son of God." It was also a subject of wonder in Christ's death that He
died sooner than the others who were tormented with the same suffering.
Hence John says (19:32) that "they broke the legs of the first, and of
the other that was crucified with Him," that they might die more
speedily; "but after they were come to Jesus, when they saw that He was
already dead, they did not break His legs." Mark also states (15:44)
that "Pilate wondered that He should be already dead." For as of His
own will His bodily nature kept its vigor to the end, so likewise, when
He willed, He suddenly succumbed to the injury inflicted.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ at the same time suffered violence in
order to die, and died, nevertheless, voluntarily; because violence was
inflicted on His body, which, however, prevailed over His body only so
far as He willed it.
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Whether Christ died out of obedience?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not die out of obedience.
For obedience is referred to a command. But we do not read that Christ
was commanded to suffer. Therefore He did not suffer out of obedience.
Objection 2: Further, a man is said to do from obedience what he does
from necessity of precept. But Christ did not suffer necessarily, but
voluntarily. Therefore He did not suffer out of obedience.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than
obedience. But we read that Christ suffered out of charity, according
to Eph. 5:2: "Walk in love, as Christ also has loved us, and delivered
Himself up for us." Therefore Christ's Passion ought to be ascribed
rather to charity than to obedience.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:8): "He became obedient" to the
Father "unto death."
I answer that, It was befitting that Christ should suffer out of
obedience. First of all, because it was in keeping with human
justification, that "as by the disobedience of one man, many were made
sinners: so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just," as
is written Rom. 5:19. Secondly, it was suitable for reconciling man
with God: hence it is written (Rom. 5:10): "We are reconciled to God by
the death of His Son," in so far as Christ's death was a most
acceptable sacrifice to God, according to Eph. 5:2: "He delivered
Himself for us an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of
sweetness." Now obedience is preferred to all sacrifices. according to
1 Kings 15:22: "Obedience is better than sacrifices." Therefore it was
fitting that the sacrifice of Christ's Passion and death should proceed
from obedience. Thirdly, it was in keeping with His victory whereby He
triumphed over death and its author; because a soldier cannot conquer
unless he obey his captain. And so the Man-Christ secured the victory
through being obedient to God, according to Prov. 21:28: "An obedient
man shall speak of victory."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ received a command from the Father to
suffer. For it is written (Jn. 10:18): "I have power to lay down My
life, and I have power to take it up again: (and) this commandment have
I received of My Father"---namely, of laying down His life and of
resuming it again. "From which," as Chrysostom says (Hom. lix in
Joan.), it is not to be understood "that at first He awaited the
command, and that He had need to be told, but He showed the proceeding
to be a voluntary one, and destroyed suspicion of opposition" to the
Father. Yet because the Old Law was ended by Christ's death, according
to His dying words, "It is consummated" (Jn. 19:30), it may be
understood that by His suffering He fulfilled all the precepts of the
Old Law. He fulfilled those of the moral order which are founded on the
precepts of charity, inasmuch as He suffered both out of love of the
Father, according to Jn. 14:31: "That the world may know that I love
the Father, and as the Father hath given Me commandment, so do I:
arise, let us go hence"---namely, to the place of His Passion: and out
of love of His neighbor, according to Gal. 2:20: "He loved me, and
delivered Himself up for me." Christ likewise by His Passion fulfilled
the ceremonial precepts of the Law, which are chiefly ordained for
sacrifices and oblations, in so far as all the ancient sacrifices were
figures of that true sacrifice which the dying Christ offered for us.
Hence it is written (Col. 2:16,17): "Let no man judge you in meat or
drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the
sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is
Christ's," for the reason that Christ is compared to them as a body is
to a shadow. Christ also by His Passion fulfilled the judicial precepts
of the Law, which are chiefly ordained for making compensation to them
who have suffered wrong, since, as is written Ps. 68:5: He "paid that
which" He "took not away," suffering Himself to be fastened to a tree
on account of the apple which man had plucked from the tree against
God's command.
Reply to Objection 2: Although obedience implies necessity with regard
to the thing commanded, nevertheless it implies free-will with regard
to the fulfilling of the precept. And, indeed, such was Christ's
obedience, for, although His Passion and death, considered in
themselves, were repugnant to the natural will, yet Christ resolved to
fulfill God's will with respect to the same, according to Ps. 39:9:
"That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired it." Hence He said
(Mat. 26:42): "If this chalice may not pass away, but I must drink it,
Thy will be done."
Reply to Objection 3: For the same reason Christ suffered out of
charity and out of obedience; because He fulfilled even the precepts of
charity out of obedience only; and was obedient, out of love, to the
Father's command.
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Whether God the Father delivered up Christ to the Passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that God the Father did not deliver up
Christ to the Passion. For it is a wicked and cruel act to hand over an
innocent man to torment and death. But, as it is written (Dt. 32:4):
"God is faithful, and without any iniquity." Therefore He did not hand
over the innocent Christ to His Passion and death.
Objection 2: Further, it is not likely that a man be given over to
death by himself and by another also. But Christ gave Himself up for
us, as it is written (Is. 53:12): "He hath delivered His soul unto
death." Consequently it does not appear that God the Father delivered
Him up.
Objection 3: Further, Judas is held to be guilty because he betrayed
Christ to the Jews, according to Jn. 6:71: "One of you is a devil,"
alluding to Judas, who was to betray Him. The Jews are likewise reviled
for delivering Him up to Pilate; as we read in Jn. 18:35: "Thy own
nation, and the chief priests have delivered Thee up to me." Moreover,
as is related in Jn. 19:16: Pilate "delivered Him to them to be
crucified"; and according to 2 Cor. 6:14: there is no "participation of
justice with injustice." It seems, therefore, that God the Father did
not deliver up Christ to His Passion.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:32): "God hath not spared His
own Son, but delivered Him up for us all."
I answer that, As observed above [4246](A[2]), Christ suffered
voluntarily out of obedience to the Father. Hence in three respects God
the Father did deliver up Christ to the Passion. In the first way,
because by His eternal will He preordained Christ's Passion for the
deliverance of the human race, according to the words of Isaias (53:6):
"The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquities of us all"; and again (Is.
53:10): "The Lord was pleased to bruise Him in infirmity." Secondly,
inasmuch as, by the infusion of charity, He inspired Him with the will
to suffer for us; hence we read in the same passage: "He was offered
because it was His own will" (Is. 53:7). Thirdly, by not shielding Him
from the Passion, but abandoning Him to His persecutors: thus we read
(Mat. 27:46) that Christ, while hanging upon the cross, cried out: "My
God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" because, to wit, He left Him
to the power of His persecutors, as Augustine says (Ep. cxl).
Reply to Objection 1: It is indeed a wicked and cruel act to hand over
an innocent man to torment and to death against his will. Yet God the
Father did not so deliver up Christ, but inspired Him with the will to
suffer for us. God's "severity" (cf. Rom. 11:22) is thereby shown, for
He would not remit sin without penalty: and the Apostle indicates this
when (Rom. 8:32) he says: "God spared not even His own Son." Likewise
His "goodness" (Rom. 11:22) shines forth, since by no penalty endured
could man pay Him enough satisfaction: and the Apostle denotes this
when he says: "He delivered Him up for us all": and, again (Rom. 3:25):
"Whom"---that is to say, Christ---God "hath proposed to be a
propitiation through faith in His blood."
Reply to Objection 2: Christ as God delivered Himself up to death by
the same will and action as that by which the Father delivered Him up;
but as man He gave Himself up by a will inspired of the Father.
Consequently there is no contrariety in the Father delivering Him up
and in Christ delivering Himself up.
Reply to Objection 3: The same act, for good or evil, is judged
differently, accordingly as it proceeds from a different source. The
Father delivered up Christ, and Christ surrendered Himself, from
charity, and consequently we give praise to both: but Judas betrayed
Christ from greed, the Jews from envy, and Pilate from worldly fear,
for he stood in fear of Caesar; and these accordingly are held guilty.
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Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer at the hands of the Gentiles?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should suffer at the
hands of the Gentiles. For since men were to be freed from sin by
Christ's death, it would seem fitting that very few should sin in His
death. But the Jews sinned in His death, on whose behalf it is said
(Mat. 21:38): "This is the heir; come, let us kill him." It seems
fitting, therefore, that the Gentiles should not be implicated in the
sin of Christ's slaying.
Objection 2: Further, the truth should respond to the figure. Now it
was not the Gentiles but the Jews who offered the figurative sacrifices
of the Old Law. Therefore neither ought Christ's Passion, which was a
true sacrifice, to be fulfilled at the hands of the Gentiles.
Objection 3: Further, as related Jn. 5:18, "the Jews sought to kill"
Christ because "He did not only break the sabbath, but also said God
was His Father, making Himself equal to God." But these things seemed
to be only against the Law of the Jews: hence they themselves said (Jn.
19:7): "According to the Law He ought to die because He made Himself
the Son of God." It seems fitting, therefore, that Christ should
suffer, at the hands not of the Gentiles, but of the Jews, and that
what they said was untrue: "It is not lawful for us to put any man to
death," since many sins are punishable with death according to the Law,
as is evident from Lev. 20.
On the contrary, our Lord Himself says (Mat. 20:19): "They shall
deliver Him to the Gentiles to be mocked, and scourged, and crucified."
I answer that, The effect of Christ's Passion was foreshown by the very
manner of His death. For Christ's Passion wrought its effect of
salvation first of all among the Jews, very many of whom were baptized
in His death, as is evident from Acts 2:41 and Acts 4:4. Afterwards, by
the preaching of Jews, Christ's Passion passed on to the Gentiles.
Consequently it was fitting that Christ should begin His sufferings at
the hands of the Jews, and, after they had delivered Him up, finish His
Passion at the hands of the Gentiles.
Reply to Objection 1: In order to demonstrate the fulness of His love,
on account of which He suffered, Christ upon the cross prayed for His
persecutors. Therefore, that the fruits of His petition might accrue to
Jews and Gentiles, Christ willed to suffer from both.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's Passion was the offering of a sacrifice,
inasmuch as He endured death of His own free-will out of charity: but
in so far as He suffered from His persecutors it was not a sacrifice,
but a most grievous sin.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. cxiv in Joan.): "The
Jews said that 'it is not lawful for us to put any man to death,'
because they understood that it was not lawful for them to put any man
to death" owing to the sacredness of the feast-day, which they had
already begun to celebrate. or, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. lxxxiii in
Joan.), because they wanted Him to be slain, not as a transgressor of
the Law, but as a public enemy, since He had made Himself out to be a
king, of which it was not their place to judge. Or, again, because it
was not lawful for them to crucify Him (as they wanted to), but to
stone Him, as they did to Stephen. Better still is it to say that the
power of putting to death was taken from them by the Romans, whose
subjects they were.
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Whether Christ's persecutors knew who He was?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's persecutors did know who He
was. For it is written (Mat. 21:38) that the husbandmen seeing the son
said within themselves: "This is the heir; come, let us kill him." On
this Jerome remarks: "Our Lord proves most manifestly by these words
that the rulers of the Jews crucified the Son of God, not from
ignorance, but out of envy: for they understood that it was He to whom
the Father says by the Prophet: 'Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the
Gentiles for Thy inheritance.'" It seems, therefore, that they knew Him
to be Christ or the Son of God.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord says (Jn. 15:24): "But now they have
both seen and hated both Me and My Father." Now what is seen is known
manifestly. Therefore the Jews, knowing Christ, inflicted the Passion
on Him out of hatred.
Objection 3: Further, it is said in a sermon delivered in the Council
of Ephesus (P. iii, cap. x): "Just as he who tears up the imperial
message is doomed to die, as despising the prince's word; so the Jew,
who crucified Him whom he had seen, will pay the penalty for daring to
lay his hands on God the Word Himself." Now this would not be so had
they not known Him to be the Son of God, because their ignorance would
have excused them. Therefore it seems that the Jews in crucifying
Christ knew Him to be the Son of God.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 2:8): "If they had known it,
they would never have crucified the Lord of glory." And (Acts 3:17),
Peter, addressing the Jews, says: "I know that you did it through
ignorance, as did also your rulers." Likewise the Lord hanging upon the
cross said: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" (Lk.
23:34).
I answer that, Among the Jews some were elders, and others of lesser
degree. Now according to the author of De Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu.
lxvi, the elders, who were called "rulers, knew," as did also the
devils, "that He was the Christ promised in the Law: for they saw all
the signs in Him which the prophets said would come to pass: but they
did not know the mystery of His Godhead." Consequently the Apostle
says: "If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord
of glory." It must, however, be understood that their ignorance did not
excuse them from crime, because it was, as it were, affected ignorance.
For they saw manifest signs of His Godhead; yet they perverted them out
of hatred and envy of Christ; neither would they believe His words,
whereby He avowed that He was the Son of God. Hence He Himself says of
them (Jn. 15:22): "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would
not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin." And
afterwards He adds (Jn. 15:24): "If I had not done among them the works
that no other man hath done, they would not have sin." And so the
expression employed by Job (21:14) can be accepted on their behalf:
"(Who) said to God: depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy
ways."
But those of lesser degree---namely, the common folk---who had not
grasped the mysteries of the Scriptures, did not fully comprehend that
He was the Christ or the Son of God. For although some of them believed
in Him, yet the multitude did not; and if they doubted sometimes
whether He was the Christ, on account of the manifold signs and force
of His teaching, as is stated Jn. 7:31,41, nevertheless they were
deceived afterwards by their rulers, so that they did not believe Him
to be the Son of God or the Christ. Hence Peter said to them: "I know
that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers"---namely,
because they were seduced by the rulers.
Reply to Objection 1: Those words are spoken by the husbandmen of the
vineyard; and these signify the rulers of the people, who knew Him to
be the heir, inasmuch as they knew Him to be the Christ promised in the
Law, but the words of Ps. 2:8 seem to militate against this answer:
"Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance";
which are addressed to Him of whom it is said: "Thou art My Son, this
day have I begotten Thee." If, then, they knew Him to be the one to
whom the words were addressed: "Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the
Gentiles for Thy inheritance," it follows that they knew Him to be the
Son of God. Chrysostom, too, says upon the same passage that "they knew
Him to be the Son of God." Bede likewise, commenting on the words, "For
they know not what they do" (Lk. 23:34), says: "It is to be observed
that He does not pray for them who, understanding Him to be the Son of
God, preferred to crucify Him rather than acknowledge Him." But to this
it may be replied that they knew Him to be the Son of God, not from His
Nature, but from the excellence of His singular grace.
Yet we may hold that they are said to have known also that He was
verily the Son of God, in that they had evident signs thereof: yet out
of hatred and envy, they refused credence to these signs, by which they
might have known that He was the Son of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted are preceded by the following:
"If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done,
they would not have sin"; and then follow the words: "But now they have
both seen and hated both Me and My Father." Now all this shows that
while they beheld Christ's marvelous works, it was owing to their
hatred that they did not know Him to be the Son of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Affected ignorance does not excuse from guilt,
but seems, rather, to aggravate it: for it shows that a man is so
strongly attached to sin that he wishes to incur ignorance lest he
avoid sinning. The Jews therefore sinned, as crucifiers not only of the
Man-Christ, but also as of God.
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Whether the sin of those who crucified Christ was most grievous?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of Christ's crucifiers was not
the most grievous. Because the sin which has some excuse cannot be most
grievous. But our Lord Himself excused the sin of His crucifiers when
He said: "Father, forgive them: for they know not what they do" (Lk.
23:34). Therefore theirs was not the most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord said to Pilate (Jn. 19:11): "He that
hath delivered Me to thee hath the greater sin." But it was Pilate who
caused Christ to be crucified by his minions. Therefore the sin of
Judas the traitor seems to be greater than that of those who crucified
Him.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v): "No one
suffers injustice willingly"; and in the same place he adds: "Where no
one suffers injustice, nobody works injustice." Consequently nobody
wreaks injustice upon a willing subject. But Christ suffered willingly,
as was shown above ([4247]AA[1],2). Therefore those who crucified
Christ did Him no injustice; and hence their sin was not the most
grievous.
On the contrary, Chrysostom, commenting on the words, "Fill ye up,
then, the measure of your fathers" (Mat. 23:32), says: "In very truth
they exceeded the measure of their fathers; for these latter slew men,
but they crucified God."
I answer that, As stated above [4248](A[5]), the rulers of the Jews
knew that He was the Christ: and if there was any ignorance in them, it
was affected ignorance, which could not excuse them. Therefore their
sin was the most grievous, both on account of the kind of sin, as well
as from the malice of their will. The Jews also of the common order
sinned most grievously as to the kind of their sin: yet in one respect
their crime was lessened by reason of their ignorance. Hence Bede,
commenting on Lk. 23:34, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what
they do," says: "He prays for them who know not what they are doing, as
having the zeal of God, but not according to knowledge." But the sin of
the Gentiles, by whose hands He was crucified, was much more excusable,
since they had no knowledge of the Law.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the excuse made by our Lord is
not to be referred to the rulers among the Jews, but to the common
people.
Reply to Objection 2: Judas did not deliver up Christ to Pilate, but to
the chief priests who gave Him up to Pilate, according to Jn. 18:35:
"Thy own nation and the chief priests have delivered Thee up to me."
But the sin of all these was greater than that of Pilate, who slew
Christ from fear of Caesar; and even greater than the sin of the
soldiers who crucified Him at the governor's bidding, not out of
cupidity like Judas, nor from envy and hate like the chief priests.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ, indeed willed His Passion just as the
Father willed it; yet He did not will the unjust action of the Jews.
Consequently Christ's slayers are not excused of their injustice.
Nevertheless, whoever slays a man not only does a wrong to the one
slain, but likewise to God and to the State; just as he who kills
himself, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v). Hence it was that David
condemned to death the man who "did not fear to lay hands upon the
Lord's anointed," even though he (Saul) had requested it, as related 2
Kings 1:5-14.
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OF THE EFFICIENCY OF CHRIST'S PASSION (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider Christ's Passion as to its effect; first of
all, as to the manner in which it was brought about; and, secondly, as
to the effect in itself. Under the first heading there are six points
for inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's Passion brought about our salvation by way of
merit?
(2) Whether it was by way of atonement?
(3) Whether it was by way of sacrifice?
(4) Whether it was by way of redemption?
(5) Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Redeemer?
(6) Whether (the Passion) secured man's salvation efficiently?
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Whether Christ's Passion brought about our salvation by way of merit?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion did not bring about
our salvation by way of merit. For the sources of our sufferings are
not within us. But no one merits or is praised except for that whose
principle lies within him. Therefore Christ's Passion wrought nothing
by way of merit.
Objection 2: Further, from the beginning of His conception Christ
merited for Himself and for us, as stated above ([4249]Q[9],
A[4];[4250] Q[34], A[3]). But it is superfluous to merit over again
what has been merited before. Therefore by His Passion Christ did not
merit our salvation.
Objection 3: Further, the source of merit is charity. But Christ's
charity was not made greater by the Passion than it was before.
Therefore He did not merit our salvation by suffering more than He had
already.
On the contrary, on the words of Phil. 2:9, "Therefore God exalted
Him," etc., Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.): "The lowliness" of
the Passion "merited glory; glory was the reward of lowliness." But He
was glorified, not merely in Himself, but likewise in His faithful
ones, as He says Himself (Jn. 17:10). Therefore it appears that He
merited the salvation of the faithful.
I answer that, As stated above ([4251]Q[7], AA[1],9;[4252] Q[8],
AA[1],5), grace was bestowed upon Christ, not only as an individual,
but inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, so that it might overflow
into His members; and therefore Christ's works are referred to Himself
and to His members in the same way as the works of any other man in a
state of grace are referred to himself. But it is evident that
whosoever suffers for justice's sake, provided that he be in a state of
grace, merits his salvation thereby, according to Mat. 5:10: "Blessed
are they that suffer persecution for justice's sake." Consequently
Christ by His Passion merited salvation, not only for Himself, but
likewise for all His members.
Reply to Objection 1: Suffering, as such, is caused by an outward
principle: but inasmuch as one bears it willingly, it has an inward
principle.
Reply to Objection 2: From the beginning of His conception Christ
merited our eternal salvation; but on our side there were some
obstacles, whereby we were hindered from securing the effect of His
preceding merits: consequently, in order to remove such hindrances, "it
was necessary for Christ to suffer," as stated above ([4253]Q[46],
A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion has a special effect, which His
preceding merits did not possess, not on account of greater charity,
but because of the nature of the work, which was suitable for such an
effect, as is clear from the arguments brought forward above all the
fittingness of Christ's Passion (Q[46], AA, 3,4).
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Whether Christ's Passion brought about our salvation by way of atonement?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion did not bring about
our salvation by way of atonement. For it seems that to make the
atonement devolves on him who commits the sin; as is clear in the other
parts of penance, because he who has done the wrong must grieve over it
and confess it. But Christ never sinned, according to 1 Pet. 2:22: "Who
did no sin." Therefore He made no atonement by His personal suffering.
Objection 2: Further, no atonement is made to another by committing a
graver offense. But in Christ's Passion the gravest of all offenses was
perpetrated, because those who slew Him sinned most grievously, as
stated above ([4254]Q[47], A[6]). Consequently it seems that atonement
could not be made to God by Christ's Passion.
Objection 3: Further, atonement implies equality with the trespass,
since it is an act of justice. But Christ's Passion does not appear
equal to all the sins of the human race, because Christ did not suffer
in His Godhead, but in His flesh, according to 1 Pet. 4:1: "Christ
therefore having suffered in the flesh." Now the soul, which is the
subject of sin, is of greater account than the flesh. Therefore Christ
did not atone for our sins by His Passion.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 68:5) in Christ's person: "Then did
I pay that which I took not away." But he has not paid who has not
fully atoned. Therefore it appears that Christ by His suffering has
fully atoned for our sins.
I answer that, He properly atones for an offense who offers something
which the offended one loves equally, or even more than he detested the
offense. But by suffering out of love and obedience, Christ gave more
to God than was required to compensate for the offense of the whole
human race. First of all, because of the exceeding charity from which
He suffered; secondly, on account of the dignity of His life which He
laid down in atonement, for it was the life of one who was God and man;
thirdly, on account of the extent of the Passion, and the greatness of
the grief endured, as stated above ([4255]Q[46], A[6]). And therefore
Christ's Passion was not only a sufficient but a superabundant
atonement for the sins of the human race; according to 1 Jn. 2:2: "He
is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for
those of the whole world."
Reply to Objection 1: The head and members are as one mystic person;
and therefore Christ's satisfaction belongs to all the faithful as
being His members. Also, in so far as any two men are one in charity,
the one can atone for the other as shall be shown later ([4256]XP,
Q[13], A[2]). But the same reason does not hold good of confession and
contrition, because atonement consists in an outward action, for which
helps may be used, among which friends are to be computed.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's love was greater than His slayers'
malice: and therefore the value of His Passion in atoning surpassed the
murderous guilt of those who crucified Him: so much so that Christ's
suffering was sufficient and superabundant atonement for His murderer's
crime.
Reply to Objection 3: The dignity of Christ's flesh is not to be
estimated solely from the nature of flesh, but also from the Person
assuming it---namely, inasmuch as it was God's flesh, the result of
which was that it was of infinite worth.
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Whether Christ's Passion operated by way of sacrifice?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion did not operate by way
of sacrifice. For the truth should correspond with the figure. But
human flesh was never offered up in the sacrifices of the Old Law,
which were figures of Christ: nay, such sacrifices were reputed as
impious, according to Ps. 105:38: "And they shed innocent blood: the
blood of their sons and of their daughters, which they sacrificed to
the idols of Chanaan." It seems therefore that Christ's Passion cannot
be called a sacrifice.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that "a visible
sacrifice is a sacrament---that is, a sacred sign---of an invisible
sacrifice." Now Christ's Passion is not a sign, but rather the thing
signified by other signs. Therefore it seems that Christ's Passion is
not a sacrifice.
Objection 3: Further, whoever offers sacrifice performs some sacred
rite, as the very word "sacrifice" shows. But those men who slew Christ
did not perform any sacred act, but rather wrought a great wrong.
Therefore Christ's Passion was rather a malefice than a sacrifice.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:2): "He delivered Himself up
for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness."
I answer that, A sacrifice properly so called is something done for
that honor which is properly due to God, in order to appease Him: and
hence it is that Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x): "A true sacrifice is
every good work done in order that we may cling to God in holy
fellowship, yet referred to that consummation of happiness wherein we
can be truly blessed." But, as is added in the same place, "Christ
offered Himself up for us in the Passion": and this voluntary enduring
of the Passion was most acceptable to God, as coming from charity.
Therefore it is manifest that Christ's Passion was a true sacrifice.
Moreover, as Augustine says farther on in the same book, "the primitive
sacrifices of the holy Fathers were many and various signs of this true
sacrifice, one being prefigured by many, in the same way as a single
concept of thought is expressed in many words, in order to commend it
without tediousness": and, as Augustine observe, (De Trin. iv), "since
there are four things to be noted in every sacrifice---to wit, to whom
it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, and for whom it
is offered---that the same one true Mediator reconciling us with God
through the peace-sacrifice might continue to be one with Him to whom
He offered it, might be one with them for whom He offered it, and might
Himself be the offerer and what He offered."
Reply to Objection 1: Although the truth answers to the figure in some
respects, yet it does not in all, since the truth must go beyond the
figure. Therefore the figure of this sacrifice, in which Christ's flesh
is offered, was flesh right fittingly, not the flesh of men, but of
animals, as denoting Christ's. And this is a most perfect sacrifice.
First of all, since being flesh of human nature, it is fittingly
offered for men, and is partaken of by them under the Sacrament.
Secondly, because being passible and mortal, it was fit for immolation.
Thirdly, because, being sinless, it had virtue to cleanse from sins.
Fourthly, because, being the offerer's own flesh, it was acceptable to
God on account of His charity in offering up His own flesh. Hence it is
that Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "What else could be so fittingly
partaken of by men, or offered up for men, as human flesh? What else
could be so appropriate for this immolation as mortal flesh? What else
is there so clean for cleansing mortals as the flesh born in the womb
without fleshly concupiscence, and coming from a virginal womb? What
could be so favorably offered and accepted as the flesh of our
sacrifice, which was made the body of our Priest?"
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of visible figurative
sacrifices: and even Christ's Passion, although denoted by other
figurative sacrifices, is yet a sign of something to be observed by us,
according to 1 Pet. 4:1: "Christ therefore, having suffered in the
flesh, be you also armed with the same thought: for he that hath
suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sins: that now he may live the
rest of his time in the flesh, not after the desires of men, but
according to the will of God."
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion was indeed a malefice on His
slayers' part; but on His own it was the sacrifice of one suffering out
of charity. Hence it is Christ who is said to have offered this
sacrifice, and not the executioners.
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Whether Christ's Passion brought about our salvation by way of redemption?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion did not effect our
salvation by way of redemption. For no one purchases or redeems what
never ceased to belong to him. But men never ceased to belong to God
according to Ps. 23:1: "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness
thereof: the world and all they that dwell therein." Therefore it seems
that Christ did not redeem us by His Passion.
Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "The devil had
to be overthrown by Christ's justice." But justice requires that the
man who has treacherously seized another's property shall be deprived
of it, because deceit and cunning should not benefit anyone, as even
human laws declare. Consequently, since the devil by treachery deceived
and subjugated to himself man, who is God's creature, it seems that man
ought not to be rescued from his power by way of redemption.
Objection 3: Further, whoever buys or redeems an object pays the price
to the holder. But it was not to the devil, who held us in bondage,
that Christ paid His blood as the price of our redemption. Therefore
Christ did not redeem us by His Passion.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 1:18): "You were not redeemed
with corruptible things as gold or silver from your vain conversation
of the tradition of your fathers: but with the precious blood of
Christ, as of a lamb unspotted and undefiled." And (Gal. 3:13): "Christ
hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us."
Now He is said to be a curse for us inasmuch as He suffered upon the
tree, as stated above ([4257]Q[46], A[4]). Therefore He did redeem us
by His Passion.
I answer that, Man was held captive on account of sin in two ways:
first of all, by the bondage of sin, because (Jn. 8:34): "Whosoever
committeth sin is the servant of sin"; and (2 Pet. 2:19): "By whom a
man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave." Since, then, the
devil had overcome man by inducing him to sin, man was subject to the
devil's bondage. Secondly, as to the debt of punishment, to the payment
of which man was held fast by God's justice: and this, too, is a kind
of bondage, since it savors of bondage for a man to suffer what he does
not wish, just as it is the free man's condition to apply himself to
what he wills.
Since, then, Christ's Passion was a sufficient and a superabundant
atonement for the sin and the debt of the human race, it was as a price
at the cost of which we were freed from both obligations. For the
atonement by which one satisfies for self or another is called the
price, by which he ransoms himself or someone else from sin and its
penalty, according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Now
Christ made satisfaction, not by giving money or anything of the sort,
but by bestowing what was of greatest price---Himself---for us. And
therefore Christ's Passion is called our redemption.
Reply to Objection 1: Man is said to belong to God in two ways. First
of all, in so far as he comes under God's power: in which way he never
ceased to belong to God; according to Dan. 4:22: "The Most High ruleth
over the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will."
Secondly, by being united to Him in charity, according to Rom. 8:9: "If
any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His." In the first
way, then, man never ceased to belong to God, but in the second way he
did cease because of sin. And therefore in so far as he was delivered
from sin by the satisfaction of Christ's Passion, he is said to be
redeemed by the Passion of Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: Man by sinning became the bondsman both of God
and of the devil. Through guilt he had offended God, and put himself
under the devil by consenting to him; consequently he did not become
God's servant on account of his guilt, but rather, by withdrawing from
God's service, he, by God's just permission, fell under the devil's
servitude on account of the offense perpetrated. But as to the penalty,
man was chiefly bound to God as his sovereign judge, and to the devil
as his torturer, according to Mat. 5:25: "Lest perhaps the adversary
deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the
officer"---that is, "to the relentless avenging angel," as Chrysostom
says (Hom. xi). Consequently, although, after deceiving man, the devil,
so far as in him lay, held him unjustly in bondage as to both sin and
penalty, still it was just that man should suffer it. God so permitting
it as to the sin and ordaining it as to the penalty. And therefore
justice required man's redemption with regard to God, but not with
regard to the devil.
Reply to Objection 3: Because, with regard to God, redemption was
necessary for man's deliverance, but not with regard to the devil, the
price had to be paid not to the devil, but to God. And therefore Christ
is said to have paid the price of our redemption---His own precious
blood---not to the devil, but to God.
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Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Redeemer?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to be the
Redeemer, because it is written (Ps. 30:6): "Thou hast redeemed me, O
Lord, the God of Truth." But to be the Lord God of Truth belongs to the
entire Trinity. Therefore it is not proper to Christ.
Objection 2: Further, he is said to redeem who pays the price of
redemption. But God the Father gave His Son in redemption for our sins,
as is written (Ps. 110:9): "The Lord hath sent redemption to His
people," upon which the gloss adds, "that is, Christ, who gives
redemption to captives." Therefore not only Christ, but the Father
also, redeemed us.
Objection 3: Further, not only Christ's Passion, but also that of other
saints conduced to our salvation, according to Col. 1:24: "I now
rejoice in my sufferings for you, and fill up those things that are
wanting of the sufferings of Christ, in my flesh for His body, which is
the Church." Therefore the title of Redeemer belongs not only to
Christ, but also to the other saints.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 3:13): "Christ redeemed us from
the curse of the Law, being made a curse for us." But only Christ was
made a curse for us. Therefore only Christ ought to be called our
Redeemer.
I answer that, For someone to redeem, two things are required---namely,
the act of paying and the price paid. For if in redeeming something a
man pays a price which is not his own, but another's, he is not said to
be the chief redeemer, but rather the other is, whose price it is. Now
Christ's blood or His bodily life, which "is in the blood," is the
price of our redemption (Lev. 17:11, 14), and that life He paid. Hence
both of these belong immediately to Christ as man; but to the Trinity
as to the first and remote cause, to whom Christ's life belonged as to
its first author, and from whom Christ received the inspiration of
suffering for us. Consequently it is proper to Christ as man to be the
Redeemer immediately; although the redemption may be ascribed to the
whole Trinity as its first cause.
Reply to Objection 1: A gloss explains the text thus: "Thou, O Lord God
of Truth, hast redeemed me in Christ, crying out, 'Lord, into Thy hands
I commend my spirit.'" And so redemption belongs immediately to the
Man-Christ, but principally to God.
Reply to Objection 2: The Man-Christ paid the price of our redemption
immediately, but at the command of the Father as the original author.
Reply to Objection 3: The sufferings of the saints are beneficial to
the Church, as by way, not of redemption, but of example and
exhortation, according to 2 Cor. 1:6: "Whether we be in tribulation, it
is for your exhortation and salvation."
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Whether Christ's Passion brought about our salvation efficiently?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion did not bring about
our salvation efficiently. For the efficient cause of our salvation is
the greatness of the Divine power, according to Is. 59:1: "Behold the
hand of the Lord is not shortened that it cannot save." But "Christ was
crucified through weakness," as it is written (2 Cor. 13:4). Therefore,
Christ's Passion did not bring about our salvation efficiently.
Objection 2: Further, no corporeal agency acts efficiently except by
contact: hence even Christ cleansed the leper by touching him "in order
to show that His flesh had saving power," as Chrysostom [*Theophylact,
Enarr. in Luc.] says. But Christ's Passion could not touch all mankind.
Therefore it could not efficiently bring about the salvation of all
men.
Objection 3: Further, it does not seem to be consistent for the same
agent to operate by way of merit and by way of efficiency, since he who
merits awaits the result from someone else. But it was by way of merit
that Christ's Passion accomplished our salvation. Therefore it was not
by way of efficiency.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 1:18) that "the word of the
cross to them that are saved . . . is the power of God." But God's
power brings about our salvation efficiently. Therefore Christ's
Passion on the cross accomplished our salvation efficiently.
I answer that, There is a twofold efficient agency---namely, the
principal and the instrumental. Now the principal efficient cause of
man's salvation is God. But since Christ's humanity is the "instrument
of the Godhead," as stated above ([4258]Q[43], A[2]), therefore all
Christ's actions and sufferings operate instrumentally in virtue of His
Godhead for the salvation of men. Consequently, then, Christ's Passion
accomplishes man's salvation efficiently.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's Passion in relation to His flesh is
consistent with the infirmity which He took upon Himself, but in
relation to the Godhead it draws infinite might from It, according to 1
Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of God is stronger than men"; because Christ's
weakness, inasmuch as He is God, has a might exceeding all human power.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's Passion, although corporeal, has yet a
spiritual effect from the Godhead united: and therefore it secures its
efficacy by spiritual contact---namely, by faith and the sacraments of
faith, as the Apostle says (Rom. 3:25): "Whom God hath proposed to be a
propitiation, through faith in His blood."
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion, according as it is compared
with His Godhead, operates in an efficient manner: but in so far as it
is compared with the will of Christ's soul it acts in a meritorious
manner: considered as being within Christ's very flesh, it acts by way
of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt of
punishment; while inasmuch as we are freed from the servitude of guilt,
it acts by way of redemption: but in so far as we are reconciled with
God it acts by way of sacrifice, as shall be shown farther on
([4259]Q[49]).
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OF THE EFFECTS OF CHRIST'S PASSION (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider what are the effects of Christ's Passion,
concerning which there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether we were freed from sin by Christ's Passion?
(2) Whether we were thereby delivered from the power of the devil?
(3) Whether we were freed thereby from our debt of punishment?
(4) Whether we were thereby reconciled with God?
(5) Whether heaven's gate was opened to us thereby?
(6) Whether Christ derived exaltation from it?
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Whether we were delivered from sin through Christ's Passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that we were not delivered from sin through
Christ's Passion. For to deliver from sin belongs to God alone,
according to Is. 43:25: "I am He who blot out your iniquities for My
own sake." But Christ did not suffer as God, but as man. Therefore
Christ's Passion did not free us from sin.
Objection 2: Further, what is corporeal does not act upon what is
spiritual. But Christ's Passion is corporeal, whereas sin exists in the
soul, which is a spiritual creature. Therefore Christ's Passion could
not cleanse us from sin.
Objection 3: Further, one cannot be purged from a sin not yet
committed, but which shall be committed hereafter. Since, then, many
sins have been committed since Christ's death, and are being committed
daily, it seems that we were not delivered from sin by Christ's death.
Objection 4: Further, given an efficient cause, nothing else is
required for producing the effect. But other things besides are
required for the forgiveness of sins, such as baptism and penance.
Consequently it seems that Christ's Passion is not the sufficient cause
of the forgiveness of sins.
Objection 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): "Charity covereth
all sins"; and (Prov. 15:27): "By mercy and faith, sins are purged
away." But there are many other things of which we have faith, and
which excite charity. Therefore Christ's Passion is not the proper
cause of the forgiveness of sins.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 1:5): "He loved us, and washed us
from our sins in His own blood."
I answer that, Christ's Passion is the proper cause of the forgiveness
of sins in three ways. First of all, by way of exciting our charity,
because, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:8): "God commendeth His charity
towards us: because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time,
Christ died for us." But it is by charity that we procure pardon of our
sins, according to Lk. 7:47: "Many sins are forgiven her because she
hath loved much." Secondly, Christ's Passion causes forgiveness of sins
by way of redemption. For since He is our head, then, by the Passion
which He endured from love and obedience, He delivered us as His
members from our sins, as by the price of His Passion: in the same way
as if a man by the good industry of his hands were to redeem himself
from a sin committed with his feet. For, just as the natural body is
one though made up of diverse members, so the whole Church, Christ's
mystic body, is reckoned as one person with its head, which is Christ.
Thirdly, by way of efficiency, inasmuch as Christ's flesh, wherein He
endured the Passion, is the instrument of the Godhead, so that His
sufferings and actions operate with Divine power for expelling sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ did not suffer as God,
nevertheless His flesh is the instrument of the Godhead; and hence it
is that His Passion has a kind of Divine Power of casting out sin, as
was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ's Passion is corporeal, still it
derives a kind of spiritual energy from the Godhead, to which the flesh
is united as an instrument: and according to this power Christ's
Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sins.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ by His Passion delivered us from our sins
causally---that is, by setting up the cause of our deliverance, from
which cause all sins whatsoever, past, present, or to come, could be
forgiven: just as if a doctor were to prepare a medicine by which all
sicknesses can be cured even in future.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, since Christ's Passion preceded,
as a kind of universal cause of the forgiveness of sins, it needs to be
applied to each individual for the cleansing of personal sins. Now this
is done by baptism and penance and the other sacraments, which derive
their power from Christ's Passion, as shall be shown later
([4260]Q[62], A[5]).
Reply to Objection 5: Christ's Passion is applied to us even through
faith, that we may share in its fruits, according to Rom. 3:25: "Whom
God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood."
But the faith through which we are cleansed from sin is not "lifeless
faith," which can exist even with sin, but "faith living" through
charity; that thus Christ's Passion may be applied to us, not only as
to our minds, but also as to our hearts. And even in this way sins are
forgiven through the power of the Passion of Christ.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we were delivered from the devil's power through Christ's Passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that we were not delivered from the power of
the devil through Christ's Passion. For he has no power over others,
who can do nothing to them without the sanction of another. But without
the Divine permission the devil could never do hurt to any man, as is
evident in the instance of Job (1,2), where, by power received from
God, the devil first injured him in his possessions, and afterwards in
his body. In like manner it is stated (Mat. 8:31,32) that the devils
could not enter into the swine except with Christ's leave. Therefore
the devil never had power over men: and hence we are not delivered from
his power through Christ's Passion.
Objection 2: Further, the devil exercises his power over men by
tempting them and molesting their bodies. But even after the Passion he
continues to do the same to men. Therefore we are not delivered from
his power through Christ's Passion.
Objection 3: Further, the might of Christ's Passion endures for ever,
as, according to Heb. 10:14: "By one oblation He hath perfected for
ever them that are sanctified." But deliverance rom the devil's power
is not found everywhere, since there are still idolaters in many
regions of the world; nor will it endure for ever, because in the time
of Antichrist he will be especially active in using his power to the
hurt of men; because it is said of him (2 Thess. 2:9): "Whose coming is
according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying
wonders, and in all seduction of iniquity." Consequently it seems that
Christ's Passion is not the cause of the human race being delivered
from the power of the devil.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 12:31), when His Passion was
drawing nigh: "Now shall the prince of this world be cast out; and I,
if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to Myself." Now
He was lifted up from the earth by His Passion on the cross. Therefore
by His Passion the devil was deprived of his power over man.
I answer that, There are three things to be considered regarding the
power which the devil exercised over men previous to Christ's Passion.
The first is on man's own part, who by his sin deserved to be delivered
over to the devil's power, and was overcome by his tempting. Another
point is on God's part, whom man had offended by sinning, and who with
justice left man under the devil's power. The third is on the devil's
part, who out of his most wicked will hindered man from securing his
salvation.
As to the first point, by Christ's Passion man was delivered from the
devil's power, in so far as the Passion is the cause of the forgiveness
of sins, as stated above [4261](A[1]). As to the second, it must be
said that Christ's Passion freed us from the devil's power, inasmuch as
it reconciled us with God, as shall be shown later [4262](A[4]). But as
to the third, Christ's Passion delivered us from the devil, inasmuch as
in Christ's Passion he exceeded the limit of power assigned him by God,
by conspiring to bring about Christ's death, Who, being sinless, did
not deserve to die. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, cap. xiv):
"The devil was vanquished by Christ's justice: because, while
discovering in Him nothing deserving of death, nevertheless he slew
Him. And it is certainly just that the debtors whom he held captive
should be set at liberty since they believed in Him whom the devil
slew, though He was no debtor."
Reply to Objection 1: The devil is said to have had such power over men
not as though he were able to injure them without God's sanction, but
because he was justly permitted to injure men whom by tempting he had
induced to give consent.
Reply to Objection 2: God so permitting it, the devil can still tempt
men's souls and harass their bodies: yet there is a remedy provided for
man through Christ's Passion, whereby he can safeguard himself against
the enemy's assaults, so as not to be dragged down into the destruction
of everlasting death. And all who resisted the devil previous to the
Passion were enabled to do so through faith in the Passion, although it
was not yet accomplished. Yet in one respect no one was able to escape
the devil's hands, i.e. so as not to descend into hell. But after
Christ's Passion, men can defend themselves from this by its power.
Reply to Objection 3: God permits the devil to deceive men by certain
persons, and in times and places, according to the hidden motive of His
judgments; still, there is always a remedy provided through Christ's
Passion, for defending themselves against the wicked snares of the
demons, even in Antichrist's time. But if any man neglect to make use
of this remedy, it detracts nothing from the efficacy of Christ's
Passion.
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Whether men were freed from the punishment of sin through Christ's Passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that men were not freed from the punishment
of sin by Christ's Passion. For the chief punishment of sin is eternal
damnation. But those damned in hell for their sins were not set free by
Christ's Passion, because "in hell there is no redemption" [*Office of
the Dead, Resp. vii]. It seems, therefore, that Christ's Passion did
not deliver men from the punishment of sin.
Objection 2: Further, no punishment should be imposed upon them who are
delivered from the debt of punishment. But a satisfactory punishment is
imposed upon penitents. Consequently, men were not freed from the debt
of punishment by Christ's Passion.
Objection 3: Further, death is a punishment of sin, according to Rom.
6:23: "The wages of sin is death." But men still die after Christ's
Passion. Therefore it seems that we have not been delivered from the
debt of punishment.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 53:4): "Surely He hath borne our
iniquities and carried our sorrows."
I answer that, Through Christ's Passion we have been delivered from the
debt of punishment in two ways. First of all, directly---namely,
inasmuch as Christ's Passion was sufficient and superabundant
satisfaction for the sins of the whole human race: but when sufficient
satisfaction has been paid, then the debt of punishment is abolished.
In another way---indirectly, that is to say---in so far as Christ's
Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, upon which the debt of
punishment rests.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's Passion works its effect in them to whom
it is applied, through faith and charity and the sacraments of faith.
And, consequently, the lost in hell cannot avail themselves of its
effects, since they are not united to Christ in the aforesaid manner.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (A[1], ad 4,5), in order to
secure the effects of Christ's Passion, we must be likened unto Him.
Now we are likened unto Him sacramentally in Baptism, according to Rom.
6:4: "For we are buried together with Him by baptism into death." Hence
no punishment of satisfaction is imposed upon men at their baptism,
since they are fully delivered by Christ's satisfaction. But because,
as it is written (1 Pet. 3:18), "Christ died" but "once for our sins,"
therefore a man cannot a second time be likened unto Christ's death by
the sacrament of Baptism. Hence it is necessary that those who sin
after Baptism be likened unto Christ suffering by some form of
punishment or suffering which they endure in their own person; yet, by
the co-operation of Christ's satisfaction, much lighter penalty
suffices than one that is proportionate to the sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's satisfaction works its effect in us
inasmuch as we are incorporated with Him, as the members with their
head, as stated above [4263](A[1]). Now the members must be conformed
to their head. Consequently, as Christ first had grace in His soul with
bodily passibility, and through the Passion attained to the glory of
immortality, so we likewise, who are His members, are freed by His
Passion from all debt of punishment, yet so that we first receive in
our souls "the spirit of adoption of sons," whereby our names are
written down for the inheritance of immortal glory, while we yet have a
passible and mortal body: but afterwards, "being made conformable" to
the sufferings and death of Christ, we are brought into immortal glory,
according to the saying of the Apostle (Rom. 8:17): "And if sons, heirs
also: heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ; yet so if we
suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified with Him."
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Whether we were reconciled to God through Christ's Passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that we were not reconciled to God through
Christ's Passion. For there is no need of reconciliation between
friends. But God always loved us, according to Wis. 11:25: "Thou lovest
all the things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast
made." Therefore Christ's Passion did not reconcile us to God.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect: hence
grace, which is the cause of meriting, does not come under merit. But
God's love is the cause of Christ's Passion, according to Jn. 3:16:
"God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son." It does not
appear, then, that we were reconciled to God through Christ's Passion,
so that He began to love us anew.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's Passion was completed by men slaying
Him; and thereby they offended God grievously. Therefore Christ's
Passion is rather the cause of wrath than of reconciliation to God.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:10): "We are reconciled to
God by the death of His Son."
I answer that, Christ's Passion is in two ways the cause of our
reconciliation to God. In the first way, inasmuch as it takes away sin
by which men became God's enemies, according to Wis. 14:9: "To God the
wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike"; and Ps. 5:7: "Thou hatest
all the workers of iniquity." In another way, inasmuch as it is a most
acceptable sacrifice to God. Now it is the proper effect of sacrifice
to appease God: just as man likewise overlooks an offense committed
against him on account of some pleasing act of homage shown him. Hence
it is written (1 Kings 26:19): "If the Lord stir thee up against me,
let Him accept of sacrifice." And in like fashion Christ's voluntary
suffering was such a good act that, because of its being found in human
nature, God was appeased for every offense of the human race with
regard to those who are made one with the crucified Christ in the
aforesaid manner (A[1], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 1: God loves all men as to their nature, which He
Himself made; yet He hates them with respect to the crimes they commit
against Him, according to Ecclus. 12:3: "The Highest hateth sinners."
Reply to Objection 2: Christ is not said to have reconciled us with
God, as if God had begun anew to love us, since it is written (Jer.
31:3): "I have loved thee with an everlasting love"; but because the
source of hatred was taken away by Christ's Passion, both through sin
being washed away and through compensation being made in the shape of a
more pleasing offering.
Reply to Objection 3: As Christ's slayers were men, so also was the
Christ slain. Now the charity of the suffering Christ surpassed the
wickedness of His slayers. Accordingly Christ's Passion prevailed more
in reconciling God to the whole human race than in provoking Him to
wrath.
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Whether Christ opened the gate of heaven to us by His Passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not open the gate of heaven
to us by His Passion. For it is written (Prov. 11:18): "To him that
soweth justice, there is a faithful reward." But the reward of justice
is the entering into the kingdom of heaven. It seems, therefore, that
the holy Fathers who wrought works of justice, obtained by faith the
entering into the heavenly kingdom even without Christ's Passion.
Consequently Christ's Passion is not the cause of the opening of the
gate of the kingdom of heaven.
Objection 2: Further, Elias was caught up to heaven previous to
Christ's Passion (4 Kings 2). But the effect never precedes the cause.
Therefore it seems that the opening of heaven's gate is not the result
of Christ's Passion.
Objection 3: Further, as it is written (Mat. 3:16), when Christ was
baptized the heavens were opened to Him. But His baptism preceded the
Passion. Consequently the opening of heaven is not the result of
Christ's Passion.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Mic. 2:13): "For He shall go up
that shall open the way before them." But to open the way to heaven
seems to be nothing else than to throw open its gate. Therefore it
seems that the gate of heaven was opened to us, not by Christ's
Passion, but by His Ascension.
On the contrary, is the saying of the Apostle (Heb. 10:19): "We have
[Vulg.: 'having a'] confidence in the entering into the Holies"---that
is, of the heavenly places---"through the blood of Christ."
I answer that, The shutting of the gate is the obstacle which hinders
men from entering in. But it is on account of sin that men were
prevented from entering into the heavenly kingdom, since, according to
Is. 35:8: "It shall be called the holy way, and the unclean shall not
pass over it." Now there is a twofold sin which prevents men from
entering into the kingdom of heaven. The first is common to the whole
race, for it is our first parents' sin, and by that sin heaven's
entrance is closed to man. Hence we read in Gn. 3:24 that after our
first parents' sin God "placed . . . cherubim and a flaming sword,
turning every way, to keep the way of the tree of life." The other is
the personal sin of each one of us, committed by our personal act.
Now by Christ's Passion we have been delivered not only from the common
sin of the whole human race, both as to its guilt and as to the debt of
punishment, for which He paid the penalty on our behalf; but,
furthermore, from the personal sins of individuals, who share in His
Passion by faith and charity and the sacraments of faith. Consequently,
then the gate of heaven's kingdom is thrown open to us through Christ's
Passion. This is precisely what the Apostle says (Heb. 9:11,12):
"Christ being come a high-priest of the good things to come . . . by
His own blood entered once into the Holies, having obtained eternal
redemption." And this is foreshadowed (Num. 35:25, 28), where it is
said that the slayer* "shall abide there"---that is to say, in the city
of refuge---"until the death of the high-priest, that is anointed with
the holy oil: but after he is dead, then shall he return home." [*The
Septuagint has 'slayer', the Vulgate, 'innocent'---i.e. the man who has
slain 'without hatred and enmity'.]
Reply to Objection 1: The holy Fathers, by doing works of justice,
merited to enter into the heavenly kingdom, through faith in Christ's
Passion, according to Heb. 11:33: The saints "by faith conquered
kingdoms, wrought justice," and each of them was thereby cleansed from
sin, so far as the cleansing of the individual is concerned.
Nevertheless the faith and righteousness of no one of them sufficed for
removing the barrier arising from the guilt of the whole human race:
but this was removed at the cost of Christ's blood. Consequently,
before Christ's Passion no one could enter the kingdom of heaven by
obtaining everlasting beatitude, which consists in the full enjoyment
of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Elias was taken up into the atmospheric heaven,
but not in to the empyrean heaven, which is the abode of the saints:
and likewise Enoch was translated into the earthly paradise, where he
is believed to live with Elias until the coming of Antichrist.
Reply to Objection 3: As was stated above ([4264]Q[39], A[5]), the
heavens were opened at Christ's baptism, not for Christ's sake, to whom
heaven was ever open, but in order to signify that heaven is opened to
the baptized, through Christ's baptism, which has its efficacy from His
Passion.
Reply to Objection 4: Christ by His Passion merited for us the opening
of the kingdom of heaven, and removed the obstacle; but by His
ascension He, as it were, brought us to the possession of the heavenly
kingdom. And consequently it is said that by ascending He "opened the
way before them."
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Whether by His Passion Christ merited to be exalted?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ did not merit to be exalted on
account of His Passion. For eminence of rank belongs to God alone, just
as knowledge of truth, according to Ps. 112:4: "The Lord is high above
all nations, and His glory above the heavens." But Christ as man had
the knowledge of all truth, not on account of any preceding merit, but
from the very union of God and man, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw His
glory . . . as it were of the only-Begotten of the Father, full of
grace and of truth." Therefore neither had He exaltation from the merit
of the Passion but from the union alone.
Objection 2: Further, Christ merited for Himself from the first instant
of His conception, as stated above ([4265]Q[34], A[3]). But His love
was no greater during the Passion than before. Therefore, since charity
is the principle of merit, it seems that He did not merit exaltation
from the Passion more than before.
Objection 3: Further, the glory of the body comes from the glory of the
soul, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.). But by His Passion Christ
did not merit exaltation as to the glory of His soul, because His soul
was beatified from the first instant of His conception. Therefore
neither did He merit exaltation, as to the glory of His body, from the
Passion.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:8): "He became obedient unto
death, even the death of the cross; for which cause God also exalted
Him."
I answer that, Merit implies a certain equality of justice: hence the
Apostle says (Rom. 4:4): "Now to him that worketh, the reward is
reckoned according to debt." But when anyone by reason of his unjust
will ascribes to himself something beyond his due, it is only just that
he be deprived of something else which is his due; thus, "when a man
steals a sheep he shall pay back four" (Ex. 22:1). And he is said to
deserve it, inasmuch as his unjust will is chastised thereby. So
likewise when any man through his just will has stripped himself of
what he ought to have, he deserves that something further be granted to
him as the reward of his just will. And hence it is written (Lk.
14:11): "He that humbleth himself shall be exalted."
Now in His Passion Christ humbled Himself beneath His dignity in four
respects. In the first place as to His Passion and death, to which He
was not bound; secondly, as to the place, since His body was laid in a
sepulchre and His soul in hell; thirdly, as to the shame and mockeries
He endured; fourthly, as to His being delivered up to man's power, as
He Himself said to Pilate (Jn. 19:11): "Thou shouldst not have any
power against Me, unless it were given thee from above." And,
consequently, He merited a four-fold exaltation from His Passion. First
of all, as to His glorious Resurrection: hence it is written (Ps.
138:1): "Thou hast known my sitting down"---that is, the lowliness of
My Passion---"and My rising up." Secondly, as to His ascension into
heaven: hence it is written (Eph. 4:9): "Now that He ascended, what is
it, but because He also descended first into the lower parts of the
earth? He that descended is the same also that ascended above all the
heavens." Thirdly, as to the sitting on the right hand of the Father
and the showing forth of His Godhead, according to Is. 52:13: "He shall
be exalted and extolled, and shall be exceeding high: as many have been
astonished at him, so shall His visage be inglorious among men."
Moreover (Phil. 2:8) it is written: "He humbled Himself, becoming
obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross: for which cause
also God hath exalted Him, and hath given Him a name which is above all
names"---that is to say, so that He shall be hailed as God by all; and
all shall pay Him homage as God. And this is expressed in what follows:
"That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in
heaven, on earth, and under the earth." Fourthly, as to His judiciary
power: for it is written (Job 36:17): "Thy cause hath been judged as
that of the wicked cause and judgment Thou shalt recover."
Reply to Objection 1: The source of meriting comes of the soul, while
the body is the instrument of the meritorious work. And consequently
the perfection of Christ's soul, which was the source of meriting,
ought not to be acquired in Him by merit, like the perfection of the
body, which was the subject of suffering, and was thereby the
instrument of His merit.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ by His previous merits did merit
exaltation on behalf of His soul, whose will was animated with charity
and the other virtues; but in the Passion He merited His exaltation by
way of recompense even on behalf of His body: since it is only just
that the body, which from charity was subjected to the Passion, should
receive recompense in glory.
Reply to Objection 3: It was owing to a special dispensation in Christ
that before the Passion the glory of His soul did not shine out in His
body, in order that He might procure His bodily glory with greater
honor, when He had merited it by His Passion. But it was not beseeming
for the glory of His soul to be postponed, since the soul was united
immediately with the Word; hence it was beseeming that its glory should
be filled by the Word Himself. But the body was united with the Word
through the soul.
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OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the death of Christ; concerning which there are
six subjects of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was fitting that Christ should die?
(2) Whether His death severed the union of Godhead and flesh?
(3) Whether His Godhead was separated from His soul?
(4) Whether Christ was a man during the three days of His death?
(5) Whether His was the same body, living and dead?
(6) Whether His death conduced in any way to our salvation?
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Whether it was fitting that Christ should die?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should
die. For a first principle in any order is not affected by anything
contrary to such order: thus fire, which is the principle of heat, can
never become cold. But the Son of God is the fountain-head and
principle of all life, according to Ps. 35:10: "With Thee is the
fountain of life." Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ to
die.
Objection 2: Further, death is a greater defect than sickness, because
it is through sickness that one comes to die. But it was not beseeming
for Christ to languish from sickness, as Chrysostom [*Athanasius, Orat.
de Incarn. Verbi] says. Consequently, neither was it becoming for
Christ to die.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Jn. 10:10): "I am come that they
may have life, and may have it more abundantly." But one opposite does
not lead to another. Therefore it seems that neither was it fitting for
Christ to die.
On the contrary, It is written, (Jn. 11:50): "It is expedient that one
man should die for the people . . . that the whole nation perish not":
which words were spoken prophetically by Caiphas, as the Evangelist
testifies.
I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to die. First of all to
satisfy for the whole human race, which was sentenced to die on account
of sin, according to Gn. 2:17: "In what day soever ye shall [Vulg.:
'thou shalt'] eat of it ye shall [Vulg.: 'thou shalt'] die the death."
Now it is a fitting way of satisfying for another to submit oneself to
the penalty deserved by that other. And so Christ resolved to die, that
by dying He might atone for us, according to 1 Pet. 3:18: "Christ also
died once for our sins." Secondly, in order to show the reality of the
flesh assumed. For, as Eusebius says (Orat. de Laud. Constant. xv),
"if, after dwelling among men Christ were suddenly to disappear from
men's sight, as though shunning death, then by all men He would be
likened to a phantom." Thirdly, that by dying He might deliver us from
fearing death: hence it is written (Heb. 2:14,15) that He communicated
"to flesh and blood, that through death He might destroy him who had
the empire of death and might deliver them who, through the fear of
death, were all their lifetime subject to servitude." Fourthly, that by
dying in the body to the likeness of sin---that is, to its penalty---He
might set us the example of dying to sin spiritually. Hence it is
written (Rom. 6:10): "For in that He died to sin, He died once, but in
that He liveth, He liveth unto God: so do you also reckon that you are
dead to sin, but alive unto God." Fifthly, that by rising from the
dead, and manifesting His power whereby He overthrew death, He might
instill into us the hope of rising from the dead. Hence the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 15:12): "If Christ be preached that He rose again from the
dead, how do some among you say, that there is no resurrection from the
dead?"
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is the fountain of life, as God, and not
as man: but He died as man, and not as God. Hence Augustine [*Vigilius
Tapsensis] says against Felician: "Far be it from us to suppose that
Christ so felt death that He lost His life inasmuch as He is life in
Himself; for, were it so, the fountain of life would have run dry.
Accordingly, He experienced death by sharing in our human feeling,
which of His own accord He had taken upon Himself, but He did not lose
the power of His Nature, through which He gives life to all things."
Reply to Objection 2: Christ did not suffer death which comes of
sickness, lest He should seem to die of necessity from exhausted
nature: but He endured death inflicted from without, to which He
willingly surrendered Himself, that His death might be shown to be a
voluntary one.
Reply to Objection 3: One opposite does not of itself lead to the
other, yet it does so indirectly at times: thus cold sometimes is the
indirect cause of heat: and in this way Christ by His death brought us
back to life, when by His death He destroyed our death; just as he who
bears another's punishment takes such punishment away.
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Whether the Godhead was separated from the flesh when Christ died?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Godhead was separated from the
flesh when Christ died. For as Matthew relates (27:46), when our Lord
was hanging upon the cross He cried out: "My God, My God, why hast Thou
forsaken Me?" which words Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 23:46, explains as
follows: "The man cried out when about to expire by being severed from
the Godhead; for since the Godhead is immune from death, assuredly
death could not be there, except life departed, for the Godhead is
life." And so it seems that when Christ died, the Godhead was separated
from His flesh.
Objection 2: Further, extremes are severed when the mean is removed.
But the soul was the mean through which the Godhead was united with the
flesh, as stated above ([4266]Q[6], A[1]). Therefore since the soul was
severed from the flesh by death, it seems that, in consequence, His
Godhead was also separated from it.
Objection 3: Further, God's life-giving power is greater than that of
the soul. But the body could not die unless the soul quitted it.
Therefore, much less could it die unless the Godhead departed.
On the contrary, As stated above ([4267]Q[16], AA[4],5), the attributes
of human nature are predicated of the Son of God only by reason of the
union. But what belongs to the body of Christ after death is predicated
of the Son of God---namely, being buried: as is evident from the Creed,
in which it is said that the Son of God "was conceived and born of a
Virgin, suffered, died, and was buried." Therefore Christ's Godhead was
not separated from the flesh when He died.
I answer that, What is bestowed through God's grace is never withdrawn
except through fault. Hence it is written (Rom. 11:29): "The gifts and
the calling of God are without repentance." But the grace of union
whereby the Godhead was united to the flesh in Christ's Person, is
greater than the grace of adoption whereby others are sanctified: also
it is more enduring of itself, because this grace is ordained for
personal union, whereas the grace of adoption is referred to a certain
affective union. And yet we see that the grace of adoption is never
lost without fault. Since, then there was no sin in Christ, it was
impossible for the union of the Godhead with the flesh to be dissolved.
Consequently, as before death Christ's flesh was united personally and
hypostatically with the Word of God, it remained so after His death, so
that the hypostasis of the Word of God was not different from that of
Christ's flesh after death, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii).
Reply to Objection 1: Such forsaking is not to be referred to the
dissolving of the personal union, but to this, that God the Father gave
Him up to the Passion: hence there "to forsake" means simply not to
protect from persecutors. or else He says there that He is forsaken,
with reference to the prayer He had made: "Father, if it be possible,
let this chalice pass away from Me," as Augustine explains it (De
Gratia Novi Test.).
Reply to Objection 2: The Word of God is said to be united with the
flesh through the medium of the soul, inasmuch as it is through the
soul that the flesh belongs to human nature, which the Son of God
intended to assume; but not as though the soul were the medium linking
them together. But it is due to the soul that the flesh is human even
after the soul has been separated from it---namely, inasmuch as by
God's ordinance there remains in the dead flesh a certain relation to
the resurrection. And therefore the union of the Godhead with the flesh
is not taken away.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul formally possesses the life-giving
energy, and therefore, while it is present, and united formally, the
body must necessarily be a living one, whereas the Godhead has not the
life-giving energy formally, but effectively; because It cannot be the
form of the body: and therefore it is not necessary for the flesh to be
living while the union of the Godhead with the flesh remains, since God
does not act of necessity, but of His own will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in Christ's death there was a severance between His Godhead and His
soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was a severance in death between
Christ's Godhead and His soul, because our Lord said (Jn. 10:18): "No
man taketh away My soul from Me: but I lay it down of Myself, and I
have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again." But
it does not appear that the body can set the soul aside, by separating
the soul from itself, because the soul is not subject to the power of
the body, but rather conversely: and so it appears that it belongs to
Christ, as the Word of God, to lay down His soul: but this is to
separate it from Himself. Consequently, by death His soul was severed
from the Godhead.
Objection 2: Further, Athanasius [*Vigilius Tapsensis, De Trin. vi;
Bardenhewer assigns it to St. Athanasius: 45, iii. The full title is De
Trinitate et Spiritu Sancto] says that he "is accursed who does not
confess that the entire man, whom the Son of God took to Himself, after
being assumed once more or delivered by Him, rose again from the dead
on the third day." But the entire man could not be assumed again,
unless the entire man was at one time separated from the Word of God:
and the entire man is made of soul and body. Therefore there was a
separation made at one time of the Godhead from both the body and the
soul.
Objection 3: Further, the Son of God is truly styled a man because of
the union with the entire man. If then, when the union of the soul with
the body was dissolved by death, the Word of God continued united with
the soul, it would follow that the Son of God could be truly called a
soul. But this is false, because since the soul is the form of the
body, it would result in the Word of God being the form of the body;
which is impossible. Therefore, in death the soul of Christ was
separated from the Word of God.
Objection 4: Further, the separated soul and body are not one
hypostasis, but two. Therefore, if the Word of God remained united with
Christ's soul and body, then, when they were severed by Christ's death,
it seems to follow that the Word of God was two hypostases during such
time as Christ was dead; which cannot be admitted. Therefore after
Christ's death His soul did not continue to be united with the Word.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "Although Christ
died as man, and His holy soul was separated from His spotless body,
nevertheless His Godhead remained unseparated from both---from the
soul, I mean, and from the body."
I answer that, The soul is united with the Word of God more immediately
and more primarily than the body is, because it is through the soul
that the body is united with the Word of God, as stated above
([4268]Q[6], A[1]). Since, then, the Word of God was not separated from
the body at Christ's death, much less was He separated from the soul.
Accordingly, since what regards the body severed from the soul is
affirmed of the Son of God---namely, that "it was buried"---so is it
said of Him in the Creed that "He descended into hell," because His
soul when separated from the body did go down into hell.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine (Tract. xlvii in Joan.), in commenting
on the text of John, asks, since Christ is Word and soul and body,
"whether He putteth down His soul, for that He is the Word? Or, for
that He is a soul?" Or, again, "for that He is flesh?" And he says
that, "should we say that the Word of God laid down His soul" . . . it
would follow that "there was a time when that soul was severed from the
Word"---which is untrue. "For death severed the body and soul . . . but
that the soul was severed from the Word I do not affirm . . . But
should we say that the soul laid itself down," it follows "that it is
severed from itself: which is most absurd." It remains, therefore, that
"the flesh itself layeth down its soul and taketh it again, not by its
own power, but by the power of the Word dwelling in the flesh":
because, as stated above [4269](A[2]), the Godhead of the Word was not
severed from the flesh in death.
Reply to Objection 2: In those words Athanasius never meant to say that
the whole man was reassumed---that is, as to all his parts---as if the
Word of God had laid aside the parts of human nature by His death; but
that the totality of the assumed nature was restored once more in the
resurrection by the resumed union of soul and body.
Reply to Objection 2: Through being united to human nature, the Word of
God is not on that account called human nature: but He is called a
man---that is, one having human nature. Now the soul and the body are
essential parts of human nature. Hence it does not follow that the Word
is a soul or a body through being united with both, but that He is one
possessing a soul or a body.
Reply to Objection 4: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "In
Christ's death the soul was separated from the flesh: not one
hypostasis divided into two: because both soul and body in the same
respect had their existence from the beginning in the hypostasis of the
Word; and in death, though severed from one another, each one continued
to have the one same hypostasis of the Word. Wherefore the one
hypostasis of the Word was the hypostasis of the Word, of the soul, and
of the body. For neither soul nor body ever had an hypostasis of its
own, besides the hypostasis of the Word: for there was always one
hypostasis of the Word, and never two."
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Whether Christ was a man during the three days of His death?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was a man during the three days
of His death, because Augustine says (De Trin. iii): "Such was the
assuming [of nature] as to make God to be man, and man to be God." But
this assuming [of nature] did not cease at Christ's death. Therefore it
seems that He did not cease to be a man in consequence of death.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix) that "each man
is his intellect"; consequently, when we address the soul of Peter
after his death we say: "Saint Peter, pray for us." But the Son of God
after death was not separated from His intellectual soul. Therefore,
during those three days the Son of God was a man.
Objection 3: Further, every priest is a man. But during those three
days of death Christ was a priest: otherwise what is said in Ps. 109:4
would not be true: "Thou art a priest for ever." Therefore Christ was a
man during those three days.
On the contrary, When the higher [species] is removed, so is the lower.
But the living or animated being is a higher species than animal and
man, because an animal is a sensible animated substance. Now during
those three days of death Christ's body was not living or animated.
Therefore He was not a man.
I answer that, It is an article of faith that Christ was truly dead:
hence it is an error against faith to assert anything whereby the truth
of Christ's death is destroyed. Accordingly it is said in the Synodal
epistle of Cyril [*Act. Conc. Ephes. P. I, cap. xxvi]: "If any man does
not acknowledge that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, and was
crucified in the flesh and tasted death in the flesh, let him be
anathema." Now it belongs to the truth of the death of man or animal
that by death the subject ceases to be man or animal; because the death
of the man or animal results from the separation of the soul, which is
the formal complement of the man or animal. Consequently, to say that
Christ was a man during the three days of His death simply and without
qualification, is erroneous. Yet it can be said that He was "a dead
man" during those three days.
However, some writers have contended that Christ was a man during those
three days, uttering words which are indeed erroneous, yet without
intent of error in faith: as Hugh of Saint Victor, who (De Sacram. ii)
contended that Christ, during the three days that followed His death,
was a man, because he held that the soul is a man: but this is false,
as was shown in the [4270]FP, Q[75], A[4]. Likewise the Master of the
Sentences (iii, D, 22) held Christ to be a man during the three days of
His death for quite another reason. For he believed the union of soul
and flesh not to be essential to a man, and that for anything to be a
man it suffices if it have a soul and body, whether united or
separated: and that this is likewise false is clear both from what has
been said in the [4271]FP, Q[75], A[4], and from what has been said
above regarding the mode of union (Q[2] , A[5]).
Reply to Objection 1: The Word of God assumed a united soul and body:
and the result of this assumption was that God is man, and man is God.
But this assumption did not cease by the separation of the Word from
the soul or from the flesh; yet the union of soul and flesh ceased.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be his own intellect, not because
the intellect is the entire man, but because the intellect is the chief
part of man, in which man's whole disposition lies virtually; just as
the ruler of the city may be called the whole city, since its entire
disposal is vested in him.
Reply to Objection 3: That a man is competent to be a priest is by
reason of the soul, which is the subject of the character of order:
hence a man does not lose his priestly order by death, and much less
does Christ, who is the fount of the entire priesthood.
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Whether Christ's was identically the same body living and dead?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's was not identically the same
body living and dead. For Christ truly died just as other men do. But
the body of everyone else is not simply identically the same, dead and
living, because there is an essential difference between them.
Therefore neither is the body of Christ identically the same, dead and
living.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text.
12), things specifically diverse are also numerically diverse. But
Christ's body, living and dead, was specifically diverse: because the
eye or flesh of the dead is only called so equivocally, as is evident
from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 9; Metaph. vii). Therefore
Christ's body was not simply identically the same, living and dead.
Objection 3: Further, death is a kind of corruption. But what is
corrupted by substantial corruption after being corrupted, exists no
longer, since corruption is change from being to non-being. Therefore,
Christ's body, after it was dead, did not remain identically the same,
because death is a substantial corruption.
On the contrary, Athanasius says (Epist. ad Epict.): "In that body
which was circumcised and carried, which ate, and toiled, and was
nailed on the tree, there was the impassible and incorporeal Word of
God: the same was laid in the tomb." But Christ's living body was
circumcised and nailed on the tree; and Christ's dead body was laid in
the tomb. Therefore it was the same body living and dead.
I answer that, The expression "simply" can be taken in two senses. In
the first instance by taking "simply" to be the same as "absolutely";
thus "that is said simply which is said without addition," as the
Philosopher put it (Topic. ii): and in this way the dead and living
body of Christ was simply identically the same: since a thing is said
to be "simply" identically the same from the identity of the subject.
But Christ's body living and dead was identical in its suppositum
because alive and dead it had none other besides the Word of God, as
was stated above [4272](A[2]). And it is in this sense that Athanasius
is speaking in the passage quoted.
In another way "simply" is the same as "altogether" or "totally": in
which sense the body of Christ, dead and alive, was not "simply" the
same identically, because it was not "totally" the same, since life is
of the essence of a living body; for it is an essential and not an
accidental predicate: hence it follows that a body which ceases to be
living does not remain totally the same. Moreover, if it were to be
said that Christ's dead body did continue "totally" the same, it would
follow that it was not corrupted---I mean, by the corruption of death:
which is the heresy of the Gaianites, as Isidore says (Etym. viii), and
is to be found in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. iii). And Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii) that "the term 'corruption' denotes two things: in one
way it is the separation of the soul from the body and other things of
the sort; in another way, the complete dissolving into elements.
Consequently it is impious to say with Julian and Gaian that the Lord's
body was incorruptible after the first manner of corruption before the
resurrection: because Christ's body would not be consubstantial with
us, nor truly dead, nor would we have been saved in very truth. But in
the second way Christ's body was incorrupt."
Reply to Objection 1: The dead body of everyone else does not continue
united to an abiding hypostasis, as Christ's dead body did;
consequently the dead body of everyone else is not the same "simply,"
but only in some respect: because it is the same as to its matter, but
not the same as to its form. But Christ's body remains the same simply,
on account of the identity of the suppositum, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Since a thing is said to be the same identically
according to suppositum, but the same specifically according to form:
wherever the suppositum subsists in only one nature, it follows of
necessity that when the unity of species is taken away the unity of
identity is also taken away. But the hypostasis of the Word of God
subsists in two natures; and consequently, although in others the body
does not remain the same according to the species of human nature,
still it continues identically the same in Christ according to the
suppositum of the Word of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Corruption and death do not belong to Christ by
reason of the suppositum, from which suppositum follows the unity of
identity; but by reason of the human nature, according to which is
found the difference of death and of life in Christ's body.
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Whether Christ's death conduced in any way to our salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's death did not conduce in any
way to our salvation. For death is a sort of privation, since it is the
privation of life. But privation has not any power of activity, because
it is nothing positive. Therefore it could not work anything for our
salvation.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's Passion wrought our salvation by way of
merit. But Christ's death could not operate in this way, because in
death the body is separated from the soul, which is the principle of
meriting. Consequently, Christ's death did not accomplish anything
towards our salvation.
Objection 3: Further, what is corporeal is not the cause of what is
spiritual. But Christ's death was corporeal. Therefore it could not be
the cause of our salvation, which is something spiritual.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "The one death of our
Saviour," namely, that of the body, "saved us from our two deaths,"
that is, of the soul and the body.
I answer that, We may speak of Christ's death in two ways, "in
becoming" and "in fact." Death is said to be "in becoming" when anyone
from natural or enforced suffering is tending towards death: and in
this way it is the same thing to speak of Christ's death as of His
Passion: so that in this sense Christ's death is the cause of our
salvation, according to what has been already said of the Passion
([4273]Q[48]). But death is considered in fact, inasmuch as the
separation of soul and body has already taken place: and it is in this
sense that we are now speaking of Christ's death. In this way Christ's
death cannot be the cause of our salvation by way of merit, but only by
way of causality, that is to say, inasmuch as the Godhead was not
separated from Christ's flesh by death; and therefore, whatever befell
Christ's flesh, even when the soul was departed, was conducive to
salvation in virtue of the Godhead united. But the effect of any cause
is properly estimated according to its resemblance to the cause.
Consequently, since death is a kind of privation of one's own life, the
effect of Christ's death is considered in relation to the removal of
the obstacles to our salvation: and these are the death of the soul and
of the body. Hence Christ's death is said to have destroyed in us both
the death of the soul, caused by sin, according to Rom. 4:25: "He was
delivered up [namely unto death] for our sins": and the death of the
body, consisting in the separation of the soul, according to 1 Cor.
15:54: "Death is swallowed up in victory."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's death wrought our salvation from the
power of the Godhead united, and not consisted merely as His death.
Reply to Objection 2: Though Christ's death, considered "in fact" did
not effect our salvation by way of merit, yet it did so by way of
causality, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's death was indeed corporeal; but the body
was the instrument of the Godhead united to Him, working by Its power,
although dead.
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OF CHRIST'S BURIAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider Christ's burial, concerning which there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was fitting for Christ to be buried?
(2) Concerning the manner of His burial;
(3) Whether His body was decomposed in the tomb?
(4) Concerning the length of time He lay in the tomb.
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Whether it was fitting for Christ to be buried?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for Christ to have been buried,
because it is said of Him (Ps. 87:6): "He is [Vulg.: 'I am'] become as
a man without help, free among the dead." But the bodies of the dead
are enclosed in a tomb; which seems contrary to liberty. Therefore it
does not seem fitting for Christ to have been buried.
Objection 2: Further, nothing should be done to Christ except it was
helpful to our salvation. But Christ's burial seems in no way to be
conducive to our salvation. Therefore, it was not fitting for Him to be
buried.
Objection 3: Further, it seems out of place for God who is above the
high heavens to be laid in the earth. But what befalls the dead body of
Christ is attributed to God by reason of the union. Therefore it
appears to be unbecoming for Christ to be buried.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 26:10) of the woman who anointed
Him: "She has wrought a good work upon Me," and then He added (Mat.
26:12)---"for she, in pouring this ointment upon My body, hath done it
for My burial."
I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to be buried. First of all, to
establish the truth of His death; for no one is laid in the grave
unless there be certainty of death. Hence we read (Mk. 15:44,45), that
Pilate by diligent inquiry assured himself of Christ's death before
granting leave for His burial. Secondly, because by Christ's rising
from the grave, to them who are in the grave, hope is given of rising
again through Him, according to Jn. 5:25,28: "All that are in their
graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and they that hear
shall live." Thirdly, as an example to them who dying spiritually to
their sins are hidden away "from the disturbance of men" (Ps. 30:21).
Hence it is said (Col. 3:3): "You are dead, and your life is hid with
Christ in God." Wherefore the baptized likewise who through Christ's
death die to sins, are as it were buried with Christ by immersion,
according to Rom. 6:4: "We are buried together with Christ by baptism
into death."
Reply to Objection 1: Though buried, Christ proved Himself "free among
the dead": since, although imprisoned in the tomb, He could not be
hindered from going forth by rising again.
Reply to Objection 2: As Christ's death wrought our salvation, so
likewise did His burial. Hence Jerome says (Super Marc. xiv): "By
Christ's burial we rise again"; and on Is. 53:9: "He shall give the
ungodly for His burial," a gloss says: "He shall give to God and the
Father the Gentiles who were without godliness, because He purchased
them by His death and burial."
Reply to Objection 3: As is said in a discourse made at the Council of
Ephesus [*P. iii, cap. 9], "Nothing that saves man is derogatory to
God; showing Him to be not passible, but merciful": and in another
discourse of the same Council [*P. iii, cap. 10]: "God does not repute
anything as an injury which is an occasion of men's salvation. Thus
thou shalt not deem God's Nature to be so vile, as though It may
sometimes be subjected to injuries."
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Whether Christ was buried in a becoming manner?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was buried in an unbecoming
manner. For His burial should be in keeping with His death. But Christ
underwent a most shameful death, according to Wis. 2:20: "Let us
condemn Him to a most shameful death." It seems therefore unbecoming
for honorable burial to be accorded to Christ, inasmuch as He was
buried by men of position---namely, by Joseph of Arimathea, who was "a
noble counselor," to use Mark's expression (Mk. 15:43), and by
Nicodemus, who was "a ruler of the Jews," as John states (Jn. 3:1).
Objection 2: Further, nothing should be done to Christ which might set
an example of wastefulness. But it seems to savor of waste that in
order to bury Christ Nicodemus came "bringing a mixture of myrrh and
aloes about a hundred pounds weight," as recorded by John (19:39),
especially since a woman came beforehand to anoint His body for the
burial, as Mark relates (Mk. 14:28). Consequently, this was not done
becomingly with regard to Christ.
Objection 3: Further, it is not becoming for anything done to be
inconsistent with itself. But Christ's burial on the one hand was
simple, because "Joseph wrapped His body in a clean linen cloth," as is
related by Matthew (27:59), "but not with gold or gems, or silk," as
Jerome observes: yet on the other hand there appears to have been some
display, inasmuch as they buried Him with fragrant spices (Jn. 19:40).
Consequently, the manner of Christ's burial does not seem to have been
seemly.
Objection 4: Further, "What things soever were written," especially of
Christ, "were written for our learning," according to Rom. 15:4. But
some of the things written in the Gospels touching Christ's burial in
no wise seem to pertain to our instruction---as that He was buried "in
a garden . . . "in a tomb which was not His own, which was "new," and
"hewed out in a rock." Therefore the manner of Christ's burial was not
becoming.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:10): "And His sepulchre shall be
glorious."
I answer that, The manner of Christ's burial is shown to be seemly in
three respects. First, to confirm faith in His death and resurrection.
Secondly, to commend the devotion of those who gave Him burial. Hence
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i): "The Gospel mentions as praiseworthy
the deed of those who received His body from the cross, and with due
care and reverence wrapped it up and buried it." Thirdly, as to the
mystery whereby those are molded who "are buried together with Christ
into death" (Rom. 6:4).
Reply to Objection 1: With regard to Christ's death, His patience and
constancy in enduring death are commended, and all the more that His
death was the more despicable: but in His honorable burial we can see
the power of the dying Man, who, even in death, frustrated the intent
of His murderers, and was buried with honor: and thereby is
foreshadowed the devotion of the faithful who in the time to come were
to serve the dead Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: On that expression of the Evangelist (Jn. 19:40)
that they buried Him "as the manner of the Jews is to bury," Augustine
says (Tract. in Joan. cxx): "He admonishes us that in offices of this
kind which are rendered to the dead, the custom of each nation should
be observed." Now it was the custom of this people to anoint bodies
with various spices in order the longer to preserve them from
corruption [*Cf. Catena Aurea in Joan. xix]. Accordingly it is said in
De Doctr. Christ. iii that "in all such things, it is not the use
thereof, but the luxury of the user that is at fault"; and, farther on:
"what in other persons is frequently criminal, in a divine or prophetic
person is a sign of something great." For myrrh and aloes by their
bitterness denote penance, by which man keeps Christ within himself
without the corruption of sin; while the odor of the ointments
expresses good report.
Reply to Objection 3: Myrrh and aloes were used on Christ's body in
order that it might be preserved from corruption, and this seemed to
imply a certain need (in the body): hence the example is set us that we
may lawfully use precious things medicinally, from the need of
preserving our body. But the wrapping up of the body was merely a
question of becoming propriety. And we ought to content ourselves with
simplicity in such things. Yet, as Jerome observes, by this act was
denoted that "he swathes Jesus in clean linen, who receives Him with a
pure soul." Hence, as Bede says on Mark 15:46: "The Church's custom has
prevailed for the sacrifice of the altar to be offered not upon silk,
nor upon dyed cloth, but on linen of the earth; as the Lord's body was
buried in a clean winding-sheet."
Reply to Objection 4: Christ was buried "in a garden" to express that
by His death and burial we are delivered from the death which we incur
through Adam's sin committed in the garden of paradise. But for this
"was our Lord buried in the grave of a stranger," as Augustine says in
a sermon (ccxlviii), "because He died for the salvation of others; and
a sepulchre is the abode of death." Also the extent of the poverty
endured for us can be thereby estimated: since He who while living had
no home, after death was laid to rest in another's tomb, and being
naked was clothed by Joseph. But He is laid in a "new" sepulchre, as
Jerome observes on Mat. 27:60, "lest after the resurrection it might be
pretended that someone else had risen, while the other corpses
remained. The new sepulchre can also denote Mary's virginal womb." And
furthermore it may be understood that all of us are renewed by Christ's
burial; death and corruption being destroyed. Moreover, He was buried
in a monument "hewn out of a rock," as Jerome says on Mat. 27:64,
"lest, if it had been constructed of many stones, they might say that
He was stolen away by digging away the foundations of the tomb." Hence
the "great stone" which was set shows that "the tomb could not be
opened except by the help of many hands. Again, if He had been buried
in the earth, they might have said: They dug up the soil and stole Him
away," as Augustine observes [*Cf. Catena Aurea]. Hilary (Comment. in
Matth. cap. xxxiii) gives the mystical interpretation, saying that "by
the teaching of the apostles, Christ is borne into the stony heart of
the gentile; for it is hewn out by the process of teaching, unpolished
and new, untenanted and open to the entrance of the fear of God. And
since naught besides Him must enter into our hearts, a great stone is
rolled against the door." Furthermore, as Origen says (Tract. xxxv in
Matth.): "It was not written by hazard: 'Joseph wrapped Christ's body
in a clean winding-sheet, and placed it in a new monument,'" and that
"'he rolled a great stone,' because all things around the body of Jesus
are clean, and new, and exceeding great."
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Whether Christ's body was reduced to dust in the tomb?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body was reduced to dust in
the tomb. For just as man dies in punishment of his first parent's sin,
so also does he return to dust, since it was said to the first man
after his sin: "Dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return" (Gn.
3:19). But Christ endured death in order to deliver us from death.
Therefore His body ought to be made to return to dust, so as to free us
from the same penalty.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's body was of the same nature as ours. But
directly after death our bodies begin to dissolve into dust, and are
disposed towards putrefaction, because when the natural heat departs,
there supervenes heat from without which causes corruption. Therefore
it seems that the same thing happened to Christ's body.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above [4274](A[1]), Christ willed to be
buried in order to furnish men with the hope of rising likewise from
the grave. Consequently, He sought likewise to return to dust so as to
give to them who have returned to dust the hope of rising from the
dust.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 15:10): "Nor wilt Thou suffer Thy
holy one to see corruption": and Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii) expounds
this of the corruption which comes of dissolving into elements.
I answer that, It was not fitting for Christ's body to putrefy, or in
any way be reduced to dust, since the putrefaction of any body comes of
that body's infirmity of nature, which can no longer hold the body
together. But as was said above ([4275]Q[50], A[1], ad 2), Christ's
death ought not to come from weakness of nature, lest it might not be
believed to be voluntary: and therefore He willed to die, not from
sickness, but from suffering inflicted on Him, to which He gave Himself
up willingly. And therefore, lest His death might be ascribed to
infirmity of nature, Christ did not wish His body to putrefy in any way
or dissolve no matter how; but for the manifestation of His Divine
power He willed that His body should continue incorrupt. Hence
Chrysostom says (Cont. Jud. et Gent. quod 'Christus sit Deus') that
"with other men, especially with such as have wrought strenuously,
their deeds shine forth in their lifetime; but as soon as they die,
their deeds go with them. But it is quite the contrary with Christ:
because previous to the cross all is sadness and weakness, but as soon
as He is crucified, everything comes to light, in order that you may
learn it was not an ordinary man that was crucified."
Reply to Objection 1: Since Christ was not subject to sin, neither was
He prone to die or to return to dust. Yet of His own will He endured
death for our salvation, for the reasons alleged above ([4276]Q[51],
A[1]). But had His body putrefied or dissolved, this fact would have
been detrimental to man's salvation, for it would not have seemed
credible that the Divine power was in Him. Hence it is on His behalf
that it is written (Ps. 19:10): "What profit is there in my blood,
whilst I go down to corruption?" as if He were to say: "If My body
corrupt, the profit of the blood shed will be lost."
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's body was a subject of corruption
according to the condition of its passible nature, but not as to the
deserving cause of putrefaction, which is sin: but the Divine power
preserved Christ's body from putrefying, just as it raised it up from
death.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ rose from the tomb by Divine power, which
is not narrowed within bounds. Consequently, His rising from the grave
was a sufficient argument to prove that men are to be raised up by
Divine power, not only from their graves, but also from any dust
whatever.
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Whether Christ was in the tomb only one day and two nights?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not in the tomb during only
one day and two nights; because He said (Mat. 12:40): "As Jonas was in
the whale's belly three days and three nights: so shall the Son of man
be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights." But He was
in the heart of the earth while He was in the grave. Therefore He was
not in the tomb for only one day and two nights.
Objection 2: Gregory says in a Paschal Homily (Hom. xxi): "As Samson
carried off the gates of Gaza during the night, even so Christ rose in
the night, taking away the gates of hell." But after rising He was not
in the tomb. Therefore He was not two whole nights in the grave.
Objection 3: Further, light prevailed over darkness by Christ's death.
But night belongs to darkness, and day to light. Therefore it was more
fitting for Christ's body to be in the tomb for two days and a night,
rather than conversely.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "There were thirty-six
hours from the evening of His burial to the dawn of the resurrection,
that is, a whole night with a whole day, and a whole night."
I answer that, The very time during which Christ remained in the tomb
shows forth the effect of His death. For it was said above
([4277]Q[50], A[6]) that by Christ's death we were delivered from a
twofold death, namely, from the death of the soul and of the body: and
this is signified by the two nights during which He remained in the
tomb. But since His death did not come of sin, but was endured from
charity, it has not the semblance of night, but of day: consequently it
is denoted by the whole day during which Christ was in the sepulchre.
And so it was fitting for Christ to be in the sepulchre during one day
and two nights.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): "Some
men, ignorant of Scriptural language, wished to compute as night those
three hours, from the sixth to the ninth hour, during which the sun was
darkened, and as day those other three hours during which it was
restored to the earth, that is, from the ninth hour until its setting:
for the coming night of the Sabbath follows, and if this be reckoned
with its day, there will be already two nights and two days. Now after
the Sabbath there follows the night of the first day of the Sabbath,
that is, of the dawning Sunday, on which the Lord rose. Even so, the
reckoning of the three days and three nights will not stand. It remains
then to find the solution in the customary usage of speech of the
Scriptures, whereby the whole is understood from the part": so that we
are able to take a day and a night as one natural day. And so the first
day is computed from its ending, during which Christ died and was
buried on the Friday; while the second. day is an entire day with
twenty-four hours of night and day; while the night following belongs
to the third day. "For as the primitive days were computed from light
to night on account of man's future fall, so these days are computed
from the darkness to the daylight on account of man's restoration" (De
Trin. iv).
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. iv; cf. De Consens.
Evang. iii), Christ rose with the dawn, when light appears in part, and
still some part of the darkness of the night remains. Hence it is said
of the women that "when it was yet dark" they came "to the sepulchre"
(Jn. 20:1). Therefore, in consequence of this darkness, Gregory says
(Hom. xxi) that Christ rose in the middle of the night, not that night
is divided into two equal parts, but during the night itself: for the
expression "early" can be taken as partly night and partly day, from
its fittingness with both.
Reply to Objection 3: The light prevailed so far in Christ's death
(which is denoted by the one day) that it dispelled the darkness of the
two nights, that is, of our twofold death, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CHRIST'S DESCENT INTO HELL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider Christ's descent into hell; concerning which
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was fitting for Christ to descend into hell?
(2) Into which hell did He descend?
(3) Whether He was entirely in hell?
(4) Whether He made any stay there?
(5) Whether He delivered the Holy Fathers from hell?
(6) Whether He delivered the lost from hell?
(7) Whether He delivered the children who died in original sin?
(8) Whether He delivered men from Purgatory?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting for Christ to descend into hell?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for Christ to
descend into hell, because Augustine says (Ep. ad Evod. cliv.): "Nor
could I find anywhere in the Scriptures hell mentioned as something
good." But Christ's soul did not descend into any evil place, for
neither do the souls of the just. Therefore it does not seem fitting
for Christ's soul to descend into hell.
Objection 2: Further, it cannot belong to Christ to descend into hell
according to His Divine Nature, which is altogether immovable; but only
according to His assumed nature. But that which Christ did or suffered
in His assumed nature is ordained for man's salvation: and to secure
this it does not seem necessary for Christ to descend into hell, since
He delivered us from both guilt and penalty by His Passion which He
endured in this world, as stated above ([4278]Q[49], AA[1],3).
Consequently, it was not fitting that Christ should descend into hell.
Objection 3: Further, by Christ's death His soul was separated from His
body, and this was laid in the sepulchre, as stated above
([4279]Q[51]). But it seems that He descended into hell, not according
to His soul only, because seemingly the soul, being incorporeal, cannot
be a subject of local motion; for this belongs to bodies, as is proved
in Phys. vi, text. 32; while descent implies corporeal motion.
Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to descend into hell.
On the contrary, It is said in the Creed: "He descended into hell": and
the Apostle says (Eph. 4:9): "Now that He ascended, what is it, but
because He also descended first into the lower parts of the earth?" And
a gloss adds: "that is---into hell."
I answer that It was fitting for Christ to descend into hell. First of
all, because He came to bear our penalty in order to free us from
penalty, according to Is. 53:4: "Surely He hath borne our infirmities
and carried our sorrows." But through sin man had incurred not only the
death of the body, but also descent into hell. Consequently since it
was fitting for Christ to die in order to deliver us from death, so it
was fitting for Him to descend into hell in order to deliver us also
from going down into hell. Hence it is written (Osee 13:14): "O death,
I will be thy death; O hell, I will be thy bite." Secondly, because it
was fitting when the devil was overthrown by the Passion that Christ
should deliver the captives detained in hell, according to Zech. 9:11:
"Thou also by the blood of Thy Testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners
out of the pit." And it is written (Col. 2:15): "Despoiling the
principalities and powers, He hath exposed them confidently." Thirdly,
that as He showed forth His power on earth by living and dying, so also
He might manifest it in hell, by visiting it and enlightening it.
Accordingly it is written (Ps. 23:7): "Lift up your gates, O ye
princes," which the gloss thus interprets: "that is---Ye princes of
hell, take away your power, whereby hitherto you held men fast in
hell"; and so "at the name of Jesus every knee should bow," not only
"of them that are in heaven," but likewise "of them that are in hell,"
as is said in Phil. 2:10.
Reply to Objection 1: The name of hell stands for an evil of penalty,
and not for an evil of guilt. Hence it was becoming that Christ should
descend into hell, not as liable to punishment Himself, but to deliver
them who were.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's Passion was a kind of universal cause of
men's salvation, both of the living and of the dead. But a general
cause is applied to particular effects by means of something special.
Hence, as the power of the Passion is applied to the living through the
sacraments which make us like unto Christ's Passion, so likewise it is
applied to the dead through His descent into hell. On which account it
is written (Zech. 9:11) that "He sent forth prisoners out of the pit,
in the blood of His testament," that is, by the power of His Passion.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's soul descended into hell not by the same
kind of motion as that whereby bodies are moved, but by that kind
whereby the angels are moved, as was said in the [4280]FP, Q[53], A[1].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ went down into the hell of the lost?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ went down into the hell of the
lost, because it is said by the mouth of Divine Wisdom (Ecclus. 24:45):
"I will penetrate to all the lower parts of the earth." But the hell of
the lost is computed among the lower parts of the earth according to
Ps. 62:10: "They shall go into the lower parts of the earth." Therefore
Christ who is the Wisdom of God, went down even into the hell of the
lost.
Objection 2: Further, Peter says (Acts 2:24) that "God hath raised up
Christ, having loosed the sorrows of hell, as it was impossible that He
should be holden by it." But there are no sorrows in the hell of the
Fathers, nor in the hell of the children, since they are not punished
with sensible pain on account of any actual sin, but only with the pain
of loss on account of original sin. Therefore Christ went down into the
hell of the lost, or else into Purgatory, where men are tormented with
sensible pain on account of actual sins.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 3:19) that "Christ coming
in spirit preached to those spirits that were in prison, which had some
time been incredulous": and this is understood of Christ's descent into
hell, as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.). For he says that "Christ's
body was laid in the sepulchre when He went to preach to those spirits
who were in bondage, as Peter said." But it is clear the unbelievers
were in the hell of the lost. Therefore Christ went down into the hell
of the lost.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Ep. ad Evod. clxiv): "If the
sacred Scriptures had said that Christ came into Abraham's bosom,
without naming hell or its woes, I wonder whether any person would dare
to assert that He descended into hell. But since evident testimonies
mention hell and its sorrows, there is no reason for believing that
Christ went there except to deliver men from the same woes." But the
place of woes is the hell of the lost. Therefore Christ descended into
the hell of the lost.
Objection 5: Further, as Augustine says in a sermon upon the
Resurrection: Christ descending into hell "set free all the just who
were held in the bonds of original sin." But among them was Job, who
says of himself (Job 17:16): "All that I have shall go down into the
deepest pit." Therefore Christ descended into the deepest pit.
On the contrary, Regarding the hell of the lost it is written (Job
10:21): "Before I go, and return no more, to a land that is dark and
covered with the mist of death." Now there is no "fellowship of light
with darkness," according to 2 Cor. 6:14. Therefore Christ, who is "the
light," did not descend into the hell of the lost.
I answer that, A thing is said to be in a place in two ways. First of
all, through its effect, and in this way Christ descended into each of
the hells, but in different manner. For going down into the hell of the
lost He wrought this effect, that by descending thither He put them to
shame for their unbelief and wickedness: but to them who were detained
in Purgatory He gave hope of attaining to glory: while upon the holy
Fathers detained in hell solely on account of original sin, He shed the
light of glory everlasting.
In another way a thing is said to be in a place through its essence:
and in this way Christ's soul descended only into that part of hell
wherein the just were detained. so that He visited them "in place,"
according to His soul, whom He visited "interiorly by grace," according
to His Godhead. Accordingly, while remaining in one part of hell, He
wrought this effect in a measure in every part of hell, just as while
suffering in one part of the earth He delivered the whole world by His
Passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ, who is the Wisdom of God, penetrated to
all the lower parts of the earth, not passing through them locally with
His soul, but by spreading the effects of His power in a measure to
them all: yet so that He enlightened only the just: because the text
quoted continues: "And I will enlighten all that hope in the Lord."
Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow is twofold: one is the suffering of pain
which men endure for actual sin, according to Ps. 17:6: "The sorrows of
hell encompassed me." Another sorrow comes of hoped-for glory being
deferred, according to Prov. 13:12: "Hope that is deferred afflicteth
the soul": and such was the sorrow which the holy Fathers suffered in
hell, and Augustine refers to it in a sermon on the Passion, saying
that "they besought Christ with tearful entreaty." Now by descending
into hell Christ took away both sorrows, yet in different ways: for He
did away with the sorrows of pains by preserving souls from them, just
as a physician is said to free a man from sickness by warding it off by
means of physic. Likewise He removed the sorrows caused by glory
deferred, by bestowing glory.
Reply to Objection 3: These words of Peter are referred by some to
Christ's descent into hell: and they explain it in this sense: "Christ
preached to them who formerly were unbelievers, and who were shut up in
prison"---that is, in hell---"in spirit"---that is, by His soul. Hence
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "As He evangelized them who are
upon the earth, so did He those who were in hell"; not in order to
convert unbelievers unto belief, but to put them to shame for their
unbelief, since preaching cannot be understood otherwise than as the
open manifesting of His Godhead. which was laid bare before them in the
lower regions by His descending in power into hell.
Augustine, however, furnishes a better exposition of the text in his
Epistle to Evodius quoted above, namely, that the preaching is not to
be referred to Christ's descent into hell, but to the operation of His
Godhead, to which He gave effect from the beginning of the world.
Consequently, the sense is, that "to those (spirits) that were in
prison"---that is, living in the mortal body, which is, as it were, the
soul's prison-house---"by the spirit" of His Godhead "He came and
preached" by internal inspirations, and from without by the admonitions
spoken by the righteous: to those, I say, He preached "which had been
some time incredulous," i.e. not believing in the preaching of Noe,
"when they waited for the patience of God," whereby the chastisement of
the Deluge was put off: accordingly (Peter) adds: "In the days of Noe,
when the Ark was being built."
Reply to Objection 4: The expression "Abraham's bosom" may be taken in
two senses. First of all, as implying that restfulness, existing there,
from sensible pain; so that in this sense it cannot be called hell, nor
are there any sorrows there. In another way it can be taken as implying
the privation of longed-for glory: in this sense it has the character
of hell and sorrow. Consequently, that rest of the blessed is now
called Abraham's bosom, yet it is not styled hell, nor are sorrows said
to be now in Abraham's bosom.
Reply to Objection 5: As Gregory says (Moral. xiii): "Even the higher
regions of hell he calls the deepest hell . . . For if relatively to
the height of heaven this darksome air is infernal, then relatively to
the height of this same air the earth lying beneath can be considered
as infernal and deep. And again in comparison with the height of the
same earth, those parts of hell which are higher than the other
infernal mansions, may in this way be designated as the deepest hell."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the whole Christ was in hell?
Objection 1: It would seem that the whole Christ was not in hell. For
Christ's body is one of His parts. But His body was not in hell.
Therefore, the whole Christ was not in hell.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be termed whole when its parts are
severed. But the soul and body, which are the parts of human nature,
were separated at His death, as stated above ([4281]Q[50], AA[3],4),
and it was after death that He descended into hell. Therefore the whole
(Christ) could not be in hell.
Objection 3: Further, the whole of a thing is said to be in a place
when no part of it is outside such place. But there were parts of
Christ outside hell; for instance, His body was in the grave, and His
Godhead everywhere. Therefore the whole Christ was not in hell.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Symbolo iii): "The whole Son is
with the Father, the whole Son in heaven, on earth, in the Virgin's
womb, on the Cross, in hell, in paradise, into which He brought the
robber."
I answer that, It is evident from what was said in the [4282]FP, Q[31],
A[2], ad 4, the masculine gender is referred to the hypostasis or
person, while the neuter belongs to the nature. Now in the death of
Christ, although the soul was separated from the body, yet neither was
separated from the Person of the Son of God, as stated above (Q[50],
A[2]). Consequently, it must be affirmed that during the three days of
Christ's death the whole Christ was in the tomb, because the whole
Person was there through the body united with Him, and likewise He was
entirely in hell, because the whole Person of Christ was there by
reason of the soul united with Him, and the whole Christ was then
everywhere by reason of the Divine Nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The body which was then in the grave is not a
part of the uncreated Person, but of the assumed nature. Consequently,
the fact of Christ's body not being in hell does not prevent the whole
Christ from being there: but proves that not everything appertaining to
human nature was there.
Reply to Objection 2: The whole human nature is made up of the united
soul and body; not so the Divine Person. Consequently when death
severed the union of the soul with the body, the whole Christ remained,
but His whole human nature did not remain.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Person is whole in each single place,
but not wholly, because it is not circumscribed by any place: indeed,
all places put together could not comprise His immensity; rather is it
His immensity that embraces all things. But it happens in those things
which are in a place corporeally and circumscriptively, that if a whole
be in some place, then no part of it is outside that place. But this is
not the case with God. Hence Augustine says (De Symbolo iii): "It is
not according to times or places that we say that the whole Christ is
everywhere, as if He were at one time whole in one place, at another
time whole in another: but as being whole always and everywhere."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ made any stay in hell?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not make any stay in hell.
For Christ went down into hell to deliver men from thence. But He
accomplished this deliverance at once by His descent, for, according to
Ecclus. 11:23: "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the
poor man rich." Consequently He does not seem to have tarried in hell.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion (clx)
that "of a sudden at our Lord and Saviour's bidding all 'the bars of
iron were burst'" (Cf. Is. 45:2). Hence on behalf of the angels
accompanying Christ it is written (Ps. 23:7, 9): "Lift up your gates, O
ye princes." Now Christ descended thither in order to break the bolts
of hell. Therefore He did not make any stay in hell.
Objection 3: Further, it is related (Lk. 23:43) that our Lord while
hanging on the cross said to the thief: "This day thou shalt be with Me
in paradise": from which it is evident that Christ was in paradise on
that very day. But He was not there with His body. for that was in the
grave. Therefore He was there with the soul which had gone down into
hell: and consequently it appears that He made no stay in hell.
On the contrary, Peter says (Acts 2:24): "Whom God hath raised up,
having loosed the sorrows of hell, as it was impossible that He should
be held by it." Therefore it seems that He remained in hell until the
hour of the Resurrection.
I answer that, As Christ, in order to take our penalties upon Himself,
willed His body to be laid in the tomb, so likewise He willed His soul
to descend into hell. But the body lay in the tomb for a day and two
nights, so as to demonstrate the truth of His death. Consequently, it
is to be believed that His soul was in hell, in order that it might be
brought back out of hell simultaneously with His body from the tomb.
Reply to Objection 1: When Christ descended into hell He delivered the
saints who were there, not by leading them out at once from the
confines of hell, but by enlightening them with the light of glory in
hell itself. Nevertheless it was fitting that His soul should abide in
hell as long as His body remained in the tomb.
Reply to Objection 2: By the expression "bars of hell" are understood
the obstacles which kept the holy Fathers from quitting hell, through
the guilt of our first parent's sin; and these bars Christ burst
asunder by the power of His Passion on descending into hell:
nevertheless He chose to remain in hell for some time, for the reason
stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord's expression is not to be understood of
the earthly corporeal paradise, but of a spiritual one, in which all
are said to be who enjoy the Divine glory. Accordingly, the thief
descended locally into hell with Christ, because it was said to him:
"This day thou shalt be with Me in paradise"; still as to reward he was
in paradise, because he enjoyed Christ's Godhead just as the other
saints did.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ descending into hell delivered the holy Fathers from thence?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ descending into hell did not
deliver the holy Fathers from thence. For Augustine (Epist. ad Evod.
clxiv) says: "I have not yet discovered what Christ descending into
hell bestowed upon those righteous ones who were in Abraham's bosom,
from whom I fail to see that He ever departed according to the beatific
presence of His Godhead." But had He delivered them, He would have
bestowed much upon them. Therefore it does not appear that Christ
delivered the holy Fathers from hell.
Objection 2: Further, no one is detained in hell except on account of
sin. But during life the holy Fathers were justified from sin through
faith in Christ. Consequently they did not need to be delivered from
hell on Christ's descent thither.
Objection 3: Further, if you remove the cause, you remove the effect.
But that Christ went down into hell was due to sin which was taken away
by the Passion, as stated above ([4283]Q[49], A[1]). Consequently, the
holy Fathers were not delivered on Christ's descent into hell.
On the contrary, Augustine says in the sermon on the Passion already
quoted that when Christ descended into hell "He broke down the gate and
'iron bars' of hell, setting at liberty all the righteous who were held
fast through original sin."
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 2), when Christ descended into
hell He worked through the power of His Passion. But through Christ's
Passion the human race was delivered not only from sin, but also from
the debt of its penalty, as stated above (Q[49], AA[1],3). Now men were
held fast by the debt of punishment in two ways: first of all for
actual sin which each had committed personally: secondly, for the sin
of the whole human race, which each one in his origin contracts from
our first parent, as stated in Rom. 5 of which sin the penalty is the
death of the body as well as exclusion from glory, as is evident from
Gn. 2 and 3: because God cast out man from paradise after sin, having
beforehand threatened him with death should he sin. Consequently, when
Christ descended into hell, by the power of His Passion He delivered
the saints from the penalty whereby they were excluded from the life of
glory, so as to be unable to see God in His Essence, wherein man's
beatitude lies, as stated in the [4284]FS, Q[3], A[8]. But the holy
Fathers were detained in hell for the reason, that, owing to our first
parent's sin, the approach to the life of glory was not opened. And so
when Christ descended into hell He delivered the holy Fathers from
thence. And this is what is written Zech. 9:11: "Thou also by the blood
of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein
is no water." And (Col. 2:15) it is written that "despoiling the
principalities and powers," i.e. "of hell, by taking out Isaac and
Jacob, and the other just souls," "He led them," i.e. "He brought them
far from this kingdom of darkness into heaven," as the gloss explains.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there against such as
maintained that the righteous of old were subject to penal sufferings
before Christ's descent into hell. Hence shortly before the passage
quoted he says: "Some add that this benefit was also bestowed upon the
saints of old, that on the Lord's coming into hell they were freed from
their sufferings. But I fail to see how Abraham, into whose bosom the
poor man was received, was ever in such sufferings." Consequently, when
he afterwards adds that "he had not yet discovered what Christ's
descent into hell had brought to the righteous of old," this must be
understood as to their being freed from penal sufferings. Yet Christ
bestowed something upon them as to their attaining glory: and in
consequence He dispelled the suffering which they endured through their
glory being delayed: still they had great joy from the very hope
thereof, according to Jn. 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he
might see my day." And therefore he adds: "I fail to see that He ever
departed, according to the beatific presence of His Godhead," that is,
inasmuch as even before Christ's coming they were happy in hope,
although not yet fully happy in fact.
Reply to Objection 2: The holy Fathers while yet living were delivered
from original as well as actual sin through faith in Christ; also from
the penalty of actual sins, but not from the penalty of original sin,
whereby they were excluded from glory, since the price of man's
redemption was not yet paid: just as the faithful are now delivered by
baptism from the penalty of actual sins, and from the penalty of
original sin as to exclusion from glory, yet still remain bound by the
penalty of original sin as to the necessity of dying in the body
because they are renewed in the spirit, but not yet in the flesh,
according to Rom. 8:10: "The body indeed is dead, because of sin; but
the spirit liveth, because of justification."
Reply to Objection 3: Directly Christ died His soul went down into
hell, and bestowed the fruits of His Passion on the saints detained
there; although they did not go out as long as Christ remained in hell,
because His presence was part of the fulness of their glory.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ delivered any of the lost from hell?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did deliver some of the lost
from hell, because it is written (Is. 24:22): "And they shall be
gathered together as in the gathering of one bundle into the pit, end
they shall be shut up there in prison: and after many days they shall
be visited." But there he is speaking of the lost, who "had adored the
host of heaven," according to Jerome's commentary. Consequently it
seems that even the lost were visited at Christ's descent into hell;
and this seems to imply their deliverance.
Objection 2: Further, on Zech. 9:11: "Thou also by the blood of Thy
testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no
water," the gloss observes: "Thou hast delivered them who were held
bound in prisons, where no mercy refreshed them, which that rich man
prayed for." But only the lost are shut up in merciless prisons.
Therefore Christ did deliver some from the hell of the lost.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's power was not less in hell than in this
world, because He worked in every place by the power of His Godhead.
But in this world He delivered some persons of every state. Therefore,
in hell also, He delivered some from the state of the lost.
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 13:14): "O death, I will be thy
death; O hell, I will be thy bite": upon which the gloss says: "By
leading forth the elect, and leaving there the reprobate." But only the
reprobate are in the hell of the lost. Therefore, by Christ's descent
into hell none were delivered from the hell of the lost.
I answer that, As stated above [4285](A[5]), when Christ descended into
hell He worked by the power of His Passion. Consequently, His descent
into hell brought the fruits of deliverance to them only who were
united to His Passion through faith quickened by charity, whereby sins
are taken away. Now those detained in the hell of the lost either had
no faith in Christ's Passion, as infidels; or if they had faith, they
had no conformity with the charity of the suffering Christ: hence they
could not be cleansed from their sins. And on this account Christ's
descent into hell brought them no deliverance from the debt of
punishment in hell.
Reply to Objection 1: When Christ descended into hell, all who were in
any part of hell were visited in some respect: some to their
consolation and deliverance, others, namely, the lost, to their shame
and confusion. Accordingly the passage continues: "And the moon shall
blush, and the sun be put to shame," etc.
This can also be referred to the visitation which will come upon them
in the Day of Judgment, not for their deliverance, but for their yet
greater confusion, according to Sophon. i, 12: "I will visit upon the
men that are settled on their lees."
Reply to Objection 2: When the gloss says "where no mercy refreshed
them," this is to be understood of the refreshing of full deliverance,
because the holy Fathers could not be delivered from this prison of
hell before Christ's coming.
Reply to Objection 3: It was not due to any lack of power on Christ's
part that some were not delivered from every state in hell, as out of
every state among men in this world; but it was owing to the very
different condition of each state. For, so long as men live here below,
they can be converted to faith and charity, because in this life men
are not confirmed either in good or in evil, as they are after quitting
this life.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the children who died in original sin were delivered by Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that the children who died in original sin
were delivered from hell by Christ's descending thither. For, like the
holy Fathers, the children were kept in hell simply because of original
sin. But the holy Fathers were delivered from hell, as stated above
[4286](A[5]). Therefore the children were similarly delivered from hell
by Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15): "If by the offense
of one, many died; much more the grace of God and the gift, by the
grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many." But the
children who die with none but original sin are detained in hell owing
to their first parent's sin. Therefore, much more were they delivered
from hell through the grace of Christ.
Objection 3: Further, as Baptism works in virtue of Christ's Passion,
so also does Christ's descent into hell, as is clear from what has been
said (A[4], ad 2, AA[5],6). But through Baptism children are delivered
from original sin and hell. Therefore, they were similarly delivered by
Christ's descent into hell.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 3:25): "God hath proposed
Christ to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood." But the
children who had died with only original sin were in no wise sharers of
faith in Christ. Therefore, they did not receive the fruits of Christ's
propitiation, so as to be delivered by Him from hell.
I answer that, As stated above [4287](A[6]), Christ's descent into hell
had its effect of deliverance on them only who through faith and
charity were united to Christ's Passion, in virtue whereof Christ's
descent into hell was one of deliverance. But the children who had died
in original sin were in no way united to Christ's Passion by faith and
love: for, not having the use of free will, they could have no faith of
their own; nor were they cleansed from original sin either by their
parents' faith or by any sacrament of faith. Consequently, Christ's
descent into hell did not deliver the children from thence. And
furthermore, the holy Fathers were delivered from hell by being
admitted to the glory of the vision of God, to which no one can come
except through grace; according to Rom. 6:23: "The grace of God is life
everlasting." Therefore, since children dying in original sin had no
grace, they were not delivered from hell.
Reply to Objection 1: The holy Fathers, although still held bound by
the debt of original sin, in so far as it touches human nature, were
nevertheless delivered from all stain of sin by faith in Christ:
consequently, they were capable of that deliverance which Christ
brought by descending into hell. But the same cannot be said of the
children, as is evident from what was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: When the Apostle says that the grace of God "hath
abounded unto many," the word "many" [*The Vulgate reads 'plures,' i.e.
'many more'] is to be taken, not comparatively, as if more were saved
by Christ's grace than lost by Adam's sin: but absolutely, as if he
said that the grace of the one Christ abounded unto many, just as
Adam's sin was contracted by many. But as Adam's sin was contracted by
those only who descended seminally from him according to the flesh, so
Christ's grace reached those only who became His members by spiritual
regeneration: which does not apply to children dying in original sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is applied to men in this life, in which
man's state can be changed from sin into grace: but Christ's descent
into hell was vouchsafed to the souls after this life when they are no
longer capable of the said change. And consequently by baptism children
are delivered from original sin and from hell, but not by Christ's
descent into hell.
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Whether Christ by His descent into hell delivered souls from purgatory?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ by His descent into hell
delivered souls from Purgatory---for Augustine says (Ep. ad Evod.
clxiv): "Because evident testimonies speak of hell and its pains, there
is no reason for believing that the Saviour came thither except to
rescue men from those same pains: but I still wish to know whether it
was all whom He found there, or some whom He deemed worthy of such a
benefit. Yet I do not doubt that Christ went into hell, and granted
this favor to them who were suffering from its pains." But, as stated
above [4288](A[6]), He did not confer the benefit of deliverance upon
the lost: and there are no others in a state of penal suffering except
those in Purgatory. Consequently Christ delivered souls from Purgatory.
Objection 2: Further, the very presence of Christ's soul had no less
effect than His sacraments have. But souls are delivered from Purgatory
by the sacraments, especially by the sacrament of the Eucharist, as
shall be shown later ([4289]XP, Q[71], A[9]). Therefore much more were
souls delivered from Purgatory by the presence of Christ descending
into hell.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Poenit. ix), those whom
Christ healed in this life He healed completely. Also, our Lord says
(Jn. 7:23): "I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day." But
Christ delivered them who were in Purgatory from the punishment of the
pain of loss, whereby they were excluded from glory. Therefore, He also
delivered them from the punishment of Purgatory.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xiii): "Since our Creator and
Redeemer, penetrating the bars of hell, brought out from thence the
souls of the elect, He does not permit us to go thither, from whence He
has already by descending set others free." But He permits us to go to
Purgatory. Therefore, by descending into hell, He did not deliver souls
from Purgatory.
I answer that, As we have stated more than once (A[4], ad 2,
AA[5],6,7), Christ's descent into hell was one of deliverance in virtue
of His Passion. Now Christ's Passion had a virtue which was neither
temporal nor transitory, but everlasting, according to Heb. 10:14: "For
by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified."
And so it is evident that Christ's Passion had no greater efficacy then
than it has now. Consequently, they who were such as those who are now
in Purgatory, were not set free from Purgatory by Christ's descent into
hell. But if any were found such as are now set free from Purgatory by
virtue of Christ's Passion, then there was nothing to hinder them from
being delivered from Purgatory by Christ's descent into hell.
Reply to Objection 1: From this passage of Augustine it cannot be
concluded that all who were in Purgatory were delivered from it, but
that such a benefit was bestowed upon some persons, that is to say,
upon such as were already cleansed sufficiently, or who in life, by
their faith and devotion towards Christ's death, so merited, that when
He descended, they were delivered from the temporal punishment of
Purgatory.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's power operates in the sacraments by way
of healing and expiation. Consequently, the sacrament of the Eucharist
delivers men from Purgatory inasmuch as it is a satisfactory sacrifice
for sin. But Christ's descent into hell was not satisfactory; yet it
operated in virtue of the Passion, which was satisfactory, as stated
above ([4290]Q[48], A[2]), but satisfactory in general, since its
virtue had to be applied to each individual by something specially
personal ([4291]Q[49], A[1], ad 4,5). Consequently, it does not follow
of necessity that all were delivered from Purgatory by Christ's descent
into hell.
Reply to Objection 3: Those defects from which Christ altogether
delivered men in this world were purely personal, and concerned the
individual; whereas exclusion from God's glory was a general defect and
common to all human nature. Consequently, there was nothing to prevent
those detained in Purgatory being delivered by Christ from their
privation of glory, but not from the debt of punishment in Purgatory
which pertains to personal defect. Just as on the other hand, the holy
Fathers before Christ's coming were delivered from their personal
defects, but not from the common defect, as was stated above (A[7], ad
1;[4292] Q[49], A[5], ad 1).
__________________________________________________________________
OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider those things that concern Christ's Exaltation;
and we shall deal with (1) His Resurrection; (2) His Ascension; (3) His
sitting at the right hand of God the Father; (4) His Judiciary Power.
Under the first heading there is a fourfold consideration: (1) Christ's
Resurrection in itself; (2) the quality of the Person rising; (3) the
manifestation of the Resurrection; (4) its causality. Concerning the
first there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The necessity of His Resurrection;
(2) The time of the Resurrection;
(3) Its order;
(4) Its cause.
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Whether it was necessary for Christ to rise again?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for Christ to rise
again. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): "Resurrection is the
rising again of an animate being, which was disintegrated and fallen."
But Christ did not fall by sinning, nor was His body dissolved, as is
manifest from what was stated above ([4293]Q[51], A[3]). Therefore, it
does not properly belong to Him to rise again.
Objection 2: Further, whoever rises again is promoted to a higher
state, since to rise is to be uplifted. But after death Christ's body
continued to be united with the Godhead, hence it could not be uplifted
to any higher condition. Therefore, it was not due to it to rise again.
Objection 3: Further, all that befell Christ's humanity was ordained
for our salvation. But Christ's Passion sufficed for our salvation,
since by it we were loosed from guilt and punishment, as is clear from
what was said above ([4294]Q[49], A[1],3). Consequently, it was not
necessary for Christ to rise again from the dead.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 24:46): "It behooved Christ to
suffer and to rise again from the dead."
I answer that, It behooved Christ to rise again, for five reasons.
First of all; for the commendation of Divine Justice, to which it
belongs to exalt them who humble themselves for God's sake, according
to Lk. 1:52: "He hath put down the mighty from their seat, and hath
exalted the humble." Consequently, because Christ humbled Himself even
to the death of the Cross, from love and obedience to God, it behooved
Him to be uplifted by God to a glorious resurrection; hence it is said
in His Person (Ps. 138:2): "Thou hast known," i.e. approved, "my
sitting down," i.e. My humiliation and Passion, "and my rising up,"
i.e. My glorification in the resurrection; as the gloss expounds.
Secondly, for our instruction in the faith, since our belief in
Christ's Godhead is confirmed by His rising again, because, according
to 2 Cor. 13:4, "although He was crucified through weakness, yet He
liveth by the power of God." And therefore it is written (1 Cor.
15:14): "If Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and
our [Vulg.: 'your'] faith is also vain": and (Ps. 29:10): "What profit
is there in my blood?" that is, in the shedding of My blood, "while I
go down," as by various degrees of evils, "into corruption?" As though
He were to answer: "None. 'For if I do not at once rise again but My
body be corrupted, I shall preach to no one, I shall gain no one,'" as
the gloss expounds.
Thirdly, for the raising of our hope, since through seeing Christ, who
is our head, rise again, we hope that we likewise shall rise again.
Hence it is written (1 Cor. 15:12): "Now if Christ be preached that He
rose from the dead, how do some among you say, that there is no
resurrection of the dead?" And (Job 19:25, 27): "I know," that is with
certainty of faith, "that my Redeemer," i.e. Christ, "liveth," having
risen from the dead; "and" therefore "in the last day I shall rise out
of the earth . . . this my hope is laid up in my bosom."
Fourthly, to set in order the lives of the faithful: according to Rom.
6:4: "As Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so
we also may walk in newness of life": and further on; "Christ rising
from the dead dieth now no more; so do you also reckon that you are
dead to sin, but alive to God."
Fifthly, in order to complete the work of our salvation: because, just
as for this reason did He endure evil things in dying that He might
deliver us from evil, so was He glorified in rising again in order to
advance us towards good things; according to Rom. 4:25: "He was
delivered up for our sins, and rose again for our justification."
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ did not fall by sin, yet He fell
by death, because as sin is a fall from righteousness, so death is a
fall from life: hence the words of Mic. 7:8 can be taken as though
spoken by Christ: "Rejoice not thou, my enemy, over me, because I am
fallen: I shall rise again." Likewise, although Christ's body was not
disintegrated by returning to dust, yet the separation of His soul and
body was a kind of disintegration.
Reply to Objection 2: The Godhead was united with Christ's flesh after
death by personal union, but not by natural union; thus the soul is
united with the body as its form, so as to constitute human nature.
Consequently, by the union of the body and soul, the body was uplifted
to a higher condition of nature, but not to a higher personal state.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion wrought our salvation, properly
speaking, by removing evils; but the Resurrection did so as the
beginning and exemplar of all good things.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting for Christ to rise again on the third day?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should have risen
again on the third day. For the members ought to be in conformity with
their head. But we who are His members do not rise from death on the
third day, since our rising is put off until the end of the world.
Therefore, it seems that Christ, who is our head, should not have risen
on the third day, but that His Resurrection ought to have been deferred
until the end of the world.
Objection 2: Further, Peter said (Acts 2:24) that "it was impossible
for Christ to be held fast by hell" and death. Therefore it seems that
Christ's rising ought not to have been deferred until the third day,
but that He ought to have risen at once on the same day; especially
since the gloss quoted above [4295](A[1]) says that "there is no profit
in the shedding of Christ's blood, if He did not rise at once."
Objection 3: The day seems to start with the rising of the sun, the
presence of which causes the day. But Christ rose before sunrise: for
it is related (Jn. 20:1) that "Mary Magdalen cometh early, when it was
yet dark, unto the sepulchre": but Christ was already risen, for it
goes on to say: "And she saw the stone taken away from the sepulchre."
Therefore Christ did not rise on the third day.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 20:19): "They shall deliver Him to
the Gentiles to be mocked, and scourged, and crucified, and the third
day He shall rise again."
I answer that, As stated above [4296](A[1]) Christ's Resurrection was
necessary for the instruction of our faith. But our faith regards
Christ's Godhead and humanity, for it is not enough to believe the one
without the other, as is evident from what has been said (Q[36], A[4];
cf. [4297]SS, Q[2], AA[7],8). Consequently, in order that our faith in
the truth of His Godhead might be confirmed it was necessary that He
should rise speedily, and that His Resurrection should not be deferred
until the end of the world. But to confirm our faith regarding the
truth of His humanity and death, it was needful that there should be
some interval between His death and rising. For if He had risen
directly after death, it might seem that His death was not genuine and
consequently neither would His Resurrection be true. But to establish
the truth of Christ's death, it was enough for His rising to be
deferred until the third day, for within that time some signs of life
always appear in one who appears to be dead whereas he is alive.
Furthermore, by His rising on the third day, the perfection of the
number "three" is commended, which is "the number of everything," as
having "beginning, middle, and end," as is said in De Coelo i. Again in
the mystical sense we are taught that Christ by "His one death" (i.e.
of the body) which was light, by reason of His righteousness,
"destroyed our two deaths" (i.e. of soul and body), which are as
darkness on account of sin; consequently, He remained in death for one
day and two nights, as Augustine observes (De Trin. iv).
And thereby is also signified that a third epoch began with the
Resurrection: for the first was before the Law; the second under the
Law; and the third under grace. Moreover the third state of the saints
began with the Resurrection of Christ: for, the first was under figures
of the Law; the second under the truth of faith; while the third will
be in the eternity of glory, which Christ inaugurated by rising again.
Reply to Objection 1: The head and members are likened in nature, but
not in power; because the power of the head is more excellent than that
of the members. Accordingly, to show forth the excellence of Christ's
power, it was fitting that He should rise on the third day, while the
resurrection of the rest is put off until the end of the world.
Reply to Objection 2: Detention implies a certain compulsion. But
Christ was not held fast by any necessity of death, but was "free among
the dead": and therefore He abode a while in death, not as one held
fast, but of His own will, just so long as He deemed necessary for the
instruction of our faith. And a task is said to be done "at once" which
is performed within a short space of time.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4298]Q[51], A[4], ad 1,2),
Christ rose early when the day was beginning to dawn, to denote that by
His Resurrection He brought us to the light of glory; just as He died
when the day was drawing to its close, and nearing to darkness, in
order to signify that by His death He would destroy the darkness of sin
and its punishment. Nevertheless He is said to have risen on the third
day, taking day as a natural day which contains twenty-four hours. And
as Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "The night until the dawn, when the
Lord's Resurrection was proclaimed, belongs to the third day. Because
God, who made the light to shine forth from darkness, in order that by
the grace of the New Testament and partaking of Christ's rising we
might hear this---'once ye were darkness, but now light in the
Lord'---insinuates in a measure to us that day draws its origin from
night: for, as the first days are computed from light to darkness on
account of man's coming fall, so these days are reckoned from darkness
to light owing to man's restoration." And so it is evident that even if
He had risen at midnight, He could be said to have risen on the third
day, taking it as a natural day. But now that He rose early, it can be
affirmed that He rose on the third day, even taking the artificial day
which is caused by the sun's presence, because the sun had already
begun to brighten the sky. Hence it is written (Mk. 16:2) that "the
women come to the sepulchre, the sun being now risen"; which is not
contrary to John's statement "when it was yet dark," as Augustine says
(De Cons. Evang. iii), "because, as the day advances the more the light
rises, the more are the remaining shadows dispelled." But when Mark
says "'the sun being now risen,' it is not to be taken as if the sun
were already apparent over the horizon, but as coming presently into
those parts."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ was the first to rise from the dead?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not the first to rise from
the dead, because we read in the Old Testament of some persons raised
to life by Elias and Eliseus, according to Heb. 11:35: "Women received
their dead raised to life again": also Christ before His Passion raised
three dead persons to life. Therefore Christ was not the first to rise
from the dead.
Objection 2: Further, among the other miracles which happened during
the Passion, it is narrated (Mat. 27:52) that "the monuments were
opened, and many bodies of the saints who had slept rose again."
Therefore Christ was not the first to rise from the dead.
Objection 3: Further, as Christ by His own rising is the cause of our
resurrection, so by His grace He is the cause of our grace, according
to Jn. 1:16: "Of His fulness we all have received." But in point of
time some others had grace previous to Christ---for instance all the
fathers of the Old Testament. Therefore some others came to the
resurrection of the body before Christ.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:20): "Christ is risen from
the dead, the first fruits of them that sleep---because," says the
gloss, "He rose first in point of time and dignity."
I answer that, Resurrection is a restoring from death to life. Now a
man is snatched from death in two ways: first of all, from actual
death, so that he begins in any way to live anew after being actually
dead: in another way, so that he is not only rescued from death, but
from the necessity, nay more, from the possibility of dying again. Such
is a true and perfect resurrection, because so long as a man lives,
subject to the necessity of dying, death has dominion over him in a
measure, according to Rom. 8:10: "The body indeed is dead because of
sin." Furthermore, what has the possibility of existence, is said to
exist in some respect, that is, in potentiality. Thus it is evident
that the resurrection, whereby one is rescued from actual death only,
is but an imperfect one.
Consequently, speaking of perfect resurrection, Christ is the first of
them who rise, because by rising He was the first to attain life
utterly immortal, according to Rom. 6:9: "Christ rising from the dead
dieth now no more." But by an imperfect resurrection, some others have
risen before Christ, so as to be a kind of figure of His Resurrection.
And thus the answer to the first objection is clear: because both those
raised from the dead in the old Testament, and those raised by Christ,
so returned to life that they had to die again.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions regarding them who rose
with Christ. Some hold that they rose to life so as to die no more,
because it would be a greater torment for them to die a second time
than not to rise at all. According to this view, as Jerome observes on
Mat. 27:52,53, we must understand that "they had not risen before our
Lord rose." Hence the Evangelist says that "coming out of the tombs
after His Resurrection, they came into the holy city, and appeared to
many." But Augustine (Ep. ad Evod. clxiv) while giving this opinion,
says: "I know that it appears some, that by the death of Christ the
Lord the same resurrection was bestowed upon the righteous as is
promised to us in the end; and if they slept not again by laying aside
their bodies, it remains to be seen how Christ can be understood to be
'the first-born of the dead,' if so many preceded Him unto that
resurrection. Now if reply be made that this is said by anticipation,
so that the monuments be understood to have been opened by the
earthquake while Christ was still hanging on the cross, but that the
bodies of the just did not rise then but after He had risen, the
difficulty still arises---how is it that Peter asserts that it was
predicted not of David but of Christ, that His body would not see
corruption, since David's tomb was in their midst; and thus he did not
convince them, if David's body was no longer there; for even if he had
risen soon after his death, and his flesh had not seen corruption, his
tomb might nevertheless remain. Now it seems hard that David from whose
seed Christ is descended, was not in that rising of the just, if an
eternal rising was conferred upon them. Also that saying in the Epistle
to the Hebrews (11:40) regarding the ancient just would be hard to
explain, 'that they should not be perfected without us,' if they were
already established in that incorruption of the resurrection which is
promised at the end when we shall be made perfect": so that Augustine
would seem to think that they rose to die again. In this sense Jerome
also in commenting on Matthew (27:52,53) says: "As Lazarus rose, so
also many of the bodies of the saints rose, that they might bear
witness to the risen Christ." Nevertheless in a sermon for the
Assumption [*Ep. ix ad Paul. et Eustoch.; among the supposititious
works ascribed to St. Jerome] he seems to leave the matter doubtful.
But Augustine's reasons seem to be much more cogent.
Reply to Objection 3: As everything preceding Christ's coming was
preparatory for Christ, so is grace a disposition for glory.
Consequently, it behooved all things appertaining to glory, whether
they regard the soul, as the perfect fruition of God, or whether they
regard the body, as the glorious resurrection, to be first in Christ as
the author of glory: but that grace should be first in those that were
ordained unto Christ.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ was the cause of His own Resurrection?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ was not the cause of His own
Resurrection. For whoever is raised up by another is not the cause of
his own rising. But Christ was raised up by another, according to Acts
2:24: "Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the sorrows of hell": and
Rom. 8:11: "He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, shall quicken
also your mortal bodies." Therefore Christ is not the cause of His own
Resurrection.
Objection 2: Further, no one is said to merit, or ask from another,
that of which he is himself the cause. But Christ by His Passion
merited the Resurrection, as Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.): "The
lowliness of the Passion is the meritorious cause of the glory of the
Resurrection." Moreover He asked the Father that He might be raised up
again, according to Ps. 40:11: "But thou, O Lord, have mercy on me, and
raise me up again." Therefore He was not the cause of His rising again.
Objection 3: Further, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. iv), it is not
the soul that rises again, but the body, which is stricken by death.
But the body could not unite the soul with itself, since the soul is
nobler. Therefore what rose in Christ could not be the cause of His
Resurrection.
On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jn. 10:18): "No one taketh My soul from
Me, but I lay it down, and I take it up again." But to rise is nothing
else than to take the soul up again. Consequently, it appears that
Christ rose again of His own power.
I answer that, As stated above ([4299]Q[50], AA[2],3) in consequence of
death Christ's Godhead was not separated from His soul, nor from His
flesh. Consequently, both the soul and the flesh of the dead Christ can
be considered in two respects: first, in respect of His Godhead;
secondly, in respect of His created nature. Therefore, according to the
virtue of the Godhead united to it, the body took back again the soul
which it had laid aside, and the soul took back again the body which it
had abandoned: and thus Christ rose by His own power. And this is
precisely what is written (2 Cor. 13:4): "For although He was crucified
through" our "weakness, yet He liveth by the power of God." But if we
consider the body and soul of the dead Christ according to the power of
created nature, they could not thus be reunited, but it was necessary
for Christ to be raised up by God.
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine power is the same thing as the
operation of the Father and the Son; accordingly these two things are
mutually consequent, that Christ was raised up by the Divine power of
the Father, and by His own power.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ by praying besought and merited His
Resurrection, as man and not as God.
Reply to Objection 3: According to its created nature Christ's body is
not more powerful than His soul; yet according to its Divine power it
is more powerful. Again the soul by reason of the Godhead united to it
is more powerful than the body in respect of its created nature.
Consequently, it was by the Divine power that the body and soul
mutually resumed each other, but not by the power of their created
nature.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE QUALITY OF CHRIST RISING AGAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the quality of the rising Christ, which
presents four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ had a true body after His Resurrection?
(2) Whether He rose with His complete body?
(3) Whether His was a glorified body?
(4) Of the scars which showed in His body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ had a true body after His Resurrection?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not have a true body after
His Resurrection. For a true body cannot be in the same place at the
same time with another body. But after the Resurrection Christ's body
was with another at the same time in the same place: since He entered
among the disciples "the doors being shut," as is related in Jn. 20:26.
Therefore it seems that Christ did not have a true body after His
Resurrection.
Objection 2: Further, a true body does not vanish from the beholder's
sight unless perchance it be corrupted. But Christ's body "vanished out
of the sight" of the disciples as they gazed upon Him, as is related in
Lk. 24:31. Therefore, it seems that Christ did not have a true body
after His Resurrection.
Objection 3: Further, every true body has its determinate shape. But
Christ's body appeared before the disciples "in another shape," as is
evident from Mk. 15:12. Therefore it seems that Christ did not possess
a true body after His Resurrection.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 24:37) that when Christ appeared to
His disciples "they being troubled and frightened, supposed that they
saw a spirit," as if He had not a true but an imaginary body: but to
remove their fears He presently added: "Handle and see, for a spirit
hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have." Consequently, He had
not an imaginary but a true body.
I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): that is said to
rise, which fell. But Christ's body fell by death; namely, inasmuch as
the soul which was its formal perfection was separated from it. Hence,
in order for it to be a true resurrection, it was necessary for the
same body of Christ to be once more united with the same soul. And
since the truth of the body's nature is from its form it follows that
Christ's body after His Resurrection was a true body, and of the same
nature as it was before. But had His been an imaginary body, then His
Resurrection would not have been true, but apparent.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body after His Resurrection, not by
miracle but from its glorified condition, as some say, entered in among
the disciples while the doors were shut, thus existing with another
body in the same place. But whether a glorified body can have this from
some hidden property, so as to be with another body at the same time in
the same place, will be discussed later ([4300]XP, Q[83], A[4]) when
the common resurrection will be dealt with. For the present let it
suffice to say that it was not from any property within the body, but
by virtue of the Godhead united to it, that this body, although a true
one, entered in among the disciples while the doors were shut.
Accordingly Augustine says in a sermon for Easter (ccxlvii) that some
men argue in this fashion: "If it were a body; if what rose from the
sepulchre were what hung upon the tree, how could it enter through
closed doors?" And he answers: "If you understand how, it is no
miracle: where reason fails, faith abounds." And (Tract. cxxi super
Joan.) he says: "Closed doors were no obstacle to the substance of a
Body wherein was the Godhead; for truly He could enter in by doors not
open, in whose Birth His Mother's virginity remained inviolate." And
Gregory says the same in a homily for the octave of Easter (xxvi in
Evang.).
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([4301]Q[53], A[3]), Christ rose
to the immortal life of glory. But such is the disposition of a
glorified body that it is spiritual, i.e. subject to the spirit, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:44). Now in order for the body to be entirely
subject to the spirit, it is necessary for the body's every action to
be subject to the will of the spirit. Again, that an object be seen is
due to the action of the visible object upon the sight, as the
Philosopher shows (De Anima ii). Consequently, whoever has a glorified
body has it in his power to be seen when he so wishes, and not to be
seen when he does not wish it. Moreover Christ had this not only from
the condition of His glorified body, but also from the power of His
Godhead, by which power it may happen that even bodies not glorified
are miraculously unseen: as was by a miracle bestowed on the blessed
Bartholomew, that "if he wished he could be seen, and not be seen if he
did not wish it" [*Apocryphal Historia Apost. viii, 2]. Christ, then,
is said to have vanished from the eyes of the disciples, not as though
He were corrupted or dissolved into invisible elements; but because He
ceased, of His own will, to be seen by them, either while He was
present or while He was departing by the gift of agility.
Reply to Objection 3: As Severianus [*Peter Chrysologus: Serm. lxxxii]
says in a sermon for Easter: "Let no one suppose that Christ changed
His features at the Resurrection." This is to be understood of the
outline of His members; since there was nothing out of keeping or
deformed in the body of Christ which was conceived of the Holy Ghost,
that had to be righted at the Resurrection. Nevertheless He received
the glory of clarity in the Resurrection: accordingly the same writer
adds: "but the semblance is changed, when, ceasing to be mortal, it
becomes immortal; so that it acquired the glory of countenance, without
losing the substance of the countenance." Yet He did not come to those
disciples in glorified appearance; but, as it lay in His power for His
body to be seen or not, so it was within His power to present to the
eyes of the beholders His form either glorified or not glorified, or
partly glorified and partly not, or in any fashion whatsoever. Still it
requires but a slight difference for anyone to seem to appear another
shape.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ's body rose glorified? [*Some editions give this article as
the third, following the order of the introduction to the question. But thi
s
is evident from the first sentence of the body of A[3] (A[2] in the
aforesaid editions), that the order of the Leonine edition is correct.]
Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body did not rise glorified. For
glorified bodies shine, according to Mat. 13:43: "Then shall the just
shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." But shining bodies
are seen under the aspect of light, but not of color. Therefore, since
Christ's body was beheld under the aspect of color, as it had been
hitherto, it seems that it was not a glorified one.
Objection 2: Further, a glorified body is incorruptible. But Christ's
body seems not to have been incorruptible; because it was palpable, as
He Himself says in Lk. 24:39: "Handle, and see." Now Gregory says (Hom.
in Evang. xxvi) that "what is handled must be corruptible, and that
which is incorruptible cannot be handled." Consequently, Christ's body
was not glorified.
Objection 3: Further, a glorified body is not animal, but spiritual, as
is clear from 1 Cor. 15. But after the Resurrection Christ's body seems
to have been animal, since He ate and drank with His disciples, as we
read in the closing chapters of Luke and John. Therefore, it seems that
Christ's body was not glorified.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 3:21): "He will reform the
body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory."
I answer that, Christ's was a glorified body in His Resurrection, and
this is evident from three reasons. First of all, because His
Resurrection was the exemplar and the cause of ours, as is stated in 1
Cor. 15:43. But in the resurrection the saints will have glorified
bodies, as is written in the same place: "It is sown in dishonor, it
shall rise in glory." Hence, since the cause is mightier than the
effect, and the exemplar than the exemplate; much more glorious, then,
was the body of Christ in His Resurrection. Secondly, because He
merited the glory of His Resurrection by the lowliness of His Passion.
Hence He said (Jn. 12:27): "Now is My soul troubled," which refers to
the Passion; and later He adds: "Father, glorify Thy name," whereby He
asks for the glory of the Resurrection. Thirdly, because as stated
above ([4302]Q[34], A[4]), Christ's soul was glorified from the instant
of His conception by perfect fruition of the Godhead. But, as stated
above ([4303]Q[14], A[1], ad 2), it was owing to the Divine economy
that the glory did not pass from His soul to His body, in order that by
the Passion He might accomplish the mystery of our redemption.
Consequently, when this mystery of Christ's Passion and death was
finished, straightway the soul communicated its glory to the risen body
in the Resurrection; and so that body was made glorious.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is received within a subject is received
according to the subject's capacity. Therefore, since glory flows from
the soul into the body, it follows that, as Augustine says (Ep. ad
Dioscor. cxviii), the brightness or splendor of a glorified body is
after the manner of natural color in the human body; just as variously
colored glass derives its splendor from the sun's radiance, according
to the mode of the color. But as it lies within the power of a
glorified man whether his body be seen or not, as stated above (A[1],
ad 2), so is it in his power whether its splendor be seen or not.
Accordingly it can be seen in its color without its brightness. And it
was in this way that Christ's body appeared to the disciples after the
Resurrection.
Reply to Objection 2: We say that a body can be handled not only
because of its resistance, but also on account of its density. But from
rarity and density follow weight and lightness, heat and cold, and
similar contraries, which are the principles of corruption in
elementary bodies. Consequently, a body that can be handled by human
touch is naturally corruptible. But if there be a body that resists
touch, and yet is not disposed according to the qualities mentioned,
which are the proper objects of human touch, such as a heavenly body,
then such body cannot be said to be handled. But Christ's body after
the Resurrection was truly made up of elements, and had tangible
qualities such as the nature of a human body requires, and therefore it
could naturally be handled; and if it had nothing beyond the nature of
a human body, it would likewise be corruptible. But it had something
else which made it incorruptible, and this was not the nature of a
heavenly body, as some maintain, and into which we shall make fuller
inquiry later ([4304]XP, Q[82], A[1]), but it was glory flowing from a
beatified soul: because, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii):
"God made the soul of such powerful nature, that from its fullest
beatitude the fulness of health overflows into the body, that is, the
vigor of incorruption." And therefore Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
xxvi): "Christ's body is shown to be of the same nature, but of
different glory, after the Resurrection."
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii): "After the
Resurrection, our Saviour in spiritual but true flesh partook of meat
with the disciples, not from need of food, but because it lay in His
power." For as Bede says on Lk. 24:41: "The thirsty earth sucks in the
water, and the sun's burning ray absorbs it; the former from need, the
latter by its power." Hence after the Resurrection He ate, "not as
needing food, but in order thus to show the nature of His risen body."
Nor does it follow that His was an animal body that stands in need of
food.
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Whether Christ's body rose again entire?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body did not rise entire. For
flesh and blood belong to the integrity of the body: whereas Christ
seems not to have had both, for it is written (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh
and blood can not possess the kingdom of God." But Christ rose in the
glory of the kingdom of God. Therefore it seems that He did not have
flesh and blood.
Objection 2: Further, blood is one of the four humors. Consequently, if
Christ had blood, with equal reason He also had the other humors, from
which corruption is caused in animal bodies. It would follow, then,
that Christ's body was corruptible, which is unseemly. Therefore Christ
did not have flesh and blood.
Objection 3: Further, the body of Christ which rose, ascended to
heaven. But some of His blood is kept as relics in various churches.
Therefore Christ's body did not rise with the integrity of all its
parts.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 24:39) while addressing His
disciples after the Resurrection: "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as
you see Me to have."
I answer that, As stated above [4305](A[2]), Christ's body in the
Resurrection was "of the same nature, but differed in glory."
Accordingly, whatever goes with the nature of a human body, was
entirely in the body of Christ when He rose again. Now it is clear that
flesh, bones, blood, and other such things, are of the very nature of
the human body. Consequently, all these things were in Christ's body
when He rose again; and this also integrally, without any diminution;
otherwise it would not have been a complete resurrection, if whatever
was lost by death had not been restored. Hence our Lord assured His
faithful ones by saying (Mat. 10:30): "The very hairs of your head are
all numbered": and (Lk. 21:18): "A hair of your head shall not perish."
But to say that Christ's body had neither flesh, nor bones, nor the
other natural parts of a human body, belongs to the error of Eutyches,
Bishop of Constantinople, who maintained that "our body in that glory
of the resurrection will be impalpable, and more subtle than wind and
air: and that our Lord, after the hearts of the disciples who handled
Him were confirmed, brought back to subtlety whatever could be handled
in Him" [*St. Gregory, Moral. in Job 14:56]. Now Gregory condemns this
in the same book, because Christ's body was not changed after the
Resurrection, according to Rom. 6:9: "Christ rising from the dead,
dieth now no more." Accordingly, the very man who had said these
things, himself retracted them at his death. For, if it be unbecoming
for Christ to take a body of another nature in His conception, a
heavenly one for instance, as Valentine asserted, it is much more
unbecoming for Him at His Resurrection to resume a body of another
nature, because in His Resurrection He resumed unto an everlasting
life, the body which in His conception He had assumed to a mortal life.
Reply to Objection 1: Flesh and blood are not to be taken there for the
nature of flesh and blood, but, either for the guilt of flesh and
blood, as Gregory says [*St. Gregory, Moral. in Job 14:56], or else for
the corruption of flesh and blood: because, as Augustine says (Ad
Consent., De Resur. Carn.), "there will be neither corruption there,
nor mortality of flesh and blood." Therefore flesh according to its
substance possesses the kingdom of God, according to Lk. 24:39: "A
spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have." But flesh, if
understood as to its corruption, will not possess it; hence it is
straightway added in the words of the Apostle: "Neither shall
corruption possess incorruption."
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in the same book: "Perchance by
reason of the blood some keener critic will press us and say; If the
blood was" in the body of Christ when He rose, "why not the rheum?"
that is, the phlegm; "why not also the yellow gall?" that is, the gall
proper; "and why not the black gall?" that is, the bile, "with which
four humors the body is tempered, as medical science bears witness. But
whatever anyone may add, let him take heed not to add corruption, lest
he corrupt the health and purity of his own faith; because Divine power
is equal to taking away such qualities as it wills from the visible and
tractable body, while allowing others to remain, so that there be no
defilement," i.e. of corruption, "though the features be there; motion
without weariness, the power to eat, without need of food."
Reply to Objection 3: All the blood which flowed from Christ's body,
belonging as it does to the integrity of human nature, rose again with
His body: and the same reason holds good for all the particles which
belong to the truth and integrity of human nature. But the blood
preserved as relics in some churches did not flow from Christ's side,
but is said to have flowed from some maltreated image of Christ.
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Whether Christ's body ought to have risen with its scars?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body ought not to have risen
with its scars. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "The dead shall rise
incorrupt." But scars and wounds imply corruption and defect. Therefore
it was not fitting for Christ, the author of the resurrection, to rise
again with scars.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's body rose entire, as stated above
[4306](A[3]). But open scars are opposed to bodily integrity, since
they interfere with the continuity of the tissue. It does not therefore
seem fitting for the open wounds to remain in Christ's body; although
the traces of the wounds might remain, which would satisfy the
beholder; thus it was that Thomas believed, to whom it was said:
"Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed" (Jn. 20:29).
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that "some
things are truly said of Christ after the Resurrection, which He did
not have from nature but from special dispensation, such as the scars,
in order to make it sure that it was the body which had suffered that
rose again." Now when the cause ceases, the effect ceases. Therefore it
seems that when the disciples were assured of the Resurrection, He bore
the scars no longer. But it ill became the unchangeableness of His
glory that He should assume anything which was not to remain in Him for
ever. Consequently, it seems that He ought not at His Resurrection to
have resumed a body with scars.
On the contrary, Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:27): "Put in thy
finger hither, and see My hands; and bring hither thy hand, and put it
into My side, and be not faithless but believing."
I answer that, It was fitting for Christ's soul at His Resurrection to
resume the body with its scars. In the first place, for Christ's own
glory. For Bede says on Lk. 24:40 that He kept His scars not from
inability to heal them, "but to wear them as an everlasting trophy of
His victory." Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): "Perhaps in that
kingdom we shall see on the bodies of the Martyrs the traces of the
wounds which they bore for Christ's name: because it will not be a
deformity, but a dignity in them; and a certain kind of beauty will
shine in them, in the body, though not of the body." Secondly, to
confirm the hearts of the disciples as to "the faith in His
Resurrection" (Bede, on Lk. 24:40). Thirdly, "that when He pleads for
us with the Father, He may always show the manner of death He endured
for us" (Bede, on Lk. 24:40). Fourthly, "that He may convince those
redeemed in His blood, how mercifully they have been helped, as He
exposes before them the traces of the same death" (Bede, on Lk. 24:40).
Lastly, "that in the Judgment-day He may upbraid them with their just
condemnation" (Bede, on Lk. 24:40). Hence, as Augustine says (De Symb.
ii): "Christ knew why He kept the scars in His body. For, as He showed
them to Thomas who would not believe except he handled and saw them, so
will He show His wounds to His enemies, so that He who is the Truth may
convict them, saying: 'Behold the man whom you crucified; see the
wounds you inflicted; recognize the side you pierced, since it was
opened by you and for you, yet you would not enter.'"
Reply to Objection 1: The scars that remained in Christ's body belong
neither to corruption nor defect, but to the greater increase of glory,
inasmuch as they are the trophies of His power; and a special
comeliness will appear in the places scarred by the wounds.
Reply to Objection 2: Although those openings of the wounds break the
continuity of the tissue, still the greater beauty of glory compensates
for all this, so that the body is not less entire, but more perfected.
Thomas, however, not only saw, but handled the wounds, because as Pope
Leo [*Cf. Append. Opp. August., Serm. clxii] says: "It sufficed for his
personal faith for him to have seen what he saw; but it was on our
behalf that he touched what he beheld."
Reply to Objection 3: Christ willed the scars of His wounds to remain
on His body, not only to confirm the faith of His disciples, but for
other reasons also. From these it seems that those scars will always
remain on His body; because, as Augustine says (Ad Consent., De Resurr.
Carn.): "I believe our Lord's body to be in heaven, such as it was when
He ascended into heaven." And Gregory (Moral. xiv) says that "if aught
could be changed in Christ's body after His Resurrection, contrary to
Paul's truthful teaching, then the Lord after His Resurrection returned
to death; and what fool would dare to say this, save he that denies the
true resurrection of the flesh?" Accordingly, it is evident that the
scars which Christ showed on His body after His Resurrection, have
never since been removed from His body.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE RESURRECTION (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the manifestation of the Resurrection:
concerning which there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all
men or only to some special individuals?
(2) Whether it was fitting that they should see Him rise?
(3) Whether He ought to have lived with the disciples after the
Resurrection?
(4) Whether it was fitting for Him to appeal to the disciples "in
another shape"?
(5) Whether He ought to have demonstrated the Resurrection by proofs?
(6) Of the cogency of those proofs.
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Whether Christ's Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Resurrection ought to have
been manifested to all. For just as a public penalty is due for public
sin, according to 1 Tim. 5:20: "Them that sin reprove before all," so
is a public reward due for public merit. But, as Augustine says (Tract.
civ in Joan.), "the glory of the Resurrection is the reward of the
humility of the Passion." Therefore, since Christ's Passion was
manifested to all while He suffered in public, it seems that the glory
of the Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all.
Objection 2: Further, as Christ's Passion is ordained for our
salvation, so also is His Resurrection, according to Rom. 4:25: "He
rose again for our justification." But what belongs to the public weal
ought to be manifested to all. Therefore Christ's Resurrection ought to
have been manifested to all, and not to some specially.
Objection 3: Further, they to whom it was manifested were witnesses of
the Resurrection: hence it is said (Acts 3:15): "Whom God hath raised
from the dead, of which we are witnesses." Now they bore witness by
preaching in public: and this is unbecoming in women, according to 1
Cor. 14:34: "Let women keep silence in the churches": and 1 Tim. 2:12:
"I suffer not a woman to teach." Therefore, it does not seem becoming
for Christ's Resurrection to be manifested first of all to the women
and afterwards to mankind in general.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 10:40): "Him God raised up the
third day, and gave Him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but
to witnesses preordained by God."
I answer that, Some things come to our knowledge by nature's common
law, others by special favor of grace, as things divinely revealed.
Now, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), the divinely established law
of such things is that they be revealed immediately by God to higher
persons, through whom they are imparted to others, as is evident in the
ordering of the heavenly spirits. But such things as concern future
glory are beyond the common ken of mankind, according to Is. 64:4: "The
eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared
for them that wait for Thee." Consequently, such things are not known
by man except through Divine revelation, as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:10): "God hath revealed them to us by His spirit." Since, then,
Christ rose by a glorious Resurrection, consequently His Resurrection
was not manifested to everyone, but to some, by whose testimony it
could be brought to the knowledge of others.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's Passion was consummated in a body that
still had a passible nature, which is known to all by general laws:
consequently His Passion could be directly manifested to all. But the
Resurrection was accomplished "through the glory of the Father," as the
Apostle says (Rom. 6:4). Therefore it was manifested directly to some,
but not to all.
But that a public penance is imposed upon public sinners, is to be
understood of the punishment of this present life. And in like manner
public merits should be rewarded in public, in order that others may be
stirred to emulation. But the punishments and rewards of the future
life are not publicly manifested to all, but to those specially who are
preordained thereto by God.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as Christ's Resurrection is for the common
salvation of all, so it came to the knowledge of all; yet not so that
it was directly manifested to all, but only to some, through whose
testimony it could be brought to the knowledge of all.
Reply to Objection 3: A woman is not to be allowed to teach publicly in
church; but she may be permitted to give familiar instruction to some
privately. And therefore as Ambrose says on Lk. 24:22, "a woman is sent
to them who are of her household," but not to the people to bear
witness to the Resurrection. But Christ appeared to the woman first,
for this reason, that as a woman was the first to bring the source of
death to man, so she might be the first to announce the dawn of
Christ's glorious Resurrection. Hence Cyril says on Jn. 20:17: "Woman
who formerly was the minister of death, is the first to see and
proclaim the adorable mystery of the Resurrection: thus womankind has
procured absolution from ignominy, and removal of the curse." Hereby,
moreover, it is shown, so far as the state of glory is concerned, that
the female sex shall suffer no hurt; but if women burn with greater
charity, they shall also attain greater glory from the Divine vision:
because the women whose love for our Lord was more persistent---so much
so that "when even the disciples withdrew" from the sepulchre "they did
not depart" [*Gregory, Hom. xxv in Evang.]---were the first to see Him
rising in glory.
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Whether it was fitting that the disciples should see Him rise again?
Objection 1: It would seem fitting that the disciples should have seen
Him rise again, because it was their office to bear witness to the
Resurrection, according to Acts 4:33: "With great power did the
apostles give testimony to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ our Lord."
But the surest witness of all is an eye-witness. Therefore it would
have been fitting for them to see the very Resurrection of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, in order to have the certainty of faith the
disciples saw Christ ascend into heaven, according to Acts 1:9: "While
they looked on, He was raised up." But it was also necessary for them
to have faith in the Resurrection. Therefore it seems that Christ ought
to have risen in sight of the disciples.
Objection 3: Further, the raising of Lazarus was a sign of Christ's
coming Resurrection. But the Lord raised up Lazarus in sight of the
disciples. Consequently, it seems that Christ ought to have risen in
sight of the disciples.
On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:9): The Lord "rising early the
first day of the week, appeared first to Mary Magdalen." Now Mary
Magdalen did not see Him rise; but, while searching for Him in the
sepulchre, she heard from the angel: "He is risen, He is not here."
Therefore no one saw Him rise again.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "Those things that are
of God, are well ordered [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of
God]." Now the divinely established order is this, that things above
men's ken are revealed to them by angels, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. iv). But Christ on rising did not return to the familiar manner
of life, but to a kind of immortal and God-like condition, according to
Rom. 6:10: "For in that He liveth, He liveth unto God." And therefore
it was fitting for Christ's Resurrection not to be witnessed by men
directly, but to be proclaimed to them by angels. Accordingly, Hilary
(Comment. Matth. cap. ult.) says: "An angel is therefore the first
herald of the Resurrection, that it might be declared out of obedience
to the Father's will."
Reply to Objection 1: The apostles were able to testify to the
Resurrection even by sight, because from the testimony of their own
eyes they saw Christ alive, whom they had known to be dead. But just as
man comes from the hearing of faith to the beatific vision, so did men
come to the sight of the risen Christ through the message already
received from angels.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's Ascension as to its term wherefrom, was
not above men's common knowledge, but only as to its term whereunto.
Consequently, the disciples were able to behold Christ's Ascension as
to the term wherefrom, that is, according as He was uplifted from the
earth; but they did not behold Him as to the term whereunto, because
they did not see how He was received into heaven. But Christ's
Resurrection transcended common knowledge as to the term wherefrom,
according as His soul returned from hell and His body from the closed
sepulchre; and likewise as to the term whereunto, according as He
attained to the life of glory. Consequently, the Resurrection ought not
to be accomplished so as to be seen by man.
Reply to Objection 3: Lazarus was raised so that he returned to the
same life as before, which life is not beyond man's common ken.
Consequently, there is no parity.
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Whether Christ ought to have lived constantly with His disciples after the
Resurrection?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought to have lived constantly
with His Disciples, because He appeared to them after His Resurrection
in order to confirm their faith in the Resurrection, and to bring them
comfort in their disturbed state, according to Jn. 20:20: "The
disciples were glad when they saw the Lord." But they would have been
more assured and consoled had He constantly shown them His presence.
Therefore it seems that He ought to have lived constantly with them.
Objection 2: Further, Christ rising from the dead did not at once
ascend to heaven, but after forty days, as is narrated in Acts 1:3. But
meanwhile He could have been in no more suitable place than where the
disciples were met together. Therefore it seems that He ought to have
lived with them continually.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii), we
read how Christ appeared five times on the very day of His
Resurrection: first "to the women at the sepulchre; secondly to the
same on the way from the sepulchre; thirdly to Peter; fourthly to the
two disciples going to the town; fifthly to several of them in
Jerusalem when Thomas was not present." Therefore it also seems that He
ought to have appeared several times on the other days before the
Ascension.
Objection 4: Further, our Lord had said to them before the Passion
(Mat. 26:32): "But after I shall be risen again, I will go before you
into Galilee"; moreover an angel and our Lord Himself repeated the same
to the women after the Resurrection: nevertheless He was seen by them
in Jerusalem on the very day of the Resurrection, as stated above
(OBJ[3]); also on the eighth day, as we read in Jn. 20:26. It seems,
therefore, that He did not live with the disciples in a fitting way
after the Resurrection.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 20:26) that "after eight days"
Christ appeared to the disciples. Therefore He did not live constantly
with them.
I answer that, Concerning the Resurrection two things had to be
manifested to the disciples, namely, the truth of the Resurrection, and
the glory of Him who rose. Now in order to manifest the truth of the
Resurrection, it sufficed for Him to appear several times before them,
to speak familiarly to them, to eat and drink, and let them touch Him.
But in order to manifest the glory of the risen Christ, He was not
desirous of living with them constantly as He had done before, lest it
might seem that He rose unto the same life as before. Hence (Lk. 24:44)
He said to them: "These are the words which I spoke to you, while I was
yet with you." For He was there with them by His bodily presence, but
hitherto He had been with them not merely by His bodily presence, but
also in mortal semblance. Hence Bede in explaining those words of Luke,
"while I was with you," says: "that is, while I was still in mortal
flesh, in which you are yet: for He had then risen in the same flesh,
but was not in the same state of mortality as they."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's frequent appearing served to assure the
disciples of the truth of the Resurrection; but continual intercourse
might have led them into the error of believing that He had risen to
the same life as was His before. Yet by His constant presence He
promised them comfort in another life, according to Jn. 16:22: "I will
see you again, and your heart shall rejoice; and your joy no man shall
take from you."
Reply to Objection 2: That Christ did not stay continually with the
disciples was not because He deemed it more expedient for Him to be
elsewhere: but because He judged it to be more suitable for the
apostles' instruction that He should not abide continually with them,
for the reason given above. But it is quite unknown in what places He
was bodily present in the meantime, since Scripture is silent, and His
dominion is in every place (Cf. Ps. 102:22).
Reply to Objection 3: He appeared oftener on the first day, because the
disciples were to be admonished by many proofs to accept the faith in
His Resurrection from the very out set: but after they had once
accepted it, they had no further need of being instructed by so many
apparitions. Accordingly one reads in the Gospel that after the first
day He appeared again only five times. For, as Augustine says (De
Consens. Evang. iii), after the first five apparitions "He came again a
sixth time when Thomas saw Him; a seventh time was by the sea of
Tiberias at the capture of the fishes; the eighth was on the mountain
of Galilee, according to Matthew; the ninth occasion is expressed by
Mark, 'at length when they were at table,' because no more were they
going to eat with Him upon earth; the tenth was on the very day, when
no longer upon the earth, but uplifted into the cloud, He was ascending
into heaven. But, as John admits, not all things were written down. And
He visited them frequently before He went up to heaven," in order to
comfort them. Hence it is written (1 Cor. 15:6,7) that "He was seen by
more than five hundred brethren at once . . . after that He was seen by
James"; of which apparitions no mention is made in the Gospels.
Reply to Objection 4: Chrysostom in explaining Mat. 26:32---"after I
shall be risen again, I will go before you into Galilee," says (Hom.
lxxxiii in Matth.), "He goes not to some far off region in order to
appear to them, but among His own people, and in those very places" in
which for the most part they had lived with Him; "in order that they
might thereby believe that He who was crucified was the same as He who
rose again." And on this account "He said that He would go into
Galilee, that they might be delivered from fear of the Jews."
Consequently, as Ambrose says (Expos. in Luc.), "The Lord had sent word
to the disciples that they were to see Him in Galilee; yet He showed
Himself first to them when they were assembled together in the room out
of fear. (Nor is there any breaking of a promise here, but rather a
hastened fulfilling out of kindness)" [*Cf. Catena Aurea in Luc. xxiv,
36]: "afterwards, however, when their minds were comforted, they went
into Galilee. Nor is there any reason to prevent us from supposing that
there were few in the room, and many more on the mountain." For, as
Eusebius [*Of Caesarea; Cf. Migne, P. G., xxii, 1003] says, "Two
Evangelists, Luke and John, write that He appeared in Jerusalem to the
eleven only; but the other two said that an angel and our Saviour
commanded not merely the eleven, but all the disciples and brethren, to
go into Galilee. Paul makes mention of them when he says (1 Cor. 15:6):
'Then He appeared to more then five hundred brethren at once.'" The
truer solution, however, is this, that while they were in hiding in
Jerusalem He appeared to them at first in order to comfort them; but in
Galilee it was not secretly, nor once or twice, that He made Himself
known to them with great power, "showing Himself to them alive after
His Passion, by many proofs," as Luke says (Acts 1:3). Or as Augustine
writes (De Consens. Evang. iii): "What was said by the angel and by our
Lord---that He would 'go before them into Galilee,' must be taken
prophetically. For if we take Galilee as meaning 'a passing,' we must
understand that they were going to pass from the people of Israel to
the Gentiles, who would not believe in the preaching of the apostles
unless He prepared the way for them in men's hearts: and this is
signified by the words 'He shall go before you into Galilee.' But if by
Galilee we understand 'revelation,' we are to understand this as
applying to Him not in the form of a servant, but in that form wherein
He is equal to the Father, and which He has promised to them that love
Him. Although He has gone before us in this sense, He has not abandoned
us."
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Whether Christ should have appeared to the disciples "in another shape"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought not to have appeared to
the disciples "in another shape." For a thing cannot appear in very
truth other than it is. But there was only one shape in Christ.
Therefore if He appeared under another, it was not a true but a false
apparition. Now this is not at all fitting, because as Augustine says
(QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 14): "If He deceives He is not the Truth; yet Christ
is the Truth." Consequently, it seems that Christ ought not to have
appeared to the disciples "in another shape."
Objection 2: Further, nothing can appear in another shape than the one
it has, except the beholder's eyes be captivated by some illusions. But
since such illusions are brought about by magical arts, they are
unbecoming in Christ, according to what is written (2 Cor. 6:15): "What
concord hath Christ with Belial?" Therefore it seems that Christ ought
not to have appeared in another shape.
Objection 3: Further, just as our faith receives its surety from
Scripture, so were the disciples assured of their faith in the
Resurrection by Christ appearing to them. But, as Augustine says in an
Epistle to Jerome (xxviii), if but one untruth be admitted into the
Sacred Scripture, the whole authority of the Scriptures is weakened.
Consequently, if Christ appeared to the disciples, in but one
apparition, otherwise than He was, then whatever they saw in Christ
after the Resurrection will be of less import, which is not fitting.
Therefore He ought not to have appeared in another shape.
On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:12): "After that He appeared in
another shape to two of them walking, as they were going into the
country."
I answer that, As stated above ([4307]AA[1],2), Christ's Resurrection
was to be manifested to men in the same way as Divine things are
revealed. But Divine things are revealed to men in various ways,
according as they are variously disposed. For, those who have minds
well disposed, perceive Divine things rightly, whereas those not so
disposed perceive them with a certain confusion of doubt or error:
"for, the sensual men perceiveth not those things that are of the
Spirit of God," as is said in 1 Cor. 2:14. Consequently, after His
Resurrection Christ appeared in His own shape to some who were well
disposed to belief, while He appeared in another shape to them who
seemed to be already growing tepid in their faith: hence these said
(Lk. 24:21): "We hoped that it was He that should have redeemed
Israel." Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxiii in Evang.), that "He showed
Himself to them in body such as He was in their minds: for, because He
was as yet a stranger to faith in their hearts, He made pretense of
going on farther," that is, as if He were a stranger.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Qq. Evang. ii), "not
everything of which we make pretense is a falsehood; but when what we
pretend has no meaning then is it a falsehood. But when our pretense
has some signification, it is not a lie, but a figure of the truth;
otherwise everything said figuratively by wise and holy men, or even by
our Lord Himself, would be set down as a falsehood, because it is not
customary to take such expressions in the literal sense. And deeds,
like words, are feigned without falsehood, in order to denote something
else." And so it happened here. as has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): "Our
Lord could change His flesh so that His shape really was other than
they were accustomed to behold; for, before His Passion He was
transfigured on the mountain, so that His face shone like the sun. But
it did not happen thus now." For not without reason do we "understand
this hindrance in their eyes to have been of Satan's doing, lest Jesus
might be recognized." Hence Luke says (24:16) that "their eyes were
held, that they should not know Him."
Reply to Objection 3: Such an argument would prove, if they had not
been brought back from the sight of a strange shape to that of Christ's
true countenance. For, as Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): "The
permission was granted by Christ," namely, that their eyes should be
held fast in the aforesaid way, "until the Sacrament of the bread; that
when they had shared in the unity of His body, the enemy's hindrance
may be understood to have been taken away, so that Christ might be
recognized." Hence he goes on to say that "'their eyes were opened, and
they knew Him'; not that they were hitherto walking with their eyes
shut; but there was something in them whereby they were not permitted
to recognize what they saw. This could be caused by the darkness or by
some kind of humor."
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Whether Christ should have demonstrated the truth of His Resurrection by
proofs?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have demonstrated the
truth of His Resurrection by proofs. For Ambrose says (De Fide, ad
Gratian. i): "Let there be no proofs where faith is required." But
faith is required regarding the Resurrection. Therefore proofs are out
of place there.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi): "Faith has no merit
where human reason supplies the test." But it was no part of Christ's
office to void the merit of faith. Consequently, it was not for Him to
confirm the Resurrection by proofs.
Objection 3: Further, Christ came into the world in order that men
might attain beatitude through Him, according to Jn. 10:10: "I am come
that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly." But
supplying proofs seems to be a hindrance in the way of man's beatitude;
because our Lord Himself said (Jn. 20:29): "Blessed are they that have
not seen, and have believed." Consequently, it seems that Christ ought
not to manifest His Resurrection by any proofs.
On the contrary, It is related in Acts 1:3, that Christ appeared to His
disciples "for forty days by many proofs, speaking of the Kingdom of
God."
I answer that, The word "proof" is susceptible of a twofold meaning:
sometimes it is employed to designate any sort "of reason in
confirmation of what is a matter of doubt" [*Tully, Topic. ii]: and
sometimes it means a sensible sign employed to manifest the truth; thus
also Aristotle occasionally uses the term in his works [*Cf. Prior.
Anal. ii; Rhetor. i]. Taking "proof" in the first sense, Christ did not
demonstrate His Resurrection to the disciples by proofs, because such
argumentative proof would have to be grounded on some principles: and
if these were not known to the disciples, nothing would thereby be
demonstrated to them, because nothing can be known from the unknown.
And if such principles were known to them, they would not go beyond
human reason, and consequently would not be efficacious for
establishing faith in the Resurrection, which is beyond human reason,
since principles must be assumed which are of the same order, according
to 1 Poster. But it was from the authority of the Sacred Scriptures
that He proved to them the truth of His Resurrection, which authority
is the basis of faith, when He said: "All things must needs be
fulfilled which are written in the Law, and in the prophets, and in the
Psalms, concerning Me": as is set forth Lk. 24:44.
But if the term "proof" be taken in the second sense, then Christ is
said to have demonstrated His Resurrection by proofs, inasmuch as by
most evident signs He showed that He was truly risen. Hence where our
version has "by many proofs," the Greek text, instead of proof has
{tekmerion}, i.e. "an evident sign affording positive proof" [*Cf.
Prior. Anal. ii]. Now Christ showed these signs of the Resurrection to
His disciples, for two reasons. First, because their hearts were not
disposed so as to accept readily the faith in the Resurrection. Hence
He says Himself (Lk. 24:25): "O foolish and slow of heart to believe":
and (Mk. 16:14): "He upbraided them with their incredulity and hardness
of heart." Secondly, that their testimony might be rendered more
efficacious through the signs shown them, according to 1 Jn. 1:1, 3:
"That which we have seen, and have heard, and our hands have handled .
. . we declare."
Reply to Objection 1: Ambrose is speaking there of proofs drawn from
human reason, which are useless for demonstrating things of faith, as
was shown above.
Reply to Objection 2: The merit of faith arises from this, that at
God's bidding man believes what he does not see. Accordingly, only that
reason debars merit of faith which enables one to see by knowledge what
is proposed for belief: and this is demonstrative argument. But Christ
did not make use of any such argument for demonstrating His
Resurrection.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated already (ad 2), the merit of beatitude,
which comes of faith, is not entirely excluded except a man refuse to
believe only such things as he can see. But for a man to believe from
visible signs the things he does not see, does not entirely deprive him
of faith nor of the merit of faith: just as Thomas, to whom it was said
(Jn. 20:29): "'Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed,'
saw one thing and believed another" [*Gregory, Hom. xxvi]: the wounds
were what he saw, God was the object of His belief. But his is the more
perfect faith who does not require such helps for belief. Hence, to put
to shame the faith of some men, our Lord said (Jn. 4:48): "Unless you
see signs and wonders, you believe not." From this one can learn how
they who are so ready to believe God, even without beholding signs, are
blessed in comparison with them who do not believe except they see the
like.
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Whether the proofs which Christ made use of manifested sufficiently the
truth of His Resurrection?
Objection 1: It would seem that the proofs which Christ made use of did
not sufficiently manifest the truth of His Resurrection. For after the
Resurrection Christ showed nothing to His disciples which angels
appearing to men did not or could not show; because angels have
frequently shown themselves to men under human aspect, have spoken and
lived with them, and eaten with them, just as if they were truly men,
as is evident from Genesis 18, of the angels whom Abraham entertained.
and in the Book of Tobias, of the angel who "conducted" him "and
brought" him back. Nevertheless, angels have not true bodies naturally
united to them; which is required for a resurrection. Consequently, the
signs which Christ showed His disciples were not sufficient for
manifesting His Resurrection.
Objection 2: Further, Christ rose again gloriously, that is, having a
human nature with glory. But some of the things which Christ showed to
His disciples seem contrary to human nature, as for instance, that "He
vanished out of their sight," and entered in among them "when the doors
were shut": and some other things seem contrary to glory, as for
instance, that He ate and drank, and bore the scars of His wounds.
Consequently, it seems that those proofs were neither sufficient nor
fitting for establishing faith in the Resurrection.
Objection 3: Further, after the Resurrection Christ's body was such
that it ought not to be touched by mortal man; hence He said to
Magdalen (Jn. 20:17): "Do not touch Me; for I am not yet ascended to My
Father." Consequently, it was not fitting for manifesting the truth of
His Resurrection, that He should permit Himself to be handled by His
disciples.
Objection 4: Further, clarity seems to be the principal of the
qualities of a glorified body: yet He gave no sign thereof in His
Resurrection. Therefore it seems that those proofs were insufficient
for showing the quality of Christ's Resurrection.
Objection 5: [*This objection is wanting in the older codices, and in
the text of the Leonine edition, which, however, gives it in a note as
taken from one of the more recent codices of the Vatican.]
Further, the angels introduced as witnesses for the Resurrection seem
insufficient from the want of agreement on the part of the Evangelists.
Because in Matthew's account the angel is described as sitting upon the
stone rolled back, while Mark states that he was seen after the women
had entered the tomb; and again, whereas these mention one angel, John
says that there were two sitting, and Luke says that there were two
standing. Consequently, the arguments for the Resurrection do not seem
to agree.
On the contrary, Christ, who is the Wisdom of God, "ordereth all things
sweetly" and in a fitting manner, according to Wis. 8:1.
I answer that, Christ manifested His Resurrection in two ways: namely,
by testimony; and by proof or sign: and each manifestation was
sufficient in its own class. For in order to manifest His Resurrection
He made use of a double testimony, neither of which can be rebutted.
The first of these was the angels' testimony, who announced the
Resurrection to the women, as is seen in all the Evangelists: the other
was the testimony of the Scriptures, which He set before them to show
the truth of the Resurrection, as is narrated in the last chapter of
Luke.
Again, the proofs were sufficient for showing that the Resurrection was
both true and glorious. That it was a true Resurrection He shows first
on the part of the body; and this He shows in three respects; first of
all, that it was a true and solid body, and not phantastic or rarefied,
like the air. And He establishes this by offering His body to be
handled; hence He says in the last chapter of Luke (39): "Handle and
see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have."
Secondly, He shows that it was a human body, by presenting His true
features for them to behold. Thirdly, He shows that it was identically
the same body which He had before, by showing them the scars of the
wounds; hence, as we read in the last chapter of Luke (39) he said to
them: "See My hands and feet, that it is I Myself."
Secondly, He showed them the truth of His Resurrection on the part of
His soul reunited with His body: and He showed this by the works of the
threefold life. First of all, in the operations of the nutritive life,
by eating and drinking with His disciples, as we read in the last
chapter of Luke. Secondly, in the works of the sensitive life, by
replying to His disciples' questions, and by greeting them when they
were in His presence, showing thereby that He both saw and heard;
thirdly, in the works of the intellective life by their conversing with
Him, and discoursing on the Scriptures. And, in order that nothing
might be wanting to make the manifestation complete, He also showed
that He had the Divine Nature, by working the miracle of the draught of
fishes, and further by ascending into heaven while they were beholding
Him: because, according to Jn. 3:13: "No man hath ascended into heaven,
but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven."
He also showed His disciples the glory of His Resurrection by entering
in among them when the doors were closed: as Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in
Evang.): "Our Lord allowed them to handle His flesh which He had
brought through closed doors, to show that His body was of the same
nature but of different glory." It likewise was part of the property of
glory that "He vanished suddenly from their eyes," as related in the
last chapter of Luke; because thereby it was shown that it lay in His
power to be seen or not seen; and this belongs to a glorified body, as
stated above ([4308]Q[54], A[1], ad 2, A[2], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 1: Each separate argument would not suffice of
itself for showing perfectly Christ's Resurrection, yet all taken
collectively establish it completely, especially owing to the
testimonies of the Scriptures, the sayings of the angels, and even
Christ's own assertion supported by miracles. As to the angels who
appeared, they did not say they were men, as Christ asserted that He
was truly a man. Moreover, the manner of eating was different in Christ
and the angels: for since the bodies assumed by the angels were neither
living nor animated, there was no true eating, although the food was
really masticated and passed into the interior of the assumed body:
hence the angels said to Tobias (12:18,19): "When I was with you . . .
I seemed indeed to eat and drink with you; but I use an invisible
meat." But since Christ's body was truly animated, His eating was
genuine. For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xiii), "it is not the
power but the need of eating that shall be taken away from the bodies
of them who rise again." Hence Bede says on Lk. 24:41: "Christ ate
because He could, not because He needed."
Reply to Objection 2: As was observed above, some proofs were employed
by Christ to prove the truth of His human nature, and others to show
forth His glory in rising again. But the condition of human nature, as
considered in itself, namely, as to its present state, is opposite to
the condition of glory, as is said in 1 Cor. 15:43: "It is sown in
weakness, it shall rise in power." Consequently, the proofs brought
forward for showing the condition of glory, seem to be in opposition to
nature, not absolutely, but according to the present state, and
conversely. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): "The Lord
manifested two wonders, which are mutually contrary according to human
reason, when after the Resurrection He showed His body as incorruptible
and at the same time palpable."
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. cxxi super Joan.),
"these words of our Lord, 'Do not touch Me, for I am not yet ascended
to My Father,'" show "that in that woman there is a figure of the
Church of the Gentiles, which did not believe in Christ until He was
ascended to the Father. Or Jesus would have men to believe in Him, i.e.
to touch Him spiritually, as being Himself one with the Father. For to
that man's innermost perceptions He is, in some sort, ascended unto the
Father, who has become so far proficient in Him, as to recognize in Him
the equal with the Father . . . whereas she as yet believed in Him but
carnally, since she wept for Him as for a man." But when one reads
elsewhere of Mary having touched Him, when with the other women, she
"'came up and took hold of His feet,' that matters little," as
Severianus says [*Chrysologus, Serm. lxxvi], "for, the first act
relates to figure, the other to sex; the former is of Divine grace, the
latter of human nature." Or as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxvi in Joan.):
"This woman wanted to converse with Christ just as before the Passion,
and out of joy was thinking of nothing great, although Christ's flesh
had become much nobler by rising again." And therefore He said: "I have
not yet ascended to My Father"; as if to say: "Do not suppose I am
leading an earthly life; for if you see Me upon earth, it is because I
have not yet ascended to My Father, but I am going to ascend shortly."
Hence He goes on to say: "I ascend to My Father, and to your Father."
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says ad Orosium (Dial. lxv, Qq.):
"Our Lord rose in clarified flesh; yet He did not wish to appear before
the disciples in that condition of clarity, because their eyes could
not gaze upon that brilliancy. For if before He died for us and rose
again the disciples could not look upon Him when He was transfigured
upon the mountain, how much less were they able to gaze upon Him when
our Lord's flesh was glorified." It must also be borne in mind that
after His Resurrection our Lord wished especially to show that He was
the same as had died; which the manifestation of His brightness would
have hindered considerably: because change of features shows more than
anything else the difference in the person seen: and this is because
sight specially judges of the common sensibles, among which is one and
many, or the same and different. But before the Passion, lest His
disciples might despise its weakness, Christ meant to show them the
glory of His majesty; and this the brightness of the body specially
indicates. Consequently, before the Passion He showed the disciples His
glory by brightness, but after the Resurrection by other tokens.
Reply to Objection 5: As Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): "We
can understand one angel to have been seen by the women, according to
both Matthew and Mark, if we take them as having entered the sepulchre,
that is, into some sort of walled enclosure, and that there they saw an
angel sitting upon the stone which was rolled back from the monument,
as Matthew says; and that this is Mark's expression---'sitting on the
right side'; afterwards when they scanned the spot where the Lord's
body had lain, they beheld two angels, who were at first seated, as
John says, and who afterwards rose so as to be seen standing, as Luke
relates."
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OF THE CAUSALITY OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the causality of Christ's Resurrection,
concerning which there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's Resurrection is the cause of our resurrection?
(2) Whether it is the cause of our justification?
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Whether Christ's Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of our
bodies?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Resurrection is not the cause
of the resurrection of our bodies, because, given a sufficient cause,
the effect must follow of necessity. If, then, Christ's Resurrection be
the sufficient cause of the resurrection of our bodies, then all the
dead should have risen again as soon as He rose.
Objection 2: Further, Divine justice is the cause of the resurrection
of the dead, so that the body may be rewarded or punished together with
the soul, since they shared in merit or sin, as Dionysius says (Eccles.
Hier. vii) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv). But God's justice must
necessarily be accomplished, even if Christ had not risen. Therefore
the dead would rise again even though Christ did not. Consequently
Christ's Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of our
bodies.
Objection 3: Further, if Christ's Resurrection be the cause of the
resurrection of our bodies, it would be either the exemplar, or the
efficient, or the meritorious cause. Now it is not the exemplar cause;
because it is God who will bring about the resurrection of our bodies,
according to Jn. 5:21: "The Father raiseth up the dead": and God has no
need to look at any exemplar cause outside Himself. In like manner it
is not the efficient cause; because an efficient cause acts only
through contact, whether spiritual or corporeal. Now it is evident that
Christ's Resurrection has no corporeal contact with the dead who shall
rise again, owing to distance of time and place; and similarly it has
no spiritual contact, which is through faith and charity, because even
unbelievers and sinners shall rise again. Nor again is it the
meritorious cause, because when Christ rose He was no longer a
wayfarer, and consequently not in a state of merit. Therefore, Christ's
Resurrection does not appear to be in any way the cause of ours.
Objection 4: Further, since death is the privation of life, then to
destroy death seems to be nothing else than to bring life back again;
and this is resurrection. But "by dying, Christ destroyed our death"
[*Preface of Mass in Paschal Time]. Consequently, Christ's death, not
His Resurrection, is the cause of our resurrection.
On the contrary, on 1 Cor. 15:12: "Now if Christ be preached, that He
rose again from the dead," the gloss says: "Who is the efficient cause
of our resurrection."
I answer that, As stated in 2 Metaphysics, text 4: "Whatever is first
in any order, is the cause of all that come after it." But Christ's
Resurrection was the first in the order of our resurrection, as is
evident from what was said above ([4309]Q[53], A[3]). Hence Christ's
Resurrection must be the cause of ours: and this is what the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 15:20,21): "Christ is risen from the dead, the
first-fruits of them that sleep; for by a man came death, and by a man
the resurrection of the dead."
And this is reasonable. Because the principle of human life-giving is
the Word of God, of whom it is said (Ps. 35:10): "With Thee is the
fountain of life": hence He Himself says (Jn. 5:21): "As the Father
raiseth up the dead, and giveth life; so the Son also giveth life to
whom He will." Now the divinely established natural order is that every
cause operates first upon what is nearest to it, and through it upon
others which are more remote; just as fire first heats the nearest air,
and through it it heats bodies that are further off: and God Himself
first enlightens those substances which are closer to Him, and through
them others that are more remote, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiii).
Consequently, the Word of God first bestows immortal life upon that
body which is naturally united with Himself, and through it works the
resurrection in all other bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: As was stated above, Christ's Resurrection is the
cause of ours through the power of the united Word, who operates
according to His will. And consequently, it is not necessary for the
effect to follow at once, but according as the Word of God disposes,
namely, that first of all we be conformed to the suffering and dying
Christ in this suffering and mortal life; and afterwards may come to
share in the likeness of His Resurrection.
Reply to Objection 2: God's justice is the first cause of our
resurrection, whereas Christ's Resurrection is the secondary, and as it
were the instrumental cause. But although the power of the principal
cause is not restricted to one instrument determinately, nevertheless
since it works through this instrument, such instrument causes the
effect. So, then, the Divine justice in itself is not tied down to
Christ's Resurrection as a means of bringing about our resurrection:
because God could deliver us in some other way than through Christ's
Passion and Resurrection, as already stated ([4310]Q[46], A[2]). But
having once decreed to deliver us in this way, it is evident that
Christ's Resurrection is the cause of ours.
Reply to Objection 3: Properly speaking, Christ's Resurrection is not
the meritorious cause, but the efficient and exemplar cause of our
resurrection. It is the efficient cause, inasmuch as Christ's humanity,
according to which He rose again, is as it were the instrument of His
Godhead, and works by Its power, as stated above ([4311]Q[13],
AA[2],3). And therefore, just as all other things which Christ did and
endured in His humanity are profitable to our salvation through the
power of the Godhead, as already stated ([4312]Q[48], A[6]), so also is
Christ's Resurrection the efficient cause of ours, through the Divine
power whose office it is to quicken the dead; and this power by its
presence is in touch with all places and times; and such virtual
contact suffices for its efficiency. And since, as was stated above (ad
2), the primary cause of human resurrection is the Divine justice, from
which Christ has "the power of passing judgment, because He is the Son
of Man" (Jn. 5:27); the efficient power of His Resurrection extends to
the good and wicked alike, who are subject to His judgment.
But just as the Resurrection of Christ's body, through its personal
union with the Word, is first in point of time, so also is it first in
dignity and perfection; as the gloss says on 1 Cor. 15:20,23. But
whatever is most perfect is always the exemplar, which the less perfect
copies according to its mode; consequently Christ's Resurrection is the
exemplar of ours. And this is necessary, not on the part of Him who
rose again, who needs no exemplar, but on the part of them who are
raised up, who must be likened to that Resurrection, according to Phil.
3:21: "He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of
His glory." Now although the efficiency of Christ's Resurrection
extends to the resurrection of the good and wicked alike, still its
exemplarity extends properly only to the just, who are made conformable
with His Sonship, according to Rom. 8:29.
Reply to Objection 4: Considered on the part of their efficiency, which
is dependent on the Divine power, both Christ's death and His
Resurrection are the cause both of the destruction of death and of the
renewal of life: but considered as exemplar causes, Christ's death---by
which He withdrew from mortal life---is the cause of the destruction of
our death; while His Resurrection, whereby He inaugurated immortal
life, is the cause of the repairing of our life. But Christ's Passion
is furthermore a meritorious cause, as stated above ([4313]Q[48],
A[1]).
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Whether Christ's Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of souls?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Resurrection is not the cause
of the resurrection of souls, because Augustine says (Tract. xxiii
super Joan.) that "bodies rise by His human dispensation, but souls
rise by the Substance of God." But Christ's Resurrection does not
belong to God's Substance, but to the dispensation of His humanity.
Therefore, although Christ's Resurrection is the cause of bodies
rising, nevertheless it does not seem to be the cause of the
resurrection of souls.
Objection 2: Further, a body does not act upon a spirit. But the
Resurrection belongs to His body, which death laid low. Therefore His
Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of souls.
Objection 3: Further, since Christ's Resurrection is the cause why
bodies rise again, the bodies of all men shall rise again, according to
1 Cor. 15:51: "We shall all indeed rise again." But the souls of all
will not rise again, because according to Mat. 25:46: "some shall go
into everlasting punishment." Therefore Christ's Resurrection is not
the cause of the resurrection of souls.
Objection 4: Further, the resurrection of souls comes of the
forgiveness of sins. But this was effected by Christ's Passion,
according to Apoc. 1:5: "He washed us from our sins in His own blood."
Consequently, Christ's Passion even more than His Resurrection is the
cause of the resurrection of souls.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 4:25): "He rose again for our
justification," which is nothing else than the resurrection of souls:
and on Ps. 29:6: "In the evening weeping shall have place," the gloss
says, "Christ's Resurrection is the cause of ours, both of the soul at
present, and of the body in the future."
I answer that, As stated above, Christ's Resurrection works in virtue
of the Godhead; now this virtue extends not only to the resurrection of
bodies, but also to that of souls: for it comes of God that the soul
lives by grace, and that the body lives by the soul. Consequently,
Christ's Resurrection has instrumentally an effective power not only
with regard to the resurrection of bodies, but also with respect to the
resurrection of souls. In like fashion it is an exemplar cause with
regard to the resurrection of souls, because even in our souls we must
be conformed with the rising Christ: as the Apostle says (Rom. 6:4-11)
"Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also
may walk in newness of life": and as He, "rising again from the dead,
dieth now no more, so let us reckon that we (Vulg.: 'you')" are dead to
sin, that we may "live together with Him."
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says that the resurrection of souls is
wrought by God's Substance, as to participation, because souls become
good and just by sharing in the Divine goodness, but not by sharing in
anything created. Accordingly, after saying that souls rise by the
Divine Substance, he adds: the soul is beatified by a participation
with God, and not by a participation with a holy soul. But our bodies
are made glorious by sharing in the glory of Christ's body.
Reply to Objection 2: The efficacy of Christ's Resurrection reaches
souls not from any special virtue of His risen body, but from the
virtue of the Godhead personally united with it.
Reply to Objection 3: The resurrection of souls pertains to merit,
which is the effect of justification; but the resurrection of bodies is
ordained for punishment or reward, which are the effects of Him who
judges. Now it belongs to Christ, not to justify all men, but to judge
them: and therefore He raises up all as to their bodies, but not as to
their souls.
Reply to Objection 4: Two things concur in the justification of souls,
namely, forgiveness of sin and newness of life through grace.
Consequently, as to efficacy, which comes of the Divine power, the
Passion as well as the Resurrection of Christ is the cause of
justification as to both the above. But as to exemplarity, properly
speaking Christ's Passion and death are the cause of the forgiveness of
guilt, by which forgiveness we die unto sin: whereas Christ's
Resurrection is the cause of newness of life, which comes through grace
or justice: consequently, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:25) that "He was
delivered up," i.e. to death, "for our sins," i.e. to take them away,
"and rose again for our justification." But Christ's Passion was also a
meritorious cause, as stated above (A[1], ad 4;[4314] Q[48], A[1]).
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OF THE ASCENSION OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider Christ's Ascension: concerning which there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it belonged for Christ to ascend into heaven?
(2) According to which nature did it become Him to ascend?
(3) Whether He ascended by His own power?
(4) Whether He ascended above all the corporeal heavens?
(5) Whether He ascended above all spiritual creatures?
(6) Of the effect of the Ascension.
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Whether it was fitting for Christ to ascend into heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for Christ to ascend
into heaven. For the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii) that "things which
are in a state of perfection possess their good without movement." But
Christ was in a state of perfection, since He is the Sovereign Good in
respect of His Divine Nature, and sovereignly glorified in respect of
His human nature. Consequently, He has His good without movement. But
ascension is movement. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to
ascend.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is moved, is moved on account of
something better. But it was no better thing for Christ to be in heaven
than upon earth, because He gained nothing either in soul or in body by
being in heaven. Therefore it seems that Christ should not have
ascended into heaven.
Objection 3: Further, the Son of God took human flesh for our
salvation. But it would have been more beneficial for men if He had
tarried always with us upon earth; thus He said to His disciples (Lk.
17:22): "The days will come when you shall desire to see one day of the
Son of man; and you shall not see it." Therefore it seems unfitting for
Christ to have ascended into heaven.
Objection 4: Further, as Gregory says (Moral. xiv), Christ's body was
in no way changed after the Resurrection. But He did not ascend into
heaven immediately after rising again, for He said after the
Resurrection (Jn. 20:17): "I am not yet ascended to My Father."
Therefore it seems that neither should He have ascended after forty
days.
On the contrary, Are the words of our Lord (Jn. 20:17): "I ascend to My
Father and to your Father."
I answer that, The place ought to be in keeping with what is contained
therein. Now by His Resurrection Christ entered upon an immortal and
incorruptible life. But whereas our dwelling-place is one of generation
and corruption, the heavenly place is one of incorruption. And
consequently it was not fitting that Christ should remain upon earth
after the Resurrection; but it was fitting that He should ascend to
heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is best and possesses its good without
movement is God Himself, because He is utterly unchangeable, according
to Malachi 3:6: "I am the Lord, and I change not." But every creature
is changeable in some respect, as is evident from Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. viii). And since the nature assumed by the Son of God remained a
creature, as is clear from what was said above ([4315]Q[2], A[7];[4316]
Q[16], AA[8],10;[4317] Q[20], A[1] ), it is not unbecoming if some
movement be attributed to it.
Reply to Objection 2: By ascending into heaven Christ acquired no
addition to His essential glory either in body or in soul: nevertheless
He did acquire something as to the fittingness of place, which pertains
to the well-being of glory: not that His body acquired anything from a
heavenly body by way of perfection or preservation; but merely out of a
certain fittingness. Now this in a measure belonged to His glory; and
He had a certain kind of joy from such fittingness, not indeed that He
then began to derive joy from it when He ascended into heaven, but that
He rejoiced thereat in a new way, as at a thing completed. Hence, on
Ps. 15:11: "At Thy right hand are delights even unto the end," the
gloss says: "I shall delight in sitting nigh to Thee, when I shall be
taken away from the sight of men."
Reply to Objection 3: Although Christ's bodily presence was withdrawn
from the faithful by the Ascension, still the presence of His Godhead
is ever with the faithful, as He Himself says (Mat. 28:20): "Behold, I
am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." For, "by
ascending into heaven He did not abandon those whom He adopted," as
Pope Leo says (De Resurrec., Serm. ii). But Christ's Ascension into
heaven, whereby He withdrew His bodily presence from us, was more
profitable for us than His bodily presence would have been.
First of all, in order to increase our faith, which is of things
unseen. Hence our Lord said (Jn. 26) that the Holy Ghost shall come and
"convince the world . . . of justice," that is, of the justice "of
those that believe," as Augustine says (Tract. xcv super Joan.): "For
even to put the faithful beside the unbeliever is to put the unbeliever
to shame"; wherefore he goes on to say (10): "'Because I go to the
Father; and you shall see Me no longer'"---"For 'blessed are they that
see not, yet believe.' Hence it is of our justice that the world is
reproved: because 'you will believe in Me whom you shall not see.'"
Secondly, to uplift our hope: hence He says (Jn. 14:3): "If I shall go,
and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and will take you to
Myself; that where I am, you also may be." For by placing in heaven the
human nature which He assumed, Christ gave us the hope of going
thither; since "wheresoever the body shall be, there shall the eagles
also be gathered together," as is written in Mat. 24:28. Hence it is
written likewise (Mic. 2:13): "He shall go up that shall open the way
before them."
Thirdly, in order to direct the fervor of our charity to heavenly
things. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 3:1,2): "Seek the things that are
above, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God. Mind the
things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth": for as
is said (Mat. 6:21): "Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also."
And since the Holy Ghost is love drawing us up to heavenly things,
therefore our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 16:7): "It is expedient
to you that I go; for if I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you;
but if I go, I will send Him to you." On which words Augustine says
(Tract. xciv super Joan.): "Ye cannot receive the Spirit, so long as ye
persist in knowing Christ according to the flesh. But when Christ
withdrew in body, not only
the Holy Ghost, but both Father and Son were present with them
spiritually."
Reply to Objection 4: Although a heavenly place befitted Christ when He
rose to immortal life, nevertheless He delayed the Ascension in order
to confirm the truth of His Resurrection. Hence it is written (Acts
1:3), that "He showed Himself alive after His Passion, by many proofs,
for forty days appearing to them": upon which the gloss says that
"because He was dead for forty hours, during forty days He established
the fact of His being alive again. Or the forty days may be understood
as a figure of this world, wherein Christ dwells in His Church:
inasmuch as man is made out of the four elements, and is cautioned not
to transgress the Decalogue."
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Whether Christ's Ascension into heaven belonged to Him according to His
Divine Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Ascension into heaven belonged
to Him according to His Divine Nature. For, it is written (Ps. 46:6):
"God is ascended with jubilee": and (Dt. 33:26): "He that is mounted
upon the heaven is thy helper." But these words were spoken of God even
before Christ's Incarnation. Therefore it belongs to Christ to ascend
into heaven as God.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the same person to ascend into
heaven as to descend from heaven, according to Jn. 3:13: "No man hath
ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven": and Eph.
4:10: "He that descended is the same also that ascended." But Christ
came down from heaven not as man, but as God: because previously His
Nature in heaven was not human, but Divine. Therefore it seems that
Christ ascended into heaven as God.
Objection 3: Further, by His Ascension Christ ascended to the Father.
But it was not as man that He rose to equality with the Father; for in
this respect He says: "He is greater than I," as is said in Jn. 14:28.
Therefore it seems that Christ ascended as God.
On the contrary, on Eph. 4:10: "That He ascended, what is it, but
because He also descended," a gloss says: "It is clear that He
descended and ascended according to His humanity."
I answer that, The expression "according to" can denote two things; the
condition of the one who ascends, and the cause of his ascension. When
taken to express the condition of the one ascending, the Ascension in
no wise belongs to Christ according to the condition of His Divine
Nature; both because there is nothing higher than the Divine Nature to
which He can ascend; and because ascension is local motion, a thing not
in keeping with the Divine Nature, which is immovable and outside all
place. Yet the Ascension is in keeping with Christ according to His
human nature, which is limited by place, and can be the subject of
motion. In this sense, then, we can say that Christ ascended into
heaven as man, but not as God.
But if the phrase "according to" denote the cause of the Ascension,
since Christ ascended into heaven in virtue of His Godhead, and not in
virtue of His human nature, then it must be said that Christ ascended
into heaven not as man, but as God. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on
the Ascension: "It was our doing that the Son of man hung upon the
cross; but it was His own doing that He ascended."
Reply to Objection 1: These utterances were spoken prophetically of God
who was one day to become incarnate. Still it can be said that although
to ascend does not belong to the Divine Nature properly, yet it can
metaphorically; as, for instance, it is said "to ascend in the heart of
man" (cf. Ps. 83:6), when his heart submits and humbles itself before
God: and in the same way God is said to ascend metaphorically with
regard to every creature, since He subjects it to Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: He who ascended is the same as He who descended.
For Augustine says (De Symb. iv): "Who is it that descends? The
God-Man. Who is it that ascends? The self-same God-Man." Nevertheless a
twofold descent is attributed to Christ; one, whereby He is said to
have descended from heaven, which is attributed to the God-Man
according as He is God: for He is not to be understood as having
descended by any local movement, but as having "emptied Himself," since
"when He was in the form of God He took the form of a servant." For
just as He is said to be emptied, not by losing His fulness, but
because He took our littleness upon Himself, so likewise He is said to
have descended from heaven, not that He deserted heaven, but because He
assumed human nature in unity of person.
And there is another descent whereby He descended "into the lower
regions of the earth," as is written Eph. 4:9; and this is local
descent: hence this belongs to Christ according to the condition of
human nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ is said to ascend to the Father, inasmuch
as He ascends to sit on the right hand of the Father; and this is
befitting Christ in a measure according to His Divine Nature, and in a
measure according to His human nature, as will be said later
([4318]Q[58], A[3])
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Whether Christ ascended by His own power?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not ascend by His own power,
because it is written (Mk. 16:19) that "the Lord Jesus, after He had
spoken to them, was taken up to heaven"; and (Acts 1:9) that, "while
they looked on, He was raised up, and a cloud received Him out of their
sight." But what is taken up, and lifted up, appears to be moved by
another. Consequently, it was not by His own power, but by another's
that Christ was taken up into heaven.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's was an earthly body, like to ours. But
it is contrary to the nature of an earthly body to be borne upwards.
Moreover, what is moved contrary to its nature is nowise moved by its
own power. Therefore Christ did not ascend to heaven by His own power.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's own power is Divine. But this motion
does not seem to have been Divine, because, whereas the Divine power is
infinite, such motion would be instantaneous; consequently, He would
not have been uplifted to heaven "while" the disciples "looked on," as
is stated in Acts 1:9. Therefore, it seems that Christ did not ascend
to heaven by His own power.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 63:1): "This beautiful one in his
robe, walking in the greatness of his strength." Also Gregory says in a
Homily on the Ascension (xxix): "It is to be noted that we read of
Elias having ascended in a chariot, that it might be shown that one who
was mere man needed another's help. But we do not read of our Saviour
being lifted up either in a chariot or by angels, because He who had
made all things was taken up above all things by His own power."
I answer that, There is a twofold nature in Christ, to wit, the Divine
and the human. Hence His own power can be accepted according to both.
Likewise a twofold power can be accepted regarding His human nature:
one is natural, flowing from the principles of nature; and it is quite
evident that Christ did not ascend into heaven by such power as this.
The other is the power of glory, which is in Christ's human nature; and
it was according to this that He ascended to heaven.
Now there are some who endeavor to assign the cause of this power to
the nature of the fifth essence. This, as they say, is light, which
they make out to be of the composition of the human body, and by which
they contend that contrary elements are reconciled; so that in the
state of this mortality, elemental nature is predominant in human
bodies: so that, according to the nature of this predominating element
the human body is borne downwards by its own power: but in the
condition of glory the heavenly nature will predominate, by whose
tendency and power Christ's body and the bodies of the saints are
lifted up to heaven. But we have already treated of this opinion in the
[4319]FP, Q[76], A[7], and shall deal with it more fully in treating of
the general resurrection ([4320]XP, Q[84], A[1]).
Setting this opinion aside, others assign as the cause of this power
the glorified soul itself, from whose overflow the body will be
glorified, as Augustine writes to Dioscorus (Ep. cxviii). For the
glorified body will be so submissive to the glorified soul, that, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), "wheresoever the spirit listeth,
thither the body will be on the instant; nor will the spirit desire
anything unbecoming to the soul or the body." Now it is befitting the
glorified and immortal body for it to be in a heavenly place, as stated
above [4321](A[1]). Consequently, Christ's body ascended into heaven by
the power of His soul willing it. But as the body is made glorious by
participation with the soul, even so, as Augustine says (Tract. xxiii
in Joan.), "the soul is beatified by participating in God."
Consequently, the Divine power is the first source of the ascent into
heaven. Therefore Christ ascended into heaven by His own power, first
of all by His Divine power, and secondly by the power of His glorified
soul moving His body at will.
Reply to Objection 1: As Christ is said to have risen by His own power,
though He was raised to life by the power of the Father, since the
Father's power is the same as the Son's; so also Christ ascended into
heaven by His own power, and yet was raised up and taken up to heaven
by the Father.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that Christ did not ascend
into heaven by His own power, i.e. that which is natural to human
nature: yet He did ascend by His own power, i.e. His Divine power, as
well as by His own power, i.e. the power of His beatified soul. And
although to mount upwards is contrary to the nature of a human body in
its present condition, in which the body is not entirely dominated by
the soul, still it will not be unnatural or forced in a glorified body,
whose entire nature is utterly under the control of the spirit.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the Divine power be infinite, and
operate infinitely, so far as the worker is concerned, still the effect
thereof is received in things according to their capacity, and as God
disposes. Now a body is incapable of being moved locally in an instant,
because it must be commensurate with space, according to the division
of which time is reckoned, as is proved in Physics vi. Consequently, it
is not necessary for a body moved by God to be moved instantaneously,
but with such speed as God disposes.
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Whether Christ ascended above all the heavens?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not ascend above all the
heavens, for it is written (Ps. 10:5): "The Lord is in His holy temple,
the Lord's throne is in heaven." But what is in heaven is not above
heaven. Therefore Christ did not ascend above all the heavens.
Objection 2: [*This objection with its solution is omitted in the
Leonine edition as not being in the original manuscript.]
Further, there is no place above the heavens, as is proved in De Coelo
i. But every body must occupy a place. Therefore Christ's body did not
ascend above all the heavens.
Objection 3: Further, two bodies cannot occupy the same place. Since,
then, there is no passing from place to place except through the middle
space, it seems that Christ could not have ascended above all the
heavens unless heaven were divided; which is impossible.
Objection 4: Further, it is narrated (Acts 1:9) that "a cloud received
Him out of their sight." But clouds cannot be uplifted beyond heaven.
Consequently, Christ did not ascend above all the heavens.
Objection 5: Further, we believe that Christ will dwell for ever in the
place whither He has ascended. But what is against nature cannot last
for ever, because what is according to nature is more prevalent and of
more frequent occurrence. Therefore, since it is contrary to nature for
an earthly body to be above heaven, it seems that Christ's body did not
ascend above heaven.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:10): "He ascended above all the
heavens that He might fill all things."
I answer that, The more fully anything corporeal shares in the Divine
goodness, the higher its place in the corporeal order, which is order
of place. Hence we see that the more formal bodies are naturally the
higher, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. iv; De Coelo ii), since
it is by its form that every body partakes of the Divine Essence, as is
shown in Physics i. But through glory the body derives a greater share
in the Divine goodness than any other natural body does through its
natural form; while among other glorious bodies it is manifest that
Christ's body shines with greater glory. Hence it was most fitting for
it to be set above all bodies. Thus it is that on Eph. 4:8: "Ascending
on high," the gloss says: "in place and dignity."
Reply to Objection 1: God's seat is said to be in heaven, not as though
heaven contained Him, but rather because it is contained by Him. Hence
it is not necessary for any part of heaven to be higher, but for Him to
be above all the heavens; according to Ps. 8:2: "For Thy magnificence
is elevated above the heavens, O God!"
Reply to Objection 2: [*Omitted in Leonine edition; see OBJ[2]]
A place implies the notion of containing; hence the first container has
the formality of first place, and such is the first heaven. Therefore
bodies need in themselves to be in a place, in so far as they are
contained by a heavenly body. But glorified bodies, Christ's
especially, do not stand in need of being so contained, because they
draw nothing from the heavenly bodies, but from God through the soul.
So there is nothing to prevent Christ's body from being beyond the
containing radius of the heavenly bodies, and not in a containing
place. Nor is there need for a vacuum to exist outside heaven, since
there is no place there, nor is there any potentiality susceptive of a
body, but the potentiality of reaching thither lies in Christ. So when
Aristotle proves (De Coelo ii) that there is no body beyond heaven,
this must be understood of bodies which are in a state of pure nature,
as is seen from the proofs.
Reply to Objection 3: Although it is not of the nature of a body for it
to be in the same place with another body, yet God can bring it about
miraculously that a body be with another in the same place, as Christ
did when He went forth from the Virgin's sealed womb, also when He
entered among the disciples through closed doors, as Gregory says (Hom.
xxvi). Therefore Christ's body can be in the same place with another
body, not through some inherent property in the body, but through the
assistance and operation of the Divine power.
Reply to Objection 4: That cloud afforded no support as a vehicle to
the ascending Christ: but it appeared as a sign of the Godhead, just as
God's glory appeared to Israel in a cloud over the Tabernacle (Ex.
40:32; Num. 9:15).
Reply to Objection 5: A glorified body has the power to be in heaven or
above heaven. not from its natural principles, but from the beatified
soul, from which it derives its glory: and just as the upward motion of
a glorified body is not violent, so neither is its rest violent:
consequently, there is nothing to prevent it from being everlasting.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ's body ascended above every spiritual creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body did not ascend above
every spiritual creature. For no fitting comparison can be made between
things which have no common ratio. But place is not predicated in the
same ratio of bodies and of spiritual creatures, as is evident from
what was said in the [4322]FP, Q[8], A[2], ad 1,2; [4323]FP, Q[52],
A[1]. Therefore it seems that Christ's body cannot be said to have
ascended above every spiritual creature.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. lv) that a spirit
always takes precedence over a body. But the higher place is due to the
higher things. Therefore it does not seem that Christ ascended above
every spiritual creature.
Objection 3: Further, in every place a body exists, since there is no
such thing as a vacuum in nature. Therefore if no body obtains a higher
place than a spirit in the order of natural bodies, then there will be
no place above every spiritual creature. Consequently, Christ's body
could not ascend above every spiritual creature.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:21): "God set Him above all
principality, and Power, and every name that is named, not only in this
world, but also in that which is to come."
I answer that, The more exalted place is due to the nobler subject,
whether it be a place according to bodily contact, as regards bodies,
or whether it be by way of spiritual contact, as regards spiritual
substances; thus a heavenly place which is the highest of places is
becomingly due to spiritual substances, since they are highest in the
order of substances. But although Christ's body is beneath spiritual
substances, if we weigh the conditions of its corporeal nature,
nevertheless it surpasses all spiritual substances in dignity, when we
call to mind its dignity of union whereby it is united personally with
God. Consequently, owing to this very fittingness, a higher place is
due to it above every spiritual creature. Hence Gregory says in a
Homily on the Ascension (xxix in Evang.) that "He who had made all
things, was by His own power raised up above all things."
Reply to Objection 1: Although a place is differently attributed to
corporeal and spiritual substances, still in either case this remains
in common, that the higher place is assigned to the worthier.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds good of Christ's body
according to the conditions of its corporeal nature, but not according
to its formality of union.
Reply to Objection 3: This comparison may be considered either on the
part of the places; and thus there is no place so high as to exceed the
dignity of a spiritual substance: in this sense the objection runs. Or
it may be considered on the part of the dignity of the things to which
a place is attributed: and in this way it is due to the body of Christ
to be above spiritual creatures.
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Whether Christ's Ascension is the cause of our salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Ascension is not the cause of
our salvation. For, Christ was the cause of our salvation in so far as
He merited it. But He merited nothing for us by His Ascension, because
His Ascension belongs to the reward of His exaltation: and the same
thing is not both merit and reward, just as neither are a road and its
terminus the same. Therefore it seems that Christ's Ascension is not
the cause of our salvation.
Objection 2: Further, if Christ's Ascension be the cause of our
salvation, it seems that this is principally due to the fact that His
Ascension is the cause of ours. But this was bestowed upon us by His
Passion, for it is written (Heb. 10:19): "We have [Vulg.: 'Having']
confidence in the entering into the holies by" His "blood." Therefore
it seems that Christ's Ascension was not the cause of our salvation.
Objection 3: Further, the salvation which Christ bestows is an
everlasting one, according to Is. 51:6: "My salvation shall be for
ever." But Christ did not ascend into heaven to remain there eternally;
for it is written (Acts 1:11): "He shall so come as you have seen Him
going, into heaven." Besides, we read of Him showing Himself to many
holy people on earth after He went up to heaven. to Paul, for instance
(Acts 9). Consequently, it seems that Christ's Ascension is not the
cause of our salvation.
On the contrary, He Himself said (Jn. 16:7): "It is expedient to you
that I go"; i.e. that I should leave you and ascend into heaven.
I answer that, Christ's Ascension is the cause of our salvation in two
ways: first of all, on our part; secondly, on His.
On our part, in so far as by the Ascension our souls are uplifted to
Him; because, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), His Ascension fosters,
first, faith; secondly, hope; thirdly, charity. Fourthly, our reverence
for Him is thereby increased, since we no longer deem Him an earthly
man, but the God of heaven; thus the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:16): "If we
have known Christ according to the flesh---'that is, as mortal, whereby
we reputed Him as a mere man,'" as the gloss interprets the
words---"but now we know Him so no longer."
On His part, in regard to those things which, in ascending, He did for
our salvation. First, He prepared the way for our ascent into heaven,
according to His own saying (Jn. 14:2): "I go to prepare a place for
you," and the words of Micheas (2:13), "He shall go up that shall open
the way before them." For since He is our Head the members must follow
whither the Head has gone: hence He said (Jn. 14:3): "That where I am,
you also may be." In sign whereof He took to heaven the souls of the
saints delivered from hell, according to Ps. 67:19 (Cf. Eph. 4:8):
"Ascending on high, He led captivity captive," because He took with Him
to heaven those who had been held captives by the devil---to heaven, as
to a place strange to human nature. captives in deed of a happy taking,
since they were acquired by His victory.
Secondly, because as the high-priest under the Old Testament entered
the holy place to stand before God for the people, so also Christ
entered heaven "to make intercession for us," as is said in Heb. 7:25.
Because the very showing of Himself in the human nature which He took
with Him to heaven is a pleading for us. so that for the very reason
that God so exalted human nature in Christ, He may take pity on them
for whom the Son of God took human nature. Thirdly, that being
established in His heavenly seat as God and Lord, He might send down
gifts upon men, according to Eph. 4:10: "He ascended above all the
heavens, that He might fill all things," that is, "with His gifts,"
according to the gloss.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's Ascension is the cause of our salvation
by way not of merit, but of efficiency, as was stated above regarding
His Resurrection ([4324]Q[56], A[1], ad 3,4).
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's Passion is the cause of our ascending to
heaven, properly speaking, by removing the hindrance which is sin, and
also by way of merit: whereas Christ's Ascension is the direct cause of
our ascension, as by beginning it in Him who is our Head, with whom the
members must be united.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ by once ascending into heaven acquired for
Himself and for us in perpetuity the right and worthiness of a heavenly
dwelling-place; which worthiness suffers in no way, if, from some
special dispensation, He sometimes comes down in body to earth; either
in order to show Himself to the whole world, as at the judgment; or
else to show Himself particularly to some individual, e.g. in Paul's
case, as we read in Acts 9. And lest any man may think that Christ was
not bodily present when this occurred, the contrary is shown from what
the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 14:8, to confirm faith in the Resurrection:
"Last of all He was seen also by me, as by one born out of due time":
which vision would not confirm the truth of the Resurrection except he
had beheld Christ's very body.
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OF CHRIST'S SITTING AT THE RIGHT HAND OF THE FATHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
WE have now to consider Christ's sitting at the right hand of the
Father, concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is seated at the right hand of the Father?
(2) Whether this belongs to Him according to the Divine Nature?
(3) Whether it belongs to Him according to His human nature?
(4) Whether it is something proper to Christ?
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Whether it is fitting that Christ should sit at the right hand of God the
Father?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should sit at the
right hand of God the Father. For right and left are differences of
bodily position. But nothing corporeal can be applied to God, since
"God is a spirit," as we read in Jn. 4:24. Therefore it seems that
Christ does not sit at the right hand of the Father.
Objection 2: Further, if anyone sits at another's right hand, then the
latter is seated on his left. Consequently, if Christ sits at the right
hand of the Father, it follows that the Father is seated on the left of
the Son; which is unseemly.
Objection 3: Further, sitting and standing savor of opposition. But
Stephen (Acts 7:55) said: "Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the
Son of man standing on the right hand of God." Therefore it seems that
Christ does not sit at the right hand of the Father.
On the contrary, It is written in the last chapter of Mark (16:19):
"The Lord Jesus, after He had spoken to them, was taken up to heaven,
and sitteth on the right hand of God."
I answer that, The word "sitting" may have a twofold meaning; namely,
"abiding" as in Lk. 24:49: "Sit [Douay: 'Stay'] you in the city": and
royal or judiciary "power," as in Prov. 20:8: "The king, that sitteth
on the throne of judgment, scattereth away all evil with his look." Now
in either sense it belongs to Christ to sit at the Father's right hand.
First of all inasmuch as He abides eternally unchangeable in the
Father's bliss, which is termed His right hand, according to Ps. 15:11:
"At Thy right hand are delights even to the end." Hence Augustine says
(De Symb. i): "'Sitteth at the right hand of the Father': To sit means
to dwell, just as we say of any man: 'He sat in that country for three
years': Believe, then, that Christ dwells so at the right hand of the
Father: for He is happy, and the Father's right hand is the name for
His bliss." Secondly, Christ is said to sit at the right hand of the
Father inasmuch as He reigns together with the Father, and has
judiciary power from Him; just as he who sits at the king's right hand
helps him in ruling and judging. Hence Augustine says (De Symb. ii):
"By the expression 'right hand,' understand the power which this Man,
chosen of God, received, that He might come to judge, who before had
come to be judged."
Reply to Objection 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): "We do not
speak of the Father's right hand as of a place, for how can a place be
designated by His right hand, who Himself is beyond all place? Right
and left belong to things definable by limit. But we style, as the
Father's right hand, the glory and honor of the Godhead."
Reply to Objection 2: The argument holds good if sitting at the right
hand be taken corporeally. Hence Augustine says (De Symb. i): "If we
accept it in a carnal sense that Christ sits at the Father's right
hand, then the Father will be on the left. But there"---that is, in
eternal bliss, "it is all right hand, since no misery is there."
Reply to Objection 3: As Gregory says in a Homily on the Ascension
(Hom. xxix in Evang.), "it is the judge's place to sit, while to stand
is the place of the combatant or helper. Consequently, Stephen in his
toil of combat saw Him standing whom He had as his helper. But Mark
describes Him as seated after the Ascension, because after the glory of
His Ascension He will at the end be seen as judge."
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Whether it belongs to Christ as God to sit at the right hand of the Father?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as God to
sit at the right hand of the Father. For, as God, Christ is the
Father's right hand. But it does not appear to be the same thing to be
the right hand of anyone and to sit on his right hand. Therefore, as
God, Christ does not sit at the right hand of the Father.
Objection 2: Further, in the last chapter of Mark (16:19) it is said
that "the Lord Jesus was taken up into heaven, and sitteth on the right
hand of God." But it was not as God that Christ was taken up to heaven.
Therefore neither does He, as God, sit at the right hand of God.
Objection 3: Further, Christ as God is the equal of the Father and of
the Holy Ghost. Consequently, if Christ sits as God at the right hand
of the Father, with equal reason the Holy Ghost sits at the right hand
of the Father and of the Son, and the Father Himself on the right hand
of the Son; which no one is found to say.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): that "what we style
as the Father's right hand, is the glory and honor of the Godhead,
wherein the Son of God existed before ages as God and as consubstantial
with the Father."
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said [4325](A[1])
three things can be understood under the expression "right hand." First
of all, as Damascene takes it, "the glory of the Godhead": secondly,
according to Augustine "the beatitude of the Father": thirdly,
according to the same authority, "judiciary power." Now as we observed
[4326](A[1]) "sitting denotes" either abiding, or royal or judiciary
dignity. Hence, to sit on the right hand of the Father is nothing else
than to share in the glory of the Godhead with the Father, and to
possess beatitude and judiciary power, and that unchangeably and
royally. But this belongs to the Son as God. Hence it is manifest that
Christ as God sits at the right hand of the Father; yet so that this
preposition "at," which is a transitive one, implies merely personal
distinction and order of origin, but not degree of nature or dignity,
for there is no such thing in the Divine Persons, as was shown in the
[4327]FP, Q[42], AA[3],4.
Reply to Objection 1: The Son of God is called the Father's "right
hand" by appropriation, just as He is called the "Power" of the Father
(1 Cor. 1:24). But "right hand of the Father," in its three meanings
given above, is something common to the three Persons.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ as man is exalted to Divine honor; and
this is signified in the aforesaid sitting; nevertheless such honor
belongs to Him as God, not through any assumption, but through His
origin from eternity.
Reply to Objection 3: In no way can it be said that the Father is
seated at the right hand of the Son or of the Holy Ghost; because the
Son and the Holy Ghost derive their origin from the Father, and not
conversely. The Holy Ghost, however, can be said properly to sit at the
right hand of the Father or of the Son, in the aforesaid sense,
although by a kind of appropriation it is attributed to the Son, to
whom equality is appropriated; thus Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
i) that "in the Father there is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy
Ghost the connection of unity with equality."
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Whether it belongs to Christ as man to sit at the right hand of the Father?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to
sit at the right hand of the Father, because, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iv): "What we call the Father's right hand is the glory and
honor of the Godhead." But the glory and honor of the Godhead do not
belong to Christ as man. Consequently, it seems that Christ as man does
not sit at the right hand of the Father.
Objection 2: Further, to sit on the ruler's right hand seems to exclude
subjection, because one so sitting seems in a measure to be reigning
with him. But Christ as man is "subject unto" the Father, as is said in
1 Cor. 15:28. Therefore it seems that Christ as man does not sit at the
Father's right hand.
Objection 3: Further, on Rom. 8:34: "Who is at the right hand of God,"
the gloss adds: "that is, equal to the Father in that honor, whereby
God is the Father: or, on the right hand of the Father, that is, in the
mightier gifts of God." And on Heb. 1:3: "sitteth on the right hand of
the majesty on high," the gloss adds, "that is, in equality with the
Father over all things, both in place and dignity." But equality with
God does not belong to Christ as man; for in this respect Christ
Himself says (Jn. 14:28): "The Father is greater than I." Consequently,
it appears unseemly for Christ as man to sit on the Father's right
hand.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Symb. ii): "By the expression
'right hand' understand the power which this Man, chosen of God,
received, that He might come as judge, who before had come to be
judged."
I answer that, As stated above [4328](A[2]), by the expression "right
hand" is understood either the glory of His Godhead, or His eternal
beatitude, or His judicial and royal power. Now this preposition "at"
signifies a kind of approach to the right hand; thus denoting something
in common, and yet with a distinction, as already observed (De Symb.
ii). And this can be in three ways: first of all, by something common
in nature, and a distinction in person; and thus Christ as the Son of
God, sits at the right hand of the Father, because He has the same
Nature as the Father: hence these things belong to the Son essentially,
just as to the Father; and this is to be in equality with the Father.
Secondly, according to the grace of union, which, on the contrary,
implies distinction of nature, and unity of person. According to this,
Christ as man is the Son of God, and consequently sits at the Father's
right hand; yet so that the expression "as" does not denote condition
of nature, but unity of suppositum, as explained above (Q[16],
AA[10],11). Thirdly, the said approach can be understood according to
habitual grace, which is more fully in Christ than in all other
creatures, so much so that human nature in Christ is more blessed than
all other creatures, and possesses over all other creatures royal and
judiciary power.
So, then, if "as" denote condition of nature, then Christ, as God, sits
"at the Father's right hand," that is, "in equality with the Father";
but as man, He sits "at the right hand of the Father," that is, "in the
Father's mightier gifts beyond all other creatures," that is to say,
"in greater beatitude," and "exercising judiciary power." But if "as"
denote unity of person, thus again as man, He sits at the Father's
right hand "as to equality of honor," inasmuch as with the same honor
we venerate the Son of God with His assumed nature, as was said above
([4329]Q[25], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's humanity according to the conditions of
His nature has not the glory or honor of the Godhead, which it has
nevertheless by reason of the Person with whom it is united. Hence
Damascene adds in the passage quoted: "In which," that is, in the glory
of the Godhead, "the Son of God existing before ages, as God and
consubstantial with the Father, sits in His conglorified flesh; for,
under one adoration the one hypostasis, together with His flesh, is
adored by every creature."
Reply to Objection 2: Christ as man is subject to the Father, if "as"
denote the condition of nature: in which respect it does not belong to
Him as man to sit at the Father's right hand, by reason of their mutual
equality. But it does thus belong to Him to sit at the right hand of
the Father, according as is thereby denoted the excellence of beatitude
and His judiciary power over every creature.
Reply to Objection 3: It does not belong to Christ's human nature to be
in equality with the Father, but only to the Person who assumed it; but
it does belong even to the assumed human nature to share in God's
mightier gifts, in so far as it implies exaltation above other
creatures.
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Whether it is proper to Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to sit at
the right hand of the Father, because the Apostle says (Eph. 2:4, 6):
"God . . . hath raised us up together, and hath made us sit together in
the heavenly places through Christ Jesus." But to be raised up is not
proper to Christ. Therefore for like reason neither is it proper to Him
to sit "on the right hand" of God "on high" (Heb. 1:3).
Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Symb. i): "For Christ to
sit at the right hand of the Father, is to dwell in His beatitude." But
many more share in this. Therefore it does not appear to be proper to
Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father.
Objection 3: Further, Christ Himself says (Apoc. 3:21): "To him that
shall overcome, I will give to sit with Me in My throne: as I also have
overcome, and am set down with My Father in His throne." But it is by
sitting on His Father's throne that Christ is seated at His right hand.
Therefore others who overcome likewise, sit at the Father's right hand.
Objection 4: Further, the Lord says (Mat. 20:23): "To sit on My right
or left hand, is not Mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is
prepared by My Father." But no purpose would be served by saying this,
unless it was prepared for some. Consequently, to sit at the right hand
is not proper to Christ.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 1:13): "To which of the angels
said He at any time: Sit thou on My right hand, i.e. 'in My mightier
gifts,'" or "'as my equal in the Godhead'"? [*The comment is from the
gloss of Peter Lombard] as if to answer: "To none." But angels are
higher than other creatures. Therefore, much less does it belong to
anyone save Christ to sit at the Father's right hand.
I answer that, As stated above [4330](A[3]), Christ is said to sit at
the Father's right hand inasmuch as He is on equality with the Father
in respect of His Divine Nature, while in respect of His humanity, He
excels all creatures in the possession of Divine gifts. But each of
these belongs exclusively to Christ. Consequently, it belongs to no one
else, angel or man, but to Christ alone, to sit at the right hand of
the Father.
Reply to Objection 1: Since Christ is our Head, then what was bestowed
on Christ is bestowed on us through Him. And on this account, since He
is already raised up, the Apostle says that God has, so to speak,
"raised us up together with Him," still we ourselves are not raised up
yet, but are to be raised up, according to Rom. 8:11: "He who raised up
Jesus from the dead, shall quicken also your mortal bodies": and after
the same manner of speech the Apostle adds that "He has made us to sit
together with Him, in the heavenly places"; namely, for the very reason
that Christ our Head sits there.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the right hand is the Divine beatitude,
then "to sit on the right hand" does not mean simply to be in
beatitude, but to possess beatitude with a kind of dominative power, as
a property and part of one's nature. This belongs to Christ alone, and
to no other creature. Yet it can be said that every saint in bliss is
placed on God's right hand; hence it is written (Mat. 25:33): "He shall
set the sheep on His right hand."
Reply to Objection 3: By the "throne" is meant the judiciary power
which Christ has from the Father: and in this sense He is said "to sit
in the Father's throne." But other saints have it from Christ; and in
this respect they are said "to sit on Christ's throne"; according to
Mat. 19:28: "You also shall sit upon twelve seats, judging the twelve
tribes of Israel."
Reply to Objection 4: As Chrysostom says (Hom. lxv in Matth.), "that
place," to wit, sitting at the right hand, "is closed not only to all
men, but likewise to angels: for, Paul declares it to be the
prerogative of Christ, saying: 'To which of the angels said He at any
time: Sit on My right hand?'" Our Lord therefore "replied not as though
some were going to sit there one day, but condescending to the
supplication of the questioners; since more than others they sought
this one thing alone, to stand nigh to Him." Still it can be said that
the sons of Zebedee sought for higher excellence in sharing His
judiciary power; hence they did not ask to sit on the Father's right
hand or left, but on Christ's.
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OF CHRIST'S JUDICIARY POWER (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider Christ's judiciary power. Under this head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether judiciary power is to be attributed to Christ?
(2) Whether it belongs to Him as man?
(3) Whether He acquired it by merits?
(4) Whether His judiciary power is universal with regard to all men?
(5) Whether besides the judgment that takes place now in time, we are
to expect Him in the future general judgment?
(6) Whether His judiciary power extends likewise to the angels?
It will be more suitable to consider the execution of the Last Judgment
when we treat of things pertaining to the end of the world [*See XP,
QQ[88], seqq.]. For the present it will be enough to touch on those
points that concern Christ's dignity.
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Whether judiciary power is to be specially attributed to Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power is not to be specially
attributed to Christ. For judgment of others seems to belong to their
lord; hence it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest
another man's servant?" But, it belongs to the entire Trinity to be
Lord over creatures. Therefore judiciary power ought not to be
attributed specially to Christ.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 7:9): "The Ancient of days
sat"; and further on (Dan. 7:10), "the judgment sat, and the books were
opened." But the Ancient of days is understood to be the Father,
because as Hilary says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father."
Consequently, judiciary power ought rather to be attributed to the
Father than to Christ.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to the same person to judge as
it does to convince. But it belongs to the Holy Ghost to convince: for
our Lord says (Jn. 16:8): "And when He is come," i.e. the Holy Ghost,
"He will convince the world of sin, and of justice, and of judgment."
Therefore judiciary power ought to be attributed to the Holy Ghost
rather than to Christ.
On the contrary, It is said of Christ (Acts 10:42): "It is He who was
appointed by God, to be judge of the living end of the dead."
I answer that, Three things are required for passing judgment: first,
the power of coercing subjects; hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:6):
"Seek not to be made a judge unless thou have strength enough to
extirpate iniquities." The second thing required is upright zeal, so as
to pass judgment not out of hatred or malice, but from love of justice,
according to Prov. 3:12: "For whom the Lord loveth, He chasteneth: and
as a father in the son He pleaseth Himself." Thirdly, wisdom is needed,
upon which judgment is based, according to Ecclus. 10:1: "A wise judge
shall judge his people." The first two are conditions for judging; but
on the third the very rule of judgment is based, because the standard
of judgment is the law of wisdom or truth, according to which the
judgment is passed.
Now because the Son is Wisdom begotten, and Truth proceeding from the
Father, and His perfect Image, consequently, judiciary power is
properly attributed to the Son of God. Accordingly Augustine says (De
Vera Relig. xxxi): "This is that unchangeable Truth, which is rightly
styled the law of all arts, and the art of the Almighty Craftsman. But
even as we and all rational souls judge aright of the things beneath
us, so does He who alone is Truth itself pass judgment on us, when we
cling to Him. But the Father judges Him not, for He is the Truth no
less than Himself. Consequently, whatever the Father judges, He judges
through It." Further on he concludes by saying: "Therefore the Father
judges no man, but has given all judgment to the Son."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that judiciary power is
common to the entire Trinity, which is quite true: still by special
appropriation such power is attributed to the Son, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), eternity is
attributed to the Father, because He is the Principle, which is implied
in the idea of eternity. And in the same place Augustine says that the
Son is the art of the Father. So, then, judiciary authority is
attributed to the Father, inasmuch as He is the Principle of the Son,
but the very rule of judgment is attributed to the Son who is the art
and wisdom of the Father, so that as the Father does all things through
the Son, inasmuch as the Son is His art, so He judges all things
through the Son, inasmuch as the Son is His wisdom and truth. And this
is implied by Daniel, when he says in the first passage that "the
Ancient of days sat," and when he subsequently adds that the Son of Man
"came even to the Ancient of days, who gave Him power, and glory, and a
kingdom": and thereby we are given to understand that the authority for
judging lies with the Father, from whom the Son received the power to
judge.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xcv in Joan.): "Christ
said that the Holy Ghost shall convince the world of sin, as if to say
'He shall pour out charity upon your hearts.' For thus, when fear is
driven away, you shall have freedom for convincing." Consequently,
then, judgment is attributed to the Holy Ghost, not as regards the rule
of judgment, but as regards man's desire to judge others aright.
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Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ as man?
Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power does not belong to
Christ as man. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that judgment
is attributed to the Son inasmuch as He is the law of the first truth.
But this is Christ's attribute as God. Consequently, judiciary power
does not belong to Christ as man but as God.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to judiciary power to reward the good,
just as to punish the wicked. But eternal beatitude, which is the
reward of good works, is bestowed by God alone: thus Augustine says
(Tract. xxiii super Joan.) that "the soul is made blessed by
participation of God, and not by participation of a holy soul."
Therefore it seems that judiciary power does not belong to Christ as
man, but as God.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to Christ's judiciary power to judge
secrets of hearts, according to 1 Cor. 4:5: "Judge not before the time;
until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of
darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts." But this
belongs exclusively to the Divine power, according to Jer. 17:9,10:
"The heart of man is perverse and unsearchable, who can know it? I am
the Lord who search the heart, and prove the reins: who give to every
one according to his way." Therefore judiciary power does not belong to
Christ as man but as God.
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:27): "He hath given Him power to do
judgment, because He is the Son of man."
I answer that, Chrysostom (Hom. xxxix in Joan.) seems to think that
judiciary power belongs to Christ not as man, but only as God.
Accordingly he thus explains the passage just quoted from John: "'He
gave Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man: wonder not
at this.' For He received judiciary power, not because He is man; but
because He is the Son of the ineffable God, therefore is He judge. But
since the expressions used were greater than those appertaining to man,
He said in explanation: 'Wonder not at this, because He is the Son of
man, for He is likewise the Son of God.'" And he proves this by the
effect of the Resurrection: wherefore He adds: "Because the hour cometh
when the dead in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God."
But it must be observed that although the primary authority of judging
rests with God, nevertheless the power to judge is committed to men
with regard to those subject to their jurisdiction. Hence it is written
(Dt. 1:16): "Judge that which is just"; and further on (Dt. 1:17):
"Because it is the judgment of God," that is to say, it is by His
authority that you judge. Now it was said before ([4331]Q[8], AA[1],4)
that Christ even in His human nature is Head of the entire Church, and
that God has "put all things under His feet." Consequently, it belongs
to Him, even according to His human nature, to exercise judiciary
power. on this account. it seems that the authority of Scripture quoted
above must be interpreted thus: "He gave Him power to do judgment,
because He is the Son of Man"; not on account of the condition of His
nature, for thus all men would have this kind of power, as Chrysostom
objects (Hom. xxxix in Joan.); but because this belongs to the grace of
the Head, which Christ received in His human nature.
Now judiciary power belongs to Christ in this way according to His
human nature on three accounts. First, because of His likeness and
kinship with men; for, as God works through intermediary causes, as
being closer to the effects, so He judges men through the Man Christ,
that His judgment may be sweeter to men. Hence (Heb. 4:15) the Apostle
says: "For we have not a high-priest, who cannot have compassion on our
infirmities; but one tempted in all things like as we are, without sin.
Let us go therefore with confidence to the throne of His grace."
Secondly, because at the last judgment, as Augustine says (Tract. xix
in Joan.), "there will be a resurrection of dead bodies, which God will
raise up through the Son of Man"; just as by "the same Christ He raises
souls," inasmuch as "He is the Son of God." Thirdly, because, as
Augustine observes (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cxxvii): "It was but right
that those who were to be judged should see their judge. But those to
be judged were the good and the bad. It follows that the form of a
servant should be shown in the judgment to both good and wicked, while
the form of God should be kept for the good alone."
Reply to Objection 1: Judgment belongs to truth as its standard, while
it belongs to the man imbued with truth, according as he is as it were
one with truth, as a kind of law and "living justice" [*Aristotle,
Ethic. v]. Hence Augustine quotes (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cxxvii) the
saying of 1 Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But
beyond all creatures Christ's soul was more closely united with truth,
and more full of truth; according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw Him . . . full
of grace and truth." And according to this it belongs principally to
the soul of Christ to judge all things.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to God alone to bestow beatitude upon
souls by a participation with Himself; but it is Christ's prerogative
to bring them to such beatitude, inasmuch as He is their Head and the
author of their salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: "Who had brought
many children into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by
His Passion."
Reply to Objection 3: To know and judge the secrets of hearts, of
itself belongs to God alone; but from the overflow of the Godhead into
Christ's soul it belongs to Him also to know and to judge the secrets
of hearts, as we stated above ([4332]Q[10], A[2]), when dealing with
the knowledge of Christ. Hence it is written (Rom. 2:16): "In the day
when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ."
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Whether Christ acquired His judiciary power by His merits?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not acquire His judiciary
power by His merits. For judiciary power flows from the royal dignity:
according to Prov. 20:8: "The king that sitteth on the throne of
judgment, scattereth away all evil with his look." But it was without
merits that Christ acquired royal power, for it is His due as God's
Only-begotten Son: thus it is written (Lk. 1:32): "The Lord God shall
give unto Him the throne of David His father, and He shall reign in the
house of Jacob for ever." Therefore Christ did not obtain judiciary
power by His merits.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [4333](A[2]), judiciary power is
Christ's due inasmuch as He is our Head. But the grace of headship does
not belong to Christ by reason of merit, but follows the personal union
of the Divine and human natures: according to Jn. 1:14, 16: "We saw His
glory . . . as of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and
truth . . . and of His fulness we all have received": and this pertains
to the notion of headship. Consequently, it seems that Christ did not
have judiciary power from merits.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual
man judgeth all things." But a man becomes spiritual through grace,
which is not from merits; otherwise it is "no more grace," as is said
in Rom. 11:6. Therefore it seems that judiciary power belongs neither
to Christ nor to others from any merits, but from grace alone.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:17): "Thy cause hath been judged
as that of the wicked, cause and judgment thou shalt recover." And
Augustine says (Serm. cxxvii): "The Judge shall sit, who stood before a
judge; He shall condemn the truly wicked, who Himself was falsely
reputed wicked."
I answer that, There is nothing to hinder one and the same thing from
being due to some one from various causes: as the glory of the body in
rising was due to Christ not only as befitting His Godhead and His
soul's glory, but likewise "from the merit of the lowliness of His
Passion" [*Cf. Augustine, Tract. civ in Joan.]. And in the same way it
must be said that judiciary power belongs to the Man Christ on account
of both His Divine personality, and the dignity of His headship, and
the fulness of His habitual grace: and yet He obtained it from merit,
so that, in accordance with the Divine justice, He should be judge who
fought for God's justice, and conquered, and was unjustly condemned.
Hence He Himself says (Apoc. 3:21): "I have overcome and am set down in
My Father's throne [Vulg.: 'with My Father in His throne']." Now
judiciary power is understood by "throne," according to Ps. 9:5: "Thou
hast sat on the throne, who judgest justice."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds good of judiciary power
according as it is due to Christ by reason of the union with the Word
of God.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is based on the ground of His grace
as Head.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds good in regard to habitual
grace, which perfects Christ's soul. But although judiciary power be
Christ's due in these ways, it is not hindered from being His due from
merit.
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Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ with respect to all human affairs
?
Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power concerning all human
affairs does not belong to Christ. For as we read in Lk. 12:13,14, when
one of the crowd said to Christ: "Speak to my brother that he divide
the inheritance with me; He said to him: Man, who hath appointed Me
judge, or divider over you?" Consequently, He does not exercise
judgment over all human affairs.
Objection 2: Further, no one exercises judgment except over his own
subjects. But, according to Heb. 2:8, "we see not as yet all things
subject to" Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ has not judgment
over all human affairs.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that it is part
of Divine judgment for the good to be afflicted sometimes in this
world, and sometimes to prosper, and in like manner the wicked. But the
same was the case also before the Incarnation. Consequently, not all
God's judgments regarding human affairs are included in Christ's
judiciary power.
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:22): "The Father hath given all
judgment to the Son."
I answer that, If we speak of Christ according to His Divine Nature, it
is evident that every judgment of the Father belongs to the Son; for,
as the Father does all things through His Word, so He judges all things
through His Word.
But if we speak of Christ in His human nature, thus again is it evident
that all things are subject to His judgment. This is made clear if we
consider first of all the relationship subsisting between Christ's soul
and the Word of God; for, if "the spiritual man judgeth all things," as
is said in 1 Cor. 2:15, inasmuch as his soul clings to the Word of God,
how much more Christ's soul, which is filled with the truth of the Word
of God, passes judgment upon all things.
Secondly, the same appears from the merit of His death; because,
according to Rom. 14:9: "To this end Christ died and rose again; that
He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living." And therefore He
has judgment over all men; and on this account the Apostle adds (Rom.
14:10): "We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ": and
(Dan. 7:14) it is written that "He gave Him power, and glory, and a
kingdom; and all peoples, tribes, and tongues shall serve Him."
Thirdly, the same thing is evident from comparison of human affairs
with the end of human salvation. For, to whomsoever the substance is
entrusted, the accessory is likewise committed. Now all human affairs
are ordered for the end of beatitude, which is everlasting salvation,
to which men are admitted, or from which they are excluded by Christ's
judgment, as is evident from Mat. 25:31,40. Consequently, it is
manifest that all human affairs are included in Christ's judiciary
power.
Reply to Objection 1: As was said above (A[3], OBJ[1]), judiciary power
goes with royal dignity. Now Christ, although established king by God,
did not wish while living on earth to govern temporarily an earthly
kingdom; consequently He said (Jn. 18:36): "My kingdom is not of this
world." In like fashion He did not wish to exercise judiciary power
over temporal concerns, since He came to raise men to Divine things.
Hence Ambrose observes on this passage in Luke: "It is well that He who
came down with a Divine purpose should hold Himself aloof from temporal
concerns; nor does He deign to be a judge of quarrels and an arbiter of
property, since He is judge of the quick and the dead, and the
arbitrator of merits."
Reply to Objection 2: All things are subject to Christ in respect of
that power, which He received from the Father, over all things,
according to Mat. 28:18: "All power is given to Me in heaven and in
earth." But as to the exercise of this power, all things are not yet
subject to Him: this will come to pass in the future, when He shall
fulfil His will regarding all things, by saving some and punishing
others.
Reply to Objection 3: Judgments of this kind were exercised by Christ
before His Incarnation, inasmuch as He is the Word of God: and the soul
united with Him personally became a partaker of this power by the
Incarnation.
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Whether after the Judgment that takes place in the present time, there
remains yet another General Judgment?
Objection 1: It would seem that after the Judgment that takes place in
the present time, there does not remain another General Judgment. For a
judgment serves no purpose after the final allotment of rewards and
punishments. But rewards and punishments are allotted in this present
time: for our Lord said to the thief on the cross (Lk. 23:43): "This
day thou shalt be with Me in paradise": and (Lk. 16:22) it is said that
"the rich man died and was buried in hell." Therefore it is useless to
look forward to a final Judgment.
Objection 2: Further, according to another (the Septuagint) version of
Nahum 1:9, "God shall not judge the same thing a second time." But in
the present time God judges both temporal and spiritual matters.
Therefore, it does not seem that another final judgment is to be
expected.
Objection 3: Further, reward and punishment correspond with merit and
demerit. But merit and demerit bear relation to the body only in so far
as it is the instrument of the soul. Therefore reward or punishment is
not due to the body save as the soul's instrument. Therefore no other
Judgment is called for at the end (of the world) to requite man with
reward or punishment in the body, besides that Judgment in which souls
are now punished or rewarded.
On the contrary, It is said in Jn. 12:48: "The word that I have spoken,
the same shall judge you [Vulg.: 'him'] in the last day." Therefore
there will be a Judgment at the last day besides that which takes place
in the present time.
I answer that, Judgment cannot be passed perfectly upon any changeable
subject before its consummation: just as judgment cannot be given
perfectly regarding the quality of any action before its completion in
itself and in its results: because many actions appear to be
profitable, which in their effects prove to be hurtful. And in the same
way perfect judgment cannot be passed upon any man before the close of
his life, since he can be changed in many respects from good to evil,
or conversely, or from good to better, or from evil to worse. Hence the
Apostle says (Heb. 9:27): "It is appointed unto men once to die, and
after this the Judgment."
But it must be observed that although man's temporal life in itself
ends with death, still it continues dependent in a measure on what
comes after it in the future. In one way, as it still lives on in men's
memories, in which sometimes, contrary to the truth, good or evil
reputations linger on. In another way in a man's children, who are so
to speak something of their parent, according to Ecclus. 30:4: "His
father is dead, and he is as if he were not dead, for he hath left one
behind him that is like himself." And yet many good men have wicked
sons, and conversely. Thirdly, as to the result of his actions: just as
from the deceit of Arius and other false leaders unbelief continues to
flourish down to the close of the world; and even until then faith will
continue to derive its progress from the preaching of the apostles. In
a fourth way, as to the body, which is sometimes buried with honor and
sometimes left unburied, and finally falls to dust utterly. In a fifth
way, as to the things upon which a man's heart is set, such as temporal
concerns, for example, some of which quickly lapse, while others endure
longer.
Now all these things are submitted to the verdict of the Divine
Judgment; and consequently, a perfect and public Judgment cannot be
made of all these things during the course of this present time.
Wherefore, there must be a final Judgment at the last day, in which
everything concerning every man in every respect shall be perfectly and
publicly judged.
Reply to Objection 1: Some men have held the opinion that the souls of
the saints shall not be rewarded in heaven, nor the souls of the lost
punished in hell, until the Judgment-day. That this is false appears
from the testimony of the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:8), where he says: "We are
confident and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and
to be present with the Lord": that is, not to "walk by faith" but "by
sight," as appears from the context. But this is to see God in His
Essence, wherein consists "eternal life," as is clear from Jn. 17:3.
Hence it is manifest that the souls separated from bodies are in
eternal life.
Consequently, it must be maintained that after death man enters into an
unchangeable state as to all that concerns the soul: and therefore
there is no need for postponing judgment as to the reward of the soul.
But since there are some other things pertaining to a man which go on
through the whole course of time, and which are not foreign to the
Divine judgment, all these things must be brought to judgment at the
end of time. For although in regard to such things a man neither merits
nor demerits, still in a measure they accompany his reward or
punishment. Consequently all these things must be weighed in the final
judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: "God shall not judge twice the same thing," i.e.
in the same respect; but it is not unseemly for God to judge twice
according to different respects.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the reward or punishment of the body
depends upon the reward or punishment of the soul, nevertheless, since
the soul is changeable only accidentally, on account of the body, once
it is separated from the body it enters into an unchangeable condition,
and receives its judgment. But the body remains subject to change down
to the close of time: and therefore it must receive its reward or
punishment then, in the last Judgment.
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Whether Christ's judiciary power extends to the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's judiciary power does not
extend to the angels, because the good and wicked angels alike were
judged in the beginning of the world, when some fell through sin while
others were confirmed in bliss. But those already judged have no need
of being judged again. Therefore Christ's judiciary power does not
extend to the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the same person cannot be both judge and judged.
But the angels will come to judge with Christ, according to Mat. 25:31:
"When the Son of Man shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with
Him." Therefore it seems that the angels will not be judged by Christ.
Objection 3: Further, the angels are higher than other creatures. If
Christ, then, be judge not only of men but likewise of angels, then for
the same reason He will be judge of all creatures; which seems to be
false, since this belongs to God's providence: hence it is written (Job
34:13): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He
set over the world which He made?" Therefore Christ is not the judge of
the angels.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:3): "Know you not that we
shall judge angels?" But the saints judge only by Christ's authority.
Therefore, much more does Christ possess judiciary power over the
angels.
I answer that, The angels are subjects of Christ's judiciary power, not
only with regard to His Divine Nature, as He is the Word of God, but
also with regard to His human nature. And this is evident from three
considerations. First of all, from the closeness of His assumed nature
to God; because, according to Heb. 2:16: "For nowhere doth He take hold
of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold."
Consequently, Christ's soul is more filled with the truth of the Word
of God than any angel: for which reason He also enlightens the angels,
as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), and so He has power to judge them.
Secondly, because by the lowliness of His Passion, human nature in
Christ merited to be exalted above the angels; so that, as is said in
Phil. 2:10: "In the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that
are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth." And therefore Christ has
judiciary power even over the good and wicked angels: in token whereof
it is said in the Apocalypse (7:11) that "all the angels stood round
about the throne." Thirdly, on account of what they do for men, of whom
Christ is the Head in a special manner. Hence it is written (Heb.
1:14): "They are [Vulg.: 'Are they not'] all ministering spirits, sent
to minister for them, who shall receive the inheritance of salvation
(?)." But they are submitted to Christ's judgment, first, as regards
the dispensing of those things which are done through them; which
dispensing is likewise done by the Man Christ, to whom the angels
ministered, as related (Mat. 4:11), and from whom the devils besought
that they might be sent into the swine, according to Mat. 8:31.
Secondly, as to other accidental rewards of the good angels, such as
the joy which they have at the salvation of men, according to Lk.
15:10: "There shall be joy before the angels of God upon one sinner
doing penance": and furthermore as to the accidental punishments of the
devils wherewith they are either tormented here, or are shut up in
hell; and this also belongs to the Man Christ: hence it is written (Mk.
1:24) that the devil cried out: "What have we to do with thee, Jesus of
Nazareth? art Thou come to destroy us?" Thirdly, as to the essential
reward of the good angels, which is everlasting bliss; and as to the
essential punishment of the wicked angels, which is everlasting
damnation. But this was done by Christ from the beginning of the world,
inasmuch as He is the Word of God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers judgment as to the
essential reward and chief punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi):
"Although the spiritual man judgeth all things, still he is judged by
Truth Itself." Consequently, although the angels judge, as being
spiritual creatures, still they are judged by Christ, inasmuch as He is
the Truth.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ judges not only the angels, but also the
administration of all creatures. For if, as Augustine says (De Trin.
iii) the lower things are ruled by God through the higher, in a certain
order, it must be said that all things are ruled by Christ's soul,
which is above every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 2:5): "For
God hath not subjected unto angels the world to come"---subject namely
to Christ---"of whom we speak" [Douay: 'whereof we speak'] [*The words
"subject namely to Christ" are from a gloss]. Nor does it follow that
God set another over the earth; since one and the same Person is God
and Man, our Lord Jesus Christ.
Let what has been said of the Mystery of His Incarnation suffice for
the present.
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TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENTS (QQ[60]-90)
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WHAT IS A SACRAMENT? (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After considering those things that concern the mystery of the
incarnate Word, we must consider the sacraments of the Church which
derive their efficacy from the Word incarnate Himself. First we shall
consider the sacraments in general; secondly, we shall consider
specially each sacrament.
Concerning the first our consideration will be fivefold: (1) What is a
sacrament? (2) Of the necessity of the sacraments; (3) of the effects
of the sacraments; (4) Of their cause; (5) Of their number.
Under the first heading there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign?
(2) Whether every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament?
(3) Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only, or of several?
(4) Whether a sacrament is a sign that is something sensible?
(5) Whether some determinate sensible thing is required for a
sacrament?
(6) Whether signification expressed by words is necessary for a
sacrament?
(7) Whether determinate words are required?
(8) Whether anything may be added to or subtracted from these words?
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Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign?
Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign. For
sacrament appears to be derived from "sacring" [sacrando]; just as
medicament, from "medicando" [healing]. But this seems to be of the
nature of a cause rather than of a sign. Therefore a sacrament is a
kind of cause rather than a kind of sign.
Objection 2: Further, sacrament seems to signify something hidden,
according to Tob. 12:7: "It is good to hide the secret [sacramentum] of
a king"; and Eph. 3:9: "What is the dispensation of the mystery
[sacramenti] which hath been hidden from eternity in God." But that
which is hidden, seems foreign to the nature of a sign; for "a sign is
that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species
which it impresses on the senses," as Augustine explains (De Doctr.
Christ. ii). Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign.
Objection 3: Further, an oath is sometimes called a sacrament: for it
is written in the Decretals (Caus. xxii, qu. 5): "Children who have not
attained the use of reason must not be obliged to swear: and whoever
has foresworn himself once, must no more be a witness, nor be allowed
to take a sacrament," i.e. an oath. But an oath is not a kind of sign,
therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x): "The visible sacrifice
is the sacrament, i.e. the sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice."
I answer that, All things that are ordained to one, even in different
ways, can be denominated from it: thus, from health which is in an
animal, not only is the animal said to be healthy through being the
subject of health: but medicine also is said to be healthy through
producing health; diet through preserving it; and urine, through being
a sign of health. Consequently, a thing may be called a "sacrament,"
either from having a certain hidden sanctity, and in this sense a
sacrament is a "sacred secret"; or from having some relationship to
this sanctity, which relationship may be that of a cause, or of a sign
or of any other relation. But now we are speaking of sacraments in a
special sense, as implying the habitude of sign: and in this way a
sacrament is a kind of sign.
Reply to Objection 1: Because medicine is an efficient cause of health,
consequently whatever things are denominated from medicine are to be
referred to some first active cause: so that a medicament implies a
certain causality. But sanctity from which a sacrament is denominated,
is not there taken as an efficient cause, but rather as a formal or a
final cause. Therefore it does not follow that a sacrament need always
imply causality.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sacrament in the sense of
a "sacred secret." Now not only God's but also the king's, secret, is
said to be sacred and to be a sacrament: because according to the
ancients, whatever it was unlawful to lay violent hands on was said to
be holy or sacrosanct, such as the city walls, and persons of high
rank. Consequently those secrets, whether Divine or human, which it is
unlawful to violate by making them known to anybody whatever, are
called "sacred secrets or sacraments."
Reply to Objection 3: Even an oath has a certain relation to sacred
things, in so far as it consists in calling a sacred thing to witness.
And in this sense it is called a sacrament: not in the sense in which
we speak of sacraments now; the word "sacrament" being thus used not
equivocally but analogically, i.e. by reason of a different relation to
the one thing, viz. something sacred.
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Whether every sign of a holy thing is a sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a
sacrament. For all sensible creatures are signs of sacred things;
according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen
being understood by the things that are made." And yet all sensible
things cannot be called sacraments. Therefore not every sign of a
sacred thing is a sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, whatever was done under the Old Law was a figure
of Christ Who is the "Holy of Holies" (Dan. 9:24), according to 1 Cor.
10:11: "All (these) things happened to them in figure"; and Col. 2:17:
"Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's." And
yet not all that was done by the Fathers of the Old Testament, not even
all the ceremonies of the Law, were sacraments, but only in certain
special cases, as stated in the [4334]FS, Q[101], A[4]. Therefore it
seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, even in the New Testament many things are done in
sign of some sacred thing; yet they are not called sacraments; such as
sprinkling with holy water, the consecration of an altar, and such
like. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.
On the contrary, A definition is convertible with the thing defined.
Now some define a sacrament as being "the sign of a sacred thing";
moreover, this is clear from the passage quoted above [4335](A[1]) from
Augustine. Therefore it seems that every sign of a sacred thing is a
sacrament.
I answer that, Signs are given to men, to whom it is proper to discover
the unknown by means of the known. Consequently a sacrament properly so
called is that which is the sign of some sacred thing pertaining to
man; so that properly speaking a sacrament, as considered by us now, is
defined as being the "sign of a holy thing so far as it makes men
holy."
Reply to Objection 1: Sensible creatures signify something holy, viz.
Divine wisdom and goodness inasmuch as these are holy in themselves;
but not inasmuch as we are made holy by them. Therefore they cannot be
called sacraments as we understand sacraments now.
Reply to Objection 2: Some things pertaining to the Old Testament
signified the holiness of Christ considered as holy in Himself. Others
signified His holiness considered as the cause of our holiness; thus
the sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb signified Christ's Sacrifice whereby
we are made holy: and such like are properly styled sacraments of the
Old Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Names are given to things considered in reference
to their end and state of completeness. Now a disposition is not an
end, whereas perfection is. Consequently things that signify
disposition to holiness are not called sacraments, and with regard to
these the objection is verified: only those are called sacraments which
signify the perfection of holiness in man.
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Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only?
Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is a sign of one thing only. For
that which signifies many things is an ambiguous sign, and consequently
occasions deception: this is clearly seen in equivocal words. But all
deception should be removed from the Christian religion, according to
Col. 2:8: "Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain
deceit." Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a sign of several
things.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [4336](A[2]), a sacrament
signifies a holy thing in so far as it makes man holy. But there is
only one cause of man's holiness, viz. the blood of Christ; according
to Heb. 13:12: "Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His own
blood, suffered without the gate." Therefore it seems that a sacrament
does not signify several things.
Objection 3: Further, it has been said above (A[2], ad 3) that a
sacrament signifies properly the very end of sanctification. Now the
end of sanctification is eternal life, according to Rom. 6:22: "You
have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting."
Therefore it seems that the sacraments signify one thing only, viz.
eternal life.
On the contrary, In the Sacrament of the Altar, two things are
signified, viz. Christ's true body, and Christ's mystical body; as
Augustine says (Liber Sent. Prosper.).
I answer that, As stated above [4337](A[2]) a sacrament properly
speaking is that which is ordained to signify our sanctification. In
which three things may be considered; viz. the very cause of our
sanctification, which is Christ's passion; the form of our
sanctification, which is grace and the virtues; and the ultimate end of
our sanctification, which is eternal life. And all these are signified
by the sacraments. Consequently a sacrament is a sign that is both a
reminder of the past, i.e. the passion of Christ; and an indication of
that which is effected in us by Christ's passion, i.e. grace; and a
prognostic, that is, a foretelling of future glory.
Reply to Objection 1: Then is a sign ambiguous and the occasion of
deception, when it signifies many things not ordained to one another.
But when it signifies many things inasmuch as, through being mutually
ordained, they form one thing, then the sign is not ambiguous but
certain: thus this word "man" signifies the soul and body inasmuch as
together they form the human nature. In this way a sacrament signifies
the three things aforesaid, inasmuch as by being in a certain order
they are one thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Since a sacrament signifies that which
sanctifies, it must needs signify the effect, which is implied in the
sanctifying cause as such.
Reply to Objection 3: It is enough for a sacrament that it signify that
perfection which consists in the form, nor is it necessary that it
should signify only that perfection which is the end.
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Whether a sacrament is always something sensible?
Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is not always something
sensible. Because, according to the Philosopher (Prior. Anal. ii),
every effect is a sign of its cause. But just as there are some
sensible effects, so are there some intelligible effects; thus science
is the effect of a demonstration. Therefore not every sign is sensible.
Now all that is required for a sacrament is something that is a sign of
some sacred thing, inasmuch as thereby man is sanctified, as stated
above [4338](A[2]). Therefore something sensible is not required for a
sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, sacraments belong to the kingdom of God and the
Divine worship. But sensible things do not seem to belong to the Divine
worship: for we are told (Jn. 4:24) that "God is a spirit; and they
that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth"; and (Rom.
14:17) that "the kingdom of God is not meat and drink." Therefore
sensible things are not required for the sacraments.
Objection 3: Further. Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) that "sensible
things are goods of least account, since without them man can live
aright." But the sacraments are necessary for man's salvation, as we
shall show farther on ([4339]Q[61], A[1]): so that man cannot live
aright without them. Therefore sensible things are not required for the
sacraments.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super Joan.): "The word is
added to the element and this becomes a sacrament"; and he is speaking
there of water which is a sensible element. Therefore sensible things
are required for the sacraments.
I answer that, Divine wisdom provides for each thing according to its
mode; hence it is written (Wis. 8:1) that "she . . . ordereth all
things sweetly": wherefore also we are told (Mat. 25:15) that she "gave
to everyone according to his proper ability." Now it is part of man's
nature to acquire knowledge of the intelligible from the sensible. But
a sign is that by means of which one attains to the knowledge of
something else. Consequently, since the sacred things which are
signified by the sacraments, are the spiritual and intelligible goods
by means of which man is sanctified, it follows that the sacramental
signs consist in sensible things: just as in the Divine Scriptures
spiritual things are set before us under the guise of things sensible.
And hence it is that sensible things are required for the sacraments;
as Dionysius also proves in his book on the heavenly hierarchy (Coel.
Hier. i).
Reply to Objection 1: The name and definition of a thing is taken
principally from that which belongs to a thing primarily and
essentially: and not from that which belongs to it through something
else. Now a sensible effect being the primary and direct object of
man's knowledge (since all our knowledge springs from the senses) by
its very nature leads to the knowledge of something else: whereas
intelligible effects are not such as to be able to lead us to the
knowledge of something else, except in so far as they are manifested by
some other thing, i.e. by certain sensibles. It is for this reason that
the name sign is given primarily and principally to things which are
offered to the senses; hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that
a sign "is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the
species which it impresses on the senses." But intelligible effects do
not partake of the nature of a sign except in so far as they are
pointed out by certain signs. And in this way, too, certain things
which are not sensible are termed sacraments as it were, in so far as
they are signified by certain sensible things, of which we shall treat
further on ([4340]Q[63], A[1], ad 2; A[3], ad 2;[4341] Q[73],
A[6];[4342] Q[74], A[1], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: Sensible things considered in their own nature do
not belong to the worship or kingdom of God: but considered only as
signs of spiritual things in which the kingdom of God consists.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of sensible things,
considered in their nature; but not as employed to signify spiritual
things, which are the highest goods.
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Whether determinate things are required for a sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that determinate things are not required for a
sacrament. For sensible things are required in sacraments for the
purpose of signification, as stated above [4343](A[4]). But nothing
hinders the same thing being signified by divers sensible things: thus
in Holy Scripture God is signified metaphorically, sometimes by a stone
(2 Kings 22:2; Zech. 3:9; 1 Cor. 10:4; Apoc. 4:3); sometimes by a lion
(Is. 31:4; Apoc. 5:5); sometimes by the sun (Is. 60:19,20; Mal. 4:2),
or by something similar. Therefore it seems that divers things can be
suitable to the same sacrament. Therefore determinate things are not
required for the sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, the health of the soul is more necessary than
that of the body. But in bodily medicines, which are ordained to the
health of the body, one thing can be substituted for another which
happens to be wanting. Therefore much more in the sacraments, which are
spiritual remedies ordained to the health of the soul, can one thing be
substituted for another when this happens to be lacking.
Objection 3: Further, it is not fitting that the salvation of men be
restricted by the Divine Law: still less by the Law of Christ, Who came
to save all. But in the state of the Law of nature determinate things
were not required in the sacraments, but were put to that use through a
vow, as appears from Gn. 28, where Jacob vowed that he would offer to
God tithes and peace-offerings. Therefore it seems that man should not
have been restricted, especially under the New Law, to the use of any
determinate thing in the sacraments.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 3:5): "Unless a man be born again
of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."
I answer that, In the use of the sacraments two things may be
considered, namely, the worship of God, and the sanctification of man:
the former of which pertains to man as referred to God, and the latter
pertains to God in reference to man. Now it is not for anyone to
determine that which is in the power of another, but only that which is
in his own power. Since, therefore, the sanctification of man is in the
power of God Who sanctifies, it is not for man to decide what things
should be used for his sanctification, but this should be determined by
Divine institution. Therefore in the sacraments of the New Law, by
which man is sanctified according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "You are washed, you
are sanctified," we must use those things which are determined by
Divine institution.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the same thing can be signified by divers
signs, yet to determine which sign must be used belongs to the
signifier. Now it is God Who signifies spiritual things to us by means
of the sensible things in the sacraments, and of similitudes in the
Scriptures. And consequently, just as the Holy Ghost decides by what
similitudes spiritual things are to be signified in certain passages of
Scripture, so also must it be determined by Divine institution what
things are to be employed for the purpose of signification in this or
that sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Sensible things are endowed with natural powers
conducive to the health of the body: and therefore if two of them have
the same virtue, it matters not which we use. Yet they are ordained
unto sanctification not through any power that they possess naturally,
but only in virtue of the Divine institution. And therefore it was
necessary that God should determine the sensible things to be employed
in the sacraments.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), diverse
sacraments suit different times; just as different times are signified
by different parts of the verb, viz. present, past, and future.
Consequently, just as under the state of the Law of nature man was
moved by inward instinct and without any outward law, to worship God,
so also the sensible things to be employed in the worship of God were
determined by inward instinct. But later on it became necessary for a
law to be given (to man) from without: both because the Law of nature
had become obscured by man's sins; and in order to signify more
expressly the grace of Christ, by which the human race is sanctified.
And hence the need for those things to be determinate, of which men
have to make use in the sacraments. Nor is the way of salvation
narrowed thereby: because the things which need to be used in the
sacraments, are either in everyone's possession or can be had with
little trouble.
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Whether words are required for the signification of the sacraments?
Objection 1: It seems that words are not required for the signification
of the sacraments. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): "What else
is a corporeal sacrament but a kind of visible word?" Wherefore to add
words to the sensible things in the sacraments seems to be the same as
to add words to words. But this is superfluous. Therefore words are not
required besides the sensible things in the sacraments .
Objection 2: Further, a sacrament is some one thing, but it does not
seem possible to make one thing of those that belong to different
genera. Since, therefore, sensible things and words are of different
genera, for sensible things are the product of nature, but words, of
reason; it seems that in the sacraments, words are not required besides
sensible things.
Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the New Law succeed those of
the Old Law: since "the former were instituted when the latter were
abolished," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix). But no form of words
was required in the sacraments of the Old Law. Therefore neither is it
required in those of the New Law.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:25,26): "Christ loved the
Church, and delivered Himself up for it; that He might sanctify it,
cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life." And Augustine
says (Tract. xxx in Joan.): "The word is added to the element, and this
becomes a sacrament."
I answer that, The sacraments, as stated above ([4344]AA[2],3), are
employed as signs for man's sanctification. Consequently they can be
considered in three ways: and in each way it is fitting for words to be
added to the sensible signs. For in the first place they can be
considered in regard to the cause of sanctification, which is the Word
incarnate: to Whom the sacraments have a certain conformity, in that
the word is joined to the sensible sign, just as in the mystery of the
Incarnation the Word of God is united to sensible flesh.
Secondly, sacraments may be considered on the part of man who is
sanctified, and who is composed of soul and body: to whom the
sacramental remedy is adjusted, since it touches the body through the
sensible element, and the soul through faith in the words. Hence
Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.) on Jn. 15:3, "Now you are clean
by reason of the word," etc.: "Whence hath water this so great virtue,
to touch the body and wash the heart, but by the word doing it, not
because it is spoken, but because it is believed?"
Thirdly, a sacrament may be considered on the part of the sacramental
signification. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "words
are the principal signs used by men"; because words can be formed in
various ways for the purpose of signifying various mental concepts, so
that we are able to express our thoughts with greater distinctness by
means of words. And therefore in order to insure the perfection of
sacramental signification it was necessary to determine the
signification of the sensible things by means of certain words. For
water may signify both a cleansing by reason of its humidity, and
refreshment by reason of its being cool: but when we say, "I baptize
thee," it is clear that we use water in baptism in order to signify a
spiritual cleansing.
Reply to Objection 1: The sensible elements of the sacraments are
called words by way of a certain likeness, in so far as they partake of
a certain significative power, which resides principally in the very
words, as stated above. Consequently it is not a superfluous repetition
to add words to the visible element in the sacraments; because one
determines the other, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although words and other sensible things are not
in the same genus, considered in their natures, yet have they something
in common as to the thing signified by them: which is more perfectly
done in words than in other things. Wherefore in the sacraments, words
and things, like form and matter, combine in the formation of one
thing, in so far as the signification of things is completed by means
of words, as above stated. And under words are comprised also sensible
actions, such as cleansing and anointing and such like: because they
have a like signification with the things.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), the
sacraments of things present should be different from sacraments of
things to come. Now the sacraments of the Old Law foretold the coming
of Christ. Consequently they did not signify Christ so clearly as the
sacraments of the New Law, which flow from Christ Himself, and have a
certain likeness to Him, as stated above. Nevertheless in the Old Law,
certain words were used in things pertaining to the worship of God,
both by the priests, who were the ministers of those sacraments,
according to Num. 6:23,24: "Thus shall you bless the children of
Israel, and you shall say to them: The Lord bless thee," etc.; and by
those who made use of those sacraments, according to Dt. 26:3: "I
profess this day before the Lord thy God," etc.
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Whether determinate words are required in the sacraments?
Objection 1: It seems that determinate words are not required in the
sacraments. For as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i), "words are not
the same for all." But salvation, which is sought through the
sacraments, is the same for all. Therefore determinate words are not
required in the sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, words are required in the sacraments forasmuch as
they are the principal means of signification, as stated above
[4345](A[6]). But it happens that various words mean the same.
Therefore determinate words are not required in the sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, corruption of anything changes its species. But
some corrupt the pronunciation of words, and yet it is not credible
that the sacramental effect is hindered thereby; else unlettered men
and stammerers, in conferring sacraments, would frequently do so
invalidly. Therefore it seems that determinate words are not required
in the sacraments.
On the contrary, our Lord used determinate words in consecrating the
sacrament of the Eucharist, when He said (Mat. 26:26): "This is My
Body." Likewise He commanded His disciples to baptize under a form of
determinate words, saying (Mat. 28:19): "Go ye and teach all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the
Holy Ghost."
I answer that, As stated above (A[6], ad 2), in the sacraments the
words are as the form, and sensible things are as the matter. Now in
all things composed of matter and form, the determining principle is on
the part of the form, which is as it were the end and terminus of the
matter. Consequently for the being of a thing the need of a determinate
form is prior to the need of determinate matter: for determinate matter
is needed that it may be adapted to the determinate form. Since,
therefore, in the sacraments determinate sensible things are required,
which are as the sacramental matter, much more is there need in them of
a determinate form of words.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super Joan.), the
word operates in the sacraments "not because it is spoken," i.e. not by
the outward sound of the voice, "but because it is believed" in
accordance with the sense of the words which is held by faith. And this
sense is indeed the same for all, though the same words as to their
sound be not used by all. Consequently no matter in what language this
sense is expressed, the sacrament is complete.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it happens in every language that
various words signify the same thing, yet one of those words is that
which those who speak that language use principally and more commonly
to signify that particular thing: and this is the word which should be
used for the sacramental signification. So also among sensible things,
that one is used for the sacramental signification which is most
commonly employed for the action by which the sacramental effect is
signified: thus water is most commonly used by men for bodily
cleansing, by which the spiritual cleansing is signified: and therefore
water is employed as the matter of baptism.
Reply to Objection 3: If he who corrupts the pronunciation of the
sacramental words---does so on purpose, he does not seem to intend to
do what the Church intends: and thus the sacrament seems to be
defective. But if he do this through error or a slip of the tongue, and
if he so far mispronounce the words as to deprive them of sense, the
sacrament seems to be defective. This would be the case especially if
the mispronunciation be in the beginning of a word, for instance, if
one were to say "in nomine matris" instead of "in nomine Patris." If,
however, the sense of the words be not entirely lost by this
mispronunciation, the sacrament is complete. This would be the case
principally if the end of a word be mispronounced; for instance, if one
were to say "patrias et filias." For although the words thus
mispronounced have no appointed meaning, yet we allow them an
accommodated meaning corresponding to the usual forms of speech. And
so, although the sensible sound is changed, yet the sense remains the
same.
What has been said about the various mispronunciations of words, either
at the beginning or at the end, holds forasmuch as with us a change at
the beginning of a word changes the meaning, whereas a change at the
end generally speaking does not effect such a change: whereas with the
Greeks the sense is changed also in the beginning of words in the
conjugation of verbs.
Nevertheless the principle point to observe is the extent of the
corruption entailed by mispronunciation: for in either case it may be
so little that it does not alter the sense of the words; or so great
that it destroys it. But it is easier for the one to happen on the part
of the beginning of the words, and the other at the end.
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Whether it is lawful to add anything to the words in which the sacramental
form consists?
Objection 1: It seems that it is not lawful to add anything to the
words in which the sacramental form consists. For these sacramental
words are not of less importance than are the words of Holy Scripture.
But it is not lawful to add anything to, or to take anything from, the
words of Holy Scripture: for it is written (Dt. 4:2): "You shall not
add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from
it"; and (Apoc. 22:18,19): "I testify to everyone that heareth the
words of the prophecy of this book: if any man shall add to these
things, God shall add to him the plagues written in this book. And if
any man shall take away . . . God shall take away his part out of the
book of life." Therefore it seems that neither is it lawful to add
anything to, or to take anything from, the sacramental forms.
Objection 2: Further, in the sacraments words are by way of form, as
stated above (A[6], ad 2; A[7]). But any addition or subtraction in
forms changes the species, as also in numbers (Metaph. viii). Therefore
it seems that if anything be added to or subtracted from a sacramental
form, it will not be the same sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sacramental form demands a certain
number of words, so does it require that these words should be
pronounced in a certain order and without interruption. If therefore,
the sacrament is not rendered invalid by addition or subtraction of
words, in like manner it seems that neither is it, if the words be
pronounced in a different order or with interruptions.
On the contrary, Certain words are inserted by some in the sacramental
forms, which are not inserted by others: thus the Latins baptize under
this form: "I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son,
and of the Holy Ghost"; whereas the Greeks use the following form: "The
servant of God, N . . . is baptized in the name of the Father," etc.
Yet both confer the sacrament validly. Therefore it is lawful to add
something to, or to take something from, the sacramental forms.
I answer that, With regard to all the variations that may occur in the
sacramental forms, two points seem to call for our attention. one is on
the part of the person who says the words, and whose intention is
essential to the sacrament, as will be explained further on
([4346]Q[64], A[8] ). Wherefore if he intends by such addition or
suppression to perform a rite other from that which is recognized by
the Church, it seems that the sacrament is invalid: because he seems
not to intend to do what the Church does.
The other point to be considered is the meaning of the words. For since
in the sacraments, the words produce an effect according to the sense
which they convey, as stated above (A[7], ad 1), we must see whether
the change of words destroys the essential sense of the words: because
then the sacrament is clearly rendered invalid. Now it is clear, if any
substantial part of the sacramental form be suppressed, that the
essential sense of the words is destroyed; and consequently the
sacrament is invalid. Wherefore Didymus says (De Spir. Sanct. ii): "If
anyone attempt to baptize in such a way as to omit one of the aforesaid
names," i.e. of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, "his baptism will be
invalid." But if that which is omitted be not a substantial part of the
form, such an omission does not destroy the essential sense of the
words, nor consequently the validity of the sacrament. Thus in the form
of the Eucharist---"For this is My Body," the omission of the word
"for" does not destroy the essential sense of the words, nor
consequently cause the sacrament to be invalid; although perhaps he who
makes the omission may sin from negligence or contempt.
Again, it is possible to add something that destroys the essential
sense of the words: for instance, if one were to say: "I baptize thee
in the name of the Father Who is greater, and of the Son Who is less,"
with which form the Arians baptized: and consequently such an addition
makes the sacrament invalid. But if the addition be such as not to
destroy the essential sense, the sacrament is not rendered invalid. Nor
does it matter whether this addition be made at the beginning, in the
middle, or at the end: For instance, if one were to say, "I baptize
thee in the name of the Father Almighty, and of the only Begotten Son,
and of the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete," the baptism would be valid; and
in like manner if one were to say, "I baptize thee in the name of the
Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost"; and may the Blessed
Virgin succour thee, the baptism would be valid.
Perhaps, however, if one were to say, "I baptize thee in the name of
the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and of the Blessed
Virgin Mary," the baptism would be void; because it is written (1 Cor.
1:13): "Was Paul crucified for you or were you baptized in the name of
Paul?" But this is true if the intention be to baptize in the name of
the Blessed Virgin as in the name of the Trinity, by which baptism is
consecrated: for such a sense would be contrary to faith, and would
therefore render the sacrament invalid: whereas if the addition, "and
in the name of the Blessed Virgin" be understood, not as if the name of
the Blessed Virgin effected anything in baptism, but as intimating that
her intercession may help the person baptized to preserve the baptismal
grace, then the sacrament is not rendered void.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not lawful to add anything to the words of
Holy Scripture as regards the sense; but many words are added by
Doctors by way of explanation of the Holy Scriptures. Nevertheless, it
is not lawful to add even words to Holy Scripture as though such words
were a part thereof, for this would amount to forgery. It would amount
to the same if anyone were to pretend that something is essential to a
sacramental form, which is not so.
Reply to Objection 2: Words belong to a sacramental form by reason of
the sense signified by them. Consequently any addition or suppression
of words which does not add to or take from the essential sense, does
not destroy the essence of the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: If the words are interrupted to such an extent
that the intention of the speaker is interrupted, the sacramental sense
is destroyed, and consequently, the validity of the sacrament. But this
is not the case if the interruption of the speaker is so slight, that
his intention and the sense of the words is not interrupted.
The same is to be said of a change in the order of the words. Because
if this destroys the sense of the words, the sacrament is invalidated:
as happens when a negation is made to precede or follow a word. But if
the order is so changed that the sense of the words does not vary, the
sacrament is not invalidated, according to the Philosopher's dictum:
"Nouns and verbs mean the same though they be transposed" (Peri Herm.
x).
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OF THE NECESSITY OF THE SACRAMENTS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the necessity of the sacraments; concerning which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sacraments are necessary for man's salvation?
(2) Whether they were necessary in the state that preceded sin?
(3) Whether they were necessary in the state after sin and before
Christ?
(4) Whether they were necessary after Christ's coming?
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Whether sacraments are necessary for man's salvation?
Objection 1: It seems that sacraments are not necessary for man's
salvation. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): "Bodily exercise is
profitable to little." But the use of sacraments pertains to bodily
exercise; because sacraments are perfected in the signification of
sensible things and words, as stated above ([4347]Q[60], A[6]).
Therefore sacraments are not necessary for the salvation of man.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle was told (2 Cor. 12:9): "My grace is
sufficient for thee." But it would not suffice if sacraments were
necessary for salvation. Therefore sacraments are not necessary for
man's salvation.
Objection 3: Further, given a sufficient cause, nothing more seems to
be required for the effect. But Christ's Passion is the sufficient
cause of our salvation; for the Apostle says (Rom. 5:10): "If, when we
were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son: much
more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by His life." Therefore
sacraments are not necessary for man's salvation.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): "It is impossible
to keep men together in one religious denomination, whether true or
false, except they be united by means of visible signs or sacraments."
But it is necessary for salvation that men be united together in the
name of the one true religion. Therefore sacraments are necessary for
man's salvation.
I answer that, Sacraments are necessary unto man's salvation for three
reasons. The first is taken from the condition of human nature which is
such that it has to be led by things corporeal and sensible to things
spiritual and intelligible. Now it belongs to Divine providence to
provide for each one according as its condition requires. Divine
wisdom, therefore, fittingly provides man with means of salvation, in
the shape of corporeal and sensible signs that are called sacraments.
The second reason is taken from the state of man who in sinning
subjected himself by his affections to corporeal things. Now the
healing remedy should be given to a man so as to reach the part
affected by disease. Consequently it was fitting that God should
provide man with a spiritual medicine by means of certain corporeal
signs; for if man were offered spiritual things without a veil, his
mind being taken up with the material world would be unable to apply
itself to them.
The third reason is taken from the fact that man is prone to direct his
activity chiefly towards material things. Lest, therefore, it should be
too hard for man to be drawn away entirely from bodily actions, bodily
exercise was offered to him in the sacraments, by which he might be
trained to avoid superstitious practices, consisting in the worship of
demons, and all manner of harmful action, consisting in sinful deeds.
It follows, therefore, that through the institution of the sacraments
man, consistently with his nature, is instructed through sensible
things; he is humbled, through confessing that he is subject to
corporeal things, seeing that he receives assistance through them: and
he is even preserved from bodily hurt, by the healthy exercise of the
sacraments.
Reply to Objection 1: Bodily exercise, as such, is not very profitable:
but exercise taken in the use of the sacraments is not merely bodily,
but to a certain extent spiritual, viz. in its signification and in its
causality.
Reply to Objection 2: God's grace is a sufficient cause of man's
salvation. But God gives grace to man in a way which is suitable to
him. Hence it is that man needs the sacraments that he may obtain
grace.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion is a sufficient cause of man's
salvation. But it does not follow that the sacraments are not also
necessary for that purpose: because they obtain their effect through
the power of Christ's Passion; and Christ's Passion is, so to say,
applied to man through the sacraments according to the Apostle (Rom.
6:3): "All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His
death."
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Whether before sin sacraments were necessary to man?
Objection 1: It seems that before sin sacraments were necessary to man.
For, as stated above (A[1], ad 2) man needs sacraments that he may
obtain grace. But man needed grace even in the state of innocence, as
we stated in the [4348]FP, Q[95], A[4] (cf. [4349]FS, Q[109], A[2];
[4350]FS, Q[114], A[2]). Therefore sacraments were necessary in that
state also.
Objection 2: Further, sacraments are suitable to man by reason of the
conditions of human nature, as stated above [4351](A[1]). But man's
nature is the same before and after sin. Therefore it seems that before
sin, man needed the sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, matrimony is a sacrament, according to Eph. 5:32:
"This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."
But matrimony was instituted before sin, as may be seen in Gn. 2.
Therefore sacraments were necessary to man before sin.
On the contrary, None but the sick need remedies, according to Mat.
9:12: "They that are in health need not a physician." Now the
sacraments are spiritual remedies for the healing of wounds inflicted
by sin. Therefore they were not necessary before sin.
I answer that, Sacraments were not necessary in the state of innocence.
This can be proved from the rectitude of that state, in which the
higher (parts of man) ruled the lower, and nowise depended on them: for
just as the mind was subject to God, so were the lower powers of the
soul subject to the mind, and the body to the soul. And it would be
contrary to this order if the soul were perfected either in knowledge
or in grace, by anything corporeal; which happens in the sacraments.
Therefore in the state of innocence man needed no sacraments, whether
as remedies against sin or as means of perfecting the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: In the state of innocence man needed grace: not
so that he needed to obtain grace by means of sensible signs, but in a
spiritual and invisible manner.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's nature is the same before and after sin,
but the state of his nature is not the same. Because after sin, the
soul, even in its higher part, needs to receive something from
corporeal things in order that it may be perfected: whereas man had no
need of this in that state.
Reply to Objection 3: Matrimony was instituted in the state of
innocence, not as a sacrament, but as a function of nature.
Consequently, however, it foreshadowed something in relation to Christ
and the Church: just as everything else foreshadowed Christ.
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Whether there should have been sacraments after sin, before Christ?
Objection 1: It seems that there should have been no sacraments after
sin, before Christ. For it has been stated that the Passion of Christ
is applied to men through the sacraments: so that Christ's Passion is
compared to the sacraments as cause to effect. But effect does not
precede cause. Therefore there should have been no sacraments before
Christ's coming.
Objection 2: Further, sacraments should be suitable to the state of the
human race, as Augustine declares (Contra Faust. xix). But the state of
the human race underwent no change after sin until it was repaired by
Christ. Neither, therefore, should the sacraments have been changed, so
that besides the sacraments of the natural law, others should be
instituted in the law of Moses.
Objection 3: Further, the nearer a thing approaches to that which is
perfect, the more like it should it be. Now the perfection of human
salvation was accomplished by Christ; to Whom the sacraments of the Old
Law were nearer than those that preceded the Law. Therefore they should
have borne a greater likeness to the sacraments of Christ. And yet the
contrary is the case, since it was foretold that the priesthood of
Christ would be "according to the order of Melchisedech, and not . . .
according to the order of Aaron" (Heb. 7:11). Therefore sacraments were
unsuitably instituted before Christ.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix) that "the first
sacraments which the Law commanded to be solemnized and observed were
announcements of Christ's future coming." But it was necessary for
man's salvation that Christ's coming should be announced beforehand.
Therefore it was necessary that some sacraments should be instituted
before Christ.
I answer that, Sacraments are necessary for man's salvation, in so far
as they are sensible signs of invisible things whereby man is made
holy. Now after sin no man can be made holy save through Christ, "Whom
God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood, to
the showing of His justice . . . that He Himself may be just, and the
justifier of him who is of the faith of Jesus Christ" (Rom. 3:25,26).
Therefore before Christ's coming there was need for some visible signs
whereby man might testify to his faith in the future coming of a
Saviour. And these signs are called sacraments. It is therefore clear
that some sacraments were necessary before Christ's coming.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's Passion is the final cause of the old
sacraments: for they were instituted in order to foreshadow it. Now the
final cause precedes not in time, but in the intention of the agent.
Consequently, there is no reason against the existence of sacraments
before Christ's Passion.
Reply to Objection 2: The state of the human race after sin and before
Christ can be considered from two points of view. First, from that of
faith: and thus it was always one and the same: since men were made
righteous, through faith in the future coming of Christ. Secondly,
according as sin was more or less intense, and knowledge concerning
Christ more or less explicit. For as time went on sin gained a greater
hold on man, so much so that it clouded man's reason, the consequence
being that the precepts of the natural law were insufficient to make
man live aright, and it became necessary to have a written code of
fixed laws, and together with these certain sacraments of faith. For it
was necessary, as time went on, that the knowledge of faith should be
more and more unfolded, since, as Gregory says (Hom. vi in Ezech.):
"With the advance of time there was an advance in the knowledge of
Divine things." Consequently in the old Law there was also a need for
certain fixed sacraments significative of man's faith in the future
coming of Christ: which sacraments are compared to those that preceded
the Law, as something determinate to that which is indeterminate:
inasmuch as before the Law it was not laid down precisely of what
sacraments men were to make use: whereas this was prescribed by the
Law; and this was necessary both on account of the overclouding of the
natural law, and for the clearer signification of faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The sacrament of Melchisedech which preceded the
Law is more like the Sacrament of the New Law in its matter: in so far
as "he offered bread and wine" (Gn. 14:18), just as bread and wine are
offered in the sacrifice of the New Testament. Nevertheless the
sacraments of the Mosaic Law are more like the thing signified by the
sacrament, i.e. the Passion of Christ: as clearly appears in the
Paschal Lamb and such like. The reason of this was lest, if the
sacraments retained the same appearance, it might seem to be the
continuation of one and the same sacrament, where there was no
interruption of time.
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Whether there was need for any sacraments after Christ came?
Objection 1: It seems that there was no need for any sacraments after
Christ came. For the figure should cease with the advent of the truth.
But "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (Jn. 1:17). Since,
therefore, the sacraments are signs or figures of the truth, it seems
that there was no need for any sacraments after Christ's Passion.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments consist in certain elements, as
stated above ([4352]Q[60], A[4]). But the Apostle says (Gal. 4:3,4)
that "when we were children we were serving under the elements of the
world": but that now "when the fulness of time" has "come," we are no
longer children. Therefore it seems that we should not serve God under
the elements of this world, by making use of corporeal sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, according to James 1:17 with God "there is no
change, nor shadow of alteration." But it seems to argue some change in
the Divine will that God should give man certain sacraments for his
sanctification now during the time of grace, and other sacraments
before Christ's coming. Therefore it seems that other sacraments should
not have been instituted after Christ.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix) that the sacraments
of the Old Law "were abolished because they were fulfilled; and others
were instituted, fewer in number, but more efficacious, more
profitable, and of easier accomplishment."
I answer that, As the ancient Fathers were saved through faith in
Christ's future coming, so are we saved through faith in Christ's past
birth and Passion. Now the sacraments are signs in protestation of the
faith whereby man is justified; and signs should vary according as they
signify the future, the past, or the present; for as Augustine says
(Contra Faust. xix), "the same thing is variously pronounced as to be
done and as having been done: for instance the word 'passurus' [going
to suffer] differs from 'passus' [having suffered]." Therefore the
sacraments of the New Law, that signify Christ in relation to the past,
must needs differ from those of the Old Law, that foreshadowed the
future.
Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), the state of
the New Law. is between the state of the Old Law, whose figures are
fulfilled in the New, and the state of glory, in which all truth will
be openly and perfectly revealed. Wherefore then there will be no
sacraments. But now, so long as we know "through a glass in a dark
manner," (1 Cor. 13:12) we need sensible signs in order to reach
spiritual things: and this is the province of the sacraments.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle calls the sacraments of the Old Law
"weak and needy elements" (Gal. 4:9) because they neither contained nor
caused grace. Hence the Apostle says that those who used these
sacraments served God "under the elements of this world": for the very
reason that these sacraments were nothing else than the elements of
this world. But our sacraments both contain and cause grace:
consequently the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the head of the house is not proved to
have a changeable mind, through issuing various commands to his
household at various seasons, ordering things differently in winter and
summer; so it does not follow that there is any change in God, because
He instituted sacraments of one kind after Christ's coming, and of
another kind at the time of the Law. because the latter were suitable
as foreshadowing grace; the former as signifying the presence of grace,
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SACRAMENTS' PRINCIPAL EFFECT, WHICH IS GRACE (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the effect of the sacraments. First of their
principal effect, which is grace; secondly, of their secondary effect,
which is a character. Concerning the first there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether the sacraments of the New Law are the cause of grace?
(2) Whether sacramental grace confers anything in addition to the grace
of the virtues and gifts?
(3) Whether the sacraments contain grace?
(4) Whether there is any power in them for the causing of grace?
(5) Whether the sacraments derive this power from Christ's Passion?
(6) Whether the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace?
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Whether the sacraments are the cause of grace?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments are not the cause of grace.
For it seems that the same thing is not both sign and cause: since the
nature of sign appears to be more in keeping with an effect. But a
sacrament is a sign of grace. Therefore it is not its cause.
Objection 2: Further, nothing corporeal can act on a spiritual thing:
since "the agent is more excellent than the patient," as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii). But the subject of grace is the human mind, which
is something spiritual. Therefore the sacraments cannot cause grace.
Objection 3: Further, what is proper to God should not be ascribed to a
creature. But it is proper to God to cause grace, according to Ps.
83:12: "The Lord will give grace and glory." Since, therefore, the
sacraments consist in certain words and created things, it seems that
they cannot cause grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.) that the
baptismal water "touches the body and cleanses the heart." But the
heart is not cleansed save through grace. Therefore it causes grace:
and for like reason so do the other sacraments of the Church.
I answer that, We must needs say that in some way the sacraments of the
New Law cause grace. For it is evident that through the sacraments of
the New Law man is incorporated with Christ: thus the Apostle says of
Baptism (Gal. 3:27): "As many of you as have been baptized in Christ
have put on Christ." And man is made a member of Christ through grace
alone.
Some, however, say that they are the cause of grace not by their own
operation, but in so far as God causes grace in the soul when the
sacraments are employed. And they give as an example a man who on
presenting a leaden coin, receives, by the king's command, a hundred
pounds: not as though the leaden coin, by any operation of its own,
caused him to be given that sum of money; this being the effect of the
mere will of the king. Hence Bernard says in a sermon on the Lord's
Supper: "Just as a canon is invested by means of a book, an abbot by
means of a crozier, a bishop by means of a ring, so by the various
sacraments various kinds of grace are conferred." But if we examine the
question properly, we shall see that according to the above mode the
sacraments are mere signs. For the leaden coin is nothing but a sign of
the king's command that this man should receive money. In like manner
the book is a sign of the conferring of a canonry. Hence, according to
this opinion the sacraments of the New Law would be mere signs of
grace; whereas we have it on the authority of many saints that the
sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but also cause grace.
We must therefore say otherwise, that an efficient cause is twofold,
principal and instrumental. The principal cause works by the power of
its form, to which form the effect is likened; just as fire by its own
heat makes something hot. In this way none but God can cause grace:
since grace is nothing else than a participated likeness of the Divine
Nature, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: "He hath given us most great and
precious promises; that we may be [Vulg.: 'you may be made'] partakers
of the Divine Nature." But the instrumental cause works not by the
power of its form, but only by the motion whereby it is moved by the
principal agent: so that the effect is not likened to the instrument
but to the principal agent: for instance, the couch is not like the
axe, but like the art which is in the craftsman's mind. And it is thus
that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace: for they are instituted
by God to be employed for the purpose of conferring grace. Hence
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): "All these things," viz. pertaining
to the sacraments, "are done and pass away, but the power," viz. of
God, "which works by them, remains ever." Now that is, properly
speaking, an instrument by which someone works: wherefore it is written
(Titus 3:5): "He saved us by the laver of regeneration."
Reply to Objection 1: The principal cause cannot properly be called a
sign of its effect, even though the latter be hidden and the cause
itself sensible and manifest. But an instrumental cause, if manifest,
can be called a sign of a hidden effect, for this reason, that it is
not merely a cause but also in a measure an effect in so far as it is
moved by the principal agent. And in this sense the sacraments of the
New Law are both cause and signs. Hence, too, is it that, to use the
common expression, "they effect what they signify." From this it is
clear that they perfectly fulfil the conditions of a sacrament; being
ordained to something sacred, not only as a sign, but also as a cause.
Reply to Objection 2: An instrument has a twofold action; one is
instrumental, in respect of which it works not by its own power but by
the power of the principal agent: the other is its proper action, which
belongs to it in respect of its proper form: thus it belongs to an axe
to cut asunder by reason of its sharpness, but to make a couch, in so
far as it is the instrument of an art. But it does not accomplish the
instrumental action save by exercising its proper action: for it is by
cutting that it makes a couch. In like manner the corporeal sacraments
by their operation, which they exercise on the body that they touch,
accomplish through the Divine institution an instrumental operation on
the soul; for example, the water of baptism, in respect of its proper
power, cleanses the body, and thereby, inasmuch as it is the instrument
of the Divine power, cleanses the soul: since from soul and body one
thing is made. And thus it is that Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii)
that it "touches the body and cleanses the heart."
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers that which causes grace
as principal agent; for this belongs to God alone, as stated above.
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Whether sacramental grace confers anything in addition to the grace of the
virtues and gifts?
Objection 1: It seems that sacramental grace confers nothing in
addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts. For the grace of the
virtues and gifts perfects the soul sufficiently, both in its essence
and in its powers; as is clear from what was said in the [4353]FS,
Q[110], AA[3],4. But grace is ordained to the perfecting of the soul.
Therefore sacramental grace cannot confer anything in addition to the
grace of the virtues and gifts.
Objection 2: Further, the soul's defects are caused by sin. But all
sins are sufficiently removed by the grace of the virtues and gifts:
because there is no sin that is not contrary to some virtue. Since,
therefore, sacramental grace is ordained to the removal of the soul's
defects, it cannot confer anything in addition to the grace of the
virtues and gifts.
Objection 3: Further, every addition or subtraction of form varies the
species (Metaph. viii). If, therefore, sacramental grace confers
anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts, it follows
that it is called grace equivocally: and so we are none the wiser when
it is said that the sacraments cause grace.
On the contrary, If sacramental grace confers nothing in addition to
the grace of the virtues and gifts, it is useless to confer the
sacraments on those who have the virtues and gifts. But there is
nothing useless in God's works. Therefore it seems that sacramental
grace confers something in addition to the grace of the virtues and
gifts.
I answer that, As stated in the [4354]FS, Q[110], AA[3],4, grace,
considered in itself, perfects the essence of the soul, in so far as it
is a certain participated likeness of the Divine Nature. And just as
the soul's powers flow from its essence, so from grace there flow
certain perfections into the powers of the soul, which are called
virtues and gifts, whereby the powers are perfected in reference to
their actions. Now the sacraments are ordained unto certain special
effects which are necessary in the Christian life: thus Baptism is
ordained unto a certain spiritual regeneration, by which man dies to
vice and becomes a member of Christ: which effect is something special
in addition to the actions of the soul's powers: and the same holds
true of the other sacraments. Consequently just as the virtues and
gifts confer, in addition to grace commonly so called, a certain
special perfection ordained to the powers' proper actions, so does
sacramental grace confer, over and above grace commonly so called, and
in addition to the virtues and gifts, a certain Divine assistance in
obtaining the end of the sacrament. It is thus that sacramental grace
confers something in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.
Reply to Objection 1: The grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the
essence and powers of the soul sufficiently as regards ordinary
conduct: but as regards certain special effects which are necessary in
a Christian life, sacramental grace is needed.
Reply to Objection 2: Vices and sins are sufficiently removed by
virtues and gifts, as to present and future time. in so far as they
prevent man from sinning. But in regard to past sins, the acts of which
are transitory whereas their guilt remains, man is provided with a
special remedy in the sacraments.
Reply to Objection 3: Sacramental grace is compared to grace commonly
so called, as species to genus. Wherefore just as it is not equivocal
to use the term "animal" in its generic sense, and as applied to a man,
so neither is it equivocal to speak of grace commonly so called and of
sacramental grace.
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Whether the sacraments of the New Law contain grace?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments of the New Law do not contain
grace. For it seems that what is contained is in the container. But
grace is not in the sacraments; neither as in a subject, because the
subject of grace is not a body but a spirit; nor as in a vessel, for
according to Phys. iv, "a vessel is a movable place," and an accident
cannot be in a place. Therefore it seems that the sacraments of the New
Law do not contain grace.
Objection 2: Further, sacraments are instituted as means whereby men
may obtain grace. But since grace is an accident it cannot pass from
one subject to another. Therefore it would be of no account if grace
were in the sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, a spiritual thing is not contained by a
corporeal, even if it be therein; for the soul is not contained by the
body; rather does it contain the body. Since, therefore, grace is
something spiritual, it seems that it cannot be contained in a
corporeal sacrament.
On the contrary, Hugh of S. Victor says (De Sacram. i) that "a
sacrament, through its being sanctified, contains an invisible grace."
I answer that, A thing is said to be in another in various ways; in two
of which grace is said to be in the sacraments. First, as in its sign;
for a sacrament is a sign of grace. Secondly, as in its cause; for, as
stated above [4355](A[1]) a sacrament of the New Law is an instrumental
cause of grace. Wherefore grace is in a sacrament of the New Law, not
as to its specific likeness, as an effect in its univocal cause; nor as
to some proper and permanent form proportioned to such an effect, as
effects in non-univocal causes, for instance, as things generated are
in the sun; but as to a certain instrumental power transient and
incomplete in its natural being, as will be explained later on
[4356](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: Grace is said to be in a sacrament not as in its
subject; nor as in a vessel considered as a place, but understood as
the instrument of some work to be done, according to Ezech. 9:1:
"Everyone hath a destroying vessel [Douay: 'weapon'] in his hand."
Reply to Objection 2: Although an accident does not pass from one
subject to another, nevertheless in a fashion it does pass from its
cause into its subject through the instrument; not so that it be in
each of these in the same way, but in each according to its respective
nature.
Reply to Objection 3: If a spiritual thing exist perfectly in
something, it contains it and is not contained by it. But, in a
sacrament, grace has a passing and incomplete mode of being: and
consequently it is not unfitting to say that the sacraments contain
grace.
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Whether there be in the sacraments a power of causing grace?
Objection 1: It seems that there is not in the sacraments a power of
causing grace. For the power of causing grace is a spiritual power. But
a spiritual power cannot be in a body; neither as proper to it, because
power flows from a thing's essence and consequently cannot transcend
it; nor as derived from something else, because that which is received
into anything follows the mode of the recipient. Therefore in the
sacraments there is no power of causing grace.
Objection 2: Further, whatever exists is reducible to some kind of
being and some degree of good. But there is no assignable kind of being
to which such a power can belong; as anyone may see by running. through
them all. Nor is it reducible to some degree of good; for neither is it
one of the goods of least account, since sacraments are necessary for
salvation: nor is it an intermediate good, such as are the powers of
the soul, which are natural powers; nor is it one of the greater goods,
for it is neither grace nor a virtue of the mind. Therefore it seems
that in the sacraments there is no power of causing grace.
Objection 3: Further, if there be such a power in the sacraments, its
presence there must be due to nothing less than a creative act of God.
But it seems unbecoming that so excellent a being created by God should
cease to exist as soon as the sacrament is complete. Therefore it seems
that in the sacraments there is no power for causing grace.
Objection 4: Further, the same thing cannot be in several. But several
things concur in the completion of a sacrament, namely, words and
things: while in one sacrament there can be but one power. Therefore it
seems that there is no power of causing grace in the sacraments.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.): "Whence hath
water so great power, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart?"
And Bede says that "Our Lord conferred a power of regeneration on the
waters by the contact of His most pure body."
I answer that, Those who hold that the sacraments do not cause grace
save by a certain coincidence, deny the sacraments any power that is
itself productive of the sacramental effect, and hold that the Divine
power assists the sacraments and produces their effect. But if we hold
that a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace, we must needs allow
that there is in the sacraments a certain instrumental power of
bringing about the sacramental effects. Now such power is proportionate
to the instrument: and consequently it stands in comparison to the
complete and perfect power of anything, as the instrument to the
principal agent. For an instrument, as stated above [4357](A[1]), does
not work save as moved by the principal agent, which works of itself.
And therefore the power of the principal agent exists in nature
completely and perfectly: whereas the instrumental power has a being
that passes from one thing into another, and is incomplete; just as
motion is an imperfect act passing from agent to patient.
Reply to Objection 1: A spiritual power cannot be in a corporeal
subject, after the manner of a permanent and complete power, as the
argument proves. But there is nothing to hinder an instrumental
spiritual power from being in a body; in so far as a body can be moved
by a particular spiritual substance so as to produce a particular
spiritual effect; thus in the very voice which is perceived by the
senses there is a certain spiritual power, inasmuch as it proceeds from
a mental concept, of arousing the mind of the hearer. It is in this way
that a spiritual power is in the sacraments, inasmuch as they are
ordained by God unto the production of a spiritual effect.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as motion, through being an imperfect act,
is not properly in a genus, but is reducible to a genus of perfect act,
for instance, alteration to the genus of quality: so, instrumental
power, properly speaking, is not in any genus, but is reducible to a
genus and species of perfect act.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as an instrumental power accrues to an
instrument through its being moved by the principal agent, so does a
sacrament receive spiritual power from Christ's blessing and from the
action of the minister in applying it to a sacramental use. Hence
Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (St. Maximus of Turin, Serm.
xii): "Nor should you marvel, if we say that water, a corporeal
substance, achieves the cleansing of the soul. It does indeed, and
penetrates every secret hiding-place of the conscience. For subtle and
clear as it is, the blessing of Christ makes it yet more subtle, so
that it permeates into the very principles of life and searches the
inner-most recesses of the heart."
Reply to Objection 4: Just as the one same power of the principal agent
is instrumentally in all the instruments that are ordained unto the
production of an effect, forasmuch as they are one as being so
ordained: so also the one same sacramental power is in both words and
things, forasmuch as words and things combine to form one sacrament.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sacraments of the New Law derive their power from Christ's
Passion?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments of the New Law do not derive
their power from Christ's Passion. For the power of the sacraments is
in the causing of grace which is the principle of spiritual life in the
soul. But as Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.): "The Word, as He was
in the beginning with God, quickens souls; as He was made flesh,
quickens bodies." Since, therefore, Christ's Passion pertains to the
Word as made flesh, it seems that it cannot cause the power of the
sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, the power of the sacraments seems to depend on
faith. for as Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.), the Divine Word
perfects the sacrament "not because it is spoken, but because it is
believed." But our faith regards not only Christ's Passion, but also
the other mysteries of His humanity, and in a yet higher measure, His
Godhead. Therefore it seems that the power of the sacraments is not due
specially to Christ's Passion.
Objection 3: Further, the sacraments are ordained unto man's
justification, according to 1 Cor. 6:11: "You are washed . . . you are
justified." Now justification is ascribed to the Resurrection,
according to Rom. 4:25: "(Who) rose again for our justification."
Therefore it seems that the sacraments derive their power from Christ's
Resurrection rather than from His Passion.
On the contrary, on Rom. 5:14: "After the similitude of the
transgression of Adam," etc., the gloss says: "From the side of Christ
asleep on the Cross flowed the sacraments which brought salvation to
the Church." Consequently, it seems that the sacraments derive their
power from Christ's Passion.
I answer that, As stated above [4358](A[1]) a sacrament in causing
grace works after the manner of an instrument. Now an instrument is
twofold. the one, separate, as a stick, for instance; the other,
united, as a hand. Moreover, the separate instrument is moved by means
of the united instrument, as a stick by the hand. Now the principal
efficient cause of grace is God Himself, in comparison with Whom
Christ's humanity is as a united instrument, whereas the sacrament is
as a separate instrument. Consequently, the saving power must needs be
derived by the sacraments from Christ's Godhead through His humanity.
Now sacramental grace seems to be ordained principally to two things:
namely, to take away the defects consequent on past sins, in so far as
they are transitory in act, but endure in guilt; and, further, to
perfect the soul in things pertaining to Divine Worship in regard to
the Christian Religion. But it is manifest from what has been stated
above ([4359]Q[48], AA[1],2,6;[4360] Q[49], AA[1],3) that Christ
delivered us from our sins principally through His Passion, not only by
way of efficiency and merit, but also by way of satisfaction. Likewise
by His Passion He inaugurated the Rites of the Christian Religion by
offering "Himself---an oblation and a sacrifice to God" (Eph. 5:2).
Wherefore it is manifest that the sacraments of the Church derive their
power specially from Christ's Passion, the virtue of which is in a
manner united to us by our receiving the sacraments. It was in sign of
this that from the side of Christ hanging on the Cross there flowed
water and blood, the former of which belongs to Baptism, the latter to
the Eucharist, which are the principal sacraments.
Reply to Objection 1: The Word, forasmuch as He was in the beginning
with God, quickens souls as principal agent; but His flesh, and the
mysteries accomplished therein, are as instrumental causes in the
process of giving life to the soul: while in giving life to the body
they act not only as instrumental causes, but also to a certain extent
as exemplars, as we stated above ([4361]Q[56], A[1], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: Christ dwells in us "by faith" (Eph. 3:17).
Consequently, by faith Christ's power is united to us. Now the power of
blotting out sin belongs in a special way to His Passion. And therefore
men are delivered from sin especially by faith in His Passion,
according to Rom. 3:25: "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation
through faith in His Blood." Therefore the power of the sacraments
which is ordained unto the remission of sins is derived principally
from faith in Christ's Passion.
Reply to Objection 3: Justification is ascribed to the Resurrection by
reason of the term "whither," which is newness of life through grace.
But it is ascribed to the Passion by reason of the term "whence," i.e.
in regard to the forgiveness of sin.
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Whether the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace.
For, as stated above (A[5], ad 2) the sacraments of the New Law derive
their efficacy from faith in Christ's Passion. But there was faith in
Christ's Passion under the Old Law, as well as under the New, since we
have "the same spirit of faith" (2 Cor. 4:13). Therefore just as the
sacraments of the New Law confer grace, so did the sacraments of the
Old Law.
Objection 2: Further, there is no sanctification save by grace. But men
were sanctified by the sacraments of the Old Law: for it is written
(Lev. 8:31): "And when he," i.e. Moses, "had sanctified them," i.e.
Aaron and his sons, "in their vestments," etc. Therefore it seems that
the sacraments of the Old Law conferred grace.
Objection 3: Further, Bede says in a homily on the Circumcision: "Under
the Law circumcision provided the same health-giving balm against the
wound of original sin, as baptism in the time of revealed grace." But
Baptism confers grace now. Therefore circumcision conferred grace; and
in like manner, the other sacraments of the Law; for just as Baptism is
the door of the sacraments of the New Law, so was circumcision the door
of the sacraments of the Old Law: hence the Apostle says (Gal. 5:3): "I
testify to every man circumcising himself, that he is a debtor to the
whole law."
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:9): "Turn you again to the weak
and needy elements?" i.e. "to the Law," says the gloss, "which is
called weak, because it does not justify perfectly." But grace
justifies perfectly. Therefore the sacraments of the old Law did not
confer grace.
I answer that, It cannot be said that the sacraments of the Old Law
conferred sanctifying grace of themselves, i.e. by their own power:
since thus Christ's Passion would not have been necessary, according to
Gal. 2:21: "If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain."
But neither can it be said that they derived the power of conferring
sanctifying grace from Christ's Passion. For as it was stated above
(A[5] ), the power of Christ's Passion is united to us by faith and the
sacraments, but in different ways; because the link that comes from
faith is produced by an act of the soul; whereas the link that comes
from the sacraments, is produced by making use of exterior things. Now
nothing hinders that which is subsequent in point of time, from causing
movement, even before it exists in reality, in so far as it pre-exists
in an act of the soul: thus the end, which is subsequent in point of
time, moves the agent in so far as it is apprehended and desired by
him. On the other hand, what does not yet actually exist, does not
cause movement if we consider the use of exterior things. Consequently,
the efficient cause cannot in point of time come into existence after
causing movement, as does the final cause. It is therefore clear that
the sacraments of the New Law do reasonably derive the power of
justification from Christ's Passion, which is the cause of man's
righteousness; whereas the sacraments of the Old Law did not.
Nevertheless the Fathers of old were justified by faith in Christ's
Passion, just as we are. And the sacraments of the old Law were a kind
of protestation of that faith, inasmuch as they signified Christ's
Passion and its effects. It is therefore manifest that the sacraments
of the Old Law were not endowed with any power by which they conduced
to the bestowal of justifying grace: and they merely signified faith by
which men were justified.
Reply to Objection 1: The Fathers of old had faith in the future
Passion of Christ, which, inasmuch as it was apprehended by the mind,
was able to justify them. But we have faith in the past Passion of
Christ, which is able to justify, also by the real use of sacramental
things as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: That sanctification was but a figure: for they
were said to be sanctified forasmuch as they gave themselves up to the
Divine worship according to the rite of the Old Law, which was wholly
ordained to the foreshadowing of Christ's Passion.
Reply to Objection 3: There have been many opinions about Circumcision.
For, according to some, Circumcision conferred no grace, but only
remitted sin. But this is impossible; because man is not justified from
sin save by grace, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely by
His grace."
Wherefore others said that by Circumcision grace is conferred, as to
the privative effects of sin, but not as to its positive effects. But
this also appears to be false, because by Circumcision, children
received the faculty of obtaining glory, which is the ultimate positive
effect of grace. Moreover, as regards the order of the formal cause,
positive effects are naturally prior to privative effects, though
according to the order of the material cause, the reverse is the case:
for a form does not exclude privation save by informing the subject.
Hence others say that Circumcision conferred grace also as regards a
certain positive effect, i.e. by making man worthy of eternal life, but
not so as to repress concupiscence which makes man prone to sin. And so
at one time it seemed to me. But if the matter be considered carefully,
this too appears to be untrue; because the very least grace is
sufficient to resist any degree of concupiscence, and to merit eternal
life.
And therefore it seems better to say that Circumcision was a sign of
justifying faith: wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 4:11) that Abraham
"received the sign of Circumcision, a seal of the justice of faith."
Consequently grace was conferred in Circumcision in so far as it was a
sign of Christ's future Passion, as will be made clear further on
([4362]Q[70], A[4]).
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OF THE OTHER EFFECT OF THE SACRAMENTS, WHICH IS A CHARACTER (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the other effect of the sacraments, which is a
character: and concerning this there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether by the sacraments a character is produced in the soul?
(2) What is this character?
(3) Of whom is this character?
(4) What is its subject?
(5) Is it indelible?
(6) Whether every sacrament imprints a character?
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Whether a sacrament imprints a character on the soul?
Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament does not imprint a character on
the soul. For the word "character" seems to signify some kind of
distinctive sign. But Christ's members are distinguished from others by
eternal predestination, which does not imply anything in the
predestined, but only in God predestinating, as we have stated in the
[4363]FP, Q[23], A[2]. For it is written (2 Tim. 2:19): "The sure
foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal: The Lord knoweth who
are His." Therefore the sacraments do not imprint a character on the
soul.
Objection 2: Further, a character is a distinctive sign. Now a sign, as
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) "is that which conveys something
else to the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the
senses." But nothing in the soul can impress a species on the senses.
Therefore it seems that no character is imprinted on the soul by the
sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, just as the believer is distinguished from the
unbeliever by the sacraments of the New Law, so was it under the Old
Law. But the sacraments of the Old Law did not imprint a character;
whence they are called "justices of the flesh" (Heb. 9:10) by the
Apostle. Therefore neither seemingly do the sacraments of the New Law.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 1:21,22): "He . . . that hath
anointed us is God; Who also hath sealed us, and given the pledge of
the spirit in our hearts." But a character means nothing else than a
kind of sealing. Therefore it seems that by the sacraments God imprints
His character on us.
I answer that, As is clear from what has been already stated
([4364]Q[62], A[5]) the sacraments of the New Law are ordained for a
twofold purpose; namely, for a remedy against sins; and for the
perfecting of the soul in things pertaining to the Divine worship
according to the rite of the Christian life. Now whenever anyone is
deputed to some definite purpose he is wont to receive some outward
sign thereof; thus in olden times soldiers who enlisted in the ranks
used to be marked with certain characters on the body, through being
deputed to a bodily service. Since, therefore, by the sacraments men
are deputed to a spiritual service pertaining to the worship of God, it
follows that by their means the faithful receive a certain spiritual
character. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): "If a deserter
from the battle, through dread of the mark of enlistment on his body,
throws himself on the emperor's clemency, and having besought and
received mercy, return to the fight; is that character renewed, when
the man has been set free and reprimanded? is it not rather
acknowledged and approved? Are the Christian sacraments, by any chance,
of a nature less lasting than this bodily mark?"
Reply to Objection 1: The faithful of Christ are destined to the reward
of the glory that is to come, by the seal of Divine Predestination. But
they are deputed to acts becoming the Church that is now, by a certain
spiritual seal that is set on them, and is called a character.
Reply to Objection 2: The character imprinted on the soul is a kind of
sign in so far as it is imprinted by a sensible sacrament: since we
know that a certain one has received the baptismal character, through
his being cleansed by the sensible water. Nevertheless from a kind of
likeness, anything that assimilates one thing to another, or
discriminates one thing from another, even though it be not sensible,
can be called a character or a seal; thus the Apostle calls Christ "the
figure" or {charakter} "of the substance of the Father" (Heb. 1:3).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4365]Q[62], A[6]) the
sacraments of the Old Law had not in themselves any spiritual power of
producing a spiritual effect. Consequently in those sacraments there
was no need of a spiritual character, and bodily circumcision sufficed,
which the Apostle calls "a seal" (Rom. 4:11).
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Whether a character is a spiritual power?
Objection 1: It seems that a character is not a spiritual power. For
"character" seems to be the same thing as "figure"; hence (Heb. 1:3),
where we read "figure of His substance, "for "figure" the Greek has
{charakter}. Now "figure" is in the fourth species of quality, and thus
differs from power which is in the second species. Therefore character
is not a spiritual power.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii): "The Divine
Beatitude admits him that seeks happiness to a share in Itself, and
grants this share to him by conferring on him Its light as a kind of
seal." Consequently, it seems that a character is a kind of light. Now
light belongs rather to the third species of quality. Therefore a
character is not a power, since this seems to belong to the second
species.
Objection 3: Further, character is defined by some thus: "A character
is a holy sign of the communion of faith and of the holy ordination
conferred by a hierarch." Now a sign is in the genus of "relation," not
of "power." Therefore a character is not a spiritual power.
Objection 4: Further, a power is in the nature of a cause and principle
(Metaph. v). But a "sign" which is set down in the definition of a
character is rather in the nature of an effect. Therefore a character
is not a spiritual power.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii): "There are three
things in the soul, power, habit, and passion." Now a character is not
a passion: since a passion passes quickly, whereas a character is
indelible, as will be made clear further on [4366](A[5]). In like
manner it is not a habit: because no habit is indifferent to acting
well or ill: whereas a character is indifferent to either, since some
use it well, some ill. Now this cannot occur with a habit: because no
one abuses a habit of virtue, or uses well an evil habit. It remains,
therefore, that a character is a power.
I answer that, As stated above [4367](A[1]), the sacraments of the New
Law produce a character, in so far as by them we are deputed to the
worship of God according to the rite of the Christian religion.
Wherefore Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii), after saying that God "by a kind
of sign grants a share of Himself to those that approach Him," adds "by
making them Godlike and communicators of Divine gifts." Now the worship
of God consists either in receiving Divine gifts, or in bestowing them
on others. And for both these purposes some power is needed; for to
bestow something on others, active power is necessary; and in order to
receive, we need a passive power. Consequently, a character signifies a
certain spiritual power ordained unto things pertaining to the Divine
worship.
But it must be observed that this spiritual power is instrumental: as
we have stated above ([4368]Q[62], A[4]) of the virtue which is in the
sacraments. For to have a sacramental character belongs to God's
ministers: and a minister is a kind of instrument, as the Philosopher
says (Polit. i). Consequently, just as the virtue which is in the
sacraments is not of itself in a genus, but is reducible to a genus,
for the reason that it is of a transitory and incomplete nature: so
also a character is not properly in a genus or species, but is
reducible to the second species of quality.
Reply to Objection 1: Configuration is a certain boundary of quantity.
Wherefore, properly speaking, it is only in corporeal things; and of
spiritual things is said metaphorically. Now that which decides the
genus or species of a thing must needs be predicated of it properly.
Consequently, a character cannot be in the fourth species of quality,
although some have held this to be the case.
Reply to Objection 2: The third species of quality contains only
sensible passions or sensible qualities. Now a character is not a
sensible light. Consequently, it is not in the third species of quality
as some have maintained.
Reply to Objection 3: The relation signified by the word "sign" must
needs have some foundation. Now the relation signified by this sign
which is a character, cannot be founded immediately on the essence of
the soul: because then it would belong to every soul naturally.
Consequently, there must be something in the soul on which such a
relation is founded. And it is in this that a character essentially
consists. Therefore it need not be in the genus "relation" as some have
held.
Reply to Objection 4: A character is in the nature of a sign in
comparison to the sensible sacrament by which it is imprinted. But
considered in itself, it is in the nature of a principle, in the way
already explained.
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Whether the sacramental character is the character of Christ?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental character is not the
character of Christ. For it is written (Eph. 4:30): "Grieve not the
Holy Spirit of God, whereby you are sealed." But a character consists
essentially in some. thing that seals. Therefore the sacramental
character should be attributed to the Holy Ghost rather than to Christ.
Objection 2: Further, a character has the nature of a sign. And it is a
sign of the grace that is conferred by the sacrament. Now grace is
poured forth into the soul by the whole Trinity; wherefore it is
written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace and glory." Therefore it
seems that the sacramental character should not be attributed specially
to Christ.
Objection 3: Further, a man is marked with a character that he may be
distinguishable from others. But the saints are distinguishable from
others by charity, which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "alone
separates the children of the Kingdom from the children of perdition":
wherefore also the children of perdition are said to have "the
character of the beast" (Apoc. 13:16,17). But charity is not attributed
to Christ, but rather to the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 5:5: "The
charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is
given to us"; or even to the Father, according to 2 Cor. 13:13: "The
grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the charity of God." Therefore it
seems that the sacramental character should not be attributed to
Christ.
On the contrary, Some define character thus: "A character is a
distinctive mark printed in a man's rational soul by the eternal
Character, whereby the created trinity is sealed with the likeness of
the creating and re-creating Trinity, and distinguishing him from those
who are not so enlikened, according to the state of faith." But the
eternal Character is Christ Himself, according to Heb. 1:3: "Who being
the brightness of His glory and the figure," or character, "of His
substance." It seems, therefore, that the character should properly be
attributed to Christ.
I answer that, As has been made clear above [4369](A[1]), a character
is properly a kind of seal, whereby something is marked, as being
ordained to some particular end: thus a coin is marked for use in
exchange of goods, and soldiers are marked with a character as being
deputed to military service. Now the faithful are deputed to a twofold
end. First and principally to the enjoyment of glory. And for this
purpose they are marked with the seal of grace according to Ezech. 9:4:
"Mark Thou upon the foreheads of the men that sigh and mourn"; and
Apoc. 7:3: "Hurt not the earth, nor the sea, nor the trees, till we
sign the servants of our God in their foreheads."
Secondly, each of the faithful is deputed to receive, or to bestow on
others, things pertaining to the worship of God. And this, properly
speaking, is the purpose of the sacramental character. Now the whole
rite of the Christian religion is derived from Christ's priesthood.
Consequently, it is clear that the sacramental character is specially
the character of Christ, to Whose character the faithful are likened by
reason of the sacramental characters, which are nothing else than
certain participations of Christ's Priesthood, flowing from Christ
Himself.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks there of that sealing by which
a man is assigned to future glory, and which is effected by grace. Now
grace is attributed to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it is through love
that God gives us something gratis, which is the very nature of grace:
while the Holy Ghost is love. Wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 12:4):
"There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit."
Reply to Objection 2: The sacramental character is a thing as regards
the exterior sacrament, and a sacrament in regard to the ultimate
effect. Consequently, something can be attributed to a character in two
ways. First, if the character be considered as a sacrament: and thus it
is a sign of the invisible grace which is conferred in the sacrament.
Secondly, if it be considered as a character. And thus it is a sign
conferring on a man a likeness to some principal person in whom is
vested the authority over that to which he is assigned: thus soldiers
who are assigned to military service, are marked with their leader's
sign, by which they are, in a fashion, likened to him. And in this way
those who are deputed to the Christian worship, of which Christ is the
author, receive a character by which they are likened to Christ.
Consequently, properly speaking, this is Christ's character.
Reply to Objection 3: A character distinguishes one from another, in
relation to some particular end, to which he, who receives the
character is ordained: as has been stated concerning the military
character [4370](A[1]) by which a soldier of the king is distinguished
from the enemy's soldier in relation to the battle. In like manner the
character of the faithful is that by which the faithful of Christ are
distinguished from the servants of the devil, either in relation to
eternal life, or in relation to the worship of the Church that now is.
Of these the former is the result of charity and grace, as the
objection runs; while the latter results from the sacramental
character. Wherefore the "character of the beast" may be understood by
opposition, to mean either the obstinate malice for which some are
assigned to eternal punishment, or the profession of an unlawful form
of worship.
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Whether the character be subjected in the powers of the soul?
Objection 1: It seems that the character is not subjected in the powers
of the soul. For a character is said to be a disposition to grace. But
grace is subjected in the essence of the soul as we have stated in the
[4371]FS, Q[110], A[4]. Therefore it seems that the character is in the
essence of the soul and not in the powers.
Objection 2: Further, a power of the soul does not seem to be the
subject of anything save habit and disposition. But a character, as
stated above [4372](A[2]), is neither habit nor disposition, but rather
a power: the subject of which is nothing else than the essence of the
soul. Therefore it seems that the character is not subjected in a power
of the soul, but rather in its essence.
Objection 3: Further, the powers of the soul are divided into those of
knowledge and those of appetite. But it cannot be said that a character
is only in a cognitive power, nor, again, only in an appetitive power:
since it is neither ordained to knowledge only, nor to desire only.
Likewise, neither can it be said to be in both, because the same
accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore it seems that a
character is not subjected in a power of the soul, but rather in the
essence.
On the contrary, A character, according to its definition given above
[4373](A[3]), is imprinted in the rational soul "by way of an image."
But the image of the Trinity in the soul is seen in the powers.
Therefore a character is in the powers of the soul.
I answer that, As stated above [4374](A[3]), a character is a kind of
seal by which the soul is marked, so that it may receive, or bestow on
others, things pertaining to Divine worship. Now the Divine worship
consists in certain actions: and the powers of the soul are properly
ordained to actions, just as the essence is ordained to existence.
Therefore a character is subjected not in the essence of the soul, but
in its power.
Reply to Objection 1: The subject is ascribed to an. accident in
respect of that to which the accident disposes it proximately, but not
in respect of that to which it disposes it remotely or indirectly. Now
a character disposes the soul directly and proximately to the
fulfilling of things pertaining to Divine worship: and because such
cannot be accomplished suitably without the help of grace, since,
according to Jn. 4:24, "they that adore" God "must adore Him in spirit
and in truth," consequently, the Divine bounty bestows grace on those
who receive the character, so that they may accomplish worthily the
service to which they are deputed. Therefore the subject should be
ascribed to a character in respect of those actions that pertain to the
Divine worship, rather than in respect of grace.
Reply to Objection 2: The subject of the natural power, which flows
from the principles of the essence. Now a character is not a power of
this kind. but a spiritual power coming from without. Wherefore, just
as the essence of the soul, from which man has his natural life, is
perfected by grace from which the soul derives spiritual life; so the
natural power of the soul is perfected by a spiritual power, which is a
character. For habit and disposition belong to a power of the soul,
since they are ordained to actions of which the powers are the
principles. And in like manner whatever is ordained to action, should
be attributed to a power.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, a character is ordained unto
things pertaining to the Divine worship; which is a protestation of
faith expressed by exterior signs. Consequently, a character needs to
be in the soul's cognitive power, where also is faith.
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Whether a character can be blotted out from the soul?
Objection 1: It seems that a character can be blotted out from the
soul. Because the more perfect an accident is, the more firmly does it
adhere to its subject. But grace is more perfect than a character;
because a character is ordained unto grace as to a further end. Now
grace is lost through sin. Much more, therefore, is a character so
lost.
Objection 2: Further, by a character a man is deputed to the Divine
worship, as stated above ([4375]AA[3],4). But some pass from the
worship of God to a contrary worship by apostasy from the faith. It
seems, therefore, that such lose the sacramental character.
Objection 3: Further, when the end ceases, the means to the end should
cease also: thus after the resurrection there will be no marriage,
because begetting will cease, which is the purpose of marriage. Now the
exterior worship to which a character is ordained, will not endure in
heaven, where there will be no shadows, but all will be truth without a
veil. Therefore the sacramental character does not last in the soul for
ever: and consequently it can be blotted out.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): "The Christian
sacraments are not less lasting than the bodily mark" of military
service. But the character of military service is not repeated, but is
"recognized and approved" in the man who obtains the emperor's
forgiveness after offending him. Therefore neither can the sacramental
character be blotted out.
I answer that, As stated above [4376](A[3]), in a sacramental character
Christ's faithful have a share in His Priesthood; in the sense that as
Christ has the full power of a spiritual priesthood, so His faithful
are likened to Him by sharing a certain spiritual power with regard to
the sacraments and to things pertaining to the Divine worship. For this
reason it is unbecoming that Christ should have a character: but His
Priesthood is compared to a character, as that which is complete and
perfect is compared to some participation of itself. Now Christ's
Priesthood is eternal, according to Ps. 109:4: "Thou art a priest for
ever, according to the order of Melchisedech." Consequently, every
sanctification wrought by His Priesthood, is perpetual, enduring as
long as the thing sanctified endures. This is clear even in inanimate
things; for the consecration of a church or an altar lasts for ever
unless they be destroyed. Since, therefore, the subject of a character
is the soul as to its intellective part, where faith resides, as stated
above (A[4], ad 3); it is clear that, the intellect being perpetual and
incorruptible, a character cannot be blotted out from the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: Both grace and character are in the soul, but in
different ways. For grace is in the soul, as a form having complete
existence therein: whereas a character is in the soul, as an
instrumental power, as stated above [4377](A[2]). Now a complete form
is in its subject according to the condition of the subject. And since
the soul as long as it is a wayfarer is changeable in respect of the
free-will, it results that grace is in the soul in a changeable manner.
But an instrumental power follows rather the condition of the principal
agent: and consequently a character exists in the soul in an indelible
manner, not from any perfection of its own, but from the perfection of
Christ's Priesthood, from which the character flows like an
instrumental power.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii), "even
apostates are not deprived of their baptism, for when they repent and
return to the fold they do not receive it again; whence we conclude
that it cannot be lost." The reason of this is that a character is an
instrumental power, as stated above (ad 1), and the nature of an
instrument as such is to be moved by another, but not to move itself;
this belongs to the will. Consequently, however much the will be moved
in the contrary direction, the character is not removed, by reason of
the immobility of the principal mover.
Reply to Objection 3: Although external worship does not last after
this life, yet its end remains. Consequently, after this life the
character remains, both in the good as adding to their glory, and in
the wicked as increasing their shame: just as the character of the
military service remains in the soldiers after the victory, as the
boast of the conquerors, and the disgrace of the conquered.
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Whether a character is imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law?
Objection 1: It seems that a character is imprinted by all the
sacraments of the New Law: because each sacrament of the New Law makes
man a participator in Christ's Priesthood. But the sacramental
character is nothing but a participation in Christ's Priesthood, as
already stated ([4378]AA[3],5). Therefore it seems that a character is
imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law.
Objection 2: Further, a character may be compared to the soul in which
it is, as a consecration to that which is consecrated. But by each
sacrament of the New Law man becomes the recipient of sanctifying
grace, as stated above ([4379]Q[62], A[1]). Therefore it seems that a
character is imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law.
Objection 3: Further, a character is both a reality and a sacrament.
But in each sacrament of the New Law, there is something which is only
a reality, and something which is only a sacrament, and something which
is both reality and sacrament. Therefore a character is imprinted by
each sacrament of the New Law.
On the contrary, Those sacraments in which a character is imprinted,
are not reiterated, because a character is indelible, as stated above
[4380](A[5]): whereas some sacraments are reiterated, for instance,
penance and matrimony. Therefore not all the sacraments imprint a
character.
I answer that, As stated above ([4381]Q[62], AA[1],5), the sacraments
of the New Law are ordained for a twofold purpose, namely, as a remedy
for sin, and for the Divine worship. Now all the sacraments, from the
fact that they confer grace, have this in common, that they afford a
remedy against sin: whereas not all the sacraments are directly
ordained to the Divine worship. Thus it is clear that penance, whereby
man is delivered from sin, does not afford man any advance in the
Divine worship, but restores him to his former state.
Now a sacrament may belong to the Divine worship in three ways: first
in regard to the thing done; secondly, in regard to the agent; thirdly,
in regard to the recipient. In regard to the thing done, the Eucharist
belongs to the Divine worship, for the Divine worship consists
principally therein, so far as it is the sacrifice of the Church. And
by this same sacrament a character is not imprinted on man; because it
does not ordain man to any further sacramental action or benefit
received, since rather is it "the end and consummation of all the
sacraments," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). But it contains
within itself Christ, in Whom there is not the character, but the very
plenitude of the Priesthood.
But it is the sacrament of order that pertains to the sacramental
agents: for it is by this sacrament that men are deputed to confer
sacraments on others: while the sacrament of Baptism pertains to the
recipients, since it confers on man the power to receive the other
sacraments of the Church; whence it is called the "door of the
sacraments." In a way Confirmation also is ordained for the same
purpose, as we shall explain in its proper place ([4382]Q[65], A[3]).
Consequently, these three sacraments imprint a character, namely,
Baptism, Confirmation, and order.
Reply to Objection 1: Every sacrament makes man of the a participator
in Christ's Priesthood, from the fact that it confers on him some
effect thereof. But every sacrament does not depute a man to do or
receive something pertaining to the worship of the priesthood of
Christ: while it is just this that is required for a sacrament to
imprint a character.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is sanctified by each of the sacraments,
since sanctity means immunity from sin, which is the effect of grace.
But in a special way some sacraments, which imprint a character, bestow
on man a certain consecration, thus deputing him to the Divine worship:
just as inanimate things are said to be consecrated forasmuch as they
are deputed to Divine worship.
Reply to Objection 3: Although a character is a reality and a
sacrament, it does not follow that whatever is a reality and a
sacrament, is also a character. With regard to the other sacraments we
shall explain further on what is the reality and what is the sacrament.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSES OF THE SACRAMENTS (TEN ARTICLES)
In the next place we have to consider the causes of the sacraments,
both as to authorship and as to ministration. Concerning which there
are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God alone works inwardly in the sacraments?
(2) Whether the institution of the sacraments is from God alone?
(3) Of the power which Christ exercised over the sacraments;
(4) Whether He could transmit that power to others?
(5) Whether the wicked can have the power of administering the
sacraments?
(6) Whether the wicked sin in administering the sacraments?
(7) Whether the angels can be ministers of the sacraments?
(8) Whether the minister's intention is necessary in the sacraments?
(9) Whether right faith is required therein; so that it be impossible
for an unbeliever to confer a sacrament?
(10) Whether a right intention is required therein?
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Whether God alone, or the minister also, works inwardly unto the sacramenta
l
effect?
Objection 1: It seems that not God alone, but also the minister, works
inwardly unto the sacramental effect. For the inward sacramental effect
is to cleanse man from sin and enlighten him by grace. But it belongs
to the ministers of the Church "to cleanse, enlighten and perfect," as
Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. v). Therefore it seems that the
sacramental effect is the work not only of God, but also of the
ministers of the Church.
Objection 2: Further, certain prayers are offered up in conferring the
sacraments. But the prayers of the righteous are more acceptable to God
than those of any other, according to Jn. 9:31: "If a man be a server
of God, and doth His will, him He heareth." Therefore it stems that a
man obtains a greater sacramental effect if he receive it from a good
minister. Consequently, the interior effect is partly the work of the
minister and not of God alone.
Objection 3: Further, man is of greater account than an inanimate
thing. But an inanimate thing contributes something to the interior
effect: since "water touches the body and cleanses the soul," as
Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.). Therefore the interior
sacramental effect is partly the work of man and not of God alone.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:33): "God that justifieth."
Since, then, the inward effect of all the sacraments is justification,
it seems that God alone works the interior sacramental effect.
I answer that, There are two ways of producing an effect; first, as a
principal agent; secondly, as an instrument. In the former way the
interior sacramental effect is the work of God alone: first, because
God alone can enter the soul wherein the sacramental effect takes
place; and no agent can operate immediately where it is not: secondly,
because grace which is an interior sacramental effect is from God
alone, as we have established in the [4383]FS, Q[112], A[1]; while the
character which is the interior effect of certain sacraments, is an
instrumental power which flows from the principal agent, which is God.
In the second way, however, the interior sacramental effect can be the
work of man, in so far as he works as a minister. For a minister is of
the nature of an instrument, since the action of both is applied to
something extrinsic, while the interior effect is produced through the
power of the principal agent, which is God.
Reply to Objection 1: Cleansing in so far as it is attributed to the
ministers of the Church is not a washing from sin: deacons are said to
"cleanse," inasmuch as they remove the unclean from the body of the
faithful, or prepare them by their pious admonitions for the reception
of the sacraments. In like manner also priests are said to "enlighten"
God's people, not indeed by giving them grace, but by conferring on
them the sacraments of grace; as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. v).
Reply to Objection 2: The prayers which are said in giving the
sacraments, are offered to God, not on the part of the individual, but
on the part of the whole Church, whose prayers are acceptable to God,
according to Mat. 18:19: "If two of you shall consent upon earth,
concerning anything whatsoever they shall ask, it shall be done to them
by My Father." Nor is there any reason why the devotion of a just man
should not contribute to this effect. But that which is the sacramental
effect is not impetrated by the prayer of the Church or of the
minister, but through the merit of Christ's Passion, the power of which
operates in the sacraments, as stated above ([4384]Q[62], A[5]).
Wherefore the sacramental effect is made no better by a better
minister. And yet something in addition may be impetrated for the
receiver of the sacrament through the devotion of the minister: but
this is not the work of the minister, but the work of God Who hears the
minister's prayer.
Reply to Objection 3: Inanimate things do not produce the sacramental
effect, except instrumentally, as stated above. In like manner neither
do men produce the sacramental effect, except ministerially, as also
stated above.
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Whether the sacraments are instituted by God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments are not instituted by God
alone. For those things which God has instituted are delivered to us in
Holy Scripture. But in the sacraments certain things are done which are
nowhere mentioned in Holy Scripture; for instance, the chrism with
which men are confirmed, the oil with which priests are anointed, and
many others, both words and actions, which we employ in the sacraments.
Therefore the sacraments were not instituted by God alone.
Objection 2: Further, a sacrament is a kind of sign. Now sensible
things have their own natural signification. Nor can it be said that
God takes pleasure in certain significations and not in others; because
He approves of all that He made. Moreover, it seems to be peculiar to
the demons to be enticed to something by means of signs; for Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xxi): "The demons are enticed . . . by means of
creatures, which were created not by them but by God, by various means
of attraction according to their various natures, not as an animal is
enticed by food, but as a spirit is drawn by a sign." It seems,
therefore, that there is no need for the sacraments to be instituted by
God.
Objection 3: Further, the apostles were God's vicegerents on earth:
hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:10): "For what I have pardoned, if I
have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of
Christ," i.e. as though Christ Himself had pardoned. Therefore it seems
that the apostles and their successors can institute new sacraments.
On the contrary, The institutor of anything is he who gives it strength
and power: as in the case of those who institute laws. But the power of
a sacrament is from God alone, as we have shown above [4385](A[1];
Q[62], A[1]). Therefore God alone can institute a sacrament.
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above [4386](A[1];
Q[62], A[1]), the sacraments are instrumental causes of spiritual
effects. Now an instrument has its power from the principal agent. But
an agent in respect of a sacrament is twofold; viz. he who institutes
the sacraments, and he who makes use of the sacrament instituted, by
applying it for the production of the effect. Now the power of a
sacrament cannot be from him who makes use of the sacrament: because he
works but as a minister. Consequently, it follows that the power of the
sacrament is from the institutor of the sacrament. Since, therefore,
the power of the sacrament is from God alone, it follows that God alone
can institute the sacraments.
Reply to Objection 1: Human institutions observed in the sacraments are
not essential to the sacrament; but belong to the solemnity which is
added to the sacraments in order to arouse devotion and reverence in
the recipients. But those things that are essential to the sacrament,
are instituted by Christ Himself, Who is God and man. And though they
are not all handed down by the Scriptures, yet the Church holds them
from the intimate tradition of the apostles, according to the saying of
the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:34): "The rest I will set in order when I come."
Reply to Objection 2: From their very nature sensible things have a
certain aptitude for the signifying of spiritual effects: but this
aptitude is fixed by the Divine institution to some special
signification. This is what Hugh of St. Victor means by saying (De
Sacram. i) that "a sacrament owes its signification to its
institution." Yet God chooses certain things rather than others for
sacramental signification, not as though His choice were restricted to
them, but in order that their signification be more suitable to them.
Reply to Objection 3: The apostles and their successors are God's
vicars in governing the Church which is built on faith and the
sacraments of faith. Wherefore, just as they may not institute another
Church, so neither may they deliver another faith, nor institute other
sacraments: on the contrary, the Church is said to be built up with the
sacraments "which flowed from the side of Christ while hanging on the
Cross."
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Whether Christ as man had the power of producing the inward sacramental
effect?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ as man had the power of producing the
interior sacramental effect. For John the Baptist said (Jn. 1:33): "He,
Who sent me to baptize in water, said to me: He upon Whom thou shalt
see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that
baptizeth with the Holy Ghost." But to baptize with the Holy Ghost is
to confer inwardly the grace of the Holy Ghost. And the Holy Ghost
descended upon Christ as man, not as God: for thus He Himself gives the
Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that Christ, as man, had the power of
producing the inward sacramental effect.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 9:6): "That you may know that
the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins." But forgiveness of
sins is an inward sacramental effect. Therefore it seems that Christ as
man produces the inward sacramental effect.
Objection 3: Further, the institution of the sacraments belongs to him
who acts as principal agent in producing the inward sacramental effect.
Now it is clear that Christ instituted the sacraments. Therefore it is
He that produces the inward sacramental effect.
Objection 4: Further, no one can confer the sacramental effect without
conferring the sacrament, except he produce the sacramental effect by
his own power. But Christ conferred the sacramental effect without
conferring the sacrament; as in the case of Magdalen to whom He said:
"Thy sins are forgiven Thee" (Lk. 7:48). Therefore it seems that
Christ, as man, produces the inward sacramental effect.
Objection 5: Further, the principal agent in causing the inward effect
is that in virtue of which the sacrament operates. But the sacraments
derive their power from Christ's Passion and through the invocation of
His Name; according to 1 Cor. 1:13: "Was Paul then crucified for you?
or were you baptized in the name of Paul?" Therefore Christ, as man,
produces the inward sacramental effect.
On the contrary, Augustine (Isidore, Etym. vi) says: "The Divine power
in the sacraments works inwardly in producing their salutary effect."
Now the Divine power is Christ's as God, not as man. Therefore Christ
produces the inward sacramental effect, not as man but as God.
I answer that, Christ produces the inward sacramental effect, both as
God and as man, but not in the same way. For, as God, He works in the
sacraments by authority: but, as man, His operation conduces to the
inward sacramental effects meritoriously and efficiently, but
instrumentally. For it has been stated ([4387]Q[48], AA[1],6;[4388]
Q[49], A[1]) that Christ's Passion which belongs to Him in respect of
His human nature, is the cause of justification, both meritoriously and
efficiently, not as the principal cause thereof, or by His own
authority, but as an instrument, in so far as His humanity is the
instrument of His Godhead, as stated above ([4389]Q[13], AA[2],3;[4390]
Q[19], A[1]).
Nevertheless, since it is an instrument united to the Godhead in unity
of Person, it has a certain headship and efficiency in regard to
extrinsic instruments, which are the ministers of the Church and the
sacraments themselves, as has been explained above [4391](A[1]).
Consequently, just as Christ, as God, has power of "authority" over the
sacraments, so, as man, He has the power of ministry in chief, or power
of "excellence." And this consists in four things. First in this, that
the merit and power of His Passion operates in the sacraments, as
stated above (Q[62], A[5]). And because the power of the Passion is
communicated to us by faith, according to Rom. 3:25: "Whom God hath
proposed to be a propitiation through faith in His blood," which faith
we proclaim by calling on the name of Christ: therefore, secondly,
Christ's power of excellence over the sacraments consists in this, that
they are sanctified by the invocation of His name. And because the
sacraments derive their power from their institution, hence, thirdly,
the excellence of Christ's power consists in this, that He, Who gave
them their power, could institute the sacraments. And since cause does
not depend on effect, but rather conversely, it belongs to the
excellence of Christ's power, that He could bestow the sacramental
effect without conferring the exterior sacrament. Thus it is clear how
to solve the objections; for the arguments on either side are true to a
certain extent, as explained above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ could communicate to ministers the power which He had in the
sacraments?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ could not communicate to ministers
the power which He had in the sacraments. For as Augustine argues
against Maximin, "if He could, but would not, He was jealous of His
power." But jealousy was far from Christ Who had the fulness of
charity. Since, therefore, Christ did not communicate His power to
ministers, it seems that He could not.
Objection 2: Further, on Jn. 14:12: "Greater than these shall he do,"
Augustine says (Tract. lxxii): "I affirm this to be altogether
greater," namely, for a man from being ungodly to be made righteous,
"than to create heaven and earth." But Christ could not communicate to
His disciples the power of creating heaven and earth: neither,
therefore, could He give them the power of making the ungodly to be
righteous. Since, therefore, the justification of the ungodly is
effected by the power that Christ has in the sacraments, it seems that
He could not communicate that power to ministers.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to Christ as Head of the Church that
grace should flow from Him to others, according to Jn. 1:16: "Of His
fulness we all have received." But this could not be communicated to
others; since then the Church would be deformed, having many heads.
Therefore it seems that Christ could not communicate His power to
ministers.
On the contrary, on Jn. 1:31: "I knew Him not," Augustine says (Tract.
v) that "he did not know that our Lord having the authority of
baptizing . . . would keep it to Himself." But John would not have been
in ignorance of this, if such a power were incommunicable. Therefore
Christ could communicate His power to ministers.
I answer that, As stated above [4392](A[3]), Christ had a twofold power
in the sacraments. one was the power of "authority," which belongs to
Him as God: and this power He could not communicate to any creature;
just as neither could He communicate the Divine Essence. The other was
the power of "excellence," which belongs to Him as man. This power He
could communicate to ministers; namely, by giving them such a fulness
of grace---that their merits would conduce to the sacramental
effect---that by the invocation of their names, the sacraments would be
sanctified---and that they themselves might institute sacraments, and
by their mere will confer the sacramental effect without observing the
sacramental rite. For a united instrument, the more powerful it is, is
all the more able to lend its power to the separated instrument; as the
hand can to a stick.
Reply to Objection 1: It was not through jealousy that Christ refrained
from communicating to ministers His power of excellence, but for the
good of the faithful; lest they should put their trust in men, and lest
there should be various kinds of sacraments, giving rise to division in
the Church; as may be seen in those who said: "I am of Paul, I am of
Apollo, and I of Cephas" (1 Cor. 1:12).
Reply to Objection 2: This objection is true of the power of authority,
which belongs to Christ as God. At the same time the power of
excellence can be called authority in comparison to other ministers.
Whence on 1 Cor. 1:13: "Is Christ divided?" the gloss says that "He
could give power of authority in baptizing, to those to whom He gave
the power of administering it."
Reply to Objection 3: It was in order to avoid the incongruity of many
heads in the Church, that Christ was unwilling to communicate to
ministers His power of excellence. If, however, He had done so, He
would have been Head in chief; the others in subjection to Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sacraments can be conferred by evil ministers?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments cannot be conferred by evil
ministers. For the sacraments of the New Law are ordained for the
purpose of cleansing from sin and for the bestowal of grace. Now evil
men, being themselves unclean, cannot cleanse others from sin,
according to Ecclus. 34:4: "Who [Vulg.: 'What'] can be made clean by
the unclean?" Moreover, since they have not grace, it seems that they
cannot give grace, for "no one gives what he has not." It seems,
therefore, that the sacraments cannot be conferred by wicked men.
Objection 2: Further, all the power of the sacraments is derived from
Christ, as stated above [4393](A[3]; Q[62], A[5]). But evil men are cut
off from Christ: because they have not charity, by which the members
are united to their Head, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in
charity, abideth in God, and God in him." Therefore it seems that the
sacraments cannot be conferred by evil men.
Objection 3: Further, if anything is wanting that is required for the
sacraments, the sacrament is invalid; for instance, if the required
matter or form be wanting. But the minister required for a sacrament is
one who is without the stain of sin, according to Lev. 21:17,18:
"Whosoever of thy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish, he
shall not offer bread to his God, neither shall he approach to minister
to Him." Therefore it seems that if the minister be wicked, the
sacrament has no effect.
On the contrary, Augustine says on Jn. 1:33: "He upon Whom thou shalt
see the Spirit," etc. (Tract. v in Joan.), that "John did not know that
our Lord, having the authority of baptizing, would keep it to Himself,
but that the ministry would certainly pass to both good and evil men .
. . What is a bad minister to thee, where the Lord is good?"
I answer that, As stated above [4394](A[1]), the ministers of the
Church work instrumentally in the sacraments, because, in a way, a
minister is of the nature of an instrument. But, as stated above
(Q[62], AA[1],4), an instrument acts not by reason of its own form, but
by the power of the one who moves it. Consequently, whatever form or
power an instrument has in addition to that which it has as an
instrument, is accidental to it: for instance, that a physician's body,
which is the instrument of his soul, wherein is his medical art, be
healthy or sickly; or that a pipe, through which water passes, be of
silver or lead. Therefore the ministers of the Church can confer the
sacraments, though they be wicked.
Reply to Objection 1: The ministers of the Church do not by their own
power cleanse from sin those who approach the sacraments, nor do they
confer grace on them: it is Christ Who does this by His own power while
He employs them as instruments. Consequently, those who approach the
sacraments receive an effect whereby they are enlikened not to the
ministers but to Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's members are united to their Head by
charity, so that they may receive life from Him; for as it is written
(1 Jn. 3:14): "He that loveth not abideth in death." Now it is possible
for a man to work with a lifeless instrument, and separated from him as
to bodily union, provided it be united to him by some sort of motion:
for a workman works in one way with his hand, in another with his axe.
Consequently, it is thus that Christ works in the sacraments, both by
wicked men as lifeless instruments, and by good men as living
instruments.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is required in a sacrament in two ways.
First, as being essential to it: and if this be wanting, the sacrament
is invalid; for instance, if the due form or matter be wanting.
Secondly, a thing is required for a sacrament, by reason of a certain
fitness. And in this way good ministers are required for a sacrament.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wicked men sin in administering the sacraments?
Objection 1: It seems that wicked men do not sin in administering the
sacraments. For just as men serve God in the sacraments, so do they
serve Him in works of charity; whence it is written (Heb. 13:16): "Do
not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor
is obtained." But the wicked do not sin in serving God by works of
charity: indeed, they should be persuaded to do so, according to Dan.
4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable" to the king; "Redeem thou thy sins
with alms." Therefore it seems that wicked men do not sin in
administering the sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, whoever co-operates with another in his sin, is
also guilty of sin, according to Rom. 1:32: "He is [Vulg.: 'They are']
worthy of death; not only he that commits the sin, but also he who
consents to them that do them." But if wicked ministers sin in
administering sacraments, those who receive sacraments from them,
co-operate in their sin. Therefore they would sin also; which seems
unreasonable.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that no one should act when in doubt,
for thus man would be driven to despair, as being unable to avoid sin.
But if the wicked were to sin in administering sacraments, they would
be in a state of perplexity: since sometimes they would sin also if
they did not administer sacraments; for instance, when by reason of
their office it is their bounden duty to do so; for it is written (1
Cor. 9:16): "For a necessity lieth upon me: Woe is unto me if I preach
not the gospel." Sometimes also on account of some danger; for
instance, if a child in danger of death be brought to a sinner for
baptism. Therefore it seems that the wicked do not sin in administering
the sacraments.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i) that "it is wrong for
the wicked even to touch the symbols," i.e. the sacramental signs. And
he says in the epistle to Demophilus: "It seems presumptuous for such a
man," i.e. a sinner, "to lay hands on priestly things; he is neither
afraid nor ashamed, all unworthy that he is, to take part in Divine
things, with the thought that God does not see what he sees in himself:
he thinks, by false pretenses, to cheat Him Whom he calls his Father;
he dares to utter, in the person of Christ, words polluted by his
infamy, I will not call them prayers, over the Divine symbols."
I answer that, A sinful action consists in this, that a man "fails to
act as he ought to," as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii). Now it
has been said (A[5], ad 3) that it is fitting for the ministers of
sacraments to be righteous; because ministers should be like unto their
Lord, according to Lev. 19:2: "Be ye holy, because I . . . am holy";
and Ecclus. 10:2: "As the judge of the people is himself, so also are
his ministers." Consequently, there can be no doubt that the wicked sin
by exercising the ministry of God and the Church, by conferring the
sacraments. And since this sin pertains to irreverence towards God and
the contamination of holy things, as far as the man who sins is
concerned, although holy things in themselves cannot be contaminated;
it follows that such a sin is mortal in its genus.
Reply to Objection 1: Works of charity are not made holy by some
process of consecration, but they belong to the holiness of
righteousness, as being in a way parts of righteousness. Consequently,
when a man shows himself as a minister of God, by doing works of
charity, if he be righteous, he will be made yet holier; but if he be a
sinner, he is thereby disposed to holiness. On the other hand, the
sacraments are holy in themselves owing to their mystical consecration.
Wherefore the holiness of righteousness is required in the minister,
that he may be suitable for his ministry: for which reason he acts
unbecomingly and sins, if while in a state of sin he attempts to fulfil
that ministry.
Reply to Objection 2: He who approaches a sacrament, receives it from a
minister of the Church, not because he is such and such a man, but
because he is a minister of the Church. Consequently, as long as the
latter is tolerated in the ministry, he that receives a sacrament from
him, does not communicate in his sin, but communicates with the Church
from. whom he has his ministry. But if the Church, by degrading,
excommunicating, or suspending him, does not tolerate him in the
ministry, he that receives a sacrament from him sins, because he
communicates in his sin.
Reply to Objection 3: A man who is in mortal sin is not perplexed
simply, if by reason of his office it be his bounden duty to minister
sacraments; because he can repent of his sin and so minister lawfully.
But there is nothing unreasonable in his being perplexed, if we suppose
that he wishes to remain in sin.
However, in a case of necessity when even a lay person might baptize,
he would not sin in baptizing. For it is clear that then he does not
exercise the ministry of the Church, but comes to the aid of one who is
in need of his services. It is not so with the other sacraments, which
are not so necessary as baptism, as we shall show further on
([4395]Q[65], AA[3],4;[4396] Q[62], A[3]).
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Whether angels can administer sacraments?
Objection 1: It seems that angels can administer sacraments. Because a
higher minister can do whatever the lower can; thus a priest can do
whatever a deacon can: but not conversely. But angels are higher
ministers in the hierarchical order than any men whatsoever, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix). Therefore, since men can be ministers
of sacraments, it seems that much more can angels be.
Objection 2: Further, in heaven holy men are likened to the angels
(Mat. 22:30). But some holy men, when in heaven, can be ministers of
the sacraments; since the sacramental character is indelible, as stated
above ([4397]Q[63], A[5]). Therefore it seems that angels too can be
ministers of sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([4398]Q[8], A[7]), the devil is
head of the wicked, and the wicked are his members. But sacraments can
be administered by the wicked. Therefore it seems that they can be
administered even by demons.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:1): "Every high priest taken
from among men, is ordained for men in the things that appertain to
God." But angels whether good or bad are not taken from among men.
Therefore they are not ordained ministers in the things that appertain
to God, i.e. in the sacraments.
I answer that, As stated above [4399](A[3]; Q[62], A[5]), the whole
power of the sacraments flows from Christ's Passion, which belongs to
Him as man. And Him in their very nature men, not angels, resemble;
indeed, in respect of His Passion, He is described as being "a little
lower than the angels" (Heb. 2:9). Consequently, it belongs to men, but
not to angels, to dispense the sacraments and to take part in their
administration.
But it must be observed that as God did not bind His power to the
sacraments, so as to be unable to bestow the sacramental effect without
conferring the sacrament; so neither did He bind His power to the
ministers of the Church so as to be unable to give angels power to
administer the sacraments. And since good angels are messengers of
truth; if any sacramental rite were performed by good angels, it should
be considered valid, because it ought to be evident that this is being
done by the will of God: for instance, certain churches are said to
have been consecrated by the ministry of the angels [*See Acta S.S.,
September 29]. But if demons, who are "lying spirits," were to perform
a sacramental rite, it should be pronounced as invalid.
Reply to Objection 1: What men do in a less perfect manner, i.e. by
sensible sacraments, which are proportionate to their nature, angels
also do, as ministers of a higher degree, in a more perfect manner,
i.e. invisibly---by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting.
Reply to Objection 2: The saints in heaven resemble the angels as to
their share of glory, but not as to the conditions of their nature: and
consequently not in regard to the sacraments.
Reply to Objection 3: Wicked men do not owe their power of conferring
sacraments to their being members of the devil. Consequently, it does
not follow that "a fortiori" the devil, their head, can do so.
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Whether the minister's intention is required for the validity of a
sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the minister's intention is not required for
the validity of a sacrament. For the minister of a sacrament works
instrumentally. But the perfection of an action does not depend on the
intention of the instrument, but on that of the principal agent.
Therefore the minister's intention is not necessary for the perfecting
of a sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, one man's intention cannot be known to another.
Therefore if the minister's intention were required for the validity of
a sacrament, he who approaches a sacrament could not know whether he
has received the sacrament. Consequently he could have no certainty in
regard to salvation; the more that some sacraments are necessary for
salvation, as we shall state further on ([4400]Q[65], A[4]).
Objection 3: Further, a man's intention cannot bear on that to which he
does not attend. But sometimes ministers of sacraments do not attend to
what they say or do, through thinking of something else. Therefore in
this respect the sacrament would be invalid through want of intention.
On the contrary, What is unintentional happens by chance. But this
cannot be said of the sacramental operation. Therefore the sacraments
require the intention of the minister.
I answer that, When a thing is indifferent to many uses, it must needs
be determined to one, if that one has to be effected. Now those things
which are done in the sacraments, can be done with various intent; for
instance, washing with water, which is done in baptism, may be ordained
to bodily cleanliness, to the health of the body, to amusement, and
many other similar things. Consequently, it needs to be determined to
one purpose, i.e. the sacramental effect, by the intention of him who
washes. And this intention is expressed by the words which are
pronounced in the sacraments; for instance the words, "I baptize thee
in the name of the Father," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: An inanimate instrument has no intention
regarding the effect; but instead of the intention there is the motion
whereby it is moved by the principal agent. But an animate instrument,
such as a minister, is not only moved, but in a sense moves itself, in
so far as by his will he moves his bodily members to act. Consequently,
his intention is required, whereby he subjects himself to the principal
agent; that is, it is necessary that he intend to do that which Christ
and the Church do.
Reply to Objection 2: On this point there are two opinions. For some
hold that the mental intention of the minister is necessary; in the
absence of which the sacrament is invalid: and that this defect in the
case of children who have not the intention of approaching the
sacrament, is made good by Christ, Who baptizes inwardly: whereas in
adults, who have that intention, this defect is made good by their
faith and devotion.
This might be true enough of the ultimate effect, i.e. justification
from sins; but as to that effect which is both real and sacramental,
viz. the character, it does not appear possible for it to be made good
by the devotion of the recipient, since a character is never imprinted
save by a sacrament.
Consequently, others with better reason hold that the minister of a
sacrament acts in the person of the whole Church, whose minister he is;
while in the words uttered by him, the intention of the Church is
expressed; and that this suffices for the validity of the sacrament,
except the contrary be expressed on the part either of the minister or
of the recipient of the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: Although he who thinks of something else, has no
actual intention, yet he has habitual intention, which suffices for the
validity of the sacrament; for instance if, when a priest goes to
baptize someone, he intends to do to him what the Church does.
Wherefore if subsequently during the exercise of the act his mind be
distracted by other matters, the sacrament is valid in virtue of his
original intention. Nevertheless, the minister of a sacrament should
take great care to have actual intention. But this is not entirely in
man's power, because when a man wishes to be very intent on something,
he begins unintentionally to think of other things, according to Ps.
39:18: "My heart hath forsaken me."
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Whether faith is required of necessity in the minister of a sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that faith is required of necessity in the
minister of a sacrament. For, as stated above [4401](A[8]), the
intention of the minister is necessary for the validity of a sacrament.
But "faith directs in intention" as Augustine says against Julian (In
Psalm xxxi, cf. Contra Julian iv). Therefore, if the minister is
without the true faith, the sacrament is invalid.
Objection 2: Further, if a minister of the Church has not the true
faith, it seems that he is a heretic. But heretics, seemingly, cannot
confer sacraments. For Cyprian says in an epistle against heretics
(lxxiii): "Everything whatsoever heretics do, is carnal, void and
counterfeit, so that nothing that they do should receive our approval."
And Pope Leo says in his epistle to Leo Augustus (clvi): "It is a
matter of notoriety that the light of all the heavenly sacraments is
extinguished in the see of Alexandria, by an act of dire and senseless
cruelty. The sacrifice is no longer offered, the chrism is no longer
consecrated, all the mysteries of religion have fled at the touch of
the parricide hands of ungodly men." Therefore a sacrament requires of
necessity that the minister should have the true faith.
Objection 3: Further, those who have not the true faith seem to be
separated from the Church by excommunication: for it is written in the
second canonical epistle of John (10): "If any man come to you, and
bring not this doctrine, receive him not into the house, nor say to
him; God speed you": and (Titus 3:10): "A man that is a heretic, after
the first and second admonition avoid." But it seems that an
excommunicate cannot confer a sacrament of the Church: since he is
separated from the Church, to whose ministry the dispensation of the
sacraments belongs. Therefore a sacrament requires of necessity that
the minister should have the true faith.
On the contrary, Augustine says against the Donatist Petilian:
"Remember that the evil lives of wicked men are not prejudicial to
God's sacraments, by rendering them either invalid or less holy."
I answer that, As stated above [4402](A[5]), since the minister works
instrumentally in the sacraments, he acts not by his own but by
Christ's power. Now just as charity belongs to a man's own power so
also does faith. Wherefore, just as the validity of a sacrament does
not require that the minister should have charity, and even sinners can
confer sacraments, as stated above [4403](A[5]); so neither is it
necessary that he should have faith, and even an unbeliever can confer
a true sacrament, provided that the other essentials be there.
Reply to Objection 1: It may happen that a man's faith is defective in
regard to something else, and not in regard to the reality of the
sacrament which he confers: for instance, he may believe that it is
unlawful to swear in any case whatever, and yet he may believe that
baptism is an efficient cause of salvation. And thus such unbelief does
not hinder the intention of conferring the sacrament. But if his faith
be defective in regard to the very sacrament that he confers, although
he believe that no inward effect is caused by the thing done outwardly,
yet he does know that the Catholic Church intends to confer a sacrament
by that which is outwardly done. Wherefore, his unbelief
notwithstanding, he can intend to do what the Church does, albeit he
esteem it to be nothing. And such an intention suffices for a
sacrament: because as stated above (A[8], ad 2) the minister of a
sacrament acts in the person of the Church by whose faith any defect in
the minister's faith is made good.
Reply to Objection 2: Some heretics in conferring sacraments do not
observe the form prescribed by the Church: and these confer neither the
sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament. But some do observe the
form prescribed by the Church: and these confer indeed the sacrament
but not the reality. I say this in the supposition that they are
outwardly cut off from the Church; because from the very fact that
anyone receives the sacraments from them, he sins; and consequently is
hindered from receiving the effect of the sacrament. Wherefore
Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Pet.) says: "Be well assured and have
no doubt whatever that those who are baptized outside the Church,
unless they come back to the Church, will reap disaster from their
Baptism." In this sense Pope Leo says that "the light of the sacraments
was extinguished in the Church of Alexandria"; viz. in regard to the
reality of the sacrament, not as to the sacrament itself.
Cyprian, however, thought that heretics do not confer even the
sacrament: but in this respect we do not follow his opinion. Hence
Augustine says (De unico Baptismo xiii): "Though the martyr Cyprian
refused to recognize Baptism conferred by heretics or schismatics, yet
so great are his merits, culminating in the crown of martyrdom, that
the light of his charity dispels the darkness of his fault, and if
anything needed pruning, the sickle of his passion cut it off."
Reply to Objection 3: The power of administering the sacraments belongs
to the spiritual character which is indelible, as explained above
([4404]Q[63], A[3] ). Consequently, if a man be suspended by the
Church, or excommunicated or degraded, he does not lose the power of
conferring sacraments, but the permission to use this power. Wherefore
he does indeed confer the sacrament, but he sins in so doing. He also
sins that receives a sacrament from such a man: so that he does not
receive the reality of the sacrament, unless ignorance excuses him.
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Whether the validity of a sacrament requires a good intention in the
minister?
Objection 1: It seems that the validity of a sacrament requires a good
intention in the minister. For the minister's intention should be in
conformity with the Church's intention, as explained above (A[8], ad
1). But the intention of the Church is always good. Therefore the
validity of a sacrament requires of necessity a good intention in the
minister.
Objection 2: Further, a perverse intention seems worse than a playful
one. But a playful intention destroys a sacrament: for instance, if
someone were to baptize anybody not seriously but in fun. Much more,
therefore, does a perverse intention destroy a sacrament: for instance,
if somebody were to baptize a man in order to kill him afterwards.
Objection 3: Further, a perverse intention vitiates the whole work,
according to Lk. 11:34: "If thy eye be evil, thy" whole "body will be
darksome." But the sacraments of Christ cannot be contaminated by evil
men; as Augustine says against Petilian (Cont. Litt. Petil ii).
Therefore it seems that, if the minister's intention is perverse, the
sacrament is invalid.
On the contrary, A perverse intention belongs to the wickedness of the
minister. But the wickedness of the minister does not annul the
sacrament: neither, therefore, does his perverse intention.
I answer that, The minister's intention may be perverted in two ways.
First in regard to the sacrament: for instance, when a man does not
intend to confer a sacrament, but to make a mockery of it. Such a
perverse intention takes away the truth of the sacrament, especially if
it be manifested outwardly.
Secondly, the minister's intention may be perverted as to something
that follows the sacrament: for instance, a priest may intend to
baptize a woman so as to be able to abuse her; or to consecrate the
Body of Christ, so as to use it for sorcery. And because that which
comes first does not depend on that which follows, consequently such a
perverse intention does not annul the sacrament; but the minister
himself sins grievously in having such an intention.
Reply to Objection 1: The Church has a good intention both as to the
validity of the sacrament and as to the use thereof: but it is the
former intention that perfects the sacrament, while the latter conduces
to the meritorious effect. Consequently, the minister who conforms his
intention to the Church as to the former rectitude, but not as to the
latter, perfects the sacrament indeed, but gains no merit for himself.
Reply to Objection 2: The intention of mimicry or fun excludes the
first kind of right intention, necessary for the validity of a
sacrament. Consequently, there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: A perverse intention perverts the action of the
one who has such an intention, not the action of another. Consequently,
the perverse intention of the minister perverts the sacrament in so far
as it is his action: not in so far as it is the action of Christ, Whose
minister he is. It is just as if the servant [minister] of some man
were to carry alms to the poor with a wicked intention, whereas his
master had commanded him with a good intention to do so.
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OF THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the number of the sacraments: and concerning
this there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are seven sacraments?
(2) The order of the sacraments among themselves;
(3) Their mutual comparison;
(4) Whether all the sacraments are necessary for salvation?
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Whether there should be seven sacraments?
Objection 1: It seems that there ought not to be seven sacraments. For
the sacraments derive their efficacy from the Divine power, and the
power of Christ's Passion. But the Divine power is one, and Christ's
Passion is one; since "by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them
that are sanctified" (Heb. 10:14). Therefore there should be but one
sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, a sacrament is intended as a remedy for the
defect caused by sin. Now this is twofold, punishment and guilt.
Therefore two sacraments would be enough.
Objection 3: Further, sacraments belong to the actions of the
ecclesiastical hierarchy, as Dionysius explains (Eccl. Hier. v). But,
as he says, there are three actions of the ecclesiastical hierarchy,
namely, "to cleanse, to enlighten, to perfect." Therefore there should
be no more than three sacraments.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix) that the
"sacraments" of the New Law are "less numerous" than those of the Old
Law. But in the Old Law there was no sacrament corresponding to
Confirmation and Extreme Unction. Therefore these should not be counted
among the sacraments of the New Law.
Objection 5: Further, lust is not more grievous than other sins, as we
have made clear in the [4405]FS, Q[74], A[5]; [4406]SS, Q[154], A[3].
But there is no sacrament instituted as a remedy for other sins.
Therefore neither should matrimony be instituted as a remedy for lust.
Objection 6: On the other hand, It seems that there should be more than
seven sacraments. For sacraments are a kind of sacred sign. But in the
Church there are many sanctifications by sensible signs, such as Holy
Water the Consecration of Altars, and such like. Therefore there are
more than seven sacraments.
Objection 7: Further, Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. i) says that the
sacraments of the Old Law were oblations, tithes and sacrifices. But
the Sacrifice of the Church is one sacrament, called the Eucharist.
Therefore oblations also and tithes should be called sacraments.
Objection 8: Further, there are three kinds of sin, original, mortal
and venial. Now Baptism is intended as a remedy against original sin,
and Penance against mortal sin. Therefore besides the seven sacraments,
there should be another against venial sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([4407]Q[62], A[5];[4408] Q[63], A[1]),
the sacraments of the Church were instituted for a twofold purpose:
namely, in order to perfect man in things pertaining to the worship of
God according to the religion of Christian life, and to be a remedy
against the defects caused by sin. And in either way it is becoming
that there should be seven sacraments.
For spiritual life has a certain conformity with the life of the body:
just as other corporeal things have a certain likeness to things
spiritual. Now a man attains perfection in the corporeal life in two
ways: first, in regard to his own person; secondly, in regard to the
whole community of the society in which he lives, for man is by nature
a social animal. With regard to himself man is perfected in the life of
the body, in two ways; first, directly [per se], i.e. by acquiring some
vital perfection; secondly, indirectly [per accidens], i.e. by the
removal of hindrances to life, such as ailments, or the like. Now the
life of the body is perfected "directly," in three ways. First, by
generation whereby a man begins to be and to live: and corresponding to
this in the spiritual life there is Baptism, which is a spiritual
regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: "By the laver of regeneration,"
etc. Secondly, by growth whereby a man is brought to perfect size and
strength: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is
Confirmation, in which the Holy Ghost is given to strengthen us.
Wherefore the disciples who were already baptized were bidden thus:
"Stay you in the city till you be endued with power from on high" (Lk.
24:49). Thirdly, by nourishment, whereby life and strength are
preserved to man; and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there
is the Eucharist. Wherefore it is said (Jn. 6:54): "Except you eat of
the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have
life in you."
And this would be enough for man if he had an impassible life, both
corporally and spiritually; but since man is liable at times to both
corporal and spiritual infirmity, i.e. sin, hence man needs a cure from
his infirmity; which cure is twofold. one is the healing, that restores
health: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is
Penance, according to Ps. 40:5: "Heal my soul, for I have sinned
against Thee." The other is the restoration of former vigor by means of
suitable diet and exercise: and corresponding to this in the spiritual
life there is Extreme Unction, which removes the remainder of sin, and
prepares man for final glory. Wherefore it is written (James 5:15):
"And if he be in sins they shall be forgiven him."
In regard to the whole community, man is perfected in two ways. First,
by receiving power to rule the community and to exercise public acts:
and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is the sacrament
of order, according to the saying of Heb. 7:27, that priests offer
sacrifices not for themselves only, but also for the people. Secondly
in regard to natural propagation. This is accomplished by Matrimony
both in the corporal and in the spiritual life: since it is not only a
sacrament but also a function of nature.
We may likewise gather the number of the sacraments from their being
instituted as a remedy against the defect caused by sin. For Baptism is
intended as a remedy against the absence of spiritual life;
Confirmation, against the infirmity of soul found in those of recent
birth; the Eucharist, against the soul's proneness to sin; Penance,
against actual sin committed after baptism; Extreme Unction, against
the remainders of sins---of those sins, namely, which are not
sufficiently removed by Penance, whether through negligence or through
ignorance; order, against divisions in the community; Matrimony, as a
remedy against concupiscence in the individual, and against the
decrease in numbers that results from death.
Some, again, gather the number of sacraments from a certain adaptation
to the virtues and to the defects and penal effects resulting from sin.
They say that Baptism corresponds to Faith, and is ordained as a remedy
against original sin; Extreme Unction, to Hope, being ordained against
venial sin; the Eucharist, to Charity, being ordained against the penal
effect which is malice. order, to Prudence, being ordained against
ignorance; Penance to Justice, being ordained against mortal sin;
Matrimony, to Temperance, being ordained against concupiscence;
Confirmation, to Fortitude, being ordained against infirmity.
Reply to Objection 1: The same principal agent uses various instruments
unto various effects, in accordance with the thing to be done. In the
same way the Divine power and the Passion of Christ work in us through
the various sacraments as through various instruments.
Reply to Objection 2: Guilt and punishment are diversified both
according to species, inasmuch as there are various species of guilt
and punishment, and according to men's various states and habitudes.
And in this respect it was necessary to have a number of sacraments, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: In hierarchical actions we must consider the
agents, the recipients and the actions. The agents are the ministers of
the Church; and to these the sacrament of order belongs. The recipients
are those who approach the sacraments: and these are brought into being
by Matrimony. The actions are "cleansing," "enlightening," and
"perfecting." Mere cleansing, however, cannot be a sacrament of the New
Law, which confers grace: yet it belongs to certain sacramentals, i.e.
catechism and exorcism. But cleansing coupled with enlightening,
according to Dionysius, belongs to Baptism; and, for him who falls back
into sin, they belong secondarily to Penance and Extreme Unction. And
perfecting, as regards power, which is, as it were, a formal
perfection, belongs to Confirmation: while, as regards the attainment
of the end, it belongs to the Eucharist.
Reply to Objection 4: In the sacrament of Confirmation we receive the
fulness of the Holy Ghost in order to be strengthened; while in Extreme
Unction man is prepared for the immediate attainment of glory; and
neither of these two purposes was becoming to the Old Testament.
Consequently, nothing in the old Law could correspond to these
sacraments. Nevertheless, the sacraments of the old Law were more
numerous, on account of the various kinds of sacrifices and ceremonies.
Reply to Objection 5: There was need for a special sacrament to be
applied as a remedy against venereal concupiscence: first because by
this concupiscence, not only the person but also the nature is defiled:
secondly, by reason of its vehemence whereby it clouds the reason.
Reply to Objection 6: Holy Water and other consecrated things are not
called sacraments, because they do not produce the sacramental effect,
which is the receiving of grace. They are, however, a kind of
disposition to the sacraments: either by removing obstacles. thus holy
water is ordained against the snares of the demons, and against venial
sins: or by making things suitable for the conferring of a sacrament;
thus the altar and vessels are consecrated through reverence for the
Eucharist.
Reply to Objection 7: Oblations and tithes, both the Law of nature and
in the Law of Moses, ere ordained not only for the sustenance of the
ministers and the poor, but also figuratively; and consequently they
were sacraments. But now they remain no longer as figures, and
therefore they are not sacraments.
Reply to Objection 8: The infusion of grace is not necessary for the
blotting out of venial sin. Wherefore, since grace is infused in each
of the sacraments of the New Law, none of them was instituted directly
against venial sin. This is taken away by certain sacramentals, for
instance, Holy Water and such like. Some, however, hold that Extreme
Unction is ordained against venial sin. But of this we shall speak in
its proper place ([4409]XP, Q[30], A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the order of the sacraments, as given above, is becoming?
Objection 1: It seems that the order of the sacraments as given above
is unbecoming. For according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:46), "that was .
. . first . . . which is natural, afterwards that which is spiritual."
But man is begotten through Matrimony by a first and natural
generation; while in Baptism he is regenerated as by a second and
spiritual generation. Therefore Matrimony should precede Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, through the sacrament of order man receives the
power of agent in sacramental actions. But the agent precedes his
action. Therefore order should precede Baptism and the other
sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, the Eucharist is a spiritual food; while
Confirmation is compared to growth. But food causes, and consequently
precedes, growth. Therefore the Eucharist precedes Confirmation.
Objection 4: Further, Penance prepares man for the Eucharist. But a
disposition precedes perfection. Therefore Penance should precede the
Eucharist.
Objection 5: Further, that which is nearer the last end comes after
other things. But, of all the sacraments, Extreme Unction is nearest to
the last end which is Happiness. Therefore it should be placed last
among the sacraments.
On the contrary, The order of the sacraments, as given above, is
commonly adopted by all.
I answer that, The reason of the order among the sacraments appears
from what has been said above [4410](A[1]). For just as unity precedes
multitude, so those sacraments which are intended for the perfection of
the individual, naturally precede those which are intended for the
perfection of the multitude; and consequently the last place among the
sacraments is given to order and Matrimony, which are intended for the
perfection of the multitude: while Matrimony is placed after order,
because it has less participation in the nature of the spiritual life,
to which the sacraments are ordained. Moreover, among things ordained
to the perfection of the individual, those naturally come first which
are ordained directly to the perfection of the spiritual life, and
afterwards, those which are ordained thereto indirectly, viz. by
removing some supervening accidental cause of harm; such are Penance
and Extreme Unction: while, of these, Extreme Unction is naturally
placed last, for it preserves the healing which was begun by Penance.
Of the remaining three, it is clear that Baptism which is a spiritual
regeneration, comes first; then Confirmation, which is ordained to the
formal perfection of power; and after these the Eucharist which is
ordained to final perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Matrimony as ordained to natural life is a
function of nature. But in so far as it has something spiritual it is a
sacrament. And because it has the least amount of spirituality it is
placed last.
Reply to Objection 2: For a thing to be an agent it must first of all
be perfect in itself. Wherefore those sacraments by which a man is
perfected in himself, are placed before the sacrament of order, in
which a man is made a perfecter of others.
Reply to Objection 3: Nourishment both precedes growth, as its cause;
and follows it, as maintaining the perfection of size and power in man.
Consequently, the Eucharist can be placed before Confirmation, as
Dionysius places it (Eccl. Hier. iii, iv), and can be placed after it,
as the Master does (iv, 2,8).
Reply to Objection 4: This argument would hold if Penance were required
of necessity as a preparation to the Eucharist. But this is not true:
for if anyone be without mortal sin, he does not need Penance in order
to receive the Eucharist. Thus it is clear that Penance is an
accidental preparation to the Eucharist, that is to say, sin being
supposed. Wherefore it is written in the last chapter of the second
Book of Paralipomenon (cf. 2 Paral 33:18): "Thou, O Lord of the
righteous, didst not impose penance on righteous men." [*The words
quoted are from the apocryphal Prayer of Manasses, which, before the
Council of Trent, was to be found inserted in some Latin copies of the
Bible.]
Reply to Objection 5: Extreme Unction, for this very reason, is given
the last place among those sacraments which are ordained to the
perfection of the individual.
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Whether the Eucharist is the greatest of the sacraments?
Objection 1: It seems that the Eucharist is not the principal of the
sacraments. For the common good is of more account than the good of the
individual (1 Ethic. ii). But Matrimony is ordained to the common good
of the human race by means of generation: whereas the sacrament of the
Eucharist is ordained to the private good of the recipient. Therefore
it is not the greatest of the sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, those sacraments, seemingly, are greater, which
are conferred by a greater minister. But the sacraments of Confirmation
and order are conferred by a bishop only, who is a greater minister
than a mere minister such as a priest, by whom the sacraments of the
Eucharist is conferred. Therefore those sacraments are greater.
Objection 3: Further, those sacraments are greater that have the
greater power. But some of the sacraments imprint a character, viz.
Baptism, Confirmation and order; whereas the Eucharist does not.
Therefore those sacraments are greater.
Objection 4: Further, that seems to be greater, on which others depend
without its depending on them. But the Eucharist depends on Baptism:
since no one can receive the Eucharist except he has been baptized.
Therefore Baptism is greater than the Eucharist.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii) that "No one receives
hierarchical perfection save by the most God-like Eucharist." Therefore
this sacrament is greater than all the others and perfects them.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, the sacrament of the Eucharist is
the greatest of all the sacraments: and this may be shown in three
ways. First of all because it contains Christ Himself substantially:
whereas the other sacraments contain a certain instrumental power which
is a share of Christ's power, as we have shown above ([4411]Q[62],
A[4], ad 3, A[5] ). Now that which is essentially such is always of
more account than that which is such by participation.
Secondly, this is made clear by considering the relation of the
sacraments to one another. For all the other sacraments seem to be
ordained to this one as to their end. For it is manifest that the
sacrament of order is ordained to the consecration of the Eucharist:
and the sacrament of Baptism to the reception of the Eucharist: while a
man is perfected by Confirmation, so as not to fear to abstain from
this sacrament. By Penance and Extreme Unction man is prepared to
receive the Body of Christ worthily. And Matrimony at least in its
signification, touches this sacrament; in so far as it signifies the
union of Christ with the Church, of which union the Eucharist is a
figure: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32): "This is a great sacrament:
but I speak in Christ and in the Church."
Thirdly, this is made clear by considering the rites of the sacraments.
For nearly all the sacraments terminate in the Eucharist, as Dionysius
says (Eccl. Hier. iii): thus those who have been ordained receive Holy
Communion, as also do those who have been baptized, if they be adults.
The remaining sacraments may be compared to one another in several
ways. For on the ground of necessity, Baptism is the greatest of the
sacraments; while from the point of view of perfection, order comes
first; while Confirmation holds a middle place. The sacraments of
Penance and Extreme Unction are on a degree inferior to those mentioned
above; because, as stated above [4412](A[2]), they are ordained to the
Christian life, not directly, but accidentally, as it were, that is to
say, as remedies against supervening defects. And among these, Extreme
Unction is compared to Penance, as Confirmation to Baptism; in such a
way, that Penance is more necessary, whereas Extreme Unction is more
perfect.
Reply to Objection 1: Matrimony is ordained to the common good as
regards the body. But the common spiritual good of the whole Church is
contained substantially in the sacrament itself of the Eucharist.
Reply to Objection 2: By order and Confirmation the faithful of Christ
are deputed to certain special duties; and this can be done by the
prince alone. Consequently the conferring of these sacraments belongs
exclusively to a bishop, who is, as it were, a prince in the Church.
But a man is not deputed to any duty by the sacrament of the Eucharist,
rather is this sacrament the end of all duties, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The sacramental character, as stated above
([4413]Q[63], A[3]), is a kind of participation in Christ's priesthood.
Wherefore the sacrament that unites man to Christ Himself, is greater
than a sacrament that imprints Christ's character.
Reply to Objection 4: This argument proceeds on the ground of
necessity. For thus Baptism, being of the greatest necessity, is the
greatest of the sacraments, just as order and Confirmation have a
certain excellence considered in their administration; and Matrimony by
reason of its signification. For there is no reason why a thing should
not be greater from a certain point of view which is not greater
absolutely speaking.
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Whether all the sacraments are necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It seems that all the sacraments are necessary for
salvation. For what is not necessary seems to be superfluous. But no
sacrament is superfluous, because "God does nothing without a purpose"
(De Coelo et Mundo i). Therefore all the sacraments are necessary for
salvation.
Objection 2: Further, just as it is said of Baptism (Jn. 3:5): "Unless
a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter in to
the kingdom of God," so of the Eucharist is it said (Jn. 6:54): "Except
you eat of the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink of His blood, you
shall not have life in you." Therefore, just as Baptism is a necessary
sacrament, so is the Eucharist.
Objection 3: Further, a man can be saved without the sacrament of
Baptism, provided that some unavoidable obstacle, and not his contempt
for religion, debar him from the sacrament, as we shall state further
on ([4414]Q[68], A[2]). But contempt of religion in any sacrament is a
hindrance to salvation. Therefore, in like manner, all the sacraments
are necessary for salvation.
On the contrary, Children are saved by Baptism alone without the other
sacraments.
I answer that, Necessity of end, of which we speak now, is twofold.
First, a thing may be necessary so that without it the end cannot be
attained; thus food is necessary for human life. And this is simple
necessity of end. Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if,
without it, the end cannot be attained so becomingly: thus a horse is
necessary for a journey. But this is not simple necessity of end.
In the first way, three sacraments are necessary for salvation. Two of
them are necessary to the individual; Baptism, simply and absolutely;
Penance, in the case of mortal sin committed after Baptism; while the
sacrament of order is necessary to the Church, since "where there is no
governor the people shall fall" (Prov. 11:14).
But in the second way the other sacraments are necessary. For in a
sense Confirmation perfects Baptism; Extreme Unction perfects Penance;
while Matrimony, by multiplying them, preserves the numbers in the
Church.
Reply to Objection 1: For a thing not to be superfluous it is enough if
it be necessary either in the first or the second way. It is thus that
the sacraments are necessary, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: These words of our Lord are to be understood of
spiritual, and not of merely sacramental, eating, as Augustine explains
(Tract. xxvi super Joan.).
Reply to Objection 3: Although contempt of any of the sacraments is a
hindrance to salvation, yet it does not amount to contempt of the
sacrament, if anyone does not trouble to receive a sacrament that is
not necessary for salvation. Else those who do not receive orders, and
those who do not contract Matrimony, would be guilty of contempt of
those sacraments.
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OF THE SACRAMENT OF BAPTISM (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We have now to consider each sacrament specially: (1) Baptism; (2)
Confirmation; (3) the Eucharist; (4) Penance; (5) Extreme Unction; (6)
Order; (7) Matrimony.
Concerning the first, our consideration will be twofold: (1) of Baptism
itself; (2) of things preparatory to Baptism.
Concerning the first, four points arise for our consideration: (1)
Things pertaining to the sacrament of Baptism; (2) The minister of this
sacrament; (3) The recipients of this sacrament; (4) The effect of this
sacrament.
Concerning the first there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) What is Baptism? Is it a washing?
(2) Of the institution of this sacrament;
(3) Whether water be the proper matter of this sacrament?
(4) Whether plain water be required?
(5) Whether this be a suitable form of this sacrament: "I baptize thee
in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost"?
(6) Whether one could baptize with this form: "I baptize thee in the
name of Christ?"
(7) Whether immersion is necessary for Baptism?
(8) Whether trine immersion is necessary?
(9) Whether Baptism can be reiterated?
(10) Of the Baptismal rite;
(11) Of the various kinds of Baptism;
(12) Of the comparison between various Baptisms.
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Whether Baptism is the mere washing?
Objection 1: It seems that Baptism is not the mere washing. For the
washing of the body is something transitory: but Baptism is something
permanent. Therefore Baptism is not the mere washing; but rather is it
"the regeneration, the seal, the safeguarding, the enlightenment," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv).
Objection 2: Further, Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii) that
"Baptism is water sanctified by God's word for the blotting out of
sins." But the washing itself is not water, but a certain use of water.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super Joan.): "The
word is added to the element, and this becomes a sacrament." Now, the
element is the water. Therefore Baptism is the water and not the
washing.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 34:30): "He that washeth
himself [baptizatur] after touching the dead, if he touch him again,
what does his washing avail?" It seems, therefore, that Baptism is the
washing or bathing.
I answer that, In the sacrament of Baptism, three things may be
considered: namely, that which is "sacrament only"; that which is
"reality and sacrament"; and that which is "reality only." That which
is sacrament only, is something visible and outward; the sign, namely,
of the inward effect: for such is the very nature of a sacrament. And
this outward something that can be perceived by the sense is both the
water itself and its use, which is the washing. Hence some have thought
that the water itself is the sacrament: which seems to be the meaning
of the passage quoted from Hugh of St. Victor. For in the general
definition of a sacrament he says that it is "a material element": and
in defining Baptism he says it is "water."
But this is not true. For since the sacraments of the New Law effect a
certain sanctification, there the sacrament is completed where the
sanctification is completed. Now, the sanctification is not completed
in water; but a certain sanctifying instrumental virtue, not permanent
but transient, passes from the water, in which it is, into man who is
the subject of true sanctification. Consequently the sacrament is not
completed in the very water, but in applying the water to man, i.e. in
the washing. Hence the Master (iv, 3) says that "Baptism is the outward
washing of the body done together with the prescribed form of words."
The Baptismal character is both reality and sacrament: because it is
something real signified by the outward washing; and a sacramental sign
of the inward justification: and this last is the reality only, in this
sacrament---namely, the reality signified and not signifying.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is both sacrament and reality---i.e.
the character---and that which is reality only---i.e. the inward
justification---remain: the character remains and is indelible, as
stated above ([4415]Q[63], A[5]); the justification remains, but can be
lost. Consequently Damascene defined Baptism, not as to that which is
done outwardly, and is the sacrament only; but as to that which is
inward. Hence he sets down two things as pertaining to the
character---namely, "seal" and "safeguarding"; inasmuch as the
character which is called a seal, so far as itself is concerned,
safeguards the soul in good. He also sets down two things as pertaining
to the ultimate reality of the sacrament---namely, "regeneration" which
refers to the fact that man by being baptized begins the new life of
righteousness; and "enlightenment," which refers especially to faith,
by which man receives spiritual life, according to Habac 2 (Heb. 10:38;
cf. Habac 2:4): "But (My) just man liveth by faith"; and Baptism is a
sort of protestation of faith; whence it is called the "Sacrament of
Faith." Likewise Dionysius defined Baptism by its relation to the other
sacraments, saying (Eccl. Hier. ii) that it is "the principle that
forms the habits of the soul for the reception of those most holy words
and sacraments"; and again by its relation to heavenly glory, which is
the universal end of all the sacraments, when he adds, "preparing the
way for us, whereby we mount to the repose of the heavenly kingdom";
and again as to the beginning of spiritual life, when he adds, "the
conferring of our most sacred and Godlike regeneration."
Reply to Objection 2: As already stated, the opinion of Hugh of St.
Victor on this question is not to be followed. Nevertheless the saying
that "Baptism is water" may be verified in so far as water is the
material principle of Baptism: and thus there would be "causal
predication."
Reply to Objection 3: When the words are added, the element becomes a
sacrament, not in the element itself, but in man, to whom the element
is applied, by being used in washing him. Indeed, this is signified by
those very words which are added to the element, when we say: "I
baptize thee," etc.
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Whether Baptism was instituted after Christ's Passion?
Objection 1: It seems that Baptism was instituted after Christ's
Passion. For the cause precedes the effect. Now Christ's Passion
operates in the sacraments of the New Law. Therefore Christ's Passion
precedes the institution of the sacraments of the New Law: especially
the sacrament of Baptism since the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3): "All we,
who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His death," etc.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments of the New Law derive their
efficacy from the mandate of Christ. But Christ gave the disciples the
mandate of Baptism after His Passion and Resurrection, when He said:
"Going, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the
Father," etc. (Mat. 28:19). Therefore it seems that Baptism was
instituted after Christ's Passion.
Objection 3: Further, Baptism is a necessary sacrament, as stated above
([4416]Q[65] , A[4]): wherefore, seemingly, it must have been binding
on man as soon as it was instituted. But before Christ's Passion men
were not bound to be baptized: for Circumcision was still in force,
which was supplanted by Baptism. Therefore it seems that Baptism was
not instituted before Christ's Passion.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (Append.
Serm., clxxxv): "As soon as Christ was plunged into the waters, the
waters washed away the sins of all." But this was before Christ's
Passion. Therefore Baptism was instituted before Christ's Passion.
I answer that, As stated above ([4417]Q[62], A[1]), sacraments derive
from their institution the power of conferring grace. Wherefore it
seems that a sacrament is then instituted, when it receives the power
of producing its effect. Now Baptism received this power when Christ
was baptized. Consequently Baptism was truly instituted then, if we
consider it as a sacrament. But the obligation of receiving this
sacrament was proclaimed to mankind after the Passion and Resurrection.
First, because Christ's Passion put an end to the figurative
sacraments, which were supplanted by Baptism and the other sacraments
of the New Law. Secondly, because by Baptism man is "made conformable"
to Christ's Passion and Resurrection, in so far as he dies to sin and
begins to live anew unto righteousness. Consequently it behooved Christ
to suffer and to rise again, before proclaiming to man his obligation
of conforming himself to Christ's Death and Resurrection.
Reply to Objection 1: Even before Christ's Passion, Baptism, inasmuch
as it foreshadowed it, derived its efficacy therefrom; but not in the
same way as the sacraments of the Old Law. For these were mere figures:
whereas Baptism derived the power of justifying from Christ Himself, to
Whose power the Passion itself owed its saving virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: It was not meet that men should be restricted to
a number of figures by Christ, Who came to fulfil and replace the
figure by His reality. Therefore before His Passion He did not make
Baptism obligatory as soon as it was instituted; but wished men to
become accustomed to its use; especially in regard to the Jews, to whom
all things were figurative, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv). But
after His Passion and Resurrection He made Baptism obligatory, not only
on the Jews, but also on the Gentiles, when He gave the commandment:
"Going, teach ye all nations."
Reply to Objection 3: Sacraments are not obligatory except when we are
commanded to receive them. And this was not before the Passion, as
stated above. For our Lord's words to Nicodemus (Jn. 3:5), "Unless a
man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the
kingdom of God, seem to refer to the future rather than to the
present."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether water is the proper matter of Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that water is not the proper matter of Baptism.
For Baptism, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) and Damascene (De
Fide Orth. iv), has a power of enlightening. But enlightenment is a
special characteristic of fire. Therefore Baptism should be conferred
with fire rather than with water: and all the more since John the
Baptist said when foretelling Christ's Baptism (Mat. 3:11): "He shall
baptize you in the Holy Ghost and fire."
Objection 2: Further, the washing away of sins is signified in Baptism.
But many other things besides water are employed in washing, such as
wine, oil, and such like. Therefore Baptism can be conferred with these
also; and consequently water is not the proper matter of Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the Church flowed from the side
of Christ hanging on the cross, as stated above ([4418]Q[62], A[5]).
But not only water flowed therefrom, but also blood. Therefore it seems
that Baptism can also be conferred with blood. And this seems to be
more in keeping with the effect of Baptism, because it is written
(Apoc. 1:5): "(Who) washed us from our sins in His own blood."
Objection 4: Further, as Augustine (cf. Master of the Sentences, iv, 3)
and Bede (Exposit. in Luc. iii, 21) say, Christ, by "the touch of His
most pure flesh, endowed the waters with a regenerating and cleansing
virtue." But all waters are not connected with the waters of the Jordan
which Christ touched with His flesh. Consequently it seems that Baptism
cannot be conferred with any water; and therefore water, as such, is
not the proper matter of Baptism.
Objection 5: Further, if water, as such, were the proper matter of
Baptism, there would be no need to do anything to the water before
using it for Baptism. But in solemn Baptism the water which is used for
baptizing, is exorcized and blessed. Therefore it seems that water, as
such, is not the proper matter of Baptism.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 3:5): "Unless a man be born again
of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."
I answer that, By Divine institution water is the proper matter of
Baptism; and with reason. First, by reason of the very nature of
Baptism, which is a regeneration unto spiritual life. And this answers
to the nature of water in a special degree; wherefore seeds, from which
all living things, viz. plants and animals are generated, are moist and
akin to water. For this reason certain philosophers held that water is
the first principle of all things.
Secondly, in regard to the effects of Baptism, to which the properties
of water correspond. For by reason of its moistness it cleanses; and
hence it fittingly signifies and causes the cleansing from sins. By
reason of its coolness it tempers superfluous heat: wherefore it
fittingly mitigates the concupiscence of the fomes. By reason of its
transparency, it is susceptive of light; hence its adaptability to
Baptism as the "sacrament of Faith."
Thirdly, because it is suitable for the signification of the mysteries
of Christ, by which we are justified. For, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv
in Joan.) on Jn. 3:5, "Unless a man be born again," etc., "When we dip
our heads under the water as in a kind of tomb our old man is buried,
and being submerged is hidden below, and thence he rises again
renewed."
Fourthly, because by being so universal and abundant, it is a matter
suitable to our need of this sacrament: for it can easily be obtained
everywhere.
Reply to Objection 1: Fire enlightens actively. But he who is baptized
does not become an enlightener, but is enlightened by faith, which
"cometh by hearing" (Rom. 10:17). Consequently water is more suitable,
than fire, for Baptism.
But when we find it said: "He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost and
fire," we may understand fire, as Jerome says (In Matth. ii), to mean
the Holy Ghost, Who appeared above the disciples under the form of
fiery tongues (Acts 2:3). Or we may understand it to mean tribulation,
as Chrysostom says (Hom. iii in Matth.): because tribulation washes
away sin, and tempers concupiscence. Or again, as Hilary says (Super
Matth. ii) that "when we have been baptized in the Holy Ghost," we
still have to be "perfected by the fire of the judgment."
Reply to Objection 2: Wine and oil are not so commonly used for
washing, as water. Neither do they wash so efficiently: for whatever is
washed with them, contracts a certain smell therefrom; which is not the
case if water be used. Moreover, they are not so universal or so
abundant as water.
Reply to Objection 3: Water flowed from Christ's side to wash us;
blood, to redeem us. Wherefore blood belongs to the sacrament of the
Eucharist, while water belongs to the sacrament of Baptism. Yet this
latter sacrament derives its cleansing virtue from the power of
Christ's blood.
Reply to Objection 4: Christ's power flowed into all waters, by reason
of, not connection of place, but likeness of species, as Augustine says
in a sermon on the Epiphany (Append. Serm. cxxxv): "The blessing that
flowed from the Saviour's Baptism, like a mystic river, swelled the
course of every stream, and filled the channels of every spring."
Reply to Objection 5: The blessing of the water is not essential to
Baptism, but belongs to a certain solemnity, whereby the devotion of
the faithful is aroused, and the cunning of the devil hindered from
impeding the baptismal effect.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether plain water is necessary for Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that plain water is not necessary for Baptism.
For the water which we have is not plain water; as appears especially
in sea-water, in which there is a considerable proportion of the
earthly element, as the Philosopher shows (Meteor. ii). Yet this water
may be used for Baptism. Therefore plain and pure water is not
necessary for Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, in the solemn celebration of Baptism, chrism is
poured into the water. But this seems to take away the purity and
plainness of the water. Therefore pure and plain water is not necessary
for Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, the water that flowed from the side of Christ
hanging on the cross was a figure of Baptism, as stated above (A[3], ad
3). But that water, seemingly, was not pure, because the elements do
not exist actually in a mixed body, such as Christ's. Therefore it
seems that pure or plain water is not necessary for Baptism.
Objection 4: Further, lye does not seem to be pure water, for it has
the properties of heating and drying, which are contrary to those of
water. Nevertheless it seems that lye can be used for Baptism; for the
water of the Baths can be so used, which has filtered through a
sulphurous vein, just as lye percolates through ashes. Therefore it
seems that plain water is not necessary for Baptism.
Objection 5: Further, rose-water is distilled from roses, just as
chemical waters are distilled from certain bodies. But seemingly, such
like waters may be used in Baptism; just as rain-water, which is
distilled from vapors. Since, therefore, such waters are not pure and
plain water, it seems that pure and plain water is not necessary for
Baptism.
On the contrary, The proper matter of Baptism is water, as stated above
[4419](A[3]). But plain water alone has the nature of water. Therefore
pure plain water is necessary for Baptism.
I answer that, Water may cease to be pure or plain water in two ways:
first, by being mixed with another body; secondly, by alteration. And
each of these may happen in a twofold manner; artificially and
naturally. Now art fails in the operation of nature: because nature
gives the substantial form, which art cannot give; for whatever form is
given by art is accidental; except perchance when art applies a proper
agent to its proper matter, as fire to a combustible; in which manner
animals are produced from certain things by way of putrefaction.
Whatever artificial change, then, takes place in the water, whether by
mixture or by alteration, the water's nature is not changed.
Consequently such water can be used for Baptism: unless perhaps such a
small quantity of water be mixed artificially with a body that the
compound is something other than water; thus mud is earth rather than
water, and diluted wine is wine rather than water.
But if the change be natural, sometimes it destroys the nature of the
water; and this is when by a natural process water enters into the
substance of a mixed body: thus water changed into the juice of the
grape is wine, wherefore it has not the nature of water. Sometimes,
however, there may be a natural change of the water, without
destruction of species: and this, both by alteration, as we may see in
the case of water heated by the sun; and by mixture, as when the water
of a river has become muddy by being mixed with particles of earth.
We must therefore say that any water may be used for Baptism, no matter
how much it may be changed, as long as the species of water is not
destroyed; but if the species of water be destroyed, it cannot be used
for Baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: The change in sea-water and in other waters which
we have to hand, is not so great as to destroy the species of water.
And therefore such waters may be used for Baptism.
Reply to Objection 2: Chrism does not destroy the nature of the water
by being mixed with it: just as neither is water changed wherein meat
and the like are boiled: except the substance boiled be so dissolved
that the liquor be of a nature foreign to water; in this we may be
guided by the specific gravity [spissitudine]. If, however, from the
liquor thus thickened plain water be strained, it can be used for
Baptism: just as water strained from mud, although mud cannot be used
for baptizing.
Reply to Objection 3: The water which flowed from the side of Christ
hanging on the cross, was not the phlegmatic humor, as some have
supposed. For a liquid of this kind cannot be used for Baptism, as
neither can the blood of an animal, or wine, or any liquid extracted
from plants. It was pure water gushing forth miraculously like the
blood from a dead body, to prove the reality of our Lord's body, and
confute the error of the Manichees: water, which is one of the four
elements, showing Christ's body to be composed of the four elements;
blood, proving that it was composed of the four humors.
Reply to Objection 4: Baptism may be conferred with lye and the waters
of Sulphur Baths: because such like waters are not incorporated,
artificially or naturally, with certain mixed bodies, and suffer only a
certain alteration by passing through certain bodies.
Reply to Objection 5: Rose-water is a liquid distilled from roses:
consequently it cannot be used for Baptism. For the same reason
chemical waters cannot be used, as neither can wine. Nor does the
comparison hold with rain-water, which for the most part is formed by
the condensing of vapors, themselves formed from water, and contains a
minimum of the liquid matter from mixed bodies; which liquid matter by
the force of nature, which is stronger than art, is transformed in this
process of condensation into real water, a result which cannot be
produced artificially. Consequently rain-water retains no properties of
any mixed body; which cannot be said of rose-water or chemical waters.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this be a suitable form of Baptism: "I baptize thee in the name of
the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost"?
Objection 1: It seems that this is not a suitable form of Baptism: "I
baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy
Ghost." For action should be ascribed to the principal agent rather
than to the minister. Now the minister of a sacrament acts as an
instrument, as stated above ([4420]Q[64], A[1]); while the principal
agent in Baptism is Christ, according to Jn. 1:33, "He upon Whom thou
shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that
baptizeth." It is therefore unbecoming for the minister to say, "I
baptize thee": the more so that "Ego" [I] is understood in the word
"baptizo" [I baptize], so that it seems redundant.
Objection 2: Further, there is no need for a man who does an action, to
make mention of the action done; thus he who teaches, need not say, "I
teach you." Now our Lord gave at the same time the precepts both of
baptizing and of teaching, when He said (Mat. 28:19): "Going, teach ye
all nations," etc. Therefore there is no need in the form of Baptism to
mention the action of baptizing.
Objection 3: Further, the person baptized sometimes does not understand
the words; for instance, if he be deaf, or a child. But it is useless
to address such a one; according to Ecclus. 32:6: "Where there is no
hearing, pour not out words." Therefore it is unfitting to address the
person baptized with these words: "I baptize thee."
Objection 4: Further, it may happen that several are baptized by
several at the same time; thus the apostles on one day baptized three
thousand, and on another, five thousand (Acts 2, 4). Therefore the form
of Baptism should not be limited to the singular number in the words,
"I baptize thee": but one should be able to say, "We baptize you."
Objection 5: Further, Baptism derives its power from Christ's Passion.
But Baptism is sanctified by the form. Therefore it seems that Christ's
Passion should be mentioned in the form of Baptism.
Objection 6: Further, a name signifies a thing's property. But there
are three Personal Properties of the Divine Persons, as stated in the
[4421]FP, Q[32], A[3]. Therefore we should not say, "in the name," but
"in the names of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."
Objection 7: Further, the Person of the Father is designated not only
by the name Father, but also by that of "Unbegotten and Begetter"; and
the Son by those of "Word," "Image," and "Begotten"; and the Holy Ghost
by those of "Gift," "Love," and the "Proceeding One." Therefore it
seems that Baptism is valid if conferred in these names.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 28:19): "Going . . . teach ye all
nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and
of the Holy Ghost."
I answer that, Baptism receives its consecration from its form,
according to Eph. 5:26: "Cleansing it by the laver of water in the word
of life." And Augustine says (De Unico Baptismo iv) that "Baptism is
consecrated by the words of the Gospel." Consequently the cause of
Baptism needs to be expressed in the baptismal form. Now this cause is
twofold; the principal cause from which it derives its virtue, and this
is the Blessed Trinity; and the instrumental cause, viz. the minister
who confers the sacrament outwardly. Wherefore both causes should be
expressed in the form of Baptism. Now the minister is designated by the
words, "I baptize thee"; and the principal cause in the words, "in the
name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Therefore
this is the suitable form of Baptism: "I baptize thee in the name of
the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."
Reply to Objection 1: Action is attributed to an instrument as to the
immediate agent; but to the principal agent inasmuch as the instrument
acts in virtue thereof. Consequently it is fitting that in the
baptismal form the minister should be mentioned as performing the act
of baptizing, in the words, "I baptize thee"; indeed, our Lord
attributed to the ministers the act of baptizing, when He said:
"Baptizing them," etc. But the principal cause is indicated as
conferring the sacrament by His own power, in the words, "in the name
of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost": for Christ does
not baptize without the Father and the Holy Ghost.
The Greeks, however, do not attribute the act of baptizing to the
minister, in order to avoid the error of those who in the past ascribed
the baptismal power to the baptizers, saying (1 Cor. 1:12): "I am of
Paul . . . and I of Cephas." Wherefore they use the form: "May the
servant of Christ, N . . ., be baptized, in the name of the Father,"
etc. And since the action performed by the minister is expressed with
the invocation of the Trinity, the sacrament is validly conferred. As
to the addition of "Ego" in our form, it is not essential; but it is
added in order to lay greater stress on the intention.
Reply to Objection 2: Since a man may be washed with water for several
reasons, the purpose for which it is done must be expressed by the
words of the form. And this is not done by saying: "In the name of the
Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost"; because we are bound to
do all things in that Name (Col. 3:17). Wherefore unless the act of
baptizing be expressed, either as we do, or as the Greeks do, the
sacrament is not valid; according to the decretal of Alexander III: "If
anyone dip a child thrice in the water in the name of the Father, and
of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, Amen, without saying, I baptize thee
in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, Amen,
the child is not baptized."
Reply to Objection 3: The words which are uttered in the sacramental
forms, are said not merely for the purpose of signification, but also
for the purpose of efficiency, inasmuch as they derive efficacy from
that Word, by Whom "all things were made." Consequently they are
becomingly addressed not only to men, but also to insensible creatures;
for instance, when we say: "I exorcize thee, creature salt" (Roman
Ritual).
Reply to Objection 4: Several cannot baptize one at the same time:
because an action is multiplied according to the number of the agents,
if it be done perfectly by each. So that if two were to combine, of
whom one were mute, and unable to utter the words, and the other were
without hands, and unable to perform the action, they could not both
baptize at the same time, one saying the words and the other performing
the action.
On the other hand, in a case of necessity, several could be baptized at
the same time; for no single one of them would receive more than one
baptism. But it would be necessary, in that case, to say: "I baptize
ye." Nor would this be a change of form, because "ye" is the same as
"thee and thee." Whereas "we" does not mean "I and I," but "I and
thou"; so that this would be a change of form.
Likewise it would be a change of form to say, "I baptize myself":
consequently no one can baptize himself. For this reason did Christ
choose to be baptized by John (Extra, De Baptismo et ejus effectu, cap.
Debitum).
Reply to Objection 5: Although Christ's Passion is the principal cause
as compared to the minister, yet it is an instrumental cause as
compared to the Blessed Trinity. For this reason the Trinity is
mentioned rather than Christ's Passion.
Reply to Objection 6: Although there are three personal names of the
three Persons, there is but one essential name. Now the Divine power
which works in Baptism, pertains to the Essence; and therefore we say,
"in the name," and not, "in the names."
Reply to Objection 7: Just as water is used in Baptism, because it is
more commonly employed in washing, so for the purpose of designating
the three Persons, in the form of Baptism, those names are chosen,
which are generally used, in a particular language, to signify the
Persons. Nor is the sacrament valid if conferred in any other names.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Baptism can be conferred in the name of Christ?
Objection 1: It seems that Baptism can be conferred in the name of
Christ. For just as there is "one Faith," so is there "one Baptism"
(Eph. 4:5). But it is related (Acts 8:12) that "in the name of Jesus
Christ they were baptized, both men and women." Therefore now also can
Baptism be conferred in the name of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i): "If you mention
Christ, you designate both the Father by Whom He was anointed, and the
Son Himself, Who was anointed, and the Holy Ghost with Whom He was
anointed." But Baptism can be conferred in the name of the Trinity:
therefore also in the name of Christ.
Objection 3: Further, Pope Nicholas I, answering questions put to him
by the Bulgars, said: "Those who have been baptized in the name of the
Trinity, or only in the name of Christ, as we read in the Acts of the
Apostles (it is all the same, as Blessed Ambrose saith), must not be
rebaptized." But they would be baptized again if they had not been
validly baptized with that form. Therefore Baptism can be celebrated in
the name of Christ by using this form: "I baptize thee in the name of
Christ."
On the contrary, Pope Pelagius II wrote to the Bishop Gaudentius: "If
any people living in your Worship's neighborhood, avow that they have
been baptized in the name of the Lord only, without any hesitation
baptize them again in the name of the Blessed Trinity, when they come
in quest of the Catholic Faith." Didymus, too, says (De Spir. Sanct.):
"If indeed there be such a one with a mind so foreign to faith as to
baptize while omitting one of the aforesaid names," viz. of the three
Persons, "he baptizes invalidly."
I answer that, As stated above ([4422]Q[64], A[3]), the sacraments
derive their efficacy from Christ's institution. Consequently, if any
of those things be omitted which Christ instituted in regard to a
sacrament, it is invalid; save by special dispensation of Him Who did
not bind His power to the sacraments. Now Christ commanded the
sacrament of Baptism to be given with the invocation of the Trinity.
And consequently whatever is lacking to the full invocation of the
Trinity, destroys the integrity of Baptism.
Nor does it matter that in the name of one Person another is implied,
as the name of the Son is implied in that of the Father, or that he who
mentions the name of only one Person may believe aright in the Three;
because just as a sacrament requires sensible matter, so does it
require a sensible form. Hence, for the validity of the sacrament it is
not enough to imply or to believe in the Trinity, unless the Trinity be
expressed in sensible words. For this reason at Christ's Baptism,
wherein was the source of the sanctification of our Baptism, the
Trinity was present in sensible signs: viz. the Father in the voice,
the Son in the human nature, the Holy Ghost in the dove.
Reply to Objection 1: It was by a special revelation from Christ that
in the primitive Church the apostles baptized in the name of Christ; in
order that the name of Christ, which was hateful to Jews and Gentiles,
might become an object of veneration, in that the Holy Ghost was given
in Baptism at the invocation of that Name.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose here gives this reason why exception
could, without inconsistency, be allowed in the primitive Church;
namely, because the whole Trinity is implied in the name of Christ, and
therefore the form prescribed by Christ in the Gospel was observed in
its integrity, at least implicitly.
Reply to Objection 3: Pope Nicolas confirms his words by quoting the
two authorities given in the preceding objections: wherefore the answer
to this is clear from the two solutions given above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether immersion in water is necessary for Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that immersion in water is necessary for Baptism.
Because it is written (Eph. 4:5): "One faith, one baptism." But in many
parts of the world the ordinary way of baptizing is by immersion.
Therefore it seems that there can be no Baptism without immersion.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3,4): "All we who are
baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His death: for we are buried
together with Him, by Baptism into death." But this is done by
immersion: for Chrysostom says on Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be born again
of water and the Holy Ghost," etc.: "When we dip our heads under the
water as in a kind of tomb, our old man is buried, and being submerged,
is hidden below, and thence he rises again renewed." Therefore it seems
that immersion is essential to Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, if Baptism is valid without total immersion of
the body, it would follow that it would be equally sufficient to pour
water over any part of the body. But this seems unreasonable; since
original sin, to remedy which is the principal purpose of Baptism, is
not in only one part of the body. Therefore it seems that immersion is
necessary for Baptism, and that mere sprinkling is not enough.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 10:22): "Let us draw near with a
true heart in fulness of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an
evil conscience, and our bodies washed with clean water."
I answer that, In the sacrament of Baptism water is put to the use of a
washing of the body, whereby to signify the inward washing away of
sins. Now washing may be done with water not only by immersion, but
also by sprinkling or pouring. And, therefore, although it is safer to
baptize by immersion, because this is the more ordinary fashion, yet
Baptism can be conferred by sprinkling or also by pouring, according to
Ezech. 36:25: "I will pour upon you clean water," as also the Blessed
Lawrence is related to have baptized. And this especially in cases of
urgency: either because there is a great number to be baptized, as was
clearly the case in Acts 2 and 4, where we read that on one day three
thousand believed, and on another five thousand: or through there being
but a small supply of water, or through feebleness of the minister, who
cannot hold up the candidate for Baptism; or through feebleness of the
candidate, whose life might be endangered by immersion. We must
therefore conclude that immersion is not necessary for Baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: What is accidental to a thing does not diversify
its essence. Now bodily washing with water is essential to Baptism:
wherefore Baptism is called a "laver," according to Eph. 5:26:
"Cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life." But that the
washing be done this or that way, is accidental to Baptism. And
consequently such diversity does not destroy the oneness of Baptism.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's burial is more clearly represented by
immersion: wherefore this manner of baptizing is more frequently in use
and more commendable. Yet in the other ways of baptizing it is
represented after a fashion, albeit not so clearly; for no matter how
the washing is done, the body of a man, or some part thereof, is put
under water, just as Christ's body was put under the earth.
Reply to Objection 3: The principal part of the body, especially in
relation to the exterior members, is the head, wherein all the senses,
both interior and exterior, flourish. And therefore, if the whole body
cannot be covered with water, because of the scarcity of water, or
because of some other reason, it is necessary to pour water over the
head, in which the principle of animal life is made manifest.
And although original sin is transmitted through the members that serve
for procreation, yet those members are not to be sprinkled in
preference to the head, because by Baptism the transmission of original
sin to the offspring by the act of procreation is not deleted, but the
soul is freed from the stain and debt of sin which it has contracted.
Consequently that part of the body should be washed in preference, in
which the works of the soul are made manifest.
Nevertheless in the Old Law the remedy against original sin was affixed
to the member of procreation; because He through Whom original sin was
to be removed, was yet to be born of the seed of Abraham, whose faith
was signified by circumcision according to Rom. 4:11.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether trine immersion is essential to Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that trine immersion is essential to Baptism. For
Augustine says in a sermon on the Symbol, addressed to the Neophytes:
"Rightly were you dipped three times, since you were baptized in the
name of the Trinity. Rightly were you dipped three times, because you
were baptized in the name of Jesus Christ, Who on the third day rose
again from the dead. For that thrice repeated immersion reproduces the
burial of the Lord by which you were buried with Christ in Baptism."
Now both seem to be essential to Baptism, namely, that in Baptism the
Trinity of Persons should be signified, and that we should be conformed
to Christ's burial. Therefore it seems that trine immersion is
essential to Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from
Christ's mandate. But trine immersion was commanded by Christ: for Pope
Pelagius II wrote to Bishop Gaudentius: "The Gospel precept given by
our Lord God Himself, our Saviour Jesus Christ, admonishes us to confer
the sacrament of Baptism to each one in the name of the Trinity and
also with trine immersion." Therefore, just as it is essential to
Baptism to call on the name of the Trinity, so is it essential to
baptize by trine immersion.
Objection 3: Further, if trine immersion be not essential to Baptism,
it follows that the sacrament of Baptism is conferred at the first
immersion; so that if a second or third immersion be added, it seems
that Baptism is conferred a second or third time. which is absurd.
Therefore one immersion does not suffice for the sacrament of Baptism,
and trine immersion is essential thereto.
On the contrary, Gregory wrote to the Bishop Leander: "It cannot be in
any way reprehensible to baptize an infant with either a trine or a
single immersion: since the Trinity can be represented in the three
immersions, and the unity of the Godhead in one immersion."
I answer that As stated above (A[7], ad 1), washing with water is of
itself required for Baptism, being essential to the sacrament: whereas
the mode of washing is accidental to the sacrament. Consequently, as
Gregory in the words above quoted explains, both single and trine
immersion are lawful considered in themselves; since one immersion
signifies the oneness of Christ's death and of the Godhead; while trine
immersion signifies the three days of Christ's burial, and also the
Trinity of Persons.
But for various reasons, according as the Church has ordained, one mode
has been in practice, at one time, the other at another time. For since
from the very earliest days of the Church some have had false notions
concerning the Trinity, holding that Christ is a mere man, and that He
is not called the "Son of God" or "God" except by reason of His merit,
which was chiefly in His death; for this reason they did not baptize in
the name of the Trinity, but in memory of Christ's death, and with one
immersion. And this was condemned in the early Church. Wherefore in the
Apostolic Canons (xlix) we read: "If any priest or bishop confer
baptism not with the trine immersion in the one administration, but
with one immersion, which baptism is said to be conferred by some in
the death of the Lord, let him be deposed": for our Lord did not say,
"Baptize ye in My death," but "In the name of the Father and of the
Son, and of the Holy Ghost."
Later on, however, there arose the error of certain schismatics and
heretics who rebaptized: as Augustine (Super. Joan., cf. De Haeres.
lxix) relates of the Donatists. Wherefore, in detestation of their
error, only one immersion was ordered to be made, by the (fourth)
council of Toledo, in the acts of which we read: "In order to avoid the
scandal of schism or the practice of heretical teaching let us hold to
the single baptismal immersion."
But now that this motive has ceased, trine immersion is universally
observed in Baptism: and consequently anyone baptizing otherwise would
sin gravely, through not following the ritual of the Church. It would,
however, be valid Baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: The Trinity acts as principal agent in Baptism.
Now the likeness of the agent enters into the effect, in regard to the
form and not in regard to the matter. Wherefore the Trinity is
signified in Baptism by the words of the form. Nor is it essential for
the Trinity to be signified by the manner in which the matter is used;
although this is done to make the signification clearer.
In like manner Christ's death is sufficiently represented in the one
immersion. And the three days of His burial were not necessary for our
salvation, because even if He had been buried or dead for one day, this
would have been enough to consummate our redemption: yet those three
days were ordained unto the manifestation of the reality of His death,
as stated above ([4423]Q[53], A[2]). It is therefore clear that neither
on the part of the Trinity, nor on the part of Christ's Passion, is the
trine immersion essential to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Pope Pelagius understood the trine immersion to
be ordained by Christ in its equivalent; in the sense that Christ
commanded Baptism to be conferred "in the name of the Father, and of
the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Nor can we argue from the form to the
use of the matter, as stated above (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4424]Q[64], A[8]), the
intention is essential to Baptism. Consequently, one Baptism results
from the intention of the Church's minister, who intends to confer one
Baptism by a trine immersion. Wherefore Jerome says on Eph. 4:5,6:
"Though the Baptism," i.e. the immersion, "be thrice repeated, on
account of the mystery of the Trinity, yet it is reputed as one
Baptism."
If, however, the intention were to confer one Baptism at each immersion
together with the repetition of the words of the form, it would be a
sin, in itself, because it would be a repetition of Baptism.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Baptism may be reiterated?
Objection 1: It seems that Baptism may be reiterated. For Baptism was
instituted, seemingly, in order to wash away sins. But sins are
reiterated. Therefore much more should Baptism be reiterated: because
Christ's mercy surpasses man's guilt.
Objection 2: Further, John the Baptist received special commendation
from Christ, Who said of him (Mat. 11:11): "There hath not risen among
them that are born of women, a greater than John the Baptist." But
those whom John had baptized were baptized again, according to Acts
19:1-7, where it is stated that Paul rebaptized those who had received
the Baptism of John. Much more, therefore, should those be rebaptized,
who have been baptized by heretics or sinners.
Objection 3: Further, it was decreed in the Council of Nicaea (Can.
xix) that if "any of the Paulianists or Cataphrygians should be
converted to the Catholic Church, they were to be baptized": and this
seemingly should be said in regard to other heretics. Therefore those
whom the heretics have baptized, should be baptized again.
Objection 4: Further, Baptism is necessary for salvation. But sometimes
there is a doubt about the baptism of those who really have been
baptized. Therefore it seems that they should be baptized again.
Objection 5: Further, the Eucharist is a more perfect sacrament than
Baptism, as stated above ([4425]Q[65], A[3]). But the sacrament of the
Eucharist is reiterated. Much more reason, therefore, is there for
Baptism to be reiterated.
On the contrary, It is written, (Eph. 4:5): "One faith, one Baptism."
I answer that, Baptism cannot be reiterated.
First, because Baptism is a spiritual regeneration; inasmuch as a man
dies to the old life, and begins to lead the new life. Whence it is
written (Jn. 3:5): "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy
Ghost, He cannot see [Vulg.: 'enter into'] the kingdom of God." Now one
man can be begotten but once. Wherefore Baptism cannot be reiterated,
just as neither can carnal generation. Hence Augustine says on Jn. 3:4:
"'Can he enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born again':
So thou," says he, "must understand the birth of the Spirit, as
Nicodemus understood the birth of the flesh . . . . As there is no
return to the womb, so neither is there to Baptism."
Secondly, because "we are baptized in Christ's death," by which we die
unto sin and rise again unto "newness of life" (cf. Rom. 6:3,4). Now
"Christ died" but "once" (Rom. 6:10). Wherefore neither should Baptism
be reiterated. For this reason (Heb. 6:6) is it said against some who
wished to be baptized again: "Crucifying again to themselves the Son of
God"; on which the gloss observes: "Christ's one death hallowed the one
Baptism."
Thirdly, because Baptism imprints a character, which is indelible, and
is conferred with a certain consecration. Wherefore, just as other
consecrations are not reiterated in the Church, so neither is Baptism.
This is the view expressed by Augustine, who says (Contra Epist.
Parmen. ii) that "the military character is not renewed": and that "the
sacrament of Christ is not less enduring than this bodily mark, since
we see that not even apostates are deprived of Baptism, since when they
repent and return they are not baptized anew."
Fourthly, because Baptism is conferred principally as a remedy against
original sin. Wherefore, just as original sin is not renewed, so
neither is Baptism reiterated, for as it is written (Rom. 5:18), "as by
the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation, so also by the
justice of one, unto all men to justification of life."
Reply to Objection 1: Baptism derives its efficacy from Christ's
Passion, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). Wherefore, just as subsequent
sins do not cancel the virtue of Christ's Passion, so neither do they
cancel Baptism, so as to call for its repetition. on the other hand the
sin which hindered the effect of Baptism is blotted out on being
submitted to Penance.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says on Jn. 1:33: "'And I knew Him
not': Behold; after John had baptized, Baptism was administered; after
a murderer has baptized, it is not administered: because John gave his
own Baptism; the murderer, Christ's; for that sacrament is so sacred,
that not even a murderer's administration contaminates it."
Reply to Objection 3: The Paulianists and Cataphrygians used not to
baptize in the name of the Trinity. Wherefore Gregory, writing to the
Bishop Quiricus, says: "Those heretics who are not baptized in the name
of the Trinity, such as the Bonosians and Cataphrygians" (who were of
the same mind as the Paulianists), "since the former believe not that
Christ is God" (holding Him to be a mere man), "while the latter," i.e.
the Cataphrygians, "are so perverse as to deem a mere man," viz.
Montanus, "to be the Holy Ghost: all these are baptized when they come
to holy Church, for the baptism which they received while in that state
of error was no Baptism at all, not being conferred in the name of the
Trinity." On the other hand, as set down in De Eccles. Dogm. xxii:
"Those heretics who have been baptized in the confession of the name of
the Trinity are to be received as already baptized when they come to
the Catholic Faith."
Reply to Objection 4: According to the Decretal of Alexander III:
"Those about whose Baptism there is a doubt are to be baptized with
these words prefixed to the form: 'If thou art baptized, I do not
rebaptize thee; but if thou art not baptized, I baptize thee,' etc.:
for that does not appear to be repeated, which is not known to have
been done."
Reply to Objection 5: Both sacraments, viz. Baptism and the Eucharist,
are a representation of our Lord's death and Passion, but not in the
same way. For Baptism is a commemoration of Christ's death in so far as
man dies with Christ, that he may be born again into a new life. But
the Eucharist is a commemoration of Christ's death, in so far as the
suffering Christ Himself is offered to us as the Paschal banquet,
according to 1 Cor. 5:7,8: "Christ our pasch is sacrificed; therefore
let us feast." And forasmuch as man is born once, whereas he eats many
times, so is Baptism given once, but the Eucharist frequently.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Church observes a suitable rite in baptizing?
Objection 1: It seems that the Church observes an unsuitable rite in
baptizing. For as Chrysostom (Chromatius, in Matth. 3:15) says: "The
waters of Baptism would never avail to purge the sins of them that
believe, had they not been hallowed by the touch of our Lord's body."
Now this took place at Christ's Baptism, which is commemorated in the
Feast of the Epiphany. Therefore solemn Baptism should be celebrated at
the Feast of the Epiphany rather than on the eves of Easter and
Whitsunday.
Objection 2: Further, it seems that several matters should not be used
in the same sacrament. But water is used for washing in Baptism.
Therefore it is unfitting that the person baptized should be anointed
thrice with holy oil first on the breast, and then between the
shoulders, and a third time with chrism on the top of the head.
Objection 3: Further, "in Christ Jesus . . . there is neither male nor
female" (Gal. 3:23) . . . "neither Barbarian nor Scythian" (Col. 3:11),
nor, in like manner, any other such like distinctions. Much less,
therefore can a difference of clothing have any efficacy in the Faith
of Christ. It is consequently unfitting to bestow a white garment on
those who have been baptized.
Objection 4: Further, Baptism can be celebrated without such like
ceremonies. Therefore it seems that those mentioned above are
superfluous; and consequently that they are unsuitably inserted by the
Church in the baptismal rite.
On the contrary, The Church is ruled by the Holy Ghost, Who does
nothing inordinate.
I answer that, In the sacrament of Baptism something is done which is
essential to the sacrament, and something which belongs to a certain
solemnity of the sacrament. Essential indeed, to the sacrament are both
the form which designates the principal cause of the sacrament; and the
minister who is the instrumental cause; and the use of the matter,
namely, washing with water, which designates the principal sacramental
effect. But all the other things which the Church observes in the
baptismal rite, belong rather to a certain solemnity of the sacrament.
And these, indeed, are used in conjunction with the sacrament for three
reasons. First, in order to arouse the devotion of the faithful, and
their reverence for the sacrament. For if there were nothing done but a
mere washing with water, without any solemnity, some might easily think
it to be an ordinary washing.
Secondly, for the instruction of the faithful. Because simple and
unlettered folk need to be taught by some sensible signs, for instance,
pictures and the like. And in this way by means of the sacramental
ceremonies they are either instructed, or urged to seek the
signification of such like sensible signs. And consequently, since,
besides the principal sacramental effect, other things should be known
about Baptism, it was fitting that these also should be represented by
some outward signs.
Thirdly, because the power of the devil is restrained, by prayers,
blessings, and the like, from hindering the sacramental effect.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ was baptized on the Epiphany with the
Baptism of John, as stated above ([4426]Q[39], A[2]), with which
baptism, indeed, the faithful are not baptized, rather are they
baptized with Christ's Baptism. This has its efficacy from the Passion
of Christ, according to Rom. 6:3: "We who are baptized in Christ Jesus,
are baptized in His death"; and in the Holy Ghost, according to Jn.
3:5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost."
Therefore it is that solemn Baptism is held in the Church, both on
Easter Eve, when we commemorate our Lord's burial and resurrection; for
which reason our Lord gave His disciples the commandment concerning
Baptism as related by Matthew (28:19): and on Whitsun-eve, when the
celebration of the Feast of the Holy Ghost begins; for which reason the
apostles are said to have baptized three thousand on the very day of
Pentecost when they had received the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: The use of water in Baptism is part of the
substance of the sacrament; but the use of oil or chrism is part of the
solemnity. For the candidate is first of all anointed with Holy oil on
the breast and between the shoulders, as "one who wrestles for God," to
use Ambrose's expression (De Sacram. i): thus are prize-fighters wont
to besmear themselves with oil. Or, as Innocent III says in a decretal
on the Holy Unction: "The candidate is anointed on the breast, in order
to receive the gift of the Holy Ghost, to cast off error and ignorance,
and to acknowledge the true faith, since 'the just man liveth by
faith'; while he is anointed between the shoulders, that he may be
clothed with the grace of the Holy Ghost, lay aside indifference and
sloth, and become active in good works; so that the sacrament of faith
may purify the thoughts of his heart, and strengthen his shoulders for
the burden of labor." But after Baptism, as Rabanus says (De Sacram.
iii), "he is forthwith anointed on the head by the priest with Holy
Chrism, who proceeds at once to offer up a prayer that the neophyte may
have a share in Christ's kingdom, and be called a Christian after
Christ." Or, as Ambrose says (De Sacram. iii), his head is anointed,
because "the senses of a wise man are in his head" (Eccl 2:14): to wit,
that he may "be ready to satisfy everyone that asketh" him to give "a
reason of his faith" (cf. 1 Pet. 3:15; Innocent III, Decretal on Holy
Unction).
Reply to Objection 3: This white garment is given, not as though it
were unlawful for the neophyte to use others: but as a sign of the
glorious resurrection, unto which men are born again by Baptism; and in
order to designate the purity of life, to which he will be bound after
being baptized, according to Rom. 6:4: "That we may walk in newness of
life."
Reply to Objection 4: Although those things that belong to the
solemnity of a sacrament are not essential to it, yet are they not
superfluous, since they pertain to the sacrament's wellbeing, as stated
above.
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Whether three kinds of Baptism are fittingly described---viz. Baptism of
Water, of Blood, and of the Spirit?
Objection 1: It seems that the three kinds of Baptism are not fittingly
described as Baptism of Water, of Blood, and of the Spirit, i.e. of the
Holy Ghost. Because the Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Faith, one
Baptism." Now there is but one Faith. Therefore there should not be
three Baptisms.
Objection 2: Further, Baptism is a sacrament, as we have made clear
above ([4427]Q[65], A[1]). Now none but Baptism of Water is a
sacrament. Therefore we should not reckon two other Baptisms.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv) distinguishes
several other kinds of Baptism. Therefore we should admit more than
three Baptisms.
On the contrary, on Heb. 6:2, "Of the doctrine of Baptisms," the gloss
says: "He uses the plural, because there is Baptism of Water, of
Repentance, and of Blood."
I answer that, As stated above ([4428]Q[62], A[5]), Baptism of Water
has its efficacy from Christ's Passion, to which a man is conformed by
Baptism, and also from the Holy Ghost, as first cause. Now although the
effect depends on the first cause, the cause far surpasses the effect,
nor does it depend on it. Consequently, a man may, without Baptism of
Water, receive the sacramental effect from Christ's Passion, in so far
as he is conformed to Christ by suffering for Him. Hence it is written
(Apoc. 7:14): "These are they who are come out of great tribulation,
and have washed their robes and have made them white in the blood of
the Lamb." In like manner a man receives the effect of Baptism by the
power of the Holy Ghost, not only without Baptism of Water, but also
without Baptism of Blood: forasmuch as his heart is moved by the Holy
Ghost to believe in and love God and to repent of his sins: wherefore
this is also called Baptism of Repentance. Of this it is written (Is.
4:4): "If the Lord shall wash away the filth of the daughters of Zion,
and shall wash away the blood of Jerusalem out of the midst thereof, by
the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning." Thus, therefore,
each of these other Baptisms is called Baptism, forasmuch as it takes
the place of Baptism. Wherefore Augustine says (De Unico Baptismo
Parvulorum iv): "The Blessed Cyprian argues with considerable reason
from the thief to whom, though not baptized, it was said: 'Today shalt
thou be with Me in Paradise' that suffering can take the place of
Baptism. Having weighed this in my mind again and again, I perceive
that not only can suffering for the name of Christ supply for what was
lacking in Baptism, but even faith and conversion of heart, if
perchance on account of the stress of the times the celebration of the
mystery of Baptism is not practicable."
Reply to Objection 1: The other two Baptisms are included in the
Baptism of Water, which derives its efficacy, both from Christ's
Passion and from the Holy Ghost. Consequently for this reason the unity
of Baptism is not destroyed.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([4429]Q[60], A[1]), a sacrament
is a kind of sign. The other two, however, are like the Baptism of
Water, not, indeed, in the nature of sign, but in the baptismal effect.
Consequently they are not sacraments.
Reply to Objection 3: Damascene enumerates certain figurative Baptisms.
For instance, "the Deluge" was a figure of our Baptism, in respect of
the salvation of the faithful in the Church; since then "a few . . .
souls were saved in the ark [Vulg.: 'by water']," according to 1 Pet.
3:20. He also mentions "the crossing of the Red Sea": which was a
figure of our Baptism, in respect of our delivery from the bondage of
sin; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:2) that "all . . . were baptized
in the cloud and in the sea." And again he mentions "the various
washings which were customary under the Old Law," which were figures of
our Baptism, as to the cleansing from sins: also "the Baptism of John,"
which prepared the way for our Baptism.
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Whether the Baptism of Blood is the most excellent of these?
Objection 1: It seems that the Baptism of Blood is not the most
excellent of these three. For the Baptism of Water impresses a
character; which the Baptism of Blood cannot do. Therefore the Baptism
of Blood is not more excellent than the Baptism of Water.
Objection 2: Further, the Baptism of Blood is of no avail without the
Baptism of the Spirit, which is by charity; for it is written (1 Cor.
13:3): "If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity,
it profiteth me nothing." But the Baptism of the Spirit avails without
the Baptism of Blood; for not only the martyrs are saved. Therefore the
Baptism of Blood is not the most excellent.
Objection 3: Further, just as the Baptism of Water derives its efficacy
from Christ's Passion, to which, as stated above [4430](A[11]), the
Baptism of Blood corresponds, so Christ's Passion derives its efficacy
from the Holy Ghost, according to Heb. 9:14: "The Blood of Christ, Who
by the Holy Ghost offered Himself unspotted unto God, shall cleanse our
conscience from dead works," etc. Therefore the Baptism of the Spirit
is more excellent than the Baptism of Blood. Therefore the Baptism of
Blood is not the most excellent.
On the contrary, Augustine (Ad Fortunatum) speaking of the comparison
between Baptisms says: "The newly baptized confesses his faith in the
presence of the priest: the martyr in the presence of the persecutor.
The former is sprinkled with water, after he has confessed; the latter
with his blood. The former receives the Holy Ghost by the imposition of
the bishop's hands; the latter is made the temple of the Holy Ghost."
I answer that, As stated above [4431](A[11]), the shedding of blood for
Christ's sake, and the inward operation of the Holy Ghost, are called
baptisms, in so far as they produce the effect of the Baptism of Water.
Now the Baptism of Water derives its efficacy from Christ's Passion and
from the Holy Ghost, as already stated [4432](A[11]). These two causes
act in each of these three Baptisms; most excellently, however, in the
Baptism of Blood. For Christ's Passion acts in the Baptism of Water by
way of a figurative representation; in the Baptism of the Spirit or of
Repentance, by way of desire. but in the Baptism of Blood, by way of
imitating the (Divine) act. In like manner, too, the power of the Holy
Ghost acts in the Baptism of Water through a certain hidden power. in
the Baptism of Repentance by moving the heart; but in the Baptism of
Blood by the highest degree of fervor of dilection and love, according
to Jn. 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath that a man lay down
his life for his friends."
Reply to Objection 1: A character is both reality and a sacrament. And
we do not say that the Baptism of Blood is more excellent, considering
the nature of a sacrament; but considering the sacramental effect.
Reply to Objection 2: The shedding of blood is not in the nature of a
Baptism if it be without charity. Hence it is clear that the Baptism of
Blood includes the Baptism of the Spirit, but not conversely. And from
this it is proved to be more perfect.
Reply to Objection 3: The Baptism owes its pre-eminence not only to
Christ's Passion, but also to the Holy Ghost, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MINISTERS BY WHOM THE SACRAMENT OF BAPTISM IS CONFERRED (EIGHT
ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the ministers by whom the sacrament of Baptism
is conferred. And concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it belongs to a deacon to baptize?
(2) Whether this belongs to a priest, or to a bishop only?
(3) Whether a layman can confer the sacrament of Baptism?
(4) Whether a woman can do this?
(5) Whether an unbaptized person can baptize?
(6) Whether several can at the same time baptize one and the same
person?
(7) Whether it is essential that someone should raise the person
baptized from the sacred font?
(8) Whether he who raises someone from the sacred font is bound to
instruct him?
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Whether it is part of a deacon's duty to baptize?
Objection 1: It seems that it is part of a deacon's duty to baptize.
Because the duties of preaching and of baptizing were enjoined by our
Lord at the same time, according to Mat. 28:19: "Going . . . teach ye
all nations, baptizing them," etc. But it is part of a deacon's duty to
preach the gospel. Therefore it seems that it is also part of a
deacon's duty to baptize.
Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) to
"cleanse" is part of the deacon's duty. But cleansing from sins is
effected specially by Baptism, according to Eph. 5:26: "Cleansing it by
the laver of water in the word of life." Therefore it seems that it
belongs to a deacon to baptize.
Objection 3: Further, it is told of Blessed Laurence, who was a deacon,
that he baptized many. Therefore it seems that it belongs to deacons to
baptize.
On the contrary, Pope Gelasius I says (the passage is to be found in
the Decrees, dist. 93): "We order the deacons to keep within their own
province"; and further on: "Without bishop or priest they must not dare
to baptize, except in cases of extreme urgency, when the aforesaid are
a long way off."
I answer that, Just as the properties and duties of the heavenly orders
are gathered from their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi), so
can we gather, from the names of the ecclesiastical orders, what
belongs to each order. Now "deacons" are so called from being
"ministers"; because, to wit, it is not in the deacon's province to be
the chief and official celebrant in conferring a sacrament, but to
minister to others, his elders, in the sacramental dispensations. And
so it does not belong to a deacon to confer the sacrament of Baptism
officially as it were; but to assist and serve his elders in the
bestowal of this and other sacraments. Hence Isidore says (Epist. ad
Ludifred.): "It is a deacon's duty to assist and serve the priests, in
all the rites of Christ's sacraments, viz. those of Baptism, of the
Chrism, of the Paten and Chalice."
Reply to Objection 1: It is the deacon's duty to read the Gospel in
church, and to preach it as one catechizing; hence Dionysius says
(Eccl. Hier. v) that a deacon's office involves power over the unclean
among whom he includes the catechumens. But to teach, i.e. to expound
the Gospel, is the proper office of a bishop, whose action is "to
perfect," as Dionysius teaches (Eccl. Hier. v); and "to perfect" is the
same as "to teach." Consequently, it does not follow that the office of
baptizing belongs to deacons.
Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii), Baptism has a
power not only of "cleansing" but also of "enlightening." Consequently,
it is outside the province of the deacon whose duty it is to cleanse
only: viz. either by driving away the unclean, or by preparing them for
the reception of a sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: Because Baptism is a necessary sacrament, deacons
are allowed to baptize in cases of urgency when their elders are not at
hand; as appears from the authority of Gelasius quoted above. And it
was thus that Blessed Laurence, being but a deacon, baptized.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to baptize is part of the priestly office, or proper to that of
bishops?
Objection 1: It seems that to baptize is not part of the priestly
office, but proper to that of bishops. Because, as stated above (A[1],
OBJ[1]), the duties of teaching and baptizing are enjoined in the same
precept (Mat. 28:19). But to teach, which is "to perfect," belongs to
the office of bishop, as Dionysius declares (Eccl. Hier. v, vi).
Therefore to baptize also belongs to the episcopal office.
Objection 2: Further, by Baptism a man is admitted to the body of the
Christian people: and to do this seems consistent with no other than
the princely office. Now the bishops hold the position of princes in
the Church, as the gloss observes on Lk. 10:1: indeed, they even take
the place of the apostles, of whom it is written (Ps. 44:17): "Thou
shalt make them princes over all the earth." Therefore it seems that to
baptize belongs exclusively to the office of bishops.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Epist. ad Ludifred.) that "it
belongs to the bishop to consecrate churches, to anoint altars, to
consecrate [conficere] the chrism; he it is that confers the
ecclesiastical orders, and blesses the consecrated virgins." But the
sacrament of Baptism is greater than all these. Therefore much more
reason is there why to baptize should belong exclusively to the
episcopal office.
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Officiis. ii): "It is certain that
Baptism was entrusted to priests alone."
I answer that, Priests are consecrated for the purpose of celebrating
the sacrament of Christ's Body, as stated above ([4433]Q[65], A[3]).
Now that is the sacrament of ecclesiastical unity, according to the
Apostle (1 Cor. 10:17): "We, being many, are one bread, one body, all
that partake of one bread and one chalice." Moreover, by Baptism a man
becomes a participator in ecclesiastical unity, wherefore also he
receives the right to approach our Lord's Table. Consequently, just as
it belongs to a priest to consecrate the Eucharist, which is the
principal purpose of the priesthood, so it is the proper office of a
priest to baptize: since it seems to belong to one and the same, to
produce the whole and to dispose the part in the whole.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord enjoined on the apostles, whose place is
taken by the bishops, both duties, namely, of teaching and of
baptizing, but in different ways. Because Christ committed to them the
duty of teaching, that they might exercise it themselves as being the
most important duty of all: wherefore the apostles themselves said
(Acts 6:2): "It is not reason that we should leave the word of God and
serve tables." On the other hand, He entrusted the apostles with the
office of baptizing, to be exercised vicariously; wherefore the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 1:17): "Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the
Gospel." And the reason for this was that the merit and wisdom of the
minister have no bearing on the baptismal effect, as they have in
teaching, as may be seen from what we have stated above (Q[64], A[1],
ad 2; [4434]AA[5],9). A proof of this is found also in the fact that
our Lord Himself did not baptize, but His disciples, as John relates
(4:2). Nor does it follow from this that bishops cannot baptize; since
what a lower power can do, that can also a higher power. Wherefore also
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 1:14, 16) that he had baptized some.
Reply to Objection 2: In every commonwealth minor affairs are entrusted
to lower officials, while greater affairs are restricted to higher
officials; according to Ex. 18:22: "When any great matter soever shall
fall out, let them refer it to thee, and let them judge the lesser
matters only." Consequently it belongs to the lower officials of the
state to decide matters concerning the lower orders; while to the
highest it belongs to set in order those matters that regard the higher
orders of the state. Now by Baptism a man attains only to the lowest
rank among the Christian people: and consequently it belongs to the
lesser officials of the Church
to baptize, namely, the priests, who hold the place of the seventy-two
disciples of Christ, as the gloss says in the passage quoted from Luke
10.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4435]Q[65], A[3]), the
sacrament of Baptism holds the first place in the order of necessity;
but in the order of perfection there are other greater sacraments which
are reserved to bishops.
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Whether a layman can baptize?
Objection 1: It seems that a layman cannot baptize. Because, as stated
above [4436](A[2]), to baptize belongs properly to the priestly order.
But those things which belong to an order cannot be entrusted to one
that is not ordained. Therefore it seems that a layman, who has no
orders, cannot baptize.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater thing to baptize, than to perform
the other sacramental rites of Baptism, such as to catechize, to
exorcize, and to bless the baptismal water. But these things cannot be
done by laymen, but only by priests. Therefore it seems that much less
can laymen baptize.
Objection 3: Further, just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is
Penance. But a layman cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance.
Neither, therefore, can he baptize.
On the contrary, Pope Gelasius I and Isidore say that "it is often
permissible for Christian laymen to baptize, in cases of urgent
necessity."
I answer that, It is due to the mercy of Him "Who will have all men to
be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4) that in those things which are necessary for
salvation, man can easily find the remedy. Now the most necessary among
all the sacraments is Baptism, which is man's regeneration unto
spiritual life: since for children there is no substitute, while adults
cannot otherwise than by Baptism receive a full remission both of guilt
and of its punishment. Consequently, lest man should have to go without
so necessary a remedy, it was ordained, both that the matter of Baptism
should be something common that is easily obtainable by all, i.e.
water; and that the minister of Baptism should be anyone, even not in
orders, lest from lack of being baptized, man should suffer loss of his
salvation.
Reply to Objection 1: To baptize belongs to the priestly order by
reason of a certain appropriateness and solemnity; but this is not
essential to the sacrament. Consequently, if a layman were to baptize
even outside a case of urgency; he would sin, yet he would confer the
sacrament; nor would the person thus baptized have to be baptized
again.
Reply to Objection 2: These sacramental rites of Baptism belong to the
solemnity of, and are not essential to, Baptism. And therefore they
neither should nor can be done by a layman, but only by a priest, whose
office it is to baptize solemnly.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4437]Q[65], AA[3],4), Penance
is not so necessary as Baptism; since contrition can supply the defect
of the priestly absolution which does not free from the whole
punishment, nor again is it given to children. Therefore the comparison
with Baptism does not stand, because its effect cannot be supplied by
anything else.
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Whether a woman can baptize?
Objection 1: It seems that a woman cannot baptize. For we read in the
acts of the Council of Carthage (iv): "However learned and holy a woman
may be, she must not presume to teach men in the church, or to
baptize." But in no case is a woman allowed to teach in church,
according to 1 Cor. 14:35: "It is a shame for a woman to speak in the
church." Therefore it seems that neither is a woman in any
circumstances permitted to baptize.
Objection 2: Further, to baptize belongs to those having authority.
wherefore baptism should be conferred by priests having charge of
souls. But women are not qualified for this; according to 1 Tim. 2:12:
"I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to use authority over man, but to
be subject to him [Vulg.: 'but to be in silence']." Therefore a woman
cannot baptize.
Objection 3: Further, in the spiritual regeneration water seems to hold
the place of the mother's womb, as Augustine says on Jn. 3:4, "Can" a
man "enter a second time into his mother's womb, and be born again?"
While he who baptizes seems to hold rather the position of father. But
this is unfitting for a woman. Therefore a woman cannot baptize.
On the contrary, Pope Urban II says (Decreta xxx): "In reply to the
questions asked by your beatitude, we consider that the following
answer should be given: that the baptism is valid when, in cases of
necessity, a woman baptizes a child in the name of the Trinity."
I answer that, Christ is the chief Baptizer, according to Jn. 1:33: "He
upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him,
He it is that baptizeth." For it is written in Col. 3 (cf. Gal. 3:28),
that in Christ there is neither male nor female. Consequently, just as
a layman can baptize, as Christ's minister, so can a woman.
But since "the head of the woman is the man," and "the head of . . .
man, is Christ" (1 Cor. 11:3), a woman should not baptize if a man be
available for the purpose; just as neither should a layman in the
presence of a cleric, nor a cleric in the presence of a priest. The
last, however, can baptize in the presence of a bishop, because it is
part of the priestly office.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as a woman is not suffered to teach in
public, but is allowed to instruct and admonish privately; so she is
not permitted to baptize publicly and solemnly, and yet she can baptize
in a case of urgency.
Reply to Objection 2: When Baptism is celebrated solemnly and with due
form, it should be conferred by a priest having charge of souls, or by
one representing him. But this is not required in cases of urgency,
when a woman may baptize.
Reply to Objection 3: In carnal generation male and female co-operate
according to the power of their proper nature; wherefore the female
cannot be the active, but only the passive, principle of generation.
But in spiritual generation they do not act, either of them, by their
proper power, but only instrumentally by the power of Christ.
Consequently, on the same grounds either man or woman can baptize in a
case of urgency.
If, however, a woman were to baptize without any urgency for so doing.
there would be no need of rebaptism: as we have said in regard to
laymen (A[3], ad 1). But the baptizer herself would sin, as also those
who took part with her therein, either by receiving Baptism from her,
or by bringing someone to her to be baptized.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one that is not baptized can confer the sacrament of Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that one that is not baptized cannot confer the
sacrament of Baptism. For "none gives what he has not." But a
non-baptized person has not the sacrament of Baptism. Therefore he
cannot give it.
Objection 2: Further, a man confers the sacrament of Baptism inasmuch
as he is a minister of the Church. But one that is not baptized,
belongs nowise to the Church, i.e. neither really nor sacramentally.
Therefore he cannot confer the sacrament of Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, it is more to confer a sacrament than to receive
it. But one that is not baptized, cannot receive the other sacraments.
Much less, therefore, can he confer any sacrament.
On the contrary, Isidore says: "The Roman Pontiff does not consider it
to be the man who baptizes, but that the Holy Ghost confers the grace
of Baptism, though he that baptizes be a pagan." But he who is
baptized, is not called a pagan. Therefore he who is not baptized can
confer the sacrament of Baptism.
I answer that, Augustine left this question without deciding it. For he
says (Contra Ep. Parmen. ii): "This is indeed another question, whether
even those can baptize who were never Christians; nor should anything
be rashly asserted hereupon, without the authority of a sacred council
such as suffices for so great a matter." But afterwards it was decided
by the Church that the unbaptized, whether Jews or pagans, can confer
the sacrament of Baptism, provided they baptize in the form of the
Church. Wherefore Pope Nicolas I replies to the questions propounded by
the Bulgars: "You say that many in your country have been baptized by
someone, whether Christian or pagan you know not. If these were
baptized in the name of the Trinity, they must not be rebaptized." But
if the form of the Church be not observed, the sacrament of Baptism is
not conferred. And thus is to be explained what Gregory II [*Gregory
III] writes to Bishop Boniface: "Those whom you assert to have been
baptized by pagans," namely, with a form not recognized by the Church,
"we command you to rebaptize in the name of the Trinity." And the
reason of this is that, just as on the part of the matter, as far as
the essentials of the sacrament are concerned, any water will suffice,
so, on the part of the minister, any man is competent. Consequently, an
unbaptized person can baptize in a case of urgency. So that two
unbaptized persons may baptize one another, one baptizing the other and
being afterwards baptized by him: and each would receive not only the
sacrament but also the reality of the sacrament. But if this were done
outside a case of urgency, each would sin grievously, both the baptizer
and the baptized, and thus the baptismal effect would be frustrated,
although the sacrament itself would not be invalidated.
Reply to Objection 1: The man who baptizes offers but his outward
ministration; whereas Christ it is Who baptizes inwardly, Who can use
all men to whatever purpose He wills. Consequently, the unbaptized can
baptize: because, as Pope Nicolas I says, "the Baptism is not theirs,"
i.e. the baptizers', "but His," i.e. Christ's.
Reply to Objection 2: He who is not baptized, though he belongs not to
the Church either in reality or sacramentally, can nevertheless belong
to her in intention and by similarity of action, namely, in so far as
he intends to do what the Church does, and in baptizing observes the
Church's form, and thus acts as the minister of Christ, Who did not
confine His power to those that are baptized, as neither did He to the
sacraments.
Reply to Objection 3: The other sacraments are not so necessary as
Baptism. And therefore it is allowable that an unbaptized person should
baptize rather than that he should receive other sacraments.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether several can baptize at the same time?
Objection 1: It seems that several can baptize at the same time. For
unity is contained in multitude, but not "vice versa." Wherefore it
seems that many can do whatever one can but not "vice versa": thus many
draw a ship which one could draw. But one man can baptize. Therefore
several, too, can baptize one at the same time.
Objection 2: Further, it is more difficult for one agent to act on many
things, than for many to act at the same time on one. But one man can
baptize several at the same time. Much more, therefore, can many
baptize one at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, Baptism is a sacrament of the greatest necessity.
Now in certain cases it seems necessary for several to baptize one at
the same time; for instance, suppose a child to be in danger of death,
and two persons present, one of whom is dumb, and the other without
hands or arms; for then the mutilated person would have to pronounce
the words, and the dumb person would have to perform the act of
baptizing. Therefore it seems that several can baptize one at the same
time.
On the contrary, Where there is one agent there is one action. If,
therefore, several were to baptize one, it seems to follow that there
would be several baptisms: and this is contrary to Eph. 4:5: "one
Faith, one Baptism."
I answer that, The Sacrament of Baptism derives its power principally
from its form, which the Apostle calls "the word of life" (Eph. 5:26).
Consequently, if several were to baptize one at the same time, we must
consider what form they would use. For were they to say: "We baptize
thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,"
some maintain that the sacrament of Baptism would not be conferred,
because the form of the Church would not be observed, i.e. "I baptize
thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."
But this reasoning is disproved by the form observed in the Greek
Church. For they might say: "The servant of God, N . . ., is baptized
in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost," under
which form the Greeks receive the sacrament of Baptism: and yet this
form differs far more from the form that we use, than does this: "We
baptize thee."
The point to be observed, however, is this, that by this form, "We
baptize thee," the intention expressed is that several concur in
conferring one Baptism: and this seems contrary to the notion of a
minister; for a man does not baptize save as a minister of Christ, and
as standing in His place; wherefore just as there is one Christ, so
should there be one minister to represent Christ. Hence the Apostle
says pointedly (Eph. 4:5): "one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism."
Consequently, an intention which is in opposition to this seems to
annul the sacrament of Baptism.
On the other hand, if each were to say: "I baptize thee in the name of
the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost," each would signify
his intention as though he were conferring Baptism independently of the
other. This might occur in the case where both were striving to baptize
someone; and then it is clear that whichever pronounced the words first
would confer the sacrament of Baptism; while the other, however great
his right to baptize, if he presume to utter the words, would be liable
to be punished as a rebaptizer. If, however, they were to pronounce the
words absolutely at the same time, and dipped or sprinkled the man
together, they should be punished for baptizing in an improper manner,
but not for rebaptizing: because each would intend to baptize an
unbaptized person, and each, so far as he is concerned, would baptize.
Nor would they confer several sacraments: but the one Christ baptizing
inwardly would confer one sacrament by means of both together.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument avails in those agents that act by
their own power. But men do not baptize by their own, but by Christ's
power, Who, since He is one, perfects His work by means of one
minister.
Reply to Objection 2: In a case of necessity one could baptize several
at the same time under this form: "I baptize ye": for instance, if they
were threatened by a falling house, or by the sword or something of the
kind, so as not to allow of the delay involved by baptizing them
singly. Nor would this cause a change in the Church's form, since the
plural is nothing but the singular doubled: especially as we find the
plural expressed in Mat. 28:19: "Baptizing them," etc. Nor is there
parity between the baptizer and the baptized; since Christ, the
baptizer in chief, is one: while many are made one in Christ by
Baptism.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4438]Q[66], A[1]), the
integrity of Baptism consists in the form of words and the use of the
matter. Consequently, neither he who only pronounces the words,
baptizes, nor he who dips. Where fore if one pronounces the words and
the other dips, no form of words can be fitting. For neither could he
say: "I baptize thee": since he dips not, and therefore baptizes not.
Nor could they say: "We baptize thee": since neither baptizes. For if
of two men, one write one part of a book, and the other write the
other, it would not be a proper form of speech to say: "We wrote this
book," but the figure of synecdoche in which the whole is put for the
part.
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Whether in Baptism it is necessary for someone to raise the baptized from
the sacred font?
Objection 1: It seems that in Baptism it is not necessary for someone
to raise the baptized from the sacred font. For our Baptism is
consecrated by Christ's Baptism and is conformed thereto. But Christ
when baptized was not raised by anyone from the font, but according to
Mat. 3:16, "Jesus being baptized, forthwith came out of the water."
Therefore it seems that neither when others are baptized should anyone
raise the baptized from the sacred font.
Objection 2: Further, Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, as stated
above [4439](A[3]). But in carnal generation nothing else is required
but the active principle, i.e. the father, and the passive principle,
i.e. the mother. Since, then, in Baptism he that baptizes takes the
place of the father, while the very water of Baptism takes the place of
the mother, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxxxv); it
seems that there is no further need for someone to raise the baptized
from the sacred font.
Objection 3: Further, nothing ridiculous should be observed in the
sacraments of the Church. But it seems ridiculous that after being
baptized, adults who can stand up of themselves and leave the sacred
font, should be held up by another. Therefore there seems no need for
anyone, especially in the Baptism of adults, to raise the baptized from
the sacred font.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii) that "the priests
taking the baptized hand him over to his sponsor and guide."
I answer that, The spiritual regeneration, which takes place in
Baptism, is in a certain manner likened to carnal generation: wherefore
it is written (1 Pet. 2:2): "As new-born babes, endowed with reason
desire milk [Vulg.: 'desire reasonable milk'] without guile." Now, in
carnal generation the new-born child needs nourishment and guidance:
wherefore, in spiritual generation also, someone is needed to undertake
the office of nurse and tutor by forming and instructing one who is yet
a novice in the Faith, concerning things pertaining to Christian faith
and mode of life, which the clergy have not the leisure to do through
being busy with watching over the people generally: because little
children and novices need more than ordinary care. Consequently someone
is needed to receive the baptized from the sacred font as though for
the purpose of instructing and guiding them. It is to this that
Dionysius refers (Eccl. Hier. xi) saying: "It occurred to our heavenly
guides," i.e. the Apostles, "and they decided, that infants should be
taken charge of thus: that the parents of the child should hand it over
to some instructor versed in holy things, who would thenceforth take
charge of the child, and be to it a spiritual father and a guide in the
road of salvation."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ was baptized not that He might be
regenerated, but that He might regenerate others: wherefore after His
Baptism He needed no tutor like other children.
Reply to Objection 2: In carnal generation nothing is essential besides
a father and a mother: yet to ease the latter in her travail, there is
need for a midwife; and for the child to be suitably brought up there
is need for a nurse and a tutor: while their place is taken in Baptism
by him who raises the child from the sacred font. Consequently this is
not essential to the sacrament, and in a case of necessity one alone
can baptize with water.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not on account of bodily weakness that the
baptized is raised from the sacred font by the godparent, but on
account of spiritual weakness, as stated above.
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Whether he who raises anyone from the sacred font is bound to instruct him?
Objection 1: It seems that he who raises anyone from the sacred font is
not bound to instruct him. For none but those who are themselves
instructed can give instruction. But even the uneducated and
ill-instructed are allowed to raise people from the sacred font.
Therefore he who raises a baptized person from the font is not bound to
instruct him.
Objection 2: Further, a son is instructed by his father better than by
a stranger: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), a son receives
from his father, "being, food, and education." If, therefore,
godparents are bound to instruct their godchildren, it would be fitting
for the carnal father, rather than another, to be the godparent of his
own child. And yet this seems to be forbidden, as may be seen in the
Decretals (xxx, qu. 1, Cap. Pervenit and Dictum est).
Objection 3: Further, it is better for several to instruct than for one
only. If, therefore, godparents are bound to instruct their
godchildren, it would be better to have several godparents than only
one. Yet this is forbidden in a decree of Pope Leo, who says: "A child
should not have more than one godparent, be this a man or a woman."
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon for Easter (clxviii): "In
the first place I admonish you, both men and women, who have raised
children in Baptism, that ye stand before God as sureties for those
whom you have been seen to raise from the sacred font."
I answer that, Every man is bound to fulfil those duties which he has
undertaken to perform. Now it has been stated above [4440](A[7]) that
godparents take upon themselves the duties of a tutor. Consequently
they are bound to watch over their godchildren when there is need for
them to do so: for instance when and where children are brought up
among unbelievers. But if they are brought up among Catholic
Christians, the godparents may well be excused from this
responsibility, since it may be presumed that the children will be
carefully instructed by their parents. If, however, they perceive in
any way that the contrary is the case, they would be bound, as far as
they are able, to see to the spiritual welfare of their godchildren.
Reply to Objection 1: Where the danger is imminent, the godparent, as
Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii), should be someone "versed in holy
things." But where the danger is not imminent, by reason of the
children being brought up among Catholics, anyone is admitted to this
position, because the things pertaining to the Christian rule of life
and faith are known openly by all. Nevertheless an unbaptized person
cannot be a godparent, as was decreed in the Council of Mainz, although
an unbaptized person: because the person baptizing is essential to the
sacrament, wherefore as the godparent is not, as stated above (A[7], ad
2).
Reply to Objection 2: Just as spiritual generation is distinct from
carnal generation, so is spiritual education distinct from that of the
body; according to Heb. 12:9: "Moreover we have had fathers of our
flesh for instructors, and we reverenced them: shall we not much more
obey the Father of Spirits, and live?" Therefore the spiritual father
should be distinct from the carnal father, unless necessity demanded
otherwise.
Reply to Objection 3: Education would be full of confusion if there
were more than one head instructor. Wherefore there should be one
principal sponsor in Baptism: but others can be allowed as assistants.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE BAPTISM (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We have now to consider those who receive Baptism; concerning which
there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all are bound to receive Baptism?
(2) Whether a man can be saved without Baptism?
(3) Whether Baptism should be deferred?
(4) Whether sinners should be baptized?
(5) Whether works of satisfaction should be enjoined on sinners that
have been baptized?
(6) Whether Confession of sins is necessary?
(7) Whether an intention is required on the part of the one baptized?
(8) Whether faith is necessary?
(9) Whether infants should be baptized?
(10) Whether the children of Jews should be baptized against the will
of their parents?
(11) Whether anyone should be baptized in the mother's womb?
(12) Whether madmen and imbeciles should be baptized?
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Whether all are bound to receive Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that not all are bound to receive Baptism. For
Christ did not narrow man's road to salvation. But before Christ's
coming men could be saved without Baptism: therefore also after
Christ's coming.
Objection 2: Further, Baptism seems to have been instituted principally
as a remedy for original sin. Now, since a man who is baptized is
without original sin, it seems that he cannot transmit it to his
children. Therefore it seems that the children of those who have been
baptized, should not themselves be baptized.
Objection 3: Further, Baptism is given in order that a man may, through
grace, be cleansed from sin. But those who are sanctified in the womb,
obtain this without Baptism. Therefore they are not bound to receive
Baptism.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:5): "Unless a man be born again
of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."
Again it is stated in De Eccl. Dogm. xli, that "we believe the way of
salvation to be open to those only who are baptized."
I answer that, Men are bound to that without which they cannot obtain
salvation. Now it is manifest that no one can obtain salvation but
through Christ; wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 5:18): "As by the
offense of one unto all men unto condemnation; so also by the justice
of one, unto all men unto justification of life." But for this end is
Baptism conferred on a man, that being regenerated thereby, he may be
incorporated in Christ, by becoming His member: wherefore it is written
(Gal. 3:27): "As many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put
on Christ." Consequently it is manifest that all are bound to be
baptized: and that without Baptism there is no salvation for men.
Reply to Objection 1: At no time, not even before the coming of Christ,
could men be saved unless they became members of Christ: because, as it
is written (Acts 4:12), "there is no other name under heaven given to
men, whereby we must be saved." But before Christ's coming, men were
incorporated in Christ by faith in His future coming: of which faith
circumcision was the "seal," as the Apostle calls it (Rom. 4:11):
whereas before circumcision was instituted, men were incorporated in
Christ by "faith alone," as Gregory says (Moral. iv), together with the
offering of sacrifices, by means of which the Fathers of old made
profession of their faith. Again, since Christ's coming, men are
incorporated in Christ by faith; according to Eph. 3:17: "That Christ
may dwell by faith in your hearts." But faith in a thing already
present is manifested by a sign different from that by which it was
manifested when that thing was yet in the future: just as we use other
parts of the verb, to signify the present, the past, and the future.
Consequently although the sacrament itself of Baptism was not always
necessary for salvation, yet faith, of which Baptism is the sacrament,
was always necessary.
Reply to Objection 2: As we have stated in the [4441]FS, Q[81], A[3],
ad 2, those who are baptized are renewed in spirit by Baptism, while
their body remains subject to the oldness of sin, according to Rom.
8:10: "The body, indeed, is dead because of sin, but the spirit liveth
because of justification." Wherefore Augustine (Contra Julian. vi)
proves that "not everything that is in man is baptized." Now it is
manifest that in carnal generation man does not beget in respect of his
soul, but in respect of his body. Consequently the children of those
who are baptized are born with original sin; wherefore they need to be
baptized.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who are sanctified in the womb, receive
indeed grace which cleanses them from original sin, but they do not
therefore receive the character, by which they are conformed to Christ.
Consequently, if any were to be sanctified in the womb now, they would
need to be baptized, in order to be conformed to Christ's other members
by receiving the character.
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Whether a man can be saved without Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that no man can be saved without Baptism. For our
Lord said (Jn. 3:5): "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy
Ghost, he cannot enter the kingdom of God." But those alone are saved
who enter God's kingdom. Therefore none can be saved without Baptism,
by which a man is born again of water and the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xli, it is written:
"We believe that no catechumen, though he die in his good works, will
have eternal life, except he suffer martyrdom, which contains all the
sacramental virtue of Baptism." But if it were possible for anyone to
be saved without Baptism, this would be the case specially with
catechumens who are credited with good works, for they seem to have the
"faith that worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Therefore it seems that
none can be saved without Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above [4442](A[1]; Q[65], A[4]), the
sacrament of Baptism is necessary for salvation. Now that is necessary
"without which something cannot be" (Metaph. v). Therefore it seems
that none can obtain salvation without Baptism.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Super Levit. lxxxiv) that "some have
received the invisible sanctification without visible sacraments, and
to their profit; but though it is possible to have the visible
sanctification, consisting in a visible sacrament, without the
invisible sanctification, it will be to no profit." Since, therefore,
the sacrament of Baptism pertains to the visible sanctification, it
seems that a man can obtain salvation without the sacrament of Baptism,
by means of the invisible sanctification.
I answer that, The sacrament or Baptism may be wanting to someone in
two ways. First, both in reality and in desire; as is the case with
those who neither are baptized, nor wished to be baptized: which
clearly indicates contempt of the sacrament, in regard to those who
have the use of the free-will. Consequently those to whom Baptism is
wanting thus, cannot obtain salvation: since neither sacramentally nor
mentally are they incorporated in Christ, through Whom alone can
salvation be obtained.
Secondly, the sacrament of Baptism may be wanting to anyone in reality
but not in desire: for instance, when a man wishes to be baptized, but
by some ill-chance he is forestalled by death before receiving Baptism.
And such a man can obtain salvation without being actually baptized, on
account of his desire for Baptism, which desire is the outcome of
"faith that worketh by charity," whereby God, Whose power is not tied
to visible sacraments, sanctifies man inwardly. Hence Ambrose says of
Valentinian, who died while yet a catechumen: "I lost him whom I was to
regenerate: but he did not lose the grace he prayed for."
Reply to Objection 1: As it is written (1 Kings 16:7), "man seeth those
things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Now a man who
desires to be "born again of water and the Holy Ghost" by Baptism, is
regenerated in heart though not in body. thus the Apostle says (Rom.
2:29) that "the circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, not
in the letter; whose praise is not of men but of God."
Reply to Objection 2: No man obtains eternal life unless he be free
from all guilt and debt of punishment. Now this plenary absolution is
given when a man receives Baptism, or suffers martyrdom: for which
reason is it stated that martyrdom "contains all the sacramental virtue
of Baptism," i.e. as to the full deliverance from guilt and punishment.
Suppose, therefore, a catechumen to have the desire for Baptism (else
he could not be said to die in his good works, which cannot be without
"faith that worketh by charity"), such a one, were he to die, would not
forthwith come to eternal life, but would suffer punishment for his
past sins, "but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire" as is
stated 1 Cor. 3:15.
Reply to Objection 3: The sacrament of Baptism is said to be necessary
for salvation in so far as man cannot be saved without, at least,
Baptism of desire; "which, with God, counts for the deed" (Augustine,
Enarr. in Ps. 57).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Baptism should be deferred?
Objection 1: It seems that Baptism should be deferred. For Pope Leo
says (Epist. xvi): "Two seasons," i.e. Easter and Whitsuntide, "are
fixed by the Roman Pontiff for the celebration of Baptism. Wherefore we
admonish your Beatitude not to add any other days to this custom."
Therefore it seems that Baptism should be conferred not at once, but
delayed until the aforesaid seasons.
Objection 2: Further, we read in the decrees of the Council of Agde
(Can. xxxiv): "If Jews whose bad faith often "returns to the vomit,"
wish to submit to the Law of the Catholic Church, let them for eight
months enter the porch of the church with the catechumens; and if they
are found to come in good faith then at last they may deserve the grace
of Baptism." Therefore men should not be baptized at once, and Baptism
should be deferred for a certain fixed time.
Objection 3: Further, as we read in Is. 27:9, "this is all the fruit,
that the sin . . . should be taken away." Now sin seems to be taken
away, or at any rate lessened, if Baptism be deferred. First, because
those who sin after Baptism, sin more grievously, according to Heb.
10:29: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments,
who hath . . . esteemed the blood of the testament," i.e. Baptism,
"unclean, by which he was sanctified?" Secondly, because Baptism takes
away past, but not future, sins: wherefore the more it is deferred, the
more sins it takes away. Therefore it seems that Baptism should be
deferred for a long time.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:8): "Delay not to be
converted to the Lord, and defer it not from day to day." But the
perfect conversion to God is of those who are regenerated in Christ by
Baptism. Therefore Baptism should not be deferred from day to day.
I answer that, In this matter we must make a distinction and see
whether those who are to be baptized are children or adults. For if
they be children, Baptism should not be deferred. First, because in
them we do not look for better instruction or fuller conversion.
Secondly, because of the danger of death, for no other remedy is
available for them besides the sacrament of Baptism.
On the other hand, adults have a remedy in the mere desire for Baptism,
as stated above [4443](A[2]). And therefore Baptism should not be
conferred on adults as soon as they are converted, but it should be
deferred until some fixed time. First, as a safeguard to the Church,
lest she be deceived through baptizing those who come to her under
false pretenses, according to 1 Jn. 4:1: "Believe not every spirit, but
try the spirits, if they be of God." And those who approach Baptism are
put to this test, when their faith and morals are subjected to proof
for a space of time. Secondly, this is needful as being useful for
those who are baptized; for they require a certain space of time in
order to be fully instructed in the faith, and to be drilled in those
things that pertain to the Christian mode of life. Thirdly, a certain
reverence for the sacrament demands a delay whereby men are admitted to
Baptism at the principal festivities, viz. of Easter and Pentecost, the
result being that they receive the sacrament with greater devotion.
There are, however, two reasons for forgoing this delay. First, when
those who are to be baptized appear to be perfectly instructed in the
faith and ready for Baptism; thus, Philip baptized the Eunuch at once
(Acts 8); and Peter, Cornelius and those who were with him (Acts 10).
Secondly, by reason of sickness or some kind of danger of death.
Wherefore Pope Leo says (Epist. xvi): "Those who are threatened by
death, sickness, siege, persecution, or shipwreck, should be baptized
at any time." Yet if a man is forestalled by death, so as to have no
time to receive the sacrament, while he awaits the season appointed by
the Church, he is saved, yet "so as by fire," as stated above (A[2], ad
2). Nevertheless he sins if he defer being baptized beyond the time
appointed by the Church, except this be for an unavoidable cause and
with the permission of the authorities of the Church. But even this
sin, with his other sins, can be washed away by his subsequent
contrition, which takes the place of Baptism, as stated above
([4444]Q[66], A[11]).
Reply to Objection 1: This decree of Pope Leo, concerning the
celebration of Baptism at two seasons, is to be understood "with the
exception of the danger of death" (which is always to be feared in
children) as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: This decree concerning the Jews was for a
safeguard to the Church, lest they corrupt the faith of simple people,
if they be not fully converted. Nevertheless, as the same passage reads
further on, "if within the appointed time they are threatened with
danger of sickness, they should be baptized."
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism, by the grace which it bestows, removes
not only past sins, but hinders the commission of future sins. Now this
is the point to be considered---that men may not sin: it is a secondary
consideration that their sins be less grievous, or that their sins be
washed away, according to 1 Jn. 2:1,2: "My little children, these
things I write to you, that you may not sin. But if any man sin, we
have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just; and He is the
propitiation for our sins."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sinners should be baptized?
Objection 1: It seems that sinners should be baptized. For it is
written (Zech. 13:1): "In that day there shall be a fountain open to
the House of David, and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem: for the
washing of the sinner and of the unclean woman": and this is to be
understood of the fountain of Baptism. Therefore it seems that the
sacrament of Baptism should be offered even to sinners.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 9:12): "They that are in
health need not a physician, but they that are ill." But they that are
ill are sinners. Therefore since Baptism is the remedy of Christ the
physician of our souls, it seems that this sacrament should be offered
to sinners.
Objection 3: Further, no assistance should be withdrawn from sinners.
But sinners who have been baptized derive spiritual assistance from the
very character of Baptism, since it is a disposition to grace.
Therefore it seems that the sacrament of Baptism should be offered to
sinners.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Serm. clxix): "He Who created thee
without thee, will not justify thee without thee." But since a sinner's
will is ill-disposed, he does not co-operate with God. Therefore it is
useless to employ Baptism as a means of justification.
I answer that, A man may be said to be a sinner in two ways. First, on
account of the stain and the debt of punishment incurred in the past:
and on sinners in this sense the sacrament of Baptism should be
conferred, since it is instituted specially for this purpose, that by
it the uncleanness of sin may be washed away, according to Eph. 5:26:
"Cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life."
Secondly, a man may be called a sinner because he wills to sin and
purposes to remain in sin: and on sinners in this sense the sacrament
of Baptism should not be conferred. First, indeed, because by Baptism
men are incorporated in Christ, according to Gal. 3:27: "As many of you
as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ." Now so long as a
man wills to sin, he cannot be united to Christ, according to 2 Cor.
6:14: "What participation hath justice with injustice?" Wherefore
Augustine says in his book on Penance (Serm. cccli) that "no man who
has the use of free-will can begin the new life, except he repent of
his former life." Secondly, because there should be nothing useless in
the works of Christ and of the Church. Now that is useless which does
not reach the end to which it is ordained; and, on the other hand, no
one having the will to sin can, at the same time, be cleansed from sin,
which is the purpose of Baptism; for this would be to combine two
contradictory things. Thirdly, because there should be no falsehood in
the sacramental signs. Now a sign is false if it does not correspond
with the thing signified. But the very fact that a man presents himself
to be cleansed by Baptism, signifies that he prepares himself for the
inward cleansing: while this cannot be the case with one who purposes
to remain in sin. Therefore it is manifest that on such a man the
sacrament of Baptism is not to be conferred.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted are to be understood of those
sinners whose will is set on renouncing sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The physician of souls, i.e. Christ, works in two
ways. First, inwardly, by Himself: and thus He prepares man's will so
that it wills good and hates evil. Secondly, He works through
ministers, by the outward application of the sacraments: and in this
way His work consists in perfecting what was begun outwardly. Therefore
the sacrament of Baptism is not to be conferred save on those in whom
there appears some sign of their interior conversion: just as neither
is bodily medicine given to a sick man, unless he show some sign of
life.
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is the sacrament of faith. Now dead faith
does not suffice for salvation; nor is it the foundation, but living
faith alone, "that worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6), as Augustine says
(De Fide et oper.). Neither, therefore, can the sacrament of Baptism
give salvation to a man whose will is set on sinning, and hence expels
the form of faith. Moreover, the impression of the baptismal character
cannot dispose a man for grace as long as he retains the will to sin;
for "God compels no man to be virtuous," as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether works of satisfaction should be enjoined on sinners that have been
baptized?
Objection 1: It seems that works of satisfaction should be enjoined on
sinners that have been baptized. For God's justice seems to demand that
a man should be punished for every sin of his, according to Eccles.
12:14: "All things that are done, God will bring into judgment." But
works of satisfaction are enjoined on sinners in punishment of past
sins. Therefore it seems that works of satisfaction should be enjoined
on sinners that have been baptized.
Objection 2: Further, by means of works of satisfaction sinners
recently converted are drilled into righteousness, and are made to
avoid the occasions of sin: "for satisfaction consists in extirpating
the causes of vice, and closing the doors to sin" (De Eccl. Dogm. iv).
But this is most necessary in the case of those who have been baptized
recently. Therefore it seems that works of satisfaction should be
enjoined on sinners.
Objection 3: Further, man owes satisfaction to God not less than to his
neighbor. But if those who were recently baptized have injured their
neighbor, they should be told to make reparation to God by works of
penance.
On the contrary, Ambrose commenting on Rom. 11:29: "The gifts and the
calling of God are without repentance," says: "The grace of God
requires neither sighs nor groans in Baptism, nor indeed any work at
all, but faith alone; and remits all, gratis."
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3,4), "all we who are
baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His death: for we are buried
together with Him, by Baptism unto death"; which is to say that by
Baptism man is incorporated in the very death of Christ. Now it is
manifest from what has been said above ([4445]Q[48], AA[2],4;[4446]
Q[49], A[3]) that Christ's death satisfied sufficiently for sins, "not
for ours only, but also for those of the whole world," according to 1
Jn. 2:2. Consequently no kind of satisfaction should be enjoined on one
who is being baptized, for any sins whatever: and this would be to
dishonor the Passion and death of Christ, as being insufficient for the
plenary satisfaction for the sins of those who were to be baptized.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in his book on Infant Baptism
(De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i), "the effect of Baptism is to make
those, who are baptized, to be incorporated in Christ as His members."
Wherefore the very pains of Christ were satisfactory for the sins of
those who were to be baptized; just as the pain of one member can be
satisfactory for the sin of another member. Hence it is written (Is.
53:4): "Surely He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows."
Reply to Objection 2: Those who have been lately baptized should be
drilled into righteousness, not by penal, but by "easy works, so as to
advance to perfection by taking exercise, as infants by taking milk,"
as a gloss says on Ps. 130:2: "As a child that is weaned is towards his
mother." For this reason did our Lord excuse His disciples from fasting
when they were recently converted, as we read in Mat. 9:14,15: and the
same is written 1 Pet. 2:2: "As new-born babes desire . . . milk . . .
that thereby you may grow unto salvation."
Reply to Objection 3: To restore what has been ill taken from one's
neighbor, and to make satisfaction for wrong done to him, is to cease
from sin: for the very fact of retaining what belongs to another and of
not being reconciled to one's neighbor, is a sin. Wherefore those who
are baptized should be enjoined to make satisfaction to their neighbor,
as also to desist from sin. But they are not to be enjoined to suffer
any punishment for past sins.
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Whether sinners who are going to be baptized are bound to confess their
sins?
Objection 1: It seems that sinners who are going to be baptized are
bound to confess their sins. For it is written (Mat. 3:6) that many
"were baptized" by John "in the Jordan confessing their sins." But
Christ's Baptism is more perfect than John's. Therefore it seems that
there is yet greater reason why they who are about to receive Christ's
Baptism should confess their sins.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:13): "He that hideth his
sins, shall not prosper; but he that shall confess and forsake them,
shall obtain mercy." Now for this is a man baptized, that he may obtain
mercy for his sins. Therefore those who are going to be baptized should
confess their sins.
Objection 3: Further, Penance is required before Baptism, according to
Acts 2:38: "Do penance and be baptized every one of you." But
confession is a part of Penance. Therefore it seems that confession of
sins should take place before Baptism.
On the contrary, Confession of sins should be sorrowful: thus Augustine
says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. xiv): "All these circumstances should be
taken into account and deplored." Now, as Ambrose says on Rom. 11:29,
"the grace of God requires neither sighs nor groans in Baptism."
Therefore confession of sins should not be required of those who are
going to be baptized.
I answer that, Confession of sins is twofold. One is made inwardly to
God: and such confession of sins is required before Baptism: in other
words, man should call his sins to mind and sorrow for them; since "he
cannot begin the new life, except he repent of his former life," as
Augustine says in his book on Penance (Serm. cccli). The other is the
outward confession of sins, which is made to a priest; and such
confession is not required before Baptism. First, because this
confession, since it is directed to the person of the minister, belongs
to the sacrament of Penance, which is not required before Baptism,
which is the door of all the sacraments. Secondly, because the reason
why a man makes outward confession to a priest, is that the priest may
absolve him from his sins, and bind him to works of satisfaction, which
should not be enjoined on the baptized, as stated above [4447](A[5]).
Moreover those who are being baptized do not need to be released from
their sins by the keys of the Church, since all are forgiven them in
Baptism. Thirdly, because the very act of confession made to a man is
penal, by reason of the shame it inflicts on the one confessing:
whereas no exterior punishment is enjoined on a man who is being
baptized.
Therefore no special confession of sins is required of those who are
being baptized; but that general confession suffices which they make
when in accordance with the Church's ritual they "renounce Satan and
all his works." And in this sense a gloss explains Mat. 3:6, saying
that in John's Baptism "those who are going to be baptized learn that
they should confess their sins and promise to amend their life."
If, however, any persons about to be baptized, wish, out of devotion,
to confess their sins, their confession should be heard; not for the
purpose of enjoining them to do satisfaction, but in order to instruct
them in the spiritual life as a remedy against their vicious habits.
Reply to Objection 1: Sins were not forgiven in John's Baptism, which,
however, was the Baptism of Penance. Consequently it was fitting that
those who went to receive that Baptism, should confess their sins, so
that they should receive a penance in proportion to their sins. But
Christ's Baptism is without outward penance, as Ambrose says (on Rom.
11:29); and therefore there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 2: It is enough that the baptized make inward
confession to God, and also an outward general confession, for them to
"prosper and obtain mercy": and they need no special outward
confession, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Confession is a part of sacramental Penance,
which is not required before Baptism, as stated above: but the inward
virtue of Penance is required.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the intention of receiving the sacrament of Baptism is required on
the part of the one baptized?
Objection 1: It seems that the intention of receiving the sacrament of
Baptism is not required on the part of the one baptized. For the one
baptized is, as it were, "patient" in the sacrament. But an intention
is required not on the part of the patient but on the part of the
agent. Therefore it seems that the intention of receiving Baptism is
not required on the part of the one baptized.
Objection 2: Further, if what is necessary for Baptism be omitted, the
Baptism must be repeated; for instance, if the invocation of the
Trinity be omitted, as stated above ([4448]Q[66], A[9], ad 3). But it
does not seem that a man should be rebaptized through not having had
the intention of receiving Baptism: else, since his intention cannot be
proved, anyone might ask to be baptized again on account of his lack of
intention. Therefore it seems that no intention is required on the part
of the one baptized, in order that he receive the sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, Baptism is given as a remedy for original sin.
But original sin is contracted without the intention of the person
born. Therefore, seemingly, Baptism requires no intention on the part
of the person baptized.
On the contrary, According to the Church's ritual, those who are to be
baptized ask of the Church that they may receive Baptism: and thus they
express their intention of receiving the sacrament.
I answer that, By Baptism a man dies to the old life of sin, and begins
a certain newness of life, according to Rom. 6:4: "We are buried
together with" Christ "by Baptism into death; that, as Christ is risen
from the dead . . . so we also may walk in newness of life."
Consequently, just as, according to Augustine (Serm. cccli), he who has
the use of free-will, must, in order to die to the old life, "will to
repent of his former life"; so must he, of his own will, intend to lead
a new life, the beginning of which is precisely the receiving of the
sacrament. Therefore on the part of the one baptized, it is necessary
for him to have the will or intention of receiving the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man is justified by Baptism, his
passiveness is not violent but voluntary: wherefore it is necessary for
him to intend to receive that which is given him.
Reply to Objection 2: If an adult lack the intention of receiving the
sacrament, he must be rebaptized. But if there be doubt about this, the
form to be used should be: "If thou art not baptized, I baptize thee."
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is a remedy not only against original,
but also against actual sins, which are caused by our will and
intention.
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Whether faith is required on the part of the one baptized?
Objection 1: It seems that faith is required on the part of the one
baptized. For the sacrament of Baptism was instituted by Christ. But
Christ, in giving the form of Baptism, makes faith to precede Baptism
(Mk. 16:16): "He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved."
Therefore it seems that without faith there can be no sacrament of
Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, nothing useless is done in the sacraments of the
Church. But according to the Church's ritual, the man who comes to be
baptized is asked concerning his faith: "Dost thou believe in God the
Father Almighty?" Therefore it seems that faith is required for
Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, the intention of receiving the sacrament is
required for Baptism. But this cannot be without right faith, since
Baptism is the sacrament of right faith: for thereby men "are
incorporated in Christ," as Augustine says in his book on Infant
Baptism (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i); and this cannot be without
right faith, according to Eph. 3:17: "That Christ may dwell by faith in
your hearts." Therefore it seems that a man who has not right faith
cannot receive the sacrament of Baptism.
Objection 4: Further, unbelief is a most grievous sin, as we have shown
in the [4449]SS, Q[10], A[3]. But those who remain in sin should not be
baptized: therefore neither should those who remain in unbelief.
On the contrary, Gregory writing to the bishop Quiricus says: "We have
learned from the ancient tradition of the Fathers that when heretics,
baptized in the name of the Trinity, come back to Holy Church, they are
to be welcomed to her bosom, either with the anointing of chrism, or
the imposition of hands, or the mere profession of faith." But such
would not be the case if faith were necessary for a man to receive
Baptism.
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above ([4450]Q[63],
A[6];[4451] Q[66], A[9]) Baptism produces a twofold effect in the soul,
viz. the character and grace. Therefore in two ways may a thing be
necessary for Baptism. First, as something without which grace, which
is the ultimate effect of the sacrament, cannot be had. And thus right
faith is necessary for Baptism, because, as it appears from Rom. 3:22,
the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ.
Secondly, something is required of necessity for Baptism, because
without it the baptismal character cannot be imprinted And thus right
faith is not necessary in the one baptized any more than in the one who
baptizes: provided the other conditions are fulfilled which are
essential to the sacrament. For the sacrament is not perfected by the
righteousness of the minister or of the recipient of Baptism, but by
the power of God.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord is speaking there of Baptism as bringing
us to salvation by giving us sanctifying grace: which of course cannot
be without right faith: wherefore He says pointedly: "He that believeth
and is baptized, shall be saved."
Reply to Objection 2: The Church's intention in Baptizing men is that
they may be cleansed from sin, according to Is. 27:9: "This is all the
fruit, that the sin . . . should be taken away." And therefore, as far
as she is concerned, she does not intend to give Baptism save to those
who have right faith, without which there is no remission of sins. And
for this reason she asks those who come to be baptized whether they
believe. If, on the contrary, anyone, without right faith, receive
Baptism outside the Church, he does not receive it unto salvation.
Hence Augustine says (De Baptism. contr. Donat. iv): "From the Church
being compared to Paradise we learn that men can receive her Baptism
even outside her fold, but that elsewhere none can receive or keep the
salvation of the blessed."
Reply to Objection 3: Even he who has not right faith on other points,
can have right faith about the sacrament of Baptism: and so he is not
hindered from having the intention of receiving that sacrament. Yet
even if he think not aright concerning this sacrament, it is enough,
for the receiving of the sacrament, that he should have a general
intention of receiving Baptism, according as Christ instituted, and as
the Church bestows it.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as the sacrament of Baptism is not to be
conferred on a man who is unwilling to give up his other sins, so
neither should it be given to one who is unwilling to renounce his
unbelief. Yet each receives the sacrament if it be conferred on him,
though not unto salvation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether children should be baptized?
Objection 1: It seems that children should not be baptized. For the
intention to receive the sacrament is required in one who is being
baptized, as stated above [4452](A[7]). But children cannot have such
an intention, since they have not the use of free-will. Therefore it
seems that they cannot receive the sacrament of Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, Baptism is the sacrament of faith, as stated
above ([4453]Q[39], A[5];[4454] Q[66], A[1], ad 1). But children have
not faith, which demands an act of the will on the part of the
believer, as Augustine says (Super Joan. xxvi). Nor can it be said that
their salvation is implied in the faith of their parents; since the
latter are sometimes unbelievers, and their unbelief would conduce
rather to the damnation of their children. Therefore it seems that
children cannot be baptized.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 3:21) that "Baptism saveth"
men; "not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the
examination of a good conscience towards God." But children have no
conscience, either good or bad, since they have not the use of reason:
nor can they be fittingly examined, since they understand not.
Therefore children should not be baptized.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii): "Our heavenly
guides," i.e. the Apostles, "approved of infants being admitted to
Baptism."
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 5:17), "if by one man's
offense death reigned through one," namely Adam, "much more they who
receive abundance of grace, and of the gift, and of justice, shall
reign in life through one, Jesus Christ." Now children contract
original sin from the sin of Adam; which is made clear by the fact that
they are under the ban of death, which "passed upon all" on account of
the sin of the first man, as the Apostle says in the same passage (Rom.
5:12). Much more, therefore, can children receive grace through Christ,
so as to reign in eternal life. But our Lord Himself said (Jn. 3:5):
"Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot
enter into the kingdom of God." Consequently it became necessary to
baptize children, that, as in birth they incurred damnation through
Adam so in a second birth they might obtain salvation through Christ.
Moreover it was fitting that children should receive Baptism, in order
that being reared from childhood in things pertaining to the Christian
mode of life, they may the more easily persevere therein; according to
Prov. 22:5: "A young man according to his way, even when he is old, he
will not depart from it." This reason is also given by Dionysius (Eccl.
Hier. iii).
Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual regeneration effected by Baptism is
somewhat like carnal birth, in this respect, that as the child while in
the mother's womb receives nourishment not independently, but through
the nourishment of its mother, so also children before the use of
reason, being as it were in the womb of their mother the Church,
receive salvation not by their own act, but by the act of the Church.
Hence Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i): "The Church, our
mother, offers her maternal mouth for her children, that they may
imbibe the sacred mysteries: for they cannot as yet with their own
hearts believe unto justice, nor with their own mouths confess unto
salvation . . . And if they are rightly said to believe, because in a
certain fashion they make profession of faith by the words of their
sponsors, why should they not also be said to repent, since by the
words of those same sponsors they evidence their renunciation of the
devil and this world?" For the same reason they can be said to intend,
not by their own act of intention, since at times they struggle and
cry; but by the act of those who bring them to be baptized.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says, writing to Boniface (Cont.
duas Ep. Pelag. i), "in the Church of our Saviour little children
believe through others, just as they contracted from others those sins
which are remitted in Baptism." Nor is it a hindrance to their
salvation if their parents be unbelievers, because, as Augustine says,
writing to the same Boniface (Ep. xcviii), "little children are offered
that they may receive grace in their souls, not so much from the hands
of those that carry them (yet from these too, if they be good and
faithful) as from the whole company of the saints and the faithful. For
they are rightly considered to be offered by those who are pleased at
their being offered, and by whose charity they are united in communion
with the Holy Ghost." And the unbelief of their own parents, even if
after Baptism these strive to infect them with the worship of demons,
hurts not the children. For as Augustine says (Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. i)
"when once the child has been begotten by the will of others, he cannot
subsequently be held by the bonds of another's sin so long as he
consent not with his will, according to" Ezech. 18:4: "'As the soul of
the Father, so also the soul of the son is mine; the soul that sinneth,
the same shall die.' Yet he contracted from Adam that which was loosed
by the grace of this sacrament, because as yet he was not endowed with
a separate existence." But the faith of one, indeed of the whole
Church, profits the child through the operation of the Holy Ghost, Who
unites the Church together, and communicates the goods of one member to
another.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as a child, when he is being baptized,
believes not by himself but by others, so is he examined not by himself
but through others, and these in answer confess the Church's faith in
the child's stead, who is aggregated to this faith by the sacrament of
faith. And the child acquires a good conscience in himself, not indeed
as to the act, but as to the habit, by sanctifying grace.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether children of Jews or other unbelievers be baptized against the will
of their parents?
Objection 1: It seems that children of Jews or other unbelievers should
be baptized against the will of their parents. For it is a matter of
greater urgency to rescue a man from the danger of eternal death than
from the danger of temporal death. But one ought to rescue a child that
is threatened by the danger of temporal death, even if its parents
through malice try to prevent its being rescued. Therefore much more
reason is there for rescuing the children of unbelievers from the
danger of eternal death, even against their parents' will.
Objection 2: The children of slaves are themselves slaves, and in the
power of their masters. But Jews and all other unbelievers are the
slaves of kings and rulers. Therefore without any injustice rulers can
have the children of Jews baptized, as well as those of other slaves
who are unbelievers.
Objection 3: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has
his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body.
Therefore it is not unjust if the children of unbelievers are taken
away from their carnal parents, and consecrated to God by Baptism.
On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (Dist. xlv), quoting
the council of Toledo: "In regard to the Jews the holy synod commands
that henceforward none of them be forced to believe: for such are not
to be saved against their will, but willingly, that their righteousness
may be without flaw."
I answer that, The children of unbelievers either have the use of
reason or they have not. If they have, then they already begin to
control their own actions, in things that are of Divine or natural law.
And therefore of their own accord, and against the will of their
parents, they can receive Baptism, just as they can contract marriage.
Consequently such can lawfully be advised and persuaded to be baptized.
If, however, they have not yet the use of free-will, according to the
natural law they are under the care of their parents as long as they
cannot look after themselves. For which reason we say that even the
children of the ancients "were saved through the faith of their
parents." Wherefore it would be contrary to natural justice if such
children were baptized against their parents' will; just as it would be
if one having the use of reason were baptized against his will.
Moreover under the circumstances it would be dangerous to baptize the
children of unbelievers; for they would be liable to lapse into
unbelief, by reason of their natural affection for their parents.
Therefore it is not the custom of the Church to baptize the children of
unbelievers against their parents' will.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not right to rescue a man from death of the
body against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man be
condemned to death by the judge who has tried him, none should use
force in order to rescue him from death. Consequently, neither should
anyone infringe the order of the natural law, in virtue of which a
child is under the care of its father, in order to rescue it from the
danger of eternal death.
Reply to Objection 2: Jews are slaves of rulers by civil slavery, which
does not exclude the order of the natural and Divine law.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is ordained unto God through his reason, by
which he can know God. Wherefore a child, before it has the use of
reason, is ordained to God, by a natural order, through the reason of
its parents, under whose care it naturally lies, and it is according to
their ordering that things pertaining to God are to be done in respect
of the child.
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Whether a child can be baptized while yet in its mother's womb?
Objection 1: It seems that a child can be baptized while yet in its
mother's womb. For the gift of Christ is more efficacious unto
salvation than Adam's sin unto condemnation, as the Apostle says (Rom.
5:15). But a child while yet in its mother's womb is under sentence of
condemnation on account of Adam's sin. For much more reason, therefore,
can it be saved through the gift of Christ, which is bestowed by means
of Baptism. Therefore a child can be baptized while yet in its mother's
womb.
Objection 2: Further, a child, while yet in its mother's womb, seems to
be part of its mother. Now, when the mother is baptized, whatever is in
her and part of her, is baptized. Therefore it seems that when the
mother is baptized, the child in her womb is baptized.
Objection 3: Further, eternal death is a greater evil than death of the
body. But of two evils the less should be chosen. If, therefore, the
child in the mother's womb cannot be baptized, it would be better for
the mother to be opened, and the child to be taken out by force and
baptized, than that the child should be eternally damned through dying
without Baptism.
Objection 4: Further, it happens at times that some part of the child
comes forth first, as we read in Gn. 38:27: "In the very delivery of
the infants, one put forth a hand, whereon the midwife tied a scarlet
thread, saying: This shall come forth the first. But he drawing back
his hand, the other came forth." Now sometimes in such cases there is
danger of death. Therefore it seems that that part should be baptized,
while the child is yet in its mother's womb.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan.): "No one can be born a
second time unless he be born first." But Baptism is a spiritual
regeneration. Therefore no one should be baptized before he is born
from the womb.
I answer that, It is essential to Baptism that some part of the body of
the person baptized be in some way washed with water, since Baptism is
a kind of washing, as stated above ([4455]Q[66], A[1]). But an infant's
body, before being born from the womb, can nowise be washed with water;
unless perchance it be said that the baptismal water, with which the
mother's body is washed, reaches the child while yet in its mother's
womb. But this is impossible: both because the child's soul, to the
sanctification of which Baptism is ordained, is distinct from the soul
of the mother; and because the body of the animated infant is already
formed, and consequently distinct from the body of the mother.
Therefore the Baptism which the mother receives does not overflow on to
the child which is in her womb. Hence Augustine says (Cont. Julian.
vi): "If what is conceived within a mother belonged to her body, so as
to be considered a part thereof, we should not baptize an infant whose
mother, through danger of death, was baptized while she bore it in her
womb. Since, then, it," i.e. the infant, "is baptized, it certainly did
not belong to the mother's body while it was in the womb." It follows,
therefore, that a child can nowise be baptized while in its mother's
womb.
Reply to Objection 1: Children while in the mother's womb have not yet
come forth into the world to live among other men. Consequently they
cannot be subject to the action of man, so as to receive the sacrament,
at the hands of man, unto salvation. They can, however, be subject to
the action of God, in Whose sight they live, so as, by a kind of
privilege, to receive the grace of sanctification; as was the case with
those who were sanctified in the womb.
Reply to Objection 2: An internal member of the mother is something of
hers by continuity and material union of the part with the whole:
whereas a child while in its mother's womb is something of hers through
being joined with, and yet distinct from her. Wherefore there is no
comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: We should "not do evil that there may come good"
(Rom. 3:8). Therefore it is wrong to kill a mother that her child may
be baptized. If, however, the mother die while the child lives yet in
her womb, she should be opened that the child may be baptized.
Reply to Objection 4: Unless death be imminent, we should wait until
the child has entirely come forth from the womb before baptizing it.
If, however, the head, wherein the senses are rooted, appear first, it
should be baptized, in cases of danger: nor should it be baptized
again, if perfect birth should ensue. And seemingly the same should be
done in cases of danger no matter what part of the body appear first.
But as none of the exterior parts of the body belong to its integrity
in the same degree as the head, some hold that since the matter is
doubtful, whenever any other part of the body has been baptized, the
child, when perfect birth has taken place, should be baptized with the
form: "If thou art not baptized, I baptize thee," etc.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether madmen and imbeciles should be baptized?
Objection 1: It seems that madmen and imbeciles should not be baptized.
For in order to receive Baptism, the person baptized must have the
intention, as stated above [4456](A[7]). But since madmen and imbeciles
lack the use of reason, they can have but a disorderly intention.
Therefore they should not be baptized.
Objection 2: Further, man excels irrational animals in that he has
reason. But madmen and imbeciles lack the use of reason, indeed in some
cases we do not expect them ever to have it, as we do in the case of
children. It seems, therefore, that just as irrational animals are not
baptized, so neither should madmen and imbeciles in those cases be
baptized.
Objection 3: Further, the use of reason is suspended in madmen and
imbeciles more than it is in one who sleeps. But it is not customary to
baptize people while they sleep. Therefore it should not be given to
madmen and imbeciles.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv) of his friend that "he
was baptized when his recovery was despaired of": and yet Baptism was
efficacious with him. Therefore Baptism should sometimes be given to
those who lack the use of reason.
I answer that, In the matter of madmen and imbeciles a distinction is
to be made. For some are so from birth, and have no lucid intervals,
and show no signs of the use of reason. And with regard to these it
seems that we should come to the same decision as with regard to
children who are baptized in the Faith of the Church, as stated above
(A[9], ad 2).
But there are others who have fallen from a state of sanity into a
state of insanity. And with regard to these we must be guided by their
wishes as expressed by them when sane: so that, if then they manifested
a desire to receive Baptism, it should be given to them when in a state
of madness or imbecility, even though then they refuse. If, on the
other hand, while sane they showed no desire to receive Baptism, they
must not be baptized.
Again, there are some who, though mad or imbecile from birth, have,
nevertheless, lucid intervals, in which they can make right use of
reason. Wherefore, if then they express a desire for Baptism, they can
be baptized though they be actually in a state of madness. And in this
case the sacrament should be bestowed on them if there be fear of
danger otherwise it is better to wait until the time when they are
sane, so that they may receive the sacrament more devoutly. But if
during the interval of lucidity they manifest no desire to receive
Baptism, they should not be baptized while in a state of insanity.
Lastly there are others who, though not altogether sane, yet can use
their reason so far as to think about their salvation, and understand
the power of the sacrament. And these are to be treated the same as
those who are sane, and who are baptized if they be willing, but not
against their will.
Reply to Objection 1: Imbeciles who never had, and have not now, the
use of reason, are baptized, according to the Church's intention, just
as according to the Church's ritual, they believe and repent; as we
have stated above of children (A[9], ad OBJ). But those who have had
the use of reason at some time, or have now, are baptized according to
their own intention, which they have now, or had when they were sane.
Reply to Objection 2: Madmen and imbeciles lack the use of reason
accidentally, i.e. through some impediment in a bodily organ; but not
like irrational animals through want of a rational soul. Consequently
the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: A person should not be baptized while asleep,
except he be threatened with the danger of death. In which case he
should be baptized, if previously he has manifested a desire to receive
Baptism, as we have stated in reference to imbeciles: thus Augustine
relates of his friend that "he was baptized while unconscious," because
he was in danger of death (Confess. iv).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECTS OF BAPTISM (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of Baptism, concerning which there are
ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all sins are taken away by Baptism?
(2) Whether man is freed from all punishment by Baptism?
(3) Whether Baptism takes away the penalties of sin that belong to this
life?
(4) Whether grace and virtues are bestowed on man by Baptism?
(5) Of the effects of virtue which are conferred by Baptism?
(6) Whether even children receive grace and virtues in Baptism?
(7) Whether Baptism opens the gates of the heavenly kingdom to those
who are baptized?
(8) Whether Baptism produces an equal effect in all who are baptized?
(9) Whether insincerity hinders the effect of Baptism?
(10) Whether Baptism takes effect when the insincerity ceases?
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Whether all sins are taken away by Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that not all sins are taken away by Baptism. For
Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, which corresponds to carnal
generation. But by carnal generation man contracts none but original
sin. Therefore none but original sin is taken away by Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, Penance is a sufficient cause of the remission of
actual sins. But penance is required in adults before Baptism,
according to Acts 2:38: "Do penance and be baptized every one of you."
Therefore Baptism has nothing to do with the remission of actual sins.
Objection 3: Further, various diseases demand various remedies: because
as Jerome says on Mk. 9:27,28: "What is a cure for the heel is no cure
for the eye." But original sin, which is taken away by Baptism, is
generically distinct from actual sin. Therefore not all sins are taken
away by Baptism.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 36:25): "I will pour upon you
clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your filthiness."
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3), "all we, who are
baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His death." And further on he
concludes (Rom. 6:11): "So do you also reckon that you are dead to sin,
but alive unto God in Christ Jesus our Lord." Hence it is clear that by
Baptism man dies unto the oldness of sin, and begins to live unto the
newness of grace. But every sin belongs to the primitive oldness.
Consequently every sin is taken away by Baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15,16), the sin of
Adam was not so far-reaching as the gift of Christ, which is bestowed
in Baptism: "for judgment was by one unto condemnation; but grace is of
many offenses, unto justification." Wherefore Augustine says in his
book on Infant Baptism (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i), that "in carnal
generation, original sin alone is contracted; but when we are born
again of the Spirit, not only original sin but also wilful sin is
forgiven."
Reply to Objection 2: No sin can be forgiven save by the power of
Christ's Passion: hence the Apostle says (Heb. 9:22) that "without
shedding of blood there is no remission." Consequently no movement of
the human will suffices for the remission of sin, unless there be faith
in Christ's Passion, and the purpose of participating in it, either by
receiving Baptism, or by submitting to the keys of the Church.
Therefore when an adult approaches Baptism, he does indeed receive the
forgiveness of all his sins through his purpose of being baptized, but
more perfectly through the actual reception of Baptism.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of special remedies. But
Baptism operates by the power of Christ's Passion, which is the
universal remedy for all sins; and so by Baptism all sins are loosed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man is freed by Baptism from all debt of punishment due to sin?
Objection 1: It seems that man is not freed by Baptism from all debt of
punishment due to sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "Those things
that are of God are well ordered [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained
of God']." But guilt is not set in order save by punishment, as
Augustine says (Ep. cxl). Therefore Baptism does not take away the debt
of punishment due to sins already committed.
Objection 2: Further, the effect of a sacrament has a certain likeness
to the sacrament itself; since the sacraments of the New Law "effect
what they signify," as stated above ([4457]Q[62], A[1], ad 1). But the
washing of Baptism has indeed a certain likeness with the cleansing
from the stain of sin, but none, seemingly, with the remission of the
debt of punishment. Therefore the debt of punishment is not taken away
by Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, when the debt of punishment has been remitted, a
man no longer deserves to be punished, and so it would be unjust to
punish him. If, therefore, the debt of punishment be remitted by
Baptism, it would be unjust, after Baptism, to hang a thief who had
committed murder before. Consequently the severity of human legislation
would be relaxed on account of Baptism; which is undesirable. Therefore
Baptism does not remit the debt of punishment.
On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Rom. 11:29, "The gifts and the
calling of God ate without repentance," says: "The grace of God in
Baptism remits all, gratis."
I answer that, As stated above ([4458]Q[49], A[3], ad 2;[4459] Q[68],
AA[1],4,5) by Baptism a man is incorporated in the Passion and death of
Christ, according to Rom. 6:8: "If we be dead with Christ, we believe
that we shall live also together with Christ." Hence it is clear that
the Passion of Christ is communicated to every baptized person, so that
he is healed just as if he himself had suffered and died. Now Christ's
Passion, as stated above ([4460]Q[68], A[5]), is a sufficient
satisfaction for all the sins of all men. Consequently he who is
baptized, is freed from the debt of all punishment due to him for his
sins, just as if he himself had offered sufficient satisfaction for all
his sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the pains of Christ's Passion are
communicated to the person baptized, inasmuch as he is made a member of
Christ, just as if he himself had borne those pains, his sins are set
in order by the pains of Christ's Passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Water not only cleanses but also refreshes. And
thus by refreshing it signifies the remission of the debt of
punishment, just as by cleansing it signifies the washing away of
guilt.
Reply to Objection 3: In punishments inflicted by a human tribunal, we
have to consider not only what punishment a man deserves in respect of
God, but also to what extent he is indebted to men who are hurt and
scandalized by another's sin. Consequently, although a murderer is
freed by Baptism from his debt of punishment in respect of God, he
remains, nevertheless, in debt to men; and it is right that they should
be edified at his punishment, since they were scandalized at his sin.
But the sovereign may remit the penalty to such like out of kindness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Baptism should take away the penalties of sin that belong to this
life?
Objection 1: It seems that Baptism should take away the penalties of
sin that belong to this life. For as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15), the
gift of Christ is farther-reaching than the sin of Adam. But through
Adam's sin, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12), "death entered into this
world," and, consequently, all the other penalties of the present life.
Much more, therefore, should man be freed from the penalties of the
present life, by the gift of Christ which is received in Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, Baptism takes away the guilt of both original and
actual sin. Now it takes away the guilt of actual sin in such a way as
to free man from all debt of punishment resulting therefrom. Therefore
it also frees man from the penalties of the present life, which are a
punishment of original sin.
Objection 3: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed.
But the cause of these penalties is original sin, which is taken away
by Baptism. Therefore such like penalties should not remain.
On the contrary, on Rom. 6:6, "that the body of sin may be destroyed,"
a gloss says: "The effect of Baptism is that the old man is crucified,
and the body of sin destroyed, not as though the living flesh of man
were delivered by the destruction of that concupiscence with which it
has been bespattered from its birth; but that it may not hurt him, when
dead, though it was in him when he was born." Therefore for the same
reason neither are the other penalties taken away by Baptism.
I answer that, Baptism has the power to take away the penalties of the
present life yet it does not take them away during the present life,
but by its power they will be taken away from the just in the
resurrection when "this mortal hath put on immortality" (1 Cor. 15:54).
And this is reasonable. First, because, by Baptism, man is incorporated
in Christ, and is made His member, as stated above [4461](A[3]; Q[68],
A[5]). Consequently it is fitting that what takes place in the Head
should take place also in the member incorporated. Now, from the very
beginning of His conception Christ was "full of grace and truth," yet
He had a passible body, which through His Passion and death was raised
up to a life of glory. Wherefore a Christian receives grace in Baptism,
as to his soul; but he retains a passible body, so that he may suffer
for Christ therein: yet at length he will be raised up to a life of
impassibility. Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 8:11): "He that raised up
Jesus Christ from the dead, shall quicken also our [Vulg.: 'your']
mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in us [Vulg.:
'you']": and further on in the same chapter (Rom. 8:17): "Heirs indeed
of God, and joint heirs with Christ: yet so, if we suffer with Him,
that we may be also glorified with Him."
Secondly, this is suitable for our spiritual training: namely, in order
that, by fighting against concupiscence and other defects to which he
is subject, man may receive the crown of victory. Wherefore on Rom.
6:6, "that the body of sin may be destroyed," a gloss says: "If a man
after Baptism live in the flesh, he has concupiscence to fight against,
and to conquer by God's help." In sign of which it is written (Judges
3:1,2): "These are the nations which the Lord left, that by them He
might instruct Israel . . . that afterwards their children might learn
to fight with their enemies, and to be trained up to war."
Thirdly, this was suitable, lest men might seek to be baptized for the
sake of impassibility in the present life, and not for the sake of the
glory of life eternal. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:19): "If
in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most
miserable."
Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss says on Rom. 6:6, "that we may serve
sin no longer---Like a man who, having captured a redoubtable enemy,
slays him not forthwith, but suffers him to live for a little time in
shame and suffering; so did Christ first of all fetter our punishment,
but at a future time He will destroy it."
Reply to Objection 2: As the gloss says on the same passage (cf. ad 1),
"the punishment of sin is twofold, the punishment of hell, and temporal
punishment. Christ entirely abolished the punishment of hell, so that
those who are baptized and truly repent, should not be subject to it.
He did not, however, altogether abolish temporal punishment yet awhile;
for hunger, thirst, and death still remain. But He overthrew its
kingdom and power" in the sense that man should no longer be in fear of
them: "and at length He will altogether exterminate it at the last
day."
Reply to Objection 3: As we stated in the [4462]FS, Q[81], A[1];
[4463]FS, Q[82], A[1], ad 2 original sin spread in this way, that at
first the person infected the nature, and afterwards the nature
infected the person. Whereas Christ in reverse order at first repairs
what regards the person, and afterwards will simultaneously repair what
pertains to the nature in all men. Consequently by Baptism He takes
away from man forthwith the guilt of original sin and the punishment of
being deprived of the heavenly vision. But the penalties of the present
life, such as death, hunger, thirst, and the like, pertain to the
nature, from the principles of which they arise, inasmuch as it is
deprived of original justice. Therefore these defects will not be taken
away until the ultimate restoration of nature through the glorious
resurrection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether grace and virtues are bestowed on man by Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that grace and virtues are not bestowed on man by
Baptism. Because, as stated above ([4464]Q[62], A[1], ad 1), the
sacraments of the New Law "effect what they signify." But the baptismal
cleansing signifies the cleansing of the soul from guilt, and not the
fashioning of the soul with grace and virtues. Therefore it seems that
grace and virtues are not bestowed on man by Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, one does not need to receive what one has already
acquired. But some approach Baptism who have already grace and virtues:
thus we read (Acts 10:1,2): "There was a certain man in Cesarea, named
Cornelius, a centurion of that which is called the Italian band, a
religious man and fearing God"; who, nevertheless, was afterwards
baptized by Peter. Therefore grace and virtues are not bestowed by
Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, virtue is a habit: which is defined as a "quality
not easily removed, by which one may act easily and pleasurably." But
after Baptism man retains proneness to evil which removes virtue; and
experiences difficulty in doing good, in which the act of virtue
consists. Therefore man does not acquire grace and virtue in Baptism.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5,6): "He saved us by the
laver of regeneration," i.e. by Baptism, "and renovation of the Holy
Ghost, Whom He hath poured forth upon us abundantly," i.e. "unto the
remission of sins and the fulness of virtues," as a gloss expounds.
Therefore the grace of the Holy Ghost and the fulness of virtues are
given in Baptism.
I answer that, As Augustine says in the book on Infant Baptism (De
Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i) "the effect of Baptism is that the baptized
are incorporated in Christ as His members." Now the fulness of grace
and virtues flows from Christ the Head to all His members, according to
Jn. 1:16: "Of His fulness we all have received." Hence it is clear that
man receives grace and virtues in Baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: As the baptismal water by its cleansing signifies
the washing away of guilt, and by its refreshment the remission of
punishment, so by its natural clearness it signifies the splendor of
grace and virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (A[1], ad 2;[4465] Q[68], A[2])
man receives the forgiveness of sins before Baptism in so far as he has
Baptism of desire, explicitly or implicitly; and yet when he actually
receives Baptism, he receives a fuller remission, as to the remission
of the entire punishment. So also before Baptism Cornelius and others
like him receive grace and virtues through their faith in Christ and
their desire for Baptism, implicit or explicit: but afterwards when
baptized, they receive a yet greater fulness of grace and virtues.
Hence in Ps. 22:2, "He hath brought me up on the water of refreshment,"
a gloss says: "He has brought us up by an increase of virtue and good
deeds in Baptism."
Reply to Objection 3: Difficulty in doing good and proneness to evil
are in the baptized, not through their lacking the habits of the
virtues, but through concupiscence which is not taken away in Baptism.
But just as concupiscence is diminished by Baptism, so as not to
enslave us, so also are both the aforesaid defects diminished, so that
man be not overcome by them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether certain acts of the virtues are fittingly set down as effects of
Baptism, to wit---incorporation in Christ, enlightenment, and fruitfulness?
Objection 1: It seems that certain acts of the virtues are unfittingly
set down as effects of Baptism, to wit---"incorporation in Christ,
enlightenment, and fruitfulness." For Baptism is not given to an adult,
except he believe; according to Mk. 16:16: "He that believeth and is
baptized, shall be saved." But it is by faith that man is incorporated
in Christ, according to Eph. 3:17: "That Christ may dwell by faith in
your hearts." Therefore no one is baptized except he be already
incorporated in Christ. Therefore incorporation with Christ is not the
effect of Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, enlightenment is caused by teaching, according to
Eph. 3:8,9: "To me the least of all the saints, is given this grace . .
. to enlighten all men," etc. But teaching by the catechism precedes
Baptism. Therefore it is not the effect of Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, fruitfulness pertains to active generation. But a
man is regenerated spiritually by Baptism. Therefore fruitfulness is
not an effect of Baptism.
On the contrary, Augustine says in the book on Infant Baptism (De Pecc.
Merit. et Remiss. i) that "the effect of Baptism is that the baptized
are incorporated in Christ." And Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii) ascribes
enlightenment to Baptism. And on Ps. 22:2, "He hath brought me up on
the water of refreshment," a gloss says that "the sinner's soul,
sterilized by drought, is made fruitful by Baptism."
I answer that, By Baptism man is born again unto the spiritual life,
which is proper to the faithful of Christ, as the Apostle says (Gal.
2:20): "And that I live now in the flesh; I live in the faith of the
Son of God." Now life is only in those members that are united to the
head, from which they derive sense and movement. And therefore it
follows of necessity that by Baptism man is incorporated in Christ, as
one of His members. Again, just as the members derive sense and
movement from the material head, so from their spiritual Head, i.e.
Christ, do His members derive spiritual sense consisting in the
knowledge Of truth, and spiritual movement which results from the
instinct of grace. Hence it is written (Jn. 1:14, 16): "We have seen
Him . . . full of grace and truth; and of His fulness we all have
received." And it follows from this that the baptized are enlightened
by Christ as to the knowledge of truth, and made fruitful by Him with
the fruitfulness of good works by the infusion of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Adults who already believe in Christ are
incorporated in Him mentally. But afterwards, when they are baptized,
they are incorporated in Him, corporally, as it were, i.e. by the
visible sacrament; without the desire of which they could not have been
incorporated in Him even mentally.
Reply to Objection 2: The teacher enlightens outwardly and
ministerially by catechizing: but God enlightens the baptized inwardly,
by preparing their hearts for the reception of the doctrines of truth,
according to Jn. 6:45: "It is written in the prophets . . . They shall
all be taught of God."
Reply to Objection 3: The fruitfulness which i ascribed as an effect of
Baptism is that by which man brings forth good works; not that by which
he begets others in Christ, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:15): "In
Christ Jesus by the Gospel I have begotten you."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether children receive grace and virtue in Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that children do not receive grace and virtues in
Baptism. For grace and virtues are not possessed without faith and
charity. But faith, as Augustine says (Ep. xcviii), "depends on the
will of the believer": and in like manner charity depends on the will
of the lover. Now children have not the use of the will, and
consequently they have neither faith nor charity. Therefore children do
not receive grace and virtues in Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, on Jn. 14:12, "Greater than these shall he do,"
Augustine says that in order for the ungodly to be made righteous
"Christ worketh in him, but not without him." But a child, through not
having the use of free-will, does not co-operate with Christ unto its
justification: indeed at times it does its best to resist. Therefore it
is not justified by grace and virtues.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Rom. 4:5): "To him that worketh
not, yet believing in Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is
reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God." But a
child believeth not "in Him that justifieth the ungodly." Therefore a
child receives neither sanctifying grace nor virtues.
Objection 4: Further, what is done with a carnal intention does not
seem to have a spiritual effect. But sometimes children are taken to
Baptism with a carnal intention, to wit, that their bodies may be
healed. Therefore they do not receive the spiritual effect consisting
in grace and virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion lii): "When little
children are baptized, they die to that sin which they contracted in
birth: so that to them also may be applied the words: 'We are buried
together with Him by Baptism unto death'": (and he continues thus)
"'that as Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so
we also may walk in newness of life.'" Now newness of life is through
grace and virtues. Therefore children receive grace and virtues in
Baptism.
I answer that, Some of the early writers held that children do not
receive grace and virtues in Baptism, but that they receive the imprint
of the character of Christ, by the power of which they receive grace
and virtue when they arrive at the perfect age. But this is evidently
false, for two reasons. First, because children, like adults, are made
members of Christ in Baptism; hence they must, of necessity, receive an
influx of grace and virtues from the Head. Secondly, because, if this
were true, children that die after Baptism, would not come to eternal
life; since according to Rom. 6:23, "the grace of God is life
everlasting." And consequently Baptism would not have profited them
unto salvation.
Now the source of their error was that they did not recognize the
distinction between habit and act. And so, seeing children to be
incapable of acts of virtue, they thought that they had no virtues at
all after Baptism. But this inability of children to act is not due to
the absence of habits, but to an impediment on the part of the body:
thus also when a man is asleep, though he may have the habits of
virtue, yet is he hindered from virtuous acts through being asleep.
Reply to Objection 1: Faith and charity depend on man's will, yet so
that the habits of these and other virtues require the power of the
will which is in children; whereas acts of virtue require an act of the
will, which is not in children. In this sense Augustine says in the
book on Infant Baptism (Ep. xcviii): "The little child is made a
believer, not as yet by that faith which depends on the will of the
believer, but by the sacrament of faith itself," which causes the habit
of faith.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in his book on Charity (Ep.
Joan. ad Parth. iii), "no man is born of water and the Holy Ghost
unwillingly which is to be understood not of little children but of
adults." In like manner we are to understand as applying to adults,
that man "without himself is not justified by Christ." Moreover, if
little children who are about to be baptized resist as much as they
can, "this is not imputed to them, since so little do they know what
they do, that they seem not to do it at all": as Augustine says in a
book on the Presence of God, addressed to Dardanus (Ep. clxxxvii).
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Serm. clxxvi): "Mother Church
lends other feet to the little children that they may come; another
heart that they may believe; another tongue that they may confess." So
that children believe, not by their own act, but by the faith of the
Church, which is applied to them: by the power of which faith, grace
and virtues are bestowed on them.
Reply to Objection 4: The carnal intention of those who take children
to be baptized does not hurt the latter, as neither does one's sin hurt
another, unless he consent. Hence Augustine says in his letter to
Boniface (Ep. xcviii): "Be not disturbed because some bring children to
be baptized, not in the hope that they may be born again to eternal
life by the spiritual grace, but because they think it to be a remedy
whereby they may preserve or recover health. For they are not deprived
of regeneration, through not being brought for this intention."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the effect of Baptism is to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom?
Objection 1: It seems that it is not the effect of Baptism, to open the
gates of the heavenly kingdom. For what is already opened needs no
opening. But the gates of the heavenly kingdom were opened by Christ's
Passion: hence it is written (Apoc. 4:1): "After these things I looked
and behold (a great) door was opened in heaven." Therefore it is not
the effect of Baptism, to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom.
Objection 2: Further, Baptism has had its effects ever since it was
instituted. But some were baptized with Christ's Baptism, before His
Passion, according toJn. 3:22, 26: and if they had died then, the gates
of the heavenly kingdom would not have been opened to them, since none
entered therein before Christ, according to Mic. 2:13: "He went up
[Vulg.: 'shall go up'] that shall open the way before them." Therefore
it is not the effect of Baptism, to open the gates of the heavenly
kingdom.
Objection 3: Further, the baptized are still subject to death and the
other penalties of the present life, as stated above [4466](A[3]). But
entrance to the heavenly kingdom is opened to none that are subject to
punishment: as is clear in regard to those who are in purgatory.
Therefore it is not the effect of Baptism, to open the gates of the
heavenly kingdom.
On the contrary, on Lk. 3:21, "Heaven was opened," the gloss of Bede
says: "We see here the power of Baptism; from which when a man comes
forth, the gates of the heavenly kingdom are opened unto him."
I answer that, To open the gates of the heavenly kingdom is to remove
the obstacle that prevents one from entering therein. Now this obstacle
is guilt and the debt of punishment. But it has been shown above
([4467]AA[1] ,2) that all guilt and also all debt of punishment are
taken away by Baptism. It follows, therefore, that the effect of
Baptism is to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom.
Reply to Objection 1: Baptism opens the gates of the heavenly kingdom
to the baptized in so far as it incorporates them in the Passion of
Christ, by applying its power to man.
Reply to Objection 2: When Christ's Passion was not as yet consummated
actually but only in the faith of believers, Baptism proportionately
caused the gates to be opened, not in fact but in hope. For the
baptized who died then looked forward, with a sure hope, to enter the
heavenly kingdom.
Reply to Objection 3: The baptized are subject to death and the
penalties of the present life, not by reason of a personal debt of
punishment but by reason of the state of their nature. And therefore
this is no bar to their entrance to the heavenly kingdom, when death
severs the soul from the body; since they have paid, as it were, the
debt of nature.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Baptism has an equal effect in all?
Objection 1: It seems that Baptism has not an equal effect in all. For
the effect of Baptism is to remove guilt. But in some it takes away
more sins than in others; for in children it takes away only original
sins, whereas in adults it takes away actual sins, in some many, in
others few. Therefore Baptism has not an equal effect in all.
Objection 2: Further, grace and virtues are bestowed on man by Baptism.
But some, after Baptism, seem to have more grace and more perfect
virtue than others who have been baptized. Therefore Baptism has not an
equal effect in all.
Objection 3: Further, nature is perfected by grace, as matter by form.
But a form is received into matter according to its capacity.
Therefore, since some of the baptized, even children, have greater
capacity for natural gifts than others have, it seems that some receive
greater grace than others.
Objection 4: Further, in Baptism some receive not only spiritual, but
also bodily health; thus Constantine was cleansed in Baptism from
leprosy. But all the infirm do not receive bodily health in Baptism.
Therefore it has not an equal effect in all.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:5): "One Faith, one Baptism."
But a uniform cause has a uniform effect. Therefore Baptism has an
equal effect in all.
I answer that, The effect of Baptism is twofold, the essential effect,
and the accidental. The essential effect of Baptism is that for which
Baptism was instituted, namely, the begetting of men unto spiritual
life. Therefore, since all children are equally disposed to Baptism,
because they are baptized not in their own faith, but in that of the
Church, they all receive an equal effect in Baptism. Whereas adults,
who approach Baptism in their own faith, are not equally disposed to
Baptism; for some approach thereto with greater, some with less,
devotion. And therefore some receive a greater, some a smaller share of
the grace of newness; just as from the same fire, he receives more heat
who approaches nearest to it, although the fire, as far as it is
concerned, sends forth its heat equally to all.
But the accidental effect of Baptism, is that to which Baptism is not
ordained, but which the Divine power produces miraculously in Baptism:
thus on Rom. 6:6, "that we may serve sin no longer," a gloss says:
"this is not bestowed in Baptism, save by an ineffable miracle of the
Creator, so that the law of sin, which is in our members, be absolutely
destroyed." And such like effects are not equally received by all the
baptized, even if they approach with equal devotion: but they are
bestowed according to the ordering of Divine providence.
Reply to Objection 1: The least baptismal grace suffices to blot out
all sins. Wherefore that in some more sins are loosed than in others is
not due to the greater efficacy of Baptism, but to the condition of the
recipient: for in each one it looses whatever it finds.
Reply to Objection 2: That greater or lesser grace appears in the
baptized, may occur in two ways. First, because one receives greater
grace in Baptism than another, on account of his greater devotion, as
stated above. Secondly, because, though they receive equal grace, they
do not make an equal use of it, but one applies himself more to advance
therein, while another by his negligence baffles grace.
Reply to Objection 3: The various degrees of capacity in men arise, not
from a variety in the mind which is renewed by Baptism (since all men,
being of one species, are of one form), but from the diversity of
bodies. But it is otherwise with the angels, who differ in species. And
therefore gratuitous gifts are bestowed on the angels according to
their diverse capacity for natural gifts, but not on men.
Reply to Objection 4: Bodily health is not the essential effect of
Baptism, but a miraculous work of Divine providence.
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Whether insincerity hinders the effect of Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that insincerity does not hinder the effect of
Baptism. For the Apostle says (Gal. 3:27): "As many of you as have been
baptized in Christ Jesus, have put on Christ." But all that receive the
Baptism of Christ, are baptized in Christ. Therefore they all put on
Christ: and this is to receive the effect of Baptism. Consequently
insincerity does not hinder the effect of Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine power which can change man's will to
that which is better, works in Baptism. But the effect of the efficient
cause cannot be hindered by that which can be removed by that cause.
Therefore insincerity cannot hinder the effect of Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, the effect of Baptism is grace, to which sin is
in opposition. But many other sins are more grievous than insincerity,
which are not said to hinder the effect of Baptism. Therefore neither
does insincerity.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:5): "The Holy Spirit of
discipline will flee from the deceitful." But the effect of Baptism is
from the Holy Ghost. Therefore insincerity hinders the effect of
Baptism.
I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "God does not
compel man to be righteous." Consequently in order that a man be
justified by Baptism, his will must needs embrace both Baptism and the
baptismal effect. Now, a man is said to be insincere by reason of his
will being in contradiction with either Baptism or its effect. For,
according to Augustine (De Bapt. cont. Donat. vii), a man is said to be
insincere, in four ways: first, because he does not believe, whereas
Baptism is the sacrament of Faith; secondly, through scorning the
sacrament itself; thirdly, through observing a rite which differs from
that prescribed by the Church in conferring the sacrament; fourthly,
through approaching the sacrament without devotion. Wherefore it is
manifest that insincerity hinders the effect of Baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: "To be baptized in Christ," may be taken in two
ways. First, "in Christ," i.e. "in conformity with Christ." And thus
whoever is baptized in Christ so as to be conformed to Him by Faith and
Charity, puts on Christ by grace. Secondly, a man is said to be
baptized in Christ, in so far as he receives Christ's sacrament. And
thus all put on Christ, through being configured to Him by the
character, but not through being conformed to Him by grace.
Reply to Objection 2: When God changes man's will from evil to good,
man does not approach with insincerity. But God does not always do
this. Nor is this the purpose of the sacrament, that an insincere man
be made sincere; but that he who comes in sincerity, be justified.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to be insincere who makes a show of
willing what he wills not. Now whoever approaches Baptism, by that very
fact makes a show of having right faith in Christ, of veneration for
this sacrament, and of wishing to conform to the Church, and to
renounce sin. Consequently, to whatever sin a man wishes to cleave, if
he approach Baptism, he approaches insincerely, which is the same as to
approach without devotion. But this must be understood of mortal sin,
which is in opposition to grace: but not of venial sin. Consequently,
here insincerity includes, in a way, every sin.
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Whether Baptism produces its effect when the insincerity ceases?
Objection 1: It seems that Baptism does not produce its effect, when
the insincerity ceases. For a dead work, which is void of charity, can
never come to life. But he who approaches Baptism insincerely, receives
the sacrament without charity. Therefore it can never come to life so
as to bestow grace.
Objection 2: Further, insincerity seems to be stronger than Baptism,
because it hinders its effect. But the stronger is not removed by the
weaker. Therefore the sin of insincerity cannot be taken away by
Baptism which has been hindered by insincerity. And thus Baptism will
not receive its full effect, which is the remission of all sins.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that a man approach Baptism
insincerely, and afterwards commit a number of sins. And yet these sins
will not be taken away by Baptism; because Baptism washes away past,
not future, sins. Such a Baptism, therefore, will never have its
effect, which is the remission of all sins.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bapt. cont. Donat. i): "Then does
Baptism begin to have its salutary effect, when truthful confession
takes the place of that insincerity which hindered sins from being
washed away, so long as the heart persisted in malice and sacrilege."
I answer that, As stated above ([4468]Q[66], A[9]), Baptism is a
spiritual regeneration. Now when a thing is generated, it receives
together with the form, the form's effect, unless there be an obstacle;
and when this is removed, the form of the thing generated produces its
effect: thus at the same time as a weighty body is generated, it has a
downward movement, unless something prevent this; and when the obstacle
is removed, it begins forthwith to move downwards. In like manner when
a man is baptized, he receives the character, which is like a form; and
he receives in consequence its proper effect, which is grace whereby
all his sins are remitted. But this effect is sometimes hindered by
insincerity. Wherefore, when this obstacle is removed by Penance,
Baptism forthwith produces its effect.
Reply to Objection 1: The sacrament of Baptism is the work of God, not
of man. Consequently, it is not dead in the man, who being insincere,
is baptized without charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Insincerity is not removed by Baptism but by
Penance: and when it is removed, Baptism takes away all guilt, and all
debt of punishment due to sins, whether committed before Baptism, or
even co-existent with Baptism. Hence Augustine says (De Bapt. cont.
Donat. i): "Yesterday is blotted out, and whatever remains over and
above, even the very last hour and moment preceding Baptism, the very
moment of Baptism. But from that moment forward he is bound by his
obligations." And so both Baptism and Penance concur in producing the
effect of Baptism, but Baptism as the direct efficient cause, Penance
as the indirect cause, i.e. as removing the obstacle.
Reply to Objection 3: The effect of Baptism is to take away not future,
but present and past sins. And consequently, when the insincerity
passes away, subsequent sins are indeed remitted, but by Penance, not
by Baptism. Wherefore they are not remitted, like the sins which
preceded Baptism, as to the whole debt of punishment.
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OF CIRCUMCISION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider things that are preparatory to Baptism: and (1)
that which preceded Baptism, viz. Circumcision, (2) those which
accompany Baptism, viz. Catechism and Exorcism.
Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether circumcision was a preparation for, and a figure of,
Baptism?
(2) Its institution;
(3) Its rite;
(4) Its effect.
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Whether circumcision was a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that circumcision was not a preparation for, and
a figure of Baptism. For every figure has some likeness to that which
it foreshadows. But circumcision has no likeness to Baptism. Therefore
it seems that it was not a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle, speaking of the Fathers of old, says
(1 Cor. 10:2), that "all were baptized in the cloud, and in the sea":
but not that they were baptized in circumcision. Therefore the
protecting pillar of a cloud, and the crossing of the Red Sea, rather
than circumcision, were a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, it was stated above ([4469]Q[38], AA[1],3) that
the baptism of John was a preparation for Christ's. Consequently, if
circumcision was a preparation for, and a figure of Christ's Baptism,
it seems that John's baptism was superfluous: which is unseemly.
Therefore circumcision was not a preparation for, and a figure of
Baptism.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:11,12): "You are circumcised
with circumcision, not made by hand in despoiling the body of the
flesh, but in the circumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism."
I answer that, Baptism is called the Sacrament of Faith; in so far, to
wit, as in Baptism man makes a profession of faith, and by Baptism is
aggregated to the congregation of the faithful. Now our faith is the
same as that of the Fathers of old, according to the Apostle (2 Cor.
4:13): "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we . . . believe." But
circumcision was a protestation of faith; wherefore by circumcision
also men of old were aggregated to the body of the faithful.
Consequently, it is manifest that circumcision was a preparation for
Baptism and a figure thereof, forasmuch as "all things happened" to the
Fathers of old "in figure" (1 Cor. 10:11); just as their faith regarded
things to come.
Reply to Objection 1: Circumcision was like Baptism as to the spiritual
effect of the latter. For just as circumcision removed a carnal
pellicule, so Baptism despoils man of carnal behavior.
Reply to Objection 2: The protecting pillar of cloud and the crossing
of the Red Sea were indeed figures of our Baptism, whereby we are born
again of water, signified by the Red Sea; and of the Holy Ghost,
signified by the pillar of cloud: yet man did not make, by means of
these, a profession of faith, as by circumcision; so that these two
things were figures but not sacraments. But circumcision was a
sacrament, and a preparation for Baptism; although less clearly
figurative of Baptism, as to externals, than the aforesaid. And for
this reason the Apostle mentions them rather than circumcision.
Reply to Objection 3: John's baptism was a preparation for Christ's as
to the act done: but circumcision, as to the profession of faith, which
is required in Baptism, as stated above.
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Whether circumcision was instituted in a fitting manner?
Objection 1: It seems that circumcision was instituted in an unfitting
manner. For as stated above [4470](A[1]) a profession of faith was made
in circumcision. But none could ever be delivered from the first man's
sin, except by faith in Christ's Passion, according to Rom. 3:25: "Whom
God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood."
Therefore circumcision should have been instituted forthwith after the
first man's sin, and not at the time of Abraham.
Objection 2: Further, in circumcision man made profession of keeping
the Old Law, just as in Baptism he makes profession of keeping the New
Law; wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 5:3): "I testify . . . to every
man circumcising himself, that he is a debtor to do the whole Law." But
the observance of the Law was not promulgated at the time of Abraham,
but rather at the time of Moses. Therefore it was unfitting for
circumcision to be instituted at the time of Abraham
Objection 3: Further, circumcision was a figure of, and a preparation
for, Baptism. But Baptism is offered to all nations, according to Mat.
28:19: "Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them." Therefore
circumcision should have been instituted as binding, not the Jews only,
but also all nations.
Objection 4: Further, carnal circumcision should correspond to
spiritual circumcision, as the shadow to the reality. But spiritual
circumcision which is of Christ, regards indifferently both sexes,
since "in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female," as is written
Col. 3 [*Gal. 3:28]. Therefore the institution of circumcision which
concerns only males, was unfitting.
On the contrary, We read (Gn. 17) that circumcision was instituted by
God, Whose "works are perfect" (Dt. 32:4).
I answer that, As stated above [4471](A[1]) circumcision was a
preparation for Baptism, inasmuch as it was a profession of faith in
Christ, which we also profess in Baptism. Now among the Fathers of old,
Abraham was the first to receive the promise of the future birth of
Christ, when it was said to him: "In thy seed shall all the nations of
the earth be blessed" (Gn. 22:18). Moreover, he was the first to cut
himself off from the society of unbelievers, in accordance with the
commandment of the Lord, Who said to him (Gn. 13:1): "Go forth out of
thy country and from thy kindred." Therefore circumcision was fittingly
instituted in the person of Abraham.
Reply to Objection 1: Immediately after the sin of our first parent, on
account of the knowledge possessed by Adam, who was fully instructed
about Divine things, both faith and natural reason flourished in man to
such an extent, that there was no need for any signs of faith and
salvation to be prescribed to him, but each one was wont to make
protestation of his faith, by outward signs of his profession,
according as he thought best. But about the time of Abraham faith was
on the wane, many being given over to idolatry. Moreover, by the growth
of carnal concupiscence natural reason was clouded even in regard to
sins against nature. And therefore it was fitting that then, and not
before, circumcision should be instituted, as a profession of faith and
a remedy against carnal concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 2: The observance of the Law was not to be
promulgated until the people were already gathered together: because
the law is ordained to the public good, as we have stated in the
[4472]FS, Q[90], A[2]. Now it behooved the body of the faithful to be
gathered together by a sensible sign, which is necessary in order that
men be united together in any religion, as Augustine says (Contra
Faust. xix). Consequently, it was necessary for circumcision to be
instituted before the giving of the Law. Those Fathers, however, who
lived before the Law, taught their families concerning Divine things by
way of paternal admonition. Hence the Lord said of Abraham (Gn. 18:19):
"I know that he will command his children, and his household after him
to keep the way of the Lord."
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism contains in itself the perfection of
salvation, to which God calls all men, according to 1 Tim. 2:4: "Who
will have all men to be saved." Wherefore Baptism is offered to all
nations. On the other hand circumcision did not contain the perfection
of salvation, but signified it as to be achieved by Christ, Who was to
be born of the Jewish nation. For this reason circumcision was given to
that nation alone.
Reply to Objection 4: The institution of circumcision is as a sign of
Abraham's faith, who believed that himself would be the father of
Christ Who was promised to him: and for this reason it was suitable
that it should be for males only. Again, original sin, against which
circumcision was specially ordained, is contracted from the father, not
from the mother, as was stated in the [4473]FS, Q[81], A[5]. But
Baptism contains the power of Christ, Who is the universal cause of
salvation for all, and is "The Remission of all sins" (Post-Communion,
Tuesday in Whitweek).
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Whether the rite of circumcision was fitting?
Objection 1: It seems that the rite of circumcision was unfitting. For
circumcision, as stated above ([4474]AA[1],2), was a profession of
faith. But faith is in the apprehensive power, whose operations appear
mostly in the head. Therefore the sign of circumcision should have been
conferred on the head rather than on the virile member.
Objection 2: Further, in the sacraments we make use of such things as
are in more frequent use; for instance, water, which is used for
washing, and bread, which we use for nourishment. But, in cutting, we
use an iron knife more commonly than a stone knife. Therefore
circumcision should not have been performed with a stone knife.
Objection 3: Further, just as Baptism was instituted as a remedy
against original sin, so also was circumcision, as Bede says (Hom. in
Circum.). But now Baptism is not put off until the eighth day, lest
children should be in danger of loss on account of original sin, if
they should die before being baptized. On the other hand, sometimes
Baptism is put off until after the eighth day. Therefore the eighth day
should not have been fixed for circumcision, but this day should have
been anticipated, just as sometimes it was deferred.
On the contrary, The aforesaid rite of circumcision is fixed by a gloss
on Rom. 4:11: "And he received the sign of circumcision."
I answer that, As stated above [4475](A[2]), circumcision was
established, as a sign of faith, by God "of" Whose "wisdom there is no
number" (Ps. 146:5). Now to determine suitable signs is a work of
wisdom. Consequently, it must be allowed that the rite of circumcision
was fitting.
Reply to Objection 1: It was fitting for circumcision to be performed
on the virile member. First, because it was a sign of that faith
whereby Abraham believed that Christ would be born of his seed.
Secondly, because it was to be a remedy against original sin, which is
contracted through the act of generation. Thirdly, because it was
ordained as a remedy for carnal concupiscence, which thrives
principally in those members, by reason of the abundance of venereal
pleasure.
Reply to Objection 2: A stone knife was not essential to circumcision.
Wherefore we do not find that an instrument of this description is
required by any divine precept; nor did the Jews, as a rule, make use
of such a knife for circumcision; indeed, neither do they now.
Nevertheless, certain well-known circumcisions are related as having
been performed with a stone knife, thus (Ex. 4:25) we read that
"Sephora took a very sharp stone and circumcised the foreskin of her
son," and (Joshua 5:2): "Make thee knives of stone, and circumcise the
second time the children of Israel." Which signified that spiritual
circumcision would be done by Christ, of Whom it is written (1 Cor.
10:4): "Now the rock was Christ."
Reply to Objection 3: The eighth day was fixed for circumcision: first,
because of the mystery; since, Christ, by taking away from the elect,
not only guilt but also all penalties, will perfect the spiritual
circumcision, in the eighth age (which is the age of those that rise
again), as it were, on the eighth day. Secondly, on account of the
tenderness of the infant before the eighth day. Wherefore even in
regard to other animals it is prescribed (Lev. 22:27): "When a bullock,
or a sheep, or a goat, is brought forth, they shall be seven days under
the udder of their dam: but the eighth day and thenceforth, they may be
offered to the Lord."
Moreover, the eighth day was necessary for the fulfilment of the
precept; so that, to wit, those who delayed beyond the eighth day,
sinned, even though it were the sabbath, according to Jn. 7:23: "(If) a
man receives circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the Law of Moses may
not be broken." But it was not necessary for the validity of the
sacrament: because if anyone delayed beyond the eighth day, they could
be circumcised afterwards.
Some also say that in imminent danger of death, it was allowable to
anticipate the eighth day. But this cannot be proved either from the
authority of Scripture or from the custom of the Jews. Wherefore it is
better to say with Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. i) that the eighth
day was never anticipated for any motive, however urgent. Hence on
Prov. 4:3: "I was . . . an only son in the sight of my mother," a gloss
says, that Bersabee's other baby boy did not count because through
dying before the eighth day it received no name; and consequently
neither was it circumcised.
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Whether circumcision bestowed sanctifying grace?
Objection 1: It seems that circumcision did not bestow sanctifying
grace. For the Apostle says (Gal. 2:21): "If justice be by the Law,
then Christ died in vain," i.e. without cause. But circumcision was an
obligation imposed by the Law, according to Gal. 5:3: "I testify . . .
to every man circumcising himself, that ne is a debtor to do the whole
law." Therefore, if justice be by circumcision, "Christ died in vain,"
i.e. without cause. But this cannot be allowed. Therefore circumcision
did not confer grace whereby the sinner is made righteous.
Objection 2: Further, before the institution of circumcision faith
alone sufficed for justification; hence Gregory says (Moral. iv):
"Faith alone did of old in behalf of infants that for which the water
of Baptism avails with us." But faith has lost nothing of its strength
through the commandment of circumcision. Therefore faith alone
justified little ones, and not circumcision.
Objection 3: Further, we read (Joshua 5:5,6) that "the people that were
born in the desert, during the forty years . . . were uncircumcised."
If, therefore, original sin was taken away by circumcision, it seems
that all who died in the desert, both little children and adults, were
lost. And the same argument avails in regard to those who died before
the eighth day, which was that of circumcision, which day could nol be
anticipated, as stated above (A[3], ad 3).
Objection 4: Further, nothing but sin closes the entrance to the
heavenly kingdom. But before the Passion the entrance to the heavenly
kingdom was closed to the circumcised. Therefore men were not justified
from sin by circumcision.
Objection 5: Further, original sin is not remitted without actual sin
being remitted also: because "it is wicked to hope for half forgiveness
from God," as Augustine says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. ix). But we read
nowhere of circumcision as remitting actual sin. Therefore neither did
it remit original sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says, writing to Valerius in answer to
Julian (De Nup. et Concup. ii): "From the time that circumcision was
instituted among God's people, as 'a seal of the justice of the faith,'
it availed little children unto sanctification by cleansing them from
the original and bygone sin; just as Baptism also from the time of its
institution began to avail unto the renewal of man."
I answer that, All are agreed in saying that original sin was remitted
in circumcision. But some said that no grace was conferred, and that
the only effect was to remit sin. The Master holds this opinion (Sent.
iv, D, 1), and in a gloss on Rom. 4:11. But this is impossible, since
guilt is not remitted except by grace, according to Rom. 3:2: "Being
justified freely by His grace," etc.
Wherefore others said that grace was bestowed by circumcision, as to
that effect which is the remission of guilt, but not as to its positive
effects; lest they should be compelled to say that the grace bestowed
in circumcision sufficed for the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law,
and that, consequently, the coming of Christ was unnecessary. But
neither can this opinion stand. First, because by circumcision
children. received the power of obtaining glory at the allotted time,
which is the last positive effect of grace. Secondly, because, in the
order of the formal cause, positive effects naturally precede those
that denote privation, although it is the reverse in the order of the
material cause: since a form does not remove a privation save by
informing the subject.
Consequently, others said that grace was conferred in circumcision,
also as a particular positive effect consisting in being made worthy of
eternal life; but not as to all its effects, for it did not suffice for
the repression of the concupiscence of the fomes, nor again for the
fulfilment of the precepts of the Law. And this was my opinion at one
time (Sent. iv, D, 1;[4476] Q[2], A[4]). But if one consider the matter
carefully, it is clear that this is not true. Because the least grace
can resist any degree of concupiscence, and avoid every mortal sin,
that is committed in transgressing the precepts of the Law; for the
smallest degree of charity loves God more than cupidity loves
"thousands of gold and silver" (Ps. 118:72).
We must say, therefore, that grace was bestowed in circumcision as to
all the effects of grace, but not as in Baptism. Because in Baptism
grace is bestowed by the very power of Baptism itself, which power
Baptism has as the instrument of Christ's Passion already consummated.
Whereas circumcision bestowed grace, inasmuch as it was a sign of faith
in Christ's future Passion: so that the man who was circumcised,
professed to embrace that faith; whether, being an adult, he made
profession for himself, or, being a child, someone else made profession
for him. Hence, too, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:11), that Abraham
"received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the
faith": because, to wit, justice was of faith signified: not of
circumcision signifying. And since Baptism operates instrumentally by
the power of Christ's Passion, whereas circumcision does not, therefore
Baptism imprints a character that incorporates man in Christ, and
bestows grace more copiously than does circumcision; since greater is
the effect of a thing already present, than of the hope thereof.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove if justice were of
circumcision otherwise than through faith in Christ's Passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as before the institution of circumcision,
faith in Christ to come justified both children and adults, so, too,
after its institution. But before, there was no need of a sign
expressive of this faith; because as yet believers had not begun to be
united together apart from unbelievers for the worship of one God. It
is probable, however, that parents who were believers offered up some
prayers to God for their children, especially if these were in any
danger. Or bestowed some blessing on them, as a "seal of faith"; just
as the adults offered prayers and sacrifices for themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: There was an excuse for the people in the desert
failing to fulfil the precept of circumcision, both because they knew
not when the camp was removed, and because, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iv) they needed no distinctive sign while they dwelt apart from
other nations. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (QQ. in Josue vi), those
were guilty of disobedience who failed to obey through contempt.
It seems, however, that none of the uncircumcised died in the desert,
for it is written (Ps. 104:37): "There was not among their tribes one
that was feeble": and that those alone died in the desert, who had been
circumcised in Egypt. If, however, some of the uncircumcised did die
there, the same applies to them as to those who died before the
institution of circumcision. And this applies also to those children
who, at the time of the Law, died before the eighth day.
Reply to Objection 4: Original sin was taken away in circumcision, in
regard to the person; but on the part of the entire nature, there
remained the obstacle to the entrance of the kingdom of heaven, which
obstacle was removed by Christ's Passion. Consequently, before Christ's
Passion not even Baptism gave entrance to the kingdom. But were
circumcision to avail after Christ's Passion, it would give entrance to
the kingdom.
Reply to Objection 5: When adults were circumcised, they received
remission not only of original, but also of actual sin: yet not so as
to be delivered from all debt of punishment, as in Baptism, in which
grace is conferred more copiously.
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OF THE PREPARATIONS THAT ACCOMPANY BAPTISM (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the preparations that accompany Baptism:
concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether catechism should precede Baptism?
(2) Whether exorcism should precede Baptism?
(3) Whether what is done in catechizing and exorcizing, effects
anything, or is a mere sign?
(4) Whether those who are to be baptized should be catechized or
exorcized by priests?
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Whether catechism should precede Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that catechism should not precede Baptism. For by
Baptism men are regenerated unto the spiritual life. But man begins to
live before being taught. Therefore man should not be catechized, i.e.
taught, before being baptized.
Objection 2: Further, Baptism is given not only to adults, but also to
children, who are not capable of being taught, since they have not the
use of reason. Therefore it is absurd to catechize them.
Objection 3: Further, a man, when catechized, confesses his faith. Now
a child cannot confess its faith by itself, nor can anyone else in its
stead; both because no one can bind another to do anything; and because
one cannot know whether the child, having come to the right age, will
give its assent to faith. Therefore catechism should not precede
Baptism.
On the contrary, Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i): "Before Baptism
man should be prepared by catechism, in order that the catechumen may
receive the rudiments of faith."
I answer that, As stated above ([4477]Q[70], A[1]), Baptism is the
Sacrament of Faith: since it is a profession of the Christian faith.
Now in order that a man receive the faith, he must be instructed
therein, according to Rom. 10:14: "How shall they believe Him, of Whom
they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?" And
therefore it is fitting that catechism should precede Baptism. Hence
when our Lord bade His disciples to baptize, He made teaching to
precede Baptism, saying: "Go ye . . . and teach all nations, baptizing
them," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: The life of grace unto which a man is
regenerated, presupposes the life of the rational nature, in which man
is capable of receiving instruction.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as Mother Church, as stated above
([4478]Q[69], A[6], ad 3), lends children another's feet that they may
come, and another's heart that they may believe, so, too, she lends
them another's ears, that they may hear, and another's mind, that
through others they may be taught. And therefore, as they are to be
baptized, on the same grounds they are to be instructed.
Reply to Objection 3: He who answers in the child's stead: "I do
believe," does not foretell that the child will believe when it comes
to the right age, else he would say: "He will believe"; but in the
child's stead he professes the Church's faith which is communicated to
that child, the sacrament of which faith is bestowed on it, and to
which faith he is bound by another. For there is nothing unfitting in a
person being bound by another in things necessary for salvation. In
like manner the sponsor, in answering for the child, promises to use
his endeavors that the child may believe. This, however, would not be
sufficient in the case of adults having the use of reason.
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Whether exorcism should precede Baptism?
Objection 1: It seems that exorcism should not precede Baptism. For
exorcism is ordained against energumens or those who are possessed. But
not all are such like. Therefore exorcism should not precede Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, so long as man is a subject of sin, the devil has
power over him, according to Jn. 8:34: "Whosoever committeth sin is the
servant of sin." But sin is taken away by Baptism. Therefore men should
not be exorcized before Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, Holy water was introduced in order to ward off
the power of the demons. Therefore exorcism was not needed as a further
remedy.
On the contrary, Pope Celestine says (Epist. ad Episcop. Galliae):
"Whether children or young people approach the sacrament of
regeneration, they should not come to the fount of life before the
unclean spirit has been expelled from them by the exorcisms and
breathings of the clerics."
I answer that, Whoever purposes to do a work wisely, first removes the
obstacles to his work; hence it is written (Jer. 4:3): "Break up anew
your fallow ground and sow not upon thorns." Now the devil is the enemy
of man's salvation, which man acquires by Baptism; and he has a certain
power over man from the very fact that the latter is subject to
original, or even actual, sin. Consequently it is fitting that before
Baptism the demons should be cast out by exorcisms, lest they impede
man's salvation. Which expulsion is signified by the (priest) breathing
(upon the person to be baptized); while the blessing, with the
imposition of hands, bars the way against the return of him who was
cast out. Then the salt which is put in the mouth, and the anointing of
the nose and ears with spittle, signify the receiving of doctrine, as
to the ears; consent thereto as to the nose; and confession thereof, as
to the mouth. And the anointing with oil signifies man's ability to
fight against the demons.
Reply to Objection 1: The energumens are so-called from "laboring
inwardly" under the outward operation of the devil. And though not all
that approach Baptism are troubled by him in their bodies, yet all who
are not baptized are subject to the power of the demons, at least on
account of the guilt of original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of the devil in so far as he hinders
man from obtaining glory, is expelled from man by the baptismal
ablution; but in so far as he hinders man from receiving the sacrament,
his power is cast out by the exorcisms.
Reply to Objection 3: Holy water is used against the assaults of demons
from without. But exorcisms are directed against those assaults of the
demons which are from within. hence those who are exorcized are called
energumens, as it were "laboring inwardly."
Or we may say that just as Penance is given as a further remedy against
sin, because Baptism is not repeated; so Holy Water is given as a
further remedy against the assaults of demons, because the baptismal
exorcisms are not given a second time.
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Whether what is done in the exorcism effects anything, or is a mere sign?
Objection 1: It seems that what is done in the exorcism does not effect
anything, but is a mere sign. For if a child die after the exorcisms,
before being baptized, it is not saved. But the effects of what is done
in the sacraments are ordained to the salvation of man; hence it is
written (Mk. 16:16): "He that believeth and is baptized shall be
saved." Therefore what is done in the exorcism effects nothing, but is
a mere sign.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is required for a sacrament of the New
Law, but that it should be a sign and a cause, as stated above
([4479]Q[62], A[1]). If, therefore, the things done in the exorcism
effect anything, it seems that each of them is a sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, just as the exorcism is ordained to Baptism, so
if anything be effected in the exorcism, it is ordained to the effect
of Baptism. But disposition must needs precede the perfect form:
because form is not received save into matter already disposed. It
would follow, therefore, that none could obtain the effect of Baptism
unless he were previously exorcized; which is clearly false. Therefore
what is done in the exorcisms has no effect.
Objection 4: Further, just as some things are done in the exorcism
before Baptism, so are some things done after Baptism; for instance,
the priest anoints the baptized on the top of the head. But what is
done after Baptism seems to have no effect; for, if it had, the effect
of Baptism would be imperfect. Therefore neither have those things an
effect, which are done in exorcism before Baptism.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Symbolo I): "Little children are
breathed upon and exorcized, in order to expel from them the devil's
hostile power, which deceived man." But the Church does nothing in
vain. Therefore the effect of these breathings is that the power of the
devils is expelled.
I answer that, Some say that the things done in the exorcism have no
effect, but are mere signs. But this is clearly false; since in
exorcizing, the Church uses words of command to cast out the devil's
power, for instance, when she says: "Therefore, accursed devil, go out
from him," etc.
Therefore we must say that they have some effect, but, other than that
of Baptism. For Baptism gives man grace unto the full remission of
sins. But those things that are done in the exorcism remove the twofold
impediment against the reception of saving grace. Of these, one is the
outward impediment, so far as the demons strive to hinder man's
salvation. And this impediment is removed by the breathings, whereby
the demon's power is cast out, as appears from the passage quoted from
Augustine, i.e. as to the devil not placing obstacles against the
reception of the sacrament. Nevertheless, the demon's power over man
remains as to the stain of sin, and the debt of punishment, until sin
be washed away by Baptism. And in this sense Cyprian says (Epist.
lxxvi): "Know that the devil's evil power remains until the pouring of
the saving water: but in Baptism he loses it all."
The other impediment is within, forasmuch as, from having contracted
original sin, man's sense is closed to the perception of the mysteries
of salvation. Hence Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i) that "by means
of the typifying spittle and the touch of the priest, the Divine wisdom
and power brings salvation to the catechumen, that his nostrils being
opened he may perceive the odor of the knowledge of God, that his ears
be opened to hear the commandments of God, that his senses be opened in
his inmost heart to respond."
Reply to Objection 1: What is done in the exorcism does not take away
the sin for which man is punished after death; but only the impediments
against his receiving the remission of sin through the sacrament.
Wherefore exorcism avails a man nothing after death if he has not been
baptized.
Praepositivus, however, says that children who die after being
exorcized but before being baptized are subjected to lesser darkness.
But this does not seem to be true: because that darkness consists in
privation of the vision of God, which cannot be greater or lesser.
Reply to Objection 2: It is essential to a sacrament to produce its
principal effect, which is grace that remits sin, or supplies some
defect in man. But those things that are done in the exorcism do not
effect this; they merely remove these impediments. Consequently, they
are not sacraments but sacramentals.
Reply to Objection 3: The disposition that suffices for receiving the
baptismal grace is the faith and intention, either of the one baptized,
if it be an adult, or of the Church, if it be a child. But these things
that are done in the exorcism, are directed to the removal of the
impediments. And therefore one may receive the effect of Baptism
without them.
Yet they are not to be omitted save in a case of necessity. And then,
if the danger pass, they should be supplied, that uniformity in Baptism
may be observed. Nor are they supplied to no purpose after Baptism:
because, just as the effect of Baptism may be hindered before it is
received, so can it be hindered after it has been received.
Reply to Objection 4: Of those things that are done after Baptism in
respect of the person baptized, something is done which is not a mere
sign, but produces an effect, for instance, the anointing on the top of
the head, the effect of which is the preservation of baptismal grace.
And there is something which has no effect, but is a mere sign, for
instance, the baptized are given a white garment to signify the newness
of life.
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Whether it belongs to a priest to catechize and exorcize the person to be
baptized?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to a priest to catechize
and exorcize the person to be baptized. For it belongs to the office of
ministers to operate on the unclean, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v).
But catechumens who are instructed by catechism, and "energumens" who
are cleansed by exorcism, are counted among the unclean, as Dionysius
says in the same place. Therefore to catechize and to exorcize do not
belong to the office of the priests, but rather to that of the
ministers.
Objection 2: Further, catechumens are instructed in the Faith by the
Holy Scripture which is read in the church by ministers: for just as
the Old Testament is recited by the Readers, so the New Testament is
read by the Deacons and Subdeacons. And thus it belongs to the
ministers to catechize. In like manner it belongs, seemingly, to the
ministers to exorcize. For Isidore says (Epist. ad Ludifred.): "The
exorcist should know the exorcisms by heart, and impose his hands on
the energumens and catechumens during the exorcism." Therefore it
belongs not to the priestly office to catechize and exorcize.
Objection 3: Further, "to catechize" is the same as "to teach," and
this is the same as "to perfect." Now this belongs to the office of a
bishop, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). Therefore it does not belong
to the priestly office.
On the contrary, Pope Nicolas I says: "The catechizing of those who are
to be baptized can be undertaken by the priests attached to each
church." And Gregory says (Hom. xxix super Ezech.): "When priests place
their hands on believers for the grace of exorcism, what else do they
but cast out the devils?"
I answer that, The minister compared to the priest, is as a secondary
and instrumental agent to the principal agent: as is implied in the
very word "minister." Now the secondary agent does nothing without the
principal agent in operating. And the more mighty the operation, so
much the mightier instruments does the principal agent require. But the
operation of the priest in conferring the sacrament itself is mightier
than in those things that are preparatory to the sacrament. And so the
highest ministers who are called deacons co-operate with the priest in
bestowing the sacraments themselves: for Isidore says (Epist. ad
Ludifred.) that "it belongs to the deacons to assist the priests in all
things that are done in Christ's sacraments, in Baptism, to wit, in the
Chrism, in the Paten and Chalice"; while the inferior ministers assist
the priest in those things which are preparatory to the sacraments: the
readers, for instance, in catechizing; the exorcists in exorcizing.
Reply to Objection 1: The minister's operation in regard to the unclean
is ministerial and, as it were, instrumental, but the priest's is
principal.
Reply to Objection 2: To readers and exorcists belongs the duty of
catechizing and exorcizing, not, indeed, principally, but as ministers
of the priest in these things.
Reply to Objection 3: Instruction is manifold. one leads to the
embracing of the Faith; and is ascribed by Dionysius to bishops (Eccl.
Hier. ii) and can be undertaken by any preacher, or even by any
believer. Another is that by which a man is taught the rudiments of
faith, and how to comport himself in receiving the sacraments: this
belongs secondarily to the ministers, primarily to the priests. A third
is instruction in the mode of Christian life: and this belongs to the
sponsors. A fourth is the instruction in the profound mysteries of
faith, and on the perfection of Christian life: this belongs to bishops
"ex officio," in virtue of their office.
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CONFIRMATION (Q[72])
OF THE SACRAMENT OF CONFIRMATION (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the Sacrament of Confirmation. Concerning this
there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Confirmation is a sacrament?
(2) Its matter;
(3) Whether it is essential to the sacrament that the chrism should
have been previously consecrated by a bishop?
(4) Its form;
(5) Whether it imprints a character?
(6) Whether the character of Confirmation presupposes the character of
Baptism?
(7) Whether it bestows grace?
(8) Who is competent to receive this sacrament?
(9) In what part of the body?
(10) Whether someone is required to stand for the person to be
confirmed?
(11) Whether this sacrament is given by bishops only?
(12) Of its rite.
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Whether confirmation is a sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that Confirmation is not a sacrament. For
sacraments derive their efficacy from the Divine institution, as stated
above ([4480]Q[64] , A[2]). But we read nowhere of Confirmation being
instituted by Christ. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments of the New Law were foreshadowed
in the Old Law; thus the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:2-4), that "all in
Moses were baptized, in the cloud and in the sea; and did all eat the
same spiritual food, and all drank the same spiritual drink." But
Confirmation was not foreshadowed in the old Testament. Therefore it is
not a sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, the sacraments are ordained unto man's salvation.
But man can be saved without Confirmation: since children that are
baptized, who die before being confirmed, are saved. Therefore
Confirmation is not a sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, by all the sacraments of the Church, man is
conformed to Christ, Who is the Author of the sacraments. But man
cannot be conformed to Christ by Confirmation, since we read nowhere of
Christ being confirmed.
On the contrary, Pope Melchiades wrote to the bishops of Spain:
"Concerning the point on which you sought to be informed, i.e. whether
the imposition of the bishop's hand were a greater sacrament than
Baptism, know that each is a great sacrament."
I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are ordained unto special
effects of grace: and therefore where there is a special effect of
grace, there we find a special sacrament ordained for the purpose. But
since sensible and material things bear a likeness to things spiritual
and intelligible, from what occurs in the life of the body, we can
perceive that which is special to the spiritual life. Now it is evident
that in the life of the body a certain special perfection consists in
man's attaining to the perfect age, and being able to perform the
perfect actions of a man: hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:11): "When
I became a man, I put away the things of a child." And thence it is
that besides the movement of generation whereby man receives life of
the body, there is the movement of growth, whereby man is brought to
the perfect age. So therefore does man receive spiritual life in
Baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration: while in Confirmation man
arrives at the perfect age, as it were, of the spiritual life. Hence
Pope Melchiades says: "The Holy Ghost, Who comes down on the waters of
Baptism bearing salvation in His flight, bestows at the font, the
fulness of innocence; but in Confirmation He confers an increase of
grace. In Baptism we are born again unto life; after Baptism we are
strengthened." And therefore it is evident that Confirmation is a
special sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Concerning the institution of this sacrament
there are three opinions. Some (Alexander of Hales, Summa Theol. P. IV,
Q. IX; St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 7) have maintained that this
sacrament was instituted neither by Christ, nor by the apostles; but
later in the course of time by one of the councils. Others (Pierre de
Tarentaise, Sent. iv, D, 7) held that it was instituted by the
apostles. But this cannot be admitted; since the institution of a new
sacrament belongs to the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ
alone.
And therefore we must say that Christ instituted this sacrament not by
bestowing, but by promising it, according to Jn. 16:7: "If I go not,
the Paraclete will not come to you, but if I go, I will send Him to
you." And this was because in this sacrament the fulness of the Holy
Ghost is bestowed, which was not to be given before Christ's
Resurrection and Ascension; according to Jn. 7:39: "As yet the Spirit
was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified."
Reply to Objection 2: Confirmation is the sacrament of the fulness of
grace: wherefore there could be nothing corresponding to it in the Old
Law, since "the Law brought nothing to perfection" (Heb. 7:19).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4481]Q[65], A[4]), all the
sacraments are in some way necessary for salvation: but some, so that
there is no salvation without them; some as conducing to the perfection
of salvation; and thus it is that Confirmation is necessary for
salvation: although salvation is possible without it, provided it be
not omitted out of contempt.
Reply to Objection 4: Those who receive Confirmation, which is the
sacrament of the fulness of grace, are conformed to Christ, inasmuch as
from the very first instant of His conception He was "full of grace and
truth" (Jn. 1:14). This fulness was made known at His Baptism, when
"the Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape . . . upon Him" (Lk. 3:22).
Hence (Lk. 4:1) it is written that "Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost,
returned from the Jordan." Nor was it fitting to Christ's dignity, that
He, Who is the Author of the sacraments, should receive the fulness of
grace from a sacrament.
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Whether chrism is a fitting matter for this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that chrism is not a fitting matter for this
sacrament. For this sacrament, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), was
instituted by Christ when He promised His disciples the Holy Ghost. But
He sent them the Holy Ghost without their being anointed with chrism.
Moreover, the apostles themselves bestowed this sacrament without
chrism, by the mere imposition of hands: for it is written (Acts 8:17)
that the apostles "laid their hands upon" those who were baptized, "and
they received the Holy Ghost." Therefore chrism is not the matter of
this sacrament: since the matter is essential to the sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, Confirmation perfects, in a way, the sacrament of
Baptism, as stated above ([4482]Q[65], AA[3],4): and so it ought to be
conformed to it as perfection to the thing perfected. But the matter,
in Baptism, is a simple element, viz. water. Therefore chrism, which is
made of oil and balm, is not a fitting matter for this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, oil is used as the matter of this sacrament for
the purpose of anointing. But any oil will do for anointing: for
instance, oil made from nuts, and from anything else. Therefore not
only olive oil should be used for this sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, it has been stated above ([4483]Q[66], A[3]) that
water is used as the matter of Baptism, because it is easily procured
everywhere. But olive oil is not to be procured everywhere; and much
less is balm. Therefore chrism, which is made of these, is not a
fitting matter for this sacrament.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Registr. iv): "Let no priest dare to
sign the baptized infants on the brow with the sacred chrism."
Therefore chrism is the matter of this sacrament.
I answer that, Chrism is the fitting matter of this sacrament. For, as
stated above [4484](A[1]), in this sacrament the fulness of the Holy
Ghost is given for the spiritual strength which belongs to the perfect
age. Now when man comes to perfect age he begins at once to have
intercourse with others; whereas until then he lives an individual
life, as it were, confined to himself. Now the grace of the Holy Ghost
is signified by oil; hence Christ is said to be "anointed with the oil
of gladness" (Ps. 44:8), by reason of His being gifted with the fulness
of the Holy Ghost. Consequently oil is a suitable matter of this
sacrament. And balm is mixed with the oil, by reason of its fragrant
odor, which spreads about: hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:15): "We
are the good odor of Christ," etc. And though many other things be
fragrant, yet preference is given to balm, because it has a special
odor of its own, and because it confers incorruptibility: hence it is
written (Ecclus. 24:21): "My odor is as the purest balm."
Reply to Objection 1: Christ, by the power which He exercises in the
sacraments, bestowed on the apostles the reality of this sacrament,
i.e. the fulness of the Holy Ghost, without the sacrament itself,
because they had received "the first fruits of the Spirit" (Rom. 8:23).
Nevertheless, something of keeping with the matter of this sacrament
was displayed to the apostles in a sensible manner when they received
the Holy Ghost. For that the Holy Ghost came down upon them in a
sensible manner under the form of fire, refers to the same
signification as oil: except in so far as fire has an active power,
while oil has a passive power, as being the matter and incentive of
fire. And this was quite fitting: for it was through the apostles that
the grace of the Holy Ghost was to flow forth to others. Again, the
Holy Ghost came down on the apostles in the shape of a tongue. Which
refers to the same signification as balm: except in so far as the
tongue communicates with others by speech, but balm, by its odor.
because, to wit, the apostles were filled with the Holy Ghost, as
teachers of the Faith; but the rest of the believers, as doing that
which gives edification to the faithful.
In like manner, too, when the apostles imposed their hands, and when
they preached, the fulness of the Holy Ghost came down under visible
signs on the faithful, just as, at the beginning, He came down on the
apostles: hence Peter said (Acts 11:15): "When I had begun to speak,
the Holy Ghost fell upon them, as upon us also in the beginning."
Consequently there was no need for sacramental sensible matter, where
God sent sensible signs miraculously.
However, the apostles commonly made use of chrism in bestowing the
sacrament, when such like visible signs were lacking. For Dionysius
says (Eccl. Hier. iv): "There is a certain perfecting operation which
our guides," i.e. the apostles, "call the sacrifice of Chrism."
Reply to Objection 2: Baptism is bestowed that spiritual life may be
received simply; wherefore simple matter is fitting to it. But this
sacrament is given that we may receive the fulness of the Holy Ghost,
Whose operations are manifold, according to Wis. 7:22, "In her is the"
Holy "Spirit . . . one, manifold"; and 1 Cor. 12:4, "There are
diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." Consequently a compound
matter is appropriate to this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: These properties of oil, by reason of which it
symbolizes the Holy Ghost, are to be found in olive oil rather than in
any other oil. In fact, the olive-tree itself, through being an
evergreen, signifies the refreshing and merciful operation of the Holy
Ghost.
Moreover, this oil is called oil properly, and is very much in use,
wherever it is to be had. And whatever other liquid is so called,
derives its name from its likeness to this oil: nor are the latter
commonly used, unless it be to supply the want of olive oil. Therefore
it is that this oil alone is used for this and certain other
sacraments.
Reply to Objection 4: Baptism is the sacrament of absolute necessity;
and so its matter should be at hand everywhere. But it is enough that
the matter of this sacrament, which is not of such great necessity, be
easily sent to all parts of the world.
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Whether it is essential to this sacrament that the chrism which is its
matter be previously consecrated by a bishop?
Objection 1: It seems that it is not essential to this sacrament, that
the chrism, which is its matter, be previously consecrated by a bishop.
For Baptism which bestows full remission of sins is not less
efficacious than this sacrament. But, though the baptismal water
receives a kind of blessing before being used for Baptism; yet this is
not essential to the sacrament: since in a case of necessity it can be
dispensed with. Therefore neither is it essential to this sacrament
that the chrism should be previously consecrated by a bishop.
Objection 2: Further, the same should not be consecrated twice. But the
sacramental matter is sanctified, in the very conferring of the
sacrament, by the form of words wherein the sacrament is bestowed;
hence Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.): "The word is added to the
element, and this becomes a sacrament." Therefore the chrism should not
be consecrated before this sacrament is given.
Objection 3: Further, every consecration employed in the sacraments is
ordained to the bestowal of grace. But the sensible matter composed of
oil and balm is not receptive of grace. Therefore it should not be
consecrated.
On the contrary, Pope Innocent I says (Ep. ad Decent.): "Priests, when
baptizing, may anoint the baptized with chrism, previously consecrated
by a bishop: but they must not sign the brow with the same oil; this
belongs to the bishop alone, when he gives the Paraclete." Now this is
done in this sacrament. Therefore it is necessary for this sacrament
that its matter be previously consecrated by a bishop.
I answer that, The entire sanctification of the sacraments is derived
from Christ, as stated above ([4485]Q[64], A[3]). But it must be
observed that Christ did use certain sacraments having a corporeal
matter, viz. Baptism, and also the Eucharist. And consequently, from
Christ's very act in using them, the matter of these sacraments
received a certain aptitude to the perfection of the sacrament. Hence
Chrysostom (Chromatius, In Matth. 3:15) says that "the waters of
Baptism could never wash away the sins of believers, had they not been
sanctified by contact with our Lord's body." And again, our Lord
Himself "taking bread . . . blessed . . . and in like manner the
chalice" (Mat. 26:26,27; Lk. 22:19, 20). For this reason there is no
need for the matter of these sacraments to be blessed previously, since
Christ's blessing is enough. And if any blessing be used, it belongs to
the solemnity of the sacrament, not to its essence. But Christ did not
make use of visible anointings, so as not to slight the invisible
unction whereby He was "anointed above" His "fellows" (Ps. 44:8). And
hence both chrism, and the holy oil, and the oil of the sick are
blessed before being put to sacramental use. This suffices for the
reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Each consecration of the chrism has not the same
object. For just as an instrument derives instrumental power in two
ways, viz. when it receives the form of an instrument, and when it is
moved by the principal agent; so too the sacramental matter needs a
twofold sanctification, by one of which it becomes fit matter for the
sacrament, while by the other it is applied to the production of the
effect.
Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal matter is receptive of grace, not so as
to be the subject of grace, but only as the instrument of grace, as
explained above ([4486]Q[62], A[3]). And this sacramental matter is
consecrated, either by Christ, or by a bishop, who, in the Church,
impersonates Christ.
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Whether the proper form of this sacrament is: "I sign thee with the sign of
the cross," etc.?
Objection 1: It seems that the proper form of this sacrament is not: "I
sign thee with the sign of the cross, I confirm thee with the chrism of
salvation, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy
Ghost. Amen." For the use of the sacraments is derived from Christ and
the apostles. But neither did Christ institute this form, nor do we
read of the apostles making use of it. Therefore it is not the proper
form of this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, just as the sacrament is the same everywhere, so
should the form be the same: because everything has unity, just as it
has being, from its form. But this form is not used by all: for some
say: "I confirm thee with the chrism of sanctification." Therefore the
above is not the proper form of this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, this sacrament should be conformed to Baptism, as
the perfect to the thing perfected, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]). But
in the form of Baptism no mention is made of signing the character; nor
again of the cross of Christ, though in Baptism man dies with Christ,
as the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3-8); nor of the effect which is salvation,
though Baptism is necessary for salvation. Again, in the baptismal
form, only one action is included; and the person of the baptizer is
expressed in the words: "I baptize thee, whereas the contrary is to be
observed in the above form." Therefore this is not the proper form of
this sacrament.
On the contrary, Is the authority of the Church, who always uses this
form.
I answer that, The above form is appropriate to this sacrament. For
just as the form of a natural thing gives it its species, so a
sacramental form should contain whatever belongs to the species of the
sacrament. Now as is evident from what has been already said
([4487]AA[1],2), in this sacrament the Holy Ghost is given for strength
in the spiritual combat. Wherefore in this sacrament three things are
necessary; and they are contained in the above form. The first of these
is the cause conferring fulness of spiritual strength which cause is
the Blessed Trinity: and this is expressed in the words, "In the name
of the Father," etc. The second is the spiritual strength itself
bestowed on man unto salvation by the sacrament of visible matter; and
this is referred to in the words, "I confirm thee with the chrism of
salvation." The third is the sign which is given to the combatant, as
in a bodily combat: thus are soldiers marked with the sign of their
leaders. And to this refer the words, "I sign thee with the sign of the
cross," in which sign, to wit, our King triumphed (cf. Col. 2:15).
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[2], ad 1), sometimes the
effect of this sacrament, i.e. the fulness of the Holy Ghost, was given
through the ministry of the apostles, under certain visible signs,
wrought miraculously by God, Who can bestow the sacramental effect,
independently of the sacrament. In these cases there was no need for
either the matter or the form of this sacrament. On the other hand,
sometimes they bestowed this sacrament as ministers of the sacraments.
And then, they used both matter and form according to Christ's command.
For the apostles, in conferring the sacraments, observed many things
which are not handed down in those Scriptures that are in general use.
Hence Dionysius says at the end of his treatise on the Ecclesiastical
Hierarchy (chap. vii): "It is not allowed to explain in writing the
prayers which are used in the sacraments, and to publish their mystical
meaning, or the power which, coming from God, gives them their
efficacy; we learn these things by holy tradition without any
display,"* i.e. secretly. [*The passage quoted in the text of the Summa
differs slightly from the above, which is translated directly from the
works of Dionysius.] Hence the Apostle, speaking of the celebration of
the Eucharist, writes (1 Cor. 11:34): "The rest I will set in order,
when I come."
Reply to Objection 2: Holiness is the cause of salvation. Therefore it
comes to the same whether we say "chrism of salvation" or "of
sanctification."
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is the regeneration unto the spiritual
life, whereby man lives in himself. And therefore in the baptismal form
that action alone is expressed which refers to the man to be
sanctified. But this sacrament is ordained not only to the
sanctification of man in himself, but also to strengthen him in his
outward combat. Consequently not only is mention made of interior
sanctification, in the words, "I confirm thee with the chrism of
salvation": but furthermore man is signed outwardly, as it were with
the standard of the cross, unto the outward spiritual combat; and this
is signified by the words, "I sign thee with the sign of the cross."
But in the very word "baptize," which signifies "to cleanse," we can
understand both the matter, which is the cleansing water, and the
effect, which is salvation. Whereas these are not understood by the
word "confirm"; and consequently they had to be expressed.
Again, it has been said above (Q[66], A[5], ad 1) that the pronoun "I"
is not necessary to the Baptismal form, because it is included in the
first person of the verb. It is, however, included in order to express
the intention. But this does not seem so necessary in Confirmation,
which is conferred only by a minister of excellence, as we shall state
later on [4488](A[11]).
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Whether the sacrament of Confirmation imprints a character?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacrament of Confirmation does not
imprint a character. For a character means a distinctive sign. But a
man is not distinguished from unbelievers by the sacrament of
Confirmation, for this is the effect of Baptism; nor from the rest of
the faithful, because this sacrament is ordained to the spiritual
combat, which is enjoined to all the faithful. Therefore a character is
not imprinted in this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, it was stated above ([4489]Q[63], A[2]) that a
character is a spiritual power. Now a power must be either active or
passive. But the active power in the sacraments is conferred by the
sacrament of order: while the passive or receptive power is conferred
by the sacrament of Baptism. Therefore no character is imprinted by the
sacrament of Confirmation.
Objection 3: Further, in circumcision, which is a character of the
body, no spiritual character is imprinted. But in this sacrament a
character is imprinted on the body, when the sign of the cross is
signed with chrism on man's brow. Therefore a spiritual character is
not imprinted by this sacrament.
On the contrary, A character is imprinted in every sacrament that is
not repeated. But this sacrament is not repeated: for Gregory II says
(Ep. iv ad Bonifac.): "As to the man who was confirmed a second time by
a bishop, such a repetition must be forbidden." Therefore a character
is imprinted in Confirmation.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), a character is a
spiritual power ordained to certain sacred actions. Now it has been
said above [4490](A[1]; Q[65], A[1]) that, just as Baptism is a
spiritual regeneration unto Christian life, so also is Confirmation a
certain spiritual growth bringing man to perfect spiritual age. But it
is evident, from a comparison with the life of the body, that the
action which is proper to man immediately after birth, is different
from the action which is proper to him when he has come to perfect age.
And therefore by the sacrament of Confirmation man is given a spiritual
power in respect of sacred actions other than those in respect of which
he receives power in Baptism. For in Baptism he receives power to do
those things which pertain to his own salvation, forasmuch as he lives
to himself: whereas in Confirmation he receives power to do those
things which pertain to the spiritual combat with the enemies of the
Faith. This is evident from the example of the apostles, who, before
they received the fulness of the Holy Ghost, were in the "upper room .
. . persevering . . . in prayer" (Acts 1:13,14); whereas afterwards
they went out and feared not to confess their faith in public, even in
the face of the enemies of the Christian Faith. And therefore it is
evident that a character is imprinted in the sacrament of Confirmation.
Reply to Objection 1: All have to wage the spiritual combat with our
invisible enemies. But to fight against visible foes, viz. against the
persecutors of the Faith, by confessing Christ's name, belongs to the
confirmed, who have already come spiritually to the age of virility,
according to 1 Jn. 2:14: "I write unto you, young men, because you are
strong, and the word of God abideth in you, and you have overcome the
wicked one." And therefore the character of Confirmation is a
distinctive sign, not between unbelievers and believers, but between
those who are grown up spiritually and those of whom it is written: "As
new-born babes" (1 Pet. 2:2).
Reply to Objection 2: All the sacraments are protestations of faith.
Therefore just as he who is baptized receives the power of testifying
to his faith by receiving the other sacraments; so he who is confirmed
receives the power of publicly confessing his faith by words, as it
were "ex officio."
Reply to Objection 3: The sacraments of the Old Law are called "justice
of the flesh" (Heb. 9:10) because, to wit, they wrought nothing
inwardly. Consequently in circumcision a character was imprinted in the
body only, but not in the soul. But in Confirmation, since it is a
sacrament of the New Law, a spiritual character is imprinted at the
same time, together with the bodily character.
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Whether the character of Confirmation presupposes of necessity, the
baptismal character?
Objection 1: It seems that the character of Confirmation does not
presuppose, of necessity, the baptismal character. For the sacrament of
Confirmation is ordained to the public confession of the Faith of
Christ. But many, even before Baptism, have publicly confessed the
Faith of Christ by shedding their blood for the Faith. Therefore the
character of Confirmation does not presuppose the baptismal character.
Objection 2: Further, it is not related of the apostles that they were
baptized; especially, since it is written (Jn. 4:2) that Christ
"Himself did not baptize, but His disciples." Yet afterwards they were
confirmed by the coming of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in like manner,
others can be confirmed before being baptized.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Acts 10:44-48) that "while Peter
was yet speaking . . . the Holy Ghost fell on all them that heard the
word . . . and [Vulg.: 'for'] they heard them speaking with tongues":
and afterwards "he commanded them to be baptized." Therefore others
with equal reason can be confirmed before being baptized.
On the contrary, Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i): "Lastly the
Paraclete is given to the baptized by the imposition of the high
priest's hands, in order that the baptized may be strengthened by the
Holy Ghost so as to publish his faith."
I answer that, The character of Confirmation, of necessity supposes the
baptismal character: so that, in effect, if one who is not baptized
were to be confirmed, he would receive nothing, but would have to be
confirmed again after receiving Baptism. The reason of this is that,
Confirmation is to Baptism as growth to birth, as is evident from what
has been said above [4491](A[1]; Q[65], A[1]). Now it is clear that no
one can be brought to perfect age unless he be first born: and in like
manner, unless a man be first baptized, he cannot receive the sacrament
of Confirmation.
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine power is not confined to the
sacraments. Hence man can receive spiritual strength to confess the
Faith of Christ publicly, without receiving the sacrament of
Confirmation: just as he can also receive remission of sins without
Baptism. Yet, just as none receive the effect of Baptism without the
desire of Baptism; so none receive the effect of Confirmation, without
the desire of Confirmation. And man can have this even before receiving
Baptism.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Ep. cclxv), from our Lord's
words, "'He that is washed, needeth not but to wash his feet' (Jn.
13:10), we gather that Peter and Christ's other disciples had been
baptized, either with John's Baptism, as some think; or with Christ's,
which is more credible. For He did not refuse to administer Baptism, so
as to have servants by whom to baptize others."
Reply to Objection 3: Those who heard the preaching of Peter received
the effect of Confirmation miraculously: but not the sacrament of
Confirmation. Now it has been stated (ad 1) that the effect of
Confirmation can be bestowed on man before Baptism, whereas the
sacrament cannot. For just as the effect of Confirmation, which is
spiritual strength, presupposes the effect of Baptism, which is
justification, so the sacrament of Confirmation presupposes the
sacrament of Baptism.
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Whether sanctifying grace is bestowed in this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that sanctifying grace is not bestowed in this
sacrament. For sanctifying grace is ordained against sin. But this
sacrament, as stated above [4492](A[6]) is given only to the baptized,
who are cleansed from sin. Therefore sanctifying grace is not bestowed
in this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, sinners especially need sanctifying grace, by
which alone can they be justified. If, therefore, sanctifying grace is
bestowed in this sacrament, it seems that it should be given to those
who are in sin. And yet this is not true.
Objection 3: Further, there can only be one species of sanctifying
grace, since it is ordained to one effect. But two forms of the same
species cannot be in the same subject. Since, therefore, man receives
sanctifying grace in Baptism, it seems that sanctifying grace is not
bestowed in Confirmation, which is given to none but the baptized.
On the contrary, Pope Melchiades says (Ep. ad Episc. Hispan.): "The
Holy Ghost bestows at the font the fulness of innocence; but in
Confirmation He confers an increase of grace."
I answer that, In this sacrament, as stated above ([4493]AA[1],4), the
Holy Ghost is given to the baptized for strength: just as He was given
to the apostles on the day of Pentecost, as we read in Acts 2; and just
as He was given to the baptized by the imposition of the apostles'
hands, as related in Acts 8:17. Now it has been proved in the [4494]FP,
Q[43], A[3] that the Holy Ghost is not sent or given except with
sanctifying grace. Consequently it is evident that sanctifying grace is
bestowed in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Sanctifying grace does indeed take away sin; but
it has other effects also, because it suffices to carry man through
every step as far as eternal life. Hence to Paul was it said (2 Cor.
12:9): "My grace is sufficient for thee": and he says of himself (1
Cor. 15:10): "By the grace of God I am what I am." Therefore
sanctifying grace is given not only for the remission of sin, but also
for growth and stability in righteousness. And thus is it bestowed in
this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Further, as appears from its very name, this
sacrament is given in order "to confirm" what it finds already there.
And consequently it should not be given to those who are not in a state
of grace. For this reason, just as it is not given to the unbaptized,
so neither should it be given to the adult sinners, except they be
restored by Penance. Wherefore was it decreed in the Council of Orleans
(Can. iii) that "men should come to Confirmation fasting; and should be
admonished to confess their sins first, so that being cleansed they may
be able to receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." And then this sacrament
perfects the effects of Penance, as of Baptism: because by the grace
which he has received in this sacrament, the penitent will obtain
fuller remission of his sin. And if any adult approach, being in a
state of sin of which he is not conscious or for which he is not
perfectly contrite, he will receive the remission of his sins through
the grace bestowed in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4495]Q[62], A[2]), the
sacramental grace adds to the sanctifying grace taken in its wide
sense, something that produces a special effect, and to which the
sacrament is ordained. If, then, we consider, in its wide sense, the
grace bestowed in this sacrament, it does not differ from that bestowed
in Baptism, but increases what was already there. On the other hand, if
we consider it as to that which is added over and above, then one
differs in species from the other.
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Whether this sacrament should be given to all?
Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament should not be given to all.
For this sacrament is given in order to confer a certain excellence, as
stated above (A[11], ad 2). But all are not suited for that which
belongs to excellence. Therefore this sacrament should not be given to
all.
Objection 2: Further, by this sacrament man advances spiritually to
perfect age. But perfect age is inconsistent with childhood. Therefore
at least it should not be given to children.
Objection 3: Further, as Pope Melchiades says (Ep. ad Episc. Hispan.)
"after Baptism we are strengthened for the combat." But women are
incompetent to combat, by reason of the frailty of their sex. Therefore
neither should women receive this sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, Pope Melchiades says (Ep. ad Episc. Hispan.):
"Although the benefit of Regeneration suffices for those who are on the
point of death, yet the graces of Confirmation are necessary for those
who are to conquer. Confirmation arms and strengthens those to whom the
struggles and combats of this world are reserved. And he who comes to
die, having kept unsullied the innocence he acquired in Baptism, is
confirmed by death; for after death he can sin no more." Therefore this
sacrament should not be given to those who are on the point of death:
and so it should not be given to all.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 2:2) that the Holy Ghost in
coming, "filled the whole house," whereby the Church is signified; and
afterwards it is added that "they were all filled with the Holy Ghost."
But this sacrament is given that we may receive that fulness. Therefore
it should be given to all who belong to the Church.
I answer that, As stated above [4496](A[1]), man is spiritually
advanced by this sacrament to perfect age. Now the intention of nature
is that everyone born corporally, should come to perfect age: yet this
is sometimes hindered by reason of the corruptibility of the body,
which is forestalled by death. But much more is it God's intention to
bring all things to perfection, since nature shares in this intention
inasmuch as it reflects Him: hence it is written (Dt. 32:4): "The works
of God are perfect." Now the soul, to which spiritual birth and perfect
spiritual age belong, is immortal; and just as it can in old age attain
to spiritual birth, so can it attain to perfect (spiritual) age in
youth or childhood; because the various ages of the body do not affect
the soul. Therefore this sacrament should be given to all.
Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament is given in order to confer a
certain excellence, not indeed, like the sacrament of order, of one man
over another, but of man in regard to himself: thus the same man, when
arrived at maturity, excels himself as he was when a boy.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, the age of the body does not
affect the soul. Consequently even in childhood man can attain to the
perfection of spiritual age, of which it is written (Wis. 4:8):
"Venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number
of years." And hence it is that many children, by reason of the
strength of the Holy Ghost which they had received, fought bravely for
Christ even to the shedding of their blood.
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. i De Machab.), "in
earthly contests fitness of age, physique and rank are required; and
consequently slaves, women, old men, and boys are debarred from taking
part therein. But in the heavenly combats, the Stadium is open equally
to all, to every age, and to either sex." Again, he says (Hom. de
Militia Spirit.): "In God's eyes even women fight, for many a woman has
waged the spiritual warfare with the courage of a man. For some have
rivaled men in the courage with which they have suffered martyrdom; and
some indeed have shown themselves stronger than men." Therefore this
sacrament should be given to women.
Reply to Objection 4: As we have already observed, the soul, to which
spiritual age belongs, is immortal. Wherefore this sacrament should be
given to those on the point of death, that they may be seen to be
perfect at the resurrection, according to Eph. 4:13: "Until we all meet
into the unity of faith . . . unto the measure of the age of the
fulness of Christ." And hence Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii),
"It would be altogether hazardous, if anyone happened to go forth from
this life without being confirmed": not that such a one would be lost,
except perhaps through contempt; but that this would be detrimental to
his perfection. And therefore even children dying after Confirmation
obtain greater glory, just as here below they receive more grace. The
passage quoted is to be taken in the sense that, with regard to the
dangers of the present combat, those who are on the point of death do
not need this sacrament.
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Whether this sacrament should be given to man on the forehead?
Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament should not be given to man on
the forehead. For this sacrament perfects Baptism, as stated above
([4497]Q[65], AA[3],4). But the sacrament of Baptism is given to man
over his whole body. Therefore this sacrament should not be given on
the forehead only.
Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is given for spiritual strength,
as stated above ([4498]AA[1],2,4). But spiritual strength is situated
principally in the heart. Therefore this sacrament should be given over
the heart rather than on the forehead.
Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is given to man that he may freely
confess the faith of Christ. But "with the mouth, confession is made
unto salvation," according to Rom. 10:10. Therefore this sacrament
should be given about the mouth rather than on the forehead.
On the contrary, Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i): "The baptized is
signed by the priest with chrism on the top of the head, but by the
bishop on the forehead."
I answer that, As stated above ([4499]AA[1],4), in this sacrament man
receives the Holy Ghost for strength in the spiritual combat, that he
may bravely confess the Faith of Christ even in face of the enemies of
that Faith. Wherefore he is fittingly signed with the sign of the cross
on the forehead, with chrism, for two reasons. First, because he is
signed with the sign of the cross, as a soldier with the sign of his
leader, which should be evident and manifest. Now, the forehead, which
is hardly ever covered, is the most conspicuous part of the human body.
Wherefore the confirmed is anointed with chrism on the forehead, that
he may show publicly that he is a Christian: thus too the apostles
after receiving the Holy Ghost showed themselves in public, whereas
before they remained hidden in the upper room.
Secondly, because man is hindered from freely confessing Christ's name,
by two things---by fear and by shame. Now both these things betray
themselves principally on the forehead on account of the proximity of
the imagination, and because the (vital) spirits mount directly from
the heart to the forehead: hence "those who are ashamed, blush, and
those who are afraid, pale" (Ethic. iv). And therefore man is signed
with chrism, that neither fear nor shame may hinder him from confessing
the name of Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: By baptism we are regenerated unto spiritual
life, which belongs to the whole man. But in Confirmation we are
strengthened for the combat; the sign of which should be borne on the
forehead, as in a conspicuous place.
Reply to Objection 2: The principle of fortitude is in the heart, but
its sign appears on the forehead: wherefore it is written (Ezech. 3:8):
"Behold I have made . . . thy forehead harder than their foreheads."
Hence the sacrament of the Eucharist, whereby man is confirmed in
himself, belongs to the heart, according to Ps. 103:15: "That bread may
strengthen man's heart." But the sacrament of Confirmation is required
as a sign of fortitude against others; and for this reason it is given
on the forehead.
Reply to Objection 3: This sacrament is given that we may confess
freely: but not that we may confess simply, for this is also the effect
of Baptism. And therefore it should not be given on the mouth, but on
the forehead, where appear the signs of those passions which hinder
free confession.
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Whether he who is confirmed needs one to stand* for him? [*Literally, "to
hold him"]
Objection 1: It seems that he who is confirmed needs no one to stand
for him. For this sacrament is given not only to children but also to
adults. But adults can stand for themselves. Therefore it is absurd
that someone else should stand for them.
Objection 2: Further, he that belongs already to the Church, has free
access to the prince of the Church, i.e. the bishop. But this
sacrament, as stated above [4500](A[6]), is given only to one that is
baptized, who is already a member of the Church. Therefore it seems
that he should not be brought by another to the bishop in order to
receive this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is given for spiritual strength,
which has more vigor in men than in women, according to Prov. 31:10:
"Who shall find a valiant woman?" Therefore at least a woman should not
stand for a man in confirmation.
On the contrary, Are the following words of Pope Innocent, which are to
be found in the Decretals (XXX, Q[4]): "If anyone raise the children of
another's marriage from the sacred font, or stand for them in
Confirmation," etc. Therefore, just as someone is required as sponsor
of one who is baptized, so is someone required to stand for him who is
to be confirmed .
I answer that, As stated above ([4501]AA[1],4,9), this sacrament is
given to man for strength in the spiritual combat. Now, just as one
newly born requires someone to teach him things pertaining to ordinary
conduct, according to Heb. 12:9: "We have had fathers of our flesh, for
instructors, and we obeyed [Vulg.: 'reverenced']" them; so they who are
chosen for the fight need instructors by whom they are informed of
things concerning the conduct of the battle, and hence in earthly wars,
generals and captains are appointed to the command of the others. For
this reason he also who receives this sacrament, has someone to stand
for him, who, as it were, has to instruct him concerning the fight.
Likewise, since this sacrament bestows on man the perfection of
spiritual age, as stated above ([4502]AA[2],5), therefore he who
approaches this sacrament is upheld by another, as being spiritually a
weakling and a child.
Reply to Objection 1: Although he who is confirmed, be adult in body,
nevertheless he is not yet spiritually adult.
Reply to Objection 2: Though he who is baptized is made a member of the
Church, nevertheless he is not yet enrolled as a Christian soldier. And
therefore he is brought to the bishop, as to the commander of the army,
by one who is already enrolled as a Christian soldier. For one who is
not yet confirmed should not stand for another in Confirmation.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Col. 3 *(Gal. 3:28), "in Christ
Jesus there is neither male nor female." Consequently it matters not
whether a man or a woman stand for one who is to be confirmed.
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Whether only a bishop can confer this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that not only a bishop can confer this sacrament.
For Gregory (Regist. iv), writing to Bishop Januarius, says: "We hear
that some were scandalized because we forbade priests to anoint with
chrism those who have been baptized. Yet in doing this we followed the
ancient custom of our Church: but if this trouble some so very much we
permit priests, where no bishop is to be had, to anoint the baptized on
the forehead with chrism." But that which is essential to the
sacraments should not be changed for the purpose of avoiding scandal.
Therefore it seems that it is not essential to this sacrament that it
be conferred by a bishop.
Objection 2: Further, the sacrament of Baptism seems to be more
efficacious than the sacrament of Confirmation: since it bestows full
remission of sins, both as to guilt and as to punishment, whereas this
sacrament does not. But a simple priest, in virtue of his office, can
give the sacrament of Baptism: and in a case of necessity anyone, even
without orders, can baptize. Therefore it is not essential to this
sacrament that it be conferred by a bishop.
Objection 3: Further, the top of the head, where according to medical
men the reason is situated (i.e. the "particular reason," which is
called the "cogitative faculty"), is more noble than the forehead,
which is the site of the imagination. But a simple priest can anoint
the baptized with chrism on the top of the head. Therefore much more
can he anoint them with chrism on the forehead, which belongs to this
sacrament.
On the contrary, Pope Eusebius (Ep. iii ad Ep. Tusc.) says: "The
sacrament of the imposition of the hand should be held in great
veneration, and can be given by none but the high priests. Nor is it
related or known to have been conf erred in apostolic times by others
than the apostles themselves; nor can it ever be either licitly or
validly performed by others than those who stand in their place. And if
anyone presume to do otherwise, it must be considered null and void;
nor will such a thing ever be counted among the sacraments of the
Church." Therefore it is essential to this sacrament, which is called
"the sacrament of the imposition of the hand," that it be given by a
bishop.
I answer that, In every work the final completion is reserved to the
supreme act or power; thus the preparation of the matter belongs to the
lower craftsmen, the higher gives the form, but the highest of all is
he to whom pertains the use, which is the end of things made by art;
thus also the letter which is written by the clerk, is signed by his
employer. Now the faithful of Christ are a Divine work, according to 1
Cor. 3:9: "You are God's building"; and they are also "an epistle," as
it were, "written with the Spirit of God," according to 2 Cor. 3:2,3.
And this sacrament of Confirmation is, as it were, the final completion
of the sacrament of Baptism; in the sense that by Baptism man is built
up into a spiritual dwelling, and is written like a spiritual letter;
whereas by the sacrament of Confirmation, like a house already built,
he is consecrated as a temple of the Holy Ghost, and as a letter
already written, is signed with the sign of the cross. Therefore the
conferring of this sacrament is reserved to bishops, who possess
supreme power in the Church: just as in the primitive Church, the
fulness of the Holy Ghost was given by the apostles, in whose place the
bishops stand (Acts 8). Hence Pope Urban I says: "All the faithful
should. after Baptism, receive the Holy Ghost by the imposition of the
bishop's hand, that they may become perfect Christians."
Reply to Objection 1: The Pope has the plenitude of power in the
Church, in virtue of which he can commit to certain lower orders things
that belong to the higher orders: thus he allows priests to confer
minor orders, which belong to the episcopal power. And in virtue of
this fulness of power the Pope, Blessed Gregory, allowed simple priests
to confer this sacrament, so long as the scandal was ended.
Reply to Objection 2: The sacrament of Baptism is more efficacious than
this sacrament as to the removal of evil, since it is a spiritual
birth, that consists in change from non-being to being. But this
sacrament is more efficacious for progress in good; since it is a
spiritual growth from imperfect being to perfect being. And hence this
sacrament is committed to a more worthy minister.
Reply to Objection 3: As Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i), "the
baptized is signed by the priest with chrism on the top of the head,
but by the bishop on the forehead; that the former unction may
symbolize the descent of the Holy Ghost on hint, in order to consecrate
a dwelling to God: and that the second also may teach us that the
sevenfold grace of the same Holy Ghost descends on man with all fulness
of sanctity, knowledge and virtue." Hence this unction is reserved to
bishops, not on account of its being applied to a more worthy part of
the body, but by reason of its having a more powerful effect.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the rite of this sacrament is appropriate?
Objection 1: It seems that the rite of this sacrament is not
appropriate. For the sacrament of Baptism is of greater necessity than
this, as stated above (A[2], ad 4;[4503] Q[65], AA[3],4). But certain
seasons are fixed for Baptism, viz. Easter and Pentecost. Therefore
some fixed time of the year should be chosen for this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, just as this sacrament requires devotion both in
the giver and in the receiver, so also does the sacrament of Baptism.
But in the sacrament of Baptism it is not necessary that it should be
received or given fasting. Therefore it seems unfitting for the Council
of Orleans to declare that "those who come to Confirmation should be
fasting"; and the Council of Meaux, "that bishops should not give the
Holy Ghost with imposition of the hand except they be fasting."
Objection 3: Further, chrism is a sign of the fulness of the Holy
Ghost, as stated above [4504](A[2]). But the fulness of the Holy Ghost
was given to Christ's faithful on the day of Pentecost, as related in
Acts 2:1. Therefore the chrism should be mixed and blessed on the day
of Pentecost rather than on Maundy Thursday.
On the contrary, Is the use of the Church, who is governed by the Holy
Ghost.
I answer that, Our Lord promised His faithful (Mat. 18:20) saying:
"Where there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I
in the midst of them." And therefore we must hold firmly that the
Church's ordinations are directed by the wisdom of Christ. And for this
reason we must look upon it as certain that the rite observed by the
Church, in this and the other sacraments, is appropriate.
Reply to Objection 1: As Pope Melchiades says (Ep. ad Epis. Hispan.),
"these two sacraments," viz. Baptism and Confirmation, "are so closely
connected that they can nowise be separated save by death intervening,
nor can one be duly celebrated without the other." Consequently the
same seasons are fixed for the solemn celebration of Baptism and of
this sacrament. But since this sacrament is given only by bishops, who
are not always present where priests are baptizing, it was necessary,
as regards the common use, to defer the sacrament of Confirmation to
other seasons also.
Reply to Objection 2: The sick and those in danger of death are exempt
from this prohibition, as we read in the decree of the Council of
Meaux. And therefore, on account of the multitude of the faithful, and
on account of imminent dangers, it is allowed for this sacrament, which
can be given by none but a bishop, to be given or received even by
those who are not fasting: since one bishop, especially in a large
diocese, would not suffice to confirm all, if he were confined to
certain times. But where it can be done conveniently, it is more
becoming that both giver and receiver should be fasting.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the acts of the Council of Pope
Martin, "it was lawful at all times to prepare the chrism." But since
solemn Baptism, for which chrism has to be used, is celebrated on
Easter Eve, it was rightly decreed, that chrism should be consecrated
by the bishop two days beforehand, that it may be sent to the various
parts of the diocese. Moreover, this day is sufficiently appropriate to
the blessing of sacramental matter, since thereon was the Eucharist
instituted, to which, in a certain way, all the other sacraments are
ordained, as stated above ([4505]Q[65], A[3]).
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OF THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the sacrament of the Eucharist; and first of
all we treat of the sacrament itself; secondly, of its matter; thirdly,
of its form; fourthly, of its effects; fifthly, of the recipients of
this sacrament; sixthly, of the minister; seventhly, of the rite.
Under the first heading there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Eucharist is a sacrament?
(2) Whether it is one or several sacraments?
(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation?
(4) Its names;
(5) Its institution;
(6) Its figures.
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Whether the Eucharist is a sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the Eucharist is not a sacrament. For two
sacraments ought not to be ordained for the same end, because every
sacrament is efficacious in producing its effect. Therefore, since both
Confirmation and the Eucharist are ordained for perfection, as
Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iv), it seems that the Eucharist is not a
sacrament, since Confirmation is one, as stated above ([4506]Q[65],
A[1];[4507] Q[72], A[1]).
Objection 2: Further, in every sacrament of the New Law, that which
comes visibly under our senses causes the invisible effect of the
sacrament, just as cleansing with water causes the baptismal character
and spiritual cleansing, as stated above ([4508]Q[63], A[6];[4509]
Q[66], AA[1],3,7). But the species of bread and wine, which are the
objects of our senses in this sacrament, neither produce Christ's true
body, which is both reality and sacrament, nor His mystical body, which
is the reality only in the Eucharist. Therefore, it seems that the
Eucharist is not a sacrament of the New Law.
Objection 3: Further, sacraments of the New Law, as having matter, are
perfected by the use of the matter, as Baptism is by ablution, and
Confirmation by signing with chrism. If, then, the Eucharist be a
sacrament, it would be perfected by the use of the matter, and not by
its consecration. But this is manifestly false, because the words
spoken in the consecration of the matter are the form of this
sacrament, as will be shown later on ([4510]Q[78], A[1]). Therefore the
Eucharist is not a sacrament.
On the contrary, It is said in the Collect [*Postcommunion "pro vivis
et defunctis"]: "May this Thy Sacrament not make us deserving of
punishment."
I answer that, The Church's sacraments are ordained for helping man in
the spiritual life. But the spiritual life is analogous to the
corporeal, since corporeal things bear a resemblance to spiritual. Now
it is clear that just as generation is required for corporeal life,
since thereby man receives life; and growth, whereby man is brought to
maturity: so likewise food is required for the preservation of life.
Consequently, just as for the spiritual life there had to be Baptism,
which is spiritual generation; and Confirmation, which is spiritual
growth: so there needed to be the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is
spiritual food.
Reply to Objection 1: Perfection is twofold. The first lies within man
himself; and he attains it by growth: such perfection belongs to
Confirmation. The other is the perfection which comes to man from the
addition of food, or clothing, or something of the kind; and such is
the perfection befitting the Eucharist, which is the spiritual
refreshment.
Reply to Objection 2: The water of Baptism does not cause any spiritual
effect by reason of the water, but by reason of the power of the Holy
Ghost, which power is in the water. Hence on Jn. 5:4, "An angel of the
Lord at certain times," etc., Chrysostom observes: "The water does not
act simply as such upon the baptized, but when it receives the grace of
the Holy Ghost, then it looses all sins." But the true body of Christ.
bears the same relation to the species of the bread and wine, as the
power of the Holy Ghost does to the water of Baptism: hence the species
of the bread and wine produce no effect except from the virtue of
Christ's true body.
Reply to Objection 3: A sacrament is so termed because it contains
something sacred. Now a thing can be styled sacred from two causes;
either absolutely, or in relation to something else. The difference
between the Eucharist and other sacraments having sensible matter is
that whereas the Eucharist contains something which is sacred
absolutely, namely, Christ's own body; the baptismal water contains
something which is sacred in relation to something else, namely, the
sanctifying power: and the same holds good of chrism and such like.
Consequently, the sacrament of the Eucharist is completed in the very
consecration of the matter, whereas the other sacraments are completed
in the application of the matter for the sanctifying of the individual.
And from this follows another difference. For, in the sacrament of the
Eucharist, what is both reality and sacrament is in the matter itself.
but what is reality only, namely, the grace bestowed, is in the
recipient; whereas in Baptism both are in the recipient, namely, the
character, which is both reality and sacrament, and the grace of pardon
of sins, which is reality only. And the same holds good of the other
sacraments.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Eucharist is one sacrament or several?
Objection 1: It seems that the Eucharist is not one sacrament but
several, because it is said in the Collect [*Postcommunion "pro vivis
et defunctis"]: "May the sacraments which we have received purify us, O
Lord": and this is said on account of our receiving the Eucharist.
Consequently the Eucharist is not one sacrament but several.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible for genera to be multiplied
without the species being multiplied: thus it is impossible for one man
to be many animals. But, as stated above ([4511]Q[60], A[1]), sign is
the genus of sacrament. Since, then, there are more signs than one, to
wit, bread and wine, it seems to follow that here must be more
sacraments than one.
Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is perfected in the consecration
of the matter, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But in this sacrament
there is a double consecration of the matter. Therefore, it is a
twofold sacrament.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:17): "For we, being many,
are one bread, one body, all that partake of one bread": from which it
is clear that the Eucharist is the sacrament of the Church's unity. But
a sacrament bears the likeness of the reality whereof it is the
sacrament. Therefore the Eucharist is one sacrament.
I answer that, As stated in Metaph. v, a thing is said to be one, not
only from being indivisible, or continuous, but also when it is
complete; thus we speak of one house, and one man. A thing is one in
perfection, when it is complete through the presence of all that is
needed for its end; as a man is complete by having all the members
required for the operation of his soul, and a house by having all the
parts needful for dwelling therein. And so this sacrament is said to be
one. Because it is ordained for spiritual refreshment, which is
conformed to corporeal refreshment. Now there are two things required
for corporeal refreshment, namely, food, which is dry sustenance, and
drink, which is wet sustenance. Consequently, two things concur for the
integrity of this sacrament, to wit, spiritual food and spiritual
drink, according to John: "My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is
drink indeed." Therefore, this sacrament is materially many, but
formally and perfectively one.
Reply to Objection 1: The same Collect at first employs the plural:
"May the sacraments which we have received purify us"; and afterwards
the singular number: "May this sacrament of Thine not make us worthy of
punishment": so as to show that this sacrament is in a measure several,
yet simply one.
Reply to Objection 2: The bread and wine are materially several signs,
yet formally and perfectively one, inasmuch as one refreshment is
prepared therefrom.
Reply to Objection 3: From the double consecration of the matter no
more can be gathered than that the sacrament is several materially, as
stated above.
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Whether the Eucharist is necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament is necessary for salvation.
For our Lord said (Jn. 6:54): "Except you eat the flesh of the Son of
Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you." But Christ's
flesh is eaten and His blood drunk in this sacrament. Therefore,
without this sacrament man cannot have the health of spiritual life.
Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is a kind of spiritual food. But
bodily food is requisite for bodily health. Therefore, also is this
sacrament, for spiritual health.
Objection 3: Further, as Baptism is the sacrament of our Lord's
Passion, without which there is no salvation, so also is the Eucharist.
For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:26): "For as often as you shall eat
this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the
Lord, until He come." Consequently, as Baptism is necessary for
salvation, so also is this sacrament.
On the contrary, Augustine writes (Ad Bonifac. contra Pelag. I): "Nor
are you to suppose that children cannot possess life, who are deprived
of the body and blood of Christ."
I answer that, Two things have to be considered in this sacrament,
namely, the sacrament itself, and what is contained in it. Now it was
stated above (A[1], OBJ[2]) that the reality of the sacrament is the
unity of the mystical body, without which there can be no salvation;
for there is no entering into salvation outside the Church, just as in
the time of the deluge there was none outside the Ark, which denotes
the Church, according to 1 Pet. 3:20,21. And it has been said above
([4512]Q[68], A[2]), that before receiving a sacrament, the reality of
the sacrament can be had through the very desire of receiving the
sacrament. Accordingly, before actual reception of this sacrament, a
man can obtain salvation through the desire of receiving it, just as he
can before Baptism through the desire of Baptism, as stated above
([4513]Q[68], A[2]). Yet there is a difference in two respects. First
of all, because Baptism is the beginning of the spiritual life, and the
door of the sacraments; whereas the Eucharist is, as it were, the
consummation of the spiritual life, and the end of all the sacraments,
as was observed above ([4514]Q[63], A[6]): for by the hallowings of all
the sacraments preparation is made for receiving or consecrating the
Eucharist. Consequently, the reception of Baptism is necessary for
starting the spiritual life, while the receiving of the Eucharist is
requisite for its consummation; by partaking not indeed actually, but
in desire, as an end is possessed in desire and intention. Another
difference is because by Baptism a man is ordained to the Eucharist,
and therefore from the fact of children being baptized, they are
destined by the Church to the Eucharist; and just as they believe
through the Church's faith, so they desire the Eucharist through the
Church's intention, and, as a result, receive its reality. But they are
not disposed for Baptism by any previous sacrament, and consequently
before receiving Baptism, in no way have they Baptism in desire; but
adults alone have: consequently, they cannot have the reality of the
sacrament without receiving the sacrament itself. Therefore this
sacrament is not necessary for salvation in the same way as Baptism is.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says, explaining Jn. 6:54, "This
food and this drink," namely, of His flesh and blood: "He would have us
understand the fellowship of His body and members, which is the Church
in His predestinated, and called, and justified, and glorified, His
holy and believing ones." Hence, as he says in his Epistle to Boniface
(Pseudo-Beda, in 1 Cor. 10:17): "No one should entertain the slightest
doubt, that then every one of the faithful becomes a partaker of the
body and blood of Christ, when in Baptism he is made a member of
Christ's body; nor is he deprived of his share in that body and chalice
even though he depart from this world in the unity of Christ's body,
before he eats that bread and drinks of that chalice."
Reply to Objection 2: The difference between corporeal and spiritual
food lies in this, that the former is changed into the substance of the
person nourished, and consequently it cannot avail for supporting life
except it be partaken of; but spiritual food changes man into itself,
according to that saying of Augustine (Confess. vii), that he heard the
voice of Christ as it were saying to him: "Nor shalt thou change Me
into thyself, as food of thy flesh, but thou shalt be changed into Me."
But one can be changed into Christ, and be incorporated in Him by
mental desire, even without receiving this sacrament. And consequently
the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is the sacrament of Christ's death and
Passion, according as a man is born anew in Christ in virtue of His
Passion; but the Eucharist is the sacrament of Christ's Passion
according as a man is made perfect in union with Christ Who suffered.
Hence, as Baptism is called the sacrament of Faith, which is the
foundation of the spiritual life, so the Eucharist is termed the
sacrament of Charity, which is "the bond of perfection" (Col. 3:14).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this sacrament is suitably called by various names?
Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament is not suitably called by
various names. For names should correspond with things. But this
sacrament is one, as stated above [4515](A[2]). Therefore, it ought not
to be called by various names.
Objection 2: Further, a species is not properly denominated by what is
common to the whole genus. But the Eucharist is a sacrament of the New
Law; and it is common to all the sacraments for grace to be conferred
by them, which the name "Eucharist" denotes, for it is the same thing
as "good grace." Furthermore, all the sacraments bring us help on our
journey through this present life, which is the notion conveyed by
"Viaticum." Again something sacred is done in all the sacraments, which
belongs to the notion of "Sacrifice"; and the faithful intercommunicate
through all the sacraments, which this Greek word {Synaxis} and the
Latin "Communio" express. Therefore, these names are not suitably
adapted to this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, a host [*From Latin "hostia," a victim] seems to
be the same as a sacrifice. Therefore, as it is not properly called a
sacrifice, so neither is it properly termed a "Host."
On the contrary, is the use of these expressions by the faithful.
I answer that, This sacrament has a threefold significance. one with
regard to the past, inasmuch as it is commemorative of our Lord's
Passion, which was a true sacrifice, as stated above ([4516]Q[48],
A[3]), and in this respect it is called a "Sacrifice."
With regard to the present it has another meaning, namely, that of
Ecclesiastical unity, in which men are aggregated through this
Sacrament; and in this respect it is called "Communion" or {Synaxis}.
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that "it is called Communion
because we communicate with Christ through it, both because we partake
of His flesh and Godhead, and because we communicate with and are
united to one another through it."
With regard to the future it has a third meaning, inasmuch as this
sacrament foreshadows the Divine fruition, which shall come to pass in
heaven; and according to this it is called "Viaticum," because it
supplies the way of winning thither. And in this respect it is also
called the "Eucharist," that is, "good grace," because "the grace of
God is life everlasting" (Rom. 6:23); or because it really contains
Christ, Who is "full of grace."
In Greek, moreover, it is called {Metalepsis}, i.e. "Assumption,"
because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv), "we thereby assume the
Godhead of the Son."
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to hinder the same thing from
being called by several names, according to its various properties or
effects.
Reply to Objection 2: What is common to all the sacraments is
attributed antonomastically to this one on account of its excellence.
Reply to Objection 3: This sacrament is called a "Sacrifice" inasmuch
as it represents the Passion of Christ; but it is termed a "Host"
inasmuch as it contains Christ, Who is "a host (Douay: 'sacrifice') . .
. of sweetness" (Eph. 5:2).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the institution of this sacrament was appropriate?
Objection 1: It seems that the institution of this sacrament was not
appropriate, because as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii): "We are
nourished by the things from whence we spring." But by Baptism, which
is spiritual regeneration, we receive our spiritual being, as Dionysius
says (Eccl. Hier. ii). Therefore we are also nourished by Baptism.
Consequently there was no need to institute this sacrament as spiritual
nourishment.
Objection 2: Further, men are united with Christ through this sacrament
as the members with the head. But Christ is the Head of all men, even
of those who have existed from the beginning of the world, as stated
above ([4517]Q[8], AA[3],6). Therefore the institution of this
sacrament should not have been postponed till the Lord's supper.
Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is called the memorial of our
Lord's Passion, according to Mat. 26 (Lk. 22:19): "Do this for a
commemoration of Me." But a commemoration is of things past. Therefore,
this sacrament should not have been instituted before Christ's Passion.
Objection 4: Further, a man is prepared by Baptism for the Eucharist,
which ought to be given only to the baptized. But Baptism was
instituted by Christ after His Passion and Resurrection, as is evident
from Mat. 28:19. Therefore, this sacrament was not suitably instituted
before Christ's Passion.
On the contrary, This sacrament was instituted by Christ, of Whom it is
said (Mk. 7:37) that "He did all things well."
I answer that, This sacrament was appropriately instituted at the
supper, when Christ conversed with His disciples for the last time.
First of all, because of what is contained in the sacrament: for Christ
is Himself contained in the Eucharist sacramentally. Consequently, when
Christ was going to leave His disciples in His proper species, He left
Himself with them under the sacramental species; as the Emperor's image
is set up to be reverenced in his absence. Hence Eusebius says: "Since
He was going to withdraw His assumed body from their eyes, and bear it
away to the stars, it was needful that on the day of the supper He
should consecrate the sacrament of His body and blood for our sakes, in
order that what was once offered up for our ransom should be fittingly
worshiped in a mystery."
Secondly, because without faith in the Passion there could never be any
salvation, according to Rom. 3:25: "Whom God hath proposed to be a
propitiation, through faith in His blood." It was necessary accordingly
that there should be at all times among men something to show forth our
Lord's Passion; the chief sacrament of which in the old Law was the
Paschal Lamb. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:7): "Christ our Pasch is
sacrificed." But its successor under the New Testament is the sacrament
of the Eucharist, which is a remembrance of the Passion now past, just
as the other was figurative of the Passion to come. And so it was
fitting that when the hour of the Passion was come, Christ should
institute a new Sacrament after celebrating the old, as Pope Leo I says
(Serm. lviii).
Thirdly, because last words, chiefly such as are spoken by departing
friends, are committed most deeply to memory; since then especially
affection for friends is more enkindled, and the things which affect us
most are impressed the deepest in the soul. Consequently, since, as
Pope Alexander I says, "among sacrifices there can be none greater than
the body and blood of Christ, nor any more powerful oblation"; our Lord
instituted this sacrament at His last parting with His disciples, in
order that it might be held in the greater veneration. And this is what
Augustine says (Respons. ad Januar. i): "In order to commend more
earnestly the death of this mystery, our Saviour willed this last act
to be fixed in the hearts and memories of the disciples whom He was
about to quit for the Passion."
Reply to Objection 1: We are nourished from the same things of which we
are made, but they do not come to us in the same way; for those out of
which we are made come to us through generation, while the same, as
nourishing us, come to us through being eaten. Hence, as we are
new-born in Christ through Baptism, so through the Eucharist we eat
Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: The Eucharist is the perfect sacrament of our
Lord's Passion, as containing Christ crucified; consequently it could
not be instituted before the Incarnation; but then there was room for
only such sacraments as were prefigurative of the Lord's Passion.
Reply to Objection 3: This sacrament was instituted during the supper,
so as in the future to be a memorial of our Lord's Passion as
accomplished. Hence He said expressively: "As often as ye shall do
these things" [*Cf. Canon of the Mass], speaking of the future.
Reply to Objection 4: The institution responds to the order of
intention. But the sacrament of the Eucharist, although after Baptism
in the receiving, is yet previous to it in intention; and therefore it
behooved to be instituted first. or else it can be said that Baptism
was already instituted in Christ's Baptism; hence some were already
baptized with Christ's Baptism, as we read in Jn. 3:22.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Paschal Lamb was the chief figure of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the Paschal Lamb was not the chief figure of
this sacrament, because (Ps. 109:4) Christ is called "a priest
according to the order of Melchisedech," since Melchisedech bore the
figure of Christ's sacrifice, in offering bread and wine. But the
expression of likeness causes one thing to be named from another.
Therefore, it seems that Melchisedech's offering was the "principal"
figure of this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, the passage of the Red Sea was a figure of
Baptism, according to 1 Cor. 10:2: "All . . . were baptized in the
cloud and in the sea." But the immolation of the Paschal Lamb was
previous to the passage of the Red Sea, and the Manna came after it,
just as the Eucharist follows Baptism. Therefore the Manna is a more
expressive figure of this sacrament than the Paschal Lamb.
Objection 3: Further, the principal power of this sacrament is that it
brings us into the kingdom of heaven, being a kind of "viaticum." But
this was chiefly prefigured in the sacrament of expiation when the
"high-priest entered once a year into the Holy of Holies with blood,"
as the Apostle proves in Heb. 9. Consequently, it seems that that
sacrifice was a more significant figure of this sacrament than was the
Paschal Lamb.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:7,8): "Christ our Pasch is
sacrificed; therefore let us feast . . . with the unleavened bread of
sincerity and truth."
I answer that, We can consider three things in this sacrament: namely,
that which is sacrament only, and this is the bread and wine; that
which is both reality and sacrament, to wit, Christ's true body; and
lastly that which is reality only, namely, the effect of this
sacrament. Consequently, in relation to what is sacrament only, the
chief figure of this sacrament was the oblation of Melchisedech, who
offered up bread and wine. In relation to Christ crucified, Who is
contained in this sacrament, its figures were all the sacrifices of the
Old Testament, especially the sacrifice of expiation, which was the
most solemn of all. While with regard to its effect, the chief figure
was the Manna, "having in it the sweetness of every taste" (Wis.
16:20), just as the grace of this sacrament refreshes the soul in all
respects.
The Paschal Lamb foreshadowed this sacrament in these three ways. First
of all, because it was eaten with unleavened loaves, according to Ex.
12:8: "They shall eat flesh . . . and unleavened bread." As to the
second because it was immolated by the entire multitude of the children
of Israel on the fourteenth day of the moon; and this was a figure of
the Passion of Christ, Who is called the Lamb on account of His
innocence. As to the effect, because by the blood of the Paschal Lamb
the children of Israel were preserved from the destroying Angel, and
brought from the Egyptian captivity; and in this respect the Paschal
Lamb is the chief figure of this sacrament, because it represents it in
every respect.
From this the answer to the Objections is manifest.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MATTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the matter of this sacrament: and first of all
as to its species; secondly, the change of the bread and wine into the
body of Christ; thirdly, the manner in which Christ's body exists in
this sacrament; fourthly, the accidents of bread and wine which
continue in this sacrament.
Under the first heading there are eight points for inquiry:
(1) Whether bread and wine are the matter of this sacrament?
(2) Whether a determinate quantity of the same is required for the
matter of this sacrament?
(3) Whether the matter of this sacrament is wheaten bread?
(4) Whether it is unleavened or fermented bread?
(5) Whether the matter of this sacrament is wine from the grape?
(6) Whether water should be mixed with it?
(7) Whether water is of necessity for this sacrament?
(8) Of the quantity of the water added.
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Whether the matter of this sacrament is bread and wine?
Objection 1: It seems that the matter of this sacrament is not bread
and wine. Because this sacrament ought to represent Christ's Passion
more fully than did the sacraments of the Old Law. But the flesh of
animals, which was the matter of the sacraments under the Old Law,
shows forth Christ's Passion more fully than bread and wine. Therefore
the matter of this sacrament ought rather to be the flesh of animals
than bread and wine.
Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is to be celebrated in every
place. But in many lands bread is not to be found, and in many places
wine is not to be found. Therefore bread and wine are not a suitable
matter for this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is for both hale and weak. But to
some weak persons wine is hurtful. Therefore it seems that wine ought
not to be the matter of this sacrament.
On the contrary, Pope Alexander I says (Ep. ad omnes orth. i): "In
oblations of the sacraments only bread and wine mixed with water are to
be offered."
I answer that, Some have fallen into various errors about the matter of
this sacrament. Some, known as the Artotyrytae, as Augustine says (De
Haeres. xxviii), "offer bread and cheese in this sacrament, contending
that oblations were celebrated by men in the first ages, from fruits of
the earth and sheep." Others, called Cataphrygae and Pepuziani, "are
reputed to have made their Eucharistic bread with infants' blood drawn
from tiny punctures over the entire body, and mixed with flour."
Others, styled Aquarii, under guise of sobriety, offer nothing but
water in this sacrament.
Now all these and similar errors are excluded by the fact that Christ
instituted this sacrament under the species of bread and wine, as is
evident from Mat. 26. Consequently, bread and wine are the proper
matter of this sacrament. And the reasonableness of this is seen first,
in the use of this sacrament, which is eating: for, as water is used in
the sacrament of Baptism for the purpose of spiritual cleansing, since
bodily cleansing is commonly done with water; so bread and wine,
wherewith men are commonly fed, are employed in this sacrament for the
use of spiritual eating.
Secondly, in relation to Christ's Passion, in which the blood was
separated from the body. And therefore in this sacrament, which is the
memorial of our Lord's Passion, the bread is received apart as the
sacrament of the body, and the wine as the sacrament of the blood.
Thirdly, as to the effect, considered in each of the partakers. For, as
Ambrose (Mag. Sent. iv, D, xi) says on 1 Cor. 11:20, this sacrament
"avails for the defense of soul and body"; and therefore "Christ's body
is offered" under the species of bread "for the health of the body, and
the blood" under the species of wine "for the health of the soul,"
according to Lev. 17:14: "The life of the animal [Vulg.: 'of all
flesh'] is in the blood."
Fourthly, as to the effect with regard to the whole Church, which is
made up of many believers, just "as bread is composed of many grains,
and wine flows from many grapes," as the gloss observes on 1 Cor.
10:17: "We being many are . . . one body," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the flesh of slaughtered animals
represents the Passion more forcibly, nevertheless it is less suitable
for the common use of this sacrament, and for denoting the unity of the
Church.
Reply to Objection 2: Although wheat and wine are not produced in every
country, yet they can easily be conveyed to every land, that is, as
much as is needful for the use of this sacrament: at the same time one
is not to be consecrated when the other is lacking, because it would
not be a complete sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: Wine taken in small quantity cannot do the sick
much harm: yet if there be fear of harm, it is not necessary for all
who take Christ's body to partake also of His blood, as will be stated
later ([4518]Q[80], A[12]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a determinate quantity of bread and wine is required for the matter
of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that a determinate quantity of bread and wine is
required for the matter of this sacrament. Because the effects of grace
are no less set in order than those of nature. But, "there is a limit
set by nature upon all existing things, and a reckoning of size and
development" (De Anima ii). Consequently, in this sacrament, which is
called "Eucharist," that is, "a good grace," a determinate quantity of
the bread and wine is required.
Objection 2: Further, Christ gave no power to the ministers of the
Church regarding matters which involve derision of the faith and of His
sacraments, according to 2 Cor. 10:8: "Of our power which the Lord hath
given us unto edification, and not for your destruction." But it would
lead to mockery of this sacrament if the priest were to wish to
consecrate all the bread which is sold in the market and all the wine
in the cellar. Therefore he cannot do this.
Objection 3: Further, if anyone be baptized in the sea, the entire
sea-water is not sanctified by the form of baptism, but only the water
wherewith the body of the baptized is cleansed. Therefore, neither in
this sacrament can a superfluous quantity of bread be consecrated.
On the contrary, Much is opposed to little, and great to small. But
there is no quantity, however small, of the bread and wine which cannot
be consecrated. Therefore, neither is there any quantity, however
great, which cannot be consecrated.
I answer that, Some have maintained that the priest could not
consecrate an immense quantity of bread and wine, for instance, all the
bread in the market or all the wine in a cask. But this does not appear
to be true, because in all things containing matter, the reason for the
determination of the matter is drawn from its disposition to an end,
just as the matter of a saw is iron, so as to adapt it for cutting. But
the end of this sacrament is the use of the faithful. Consequently, the
quantity of the matter of this sacrament must be determined by
comparison with the use of the faithful. But this cannot be determined
by comparison with the use of the faithful who are actually present;
otherwise the parish priest having few parishioners could not
consecrate many hosts. It remains, then, for the matter of this
sacrament to be determined in reference to the number of the faithful
absolutely. But the number of the faithful is not a determinate one.
Hence it cannot be said that the quantity of the matter of this
sacrament is restricted.
Reply to Objection 1: The matter of every natural object has its
determinate quantity by comparison with its determinate form. But the
number of the faithful, for whose use this sacrament is ordained, is
not a determinate one. Consequently there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of the Church's ministers is ordained
for two purposes: first for the proper effect, and secondly for the end
of the effect. But the second does not take away the first. Hence, if
the priest intends to consecrate the body of Christ for an evil
purpose, for instance, to make mockery of it, or to administer poison
through it, he commits sin by his evil intention, nevertheless, on
account of the power committed to him, he accomplishes the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: The sacrament of Baptism is perfected in the use
of the matter: and therefore no more of the water is hallowed than what
is used. But this sacrament is wrought in the consecration of the
matter. Consequently there is no parallel.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wheaten bread is required for the matter of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that wheaten bread is not requisite for the
matter of this sacrament, because this sacrament is a reminder of our
Lord's Passion. But barley bread seems to be more in keeping with the
Passion than wheaten bread, as being more bitter, and because Christ
used it to feed the multitudes upon the mountain, as narrated in Jn. 6.
Therefore wheaten bread is not the proper matter of this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, in natural things the shape is a sign of species.
But some cereals resemble wheat, such as spelt and maize, from which in
some localities bread is made for the use of this sacrament. Therefore
wheaten bread is not the proper matter of this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, mixing dissolves species. But wheaten flour is
hardly to be found unmixed with some other species of grain, except in
the instance of specially selected grain. Therefore it does not seem
that wheaten bread is the proper matter for this sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, what is corrupted appears to be of another
species. But some make the sacrament from bread which is corrupted, and
which no longer seems to be wheaten bread. Therefore, it seems that
such bread is not the proper matter of this sacrament.
On the contrary, Christ is contained in this sacrament, and He compares
Himself to a grain of wheat, saying (Jn. 12:24): "Unless the grain of
wheat falling into the ground die, itself remaineth alone." Therefore
bread from corn, i.e. wheaten bread, is the matter of this sacrament.
I answer that, As stated above [4519](A[1]), for the use of the
sacraments such matter is adopted as is commonly made use of among men.
Now among other breads wheaten bread is more commonly used by men;
since other breads seem to be employed when this fails. And
consequently Christ is believed to have instituted this sacrament under
this species of bread. Moreover this bread strengthens man, and so it
denotes more suitably the effect of this sacrament. Consequently, the
proper matter for this sacrament is wheaten bread.
Reply to Objection 1: Barley bread serves to denote the hardness of the
Old Law; both on account of the hardness of the bread, and because, as
Augustine says ([4520]Q[83]): "The flour within the barley, wrapped up
as it is within a most tenacious fibre, denotes either the Law itself,
which was given in such manner as to be vested in bodily sacraments; or
else it denotes the people themselves, who were not yet despoiled of
carnal desires, which clung to their hearts like fibre." But this
sacrament belongs to Christ's "sweet yoke," and to the truth already
manifested, and to a spiritual people. Consequently barley bread would
not be a suitable matter for this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: A begetter begets a thing like to itself in
species. yet there is some unlikeness as to the accidents, owing either
to the matter, or to weakness within the generative power. And
therefore, if there be any cereals which can be grown from the seed of
the wheat (as wild wheat from wheat seed grown in bad ground), the
bread made from such grain can be the matter of this sacrament: and
this does not obtain either in barley, or in spelt, or even in maize,
which is of all grains the one most resembling the wheat grain. But the
resemblance as to shape in such seems to denote closeness of species
rather than identity; just as the resemblance in shape between the dog
and the wolf goes to show that they are allied but not of the same
species. Hence from such grains, which cannot in any way be generated
from wheat grain, bread cannot be made such as to be the proper matter
of this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: A moderate mixing does not alter the species,
because that little is as it were absorbed by the greater.
Consequently, then, if a small quantity of another grain be mixed with
a much greater quantity of wheat, bread may be made therefrom so as to
be the proper matter of this sacrament; but if the mixing be notable,
for instance, half and half; or nearly so, then such mixing alters the
species; consequently, bread made therefrom will not be the proper
matter of this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes there is such corruption of the bread
that the species of bread is lost, as when the continuity of its parts
is destroyed, and the taste, color, and other accidents are changed;
hence the body of Christ may not be made from such matter. But
sometimes there is not such corruption as to alter the species, but
merely disposition towards corruption, which a slight change in the
savor betrays, and from such bread the body of Christ may be made: but
he who does so, sins from irreverence towards the sacrament. And
because starch comes of corrupted wheat, it does not seem as if the
body of Christ could be made of the bread made therefrom, although some
hold the contrary.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this sacrament ought to be made of unleavened bread?
Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament ought not to be made of
unleavened bread. because in this sacrament we ought to imitate
Christ's institution. But Christ appears to have instituted this
sacrament in fermented bread, because, as we have read in Ex. 12, the
Jews, according to the Law, began to use unleavened bread on the day of
the Passover which is celebrated on the fourteenth day of the moon; and
Christ instituted this sacrament at the supper which He celebrated
"before the festival day of the Pasch" (Jn. 13:1, 4). Therefore we
ought likewise to celebrate this sacrament with fermented bread.
Objection 2: Further, legal observances ought not to be continued in
the time of grace. But the use of unleavened bread was a ceremony of
the Law, as is clear from Ex. 12. Therefore we ought not to use
unfermented bread in this sacrament of grace.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([4521]Q[65], A[1];[4522] Q[73],
A[3]), the Eucharist is the sacrament of charity just as Baptism is the
sacrament of faith. But the fervor of charity is signified by fermented
bread, as is declared by the gloss on Mat. 13:33: "The kingdom of
heaven is like unto leaven," etc. Therefore this sacrament ought to be
made of leavened bread.
Objection 4: Further, leavened or unleavened are mere accidents of
bread, which do not vary the species. But in the matter for the
sacrament of Baptism no difference is observed regarding the variation
of the accidents, as to whether it be salt or fresh, warm or cold
water. Therefore neither ought any distinction to be observed, as to
whether the bread be unleavened or leavened.
On the contrary, According to the Decretals (Extra, De Celebr. Miss.),
a priest is punished "for presuming to celebrate, using fermented bread
and a wooden cup."
I answer that, Two things may be considered touching the matter of this
sacrament namely, what is necessary, and what is suitable. It is
necessary that the bread be wheaten, without which the sacrament is not
valid, as stated above [4523](A[3]). It is not, however, necessary for
the sacrament that the bread be unleavened or leavened, since it can be
celebrated in either.
But it is suitable that every priest observe the rite of his Church in
the celebration of the sacrament. Now in this matter there are various
customs of the Churches: for, Gregory says: "The Roman Church offers
unleavened bread, because our Lord took flesh without union of sexes:
but the Greek Churches offer leavened bread, because the Word of the
Father was clothed with flesh; as leaven is mixed with the flour."
Hence, as a priest sins by celebrating with fermented bread in the
Latin Church, so a Greek priest celebrating with unfermented bread in a
church of the Greeks would also sin, as perverting the rite of his
Church. Nevertheless the custom of celebrating with unleavened bread is
more reasonable. First, on account of Christ's institution: for He
instituted this sacrament "on the first day of the Azymes" (Mat. 26:17;
Mk. 14:12; Lk. 22:7), on which day there ought to be nothing fermented
in the houses of the Jews, as is stated in Ex. 12:15,19. Secondly,
because bread is properly the sacrament of Christ's body, which was
conceived without corruption, rather than of His Godhead, as will be
seen later ([4524]Q[76], A[1], ad 1). Thirdly, because this is more in
keeping with the sincerity of the faithful, which is required in the
use of this sacrament, according to 1 Cor. 5:7: "Christ our Pasch is
sacrificed: therefore let us feast . . . with the unleavened bread of
sincerity and truth."
However, this custom of the Greeks is not unreasonable both on account
of its signification, to which Gregory refers, and in detestation of
the heresy of the Nazarenes, who mixed up legal observances with the
Gospel.
Reply to Objection 1: As we read in Ex. 12, the paschal solemnity began
on the evening of the fourteenth day of the moon. So, then, after
immolating the Paschal Lamb, Christ instituted this sacrament: hence
this day is said by John to precede the day of the Pasch, while the
other three Evangelists call it "the first day of the Azymes," when
fermented bread was not found in the houses of the Jews, as stated
above. Fuller mention was made of this in the treatise on our Lord's
Passion ([4525]Q[46], A[9], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 2: Those who celebrate the sacrament with unleavened
bread do not intend to follow the ceremonial of the Law, but to conform
to Christ's institution; so they are not Judaizing; otherwise those
celebrating in fermented bread would be Judaizing, because the Jews
offered up fermented bread for the first-fruits.
Reply to Objection 3: Leaven denotes charity on account of one single
effect, because it makes the bread more savory and larger; but it also
signifies corruption from its very nature.
Reply to Objection 4: Since whatever is fermented partakes of
corruption, this sacrament may not be made from corrupt bread, as
stated above (A[3], ad 4); consequently, there is a wider difference
between unleavened and leavened bread than between warm and cold
baptismal water: because there might be such corruption of fermented
bread that it could not be validly used for the sacrament.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wine of the grape is the proper matter of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that wine of the grape is not the proper matter
of this sacrament. Because, as water is the matter of Baptism, so is
wine the matter of this sacrament. But Baptism can be conferred with
any kind of water. Therefore this sacrament can be celebrated in any
kind of wine, such as of pomegranates, or of mulberries; since vines do
not grow in some countries.
Objection 2: Further, vinegar is a kind of wine drawn from the grape,
as Isidore says (Etym. xx). But this sacrament cannot be celebrated
with vinegar. Therefore, it seems that wine from the grape is not the
proper matter of this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, just as the clarified wine is drawn from grapes,
so also are the juice of unripe grapes and must. But it does not appear
that this sacrament may be made from such, according to what we read in
the Sixth Council (Trull., Can. 28): "We have learned that in some
churches the priests add grapes to the sacrifice of the oblation; and
so they dispense both together to the people. Consequently we give
order that no priest shall do this in future." And Pope Julius I
rebukes some priests "who offer wine pressed from the grape in the
sacrament of the Lord's chalice." Consequently, it seems that wine from
the grape is not the proper matter of this sacrament.
On the contrary, As our Lord compared Himself to the grain of wheat, so
also He compared Himself to the vine, saying (Jn. 15:1): "I am the true
vine." But only bread from wheat is the matter of this sacrament, as
stated above [4526](A[3]). Therefore, only wine from the grape is the
proper matter of this sacrament.
I answer that, This sacrament can only be performed with wine from the
grape. First of all on account of Christ's institution, since He
instituted this sacrament in wine from the grape, as is evident from
His own words, in instituting this sacrament (Mat. 26:29): "I will not
drink from henceforth of this fruit of the vine." Secondly, because, as
stated above [4527](A[3]), that is adopted as the matter of the
sacraments which is properly and universally considered as such. Now
that is properly called wine, which is drawn from the grape, whereas
other liquors are called wine from resemblance to the wine of the
grape. Thirdly, because the wine from the grape is more in keeping with
the effect of this sacrament, which is spiritual; because it is written
(Ps. 103:15): "That wine may cheer the heart of man."
Reply to Objection 1: Such liquors are called wine, not properly but
only from their resemblance thereto. But genuine wine can be conveyed
to such countries wherein the grape-vine does not flourish, in a
quantity sufficient for this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Wine becomes vinegar by corruption; hence there
is no returning from vinegar to wine, as is said in Metaph. viii. And
consequently, just as this sacrament may not be made from bread which
is utterly corrupt, so neither can it be made from vinegar. It can,
however, be made from wine which is turning sour, just as from bread
turning corrupt, although he who does so sins, as stated above
[4528](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: The juice of unripe grapes is at the stage of
incomplete generation, and therefore it has not yet the species of
wine: on which account it may not be used for this sacrament. Must,
however, has already the species of wine, for its sweetness [*"Aut
dulcis musti Vulcano decoquit humorem"; Virgil, Georg. i, 295]
indicates fermentation which is "the result of its natural heat"
(Meteor. iv); consequently this sacrament can be made from must.
Nevertheless entire grapes ought not to be mixed with this sacrament,
because then there would be something else besides wine. It is
furthermore forbidden to offer must in the chalice, as soon as it has
been squeezed from the grape, since this is unbecoming owing to the
impurity of the must. But in case of necessity it may be done: for it
is said by the same Pope Julius, in the passage quoted in the argument:
"If necessary, let the grape be pressed into the chalice."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether water should be mixed with the wine?
Objection 1: It seems that water ought not to be mixed with the wine,
since Christ's sacrifice was foreshadowed by that of Melchisedech, who
(Gn. 14:18) is related to have offered up bread and wine only.
Consequently it seems that water should not be added in this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, the various sacraments have their respective
matters. But water is the matter of Baptism. Therefore it should not be
employed as the matter of this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, bread and wine are the matter of this sacrament.
But nothing is added to the bread. Therefore neither should anything be
added to the wine.
On the contrary, Pope Alexander I writes (Ep. 1 ad omnes orth.): "In
the sacramental oblations which in mass are offered to the Lord, only
bread and wine mixed with water are to be offered in sacrifice."
I answer that, Water ought to be mingled with the wine which is offered
in this sacrament. First of all on account of its institution: for it
is believed with probability that our Lord instituted this sacrament in
wine tempered with water according to the custom of that country: hence
it is written (Prov. 9:5): "Drink the wine which I have mixed for you."
Secondly, because it harmonizes with the representation of our Lord's
Passion: hence Pope Alexander I says (Ep. 1 ad omnes orth.): "In the
Lord's chalice neither wine only nor water only ought to be offered,
but both mixed because we read that both flowed from His side in the
Passion." Thirdly, because this is adapted for signifying the effect of
this sacrament, since as Pope Julius says (Concil. Bracarens iii, Can.
1): "We see that the people are signified by the water, but Christ's
blood by the wine. Therefore when water is mixed with the wine in the
chalice, the people is made one with Christ." Fourthly, because this is
appropriate to the fourth effect of this sacrament, which is the
entering into everlasting life: hence Ambrose says (De Sacram. v): "The
water flows into the chalice, and springs forth unto everlasting life."
Reply to Objection 1: As Ambrose says (De Sacram. v), just as Christ's
sacrifice is denoted by the offering of Melchisedech, so likewise it is
signified by the water which flowed from the rock in the desert,
according to 1 Cor. 10:4: "But they drank of the spiritual rock which
came after them."
Reply to Objection 2: In Baptism water is used for the purpose of
ablution: but in this sacrament it is used by way of refreshment,
according to Ps. 22:3: "He hath brought me up on the water of
refreshment."
Reply to Objection 3: Bread is made of water and flour; and therefore,
since water is mixed with the wine, neither is without water.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the mixing with water is essential to this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the mixing with water is essential to this
sacrament. Because Cyprian says to Cecilius (Ep. lxiii): "Thus the
Lord's chalice is not water only and wine only, but both must be mixed
together: in the same way as neither the Lord's body be of flour only,
except both," i.e. the flour and the water "be united as one." But the
admixture of water with the flour is necessary for this sacrament.
Consequently, for the like reason, so is the mixing of water with the
wine.
Objection 2: Further, at our Lord's Passion, of which this is the
memorial, water as well as blood flowed from His side. But wine, which
is the sacrament of the blood, is necessary for this sacrament. For the
same reason, therefore, so is water.
Objection 3: Further, if water were not essential to this sacrament, it
would not matter in the least what kind of water was used; and so water
distilled from roses, or any other kind might be employed; which is
contrary to the usage of the Church. Consequently water is essential to
this sacrament.
On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. lxiii): "If any of our predecessors,
out of ignorance or simplicity, has not kept this usage," i.e. of
mixing water with the wine, "one may pardon his simplicity"; which
would not be the case if water were essential to the sacrament, as the
wine or the bread. Therefore the mingling of water with the wine is not
essential to the sacrament.
I answer that, Judgment concerning a sign is to be drawn from the thing
signified. Now the adding of water to the wine is for the purpose of
signifying the sharing of this sacrament by the faithful, in this
respect that by the mixing of the water with the wine is signified the
union of the people with Christ, as stated [4529](A[6]). Moreover, the
flowing of water from the side of Christ hanging on the cross refers to
the same, because by the water is denoted the cleansing from sins,
which was the effect of Christ's Passion. Now it was observed above
(Q[73], A[1], ad 3), that this sacrament is completed in the
consecration of the matter: while the usage of the faithful is not
essential to the sacrament, but only a consequence thereof.
Consequently, then, the adding of water is not essential to the
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Cyprian's expression is to be taken in the same
sense in which we say that a thing cannot be, which cannot be suitably.
And so the comparison refers to what ought to be done, not to what is
essential to be done; since water is of the essence of bread, but not
of the essence of wine.
Reply to Objection 2: The shedding of the blood belonged directly to
Christ's Passion: for it is natural for blood to flow from a wounded
human body. But the flowing of the water was not necessary for the
Passion; but merely to show its effect, which is to wash away sins, and
to refresh us from the heat of concupiscence. And therefore the water
is not offered apart from the wine in this sacrament, as the wine is
offered apart from the bread; but the water is offered mixed with the
wine to show that the wine belongs of itself to this sacrament, as of
its very essence; but the water as something added to the wine.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the mixing of water with the wine is not
necessary for the sacrament, it does not matter, as to the essence of
the sacrament, what kind of water is added to the wine, whether natural
water, or artificial, as rose-water, although, as to the propriety of
the sacrament, he would sin who mixes any other than natural and true
water, because true water flowed from the side of Christ hanging on the
cross, and not phlegm, as some have said, in order to show that
Christ's body was truly composed of the four elements; as by the
flowing blood, it was shown to be composed of the four humors, as Pope
Innocent III says in a certain Decree. But because the mixing of water
with flour is essential to this sacrament, as making the composition of
bread, if rose-water, or any other liquor besides true water, be mixed
with the flour, the sacrament would not be valid, because it would not
be true bread.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether water should be added in great quantity?
Objection 1: It seems that water ought to be added in great quantity,
because as blood flowed sensibly from Christ's side, so did water:
hence it is written (Jn. 19:35): "He that saw it, hath given
testimony." But water could not be sensibly present in this sacrament
except it were used in great quantity. Consequently it seems that water
ought to be added in great quantity.
Objection 2: Further, a little water mixed with much wine is corrupted.
But what is corrupted no longer exists. Therefore, it is the same thing
to add a little water in this sacrament as to add none. But it is not
lawful to add none. Therefore, neither is it lawful to add a little.
Objection 3: Further, if it sufficed to add a little, then as a
consequence it would suffice to throw one drop of water into an entire
cask. But this seems ridiculous. Therefore it does not suffice for a
small quantity to be added.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Extra, De Celeb. Miss.):
"The pernicious abuse has prevailed in your country of adding water in
greater quantity than the wine, in the sacrifice, where according to
the reasonable custom of the entire Church more wine than water ought
to be employed."
I answer that, There is a threefold opinion regarding the water added
to the wine, as Pope Innocent III says in a certain Decretal. For some
say that the water remains by itself when the wine is changed into
blood: but such an opinion cannot stand, because in the sacrament of
the altar after the consecration there is nothing else save the body
and the blood of Christ. Because, as Ambrose says in De Officiis (De
Mysteriis ix): "Before the blessing it is another species that is
named, after the blessing the Body is signified; otherwise it would not
be adored with adoration of latria." And therefore others have said
that as the wine is changed into blood, so the water is changed into
the water which flowed from Christ's side. But this cannot be
maintained reasonably, because according to this the water would be
consecrated apart from the wine, as the wine is from the bread.
And therefore as he (Innocent III, Decretals, Extra, De Celeb. Miss.)
says, the more probable opinion is that which holds that the water is
changed into wine, and the wine into blood. Now, this could not be done
unless so little water was used that it would be changed into wine.
Consequently, it is always safer to add little water, especially if the
wine be weak, because the sacrament could not be celebrated if there
were such addition of water as to destroy the species of the wine.
Hence Pope Julius I reprehends some who "keep throughout the year a
linen cloth steeped in must, and at the time of sacrifice wash a part
of it with water, and so make the offering."
Reply to Objection 1: For the signification of this sacrament it
suffices for the water to be appreciable by sense when it is mixed with
the wine: but it is not necessary for it to be sensible after the
mingling.
Reply to Objection 2: If no water were added, the signification would
be utterly excluded: but when the water is changed into wine, it is
signified that the people is incorporated with Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: If water were added to a cask, it would not
suffice for the signification of this sacrament, but the water must be
added to the wine at the actual celebration of the sacrament.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CHANGE OF BREAD AND WINE INTO THE BODY AND BLOOD OF CHRIST (EIGHT
ARTICLES)
We have to consider the change of the bread and wine into the body and
blood of Christ; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the substance of bread and wine remain in this sacrament
after the consecration?*
(2) Whether it is annihilated?
(3) Whether it is changed into the body and blood of Christ?
(4) Whether the accidents remain after the change?
(5) Whether the substantial form remains there?
(6) Whether this change is instantaneous?
(7) Whether it is more miraculous than any other change?
(8) By what words it may be suitably expressed?
[*The titles of the Articles here given were taken by St. Thomas from
his Commentary on the Sentences (Sent. iv, D, 90). However, in writing
the Articles he introduced a new point of inquiry, that of the First
Article; and substituted another division of the matter under
discussion, as may be seen by referring to the titles of the various
Articles. Most editions have ignored St. Thomas's original division,
and give the one to which he subsequently adhered.]
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the body of Christ be in this sacrament in very truth, or merely as
in a figure or sign?
Objection 1: It seems that the body of Christ is not in this sacrament
in very truth, but only as in a figure, or sign. For it is written (Jn.
6:54) that when our Lord had uttered these words: "Except you eat the
flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood," etc., "Many of His
disciples on hearing it said: 'this is a hard saying'": to whom He
rejoined: "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth
nothing": as if He were to say, according to Augustine's exposition on
Ps. 4 [*On Ps. 98:9]: "Give a spiritual meaning to what I have said.
You are not to eat this body which you see, nor to drink the blood
which they who crucify Me are to spill. It is a mystery that I put
before you: in its spiritual sense it will quicken you; but the flesh
profiteth nothing."
Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 28:20): "Behold I am with you
all days even to the consummation of the world." Now in explaining
this, Augustine makes this observation (Tract. xxx in Joan.): "The Lord
is on high until the world be ended; nevertheless the truth of the Lord
is here with us; for the body, in which He rose again, must be in one
place; but His truth is spread abroad everywhere." Therefore, the body
of Christ is not in this sacrament in very truth, but only as in a
sign.
Objection 3: Further, no body can be in several places at the one time.
For this does not even belong to an angel; since for the same reason it
could be everywhere. But Christ's is a true body, and it is in heaven.
Consequently, it seems that it is not in very truth in the sacrament of
the altar, but only as in a sign.
Objection 4: Further, the Church's sacraments are ordained for the
profit of the faithful. But according to Gregory in a certain Homily
(xxviii in Evang.), the ruler is rebuked "for demanding Christ's bodily
presence." Moreover the apostles were prevented from receiving the Holy
Ghost because they were attached to His bodily presence, as Augustine
says on Jn. 16:7: "Except I go, the Paraclete will not come to you"
(Tract. xciv in Joan.). Therefore Christ is not in the sacrament of the
altar according to His bodily presence.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii): "There is no room for
doubt regarding the truth of Christ's body and blood; for now by our
Lord's own declaring and by our faith His flesh is truly food, and His
blood is truly drink." And Ambrose says (De Sacram. vi): "As the Lord
Jesus Christ is God's true Son so is it Christ's true flesh which we
take, and His true blood which we drink."
I answer that, The presence of Christ's true body and blood in this
sacrament cannot be detected by sense, nor understanding, but by faith
alone, which rests upon Divine authority. Hence, on Lk. 22:19: "This is
My body which shall be delivered up for you," Cyril says: "Doubt not
whether this be true; but take rather the Saviour's words with faith;
for since He is the Truth, He lieth not."
Now this is suitable, first for the perfection of the New Law. For, the
sacrifices of the Old Law contained only in figure that true sacrifice
of Christ's Passion, according to Heb. 10:1: "For the law having a
shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things."
And therefore it was necessary that the sacrifice of the New Law
instituted by Christ should have something more, namely, that it should
contain Christ Himself crucified, not merely in signification or
figure, but also in very truth. And therefore this sacrament which
contains Christ Himself, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), is
perfective of all the other sacraments, in which Christ's virtue is
participated.
Secondly, this belongs to Christ's love, out of which for our salvation
He assumed a true body of our nature. And because it is the special
feature of friendship to live together with friends, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ix), He promises us His bodily presence as a reward,
saying (Mat. 24:28): "Where the body is, there shall the eagles be
gathered together." Yet meanwhile in our pilgrimage He does not deprive
us of His bodily presence; but unites us with Himself in this sacrament
through the truth of His body and blood. Hence (Jn. 6:57) he says: "He
that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, abideth in Me, and I in
him." Hence this sacrament is the sign of supreme charity, and the
uplifter of our hope, from such familiar union of Christ with us.
Thirdly, it belongs to the perfection of faith, which concerns His
humanity just as it does His Godhead, according to Jn. 14:1: "You
believe in God, believe also in Me." And since faith is of things
unseen, as Christ shows us His Godhead invisibly, so also in this
sacrament He shows us His flesh in an invisible manner.
Some men accordingly, not paying heed to these things, have contended
that Christ's body and blood are not in this sacrament except as in a
sign, a thing to be rejected as heretical, since it is contrary to
Christ's words. Hence Berengarius, who had been the first deviser of
this heresy, was afterwards forced to withdraw his error, and to
acknowledge the truth of the faith.
Reply to Objection 1: From this authority the aforesaid heretics have
taken occasion to err from evilly understanding Augustine's words. For
when Augustine says: "You are not to eat this body which you see," he
means not to exclude the truth of Christ's body, but that it was not to
be eaten in this species in which it was seen by them. And by the
words: "It is a mystery that I put before you; in its spiritual sense
it will quicken you," he intends not that the body of Christ is in this
sacrament merely according to mystical signification, but
"spiritually," that is, invisibly, and by the power of the spirit.
Hence (Tract. xxvii), expounding Jn. 6:64: "the flesh profiteth
nothing," he says: "Yea, but as they understood it, for they understood
that the flesh was to be eaten as it is divided piecemeal in a dead
body, or as sold in the shambles, not as it is quickened by the spirit
. . . Let the spirit draw nigh to the flesh . . . then the flesh
profiteth very much: for if the flesh profiteth nothing, the Word had
not been made flesh, that It might dwell among us."
Reply to Objection 2: That saying of Augustine and all others like it
are to be understood of Christ's body as it is beheld in its proper
species; according as our Lord Himself says (Mat. 26:11): "But Me you
have not always." Nevertheless He is invisibly under the species of
this sacrament, wherever this sacrament is performed.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's body is not in this sacrament in the
same way as a body is in a place, which by its dimensions is
commensurate with the place; but in a special manner which is proper to
this sacrament. Hence we say that Christ's body is upon many altars,
not as in different places, but "sacramentally": and thereby we do not
understand that Christ is there only as in a sign, although a sacrament
is a kind of sign; but that Christ's body is here after a fashion
proper to this sacrament, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: This argument holds good of Christ's bodily
presence, as He is present after the manner of a body, that is, as it
is in its visible appearance, but not as it is spiritually, that is,
invisibly, after the manner and by the virtue of the spirit. Hence
Augustine (Tract. xxvii in Joan.) says: "If thou hast understood"
Christ's words spiritually concerning His flesh, "they are spirit and
life to thee; if thou hast understood them carnally, they are also
spirit and life, but not to thee."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in this sacrament the substance of the bread and wine remains after
the consecration?
Objection 1: It seems that the substance of the bread and wine does
remain in this sacrament after the consecration: because Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iv): "Since it is customary for men to eat bread and
drink wine, God has wedded his Godhead to them, and made them His body
and blood": and further on: "The bread of communication is not simple
bread, but is united to the Godhead." But wedding together belongs to
things actually existing. Therefore the bread and wine are at the same
time, in this sacrament, with the body and the blood of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, there ought to be conformity between the
sacraments. But in the other sacraments the substance of the matter
remains, like the substance of water in Baptism, and the substance of
chrism in Confirmation. Therefore the substance of the bread and wine
remains also in this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, bread and wine are made use of in this sacrament,
inasmuch as they denote ecclesiastical unity, as "one bread is made
from many grains and wine from many grapes," as Augustine says in his
book on the Creed (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But this belongs to the
substance of bread and wine. Therefore, the substance of the bread and
wine remains in this sacrament.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "Although the figure of
the bread and wine be seen, still, after the Consecration, they are to
be believed to be nothing else than the body end blood of Christ."
I answer that, Some have held that the substance of the bread and wine
remains in this sacrament after the consecration. But this opinion
cannot stand: first of all, because by such an opinion the truth of
this sacrament is destroyed, to which it belongs that Christ's true
body exists in this sacrament; which indeed was not there before the
consecration. Now a thing cannot be in any place, where it was not
previously, except by change of place, or by the conversion of another
thing into itself; just as fire begins anew to be in some house, either
because it is carried thither, or because it is generated there. Now it
is evident that Christ's body does not begin to be present in this
sacrament by local motion. First of all, because it would follow that
it would cease to be in heaven: for what is moved locally does not come
anew to some place unless it quit the former one. Secondly, because
every body moved locally passes through all intermediary spaces, which
cannot be said here. Thirdly, because it is not possible for one
movement of the same body moved locally to be terminated in different
places at the one time, whereas the body of Christ under this sacrament
begins at the one time to be in several places. And consequently it
remains that Christ's body cannot begin to be anew in this sacrament
except by change of the substance of bread into itself. But what is
changed into another thing, no longer remains after such change. Hence
the conclusion is that, saving the truth of this sacrament, the
substance of the bread cannot remain after the consecration.
Secondly, because this position is contrary to the form of this
sacrament, in which it is said: "This is My body," which would not be
true if the substance of the bread were to remain there; for the
substance of bread never is the body of Christ. Rather should one say
in that case: "Here is My body."
Thirdly, because it would be opposed to the veneration of this
sacrament, if any substance were there, which could not be adored with
adoration of latria.
Fourthly, because it is contrary to the rite of the Church, according
to which it is not lawful to take the body of Christ after bodily food,
while it is nevertheless lawful to take one consecrated host after
another. Hence this opinion is to be avoided as heretical.
Reply to Objection 1: God "wedded His Godhead," i.e. His Divine power,
to the bread and wine, not that these may remain in this sacrament, but
in order that He may make from them His body and blood.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ is not really present in the other
sacraments, as in this; and therefore the substance of the matter
remains in the other sacraments, but not in this.
Reply to Objection 3: The species which remain in this sacrament, as
shall be said later [4530](A[5]), suffice for its signification;
because the nature of the substance is known by its accidents.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the substance of the bread or wine is annihilated after the
consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into their original matter?
Objection 1: It seems that the substance of the bread is annihilated
after the consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into its
original matter. For whatever is corporeal must be somewhere. But the
substance of bread, which is something corporeal, does not remain, in
this sacrament, as stated above [4531](A[2]); nor can we assign any
place where it may be. Consequently it is nothing after the
consecration. Therefore, it is either annihilated, or dissolved into
its original matter.
Objection 2: Further, what is the term "wherefrom" in every change
exists no longer, except in the potentiality of matter; e.g. when air
is changed into fire, the form of the air remains only in the
potentiality of matter; and in like fashion when what is white becomes
black. But in this sacrament the substance of the bread or of the wine
is the term "wherefrom," while the body or the blood of Christ is the
term "whereunto": for Ambrose says in De Officiis (De Myster. ix):
"Before the blessing it is called another species, after the blessing
the body of Christ is signified." Therefore, when the consecration
takes place, the substance of the bread or wine no longer remains,
unless perchance dissolved into its (original) matter.
Objection 3: Further, one of two contradictories must be true. But this
proposition is false: "After the consecration the substance of the
bread or wine is something." Consequently, this is true: "The substance
of the bread or wine is nothing."
On the contrary, Augustine says ([4532]Q[83]): "God is not the cause of
tending to nothing." But this sacrament is wrought by Divine power.
Therefore, in this sacrament the substance of the bread or wine is not
annihilated.
I answer that, Because the substance of the bread and wine does not
remain in this sacrament, some, deeming that it is impossible for the
substance of the bread and wine to be changed into Christ's flesh and
blood, have maintained that by the consecration, the substance of the
bread and wine is either dissolved into the original matter, or that it
is annihilated.
Now the original matter into which mixed bodies can be dissolved is the
four elements. For dissolution cannot be made into primary matter, so
that a subject can exist without a form, since matter cannot exist
without a form. But since after the consecration nothing remains under
the sacramental species except the body and the blood of Christ, it
will be necessary to say that the elements into which the substance of
the bread and wine is dissolved, depart from thence by local motion,
which would be perceived by the senses. In like manner also the
substance of the bread or wine remains until the last instant of the
consecration; but in the last instant of the consecration there is
already present there the substance of the body or blood of Christ,
just as the form is already present in the last instant of generation.
Hence no instant can be assigned in which the original matter can be
there. For it cannot be said that the substance of the bread or wine is
dissolved gradually into the original matter, or that it successively
quits the species, for if this began to be done in the last instant of
its consecration, then at the one time under part of the host there
would be the body of Christ together with the substance of bread, which
is contrary to what has been said above [4533](A[2]). But if this begin
to come to pass before the consecration, there will then be a time in
which under one part of the host there will be neither the substance of
bread nor the body of Christ, which is not fitting. They seem indeed to
have taken this into careful consideration, wherefore they formulated
their proposition with an alternative viz. that (the substance) may be
annihilated. But even this cannot stand, because no way can be assigned
whereby Christ's true body can begin to be in this sacrament, except by
the change of the substance of bread into it, which change is excluded
the moment we admit either annihilation of the substance of the bread,
or dissolution into the original matter. Likewise no cause can be
assigned for such dissolution or annihilation, since the effect of the
sacrament is signified by the form: "This is My body." Hence it is
clear that the aforesaid opinion is false.
Reply to Objection 1: The substance of the bread or wine, after the
consecration, remains neither under the sacramental species, nor
elsewhere; yet it does not follow that it is annihilated; for it is
changed into the body of Christ; just as if the air, from which fire is
generated, be not there or elsewhere, it does not follow that it is
annihilated.
Reply to Objection 2: The form, which is the term "wherefrom," is not
changed into another form; but one form succeeds another in the
subject; and therefore the first form remains only in the potentiality
of matter. But here the substance of the bread is changed into the body
of Christ, as stated above. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 3: Although after the consecration this proposition
is false: "The substance of the breed is something," still that into
which the substance of the bread is changed, is something, and
consequently the substance of the bread is not annihilated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether bread can be converted into the body of Christ?
Objection 1: It seems that bread cannot be converted into the body of
Christ. For conversion is a kind of change. But in every change there
must be some subject, which from being previously in potentiality is
now in act. because as is said in Phys. iii: "motion is the act of a
thing existing in potentiality." But no subject can be assigned for the
substance of the bread and of the body of Christ, because it is of the
very nature of substance for it "not to be in a subject," as it is said
in Praedic. iii. Therefore it is not possible for the whole substance
of the bread to be converted into the body of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the form of the thing into which another is
converted, begins anew to inhere in the matter of the thing converted
into it: as when air is changed into fire not already existing, the
form of fire begins anew to be in the matter of the air; and in like
manner when food is converted into non-pre-existing man, the form of
the man begins to be anew in the matter of the food. Therefore, if
bread be changed into the body of Christ, the form of Christ's body
must necessarily begin to be in the matter of the bread, which is
false. Consequently, the bread is not changed into the substance of
Christ's body.
Objection 3: Further, when two things are diverse, one never becomes
the other, as whiteness never becomes blackness, as is stated in Phys.
i. But since two contrary forms are of themselves diverse, as being the
principles of formal difference, so two signate matters are of
themselves diverse, as being the principles of material distinction.
Consequently, it is not possible for this matter of bread to become
this matter whereby Christ's body is individuated, and so it is not
possible for this substance of bread to be changed into the substance
of Christ's body.
On the contrary, Eusebius Emesenus says: "To thee it ought neither to
be a novelty nor an impossibility that earthly and mortal things be
changed into the substance of Christ."
I answer that, As stated above [4534](A[2]), since Christ's true body
is in this sacrament, and since it does not begin to be there by local
motion, nor is it contained therein as in a place, as is evident from
what was stated above (A[1], ad 2), it must be said then that it begins
to be there by conversion of the substance of bread into itself.
Yet this change is not like natural changes, but is entirely
supernatural, and effected by God's power alone. Hence Ambrose says
[(De Sacram. iv): "See how Christ's word changes nature's laws, as He
wills: a man is not wont to be born save of man and woman: see
therefore that against the established law and order a man is born of a
Virgin": and] [*The passage in the brackets is not in the Leonine
edition] (De Myster. iv): "It is clear that a Virgin begot beyond the
order of nature: and what we make is the body from the Virgin. Why,
then, do you look for nature's order in Christ's body, since the Lord
Jesus was Himself brought forth of a Virgin beyond nature?" Chrysostom
likewise (Hom. xlvii), commenting on Jn. 6:64: "The words which I have
spoken to you," namely, of this sacrament, "are spirit and life," says:
i.e. "spiritual, having nothing carnal, nor natural consequence; but
they are rent from all such necessity which exists upon earth, and from
the laws here established."
For it is evident that every agent acts according as it is in act. But
every created agent is limited in its act, as being of a determinate
genus and species: and consequently the action of every created agent
bears upon some determinate act. Now the determination of every thing
in actual existence comes from its form. Consequently, no natural or
created agent can act except by changing the form in something; and on
this account every change made according to nature's laws is a formal
change. But God is infinite act, as stated in the [4535]FP, Q[7], A[1];
Q[26], A[2]; hence His action extends to the whole nature of being.
Therefore He can work not only formal conversion, so that diverse forms
succeed each other in the same subject; but also the change of all
being, so that, to wit, the whole substance of one thing be changed
into the whole substance of another. And this is done by Divine power
in this sacrament; for the whole substance of the bread is changed into
the whole substance of Christ's body, and the whole substance of the
wine into the whole substance of Christ's blood. Hence this is not a
formal, but a substantial conversion; nor is it a kind of natural
movement: but, with a name of its own, it can be called
"transubstantiation."
Reply to Objection 1: This objection holds good in respect of formal
change, because it belongs to a form to be in matter or in a subject;
but it does not hold good in respect of the change of the entire
substance. Hence, since this substantial change implies a certain order
of substances, one of which is changed into the other, it is in both
substances as in a subject, just as order and number.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument also is true of formal conversion
or change, because, as stated above (ad 1), a form must be in some
matter or subject. But this is not so in a change of the entire
substance; for in this case no subject is possible.
Reply to Objection 3: Form cannot be changed into form, nor matter into
matter by the power of any finite agent. Such a change, however, can be
made by the power of an infinite agent, which has control over all
being, because the nature of being is common to both forms and to both
matters; and whatever there is of being in the one, the author of being
can change into whatever there is of being in the other, withdrawing
that whereby it was distinguished from the other.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the accidents of the bread and wine remain in this sacrament after
the change?
Objection 1: It seems that the accidents of the bread and wine do not
remain in this sacrament. For when that which comes first is removed,
that which follows is also taken away. But substance is naturally
before accident, as is proved in Metaph. vii. Since, then, after
consecration, the substance of the bread does not remain in this
sacrament, it seems that its accidents cannot remain.
Objection 2: Further, there ought not to be any deception in a
sacrament of truth. But we judge of substance by accidents. It seems,
then, that human judgment is deceived, if, while the accidents remain,
the substance of the bread does not. Consequently this is unbecoming to
this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, although our faith is not subject to reason,
still it is not contrary to reason, but above it, as was said in the
beginning of this work ([4536]FP, Q[1], A[6], ad 2; A[8]). But our
reason has its origin in the senses. Therefore our faith ought not to
be contrary to the senses, as it is when sense judges that to be bread
which faith believes to be the substance of Christ's body. Therefore it
is not befitting this sacrament for the accidents of bread to remain
subject to the senses, and for the substance of bread not to remain.
Objection 4: Further, what remains after the change has taken place
seems to be the subject of change. If therefore the accidents of the
bread remain after the change has been effected, it seems that the
accidents are the subject of the change. But this is impossible; for
"an accident cannot have an accident" (Metaph. iii). Therefore the
accidents of the bread and wine ought not to remain in this sacrament.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Sentences of Prosper
(Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xiii): "Under the species which we
behold, of bread and wine, we honor invisible things, i.e. flesh and
blood."
I answer that, It is evident to sense that all the accidents of the
bread and wine remain after the consecration. And this is reasonably
done by Divine providence. First of all, because it is not customary,
but horrible, for men to eat human flesh, and to drink blood. And
therefore Christ's flesh and blood are set before us to be partaken of
under the species of those things which are the more commonly used by
men, namely, bread and wine. Secondly, lest this sacrament might be
derided by unbelievers, if we were to eat our Lord under His own
species. Thirdly, that while we receive our Lord's body and blood
invisibly, this may redound to the merit of faith.
Reply to Objection 1: As is said in the book De Causis, an effect
depends more on the first cause than on the second. And therefore by
God's power, which is the first cause of all things, it is possible for
that which follows to remain, while that which is first is taken away.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no deception in this sacrament; for the
accidents which are discerned by the senses are truly present. But the
intellect, whose proper object is substance as is said in De Anima iii,
is preserved by faith from deception.
And this serves as answer to the third argument; because faith is not
contrary to the senses, but concerns things to which sense does not
reach.
Reply to Objection 4: This change has not properly a subject, as was
stated above (A[4], ad 1); nevertheless the accidents which remain have
some resemblance of a subject.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after
the consecration?
Objection 1: It seems that the substantial form of the bread remains in
this sacrament after the consecration. For it has been said
[4537](A[5]) that the accidents remain after the consecration. But
since bread is an artificial thing, its form is an accident. Therefore
it remains after the consecration.
Objection 2: Further, the form of Christ's body is His soul: for it is
said in De Anima ii, that the soul "is the act of a physical body which
has life in potentiality". But it cannot be said that the substantial
form of the bread is changed into the soul. Therefore it appears that
it remains after the consecration.
Objection 3: Further, the proper operation of a things follows its
substantial form. But what remains in this sacrament, nourishes, and
performs every operation which bread would do were it present.
Therefore the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament
after the consecration.
On the contrary, The substantial form of bread is of the substance of
bread. But the substance of the bread is changed into the body of
Christ, as stated above ([4538]AA[2],3,4). Therefore the substantial
form of the bread does not remain.
I answer that, Some have contended that after the consecration not only
do the accidents of the bread remain, but also its substantial form.
But this cannot be. First of all, because if the substantial form of
the bread were to remain, nothing of the bread would be changed into
the body of Christ, excepting the matter; and so it would follow that
it would be changed, not into the whole body of Christ, but into its
matter, which is repugnant to the form of the sacrament, wherein it is
said: "This is My body."
Secondly, because if the substantial form of the bread were to remain,
it would remain either in matter, or separated from matter. The first
cannot be, for if it were to remain in the matter of the bread, then
the whole substance of the bread would remain, which is against what
was said above [4539](A[2]). Nor could it remain in any other matter,
because the proper form exists only in its proper matter. But if it
were to remain separate from matter, it would then be an actually
intelligible form, and also an intelligence; for all forms separated
from matter are such.
Thirdly, it would be unbefitting this sacrament: because the accidents
of the bread remain in this sacrament, in order that the body of Christ
may be seen under them, and not under its proper species, as stated
above [4540](A[5]).
And therefore it must be said that the substantial form of the bread
does not remain.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to prevent art from making a
thing whose form is not an accident, but a substantial form; as frogs
and serpents can be produced by art: for art produces such forms not by
its own power, but by the power of natural energies. And in this way it
produces the substantial forms of bread, by the power of fire baking
the matter made up of flour and water.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul is the form of the body, giving it the
whole order of perfect being, i.e. being, corporeal being, and animated
being, and so on. Therefore the form of the bread is changed into the
form of Christ's body, according as the latter gives corporeal being,
but not according as it bestows animated being.
Reply to Objection 3: Some of the operations of bread follow it by
reason of the accidents, such as to affect the senses, and such
operations are found in the species of the bread after the consecration
on account of the accidents which remain. But some other operations
follow the bread either by reason of the matter, such as that it is
changed into something else, or else by reason of the substantial form,
such as an operation consequent upon its species, for instance, that it
"strengthens man's heart" (Ps. 103:15); and such operations are found
in this sacrament, not on account of the form or matter remaining, but
because they are bestowed miraculously upon the accidents themselves,
as will be said later (Q[77], A[3], ad 2,3; [4541]AA[5],6).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this change is wrought instantaneously?
Objection 1: It seems that this change is not wrought instantaneously,
but successively. For in this change there is first the substance of
bread, and afterwards the substance of Christ's body. Neither, then, is
in the same instant, but in two instants. But there is a mid-time
between every two instants. Therefore this change must take place
according to the succession of time, which is between the last instant
in which the bread is there, and the first instant in which the body of
Christ is present.
Objection 2: Further, in every change something is "in becoming" and
something is "in being." But these two things do not exist at the one
time for, what is "in becoming," is not yet, whereas what is "in
being," already is. Consequently, there is a before and an after in
such change: and so necessarily the change cannot be instantaneous, but
successive.
Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv) that this sacrament
"is made by the words of Christ." But Christ's words are pronounced
successively. Therefore the change takes place successively.
On the contrary, This change is effected by a power which is infinite,
to which it belongs to operate in an instant.
I answer that, A change may be instantaneous from a threefold reason.
First on the part of the form, which is the terminus of the change.
For, if it be a form that receives more and less, it is acquired by its
subject successively, such as health; and therefore because a
substantial form does not receive more and less, it follows that its
introduction into matter is instantaneous.
Secondly on the part of the subject, which sometimes is prepared
successively for receiving the form; thus water is heated successively.
When, however, the subject itself is in the ultimate disposition for
receiving the form, it receives it suddenly, as a transparent body is
illuminated suddenly. Thirdly on the part of the agent, which possesses
infinite power: wherefore it can instantly dispose the matter for the
form. Thus it is written (Mk. 7:34) that when Christ had said,
"'Ephpheta,' which is 'Be thou opened,' immediately his ears were
opened, and the string of his tongue was loosed."
For these three reasons this conversion is instantaneous. First,
because the substance of Christ's body which is the term of this
conversion, does not receive more or less. Secondly, because in this
conversion there is no subject to be disposed successively. Thirdly,
because it is effected by God's infinite power.
Reply to Objection 1: Some [*Cf. Albert the Great, Sent. iv, D, 11; St.
Bonaventure, Sent., iv, D, 11] do not grant simply that there is a
mid-time between every two instants. For they say that this is true of
two instants referring to the same movement, but not if they refer to
different things. Hence between the instant that marks the close of
rest, and another which marks the beginning of movement, there is no
mid-time. But in this they are mistaken, because the unity of time and
of instant, or even their plurality, is not taken according to
movements of any sort, but according to the first movement of the
heavens, which is the measure of all movement and rest.
Accordingly others grant this of the time which measures movement
depending on the movement of the heavens. But there are some movements
which are not dependent on the movement of the heavens, nor measured by
it, as was said in the [4542]FP, Q[53], A[3] concerning the movements
of the angels. Hence between two instants responding to those movements
there is no mid-time. But this is not to the point, because although
the change in question has no relation of itself to the movement of the
heavens, still it follows the pronouncing of the words, which
(pronouncing) must necessarily be measured by the movement of the
heavens. And therefore there must of necessity be a mid-time between
every two signate instants in connection with that change.
Some say therefore that the instant in which the bread was last, and
the instant in which the body of Christ is first, are indeed two in
comparison with the things measured, but are one comparatively to the
time measuring; as when two lines touch, there are two points on the
part of the two lines, but one point on the part of the place
containing them. But here there is no likeness, because instant and
time is not the intrinsic measure of particular movements, as a line
and point are of a body, but only the extrinsic measure, as place is to
bodies.
Hence others say that it is the same instant in fact, but another
according to reason. But according to this it would follow that things
really opposite would exist together; for diversity of reason does not
change a thing objectively.
And therefore it must be said that this change, as stated above, is
wrought by Christ's words which are spoken by the priest, so that the
last instant of pronouncing the words is the first instant in which
Christ's body is in the sacrament; and that the substance of the bread
is there during the whole preceding time. Of this time no instant is to
be taken as proximately preceding the last one, because time is not
made up of successive instants, as is proved in Phys. vi. And therefore
a first instant can be assigned in which Christ's body is present; but
a last instant cannot be assigned in which the substance of bread is
there, but a last time can be assigned. And the same holds good in
natural changes, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. viii).
Reply to Objection 2: In instantaneous changes a thing is "in
becoming," and is "in being" simultaneously; just as becoming
illuminated and to be actually illuminated are simultaneous: for in
such, a thing is said to be "in being" according as it now is; but to
be "in becoming," according as it was not before.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), this change comes about
in the last instant of the pronouncing of the words. for then the
meaning of the words is finished, which meaning is efficacious in the
forms of the sacraments. And therefore it does not follow that this
change is successive.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this proposition is false: "The body of Christ is made out of
bread"?
Objection 1: It seems that this proposition is false: "The body of
Christ is made out of bread." For everything out of which another is
made, is that which is made the other; but not conversely: for we say
that a black thing is made out of a white thing, and that a white thing
is made black: and although we may say that a man becomes black still
we do not say that a black thing is made out of a man, as is shown in
Phys. i. If it be true, then, that Christ's body is made out of bread,
it will be true to say that bread is made the body of Christ. But this
seems to be false, because the bread is not the subject of the making,
but rather its term. Therefore, it is not said truly that Christ's body
is made out of bread.
Objection 2: Further, the term of "becoming" is something that is, or
something that is "made." But this proposition is never true: "The
bread is the body of Christ"; or "The bread is made the body of
Christ"; or again, "The bread will be the body of Christ." Therefore it
seems that not even this is true: "The body of Christ is made out of
bread."
Objection 3: Further, everything out of which another is made is
converted into that which is made from it. But this proposition seems
to be false: "The bread is converted into the body of Christ," because
such conversion seems to be more miraculous than the creation of the
world, in which it is not said that non-being is converted into being.
Therefore it seems that this proposition likewise is false: "The body
of Christ is made out of bread."
Objection 4: Further, that out of which something is made, can be that
thing. But this proposition is false: "Bread can be the body of
Christ." Therefore this is likewise false: "The body of Christ is made
out of bread."
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "When the consecration
takes place, the body of Christ is made out of the bread."
I answer that, This conversion of bread into the body of Christ has
something in common with creation, and with natural transmutation, and
in some respect differs from both. For the order of the terms is common
to these three; that is, that after one thing there is another (for, in
creation there is being after non-being; in this sacrament, Christ's
body after the substance of bread; in natural transmutation white after
black, or fire after air); and that the aforesaid terms are not
coexistent.
Now the conversion, of which we are speaking, has this in common with
creation, that in neither of them is there any common subject belonging
to either of the extremes; the contrary of which appears in every
natural transmutation.
Again, this conversion has something in common with natural
transmutation in two respects, although not in the same fashion. First
of all because in both, one of the extremes passes into the other, as
bread into Christ's body, and air into fire; whereas non-being is not
converted into being. But this comes to pass differently on the one
side and on the other; for in this sacrament the whole substance of the
bread passes into the whole body of Christ; whereas in natural
transmutation the matter of the one receives the form of the other, the
previous form being laid aside. Secondly, they have this in common,
that on both sides something remains the same; whereas this does not
happen in creation: yet differently; for the same matter or subject
remains in natural transmutation; whereas in this sacrament the same
accidents remain.
From these observations we can gather the various ways of speaking in
such matters. For, because in no one of the aforesaid three things are
the extremes coexistent, therefore in none of them can one extreme be
predicated of the other by the substantive verb of the present tense:
for we do not say, "Non-being is being" or, "Bread is the body of
Christ," or, "Air is fire," or, "White is black." Yet because of the
relationship of the extremes in all of them we can use the preposition
"ex" [out of], which denotes order; for we can truly and properly say
that "being is made out of non-being," and "out of bread, the body of
Christ," and "out of air, fire," and "out of white, black." But because
in creation one of the extremes does not pass into the other, we cannot
use the word "conversion" in creation, so as to say that "non-being is
converted into being": we can, however, use the word in this sacrament,
just as in natural transmutation. But since in this sacrament the whole
substance is converted into the whole substance, on that account this
conversion is properly termed transubstantiation.
Again, since there is no subject of this conversion, the things which
are true in natural conversion by reason of the subject, are not to be
granted in this conversion. And in the first place indeed it is evident
that potentiality to the opposite follows a subject, by reason whereof
we say that "a white thing can be black," or that "air can be fire";
although the latter is not so proper as the former: for the subject of
whiteness, in which there is potentiality to blackness, is the whole
substance of the white thing; since whiteness is not a part thereof;
whereas the subject of the form of air is part thereof: hence when it
is said, "Air can be fire," it is verified by synecdoche by reason of
the part. But in this conversion, and similarly in creation, because
there is no subject, it is not said that one extreme can be the other,
as that "non-being can be being," or that "bread can be the body of
Christ": and for the same reason it cannot be properly said that "being
is made of [de] non-being," or that "the body of Christ is made of
bread," because this preposition "of" [de] denotes a consubstantial
cause, which consubstantiality of the extremes in natural
transmutations is considered according to something common in the
subject. And for the same reason it is not granted that "bread will be
the body of Christ," or that it "may become the body of Christ," just
as it is not granted in creation that "non-being will be being," or
that "non-being may become being," because this manner of speaking is
verified in natural transmutations by reason of the subject: for
instance, when we say that "a white thing becomes black," or "a white
thing will be black."
Nevertheless, since in this sacrament, after the change, something
remains the same, namely, the accidents of the bread, as stated above
[4543](A[5]), some of these expressions may be admitted by way of
similitude, namely, that "bread is the body of Christ," or, "bread will
be the body of Christ," or "the body of Christ is made of bread";
provided that by the word "bread" is not understood the substance of
bread, but in general "that which is contained under the species of
bread," under which species there is first contained the substance of
bread, and afterwards the body of Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: That out of which something else is made,
sometimes implies together with the subject, one of the extremes of the
transmutation, as when it is said "a black thing is made out of a white
one"; but sometimes it implies only the opposite or the extreme, as
when it is said---"out of morning comes the day." And so it is not
granted that the latter becomes the former, that is, "that morning
becomes the day." So likewise in the matter in hand, although it may be
said properly that "the body of Christ is made out of bread," yet it is
not said properly that "bread becomes the body of Christ," except by
similitude, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: That out of which another is made, will sometimes
be that other because of the subject which is implied. And therefore,
since there is no subject of this change, the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: In this change there are many more difficulties
than in creation, in which there is but this one difficulty, that
something is made out of nothing; yet this belongs to the proper mode
of production of the first cause, which presupposes nothing else. But
in this conversion not only is it difficult for this whole to be
changed into that whole, so that nothing of the former may remain
(which does not belong to the common mode of production of a cause),
but furthermore it has this difficulty that the accidents remain while
the substance is destroyed, and many other difficulties of which we
shall treat hereafter ([4544]Q[77]). Nevertheless the word "conversion"
is admitted in this sacrament, but not in creation, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: As was observed above, potentiality belongs to
the subject, whereas there is no subject in this conversion. And
therefore it is not granted that bread can be the body of Christ: for
this conversion does not come about by the passive potentiality of the
creature, but solely by the active power of the Creator.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE WAY IN WHICH CHRIST IS IN THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the manner in which Christ exists in this
sacrament; and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the whole Christ is under this sacrament?
(2) Whether the entire Christ is under each species of the sacrament?
(3) Whether the entire Christ is under every part of the species?
(4) Whether all the dimensions of Christ's body are in this sacrament?
(5) Whether the body of Christ is in this sacrament locally?
(6) Whether after the consecration, the body of Christ is moved when
the host or chalice is moved?
(7) Whether Christ's body, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by
the eye?
(8) Whether the true body of Christ remains in this sacrament when He
is seen under the appearance of a child or of flesh?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the whole Christ is contained under this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the whole Christ is not contained under this
sacrament, because Christ begins to be in this sacrament by conversion
of the bread and wine. But it is evident that the bread and wine cannot
be changed either into the Godhead or into the soul of Christ. Since
therefore Christ exists in three substances, namely, the Godhead, soul
and body, as shown above ([4545]Q[2], A[5];[4546] Q[5], AA[1],3), it
seems that the entire Christ is not under this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, Christ is in this sacrament, forasmuch as it is
ordained to the refection of the faithful, which consists in food and
drink, as stated above ([4547]Q[74], A[1]). But our Lord said (Jn.
6:56): "My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed."
Therefore, only the flesh and blood of Christ are contained in this
sacrament. But there are many other parts of Christ's body, for
instance, the nerves, bones, and such like. Therefore the entire Christ
is not contained under this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, a body of greater quantity cannot be contained
under the measure of a lesser. But the measure of the bread and wine is
much smaller than the measure of Christ's body. Therefore it is
impossible that the entire Christ be contained under this sacrament.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Officiis): "Christ is in this
sacrament."
I answer that, It is absolutely necessary to confess according to
Catholic faith that the entire Christ is in this sacrament. Yet we must
know that there is something of Christ in this sacrament in a twofold
manner: first, as it were, by the power of the sacrament; secondly,
from natural concomitance. By the power of the sacrament, there is
under the species of this sacrament that into which the pre-existing
substance of the bread and wine is changed, as expressed by the words
of the form, which are effective in this as in the other sacraments;
for instance, by the words: "This is My body," or, "This is My blood."
But from natural concomitance there is also in this sacrament that
which is really united with that thing wherein the aforesaid conversion
is terminated. For if any two things be really united, then wherever
the one is really, there must the other also be: since things really
united together are only distinguished by an operation of the mind.
Reply to Objection 1: Because the change of the bread and wine is not
terminated at the Godhead or the soul of Christ, it follows as a
consequence that the Godhead or the soul of Christ is in this sacrament
not by the power of the sacrament, but from real concomitance. For
since the Godhead never set aside the assumed body, wherever the body
of Christ is, there, of necessity, must the Godhead be; and therefore
it is necessary for the Godhead to be in this sacrament concomitantly
with His body. Hence we read in the profession of faith at Ephesus (P.
I., chap. xxvi): "We are made partakers of the body and blood of
Christ, not as taking common flesh, nor as of a holy man united to the
Word in dignity, but the truly life-giving flesh of the Word Himself."
On the other hand, His soul was truly separated from His body, as
stated above ([4548]Q[50], A[5]). And therefore had this sacrament been
celebrated during those three days when He was dead, the soul of Christ
would not have been there, neither by the power of the sacrament, nor
from real concomitance. But since "Christ rising from the dead dieth
now no more" (Rom. 6:9), His soul is always really united with His
body. And therefore in this sacrament the body indeed of Christ is
present by the power of the sacrament, but His soul from real
concomitance.
Reply to Objection 2: By the power of the sacrament there is contained
under it, as to the species of the bread, not only the flesh, but the
entire body of Christ, that is, the bones the nerves, and the like. And
this is apparent from the form of this sacrament, wherein it is not
said: "This is My flesh," but "This is My body." Accordingly, when our
Lord said (Jn. 6:56): "My flesh is meat indeed," there the word flesh
is put for the entire body, because according to human custom it seems
to be more adapted for eating, as men commonly are fed on the flesh of
animals, but not on the bones or the like.
Reply to Objection 3: As has been already stated ([4549]Q[75], A[5]),
after the consecration of the bread into the body of Christ, or of the
wine into His blood, the accidents of both remain. From which it is
evident that the dimensions of the bread or wine are not changed into
the dimensions of the body of Christ, but substance into substance. And
so the substance of Christ's body or blood is under this sacrament by
the power of the sacrament, but not the dimensions of Christ's body or
blood. Hence it is clear that the body of Christ is in this sacrament
"by way of substance," and not by way of quantity. But the proper
totality of substance is contained indifferently in a small or large
quantity; as the whole nature of air in a great or small amount of air,
and the whole nature of a man in a big or small individual. Wherefore,
after the consecration, the whole substance of Christ's body and blood
is contained in this sacrament, just as the whole substance of the
bread and wine was contained there before the consecration.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the whole Christ is contained under each species of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the whole Christ is not contained under both
species of this sacrament. For this sacrament is ordained for the
salvation of the faithful, not by virtue of the species, but by virtue
of what is contained under the species, because the species were there
even before the consecration, from which comes the power of this
sacrament. If nothing, then, be contained under one species, but what
is contained under the other, and if the whole Christ be contained
under both, it seems that one of them is superfluous in this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, it was stated above (A[1], ad 1) that all the
other parts of the body, such as the bones, nerves, and the like, are
comprised under the name of flesh. But the blood is one of the parts of
the human body, as Aristotle proves (De Anima Histor. i). If, then,
Christ's blood be contained under the species of bread, just as the
other parts of the body are contained there, the blood ought not to be
consecrated apart, just as no other part of the body is consecrated
separately.
Objection 3: Further, what is once "in being" cannot be again "in
becoming." But Christ's body has already begun to be in this sacrament
by the consecration of the bread. Therefore, it cannot begin again to
be there by the consecration of the wine; and so Christ's body will not
be contained under the species of the wine, and accordingly neither the
entire Christ. Therefore the whole Christ is not contained under each
species.
On the contrary, The gloss on 1 Cor. 11:25, commenting on the word
"Chalice," says that "under each species," namely, of the bread and
wine, "the same is received"; and thus it seems that Christ is entire
under each species.
I answer that, After what we have said above [4550](A[1]), it must be
held most certainly that the whole Christ is under each sacramental
species yet not alike in each. For the body of Christ is indeed present
under the species of bread by the power of the sacrament, while the
blood is there from real concomitance, as stated above (A[1], ad 1) in
regard to the soul and Godhead of Christ; and under the species of wine
the blood is present by the power of the sacrament, and His body by
real concomitance, as is also His soul and Godhead: because now
Christ's blood is not separated from His body, as it was at the time of
His Passion and death. Hence if this sacrament had been celebrated
then, the body of Christ would have been under the species of the
bread, but without the blood; and, under the species of the wine, the
blood would have been present without the body, as it was then, in
fact.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the whole Christ is under each species,
yet it is so not without purpose. For in the first place this serves to
represent Christ's Passion, in which the blood was separated from the
body; hence in the form for the consecration of the blood mention is
made of its shedding. Secondly, it is in keeping with the use of this
sacrament, that Christ's body be shown apart to the faithful as food,
and the blood as drink. Thirdly, it is in keeping with its effect, in
which sense it was stated above ([4551]Q[74], A[1]) that "the body is
offered for the salvation of the body, and the blood for the salvation
of the soul."
Reply to Objection 2: In Christ's Passion, of which this is the
memorial, the other parts of the body were not separated from one
another, as the blood was, but the body remained entire, according to
Ex. 12:46: "You shall not break a bone thereof." And therefore in this
sacrament the blood is consecrated apart from the body, but no other
part is consecrated separately from the rest.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the body of Christ is not under
the species of wine by the power of the sacrament, but by real
concomitance: and therefore by the consecration of the wine the body of
Christ is not there of itself, but concomitantly.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ is entire under every part of the species of the bread and
wine?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ is not entire under every part of the
species of bread and wine. Because those species can be divided
infinitely. If therefore Christ be entirely under every part of the
said species, it would follow that He is in this sacrament an infinite
number of times: which is unreasonable; because the infinite is
repugnant not only to nature, but likewise to grace.
Objection 2: Further, since Christ's is an organic body, it has parts
determinately distant. for a determinate distance of the individual
parts from each other is of the very nature of an organic body, as that
of eye from eye, and eye from ear. But this could not be so, if Christ
were entire under every part of the species; for every part would have
to be under every other part, and so where one part would be, there
another part would be. It cannot be then that the entire Christ is
under every part of the host or of the wine contained in the chalice.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's body always retains the true nature of a
body, nor is it ever changed into a spirit. Now it is the nature of a
body for it to be "quantity having position" (Predic. iv). But it
belongs to the nature of this quantity that the various parts exist in
various parts of place. Therefore, apparently it is impossible for the
entire Christ to be under every part of the species.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (Gregory, Sacramentarium):
"Each receives Christ the Lord, Who is entire under every morsel, nor
is He less in each portion, but bestows Himself entire under each."
I answer that, As was observed above (A[1], ad 3), because the
substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament by the power of the
sacrament, while dimensive quantity is there by reason of real
concomitance, consequently Christ's body is in this sacrament
substantively, that is, in the way in which substance is under
dimensions, but not after the manner of dimensions, which means, not in
the way in which the dimensive quantity of a body is under the
dimensive quantity of place.
Now it is evident that the whole nature of a substance is under every
part of the dimensions under which it is contained; just as the entire
nature of air is under every part of air, and the entire nature of
bread under every part of bread; and this indifferently, whether the
dimensions be actually divided (as when the air is divided or the bread
cut), or whether they be actually undivided, but potentially divisible.
And therefore it is manifest that the entire Christ is under every part
of the species of the bread, even while the host remains entire, and
not merely when it is broken, as some say, giving the example of an
image which appears in a mirror, which appears as one in the unbroken
mirror, whereas when the mirror is broken, there is an image in each
part of the broken mirror: for the comparison is not perfect, because
the multiplying of such images results in the broken mirror on account
of the various reflections in the various parts of the mirror; but here
there is only one consecration, whereby Christ's body is in this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Number follows division, and therefore so long as
quantity remains actually undivided, neither is the substance of any
thing several times under its proper dimensions, nor is Christ's body
several times under the dimensions of the bread; and consequently not
an infinite number of times, but just as many times as it is divided
into parts.
Reply to Objection 2: The determinate distance of parts in an organic
body is based upon its dimensive quantity; but the nature of substance
precedes even dimensive quantity. And since the conversion of the
substance of the bread is terminated at the substance of the body of
Christ, and since according to the manner of substance the body of
Christ is properly and directly in this sacrament; such distance of
parts is indeed in Christ's true body, which, however, is not compared
to this sacrament according to such distance, but according to the
manner of its substance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is based on the nature of a body,
arising from dimensive quantity. But it was said above (ad 2) that
Christ's body is compared with this sacrament not by reason of
dimensive quantity, but by reason of its substance, as already stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's
body is not in this sacrament. For it was said [4552](A[3]) that
Christ's entire body is contained under every part of the consecrated
host. But no dimensive quantity is contained entirely in any whole, and
in its every part. Therefore it is impossible for the entire dimensive
quantity of Christ's body to be there.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible for two dimensive quantities to
be together, even though one be separate from its subject, and the
other in a natural body, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph.
iii). But the dimensive quantity of the bread remains in this
sacrament, as is evident to our senses. Consequently, the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is not there.
Objection 3: Further, if two unequal dimensive quantities be set side
by side, the greater will overlap the lesser. But the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is considerably larger than the dimensive
quantity of the consecrated host according to every dimension.
Therefore, if the dimensive quantity of Christ's body be in this
sacrament together with the dimensive quantity of the host, the
dimensive quantity of Christ's body is extended beyond the quantity of
the host, which nevertheless is not without the substance of Christ's
body. Therefore, the substance of Christ's body will be in this
sacrament even outside the species of the bread, which is unreasonable,
since the substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament, only by the
consecration of the bread, as stated above [4553](A[2]). Consequently,
it is impossible for the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body to
be in this sacrament.
On the contrary, The existence of the dimensive quantity of any body
cannot be separated from the existence of its substance. But in this
sacrament the entire substance of Christ's body is present, as stated
above ([4554]AA[1],3). Therefore the entire dimensive quantity of
Christ's body is in this sacrament.
I answer that, As stated above [4555](A[1]), any part of Christ is in
this sacrament in two ways: in one way, by the power of the sacrament;
in another, from real concomitance. By the power of the sacrament the
dimensive quantity of Christ's body is not in this sacrament; for, by
the power of the sacrament that is present in this sacrament, whereat
the conversion is terminated. But the conversion which takes place in
this sacrament is terminated directly at the substance of Christ's
body, and not at its dimensions; which is evident from the fact that
the dimensive quantity of the bread remains after the consecration,
while only the substance of the bread passes away.
Nevertheless, since the substance of Christ's body is not really
deprived of its dimensive quantity and its other accidents, hence it
comes that by reason of real concomitance the whole dimensive quantity
of Christ's body and all its other accidents are in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: The manner of being of every thing is determined
by what belongs to it of itself, and not according to what is coupled
accidentally with it: thus an object is present to the sight, according
as it is white, and not according as it is sweet, although the same
object may be both white and sweet; hence sweetness is in the sight
after the manner of whiteness, and not after that of sweetness. Since,
then, the substance of Christ's body is present on the altar by the
power of this sacrament, while its dimensive quantity is there
concomitantly and as it were accidentally, therefore the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament, not according to its
proper manner (namely, that the whole is in the whole, and the
individual parts in individual parts), but after the manner of
substance, whose nature is for the whole to be in the whole, and the
whole in every part.
Reply to Objection 2: Two dimensive quantities cannot naturally be in
the same subject at the same time, so that each be there according to
the proper manner of dimensive quantity. But in this sacrament the
dimensive quantity of the bread is there after its proper manner, that
is, according to commensuration: not so the dimensive quantity of
Christ's body, for that is there after the manner of substance, as
stated above (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: The dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in
this sacrament not by way of commensuration, which is proper to
quantity, and to which it belongs for the greater to be extended beyond
the lesser; but in the way mentioned above (ad 1,2).
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Whether Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a place?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a
place. Because, to be in a place definitively or circumscriptively
belongs to being in a place. But Christ's body seems to be definitively
in this sacrament, because it is so present where the species of the
bread and wine are, that it is nowhere else upon the altar: likewise it
seems to be there circumscriptively, because it is so contained under
the species of the consecrated host, that it neither exceeds it nor is
exceeded by it. Therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a
place.
Objection 2: Further, the place of the bread and wine is not empty,
because nature abhors a vacuum; nor is the substance of the bread
there, as stated above ([4556]Q[75], A[2]); but only the body of Christ
is there. Consequently the body of Christ fills that place. But
whatever fills a place is there locally. Therefore the body of Christ
is in this sacrament locally.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above [4557](A[4]), the body of Christ
is in this sacrament with its dimensive quantity, and with all its
accidents. But to be in a place is an accident of a body; hence "where"
is numbered among the nine kinds of accidents. Therefore Christ's body
is in this sacrament locally.
On the contrary, The place and the object placed must be equal, as is
clear from the Philosopher (Phys. iv). But the place, where this
sacrament is, is much less than the body of Christ. Therefore Christ's
body is not in this sacrament as in a place.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]), Christ's body is in
this sacrament not after the proper manner of dimensive quantity, but
rather after the manner of substance. But every body occupying a place
is in the place according to the manner of dimensive quantity, namely,
inasmuch as it is commensurate with the place according to its
dimensive quantity. Hence it remains that Christ's body is not in this
sacrament as in a place, but after the manner of substance, that is to
say, in that way in which substance is contained by dimensions; because
the substance of Christ's body succeeds the substance of bread in this
sacrament: hence as the substance of bread was not locally under its
dimensions, but after the manner of substance, so neither is the
substance of Christ's body. Nevertheless the substance of Christ's body
is not the subject of those dimensions, as was the substance of the
bread: and therefore the substance of the bread was there locally by
reason of its dimensions, because it was compared with that place
through the medium of its own dimensions; but the substance of Christ's
body is compared with that place through the medium of foreign
dimensions, so that, on the contrary, the proper dimensions of Christ's
body are compared with that place through the medium of substance;
which is contrary to the notion of a located body.
Hence in no way is Christ's body locally in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body is not in this sacrament
definitively, because then it would be only on the particular altar
where this sacrament is performed: whereas it is in heaven under its
own species, and on many other altars under the sacramental species.
Likewise it is evident that it is not in this sacrament
circumscriptively, because it is not there according to the
commensuration of its own quantity, as stated above. But that it is not
outside the superficies of the sacrament, nor on any other part of the
altar, is due not to its being there definitively or circumscriptively,
but to its being there by consecration and conversion of the bread and
wine, as stated above [4558](A[1]; Q[15], A[2], sqq.).
Reply to Objection 2: The place in which Christ's body is, is not
empty; nor yet is it properly filled with the substance of Christ's
body, which is not there locally, as stated above; but it is filled
with the sacramental species, which have to fill the place either
because of the nature of dimensions, or at least miraculously, as they
also subsist miraculously after the fashion of substance.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above [4559](A[4]), the accidents of
Christ's body are in this sacrament by real concomitance. And therefore
those accidents of Christ's body which are intrinsic to it are in this
sacrament. But to be in a place is an accident when compared with the
extrinsic container. And therefore it is not necessary for Christ to be
in this sacrament as in a place.
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Whether Christ's body is in this sacrament movably?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body is movably in this sacrament,
because the Philosopher says (Topic. ii) that "when we are moved, the
things within us are moved": and this is true even of the soul's
spiritual substance. "But Christ is in this sacrament," as shown above
([4560]Q[74], A[1] ). Therefore He is moved when it is moved.
Objection 2: Further, the truth ought to correspond with the figure.
But, according to the commandment (Ex. 12:10), concerning the Paschal
Lamb, a figure of this sacrament, "there remained nothing until the
morning." Neither, therefore, if this sacrament be reserved until
morning, will Christ's body be there; and so it is not immovably in
this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, if Christ's body were to remain under this
sacrament even until the morrow, for the same reason it will remain
there during all coming time; for it cannot be said that it ceases to
be there when the species pass, because the existence of Christ's body
is not dependent on those species. Yet Christ does not remain in this
sacrament for all coming time. It seems, then, that straightway on the
morrow, or after a short time, He ceases to be under this sacrament.
And so it seems that Christ is in this sacrament movably.
On the contrary, it is impossible for the same thing to be in motion
and at rest, else contradictories would be verified of the same
subject. But Christ's body is at rest in heaven. Therefore it is not
movably in this sacrament.
I answer that, When any thing is one, as to subject, and manifold in
being, there is nothing to hinder it from being moved in one respect,
and yet to remain at rest in another just as it is one thing for a body
to be white, and another thing, to be large; hence it can be moved as
to its whiteness, and yet continue unmoved as to its magnitude. But in
Christ, being in Himself and being under the sacrament are not the same
thing, because when we say that He is under this sacrament, we express
a kind of relationship to this sacrament. According to this being,
then, Christ is not moved locally of Himself, but only accidentally,
because Christ is not in this sacrament as in a place, as stated above
[4561](A[5]). But what is not in a place, is not moved of itself
locally, but only according to the motion of the subject in which it
is.
In the same way neither is it moved of itself according to the being
which it has in this sacrament, by any other change whatever, as for
instance, that it ceases to be under this sacrament: because whatever
possesses unfailing existence of itself, cannot be the principle of
failing; but when something else fails, then it ceases to be in it;
just as God, Whose existence is unfailing and immortal, ceases to be in
some corruptible creature because such corruptible creature ceases to
exist. And in this way, since Christ has unfailing and incorruptible
being, He ceases to be under this sacrament, not because He ceases to
be, nor yet by local movement of His own, as is clear from what has
been said, but only by the fact that the sacramental species cease to
exist.
Hence it is clear that Christ, strictly speaking is immovably in this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument deals with accidental movement,
whereby things within us are moved together with us. But with things
which can of themselves be in a place, like bodies, it is otherwise
than with things which cannot of themselves be in a place, such as
forms and spiritual substances. And to this mode can be reduced what we
say of Christ, being moved accidentally, according to the existence
which He has in this sacrament, in which He is not present as in a
place.
Reply to Objection 2: It was this argument which seems to have
convinced those who held that Christ's body does not remain under this
sacrament if it be reserved until the morrow. It is against these that
Cyril says (Ep. lxxxiii): "Some are so foolish as to say that the
mystical blessing departs from the sacrament, if any of its fragments
remain until the next day: for Christ's consecrated body is not
changed, and the power of the blessing, and the life-giving grace is
perpetually in it." Thus are all other consecrations irremovable so
long as the consecrated things endure; on which account they are not
repeated. And although the truth corresponds with the figure, still the
figure cannot equal it.
Reply to Objection 3: The body of Christ remains in this sacrament not
only until the morrow, but also in the future, so long as the
sacramental species remain: and when they cease, Christ's body ceases
to be under them, not because it depends on them, but because the
relationship of Christ's body to those species is taken away, in the
same way as God ceases to be the Lord of a creature which ceases to
exist.
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Whether the body of Christ, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by any
eye, at least by a glorified one?
Objection 1: It seems that the body of Christ, as it is in this
sacrament, can be seen by the eye, at least by a glorified one. For our
eyes are hindered from beholding Christ's body in this sacrament, on
account of the sacramental species veiling it. But the glorified eye
cannot be hindered by anything from seeing bodies as they are.
Therefore, the glorified eye can see Christ's body as it is in this
sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, the glorified bodies of the saints will be "made
like to the body" of Christ's "glory," according to Phil. 3:21. But
Christ's eye beholds Himself as He is in this sacrament. Therefore, for
the same reason, every other glorified eye can see Him.
Objection 3: Further, in the resurrection the saints will be equal to
the angels, according to Lk. 20:36. But the angels see the body of
Christ as it is in this sacrament, for even the devils are found to pay
reverence thereto, and to fear it. Therefore, for like reason, the
glorified eye can see Christ as He is in this sacrament.
On the contrary, As long as a thing remains the same, it cannot at the
same time be seen by the same eye under diverse species. But the
glorified eye sees Christ always, as He is in His own species,
according to Is. 33:17: "(His eyes) shall see the king in his beauty."
It seems, then, that it does not see Christ, as He is under the species
of this sacrament.
I answer that, The eye is of two kinds, namely, the bodily eye properly
so-called, and the intellectual eye, so-called by similitude. But
Christ's body as it is in this sacrament cannot be seen by any bodily
eye. First of all, because a body which is visible brings about an
alteration in the medium, through its accidents. Now the accidents of
Christ's body are in this sacrament by means of the substance; so that
the accidents of Christ's body have no immediate relationship either to
this sacrament or to adjacent bodies; consequently they do not act on
the medium so as to be seen by any corporeal eye. Secondly, because, as
stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]), Christ's body is substantially present
in this sacrament. But substance, as such, is not visible to the bodily
eye, nor does it come under any one of the senses, nor under the
imagination, but solely under the intellect, whose object is "what a
thing is" (De Anima iii). And therefore, properly speaking, Christ's
body, according to the mode of being which it has in this sacrament, is
perceptible neither by the sense nor by the imagination, but only by
the intellect, which is called the spiritual eye.
Moreover it is perceived differently by different intellects. For since
the way in which Christ is in this sacrament is entirely supernatural,
it is visible in itself to a supernatural, i.e. the Divine, intellect,
and consequently to a beatified intellect, of angel or of man, which,
through the participated glory of the Divine intellect, sees all
supernatural things in the vision of the Divine Essence. But it can be
seen by a wayfarer through faith alone, like other supernatural things.
And not even the angelic intellect of its own natural power is capable
of beholding it; consequently the devils cannot by their intellect
perceive Christ in this sacrament, except through faith, to which they
do not pay willing assent; yet they are convinced of it from the
evidence of signs, according to James 2:19: "The devils believe, and
tremble."
Reply to Objection 1: Our bodily eye, on account of the sacramental
species, is hindered from beholding the body of Christ underlying them,
not merely as by way of veil (just as we are hindered from seeing what
is covered with any corporeal veil), but also because Christ's body
bears a relation to the medium surrounding this sacrament, not through
its own accidents, but through the sacramental species.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's own bodily eye sees Himself existing
under the sacrament, yet it cannot see the way in which it exists under
the sacrament, because that belongs to the intellect. But it is not the
same with any other glorified eye, because Christ's eye is under this
sacrament, in which no other glorified eye is conformed to it.
Reply to Objection 3: No angel, good or bad, can see anything with a
bodily eye, but only with the mental eye. Hence there is no parallel
reason, as is evident from what was said above.
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Whether Christ's body is truly there when flesh or a child appears
miraculously in this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body is not truly there when flesh
or a child appears miraculously in this sacrament. Because His body
ceases to be under this sacrament when the sacramental species cease to
be present, as stated above [4562](A[6]). But when flesh or a child
appears, the sacramental species cease to be present. Therefore
Christ's body is not truly there.
Objection 2: Further, wherever Christ's body is, it is there either
under its own species, or under those of the sacrament. But when such
apparitions occur, it is evident that Christ is not present under His
own species, because the entire Christ is contained in this sacrament,
and He remains entire under the form in which He ascended to heaven:
yet what appears miraculously in this sacrament is sometimes seen as a
small particle of flesh, or at times as a small child. Now it is
evident that He is not there under the sacramental species, which is
that of bread or wine. Consequently, it seems that Christ's body is not
there in any way.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's body begins to be in this sacrament by
consecration and conversion, as was said above ([4563]Q[75],
AA[2],3,4). But the flesh and blood which appear by miracle are not
consecrated, nor are they converted into Christ's true body and blood.
Therefore the body or the blood of Christ is not under those species.
On the contrary, When such apparition takes place, the same reverence
is shown to it as was shown at first, which would not be done if Christ
were not truly there, to Whom we show reverence of "latria." Therefore,
when such apparition occurs, Christ is under the sacrament.
I answer that, Such apparition comes about in two ways, when
occasionally in this sacrament flesh, or blood, or a child, is seen.
Sometimes it happens on the part of the beholders, whose eyes are so
affected as if they outwardly saw flesh, or blood, or a child, while no
change takes place in the sacrament. And this seems to happen when to
one person it is seen under the species of flesh or of a child, while
to others it is seen as before under the species of bread; or when to
the same individual it appears for an hour under the appearance of
flesh or a child, and afterwards under the appearance of bread. Nor is
there any deception there, as occurs in the feats of magicians, because
such species is divinely formed in the eye in order to represent some
truth, namely, for the purpose of showing that Christ's body is truly
under this sacrament; just as Christ without deception appeared to the
disciples who were going to Emmaus. For Augustine says (De Qq. Evang.
ii) that "when our pretense is referred to some significance, it is not
a lie, but a figure of the truth." And since in this way no change is
made in the sacrament, it is manifest that, when such apparition
occurs, Christ does not cease to be under this sacrament.
But it sometimes happens that such apparition comes about not merely by
a change wrought in the beholders, but by an appearance which really
exists outwardly. And this indeed is seen to happen when it is beheld
by everyone under such an appearance, and it remains so not for an
hour, but for a considerable time; and, in this case some think that it
is the proper species of Christ's body. Nor does it matter that
sometimes Christ's entire body is not seen there, but part of His
flesh, or else that it is not seen in youthful guise. but in the
semblance of a child, because it lies within the power of a glorified
body for it to be seen by a non-glorified eye either entirely or in
part, and under its own semblance or in strange guise, as will be said
later ([4564]XP, Q[85], AA[2],3).
But this seems unlikely. First of all, because Christ's body under its
proper species can be seen only in one place, wherein it is
definitively contained. Hence since it is seen in its proper species,
and is adored in heaven, it is not seen under its proper species in
this sacrament. Secondly, because a glorified body, which appears at
will, disappears when it wills after the apparition; thus it is related
(Lk. 24:31) that our Lord "vanished out of sight" of the disciples. But
that which appears under the likeness of flesh in this sacrament,
continues for a long time; indeed, one reads of its being sometimes
enclosed, and, by order of many bishops, preserved in a pyx, which it
would be wicked to think of Christ under His proper semblance.
Consequently, it remains to be said, that, while the dimensions remain
the same as before, there is a miraculous change wrought in the other
accidents, such as shape, color, and the rest, so that flesh, or blood,
or a child, is seen. And, as was said already, this is not deception,
because it is done "to represent the truth," namely, to show by this
miraculous apparition that Christ's body and blood are truly in this
sacrament. And thus it is clear that as the dimensions remain, which
are the foundation of the other accidents, as we shall see later on
([4565]Q[77], A[2]), the body of Christ truly remains in this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: When such apparition takes place, the sacramental
species sometimes continue entire in themselves; and sometimes only as
to that which is principal, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, during such apparitions Christ's
proper semblance is not seen, but a species miraculously formed either
in the eyes of the beholders, or in the sacramental dimensions
themselves, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 3: The dimensions of the consecrated bread and wine
continue, while a miraculous change is wrought in the other accidents,
as stated above.
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OF THE ACCIDENTS WHICH REMAIN IN THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the accidents which remain in this sacrament;
under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the accidents which remain are without a subject?
(2) Whether dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents?
(3) Whether such accidents can affect an extrinsic body?
(4) Whether they can be corrupted?
(5) Whether anything can be generated from them?
(6) Whether they can nourish?
(7) Of the breaking of the consecrated bread?
(8) Whether anything can be mixed with the consecrated wine?
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Whether the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject?
Objection 1: It seems that the accidents do not remain in this
sacrament without a subject, because there ought not to be anything
disorderly or deceitful in this sacrament of truth. But for accidents
to be without a subject is contrary to the order which God established
in nature; and furthermore it seems to savor of deceit, since accidents
are naturally the signs of the nature of the subject. Therefore the
accidents are not without a subject in this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, not even by miracle can the definition of a thing
be severed from it, or the definition of another thing be applied to
it; for instance, that, while man remains a man, he can be an
irrational animal. For it would follow that contradictories can exist
at the one time: for the "definition of a thing is what its name
expresses," as is said in Metaph. iv. But it belongs to the definition
of an accident for it to be in a subject, while the definition of
substance is that it must subsist of itself, and not in another.
Therefore it cannot come to pass, even by miracle, that the accidents
exist without a subject in this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, an accident is individuated by its subject. If
therefore the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject,
they will not be individual, but general, which is clearly false,
because thus they would not be sensible, but merely intelligible.
Objection 4: Further, the accidents after the consecration of this
sacrament do not obtain any composition. But before the consecration
they were not composed either of matter and form, nor of existence [quo
est] and essence [quod est]. Therefore, even after consecration they
are not composite in either of these ways. But this is unreasonable,
for thus they would be simpler than angels, whereas at the same time
these accidents are perceptible to the senses. Therefore, in this
sacrament the accidents do not remain without a subject.
On the contrary, Gregory says in an Easter Homily (Lanfranc, De Corp.
et Sang. Dom. xx) that "the sacramental species are the names of those
things which were there before, namely, of the bread and wine."
Therefore since the substance of the bread and the wine does not
remain, it seems that these species remain without a subject.
I answer that, The species of the bread and wine, which are perceived
by our senses to remain in this sacrament after consecration, are not
subjected in the substance of the bread and wine, for that does not
remain, as stated above ([4566]Q[75], A[2]); nor in the substantial
form, for that does not remain ([4567]Q[75], A[6]), and if it did
remain, "it could not be a subject," as Boethius declares (De Trin. i).
Furthermore it is manifest that these accidents are not subjected in
the substance of Christ's body and blood, because the substance of the
human body cannot in any way be affected by such accidents; nor is it
possible for Christ's glorious and impassible body to be altered so as
to receive these qualities.
Now there are some who say that they are in the surrounding atmosphere
as in a subject. But even this cannot be: in the first place, because
atmosphere is not susceptive of such accidents. Secondly, because these
accidents are not where the atmosphere is, nay more, the atmosphere is
displaced by the motion of these species. Thirdly, because accidents do
not pass from subject to subject, so that the same identical accident
which was first in one subject be afterwards in another; because an
accident is individuated by the subject; hence it cannot come to pass
for an accident remaining identically the same to be at one time in one
subject, and at another time in another. Fourthly, since the atmosphere
is not deprived of its own accidents, it would have at the one time its
own accidents and others foreign to it. Nor can it be maintained that
this is done miraculously in virtue of the consecration, because the
words of consecration do not signify this, and they effect only what
they signify.
Therefore it follows that the accidents continue in this sacrament
without a subject. This can be done by Divine power: for since an
effect depends more upon the first cause than on the second, God Who is
the first cause both of substance and accident, can by His unlimited
power preserve an accident in existence when the substance is withdrawn
whereby it was preserved in existence as by its proper cause, just as
without natural causes He can produce other effects of natural causes,
even as He formed a human body in the Virgin's womb, "without the seed
of man" (Hymn for Christmas, First Vespers).
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to hinder the common law of
nature from ordaining a thing, the contrary of which is nevertheless
ordained by a special privilege of grace, as is evident in the raising
of the dead, and in the restoring of sight to the blind: even thus in
human affairs, to some individuals some things are granted by special
privilege which are outside the common law. And so, even though it be
according to the common law of nature for an accident to be in a
subject, still for a special reason, according to the order of grace,
the accidents exist in this sacrament without a subject, on account of
the reasons given above ([4568]Q[75] , A[5]).
Reply to Objection 2: Since being is not a genus, then being cannot be
of itself the essence of either substance or accident. Consequently,
the definition of substance is not---"a being of itself without a
subject," nor is the definition of accident---"a being in a subject";
but it belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance "to have
existence not in a subject"; while it belongs to the quiddity or
essence of accident "to have existence in a subject." But in this
sacrament it is not in virtue of their essence that accidents are not
in a subject, but through the Divine power sustaining them; and
consequently they do not cease to be accidents, because neither is the
definition of accident withdrawn from them, nor does the definition of
substance apply to them.
Reply to Objection 3: These accidents acquired individual being in the
substance of the bread and wine; and when this substance is changed
into the body and blood of Christ, they remain in that individuated
being which they possessed before, hence they are individual and
sensible.
Reply to Objection 4: These accidents had no being of their own nor
other accidents, so long as the substance of the bread and wine
remained; but their subjects had "such" being through them, just as
snow is "white" through whiteness. But after the consecration the
accidents which remain have being; hence they are compounded of
existence and essence, as was said of the angels, in the [4569]FP,
Q[50], A[2], ad 3; and besides they have composition of quantitative
parts.
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Whether in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine is th
e
subject of the other accidents?
Objection 1: It seems that in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of
the bread or wine is not the subject of the other accidents. For
accident is not the subject of accident; because no form can be a
subject, since to be a subject is a property of matter. But dimensive
quantity is an accident. Therefore dimensive quantity cannot be the
subject of the other accidents.
Objection 2: Further, just as quantity is individuated by substance, so
also are the other accidents. If, then, the dimensive quantity of the
bread or wine remains individuated according to the being it had
before, in which it is preserved, for like reason the other accidents
remain individuated according to the existence which they had before in
the substance. Therefore they are not in dimensive quantity as in a
subject, since every accident is individuated by its own subject.
Objection 3: Further, among the other accidents that remain, of the
bread and wine, the senses perceive also rarity and density, which
cannot be in dimensive quantity existing outside matter; because a
thing is rare which has little matter under great dimensions. while a
thing is dense which has much matter under small dimensions, as is said
in Phys. iv. It does not seem, then, that dimensive quantity can be the
subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, quantity abstract from matter seems to be
mathematical quantity, which is not the subject of sensible qualities.
Since, then, the remaining accidents in this sacrament are sensible, it
seems that in this sacrament they cannot be subjected in the dimensive
quantity of the bread and wine that remains after consecration.
On the contrary, Qualities are divisible only accidentally, that is, by
reason of the subject. But the qualities remaining in this sacrament
are divided by the division of dimensive quantity, as is evident
through our senses. Therefore, dimensive quantity is the subject of the
accidents which remain in this sacrament.
I answer that, It is necessary to say that the other accidents which
remain in this sacrament are subjected in the dimensive quantity of the
bread and wine that remains: first of all, because something having
quantity and color and affected by other accidents is perceived by the
senses; nor is sense deceived in such. Secondly, because the first
disposition of matter is dimensive quantity, hence Plato also assigned
"great" and "small" as the first differences of matter (Aristotle,
Metaph. iv). And because the first subject is matter, the consequence
is that all other accidents are related to their subject through the
medium of dimensive quantity; just as the first subject of color is
said to be the surface, on which account some have maintained that
dimensions are the substances of bodies, as is said in Metaph. iii. And
since, when the subject is withdrawn, the accidents remain according to
the being which they had before, it follows that all accidents remain
founded upon dimensive quantity.
Thirdly, because, since the subject is the principle of individuation
of the accidents, it is necessary for what is admitted as the subject
of some accidents to be somehow the principle of individuation: for it
is of the very notion of an individual that it cannot be in several;
and this happens in two ways. First, because it is not natural to it to
be in any one; and in this way immaterial separated forms, subsisting
of themselves, are also individuals of themselves. Secondly, because a
form, be it substantial or accidental, is naturally in someone indeed,
not in several, as this whiteness, which is in this body. As to the
first, matter is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms,
because, since these forms, considered in themselves, are naturally in
something as in a subject, from the very fact that one of them is
received in matter, which is not in another, it follows that neither
can the form itself thus existing be in another. As to the second, it
must be maintained that the principle of individuation is dimensive
quantity. For that something is naturally in another one solely, is due
to the fact that that other is undivided in itself, and distinct from
all others. But it is on account of quantity that substance can be
divided, as is said in Phys. i. And therefore dimensive quantity itself
is a particular principle of individuation in forms of this kind,
namely, inasmuch as forms numerically distinct are in different parts
of the matter. Hence also dimensive quantity has of itself a kind of
individuation, so that we can imagine several lines of the same
species, differing in position, which is included in the notion of this
quantity; for it belongs to dimension for it to be "quantity having
position" (Aristotle, Categor. iv), and therefore dimensive quantity
can be the subject of the other accidents, rather than the other way
about.
Reply to Objection 1: One accident cannot of itself be the subject of
another, because it does not exist of itself. But inasmuch as an
accident is received in another thing, one is said to be the subject of
the other, inasmuch as one is received in a subject through another, as
the surface is said to be the subject of color. Hence when God makes an
accident to exist of itself, it can also be of itself the subject of
another.
Reply to Objection 2: The other accidents, even as they were in the
substance of the bread, were individuated by means of dimensive
quantity, as stated above. And therefore dimensive quantity is the
subject of the other accidents remaining in this sacrament, rather than
conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: Rarity and density are particular qualities
accompanying bodies, by reason of their having much or little matter
under dimensions; just as all other accidents likewise follow from the
principles of substance. And consequently, as the accidents are
preserved by Divine power when the substance is withdrawn, so, when
matter is withdrawn, the qualities which go with matter, such as rarity
and density, are preserved by Divine power.
Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical quantity abstracts not from
intelligible matter, but from sensible matter, as is said in Metaph.
vii. But matter is termed sensible because it underlies sensible
qualities. And therefore it is manifest that the dimensive quantity,
which remains in this sacrament without a subject, is not mathematical
quantity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the species remaining in this sacrament can change external objects
?
Objection 1: It seems that the species which remain in this sacrament
cannot affect external objects. For it is proved in Phys. vii, that
forms which are in matter are produced by forms that are in matter, but
not from forms which are without matter, because like makes like. But
the sacramental species are species without matter, since they remain
without a subject, as is evident from what was said above [4570](A[1]).
Therefore they cannot affect other matter by producing any form in it.
Objection 2: Further, when the action of the principal agent ceases,
then the action of the instrument must cease, as when the carpenter
rests, the hammer is moved no longer. But all accidental forms act
instrumentally in virtue of the substantial form as the principal
agent. Therefore, since the substantial form of the bread and wine does
not remain in this sacrament, as was shown above ([4571]Q[75], A[6]),
it seems that the accidental forms which remain cannot act so as to
change external matter.
Objection 3: Further, nothing acts outside its species, because an
effect cannot surpass its cause. But all the sacramental species are
accidents. Therefore they cannot change external matter, at least as to
a substantial form.
On the contrary, If they could not change external bodies, they could
not be felt; for a thing is felt from the senses being changed by a
sensible thing, as is said in De Anima ii.
I answer that, Because everything acts in so far as it is an actual
being, the consequence is that everything stands in the same relation
to action as it does to being. Therefore, because, according to what
was said above [4572](A[1]), it is an effect of the Divine power that
the sacramental species continue in the being which they had when the
substance of the bread and wine was present, it follows that they
continue in their action. Consequently they retain every action which
they had while the substance of the bread and wine remained, now that
the substance of the bread and wine has passed into the body and blood
of Christ. Hence there is no doubt but that they can change external
bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: The sacramental species, although they are forms
existing without matter, still retain the same being which they had
before in matter, and therefore as to their being they are like forms
which are in matter.
Reply to Objection 2: The action of an accidental form depends upon the
action of a substantial form in the same way as the being of accident
depends upon the being of substance; and therefore, as it is an effect
of Divine power that the sacramental species exist without substance,
so is it an effect of Divine power that they can act without a
substantial form, because every action of a substantial or accidental
form depends upon God as the first agent.
Reply to Objection 3: The change which terminates in a substantial form
is not effected by a substantial form directly, but by means of the
active and passive qualities, which act in virtue of the substantial
form. But by Divine power this instrumental energy is retained in the
sacramental species, just as it was before: and consequently their
action can be directed to a substantial form instrumentally, just in
the same way as anything can act outside its species, not as by its own
power, but by the power of the chief agent.
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Whether the sacramental species can be corrupted?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species cannot be corrupted,
because corruption comes of the separation of the form from the matter.
But the matter of the bread does not remain in this sacrament, as is
clear from what was said above ([4573]Q[75], A[2]). Therefore these
species cannot be corrupted.
Objection 2: Further, no form is corrupted except accidentally, that
is, when its subject is corrupted; hence self-subsisting forms are
incorruptible, as is seen in spiritual substances. But the sacramental
species are forms without a subject. Therefore they cannot be
corrupted.
Objection 3: Further, if they be corrupted, it will either be naturally
or miraculously. But they cannot be corrupted naturally, because no
subject of corruption can be assigned as remaining after the corruption
has taken place. Neither can they be corrupted miraculously, because
the miracles which occur in this sacrament take place in virtue of the
consecration, whereby the sacramental species are preserved: and the
same thing is not the cause of preservation and of corruption.
Therefore, in no way can the sacramental species be corrupted.
On the contrary, We perceive by our senses that the consecrated hosts
become putrefied and corrupted.
I answer that, Corruption is "movement from being into non-being"
(Aristotle, Phys. v). Now it has been stated [4574](A[3]) that the
sacramental species retain the same being as they had before when the
substance of the bread was present. Consequently, as the being of those
accidents could be corrupted while the substance of the bread and wine
was present, so likewise they can be corrupted now that the substance
has passed away.
But such accidents could have been previously corrupted in two ways: in
one way, of themselves; in another way, accidentally. They could be
corrupted of themselves, as by alteration of the qualities, and
increase or decrease of the quantity, not in the way in which increase
or decrease is found only in animated bodies, such as the substances of
the bread and wine are not, but by addition or division; for, as is
said in Metaph. iii, one dimension is dissolved by division, and two
dimensions result; while on the contrary, by addition, two dimensions
become one. And in this way such accidents can be corrupted manifestly
after consecration, because the dimensive quantity which remains can
receive division and addition; and since it is the subject of sensible
qualities, as stated above [4575](A[1]), it can likewise be the subject
of their alteration, for instance, if the color or the savor of the
bread or wine be altered.
An accident can be corrupted in another way, through the corruption of
its subject, and in this way also they can be corrupted after
consecration; for although the subject does not remain, still the being
which they had in the subject does remain, which being is proper, and
suited to the subject. And therefore such being can be corrupted by a
contrary agent, as the substance of the bread or wine was subject to
corruption, and, moreover, was not corrupted except by a preceding
alteration regarding the accidents.
Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between each of the aforesaid
corruptions; because, when the body and the blood of Christ succeed in
this sacrament to the substance of the bread and wine, if there be such
change on the part of the accidents as would not have sufficed for the
corruption of the bread and wine, then the body and blood of Christ do
not cease to be under this sacrament on account of such change, whether
the change be on the part of the quality, as for instance, when the
color or the savor of the bread or wine is slightly modified; or on the
part of the quantity, as when the bread or the wine is divided into
such parts as to keep in them the nature of bread or of wine. But if
the change be so great that the substance of the bread or wine would
have been corrupted, then Christ's body and blood do not remain under
this sacrament; and this either on the part of the qualities, as when
the color, savor, and other qualities of the bread and wine are so
altered as to be incompatible with the nature of bread or of wine; or
else on the part of the quantity, as, for instance, if the bread be
reduced to fine particles, or the wine divided into such tiny drops
that the species of bread or wine no longer remain.
Reply to Objection 1: Since it belongs essentially to corruption to
take away the being of a thing, in so far as the being of some form is
in matter, it results that by corruption the form is separated from the
matter. But if such being were not in matter, yet like such being as is
in matter, it could be taken away by corruption, even where there is no
matter; as takes place in this sacrament, as is evident from what was
said above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the sacramental species are forms not in
matter, yet they have the being which they had in matter.
Reply to Objection 3: This corruption of species is not miraculous, but
natural; nevertheless, it presupposes the miracle which is wrought in
the consecration, namely, that those sacramental species retain without
a subject, the same being as they had in a subject; just as a blind
man, to whom sight is given miraculously, sees naturally.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anything can be generated from the sacramental species?
Objection 1: It seems that nothing can be generated from the
sacramental species: because, whatever is generated, is generated out
of some matter: for nothing is generated out of nothing, although by
creation something is made out of nothing. But there is no matter
underlying the sacramental species except that of Christ's body, and
that body is incorruptible. Therefore it seems that nothing can be
generated from the sacramental species.
Objection 2: Further, things which are not of the same genus cannot
spring from one another: thus a line is not made of whiteness. But
accident and substance differ generically. Therefore, since the
sacramental species are accidents, it seems that no substance can be
generated from them.
Objection 3: Further, if any corporeal substance be generated from
them, such substance will not be without accident. Therefore, if any
corporeal substance be generated from the sacramental species, then
substance and accident would be generated from accident, namely, two
things from one, which is impossible. Consequently, it is impossible
for any corporeal substance to be generated out of the sacramental
species.
On the contrary, The senses are witness that something is generated out
of the sacramental species, either ashes, if they be burned, worms if
they putrefy, or dust if they be crushed.
I answer that, Since "the corruption of one thing is the generation of
another" (De Gener. i), something must be generated necessarily from
the sacramental species if they be corrupted, as stated above
[4576](A[4]); for they are not corrupted in such a way that they
disappear altogether, as if reduced to nothing; on the contrary,
something sensible manifestly succeeds to them.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how anything can be generated from
them. For it is quite evident that nothing is generated out of the body
and blood of Christ which are truly there, because these are
incorruptible. But if the substance, or even the matter, of the bread
and wine were to remain in this sacrament, then, as some have
maintained, it would be easy to account for this sensible object which
succeeds to them. But that supposition is false, as was stated above
([4577]Q[75], AA[2],4,8).
Hence it is that others have said that the things generated have not
sprung from the sacramental species, but from the surrounding
atmosphere. But this can be shown in many ways to be impossible. In the
first place, because when a thing is generated from another, the latter
at first appears changed and corrupted; whereas no alteration or
corruption appeared previously in the adjacent atmosphere; hence the
worms or ashes are not generated therefrom. Secondly, because the
nature of the atmosphere is not such as to permit of such things being
generated by such alterations. Thirdly, because it is possible for many
consecrated hosts to be burned or putrefied; nor would it be possible
for an earthen body, large enough to be generated from the atmosphere,
unless a great and, in fact, exceedingly sensible condensation of the
atmosphere took place. Fourthly, because the same thing can happen to
the solid bodies surrounding them, such as iron or stone, which remain
entire after the generation of the aforesaid things. Hence this opinion
cannot stand, because it is opposed to what is manifest to our senses.
And therefore others have said that the substance of the bread and wine
returns during the corruption of the species, and so from the returning
substance of the bread and wine, ashes or worms or something of the
kind are generated. But this explanation seems an impossible one. First
of all, because if the substance of the bread and wine be converted
into the body and blood of Christ, as was shown above (Q[75], AA[2],4),
the substance of the bread and wine cannot return, except the body and
blood of Christ be again changed back into the substance of bread and
wine, which is impossible: thus if air be turned into fire, the air
cannot return without the fire being again changed into air. But if the
substance of bread or wine be annihilated, it cannot return again,
because what lapses into nothing does not return numerically the same.
Unless perchance it be said that the said substance returns, because
God creates anew another new substance to replace the first. Secondly,
this seems to be impossible, because no time can be assigned when the
substance of the bread returns. For, from what was said above
[4578](A[4]; Q[76], A[6], ad 3), it is evident that while the species
of the bread and wine remain, there remain also the body and blood of
Christ, which are not present together with the substance of the bread
and wine in this sacrament, according to what was stated above (Q[75],
A[2]). Hence the substance of the bread and wine cannot return while
the sacramental species remain; nor, again, when these species pass
away; because then the substance of the bread and wine would be without
their proper accidents, which is impossible. Unless perchance it be
said that in the last instant of the corruption of the species there
returns (not, indeed, the substance of bread and wine, because it is in
that very instant that they have the being of the substance generated
from the species, but) the matter of the bread and wine; which, matter,
properly speaking, would be more correctly described as created anew,
than as returning. And in this sense the aforesaid position might be
held.
However, since it does not seem reasonable to say that anything takes
place miraculously in this sacrament, except in virtue of the
consecration itself, which does not imply either creation or return of
matter, it seems better to say that in the actual consecration it is
miraculously bestowed on the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine
to be the subject of subsequent forms. Now this is proper to matter;
and therefore as a consequence everything which goes with matter is
bestowed on dimensive quantity; and therefore everything which could be
generated from the matter of bread or wine, if it were present, can be
generated from the aforesaid dimensive quantity of the bread or wine,
not, indeed, by a new miracle, but by virtue of the miracle which has
already taken place.
Reply to Objection 1: Although no matter is there out of which a thing
may be generated, nevertheless dimensive quantity supplies the place of
matter, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Those sacramental species are indeed accidents,
yet they have the act and power of substance, as stated above
[4579](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: The dimensive quantity of the bread and wine
retains its own nature, and receives miraculously the power and
property of substance; and therefore it can pass to both, that is, into
substance and dimension.
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Whether the sacramental species can nourish?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species cannot nourish,
because, as Ambrose says (De Sacram. v), "it is not this bread that
enters into our body, but the bread of everlasting life, which supports
the substance of our soul." But whatever nourishes enters into the
body. Therefore this bread does not nourish: and the same reason holds
good of the wine.
Objection 2: Further, as is said in De Gener. ii, "We are nourished by
the very things of which we are made." But the sacramental species are
accidents, whereas man is not made of accidents, because accident is
not a part of substance. Therefore it seems that the sacramental
species cannot nourish.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii) that "food
nourishes according as it is a substance, but it gives increase by
reason of its quantity." But the sacramental species are not a
substance. Consequently they cannot nourish.
On the contrary, The Apostle speaking of this sacrament says (1 Cor.
11:21): "One, indeed, is hungry, and another is drunk": upon which the
gloss observes that "he alludes to those who after the celebration of
the sacred mystery, and after the consecration of the bread and wine,
claimed their oblations, and not sharing them with others, took the
whole, so as even to become intoxicated thereby." But this could not
happen if the sacramental species did not nourish. Therefore the
sacramental species do nourish.
I answer that, This question presents no difficulty, now that we have
solved the preceding question. Because, as stated in De Anima ii, food
nourishes by being converted into the substance of the individual
nourished. Now it has been stated [4580](A[5]) that the sacramental
species can be converted into a substance generated from them. And they
can be converted into the human body for the same reason as they can
into ashes or worms. Consequently, it is evident that they nourish.
But the senses witness to the untruth of what some maintain; viz. that
the species do not nourish as though they were changed into the human
body, but merely refresh and hearten by acting upon the senses (as a
man is heartened by the odor of meat, and intoxicated by the fumes of
wine). Because such refreshment does not suffice long for a man, whose
body needs repair owing to constant waste: and yet a man could be
supported for long if he were to take hosts and consecrated wine in
great quantity.
In like manner the statement advanced by others cannot stand, who hold
that the sacramental species nourish owing to the remaining substantial
form of the bread and wine: both because the form does not remain, as
stated above ([4581]Q[75], A[6]): and because to nourish is the act not
of a form but rather of matter, which takes the form of the one
nourished, while the form of the nourishment passes away: hence it is
said in De Anima ii that nourishment is at first unlike, but at the end
is like.
Reply to Objection 1: After the consecration bread can be said to be in
this sacrament in two ways. First, as to the species, which retain the
name of the previous substance, as Gregory says in an Easter Homily
(Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xx). Secondly, Christ's very body can
be called bread, since it is the mystical bread "coming down from
heaven." Consequently, Ambrose uses the word "bread" in this second
meaning, when he says that "this bread does not pass into the body,"
because, to wit, Christ's body is not changed into man's body, but
nourishes his soul. But he is not speaking of bread taken in the first
acceptation.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the sacramental species are not those
things out of which the human body is made, yet they are changed into
those things stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the sacramental species are not a
substance, still they have the virtue of a substance, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sacramental species are broken in this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species are not broken in
this sacrament, because the Philosopher says in Meteor. iv that bodies
are breakable owing to a certain disposition of the pores; a thing
which cannot be attributed to the sacramental species. Therefore the
sacramental species cannot be broken.
Objection 2: Further, breaking is followed by sound. But the
sacramental species emit no sound: because the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii), that what emits sound is a hard body, having a smooth
surface. Therefore the sacramental species are not broken.
Objection 3: Further, breaking and mastication are seemingly of the
same object. But it is Christ's true body that is eaten, according to
Jn. 6:57: "He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood." Therefore
it is Christ's body that is broken and masticated: and hence it is said
in the confession of Berengarius: "I agree with the Holy Catholic
Church, and with heart and lips I profess, that the bread and wine
which are placed on the altar, are the true body and blood of Christ
after consecration, and are truly handled and broken by the priest's
hands, broken and crushed by the teeth of believers." Consequently, the
breaking ought not to be ascribed to the sacramental species.
On the contrary, Breaking arises from the division of that which has
quantity. But nothing having quantity except the sacramental species is
broken here, because neither Christ's body is broken, as being
incorruptible, nor is the substance of the bread, because it no longer
remains. Therefore the sacramental species are broken.
I answer that, Many opinions prevailed of old on this matter. Some held
that in this sacrament there was no breaking at all in reality, but
merely in the eyes of the beholders. But this contention cannot stand,
because in this sacrament of truth the sense is not deceived with
regard to its proper object of judgment, and one of these objects is
breaking, whereby from one thing arise many: and these are common
sensibles, as is stated in De Anima ii.
Others accordingly have said that there was indeed a genuine breaking,
but without any subject. But this again contradicts our senses; because
a quantitative body is seen in this sacrament, which formerly was one,
and is now divided into many, and this must be the subject of the
breaking.
But it cannot be said that Christ's true body is broken. First of all,
because it is incorruptible and impassible: secondly, because it is
entire under every part, as was shown above ([4582]Q[76], A[3]), which
is contrary to the nature of a thing broken.
It remains, then, that the breaking is in the dimensive quantity of the
bread, as in a subject, just as the other accidents. And as the
sacramental species are the sacrament of Christ's true body, so is the
breaking of these species the sacrament of our Lord's Passion, which
was in Christ's true body.
Reply to Objection 1: As rarity and density remain under the
sacramental species, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), so likewise
porousness remains, and in consequence breakableness.
Reply to Objection 2: Hardness results from density; therefore, as
density remains under the sacramental species, hardness remains there
too, and the capability of sound as a consequence.
Reply to Objection 3: What is eaten under its own species, is also
broken and masticated under its own species; but Christ's body is eaten
not under its proper, but under the sacramental species. Hence in
explaining Jn. 6:64, "The flesh profiteth nothing," Augustine (Tract.
xxvii in Joan.) says that this is to be taken as referring to those who
understood carnally: "for they understood the flesh, thus, as it is
divided piecemeal, in a dead body, or as sold in the shambles."
Consequently, Christ's very body is not broken, except according to its
sacramental species. And the confession made by Berengarius is to be
understood in this sense, that the breaking and the crushing with the
teeth is to be referred to the sacramental species, under which the
body of Christ truly is.
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Whether any liquid can be mingled with the consecrated wine?
Objection 1: It seems that no liquid can be mingled with the
consecrated wine, because everything mingled with another partakes of
its quality. But no liquid can share in the quality of the sacramental
species, because those accidents are without a subject, as stated above
[4583](A[1]). Therefore it seems that no liquid can be mingled with the
sacramental species of the wine.
Objection 2: Further, if any kind of liquid be mixed with those
species, then some one thing must be the result. But no one thing can
result from the liquid, which is a substance, and the sacramental
species, which are accidents; nor from the liquid and Christ's blood,
which owing to its incorruptibility suffers neither increase nor
decrease. Therefore no liquid can be mixed with the consecrated wine.
Objection 3: Further, if any liquid be mixed with the consecrated wine,
then that also would appear to be consecrated; just as water added to
holy-water becomes holy. But the consecrated wine is truly Christ's
blood. Therefore the liquid added would likewise be Christ's blood
otherwise than by consecration, which is unbecoming. Therefore no
liquid can be mingled with the consecrated wine.
Objection 4: Further, if one of two things be entirely corrupted, there
is no mixture (De Gener. i). But if we mix any liquid, it seems that
the entire species of the sacramental wine is corrupted, so that the
blood of Christ ceases to be beneath it; both because great and little
are difference of quantity, and alter it, as white and black cause a
difference of color; and because the liquid mixed, as having no
obstacle, seems to permeate the whole, and so Christ's blood ceases to
be there, since it is not there with any other substance. Consequently,
no liquid can be mixed with the consecrated wine.
On the contrary, It is evident to our senses that another liquid can be
mixed with the wine after it is consecrated, just as before.
I answer that, The truth of this question is evident from what has been
said already. For it was said above [4584](A[3]; A[5], ad 2) that the
species remaining in this sacrament, as they acquire the manner of
being of substance in virtue of the consecration, so likewise do they
obtain the mode of acting and of being acted upon, so that they can do
or receive whatever their substance could do or receive, were it there
present. But it is evident that if the substance of wine were there
present, then some other liquid could be mingled with it.
Nevertheless there would be a different effect of such mixing both
according to the form and according to the quantity of the liquid. For
if sufficient liquid were mixed so as to spread itself all through the
wine, then the whole would be a mixed substance. Now what is made up of
things mixed is neither of them, but each passes into a third resulting
from both: hence it would result that the former wine would remain no
longer. But if the liquid added were of another species, for instance,
if water were mixed, the species of the wine would be dissolved, and
there would be a liquid of another species. But if liquid of the same
species were added, of instance, wine with wine, the same species would
remain, but the wine would not be the same numerically, as the
diversity of the accidents shows: for instance, if one wine were white
and the other red.
But if the liquid added were of such minute quantity that it could not
permeate the whole, the entire wine would not be mixed, but only part
of it, which would not remain the same numerically owing to the
blending of extraneous matter: still it would remain the same
specifically, not only if a little liquid of the same species were
mixed with it, but even if it were of another species, since a drop of
water blended with much wine passes into the species of wine (De Gener.
i).
Now it is evident that the body and blood of Christ abide in this
sacrament so long as the species remain numerically the same, as stated
above [4585](A[4]; Q[76], A[6], ad 3); because it is this bread and
this wine which is consecrated. Hence, if the liquid of any kind
whatsoever added be so much in quantity as to permeate the whole of the
consecrated wine, and be mixed with it throughout, the result would be
something numerically distinct, and the blood of Christ will remain
there no longer. But if the quantity of the liquid added be so slight
as not to permeate throughout, but to reach only a part of the species,
Christ's blood will cease to be under that part of the consecrated
wine, yet will remain under the rest.
Reply to Objection 1: Pope Innocent III in a Decretal writes thus: "The
very accidents appear to affect the wine that is added, because, if
water is added, it takes the savor of the wine. The result is, then,
that the accidents change the subject, just as subject changes
accidents; for nature yields to miracle, and power works beyond
custom." But this must not be understood as if the same identical
accident, which was in the wine previous to consecration, is afterwards
in the wine that is added; but such change is the result of action;
because the remaining accidents of the wine retain the action of
substance, as stated above, and so they act upon the liquid added, by
changing it.
Reply to Objection 2: The liquid added to the consecrated wine is in no
way mixed with the substance of Christ's blood. Nevertheless it is
mixed with the sacramental species, yet so that after such mixing the
aforesaid species are corrupted entirely or in part, after the way
mentioned above [4586](A[5]), whereby something can be generated from
those species. And if they be entirely corrupted, there remains no
further question, because the whole will be uniform. But if they be
corrupted in part, there will be one dimension according to the
continuity of quantity, but not one according to the mode of being,
because one part thereof will be without a subject while the other is
in a subject; as in a body that is made up of two metals, there will be
one body quantitatively, but not one as to the species of the matter.
Reply to Objection 3: As Pope Innocent says in the aforesaid Decretal,
"if after the consecration other wine be put in the chalice, it is not
changed into the blood, nor is it mingled with the blood, but, mixed
with the accidents of the previous wine, it is diffused throughout the
body which underlies them, yet without wetting what surrounds it." Now
this is to be understood when there is not sufficient mixing of
extraneous liquid to cause the blood of Christ to cease to be under the
whole; because a thing is said to be "diffused throughout," not because
it touches the body of Christ according to its proper dimensions, but
according to the sacramental dimensions, under which it is contained.
Now it is not the same with holy water, because the blessing works no
change in the substance of the water, as the consecration of the wine
does.
Reply to Objection 4: Some have held that however slight be the mixing
of extraneous liquid, the substance of Christ's blood ceases to be
under the whole, and for the reason given above (OBJ[4]); which,
however, is not a cogent one; because "more" or "less" diversify
dimensive quantity, not as to its essence, but as to the determination
of its measure. In like manner the liquid added can be so small as on
that account to be hindered from permeating the whole, and not simply
by the dimensions; which, although they are present without a subject,
still they are opposed to another liquid, just as substance would be if
it were present, according to what was said at the beginning of the
article.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE FORM OF THIS SACRAMENT (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the form of this sacrament; concerning which there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) What is the form of this sacrament?
(2) Whether the form for the consecration of the bread is appropriate?
(3) Whether the form for the consecration of the blood is appropriate?
(4) Of the power of each form?
(5) Of the truth of the expression?
(6) Of the comparison of the one form with the other?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this is the form of this sacrament: "This is My body," and "This is
the chalice of My blood"?
Objection 1: It seems that this is not the form of this sacrament:
"This is My body," and, "This is the chalice of My blood." Because
those words seem to belong to the form of this sacrament, wherewith
Christ consecrated His body and blood. But Christ first blessed the
bread which He took, and said afterwards: "Take ye and eat; this is My
body" (Mat. 26:26). Therefore the whole of this seems to belong to the
form of this sacrament: and the same reason holds good of the words
which go with the consecration of the blood.
Objection 2: Further, Eusebius Emissenus (Pseudo-Hieron: Ep. xxix;
Pseudo-Isid.: Hom. iv) says: "The invisible Priest changes visible
creatures into His own body, saying: 'Take ye and eat; this is My
body.'" Therefore, the whole of this seems to belong to the form of
this sacrament: and the same hold good of the works appertaining to the
blood.
Objection 3: Further, in the form of Baptism both the minister and his
act are expressed, when it is said, "I baptize thee." But in the words
set forth above there is no mention made either of the minister or of
his act. Therefore the form of the sacrament is not a suitable one.
Objection 4: Further, the form of the sacrament suffices for its
perfection; hence the sacrament of Baptism can be performed sometimes
by pronouncing the words of the form only, omitting all the others.
Therefore, if the aforesaid words be the form of this sacrament, it
would seem as if this sacrament could be performed sometimes by
uttering those words alone, while leaving out all the others which are
said in the mass; yet this seems to be false, because, were the other
words to be passed over, the said words would be taken as spoken in the
person of the priest saying them, whereas the bread and wine are not
changed into his body and blood. Consequently, the aforesaid words are
not the form of this sacrament.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "The consecration is
accomplished by the words and expressions of the Lord Jesus. Because,
by all the other words spoken, praise is rendered to God, prayer is put
up for the people, for kings, and others; but when the time comes for
perfecting the sacrament, the priest uses no longer his own words, but
the words of Christ. Therefore, it is Christ's words that perfect this
sacrament."
I answer that, This sacrament differs from the other sacraments in two
respects. First of all, in this, that this sacrament is accomplished by
the consecration of the matter, while the rest are perfected in the use
of the consecrated matter. Secondly, because in the other sacraments
the consecration of the matter consists only in a blessing, from which
the matter consecrated derives instrumentally a spiritual power, which
through the priest who is an animated instrument, can pass on to
inanimate instruments. But in this sacrament the consecration of the
matter consists in the miraculous change of the substance, which can
only be done by God; hence the minister in performing this sacrament
has no other act save the pronouncing of the words. And because the
form should suit the thing, therefore the form of this sacrament
differs from the forms of the other sacraments in two respects. First,
because the form of the other sacraments implies the use of the matter,
as for instance, baptizing, or signing; but the form of this sacrament
implies merely the consecration of the matter, which consists in
transubstantiation, as when it is said, "This is My body," or, "This is
the chalice of My blood." Secondly, because the forms of the other
sacraments are pronounced in the person of the minister, whether by way
of exercising an act, as when it is said, "I baptize thee," or "I
confirm thee," etc.; or by way of command, as when it is said in the
sacrament of order, "Take the power," etc.; or by way of entreaty, as
when in the sacrament of Extreme Unction it is said, "By this anointing
and our intercession," etc. But the form of this sacrament is
pronounced as if Christ were speaking in person, so that it is given to
be understood that the minister does nothing in perfecting this
sacrament, except to pronounce the words of Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: There are many opinions on this matter. Some have
said that Christ, Who had power of excellence in the sacraments,
performed this sacrament without using any form of words, and that
afterwards He pronounced the words under which others were to
consecrate thereafter. And the words of Pope Innocent III seem to
convey the same sense (De Sacr. Alt. Myst. iv), where he says: "In good
sooth it can be said that Christ accomplished this sacrament by His
Divine power, and subsequently expressed the form under which those who
came after were to consecrate." But in opposition to this view are the
words of the Gospel in which it is said that Christ "blessed," and this
blessing was effected by certain words. Accordingly those words of
Innocent are to be considered as expressing an opinion, rather than
determining the point.
Others, again, have said that the blessing was effected by other words
not known to us. But this statement cannot stand, because the blessing
of the consecration is now performed by reciting the things which were
then accomplished; hence, if the consecration was not performed then by
these words, neither would it be now.
Accordingly, others have maintained that this blessing was effected by
the same words as are used now; but that Christ spoke them twice, at
first secretly, in order to consecrate, and afterwards openly, to
instruct others. But even this will not hold good, because the priest
in consecrating uses these words, not as spoken in secret, but as
openly pronounced. Accordingly, since these words have no power except
from Christ pronouncing them, it seems that Christ also consecrated by
pronouncing them openly.
And therefore others said that the Evangelists did not always follow
the precise order in their narrative as that in which things actually
happened, as is seen from Augustine (De Consens. Evang. ii). Hence it
is to be understood that the order of what took place can be expressed
thus: "Taking the bread He blessed it, saying: This is My body, and
then He broke it, and gave it to His disciples." But the same sense can
be had even without changing the words of the Gospel; because the
participle "saying" implies sequence of the words uttered with what
goes before. And it is not necessary for the sequence to be understood
only with respect to the last word spoken, as if Christ had just then
pronounced those words, when He gave it to His disciples; but the
sequence can be understood with regard to all that had gone before; so
that the sense is: "While He was blessing, and breaking, and giving it
to His disciples, He spoke the words, 'Take ye,'" etc.
Reply to Objection 2: In these words, "Take ye and eat," the use of the
consecrated, matter is indicated, which is not of the necessity of this
sacrament, as stated above ([4587]Q[74], A[7]). And therefore not even
these words belong to the substance of the form. Nevertheless, because
the use of the consecrated matter belongs to a certain perfection of
the sacrament, in the same way as operation is not the first but the
second perfection of a thing, consequently, the whole perfection of
this sacrament is expressed by all those words: and it was in this way
that Eusebius understood that the sacrament was accomplished by those
words, as to its first and second perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: In the sacrament of Baptism the minister
exercises an act regarding the use of the matter, which is of the
essence of the sacrament: such is not the case in this sacrament; hence
there is no parallel.
Reply to Objection 4: Some have contended that this sacrament cannot be
accomplished by uttering the aforesaid words, while leaving out the
rest, especially the words in the Canon of the Mass. But that this is
false can be seen both from Ambrose's words quoted above, as well as
from the fact that the Canon of the Mass is not the same in all places
or times, but various portions have been introduced by various people.
Accordingly it must be held that if the priest were to pronounce only
the aforesaid words with the intention of consecrating this sacrament,
this sacrament would be valid because the intention would cause these
words to be understood as spoken in the person of Christ, even though
the words were pronounced without those that precede. The priest,
however, would sin gravely in consecrating the sacrament thus, as he
would not be observing the rite of the Church. Nor does the comparison
with Baptism prove anything; for it is a sacrament of necessity:
whereas the lack of this sacrament can be supplied by the spiritual
partaking thereof, as Augustine says (cf.[4588] Q[73], A[3], ad 1).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this is the proper form for the consecration of the bread: "This is
My body"?
Objection 1: It seems that this is not the proper form of this
sacrament: "This is My body." For the effect of a sacrament ought to be
expressed in its form. But the effect of the consecration of the bread
is the change of the substance of the bread into the body of Christ,
and this is better expressed by the word "becomes" than by "is."
Therefore, in the form of the consecration we ought to say: "This
becomes My body."
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv), "Christ's words
consecrate this sacrament. What word of Christ? This word, whereby all
things are made. The Lord commanded, and the heavens and earth were
made. " Therefore, it would be a more proper form of this sacrament if
the imperative mood were employed, so as to say: "Be this My body."
Objection 3: Further, that which is changed is implied in the subject
of this phrase, just as the term of the change is implied in the
predicate. But just as that into which the change is made is something
determinate, for the change is into nothing else but the body of
Christ, so also that which is converted is determinate, since only
bread is converted into the body of Christ. Therefore, as a noun is
inserted on the part of the predicate, so also should a noun be
inserted in the subject, so that it be said: "This bread is My body."
Objection 4: Further, just as the term of the change is determinate in
nature, because it is a body, so also is it determinate in person.
Consequently, in order to determine the person, it ought to be said:
"This is the body of Christ."
Objection 5: Further, nothing ought to be inserted in the form except
what is substantial to it. Consequently, the conjunction "for" is
improperly added in some books, since it does not belong to the
substance of the form.
On the contrary, our Lord used this form in consecrating, as is evident
from Mat. 26:26.
I answer that, This is the proper form for the consecration of the
bread. For it was said [4589](A[1]) that this consecration consists in
changing the substance of bread into the body of Christ. Now the form
of a sacrament ought to denote what is done in the sacrament.
Consequently the form for the consecration of the bread ought to
signify the actual conversion of the bread into the body of Christ. And
herein are three things to be considered: namely, the actual
conversion, the term "whence," and the term "whereunto."
Now the conversion can be considered in two ways: first, in "becoming,"
secondly, in "being." But the conversion ought not to be signified in
this form as in "becoming," but as in "being." First, because such
conversion is not successive, as was said above ([4590]Q[75], A[7]),
but instantaneous; and in such changes the "becoming" is nothing else
than the "being." Secondly, because the sacramental forms bear the same
relation to the signification of the sacramental effect as artificial
forms to the representation of the effect of art. Now an artificial
form is the likeness of the ultimate effect, on which the artist's
intention is fixed ;. just as the art-form in the builder's mind is
principally the form of the house constructed, and secondarily of the
constructing. Accordingly, in this form also the conversion ought to be
expressed as in "being," to which the intention is referred.
And since the conversion is expressed in this form as in "being," it is
necessary for the extremes of the conversion to be signified as they
exist in the fact of conversion. But then the term "whereunto" has the
proper nature of its own substance; whereas the term "whence" does not
remain in its own substance, but only as to the accidents whereby it
comes under the senses, and can be determined in relation to the
senses. Hence the term "whence" of the conversion is conveniently
expressed by the demonstrative pronoun, relative to the sensible
accidents which continue; but the term "whereunto" is expressed by the
noun signifying the nature of the thing which terminates the
conversion, and this is Christ's entire body, and not merely His flesh;
as was said above ([4591]Q[76], A[1], ad 2). Hence this form is most
appropriate: "This is My body."
Reply to Objection 1: The ultimate effect of this conversion is not a
"becoming" but a "being," as stated above, and consequently prominence
should be given to this in the form.
Reply to Objection 2: God's word operated in the creation of things,
and it is the same which operates in this consecration, yet each in
different fashion: because here it operates effectively and
sacramentally, that is, in virtue of its signification. And
consequently the last effect of the consecration must needs be
signified in this sentence by a substantive verb of the indicative mood
and present time. But in the creation of things it worked merely
effectively, and such efficiency is due to the command of His wisdom;
and therefore in the creation of things the Lord's word is expressed by
a verb in the imperative mood, as in Gn. 1:3: "Let there be light, and
light was made."
Reply to Objection 3: The term "whence" does not retain the nature of
its substance in the "being" of the conversion, as the term "whereunto"
does. Therefore there is no parallel.
Reply to Objection 4: The pronoun "My," which implicitly points to the
chief person, i.e. the person of the speaker, sufficiently indicates
Christ's person, in Whose person these words are uttered, as stated
above [4592](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 5: The conjunction "for" is set in this form
according to the custom of the Roman Church, who derived it from Peter
the Apostle; and this on account of the sequence with the words
preceding: and therefore it is not part of the form, just as the words
preceding the form are not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this is the proper form for the consecration of the wine: "This is
the chalice of My blood," etc.?
Objection 1: It seems that this is not the proper form for the
consecration of the wine. "This is the chalice of My blood, of the New
and Eternal Testament, the Mystery of Faith, which shall be shed for
you and for many unto the forgiveness of sins." For as the bread is
changed by the power of consecration into Christ's body, so is the wine
changed into Christ's blood, as is clear from what was said above
([4593]Q[76], AA[1],2,3). But in the form of the consecration of the
bread, the body of Christ is expressly mentioned, without any addition.
Therefore in this form the blood of Christ is improperly expressed in
the oblique case, and the chalice in the nominative, when it is said:
"This is the chalice of My blood."
Objection 2: Further, the words spoken in the consecration of the bread
are not more efficacious than those spoken in the consecration of the
wine, since both are Christ's words. But directly the words are
spoken---"This is My body," there is perfect consecration of the bread.
Therefore, directly these other words are uttered---"This is the
chalice of My blood," there is perfect consecration of the blood; and
so the words which follow do not appeal to be of the substance of the
form, especially since they refer to the properties of this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, the New Testament seems to be an internal
inspiration, as is evident from the Apostle quoting the words of
Jeremias (31:31): "I will perfect unto the house of Israel a New
Testament . . . I will give My laws into their mind" (Heb. 8:8). But a
sacrament is an outward visible act. Therefore, in the form of the
sacrament the words "of the New Testament" are improperly added.
Objection 4: Further, a thing is said to be new which is near the
beginning of its existence. But what is eternal has no beginning of its
existence. Therefore it is incorrect to say "of the New and Eternal,"
because it seems to savor of a contradiction.
Objection 5: Further, occasions of error ought to be withheld from men,
according to Is. 57:14: "Take away the stumbling blocks out of the way
of My people." But some have fallen into error in thinking that
Christ's body and blood are only mystically present in this sacrament.
Therefore it is out of place to add "the mystery of faith."
Objection 6: Further, it was said above ([4594]Q[73], A[3], ad 3), that
as Baptism is the sacrament of faith, so is the Eucharist the sacrament
of charity. Consequently, in this form the word "charity" ought rather
to be used than "faith."
Objection 7: Further, the whole of this sacrament, both as to body and
blood, is a memorial of our Lord's Passion, according to 1 Cor. 11:26:
"As often as you shall eat this bread and drink the chalice, you shall
show the death of the Lord." Consequently, mention ought to be made of
Christ's Passion and its fruit rather in the form of the consecration
of the blood, than in the form of the consecration of the body,
especially since our Lord said: "This is My body, which shall be
delivered up for you" (Lk. 22:19).
Objection 8: Further, as was already observed ([4595]Q[48], A[2];[4596]
Q[49], A[3]), Christ's Passion sufficed for all; while as to its
efficacy it was profitable for many. Therefore it ought to be said:
"Which shall be shed for all," or else "for many," without adding, "for
you."
Objection 9: Further, the words whereby this sacrament is consecrated
draw their efficacy from Christ's institution. But no Evangelist
narrates that Christ spoke all these words. Therefore this is not an
appropriate form for the consecration of the wine.
On the contrary, The Church, instructed by the apostles, uses this
form.
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion regarding this form. Some
have maintained that the words "This is the chalice of My blood" alone
belong to the substance of this form, but not those words which follow.
Now this seems incorrect, because the words which follow them are
determinations of the predicate, that is, of Christ's blood.
consequently they belong to the integrity of the expression.
And on this account others say more accurately that all the words which
follow are of the substance of the form down to the words, "As often as
ye shall do this," which belong to the use of this sacrament, and
consequently do not belong to the substance of the form. Hence it is
that the priest pronounces all these words, under the same rite and
manner, namely, holding the chalice in his hands. Moreover, in Lk.
22:20, the words that follow are interposed with the preceding words:
"This is the chalice, the new testament in My blood."
Consequently it must be said that all the aforesaid words belong to the
substance of the form; but that by the first words, "This is the
chalice of My blood," the change of the wine into blood is denoted, as
explained above [4597](A[2]) in the form for the consecration of the
bread; but by the words which come after is shown the power of the
blood shed in the Passion, which power works in this sacrament, and is
ordained for three purposes. First and principally for securing our
eternal heritage, according to Heb. 10:19: "Having confidence in the
entering into the holies by the blood of Christ"; and in order to
denote this, we say, "of the New and Eternal Testament." Secondly, for
justifying by grace, which is by faith according to Rom. 3:25,26: "Whom
God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood . .
. that He Himself may be just, and the justifier of him who is of the
faith of Jesus Christ": and on this account we add, "The Mystery of
Faith." Thirdly, for removing sins which are the impediments to both of
these things, according to Heb. 9:14: "The blood of Christ . . . shall
cleanse our conscience from dead works," that is, from sins; and on
this account, we say, "which shall be shed for you and for many unto
the forgiveness of sins."
Reply to Objection 1: The expression "This is the chalice of My blood"
is a figure of speech, which can be understood in two ways. First, as a
figure of metonymy; because the container is put for the contained, so
that the meaning is: "This is My blood contained in the chalice"; of
which mention is now made, because Christ's blood is consecrated in
this sacrament, inasmuch as it is the drink of the faithful, which is
not implied under the notion of blood; consequently this had to be
denoted by the vessel adapted for such usage.
Secondly, it can be taken by way of metaphor, so that Christ's Passion
is understood by the chalice by way of comparison, because, like a cup,
it inebriates, according to Lam. 3:15: "He hath filled me with
bitterness, he hath inebriated me with wormwood": hence our Lord
Himself spoke of His Passion as a chalice, when He said (Mat. 26:39):
"Let this chalice pass away from Me": so that the meaning is: "This is
the chalice of My Passion." This is denoted by the blood being
consecrated apart from the body; because it was by the Passion that the
blood was separated from the body.
Reply to Objection 2: As was said above (ad 1;[4598] Q[76], A[2], ad
1), the blood consecrated apart expressly represents Christ's Passion,
and therefore mention is made of the fruits of the Passion in the
consecration of the blood rather than in that of the body, since the
body is the subject of the Passion. This is also pointed out in our
Lord's saying, "which shall be delivered up for you," as if to say,
"which shall undergo the Passion for you."
Reply to Objection 3: A testament is the disposal of a heritage. But
God disposed of a heavenly heritage to men, to be bestowed through the
virtue of the blood of Jesus Christ; because, according to Heb. 9:16:
"Where there is a testament the death of the testator must of necessity
come in." Now Christ's blood was exhibited to men in two ways. First of
all in figure, and this belongs to the Old Testament; consequently the
Apostle concludes (Heb. 9:16): "Whereupon neither was the first indeed
dedicated without blood," which is evident from this, that as related
in Ex. 24:7,8, "when every" commandment of the law "had been read" by
Moses, "he sprinkled all the people" saying: "This is the blood of the
testament which the Lord hath enjoined unto you."
Secondly, it was shown in very truth; and this belongs to the New
Testament. This is what the Apostle premises when he says (Rom. 9:15):
"Therefore He is the Mediator of the New Testament, that by means of
His death . . . they that are called may receive the promise of eternal
inheritance." Consequently, we say here, "The blood of the New
Testament," because it is shown now not in figure but in truth; and
therefore we add, "which shall be shed for you." But the internal
inspiration has its origin in the power of this blood, according as we
are justified by Christ's Passion.
Reply to Objection 4: This Testament is a "new one" by reason of its
showing forth: yet it is called "eternal" both on account of God's
eternal pre-ordination, as well as on account of the eternal heritage
which is prepared by this testament. Moreover, Christ's Person is
eternal, in Whose blood this testament is appointed.
Reply to Objection 5: The word "mystery" is inserted, not in order to
exclude reality, but to show that the reality is hidden, because
Christ's blood is in this sacrament in a hidden manner, and His Passion
was dimly foreshadowed in the Old Testament.
Reply to Objection 6: It is called the "Sacrament of Faith," as being
an object of faith: because by faith alone do we hold the presence of
Christ's blood in this sacrament. Moreover Christ's Passion justifies
by faith. Baptism is called the "Sacrament of Faith" because it is a
profession of faith. This is called the "Sacrament of Charity," as
being figurative and effective thereof.
Reply to Objection 7: As stated above (ad 2), the blood consecrated
apart represents Christ's blood more expressively; and therefore
mention is made of Christ's Passion and its fruits, in the consecration
of the blood rather than in that of the body.
Reply to Objection 8: The blood of Christ's Passion has its efficacy
not merely in the elect among the Jews, to whom the blood of the Old
Testament was exhibited, but also in the Gentiles; nor only in priests
who consecrate this sacrament, and in those others who partake of it;
but likewise in those for whom it is offered. And therefore He says
expressly, "for you," the Jews, "and for many," namely the Gentiles;
or, "for you" who eat of it, and "for many," for whom it is offered.
Reply to Objection 9: The Evangelists did not intend to hand down the
forms of the sacraments, which in the primitive Church had to be kept
concealed, as Dionysius observes at the close of his book on the
ecclesiastical hierarchy; their object was to write the story of
Christ. Nevertheless nearly all these words can be culled from various
passages of the Scriptures. Because the words, "This is the chalice,"
are found in Lk. 22:20, and 1 Cor. 11:25, while Matthew says in chapter
26:28: "This is My blood of the New Testament, which shall be shed for
many unto the remission of sins." The words added, namely, "eternal"
and "mystery of faith," were handed down to the Church by the apostles,
who received them from our Lord, according to 1 Cor. 11:23: "I have
received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you."
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Whether in the aforesaid words of the forms there be any created power whic
h
causes the consecration?
Objection 1: It seems that in the aforesaid words of the forms there is
no created power which causes the consecration. Because Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iv): "The change of the bread into Christ's body is
caused solely by the power of the Holy Ghost." But the power of the
Holy Ghost is uncreated. Therefore this sacrament is not caused by any
created power of those words.
Objection 2: Further, miraculous works are wrought not by any created
power, but solely by Divine power, as was stated in the [4599]FP,
Q[110], A[4]. But the change of the bread and wine into Christ's body
and blood is a work not less miraculous than the creation of things, or
than the formation of Christ's body in the womb of a virgin: which
things could not be done by any created power. Therefore, neither is
this sacrament consecrated by any created power of the aforesaid words.
Objection 3: Further, the aforesaid words are not simple, but composed
of many; nor are they uttered simultaneously, but successively. But, as
stated above ([4600]Q[75], A[7]), this change is wrought
instantaneously. hence it must be done by a simple power. Therefore it
is not effected by the power of those words.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "If there be such might
in the word of the Lord Jesus that things non-existent came into being,
how much more efficacious is it to make things existing to continue,
and to be changed into something else? And so, what was bread before
consecration is now the body of Christ after consecration, because
Christ's word changes a creature into something different."
I answer that, Some have maintained that neither in the above words is
there any created power for causing the transubstantiation, nor in the
other forms of the sacraments, or even in the sacraments themselves,
for producing the sacramental effects. This, as was shown above
([4601]Q[62], A[1] ), is both contrary to the teachings of the saints,
and detracts from the dignity of the sacraments of the New Law. Hence,
since this sacrament is of greater worth than the others, as stated
above ([4602]Q[65], A[3]), the result is that there is in the words of
the form of this sacrament a created power which causes the change to
be wrought in it: instrumental, however, as in the other sacraments, as
stated above ([4603]Q[62], AA[3],4). For since these words are uttered
in the person of Christ, it is from His command that they receive their
instrumental power from Him, just as His other deeds and sayings derive
their salutary power instrumentally, as was observed above
([4604]Q[48], A[6];[4605] Q[56], A[1], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: When the bread is said to be changed into
Christ's body solely by the power of the Holy Ghost, the instrumental
power which lies in the form of this sacrament is not excluded: just as
when we say that the smith alone makes a knife we do not deny the power
of the hammer.
Reply to Objection 2: No creature can work miracles as the chief agent.
yet it can do so instrumentally, just as the touch of Christ's hand
healed the leper. And in this fashion Christ's words change the bread
into His body. But in Christ's conception, whereby His body was
fashioned, it was impossible for anything derived from His body to have
the instrumental power of forming that very body. Likewise in creation
there was no term wherein the instrumental action of a creature could
be received. Consequently there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: The aforesaid words, which work the consecration,
operate sacramentally. Consequently, the converting power latent under
the forms of these sacraments follows the meaning, which is terminated
in the uttering of the last word. And therefore the aforesaid words
have this power in the last instant of their being uttered, taken in
conjunction with those uttered before. And this power is simple by
reason of the thing signified, although there be composition in the
words uttered outwardly.
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Whether the aforesaid expressions are true?
Objection 1: It seems that the aforesaid expressions are not true.
Because when we say: "This is My body," the word "this" designates a
substance. But according to what was said above ([4606]AA[1],4, ad
3;[4607] Q[75], AA[2],7), when the pronoun "this" is spoken, the
substance of the bread is still there, because the transubstantiation
takes place in the last instant of pronouncing the words. But it is
false to say: "Bread is Christ's body." Consequently this expression,
"This is My body," is false.
Objection 2: Further, the pronoun "this" appeals to the senses. But the
sensible species in this sacrament are neither Christ's body nor even
its accidents. Therefore this expression, "This is My body," cannot be
true.
Objection 3: Further, as was observed above (A[4], ad 3), these words,
by their signification, effect the change of the bread into the body of
Christ. But an effective cause is understood as preceding its effect.
Therefore the meaning of these words is understood as preceding the
change of the bread into the body of Christ. But previous to the change
this expression, "This is My body," is false. Therefore the expression
is to be judged as false simply; and the same reason holds good of the
other phrase: "This is the chalice of My blood," etc.
On the contrary, These words are pronounced in the person of Christ,
Who says of Himself (Jn. 14:6): "I am the truth."
I answer that, There have been many opinions on this point. Some have
said that in this expression, "This is My body," the word "this"
implies demonstration as conceived, and not as exercised, because the
whole phrase is taken materially, since it is uttered by a way of
narration: for the priest relates that Christ said: "This is My body."
But such a view cannot hold good, because then these words would not be
applied to the corporeal matter present, and consequently the sacrament
would not be valid: for Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.): "The
word is added to the element, and this becomes a sacrament." Moreover
this solution ignores entirely the difficulty which this question
presents: for there is still the objection in regard to the first
uttering of these words by Christ; since it is evident that then they
were employed, not materially, but significatively. And therefore it
must be said that even when spoken by the priest they are taken
significatively, and not merely materially. Nor does it matter that the
priest pronounces them by way of recital, as though they were spoken by
Christ, because owing to Christ's infinite power, just as through
contact with His flesh the regenerative power entered not only into the
waters which came into contact with Christ, but into all waters
throughout the whole world and during all future ages, so likewise from
Christ's uttering these words they derived their consecrating power, by
whatever priest they be uttered, as if Christ present were saying them.
And therefore others have said that in this phrase the word "this"
appeals, not to the senses, but to the intellect; so that the meaning
is, "This is My body"---i.e. "The thing signified by 'this' is My
body." But neither can this stand, because, since in the sacraments the
effect is that which is signified, from such a form it would not result
that Christ's body was in very truth in this sacrament, but merely as
in a sign, which is heretical, as stated above ([4608]Q[85], A[1]).
Consequently, others have said that the word "this" appeals to the
senses; not at the precise instant of its being uttered, but merely at
the last instant thereof; as when a man says, "Now I am silent," this
adverb "now" points to the instant immediately following the speech:
because the sense is: "Directly these words are spoken I am silent."
But neither can this hold good, because in that case the meaning of the
sentence would be: "My body is My body," which the above phrase does
not effect, because this was so even before the utterance of the words:
hence neither does the aforesaid sentence mean this.
Consequently, then, it remains to be said, as stated above
[4609](A[4]), that this sentence possesses the power of effecting the
conversion of the bread into the body of Christ. And therefore it is
compared to other sentences, which have power only of signifying and
not of producing, as the concept of the practical intellect, which is
productive of the thing, is compared to the concept of our speculative
intellect which is drawn from things. because "words are signs of
concepts," as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). And therefore as the
concept of the practical intellect does not presuppose the thing
understood, but makes it, so the truth of this expression does not
presuppose the thing signified, but makes it; for such is the relation
of God's word to the things made by the Word. Now this change takes
place not successively, but in an instant, as stated above (Q[77],
A[7]). Consequently one must understand the aforesaid expression with
reference to the last instant of the words being spoken, yet not so
that the subject may be understood to have stood for that which is the
term of the conversion; viz. that the body of Christ is the body of
Christ; nor again that the subject be understood to stand for that
which it was before the conversion, namely, the bread. but for that
which is commonly related to both, i.e. that which is contained in
general under those species. For these words do not make the body of
Christ to be the body of Christ, nor do they make the bread to be the
body of Christ; but what was contained under those species, and was
formerly bread, they make to be the body of Christ. And therefore
expressly our Lord did not say: "This bread is My body," which would be
the meaning of the second opinion; nor "This My body is My body," which
would be the meaning of the third opinion: but in general: "This is My
body," assigning no noun on the part of the subject, but only a
pronoun, which signifies substance in common, without quality, that is,
without a determinate form.
Reply to Objection 1: The term "this" points to a substance, yet
without determining its proper nature, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The pronoun "this" does not indicate the
accidents, but the substance underlying the accidents, which at first
was bread, and is afterwards the body of Christ, which body, although
not informed by those accidents, is yet contained under them.
Reply to Objection 3: The meaning of this expression is, in the order
of nature, understood before the thing signified, just as a cause is
naturally prior to the effect; but not in order of time, because this
cause has its effect with it at the same time, and this suffices for
the truth of the expression.
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Whether the form of the consecration of the bread accomplishes its effect
before the form of the consecration of the wine be completed?
Objection 1: It seems that the form of the consecration of the bread
does not accomplish its effect until the form for the consecration of
the wine be completed. For, as Christ's body begins to be in this
sacrament by the consecration of the bread, so does His blood come to
be there by the consecration of the wine. If, then, the words for
consecrating the bread were to produce their effect before the
consecration of the wine, it would follow that Christ's body would be
present in this sacrament without the blood, which is improper.
Objection 2: Further, one sacrament has one completion: hence although
there be three immersions in Baptism, yet the first immersion does not
produce its effect until the third be completed. But all this sacrament
is one, as stated above ([4610]Q[73], A[2]). Therefore the words
whereby the bread is consecrated do not bring about their effect
without the sacramental words whereby the wine is consecrated.
Objection 3: Further, there are several words in the form for
consecrating the bread, the first of which do not secure their effect
until the last be uttered, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). Therefore, for
the same reason, neither do the words for the consecration of Christ's
body produce their effect, until the words for consecrating Christ's
blood are spoken.
On the contrary, Directly the words are uttered for consecrating the
bread, the consecrated host is shown to the people to be adored, which
would not be done if Christ's body were not there, for that would be an
act of idolatry. Therefore the consecrating words of the bread produce
their effect before. the words are spoken for consecrating the wine.
I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors said that these two forms,
namely, for consecrating the bread and the wine, await each other's
action, so that the first does not produce its effect until the second
be uttered.
But this cannot stand, because, as stated above (A[5], ad 3), for the
truth of this phrase, "This is My body," wherein the verb is in the
present tense, it is required for the thing signified to be present
simultaneously in time with the signification of the expression used;
otherwise, if the thing signified had to be awaited for afterwards, a
verb of the future tense would be employed, and not one of the present
tense, so that we should not say, "This is My body," but "This will be
My body." But the signification of this speech is complete directly
those words are spoken. And therefore the thing signified must be
present instantaneously, and such is the effect of this sacrament;
otherwise it would not be a true speech. Moreover, this opinion is
against the rite of the Church, which forthwith adores the body of
Christ after the words are uttered.
Hence it must be said that the first form does not await the second in
its action, but has its effect on the instant.
Reply to Objection 1: It is on this account that they who maintained
the above opinion seem to have erred. Hence it must be understood that
directly the consecration of the bread is complete, the body of Christ
is indeed present by the power of the sacrament, and the blood by real
concomitance; but afterwards by the consecration of the wine,
conversely, the blood of Christ is there by the power of the sacrament,
and the body by real concomitance, so that the entire Christ is under
either species, as stated above ([4611]Q[76], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: This sacrament is one in perfection, as stated
above ([4612]Q[73] , A[2]), namely, inasmuch as it is made up of two
things, that is, of food and drink, each of which of itself has its own
perfection; but the three immersions of Baptism are ordained to one
simple effect, and therefore there is no resemblance.
Reply to Objection 3: The various words in the form for consecrating
the bread constitute the truth of one speech, but the words of the
different forms do not, and consequently there is no parallel.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECTS OF THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of this sacrament, and under this head
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether this sacrament bestows grace?
(2) Whether the attaining of glory is an effect of this sacrament?
(3) Whether the forgiveness of mortal sin is an effect of this
sacrament?
(4) Whether venial sin is forgiven by this sacrament?
(5) Whether the entire punishment due for sin is forgiven by this
sacrament?
(6) Whether this sacrament preserves man from future sins?
(7) Whether this sacrament benefits others besides the recipients?
(8) Of the obstacles to the effect of this sacrament.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether grace is bestowed through this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that grace is not bestowed through this
sacrament. For this sacrament is spiritual nourishment. But nourishment
is only given to the living. Therefore since the spiritual life is the
effect of grace, this sacrament belongs only to one in the state of
grace. Therefore grace is not bestowed through this sacrament for it to
be had in the first instance. In like manner neither is it given so as
grace may be increased, because spiritual growth belongs to the
sacrament of Confirmation, as stated above ([4613]Q[72], A[1]).
Consequently, grace is not bestowed through this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is given as a spiritual
refreshment. But spiritual refreshment seems to belong to the use of
grace rather than to its bestowal. Therefore it seems that grace is not
given through this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, as was said above (Q[74], A[1]), "Christ's body
is offered up in this sacrament for the salvation of the body, and His
blood for that of the soul." Now it is not the body which is the
subject of grace, but the soul, as was shown in the [4614]FS, Q[110],
A[4]. Therefore grace is not bestowed through this sacrament, at least
so far as the body is concerned.
On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jn. 6:52): "The bread which I will
give, is My flesh for the life of the world." But the spiritual life is
the effect of grace. Therefore grace is bestowed through this
sacrament.
I answer that, The effect of this sacrament ought to be considered,
first of all and principally, from what is contained in this sacrament,
which is Christ; Who, just as by coming into the world, He visibly
bestowed the life of grace upon the world, according to Jn. 1:17:
"Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ," so also, by coming
sacramentally into man causes the life of grace, according to Jn. 6:58:
"He that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me." Hence Cyril says
on Lk. 22:19: "God's life-giving Word by uniting Himself with His own
flesh, made it to be productive of life. For it was becoming that He
should be united somehow with bodies through His sacred flesh and
precious blood, which we receive in a life-giving blessing in the bread
and wine."
Secondly, it is considered on the part of what is represented by this
sacrament, which is Christ's Passion, as stated above ([4615]Q[74],
A[1];[4616] Q[76] , A[2], ad 1). And therefore this sacrament works in
man the effect which Christ's Passion wrought in the world. Hence,
Chrysostom says on the words, "Immediately there came out blood and
water" (Jn. 19:34): "Since the sacred mysteries derive their origin
from thence, when you draw nigh to the awe-inspiring chalice, so
approach as if you were going to drink from Christ's own side." Hence
our Lord Himself says (Mat. 26:28): "This is My blood . . . which shall
be shed for many unto the remission of sins."
Thirdly, the effect of this sacrament is considered from the way in
which this sacrament is given; for it is given by way of food and
drink. And therefore this sacrament does for the spiritual life all
that material food does for the bodily life, namely, by sustaining,
giving increase, restoring, and giving delight. Accordingly, Ambrose
says (De Sacram. v): "This is the bread of everlasting life, which
supports the substance of our soul." And Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in
Joan.): "When we desire it, He lets us feel Him, and eat Him, and
embrace Him." And hence our Lord says (Jn. 6:56): "My flesh is meat
indeed, and My blood is drink indeed."
Fourthly, the effect of this sacrament is considered from the species
under which it is given. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.):
"Our Lord betokened His body and blood in things which out of many
units are made into some one whole: for out of many grains is one thing
made," viz. bread; "and many grapes flow into one thing," viz. wine.
And therefore he observes elsewhere (Tract. xxvi in Joan.): "O
sacrament of piety, O sign of unity, O bond of charity!"
And since Christ and His Passion are the cause of grace. and since
spiritual refreshment, and charity cannot be without grace, it is clear
from all that has been set forth that this sacrament bestows grace.
Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament has of itself the power of
bestowing grace; nor does anyone possess grace before receiving this
sacrament except from some desire thereof; from his own desire, as in
the case of the adult. or from the Church's desire in the case of
children, as stated above ([4617]Q[73], A[3]). Hence it is due to the
efficacy of its power, that even from desire thereof a man procures
grace whereby he is enabled to lead the spiritual life. It remains,
then, that when the sacrament itself is really received, grace is
increased, and the spiritual life perfected: yet in different fashion
from the sacrament of Confirmation, in which grace is increased and
perfected for resisting the outward assaults of Christ's enemies. But
by this sacrament grace receives increase, and the spiritual life is
perfected, so that man may stand perfect in himself by union with God.
Reply to Objection 2: This sacrament confers grace spiritually together
with the virtue of charity. Hence Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv) compares
this sacrament to the burning coal which Isaias saw (Is. 6:6): "For a
live ember is not simply wood, but wood united to fire; so also the
bread of communion is not simple bread but bread united with the
Godhead." But as Gregory observes in a Homily for Pentecost, "God's
love is never idle; for, wherever it is it does great works." And
consequently through this sacrament, as far as its power is concerned,
not only is the habit of grace and of virtue bestowed, but it is
furthermore aroused to act, according to 2 Cor. 5:14: "The charity of
Christ presseth us." Hence it is that the soul is spiritually nourished
through the power of this sacrament, by being spiritually gladdened,
and as it were inebriated with the sweetness of the Divine goodness,
according to Cant 5:1: "Eat, O friends, and drink, and be inebriated,
my dearly beloved."
Reply to Objection 3: Because the sacraments operate according to the
similitude by which they signify, therefore by way of assimilation it
is said that in this sacrament "the body is offered for the salvation
of the body, and the blood for the salvation of the soul," although
each works for the salvation of both, since the entire Christ is under
each, as stated above ([4618]Q[76], A[2]). And although the body is not
the immediate subject of grace, still the effect of grace flows into
the body while in the present life we present "our [Vulg.: 'your']
members" as "instruments of justice unto God" (Rom. 6:13), and in the
life to come our body will share in the incorruption and the glory of
the soul.
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Whether the attaining of glory is an effect of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the attaining of glory is not an effect of
this sacrament. For an effect is proportioned to its cause. But this
sacrament belongs to "wayfarers" [viatoribus], and hence it is termed
"Viaticum." Since, then, wayfarers are not yet capable of glory, it
seems that this sacrament does not cause the attaining of glory.
Objection 2: Further, given sufficient cause, the effect follows. But
many take this sacrament who will never come to glory, as Augustine
declares (De Civ. Dei xxi). Consequently, this sacrament is not the
cause of attaining unto glory.
Objection 3: Further, the greater is not brought about by the lesser,
for nothing acts outside its species. But it is the lesser thing to
receive Christ under a strange species, which happens in this
sacrament, than to enjoy Him in His own species, which belongs to
glory. Therefore this sacrament does not cause the attaining of glory.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:52): "If any man eat of this
bread, he shall live for ever." But eternal life is the life of glory.
Therefore the attaining of glory is an effect of this sacrament.
I answer that, In this sacrament we may consider both that from which
it derives its effect, namely, Christ contained in it, as also His
Passion represented by it; and that through which it works its effect,
namely, the use of the sacrament, and its species.
Now as to both of these it belongs to this sacrament to cause the
attaining of eternal life. Because it was by His Passion that Christ
opened to us the approach to eternal life, according to Heb. 9:15: "He
is the Mediator of the New Testament; that by means of His death . . .
they that are called may receive the promise of eternal inheritance."
Accordingly in the form of this sacrament it is said: "This is the
chalice of My blood, of the New and Eternal Testament."
In like manner the refreshment of spiritual food and the unity denoted
by the species of the bread and wine are to be had in the present life,
although imperfectly. but perfectly in the state of glory. Hence
Augustine says on the words, "My flesh is meat indeed" (Jn. 6:56):
"Seeing that in meat and drink, men aim at this, that they hunger not
nor thirst, this verily nought doth afford save only this meat and
drink which maketh them who partake thereof to be immortal and
incorruptible, in the fellowship of the saints, where shall be peace,
and unity, full and perfect."
Reply to Objection 1: As Christ's Passion, in virtue whereof this
sacrament is accomplished, is indeed the sufficient cause of glory, yet
not so that we are thereby forthwith admitted to glory, but we must
first "suffer with Him in order that we may also be glorified"
afterwards "with Him" (Rom. 8:17), so this sacrament does not at once
admit us to glory, but bestows on us the power of coming unto glory.
And therefore it is called "Viaticum," a figure whereof we read in 3
Kings 19:8: "Elias ate and drank, and walked in the strength of that
food forty days and forty nights unto the mount of God, Horeb."
Reply to Objection 2: Just as Christ's Passion has not its effect in
them who are not disposed towards it as they should be, so also they do
not come to glory through this sacrament who receive it unworthily.
Hence Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), expounding the same passage,
observes: "The sacrament is one thing, the power of the sacrament
another. Many receive it from the altar . . . and by receiving" . . .
die . . . Eat, then, spiritually the heavenly "bread, bring innocence
to the altar." It is no wonder, then, if those who do not keep
innocence, do not secure the effect of this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: That Christ is received under another species
belongs to the nature of a sacrament, which acts instrumentally. But
there is nothing to prevent an instrumental cause from producing a more
mighty effect, as is evident from what was said above ([4619]Q[77],
A[3], ad 3).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the forgiveness of mortal sin is an effect of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the forgiveness of mortal sin is an effect
of this sacrament. For it is said in one of the Collects
(Postcommunion, Pro vivis et defunctis): "May this sacrament be a
cleansing from crimes." But mortal sins are called crimes. Therefore
mortal sins are blotted out by this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, this sacrament, like Baptism, works by the power
of Christ's Passion. But mortal sins are forgiven by Baptism, as stated
above ([4620]Q[69], A[1]). Therefore they are forgiven likewise by this
sacrament, especially since in the form of this sacrament it is said:
"Which shall be shed for many unto the forgiveness of sins."
Objection 3: Further, grace is bestowed through this sacrament, as
stated above [4621](A[1]). But by grace a man is justified from mortal
sins, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely by His grace."
Therefore mortal sins are forgiven by this sacrament.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 11:29): "He that eateth and
drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself": and a
gloss of the same passage makes the following commentary: "He eats and
drinks unworthily who is in the state of sin, or who handles (the
sacrament) irreverently; and such a one eats and drinks judgment, i.e.
damnation, unto himself." Therefore, he that is in mortal sin, by
taking the sacrament heaps sin upon sin, rather than obtains
forgiveness of his sin.
I answer that, The power of this sacrament can be considered in two
ways. First of all, in itself: and thus this sacrament has from
Christ's Passion the power of forgiving all sins, since the Passion is
the fount and cause of the forgiveness of sins.
Secondly, it can be considered in comparison with the recipient of the
sacrament, in so far as there is, or is not, found in him an obstacle
to receiving the fruit of this sacrament. Now whoever is conscious of
mortal sin, has within him an obstacle to receiving the effect of this
sacrament; since he is not a proper recipient of this sacrament, both
because he is not alive spiritually, and so he ought not to eat the
spiritual nourishment, since nourishment is confined to the living; and
because he cannot be united with Christ, which is the effect of this
sacrament, as long as he retains an attachment towards mortal sin.
Consequently, as is said in the book De Eccles. Dogm.: "If the soul
leans towards sin, it is burdened rather than purified from partaking
of the Eucharist." Hence, in him who is conscious of mortal sin, this
sacrament does not cause the forgiveness of sin.
Nevertheless this sacrament can effect the forgiveness of sin in two
ways. First of all, by being received, not actually, but in desire; as
when a man is first justified from sin. Secondly, when received by one
in mortal sin of which he is not conscious, and for which he has no
attachment; since possibly he was not sufficiently contrite at first,
but by approaching this sacrament devoutly and reverently he obtains
the grace of charity, which will perfect his contrition and bring
forgiveness of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: We ask that this sacrament may be the "cleansing
of crimes," or of those sins of which we are unconscious, according to
Ps. 18:13: "Lord, cleanse me from my hidden sins"; or that our
contrition may be perfected for the forgiveness of our sins; or that
strength be bestowed on us to avoid sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Baptism is spiritual generation, which is a
transition from spiritual non-being into spiritual being, and is given
by way of ablution. Consequently, in both respects he who is conscious
of mortal sin does not improperly approach Baptism. But in this
sacrament man receives Christ within himself by way of spiritual
nourishment, which is unbecoming to one that lies dead in his sins.
Therefore the comparison does not hold good.
Reply to Objection 3: Grace is the sufficient cause of the forgiveness
of mortal sin; yet it does not forgive sin except when it is first
bestowed on the sinner. But it is not given so in this sacrament. Hence
the argument does not prove.
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Whether venial sins are forgiven through this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that venial sins are not forgiven by this
sacrament, because this is the "sacrament of charity," as Augustine
says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But venial sins are not contrary to
charity, as was shown in the [4622]FS, Q[88], AA[1],2; [4623]SS, Q[24],
A[10]. Therefore, since contrary is taken away by its contrary, it
seems that venial sins are not forgiven by this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, if venial sins be forgiven by this sacrament,
then all of them are forgiven for the same reason as one is. But it
does not appear that all are forgiven, because thus one might
frequently be without any venial sin, against what is said in 1 Jn.
1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore
no venial sin is forgiven by this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, contraries mutually exclude each other. But
venial sins do not forbid the receiving of this sacrament: because
Augustine says on the words, "If any man eat of it he shall [Vulg.:
'may'] not die for ever" (Jn. 6:50): "Bring innocence to the altar:
your sins, though they be daily . . . let them not be deadly."
Therefore neither are venial sins taken away by this sacrament.
On the contrary, Innocent III says (De S. Alt. Myst. iv) that this
sacrament "blots out venial sins, and wards off mortal sins."
I answer that, Two things may be considered in this sacrament, to wit,
the sacrament itself, and the reality of the sacrament: and it appears
from both that this sacrament has the power of forgiving venial sins.
For this sacrament is received under the form of nourishing food. Now
nourishment from food is requisite for the body to make good the daily
waste caused by the action of natural heat. But something is also lost
daily of our spirituality from the heat of concupiscence through venial
sins, which lessen the fervor of charity, as was shown in the [4624]SS,
Q[24], A[10]. And therefore it belongs to this sacrament to forgive
venial sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Sacram. v) that this daily bread is
taken "as a remedy against daily infirmity."
The reality of this sacrament is charity, not only as to its habit, but
also as to its act, which is kindled in this sacrament; and by this
means venial sins are forgiven. Consequently, it is manifest that
venial sins are forgiven by the power of this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial sins, although not opposed to the habit of
charity, are nevertheless opposed to the fervor of its act, which act
is kindled by this sacrament; by reason of which act venial sins are
blotted out.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted is not to be understood as if
a man could not at some time be without all guilt of venial sin: but
that the just do not pass through this life without committing venial
sins.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of charity, to which this sacrament
belongs, is greater than that of venial sins: because charity by its
act takes away venial sins, which nevertheless cannot entirely hinder
the act of charity. And the same holds good of this sacrament.
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Whether the entire punishment due to sin is forgiven through this sacrament
?
Objection 1: It seems that the entire punishment due to sin is forgiven
through this sacrament. For through this sacrament man receives the
effect of Christ's Passion within himself as stated above
([4625]AA[1],2), just as he does through Baptism. But through Baptism
man receives forgiveness of all punishment, through the virtue of
Christ's Passion, which satisfied sufficiently for all sins, as was
explained above (Q[69], A[2] ). Therefore it seems the whole debt of
punishment is forgiven through this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, Pope Alexander I says (Ep. ad omnes orth.): "No
sacrifice can be greater than the body and the blood of Christ." But
man satisfied for his sins by the sacrifices of the old Law: for it is
written (Lev. 4, 5): "If a man shall sin, let him offer" (so and so)
"for his sin, and it shall be forgiven him." Therefore this sacrament
avails much more for the forgiveness of all punishment.
Objection 3: Further, it is certain that some part of the debt of
punishment is forgiven by this sacrament; for which reason it is
sometimes enjoined upon a man, by way of satisfaction, to have masses
said for himself. But if one part of the punishment is forgiven, for
the same reason is the other forgiven: owing to Christ's infinite power
contained in this sacrament. Consequently, it seems that the whole
punishment can be taken away by this sacrament.
On the contrary, In that case no other punishment would have to be
enjoined; just as none is imposed upon the newly baptized.
I answer that, This sacrament is both a sacrifice and a sacrament. it
has the nature of a sacrifice inasmuch as it is offered up; and it has
the nature of a sacrament inasmuch as it is received. And therefore it
has the effect of a sacrament in the recipient, and the effect of a
sacrifice in the offerer, or in them for whom it is offered.
If, then, it be considered as a sacrament, it produces its effect in
two ways: first of all directly through the power of the sacrament;
secondly as by a kind of concomitance, as was said above regarding what
is contained in the sacrament ([4626]Q[76], AA[1],2). Through the power
of the sacrament it produces directly that effect for which it was
instituted. Now it was instituted not for satisfaction, but for
nourishing spiritually through union between Christ and His members, as
nourishment is united with the person nourished. But because this union
is the effect of charity, from the fervor of which man obtains
forgiveness, not only of guilt but also of punishment, hence it is that
as a consequence, and by concomitance with the chief effect, man
obtains forgiveness of the punishment, not indeed of the entire
punishment, but according to the measure of his devotion and fervor.
But in so far as it is a sacrifice, it has a satisfactory power. Yet in
satisfaction, the affection of the offerer is weighed rather than the
quantity of the offering. Hence our Lord says (Mk. 12:43: cf. Lk. 21:4)
of the widow who offered "two mites" that she "cast in more than all."
Therefore, although this offering suffices of its own quantity to
satisfy for all punishment, yet it becomes satisfactory for them for
whom it is offered, or even for the offerers, according to the measure
of their devotion, and not for the whole punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: The sacrament of Baptism is directly ordained for
the remission of punishment and guilt: not so the Eucharist, because
Baptism is given to man as dying with Christ, whereas the Eucharist is
given as by way of nourishing and perfecting him through Christ.
Consequently there is no parallel.
Reply to Objection 2: Those other sacrifices and oblations did not
effect the forgiveness of the whole punishment, neither as to the
quantity of the thing offered, as this sacrament does, nor as to
personal devotion; from which it comes to pass that even here the whole
punishment is not taken away.
Reply to Objection 3: If part of the punishment and not the whole be
taken away by this sacrament, it is due to a defect not on the part of
Christ's power, but on the part of man's devotion.
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Whether man is preserved by this sacrament from future sins?
Objection 1: It seems that man is not preserved by this sacrament from
future sins. For there are many that receive this sacrament worthily,
who afterwards fall into sin. Now this would not happen if this
sacrament were to preserve them from future sins. Consequently, it is
not an effect of this sacrament to preserve from future sins.
Objection 2: Further, the Eucharist is the sacrament of charity, as
stated above [4627](A[4]). But charity does not seem to preserve from
future sins, because it can be lost through sin after one has possessed
it, as was stated in the [4628]SS, Q[24], A[11]. Therefore it seems
that this sacrament does not preserve man from sin.
Objection 3: Further, the origin of sin within us is "the law of sin,
which is in our members," as declared by the Apostle (Rom. 7:23). But
the lessening of the fomes, which is the law of sin, is set down as an
effect not of this sacrament, but rather of Baptism. Therefore
preservation from sin is not an effect of this sacrament.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 6:50): "This is the bread which
cometh down from heaven; that if any man eat of it, he may not die":
which manifestly is not to be understood of the death of the body.
Therefore it is to be understood that this sacrament preserves from
spiritual death, which is through sin.
I answer that, Sin is the spiritual death of the soul. Hence man is
preserved from future sin in the same way as the body is preserved from
future death of the body: and this happens in two ways. First of all,
in so far as man's nature is strengthened inwardly against inner decay,
and so by means of food and medicine he is preserved from death.
Secondly, by being guarded against outward assaults; and thus he is
protected by means of arms by which he defends his body.
Now this sacrament preserves man from sin in both of these ways. For,
first of all, by uniting man with Christ through grace, it strengthens
his spiritual life, as spiritual food and spiritual medicine, according
to Ps. 103:5: "(That) bread strengthens [Vulg.: 'may strengthen'] man's
heart." Augustine likewise says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.): "Approach
without fear; it is bread, not poison." Secondly, inasmuch as it is a
sign of Christ's Passion, whereby the devils are conquered, it repels
all the assaults of demons. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in Joan.):
"Like lions breathing forth fire, thus do we depart from that table,
being made terrible to the devil."
Reply to Objection 1: The effect of this sacrament is received
according to man's condition: such is the case with every active cause
in that its effect is received in matter according to the condition of
the matter. But such is the condition of man on earth that his
free-will can be bent to good or evil. Hence, although this sacrament
of itself has the power of preserving from sin, yet it does not take
away from man the possibility of sinning.
Reply to Objection 2: Even charity of itself keeps man from sin,
according to Rom. 13:10: "The love of our neighbor worketh no evil":
but it is due to the mutability of free-will that a man sins after
possessing charity, just as after receiving this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: Although this sacrament is not ordained directly
to lessen the fomes, yet it does lessen it as a consequence, inasmuch
as it increases charity, because, as Augustine says ([4629]Q[83]), "the
increase of charity is the lessening of concupiscence." But it directly
strengthens man's heart in good; whereby he is also preserved from sin.
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Whether this sacrament benefit others besides the recipients?
Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament benefits only the recipients.
For this sacrament is of the same genus as the other sacraments, being
one of those into which that genus is divided. But the other sacraments
only benefit the recipients; thus the baptized person alone receives
effect of Baptism. Therefore, neither does this sacrament benefit
others than the recipients.
Objection 2: Further, the effects of this sacrament are the attainment
of grace and glory, and the forgiveness of sin, at least of venial sin.
If therefore this sacrament were to produce its effects in others
besides the recipients, a man might happen to acquire grace and glory
and forgiveness of sin without doing or receiving anything himself,
through another receiving or offering this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, when the cause is multiplied, the effect is
likewise multiplied. If therefore this sacrament benefit others besides
the recipients, it would follow that it benefits a man more if he
receive this sacrament through many hosts being consecrated in one
mass, whereas this is not the Church's custom: for instance, that many
receive communion for the salvation of one individual. Consequently, it
does not seem that this sacrament benefits anyone but the recipient.
On the contrary, Prayer is made for many others during the celebration
of this sacrament; which would serve no purpose were the sacrament not
beneficial to others. Therefore, this sacrament is beneficial not
merely to them who receive it.
I answer that, As stated above [4630](A[3]), this sacrament is not only
a sacrament, but also a sacrifice. For, it has the nature of a
sacrifice inasmuch as in this sacrament Christ's Passion is
represented, whereby Christ "offered Himself a Victim to God" (Eph.
5:2), and it has the nature of a sacrament inasmuch as invisible grace
is bestowed in this sacrament under a visible species. So, then, this
sacrament benefits recipients by way both of sacrament and of
sacrifice, because it is offered for all who partake of it. For it is
said in the Canon of the Mass: "May as many of us as, by participation
at this Altar, shall receive the most sacred body and blood of Thy Son,
be filled with all heavenly benediction and grace."
But to others who do not receive it, it is beneficial by way of
sacrifice, inasmuch as it is offered for their salvation. Hence it is
said in the Canon of the Mass: "Be mindful, O Lord, of Thy servants,
men and women . . . for whom we offer, or who offer up to Thee, this
sacrifice of praise for themselves and for all their own, for the
redemption of their souls, for the hope of their safety and salvation."
And our Lord expressed both ways, saying (Mat. 26:28, with Lk. 22:20):
"Which for you," i.e. who receive it, "and for many," i.e. others,
"shall be shed unto remission of sins."
Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament has this in addition to the
others, that it is a sacrifice: and therefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: As Christ's Passion benefits all, for the
forgiveness of sin and the attaining of grace and glory, whereas it
produces no effect except in those who are united with Christ's Passion
through faith and charity, so likewise this sacrifice, which is the
memorial of our Lord's Passion, has no effect except in those who are
united with this sacrament through faith and charity. Hence Augustine
says to Renatus (De Anima et ejus origine i): "Who may offer Christ's
body except for them who are Christ's members?" Hence in the Canon of
the Mass no prayer is made for them who are outside the pale of the
Church. But it benefits them who are members, more or less, according
to the measure of their devotion.
Reply to Objection 3: Receiving is of the very nature of the sacrament,
but offering belongs to the nature of sacrifice: consequently, when one
or even several receive the body of Christ, no help accrues to others.
In like fashion even when the priest consecrates several hosts in one
mass, the effect of this sacrament is not increased, since there is
only one sacrifice; because there is no more power in several hosts
than in one, since there is only one Christ present under all the hosts
and under one. Hence, neither will any one receive greater effect from
the sacrament by taking many consecrated hosts in one mass. But the
oblation of the sacrifice is multiplied in several masses, and
therefore the effect of the sacrifice and of the sacrament is
multiplied.
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Whether the effect of this sacrament is hindered by venial sin?
Objection 1: It seems that the effect of this sacrament is not hindered
by venial sin. For Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), commenting on Jn.
6:52, "If any man eat of this bread," etc., says: "Eat the heavenly
bread spiritually; bring innocence to the altar; your sins, though they
be daily, let them not be deadly." From this it is evident that venial
sins, which are called daily sins, do not prevent spiritual eating. But
they who eat spiritually, receive the effect of this sacrament.
Therefore, venial sins do not hinder the effect of this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is not less powerful than Baptism.
But, as stated above ([4631]Q[69], AA[9],10), only pretense checks the
effect of Baptism, and venial sins do not belong to pretense; because
according to Wis. 1:5: "the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from
the deceitful," yet He is not put to flight by venial sins. Therefore
neither do venial sins hinder the effect of this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, nothing which is removed by the action of any
cause, can hinder the effect of such cause. But venial sins are taken
away by this sacrament. Therefore, they do not hinder its effect.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): "The fire of that
desire which is within us, being kindled by the burning coal," i.e.
this sacrament, "will consume our sins, and enlighten our hearts, so
that we shall be inflamed and made godlike." But the fire of our desire
or love is hindered by venial sins, which hinder the fervor of charity,
as was shown in the [4632]FS, Q[81], A[4]; [4633]SS, Q[24], A[10].
Therefore venial sins hinder the effect of this sacrament.
I answer that, Venial sins can be taken in two ways: first of all as
past, secondly as in the act of being committed. Venial sins taken in
the first way do not in any way hinder the effect of this sacrament.
For it can come to pass that after many venial sins a man may approach
devoutly to this sacrament and fully secure its effect. Considered in
the second way venial sins do not utterly hinder the effect of this
sacrament, but merely in part. For, it has been stated above
[4634](A[1]), that the effect of this sacrament is not only the
obtaining of habitual grace or charity, but also a certain actual
refreshment of spiritual sweetness: which is indeed hindered if anyone
approach to this sacrament with mind distracted through venial sins;
but the increase of habitual grace or of charity is not taken away.
Reply to Objection 1: He that approaches this sacrament with actual
venial sin, eats spiritually indeed, in habit but not in act: and
therefore he shares in the habitual effect of the sacrament, but not in
its actual effect.
Reply to Objection 2: Baptism is not ordained, as this sacrament is,
for the fervor of charity as its actual effect. Because Baptism is
spiritual regeneration, through which the first perfection is acquired,
which is a habit or form; but this sacrament is spiritual eating, which
has actual delight.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument deals with past venial sins, which
are taken away by this sacrament.
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OF THE USE OR RECEIVING OF THIS SACRAMENT IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the use or receiving of this sacrament, first
of all in general; secondly, how Christ used this sacrament.
Under the first heading there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are two ways of eating this sacrament, namely,
sacramentally and spiritually?
(2) Whether it belongs to man alone to eat this sacrament spiritually?
(3) Whether it belongs to the just man only to eat it sacramentally?
(4) Whether the sinner sins in eating it sacramentally?
(5) Of the degree of this sin;
(6) Whether this sacrament should be refused to the sinner that
approaches it?
(7) Whether nocturnal pollution prevents man from receiving this
sacrament?
(8) Whether it is to be received only when one is fasting?
(9) Whether it is to be given to them who lack the use of reason?
(10) Whether it is to be received daily?
(11) Whether it is lawful to refrain from it altogether?
(12) Whether it is lawful to receive the body without the blood?
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Whether there are two ways to be distinguished of eating Christ's body?
Objection 1: It seems that two ways ought not to be distinguished of
eating Christ's body, namely, sacramentally and spiritually. For, as
Baptism is spiritual regeneration, according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man
be born again of water and the Holy Ghost," etc., so also this
sacrament is spiritual food: hence our Lord, speaking of this
sacrament, says (Jn. 6:64): "The words that I have spoken to you are
spirit and life." But there are no two distinct ways of receiving
Baptism, namely, sacramentally and spiritually. Therefore neither ought
this distinction to be made regarding this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, when two things are so related that one is on
account of the other, they should not be put in contra-distinction to
one another, because the one derives its species from the other. But
sacramental eating is ordained for spiritual eating as its end.
Therefore sacramental eating ought not to be divided in contrast with
spiritual eating.
Objection 3: Further, things which cannot exist without one another
ought not to be divided in contrast with each other. But it seems that
no one can eat spiritually without eating sacramentally; otherwise the
fathers of old would have eaten this sacrament spiritually. Moreover,
sacramental eating would be to no purpose, if the spiritual eating
could be had without it. Therefore it is not right to distinguish a
twofold eating, namely, sacramental and spiritual.
On the contrary, The gloss says on 1 Cor. 11:29: "He that eateth and
drinketh unworthily," etc.: "We hold that there are two ways of eating,
the one sacramental, and the other spiritual."
I answer that, There are two things to be considered in the receiving
of this sacrament, namely, the sacrament itself, and its fruits, and we
have already spoken of both (QQ[73],79). The perfect way, then, of
receiving this sacrament is when one takes it so as to partake of its
effect. Now, as was stated above ([4635]Q[79], AA[3],8), it sometimes
happens that a man is hindered from receiving the effect of this
sacrament; and such receiving of this sacrament is an imperfect one.
Therefore, as the perfect is divided against the imperfect, so
sacramental eating, whereby the sacrament only is received without its
effect, is divided against spiritual eating, by which one receives the
effect of this sacrament, whereby a man is spiritually united with
Christ through faith and charity.
Reply to Objection 1: The same distinction is made regarding Baptism
and the other sacraments: for, some receive the sacrament only, while
others receive the sacrament and the reality of the sacrament. However,
there is a difference, because, since the other sacraments are
accomplished in the use of the matter, the receiving of the sacrament
is the actual perfection of the sacrament; whereas this sacrament is
accomplished in the consecration of the matter: and consequently both
uses follow the sacrament. On the other hand, in Baptism and in the
other sacraments that imprint a character, they who receive the
sacrament receive some spiritual effect, that is, the character. which
is not the case in this sacrament. And therefore, in this sacrament,
rather than in Baptism, the sacramental use is distinguished from the
spiritual use.
Reply to Objection 2: That sacramental eating which is also a spiritual
eating is not divided in contrast with spiritual eating, but is
included under it; but that sacramental eating which does not secure
the effect, is divided in contrast with spiritual eating; just as the
imperfect, which does not attain the perfection of its species, is
divided in contrast with the perfect.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4636]Q[73], A[3]), the effect
of the sacrament can be secured by every man if he receive it in
desire, though not in reality. Consequently, just as some are baptized
with the Baptism of desire, through their desire of baptism, before
being baptized in the Baptism of water; so likewise some eat this
sacrament spiritually ere they receive it sacramentally. Now this
happens in two ways. First of all, from desire of receiving the
sacrament itself, and thus are said to be baptized, and to eat
spiritually, and not sacramentally, they who desire to receive these
sacraments since they have been instituted. Secondly, by a figure: thus
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:2), that the fathers of old were "baptized
in the cloud and in the sea," and that "they did eat . . . spiritual
food, and . . . drank . . . spiritual drink." Nevertheless sacramental
eating is not without avail, because the actual receiving of the
sacrament produces more fully the effect of the sacrament than does the
desire thereof, as stated above of Baptism ([4637]Q[69] , A[4], ad 2).
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Whether it belongs to man alone to eat this sacrament spiritually?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to man alone to eat this
sacrament spiritually, but likewise to angels. Because on Ps. 77:25:
"Man ate the bread of angels," the gloss says: "that is, the body of
Christ, Who i's truly the food of angels." But it would not be so
unless the angels were to eat Christ spiritually. Therefore the angels
eat Christ spiritually.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) says: By "this
meat and drink, He would have us to understand the fellowship of His
body and members, which is the Church in His predestinated ones." But
not only men, but also the holy angels belong to that fellowship.
Therefore the holy angels eat of it spiritually.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine in his book De Verbis Domini (Serm.
cxlii) says: "Christ is to be eaten spiritually, as He Himself
declares: 'He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood, abideth in
Me, and I in him.'" But this belongs not only to men, but also to the
holy angels, in whom Christ dwells by charity, and they in Him.
Consequently, it seems that to eat Christ spiritually is not for men
only, but also for the angels.
On the contrary, Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) says: "Eat the bread"
of the altar "spiritually; take innocence to the altar." But angels do
not approach the altar as for the purpose of taking something
therefrom. Therefore the angels do not eat spiritually.
I answer that, Christ Himself is contained in this sacrament, not under
His proper species, but under the sacramental species. Consequently
there are two ways of eating spiritually. First, as Christ Himself
exists under His proper species, and in this way the angels eat Christ
spiritually inasmuch as they are united with Him in the enjoyment of
perfect charity, and in clear vision (and this is the bread we hope for
in heaven), and not by faith, as we are united with Him here.
In another way one may eat Christ spiritually, as He is under the
sacramental species, inasmuch as a man believes in Christ, while
desiring to receive this sacrament; and this is not merely to eat
Christ spiritually, but likewise to eat this sacrament; which does not
fall to the lot of the angels. And therefore although the angels feed
on Christ spiritually, yet it does not belong to them to eat this
sacrament spiritually.
Reply to Objection 1: The receiving of Christ under this sacrament is
ordained to the enjoyment of heaven, as to its end, in the same way as
the angels enjoy it; and since the means are gauged by the end, hence
it is that such eating of Christ whereby we receive Him under this
sacrament, is, as it were, derived from that eating whereby the angels
enjoy Christ in heaven. Consequently, man is said to eat the "bread of
angels," because it belongs to the angels to do so firstly and
principally, since they enjoy Him in his proper species; and secondly
it belongs to men, who receive Christ under this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Both men and angels belong to the fellowship of
His mystical body; men by faith, and angels by manifest vision. But the
sacraments are proportioned to faith, through which the truth is seen
"through a glass" and "in a dark manner." And therefore, properly
speaking, it does not belong to angels, but to men, to eat this
sacrament spiritually.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ dwells in men through faith, according to
their present state, but He is in the blessed angels by manifest
vision. Consequently the comparison does not hold, as stated above (ad
2).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the just man alone may eat Christ sacramentally?
Objection 1: It seems that none but the just man may eat Christ
sacramentally. For Augustine says in his book De Remedio Penitentiae
(cf. Tract. in Joan. xxv, n. 12; xxvi, n. 1): "Why make ready tooth and
belly? Believe, and thou hast eaten . . . For to believe in Him, this
it is, to eat the living bread." But the sinner does not believe in
Him; because he has not living faith, to which it belongs to believe
"in God," as stated above in the [4638]SS, Q[2], A[2]; [4639]SS, Q[4],
A[5]. Therefore the sinner cannot eat this sacrament, which is the
living bread.
Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is specially called "the sacrament
of charity," as stated above ([4640]Q[78], A[3], ad 6). But as
unbelievers lack faith, so all sinners lack charity. Now unbelievers do
not seem to be capable of eating this sacrament, since in the
sacramental form it is called the "Mystery of Faith." Therefore, for
like reason, the sinner cannot eat Christ's body sacramentally.
Objection 3: Further, the sinner is more abominable before God than the
irrational creature: for it is said of the sinner (Ps. 48:21): "Man
when he was in honor did not understand; he hath been compared to
senseless beasts, and made like to them." But an irrational animal,
such as a mouse or a dog, cannot receive this sacrament, just as it
cannot receive the sacrament of Baptism. Therefore it seems that for
the like reason neither may sinners eat this sacrament.
On the contrary, Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), commenting on the
words, "that if any man eat of it he may not die," says: "Many receive
from the altar, and by receiving die: whence the Apostle saith, 'eateth
and drinketh judgment to himself.'" But only sinners die by receiving.
Therefore sinners eat the body of Christ sacramentally, and not the
just only.
I answer that, In the past, some have erred upon this point, saying
that Christ's body is not received sacramentally by sinners; but that
directly the body is touched by the lips of sinners, it ceases to be
under the sacramental species.
But this is erroneous; because it detracts from the truth of this
sacrament, to which truth it belongs that so long as the species last,
Christ's body does not cease to be under them, as stated above
([4641]Q[76], A[6], ad 3;[4642] Q[77], A[8]). But the species last so
long as the substance of the bread would remain, if it were there, as
was stated above ([4643]Q[77], A[4]). Now it is clear that the
substance of bread taken by a sinner does not at once cease to be, but
it continues until digested by natural heat: hence Christ's body
remains just as long under the sacramental species when taken by
sinners. Hence it must be said that the sinner, and not merely the
just, can eat Christ's body.
Reply to Objection 1: Such words and similar expressions are to be
understood of spiritual eating, which does not belong to sinners.
Consequently, it is from such expressions being misunderstood that the
above error seems to have arisen, through ignorance of the distinction
between corporeal and spiritual eating.
Reply to Objection 2: Should even an unbeliever receive the sacramental
species, he would receive Christ's body under the sacrament: hence he
would eat Christ sacramentally, if the word "sacramentally" qualify the
verb on the part of the thing eaten. But if it qualify the verb on the
part of the one eating, then, properly speaking, he does not eat
sacramentally, because he uses what he takes, not as a sacrament, but
as simple food. Unless perchance the unbeliever were to intend to
receive what the Church bestows; without having proper faith regarding
the other articles, or regarding this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: Even though a mouse or a dog were to eat the
consecrated host, the substance of Christ's body would not cease to be
under the species, so long as those species remain, and that is, so
long as the substance of bread would have remained; just as if it were
to be cast into the mire. Nor does this turn to any indignity regarding
Christ's body, since He willed to be crucified by sinners without
detracting from His dignity; especially since the mouse or dog does not
touch Christ's body in its proper species, but only as to its
sacramental species. Some, however, have said that Christ's body would
cease to be there, directly it were touched by a mouse or a dog; but
this again detracts from the truth of the sacrament, as stated above.
None the less it must not be said that the irrational animal eats the
body of Christ sacramentally; since it is incapable of using it as a
sacrament. Hence it eats Christ's body "accidentally," and not
sacramentally, just as if anyone not knowing a host to be consecrated
were to consume it. And since no genus is divided by an accidental
difference, therefore this manner of eating Christ's body is not set
down as a third way besides sacramental and spiritual eating.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sinner sins in receiving Christ's body sacramentally?
Objection 1: It seems that the sinner does not sin in receiving
Christ's body sacramentally, because Christ has no greater dignity
under the sacramental species than under His own. But sinners did not
sin when they touched Christ's body under its proper species; nay,
rather they obtained forgiveness of their sins, as we read in Lk. 7 of
the woman who was a sinner; while it is written (Mat. 14:36) that "as
many as touched the hem of His garment were healed." Therefore, they do
not sin, but rather obtain salvation, by receiving the body of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, this sacrament, like the others, is a spiritual
medicine. But medicine is given to the sick for their recovery,
according to Mat. 9:12: "They that are in health need not a physician."
Now they that are spiritually sick or infirm are sinners. Therefore
this sacrament can be received by them without sin.
Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is one of our greatest gifts,
since it contains Christ. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii),
the greatest gifts are those "which no one can abuse." Now no one sins
except by abusing something. Therefore no sinner sins by receiving this
sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, as this sacrament is perceived by taste and
touch, so also is it by sight. Consequently, if the sinner sins by
receiving the sacrament, it seems that he would sin by beholding it,
which is manifestly untrue, since the Church exposes this sacrament to
be seen and adored by all. Therefore the sinner does not sin by eating
this sacrament.
Objection 5: Further, it happens sometimes that the sinner is
unconscious of his sin. Yet such a one does not seem to sin by
receiving the body of Christ, for according to this all who receive it
would sin, as exposing themselves to danger, since the Apostle says (1
Cor. 4:4): "I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet I am not
hereby justified." Therefore, the sinner, if he receive this sacrament,
does not appear to be guilty of sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:29): "He that eateth and
drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself." Now the
gloss says on this passage: "He eats and drinks unworthily who is in
sin, or who handles it irreverently." Therefore, if anyone, while in
mortal sin, receives this sacrament, he purchases damnation, by sinning
mortally.
I answer that, In this sacrament, as in the others, that which is a
sacrament is a sign of the reality of the sacrament. Now there is a
twofold reality of this sacrament, as stated above ([4644]Q[73], A[6]):
one which is signified and contained, namely, Christ Himself; while the
other is signified but not contained, namely, Christ's mystical body,
which is the fellowship of the saints. Therefore, whoever receives this
sacrament, expresses thereby that he is made one with Christ, and
incorporated in His members; and this is done by living faith, which no
one has who is in mortal sin. And therefore it is manifest that whoever
receives this sacrament while in mortal sin, is guilty of lying to this
sacrament, and consequently of sacrilege, because he profanes the
sacrament: and therefore he sins mortally.
Reply to Objection 1: When Christ appeared under His proper species, He
did not give Himself to be touched by men as a sign of spiritual union
with Himself, as He gives Himself to be received in this sacrament. And
therefore sinners in touching Him under His proper species did not
incur the sin of lying to Godlike things, as sinners do in receiving
this sacrament.
Furthermore, Christ still bore the likeness of the body of sin;
consequently He fittingly allowed Himself to be touched by sinners. But
as soon as the body of sin was taken away by the glory of the
Resurrection, he forbade the woman to touch Him, for her faith in Him
was defective, according to Jn. 20:17: "Do not touch Me, for I am not
yet ascended to My Father," i.e. "in your heart," as Augustine explains
(Tract. cxxi in Joan.). And therefore sinners, who lack living faith
regarding Christ are not allowed to touch this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Every medicine does not suit every stage of
sickness; because the tonic given to those who are recovering from
fever would be hurtful to them if given while yet in their feverish
condition. So likewise Baptism and Penance are as purgative medicines,
given to take away the fever of sin; whereas this sacrament is a
medicine given to strengthen, and it ought not to be given except to
them who are quit of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: By the greatest gifts Augustine understands the
soul's virtues, "which no one uses to evil purpose," as though they
were principles of evil. Nevertheless sometimes a man makes a bad use
of them, as objects of an evil use, as is seen in those who are proud
of their virtues. So likewise this sacrament, so far as the sacrament
is concerned, is not the principle of an evil use, but the object
thereof. Hence Augustine says (Tract. lxii in Joan.): "Many receive
Christ's body unworthily; whence we are taught what need there is to
beware of receiving a good thing evilly . . . For behold, of a good
thing, received evilly, evil is wrought": just as on the other hand, in
the Apostle's case, "good was wrought through evil well received,"
namely, by bearing patiently the sting of Satan.
Reply to Objection 4: Christ's body is not received by being seen, but
only its sacrament, because sight does not penetrate to the substance
of Christ's body, but only to the sacramental species, as stated above
([4645]Q[76], A[7]). But he who eats, receives not only the sacramental
species, but likewise Christ Himself Who is under them. Consequently,
no one is forbidden to behold Christ's body, when once he has received
Christ's sacrament, namely, Baptism: whereas the non-baptized are not
to be allowed even to see this sacrament, as is clear from Dionysius
(Eccl. Hier. vii). But only those are to be allowed to share in the
eating who are united with Christ not merely sacramentally, but
likewise really.
Reply to Objection 5: The fact of a man being unconscious of his sin
can come about in two ways. First of all through his own fault, either
because through ignorance of the law (which ignorance does not excuse
him), he thinks something not to be sinful which is a sin, as for
example if one guilty of fornication were to deem simple fornication
not to be a mortal sin; or because he neglects to examine his
conscience, which is opposed to what the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:28):
"Let a man prove himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink
of the chalice." And in this way nevertheless the sinner who receives
Christ's body commits sin, although unconscious thereof, because the
very ignorance is a sin on his part.
Secondly, it may happen without fault on his part, as, for instance,
when he has sorrowed over his sin, but is not sufficiently contrite:
and in such a case he does not sin in receiving the body of Christ,
because a man cannot know for certain whether he is truly contrite. It
suffices, however, if he find in himself the marks of contrition, for
instance, if he "grieve over past sins," and "propose to avoid them in
the future" [*Cf. Rule of Augustine]. But if he be ignorant that what
he did was a sinful act, through ignorance of the fact, which excuses,
for instance, if a man approach a woman whom he believed to be his wife
whereas she was not, he is not to be called a sinner on that account;
in the same way if he has utterly forgotten his sin, general contrition
suffices for blotting it out, as will be said hereafter ([4646]XP,
Q[2], A[3], ad 2); hence he is no longer to be called a sinner.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to approach this sacrament with consciousness of sin is the gravest
of all sins?
Objection 1: It seems that to approach this sacrament with
consciousness of sin is the gravest of all sins; because the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 11:27): "Whosoever shall eat this bread, or drink the
chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and of the
blood of the Lord": upon which the gloss observes: "He shall be
punished as though he slew Christ." But the sin of them who slew Christ
seems to have been most grave. Therefore this sin, whereby a man
approaches Christ's table with consciousness of sin, appears to be the
gravest.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says in an Epistle (xlix): "What hast thou
to do with women, thou that speakest familiarly with God at the altar?"
[*The remaining part of the quotation is not from St. Jerome]. Say,
priest, say, cleric, how dost thou kiss the Son of God with the same
lips wherewith thou hast kissed the daughter of a harlot? "Judas, thou
betrayest the Son of Man with a kiss!" And thus it appears that the
fornicator approaching Christ's table sins as Judas did, whose sin was
most grave. But there are many other sins which are graver than
fornication, especially the sin of unbelief. Therefore the sin of every
sinner approaching Christ's table is the gravest of all.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual uncleanness is more abominable to God
than corporeal. But if anyone was to cast Christ's body into mud or a
cess-pool, his sin would be reputed a most grave one. Therefore, he
sins more deeply by receiving it with sin, which is spiritual
uncleanness, upon his soul.
On the contrary, Augustine says on the words, "If I had not come, and
had not spoken to them, they would be without sin" (Tract. lxxxix in
Joan.), that this is to be understood of the sin of unbelief, "in which
all sins are comprised," and so the greatest of all sins appears to be,
not this, but rather the sin of unbelief.
I answer that, As stated in the [4647]FS, Q[73], AA[3],6; [4648]SS,
Q[73], A[3], one sin can be said to be graver than another in two ways:
first of all essentially, secondly accidentally. Essentially, in regard
to its species, which is taken from its object: and so a sin is greater
according as that against which it is committed is greater. And since
Christ's Godhead is greater than His humanity, and His humanity greater
than the sacraments of His humanity, hence it is that those are the
gravest sins which are committed against the Godhead, such as unbelief
and blasphemy. The second degree of gravity is held by those sins which
are committed against His humanity: hence it is written (Mat. 12:32):
"Whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it shall be
forgiven him; but he that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall
not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come."
In the third place come sins committed against the sacraments, which
belong to Christ's humanity; and after these are the other sins
committed against mere creatures.
Accidentally, one sin can be graver than another on the sinner's part.
for example, the sin which is the result of ignorance or of weakness is
lighter than one arising from contempt, or from sure knowledge; and the
same reason holds good of other circumstances. And according to this,
the above sin can be graver in some, as happens in them who from actual
contempt and with consciousness of sin approach this sacrament: but in
others it is less grave; for instance, in those who from fear of their
sin being discovered, approach this sacrament with consciousness of
sin.
So, then, it is evident that this sin is specifically graver than many
others, yet it is not the greatest of all.
Reply to Objection 1: The sin of the unworthy recipient is compared to
the sin of them who slew Christ, by way of similitude, because each is
committed against Christ's body; but not according to the degree of the
crime. Because the sin of Christ's slayers was much graver, first of
all, because their sin was against Christ's body in its own species,
while this sin is against it under sacramental species; secondly,
because their sin came of the intent of injuring Christ, while this
does not.
Reply to Objection 2: The sin of the fornicator receiving Christ's body
is likened to Judas kissing Christ, as to the resemblance of the sin,
because each outrages Christ with the sign of friendship. but not as to
the extent of the sin, as was observed above (ad 1). And this
resemblance in crime applies no less to other sinners than to
fornicators: because by other mortal sins, sinners act against the
charity of Christ, of which this sacrament is the sign, and all the
more according as their sins are graver. But in a measure the sin of
fornication makes one more unfit for receiving this sacrament, because
thereby especially the spirit becomes enslaved by the flesh, which is a
hindrance to the fervor of love required for this sacrament.
However, the hindrance to charity itself weighs more than the hindrance
to its fervor. Hence the sin of unbelief, which fundamentally severs a
man from the unity of the Church, simply speaking, makes him to be
utterly unfit for receiving this sacrament; because it is the sacrament
of the Church's unity, as stated above ([4649]Q[61], A[2]). Hence the
unbeliever who receives this sacrament sins more grievously than the
believer who is in sin; and shows greater contempt towards Christ Who
is in the sacrament, especially if he does not believe Christ to be
truly in this sacrament; because, so far as lies in him, he lessens the
holiness of the sacrament, and the power of Christ acting in it, and
this is to despise the sacrament in itself. But the believer who
receives the sacrament with consciousness of sin, by receiving it
unworthily despises the sacrament, not in itself, but in its use. Hence
the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:29) in assigning the cause of this sin, says,
"not discerning the body of the Lord," that is, not distinguishing it
from other food: and this is what he does who disbelieves Christ's
presence in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: The man who would throw this sacrament into the
mire would be guilty of more heinous sin than another approaching the
sacrament fully conscious of mortal sin. First of all, because he would
intend to outrage the sacrament, whereas the sinner receiving Christ's
body unworthily has no such intent; secondly, because the sinner is
capable of grace; hence he is more capable of receiving this sacrament
than any irrational creature. Hence he would make a most revolting use
of this sacrament who would throw it to dogs to eat, or fling it in the
mire to be trodden upon.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the priest ought to deny the body of Christ to the sinner seeking
it?
Objection 1: It seems that the priest should deny the body of Christ to
the sinner seeking it. For Christ's precept is not to be set aside for
the sake of avoiding scandal or on account of infamy to anyone. But
(Mat. 7:6) our Lord gave this command: "Give not that which is holy to
dogs." Now it is especially casting holy things to dogs to give this
sacrament to sinners. Therefore, neither on account of avoiding scandal
or infamy should this sacrament be administered to the sinner who asks
for it.
Objection 2: Further, one must choose the lesser of two evils. But it
seems to be the lesser evil if the sinner incur infamy; or if an
unconsecrated host be given to him; than for him to sin mortally by
receiving the body of Christ. Consequently, it seems that the course to
be adopted is either that the sinner seeking the body of Christ be
exposed to infamy, or that an unconsecrated host be given to him.
Objection 3: Further, the body of Christ is sometimes given to those
suspected of crime in order to put them to proof. Because we read in
the Decretals: "It often happens that thefts are perpetrated in
monasteries of monks; wherefore we command that when the brethren have
to exonerate themselves of such acts, that the abbot shall celebrate
Mass, or someone else deputed by him, in the presence of the community;
and so, when the Mass is over, all shall communicate under these words:
'May the body of Christ prove thee today.'" And further on: "If any
evil deed be imputed to a bishop or priest, for each charge he must say
Mass and communicate, and show that he is innocent of each act
imputed." But secret sinners must not be disclosed, for, once the blush
of shame is set aside, they will indulge the more in sin, as Augustine
says (De Verbis. Dom.; cf. Serm. lxxxii). Consequently, Christ's body
is not to be given to occult sinners, even if they ask for it.
On the contrary, on Ps. 21:30: "All the fat ones of the earth have
eaten and have adored," Augustine says: "Let not the dispenser hinder
the fat ones of the earth," i.e. sinners, "from eating at the table of
the Lord."
I answer that, A distinction must be made among sinners: some are
secret; others are notorious, either from evidence of the fact, as
public usurers, or public robbers, or from being denounced as evil men
by some ecclesiastical or civil tribunal. Therefore Holy Communion
ought not to be given to open sinners when they ask for it. Hence
Cyprian writes to someone (Ep. lxi): "You were so kind as to consider
that I ought to be consulted regarding actors, end that magician who
continues to practice his disgraceful arts among you; as to whether I
thought that Holy Communion ought to be given to such with the other
Christians. I think that it is beseeming neither the Divine majesty,
nor Christian discipline, for the Church's modesty and honor to be
defiled by such shameful and infamous contagion."
But if they be not open sinners, but occult, the Holy Communion should
not be denied them if they ask for it. For since every Christian, from
the fact that he is baptized, is admitted to the Lord's table, he may
not be robbed of his right, except from some open cause. Hence on 1
Cor. 5:11, "If he who is called a brother among you," etc., Augustine's
gloss remarks: "We cannot inhibit any person from Communion, except he
has openly confessed, or has been named and convicted by some
ecclesiastical or lay tribunal." Nevertheless a priest who has
knowledge of the crime can privately warn the secret sinner, or warn
all openly in public, from approaching the Lord's table, until they
have repented of their sins and have been reconciled to the Church;
because after repentance and reconciliation, Communion must not be
refused even to public sinners, especially in the hour of death. Hence
in the (3rd) Council of Carthage (Can. xxxv) we read: "Reconciliation
is not to be denied to stage-players or actors, or others of the sort,
or to apostates, after their conversion to God."
Reply to Objection 1: Holy things are forbidden to be given to dogs,
that is, to notorious sinners: whereas hidden deeds may not be
published, but are to be left to the Divine judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is worse for the secret sinner to sin
mortally in taking the body of Christ, rather than be defamed,
nevertheless for the priest administering the body of Christ it is
worse to commit mortal sin by unjustly defaming the hidden sinner than
that the sinner should sin mortally; because no one ought to commit
mortal sin in order to keep another out of mortal sin. Hence Augustine
says (Quaest. super Gen. 42): "It is a most dangerous exchange, for us
to do evil lest another perpetrate a greater evil." But the secret
sinner ought rather to prefer infamy than approach the Lord's table
unworthily.
Yet by no means should an unconsecrated host be given in place of a
consecrated one; because the priest by so doing, so far as he is
concerned, makes others, either the bystanders or the communicant,
commit idolatry by believing that it is a consecrated host; because, as
Augustine says on Ps. 98:5: "Let no one eat Christ's flesh, except he
first adore it." Hence in the Decretals (Extra, De Celeb. Miss., Ch. De
Homine) it is said: "Although he who reputes himself unworthy of the
Sacrament, through consciousness of his sin, sins gravely, if he
receive; still he seems to offend more deeply who deceitfully has
presumed to simulate it."
Reply to Objection 3: Those decrees were abolished by contrary
enactments of Roman Pontiffs: because Pope Stephen V writes as follows:
"The Sacred Canons do not allow of a confession being extorted from any
person by trial made by burning iron or boiling water; it belongs to
our government to judge of public crimes committed, and that by means
of confession made spontaneously, or by proof of witnesses: but private
and unknown crimes are to be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of
the sons of men." And the same is found in the Decretals (Extra, De
Purgationibus, Ch. Ex tuarum). Because in all such practices there
seems to be a tempting of God; hence such things cannot be done without
sin. And it would seem graver still if anyone were to incur judgment of
death through this sacrament, which was instituted as a means of
salvation. Consequently, the body of Christ should never be given to
anyone suspected of crime, as by way of examination.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the seminal loss that occurs during sleep hinders anyone from
receiving this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that seminal loss does not hinder anyone from
receiving the body of Christ: because no one is prevented from
receiving the body of Christ except on account of sin. But seminal loss
happens without sin: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that "the
same image that comes into the mind of a speaker may present itself to
the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter be unable to distinguish
the image from the reality, and is moved carnally and with the result
that usually follows such motions; and there is as little sin in this
as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things."
Consequently these motions do not prevent one from receiving this
sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a Letter to Augustine, Bishop of
the English (Regist. xi): "Those who pay the debt of marriage not from
lust, but from desire to have children, should be left to their own
judgment, as to whether they should enter the church and receive the
mystery of our Lord's body, after such intercourse: because they ought
not to be forbidden from receiving it, since they have passed through
the fire unscorched."
From this it is evident that seminal loss even of one awake, if it be
without sin, is no hindrance to receiving the body of Christ.
Consequently, much less is it in the case of one asleep.
Objection 3: Further, these movements of the flesh seem to bring with
them only bodily uncleanness. But there are other bodily defilements
which according to the Law forbade entrance into the holy places, yet
which under the New Law do not prevent receiving this sacrament: as,
for instance, in the case of a woman after child-birth, or in her
periods, or suffering from issue of blood, as Gregory writes to
Augustine, Bishop of the English (Regist. xi). Therefore it seems that
neither do these movements of the flesh hinder a man from receiving
this sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, venial sin is no hindrance to receiving the
sacrament, nor is mortal sin after repentance. But even supposing that
seminal loss arises from some foregoing sin, whether of intemperance,
or of bad thoughts, for the most part such sin is venial; and if
occasionally it be mortal, a man may repent of it by morning and
confess it. Consequently, it seems that he ought not to be prevented
from receiving this sacrament.
Objection 5: Further, a sin against the Fifth Commandment is greater
than a sin against the Sixth. But if a man dream that he has broken the
Fifth or Seventh or any other Commandment, he is not on that account
debarred from receiving this sacrament. Therefore it seems that much
less should he be debarred through defilement resulting from a dream
against the Sixth Commandment.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 15:16): "The man from whom the
seed of copulation goeth out . . . shall be unclean until evening." But
for the unclean there is no approaching to the sacraments. Therefore,
it seems that owing to such defilement of the flesh a man is debarred
from taking this which is the greatest of the sacraments.
I answer that, There are two things to be weighed regarding the
aforesaid movements: one on account of which they necessarily prevent a
man from receiving this sacrament; the other, on account of which they
do so, not of necessity, but from a sense of propriety.
Mortal sin alone necessarily prevents anyone from partaking of this
sacrament: and although these movements during sleep, considered in
themselves, cannot be a mortal sin, nevertheless, owing to their cause,
they have mortal sin connected with them; which cause, therefore, must
be investigated. Sometimes they are due to an external spiritual cause,
viz. the deception of the demons, who can stir up phantasms, as was
stated in the [4650]FP, Q[111], A[3], through the apparition of which,
these movements occasionally follow. Sometimes they are due to an
internal spiritual cause, such as previous thoughts. At other times
they arise from some internal corporeal cause, as from abundance or
weakness of nature, or even from surfeit of meat or drink. Now every
one of these three causes can be without sin at all, or else with
venial sin, or with mortal sin. If it be without sin, or with venial
sin, it does not necessarily prevent the receiving of this sacrament,
so as to make a man guilty of the body and blood of the Lord: but
should it be with mortal sin, it prevents it of necessity.
For such illusions on the part of demons sometimes come from one's not
striving to receive fervently; and this can be either a mortal or a
venial sin. At other times it is due to malice alone on the part of the
demons who wish to keep men from receiving this sacrament. So we read
in the Conferences of the Fathers (Cassian, Collat. xxii) that when a
certain one always suffered thus on those feast-days on which he had to
receive Communion, his superiors, discovering that there was no fault
on his part, ruled that he was not to refrain from communicating on
that account, and the demoniacal illusion ceased.
In like fashion previous evil thoughts can sometimes be without any sin
whatever, as when one has to think of such things on account of
lecturing or debating; and if it be done without concupiscence and
delectation, the thoughts will not be unclean but honest; and yet
defilement can come of such thoughts, as is clear from the authority of
Augustine (OBJ[1]). At other times such thoughts come of concupiscence
and delectation, and should there be consent, it will be a mortal sin:
otherwise it will be a venial sin.
In the same way too the corporeal cause can be without sin, as when it
arises from bodily debility, and hence some individuals suffer seminal
loss without sin even in their wakeful hours; or it can come from the
abundance of nature: for, just as blood can flow without sin, so also
can the semen which is superfluity of the blood, according to the
Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i). But occasionally it is with sin, as
when it is due to excess of food or drink. And this also can be either
venial or mortal sin; although more frequently the sin is mortal in the
case of evil thoughts on account of the proneness to consent, rather
than in the case of consumption of food and drink. Hence Gregory,
writing to Augustine, Bishop of the English (Regist. xi), says that one
ought to refrain from Communion when this arises from evil thoughts,
but not when it arises from excess of food or drink, especially if
necessity call for Communion. So, then, one must judge from its cause
whether such bodily defilement of necessity hinders the receiving of
this sacrament.
At the same time a sense of decency forbids Communion on two accounts.
The first of these is always verified, viz. the bodily defilement, with
which, out of reverence for the sacrament, it is unbecoming to approach
the altar (and hence those who wish to touch any sacred object, wash
their hands): except perchance such uncleanness be perpetual or of long
standing, such as leprosy or issue of blood, or anything else of the
kind. The other reason is the mental distraction which follows after
the aforesaid movements, especially when they take place with unclean
imaginings. Now this obstacle, which arises from a sense of decency,
can be set aside owing to any necessity, as Gregory says (Regist. xi):
"As when perchance either a festival day calls for it, or necessity
compels one to exercise the ministry because there is no other priest
at hand."
Reply to Objection 1: A person is hindered necessarily, only by mortal
sin, from receiving this sacrament: but from a sense of decency one may
be hindered through other causes, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Conjugal intercourse, if it be without sin, (for
instance, if it be done for the sake of begetting offspring, or of
paying the marriage debt), does not prevent the receiving of this
sacrament for any other reason than do those movements in question
which happen without sin, as stated above; namely, on account of the
defilement to the body and distraction to the mind. On this account
Jerome expresses himself in the following terms in his commentary on
Matthew (Epist. xxviii, among St. Jerome's works): "If the loaves of
Proposition might not be eaten by them who had known their wives
carnally, how much less may this bread which has come down from heaven
be defiled and touched by them who shortly before have been in conjugal
embraces? It is not that we condemn marriages, but that at the time
when we are going to eat the flesh of the Lamb, we ought not to indulge
in carnal acts." But since this is to be understood in the sense of
decency, and not of necessity, Gregory says that such a person "is to
be left to his own judgment." "But if," as Gregory says (Regist. xi),
"it be not desire of begetting offspring, but lust that prevails," then
such a one should be forbidden to approach this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: As Gregory says in his Letter quoted above to
Augustine, Bishop of the English, in the Old Testament some persons
were termed polluted figuratively, which the people of the New Law
understand spiritually. Hence such bodily uncleannesses, if perpetual
or of long standing, do not hinder the receiving of this saving
sacrament, as they prevented approaching those figurative sacraments;
but if they pass speedily, like the uncleanness of the aforesaid
movements, then from a sense of fittingness they hinder the receiving
of this sacrament during the day on which it happens. Hence it is
written (Dt. 23:10): "If there be among you any man, that is defiled in
a dream by night, he shall go forth out of the camp; and he shall not
return before he be washed with water in the evening."
Reply to Objection 4: Although the stain of guilt be taken away by
contrition and confession nevertheless the bodily defilement is not
taken away, nor the mental distraction which follows therefrom.
Reply to Objection 5: To dream of homicide brings no bodily
uncleanness, nor such distraction of mind as fornication, on account of
its intense delectation; still if the dream of homicide comes of a
cause sinful in itself, especially if it be mortal sin, then owing to
its cause it hinders the receiving of this sacrament.
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Whether food or drink taken beforehand hinders the receiving of this
sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that food or drink taken beforehand does not
hinder the receiving of this sacrament. For this sacrament was
instituted by our Lord at the supper. But when the supper was ended our
Lord gave the sacrament to His disciples, as is evident from Lk. 22:20,
and from 1 Cor. 11:25. Therefore it seems that we ought to take this
sacrament after receiving other food.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 11:33): "When you come
together to eat," namely, the Lord's body, "wait for one another; if
any man be hungry, let him eat at home": and thus it seems that after
eating at home a man may eat Christ's body in the Church.
Objection 3: Further, we read in the (3rd) Council of Carthage (Can.
xxix): "Let the sacraments of the altar be celebrated only by men who
are fasting, with the exception of the anniversary day on which the
Lord's Supper is celebrated." Therefore, at least on that day, one may
receive the body of Christ after partaking of other food.
Objection 4: Further, the taking of water or medicine, or of any other
food or drink in very slight quantity, or of the remains of food
continuing in the mouth, neither breaks the Church's fast, nor takes
away the sobriety required for reverently receiving this sacrament.
Consequently, one is not prevented by the above things from receiving
this sacrament.
Objection 5: Further, some eat and drink late at night, and possibly
after passing a sleepless night receive the sacred mysteries in the
morning when the food it not digested. But it would savor more of
moderation if a man were to eat a little in the morning and afterwards
receive this sacrament about the ninth hour, since also there is
occasionally a longer interval of time. Consequently, it seems that
such taking of food beforehand does not keep one from this sacrament.
Objection 6: Further, there is no less reverence due to this sacrament
after receiving it, than before. But one may take food and drink after
receiving the sacrament. Therefore one may do so before receiving it.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Resp. ad Januar., Ep. liv): "It has
pleased the Holy Ghost that, out of honor for this great sacrament, the
Lord's body should enter the mouth of a Christian before other foods."
I answer that, A thing may prevent the receiving of this sacrament in
two ways: first of all in itself, like mortal sin, which is repugnant
to what is signified by this sacrament, as stated above [4651](A[4]):
secondly, on account of the Church's prohibition; and thus a man is
prevented from taking this sacrament after receiving food or drink, for
three reasons. First, as Augustine says (Resp. ad Januar., Ep. liv),
"out of respect for this sacrament," so that it may enter into a mouth
not yet contaminated by any food or drink. Secondly, because of its
signification. i.e. to give us to understand that Christ, Who is the
reality of this sacrament, and His charity, ought to be first of all
established in our hearts, according to Mat. 6:33: "Seek first the
kingdom of God." Thirdly, on account of the danger of vomiting and
intemperance, which sometimes arise from over-indulging in food, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:21): "One, indeed, is hungry, and another is
drunk."
Nevertheless the sick are exempted from this general rule, for they
should be given Communion at once, even after food, should there be any
doubt as to their danger, lest they die without Communion, because
necessity has no law. Hence it is said in the Canon de Consecratione:
"Let the priest at once take Communion to the sick person, lest he die
without Communion."
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in the same book, "the fact
that our Lord gave this sacrament after taking food is no reason why
the brethren should assemble after dinner or supper in order to partake
of it, or receive it at meal-time, as did those whom the Apostle
reproves and corrects. For our Saviour, in order the more strongly to
commend the depth of this mystery, wished to fix it closely in the
hearts and memories of the disciples. and on that account He gave no
command for it to be received in that order, leaving this to the
apostles, to whom He was about to entrust the government of the
churches."
Reply to Objection 2: The text quoted is thus paraphrased by the gloss:
"If any man be hungry and loath to await the rest, let him partake of
his food at home, that is, let him fill himself with earthly bread,
without partaking of the Eucharist afterwards."
Reply to Objection 3: The wording of this decree is in accordance with
the former custom observed by some of receiving the body of Christ on
that day after breaking their fast, so as to represent the Lord's
supper. But this is now abrogated, because as Augustine says (Resp. ad
Januar., Ep. liv), it is customary throughout the whole world for
Christ's body to be received before breaking the fast.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated in the [4652]SS, Q[147], A[6], ad 2,
there are two kinds of fast. First, there is the natural fast, which
implies privation of everything taken before-hand by way of food or
drink: and such fast is required for this sacrament for the reasons
given above. And therefore it is never lawful to take this sacrament
after taking water, or other food or drink, or even medicine, no matter
how small the quantity be. Nor does it matter whether it nourishes or
not, whether it be taken by itself or with other things, provided it be
taken by way of food or drink. But the remains of food left in the
mouth, if swallowed accidentally, do not hinder receiving this
sacrament, because they are swallowed not by way of food but by way of
saliva. The same holds good of the unavoidable remains of the water or
wine wherewith the mouth is rinsed, provided they be not swallowed in
great quantity, but mixed with saliva.
Secondly, there is the fast of the Church, instituted for afflicting
the body: and this fast is not hindered by the things mentioned (in the
objection), because they do not give much nourishment, but are taken
rather as an alterative.
Reply to Objection 5: That this sacrament ought to enter into the mouth
of a Christian before any other food must not be understood absolutely
of all time, otherwise he who had once eaten or drunk could never
afterwards take this sacrament: but it must be understood of the same
day; and although the beginning of the day varies according to
different systems of reckoning (for some begin their day at noon, some
at sunset, others at midnight, and others at sunrise), the Roman Church
begins it at midnight. Consequently, if any person takes anything by
way of food or drink after midnight, he may not receive this sacrament
on that day; but he can do so if the food was taken before midnight.
Nor does it matter, so far as the precept is concerned, whether he has
slept after taking food or drink, or whether he has digested it; but it
does matter as to the mental disturbance which one suffers from want of
sleep or from indigestion, for, if the mind be much disturbed, one
becomes unfit for receiving this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 6: The greatest devotion is called for at the moment
of receiving this sacrament, because it is then that the effect of the
sacrament is bestowed, and such devotion is hindered more by what goes
before it than by what comes after it. And therefore it was ordained
that men should fast before receiving the sacrament rather than after.
Nevertheless there ought to be some interval between receiving this
sacrament and taking other food. Consequently, both the Postcommunion
prayer of thanksgiving is said in the Mass, and the communicants say
their own private prayers.
However, according to the ancient Canons, the following ordination was
made by Pope Clement I, (Ep. ii), "If the Lord's portion be eaten in
the morning, the ministers who have taken it shall fast until the sixth
hour, and if they take it at the third or fourth hour, they shall fast
until evening." For in olden times, the priest celebrated Mass less
frequently, and with greater preparation: but now, because the sacred
mysteries have to be celebrated oftener, the same could not be easily
observed, and so it has been abrogated by contrary custom.
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Whether those who have not the use of reason ought to receive this
sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that those who have not the use of reason ought
not to receive this sacrament. For it is required that man should
approach this sacrament with devotion and previous self-examination,
according to 1 Cor. 11:28: "Let a man prove himself, and so let him eat
of that bread, and drink of the chalice." But this is not possible for
those who are devoid of reason. Therefore this sacrament should not be
given to them.
Objection 2: Further, among those who have not the use of reason are
the possessed, who are called energumens. But such persons are kept
from even beholding this sacrament, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier.
iii). Therefore this sacrament ought not to be given to those who have
not the use of reason.
Objection 3: Further, among those that lack the use of reason are
children, the most innocent of all. But this sacrament is not given to
children. Therefore much less should it be given to others deprived of
the use of reason.
On the contrary, We read in the First Council of Orange, (Canon 13);
and the same is to be found in the Decretals (xxvi, 6): "All things
that pertain to piety are to be given to the insane": and consequently,
since this is the "sacrament of piety," it must be given to them.
I answer that, Men are said to be devoid of reason in two ways. First,
when they are feeble-minded, as a man who sees dimly is said not to
see: and since such persons can conceive some devotion towards this
sacrament, it is not to be denied them.
In another way men are said not to possess fully the use of reason.
Either, then, they never had the use of reason, and have remained so
from birth; and in that case this sacrament is not to be given to them,
because in no way has there been any preceding devotion towards the
sacrament: or else, they were not always devoid of reason, and then, if
when they formerly had their wits they showed devotion towards this
sacrament, it ought to be given to them in the hour of death; unless
danger be feared of vomiting or spitting it out. Hence we read in the
acts of the Fourth Council of Carthage (Canon 76). and the same is to
be found in the Decretals (xxvi, 6): "If a sick man ask to receive the
sacrament of Penance; and if, when the priest who has been sent for
comes to him, he be so weak as to be unable to speak, or becomes
delirious, let them, who heard him ask, bear witness, and let him
receive the sacrament of Penance. then if it be thought that he is
going to die shortly, let him be reconciled by imposition of hands, and
let the Eucharist be placed in his mouth."
Reply to Objection 1: Those lacking the use of reason can have devotion
towards the sacrament; actual devotion in some cases, and past in
others.
Reply to Objection 2: Dionysius is speaking there of energumens who are
not yet baptized, in whom the devil's power is not yet extinct, since
it thrives in them through the presence of original sin. But as to
baptized persons who are vexed in body by unclean spirits, the same
reason holds good of them as of others who are demented. Hence Cassian
says (Collat. vii): "We do not remember the most Holy Communion to have
ever been denied by our elders to them who are vexed by unclean
spirits."
Reply to Objection 3: The same reason holds good of newly born children
as of the insane who never have had the use of reason: consequently,
the sacred mysteries are not to be given to them. Although certain
Greeks do the contrary, because Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii) that
Holy Communion is to be given to them who are baptized; not
understanding that Dionysius is speaking there of the Baptism of
adults. Nor do they suffer any loss of life from the fact of our Lord
saying (Jn. 6:54), "Except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and
drink His blood, you shall not have life in you"; because, as Augustine
writes to Boniface (Pseudo-Beda, Comment. in 1 Cor. 10:17), "then every
one of the faithful becomes a partaker," i.e. spiritually, "of the body
and blood of the Lord, when he is made a member of Christ's body in
Baptism." But when children once begin to have some use of reason so as
to be able to conceive some devotion for the sacrament, then it can be
given to them.
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Whether it is lawful to receive this sacrament daily?
Objection 1: It does not appear to be lawful to receive this sacrament
daily, because, as Baptism shows forth our Lord's Passion, so also does
this sacrament. Now one may not be baptized several times, but only
once, because "Christ died once" only "for our sins," according to 1
Pet. 3:18. Therefore, it seems unlawful to receive this sacrament
daily.
Objection 2: Further, the reality ought to answer to the figure. But
the Paschal Lamb, which was the chief figure of this sacrament, as was
said above (Q[73], A[9]) was eaten only once in the year; while the
Church once a year commemorates Christ's Passion, of which this
sacrament is the memorial. It seems, then, that it is lawful to receive
this sacrament not daily, but only once in the year.
Objection 3: Further, the greatest reverence is due to this sacrament
as containing Christ. But it is a token of reverence to refrain from
receiving this sacrament; hence the Centurion is praised for saying
(Mat. 8:8), "Lord, I am not worthy that Thou shouldst enter under my
roof"; also Peter, for saying (Lk. 5:8), "Depart from me, for I am a
sinful man, O Lord." Therefore, it is not praiseworthy for a man to
receive this sacrament daily.
Objection 4: Further, if it were a praiseworthy custom to receive this
sacrament frequently, then the oftener it were taken the more
praise-worthy it would be. But there would be greater frequency if one
were to receive it several. times daily; and yet this is not the custom
of the Church. Consequently, it does not seem praiseworthy to receive
it daily.
Objection 5: Further, the Church by her statutes intends to promote the
welfare of the faithful. But the Church's statute only requires
Communion once a year; hence it is enacted (Extra, De Poenit. et
Remiss. xii): "Let every person of either sex devoutly receive the
sacrament of the Eucharist at least at Easter; unless by the advice of
his parish priest, and for some reasonable cause, he considers he ought
to refrain from receiving for a time." Consequently, it is not
praiseworthy to receive this sacrament daily.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. xxviii): "This is
our daily bread; take it daily, that it may profit thee daily."
I answer that, There are two things to be considered regarding the use
of this sacrament. The first is on the part of the sacrament itself,
the virtue of which gives health to men; and consequently it is
profitable to receive it daily so as to receive its fruits daily. Hence
Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "If, whenever Christ's blood is shed, it
is shed for the forgiveness of sins, I who sin often, should receive it
often: I need a frequent remedy." The second thing to be considered is
on the part of the recipient, who is required to approach this
sacrament with great reverence and devotion. Consequently, if anyone
finds that he has these dispositions every day, he will do well to
receive it daily. Hence, Augustine after saying, "Receive daily, that
it may profit thee daily," adds: "So live, as to deserve to receive it
daily." But because many persons are lacking in this devotion, on
account of the many drawbacks both spiritual and corporal from which
they suffer, it is not expedient for all to approach this sacrament
every day; but they should do so as often as they find themselves
properly disposed. Hence it is said in De Eccles. Dogmat. liii: "I
neither praise nor blame daily reception of the Eucharist."
Reply to Objection 1: In the sacrament of Baptism a man is conformed to
Christ's death, by receiving His character within him. And therefore,
as Christ died but once, so a man ought to be baptized but once. But a
man does not receive Christ's character in this sacrament; He receives
Christ Himself, Whose virtue endures for ever. Hence it is written
(Heb. 10:14): "By one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are
sanctified." Consequently, since man has daily need of Christ's
health-giving virtue, he may commendably receive this sacrament every
day.
And since Baptism is above all a spiritual regeneration, therefore, as
a man is born naturally but once, so ought he by Baptism to be reborn
spiritually but once, as Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan.),
commenting on Jn. 3:4, "How can a man be born again, when he is grown
old?" But this sacrament is spiritual food; hence, just as bodily food
is taken every day, so is it a good thing to receive this sacrament
every day. Hence it is that our Lord (Lk. 11:3), teaches us to pray,
"Give us this day our daily bread": in explaining which words Augustine
observes (De Verb. Dom., Serm. xxviii): "If you receive it," i.e. this
sacrament, every day, "every day is today for thee, and Christ rises
again every day in thee, for when Christ riseth it is today."
Reply to Objection 2: The Paschal Lamb was the figure of this sacrament
chiefly as to Christ's Passion represented therein; and therefore it
was partaken of once a year only, since Christ died but once. And on
this account the Church celebrates once a year the remembrance of
Christ's Passion. But in this sacrament the memorial of His Passion is
given by way of food which is partaken of daily; and therefore in this
respect it is represented by the manna which was given daily to the
people in the desert.
Reply to Objection 3: Reverence for this sacrament consists in fear
associated with love; consequently reverential fear of God is called
filial fear, as was said in the [4653]FS, Q[67], A[4], ad 2; [4654]SS,
Q[19], AA[9],11,12; because the desire of receiving arises from love,
while the humility of reverence springs from fear. Consequently, each
of these belongs to the reverence due to this sacrament; both as to
receiving it daily, and as to refraining from it sometimes. Hence
Augustine says (Ep. liv): "If one says that the Eucharist should not be
received daily, while another maintains the contrary, let each one do
as according to his devotion he thinketh right; for Zaccheus and the
Centurion did not contradict one another while the one received the
Lord with joy, whereas the other said: 'Lord I am not worthy that Thou
shouldst enter under my roof'; since both honored our Saviour, though
not in the same way." But love and hope, whereunto the Scriptures
constantly urge us, are preferable to fear. Hence, too, when Peter had
said, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord," Jesus answered:
"Fear not."
Reply to Objection 4: Because our Lord said (Lk. 11:3), "Give us this
day our daily bread," we are not on that account to communicate several
times daily, for, by one daily communion the unity of Christ's Passion
is set forth.
Reply to Objection 5: Various statutes have emanated according to the
various ages of the Church. In the primitive Church, when the devotion
of the Christian faith was more flourishing, it was enacted that the
faithful should communicate daily: hence Pope Anaclete says (Ep. i):
"When the consecration is finished, let all communicate who do not wish
to cut themselves off from the Church; for so the apostles have
ordained, and the holy Roman Church holds." Later on, when the fervor
of faith relaxed, Pope Fabian (Third Council of Tours, Canon 1) gave
permission "that all should communicate, if not more frequently, at
least three times in the year, namely, at Easter, Pentecost, and
Christmas." Pope Soter likewise (Second Council of Chalon, Canon xlvii)
declares that Communion should be received "on Holy Thursday," as is
set forth in the Decretals (De Consecratione, dist. 2). Later on, when
"iniquity abounded and charity grew cold" (Mat. 24:12), Pope Innocent
III commanded that the faithful should communicate "at least once a
year," namely, "at Easter." However, in De Eccles. Dogmat. xxiii, the
faithful are counseled "to communicate on all Sundays."
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Whether it is lawful to abstain altogether from communion?
Objection 1: It seems to be lawful to abstain altogether from
Communion. Because the Centurion is praised for saying (Mat. 8:8):
"Lord, I am not worthy that Thou shouldst enter under my roof"; and he
who deems that he ought to refrain entirely from Communion can be
compared to the Centurion, as stated above (A[10], ad 3). Therefore,
since we do not read of Christ entering his house, it seems to be
lawful for any individual to abstain from Communion his whole life
long.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for anyone to refrain from what is
not of necessity for salvation. But this sacrament is not of necessity
for salvation, as was stated above ([4655]Q[73], A[3]). Therefore it is
permissible to abstain from Communion altogether.
Objection 3: Further, sinners are not bound to go to Communion: hence
Pope Fabian (Third Council of Tours, Canon 1) after saying, "Let all
communicate thrice each year," adds: "Except those who are hindered by
grievous crimes." Consequently, if those who are not in the state of
sin are bound to go to Communion, it seems that sinners are better off
than good people, which is unfitting. Therefore, it seems lawful even
for the godly to refrain from Communion.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 6:54): "Except ye eat the flesh of
the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you."
I answer that, As stated above [4656](A[1]), there are two ways of
receiving this sacrament namely, spiritually and sacramentally. Now it
is clear that all are bound to eat it at least spiritually, because
this is to be incorporated in Christ, as was said above (Q[73], A[3],
ad 1). Now spiritual eating comprises the desire or yearning for
receiving this sacrament, as was said above (A[1], ad 3, A[2]).
Therefore, a man cannot be saved without desiring to receive this
sacrament.
Now a desire would be vain except it were fulfilled when opportunity
presented itself. Consequently, it is evident that a man is bound to
receive this sacrament, not only by virtue of the Church's precept, but
also by virtue of the Lord's command (Lk. 22:19): "Do this in memory of
Me." But by the precept of the Church there are fixed times for
fulfilling Christ's command.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says: "He is truly humble, who is not
obstinate in rejecting what is commanded for his good." Consequently,
humility is not praiseworthy if anyone abstains altogether from
Communion against the precept of Christ and the Church. Again the
Centurion was not commanded to receive Christ into his house.
Reply to Objection 2: This sacrament is said not to be as necessary as
Baptism, with regard to children, who can be saved without the
Eucharist, but not without the sacrament of Baptism: both, however, are
of necessity with regard to adults.
Reply to Objection 3: Sinners suffer great loss in being kept back from
receiving this sacrament, so that they are not better off on that
account; and although while continuing in their sins they are not on
that account excused from transgressing the precept, nevertheless, as
Pope Innocent III says, penitents, "who refrain on the advice of their
priest," are excused.
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Whether it is lawful to receive the body of Christ without the blood?
Objection 1: It seems unlawful to receive the body of Christ without
the blood. For Pope Gelasius says (cf. De Consecr. ii): "We have
learned that some persons after taking only a portion of the sacred
body, abstain from the chalice of the sacred blood. I know not for what
superstitious motive they do this: therefore let them either receive
the entire sacrament, or let them be withheld from the sacrament
altogether." Therefore it is not lawful to receive the body of Christ
without His blood.
Objection 2: Further, the eating of the body and the drinking of the
blood are required for the perfection of this sacrament, as stated
above ([4657]Q[73], A[2];[4658] Q[76], A[2], ad 1). Consequently, if
the body be taken without the blood, it will be an imperfect sacrament,
which seems to savor of sacrilege; hence Pope Gelasius adds (cf. De
Consecr. ii), "because the dividing of one and the same mystery cannot
happen without a great sacrilege."
Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is celebrated in memory of our
Lord's Passion, as stated above ([4659]Q[73], AA[4],5;[4660] Q[74],
A[1]), and is received for the health of soul. But the Passion is
expressed in the blood rather than in the body; moreover, as stated
above ([4661]Q[74], A[1]), the blood is offered for the health of the
soul. Consequently, one ought to refrain from receiving the body rather
than the blood. Therefore, such as approach this sacrament ought not to
take Christ's body without His blood.
On the contrary, It is the custom of many churches for the body of
Christ to be given to the communicant without His blood.
I answer that, Two points should be observed regarding the use of this
sacrament, one on the part of the sacrament, the other on the part of
the recipients; on the part of the sacrament it is proper for both the
body and the blood to be received, since the perfection of the
sacrament lies in both, and consequently, since it is the priest's duty
both to consecrate and finish the sacrament, he ought on no account to
receive Christ's body without the blood.
But on the part of the recipient the greatest reverence and caution are
called for, lest anything happen which is unworthy of so great a
mystery. Now this could especially happen in receiving the blood, for,
if incautiously handled, it might easily be spilt. And because the
multitude of the Christian people increased, in which there are old,
young, and children, some of whom have not enough discretion to observe
due caution in using this sacrament, on that account it is a prudent
custom in some churches for the blood not to be offered to the
reception of the people, but to be received by the priest alone.
Reply to Objection 1: Pope Gelasius is speaking of priests, who, as
they consecrate the entire sacrament, ought to communicate in the
entire sacrament. For, as we read in the (Twelfth) Council of Toledo,
"What kind of a sacrifice is that, wherein not even the sacrificer is
known to have a share?"
Reply to Objection 2: The perfection of this sacrament does not lie in
the use of the faithful, but in the consecration of the matter. And
hence there is nothing derogatory to the perfection of this sacrament;
if the people receive the body without the blood, provided that the
priest who consecrates receive both.
Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord's Passion is represented in the very
consecration of this sacrament, in which the body ought not to be
consecrated without the blood. But the body can be received by the
people without the blood: nor is this detrimental to the sacrament.
Because the priest both offers and consumes the blood on behalf of all;
and Christ is fully contained under either species, as was shown above
([4662]Q[76], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE USE WHICH CHRIST MADE OF THIS SACRAMENT AT ITS INSTITUTION (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the use which Christ made of this sacrament at
its institution; under which heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ received His own body and blood?
(2) Whether He gave it to Judas?
(3) What kind of body did He receive or give, namely, was it passible
or impassible?
(4) What would have been the condition of Christ's body under this
sacrament, if it had been reserved or consecrated during the three days
He lay dead?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ received His own body and blood?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ did not receive His own body and
blood, because nothing ought to be asserted of either Christ's doings
or sayings, which is not handed down by the authority of Sacred
Scripture. But it is not narrated in the gospels that He ate His own
body or drank His own blood. Therefore we must not assert this as a
fact.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be within itself except perchance by
reason of its parts, for instance. as one part is in another, as is
stated in Phys. iv. But what is eaten and drunk is in the eater and
drinker. Therefore, since the entire Christ is under each species of
the sacrament, it seems impossible for Him to have received this
sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, the receiving of this sacrament is twofold,
namely, spiritual and sacramental. But the spiritual was unsuitable for
Christ, as He derived no benefit from the sacrament. and in consequence
so was the sacramental, since it is imperfect without the spiritual, as
was observed above ([4663]Q[80], A[1]). Consequently, in no way did
Christ partake of this sacrament.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ad Hedib., Ep. xxx), "The Lord Jesus
Christ, Himself the guest and banquet, is both the partaker and what is
eaten."
I answer that, Some have said that Christ during the supper gave His
body and blood to His disciples, but did not partake of it Himself. But
this seems improbable. Because Christ Himself was the first to fulfill
what He required others to observe: hence He willed first to be
baptized when imposing Baptism upon others: as we read in Acts 1:1:
"Jesus began to do and to teach." Hence He first of all took His own
body and blood, and afterwards gave it to be taken by the disciples.
And hence the gloss upon Ruth 3:7, "When he had eaten and drunk, says:
Christ ate and drank at the supper, when He gave to the disciples the
sacrament of His body and blood. Hence, 'because the children partook
[*Vulg.: 'are partakers' (Heb. 2:14)] of His flesh and blood, He also
hath been partaker in the same.'"
Reply to Objection 1: We read in the Gospels how Christ "took the bread
. . . and the chalice"; but it is not to be understood that He took
them merely into His hands, as some say. but that He took them in the
same way as He gave them to others to take. Hence when He said to the
disciples, "Take ye and eat," and again, "Take ye and drink," it is to
be understood that He Himself, in taking it, both ate and drank. Hence
some have composed this rhyme:
"The King at supper sits,
The twelve as guests He greets,
Clasping Himself in His hands,
The food Himself now eats."
Reply to Objection 2: As was said above ([4664]Q[76], A[5]), Christ as
contained under this sacrament stands in relation to place, not
according to His own dimensions, but according to the dimensions of the
sacramental species; so that Christ is Himself in every place where
those species are. And because the species were able to be both in the
hands and the mouth of Christ, the entire Christ could be in both His
hands and mouth. Now this could not come to pass were His relation to
place to be according to His proper dimensions.
Reply to Objection 3: As was stated above ([4665]Q[79], A[1], ad 2),
the effect of this sacrament is not merely an increase of habitual
grace, but furthermore a certain actual delectation of spiritual
sweetness. But although grace was not increased in Christ through His
receiving this sacrament, yet He had a certain spiritual delectation
from the new institution of this sacrament. Hence He Himself said (Lk.
22:15): "With desire I have desired to eat this Pasch with you," which
words Eusebius explains of the new mystery of the New Testament, which
He gave to the disciples. And therefore He ate it both spiritually and
sacramentally, inasmuch as He received His own body under the sacrament
which sacrament of His own body He both understood and prepared; yet
differently from others who partake of it both sacramentally and
spiritually, for these receive an increase of grace, and they have need
of the sacramental signs for perceiving its truth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ gave His body to Judas?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ did not give His body to Judas.
Because, as we read (Mat. 26:29), our Lord, after giving His body and
blood to the disciples, said to them: "I will not drink from henceforth
of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I shall drink it with
you new in the kingdom of My Father." From this it appears that those
to whom He had given His body and blood were to drink of it again with
Him. But Judas did not drink of it afterwards with Him. Therefore he
did not receive Christ's body and blood with the other disciples.
Objection 2: Further, what the Lord commanded, He Himself fulfilled, as
is said in Acts 1:1: "Jesus began to do and to teach." But He gave the
command (Mat. 7:6): "Give not that which is holy to dogs." Therefore,
knowing Judas to be a sinner, seemingly He did not give him His body
and blood.
Objection 3: Further, it is distinctly related (Jn. 13:26) that Christ
gave dipped bread to Judas. Consequently, if He gave His body to him,
it appears that He gave it him in the morsel, especially since we read
(Jn. 13:26) that "after the morsel, Satan entered into him." And on
this passage Augustine says (Tract. lxii in Joan.): "From this we learn
how we should beware of receiving a good thing in an evil way . . . For
if he be 'chastised' who does 'not discern,' i.e. distinguish, the body
of the Lord from other meats, how must he be 'condemned' who, feigning
himself a friend, comes to His table a foe?" But (Judas) did not
receive our Lord's body with the dipped morsel; thus Augustine
commenting on Jn. 13:26, "When He had dipped the bread, He gave it to
Judas, the son of Simon the Iscariot [Vulg.: 'to Judas Iscariot, the
son of Simon]," says (Tract. lxii in Joan.): "Judas did not receive
Christ's body then, as some think who read carelessly." Therefore it
seems that Judas did not receive the body of Christ.
On the contrary, Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxii in Matth.): "Judas was
not converted while partaking of the sacred mysteries: hence on both
sides his crime becomes the more heinous, both because imbued with such
a purpose he approached the mysteries, and because he became none the
better for approaching, neither from fear, nor from the benefit
received, nor from the honor conferred on him."
I answer that, Hilary, in commenting on Mat. 26:17, held that Christ
did not give His body and blood to Judas. And this would have been
quite proper, if the malice of Judas be considered. But since Christ
was to serve us as a pattern of justice, it was not in keeping with His
teaching authority to sever Judas, a hidden sinner, from Communion with
the others without an accuser and evident proof. lest the Church's
prelates might have an example for doing the like, and lest Judas
himself being exasperated might take occasion of sinning. Therefore, it
remains to be said that Judas received our Lord's body and blood with
the other disciples, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), and Augustine
(Tract. lxii in Joan.).
Reply to Objection 1: This is Hilary's argument, to show that Judas did
not receive Christ's body. But it is not cogent; because Christ is
speaking to the disciples, from whose company Judas separated himself:
and it was not Christ that excluded him. Therefore Christ for His part
drinks the wine even with Judas in the kingdom of God; but Judas
himself repudiated this banquet.
Reply to Objection 2: The wickedness of Judas was known to Christ as
God; but it was unknown to Him, after the manner in which men know it.
Consequently, Christ did not repel Judas from Communion; so as to
furnish an example that such secret sinners are not to be repelled by
other priests.
Reply to Objection 3: Without any doubt Judas did not receive Christ's
body in the dipped bread; he received mere bread. Yet as Augustine
observes (Tract. lxii in Joan.), "perchance the feigning of Judas is
denoted by the dipping of the bread; just as some things are dipped to
be dyed. If, however, the dipping signifies here anything good" (for
instance, the sweetness of the Divine goodness, since bread is rendered
more savory by being dipped), "then, not undeservedly, did condemnation
follow his ingratitude for that same good." And owing to that
ingratitude, "what is good became evil to him, as happens to them who
receive Christ's body unworthily."
And as Augustine says (Tract. lxii in Joan.), "it must be understood
that our Lord had already distributed the sacrament of His body and
blood to all His disciples, among whom was Judas also, as Luke
narrates: and after that, we came to this, where, according to the
relation of John, our Lord, by dipping and handing the morsel, does
most openly declare His betrayer."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ received and gave to the disciples His impassible body?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ both received and gave to the
disciples His impassible body. Because on Mat. 17:2, "He was
transfigured before them," the gloss says: "He gave to the disciples at
the supper that body which He had through nature, but neither mortal
nor passible." And again, on Lev. 2:5, "if thy oblation be from the
frying-pan," the gloss says: "The Cross mightier than all things made
Christ's flesh fit for being eaten, which before the Passion did not
seem so suited." But Christ gave His body as suited for eating.
Therefore He gave it just as it was after the Passion, that is,
impassible and immortal.
Objection 2: Further, every passible body suffers by contact and by
being eaten. Consequently, if Christ's body was passible, it would have
suffered both from contact and from being eaten by the disciples.
Objection 3: Further, the sacramental words now spoken by the priest in
the person of Christ are not more powerful than when uttered by Christ
Himself. But now by virtue of the sacramental words it is Christ's
impassible and immortal body which is consecrated upon the altar.
Therefore, much more so was it then.
On the contrary, As Innocent III says (De Sacr. Alt. Myst. iv), "He
bestowed on the disciples His body such as it was." But then He had a
passible and a mortal body. Therefore, He gave a passible and mortal
body to the disciples.
I answer that, Hugh of Saint Victor (Innocent III, De Sacr. Alt. Myst.
iv), maintained, that before the Passion, Christ assumed at various
times the four properties of a glorified body ---namely, subtlety in
His birth, when He came forth from the closed womb of the Virgin;
agility, when He walked dryshod upon the sea; clarity, in the
Transfiguration; and impassibility at the Last Supper, when He gave His
body to the disciples to be eaten. And according to this He gave His
body in an impassible and immortal condition to His disciples.
But whatever may be the case touching the other qualities, concerning
which we have already stated what should be held ([4666]Q[28], A[2], ad
3;[4667] Q[45], A[2]), nevertheless the above opinion regarding
impassibility is inadmissible. For it is manifest that the same body of
Christ which was then seen by the disciples in its own species, was
received by them under the sacramental species. But as seen in its own
species it was not impassible; nay more, it was ready for the Passion.
Therefore, neither was Christ's body impassible when given under the
sacramental species.
Yet there was present in the sacrament, in an impassible manner, that
which was passible of itself; just as that was there invisibly which of
itself was visible. For as sight requires that the body seen be in
contact with the adjacent medium of sight, so does passion require
contact of the suffering body with the active agents. But Christ's
body, according as it is under the sacrament, as stated above (A[1], ad
2;[4668] Q[76], A[5]), is not compared with its surroundings through
the intermediary of its own dimensions, whereby bodies touch each
other, but through the dimensions of the bread and wine; consequently,
it is those species which are acted upon and are seen, but not Christ's
own body.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said not to have given His mortal and
passible body at the supper, because He did not give it in mortal and
passible fashion. But the Cross made His flesh adapted for eating,
inasmuch as this sacrament represents Christ's Passion.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold, if Christ's body, as it
was passible, were also present in a passible manner in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4669]Q[76], A[4]), the
accidents of Christ's body are in this sacrament by real concomitance,
but not by the power of the sacrament, whereby the substance of
Christ's body comes to be there. And therefore the power of the
sacramental words extends to this, that the body, i.e. Christ's, is
under this sacrament, whatever accidents really exist in it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, if this sacrament had been reserved in a pyx, or consecrated at th
e
moment of Christ's death by one of the apostles, Christ Himself would have
died there?
Objection 1: It seems that if this sacrament had been reserved in a pyx
at the moment of Christ's death, or had then been consecrated by one of
the apostles, that Christ would not have died there. For Christ's death
happened through His Passion. But even then He was in this sacrament in
an impassible manner. Therefore, He could not die in this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, on the death of Christ, His blood was separated
from the body. But His flesh and blood are together in this sacrament.
Therefore He could not die in this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, death ensues from the separation of the soul from
the body. But both the body and the soul of Christ are contained in
this sacrament. Therefore Christ could not die in this sacrament.
On the contrary, The same Christ Who was upon the cross would have been
in this sacrament. But He died upon the cross. Therefore, if this
sacrament had been reserved, He would have died therein.
I answer that, Christ's body is substantially the same in this
sacrament, as in its proper species, but not after the same fashion;
because in its proper species it comes in contact with surrounding
bodies by its own dimensions: but it does not do so as it is in this
sacrament, as stated above [4670](A[3]). And therefore, all that
belongs to Christ, as He is in Himself, can be attributed to Him both
in His proper species, and as He exists in the sacrament; such as to
live, to die, to grieve, to be animate or inanimate, and the like;
while all that belongs to Him in relation to outward bodies, can be
attributed to Him as He exists in His proper species, but not as He is
in this sacrament; such as to be mocked, to be spat upon, to be
crucified, to be scourged, and the rest. Hence some have composed this
verse:
"Our Lord can grieve beneath the sacramental veils But cannot feel the
piercing of the thorns and nails."
Reply to Objection 1: As was stated above, suffering belongs to a body
that suffers in respect of some extrinsic body. And therefore Christ,
as in this sacrament, cannot suffer; yet He can die.
Reply to Objection 2: As was said above ([4671]Q[76], A[2]), in virtue
of the consecration, the body of Christ is under the species of bread,
while His blood is under the species of wine. But now that His blood is
not really separated from His body; by real concomitance, both His
blood is present with the body under the species of the bread, and His
body together with the blood under the species of the wine. But at the
time when Christ suffered, when His blood was really separated from His
body, if this sacrament had been consecrated, then the body only would
have been present under the species of the bread, and the blood only
under the species of the wine.
Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above ([4672]Q[76], A[1], ad 1),
Christ's soul is in this sacrament by real concomitance; because it is
not without the body: but it is not there in virtue of the
consecration. And therefore, if this sacrament had been consecrated
then, or reserved, when His soul was really separated from His body,
Christ's soul would not have been under this sacrament, not from any
defect in the form of the words, but owing to the different
dispositions of the thing contained.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (TEN ARTICLES)
We now proceed to consider the minister of this sacrament: under which
head there are ten points for our inquiry:
(1) Whether it belongs to a priest alone to consecrate this sacrament?
(2) Whether several priests can at the same time consecrate the same
host?
(3) Whether it belongs to the priest alone to dispense this sacrament?
(4) Whether it is lawful for the priest consecrating to refrain from
communicating?
(5) Whether a priest in sin can perform this sacrament?
(6) Whether the Mass of a wicked priest is of less value than that of a
good one?
(7) Whether those who are heretics, schismatics, or excommunicated, can
perform this sacrament?
(8) Whether degraded priests can do so?
(9) Whether communicants receiving at their hands are guilty of
sinning?
(10) Whether a priest may lawfully refrain altogether from celebrating?
[*This is the order observed by St. Thomas in writing the Articles; but
in writing this prologue, he placed Article 10 immediately after
Article 4 (Cf. Leonine edition).]
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the consecration of this sacrament belongs to a priest alone?
Objection 1: It seems that the consecration of this sacrament does not
belong exclusively to a priest. Because it was said above ([4673]Q[78],
A[4]) that this sacrament is consecrated in virtue of the words, which
are the form of this sacrament. But those words are not changed,
whether spoken by a priest or by anyone else. Therefore, it seems that
not only a priest, but anyone else, can consecrate this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, the priest performs this sacrament in the person
of Christ. But a devout layman is united with Christ through charity.
Therefore, it seems that even a layman can perform this sacrament.
Hence Chrysostom (Opus imperfectum in Matth., Hom. xliii) says that
"every holy man is a priest."
Objection 3: Further, as Baptism is ordained for the salvation of
mankind, so also is this sacrament, as is clear from what was said
above ([4674]Q[74], A[1] ;[4675] Q[79], A[2]). But a layman can also
baptize, as was stated above ([4676]Q[67] , A[3]). Consequently, the
consecration of this sacrament is not proper to a priest.
Objection 4: Further, this sacrament is completed in the consecration
of the matter. But the consecration of other matters such as the
chrism, the holy oil, and blessed oil, belongs exclusively to a bishop;
yet their consecration does not equal the dignity of the consecration
of the Eucharist, in which the entire Christ is contained. Therefore it
belongs, not to a priest, but only to a bishop, to perform this
sacrament.
On the contrary, Isidore says in an Epistle to Ludifred (Decretals,
dist. 25): "It belongs to a priest to consecrate this sacrament of the
Lord's body and blood upon God's altar."
I answer that, As stated above ([4677]Q[78], AA[1],4), such is the
dignity of this sacrament that it is performed only as in the person of
Christ. Now whoever performs any act in another's stead, must do so by
the power bestowed by such a one. But as the power of receiving this
sacrament is conceded by Christ to the baptized person, so likewise the
power of consecrating this sacrament on Christ's behalf is bestowed
upon the priest at his ordination: for thereby he is put upon a level
with them to whom the Lord said (Lk. 22:19): "Do this for a
commemoration of Me." Therefore, it must be said that it belongs to
priests to accomplish this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: The sacramental power is in several things, and
not merely in one: thus the power of Baptism lies both in the words and
in the water. Accordingly the consecrating power is not merely in the
words, but likewise in the power delivered to the priest in his
consecration and ordination, when the bishop says to him: "Receive the
power of offering up the Sacrifice in the Church for the living as well
as for the dead." For instrumental power lies in several instruments
through which the chief agent acts.
Reply to Objection 2: A devout layman is united with Christ by
spiritual union through faith and charity, but not by sacramental
power: consequently he has a spiritual priesthood for offering
spiritual sacrifices, of which it is said (Ps. 1:19): "A sacrifice to
God is an afflicted spirit"; and (Rom. 12:1): "Present your bodies a
living sacrifice." Hence, too, it is written (1 Pet. 2:5): "A holy
priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices."
Reply to Objection 3: The receiving of this sacrament is not of such
necessity as the receiving of Baptism, as is evident from what was said
above ([4678]Q[65], AA[3],4;[4679] Q[80], A[11], ad 2). And therefore,
although a layman can baptize in case of necessity, he cannot perform
this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 4: The bishop receives power to act on Christ's
behalf upon His mystical body, that is, upon the Church; but the priest
receives no such power in his consecration, although he may have it by
commission from the bishop. Consequently all such things as do not
belong to the mystical body are not reserved to the bishop, such as the
consecration of this sacrament. But it belongs to the bishop to
deliver, not only to the people, but likewise to priests, such things
as serve them in the fulfillment of their respective duties. And
because the blessing of the chrism, and of the holy oil, and of the oil
of the sick, and other consecrated things, such as altars, churches,
vestments, and sacred vessels, makes such things fit for use in
performing the sacraments which
belong to the priestly duty, therefore such consecrations are reserved
to the bishop as the head of the whole ecclesiastical order.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether several priests can consecrate one and the same host?
Objection 1: It seems that several priests cannot consecrate one and
the same host. For it was said above ([4680]Q[67], A[6]), that several
cannot at the same time baptize one individual. But the power of a
priest consecrating is not less than that of a man baptizing.
Therefore, several priests cannot consecrate one host at the same time.
Objection 2: Further, what can be done by one, is superfluously done by
several. But there ought to be nothing superfluous in the sacraments.
Since, then, one is sufficient for consecrating, it seems that several
cannot consecrate one host.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), this is
"the sacrament of unity." But multitude seems to be opposed to unity.
Therefore it seems inconsistent with the sacrament for several priests
to consecrate the same host.
On the contrary, It is the custom of some Churches for priests newly
ordained to co-celebrate with the bishop ordaining them.
I answer that, As stated above [4681](A[1]), when a priest is ordained
he is placed on a level with those who received consecrating power from
our Lord at the Supper. And therefore, according to the custom of some
Churches, as the apostles supped when Christ supped, so the newly
ordained co-celebrate with the ordaining bishop. Nor is the
consecration, on that account, repeated over the same host, because as
Innocent III says (De Sacr. Alt. Myst. iv), the intention of all should
be directed to the same instant of the consecration.
Reply to Objection 1: We do not read of Christ baptizing with the
apostles when He committed to them the duty of baptizing; consequently
there is no parallel.
Reply to Objection 2: If each individual priest were acting in his own
power, then other celebrants would be superfluous, since one would be
sufficient. But whereas the priest does not consecrate except as in
Christ's stead; and since many are "one in Christ" (Gal. 3:28);
consequently it does not matter whether this sacrament be consecrated
by one or by many, except that the rite of the Church must be observed.
Reply to Objection 3: The Eucharist is the sacrament of ecclesiastical
unity, which is brought about by many being "one in Christ."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether dispensing of this sacrament belongs to a priest alone?
Objection 1: It seems that the dispensing of this sacrament does not
belong to a priest alone. For Christ's blood belongs to this sacrament
no less than His body. But Christ's blood is dispensed by deacons:
hence the blessed Lawrence said to the blessed Sixtus (Office of St.
Lawrence, Resp. at Matins): "Try whether you have chosen a fit
minister, to whom you have entrusted the dispensing of the Lord's
blood." Therefore, with equal reason the dispensing of Christ's body
does not belong to priests only.
Objection 2: Further, priests are the appointed ministers of the
sacraments. But this sacrament is completed in the consecration of the
matter, and not in the use, to which the dispensing belongs. Therefore
it seems that it does not belong to a priest to dispense the Lord's
body.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii, iv) that this
sacrament, like chrism, has the power of perfecting. But it belongs,
not to priests, but to bishops, to sign with the chrism. Therefore
likewise, to dispense this sacrament belongs to the bishop and not to
the priest.
On the contrary, It is written (De Consecr., dist. 12): "It has come to
our knowledge that some priests deliver the Lord's body to a layman or
to a woman to carry it to the sick: The synod therefore forbids such
presumption to continue; and let the priest himself communicate the
sick."
I answer that, The dispensing of Christ's body belongs to the priest
for three reasons. First, because, as was said above [4682](A[1]), he
consecrates as in the person of Christ. But as Christ consecrated His
body at the supper, so also He gave it to others to be partaken of by
them. Accordingly, as the consecration of Christ's body belongs to the
priest, so likewise does the dispensing belong to him. Secondly,
because the priest is the appointed intermediary between God and the
people; hence as it belongs to him to offer the people's gifts to God,
so it belongs to him to deliver consecrated gifts to the people.
Thirdly, because out of reverence towards this sacrament, nothing
touches it, but what is consecrated; hence the corporal and the chalice
are consecrated, and likewise the priest's hands, for touching this
sacrament. Hence it is not lawful for anyone else to touch it except
from necessity, for instance, if it were to fall upon the ground, or
else in some other case of urgency.
Reply to Objection 1: The deacon, as being nigh to the priestly order,
has a certain share in the latter's duties, so that he may dispense the
blood; but not the body, except in case of necessity, at the bidding of
a bishop or of a priest. First of all, because Christ's blood is
contained in a vessel, hence there is no need for it to be touched by
the dispenser, as Christ's body is touched. Secondly, because the blood
denotes the redemption derived by the people from Christ; hence it is
that water is mixed with the blood, which water denotes the people. And
because deacons are between priest and people, the dispensing of the
blood is in the competency of deacons, rather than the dispensing of
the body.
Reply to Objection 2: For the reason given above, it belongs to the
same person to dispense and to consecrate this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: As the deacon, in a measure, shares in the
priest's "power of enlightening" (Eccl. Hier. v), inasmuch as he
dispenses the blood. so the priest shares in the "perfective
dispensing" (Eccl. Hier. v) of the bishop, inasmuch as he dispenses
this sacrament whereby man is perfected in himself by union with
Christ. But other perfections whereby a man is perfected in relation to
others, are reserved to the bishop.
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Whether the priest who consecrates is bound to receive this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that the priest who consecrates is not bound to
receive this sacrament. Because, in the other consecrations, he who
consecrates the matter does not use it, just as the bishop consecrating
the chrism is not anointed therewith. But this sacrament consists in
the consecration of the matter. Therefore, the priest performing this
sacrament need not use the same, but may lawfully refrain from
receiving it.
Objection 2: Further, in the other sacraments the minister does not
give the sacrament to himself: for no one can baptize himself, as
stated above ([4683]Q[66], A[5], ad 4). But as Baptism is dispensed in
due order, so also is this sacrament. Therefore the priest who
consecrates this sacrament ought not to receive it at his own hands.
Objection 3: Further, it sometimes happens that Christ's body appears
upon the altar under the guise of flesh, and the blood under the guise
of blood; which are unsuited for food and drink: hence, as was said
above ([4684]Q[75], A[5]), it is on that account that they are given
under another species, lest they beget revulsion in the communicants.
Therefore the priest who consecrates is not always bound to receive
this sacrament.
On the contrary, We read in the acts of the (Twelfth) Council of Toledo
(Can. v), and again (De Consecr., dist. 2): "It must be strictly
observed that as often as the priest sacrifices the body and blood of
our Lord Jesus Christ upon the altar, he must himself be a partaker of
Christ's body and blood."
I answer that, As stated above ([4685]Q[79], AA[5],7), the Eucharist is
not only a sacrament, but also a sacrifice. Now whoever offers
sacrifice must be a sharer in the sacrifice, because the outward
sacrifice he offers is a sign of the inner sacrifice whereby he offers
himself to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x). Hence by partaking
of the sacrifice he shows that the inner one is likewise his. In the
same way also, by dispensing the sacrifice to the people he shows that
he is the dispenser of Divine gifts, of which he ought himself to be
the first to partake, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii).
Consequently, he ought to receive before dispensing it to the people.
Accordingly we read in the chapter mentioned above (Twelfth Council of
Toledo, Can. v): "What kind of sacrifice is that wherein not even the
sacrificer is known to have a share?" But it is by partaking of the
sacrifice that he has a share in it, as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
10:18): "Are not they that eat of the sacrifices, partakers of the
altar?" Therefore it is necessary for the priest, as often as he
consecrates, to receive this sacrament in its integrity.
Reply to Objection 1: The consecration of chrism or of anything else is
not a sacrifice, as the consecration of the Eucharist is: consequently
there is no parallel.
Reply to Objection 2: The sacrament of Baptism is accomplished in the
use of the matter, and consequently no one can baptize himself, because
the same person cannot be active and passive in a sacrament. Hence
neither in this sacrament does the priest consecrate himself, but he
consecrates the bread and wine, in which consecration the sacrament is
completed. But the use thereof follows the sacrament, and therefore
there is no parallel.
Reply to Objection 3: If Christ's body appears miraculously upon the
altar under the guise of flesh, or the blood under the guise of blood,
it is not to be received. For Jerome says upon Leviticus (cf. De
Consecr., dist. 2): "It is lawful to eat of this sacrifice which is
wonderfully performed in memory of Christ: but it is not lawful for
anyone to eat of that one which Christ offered on the altar of the
cross." Nor does the priest transgress on that account, because
miraculous events are not subject to human laws. Nevertheless the
priest would be well advised to consecrate again and receive the Lord's
body and blood.
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Whether a wicked priest can consecrate the Eucharist?
Objection 1: It seems that a wicked priest cannot consecrate the
Eucharist. For Jerome, commenting on Sophon. iii, 4, says: "The priests
who perform the Eucharist, and who distribute our Lord's blood to the
people, act wickedly against Christ's law, in deeming that the
Eucharist is consecrated by a prayer rather than by a good life; and
that only the solemn prayer is requisite, and not the priest's merits:
of whom it is said: 'Let not the priest, in whatever defilement he may
be, approach to offer oblations to the Lord'" (Lev. 21:21, Septuagint).
But the sinful priest, being defiled, has neither the life nor the
merits befitting this sacrament. Therefore a sinful priest cannot
consecrate the Eucharist.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that "the bread
and wine are changed supernaturally into the body and blood of our
Lord, by the coming of the Holy Ghost." But Pope Gelasius I says (Ep.
ad Elphid., cf. Decret. i, q. 1): "How shall the Holy Spirit, when
invoked, come for the consecration of the Divine Mystery, if the priest
invoking him be proved full of guilty deeds?" Consequently, the
Eucharist cannot be consecrated by a wicked priest.
Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is consecrated by the priest's
blessing. But a sinful priest's blessing is not efficacious for
consecrating this sacrament, since it is written (Malachi 2:2): "I will
curse your blessings." Again, Dionysius says in his Epistle (viii) to
the monk Demophilus: "He who is not enlightened has completely fallen
away from the priestly order; and I wonder that such a man dare to
employ his hands in priestly actions, and in the person of Christ to
utter, over the Divine symbols, his unclean infamies, for I will not
call them prayers."
On the contrary, Augustine (Paschasius) says (De Corp. Dom. xii):
"Within the Catholic Church, in the mystery of the Lord's body and
blood, nothing greater is done by a good priest, nothing less by an
evil priest, because it is not by the merits of the consecrator that
the sacrament is accomplished, but by the Creator's word, and by the
power of the Holy Spirit."
I answer that, As was said above ([4686]AA[1],3), the priest
consecrates this sacrament not by his own power, but as the minister of
Christ, in Whose person he consecrates this sacrament. But from the
fact of being wicked he does not cease to be Christ's minister; because
our Lord has good and wicked ministers or servants. Hence (Mat. 24:45)
our Lord says: "Who, thinkest thou, is a faithful and wise servant?"
and afterwards He adds: "But if that evil servant shall say in his
heart," etc. And the Apostle (1 Cor. 4:1) says: "Let a man so account
of us as of the ministers of Christ"; and afterwards he adds: "I am not
conscious to myself of anything; yet am I not hereby justified." He was
therefore certain that he was Christ's minister; yet he was not certain
that he was a just man. Consequently, a man can be Christ's minister
even though he be not one of the just. And this belongs to Christ's
excellence, Whom, as the true God, things both good and evil serve,
since they are ordained by His providence for His glory. Hence it is
evident that priests, even though they be not godly, but sinners, can
consecrate the Eucharist.
Reply to Objection 1: In those words Jerome is condemning the error of
priests who believed they could consecrate the Eucharist worthily, from
the mere fact of being priests, even though they were sinners; and
Jerome condemns this from the fact that persons defiled are forbidden
to approach the altar; but this does not prevent the sacrifice, which
they offer, from being a true sacrifice, if they do approach.
Reply to Objection 2: Previous to the words quoted, Pope Gelasius
expresses himself as follows: "That most holy rite, which contains the
Catholic discipline, claims for itself such reverence that no one may
dare to approach it except with clean conscience." From this it is
evident that his meaning is that the priest who is a sinner ought not
to approach this sacrament. Hence when he resumes, "How shall the Holy
Spirit come when summoned," it must be understood that He comes, not
through the priest's merits, but through the power of Christ, Whose
words the priest utters.
Reply to Objection 3: As the same action can be evil, inasmuch as it is
done with a bad intention of the servant; and good from the good
intention of the master; so the blessing of a sinful priest, inasmuch
as he acts unworthily is deserving of a curse, and is reputed an infamy
and a blasphemy, and not a prayer; whereas, inasmuch as it is
pronounced in the person of Christ, it is holy and efficacious. Hence
it is said with significance: "I will curse your blessings."
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Whether the mass of a sinful priest is of less worth than the mass of a goo
d
priest?
Objection 1: It seems that the mass of a sinful priest is not of less
worth than that of a good priest. For Pope Gregory says in the
Register: "Alas, into what a great snare they fall who believe that the
Divine and hidden mysteries can be sanctified more by some than by
others; since it is the one and the same Holy Ghost Who hallows those
mysteries in a hidden and invisible manner." But these hidden mysteries
are celebrated in the mass. Therefore the mass of a sinful priest is
not of less value than the mass of a good priest.
Objection 2: Further, as Baptism is conferred by a minister through the
power of Christ Who baptizes, so likewise this sacrament is consecrated
in the person of Christ. But Baptism is no better when conferred by a
better priest, as was said above ([4687]Q[64], A[1], ad 2). Therefore
neither is a mass the better, which is celebrated by a better priest.
Objection 3: Further, as the merits of priests differ in the point of
being good and better, so they likewise differ in the point of being
good and bad. Consequently, if the mass of a better priest be itself
better, it follows that the mass of a bad priest must be bad. Now this
is unreasonable, because the malice of the ministers cannot affect
Christ's mysteries, as Augustine says in his work on Baptism (Contra
Donat. xii). Therefore neither is the mass of a better priest the
better.
On the contrary, It is stated in Decretal i, q. 1: "The worthier the
priest, the sooner is he heard in the needs for which he prays."
I answer that, There are two things to be considered in the mass.
namely, the sacrament itself, which is the chief thing; and the prayers
which are offered up in the mass for the quick and the dead. So far as
the mass itself is concerned, the mass of a wicked priest is not of
less value than that of a good priest, because the same sacrifice is
offered by both.
Again, the prayer put up in the mass can be considered in two respects:
first of all, in so far as it has its efficacy from the devotion of the
priest interceding, and in this respect there is no doubt but that the
mass of the better priest is the more fruitful. In another respect,
inasmuch as the prayer is said by the priest in the mass in the place
of the entire Church, of which the priest is the minister; and this
ministry remains even in sinful men, as was said above [4688](A[5]) in
regard to Christ's ministry. Hence, in this respect the prayer even of
the sinful priest is fruitful, not only that which he utters in the
mass, but likewise all those he recites in the ecclesiastical offices,
wherein he takes the place of the Church. on the other hand, his
private prayers are not fruitful, according to Prov. 28:9: "He that
turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an
abomination."
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking there of the holiness of the
Divine sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: In the sacrament of Baptism solemn prayers are
not made for all the faithful, as in the mass; therefore there is no
parallel in this respect. There is, however, a resemblance as to the
effect of the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: By reason of the power of the Holy Ghost, Who
communicates to each one the blessings of Christ's members on account
of their being united in charity, the private blessing in the mass of a
good priest is fruitful to others. But the private evil of one man
cannot hurt another, except the latter, in some way, consent, as
Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii).
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Whether heretics, schismatics, and excommunicated persons can consecrate?
Objection 1: It seems that heretics, schismatics, and excommunicated
persons are not able to consecrate the Eucharist. For Augustine says
(Liber sentent. Prosperi xv) that "there is no such thing as a true
sacrifice outside the Catholic Church": and Pope Leo I says (Ep. lxxx;
cf. Decretal i, q. 1): Elsewhere "(i.e. than in the Church which is
Christ's body) there is neither valid priesthood nor true sacrifice."
But heretics, schismatics, and excommunicated persons are severed from
the Church. Therefore they are unable to offer a true sacrifice.
Objection 2: Further (Decretal, caus. i, q. 1), Innocent I is quoted as
saying: "Because we receive the laity of the Arians and other
pestilential persons, if they seem to repent, it does not follow that
their clergy have the dignity of the priesthood or of any other
ministerial office, for we allow them to confer nothing save Baptism."
But none can consecrate the Eucharist, unless he have the dignity of
the priesthood. Therefore heretics and the like cannot consecrate the
Eucharist.
Objection 3: Further, it does not seem feasible for one outside the
Church to act on behalf of the Church. But when the priest consecrates
the Eucharist, he does so in the person of the entire Church, as is
evident from the fact of his putting up all prayers in the person of
the Church. Therefore, it seems that those who are outside the Church,
such as those who are heretics, schismatics, and excommunicate, are not
able to consecrate the Eucharist.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): "Just as Baptism
remains in them," i.e. in heretics, schismatics, and those who are
excommunicate, "so do their orders remain intact." Now, by the power of
his ordination, a priest can consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, it
seems that heretics, schismatics, and those who are excommunicate, can
consecrate the Eucharist, since their orders remain entire.
I answer that, Some have contended that heretics, schismatics, and the
excommunicate, who are outside the pale of the Church, cannot perform
this sacrament. But herein they are deceived, because, as Augustine
says (Contra Parmen. ii), "it is one thing to lack something utterly,
and another to have it improperly"; and in like fashion, "it is one
thing not to bestow, and quite another to bestow, but not rightly."
Accordingly, such as, being within the Church, received the power of
consecrating the Eucharist through being ordained to the priesthood,
have such power rightly indeed; but they use it improperly if
afterwards they be separated from the Church by heresy, schism, or
excommunication. But such as are ordained while separated from the
Church, have neither the power rightly, nor do they use it rightly. But
that in both cases they have the power, is clear from what Augustine
says (Contra Parmen. ii), that when they return to the unity of the
Church, they are not re-ordained, but are received in their orders. And
since the consecration of the Eucharist is an act which follows the
power of order, such persons as are separated from the Church by
heresy, schism, or excommunication, can indeed consecrate the
Eucharist, which on being consecrated by them contains Christ's true
body and blood; but they act wrongly, and sin by doing so; and in
consequence they do not receive the fruit of the sacrifice, which is a
spiritual sacrifice.
Reply to Objection 1: Such and similar authorities are to be understood
in this sense, that the sacrifice is offered wrongly outside the
Church. Hence outside the Church there can be no spiritual sacrifice
that is a true sacrifice with the truth of its fruit, although it be a
true sacrifice with the truth of the sacrament; thus it was stated
above ([4689]Q[80], A[3]), that the sinner receives Christ's body
sacramentally, but not spiritually.
Reply to Objection 2: Baptism alone is allowed to be conferred by
heretics, and schismatics, because they can lawfully baptize in case of
necessity; but in no case can they lawfully consecrate the Eucharist,
or confer the other sacraments.
Reply to Objection 3: The priest, in reciting the prayers of the mass,
speaks instead of the Church, in whose unity he remains; but in
consecrating the sacrament he speaks as in the person of Christ, Whose
place he holds by the power of his orders. Consequently, if a priest
severed from the unity of the Church celebrates mass, not having lost
the power of order, he consecrates Christ's true body and blood; but
because he is severed from the unity of the Church, his prayers have no
efficacy.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a degraded priest can consecrate this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that a degraded priest cannot consecrate this
sacrament. For no one can perform this sacrament except he have the
power of consecrating. But the priest "who has been degraded has no
power of consecrating, although he has the power of baptizing" (App.
Gratiani). Therefore it seems that a degraded priest cannot consecrate
the Eucharist.
Objection 2: Further, he who gives can take away. But the bishop in
ordaining gives to the priest the power of consecrating. Therefore he
can take it away by degrading him.
Objection 3: Further, the priest, by degradation, loses either the
power of consecrating, or the use of such power. But he does not lose
merely the use, for thus the degraded one would lose no more than one
excommunicated, who also lacks the use. Therefore it seems that he
loses the power to consecrate, and in consequence that he cannot
perform this sacrament.
On the contrary, Augustine (Contra Parmen. ii) proves that "apostates"
from the faith "are not deprived of their Baptism," from the fact that
"it is not restored to them when they return repentant; and therefore
it is deemed that it cannot be lost." But in like fashion, if the
degraded man be restored, he has not to be ordained over again.
Consequently, he has not lost the power of consecrating, and so the
degraded priest can perform this sacrament.
I answer that, The power of consecrating the Eucharist belongs to the
character of the priestly order. But every character is indelible,
because it is given with a kind of consecration, as was said above
([4690]Q[63] , A[5]), just as the consecrations of all other things are
perpetual, and cannot be lost or repeated. Hence it is clear that the
power of consecrating is not lost by degradation. For, again, Augustine
says (Contra Parmen. ii): "Both are sacraments," namely Baptism and
order, "and both are given to a man with a kind of consecration; the
former, when he is baptized; the latter when he is ordained; and
therefore it is not lawful for Catholics to repeat either of them." And
thus it is evident that the degraded priest can perform this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: That Canon is speaking, not as by way of
assertion, but by way of inquiry, as can be gleaned from the context.
Reply to Objection 2: The bishop gives the priestly power of order, not
as though coming from himself, but instrumentally, as God's minister,
and its effect cannot be taken away by man, according to Mat. 19:6:
"What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." And therefore
the bishop cannot take this power away, just as neither can he who
baptizes take away the baptismal character.
Reply to Objection 3: Excommunication is medicinal. And therefore the
ministry of the priestly power is not taken away from the
excommunicate, as it were, perpetually, but only for a time, that they
may mend; but the exercise is withdrawn from the degraded, as though
condemned perpetually.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is permissible to receive communion from heretical,
excommunicate, or sinful priests, and to hear mass said by them?
Objection 1: It seems that one may lawfully receive Communion from
heretical, excommunicate, or even sinful priests, and to hear mass said
by them. Because, as Augustine says (Contra Petilian. iii), "we should
not avoid God's sacraments, whether they be given by a good man or by a
wicked one." But priests, even if they be sinful, or heretics, or
excommunicate, perform a valid sacrament. Therefore it seems that one
ought not to refrain from receiving Communion at their hands, or from
hearing their mass.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's true body is figurative of His mystical
body, as was said above ([4691]Q[67], A[2]). But Christ's true body is
consecrated by the priests mentioned above. Therefore it seems that
whoever belongs to His mystical body can communicate in their
sacrifices.
Objection 3: Further, there are many sins graver than fornication. But
it is not forbidden to hear the masses of priests who sin otherwise.
Therefore, it ought not to be forbidden to hear the masses of priests
guilty of this sin.
On the contrary, The Canon says (Dist. 32): "Let no one hear the mass
of a priest whom he knows without doubt to have a concubine." Moreover,
Gregory says (Dial. iii) that "the faithless father sent an Arian
bishop to his son, for him to receive sacrilegiously the consecrated
Communion at his hands. But, when the Arian bishop arrived, God's
devoted servant rebuked him, as was right for him to do."
I answer that, As was said above ([4692]AA[5],7), heretical,
schismatical, excommunicate, or even sinful priests, although they have
the power to consecrate the Eucharist, yet they do not make a proper
use of it; on the contrary, they sin by using it. But whoever
communicates with another who is in sin, becomes a sharer in his sin.
Hence we read in John's Second Canonical Epistle (11) that "He that
saith unto him, God speed you, communicateth with his wicked works."
Consequently, it is not lawful to receive Communion from them, or to
assist at their mass.
Still there is a difference among the above, because heretics,
schismatics, and excommunicates, have been forbidden, by the Church's
sentence, to perform the Eucharistic rite. And therefore whoever hears
their mass or receives the sacraments from them, commits sin. But not
all who are sinners are debarred by the Church's sentence from using
this power: and so, although suspended by the Divine sentence, yet they
are not suspended in regard to others by any ecclesiastical sentence:
consequently, until the Church's sentence is pronounced, it is lawful
to receive Communion at their hands, and to hear their mass. Hence on 1
Cor. 5:11, "with such a one not so much as to eat," Augustine's gloss
runs thus: "In saying this he was unwilling for a man to be judged by
his fellow man on arbitrary suspicion, or even by usurped extraordinary
judgment, but rather by God's law, according to the Church's ordering,
whether he confess of his own accord, or whether he be accused and
convicted."
Reply to Objection 1: By refusing to hear the masses of such priests,
or to receive Communion from them, we are not shunning God's
sacraments; on the contrary, by so doing we are giving them honor
(hence a host consecrated by such priests is to be adored, and if it be
reserved, it can be consumed by a lawful priest): but what we shun is
the sin of the unworthy ministers.
Reply to Objection 2: The unity of the mystical body is the fruit of
the true body received. But those who receive or minister unworthily,
are deprived of the fruit, as was said above [4693](A[7]; Q[80], A[4]).
And therefore, those who belong to the unity of the Faith are not to
receive the sacrament from their dispensing.
Reply to Objection 3: Although fornication is not graver than other
sins, yet men are more prone to it, owing to fleshly concupiscence.
Consequently, this sin is specially inhibited to priests by the Church,
lest anyone hear the mass of one living in concubinage. However, this
is to be understood of one who is notorious, either from being
convicted and sentenced, or from having acknowledged his guilt in legal
form, or from it being impossible to conceal his guilt by any
subterfuge.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a priest to refrain entirely from consecrating the
Eucharist?
Objection 1: It seems to be lawful for a priest to refrain entirely
from consecrating the Eucharist. Because, as it is the priest's office
to consecrate the Eucharist, so it is likewise to baptize and
administer the other sacraments. But the priest is not bound to act as
a minister of the other sacraments, unless he has undertaken the care
of souls. Therefore, it seems that likewise he is not bound to
consecrate the Eucharist except he be charged with the care of souls.
Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is unlawful for him to
do; otherwise he would be in two minds. But it is not lawful for the
priest who is in a state of sin, or excommunicate, to consecrate the
Eucharist, as was said above [4694](A[7]). Therefore it seems that such
men are not bound to celebrate, and so neither are the others;
otherwise they would be gainers by their fault.
Objection 3: Further, the priestly dignity is not lost by subsequent
weakness: because Pope Gelasius I says (cf. Decretal, Dist. 55): "As
the canonical precepts do not permit them who are feeble in body to
approach the priesthood, so if anyone be disabled when once in that
state, he cannot lose that he received at the time he was well." But it
sometimes happens that those who are already ordained as priests incur
defects whereby they are hindered from celebrating, such as leprosy or
epilepsy, or the like. Consequently, it does not appear that priests
are bound to celebrate.
On the contrary, Ambrose says in one of his Orations (xxxiii): "It is a
grave matter if we do not approach Thy altar with clean heart and pure
hands; but it is graver still if while shunning sins we also fail to
offer our sacrifice."
I answer that, Some have said that a priest may lawfully refrain
altogether from consecrating, except he be bound to do so, and to give
the sacraments to the people, by reason of his being entrusted with the
care of souls.
But this is said quite unreasonably, because everyone is bound to use
the grace entrusted to him, when opportunity serves, according to 2
Cor. 6:1: "We exhort you that you receive not the grace of God in
vain." But the opportunity of offering sacrifice is considered not
merely in relation to the faithful of Christ to whom the sacraments
must be administered, but chiefly with regard to God to Whom the
sacrifice of this sacrament is offered by consecrating. Hence, it is
not lawful for the priest, even though he has not the care of souls, to
refrain altogether from celebrating; and he seems to be bound to
celebrate at least on the chief festivals, and especially on those days
on which the faithful usually communicate. And hence it is that (2
Macc. 4:14) it is said against some priests that they "were not now
occupied about the offices of the altar . . . despising the temple and
neglecting the sacrifices."
Reply to Objection 1: The other sacraments are accomplished in being
used by the faithful, and therefore he alone is bound to administer
them who has undertaken the care of souls. But this sacrament is
performed in the consecration of the Eucharist, whereby a sacrifice is
offered to God, to which the priest is bound from the order he has
received.
Reply to Objection 2: The sinful priest, if deprived by the Church's
sentence from exercising his order, simply or for a time, is rendered
incapable of offering sacrifice; consequently, the obligation lapses.
But if not deprived of the power of celebrating, the obligation is not
removed; nor is he in two minds, because he can repent of his sin and
then celebrate.
Reply to Objection 3: Weakness or sickness contracted by a priest after
his ordination does not deprive him of his orders; but hinders him from
exercising them, as to the consecration of the Eucharist: sometimes by
making it impossible to exercise them, as, for example, if he lose his
sight, or his fingers, or the use of speech; and sometimes on account
of danger, as in the case of one suffering from epilepsy, or indeed any
disease of the mind; and sometimes, on account of loathsomeness, as is
evident in the case of a leper, who ought not to celebrate in public:
he can, however, say mass privately, unless the leprosy has gone so far
that it has rendered him incapable owing to the wasting away of his
limbs.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE RITE OF THIS SACRAMENT (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the Rite of this sacrament, under which head
there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is sacrificed in the celebration of this mystery?
(2) Of the time of celebrating;
(3) Of the place and other matters relating to the equipment for this
celebration;
(4) Of the words uttered in celebrating this mystery;
(5) Of the actions performed in celebrating this mystery.
(6) Of the defects which occur in the celebration of this sacrament.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ is sacrificed in this sacrament?
Objection 1: It seems that Christ is not sacrificed in the celebration
of this sacrament. For it is written (Heb. 10:14) that "Christ by one
oblation hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified." But that
oblation was His oblation. Therefore Christ is not sacrificed in the
celebration of this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's sacrifice was made upon the cross,
whereon "He delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to
God for an odor of sweetness," as is said in Eph. 5:2. But Christ is
not crucified in the celebration of this mystery. Therefore, neither is
He sacrificed.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv), in Christ's
sacrifice the priest and the victim are one and the same. But in the
celebration of this sacrament the priest and the victim are not the
same. Therefore, the celebration of this sacrament is not a sacrifice
of Christ.
On the contrary, Augustine says in the Liber Sentent. Prosp. (cf. Ep.
xcviii): "Christ was sacrificed once in Himself, and yet He is
sacrificed daily in the Sacrament."
I answer that, The celebration of this sacrament is called a sacrifice
for two reasons. First, because, as Augustine says (Ad Simplician. ii),
"the images of things are called by the names of the things whereof
they are the images; as when we look upon a picture or a fresco, we
say, 'This is Cicero and that is Sallust.'" But, as was said above
([4695]Q[79], A[1]), the celebration of this sacrament is an image
representing Christ's Passion, which is His true sacrifice. Accordingly
the celebration of this sacrament is called Christ's sacrifice. Hence
it is that Ambrose, in commenting on Heb. 10:1, says: "In Christ was
offered up a sacrifice capable of giving eternal salvation; what then
do we do? Do we not offer it up every day in memory of His death?"
Secondly it is called a sacrifice, in respect of the effect of His
Passion: because, to wit, by this sacrament, we are made partakers of
the fruit of our Lord's Passion. Hence in one of the Sunday Secrets
(Ninth Sunday after Pentecost) we say: "Whenever the commemoration of
this sacrifice is celebrated, the work of our redemption is enacted."
Consequently, according to the first reason, it is true to say that
Christ was sacrificed, even in the figures of the Old Testament: hence
it is stated in the Apocalypse (13:8): "Whose names are not written in
the Book of Life of the Lamb, which was slain from the beginning of the
world." But according to the second reason, it is proper to this
sacrament for Christ to be sacrificed in its celebration.
Reply to Objection 1: As Ambrose says (commenting on Heb. 10:1), "there
is but one victim," namely that which Christ offered, and which we
offer, "and not many victims, because Christ was offered but once: and
this latter sacrifice is the pattern of the former. For, just as what
is offered everywhere is one body, and not many bodies, so also is it
but one sacrifice."
Reply to Objection 2: As the celebration of this sacrament is an image
representing Christ's Passion, so the altar is representative of the
cross itself, upon which Christ was sacrificed in His proper species.
Reply to Objection 3: For the same reason (cf. Reply OBJ[2]) the priest
also bears Christ's image, in Whose person and by Whose power he
pronounces the words of consecration, as is evident from what was said
above ([4696]Q[82], AA[1],3). And so, in a measure, the priest and
victim are one and the same.
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Whether the time for celebrating this mystery has been properly determined?
Objection 1: It seems that the time for celebrating this mystery has
not been properly determined. For as was observed above [4697](A[1]),
this sacrament is representative of our Lord's Passion. But the
commemoration of our Lord's Passion takes place in the Church once in
the year: because Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps. 21): "Is not Christ
slain as often as the Pasch is celebrated? Nevertheless, the
anniversary remembrance represents what took place in by-gone days; and
so it does not cause us to be stirred as if we saw our Lord hanging
upon the cross." Therefore this sacrament ought to be celebrated but
once a year.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's Passion is commemorated in the Church on
the Friday before Easter, and not on Christmas Day. Consequently, since
this sacrament is commemorative of our Lord's Passion, it seems
unsuitable for this sacrament to be celebrated thrice on Christmas Day,
and to be entirely omitted on Good Friday.
Objection 3: Further, in the celebration of this sacrament the Church
ought to imitate Christ's institution. But it was in the evening that
Christ consecrated this sacrament. Therefore it seems that this
sacrament ought to be celebrated at that time of day.
Objection 4: Further, as is set down in the Decretals (De Consecr.,
dist. i), Pope Leo I wrote to Dioscorus, Bishop of Alexandria, that "it
is permissible to celebrate mass in the first part of the day." But the
day begins at midnight, as was said above ([4698]Q[80], A[8], ad 5).
Therefore it seems that after midnight it is lawful to celebrate.
Objection 5: Further, in one of the Sunday Secrets (Ninth Sunday after
Pentecost) we say: "Grant us, Lord, we beseech Thee, to frequent these
mysteries." But there will be greater frequency if the priest
celebrates several times a day. Therefore it seems that the priest
ought not to be hindered from celebrating several times daily.
On the contrary is the custom which the Church observes according to
the statutes of the Canons.
I answer that, As stated above [4699](A[1]), in the celebration of this
mystery, we must take into consideration the representation of our
Lord's Passion, and the participation of its fruits; and the time
suitable for the celebration of this mystery ought to be determined by
each of these considerations. Now since, owing to our daily defects, we
stand in daily need of the fruits of our Lord's Passion, this sacrament
is offered regularly every day in the Church. Hence our Lord teaches us
to pray (Lk. 11:3): "Give us this day our daily bread": in explanation
of which words Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxviii): "If it be a daily
bread, why do you take it once a year, as the Greeks have the custom in
the east? Receive it daily that it may benefit you every day."
But since our Lord's Passion was celebrated from the third to the ninth
hour, therefore this sacrament is solemnly celebrated by the Church in
that part of the day.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's Passion is recalled in this sacrament,
inasmuch as its effect flows out to the faithful; but at Passion-tide
Christ's Passion is recalled inasmuch as it was wrought in Him Who is
our Head. This took place but once; whereas the faithful receive daily
the fruits of His Passion: consequently, the former is commemorated but
once in the year, whereas the latter takes place every day, both that
we may partake of its fruit and in order that we may have a perpetual
memorial.
Reply to Objection 2: The figure ceases on the advent of the reality.
But this sacrament is a figure and a representation of our Lord's
Passion, as stated above. And therefore on the day on which our Lord's
Passion is recalled as it was really accomplished, this sacrament is
not consecrated. Nevertheless, lest the Church be deprived on that day
of the fruit of the Passion offered to us by this sacrament, the body
of Christ consecrated the day before is reserved to be consumed on that
day; but the blood is not reserved, on account of danger, and because
the blood is more specially the image of our Lord's Passion, as stated
above ([4700]Q[78], A[3], ad 2). Nor is it true, as some affirm, that
the wine is changed into blood when the particle of Christ's body is
dropped into it. Because this cannot be done otherwise than by
consecration under the due form of words.
On Christmas Day, however, several masses are said on account of
Christ's threefold nativity. Of these the first is His eternal birth,
which is hidden in our regard. and therefore one mass is sung in the
night, in the "Introit" of which we say: "The Lord said unto Me: Thou
art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee." The second is His nativity
in time, and the spiritual birth, whereby Christ rises "as the day-star
in our [Vulg.: 'your'] hearts" (2 Pet. 1:19), and on this account the
mass is sung at dawn, and in the "Introit" we say: "The light will
shine on us today." The third is Christ's temporal and bodily birth,
according as He went forth from the virginal womb, becoming visible to
us through being clothed with flesh: and on that account the third mass
is sung in broad daylight, in the "Introit" of which we say: "A child
is born to us." Nevertheless, on the other hand, it can be said that
His eternal generation, of itself, is in the full light, and on this
account in the gospel of the third mass mention is made of His eternal
birth. But regarding His birth in the body, He was literally born
during the night, as a sign that He came to the darknesses of our
infirmity; hence also in the midnight mass we say the gospel of
Christ's nativity in the flesh.
Likewise on other days upon which many of God's benefits have to be
recalled or besought, several masses are celebrated on one day, as for
instance, one for the feast, and another for a fast or for the dead.
Reply to Objection 3: As already observed ([4701]Q[73], A[5]), Christ
wished to give this sacrament last of all, in order that it might make
a deeper impression on the hearts of the disciples; and therefore it
was after supper, at the close of day, that He consecrated this
sacrament and gave it to His disciples. But we celebrate at the hour
when our Lord suffered, i.e. either, as on feast-days, at the hour of
Terce, when He was crucified by the tongues of the Jews (Mk. 15:25),
and when the Holy Ghost descended upon the disciples (Acts 2:15); or,
as when no feast is kept, at the hour of Sext, when He was crucified at
the hands of the soldiers (Jn. 19:14), or, as on fasting days, at None,
when crying out with a loud voice He gave up the ghost (Mat. 27:46,
50).
Nevertheless the mass can be postponed, especially when Holy orders
have to be conferred, and still more on Holy Saturday; both on account
of the length of the office, and also because orders belong to the
Sunday, as is set forth in the Decretals (dist. 75).
Masses, however, can be celebrated "in the first part of the day,"
owing to any necessity; as is stated De Consecr., dist. 1.
Reply to Objection 4: As a rule mass ought to be said in the day and
not in the night, because Christ is present in this sacrament, Who says
(Jn. 9:4,5): "I must work the works of Him that sent Me, whilst it is
day: because the night cometh when no man can work; as long as I am in
the world, I am the light of the world." Yet this should be done in
such a manner that the beginning of the day is not to be taken from
midnight; nor from sunrise, that is, when the substance of the sun
appears above the earth; but when the dawn begins to show: because then
the sun is said to be risen when the brightness of his beams appears.
Accordingly it is written (Mk. 16:1) that "the women came to the tomb,
the sun being now risen"; though, as John relates (Jn. 20:1), "while it
was yet dark they came to the tomb." It is in this way that Augustine
explains this difference (De Consens. Evang. iii).
Exception is made on the night of Christmas eve, when mass is
celebrated, because our Lord was born in the night (De Consecr., dist.
1). And in like manner it is celebrated on Holy Saturday towards the
beginning of the night, since our Lord rose in the night, that is,
"when it was yet dark, before the sun's rising was manifest."
Reply to Objection 5: As is set down in the decree (De Consecr., dist.
1), in virtue of a decree of Pope Alexander II, "it is enough for a
priest to celebrate one mass each day, because Christ suffered once and
redeemed the whole world; and very happy is he who can worthily
celebrate one mass. But there are some who say one mass for the dead,
and another of the day, if need be. But I do not deem that those escape
condemnation who presume to celebrate several masses daily, either for
the sake of money, or to gain flattery from the laity." And Pope
Innocent III says (Extra, De Celebr. Miss., chap. Consuluisti) that
"except on the day of our Lord's birth, unless necessity urges, it
suffices for a priest to celebrate only one mass each day."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this sacrament ought to be celebrated in a house and with sacred
vessels?
Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament ought not to be celebrated in
a house and with sacred vessels. For this sacrament is a representation
of our Lord's Passion. But Christ did not suffer in a house, but
outside the city gate, according to Heb. 1:12: "Jesus, that He might
sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate."
Therefore, it seems that this sacrament ought not to be celebrated in a
house, but rather in the open air.
Objection 2: Further, in the celebration of this sacrament the Church
ought to imitate the custom of Christ and the apostles. But the house
wherein Christ first wrought this sacrament was not consecrated, but
merely an ordinary supper-room prepared by the master of the house, as
related in Lk. 22:11,12. Moreover, we read (Acts 2:46) that "the
apostles were continuing daily with one accord in the temple; and,
breaking bread from house to house, they took their meat with
gladness." Consequently, there is no need for houses, in which this
sacrament is celebrated, to be consecrated.
Objection 3: Further, nothing that is to no purpose ought to be done in
the Church, which is governed by the Holy Ghost. But it seems useless
to consecrate a church, or an altar, or such like inanimate things,
since they are not capable of receiving grace or spiritual virtue.
Therefore it is unbecoming for such consecrations to be performed in
the Church.
Objection 4: Further, only Divine works ought to be recalled with
solemnity, according to Ps. 91:5: "I shall rejoice in the works of Thy
hands." Now the consecration of a church or altar, is the work of a
man; as is also the consecration of the chalice, and of the ministers,
and of other such things. But these latter consecrations are not
commemorated in the Church. Therefore neither ought the consecration of
a church or of an altar to be commemorated with solemnity.
Objection 5: Further, the truth ought to correspond with the figure.
But in the Old Testament, which was a figure of the New, the altar was
not made of hewn stones: for, it is written (Ex. 20:24): "You shall
make an altar of earth unto Me . . . and if thou make an altar of stone
unto Me, thou shalt not build it of hewn stones." Again, the altar is
commanded to be made of "setim-wood," covered "with brass" (Ex.
27:1,2), or "with gold" (Ex. 25). Consequently, it seems unfitting for
the Church to make exclusive use of altars made of stone.
Objection 6: Further, the chalice with the paten represents Christ's
tomb, which was "hewn in a rock," as is narrated in the Gospels.
Consequently, the chalice ought to be of stone, and not of gold or of
silver or tin.
Objection 7: Further, just as gold is the most precious among the
materials of the altar vessels, so are cloths of silk the most precious
among other cloths. Consequently, since the chalice is of gold, the
altar cloths ought to be made of silk and not of linen.
Objection 8: Further, the dispensing and ordering of the sacraments
belong to the Church's ministers, just as the ordering of temporal
affairs is subject to the ruling of secular princes; hence the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 4:1): "Let a man so esteem us as the ministers of Christ
end the dispensers of the mysteries of God." But if anything be done
against the ordinances of princes it is deemed void. Therefore, if the
various items mentioned above are suitably commanded by the Church's
prelates, it seems that the body of Christ could not be consecrated
unless they be observed; and so it appears to follow that Christ's
words are not sufficient of themselves for consecrating this sacrament:
which is contrary to the fact. Consequently, it does not seem fitting
for such ordinances to be made touching the celebration of this
sacrament.
On the contrary, The Church's ordinances are Christ's own ordinances;
since He said (Mat. 18:20): "Wherever two or three are gathered
together in My name, there am I in the midst of them."
I answer that, There are two things to be considered regarding the
equipment of this sacrament: one of these belongs to the representation
of the events connected with our Lord's Passion; while the other is
connected with the reverence due to the sacrament, in which Christ is
contained verily, and not in figure only.
Hence we consecrate those things which we make use of in this
sacrament; both that we may show our reverence for the sacrament, and
in order to represent the holiness which is the effect of the Passion
of Christ, according to Heb. 13:12: "Jesus, that He might sanctify the
people by His own blood," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament ought as a rule to be celebrated
in a house, whereby the Church is signified, according to 1 Tim. 3:15:
"That thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house
of God, which is the Church of the living God." Because "outside the
Church there is no place for the true sacrifice," as Augustine says
(Liber Sentent. Prosp. xv). And because the Church was not to be
confined within the territories of the Jewish people, but was to be
established throughout the whole world, therefore Christ's Passion was
not celebrated within the city of the Jews, but in the open country,
that so the whole world might serve as a house for Christ's Passion.
Nevertheless, as is said in De Consecr., dist. 1, "if a church be not
to hand, we permit travelers to celebrate mass in the open air, or in a
tent, if there be a consecrated altar-table to hand, and the other
requisites belonging to the sacred function."
Reply to Objection 2: The house in which this sacrament is celebrated
denotes the Church, and is termed a church; and so it is fittingly
consecrated, both to represent the holiness which the Church acquired
from the Passion, as well as to denote the holiness required of them
who have to receive this sacrament. By the altar Christ Himself is
signified, of Whom the Apostle says (Heb. 13:15): "Through Him we offer
a sacrifice of praise to God." Hence the consecration of the altar
signifies Christ's holiness, of which it was said (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy
one born of thee shall be called the Son of God." Hence we read in De
Consecr., dist. 1: "It has seemed pleasing for the altars to be
consecrated not merely with the anointing of chrism, but likewise with
the priestly blessing."
And therefore, as a rule, it is not lawful to celebrate this sacrament
except in a consecrated house. Hence it is enacted (De Consecr., dist.
1): "Let no priest presume to say mass except in places consecrated by
the bishop." And furthermore because pagans and other unbelievers are
not members of the Church, therefore we read (De Consecr., dist. 1):
"It is not lawful to bless a church in which the bodies of unbelievers
are buried, but if it seem suitable for consecration, then, after
removing the corpses and tearing down the walls or beams, let it be
rebuilt. If, however, it has been already consecrated, and the faithful
lie in it, it is lawful to celebrate mass therein." Nevertheless in a
case of necessity this sacrament can be performed in houses which have
not been consecrated, or which have been profaned; but with the
bishop's consent. Hence we read in the same distinction: "We deem that
masses are not to be celebrated everywhere, but in places consecrated
by the bishop, or where he gives permission." But not without a
portable altar consecrated by the bishop: hence in the same distinction
we read: "We permit that, if the churches be devastated or burned,
masses may be celebrated in chapels, with a consecrated altar." For
because Christ's holiness is the fount of all the Church's holiness,
therefore in necessity a consecrated altar suffices for performing this
sacrament. And on this account a church is never consecrated without
consecrating the altar. Yet sometimes an altar is consecrated apart
from the church, with the relics of the saints, "whose lives are hidden
with Christ in God" (Col. 3:3). Accordingly under the same distinction
we read: "It is our pleasure that altars, in which no relics of saints
are found enclosed, be thrown down, if possible, by the bishops
presiding over such places."
Reply to Objection 3: The church, altar, and other like inanimate
things are consecrated, not because they are capable of receiving
grace, but because they acquire special spiritual virtue from the
consecration, whereby they are rendered fit for the Divine worship, so
that man derives devotion therefrom, making him more fitted for Divine
functions, unless this be hindered by want of reverence. Hence it is
written (2 Macc. 3:38): "There is undoubtedly in that place a certain
power of God; for He that hath His dwelling in the heavens is the
visitor, and the protector of that place."
Hence it is that such places are cleansed and exorcised before being
consecrated, that the enemy's power may be driven forth. And for the
same reason churches defiled by shedding of blood or seed are
reconciled: because some machination of the enemy is apparent on
account of the sin committed there. And for this reason we read in the
same distinction: "Wherever you find churches of the Arians, consecrate
them as Catholic churches without delay by means of devout prayers and
rites." Hence, too, it is that some say with probability, that by
entering a consecrated church one obtains forgiveness of venial sins,
just as one does by the sprinkling of holy water; alleging the words of
Ps. 84:2,3: "Lord, Thou hast blessed Thy land . . . Thou hast forgiven
the iniquity of Thy people." And therefore, in consequence of the
virtue acquired by a church's consecration, the consecration is never
repeated. Accordingly we find in the same distinction the following
words quoted from the Council of Nicaea: "Churches which have once been
consecrated, must not be consecrated again, except they be devastated
by fire, or defiled by shedding of blood or of anyone's seed; because,
just as a child once baptized in the name of the Father, and of the
Son, and of the Holy Ghost, ought not to be baptized again, so neither
ought a place, once dedicated to God, to be consecrated again, except
owing to the causes mentioned above; provided that the consecrators
held faith in the Holy Trinity": in fact, those outside the Church
cannot consecrate. But, as we read in the same distinction: "Churches
or altars of doubtful consecration are to be consecrated anew."
And since they acquire special spiritual virtue from their
consecration, we find it laid down in the same distinction that "the
beams of a dedicated church ought not to be used for any other purpose,
except it be for some other church, or else they are to be burned, or
put to the use of brethren in some monastery: but on no account are
they to be discarded for works of the laity." We read there, too, that
"the altar covering, chair, candlesticks, and veil, are to be burned
when warn out; and their ashes are to be placed in the baptistery, or
in the walls, or else cast into the trenches beneath the flag-stones,
so as not to be defiled by the feet of those that enter."
Reply to Objection 4: Since the consecration of the altar signifies
Christ's holiness, and the consecration of a house the holiness of the
entire Church, therefore the consecration of a church or of an altar is
more fittingly commemorated. And on this account the solemnity of a
church dedication is observed for eight days, in order to signify the
happy resurrection of Christ and of the Church's members. Nor is the
consecration of a church or altar man's doing only, since it has a
spiritual virtue. Hence in the same distinction (De Consecr.) it is
said: "The solemnities of the dedication of churches are to be solemnly
celebrated each year: and that dedications are to be kept up for eight
days, you will find in the third book of Kings" (8:66).
Reply to Objection 5: As we read in De Consecr., dist. 1, "altars, if
not of stone, are not to be consecrated with the anointing of chrism."
And this is in keeping with the signification of this sacrament; both
because the altar signifies Christ, for in 1 Cor. 10:3, it is written,
"But the rock was Christ": and because Christ's body was laid in a
stone sepulchre. This is also in keeping with the use of the sacrament.
Because stone is solid, and may be found everywhere. which was not
necessary in the old Law, when the altar was made in one place. As to
the commandment to make the altar of earth, or of unhewn stones, this
was given in order to remove idolatry.
Reply to Objection 6: As is laid down in the same distinction,
"formerly the priests did not use golden but wooden chalices; but Pope
Zephyrinus ordered the mass to be said with glass patens; and
subsequently Pope Urban had everything made of silver." Afterwards it
was decided that "the Lord's chalice with the paten should be made
entirely of gold, or of silver or at least of tin. But it is not to be
made of brass, or copper, because the action of the wine thereon
produces verdigris, and provokes vomiting. But no one is to presume to
sing mass with a chalice of wood or of glass," because as the wood is
porous, the consecrated blood would remain in it; while glass is
brittle and there might arise danger of breakage; and the same applies
to stone. Consequently, out of reverence for the sacrament, it was
enacted that the chalice should be made of the aforesaid materials.
Reply to Objection 7: Where it could be done without danger, the Church
gave order for that thing to be used which more expressively represents
Christ's Passion. But there was not so much danger regarding the body
which is placed on the corporal, as there is with the blood contained
in the chalice. And consequently, although the chalice is not made of
stone, yet the corporal is made of linen, since Christ's body was
wrapped therein. Hence we read in an Epistle of Pope Silvester, quoted
in the same distinction: "By a unanimous decree we command that no one
shall presume to celebrate the sacrifice of the altar upon a cloth of
silk, or dyed material, but upon linen consecrated by the bishop; as
Christ's body was buried in a clean linen winding-sheet." Moreover,
linen material is becoming, owing to its cleanness, to denote purity of
conscience, and, owing to the manifold labor with which it is prepared,
to denote Christ's Passion.
Reply to Objection 8: The dispensing of the sacraments belongs to the
Church's ministers; but their consecration is from God Himself.
Consequently, the Church's ministers can make no ordinances regarding
the form of the consecration, and the manner of celebrating. And
therefore, if the priest pronounces the words of consecration over the
proper matter with the intention of consecrating, then, without every
one of the things mentioned above---namely, without house, and altar,
consecrated chalice and corporal, and the other things instituted by
the Church---he consecrates Christ's body in very truth; yet he is
guilty of grave sin, in not following the rite of the Church.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the words spoken in this sacrament are properly framed?
Objection 1: It seems that the words spoken in this sacrament are not
properly framed. For, as Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv), this sacrament
is consecrated with Christ's own words. Therefore no other words
besides Christ's should be spoken in this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's words and deeds are made known to us
through the Gospel. But in consecrating this sacrament words are used
which are not set down in the Gospels: for we do not read in the
Gospel, of Christ lifting up His eyes to heaven while consecrating this
sacrament: and similarly it is said in the Gospel: "Take ye and eat"
[comedite] without the addition of the word "all," whereas in
celebrating this sacrament we say: "Lifting up His eyes to heaven," and
again, "Take ye and eat [manducate] of this." Therefore such words as
these are out of place when spoken in the celebration of this
sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, all the other sacraments are ordained for the
salvation of all the faithful. But in the celebration of the other
sacraments there is no common prayer put up for the salvation of all
the faithful and of the departed. Consequently it is unbecoming in this
sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, Baptism especially is called the sacrament of
faith. Consequently, the truths which belong to instruction in the
faith ought rather to be given regarding Baptism than regarding this
sacrament, such as the doctrine of the apostles and of the Gospels.
Objection 5: Further, devotion on the part of the faithful is required
in every sacrament. Consequently, the devotion of the faithful ought
not to be stirred up in this sacrament more than in the others by
Divine praises and by admonitions, such as, "Lift up your hearts."
Objection 6: Further, the minister of this sacrament is the priest, as
stated above ([4702]Q[82], A[1]). Consequently, all the words spoken in
this sacrament ought to be uttered by the priest, and not some by the
ministers, and some by the choir.
Objection 7: Further, the Divine power works this sacrament
unfailingly. Therefore it is to no purpose that the priest asks for the
perfecting of this sacrament, saying: "Which oblation do thou, O God,
in all," etc.
Objection 8: Further, the sacrifice of the New Law is much more
excellent than the sacrifice of the fathers of old. Therefore, it is
unfitting for the priest to pray that this sacrifice may be as
acceptable as the sacrifice of Abel, Abraham, and Melchisedech.
Objection 9: Further, just as Christ's body does not begin to be in
this sacrament by change of place, as stated above ([4703]Q[75], A[2]),
so likewise neither does it cease to be there. Consequently, it is
improper for the priest to ask: "Bid these things be borne by the hands
of thy holy angel unto Thine altar on high."
On the contrary, We find it stated in De Consecr., dist. 1, that
"James, the brother of the Lord according to the flesh, and Basil,
bishop of Caesarea, edited the rite of celebrating the mass": and from
their authority it is manifest that whatever words are employed in this
matter, are chosen becomingly.
I answer that, Since the whole mystery of our salvation is comprised in
this sacrament, therefore is it performed with greater solemnity than
the other sacraments. And since it is written (Eccles. 4:17): "Keep thy
foot when thou goest into the house of God"; and (Ecclus. 18:23):
"Before prayer prepare thy soul," therefore the celebration of this
mystery is preceded by a certain preparation in order that we may
perform worthily that which follows after. The first part of this
preparation is Divine praise, and consists in the "Introit": according
to Ps. 49:23: "The sacrifice of praise shall glorify me; and there is
the way by which I will show him the salvation of God": and this is
taken for the most part from the Psalms, or, at least, is sung with a
Psalm, because, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii): "The Psalms
comprise by way of praise whatever is contained in Sacred Scripture."
The second part contains a reference to our present misery, by reason
of which we pray for mercy, saying: "Lord, have mercy on us," thrice
for the Person of the Father, and "Christ, have mercy on us," thrice
for the Person of the Son, and "Lord, have mercy on us," thrice for the
Person of the Holy Ghost; against the threefold misery of ignorance,
sin, and punishment; or else to express the "circuminsession" of all
the Divine Persons.
The third part commemorates the heavenly glory, to the possession of
which, after this life of misery, we are tending, in the words, "Glory
be to God on high," which are sung on festival days, on which the
heavenly glory is commemorated, but are omitted in those sorrowful
offices which commemorate our unhappy state.
The fourth part contains the prayer which the priest makes for the
people, that they may be made worthy of such great mysteries.
There precedes, in the second place, the instruction of the faithful,
because this sacrament is "a mystery of faith," as stated above
([4704]Q[78], A[3], ad 5). Now this instruction is given
"dispositively," when the Lectors and Sub-deacons read aloud in the
church the teachings of the prophets and apostles: after this "lesson,"
the choir sing the "Gradual," which signifies progress in life; then
the "Alleluia" is intoned, and this denotes spiritual joy; or in
mournful offices the "Tract", expressive of spiritual sighing; for all
these things ought to result from the aforesaid teaching. But the
people are instructed "perfectly" by Christ's teaching contained in the
Gospel, which is read by the higher ministers, that is, by the Deacons.
And because we believe Christ as the Divine truth, according to Jn.
8:46, "If I tell you the truth, why do you not believe Me?" after the
Gospel has been read, the "Creed" is sung in which the people show that
they assent by faith to Christ's doctrine. And it is sung on those
festivals of which mention is made therein, as on the festivals of
Christ, of the Blessed Virgin, and of the apostles, who laid the
foundations of this faith, and on other such days.
So then, after the people have been prepared and instructed, the next
step is to proceed to the celebration of the mystery, which is both
offered as a sacrifice, and consecrated and received as a sacrament:
since first we have the oblation; then the consecration of the matter
offered; and thirdly, its reception.
In regard to the oblation, two things are done, namely, the people's
praise in singing the "offertory," expressing the joy of the offerers,
and the priest's prayer asking for the people's oblation to be made
acceptable to God. Hence David said (1 Para 29:17): "In the simplicity
of my heart, I have . . . offered all these things: and I have seen
with great joy Thy people which are here present, offer Thee their
offerings": and then he makes the following prayer: "O Lord God . . .
keep . . . this will."
Then, regarding the consecration, performed by supernatural power, the
people are first of all excited to devotion in the "Preface," hence
they are admonished "to lift up their hearts to the Lord," and
therefore when the "Preface" is ended the people devoutly praise
Christ's Godhead, saying with the angels: "Holy, Holy, Holy"; and His
humanity, saying with the children: "Blessed is he that cometh." In the
next place the priest makes a "commemoration," first of those for whom
this sacrifice is offered, namely, for the whole Church, and "for those
set in high places" (1 Tim. 2:2), and, in a special manner, of them
"who offer, or for whom the mass is offered." Secondly, he commemorates
the saints, invoking their patronage for those mentioned above, when he
says: "Communicating with, and honoring the memory," etc. Thirdly, he
concludes the petition when he says: "Wherefore that this oblation,"
etc., in order that the oblation may be salutary to them for whom it is
offered.
Then he comes to the consecration itself. Here he asks first of all for
the effect of the consecration, when he says: "Which oblation do Thou,
O God," etc. Secondly, he performs the consecration using our Saviour's
words, when he says: "Who the day before," etc. Thirdly, he makes
excuse for his presumption in obeying Christ's command, saying:
"Wherefore, calling to mind," etc. Fourthly, he asks that the sacrifice
accomplished may find favor with God, when he says: "Look down upon
them with a propitious," etc. Fifthly, he begs for the effect of this
sacrifice and sacrament, first for the partakers, saying: "We humbly
beseech Thee"; then for the dead, who can no longer receive it, saying:
"Be mindful also, O Lord," etc.; thirdly, for the priests themselves
who offer, saying: "And to us sinners," etc.
Then follows the act of receiving the sacrament. First of all, the
people are prepared for Communion; first, by the common prayer of the
congregation, which is the Lord's Prayer, in which we ask for our daily
bread to be given us; and also by private prayer, which the priest puts
up specially for the people, when he says: "Deliver us, we beseech
Thee, O Lord," etc. Secondly, the people are prepared by the "Pax"
which is given with the words, "Lamb of God," etc., because this is the
sacrament of unity and peace, as stated above ([4705]Q[73], A[4];[4706]
Q[79], A[1]). But in masses for the dead, in which the sacrifice is
offered not for present peace, but for the repose of the dead, the
"Pax" is omitted.
Then follows the reception of the sacrament, the priest receiving
first, and afterwards giving it to others, because, as Dionysius says
(Eccl. Hier. iii), he who gives Divine things to others, ought first to
partake thereof himself.
Finally, the whole celebration of mass ends with the thanksgiving, the
people rejoicing for having received the mystery (and this is the
meaning of the singing after the Communion); and the priest returning
thanks by prayer, as Christ, at the close of the supper with His
disciples, "said a hymn" (Mat. 26:30).
Reply to Objection 1: The consecration is accomplished by Christ's
words only; but the other words must be added to dispose the people for
receiving it, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: As is stated in the last chapter of John (verse
25), our Lord said and did many things which are not written down by
the Evangelists; and among them is the uplifting of His eyes to heaven
at the supper; nevertheless the Roman Church had it by tradition from
the apostles. For it seems reasonable that He Who lifted up His eyes to
the Father in raising Lazarus to life, as related in Jn. 11:41, and in
the prayer which He made for the disciples (Jn. 17:1), had more reason
to do so in instituting this sacrament, as being of greater import.
The use of the word "manducate" instead of "comedite" makes no
difference in the meaning, nor does the expression signify, especially
since those words are no part of the form, as stated above
([4707]Q[78], A[1], ad 2,4).
The additional word "all" is understood in the Gospels, although not
expressed, because He had said (Jn. 6:54): "Except you eat the flesh of
the Son of Man . . . you shall not have life in you."
Reply to Objection 3: The Eucharist is the sacrament of the unity of
the whole Church: and therefore in this sacrament, more than in the
others, mention ought to be made of all that belongs to the salvation
of the entire Church.
Reply to Objection 4: There is a twofold instruction in the Faith: the
first is for those receiving it for the first time, that is to say, for
catechumens, and such instruction is given in connection with Baptism.
The other is the instruction of the faithful who take part in this
sacrament; and such instruction is given in connection with this
sacrament. Nevertheless catechumens and unbelievers are not excluded
therefrom. Hence in De Consecr., dist. 1, it is laid down: "Let the
bishop hinder no one from entering the church, and hearing the word of
God, be they Gentiles, heretics, or Jews, until the mass of the
Catechumens begins," in which the instruction regarding the Faith is
contained.
Reply to Objection 5: Greater devotion is required in this sacrament
than in the others, for the reason that the entire Christ is contained
therein. Moreover, this sacrament requires a more general devotion,
i.e. on the part of the whole people, since for them it is offered; and
not merely on the part of the recipients, as in the other sacraments.
Hence Cyprian observes (De Orat. Domin. 31), "The priest, in saying the
Preface, disposes the souls of the brethren by saying, 'Lift up your
hearts,' and when the people answer---'We have lifted them up to the
Lord,' let them remember that they are to think of nothing else but
God."
Reply to Objection 6: As was said above (ad 3), those things are
mentioned in this sacrament which belong to the entire Church; and
consequently some things which refer to the people are sung by the
choir, and same of these words are all sung by the choir, as though
inspiring the entire people with them; and there are other words which
the priest begins and the people take up, the priest then acting as in
the person of God; to show that the things they denote have come to the
people through Divine revelation, such as faith and heavenly glory; and
therefore the priest intones the "Creed" and the "Gloria in excelsis
Deo." Other words are uttered by the ministers, such as the doctrine of
the Old and New Testament, as a sign that this doctrine was announced
to the peoples through ministers sent by God. And there are other words
which the priest alone recites, namely, such as belong to his personal
office, "that he may offer up gifts and prayers for the people" (Heb.
5:1). Some of these, however, he says aloud, namely, such as are common
to priest and people alike, such as the "common prayers"; other words,
however, belong to the priest alone, such as the oblation and the
consecration; consequently, the prayers that are said in connection
with these have to be said by the priest in secret. Nevertheless, in
both he calls the people to attention by saying: "The Lord be with
you," and he waits for them to assent by saying "Amen." And therefore
before the secret prayers he says aloud, "The Lord be with you," and he
concludes, "For ever and ever." Or the priest secretly pronounces some
of the words as a token that regarding Christ's Passion the disciples
acknowledged Him only in secret.
Reply to Objection 7: The efficacy of the sacramental words can be
hindered by the priest's intention. Nor is there anything unbecoming in
our asking of God for what we know He will do, just as Christ (Jn.
17:1, 5) asked for His glorification.
But the priest does not seem to pray there for the consecration to be
fulfilled, but that it may be fruitful in our regard, hence he says
expressively: "That it may become 'to us' the body and the blood."
Again, the words preceding these have that meaning, when he says:
"Vouchsafe to make this oblation blessed," i.e. according to Augustine
(Paschasius, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xii), "that we may receive a
blessing," namely, through grace; "'enrolled,' i.e. that we may be
enrolled in heaven; 'ratified,' i.e. that we may be incorporated in
Christ; 'reasonable,' i.e. that we may be stripped of our animal sense;
'acceptable,' i.e. that we who in ourselves are displeasing, may, by
its means, be made acceptable to His only Son."
Reply to Objection 8: Although this sacrament is of itself preferable
to all ancient sacrifices, yet the sacrifices of the men of old were
most acceptable to God on account of their devotion. Consequently the
priest asks that this sacrifice may be accepted by God through the
devotion of the offerers, just as the former sacrifices were accepted
by Him.
Reply to Objection 9: The priest does not pray that the sacramental
species may be borne up to heaven; nor that Christ's true body may be
borne thither, for it does not cease to be there; but he offers this
prayer for Christ's mystical body, which is signified in this
sacrament, that the angel standing by at the Divine mysteries may
present to God the prayers of both priest and people, according to
Apoc. 8:4: "And the smoke of the incense of the prayers of the saints
ascended up before God, from the hand of the angel." But God's "altar
on high" means either the Church triumphant, unto which we pray to be
translated, or else God Himself, in Whom we ask to share; because it is
said of this altar (Ex. 20:26): "Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My
altar, i.e. thou shalt make no steps towards the Trinity." Or else by
the angel we are to understand Christ Himself, Who is the "Angel of
great counsel" (Is. 9:6: Septuagint), Who unites His mystical body with
God the Father and the Church triumphant.
And from this the mass derives its name [missa]; because the priest
sends [mittit] his prayers up to God through the angel, as the people
do through the priest. or else because Christ is the victim sent
[missa] to us: accordingly the deacon on festival days "dismisses" the
people at the end of the mass, by saying: "Ite, missa est," that is,
the victim has been sent [missa est] to God through the angel, so that
it may be accepted by God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the actions performed in celebrating this sacrament are becoming?
Objection 1: It seems that the actions performed in celebrating this
mystery are not becoming. For, as is evident from its form, this
sacrament belongs to the New Testament. But under the New Testament the
ceremonies of the old are not to be observed, such as that the priests
and ministers were purified with water when they drew nigh to offer up
the sacrifice: for we read (Ex. 30:19,20): "Aaron and his sons shall
wash their hands and feet . . . when they are going into the tabernacle
of the testimony . . . and when they are to come to the altar."
Therefore it is not fitting that the priest should wash his hands when
celebrating mass.
Objection 2: Further, (Ex. 30:7), the Lord commanded Aaron to "burn
sweet-smelling incense" upon the altar which was "before the
propitiatory": and the same action was part of the ceremonies of the
Old Law. Therefore it is not fitting for the priest to use incense
during mass.
Objection 3: Further, the ceremonies performed in the sacraments of the
Church ought not to be repeated. Consequently it is not proper for the
priest to repeat the sign of the cross many times over this sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:7): "And without all
contradiction, that which is less, is blessed by the better." But
Christ, Who is in this sacrament after the consecration, is much
greater than the priest. Therefore quite unseemingly the priest, after
the consecration, blesses this sacrament, by signing it with the cross.
Objection 5: Further, nothing which appears ridiculous ought to be done
in one of the Church's sacraments. But it seems ridiculous to perform
gestures, e.g. for the priest to stretch out his arms at times, to join
his hands, to join together his fingers, and to bow down. Consequently,
such things ought not to be done in this sacrament.
Objection 6: Further, it seems ridiculous for the priest to turn round
frequently towards the people, and often to greet the people.
Consequently, such things ought not to be done in the celebration of
this sacrament.
Objection 7: Further, the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) deems it improper for
Christ to be divided. But Christ is in this sacrament after the
consecration. Therefore it is not proper for the priest to divide the
host.
Objection 8: Further, the ceremonies performed in this sacrament
represent Christ's Passion. But during the Passion Christ's body was
divided in the places of the five wounds. Therefore Christ's body ought
to be broken into five parts rather than into three.
Objection 9: Further, Christ's entire body is consecrated in this
sacrament apart from the blood. Consequently, it is not proper for a
particle of the body to be mixed with the blood.
Objection 10: Further, just as, in this sacrament, Christ's body is set
before us as food, so is His blood, as drink. But in receiving Christ's
body no other bodily food is added in the celebration of the mass.
Therefore, it is out of place for the priest, after taking Christ's
blood, to receive other wine which is not consecrated.
Objection 11: Further, the truth ought to be conformable with the
figure. But regarding the Paschal Lamb, which was a figure of this
sacrament, it was commanded that nothing of it should "remain until the
morning." It is improper therefore for consecrated hosts to be
reserved, and not consumed at once.
Objection 12: Further, the priest addresses in the plural number those
who are hearing mass, when he says, "The Lord be with you": and, "Let
us return thanks." But it is out of keeping to address one individual
in the plural number, especially an inferior. Consequently it seems
unfitting for a priest to say mass with only a single server present.
Therefore in the celebration of this sacrament it seems that some of
the things done are out of place.
On the contrary, The custom of the Church stands for these things: and
the Church cannot err, since she is taught by the Holy Ghost.
I answer that, As was said above ([4708]Q[60], A[6]), there is a
twofold manner of signification in the sacraments, by words, and by
actions, in order that the signification may thus be more perfect. Now,
in the celebration of this sacrament words are used to signify things
pertaining to Christ's Passion, which is represented in this sacrament;
or again, pertaining to Christ's mystical body, which is signified
therein; and again, things pertaining to the use of this sacrament,
which use ought to be devout and reverent. Consequently, in the
celebration of this mystery some things are done in order to represent
Christ's Passion, or the disposing of His mystical body, and some
others are done which pertain to the devotion and reverence due to this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: The washing of the hands is done in the
celebration of mass out of reverence for this sacrament; and this for
two reasons: first, because we are not wont to handle precious objects
except the hands be washed; hence it seems indecent for anyone to
approach so great a sacrament with hands that are, even literally,
unclean. Secondly, on account of its signification, because, as
Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), the washing of the extremities of the
limbs denotes cleansing from even the smallest sins, according to Jn.
13:10: "He that is washed needeth not but to wash his feet." And such
cleansing is required of him who approaches this sacrament; and this is
denoted by the confession which is made before the "Introit" of the
mass. Moreover, this was signified by the washing of the priests under
the Old Law, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). However, the Church
observes this ceremony, not because it was prescribed under the Old
Law, but because it is becoming in itself, and therefore instituted by
the Church. Hence it is not observed in the same way as it was then:
because the washing of the feet is omitted, and the washing of the
hands is observed; for this can be done more readily, and suffices far
denoting perfect cleansing. For, since the hand is the "organ of
organs" (De Anima iii), all works are attributed to the hands: hence it
is said in Ps. 25:6: "I will wash my hands among the innocent."
Reply to Objection 2: We use incense, not as commanded by a ceremonial
precept of the Law, but as prescribed by the Church; accordingly we do
not use it in the same fashion as it was ordered under the Old Law. It
has reference to two things: first, to the reverence due to this
sacrament, i.e. in order by its good odor, to remove any disagreeable
smell that may be about the place; secondly, it serves to show the
effect of grace, wherewith Christ was filled as with a good odor,
according to Gn. 27:27: "Behold, the odor of my son is like the odor of
a ripe field"; and from Christ it spreads to the faithful by the work
of His ministers, according to 2 Cor. 2:14: "He manifesteth the odor of
his knowledge by us in every place"; and therefore when the altar which
represents Christ, has been incensed on every side, then all are
incensed in their proper order.
Reply to Objection 3: The priest, in celebrating the mass, makes use of
the sign of the cross to signify Christ's Passion which was ended upon
the cross. Now, Christ's Passion was accomplished in certain stages.
First of all there was Christ's betrayal, which was the work of God, of
Judas, and of the Jews; and this is signified by the triple sign of the
cross at the words, "These gifts, these presents, these holy unspotted
sacrifices."
Secondly, there was the selling of Christ. Now he was sold to the
Priests, to the Scribes, and to the Pharisees: and to signify this the
threefold sign of the cross is repeated, at the words, "blessed,
enrolled, ratified." Or again, to signify the price for which He was
sold, viz. thirty pence. And a double cross is added at the
words---"that it may become to us the Body and the Blood," etc., to
signify the person of Judas the seller, and of Christ Who was sold.
Thirdly, there was the foreshadowing of the Passion at the last supper.
To denote this, in the third place, two crosses are made, one in
consecrating the body, the other in consecrating the blood; each time
while saying, "He blessed."
Fourthly, there was Christ's Passion itself. And so in order to
represent His five wounds, in the fourth place, there is a fivefold
signing of the cross at the words, "a pure Victim, a holy Victim, a
spotless Victim, the holy bread of eternal life, and the cup of
everlasting salvation."
Fifthly, the outstretching of Christ's body, and the shedding of the
blood, and the fruits of the Passion, are signified by the triple
signing of the cross at the words, "as many as shall receive the body
and blood, may be filled with every blessing," etc.
Sixthly, Christ's threefold prayer upon the cross is represented; one
for His persecutors when He said, "Father, forgive them"; the second
for deliverance from death, when He cried, "My God, My God, why hast
Thou forsaken Me?" the third referring to His entrance into glory, when
He said, "Father, into Thy hands I commend My spirit"; and in order to
denote these there is a triple signing with the cross made at the
words, "Thou dost sanctify, quicken, bless."
Seventhly, the three hours during which He hung upon the cross, that
is, from the sixth to the ninth hour, are represented; in signification
of which we make once more a triple sign of the cross at the words,
"Through Him, and with Him, and in Him."
Eighthly, the separation of His soul from the body is signified by the
two subsequent crosses made over the chalice.
Ninthly, the resurrection on the third day is represented by the three
crosses made at the words---"May the peace of the Lord be ever with
you."
In short, we may say that the consecration of this sacrament, and the
acceptance of this sacrifice, and its fruits, proceed from the virtue
of the cross of Christ, and therefore wherever mention is made of
these, the priest makes use of the sign of the cross.
Reply to Objection 4: After the consecration, the priest makes the sign
of the cross, not for the purpose of blessing and consecrating, but
only for calling to mind the virtue of the cross, and the manner of
Christ's suffering, as is evident from what has been said (ad 3).
Reply to Objection 5: The actions performed by the priest in mass are
not ridiculous gestures, since they are done so as to represent
something else. The priest in extending his arms signifies the
outstretching of Christ's arms upon the cross. He also lifts up his
hands as he prays, to point out that his prayer is directed to God for
the people, according to Lam. 3:41: "Let us lift up our hearts with our
hands to the Lord in the heavens": and Ex. 17:11: "And when Moses
lifted up his hands Israel overcame." That at times he joins his hands,
and bows down, praying earnestly and humbly, denotes the humility and
obedience of Christ, out of which He suffered. He closes his fingers,
i.e. the thumb and first finger, after the consecration, because, with
them, he had touched the consecrated body of Christ; so that if any
particle cling to the fingers, it may not be scattered: and this
belongs to the reverence for this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 6: Five times does the priest turn round towards the
people, to denote that our Lord manifested Himself five times on the
day of His Resurrection, as stated above in the treatise on Christ's
Resurrection ([4709]Q[55], A[3], OBJ[3]). But the priest greets the
people seven times, namely, five times, by turning round to the people,
and twice without turning round, namely, when he says, "The Lord be
with you" before the "Preface," and again when he says, "May the peace
of the Lord be ever with you": and this is to denote the sevenfold
grace of the Holy Ghost. But a bishop, when he celebrates on festival
days, in his first greeting says, "Peace be to you," which was our
Lord's greeting after Resurrection, Whose person the bishop chiefly
represents.
Reply to Objection 7: The breaking of the host denotes three things:
first, the rending of Christ's body, which took place in the Passion;
secondly, the distinction of His mystical body according to its various
states; and thirdly, the distribution of the graces which flow from
Christ's Passion, as Dionysius observes (Eccl. Hier. iii). Hence this
breaking does not imply severance in Christ.
Reply to Objection 8: As Pope Sergius says, and it is to be found in
the Decretals (De Consecr., dist. ii), "the Lord's body is threefold;
the part offered and put into the chalice signifies Christ's risen
body," namely, Christ Himself, and the Blessed Virgin, and the other
saints, if there be any, who are already in glory with their bodies.
"The part consumed denotes those still walking upon earth," because
while living upon earth they are united together by this sacrament; and
are bruised by the passions, just as the bread eaten is bruised by the
teeth. "The part reserved on the altar till the close of the mass, is
His body hidden in the sepulchre, because the bodies of the saints will
be in their graves until the end of the world": though their souls are
either in purgatory, or in heaven. However, this rite of reserving one
part on the altar till the close of the mass is no longer observed, on
account of the danger; nevertheless, the same meaning of the parts
continues, which some persons have expressed in verse, thus:
"The host being rent---
What is dipped, means the blest;
What is dry, means the living;
What is kept, those at rest."
Others, however, say that the part put into the chalice denotes those
still living in this world. while the part kept outside the chalice
denotes those fully blessed both in soul and body; while the part
consumed means the others.
Reply to Objection 9: Two things can be signified by the chalice:
first, the Passion itself, which is represented in this sacrament, and
according to this, by the part put into the chalice are denoted those
who are still sharers of Christ's sufferings; secondly, the enjoyment
of the Blessed can be signified, which is likewise foreshadowed in this
sacrament; and therefore those whose bodies are already in full
beatitude, are denoted by the part put into the chalice. And it is to
be observed that the part put into the chalice ought not to be given to
the people to supplement the communion, because Christ gave dipped
bread only to Judas the betrayer.
Reply to Objection 10: Wine, by reason of its humidity, is capable of
washing, consequently it is received in order to rinse the mouth after
receiving this sacrament, lest any particles remain: and this belongs
to reverence for the sacrament. Hence (Extra, De Celebratione missae,
chap. Ex parte), it is said: "The priest should always cleanse his
mouth with wine after receiving the entire sacrament of Eucharist:
except when he has to celebrate another mass on the same day, lest from
taking the ablution-wine he be prevented from celebrating again"; and
it is for the same reason that wine is poured over the fingers with
which he had touched the body of Christ.
Reply to Objection 11: The truth ought to be conformable with the
figure, in some respect: namely, because a part of the host
consecrated, of which the priest and ministers or even the people
communicate, ought not to be reserved until the day following. Hence,
as is laid down (De Consecr., dist. ii), Pope Clement I ordered that
"as many hosts are to be offered on the altar as shall suffice for the
people; should any be left over, they are not to be reserved until the
morrow, but let the clergy carefully consume them with fear and
trembling." Nevertheless, since this sacrament is to be received daily,
whereas the Paschal Lamb was not, it is therefore necessary for other
hosts to be reserved for the sick. Hence we read in the same
distinction: "Let the priest always have the Eucharist ready, so that,
when anyone fall sick, he may take Communion to him at once, lest he
die without it."
Reply to Objection 12: Several persons ought to be present at the
solemn celebration of the mass. Hence Pope Soter says (De Consecr.,
dist. 1): "It has also been ordained, that no priest is to presume to
celebrate solemn mass, unless two others be present answering him,
while he himself makes the third; because when he says in the plural,
'The Lord be with you,' and again in the Secrets, 'Pray ye for me,' it
is most becoming that they should answer his greeting." Hence it is for
the sake of greater solemnity that we find it decreed (De Consecr.
dist. 1) that a bishop is to solemnize mass with several assistants.
Nevertheless, in private masses it suffices to have one server, who
takes the place of the whole Catholic people, on whose behalf he makes
answer in the plural to the priest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the defects occurring during the celebration of this sacrament can
be sufficiently met by observing the Church's statutes?
Objection 1: It seems that the defects occurring during the celebration
of this sacrament cannot be sufficiently met by observing the statutes
of the Church. For it sometimes happens that before or after the
consecration the priest dies or goes mad, or is hindered by some other
infirmity from receiving the sacrament and completing the mass.
Consequently it seems impossible to observe the Church's statute,
whereby the priest consecrating must communicate of his own sacrifice.
Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that, before the
consecration, the priest remembers that he has eaten or drunk
something, or that he is in mortal sin, or under excommunication, which
he did not remember previously. Therefore, in such a dilemma a man must
necessarily commit mortal sin by acting against the Church's statute,
whether he receives or not.
Objection 3: Further, it sometimes happens that a fly or a spider, or
some other poisonous creature falls into the chalice after the
consecration. Or even that the priest comes to know that poison has
been put in by some evilly disposed person in order to kill him. Now in
this instance, if he takes it, he appears to sin by killing himself, or
by tempting God: also in like manner if he does not take it, he sins by
acting against the Church's statute. Consequently, he seems to be
perplexed, and under necessity of sinning, which is not becoming.
Objection 4: Further, it sometimes happens from the server's want of
heed that water is not added to the chalice, or even the wine
overlooked, and that the priest discovers this. Therefore he seems to
be perplexed likewise in this case, whether he receives the body
without the blood, thus making the sacrifice to be incomplete, or
whether he receives neither the body nor the blood.
Objection 5: Further, it sometimes happens that the priest cannot
remember having said the words of consecration, or other words which
are uttered in the celebration of this sacrament. In this case he seems
to sin, whether he repeats the words over the same matter, which words
possibly he has said before, or whether he uses bread and wine which
are not consecrated, as if they were consecrated.
Objection 6: Further, it sometimes comes to pass owing to the cold that
the host will slip from the priest's hands into the chalice, either
before or after the breaking. In this case then the priest will not be
able to comply with the Church's rite, either as to the breaking, or
else as to this, that only a third part is put into the chalice.
Objection 7: Further, sometimes, too, it happens, owing to the priest's
want of care, that Christ's blood is spilled, or that he vomits the
sacrament received, or that the consecrated hosts are kept so long that
they become corrupt, or that they are nibbled by mice, or lost in any
manner whatsoever; in which cases it does not seem possible for due
reverence to be shown towards this sacrament, as the Church's
ordinances require. It does not seem then that such defects or dangers
can be met by keeping to the Church's statutes.
On the contrary, Just as God does not command an impossibility, so
neither does the Church.
I answer that, Dangers or defects happening to this sacrament can be
met in two ways: first, by preventing any such mishaps from occurring:
secondly, by dealing with them in such a way, that what may have
happened amiss is put right, either by employing a remedy, or at least
by repentance on his part who has acted negligently regarding this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: If the priest be stricken by death or grave
sickness before the consecration of our Lord's body and blood, there is
no need for it to be completed by another. But if this happens after
the consecration is begun, for instance, when the body has been
consecrated and before the consecration of the blood, or even after
both have been consecrated, then the celebration of the mass ought to
be finished by someone else. Hence, as is laid down (Decretal vii, q.
1), we read the following decree of the (Seventh) Council of Toledo:
"We consider it to be fitting that when the sacred mysteries are
consecrated by priests during the time of mass, if any sickness
supervenes, in consequence of which they cannot finish the mystery
begun, let it be free for the bishop or another priest to finish the
consecration of the office thus begun. For nothing else is suitable for
completing the mysteries commenced, unless the consecration be
completed either by the priest who began it, or by the one who follows
him: because they cannot be completed except they be performed in
perfect order. For since we are all one in Christ, the change of
persons makes no difference, since unity of faith insures the happy
issue of the mystery. Yet let not the course we propose for cases of
natural debility, be presumptuously abused: and let no minister or
priest presume ever to leave the Divine offices unfinished, unless he
be absolutely prevented from continuing. If anyone shall have rashly
presumed to do so, he will incur sentence of excommunication."
Reply to Objection 2: Where difficulty arises, the less dangerous
course should always be followed. But the greatest danger regarding
this sacrament lies in whatever may prevent its completion, because
this is a heinous sacrilege; while that danger is of less account which
regards the condition of the receiver. Consequently, if after the
consecration has been begun the priest remembers that he has eaten or
drunk anything, he ought nevertheless to complete the sacrifice and
receive the sacrament. Likewise, if he recalls a sin committed, he
ought to make an act of contrition, with the firm purpose of confessing
and making satisfaction for it: and thus he will not receive the
sacrament unworthily, but with profit. The same applies if he calls to
mind that he is under some excommunication; for he ought to make the
resolution of humbly seeking absolution; and so he will receive
absolution from the invisible High Priest Jesus Christ for his act of
completing the Divine mysteries.
But if he calls to mind any of the above facts previous to the
consecration, I should deem it safer for him to interrupt the mass
begun, especially if he has broken his fast, or is under
excommunication, unless grave scandal were to be feared.
Reply to Objection 3: If a fly or a spider falls into the chalice
before consecration, or if it be discovered that the wine is poisoned,
it ought to be poured out, and after purifying the chalice, fresh wine
should be served for consecration. But if anything of the sort happen
after the consecration, the insect should be caught carefully and
washed thoroughly, then burned, and the "ablution," together with the
ashes, thrown into the sacrarium. If it be discovered that the wine has
been poisoned, the priest should neither receive it nor administer it
to others on any account, lest the life-giving chalice become one of
death, but it ought to be kept in a suitable vessel with the relics:
and in order that the sacrament may not remain incomplete, he ought to
put other wine into the chalice, resume the mass from the consecration
of the blood, and complete the sacrifice.
Reply to Objection 4: If before the consecration of the blood, and
after the consecration of the body the priest detect that either the
wine or the water is absent, then he ought at once to add them and
consecrate. But if after the words of consecration he discover that the
water is absent, he ought notwithstanding to proceed straight on,
because the addition of the water is not necessary for the sacrament,
as stated above ([4710]Q[74], A[7]): nevertheless the person
responsible for the neglect ought to be punished. And on no account
should water be mixed with the consecrated wine, because corruption of
the sacrament would ensue in part, as was said above ([4711]Q[77],
A[8]). But if after the words of consecration the priest perceive that
no wine has been put in the chalice, and if he detect it before
receiving the body, then rejecting the water, he ought to pour in wine
with water, and begin over again the consecrating words of the blood.
But if he notice it after receiving the body, he ought to procure
another host which must be consecrated together with the blood; and I
say so for this reason, because if he were to say only the words of
consecration of the blood, the proper order of consecrating would not
be observed; and, as is laid down by the Council of Toledo, quoted
above (ad 1), sacrifices cannot be perfect, except they be performed in
perfect order. But if he were to begin from the consecration of the
blood, and were to repeat all the words which follow, it would not
suffice, unless there was a consecrated host present, since in those
words there are things to be said and done not only regarding the
blood, but also regarding the body; and at the close he ought once more
to receive the consecrated host and blood, even if he had already taken
the water which was in the chalice, because the precept of the
completing this sacrament is of greater weight than the precept of
receiving the sacrament while fasting, as stated above ([4712]Q[80],
A[8]).
Reply to Objection 5: Although the priest may not recollect having said
some of the words he ought to say, he ought not to be disturbed
mentally on that account; for a man who utters many words cannot recall
to mind all that he has said; unless perchance in uttering them he
adverts to something connected with the consecration; for so it is
impressed on the memory. Hence, if a man pays attention to what he is
saying, but without adverting to the fact that he is saying these
particular words, he remembers soon after that he has said them; for, a
thing is presented to the memory under the formality of the past (De
Mem. et Remin. i).
But if it seem to the priest that he has probably omitted some of the
words that are not necessary for the sacrament, I think that he ought
not to repeat them on that account, changing the order of the
sacrifice, but that he ought to proceed: but if he is certain that he
has left out any of those that are necessary for the sacrament, namely,
the form of the consecration, since the form of the consecration is
necessary for the sacrament, just as the matter is, it seems that the
same thing ought to be done as was stated above (ad 4) with regard to
defect in the matter, namely, that he should begin again with the form
of the consecration, and repeat the other things in order, lest the
order of the sacrifice be altered.
Reply to Objection 6: The breaking of the consecrated host, and the
putting of only one part into the chalice, regards the mystical body,
just as the mixing with water signifies the people, and therefore the
omission of either of them causes no such imperfection in the
sacrifice, as calls for repetition regarding the celebration of this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 7: According to the decree, De Consecr., dist. ii,
quoting a decree of Pope Pius I, "If from neglect any of the blood
falls upon a board which is fixed to the ground, let it be taken up
with the tongue, and let the board be scraped. But if it be not a
board, let the ground be scraped, and the scrapings burned, and the
ashes buried inside the altar and let the priest do penance for forty
days. But if a drop fall from the chalice on to the altar, let the
minister suck up the drop, and do penance during three days; if it
falls upon the altar cloth and penetrates to the second altar cloth,
let him do four days' penance; if it penetrates to the third, let him
do nine days' penance; if to the fourth, let him do twenty days'
penance; and let the altar linens which the drop touched be washed
three times by the priest, holding the chalice below, then let the
water be taken and put away nigh to the altar." It might even be drunk
by the minister, unless it might be rejected from nausea. Some persons
go further, and cut out that part of the linen, which they burn,
putting the ashes in the altar or down the sacrarium. And the Decretal
continues with a quotation from the Penitential of Bede the Priest:
"If, owing to drunkenness or gluttony, anyone vomits up the Eucharist,
let him do forty days' penance, if he be a layman; but let clerics or
monks, deacons and priests, do seventy days' penance; and let a bishop
do ninety days'. But if they vomit from sickness, let them do penance
for seven days." And in the same distinction, we read a decree of the
(Fourth) Council of Arles: "They who do not keep proper custody over
the sacrament, if a mouse or other animal consume it, must do forty
days' penance: he who loses it in a church, or if a part fall and be
not found, shall do thirty days' penance." And the priest seems to
deserve the same penance, who from neglect allows the hosts to putrefy.
And on those days the one doing penance ought to fast, and abstain from
Communion. However, after weighing the circumstances of the fact and of
the person, the said penances may be lessened or increased. But it must
be observed that wherever the species are found to be entire, they must
be preserved reverently, or consumed; because Christ's body is there so
long as the species last, as stated above ([4713]Q[77], AA[4],5). But
if it can be done conveniently, the things in which they are found are
to be burned, and the ashes put in the sacrarium, as was said of the
scrapings of the altar-table, here above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Sacrament of Penance. We shall consider (1)
Penance itself; (2) Its effect; (3) Its Parts; (4) The recipients of
this sacrament; (5) The power of the ministers, which pertains to the
keys; (6) The solemnization of this sacrament.
The first of these considerations will be two fold: (1) Penance as a
sacrament; (2) Penance as a virtue.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Penance is a sacrament?
(2) Of its proper matter;
(3) Of its form;
(4) Whether imposition of hands is necessary for this sacrament?
(5) Whether this sacrament is necessary for salvation?
(6) Of its relation to the other sacraments;
(7) Of its institution;
(8) Of its duration;
(9) Of its continuance;
(10) Whether it can be repeated?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Penance is a sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that Penance is not a sacrament. For Gregory
[*Cf. Isidore, Etym. vi, ch. 19] says: "The sacraments are Baptism,
Chrism, and the Body and Blood of Christ; which are called sacraments
because under the veil of corporeal things the Divine power works out
salvation in a hidden manner." But this does not happen in Penance,
because therein corporeal things are not employed that, under them, the
power of God may work our salvation. Therefore Penance is not a
sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments of the Church are shown forth by
the ministers of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:1: "Let a man so account
of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the
mysteries of God." But Penance is not conferred by the ministers of
Christ, but is inspired inwardly into man by God, according to Jer.
31:19: "After Thou didst convert me, I did penance." Therefore it seems
that Penance is not a sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, in the sacraments of which we have already spoken
above, there is something that is sacrament only, something that is
both reality and sacrament, and something that is reality only, as is
clear from what has been stated ([4714]Q[66], A[1]). But this does not
apply to Penance. Therefore Penance is not a sacrament.
On the contrary, As Baptism is conferred that we may be cleansed from
sin, so also is Penance: wherefore Peter said to Simon Magus (Acts
8:22): "Do penance . . . from this thy wickedness." But Baptism is a
sacrament as stated above ([4715]Q[66], A[1]). Therefore for the same
reason Penance is also a sacrament.
I answer that, As Gregory says [*Isidore, Etym. vi, ch. 19], "a
sacrament consists in a solemn act, whereby something is so done that
we understand it to signify the holiness which it confers." Now it is
evident that in Penance something is done so that something holy is
signified both on the part of the penitent sinner, and on the part of
the priest absolving, because the penitent sinner, by deed and word,
shows his heart to have renounced sin, and in like manner the priest,
by his deed and word with regard to the penitent, signifies the work of
God Who forgives his sins. Therefore it is evident that Penance, as
practiced in the Church, is a sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: By corporeal things taken in a wide sense we may
understand also external sensible actions, which are to this sacrament
what water is to Baptism, or chrism to Confirmation. But it is to be
observed that in those sacraments, whereby an exceptional grace
surpassing altogether the proportion of a human act, is conferred, some
corporeal matter is employed externally, e.g. in Baptism, which confers
full remission of all sins, both as to guilt and as to punishment, and
in Confirmation, wherein the fulness of the Holy Ghost is bestowed, and
in Extreme Unction, which confers perfect spiritual health derived from
the virtue of Christ as from an extrinsic principle. Wherefore, such
human acts as are in these sacraments, are not the essential matter of
the sacrament, but are dispositions thereto. On the other hand, in
those sacraments whose effect corresponds to that of some human act,
the sensible human act itself takes the place of matter, as in the case
of Penance and Matrimony, even as in bodily medicines, some are applied
externally, such as plasters and drugs, while others are acts of the
person who seeks to be cured, such as certain exercises.
Reply to Objection 2: In those sacraments which have a corporeal
matter, this matter needs to be applied by a minister of the Church,
who stands in the place of Christ, which denotes that the excellence of
the power which operates in the sacraments is from Christ. But in the
sacrament of Penance, as stated above (ad 1), human actions take the
place of matter, and these actions proceed from internal inspiration,
wherefore the matter is not applied by the minister, but by God working
inwardly; while the minister furnishes the complement of the sacrament,
when he absolves the penitent.
Reply to Objection 3: In Penance also, there is something which is
sacrament only, viz. the acts performed outwardly both by the repentant
sinner, and by the priest in giving absolution; that which is reality
and sacrament is the sinner's inward repentance; while that which is
reality, and not sacrament, is the forgiveness of sin. The first of
these taken altogether is the cause of the second; and the first and
second together are the cause of the third.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sins are the proper matter of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins are not the proper matter of this
sacrament. Because, in the other sacraments, the matter is hallowed by
the utterance of certain words, and being thus hallowed produces the
sacramental effect. Now sins cannot be hallowed, for they are opposed
to the effect of the sacrament, viz. grace which blots out sin.
Therefore sins are not the proper matter of this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his book De Poenitentia [Cf.
Serm. cccli]: "No one can begin a new life, unless he repent of the
old." Now not only sins but also the penalties of the present life
belong to the old life. Therefore sins are not the proper matter of
Penance.
Objection 3: Further, sin is either original, mortal or venial. Now the
sacrament of Penance is not ordained against original sin, for this is
taken away by Baptism, [nor against mortal sin, for this is taken away
by the sinner's confession]*, nor against venial sin, which is taken
away by the beating of the breast and the sprinkling of holy water and
the like. Therefore sins are not the proper matter of Penance. [*The
words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition].
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): "(Who) have not done
penance for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness, that
they have committed."
I answer that, Matter is twofold, viz. proximate and remote: thus the
proximate matter of a statue is a metal, while the remote matter is
water. Now it has been stated (A[1], ad 1, ad 2), that the proximate
matter of this sacrament consists in the acts of the penitent, the
matter of which acts are the sins over which he grieves, which he
confesses, and for which he satisfies. Hence it follows that sins are
the remote matter of Penance, as a matter, not for approval, but for
detestation, and destruction.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the proximate matter of a
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: The old life that was subject to death is the
object of Penance, not as regards the punishment, but as regards the
guilt connected with it.
Reply to Objection 3: Penance regards every kind of sin in a way, but
not each in the same way. Because Penance regards actual mortal sin
properly and chiefly; properly, since, properly speaking, we are said
to repent of what we have done of our own will; chiefly, since this
sacrament was instituted chiefly for the blotting out of mortal sin.
Penance regards venial sins, properly speaking indeed, in so far as
they are committed of our own will, but this was not the chief purpose
of its institution. But as to original sin, Penance regards it neither
chiefly, since Baptism, and not Penance, is ordained against original
sin, nor properly, because original sin is not done of our own will,
except in so far as Adam's will is looked upon as ours, in which sense
the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "In whom all have sinned." Nevertheless,
Penance may be said to regard original sin, if we take it in a wide
sense for any detestation of something past: in which sense Augustine
uses the term in his book De Poenitentia (Serm. cccli).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the form of this sacrament is: "I absolve thee"?
Objection 1: It would seem that the form of this sacrament is not: "I
absolve thee." Because the forms of the sacraments are received from
Christ's institution and the Church's custom. But we do not read that
Christ instituted this form. Nor is it in common use; in fact in
certain absolutions which are given publicly in church (e.g. at Prime
and Compline and on Maundy Thursday), absolution is given not in the
indicative form by saying: "I absolve thee," but In the deprecatory
form, by saying: "May Almighty God have mercy on you," or: "May
Almighty God grant you absolution and forgiveness." Therefore the form
of this sacrament is not: "I absolve thee."
Objection 2: Further, Pope Leo says (Ep. cviii) that God's forgiveness
cannot be obtained without the priestly supplications: and he is
speaking there of God's forgiveness granted to the penitent. Therefore
the form of this sacrament should be deprecatory.
Objection 3: Further, to absolve from sin is the same as to remit sin.
But God alone remits sin, for He alone cleanses man inwardly from sin,
as Augustine says (Contra Donatist. v, 21). Therefore it seems that God
alone absolves from sin. Therefore the priest should say not: "I
absolve thee," as neither does he say: "I remit thy sins."
Objection 4: Further, just as our Lord gave His disciples the power to
absolve from sins, so also did He give them the power "to heal
infirmities," "to cast out devils," and "to cure diseases" (Mat. 10:1;
Lk. 9:1). Now the apostles, in healing the sick, did not use the words:
"I heal thee," but: "The Lord Jesus Christ heal [Vulg.: 'heals'] thee,"
as Peter said to the palsied man (Acts 9:34). Therefore since priests
have the power which Christ gave His apostles, it seems that they
should not use the form: "I absolve thee," but: "May Christ absolve
thee."
Objection 5: Further, some explain this form by stating that when they
say: "I absolve thee," they mean "I declare you to be absolved." But
neither can this be done by a priest unless it be revealed to him by
God, wherefore, as we read in Mat. 16:19 before it was said to Peter:
"Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth," etc., it was said to him (Mat.
16:17): "Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jona: because flesh and blood have
not revealed it to thee, but My Father Who is in heaven." Therefore it
seems presumptuous for a priest, who has received no revelation on the
matter, to say: "I absolve thee," even if this be explained to mean: "I
declare thee absolved."
On the contrary, As our Lord said to His disciples (Mat. 28:19): "Going
. . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them," etc., so did He say to
Peter (Mat. 16:19): "Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth," etc. Now
the priest, relying on the authority of those words of Christ, says: "I
baptize thee." Therefore on the same authority he should say in this
sacrament: "I absolve thee."
I answer that, The perfection of a thing is ascribed to its form. Now
it has been stated above (A[1], ad 2) that this sacrament is perfected
by that which is done by the priest. Wherefore the part taken by the
penitent, whether it consist of words or deeds, must needs be the
matter of this sacrament, while the part taken by the priest, takes the
place of the form.
Now since the sacraments of the New Law accomplish what they signify,
as stated above ([4716]Q[62], A[1], ad 1), it behooves the sacramental
form to signify the sacramental effect in a manner that is in keeping
with the matter. Hence the form of Baptism is: "I baptize thee," and
the form of Confirmation is: "I sign thee with the sign of the cross,
and I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation," because these
sacraments are perfected in the use of their matter: while in the
sacrament of the Eucharist, which consists in the very consecration of
the matter, the reality of the consecration is expressed in the words:
"This is My Body."
Now this sacrament, namely the sacrament of Penance, consists not in
the consecration of a matter, nor in the use of a hallowed matter, but
rather in the removal of a certain matter, viz. sin, in so far as sins
are said to be the matter of Penance, as explained above [4717](A[2]).
This removal is expressed by the priest saying: "I absolve thee":
because sins are fetters, according to Prov. 5:22. "His own iniquities
catch the wicked, and he is fast bound with the ropes of his own sins."
Wherefore it is evident that this is the most fitting form of this
sacrament: "I absolve thee."
Reply to Objection 1: This form is taken from Christ's very words which
He addressed to Peter (Mat. 16:19): "Whatsoever thou shalt loose on
earth," etc., and such is the form employed by the Church in
sacramental absolution. But such absolutions as are given in public are
not sacramental, but are prayers for the remission of venial sins.
Wherefore in giving sacramental absolution it would not suffice to say:
"May Almighty God have mercy on thee," or: "May God grant thee
absolution and forgiveness," because by such words the priest does not
signify the giving of absolution, but prays that it may be given.
Nevertheless the above prayer is said before the sacramental absolution
is given, lest the sacramental effect be hindered on the part of the
penitent, whose acts are as matter in this sacrament, but not in
Baptism or Confirmation.
Reply to Objection 2: The words of Leo are to be understood of the
prayer that precedes the absolution, and do not exclude the fact that
the priest pronounces absolution.
Reply to Objection 3: God alone absolves from sin and forgives sins
authoritatively; yet priests do both ministerially, because the words
of the priest in this sacrament work as instruments of the Divine
power, as in the other sacraments: because it is the Divine power that
works inwardly in all the sacramental signs, be they things or words,
as shown above ([4718]Q[62], A[4];[4719] Q[64], AA[1],2). Wherefore our
Lord expressed both: for He said to Peter (Mat. 16:19): "Whatsoever
thou shalt loose on earth," etc., and to His disciples (Jn. 20:23):
"Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." Yet the priest
says: "I absolve thee," rather than: "I forgive thee thy sins," because
it is more in keeping with the words of our Lord, by expressing the
power of the keys whereby priests absolve. Nevertheless, since the
priest absolves ministerially, something is suitably added in reference
to the supreme authority of God, by the priest saying: "I absolve thee
in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," or
by the power of Christ's Passion, or by the authority of God. However,
as this is not defined by the words of Christ, as it is for Baptism,
this addition is left to the discretion of the priest.
Reply to Objection 4: Power was given to the apostles, not that they
themselves might heal the sick, but that the sick might be healed at
the prayer of the apostles: whereas power was given to them to work
instrumentally or ministerially in the sacraments; wherefore they could
express their own agency in the sacramental forms rather than in the
healing of infirmities. Nevertheless in the latter case they did not
always use the deprecatory form, but sometimes employed the indicative
or imperative: thus we read (Acts 3:6) that Peter said to the lame man:
"What I have, I give thee: In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth,
arise and walk."
Reply to Objection 5: It is true in a sense that the words, "I absolve
thee" mean "I declare thee absolved," but this explanation is
incomplete. Because the sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but
effect what they signify. Wherefore, just as the priest in baptizing
anyone, declares by deed and word that the person is washed inwardly,
and this not only significatively but also effectively, so also when he
says: "I absolve thee," he declares the man to be absolved not only
significatively but also effectively. And yet he does not speak as of
something uncertain, because just as the other sacraments of the New
Law have, of themselves, a sure effect through the power of Christ's
Passion, which effect, nevertheless, may be impeded on the part of the
recipient, so is it with this sacrament. Hence Augustine says (De
Adult. Conjug. ii): "There is nothing disgraceful or onerous in the
reconciliation of husband and wife, when adultery committed has been
washed away, since there is no doubt that remission of sins is granted
through the keys of the kingdom of heaven." Consequently there is no
need for a special revelation to be made to the priest, but the general
revelation of faith suffices, through which sins are forgiven. Hence
the revelation of faith is said to have been made to Peter.
It would be a more complete explanation to say that the words, "I
absolve thee" mean: "I grant thee the sacrament of absolution."
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Whether the imposition of the priest's hands is necessary for this
sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that the imposition of the priest's hands is
necessary for this sacrament. For it is written (Mk. 16:18): "They
shall lay hands upon the sick, and they shall recover." Now sinners are
sick spiritually, and obtain recovery through this sacrament. Therefore
an imposition of hands should be made in this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, in this sacrament man regains the Holy Ghost Whom
he had lost, wherefore it is said in the person of the penitent (Ps.
1:14): "Restore unto me the joy of Thy salvation, and strengthen me
with a perfect spirit." Now the Holy Ghost is given by the imposition
of hands; for we read (Acts 8:17) that the apostles "laid their hands
upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost"; and (Mat. 19:13) that
"little children were presented" to our Lord, "that He should impose
hands upon them." Therefore an imposition of hands should be made in
this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, the priest's words are not more efficacious in
this than in the other sacraments. But in the other sacraments the
words of the minister do not suffice, unless he perform some action:
thus, in Baptism, the priest while saying: "I baptize thee," has to
perform a bodily washing. Therefore, also while saying: "I absolve
thee," the priest should perform some action in regard to the penitent,
by laying hands on him.
On the contrary, When our Lord said to Peter (Mat. 16:19): "Whatsoever
thou shalt loose on earth," etc., He made no mention of an imposition
of hands; nor did He when He said to all the apostles (Jn. 20:13):
"Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." Therefore no
imposition of hands is required for this sacrament.
I answer that, In the sacraments of the Church the imposition of hands
is made, to signify some abundant effect of grace, through those on
whom the hands are laid being, as it were, united to the ministers in
whom grace should be plentiful. Wherefore an imposition of hands is
made in the sacrament of Confirmation, wherein the fulness of the Holy
Ghost is conferred; and in the sacrament of order, wherein is bestowed
a certain excellence of power over the Divine mysteries; hence it is
written (2 Tim. 1:6): "Stir up the grace of God which is in thee, by
the imposition of my hands."
Now the sacrament of Penance is ordained, not that man may receive some
abundance of grace, but that his sins may be taken away; and therefore
no imposition of hands is required for this sacrament, as neither is
there for Baptism, wherein nevertheless a fuller remission of sins is
bestowed.
Reply to Objection 1: That imposition of hands is not sacramental, but
is intended for the working of miracles, namely, that by the contact of
a sanctified man's hand, even bodily infirmity might be removed; even
as we read of our Lord (Mk. 6:5) that He cured the sick, "laying His
hands upon them," and (Mat. 8:3) that He cleansed a leper by touching
him.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not every reception of the Holy Ghost that
requires an imposition of hands, since even in Baptism man receives the
Holy Ghost, without any imposition of hands: it is at the reception of
the fulness of the Holy Ghost which belongs to Confirmation that an
imposition of hands is required.
Reply to Objection 3: In those sacraments which are perfected in the
use of the matter, the minister has to perform some bodily action on
the recipient of the sacrament, e.g. in Baptism, Confirmation, and
Extreme Unction; whereas this sacrament does not consist in the use of
matter employed outwardly, the matter being supplied by the part taken
by the penitent: wherefore, just as in the Eucharist the priest
perfects the sacrament by merely pronouncing the words over the matter,
so the mere words which the priest while absolving pronounces over the
penitent perfect the sacrament of absolution. If, indeed, any bodily
act were necessary on the part of the priest, the sign of the cross,
which is employed in the Eucharist, would not be less becoming than the
imposition of hands, in token that sins are forgiven through the blood
of Christ crucified; and yet this is not essential to this sacrament as
neither is it to the Eucharist.
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Whether this sacrament is necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament is not necessary for
salvation. Because on Ps. 125:5, "They that sow in tears," etc., the
gloss says: "Be not sorrowful, if thou hast a good will, of which peace
is the meed." But sorrow is essential to Penance, according to 2 Cor.
7:10: "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast
unto salvation." Therefore a good will without Penance suffices for
salvation.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): "Charity covereth
all sins," and further on (Prov. 15:27): "By mercy and faith sins are
purged away." But this sacrament is for nothing else but the purging of
sins. Therefore if one has charity, faith, and mercy, one can obtain
salvation, without the sacrament of Penance.
Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the Church take their origin
from the institution of Christ. But according to Jn. 8 Christ absolved
the adulterous woman without Penance. Therefore it seems that Penance
is not necessary for salvation.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 13:3): "Unless you shall do
penance, you shall all likewise perish."
I answer that, A thing is necessary for salvation in two ways: first,
absolutely; secondly, on a supposition. A thing is absolutely necessary
for salvation, if no one can obtain salvation without it, as, for
example, the grace of Christ, and the sacrament of Baptism, whereby a
man is born again in Christ. The sacrament of Penance is necessary on a
supposition, for it is necessary, not for all, but for those who are in
sin. For it is written (2 Paral 37 [*The prayer of Manasses, among the
Apocrypha]), "Thou, Lord, God of the righteous, hast not appointed
repentance to the righteous, to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, nor to those
who sinned not against Thee." But "sin, when it is completed, begetteth
death" (James 1:15). Consequently it is necessary for the sinner's
salvation that sin be taken away from him; which cannot be done without
the sacrament of Penance, wherein the power of Christ's Passion
operates through the priest's absolution and the acts of the penitent,
who co-operates with grace unto the destruction of his sin. For as
Augustine says (Tract. lxxii in Joan. [*Implicitly in the passage
referred to, but explicitly Serm. xv de verb Apost.]), "He Who created
thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." Therefore it is
evident that after sin the sacrament of Penance is necessary for
salvation, even as bodily medicine after man has contracted a dangerous
disease.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss should apparently be understood as
referring to the man who has a good will unimpaired by sin, for such a
man has no cause for sorrow: but as soon as the good will is forfeited
through sin, it cannot be restored without that sorrow whereby a man
sorrows for his past sin, and which belongs to Penance.
Reply to Objection 2: As soon as a man falls into sin, charity, faith,
and mercy do not deliver him from sin, without Penance. Because charity
demands that a man should grieve for the offense committed against his
friend, and that he should be anxious to make satisfaction to his
friend; faith requires that he should seek to be justified from his
sins through the power of Christ's Passion which operates in the
sacraments of the Church; and well-ordered pity necessitates that man
should succor himself by repenting of the pitiful condition into which
sin has brought him, according to Prov. 14:34: "Sin maketh nations
miserable"; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): "Have pity on thy
own soul, pleasing God."
Reply to Objection 3: It was due to His power of "excellence," which He
alone had, as stated above ([4720]Q[64], A[3]), that Christ bestowed on
the adulterous woman the effect of the sacrament of Penance, viz. the
forgiveness of sins, without the sacrament of Penance, although not
without internal repentance, which He operated in her by grace.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Penance is a second plank after shipwreck?
Objection 1: It would seem that Penance is not a second plank after
shipwreck. Because on Is. 3:9, "They have proclaimed abroad their sin
as Sodom," a gloss says: "The second plank after shipwreck is to hide
one's sins." Now Penance does not hide sins, but reveals them.
Therefore Penance is not a second plank.
Objection 2: Further, in a building the foundation takes the first, not
the second place. Now in the spiritual edifice, Penance is the
foundation, according to Heb. 6:1: "Not laying again the foundation of
Penance from dead works"; wherefore it precedes even Baptism, according
to Acts 2:38: "Do penance, and be baptized every one of you." Therefore
Penance should not be called a second plank.
Objection 3: Further, all the sacraments are planks, i.e. helps against
sin. Now Penance holds, not the second but the fourth, place among the
sacraments, as is clear from what has been said above ([4721]Q[65],
AA[1],2). Therefore Penance should not be called a second plank after
shipwreck.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. cxxx) that "Penance is a second plank
after shipwreck."
I answer that, That which is of itself precedes naturally that which is
accidental, as substance precedes accident. Now some sacraments are, of
themselves, ordained to man's salvation, e.g. Baptism, which is the
spiritual birth, Confirmation which is the spiritual growth, the
Eucharist which is the spiritual food; whereas Penance is ordained to
man's salvation accidentally as it were, and on something being
supposed, viz. sin: for unless man were to sin actually, he would not
stand in need of Penance and yet he would need Baptism, Confirmation,
and the Eucharist; even as in the life of the body, man would need no
medical treatment, unless he were ill, and yet life, birth, growth, and
food are, of themselves, necessary to man.
Consequently Penance holds the second place with regard to the state of
integrity which is bestowed and safeguarded by the aforesaid
sacraments, so that it is called metaphorically "a second plank after
shipwreck." For just as the first help for those who cross the sea is
to be safeguarded in a whole ship, while the second help when the ship
is wrecked, is to cling to a plank; so too the first help in this
life's ocean is that man safeguard his integrity, while the second help
is, if he lose his integrity through sin, that he regain it by means of
Penance.
Reply to Objection 1: To hide one's sins may happen in two ways: first,
in the very act of sinning. Now it is worse to sin in public than in
private, both because a public sinner seems to sin more from contempt,
and because by sinning he gives scandal to others. Consequently in sin
it is a kind of remedy to sin secretly, and it is in this sense that
the gloss says that "to hide one's sins is a second plank after
shipwreck"; not that it takes away sin, as Penance does, but because it
makes the sin less grievous. Secondly, one hides one's sin previously
committed, by neglecting to confess it: this is opposed to Penance, and
to hide one's sins thus is not a second plank, but is the reverse,
since it is written (Prov. 28:13): "He that hideth his sins shall not
prosper."
Reply to Objection 2: Penance cannot be called the foundation of the
spiritual edifice simply, i.e. in the first building thereof; but it is
the foundation in the second building which is accomplished by
destroying sin, because man, on his return to God, needs Penance first.
However, the Apostle is speaking there of the foundation of spiritual
doctrine. Moreover, the penance which precedes Baptism is not the
sacrament of Penance.
Reply to Objection 3: The three sacraments which precede Penance refer
to the ship in its integrity, i.e. to man's state of integrity, with
regard to which Penance is called a second plank.
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Whether this sacrament was suitably instituted in the New Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament was unsuitably
instituted in the New Law. Because those things which belong to the
natural law need not to be instituted. Now it belongs to the natural
law that one should repent of the evil one has done: for it is
impossible to love good without grieving for its contrary. Therefore
Penance was unsuitably instituted in the New Law.
Objection 2: Further, that which existed in the Old Law had not to be
instituted in the New. Now there was Penance in the old Law wherefore
the Lord complains (Jer. 8:6) saying: "There is none that doth penance
for his sin, saying: What have I done?" Therefore Penance should not
have been instituted in the New Law.
Objection 3: Further, Penance comes after Baptism, since it is a second
plank, as stated above [4722](A[6]). Now it seems that our Lord
instituted Penance before Baptism, because we read that at the
beginning of His preaching He said (Mat. 4:17): "Do penance, for the
kingdom of heaven is at hand." Therefore this sacrament was not
suitably instituted in the New Law.
Objection 4: Further, the sacraments of the New Law were instituted by
Christ, by Whose power they work, as stated above ([4723]Q[62],
A[5];[4724] Q[64], A[1]). But Christ does not seem to have instituted
this sacrament, since He made no use of it, as of the other sacraments
which He instituted. Therefore this sacrament was unsuitably instituted
in the New Law.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 24:46,47): "It behooved Christ to
suffer, and to rise again from the dead the third day: and that penance
and remission of sins should be preached in His name unto all nations."
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 1, ad 2), in this sacrament
the acts of the penitent are as matter, while the part taken by the
priest, who works as Christ's minister, is the formal and completive
element of the sacrament. Now in the other sacraments the matter
pre-exists, being provided by nature, as water, or by art, as bread:
but that such and such a matter be employed for a sacrament requires to
be decided by the institution; while the sacrament derives its form and
power entirely from the institution of Christ, from Whose Passion the
power of the sacraments proceeds.
Accordingly the matter of this sacrament pre-exists, being provided by
nature; since it is by a natural principle of reason that man is moved
to repent of the evil he has done: yet it is due to Divine institution
that man does penance in this or that way. Wherefore at the outset of
His preaching, our Lord admonished men, not only to repent, but also to
"do penance," thus pointing to the particular manner of actions
required for this sacrament. As to the part to be taken by the
ministers, this was fixed by our Lord when He said to Peter (Mat.
16:19): "To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven," etc.;
but it was after His resurrection that He made known the efficacy of
this sacrament and the source of its power, when He said (Lk. 24:47)
that "penance and remission of sins should be preached in His name unto
all nations," after speaking of His Passion and resurrection. Because
it is from the power of the name of Jesus Christ suffering and rising
again that this sacrament is efficacious unto the remission of sins.
It is therefore evident that this sacrament was suitably instituted in
the New Law.
Reply to Objection 1: It is a natural law that one should repent of the
evil one has done, by grieving for having done it, and by seeking a
remedy for one's grief in some way or other, and also that one should
show some signs of grief, even as the Ninevites did, as we read in Jn.
3. And yet even in their case there was also something of faith which
they had received through Jonas' preaching, inasmuch as they did these
things in the hope that they would receive pardon from God, according
as we read (Jn. 3:9): "Who can tell if God will turn and forgive, and
will turn away from His fierce anger, and we shall not perish?" But
just as other matters which are of the natural law were fixed in detail
by the institution of the Divine law, as we have stated in the
[4725]FS, Q[91], A[4]; [4726]FS, Q[95], A[2]; FS, Q[99], so was it with
Penance.
Reply to Objection 2: Things which are of the natural law were
determined in various ways in the old and in the New Law, in keeping
with the imperfection of the old, and the perfection of the New.
Wherefore Penance was fixed in a certain way in the Old Law---with
regard to sorrow, that it should be in the heart rather than in
external signs, according to Joel 2:13: "Rend your hearts and not your
garments"; and with regard to seeking a remedy for sorrow, that they
should in some way confess their sins, at least in general, to God's
ministers. Wherefore the Lord said (Lev. 5:17,18): "If anyone sin
through ignorance . . . he shall offer of the flocks a ram without
blemish to the priest, according to the measure and estimation of the
sin, and the priest shall pray for him, because he did it ignorantly,
and it shall be forgiven him"; since by the very fact of making an
offering for his sin, a man, in a fashion, confessed his sin to the
priest. And accordingly it is written (Prov. 28:13): "He that hideth
his sins, shall not prosper: but he that shall confess, and forsake
them, shall obtain mercy." Not yet, however, was the power of the keys
instituted, which is derived from Christ's Passion, and consequently it
was not yet ordained that a man should grieve for his sin, with the
purpose of submitting himself by confession and satisfaction to the
keys of the Church, in the hope of receiving forgiveness through the
power of Christ's Passion.
Reply to Objection 3: If we note carefully what our Lord said about the
necessity of Baptism (Jn. 3:3, seqq.), we shall see that this was said
before His words about the necessity of Penance (Mat. 4:17); because He
spoke to Nicodemus about Baptism before the imprisonment of John, of
whom it is related afterwards (Jn. 3:23, 24) that he baptized, whereas
His words about Penance were said after John was cast into prison.
If, however, He had admonished men to do penance before admonishing
them to be baptized, this would be because also before Baptism some
kind of penance is required, according to the words of Peter (Acts
2:38): "Do penance, and be baptized, every one of you."
Reply to Objection 4: Christ did not use the Baptism which He
instituted, but was baptized with the baptism of John, as stated above
([4727]Q[39], AA[1],2). Nor did He use it actively by administering it
Himself, because He "did not baptize" as a rule, "but His disciples"
did, as related in Jn. 4:2, although it is to be believed that He
baptized His disciples, as Augustine asserts (Ep. cclxv, ad Seleuc.).
But with regard to His institution of this sacrament it was nowise
fitting that He should use it, neither by repenting Himself, in Whom
there was no sin, nor by administering the sacrament to others, since,
in order to show His mercy and power, He was wont to confer the effect
of this sacrament without the sacrament itself, as stated above (A[5],
ad 3). On the other hand, He both received and gave to others the
sacrament of the Eucharist, both in order to commend the excellence of
that sacrament, and because that sacrament is a memorial of His
Passion, in which Christ is both priest and victim.
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Whether Penance should last till the end of life?
Objection 1: It would seem that Penance should not last till the end of
life. Because Penance is ordained for the blotting out of sin. Now the
penitent receives forgiveness of his sins at once, according to Ezech.
18:21: "If the wicked do penance for all his sins which he hath
committed . . . he shall live and shall not die." Therefore there is no
need for Penance to be further prolonged.
Objection 2: Further, Penance belongs to the state of beginners. But
man ought to advance from that state to the state of the proficient,
and, from this, on to the state of the perfect. Therefore man need not
do Penance till the end of his life.
Objection 3: Further, man is bound to observe the laws of the Church in
this as in the other sacraments. But the duration of repentance is
fixed by the canons, so that, to wit, for such and such a sin one is
bound to do penance for so many years. Therefore it seems that Penance
should not be prolonged till the end of life.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book, De Poenitentia [*De vera
et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "What
remains for us to do, save to sorrow ever in this life? For when sorrow
ceases, repentance fails; and if repentance fails, what becomes of
pardon?"
I answer that, Penance is twofold, internal and external. Internal
penance is that whereby one grieves for a sin one has committed, and
this penance should last until the end of life. Because man should
always be displeased at having sinned, for if he were to be pleased
thereat, he would for this very reason fall into sin and lose the fruit
of pardon. Now displeasure causes sorrow in one who is susceptible to
sorrow, as man is in this life; but after this life the saints are not
susceptible to sorrow, wherefore they will be displeased at, without
sorrowing for, their past sins, according to Is. 65:16. "The former
distresses are forgotten."
External penance is that whereby a man shows external signs of sorrow,
confesses his sins verbally to the priest who absolves him, and makes
satisfaction for his sins according to the judgment of the priest. Such
penance need not last until the end of life, but only for a fixed time
according to the measure of the sin.
Reply to Objection 1: True penance not only removes past sins, but also
preserves man from future sins. Consequently, although a man receives
forgiveness of past sins in the first instant of his true penance,
nevertheless he must persevere in his penance, lest he fall again into
sin.
Reply to Objection 2: To do penance both internal and external belongs
to the state of beginners, of those, to wit, who are making a fresh
start from the state of sin. But there is room for internal penance
even in the proficient and the perfect, according to Ps. 83:7: "In his
heart he hath disposed to ascend by steps, in the vale of tears."
Wherefore Paul says (1 Cor. 15:9): "I . . . am not worthy to be called
an apostle because I persecuted the Church of God."
Reply to Objection 3: These durations of time are fixed for penitents
as regards the exercise of external penance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Penance can be continuous?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance cannot be continuous. For it is
written (Jer. 31:16): "Let thy voice cease from weeping, and thy eyes
from tears." But this would be impossible if penance were continuous,
for it consists in weeping and tears. Therefore penance cannot be
continuous.
Objection 2: Further, man ought to rejoice at every good work,
according to Ps. 99:1: "Serve ye the Lord with gladness." Now to do
penance is a good work. Therefore man should rejoice at it. But man
cannot rejoice and grieve at the same time, as the Philosopher declares
(Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore a penitent cannot grieve continually for his
past sins, which is essential to penance. Therefore penance cannot be
continuous.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:7): "Comfort him,"
viz. the penitent, "lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with
overmuch sorrow." But comfort dispels grief, which is essential to
penance. Therefore penance need not be continuous.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on Penance [*De vera et
falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "In doing
penance grief should be continual."
I answer that, One is said to repent in two ways, actually and
habitually. It is impossible for a man continually to repent actually.
for the acts, whether internal or external, of a penitent must needs be
interrupted by sleep and other things which the body needs. Secondly, a
man is said to repent habitually. and thus he should repent
continually, both by never doing anything contrary to penance, so as to
destroy the habitual disposition of the penitent, and by being resolved
that his past sins should always be displeasing to him.
Reply to Objection 1: Weeping and tears belong to the act of external
penance, and this act needs neither to be continuous, nor to last until
the end of life, as stated above [4728](A[8]): wherefore it is
significantly added: "For there is a reward for thy work." Now the
reward of the penitent's work is the full remission of sin both as to
guilt and as to punishment; and after receiving this reward there is no
need for man to proceed to acts of external penance. This, however,
does not prevent penance being continual, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Of sorrow and joy we may speak in two ways:
first, as being passions of the sensitive appetite; and thus they can
no. wise be together, since they are altogether contrary to one
another, either on the part of the object (as when they have the same
object), or at least on the part of the movement, for joy is with
expansion [*Cf. [4729]FS, Q[33], A[1]] of the heart, whereas sorrow is
with contraction; and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks
in Ethic. ix. Secondly, we may speak of joy and sorrow as being simple
acts of the will, to which something is pleasing or displeasing.
Accordingly, they cannot be contrary to one another, except on the part
of the object, as when they concern the same object in the same
respect, in which way joy and sorrow cannot be simultaneous, because
the same thing in the same respect cannot be pleasing and displeasing.
If, on the other hand, joy and sorrow, understood thus, be not of the
same object in the same respect, but either of different objects, or of
the same object in different respects, in that case joy and sorrow are
not contrary to one another, so that nothing hinders a man from being
joyful and sorrowful at the same time---for instance, if we see a good
man suffer, we both rejoice at his goodness and at the same time grieve
for his suffering. In this way a man may be displeased at having
sinned, and be pleased at his displeasure together with his hope for
pardon, so that his very sorrow is a matter of joy. Hence Augustine
says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is
unknown]: "The penitent should ever grieve and rejoice at his grief."
If, however, sorrow were altogether incompatible with joy, this would
prevent the continuance, not of habitual penance, but only of actual
penance.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3,6,7,9)
it belongs to virtue to establish the mean in the passions. Now the
sorrow which, in the sensitive appetite of the penitent, arises from
the displeasure of his will, is a passion; wherefore it should be
moderated according to virtue, and if it be excessive it is sinful,
because it leads to despair, as the Apostle teaches (2 Cor. 2:7),
saying: "Lest such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow."
Accordingly comfort, of which the Apostle speaks, moderates sorrow but
does not destroy it altogether.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sacrament of Penance may be repeated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sacrament of Penance should not be
repeated. For the Apostle says (Heb. 6:4, seqq.): "It is impossible for
those, who were once illuminated, have tasted also the heavenly gift,
and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost . . . and are fallen away, to
be renewed again to penance." Now whosoever have done penance, have
been illuminated, and have received the gift of the Holy Ghost.
Therefore whosoever sin after doing penance, cannot do penance again.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii): "Some are to be
found who think they ought often to do penance, who take liberties with
Christ: for if they were truly penitent, they would not think of doing
penance over again, since there is but one Penance even as there is but
one Baptism." Now Baptism is not repeated. Neither, therefore, is
Penance to be repeated.
Objection 3: Further, the miracles whereby our Lord healed bodily
diseases, signify the healing of spiritual diseases, whereby men are
delivered from sins. Now we do not read that our Lord restored the
sight to any blind man twice, or that He cleansed any leper twice, or
twice raised any dead man to life. Therefore it seems that He does not
twice grant pardon to any sinner.
Objection 4: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Penance
consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again those we
have deplored": and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii): "He is a mocker
and no penitent who still does what he has repented of." If, therefore,
a man is truly penitent, he will not sin again. Therefore Penance
cannot be repeated.
Objection 5: Further, just as Baptism derives its efficacy from the
Passion of Christ, so does Penance. Now Baptism is not repeated, on
account of the unity of Christ's Passion and death. Therefore in like
manner Penance is not repeated.
Objection 6: Further, Ambrose says on Ps. 118:58, "I entreated Thy
face," etc., that "facility of obtaining pardon is an incentive to
sin." If, therefore, God frequently grants pardon through Penance, it
seems that He affords man an incentive to sin, and thus He seems to
take pleasure in sin, which is contrary to His goodness. Therefore
Penance cannot be repeated.
On the contrary, Man is induced to be merciful by the example of Divine
mercy, according to Lk. 6:36: "Be ye . . . merciful, as your Father
also is merciful." Now our Lord commanded His disciples to be merciful
by frequently pardoning their brethren who had sinned against them;
wherefore, as related in Mat. 18:21, when Peter asked: "How often shall
my brother off end against me, and I forgive him? till seven times?"
Jesus answered: "I say not to thee, till seven times, but till seventy
times seven times." Therefore also God over and over again, through
Penance, grants pardon to sinners, especially as He teaches us to pray
(Mat. 6:12): "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that
trespass against us."
I answer that, As regards Penance, some have erred, saying that a man
cannot obtain pardon of his sins through Penance a second time. Some of
these, viz. the Novatians, went so far as to say that he who sins after
the first Penance which is done in Baptism, cannot be restored again
through Penance. There were also other heretics who, as Augustine
relates in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the
authorship of which is unknown], said that, after Baptism, Penance is
useful, not many times, but only once.
These errors seem to have arisen from a twofold source: first from not
knowing the nature of true Penance. For since true Penance requires
charity, without which sins are not taken away, they thought that
charity once possessed could not be lost, and that, consequently,
Penance, if true, could never be removed by sin, so that it should be
necessary to repeat it. But this was refuted in the [4730]SS, Q[24],
A[11], where it was shown that on account of free-will charity, once
possessed, can be lost, and that, consequently, after true Penance, a
man can sin mortally. Secondly, they erred in their estimation of the
gravity of sin. For they deemed a sin committed by a man after he had
received pardon, to be so grave that it could not be forgiven. In this
they erred not only with regard to sin which, even after a sin has been
forgiven, can be either more or less grievous than the first, which was
forgiven, but much more did they err against the infinity of Divine
mercy, which surpasses any number and magnitude of sins, according to
Ps. 50:1,2: "Have mercy on me, O God, according to Thy great mercy: and
according to the multitude of Thy tender mercies, blot out my
iniquity." Wherefore the words of Cain were reprehensible, when he said
(Gn. 4:13): "My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon."
And so God's mercy, through Penance, grants pardon to sinners without
any end, wherefore it is written (2 Paral 37 [*Prayer of Manasses,
among the Apocrypha. St. Thomas is evidently quoting from memory, and
omits the words in brackets.]): "Thy merciful promise is unmeasurable
and unsearchable . . . (and Thou repentest) for the evil brought upon
man." It is therefore evident that Penance can be repeated many times.
Reply to Objection 1: Some of the Jews thought that a man could be
washed several times in the laver of Baptism, because among them the
Law prescribed certain washing-places where they were wont to cleanse
themselves repeatedly from their uncleannesses. In order to disprove
this the Apostle wrote to the Hebrews that "it is impossible for those
who were once illuminated," viz. through Baptism, "to be renewed again
to penance," viz. through Baptism, which is "the laver of regeneration,
and renovation of the Holy Ghost," as stated in Titus 3:5: and he
declares the reason to be that by Baptism man dies with Christ,
wherefore he adds (Heb. 6:6): "Crucifying again to themselves the Son
of God."
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose is speaking of solemn Penance, which is
not repeated in the Church, as we shall state further on ([4731]XP,
Q[28], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia
the authorship of which is unknown], "Our Lord gave sight to many blind
men at various times, and strength to many infirm, thereby showing, in
these different men, that the same sins are repeatedly forgiven, at one
time healing a man from leprosy and afterwards from blindness. For this
reason He healed so many stricken with fever, so many feeble in body,
so many lame, blind, and withered, that the sinner might not despair;
for this reason He is not described as healing anyone but once, that
every one might fear to link himself with sin; for this reason He
declares Himself to be the physician welcomed not of the hale, but of
the unhealthy. What sort of a physician is he who knows not how to heal
a recurring disease? For if a man ail a hundred times it is for the
physician to heal him a hundred times: and if he failed where others
succeed, he would be a poor physician in comparison with them."
Reply to Objection 4: Penance is to deplore past sins, and, "while
deploring them," not to commit again, either by act or by intention,
those which we have to deplore. Because a man is a mocker and not a
penitent, who, "while doing penance," does what he repents having done,
or intends to do again what he did before, or even commits actually the
same or another kind of sin. But if a man sin afterwards either by act
or intention, this does not destroy the fact that his former penance
was real, because the reality of a former act is never destroyed by a
subsequent contrary act: for even as he truly ran who afterwards sits,
so he truly repented who subsequently sins.
Reply to Objection 5: Baptism derives its power from Christ's Passion,
as a spiritual regeneration, with a spiritual death, of a previous
life. Now "it is appointed unto man once to die" (Heb. 9:27), and to be
born once, wherefore man should be baptized but once. On the other
hand, Penance derives its power from Christ's Passion, as a spiritual
medicine, which can be repeated frequently.
Reply to Objection 6: According to Augustine (De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown), "it is evident that
sins displease God exceedingly, for He is always ready to destroy them,
lest what He created should perish, and what He loved be lost," viz. by
despair.
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OF PENANCE AS A VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider penance as a virtue, under which head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether penance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) To what species of virtue does it belong?
(4) Of its subject;
(5) Of its cause;
(6) Of its relation to the other virtues.
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Whether Penance is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a virtue. For penance is
a sacrament numbered among the other sacraments, as was shown above
([4732]Q[84], A[1];[4733] Q[65], A[1]). Now no other sacrament is a
virtue. Therefore neither is penance a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9),
"shame is not a virtue," both because it is a passion accompanied by a
bodily alteration, and because it is not the disposition of a perfect
thing, since it is about an evil act, so that it has no place in a
virtuous man. Now, in like manner, penance is a passion accompanied by
a bodily alteration, viz. tears, according to Gregory, who says (Hom.
xxxiv in Evang.) that "penance consists in deploring past sins":
moreover it is about evil deeds, viz. sins, which have no place in a
virtuous man. Therefore penance is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "no
virtuous man is foolish." But it seems foolish to deplore what has been
done in the past, since it cannot be otherwise, and yet this is what we
understand by penance. Therefore penance is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue,
because "a lawgiver intends to make the citizens virtuous" (Ethic. ii,
1). But there is a precept about penance in the Divine law, according
to Mat. 4:17: "Do penance," etc. Therefore penance is a virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (OBJ[2];[4734] Q[84], A[10], ad 4), to
repent is to deplore something one has done. Now it has been stated
above ([4735]Q[84] , A[9]) that sorrow or sadness is twofold. First, it
denotes a passion of the sensitive appetite, and in this sense penance
is not a virtue, but a passion. Secondly, it denotes an act of the
will, and in this way it implies choice, and if this be right, it must,
of necessity, be an act of virtue. For it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6
that virtue is a habit of choosing according to right reason. Now it
belongs to right reason than one should grieve for a proper object of
grief as one ought to grieve, and for an end for which one ought to
grieve. And this is observed in the penance of which we are speaking
now; since the penitent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins,
with the intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the
penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue or the act of
a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[84], A[1], ad 1;
[4736]AA[2],3), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place
of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation.
Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a
virtue or accompanies a virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation.
Reply to Objection 2: Penance, considered as a passion, is not a
virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a
bodily alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it
includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however,
applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil
deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed as past. Now it
is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have an evil
deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is
not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should have previously
committed evil deeds, of which it behooves us to repent, since a man
from being wicked becomes virtuous.
Reply to Objection 3: It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has
already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done.
But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or
disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of
removing its result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of punishment:
and this is not foolish.
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Whether Penance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a special virtue. For it
seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve for the
evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the good one
has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy emotion
proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,8,9):
wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth not at
iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." Therefore, in like manner,
neither is penance, which is sorrow for past sins, a special virtue,
but an emotion resulting from charity.
Objection 2: Further, every special virtue has its special matter,
because habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their
objects. But penance has no special matter, because its matter is past
sins in any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary. But
penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins, and
consequently is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, The Law has a special precept about penance, as stated
above ([4737]Q[84], AA[5],7).
I answer that, As stated in the [4738]FS, Q[54], A[1], ad 1, A[2],
habits are specifically distinguished according to the species of their
acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason for being
praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it is evident
that there is a special reason for praising the act of penance, because
it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as an offense
against God, which does not apply to any other virtue. We must
therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: An act springs from charity in two ways: first as
being elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no other
virtue than charity, e.g. to love the good, to rejoice therein, and to
grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondly, an act springs from
charity, being, so to speak, commanded by charity; and thus, since
charity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to its
own end, an act springing from charity may belong even to another
special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of the penitent we consider
the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity
immediately, in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the
intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special
virtue subordinate to charity.
Reply to Objection 2: In point of fact, penance has indeed a general
matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; but it does so under a special
aspect, inasmuch as they can be remedied by an act of man in
co-operating with God for his justification.
Reply to Objection 3: Every special virtue removes formally the habit
of the opposite vice, just as whiteness removes blackness from the same
subject: but penance removes every sin effectively, inasmuch as it
works for the destruction of sins, according as they are pardonable
through the grace of God if man co-operate therewith. Wherefore it does
not follow that it is a general virtue.
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Whether the virtue of penance is a species of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtue of penance is not a species
of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral virtue, as was
shown in the [4739]SS, Q[62], A[3]. But penance seems to be a
theological virtue, since God is its object, for it makes satisfaction
to God, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems
that penance is not a species of justice.
Objection 2: Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the
mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the
extreme, according to Jer. 6:26: "Make thee mourning as for an only
son, a bitter lamentation." Therefore penance is not a species of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, there are two species of justice, as stated in
Ethic. v, 4, viz. "distributive" and "commutative." But penance does
not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore it seems that
penance is not a species of justice.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Lk. 6:21, "Blessed are ye that weep
now," says: "It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly
things and the happiness of heavenly things." But weeping is an act of
penance. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of
justice.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Penance is the
vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry
for having done." But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore
Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called
vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2) penance is a special virtue
not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would
suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he
has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes
to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not
made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind
of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another,
just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the
offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the
part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the
matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it
is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice.
It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and relatively. A
thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind
of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just, because all
citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler,
retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when it is
between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under
his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband. It is
this kind of just that we consider in penance. Wherefore the penitent
has recourse to God with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his
master, according to Ps. 122:2: "Behold, as the eyes of servants are on
the hands of their masters . . . so are our eyes unto the Lord our God,
until He have mercy on us"; and as a son to his father, according to
Lk. 15:21: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee"; and
as a wife to her husband, according to Jer. 3:1: "Thou hast prostituted
thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith the Lord."
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. v, 1, justice is a virtue
towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the
person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of
distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God,
but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is as
one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not
a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object.
Reply to Objection 2: The mean of justice is the equality that is
established between those between whom justice is, as stated in Ethic.
v. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on
account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and
man, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such
cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet
this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the
acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing
excess to penance.
Reply to Objection 3: As there is a kind of commutation in favors,
when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there
commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense
committed against another, a man is either punished against his will,
which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own
accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the
sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge.
Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative
justice.
Reply to Objection 4: Although penance is directly a species of
justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the
virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must
have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the
object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in
Christ's Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon,
and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a
moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral
virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something
belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and
fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which
pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fortitude
moderates, are objects of commutative justice. Accordingly it belongs
to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance,
and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude.
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Whether the will is properly the subject of penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of penance is not properly
the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the
concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the
concupiscible faculty.
Objection 2: Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine
states in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship
of which is unknown]. But vengeance seems to regard the irascible
faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems
that penance is in the irascible part.
Objection 3: Further, the past is the proper object of the memory,
according to the Philosopher (De Memoria i). Now penance regards the
past, as stated above (A[1], ad 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is
subjected in the memory.
Objection 4: Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes
sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every
power of the soul, and not only in the will.
On the contrary, Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Ps.
50:19: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit." But to offer a
sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Ps. 53:8: "I will freely
sacrifice to Thee." Therefore penance is in the will.
I answer that, We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as
it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the
concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a
virtue, and thus, as stated above [4740](A[3]), it is a species of
justice. Now justice, as stated in the [4741]FS, Q[56], A[6], is
subjected in the rational appetite which is the will. Therefore it is
evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is subjected in the
will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed
against God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers penance as a passion.
Reply to Objection 2: To desire vengeance on another, through passion,
belongs to the irascible appetite, but to desire or take vengeance on
oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will.
Reply to Objection 3: The memory is a power that apprehends the past.
But penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appetitive
power, which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance
is not in the memory, but presupposes it.
Reply to Objection 4: The will, as stated above ([4742]FP, Q[82], A[4];
[4743]FS, Q[9], A[1] ), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that
it is not unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to
produce an effect in each power of the soul.
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Whether penance originates from fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance does not originate from fear.
For penance originates in displeasure at sin. But this belongs to
charity, as stated above [4744](A[3]). Therefore penance originates
from love rather than fear.
Objection 2: Further, men are induced to do penance, through the
expectation of the heavenly kingdom, according to Mat. 3:2 and Mat.
4:17: "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Now the
kingdom of heaven is the object of hope. Therefore penance results from
hope rather than from fear.
Objection 3: Further, fear is an internal act of man. But penance does
not seem to arise in us through any work of man, but through the
operation of God, according to Jer. 31:19: "After Thou didst convert me
I did penance." Therefore penance does not result from fear.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:17): "As a woman with child,
when she draweth near the time of her delivery, is in pain, and crieth
out in her pangs, so ere we become," by penance, to wit; and according
to another [*The Septuagint] version the text continues: "Through fear
of Thee, O Lord, we have conceived, and been as it were in labor, and
have brought forth the spirit of salvation," i.e. of salutary penance,
as is clear from what precedes. Therefore penance results from fear.
I answer that, We may speak of penance in two ways: first, as to the
habit, and then it is infused by God immediately without our operating
as principal agents, but not without our co-operating dispositively by
certain acts. Secondly, we may speak of penance, with regard to the
acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operating, the first
principle [*Cf. FS, Q[113]] of which acts is the operation of God in
turning the heart, according to Lam. 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to
Thee, and we shall be converted"; the second, an act of faith; the
third, a movement of servile fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin
through fear of punishment; the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby a
man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of obtaining pardon; the
fifth, a movement of charity, whereby sin is displeasing to man for its
own sake and no longer for the sake of the punishment; the sixth, a
movement of filial fear whereby a man, of his own accord, offers to
make amends to God through fear of Him.
Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance results from servile
fear as from the first movement of the appetite in this direction and
from filial fear as from its immediate and proper principle.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin begins to displease a man, especially a
sinner, on account of the punishments which servile fear regards,
before it displeases him on account of its being an offense against
God, or on account of its wickedness, which pertains to charity.
Reply to Objection 2: When the kingdom of heaven is said to be at hand,
we are to understand that the king is on his way, not only to reward
but also to punish. Wherefore John the Baptist said (Mat. 3:7): "Ye
brood of vipers, who hath showed you to flee from the wrath to come?"
Reply to Objection 3: Even the movement of fear proceeds from God's act
in turning the heart; wherefore it is written (Dt. 5:29): "Who shall
give them to have such a mind, to fear Me?" And so the fact that
penance results from fear does not hinder its resulting from the act of
God in turning the heart.
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Whether penance is the first of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is the first of the virtues.
Because, on Mat. 3:2, "Do penance," etc., a gloss says: "The first
virtue is to destroy the old man, and hate sin by means of penance."
Objection 2: Further, withdrawal from one extreme seems to precede
approach to the other. Now all the other virtues seem to regard
approach to a term, because they all direct man to do good; whereas
penance seems to direct him to withdraw from evil. Therefore it seems
that penance precedes all the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, before penance, there is sin in the soul. Now no
virtue is compatible with sin in the soul. Therefore no virtue precedes
penance, which is itself the first of all and opens the door to the
others by expelling sin.
On the contrary, Penance results from faith, hope, and charity, as
already stated ([4745]AA[2],5). Therefore penance is not the first of
the virtues.
I answer that, In speaking of the virtues, we do not consider the order
of time with regard to the habits, because, since the virtues are
connected with one another, as stated in the [4746]FS, Q[65], A[1],
they all begin at the same time to be in the soul; but one is said to
precede the other in the order of nature, which order depends on the
order of their acts, in so far as the act of one virtue presupposes the
act of another. Accordingly, then, one must say that, even in the order
of time, certain praiseworthy acts can precede the act and the habit of
penance, e.g. acts of dead faith and hope, and an act of servile fear;
while the act and habit of charity are, in point of time, simultaneous
with the act and habit of penance, and with the habits of the other
virtues. For, as was stated in the [4747]FS, Q[113], AA[7],8, in the
justification of the ungodly, the movement of the free-will towards
God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and the movement of
the free-will towards sin, which is the act of penance, are
simultaneous. Yet of these two acts, the former naturally precedes the
latter, because the act of the virtue of penance is directed against
sin, through love of God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason
and cause of the second.
Consequently penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either in
the order of time, or in the order of nature, because, in the order of
nature, the theological virtues precede it simply. Nevertheless, in a
certain respect, it is the first of the other virtues in the order of
time, as regards its act, because this act is the first in the
justification of the ungodly; whereas in the order of nature, the other
virtues seem to precede, as that which is natural precedes that which
is accidental; because the other virtues seem to be necessary for man's
good, by reason of their very nature, whereas penance is only necessary
if something, viz. sin, be presupposed, as stated above ([4748]Q[55],
A[2]), when we spoke of the relation of the sacrament of penance to the
other sacraments aforesaid.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is to be taken as meaning that the act
of penance is the first in point of time, in comparison with the acts
of the other virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: In successive movements withdrawal from one
extreme precedes approach to the other, in point of time; and also in
the order of nature, if we consider the subject, i.e. the order of the
material cause; but if we consider the order of the efficient and final
causes, approach to the end is first, for it is this that the efficient
cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we consider
chiefly in the acts of the soul, as stated in Phys. ii.
Reply to Objection 3: Penance opens the door to the other virtues,
because it expels sin by the virtues of faith, hope and charity, which
precede it in the order of nature; yet it so opens the door to them
that they enter at the same time as it: because, in the justification
of the ungodly, at the same time as the free-will is moved towards God
and against sin, the sin is pardoned and grace infused, and with grace
all the virtues, as stated in the [4749]FS, Q[65], AA[3],5.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECT OF PENANCE, AS REGARDS THE PARDON OF MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effect of Penance; and (1) as regards the
pardon of mortal sins; (2) as regards the pardon of venial sins; (3) as
regards the return of sins which have been pardoned; (4) as regards the
recovery of the virtues.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all mortal sins are taken away by Penance?
(2) Whether they can be taken away without Penance?
(3) Whether one can be taken away without the other?
(4) Whether Penance takes away the guilt while the debt remains?
(5) Whether any remnants of sin remain?
(6) Whether the removal of sin is the effect of Penance as a virtue, or
as a sacrament?
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Whether all sins are taken away by Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all sins are taken away by Penance.
For the Apostle says (Heb. 12:17) that Esau "found no place of
repentance, although with tears he had sought it," which a gloss
explains as meaning that "he found no place of pardon and blessing
through Penance": and it is related (2 Macc. 9:13) of Antiochus, that
"this wicked man prayed to the Lord, of Whom he was not to obtain
mercy." Therefore it does not seem that all sins are taken away by
Penance.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i) that
"so great is the stain of that sin (namely, when a man, after coming to
the knowledge of God through the grace of Christ, resists fraternal
charity, and by the brands of envy combats grace itself) that he is
unable to humble himself in prayer, although he is forced by his wicked
conscience to acknowledge and confess his sin." Therefore not every sin
can be taken away by Penance.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 12:32): "He that shall speak
against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this
world nor in the world to come." Therefore not every sin can be
pardoned through Penance.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:22): "I will not remember"
any more "all his iniquities that he hath done."
I answer that, The fact that a sin cannot be taken away by Penance may
happen in two ways: first, because of the impossibility of repenting of
sin; secondly, because of Penance being unable to blot out a sin. In
the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be
blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in evil, so
that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but only as to the
punishment which they suffer, by reason of which they have a kind of
repentance, which yet is fruitless, according to Wis. 5:3: "Repenting,
and groaning for anguish of spirit." Consequently such Penance brings
no hope of pardon, but only despair. Nevertheless no sin of a wayfarer
can be such as that, because his will is flexible to good and evil.
Wherefore to say that in this life there is any sin of which one cannot
repent, is erroneous, first, because this would destroy free-will,
secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of grace,
whereby the heart of any sinner whatsoever can be moved to repent,
according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the
Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it."
It is also erroneous to say that any sin cannot be pardoned through
true Penance. First, because this is contrary to Divine mercy, of which
it is written (Joel 2:13) that God is "gracious and merciful, patient,
and rich in mercy, and ready to repent of the evil"; for, in a manner,
God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to be blotted out,
which God were unwilling to blot out. Secondly, because this would be
derogatory to the power of Christ's Passion, through which Penance
produces its effect, as do the other sacraments, since it is written (1
Jn. 2:2): "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only,
but also for those of the whole world."
Therefore we must say simply that, in this life, every sin can be
blotted out by true Penance.
Reply to Objection 1: Esau did not truly repent. This is evident from
his saying (Gn. 27:41): "The days will come of the mourning of my
father, and I will kill my brother Jacob." Likewise neither did
Antiochus repent truly; since he grieved for his past sin, not because
he had offended God thereby, but on account of the sickness which he
suffered in his body.
Reply to Objection 2: These words of Augustine should be understood
thus: "So great is the stain of that sin, that man is unable to humble
himself in prayer," i.e. it is not easy for him to do so; in which
sense we say that a man cannot be healed, when it is difficult to heal
him. Yet this is possible by the power of God's grace, which sometimes
turns men even "into the depths of the sea" (Ps. 67:23).
Reply to Objection 3: The word or blasphemy spoken against the Holy
Ghost is final impenitence, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xi),
which is altogether unpardonable, because after this life is ended,
there is no pardon of sins. or, if by the blasphemy against the Holy
Ghost, we understand sin committed through certain malice, this means
either that the blasphemy itself against the Holy Ghost is
unpardonable, i.e. not easily pardonable, or that such a sin does not
contain in itself any motive for pardon, or that for such a sin a man
is punished both in this and in the next world, as we explained in the
[4750]SS, Q[14], A[3].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin can be pardoned without Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin can be pardoned without Penance.
For the power of God is no less with regard to adults than with regard
to children. But He pardons the sins of children without Penance.
Therefore He also pardons adults without penance.
Objection 2: Further, God did not bind His power to the sacraments. But
Penance is a sacrament. Therefore by God's power sin can be pardoned
without Penance.
Objection 3: Further, God's mercy is greater than man's. Now man
sometimes forgives another for offending him, without his repenting:
wherefore our Lord commanded us (Mat. 5:44): "Love your enemies, do
good to them that hate you." Much more, therefore, does God pardon men
for offending him, without their repenting.
On the contrary, The Lord said (Jer. 18:8): "If that nation . . . shall
repent of their evil" which they have done, "I also will repent of the
evil that I have thought to do them," so that, on the other hand, if
man "do not penance," it seems that God will not pardon him his sin.
I answer that, It is impossible for a mortal actual sin to be pardoned
without penance, if we speak of penance as a virtue. For, as sin is an
offense against God, He pardons sin in the same way as he pardons an
offense committed against Him. Now an offense is directly opposed to
grace, since one man is said to be offended with another, because he
excludes him from his grace. Now, as stated in the [4751]FS, Q[110],
A[1], the difference between the grace of God and the grace of man, is
that the latter does not cause, but presupposes true or apparent
goodness in him who is graced, whereas the grace of God causes goodness
in the man who is graced, because the good-will of God, which is
denoted by the word "grace," is the cause of all created good. Hence it
is possible for a man to pardon an offense, for which he is offended
with someone, without any change in the latter's will; but it is
impossible that God pardon a man for an offense, without his will being
changed. Now the offense of mortal sin is due to man's will being
turned away from God, through being turned to some mutable good.
Consequently, for the pardon of this offense against God, it is
necessary for man's will to be so changed as to turn to God and to
renounce having turned to something else in the aforesaid manner,
together with a purpose of amendment; all of which belongs to the
nature of penance as a virtue. Therefore it is impossible for a sin to
be pardoned anyone without penance as a virtue.
But the sacrament of Penance, as stated above ([4752]Q[88], A[3]), is
perfected by the priestly office of binding and loosing, without which
God can forgive sins, even as Christ pardoned the adulterous woman, as
related in Jn. 8, and the woman that was a sinner, as related in Luke
vii, whose sins, however, He did not forgive without the virtue of
penance: for as Gregory states (Hom. xxxiii in Evang.), "He drew
inwardly by grace," i.e. by penance, "her whom He received outwardly by
His mercy."
Reply to Objection 1: In children there is none but original sin, which
consists, not in an actual disorder of the will, but in a habitual
disorder of nature, as explained in the [4753]FS, Q[82], A[1], and so
in them the forgiveness of sin is accompanied by a habitual change
resulting from the infusion of grace and virtues, but not by an actual
change. On the other hand, in the case of an adult, in whom there are
actual sins, which consist in an actual disorder of the will, there is
no remission of sins, even in Baptism, without an actual change of the
will, which is the effect of Penance.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes Penance as a sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: God's mercy is more powerful than man's, in that
it moves man's will to repent, which man's mercy cannot do.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another?
Objection 1: It would seem that by Penance one sin can be pardoned
without another. For it is written (Amos 4:7): "I caused it to rain
upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece
was rained upon: and the piece whereupon I rained not, withered." These
words are expounded by Gregory, who says (Hom. x super Ezech.): "When a
man who hates his neighbor, breaks himself of other vices, rain falls
on one part of the city, leaving the other part withered, for there are
some men who, when they prune some vices, become much more rooted in
others." Therefore one sin can be forgiven by Penance, without another.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose in commenting on Ps. 118, "Blessed are
the undefiled in the way," after expounding verse 136 ("My eyes have
sent forth springs of water"), says that "the first consolation is that
God is mindful to have mercy; and the second, that He punishes, for
although faith be wanting, punishment makes satisfaction and raises us
up." Therefore a man can be raised up from one sin, while the sin of
unbelief remains.
Objection 3: Further, when several things are not necessarily together,
one can be removed without the other. Now it was stated in the
[4754]FS, Q[73], A[1] that sins are not connected together, so that one
sin can be without another. Therefore also one sin can be taken away by
Penance without another being taken away.
Objection 4: Further, sins are the debts, for which we pray for pardon
when we say in the Lord's Prayer: "Forgive us our trespasses," etc. Now
man sometimes forgives one debt without forgiving another. Therefore
God also, by Penance, forgives one sin without another.
Objection 5: Further, man's sins are forgiven him through the love of
God, according to Jer. 31:3: "I have loved thee with an everlasting
love, therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity on thee." Now there is
nothing to hinder God from loving a man in one respect, while being
offended with him in another, even as He loves the sinner as regards
his nature, while hating him for his sin. Therefore it seems possible
for God, by Penance, to pardon one sin without another.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "There are many who
repent having sinned, but not completely; for they except certain
things which give them pleasure, forgetting that our Lord delivered
from the devil the man who was both dumb and deaf, whereby He shows us
that we are never healed unless it be from all sins."
I answer that, It is impossible for Penance to take one sin away
without another. First because sin is taken away by grace removing the
offense against God. Wherefore it was stated in the [4755]FS, Q[109],
A[7]; [4756]FS, Q[113], A[2] that without grace no sin can be forgiven.
Now every mortal sin is opposed to grace and excludes it. Therefore it
is impossible for one sin to be pardoned without another. Secondly,
because, as shown above [4757](A[2]) mortal sin cannot be forgiven
without true Penance, to which it belongs to renounce sin, by reason of
its being against God, which is common to all mortal sins: and where
the same reason applies, the result will be the same. Consequently a
man cannot be truly penitent, if he repent of one sin and not of
another. For if one particular sin were displeasing to him, because it
is against the love of God above all things (which motive is necessary
for true repentance), it follows that he would repent of all. Whence it
follows that it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned through
Penance, without another. Thirdly, because this would be contrary to
the perfection of God's mercy, since His works are perfect, as stated
in Dt. 32:4; wherefore whomsoever He pardons, He pardons altogether.
Hence Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of
which is unknown], that "it is irreverent and heretical to expect half
a pardon from Him Who is just and justice itself."
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Gregory do not refer to the
forgiveness of the guilt, but to the cessation from act, because
sometimes a man who has been wont to commit several kinds of sin,
renounces one and not the other; which is indeed due to God's
assistance, but does not reach to the pardon of the sin.
Reply to Objection 2: In this saying of Ambrose "faith" cannot denote
the faith whereby we believe in Christ, because, as Augustine says on
Jn. 15:22, "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have
sin" (viz. unbelief): "for this is the sin which contains all others":
but it stands for consciousness, because sometimes a man receives
pardon for a sin of which he is not conscious, through the punishment
which he bears patiently.
Reply to Objection 3: Although sins are not connected in so far as they
turn towards a mutable good, yet they are connected in so far as they
turn away from the immutable Good, which applies to all mortal sins in
common. and it is thus that they have the character of an offense which
needs to be removed by Penance.
Reply to Objection 4: Debt as regards external things, e.g. money, is
not opposed to friendship through which the debt is pardoned. hence one
debt can be condoned without another. On the other hand, the debt of
sin is opposed to friendship, and so one sin or offense is not pardoned
without another; for it would seem absurd for anyone to ask even a man
to forgive him one offense and not another.
Reply to Objection 5: The love whereby God loves man's nature, does not
ordain man to the good of glory from which man is excluded by any
mortal sin. but the love of grace, whereby mortal sin is forgiven,
ordains man to eternal life, according to Rom. 6:23: "The grace of God
(is) life everlasting." Hence there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven
through Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that no debt of punishment remains after the
guilt has been forgiven through Penance. For when the cause is removed,
the effect is removed. But the guilt is the cause of the debt of
punishment: since a man deserves to be punished because he has been
guilty of a sin. Therefore when the sin has been forgiven, no debt of
punishment can remain.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. 5) the gift of
Christ is more effective than the sin of Adam. Now, by sinning, man
incurs at the same time guilt and the debt of punishment. Much more
therefore, by the gift of grace, is the guilt forgiven and at the same
time the debt of punishment remitted.
Objection 3: Further, the forgiveness of sins is effected in Penance
through the power of Christ's Passion, according to Rom. 3:25: "Whom
God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His Blood . .
. for the remission of former sins." Now Christ's Passion made
satisfaction sufficient for all sins, as stated above (QQ[48],49,79,
A[5]). Therefore after the guilt has been pardoned, no debt of
punishment remains.
On the contrary, It is related (2 Kings 12:13) that when David penitent
had said to Nathan: "I have sinned against the Lord," Nathan said to
him: "The Lord also hath taken away thy sin, thou shalt not die.
Nevertheless . . . the child that is born to thee shall surely die,"
which was to punish him for the sin he had committed, as stated in the
same place. Therefore a debt of some punishment remains after the guilt
has been forgiven.
I answer that, As stated in the [4758]FS, Q[87], A[4], in mortal sin
there are two things, namely, a turning from the immutable Good, and an
inordinate turning to mutable good. Accordingly, in so far as mortal
sin turns away from the immutable Good, it induces a debt of eternal
punishment, so that whosoever sins against the eternal Good should be
punished eternally. Again, in so far as mortal sin turns inordinately
to a mutable good, it gives rise to a debt of some punishment, because
the disorder of guilt is not brought back to the order of justice,
except by punishment: since it is just that he who has been too
indulgent to his will, should suffer something against his will, for
thus will equality be restored. Hence it is written (Apoc. 18:7): "As
much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much
torment and sorrow give ye to her."
Since, however, the turning to mutable good is finite, sin does not, in
this respect, induce a debt of eternal punishment. Wherefore, if man
turns inordinately to a mutable good, without turning from God, as
happens in venial sins, he incurs a debt, not of eternal but of
temporal punishment. Consequently when guilt is pardoned through grace,
the soul ceases to be turned away from God, through being united to God
by grace: so that at the same time, the debt of punishment is taken
away, albeit a debt of some temporal punishment may yet remain.
Reply to Objection 1: Mortal sin both turns away from God and turns to
a created good. But, as stated in the [4759]FS, Q[71], A[6], the
turning away from God is as its form while the turning to created good
is as its matter. Now if the formal element of anything be removed, the
species is taken away: thus, if you take away rational, you take away
the human species. Consequently mortal sin is said to be pardoned from
the very fact that, by means of grace, the aversion of the mind from
God is taken away together with the debt of eternal punishment: and yet
the material element remains, viz. the inordinate turning to a created
good, for which a debt of temporal punishment is due.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the [4760]FS, Q[109], AA[7],8;
[4761]FS, Q[111], A[2], it belongs to grace to operate in man by
justifying him from sin, and to co-operate with man that his work may
be rightly done. Consequently the forgiveness of guilt and of the debt
of eternal punishment belongs to operating grace, while the remission
of the debt of temporal punishment belongs to co-operating grace, in so
far as man, by bearing punishment patiently with the help of Divine
grace, is released also from the debt of temporal punishment.
Consequently just as the effect of operating grace precedes the effect
of co-operating grace, so too, the remission of guilt and of eternal
punishment precedes the complete release from temporal punishment,
since both are from grace, but the former, from grace alone, the
latter, from grace and free-will.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion is of itself sufficient to
remove all debt of punishment, not only eternal, but also temporal; and
man is released from the debt of punishment according to the measure of
his share in the power of Christ's Passion. Now in Baptism man shares
the Power of Christ's Passion fully, since by water and the Spirit of
Christ, he dies with Him to sin, and is born again in Him to a new
life, so that, in Baptism, man receives the remission of all debt of
punishment. In Penance, on the other hand, man shares in the power of
Christ's Passion according to the measure of his own acts, which are
the matter of Penance, as water is of Baptism, as stated above
([4762]Q[84], AA[1],3). Wherefore the entire debt of punishment is not
remitted at once after the first act of Penance, by which act the guilt
is remitted, but only when all the acts of Penance have been completed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the remnants of sin are removed
when a mortal sin is forgiven. For Augustine says in De Poenitentia
[*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]:
"Our Lord never healed anyone without delivering him wholly; for He
wholly healed the man on the Sabbath, since He delivered his body from
all disease, and his soul from all taint." Now the remnants of sin
belong to the disease of sin. Therefore it does not seem possible for
any remnants of sin to remain when the guilt has been pardoned.
Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "good is
more efficacious than evil, since evil does not act save in virtue of
some good." Now, by sinning, man incurs the taint of sin all at once.
Much more, therefore, by repenting, is he delivered also from all
remnants of sin.
Objection 3: Further, God's work is more efficacious than man's. Now by
the exercise of good human works the remnants of contrary sins are
removed. Much more, therefore, are they taken away by the remission of
guilt, which is a work of God.
On the contrary, We read (Mk. 8) that the blind man whom our Lord
enlightened, was restored first of all to imperfect sight, wherefore he
said (Mk. 8:24): "I see men, as it were trees, walking"; and afterwards
he was restored perfectly, "so that he saw all things clearly." Now the
enlightenment of the blind man signifies the delivery of the sinner.
Therefore after the first remission of sin, whereby the sinner is
restored to spiritual sight, there still remain in him some remnants of
his past sin.
I answer that, Mortal sin, in so far as it turns inordinately to a
mutable good, produces in the soul a certain disposition, or even a
habit, if the acts be repeated frequently. Now it has been said above
[4763](A[4]) that the guilt of mortal sin is pardoned through grace
removing the aversion of the mind from God. Nevertheless when that
which is on the part of the aversion has been taken away by grace, that
which is on the part of the inordinate turning to a mutable good can
remain, since this may happen to be without the other, as stated above
[4764](A[4]). Consequently, there is no reason why, after the guilt has
been forgiven, the dispositions caused by preceding acts should not
remain, which are called the remnants of sin. Yet they remain weakened
and diminished, so as not to domineer over man, and they are after the
manner of dispositions rather than of habits, like the "fomes" which
remains after Baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: God heals the whole man perfectly; but sometimes
suddenly, as Peter's mother-in-law was restored at once to perfect
health, so that "rising she ministered to them" (Lk. 4:39), and
sometimes by degrees, as we said above ([4765]Q[44], A[3], ad 2) about
the blind man who was restored to sight (Mat. 8). And so too, He
sometimes turns the heart of man with such power, that it receives at
once perfect spiritual health, not only the guilt being pardoned, but
all remnants of sin being removed as was the case with Magdalen (Lk.
7); whereas at other times He sometimes first pardons the guilt by
operating grace, and afterwards, by co-operating grace, removes the
remnants of sin by degrees.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin too, sometimes induces at once a weak
disposition, such as is the result of one act, and sometimes a stronger
disposition, the result of many acts.
Reply to Objection 3: One human act does not remove all the remnants of
sin, because, as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. viii) "a vicious
man by doing good works will make but little progress so as to be any
better, but if he continue in good practice, he will end in being good
as to acquired virtue." But God's grace does this much more
effectively, whether by one or by several acts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the forgiveness of guilt is an effect of Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of guilt is not an
effect of penance as a virtue. For penance is said to be a virtue, in
so far as it is a principle of a human action. But human action does
nothing towards the remission of guilt, since this is an effect of
operating grace. Therefore the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect of
penance as a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, certain other virtues are more excellent than
penance. But the forgiveness of sin is not said to be the effect of any
other virtue. Neither, therefore, is it the effect of penance as a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is no forgiveness of sin except through the
power of Christ's Passion, according to Heb. 9:22: "Without shedding of
blood there is no remission." Now Penance, as a sacrament, produces its
effect through the power of Christ's Passion, even as the other
sacraments do, as was shown above ([4766]Q[62], AA[4],5). Therefore the
forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, not as a virtue, but as a
sacrament.
On the contrary, Properly speaking, the cause of a thing is that
without which it cannot be, since every defect depends on its cause.
Now forgiveness of sin can come from God without the sacrament of
Penance, but not without the virtue of penance, as stated above
([4767]Q[84], A[5], ad 3;[4768] Q[85], A[2]); so that, even before the
sacraments of the New Law were instituted, God pardoned the sins of the
penitent. Therefore the forgiveness of sin is chiefly the effect of
penance as a virtue.
I answer that, Penance is a virtue in so far as it is a principle of
certain human acts. Now the human acts, which are performed by the
sinner, are the material element in the sacrament of Penance. Moreover
every sacrament produces its effect, in virtue not only of its form,
but also of its matter. because both these together make the one
sacrament, as stated above ([4769]Q[60], A[6], ad 2, A[7]). Hence in
Baptism forgiveness of sin is effected, in virtue not only of the form
(but also of the matter, viz. water, albeit chiefly in virtue of the
form) [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition] from
which the water receives its power---and, similarly, the forgiveness of
sin is the effect of Penance, chiefly by the power of the keys, which
is vested in the ministers, who furnish the formal part of the
sacrament, as stated above ([4770]Q[84], A[3]), and secondarily by the
instrumentality of those acts of the penitent which pertain to the
virtue of penance, but only in so far as such acts are, in some way,
subordinate to the keys of the Church. Accordingly it is evident that
the forgiveness of sin is the effect of penance as a virtue, but still
more of Penance as a sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: The effect of operating grace is the
justification of the ungodly (as stated in the [4771]FS, Q[113]),
wherein there is, as was there stated ([4772]AA[1],2,3), not only
infusion of grace and forgiveness of sin, but also a movement of the
free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity,
and a movement of the free-will against sin, which is the act of
penance. Yet these human acts are there as the effects of operating
grace, and are produced at the same time as the forgiveness of sin.
Consequently the forgiveness of sin does not take place without an act
of the virtue of penance, although it is the effect of operating grace.
Reply to Objection 2: In the justification of the ungodly there is not
only an act of penance, but also an act of faith, as stated above (ad
1: [4773]FS, Q[113], A[4]). Wherefore the forgiveness of sin is
accounted the effect not only of the virtue of penance, but also, and
that chiefly, of faith and charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of the virtue of penance is subordinate
to Christ's Passion both by faith, and by its relation to the keys of
the Church; and so, in both ways, it causes the forgiveness of sin, by
the power of Christ's Passion.
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that the act of
the virtue of penance is necessary for the forgiveness of sin, through
being an inseparable effect of grace, whereby chiefly is sin pardoned,
and which produces its effect in all the sacraments. Consequently it
only follows that grace is a higher cause of the forgiveness of sin
than the sacrament of Penance. Moreover, it must be observed that,
under the Old Law and the law of nature, there was a sacrament of
Penance after a fashion, as stated above ([4774]Q[84], A[7], ad 2).
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OF THE REMISSION OF VENIAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the forgiveness of venial sins, under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance?
(2) Whether it can be forgiven without the infusion of grace?
(3) Whether venial sins are forgiven by the sprinkling of holy water, a
bishop's blessing, the beating of the breast, the Lord's Prayer, and
the like?
(4) Whether a venial sin can be taken away without a mortal sin?
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Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be forgiven without
penance. For, as stated above ([4775]Q[84], A[10], ad 4), it is
essential to true penance that man should not only sorrow for his past
sins, but also that he should purpose to avoid them for the future. Now
venial sins are forgiven without any such purpose, for it is certain
that man cannot lead the present life without committing venial sins.
Therefore venial sins can be forgiven without penance.
Objection 2: Further, there is no penance without actual displeasure at
one's sins. But venial sins can be taken away without any actual
displeasure at them, as would be the case if a man were to be killed in
his sleep, for Christ's sake, since he would go to heaven at once,
which would not happen if his venial sins remained. Therefore venial
sins can be forgiven without penance.
Objection 3: Further, venial sins are contrary to the fervor of
charity, as stated in the [4776]SS, Q[24], A[10]. Now one contrary is
removed by another. Therefore forgiveness of venial sins is caused by
the fervor of charity, which may be without actual displeasure at
venial sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown], that "there is a
penance which is done for venial sins in the Church every day" which
would be useless if venial sins could be forgiven without Penance.
I answer that, Forgiveness of sin, as stated above ([4777]Q[86], A[2]),
is effected by man being united to God from Whom sin separates him in
some way. Now this separation is made complete by mortal sin, and
incomplete by venial sin: because, by mortal sin, the mind through
acting against charity is altogether turned away from God; whereas by
venial sin man's affections are clogged, so that they are slow in
tending towards God. Consequently both kinds of sin are taken away by
penance, because by both of them man's will is disordered through
turning inordinately to a created good; for just as mortal sin cannot
be forgiven so long as the will is attached to sin, so neither can
venial sin, because while the cause remains, the effect remains.
Yet a more perfect penance is requisite for the forgiveness of mortal
sin, namely that man should detest actually the mortal sin which he
committed, so far as lies in his power, that is to say, he should
endeavor to remember each single mortal sin, in order to detest each
one. But this is, not required for the forgiveness of venial sins;
although it does not suffice to have habitual displeasure, which is
included in the habit of charity or of penance as a virtue, since then
venial sin would be incompatible with charity, which is evidently
untrue. Consequently it is necessary to have a certain virtual
displeasure, so that, for instance, a man's affections so tend to God
and Divine things, that whatever might happen to him to hamper that
tendency would be displeasing to him, and would grieve him, were he to
commit it, even though he were not to think of it actually: and this is
not sufficient for the remission of mortal sin, except as regards those
sins which he fails to remember after a careful examination.
Reply to Objection 1: When man is in a state of grace, he can avoid all
mortal sins, and each single one; and he can avoid each single venial
sin, but not all, as was explained in the [4778]FS, Q[74], A[8], ad 2;
[4779]FS, Q[109], A[8]. Consequently penance for mortal sins requires
man to purpose abstaining from mortal sins, all and each; whereas
penance for venial sins requires man to purpose abstaining from each,
but not from all, because the weakness of this life does not allow of
this. Nevertheless he needs to have the purpose of taking steps to
commit fewer venial sins, else he would be in danger of falling back,
if he gave up the desire of going forward, or of removing the obstacles
to spiritual progress, such as venial sins are.
Reply to Objection 2: Death for Christ's sake, as stated above
([4780]Q[66], A[11]), obtains the power of Baptism, wherefore it washes
away all sin, both venial and mortal, unless it find the will attached
to sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The fervor of charity implies virtual displeasure
at venial sins, as stated above ([4781]Q[79], A[4]).
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Whether infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of venial sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that infusion of grace is necessary for the
remission of venial sins. Because an effect is not produced without its
proper cause. Now the proper cause of the remission of sins is grace;
for man's sins are not forgiven through his own merits; wherefore it is
written (Eph. 2:4,5): "God, Who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding
charity, wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath
quickened us together in Christ, by Whose grace you are saved."
Therefore venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.
Objection 2: Further, venial sins are not forgiven without Penance. Now
grace is infused, in Penance as in the other sacraments of the New Law.
Therefore venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.
Objection 3: Further, venial sin produces a stain on the soul. Now a
stain is not removed save by grace which is the spiritual beauty of the
soul. Therefore it seems that venial sins are not forgiven without
infusion of grace.
On the contrary, The advent of venial sin neither destroys nor
diminishes grace, as stated in the [4782]SS, Q[24], A[10]. Therefore,
in like manner, an infusion of grace is not necessary in order to
remove venial sin.
I answer that, Each thing is removed by its contrary. But venial sin is
not contrary to habitual grace or charity, but hampers its act, through
man being too much attached to a created good, albeit not in opposition
to God, as stated in the [4783]FS, Q[88], A[1]; [4784]SS, Q[24], A[10].
Therefore, in order that venial sin be removed, it is not necessary
that habitual grace be infused, but a movement of grace or charity
suffices for its forgiveness.
Nevertheless, since in those who have the use of free-will (in whom
alone can there be venial sins), there can be no infusion of grace
without an actual movement of the free-will towards God and against
sin, consequently whenever grace is infused anew, venial sins are
forgiven.
Reply to Objection 1: Even the forgiveness of venial sins is an effect
of grace, in virtue of the act which grace produces anew, but not
through any habit infused anew into the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is never forgiven without some act,
explicit or implicit, of the virtue of penance, as stated above
[4785](A[1]): it can, however, be forgiven without the sacrament of
Penance, which is formally perfected by the priestly absolution, as
stated above (Q[87], A[2]). Hence it does not follow that infusion of
grace is required for the forgiveness of venial sin, for although this
infusion takes place in every sacrament, it does not occur in every act
of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as there are two kinds of bodily stain, one
consisting in the privation of something required for beauty, e.g. the
right color or the due proportion of members, and another by the
introduction of some hindrance to beauty, e.g. mud or dust; so too, a
stain is put on the soul, in one way, by the privation of the beauty of
grace through mortal sin, in another, by the inordinate inclination of
the affections to some temporal thing, and this is the result of venial
sin. Consequently, an infusion of grace is necessary for the removal of
mortal sin, but in order to remove venial sin, it is necessary to have
a movement proceeding from grace, removing the inordinate attachment to
the temporal thing.
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Whether venial sins are removed by the sprinkling of holy water and the
like?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are not removed by the
sprinkling of holy water, a bishop's blessing, and the like. For venial
sins are not forgiven without Penance, as stated above [4786](A[1]).
But Penance suffices by itself for the remission of venial sins.
Therefore the above have nothing to do with the remission of venial
sins.
Objection 2: Further, each of the above bears the same relation to one
venial sin as to all. If therefore, by means of one of them, some
venial sin is remitted, it follows that in like manner all are
remitted, so that by beating his breast once, or by being sprinkled
once with holy water, a man would be delivered from all his venial
sins, which seems unreasonable.
Objection 3: Further, venial sins occasion a debt of some punishment,
albeit temporal; for it is written (1 Cor. 3:12, 15) of him that builds
up "wood, hay, stubble" that "he shall be saved, yet so as by fire."
Now the above things whereby venial sins are said to be taken away,
contain either no punishment at all, or very little. Therefore they do
not suffice for the full remission of venial sins.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*Hom. 30 inter 1;
Ep. cclxv] that "for our slight sins we strike our breasts, and say:
Forgive us our trespasses," and so it seems that striking one's breast,
and the Lord's Prayer cause the remission of venial sins: and the same
seems to apply to the other things.
I answer that, As stated above [4787](A[2]), no infusion of fresh grace
is required for the forgiveness of a venial sin, but it is enough to
have an act proceeding from grace, in detestation of that venial sin,
either explicit or at least implicit, as when one is moved fervently to
God. Hence, for three reasons, certain things cause the remission of
venial sins: first, because they imply the infusion of grace, since the
infusion of grace removes venial sins, as stated above [4788](A[2]);
and so, by the Eucharist, Extreme Unction, and by all the sacraments of
the New Law without exception, wherein grace is conferred, venial sins
are remitted. Secondly, because they imply a movement of detestation
for sin, and in this way the general confession [*i.e. the recital of
the Confiteor or of an act of contrition], the beating of one's breast,
and the Lord's Prayer conduce to the remission of venial sins, for we
ask in the Lord's Prayer: "Forgive us our trespasses." Thirdly, because
they include a movement of reverence for God and Divine things; and in
this way a bishop's blessing, the sprinkling of holy water, any
sacramental anointing, a prayer said in a dedicated church, and
anything else of the kind, conduce to the remission of venial sins.
Reply to Objection 1: All these things cause the remission of venial
sins, in so far as they incline the soul to the movement of penance,
viz., the implicit or explicit detestation of one's sins.
Reply to Objection 2: All these things, so far as they are concerned,
conduce to the remission of all venial sins: but the remission may be
hindered as regards certain venial sins, to which the mind is still
actually attached, even as insincerity sometimes impedes the effect of
Baptism.
Reply to Objection 3: By the above things, venial sins are indeed taken
away as regards the guilt, both because those things are a kind of
satisfaction, and through the virtue of charity whose movement is
aroused by such things.
Yet it does not always happen that, by means of each one, the whole
guilt of punishment is taken away, because, in that case, whoever was
entirely free from mortal sin, would go straight to heaven if sprinkled
with holy water: but the debt of punishment is remitted by means of the
above, according to the movement of fervor towards God, which fervor is
aroused by such things, sometimes more, sometimes less.
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Whether venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be taken away without
mortal sin. For, on Jn. 8:7: "He that is without sin among you, let him
first cast a stone at her," a gloss says that "all those men were in a
state of mortal sin: for venial offenses were forgiven them through the
legal ceremonies." Therefore venial sin can be taken away without
mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, no infusion of grace is required for the
remission of venial sin. but it is required for the forgiveness of
mortal sin. Therefore venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, a venial sin differs from a mortal sin more than
from another venial sin. But one venial sin can be pardoned without
another, as stated above (A[3], ad 2;[4789] Q[87], A[3]). Therefore a
venial sin can be taken away without a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:26): "Amen I say to thee, thou
shalt not go out from thence," viz., from the prison, into which a man
is cast for mortal sin, "till thou repay the last farthing," by which
venial sin is denoted. Therefore a venial sin is not forgiven without
mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([4790]Q[87], A[3]), there is no
remission of any sin whatever except by the power of grace, because, as
the Apostle declares (Rom. 4:8), it is owing to God's grace that He
does not impute sin to a man, which a gloss on that passage expounds as
referring to venial sin. Now he that is in a state of mortal sin is
without the grace of God. Therefore no venial sin is forgiven him.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial offenses, in the passage quoted, denote
the irregularities or uncleannesses which men contracted in accordance
with the Law.
Reply to Objection 2: Although no new infusion of habitual grace is
requisite for the remission of venial sin, yet it is necessary to
exercise some act of grace, which cannot be in one who is a subject of
mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Venial sin does not preclude every act of grace
whereby all venial sins can be removed; whereas mortal sin excludes
altogether the habit of grace, without which no sin, either mortal or
venial, is remitted. Hence the comparison fails.
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OF THE RETURN OF SINS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY BY PENANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the return of sins which have been taken away by
Penance: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sins which have been taken away by Penance return simply
through a subsequent sin?
(2) Whether more specially as regards certain sins they return, in a
way, on account of ingratitude?
(3) Whether the debt of punishment remains the same for sins thus
returned?
(4) Whether this ingratitude, on account of which sins return, is a
special sin?
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Whether sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins once forgiven return through a
subsequent sin. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. i, 12): "Our
Lord teaches most explicitly in the Gospel that sins which have been
forgiven return, when fraternal charity ceases, in the example of the
servant from whom his master exacted the payment of the debt already
forgiven, because he had refused to forgive the debt of his
fellow-servant." Now fraternal charity is destroyed through each mortal
sin. Therefore sins already taken away through Penance, return through
each subsequent mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, on Lk. 11:24, "I will return into my house,
whence I came out," Bede says: "This verse should make us tremble, we
should not endeavor to explain it away lest through carelessness we
give place to the sin which we thought to have been taken away, and
become its slave once more." Now this would not be so unless it
returned. Therefore a sin returns after once being taken away by
Penance.
Objection 3: Further, the Lord said (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man
turn himself away from his justice, and do iniquity . . . all his
justices which he hath done, shall not be remembered." Now among the
other "justices" which he had done, is also his previous penance, since
it was said above ([4791]Q[85], A[3]) that penance is a part of
justice. Therefore when one who has done penance, sins, his previous
penance, whereby he received forgiveness of his sins, is not imputed to
him. Therefore his sins return.
Objection 4: Further, past sins are covered by grace, as the Apostle
declares (Rom. 4:7) where he quotes Ps. 31:1: "Blessed are they whose
iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered." But a subsequent
mortal sin takes away grace. Therefore the sins committed previously,
become uncovered: and so, seemingly, they return.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 11:29): "The gifts and the
calling of God are without repentance." Now the penitent's sins are
taken away by a gift of God. Therefore the sins which have been taken
away do not return through a subsequent sin, as though God repented His
gift of forgiveness.
Moreover, Augustine says (Lib. Resp. Prosperi i [*Cf. Prosper,
Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum ii]): "When he that turns away from
Christ, comes to the end of this life a stranger to grace, whither does
he go, except to perdition? Yet he does not fall back into that which
had been forgiven, nor will he be condemned for original sin."
I answer that, As stated above ([4792]Q[86], A[4]), mortal sin contains
two things, aversion from God and adherence to a created good. Now, in
mortal sin, whatever attaches to the aversion, is, considered in
itself, common to all mortal sins, since man turns away from God by
every mortal sin, so that, in consequence, the stain resulting from the
privation of grace, and the debt of everlasting punishment are common
to all mortal sins. This is what is meant by what is written (James
2:10): "Whosoever . . . shall offend in one point, is become guilty of
all." On the other hand, as regards their adherence they are different
from, and sometimes contrary to one another. Hence it is evident, that
on the part of the adherence, a subsequent mortal sin does not cause
the return of mortal sins previously dispelled, else it would follow
that by a sin of wastefulness a man would be brought back to the habit
or disposition of avarice previously dispelled, so that one contrary
would be the cause of another, which is impossible. But if in mortal
sins we consider that which attaches to the aversion absolutely, then a
subsequent mortal sin [causes the return of that which was comprised in
the mortal sins before they were pardoned, in so far as the subsequent
mortal sin] [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine
edition.] deprives man of grace, and makes him deserving of everlasting
punishment, just as he was before. Nevertheless, since the aversion of
mortal sin is [in a way, caused by the adherence, those things which
attach to the aversion are*] diversified somewhat in relation to
various adherences, as it were to various causes, so that there will be
a different aversion, a different stain, a different debt of
punishment, according to the different acts of mortal sin from which
they arise; hence the question is moved whether the stain and the debt
of eternal punishment, as caused by acts of sins previously pardoned,
return through a subsequent mortal sin.
Accordingly some have maintained that they return simply even in this
way. But this is impossible, because what God has done cannot be undone
by the work of man. Now the pardon of the previous sins was a work of
Divine mercy, so that it cannot be undone by man's subsequent sin,
according to Rom. 3:3: "Shall their unbelief make the faith of God
without effect?"
Wherefore others who maintained the possibility of sins returning, said
that God pardons the sins of a penitent who will afterwards sin again,
not according to His foreknowledge, but only according to His present
justice: since He foresees that He will punish such a man eternally for
his sins, and yet, by His grace, He makes him righteous for the
present. But this cannot stand: because if a cause be placed
absolutely, its effect is placed absolutely; so that if the remission
of sins were effected by grace and the sacraments of grace, not
absolutely but under some condition dependent on some future event, it
would follow that grace and the sacraments of grace are not the
sufficient causes of the remission of sins, which is erroneous, as
being derogatory to God's grace.
Consequently it is in no way possible for the stain of past sins and
the debt of punishment incurred thereby, to return, as caused by those
acts. Yet it may happen that a subsequent sinful act virtually contains
the debt of punishment due to the previous sin, in so far as when a man
sins a second time, for this very reason he seems to sin more
grievously than before, as stated in Rom. 2:5: "According to thy
hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath
against the day of wrath," from the mere fact, namely, that God's
goodness, which waits for us to repent, is despised. And so much the
more is God's goodness despised, if the first sin is committed a second
time after having been forgiven, as it is a greater favor for the sin
to be forgiven than for the sinner to be endured.
Accordingly the sin which follows repentance brings back, in a sense,
the debt of punishment due to the sins previously forgiven, not as
caused by those sins already forgiven but as caused by this last sin
being committed, on account of its being aggravated in view of those
previous sins. This means that those sins return, not simply, but in a
restricted sense, viz., in so far as they are virtually contained in
the subsequent sin.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine seems to refer to the
return of sins as to the debt of eternal punishment considered in
itself, namely, that he who sins after doing penance incurs a debt of
eternal punishment, just as before, but not altogether for the same
"reason." Wherefore Augustine, after saying (Lib. Resp. Prosperi i
[*Cf. Prosper, Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum ii]) that "he does not
fall back into that which was forgiven, nor will he be condemned for
original sin," adds: "Nevertheless, for these last sins he will be
condemned to the same death, which he deserved to suffer for the
former," because he incurs the punishment of eternal death which he
deserved for his previous sins.
Reply to Objection 2: By these words Bede means that the guilt already
forgiven enslaves man, not by the return of his former debt of
punishment, but by the repetition of his act.
Reply to Objection 3: The effect of a subsequent sin is that the former
"justices" are not remembered, in so far as they were deserving of
eternal life, but not in so far as they were a hindrance to sin.
Consequently if a man sins mortally after making restitution, he does
not become guilty as though he had not paid back what he owed; and much
less is penance previously done forgotten as to the pardon of the
guilt, since this is the work of God rather than of man.
Reply to Objection 4: Grace removes the stain and the debt of eternal
punishment simply; but it covers the past sinful acts, lest, on their
account, God deprive man of grace, and judge him deserving of eternal
punishment; and what grace has once done, endures for ever.
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Whether sins that have been forgiven, return through ingratitude which is
shown especially in four kinds of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not return through ingratitude,
which is shown especially in four kinds of sin, viz., hatred of one's
neighbor, apostasy from faith, contempt of confession and regret for
past repentance, and which have been expressed in the following verse:
"Fratres odit, apostata fit, spernitque, fateri,
Poenituisse piget, pristina culpa redit."
For the more grievous the sin committed against God after one has
received the grace of pardon, the greater the ingratitude. But there
are sins more grievous than these, such as blasphemy against God, and
the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that sins already
pardoned do not return through ingratitude as manifested in these sins,
any more than as shown in other sins.
Objection 2: Further, Rabanus says: "God delivered the wicked servant
to the torturers, until he should pay the whole debt, because a man
will be deemed punishable not only for the sins he commits after
Baptism, but also for original sin which was taken away when he was
baptized." Now venial sins are reckoned among our debts, since we pray
in their regard: "Forgive us our trespasses [debita]." Therefore they
too return through ingratitude; and, in like manner seemingly, sins
already pardoned return through venial sins, and not only through those
sins mentioned above.
Objection 3: Further, ingratitude is all the greater, according as one
sins after receiving a greater favor. Now innocence whereby one avoids
sin is a Divine favor, for Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Whatever sins
I have avoided committing, I owe it to Thy grace." Now innocence is a
greater gift, than even the forgiveness of all sins. Therefore the
first sin committed after innocence is no less an ingratitude to God,
than a sin committed after repentance, so that seemingly ingratitude in
respect of the aforesaid sins is not the chief cause of sins returning.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii [*Cf. Dial. iv]): "It is
evident from the words of the Gospel that if we do not forgive from our
hearts the offenses committed against us, we become once more
accountable for what we rejoiced in as forgiven through Penance": so
that ingratitude implied in the hatred of one's brother is a special
cause of the return of sins already forgiven: and the same seems to
apply to the others.
I answer that, As stated above [4793](A[1]), sins pardoned through
Penance are said to return, in so far as their debt of punishment, by
reason of ingratitude, is virtually contained in the subsequent sin.
Now one may be guilty of ingratitude in two ways: first by doing
something against the favor received, and, in this way, man is
ungrateful to God in every mortal sin whereby he offends God Who
forgave his sins, so that by every subsequent mortal sin, the sins
previously pardoned return, on account of the ingratitude. Secondly,
one is guilty of ingratitude, by doing something not only against the
favor itself, but also against the form of the favor received. If this
form be considered on the part of the benefactor, it is the remission
of something due to him; wherefore he who does not forgive his brother
when he asks pardon, and persists in his hatred, acts against this
form. If, however, this form be taken in regard to the penitent who
receives this favor, we find on his part a twofold movement of the
free-will. The first is the movement of the free-will towards God, and
is an act of faith quickened by charity; and against this a man acts by
apostatizing from the faith. The second is a movement of the free-will
against sin, and is the act of penance. This act consists first, as we
have stated above (Q[85], AA[2],5) in man's detestation of his past
sins; and against this a man acts when he regrets having done penance.
Secondly, the act of penance consists in the penitent purposing to
subject himself to the keys of the Church by confession, according to
Ps. 31:5: "I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the
Lord: and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin": and against
this a man acts when he scorns to confess as he had purposed to do.
Accordingly it is said that the ingratitude of sinners is a special
cause of the return of sins previously forgiven.
Reply to Objection 1: This is not said of these sins as though they
were more grievous than others, but because they are more directly
opposed to the favor of the forgiveness of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Even venial sins and original sin return in the
way explained above, just as mortal sins do, in so far as the favor
conferred by God in forgiving those sins is despised. A man does not,
however, incur ingratitude by committing a venial sin, because by
sinning venially man does not act against God, but apart from Him,
wherefore venial sins nowise cause the return of sins already forgiven.
Reply to Objection 3: A favor can be weighed in two ways. First by the
quantity of the favor itself, and in this way innocence is a greater
favor from God than penance, which is called the second plank after
shipwreck (cf.[4794] Q[84], A[6]). Secondly, a favor may be weighed
with regard to the recipient, who is less worthy, wherefore a greater
favor is bestowed on him, so that he is the more ungrateful if he
scorns it. In this way the favor of the pardon of sins is greater when
bestowed on one who is altogether unworthy, so that the ingratitude
which follows is all the greater.
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Whether the debt of punishment that arises through ingratitude in respect o
f
a subsequent sin is as great as that of the sins previously pardoned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment arising through
ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as that of the
sins previously pardoned. Because the greatness of the favor of the
pardon of sins is according to the greatness of the sin pardoned, and
so too, in consequence, is the greatness of the ingratitude whereby
this favor is scorned. But the greatness of the consequent debt of
punishment is in accord with the greatness of the ingratitude.
Therefore the debt of punishment arising through ingratitude in respect
of a subsequent sin is as great as the debt of punishment due for all
the previous sins.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater sin to offend God than to offend
man. But a slave who is freed by his master returns to the same state
of slavery from which he was freed, or even to a worse state. Much more
therefore he that sins against God after being freed from sin, returns
to the debt of as great a punishment as he had incurred before.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 18:34) that "his lord being
angry, delivered him" (whose sins returned to him on account of his
ingratitude) "to the torturers, until he paid all the debt." But this
would not be so unless the debt of punishment incurred through
ingratitude were as great as that incurred through all previous sins.
Therefore an equal debt of punishment returns through ingratitude.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to the measure of
the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be," whence it is evident
that a great debt of punishment does not arise from a slight sin. But
sometimes a subsequent mortal sin is much less grievous than any one of
those previously pardoned. Therefore the debt of punishment incurred
through subsequent sins is not equal to that of sins previously
forgiven.
I answer that, Some have maintained that the debt of punishment
incurred through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is equal to
that of the sins previously pardoned, in addition to the debt proper to
this subsequent sin. But there is no need for this, because, as stated
above [4795](A[1]), the debt of punishment incurred by previous sins
does not return on account of a subsequent sin, as resulting from the
acts of the subsequent sin. Wherefore the amount of the debt that
returns must be according to the gravity of the subsequent sin.
It is possible, however, for the gravity of the subsequent sin to equal
the gravity of all previous sins. But it need not always be so, whether
we speak of the gravity which a sin has from its species (since the
subsequent sin may be one of simple fornication, while the previous
sins were adulteries, murders, or sacrileges); or of the gravity which
it incurs through the ingratitude connected with it. For it is not
necessary that the measure of ingratitude should be exactly equal to
the measure of the favor received, which latter is measured according
to the greatness of the sins previously pardoned. Because it may happen
that in respect of the same favor, one man is very ungrateful, either
on account of the intensity of his scorn for the favor received, or on
account of the gravity of the offense committed against the benefactor,
while another man is slightly ungrateful, either because his scorn is
less intense, or because his offense against the benefactor is less
grave. But the measure of ingratitude is proportionately equal to the
measure of the favor received: for supposing an equal contempt of the
favor, or an equal offense against the benefactor, the ingratitude will
be so much the greater, as the favor received is greater.
Hence it is evident that the debt of punishment incurred by a
subsequent sin need not always be equal to that of previous sins; but
it must be in proportion thereto, so that the more numerous or the
greater the sins previously pardoned, the greater must be the debt of
punishment incurred by any subsequent mortal sin whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: The favor of the pardon of sins takes its
absolute quantity from the quantity of the sins previously pardoned:
but the sin of ingratitude does not take its absolute quantity from the
measure of the favor bestowed, but from the measure of the contempt or
of the offense, as stated above: and so the objection does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: A slave who has been given his freedom is not
brought back to his previous state of slavery for any kind of
ingratitude, but only when this is grave.
Reply to Objection 3: He whose forgiven sins return to him on account
of subsequent ingratitude, incurs the debt for all, in so far as the
measure of his previous sins is contained proportionally in his
subsequent ingratitude, but not absolutely, as stated above.
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Whether the ingratitude whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of
previous sins, is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ingratitude, whereby a subsequent
sin causes the return of sins previously forgiven, is a special sin.
For the giving of thanks belongs to counterpassion which is a necessary
condition of justice, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. v, 5). But
justice is a special virtue. Therefore this ingratitude is a special
sin.
Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that thanksgiving
is a special virtue. But ingratitude is opposed to thanksgiving.
Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.
Objection 3: Further, a special effect proceeds from a special cause.
Now ingratitude has a special effect, viz. the return, after a fashion,
of sins already forgiven. Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.
On the contrary, That which is a sequel to every sin is not a special
sin. Now by any mortal sin whatever, a man becomes ungrateful to God,
as evidenced from what has been said [4796](A[1]). Therefore
ingratitude is not a special sin.
I answer that, The ingratitude of the sinner is sometimes a special
sin; and sometimes it is not, but a circumstance arising from all
mortal sins in common committed against God. For a sin takes its
species according to the sinner's intention, wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery in order to steal is a
thief rather than an adulterer."
If, therefore, a sinner commits a sin in contempt of God and of the
favor received from Him, that sin is drawn to the species of
ingratitude, and in this way a sinner's ingratitude is a special sin.
If, however, a man, while intending to commit a sin, e.g. murder or
adultery, is not withheld from it on account of its implying contempt
of God, his ingratitude will not be a special sin, but will be drawn to
the species of the other sin, as a circumstance thereof. And, as
Augustine observes (De Nat. et Grat. xxix), not every sin implies
contempt of God in His commandments. Therefore it is evident that the
sinner's ingratitude is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first (three)
objections prove that ingratitude is in itself a special sin; while the
last objection proves that ingratitude, as included in every sin, is
not a special sin.
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OF THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE BY MEANS OF PENANCE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the recovery of virtues by means of Penance, under
which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether virtues are restored through Penance?
(2) Whether they are restored in equal measure?
(3) Whether equal dignity is restored to the penitent?
(4) Whether works of virtue are deadened by subsequent sin?
(5) Whether works deadened by sin revive through Penance?
(6) Whether dead works, i.e. works that are done without charity, are
quickened by Penance?
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Whether the virtues are restored through Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are not restored through
penance. Because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless
penance be the cause of virtue. But, since penance is itself a virtue,
it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and all the more, since some
virtues naturally precede penance, viz., faith, hope, and charity, as
stated above ([4797]Q[85], A[6]). Therefore the virtues are not
restored through penance.
Objection 2: Further, Penance consists in certain acts of the penitent.
But the gratuitous virtues are not caused through any act of ours: for
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18: In Ps. 118) that "God forms the
virtues in us without us." Therefore it seems that the virtues are not
restored through Penance.
Objection 3: Further, he that has virtue performs works of virtue with
ease and pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "a
man is not just if he does not rejoice in just deeds." Now many
penitents find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore the
virtues are not restored through Penance.
On the contrary, We read (Lk. 15:22) that the father commanded his
penitent son to be clothed in "the first robe," which, according to
Ambrose (Expos. in Luc. vii), is the "mantle of wisdom," from which all
the virtues flow together, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore all
the virtues are restored through Penance.
I answer that, Sins are pardoned through Penance, as stated above
(Q[86] , A[1]). But there can be no remission of sins except through
the infusion of grace. Wherefore it follows that grace is infused into
man through Penance. Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from grace,
even as all the powers result from the essence of the soul; as stated
in the [4798]FS, Q[110], A[4], ad 1. Therefore all the virtues are
restored through Penance.
Reply to Objection 1: Penance restores the virtues in the same way as
it causes grace, as stated above ([4799]Q[86], A[1]). Now it is a cause
of grace, in so far as it is a sacrament, because, in so far as it is a
virtue, it is rather an effect of grace. Consequently it does not
follow that penance, as a virtue, needs to be the cause of all the
other virtues, but that the habit of penance together with the habits
of the other virtues is caused through the sacrament of Penance.
Reply to Objection 2: In the sacrament of Penance human acts stand as
matter, while the formal power of this sacrament is derived from the
power of the keys. Consequently the power of the keys causes grace and
virtue effectively indeed, but instrumentally; and the first act of the
penitent, viz., contrition, stands as ultimate disposition to the
reception of grace, while the subsequent acts of Penance proceed from
the grace and virtues which are already there.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4800]Q[86], A[5]), sometimes
after the first act of Penance, which is contrition, certain remnants
of sin remain, viz. dispositions caused by previous acts, the result
being that the penitent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue.
Nevertheless, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the
other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of virtue with
pleasure and ease. even as a virtuous man may accidentally find it hard
to do an act of virtue, on account of sleepiness or some indisposition
of the body.
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Whether, after Penance, man rises again to equal virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that, after Penance, man rises again to
equal virtue. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:28): "To them that love God
all things work together unto good," whereupon a gloss of Augustine
says that "this is so true that, if any such man goes astray and
wanders from the path, God makes even this conduce to his good." But
this would not be true if he rose again to lesser virtue. Therefore it
seems that a penitent never rises again to lesser virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Cf. Hypognosticon iii, an
anonymous work falsely ascribed to St. Augustine] that "Penance is a
very good thing, for it restores every defect to a state of
perfection." But this would not be true unless virtues were recovered
in equal measure. Therefore equal virtue is always recovered through
Penance.
Objection 3: Further, on Gn. 1:5: "There was evening and morning, one
day," a gloss says: "The evening light is that from which we fall the
morning light is that to which we rise again." Now the morning light is
greater than the evening light. Therefore a man rises to greater grace
or charity than that which he had before; which is confirmed by the
Apostle's words (Rom. 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace did more
abound."
On the contrary, Charity whether proficient or perfect is greater than
incipient charity. But sometimes a man falls from proficient charity,
and rises again to incipient charity. Therefore man always rises again
to less virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[86], A[6], ad 3; Q[89], A[1], ad 2),
the movement of the free-will, in the justification of the ungodly, is
the ultimate disposition to grace; so that in the same instant there is
infusion of grace together with the aforesaid movement of the
free-will, as stated in the [4801]FS, Q[113], AA[5],7, which movement
includes an act of penance, as stated above (Q[86], A[2]). But it is
evident that forms which admit of being more or less, become intense or
remiss, according to the different dispositions of the subject, as
stated in the [4802]FS, Q[52], AA[1],2; [4803]FS, Q[66], A[1]. Hence it
is that, in Penance, according to the degree of intensity or remissness
in the movement of the free-will, the penitent receives greater or
lesser grace. Now the intensity of the penitent's movement may be
proportionate sometimes to a greater grace than that from which man
fell by sinning, sometimes to an equal grace, sometimes to a lesser.
Wherefore the penitent sometimes arises to a greater grace than that
which he had before, sometimes to an equal, sometimes to a lesser
grace: and the same applies to the virtues, which flow from grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The very fact of falling away from the love of
God by sin, does not work unto the good of all those who love God,
which is evident in the case of those who fall and never rise again, or
who rise and fall yet again; but only to the good of "such as according
to His purpose are called to be saints," viz. the predestined, who,
however often they may fall, yet rise again finally. Consequently good
comes of their falling, not that they always rise again to greater
grace, but that they rise to more abiding grace, not indeed on the part
of grace itself, because the greater the grace, the more abiding it is,
but on the part of man, who, the more careful and humble he is, abides
the more steadfastly in grace. Hence the same gloss adds that "their
fall conduces to their good, because they rise more humble and more
enlightened."
Reply to Objection 2: Penance, considered in itself, has the power to
bring all defects back to perfection, and even to advance man to a
higher state; but this is sometimes hindered on the part of man, whose
movement towards God and in detestation of sin is too remiss, just as
in Baptism adults receive a greater or a lesser grace, according to the
various ways in which they prepare themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: This comparison of the two graces to the evening
and morning light is made on account of a likeness of order, since the
darkness of night follows after the evening light, and the light of day
after the light of morning, but not on account of a likeness of greater
or lesser quantity. Again, this saying of the Apostle refers to the
grace of Christ, which abounds more than any number of man's sins. Nor
is it true of all, that the more their sins abound, the more abundant
grace they receive, if we measure habitual grace by the quantity. Grace
is, however, more abundant, as regards the very notion of grace,
because to him who sins more a more "gratuitous" favor is vouchsafed by
his pardon; although sometimes those whose sins abound, abound also in
sorrow, so that they receive a more abundant habit of grace and virtue,
as was the case with Magdalen.
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense it must be replied that
in one and the same man proficient grace is greater than incipient
grace, but this is not necessarily the case in different men, for one
begins with a greater grace than another has in the state of
proficiency: thus Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): "Let all, both now and
hereafter, acknowledge how perfectly the boy Benedict turned to the
life of grace from the very beginning."
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Whether, by Penance, man is restored to his former dignity?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not restored by Penance to his
former dignity: because a gloss on Amos 5:2, "The virgin of Israel is
cast down," observes: "It is not said that she cannot rise up, but that
the virgin of Israel shall not rise; because the sheep that has once
strayed, although the shepherd bring it back on his shoulder, has not
the same glory as if it had never strayed." Therefore man does not,
through Penance, recover his former dignity.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says: "Whoever fail to preserve the
dignity of the sacred order, must be content with saving their souls;
for it is a difficult thing to return to their former degree." Again,
Pope Innocent I says (Ep. vi ad Agapit.) that "the canons framed at the
council of Nicaea exclude penitents from even the lowest orders of
clerics." Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former
dignity.
Objection 3: Further, before sinning a man can advance to a higher
sacred order. But this is not permitted to a penitent after his sin,
for it is written (Ezech. 44:10, 13): "The Levites that went away . . .
from Me . . . shall never [Vulg.: 'not'] come near to Me, to do the
office of priest": and as laid down in the Decretals (Dist. 1, ch. 52),
and taken from the council of Lerida: "If those who serve at the Holy
Altar fall suddenly into some deplorable weakness of the flesh, and by
God's mercy do proper penance, let them return to their duties, yet so
as not to receive further promotion." Therefore Penance does not
restore man to his former dignity.
On the contrary, As we read in the same Distinction, Gregory writing to
Secundinus (Regist. vii) says: "We consider that when a man has made
proper satisfaction, he may return to his honorable position": and
moreover we read in the acts of the council of Agde: "Contumacious
clerics, so far as their position allows, should be corrected by their
bishops. so that when Penance has reformed them, they may recover their
degree and dignity."
I answer that, By sin, man loses a twofold dignity, one in respect of
God, the other in respect of the Church. In respect of God he again
loses a twofold dignity. one is his principal dignity, whereby he was
counted among the children of God, and this he recovers by Penance,
which is signified (Lk. 15) in the prodigal son, for when he repented,
his father commanded that the first garment should be restored to him,
together with a ring and shoes. The other is his secondary dignity,
viz. innocence, of which, as we read in the same chapter, the elder son
boasted saying (Lk. 15:29): "Behold, for so many years do I serve thee,
and I have never transgressed thy commandments": and this dignity the
penitent cannot recover. Nevertheless he recovers something greater
sometimes; because as Gregory says (Hom. de centum Ovibus, 34 in
Evang.), "those who acknowledge themselves to have strayed away from
God, make up for their past losses, by subsequent gains: so that there
is more joy in heaven on their account, even as in battle, the
commanding officer thinks more of the soldier who, after running away,
returns and bravely attacks the foe, than of one who has never turned
his back, but has done nothing brave."
By sin man loses his ecclesiastical dignity, because thereby he becomes
unworthy of those things which appertain to the exercise of the
ecclesiastical dignity. This he is debarred from recovering: first,
because he fails to repent; wherefore Isidore wrote to the bishop
Masso, and as we read in the Distinction quoted above (OBJ[3]): "The
canons order those to be restored to their former degree, who by
repentance have made satisfaction for their sins, or have made worthy
confession of them. On the other hand, those who do not mend their
corrupt and wicked ways are neither allowed to exercise their order,
nor received to the grace of communion."
Secondly, because he does penance negligently, wherefore it is written
in the same Distinction (OBJ 3): "We can be sure that those who show no
signs of humble compunction, or of earnest prayer, who avoid fasting or
study, would exercise their former duties with great negligence if they
were restored to them."
Thirdly, if he has committed a sin to which an irregularity is
attached; wherefore it is said in the same Distinction (OBJ[3]),
quoting the council of Pope Martin [*Martin, bishop of Braga]: "If a
man marry a widow or the relict of another, he must not be admitted to
the ranks of the clergy: and if he has succeeded in creeping in, he
must be turned out. In like manner, if anyone after Baptism be guilty
of homicide, whether by deed, or by command, or by counsel, or in
self-defense." But this is in consequence not of sin, but of
irregularity.
Fourthly, on account of scandal, wherefore it is said in the same
Distinction (OBJ[3]): "Those who have been publicly convicted or caught
in the act of perjury, robbery, fornication, and of such like crimes,
according to the prescription of the sacred canons must be deprived of
the exercise of their respective orders, because it is a scandal to
God's people that such persons should be placed over them. But those
who commit such sins occultly and confess them secretly to a priest,
may be retained in the exercise of their respective orders, with the
assurance of God's merciful forgiveness, provided they be careful to
expiate their sins by fasts and alms, vigils and holy deeds." The same
is expressed (Extra, De Qual. Ordinand.): "If the aforesaid crimes are
not proved by a judicial process, or in some other way made notorious,
those who are guilty of them must not be hindered, after they have done
penance, from exercising the orders they have received, or from
receiving further orders, except in cases of homicide."
Reply to Objection 1: The same is to be said of the recovery of
virginity as of the recovery of innocence which belongs to man's
secondary dignity in the sight of God.
Reply to Objection 2: In these words Jerome does not say that it is
impossible, but that it is difficult, for man to recover his former
dignity after having sinned, because this is allowed to none but those
who repent perfectly, as stated above. To those canonical statutes,
which seem to forbid this, Augustine replies in his letter to Boniface
(Ep. clxxxv): "If the law of the Church forbids anyone, after doing
penance for a crime, to become a cleric, or to return to his clerical
duties, or to retain them the intention was not to deprive him of the
hope of pardon, but to preserve the rigor of discipline; else we should
have to deny the keys given to the Church, of which it was said:
'Whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.'" And
further on he adds: "For holy David did penance for his deadly crimes,
and yet he retained his dignity; and Blessed Peter by shedding most
bitter tears did indeed repent him of having denied his Lord, and yet
he remained an apostle. Nevertheless we must not deem the care of later
teachers excessive, who without endangering a man's salvation, exacted
more from his humility, having, in my opinion, found by experience,
that some assumed a pretended repentance through hankering after honors
and power."
Reply to Objection 3: This statute is to be understood as applying to
those who do public penance, for these cannot be promoted to a higher
order. For Peter, after his denial, was made shepherd of Christ's
sheep, as appears from Jn. 21:21, where Chrysostom comments as follows:
"After his denial and repentance Peter gives proof of greater
confidence in Christ: for whereas, at the supper, he durst not ask Him,
but deputed John to ask in his stead, afterwards he was placed at the
head of his brethren, and not only did not depute another to ask for
him, what concerned him, but henceforth asks the Master instead of
John."
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Whether virtuous deeds done in charity can be deadened?
Objection 1: It would seem that virtuous deeds done in charity cannot
be deadened. For that which is not cannot be changed. But to be
deadened is to be changed from life to death. Since therefore virtuous
deeds, after being done, are no more, it seems that they cannot
afterwards be deadened.
Objection 2: Further, by virtuous deeds done in charity, man merits
eternal life. But to take away the reward from one who has merited it
is an injustice, which cannot be ascribed to God. Therefore it is not
possible for virtuous deeds done in charity to be deadened by a
subsequent sin.
Objection 3: Further, the strong is not corrupted by the weak. Now
works of charity are stronger than any sins, because, as it is written
(Prov. 10:12), "charity covereth all sins." Therefore it seems that
deeds done in charity cannot be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man turn
himself away from his justice . . . all his justices which he hath done
shall not be remembered."
I answer that, A living thing, by dying, ceases to have vital
operations: for which reason, by a kind of metaphor, a thing is said to
be deadened when it is hindered from producing its proper effect or
operation.
Now the effect of virtuous works, which are done in charity, is to
bring man to eternal life; and this is hindered by a subsequent mortal
sin, inasmuch as it takes away grace. Wherefore deeds done in charity
are said to be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as sinful deeds pass as to the act but
remain as to guilt, so deeds done in charity, after passing, as to the
act, remain as to merit, in so far as they are acceptable to God. It is
in this respect that they are deadened, inasmuch as man is hindered
from receiving his reward.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no injustice in withdrawing the reward
from him who has deserved it, if he has made himself unworthy by his
subsequent fault, since at times a man justly forfeits through his own
fault, even that which he has already received.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not on account of the strength of sinful
deeds that deeds, previously done in charity, are deadened, but on
account of the freedom of the will which can be turned away from good
to evil.
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Whether deeds deadened by sin, are revived by Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that deeds deadened by sin are not revived
by Penance. Because just as past sins are remitted by subsequent
Penance, so are deeds previously done in charity, deadened by
subsequent sin. But sins remitted by Penance do not return, as stated
above ([4804]Q[88], AA[1],2). Therefore it seems that neither are dead
deeds revived by charity.
Objection 2: Further, deeds are said to be deadened by comparison with
animals who die, as stated above [4805](A[4]). But a dead animal cannot
be revived. Therefore neither can dead works be revived by Penance.
Objection 3: Further, deeds done in charity are deserving of glory
according to the quantity of grace or charity. But sometimes man arises
through Penance to lesser grace or charity. Therefore he does not
receive glory according to the merit of his previous works; so that it
seems that deeds deadened by sin are not revived.
On the contrary, on Joel 2:25, "I will restore to you the years, which
the locust . . . hath eaten," a gloss says: "I will not suffer to
perish the fruit which you lost when your soul was disturbed." But this
fruit is the merit of good works which was lost through sin. Therefore
meritorious deeds done before are revived by Penance.
I answer that, Some have said that meritorious works deadened by
subsequent sin are not revived by the ensuing Penance, because they
deemed such works to have passed away, so that they could not be
revived. But that is no reason why they should not be revived: because
they are conducive to eternal life (wherein their life consists) not
only as actually existing, but also after they cease to exist actually,
and as abiding in the Divine acceptance. Now, they abide thus, so far
as they are concerned, even after they have been deadened by sin,
because those works, according as they were done, will ever be
acceptable to God and give joy to the saints, according to Apoc. 3:11:
"Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown." That they
fail in their efficacy to bring the man, who did them, to eternal life,
is due to the impediment of the supervening sin whereby he is become
unworthy of eternal life. But this impediment is removed by Penance,
inasmuch as sins are taken away thereby. Hence it follows that deeds
previously deadened, recover, through Penance, their efficacy in
bringing him, who did them, to eternal life, and, in other words, they
are revived. It is therefore evident that deadened works are revived by
Penance.
Reply to Objection 1: The very works themselves of sin are removed by
Penance, so that, by God's mercy, no further stain or debt of
punishment is incurred on their account: on the other hand, works done
in charity are not removed by God, since they abide in His acceptance,
but they are hindered on the part of the man who does them; wherefore
if this hindrance, on the part of the man who does those works, be
removed, God on His side fulfills what those works deserved.
Reply to Objection 2: Deeds done in charity are not in themselves
deadened, as explained above, but only with regard to a supervening
impediment on the part of the man who does them. On the other hand, an
animal dies in itself, through being deprived of the principle of life:
so that the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: He who, through Penance, arises to lesser
charity, will receive the essential reward according to the degree of
charity in which he is found. Yet he will have greater joy for the
works he had done in his former charity, than for those which he did in
his subsequent charity: and this joy belongs to the accidental reward.
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Whether the effect of subsequent Penance is to quicken even dead works?
Objection 1: It would seem that the effect of subsequent Penance is to
quicken even dead works, those, namely, that were not done in charity.
For it seems more difficult to bring to life that which has been
deadened, since this is never done naturally, than to quicken that
which never had life, since certain living things are engendered
naturally from things without life. Now deadened works are revived by
Penance, as stated above [4806](A[5]). Much more, therefore, are dead
works revived.
Objection 2: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed.
But the cause of the lack of life in works generically good done
without charity, was the lack of charity and grace. which lack is
removed by Penance. Therefore dead works are quickened by charity.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome in commenting on Agg. i, 6: "You have
sowed much," says: "If at any time you find a sinner, among his many
evil deeds, doing that which is right, God is not so unjust as to
forget the few good deeds on account of his many evil deeds." Now this
seems to be the case chiefly when past evil "deeds" are removed by
Penance. Therefore it seems that through Penance, God rewards the
former deeds done in the state of sin, which implies that they are
quickened.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my
body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." But
this would not be true, if, at least by subsequent Penance, they were
quickened. Therefore Penance does not quicken works which before were
dead.
I answer that, A work is said to be dead in two ways: first,
effectively, because, to wit, it is a cause of death, in which sense
sinful works are said to be dead, according to Heb. 9:14: "The blood of
Christ . . . shall cleanse our conscience from dead works." These dead
works are not quickened but removed by Penance, according to Heb. 6:1:
"Not laying again the foundation of Penance from dead works." Secondly,
works are said to be dead privatively, because, to wit, they lack
spiritual life, which is founded on charity, whereby the soul is united
to God, the result being that it is quickened as the body by the soul:
in which sense too, faith, if it lack charity, is said to be dead,
according to James 2:20: "Faith without works is dead." In this way
also, all works that are generically good, are said to be dead, if they
be done without charity, inasmuch as they fail to proceed from the
principle of life; even as we might call the sound of a harp, a dead
voice. Accordingly, the difference of life and death in works is in
relation to the principle from which they proceed. But works cannot
proceed a second time from a principle, because they are transitory,
and the same identical deed cannot be resumed. Therefore it is
impossible for dead works to be quickened by Penance.
Reply to Objection 1: In the physical order things whether dead or
deadened lack the principle of life. But works are said to be deadened,
not in relation to the principle whence they proceeded, but in relation
to an extrinsic impediment; while they are said to be dead in relation
to a principle. Consequently there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 2: Works generically good done without charity are
said to be dead on account of the lack of grace and charity, as
principles. Now the subsequent Penance does not supply that want, so as
to make them proceed from such a principle. Hence the argument does not
prove.
Reply to Objection 3: God remembers the good deeds a man does when in a
state of sin, not by rewarding them in eternal life, which is due only
to living works, i.e. those done from charity, but by a temporal
reward: thus Gregory declares (Hom. de Divite et Lazaro, 41 in Evang.)
that "unless that rich man had done some good deed, and had received
his reward in this world, Abraham would certainly not have said to him:
'Thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.'" Or again, this may
mean that he will be judged less severely: wherefore Augustine says (De
Patientia xxvi): "We cannot say that it would be better for the
schismatic that by denying Christ he should suffer none of those things
which he suffered by confessing Him; but we must believe that he will
be judged with less severity, than if by denying Christ, he had
suffered none of those things. Thus the words of the Apostle, 'If I
should deliver my body to be burned and have not charity, it profiteth
me nothing,' refer to the obtaining of the kingdom of heaven, and do
not exclude the possibility of being sentenced with less severity at
the last judgment."
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OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of Penance: (1) in general. (2) each one
in particular.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Penance has any parts?
(2) Of the number of its parts;
(3) What kind of parts are they?
(4) Of its division into subjective parts.
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Whether Penance should be assigned any parts?
Objection 1: It would seem that parts should not be assigned to
Penance. For it is the Divine power that works our salvation most
secretly in the sacraments. Now the Divine power is one and simple.
Therefore Penance, being a sacrament, should have no parts assigned to
it.
Objection 2: Further, Penance is both a virtue and a sacrament. Now no
parts are assigned to it as a virtue, since virtue is a habit, which is
a simple quality of the mind. In like manner, it seems that parts
should not be assigned to Penance as a sacrament, because no parts are
assigned to Baptism and the other sacraments. Therefore no parts at all
should be assigned to Penance.
Objection 3: Further, the matter of Penance is sin, as stated above
([4807]Q[84], A[2]). But no parts are assigned to sin. Neither,
therefore, should parts be assigned to Penance.
On the contrary, The parts of a thing are those out of which the whole
is composed. Now the perfection of Penance is composed of several
things, viz. contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Therefore
Penance has parts.
I answer that, The parts of a thing are those into which the whole is
divided materially, for the parts of a thing are to the whole, what
matter is to the form; wherefore the parts are reckoned as a kind of
material cause, and the whole as a kind of formal cause (Phys. ii).
Accordingly wherever, on the part of matter, we find a kind of
plurality, there we shall find a reason for assigning parts.
Now it has been stated above (Q[84], AA[2],3), that, in the sacrament
of Penance, human actions stand as matter: and so, since several
actions are requisite for the perfection of Penance, viz., contrition,
confession, and satisfaction, as we shall show further on [4808](A[2]),
it follows that the sacrament of Penance has parts.
Reply to Objection 1: Every sacrament is something simple by reason of
the Divine power, which operates therein: but the Divine power is so
great that it can operate both through one and through many, and by
reason of these many, parts may be assigned to a particular sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Parts are not assigned to penance as a virtue:
because the human acts of which there are several in penance, are
related to the habit of virtue, not as its parts, but as its effects.
It follows, therefore, that parts are assigned to Penance as a
sacrament, to which the human acts are related as matter: whereas in
the other sacraments the matter does not consist of human acts, but of
some one external thing, either simple, as water or oil, or compound,
as chrism, and so parts are not assigned to the other sacraments.
Reply to Objection 3: Sins are the remote matter of Penance, inasmuch,
to wit, as they are the matter or object of the human acts, which are
the proper matter of Penance as a sacrament.
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Whether contrition, confession, and satisfaction are fittingly assigned as
parts of Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition, confession, and
satisfaction are not fittingly assigned as parts of Penance. For
contrition is in the heart, and so belongs to interior penance; while
confession consists of words, and satisfaction in deeds; so that the
two latter belong to interior penance. Now interior penance is not a
sacrament, but only exterior penance which is perceptible by the
senses. Therefore these three parts are not fittingly assigned to the
sacrament of Penance.
Objection 2: Further, grace is conferred in the sacraments of the New
Law, as stated above ([4809]Q[62], AA[1],3). But no grace is conferred
in satisfaction. Therefore satisfaction is not part of a sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, the fruit of a thing is not the same as its part.
But satisfaction is a fruit of penance, according to Lk. 3:8: "Bring
forth . . . fruits worthy of penance." Therefore it is not a part of
Penance.
Objection 4: Further, Penance is ordained against sin. But sin can be
completed merely in the thought by consent, as stated in the [4810]FS,
Q[72], A[7]: therefore Penance can also. Therefore confession in word
and satisfaction in deed should not be reckoned as parts of Penance.
On the contrary, It seems that yet more parts should be assigned to
Penance. For not only is the body assigned as a part of man, as being
the matter, but also the soul, which is his form. But the aforesaid
three, being the acts of the penitent, stand as matter, while the
priestly absolution stands as form. Therefore the priestly absolution
should be assigned as a fourth part of Penance.
I answer that, A part is twofold, essential and quantitative. The
essential parts are naturally the form and the matter, and logically
the genus and the difference. In this way, each sacrament is divided
into matter and form as its essential parts. Hence it has been said
above (Q[60], AA[5],6) that sacraments consist of things and words. But
since quantity is on the part of matter, quantitative parts are parts
of matter: and, in this way, as stated above [4811](A[1]), parts are
assigned specially to the sacrament of Penance, as regards the acts of
the penitent, which are the matter of this sacrament.
Now it has been said above ([4812]Q[85], A[3], ad 3) that an offense is
atoned otherwise in Penance than in vindictive justice. Because, in
vindictive justice the atonement is made according to the judge's
decision, and not according to the discretion of the offender or of the
person offended; whereas, in Penance, the offense is atoned according
to the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against Whom the sin
was committed, because in the latter case we seek not only the
restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive justice, but
also and still more the reconciliation of friendship, which is
accomplished by the offender making atonement according to the will of
the person offended. Accordingly the first requisite on the part of the
penitent is the will to atone, and this is done by contrition; the
second is that he submit to the judgment of the priest standing in
God's place, and this is done in confession; and the third is that he
atone according to the decision of God's minister, and this is done in
satisfaction: and so contrition, confession, and satisfaction are
assigned as parts of Penance.
Reply to Objection 1: Contrition, as to its essence, is in the heart,
and belongs to interior penance; yet, virtually, it belongs to exterior
penance, inasmuch as it implies the purpose of confessing and making
satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 2: Satisfaction confers grace, in so far as it is in
man's purpose, and it increases grace, according as it is accomplished,
just as Baptism does in adults, as stated above ([4813]Q[68],
A[2];[4814] Q[69], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 3: Satisfaction is a part of Penance as a sacrament,
and a fruit of penance as a virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: More things are required for good, "which
proceeds from a cause that is entire," than for evil, "which results
from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). And thus,
although sin is completed in the consent of the heart, yet the
perfection of Penance requires contrition of the heart, together with
confession in word and satisfaction in deed.
The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.
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Whether these three are integral parts of Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that these three are not integral parts of
Penance. For, as stated above ([4815]Q[84], A[3]), Penance is ordained
against sin. But sins of thought, word, and deed are the subjective and
not integral parts of sin, because sin is predicated of each one of
them. Therefore in Penance also, contrition in thought, confession in
word, and satisfaction in deed are not integral parts.
Objection 2: Further, no integral part includes within itself another
that is condivided with it. But contrition includes both confession and
satisfaction in the purpose of amendment. Therefore they are not
integral parts.
Objection 3: Further, a whole is composed of its integral parts, taken
at the same time and equally, just as a line is made up of its parts.
But such is not the case here. Therefore these are not integral parts
of Penance.
On the contrary, Integral parts are those by which the perfection of
the whole is integrated. But the perfection of Penance is integrated by
these three. Therefore they are integral parts of Penance.
I answer that, Some have said that these three are subjective parts of
Penance. But this is impossible, because the entire power of the whole
is present in each subjective part at the same time and equally, just
as the entire power of an animal, as such, is assured to each animal
species, all of which species divide the animal genus at the same time
and equally: which does not apply to the point in question. Wherefore
others have said that these are potential parts: yet neither can this
be true, since the whole is present, as to the entire essence, in each
potential part, just as the entire essence of the soul is present in
each of its powers: which does not apply to the case in point.
Therefore it follows that these three are integral parts of Penance,
the nature of which is that the whole is not present in each of the
parts, either as to its entire power, or as to its entire essence, but
that it is present to all of them together at the same time.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin forasmuch as it is an evil, can be completed
in one single point, as stated above (A[2], ad 4); and so the sin which
is completed in thought alone, is a special kind of sin. Another
species is the sin that is completed in thought and word: and yet a
third species is the sin that is completed in thought, word, and deed;
and the quasi-integral parts of this last sin, are that which is in
thought, that which is in word, and that which is in deed. Wherefore
these three are the integral parts of Penance, which is completed in
them.
Reply to Objection 2: One integral part can include the whole, though
not as to its essence: because the foundation, in a way, contains
virtually the whole building. In this way contrition includes virtually
the whole of Penance.
Reply to Objection 3: All integral parts have a certain relation of
order to one another: but some are only related as to position, whether
in sequence as the parts of an army, or by contact, as the parts of a
heap, or by being fitted together, as the parts of a house, or by
continuation, as the parts of a line; while some are related, in
addition, as to power, as the parts of an animal, the first of which is
the heart, the others in a certain order being dependent on one
another: and thirdly some are related in the order of time: as the
parts of time and movement. Accordingly the parts of Penance are
related to one another in the order of power and time, since they are
actions, but not in the order of position, since they do not occupy a
place.
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Whether Penance is fittingly divided into penance before Baptism, penance
for mortal sins, and penance for venial sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is unfittingly divided into
penance before Baptism, penance for mortal, and penance for venial
sins. For Penance is the second plank after shipwreck, as stated above
([4816]Q[84], A[6] ), while Baptism is the first. Therefore that which
precedes Baptism should not be called a species of penance.
Objection 2: Further, that which can destroy the greater, can destroy
the lesser. Now mortal sin is greater than venial; and penance which
regards mortal sins regards also venial sins. Therefore they should not
be considered as different species of penance.
Objection 3: Further, just as after Baptism man commits venial and
mortal sins, so does he before Baptism. If therefore penance for venial
sins is distinct from penance for mortal sins after Baptism, in like
manner they should be distinguished before Baptism. Therefore penance
is not fittingly divided into these species.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*Cf. Hom. 30 inter
1] that these three are species of Penance.
I answer that, This is a division of penance as a virtue. Now it must
be observed that every virtue acts in accordance with the time being,
as also in keeping with other due circumstances, wherefore the virtue
of penance has its act at this time, according to the requirements of
the New Law.
Now it belongs to penance to detest one's past sins, and to purpose, at
the same time, to change one's life for the better, which is the end,
so to speak, of penance. And since moral matters take their species
from the end, as stated in the [4817]FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, 18, AA[4],6,
it is reasonable to distinguish various species of penance, according
to the various changes intended by the penitent.
Accordingly there is a threefold change intended by the penitent. The
first is by regeneration unto a new life, and this belongs to that
penance which precedes Baptism. The second is by reforming one's past
life after it has been already destroyed, and this belongs to penance
for mortal sins committed after Baptism. The third is by changing to a
more perfect operation of life, and this belongs to penance for venial
sins, which are remitted through a fervent act of charity, as stated
above ([4818]Q[87], AA[2],3).
Reply to Objection 1: The penance which precedes Baptism is not a
sacrament, but an act of virtue disposing one to that sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: The penance which washes away mortal sins, washes
away venial sins also, but the converse does not hold. Wherefore these
two species of penance are related to one another as perfect and
imperfect.
Reply to Objection 3: Before Baptism there are no venial sins without
mortal sins. And since a venial sin cannot be remitted without mortal
sin, as stated above ([4819]Q[87], A[4]), before Baptism, penance for
mortal sins is not distinct from penance for venial sins.
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SUPPLEMENT (XP): TO THE THIRD PART OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINA
S
GATHERED FROM HIS COMMENTARY ON BOOK IV OF THE SENTENCES (QQ[1] -99)
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EDITOR'S NOTE:
After writing these few questions of the treatise on Penance, St.
Thomas was called to the heavenly reward which he had merited by
writing so well of his Divine Master. The remainder of the Summa
Theologica, known as the Supplement, was compiled probably by Fra
Rainaldo da Piperno, companion and friend of the Angelic Doctor, and
was gathered from St. Thomas's commentary on the Fourth Book of the
Sentences of Peter Lombard. This commentary was written in the years
1235-1253, while St. Thomas was under thirty years of age. Everywhere
it reveals the influence of him whom St. Thomas always called the
Master. But that influence was not to be always supreme. That the mind
of the Angelic Doctor moved forward to positions which directly
contradicted the Master may be seen by any student of the Summa
Theologica. The compiler of the Supplement was evidently well
acquainted with the commentary on the Sentences, which had been in
circulation for some twenty years or more, but it is probable that he
was badly acquainted with the Summa Theologica. This will be realized
and must be borne in mind when we read the Supplement, notably
[4820]TP, Q[62], A[1]; also Q[43], A[3], ad 2 of the Supplement.
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OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN PARTICULAR, AND FIRST OF CONTRITION (THREE
ARTICLES)
We must now consider each single part of Penance, and (1) Contrition;
(2) Confession; (3) Satisfaction. The consideration about Contrition
will be fourfold: (1) What is it? (2) What should it be about? (3) How
great should it be? (4) Of its duration; (5) Of its effect.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Contrition is suitably defined?
(2) Whether it is an act of virtue?
(3) Whether attrition can become contrition?
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Whether contrition is an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose
of confessing them and of making satisfaction for them?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition is not "an assumed sorrow
for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making
satisfaction for them," as some define it. For, as Augustine states (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 6), "sorrow is for those things that happen against our
will." But this does not apply to sin. Therefore contrition is not
sorrow for sins.
Objection 2: Further, contrition is given us by God. But what is given
is not assumed. Therefore contrition is not an assumed sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, satisfaction and confession are necessary for the
remission of the punishment which was not remitted by contrition. But
sometimes the whole punishment is remitted in contrition. Therefore it
is not always necessary for the contrite person to have the purpose of
confessing and of making satisfaction.
On the contrary, stands the definition.
I answer that, As stated in Ecclus. 10:15, "pride is the beginning of
all sin," because thereby man clings to his own judgment, and strays
from the Divine commandments. Consequently that which destroys sin must
needs make man give up his own judgment. Now he that persists in his
own judgment, is called metaphorically rigid and hard: wherefore anyone
is said to be broken when he is torn from his own judgment. But, in
material things, whence these expressions are transferred to spiritual
things, there is a difference between breaking and crushing or
contrition, as stated in Meteor. iv, in that we speak of breaking when
a thing is sundered into large parts, but of crushing or contrition
when that which was in itself solid is reduced to minute particles. And
since, for the remission of sin, it is necessary that man should put
aside entirely his attachment to sin, which implies a certain state of
continuity and solidity in his mind, therefore it is that the act
through which sin is cast aside is called contrition metaphorically.
In this contrition several things are to be observed, viz. the very
substance of the act, the way of acting, its origin and its effect: in
respect of which we find that contrition has been defined in various
ways. For, as regards the substance of the act, we have the definition
given above: and since the act of contrition is both an act of virtue,
and a part of the sacrament of Penance, its nature as an act of virtue
is explained in this definition by mentioning its genus, viz. "sorrow,"
its object by the words "for sins," and the act of choice which is
necessary for an act of virtue, by the word "assumed": while, as a part
of the sacrament, it is made manifest by pointing out its relation to
the other parts, in the words "together with the purpose of confessing
and of making satisfaction."
There is another definition which defines contrition, only as an act of
virtue; but at the same time including the difference which confines it
to a special virtue, viz. penance, for it is thus expressed:
"Contrition is voluntary sorrow for sin whereby man punishes in himself
that which he grieves to have done," because the addition of the word
"punishes" defines the definition to a special virtue. Another
definition is given by Isidore (De Sum. Bono ii, 12) as follows:
"Contrition is a tearful sorrow and humility of mind, arising from
remembrance of sin and fear of the Judgment." Here we have an allusion
to the derivation of the word, when it is said that it is "humility of
the mind," because just as pride makes the mind rigid, so is a man
humbled, when contrition leads him to give up his mind. Also the
external manner is indicated by the word "tearful," and the origin of
contrition, by the words, "arising from remembrance of sin," etc.
Another definition is taken from the words of Augustine [*Implicitly on
Ps. 46], and indicates the effect of contrition. It runs thus:
"Contrition is the sorrow which takes away sin." Yet another is
gathered from the words of Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 11) as follows:
"Contrition is humility of the soul, crushing sin between hope and
fear." Here the derivation is indicated by saying that contrition is
"humility of the soul"; the effect, by the words, "crushing sin"; and
the origin, by the words, "between hope and fear." Indeed, it includes
not only the principal cause, which is fear, but also its joint cause,
which is hope, without which, fear might lead to despair.
Reply to Objection 1: Although sins, when committed, were voluntary,
yet when we are contrite for them, they are no longer voluntary, so
that they occur against our will; not indeed in respect of the will
that we had when we consented to them, but in respect of that which we
have now, so as to wish they had never been.
Reply to Objection 2: Contrition is from God alone as to the form that
quickens it, but as to the substance of the act, it is from the
free-will and from God, Who operates in all works both of nature and of
will.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the entire punishment may be remitted by
contrition, yet confession and satisfaction are still necessary, both
because man cannot be sure that his contrition was sufficient to take
away all, and because confession and satisfaction are a matter of
precept: wherefore he becomes a transgressor, who confesses not and
makes not satisfaction.
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Whether contrition is an act of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition is not an act of virtue. For
passions are not acts of virtue, since "they bring us neither praise
nor blame" (Ethic. ii, 5). But sorrow is a passion. As therefore
contrition is sorrow, it seems that it is not an act of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as contrition is so called from its being a
crushing, so is attrition. Now all agree in saying that attrition is
not an act of virtue. Neither, therefore, is contrition an act of
virtue.
On the contrary, Nothing but an act of virtue is meritorious. But
contrition is a meritorious act. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
I answer that, Contrition as to the literal signification of the word,
does not denote an act of virtue, but a corporeal passion. But the
question in point does not refer to contrition in this sense, but to
that which the word is employed to signify by way of metaphor. For just
as the inflation of one's own will unto wrong-doing implies, in itself,
a generic evil, so the utter undoing and crushing of that same will
implies something generically good, for this is to detest one's own
will whereby sin was committed. Wherefore contrition, which signifies
this, implies rectitude of the will; and so it is the act of that
virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sins, the act, to
wit, of penance, as is evident from what was said above (Sent. iv, D,
14, Q[1], A[1]; [4821]TP, Q[85], AA[2],3).
Reply to Objection 1: Contrition includes a twofold sorrow for sin. One
is in the sensitive part, and is a passion. This does not belong
essentially to contrition as an act of virtue, but is rather its
effect. For just as the virtue of penance inflicts outward punishment
on the body, in order to compensate for the offense done to God through
the instrumentality of the bodily members, so does it inflict on the
concupiscible part of the soul a punishment, viz. the aforesaid sorrow,
because the concupiscible also co-operated in the sinful deeds.
Nevertheless this sorrow may belong to contrition taken as part of the
sacrament, since the nature of a sacrament is such that it consists not
only of internal but also of external acts and sensible things. The
other sorrow is in the will, and is nothing else save displeasure for
some evil, for the emotions of the will are named after the passions,
as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 26, Q[1], A[5]; [4822]FS, Q[22], A[3],
ad 3). Accordingly, contrition is essentially a kind of sorrow, and is
an act of the virtue of penance.
Reply to Objection 2: Attrition denotes approach to perfect contrition,
wherefore in corporeal matters, things are said to be attrite, when
they are worn away to a certain extent, but not altogether crushed to
pieces; while they are said to be contrite, when all the parts are
crushed [tritae] minutely. Wherefore, in spiritual matters, attrition
signifies a certain but not a perfect displeasure for sins committed,
whereas contrition denotes perfect displeasure.
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Whether attrition can become contrition?
Objection 1: It would seem that attrition can become contrition. For
contrition differs from attrition, as living from dead. Now dead faith
becomes living. Therefore attrition can become contrition.
Objection 2: Further, matter receives perfection when privation is
removed. Now sorrow is to grace, as matter to form, because grace
quickens sorrow. Therefore the sorrow that was previously lifeless,
while guilt remained, receives perfection through being quickened by
grace: and so the same conclusion follows as above.
On the contrary, Things which are caused by principles altogether
diverse cannot be changed, one into the other. Now the principle of
attrition is servile fear, while filial fear is the cause of
contrition. Therefore attrition cannot become contrition.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question: for some say
that attrition may become contrition, even as lifeless faith becomes
living faith. But, seemingly, this is impossible; since, although the
habit of lifeless faith becomes living, yet never does an act of
lifeless faith become an act of living faith, because the lifeless act
passes away and remains no more, as soon as charity comes. Now
attrition and contrition do not denote a habit, but an act only: and
those habits of infused virtue which regard the will cannot be
lifeless, since they result from charity, as stated above (Sent. iii,
D, 27, Q[2], A[4]; [4823]FS, Q[65], A[4]). Wherefore until grace be
infused, there is no habit by which afterwards the act of contrition
may be elicited; so that attrition can nowise become attrition: and
this is the other opinion.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no comparison between faith and
contrition, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: When the privation is removed from matter, the
matter is quickened if it remains when the perfection comes. But the
sorrow which was lifeless, does not remain when charity comes,
wherefore it cannot be quickened.
It may also be replied that matter does not take its origin from the
form essentially, as an act takes its origin from the habit which
quickens it. Wherefore nothing hinders matter being quickened anew by
some form, whereby it was not quickened previously: whereas this cannot
be said of an act, even as it is impossible for the identically same
thing to arise from a cause wherefrom it did not arise before, since a
thing is brought into being but once.
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OF THE OBJECT OF CONTRITION (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the object of contrition. Under this head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man should be contrite on account of his punishment?
(2) Whether, on account of original sin?
(3) Whether, for every actual sin he has committed?
(4) Whether, for actual sins he will commit?
(5) Whether, for the sins of others?
(6) Whether, for each single mortal sin?
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Whether man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only o
n
account of his sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that man should be contrite on account of
the punishment, and not only on account of his sin. For Augustine says
in De Poenitentia [*Cf. Hom. 50 inter 1]: "No man desires life
everlasting unless he repent of this mortal life." But the morality of
this life is a punishment. Therefore the penitent should be contrite on
account of his punishments also.
Objection 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 16, cap. i),
quoting Augustine (De vera et falsa Poenitentia [*Work of an unknown
author]), that the penitent should be sorry for having deprived himself
of virtue. But privation of virtue is a punishment. Therefore
contrition is sorrow for punishments also.
On the contrary, No one holds to that for which he is sorry. But a
penitent, by the very signification of the word, is one who holds to
his punishment [*"Poenitens," i.e. "poenam tenens"]. Therefore he is
not sorry on account of his punishment, so that contrition which is
penitential sorrow is not on account of punishment.
I answer that, As stated above ([4824]Q[1], A[1]), contrition implies
the crushing of something hard and whole. Now this wholeness and
hardness is found in the evil of fault, since the will, which is the
cause thereof in the evil-doer, sticks to its own ground*, and refuses
to yield to the precept of the law, wherefore displeasure at a suchlike
evil is called metaphorically "contrition." [*There is a play on the
words here---'integer' (whole) and 'in suis terminis' (to its own
ground)]. But this metaphor cannot be applied to evil of punishment,
because punishment simply denotes a lessening, so that it is possible
to have sorrow for punishment but not contrition.
Reply to Objection 1: According to St. Augustine, penance should be on
account of this mortal life, not by reason of its mortality (unless
penance be taken broadly for every kind of sorrow); but by reason of
sins, to which we are prone on account of the weakness of this life.
Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow for the loss of virtue through sin is not
essentially the same as contrition, but is its principle. For just as
we are moved to desire a thing on account of the good we expect to
derive from it, so are we moved to be sorry for something on account of
the evil accruing to us therefrom.
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Whether contrition should be on account of original sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition should be on account of
original sin. For we ought to be contrite on account of actual sin; not
by reason of the act, considered as a kind of being, but by reason of
its deformity, since the act, regarded in its substance, is a good, and
is from God. Now original sin has a deformity, even as actual sin has.
Therefore we should be contrite on its account also.
Objection 2: Further, by original sin man has been turned away from
God, since in punishment thereof he was to be deprived of seeing God.
But every man should be displeased at having been turned away from God.
Therefore man should be displeased at original sin; and so he ought to
have contrition for it.
On the contrary, The medicine should be proportionate to the disease.
Now we contracted original sin without willing to do so. Therefore it
is not necessary that we should be cleansed from it by an act of the
will, such as contrition is.
I answer that, Contrition is sorrow, as stated above ([4825]Q[1],
AA[1],2), respecting and, so to speak, crushing the hardness of the
will. Consequently it can regard those sins only which result in us
through the hardness of our will. And as original sin was not brought
upon us by our own will, but contracted from the origin of our infected
nature, it follows that, properly speaking, we cannot have contrition
on its account, but only displeasure or sorrow.
Reply to Objection 1: Contrition is for sin, not by reason of the mere
substance of the act, because it does not derive the character of evil
therefrom; nor again, by reason of its deformity alone, because
deformity, of itself, does not include the notion of guilt, and
sometimes denotes a punishment. But contrition ought to be on account
of sin, as implying deformity resulting from an act of the will; and
this does not apply to original sin, so that contrition does not apply
to it.
The same Reply avails for the Second Objection, because contrition is
due to aversion of the will.
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Whether we should have contrition for every actual sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that we have no need to have contrition for
every actual sin we have committed. For contraries are healed by their
contraries. Now some sins are committed through sorrow, e.g. sloth and
envy. Therefore their remedy should not be sorrow, such as contrition
is, but joy.
Objection 2: Further, contrition is an act of the will, which cannot
refer to that which is not known. But there are sins of which we have
no knowledge, such as those we have forgotten. Therefore we cannot have
contrition for them.
Objection 3: Further, by voluntary contrition those sins are blotted
out which we committed voluntarily. But ignorance takes away
voluntariness, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore
contrition need not cover things which have occurred through ignorance.
Objection 4: Further, we need not be contrite for a sin which is not
removed by contrition. Now some sins are not removed by contrition,
e.g. venial sins, that remain after the grace of contrition. Therefore
there is no need to have contrition for all one's past sins.
On the contrary, Penance is a remedy for all actual sins. But penance
cannot regard some sins, without contrition regarding them also, for it
is the first part of Penance. Therefore contrition should be for all
one's past sins.
Further, no sin is forgiven a man unless he be justified. But
justification requires contrition, as stated above (Q[1], A[1];
[4826]FS, Q[113]). Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for all
one's sins.
I answer that, Every actual sin is caused by our will not yielding to
God's law, either by transgressing it, or by omitting it, or by acting
beside it: and since a hard thing is one that is disposed not to give
way easily, hence it is that a certain hardness of the will is to be
found in every actual sin. Wherefore, if a sin is to be remedied, it
needs to be taken away by contrition which crushes it.
Reply to Objection 1: As clearly shown above (A[2], ad 1), contrition
is opposed to sin, in so far as it proceeds from the choice of the will
that had failed to obey the command of God's law, and not as regards
the material part of sin: and it is on this that the choice of the will
falls. Now the will's choice falls not only on the acts of the other
powers, which the will uses for its own end, but also on the will's own
proper act: for the will wills to will something. Accordingly the
will's choice falls on that pain or sadness which is to be found in the
sin of envy and the like, whether such pain be in the senses or in the
will itself. Consequently the sorrow of contrition is opposed to those
sins.
Reply to Objection 2: One may forget a thing in two ways, either so
that it escapes the memory altogether, and then one cannot search for
it; or so that it escapes from the memory in part, and in part remains,
as when I remember having heard something in general, but know not what
it was in particular, and then I search my memory in order to discover
it. Accordingly a sin also may be forgotten in two ways, either so as
to remain in a general, but not in a particular remembrance, and then a
man is bound to bethink himself in order to discover the sin, because
he is bound to have contrition for each individual mortal sin. And if
he is unable to discover it, after applying himself with due care, it
is enough that he be contrite for it, according as it stands in his
knowledge, and indeed he should grieve not only for the sin, but also
for having forgotten it, because this is owing to his neglect. If,
however, the sin has escaped from his memory altogether, then he is
excused from his duty through being unable to fulfill it, and it is
enough that he be contrite in general for everything wherein he has
offended God. But when this inability is removed, as when the sin is
recalled to his memory, then he is bound to have contrition for that
sin in particular, even as a poor man, who cannot pay a debt, is
excused, and yet is bound to, as soon as he can.
Reply to Objection 3: If ignorance were to remove altogether the will
to do evil, it will excuse, and there would be no sin: and sometimes it
does not remove the will altogether, and then it does not altogether
excuse, but only to a certain extent: wherefore a man is bound to be
contrite for a sin committed through ignorance.
Reply to Objection 4: A venial sin can remain after contrition for a
mortal sin, but not after contrition for the venial sin: wherefore
contrition should also cover venial sins even as penance does, as
stated above (Sent. iv, D, 16, Q[2], A[2], qu. 2; [4827]XP, Q[87],
A[1]).
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Whether a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to have contrition for
his future sins also. For contrition is an act of the free-will: and
the free-will extends to the future rather than to the past, since
choice, which is an act of the free-will, is about future contingents,
as stated in Ethic. iii. Therefore contrition is about future sins
rather than about past sins.
Objection 2: Further, sin is aggravated by the result that ensues from
it: wherefore Jerome says [*St. Basil asserts this implicitly in De
Vera Virgin.] that the punishment of Arius is not yet ended, for it is
yet possible for some to be ruined through his heresy, by reason of
whose ruin his punishment would be increased: and the same applies to a
man who is judged guilty of murder, if he has committed a murderous
assault, even before his victim dies. Now the sinner ought to be
contrite during that intervening time. Therefore the degree of his
contrition ought to be proportionate not only to his past act, but also
to its eventual result: and consequently contrition regards the future.
On the contrary, Contrition is a part of penance. But penance always
regards the past: and therefore contrition does also, and consequently
is not for a future sin.
I answer that, In every series of things moving and moved ordained to
one another, we find that the inferior mover has its proper movement,
and besides this, it follows, in some respect, the movement of the
superior mover: this is seen in the movement of the planets, which, in
addition to their proper movements, follow the movement of the first
heaven. Now, in all the moral virtues, the first mover is prudence,
which is called the charioteer of the virtues. Consequently each moral
virtue, in addition to its proper movement, has something of the
movement of prudence: and therefore, since penance is a moral virtue,
as it is a part of justice, in addition to its own act, it acquires the
movement of prudence. Now its proper movement is towards its proper
object, which is a sin committed. Wherefore its proper and principal
act, viz. contrition, essentially regards past sins alone; but,
inasmuch as it acquires something of the act of prudence, it regards
future sins indirectly, although it is not essentially moved towards
those future sins. For this reason, he that is contrite, is sorry for
his past sins, and is cautious of future sins. Yet we do not speak of
contrition for future sins, but of caution, which is a part of prudence
conjoined to penance.
Reply to Objection 1: The free-will is said to regard future
contingents, in so far as it is concerned with acts, but not with the
object of acts: because, of his own free-will, a man can think about
past and necessary things, and yet the very act of thinking, in so far
as it is subject to the free-will, is a future contingent. Hence the
act the contrition also is a future contingent, in so far as it is
subject to the free-will; and yet its object can be something past.
Reply to Objection 2: The consequent result which aggravates a sin was
already present in the act as in its cause; wherefore when the sin was
committed, its degree of gravity was already complete, and no further
guilt accrued to it when the result took place. Nevertheless some
accidental punishment accrues to it, in the respect of which the damned
will have the more motives of regret for the more evils that have
resulted from their sins. It is in this sense that Jerome [*Basil]
speaks. Hence there is not need for contrition to be for other than
past sins.
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Whether a man ought to have contrition for another's sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to have contrition for
another's sin. For one should not ask forgiveness for a sin unless one
is contrite for it. Now forgiveness is asked for another's sin in Ps.
18:13: "From those of others spare thy servant." Therefore a man ought
to be contrite for another's sins.
Objection 2: Further, man is bound, ought of charity, to love his
neighbor as himself. Now, through love of himself, he both grieves for
his ills, and desires good things. Therefore, since we are bound to
desire the goods of grace for our neighbor, as for ourselves, it seems
that we ought to grieve for his sins, even as for our own. But
contrition is nothing else than sorrow for sins. Therefore man should
be contrite for the sins of others.
On the contrary, Contrition is an act of the virtue of penance. But no
one repents save for what he has done himself. Therefore no one is
contrite for others' sins.
I answer that, The same thing is crushed [conteritur] which hitherto
was hard and whole. Hence contrition for sin must needs be in the same
subject in which the hardness of sin was hitherto: so that there is no
contrition for the sins of others.
Reply to Objection 1: The prophet prays to be spared from the sins of
others, in so far as, through fellowship with sinners, a man contracts
a stain by consenting to their sins: thus it is written (Ps. 17:27):
"With the perverse thou wilt be perverted."
Reply to Objection 2: We ought to grieve for the sins of others, but
not to have contrition for them, because not all sorrow for past sins
is contrition, as is evident for what has been said already.
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Whether it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to have contrition
for each mortal sin. For the movement of contrition in justification is
instantaneous: whereas a man cannot think of every mortal sin in an
instant. Therefore it is not necessary to have contrition for each
mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, contrition should be for sins, inasmuch as they
turn us away from God, because we need not be contrite for turning to
creatures without turning away from God. Now all mortal sins agree in
turning us away from God. Therefore one contrition for all is
sufficient.
Objection 3: Further, mortal sins have more in common with one another,
than actual and original sin. Now one Baptism blots out all sins both
actual and original. Therefore one general contrition blots out all
mortal sins.
On the contrary, For diverse diseases there are diverse remedies, since
"what heals the eye will not heal the foot," as Jerome says (Super
Marc. ix, 28). But contrition is the special remedy for one mortal sin.
Therefore one general contrition for all mortal sins does not suffice.
Further, contrition is expressed by confession. But it is necessary to
confess each mortal sin. Therefore it is necessary to have contrition
for each mortal sin.
I answer that, Contrition may be considered in two ways, as to its
origin, and as to its term. By origin of contrition I mean the process
of thought, when a man thinks of his sin and is sorry for it, albeit
not with the sorrow of contrition, yet with that of attrition. The term
of contrition is when that sorrow is already quickened by grace.
Accordingly, as regards the origin of contrition, a man needs to be
contrite for each sin that he calls to mind; but as regards its term,
it suffices for him to have one general contrition for all, because
then the movement of his contrition acts in virtue of all his preceding
dispositions.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Although all mortal sins agree in turning man
away from God, yet they differ in the cause and mode of aversion, and
in the degree of separation from God; and this regards the different
ways in which they turn us to creatures.
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism acts in virtue of Christ's merit, Who had
infinite power for the blotting out of all sins; and so for all sins
one Baptism suffices. But in contrition, in addition to the merit of
Christ, an act of ours is requisite, which must, therefore, correspond
to each sin, since it has not infinite power for contrition.
It may also be replied that Baptism is a spiritual generation; whereas
Penance, as regards contrition and its other parts, is a kind of
spiritual healing by way of some alteration. Now it is evident in the
generation of a body, accompanied by corruption of another body, that
all the accidents contrary to the thing generated, and which were the
accidents of the thing corrupted, are removed by the one generation:
whereas in alteration, only that accident is removed which was contrary
to the accident which is the term of the alteration. In like manner,
one Baptism blots out all sins together and introduces a new life;
whereas Penance does not blot out each sin, unless it be directed to
each. For this reason it is necessary to be contrite for, and to
confess each sin.
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OF THE DEGREE OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the degree of contrition: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?
(2) Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?
(3) Whether sorrow for one sin ought to be greater than for another?
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Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition is not the greatest possible
sorrow in the world. For sorrow is the sensation of hurt. But some
hurts are more keenly felt than the hurt of sin, e.g. the hurt of a
wound. Therefore contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, we judge of a cause according to its effect. Now
the effect of sorrow is tears. Since therefore sometimes a contrite
person does not shed outward tears for his sins, whereas he weeps for
the death of a friend, or for a blow, or the like, it seems that
contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, the more a thing is mingled with its contrary,
the less its intensity. But the sorrow of contrition has a considerable
admixture of joy, because the contrite man rejoices in his delivery, in
the hope of pardon, and in many like things. Therefore his sorrow is
very slight.
Objection 4: Further, the sorrow of contrition is a kind of
displeasure. But there are many things more displeasing to the contrite
than their past sins; for they would not prefer to suffer the pains of
hell rather than to sin. nor to have suffered, nor yet to suffer all
manner of temporal punishment; else few would be found contrite.
Therefore the sorrow of contrition is not the greatest.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), "all
sorrow is based on love." Now the love of charity, on which the sorrow
of contrition is based, is the greatest love. Therefore the sorrow of
contrition is the greatest sorrow.
Further, sorrow is for evil. Therefore the greater the evil, the
greater the sorrow. But the fault is a greater evil than its
punishment. Therefore contrition which is sorrow for fault, surpasses
all other sorrow.
I answer that, As stated above ([4828]Q[1], A[2], ad 1), there is a
twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the will, and is the very
essence of contrition, being nothing else than displeasure at past sin,
and this sorrow, in contrition, surpasses all other sorrows. For the
more pleasing a thing is, the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the
last end is above all things pleasing: wherefore sin, which turns us
away from the last end, should be, above all things, displeasing. The
other sorrow is in the sensitive part, and is caused by the former
sorrow either from natural necessity, in so far as the lower powers
follow the movements of the higher, or from choice, in so far as a
penitent excites in himself this sorrow for his sins. In neither of
these ways is such sorrow, of necessity, the greatest, because the
lower powers are more deeply moved by their own objects than through
redundance from the higher powers. Wherefore the nearer the operation
of the higher powers approaches to the objects of the lower powers, the
more do the latter follow the movement of the former. Consequently
there is greater pain in the sensitive part, on account of a sensible
hurt, than that which redounds into the sensitive part from the reason;
and likewise, that which redounds from the reason when it deliberates
on corporeal things, is greater than that which redounds from the
reason in considering spiritual things. Therefore the sorrow which
results in the sensitive part from the reason's displeasure at sin, is
not greater than the other sorrows of which that same part is the
subject: and likewise, neither is the sorrow which is assumed
voluntarily greater than other sorrows---both because the lower
appetite does not obey the higher appetite infallibly, as though in the
lower appetite there should arise a passion of such intensity and of
such a kind as the higher appetite might ordain---and because the
passions are employed by the reason, in acts of virtue, according to a
certain measure, which the sorrow that is without virtue sometimes does
not observe, but exceeds.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as sensible sorrow is on account of the
sensation of hurt, so interior sorrow is on account of the thought of
something hurtful. Therefore, although the hurt of sin is not perceived
by the external sense, yet it is perceived to be the most grievous hurt
by the interior sense or reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Affections of the body are the immediate result
of the sensitive passions and, through them, of the emotions of the
higher appetite. Hence it is that bodily tears flow more quickly from
sensible sorrow, or even from a thing that hurts the senses, than from
the spiritual sorrow of contrition.
Reply to Objection 3: The joy which a penitent has for his sorrow does
not lessen his displeasure (for it is not contrary to it), but
increases it, according as every operation is increased by the delight
which it causes, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Thus he who delights in
learning a science, learns the better, and, in like manner, he who
rejoices in his displeasure, is the more intensely displeased. But it
may well happen that this joy tempers the sorrow that results from the
reason in the sensitive part.
Reply to Objection 4: The degree of displeasure at a thing should be
proportionate to the degree of its malice. Now the malice of mortal sin
is measured from Him against Whom it is committed, inasmuch as it is
offensive to Him; and from him who sins, inasmuch as it is hurtful to
him. And, since man should love God more than himself, therefore he
should hate sin, as an offense against God, more than as being hurtful
to himself. Now it is hurtful to him chiefly because it separates him
from God; and in this respect the separation from God which is a
punishment, should be more displeasing than the sin itself, as causing
this hurt (since what is hated on account of something else, is less
hated), but less than the sin, as an offense against God. Again, among
all the punishments of malice a certain order is observed according to
the degree of the hurt. Consequently, since this is the greatest hurt,
inasmuch as it consists in privation of the greatest good, the greatest
of all punishments will be separation from God.
Again, with regard to this displeasure, it is necessary to observe that
there is also an accidental degree of malice, in respect of the present
and the past; since what is past, is no more, whence it has less of the
character of malice or goodness. Hence it is that a man shrinks from
suffering an evil at the present, or at some future time, more than he
shudders at the past evil: wherefore also, no passion of the soul
corresponds directly to the past, as sorrow corresponds to present
evil, and fear to future evil. Consequently, of two past evils, the
mind shrinks the more from that one which still produces a greater
effect at the present time, or which, it fears, will produce a greater
effect in the future, although in the past it was the lesser evil. And,
since the effect of the past sin is sometimes not so keenly felt as the
effect of the past punishment, both because sin is more perfectly
remedied than punishment, and because bodily defect is more manifest
than spiritual defect, therefore even a man, who is well disposed,
sometimes feels a greater abhorrence of his past punishment than of his
past sin, although he would be ready to suffer the same punishment over
again rather than commit the same sin.
We must also observe, in comparing sin with punishment, that some
punishments are inseparable from offense of God, e.g. separation from
God; and some also are everlasting, e.g. the punishment of hell.
Therefore the punishment to which is connected offense of God is to be
shunned in the same way as sin; whereas that which is everlasting is
simply to be shunned more than sin. If, however, we separate from these
punishments the notion of offense, and consider only the notion of
punishment, they have the character of malice, less than sin has as an
offense against God: and for this reason should cause less displeasure.
We must, however, take note that, although the contrite should be thus
disposed, yet he should not be questioned about his feelings, because
man cannot easily measure them. Sometimes that which displeases least
seems to displease most, through being more closely connected with some
sensible hurt, which is more known to us.
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Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of contrition cannot be too
great. For no sorrow can be more immoderate than that which destroys
its own subject. But the sorrow of contrition, if it be so great as to
cause death or corruption of the body, is praiseworthy. For Anselm says
(Orat. lii): "Would that such were the exuberance of my inmost soul, as
to dry up the marrow of my body"; and Augustine [*De Contritione
Cordis, work of an unknown author] confesses that "he deserves to blind
his eyes with tears." Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot be too
great.
Objection 2: Further, the sorrow of contrition results from the love of
charity. But the love of charity cannot be too great. Neither,
therefore, can the sorrow of contrition be too great.
Objection 3: On the contrary, Every moral virtue is destroyed by excess
and deficiency. But contrition is an act of a moral virtue, viz.
penance, since it is a part of justice. Therefore sorrow for sins can
be too great.
I answer that, Contrition, as regards the sorrow in the reason, i.e.
the displeasure, whereby the sin is displeasing through being an
offense against God, cannot be too great; even as neither can the love
of charity be too great, for when this is increased the aforesaid
displeasure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow,
contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction of the body may
be too great. In all these things the rule should be the safeguarding
of the subject, and of that general well-being which suffices for the
fulfillment of one's duties; hence it is written (Rom. 12:1): "Let your
sacrifice be reasonable [*Vulg.: 'Present your bodies . . . a
reasonable sacrifice']."
Reply to Objection 1: Anselm desired the marrow of his body to be dried
up by the exuberance of his devotion, not as regards the natural humor,
but as to his bodily desires and concupiscences. And, although
Augustine acknowledged that he deserved to lose the use of his bodily
eyes on account of his sins, because every sinner deserves not only
eternal, but also temporal death, yet he did not wish his eyes to be
blinded.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection considers the sorrow which is in
the reason: while the Third considers the sorrow of the sensitive part.
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Whether sorrow for one sin should be greater than for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow for one sin need not be greater
than for another. For Jerome (Ep. cviii) commends Paula for that "she
deplored her slightest sins as much as great ones." Therefore one need
not be more sorry for one sin than for another.
Objection 2: Further, the movement of contrition is instantaneous. Now
one instantaneous movement cannot be at the same time more intense and
more remiss. Therefore contrition for one sin need not be greater than
for another.
Objection 3: Further, contrition is for sin chiefly as turning us away
from God. But all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God, since
they all deprive us of grace whereby the soul is united to God.
Therefore we should have equal contrition for all mortal sins.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to the measure of
the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now, in contrition,
the stripes are measured according to the sins, because to contrition
is united the purpose of making satisfaction. Therefore contrition
should be for one sin more than for another.
Further, man should be contrite for that which he ought to have
avoided. But he ought to avoid one sin more than another, if that sin
is more grievous, and it be necessary to do one or the other.
Therefore, in like manner, he ought to be more sorry for one, viz. the
more grievous, than for the other.
I answer that, We may speak of contrition in two ways: first, in so far
as it corresponds to each single sin, and thus, as regards the sorrow
in the higher appetite, a man ought to be more sorry for a more
grievous sin, because there is more reason for sorrow, viz. the offense
against God, in such a sin than in another, since the more inordinate
the act is, the more it offends God. In like manner, since the greater
sin deserves a greater punishment, the sorrow also of the sensitive
part, in so far as it is voluntarily undergone for sin, as the
punishment thereof, ought to be greater where the sin is greater. But
in so far as the emotions of the lower appetite result from the
impression of the higher appetite, the degree of sorrow depends on the
disposition of the lower faculty to the reception of impressions from
the higher faculty, and not on the greatness of the sin.
Secondly, contrition may be taken in so far as it is directed to all
one's sins together, as in the act of justification. Such contrition
arises either from the consideration of each single sin, and thus
although it is but one act, yet the distinction of the sins remains
virtually therein; or, at least, it includes the purpose of thinking of
each sin; and in this way too it is habitually more for one than for
another.
Reply to Objection 1: Paula is commended, not for deploring all her
sins equally, but because she grieved for her slight sins as much as
though they were grave sins, in comparison with other persons who
grieve for their sins: but for graver sins she would have grieved much
more.
Reply to Objection 2: In that instantaneous movement of contrition,
although it is not possible to find an actually distinct intensity in
respect of each individual sin, yet it is found in the way explained
above; and also in another way, in so far as, in this general
contrition, each individual sin is related to that particular motive of
sorrow which occurs to the contrite person, viz. the offense against
God. For he who loves a whole, loves its parts potentially although not
actually, and accordingly he loves some parts more and some less, in
proportion to their relation to the whole; thus he who loves a
community, virtually loves each one more or less according to their
respective relations to the common good. In like manner he who is sorry
for having offended God, implicitly grieves for his different sins in
different ways, according as by them he offended God more or less.
Reply to Objection 3: Although each mortal sin turns us away from God
and deprives us of His grace, yet some remove us further away than
others, inasmuch as through their inordinateness they become more out
of harmony with the order of the Divine goodness, than others do.
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OF THE TIME FOR CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the time for contrition: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?
(2) Whether it is expedient to grieve continually for our sins?
(3) Whether souls grieve for their sins even after this life?
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Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the time for contrition is not the
whole of this life. For as we should be sorry for a sin committed, so
should we be ashamed of it. But shame for sin does not last all one's
life, for Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii) that "he whose sin is forgiven
has nothing to be ashamed of." Therefore it seems that neither should
contrition last all one's life, since it is sorrow for sin.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that "perfect charity
casteth out fear, because fear hath pain." But sorrow also has pain.
Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot remain in the state of
perfect charity.
Objection 3: Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the past (since it
is, properly speaking, about a present evil) except in so far as
something of the past sin remains in the present time. Now, in this
life, sometimes one attains to a state in which nothing remains of a
past sin, neither disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of punishment.
Therefore there is no need to grieve any more for that sin.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:28) that "to them that love
God all things work together unto good," even sins as a gloss declares
[*Augustine, De Correp. et Grat.]. Therefore there is no need for them
to grieve for sin after it has been forgiven.
Objection 5: Further, contrition is a part of Penance, condivided with
satisfaction. But there is no need for continual satisfaction.
Therefore contrition for sin need not be continual.
On the contrary, Augustine in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says that "when sorrow ceases,
penance fails, and when penance fails, no pardon remains." Therefore,
since it behooves one not to lose the forgiveness which has been
granted, it seems that one ought always to grieve for one's sins.
Further, it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): "Be not without fear about sin
forgiven." Therefore man should always grieve, that his sins may be
forgiven him.
I answer that, As stated above ([4829]Q[3], A[1]), there is a twofold
sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is detestation of the
sin committed; the other is in the sensitive part, and results from the
former: and as regards both, the time for contrition is the whole of
the present state of life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one
detests the obstacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end
of the way. Wherefore, since past sin retards the course of our life
towards God (because the time which was given to us for the course
cannot be recovered), it follows that the state of contrition remains
during the whole of this lifetime, as regards the detestation of sin.
The same is to be said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the
will as a punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved everlasting
punishment, and sinned against the eternal God, the everlasting
punishment being commuted into a temporal one, sorrow ought to remain
during the whole of man's eternity, i.e. during the whole of the state
of this life. For this reason Hugh of St. Victor says [*Richard of St.
Victor, De Pot. Lig. et Solv. 3,5,13] that "when God absolves a man
from eternal guilt and punishment, He binds him with a chain of eternal
detestation of sin."
Reply to Objection 1: Shame regards sin only as a disgraceful act;
wherefore after sin has been taken away as to its guilt, there is no
further motive for shame; but there does remain a motive of sorrow,
which is for the guilt, not only as being something disgraceful, but
also as having a hurt connected with it.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear which charity casts out, is opposed
to charity by reason of its servility, because it regards the
punishment. But the sorrow of contrition results from charity, as
stated above ([4830]Q[3], A[2]): wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Although, by penance, the sinner returns to his
former state of grace and immunity from the debt of punishment, yet he
never returns to his former dignity of innocence, and so something
always remains from his past sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as a man ought not to do evil that good may
come of it, so he ought not to rejoice in evil, for the reason that
good may perchance come from it through the agency of Divine grace or
providence, because his sins did not cause but hindered those goods;
rather was it Divine providence that was their cause, and in this man
should rejoice, whereas he should grieve for his sins.
Reply to Objection 5: Satisfaction depends on the punishment appointed,
which should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an end, so that
there be no further need of satisfaction. But that punishment is
proportionate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence to a creature
whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the sorrow of
contrition corresponds to sin on the part of the aversion, whence it
derives a certain infinity; wherefore contrition ought to continue
always; nor is it unreasonable if that which precedes remains, when
that which follows is taken away.
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Whether it is expedient to grieve for sin continually?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to grieve for sin
continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is evident
from Phil. 4:4, where the gloss on the words, "Rejoice in the Lord
always," says that "it is necessary to rejoice." Now it is not possible
to rejoice and grieve at the same time. Therefore it is not expedient
to grieve for sin continually.
Objection 2: Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a thing to
be avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except in so far as it is
necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of burning or
cutting a wound. Now sorrow is in itself an evil; wherefore it is
written (Ecclus. 30:24): "Drive away sadness far from thee," and the
reason is given (Ecclus. 30:25): "For sadness hath killed many, and
there is no profit in it." Moreover the Philosopher says the same
(Ethic. vii, 13,14; x, 5). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any
longer than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already
blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not
expedient to grieve any longer.
Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant.): "Sorrow is a
good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with
wormwood." Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve
continually.
On the contrary, Augustine [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an
unknown author] says: "The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice
in his grief."
Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible,
those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow for sin, as
is shown by the words of Mat. 5:5, "Blessed are they that mourn."
Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.
I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that
in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethic. ii,
6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure
seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance,
there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to
its duration, except in so far as the act of one virtue hinders the act
of another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently the
more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better
it is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he
ought to. On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both
in intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow,
which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so
ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long,
man fall into despair, cowardice, and such like vices.
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to
worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has
sorrow itself for object.
Reply to Objection 2: The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy:
and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we
should make moderate use, according as the end, for which it is
assumed, demands.
Reply to Objection 3: Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.
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Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that our souls are contrite for sins even
after this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin.
Now, after this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and
as to its habit, since "charity never falleth away." Therefore the
displeasure at the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition,
remains.
Objection 2: Further, we should grieve more for sin than for
punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible
punishment and for the delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they
grieve for the sins they committed.
Objection 3: Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin. But
satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition.
Therefore contrition remains after this life.
On the contrary, contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But
the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does
contrition.
Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and
punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have contrition,
it would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted
through the power of their contrition, so that they would be delivered
from their sensible pain, which is false.
I answer that, Three things are to be observed in contrition: first,
its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue
quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious
and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory.
Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly
country, cannot have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by
reason of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no
contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which
quickens sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have a sorrow for
their sins, that is quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for
they are not in the state of meriting. In this life, however, all these
three can be found.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those
who are capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes
all capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have
charity, they have no contrition.
Reply to Objection 2: The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but
their sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of
contrition.
Reply to Objection 3: The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory,
cannot, properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction
demands a meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the
punishment due may be called satisfaction.
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OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition?
(2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
(3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?
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Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of sin is not the
effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat
the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore
contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.
Objection 2: Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue
follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together
in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness
of sin.
Objection 3: Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the
Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going to
confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of
their sins.
On the contrary, a gloss on Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to God is an
afflicted spirit," says: "A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which
sins are loosed."
Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same
causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is committed through the
heart's inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by
the heart's ordinate love; and consequently contrition blots out sin.
I answer that, Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part
of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is the
cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as
part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an instrument for the
forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments
(cf. Sent. iv, D, 1, Q[1], A[4]: [4831]TP, Q[62], A[1]); while, as an
act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin's forgiveness. For
a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification,
and a disposition is reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to
denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise
in the case of an agent's disposition to act, because this is reduced
to the genus of efficient cause.
Reply to Objection 1: God alone is the principal efficient cause of the
forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and
likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words
uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring grace whereby
sins are forgiven.
Reply to Objection 2: The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the
infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far
as it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the
forgiveness of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the
ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion
until his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church,
although his sin may be forgiven him before God.
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Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition cannot take away the debt of
punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are ordained for
man's deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so
perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and satisfaction.
Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt
of punishment.
Objection 2: Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way
compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of
the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that
"by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented" (Wis.
11:17), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be
remitted by contrition.
Objection 3: Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an
infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore
contrition can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.
On the contrary, The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God
than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt
by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the
heart's affections, such as contrition is.
Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said
(Lk. 23:43): "This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise," on account
of his one act of repentance.
As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by
contrition, this question has already been considered above (Sent. iv,
D, 14, Q[2], AA[1],2; [4832]TP, Q[86], A[4]), where the same question
was raised with regard to Penance.
I answer that, The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways.
First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and in
this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the
contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt,
but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the
sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: and since this
sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense as to suffice
for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices
for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound
to confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition
would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose of confessing
united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on
account of the precept given concerning confession.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as inward joy redounds into the outward
parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior
members: wherefore it is written (Prov. 17:22): "A sorrowful spirit
drieth up the bones."
Reply to Objection 3: Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in
its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet
it derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so
it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
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Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight contrition does not suffice to
blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a bodily
remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal
a greater. Therefore the least contrition does not suffice to blot out
very great sins.
Objection 2: Further, it was stated above ([4833]Q[3], A[3]) that for
greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does
not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the requisite conditions.
Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.
On the contrary, Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin,
because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened
by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all
sins.
I answer that, As we have often said ([4834]Q[1], A[2], ad 1;[4835]
Q[3], A[1];[4836] Q[4] , A[1]), contrition includes a twofold sorrow.
One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can
be so slight as not to suffice for real contrition, e.g. if a sin were
less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought to
be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity.
The other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no
hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong
essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor
again is it under our control. Accordingly we must say that sorrow,
however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots
out all sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from
the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which
suffices for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin.
This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the same
applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary conditions.
Reply to Objection 2: It follows of necessity that a man grieves more
for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant
to the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of
sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser, this would
suffice for the remission of the sin.
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OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for
our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession; (2) Its nature; (3)
Its minister; (4) Its quality; (5) Its effect; (6) The seal of
confession.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
(2) Whether confession is according to the natural law?
(3) Whether all are bound to confession?
(4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty?
(5) Whether one is bound to confess at once?
(6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?
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Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not necessary for
salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the
remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of
grace. Therefore confession is not necessary in order to do penance for
one's sins.
Objection 2: Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without
confession, e.g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that remits
sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is
it necessary for salvation now that man should confess.
Objection 3: Further, a sin which is contracted from another, should
receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man has
committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man
himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore
confession is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 4: Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence,
in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the offense.
Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even
that which might be inflicted on him by another. Therefore it seems
that confession is not necessary for salvation.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. i): "If you want the
physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known
to him." But it is necessary for salvation that man should take
medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation that man
should make his disease known by means of confession.
Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused.
Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be his own judge,
but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to
him.
I answer that, Christ's Passion, without whose power, neither original
nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the
reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it.
Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin, a
sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at
least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament actually,
through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently
those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is
incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation: and so just
as Baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for
salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance. And just as a man
through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church,
to whom the dispensation of that sacrament belongs, even so, by
confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that,
through the sacrament of Penance dispensed by him, he may receive the
pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless
he be acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the
penitent's confession. Wherefore confession is necessary for the
salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The infusion of grace suffices for the remission
of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a
debt of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are
ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace, and
before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does
not receive grace. This is evident in the case of Baptism, and applies
to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal
punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the
keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction which the
priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in
confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession is necessary for
salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins,
because this punishment to which one remains bound after the remission
of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open,
without such punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to
its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although we do not read that they confessed, it
may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded
in writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the
sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament
without using the things which belong to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin that is contracted from another, viz.
original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the
case of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself,
cannot be expiated, without some operation on the part of the sinner.
Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself,
though he was sufficient to sin by himself, because sin is finite on
the part of the thing to which it turns, in which respect the sinner
returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives
infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must needs begin from
someone else, because "that which is last in order of generation is
first in the order of intention" (Ethic. iii). Consequently actual sin
also must needs take its remedy from another.
Reply to Objection 4: Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation
of sin's punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which
is enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the
sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it ought to be
imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently
confession is necessary.
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Whether confession is according to the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is according to the natural
law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the
natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin.
Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and
New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed
in the Old Law, as may be gathered from Is. 43:26: "Tell, if thou hast
anything to justify thyself." Therefore it is according to the natural
law.
Objection 3: Further, Job was subject only to the natural law. But he
confessed his sins, as appears from his words (Job 31:33) "If, as a
man, I have hid my sin." Therefore confession is according to the
natural law.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v.) that the natural law is the
same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way. Therefore it
is not according to the natural law. Further, confession is made to one
who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are not an institution of
the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.
I answer that, The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they
ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge
of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the
sacraments. And since "the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but
a product of a certain innate power," as Tully states (De Inv. Rhet.
ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but
of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is
sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from
its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things
are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature.
But such things are above nature as God reserves to Himself; and these
are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of
miracles, or in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of
the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is
according to Divine, but not according to natural law.
Reply to Objection 1: Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin
before God: because the confession which is made to God by the
acknowledgment of one's sin, is according to the natural law. whereas
here we are speaking of confession made to a man. We may also reply
that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural
law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court
of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his
sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made
voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the forgiveness of
one's sins, is not according to the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the natural law avail in the same
way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a
kind of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same
manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for in the law
of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one's sin inwardly before
God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary for a man to declare
his sin by some external sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the
fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not
necessary for him to make known what particular sin he had committed,
or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by
denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may
gather from a gloss [*Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9] on the passage.
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Whether all are bound to confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for
Jerome says on Is. 3:9 ("They have proclaimed abroad"), "their sin,"
etc.: "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck." But some have not
suffered shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting
them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of
Penance.
Objection 2: Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made
in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they are not
bound to confession.
Objection 3: Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not
bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to
confession.
On the contrary, Confession is condivided with satisfaction and
contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore
all are bound to confession also.
Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Remiss. xii),
where it is stated that "all of either sex are bound to confess their
sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion."
I answer that, We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the
Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in this
way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into
mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of positive law, and
in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the
general council (Lateran iv, Can. 21) under Innocent III, both in order
that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner, because "all have
sinned and need the grace of God" (Rom. 3:23); and that the Eucharist
may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish
priests may know their flock, lest a wolf may hide therein.
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal
life, to avoid shipwreck, i.e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot
avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which
also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room for Penance,
and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal
sins.
Reply to Objection 2: All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to
Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the
latter may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the
superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the confessor is
the minister of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in
virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and
that, when he has no other sins to confess. We may also, with others,
answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others than those
who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it
orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot apply to venial sins,
because no one can confess all his venial sins. Accordingly, a man who
has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins,
but it suffices for the fulfillment of the commandment of the Church
that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be
unconscious of any mortal sin: and this will count for his confession.
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Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin
which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist. xii), "it is
the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is
none." Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience to accuse oneself
of those sins which one has not committed.
Objection 2: Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than
another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised.
But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he
is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed a more grievous
sin than one has.
Objection 3: Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be
mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess it as
mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has
not committed.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction originates from confession. But a
man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed. Therefore
he can also confess a sin which he has not done.
On the contrary, Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an
untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every
untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has
not committed.
Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a
crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses. Now the
witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man
ought not to accuse himself of a sin which is not on his conscience.
I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, make his state
known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other
than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does
not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his
confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words
must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only of what
is on his conscience.
Reply to Objection 1: To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may
be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the
act, and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an
erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one has not done.
Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the
saying of Gregory is true, because a just man fears lest, in any act
which is good in itself, there should be any defect on his part. thus
it is written (Job 9:28): "I feared all my works." Wherefore it is also
the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words
of this fear which he holds in his thoughts.
From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a
just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not as though he had
committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those
things which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more grievously.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man doubts whether a certain sin be
mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt,
because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while
doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to
chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that
which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however, affirm
that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to
the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and
what is not.
Reply to Objection 4: A man does not commit a falsehood by making
satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone
confesses a sin which he thinks he has not committed. And if he
mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he
does not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession
thereof tally with his conscience.
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Whether one is bound to confess at once?
Objection 1: It would seem that one is bound to confess at once. For
Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): "The contempt of confession is
inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason for delay." But everyone
is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is bound to confess as
soon as possible.
Objection 2: Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual
disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in body
were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his
health. Therefore it seems that it must needs be detrimental to a man's
health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one
at hand.
Objection 3: Further, that which is due always, is due at once. But man
owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess at
once.
On the contrary, A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the
Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus:
De Poenit. et Remiss.). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive
the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does not sin if he
does not confess before that time.
Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to
do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once, and omits to do so,
with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner
at any other time, and so on, so that he would fall into many mortal
sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.
I answer that, As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a
man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition,
viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger
of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be
forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be
bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to confess
or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to contrition and to
have the purpose of confessing.
But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First,
accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he cannot do
without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for
then he is bound to confess; for instance, if he has to receive the
Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin,
without confessing first, if a priest be at hand, and there be no
urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess
once a year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a
year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession before that
time.
Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the
same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay of Baptism,
because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to
receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind to be baptized; and so
he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is
there any fixed time beyond which, if he defer Baptism, he would incur
a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal
sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since,
as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the will does not defer
doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if
the cause of the delay of Baptism has a mortal sin connected with it,
e.g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like
motive, the delay will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same
seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary than Baptism.
Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill in this life those things that
are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in danger of death, he
is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to
receive Baptism. For this reason too, James proclaimed at the same time
the commandment about making confession and that about receiving
Extreme Unction (James 5:14, 16). Therefore the opinion seems probable
of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at once, though it
is dangerous to delay.
Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once,
as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity. Nor does it
matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession,
because the Church does not favor delay, but forbids the neglect
involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who
delays is excused, not from sin in the tribunal of conscience; but from
punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would
not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time.
But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts bind, not at
once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient
to fulfill them then (for in that case if a man were not to give alms
of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would
commit a mortal sin, which is false), but because the time involves
urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first
opportunity, it does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even
though he does not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes urgent
for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on
account of the Church's indulgence that he is not bound to confess at
once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that
before the commandment was made, there was still less obligation.
Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before
Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that religious are
bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for
penance. But this is not to the point; for religious have no
obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as
they are bound to by vow.
Reply to Objection 1: Hugh is speaking of those who die without this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary for bodily health that the
physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being
healed: and the same applies to spiritual disease.
Reply to Objection 3: The retaining of another's property against the
owner's will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and
for always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate
restitution. It is not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative
precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not
bound to fulfill it at once.
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Whether one can be dispensed from confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can be dispensed from confessing
his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to
dispensation by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as
appears from what was said above [4837](A[3]). Therefore one may be
dispensed from confession.
Objection 2: Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was
instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted, not by
God, but by a man (James 5:16): "Confess your sins, one to another."
Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the
apostles, as appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also
dispense a man from confessing.
On the contrary, Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary
sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed
from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.
I answer that, The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church
which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the
Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation
is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is founded
on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power
to publish new articles of faith, or to do away with those which are
already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to abolish those
that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which
belongs to Christ alone, Who is the foundation of the Church.
Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be
saved without Baptism, nor that he be saved without confession, in so
far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however,
dispense from confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of
the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession
longer than the limit prescribed by the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less
than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is
possible from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive
Divine law.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept about confession was not instituted
by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was
instituted by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it
was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being
prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their
sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests, and
though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood
of the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.
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OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
(2) Whether confession is an act of virtue?
(3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?
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Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that Augustine defines confession
unfittingly, when he says (Super Ps. 21) that confession "lays bare the
hidden disease by the hope of pardon." For the disease against which
confession is ordained, is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest.
Therefore it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a
"hidden" disease.
Objection 2: Further, the beginning of penance is fear. But confession
is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather than "hope" should be set
down as the cause of confession.
Objection 3: Further, that which is placed under a seal, is not laid
bare, but closed up. But the sin which is confessed is placed under the
seal of confession. Therefore sin is not laid bare in confession, but
closed up.
Objection 4: Further, other definitions are to be found differing from
the above. For Gregory says (Hom. xl in Evang.) that confession is "the
uncovering of sins, and the opening of the wound." Others say that
"confession is a legal declaration of our sins in the presence of a
priest." Others define it thus: "Confession is the sinner's sacramental
self-accusation through shame for what he has done, which through the
keys of the Church makes satisfaction for his sins, and binds him to
perform the penance imposed on him." Therefore it seems that the
definition in question is insufficient, since it does not include all
that these include.
I answer that, Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act
of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which is
a kind of manifestation; secondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin;
thirdly, the person to whom the manifestation is made, viz. the priest;
fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, viz.
release from part of the punishment, and the obligation to pay the
other part. Accordingly the first definition, given by Augustine,
indicates the substance of the act, by saying that "it lays bare"---the
matter of confession, by saying that it is a "hidden disease"---its
cause, which is "the hope of pardon"; while the other definitions
include one or other of the five things aforesaid, as may be seen by
anyone who considers the matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the priest, as a man, may sometimes have
knowledge of the penitent's sin, yet he does not know it as a vicar of
Christ (even as a judge sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he
is ignorant, as a judge), and in this respect it is made known to him
by confession. or we may reply that although the external act may be in
the open, yet the internal act, which is the cause of the external act,
is hidden; so that it needs to be revealed by confession.
Reply to Objection 2: Confession presupposes charity, which gives us
life, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now it is in contrition
that charity is given; while servile fear, which is void of hope, is
previous to charity: yet he that has charity is moved more by hope than
by fear. Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause of
confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In every confession sin is laid bare to the
priest, and closed to others by the seal of confession.
Reply to Objection 4: It is not necessary that every definition should
include everything connected with the thing defined: and for this
reason we find some definitions or descriptions that indicate one
cause, and some that indicate another.
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Whether confession is an act of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of virtue. For
every act of virtue belongs to the natural law, since "we are naturally
capable of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). But
confession does not belong to the natural law. Therefore it is not an
act of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, an act of virtue is more befitting one who is
innocent than one who has sinned. But the confession of a sin, which is
the confession of which we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an
innocent man. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the grace which is in the sacraments differs
somewhat from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. But
confession is part of a sacrament. Therefore it is not an act of
virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But
confession comes under a precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is
meritorious, for "it opens the gate of heaven," as the Master says
(Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore it seems that it is an act of virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([4838]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7; [4839]SS,
Q[80]; [4840]SS, Q[85] , A[3]; [4841]SS, Q[109], A[3]), for an act to
belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply
some condition belonging to virtue. Now, although confession does not
include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name
implies the manifestation of that which a man has on his conscience:
for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with his lips
what he does not hold in his heart, it is not a confession but a
fiction. Now to express in words what one has in one's thoughts is a
condition of virtue; and, consequently, confession is a good thing
generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it
be devoid of other due circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural reason, in a general way, inclines a man
to make confession in the proper way, to confess as he ought, what he
ought, and when he ought, and in this way confession belongs to the
natural law. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the
circumstances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the
confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it is evident that
the natural law inclines a man to confession, by means of the Divine
law, which determines the circumstances, as is the case with all
matters belonging to the positive law.
Reply to Objection 2: Although an innocent man may have the habit of
the virtue whose object is a sin already committed, he has not the act,
so long as he remains innocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of
which confession we are speaking now, is not befitting an innocent man,
though it is an act of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Though the grace of the sacraments differs from
the grace of the virtues, they are not contrary but disparate; hence
there is nothing to prevent that which is an act of virtue, in so far
as it proceeds from the free-will quickened by grace, from being a
sacrament, or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a
remedy for sin.
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Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of the virtue
of penance. For an act belongs to the virtue which is its cause. Now
the cause of confession is the hope of pardon, as appears from the
definition given above [4842](A[1]). Therefore it seems that it is an
act of hope and not of penance.
Objection 2: Further, shame is a part of temperance. But confession
arises from shame, as appears in the definition given above (A[1],
OBJ[4]). Therefore it is an act of temperance and not of penance.
Objection 3: Further, the act of penance leans on Divine mercy. But
confession leans rather on Divine wisdom, by reason of the truth which
is required in it. Therefore it is not an act of penance.
Objection 4: Further, we are moved to penance by the article of the
Creed which is about the Judgment, on account of fear, which is the
origin of penance. But we are moved to confession by the article which
is about life everlasting, because it arises from hope of pardon.
Therefore it is not an act of penance.
Objection 5: Further, it belongs to the virtue of truth that a man
shows himself to be what he is. But this is what a man does when he
goes to confession. Therefore confession is an act of that virtue which
is called truth, and not of penance.
On the contrary, Penance is ordained for the destruction of sin. Now
confession is ordained to this also. Therefore it is an act of penance.
I answer that, It must be observed with regard to virtues, that when a
special reason of goodness or difficulty is added over and above the
object of a virtue, there is need of a special virtue: thus the
expenditure of large sums is the object of magnificence, although the
ordinary kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberality,
as appears from Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1. The same applies to the confession
of truth, which, although it belongs to the virtue of truth absolutely,
yet, on account of the additional reason of goodness, begins to belong
to another kind of virtue. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7)
that a confession made in a court of justice belongs to the virtue of
justice rather than to truth. In like manner the confession of God's
favors in praise of God, belongs not to truth, but to religion: and so
too the confession of sins, in order to receive pardon for them, is not
the elicited act of the virtue of truth, as some say, but of the virtue
of penance. It may, however, be the commanded act of many virtues, in
so far as the act of confession can be directed to the end of many
virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope is the cause of confession, not as eliciting
but as commanding.
Reply to Objection 2: In that definition shame is not mentioned as the
cause of confession, since it is more of a nature to hinder the act of
confession, but rather as the joint cause of delivery from punishment
(because shame is in itself a punishment), since also the keys of the
Church are the joint cause with confession, to the same effect.
Reply to Objection 3: By a certain adaptation the parts of Penance can
be ascribed to three Personal Attributes, so that contrition may
correspond to mercy or goodness, by reason of its being sorrow for
evil---confession to wisdom, by reason of its being a manifestation of
the truth---and satisfaction to power, on account of the labor it
entails. And since contrition is the first part of Penance, and renders
the other parts efficacious, for this reason the same is to be said of
Penance as a whole, as of contrition.
Reply to Objection 4: Since confession results from hope rather than
from fear, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), it is based on the article
about eternal life which hope looks to, rather than on the article
about the Judgment, which fear considers; although penance, in its
aspect of contrition, is the opposite.
The Reply to the Fifth Objection is to be gathered from what has been
said.
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OF THE MINISTER OF CONFESSION (SEVEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the minister of confession, under which head there
are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?
(2) Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?
(3) Whether outside a case of necessity one who is not a priest can
hear the confession of venial sins?
(4) Whether it is necessary for a man to confess to his own priest?
(5) Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own
priest, in virtue of a privilege or of the command of a superior?
(6) Whether a penitent, in danger of death can be absolved by any
priest?
(7) Whether the temporal punishment should be enjoined in proportion to
the sin?
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Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to confess to a
priest. For we are not bound to confession, except in virtue of its
Divine institution. Now its Divine institution is made known to us
(James 5:16): "Confess your sins, one to another," where there is no
mention of a priest. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a
priest.
Objection 2: Further, Penance is a necessary sacrament, as is also
Baptism. But any man is the minister of Baptism, on account of its
necessity. Therefore any man is the minister of Penance. Now confession
should be made to the minister of Penance. Therefore it suffices to
confess to anyone.
Objection 3: Further, confession is necessary in order that the measure
of satisfaction should be imposed on the penitent. Now, sometimes
another than a priest might be more discreet than many priests are in
imposing the measure of satisfaction on the penitent. Therefore it is
not necessary to confess to a priest.
Objection 4: Further, confession was instituted in the Church in order
that the rectors might know their sheep by sight. But sometimes a
rector or prelate is not a priest. Therefore confession should not
always be made to a priest.
On the contrary, The absolution of the penitent, for the sake of which
he makes his confession, is imparted by none but priests to whom the
keys are intrusted. Therefore confession should be made to a priest.
Further, confession is foreshadowed in the raising of the dead Lazarus
to life. Now our Lord commanded none but the disciples to loose Lazarus
(Jn. 11:44). Therefore confession should be made to a priest.
I answer that, The grace which is given in the sacraments, descends
from the Head to the members. Wherefore he alone who exercises a
ministry over Christ's true body is a minister of the sacraments,
wherein grace is given; and this belongs to a priest alone, who can
consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, since grace is given in the
sacrament of Penance, none but a priest is the minister of the
sacrament: and consequently sacramental confession which should be made
to a minister of the Church, should be made to none but a priest.
Reply to Objection 1: James speaks on the presupposition of the Divine
institutions: and since confession had already been prescribed by God
to be made to a priest, in that He empowered them, in the person of the
apostles, to forgive sins, as related in Jn. 20:23, we must take the
words of James as conveying an admonishment to confess to priests.
Reply to Objection 2: Baptism is a sacrament of greater necessity than
Penance, as regards confession and absolution, because sometimes
Baptism cannot be omitted without loss of eternal salvation, as in the
case of children who have not come to the use of reason: whereas this
cannot be said of confession and absolution, which regard none but
adults, in whom contrition, together with the purpose of confessing and
the desire of absolution, suffices to deliver them from everlasting
death. Consequently there is no parity between Baptism and confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In satisfaction we must consider not only the
quantity of the punishment but also its power, inasmuch as it is part
of a sacrament. In this way it requires a dispenser of the sacraments,
though the quantity of the punishment may be fixed by another than a
priest.
Reply to Objection 4: It may be necessary for two reasons to know the
sheep by sight. First, in order to register them as members of Christ's
flock, and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the pastoral
charge and care, which is sometimes the duty of those who are not
priests. Secondly, that they may be provided with suitable remedies for
their health; and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the man,
i.e. the priest, whose business it is to provide remedies conducive to
health, such as the sacrament of the Eucharist, and other like things.
It is to this knowledge of the sheep that confession is ordained.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is never lawful to confess to
another than a priest. For confession is a sacramental accusation, as
appears from the definition given above ([4843]Q[7], A[1]). But the
dispensing of a sacrament belongs to none but the minister of a
sacrament. Since then the proper minister of Penance is a priest, it
seems that confession should be made to no one else.
Objection 2: Further, in every court of justice confession is ordained
to the sentence. Now in a disputed case the sentence is void if
pronounced by another than the proper judge; so that confession should
be made to none but a judge. But, in the court of conscience, the judge
is none but a priest, who has the power of binding and loosing.
Therefore confession should be made to no one else.
Objection 3: Further, in the case of Baptism, since anyone can baptize,
if a layman has baptized, even without necessity, the Baptism should
not be repeated by a priest. But if anyone confess to a layman in a
case of necessity, he is bound to repeat his confession to a priest,
when the cause for urgency has passed. Therefore confession should not
be made to a layman in a case of necessity.
On the contrary, is the authority of the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).
I answer that, Just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is Penance.
And Baptism, through being a necessary sacrament has a twofold
minister: one whose duty it is to baptize, in virtue of his office,
viz. the priest, and another, to whom the conferring of Baptism is
committed, in a case of necessity. In like manner the minister of
Penance, to whom, in virtue of his office, confession should be made,
is a priest; but in a case of necessity even a layman may take the
place of a priest, and hear a person's confession.
Reply to Objection 1: In the sacrament of Penance there is not only
something on the part of the minister, viz. the absolution and
imposition of satisfaction, but also something on the part of the
recipient, which is also essential to the sacrament, viz. contrition
and confession. Now satisfaction originates from the minister in so far
as he enjoins it, and from the penitent who fulfills it; and, for the
fulness of the sacrament, both these things should concur when
possible. But when there is reason for urgency, the penitent should
fulfill his own part, by being contrite and confessing to whom he can;
and although this person cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to fulfill
the part of the priest by giving absolution, yet this defect is
supplied by the High Priest. Nevertheless confession made to a layman,
through lack* of a priest, is quasi-sacramental, although it is not a
perfect sacrament, on account of the absence of the part which belongs
to the priest. [*Here and in the Reply to OBJ[2] the Leonine edition
reads "through desire for a priest".]
Reply to Objection 2: Although a layman is not the judge of the person
who confesses to him, yet, on account of the urgency, he does take the
place of a judge over him, absolutely speaking, in so far as the
penitent submits to him, through lack of a priest.
Reply to Objection 3: By means of the sacraments man must needs be
reconciled not only to God, but also to the Church. Now he cannot be
reconciled to the Church, unless the hallowing of the Church reach him.
In Baptism the hallowing of the Church reaches a man through the
element itself applied externally, which is sanctified by "the word of
life" (Eph. 5:26), by whomsoever it is conferred: and so when once a
man has been baptized, no matter by whom, he must not be baptized
again. On the other hand, in Penance the hallowing of the Church
reaches man by the minister alone, because in that sacrament there is
no bodily element applied externally, through the hallowing of which
grace may be conferred. Consequently although the man who, in a case of
necessity, has confessed to a layman, has received forgiveness from
God, for the reason that he fulfilled, so far as he could, the purpose
which he conceived in accordance with God's command, he is not yet
reconciled to the Church, so as to be admitted to the sacraments,
unless he first be absolved by a priest, even as he who has received
the Baptism of desire, is not admitted to the Eucharist. Wherefore he
must confess again to a priest, as soon as there is one at hand, and
the more so since, as stated above (ad 1), the sacrament of Penance was
not perfected, and so it needs yet to be perfected, in order that by
receiving the sacrament, the penitent may receive a more plentiful
effect, and that he may fulfill the commandment about receiving the
sacrament of Penance.
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Whether, outside a case of necessity, anyone who is not a priest may hear
the confession of venial sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that, outside a case of necessity, no one
but a priest may hear the confession of venial sins. For the
dispensation of a sacrament is committed to a layman by reason of
necessity. But the confession of venial sins is not necessary.
Therefore it is not committed to a layman.
Objection 2: Further, Extreme Unction is ordained against venial sin,
just as Penance is. But the former may not be given by a layman, as
appears from James 5:14. Therefore neither can the confession of venial
sins be made to a layman.
On the contrary, is the authority of Bede (on James 5:16, "Confess . .
. one to another") quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).
I answer that, By venial sin man is separated neither from God nor from
the sacraments of the Church: wherefore he does not need to receive any
further grace for the forgiveness of such a sin, nor does he need to be
reconciled to the Church. Consequently a man does not need to confess
his venial sins to a priest. And since confession made to a layman is a
sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, and since it
proceeds from charity, it has a natural aptitude to remit sins, just as
the beating of one's breast, or the sprinkling of holy water (cf.
[4844]TP, Q[87], A[3]).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection, because there is no
need to receive a sacrament for the forgiveness of venial sins. and a
sacramental, such as holy water or the like, suffices for the purpose.
Reply to Objection 2: Extreme Unction is not given directly as a remedy
for venial sin, nor is any other sacrament.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary for one to confess to one's own priest?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is nol necessary to confess to one's
own priest. For Gregory [*Cf. Can. Ex auctoritate xvi, Q[1]] says: "By
our apostolic authority and in discharge of our solicitude we have
decreed that priests, who as monks imitate the ex. ample of the
apostles, may preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose
penances, and absolve from sins." Now monks are not the proper priests
of anyone, since they have not the care of souls. Since, therefore
confession is made for the sake of absolution it suffices for it to be
made to any priest.
Objection 2: Further, the minister of this sacrament is a priest, as
also of the Eucharist. But any priest can perform the Eucharist.
Therefore any priest can administer the sacrament of Penance. Therefore
there is no need to confess to one's own priest.
Objection 3: Further, when we are bound to one thing in particular it
is not left to our choice. But the choice of a discreet priest is left
to us as appears from the authority of Augustine quoted in the text
(Sent. ix, D, 17): for he says in De vera et falsa Poenitentia [*Work
of an unknown author]: "He who wishes to confess his sins, in order to
find grace, must seek a priest who knows how to loose and to bind."
Therefore it seems unnecessary to confess to one's own priest.
Objection 4: Further, there are some, such as prelates, who seem to
have no priest of their own, since they have no superior: yet they are
bound to confession. Therefore a man is not always bound to confess to
his own priest.
Objection 5: Further, "That which is instituted for the sake of
charity, does not militate against charity," as Bernard observes (De
Praecept. et Dispens. ii). Now confession, which was instituted for the
sake of charity, would militate against charity, if a man were bound to
confess to any particular priest: e.g. if the sinner know that his own
priest is a heretic, or a man of evil influence, or weak and prone to
the very sin that he wishes to confess to him, or reasonably suspected
of breaking the seal of confession, or if the penitent has to confess a
sin committed against his confessor. Therefore it seems that one need
not always confess to one's own priest.
Objection 6: Further, men should not be straitened in matters necessary
for salvation, lest they be hindered in the way of salvation. But it
seems a great inconvenience to be bound of necessity to confess to one
particular man, and many might be hindered from going to confession,
through either fear, shame, or something else of the kind. Therefore,
since confession is necessary for salvation, men should not be
straitened, as apparently they would be, by having to confess to their
own priest.
On the contrary, stands a decree of Pope Innocent III in the Fourth
Lateran Council (Can. 21), who appointed "all of either sex to confess
once a year to their own priest."
Further, as a bishop is to his diocese, so is a priest to his parish.
Now it is unlawful, according to canon law (Can. Nullus primas
ix[4845], Q[2]; Can. Si quis episcoporum xvi[4846], Q[5]), for a bishop
to exercise the episcopal office in another diocese. Therefore it is
not lawful for one priest to hear the confession of another's
parishioner.
I answer that, The other sacraments do not consist in an action of the
recipient, but only in his receiving something, as is evident with
regard to Baptism and so forth. though the action of the recipient is
required as removing an obstacle, i.e. insincerity, in order that he
may receive the benefit of the sacrament, if he has come to the use of
his free-will. On the other hand, the action of the man who approaches
the sacrament of Penance is essential to the sacrament, since
contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are acts of the
penitent, are parts of Penance. Now our actions, since they have their
origin in us, cannot be dispensed by others, except through their
command. Hence whoever is appointed a dispenser of this sacrament, must
be such as to be able to command something to be done. Now a man is not
competent to command another unless he have jurisdiction over him.
Consequently it is essential to this sacrament, not only for the
minister to be in orders, as in the case of the other sacraments, but
also for him to have jurisdiction: wherefore he that has no
jurisdiction cannot administer this sacrament any more than one who is
not a priest. Therefore confession should be made not only to a priest,
but to one's own priest; for since a priest does not absolve a man
except by binding him to do something, he alone can absolve, who, by
his command, can bind the penitent to do something.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of those monks who have
jurisdiction, through having charge of a parish; about whom some had
maintained that from the very fact that they were monks, they could not
absolve or impose penance, which is false.
Reply to Objection 2: The sacrament of the Eucharist does not require
the power of command over a man, whereas this sacrament does, as stated
above: and so the argument proves nothing. Nevertheless it is not
lawful to receive the Eucharist from another than one's own priest,
although it is a real sacrament that one receives from another.
Reply to Objection 3: The choice of a discreet priest is not left to us
in such a way that we can do just as we like; but it is left to the
permission of a higher authority, if perchance one's own priest happens
to be less suitable for applying a salutary remedy to our sins.
Reply to Objection 4: Since it is the duty of prelates to dispense the
sacraments, which the clean alone should handle, they are allowed by
law (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Ne pro dilatione) to choose a priest
for their confessor; who in this respect is the prelate's superior;
even as one physician is cured by another, not as a physician but as a
patient.
Reply to Objection 5: In those cases wherein the penitent has reason to
fear some harm to himself or to the priest by reason of his confessing
to him, he should have recourse to the higher authority, or ask
permission of the priest himself to confess to another; and if he fails
to obtain permission, the case is to be decided as for a man who has no
priest at hand; so that he should rather choose a layman and confess to
him. Nor does he disobey the law of the Church by so doing, because the
precepts of positive law do not extend beyond the intention of the
lawgiver, which is the end of the precept, and in this case, is
charity, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5). Nor is any slur cast on
the priest, for he deserves to forfeit his privilege, for abusing the
power intrusted to him.
Reply to Objection 6: The necessity of confessing to one's own priest
does not straiten the way of salvation, but determines it sufficiently.
A priest, however, would sin if he were not easy in giving permission
to confess to another, because many are so weak that they would rather
die without confession than confess to such a priest. Wherefore those
priests who are too anxious to probe the consciences of their subjects
by means of confession, lay a snare of damnation for many, and
consequently for themselves.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest,
in virtue of a privilege or a command given by a superior?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for anyone to confess
to another than his own priest, even in virtue of a privilege or
command given by a superior. For no privilege should be given that
wrongs a third party. Now it would be prejudicial to the subject's own
priest, if he were to confess to another. Therefore this cannot be
allowed by a superior's privilege, permission, or command.
Objection 2: Further, that which hinders the observance of a Divine
command cannot be the subject of a command or privilege given by man.
Now it is a Divine command to the rectors of churches to "know the
countenance of their own cattle" (Prov. 27:23); and this is hindered if
another than the rector hear the confession of his subjects. Therefore
this cannot be prescribed by any human privilege or command.
Objection 3: Further, he that hears another's confession is the
latter's own judge, else he could not bind or loose him. Now one man
cannot have several priests or judges of his own, for then he would be
bound to obey several men, which would be impossible, if their commands
were contrary or incompatible. Therefore one may not confess to another
than one's own priest, even with the superior's permission.
Objection 4: Further, it is derogatory to a sacrament, or at least
useless, to repeat a sacrament over the same matter. But he who has
confessed to another priest, is bound to confess again to his own
priest, if the latter requires him to do so, because he is not absolved
from his obedience, whereby he is bound to him in this respect.
Therefore it cannot be lawful for anyone to confess to another than his
own priest.
On the contrary, He that can perform the actions of an order can depute
the exercise thereof to anyone who has the same order. Now a superior,
such as a bishop, can hear the confession of anyone belonging to a
priest's parish, for sometimes he reserves certain cases to himself,
since he is the chief rector. Therefore he can also depute another
priest to hear that man.
Further, a superior can do whatever his subject can do. But the priest
himself can give his parishioner permission to confess to another. Much
more, therefore, can his superior do this.
Further, the power which a priest has among his people, comes to him
from the bishop. Now it is through that power that he can hear
confessions. Therefore, in like manner, another can do so, to whom the
bishop gives the same power.
I answer that, A priest may be hindered in two ways from hearing a
man's confession: first, through lack of jurisdiction; secondly,
through being prevented from exercising his order, as those who are
excommunicate, degraded, and so forth. Now whoever has jurisdiction,
can depute to another whatever comes under his jurisdiction; so that if
a priest is hindered from hearing a man's confession through want of
jurisdiction, anyone who has immediate jurisdiction over that man,
priest, bishop, or Pope, can depute that priest to hear his confession
and absolve him. If, on the other hand, the priest cannot hear the
confession, on account of an impediment to the exercise of his order,
anyone who has the power to remove that impediment can permit him to
hear confessions.
Reply to Objection 1: No wrong is done to a person unless what is taken
away from him was granted for his own benefit. Now the power of
jurisdiction is not granted a man for his own benefit, but for the good
of the people and for the glory of God. Wherefore if the higher
prelates deem it expedient for the furthering of the people's salvation
and God's glory, to commit matters of jurisdiction to others, no wrong
is done to the inferior prelates, except to those who "seek the things
that are their own; not the things that are Jesus Christ's" (Phil.
2:21), and who rule their flock, not by feeding it, but by feeding on
it.
Reply to Objection 2: The rector of a church should "know the
countenance of his own cattle" in two ways. First, by an assiduous
attention to their external conduct, so as to watch over the flock
committed to his care: and in acquiring this knowledge he should not
believe his subject, but, as far as possible, inquire into the truth of
facts. Secondly, by the manifestation of confession; and with regard to
this knowledge, he cannot arrive at any greater certainty than by
believing his subject, because this is necessary that he may help his
subject's conscience. Consequently in the tribunal of confession, the
penitent is believed whether he speak for himself or against himself,
but not in the court of external judgment: wherefore it suffices for
this knowledge that he believe the penitent when he says that he has
confessed to one who could absolve him. It is therefore clear that this
knowledge of the flock is not hindered by a privilege granted to
another to hear confessions.
Reply to Objection 3: It would be inconvenient, if two men were placed
equally over the same people, but there is no inconvenience if over the
same people two are placed one of whom is over the other. In this way
the parish priest, the bishop, and the Pope are placed immediately over
the same people, and each of them can commit matters of jurisdiction to
some other. Now a higher superior delegates a man in two ways: first,
so that the latter takes the superior's place, as when the Pope or a
bishop appoints his penitentiaries; and then the man thus delegated is
higher than the inferior prelate, as the Pope's penitentiary is higher
than a bishop, and the bishop's penitentiary than a parish priest, and
the penitent is bound to obey the former rather than the latter.
Secondly, so that the delegate is appointed the coadjutor of this other
priest; and since a co-adjutor is subordinate to the person he is
appointed to help, he holds a lower rank, and the penitent is not so
bound to obey him as his own priest.
Reply to Objection 4: No man is bound to confess sins that he has no
longer. Consequently, if a man has confessed to the bishop's
penitentiary, or to someone else having faculties from the bishop, his
sins are forgiven both before the Church and before God, so that he is
not bound to confess them to his own priest, however much the latter
may insist: but on account of the Ecclesiastical precept (De Poenit. et
Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque) which prescribes confession to be made
once a year to one's own priest, he is under the same obligation as one
who has committed none but venial sins. For such a one, according to
some, is bound to confess none but venial sins, or he must declare that
he is free from mortal sin, and the priest, in the tribunal of
conscience, ought, and is bound, to believe him. If, however, he were
bound to confess again, his first confession would not be useless,
because the more priests one confesses to, the more is the punishment
remitted, both by reason of the shame in confessing, which is reckoned
as a satisfactory punishment, and by reason of the power of the keys:
so that one might confess so often as to be delivered from all
punishment. Nor is repetition derogatory to a sacrament, except in
those wherein there is some kind of sanctification, either by the
impressing of a character, or by the consecration of the matter,
neither of which applies to Penance. Hence it would be well for him who
hears confessions by the bishop's authority, to advise the penitent to
confess to his own priest, yet he must absolve him, even if he declines
to do so.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a penitent, at the point of death, can be absolved by any priest?
Objection 1: It would seem that a penitent, at the point of death,
cannot be absolved by any priest. For absolution requires jurisdiction,
as stated above [4847](A[5]). Now a priest does not acquire
jurisdiction over a man who repents at the point of death. Therefore he
cannot absolve him.
Objection 2: Further, he that receives the sacrament of Baptism, when
in danger of death, from another than his own priest, does not need to
be baptized again by the latter. If, therefore, any priest can absolve,
from any sin, a man who is in danger of death, the penitent, if he
survive the danger, need not go to his own priest; which is false,
since otherwise the priest would not "know the countenance of his
cattle."
Objection 3: Further, when there is danger of death, Baptism can be
conferred not only by a strange priest, but also by one who is not a
priest. But one who is not a priest can never absolve in the tribunal
of Penance. Therefore neither can a priest absolve a man who is not his
subject, when he is in danger of death.
On the contrary, Spiritual necessity is greater than bodily necessity.
But it is lawful in a case of extreme necessity, for a man to make use
of another's property, even against the owner's will, in order to
supply a bodily need. Therefore in danger of death, a man may be
absolved by another than his own priest, in order to supply his
spiritual need.
Further, the authorities quoted in the text prove the same (Sent. iv,
D, 20, Cap. Non Habet).
I answer that, If we consider the power of the keys, every priest has
power over all men equally and over all sins: and it is due to the fact
that by the ordination of the Church, he has a limited jurisdiction or
none at all, that he cannot absolve all men from all sins. But since
"necessity knows no law" [*Cap. Consilium, De observ. jejun.; De reg.
jur. (v, Decretal)] in cases of necessity the ordination of the Church
does not hinder him from being able to absolve, since he has the keys
sacramentally: and the penitent will receive as much benefit from the
absolution of this other priest as if he had been absolved by his own.
Moreover a man can then be absolved by any priest not only from his
sins, but also from excommunication, by whomsoever pronounced, because
such absolution is also a matter of that jurisdiction which by the
ordination of the Church is con. fined within certain limits.
Reply to Objection 1: One person may act on the jurisdiction of another
according to the latter's will, since matters of jurisdiction can be
deputed. Since, therefore, the Church recognizes absolution granted by
any priest at the hour of death, from this very fact a priest has the
use of jurisdiction though he lack the power of jurisdiction.
Reply to Objection 2: He needs to go to his own priest, not that he may
be absolved again from the sins, from which he was absolved when in
danger of death, but that his own priest may know that he is absolved.
In like manner, he who has been absolved from excommunication needs to
go to the judge, who in other circumstances could have absolved him,
not in order to seek absolution, but in order to offer satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism derives its efficacy from the
sanctification of the matter itself, so that a man receives the
sacrament whosoever baptizes him: whereas the sacramental power of
Penance consists in a sanctification pronounced by the minister, so
that if a man confess to a layman, although he fulfills his own part of
the sacramental confession, he does not receive sacramental absolution.
Wherefore his confession avails him somewhat, as to the lessening of
his punishment, owing to the merit derived from his confession and to
his repentance. but he does not receive that diminution of his
punishment which results from the power of the keys; and consequently
he must confess again to a priest; and one who has confessed thus, is
more punished hereafter than if he had confessed to a priest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the temporal punishment is imposed according to the degree of the
fault?
Objection 1: It would seem that the temporal punishment, the debt of
which remains after Penance, is not imposed according to the degree of
fault. For it is imposed according to the degree of pleasure derived
from the sin, as appears from Apoc. 18:7: "As much as she hath
glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow
give ye her." Yet sometimes where there is greater pleasure, there is
less fault, since "carnal sins, which afford more pleasure than
spiritual sins, are less guilty," according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii,
2). Therefore the punishment is not imposed according to the degree of
fault.
Objection 2: Further, in the New Law one is bound to punishment for
mortal sins, in the same way as in the Old Law. Now in the Old Law the
punishment for sin was due to last seven days, in other words, they had
to remain unclean seven days for one mortal sin. Since therefore, in
the New Testament, a punishment of seven years is imposed for one
mortal sin, it seems that the quantity of the punishment does not
answer to the degree of fault.
Objection 3: Further, the sin of murder in a layman is more grievous
than that of fornication in a priest, because the circumstance which is
taken from the species of a sin, is more aggravating than that which is
taken from the person of the sinner. Now a punishment of seven years'
duration is appointed for a layman guilty of murder, while for
fornication a priest is punished for ten years, according to Can.
Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii. Therefore punishment is not imposed according
to the degree of fault.
Objection 4: Further, a sin committed against the very body of Christ
is most grievous, because the greater the person sinned against, the
more grievous the sin. Now for spilling the blood of Christ in the
sacrament of the altar a punishment of forty days or a little more is
enjoined, while a punishment of seven years is prescribed for
fornication, according to the Canons (Can. Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii).
Therefore the quantity of the punishment does not answer to the degree
of fault.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 27:8): "In measure against measure,
when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Therefore the quantity
of punishment adjudicated for sin answers the degree of fault.
Further, man is reduced to the equality of justice by the punishment
inflicted on him. But this would not be so if the quantity of the fault
and of the punishment did not mutually correspond. Therefore one
answers to the other.
I answer that, After the forgiveness of sin, a punishment is required
for two reasons, viz. to pay the debt, and to afford a remedy. Hence
the punishment may be imposed in consideration of two things. First, in
consideration of the debt, and in this way the quantity of the
punishment corresponds radically to the quantity of the fault, before
anything of the latter is forgiven: yet the more there is remitted by
the first of those things which are of a nature to remit punishment,
the less there remains to be remitted or paid by the other, because the
more contrition remits of the punishment, the less there remains to be
remitted by confession. Secondly, in consideration of the remedy,
either as regards the one who sinned, or as regards others: and thus
sometimes a greater punishment is enjoined for a lesser sin; either
because one man's sin is more difficult to resist than another's (thus
a heavier punishment is imposed on a young man for fornication, than on
an old man, though the former's sin be less grievous), or because one
man's sin; for instance, a priest's, is more dangerous to others, than
another's sin, or because the people are more prone to that particular
sin, so that it is necessary by the punishment of the one man to deter
others. Consequently, in the tribunal of Penance, the punishment has to
be imposed with due regard to both these things: and so a greater
punishment is not always imposed for a greater sin. on the other hand,
the punishment of Purgatory is only for the payment of the debt,
because there is no longer any possibility of sinning, so that this
punishment is meted only according to the measure of sin, with due
consideration however for the degree of contrition, and for confession
and absolution, since all these lessen the punishment somewhat:
wherefore the priest in enjoining satisfaction should bear them in
mind.
Reply to Objection 1: In the words quoted two things are mentioned with
regard to the sin, viz. "glorification" and "delicacies" or
"delectation"; the first of which regards the uplifting of the sinner,
whereby he resists God; while the second regards the pleasure of sin:
and though sometimes there is less pleasure in a greater sin, yet there
is greater uplifting; wherefore the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: This punishment of seven days did not expiate the
punishment due for the sin, so that even if the sinner died after that
time, he would be punished in Purgatory: but it was in expiation of the
irregularity incurred, from which all the legal sacrifices expiated.
Nevertheless, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously
under the New Law than under the Old, on account of the more plentiful
sanctification received in Baptism, and on account of the more powerful
blessings bestowed by God on the human race. This is evident from Heb.
29: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments," etc.
And yet it is not universally true that a seven years' penance is
exacted for every mortal sin: but it is a kind of general rule
applicable to the majority of cases, which must, nevertheless, be
disregarded, with due consideration for the various circumstances of
sins and penitents.
Reply to Objection 3: A bishop or priest sins with greater danger to
others or to himself; wherefore the canons are more anxious to withdraw
him from sin, by inflicting a greater punishment, in as much as it is
intended as a remedy; although sometimes so great a punishment is not
strictly due. Hence he is punished less in Purgatory.
Reply to Objection 4: This punishment refers to the case when this
happens against the priest's will: for if he spilled it willingly he
would deserve a much heavier punishment.
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OF THE QUALITY OF CONFESSION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the quality of confession: under which head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession can be lacking in form?
(2) Whether confession ought to be entire?
(3) Whether one can confess through another, or by writing?
(4) Whether the sixteen conditions, which are assigned by the masters,
are necessary for confession?
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Whether confession can be lacking in form?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession cannot be lacking in form.
For it is written (Ecclus. 17:26): "Praise [confession] perisheth from
the dead as nothing." But a man without charity is dead, because
charity is the life of the soul. Therefore there can be no confession
without charity.
Objection 2: Further, confession is condivided with contrition and
satisfaction. But contrition and satisfaction are impossible without
charity. Therefore confession is also impossible without charity.
Objection 3: Further, it is necessary in confession that the word
should agree with the thought for the very name of confession requires
this. Now if a man confess while remaining attached to sin, his word is
not in accord with his thought, since in his heart he holds to sin,
while he condemns it with his lips. Therefore such a man does not
confess.
On the contrary, Every man is bound to confess his mortal sins. Now if
a man in mortal sin has confessed once, he is not bound to confess the
same sins again, because, as no man knows himself to have charity, no
man would know of him that he had confessed. Therefore it is not
necessary that confession should be quickened by charity.
I answer that, Confession is an act of virtue, and is part of a
sacrament. In so far as it is an act of virtue, it has the property of
being meritorious, and thus is of no avail without charity, which is
the principle of merit. But in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it
subordinates the penitent to the priest who has the keys of the Church,
and who by means of the confession knows the conscience of the person
confessing. In this way it is possible for confession to be in one who
is not contrite, for he can make his sins known to the priest, and
subject himself to the keys of the Church: and though he does not
receive the fruit of absolution then, yet he will begin to receive it,
when he is sincerely contrite, as happens in the other sacraments:
wherefore he is not bound to repeat his confession, but to confess his
lack of sincerity.
Reply to Objection 1: These words must be understood as referring to
the receiving of the fruit of confession, which none can receive who is
not in the state of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Contrition and satisfaction are offered to God:
but confession is made to man: hence it is essential to contrition and
satisfaction, but not to confession, that man should be united to God
by charity.
Reply to Objection 3: He who declares the sins which he has, speaks the
truth; and thus his thought agrees with his lips or words, as to the
substance of confession, though it is discordant with the purpose of
confession.
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Whether confession should be entire?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for confession to
be entire, namely, for a man to confess all his sins to one priest. For
shame conduces to the diminution of punishment. Now the greater the
number of priests to whom a man confesses, the greater his shame.
Therefore confession is more fruitful if it be divided among several
priests.
Objection 2: Further, confession is necessary in Penance in order that
punishment may be enjoined for sin according to the judgment of the
priest. Now a sufficient punishment for different sins can be imposed
by different priests. Therefore it is not necessary to confess all
one's sins to one priest.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that a man after going to
confession and performing his penance, remembers a mortal sin, which
escaped his memory while confessing, and that his own priest to whom he
confessed first is no longer available, so that he can only confess
that sin to another priest, and thus he will confess different sins to
different priests.
Objection 4: Further, the sole reason for confessing one's sins to a
priest is in order to receive absolution. Now sometimes, the priest who
hears a confession can absolve from some of the sins, but not from all.
Therefore in such a case at all events the confession need not be
entire.
On the contrary, Hypocrisy is an obstacle to Penance. But it savors of
hypocrisy to divide one's confession, as Augustine says [*De vera et
falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author]. Therefore confession
should be entire. Further, confession is a part of Penance. But Penance
should be entire. Therefore confession also should be entire.
I answer that, In prescribing medicine for the body, the physician
should know not only the disease for which he is prescribing, but also
the general constitution of the sick person, since one disease is
aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine which would be
adapted to one disease, would be harmful to another. The same is to be
said in regard to sins, for one is aggravated when another is added to
it; and a remedy which would be suitable for one sin, might prove an
incentive to another, since sometimes a man is guilty of contrary sins,
as Gregory says (Pastoral. iii, 3). Hence it is necessary for
confession that man confess all the sins that he calls to mind, and if
he fails to do this, it is not a confession, but a pretense of
confession.
Reply to Objection 1: Although a man's shame is multiplied when he
makes a divided confession to different confessors, yet all his
different shames together are not so great as that with which he
confesses all his sins together: because one sin considered by itself
does not prove the evil disposition of the sinner, as when it is
considered in conjunction with several others, for a man may fall into
one sin through ignorance or weakness, but a number of sins proves the
malice of the sinner, or his great corruption.
Reply to Objection 2: The punishment imposed by different priests would
not be sufficient, because each would only consider one sin by itself,
and not the gravity which it derives from being in conjunction with
another. Moreover sometimes the punishment which would be given for one
sin would foster another. Again the priest in hearing a confession
takes the place of God, so that confession should be made to him just
as contrition is made to God: wherefore as there would be no contrition
unless one were contrite for all the sins which one calls to mind, so
is there no confession unless one confess all the sins that one
remembers committing.
Reply to Objection 3: Some say that when a man remembers a sin which he
had previously forgotten, he ought to confess again the sins which he
had confessed before, especially if he cannot go to the same priest to
whom his previous confession was made, in order that the total quantity
of his sins may be made known to one priest. But this does not seem
necessary, because sin takes its quantity both from itself and from the
conjunction of another; and as to the sins which he confessed he had
already manifested their quantity which they have of themselves, while
as to the sin which he had forgotten, in order that the priest may know
the quantity which it has under both the above heads, it is enough that
the penitent declare it explicitly, and confess the others in general,
saying that he had confessed many sins in his previous confession, but
had forgotten this particular one.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the priest may be unable to absolve the
penitent from all his sins, yet the latter is bound to confess all to
him, that he may know the total quantity of his guilt, and refer him to
the superior with regard to the sins from which he cannot absolve him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one may confess through another, or by writing?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may confess through another, or by
writing. For confession is necessary in order that the penitent's
conscience may be made known to the priest. But a man can make his
conscience known to the priest, through another or by writing.
Therefore it is enough to confess through another or by writing.
Objection 2: Further, some are not understood by their own priests on
account of a difference of language, and consequently cannot confess
save through others. Therefore it is not essential to the sacrament
that one should confess by oneself, so that if anyone confesses through
another in any way whatever, it suffices for his salvation.
Objection 3: Further, it is essential to the sacrament that a man
should confess to his own priest, as appears from what has been said
([4848]Q[8], A[5] ). Now sometimes a man's own priest is absent, so
that the penitent cannot speak to him with his own voice. But he could
make his conscience known to him by writing. Therefore it seems that he
ought to manifest his conscience to him by writing to him.
On the contrary, Man is bound to confess his sins even as he is bound
to confess his faith. But confession of faith should be made "with the
mouth," as appears from Rom. 10:10: therefore confession of sins should
also.
Further, who sinned by himself should, by himself, do penance. But
confession is part of penance. Therefore the penitent should confess
his own sins.
I answer that, Confession is not only an act of virtue, but also part
of a sacrament. Now, though, in so far as it is an act of virtue it
matters not how it is done, even if it be easier to do it in one way
than in another, yet, in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it has a
determinate act, just as the other sacraments have a determinate
matter. And as in Baptism, in order to signify the inward washing, we
employ that element which is chiefly used in washing, so in the
sacramental act which is intended for manifestation we generally make
use of that act which is most commonly employed for the purpose of
manifestation, viz. our own words; for other ways have been introduced
as supplementary to this.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as in Baptism it is not enough to wash with
anything, but it is necessary to wash with a determinate element, so
neither does it suffice, in Penance, to manifest one's sins anyhow, but
they must be declared by a determinate act.
Reply to Objection 2: It is enough for one who is ignorant of a
language, to confess by writing, or by signs, or by an interpreter,
because a man is not bound to do more than he can: although a man is
not able or obliged to receive Baptism, except with water, which is
from an entirely external source and is applied to us by another:
whereas the act of confession is from within and is performed by
ourselves, so that when we cannot confess in one way, we must confess
as we can.
Reply to Objection 3: In the absence of one's own priest, confession
may be made even to a layman, so that there is no necessity to confess
in writing, because the act of confession is more essential than the
person to whom confession is made.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sixteen conditions usually assigned are necessary for
confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that the conditions assigned by masters, and
contained in the following lines, are not requisite for confession:
Simple, humble, pure, faithful,
Frequent, undisguised, discreet, voluntary,
shamefaced,
Entire, secret, tearful, not delayed,
Courageously accusing, ready to obey.
For fidelity, simplicity, and courage are virtues by themselves, and
therefore should not be reckoned as conditions of confession.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is "pure" when it is not mixed with
anything else: and "simplicity," in like manner, removes composition
and admixture. Therefore one or the other is superfluous.
Objection 3: Further, no one is bound to confess more than once a sin
which he has committed but once. Therefore if a man does not commit a
sin again, his penance need not be "frequent."
Objection 4: Further, confession is directed to satisfaction. But
satisfaction is sometimes public. Therefore confession should not
always be "secret."
Objection 5: Further, that which is not in our power is not required of
us. But it is not in our power to shed "tears." Therefore it is not
required of those who confess.
On the contrary, We have the authority of the masters who assigned the
above.
I answer that, Some of the above conditions are essential to
confession, and some are requisite for its well-being. Now those things
which are essential to confession belong to it either as to an act of
virtue, or as to part of a sacrament. If in the first way, it is either
by reason of virtue in general, or by reason of the special virtue of
which it is the act, or by reason of the act itself. Now there are four
conditions of virtue in general, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. The first
is knowledge, in respect of which confession is said to be "discreet,"
inasmuch as prudence is required in every act of virtue: and this
discretion consists in giving greater weight to greater sins. The
second condition is choice, because acts of virtue should be voluntary,
and in this respect confession is said to be "voluntary." The third
condition is that the act be done for a particular purpose, viz. the
due end, and in this respect confession is said to be "pure," i.e. with
a right intention. The fourth condition is that one should act
immovably, and in this respect it is said that confession should be
"courageous," viz. that the truth should not be forsaken through shame.
Now confession is an act of the virtue of penance. First of all it
takes its origin in the horror which one conceives for the shamefulness
of sin, and in this respect confession should be "full of shame," so as
not to be a boastful account of one's sins, by reason of some worldly
vanity accompanying it. Then it goes on to deplore the sin committed,
and in this respect it is said to be "tearful." Thirdly, it culminates
in self-abjection, and in this respect it should be "humble," so that
one confesses one's misery and weakness.
By reason of its very nature, viz. confession, this act is one of
manifestation: which manifestation can be hindered by four things:
first, by falsehood, and in this respect confession is said to be
"faithful," i.e. true. Secondly, by the use of vague words, and against
this confession is said to be "open," so as not to be wrapped up in
vague words; thirdly, by "multiplicity" of words, in which respect it
is said to be "simple" indicating that the penitent should relate only
such matters as affect the gravity of the sin; fourthly none of those
things should be suppressed which should be made known, and in this
respect confession should be "entire."
In so far as confession is part of a sacrament it is subject to the
judgment of the priest who is the minister of the sacrament. Wherefore
it should be an "accusation" on the part of the penitent, should
manifest his "readiness to obey" the priest, should be "secret" as
regards the nature of the court wherein the hidden affairs of
conscience are tried.
The well-being of confession requires that it should be "frequent"; and
"not delayed," i.e. that the sinner should confess at once.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing unreasonable in one virtue being
a condition of the act of another virtue, through this act being
commanded by that virtue; or through the mean which belongs to one
virtue principally, belonging to other virtues by participation.
Reply to Objection 2: The condition "pure" excludes perversity of
intention, from which man is cleansed: but the condition "simple"
excludes the introduction of unnecessary matter.
Reply to Objection 3: This is not necessary for confession, but is a
condition of its well-being.
Reply to Objection 4: Confession should be made not publicly but
privately, lest others be scandalized, and led to do evil through
hearing the sins confessed. On the other hand, the penance enjoined in
satisfaction does not give rise to scandal, since like works of
satisfaction are done sometimes for slight sins, and sometimes for none
at all.
Reply to Objection 5: We must understand this to refer to tears of the
heart.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECT OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effect of confession: under which head there
are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?
(2) Whether confession delivers one in any way from punishment?
(3) Whether confession opens Paradise to us?
(4) Whether confession gives hope of salvation?
(5) Whether a general confession blots out mortal sins that one has
forgotten?
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Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession does not deliver one from
the death of sin. For confession follows contrition. But contrition
sufficiently blots out guilt. Therefore confession does not deliver one
from the death of sin.
Objection 2: Further, just as mortal sin is a fault, so is venial. Now
confession renders venial that which was mortal before, as stated in
the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore confession does not blot out
guilt, but one guilt is changed into another.
On the contrary, Confession is part of the sacrament of Penance. But
Penance deliver from guilt. Therefore confession does also.
I answer that, Penance, as a sacrament, is perfected chiefly in
confession, because by the latter a man submits to the ministers of the
Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments: for contrition has
the desire of confession united thereto, and satisfaction is enjoined
according to the judgment of the priest who hears the confession. And
since in the sacrament of Penance, as in Baptism, that grace is infused
whereby sins are forgiven, therefore confession in virtue of the
absolution granted remits guilt, even as Baptism does. Now Baptism
delivers one from the death of sin, not only by being received
actually, but also by being received in desire, as is evident with
regard to those who approach the sacrament of Baptism after being
already sanctified. And unless a man offers an obstacle, he receives,
through the very fact of being baptized, grace whereby his sins are
remitted, if they are not already remitted. The same is to be said of
confession, to which absolution is added because it delivered the
penitent from guilt through being previously in his desire. Afterwards
at the time of actual confession and absolution he receives an increase
of grace, and forgiveness of sins would also be granted to him, if his
previous sorrow for sin was not sufficient for contrition, and if at
the time he offered no obstacle to grace. Consequently just as it is
said of Baptism that it delivers from death, so can it be said of
confession.
Reply to Objection 1: Contrition has the desire of confession attached
to it, and therefore it delivers penitents from death in the same way
as the desire of Baptism delivers those who are going to be baptized.
Reply to Objection 2: In the text venial does not designate guilt, but
punishment that is easily expiated. and so it does not follow that one
guilt is changed into another but that it is wholly done away. For
"venial" is taken in three senses [*Cf. [4849]FS, Q[88], A[2]]: first,
for what is venial generically, e.g. an idle word: secondly, for what
is venial in its cause, i.e. having within itself a motive of pardon,
e.g. sins due to weakness: thirdly, for what is venial in the result,
in which sense it is understood here, because the result of confession
is that man's past guilt is pardoned.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession delivers from punishment in some way?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession nowise delivers from
punishment. For sin deserves no punishment but what is either eternal
or temporal. Now eternal punishment is remitted by contrition, and
temporal punishment by satisfaction. Therefore nothing of the
punishment is remitted by confession.
Objection 2: Further, "the will is taken for the deed" [*Cf. Can. Magna
Pietas, De Poenit., Dist. i], as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).
Now he that is contrite has the intention to confess. wherefore his
intention avails him as though he had already confessed, and so the
confession which he makes afterwards remits no part of the punishment.
On the contrary, Confession is a penal work. But all penal works
expiate the punishment due to sin. Therefore confession does also.
I answer that, Confession together with absolution has the power to
deliver from punishment, for two reasons. First, from the power of
absolution itself: and thus the very desire of absolution delivers a
man from eternal punishment, as also from the guilt. Now this
punishment is one of condemnation and total banishment: and when a man
is delivered therefrom he still remains bound to a temporal punishment,
in so far as punishment is a cleansing and perfecting remedy; and so
this punishment remains to be suffered in Purgatory by those who also
have been delivered from the punishment of hell. Which temporal
punishment is beyond the powers of the penitent dwelling in this world,
but is so far diminished by the power of the keys, that it is within
the ability of the penitent, and he is able, by making satisfaction, to
cleanse himself in this life. Secondly, confession diminishes the
punishment in virtue of the very nature of the act of the one who
confesses, for this act has the punishment of shame attached to it, so
that the oftener one confesses the same sins, the more is the
punishment diminished.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The will is not taken for the deed, if this is
done by another, as in the case of Baptism: for the will to receive
Baptism is not worth as much as the reception of Baptism. But a man's
will is taken for the deed, when the latter is something done by him,
entirely. Again, this is true of the essential reward, but not of the
removal of punishment and the like, which come under the head of
accidental and secondary reward. Consequently one who has confessed and
received absolution will be less punished in Purgatory than one who has
gone no further than contrition.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession opens paradise?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession does not open Paradise. For
different sacraments have different effects. But it is the effect of
Baptism to open Paradise. Therefore it is not the effect of confession.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible to enter by a closed door before
it be opened. But a dying man can enter heaven before making his
confession. Therefore confession does not open Paradise.
On the contrary, Confession makes a man submit to the keys of the
Church. But Paradise is opened by those keys. Therefore it is opened by
confession.
I answer that, Guilt and the debt of punishment prevent a man from
entering into Paradise: and since confession removes these obstacles,
as shown above ([4850]AA[1],2), it is said to open Paradise.
Reply to Objection 1: Although Baptism and Penance are different
sacraments, they act in virtue of Christ's one Passion, whereby a way
was opened unto Paradise.
Reply to Objection 2: If the dying man was in mortal sin Paradise was
closed to him before he conceived the desire to confess his sin,
although afterwards it was opened by contrition implying a desire for
confession, even before he actually confessed. Nevertheless the
obstacle of the debt of punishment was not entirely removed before
confession and satisfaction.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession gives hope of salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope of salvation should not be
reckoned an effect of confession. For hope arises from all meritorious
acts. Therefore, seemingly, it is not the proper effect of confession.
Objection 2: Further, we arrive at hope through tribulation, as appears
from Rom. 5:3,4. Now man suffers tribulation chiefly in satisfaction.
Therefore, satisfaction rather than confession gives hope of salvation.
On the contrary," Confession makes a man more humble and more wary," as
the Master states in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). But the result of this
is that man conceives a hope of salvation. Therefore it is the effect
of confession to give hope of salvation.
I answer that, We can have no hope for the forgiveness of our sins
except through Christ: and since by confession a man submits to the
keys of the Church which derive their power from Christ's Passion,
therefore do we say that confession gives hope of salvation.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not our actions, but the grace of our
Redeemer, that is the principal cause of the hope of salvation: and
since confession relies upon the grace of our Redeemer, it gives hope
of salvation, not only as a meritorious act, but also as part of a
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Tribulation gives hope of salvation, by making us
exercise our own virtue, and by paying off the debt of punishment:
while confession does so also in the way mentioned above.
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Whether a general confession suffices to blot out forgotten mortal sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that a general confession does not suffice
to blot out forgotten mortal sins. For there is no necessity to confess
again a sin which has been blotted out by confession. If, therefore,
forgotten sins were forgiven by a general confession, there would be no
need to confess them when they are called to mind.
Objection 2: Further, whoever is not conscious of sin, either is not
guilty of sin, or has forgotten his sin. If, therefore, mortal sins are
forgiven by a general confession, whoever is not conscious of a mortal
sin, can be certain that he is free from mortal sin, whenever he makes
a general confession: which is contrary to what the Apostle says (1
Cor. 4:4), "I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not
hereby justified."
Objection 3: Further, no man profits by neglect. Now a man cannot
forget a mortal sin without neglect, before it is forgiven him.
Therefore he does not profit by his forgetfulness so that the sin is
forgiven him without special mention thereof in confession.
Objection 4: Further, that which the penitent knows nothing about is
further from his knowledge than that which he has forgotten. Now a
general confession does not blot out sins committed through ignorance,
else heretics, who are not aware that certain things they have done are
sinful, and certain simple people, would be absolved by a general
confession, which is false. Therefore a general confession does not
take away forgotten sins.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 33:6): "Come ye to Him and be
enlightened, and your faces shall not be confounded." Now he who
confesses all the sins of which he is conscious, approaches to God as
much as he can: nor can more be required for him. Therefore he will not
be confounded by being repelled, but will be forgiven.
Further, he that confesses is pardoned unless he be insincere. But he
who confesses all the sins that he calls to mind, is not insincere
through forgetting some, because he suffers from ignorance of fact,
which excuses from sin. Therefore he receives forgiveness, and then the
sins which he has forgotten, are loosened, since it is wicked to hope
for half a pardon.
I answer that, Confession produces its effect, on the presupposition
that there is contrition which blots out guilt: so that confession is
directly ordained to the remission of punishment, which it causes in
virtue of the shame which it includes, and by the power of the keys to
which a man submits by confessing. Now it happens sometimes that by
previous contrition a sin has been blotted out as to the guilt, either
in a general way (if it was not remembered at the time) or in
particular (and yet is forgotten before confession): and then general
sacramental confession works for the remission of the punishment in
virtue of the keys, to which man submits by confessing, provided he
offers no obstacle so far as he is concerned: but so far as the shame
of confessing a sin diminishes its punishment, the punishment for the
sin for which a man does not express his shame, through failing to
confess it to the priest, is not diminished.
Reply to Objection 1: In sacramental confession, not only is absolution
required, but also the judgment of the priest who imposes satisfaction
is awaited. Wherefore although the latter has given absolution,
nevertheless the penitent is bound to confess in order to supply what
was wanting to the sacramental confession.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, confession does not produce its
effect, unless contrition be presupposed; concerning which no man can
know whether it be true contrition, even as neither can one know for
certain if he has grace. Consequently a man cannot know for certain
whether a forgotten sin has been forgiven him in a general confession,
although he may think so on account of certain conjectural signs.
Reply to Objection 3: He does not profit by his neglect, since he does
not receive such full pardon, as he would otherwise have received, nor
is his merit so great. Moreover he is bound to confess the sin when he
calls it to mind.
Reply to Objection 4: Ignorance of the law does not excuse, because it
is a sin by itself: but ignorance of fact does excuse. Therefore if a
man omits to confess a sin, because he does not know it to be a sin,
through ignorance of the Divine law, he is not excused from
insincerity. on the other hand, he would be excused, if he did not know
it to be a sin, through being unaware of some particular circumstance,
for instance, if he had knowledge of another's wife, thinking her his
own. Now forgetfulness of an act of sin comes under the head of
ignorance of fact, wherefore it excuses from the sin of insincerity in
confession, which is an obstacle to the fruit of absolution and
confession.
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OF THE SEAL OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now inquire about the seal of confession, about which there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in every case a man is bound to hide what he knows under
the seal of confession?
(2) Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those
which have reference to confession?
(3) Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?
(4) Whether, by permission of the penitent, the priest can make known
to another, a sin of his which he knew under the seal of confession?
(5) Whether he is bound to hide even what he knows through other
sources besides?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in every case the priest is bound to hide the sins which he knows
under the seal of confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that the priest is not bound in every case
to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession. For, as
Bernard says (De Proecep. et Dispens. ii), "that which is instituted
for the sake of charity does not militate against charity." Now the
secret of confession would militate against charity in certain cases:
for instance, if a man knew through confession that a certain man was a
heretic, whom he cannot persuade to desist from misleading the people;
or, in like manner, if a man knew, through confession, that certain
people who wish to marry are related to one another. Therefore such
ought to reveal what they know through confession.
Objection 2: Further, that which is obligatory solely on account of a
precept of the Church need not be observed, if the commandment be
changed to the contrary. Now the secret of confession was introduced
solely by a precept of the Church. If therefore the Church were to
prescribe that anyone who knows anything about such and such a sin must
make it known, a man that had such knowledge through confession would
be bound to speak.
Objection 3: Further, a man is bound to safeguard his conscience rather
than the good name of another, because there is order in charity. Now
it happens sometimes that a man by hiding a sin injures his own
conscience---for instance, if he be called upon to give witness of a
sin of which he has knowledge through confession, and is forced to
swear to tell the truth---or when an abbot knows through confession the
sin of a prior who is subject to him, which sin would be an occasion of
ruin to the latter, if he suffers him to retain his priorship,
wherefore he is bound to deprive him of the dignity of his pastoral
charge, and yet in depriving him he seem to divulge the secret of
confession. Therefore it seems that in certain cases it is lawful to
reveal a confession.
Objection 4: Further, it is possible for a priest through hearing a
man's confession to be conscious that the latter is unworthy of
ecclesiastical preferment. Now everyone is bound to prevent the
promotion of the unworthy, if it is his business. Since then by raising
an objection he seems to raise a suspicion of sin, and so to reveal the
confession somewhat, it seems that it is necessary sometimes to divulge
a confession.
On the contrary, The Decretal says (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis
utriusque): "Let the priest beware lest he betray the sinner, by word,
or sign, or in any other way whatever."
Further, the priest should conform himself to God, Whose minister he
is. But God does not reveal the sins which are made known to Him in
confession, but hides them. Neither, therefore, should the priest
reveal them.
I answer that, Those things which are done outwardly in the sacraments
are the signs of what takes place inwardly: wherefore confession,
whereby a man subjects himself to a priest, is a sign of the inward
submission, whereby one submits to God. Now God hides the sins of those
who submit to Him by Penance; wherefore this also should be signified
in the sacrament of Penance, and consequently the sacrament demands
that the confession should remain hidden, and he who divulges a
confession sins by violating the sacrament. Besides this there are
other advantages in this secrecy, because thereby men are more
attracted to confession, and confess their sins with greater
simplicity.
Reply to Objection 1: Some say that the priest is not bound by the seal
of confession to hide other sins than those in respect of which the
penitent promises amendment; otherwise he may reveal them to one who
can be a help and not a hindrance. But this opinion seems erroneous,
since it is contrary to the truth of the sacrament; for just as, though
the person baptized be insincere, yet his Baptism is a sacrament, and
there is no change in the essentials of the sacrament on that account,
so confession does not cease to be sacramental although he that
confesses, does not purpose amendment. Therefore, this notwithstanding,
it must be held secret; nor does the seal of confession militate
against charity on that account, because charity does not require a man
to find a remedy for a sin which he knows not: and that which is known
in confession, is, as it were, unknown, since a man knows it, not as
man, but as God knows it. Nevertheless in the cases quoted one should
apply some kind of remedy, so far as this can be done without divulging
the confession, e.g. by admonishing the penitent, and by watching over
the others lest they be corrupted by heresy. He can also tell the
prelate to watch over his flock with great care, yet so as by neither
word nor sign to betray the penitent.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept concerning the secret of confession
follows from the sacrament itself. Wherefore just as the obligation of
making a sacramental confession is of Divine law, so that no human
dispensation or command can absolve one therefrom, even so, no man can
be forced or permitted by another man to divulge the secret of
confession. Consequently if he be commanded under pain of
excommunication to be incurred "ipso facto," to say whether he knows
anything about such and such a sin, he ought not to say it, because he
should assume that the intention of the person in commanding him thus,
was that he should say what he knew as man. And even if he were
expressly interrogated about a confession, he ought to say nothing, nor
would he incur the excommunication, for he is not subject to his
superior, save as a man, and he knows this not as a man, but as God
knows it.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is not called upon to witness except as a
man, wherefore without wronging his conscience he can swear that he
knows not, what he knows only as God knows it. In like manner a
superior can, without wronging his conscience, leave a sin unpunished
which he knows only as God knows it, or he may forbear to apply a
remedy, since he is not bound to apply a remedy, except according as it
comes to his knowledge. Wherefore with regard to matters which come to
his knowledge in the tribunal of Penance, he should apply the remedy,
as far as he can, in the same court: thus as to the case in point, the
abbot should advise the prior to resign his office, and if the latter
refuse, he can absolve him from the priorship on some other occasion,
yet so as to avoid all suspicion of divulging the confession.
Reply to Objection 4: A man is rendered unworthy of ecclesiastical
preferment, by many other causes besides sin, for instance, by lack of
knowledge, age, or the like: so that by raising an objection one does
not raise a suspicion of crime or divulge the secret of confession.
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Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which
have reference to confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that the seal of confession extends to other
matters besides those which have reference to confession. For sins
alone have reference to confession. Now sometimes besides sins other
matters are told which have no reference to confession. Therefore,
since such things are told to the priest, as to God, it seems that the
seal of confession extends to them also.
Objection 2: Further, sometimes one person tells another a secret,
which the latter receives under the seal of confession. Therefore the
seal of confession extends to matters having no relation to confession.
On the contrary, The seal of confession is connected with sacramental
confession. But those things which are connected with a sacrament, do
not extend outside the bounds of the sacrament. Therefore the seal of
confession does not extend to matters other than those which have
reference to sacramental confession.
I answer that, The seal of confession does not extend directly to other
matters than those which have reference to sacramental confession, yet
indirectly matters also which are not connected with sacramental
confession are affected by the seal of confession, those, for instance,
which might lead to the discovery of a sinner or of his sin.
Nevertheless these matters also must be most carefully hidden, both on
account of scandal, and to avoid leading others into sin through their
becoming familiar with it.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: A confidence ought not easily to be accepted in
this way: but if it be done the secret must be kept in the way
promised, as though one had the secret through confession, though not
through the seal of confession.
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Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that not only the priest is bound by the
seal of confession. For sometimes a priest hears a confession through
an interpreter, if there be an urgent reason for so doing. But it seems
that the interpreter is bound to keep the confession secret. Therefore
one who is not a priest knows something under the seal of confession.
Objection 2: Further, it is possible sometimes in cases of urgency for
a layman to hear a confession. But he is bound to secrecy with regard
to those sins, since they are told to him as to God. Therefore not only
the priest is bound by the seal of confession.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that a man pretends to be a priest,
so that by this deceit he may know what is on another's conscience: and
it would seem that he also sins if he divulges the confession.
Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.
On the contrary, A priest alone is the minister of this sacrament. But
the seal of confession is connected with this sacrament. Therefore the
priest alone is bound by the seal of confession.
Further, the reason why a man is bound to keep secret what he hears in
confession, is because he knows them, not as man but as God knows them.
But the priest alone is God's minister. Therefore he alone is bound to
secrecy.
I answer that, The seal of confession affects the priest as minister of
this sacrament: which seal is nothing else than the obligation of
keeping the confession secret, even as the key is the power of
absolving. Yet, as one who is not a priest, in a particular case has a
kind of share in the act of the keys, when he hears a confession in a
case of urgency, so also does he have a certain share in the act of the
seal of confession, and is bound to secrecy, though, properly speaking,
he is not bound by the seal of confession.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether by the penitent's permission, a priest may reveal to another a sin
which he knows under the seal of confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that a priest may not, by the penitent's
permission, reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of
confession. For an inferior may not do what his superior may not. Now
the Pope cannot give permission for anyone to divulge a sin which he
knows through confession. Neither therefore can the penitent give him
such a permission.
Objection 2: Further, that which is instituted for the common good of
the Church cannot be changed at the will of an individual. Now the
secrecy of confession was instituted for the good of the whole Church,
in order that men might have greater confidence in approaching the
confessional. Therefore the penitent cannot allow the priest to divulge
his confession.
Objection 3: Further, if the priest could grant such a permission, this
would seem to palliate the wickedness of bad priests, for they might
pretend to have received the permission and so they might sin with
impunity, which would be unbecoming. Therefore it seems that the
penitent cannot grant this permission.
Objection 4: Further, the one to whom this sin is divulged does not
know that sin under the seal of confession, so that he may publish a
sin which is already blotted out, which is unbecoming. Therefore this
permission cannot be granted.
On the contrary, If the sinner consent, a superior may refer him by
letter to an inferior priest. Therefore with the consent of the
penitent, the priest may reveal a sin of his to another.
Further, whosoever can do a thing of his own authority, can do it
through another. But the penitent can by his own authority reveal his
sin to another. Therefore he can do it through the priest.
I answer that There are two reasons for which the priest is bound to
keep a sin secret: first and chiefly, because this very secrecy is
essential to the sacrament, in so far as the priest knows that sin, as
it is known to God, Whose place he holds in confession: secondly, in
order to avoid scandal. Now the penitent can make the priest know, as a
man, what he knew before only as God knows it, and he does this when he
allows him to divulge it: so that if the priest does reveal it, he does
not break the seal of confession. Nevertheless he should beware of
giving scandal by revealing the sin, lest he be deemed to have broken
the seal.
Reply to Objection 1: The Pope cannot permit a priest to divulge a sin,
because he cannot make him to know it as a man, whereas he that has
confessed it, can.
Reply to Objection 2: When that is told which was known through another
source, that which is instituted for the common good is not done away
with, because the seal of confession is not broken.
Reply to Objection 3: This does not bestow impunity on wicked priests,
because they are in danger of having to prove that they had the
penitent's permission to reveal the sin, if they should be accused of
the contrary.
Reply to Objection 4: He that is informed of a sin through the priest
with the penitent's consent, shares in an act of the priest's, so that
the same applies to him as to an interpreter, unless perchance the
penitent wish him to know it unconditionally and freely.
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Whether a man may reveal that which he knows through confession and through
some other source besides?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man may not reveal what he knows
through confession and through some other source besides. For the seal
of confession is not broken unless one reveals a sin known through
confession. If therefore a man divulges a sin which he knows through
confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise, he seems to break the
seal.
Objection 2: Further, whoever hears someone's confession, is under
obligation to him not to divulge his sins. Now if one were to promise
someone to keep something secret, he would be bound to do so, even if
he knew it through some other source. Therefore a man is bound to keep
secret what he knows through the confession, no matter how he knows it
otherwise.
Objection 3: Further, the stronger of two things draws the other to
itself. Now the knowledge whereby a man knows a sin as God knows it, is
stronger and more excellent than the knowledge whereby he knows a sin
as man. Therefore it draws the latter to itself: and consequently a man
cannot reveal that sin, because this is demanded by his knowing it as
God knows it.
Objection 4: Further, the secrecy of confession was instituted in order
to avoid scandal, and to prevent men being shy of going to confession.
But if a man might say what he had heard in confession, though he knew
it otherwise, scandal would result all the same. Therefore he can
nowise say what he has heard.
On the contrary, No one can put another under a new obligation, unless
he be his superior, who can bind him by a precept. Now he who knew of a
sin by witnessing it was not bound to keep it secret. Therefore he that
confesses to him, not being his superior, cannot put him under an
obligation of secrecy by confessing to him.
Further, the justice of the Church would be hindered if a man, in order
to escape a sentence of excommunication, incurred on account of some
sin, of which he has been convicted, were to confess to the person who
has to sentence him. Now the execution of justice falls under a
precept. Therefore a man is not bound to keep a sin secret, which he
has heard in confession, but knows from some other source.
I answer that, There are three opinions about this question. For some
say that a man can by no means tell another what he has heard in
confession, even if he knew it from some other source either before or
after the confession: while others assert that the confession debars
him from speaking of what he knew already, but not from saying what he
knew afterwards and in another way. Now both these opinions, by
exaggerating the seal of confession, are prejudicial to the truth and
to the safeguarding of justice. For a man might be more inclined to
sin, if he had no fear of being accused by his confessor supposing that
he repeated the sin in his presence: and furthermore it would be most
prejudicial to justice if a man could not bear witness to a deed which
he has seen committed again after being confessed to him. Nor does it
matter that, as some say, he ought to declare that he cannot keep it
secret, for he cannot make such a declaration until the sin has already
been confessed to him, and then every priest could, if he wished,
divulge a sin, by making such a declaration, if this made him free to
divulge it. Consequently there is a third and truer opinion, viz. that
what a man knows through another source either before or after
confession, he is not bound to keep secret, in so far as he knows it as
a man, for he can say: "I know so end so since I saw it." But he is
bound to keep it secret in so far as he knows it as God knows it, for
he cannot say: "I heard so and so in confession." Nevertheless, on
account of the scandal he should refrain from speaking of it unless
there is an urgent reason.
Reply to Objection 1: If a man says that he has seen what he has heard
in the confessional, he does not reveal what he heard in confession,
save indirectly: even as one who knows something through hearing and
seeing it, does not, properly speaking, divulge what he saw, if he says
he heard it, but only indirectly, because he says he has heard what he
incidentally saw. Wherefore he does not break the seal of confession.
Reply to Objection 2: The confessor is not forbidden to reveal a sin
simply, but to reveal it as heard in confession: for in no case is he
allowed to say that he has heard it in the confessional.
Reply to Objection 3: This is true of things that are in opposition to
one another: whereas to know a sin as God knows it, and to know it as
man knows it, are not in opposition; so that the argument proves
nothing.
Reply to Objection 4: It would not be right to avoid scandal so as to
desert justice: for the truth should not be gainsayed for fear of
scandal. Wherefore when justice and truth are in the balance, a man
should not be deterred by the fear of giving scandal, from divulging
what he has heard in confession, provided he knows it from some other
source: although he ought to avoid giving scandal, as far as he is
able.
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OF SATISFACTION, AS TO ITS NATURE (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider satisfaction; about which four things have to be
considered: (1) Its nature; (2) Its possibility; (3) Its quality; (4)
The means whereby man offers satisfaction to God.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?
(2) Whether it is an act of justice?
(3) Whether the definition of satisfaction contained in the text is
suitable?
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Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction is neither a virtue nor an
act of virtue. For every act of virtue is meritorious; whereas,
seemingly, satisfaction is not, since merit is gratuitous, while
satisfaction answers to a debt. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, every act of virtue is voluntary. But sometimes a
man has to make satisfaction for something against his will, as when
anyone is punished by the judge for an offense against another.
Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13):
"Choice holds the chief place in moral virtue." But satisfaction is not
an act of choice but regards chiefly external works. Therefore it is
not an act of virtue.
On the contrary, Satisfaction belongs to penance. Now penance is a
virtue. Therefore satisfaction is also an act of virtue.
Further, none but an act of virtue has the effect of blotting out sin,
for one contrary is destroyed by the other. Now satisfaction destroys
sin altogether. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
I answer that, An act is said to be the act of a virtue in two ways.
First, materially; and thus any act which implies no malice, or defect
of a due circumstance, may be called an act of virtue, because virtue
can make use of any such act for its end, e.g. to walk, to speak, and
so forth. Secondly, an act is said to belong to a virtue formally,
because its very name implies the form and nature of virtue; thus to
suffer courageously is an act of courage. Now the formal element in
every moral virtue is the observance of a mean. wherefore every act
that implies the observance of a mean is formally an act of virtue. And
since equality is the mean implied in the name of satisfaction (for a
thing is said to be satisfied by reason of an equal proportion to
something), it is evident that satisfaction also is formally an act of
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Although to make satisfaction is due in itself,
yet, in so far as the deed is done voluntarily by the one who offers
satisfaction, it becomes something gratuitous on the part of the agent,
so that he makes a virtue of necessity. For debt diminishes merit
through being necessary and consequently against the will, so that if
the will consent to the necessity, the element of merit is not
forfeited.
Reply to Objection 2: An act of virtue demands voluntariness not in the
patient but in the agent, for it is his act. Consequently since he on
whom the judge wreaks vengeance is the patient and not the agent as
regards satisfaction, it follows that satisfaction should be voluntary
not in him but in the judge as agent.
Reply to Objection 3: The chief element of virtue can be understood in
two ways. First, as being the chief element of virtue as virtue, and
thus the chief element of virtue denotes whatever belongs to the nature
of virtue or is most akin thereto; thus choice and other internal acts
hold the chief place in virtue. Secondly, the chief element of virtue
may be taken as denoting that which holds the first place in such and
such a virtue; and then the first place belongs to that which gives its
determination. Now the interior act, in certain virtues, is determined
by some external act, since choice, which is common to all virtues,
becomes proper to such and such a virtue through being directed to such
and such an act. Thus it is that external acts hold the chief place in
certain virtues; and this is the case with satisfaction.
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Whether satisfaction is an act of justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction is not an act of justice.
Because the purpose of satisfaction is that one may be reconciled to
the person offended. But reconciliation, being an act of love, belongs
to charity. Therefore satisfaction is an act of charity and not of
justice.
Objection 2: Further, the causes of sin in us are the passions of the
soul, which incline us to evil. But justice, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,3), is not about passions, but about
operations. Since therefore satisfaction aims at removing the causes of
sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), it seems that it is not
an act of justice.
Objection 3: Further, to be careful about the future is not an act of
justice but of prudence of which caution is a part. But it belongs to
satisfaction, "to give no opening to the suggestions of sin" [*Cf.
XP/Q[12]/A[3]/OBJ[1]]. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of justice.
On the contrary, No virtue but justice considers the notion of that
which is due. But satisfaction gives due honor to God, as Anselm states
(Cur Deus Homo i). Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.
Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality between external
things. But this is done by satisfaction which establishes equality
between amendment and the previous offense. Therefore satisfaction is
an act of justice.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3,4), the mean
of justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing and
thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore, since the very name
of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind, because the adverb
"satis" [enough] denotes an equality of proportion, it is evident that
satisfaction is formally an act of justice. Now the act of justice,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,4), is either an act done by
one man to another, as when a man pays another what he owes him, or an
act done by one man between two others, as when a judge does justice
between two men. When it is an act of justice of one man to another,
the equality is set up in the agent, while when it is something done
between two others, the equality is set up in the subject that has
suffered an injustice. And since satisfaction expresses equality in the
agent, it denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man to
another. Now a man may do justice to another either in actions and
passions or in external things; even as one may do an injustice to
another, either by taking something away, or by a hurtful action. And
since to give is to use an external thing, the act of justice, in so
far as it establishes equality between external things, signifies,
properly speaking, a giving back: but to make satisfaction clearly
points to equality between actions, although sometimes one is put for
the other. Now equalization concerns only such things as are unequal,
wherefore satisfaction presupposes inequality among actions, which
inequality constitutes an offense; so that satisfaction regards a
previous offense. But no part of justice regards a previous offense,
except vindictive justice, which establishes equality indifferently,
whether the patient be the same subject as the agent, as when anyone
punishes himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes
another man, since vindictive justice deals with both cases. The same
applies to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since it
is the penitent who holds to the penance [poenam tenet], so that
penance is in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that
satisfaction, which implies equality in the agent with respect to a
previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part which is called
penance.
Reply to Objection 1: Satisfaction, as appears from what has been said,
is compensation for injury inflicted. Wherefore as the injury inflicted
entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an
inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back directly
equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And since
an act is elicited by the habit to whose end it is immediately
directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is directed
ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded
by charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Although justice is chiefly about operations, yet
it is consequently about passions, in so far as they are the causes of
operations. Wherefore as justice curbs anger, lest it inflict an unjust
injury on another, and concupiscence from invading another's marriage
right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other sins.
Reply to Objection 3: Each moral virtue shares in the act of prudence,
because this virtue completes in it the conditions essential to virtue,
since each moral virtue takes its mean according to the ruling of
prudence, as is evident from the definition of virtue given in Ethic.
ii, 6.
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Whether the definition of satisfaction given in the text is suitable?
Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of satisfaction given in
the text (Sent. iv, D, 15) and quoted from Augustine [*Gennadius
Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] is unsuitable---viz. that
"satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no opening
to the suggestions thereof." For the cause of actual sin is the fomes.
[*"Fomes" signifies literally "fuel," and metaphorically, "incentive."
As used by the theologian, it denotes the quasi-material element and
effect of original sin, and sometimes goes under the name of
"concupiscence," Cf. [4851]FS, Q[82], A[3].] But we cannot remove the
"fomes" in this life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in
removing the causes of sins.
Objection 2: Further, the cause of sin is stronger than sin itself. But
man by himself cannot remove sin. Much less therefore can he remove the
cause of sin; and so the same conclusion follows.
Objection 3: Further, since satisfaction is a part of Penance, it
regards the past and not the future. Now "to give no opening to the
suggestions of sin" regards the future. Therefore it should not be put
in the definition of satisfaction.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction regards a past offense. Yet no
mention is made of this. Therefore the definition of satisfaction is
unsuitable.
Objection 5: Further, Anselm gives another definition (Cur Deus homo
i): "Satisfaction consists in giving God due honor," wherein no
reference is made to the things mentioned by Augustine [*Gennadius,
OBJ[1]] in this definition. Therefore one or the other is unsuitable.
Objection 6: Further, an innocent man can give due honor to God:
whereas satisfaction is not compatible with innocence. Therefore
Anselm's definition is faulty.
I answer that, Justice aims not only at removing inequality already
existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding
equality for the future, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
ii, 3) "punishments are medicinal." Wherefore satisfaction which is the
act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins
and preserving from future sins: so that when one man makes
satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes
heed for the future. Accordingly satisfaction may be defined in two
ways, first with regard to past sin, which it heals by making
compensation, and thus it is defined as "compensation for an inflicted
injury according to the equality of justice." The definition of Anselm
amounts to the same, for he says that "satisfaction consists in giving
God due honor"; where duty is considered in respect of the sin
committed. Secondly, satisfaction may be defined, considered as
preserving us from future sins; and as Augustine (Cf. OBJ[1]) defines
it. Now preservation from bodily sickness is assured by removing the
causes from which the sickness may ensue, for if they be taken away the
sickness cannot follow. But it is not thus in spiritual diseases, for
the free-will cannot be forced, so that even in the presence of their
causes, they can, though with difficulty, be avoided, while they can be
incurred even when their causes are removed. Hence he puts two things
in the definition of satisfaction, viz. removal of the causes, as to
the first, and the free-will's refusal to sin.
Reply to Objection 1: By "causes" we must understand the proximate
causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the lust of sin through
the habit or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things
which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions of
sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed
by satisfaction in this life, albeit the "fomes," which is the remote
cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in this
life though it is weakened.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the cause of evil or of privation
(according as it has a cause) is nothing else than a defective good,
and since it is easier to destroy good than to set it up, it follows
that it is easier to uproot the causes of privation and of evil than to
remove the evil itself, which can only be removed by setting up good,
as may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes. Yet the
aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does not, of
necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions of sin. Nor again
can satisfaction be made without God's help, since it is not possible
without charity, as we shall state further on ([4852]Q[14], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: Although Penance was primarily instituted and
intended with a view to the past, yet, as a consequence, it regards the
future, in so far as it is a safeguarding remedy; and the same applies
to satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine [*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl.
Dogm. liv] defined satisfaction, as made to God, from Whom, in reality,
nothing can be taken, though the sinner, for his own part, takes
something away. Consequently in such like satisfaction, amendment for
future time is of greater weight than compensation for the past. Hence
Augustine defines satisfaction from this point of view. And yet it is
possible to gauge the compensation for the past from the heed taken for
the future, for the latter regards the same object as the former, but
in the opposite way: since when looking at the past we detest the
causes of sins on account of the sins themselves, which are the
starting-point of the movement of detestation: whereas when taking heed
of the future, we begin from the causes, that by their removal we may
avoid sins the more easily.
Reply to Objection 5: There is no reason why the same thing should not
be described in different ways according to the various things found in
it: and such is the case here, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 6: By debt is meant the debt we owe to God by reason
of the sins we have committed, because Penance regards a debt, as
stated above [4853](A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the possibility of satisfaction, under which head
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God?
(2) Whether one man can make satisfaction for another?
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Whether man can make satisfaction to God?
Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot make satisfaction to God.
For satisfaction should balance the offense, as shown above
([4854]Q[12], AA[2],3). But an offense against God is infinite, since
it is measured by the person against whom it is committed, for it is a
greater offense to strike a prince than anyone else. Therefore, as no
action of man can be infinite, it seems that he cannot make
satisfaction to God.
Objection 2: Further, a slave cannot make compensation for a debt,
since all that he has is his master's. But we are the slaves of God,
and whatever good we have, we owe to Him. Therefore, as satisfaction is
compensation for a past offense, it seems that we cannot offer it to
God.
Objection 3: Further, if all that a man has suffices not to pay one
debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all that man is, all that he can
do, and all that he has, does not suffice to pay what he owes for the
blessing of creation, wherefore it is written (Is. 40:16) that "the
wood of Libanus shall not be enough for a burnt offering [*Vulg.:
'Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the beasts thereof for a
burnt offering']." Therefore by no means can he make satisfaction for
the debt resulting from the offense committed.
Objection 4: Further, man is bound to spend all his time in the service
of God. Now time once lost cannot be recovered, wherefore, as Seneca
observes (Lib. i, Ep. i, ad Lucilium) loss of time is a very grievous
matter. Therefore man cannot make compensation to God, and the same
conclusion follows as before.
Objection 5: Further, mortal actual sin is more grievous than original
sin. But none could satisfy for original sin unless he were both God
and man. Neither, therefore, can he satisfy for actual sin.
On the contrary, Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum] says:
"Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible to man,
let him be anathema." But satisfaction is commanded (Lk. 3:8): "Bring
forth . . . fruits worthy of penance." Therefore it is possible to make
satisfaction to God.
Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make
satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to
God.
Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the
fault, since "justice is the same as counterpassion," as the
Pythagoreans said [*Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; Cf. [4855]SS, Q[61], A[4]].
Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed.
Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.
I answer that, Man becomes God's debtor in two ways; first, by reason
of favors received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and just as
thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors
received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed. Now in
giving honor to one's parents or to the gods, as indeed the Philosopher
says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to repay them measure for
measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he can, for
friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible.
Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion, for as
the debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what man can do,
in comparison with himself, so that in another way the form of justice
is preserved. It is the same as regards satisfaction. Consequently man
cannot make satisfaction to God if "satis" [enough] denotes
quantitative equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equality,
as explained above, and as this suffices for justice, so does it
suffice for satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the offense derived a certain infinity
from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a
certain infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is
quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes
acceptable. Others, however, say that the offense is infinite as
regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned gratuitously,
but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in which respect it
is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is not to the point,
since satisfaction does not answer to sin, except as this is an offense
against God, which is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of
turning away from God. Others again say that even as regards the
aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue of
Christ's merit, which was, in a way, infinite. And this comes to the
same as what we said before, since grace is given to believers through
faith in the Mediator. If, however, He were to give grace otherwise,
satisfaction would suffice in the way explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Man, who was made to God's image, has a certain
share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions through his
free-will; so that, through acting by his free-will, he can make
satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was
bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he
might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that it is impossible to
make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to
make sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all that
he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation that
he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is
impossible for him, according to his present state of life, to put
forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has to be
heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain
measure, viz. the fulfillment of God's commandments, over and above
which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 4: Though man cannot recover the time that is past,
he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he should
have done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from him the
fulfillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3).
Reply to Objection 5: Though original sin has less of the nature of sin
than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is an
infection of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could
not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man can fulfill satisfactory punishment for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot fulfill satisfactory
punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction.
Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written
(Ps. 61:12): "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works."
Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.
Objection 2: Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition and
confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for another.
Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.
Objection 3: Further, by praying for another one merits also for
oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he
satisfies for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man
satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.
Objection 4: Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as he
takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from his
debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die after
the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken up by another; else,
if he be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid for
the same sin, viz. by him who has begun to make satisfaction, and by
him who is punished in Purgatory.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 6:2): "Bear ye one another's
burdens." Therefore it seems that one can bear the burden of punishment
laid upon another.
Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before
man, one can pay another's debt for love of him. Much more, therefore,
can this be done before the judgment seat of God.
I answer that, Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to
pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin.
Accordingly, as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one
does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by
another's fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing,
through the actions of another, except accidentally, in so far as a
man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another,
since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin.
But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction. on the other
hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for
another, provided he be in a state of charity, so that his works may
avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for
another should undergo a greater punishment than the principal would
have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more by
his own punishment than by another's), because punishment derives its
power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears it. And
since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another than
for himself, less punishment is required of him who satisfies for
another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the
Fathers (v, 5) of one who for love of his brother did penance for a sin
which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his charity
his brother was released from a sin which he had committed. Nor is it
necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should be unable
to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he would be
released from his debt when the other satisfied in his stead. But this
is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is medicinal: so
that a man is not to be allowed to do penance for another, unless there
be evidence of some defect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he
is unable to bear it, or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo
it.
Reply to Objection 1: The essential reward is bestowed on a man
according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God
will be according to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just
as one man is not disposed thereto by another's act, so one man does
not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has
infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children come to
eternal life through Baptism. On the other hand, the temporal
punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured
according to the disposition of the man to whom it is due, since
sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment.
Consequently one man can merit for another as regards release from
punishment, and one man's act becomes another's, by means of charity
whereby we are "all one in Christ" (Gal. 3:28).
Reply to Objection 2: Contrition is ordained against the guilt which
affects a man's disposition to goodness or malice, so that one man is
not freed from guilt by another's contrition. In like manner by
confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor can one
man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament grace
is given to the recipient, not to another. Consequently there is no
comparison between satisfaction and contrition and confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In the payment of the debt we consider the
measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard the root which is
charity: wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at
least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies for
another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the
punishment does not suffice for the sins of both, although by
satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release
from punishment, viz. eternal life.
Reply to Objection 4: If this man bound himself to undergo a certain
punishment, he would not be released from the debt before paying it:
wherefore he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as the other
makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both are
debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin
committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not follow that
one sin is twice punished.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head
there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for
another?
(2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his
sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins
which were pardoned him through his contrition?
(3) Whether a man's previous satisfaction begins to avail when he
recovers charity?
(4) Whether works done without charity merit any good?
(5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can satisfy for one sin without
satisfying for another. Because when several things are not connected
together one can be taken away without another. Now sins are not
connected together, else whoever had one would have them all. Therefore
one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without another.
Objection 2: Further, God is more merciful than man. But man accepts
the payment of one debt without the payment of another. Therefore God
accepts satisfaction for one sin without the other.
Objection 3: Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15),
"satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give no opening to
the suggestions thereof." Now this can be done with regard to one sin
and not another, as when a mall curbs his lust and perseveres in
covetousness. Therefore we can make satisfaction for one sin without
satisfying for another.
On the contrary, The fast of those who fasted "for debates and strifes"
(Is. 58:4,5) was not acceptable to God, though fasting be a work of
satisfaction. Now satisfaction cannot be made save by works that are
acceptable to God. Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot
make satisfaction to God.
Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past sins, and for
preserving from future sins, as stated above ([4856]Q[12], A[3]). But
without grace it is impossible to avoid sins. Therefore, since each sin
excludes grace, it is not possible to make satisfaction for one sin and
not for another.
I answer that, Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction
for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D,
15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offense has to be
removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must needs be
consistent with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense is
renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be anything to hinder the
renewal of friendship there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore,
every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the
friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to make
satisfaction for one sin while holding to another: even as neither
would a man make satisfaction to another for a blow, if while throwing
himself at his feet he were to give him another.
Reply to Objection 1: As sins are not connected together in some single
one, a man can incur one without incurring another; whereas all sins
are remitted by reason of one same thing, so that the remissions of
various sins are connected together. Consequently satisfaction cannot
be made for one and not for another.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man is under obligation to another by
reason of a debt, the only inequality between them is that which is
opposed to justice, so that for restitution nothing further is required
than that the equality of justice should be reinstated, and this can be
done in respect of one debt without another. But when the obligation is
based on an offense, there is inequality not only of justice but also
of friendship, so that for the offense to be removed by satisfaction,
not only must the equality of justice be restored by the payment of a
punishment equal to the offense, but also the equality of friendship
must be reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to
friendship remains.
Reply to Objection 3: By its weight, one sin drags us down to another,
as Gregory says (Moral. xxv): so that when a man holds to one sin, he
does not sufficiently cut himself off from the causes of further sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for
which he was previously contrite?
Objection 1: It would seem that if a man fall into sin after being
contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity,
satisfy for his other sins which were already pardoned him through his
contrition. For Daniel said to Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:24): "Redeem thou
thy sins with alms." Yet he was still a sinner, as is shown by his
subsequent punishment. Therefore a man can make satisfaction while in a
state of sin.
Objection 2: Further, "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or
hatred" (Eccles. 9:1). If therefore one cannot make satisfaction unless
one be in a state of charity, it would be impossible to know whether
one had made satisfaction, which would be unseemly.
Objection 3: Further, a man's entire action takes its form from the
intention which he had at the beginning. But a penitent is in a state
of charity when he begins to repent. Therefore his whole subsequent
satisfaction will derive its efficacy from the charity which quickens
his intention.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction consists in a certain equalization
of guilt to punishment. But these things can be equalized even in one
who is devoid of charity. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, "Charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12). But
satisfaction has the power of blotting out sins. Therefore it is
powerless without charity.
Further, the chief work of satisfaction is almsdeeds. But alms given by
one who is devoid of charity avail nothing, as is clearly stated 1 Cor.
13:3, "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and
have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore there can be no
satisfaction with mortal sin.
I answer that, Some have said that if, when all a man's sins have been
pardoned through contrition, and before he has made satisfaction for
them, he falls into sin, and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction
will be valid, so that if he die in that sin, he will not be punished
in hell for the other sins.
But this cannot be, because satisfaction requires the reinstatement of
friendship and the restoration of the equality of justice, the contrary
of which destroys friendship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix,
1,3). Now in satisfaction made to God, the equality is based, not on
equivalence but rather on God's acceptation: so that, although the
offense be already removed by previous contrition, the works of
satisfaction must be acceptable to God, and for this they are dependent
on charity. Consequently works done without charity are not
satisfactory.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel's advice meant that he should give up sin
and repent, and so make satisfaction by giving alms.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as man knows not for certain whether he had
charity when making satisfaction, or whether he has it now, so too he
knows not for certain whether he made full satisfaction: wherefore it
is written (Ecclus. 5:5): "Be not without fear about sin forgiven." And
yet man need not, on account of that fear, repeat the satisfaction
made, if he is not conscious of a mortal sin. For although he may not
have expiated his punishment by that satisfaction, he does not incur
the guilt of omission through neglecting to make satisfaction; even as
he who receives the Eucharist without being conscious of a mortal sin
of which he is guilty, does not incur the guilt of receiving
unworthily.
Reply to Objection 3: His intention was interrupted by his subsequent
sin, so that it gives no virtue to the works done after that sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Sufficient equalization is impossible both as to
the Divine acceptation and as to equivalence: so that the argument
proves nothing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether previous satisfaction begins to avail after man is restored to
charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that when a man has recovered charity his
previous satisfaction begins to avail, because a gloss on Lev. 25:25,
"If thy brother being impoverished," etc., says that "the fruit of a
man's good works should be counted from the time when he sinned." But
they would not be counted, unless they derived some efficacy from his
subsequent charity. Therefore they begin to avail after he recovers
charity.
Objection 2: Further, as the efficacy of satisfaction is hindered by
sin, so the efficacy of Baptism is hindered by insincerity. Now Baptism
begins to avail when insincerity ceases. Therefore satisfaction begins
to avail when sin is taken away.
Objection 3: Further, if a man is given as a penance for the sins he
has committed, to fast for several days, and then, after falling again
into sin, he completes his penance, he is not told, when he goes to
confession a second time, to fast once again. But he would be told to
do so, if he did not fulfill his duty of satisfaction by them.
Therefore his previous works become valid unto satisfaction, through
his subsequent repentance.
On the contrary, Works done without charity were not satisfactory,
through being dead works. But they are not quickened by penance.
Therefore they do not begin to be satisfactory.
Further, charity does not quicken a work, unless in some way that work
proceeds therefrom. But works cannot be acceptable to God, and
therefore cannot be satisfactory, unless they be quickened by charity.
Since then the works done without charity, in no way proceeded from
charity, nor ever can proceed therefrom, they can by no means count
towards satisfaction.
I answer that, Some have said that works done while in a state of
charity, which are called living works, are meritorious in respect of
eternal life, and satisfactory in respect of paying off the debt of
punishment; and that by subsequent charity, works done without charity
are quickened so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritorious
of eternal life. But this is impossible, because works done in charity
produce both these effects for the same reason, viz. because they are
pleasing to God: wherefore just as charity by its advent cannot make
works done without charity to be pleasing in one respect, so neither
can it make them pleasing in the other respect.
Reply to Objection 1: This means that the fruits are reckoned, not from
the time when he was first in sin, but from the time when he ceased to
sin, when, to wit, he was last in sin; unless he was contrite as soon
as he had sinned, and did many good actions before he confessed. Or we
may say that the greater the contrition the more it alleviates the
punishment, and the more good actions a man does while in sin, the more
he disposes himself to the grace of contrition, so that it is probable
that he owes a smaller debt of punishment. For this reason the priest
should use discretion in taking them into account, so as to give him a
lighter penance, according as he finds him better disposed.
Reply to Objection 2: Baptism imprints a character on the soul, whereas
satisfaction does not. Hence on the advent of charity, which removes
both insincerity and sin, it causes Baptism to have its effect, whereas
it does not do this for satisfaction. Moreover Baptism confers
justification in virtue of the deed [ex opere operato] which is not
man's deed but God's, wherefore it does not become a lifeless deed as
satisfaction does, which is a deed of man.
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes satisfaction is such as to leave an
effect in the person who makes satisfaction, even after the act of
satisfaction has been done; thus fasting leaves the body weak, and
almsdeeds result in a diminution of a person's substance, and so on. In
such cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction if they
have been done while in a state of sin, because through penance they
are acceptable to God in the result they leave behind. But when a work
of satisfaction leaves behind no effect in the person that does
satisfaction, it needs to be repeated, as in the case of prayer and so
forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, are nowise
quickened, and must be repeated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether works done without charity merit any, at least temporal, good?
Objection 1: It would seem that works done without charity merit some,
at least a temporal, good. For as punishment is to the evil act, so is
reward to a good act. Now no evil deed is unpunished by God the just
judge. Therefore no good deed is unrewarded, and so every good deed
merits some good.
Objection 2: Further, reward is not given except for merit. Now some
reward is given for works done without charity, wherefore it is written
(Mat. 6:2, 5, 16) of those who do good actions for the sake of human
glory, that "they have received their reward." Therefore those works
merit some good.
Objection 3: Further, if there be two men both in sin, one of whom does
many deeds that are good in themselves and in their circumstances,
while the other does none, they are not equally near to the reception
of good things from Gods else the latter need not be advised to do any
good deeds. Now he that is nearer to God receives more of His good
things. Therefore the former, on account of his good works, merits some
good from God.
On the contrary, Augustine says that "the sinner is not worthy of the
bread he eats." Therefore he cannot merit anything from God.
Further, he that is nothing, can merit nothing. But a sinner, through
not having charity, is nothing in respect of spiritual being, according
to 1 Cor. 13:2. Therefore he can merit nothing.
I answer that, Properly speaking a merit is an action on account of
which it is just that the agent should be given something. Now justice
is twofold: first, there is justice properly so called, which regards
something due on the part of the recipient. Secondly, there is
metaphorical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on the
part of the giver, for it may be right for the giver to give something
to which the receiver has no claim. In this sense the "fitness of the
Divine goodness" is justice; thus Anselm says (Proslog. x) that "God is
just when He spares the sinner, because this is befitting." And in this
way merit is also twofold. The first is an act in respect of which the
agent himself has a claim to receive something, and this is called
merit of "condignity." The second is an act the result of which is that
there is a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness,
wherefore it is called merit of "congruity." Now since in all
gratuitous givings, the primary reason of the giving is love, it is
impossible for anyone, properly speaking, to lay claim to a gift, if he
lack friendship. Wherefore, as all things, whether temporal or eternal,
are bestowed on us by the bounty of God, no one can acquire a claim to
any of them, save through charity towards God: so that works done
without charity are not condignly meritorious of any good from God
either eternal or temporal. But since it is befitting the goodness of
God, that wherever He finds a disposition He should grant the
perfection, a man is said to merit congruously some good by means of
good works done without charity. Accordingly suchlike works avail for a
threefold good, acquisition of temporal goods, disposition to grace,
habituation to good works. Since, however, this is not merit properly
so called, we should grant that such works are not meritorious of any
good, rather than that they are.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14),
since no matter what a son may do, he can never give back to his father
the equal of what he has received from him a father can never become
his son's debtor: and much less can man make God his debtor on account
of equivalence of work. Consequently no work of ours can merit a reward
by reason of its measure of goodness, but it can by reason of charity,
which makes friends hold their possessions in common. Therefore, no
matter how good a work may be, if it be done without charity, it does
not give man a claim to receive anything from God. On the other hand,
an evil deed deserves an equivalent punishment according to the measure
of its malice, because no evil has been done to us on the part of God,
like the good which He has done. Therefore, although an evil deed
deserves condign punishment, nevertheless a good deed without charity
does not merit condign reward.
Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments consider merit of congruity; while
the other arguments consider merit of condignity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the aforesaid works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid works do not avail for
the mitigation of the pains of hell. For the measure of punishment in
hell will answer to the measure of guilt. But works done without
charity do not diminish the measure of guilt. Neither, therefore, do
they lessen the pains of hell.
Objection 2: Further, the pain of hell, though infinite in duration, is
nevertheless finite in intensity. Now anything finite is done away with
by finite subtraction. If therefore works done without charity canceled
any of the punishment due for sins, those works might be so numerous,
that the pain of hell would be done away with altogether: which is
false.
Objection 3: Further, the suffrages of the Church are more efficacious
than works done without charity. But, according to Augustine
(Enchiridion cx), "the suffrages of the Church do not profit the damned
in hell." Much less therefore are those pains mitigated by works done
without charity.
On the contrary, Augustine also says (Enchiridion cx): "Whomsoever they
profit, either receive a full pardon, or at least find damnation itself
more tolerable."
Further, it is a greater thing to do a good deed than to omit an evil
deed. But the omission of an evil deed always avoids a punishment, even
in one who lacks charity. Much more, therefore, do good deeds void
punishment.
I answer that, Mitigation of the pains of hell can be understood in two
ways: first, as though one were delivered from the punishment which he
already deserved, and thus, since no one is delivered from punishment
unless he be absolved from guilt, (for an effect is not diminished or
taken away unless its cause be diminished or taken away), the pain of
hell cannot be mitigated by works done without charity, since they are
unable to remove or diminish guilt. Secondly, so that the demerit of
punishment is hindered; and thus the aforesaid works diminish the pain
of hell---first because he who does such works escapes being guilty of
omitting them---secondly, because such works dispose one somewhat to
good, so that a man sins from less contempt, and indeed is drawn away
from many sins thereby.
These works do, however merit a diminution or postponement of temporal
punishment, as in the case of Achab (3 Kings 21:27, seqq.), as also the
acquisition of temporal goods.
Some, however, say that they mitigate the pains of hell, not by
subtracting any of their substance, but by strengthening the subject,
so that he is more able to bear them. But this is impossible, because
there is no strengthening without a diminution of passibility. Now
passibility is according to the measure of guilt, wherefore if guilt is
not removed, neither can the subject be strengthened.
Some again say that the punishment is mitigated as to the remorse of
conscience, though not as to the pain of fire. But neither will this
stand, because as the pain of fire is equal to the guilt, so also is
the pain of the remorse of conscience: so that what applies to one
applies to the other.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?
(2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are
satisfactory?
(3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying
that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer?
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Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?
Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by means
of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the
offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given
to God by penal works, for God does not delight in our sufferings, as
appears from Tob. 3:22. Therefore satisfaction need not be made by
means of penal works.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the charity from which a work
proceeds, the less penal is that work, for "charity hath no pain
[*Vulg.: 'Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain']"
according to 1 Jn. 4:18. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be
penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will
they be: which is false.
Objection 3: Further, "Satisfaction," as Anselm states (Cur Deus homo
i) "consists in giving due honor to God." But this can be done by other
means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by
means of penal works.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): "It is just that the
sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the
greater suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his
sin."
Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by
satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of
penal works.
I answer that, As stated above ([4857]Q[12], A[3]), satisfaction
regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its
means, and also future sin wherefrom we are preserved thereby: and in
both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works.
For compensation for an offense implies equality, which must needs be
between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization
in human justice consists in taking away from one that which he has too
much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been
taken. And, although nothing can be taken away from God, so far as He
is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something
by sinning as stated above ([4858]Q[12], AA[3],4). Consequently, in
order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that
may conduce to the glory of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now
a good work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but
perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work
unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it
needs to be good that it may conduce to God's honor, and it must be
penal, so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.
Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not
easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of the punishment.
Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are
medicinal.
Reply to Objection 1: Though God does not delight in our punishments as
such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be
satisfactory.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the
penality of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now
if the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being
equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty be
diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not
diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like manner, diminution
of the penality of a work, on account of the will being made more
prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but
increases it.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is due for sin is compensation for the
offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It
is of this debt that Anselm speaks.
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Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?
Objection 1: It would seem that the scourges whereby we are punished by
God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what is
meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said
([4859]Q[14], A[2]). But we do not merit except by what is in our own
power. Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not
in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.
Objection 2: Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these
scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them
most of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.
Objection 3: Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these
scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the
case of Job. Therefore it seems that they are not satisfactory.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:3,4): "Tribulation worketh
patience, and patience trial, i.e. deliverance from sin," as a gloss
explains it.
Further, Ambrose says (Super Ps. 118): "Although faith," i.e. the
consciousness of sin, "be lacking, the punishment satisfies." Therefore
the scourges of this life are satisfactory.
I answer that, Compensation for a past offense can be enforced either
by the offender or by another. When it is enforced by another, such
compensation is of a vindictive rather than of a satisfactory nature,
whereas when it is made by the offender, it is also satisfactory.
Consequently, if the scourges, which are inflicted by God on account of
sin, become in some way the act of the sufferer they acquire a
satisfactory character. Now they become the act of the sufferer in so
far as he accepts them for the cleansing of his sins, by taking
advantage of them patiently. If, however, he refuse to submit to them
patiently, then they do not become his personal act in any way, and are
not of a satisfactory, but merely of a vindictive character.
Reply to Objection 1: Although these scourges are not altogether in our
power, yet in some respect they are, in so far as we use them
patiently. In this way man makes a virtue of necessity, so that such
things can become both meritorious and satisfactory.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 8), even as
"the same fire makes gold glisten and straw reek," so by the same
scourges are the good cleansed and the wicked worsened on account of
their impatience. Hence, though the scourges are common to both,
satisfaction is only on the side of the good.
Reply to Objection 3: These scourges always regard past guilt, not
always the guilt of the person, but sometimes the guilt of nature. For
had there not been guilt in human nature, there would have been no
punishment. But since guilt preceded in nature, punishment is inflicted
by God on a person without the person's fault, that his virtue may be
meritorious, and that he may avoid future sin. Moreover, these two
things are necessary in satisfaction. For the work needs to be
meritorious, that honor may be given to God, and it must be a safeguard
of virtue, that we may be preserved from future sins.
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Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the works of satisfaction are
unsuitably enumerated by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds,
fasting, and prayer. For a work of satisfaction should be penal. But
prayer is not penal, since it is a remedy against penal sorrow, and is
a source of pleasure, wherefore it is written (James 5:13): "Is any of
you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing." Therefore
prayer should not be reckoned among the works of satisfaction.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is either carnal or spiritual. Now, as
Jerome says on Mk. 9:28, "This kind" of demons "can go out by nothing,
but by prayer and fasting: Diseases of the body are healed by fasting,
diseases of the mind, by prayer." Therefore no other work of
satisfaction is necessary.
Objection 3: Further, satisfaction is necessary in order for us to be
cleansed from our sins. But almsgiving cleanses from all sins,
according to Lk. 11:41: "Give alms, and behold all things are clean
unto you." Therefore the other two are in excess.
Objection 4: On the other hand, it seems that there should be more. For
contrary heals contrary. But there are many more than three kinds of
sin. Therefore more works of satisfaction should be enumerated.
Objection 5: Further, pilgrimages and scourgings are also enjoined as
works of satisfaction, and are not included among the above. Therefore
they are not sufficiently enumerated.
I answer that, Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve
something taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we have but
three kinds of goods, bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or
external goods. By alms-deeds we deprive ourselves of some goods of
fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of
the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves of any of them, either
in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God, but we
should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer.
This number is shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction uproots
the causes of sin, for these are reckoned to be three (1 Jn. 2:16),
viz. "concupiscence of the flesh," "concupiscence of the eyes," and
"pride of life." Fasting is directed against concupiscence of the
"flesh," alms-deeds against concupiscence of the "eyes," and "prayer"
against "pride of life," as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 42).
This number is also shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction does
not open a way to the suggestions of sin, because every sin is
committed either against God, and this is prevented by "prayer," or
against our neighbor, and this is remedied by "alms-deeds," or against
ourselves, and this is forestalled by "fasting."
Reply to Objection 1: According to some, prayer is twofold. There is
the prayer of contemplatives whose "conversation is in heaven": and
this, since it is altogether delightful, is not a work of satisfaction.
The other is a prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this is penal
and a part of satisfaction.
It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has the character
of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the soul it is painful to
the body, since, as Gregory says (Super Ezech., Hom. xiv), "doubtless,
when our soul's love is strengthened, our body's strength is weakened";
hence we read (Gn. 32:25) that the sinew of Jacob's thigh shrank
through his wrestling with the angel.
Reply to Objection 2: Carnal sin is twofold; one which is completed in
carnal delectation, as gluttony and lust. and, another which is
completed in things relating to the flesh, though it be completed in
the delectation of the soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness.
Hence such like sins are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that
they need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsdeeds.
Reply to Objection 3: Although each of these three, by a kind of
likeness, is appropriated to some particular kind of sin because it is
reasonable that, whereby a man sins, in that he should be punished, and
that satisfaction should cut out the very root of the sin committed,
yet each of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is
unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed on him, chiefly
almsdeeds, which can take the place of the others, in so far as in
those to whom a man gives alms he purchases other works of satisfaction
thereby. Consequently even if almsgiving washes all sins away, it does
not follow that other works are in excess.
Reply to Objection 4: Though there are many kinds of sins, all are
reduced to those three roots or to those three kinds of sin, to which,
as we have said, the aforesaid works of satisfaction correspond.
Reply to Objection 5: Whatever relates to affliction of the body is all
referred to fasting, and whatever is spent for the benefit of one's
neighbor is a kind of alms, and whatever act of worship is given to God
becomes a kind of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory in
several ways.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the recipients of the sacrament of Penance: under
which head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether penance can be in the innocent?
(2) Whether it can be in the saints in glory?
(3) Whether in the good or bad angels?
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Whether penance can be in the innocent?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance cannot be in the innocent. For
penance consists in bewailing one's evil deeds: whereas the innocent
have done no evil. Therefore penance cannot be in them.
Objection 2: Further, the very name of penance [poenitentia] implies
punishment [poena]. But the innocent do not deserve punishment.
Therefore penance is not in them.
Objection 3: Further, penance coincides with vindictive justice. But if
all were innocent, there would be no room for vindictive justice.
Therefore there would be no penance, so that there is none in the
innocent.
On the contrary, All the virtues are infused together. But penance is a
virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are infused into the innocent
at Baptism, penance is infused with them.
Further, a man is said to be curable though he has never been sick in
body: therefore in like manner, one who has never been sick
spiritually. Now even as there can be no actual cure from the wound of
sin without an act of penance, so is there no possibility of cure
without the habit of penance. Therefore one who has never had the
disease of sin, has the habit of penance.
I answer that, Habit comes between power and act: and since the removal
of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not
conversely, the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the
power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because removal
of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be no act
without the matter into which it passes, hence the habit of a virtue is
possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for the reason
that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its
act---thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence, but not the
act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of
magnificence, but he can be possessed thereof.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the innocent have committed no sin,
nevertheless they can, so that they are competent to have the habit of
penance. Yet this habit can never proceed to its act, except perhaps
with regard to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy the
habit. Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a
perfection of the natural power.
Reply to Objection 2: Although they deserve no punishment actually, yet
it is possible for something to be in them for which they would deserve
to be punished.
Reply to Objection 3: So long as the power to sin remains, there would
be room for vindictive justice as to the habit, though not as to the
act, if there were no actual sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the saints in glory have penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the saints in glory have not penance.
For, as Gregory says (Moral. iv), "the blessed remember their sins,
even as we, without grief, remember our griefs after we have been
healed." But penance is grief of the heart. Therefore the saints in
heaven have not penance.
Objection 2: Further, the saints in heaven are conformed to Christ. But
there was no penance in Christ, since there was no faith which is the
principle of penance. Therefore there will be no penance in the saints
in heaven.
Objection 3: Further, a habit is useless if it is not reduced to its
act. But the saints in heaven will not repent actually, because, if
they did, there would be something in them against their wish.
Therefore the habit of penance will not be in them.
Objection 4: On the other hand, penance is a part of justice. But
justice is "perpetual and immortal" (Wis. 1:15), and will remain in
heaven. Therefore penance will also.
Objection 5: Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers, that one of
them said that even Abraham will repent of not having done more good.
But one ought to repent of evil done more than of good left undone, and
which one was not bound to do, for such is the good in question.
Therefore repentance will be there of evil done.
I answer that, The cardinal virtues will remain in heaven, but only as
regards the acts which they exercise in respect of their end.
Wherefore, since the virtue of penance is a part of justice which is a
cardinal virtue, whoever has the habit of penance in this life, will
have it in the life to come: but he will not have the same act as now,
but another, viz. thanksgiving to God for His mercy in pardoning his
sins.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that they do not have the
same act as penance has now; and we grant this.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ could not sin, wherefore the matter of
this virtue was lacking in His respect both actually and potentially:
so that there is no comparison between Him and others.
Reply to Objection 3: Repentance, properly speaking, considered as that
act of penance which is in this life, will not be in heaven: and yet
the habit will not be without its use, for it will have another act.
Reply OBJ 4,5: We grant the Fourth argument. But since the Fifth
Objection proves that there will be the same act of penance in heaven
as now, we answer the latter by saying that in heaven one will be
altogether conformed to the will of God. Wherefore, as God, by His
antecedent will, but not by His consequent will, wishes that all things
should be good, and therefore that there should be no evil, so is it
with the blessed. It is this will that this holy father improperly
calls penance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angel can be the subject of penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that even a good or bad angel can be a
subject of penance. For fear is the beginning of penance. But fear is
in the angels, according to James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and
tremble." Therefore there can be penance in them.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that "evil
men are full of repentance, and this is a great punishment for them."
Now the devils are exceeding evil, nor is there any punishment that
they lack. Therefore they can repent.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is more easily moved to that which is
according to its nature than to that which is against its nature: thus
water which has by violence been heated, of itself returns to its
natural property. Now angels can be moved to sin which is contrary to
their common nature. Much more therefore can they return to that which
is in accord with their nature. But this is done by penance. Therefore
they are susceptible to penance.
Objection 4: Further, what applies to angels, applies equally to
separated souls, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). But there can
be penance in separated souls, as some say, as in the souls of the
blessed in heaven. Therefore there can be penance in the angels.
On the contrary, By penance man obtains pardon for the sin he has
committed. But this is impossible in the angels. Therefore they are not
subjects of penance.
Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that man is subject to
penance on account of the weakness of his body. But the angels are not
united to a body. Therefore no penance can be in them.
I answer that, In us, penance is taken in two senses; first, as a
passion, and thus it is nothing but pain or sorrow on account of a sin
committed: and though, as a passion it is only in the concupiscible
part, yet, by way of comparison, the name of penance is given to that
act of the will, whereby a man detests what he has done, even as love
and other passions are spoken of as though they were in the
intellectual appetite. Secondly, penance is taken as a virtue, and in
this way its act consists in the detestation of evil done, together
with the purpose of amendment and the intention of expiating the evil,
or of placating God for the offense committed. Now detestation of evil
befits a person according as he is naturally ordained to good. And
since this order or inclination is not entirely destroyed in any
creature, it remains even in the damned, and consequently the passion
of repentance, or something like it, remains in them too, as stated in
Wis. 5:3 "(saying) within themselves, repenting," etc. This repentance,
as it is not a habit, but a passion or act, can by no means be in the
blessed angels, who have not committed any sins: but it is in the
wicked angels, since the same applies to them as to the lost souls,
for, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4), "death is to men
what sin is to an angel." But no forgiveness is possible for the sin of
an angel. Now sin is the proper object of the virtue itself which we
call penance, in so far as it can be pardoned or expiated. Therefore,
since the wicked angels cannot have the matter, they have not the power
to produce the act, so that neither can they have the habit. Hence the
angels cannot be subjects of the virtue of penance.
Reply to Objection 1: A certain movement of penance is engendered in
them from fear, but not such as is a virtue.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is natural in them is entirely good, and
inclines to good: but their free-will is fixed on evil. And since the
movement of virtue and vice follows the inclination, not of nature, but
of the free-will, there is no need that there should be movements of
virtue in them either actually or possibly, although they are inclined
to good by nature.
Reply to Objection 4: There is no parity between the holy angels and
the beatified souls, because in the latter there has been or could have
been a sin that could be pardoned, but not in the former: so that
though they are like as to their present state, they differ as to their
previous states, which penance regards directly.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the power of the ministers of this sacrament,
which power depends on the keys. As to this matter, in the first place
we shall treat of the keys, secondly, of excommunication, thirdly, of
indulgences, since these two things are connected with the power of the
keys. The first of these considerations will be fourfold: (1) the
nature and meaning of the keys. (2) the use of the keys; (3) the
ministers of the keys; (4) those on whom the use of the keys can be
exercised.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there ought to be keys in the Church?
(2) Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?
(3) Whether there are two keys or only one?
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Whether there should be keys in the Church?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no necessity for keys in the
Church. For there is no need for keys that one may enter a house the
door of which is open. But it is written (Apoc. 4:1): "I looked and
behold a door was opened in heaven," which door is Christ, for He said
of Himself (Jn. 10:7): "I am the door." Therefore the Church needs no
keys for the entrance into heaven.
Objection 2: Further, a key is needed for opening and shutting. But
this belongs to Christ alone, "Who openeth and no man shutteth,
shutteth and no man openeth" (Apoc. 3:7). Therefore the Church has no
keys in the hands of her ministers.
Objection 3: Further, hell is opened to whomever heaven is closed, and
vice versa. Therefore whoever has the keys of heaven, has the keys of
hell. But the Church is not said to have the keys of hell. Therefore
neither has she the keys of heaven.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 16:19): "To thee will I give the
keys of the kingdom of heaven."
Further, every dispenser should have the keys of the things that he
dispenses. But the ministers of the Church are the dispensers of the
divine mysteries, as appears from 1 Cor. 4:1. Therefore they ought to
have the keys.
I answer that, In material things a key is an instrument for opening a
door. Now the door of the kingdom is closed to us through sin, both as
to the stain and as to the debt of punishment. Wherefore the power of
removing this obstacle is called a key. Now this power is in the Divine
Trinity by authority; hence some say that God has the key of
"authority." But Christ Man had the power to remove the above obstacle,
through the merit of His Passion, which also is said to open the door;
hence some say that He has the keys of "excellence." And since "the
sacraments of which the Church is built, flowed from the side of Christ
while He lay asleep on the cross" [*Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 138], the
efficacy of the Passion abides in the sacraments of the Church.
Wherefore a certain power for the removal of the aforesaid obstacle is
bestowed on the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the
sacraments, not by their own, but by a Divine power and by the Passion
of Christ. This power is called metaphorically the Church's key, and is
the key of "ministry."
Reply to Objection 1: The door of heaven, considered in itself, is ever
open, but it is said to be closed to someone, on account of some
obstacle against entering therein, which is in himself. The obstacle
which the entire human nature inherited from the sin of the first man
was removed by Christ's Passion; hence, after the Passion, John saw an
opened door in heaven. Yet that door still remains closed to this or
that man, on account of the original sin which he has contracted, or
the actual sin which he has committed: hence we need the sacraments and
the keys of the Church.
Reply to Objection 2: This refers to His closing Limbo, so that
thenceforth no one should go there, and to His opening of Paradise, the
obstacle of nature being removed by His Passion.
Reply to Objection 3: The key whereby hell is opened and closed, is the
power of bestowing grace, whereby hell is opened to man, so that he is
taken out from sin which is the door of hell, and closed, so that by
the help of grace man should no more fall into sin. Now the power of
bestowing grace belongs to God alone, wherefore He kept this key to
Himself. But the key of the kingdom is also the power to remit the debt
of temporal punishment, which debt prevents man from entering the
kingdom Consequently the key of the kingdom can be given to man rather
than the key of hell, for they are not the same, as is clear from what
has been said. For a man may be set free from hell by the remission of
the debt of eternal punishment, without being at once admitted to the
kingdom, on account of his yet owing a debt of temporal punishment.
It may also be replied, as some state, that the key of heaven is also
the key of hell, since if one is opened to a man, the other, for that
very reason, is closed to him, but it takes its name from the better of
the two.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?
Objection 1: It would seem that the key is not the power of binding and
loosing, whereby "the ecclesiastical judge has to admit the worthy to
the kingdom and exclude the unworthy" therefrom, as stated in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 16). For the spiritual power conferred in a sacrament is
the same as the character. But the key and the character do not seem to
be the same, since by the character man is referred to God, whereas by
the key he is referred to his subjects. Therefore the key is not a
power.
Objection 2: Further, an ecclesiastical judge is only one who has
jurisdiction, which is not given at the same time as orders. But the
keys are given in the conferring of orders. Therefore there should have
been no mention of the ecclesiastical judge in the definition of the
keys.
Objection 3: Further, when a man has something of himself, he needs not
to be reduced to act by some active power. Now a man is admitted to the
kingdom from the very fact that he is worthy. Therefore it does not
concern the power of the keys to admit the worthy to the kingdom.
Objection 4: Further, sinners are unworthy of the kingdom. But the
Church prays for sinners, that they may go to heaven. Therefore she
does not exclude the unworthy, but admits them, so far as she is
concerned.
Objection 5: Further, in every ordered series of agents, the last end
belongs to the principal and not to the instrumental agent. But the
principal agent in view of man's salvation is God. Therefore admission
to the kingdom, which is the last end, belongs to Him, and not to those
who have the keys, who are as instrumental or ministerial agents.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 33),
"powers are defined from their acts." Wherefore, since the key is a
kind of power, it should be defined from its act or use, and reference
to the act should include its object from which it takes its species,
and the mode of acting whereby the power is shown to be well-ordered.
Now the act of the spiritual power is to open heaven, not absolutely,
since it is already open, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but for this or
that man; and this cannot be done in an orderly manner without due
consideration of the worthiness of the one to be admitted to heaven.
Hence the aforesaid definition of the key gives the genus, viz.
"power," the subject of the power, viz. the "ecclesiastical judge," and
the act, viz. "of excluding or admitting," corresponding to the two
acts of a material key which are to open and shut; the object of which
act is referred to in the words "from the kingdom," and the mode, in
the words, "worthy" and "unworthy," because account is taken of the
worthiness or unworthiness of those on whom the act is exercised.
Reply to Objection 1: The same power is directed to two things, of
which one is the cause of the other, as heat, in fire, is directed to
make a thing hot and to melt it. And since every grace and remission in
a mystical body comes to it from its head, it seems that it is
essentially the same power whereby a priest can consecrate, and whereby
he can loose and bind, if he has jurisdiction, and that there is only a
logical difference, according as it is referred to different effects,
even as fire in one respect is said to have the power of heating, and
in another, the power of melting. And because the character of the
priestly order is nothing else than the power of exercising that act to
which the priestly order is chiefly ordained (if we maintain that it is
the same as a spiritual power), therefore the character, the power of
consecrating, and the power of the keys are one and the same
essentially, but differ logically.
Reply to Objection 2: All spiritual power is conferred by some kind of
consecration. Therefore the key is given together with the order: yet
the use of the key requires due matter, i.e. a people subject through
jurisdiction, so that until he has jurisdiction, the priest has the
keys, but he cannot exercise the act of the keys. And since the key is
defined from its act, its definition contains a reference to
jurisdiction.
Reply to Objection 3: A person may be worthy to have something in two
ways, either so as to have a right to possess it, and thus whoever is
worthy has heaven already opened to him---or so that it is meet that he
should receive it, and thus the power of the keys admits those who are
worthy, but to whom heaven is not yet altogether opened.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as God hardens not by imparting malice, but
by withholding grace, so a priest is said to exclude, not as though he
placed an obstacle to entrance, but because he does not remove an
obstacle which is there, since he cannot remove it unless God has
already removed it. [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter
Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his
opinion. Cf. [4860]TP, Q[62], A[1]; [4861]TP, Q[64], A[1]; [4862]TP,
Q[86], A[6].] Hence God is prayed that He may absolve, so that there
may be room for the priest's absolution.
Reply to Objection 5: The priest's act does not bear immediately on the
kingdom, but on the sacraments, by means of which man wins to the
kingdom.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are two keys or only one?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not two keys but only one.
For one lock requires but one key. Now the lock for the removal of
which the keys of the Church are required, is sin. Therefore the Church
does not require two keys for one sin.
Objection 2: Further, the keys are given when orders are conferred. But
knowledge is not always due to infusion, but sometimes is acquired, nor
is it possessed by all those who are ordained, and is possessed by some
who are not ordained. Therefore knowledge is not a key, so that there
is but one key, viz. the power of judging.
Objection 3: Further, the power which the priest has over the mystic
body of Christ flows from the power which he has over Christ's true
body. Now the power of consecrating Christ's true body is but one.
Therefore the power which regards Christ's mystic body is but one. But
this is a key. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: On the other hand, It seems that there are more than two
keys. For just as knowledge and power are requisite for man to act, so
is will. But the knowledge of discretion is reckoned as a key, and so
is the power of judging. Therefore the will to absolve should be
counted as a key.
Objection 5: Further, all three Divine Persons remit sins. Now the
priest, through the keys, is the minister for the remission of sins.
Therefore he should have three keys, so that he may be conformed to the
Trinity.
I answer that, Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the
recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the
act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment
of the act. Therefore in the act of justice whereby a man is given what
he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern whether
he deserves to receive. Again, an authority or power is necessary for
both these things, for we cannot give save what we have in our power;
nor can there be judgment, without the right to enforce it, since
judgment is determined to one particular thing, which determination it
derives, in speculative matters, from the first principles which cannot
be gainsaid, and, in practical matters, from the power of command
vested in the one who judges. And since the act of the key requires
fitness in the person on whom it is exercised---because the
ecclesiastical judge, by means of the key, "admits the worthy and
excludes the unworthy," as may be seen from the definition given above
[4863](A[2])---therefore the judge requires both judgment of discretion
whereby he judges a man to be worthy, and also the very act of
receiving (that man's confession); and for both these things a certain
power or authority is necessary. Accordingly we may distinguish two
keys, the first of which regards the judgment about the worthiness of
the person to be absolved, while the other regards the absolution.
These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of authority, since
both belong to the minister by virtue of his office, but in comparison
with their respective acts, one of which presupposes the other.
Reply to Objection 1: One key is ordained immediately to the opening of
one lock, but it is not unfitting that one key should be ordained to
the act of another. Thus it is in the case in point. For it is the
second key, which is the power of binding and loosing, that opens the
lock of sin immediately, but the key of knowledge shows to whom that
lock should be opened.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions about the key of
knowledge. For some say that knowledge considered as a habit, acquired
or infused, is the key in this case, and that it is not the principal
key, but is called a key through being subordinate to another key: so
that it is not called a key when the other key is wanting, for
instance, in an educated man who is not a priest. And although priests
lack this key at times, through being without knowledge, acquired or
infused, of loosing and binding, yet sometimes they make use of their
natural endeavors, which they who hold this opinion call a little key,
so that although knowledge be not bestowed together with orders, yet
with the conferring of orders the knowledge becomes a key which it was
not before. This seems to have been the opinion of the Master (Sent.
iv, D, 19).
But this does not seem to agree with the words of the Gospel, whereby
the keys are promised to Peter (Mat. 16:19), so that not only one but
two are given in orders. For which reason the other opinion holds that
the key is not knowledge considered as a habit, but the authority to
exercise the act of knowledge, which authority is sometimes without
knowledge, while the knowledge is sometimes present without the
authority. This may be seen even in secular courts, for a secular judge
may have the authority to judge, without having the knowledge of the
law, while another man, on the contrary, has knowledge of the law
without having the authority to judge. And since the act of judging to
which a man is bound through the authority which is vested in him, and
not through his habit of knowledge, cannot be well performed without
both of the above, the authority to judge, which is the key of
knowledge, cannot be accepted without sin by one who lacks knowledge;
whereas knowledge void of authority can be possessed without sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of consecrating is directed to only one
act of another kind, wherefore it is not numbered among the keys, nor
is it multiplied as the power of the keys, which is directed to
different acts, although as to the essence of power and authority it is
but one, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: Everyone is free to will, so that no one needs
authority to will; wherefore will is not reckoned as a key.
Reply to Objection 5: All three Persons remit sins in the same way as
one Person, wherefore there is no need for the priest, who is the
minister of the Trinity, to have three keys: and all the more, since
the will, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, requires no key, as
stated above (ad 4).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECT OF THE KEYS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effect of the keys under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt?
(2) Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?
(3) Whether a priest can bind in virtue of the power of the keys?
(4) Whether he can loose and bind according to his own judgment?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt? [*St.
Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the
negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. TP, Q[62], A[1]; TP,
Q[64], A[1]; TP, Q[86], A[6]]
Objection 1: It would seem that the power of the keys extends to the
remission of guilt. For it was said to the disciples (Jn. 20:23):
"Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." Now this was
not said in reference to the declaration only, as the Master states
(Sent. iv, D, 18), for in that case the priest of the New Testament
would have no more power than the priest of the Old Testament.
Therefore he exercises a power over the remission of the guilt.
Objection 2: Further, in Penance grace is given for the remission of
sin. Now the priest is the dispenser of this sacrament by virtue of the
keys. Therefore, since grace is opposed to sin, not on the part of the
punishment, but on the part of the guilt, it seems that the priest
operates unto the remission of sin by virtue of the keys.
Objection 3: Further, the priest receives more power by his
consecration than the baptismal water by its sanctification. Now the
baptismal water receives the power "to touch the body and cleanse the
heart," as Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.). Much more, therefore,
does the priest, in his consecration, receive the power to cleanse the
heart from the stain of sin.
On the contrary, The Master stated above (Sent. iv, D, 18) that God has
not bestowed on the minister the power to co-operate with Him in the
inward cleansing. Now if he remitted sins as to the guilt, he would
co-operate with God in the inward cleansing. Therefore the power of the
keys does not extend to the remission of guilt.
Further, sin is not remitted save by the Holy Ghost. But no man has the
power to give the Holy Ghost, as the Master said above (Sent. i, D,
14). Neither therefore can he remit sins as to their guilt.
I answer that, According to Hugh (De Sacram. ii), "the sacraments, by
virtue of their sanctification, contain an invisible grace." Now this
sanctification is sometimes essential to the sacrament both as regards
the matter and as regards the minister, as may be seen in Confirmation,
and then the sacramental virtue is in both together. Sometimes,
however, the essence of the sacrament requires only sanctification of
the matter, as in Baptism, which has no fixed minister on whom it
depends necessarily, and then the whole virtue of the sacrament is in
the matter. Again, sometimes the essence of the sacrament requires the
consecration or sanctification of the minister without any
sanctification of the matter, and then the entire sacramental virtue is
in the minister, as in Penance. Hence the power of the keys which is in
the priest, stands in the same relation to the effect of Penance, as
the virtue in the baptismal water does to the effect of Baptism. Now
Baptism and the sacrament of Penance agree somewhat in their effect,
since each is directly ordained against guilt, which is not the case in
the other sacraments: yet they differ in this, that the sacrament of
Penance, since the acts of the recipient are as its matter, cannot be
given save to adults, who need to be disposed for the reception of the
sacramental effect; whereas Baptism is given, sometimes to adults,
sometimes to children and others who lack the use of reason, so that by
Baptism children receive grace and remission of sin without any
previous disposition, while adults do not, for they require to be
disposed by the removal of insincerity. This disposition sometimes
precedes their Baptism by priority of time, being sufficient for the
reception of grace, before they are actually baptized, but not before
they have come to the knowledge of the truth and have conceived the
desire for Baptism. At other times this disposition does not precede
the reception of Baptism by a priority of time, but is simultaneous
with it, and then the grace of the remission of guilt is bestowed
through the reception of Baptism. On the other hand, grace is never
given through the sacrament of Penance unless the recipient be disposed
either simultaneously or before. Hence the power of the keys operates
unto the remission of guilt, either through being desired or through
being actually exercised, even as the waters of Baptism. But just as
Baptism acts, not as a principal agent but as an instrument, and does
not go so far as to cause the reception itself of grace, even
instrumentally [*See note at beginning of this article], but merely
disposes the recipient to the grace whereby his guilt is remitted, so
is it with the power of the keys. Wherefore God alone directly remits
guilt, and Baptism acts through His power instrumentally, as an
inanimate instrument, and the priest as an animate instrument, such as
a servant is, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11): and
consequently the priest acts as a minister. Hence it is clear that the
power of the keys is ordained, in a manner, to the remission of guilt,
not as causing that remission, but as disposing thereto. Consequently
if a man, before receiving absolution, were not perfectly disposed for
the reception of grace, he would receive grace at the very time of
sacramental confession and absolution, provided he offered no obstacle.
For if the key were in no way ordained to the remission of guilt, but
only to the remission of punishment, as some hold, it would not be
necessary to have a desire of receiving the effect of the keys in order
to have one's sins forgiven, just as it is not necessary to have a
desire of receiving the other sacraments which are ordained, not to the
remission of guilt, but against punishment. But this enables us to see
that it is not ordained unto the remission of guilt, because the use of
the keys, in order to be effective, always requires a disposition on
the part of the recipient of the sacrament. And the same would apply to
Baptism, were it never given save to adults.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18),
the power of forgiving sins was entrusted to priests, not that they may
forgive them, by their own power, for this belongs to God, but that, as
ministers, they may declare [*See note at the beginning of this
article] the operation of God Who forgives. Now this happens in three
ways. First, by a declaration, not of present, but of future
forgiveness, without co-operating therein in any way: and thus the
sacraments of the Old Law signified the Divine operation, so that the
priest of the Old Law did but declare and did not operate the
forgiveness of sins. Secondly, by a declaration of present forgiveness
without co-operating in it at all: and thus some say that the
sacraments of the New Law signify the bestowal of grace, which God
gives when the sacraments are conferred, without the sacraments
containing any power productive of grace, according to which opinion,
even the power of the keys would merely declare the Divine operation
that has its effect in the remission of guilt when the sacrament is
conferred. Thirdly, by signifying the Divine operation causing then and
there the remission of guilt, and by co-operating towards this effect
dispositively and instrumentally: and then, according to another and
more common opinion, the sacraments of the New Law declare the
cleansing effected by God. In this way also the priest of the New
Testament declares the recipient to be absolved from guilt, because in
speaking of the sacraments, what is ascribed to the power of the
ministers must be consistent with the sacrament. Nor is it unreasonable
that the keys of the Church should dispose the penitent to the
remission of his guilt, from the fact that the guilt is already
remitted, even as neither is it unreasonable that Baptism, considered
in itself, causes a disposition in one who is already sanctified.
Reply to Objection 2: Neither the sacrament of Penance, nor the
sacrament of Baptism, by its operation, causes grace, or the remission
of guilt, directly, but only dispositively [*St. Thomas here follows
the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in
life he altered his opinion. Cf. [4864]TP, Q[62], A[1]; [4865]TP,
Q[64], A[1]; [4866]TP, Q[86], A[6]]. Hence the Reply to the Third
Objection is evident.
The other arguments show that the power of the keys does not effect the
remission of guilt directly, and this is to be granted.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that a priest cannot remit sin as to the
punishment. For sin deserves eternal and temporal punishment. But after
the priest's absolution the penitent is still obliged to undergo
temporal punishment either in Purgatory or in this world. Therefore the
priest does not remit the punishment in any way.
Objection 2: Further, the priest cannot anticipate the judgment of God.
But Divine justice appoints the punishment which penitents have to
undergo. Therefore the priest cannot remit any part of it.
Objection 3: Further, a man who has committed a slight sin, is not less
susceptible to the power of the keys, than one who has committed a
graver sin. Now if the punishment for the graver sin be lessened in any
way through the priestly administrations, it would be possible for a
sin to be so slight that the punishment which it deserves is no greater
than that which has been remitted for the graver sin. Therefore the
priest would be able to remit the entire punishment due for the slight
sin: which is false.
Objection 4: Further, the whole of the temporal punishment due for a
sin is of one kind. If, therefore, by a first absolution something is
taken away from the punishment, it will be possible for something more
to be taken away by a second absolution, so that the absolution can be
so often repeated, that by virtue of the keys the whole punishment will
be taken away, since the second absolution is not less efficacious than
the first: and consequently that sin will be altogether unpunished,
which is absurd.
On the contrary, The key is the power of binding and loosing. But the
priest can enjoin a temporal punishment. Therefore he can absolve from
punishment.
Further, the priest cannot remit sin either as to the guilt [*St.
Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the
negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. [4867]TP, Q[62],
A[1]; [4868]TP, Q[64], A[1]; [4869]TP, Q[86], A[6]], as stated in the
text (Sent. iv, D, 18), or as to the eternal punishment, for a like
reason. If therefore he cannot remit sin as to the temporal punishment,
he would be unable to remit sin in any way, which is altogether
contrary to the words of the Gospel.
I answer that, Whatever may be said of the effect of Baptism conferred
on one who has already received grace, applies equally to the effect of
the actual exercise of the power of the keys on one who has already
been contrite. For a man may obtain the grace of the remission of his
sins as to their guilt, through faith and contrition, previous to
Baptism; but when, afterwards, he actually receives Baptism, his grace
is increased, and he is entirely absolved from the debt of punishment,
since he is then made a partaker of the Passion of Christ. In like
manner when a man, through contrition, has received the pardon of his
sins as to their guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal
punishment, (which is remitted together with the guilt) by virtue of
the keys which derive their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, his
grace is increased and the temporal punishment is remitted, the debt of
which remained after the guilt had been forgiven. However, this
temporal punishment is not entirely remitted, as in Baptism, but only
partly, because the man who is regenerated in Baptism is conformed to
the Passion of Christ, by receiving into himself entirely the efficacy
of Christ's Passion, which suffices for the blotting out of all
punishment, so that nothing remains of the punishment due to his
preceding actual sins. For nothing should be imputed to a man unto
punishment, save what he has done himself, and in Baptism man begins a
new life, and by the baptismal water becomes a new man, as that no debt
for previous sin remains in him. on the other hand, in Penance, a man
does not take on a new life, since therein he is not born again, but
healed. Consequently by virtue of the keys which produce their effect
in the sacrament of Penance, the punishment is not entirely remitted,
but something is taken off the temporal punishment, the debt of which
could remain after the eternal punishment had been remitted. Nor does
this apply only to the temporal punishment which the penitent owes at
the time of confession, as some hold, (for then confession and
sacramental absolution would be mere burdens, which cannot be said of
the sacraments of the New Law), but also to the punishment due in
Purgatory, so that one who has been absolved and dies before making
satisfaction, is less punished in Purgatory, than if he had died before
receiving absolution.
Reply to Objection 1: The priest does not remit the entire temporal
punishment, but part of it; wherefore the penitent still remains
obliged to undergo satisfactory punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's Passion was sufficiently satisfactory
for the sins of the whole world, so that without prejudice to Divine
justice something can be remitted from the punishment which a sinner
deserves, in so far as the effect of Christ's Passion reaches him
through the sacraments of the Church.
Reply to Objection 3: Some satisfactory punishment must remain for each
sin, so as to provide a remedy against it. Wherefore though, by virtue
of the absolution some measure of the punishment due to a grave sin is
remitted, it does not follow that the same measure of punishment is
remitted for each sin, because in that case some sin would remain
without any punishment at all: but, by virtue of the keys, the
punishments due to various sins are remitted in due proportion.
Reply to Objection 4: Some say that at the first absolution, as much as
possible is remitted by virtue of the keys, and that, nevertheless, the
second confession is valid, on account of the instruction received, on
account of the additional surety, on account of the prayers of the
priest or confessor, and lastly on account of the merit of the shame.
But this does not seem to be true, for though there might be a reason
for repeating the confession, there would be no reason for repeating
the absolution, especially if the penitent has no cause to doubt about
his previous absolution; for he might just as well doubt after the
second as after the first absolution: even as we see that the sacrament
of Extreme Unction is not repeated during the same sickness, for the
reason that all that could be done through the sacrament, has been done
once. Moreover, in the second confession, there would be no need for
the confessor to have the keys, if the power of the keys had no effect
therein.
For these reasons others say that even in the second absolution
something of the punishment is remitted by virtue of the keys, because
when absolution is given a second time, grace is increased, and the
greater the grace received, the less there remains of the blemish of
the previous sin, and the less punishment is required to remove that
blemish. Wherefore even when a man is first absolved, his punishment is
more or less remitted by virtue of the keys, according as he disposes
himself more or less to receive grace; and this disposition may be so
great, that even by virtue of his contrition the whole punishment is
remitted, as we have already stated ([4870]Q[5], A[2]). Consequently it
is not unreasonable, if by frequent confession even the whole
punishment be remitted, that a sin remain altogether unpunished, since
Christ made satisfaction for its punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the priest can bind through the power of the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that the priest cannot bind by virtue of the
power of the keys. For the sacramental power is ordained as a remedy
against sin. Now binding is not a remedy for sin, but seemingly is
rather conducive to an aggravation of the disease. Therefore, by the
power of the keys, which is a sacramental power, the priest cannot
bind.
Objection 2: Further, just as to loose or to open is to remove an
obstacle, so to bind is to place an obstacle. Now an obstacle to heaven
is sin, which cannot be placed on us by an extrinsic cause, since no
sin is committed except by the will. Therefore the priest cannot bind.
Objection 3: Further, the keys derive their efficacy from Christ's
Passion. But binding is not an effect of the Passion. Therefore the
priest cannot bind by the power of the keys.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 16:19): "Whatsoever thou shalt
bind on earth, shall be bound also in heaven."
Further, rational powers are directed to opposites. But the power of
the keys is a rational power, since it has discretion connected with
it. Therefore it is directed to opposites. Therefore if it can loose,
it can bind.
I answer that, The operation of the priest in using the keys, is
conformed to God's operation, Whose minister he is. Now God's operation
extends both to guilt and to punishment; to the guilt indeed, so as to
loose it directly. but to bind it indirectly, in so far as He is said
to harden, when He withholds His grace; whereas His operation extends
to punishment directly, in both respects, because He both spares and
inflicts it. In like manner, therefore, although the priest, in
absolving, exercises an operation ordained to the remission of guilt,
in the way mentioned above [4871](A[1]), nevertheless, in binding, he
exercises no operation on the guilt; (unless he be said to bind by not
absolving the penitent and by declaring him to be bound), but he has
the power both of binding and of loosing with regard to the punishment.
For he looses from the punishment which he remits, while he binds as to
the punishment which remains. This he does in two ways---first as
regards the quantity of the punishment considered in general, and thus
he does not bind save by not loosing, and declaring the penitent to be
bound, secondly, as regards this or that particular punishment, and
thus he binds to punishment by imposing it.
Reply to Objection 1: The remainder of the punishment to which the
priest binds the penitent, is the medicine which cleanses the latter
from the blemish of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only sin, but also punishment is an obstacle
to heaven: and how the latter is enjoined by the priest, has been said
in the article.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the Passion of Christ binds us to some
punishment whereby we are conformed to Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment?
Objection 1: It seems that the priest can bind and loose according to
his own judgment. For Jerome [*Cf. Can. 86, Mensuram, De Poenit. Dist.
i] says: "The canons do not fix the length of time for doing penance so
precisely as to say how each sin is to be amended, but leave the
decision of this matter to the judgment of a discreet priest."
Therefore it seems that he can bind and loose according to his own
judgment.
Objection 2: Further, "The Lord commended the unjust steward, forasmuch
as he had done wisely" (Lk. 16:5), because he had allowed a liberal
discount to his master's debtors. But God is more inclined to mercy
than any temporal lord. Therefore it seems that the more punishment the
priest remits, the more he is to be commended.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's every action is our instruction. Now on
some sinners He imposed no punishment, but only amendment of life, as
in the case of the adulterous woman (Jn. 8). Therefore it seems that
the priest also, who is the vicar of Christ, can, according to his own
judgment, remit the punishment, either wholly or in part.
On the contrary, Gregory VII [*Cf. Act. Concil. Rom. v, Can. 5] says:
"We declare it a mock penance if it is not imposed according to the
authority of the holy fathers in proportion to the sin." Therefore it
seems that it does not altogether depend on the priest's judgment.
Further, the act of the keys requires discretion. Now if the priest
could remit and impose as much as he liked of a penance, he would have
no need of discretion, because there would be no room for indiscretion.
Therefore it does not altogether depend on the priest's judgment.
I answer that, In using the keys, the priest acts as the instrument and
minister of God. Now no instrument can have an efficacious act, except
in so far as it is moved by the principal agent. Wherefore, Dionysius
says (Hier. Eccl. cap. ult.) that "priests should use their
hierarchical powers, according as they are moved by God." A sign of
this is that before the power of the keys was conferred on Peter (Mat.
16:19) mention is made of the revelation vouchsafed to him of the
Godhead; and the gift of the Holy Ghost, whereby "the sons of God are
led" (Rom. 8:14), is mentioned before power was given to the apostles
to forgive sins. Consequently if anyone were to presume to use his
power against that Divine motion, he would not realize the effect, as
Dionysius states (Hier. Eccl., cap. ult.), and, besides, he would be
turned away from the Divine order, and consequently would be guilty of
a sin. Moreover, since satisfactory punishments are medicinal, just as
the medicines prescribed by the medical art are not suitable to all,
but have to be changed according to the judgment of a medical man, who
follows not his own will, but his medical science, so the satisfactory
punishments appointed by the canons are not suitable to all, but have
to be varied according to the judgment of the priest guided by the
Divine instinct. Therefore just as sometimes the physician prudently
refrains from giving a medicine sufficiently efficacious to heal the
disease, lest a greater danger should arise on account of the weakness
of nature so the priest, moved by Divine instinct, some times refrains
from enjoining the entire punishment due to one sin, lest by the
severity of the punishment, the sick man come to despair and turn away
altogether from repentance.
Reply to Objection 1: This judgment should be guided entirely by the
Divine instinct.
Reply to Objection 2: The steward is commended also for having done
wisely. Therefore in the remission of the due punishment, there is need
for discretion.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ had the power of "excellence" in the
sacraments, so that, by His own authority, He could remit the
punishment wholly or in part, just as He chose. Therefore there is no
comparison between Him and those who act merely as ministers.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MINISTERS OF THE KEYS (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the ministers and the use of the keys: under which
head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?
(2) Whether Christ had the keys?
(3) Whether priests alone have the keys?
(4) Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys or their use?
(5) Whether wicked priests have the effective use of the keys?
(6) Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate,
suspended or degraded, have the use of the keys?
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Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that the priests of the Law had the keys.
For the possession of the keys results from having orders. But they had
orders since they were called priests. Therefore the priests of the Law
had the keys.
Objection 2: Further, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), there are
two keys, knowledge of discretion, and power of judgment. But the
priests of the Law had authority for both of these: therefore they had
the keys.
Objection 3: Further, the priests of the Law had some power over the
rest of the people, which power was not temporal, else the kingly power
would not have differed from the priestly power. Therefore it was a
spiritual power; and this is the key. Therefore they had the key.
On the contrary, The keys are ordained to the opening of the heavenly
kingdom, which could not be opened before Christ's Passion. Therefore
the priest of the Law had not the keys. Further, the sacraments of the
old Law did not confer grace. Now the gate of the heavenly kingdom
could not be opened except by means of grace. Therefore it could not be
opened by means of those sacraments, so that the priests who
administered them, had not the keys of the heavenly kingdom.
I answer that, Some have held that, under the Old Law, the keys of the
kingdom were in the hands of the priests, because the right of imposing
punishment for sin was conferred on them, as related in Lev. 5, which
right seems to belong to the keys; but that these keys were incomplete
then, whereas now they are complete as bestowed by Christ on the
priests of the New Law.
But this seems to be contrary to the intent of the Apostle in the
Epistle to the Hebrews (Heb. 9:11-12). For there the priesthood of
Christ is given the preference over the priesthood of the Law, inasmuch
as Christ came, "a high priest of the good things to come," and brought
us "by His own blood" into a tabernacle not made with hand, whither the
priesthood of the Old Law brought men "by the blood of goats and of
oxen." Hence it is clear that the power of that priesthood did not
reach to heavenly things but to the shadow of heavenly things: and so,
we must say with others that they had not the keys, but that the keys
were foreshadowed in them.
Reply to Objection 1: The keys of the kingdom go with the priesthood
whereby man is brought into the heavenly kingdom, but such was not the
priesthood of Levi; hence it had the keys, not of heaven, but of an
earthly tabernacle.
Reply to Objection 2: The priests of the Old Law had authority to
discern and judge, but not to admit those they judged into heaven, but
only into the shadow of heavenly things.
Reply to Objection 3: They had no spiritual power, since, by the
sacraments of the Law, they cleansed men not from their sins but from
irregularities, so that those who were cleansed by them could enter
into a tabernacle which was "made with hand."
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Whether Christ had the key?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not have the key. For the
key goes with the character of order. But Christ did not have a
character. Therefore He had not the key.
Objection 2: Further, Christ had power of "excellence" in the
sacraments, so that He could produce the sacramental effect without the
sacramental rite. Now the key is something sacramental. Therefore He
needed no key, and it would have been useless to Him to have it.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 3:7): "These things saith . . .
He that hath the key of David," etc.
I answer that, The power to do a thing is both in the instrument and in
the principal agent, but not in the same way since it is more perfectly
in the latter. Now the power of the keys which we have, like other
sacramental powers, is instrumental: whereas it is in Christ as
principal agent in the matter of our salvation, by authority, if we
consider Him as God, by merit, if we consider Him as man [*For St.
Thomas' later teaching on this point, Cf. [4872]TP, Q[48], A[6];
[4873]FS, Q[112], A[1], AD 1]. But the very notion of a key expresses a
power to open and shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or
by an instrument. Consequently we must admit that Christ had the key,
but in a higher way than His ministers, wherefore He is said to have
the key of "excellence."
Reply to Objection 1: A character implies the notion of something
derived from another, hence the power of the keys which we receive from
Christ results from the character whereby we are conformed to Christ,
whereas in Christ it results not from a character, but from the
principal form.
Reply to Objection 2: The key, which Christ had was not sacramental,
but the origin of the sacramental key.
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Whether priests alone have the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that not only priests have the keys. For
Isidore says (Etym. vii, 12) that the "doorkeepers have to tell the
good from the bad, so as to admit the good and keep out the bad." Now
this is the definition of the keys, as appears from what has been said
([4874]Q[17], A[2]). Therefore not only priests but even doorkeepers
have the keys.
Objection 2: Further, the keys are conferred on priests when by being
anointed they receive power from God. But kings of Christian peoples
also receive power from God and are consecrated by being anointed.
Therefore not only priests have the keys.
Objection 3: Further, the priesthood is an order belonging to an
individual person. But sometimes a number of people together seem to
have the key, because certain Chapters can pass a sentence of
excommunication, which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore not
only priests have the key.
Objection 4: Further, a woman is not capable of receiving the
priesthood, since she is not competent to teach, according to the
Apostle (1 Cor. 14:34). But some women (abbesses, for instance, who
exercise a spiritual power over their subjects), seem to have the keys.
Therefore not only priests have the keys.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Poenit. i): "This right," viz. of
binding and loosing, "is granted to priests alone."
Further, by receiving the power of the keys, a man is set up between
the people and God. But this belongs to the priest alone, who is
"ordained . . . in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer
up gifts and sacrifices for sins" (Heb. 5:1). Therefore only priests
have the keys.
I answer that, There are two kinds of key. one reaches to heaven itself
directly, by remitting sin and thus removing the obstacles to the
entrance into heaven; and this is called the key of "order." Priests
alone have this key, because they alone are ordained for the people in
the things which appertain to God directly. The other key reaches to
heaven, not directly but through the medium of the Church Militant. By
this key a man goes to heaven, since, by its means, a man is shut out
from or admitted to the fellowship of the Church Militant, by
excommunication or absolution. This is called the key of "jurisdiction"
in the external court, wherefore even those who are not priests can
have this key, e.g. archdeacons, bishops elect, and others who can
excommunicate. But it is not properly called a key of heaven, but a
disposition thereto.
Reply to Objection 1: The doorkeepers have the key for taking care of
those things which are contained in a material temple, and they have to
judge whether a person should be excluded from or admitted to that
temple; which judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority, but
in pursuance to the priest's judgment, so that they appear to be the
administrators of the priestly power.
Reply to Objection 2: Kings have no power in spiritual matters, so that
they do not receive the key of the heavenly kingdom. Their power is
confined to temporal matters, and this too can only come to them from
God, as appears from Rom. 13:1. Nor are they consecrated by the unction
of a sacred order: their anointing is merely a sign that the excellence
of their power comes down to them from Christ, and that, under Christ,
they reign over the Christian people.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in civil matters the whole power is
sometimes vested in a judge, as in a kingdom, whereas sometimes it is
vested in many exercising various offices but acting together with
equal rights (Ethic. viii, 10,11), so too, spiritual jurisdiction may
be exercised both by one alone, e.g. a bishop, and by many together,
e.g. by a Chapter, and thus they have the key of jurisdiction, but they
have not all together the key of order.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:11; Titus
2:5), woman is in a state of subjection: wherefore she can have no
spiritual jurisdiction, since the Philosopher also says (Ethic. viii)
that it is a corruption of public life when the government comes into
the hands of a woman. Consequently a woman has neither the key of order
nor the key of jurisdiction. Nevertheless a certain use of the keys is
allowed to women, such as the right to correct other women who are
under them, on account of the danger that might threaten if men were to
dwell under the same roof.
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Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that holy men, even those who are not
priests, have the use of the keys. For loosing and binding, which are
the effects of the keys, derive their efficacy from the merit of
Christ's Passion. Now those are most conformed to Christ's Passion, who
follow Christ, suffering by patience and other virtues. Therefore it
seems that even if they have not the priestly order, they can bind and
loose.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Heb. 7:7): "Without all
contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg.:
'better']." Now "in spiritual matters," according to Augustine (De
Trin. vi, 8), "to be better is to be greater." Therefore those who are
better, i.e. who have more charity, can bless others by absolving them.
Hence the same conclusion follows.
On the contrary, "Action belongs to that which has the power," as the
Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil. i). But the key which is a
spiritual power belongs to priests alone. Therefore priests alone are
competent to have the use of the keys.
I answer that, There is this difference between a principal and an
instrumental agent, that the latter does not produce, in the effect,
its own likeness, but the likeness of the principal agent, whereas the
principal agent produces its own likeness. Consequently a thing becomes
a principal agent through having a form, which it can reproduce in
another, whereas an instrumental agent is not constituted thus, but
through being applied by the principal agent in order to produce a
certain effect. Since therefore in the act of the keys the principal
agent by authority is Christ as God, and by merit is Christ as man,* it
follows that on account of the very fulness of Divine goodness in Him,
and of the perfection of His grace, He is competent to exercise the act
of the keys. [*For St. Thomas' later teaching on this point, cf.
[4875]TP, Q[48], A[6]; [4876]FS, Q[112], A[1], ad 1]. But another man
is not competent to exercise this act as principal agent, since neither
can he give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can he
merit sufficiently, so that he is nothing more than an instrumental
agent. Consequently the recipient of the effect of the keys, is
likened, not to the one who uses the keys, but to Christ. Therefore, no
matter how much grace a man may have, he cannot produce the effect of
the keys, unless he be appointed to that purpose by receiving orders.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as between instrument and effect there is
need or likeness, not of a similar form, but of aptitude in the
instrument for the effect, so is it as regards the instrument and the
principal agent. The former is the likeness between holy men and the
suffering Christ, nor does it bestow on them the use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a mere man cannot merit grace for
another man condignly, yet the merit of one man can co-operate in the
salvation of another. Hence there is a twofold blessing. One proceeds
from a mere man, as meriting by his own act: this blessing can be
conferred by any holy person in whom Christ dwells by His grace, in so
far as he excels in goodness the person whom he blesses. The other
blessing is when a man blesses, as applying a blessing instrumentally
through the merit of Christ, and this requires excellence of order and
not of virtue.
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Whether wicked priests have the use of the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that wicked priests have not the use of the
keys. For in the passage where the use of the keys is bestowed on the
apostles (Jn. 20:22,23), the gift of the Holy Ghost is promised. But
wicked men have not the Holy Ghost. Therefore they have not the use of
the keys.
Objection 2: Further, no wise king entrusts his enemy with the
dispensation of his treasure. Now the use of the keys consists in
dispensing the treasure of the King of heaven, Who is Wisdom itself.
Therefore the wicked, who are His enemies on account of sin, have not
the use of the keys.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Bapt. v, 21) that God "gives
the sacrament of grace even through wicked men, but grace itself only
by Himself or through His saints." Hence He forgives sin by Himself, or
by those who are members of the Dove. But the remission of sins is the
use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not "members of the Dove,"
have not the use of the keys.
Objection 4: Further, the prayer of a wicked priest cannot effect
reconciliation, for, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 11), "if an
unacceptable person is sent to intercede, anger is provoked to yet
greater severity." But the use of the keys implies a kind of
intercession, as appears in the form of absolution. Therefore wicked
priests cannot use the keys effectively.
On the contrary, No man can know whether another man is in the state of
grace. If, therefore, no one could use the keys in giving absolution
unless he were in a state of grace, no one would know that he had been
absolved, which would be very unfitting.
Further, the wickedness of the minister cannot void the liberality of
his lord. But the priest is no more than a minister. Therefore he
cannot by his wickedness take away from us the gift which God has given
through him.
I answer that, Just as participation of a form to be induced into an
effect does not make a thing to be an instrument, so neither does the
loss of that form prevent that thing being used as an instrument.
Consequently, since man is merely an instrument in the use of the keys,
however much he may through sin be deprived of grace, whereby sins are
forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived of the use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 1: The gift of the Holy Ghost is requisite for the
use of the keys, not as being indispensable for the purpose, but
because it is unbecoming for the user to use them without it, though he
that submits to them receives their effect.
Reply to Objection 2: An earthly king can be cheated and deceived in
the matter of his treasure, and so he does not entrust his enemy with
the dispensation thereof. But the King of heaven cannot be cheated,
because all tends to His own glory, even the abuse of the keys by some,
for He can make good come out of evil, and produce many good effects
through evil men. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks of the remission of sins in so
far as holy men co-operate therein, not by virtue of the keys, but by
merit of congruity. Hence He says that God confers the sacraments even
through evil men, and among the other sacraments, absolution which is
the use of the keys should be reckoned: but that through "members of
the Dove," i.e. holy men, He grants forgiveness of sins, in so far as
He remits sins on account of their intercession.
We might also reply that by "members of the Dove" he means all who are
not cut off from the Church, for those who receive the sacraments from
them, receive grace, whereas those who receive the sacraments from
those who are cut off from the Church, do not receive grace, because
they sin in so doing, except in the case of Baptism, which, in cases of
necessity, may be received even from one who is excommunicate.
Reply to Objection 4: The prayer which the wicked priest proffers on
his own account, is not efficacious: but that which he makes as a
minister of the Church, is efficacious through the merit of Christ. Yet
in both ways the priest's prayer should profit those who are subject to
him.
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Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or
degraded have the use of the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are schismatics, heretics,
excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys. For just
as the power of the keys results from orders, so does the power of
consecration. But the above cannot lose the use of the power of
consecration, since if they do consecrate it is valid, though they sin
in doing so. Therefore neither can they lose the use of the keys.
Objection 2: Further, any active spiritual power in one who has the use
of his free-will can be exercised by him when he wills. Now the power
of the keys remains in the aforesaid, for, since it is only conferred
with orders, they would have to be reordained when they return to the
Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can exercise it
when they will.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual grace is hindered by guilt more than by
punishment. Now excommunication, suspension and degradation are
punishments. Therefore, since a man does not lose the use of the keys
on account of guilt, it seems that he does not lose it on account of
the aforesaid.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. cxxi in Joan.) that the
"charity of the Church forgives sins." Now it is the charity of the
Church which unites its members. Since therefore the above are
disunited from the Church, it seems that they have not the use of the
keys in remitting sins.
Further, no man is absolved from sin by sinning. Now it is a sin for
anyone to seek absolution of his sins from the above, for he disobeys
the Church in so doing. Therefore he cannot be absolved by them: and so
the same conclusion follows.
I answer that, In all the above the power of the keys remains as to its
essence, but its use is hindered on account of the lack of matter. For
since the use of the keys requires in the user authority over the
person on whom they are used, as stated above ([4877]Q[17], A[2], ad
2), the proper matter on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a
man under one's authority. And since it is by appointment of the Church
that one man has authority over another, so a man may be deprived of
his authority over another by his ecclesiastical superiors.
Consequently, since the Church deprives heretics, schismatics and the
like, by withdrawing their subjects from them either altogether or in
some respect, in so far as they are thus deprived, they cannot have the
use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 1: The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist, on
which the priest exercises his power, is not a man but wheaten bread,
and in Baptism, the matter is simply a man. Wherefore, just as, were a
heretic to be without wheaten bread, he could not consecrate, so
neither can a prelate absolve if he be deprived of his authority, yet
he can baptize and consecrate, albeit to his own damnation.
Reply to Objection 2: The assertion is true, provided matter be not
lacking as it is in the case in point.
Reply to Objection 3: Sin, of itself, does not remove matter, as
certain punishments do: so that punishment is a hindrance not because
it is contrary to the effect, but for the reason stated.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider those on whom the power of the keys can be
exercised. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a priest can use the key, which he has, on any man?
(2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?
(3) Whether anyone can use the keys on his superior?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a priest can use the key which he has, on any man?
Objection 1: It would seem that a priest can use the key which he has,
on any man. For the power of the keys was bestowed on priests by Divine
authority in the words: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you
shall forgive, they are forgiven them" (Jn. 20:22,23). But this was
said without any restriction. Therefore he that has the key, can use it
on any without restriction.
Objection 2: Further, a material key that opens one lock, opens all
locks of the same pattern. Now every sin of every man is the same kind
of obstacle against entering into heaven. Therefore if a priest can, by
means of the key which he has, absolve one man, he can do the same for
all others.
Objection 3: Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more
perfect than that of the Old Testament. But the priest of the Old
Testament could use the power which he had of discerning between
different kinds of leprosy, with regard to all indiscriminately. Much
more therefore can the priest of the Gospel use his power with regard
to all.
On the contrary, It is written in the Appendix of Gratian: "It is not
lawful for every priest to loose or bind another priest's parishioner."
Therefore a priest cannot absolve everybody.
Further, judgment in spiritual matters should be better regulated than
in temporal matters. But in temporal matters a judge cannot judge
everybody. Therefore, since the use of the keys is a kind of judgment,
it is not within the competency of a priest to use his key with regard
to everyone.
I answer that, That which has to do with singular matters is not
equally in the power of all. Thus, even as besides the general
principles of medicine, it is necessary to have physicians, who adapt
those general principles to individual patients or diseases, according
to their various requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one
who proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is need for others
to adapt those precepts to individual cases, according as each case
demands. For this reason, in the heavenly hierarchy also, under the
Powers who rule indiscriminately, a place is given to the
Principalities, who are appointed to individual kingdoms, and to the
Angels who are given charge over individual men, as we have explained
above ([4878]FP, Q[113], AA[1],2). Consequently there should be a like
order of authority in the Church Militant, so that an indiscriminate
authority over all should be vested in one individual, and that there
should be others under him, having distinct authority over various
people. Now the use of the keys implies a certain power to exercise
authority, whereby the one on whom the keys are used, becomes the
proper matter of that act. Therefore he that has power over all
indiscriminately, can use the keys on all, whereas those who have
received authority over distinct persons, cannot use the keys on
everyone, but only on those over whom they are appointed, except in
cases of necessity, when the sacraments should be refused to no one.
Reply to Objection 1: A twofold power is required in order to absolve
from sins, namely, power of order and power of jurisdiction. The former
power is equally in all priests, but not the latter. And therefore,
when our Lord (Jn. 20:23) gave all the apostles in general, the power
of forgiving sins, this is to be understood of the power which results
from receiving orders, wherefore these words are addressed to priests
when they are ordained. But to Peter in particular He gave the power of
forgiving sins (Mat. 16:19), that we may understand that he has the
power of jurisdiction before the others. But the power of orders,
considered in itself, extends to all who can be absolved: wherefore our
Lord said indeterminately, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are
forgiven them," on the understanding that this power should be used in
dependence on the power given to Peter, according to His appointment.
Reply to Objection 2: A material key can open only its own lock. nor
can any active force act save on its own matter. Now a man becomes the
matter of the power of order by jurisdiction: and consequently no one
can use the key in respect of another over whom he has not
jurisdiction.
Reply to Objection 3: The people of Israel were one people, and had but
one temple, so that there was no need for a distinction in priestly
jurisdiction, as there is now in the Church which comprises various
peoples and nations.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that a priest cannot always absolve his
subject. For, as Augustine says (De vera et false Poenitentia [*Work of
an unknown author]), "no man should exercise the priestly office,
unless he be free from those things which he condemns in others." But a
priest might happen to share in a sin committed by his subject, e.g. by
knowledge of a woman who is his subject. Therefore it seems that he
cannot always use the power of the keys on his subjects.
Objection 2: Further, by the power of the keys a man is healed of all
his shortcomings. Now it happens sometimes that a sin has attached to
it a defect of irregularity or a sentence of excommunication, from
which a simple priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems that he cannot
use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these things in
the above manner.
Objection 3: Further, the judgment and power of our priesthood was
foreshadowed by the judgment of the ancient priesthood. Now according
to the Law, the lesser judges were not competent to decide all cases,
and had recourse to the higher judges, according to Ex. 24:14: "If any
question shall arise" among you, "you shall refer it to them." It
seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve his subject from graver
sins, but should refer him to his superior.
On the contrary, Whoever has charge of the principal has charge of the
accessory. Now priests are charged with the dispensation of the
Eucharist to their subjects, to which sacrament the absolution of sins
is subordinate [*Cf.[4879] Q[17], A[2], ad 1]. Therefore, as far as the
power of the keys is concerned, a priest can absolve his subject from
any sins whatever.
Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But a priest dispenses
sacraments whereby grace is given. Therefore, as far as the power of
the keys is concerned, he can absolve from all sins.
I answer that, The power of order, considered in itself, extends to the
remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of this
power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their
superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain matters to
himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior;
otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction can absolve from any
sin. Now there are five cases in which a simple priest must refer his
penitent to his superior. The first is when a public penance has to be
imposed, because in that case the bishop is the proper minister of the
sacrament. The second is the case of those who are excommunicated when
the inferior priest cannot absolve a penitent through the latter being
excommunicated by his superior. The third case is when he finds that an
irregularity has been contracted, for the dispensation of which he has
to have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of arson. The
fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for the more heinous crimes
to be reserved to the bishop, in order to inspire fear, because custom
in these cases either gives the power or takes it away.
Reply to Objection 1: In this case the priest should not hear the
confession of his accomplice, with regard to that particular sin, but
must refer her to another: nor should she confess to him but should ask
permission to go to another, or should have recourse to his superior if
he refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of less
shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would be valid*: because
when Augustine says that they should not be guilty of the same sin, he
is speaking of what is congruous, not of what is essential to the
sacrament. [*Benedict XIV declared the absolution of an accomplice "in
materia turpi" to be invalid.]
Reply to Objection 2: Penance delivers man from all defects of guilt,
but not from all defects of punishment, since even after doing penance
for murder, a man remains irregular. Hence a priest can absolve from a
crime, but for the remission of the punishment he must refer the
penitent to the superior, except in the case of excommunication,
absolution from which should precede absolution from sin, for as long
as a man is excommunicated, he cannot receive any sacrament of the
Church.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers those cases in which
superiors reserve the power of jurisdiction to themselves.
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Whether a man can use the keys with regard to his superior?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot use the keys in respect of
a superior. For every sacramental act requires its proper matter. Now
the proper matter for the use of the keys, is a person who is subject,
as stated above ([4880]Q[19], A[6]). Therefore a priest cannot use the
keys in respect of one who is not his subject.
Objection 2: Further, the Church Militant is an image of the Church
Triumphant. Now in the heavenly Church an inferior angel never
cleanses, enlightens or perfects a higher angel. Therefore neither can
an inferior priest exercise on a superior a hierarchical action such as
absolution.
Objection 3: Further, the judgment of Penance should be better
regulated than the judgment of an external court. Now in the external
court an inferior cannot excommunicate or absolve his superior.
Therefore, seemingly, neither can he do so in the penitential court.
On the contrary, The higher prelate is also "compassed with infirmity,"
and may happen to sin. Now the power of the keys is the remedy for sin.
Therefore, since he cannot use the key on himself, for he cannot be
both judge and accused at the same time, it seems that an inferior can
use the power of the keys on him.
Further, absolution which is given through the power of the keys, is
ordained to the reception of the Eucharist. But an inferior can give
Communion to his superior, if the latter asks him to. Therefore he can
use the power of the keys on him if he submit to him.
I answer that, The power of the keys, considered in itself, is
applicable to all, as stated above [4881](A[2]): and that a priest is
unable to use the keys on some particular person is due to his power
being limited to certain individuals. Therefore he who limited his
power can extend it to whom he wills, so that he can give him power
over himself, although he cannot use the power of the keys on himself,
because this power requires to be exercised on a subject, and therefore
on someone else, for no man can be subject to himself.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the bishop whom a simple priest absolves
is his superior absolutely speaking, yet he is beneath him in so far as
he submits himself as a sinner to him.
Reply to Objection 2: In the angels there can be no defect by reason of
which the higher angel can submit to the lower, such as there can
happen to be among men; and so there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: External judgment is according to men, whereas
the judgment of confession is according to God, in Whose sight a man is
lessened by sinning, which is not the case in human prelacy. Therefore
just as in external judgment no man can pass sentence of
excommunication on himself, so neither can he empower another to
excommunicate him. On the other hand, in the tribunal of conscience he
can give another the power to absolve him, though he cannot use that
power himself.
It may also be replied that absolution in the tribunal of the
confessional belongs principally to the power of the keys and
consequently to the power of jurisdiction, whereas excommunication
regards jurisdiction exclusively. And, as to the power of orders, all
are equal, but not as to jurisdiction. Wherefore there is no
comparison.
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OF THE DEFINITION, CONGRUITY AND CAUSE OF EXCOMMUNICATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now treat of excommunication: we shall consider: (1) the
definition, congruity and cause of excommunication; (2) who has the
power to excommunicate; (3) communication with excommunicated persons;
(4) absolution from excommunication.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined?
(2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?
(3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal
harm?
(4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?
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Whether excommunication is suitably defined as separation from the communio
n
of the Church, etc?
Objection 1: It would seem that excommunication is unsuitably defined
by some thus: "Excommunication is separation from the communion of the
Church, as to fruit and general suffrages." For the suffrages of the
Church avail for those for whom they are offered. But the Church prays
for those who are outside the Church, as, for instance, for heretics
and pagans. Therefore she prays also for the excommunicated, since they
are outside the Church, and so the suffrages of the Church avail for
them.
Objection 2: Further, no one loses the suffrages of the Church except
by his own fault. Now excommunication is not a fault, but a punishment.
Therefore excommunication does not deprive a man of the general
suffrages of the Church.
Objection 3: Further, the fruit of the Church seems to be the same as
the Church's suffrages, for it cannot mean the fruit of temporal goods,
since excommunication does not deprive a man of these. Therefore there
is no reason for mentioning both.
Objection 4: Further, there is a kind of excommunication called minor*,
by which man is not deprived of the suffrages of the Church. [*Minor
excommunication is no longer recognized by Canon Law.] Therefore this
definition is unsuitable.
I answer that, When a man enters the Church by Baptism, he is admitted
to two things, viz. the body of the faithful and the participation of
the sacraments: and this latter presupposes the former, since the
faithful are united together in the participation of the sacraments.
Consequently a person may be expelled from the Church in two ways.
First, by being deprived merely of the participation of the sacraments,
and this is the minor excommunication. Secondly, by being deprived of
both, and this is the major excommunication, of which the above is the
definition. Nor can there be a third, consisting in the privation of
communion with the faithful, but not of the participation of the
sacraments, for the reason already given, because, to wit, the faithful
communicate together in the sacraments. Now communion with the faithful
is twofold. One consists in spiritual things, such as their praying for
one another, and meeting together for the reception of sacred things;
while another consists in certain legitimate bodily actions. These
different manners of communion are signified in the verse which
declares that those who are excommunicate are deprived of---
"os, orare, vale, communio, mensa."
"Os," i.e. we must not give them tokens of goodwill; "orare," i.e. we
must not pray with them; "vale," we must not give them marks of
respect; "communio," i.e. we must not communicate with them in the
sacraments; "mensa," i.e. we must not take meals with them. Accordingly
the above definition includes privation of the sacraments in the words
"as to the fruit," and from partaking together with the faithful in
spiritual things, in the words, "and the general prayers of the
Church."
Another definition is given which expresses the privation of both kinds
of acts, and is as follows: "Excommunication is the privation of all
lawful communion with the faithful."
Reply to Objection 1: Prayers are said for unbelievers, but they do not
receive the fruit of those prayers unless they be converted to the
faith. In like manner prayers may be offered up for those who are
excommunicated, but not among the prayers that are said for the members
of the Church. Yet they do not receive the fruit so long as they remain
under the excommunication, but prayers are said for them that they may
receive the spirit of repentance, so that they may be loosed from
excommunication.
Reply to Objection 2: One man's prayers profit another in so far as
they can reach to him. Now the action of one man may reach to another
in two ways. First, by virtue of charity which unites all the faithful,
making them one in God, according to Ps. 118:63: "I am a partaker with
all them that fear Thee." Now excommunication does not interrupt this
union, since no man can be justly excommunicated except for a mortal
sin, whereby a man is already separated from charity, even without
being excommunicated. An unjust excommunication cannot deprive a man of
charity, since this is one of the greatest of all goods, of which a man
cannot be deprived against his will. Secondly, through the intention of
the one who prays, which intention is directed to the person he prays
for, and this union is interrupted by excommunication, because by
passing sentence of excommunication, the Church severs a man from the
whole body of the faithful, for whom she prays. Hence those prayers of
the Church which are offered up for the whole Church, do not profit
those who are excommunicated. Nor can prayers be said for them among
the members of the Church as speaking in the Church's name, although a
private individual may say a prayer with the intention of offering it
for their conversion.
Reply to Objection 3: The spiritual fruit of the Church is derived not
only from her prayers, but also from the sacraments received and from
the faithful dwelling together.
Reply to Objection 4: The minor excommunication does not fulfill all
the conditions of excommunication but only a part of them, hence the
definition of excommunication need not apply to it in every respect,
but only in some.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought not to excommunicate
anyone, because excommunication is a kind of curse, and we are
forbidden to curse (Rom. 12:14). Therefore the Church should not
excommunicate.
Objection 2: Further, the Church Militant should imitate the Church
Triumphant. Now we read in the epistle of Jude (verse 9) that "when
Michael the Archangel disputing with the devil contended about the body
of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of railing
speech, but said: The Lord command thee." Therefore the Church Militant
ought not to judge any man by cursing or excommunicating him.
Objection 3: Further, no man should be given into the hands of his
enemies, unless there be no hope for him. Now by excommunication a man
is given into the hands of Satan, as is clear from 1 Cor. 5:5. Since
then we should never give up hope about anyone in this life, the Church
should not excommunicate anyone.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 5:5) ordered a man to be
excommunicated.
Further, it is written (Mat. 18:17) about the man who refuses to hear
the Church: "Let him be to thee as the heathen or publican." But
heathens are outside the Church. Therefore they also who refuse to hear
the Church, should be banished from the Church by excommunication.
I answer that, The judgment of the Church should be conformed to the
judgment of God. Now God punishes the sinner in many ways, in order to
draw him to good, either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving
him to himself so that being deprived of those helps whereby he was
kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, and humbly return to
God Whom he had abandoned in his pride. In both these respects the
Church by passing sentence of excommunication imitates the judgment of
God. For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful that he
may blush with shame, she imitates the judgment whereby God chastises
man with stripes; and by depriving him of prayers and other spiritual
things, she imitates the judgment of God in leaving man to himself, in
order that by humility he may learn to know himself and return to God.
Reply to Objection 1: A curse may be pronounced in two ways: first, so
that the intention of the one who curses is fixed on the evil which he
invokes or pronounces, and cursing in this sense is altogether
forbidden. Secondly, so that the evil which a man invokes in cursing is
intended for the good of the one who is cursed, and thus cursing is
sometimes lawful and salutary: thus a physician makes a sick man
undergo pain, by cutting him, for instance, in order to deliver him
from his sickness.
Reply to Objection 2: The devil cannot be brought to repentance,
wherefore the pain of excommunication cannot do him any good.
Reply to Objection 3: From the very fact that a man is deprived of the
prayers of the Church, he incurs a triple loss, corresponding to the
three things which a man acquires through the Church's prayers. For
they bring an increase of grace to those who have it, or merit grace
for those who have it not; and in this respect the Master of the
Sentences says (Sent. iv, D, 18): "The grace of God is taken away by
excommunication." They also prove a safeguard of virtue; and in this
respect he says that "protection is taken away," not that the
excommunicated person is withdrawn altogether from God's providence,
but that he is excluded from that protection with which He watches over
the children of the Church in a more special way. Moreover, they are
useful as a defense against the enemy, and in this respect he says that
"the devil receives greater power of assaulting the excommunicated
person, both spiritually and corporally." Hence in the early Church,
when men had to be enticed to the faith by means of outward signs (thus
the gift of the Holy Ghost was shown openly by a visible sign), so too
excommunication was evidenced by a person being troubled in his body by
the devil. Nor is it unreasonable that one, for whom there is still
hope, be given over to the enemy, for he is surrendered, not unto
damnation, but unto correction, since the Church has the power to
rescue him from the hands of the enemy, whenever he is willing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?
Objection 1: It would seem that no man should be excommunicated for
inflicting a temporal harm. For the punishment should not exceed the
fault. But the punishment of excommunication is the privation of a
spiritual good, which surpasses all temporal goods. Therefore no man
should be excommunicated for temporal injuries.
Objection 2: Further, we should render to no man evil for evil,
according to the precept of the Apostle (Rom. 12:17). But this would be
rendering evil for evil, if a man were to be excommunicated for doing
such an injury. Therefore this ought by no means to be done.
On the contrary, Peter sentenced Ananias and Saphira to death for
keeping back the price of their piece of land (Acts 5:1-10). Therefore
it is lawful for the Church to excommunicate for temporal injuries.
I answer that, By excommunication the ecclesiastical judge excludes a
man, in a sense, from the kingdom. Wherefore, since he ought not to
exclude from the kingdom others than the unworthy, as was made clear
from the definition of the keys ([4882]Q[17], A[2]), and since no one
becomes unworthy, unless, through committing a mortal sin, he lose
charity which is the way leading to the kingdom, it follows that no man
should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. And since by injuring
a man in his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and act
against charity, the Church can excommunicate a man for having
inflicted temporal injury on anyone. Yet, as excommunication is the
most severe punishment, and since punishments are intended as remedies,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii), and again since a prudent
physician begins with lighter and less risky remedies, therefore
excommunication should not be inflicted, even for a mortal sin, unless
the sinner be obstinate, either by not coming up for judgment, or by
going away before judgment is pronounced, or by failing to obey the
decision of the court. For then, if, after due warning, he refuse to
obey, he is reckoned to be obstinate, and the judge, not being able to
proceed otherwise against him, must excommunicate him.
Reply to Objection 1: A fault is not measured by the extent of the
damage a man does, but by the will with which he does it, acting
against charity. Wherefore, though the punishment of excommunication
exceeds the harm done, it does not exceed the measure of the sin.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man is corrected by being punished, evil
is not rendered to him, but good: since punishments are remedies, as
stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?
Objection 1: It would seem that an excommunication which is pronounced
unjustly has no effect at all. Because excommunication deprives a man
of the protection and grace of God, which cannot be forfeited unjustly.
Therefore excommunication has no effect if it be unjustly pronounced.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (on Mat. 16:19: "I will give to thee
the keys"): "It is a pharisaical severity to reckon as really bound or
loosed, that which is bound or loosed unjustly." But that severity was
proud and erroneous. Therefore an unjust excommunication has no effect.
On the contrary, According to Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.), "the
sentence of the pastor is to be feared whether it be just or unjust."
Now there would be no reason to fear an unjust excommunication if it
did not hurt. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, An excommunication may be unjust for two reasons. First,
on the part of its author, as when anyone excommunicates through hatred
or anger, and then, nevertheless, the excommunication takes effect,
though its author sins, because the one who is excommunicated suffers
justly, even if the author act wrongly in excommunicating him.
Secondly, on the part of the excommunication, through there being no
proper cause, or through the sentence being passed without the forms of
law being observed. In this case, if the error, on the part of the
sentence, be such as to render the sentence void, this has no effect,
for there is no excommunication; but if the error does not annul the
sentence, this takes effect, and the person excommunicated should
humbly submit (which will be credited to him as a merit), and either
seek absolution from the person who has excommunicated him, or appeal
to a higher judge. If, however, he were to contemn the sentence, he
would "ipso facto" sin mortally.
But sometimes it happens that there is sufficient cause on the part of
the excommunicator, but not on the part of the excommunicated, as when
a man is excommunicated for a crime which he has not committed, but
which has been proved against him: in this case, if he submit humbly,
the merit of his humility will compensate him for the harm of
excommunication.
Reply to Objection 1: Although a man cannot lose God's grace unjustly,
yet he can unjustly lose those things which on our part dispose us to
receive grace. for instance, a man may be deprived of the instruction
which he ought to have. It is in this sense that excommunication is
said to deprive a man of God's grace, as was explained above (A[2], ad
3).
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome is speaking of sin not of its punishments,
which can be inflicted unjustly by ecclesiastical superiors.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE WHO CAN EXCOMMUNICATE OR BE EXCOMMUNICATED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider those who can excommunicate or be excommunicated.
Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every priest can excommunicate?
(2) Whether one who is not a priest can excommunicate?
(3) Whether one who is excommunicated or suspended, can excommunicate?
(4) Whether anyone can excommunicate himself, or an equal, or a
superior?
(5) Whether a multitude can be excommunicated?
(6) Whether one who is already excommunicated can be excommunicated
again?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every priest can excommunicate?
Objection 1: It would seem that every priest can excommunicate. For
excommunication is an act of the keys. But every priest has the keys.
Therefore every priest can excommunicate.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater thing to loose and bind in the
tribunal of penance than in the tribunal of judgment. But every priest
can loose and bind his subjects in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore
every priest can excommunicate his subjects.
On the contrary, Matters fraught with danger should be left to the
decision of superiors. Now the punishment of excommunication is fraught
with many dangers, unless it be inflicted with moderation. Therefore it
should not be entrusted to every priest.
I answer that, In the tribunal of conscience the plea is between man
and God, whereas in the outward tribunal it is between man and man.
Wherefore the loosing or binding of one man in relation to God alone,
belongs to the tribunal of Penance, whereas the binding or loosing of a
man in relation to other men, belongs to the public tribunal of
external judgment. And since excommunication severs a man from the
communion of the faithful, it belongs to the external tribunal.
Consequently those alone can excommunicate who have jurisdiction in the
judicial tribunal. Hence, of their own authority, only bishops and
higher prelates, according to the more common opinion can
excommunicate, whereas parish priests can do so only by commission or
in certain cases, as those of theft, rapine and the like, in which the
law allows them to excommunicate. Others, however, have maintained that
even parish priests can excommunicate: but the former opinion is more
reasonable.
Reply to Objection 1: Excommunication is an act of the keys not
directly, but with respect to the external judgment. The sentence of
excommunication, however, though it is promulgated by an external
verdict, still, as it belongs somewhat to the entrance to the kingdom,
in so far as the Church Militant is the way to the Church Triumphant,
this jurisdiction whereby a man is competent to excommunicate, can be
called a key. It is in this sense that some distinguish between the key
of orders, which all priests have, and the key of jurisdiction in the
tribunal of judgment, which none have but the judges of the external
tribunal. Nevertheless God bestowed both on Peter (Mat. 16:19), from
whom they are derived by others, whichever of them they have.
Reply to Objection 2: Parish priests have jurisdiction indeed over
their subjects, in the tribunal of conscience, but not in the judicial
tribunal, for they cannot summons them in contentious cases. Hence they
cannot excommunicate, but they can absolve them in the tribunal of
Penance. And though the tribunal of Penance is higher, yet more
solemnity is requisite in the judicial tribunal, because therein it is
necessary to make satisfaction not only to God but also to man.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who are not priests can excommunicate?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are not priests cannot
excommunicate. Because excommunication is an act of the keys, as stated
in Sent. iv, D, 18. But those who are not priests have not the keys.
Therefore they cannot excommunicate.
Objection 2: Further, more is required for excommunication than for
absolution in the tribunal of Penance. But one who is not a priest
cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Neither therefore can he
excommunicate.
On the contrary, Archdeacons, legates and bishops-elect excommunicate,
and yet sometimes they are not priests. Therefore not only priests can
excommunicate.
I answer that, Priests alone are competent to dispense the sacraments
wherein grace is given: wherefore they alone can loose and bind in the
tribunal of Penance. On the other hand excommunication regards grace,
not directly but consequently, in so far as it deprives a man of the
Church's prayers, by which he is disposed for grace or preserved
therein. Consequently even those who are not priests, provided they
have jurisdiction in a contentious court, can excommunicate.
Reply to Objection 1: Though they have not the key of orders, they have
the key of jurisdiction.
Reply to Objection 2: These two are related to one another as something
exceeding and something exceeded [*Cf. A[1], a[2];[4883] Q[24], A[1],
ad 1], and consequently one of them may be within the competency of
someone while the other is not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is excommunicated or suspended
can excommunicate another. For such a one has lost neither orders nor
jurisdiction, since neither is he ordained anew when he is absolved,
nor is his jurisdiction renewed. But excommunication requires nothing
more than orders or jurisdiction. Therefore even one who is
excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate.
Objection 2: Further. it is a greater thing to consecrate the body of
Christ than to excommunicate. But such persons can consecrate.
Therefore they can excommunicate.
On the contrary, one whose body is bound cannot bind another. But
spiritual gyves are stronger than bodily fetters. Therefore one who is
excommunicated cannot excommunicate another, since excommunication is a
spiritual chain.
I answer that, Jurisdiction can only be used in relation to another
man. Consequently, since every excommunicated person is severed from
the communion of the faithful, he is deprived of the use of
jurisdiction. And as excommunication requires jurisdiction, an
excommunicated person cannot excommunicate, and the same reason applies
to one who is suspended from jurisdiction. For if he be suspended from
orders only, then he cannot exercise his order, but he can use his
jurisdiction, while, on the other hand, if he be suspended from
jurisdiction and not from orders. he cannot use his jurisdiction,
though he can exercise his order: and if he be suspended from both, he
can exercise neither.
Reply to Objection 1: Although an excommunicated or suspended person
does not lose his jurisdiction, yet he does lose its use.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of consecration results from the power
of the character which is indelible, wherefore, from the very fact that
a man has the character of order, he can always consecrate, though not
always lawfully. It is different with the power of excommunication
which results from jurisdiction, for this can be taken away and bound.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can excommunicate himself, his
equal, or his superior. For an angel of God was greater than Paul,
according to Mat. 11:11: "He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is
greater then he, a greater" than whom "hath not risen among men that
are born of women." Now Paul excommunicated an angel from heaven (Gal.
1:8). Therefore a man can excommunicate his superior.
Objection 2: Further, sometimes a priest pronounces a general
excommunication for theft or the like. But it might happen that he, or
his equal, or a superior has done such things. Therefore a man can
excommunicate himself, his equal, or a superior.
Objection 3: Further, a man can absolve his superior or his equal in
the tribunal of Penance, as when a bishop confesses to his subject, or
one priest confesses venial sins to another. Therefore it seems that a
man may also excommunicate his superior, or his equal.
On the contrary, Excommunication is an act of jurisdiction. But no man
has jurisdiction over himself (since one cannot be both judge and
defendant in the same trial), or over his superior, or over an equal.
Therefore a man cannot excommunicate his superior, or his equal, or
himself.
I answer that, Since, by jurisdiction, a man is placed above those over
whom he has jurisdiction, through being their judge, it follows that no
man has jurisdiction over himself, his superior, or his equal, and
that, consequently, no one can excommunicate either himself, or his
superior, or his equal.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking hypothetically, i.e.
supposing an angel were to sin, for in that case he would not be higher
than the Apostle, but lower. Nor is it absurd that, if the antecedent
of a conditional sentence be impossible, the consequence be impossible
also.
Reply to Objection 2: In that case no one would be excommunicated,
since no man has power over his peer.
Reply to Objection 3: Loosing and binding in the tribunal of confession
affects our relation to God only, in Whose sight a man from being above
another sinks below him through sin; while on the other hand
excommunication is the affair of an external tribunal in which a man
does not forfeit his superiority on account of sin. Hence there is no
comparison between the two tribunals. Nevertheless, even in the
tribunal of confession, a man cannot absolve himself, or his superior,
or his equal, unless the power to do so be committed to him. This does
not apply to venial sins, because they can be remitted through any
sacraments which confer grace, hence remission of venial sins follows
the power of orders.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men?
Objection 1: It would seem that sentence of excommunication can be
passed on a body of men. Because it is possible for a number of people
to be united together in wickedness. Now when a man is obstinate in his
wickedness he should be excommunicated. Therefore a body of men can be
excommunicated.
Objection 2: Further, the most grievous effect of an excommunication is
privation of the sacraments of the Church. But sometimes a whole
country is laid under an interdict. Therefore a body of people can be
excommunicated.
On the contrary, A gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Ep. ccl] on Mat. 12 asserts
that the sovereign and a body of people cannot be excommunicated.
I answer that, No man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin.
Now sin consists in an act: and acts do not belong to communities, but,
generally speaking, to individuals. Wherefore individual members of a
community can be excommunicated, but not the community itself. And
although sometimes an act belongs to a whole multitude, as when many
draw a boat, which none of them could draw by himself, yet it is not
probable that a community would so wholly consent to evil that there
would be no dissentients. Now God, Who judges all the earth, does not
condemn the just with the wicked (Gn. 18:25). Therefore the Church, who
should imitate the judgments of God, prudently decided that a community
should not be excommunicated, lest the wheat be uprooted together with
the tares and cockle.
The Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: Suspension is not so great a punishment as
excommunication, since those who are suspended are not deprived of the
prayers of the Church, as the excommunicated are. Wherefore a man can
be suspended without having committed a sin himself, just as a whole
kingdom is laid under an interdict on account of the king's crime.
Hence there is no comparison between excommunication and suspension.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man can be excommunicated who is already under sentence of
excommunication?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man who is already under sentence of
excommunication cannot be excommunicated any further. For the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that are without?"
Now those who are excommunicated are already outside the Church.
Therefore the Church cannot exercise any further judgment on them, so
as to excommunicate them again.
Objection 2: Further, excommunication is privation of divine things and
of the communion of the faithful. But when a man has been deprived of a
thing, he cannot be deprived of it again. Therefore one who is
excommunicated cannot be excommunicated again
On the contrary, Excommunication is a punishment and a healing
medicine. Now punishments and medicines are repeated when necessary.
Therefore excommunication can be repeated.
I answer that, A man who is under sentence of one excommunication, can
be excommunicated again, either by a repetition of the same
excommunication, for his greater confusion, so that he may renounce
sin, or for some other cause. And then there are as many principal
excommunications, as there are causes for his being excommunicated.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of heathens and of other
unbelievers who have no (sacramental) character, whereby they are
numbered among the people of God. But since the baptismal character
whereby a man is numbered among God's people, is indelible, one who is
baptized always belongs to the Church in some way, so that the Church
is always competent to sit in judgment on him.
Reply to Objection 2: Although privation does not receive more or less
in itself, yet it can, as regards its cause. In this way an
excommunication can be repeated, and a man who has been excommunicated
several times is further from the Church's prayers than one who has
been excommunicated only once.
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OF COMMUNICATION WITH EXCOMMUNICATED PERSONS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider communication with those who are excommunicated.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to communicate in matters purely corporal with
one who is excommunicated?
(2) Whether one who communicates with an excommunicated person is
excommunicated?
(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an
excommunicated person in matters not permitted by law?
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Whether it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an
excommunicated person?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful, in matters purely
corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person. For
excommunication is an act of the keys. But the power of the keys
extends only to spiritual matters. Therefore excommunication does not
prevent one from communicating with another in matters corporal.
Objection 2: Further, "What is instituted for the sake of charity, does
not militate against charity" (Cf.[4884] Q[11], A[1], OBJ[1]). But we
are bound by the precept of charity to succor our enemies, which is
impossible without some sort of communication. Therefore it is lawful
to communicate with an excommunicated person in corporal matters.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 5:11): "With such an one not so
much as to eat."
I answer that, Excommunication is twofold: there is minor
excommunication, which deprives a man merely of a share in the
sacraments, but not of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is
lawful to communicate with a person lying under an excommunication of
this kind, but not to give him the sacraments. The other is major
excommunication which deprives a man of the sacraments of the Church
and of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is not lawful to
communicate with one who lies under such an excommunication. But, since
the Church resorts to excommunication to repair and not to destroy,
exception is made from this general law, in certain matters wherein
communication is lawful, viz. in those which concern salvation, for one
is allowed to speak of such matters with an excommunicated person; and
one may even speak of other matters so as to put him at his ease and to
make the words of salvation more acceptable. Moreover exception is made
in favor of certain people whose business it is to be in attendance on
the excommunicated person, viz. his wife, child, slave, vassal or
subordinate. This, however, is to be understood of children who have
not attained their majority, else they are forbidden to communicate
with their father: and as to the others, the exception applies to them
if they have entered his service before his excommunication, but not if
they did so afterwards.
Some understand this exception to apply in the opposite way, viz. that
the master can communicate with his subjects: while others hold the
contrary. At any rate it is lawful for them to communicate with others
in matters wherein they are under an obligation to them, for just as
subjects are bound to serve their master, so is the master bound to
look after his subjects. Again certain cases are excepted; as when the
fact of the excommunication is unknown, or in the case of strangers or
travelers in the country of those who are excommunicated, for they are
allowed to buy from them, or to receive alms from them. Likewise if
anyone were to see an excommunicated person in distress: for then he
would be bound by the precept of charity to assist him. These are all
contained in the following line: "Utility, law, lowliness, ignorance of
fact, necessity," where "utility" refers to salutary words, "law" to
marriage, "lowliness" to subjection. The others need no explanation.
Reply to Objection 1: Corporal matters are subordinate to spiritual
matters. Wherefore the power which extends to spiritual things, can
also extend to matters touching the body: even as the art which
considers the end commands in matters ordained to the end.
Reply to Objection 2: In a case where one is bound by the precept of
charity to hold communication, the prohibition ceases, as is clear from
what has been said.
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Whether a person incurs excommunication for communicating with one who is
excommunicated?
Objection 1: It would seem that a person does not incur excommunication
for communicating with one who is excommunicated. For a heathen or a
Jew is more separated from the Church than a person who is
excommunicated. But one does not incur excommunication for
communicating with a heathen or a Jew. Neither, therefore, does one for
communicating with an excommunicated Christian.
Objection 2: Further, if a man incurs excommunication for communicating
with an excommunicated person, for the same reason a third would incur
excommunication for communicating with him, and thus one might go on
indefinitely, which would seem absurd. Therefore one does not incur
excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated.
On the contrary, An excommunicated person is banished from communion.
Therefore whoever communicates with him leaves the communion of the
Church: and hence he seems to be excommunicated.
I answer that, A person may incur excommunication in two ways. First,
so that the excommunication includes both himself and whosoever
communicates with him: and then, without any doubt, whoever
communicates with him, incurs a major excommunication. Secondly, so
that the excommunication is simply pronounced on him; and then a man
may communicate with him either in his crime, by counsel, help or
favor, in which case again he incurs the major excommunication, or he
may communicate with him in other things by speaking to him, greeting
him, or eating with him, in which case he incurs the minor
excommunication.
Reply to Objection 1: The Church has no intention of correcting
unbelievers as well as the faithful who are under her care: hence she
does not sever those, whom she excommunicates, from the fellowship of
unbelievers, as she does from the communion of the faithful over whom
she exercises a certain power.
Reply to Objection 2: It is lawful to hold communion with one who has
incurred a minor excommunication, so that excommunication does not pass
on to a third person.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated
person in other cases than those in which it is allowed?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is always a mortal sin to hold
communion with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in
which it is allowed. Because a certain decretal (Cap. Sacris: De his
quae vi, metuve, etc.) declares that "not even through fear of death
should anyone hold communion with an excommunicated person, since one
ought to die rather than commit a mortal sin." But this would be no
reason unless it were always a mortal sin to hold communion with an
excommunicated person. Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, it is a mortal sin to act against a commandment
of the Church. But the Church forbids anyone to hold communion with an
excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion
with one who is excommunicated.
Objection 3: Further, no man is debarred from receiving the Eucharist
on account of a venial sin. But a man who holds communion with an
excommunicated person, outside those cases in which it is allowed, is
debarred from receiving the Eucharist, since he incurs a minor
excommunication. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with an
excommunicated person, save in those cases in which it is allowed.
Objection 4: Further, no one should incur a major excommunication save
for a mortal sin. Now according to the law (Can. Praecipue, seqq.,
caus. xi) a man may incur a major excommunication for holding communion
with an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold
communion with one who is excommunicated.
On the contrary, None can absolve a man from mortal sin unless he have
jurisdiction over him. But any priest can absolve a man for holding
communion with those who are excommunicated. Therefore it is not a
mortal sin.
Further, the measure of the penalty should be according to the measure
of the sin, as stated in Dt. 25:3. Now the punishment appointed by
common custom for holding communion with an excommunicated person is
not that which is inflicted for mortal sin, but rather that which is
due for venial sin. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.
I answer that, Some hold that it is always a mortal sin to hold
communion with an excommunicated person, by word or in any of the
forbidden ways mentioned above [4885](A[2]), except in those cases
allowed by law (Cap. Quoniam). But since it seems very hard that a man
should be guilty of a mortal sin by uttering just a slight word to an
excommunicated person, and that by excommunicating a person one would
endanger the salvation of many, and lay a snare which might turn to
one's own hurt, it seems to others more probable that he is not always
guilty of a mortal sin, but only when he holds communion with him in a
criminal deed, or in an act of Divine worship, or through contempt of
the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: This decretal is speaking of holding communion in
Divine worship. It may also be replied that the same reason applies
both to mortal and venial sin, since just as one cannot do well by
committing a mortal sin, so neither can one by committing a venial sin:
so that just as it is a man's duty to suffer death rather than commit a
mortal sin, so is it his duty to do so sooner than commit a venial sin,
inasmuch as it is his duty to avoid venial sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The commandment of the Church regards spiritual
matters directly, and legitimate actions as a consequence: hence by
holding communion in Divine worship one acts against the commandment,
and commits a mortal sin; but by holding communion in other matters,
one acts beside the commandment, and sins venially.
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes a man is debarred from the Eucharist
even without his own fault, as in the case of those who are suspended
or under an interdict, because these penalties are sometimes inflicted
on one person for the sin of another who is thus punished.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it is a venial sin to hold communion
with one who is excommunicated, yet to do so obstinately is a mortal
sin: and for this reason one may be excommunicated according to the
law.
__________________________________________________________________
OF ABSOLUTION FROM EXCOMMUNICATION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider absolution from excommunication: under which head
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication?
(2) Whether a man can be absolved from excommunication against his
will?
(3) Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without
being absolved from another?
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Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication?
Objection 1: It would seem that any priest can absolve his subject from
excommunication. For the chains of sin are stronger than those of
excommunication. But any priest can absolve his subject from sin.
Therefore much more can he absolve him from excommunication.
Objection 2: Further, if the cause is removed the effect is removed.
But the cause of excommunication is a mortal sin. Therefore since any
priest can absolve (his subject) from that mortal sin, he is able
likewise to absolve him from the excommunication.
On the contrary, It belongs to the same power to excommunicate as to
absolve from excommunication. But priests of inferior degree cannot
excommunicate their subjects. Neither, therefore, can they absolve
them.
I answer that, Anyone can absolve from minor excommunication who can
absolve from the sin of participation in the sin of another. But in the
case of a major excommunication, this is pronounced either by a judge,
and then he who pronounced sentence or his superior can absolve---or it
is pronounced by law, and then the bishop or even a priest can absolve
except in the six cases which the Pope, who is the maker of laws,
reserves to himself: the first is the case of a man who lays hands on a
cleric or a religious; the second is of one who breaks into a church
and is denounced for so doing; the third is of the man who sets fire to
a church and is denounced for the deed; the fourth is of one who
knowingly communicates in the Divine worship with those whom the Pope
has excommunicated by name; the fifth is the case of one who tampers
with the letters of the Holy See; the sixth is the case of one who
communicates in a crime of one who is excommunicated. For he should not
be absolved except by the person who excommunicated him, even though he
be not subject to him, unless, by reason of the difficulty of appearing
before him, he be absolved by the bishop or by his own priest, after
binding himself by oath to submit to the command of the judge who
pronounced the excommunication on him.
There are however eight exceptions to the first case: (1) In the hour
of death, when a person can be absolved by any priest from any
excommunication; (2) if the striker be the doorkeeper of a man in
authority, and the blow be given neither through hatred nor of set
purpose; (3) if the striker be a woman; (4) if the striker be a
servant, whose master is not at fault and would suffer from his
absence; (5) if a religious strike a religious, unless he strike him
very grievously; (6) if the striker be a poor man; (7) if he be a
minor, an old man, or an invalid; (8) if there be a deadly feud between
them.
There are, besides, seven cases in which the person who strikes a
cleric does not incur excommunication: (1) if he do it for the sake of
discipline, as a teacher or a superior; (2) if it be done for fun; (3)
if the striker find the cleric behaving with impropriety towards his
wife his mother, his sister or his daughter; (4) if he return blow for
blow at once; (5) if the striker be not aware that he is striking a
cleric; (6) if the latter be guilty of apostasy after the triple
admonition; (7) if the cleric exercise an act which is altogether
contrary to the clerical life, e.g. if he become a soldier, or if he be
guilty of bigamy [*Namely, that which is known by canonists as "similar
bigamy"].
Reply to Objection 1: Although the chains of sin are in themselves
greater than those of excommunication, yet in a certain respect the
chains of excommunication are greater, inasmuch as they bind a man not
only in the sight of God, but also in the eye of the Church. Hence
absolution from excommunication requires jurisdiction in the external
forum, whereas absolution from sin does not. Nor is there need of
giving one's word by oath, as in the case of absolution from
excommunication, because, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:16),
controversies between men are decided by oath.
Reply to Objection 2: As an excommunicated person has no share in the
sacraments of the Church, a priest cannot absolve him from his guilt,
unless he be first absolved from excommunication.
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Whether anyone can be absolved against his will?
Objection 1: It would seem that no man can be absolved against his
will. For spiritual things are not conferred on anyone against his
will. Now absolution from excommunication is a spiritual favor.
Therefore it cannot be granted to a man against his will.
Objection 2: Further, the cause of excommunication is contumacy. But
when, through contempt of the excommunication, a man is unwilling to be
absolved, he shows a high degree of contumacy. Therefore he cannot be
absolved.
On the contrary, Excommunication can be pronounced on a man against his
will. Now things that happen to a man against his will, can be removed
from him against his will, as in the case of the goods of fortune.
Therefore excommunication can be removed from a man against his will.
I answer that, Evil of fault and evil of punishment differ in this,
that the origin of fault is within us, since all sin is voluntary,
whereas the origin of punishment is sometimes without, since punishment
does not need to be voluntary, in fact the nature of punishment is
rather to be against the will. Wherefore, just as a man commits no sin
except willingly, so no sin is forgiven him against his will. On the
other hand just as a person can be excommunicated against his will, so
can he be absolved therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: The assertion is true of those spiritual goods
which depend on our will, such as the virtues, which we cannot lose
unwillingly; for knowledge, although a spiritual good, can be lost by a
man against his will through sickness. Hence the argument is not to the
point.
Reply to Objection 2: It is possible for excommunication to be removed
from a man even though he be contumacious, if it seem to be for the
good of the man for whom the excommunication was intended as a
medicine.
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Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being
absolved from all?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot be absolved from one
excommunication without being absolved from all. For an effect should
be proportionate to its cause. Now the cause of excommunication is a
sin. Since then a man cannot be absolved from one sin without being
absolved from all, neither can this happen as regards excommunication.
Objection 2: Further, absolution from excommunication is pronounced in
the Church. But a man who is under the ban of one excommunication is
outside the Church. Therefore so long as one remains, a man cannot be
loosed from another.
On the contrary, Excommunication is a punishment. Now a man can be
loosed from one punishment, while another remains. Therefore a man can
be loosed from one excommunication and yet remain under another.
I answer that, Excommunications are not connected together in any way,
and so it is possible for a man to be absolved from one, and yet remain
under another.
It must be observed however that sometimes a man lies under several
excommunications pronounced by one judge; and then, when he is absolved
from one, he is understood to be absolved from all, unless the contrary
be expressed, or unless he ask to be absolved from excommunication on
one count only, whereas he was excommunicated under several. On the
other hand sometimes a man lies under several sentences of
excommunication pronounced by several judges; and then, when absolved
from one excommunication, he is not therefore absolved from the others,
unless at his prayer they all confirm his absolution, or unless they
all depute one to absolve him.
Reply to Objection 1: All sins are connected together in aversion from
God, which is incompatible with the forgiveness of sin: wherefore one
sin cannot be forgiven without another. But excommunications have no
such connection. Nor again is absolution from excommunication hindered
by contrariety of the will, as stated above [4886](A[2]). Hence the
argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as such a man was for several reasons
outside the Church so is it possible for his separation to be removed
on one count and to remain on another.
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OF INDULGENCES (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider indulgence: (1) in itself; (2) those who grant
indulgence; (3) those who receive it.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an indulgence remits any part of the punishment due for the
satisfaction of sins?
(2) Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?
(3) Whether an indulgence should be granted for temporal assistance?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an indulgence can remit any part of the punishment due for the
satisfaction of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence cannot remit any part of
the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins. Because a gloss on 2
Tim. 2:13, "He cannot deny Himself," says: "He would do this if He did
not keep His word." Now He said (Dt. 25:2): "According to the measure
of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Therefore nothing
can be remitted from the satisfactory punishment which is appointed
according to the measure of sin.
Objection 2: Further, an inferior cannot absolve from an obligation
imposed by his superior. But when God absolves us from sin He binds us
to temporal punishment, as Hugh of St. Victor declares (Tract. vi Sum.
Sent. [*Of doubtful authenticity]). Therefore no man can absolve from
that punishment, by remitting any part of it.
Objection 3: Further, the granting of the sacramental effect without
the sacraments belongs to the power of excellence. Now none but Christ
has the power of excellence in the sacraments. Since then satisfaction
is a part of the sacrament of Penance, conducing to the remission of
the punishment due, it seems that no mere man can remit the debt of
punishment without satisfaction.
Objection 4: Further, the power of the ministers of the Church was
given them, not "unto destruction," but "unto edification" (2 Cor.
10:8). But it would be conducive to destruction, if satisfaction, which
was intended for our good, inasmuch as it serves for a remedy, were
done away with. Therefore the power of the ministers of the Church does
not extend to this.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 2:10): "For, what I have
pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in
the person of Christ," and a gloss adds: i.e. "as though Christ Himself
had pardoned." But Christ could remit the punishment of a sin without
any satisfaction, as evidenced in the case of the adulterous woman (Jn.
8). Therefore Paul could do so likewise. Therefore the Pope can too,
since his power in the Church is not less than Paul's.
Further, the universal Church cannot err; since He Who "was heard for
His reverence" (Heb. 5:7) said to Peter, on whose profession of faith
the Church was founded (Lk. 22:32): "I have prayed for thee that thy
faith fail not." Now the universal Church approves and grants
indulgences. Therefore indulgences have some value.
I answer that, All admit that indulgences have some value, for it would
be blasphemy to say that the Church does anything in vain. But some say
that they do not avail to free a man from the debt of punishment which
he has deserved in Purgatory according to God's judgment, and that they
merely serve to free him from the obligation imposed on him by the
priest as a punishment for his sins, or from the canonical penalties he
has incurred. But this opinion does not seem to be true. First, because
it is expressly opposed to the privilege granted to Peter, to whom it
was said (Mat. 16:19) that whatsoever he should loose on earth should
be loosed also in heaven. Wherefore whatever remission is granted in
the court of the Church holds good in the court of God. Moreover the
Church by granting such indulgences would do more harm than good,
since, by remitting the punishment she had enjoined on a man, she would
deliver him to be punished more severely in Purgatory.
Hence we must say on the contrary that indulgences hold good both in
the Church's court and in the judgment of God, for the remission of the
punishment which remains after contrition, absolution, and confession,
whether this punishment be enjoined or not. The reason why they so
avail is the oneness of the mystical body in which many have performed
works of satisfaction exceeding the requirements of their debts; in
which, too, many have patiently borne unjust tribulations whereby a
multitude of punishments would have been paid, had they been incurred.
So great is the quantity of such merits that it exceeds the entire debt
of punishment due to those who are living at this moment: and this is
especially due to the merits of Christ: for though He acts through the
sacraments, yet His efficacy is nowise restricted to them, but
infinitely surpasses their efficacy.
Now one man can satisfy for another, as we have explained above
([4887]Q[13], A[2]). And the saints in whom this super-abundance of
satisfactions is found, did not perform their good works for this or
that particular person, who needs the remission of his punishment (else
he would have received this remission without any indulgence at all),
but they performed them for the whole Church in general, even as the
Apostle declares that he fills up "those things that are wanting of the
sufferings of Christ . . . for His body, which is the Church" to whom
he wrote (Col. 1:24). These merits, then, are the common property of
the whole Church. Now those things which are the common property of a
number are distributed to the various individuals according to the
judgment of him who rules them all. Hence, just as one man would obtain
the remission of his punishment if another were to satisfy for him, so
would he too if another's satisfactions be applied to him by one who
has the power to do so.
Reply to Objection 1: The remission which is granted by means of
indulgences does not destroy the proportion between punishment and sin,
since someone has spontaneously taken upon himself the punishment due
for another's guilt, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: He who gains an indulgence is not, strictly
speaking, absolved from the debt of punishment, but is given the means
whereby he may pay it.
Reply to Objection 3: The effect of sacramental absolution is the
removal of a man's guilt, an effect which is not produced by
indulgences. But he who grants indulgences pays the debt of punishment
which a man owes, out of the common stock of the Church's goods, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 4: Grace affords a better remedy for the avoidance
of sin than does habituation to (good) works. And since he who gains an
indulgence is disposed to grace through the love which he conceives for
the cause for which the indulgence is granted, it follows that
indulgences provide a remedy against sin. Consequently it is not
harmful to grant indulgences unless this be done without discretion.
Nevertheless those who gain indulgences should be advised, not, on this
account, to omit the penitential works imposed on them, so that they
may derive a remedy from these also, even though they may be quit of
the debt of punishment; and all the more, seeing that they are often
more in debt than they think.
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Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?
Objection 1: It would seem that indulgences are not as effective as
they claim to be. For indulgences have no effect save from the power of
the keys. Now by the power of the keys, he who has that power can only
remit some fixed part of the punishment due for sin, after taking into
account the measure of the sin and of the penitent's sorrow. Since then
indulgences depend on the mere will of the grantor, it seems that they
are not as effective as they claim to be.
Objection 2: Further, the debt of punishment keeps man back from the
attainment of glory, which he ought to desire above all things. Now, if
indulgences are as effective as they claim to be, a man by setting
himself to gain indulgences might become immune from all debt of
temporal punishment. Therefore it would seem that a man ought to put
aside all other kinds of works, and devote himself to gain indulgences.
Objection 3: Further, sometimes an indulgence whereby a man is remitted
a third part of the punishment due for his sins is granted if he
contribute towards the erection of a certain building. If, therefore,
indulgences produce the effect which is claimed for them, he who gives
a penny, and then another, and then again another, would obtain a
plenary absolution from all punishment due for his sins, which seems
absurd.
Objection 4: Further, sometimes an indulgence is granted, so that for
visiting a church a man obtains a seven years' remission. If, then, an
indulgence avails as much as is claimed for it a man who lives near
that church, or the clergy attached thereto who go there every day,
obtain as much indulgence as one who comes from a distance (which would
appear unjust); moreover, seemingly, they would gain the indulgence
several times a day, since they go there repeatedly.
Objection 5: Further, to remit a man's punishment beyond a just
estimate seems to amount to the same as to remit it without reason;
because in so far as he exceeds that estimate, he limits the
compensation. Now he who grants an indulgence cannot without cause
remit a man's punishment either wholly or partly, even though the Pope
were to say to anyone: "I remit to all the punishment you owe for your
sins." Therefore it seems that he cannot remit anything beyond the just
estimate. Now indulgences are often published which exceed that just
estimate. Therefore they do not avail as much as is claimed for them.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 13:7): "Hath God any need of your
lie, that you should speak deceitfully for Him?" Therefore the Church,
in publishing indulgences, does not lie; and so they avail as much as
is claimed for them.
Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:14): "If . . . our preaching is
vain, your faith is also vain." Therefore whoever utters a falsehood in
preaching, so far as he is concerned, makes faith void. and so sins
mortally. If therefore indulgences are not as effective as they claim
to be, all who publish indulgences would commit a mortal sin: which is
absurd.
I answer that, on this point there are many opinions. For some maintain
that indulgences have not the efficacy claimed for them, but that they
simply avail each individual in proportion to his faith and devotion.
And consequently those who maintain this, say that the Church publishes
her indulgences in such a way as, by a kind of pious fraud, to induce
men to do well, just as a mother entices her child to walk by holding
out an apple. But this seems a very dangerous assertion to make. For as
Augustine states (Ep. ad Hieron. lxxviii), "if any error were
discovered in Holy Writ, the authority of Holy Writ would perish." In
like manner, if any error were to be found in the Church's preaching,
her doctrine would have no authority in settling questions of faith.
Hence others have maintained that indulgences avail as much as is
claimed for them, according to a just estimate, not of him who grants
it---who perhaps puts too high a value on it---nor of the
recipient---for he may prize too highly the gift he receives, but a
just estimate according to the estimate of good men who consider the
condition of the person affected, and the utility and needs of the
Church, for the Church's needs are greater at one time than at another.
Yet, neither, seemingly, can this opinion stand. First, because in that
case indulgences would no longer be a remission, but rather a mere
commutation. Moreover the preaching of the Church would not be excused
from untruth, since, at times, indulgences are granted far in excess of
the requirements of this just estimate, taking into consideration all
the aforesaid conditions, as, for example, when the Pope granted to
anyone who visited a certain church, an indulgence of seven years,
which indulgence was granted by Blessed Gregory for the Roman Stations.
Hence others say that the quantity of remission accorded in an
indulgence is not to be measured by the devotion of the recipient, as
the first opinion suggested, nor according to the quantity of what is
given, as the second opinion held; but according to the cause for which
the indulgence is granted, and according to which a person is held
deserving of obtaining such an indulgence. Thus according as a man
approached near to that cause, so would he obtain remission in whole or
in part. But neither will this explain the custom of the Church, who
assigns, now a greater, now a lesser indulgence, for the same cause:
thus, under the same circumstances, now a year's indulgence, now one of
only forty days, according to the graciousness of the Pope, who grants
the indulgence, is granted to those who visit a church. Wherefore the
amount of the remission granted by the indulgence is not to be measured
by the cause for which a person is worthy of an indulgence.
We must therefore say otherwise that the quantity of an effect is
proportionate to the quantity of the cause. Now the cause of the
remission of punishment effected by indulgences is no other than the
abundance of the Church's merits, and this abundance suffices for the
remission of all punishment. The effective cause of the remission is
not the devotion, or toil, or gift of the recipient; nor, again, is it
the cause for which the indulgence was granted. We cannot, then,
estimate the quantity of the remission by any of the foregoing, but
solely by the merits of the Church---and these are always
superabundant. Consequently, according as these merits are applied to a
person so does he obtain remission. That they should be so applied
demands, firstly, authority to dispense this treasure. secondly, union
between the recipient and Him Who merited it---and this is brought
about by charity; thirdly, there is required a reason for so dispensing
this treasury, so that the intention, namely, of those who wrought
these meritorious works is safeguarded, since they did them for the
honor of God and for the good of the Church in general. Hence whenever
the cause assigned tends to the good of the Church and the honor of
God, there is sufficient reason for granting an indulgence.
Hence, according to others, indulgences have precisely the efficacy
claimed for them, provided that he who grants them have the authority,
that the recipient have charity, and that, as regards the cause, there
be piety which includes the honor of God and the profit of our
neighbor. Nor in this view have we "too great a market of the Divine
mercy" [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 20], as some maintain, nor again
does it derogate from Divine justice, for no punishment is remitted,
but the punishment of one is imputed to another.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4888]Q[19], A[3]) there are two
keys, the key of orders and the key of jurisdiction. The key of orders
is a sacramental: and as the effects of the sacraments are fixed, not
by men but by God, the priest cannot decide in the tribunal of
confession how much shall be remitted by means of the key of orders
from the punishment due; it is God Who appoints the amount to be
remitted. On the other hand the key of jurisdiction is not something
sacramental, and its effect depends on a man's decision. The remission
granted through indulgences is the effect of this key, since it does
not belong to the dispensation of the sacraments, but to the
distribution of the common property of the Church: hence it is that
legates, even though they be not priests, can grant indulgences.
Consequently the decision of how much punishment is to be remitted by
an indulgence depends on the will of the one who grants that
indulgence. If, however, he remits punishment without sufficient
reason, so that men are enticed to substitute mere nothings, as it
were, for works of penance, he sins by granting such indulgences,
although the indulgence is gained fully.
Reply to Objection 2: Although indulgences avail much for the remission
of punishment, yet works of satisfaction are more meritorious in
respect of the essential reward, which infinitely transcends the
remission of temporal punishment.
Reply to Objection 3: When an indulgence is granted in a general way to
anyone that helps towards the building of a church, we must understand
this to mean a help proportionate to the giver: and in so far as he
approaches to this, he will gain the indulgence more or less fully.
Consequently a poor man by giving one penny would gain the full
indulgence, not so a rich man, whom it would not become to give so
little to so holy and profitable a work; Just as a king would not be
said to help a man if he gave him an "obol."
Reply to Objection 4: A person who lives near the church, and the
priest and clergy of the church, gain the indulgence as much as those
who come perhaps a distance of a thousand days' journey: because the
remission, as stated above, is proportionate, not to the toil, but to
the merits which are applied. Yet he who toils most gains most merit.
This, however, is to be understood of those cases in which an
indulgence is given in an undeterminate manner. For sometimes a
distinction is expressed: thus the Pope at the time of general
absolution grants an indulgence of five years to those who come from
across the seas, and one of three years to those who come from across
the mountains, to others an indulgence of one year. Nor does a person
gain the indulgence each time he visits the church during the term of
indulgence, because sometimes it is granted for a fixed time; thus when
it is said, "Whoever visits such and such a church until such and such
a day, shall gain so much indulgence," we must understand that it can
be gained only once. on the other hand if there be a continual
indulgence in a certain church, as the indulgence of forty days to be
gained in the church of the Blessed Peter, then a person gains the
indulgence as often as he visits the church.
Reply to Objection 5: An indulgence requires a cause, not as a measure
of the remission of punishment, but in order that the intention of
those whose merits are applied, may reach to this particular
individual. Now one person's good is applied to another in two ways:
first, by charity; and in this way, even without indulgences, a person
shares in all the good deeds done, provided he have charity: secondly,
by the intention of the person who does the good action; and in this
way, provided there be a lawful cause, the intention of a person who
has done something for the profit of the Church, may reach to some
individual through indulgences.
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Whether an indulgence ought to be granted for temporal help?
Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence ought not to be granted
for temporal help. Because the remission of sins is something
spiritual. Now to exchange a spiritual for a temporal thing is simony.
Therefore this ought not to be done.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual assistance is more necessary than
temporal. But indulgences do not appear to be granted for spiritual
assistance. Much less therefore ought they to be granted for temporal
help.
On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Church in granting
indulgences for pilgrimages and almsgiving.
I answer that, Temporal things are subordinate to spiritual matters,
since we must make use of temporal things on account of spiritual
things. Consequently an indulgence must not be granted for the sake of
temporal matters as such, but in so far as they are subordinate to
spiritual things: such as the quelling of the Church's enemies, who
disturb her peace; or such as the building of a church, of a bridge,
and other forms of almsgiving. It is therefore evident that there is no
simony in these transactions, since a spiritual thing is exchanged, not
for a temporal but for a spiritual commodity.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: Indulgences can be, and sometimes are, granted
even for purely spiritual matters. Thus Pope Innocent IV granted an
indulgence of ten days to all who prayed for the king of France; and in
like manner sometimes the same indulgence is granted to those who
preach a crusade as to those who take part in it.
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OF THOSE WHO CAN GRANT INDULGENCES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those who can grant indulgences: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?
(2) Whether a deacon or another, who is not a priest, can grant
indulgences?
(3) Whether a bishop can grant them?
(4) Whether they can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?
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Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?
Objection 1: It would seem that every parish priest can grant
indulgences. For an indulgence derives its efficacy from the
superabundance of the Church's merits. Now there is no congregation
without some superabundance of merits. Therefore every priest, who has
charge of a congregation, can grant indulgences, and, in like manner,
so can every prelate.
Objection 2: Further, every prelate stands for a multitude, just as an
individual stands for himself. But any individual can assign his own
goods to another and thus offer satisfaction for a third person.
Therefore a prelate can assign the property of the multitude subject to
him, and so it seems that he can grant indulgences.
On the contrary, To excommunicate is less than to grant indulgences.
But a parish priest cannot do the former. Therefore he cannot do the
latter.
I answer that, Indulgences are effective, in as much as the works of
satisfaction done by one person are applied to another, not only by
virtue of charity, but also by the intention of the person who did them
being directed in some way to the person to whom they are applied. Now
a person's intention may be directed to another in three ways,
specifically, generically and individually. Individually, as when one
person offers satisfaction for another particular person; and thus
anyone can apply his works to another. Specifically, as when a person
prays for the congregation to which he belongs, for the members of his
household, or for his benefactors, and directs his works of
satisfaction to the same intention: in this way the superior of a
congregation can apply those works to some other person, by applying
the intention of those who belong to his congregation to some fixed
individual. Generically, as when a person directs his works for the
good of the Church in general; and thus he who presides over the whole
Church can communicate those works, by applying his intention to this
or that individual. And since a man is a member of a congregation, and
a congregation is a part of the Church, hence the intention of private
good includes the intention of the good of the congregation, and of the
good of the whole Church. Therefore he who presides over the Church can
communicate what belongs to an individual congregation or to an
individual man: and he who presides over a congregation can communicate
what belongs to an individual man, but not conversely. Yet neither the
first nor the second communication is called an indulgence, but only
the third; and this for two reasons. First, because, although those
communications loose man from the debt of punishment in the sight of
God, yet he is not freed from the obligation of fulfilling the
satisfaction enjoined, to which he is bound by a commandment of the
Church; whereas the third communication frees man even from this
obligation. Secondly, because in one person or even in one congregation
there is not such an unfailing supply of merits as to be sufficient
both for the one person or congregation and for all others; and
consequently the individual is not freed from the entire debt of
punishment unless satisfaction is offered for him individually, to the
very amount that he owes. On the other hand, in the whole Church there
is an unfailing supply of merits, chiefly on account of the merit of
Christ. Consequently he alone who is at the head of the Church can
grant indulgences. Since, however, the Church is the congregation of
the faithful, and since a congregation of men is of two kinds, the
domestic, composed of members of the same family, and the civil,
composed of members of the same nationality, the Church is like to a
civil congregation, for the people themselves are called the Church;
while the various assemblies, or parishes of one diocese are likened to
a congregation in the various families and services. Hence a bishop
alone is properly called a prelate of the Church, wherefore he alone,
like a bridegroom, receives the ring of the Church. Consequently full
power in the dispensation of the sacraments, and jurisdiction in the
public tribunal, belong to him alone as the public person, but to
others by delegation from him. Those priests who have charge of the
people are not prelates strictly speaking, but assistants, hence, in
consecrating priests the bishop says: "The more fragile we are, the
more we need these assistants": and for this reason they do not
dispense all the sacraments. Hence parish priests, or abbots or other
like prelates cannot grant indulgences.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether a deacon or another who is not a priest can grant an indulgence?
Objection 1: It would seem that a deacon, or one that is not a priest
cannot grant an indulgence. Because remission of sins is an effect of
the keys. Now none but a priest has the keys. Therefore a priest alone
can grant indulgences.
Objection 2: Further, a fuller remission of punishment is granted by
indulgences than by the tribunal of Penance. But a priest alone has
power in the latter, and, therefore, he alone has power in the former.
On the contrary, The distribution of the Church's treasury is entrusted
to the same person as the government of the Church. Now this is
entrusted sometimes to one who is not a priest. Therefore he can grant
indulgences, since they derive their efficacy from the distribution of
the Church's treasury.
I answer that, The power of granting indulgences follows jurisdiction,
as stated above ([4889]Q[25], A[2]). And since deacons and others, who
are not priests, can have jurisdiction either delegated, as legates, or
ordinary, as bishops-elect, it follows that even those who are not
priests can grant indulgences, although they cannot absolve in the
tribunal of Penance, since this follows the reception of orders. This
suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the granting of
indulgences belongs to the key of jurisdiction and not to the key of
orders.
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Whether a bishop can grant indulgences?
Objection 1: It would seem that even a bishop cannot grant indulgences.
Because the treasury of the Church is the common property of the whole
Church. Now the common property of the whole Church cannot be
distributed save by him who presides over the whole Church. Therefore
the Pope alone can grant indulgences.
Objection 2: Further, none can remit punishments fixed by law, save the
one who has the power to make the law. Now punishments in satisfaction
for sins are fixed by law. Therefore the Pope alone can remit these
punishments, since he is the maker of the law.
On the contrary, stands the custom of the Church in accordance with
which bishops grant indulgences.
I answer that, The Pope has the plenitude of pontifical power, being
like a king in his kingdom: whereas the bishops are appointed to a
share in his solicitude, like judges over each city. Hence them alone
the Pope, in his letters, addresses as "brethren," whereas he calls all
others his "sons." Therefore the plenitude of the power of granting
indulgences resides in the Pope, because he can grant them, as he
lists, provided the cause be a lawful one: while, in bishops, this
power resides subject to the Pope's ordination, so that they can grant
them within fixed limits and not beyond.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether indulgences can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that indulgences cannot be granted by one
who is in mortal sin. For a stream can no longer flow if cut off from
its source. Now the source of grace which is the Holy Ghost is cut off
from one who is in mortal sin. Therefore such a one can convey nothing
to others by granting indulgences.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater thing to grant an indulgence than
to receive one. But one who is in mortal sin cannot receive an
indulgence, as we shall show presently ([4890]Q[27], A[1]). Neither,
therefore, can he grant one.
On the contrary, Indulgences are granted in virtue of the power
conferred on the prelates of the Church. Now mortal sin takes away, not
power but goodness. Therefore one who is in mortal sin can grant
indulgences.
I answer that, The granting of indulgences belongs to jurisdiction. But
a man does not, through sin, lose jurisdiction. Consequently
indulgences are equally valid, whether they be granted by one who is in
mortal sin, or by a most holy person; since he remits punishment, not
by virtue of his own merits, but by virtue of the merits laid up in the
Church's treasury.
Reply to Objection 1: The prelate who, while in a state of mortal sin,
grants an indulgence, does not pour forth anything of his own, and so
it is not necessary that he should receive an inflow from the source,
in order that he may grant a valid indulgence.
Reply to Objection 2: Further, to grant an indulgence is more than to
receive one, if we consider the power, but it is less, if we consider
the personal profit.
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OF THOSE WHOM INDULGENCES AVAIL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those whom indulgences avail: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether indulgences avail those who are in mortal sin?
(2) Whether they avail religious?
(3) Whether they avail a person who does not fulfill the conditions for
which the indulgence is given?
(4) Whether they avail him who grants them?
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Whether an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence avails those who are in
mortal sin. For one person can merit grace and many other good things
for another, even though he be in mortal sin. Now indulgences derive
their efficacy from the application of the saints' merits to an
individual. Therefore they are effective in one who is in mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the need, the more room there is for
pity. Now a man who is in mortal sin is in very great need. Therefore
all the more should pity be extended to him by indulgence.
On the contrary, A dead member receives no inflow from the other
members that are living. But one who is in mortal sin, is like a dead
member. Therefore he receives no inflow, through indulgences, from the
merits of living members.
I answer that, Some hold that indulgences avail those even who are in
mortal sin, for the acquiring of grace, but not for the remission of
their punishment, since none can be freed from punishment who is not
yet freed from guilt. For he who has not yet been reached by God's
operation unto the remission of guilt, cannot receive the remission of
his punishment from the minister of the Church neither by indulgences
nor in the tribunal of Penance.
But this opinion seems to be untrue. Because, although those merits
which are applied by means of an indulgence, might possibly avail a
person so that he could merit grace (by way of congruity and
impetration), yet it is not for this reason that they are applied, but
for the remission of punishment. Hence they do not avail those who are
in mortal sin, and consequently, true contrition and confession are
demanded as conditions for gaining all indulgences. If however the
merits were applied by such a form as this: "I grant you a share in the
merits of the whole Church---or of one congregation, or of one
specified person," then they might avail a person in mortal sin so that
he could merit something, as the foregoing opinion holds.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Although he who is in mortal sin is in greater
need of help, yet he is less capable of receiving it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether indulgences avail religious?
Objection 1: It would seem that indulgences do not avail religious. For
there is no reason to bring supplies to those who supply others out of
their own abundance. Now indulgences are derived from the abundance of
works of satisfaction to be found in religious. Therefore it is
unreasonable for them to profit by indulgences.
Objection 2: Further, nothing detrimental to religious life should be
done in the Church. But, if indulgences were to avail religious, this
would be detrimental to regular discipline, because religious would
become lax on account of indulgences, and would neglect the penances
imposed in chapter. Therefore indulgences do not avail religious.
On the contrary, Good brings harm to no man. But the religious life is
a good thing. Therefore it does not take away from religious the profit
to be derived from indulgences.
I answer that, Indulgences avail both seculars and religious, provided
they have charity and satisfy the conditions for gaining the
indulgences: for religious can be helped by indulgences no less than
persons living in the world.
Reply to Objection 1: Although religious are in the state of
perfection, yet they cannot live without sin: and so if at times they
are liable to punishment on account of some sin, they can expiate this
debt by means of indulgences. For it is not unreasonable that one who
is well off absolutely speaking, should be in want at times and in some
respect, and thus need to be supplied with what he lacks. Hence it is
written (Gal. 6:2): "Bear ye one another's burdens."
Reply to Objection 2: There is no reason why indulgences should be
detrimental to religious observance, because, as to the reward of
eternal life, religious merit more by observing their rule than by
gaining indulgences; although, as to the remission of punishment, which
is a lesser good, they merit less. Nor again do indulgences remit the
punishment enjoined in chapter, because the chapter is a judicial
rather than a penitential tribunal. hence even those who are not
priests hold chapter. Absolution from punishment enjoined or due for
sin is given in the tribunal of Penance.
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Whether an indulgence can ever be granted to one who does not fulfill the
conditions required?
Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence can sometimes be granted
to one who does not fulfill the required conditions. Because when a
person is unable to perform a certain action his will is taken for the
deed. Now sometimes an indulgence is to be gained by giving an alms,
which a poor man is unable to do, though he would do so willingly.
Therefore he can gain the indulgence.
Objection 2: Further, one man can make satisfaction for another. Now an
indulgence is directed to the remission of punishment, just as
satisfaction is. Therefore one man can gain an indulgence for another;
and so a man can gain an indulgence without doing that for which the
indulgence is given.
On the contrary, If the cause is removed, the effect is removed. If
therefore a person fails to do that for which an indulgence is granted,
and which is the cause of the indulgence, he does not gain the
indulgence.
I answer that, Failing the condition of a grant, no grant ensues.
Hence, as an indulgence is granted on the condition that a person does
or gives a certain thing, if he fails in this, he does not gain the
indulgence.
Reply to Objection 1: This is true of the essential reward, but not of
certain accidental rewards, such as the remission of punishment and the
like.
Reply to Objection 2: A person can by his intention apply his own
action to whomever he lists, and so he can make satisfaction for
whomever he chooses. On the other hand, an indulgence cannot be applied
to someone, except in accordance with the intention of the grantor.
Hence, since he applies it to the doer or giver of a particular action
or thing, the doer cannot transfer this intention to another. If,
however, the indulgence were expressed thus: "Whosoever does this, or
for whomsoever this is done, shall gain so much indulgence," it would
avail the person for whom it is done. Nor would the person who does
this action, give the indulgence to another, but he who grants the
indulgence in this form.
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Whether an indulgence avails the person who grants it?
Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence does not avail him who
grants it. For the granting of an indulgence belongs to jurisdiction.
Now no one can exercise jurisdiction on himself. thus no one can
excommunicate himself. Therefore no one can participate in an
indulgence granted by himself.
Objection 2: Further, if this were possible, he who grants an
indulgence might gain the remission of the punishment of all his sins
for some small deed, so that he would sin with impunity, which seems
senseless.
Objection 3: Further, to grant indulgences and to excommunicate belong
to the same power. Now a man cannot excommunicate himself. Therefore he
cannot share in the indulgence of which he is the grantor.
On the contrary, He would be worse off than others if he could not make
use of the Church's treasury which he dispenses to others.
I answer that, An indulgence should be given for some reason, in order
for anyone to be enticed by the indulgence to perform some action that
conduces to the good of the Church and to the honor of God. Now the
prelate to whom is committed the care of the Church's good and of the
furthering of God's honor, does not need to entice himself thereto.
Therefore he cannot grant an indulgence to himself alone; but he can
avail himself of an indulgence that he grants for others, since it is
based on a cause for granting it to them.
Reply to Objection 1: A man cannot exercise an act of jurisdiction on
himself, but a prelate can avail himself of those things which are
granted to others by the authority of his jurisdiction, both in
temporal and in spiritual matters: thus also a priest gives himself the
Eucharist which he gives to others. And so a bishop too can apply to
himself the suffrages of the Church which he dispenses to others, the
immediate effect of which suffrages, and not of his jurisdiction, is
the remission of punishment by means of indulgences.
The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what had been said.
Reply to Objection 3: Excommunication is pronounced by way of sentence,
which no man can pronounce on himself, for the reason that in the
tribunal of justice the same man cannot be both judge and accused. On
the other hand an indulgence is not given under the form of a sentence,
but by way of dispensation, which a man can apply to himself.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SOLEMN RITE OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the solemn rite of Penance: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a penance can be published or solemnized?
(2) Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?
(3) Whether public penance should be imposed on women?
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Whether a penance should be published or solemnized?
Objection 1: It would seem that a penance should not be published or
solemnized. Because it is not lawful for a priest, even through fear,
to divulge anyone's sin, however notorious it may be. Now a sin is
published by a solemn penance. Therefore a penance should not be
solemnized.
Objection 2: Further, the judgment should follow the nature of the
tribunal. Now penance is a judgment pronounced in a secret tribunal.
Therefore it should not be published or solemnized.
Objection 3: Further, "Every deficiency is made good by penance" as
Ambrose [*Cf. Hypognost. iii, among the spurious works ascribed to St.
Augustine] states. Now solemnization has a contrary effect, since it
involves the penitent in many deficiencies: for a layman cannot be
promoted to the ranks of the clergy nor can a cleric be promoted to
higher orders, after doing solemn penance. Therefore Penance should not
be solemnized.
On the contrary, Penance is a sacrament. Now some kind of solemnity is
observed in every sacrament. Therefore there should be some solemnity
in Penance.
Further, the medicine should suit the disease. Now a sin is sometimes
public, and by its example draws many to sin. Therefore the penance
which is its medicine should also be public and solemn so as to give
edification to many.
I answer that, Some penances should be public and solemn for four
reasons. First, so that a public sin may have a public remedy;
secondly, because he who has committed a very grave crime deserves the
greatest confusion even in this life; thirdly, in order that it may
deter others; fourthly, that he may be an example of repentance, lest
those should despair, who have committed grievous sins.
Reply to Objection 1: The priest does not divulge the confession by
imposing such a penance, though people may suspect the penitent of
having committed some great sin. For a man is not certainly taken to be
guilty, because he is punished, since sometimes one does penance for
another: thus we read in the Lives of the Fathers of a certain man who,
in order to incite his companion to do penance, did penance together
with him. And if the sin be public, the penitent, by fulfilling his
penance, shows that he has been to confession.
Reply to Objection 2: A solemn penance, as to its imposition, does not
go beyond the limits of a secret tribunal, since, just as the
confession is made secretly, so the penance is imposed secretly. It is
the execution of the penance, that goes beyond the limits of the secret
tribunal: and there is nothing objectionable in this.
Reply to Objection 3: Although Penance cancels all deficiencies, by
restoring man to his former state of grace, yet it does not always
restore him to his former dignity. Hence women after doing penance for
fornication are not given the veil, because they do not recover the
honor of virginity. In like manner, after doing public penance, a
sinner does not recover his former dignity so as to be eligible for the
clerical state and a bishop who would ordain such a one ought to be
deprived of the power of ordaining, unless perhaps the needs of the
Church or custom require it. In that case such a one would be admitted
to minor orders by way of exception, but not to the sacred orders.
First, on account of the dignity of the latter; secondly, for fear of
relapse; thirdly, in order to avoid the scandal which the people might
take through recollection of his former sins; fourthly, because he
would not have the face to correct others, by reason of the publicity
of his own sin.
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Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?
Objection 1: It would seem that a solemn penance can be repeated. For
those sacraments which do not imprint a character, can be solemnized a
second time, such as the Eucharist, Extreme Unction and the like. But
Penance does not imprint a character, therefore it can be solemnized
over again.
Objection 2: Further, penance is solemnized on account of the gravity
and publicity of the sin. Now, after doing penance, a person may commit
the same sins over again, or even more grievous sins. Therefore the
solemn penance should be imposed again.
On the contrary, Solemn penance signifies the expulsion of the first
man from paradise. Now this was done but once. Therefore solemn penance
should be imposed once only.
I answer that, Solemn penance ought not to be repeated, for three
reasons. First, lest frequency bring it into contempt. Secondly, on
account of its signification; for it signifies the expulsion of the
first man from paradise, which happened only once; thirdly, because the
solemnization indicates, in a way, that one makes profession of
continual repentance. Wherefore repetition is inconsistent with
solemnization. And if the sinner fall again, he is not precluded from
doing penance, but a solemn penance should not be imposed on him again.
Reply to Objection 1: In those sacraments which are solemnized again
and again, repetition is not inconsistent with solemnity, as it is in
the present case. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Although, if we consider his crime, he ought to
do the same penance again, yet the repeated solemnization is not
becoming, for the reasons stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether solemn penance should be imposed on women and clerics, and whether
any priest can impose it?
Objection 1: It would seem that solemn penance should not be imposed on
women. Because, when this penance is imposed on a man, he has to cut
his hair off. But this becomes not a woman, according to 1 Cor. 11:15.
Therefore she should not do solemn penance.
Objection 2: It also seems that it ought to be imposed on clerics. For
it is enjoined on account of a grievous crime. Now the same sin is more
grievous in a cleric than in a layman. Therefore it ought to be imposed
on a cleric more than on a layman.
Objection 3: It also seems that it can be imposed by any priest.
Because to absolve in the tribunal of Penance belongs to one who has
the keys. Now an ordinary priest has the keys. Therefore he can
administer this penance.
I answer that, Every solemn penance is public, but not vice versa. For
solemn penance is done as follows: "On the first day of Lent, these
penitents clothed in sackcloth, with bare feet, their faces to the
ground, and their hair shorn away, accompanied by their priests,
present themselves to the bishop of the city at the door of the church.
Having brought them into the church the bishop with all his clergy
recites the seven penitential psalms, and then imposes his hand on
them, sprinkles them with holy water, puts ashes on their heads, covers
their shoulders with a hairshirt, and sorrowfully announces to them
that as Adam was expelled from paradise, so are they expelled from the
church. He then orders the ministers to put them out of the church, and
the clergy follow reciting the responsory: 'In the sweat of thy brow,'
etc. Every year on the day of our Lord's Supper they are brought back
into the church by their priests, and there shall they be until the
octave day of Easter, without however being admitted to Communion or to
the kiss of peace. This shall be done every year as long as entrance
into the church is forbidden them. The final reconciliation is reserved
to the bishop, who alone can impose solemn penance" [*Cap. lxiv, dist.
50].
This penance can be imposed on men and women; but not on clerics, for
fear of scandal. Nor ought such a penance to be imposed except for a
crime which has disturbed the whole of the city.
On the other hand public but not solemn penance is that which is done
in the presence of the Church, but without the foregoing solemnity,
such as a pilgrimage throughout the world with a staff. A penance of
this kind can be repeated, and can be imposed by a mere priest, even on
a cleric. Sometimes however a solemn penance is taken to signify a
public one: so that authorities speak of solemn penance in different
senses.
Reply to Objection 1: The woman's hair is a sign of her subjection, a
man's is not. Hence it is not proper for a woman to put aside her hair
when doing penance, as it is for a man.
Reply to Objection 2: Although in the same kind of sin, a cleric
offends more grievously than a layman, yet a solemn penance is not
imposed on him, lest his orders should be an object of contempt. Thus
deference is given not to the person but to his orders.
Reply to Objection 3: Grave sins need great care in their cure. Hence
the imposition of a solemn penance, which is only applied for the most
grievous sins, is reserved to the bishop.
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EXTREME UNCTION (QQ[29]-33)
OF EXTREME UNCTION, AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE AND INSTITUTION (NINE
ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sacrament of Extreme Unction: in respect of
which five points have to be considered: (1) Its essentials and
institution; (2) Its effect; (3) Its minister; (4) on whom should it be
conferred and in what parts; (5) Its repetition.
Under the first head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament?
(2) Whether it is one sacrament?
(3) Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ?
(4) Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament?
(5) Whether the oil ought to be consecrated?
(6) Whether the matter of this sacrament should be consecrated by a
bishop?
(7) Whether this sacrament has any form?
(8) Whether the form of this sacrament should take the shape of a
deprecatory phrase?
(9) Whether this is a suitable form for this sacrament?
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Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that Extreme Unction is not a sacrament. For
just as oil is used on sick people, so is it on catechumens. But
anointing of catechumens with oil is not a sacrament. Therefore neither
is the Extreme Unction of the sick with oil.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the
sacraments of the New Law. But there was no figure of Extreme Unction
in the Old Law. Therefore it is not a sacrament of the New Law.
Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii, v) every
sacrament aims at either cleansing, or enlightening, or perfecting. Now
Extreme Unction does not aim at either cleansing, or enlightening, for
this is ascribed to Baptism alone, or perfecting, for according to
Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii), this belongs to Confirmation and the
Eucharist. Therefore Extreme Unction is not a sacrament.
On the contrary, The sacraments of the Church supply man's defects
sufficiently with respect to every state of life. Now no other than
Extreme Unction does this for those who are departing from this life.
Therefore it is a sacrament.
Further, the sacraments are neither more nor less than spiritual
remedies. Now Extreme Unction is a spiritual remedy, since it avails
for the remission of sins, according to James 5:15. Therefore it is a
sacrament.
I answer that, Among the visible operations of the Church, some are
sacraments, as Baptism, some are sacramentals, as Exorcism. The
difference between these is that a sacrament is an action of the Church
that reaches to the principal effect intended in the administration of
the sacraments, whereas a sacramental is an action which, though it
does not reach to that effect, is nevertheless directed towards that
principal action. Now the effect intended in the administration of the
sacraments is the healing of the disease of sin: wherefore it is
written (Is. 27:9): "This is all the fruit, that the sin . . . should
be taken away." Since then Extreme Unction reaches to this effect, as
is clear from the words of James, and is not ordained to any other
sacrament as an accessory thereto, it is evident that Extreme Unction
is not a sacramental but a sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: The oil with which catechumens are anointed does
not convey the remission of sins to them by its unction, for that
belongs to Baptism. It does, however, dispose them to receive Baptism,
as stated above ([4891]TP, Q[71], A[3]). Hence that unction is not a
sacrament as Extreme Unction is.
Reply to Objection 2: This sacrament prepares man for glory
immediately, since it is given to those who are departing from this
life. And as, under the Old Law, it was not yet time to enter into
glory, because "the Law brought nobody [Vulg.: 'nothing'] to
perfection" (Heb. 7:19), so this sacrament had not to be foreshadowed
therein by some corresponding sacrament, as by a figure of the same
kind. Nevertheless it was somewhat foreshadowed remotely by all the
healings related in the Old Testament.
Reply to Objection 3: Dionysius makes no mention of Extreme Unction, as
neither of Penance, nor of Matrimony, because he had no intention to
decide any question about the sacraments, save in so far as they serve
to illustrate the orderly disposition of the ecclesiastical hierarchy,
as regards the ministers, their actions, and the recipients.
Nevertheless since Extreme Unction confers grace and remission of sins,
there is no doubt that it possesses an enlightening and cleansing
power, even as Baptism, though not so copious.
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Whether Extreme Unction is one sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that Extreme Unction is not one sacrament.
Because the oneness of a thing depends on its matter and form, since
being and oneness are derived from the same source. Now the form of
this sacrament is said several times during the one administration, and
the matter is applied to the person anointed in respect of various
parts of his body. Therefore it is not one sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, the unction itself is a sacrament, for it would
be absurd to say that the oil is a sacrament. But there are several
unctions. Therefore there are several sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, one sacrament should be performed by one
minister. But the case might occur that Extreme Unction could not be
conferred by one minister: thus if the priest die after the first
unction, another priest would have to proceed with the others.
Therefore Extreme Unction is not one sacrament.
On the contrary, As immersion is in relation to Baptism, so is unction
to this sacrament. But several immersions are but one sacrament of
Baptism. Therefore the several unctions in Extreme Unction are also one
sacrament.
Further, if it were not one sacrament, then after the first unction, it
would not be essential for the perfection of the sacrament that the
second unction should be performed, since each sacrament has perfect
being of itself. But that is not true. Therefore it is one sacrament.
I answer that, Strictly speaking, a thing is one numerically in three
ways. First, as something indivisible, which is neither actually nor
potentially several---as a point, and unity. Secondly, as something
continuous, which is actually one, but potentially several---as a line.
Thirdly, as something complete, that is composed of several parts---as
a house, which is, in a way, several things, even actually, although
those several things go together towards making one. In this way each
sacrament is said to be one thing, in as much as the many things which
are contained in one sacrament, are united together for the purpose of
signifying or causing one thing, because a sacrament is a sign of the
effect it produces. Hence when one action suffices for a perfect
signification, the unity of the sacrament consists in that action only,
as may be seen in Confirmation. When, however, the signification of the
sacrament can be both in one and in several actions, then the sacrament
can be complete both in one and in several actions, even as Baptism in
one immersion and in three, since washing which is signified in
Baptism, can be completed by one immersion and by several. But when the
perfect signification cannot be expressed except by means of several
actions, then these several actions are essential for the perfection of
the sacrament, as is exemplified in the Eucharist, for the refreshment
of the body which signifies that of the soul, can only be attained by
means of meat and drink. It is the same in this sacrament, because the
healing of the internal wounds cannot be perfectly signified save by
the application of the remedy to the various sources of the wounds.
Hence several actions are essential to the perfection of this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: The unity of a complete whole is not destroyed by
reason of a diversity of matter or form in the parts of that whole.
Thus it is evident that there is neither the same matter nor the same
form in the flesh and in the bones of which one man is composed. In
like manner too, in the sacrament of the Eucharist, and in this
sacrament, the diversity of matter and form does not destroy the unity
of the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Although those actions are several simply, yet
they are united together in one complete action, viz. the anointing of
all the external senses, whence arises the infernal malady.
Reply to Objection 3: Although, in the Eucharist, if the priest die
after the consecration of the bread, another priest can go on with the
consecration of the wine, beginning where the other left off, or can
begin over again with fresh matter, in Extreme Unction he cannot begin
over again, but should always go on, because to anoint the same part a
second time would produce as much effect as if one were to consecrate a
host a second time, which ought by no means to be done. Nor does the
plurality of ministers destroy the unity of this sacrament, because
they only act as instruments, and the unity of a smith's work is not
destroyed by his using several hammers.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament was not instituted by
Christ. For mention is made in the Gospel of the institution of those
sacraments which Christ instituted, for instance the Eucharist and
Baptism. But no mention is made of Extreme Unction. Therefore it was
not instituted by Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the Master says explicitly (Sent. iv, D, 23) that
it was instituted by the apostles. Therefore Christ did not institute
it Himself.
Objection 3: Further, Christ showed forth the sacraments which He
instituted, as in the case of the Eucharist and Baptism. But He did not
bestow this sacrament on anyone. Therefore He did not institute it
Himself.
On the contrary, The sacraments of the New Law are more excellent than
those of the Old Law. But all the sacraments of the Old Law were
instituted by God. Therefore much more do all the sacraments of the New
Law owe their institution to Christ Himself.
Further, to make an institution and to remove it belongs to the same
authority. Now the Church, who enjoys the same authority in the
successors of the apostles, as the apostles themselves possessed,
cannot do away with the sacrament of Extreme Unction. Therefore the
apostles did not institute it, but Christ Himself.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some hold that
this sacrament and Confirmation were not instituted by Christ Himself,
but were left by Him to be instituted by the apostles; for the reason
that these two sacraments, on account of the plenitude of grace
conferred in them, could not be instituted before the mission of the
Holy Ghost in perfect plenitude. Hence they are sacraments of the New
Law in such a way as not to be foreshadowed in the Old Law. But this
argument is not very cogent, since, just as Christ, before His Passion,
promised the mission of the Holy Ghost in His plenitude, so could He
institute these sacraments.
Wherefore others hold that Christ Himself instituted all the
sacraments, but that He Himself published some, which present greater
difficulty to our belief, while he reserved some to be published by the
apostles, such as Extreme Unction and Confirmation. This opinion seems
so much the more probable, as the sacraments belong to the foundation
of the Law, wherefore their institution pertains to the lawgiver;
besides, they derive their efficacy from their institution, which
efficacy is given them by God alone.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did and said many things which are not
related in the Gospel. For the evangelists were intent on handing down
chiefly those things that were necessary for salvation or concerned the
building of the ecclesiastical edifice. Hence they related the
institution by Christ of Baptism, Penance, the Eucharist and orders,
rather than of Extreme Unction and Confirmation, which are not
necessary for salvation, nor do they concern the building or division
of the Church. As a matter of fact however an anointing done by the
apostles is mentioned in the Gospel (Mk. 6:13) where it is said that
they "anointed the sick with oil."
Reply to Objection 2: The Master says it was instituted by the apostles
because its institution was made known to us by the teaching of the
apostles.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ did not show forth any sacrament except
such as He received by way of example: but He could not be a recipient
of Penance and Extreme Unction, since there was no sin in Him: hence He
did not show them forth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that olive oil is not a suitable matter for
this sacrament. For this sacrament is ordained immediately to the state
of incorruption. Now incorruption is signified by balsam which is
contained in chrism. Therefore chrism would be a more suitable matter
for this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is a spiritual healing. Now
spiritual healing is signified by the use of wine, as may be gathered
from the parable of the wounded man (Lk. 10:34). Therefore wine also
would be more suitable a matter for this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, where there is the greater danger, the remedy
should be a common one. But olive oil is not a common remedy, since the
olive is not found in every country. Therefore, since this sacrament is
given to the dying, who are in the greatest danger, it seems that olive
oil is not a suitable matter.
On the contrary, oil is appointed (James 5:14) as the matter of this
sacrament. Now, properly speaking, oil is none but olive oil. Therefore
this is the matter of this sacrament.
Further, spiritual healing is signified by anointing with oil, as is
evident from Is. 1:6 where we read: " . . . swelling sores: they are
not . . . dressed nor fomented with oil." Therefore the suitable matter
for this sacrament is oil.
I answer that, The spiritual healing, which is given at the end of
life, ought to be complete, since there is no other to follow; it ought
also to be gentle, lest hope, of which the dying stand in utmost need,
be shattered rather than fostered. Now oil has a softening effect, it
penetrates to the very heart of a thing, and spreads over it. Hence, in
both the foregoing respects, it is a suitable matter for this
sacrament. And since oil is, above all, the name of the liquid extract
of olives, for other liquids are only called oil from their likeness to
it, it follows that olive oil is the matter which should be employed in
this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: The incorruption of glory is something not
contained in this sacrament: and there is no need for the matter to
signify such a thing. Hence it is not necessary for balsam to be
included in the matter of this sacrament, because on account of its
fragrance it is indicative of a good name, which is no longer
necessary, for its own sake, to those who are dying; they need only a
clear conscience which is signified by oil.
Reply to Objection 2: Wine heals by its roughness, oil by its softness,
wherefore healing with wine pertains to Penance rather than to this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: Though olive oil is not produced everywhere, yet
it can easily be transported from one place to another. Moreover this
sacrament is not so necessary that the dying cannot obtain salvation
without it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the oil ought to be consecrated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the oil need not be consecrated.
Because there is a sanctification in the use of this sacrament, through
the form of words. Therefore another sanctification is superfluous if
it be applied to the matter.
Objection 2: Further, the efficacy and signification of the sacraments
are in their very matter. But the signification of the effect of this
sacrament, is suitable to oil on account of its natural properties, and
the efficacy thereof is due to the Divine institution. Therefore its
matter does not need to be sanctified.
Objection 3: Further, Baptism is a more perfect sacrament than Extreme
Unction. But, so far as the essentials of the sacrament are concerned,
the baptismal matter needs no sanctification. Neither therefore does
the matter of Extreme Unction need to be sanctified.
On the contrary, In all other anointings the matter is previously
consecrated. Therefore since this sacrament is an anointing, it
requires consecrated matter.
I answer that, Some hold that mere oil is the matter of this sacrament,
and that the sacrament itself is perfected in the consecration of the
oil by the bishop. But this is clearly false since we proved when
treating of the Eucharist that that sacrament alone consists in the
consecration of the matter ([4892]Q[2], A[1], ad 2).
We must therefore say that this sacrament consists in the anointing
itself, just as Baptism consists in the washing, and that the matter of
this sacrament is consecrated oil. Three reasons may be assigned why
consecrated matter is needed in this sacrament and in certain others.
The first is that all sacramental efficacy is derived from Christ:
wherefore those sacraments which He Himself used, derived their
efficacy from His use of them, even as, by the contact of His flesh, He
bestowed the force of regeneration on the waters. But He did not use
this sacrament, nor any bodily anointing, wherefore in all anointings a
consecrated matter is required. The second reason is that this
sacrament confers a plenitude of grace, so as to take away not only sin
but also the remnants of sin, and bodily sickness. The third reason is
that its effect on the body, viz. bodily health, is not caused by a
natural property of the matter. wherefore it has to derive this
efficacy from being consecrated.
Reply to Objection 1: The first consecration sanctifies the matter in
itself, but the second regards rather the use of the matter considered
as actually producing its effect. Hence neither is superfluous, because
instruments also receive their efficacy from the craftsman, both when
they are made, and when they are used for action.
Reply to Objection 2: The efficacy which the sacrament derives from its
institution, is applied to this particular matter when it is
consecrated.
The Reply to the Third Objection is gathered from what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the matter of this sacrament need be consecrated by a bishop?
Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of this sacrament need not
be consecrated by a bishop. Because the consecration of the Eucharistic
elements surpasses that of the matter in this sacrament. But a priest
can consecrate the matter in the Eucharist. Therefore he can do so in
this sacrament also.
Objection 2: Further, in material works the higher art never prepares
the matter for the lower, because the art which applies the matter is
more excellent than that which prepares it, as stated in Phys. ii,
text. 25. Now a bishop is above a priest. Therefore he does not prepare
the matter of a sacrament which is applied by a priest. But a priest
dispenses this sacrament, as we shall state further on ([4893]Q[31]).
Therefore the consecration of the matter does not belong to a bishop.
On the contrary, In other anointings also the matter is consecrated by
a bishop. Therefore the same applies to this.
I answer that, The minister of a sacrament produces the effect, not by
his own power, as though he were the principal agent, but by the
efficacy of the sacrament which he dispenses. This efficacy comes, in
the first place, from Christ, and from Him flows down to others in due
order, viz. to the people through the medium of the ministers who
dispense the sacraments, and to the lower ministers through the medium
of the higher ministers who sanctify the matter. Wherefore, in all the
sacraments which require a sanctified matter, the first consecration of
the matter is performed by a bishop, and the application thereof
sometimes by a priest, in order to show that the priest's power is
derived from the bishop's, according to Ps. 132:2: "Like the precious
ointment on the head," i.e. Christ, "that ran down upon the beard of
Aaron" first, and then "to the skirt of his garment."
Reply to Objection 1: The sacrament of the Eucharist consists in the
consecration of the matter and not in its use. Consequently, strictly
speaking, that which is the matter of the sacrament is not a
consecrated thing. Hence no consecration of the matter by a bishop is
required beforehand: but the altar and such like things, even the
priest himself, need to be consecrated, all of which can be done by
none but a bishop: so that in this sacrament also, the priest's power
is shown to be derived from the bishop's, as Dionysius observes (Eccl.
Hier. iii). The reason why a priest can perform that consecration of
matter which is a sacrament by itself, and not that which, as a
sacramental, is directed to a sacrament consisting in something used by
the faithful, is that in respect of Christ's true body no order is
above the priesthood, whereas, in respect of Christ's mystic body the
episcopate is above the priesthood, as we shall state further on
([4894]Q[40], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: The sacramental matter is not one that is made
into something else by him that uses it, as occurs in the mechanical
arts: it is one, in virtue of which something is done, so that it
partakes somewhat of the nature of an efficient cause, in so far as it
is the instrument of a Divine operation. Hence the matter needs to
acquire this virtue from a higher art or power, since among efficient
causes, the more prior the cause the more perfect it is, whereas in
material causes, the more prior the matter, the more imperfect it is.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this sacrament has a form?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament has no form. Because,
since the efficacy of the sacraments is derived from their institution,
as also from their form, the latter must needs be appointed by the
institutor of the sacrament. But there is no account of the form of
this sacrament being instituted either by Christ or by the apostles.
Therefore this sacrament has no form.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is essential to a sacrament is observed
everywhere in the same way. Now nothing is so essential to a sacrament
that has a form, as that very form. Therefore, as in this sacrament
there is no form commonly used by all, since various words are in use,
it seems that this sacrament has no form.
Objection 3: Further, in Baptism no form is needed except for the
sanctification of the matter, because the water is "sanctified by the
word of life so as to wash sin away," as Hugh states (De Sacram. ii).
Now the matter of this sacrament is already consecrated. Therefore it
needs no form of words.
On the contrary, The Master says (Sent. iv, D, 1) that every sacrament
of the New Law consists in things and words. Now the words are the
sacramental form. Therefore, since this is a sacrament of the New Law,
it seems that it has a form.
Further, this is confirmed by the rite of the Universal Church, who
uses certain words in the bestowal of this sacrament.
I answer that, Some have held that no farm is essential to this
sacrament. This, however, seems derogatory to the effect of this
sacrament, since every sacrament signifies its effect. Now the matter
is indifferent as regards its effect, and consequently cannot be
determined to any particular effect save by the form of words. Hence in
all the sacraments of the New Law, since they effect what they signify,
there must needs be things and words. Moreover James (5:14,15) seems to
ascribe the whole force of this sacrament to prayer, which is the form
thereof, as we shall state further on (ad 2: AA[8],9). Wherefore the
foregoing opinion seems presumptuous and erroneous; and for that reason
we should hold with the common opinion that this, like all the other
sacraments, has a fixed form.
Reply to Objection 1: Holy Writ is proposed to all alike: and so, the
form of Baptism, which can be conferred by all, should be expressed in
Holy Writ, as also the form of the Eucharist, which in regard to that
sacrament, expresses faith which is necessary for salvation. Now the
forms of the other sacraments are not contained in Holy Writ, but were
handed down to the Church by the apostles, who received them from our
Lord, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 11:23): "For I have received of
the Lord that which also I delivered to you," etc.
Reply to Objection 2: The words which are essential to the form, viz.
the prayer of deprecation, are said by all; but other words which
pertain to the well-being thereof, are not said by all.
Reply to Objection 3: The matter of Baptism has a certain
sanctification of its own from the very contact of our Saviour's flesh;
but the form of words sanctifies it so that it has a sanctifying force.
In like manner when the matter of this sacrament has been sanctified in
itself, it requires sanctification in its use, so that it may sanctify
actually.
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Whether the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion
or of petition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the form of this sacrament should be
expressed by way of assertion rather than of petition. Because all the
sacraments of the New Law have a sure effect. But sureness of effect is
not expressed in the sacramental forms except by way of assertion, as
when we say: "This is My body" or "I baptize thee." Therefore the form
of this sacrament should be expressed as an assertion.
Objection 2: Further, the intention of the minister should be expressed
in the sacramental forms because it is essential to the sacrament. But
the intention of conferring a sacrament is not expressed except by an
assertion. Therefore, etc.
Objection 3: Further, in some churches the following words are said in
the conferring of this sacrament: "I anoint these eyes with consecrated
oil in the name of the Father," etc., which is in keeping with the
forms of the other sacraments. Therefore it seems that such is the form
of this sacrament.
On the contrary, The form of a sacrament must needs be one that is
observed everywhere. Now the words employed according to the custom of
all the churches are not those quoted above, but take the form of a
petition viz.: "Through this holy unction, and His most tender mercy,
may the Lord pardon thee whatever sins thou hast committed, by sight,"
etc. Therefore the form of this sacrament is expressed as a petition.
Further, this seems to follow from the words of James, who ascribes the
effect of this sacrament to prayer: "The prayer of faith," says he
(5:15), "shall save the sick man." Since then a sacrament takes its
efficacy from its form, it seems that the form of this sacrament is
expressed as a petition.
I answer that, The form of this sacrament is expressed by way of a
petition, as appears from the words of James, and from the custom of
the Roman Church, who uses no other than words of supplication in
conferring this sacrament. Several reasons are assigned for this:
first, because the recipient of this sacrament is deprived of his
strength, so that he needs to be helped by prayers; secondly, because
it is given to the dying, who are on the point of quitting the courts
of the Church, and rest in the hands of God alone, for which reason
they are committed to Him by prayer; thirdly, because the effect of
this sacrament is not such that it always results from the minister's
prayer, even when all essentials have been duly observed, as is the
case with the character in Baptism and Confirmation, transubstantiation
in the Eucharist, remission of sin in Penance (given contrition) which
remission is essential to the sacrament of Penance but not to this
sacrament. Consequently the form of this sacrament cannot be expressed
in the indicative mood, as in the sacraments just mentioned.
Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament, like the others mentioned,
considered in itself, is sure of its effect. yet this effect can be
hindered through the insincerity of the recipient (though by his
intention he submit to the sacrament), so that he receives no effect at
all. Hence there is no parity between this sacrament, and the others
wherein some effect always ensues.
Reply to Objection 2: The intention is sufficiently expressed by the
act which is mentioned in the form, viz.: "By this holy unction."
Reply to Objection 3: These words in the indicative mood, which some
are wont to say before the prayer, are not the sacramental form, but
are a preparation for the form, in so far as they determine the
intention of the minister.
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Whether the foregoing prayer is a suitable form for this sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that the foregoing prayer is not a suitable
form for this sacrament. For in the forms of the other sacraments
mention is made of the matter, for instance in Confirmation, whereas
this is not done in the aforesaid words. Therefore it is not a suitable
form.
Objection 2: Further, just as the effect of this sacrament is bestowed
on us by the mercy of God, so are the effects of the other sacraments.
But mention is made in the forms of the other sacraments, not of the
Divine mercy, but rather of the Trinity and of the Passion. Therefore
the same should be done here.
Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is stated in the text (Sent. iv,
D, 23) to have a twofold effect. But in the foregoing words mention is
made of only one effect, viz. the remission of sins, and not of the
healing of the body to which end James directs the prayer of faith to
be made (James 5:15): "The prayer of faith shall save the sick man."
Therefore the above form is unsuitable.
I answer that, The prayer given above [4895](A[8]) is a suitable form
for this sacrament, for it includes the sacrament by the words: "By
this holy unction," and that which works in the sacrament, viz. "the
mercy of God," and the effect, viz. "remission of sins."
Reply to Objection 1: The matter of this sacrament may be understood in
the act of anointing, whereas the matter of Confirmation cannot be
implied by the act expressed in the form. Hence there is no parity.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of mercy is misery: and because this
sacrament is given when we are in a state of misery, i.e. of sickness,
mention of mercy is made in this rather than in other sacraments.
Reply to Objection 3: The form should contain mention of the principal
effect, and of that which always ensues in virtue of the sacrament,
unless there be something lacking on the part of the recipient. Now
bodily health is not an effect of this kind, as we shall state further
on ([4896]Q[30], AA[1] ,2), though it does ensue at times, for which
reason James ascribes this effect to the prayer which is the form of
this sacrament.
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OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effect of this sacrament: under which head
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins?
(2) Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament?
(3) Whether this sacrament imprints a character?
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Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that Extreme Unction does not avail for the
remission of sins. For when a thing can be attained by one means, no
other is needed. Now repentance is required in the recipient of Extreme
Unction for the remission of his sins. Therefore sins are not remitted
by Extreme Unction.
Objection 2: Further, there are no more than three things in sin, the
stain, the debt of punishment, and the remnants of sin. Now Extreme
Unction does not remit the stain without contrition, and this remits
sin even without Unction; nor does it remit the punishment, for if the
recipient recover, he is still bound to fulfill the satisfaction
enjoined; nor does it take away the remnants of sin, since the
dispositions remaining from preceding acts still remain, as may easily
be seen after recovery. Therefore remission of sins is by no means the
effect of Extreme Unction.
Objection 3: Further, remission of sins takes place, not successively,
but instantaneously. On the other hand, Extreme Unction is not done all
at once, since several anointings are required. Therefore the remission
of sins is not its effect.
On the contrary, It is written (James 5:15): "If he be in sins, they
shall be forgiven him."
Further, every sacrament of the New Law confers grace. Now grace
effects the forgiveness of sins. Therefore since Extreme Unction is a
sacrament of the New Law, its effect is the remission of sins.
I answer that, Each sacrament was instituted for the purpose of one
principal effect, though it may, in consequence, produce other effects
besides. And since a sacrament causes what it signifies, the principal
effect of a sacrament must be gathered from its signification. Now this
sacrament is conferred by way of a kind of medicament, even as Baptism
is conferred by way of washing, and the purpose of a medicament is to
expel sickness. Hence the chief object of the institution of this
sacrament is to cure the sickness of sin. Therefore, just as Baptism is
a spiritual regeneration, and Penance, a spiritual resurrection, so
Extreme Unction is a spiritual healing or cure. Now just as a bodily
cure presupposes bodily life in the one who is cured, so does a
spiritual cure presuppose spiritual life. Hence this sacrament is not
an antidote to those defects which deprive man of spiritual life,
namely. original and mortal sin, but is a remedy for such defects as
weaken man spiritually, so as to deprive him of perfect vigor for acts
of the life of grace or of glory; which defects consist in nothing else
but a certain weakness and unfitness, the result in us of actual or
original sin. against which weakness man is strengthened by this
sacrament. Since, however, this strength is given by grace, which is
incompatible with sin, it follows that. in consequence, if it finds any
sin, either mortal or venial, it removes it as far as the guilt is
concerned, provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient;
just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the Eucharist and
Confirmation (TP, Q[73], A[7]; [4897]TP, Q[79], A[3]). Hence, too,
James speaks of the remission of sin as being conditional, for he says:
"If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him," viz. as to the guilt.
Because it does not always blot out sin, since it does not always find
any: but it always remits in respect of the aforesaid weakness which
some call the remnants of sin. Some, however, maintain that it is
instituted chiefly as a remedy for venial sin which cannot be cured
perfectly in this lifetime: for which reason the sacrament of the dying
is ordained specially against venial sin. But this does not seem to be
true, since Penance also blots out venial sins sufficiently during this
life as to their guilt, and that we cannot avoid them after doing
penance, does not cancel the effect of the previous penance; moreover
this is part of the weakness mentioned above.
Consequently we must say that the principal effect of this sacrament is
the remission of sin, as to its remnants, and, consequently, even as to
its guilt, if it find it.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the principal effect of a sacrament can
be obtained without actually receiving that sacrament (either without
any sacrament at all, or indirectly by means of some other sacrament),
yet it never can be obtained without the purpose of receiving that
sacrament. And so, since Penance was instituted chiefly against actual
sin, whichever other sacrament may blot out sin indirectly, it does not
exclude the necessity of Penance.
Reply to Objection 2: Extreme Unction remits sin in some way as to
those three things. For, although the stain of sin is not washed out
without contrition, yet this sacrament, by the grace which it bestows,
makes the movement of the free will towards sin to be one of
contrition, just as may occur in the Eucharist and Confirmation. Again
it diminishes the debt of temporal punishment; and this indirectly, in
as much as it takes away weakness, for a strong man bears the same
punishment more easily than a weak man. Hence it does not follow that
the measure of satisfaction is diminished. As to the remnants of sin,
they do not mean here those dispositions which result from acts, and
are inchoate habits so to speak, but a certain spiritual debility in
the mind, which debility being removed, though such like habits or
dispositions remain, the mind is not so easily prone to sin.
Reply to Objection 3: When many actions are ordained to one effect, the
last is formal with respect to all the others that precede, and acts by
virtue of them: wherefore by the last anointing is infused grace which
gives the sacrament its effect.
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Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that bodily health is not an effect of this
sacrament. For every sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Now a spiritual
remedy is ordained to spiritual health, just as a bodily remedy is
ordained to health of the body. Therefore bodily health is not an
effect of this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments always produce their effect in
those who approach them in the proper dispositions. Now sometimes the
recipient of this sacrament does not receive bodily health, no matter
how devoutly he receives it. Therefore bodily health is not its effect.
Objection 3: Further, the efficacy of this sacrament is notified to us
in the fifth chapter of James. Now healing is ascribed there as the
effect, not of the anointing, but of the prayer, for he says: "The
prayer of faith shall save the sick man." Therefore bodily healing is
not an effect of this sacrament.
On the contrary, The operation of the Church is more efficacious since
Christ's Passion than before. Now, before the Passion, those whom the
apostles anointed with oil were healed (Mk. 6:13). Therefore unction
has its effect now in healing bodies.
Further, the sacraments produce their effect by signifying it. Now
Baptism signifies and effects a spiritual washing, through the bodily
washing in which it consists outwardly. Therefore Extreme Unction
signifies and causes a spiritual healing through the bodily healing
which it effects externally.
I answer that, Just as Baptism causes a spiritual cleansing from
spiritual stains by means of a bodily washing, so this sacrament causes
an inward healing by means of an outward sacramental healing: and even
as the baptismal washing has the effect of a bodily washing, since it
effects even a bodily cleansing, so too, Extreme Unction has the effect
of a bodily remedy, namely a healing of the body. But there is a
difference, for as much as the bodily washing causes a bodily cleansing
by a natural property of the bodily element, and consequently always
causes it, whereas Extreme Unction causes a bodily healing, not by a
natural property of the matter, but by the Divine power which works
reasonably. And since reasonable working never produces a secondary
effect, except in so far as it is required for the principal effect, it
follows that a bodily healing does not always ensue from this
sacrament, but only when it is requisite for the spiritual healing: and
then it produces it always, provided there be no obstacle on the part
of the recipient.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection proves that bodily health is not
the principal effect of this sacrament: and this is true.
The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what has been said
above (cf.[4898] Q[29], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 3: This prayer is the form of this sacrament as
stated above ([4899]Q[29], AA[8],9). Hence, so far as its form is
concerned, this sacrament derives from it its efficacy in healing the
body.
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Whether this sacrament imprints a character?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament imprints a character.
For a character is a distinctive sign. Now just as one who is baptized
is distinguished from one who is not so is one who is anointed, from
one who is not. Therefore, just as Baptism imprints a character so does
Extreme Unction.
Objection 2: Further, there is an anointing in the sacraments or order
and Confirmation, as there is in this sacrament. But a character is
imprinted in those sacraments. Therefore a character is imprinted in
this one also.
Objection 3: Further, every sacrament contains something that is a
reality only, something that is a sacrament only, and something that is
both reality and sacrament. Now nothing in this sacrament can be
assigned as both reality and sacrament except a character. Therefore in
this sacrament also, a character is imprinted.
On the contrary, No sacrament that imprints a character is repeated.
But this sacrament is repeated as we shall state further on
([4900]Q[33]). Therefore it does not imprint a character.
Further, a sacramental character causes a distinction among those who
are in the present Church. But Extreme Unction is given to one who is
departing from the present Church. Therefore it does not imprint a
character.
I answer that, A character is not imprinted except in those sacraments
whereby man is deputed to some sacred duty. Now this sacrament is for
no other purpose than a remedy, and man is not deputed thereby to do or
receive anything holy. Therefore it does not imprint a character.
Reply to Objection 1: A character marks a distinction of . states with
regard to duties which have to be performed in the Church, a
distinction which a man does not receive by being anointed.
Reply to Objection 2: The unction of orders and Confirmation, is the
unction of consecration whereby a man is deputed to some sacred duty,
whereas this unction is remedial. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: In this sacrament, that which is both reality and
sacrament is not a character, but a certain inward devotion which is a
kind of spiritual anointing.
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OF THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the minister of this sacrament: under which head
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a layman can confer this sacrament?
(2) Whether a deacon can?
(3) Whether none but a bishop can confer it?
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Whether a layman can confer this sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that even a layman can confer this
sacrament. For this sacrament derives its efficacy from prayer, as
James declares (James 5:15). But a layman's prayer is sometimes as
acceptable to God as a priest's. Therefore he can confer this
sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, we read of certain fathers in Egypt that they
sent the oil to the sick, and that these were healed. It is also
related of the Blessed Genevieve that she anointed the sick with oil.
Therefore this sacrament can be conferred even by lay people.
On the contrary, Remission of sins is given in this sacrament. But
laymen have not the power to forgive sins. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) there are some
who exercise hierarchical actions, and some who are recipients only.
Hence laymen are officially incompetent to dispense any sacrament: and
that they can baptize in cases of necessity, is due to the Divine
dispensation, in order that no one may be deprived of spiritual
regeneration.
Reply to Objection 1: This prayer is not said by the priest in his own
person, for since sometimes he is in sin, he would not in that case be
heard. But it is said in the person of the whole Church, in whose
person he can pray as a public official, whereas a layman cannot, for
he is a private individual.
Reply to Objection 2: These unctions were not sacramental. It was due
to the devotion of the recipients of the unction, and to the merits of
those who anointed them that they procured the effects of bodily
health, through the "grace of healing" (1 Cor. 12:9) but not through
sacramental grace.
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Whether deacons can confer this sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that deacons can confer this sacrament. For,
according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) "deacons have the power to
cleanse." Now this sacrament was instituted precisely to cleanse from
sickness of the mind and body. Therefore deacons also can confer it.
Objection 2: Further, Baptism is a more excellent sacrament than the
one of which we are speaking. But deacons can baptize, as instanced by
the Blessed Laurence. Therefore they can confer this sacrament also.
On the contrary, It is written (James 5:14): "Let him bring in the
priests of the Church."
I answer that, A deacon has the power to cleanse but not to enlighten.
Hence, since enlightenment is an effect of grace, no sacrament whereby
grace is conferred can be given by a deacon in virtue of his office:
and so he cannot confer this sacrament, since grace is bestowed
therein.
Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament cleanses by enlightening through
the bestowal of grace: wherefore a deacon is not competent to confer
it.
Reply to Objection 2: This is not a necessary sacrament, as Baptism is.
Hence its bestowal is not committed to all in cases of necessity, but
only to those who are competent to do so in virtue of their office. Nor
are deacons competent to baptize in virtue of their office.
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Whether none but a bishop can confer this sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that none but a bishop can confer this
sacrament. For this sacrament consists in an anointing, just as
Confirmation does. Now none but a bishop can confirm. Therefore only a
bishop can confer this sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less cannot do what is
greater. Now the use of consecrated matter surpasses the act of
consecrating the matter, since the former is the end of the latter.
Therefore since a priest cannot consecrate the matter, neither can he
use the matter after it has been consecrated.
On the contrary, The minister of this sacrament has to be brought in to
the recipient, as is clear from James 5:14. Now a bishop cannot go to
all the sick people of his diocese. Therefore the bishop is not the
only one who can confer this sacrament.
I answer that, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), the office of
perfecting belongs to a bishop, just as it belongs to a priest to
enlighten. Wherefore those sacraments are reserved to a bishop's
dispensation, which place the recipient in a state of perfection above
others. But this is not the case with this sacrament, for it is given
to all. Consequently it can be given by ordinary priests.
Reply to Objection 1: Confirmation imprints a character, whereby man is
placed in a state of perfection, as stated above ([4901]TP, Q[63],
AA[1], 2,6). But this does not take place in this sacrament; hence
there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the use of consecrated matter is of more
importance than the consecration of the matter, from the point of view
of the final cause; nevertheless, from the point of view of efficient
cause, the consecration of the matter is the more important, since the
use of the matter is dependent thereon, as on its active cause: hence
the consecration of the matter demands a higher power than the use of
the matter does.
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ON WHOM SHOULD THIS SACRAMENT BE CONFERRED AND ON WHAT PART OF THE BODY?
(SEVEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider on whom this sacrament should be conferred and on
what part of the body: under which head there are seven points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether this sacrament should be conferred on those who are in good
health?
(2) Whether it should be conferred in any kind of sickness?
(3) Whether it should be conferred on madmen and imbeciles?
(4) Whether it should be given to children?
(5) Whether, in this sacrament, the whole body should be anointed?
(6) Whether certain parts are suitably assigned to be anointed?
(7) Whether those who are deformed in the above parts ought to be
anointed thereon?
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Whether this sacrament ought to be conferred on those who are in good
health?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament should be conferred even
on those who are in good health. For the healing of the mind is a more
important effect of this sacrament than the healing of the body, as
stated above ([4902]Q[30], A[2]). Now even those who are healthy in
body need to be healed in mind. Therefore this sacrament should be
conferred on them also.
Objection 2: Further, this is the sacrament of those who are departing
this life, just as Baptism is the sacrament of those who are entering
this life. Now Baptism is given to all who enter. Therefore this
sacrament should be given to all who are departing. But sometimes those
who are near departure are in good health, for instance those who are
to be beheaded. Therefore this sacrament should be conferred on them.
On the contrary, It is written (James 5:14): "Is any man sick among
you," etc. Therefore none but the sick are competent to receive this
sacrament.
I answer that, This sacrament is a spiritual healing, as stated above
([4903]Q[30], AA[1],2), and is signified by way of a healing of the
body. Hence this sacrament should not be conferred on those who are not
subjects for bodily healing, those namely, who are in good health.
Reply to Objection 1: Although spiritual health is the principal effect
of this sacrament, yet this same spiritual healing needs to be
signified by a healing of the body, although bodily health may not
actually ensue. Consequently spiritual health can be conferred by this
sacrament on those alone who are competent to receive bodily healing,
viz. the sick; even as he alone can receive Baptism who is capable of a
bodily washing, and not a child yet in its mother's womb.
Reply to Objection 2: Even those who are entering into life cannot
receive Baptism unless they are capable of a bodily washing. And so
those who are departing this life cannot receive this sacrament, unless
they be subjects for a bodily healing.
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Whether this sacrament ought to be given in any kind of sickness?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament should be given in any
kind of sickness. For no kind of sickness is determined in the fifth
chapter of James where this sacrament is delivered to us. Therefore
this sacrament should be given in all kinds of sickness.
Objection 2: Further, the more excellent a remedy is, the more
generally should it be available. Now this sacrament is more excellent
than bodily medicine. Since then bodily medicine is given to all manner
of sick persons, it seems that this sacrament should be given in like
manner to all.
On the contrary, This sacrament is called by all Extreme Unction. Now
it is not every sickness that brings man to the extremity of his life,
since some ailments prolong life, according to the Philosopher (De
Long. et Brev. Vitae i). Therefore this sacrament should not be given
in every case of sickness.
I answer that, This sacrament is the last remedy that the Church can
give, since it is an immediate preparation for glory. Therefore it
ought to be given to those only, who are so sick as to be in a state of
departure from this life, through their sickness being of such a nature
as to cause death, the danger of which is to be feared.
Reply to Objection 1: Any sickness can cause death, if it be
aggravated. Hence if we consider the different kinds of disease, there
is none in which this sacrament cannot be given; and for this reason
the apostle does not determine any particular one. But if we consider
the degree and the stage of the complaint, this sacrament should not be
given to every sick person.
Reply to Objection 2: The principal effect of bodily medicine is bodily
health, which all sick people lack, whatever be the stage of their
sickness. But the principal effect of this sacrament is that immunity
from disorder which is needed by those who are taking their departure
from this life and setting out for the life of glory. Hence the
comparison fails.
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Whether this sacrament ought to be given to madmen and imbeciles?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament should be given to
madmen and imbeciles. For these diseases are full of danger and cause
death quickly. Now when there is danger it is the time to apply the
remedy. Therefore this sacrament, which was intended as a remedy to
human weakness, should be given to such people.
Objection 2: Further, Baptism is a greater sacrament than this. Now
Baptism is conferred on mad people as stated above ([4904]TP, Q[68],
A[12]). Therefore this sacrament also should be given to them.
On the contrary, This sacrament should be given to none but such as
acknowledge it. Now this does not apply to madmen and imbeciles.
Therefore it should not be given to them.
I answer that, The devotion of the recipient, the personal merit of the
minister, and the general merits of the whole Church, are of great
account towards the reception of the effect of this sacrament. This is
evident from the fact that the form of this sacrament is pronounced by
way of a prayer. Hence it should not be given those who cannot
acknowledge it, and especially to madmen and imbeciles, who might
dishonor the sacrament by their offensive conduct, unless they have
lucid intervals, when they would be capable of acknowledging the
sacrament, for then the sacrament should be given to children the same
in that state.
Reply to Objection 1: Although such people are sometimes in danger of
death; yet the remedy cannot be applied to them, on account of their
lack of devotion. Hence it should not be given to them.
Reply to Objection 2: Baptism does not require a movement of the
free-will, because it is given chiefly as a remedy for original sin,
which, in us, is not taken away by a movement of the free-will. On the
other hand this sacrament requires a movement of the free-will;
wherefore the comparison fails. Moreover Baptism is a necessary
sacrament, while Extreme Unction is not.
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Whether this sacrament should be given to children?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament ought to be given to
children. Because children suffer from the same ailments sometimes as
adults. Now the same disease requires the same remedy. Therefore this
sacrament should be given to children the same as to adults.
Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is given in order to remove the
remnants of sin, whether original or actual, as stated above
([4905]Q[30], A[1]). Now the remnants of original sin are in children.
Therefore this sacrament should be given to them.
On the contrary, This sacrament should be given to none but those to
whom the form applies. But the form of this sacrament does not apply to
children, since they have not sinned by sight and hearing; as expressed
in the form. Therefore this sacrament should not be given to them.
I answer that, This sacrament, like the Eucharist, requires actual
devotion in the recipient. Therefore, just as the Eucharist ought not
to be given to children, so neither ought this sacrament to be given to
them.
Reply to Objection 1: Children's infirmities are not caused by actual
sin, as in adults, and this sacrament is given chiefly as a remedy for
infirmities that result from sins, being the remnants of sin, as it
were.
Reply to Objection 2: This sacrament is not given as a remedy for the
remnants of original sin, except in so far as they gather strength, so
to speak, from actual sins. Hence from the very form it appears that it
is given chiefly as a remedy for actual sins, which are not in
children.
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Whether the whole body should be anointed in this sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that the whole body should be anointed in
this sacrament. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 6), "the
whole soul is in every part of the body." Now this sacrament is given
chiefly in order to heal the soul. Therefore the whole body ought to be
anointed.
Objection 2: Further, the remedy should be applied to the part affected
by the disease. But sometimes the disease is general, and affects the
whole body, as a fever does. Therefore the whole body should be
anointed.
Objection 3: Further, in Baptism the whole body is dipped under the
water. Therefore in this sacrament the whole body should be anointed.
On the contrary, stands the rite observed throughout the Church,
according to which in this sacrament the sick man is anointed, only in
certain fixed parts of the body.
I answer that, This sacrament is shown to us under the form of a
healing. Now bodily healing has to be effected, by applying the remedy,
not to the whole body, but to those parts where the root of the disease
is seated. Consequently the sacramental unction also ought to be
applied to those parts only in which the spiritual sickness is rooted.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the whole soul is, as to its essence, in
each part of the body, it is not as to its powers which are the roots
of sinful acts. Hence certain fixed parts have to be anointed, those,
namely, in which powers have their being.
Reply to Objection 2: The remedy is not always applied to the part
affected by the disease, but, with greater reason, to the part where
the root of the disease is seated.
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is given under the form of washing: and a
bodily washing cleanses only the part to which it is applied; for this
reason Baptism is applied to the whole body. It is different with
Extreme Unction for the reason given above.
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Whether the parts to be anointed are suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that these parts are unsuitably assigned,
namely, that the eyes, nose, ears, lips, hands, and feet should be
anointed. For a wise physician heals the disease in its root. Now "from
the heart come forth thoughts . . . that defile a man" (Mat. 15:19,20).
Therefore the breast ought to be anointed.
Objection 2: Further, purity of mind is not less necessary to those who
are departing this life than to those who are entering therein. Now
those who are entering are anointed with chrism on the head by the
priest, to signify purity of mind. Therefore in this sacrament those
who are departing should be anointed on the head.
Objection 3: Further, the remedy should be applied where the disease is
most virulent. Now spiritual sickness is most virulent in the loins in
men, and in the navel in women, according to Job 40:11: "His strength
is in his loins, and his force in the navel of his belly," as Gregory
expounds the passage (Moral. xxxii, 11). Therefore these parts should
be anointed.
Objection 4: Further, sins are committed with other parts of the body,
no less than with the feet. Therefore, as the feet are anointed, so
ought other members of the body to be anointed.
I answer that, The principles of sinning are the same in us as the
principles of action, for a sin is an act. Now there are in us three
principles of action; the first is the directing principle, namely, the
cognitive power; the second is the commanding principle, namely, the
appetitive power; the third is the executive principle, namely, the
motive power.
Now all our knowledge has its origin in the senses. And, since the
remedy for sin should be applied where sin originates in us first, for
that reason the places of the five senses are anointed. the eyes, to
wit, on account of the sight, the ears on account of hearing, the
nostrils on account of the smell, the mouth on account of the taste,
the hands on account of the touch which is keenest in the finger tips,
(in some places too the loins are anointed on account of the appetite),
and the feet are anointed on account of the motive power of which they
are the chief instrument. And since the cognitive power is the first
principle of human activity, the anointing of the five senses is
observed by all, as being essential to the sacrament. But some do not
observe the other unctions---some also anoint the feet but not the
loins---because the appetitive and motive powers are secondary
principles.
Reply to Objection 1: No thought arises in the heart without an act of
the imagination which is a movement proceeding from sensation (De Anima
ii). Hence the primary root of thought is not the heart, but the
sensory organs, except in so far as the heart is a principle of the
whole body, albeit a remote principle.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who enter have to receive purity of the
mind, whereas those who are departing have to cleanse the mind. Hence
the latter need to be anointed in those parts in respect of which the
mind's purity may be sullied.
Reply to Objection 3: Some are wont to anoint the loins, because they
are the chief seat of the concupiscible appetite: however, as stated
above, the appetitive power is not the primary root.
Reply to Objection 4: The bodily organs which are the instruments of
sin, are the feet, hands, and tongue, all of which are anointed, and
the organs of generation which it would be unbecoming to anoint, on
account of their uncleanliness, and out of respect for the sacrament.
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Whether those who are deformed in those parts should be anointed?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are deformed should not be
anointed in those parts. For just as this sacrament demands a certain
disposition on the part of the recipient, viz. that he should be sick,
so it demands that he should be anointed in a certain part of the body.
Now he that is not sick cannot be anointed. Therefore neither can he be
anointed who lacks the part to be anointed.
Objection 2: Further, a man born blind does not sin by his sight. Yet
in the anointing of the eyes mention is made of sins by sight.
Therefore this anointing ought not to be applied to one born blind, and
in like manner as regards the other senses.
On the contrary, Bodily deformity is not an impediment to any other
sacrament. Therefore it should not be an impediment to this one. Now
each of the anointings is essential to the sacrament. Therefore all
should be applied to those who are deformed.
I answer that, Even those who are deformed should be anointed, and that
as near as possible to the part which ought to have been anointed. For
though they have not the members, nevertheless, they have, at least
radically, the powers of the soul, corresponding to those members, and
they may commit inwardly the sins that pertain to those members, though
they cannot outwardly.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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OF THE REPETITION OF THIS SACRAMENT (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the repetition of this sacrament: under which head
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated?
(2) Whether it ought to be repeated during the same sickness?
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Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament ought not to be
repeated. For the anointing of a man is of greater import than the
anointing of a stone. But the anointing of an altar is not repeated,
unless the altar be shattered. Neither, therefore, should Extreme
Unction, whereby a man is anointed, be repeated.
Objection 2: Further, nothing comes after what is extreme. But this
unction is called extreme. Therefore it should not be repeated.
On the contrary, This sacrament is a spiritual healing applied under
the form of a bodily cure. But a bodily cure is repeated. Therefore
this sacrament also can be repeated.
I answer that, No sacramental or sacrament, having an effect that lasts
for ever, can be repeated, because this would imply that the sacrament
had failed to produce that effect; and this would be derogatory to the
sacrament. On the other hand a sacrament whose effect does not last for
ever, can be repeated without disparaging that sacrament, in order that
the lost effect may be recovered. And since health of body and soul,
which is the effect of this sacrament, can be lost after it has been
effected, it follows that this sacrament can, without disparagement
thereto, be repeated.
Reply to Objection 1: The stone is anointed in order that the altar may
be consecrated, and the stone remains consecrated, as long as the altar
remains, hence it cannot be anointed again. But a man is not
consecrated by being anointed, since it does not imprint a character on
him. Hence there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 2: What men think to be extreme is not always
extreme in reality. It is thus that this sacrament is called Extreme
Unction, because it ought not to be given save to those whose death men
think to be nigh.
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Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated during the same sickness?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament ought not to be repeated
during the same sickness. For one disease demands one remedy. Now this
sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Therefore it ought not to be repeated
for one sickness.
Objection 2: Further, if a sick man could be anointed more than once
during one disease, this might be done for a whole day: which is
absurd.
On the contrary, Sometimes a disease lasts long after the sacrament has
been received, so that the remnants of sin, against which chiefly this
sacrament is given, would be contracted. Therefore it ought to be given
again.
I answer that, This sacrament regards not only the sickness, but also
the state of the sick man, because it ought not to be given except to
those sick people who seem, in man's estimation, to be nigh to death.
Now some diseases do not last long; so that if this sacrament is given
at the time that the sick man is in a state of danger of death, he does
not leave that state except the disease be cured, and thus he needs not
to be anointed again. But if he has a relapse, it will be a second
sickness, and he can be anointed again. on the other hand some diseases
are of long duration, as hectic fever, dropsy and the like, and those
who lie sick of them should not be anointed until they seem to be in
danger of death. And if the sick man escape that danger while the
disease continues, and be brought again thereby to the same state of
danger, he can be anointed again, because it is, as it were, another
state of sickness, although strictly speaking, it is not another
sickness. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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HOLY ORDERS (QQ[34]-40)
OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER AS TO ITS ESSENCE AND ITS PARTS (FIVE
ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider the sacrament of Order: (1) Order in
general; (2) the difference of Orders; (3) those who confer Orders; (4)
the impediments to receiving Orders; (5) things connected with Orders.
Concerning Order in general three points have to be considered: (1) Its
essence, quiddity, and parts; (2) Its effect; (3) The recipients of
Orders.
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there should be Order in the Church?
(2) Whether it is fittingly defined?
(3) Whether it is a sacrament?
(4) Whether its form is expressed properly?
(5) Whether this sacrament has any matter?
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Whether there should be Order in the Church?
Objection 1: It would seem that there should not be Order in the
Church. For Order requires subjection and preeminence. But subjection
seemingly is incompatible with the liberty whereunto we are called by
Christ. Therefore there should not be Order in the Church.
Objection 2: Further, he who has received an Order becomes another's
superior. But in the Church everyone should deem himself lower than
another (Phil. 2:3): "Let each esteem others better than themselves."
Therefore Order should not be in the Church.
Objection 3: Further, we find order among the angels on account of
their differing in natural and gratuitous gifts. But all men are one in
nature, and it is not known who has the higher gifts of grace.
Therefore Order should not be in the Church.
On the contrary, "Those things that are of God, are in order [*Vulg:
'Those (powers) that are, are ordained of God.']." Now the Church is of
God, for He Himself built it with His blood. Therefore there ought to
be Order in the Church.
Further, the state of the Church is between the state of nature and the
state of glory. Now we find order in nature, in that some things are
above others, and likewise in glory, as in the angels. Therefore there
should be Order in the Church.
I answer that, God wished to produce His works in likeness to Himself,
as far as possible, in order that they might be perfect, and that He
might be known through them. Hence, that He might be portrayed in His
works, not only according to what He is in Himself, but also according
as He acts on others, He laid this natural law on all things, that last
things should be reduced and perfected by middle things, and middle
things by the first, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). Wherefore that
this beauty might not be lacking to the Church, He established Order in
her so that some should deliver the sacraments to others, being thus
made like to God in their own way, as co-operating with God; even as in
the natural body, some members act on others.
Reply to Objection 1: The subjection of slavery is incompatible with
liberty; for slavery consists in lording over others and employing them
for one's own profit. Such subjection is not required in Order, whereby
those who preside have to seek the salvation of their subjects and not
their own profit.
Reply to Objection 2: Each one should esteem himself lower in merit,
not in office; and orders are a kind of office.
Reply to Objection 3: Order among the angels does not arise from
difference of nature, unless accidentally, in so far as difference of
grace results in them from difference of nature. But in them it results
directly from their difference in grace; because their orders regard
their participation of divine things, and their communicating them in
the state of glory, which is according to the measure of grace, as
being the end and effect, so to speak, of grace. on the other hand, the
Orders of the Church militant regard the participation in the
sacraments and the communication thereof, which are the cause of grace
and, in a way, precede grace; and consequently our Orders do not
require sanctifying grace, but only the power to dispense the
sacraments; for which reason order does not correspond to the
difference of sanctifying grace, but to the difference of power.
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Whether Order is properly defined?
Objection 1: It would seem that order is improperly defined by the
Master (Sent. iv, D, 53), where it is said "Order is a seal of the
Church, whereby spiritual power is conferred on the person ordained."
For a part should not be described as the genus of the whole. Now the
character which is denoted by the seal in a subsequent definition is a
part of order, since it is placed in contradistinction with that which
is either reality only, or sacrament only, since it is both reality and
sacrament. Therefore seal should not be mentioned as the genus of
Order.
Objection 2: Further, just as a character is imprinted in the sacrament
of order, so is it in the sacrament of Baptism. Now character was not
mentioned in the definition of Baptism. Therefore neither should it be
mentioned in the definition of Order.
Objection 3: Further, in Baptism there is also given a certain
spiritual power to approach the sacraments; and again it is a seal,
since it is a sacrament. Therefore this definition is applicable to
Baptism; and consequently it is improperly applied to Order.
Objection 4: Further, Order is a kind of relation, and relation is
realized in both its terms. Now the terms of the relation of order are
the superior and the inferior. Therefore inferiors have order as well
as superiors. Yet there is no power of preeminence in them, such as is
mentioned here in the definition of Order, as appears from the
subsequent explanation (Sent. iv, D, 53), where promotion to power is
mentioned. Therefore Order is improperly defined there.
I answer that, The Master's definition of Order applies to Order as a
sacrament of the Church. Hence he mentions two things, namely the
outward sign, a "kind of seal," i.e. a kind of sign, and the inward
effect, "whereby spiritual power," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: Seal stands here, not for the inward character,
but for the outward action, which is the sign and cause of inward
power; and this is also the sense of character in the other definition.
If, however, it be taken for the inward character, the definition would
not be unsuitable; because the division of a sacrament into those three
things is not a division into integral parts, properly speaking; since
what is reality only is not essential to the sacrament, and that which
is the sacrament is transitory; while that which is sacrament and
reality is said to remain. Wherefore it follows that inward character
itself is essentially and principally the sacrament of Order.
Reply to Objection 2: Although in Baptism there is conferred a
spiritual power to receive the other sacraments, for which reason it
imprints a character, nevertheless this is not its principal effect,
but the inward cleansing; wherefore Baptism would be given even though
the former motive did not exist. On the other hand, order denotes power
principally. Wherefore the character which is a spiritual power is
included in the definition of Order, but not in that of Baptism.
Reply to Objection 3: In Baptism there is given a certain spiritual
potentiality to receive, and consequently a somewhat passive
potentiality. But power properly denotes active potentiality, together
with some kind of preeminence. Hence this definition is not applicable
to Baptism.
Reply to Objection 4: The word "order" is used in two ways. For
sometimes it denotes the relation itself, and thus it is both in the
inferior and in the superior, as the objection states; but it is not
thus that we use the word here. On the other hand, it denotes the
degree which results in the order taken in the first sense. And since
the notion of order as relation is observed where we first meet with
something higher than another, it follows that this degree of
pre-eminence by spiritual power is called Order.
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Whether Order is a sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that Order is not a sacrament. For a
sacrament, according to Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. i) "is a
material element." Now Order denotes nothing of the kind, but rather
relation or power; since Order is a part of power according to Isidore.
Therefore it is not a sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments do not concern the Church
triumphant. Yet Order is there, as in the angels. Therefore it is not a
sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, just as spiritual authority, which is Order, is
given by means of consecration, so is secular authority, since kings
also are anointed, as stated above ([4906]Q[19], A[3], ad 2). But the
kingly power is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is order of which we
speak now.
On the contrary, It is mentioned by all among the seven sacraments of
the Church.
Further, "the cause of a thing being such, is still more so." Now Order
is the cause of man being the dispenser of the other sacraments.
Therefore Order has more reason for being a sacrament than the others.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[29], A[1]; [4907]TP, Q[60]), a
sacrament is nothing else than a sanctification conferred on man with
some outward sign. Wherefore, since by receiving orders a consecration
is conferred on man by visible signs, it is clear that Order is a
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Although Order does not by its name express a
material element, it is not conferred without some material element.
Reply to Objection 2: Power must needs be proportionate to the purpose
for which it is intended. Now the communication of divine things, which
is the purpose for which spiritual power is given, is not effected
among the angels by means of sensible signs, as is the case among men.
Hence the spiritual power that is Order is not bestowed on the angels
by visible signs, as on men. Wherefore Order is a sacrament among men,
but not among angels.
Reply to Objection 3: Not every blessing or consecration given to men
is a sacrament, for both monks and abbots are blessed, and yet such
blessings are not sacraments, and in like manner neither is the
anointing of a king; because by such blessings men are not ordained to
the dispensing of the divine sacraments, as by the blessing of Order.
Hence the comparison fails.
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Whether the form of this sacrament is suitably expressed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the form of this sacrament is
unsuitably set forth in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Because the
sacraments take their efficacy from their form. Now the efficacy of the
sacraments is from the divine power, which works our salvation in them
in a most hidden manner. Therefore the form of this sacrament should
include a mention of the divine power by the invocation of the Trinity,
as in the other sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, to command pertains to one who has authority. Now
the dispenser of the sacrament exercises no authority, but only
ministry. Therefore he should not use the imperative mood by saying:
"Do" or "Receive" this or that, or some similar expression.
Objection 3: Further, mention should not be made in the sacramental
form, except of such things as are essential to the sacrament. But the
use of the power received is not essential to this sacrament, but is
consequent upon it. Therefore it should not be mentioned in the form of
this sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, all the sacraments direct us to an eternal
reward. But the forms of the other sacraments make no mention of a
reward. Therefore neither should any mention be made thereof in the
form of this sacrament, as in the words: "Since thou wilt have a share,
if faithfully," etc.
I answer that, This sacrament consists chiefly in the power conferred.
Now power is conferred by power, as like proceeds from like; and again
power is made known by its use, since powers are manifested by their
acts. Wherefore in the form of order the use of order is expressed by
the act which is commanded; and the conferring of power is expressed by
employing the imperative mood.
Reply to Objection 1: The other sacraments are not ordained chiefly to
effects similar to the power whereby the sacraments are dispensed, as
this sacrament is. Hence in this sacrament there is a kind of universal
communication. Wherefore in the other sacraments something is expressed
on the part of the divine power to which the effect of the sacrament is
likened, but not in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: [There is a special reason why this sacrament,
rather than the others, is conferred by employing the imperative mood.
For]* although the bishop who is the minister of this sacrament has no
authority in respect of the conferring of this sacrament, nevertheless
he has some power with regard to the power of Order, which power he
confers, in so far as it is derived, from his. [*The sentence in
brackets is not in the Leonine edition.]
Reply to Objection 3: The use of power is the effect of power in the
genus of efficient cause, and from this point of view it has no reason
to be mentioned in the definition of Order. But it is somewhat a cause
in the genus of final cause, and from this point of view it can be
placed in the definition of order.
Reply to Objection 4: There is here a difference between this and the
other sacraments. Because by this sacrament an office or the power to
do something is conferred; and so it is fitting that mention be made of
the reward to be obtained if it be administered faithfully. But in the
other sacraments no such office or power to act is conferred, and so no
mention of reward is made in them. Accordingly the recipient is
somewhat passive in relation to the other sacraments, because he
receives them for the perfecting of his own state only, whereas in
relation to this sacrament he holds himself somewhat actively, since he
receives it for the sake of exercising hierarchical duties in the
Church. Wherefore although the other sacraments, from the very fact
that they give grace, direct the recipient to salvation, properly
speaking they do not direct him to a reward, in the same way as this
sacrament does.
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Whether this sacrament has any matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament has no matter. Because
in every sacrament that has a matter the power that works in the
sacrament is in the matter. But in the material objects which are used
here, such as keys, candlesticks, and so forth, there is not apparently
any power of sanctification. Therefore it has no matter.
Objection 2: Further, in this sacrament the fulness of sevenfold grace
is conferred, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24), just as in
Confirmation. But the matter of Confirmation requires to be consecrated
beforehand. Since then the things which appear to be material in this
sacrament are not consecrated beforehand, it would seem that they are
not the matter of the sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, in any sacrament that has matter there needs to
be contact of matter with the recipient of the sacrament. Now, as some
say, it is not essential to this sacrament that there be contact
between the aforesaid material objects and the recipient of the
sacrament, but only that they be presented to him. Therefore the
aforesaid material objects are not the matter of this sacrament.
On the contrary, Every sacrament consists of things and words. Now in
any sacrament the thing is the matter. Therefore the things employed in
this sacrament are its matter.
Further, more is requisite to dispense the sacraments than to receive
them. Yet Baptism, wherein the power is given to receive the
sacraments, needs a matter. Therefore order also does, wherein the
power is given to dispense them.
I answer that, The matter employed outwardly in the sacraments
signifies that the power which works in the sacraments comes entirely
from without. Wherefore, since the effect proper to this sacrament,
namely the character, is not received through any operation of the one
who approaches the sacrament, as was the case in Penance, but comes
wholly from without, it is fitting that it should have a matter, yet
otherwise than the other sacraments that have matter; because that
which is bestowed in the other sacraments comes from God alone, and not
from the minister who dispenses the sacrament; whereas that which is
conferred in this sacrament, namely the spiritual power, comes also
from him who gives the sacrament, as imperfect from perfect power.
Hence the efficacy of the other sacraments resides chiefly in the
matter which both signifies and contains the divine power through the
sanctification applied by the minister; whereas the efficacy of this
sacrament resides chiefly with him who dispenses the sacrament. And the
matter is employed to show the powers conferred in particular by one
who has it completely, rather than to cause power; and this is clear
from the fact that the matter is in keeping with the use of power. This
suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: It is necessary for the matter to be consecrated
in the other sacraments, on account of the power it contains; but it is
not so in the case in point.
Reply to Objection 3: If we admit this assertion, the reason for it is
clear from what we have said; for since the power of order is received
from the minister and not from the matter, the presenting of the matter
is more essential to the sacrament than contact therewith. However, the
words themselves of the form would seem to indicate that contact with
the matter is essential to the sacrament, for it is said: "Receive"
this or that.
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OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider me effect of this sacrament. Under this head
there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order?
(2) Whether a character is imprinted in connection with all the Orders?
(3) Whether the character of Order presupposes of necessity the
character of Baptism?
(4) Whether it presupposes of necessity the character of Confirmation?
(5) Whether the character of one Order presupposes of necessity the
character of another Order?
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Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order?
Objection 1: It would seem that sanctifying grace is not conferred in
the sacrament of Order. For it is commonly agreed that the sacrament of
Order is directed to counteract the defect of ignorance. Now not
sanctifying grace but gratuitous grace is given to counteract
ignorance, for sanctifying grace has more to do with the will.
Therefore sanctifying grace is not given in the sacrament of Order.
Objection 2: Further, Order implies distinction. Now the members of the
Church are distinguished, not by sanctifying but by gratuitous grace,
of which it is said (1 Cor. 12:4): "There are diversities of graces."
Therefore sanctifying grace is not given in order.
Objection 3: Further, no cause presupposes its effect. But grace is
presupposed in one who receives orders, so that he may be worthy to
receive them. Therefore this same grace is not given in the conferring
of Orders.
On the contrary, The sacraments of the New Law cause what they signify.
Now Order by its sevenfold number signifies the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore the gifts of
the Holy Ghost, which are not apart from sanctifying grace, are given
in Orders.
Further, Order is a sacrament of the New Law. Now the definition of a
sacrament of that kind includes the words, "that it may be a cause of
grace." Therefore it causes grace in the recipient.
I answer that The works of God are perfect (Dt. 32:4); and consequently
whoever receives power from above receives also those things that
render him competent to exercise that power. This is also the case in
natural things, since animals are provided with members, by which their
soul's powers are enabled to proceed to their respective actions unless
there be some defect on the part of matter. Now just as sanctifying
grace is necessary in order that man receive the sacraments worthily,
so is it that he may dispense them worthily. Wherefore as in Baptism,
whereby a man is adapted to receive the other sacraments, sanctifying
grace is given, so is it in the sacrament of Order whereby man is
ordained to the dispensation of the other sacraments.
Reply to Objection 1: Order is given as a remedy, not to one person but
to the whole Church. Hence, although it is said to be given in order to
counteract ignorance, it does not mean that by receiving Orders a man
has his ignorance driven out of him, but that the recipient of Orders
is set in authority to expel ignorance from among the people.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the gifts of sanctifying grace are
common to all the members of the Church, nevertheless a man cannot be
the worthy recipient of those gifts, in respect of which the members of
the Church are distinguished from one another, unless he have charity,
and this cannot be apart from sanctifying grace.
Reply to Objection 3: The worthy exercise of Orders requires not any
kind of goodness but excellent goodness, in order that as they who
receive orders are set above the people in the degree of Order, so may
they be above them by the merit of holiness. Hence they are required to
have the grace that suffices to make them worthy members of Christ's
people, but when they receive Orders they are given a yet greater gift
of grace, whereby they are rendered apt for greater things.
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Whether in the sacrament of Order a character is imprinted in connection
with all the Orders?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the sacrament of Order a character
is not imprinted in connection with all the Orders. For the character
of Order is a spiritual power. Now some Orders are directed only to
certain bodily acts, for instance those of the doorkeeper or of the
acolyte. Therefore a character is not imprinted in these Orders.
Objection 2: Further, every character is indelible. Therefore a
character places a man in a state whence he cannot withdraw. Now those
who have certain Orders can lawfully return to the laity. Therefore a
character is not imprinted in all the Orders.
Objection 3: Further, by means of a character a man is appointed to
give or to receive some sacred thing. Now a man is sufficiently adapted
to the reception of the sacraments by the character of Baptism, and a
man is not appointed to dispense the sacraments except in the Order of
priesthood. Therefore a character is not imprinted in the other Orders.
On the contrary, Every sacrament in which a character is not imprinted
can be repeated. But no Order can be repeated. Therefore a character is
imprinted in each Order.
Further, a character is a distinctive sign. Now there is something
distinct in every Order. Therefore every Order imprints a character.
I answer that, There have been three opinions on this point. For some
have said that a character is imprinted only in the Order of
priesthood; but this is not true, since none but a deacon can exercise
the act of the diaconate, and so it is clear that in the dispensation
of the sacraments, he has a spiritual power which others have not. For
this reason others have said that a character is impressed in the
sacred, but not in the minor, Orders. But this again comes to nothing,
since each Order sets a man above the people in some degree of
authority directed to the dispensation of the sacraments. Wherefore
since a character is a sign whereby one thing is distinguished from
another, it follows that a character is imprinted in each Order. And
this is confirmed by the fact that they remain for ever and are never
repeated. This is the third and more common opinion.
Reply to Objection 1: Each Order either has an act connected with the
sacrament itself, or adapts a man to the dispensation of the
sacraments; thus doorkeepers exercise the act of admitting men to
witness the Divine sacraments, and so forth; and consequently a
spiritual power is required in each.
Reply to Objection 2: For all that a man may return to the laity, the
character always remains in him. This is evident from the fact that if
he return to the clerical state, he does not receive again the order
which he had already.
The Reply to the Third Objection is the same as to the First.
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Whether the character of Order presupposes the baptismal character?
Objection 1: It would seem that the character of Order does not
presuppose the character of Baptism. For the character of Order makes a
man a dispenser of the sacraments; while the character of Baptism makes
him a recipient of them. Now active power does not necessarily
presuppose passive power, for it can be without it, as in God.
Therefore the character of Order does not necessarily presuppose the
character of Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, it may happen that a man is not baptized, and yet
think with probability that he has been baptized. If therefore such a
person present himself for Orders, he will not receive the character of
Order, supposing the character of Order to presuppose the character of
Baptism; and consequently whatever he does by way of consecration or
absolution will be invalid, and the Church will be deceived therein,
which is inadmissible.
On the contrary, Baptism is the door of the sacraments. Therefore since
Order is a sacrament, it presupposes Baptism.
I answer that, No one can receive what he has not the power to receive.
Now the character of Baptism gives a man the power to receive the other
sacraments. Wherefore he that has not the baptismal character, can
receive no other sacrament; and consequently the character of Order
presupposes the character of Baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: In one who has active power of himself, the
active does not presuppose the passive power; but in one who has active
power from another, passive power, whereby he is enabled to receive the
active power, is prerequisite to active power.
Reply to Objection 2: Such a man if he be ordained to the priesthood is
not a priest, and he can neither consecrate, nor absolve in the
tribunal of Penance. Wherefore according to the canons he must be
baptized, and reordained (Extra De Presbyt. non Bapt., cap. Si quis;
cap. Veniens). And even though he be raised to the episcopate, those
whom he ordains receive not the Order. Yet it may piously be believed
that as regards the ultimate effects of the sacraments, the High Priest
will supply the defect, and that He would not allow this to be so
hidden as to endanger the Church.
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Whether the character of Order necessarily presupposes the character of
Confirmation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the character of Order necessarily
presupposes the character of Confirmation. For in things subordinate to
one another, as the middle presupposes the first, so does the last
presuppose the middle. Now the character of Confirmation presupposes
that of Baptism as being the first. Therefore the character of Order
presupposes that of Confirmation as being in the middle.
Objection 2: Further, those who are appointed to confirm should
themselves be most firm. Now those who receive the sacrament of Order
are appointed to confirm others. Therefore they especially should have
received the sacrament of Confirmation.
On the contrary, The apostles received the power of order before the
Ascension (Jn. 20:22), where it is said: "Receive the Holy Ghost." But
they were confirmed after the Ascension by the coming of the Holy
Ghost. Therefore order does not presuppose Confirmation.
I answer that, For the reception of Orders something is prerequisite
for the validity of the sacrament, and something as congruous to the
sacrament. For the validity of the sacrament it is required that one
who presents himself for Orders should be capable of receiving them,
and this is competent to him through Baptism; wherefore the baptismal
character is prerequisite for the validity of the sacrament, so that
the sacrament of Order cannot be conferred without it. On the other
hand, as congruous to the sacrament a man is required to have every
perfection whereby he becomes adapted to the exercise of Orders, and
one of these is that he be confirmed. Wherefore the character of Order
presupposes the character of Confirmation as congruous but not as
necessary.
Reply to Objection 1: In this case the middle does not stand in the
same relation to the last as the first to the middle, because the
character of Baptism enables a man to receive the sacrament of
Confirmation, whereas the character of Confirmation does not enable a
man to receive the sacrament of Order. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers aptness by way of
congruity.
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Whether the character of one Order necessarily presupposes the character of
another Order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the character of one Order necessarily
presupposes the character of another Order. For there is more in common
between one Order and another, than between Order and another
sacrament. But the character of Order presupposes the character of
another sacrament, namely Baptism. Much more therefore does the
character of one Order presuppose the character of another.
Objection 2: Further, the Orders are degrees of a kind. Now no one can
reach a further degree, unless he first mount the previous degree.
Therefore no one can receive the character of a subsequent Order unless
he has first received the preceding Order.
On the contrary, If anything necessary for a sacrament be omitted in
that sacrament, the sacrament must be repeated. But if one receive a
subsequent Order, without receiving a preceding Order, he is not
reordained, but he receives what was lacking, according to the
canonical statutes (cap. Tuae literae, De clerico per salt. prom.).
Therefore the preceding Order is not necessary for the following.
I answer that, It is not necessary for the higher Orders that one
should have received the minor Orders, because their respective powers
are distinct, and one, considered in its essentials, does not require
another in the same subject. Hence even in the early Church some were
ordained priests without having previously received the lower Orders
and yet they could do all that the lower Orders could, because the
lower power is comprised in the higher, even as sense in understanding,
and dukedom in kingdom. Afterwards, however, it was decided by the
legislation of the Church that no one should present himself to the
higher orders who had not previously humbled himself in the lower
offices. And hence it is that according to the Canons (cap. Tuae
literae, De clerico per salt. prom.) those who are ordained without
receiving a preceding Order are not reordained, but receive what was
lacking to them of the preceding Order.
Reply to Objection 1: Orders have more in common with one another as
regards specific likeness, than order has with Baptism. But as regards
proportion of power to action, Baptism has more in common with Order,
than one Order with another, because Baptism confers on man the passive
power to receive Orders, whereas a lower Order does not give him the
passive power to receive higher Orders.
Reply to Objection 2: Orders are not degrees combining in one action or
in one movement, so that it be necessary to reach the last through the
first; but they are like degrees consisting in things of different
kinds, such as the degrees between man and angel, and it is not
necessary that one who is an angel be first of all a man. Such also are
the degrees between the head and all members of the body; nor is it
necessary that that which is the head should be previously a foot; and
thus it is in the case in point.
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OF THE QUALITIES REQUIRED OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THIS SACRAMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the qualities required of those who receive the
sacrament of Order. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive this
sacrament?
(2) Whether the knowledge of the whole of Sacred Writ is required?
(3) Whether the degree of Orders is obtained by mere merit of life?
(4) Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders sins?
(5) Whether one who is in sin can without committing a sin exercise the
Order he has received?
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Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive Orders?
Objection 1: It would seem that goodness of life is not required of
those who receive Orders. For by Orders a man is ordained to the
dispensation of the sacraments. But the sacraments can be administered
by good and wicked. Therefore goodness of life is not requisite.
Objection 2: Further, the service of God in the sacraments is no
greater than service offered to Him in the body. Now our Lord did not
cast aside the sinful and notorious woman from rendering Him a bodily
service (Lk. 7). Therefore neither should the like be debarred from His
service in the sacraments.
Objection 3: Further, by every grace a remedy is given against sin. Now
those who are in sin should not be refused a remedy that may avail
them. Since then grace is given in the sacrament of order, it would
seem that this sacrament ought also to be conferred on sinners.
On the contrary, "Whosoever of the seed of Aaron throughout their
families hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God neither
shall he approach to minister to him [*Vulg.: 'Say to Aaron: Whosoever
of thy seed,'etc.]" (Lev. 21:17,18). Now "blemish signifies all kinds
of vice" according to a gloss. Therefore he who is shackled by any vice
should not be admitted to the ministry of Orders.
Further, Jerome commenting on the words of Titus 2:15, "Let no man
despise thee," says that "not only should bishops, priests, and deacons
take very great care to be examples of speech and conduct to those over
whom they are placed, but also the lower grades, and without exception
all who serve the household of God, since it is most disastrous to the
Church if the laity be better than the clergy." Therefore holiness of
life is requisite in all the Orders.
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), "even as the more
subtle and clear essences, being filled by the outpouring of the solar
radiance, like the sun enlighten other bodies with their brilliant
light, so in all things pertaining to God a man must not dare to become
a leader of others, unless in all his habits he be most deiform and
godlike." Wherefore, since in every order a man is appointed to lead
others in Divine things, he who being conscious of mortal sin presents
himself for Orders is guilty of presumption and sins mortally.
Consequently holiness of life is requisite for Orders, as a matter of
precept, but not as essential to the sacrament; and if a wicked man be
ordained, he receives the Order none the less, and yet with sin withal.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the sinner dispenses sacraments validly,
so does he receive validly the sacrament of Orders, and as he dispenses
unworthily, even so he receives unworthily.
Reply to Objection 2: The service in point consisted only in the
exercise of bodily homage, which even sinners can offer lawfully. It is
different with the spiritual service to which the ordained are
appointed, because thereby they are made to stand between God and the
people. Wherefore they should shine with a good conscience before God,
and with a good name before men.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain medicines require a robust constitution,
else it is mortally dangerous to take them; others can be given to the
weakly. So too in spiritual things certain sacraments are ordained as
remedies for sin, and the like are to be given to sinners, as Baptism
and Penance, while others, which confer the perfection of grace,
require a man made strong by grace.
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Whether knowledge of all Holy Writ is required?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge of all Holy Writ is required.
For one from whose lips we seek the law, should have knowledge of the
law. Now the laity seek the law at the mouth of the priest (Malachi
2:7). Therefore he should have knowledge of the whole law.
Objection 2: Further, "being always ready to satisfy everyone that
asketh you a reason of that faith and hope in you [*Vulg.: 'Of that
hope which is in you; St. Thomas apparently took his reading from
Bede]." Now to give a reason for things pertaining to faith and hope
belongs to those who have perfect knowledge of Holy Writ. Therefore the
like knowledge should be possessed by those who are placed in Orders,
and to whom the aforesaid words are addressed.
Objection 3: Further, no one is competent to read what he understands
not, since to read without intelligence is "negligence,"* as Cato
declares (Rudiment.). [*"Legere et non intelligere est negligere." The
play on the words is more evident in Latin.] Now it belongs to the
reader (which is the lower Order) to read the Old Testament, as stated
in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore he should understand the whole
of the Old Testament; and much more those in the higher Orders.
On the contrary, Many are raised to the priesthood even who know
nothing at all of these things, even in many religious Orders.
Therefore apparently this knowledge is not required.
Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers that some who were monks
were raised to the priesthood, being of a most holy life. Therefore the
aforesaid knowledge is not required in those to be ordained.
I answer that, For any human act to be rightly ordered there must needs
be the direction of reason. Wherefore in order that a man exercise the
office of an Order, it is necessary for him to have as much knowledge
as suffices for his direction in the act of that Order. And
consequently one who is to be raised to Orders is required to have that
knowledge, and to be instructed in Sacred Scripture, not the whole, but
more or less, according as his office is of a greater or lesser
extent---to wit, that those who are placed over others, and receive the
care of souls, know things pertaining to the doctrine of faith and
morals, and that others know whatever concerns the exercise of their
Order.
Reply to Objection 1: A priest exercises a twofold action: the one,
which is principal, over the true body of Christ; the other, which is
secondary, over the mystical body of Christ. The second act depends on
the first, but not conversely. Wherefore some are raised to the
priesthood, to whom the first act alone is deputed, for instance those
religious who are not empowered with the care of souls. The law is not
sought at the mouth of these, they are required only for the
celebration of the sacraments; and consequently it is enough for them
to have such knowledge as enables them to observe rightly those things
that regard the celebration of the sacrament. Others are raised to
exercise the other act which is over the mystical body of Christ, and
it is at the mouth of these that the people seek the law; wherefore
they ought to possess knowledge of the law, not indeed to know all the
difficult points of the law (for in these they should have recourse to
their superiors), but to know what the people have to believe and
fulfill in the law. To the higher priests, namely the bishops, it
belongs to know even those points of the law which may offer some
difficulty, and to know them the more perfectly according as they are
in a higher position.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason that we have to give for our faith and
hope does not denote one that suffices to prove matters of faith and
hope, since they are both of things invisible; it means that we should
be able to give general proofs of the probability of both, and for this
there is not much need of great knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: The reader has not to explain Holy Writ to the
people (for this belongs to the higher orders), but merely to voice the
words. Therefore he is not required to have so much knowledge as to
understand Holy Writ, but only to know how to pronounce it correctly.
And since such knowledge is obtained easily and from many persons, it
may be supposed with probability that the ordained will acquire that
knowledge even if he have it not already, especially if it appear that
he is on the road to acquire it.
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Whether a man obtains the degrees of Order by the merit of one's life?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man obtains the degrees of order by
the mere merit of his life. For, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xliii
in the Opus Imperfectum, wrongly ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "not
every priest is a saint, but every saint is a priest." Now a man
becomes a saint by the merit of his life. Consequently he thereby also
becomes a priest, and "a fortiori" has he the other Orders.
Objection 2: Further, in natural things, men obtain a higher degree
from the very fact that they are near God, and have a greater share of
His favors, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iv). Now it is by merit of
holiness and knowledge that a man approaches nearer to God and receives
more of His favors. Therefore by this alone he is raised to the degree
of Orders.
On the contrary, Holiness once possessed can be lost. But when once a
man is ordained he never loses his order. Therefore order does not
consist in the mere merit of holiness.
I answer that, A cause should be proportionate to its effect. And
consequently as in Christ, from Whom grace comes down on all men, there
must needs be fulness of grace; so in the ministers of the Church, to
whom it belongs, not to give grace, but to give the sacraments of
grace, the degree of order does not result from their having grace, but
from their participating in a sacrament of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is speaking of the priest in reference
to the reason for which he is so called, the word "sacerdos" signifying
dispenser of holy things [sacra dans]: for in this sense every
righteous man, in so far as he assists others by the sacraments, may be
called a priest. But he is not speaking according to the actual meaning
of the words; for this word "sacerdos" [priest] is employed to signify
one who gives sacred things by dispensing the sacraments.
Reply to Objection 2: Natural things acquire a degree of superiority
over others, from the fact that they are able to act on them by virtue
of their form; wherefore from the very fact that they have a higher
form, they obtain a higher degree. But the ministers of the Church are
placed over others, not to confer anything on them by virtue of their
own holiness (for this belongs to God alone), but as ministers, and as
instruments, so to say, of the outpouring from the Head to the members.
Hence the comparison fails as regards the dignity of Order, although it
applies as to congruity.
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Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders commits a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that he who raises the unworthy to orders
commits no sin. For a bishop needs assistants appointed to the lesser
offices. But he would be unable to find them in sufficient number, if
he were to require of them such qualifications as the saints enumerate.
Therefore if he raise some who are not qualified, he would seem to be
excusable.
Objection 2: Further, the Church needs not only ministers for the
dispensation of things spiritual, but also for the supervision of
temporalities. But sometimes men without knowledge or holiness of life
may be useful for the conduct of temporal affairs, either because of
their worldly power, or on account of their natural industry. Therefore
seemingly the like can be promoted without sin.
Objection 3: Further, everyone is bound to avoid sin, as far as he can.
If therefore a bishop sins in promoting the unworthy, he is bound to
take the utmost pains to know whether those who present themselves for
Orders be worthy, by making a careful inquiry about their morals and
knowledge, and yet seemingly this is not done anywhere.
On the contrary, It is worse to raise the wicked to the sacred
ministry, than not to correct those who are raised already. But Heli
sinned mortally by not correcting his sons for their wickedness;
wherefore "he fell backwards . . . and died" (1 Kings 4:18). Therefore
he who promotes the unworthy does not escape sin.
Further, spiritual things must be set before temporal things in the
Church. Now a man would commit a mortal sin were he knowingly to
endanger the temporalities of the Church. Much more therefore is it a
mortal sin to endanger spiritual things. But whoever promotes the
unworthy endangers spiritual things, since according to Gregory (Hom.
xii in Evang.) "if a man's life is contemptible, his preaching is
liable to be despised"; and for the same reason all the spiritual
things that he dispenses. Therefore he who promotes the unworthy sins
mortally.
I answer that, Our Lord describes the faithful servant whom He has set
"over His household to give them their measure of wheat." Hence he is
guilty of unfaithfulness who gives any man Divine things above his
measure: and whoso promotes the unworthy does this. Wherefore he
commits a mortal crime, as being unfaithful to his sovereign Lord,
especially since this is detrimental to the Church and to the Divine
honor which is promoted by good ministers. For a man would be
unfaithful to his earthly lord were he to place unworthy subjects in
his offices.
Reply to Objection 1: God never so abandons His Church that apt
ministers are not to be found sufficient for the needs of the people,
if the worthy be promoted and the unworthy set aside. And though it
were impossible to find as many ministers as there are now, it were
better to have few good ministers than many bad ones, as the blessed
Clement declares in his second epistle to James the brother of the
Lord.
Reply to Objection 2: Temporal things are not to be sought but for the
sake of spiritual things. Wherefore all temporal advantage should count
for nothing, and all gain be despised for the advancement of spiritual
good.
Reply to Objection 3: It is at least required that the ordainer know
that nothing contrary to holiness is in the candidate for ordination.
But besides this he is required to take the greatest care, in
proportion to the Order or office to be enjoined, so as to be certain
of the qualifications of those to be promoted, at least from the
testification of others. This is the meaning of the Apostle when he
says (1 Tim. 5:22): "Impose not hands lightly on any man."
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Whether a man who is in sin can without sin exercise the Order he has
received? [*Cf. TP, Q[64], A[6]]
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is in sin can without sin
exercise the order he has received. For since, by virtue of his office,
he is bound to exercise his order, he sins if he fails to do so. If
therefore he sins by exercising it, he cannot avoid sin: which is
inadmissible.
Objection 2: Further, a dispensation is a relaxation of the law.
Therefore although by rights it would be unlawful for him to exercise
the order he has received, it would be lawful for him to do so by
dispensation.
Objection 3: Further, whoever co-operates with another in a mortal sin,
sins mortally. If therefore a sinner sins mortally by exercising his
order, he who receives or demands any Divine thing from him also sins
mortally: and this seems absurd.
Objection 4: Further, if he sins by exercising his order, it follows
that every act of his order that he performs is a mortal sin; and
consequently since many acts concur in the one exercise of his order,
it would seem that he commits many mortal sins: which seems very hard.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Demophil.): "It seems
presumptuous for such a man, one to wit who is not enlightened, to lay
hands on priestly things; he is not afraid nor ashamed, all unworthy
that he is to take part in Divine things, with the thought that God
does not see what he sees in himself; he thinks, by false pretense, to
cheat Him Whom he falsely calls his Father; he dares to utter in the
person of Christ, words polluted by his infamy, I will not call them
prayers, over the Divine symbols." Therefore a priest is a blasphemer
and a cheat if he exercises his order unworthily, and thus he sins
mortally: and in like manner any other person in orders.
Further, holiness of life is required in one who receives an order,
that he may be qualified to exercise it. Now a man sins mortally if he
present himself for orders in mortal sin. Much more therefore does he
sin mortally whenever he exercises his order.
I answer that, The law prescribes (Dt. 16:20) that "man should follow
justly after that which is just." Wherefore whoever fulfills unworthily
the duties of his order follows unjustly after that which is just, and
acts contrary to a precept of the law, and thereby sins mortally. Now
anyone who exercises a sacred office in mortal sin, without doubt does
so unworthily. Hence it is clear that he sins mortally.
Reply to Objection 1: He is not perplexed as though he were in the
necessity of sinning; for he can renounce his sin, or resign his office
whereby he was bound to the exercise of his order.
Reply to Objection 2: The natural law allows of no dispensation; and it
is of natural law that man handle holy things holily. Therefore no one
can dispense from this.
Reply to Objection 3: So long as a minister of the Church who is in
mortal sin is recognized by the Church, his subject must receive the
sacraments from him, since this is the purpose for which he is bound to
him. Nevertheless, outside the case of necessity, it would not be safe
to induce him to an execution of his Order, as long as he is conscious
of being in mortal sin, which conscience, however, he can lay aside
since a man is repaired in an instant by Divine grace.
Reply to Objection 4: When any man performs an action as a minister of
the Church while in a state of mortal sin, he sins mortally, and as
often as he performs that action, since, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.
i), "it is wrong for the unclean even to touch the symbols," i.e. the
sacramental signs. Hence when they touch sacred things in the exercise
of their office they sin mortally. It would be otherwise if they were
to touch some sacred thing or perform some sacred duty in a case of
necessity, when it would be allowable even to a layman, for instance if
they were to baptize in a case of urgency, or gather up the Lord's body
should it be cast to the ground.
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OF THE DISTINCTION OF ORDERS, OF THEIR ACTS, AND THE IMPRINTING OF THE
CHARACTER (FIVE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider the distinction of the orders and
their acts, and the imprinting of the character. Under this head there
are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Order should be divided into several kinds?
(2) How many are there?
(3) Whether they ought to be divided into those that are sacred and
those that are not?
(4) Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text?
(5) When are the characters of the Orders imprinted?
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Whether we ought to distinguish several Orders?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to distinguish several
Orders. For the greater a power is, the less is it multiplied. Now this
sacrament ranks above the others in so far as it places its recipients
in a degree above other persons. Since then the other sacraments are
not divided into several of which the whole is predicated, neither
ought this sacrament to be divided into several Orders.
Objection 2: Further, if it be divided, the parts of the division are
either integral or subjective. But they are not integral, for then the
whole would not be predicated of them. Therefore it is a division into
subjective parts. Now subjective parts can have the remote genus
predicated of them in the plural in the same way as the proximate
genus; thus man and ass are several animals, and are several animated
bodies. Therefore also priesthood and diaconate, as they are several
Orders, even so are several sacraments, since sacrament is the genus,
so to speak, in respect of Orders.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10)
the form of authority in which one alone governs is a better government
of the common weal than aristocracy, where different persons occupy
different offices. But the government of the Church should be the best
of all. Therefore in the Church there should be no distinction of
Orders for different acts, but the whole power should reside in one
person; and consequently there ought to be only one Order.
On the contrary, The Church is Christ's mystical body, like to our
natural body, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:5; 1 Cor. 12:12, 27;
Eph. 1:22,23; Col. 1:24). Now in the natural body there are various
offices of the members. Therefore in the Church also there should be
various Orders.
Further, the ministry of the New Testament is superior to that of the
Old Testament (2 Cor. 3). Now in the Old Testament not only the
priests, but also their ministers, the Levites, were consecrated.
Therefore likewise in the New Testament not only the priests but also
their ministers should be consecrated by the sacrament of Order; and
consequently there ought to be several Orders.
I answer that, Multiplicity of Orders was introduced into the Church
for three reasons. First to show forth the wisdom of God, which is
reflected in the orderly distinction of things both natural and
spiritual. This is signified in the statement of 3 Kings 10:4,5 that
"when the queen of Saba saw . . . the order of" Solomon's "servants . .
. she had no longer any spirit in her," for she was breathless from
admiration of his wisdom. Secondly, in order to succor human weakness,
because it would be impossible for one man, without his being heavily
burdened, to fulfill all things pertaining to the Divine mysteries; and
so various orders are severally appointed to the various offices; and
this is shown by the Lord giving Moses seventy ancients to assist him.
Thirdly, that men may be given a broader way for advancing (to
perfection), seeing that the various duties are divided among many men,
so that all become the co-operators of God; than which nothing is more
God-like, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii).
Reply to Objection 1: The other sacraments are given that certain
effects may be received; but this sacrament is given chiefly that
certain acts may be performed. Hence it behooves the sacrament of Order
to be differentiated according to the diversity of acts, even as powers
are differentiated by their acts.
Reply to Objection 2: The division of Order is not that of an integral
whole into its parts, nor of a universal whole, but of a potential
whole, the nature of which is that the notion of the whole is found to
be complete in one part, but in the others by some participation
thereof. Thus it is here: for the entire fulness of the sacrament is in
one Order, namely the priesthood, while in the other sacraments there
is a participation of Order. And this is signified by the Lord saying
(Num. 11:17): "I will take of thy spirit and give to them, that they
may bear with thee the burden of the people." Therefore all the Orders
are one sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: In a kingdom, although the entire fulness of
power resides in the king, this does not exclude the ministers having a
power which is a participation of the kingly power. It is the same in
Order. In the aristocratic form of government, on the contrary, the
fulness of power resides in no one, but in all.
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Whether there are seven Orders?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not seven Orders. For the
Orders of the Church are directed to the hierarchical acts. But there
are only three hierarchical acts, namely "to cleanse, to enlighten, and
to perfect," for which reason Dionysius distinguishes three Orders
(Eccl. Hier. v). Therefore there are not seven.
Objection 2: Further, all the sacraments derive their efficacy and
authenticity from their institution by Christ, or at least by His
apostles. But no mention except of priests and deacons is made in the
teaching of Christ and His apostles. Therefore seemingly there are no
other Orders.
Objection 3: Further, by the sacrament of Order a man is appointed to
dispense the other sacraments. But there are only six other sacraments.
Therefore there should be only six Orders.
Objection 4: On the other hand, It would seem that there ought to be
more. For the higher a power is, the less is it subject to
multiplication. Now the hierarchical power is in the angels in a higher
way than in us, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i). Since then there are
nine Orders in the angelic hierarchy, there should be as many, or more,
in the Church.
Objection 5: Further, the prophecy of the Psalms is the most noble of
all the prophecies. Now there is one Order, namely of readers, for
reading the other prophecies in the Church. Therefore there ought to be
another Order for reading the Psalms, especially since (Decretals,
Dist. xxi, cap. Cleros) the "psalmist" is reckoned as the second Order
after the doorkeeper.
I answer that, Some show the sufficiency of the orders from their
correspondence with the gratuitous graces which are indicated 1 Cor.
12. For they say that the "word of wisdom" belongs to the bishop,
because he is the ordainer of others, which pertains to wisdom; the
"word of knowledge" to the priest, for he ought to have the key of
knowledge; "faith" to the deacon, for he preaches the Gospel; the
"working of miracles" to the subdeacon, who sets himself to do deeds of
perfection by the vow of continency; "interpretation of speeches" to
the acolyte, this being signified by the light which he bears; the
"grace of healing" to the exorcist; "diverse kinds of tongues" to the
psalmist; "prophecy" to the reader; and the "discerning of spirits" to
the doorkeeper, for he excludes some and admits others. But this is of
no account, for the gratuitous graces are not given, as the Orders are,
to one same man. For it is written (1 Cor. 12:4): "There are
distributions [Douay: 'diversities'] of graces." Moreover the
episcopate [*Cf.[4908] Q[40], A[5]] and the office of psalmist are
included, which are not Orders. Wherefore others account for the Orders
by likening them to the heavenly hierarchy, where the Orders are
distinguished in reference to cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting.
Thus they say that the doorkeeper cleanses outwardly, by separating
even in the body the good from the wicked; that the acolyte cleanses
inwardly, because by the light which he bears, he signifies that he
dispels inward darkness; and that the exorcist cleanses both ways, for
he casts out the devil who disturbs a man both ways. But enlightening,
which is effected by teaching, is done by readers as regards prophetic
doctrine; by subdeacons as to apostolic doctrine; and by deacons as to
the gospel doctrine; while ordinary perfection, such as the perfection
of Penance, Baptism, and so forth is the work of the priest; excellent
perfection, such as the consecration of priests and virgins, is the
work of the bishop; while the most excellent perfection is the work of
the Sovereign Pontiff in whom resides the fulness of authority. But
this again is of no account; both because the orders of the heavenly
hierarchy are not distinguished by the aforesaid hierarchical actions,
since each of them is applicable to every Order; and because, according
to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), perfecting belongs to the bishops alone,
enlightening to the priests, and cleansing to all the ministers.
Wherefore others suit the orders to the seven gifts, so that the
priesthood corresponds to the gift of wisdom, which feeds us with the
bread of life and understanding, even as the priest refreshes us with
the heavenly bread; fear to the doorkeeper, for he separates us from
the wicked; and thus the intermediate Orders to the intermediate gifts.
But this again is of no account, since the sevenfold grace is given in
each one of the Orders. Consequently we must answer differently by
saying that the sacrament of Order is directed to the sacrament of the
Eucharist, which is the sacrament of sacraments, as Dionysius says
(Eccl. Hier. iii). For just as temple, altar, vessels, and vestments
need to be consecrated, so do the ministers who are ordained for the
Eucharist; and this consecration is the sacrament of Order. Hence the
distinction of Orders is derived from their relation to the Eucharist.
For the power of Order is directed either to the consecration of the
Eucharist itself, or to some ministry in connection with this sacrament
of the Eucharist. If in the former way, then it is the Order of
priests; hence when they are ordained, they receive the chalice with
wine, and the paten with the bread, because they are receiving the
power to consecrate the body and blood of Christ. The co-operation of
the ministers is directed either to the sacrament itself, or to the
recipients. If the former, this happens in three ways. For in the first
place, there is the ministry whereby the minister co-operates with the
priest in the sacrament itself, by dispensing, but not by consecrating,
for this is done by the priest alone; and this belongs to the deacon.
Hence in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) it is said that it belongs to the
deacon to minister to the priests in whatever is done in Christ's
sacraments, wherefore he dispenses Christ's blood. Secondly, there is
the ministry directed to the disposal of the sacramental matter in the
sacred vessels of the sacrament. and this belongs to subdeacons.
Wherefore it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) that they carry
the vessels of our Lord's body and blood, and place the oblation on the
altar; hence, when they are ordained, they receive the chalice, empty
however, from the bishop's hands. Thirdly, there is the ministry
directed to the proffering of the sacramental matter, and this belongs
to the acolyte. For he, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24),
prepares the cruet with wine and water; wherefore he receives an empty
cruet. The ministry directed to the preparation of the recipients can
be exercised only over the unclean, since those who are clean are
already apt for receiving the sacraments. Now the unclean are of three
kinds, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii). For some are absolute
unbelievers and unwilling to believe; and these must be altogether
debarred from beholding Divine things and from the assembly of the
faithful; this belongs to the doorkeepers. Some, however, are willing
to believe, but are not as yet instructed, namely catechumens, and to
the instruction of such persons the Order of readers is directed, who
are therefore entrusted with the reading of the first rudiments of the
doctrine of faith, namely the Old Testament. But some are believers and
instructed, yet lie under an impediment through the power of the devil,
namely those who are possessed: and to this ministry the order of
exorcists is directed. Thus the reason and number of the degrees of
Orders is made clear.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the orders not as
sacraments, but as directed to hierarchical actions. Wherefore he
distinguishes three Orders corresponding to those actions. The first of
these Orders, namely the bishop, has all three actions; the second,
namely the priest, has two; while the third has one, namely to cleanse;
this is the deacon who is called a minister: and under this last all
the lower Orders are comprised. But the Orders derive their sacramental
nature from their relation to the greatest of the sacraments, and
consequently the number of Orders depends on this.
Reply to Objection 2: In the early Church, on account of the fewness of
ministers, all the lower ministries were entrusted to the deacons, as
Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), where he says: "Some of the ministers
stand at the closed door of the Church, others are otherwise occupied
in the exercise of their own order; others place the sacred bread and
the chalice of benediction on the altar and offer them to the priests."
Nevertheless all the power to do all these things was included in the
one power of the deacon, though implicitly. But afterwards the Divine
worship developed, and the Church committed expressly to several
persons that which had hitherto been committed implicitly in one Order.
This is what the Master means, when He says in the text (Sent. iv, D,
24) that the Church instituted other Orders.
Reply to Objection 3: The orders are directed to the sacrament of the
Eucharist chiefly, and to the other sacraments consequently, for even
the other sacraments flow from that which is contained in that
sacrament. Hence it does not follow that the orders ought to be
distinguished according to the sacraments.
Reply to Objection 4: The angels differ specifically [*Cf. [4909]FP,
Q[50], A[4]]: for this reason it is possible for them to have various
modes of receiving Divine things, and hence also they are divided into
various hierarchies. But in men there is only one hierarchy, because
they have only one mode of receiving Divine things, which results from
the human species, namely through the images of sensible objects.
Consequently the distinction of orders in the angels cannot bear any
relation to a sacrament as it is with us, but only a relation to the
hierarchical actions which among them each Order exercises on the
Orders below. In this respect our Orders correspond to theirs; since in
our hierarchy there are three Orders, distinguished according to the
three hierarchical actions, even as in each angelic hierarchy.
Reply to Objection 5: The office of psalmist is not an Order, but an
office annexed to an Order. For the psalmist is also styled precentor
because the psalms are recited with chant. Now precentor is not the
name of a special Order, both because it belongs to the whole choir to
sing, and because he has no special relation to the sacrament of the
Eucharist. Since, however, it is a particular office, it is sometimes
reckoned among the Orders, taking these in a broad sense.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Order should be divided into those that are sacred and those
that are not?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Orders ought not to be divided into
those that are sacred and those that are not. For all the Orders are
sacraments, and all the sacraments are sacred. Therefore all the Orders
are sacred.
Objection 2: Further, by the Orders of the Church a man is not
appointed to any other than Divine offices. Now all these are sacred.
Therefore all the Orders also are sacred.
On the contrary, The sacred Orders are an impediment to the contracting
of marriage and annul the marriage that is already contracted. But the
four lower orders neither impede the contracting nor annul the
contract. Therefore these are not sacred Orders.
I answer that, An Order is said to be sacred in two ways. First, in
itself, and thus every order is sacred, since it is a sacrament.
Secondly, by reason of the matter about which it exercises an act, and
thus an Order is called sacred, if it exercises an act about some
consecrated thing. In this sense there are only three sacred Orders,
namely the priesthood and diaconate, which exercise an act about the
consecrated body and blood of Christ, and the subdiaconate, which
exercises an act about the consecrated vessels. Wherefore continency is
enjoined them, that they who handle holy things may themselves be holy
and clean.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text?
Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the Orders are not rightly
assigned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Because a person is prepared by
absolution to receive Christ's body. Now the preparation of the
recipients of a sacrament belongs to the lower Orders. Therefore
absolution from sins is unfittingly reckoned among the acts of a
priest.
Objection 2: Further, man is made like to God immediately in Baptism,
by receiving the character which causes this likeness. But prayer and
the offering of oblations are acts directed immediately to God.
Therefore every baptized person can perform these acts, and not priests
alone.
Objection 3: Further, different Orders have different acts. But it
belongs to the subdeacon to place the oblations on the altar, and to
read the epistle; and subdeacons carry the cross before the Pope.
Therefore these acts should not be assigned to the deacon.
Objection 4: Further, the same truth is contained in the Old and in the
New Testament. But it belongs to the readers to read the Old Testament.
Therefore it should belong to them likewise, and not to deacons, to
read the New Testament.
Objection 5: Further, the apostles preached naught else but the gospel
of Christ (Rom. 1:15). But the teaching of the apostles is entrusted to
subdeacons to be read by them. Therefore the Gospel teaching should be
also.
Objection 6: Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) that which
belongs to a higher Order should not be applicable to a lower Order.
But it is an act of subdeacons to minister with the cruets. Therefore
it should not be assigned to acolytes.
Objection 7: Further, spiritual actions should rank above bodily
actions. But the acolyte's act is merely corporeal. Therefore the
exorcist has not the spiritual act of casting out devils, since he is
of inferior rank.
Objection 8: Further, things that have most in common should be placed
beside one another. Now the reading of the Old Testament must needs
have most in common with the reading of the New Testament, which latter
belongs to the higher ministers. Therefore the reading of the Old
Testament should be reckoned the act, not of the reader, but rather of
the acolyte; especially since the bodily light which the acolytes carry
signifies the light of spiritual doctrine.
Objection 9: Further, in every act of a special Order, there should be
some special power, which the person ordained has to the exclusion of
other persons. But in opening and shutting doors the doorkeeper has no
special power that other men have not. Therefore this should not be
reckoned their act.
I answer that, Since the consecration conferred in the sacrament of
orders is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, as stated above
[4910](A[2]), the principal act of each order is that whereby it is
most nearly directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist. In this
respect, too, one order ranks above another, in so far as one act is
more nearly directed to that same sacrament. But because many things
are directed to the Eucharist, as being the most exalted of the
sacraments, it follows not unfittingly that one Order has many acts
besides its principal act, and all the more, as it ranks higher, since
a power extends to the more things, the higher it is.
Reply to Objection 1: The preparation of the recipients of a sacrament
is twofold. One is remote and is effected by the ministers: another is
proximate, whereby they are rendered apt at once for receiving the
sacraments. This latter belongs to priests, since even in natural
things matter receives from one and the same agent both the ultimate
disposition to the form, and the form itself. And since a person
acquires the proximate disposition to the Eucharist by being cleansed
from sin, it follows that the priest is the proper minister of all
those sacraments which are chiefly instituted for the cleansing of
sins, namely Baptism, Penance, and Extreme Unction.
Reply to Objection 2: Acts are directed immediately to God in two ways;
in one way on the part of one person only, for instance the prayers of
individuals, vows, and so forth: such acts befit any baptized person.
In another way on the part of the whole Church, and thus the priest
alone exercises acts immediately directed to God; because to
impersonate the whole Church belongs to him alone who consecrates the
Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the universal Church.
Reply to Objection 3: The offerings made by the people are offered
through the priest. Hence a twofold ministry is necessary with regard
to offerings. One on the part of the people: and this belongs to the
subdeacon who receives the offerings from the people and places them on
the altar or offers them to the deacon. the other is on the part of the
priest, and belongs to the deacon, who hands the offerings to the
priest. This is the principal act of both Orders, and for this reason
the deacon's Order is the higher. But to read the epistle does not
belong to a deacon, except as the acts of lower Orders are ascribed to
the higher; and in like manner to carry the cross. Moreover, this
depends on the customs of Churches, because in secondary acts it is not
unfitting for customs to vary.
Reply to Objection 4: Doctrine is a remote preparation for the
reception of a sacrament; wherefore the announcement of doctrine is
entrusted to the ministers. But the doctrine of the Old Testament is
more remote than that of the New Testament, since it contains no
instruction about this sacrament except in figures. Hence announcing of
the New Testament is entrusted to the higher ministers, and that of the
Old Testament to the lower ministers. Moreover the doctrine of the New
Testament is more perfect as delivered by our Lord Himself, than as
made known by His apostles. Wherefore the Gospel is committed to
deacons and the Epistle to subdeacons.
This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.
Reply to Objection 6: Acolytes exercise an act over the cruet alone,
and not over the contents of the cruet; whereas the subdeacon exercises
an act over the contents of the cruet, because he handles the water and
wine to the end that they be put into the chalice,* and again he pours
the water over the hands of the priest; and the deacon, like the
subdeacon, exercises an act over the chalice only, not over its
contents, whereas the priest exercises an act over the contents. [*The
wording of St. Thomas is sufficiently vague to refer either to the
Roman rite, where the priest pours the wine and water into the chalice,
or to the Dominican rite, where this is done by the subdeacon.]
Wherefore as the subdeacon at his ordination receives an empty chalice,
while the priest receives a full chalice, so the acolyte receives an
empty cruet, but the subdeacon a full one. Thus there is a certain
connection among the Orders.
Reply to Objection 7: The bodily acts of the acolyte are more
intimately connected with the act of Holy orders than the act of the
exorcist, although the latter is, in a fashion, spiritual. For the
acolytes exercise a ministry over the vessels in which the sacramental
matter is contained, as regards the wine, which needs a vessel to hold
it on account of its humidity. Hence of all the minor orders the Order
of acolytes is the highest.
Reply to Objection 8: The act of the acolyte is more closely connected
with the principal acts of the higher ministers, than the acts of the
other minor Orders, as is self-evident; and again as regards the
secondary acts whereby they prepare the people by doctrine. For the
acolyte by bearing a light represents the doctrine of the New Testament
in a visible manner, while the reader by his recital represents it
differently, wherefore the acolyte is of higher rank. It is the same
with the exorcist, for as the act of the reader is compared with the
secondary act of the deacon and subdeacon, so is the act of the
exorcist compared with the secondary act of the priest, namely to bind
and to loose, by which man is wholly freed from the slavery of the
devil. This, too, shows the degrees of Order to be most orderly. since
only the three higher Orders co-operate with the priest in his
principal act which is to consecrate the body of Christ, while both the
higher and lower Orders co-operate with him in his secondary act, which
is to loose and bind.
Reply to Objection 9: Some say that in receiving the Order the
doorkeeper is given a Divine power to debar others from entering the
Church, even as Christ had, when He cast out the sellers from the
Temple. But this belongs to a gratuitous grace rather than to a
sacramental grace. Wherefore we should reply that he receives the power
to do this by virtue of his office, although others may do so, but not
officially. It is the case in all the acts of the minor Orders, that
they can be lawfully exercised by others, even though these have no
office to that effect: just as Mass may be said in an unconsecrated
building, although the consecration of a church is directed to the
purpose that Mass be said there.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the character is imprinted on a priest when the chalice is handed t
o
him?
Objection 1: It would seem that the character is not imprinted on the
priest at the moment when the chalice is handed to him. For the
consecration of a priest is done by anointing as in Confirmation. Now
in Confirmation the character is imprinted at the moment of anointing;
and therefore in the priesthood also and not at the handing of the
chalice.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord gave His disciples the priestly power
when He said (Jn. 20:22,23): "Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you
shall forgive," etc. Now the Holy Ghost is given by the imposition of
hands. Therefore the character of order is given at the moment of the
imposition of hands.
Objection 3: Further, as the ministers are consecrated, even so are the
ministers' vestments. Now the blessing alone consecrates the vestments.
Therefore the consecration of the priest also is effected by the mere
blessing of the bishop.
Objection 4: Further, as a chalice is handed to the priest, even so is
the priestly vestment. Therefore if a character is imprinted at the
giving of the chalice, so likewise is there at the giving of the
chasuble, and thus a priest would have two characters: but this is
false.
Objection 5: Further, the deacon's order is more closely allied to the
priest's Order than is the subdeacon's. But if a character is imprinted
on the priest at the moment of the handing of the chalice, the
subdeacon would be more closely allied to the priest than the deacon;
because the subdeacon receives the character at the handing of the
chalice and not the deacon. Therefore the priestly character is not
imprinted at the handing of the chalice.
Objection 6: Further, the Order of acolytes approaches nearer to the
priestly act by exercising an act over the cruet than by exercising an
act over the torch. Yet the character is imprinted on the acolytes when
they receive the torch rather than when they receive the cruet, because
the name of acolyte signifies candle-bearer. Therefore the character is
not imprinted on the priest when he receives the chalice.
On the contrary, The principal act of the priest's Order is to
consecrate Christ's body. Now he receives the power to this effect at
the handing of the chalice. Therefore the character is imprinted on him
then.
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1), to cause the form and to
give the matter its proximate preparation for the form belong to the
same agent. Wherefore the bishop in conferring orders does two things;
for he prepares the candidates for the reception of orders, and
delivers to them the power of order. He prepares them, both by
instructing them in their respective offices and by doing something to
them, so that they may be adapted to receive the power. This
preparation consists of three things, namely blessing, imposition of
hands, and anointing. By the blessing they are enlisted in the Divine
service, wherefore the blessing is given to all. By the imposition of
hands the fulness of grace is given, whereby they are qualified for
exalted duties, wherefore only deacons and priests receive the
imposition of hands, because they are competent to dispense the
sacraments, although the latter as principal dispensers, the former as
ministers. But by the anointing they are consecrated for the purpose of
handling the sacrament, wherefore the anointing is done to the priests
alone who touch the body of Christ with their own hands; even as a
chalice is anointed because it holds the blood, and the paten because
it holds the body.
The conferring of power is effected by giving them something pertaining
to their proper act. And since the principal act of a priest is to
consecrate the body and blood of Christ, the priestly character is
imprinted at the very giving of the chalice under the prescribed form
of words.
Reply to Objection 1: In Confirmation there is not given the office of
exercising an act on an exterior matter, wherefore the character is not
imprinted in that sacrament at the handing of some particular thing,
but at the mere imposition of hands and anointing. But it is otherwise
in the priestly Order, and consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord gave His disciples the priestly power,
as regards the principal act, before His passion at the supper when He
said: "Take ye and eat" (Mat. 26:26), wherefore He added: "Do this for
a commemoration of Me" (Lk. 22:19). After the resurrection, however, He
gave them the priestly power, as to its secondary act, which is to bind
and loose.
Reply to Objection 3: Vestments require no other consecration except to
be set aside for the Divine worship, wherefore the blessing suffices
for their consecration. But it is different with those who are
ordained, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 4: The priestly vestment signifies, not the power
given to the priest, but the aptitude required of him for exercising
the act of that power. Wherefore a character is imprinted neither on
the priest nor on anyone else at the giving of a vestment.
Reply to Objection 5: The deacon's power is midway between the
subdeacon's and the priest's. For the priest exercises a power directly
on Christ's body, the subdeacon on the vessels only, and the deacon on
Christ's body contained in a vessel. Hence it is not for him to touch
Christ's body, but to carry the body on the paten, and to dispense the
blood with the chalice. Consequently his power, as to the principal
act, could not be expressed, either by the giving of the vessel only,
or by the giving of the matter; and his power is expressed as to the
secondary act alone, by his receiving the book of the Gospels, and this
power is understood to contain the other; wherefore the character is
impressed at the handing of the book.
Reply to Objection 6: The act of the acolyte whereby he serves with the
cruet ranks before his act of carrying the torch; although he takes his
name from the secondary act, because it is better known and more proper
to him. Hence the acolyte receives the character when he is given the
cruet, by virtue of the words uttered by the bishop.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE WHO CONFER THIS SACRAMENT (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider those who confer this sacrament. Under this head
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a bishop alone can confer this sacrament?
(2) Whether a heretic or any other person cut off from the Church can
confer this sacrament?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a bishop alone confers the sacrament of Order?
Objection 1: It would seem that not only a bishop confers the sacrament
of Order. For the imposition of hands has something to do with the
consecration. Now not only the bishop but also the assisting priests
lay hands on the priests who are being ordained. Therefore not only a
bishop confers the sacrament of Order.
Objection 2: Further, a man receives the power of Order, when that
which pertains to the act of his Order is handed to him. Now the cruet
with water, bowl* and towel, are given to the subdeacon by the
archdeacon; as also the candlestick with candle, and the empty cruet to
the acolyte. [*"Bacili." The rubric has "aquamanili." Some texts of the
Summa have "mantili" ("maniple"), but the archdeacon does not give the
maniple to the subdeacon.] Therefore not only the bishop confers the
sacrament of Order.
Objection 3: Further, that which belongs to an Order cannot be
entrusted to one who has not the Order. Now the conferring of minor
Orders is entrusted to certain persons who are not bishops, for
instance to Cardinal priests. Therefore the conferring of Orders does
not belong to the episcopal Order.
Objection 4: Further, whoever is entrusted with the principal is
entrusted with the accessory also. Now the sacrament of Order is
directed to the Eucharist, as accessory to principal. Since then a
priest consecrates the Eucharist, he can also confer Orders.
Objection 5: Further, there is a greater distinction between a priest
and a deacon than between bishop and bishop. But a bishop can
consecrate a bishop. Therefore a priest can ordain a deacon.
On the contrary, Ministers are applied by their Orders to the Divine
worship in a more noble way than the sacred vessels. But the
consecration of the vessels belongs to a bishop only. Much more
therefore does the consecration of ministers.
Further, the sacrament of Order ranks higher than the sacrament of
Confirmation. Now a bishop alone confirms. Much more therefore does a
bishop alone confer the sacrament of Order.
Further, virgins are not placed in a degree of spiritual power by their
consecration, as the ordained are. Yet a bishop alone can consecrate a
virgin. Therefore much more can he alone ordain.
I answer that, The episcopal power stands in the same relation to the
power of the lower Orders, as political science, which seeks the common
good, to the lower acts and virtues which seek some special good, as
appears from what was said above ([4911]Q[37], A[1]). Now political
science, as stated in Ethic. i, 2, lays down the law to lower sciences,
namely what science each one ought to cultivate, and how far he should
pursue it and in what way. Wherefore it belongs to a bishop to assign
others to places in all the Divine services. Hence he alone confirms,
because those who are confirmed receive the office, as it were, of
confessing the faith; again he alone blesses virgins who are images of
the Church, Christ's spouse, the care of which is entrusted chiefly to
him; and he it is who consecrates the candidates for ordination to the
ministry of Orders, and, by his consecration, appoints the vessels that
they are to use; even as secular offices in various cities are allotted
by him who holds the highest power, for instance by the king.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4912]Q[37], A[5]), at the
imposition of hands there is given, not the character of the priestly
Order, but grace which makes a man fit to exercise his Order. And since
those who are raised to the priesthood need most copious grace, the
priests together with the bishop lay hands on them, but the bishop
alone lays hands on deacons.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the archdeacon is as it were
minister-in-chief, all things pertaining to the ministry are handed by
him, for instance the candle with which the acolyte serves the deacon
by carrying it before him at the Gospel, and the cruet with which he
serves the subdeacon; and in like manner he gives the subdeacon the
things with which the latter serves the higher Orders. And yet the
principal act of the subdeacon does not consist in these things, but in
his co-operation as regards the matter of the sacrament; wherefore he
receives the character through the chalice being handed to him by the
bishop. On the other hand, the acolyte receives the character by virtue
of the words of the bishop when the aforesaid things---the cruet rather
than the candlestick---are handed to him by the archdeacon. Hence it
does not follow that the archdeacon ordains.
Reply to Objection 3: The Pope, who has the fulness of episcopal power,
can entrust one who is not a bishop with things pertaining to the
episcopal dignity, provided they bear no immediate relation to the true
body of Christ. Hence by virtue of his commission a simple priest can
confer the minor Orders and confirm; but not one who is not a priest.
Nor can a priest confer the higher Orders which bear an immediate
relation to Christ's body, over the consecration of which the Pope's
power is no greater than that of a simple priest.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the Eucharist is in itself the greatest
of the sacraments, it does not place a man in an office as does the
sacrament of Order. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 5: In order to bestow what one has on another, it is
necessary not only to be near him but also to have fulness of power.
And since a priest has not fulness of power in the hierarchical
offices, as a bishop has, it does not follow that he can raise others
to the diaconate, although the latter Order is near to his.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether heretics and those who are cut off from the Church can confer
Orders? [*Cf. TP, Q[64], AA[5],9]
Objection 1: It would seem that heretics and those who are cut off from
the Church cannot confer Orders. For to confer Orders is a greater
thing than to loose or bind anyone. But a heretic cannot loose or bind.
Neither therefore can he ordain.
Objection 2: Further, a priest that is separated from the Church can
consecrate, because the character whence he derives this power remains
in him indelibly. But a bishop receives no character when he is raised
to the episcopate. Therefore he does not necessarily retain the
episcopal power after his separation from the Church.
Objection 3: Further, in no community can one who is expelled therefrom
dispose of the offices of the community. Now Orders are offices of the
Church. Therefore one who is outside the Church cannot confer Orders.
Objection 4: Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from
Christ's passion. Now a heretic is not united to Christ's passion;
neither by his own faith, since he is an unbeliever, nor by the faith
of the Church, since he is severed from the Church. Therefore he cannot
confer the sacrament of Orders.
Objection 5: Further, a blessing is necessary in the conferring of
Orders. But a heretic cannot bless; in fact his blessing is turned into
a curse, as appears from the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv,
D, 25). Therefore he cannot ordain.
On the contrary, When a bishop who has fallen into heresy is reconciled
he is not reconsecrated. Therefore he did not lose the power which he
had of conferring Orders.
Further, the power to ordain is greater than the power of Orders. But
the power of Orders is not forfeited on account of heresy and the like.
Neither therefore is the power to ordain.
Further, as the one who baptizes exercises a merely outward ministry,
so does one who ordains, while God works inwardly. But one who is cut
off from the Church by no means loses the power to baptize. Neither
therefore does he lose the power to ordain.
I answer that, on this question four opinions are mentioned in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 25). For some said that heretics, so long as they are
tolerated by the Church, retain the power to ordain, but not after they
have been cut off from the Church; as neither do those who have been
degraded and the like. This is the first opinion. Yet this is
impossible, because, happen what may, no power that is given with a
consecration can be taken away so long as the thing itself remains, any
more than the consecration itself can be annulled, for even an altar or
chrism once consecrated remains consecrated for ever. Wherefore, since
the episcopal power is conferred by consecration, it must needs endure
for ever, however much a man may sin or be cut off from the Church. For
this reason others said that those who are cut off from the Church
after having episcopal power in the Church, retain the power to ordain
and raise others, but that those who are raised by them have not this
power. This is the fourth opinion. But this again is impossible, for if
those who were ordained in the Church retain the power they received,
it is clear that by exercising their power they consecrate validly, and
therefore they validly confer whatever power is given with that
consecration, and thus those who receive ordination or promotion from
them have the same power as they. Wherefore others said that even those
who are cut off from the Church can confer Orders and the other
sacraments, provided they observe the due form and intention, both as
to the first effect, which is the conferring of the sacrament, and as
to the ultimate effect which is the conferring of grace. This is the
second opinion. But this again is inadmissible, since by the very fact
that a person communicates in the sacraments with a heretic who is cut
off from the Church, he sins, and thus approaches the sacrament
insincerely and cannot obtain grace, except perhaps in Baptism in a
case of necessity. Hence others say that they confer the sacraments
validly, but do not confer grace with them, not that the sacraments are
lacking in efficacy, but on account of the sins of those who receive
the sacraments from such persons despite the prohibition of the Church.
This is the third and the true opinion.
Reply to Objection 1: The effect of absolution is nothing else but the
forgiveness of sins which results from grace, and consequently a
heretic cannot absolve, as neither can he confer grace in the
sacraments. Moreover in order to give absolution it is necessary to
have jurisdiction, which one who is cut off from the Church has not.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man is raised to the episcopate he
receives a power which he retains for ever. This, however, cannot be
called a character, because a man is not thereby placed in direct
relation to God, but to Christ's mystical body. Nevertheless it remains
indelibly even as the character, because it is given by consecration.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who are ordained by heretics, although they
receive an Order, do not receive the exercise thereof, so as to
minister lawfully in their Orders, for the very reason indicated in the
Objection.
Reply to Objection 4: They are united to the passion of Christ by the
faith of the Church, for although in themselves they are severed from
it, they are united to it as regards the form of the Church which they
observe.
Reply to Objection 5: This refers to the ultimate effect of the
sacraments, as the third opinion maintains.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO THIS SACRAMENT (SIX ARTICLES)
We must next consider the impediments to this sacrament. Under this
head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving this
sacrament?
(2) Whether lack of the use of reason is?
(3) Whether the state of slavery is?
(4) Whether homicide is?
(5) Whether illegitimate birth is?
(6) Whether lack of members is?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving Orders?
Objection 1: It would seem that the female sex is no impediment to
receiving Orders. For the office of prophet is greater than the office
of priest, since a prophet stands midway between God and priests, just
as the priest does between God and people. Now the office of prophet
was sometimes granted to women, as may be gathered from 4 Kings 22:14.
Therefore the office of priest also may be competent to them.
Objection 2: Further, just as Order pertains to a kind of pre-eminence,
so does a position of authority as well as martyrdom and the religious
state. Now authority is entrusted to women in the New Testament, as in
the case of abbesses, and in the Old Testament, as in the case of
Debbora, who judged Israel (Judges 2). Moreover martyrdom and the
religious life are also befitting to them. Therefore the Orders of the
Church are also competent to them.
Objection 3: Further, the power of orders is founded in the soul. But
sex is not in the soul. Therefore difference in sex makes no difference
to the reception of Orders.
On the contrary, It is said (1 Tim. 2:12): "I suffer not a woman to
teach (in the Church),* nor to use authority over the man." [*The words
in parenthesis are from 1 Cor. 14:34, "Let women keep silence in the
churches."]
Further, the crown is required previous to receiving Orders, albeit not
for the validity of the sacrament. But the crown or tonsure is not
befitting to women according to 1 Cor. 11. Neither therefore is the
receiving of Orders.
I answer that, Certain things are required in the recipient of a
sacrament as being requisite for the validity of the sacrament, and if
such things be lacking, one can receive neither the sacrament nor the
reality of the sacrament. Other things, however, are required, not for
the validity of the sacrament, but for its lawfulness, as being
congruous to the sacrament; and without these one receives the
sacrament, but not the reality of the sacrament. Accordingly we must
say that the male sex is required for receiving Orders not only in the
second, but also in the first way. Wherefore even though a woman were
made the object of all that is done in conferring Orders, she would not
receive Orders, for since a sacrament is a sign, not only the thing,
but the signification of the thing, is required in all sacramental
actions; thus it was stated above ([4913]Q[32], A[2]) that in Extreme
Unction it is necessary to have a sick man, in order to signify the
need of healing. Accordingly, since it is not possible in the female
sex to signify eminence of degree, for a woman is in the state of
subjection, it follows that she cannot receive the sacrament of Order.
Some, however, have asserted that the male sex is necessary for the
lawfulness and not for the validity of the sacrament, because even in
the Decretals (cap. Mulieres dist. 32; cap. Diaconissam, 27, qu. i)
mention is made of deaconesses and priestesses. But deaconess there
denotes a woman who shares in some act of a deacon, namely who reads
the homilies in the Church; and priestess [presbytera] means a widow,
for the word "presbyter" means elder.
Reply to Objection 1: Prophecy is not a sacrament but a gift of God.
Wherefore there it is not the signification, but only the thing which
is necessary. And since in matters pertaining to the soul woman does
not differ from man as to the thing (for sometimes a woman is found to
be better than many men as regards the soul), it follows that she can
receive the gift of prophecy and the like, but not the sacrament of
Orders.
And thereby appears the Reply to the Second and Third Objections.
However, as to abbesses, it is said that they have not ordinary
authority, but delegated as it were, on account of the danger of men
and women living together. But Debbora exercised authority in temporal,
not in priestly matters, even as now woman may have temporal power.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether boys and those who lack the use of reason can receive Orders?
Objection 1: It would seem that boys and those who lack the use of
reason cannot receive Orders. For, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
25), the sacred canons have appointed a certain fixed age in those who
receive Orders. But this would not be if boys could receive the
sacrament of Orders. Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, the sacrament of Orders ranks above the sacrament
of matrimony. Now children and those who lack the use of reason cannot
contract matrimony. Neither therefore can they receive Orders.
Objection 3: Further, act and power are in the same subject, according
to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vigil. i). Now the act of Orders
requires the use of reason. Therefore the power of Orders does also.
On the contrary, one who is raised to Orders before the age of
discretion is sometimes allowed to exercise them without being
reordained, as appears from Extra., De Cler. per salt. prom. But this
would not be the case if he had not received Orders. Therefore a boy
can receive Orders.
Further, boys can receive other sacraments in which a character is
imprinted, namely Baptism and Confirmation. Therefore in like manner
they can receive Orders.
I answer that, Boyhood and other defects which remove the use of reason
occasion an impediment to act. Wherefore the like are unfit to receive
all those sacraments which require an act on the part of the recipient
of the sacrament, such as Penance, Matrimony, and so forth. But since
infused powers like natural powers precede acts---although acquired
powers follow acts---and the removal of that which comes after does not
entail the removal of what comes first, it follows that children and
those who lack the use of reason can receive all the sacraments in
which an act on the part of the recipient is not required for the
validity of the sacrament, but some spiritual power is conferred from
above; with this difference, however, that in the minor orders the age
of discretion is required out of respect for the dignity of the
sacrament, but not for its lawfulness, nor for its validity. Hence some
can without sin be raised to the minor orders before the years of
discretion, if there be an urgent reason for it and hope of their
proficiency. and they are validly ordained; for although at the time
they are not qualified for the offices entrusted to them, they will
become qualified by being habituated thereto. For the higher Orders,
however, the use of reason is required both out of respect for, and for
the lawfulness of the sacrament, not only on account of the vow of
continency annexed thereto, but also because the handling of the
sacraments is entrusted to them [*See Acts of the Council of Trent: De
Reform., Sess. xxii, cap. 4,11,12]. But for the episcopate whereby a
man receives power also over the mystical body, the act of accepting
the pastoral care of souls is required; wherefore the use of reason is
necessary for the validity of episcopal consecration. Some, however,
maintain that the use of reason is necessary for the validity of the
sacrament in all the Orders. but this statement is not confirmed either
by authority or by reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the Article, not all that is
necessary for the lawfulness of a sacrament is required for its
validity.
Reply to Objection 2: The cause of matrimony is consent, which cannot
be without the use of reason. Whereas in the reception of Orders no act
is required on the part of the recipients since no act on their part is
expressed in their consecration. Hence there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: Act and power are in the same subject; yet
sometimes a power, such as the free-will, precedes its act; and thus it
is in the case in point.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the state of slavery is an impediment to receiving Orders?
Objection 1: It would seem that the state of slavery is not an
impediment to receiving Orders. For corporal subjection is not
incompatible with spiritual authority. But in a slave there is corporal
subjection. Therefore he is not hindered from receiving the spiritual
authority which is given in orders.
Objection 2: Further, that which is an occasion for humility should not
be an impediment to the reception of a sacrament. Now such is slavery,
for the Apostle counsels a man, if possible, rather to remain in
slavery (1 Cor. 7:21). Therefore it should not hinder him from being
raised to Orders.
Objection 3: Further, it is more disgraceful for a cleric to become a
slave than for a slave to be made a cleric. Yet a cleric may lawfully
be sold as a slave; for a bishop of Nola, Paulinus, to wit, sold
himself as a slave as related by Gregory (Dial. iii). Much more
therefore can a slave be made a cleric.
Objection 4: On the contrary, It would seem that it is an impediment to
the validity of the sacrament. For a woman, on account of her
subjection, cannot receive the sacrament of Orders. But greater still
is the subjection in a slave; since woman was not given to man as his
handmaid (for which reason she was not made from his feet). Therefore
neither can a slave receive this sacrament.
Objection 5: Further, a man, from the fact that he receives an Order,
is bound to minister in that Order. But he cannot at the same time
serve his carnal master and exercise his spiritual ministry. Therefore
it would seem that he cannot receive Orders, since the master must be
indemnified.
I answer that, By receiving Orders a man pledges himself to the Divine
offices. And since no man can give what is not his, a slave who has not
the disposal of himself, cannot be raised to Orders. If, however, he be
raised, he receives the Order, because freedom is not required for the
validity of the sacrament, although it is requisite for its lawfulness,
since it hinders not the power, but the act only. The same reason
applies to all who are under an obligation to others, such as those who
are in debt and like persons.
Reply to Objection 1: The reception of spiritual power involves also an
obligation to certain bodily actions, and consequently it is hindered
by bodily subjection.
Reply to Objection 2: A man may take an occasion for humility from many
other things which do not prove a hindrance to the exercise of Orders.
Reply to Objection 3: The blessed Paulinus did this out of the
abundance of his charity, being led by the spirit of God; as was proved
by the result of his action, since by his becoming a slave, many of his
flock were freed from slavery. Hence we must not draw a conclusion from
this particular instance, since "where the spirit of the Lord is, there
is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17).
Reply to Objection 4: The sacramental signs signify by reason of their
natural likeness. Now a woman is a subject by her nature, whereas a
slave is not. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 5: If he be ordained, his master knowing and not
dissenting, by this very fact he becomes a freedman. But if his master
be in ignorance, the bishop and he who presented him are bound to pay
the master double the slave's value, if they knew him to be a slave.
Otherwise if the slave has possessions of his own, he is bound to buy
his freedom, else he would have to return to the bondage of his master,
notwithstanding the impossibility of his exercising his Order.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man should be debarred from receiving Orders on account of
homicide?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to be debarred from
receiving Orders on account of homicide. Because our Orders originated
with the office of the Levites, as stated in the previous Distinction
(Sent. iv, D, 24). But the Levites consecrated their hands by shedding
the blood of their brethren (Ex. 32:29). Therefore neither should
anyone in the New Testament be debarred from receiving Orders on
account of the shedding of blood.
Objection 2: Further, no one should be debarred from a sacrament on
account of an act of virtue. Now blood is sometimes shed for justice'
sake, for instance by a judge; and he who has the office would sin if
he did not shed it. Therefore he is not hindered on that account from
receiving Orders.
Objection 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now
sometimes a person commits homicide without fault, for instance by
defending himself, or again by mishap. Therefore he ought not to incur
the punishment of irregularity.
On the contrary, Against this there are many canonical statutes [*Cap.
Miror; cap. Clericum; cap. De his Cler., dist. 1; cap. Continebatur, De
homic. volunt.], as also the custom of the Church.
I answer that, All the Orders bear a relation to the sacrament of the
Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the peace vouchsafed to us by the
shedding of Christ's blood. And since homicide is most opposed to
peace, and those who slay are conformed to Christ's slayers rather than
to Christ slain, to whom all the ministers of the aforesaid sacrament
ought to be conformed, it follows that it is unlawful, although not
invalid, for homicides to be raised to Orders.
Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law inflicted the punishment of blood,
whereas the New Law does not. Hence the comparison fails between the
ministers of the Old Testament and those of the New, which is a sweet
yoke and a light burden (Mat. 11:30).
Reply to Objection 2: Irregularity is incurred not only on account of
sin, but chiefly on account of a person being unfit to administer the
sacrament of the Eucharist. Hence the judge and all who take part with
him in a cause of blood, are irregular, because the shedding of blood
is unbecoming to the ministers of that sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: No one does a thing without being the cause
thereof, and in man this is something voluntary. Hence he who by mishap
slays a man without knowing that it is a man, is not called a homicide,
nor does he incur irregularity (unless he was occupying himself in some
unlawful manner, or failed to take sufficient care, since in this case
the slaying becomes somewhat voluntary). But this is not because he is
not in fault, since irregularity is incurred even without fault.
Wherefore even he who in a particular case slays a man in self-defense
without committing a sin, is none the less irregular [*St. Thomas is
speaking according to the canon law of his time. This is no longer the
case now.].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those of illegitimate birth should be debarred from receiving
Orders?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are of illegitimate birth
should not be debarred from receiving Orders. For the son should not
bear the iniquity of the father (Ezech. 18:20); and yet he would if
this were an impediment to his receiving Orders. Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, one's own fault is a greater impediment than the
fault of another. Now unlawful intercourse does not always debar a man
from receiving Orders. Therefore neither should he be debarred by the
unlawful intercourse of his father.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 23:2): "A mamzer, that is to say,
one born of a prostitute, shall not enter into the Church of the Lord
until the tenth generation." Much less therefore should he be ordained.
I answer that, Those who are ordained are placed in a position of
dignity over others. Hence by a kind of propriety it is requisite that
they should be without reproach, not for the validity but for the
lawfulness of the sacrament, namely that they should be of good repute,
bedecked with a virtuous life, and not publicly penitent. And since a
man's good name is bedimmed by a sinful origin, therefore those also
who are born of an unlawful union are debarred from receiving orders,
unless they receive a dispensation; and this is the more difficult to
obtain, according as their origin is more discreditable.
Reply to Objection 1: Irregularity is not a punishment due for sin.
Hence it is clear that those who are of illegitimate birth do not bear
the iniquity of their father through being irregular.
Reply to Objection 2: What a man does by his own act can be removed by
repentance and by a contrary act; not so the things which are from
nature. Hence the comparison fails between sinful act and sinful
origin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether lack of members should be an impediment?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to be debarred from
receiving Orders on account of a lack of members. For one who is
afflicted should not receive additional affliction. Therefore a man
ought not to be deprived of the degree of Orders on account of his
suffering a bodily defect.
Objection 2: Further, integrity of discretion is more necessary for the
act of orders than integrity of body. But some can be ordained before
the years of discretion. Therefore they can also be ordained though
deficient in body.
On the contrary, The like were debarred from the ministry of the Old
Law (Lev. 21:18, seqq.). Much more therefore should they be debarred in
the New Law.
We shall speak of bigamy in the treatise on Matrimony ([4914]Q[66]).
I answer that, As appears from what we have said above
([4915]AA[3],4,5), a man is disqualified from receiving Orders, either
on account of an impediment to the act, or on account of an impediment
affecting his personal comeliness. Hence he who suffers from a lack of
members is debarred from receiving Orders, if the defect be such as to
cause a notable blemish, whereby a man's comeliness is bedimmed (for
instance if his nose be cut off) or the exercise of his Order
imperilled; otherwise he is not debarred. This integrity, however, is
necessary for the lawfulness and not for the validity of the sacrament.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER (SEVEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the things that are annexed to the sacrament of
Order. Under this head there are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether those who are ordained ought to be shaven and tonsured in
the form of a crown?
(2) Whether the tonsure is an Order?
(3) Whether by receiving the tonsure one renounces temporal goods?
(4) Whether above the priestly Order there should be an episcopal
power?
(5) Whether the episcopate is an Order?
(6) Whether in the Church there can be any power above the episcopate?
(7) Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted by
the Church?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who are ordained ought to wear the tonsure?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are ordained ought not to
wear the tonsure in the shape of a crown. For the Lord threatened
captivity and dispersion to those who were shaven in this way: "Of the
captivity of the bare head of the enemies" (Dt. 32:42), and: "I will
scatter into every wind them that have their hair cut round" (Jer.
49:32). Now the ministers of Christ should not be captives, but free.
Therefore shaving and tonsure in the shape of a crown does not become
them.
Objection 2: Further, the truth should correspond to the figure. Now
the crown was prefigured in the Old Law by the tonsure of the
Nazarenes, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore since the
Nazarenes were not ordained to the Divine ministry, it would seem that
the ministers of the Church should not receive the tonsure or shave the
head in the form of a crown. The same would seem to follow from the
fact that lay brothers, who are not ministers of the Church, receive a
tonsure in the religious Orders.
Objection 3: Further, the hair signifies superabundance, because it
grows from that which is superabundant. But the ministers of the Church
should cast off all superabundance. Therefore they should shave the
head completely and not in the shape of a crown.
On the contrary, According to Gregory, "to serve God is to reign"
(Super Ps. 101:23). Now a crown is the sign of royalty. Therefore a
crown is becoming to those who are devoted to the Divine ministry.
Further, according to 1 Cor. 11:15, hair is given us "for a covering."
But the ministers of the altar should have the mind uncovered.
Therefore the tonsure is becoming to them.
I answer that, It is becoming for those who apply themselves to the
Divine ministry to be shaven or tonsured in the form of a crown by
reason of the shape. Because a crown is the sign of royalty; and of
perfection, since it is circular; and those who are appointed to the
Divine service acquire a royal dignity and ought to be perfect in
virtue. It is also becoming to them as it involves the hair being taken
both from the higher part of the head by shaving, lest their mind be
hindered by temporal occupations from contemplating Divine things, and
from the lower part by clipping, lest their senses be entangled in
temporal things.
Reply to Objection 1: The Lord threatens those who did this for the
worship of demons.
Reply to Objection 2: The things that were done in the Old Testament
represent imperfectly the things of the New Testament. Hence things
pertaining to the ministers of the New Testament were signified not
only by the offices of the Levites, but also by all those persons who
professed some degree of perfection. Now the Nazarenes professed a
certain perfection by having their hair cut off, thus signifying their
contempt of temporal things, although they did not have it cut in the
shape of a crown, but cut it off completely, for as yet it was not the
time of the royal and perfect priesthood. In like manner lay brothers
have their hair cut because they renounce temporalities. but they do
not shave the head, because they are not occupied in the Divine
ministry, so as to have to contemplate Divine things with the mind.
Reply to Objection 3: Not only the renunciation of temporalities, but
also the royal dignity has to be signified by the form of a crown;
wherefore the hair should not be cut off entirely. Another reason is
that this would be unbecoming.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the tonsure is an Order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the tonsure is an Order. For in the
acts of the Church the spiritual corresponds to the corporal. Now the
tonsure is a corporal sign employed by the Church. Therefore seemingly
there is some interior signification corresponding thereto; so that a
person receives a character when he receives the tonsure, and
consequently the latter is an Order.
Objection 2: Further, just as Confirmation and the other Orders are
given by a bishop alone, so is the tonsure. Now a character is
imprinted in Confirmation, and the other Orders. Therefore one is
imprinted likewise in receiving the tonsure. Therefore the same
conclusion follows.
Objection 3: Further, Order denotes a degree of dignity. Now a cleric
by the very fact of being a cleric is placed on a degree above the
people. Therefore the tonsure by which he is made a cleric is an Order.
On the contrary, No Order is given except during the celebration of
Mass. But the tonsure is given even outside the office of the Mass.
Therefore it is not an Order.
Further, in the conferring of every Order mention is made of some power
granted, but not in the conferring of the tonsure. Therefore it is not
an Order.
I answer that, The ministers of the Church are severed from the people
in order that they may give themselves entirely to the Divine worship.
Now in the Divine worship are certain actions that have to be exercised
by virtue of certain definite powers, and for this purpose the
spiritual power of order is given; while other actions are performed by
the whole body of ministers in common, for instance the recital of the
Divine praises. For such things it is not necessary to have the power
of Order, but only to be deputed to such an office; and this is done by
the tonsure. Consequently it is not an Order but a preamble to Orders.
Reply to Objection 1: The tonsure has some spiritual thing inwardly
corresponding to it, as signate corresponds to sign; but this is not a
spiritual power. Wherefore a character is not imprinted in the tonsure
as in an Order.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a man does not receive a character in
the tonsure, nevertheless he is appointed to the Divine worship. Hence
this appointment should be made by the supreme minister, namely the
bishop, who moreover blesses the vestments and vessels and whatsoever
else is employed in the Divine worship.
Reply to Objection 3: A man through being a cleric is in a higher state
than a layman; but as regards power he has not the higher degree that
is required for Orders.
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Whether by receiving the tonsure a man renounces temporal goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that men renounce temporal goods by
receiving the tonsure, for when they are tonsured they say: "The Lord
is the portion of my inheritance." But as Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot.),
"the Lord disdains to be made a portion together with these temporal
things." Therefore he renounces temporalities.
Objection 2: Further, the justice of the ministers of the New Testament
ought to abound more than that of the ministers of the Old Testament
(Mat. 5:20). But the ministers of the Old Testament, namely the
Levites, did not receive a portion of inheritance with their brethren
(Dt. 10; Dt. 18). Therefore neither should the ministers of the New
Testament.
Objection 3: Further, Hugh says (De Sacram. ii) that "after a man is
made a cleric, he must from thenceforward live on the pay of the
Church." But this would not be so were he to retain his patrimony.
Therefore he would seem to renounce it by becoming a cleric.
On the contrary, Jeremias was of the priestly order (Jer. 1:1). Yet he
retained possession of his inheritance (Jer. 32:8). Therefore clerics
can retain their patrimony.
Further, if this were not so there would seem to be no difference
between religious and the secular clergy.
I answer that, Clerics by receiving the tonsure, do not renounce their
patrimony or other temporalities; since the possession of earthly
things is not contrary to the Divine worship to which clerics are
appointed, although excessive care for such things is; for as Gregory
says (Moral. x, 30), "it is not wealth but the love of wealth that is
sinful."
Reply to Objection 11: The Lord disdains to be a portion as being loved
equally with other things, so that a man place his end in God and the
things of the world. He does not, however, disdain to be the portion of
those who so possess the things of the world as not to be withdrawn
thereby from the Divine worship.
Reply to Objection 2: In the Old Testament the Levites had a right to
their paternal inheritance; and the reason why they did not receive a
portion with the other tribes was because they were scattered
throughout all the tribes, which would have been impossible if, like
the other tribes, they had received one fixed portion of the soil.
Reply to Objection 3: Clerics promoted to holy orders, if they be poor,
must be provided for by the bishop who ordained them; otherwise he is
not so bound. And they are bound to minister to the Church in the Order
they have received. The words of Hugh refer to those who have no means
of livelihood.
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Whether above the priestly Order there ought to be an episcopal power?
Objection 1: It would seem that there ought not to be an episcopal
power above the priestly Order. For as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
24) "the priestly Order originated from Aaron." Now in the Old Law
there was no one above Aaron. Therefore neither in the New Law ought
there to be any power above that of the priests.
Objection 2: Further, powers rank according to acts. Now no sacred act
can be greater than to consecrate the body of Christ, whereunto the
priestly power is directed. Therefore there should not be an episcopal
above the priestly power.
Objection 3: Further, the priest, in offering, represents Christ in the
Church, Who offered Himself for us to the Father. Now no one is above
Christ in the Church, since He is the Head of the Church. Therefore
there should not be an episcopal above the priestly power.
On the contrary, A power is so much the higher according as it extends
to more things. Now the priestly power, according to Dionysius (Eccl.
Hier. v), extends only to cleansing and enlightening, whereas the
episcopal power extends both to this and to perfecting. Therefore the
episcopal should be above the priestly power.
Further, the Divine ministries should be more orderly than human
ministries. Now the order of human ministries requires that in each
office there should be one person to preside, just as a general is
placed over soldiers. Therefore there should also be appointed over
priests one who is the chief priest, and this is the bishop. Therefore
the episcopal should be above the priestly power.
I answer that, A priest has two acts: one is the principal, namely to
consecrate the body of Christ. the other is secondary, namely to
prepare God's people for the reception of this sacrament, as stated
above ([4916]Q[37], AA[2],4). As regards the first act, the priest's
power does not depend on a higher power save God's; but as to the
second, it depends on a higher and that a human power. For every power
that cannot exercise its act without certain ordinances, depends on the
power that makes those ordinances. Now a priest cannot loose and bind,
except we presuppose him to have the jurisdiction of authority, whereby
those whom he absolves are subject to him. But he can consecrate any
matter determined by Christ, nor is anything else required for the
validity of the sacrament; although, on account of a certain
congruousness, the act of the bishop is pre-required in the
consecration of the altar, vestments, and so forth. Hence it is clear
that it behooves the episcopal to be above the priestly power, as
regards the priest's secondary act, but not as regards his primary act.
Reply to Objection 1: Aaron was both priest and pontiff, that is chief
priest. Accordingly the priestly power originated from him, in so far
as he was a priest offering sacrifices, which was lawful even to the
lesser priests; but it does not originate from him as pontiff, by which
power he was able to do certain things; for instance, to enter once a
year the Holy of Holies, which it was unlawful for the other priests to
do.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no higher power with regard to this act,
but with regard to another, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the perfections of all natural things
pre-exist in God as their exemplar, so was Christ the exemplar of all
ecclesiastical offices. Wherefore each minister of the Church is, in
some respect, a copy of Christ, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
24). Yet he is the higher who represents Christ according to a greater
perfection. Now a priest represents Christ in that He fulfilled a
certain ministry by Himself, whereas a bishop represents Him in that He
instituted other ministers and founded the Church. Hence it belongs to
a bishop to dedicate a thing to the Divine offices, as establishing the
Divine worship after the manner of Christ. For this reason also a
bishop is especially called the bridegroom of the Church even as Christ
is.
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Whether the episcopate is an Order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the episcopate is an Order. First of
all, because Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) assigns these three orders to
the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the bishop, the priest, and the minister.
In the text also (Sent. iv, D, 24) it is stated that the episcopal
Order is fourfold.
Objection 2: Further, Order is nothing else but a degree of power in
the dispensing of spiritual things. Now bishops can dispense certain
sacraments which priests cannot dispense, namely Confirmation and
Order. Therefore the episcopate is an Order.
Objection 3: Further, in the Church there is no spiritual power other
than of Order or jurisdiction. But things pertaining to the episcopal
power are not matters of jurisdiction, else they might be committed to
one who is not a bishop, which is false. Therefore they belong to the
power of Order. Therefore the bishop has an Order which a simple priest
has not; and thus the episcopate is an Order.
On the contrary, One Order does not depend on a preceding order as
regards the validity of the sacrament. But the episcopal power depends
on the priestly power, since no one can receive the episcopal power
unless he have previously the priestly power. Therefore the episcopate
is not an Order.
Further, the greater Orders are not conferred except on Saturdays [*The
four Ember Saturdays]. But the episcopal power is bestowed on Sundays
[*Dist. lxxv, can. Ordinationes]. Therefore it is not an Order.
I answer that, Order may be understood in two ways. In one way as a
sacrament, and thus, as already stated ([4917]Q[37], AA[2],4), every
Order is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist. Wherefore since
the bishop has not a higher power than the priest, in this respect the
episcopate is not an Order. In another way Order may be considered as
an office in relation to certain sacred actions: and thus since in
hierarchical actions a bishop has in relation to the mystical body a
higher power than the priest, the episcopate is an Order. It is in this
sense that the authorities quoted speak.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: Order considered as a sacrament which imprints a
character is specially directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, in
which Christ Himself is contained, because by a character we are made
like to Christ Himself [*Cf. [4918]TP, Q[63], A[3]]. Hence although at
his promotion a bishop receives a spiritual power in respect of certain
sacraments, this power nevertheless has not the nature of a character.
For this reason the episcopate is not an Order, in the sense in which
an Order is a sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: The episcopal power is one not only of
jurisdiction but also of Order, as stated above, taking Order in the
sense in which it is generally understood.
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Whether in the Church there can be anyone above the bishops?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be anyone in the Church
higher than the bishops. For all the bishops are the successors of the
apostles. Now the power so given to one of the apostles, namely Peter
(Mat. 16:19), was given to all the apostles (Jn. 20:23). Therefore all
bishops are equal, and one is not above another.
Objection 2: Further, the rite of the Church ought to be more conformed
to the Jewish rite than to that of the Gentiles. Now the distinction of
the episcopal dignity and the appointment of one over another, were
introduced by the Gentiles. as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24);
and there was no such thing in the Old Law. Therefore neither in the
Church should one bishop be above another.
Objection 3: Further, a higher power cannot be conferred by a lower,
nor equal by equal, because "without all contradiction that which is
less is blessed by the greater [Vulg.: 'better']"; hence a priest does
not consecrate a bishop or a priest, but a bishop consecrates a priest.
But a bishop can consecrate any bishop, since even the bishop of Ostia
consecrates the Pope. Therefore the episcopal dignity is equal in all
matters, and consequently one bishop should not be subject to another,
as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24).
On the contrary, We read in the council of Constantinople: "In
accordance with the Scriptures and the statutes and definitions of the
canons, we venerate the most holy bishop of ancient Rome the first and
greatest of bishops, and after him the bishop of Constantinople."
Therefore one bishop is above another.
Further, the blessed Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, says: "That we may
remain members of our apostolic head, the throne of the Roman Pontiffs,
of whom it is our duty to seek what we are to believe and what we are
to hold, venerating him, beseeching him above others; for his it is to
reprove, to correct, to appoint, to loose, and to bind in place of Him
Who set up that very throne, and Who gave the fulness of His own to no
other, but to him alone, to whom by divine right all bow the head, and
the primates of the world are obedient as to our Lord Jesus Christ
Himself." Therefore bishops are subject to someone even by divine
right.
I answer that, Wherever there are several authorities directed to one
purpose, there must needs be one universal authority over the
particular authorities, because in all virtues and acts the order is
according to the order of their ends (Ethic. i, 1,2). Now the common
good is more Godlike than the particular good. Wherefore above the
governing power which aims at a particular good there must be a
universal governing power in respect of the common good, otherwise
there would be no cohesion towards the one object. Hence since the
whole Church is one body, it behooves, if this oneness is to be
preserved, that there be a governing power in respect of the whole
Church, above the episcopal power whereby each particular Church is
governed, and this is the power of the Pope. Consequently those who
deny this power are called schismatics as causing a division in the
unity of the Church. Again, between a simple bishop and the Pope there
are other degrees of rank corresponding to the degrees of union, in
respect of which one congregation or community includes another; thus
the community of a province includes the community of a city, and the
community of a kingdom includes the community of one province, and the
community of the whole world includes the community of one kingdom.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the power of binding and loosing was
given to all the apostles in common, nevertheless in order to indicate
some order in this power, it was given first of all to Peter alone, to
show that this power must come down from him to the others. For this
reason He said to him in the singular: "Confirm thy brethren" (Lk.
22:32), and: "Feed My sheep" (Jn. 21:17), i.e. according to Chrysostom:
"Be thou the president and head of thy brethren in My stead, that they,
putting thee in My place, may preach and confirm thee throughout the
world whilst thou sittest on thy throne."
Reply to Objection 2: The Jewish rite was not spread abroad in various
kingdoms and provinces, but was confined to one nation; hence there was
no need to distinguish various pontiffs under the one who had the chief
power. But the rite of the Church, like that of the Gentiles, is spread
abroad through various nations; and consequently in this respect it is
necessary for the constitution of the Church to be like the rite of the
Gentiles rather than that of the Jews.
Reply to Objection 3: The priestly power is surpassed by the episcopal
power, as by a power of a different kind; but the episcopal is
surpassed by the papal power as by a power of the same kind. Hence a
bishop can perform every hierarchical act that the Pope can; whereas a
priest cannot perform every act that a bishop can in conferring the
sacraments. Wherefore as regards matters pertaining to the episcopal
Order, all bishops are equal, and for this reason any bishop can
consecrate another bishop.
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Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted in the
Church?
Objection 1: It would seem that the vestments of the ministers are not
fittingly instituted in the Church. For the ministers of the New
Testament are more bound to chastity than were the ministers of the Old
Testament. Now among the vestments of the Old Testament there were the
breeches as a sign of chastity. Much more therefore should they have a
place among the vestments of the Church's ministers.
Objection 2: Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more
worthy than the priesthood of the Old. But the priests of the Old
Testament had mitres, which are a sign of dignity. Therefore the
priests of the New Testament should also have them.
Objection 3: Further, the priest is nearer than the episcopal Order to
the Orders of ministers. Now the bishop uses the vestments of the
ministers, namely the dalmatic, which is the deacon's vestment, and the
tunic, which is the subdeacon's. Much more therefore should simple
priests use them.
Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law the pontiff wore the ephod
[*Superhumerale, i.e. over-the-shoulders], which signified the burden
of the Gospel, as Bede observes (De Tabernac. iii). Now this is
especially incumbent on our pontiffs. Therefore they ought to wear the
ephod.
Objection 5: Further, "Doctrine and Truth" were inscribed on the
"rational" which the pontiffs of the Old Testament wore. Now truth was
made known especially in the New Law. Therefore it is becoming to the
pontiffs of the New Law.
Objection 6: Further, the golden plate on which was written the most
admirable name of God, was the most admirable of the adornments of the
Old Law. Therefore it should especially have been transferred to the
New Law.
Objection 7: Further, the things which the ministers of the Church wear
outwardly are signs of inward power. Now the archbishop has no other
kind of power than a bishop, as stated above [4919](A[6]). Therefore he
should not have the pallium which other bishops have not.
Objection 8: Further, the fulness of power resides in the Roman
Pontiff. But he has not a crozier. Therefore other bishops should not
have one.
I answer that, The vestments of the ministers denote the qualifications
required of them for handling Divine things. And since certain things
are required of all, and some are required of the higher, that are not
so exacted of the lower ministers, therefore certain vestments are
common to all the ministers, while some pertain to the higher ministers
only. Accordingly it is becoming to all the ministers to wear the
"amice" which covers the shoulders, thereby signifying courage in the
exercise of the Divine offices to which they are deputed; and the
"alb," which signifies a pure life, and the "girdle," which signifies
restraint of the flesh. But the subdeacon wears in addition the
"maniple" on the left arm; this signifies the wiping away of the least
stains, since a maniple is a kind of handkerchief for wiping the face;
for they are the first to be admitted to the handling of sacred things.
They also have the "narrow tunic," signifying the doctrine of Christ;
wherefore in the Old Law little bells hung therefrom, and subdeacons
are the first admitted to announce the doctrine of the New Law. The
deacon has in addition the "stole" over the left shoulder, as a sign
that he is deputed to a ministry in the sacraments themselves, and the
"dalmatic" (which is a full vestment, so called because it first came
into use in Dalmatia), to signify that he is the first to be appointed
to dispense the sacraments: for he dispenses the blood, and in
dispensing one should be generous.
But in the case of the priest the "stole" hangs from both shoulders, to
show that he has received full power to dispense the sacraments, and
not as the minister of another man, for which reason the stole reaches
right down. He also wears the "chasuble," which signifies charity,
because he it is who consecrates the sacrament of charity, namely the
Eucharist.
Bishops have nine ornaments besides those which the priest has; these
are the "stockings, sandals, succinctory, tunic, dalmatic, mitre,
gloves, ring, and crozier," because there are nine things which they
can, but priests cannot, do, namely ordain clerics, bless virgins,
consecrate bishops, impose hands, dedicate churches, depose clerics,
celebrate synods, consecrate chrism, bless vestments and vessels.
We may also say that the "stockings" signify his upright walk; the
"sandals" which cover the feet, his contempt of earthly things; the
"succinctory" which girds the stole with the alb, his love of probity;
the "tunic," perseverance, for Joseph is said (Gn. 37:23) to have had a
long tunic---"talaric," because it reached down to the ankles [talos],
which denote the end of life; the "dalmatic," generosity in works of
mercy; the "gloves," prudence in action; the "mitre," knowledge of both
Testaments, for which reason it has two crests; the "crozier," his
pastoral care, whereby he has to gather together the wayward (this is
denoted by the curve at the head of the crozier), to uphold the weak
(this is denoted by the stem of the crozier), and to spur on the
laggards (this is denoted by the point at the foot of the crozier).
Hence the line:
"Gather, uphold, spur on
The wayward, the weak, and the laggard."
The "ring" signifies the sacraments of that faith whereby the Church is
espoused to Christ. For bishops are espoused to the Church in the place
of Christ. Furthermore archbishops have the "pallium" in sign of their
privileged power, for it signifies the golden chain which those who
fought rightfully were wont to receive.
Reply to Objection 1: The priests of the Old Law were enjoined
continency only for the time of their attendance for the purpose of
their ministry. Wherefore as a sign of the chastity which they had then
to observe, they wore the breeches while offering sacrifices. But the
ministers of the New Testament are enjoined perpetual continency; and
so the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: The mitre was not a sign of dignity, for it was a
kind of hat, as Jerome says (Ep. ad Fabiol.). But the diadem which was
a sign of dignity was given to the pontiffs alone, as the mitre is now.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the ministers resides in the bishop
as their source, but not in the priest, for he does not confer those
Orders. Wherefore the bishop, rather than the priest, wears those
vestments.
Reply to Objection 4: Instead of the ephod, they wear the stole, which
is intended for the same signification as the ephod.
Reply to Objection 5: The pallium takes the place of the "rational."
Reply to Objection 6: Instead of that plate our pontiff wears the
cross, as Innocent III says (De Myst. Miss. i), just as the breeches
are replaced by the sandals, the linen garment by the alb, the belt by
the girdle, the long or talaric garment by the tunic, the ephod by the
amice, the "rational" by the pallium, the diadem by the mitre.
Reply to Objection 7: Although he has not another kind of power he has
the same power more fully. and so in order to designate this
perfection, he receives the pallium which surrounds him on all sides.
Reply to Objection 8: The Roman Pontiff does not use a pastoral staff
because Peter sent his to restore to life a certain disciple who
afterwards became bishop of Treves. Hence in the diocese of Treves the
Pope carries a crozier but not elsewhere; or else it is a sign of his
not having a restricted power denoted by the curve of the staff.
__________________________________________________________________
MATRIMONY (QQ[41]-67)
OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY AS DIRECTED TO AN OFFICE OF NATURE (FOUR
ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider matrimony. We must treat of it (1)
as directed to an office of nature; (2) as a sacrament; (3) as
considered absolutely and in itself. Under the first head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is of natural law?
(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(3) Whether its act is lawful?
(4) Whether its act can be meritorious?
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Whether matrimony is of natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is not natural. Because "the
natural law is what nature has taught all animals" [*Digest. I, i, de
justitia et jure, 1]. But in other animals the sexes are united without
matrimony. Therefore matrimony is not of natural law.
Objection 1: Further, that which is of natural law is found in all men
with regard to their every state. But matrimony was not in every state
of man, for as Tully says (De Inv. Rhet.), "at the beginning men were
savages and then no man knew his own children, nor was he bound by any
marriage tie," wherein matrimony consists. Therefore it is not natural.
Objection 3: Further, natural things are the same among all. But
matrimony is not in the same way among all, since its practice varies
according to the various laws. Therefore it is not natural.
Objection 4: Further, those things without which the intention of
nature can be maintained would seem not to be natural. But nature
intends the preservation of the species by generation which is possible
without matrimony, as in the case of fornicators. Therefore matrimony
is not natural.
On the contrary, At the commencement of the Digests it is stated: "The
union of male and female, which we call matrimony, is of natural law."
Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) says that "man is an animal
more inclined by nature to connubial than political society." But "man
is naturally a political and gregarious animal," as the same author
asserts (Polit. i, 2). Therefore he is naturally inclined to connubial
union, and thus the conjugal union or matrimony is natural.
I answer that, A thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, as
resulting of necessity from the principles of nature; thus upward
movement is natural to fire. In this way matrimony is not natural, nor
are any of those things that come to pass at the intervention or motion
of the free-will. Secondly, that is said to be natural to which nature
inclines although it comes to pass through the intervention of the
free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues themselves are called
natural; and in this way matrimony is natural, because natural reason
inclines thereto in two ways. First, in relation to the principal end
of matrimony, namely the good of the offspring. For nature intends not
only the begetting of offspring, but also its education and development
until it reach the perfect state of man as man, and that is the state
of virtue. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12), we
derive three things from our parents, namely "existence,"
"nourishment," and "education." Now a child cannot be brought up and
instructed unless it have certain and definite parents, and this would
not be the case unless there were a tie between the man and a definite
woman and it is in this that matrimony consists. Secondly, in relation
to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual services which
married persons render one another in household matters. For just as
natural reason dictates that men should live together, since one is not
self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for which reason man is
described as being naturally inclined to political society, so too
among those works that are necessary for human life some are becoming
to men, others to women. Wherefore nature inculcates that society of
man and woman which consists in matrimony. These two reasons are given
by the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12).
Reply to Objection 1: Man's nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In
one way, because that thing is becoming to the generic nature, and this
is common to all animals; in another way because it is becoming to the
nature of the difference, whereby the human species in so far as it is
rational overflows the genus; such is an act of prudence or temperance.
And just as the generic nature, though one in all animals, yet is not
in all in the same way, so neither does it incline in the same way in
all, but in a way befitting each one. Accordingly man's nature inclines
to matrimony on the part of the difference, as regards the second
reason given above; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12;
Polit. i) gives this reason in men over other animals; but as regards
the first reason it inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he
says that the begetting of offspring is common to all animals. Yet
nature does not incline thereto in the same way in all animals; since
there are animals whose offspring are able to seek food immediately
after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother; and in these
there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those whose
offspring needs the support of both parents, although for a short time,
there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In man,
however, since the child needs the parents' care for a long time, there
is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even the
generic nature inclines.
Reply to Objection 2: The assertion of Tully may be true of some
particular nation, provided we understand it as referring to the
proximate beginning of that nation when it became a nation distinct
from others; for that to which natural reason inclines is not realized
in all things, and this statement is not universally true, since Holy
Writ states that there has been matrimony from the beginning of the
human race.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii) "human
nature is not unchangeable as the Divine nature is." Hence things that
are of natural law vary according to the various states and conditions
of men; although those which naturally pertain to things Divine nowise
vary.
Reply to Objection 4: Nature intends not only being in the offspring,
but also perfect being, for which matrimony is necessary, as shown
above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether matrimony still comes under a precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony still comes under a precept.
For a precept is binding so long as it is not recalled. But the primary
institution of matrimony came under a precept, as stated in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 26); nor do we read anywhere that this precept was
recalled, but rather that it was confirmed (Mat. 19:6): "What . . . God
hath joined together let no man put asunder." Therefore matrimony still
comes under a precept.
Objection 2: Further, the precepts of natural law are binding in
respect of all time. Now matrimony is of natural law, as stated above
[4920](A[1]). Therefore, etc.
Objection 3: Further, the good of the species is better than the good
of the individual, "for the good of the State is more Godlike than the
good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2). Now the precept given to the first man
concerning the preservation of the good of the individual by the act of
the nutritive power is still in force. Much more therefore does the
precept concerning matrimony still hold, since it refers to the
preservation of the species.
Objection 4: Further, where the reason of an obligation remains the
same, the obligation must remain the same. Now the reason why men were
bound to marry in olden times was lest the human race should cease to
multiply. Since then the result would be the same, if each one were
free to abstain from marriage, it would seem that matrimony comes under
a precept.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:38): "He that giveth not his
virgin in marriage doth better [*Vulg.: 'He that giveth his virgin in
marriage doth well, and he that giveth her not doth better']," namely
than he that giveth her in marriage. Therefore the contract of marriage
is not now a matter of precept.
Further, no one deserves a reward for breaking a precept. Now a special
reward, namely the aureole, is due to virgins [*Cf.[4921] Q[96], A[5]].
Therefore matrimony does not come under a precept.
I answer that, Nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way as to
that which is necessary for the perfection of the individual, and such
an obligation is binding on each one, since natural perfections are
common to all. In another way it inclines to that which is necessary
for the perfection of the community; and since there are many things of
this kind, one of which hinders another, such an inclination does not
bind each man by way of precept; else each man would be bound to
husbandry and building and to such offices as are necessary to the
human community; but the inclination of nature is satisfied by the
accomplishment of those various offices by various individuals.
Accordingly, since the perfection of the human community requires that
some should devote themselves to the contemplative life to which
marriage is a very great obstacle, the natural inclination to marriage
is not binding by way of precept even according to the philosophers.
Hence Theophrastus proves that it is not advisable for a wise man to
marry, as Jerome relates (Contra Jovin. i).
Reply to Objection 1: This precept has not been recalled, and yet it is
not binding on each individual, for the reason given above, except at
that time when the paucity of men required each one to betake himself
to the begetting of children.
The Replies to objections 2 and 3 are clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: Human nature has a general inclination to various
offices and acts, as already stated. But since it is variously in
various subjects, as individualized in this or that one, it inclines
one subject more to one of those offices, and another subject more to
another, according to the difference of temperament of various
individuals. And it is owing to this difference, as well as to Divine
providence which governs all, that one person chooses one office such
as husbandry, and another person another. And so it is too that some
choose the married life and some the contemplative. Wherefore no danger
threatens.
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Whether the marriage act is always sinful?
Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act is always sinful. For
it is written (1 Cor. 7:29): "That they . . . who have wives, be as if
they had none." But those who are not married do not perform the
marriage act. Therefore even those who are married sin in that act.
Objection 2: Further, "Your iniquities have divided between you and
your God." Now the marriage act divides man from God wherefore the
people who were to see God (Ex. 19:11) were commanded not to go near
their wives (Ex. 19:20); and Jerome says (Ep. ad Ageruch.: Contra
Jovini, 18) that in the marriage act "the Holy Ghost touches not the
hearts of the prophets." Therefore it is sinful.
Objection 3: Further, that which is shameful in itself can by no means
be well done. Now the marriage act is always connected with
concupiscence, which is always shameful. Therefore it is always sinful.
Objection 4: Further, nothing is the object of excuse save sin. Now the
marriage act needs to be excused by the marriage blessings, as the
Master says (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it is a sin.
Objection 5: Further, things alike in species are judged alike. But
marriage intercourse is of the same species as the act of adultery,
since its end is the same, namely the human species. Therefore since
the act of adultery is a sin, the marriage act is likewise.
Objection 6: Further, excess in the passions corrupts virtue. Now there
is always excess of pleasure in the marriage act, so much so that it
absorbs the reason which is man's principal good, wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "in that act it is impossible to
understand anything." Therefore the marriage act is always a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:28): "If a virgin marry she
hath not sinned," and (1 Tim. 5:14): "I will . . . that the younger
should marry," and "bear children." But there can be no bearing of
children without carnal union. Therefore the marriage act is not a sin;
else the Apostle would not have approved of it.
Further, no sin is a matter of precept. But the marriage act is a
matter of precept (1 Cor. 7:3): "Let the husband render the debt to his
life." Therefore it is not a sin.
I answer that, If we suppose the corporeal nature to be created by the
good God we cannot hold that those things which pertain to the
preservation of the corporeal nature and to which nature inclines, are
altogether evil; wherefore, since the inclination to beget an offspring
whereby the specific nature is preserved is from nature, it is
impossible to maintain that the act of begetting children is altogether
unlawful, so that it be impossible to find the mean of virtue therein;
unless we suppose, as some are mad enough to assert, that corruptible
things were created by an evil god, whence perhaps the opinion
mentioned in the text is derived (Sent. iv, D, 26); wherefore this is a
most wicked heresy.
Reply to Objection 1: By these words the Apostle did not forbid the
marriage act, as neither did he forbid the possession of things when he
said (1 Cor. 7:31): "They that use this world" (let them be) "as if
they used it not." In each case he forbade enjoyment [*"Fruitionem,"
i.e. enjoyment of a thing sought as one's last end]; which is clear
from the way in which he expresses himself; for he did not say "let
them not use it," or "let them not have them," but let them be "as if
they used it not" and "as if they had none."
Reply to Objection 2: We are united to God by the habit of grace and by
the act of contemplation and love. Therefore whatever severs the former
of these unions is always a sin, but not always that which severs the
latter, since a lawful occupation about lower things distracts the mind
so that it is not fit for actual union with God; and this is especially
the case in carnal intercourse wherein the mind is withheld by the
intensity of pleasure. For this reason those who have to contemplate
Divine things or handle sacred things are enjoined not to have to do
with their wives for that particular time; and it is in this sense that
the Holy Ghost, as regards the actual revelation of hidden things, did
not touch the hearts of the prophets at the time of the marriage act.
Reply to Objection 3: The shamefulness of concupiscence that always
accompanies the marriage act is a shamefulness not of guilt, but of
punishment inflicted for the first sin, inasmuch as the lower powers
and the members do not obey reason. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 4: Properly speaking, a thing is said to be excused
when it has some appearance of evil, and yet is not evil, or not as
evil as it seems, because some things excuse wholly, others in part.
And since the marriage act, by reason of the corruption of
concupiscence, has the appearance of an inordinate act, it is wholly
excused by the marriage blessing, so as not to be a sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Although they are the same as to their natural
species, they differ as to their moral species, which differs in
respect of one circumstance, namely intercourse with one's wife and
with another than one's wife; just as to kill a man by assault or by
justice differentiates the moral species, although the natural species
is the same; and yet the one is lawful and the other unlawful.
Reply to Objection 6: The excess of passions that corrupts virtue not
only hinders the act of reason, but also destroys the order of reason.
The intensity of pleasure in the marriage act does not do this, since,
although for the moment man is not being directed, he was previously
directed by his reason.
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Whether the marriage act is meritorious?
Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act is not meritorious.
For Chrysostom [*Hom. i in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to
St. John Chrysostom] says in his commentary on Matthew: "Although
marriage brings no punishment to those who use it, it affords them no
meed." Now merit bears a relation to meed. Therefore the marriage act
is not meritorious.
Objection 2: Further, to refrain from what is meritorious deserves not
praise. Yet virginity whereby one refrains from marriage is
praiseworthy. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.
Objection 3: Further, he who avails himself of an indulgence granted
him, avails himself of a favor received. But a man does not merit by
receiving a favor. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.
Objection 4: Further, merit like virtue, consists in difficulty. But
the marriage act affords not difficulty but pleasure. Therefore it is
not meritorious.
Objection 5: Further, that which cannot be done without venial sin is
never meritorious, for a man cannot both merit and demerit at the same
time. Now there is always a venial sin in the marriage act, since even
the first movement in such like pleasures is a venial sin. Therefore
the aforesaid act cannot be meritorious.
On the contrary, Every act whereby a precept is fulfilled is
meritorious if it be done from charity. Now such is the marriage act,
for it is said (1 Cor. 7:3): "Let the husband render the debt to his
wife." Therefore, etc.
Further, every act of virtue is meritorious. Now the aforesaid act is
an act of justice, for it is called the rendering of a debt. Therefore
it is meritorious.
I answer that, Since no act proceeding from a deliberate will is
indifferent, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40, Q[1], A[3];
[4922]FS, Q[18], A[9]), the marriage act is always either sinful or
meritorious in one who is in a state of grace. For if the motive for
the marriage act be a virtue, whether of justice that they may render
the debt, or of religion, that they may beget children for the worship
of God, it is meritorious. But if the motive be lust, yet not excluding
the marriage blessings, namely that he would by no means be willing to
go to another woman, it is a venial sin; while if he exclude the
marriage blessings, so as to be disposed to act in like manner with any
woman, it is a mortal sin. And nature cannot move without being either
directed by reason, and thus it will be an act of virtue, or not so
directed, and then it will be an act of lust.
Reply to Objection 1: The root of merit, as regards the essential
reward, is charity itself; but as regards an accidental reward, the
reason for merit consists in the difficulty of an act; and thus the
marriage act is not meritorious except in the first way.
Reply to Objection 2: The difficulty required for merit of the
accidental reward is a difficulty of labor, but the difficulty required
for the essential reward is the difficulty of observing the mean, and
this is the difficulty in the marriage act.
Reply to Objection 3: First movements in so far as they are venial sins
are movements of the appetite to some inordinate object of pleasure.
This is not the case in the marriage act, and consequently the argument
does not prove.
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OF MATRIMONY AS A SACRAMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider matrimony as a sacrament. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether matrimony is a sacrament?
(2) Whether it ought to have been instituted before sin was committed?
(3) Whether it confers grace?
(4) Whether carnal intercourse belongs to the integrity of matrimony?
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Whether matrimony is a sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is not a sacrament. For every
sacrament of the New Law has a form that is essential to the sacrament.
But the blessing given by the priest at a wedding is not essential to
matrimony. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
Objection 2: Further, a sacrament according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) is
"a material element." But matrimony has not a material element for its
matter. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from
Christ's Passion. But matrimony, since it has pleasure annexed to it,
does not conform man to Christ's Passion, which was painful. Therefore
it is not a sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, every sacrament of the New Law causes that which
it signifies. Yet matrimony does not cause the union of Christ with the
Church, which union it signifies. Therefore matrimony is not a
sacrament.
Objection 5: Further, in the other sacraments there is something which
is reality and sacrament. But this is not to be found in matrimony,
since it does not imprint a character, else it would not be repeated.
Therefore it is not a sacrament.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 5:32): "This is a great
sacrament." Therefore, etc.
Further, a sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing. But such is
Matrimony. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, A sacrament denotes a sanctifying remedy against sin
offered to man under sensible signs [*Cf. [4923]TP, Q[61], A[1];
[4924]TP, Q[65], A[1]]. Wherefore since this is the case in matrimony,
it is reckoned among the sacraments.
Reply to Objection 1: The words whereby the marriage consent is
expressed are the form of this sacrament, and not the priest's
blessing, which is a sacramental.
Reply to Objection 2: The sacrament of Matrimony, like that of Penance,
is perfected by the act of the recipient. Wherefore just as Penance has
no other matter than the sensible acts themselves, which take the place
of the material element, so it is in Matrimony.
Reply to Objection 3: Although Matrimony is not conformed to Christ's
Passion as regards pain, it is as regards charity, whereby He suffered
for the Church who was to be united to Him as His spouse.
Reply to Objection 4: The union of Christ with the Church is not the
reality contained in this sacrament, but is the reality signified and
not contained---and no sacrament causes a reality of that kind---but it
has another both contained and signified which it causes, as we shall
state further on (ad 5). The Master, however (Sent. iv, D, 26), asserts
that it is a non-contained reality, because he was of opinion that
Matrimony has no reality contained therein.
Reply to Objection 5: In this sacrament also those three things [*Cf.
[4925]TP, Q[66], A[1]] are to be found, for the acts externally
apparent are the sacrament only; the bond between husband and wife
resulting from those acts is reality and sacrament; and the ultimate
reality contained is the effect of this sacrament, while the
non-contained reality is that which the Master assigns (Sent. iv, D,
26).
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Whether this sacrament ought to have been instituted before sin was
committed?
Objection 1: It would seem that Matrimony ought not to have been
instituted before sin. Because that which is of natural law needs not
to be instituted. Now such is Matrimony, as stated above ([4926]Q[41],
A[1]). Therefore it ought not to have been instituted.
Objection 2: Further, sacraments are medicines against the disease of
sin. But a medicine is not made ready except for an actual disease.
Therefore it should not have been instituted before sin.
Objection 3: Further, one institution suffices for one thing. Now
Matrimony was instituted also after sin, as stated in the text (Sent.
iv, D, 26). Therefore it was not instituted before sin.
Objection 4: Further, the institution of a sacrament must come from
God. Now before sin, the words relating to Matrimony were not
definitely said by God but by Adam; the words which God uttered (Gn.
1:22), "Increase and multiply," were addressed also to the brute
creation where there is no marriage. Therefore Matrimony was not
instituted before sin.
Objection 5: Further, Matrimony is a sacrament of the New Law. But the
sacraments of the New Law took their origin from Christ. Therefore it
ought not to have been instituted before sin.
On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 19:4): "Have ye not read that He Who
made man from the beginning 'made them male and female'"?
Further, Matrimony was instituted for the begetting of children. But
the begetting of children was necessary to man before sin. Therefore it
behooved Matrimony to be instituted before sin.
I answer that, Nature inclines to marriage with a certain good in view,
which good varies according to the different states of man, wherefore
it was necessary for matrimony to be variously instituted in the
various states of man in reference to that good. Consequently matrimony
as directed to the begetting of children, which was necessary even when
there was no sin, was instituted before sin; according as it affords a
remedy for the wound of sin, it was instituted after sin at the time of
the natural law; its institution belongs to the Mosaic Law as regards
personal disqualifications; and it was instituted in the New Law in so
far as it represents the mystery of Christ's union with the Church, and
in this respect it is a sacrament of the New Law. As regards other
advantages resulting from matrimony, such as the friendship and mutual
services which husband and wife render one another, its institution
belongs to the civil law. Since, however, a sacrament is essentially a
sign and a remedy, it follows that the nature of sacrament applies to
matrimony as regards the intermediate institution; that it is fittingly
intended to fulfill an office of nature as regards the first
institution; and. as regards the last-mentioned institution, that it is
directed to fulfill an office of society.
Reply to Objection 1: Things which are of natural law in a general way,
need to be instituted as regards their determination which is subject
to variation according to various states; just as it is of natural law
that evil-doers be punished, but that such and such a punishment be
appointed for such and such a crime is determined by positive law.
Reply to Objection 2: Matrimony is not only for a remedy against sin,
but is chiefly for an office of nature; and thus it was instituted
before sin, not as intended for a remedy.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no reason why matrimony should not have
had several institutions corresponding to the various things that had
to be determined in connection with marriage. Hence these various
institutions are not of the same thing in the same respect.
Reply to Objection 4: Before sin matrimony was instituted by God, when
He fashioned a helpmate for man out of his rib, and said to them:
"Increase and multiply." And although this was said also to the other
animals, it was not to be fulfilled by them in the same way as by men.
As to Adam's words, he uttered them inspired by God to understand that
the institution of marriage was from God.
Reply to Objection 5: As was clearly stated, matrimony was not
instituted before Christ as a sacrament of the New Law.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether matrimony confers grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony does not confer grace. For,
according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) "the sacraments, by virtue of their
sanctification, confer an invisible grace." But matrimony has no
sanctification essential to it. Therefore grace is not conferred
therein.
Objection 2: Further, every sacrament that confers grace confers it by
virtue of its matter and form. Now the acts which are the matter in
this sacrament are not the cause of grace (for it would be the heresy
of Pelagius to assert that our acts cause grace); and the words
expressive of consent are not the cause of grace, since no
sanctification results from them. Therefore grace is by no means given
in matrimony.
Objection 3: Further, the grace that is directed against the wound of
sin is necessary to all who have that wound. Now the wound of
concupiscence is to be found in all. Therefore if grace were given in
matrimony against the wound of concupiscence, all men ought to contract
marriage, and it would be very stupid to refrain from matrimony.
Objection 4: Further, sickness does not seek a remedy where it finds
aggravation. Now concupiscence is aggravated by concupiscence, because,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12), "the desire of
concupiscence is insatiable, and is increased by congenial actions."
Therefore it would seem that grace is not conferred in matrimony, as a
remedy for concupiscence.
On the contrary, Definition and thing defined should be convertible.
Now causality of grace is included in the definition of a sacrament.
Since, then, matrimony is a sacrament, it is a cause of grace.
Further, Augustine says (De Bono Viduit. viii; Gen. ad lit. ix, 7) that
"matrimony affords a remedy to the sick." But it is not a remedy except
in so far as it has some efficacy. Therefore it has some efficacy for
the repression of concupiscence. Now concupiscence is not repressed
except by grace. Therefore grace is conferred therein.
I answer that, There have been three opinions on this point. For some
[*Peter Lombard, Sent. iv, D, 2] said that matrimony is nowise the
cause of grace, but only a sign thereof. But this cannot be maintained,
for in that case it would in no respect surpass the sacraments of the
Old Law. Wherefore there would be no reason for reckoning it among the
sacraments of the New Law; since even in the Old Law by the very nature
of the act it was able to afford a remedy to concupiscence lest the
latter run riot when held in too strict restraint.
Hence others [*St. Albert Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 26] said that grace is
conferred therein as regards the withdrawal from evil, because the act
is excused from sin, for it would be a sin apart from matrimony. But
this would be too little, since it had this also in the Old Law. And so
they say that it makes man withdraw from evil, by restraining the
concupiscence lest it tend to something outside the marriage blessings,
but that this grace does not enable a man to do good works. But this
cannot be maintained, since the same grace hinders sin and inclines to
good, just as the same heat expels cold and gives heat.
Hence others [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 26] say that matrimony,
inasmuch as it is contracted in the faith of Christ, is able to confer
the grace which enables us to do those works which are required in
matrimony. and this is more probable, since wherever God gives the
faculty to do a thing, He gives also the helps whereby man is enabled
to make becoming use of that faculty; thus it is clear that to all the
soul's powers there correspond bodily members by which they can proceed
to act. Therefore, since in matrimony man receives by Divine
institution the faculty to use his wife for the begetting of children,
he also receives the grace without which he cannot becomingly do so;
just as we have said of the sacrament of orders ([4927]Q[35], A[1]).
And thus this grace which is given is the last thing contained in this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the baptismal water by virtue of its
contact with Christ's body [*Cf. [4928]TP, Q[66], A[3], ad 4] is able
to "touch the body and cleanse the heart" [*St. Augustine, Tract. lxxx
in Joan.], so is matrimony able to do so through Christ having
represented it by His Passion, and not principally through any blessing
of the priest.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the water of Baptism together with the
form of words results immediately not in the infusion of grace, but in
the imprinting of the character, so the outward acts and the words
expressive of consent directly effect a certain tie which is the
sacrament of matrimony; and this tie by virtue of its Divine
institution works dispositively [*Cf.[4929] Q[18], A[1], where St.
Thomas uses the same expression; and Editor's notes at the beginning of
the Supplement and on that Article] to the infusion of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument would hold if no more efficacious
remedy could be employed against the disease of concupiscence; but a
yet more powerful remedy is found in spiritual works and mortification
of the flesh by those who make no use of matrimony.
Reply to Objection 4: A remedy can be employed against concupiscence in
two ways. First, on the part of concupiscence by repressing it in its
root, and thus matrimony affords a remedy by the grace given therein.
Secondly, on the part of its act, and this in two ways: first, by
depriving the act to which concupiscence inclines of its outward
shamefulness, and this is done by the marriage blessings which justify
carnal concupiscence; secondly, by hindering the shameful act, which is
done by the very nature of the act. because concupiscence, being
satisfied by the conjugal act, does not incline so much to other
wickedness. For this reason the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:9): "It is
better to marry than to burn." For though the works congenial to
concupiscence are in themselves of a nature to increase concupiscence,
yet in so far as they are directed according to reason they repress
concupiscence, because like acts result in like dispositions and
habits.
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Whether carnal intercourse is an integral part of this sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that carnal intercourse is an integral part
of marriage. For at the very institution of marriage it was declared
(Gn. 2:24): "They shall be two in one flesh." Now this is not brought
about save by carnal intercourse. Therefore it is an integral part of
marriage.
Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to the signification of a
sacrament is necessary for the sacrament, as we have stated above
[4930](A[2]; Q[9], A[1] ). Now carnal intercourse belongs to the
signification of matrimony, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26).
Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is directed to the preservation of
the species. But the species cannot be preserved without carnal
intercourse. Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, Matrimony is a sacrament inasmuch as it affords a
remedy against concupiscence; according to the Apostle's saying (1 Cor.
7:9): "It is better to marry than to burn." But it does not afford this
remedy to those who have no carnal intercourse. Therefore the same
conclusion follows as before.
On the contrary, There was matrimony in Paradise, and yet there was no
carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse is not an integral
part of matrimony.
Further, a sacrament by its very name denotes a sanctification. But
matrimony is holier without carnal intercourse, according to the text
(Sent. D, 26). Therefore carnal intercourse is not necessary for the
sacrament.
I answer that, Integrity is twofold. One regards the primal perfection
consisting in the very essence of a thing; the other regards the
secondary perfection consisting in operation. Since then carnal
intercourse is an operation or use of marriage which gives the faculty
for that intercourse, it follows, that carnal intercourse belongs to
the latter, and not to the former integrity of marriage [*Cf. [4931]TP,
Q[29], A[2] ].
Reply to Objection 1: Adam expressed the integrity of marriage in
regard to both perfections, because a thing is known by its operation.
Reply to Objection 2: Signification of the thing contained is necessary
for the sacrament. Carnal intercourse belongs not to this
signification, but to the thing not contained, as appears from what was
said above (A[1], ad 4,5).
Reply to Objection 3: A thing does not reach its end except by its own
act. Wherefore, from the fact that the end of matrimony is not attained
without carnal intercourse, it follows that it belongs to the second
and not to the first integrity.
Reply to Objection 4: Before carnal intercourse marriage is a remedy by
virtue of the grace given therein, although not by virtue of the act,
which belongs to the second integrity.
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OF MATRIMONY WITH REGARD TO THE BETROTHAL (THREE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider matrimony absolutely; and here we
must treat (1) of the betrothal; (2) of the nature of matrimony; (3) of
its efficient cause, namely the consent; (4) of its blessings; (5) of
the impediments thereto; (6) of second marriages; (7) of certain things
annexed to marriage.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) What is the betrothal?
(2) Who can contract a betrothal?
(3) Whether a betrothal can be canceled?
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Whether a betrothal is a promise of future marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that a betrothal is not rightly defined "a
promise of future marriage," as expressed in the words of Pope Nicholas
I (Resp. ad Consul. Bulgar., iii). For as Isidore says (Etym. iv), "a
man is betrothed not by a mere promise, but by giving his troth
[spondet] and providing sureties [sponsores]". Now a person is said to
be betrothed by reason of his betrothal. Therefore it is wrongly
described as a promise.
Objection 2: Further, whoever promises a thing must be compelled to
fulfill his promise. But those who have contracted a betrothal are not
compelled by the Church to fulfill the marriage. Therefore a betrothal
is not a promise.
Objection 3: Further, sometimes a betrothal does not consist of a mere
promise, but an oath is added, as also certain pledges. Therefore
seemingly it should not be defined as a mere promise.
Objection 4: Further, marriage should be free and absolute. But a
betrothal is sometimes expressed under a condition even of money to be
received. Therefore it is not fittingly described as a promise of
marriage.
Objection 5: Further, promising about the future is blamed in James
4:13, seqq. But there should be nothing blameworthy about the
sacraments. Therefore one ought not to make a promise of future
marriage.
Objection 6: Further, no man is called a spouse except on account of
his espousals. But a man is said to be a spouse on account of actual
marriage, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 27). Therefore espousals
are not always a promise of future marriage.
I answer that, Consent to conjugal union if expressed in words of the
future does not make a marriage, but a promise of marriage; and this
promise is called "a betrothal from plighting one's troth," as Isidore
says (Etym. iv). For before the use of writing-tablets, they used to
give pledges of marriage, by which they plighted their mutual consent
under the marriage code, and they provided guarantors. This promise is
made in two ways, namely absolutely, or conditionally. Absolutely, in
four ways: firstly, a mere promise, by saying: "I will take thee for my
wife," and conversely; secondly, by giving betrothal pledges, such as
money and the like; thirdly, by giving an engagement ring; fourthly, by
the addition of an oath. If, however, this promise be made
conditionally, we must draw a distinction; for it is either an
honorable condition, for instance if we say: "I will take thee, if thy
parents consent," and then the promise holds if the condition is
fulfilled, and does not hold if the condition is not fulfilled; or else
the condition is dishonorable, and this in two ways: for either it is
contrary to the marriage blessings, as if we were to say: "I will take
thee if thou promise means of sterility," and then no betrothal is
contracted; or else it is not contrary to the marriage blessings, as
were one to say: "I will take thee if thou consent to my thefts," and
then the promise holds, but the condition should be removed.
Reply to Objection 1: The betrothal itself and giving of sureties are a
ratification of the promise, wherefore it is denominated from these as
from that which is more perfect.
Reply to Objection 2: By this promise one party is bound to the other
in respect of contracting marriage; and he who fulfills not his promise
sins mortally, unless a lawful impediment arise; and the Church uses
compulsion in the sense that she enjoins a penance for the sin. But he
is not compelled by sentence of the court, because compulsory marriages
are wont to have evil results; unless the parties be bound by oath, for
then he ought to be compelled, in the opinion of some, although others
think differently on account of the reason given above, especially if
there be fear of one taking the other's life.
Reply to Objection 3: Such things are added only in confirmation of the
promise, and consequently they are not distinct from it.
Reply to Objection 4: The condition that is appended does not destroy
the liberty of marriage; for if it be unlawful, it should be renounced;
and if it be lawful, it is either about things that are good simply, as
were one to say, "I will take thee, if thy parents consent," and such a
condition does not destroy the liberty of the betrothal, but gives it
an increase of rectitude. or else it is about things that are useful,
as were one to say: "I will marry thee if thou pay me a hundred
pounds," and then this condition is appended, not as asking a price for
the consent of marriage, but as referring to the promise of a dowry; so
that the marriage does not lose its liberty. Sometimes, however, the
condition appended is the payment of a sum of money by way of penalty,
and then, since marriage should be free, such a condition does not
hold, nor can such a penalty be exacted from a person who is unwilling
to fulfill the promise of marriage.
Reply to Objection 5: James does not intend to forbid altogether the
making of promises about the future, but the making of promises as
though one were certain of one's life; hence he teaches that we ought
to add the condition. "If the Lord will," which, though it be not
expressed in words, ought nevertheless to be impressed on the heart.
Reply to Objection 6: In marriage we may consider both the marriage
union and the marriage act; and on account of his promise of the first
as future a man is called a "spouse" from his having contracted his
espousals by words expressive of the future; but from the promise of
the second a man is called a "spouse," even when the marriage has been
contracted by words expressive of the present, because by this very
fact he promises [spondet] the marriage act. However, properly
speaking, espousals are so called from the promise [sponsione] in the
first sense, because espousals are a kind of sacramental annexed to
matrimony, as exorcism to baptism.
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Whether seven years is fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal?
Objection 1: It would seem that seven years is not fittingly assigned
as the age for betrothal. For a contract that can be formed by others
does not require discretion in those whom it concerns. Now a betrothal
can be arranged by the parents without the knowledge of either of the
persons betrothed. Therefore a betrothal can be arranged before the age
of seven years as well as after.
Objection 2: Further, just as some use of reason is necessary for the
contract of betrothal, so is there for the consent to mortal sin. Now,
as Gregory says (Dial. iv), a boy of five years of age was carried off
by the devil on account of the sin of blasphemy. Therefore a betrothal
can take place before the age of seven years.
Objection 3: Further, a betrothal is directed to marriage. But for
marriage the same age is not assigned to boy and girl.
Objection 4: Further, one can become betrothed as soon as future
marriage can be agreeable to one. Now signs of this agreeableness are
often apparent in boys before the age of seven. Therefore they can
become betrothed before that age.
Objection 5: Further, if persons become betrothed before they are seven
years old, and subsequently after the age of seven and before the age
of maturity renew their promise in words expressive of the present,
they are reckoned to be betrothed. Now this is not by virtue of the
second contract, since they intend to contract not betrothal but
marriage. Therefore it is by the virtue of the first; and thus
espousals can be contracted before the age of seven.
Objection 6: Further, when a thing is done by many persons in common,
if one fails he is supplied by another, as in the case of those who row
a boat. Now the contract of betrothal is an action common to the
contracting parties. Therefore if one be of mature age, he can contract
a betrothal with a girl who is not seven years old, since the lack of
age in one is more than counterbalanced in the other.
Objection 7: Further, those who at about the age of puberty, but before
it, enter into the marriage contract by words expressive of the present
are reputed to be married. Therefore in like manner if they contract
marriage by words expressive of the future, before yet close on the age
of puberty, they are to be reputed as betrothed.
I answer that, The age of seven years is fixed reasonably enough by law
for the contracting of betrothals, for since a betrothal is a promise
of the future, as already stated [4932](A[1]), it follows that they are
within the competency of those who can make a promise in some way, and
this is only for those who can have some foresight of the future, and
this requires the use of reason, of which three degrees are to be
observed, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 4). The first is when
a person neither understands by himself nor is able to learn from
another; the second stage is when a man can learn from another but is
incapable by himself of consideration and understanding; the third
degree is when a man is both able to learn from another and to consider
by himself. And since reason develops in man by little and little, in
proportion as the movement and fluctuation of the humors is calmed, man
reaches the first stage of reason before his seventh year; and
consequently during that period he is unfit for any contract, and
therefore for betrothal. But he begins to reach the second stage at the
end of his first seven years, wherefore children at that age are sent
to school. But man begins to reach the third stage at the end of his
second seven years, as regards things concerning his person, when his
natural reason develops; but as regards things outside his person, at
the end of his third seven years. Hence before his first seven years a
man is not fit to make any contract, but at the end of that period he
begins to be fit to make certain promises for the future, especially
about those things to which natural reason inclines us more, though he
is not fit to bind himself by a perpetual obligation, because as yet he
has not a firm will. Hence at that age betrothals can be contracted.
But at the end of the second seven years he can already bind himself in
matters concerning his person, either to religion or to wedlock. And
after the third seven years he can bind himself in other matters also;
and according to the laws he is given the power of disposing of his
property after his twenty-second year.
Reply to Objection 1: If the parties are betrothed by another person
before they reach the age of puberty, either of them or both can demur;
wherefore in that case the betrothal does not take effect, so that
neither does any affinity result therefrom. Hence a betrothal made
between certain persons by some other takes effect, in so far as those
between whom the betrothal is arranged do not demur when they reach the
proper age, whence they are understood to consent to what others have
done.
Reply to Objection 2: Some say that the boy of whom Gregory tells this
story was not lost, and that he did not sin mortally; and that this
vision was for the purpose of making the father sorrowful, for he had
sinned in the boy through failing to correct him. But this is contrary
to the express intention of Gregory, who says (Dial. iv) that "the
boy's father having neglected the soul of his little son, fostered no
little sinner for the flames of hell." Consequently it must be said
that for a mortal sin it is sufficient to give consent to something
present, whereas in a betrothal the consent is to something future; and
greater discretion of reason is required for looking to the future than
for consenting to one present act. Wherefore a man can sin mortally
before he can bind himself to a future obligation.
Reply to Objection 3: Regarding the age for the marriage contract a
disposition is required not only on the part of the use of reason, but
also on the part of the body, in that it is necessary to be of an age
adapted to procreation. And since a girl becomes apt for the act of
procreation in her twelfth year, and a boy at the end of his second
seven years, as the Philosopher says (De Hist. Anim. vii), whereas the
age is the same in both for attaining the use of reason which is the
sole condition for betrothal, hence it is that the one age is assigned
for both as regards betrothal, but not as regards marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: This agreeableness in regard to boys under the
age of seven does not result from the perfect use of reason, since they
are not as yet possessed of complete self-control; it results rather
from the movement of nature than from any process of reason.
Consequently, this agreeableness does not suffice for contracting a
betrothal.
Reply to Objection 5: In this case, although the second contract does
not amount to marriage, nevertheless the parties show that they ratify
their former promise; wherefore the first contract is confirmed by the
second.
Reply to Objection 6: Those who row a boat act by way of one cause, and
consequently what is lacking in one can be supplied by another. But
those who make a contract of betrothal act as distinct persons, since a
betrothal can only be between two parties; wherefore it is necessary
for each to be qualified to contract, and thus the defect of one is an
obstacle to their betrothal, nor can it be supplied by the other.
Reply to Objection 7: It is true that in the matter of betrothal if the
contracting parties are close upon the age of seven, the contract of
betrothal is valid, since, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 56),
"when little is lacking it seems as though nothing were lacking." Some
fix the margin at six months. but it is better to determine it
according to the condition of the contracting parties, since the use of
reason comes sooner to some than to others.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a betrothal can be dissolved?
Objection 1: It would seem that a betrothal cannot be dissolved if one
of the parties enter religion. For if I have promised a thing to
someone I cannot lawfully pledge it to someone else. Now he who
betroths himself promises his body to the woman. Therefore he cannot
make a further offering of himself to God in religion.
Objection 2: Again, seemingly it should not be dissolved when one of
the parties leaves for a distant country, because in doubtful matters
one should always choose the safer course. Now the safer course would
be to wait for him. Therefore she is bound to wait for him.
Objection 3: Again, neither seemingly is it dissolved by sickness
contracted after betrothal, for no man should be punished for being
under a penalty. Now the man who contracts an infirmity would be
punished if he were to lose his right to the woman betrothed to him.
Therefore a betrothal should not be dissolved on account of a bodily
infirmity.
Objection 4: Again, neither seemingly should a betrothal be dissolved
on account of a supervening affinity, for instance if the spouse were
to commit fornication with a kinswoman of his betrothed; for in that
case the affianced bride would be penalized for the sin of her
affianced spouse, which is unreasonable.
Objection 5: Again, seemingly they cannot set one another free; for it
would be a proof of greatest fickleness if they contracted together and
then set one another free; and such conduct ought not to be tolerated
by the Church. Therefore, etc.
Objection 6: Again, neither seemingly ought a betrothal to be dissolved
on account of the fornication of one of the parties. For a betrothal
does not yet give the one power over the body of the other; wherefore
it would seem that they nowise sin against one another if meanwhile
they commit fornication. Consequently a betrothal should not be
dissolved on that account.
Objection 7: Again, neither seemingly on account of his contracting
with another woman by words expressive of the present. For a subsequent
sale does not void a previous sale. Therefore neither should a second
contract void a previous one.
Objection 8: Again, neither seemingly should it be dissolved on account
of deficient age; since what is not cannot be dissolved. Now a
betrothal is null before the requisite age. Therefore it cannot be
dissolved.
I answer that, In all the cases mentioned above the betrothal that has
been contracted is dissolved, but in different ways. For in two of
them---namely when a party enters religion, and when either of the
affianced spouses contracts with another party by words expressive of
the present---the betrothal is dissolved by law, whereas in the other
cases it has to be dissolved according to the judgment of the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: The like promise is dissolved by spiritual death,
for that promise is purely spiritual, as we shall state further on
([4933]Q[61], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: This doubt is solved by either party not putting
in an appearance at the time fixed for completing the marriage.
Wherefore if it was no fault of that party that the marriage was not
completed, he or she can lawfully marry without any sin. But if he or
she was responsible for the non-completion of the marriage, this
responsibility involves the obligation of doing penance for the broken
promise---or oath if the promise was confirmed by oath---and he or she
can contract with another if they wish it, subject to the judgment of
the Church.
Reply to Objection 3: If either of the betrothed parties incur an
infirmity which notably weakens the subject (as epilepsy or paralysis),
or causes a deformity (as loss of the nose or eyes, and the like), or
is contrary to the good of the offspring (as leprosy, which is wont to
be transmitted to the children), the betrothal can be dissolved, lest
the betrothed be displeasing to one another, and the marriage thus
contracted have an evil result. Nor is one punished for being under a
penalty, although one incurs a loss from one's penalty, and this is not
unreasonable.
Reply to Objection 4: If the affianced bridegroom has carnal knowledge
of a kinswoman of his spouse, or "vice versa," the betrothal must be
dissolved; and for proof it is sufficient that the fact be the common
talk, in order to avoid scandal; for causes whose effects mature in the
future are voided of their effects, not only by what actually is, but
also by what happens subsequently. Hence just as affinity, had it
existed at the time of the betrothal, would have prevented that
contract, so, if it supervene before marriage, which is an effect of
the betrothal, the previous contract is voided of its effect. Nor does
the other party suffer in consequence, indeed he or she gains, being
set free from one who has become hateful to God by committing
fornication.
Reply to Objection 5: Some do not admit this case. Yet they have
against them the Decretal (cap. Praeterea, De spons. et matr.) which
says expressly: "Just as those who enter into a contract of fellowship
by pledging their faith to one another and afterwards give it back, so
it may be patiently tolerated that those who are betrothed to one
another should set one another free." Yet to this they say that the
Church allows this lest worse happen rather than because it is
according to strict law. But this does not seem to agree with the
example quoted by the Decretal.
Accordingly we must reply that it is not always a proof of fickleness
to rescind an agreement, since "our counsels are uncertain" (Wis.
9:14).
Reply to Objection 6: Although when they become betrothed they have not
yet given one another power over one another's body, yet if this
[*Referring to the contention of the Objection] were to happen it would
make them suspicious of one another's fidelity; and so one can ensure
himself against the other by breaking off the engagement.
Reply to Objection 7: This argument would hold if each contract were of
the same kind; whereas the second contract of marriage has greater
force than the first, and consequently dissolves it.
Reply to Objection 8: Although it was not a true betrothal, there was a
betrothal of a kind; and consequently, lest approval should seem to be
given when they come to the lawful age, they should seek a dissolution
of the betrothal by the judgment of the Church, for the sake of a good
example.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DEFINITION OF MATRIMONY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the nature of matrimony. Under this head there are
three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?
(2) Whether it is fittingly named?
(3) Whether it is fittingly defined?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?
Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is not a kind of joining.
Because the bond whereby things are tied together differs from their
joining, as cause from effect. Now matrimony is the bond whereby those
who are joined in matrimony are tied together. Therefore it is not a
kind of joining.
Objection 2: Further, every sacrament is a sensible sign. But no
relation is a sensible accident. Therefore since matrimony is a
sacrament, it is not a kind of relation, and consequently neither is it
a kind of joining.
Objection 3: Further, a joining is a relation of equiparance as well as
of equality. Now according to Avicenna the relation of equality is not
identically the same in each extreme. Neither therefore is there an
identically same joining; and consequently if matrimony is a kind of
joining, there is not only one matrimony between man and wife.
On the contrary, It is by relation that things are related to one
another. Now by matrimony certain things are related to one another;
for the husband is the wife's husband, and the wife is the husband's
wife. Therefore matrimony is a kind of relation, nor is it other than a
joining.
Further, the union of two things into one can result only from their
being joined. Now such is the effect of matrimony (Gn. 2:24): "They
shall be two in one flesh." Therefore matrimony is a kind of joining.
I answer that, A joining denotes a kind of uniting, and so wherever
things are united there must be a joining. Now things directed to one
purpose are said to be united in their direction thereto, thus many men
are united in following one military calling or in pursuing one
business, in relation to which they are called fellow-soldiers or
business partners. Hence, since by marriage certain persons are
directed to one begetting and upbringing of children, and again to one
family life, it is clear that in matrimony there is a joining in
respect of which we speak of husband and wife; and this joining,
through being directed to some one thing, is matrimony; while the
joining together of bodies and minds is a result of matrimony.
Reply to Objection 1: Matrimony is the bond by which they are tied
formally, not effectively, and so it need not be distinct from the
joining.
Reply to Objection 2: Although relation is not itself a sensible
accident, its causes may be sensible. Nor is it necessary in a
sacrament for that which is both reality and sacrament [*Cf. [4934]TP,
Q[66], A[1]] to be sensible (for such is the relation of the aforesaid
joining to this sacrament), whereas the words expressive of consent,
which are sacrament only and are the cause of that same joining, are
sensible.
Reply to Objection 3: A relation is founded on something as its
cause---for instance likeness is founded on quality---and on something
as its subject---for instance in the things themselves that are like;
and on either hand we may find unity and diversity of relation. Since
then it is not the same identical quality that conduces to likeness,
but the same specific quality in each of the like subjects, and since,
moreover, the subjects of likeness are two in number, and the same
applies to equality, it follows that both equality and likeness are in
every way numerically distinct in either of the like or equal subjects.
But the relations of matrimony, on the one hand, have unity in both
extremes, namely on the part of the cause, since it is directed to the
one identical begetting; whereas on the part of the subject there is
numerical diversity. The fact of this relation having a diversity of
subjects is signified by the terms "husband" and "wife," while its
unity is denoted by its being called matrimony.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether matrimony is fittingly named?
Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly named. Because
a thing should be named after that which ranks higher. But the father
ranks above the mother. Therefore the union of father and mother should
rather be named after the father.
Objection 2: Further, a thing should be named from that which is
essential to it, since a "definition expresses the nature signified by
a name" (Metaph. iv, 28). Now nuptials are not essential to matrimony.
Therefore matrimony should not be called nuptials.
Objection 3: Further, a species cannot take its proper name from that
which belongs to the genus. Now a joining [conjunctio] is the genus of
matrimony. Therefore it should not be called a conjugal union.
On the contrary, stands the common use of speech.
I answer that, Three things may be considered in matrimony. First, its
essence, which is a joining together, and in reference to this it is
called the "conjugal union"; secondly, its cause, which is the wedding,
and in reference to this it is called the "nuptial union" from "nubo"
[*The original meaning of 'nubo' is 'to veil'], because at the wedding
ceremony, whereby the marriage is completed, the heads of those who are
wedded are covered with a veil [*This is still done in some countries];
thirdly, the effect, which is the offspring, and in reference to this
it is called "matrimony," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26),
because "a woman's sole purpose in marrying should be motherhood."
Matrimony may also be resolved into "matris munium" [*i.e. munus], i.e.
a mother's duty, since the duty of bringing up the children chiefly
devolves on the women; or into "matrem muniens," because it provides
the mother with a protector and support in the person of her husband;
or into "matrem monens," as admonishing her not to leave her husband
and take up with another man; or into "materia unius," because it is a
joining together for the purpose of providing the matter of one
offspring as though it were derived from {monos} and "materia"; or into
"matre" and "nato," as Isidore says (Etym. ix), because it makes a
woman the mother of a child.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the father ranks above the mother, the
mother has more to do with the offspring than the father has. or we may
say that woman was made chiefly in order to be man's helpmate in
relation to the offspring, whereas the man was not made for this
purpose. Wherefore the mother has a closer relation to the nature of
marriage than the father has.
Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes essentials are known by accidentals,
wherefore some things can be named even after their accidentals, since
a name is given to a thing for the purpose that it may become known.
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes a species is named after something
pertaining to the genus on account of an imperfection in the species,
when namely it has the generic nature completely, yet adds nothing
pertaining to dignity; thus the accidental property retains the name of
property, which is common to it and to the definition. Sometimes,
however, it is on account of a perfection, when we find the generic
nature completely in one species and not in another; thus animal is
named from soul [anima], and this belongs to an animate body, which is
the genus of animal; yet animation is not found perfectly in those
animate beings that are not animals. It is thus with the case in point.
for the joining of husband and wife by matrimony is the greatest of all
joinings, since it is a joining of soul and body, wherefore it is
called a "conjugal" union.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether matrimony is fittingly defined in the text?
Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly defined in the
text* (Sent. iv, D, 27). [*The definition alluded to is as follows:
"Marriage is the marital union of man and woman involving living
together in undivided partnership."] For it is necessary to mention
matrimony in defining a husband, since it is the husband who is joined
to the woman in matrimony. Now "marital union" is put in the definition
of matrimony. Therefore in these definitions there would seem to be a
vicious circle.
Objection 2: Further, matrimony makes the woman the man's wife no less
than it makes the man the woman's husband. Therefore it should not be
described as a "marital union" rather than an uxorial union.
Objection 3: Further, habit [consuetudo] pertains to morals. Yet it
often happens that married persons differ very much in habit. Therefore
the words "involving their living together [consuetudinem] in undivided
partnership" should have no place in the definition of matrimony.
Objection 4: Further, we find other definitions given of matrimony, for
according to Hugh (Sum. Sent. vii, 6), "matrimony is the lawful consent
of two apt persons to be joined together." Also, according to some,
"matrimony is the fellowship of a common life and a community regulated
by Divine and human law"; and we ask how these definitions differ.
I answer that, As stated above [4935](A[2]), three things are to be
considered in matrimony, namely its cause, its essence, and its effect;
and accordingly we find three definitions given of matrimony. For the
definition of Hugh indicates the cause, namely the consent, and this
definition is self-evident. The definition given in the text indicates
the essence of matrimony, namely the "union," and adds determinate
subjects by the words "between lawful persons." It also points to the
difference of the contracting parties in reference to the species, by
the word "marital," for since matrimony is a joining together for the
purpose of some one thing, this joining together is specified by the
purpose to which it is directed, and this is what pertains to the
husband [maritum]. It also indicates the force of this joining---for it
is indissoluble---by the words "involving," etc.
The remaining definition indicates the effect to which matrimony is
directed, namely the common life in family matters. And since every
community is regulated by some law, the code according to which this
community is directed, namely Divine and human law, finds a place in
this definition. while other communities, such as those of traders or
soldiers, are established by human law alone.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes the prior things from which a
definition ought to be given are not known to us, and consequently
certain things are defined from things that are posterior simply, but
prior to us; thus in the definition of quality the Philosopher employs
the word "such" [quale] when he says (Cap. De Qualitate) that "quality
is that whereby we are said to be such." Thus, too, in defining
matrimony we say that it is a "marital union," by which we mean that
matrimony is a union for the purpose of those things required by the
marital office, all of which could not be expressed in one word.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated [4936](A[2]), this difference indicates
the end of the union. And since, according to the Apostle (1 Cor.
11:9), the "man is not [Vulg.: 'was not created'] for the woman, but
the woman for the man," it follows that this difference should be
indicated in reference to the man rather than the woman.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the civic life denotes not the individual
act of this or that one, but the things that concern the common action
of the citizens, so the conjugal life is nothing else than a particular
kind of companionship pertaining to that common action. wherefore as
regards this same life the partnership of married persons is always
indivisible, although it is divisible as regards the act belonging to
each party.
The Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear from what has been said
above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MARRIAGE CONSENT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FIVE ARTICLES)
In the next place we have to consider the consent; and the first point
to discuss is the consent considered in itself; the second is the
consent confirmed by oath or by carnal intercourse; the third is
compulsory consent and conditional consent; and the fourth is the
object of the consent.
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?
(2) Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?
(3) Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a
marriage?
(4) Whether consent given in words expressive of the present, without
inward consent, makes a true marriage outwardly?
(5) Whether consent given secretly in words expressive of the present
makes a marriage?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent is not the efficient cause of
matrimony. For the sacraments depend not on the human will but on the
Divine institution, as shown above (Sent. iv, D, 2; [4937]TP, Q[64],
A[2]). But consent belongs to the human will. Therefore it is no more
the cause of matrimony than of the other sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But seemingly matrimony
is nothing else than the consent, since it is the consent which
signifies the union of Christ with the Church.
Objection 3: Further, of one thing there should be one cause. Now there
is one marriage between two persons, as stated above ([4938]Q[44],
A[1]); whereas the consents of the two parties are distinct, for they
are given by different persons and to different things, since on the
one hand there is consent to take a husband, and on the other hand
consent to take a wife. Therefore mutual consent is not the cause of
matrimony.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum,
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "It is not coition but
consent that makes a marriage."
Further, one person does not receive power over that which is at the
free disposal of another, without the latter's consent. Now by marriage
each of the married parties receives power over the other's body (1
Cor. 7:4), whereas hitherto each had free power over his own body.
Therefore consent makes a marriage.
I answer that, In every sacrament there is a spiritual operation by
means of a material operation which signifies it; thus in Baptism the
inward spiritual cleansing is effected by a bodily cleansing.
Wherefore, since in matrimony there is a kind of spiritual joining
together, in so far as matrimony is a sacrament, and a certain material
joining together, in so far as it is directed to an office of nature
and of civil life, it follows that the spiritual joining is the effect
of the Divine power by means of the material joining. Therefore seeing
that the joinings of material contracts are effected by mutual consent,
it follows that the joining together of marriage is effected in the
same way.
Reply to Objection 1: The first cause of the sacraments is the Divine
power which works in them the welfare of the soul; but the second or
instrumental causes are material operations deriving their efficacy
from the Divine institution, and thus consent is the cause in
matrimony.
Reply to Objection 2: Matrimony is not the consent itself, but the
union of persons directed to one purpose, as stated above ([4939]Q[44],
A[1]), and this union is the effect of the consent. Moreover, the
consent, properly speaking, signifies not the union of Christ with the
Church, but His will whereby His union with the Church was brought
about.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as marriage is one on the part of the object
to which the union is directed, whereas it is more than one on the part
of the persons united, so too the consent is one on the part of the
thing consented to, namely the aforesaid union, whereas it is more than
one on the part of the persons consenting. Nor is the direct object of
consent a husband but union with a husband on the part of the wife,
even as it is union with a wife on the part of the husband.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no need for the consent to be
expressed in words. For a man is brought under another's power by a vow
just as he is by matrimony. Now a vow is binding in God's sight, even
though it be not expressed in words. Therefore consent also makes a
marriage binding even without being expressed in words.
Objection 2: Further, there can be marriage between persons who are
unable to express their mutual consent in words, through being dumb or
of different languages. Therefore expression of the consent by words is
not required for matrimony.
Objection 3: Further, if that which is essential to a sacrament be
omitted for any reason whatever, there is no sacrament. Now there is a
case of marriage without the expression of words if the maid is silent
through bashfulness when her parents give her away to the bridegroom.
Therefore the expression of words is not essential to matrimony.
On the contrary, Matrimony is a sacrament. Now a sensible sign is
required in every sacrament. Therefore it is also required in
matrimony, and consequently there must needs be at least words by which
the consent is made perceptible to the senses.
Further, in matrimony there is a contract between husband and wife. Now
in every contract there must be expression of the words by which men
bind themselves mutually to one another. Therefore in matrimony also
the consent must be expressed in words.
I answer that, As stated above [4940](A[1]), the marriage union is
effected in the same way as the bond in material contracts. And since
material contracts are not feasible unless the contracting parties
express their will to one another in words, it follows that the consent
which makes a marriage must also be expressed in words, so that the
expression of words is to marriage what the outward washing is to
Baptism.
Reply to Objection 1: In a vow there is not a sacramental but only a
spiritual bond, wherefore there is no need for it to be done in the
same way as material contracts, in order that it be binding, as in the
case of matrimony.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the like cannot plight themselves to one
another in words, they can do so by signs, and such signs count for
words.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Hugh of S. Victor (Tract. vii, Sum.
Sent.), persons who are being married should give their consent by
accepting one another freely. and this is judged to be the case if they
show no dissent when they are being wedded. Wherefore in such a case
the words of the parents are taken as being the maid's, for the fact
that she does not contradict them is a sign that they are her words.
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Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent given in words expressive of
the future makes a marriage. For as present is to present, so is future
to future. But consent given in words expressive of the present makes a
marriage in the present. Therefore consent given in words expressive of
the future makes a marriage in the future.
Objection 2: Further, in other civil contracts, just as in matrimony, a
certain obligation results from the words expressing consent. Now in
other contracts it matters not whether the obligation is effected by
words of the present or of the future tense. Therefore neither does it
make any difference in matrimony.
Objection 3: Further, by the religious vow man contracts a spiritual
marriage with God. Now the religious vow is expressed in words of the
future tense, and is binding. Therefore carnal marriage also can be
effected by words of the future tense.
On the contrary, A man who consents in words of the future tense to
take a particular woman as his wife, and after, by words of the present
tense, consents to take another, according to law must take the second
for his wife (cap. Sicut ex Litteris, De spons. et matr.). But this
would not be the case if consent given in words of the future tense
made a marriage, since from the very fact that his marriage with the
one is valid, he cannot, as long as she lives, marry another. Therefore
consent given in words of the future tense does not make a marriage.
Further, he who promises to do a certain thing does it not yet. Now he
who consents in words of the future tense, promises to marry a certain
woman. Therefore he does not marry her yet.
I answer that, The sacramental causes produce their effect by
signifying it; hence they effect what they signify. Since therefore
when a man expresses his consent by words of the future tense, he does
not signify that he is marrying, but promises that he will marry, it
follows that a consent expressed in this manner does not make a
marriage, but a promise [sponsionem] of marriage, and this promise is
known as a betrothal [sponsalia].
Reply to Objection 1: When consent is expressed in words of the present
tense, not only are the words actually present, but consent is directed
to the present, so that they coincide in point of time; but when
consent is given in words of the future tense, although the words are
actually present, the consent is directed to a future time, and hence
they do not coincide in point of time. For this reason the comparison
fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Even in other contracts, a man who uses words
referring to the future, does not transfer the power over his property
to another person---for instance if he were to say "I will give
thee"---but only when he uses words indicative of the present.
Reply to Objection 3: In the vow of religious profession it is not the
spiritual marriage itself that is expressed in words which refer to the
future, but an act of the spiritual marriage, namely obedience or
observance of the rule. If, however, a man vow spiritual marriage in
the future, it is not a spiritual marriage, for a man does not become a
monk by taking such a vow, but promises to become one.
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Whether, in the absence of inward consent, a marriage is made by consent
given in words of the present?
Objection 1: It would seem that even in the absence of inward consent a
marriage is made by consent expressed in words of the present. For
"fraud and deceit should benefit no man," according to the law (cap. Ex
Tenore, De Rescrip., cap. Si Vir, De cognat. spir.). Now he who gives
consent in words without consenting in heart commits a fraud. Therefore
he should not benefit by it, through being released of the bond of
marriage.
Objection 2: Further, the mental consent of one person cannot be known
to another, except in so far as it is expressed in words. If then the
expression of the words is not enough, and inward consent is required
in both parties, neither of them will be able to know that he is truly
married to the other; and consequently whenever he uses marriage he
will commit fornication.
Objection 3: Further, if a man is proved to have consented to take a
certain woman to wife in words of the present tense, he is compelled
under pain of excommunication to take her as his wife, even though he
should say that he was wanting in mental consent, notwithstanding that
afterwards he may have contracted marriage with another woman by words
expressive of consent in the present. But this would not be the case if
mental consent were requisite for marriage. Therefore it is not
required.
On the contrary, Innocent III says in a Decretal (cap. Tua Nos, De
Spons. et matr.) in reference to this case: "Other things cannot
complete the marriage bond in the absence of consent."
Further, intention is necessary in all the sacraments. Now he who
consents not in his heart has no intention of contracting marriage; and
therefore he does not contract a marriage.
I answer that, The outward cleansing stands in the same relation to
baptism as the expression of words to this sacrament, as stated above
[4941](A[2]). Wherefore just as were a person to receive the outward
cleansing, with the intention, not of receiving the sacrament, but of
acting in jest or deceit, he would not be baptized; so, too, expression
of words without inward consent makes no marriage.
Reply to Objection 1: There are two things here, namely the lack of
consent---which benefits him in the tribunal of his conscience so that
he is not bound by the marriage tie, albeit not in the tribunal of the
Church where judgment is pronounced according to the evidence---and the
deceit in the words, which does not benefit him, neither in the
tribunal of his conscience nor in the tribunal of the Church, since in
both he is punished for this.
Reply to Objection 2: If mental consent is lacking in one of the
parties, on neither side is there marriage, since marriage consists in
a mutual joining together, as stated above ([4942]Q[44], A[1]). However
one may believe that in all probability there is no fraud unless there
be evident signs thereof; because we must presume good of everyone,
unless there be proof of the contrary. Consequently the party in whom
there is no fraud is excused from sin on account of ignorance.
Reply to Objection 3: In such a case the Church compels him to hold to
his first wife, because the Church judges according to outward
appearances; nor is she deceived in justice or right, although she is
deceived in the facts of the case. Yet such a man ought to bear the
excommunication rather than return to his first wife; or else he should
go far away into another country.
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Whether consent given secretly in words of the present makes a marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent given secretly in words of the
present does not make a marriage. For a thing that is in one person's
power is not transferred to the power of another without the consent of
the person in whose power it was. Now the maid is in her father's
power. Therefore she cannot by marriage be transferred to a husband's
power without her father's consent. Wherefore if consent be given
secretly, even though it should be expressed in words of the present,
there will be no marriage.
Objection 2: Further, in penance, just as in matrimony, our act is as
it were essential to the sacrament. But the sacrament of penance is not
made complete except by means of the ministers of the Church, who are
the dispensers of the sacraments. Therefore neither can marriage be
perfected without the priest's blessing.
Objection 3: Further, the Church does not forbid baptism to be given
secretly, since one may baptize either privately or publicly. But the
Church does forbid the celebration of clandestine marriages (cap. Cum
inhibitio, De clandest. despons.). Therefore they cannot be done
secretly.
Objection 4: Further, marriage cannot be contracted by those who are
related in the second degree, because the Church has forbidden it. But
the Church has also forbidden clandestine marriages. Therefore they
cannot be valid marriages.
On the contrary, Given the cause the effect follows. Now the sufficient
cause of matrimony is consent expressed in words of the present.
Therefore whether this be done in public or in private the result is a
marriage.
Further, wherever there is the due matter and the due form of a
sacrament there is the sacrament. Now in a secret marriage there is the
due matter, since there are persons who are able lawfully to
contract---and the due form, since there are the words of the present
expressive of consent. Therefore there is a true marriage.
I answer that, Just as in the other sacraments certain things are
essential to the sacrament, and if they are omitted there is no
sacrament, while certain things belong to the solemnization of the
sacrament, and if these be omitted the sacrament is nevertheless
validly performed, although it is a sin to omit them; so, too, consent
expressed in words of the present between persons lawfully qualified to
contract makes a marriage, because these two conditions are essential
to the sacrament; while all else belongs to the solemnization of the
sacrament, as being done in order that the marriage may be more
fittingly performed. Hence if these be omitted it is a true marriage,
although the contracting parties sin, unless they have a lawful motive
for being excused. [*Clandestine marriages have since been declared
invalid by the Council of Trent (sess. xxiv). It must be borne in mind
that throughout the treatise on marriage St. Thomas gives the Canon Law
of his time.]
Reply to Objection 1: The maid is in her father's power, not as a
female slave without power over her own body, but as a daughter, for
the purpose of education. Hence, in so far as she is free, she can give
herself into another's power without her father's consent, even as a
son or daughter, since they are free, may enter religion without their
parent's consent.
Reply to Objection 2: In penance our act, although essential to the
sacrament, does not suffice for producing the proximate effect of the
sacrament, namely forgiveness of sins, and consequently it is necessary
that the act of the priest intervene in order that the sacrament be
perfected. But in matrimony our acts are the sufficient cause for the
production of the proximate effect, which is the marriage bond, because
whoever has the right to dispose of himself can bind himself to
another. Consequently the priest's blessing is not required for
matrimony as being essential to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: It is also forbidden to receive baptism otherwise
than from a priest, except in a case of necessity. But matrimony is not
a necessary sacrament: and consequently the comparison fails. However,
clandestine marriages are forbidden on account of the evil results to
which they are liable, since it often happens that one of the parties
is guilty of fraud in such marriages; frequently, too, they have
recourse to other nuptials when they repent of having married in haste;
and many other evils result therefrom, besides which there is something
disgraceful about them.
Reply to Objection 4: Clandestine marriages are not forbidden as though
they were contrary to the essentials of marriage, in the same way as
the marriages of unlawful persons, who are undue matter for this
sacrament; and hence there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CONSENT TO WHICH AN OATH OR CARNAL INTERCOURSE IS APPENDED (TWO
ARTICLES)
We must now consider the consent to which an oath or carnal intercourse
is appended. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of
the future tense makes a marriage?
(2) Whether carnal intercourse supervening to such a consent makes a
marriage?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the
future tense makes a marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that if an oath be added to a consent that
is expressed in words of the future tense it makes a marriage. For no
one can bind himself to act against the Divine Law. But the fulfilling
of an oath is of Divine law according to Mat. 5:33, "Thou shalt perform
thy oaths to the Lord." Consequently no subsequent obligation can
relieve a man of the obligation to keep an oath previously taken. If,
therefore, after consenting to marry a woman by words expressive of the
future and confirming that consent with an oath, a man binds himself to
another woman by words expressive of the present, it would seem that
none the less he is bound to keep his former oath. But this would not
be the case unless that oath made the marriage complete. Therefore an
oath affixed to a consent expressed in words of the future tense makes
a marriage.
Objection 2: Further, Divine truth is stronger than human truth. Now an
oath confirms a thing with the Divine truth. Since then words
expressive of consent in the present in which there is mere human truth
complete a marriage, it would seem that much more is this the case with
words of the future confirmed by an oath.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (Heb. 6:16), "An oath
for confirmation is the end of all . . . controversy"; wherefore in a
court of justice at any rate one must stand by an oath rather than by a
mere affirmation. Therefore if a man consent to marry a woman by a
simple affirmation expressed in words of the present, after having
consented to marry another in words of the future confirmed by oath, it
would seem that in the judgment of the Church he should be compelled to
take the first and not the second as his wife.
Objection 4: Further, the simple uttering of words relating to the
future makes a betrothal. But the addition of an oath must have some
effect. Therefore it makes something more than a betrothal. Now beyond
a betrothal there is nothing but marriage. Therefore it makes a
marriage.
On the contrary, What is future is not yet. Now the addition of an oath
does not make words of the future tense signify anything else than
consent to something future. Therefore it is not a marriage yet.
Further, after a marriage is complete, no further consent is required
for the marriage. But after the oath there is yet another consent which
makes the marriage, else it would be useless to swear to a future
marriage. Therefore it does not make a marriage.
I answer that, An oath is employed in confirmation of one's words;
wherefore it confirms that only which is signified by the words, nor
does it change their signification. Consequently, since it belongs to
words of the future tense, by their very signification, not to make a
marriage, since what is promised in the future is not done yet, even
though an oath be added to the promise, the marriage is not made yet,
as the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).
Reply to Objection 1: The fulfilling of a lawful oath is of Divine law,
but not the fulfilling of an unlawful oath. Wherefore if a subsequent
obligation makes that oath unlawful, whereas it was lawful before, he
who does not keep the oath he took previously does not disobey the
Divine law. And so it is in the case in point; since he swears
unlawfully who promises unlawfully; and a promise about another's
property is unlawful. Consequently the subsequent consent by words of
the present, whereby a man transfers the power over his body to another
woman, makes the previous oath unlawful which was lawful before.
Reply to Objection 2: The Divine truth is most efficacious in
confirming that to which it is applied. Hence the Reply to the Third
Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 4: The oath has some effect, not by causing a new
obligation, but confirming that which is already made, and thus he who
violates it sins more grievously.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future
makes a marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that carnal intercourse after consent
expressed in words of the future makes a marriage. For consent by deed
is greater than consent by word. But he who has carnal intercourse
consents by deed to the promise he has previously made. Therefore it
would seem that much more does this make a marriage than if he were to
consent to mere words referring to the present.
Objection 2: Further, not only explicit but also interpretive consent
makes a marriage. Now there can be no better interpretation of consent
than carnal intercourse. Therefore marriage is completed thereby.
Objection 3: Further, all carnal union outside marriage is a sin. But
the woman, seemingly, does not sin by admitting her betrothed to carnal
intercourse. Therefore it makes a marriage.
Objection 4: Further, "Sin is not forgiven unless restitution be made,"
as Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.). Now a man cannot reinstate a
woman whom he has violated under the pretense of marriage unless he
marry her. Therefore it would seem that even if, after his carnal
intercourse, he happen to contract with another by words of the present
tense, he is bound to return to the first; and this would not be the
case unless he were married to her. Therefore carnal intercourse after
consent referring to the future makes a marriage.
On the contrary, Pope Nicholas I says (Resp. ad Consult. Bulg. iii;
Cap. Tuas dudum, De clandest. despons.), "Without the consent to
marriage, other things, including coition, are of no effect."
Further, that which follows a thing does not make it. But carnal
intercourse follows the actual marriage, as effect follows cause.
Therefore it cannot make a marriage.
I answer that, We may speak of marriage in two ways. First, in
reference to the tribunal of conscience, and thus in very truth carnal
intercourse cannot complete a marriage the promise of which has
previously been made in words expressive of the future, if inward
consent is lacking, since words, even though expressive of the present,
would not make a marriage in the absence of mental consent, as stated
above ([4943]Q[45], A[4]). Secondly, in reference to the judgment of
the Church; and since in the external tribunal judgment is given in
accordance with external evidence, and since nothing is more expressly
significant of consent than carnal intercourse, it follows that in the
judgment of the Church carnal intercourse following on betrothal is
declared to make a marriage, unless there appear clear signs of deceit
or fraud [*According to the pre-Tridentine legislation] (De sponsal. et
matrim., cap. Is qui fidem).
Reply to Objection 1: In reality he who has carnal intercourse consents
by deed to the act of sexual union, and does not merely for this reason
consent to marriage except according to the interpretation of the law.
Reply to Objection 2: This interpretation does not alter the truth of
the matter, but changes the judgment which is about external things.
Reply to Objection 3: If the woman admit her betrothed, thinking that
he wishes to consummate the marriage, she is excused from the sin,
unless there be clear signs of fraud; for instance if they differ
considerably in birth or fortune, or some other evident sign appear.
Nevertheless the affianced husband is guilty of fornication, and should
be punished for this fraud he has committed.
Reply to Objection 4: In a case of this kind the affianced husband,
before his marriage with the other woman, is bound to marry the one to
whom he was betrothed, if she be his equal or superior in rank. But if
he has married another woman, he is no longer able to fulfill his
obligation, wherefore it suffices if he provide for her marriage. Nor
is he bound even to do this, according to some, if her affianced
husband is of much higher rank than she, or if there be some evident
sign of fraud, because it may be presumed that in all probability she
was not deceived but pretended to be.
__________________________________________________________________
OF COMPULSORY AND CONDITIONAL CONSENT (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider compulsory and conditional consent. Under this
head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether compulsory consent is possible?
(2) Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?
(3) Whether compulsory consent invalidates marriage?
(4) Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party
using compulsion?
(5) Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?
(6) Whether one can be compelled by one's father to marry?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a compulsory consent is possible?
Objection 1: It would seem that no consent can be compulsory. For, as
stated above (Sent. ii, D, 25 [*[4944]FS, Q[6], A[4]]) the free-will
cannot be compelled. Now consent is an act of the free-will. Therefore
it cannot be compulsory.
Objection 2: Further, violent is the same as compulsory. Now, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), "a violent action is one the
principle of which is without, the patient concurring not at all." But
the principle of consent is always within. Therefore no consent can be
compulsory.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is perfected by consent. But that which
perfects a sin cannot be compulsory, for, according to Augustine (De
Lib. Arb. iii, 18), "no one sins in what he cannot avoid." Since then
violence is defined by jurists (i, ff. de eo quod vi metusve) as the
"force of a stronger being that cannot be repulsed," it would seem that
consent cannot be compulsory or violent.
Objection 4: Further, power is opposed to liberty. But compulsion is
allied to power, as appears from a definition of Tully's in which he
says that "compulsion is the force of one who exercises his power to
detain a thing outside its proper bounds." Therefore the free-will
cannot be compelled, and consequently neither can consent which is an
act thereof.
On the contrary, That which cannot be, cannot be an impediment. But
compulsory consent is an impediment to matrimony, as stated in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 29). Therefore consent can be compelled.
Further, in marriage there is a contract. Now the will can be compelled
in the matter of contracts; for which reason the law adjudges that
restitution should be made of the whole, for it does not ratify "that
which was done under compulsion or fear" (Sent. iv, D[29]). Therefore
in marriage also it is possible for the consent to be compulsory.
I answer that, Compulsion or violence is twofold. One is the cause of
absolute necessity, and violence of this kind the Philosopher calls
(Ethic. iii, 1) "violent simply," as when by bodily strength one forces
a person to move; the other causes conditional necessity, and the
Philosopher calls this a "mixed violence," as when a person throws his
merchandise overboard in order to save himself. In the latter kind of
violence, although the thing done is not voluntary in itself, yet
taking into consideration the circumstances of place and time it is
voluntary. And since actions are about particulars, it follows that it
is voluntary simply, and involuntary in a certain respect (Cf.
[4945]FS, Q[6], A[6]). Wherefore this latter violence or compulsion is
consistent with consent, but not the former. And since this compulsion
results from one's fear of a threatening danger, it follows that this
violence coincides with fear which, in a manner, compels the will,
whereas the former violence has to do with bodily actions. Moreover,
since the law considers not merely internal actions, but rather
external actions, consequently it takes violence to mean absolute
compulsion, for which reason it draws a distinction between violence
and fear. Here, however, it is a question of internal consent which
cannot be influenced by compulsion or violence as distinct from fear.
Therefore as to the question at issue compulsion and fear are the same.
Now, according to lawyers fear is "the agitation of the mind occasioned
by danger imminent or future" (Ethic. iii, 1).
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for the first set of
arguments consider the first kind of compulsion, and the second set of
arguments consider the second.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that "a constant man" [*Cap. Ad audientiam,
De his quae vi.] cannot be compelled by fear. Because the nature of a
constant man is not to be agitated in the midst of dangers. Since then
fear is "agitation of the mind occasioned by imminent danger," it would
seem that he is not compelled by fear.
Objection 2: Further, "Of all fearsome things death is the limit,"
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), as though it were the
most perfect of all things that inspire fear. But the constant man is
not compelled by death, since the brave face even mortal dangers.
Therefore no fear influences a constant man.
Objection 3: Further, of all dangers a good man fears most that which
affects his good name. But the fear of disgrace is not reckoned to
influence a constant man, because, according to the law (vii, ff, de eo
quod metus, etc.), "fear of disgrace is not included under the
ordinance, 'That which is done through fear'" [*Dig. iv, 2, Quod metus
causa]. Therefore neither does any other kind of fear influence a
constant man.
Objection 4: Further, in him who is compelled by fear, fear leaves a
sin, for it makes him promise what he is unwilling to fulfill, and thus
it makes him lie. But a constant man does not commit a sin, not even a
very slight one, for fear. Therefore no fear influences a constant man.
On the contrary, Abraham and Isaac were constant. Yet they were
influenced by fear, since on account of fear each said that his wife
was his sister (Gn. 12:12; 26:7).
Further, wherever there is mixed violence, it is fear that compels. But
however constant a man may be he may suffer violence of that kind, for
if he be on the sea, he will throw his merchandise overboard if menaced
with shipwreck. Therefore fear can influence a constant man.
I answer that, By fear influencing a man we mean his being compelled by
fear. A man is compelled by fear when he does that which otherwise he
would not wish to do, in order to avoid that which he fears. Now the
constant differs from the inconstant man in two respects. First, in
respect of the quality of the danger feared, because the constant man
follows right reason, whereby he knows whether to omit this rather than
that, and whether to do this rather than that. Now the lesser evil or
the greater good is always to be chosen in preference; and therefore
the constant man is compelled to bear with the lesser evil through fear
of the greater evil, but he is not compelled to bear with the greater
evil in order to avoid the lesser. But the inconstant man is compelled
to bear with the greater evil through fear of a lesser evil, namely to
commit sin through fear of bodily suffering; whereas on the contrary
the obstinate man cannot be compelled even to permit or to do a lesser
evil, in order to avoid a greater. Hence the constant man is a mean
between the inconstant and the obstinate. Secondly, they differ as to
their estimate of the threatening evil, for a constant man is not
compelled unless for grave and probable reasons, while the inconstant
man is compelled by trifling motives: "The wicked man seeth when no man
pursueth" (Prov. 28:1).
Reply to Objection 1: The constant man, like the brave man, is
fearless, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 4), not that he is
altogether without fear, but because he fears not what he ought not to
fear, or where, or when he ought not to fear.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin is the greatest of evils, and consequently a
constant man can nowise be compelled to sin; indeed a man should die
rather than suffer the like, as again the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
6,9). Yet certain bodily injuries are less grievous than certain
others; and chief among them are those which relate to the person, such
as death, blows, the stain resulting from rape, and slavery. Wherefore
the like compel a constant man to suffer other bodily injuries. They
are contained in the verse: "Rape, status, blows, and death." Nor does
it matter whether they refer to his own person, or to the person of his
wife or children, or the like.
Reply to Objection 3: Although disgrace is a greater injury it is easy
to remedy it. Hence fear of disgrace is not reckoned to influence a
constant man according to law.
Reply to Objection 4: The constant man is not compelled to lie, because
at the time he wishes to give; yet afterwards he wishes to ask for
restitution, or at least to appeal to the judge, if he promised not to
ask for restitution. But he cannot promise not to appeal, for since
this is contrary to the good of justice, he cannot be compelled
thereto, namely to act against justice.
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Whether compulsory consent invalidates a marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that compulsory consent does not invalidate
a marriage. For just as consent is necessary for matrimony, so is
intention necessary for Baptism. Now one who is compelled by fear to
receive Baptism, receives the sacrament. Therefore one who is compelled
by fear to consent is bound by his marriage.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1),
that which is done on account of mixed violence is more voluntary than
involuntary. Now consent cannot be compelled except by mixed violence.
Therefore it is not entirely involuntary, and consequently the marriage
is valid.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly he who has consented to marriage under
compulsion ought to be counseled to stand to that marriage; because to
promise and not to fulfill has an "appearance of evil," and the Apostle
wishes us to refrain from all such things (1 Thess 5:22). But that
would not be the case if compulsory consent invalidated a marriage
altogether. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, A Decretal says (cap. Cum locum, De sponsal. et
matrim.): "Since there is no room for consent where fear or compulsion
enters in, it follows that where a person's consent is required, every
pretext for compulsion must be set aside." Now mutual contract is
necessary in marriage. Therefore, etc.
Further, Matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which
union is according to the liberty of love. Therefore it cannot be the
result of compulsory consent.
I answer that, The marriage bond is everlasting. Hence whatever is
inconsistent with its perpetuity invalidates marriage. Now the fear
which compels a constant man deprives the contract of its perpetuity,
since its complete rescission can be demanded. Wherefore this
compulsion by fear which influences a constant man, invalidates
marriage, but not the other compulsion. Now a constant man is reckoned
a virtuous man who, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4), is a
measure in all human actions.
However, some say that if there be consent although compulsory, the
marriage is valid in conscience and in God's sight, but not in the eyes
of the Church, who presumes that there was no inward consent on account
of the fear. But this is of no account, because the Church should not
presume a person to sin until it be proved; and he sinned if he said
that he consented whereas he did not consent. Wherefore the Church
presumes that he did consent, but judges this compulsory consent to be
insufficient for a valid marriage.
Reply to Objection 1: The intention is not the efficient cause of the
sacrament in baptism, it is merely the cause that elicits the action of
the agent; whereas the consent is the efficient cause in matrimony.
Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Not any kind of voluntariness suffices for
marriage: it must be completely voluntary, because it has to be
perpetual; and consequently it is invalidated by violence of a mixed
nature.
Reply to Objection 3: He ought not always to be advised to stand to
that marriage, but only when evil results are feared from its
dissolution. Nor does he sin if he does otherwise, because there is no
appearance of evil in not fulfilling a promise that one has made
unwillingly.
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Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party who uses
compulsion?
Objection 1: It would seem that compulsory consent makes a marriage, at
least as regards the party who uses compulsion. For matrimony is a sign
of a spiritual union. But spiritual union which is by charity may be
with one who has not charity. Therefore marriage is possible with one
who wills it not.
Objection 2: Further, if she who was compelled consents afterwards, it
will be a true marriage. But he who compelled her before is not bound
by her consent. Therefore he was married to her by virtue of the
consent he gave before.
On the contrary, Matrimony is an equiparant relation. Now a relation of
that kind is equally in both terms. Therefore if there is an impediment
on the part of one, there will be no marriage on the part of the other.
I answer that, Since marriage is a kind of relation, and a relation
cannot arise in one of the terms without arising in the other, it
follows that whatever is an impediment to matrimony in the one, is an
impediment to matrimony in the other; since it is impossible for a man
to be the husband of one who is not his wife, or for a woman to be a
wife without a husband, just as it is impossible to be a mother without
having a child. Hence it is a common saying that "marriage is not
lame."
Reply to Objection 1: Although the act of the lover can be directed to
one who loves not, there can be no union between them, unless love be
mutual. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) that friendship
which consists in a kind of union requires a return of love.
Reply to Objection 2: Marriage does not result from the consent of her
who was compelled before, except in so far as the other party's
previous consent remains in force; wherefore if he were to withdraw his
consent there would be no marriage.
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Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that not even a conditional consent makes a
marriage, because a statement is not made simply if it is made subject
to a condition. But in marriage the words expressive of consent must be
uttered simply. Therefore a conditional consent makes no marriage.
Objection 2: Further, marriage should be certain. But where a statement
is made under a condition it is rendered doubtful. Therefore a like
consent makes no marriage.
On the contrary, In other contracts an obligation is undertaken
conditionally, and holds so long as the condition holds. Therefore
since marriage is a contract, it would seem that it can be made by a
conditional consent.
I answer that, The condition made is either of the present or of the
future. If it is of the present and is not contrary to marriage,
whether it be moral or immoral, the marriage holds if the condition is
verified, and is invalid if the condition is not verified. If, however,
it be contrary to the marriage blessings, the marriage is invalid, as
we have also said in reference to betrothals ([4946]Q[43], A[1]). But
if the condition refer to the future, it is either necessary, as that
the sun will rise tomorrow---and then the marriage is valid, because
such future things are present in their causes---or else it is
contingent, as the payment of a sum of money, or the consent of the
parents, and then the judgment about a consent of this kind is the same
as about a consent expressed in words of the future tense; wherefore it
makes no marriage.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether one can be compelled by one's father's command to marry?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can be compelled by one's father's
command to marry. For it is written (Col. 3:20): "Children, obey your
parents in all things." Therefore they are bound to obey them in this
also.
Objection 2: Further, Isaac charged Jacob (Gn. 28:1) not to take a wife
from the daughters of Chanaan. But he would not have charged him thus
unless he had the right to command it. Therefore a son is bound to obey
his father in this.
Objection 3: Further, no one should promise, especially with an oath,
for one whom he cannot compel to keep the promise. Now parents promise
future marriages for their children, and even confirm their promise by
oath. Therefore they can compel their children to keep that promise.
Objection 4: Further, our spiritual father, the Pope to wit, can by his
command compel a man to a spiritual marriage, namely to accept a
bishopric. Therefore a carnal father can compel his son to marriage.
On the contrary, A son may lawfully enter religion though his father
command him to marry. Therefore he is not bound to obey him in this.
Further, if he were bound to obey, a betrothal contracted by the
parents would hold good without their children's consent. But this is
against the law (cap. Ex litteris, De despon. impub.). Therefore, etc.
I answer that, Since in marriage there is a kind of perpetual service,
as it were, a father cannot by his command compel his son to marry,
since the latter is of free condition: but he may induce him for a
reasonable cause; and thus the son will be affected by his father's
command in the same way as he is affected by that cause, so that if the
cause be compelling as indicating either obligation or fitness, his
father's command will compel him in the same measure: otherwise he may
not compel him.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of the Apostle do not refer to those
matters in which a man is his own master as the father is. Such is
marriage by which the son also becomes a father.
Reply to Objection 2: There were other motives why Jacob was bound to
do what Isaac commanded him, both on account of the wickedness of those
women, and because the seed of Chanaan was to be cast forth from the
land which was promised to the seed of the patriarchs. Hence Isaac
could command this.
Reply to Objection 3: They do not swear except with the implied
condition "if it please them"; and they are bound to induce them in
good faith.
Reply to Objection 4: Some say that the Pope cannot command a man to
accept a bishopric, because consent should be free. But if this be
granted there would be an end of ecclesiastical order, for unless a man
can be compelled to accept the government of a church, the Church could
not be preserved, since sometimes those who are qualified for the
purpose are unwilling to accept unless they be compelled. Therefore we
must reply that the two cases are not parallel; for there is no bodily
service in a spiritual marriage as there is in the bodily marriage;
because the spiritual marriage is a kind of office for dispensing the
public weal: "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ,
and the dispensers of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. 4:1).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE OBJECT OF THE CONSENT (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the object of the consent. Under this head there
are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal
intercourse?
(2) Whether consent to marry a person for an immoral motive makes a
marriage?
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Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal
intercourse?
Objection 1: It would seem that the consent which makes a marriage is a
consent to carnal intercourse. For Jerome [*The words quoted are found
implicitly in St. Augustine (De Bono Viduit ix)] says that "for those
who have vowed virginity it is wicked, not only to marry, but even to
wish to marry." But it would not be wicked unless it were contrary to
virginity, and marriage is not contrary to virginity except by reason
of carnal intercourse. Therefore the will's consent in marriage is a
consent to carnal intercourse.
Objection 2: Further, whatever there is in marriage between husband and
wife is lawful between brother and sister except carnal intercourse.
But there cannot lawfully be a consent to marriage between them.
Therefore the marriage consent is a consent to carnal intercourse.
Objection 3: Further, if the woman say to the man: "I consent to take
thee provided however that you know me not," it is not a marriage
consent, because it contains something against the essence of that
consent. Yet this would not be the case unless the marriage consent
were a consent to carnal intercourse. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: Further, in everything the beginning corresponds to the
consummation. Now marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse.
Therefore, since it begins by the consent, it would seem that the
consent is to carnal intercourse.
On the contrary, No one that consents to carnal intercourse is a virgin
in mind and body. Yet Blessed John the evangelist after consenting to
marriage was a virgin both in mind and body. Therefore he did not
consent to carnal intercourse.
Further, the effect corresponds to its cause. Now consent is the cause
of marriage. Since then carnal intercourse is not essential to
marriage, seemingly neither is the consent which causes marriage a
consent to carnal intercourse.
I answer that, The consent that makes a marriage is a consent to
marriage, because the proper effect of the will is the thing willed.
Wherefore, according as carnal intercourse stands in relation to
marriage, so far is the consent that causes marriage a consent to
carnal intercourse. Now, as stated above ([4947]Q[44], A[1];[4948]
Q[45], AA[1],2), marriage is not essentially the carnal union itself,
but a certain joining together of husband and wife ordained to carnal
intercourse, and a further consequent union between husband and wife,
in so far as they each receive power over the other in reference to
carnal intercourse, which joining together is called the nuptial bond.
Hence it is evident that they said well who asserted that to consent to
marriage is to consent to carnal intercourse implicitly and not
explicitly. For carnal intercourse is not to be understood, except as
an effect is implicitly contained in its cause, for the power to have
carnal intercourse, which power is the object of the consent, is the
cause of carnal intercourse, just as the power to use one's own
property is the cause of the use.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why consent to marriage after taking
the vow of virginity is sinful, is because that consent gives a power
to do what is unlawful: even so would a man sin if he gave another man
the power to receive that which he has in deposit, and not only by
actually delivering it to him. With regard to the consent of the
Blessed Virgin, we have spoken about it above (Sent. iv, D, 3;
[4949]TP, Q[29], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Between brother and sister there can be no power
of one over the other in relation to carnal intercourse, even as
neither can there be lawfully carnal intercourse itself. Consequently
the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: Such an explicit condition is contrary not only
to the act but also to the power of carnal intercourse, and therefore
it is contrary to marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: Marriage begun corresponds to marriage
consummated, as habit or power corresponds to the act which is
operation.
The arguments on the contrary side show that consent is not given
explicitly to carnal intercourse; and this is true.
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Whether marriage can result from one person's consent to take another for a
base motive?
Objection 1: It would seem that marriage cannot result from one
person's consent to take another for a base motive. For there is but
one reason for one thing. Now marriage is one sacrament. Therefore it
cannot result from the intention of any other end than that for which
it was instituted by God; namely the begetting of children.
Objection 2: Further, the marriage union is from God, according to Mat.
19:6, "What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But
a union that is made for immoral motives is not from God. Therefore it
is not a marriage.
Objection 3: Further, in the other sacraments, if the intention of the
Church be not observed, the sacrament is invalid. Now the intention of
the Church in the sacrament of matrimony is not directed to a base
purpose. Therefore, if a marriage be contracted for a base purpose, it
will not be a valid marriage.
Objection 4: Further, according to Boethius (De Diff., Topic. ii) "a
thing is good if its end be good." But matrimony is always good.
Therefore it is not matrimony if it is done for an evil end.
Objection 5: Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the
Church; and in this there can be nothing base. Neither therefore can
marriage be contracted for a base motive.
On the contrary, He who baptizes another for the sake of gain baptizes
validly. Therefore if a man marries a woman for the purpose of gain it
is a valid marriage.
Further, the same conclusion is proved by the examples and authorities
quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30).
I answer that, The final cause of marriage may be taken as twofold,
namely essential and accidental. The essential cause of marriage is the
end to which it is by its very nature ordained, and this is always
good, namely the begetting of children and the avoiding of fornication.
But the accidental final cause thereof is that which the contracting
parties intend as the result of marriage. And since that which is
intended as the result of marriage is consequent upon marriage, and
since that which comes first is not altered by what comes after, but
conversely; marriage does not become good or evil by reason of that
cause, but the contracting parties to whom this cause is the essential
end. And since accidental causes are infinite in number, it follows
that there can be an infinite number of such causes in matrimony, some
of which are good and some bad.
Reply to Objection 1: This is true of the essential and principal
cause; but that which has one essential and principal end may have
several secondary essential ends, and an infinite number of accidental
ends.
Reply to Objection 2: The joining together can be taken for the
relation itself which is marriage, and that is always from God, and is
good, whatever be its cause; or for the act of those who are being
joined together, and thus it is sometimes evil and is not from God
simply. Nor is it unreasonable that an effect be from God, the cause of
which is evil, such as a child born of adultery; for it is not from
that cause as evil, but as having some good in so far as it is from
God, although it is not from God simply.
Reply to Objection 3: The intention of the Church whereby she intends
to confer a sacrament is essential to each sacrament, so that if it be
not observed, all sacraments are null. But the intention of the Church
whereby she intends an advantage resulting from the sacrament belongs
to the well-being and not to the essence of a sacrament; wherefore, if
it be not observed, the sacrament is none the less valid. Yet he who
omits this intention sins; for instance if in baptism one intend not
the healing of the mind which the Church intends. In like manner he who
intends to marry, although he fail to direct it to the end which the
Church intends, nevertheless contracts a valid marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: This evil which is intended is the end not of
marriage, but of the contracting parties.
Reply to Objection 5: The union itself, and not the action of those who
are united, is the sign of the union of Christ with the Church:
wherefore the conclusion does not follow.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MARRIAGE GOODS* (SIX ARTICLES) [*"Bona matrimonii," variously rendered
marriage goods, marriage blessings, and advantages of marriage.]
In the next place we must consider the marriage goods. Under this head
there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether certain goods are necessary in order to excuse marriage?
(2) Whether those assigned are sufficient?
(3) Whether the sacrament is the principal among the goods?
(4) Whether the marriage act is excused from sin by the aforesaid
goods?
(5) Whether it can ever be excused from sin without them?
(6) Whether in their absence it is always a mortal sin?
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Whether certain blessings are necessary in order to excuse marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that certain blessings are not necessary in
order to excuse marriage. For just as the preservation of the
individual which is effected by the nutritive power is intended by
nature, so too is the preservation of the species which is effected by
marriage; and indeed so much the more as the good of the species is
better and more exalted than the good of the individual. But no goods
are necessary to excuse the act of the nutritive power. Neither
therefore are they necessary to excuse marriage.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12)
the friendship between husband and wife is natural, and includes the
virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But that which is virtuous in
itself needs no excuse. Therefore neither should any goods be assigned
for the excuse of matrimony.
Objection 3: Further, matrimony was instituted as a remedy and as an
office, as stated above ([4950]Q[42], A[2]). Now it needs no excuse in
so far as it is instituted as an office, since then it would also have
needed an excuse in paradise, which is false, for there, as Augustine
says, "marriage would have been without reproach and the marriage-bed
without stain" (Gen. ad lit. ix). In like manner neither does it need
an excuse in so far as it is intended as a remedy, any more than the
other sacraments which were instituted as remedies for sin. Therefore
matrimony does not need these excuses.
Objection 4: Further, the virtues are directed to whatever can be done
aright. If then marriage can be righted by certain goods, it needs
nothing else to right it besides the virtues of the soul; and
consequently there is no need to assign to matrimony any goods whereby
it is righted, any more than to other things in which the virtues
direct us.
On the contrary, Wherever there is indulgence, there must needs be some
reason for excuse. Now marriage is allowed in the state of infirmity
"by indulgence" (1 Cor. 7:6). Therefore it needs to be excused by
certain goods.
Further, the intercourse of fornication and that of marriage are of the
same species as regards the species of nature. But the intercourse of
fornication is wrong in itself. Therefore, in order that the marriage
intercourse be not wrong, something must be added to it to make it
right, and draw it to another moral species.
I answer that, No wise man should allow himself to lose a thing except
for some compensation in the shape of an equal or better good.
Wherefore for a thing that has a loss attached to it to be eligible, it
needs to have some good connected with it, which by compensating for
that loss makes that thing ordinate and right. Now there is a loss of
reason incidental to the union of man and woman, both because the
reason is carried away entirely on account of the vehemence of the
pleasure, so that it is unable to understand anything at the same time,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11); and again because of the
tribulation of the flesh which such persons have to suffer from
solicitude for temporal things (1 Cor. 7:28). Consequently the choice
of this union cannot be made ordinate except by certain compensations
whereby that same union is righted. and these are the goods which
excuse marriage and make it right.
Reply to Objection 1: In the act of eating there is not such an intense
pleasure overpowering the reason as in the aforesaid action, both
because the generative power, whereby original sin is transmitted, is
infected and corrupt, whereas the nutritive power, by which original
sin is not transmitted, is neither corrupt nor infected; and again
because each one feels in himself a defect of the individual more than
a defect of the species. Hence, in order to entice a man to take food
which supplies a defect of the individual, it is enough that he feel
this defect; but in order to entice him to the act whereby a defect of
the species is remedied, Divine providence attached pleasure to that
act, which moves even irrational animals in which there is not the
stain of original sin. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: These goods which justify marriage belong to the
nature of marriage, which consequently needs them, not as extrinsic
causes of its rectitude, but as causing in it that rectitude which
belongs to it by nature.
Reply to Objection 3: From the very fact that marriage is intended as
an office or as a remedy it has the aspect of something useful and
right; nevertheless both aspects belong to it from the fact that it has
these goods by which it fulfills the office and affords a remedy to
concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 4: An act of virtue may derive its rectitude both
from the virtue as its elicitive principle, and from its circumstances
as its formal principles; and the goods of marriage are related to
marriage as circumstances to an act of virtue which owes it to those
circumstances that it can be an act of virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the goods of marriage are sufficiently enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goods of marriage are
insufficiently enumerated by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31), namely
"faith, offspring, and sacrament." For the object of marriage among men
is not only the begetting and feeding of children, but also the
partnership of a common life, whereby each one contributes his share of
work to the common stock, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12. Therefore as
the offspring is reckoned a good of matrimony, so also should the
communication of works.
Objection 2: Further, the union of Christ with the Church, signified by
matrimony, is the effect of charity. Therefore charity rather than
faith should be reckoned among the goods of matrimony.
Objection 3: Further, in matrimony, just as it is required that neither
party have intercourse with another, so is it required that the one pay
the marriage debt to the other. Now the former pertains to faith
according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31). Therefore justice should
also be reckoned among the goods of marriage on account of the payment
of the debt.
Objection 4: Further, in matrimony as signifying the union of Christ
with the Church, just as indivisibility is required, so also is unity,
whereby one man has one wife. But the sacrament which is reckoned among
the three marriage goods pertains to indivisibility. Therefore there
should be something else pertaining to unity.
Objection 5: On the other hand, it would seem that they are too many.
For one virtue suffices to make one act right. Now faith is one virtue.
Therefore it was not necessary to add two other goods to make marriage
right.
Objection 6: Further, the same cause does not make a thing both useful
and virtuous, since the useful and the virtuous are opposite divisions
of the good. Now marriage derives its character of useful from the
offspring. Therefore the offspring should not be reckoned among the
goods that make marriage virtuous.
Objection 7: Further, nothing should be reckoned as a property or
condition of itself. Now these goods are reckoned to be conditions of
marriage. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament, the sacrament
should not be reckoned a condition of matrimony.
I answer that, Matrimony is instituted both as an office of nature and
as a sacrament of the Church. As an office of nature it is directed by
two things, like every other virtuous act. one of these is required on
the part of the agent and is the intention of the due end, and thus the
"offspring" is accounted a good of matrimony; the other is required on
the part of the act, which is good generically through being about a
due matter; and thus we have "faith," whereby a man has intercourse
with his wife and with no other woman. Besides this it has a certain
goodness as a sacrament, and this is signified by the very word
"sacrament."
Reply to Objection 1: Offspring signifies not only the begetting of
children, but also their education, to which as its end is directed the
entire communion of works that exists between man and wife as united in
marriage, since parents naturally "lay up" for their "children" (2 Cor.
12:14); so that the offspring like a principal end includes another, as
it were, secondary end.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith is not taken here as a theological virtue,
but as part of justice, in so far as faith [fides] signifies the
suiting of deed to word [fiant dicta] by keeping one's promises; for
since marriage is a contract it contains a promise whereby this man is
assigned to this woman.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the marriage promise means that neither
party is to have intercourse with a third party, so does it require
that they should mutually pay the marriage debt. The latter is indeed
the chief of the two, since it follows from the power which each
receives over the other. Consequently both these things pertain to
faith, although the Book of Sentences mentions that which is the less
manifest.
Reply to Objection 4: By sacrament we are to understand not only
indivisibility, but all those things that result from marriage being a
sign of Christ's union with the Church. We may also reply that the
unity to which the objection refers pertains to faith, just as
indivisibility belongs to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 5: Faith here does not denote a virtue, but that
condition of virtue which is a part of justice and is called by the
name of faith.
Reply to Objection 6: Just as the right use of a useful good derives
its rectitude not from the useful but from the reason which causes the
right use, so too direction to a useful good may cause the goodness of
rectitude by virtue of the reason causing the right direction; and in
this way marriage, through being directed to the offspring, is useful,
and nevertheless righteous, inasmuch as it is directed aright.
Reply to Objection 7: As the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31), sacrament
here does not mean matrimony itself, but its indissolubility, which is
a sign of the same thing as matrimony is.
We may also reply that although marriage is a sacrament, marriage as
marriage is not the same as marriage as a sacrament, since it was
instituted not only as a sign of a sacred thing, but also as an office
of nature. Hence the sacramental aspect is a condition added to
marriage considered in itself, whence also it derives its rectitude.
Hence its sacramentality, if I may use the term, is reckoned among the
goods which justify marriage; and accordingly this third good of
marriage, the sacrament to wit, denotes not only its indissolubility,
but also whatever pertains to its signification.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sacrament is the chief of the marriage goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that the "sacrament" is not the chief of the
marriage goods. For the end is principal in everything. Now the end of
marriage is the offspring. Therefore the offspring is the chief
marriage good.
Objection 2: Further, in the specific nature the difference is more
important than the genus, even as the form is more important than
matter in the composition of a natural thing. Now "sacrament" refers to
marriage on the part of its genus, while "offspring" and "faith" refer
thereto on the part of the difference whereby it is a special kind of
sacrament. Therefore these other two are more important than sacrament
in reference to marriage.
Objection 3: Further, just as we find marriage without "offspring" and
without "faith," so do we find it without indissolubility, as in the
case where one of the parties enters religion before the marriage is
consummated. Therefore neither from this point of view is "sacrament"
the most important marriage good.
Objection 4: Further, an effect cannot be more important than its
cause. Now consent, which is the cause of matrimony, is often changed.
Therefore the marriage also can be dissolved and consequently
inseparability is not always a condition of marriage.
Objection 5: Further, the sacraments which produce an everlasting
effect imprint a character. But no character is imprinted in matrimony.
Therefore it is not conditioned by a lasting inseparability.
Consequently just as there is marriage without "offspring" so is there
marriage without "sacrament," and thus the same conclusion follows as
above.
On the contrary, That which has a place in the definition of a thing is
most essential thereto. Now inseparability, which pertains to
sacrament, is placed in the definition of marriage ([4951]Q[44], A[3]),
while offspring and faith are not. Therefore among the other goods
sacrament is the most essential to matrimony.
Further, the Divine power which works in the sacraments is more
efficacious than human power. But "offspring" and "faith" pertain to
matrimony as directed to an office of human nature, whereas "sacrament"
pertains to it as instituted by God. Therefore sacrament takes a more
important part in marriage than the other two.
I answer that, This or that may be more important to a thing in two
ways, either because it is more essential or because it is more
excellent. If the reason is because it is more excellent, then
"sacrament" is in every way the most important of the three marriage
goods, since it belongs to marriage considered as a sacrament of grace;
while the other two belong to it as an office of nature; and a
perfection of grace is more excellent than a perfection of nature. If,
however, it is said to be more important because it is more essential,
we must draw a distinction; for "faith" and "offspring" can be
considered in two ways. First, in themselves, and thus they regard the
use of matrimony in begetting children and observing the marriage
compact; while inseparability, which is denoted by "sacrament," regards
the very sacrament considered in itself, since from the very fact that
by the marriage compact man and wife give to one another power the one
over the other in perpetuity, it follows that they cannot be put
asunder. Hence there is no matrimony without inseparability, whereas
there is matrimony without "faith" and "offspring," because the
existence of a thing does not depend on its use; and in this sense
"sacrament" is more essential to matrimony than "faith" and
"offspring." Secondly, "faith" and "offspring" may be considered as in
their principles, so that "offspring" denote the intention of having
children, and "faith" the duty of remaining faithful, and there can be
no matrimony without these also, since they are caused in matrimony by
the marriage compact itself, so that if anything contrary to these were
expressed in the consent which makes a marriage, the marriage would be
invalid. Taking "faith" and "offspring" in this sense, it is clear that
"offspring" is the most essential thing in marriage, secondly "faith,"
and thirdly "sacrament"; even as to man it is more essential to be in
nature than to be in grace, although it is more excellent to be in
grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The end as regards the intention stands first in
a thing, but as regards the attainment it stands last. It is the same
with "offspring" among the marriage goods; wherefore in a way it is the
most important and in another way it is not.
Reply to Objection 2: Sacrament, even as holding the third place among
the marriage goods, belongs to matrimony by reason of its difference;
for it is called "sacrament" from its signification of that particular
sacred thing which matrimony signifies.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. ix),
marriage is a good of mortals, wherefore in the resurrection "they
shall neither marry nor be married" (Mat. 22:30). Hence the marriage
bond does not last after the life wherein it is contracted, and
consequently it is said to be inseparable, because it cannot be
sundered in this life, but either by bodily death after carnal union,
or by spiritual death after a merely spiritual union.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the consent which makes a marriage is
not everlasting materially, i.e. in regard to the substance of the act,
since that act ceases and a contrary act may succeed it, nevertheless
formally speaking it is everlasting, because it is a consent to an ever
lasting bond, else it would not make a marriage, for a consent to take
a woman for a time makes no marriage. Hence it is everlasting formally,
inasmuch as an act takes its species from its object; and thus it is
that matrimony derives its inseparability from the consent.
Reply to Objection 5: In those sacraments wherein a character is
imprinted, power is given to perform spiritual actions; but in
matrimony, to perform bodily actions. Wherefore matrimony by reason of
the power which man and wife receive over one another agrees with the
sacraments in which a character is imprinted, and from this it derives
its inseparability, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31); yet it
differs from them in so far as that power regards bodily acts; hence it
does not confer a spiritual character.
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Whether the marriage act is excused by the aforesaid goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act cannot be altogether
excused from sin by the aforesaid goods. For whoever allows himself to
lose a greater good for the sake of a lesser good sins because he
allows it inordinately. Now the good of reason which is prejudiced in
the marriage act is greater than these three marriage goods. Therefore
the aforesaid goods do not suffice to excuse marriage intercourse.
Objection 2: Further, if a moral good be added to a moral evil the sum
total is evil and not good, since one evil circumstance makes an action
evil, whereas one good circumstance does not make it good. Now the
marriage act is evil in itself, else it would need no excuse. Therefore
the addition of the marriage goods cannot make the act good.
Objection 3: Further, wherever there is immoderate passion there is
moral vice. Now the marriage goods cannot prevent the pleasure in that
act from being immoderate. Therefore they cannot excuse it from being a
sin.
Objection 4: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15),
shame is only caused by a disgraceful deed. Now the marriage goods do
not deprive that deed of its shame. Therefore they cannot excuse it
from sin.
On the contrary, The marriage act differs not from fornication except
by the marriage goods. If therefore these were not sufficient to excuse
it marriage would be always unlawful; and this is contrary to what was
stated above ([4952]Q[41], A[3]).
Further, the marriage goods are related to its act as its due
circumstances, as stated above (A[1], ad 4). Now the like circumstances
are sufficient to prevent an action from being evil. Therefore these
goods can excuse marriage so that it is nowise a sin.
I answer that, An act is said to be excused in two ways. First, on the
part of the agent, so that although it be evil it is not imputed as sin
to the agent, or at least not as so grave a sin. thus ignorance is said
to excuse a sin wholly or partly. Secondly, an act is said to be
excused on its part, so that, namely, it is not evil; and it is thus
that the aforesaid goods are said to excuse the marriage act. Now it is
from the same cause that an act is not morally evil, and that it is
good, since there is no such thing as an indifferent act, as was stated
in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40; [4953]FS, Q[18], A[9]). Now a
human act is said to be good in two ways. In one way by goodness of
virtue, and thus an act derives its goodness from those things which
place it in the mean. This is what "faith" and "offspring" do in the
marriage act, as stated above [4954](A[2]). In another way, by goodness
of the "sacrament," in which way an act is said to be not only good,
but also holy, and the marriage act derives this goodness from the
indissolubility of the union, in respect of which it signifies the
union of Christ with the Church. Thus it is clear that the aforesaid
goods sufficiently excuse the marriage act.
Reply to Objection 1: By the marriage act man does not incur harm to
his reason as to habit, but only as to act. Nor is it unfitting that a
certain act which is generically better be sometimes interrupted for
some less good act; for it is possible to do this without sin, as in
the case of one who ceases from the act of contemplation in order
meanwhile to devote himself to action.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would avail if the evil that is
inseparable from carnal intercourse were an evil of sin. But in this
case it is an evil not of sin but of punishment alone, consisting in
the rebellion of concupiscence against reason; and consequently the
conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 3: The excess of passion that amounts to a sin does
not refer to the passion's quantitative intensity, but to its
proportion to reason; wherefore it is only when a passion goes beyond
the bounds of reason that it is reckoned to be immoderate. Now the
pleasure attaching to the marriage act, while it is most intense in
point of quantity, does not go beyond the bounds previously appointed
by reason before the commencement of the act, although reason is unable
to regulate them during the pleasure itself.
Reply to Objection 4: The turpitude that always accompanies the
marriage act and always causes shame is the turpitude of punishment,
not of sin, for man is naturally ashamed of any defect.
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Whether the marriage act can be excused without the marriage goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act can be excused even
without the marriage goods. For he who is moved by nature alone to the
marriage act, apparently does not intend any of the marriage goods,
since the marriage goods pertain to grace or virtue. Yet when a person
is moved to the aforesaid act by the natural appetite alone, seemingly
he commits no sin, for nothing natural is an evil, since "evil is
contrary to nature and order," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage
goods.
Objection 2: Further, he who has intercourse with his wife in order to
avoid fornication, does not seemingly intend any of the marriage goods.
Yet he does not sin apparently, because marriage was granted to human
weakness for the very purpose of avoiding fornication (1 Cor. 7:2, 6).
Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage
goods.
Objection 3: Further, he who uses as he will that which is his own does
not act against justice, and thus seemingly does not sin. Now marriage
makes the wife the husband's own, and "vice versa." Therefore, if they
use one another at will through the instigation of lust, it would seem
that it is no sin; and thus the same conclusion follows.
Objection 4: Further, that which is good generically does not become
evil unless it be done with an evil intention. Now the marriage act
whereby a husband knows his wife is generically good. Therefore it
cannot be evil unless it be done with an evil intention. Now it can be
done with a good intention, even without intending any marriage good,
for instance by intending to keep or acquire bodily health. Therefore
it seems that this act can be excused even without the marriage goods.
On the contrary, If the cause be removed the effect is removed. Now the
marriage goods are the cause of rectitude in the marriage act.
Therefore the marriage act cannot be excused without them.
Further, the aforesaid act does not differ from the act of fornication
except in the aforesaid goods. But the act of fornication is always
evil. Therefore the marriage act also will always be evil unless it be
excused by the aforesaid goods.
I answer that, Just as the marriage goods, in so far as they consist in
a habit, make a marriage honest and holy, so too, in so far as they are
in the actual intention, they make the marriage act honest, as regards
those two marriage goods which relate to the marriage act. Hence when
married persons come together for the purpose of begetting children, or
of paying the debt to one another (which pertains to "faith") they are
wholly excused from sin. But the third good does not relate to the use
of marriage, but to its excuse, as stated above [4955](A[3]); wherefore
it makes marriage itself honest, but not its act, as though its act
were wholly excused from sin, through being done on account of some
signification. Consequently there are only two ways in which married
persons can come together without any sin at all, namely in order to
have offspring, and in order to pay the debt. otherwise it is always at
least a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The offspring considered as a marriage good
includes something besides the offspring as a good intended by nature.
For nature intends offspring as safeguarding the good of the species,
whereas the offspring as a good of the sacrament of marriage includes
besides this the directing of the child to God. Wherefore the intention
of nature which intends the offspring must needs be referred either
actually or habitually to the intention of having an offspring, as a
good of the sacrament: otherwise the intention would go no further than
a creature; and this is always a sin. Consequently whenever nature
alone moves a person to the marriage act, he is not wholly excused from
sin, except in so far as the movement of nature is further directed
actually or habitually to the offspring as a good of the sacrament. Nor
does it follow that the instigation of nature is evil, but that it is
imperfect unless it be further directed to some marriage good.
Reply to Objection 2: If a man intends by the marriage act to prevent
fornication in his wife, it is no sin, because this is a kind of
payment of the debt that comes under the good of "faith." But if he
intends to avoid fornication in himself, then there is a certain
superfluity, and accordingly there is a venial sin, nor was the
sacrament instituted for that purpose, except by indulgence, which
regards venial sins.
Reply to Objection 3: One due circumstance does not suffice to make a
good act, and consequently it does not follow that, no matter how one
use one's own property, the use is good, but when one uses it as one
ought according to all the circumstances.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it is not evil in itself to intend to
keep oneself in good health, this intention becomes evil, if one intend
health by means of something that is not naturally ordained for that
purpose; for instance if one sought only bodily health by the sacrament
of baptism, and the same applies to the marriage act in the question at
issue.
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Whether it is a mortal sin for a man to have knowledge of his wife, with th
e
intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that whenever a man has knowledge of his
wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure,
he commits a mortal sin. For according to Jerome (Comment. in Eph.
5:25), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 31), "the pleasure taken in
the embraces of a wanton is damnable in a husband." Now nothing but
mortal sin is said to be damnable. Therefore it is always a mortal sin
to have knowledge of one's wife for mere pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, consent to pleasure is a mortal sin, as stated in
the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 24). Now whoever knows his wife for the
sake of pleasure consents to the pleasure. Therefore he sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, whoever fails to refer the use of a creature to
God enjoys a creature, and this is a mortal sin. But whoever uses his
wife for mere pleasure does not refer that use to God. Therefore he
sins mortally.
Objection 4: Further, no one should be excommunicated except for a
mortal sin. Now according to the text (Sent. ii, D, 24) a man who knows
his wife for mere pleasure is debarred from entering the Church, as
though he were excommunicate. Therefore every such man sins mortally.
On the contrary, As stated in the text (Sent. ii, D, 24), according to
Augustine (Contra Jul. ii, 10; De Decem Chord. xi; Serm. xli, de
Sanct.), carnal intercourse of this kind is one of the daily sins, for
which we say the "Our Father." Now these are not mortal sins.
Therefore, etc.
Further, it is no mortal sin to take food for mere pleasure. Therefore
in like manner it is not a mortal sin for a man to use his wife merely
to satisfy his desire.
I answer that, Some say that whenever pleasure is the chief motive for
the marriage act it is a mortal sin; that when it is an indirect motive
it is a venial sin; and that when it spurns the pleasure altogether and
is displeasing, it is wholly void of venial sin; so that it would be a
mortal sin to seek pleasure in this act, a venial sin to take the
pleasure when offered, but that perfection requires one to detest it.
But this is impossible, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x,
3,4) the same judgment applies to pleasure as to action, because
pleasure in a good action is good, and in an evil action, evil;
wherefore, as the marriage act is not evil in itself, neither will it
be always a mortal sin to seek pleasure therein. Consequently the right
answer to this question is that if pleasure be sought in such a way as
to exclude the honesty of marriage, so that, to wit, it is not as a
wife but as a woman that a man treats his wife, and that he is ready to
use her in the same way if she were not his wife, it is a mortal sin;
wherefore such a man is said to be too ardent a lover of his wife,
because his ardor carries him away from the goods of marriage. If,
however, he seek pleasure within the bounds of marriage, so that it
would not be sought in another than his wife, it is a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: A man seeks wanton pleasure in his wife when he
sees no more in her that he would in a wanton.
Reply to Objection 2: Consent to the pleasure of the intercourse that
is a mortal sin is itself a mortal sin; but such is not the consent to
the marriage act.
Reply to Objection 3: Although he does not actually refer the pleasure
to God, he does not place his will's last end therein; otherwise he
would seek it anywhere indifferently. Hence it does not follow that he
enjoys a creature; but he uses a creature actually for his own sake,
and himself habitually, though not actually, for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 4: The reason for this statement is not that man
deserves to be excommunicated for this sin, but because he renders
himself unfit for spiritual things, since in that act, he becomes flesh
and nothing more.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF MARRIAGE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)
In the next place we must consider the impediments of marriage: (1) In
general; (2) In particular.
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Whether it is fitting that impediments should be assigned to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for impediments to be assigned to
marriage. For marriage is a sacrament condivided with the others. But
no impediments are assigned to the others. Neither therefore should
they be assigned to marriage.
Objection 2: Further, the less perfect a thing is the fewer its
obstacles. Now matrimony is the least perfect of the sacraments.
Therefore it should have either no impediments or very few.
Objection 3: Further, wherever there is disease, it is necessary to
have a remedy for the disease. Now concupiscence, a remedy for which is
permitted in matrimony (1 Cor. 7:6), is in all. Therefore there should
not be any impediment making it altogether unlawful for a particular
person to marry.
Objection 4: Further, unlawful means against the law. Now these
impediments that are assigned to matrimony are not against the natural
law, because they are not found to be the same in each state of the
human race, since more degrees of kindred come under prohibition at one
time than at another. Nor, seemingly, can human law set impediments
against marriage, since marriage, like the other sacraments, is not of
human but of Divine institution. Therefore impediments should not be
assigned to marriage, making it unlawful for a person to marry.
Objection 5: Further, lawful and unlawful differ as that which is
against the law from that which is not, and between these there is no
middle term, since they are opposed according to affirmation and
negation. Therefore there cannot be impediments to marriage, placing a
person in a middle position between those who are lawful and those who
are unlawful subjects of marriage.
Objection 6: Further, union of man and woman is unlawful save in
marriage. Now every unlawful union should be dissolved. Therefore if
anything prevent a marriage being contracted, it will "de facto"
dissolve it after it has been contracted; and thus impediments should
not be assigned to marriage, which hinder it from being contracted, and
dissolve it after it has been contracted.
Objection 7: Further, no impediment can remove from a thing that which
is part of its definition. Now indissolubility is part of the
definition of marriage. Therefore there cannot be any impediments which
annul a marriage already contracted.
Objection 8: On the other hand, it would seem that there should be an
infinite number of impediments to marriage. For marriage is a good. Now
good may be lacking in an infinite number of ways, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iii). Therefore there is an infinite number of impediments
to marriage.
Objection 9: Further, the impediments to marriage arise from the
conditions of individuals. But such like conditions are infinite in
number. Therefore the impediments to marriage are also infinite.
I answer that, In marriage, as in other sacraments, there are certain
things essential to marriage, and others that belong to its
solemnization. And since even without the things that pertain to its
solemnization it is still a true sacrament, as also in the case of the
other sacraments, it follows that the impediments to those things that
pertain to the solemnization of this sacrament do not derogate from the
validity of the marriage. These impediments are said to hinder the
contracting of marriage, but they do not dissolve the marriage once
contracted; such are the veto of the Church, or the holy seasons. Hence
the verse:
"The veto of the Church and holy tide
Forbid the knot, but loose it not if tied."
On the other hand, those impediments which regard the essentials of
marriage make a marriage invalid, wherefore they are said not only to
hinder the contracting of marriage, but to dissolve it if contracted;
and they are contained in the following verse:
"Error, station, vow, kinship, crime,
Difference of worship, force, holy orders,
Marriage bond, honesty, affinity, impotence,
All these forbid marriage, and annul it though
contracted."
The reason for this number may be explained as follows: Marriage may be
hindered either on the part of the contract or in regard to the
contracting parties. If in the first way, since the marriage contract
is made by voluntary consent, and this is incompatible with either
ignorance or violence, there will be two impediments to marriage,
namely "force," i.e. compulsion, and "error" in reference to ignorance.
Wherefore the Master pronounced on these two impediments when treating
of the cause of matrimony (Sent. iv, DD 29,30). Here, however, he is
treating of the impediments as arising from the contracting parties,
and these may be differentiated as follows. A person may be hindered
from contracting marriage either simply, or with some particular
person. If simply, so that he be unable to contract marriage with any
woman, this can only be because he is hindered from performing the
marriage act. This happens in two ways. First, because he cannot "de
facto," either through being altogether unable---and thus we have the
impediment of "impotence"---or through being unable to do so freely,
and thus we have the impediment of the "condition of slavery."
Secondly, because he cannot do it lawfully, and this because he is
bound to continence, which happens in two ways, either through his
being bound on account of the office he has undertaken to fulfill---and
thus we have the impediment of "Order"---or on account of his having
taken a vow---and thus "Vow" is an impediment.
If, however, a person is hindered from marrying, not simply but in
reference to a particular person, this is either because he is bound to
another person, and thus he who is married to one cannot marry another,
which constitutes the impediment of the "bond of marriage"---or through
lack of proportion to the other party, and this for three reasons.
First, on account of too great a distance separating them, and thus we
have "difference of worship"; secondly, on account of their being too
closely related, and thus we have three impediments, namely "kinship,"
then "affinity," which denotes the close relationship between two
persons, in reference to a third united to one of them by marriage, and
the "justice of public honesty," where we have a close relationship
between two persons arising out of the betrothal of one of them to a
third person; thirdly, on account of a previous undue union between him
and the woman, and thus the "crime of adultery" previously committed
with her is an impediment.
Reply to Objection 1: There may be impediments to the other sacraments
also in the omission either of that which is essential, or of that
which pertains to the solemnization of the sacrament, as stated above.
However, impediments are assigned to matrimony rather than to the other
sacraments for three reasons. First, because matrimony consists of two
persons, and consequently can be impeded in more ways than the other
sacraments which refer to one person taken individually; secondly,
because matrimony has its cause in us and in God, while some of the
other sacraments have their cause in God alone. Wherefore penance which
in a manner has a cause in us, is assigned certain impediments by the
Master (Sent. iv, D, 16), such as hypocrisy, the public games, and so
forth; thirdly, because other sacraments are objects of command or
counsel, as being more perfect goods, whereas marriage is a matter of
indulgence, as being a less perfect good (1 Cor. 7:6). Wherefore, in
order to afford an opportunity of proficiency towards a greater good,
more impediments are assigned to matrimony than to the other
sacraments.
Reply to Objection 2: The more perfect things can be hindered in more
ways, in so far as more conditions are required for them. And if an
imperfect thing requires more conditions, there will be more
impediments to it; and thus it is in matrimony.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument would hold, were there no other and
more efficacious remedies for the disease of concupiscence; which is
false.
Reply to Objection 4: Persons are said to be unlawful subjects for
marriage through being contrary to the law whereby marriage is
established. Now marriage as fulfilling an office of nature is
established by the natural law; as a sacrament, by the Divine law; as
fulfilling an office of society, by the civil law. Consequently a
person may be rendered an unlawful subject of marriage by any of the
aforesaid laws. Nor does the comparison with the other sacraments hold,
for they are sacraments only. And since the natural law is
particularized in various ways according to the various states of
mankind, and since positive law, too, varies according to the various
conditions of men, the Master (Sent. iv, D, 34) asserts that at various
times various persons have been unlawful subjects of marriage.
Reply to Objection 5: The law may forbid a thing either altogether, or
in part and in certain cases. Hence between that which is altogether
according to the law and that which is altogether against the law
(which are opposed by contrariety and not according to affirmation and
negation), that which is somewhat according to the law and somewhat
against the law is a middle term. For this reason certain persons hold
a middle place between those who are simply lawful subjects and those
who are simply unlawful.
Reply to Objection 6: Those impediments which do not annul a marriage
already contracted sometimes hinder a marriage from being contracted,
by rendering it not invalid but unlawful. And if it be contracted it is
a true marriage although the contracting parties sin; just as by
consecrating after breaking one's fast one would sin by disobeying the
Church's ordinance, and yet it would be a valid sacrament because it is
not essential to the sacrament that the consecrator be fasting.
Reply to Objection 7: When we say that the aforesaid impediments annul
marriage already contracted, we do not mean that they dissolve a
marriage contracted in due form, but that they dissolve a marriage
contracted "de facto" and not "de jure." Wherefore if an impediment
supervene after a marriage has been contracted in due form, it cannot
dissolve the marriage.
Reply to Objection 8: The impediments that hinder a good accidentally
are infinite in number, like all accidental causes. But the causes
which of their own nature corrupt a certain good are directed to that
effect, and determinate, even as are the causes which produce that
good; for the causes by which a thing is destroyed and those by which
it is made are either contrary to one another, or the same but taken in
a contrary way.
Reply to Objection 9: The conditions of particular persons taken
individually are infinite in number, but taken in general, they may be
reduced to a certain number; as instanced in medicine and all operative
arts, which consider the conditions of particular persons in whom acts
are.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF ERROR (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the impediments to matrimony in particular, and in
the first place the impediment of error. Under this head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether error of its very nature is an impediment to matrimony?
(2) What kind of error?
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Whether it is right to reckon error as an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that error should not be reckoned in itself
an impediment to marriage. For consent, which is the efficient cause of
marriage, is hindered in the same way as the voluntary. Now the
voluntary, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), may be
hindered by ignorance. But ignorance is not the same as error, because
ignorance excludes knowledge altogether, whereas error does not, since
"error is to approve the false as though it were true," according to
Augustine (De Trin. ix, 11). Therefore ignorance rather than error
should have been reckoned here as an impediment to marriage.
Objection 2: Further, that which of its very nature can be an
impediment to marriage is in opposition to the good of marriage. But
error is not a thing of this kind. Therefore error is not by its very
nature an impediment to marriage.
Objection 3: Further, just as consent is required for marriage, so is
intention required for baptism. Now if one were to baptize John,
thinking to baptize Peter, John would be baptized none the less.
Therefore error does not annul matrimony.
Objection 4: Further, there was true marriage between Lia and Jacob,
and yet, in this case, there was error. Therefore error does not annul
a marriage.
On the contrary, It is said in the Digests (Si per errorem, ff. De
jurisdic. omn. judic.): "What is more opposed to consent than error?"
Now consent is required for marriage. Therefore error is an impediment
to matrimony.
Further, consent denotes something voluntary. Now error is an obstacle
to the voluntary, since "the voluntary," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 1), Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius] (De Nat. Hom. xxxii), "is that which has its principle in
one who has knowledge of singulars which are the matter of actions."
But this does not apply to one who is in error. Therefore error is an
impediment to matrimony.
I answer that, Whatever hinders a cause, of its very nature hinders the
effect likewise. Now consent is the cause of matrimony, as stated above
([4956]Q[45], A[1]). Hence whatever voids the consent, voids marriage.
Now consent is an act of the will, presupposing an act of the
intellect; and if the first be lacking, the second must needs be
lacking also. Hence, when error hinders knowledge, there follows a
defect in the consent also, and consequently in the marriage. Therefore
it is possible according to the natural law for error to void marriage.
Reply to Objection 1: Speaking simply, ignorance differs from error,
because ignorance does not of its very nature imply an act of
knowledge, while error supposes a wrong judgment of reason about
something. However, as regards being an impediment to the voluntary, it
differs not whether we call it ignorance or error, since no ignorance
can be an impediment to the voluntary, unless it have error in
conjunction with it, because the will's act presupposes an estimate or
judgment about something which is the object of the will. Wherefore if
there be ignorance there must needs be error; and for this reason error
is set down as being the proximate cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Although error is not of itself contrary to
matrimony, it is contrary thereto as regards the cause of marriage.
Reply to Objection 3: The character of baptism is not caused directly
by the intention of the baptizer, but by the material element applied
outwardly; and the intention is effective only as directing the
material element to its effect; whereas the marriage tie is caused by
the consent directly. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 30) the
marriage between Lia and Jacob was effected not by their coming
together, which happened through an error, but by their consent, which
followed afterwards. Yet both are clearly to be excused from sin (Sent.
iv, D, 30).
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Whether every error is an impediment to matrimony?
Objection 1: It would seem that every error is an impediment to
matrimony, and not, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30), only error
about the condition or the person. For that which applies to a thing as
such applies to it in all its bearings. Now error is of its very nature
an impediment to matrimony, as stated above [4957](A[1]). Therefore
every error is an impediment to matrimony.
Objection 2: Further, if error, as such, is an impediment to matrimony,
the greater the error the greater the impediment. Now the error
concerning faith in a heretic who disbelieves in this sacrament is
greater than an error concerning the person. Therefore it should be a
greater impediment than error about the person.
Objection 3: Further, error does not void marriage except as removing
voluntariness. Now ignorance about any circumstance takes away
voluntariness (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore it is not only error about
condition or person that is an impediment to matrimony.
Objection 4: Further, just as the condition of slavery is an accident
affecting the person, so are bodily or mental qualities. But error
regarding the condition is an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error
concerning quality or fortune is equally an impediment.
Objection 5: Further, just as slavery or freedom pertains to the
condition of person, so do high and low rank, or dignity of position
and the lack thereof. Now error regarding the condition of slavery is
an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error about the other matters
mentioned is also an impediment.
Objection 6: Further, just as the condition of slavery is an
impediment, so are difference of worship and impotence, as we shall say
further on ([4958]Q[52], A[2];[4959] Q[58], A[1];[4960] Q[59], A[1]).
Therefore just as error regarding the condition is an impediment, so
also should error about those other matters be reckoned an impediment.
Objection 7: On the other hand, it would seem that not even error about
the person is an impediment to marriage. For marriage is a contract
even as a sale is. Now in buying and selling the sale is not voided if
one coin be given instead of another of equal value. Therefore a
marriage is not voided if one woman be taken instead of another.
Objection 8: Further, it is possible for them to remain in this error
for many years and to beget between them sons and daughters. But it
would be a grave assertion to maintain that they ought to be separated
then. Therefore their previous error did not void their marriage.
Objection 9: Further, it might happen that the woman is betrothed to
the brother of the man whom she thinks that she is consenting to marry,
and that she has had carnal intercourse with him; in which case,
seemingly, she cannot go back to the man to whom she thought to give
her consent, but should hold on to his brother. Thus error regarding
the person is not an impediment to marriage.
I answer that, Just as error, through causing involuntariness, is an
excuse from sin, so on the same count is it an impediment to marriage.
Now error does not excuse from sin unless it refer to a circumstance
the presence or absence of which makes an action lawful or unlawful.
For if a man were to strike his father with an iron rod thinking it to
be of wood, he is not excused from sin wholly, although perhaps in
part; but if a man were to strike his father, thinking to strike his
son to correct him, he is wholly excused provided he take due care.
Wherefore error, in order to void marriage, must needs be about the
essentials of marriage. Now marriage includes two things, namely the
two persons who are joined together, and the mutual power over one
another wherein marriage consists. The first of these is removed by
error concerning the person, the second by error regarding the
condition, since a slave cannot freely give power over his body to
another, without his master's consent. For this reason these two
errors, and no others, are an impediment to matrimony.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not from its generic nature that error is
an impediment to marriage, but from the nature of the difference added
thereto; namely from its being error about one of the essentials to
marriage.
Reply to Objection 2: An error of faith about matrimony is about things
consequent upon matrimony, for instance on the question of its being a
sacrament, or of its being lawful. Wherefore such error as these is no
impediment to marriage, as neither does an error about baptism hinder a
man from receiving the character, provided he intend to receive what
the Church gives, although he believe it to be nothing.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not any ignorance of a circumstance that
causes the involuntariness which is an excuse from sin, as stated
above; wherefore the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 4: Difference of fortune or of quality does not make
a difference in the essentials to matrimony, as the condition of
slavery does. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 5: Error about a person's rank, as such, does not
void a marriage, for the same reason as neither does error about a
personal quality. If, however, the error about a person's rank or
position amounts to an error about the person, it is an impediment to
matrimony. Hence, if the woman consent directly to this particular
person, her error about his rank does not void the marriage; but if she
intend directly to consent to marry the king's son, whoever he may be,
then, if another man than the king's son be brought to her, there is
error about the person, and the marriage will be void.
Reply to Objection 6: Error is an impediment to matrimony, although it
be about other impediments to marriage if it concern those things which
render a person an unlawful subject of marriage. But (the Master) does
not mention error about such things, because they are an impediment to
marriage whether there be error about them or not; so that if a woman
contract with a subdeacon, whether she know this or not, there is no
marriage; whereas the condition of slavery is no impediment if the
slavery be known. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 7: In contracts money is regarded as the measure of
other things (Ethic. v, 5), and not as being sought for its own sake.
Hence if the coin paid is not what it is thought to be but another of
equal value, this does not void the contract. But if there be error
about a thing sought for its own sake, the contract is voided, for
instance if one were to sell a donkey for a horse; and thus it is in
the case in point.
Reply to Objection 8: No matter how long they have cohabited, unless
she be willing to consent again, there is no marriage.
Reply to Objection 9: If she did not consent previously to marry his
brother, she may hold to the one whom she took in error. Nor can she
return to his brother, especially if there has been carnal intercourse
between her and the man she took to husband. If, however, she had
previously consented to take the first one in words of the present, she
cannot have the second while the first lives. But she may either leave
the second or return to the first; and ignorance of the fact excuses
her from sin, just as she would be excused if after the consummation of
the marriage a kinsman of her husband were to know her by fraud since
she is not to be blamed for the other's deceit.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF THE CONDITION OF SLAVERY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the impediment of the condition of slavery. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?
(2) Whether a slave can marry without his master's consent?
(3) Whether a man who is already married can make himself a slave
without his wife's consent?
(4) Whether the children should follow the condition of their father or
of their mother?
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Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?
Objection 1: It would seem that the condition of slavery is no
impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to marriage
except what is in some way opposed to it. But slavery is in no way
opposed to marriage, else there could be no marriage among slaves.
Therefore slavery is no impediment to marriage.
Objection 2: Further, that which is contrary to nature cannot be an
impediment to that which is according to nature. Now slavery is
contrary to nature, for as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), "it is
contrary to nature for man to wish to lord it over another man"; and
this is also evident from the fact that it was said of man (Gn. 1:26)
that he should "have dominion over the fishes of the sea," but not that
he should have dominion over man. Therefore it cannot be an impediment
to marriage, which is a natural thing.
Objection 3: Further, if it is an impediment, this is either of natural
law or of positive law. But it is not of natural law, since according
to natural law all men are equal, as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6),
while it is stated at the beginning of the Digests (Manumissiones, ff.
de just. et jure.) that slavery is not of natural law; and positive law
springs from the natural law, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Therefore,
according to law, slavery is not an impediment to any marriage.
Objection 4: Further, that which is an impediment to marriage is
equally an impediment whether it be known or not, as in the case of
consanguinity. Now the slavery of one party, if it be known to the
other, is no impediment to their marriage. Therefore slavery,
considered in itself, is unable to void a marriage; and consequently it
should not be reckoned by itself as a distinct impediment to marriage.
Objection 5: Further, just as one may be in error about slavery, so as
to deem a person free who is a slave, so may one be in error about
freedom, so as to deem a person a slave whereas he is free. But freedom
is not accounted an impediment to matrimony. Therefore neither should
slavery be so accounted.
Objection 7: Further, leprosy is a greater burden to the fellowship of
marriage and is a greater obstacle to the good of the offspring than
slavery is. Yet leprosy is not reckoned an impediment to marriage.
Therefore neither should slavery be so reckoned.
On the contrary, A Decretal says (De conjug. servorum, cap. Ad nostram)
that "error regarding the condition hinders a marriage from being
contracted and voids that which is already contracted."
Further, marriage is one of the goods that are sought for their own
sake, because it is qualified by honesty; whereas slavery is one of the
things to be avoided for their own sake. Therefore marriage and slavery
are contrary to one another; and consequently slavery is an impediment
to matrimony.
I answer that, In the marriage contract one party is bound to the other
in the matter of paying the debt; wherefore if one who thus binds
himself is unable to pay the debt, ignorance of this inability, on the
side of the party to whom he binds himself, voids the contract. Now
just as impotence in respect of coition makes a person unable to pay
the debt, so that he is altogether disabled, so slavery makes him
unable to pay it freely. Therefore, just as ignorance or impotence in
respect of coition is an impediment if not known but not if known, as
we shall state further on ([4961]Q[58]), so the condition of slavery is
an impediment if not known, but not if it be known.
Reply to Objection 1: Slavery is contrary to marriage as regards the
act to which marriage binds one party in relation to the other, because
it prevents the free execution of that act; and again as regards the
good of the offspring who become subject to the same condition by
reason of the parent's slavery. Since, however, it is free to everyone
to suffer detriment in that which is his due, if one of the parties
knows the other to be a slave, the marriage is none the less valid.
Likewise since in marriage there is an equal obligation on either side
to pay the debt, neither party can exact of the other a greater
obligation than that under which he lies; so that if a slave marry a
bondswoman, thinking her to be free, the marriage is not thereby
rendered invalid. It is therefore evident that slavery is no impediment
to marriage except when it is unknown to the other party, even though
the latter be in a condition of freedom; and so nothing prevents
marriage between slaves, or even between a freeman and a bondswoman.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents a thing being against nature as
to the first intention of nature, and yet not against nature as to its
second intention. Thus, as stated in De Coelo, ii, all corruption,
defect, and old age are contrary to nature, because nature intends
being and perfection, and yet they are not contrary to the second
intention of nature, because nature, through being unable to preserve
being in one thing, preserves it in another which is engendered of the
other's corruption. And when nature is unable to bring a thing to a
greater perfection it brings it to a lesser; thus when it cannot
produce a male it produces a female which is "a misbegotten male" (De
Gener. Animal. ii, 3). I say then in like manner that slavery is
contrary to the first intention of nature. Yet it is not contrary to
the second, because natural reason has this inclination, and nature has
this desire---that everyone should be good; but from the fact that a
person sins, nature has an inclination that he should be punished for
his sin, and thus slavery was brought in as a punishment of sin. Nor is
it unreasonable for a natural thing to be hindered by that which is
unnatural in this way; for thus is marriage hindered by impotence of
coition, which impotence is contrary to nature in the way mentioned.
Reply to Objection 3: The natural law requires punishment to be
inflicted for guilt, and that no one should be punished who is not
guilty; but the appointing of the punishment according to the
circumstances of person and guilt belongs to positive law. Hence
slavery which is a definite punishment is of positive law, and arises
out of natural law, as the determinate from that which is
indeterminate. And it arises from the determination of the same
positive law that slavery if unknown is an impediment to matrimony,
lest one who is not guilty be punished; for it is a punishment to the
wife to have a slave for husband, and "vice versa."
Reply to Objection 4: Certain impediments render a marriage unlawful;
and since it is not our will that makes a thing lawful or unlawful, but
the law to which our will ought to be subject, it follows that the
validity or invalidity of a marriage is not affected either by
ignorance (such as destroys voluntariness) of the impediment or by
knowledge thereof; and such an impediment is affinity or a vow, and
others of the same kind. other impediments, however, render a marriage
ineffectual as to the payment of the debt; and since it is within the
competency of our will to remit a debt that is due to us, it follows
that such impediments, if known, do not invalidate a marriage, but only
when ignorance of them destroys voluntariness. Such impediments are
slavery and impotence of coition. And, because they have of themselves
the nature of an impediment, they are reckoned as special impediments
besides error; whereas a change of person is not reckoned a special
impediment besides error, because the substitution of another person
has not the nature of an impediment except by reason of the intention
of one of the contracting parties.
Reply to Objection 5: Freedom does not hinder the marriage act,
wherefore ignorance of freedom is no impediment to matrimony.
Reply to Objection 6: Leprosy does not hinder marriage as to its first
act, since lepers can pay the debt freely; although they lay a burden
upon marriage as to its secondary effects; wherefore it is not an
impediment to marriage as slavery is.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a slave can marry without his master's consent?
Objection 1: It would seem that a slave cannot marry without his
master's consent. For no one can give a person that which is another's
without the latter's consent. Now a slave is his master's chattel.
Therefore he cannot give his wife power over his body by marrying
without his master's consent.
Objection 2: Further, a slave is bound to obey his master. But his
master may command him not to consent to marry. Therefore he cannot
marry without his consent.
Objection 3: Further, after marriage, a slave is bound even by a
precept of the Divine law to pay the debt to his wife. But at the time
that his wife asks for the debt his master may demand of him a service
which he will be unable to perform if he wish to occupy himself in
carnal intercourse. Therefore if a slave can marry without his master's
consent, the latter would be deprived of a service due to him without
any fault of his; and this ought not to be.
Objection 4: Further, a master may sell his slave into a foreign
country, where the latter's wife is unable to follow him, through
either bodily weakness, or imminent danger to her faith; for instance
if he be sold to unbelievers, or if her master be unwilling, supposing
her to be a bondswoman; and thus the marriage will be dissolved, which
is unfitting. Therefore a slave cannot marry without his master's
consent.
Objection 5: Further, the burden under which a man binds himself to the
Divine service is more advantageous than that whereby a man subjects
himself to his wife. But a slave cannot enter religion or receive
orders without his master's consent. Much less therefore can he be
married without his consent.
On the contrary, "In Christ Jesus . . . there is neither bond nor free"
(Gal. 3:26, 28). Therefore both freeman and bondsman enjoy the same
liberty to marry in the faith of Christ Jesus.
Further, slavery is of positive law; whereas marriage is of natural and
Divine law. Since then positive law is not prejudicial to the natural
or the Divine law, it would seem that a slave can marry without his
master's consent.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), the positive law arises
out of the natural law, and consequently slavery, which is of positive
law, cannot be prejudicious to those things that are of natural law.
Now just as nature seeks the preservation of the individual, so does it
seek the preservation of the species by means of procreation; wherefore
even as a slave is not so subject to his master as not to be at liberty
to eat, sleep, and do such things as pertain to the needs of his body,
and without which nature cannot be preserved, so he is not subject to
him to the extent of being unable to marry freely, even without his
master's knowledge or consent.
Reply to Objection 1: A slave is his master's chattel in matters
superadded to nature, but in natural things all are equal. Wherefore,
in things pertaining to natural acts, a slave can by marrying give
another person power over his body without his master's consent.
Reply to Objection 2: A slave is bound to obey his master in those
things which his master can command lawfully; and just as his master
cannot lawfully command him not to eat or sleep, so neither can he
lawfully command him to refrain from marrying. For it is the concern of
the lawgiver how each one uses his own, and consequently if the master
command his slave not to marry, the slave is not bound to obey his
master.
Reply to Objection 3: If a slave has married with his master's consent,
he should omit the service commanded by his master and pay the debt to
his wife; because the master, by consenting to his slave's marriage,
implicitly consented to all that marriage requires. If, however, the
marriage was contracted without the master's knowledge or consent, he
is not bound to pay the debt, but in preference to obey his master, if
the two things are incompatible. Nevertheless in such matters there are
many particulars to be considered, as in all human acts, namely the
danger to which his wife's chastity is exposed, and the obstacle which
the payment of the debt places in the way of the service commanded, and
other like considerations, all of which being duly weighed it will be
possible to judge which of the two in preference the slave is bound to
obey, his master or his wife.
Reply to Objection 4: In such a case it is said that the master should
be compelled not to sell the slave in such a way as to increase the
weight of the marriage burden, especially since he is able to obtain
anywhere a just price for his slave.
Reply to Objection 5: By entering religion or receiving orders a man is
bound to the Divine service for all time; whereas a husband is bound to
pay the debt to his wife not always, but at a fitting time; hence the
comparison fails. Moreover, he who enters religion or receives orders
binds himself to works that are superadded to natural works, and in
which his master has power over him, but not in natural works to which
a man binds himself by marriage. Hence he cannot vow continence without
his master's consent.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether slavery can supervene to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that slavery cannot supervene to marriage,
by the husband selling himself to another as slave. Because what is
done by fraud and to another's detriment should not hold. But a husband
who sells himself for a slave, does so sometimes to cheat marriage, and
at least to the detriment of his wife. Therefore such a sale should not
hold as to the effect of slavery.
Objection 2: Further, two favorable things outweigh one that is not
favorable. Now marriage and freedom are favorable things and are
contrary to slavery, which in law is not a favorable thing. Therefore
such a slavery ought to be entirely annulled in marriage.
Objection 3: Further, in marriage husband and wife are on a par with
one another. Now the wife cannot surrender herself to be a slave
without her husband's consent. Therefore neither can the husband
without his wife's consent.
Objection 4: Further, in natural things that which hinders a thing
being generated destroys it after it has been generated. Now bondage of
the husband, if unknown to the wife, is an impediment to the act of
marriage before it is performed. Therefore if it could supervene to
marriage it would dissolve it; which is unreasonable.
On the contrary, Everyone can give another that which is his own. Now
the husband is his own master since he is free. Therefore he can
surrender his right to another.
Further, a slave can marry without his master's consent, as stated
above [4962](A[2]). Therefore a husband can in like manner subject
himself to a master, without his wife's consent.
I answer that, A husband is subject to his wife in those things which
pertain to the act of nature; in these things they are equal, and the
subjection of slavery does not extend thereto. Wherefore the husband,
without his wife's knowledge, can surrender himself to be another's
slave. Nor does this result in a dissolution of the marriage, since no
impediment supervening to marriage can dissolve it, as stated above
([4963]Q[50], A[1], ad 7).
Reply to Objection 1: The fraud can indeed hurt the person who has
acted fraudulently, but it cannot be prejudicial to another person:
wherefore if the husband, to cheat his wife, surrender himself to be
another's slave, It will be to his own prejudice, through his losing
the inestimable good of freedom; whereas this can nowise be prejudicial
to the wife, and he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks, and to
do all that marriage requires of him for he cannot be taken away from
these obligations by his master's command.
Reply to Objection 2: In so far as slavery is opposed to marriage,
marriage is prejudicial to slavery, since the slave is bound then to
pay the debt to his wife, though his master be unwilling.
Reply to Objection 3: Although husband and wife are considered to be on
a par in the marriage act and in things relating to nature, to which
the condition of slavery does not extend, nevertheless as regards the
management of the household, and other such additional matters the
husband is the head of the wife and should correct her, and not "vice
versa." Hence the wife cannot surrender herself to be a slave without
her husband's consent.
Reply to Objection 4: This argument considers corruptible things; and
yet even in these there are many obstacles to generation that are not
capable of destroying what is already generated. But in things which
have stability it is possible to have an impediment which prevents a
certain thing from beginning to be, yet does not cause it to cease to
be; as instanced by the rational soul. It is the same with marriage,
which is a lasting tie so long as this life lasts.
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Whether children should follow the condition of their father?
Objection 1: It would seem that children should follow the condition of
their father. Because dominion belongs to those of higher rank. Now in
generating the father ranks above the mother. Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, the being of a thing depends on the form more
than on the matter. Now in generation the father gives the form, and
the mother the matter (De Gener. Animal. ii, 4). Therefore the child
should follow the condition of the father rather than of the mother.
Objection 3: Further, a thing should follow that chiefly to which it is
most like. Now the son is more like the father than the mother, even as
the daughter is more like the mother. Therefore at least the son should
follow the father in preference, and the daughter the mother.
Objection 4: Further, in Holy Writ genealogies are not traced through
the women but through the men. Therefore the children follow the father
rather than the mother.
On the contrary, If a man sows on another's land, the produce belongs
to the owner of the land. Now the woman's womb in relation to the seed
of man is like the land in relation to the sower. Therefore, etc.
Further, we observe that in animals born from different species the
offspring follows the mother rather that the father, wherefore mules
born of a mare and an ass are more like mares than those born of a
she-ass and a horse. Therefore it should be the same with men.
I answer that, According to civil law (XIX, ff. De statu hom. vii, cap.
De rei vendit.) the offspring follows the womb: and this is reasonable
since the offspring derives its formal complement from the father, but
the substance of the body from the mother. Now slavery is a condition
of the body, since a slave is to the master a kind of instrument in
working; wherefore children follow the mother in freedom and bondage;
whereas in matters pertaining to dignity as proceeding from a thing's
form, they follow the father, for instance in honors, franchise,
inheritance and so forth. The canons are in agreement with this (cap.
Liberi, 32, qu. iv, in gloss.: cap. Inducens, De natis ex libero
ventre) as also the law of Moses (Ex. 21).
In some countries, however, where the civil law does not hold, the
offspring follows the inferior condition, so that if the father be a
slave the children will be slaves although the mother be free; but not
if the father gave himself up as a slave after his marriage and without
his wife's consent; and the same applies if the case be reversed. And
if both be of servile condition and belong to different masters, the
children, if several, are divided among the latter, or if one only, the
one master will compensate the other in value and will take the child
thus born for his slave. However it is incredible that this custom have
as much reason in its favor as the decision of the time-honored
deliberations of many wise men. Moreover in natural things it is the
rule that what is received is in the recipient according to the mode of
the recipient and not according to the mode of the giver; wherefore it
is reasonable that the seed received by the mother should be drawn to
her condition.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the father is a more noble principle
than the mother, nevertheless the mother provides the substance of the
body, and it is to this that the condition of slavery attaches.
Reply to Objection 2: As regards things pertaining to the specific
nature the son is like the father rather than the mother, but in
material conditions should be like the mother rather than the father,
since a thing has its specific being from its form, but material
conditions from matter.
Reply to Objection 3: The son is like the father in respect of the form
which is his, and also the father's, complement. Hence the argument is
not to the point.
Reply to Objection 4: It is because the son derives honor from his
father rather than from his mother that in the genealogies of
Scripture, and according to common custom, children are named after
their father rather than from their mother. But in matters relating to
slavery they follow the mother by preference.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF VOWS AND ORDERS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the impediment of vows and orders. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a simple vow is a diriment impediment to matrimony?
(2) Whether a solemn vow is a diriment impediment?
(3) Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?
(4) Whether a man can receive a sacred order after being married?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether marriage already contracted should be annulled by the obligation of
a simple vow?
Objection 1: It would seem that a marriage already contracted ought to
be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow. For the stronger tie
takes precedence of the weaker. Now a vow is a stronger tie than
marriage, since the latter binds man to man, but the former binds man
to God. Therefore the obligation of a vow takes precedence of the
marriage tie.
Objection 2: Further, God's commandment is no less binding than the
commandment of the Church. Now the commandment of the Church is so
binding that a marriage is void if contracted in despite thereof; as
instanced in the case of those who marry within the degrees of kindred
forbidden by the Church. Therefore, since it is a Divine commandment to
keep a vow, it would seem that if a person marry in despite of a vow
his marriage should be annulled for that reason.
Objection 3: Further, in marriage a man may have carnal intercourse
without sin. Yet he who has taken a simple vow of chastity can never
have carnal intercourse with his wife without sin. Therefore a simple
vow annuls marriage. The minor is proved as follows. It is clear that
it is a mortal sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence,
since according to Jerome [*Cf. St. Augustine, De Bono Viduit, ix] "for
those who vow virginity it is damnable not only to marry, but even to
wish to marry." Now the marriage contract is not contrary to the vow of
continence, except by reason of carnal intercourse: and therefore he
sins mortally the first time he has intercourse with his wife, and for
the same reason every other time, because a sin committed in the first
instance cannot be an excuse for a subsequent sin.
Objection 4: Further, husband and wife should be equal in marriage,
especially as regards carnal intercourse. But he who has taken a simple
vow of continence can never ask for the debt without a sin, for this is
clearly against his vow of continence, since he is bound to continence
by vow. Therefore neither can he pay the debt without sin.
On the contrary, Pope Clement [*Alexander III] says (cap. Consuluit, De
his qui cler. vel vovent.) that a "simple vow is an impediment to the
contract of marriage, but does not annul it after it is contracted."
I answer that, A thing ceases to be in one man's power from the fact
that it passes into the power of another. Now the promise of a thing
does not transfer it into the power of the person to whom it is
promised, wherefore a thing does not cease to be in a person's power
for the reason that he has promised it. Since then a simple vow
contains merely a simple promise of one's body to the effect of keeping
continence for God's sake, a man still retains power over his own body
after a simple vow, and consequently can surrender it to another,
namely his wife; and in this surrender consists the sacrament of
matrimony, which is indissoluble. Therefore although a simple vow is an
impediment to the contracting of a marriage, since it is a sin to marry
after taking a simple vow of continence, yet since the contract is
valid, the marriage cannot be annulled on that account.
Reply to Objection 1: A vow is a stronger tie than matrimony, as
regards that to which man is tied, and the obligation under which he
lies. because by marriage a man is tied to his wife, with the
obligation of paying the debt, whereas by a vow a man is tied to God,
with the obligation of remaining continent. But as to the manner in
which he is tied marriage is a stronger tie than a simple vow, since by
marriage a man surrenders himself actually to the power of his wife,
but not by a simple vow as explained above: and the possessor is always
in the stronger position. In this respect a simple vow binds in the
same way as a betrothal; wherefore a betrothal must be annulled on
account of a simple vow.
Reply to Objection 2: The contracting of a marriage between blood
relations is annulled by the commandment forbidding such marriages, not
precisely because it is a commandment of God or of the Church, but
because it makes it impossible for the body of a kinswoman to be
transferred into the power of her kinsman: whereas the commandment
forbidding marriage after a simple vow has not this effect, as already
stated. Hence the argument is void for it assigns as a cause that which
is not cause.
Reply to Objection 3: If after taking a simple vow a man contract
marriage by words of the present, he cannot know his wife without
mortal sin, because until the marriage is consummated he is still in a
position to fulfill the vow of continence. But after the marriage has
been consummated, thenceforth through his fault it is unlawful for him
not to pay the debt when his wife asks: wherefore this is not covered
by his obligation to his vow, as explained above (ad 1). Nevertheless
he should atone for not keeping continence, by his tears of repentance.
Reply to Objection 4: After contracting marriage he is still bound to
keep his vow of continence in those matters wherein he is not rendered
unable to do so. Hence if his wife die he is bound to continence
altogether. And since the marriage tie does not bind him to ask for the
debt, he cannot ask for it without sin, although he can pay the debt
without sin on being asked, when once he has incurred this obligation
through the carnal intercourse that has already occurred. And this
holds whether the wife ask expressly or interpretively, as when she is
ashamed and her husband feels that she desires him to pay the debt, for
then he may pay it without sin. This is especially the case if he fears
to endanger her chastity: nor does it matter that they are equal in the
marriage act, since everyone may renounce what is his own. Some say,
however, that he may both ask and pay lest the marriage become too
burdensome to the wife who has always to ask; but if this be looked
into aright, it is the same as asking interpretively.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted?
Objection 1: It would seem that not even a solemn vow dissolves a
marriage already contracted. For according to a Decretal (cap. Rursus,
De his qui cler. vel vovent.) "in God's sight a simple vow is no less
binding than a solemn one." Now marriage stands or falls by virtue of
the Divine acceptance. Therefore since a simple vow does not dissolve
marriage, neither will a solemn vow dissolve it.
Objection 2: Further, a solemn vow does not add the same force to a
simple vow as an oath does. Now a simple vow, even though an oath be
added thereto, does not dissolve a marriage already contracted. Neither
therefore does a solemn vow.
Objection 3: Further, a solemn vow has nothing that a simple vow cannot
have. For a simple vow may give rise to scandal since it may be public,
even as a solemn vow. Again the Church could and should ordain that a
simple vow dissolves a marriage already contracted, so that many sins
may be avoided. Therefore for the same reason that a simple vow does
not dissolve a marriage already contracted, neither should a solemn vow
dissolve it.
On the contrary, He who takes a solemn vow contracts a spiritual
marriage with God, which is much more excellent than a material
marriage. Now a material marriage already contracted annuls a marriage
contracted afterwards. Therefore a solemn vow does also.
Further, the same conclusion may be proved by many authorities quoted
in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).
I answer that, All agree that as a solemn vow is an impediment to the
contracting of marriage, so it invalidates the contract. Some assign
scandal as the reason. But this is futile, because even a simple vow
sometimes leads to scandal since it is at times somewhat public.
Moreover the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the truth of life
[*Cf. [4964]FP, Q[16], A[4], ad 3; [4965]FP, Q[21], A[2], ad 2;
[4966]SS, Q[109], A[3], ad 3], which truth is not to be set aside on
account of scandal. Wherefore others say that it is on account of the
ordinance of the Church. But this again is insufficient, since in that
case the Church might decide the contrary, which is seemingly untrue.
Wherefore we must say with others that a solemn vow of its very nature
dissolves the marriage contract, inasmuch namely as thereby a man has
lost the power over his own body, through surrendering it to God for
the purpose of perpetual continence. Wherefore he is unable to
surrender it to the power of a wife by contracting marriage. And since
the marriage that follows such a vow is void, a vow of this kind is
said to annul the marriage contracted.
Reply to Objection 1: A simple vow is said to be no less binding in
God's sight than a solemn vow, in matters pertaining to God, for
instance the separation from God by mortal sin, because he who breaks a
simple vow commits a mortal sin just as one who breaks a solemn vow,
although it is more grievous to break a solemn vow, so that the
comparison be understood as to the genus and not as to the definite
degree of guilt. But as regards marriage, whereby one man is under an
obligation to another, there is no need for it to be of equal
obligation even in general, since a solemn vow binds to certain things
to which a simple vow does not bind.
Reply to Objection 2: An oath is more binding than a vow on the part of
the cause of the obligation: but a solemn vow is more binding as to the
manner in which it binds, in so far as it is an actual surrender of
that which is promised; while an oath does not do this actually. Hence
the conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 3: A solemn vow implies the actual surrender of
one's body, whereas a simple vow does not, as stated above
[4967](A[1]). Hence the argument does not suffice to prove the
conclusion.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?
Objection 1: It would seem that order is not an impediment to
matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to a thing except its contrary.
But order is not contrary to matrimony. Therefore it is not an
impediment thereto.
Objection 2: Further, orders are the same with us as with the Eastern
Church. But they are not an impediment to matrimony in the Eastern
Church. Therefore, etc.
Objection 3: Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the
Church. Now this is most fittingly signified in those who are Christ's
ministers, those namely who are ordained. Therefore order is not an
impediment to matrimony.
Objection 4: Further, all the orders are directed to spiritual things.
Now order cannot be an impediment to matrimony except by reason of its
spirituality. Therefore if order is an impediment to matrimony, every
order will be an impediment, and this is untrue.
Objection 5: Further, every ordained person can have ecclesiastical
benefices, and can enjoy equally the privilege of clergy. If,
therefore, orders are an impediment to marriage, because married
persons cannot have an ecclesiastical benefice, nor enjoy the privilege
of clergy, as jurists assert (cap. Joannes et seqq., De cler. conjug.),
then every order ought to be an impediment. Yet this is false, as shown
by the Decretal of Alexander III (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis): and
consequently it would seem that no order is an impediment to marriage.
On the contrary, the Decretal says (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis):
"any person whom you shall find to have taken a wife after receiving
the subdiaconate or the higher orders, you shall compel to put his wife
away." But this would not be so if the marriage were valid.
Further, no person who has vowed continence can contract marriage. Now
some orders have a vow of continence connected with them, as appears
from the text (Sent. iv, D, 37). Therefore in that case order is an
impediment to matrimony.
I answer that, By a certain fittingness the very nature of holy order
requires that it should be an impediment to marriage: because those who
are in holy orders handle the sacred vessels and the sacraments:
wherefore it is becoming that they keep their bodies clean by
continence [*Cf. Is. 52:11]. But it is owing to the Church's ordinance
that it is actually an impediment to marriage. However it is not the
same with the Latins as with the Greeks; since with the Greeks it is an
impediment to the contracting of marriage, solely by virtue of order;
whereas with the Latins it is an impediment by virtue of order, and
besides by virtue of the vow of continence which is annexed to the
sacred orders; for although this vow is not expressed in words,
nevertheless a person is understood to have taken it by the very fact
of his being ordained. Hence among the Greeks and other Eastern peoples
a sacred order is an impediment to the contracting of matrimony but it
does not forbid the use of marriage already contracted: for they can
use marriage contracted previously, although they cannot be married
again. But in the Western Church it is an impediment both to marriage
and to the use of marriage, unless perhaps the husband should receive a
sacred order without the knowledge or consent of his wife, because this
cannot be prejudicial to her.
Of the distinction between sacred and non-sacred orders now and in the
early Church we have spoken above ([4968]Q[37], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: Although a sacred order is not contrary to
matrimony as a sacrament, it has a certain incompatibility with
marriage in respect of the latter's act which is an obstacle to
spiritual acts.
Reply to Objection 2: The objection is based on a false statement:
since order is everywhere an impediment to the contracting of marriage,
although it has not everywhere a vow annexed to it.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who are in sacred orders signify Christ by
more sublime actions, as appears from what has been said in the
treatise on orders ([4969]Q[37], AA[2],4), than those who are married.
Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 4: Those who are in minor orders are not forbidden
to marry by virtue of their order; for although those orders are
entrusted with certain spiritualities, they are not admitted to the
immediate handling of sacred things, as those are who are in sacred
orders. But according to the laws of the Western Church, the use of
marriage is an impediment to the exercise of a non-sacred order, for
the sake of maintaining a greater honesty in the offices of the Church.
And since the holding of an ecclesiastical benefice binds a man to the
exercise of his order, and since for this very reason he enjoys the
privilege of clergy, it follows that in the Latin Church this privilege
is forfeit to a married cleric.
This suffices for the Reply to the last Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sacred order cannot supervene to
matrimony. For the stronger prejudices the weaker. Now a spiritual
obligation is stronger than a bodily tie. Therefore if a married man be
ordained, this will prejudice the wife, so that she will be unable to
demand the debt, since order is a spiritual, and marriage a bodily
bond. Hence it would seem that a man cannot receive a sacred order
after consummating marriage.
Objection 2: Further, after consummating the marriage, one of the
parties cannot vow continence without the other's consent [*Cf.[4970]
Q[61], A[1]]. Now a sacred order has a vow of continence annexed to it.
Therefore if the husband be ordained without his wife's consent, she
will be bound to remain continent against her will, since she cannot
marry another man during her husband's lifetime.
Objection 3: Further, a husband may not even for a time devote himself
to prayer without his wife's consent (1 Cor. 7:5). But in the Eastern
Church those who are in sacred orders are bound to continence for the
time when they exercise their office. Therefore neither may they be
ordained without their wife's consent, and much less may the Latins.
Objection 4: Further, husband and wife are on a par with one another.
Now a Greek priest cannot marry again after his wife's death. Therefore
neither can his wife after her husband's death. But she cannot be
deprived by her husband's act of the right to marry after his death.
Therefore her husband cannot receive orders after marriage.
Objection 5: Further, order is as much opposed to marriage as marriage
to order. Now a previous order is an impediment to a subsequent
marriage. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, Religious are bound to continence like those who are
in sacred orders. But a man may enter religion after marriage, if his
wife die, or if she consent. Therefore he can also receive orders.
Further, a man may become a man's bondsman after marriage. Therefore he
can become a bondsman of God by receiving orders.
I answer that, Marriage is not an impediment to the receiving of sacred
orders, since if a married man receive sacred orders, even though his
wife be unwilling, he receives the character of order: but he lacks the
exercise of his order. If, however, his wife consent, or if she be
dead, he receives both the order and the exercise.
Reply to Objection 1: The bond of orders dissolves the bond of marriage
as regards the payment of the debt, in respect of which it is
incompatible with marriage, on the part of the person ordained, since
he cannot demand the debt, nor is the wife bound to pay it. But it does
not dissolve the bond in respect of the other party, since the husband
is bound to pay the debt to the wife if he cannot persuade her to
observe continence.
Reply to Objection 2: If the husband receive sacred orders with the
knowledge and consent of his wife, she is bound to vow perpetual
continence, but she is not bound to enter religion, if she has no fear
of her chastity being endangered through her husband having taken a
solemn vow: it would have been different, however, if he had taken a
simple vow. On the other hand, if he be ordained without her consent,
she is not bound in this way, because the result is not prejudicial to
her in any way.
Reply to Objection 3: It would seem more probable, although some say
the contrary, that even a Greek ought not to receive sacred orders
without his wife's consent, since at least at the time of his ministry
she would be deprived of the payment of the debt, of which she cannot
be deprived according to law if the husband should have been ordained
without her consent or knowledge.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated, among the Greeks the wife, by the very
fact of consenting to her husband's receiving a sacred order, binds
herself never to marry another man, because the signification of
marriage would not be safeguarded, and this is especially required in
the marriage of a priest. If, however, he be ordained without her
consent, seemingly she would not be under that obligation.
Reply to Objection 5: Marriage has for its cause our consent: not so
order, which has a sacramental cause appointed by God. Hence matrimony
may be impeded by a previous order; so as not to be true marriage:
whereas order cannot be impeded by marriage, so as not to be true
order, because the power of the sacraments is unchangeable, whereas
human acts can be impeded.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF CONSANGUINITY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the impediment of consanguinity. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether consanguinity is rightly defined by some?
(2) Whether it is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?
(3) Whether certain degrees are by natural law an impediment to
marriage?
(4) Whether the impediment degrees can be fixed by the ordinance of the
Church?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether consanguinity is rightly defined?
Objection 1: It would seem that consanguinity is unsuitably defined by
some as follows: "Consanguinity is the tie contracted between persons
descending from the same common ancestor by carnal procreation." For
all men descend from the same common ancestor, namely Adam, by carnal
procreation. Therefore if the above definition of consanguinity is
right, all men would be related by consanguinity: which is false.
Objection 2: Further, a tie is only between things in accord with one
another, since a tie unites. Now there is not greater accordance
between persons descended from a common ancestor than there is between
other men, since they accord in species but differ in number, just as
other men do. Therefore consanguinity is not a tie.
Objection 3: Further, carnal procreation, according to the Philosopher
(De Gener. Anim. ii, 19), is effected from the surplus food [*Cf.
[4971]FP, Q[119], A[2]]. Now this surplus has more in common with that
which is eaten, since it agrees with it in substance, than with him who
eats. Since then no tie of consanguinity arises between the person born
of semen and that which he eats, neither will there be any tie of
kindred between him and the person of whom he is born by carnal
procreation.
Objection 4: Further, Laban said to Jacob (Gn. 29:14): "Thou art my
bone and my flesh," on account of the relationship between them.
Therefore such a kinship should be called flesh-relationship rather
than blood-relationship [consanguinitas].
Objection 5: Further, carnal procreation is common to men and animals.
But no tie of consanguinity is contracted among animals from carnal
procreation. Therefore neither is there among men.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11, 12) "all
friendship is based on some kind of fellowship." And since friendship
is a knot or union, it follows that the fellowship which is the cause
of friendship is called "a tie." Wherefore in respect of any kind of a
fellowship certain persons are denominated as though they were tied
together: thus we speak of fellow-citizens who are connected by a
common political life, of fellow-soldiers who are connected by the
common business of soldiering, and in the same way those who are
connected by the fellowship of nature are said to be tied by blood
[consanguinei]. Hence in the above definition "tie" is included as
being the genus of consanguinity; the "persons descending from the same
common ancestor," who are thus tied together are the subject of this
tie. while "carnal procreation" is mentioned as being its origin.
Reply to Objection 1: An active force is not received into an
instrument in the same degree of perfection as it has in the principal
agent. And since every moved mover is an instrument, it follows that
the power of the first mover in a particular genus when drawn out
through many mediate movers fails at length, and reaches something that
is moved and not a mover. But the power of a begetter moves not only as
to that which belongs to the species, but also as to that which belongs
to the individual, by reason of which the child is like the parent even
in accidentals and not only in the specific nature. And yet this
individual power of the father is not so perfect in the son as it was
in the father, and still less so in the grandson, and thus it goes on
failing: so that at length it ceases and can go no further. Since then
consanguinity results from this power being communicated to many
through being conveyed to them from one person by procreation, it
destroys itself by little and little, as Isidore says (Etym. ix).
Consequently in defining consanguinity we must not take a remote common
ancestor but the nearest, whose power still remains in those who are
descended from him.
Reply to Objection 2: It is clear from what has been said that blood
relations agree not only in the specific nature but also in that power
peculiar to the individual which is conveyed from one to many: the
result being that sometimes the child is not only like his father, but
also his grandfather or his remote ancestors (De Gener. Anim. iv, 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Likeness depends more on form whereby a thing is
actually, than on matter whereby a thing is potentially: for instance,
charcoal has more in common with fire than with the tree from which the
wood was cut. In like manner food already transformed by the nutritive
power into the substance of the person fed has more in common with the
subject nourished than with that from which the nourishment was taken.
The argument however would hold according to the opinion of those who
asserted that the whole nature of a thing is from its matter and that
all forms are accidents: which is false.
Reply to Objection 4: It is the blood that is proximately changed into
the semen, as proved in De Gener. Anim. i, 18. Hence the tie contracted
by carnal procreation is more fittingly called blood-relationship than
flesh-relationship. That sometimes one relation is called the flesh of
another, is because the blood which is transformed into the man's seed
or into the menstrual fluid is potentially flesh and bone.
Reply to Objection 5: Some say that the reason why the tie of
consanguinity is contracted among men through carnal procreation, and
not among other animals, is because whatever belongs to the truth of
human nature in all men was in our first parent: which does not apply
to other animals. But according to this, matrimonial consanguinity
would never come to an end. However the above theory was disproved in
the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30: [4972]FP, Q[119], A[1]). Wherefore we
must reply that the reason for this is that animals are not united
together in the union of friendship through the begetting of many from
one proximate parent, as is the case with men, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether consanguinity is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?
Objection 1: It would seem that consanguinity is unfittingly
distinguished by degrees and lines. For a line of consanguinity is
described as "the ordered series of persons related by blood, and
descending from a common ancestor in various degrees." Now
consanguinity is nothing else but a series of such persons. Therefore a
line of consanguinity is the same as consanguinity. Now a thing ought
not to be distinguished by itself. Therefore consanguinity is not
fittingly distinguished into lines.
Objection 2: Further, that by which a common thing is divided should
not be placed in the definition of that common thing. Now descent is
placed in the above definition of consanguinity. Therefore
consanguinity cannot be divided into ascending, descending and
collateral lines.
Objection 3: Further, a line is defined as being between two points.
But two points make but one degree. Therefore one line has but one
degree, and for this reason it would seem that consanguinity should not
be divided into lines and degrees.
Objection 4: Further, a degree is defined as "the relation between
distant persons, whereby is known the distance between them." Now since
consanguinity is a kind of propinquity, distance between persons is
opposed to consanguinity rather than a part thereof.
Objection 5: Further, if consanguinity is distinguished and known by
its degrees, those who are in the same degree ought to be equally
related. But this is false since a man's great-uncle and great-nephew
are in the same degree, and yet they are not equally related according
to a Decretal (cap. Porro; cap. Parenteloe, 35, qu. v). Therefore
consanguinity is not rightly divided into degrees.
Objection 6: Further, in ordinary things a different degree results
from the addition of one thing to another, even as every additional
unity makes a different species of number. Yet the addition of one
person to another does not always make a different degree of
consanguinity, since father and uncle are in the same degree of
consanguinity, for they are side by side. Therefore consanguinity is
not rightly divided into degrees.
Objection 7: Further, if two persons be akin to one another there is
always the same measure of kinship between them, since the distance
from one extreme to the other is the same either way. Yet the degrees
of consanguinity are not always the same on either side, since
sometimes one relative is in the third and the other in the fourth
degree. Therefore the measure of consanguinity cannot be sufficiently
known by its degrees.
I answer that, Consanguinity as stated [4973](A[1]) is a certain
propinquity based on the natural communication by the act of
procreation whereby nature is propagated. Wherefore according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) this communication is threefold. one
corresponds to the relationship between cause and effect, and this is
the consanguinity of father to son, wherefore he says that "parents
love their children as being a part of themselves." Another corresponds
to the relation of effect to cause, and this is the consanguinity of
son to father, wherefore he says that "children love their parents as
being themselves something which owes its existence to them." The third
corresponds to the mutual relation between things that come from the
same cause, as brothers, "who are born of the same parents," as he
again says (Ethic. viii, 12). And since the movement of a point makes a
line, and since a father by procreation may be said to descend to his
son, hence it is that corresponding to these three relationships there
are three lines of consanguinity, namely the "descending" line
corresponding to the first relationship, the "ascending" line
corresponding to the second, and the "collateral" line corresponding to
the third. Since however the movement of propagation does not rest in
one term but continues beyond, the result is that one can point to the
father's father and to the son's son, and so on, and according to the
various steps we take we find various degrees in one line. And seeing
that the degrees of a thing are parts of that thing, there cannot be
degrees of propinquity where there is no propinquity. Consequently
identity and too great a distance do away with degrees of
consanguinity; since no man is kin to himself any more than he is like
himself: for which reason there is no degree of consanguinity where
there is but one person, but only when one person is compared to
another.
Nevertheless there are different ways of counting the degrees in
various lines. For the degree of consanguinity in the ascending and
descending line is contracted from the fact that one of the parties
whose consanguinity is in question, is descended from the other.
Wherefore according to the canonical as well as the legal reckoning,
the person who occupies the first place, whether in the ascending or in
the descending line, is distant from a certain one, say Peter, in the
first degree---for instance father and son; while the one who occupies
the second place in either direction is distant in the second degree,
for instance grandfather, grandson and so on. But the consanguinity
that exists between persons who are in collateral lines is contracted
not through one being descended from the other, but through both being
descended from one: wherefore the degrees of consanguinity in this line
must be reckoned in relation to the one principle whence it arises.
Here, however, the canonical and legal reckonings differ: for the legal
reckoning takes into account the descent from the common stock on both
sides, whereas the canonical reckoning takes into account only one,
that namely on which the greater number of degrees are found. Hence
according to the legal reckoning brother and sister, or two brothers,
are related in the second degree, because each is separated from the
common stock by one degree; and in like manner the children of two
brothers are distant from one another in the fourth degree. But
according to the canonical reckoning, two brothers are related in the
first degree, since neither is distant more than one degree from the
common stock: but the children of one brother are distant in the second
degree from the other brother, because they are at that distance from
the common stock. Hence, according to the canonical reckoning, by
whatever degree a person is distant from some higher degree, by so much
and never by less is he distant from each person descending from that
degree, because "the cause of a thing being so is yet more so."
Wherefore although the other descendants from the common stock be
related to some person on account of his being descended from the
common stock, these descendants of the other branch cannot be more
nearly related to him than he is to the common stock. Sometimes,
however, a person is more distantly related to a descendant from the
common stock, than he himself is to the common stock, because this
other person may be more distantly related to the common stock than he
is: and consanguinity must be reckoned according to the more distant
degree.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection is based on a false premise: for
consanguinity is not the series but a mutual relationship existing
between certain persons, the series of whom forms a line of
consanguinity.
Reply to Objection 2: Descent taken in a general sense attaches to
every line of consanguinity, because carnal procreation whence the tie
of consanguinity arises is a kind of descent: but it is a particular
kind of descent, namely from the person whose consanguinity is in
question, that makes the descending line.
Reply to Objection 3: A line may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is
taken properly for the dimension itself that is the first species of
continuous quantity: and thus a straight line contains actually but two
points which terminate it, but infinite points potentially, any one of
which being actually designated, the line is divided, and becomes two
lines. But sometimes a line designates things which are arranged in a
line, and thus we have line and figure in numbers, in so far as unity
added to unity involves number. Thus every unity added makes a degree
in a particular line: and it is the same with the line of
consanguinity: wherefore one line contains several degrees.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as there cannot be likeness without a
difference, so there is no propinquity without distance. Hence not
every distance is opposed to consanguinity, but such as excludes the
propinquity of blood-relationship.
Reply to Objection 5: Even as whiteness is said to be greater in two
ways, in one way through intensity of the quality itself, in another
way through the quantity of the surface, so consanguinity is said to be
greater or lesser in two ways. First, intensively by reason of the very
nature of consanguinity: secondly, extensively as it were, and thus the
degree of consanguinity is measured by the persons between whom there
is the propagation of a common blood, and in this way the degrees of
consanguinity are distinguished. Wherefore it happens that of two
persons related to one person in the same degree of consanguinity, one
is more akin to him than the other, if we consider the quantity of
consanguinity in the first way: thus a man's father and brother are
related to him in the first degree of consanguinity, because in neither
case does any person come in between; and yet from the point of view of
intensity a man's father is more closely related to him than his
brother, since his brother is related to him only because he is of the
same father. Hence the nearer a person is to the common ancestor from
whom the consanguinity descends, the greater is his consanguinity
although he be not in a nearer degree. In this way a man's great-uncle
is more closely related to him than his great-nephew, although they are
in the same degree.
Reply to Objection 6: Although a man's father and uncle are in the same
degree in respect of the root of consanguinity, since both are
separated by one degree from the grandfather, nevertheless in respect
of the person whose consanguinity is in question, they are not in the
same degree, since the father is in the first degree, whereas the uncle
cannot be nearer than the second degree, wherein the grandfather
stands.
Reply to Objection 7: Two persons are always related in the same degree
to one another, although they are not always distant in the same number
of degrees from the common ancestor, as explained above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether consanguinity is an impediment to marriage by virtue of the natural
law?
Objection 1: It would seem that consanguinity is not by natural law an
impediment to marriage. For no woman can be more akin to a man than Eve
was to Adam, since of her did he say (Gn. 2:23): "This now is bone of
my bones and flesh of my flesh." Yet Eve was joined in marriage to
Adam. Therefore as regards the natural law no consanguinity is an
impediment to marriage.
Objection 2: Further, the natural law is the same for all. Now among
the uncivilized nations no person is debarred from marriage by reason
of consanguinity. Therefore, as regards the law of nature,
consanguinity is no impediment to marriage.
Objection 3: Further, the natural law is what "nature has taught all
animals," as stated at the beginning of the Digests (i, ff. De just. et
jure). Now brute animals copulate even with their mother. Therefore it
is not of natural law that certain persons are debarred from marriage
on account of consanguinity.
Objection 4: Further, nothing that is not contrary to one of the goods
of matrimony is an impediment to marriage. But consanguinity is not
contrary to any of the goods of marriage. Therefore it is not an
impediment thereto.
Objection 5: Further, things which are more akin and more similar to
one another are better and more firmly united together. Now matrimony
is a kind of union. Since then consanguinity is a kind of kinship, it
does not hinder marriage but rather strengthens the union.
On the contrary, According to the natural law whatever is an obstacle
to the good of the offspring is an impediment to marriage. Now
consanguinity hinders the good of the offspring, because in the words
of Gregory (Regist., epis. xxxi) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 40):
"We have learnt by experience that the children of such a union cannot
thrive." Therefore according to the law of nature consanguinity is an
impediment to matrimony.
Further, that which belongs to human nature when it was first created
is of natural law. Now it belonged to human nature from when it was
first created that one should be debarred from marrying one's father or
mother: in proof of which it was said (Gn. 2:24): "Wherefore a man
shall leave father and mother": which cannot be understood of
cohabitation, and consequently must refer to the union of marriage.
Therefore consanguinity is an impediment to marriage according to the
natural law.
I answer that, In relation to marriage a thing is said to be contrary
to the natural law if it prevents marriage from reaching the end for
which it was instituted. Now the essential and primary end of marriage
is the good of the offspring. and this is hindered by a certain
consanguinity, namely that which is between father and daughter, or son
and mother. It is not that the good of the offspring is utterly
destroyed, since a daughter can have a child of her father's semen and
with the father rear and teach that child in which things the good of
the offspring consists, but that it is not effected in a becoming way.
For it is out of order that a daughter be mated to her father in
marriage for the purpose of begetting and rearing children, since in
all things she ought to be subject to her father as proceeding from
him. Hence by natural law a father and mother are debarred from
marrying their children; and the mother still more than the father,
since it is more derogatory to the reverence due to parents if the son
marry his mother than if the father marry his daughter; since the wife
should be to a certain extent subject to her husband. The secondary
essential end of marriage is the curbing of concupiscence; and this end
would be forfeit if a man could marry any blood-relation, since a wide
scope would be afforded to concupiscence if those who have to live
together in the same house were not forbidden to be mated in the flesh.
Wherefore the Divine law debars from marriage not only father and
mother, but also other kinsfolk who have to live in close intimacy with
one another and ought to safeguard one another's modesty. The Divine
law assigns this reason (Lev. 18:10): "Thou shalt not uncover the
nakedness" of such and such a one, "because it is thy own nakedness."
But the accidental end of marriage is the binding together of mankind
and the extension of friendship: for a husband regards his wife's
kindred as his own. Hence it would be prejudicial to this extension of
friendship if a man could take a woman of his kindred to wife since no
new friendship would accrue to anyone from such a marriage. Wherefore,
according to human law and the ordinances of the Church, several
degrees of consanguinity are debarred from marriage.
Accordingly it is clear from what has been said that consanguinity is
by natural law an impediment to marriage in regard to certain persons,
by Divine law in respect of some, and by human law in respect of
others.
Reply to Objection 1: Although Eve was formed from Adam she was not
Adam's daughter, because she was not formed from him after the manner
in which it is natural for a man to beget his like in species, but by
the Divine operation, since from Adam's rib a horse might have been
formed in the same way as Eve was. Hence the natural connection between
Eve and Adam was not so great as between daughter and father, nor was
Adam the natural principle of Eve as a father is of his daughter.
Reply to Objection 2: That certain barbarians are united carnally to
their parents does not come from the natural law but from the passion
of concupiscence which has clouded the natural law in them.
Reply to Objection 3: Union of male and female is said to be of natural
law, because nature has taught this to animals: yet she has taught this
union to various animals in various ways according to their various
conditions. But carnal copulation with parents is derogatory to the
reverence due to them. For just as nature has instilled into parents
solicitude in providing for their offspring, so has it instilled into
the offspring reverence towards their parents: yet to no kind of animal
save man has she instilled a lasting solicitude for his children or
reverence for parents; but to other animals more or less, according as
the offspring is more or less necessary to its parents, or the parents
to their offspring. Hence as the Philosopher attests (De Animal. ix,
47) concerning the camel and the horse, among certain animals the son
abhors copulation with its mother as long as he retains knowledge of
her and a certain reverence for her. And since all honest customs of
animals are united together in man naturally, and more perfectly than
in other animals, it follows that man naturally abhors carnal knowledge
not only of his mother, but also of his daughter, which is, however,
less against nature, as stated above.
Moreover consanguinity does not result from carnal procreation in other
animals as in man, as stated above (A[1], ad 5). Hence the comparison
fails.
Reply to Objection 4: It has been shown how consanguinity between
married persons is contrary to the goods of marriage. Hence the
Objection proceeds from false premises.
Reply to Objection 5: It is not unreasonable for one of two unions to
be hindered by the other, even as where there is identity there is not
likeness. In like manner the tie of consanguinity may hinder the union
of marriage.
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Whether the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage
could be fixed by the Church?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of consanguinity that are
an impediment to marriage could not be fixed by the Church so as to
reach to the fourth degree. For it is written (Mat. 19:6): "What God
hath joined together let no man put asunder." But God joined those
together who are married within the fourth degree of consanguinity,
since their union is not forbidden by the Divine law. Therefore they
should not be put asunder by a human law.
Objection 2: Further, matrimony is a sacrament as also is baptism. Now
no ordinance of the Church could prevent one who is baptized from
receiving the baptismal character, if he be capable of receiving it
according to the Divine law. Therefore neither can an ordinance of the
Church forbid marriage between those who are not forbidden to marry by
the Divine law.
Objection 3: Further, positive law can neither void nor extend those
things which are natural. Now consanguinity is a natural tie which is
in itself of a nature to impede marriage. Therefore the Church cannot
by its ordinance permit or forbid certain people to marry, any more
than she can make them to be kin or not kin.
Objection 4: Further, an ordinance of positive law should have some
reasonable cause, since it is for this reasonable cause that it
proceeds from the natural law. But the causes that are assigned for the
number of degrees seem altogether unreasonable, since they bear no
relation to their effect; for instance, that consanguinity be an
impediment as far as the fourth degree on account of the four elements
as far as the sixth degree on account of the six ages of the world, as
far as the seventh degree on account of the seven days of which all
time is comprised. Therefore seemingly this prohibition is of no force.
Objection 5: Further, where the cause is the same there should be the
same effect. Now the causes for which consanguinity is an impediment to
marriage are the good of the offspring, the curbing of concupiscence,
and the extension of friendship, as stated above [4974](A[3]), which
are equally necessary for all time. Therefore the degrees of
consanguinity should have equally impeded marriage at all times: yet
this is not true since consanguinity is now an impediment to marriage
as far as the fourth degree, whereas formerly it was an impediment as
far as the seventh.
Objection 6: Further, one and the same union cannot be a kind of
sacrament and a kind of incest. But this would be the case if the
Church had the power of fixing a different number in the degrees which
are an impediment to marriage. Thus if certain parties related in the
fifth degree were married when that degree was an impediment, their
union would be incestuous, and yet this same union would be a marriage
afterwards when the Church withdrew her prohibition. And the reverse
might happen if certain degrees which were not an impediment were
subsequently to be forbidden by the Church. Therefore seemingly the
power of the Church does not extend to this.
Objection 7: Further, human law should copy the Divine law. Now
according to the Divine law which is contained in the Old Law, the
prohibition of degrees does not apply equally in the ascending and
descending lines: since in the Old Law a man was forbidden to marry his
father's sister but not his brother's daughter. Therefore neither
should there remain now a prohibition in respect of nephews and uncles.
On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Lk. 10:16): "He that
heareth you heareth Me." Therefore a commandment of the Church has the
same force as a commandment of God. Now the Church sometimes has
forbidden and sometimes allowed certain degrees which the Old Law did
not forbid. Therefore those degrees are an impediment to marriage.
Further, even as of old the marriages of pagans were controlled by the
civil law, so now is marriage controlled by the laws of the Church. Now
formerly the civil law decided which degrees of consanguinity impede
marriage, and which do not. Therefore this can be done now by a
commandment of the Church.
I answer that, The degrees within which consanguinity has been an
impediment to marriage have varied according to various times. For at
the beginning of the human race father and mother alone were debarred
from marrying their children, because then mankind were few in number,
and then it was necessary for the propagation of the human race to be
ensured with very great care, and consequently only such persons were
to be debarred as were unfitted for marriage even in respect of its
principal end which is the good of the offspring, as stated above
[4975](A[3]). Afterwards however, the human race having multiplied,
more persons were excluded by the law of Moses, for they already began
to curb concupiscence. Wherefore as Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii,
49) all those persons were debarred from marrying one another who are
wont to live together in one household, because if a lawful carnal
intercourse were possible between them, this would prove a very great
incentive to lust. Yet the Old Law permitted other degrees of
consanguinity, in fact to a certain extent it commanded them; to wit
that each man should take a wife from his kindred, in order to avoid
confusion of inheritances: because at that time the Divine worship was
handed down as the inheritance of the race. But afterwards more degrees
were forbidden by the New Law which is the law of the spirit and of
love, because the worship of God is no longer handed down and spread
abroad by a carnal birth but by a spiritual grace: wherefore it was
necessary that men should be yet more withdrawn from carnal things by
devoting themselves to things spiritual, and that love should have a
yet wider play. Hence in olden times marriage was forbidden even within
the more remote degrees of consanguinity, in order that consanguinity
and affinity might be the sources of a wider natural friendship; and
this was reasonably extended to the seventh degree, both because beyond
this it was difficult to have any recollection of the common stock, and
because this was in keeping with the sevenfold grace of the Holy Ghost.
Afterwards, however, towards these latter times the prohibition of the
Church has been restricted to the fourth degree, because it became
useless and dangerous to extend the prohibition to more remote degrees
of consanguinity. Useless, because charity waxed cold in many hearts so
that they had scarcely a greater bond of friendship with their more
remote kindred than with strangers: and it was dangerous because
through the prevalence of concupiscence and neglect men took no account
of so numerous a kindred, and thus the prohibition of the more remote
degrees became for many a snare leading to damnation. Moreover there is
a certain fittingness in the restriction of the above prohibition to
the fourth degree. First because men are wont to live until the fourth
generation, so that consanguinity cannot lapse into oblivion, wherefore
God threatened (Ex. 20:5) to visit the parent's sins on their children
to the third and fourth generation. Secondly, because in each
generation the blood, the identity of which causes consanguinity,
receives a further addition of new blood, and the more another blood is
added the less there is of the old. And because there are four
elements, each of which is the more easily mixed with another,
according as it is more rarefied it follows that at the first admixture
the identity of blood disappears as regards the first element which is
most subtle; at the second admixture, as regards the second element; at
the third, as to the third element; at the fourth, as to the fourth
element. Thus after the fourth generation it is fitting for the carnal
union to be repeated.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as God does not join together those who are
joined together against the Divine command, so does He not join
together those who are joined together against the commandment of the
Church, which has the same binding force as a commandment of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Matrimony is not only a sacrament but also
fulfills an office; wherefore it is more subject to the control of the
Church's ministers than baptism which is a sacrament only: because just
as human contracts and offices are controlled by human laws, so are
spiritual contracts and offices controlled by the law of the Church.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the tie of consanguinity is natural, it
is not natural that consanguinity forbid carnal intercourse, except as
regards certain degrees, as stated above [4976](A[3]). Wherefore the
Church's commandment does not cause certain people to be kin or not
kin, because they remain equally kin at all times: but it makes carnal
intercourse to be lawful or unlawful at different times for different
degrees of consanguinity.
Reply to Objection 4: The reasons assigned are given as indicating
aptness and congruousness rather than causality and necessity.
Reply to Objection 5: The reason for the impediment of consanguinity is
not the same at different times: wherefore that which it was useful to
allow at one time, it was beneficial to forbid at another.
Reply to Objection 6: A commandment does not affect the past but the
future. Wherefore if the fifth degree which is now allowed were to be
forbidden at any time, those in the fifth degree who are married would
not have to separate, because no impediment supervening to marriage can
annul it; and consequently a union which was a marriage from the first
would not be made incestuous by a commandment of the Church. In like
manner, if a degree which is now forbidden were to be allowed, such a
union would not become a marriage on account of the Church's
commandment by reason of the former contract, because they could
separate if they wished. Nevertheless, they could contract anew, and
this would be a new union.
Reply to Objection 7: In prohibiting the degrees of consanguinity the
Church considers chiefly the point of view of affection. And since the
reason for affection towards one's brother's son is not less but even
greater than the reasons for affection towards one's father's brother,
inasmuch as the son is more akin to the father than the father to the
son (Ethic. viii, 12), therefore did the Church equally prohibit the
degrees of consanguinity in uncles and nephews. On the other hand the
Old Law in debarring certain persons looked chiefly to the danger of
concupiscence arising from cohabitation; and debarred those persons who
were in closer intimacy with one another on account of their living
together. Now it is more usual for a niece to live with her uncle than
an aunt with her nephew: because a daughter is more identified with her
father, being part of him, whereas a sister is not in this way
identified with her brother, for she is not part of him but is born of
the same parent. Hence there was not the same reason for debarring a
niece and an aunt.
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OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF AFFINITY (ELEVEN ARTICLES)
We must consider next the impediment of affinity. Under this head there
are eleven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether affinity results from matrimony?
(2) Whether it remains after the death of husband or wife?
(3) Whether it is caused through unlawful intercourse?
(4) Whether it arises from a betrothal?
(5) Whether affinity is caused through affinity?
(6) Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?
(7) Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?
(8) Whether its degrees extend as far as the degrees of consanguinity?
(9) Whether marriages of persons related to one another by
consanguinity or affinity should always be dissolved by divorce?
(10) Whether the process for the dissolution of like marriages should
always be by way of accusation?
(11) Whether witnesses should be called in such a case?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a person contracts affinity through the marriage of a
blood-relation?
Objection 1: It would seem that a person does not contract affinity
through the marriage of a blood-relation. For "the cause of a thing
being so is yet more so." Now the wife is not connected with her
husband's kindred except by reason of the husband. Since then she does
not contract affinity with her husband, neither does she contract it
with her husband's kindred.
Objection 2: Further, if certain things be separate from one another
and something be connected with one of them, it does not follow that it
is connected with the other. Now a person's blood relations are
separate from one another. Therefore it does not follow, if a certain
woman be married to a certain man, that she is therefore connected with
all his kindred.
Objection 3: Further, relations result from certain things being united
together. Now the kindred of the husband do not become united together
by the fact of his taking a wife. Therefore they do not acquire any
relationship of affinity.
On the contrary, Husband and wife are made one flesh. Therefore if the
husband is related in the flesh to all his kindred, for the same reason
his wife will be related to them all.
Further, this is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent.
iv, D, 41).
I answer that, A certain natural friendship is founded on natural
fellowship. Now natural fellowship, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. viii, 12), arises in two ways; first, from carnal procreation;
secondly, from connection with orderly carnal procreation, wherefore he
says (Ethic. viii, 12) that the friendship of a husband towards his
wife is natural. Consequently even as a person through being connected
with another by carnal procreation is bound to him by a tie of natural
friendship, so does one person become connected with another through
carnal intercourse. But there is a difference in this, that one who is
connected with another through carnal procreation, as a son with his
father, shares in the same common stock and blood, so that a son is
connected with his father's kindred by the same kind of tie as the
father was, the tie, namely of consanguinity, albeit in a different
degree on account of his being more distant from the stock: whereas one
who is connected with another through carnal intercourse does not share
in the same stock, but is as it were an extraneous addition thereto:
whence arises another kind of tie known by the name of "affinity." This
is expressed in the verse:
Marriage makes a new kind of connection,
While birth makes a new degree,
because, to wit, the person begotten is in the same kind of
relationship, but in a different degree, whereas through carnal
intercourse he enters into a new kind of relationship.
Reply to Objection 1: Although a cause is more potent than its effect,
it does not always follow that the same name is applicable to the cause
as to the effect, because sometimes that which is in the effect, is
found in the cause not in the same but in a higher way; wherefore it is
not applicable to both cause and effect under the same name or under
the same aspect, as is the case with all equivocal effective causes.
Thus, then, the union of husband and wife is stronger than the union of
the wife with her husband's kindred, and yet it ought not to be named
affinity, but matrimony which is a kind of unity; even as a man is
identical with himself, but not with his kinsman.
Reply to Objection 2: Blood-relations are in a way separate, and in a
way connected: and it happens in respect of their connection that a
person who is connected with one of them is in some way connected with
all of them. But on account of their separation and distance from one
another it happens that a person who is connected with one of them in
one way is connected with another in another way, either as to the kind
of connection or as to the degree.
Reply to Objection 3: Further, a relation results sometimes from a
movement in each extreme, for instance fatherhood and sonship, and a
relation of this kind is really in both extremes. Sometimes it results
from the movement of one only, and this happens in two ways. In one way
when a relation results from the movement of one extreme without any
movement previous or concomitant of the other extreme; as in the
Creator and the creature, the sensible and the sense, knowledge and the
knowable object: and then the relation is in one extreme really and in
the other logically only. In another way when the relation results from
the movement of one extreme without any concomitant movement, but not
without a previous movement of the other; thus there results equality
between two men by the increase of one, without the other either
increasing or decreasing then, although previously he reached his
actual quantity by some movement or change, so that this relation is
founded really in both extremes. It is the same with consanguinity and
affinity, because the relation of brotherhood which results in a grown
child on the birth of a boy, is caused without any movement of the
former's at the time, but by virtue of that previous movement of his
wherein he was begotten; wherefore at the time it happens that there
results in him the aforesaid relation through the movement of another.
Likewise because this man descends through his own birth from the same
stock as the husband, there results in him affinity with the latter's
wife, without any new change in him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether affinity remains after the death of husband or wife?
Objection 1: It would seem that affinity does not remain after the
death of husband or wife, between the blood-relations of husband and
wife or "vice versa." Because if the cause cease the effect ceases. Now
the cause of affinity was the marriage, which ceases after the
husband's death, since then "the woman . . . is loosed from the law of
the husband" (Rom. 7:2). Therefore the aforesaid affinity ceases also.
Objection 2: Further, consanguinity is the cause of affinity. Now the
consanguinity of the husband with his blood-relations ceases at his
death. Therefore, the wife's affinity with them ceases also.
On the contrary, Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Now consanguinity
binds persons together for all time as long as they live. Therefore
affinity does so also: and consequently affinity (between two persons)
is not dissolved through the dissolution of the marriage by the death
of a third person.
I answer that, A relation ceases in two ways: in one way through the
corruption of its subject, in another way by the removal of its cause;
thus likeness ceases when one of the like subjects dies, or when the
quality that caused the likeness is removed. Now there are certain
relations which have for their cause an action, or a passion or
movement (Metaph. v, 20): and some of these are caused by movement,
through something being moved actually; such is the relation between
mover and moved: some of them are caused through something being
adapted to movement, for instance the relations between the motive
power and the movable, or between master and servant; and some of them
result from something, having been moved previously, such as the
relation between father and son, for the relation between them is
caused not by (the con) being begotten now, but by his having been
begotten. Now aptitude for movement and for being moved is transitory;
whereas the fact of having been moved is everlasting, since what has
been never ceases having been. Consequently fatherhood and sonship are
never dissolved through the removal of the cause, but only through the
corruption of the subject, that is of one of the subjects. The same
applies to affinity, for this is caused by certain persons having been
joined together not by their being actually joined. Wherefore it is not
done away, as long as the persons between whom affinity has been
contracted survive, although the person die through whom it was
contracted.
Reply to Objection 1: The marriage tie causes affinity not only by
reason of actual union, but also by reason of the union having been
effected in the past.
Reply to Objection 2: Consanguinity is not the chief cause of affinity,
but union with a blood-relation, not only because that union is now,
but because it has been. Hence the argument does not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether unlawful intercourse causes affinity?
Objection 1: It would seem that unlawful intercourse does not cause
affinity. For affinity is an honorable thing. Now honorable things do
not result from that which is dishonorable. Therefore affinity cannot
be caused by a dishonorable intercourse.
Objection 2: Further, where there is consanguinity there cannot be
affinity; since affinity is a relationship between persons that results
from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship.
Now if unlawful intercourse were a cause of affinity, it would
sometimes happen that a man would contract affinity with his
blood-relations and with himself: for instance when a man is guilty of
incest with a blood-relation. Therefore affinity is not caused by
unlawful intercourse.
Objection 3: Further, unlawful intercourse is according to nature or
against nature. Now affinity is not caused by unnatural unlawful
intercourse as decided by law (can. Extraordinaria, xxxv, qu. 2,3).
Therefore it is not caused only by unlawful intercourse according to
nature.
On the contrary, He who is joined to a harlot is made one body (1 Cor.
6:16). Now this is the reason why marriage caused affinity. Therefore
unlawful intercourse does so for the same reason.
Further, carnal intercourse is the cause of affinity, as shown by the
definition of affinity, which definition is as follows: Affinity is the
relationship of persons which results from carnal intercourse and is
altogether void of blood-relationship. But there is carnal copulation
even in unlawful intercourse. Therefore unlawful intercourse causes
affinity.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the union
of husband and wife is said to be natural chiefly on account of the
procreation of offspring, and secondly on account of the community of
works: the former of which belongs to marriage by reason of carnal
copulation, and the latter, in so far as marriage is a partnership
directed to a common life. Now the former is to be found in every
carnal union where there is a mingling of seeds, since such a union may
be productive of offspring, but the latter may be wanting. Consequently
since marriage caused affinity, in so far as it was a carnal mingling,
it follows that also an unlawful intercourse causes affinity in so far
as it has something of natural copulation.
Reply to Objection 1: In an unlawful intercourse there is something
natural which is common to fornication and marriage, and in this
respect it causes affinity. There is also something which is inordinate
whereby it differs from marriage, and in this respect it does not cause
affinity. Hence affinity remains honorable, although its cause is in a
way dishonorable.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no reason why diverse relations should
not be in the same subject by reason of different things. Consequently
there can be affinity and consanguinity between two persons, not only
on account of unlawful but also on account of lawful intercourse: for
instance if a blood-relation of mine on my father's side marries a
blood-relation of mine on my mother's side. Hence in the above
definition the words "which is altogether void of blood-relationship"
apply to affinity as such. Nor does it follow that a man by having
intercourse with his blood-relation contracts affinity with himself,
since affinity, like consanguinity, requires diversity of subjects, as
likeness does.
Reply to Objection 3: In unnatural copulation there is no mingling of
seeds that makes generation possible: wherefore a like intercourse does
not cause affinity.
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Whether affinity is caused by betrothal?
Objection 1: It would seem that affinity cannot be caused by betrothal.
For affinity is a lasting tie: whereas a betrothal is sometimes broken
off. Therefore it cannot cause affinity.
Objection 2: Further if the hymen be penetrated without the deed being
consummated, affinity is not contracted. Yet this is much more akin to
carnal intercourse than a betrothal. Therefore betrothal does not cause
affinity.
Objection 3: Further, betrothal is nothing but a promise of future
marriage. Now sometimes there is a promise of future marriage without
affinity being contracted, for instance if it take place before the age
of seven years; or if a man having a perpetual impediment of impotence
promise a woman future marriage; or if a like promise be made between
persons to whom marriage is rendered unlawful by a vow; or in any other
way whatever. Therefore betrothal cannot cause affinity.
On the contrary, Pope Alexander (cap. Ad audiendem, De spons. et
matrim.) forbade a certain woman to marry a certain man, because she
had been betrothed to his brother. Now this would not be the case
unless affinity were contracted by betrothal. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, Just as a betrothal has not the conditions of a perfect
marriage, but is a preparation for marriage, so betrothal causes not
affinity as marriage does, but something like affinity. This is called
"the justice of public honesty," which is an impediment to marriage
even as affinity and consanguinity are, and according to the same
degrees, and is defined thus: "The justice of public honesty is a
relationship arising out of betrothal, and derives its force from
ecclesiastical institution by reason of its honesty." This indicates
the reason of its name as well as its cause, namely that this
relationship was instituted by the Church on account of its honesty.
Reply to Objection 1: Betrothal, by reason not of itself but of the end
to which it is directed, causes this kind of affinity known as "the
justice of public honesty": wherefore just as marriage is a lasting
tie, so is the aforesaid kind of affinity.
Reply to Objection 2: In carnal intercourse man and woman become one
flesh by the mingling of seeds. Wherefore it is not every invasion or
penetration of the hymen that causes affinity to be contracted, but
only such as is followed by a mingling of seeds. But marriage causes
affinity not only on account of carnal intercourse, but also by reason
of the conjugal fellowship, in respect of which also marriage is
according to nature. Consequently affinity results from the marriage
contract itself expressed in words of the present and before its
consummation, and in like manner there results from betrothal, which is
a promise of conjugal fellowship, something akin to affinity, namely
the justice of public honesty.
Reply to Objection 3: All those impediments which void a betrothal
prevent affinity being contracted through a promise of marriage. Hence
whether he who actually promises marriage be lacking in age, or be
under a solemn vow of continence or any like impediment, no affinity
nor anything akin to it results because the betrothal is void. If
however, a minor, laboring under insensibility or malefice, having a
perpetual impediment, is betrothed before the age of puberty and after
the age of seven years, with a woman who is of age, from such a
contract there results the impediment called "justice of public
honesty," because at the time the impediment was not actual, since at
that age the boy who is insensible is equally impotent in respect of
the act in question.
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Whether affinity is a cause of affinity?
Objection 1: It would seem that affinity also is a cause of affinity.
For Pope Julius I says (cap. Contradicimus 35, qu. iii): "No man may
marry his wife's surviving blood-relation": and it is said in the next
chapter (cap. Porro duorum) that "the wives of two cousins are
forbidden to marry, one after the other, the same husband." But this is
only on account of affinity being contracted through union with a
person related by affinity. Therefore affinity is a cause of affinity.
Objection 2: Further, carnal intercourse makes persons akin even as
carnal procreation, since the degrees of affinity and consanguinity are
reckoned equally. But consanguinity causes affinity. Therefore affinity
does also.
Objection 3: Further, things that are the same with one and the same
are the same with one another. But the wife contracts the same
relations with all her husband's kindred. Therefore all her husband's
kindred are made one with all who are related by affinity to the wife,
and thus affinity is the cause of affinity.
Objection 4: On the contrary, If affinity is caused by affinity a man
who has connection with two women can marry neither of them, because
then the one would be related to the other by affinity. But this is
false. Therefore affinity does not cause affinity.
Objection 5: Further, if affinity arose out of affinity a man by
marrying another man's widow would contract affinity with all her first
husband's kindred, since she is related to them by affinity. But this
cannot be the case because he would become especially related by
affinity to her deceased husband. Therefore, etc.
Objection 6: Further, consanguinity is a stronger tie than affinity.
But the blood-relations of the wife do not become blood-relations of
the husband. Much less, therefore, does affinity to the wife cause
affinity to her blood-relations, and thus the same conclusion follows.
I answer that, There are two ways in which one thing proceeds from
another: in one way a thing proceeds from another in likeness of
species, as a man is begotten of a man: in another way one thing
proceeds from another, not in likeness of species; and this process is
always towards a lower species, as instanced in all equivocal agents.
The first kind of procession, however often it be repeated, the same
species always remains: thus if one man be begotten of another by an
act of the generative power, of this man also another man will be
begotten, and so on. But the second kind of procession, just as in the
first instance it produces another species, so it makes another species
as often as it is repeated. Thus by movement from a point there
proceeds a line and not a point, because a point by being moved makes a
line; and from a line moved lineally, there proceeds not a line but a
surface, and from a surface a body, and in this way the procession can
go no further. Now in the procession of kinship we find two kinds
whereby this tie is caused: one is by carnal procreation, and this
always produces the same species of relationship; the other is by the
marriage union, and this produces a different kind of relationship from
the beginning: thus it is clear that a married woman is related to her
husband's blood-relations not by blood but by affinity. Wherefore if
this kind of process be repeated, the result will be not affinity but
another kind of relationship; and consequently a married party
contracts with the affines of the other party a relation not of
affinity but of some other kind which is called affinity of the second
kind. And again if a person through marriage contracts relationship
with an affine of the second kind, it will not be affinity of the
second kind, but of a third kind, as indicated in the verse quoted
above [4977](A[1]). Formerly these two kinds were included in the
prohibition, under the head of the justice of public honesty rather
than under the head of affinity, because they fall short of true
affinity, in the same way as the relationship arising out of betrothal.
Now however they have ceased to be included in the prohibition, which
now refers only to the first kind of affinity in which true affinity
consists.
Reply to Objection 1: A husband contracts affinity of the first kind
with his wife's male blood-relation, and affinity of the second kind
with the latter's wife: wherefore if the latter man dies the former
cannot marry his widow on account of the second kind of affinity. Again
if a man A marry a widow B, C, a relation of her former husband being
connected with B by the first kind of affinity, contracts affinity of
the second kind with her husband A; and D, the wife of this relation C
being connected, by affinity of the second kind, with B, this man's
wife contracts affinity of the third kind with her husband A. And since
the third kind of affinity was included in the prohibition on account
of a certain honesty more than by reason of affinity, the canon (cap.
Porro duorum 35, qu. iii) says: "The justice of public honesty forbids
the wives of two cousins to be married to the same man, the one after
the other." But this prohibition is done away with.
Reply to Objection 2: Although carnal intercourse is a cause of people
being connected with one another, it is not the same kind of
connection.
Reply to Objection 3: The wife contracts the same connection with her
husband's relatives as to the degree but not as to the kind of
connection.
Since however the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show
that no tie is caused by affinity, we must reply to them lest the
time-honored prohibition of the Church seem unreasonable.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, a woman does not contract
affinity of the first kind with the man to whom she is united in the
flesh, wherefore she does not contract affinity of the second kind with
a woman known by the same man; and consequently if a man marry one of
these women, the other does not contract affinity of the third kind
with him. And so the laws of bygone times did not forbid the same man
to marry successively two women known by one man.
Reply to Objection 5: As a man is not connected with his wife by
affinity of the first kind, so he does not contract affinity of the
second kind with the second husband of the same wife. Wherefore the
argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 6: One person is not connected with me through
another, except they be connected together. Hence through a woman who
is affine to me, no person becomes connected with me, except such as is
connected with her. Now this cannot be except through carnal
procreation from her, or through connection with her by marriage: and
according to the olden legislation, I contracted some kind of
connection through her in both ways: because her son even by another
husband becomes affine to me in the same kind and in a different degree
of affinity, as appears from the rule given above: and again her second
husband becomes affine to me in the second kind of affinity. But her
other blood-relations are not connected with him, but she is connected
with them, either as with father or mother, inasmuch as she descends
from them, or, as with her brothers, as proceeding from the same
principle; wherefore the brother or father of my affine does not become
affine to me in any kind of affinity.
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Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that affinity is not an impediment to
marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except what is
contrary thereto. But affinity is not contrary to marriage since it is
caused by it. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.
Objection 2: Further, by marriage the wife becomes a possession of the
husband. Now the husband's kindred inherit his possessions after his
death. Therefore they can succeed to his wife, although she is affine
to them, as shown above [4978](A[5]). Therefore affinity is not an
impediment to marriage.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 18:8): "Thou shalt not uncover the
nakedness of thy father's wife." Now she is only affine. Therefore
affinity is an impediment to marriage.
I answer that, Affinity that precedes marriage hinders marriage being
contracted and voids the contract, for the same reason as
consanguinity. For just as there is a certain need for blood-relations
to live together, so is there for those who are connected by affinity:
and just as there is a tie of friendship between blood-relations, so is
there between those who are affine to one another. If, however,
affinity supervene to matrimony, it cannot void the marriage, as stated
above (Q[50], A[7]).
Reply to Objection 1: Affinity is not contrary to the marriage which
causes it, but to a marriage being contracted with an affine, in so far
as the latter would hinder the extension of friendship and the curbing
of concupiscence, which are sought in marriage.
Reply to Objection 2: The husband's possessions do not become one with
him as the wife is made one flesh with him. Wherefore just as
consanguinity is an impediment to marriage or union with the husband
according to the flesh, so is one forbidden to marry the husband's
wife.
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Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?
Objection 1: It would seem that affinity in itself admits of degrees.
For any kind of propinquity can itself be the subject of degrees. Now
affinity is a kind of propinquity. Therefore it has degrees in itself
apart from the degrees of consanguinity by which it is caused.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41) that
the child of a second marriage could not take a consort from within the
degrees of affinity of the first husband. But this would not be the
case unless the son of an affine were also affine. Therefore affinity
like consanguinity admits itself of degrees.
On the contrary, Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Therefore all the
degrees of affinity are caused by the degrees of consanguinity: and so
it has no degrees of itself.
I answer that, A thing does not of itself admit of being divided except
in reference to something belonging to it by reason of its genus: thus
animal is divided into rational and irrational and not into white and
black. Now carnal procreation has a direct relation to consanguinity,
because the tie of consanguinity is immediately contracted through it;
whereas it has no relation to affinity except through consanguinity
which is the latter's cause. Wherefore since the degrees of
relationship are distinguished in reference to carnal procreation, the
distinction of degrees is directly and immediately referable to
consanguinity, and to affinity through consanguinity. Hence the general
rule in seeking the degrees of affinity is that in whatever degree of
consanguinity I am related to the husband, in that same degree of
affinity I am related to the wife.
Reply to Objection 1: The degrees in propinquity of relationship can
only be taken in reference to ascent and descent of propagation, to
which affinity is compared only through consanguinity. Wherefore
affinity has no direct degrees, but derives them according to the
degrees of consanguinity.
Reply to Objection 2: Formerly it used to be said that the son of my
affine by a second marriage was affine to me, not directly but
accidentally as it were: wherefore he was forbidden to marry on account
of the justice of public honesty rather than affinity. And for this
reason this prohibition is now revoked.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the degrees of affinity extend in the same way as the degrees of
consanguinity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of affinity do not extend
in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity. For the tie of
affinity is less strong than the tie of consanguinity, since affinity
arises from consanguinity in diversity of species, as from an equivocal
cause. Now the stronger the tie the longer it lasts. Therefore the tie
of affinity does not last to the same number of degrees as
consanguinity.
Objection 2: Further, human law should imitate Divine law. Now
according to the Divine law certain degrees of consanguinity were
forbidden, in which degrees affinity was not an impediment to marriage:
as instanced in a brother's wife whom a man could marry although he
could not marry her sister. Therefore now too the prohibition of
affinity and consanguinity should not extend to the same degrees.
On the contrary, A woman is connected with me by affinity from the very
fact that she is married to a blood-relation of mine. Therefore in
whatever degree her husband is related to me by blood she is related to
me in that same degree by affinity: and so the degrees of affinity
should be reckoned in the same number as the degrees of consanguinity.
I answer that, Since the degrees of affinity are reckoned according to
the degrees of consanguinity, the degrees of affinity must needs be the
same in number as those of consanguinity. Nevertheless, affinity being
a lesser tie than consanguinity, both formerly and now, a dispensation
is more easily granted in the more remote degrees of affinity than in
the remote degrees of consanguinity.
Reply to Objection 1: The fact that the tie of affinity is less than
the tie of consanguinity causes a difference in the kind of
relationship but not in the degrees. Hence this argument is not to the
point.
Reply to Objection 2: A man could not take his deceased brother's wife
except, in the case when the latter died without issue, in order to
raise up seed to his brother. This was requisite at a time when
religious worship was propagated by means of the propagation of the
flesh, which is not the case now. Hence it is clear that he did not
marry her in his own person as it were, but as supplying the place of
his brother.
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Whether a marriage contracted by persons with the degrees of affinity or
consanguinity should always be annulled?
Objection 1: It would seem that a marriage contracted by persons within
the degrees of affinity or consanguinity ought not always to be
annulled by divorce. For "what God hath joined together let no man put
asunder" (Mat. 19:6). Since then it is understood that what the Church
does God does, and since the Church sometimes through ignorance joins
such persons together, it would seem that if subsequently this came to
knowledge they ought not to be separated.
Objection 2: Further, the tie of marriage is less onerous than the tie
of ownership. Now after a long time a man may acquire by prescription
the ownership of a thing of which he was not the owner. Therefore by
length of time a marriage becomes good in law, although it was not so
before.
Objection 3: Further, of like things we judge alike. Now if a marriage
ought to be annulled on account of consanguinity, in the case when two
brothers marry two sisters, if one be separated on account of
consanguinity, the other ought to be separated for the same reason. and
yet this is not seemly. Therefore a marriage ought not to be annulled
on account of affinity or consanguinity.
On the contrary, Consanguinity and affinity forbid the contracting of a
marriage and void the contract. Therefore if affinity or consanguinity
be proved, the parties should be separated even though they have
actually contracted marriage.
I answer that, Since all copulation apart from lawful marriage is a
mortal sin, which the Church uses all her endeavors to prevent, it
belongs to her to separate those between whom there cannot be valid
marriage, especially those related by blood or by affinity, who cannot
without incest be united in the flesh.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the Church is upheld by God's gift and
authority, yet in so far as she is an assembly of men there results in
her acts something of human frailty which is not Divine. Therefore a
union effected in the presence of the Church who is ignorant of an
impediment is not indissoluble by Divine authority, but is brought
about contrary to Divine authority through man's error, which being an
error of fact excuses from sin, as long as it remains. Hence when the
impediment comes to the knowledge of the Church, she ought to sever the
aforesaid union.
Reply to Objection 2: That which cannot be done without sin is not
ratified by any prescription, for as Innocent III says (Conc. Later.
iv, can. 50: cap. Non debent, De consang. et affinit.), "length of time
does not diminish sin but increases it": nor can it in any way
legitimize a marriage which could not take place between unlawful
persons.
Reply to Objection 3: In contentious suits between two persons the
verdict does not prejudice a third party, wherefore although the one
brother's marriage with the one sister is annulled on account of
consanguinity, the Church does not therefore annul the other marriage
against which no action is taken. Yet in the tribunal of the conscience
the other brother ought not on this account always to be bound to put
away his wife, because such accusations frequently proceed from
ill-will, and are proved by false witnesses. Hence he is not bound to
form his conscience on what has been done about the other marriage: but
seemingly one ought to draw a distinction, because either he has
certain knowledge of the impediment of his marriage, or he has an
opinion about it, or he has neither. In the first case, he can neither
seek nor pay the debt, in the second, he must pay, but not ask, in the
third he can both pay and ask.
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Whether it is necessary to proceed by way of accusation for the annulment o
f
a marriage contracted by persons related to each other by affinity or
consanguinity?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to proceed by way of
accusation in order to sever a marriage contracted between persons
related by affinity or consanguinity. Because accusation is preceded by
inscription* whereby a man binds himself to suffer the punishment of
retaliation, if he fail to prove his accusation. [*The accuser was
bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation;
Cf. [4979]SS, Q[33], A[7]]. But this is not required when a matrimonial
separation is at issue. Therefore accusation has no place then.
Objection 2: Further, in a matrimonial lawsuit only the relatives are
heard, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41). But in accusations even
strangers are heard. Therefore in a suit for matrimonial separation the
process is not by way of accusation.
Objection 3: Further, if a marriage ought to be denounced this should
be done especially where it is least difficult to sever the tie. Now
this is when only the betrothal has been contracted, and then it is not
the marriage that is denounced. Therefore accusation should never take
place at any other time.
Objection 4: Further, a man is not prevented from accusing by the fact
that he does not accuse at once. But this happens in marriage, for if
he was silent at first when the marriage was being contracted, he
cannot denounce the marriage afterwards without laying himself open to
suspicion. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, Whatever is unlawful can be denounced. But the
marriage of relatives by affinity and consanguinity is unlawful.
Therefore it can be denounced.
I answer that, Accusation is instituted lest the guilty be tolerated as
though they were innocent. Now just as it happens through ignorance of
fact that a guilty man is reputed innocent, so it happens through
ignorance of a circumstance that a certain fact is deemed lawful
whereas it is unlawful. Wherefore just as a man is sometimes accused,
so is a fact sometimes an object of accusation. It is in this way that
a marriage is denounced, when through ignorance of an impediment it is
deemed lawful, whereas it is unlawful.
Reply to Objection 1: The punishment of retaliation takes place when a
person is accused of a crime, because then action is taken that he may
be punished. But when it is a deed that is accused, action is taken not
for the punishment of the doer, but in order to prevent what is
unlawful. Hence in a matrimonial suit the accuser does not bind himself
to a punishment. Moreover, the accusation may be made either in words
or in writing, provided the person who denounces the marriage
denounced, and the impediment for which it is denounced, be expressed.
Reply to Objection 2: Strangers cannot know of the consanguinity except
from the relatives, since these know with greater probability. Hence
when these are silent, a stranger is liable to be suspected of acting
from ill-will unless he wish the relatives to prove his assertion.
Wherefore a stranger is debarred from accusing when there are relatives
who are silent, and by whom he cannot prove his accusation. On the
other hand the relatives, however nearly related they be, are not
debarred from accusing, when the marriage is denounced on account of a
perpetual impediment, which prevents the contracting of the marriage
and voids the contract. When, however, the accusation is based on a
denial of the contract having taken place, the parents should be
debarred from witnessing as being liable to suspicion, except those of
the party that is inferior in rank and wealth, for they, one is
inclined to think, would be willing for the marriage to stand.
Reply to Objection 3: If the marriage is not yet contracted and there
is only a betrothal, there can be no accusation, for what is not,
cannot be accused. But the impediment can be denounced lest the
marriage be contracted.
Reply to Objection 4: He who is silent at first is sometimes heard
afterwards if he wish to denounce the marriage, and sometimes he is
repulsed. This is made clear by the Decretal (cap. Cum in tua, De his
qui matrim. accus. possunt.) which runs as follows: "If an accuser
present himself after the marriage has been contracted, since he did
not declare himself when according to custom, the banns were published
in church, we may rightly ask whether he should be allowed to voice his
accusation. In this matter we deem that a distinction should be made,
so that if he who lodges information against persons already married
was absent from the diocese at the time of the aforesaid publication,
or if for some other reason this could not come to his knowledge, for
instance if through exceeding stress of weakness and fever he was not
in possession of his faculties, or was of so tender years as to be too
young to understand such matters, or if he were hindered by some other
lawful cause, his accusation should be heard. otherwise without doubt
he should be repulsed as open to suspicion, unless he swear that the
information lodged by him came to his knowledge subsequently and that
he is not moved by ill-will to make his accusation."
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Whether in a suit of this kind one should proceed by hearing witnesses in
the same way as in other suits?
Objection 1: It would seem that in such a suit one ought not to proceed
by hearing witnesses, in the same way as in other suits where any
witnesses may be called provided they be unexceptionable. But here
strangers are not admitted, although they be unexceptionable.
Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, witnesses who are suspected of private hatred or
love are debarred from giving evidence. Now relatives are especially
open to suspicion of love for one party, and hatred for the other.
Therefore their evidence should not be taken.
Objection 3: Further, marriage is a more favorable suit than those
others in which purely corporeal questions are at stake. Now in these
the same person cannot be both accuser and witness. Neither therefore
can this be in a matrimonial suit; and so it would appear that it is
not right to proceed by hearing witnesses in a suit of this kind.
On the contrary, Witnesses are called in a suit in order to give the
judge evidence concerning matters of doubt. Now evidence should be
afforded the judge in this suit as in other suits, since he must not
pronounce a hasty judgment on what is not proven. Therefore here as in
other lawsuits witnesses should be called.
I answer that, In this kind of lawsuit as in others, truth must be
unveiled by witnesses: yet, as the lawyers say, there are many things
peculiar to this suit; namely that "the same person can be accuser and
witness; that evidence is not taken 'on oath of calumny,' since it is a
quasi-spiritual lawsuit; that relatives are allowed as witnesses; that
the juridical order is not perfectly observed, since if the
denunciation has been made, and the suit is uncontested, the defendant
may be excommunicated if contumacious; that hearsay evidence is
admitted; and that witnesses may be called after the publication of the
names of the witnesses." All this is in order to prevent the sin that
may occur in such a union (cap. Quoties aliqui; cap. Super eo, De test.
et attest.; cap. Literas, De juram. calumn.).
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the impediment of spiritual relationship: under
which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?
(2) From what cause is it contracted?
(3) Between whom?
(4) Whether it passes from husband to wife?
(5) Whether it passes to the father's carnal children?
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Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is not an
impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage save
what is contrary to a marriage good. Now spiritual relationship is not
contrary to a marriage good. Therefore it is not an impediment to
marriage.
Objection 2: Further, a perpetual impediment to marriage cannot stand
together with marriage. But spiritual relationship sometimes stands
together with marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42), as
when a man in a case of necessity baptizes his own child, for then he
contracts a spiritual relationship with his wife, and yet the marriage
is not dissolved. Therefore spiritual relationship is not an impediment
to marriage.
Objection 3: Further, union of the spirit does not pass to the flesh.
But marriage is a union of the flesh. Therefore since spiritual
relationship is a union of the spirit, it cannot become an impediment
to marriage.
Objection 4: Further, contraries have not the same effects. Now
spiritual relationship is apparently contrary to disparity of worship,
since spiritual relationship is a kinship resulting from the giving of
a sacrament or the intention of so doing [*See next Article, ad 3]:
whereas disparity of worship consists in the lack of a sacrament, as
stated above ([4980]Q[50], A[1]). Since then disparity of worship is an
impediment to matrimony, it would seem that spiritual relationship has
not this effect.
On the contrary, The holier the bond, the more is it to be safeguarded.
Now a spiritual bond is holier than a bodily tie: and since the tie of
bodily kinship is an impediment to marriage, it follows that spiritual
relationship should also be an impediment.
Further, in marriage the union of souls ranks higher than union of
bodies, for it precedes it. Therefore with much more reason can a
spiritual relationship hinder marriage than bodily relationship does.
I answer that, Just as by carnal procreation man receives natural
being, so by the sacraments he receives the spiritual being of grace.
Wherefore just as the tie that is contracted by carnal procreation is
natural to man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, so the tie that is
contracted from the reception of the sacraments is after a fashion
natural to man, inasmuch as he is a member of the Church. Therefore as
carnal relationship hinders marriage, even so does spiritual
relationship by command of the Church. We must however draw a
distinction in reference to spiritual relationship, since either it
precedes or follows marriage. If it precedes, it hinders the
contracting of marriage and voids the contract. If it follows, it does
not dissolve the marriage bond: but we must draw a further distinction
in reference to the marriage act. For either the spiritual relationship
is contracted in a case of necessity, as when a father baptizes his
child who is at the point of death---and then it is not an obstacle to
the marriage act on either side---or it is contracted without any
necessity and through ignorance, in which case if the person whose
action has occasioned the relationship acted with due caution, it is
the same with him as in the former case---or it is contracted purposely
and without any necessity, and then the person whose action has
occasioned the relationship, loses the right to ask for the debt; but
is bound to pay if asked, because the fault of the one party should not
be prejudicial to the other.
Reply to Objection 1: Although spiritual relationship does not hinder
any of the chief marriage goods, it hinders one of the secondary goods,
namely the extension of friendship, because spiritual relationship is
by itself a sufficient reason for friendship: wherefore intimacy and
friendship with other persons need to be sought by means of marriage.
Reply to Objection 2: Marriage is a lasting bond, wherefore no
supervening impediment can sever it. Hence it happens sometimes that
marriage and an impediment to marriage stand together, but not if the
impediment precedes.
Reply to Objection 3: In marriage there is not only a bodily but also a
spiritual union: and consequently kinship of spirit proves an
impediment thereto, without spiritual kinship having to pass into a
bodily relationship.
Reply to Objection 4: There is nothing unreasonable in two things that
are contrary to one another being contrary to the same thing, as great
and small are contrary to equal. Thus disparity of worship and
spiritual relationship are opposed to marriage, because in one the
distance is greater, and in the other less, than required by marriage.
Hence there is an impediment to marriage in either case.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism only?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is contracted by
Baptism only. For as bodily kinship is to bodily birth, so is spiritual
kinship to spiritual birth. Now Baptism alone is called spiritual
birth. Therefore spiritual kinship is contracted by Baptism only, even
as only by carnal birth is carnal kinship contracted.
Objection 2: Further, a character is imprinted in order as in
Confirmation. But spiritual relationship does not result from receiving
orders. Therefore it does not result from Confirmation but only from
Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, sacraments are more excellent than sacramentals.
Now spiritual relationship does not result from certain sacraments, for
instance from Extreme Unction. Much less therefore does it result from
catechizing, as some maintain.
Objection 4: Further, many other sacramentals are attached to Baptism
besides catechizing. Therefore spiritual relationship is not contracted
from catechism any more than from the others.
Objection 5: Further, prayer is no less efficacious than instruction of
catechism for advancement in good. But spiritual relationship does not
result from prayer. Therefore it does not result from catechism.
Objection 6: Further, the instruction given to the baptized by
preaching to them avails no less than preaching to those who are not
yet baptized. But no spiritual relationship results from preaching.
Neither therefore does it result from catechism.
Objection 7: On the other hand, It is written (1 Cor. 4:15): "In Christ
Jesus by the gospel I have begotten you." Now spiritual birth causes
spiritual relationship. Therefore spiritual relationship results from
the preaching of the gospel and instruction, and not only from Baptism.
Objection 8: Further, as original sin is taken away by Baptism, so is
actual sin taken away by Penance. Therefore just as Baptism causes
spiritual relationship, so also does Penance.
Objection 9: Further, "father" denotes relationship. Now a man is
called another's spiritual father in respect of Penance, teaching,
pastoral care and many other like things. Therefore spiritual
relationship is contracted from many other sources besides Baptism and
Confirmation.
I answer that, There are three opinions on this question. Some say that
as spiritual regeneration is bestowed by the sevenfold grace of the
Holy Ghost, it is caused by means of seven things, beginning with the
first taste of blessed salt and ending with Confirmation given by the
bishop: and they say that spiritual relationship is contracted by each
of these seven things. But this does not seem reasonable, for carnal
relationship is not contracted except by a perfect act of generation.
Wherefore affinity is not contracted except there be mingling of seeds,
from which it is possible for carnal generation to follow. Now
spiritual generation is not perfected except by a sacrament: wherefore
it does not seem fitting for spiritual relationship to be contracted
otherwise than through a sacrament. Hence others say that spiritual
relationship is only contracted through three sacraments, namely
catechism, Baptism and Confirmation, but these do not apparently know
the meaning of what they say, since catechism is not a sacrament but a
sacramental. Wherefore others say that it is contracted through two
sacraments only, namely Confirmation and Baptism, and this is the more
common opinion. Some however of these say that catechism is a weak
impediment, since it hinders the contracting of marriage but does not
void the contract.
Reply to Objection 1: Carnal birth is twofold. The first is in the
womb, wherein that which is born is a weakling and cannot come forth
without danger: and to this birth regeneration by Baptism is likened;
wherein a man is regenerated as though yet needing to be fostered in
the womb of the Church. The second is birth from out of the womb, when
that which was born in the womb is so far strengthened that it can
without danger face the outer world which has a natural corruptive
tendency. To this is likened Confirmation, whereby man being
strengthened goes forth abroad to confess the name of Christ. Hence
spiritual relationship is fittingly contracted through both these
sacraments.
Reply to Objection 2: The effect of the sacrament of order is not
regeneration but the bestowal of power, for which reason it is not
conferred on women, and consequently no impediment to marriage can
arise therefrom. Hence this kind of relationship does not count.
Reply to Objection 3: In catechism one makes a profession of future
Baptism, just as in betrothal one enters an engagement of future
marriage. Wherefore just as in betrothal a certain kind of propinquity
is contracted, so is there in catechism, whereby marriage is rendered
at least unlawful, as some say; but not in the other sacraments.
Reply to Objection 4: There is not made a profession of faith in the
other sacramentals of Baptism, as in catechism: wherefore the
comparison fails.
The same answer applies to the Fifth and Sixth Objections.
Reply to Objection 7: The Apostle had instructed them in the faith by a
kind of catechism; and consequently his instruction was directed to
their spiritual birth.
Reply to Objection 8: Properly speaking a spiritual relationship is not
contracted through the sacrament of Penance. Wherefore a priest's son
can marry a woman whose confession the priest has heard, else in the
whole parish he could not find a woman whom he could marry. Nor does it
matter that by Penance actual sin is taken away, for this is not a kind
of birth, but a kind of healing. Nevertheless Penance occasions a kind
of bond between the woman penitent and the priest, that has a
resemblance to spiritual relationship, so that if he have carnal
intercourse with her, he sins as grievously as if she were his
spiritual daughter. The reason of this is that the relations between
priest and penitent are most intimate, and consequently in order to
remove the occasion of sin this prohibition [*Can. Omnes quos, and
seqq., Caus. xxx] was made.
Reply to Objection 9: A spiritual father is so called from his likeness
to a carnal father. Now as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) a
carnal father gives his child three things, being nourishment and
instruction: and consequently a person's spiritual father is so called
from one of these three things. Nevertheless he has not, through being
his spiritual father, a spiritual relationship with him, unless he is
like a (carnal) father as to generation which is the way to being. This
solution may also be applied to the foregoing Eighth Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship is contracted between the person baptized an
d
the person who raises him from the sacred font?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is not
contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him
from the sacred font. For in carnal generation carnal relationship is
contracted only on the part of the person of whose seed the child is
born; and not on the part of the person who receives the child after
birth. Therefore neither is spiritual relationship contracted between
the receiver and the received at the sacred font.
Objection 2: Further, he who raises a person from the sacred font is
called {anadochos} by Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii): and it is part of his
office to instruct the child. But instruction is not a sufficient cause
of spiritual relationship, as stated above [4981](A[2]). Therefore no
relationship is contracted between him and the person whom he raises
from the sacred font.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that someone raises a person from
the sacred font before he himself is baptized. Now spiritual
relationship is not contracted in such a case, since one who is not
baptized is not capable of spirituality. Therefore raising a person
from the sacred font is not sufficient to contract a spiritual
relationship.
On the contrary, There is the definition of spiritual relationship
quoted above [4982](A[1]), as also the authorities mentioned in the
text (Sent. iv, D, 42).
I answer that, Just as in carnal generation a person is born of a
father and mother, so in spiritual generation a person is born again a
son of God as Father, and of the Church as Mother. Now while he who
confers the sacrament stands in the place of God, whose instrument and
minister he is, he who raises a baptized person from the sacred font,
or holds the candidate for Confirmation, stands in the place of the
Church. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted with both.
Reply to Objection 1: Not only the father, of whose seed the child is
born, is related carnally to the child, but also the mother who
provides the matter, and in whose womb the child is begotten. So too
the godparent who in place of the Church offers and raises the
candidate for Baptism and holds the candidate for Confirmation
contracts spiritual relationship.
Reply to Objection 2: He contracts spiritual relationship not by reason
of the instruction it is his duty to give, but on account of the
spiritual birth in which he co-operates.
Reply to Objection 3: A person who is not baptized cannot raise anyone
from the sacred font, since he is not a member of the Church whom the
godparent in Baptism represents: although he can baptize, because he is
a creature of God Whom the baptizer represents. And yet he cannot
contract a spiritual relationship, since he is void of spiritual life
to which man is first born by receiving Baptism.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship passes from husband to wife?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass
from husband to wife. For spiritual and bodily union are disparate and
differ generically. Therefore carnal union which is between husband and
wife cannot be the means of contracting a spiritual relationship.
Objection 2: Further, the godfather and godmother have more in common
in the spiritual birth that is the cause of spiritual relationship,
than a husband, who is godfather, has with his wife. Now godfather and
godmother do not hereby contract spiritual relationship. Therefore
neither does a wife contract a spiritual relationship through her
husband being godfather to someone.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that the husband is baptized, and
his wife not, for instance when he is converted from unbelief without
his wife being converted. Now spiritual relationship cannot be
contracted by one who is not baptized. Therefore it does not always
pass from husband to wife.
Objection 4: Further, husband and wife together can raise a person from
the sacred font, since no law forbids it. If therefore spiritual
relationship passed from husband to wife, it would follow that each of
them is twice godfather or godmother of the same individual: which is
absurd.
On the contrary, Spiritual goods are more communicable than bodily
goods. But the bodily consanguinity of the husband passes to his wife
by affinity. Much more therefore does spiritual relationship.
I answer that, A may become co-parent with B in two ways. First, by the
act of another (B), who baptizes A's child, or raises him in Baptism.
In this way spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife,
unless perchance it be his wife's child, for then she contracts
spiritual relationship directly, even as her husband. Secondly, by his
own act, for instance when he raises B's child from the sacred font,
and thus spiritual relationship passes to the wife if he has already
had carnal knowledge of her, but not if the marriage be not yet
consummated, since they are not as yet made one flesh: and this is by
way of a kind of affinity; wherefore it would seem on the same grounds
to pass to a woman of whom he has carnal knowledge, though she be not
his wife. Hence the verse: "I may not marry my own child's godmother,
nor the mother of my godchild: but I may marry the godmother of my
wife's child."
Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that corporal and spiritual union
differ generically we may conclude that the one is not the other, but
not that the one cannot cause the other, since things of different
genera sometimes cause one another either directly or indirectly.
Reply to Objection 2: The godfather and godmother of the same person
are not united in that person's spiritual birth save accidentally,
since one of them would be self-sufficient for the purpose. Hence it
does not follow from this that any spiritual relationship results
between them whereby they are hindered from marrying one another. Hence
the verse:
"Of two co-parents one is always spiritual, the other carnal: this rule
is infallible."
On the other hand, marriage by itself makes husband and wife one flesh:
wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: If the wife be not baptized, the spiritual
relationship will not reach her, because she is not a fit subject, and
not because spiritual relationship cannot pass from husband to wife
through marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: Since no spiritual relationship results between
godfather and godmother, nothing prevents husband and wife from raising
together someone from the sacred font. Nor is it absurd that the wife
become twice godmother of the same person from different causes, just
as it is possible for her to be connected in carnal relationship both
by affinity and consanguinity to the same person.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship passes to the godfather's carnal children?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass to
the godfather's carnal children. For no degrees are assigned to
spiritual relationship. Yet there would be degrees if it passed from
father to son, since the person begotten involves a change of degree,
as stated above ([4983]Q[55], A[5]). Therefore it does not pass to the
godfather's carnal sons.
Objection 2: Further, father and son are related in the same degree as
brother and brother. If therefore spiritual relationship passes from
father to son, it will equally pass from brother to brother: and this
is false.
On the contrary, This is proved by authority quoted in the text (Sent.
iv, D, 42).
I answer that, A son is something of his father and not conversely
(Ethic. viii, 12): wherefore spiritual relationship passes from father
to his carnal son and not conversely. Thus it is clear that there are
three spiritual relationships: one called spiritual fatherhood between
godfather and godchild; another called co-paternity between the
godparent and carnal parent of the same person; and the third is called
spiritual brotherhood, between godchild and the carnal children of the
same parent. Each of these hinders the contracting of marriage and
voids the contract.
Reply to Objection 1: The addition of a person by carnal generation
entails a degree with regard to a person connected by the same kind of
relationship, but not with regard to one connected by another kind of
relationship. Thus a son is connected with his father's wife in the
same degree as his father, but by another kind of relationship. Now
spiritual relationship differs in kind from carnal. Wherefore a godson
is not related to his godfather's carnal son in the same degree as the
latter's father is related to him, through whom the spiritual
relationship is contracted. Consequently it does not follow that
spiritual relationship admits of degrees.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is not part of his brother as a son is of
his father. But a wife is part of her husband, since she is made one
with him in body. Consequently the relationship does not pass from
brother to brother, whether the brother be born before or after
spiritual brotherhood.
__________________________________________________________________
OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS BY ADOPTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider legal relationship which is by adoption. Under
this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) What is adoption?
(2) Whether one contracts through it a tie that is an impediment to
marriage?
(3) Between which persons is this tie contracted.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether adoption is rightly defined?
Objection 1: It would seem that adoption is not rightly defined:
"Adoption is the act by which a person lawfully takes for his child or
grandchild and so on one who does not belong to him." For the child
should be subject to its father. Now, sometimes the person adopted does
not come under the power of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not
always the taking of someone as a child.
Objection 2: Further, "Parents should lay up for their children" (2
Cor. 12:14). But the adoptive father does not always necessarily lay up
for his adopted child, since sometimes the adopted does not inherit the
goods of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone
as a child.
Objection 3: Further, adoption, whereby someone is taken as a child, is
likened to natural procreation whereby a child is begotten naturally.
Therefore whoever is competent to beget a child naturally is competent
to adopt. But this is untrue, since neither one who is not his own
master, nor one who is not twenty-five years of age, nor a woman can
adopt, and yet they can beget a child naturally. Therefore, properly
speaking, adoption is not the taking of someone as a child.
Objection 4: Further, to take as one's child one who is not one's own
seems necessary in order to supply the lack of children begotten
naturally. Now one who is unable to beget, through being a eunuch or
impotent, suffers especially from the absence of children of his own
begetting. Therefore he is especially competent to adopt someone as his
child. But he is not competent to adopt. Therefore adoption is not the
taking of someone as one's child.
Objection 5: Further, in spiritual relationship, where someone is taken
as a child without carnal procreation, it is of no consequence whether
an older person become the father of a younger, or "vice versa," since
a youth can baptize an old man and "vice versa." Therefore, if by
adoption a person is taken as a child without being carnally begotten,
it would make no difference whether an older person adopted a younger,
or a younger an older person; which is not true. Therefore the same
conclusion follows.
Objection 6: Further, there is no difference of degree between adopted
and adopter. Therefore whoever is adopted, is adopted as a child; and
consequently it is not right to say that one may be adopted as a
grandchild.
Objection 7: Further, adoption is a result of love, wherefore God is
said to have adopted us as children through charity. Now we should have
greater charity towards those who are connected with us than towards
strangers. Therefore adoption should be not of a stranger but of
someone connected with us.
I answer that, Art imitates nature and supplies the defect of nature
where nature is deficient. Hence just as a man begets by natural
procreation, so by positive law which is the art of what is good and
just, one person can take to himself another as a child in likeness to
one that is his child by nature, in order to take the place of the
children he has lost, this being the chief reason why adoption was
introduced. And since taking implies a term "wherefrom," for which
reason the taker is not the thing taken, it follows that the person
taken as a child must be a stranger. Accordingly, just as natural
procreation has a term "whereto," namely the form which is the end of
generation, and a term "wherefrom," namely the contrary form, so legal
generation has a term "whereto," namely a child or grandchild, and a
term "wherefrom," namely, a stranger. Consequently the above definition
includes the genus of adoption, for it is described as a "lawful
taking," and the term "wherefrom," since it is said to be the taking of
"a stranger," and the term "whereto," because it says, "as a child or
grandchild ."
Reply to Objection 1: The sonship of adoption is an imitation of
natural sonship. Wherefore there are two species of adoption, one which
imitates natural sonship perfectly, and this is called "arrogatio,"
whereby the person adopted is placed under the power of the adopter;
and one who is thus adopted inherits from his adopted father if the
latter die intestate, nor can his father legally deprive him of a
fourth part of his inheritance. But no one can adopt in this way except
one who is his own master, one namely who has no father or, if he has,
is of age. There can be no adoption of this kind without the authority
of the sovereign. The other kind of adoption imitates natural sonship
imperfectly, and is called "simple adoption," and by this the adopted
does not come under the power of the adopter: so that it is a
disposition to perfect adoption, rather than perfect adoption itself.
In this way even one who is not his own master can adopt, without the
consent of the sovereign and with the authority of a magistrate: and
one who is thus adopted does not inherit the estate of the adopter, nor
is the latter bound to bequeath to him any of his goods in his will,
unless he will.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural procreation is directed to the production
of the species; wherefore anyone in whom the specific nature is not
hindered is competent to be able to beget naturally. But adoption is
directed to hereditary succession, wherefore those alone are competent
to adopt who have the power to dispose of their estate. Consequently
one who is not his own master, or who is less than twenty-five years of
age, or a woman, cannot adopt anyone, except by special permission of
the sovereign.
Reply to Objection 4: An inheritance cannot pass to posterity through
one who has a perpetual impediment from begetting: hence for this very
reason it ought to pass to those who ought to succeed to him by right
of relationship; and consequently he cannot adopt, as neither can he
beget. Moreover greater is sorrow for children lost than for children
one has never had. Wherefore those who are impeded from begetting need
no solace for their lack of children as those who have had and have
lost them, or could have had them but have them not by reason of some
accidental impediment.
Reply to Objection 5: Spiritual relationship is contracted through a
sacrament whereby the faithful are born again in Christ, in Whom there
is no difference between male and female, bondman and free, youth and
old age (Gal. 3:28; Col. 3:11). Wherefore anyone can indifferently
become another's godfather. But adoption aims at hereditary succession
and a certain subjection of the adopted to the adopter: and it is not
fitting that older persons should be subjected to younger in the care
of the household. Consequently a younger person cannot adopt an older;
but according to law the adopted person must be so much younger than
the adopter, that he might have been the child of his natural
begetting.
Reply to Objection 6: One may lose one's grandchildren and so forth
even as one may lose one's children. Wherefore since adoption was
introduced as a solace for children lost, just as someone may be
adopted in place of a child, so may someone be adopted in place of a
grandchild and so on.
Reply to Objection 7: A relative ought to succeed by right of
relationship; and therefore such a person is not competent to be chosen
to succeed by adoption. And if a relative, who is not competent to
inherit the estate, be adopted, he is adopted not as a relative, but as
a stranger lacking the right of succeeding to the adopter's goods.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a tie that is an impediment to marriage is contracted through
adoption?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not contracted through
adoption a tie that is an impediment to marriage. For spiritual care is
more excellent than corporeal care. But no tie of relationship is
contracted through one's being subjected to another's spiritual care:
else all those who dwell in the parish would be related to the parish
priest and would be unable to marry his son. Neither therefore can this
result from adoption which places the adopted under the care of the
adopter.
Objection 2: Further, no tie of relationship results from persons
conferring a benefit on another. But adoption is nothing but the
conferring of a benefit. Therefore no tie of relationship results from
adoption.
Objection 3: Further, a natural father provides for his child chiefly
in three things, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), namely
by giving him being, nourishment and education; and hereditary
succession is subsequent to these. Now no tie of relationship is
contracted by one's providing for a person's nourishment and education,
else a person would be related to his nourishers, tutors and masters,
which is false. Therefore neither is any relationship contracted
through adoption by which one inherits another's estate.
Objection 4: Further, the sacraments of the Church are not subject to
human laws. Now marriage is a sacrament of the Church. Since then
adoption was introduced by human law, it would seem that a tie
contracted from adoption cannot be an impediment to marriage.
On the contrary, Relationship is an impediment to marriage. Now a kind
of relationship results from adoption, namely legal relationship, as
evidenced by its definition, for "legal relationship is a connection
arising out of adoption." Therefore adoption results in a tie which is
an impediment to marriage.
Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 42).
I answer that, The Divine law especially forbids marriage between those
persons who have to live together lest, as Rabbi Moses observes (Doc.
Perp. iii, 49), if it were lawful for them to have carnal intercourse,
there should be more room for concupiscence to the repression of which
marriage is directed. And since the adopted child dwells in the house
of his adopted father like one that is begotten naturally human laws
forbid the contracting of marriage between the like, and this
prohibition is approved by the Church. Hence it is that legal adoption
is an impediment to marriage. This suffices for the Replies to the
first three Objections, because none of those things entails such a
cohabitation as might be an incentive to concupiscence. Therefore they
do not cause a relationship that is an impediment to marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: The prohibition of a human law would not suffice
to make an impediment to marriage, unless the authority of the Church
intervenes by issuing the same prohibition.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether legal relationship is contracted only between the adopting father
and the adopted child?
Objection 1: It would seem that a relationship of this kind is
contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child. For
it would seem that it ought above all to be contracted between the
adopting father and the natural mother of the adopted, as happens in
spiritual relationship. Yet there is no legal relationship between
them. Therefore it is not contracted between any other persons besides
the adopter and adopted.
Objection 2: Further, the relationship that impedes marriage is a
perpetual impediment. But there is not a perpetual impediment between
the adopted son and the naturally begotten daughter of the adopted;
because when the adoption terminates at the death of the adopter, or
when the adopted comes of age, the latter can marry her. Therefore he
was not related to her in such a way as to prevent him from marrying
her.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual relationship passes to no person
incapable of being a god-parent; wherefore it does not pass to one who
is not baptized. Now a woman cannot adopt, as stated above (A[1], ad
2). Therefore legal relationship does not pass from husband to wife.
Objection 4: Further, spiritual relationship is stronger than legal.
But spiritual relationship does not pass to a grandchild. Neither,
therefore, does legal relationship.
On the contrary, Legal relationship is more in agreement with carnal
union or procreation than spiritual relationship is. But spiritual
relationship passes to another person. Therefore legal relationship
does so also.
Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 42).
I answer that, Legal relationship is of three kinds. The first is in
the descending order as it were, and is contracted between the adoptive
father and the adopted child, the latter's child grandchild and so on;
the second is between the adopted child and the naturally begotten
child; the third is like a kind of affinity, and is between the
adoptive father and the wife of the adopted son, or contrariwise
between the adopted son and the wife of the adoptive father.
Accordingly the first and third relationships are perpetual impediments
to marriage: but the second is not, but only so long as the adopted
person remains under the power of the adoptive father, wherefore when
the father dies or when the child comes of age, they can be married.
Reply to Objection 1: By spiritual generation the son is not withdrawn
from the father's power, as in the case of adoption, so that the godson
remains the son of both at the same time, whereas the adopted son does
not. Hence no relationship is contracted between the adoptive father
and the natural mother or father, as was the case in spiritual
relationship.
Reply to Objection 2: Legal relationship is an impediment to marriage
on account of the parties dwelling together: hence when the need for
dwelling together ceases, it is not unreasonable that the aforesaid tie
cease, for instance when he ceases to be under the power of the same
father. But the adoptive father and his wife always retain a certain
authority over their adopted son and his wife, wherefore the tie
between them remains.
Reply to Objection 3: Even a woman can adopt by permission of the
sovereign, wherefore legal relationship passes also to her. Moreover
the reason why spiritual relationship does not pass to a non-baptized
person is not because such a person cannot be a god-parent but because
he is not a fit subject of spirituality.
Reply to Objection 4: By spiritual relationship the son is not placed
under the power and care of the godfather, as in legal relationship:
because it is necessary that whatever is in the son's power pass under
the power of the adoptive father. Wherefore if a father be adopted the
children and grandchildren who are in the power of the person adopted
are adopted also.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF IMPOTENCE, SPELL, FRENZY OR MADNESS, INCEST AND
DEFECTIVE AGE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider five impediments to marriage, namely the
impediments of impotence, spell, frenzy or madness, incest, and
defective age. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?
(2) Whether a spell is?
(3) Whether frenzy or madness is?
(4) Whether incest is?
(5) Whether defective age is?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that impotence is not an impediment to
marriage. For carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, since
marriage is more perfect when both parties observe continency by vow.
But impotence deprives marriage of nothing save carnal copulation.
Therefore it is not a diriment impediment to the marriage contract.
Objection 2: Further, just as impotence prevents carnal copulation so
does frigidity. But frigidity is not reckoned an impediment to
marriage. Therefore neither should impotence be reckoned as such.
Objection 3: Further, all old people are frigid. Yet old people can
marry. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: Further, if the woman knows the man to be frigid when she
marries him, the marriage is valid. Therefore frigidity, considered in
itself, is not an impediment to marriage.
Objection 5: Further, calidity may prove a sufficient incentive to
carnal copulation with one who is not a virgin, but not with one who
is, because it happens to be so weak as to pass away quickly, and is
therefore insufficient for the deflowering of a virgin. Or again it may
move a man sufficiently in regard to a beautiful woman, but
insufficiently in regard to an uncomely one. Therefore it would seem
that frigidity, although it be an impediment in regard to one, is not
an impediment absolutely.
Objection 6: Further, generally speaking woman is more frigid than man.
But women are not debarred from marriage. Neither therefore should men
be debarred on account of frigidity.
On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, De Frigidis et Malefic., cap.
Quod Sedem): "Just as a boy who is incapable of marital intercourse is
unfit to marry, so also those who are impotent are deemed most unfit
for the marriage contract." Now persons affected with frigidity are the
like. Therefore, etc.
Further, no one can bind himself to the impossible. Now in marriage man
binds himself to carnal copulation; because it is for this purpose that
he gives the other party power over his body. Therefore a frigid
person, being incapable of carnal copulation, cannot marry.
I answer that, In marriage there is a contract whereby one is bound to
pay the other the marital debt: wherefore just as in other contracts,
the bond is unfitting if a person bind himself to what he cannot give
or do, so the marriage contract is unfitting, if it be made by one who
cannot pay the marital debt. This impediment is called by the general
name of impotence as regards coition, and can arise either from an
intrinsic and natural cause, or from an extrinsic and accidental cause,
for instance spell, of which we shall speak later [4984](A[2]). If it
be due to a natural cause, this may happen in two ways. For either it
is temporary, and can be remedied by medicine, or by the course of
time, and then it does not void a marriage: or it is perpetual and then
it voids marriage, so that the party who labors under this impediment
remains for ever without hope of marriage, while the other may "marry
to whom she will . . . in the Lord" (1 Cor. 7:39). In order to
ascertain whether the impediment be perpetual or not, the Church has
appointed a fixed time, namely three years, for putting the matter to a
practical proof: and if after three years, during which both parties
have honestly endeavored to fulfil their marital intercourse, the
marriage remain unconsummated, the Church adjudges the marriage to be
dissolved. And yet the Church is sometimes mistaken in this, because
three years are sometimes insufficient to prove impotence to be
perpetual. Wherefore if the Church find that she has been mistaken,
seeing that the subject of the impediment has completed carnal
copulation with another or with the same person, she reinstates the
former marriage and dissolves the subsequent one, although the latter
has been contracted with her permission. [*"Nowadays it is seldom
necessary to examine too closely into this matter, as all cases arising
from it are treated as far as possible under the form of dispensations
of non-consummated marriages." Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, article
Canonical Impediments.]
Reply to Objection 1: Although the act of carnal copulation is not
essential to marriage, ability to fulfill the act is essential, because
marriage gives each of the married parties power over the other's body
in relation to marital intercourse.
Reply to Objection 2: Excessive calidity can scarcely be a perpetual
impediment. If, however, it were to prove an impediment to marital
intercourse for three years it would be adjudged to be perpetual.
Nevertheless, since frigidity is a greater and more frequent impediment
(for it not only hinders the mingling of seeds but also weakens the
members which co-operate in the union of bodies), it is accounted an
impediment rather than calidity, since all natural defects are reduced
to frigidity.
Reply to Objection 3: Although old people have not sufficient calidity
to procreate, they have sufficient to copulate. Wherefore they are
allowed to marry, in so far as marriage is intended as a remedy,
although it does not befit them as fulfilling an office of nature.
Reply to Objection 4: In all contracts it is agreed on all hands that
anyone who is unable to satisfy an obligation is unfit to make a
contract which requires the fulfilling of that obligation. Now this
inability is of two kinds. First, because a person is unable to fulfill
the obligation "de jure," and such inability renders the contract
altogether void, whether the party with whom he contracts knows of this
or not. Secondly, because he is unable to fulfill "de facto"; and then
if the party with whom he contracts knows of this and, notwithstanding,
enters the contract, this shows that the latter seeks some other end
from the contract, and the contract stands. But if he does not know of
it the contract is void. Consequently frigidity which causes such an
impotence that a man cannot "de facto" pay the marriage debt, as also
the condition of slavery, whereby a man cannot "de facto" give his
service freely, are impediments to marriage, when the one married party
does not know that the other is unable to pay the marriage debt. But an
impediment whereby a person cannot pay the marriage debt "de jure," for
instance consanguinity, voids the marriage contract, whether the other
party knows of it or not. For this reason the Master holds (Sent. iv,
D, 34) that these two impediments, frigidity and slavery, make it not
altogether unlawful for their subjects to marry.
Reply to Objection 5: A man cannot have a perpetual natural impediment
in regard to one person and not in regard to another. But if he cannot
fulfill the carnal act with a virgin, while he can with one who is not
a virgin, the hymeneal membrane may be broken by a medical instrument,
and thus he may have connection with her. Nor would this be contrary to
nature, for it would be done not for pleasure but for a remedy. Dislike
for a woman is not a natural cause, but an accidental extrinsic cause:
and therefore we must form the same judgment in its regard as about
spells, of which we shall speak further on [4985](A[2]).
Reply to Objection 6: The male is the agent in procreation, and the
female is the patient, wherefore greater calidity is required in the
male than in the female for the act of procreation. Hence the frigidity
which renders the man impotent would not disable the woman. Yet there
may be a natural impediment from another cause, namely stricture, and
then we must judge of stricture in the woman in the same way as of
frigidity in the man.
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Whether a spell can be an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that a spell cannot be an impediment to
marriage. For the spells in question are caused by the operation of
demons. But the demons have no more power to prevent the marriage act
than other bodily actions; and these they cannot prevent, for thus they
would upset the whole world if they hindered eating and walking and the
like. Therefore they cannot hinder marriage by spells.
Objection 2: Further, God's work is stronger than the devil's. But a
spell is the work of the devil. Therefore it cannot hinder marriage
which is the work of God.
Objection 3: Further, no impediment, unless it be perpetual, voids the
marriage contract. But a spell cannot be a perpetual impediment, for
since the devil has no power over others than sinners, the spell will
be removed if the sin be cast out, or by another spell, or by the
exorcisms of the Church which are employed for the repression of the
demon's power. Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment to marriage.
Objection 4: Further, carnal copulation cannot be hindered, unless
there be an impediment to the generative power which is its principle.
But the generative power of one man is equally related to all women.
Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment in respect of one woman
without being so also in respect of all.
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. 1, cap.
iv): "If by sorcerers or witches . . . ," and further on, "if they be
incurable, they must be separated."
Further, the demons' power is greater than man's: "There is no power
upon earth that can be compared with him who was made to fear no one"
(Job 41:24). Now through the action of man, a person may be rendered
incapable of carnal copulation by some power or by castration; and this
is an impediment to marriage. Therefore much more can this be done by
the power of a demon.
I answer that, Some have asserted that witchcraft is nothing in the
world but an imagining of men who ascribed to spells those natural
effects the causes of which are hidden. But this is contrary to the
authority of holy men who state that the demons have power over men's
bodies and imaginations, when God allows them: wherefore by their means
wizards can work certain signs. Now this opinion grows from the root of
unbelief or incredulity, because they do not believe that demons exist
save only in the imagination of the common people, who ascribe to the
demon the terrors which a man conjures from his thoughts, and because,
owing to a vivid imagination, certain shapes such as he has in his
thoughts become apparent to the senses, and then he believes that he
sees the demons. But such assertions are rejected by the true faith
whereby we believe that angels fell from heaven, and that the demons
exist, and that by reason of their subtle nature they are able to do
many things which we cannot; and those who induce them to do such
things are called wizards.
Wherefore others have maintained that witchcraft can set up an
impediment to carnal copulation, but that no such impediment is
perpetual: hence it does not void the marriage contract, and they say
that the laws asserting this have been revoked. But this is contrary to
actual facts and to the new legislation which agrees with the old.
We must therefore draw a distinction: for the inability to copulate
caused by witchcraft is either perpetual and then it voids marriage, or
it is not perpetual and then it does not void marriage. And in order to
put this to practical proof the Church has fixed the space of three
years in the same way as we have stated with regard to frigidity
[4986](A[1]). There is, however this difference between a spell and
frigidity, that a person who is impotent through frigidity is equally
impotent in relation to one as to another, and consequently when the
marriage is dissolved, he is not permitted to marry another woman.
whereas through witchcraft a man may be rendered impotent in relation
to one woman and not to another, and consequently when the Church
adjudges the marriage to be dissolved, each party is permitted to seek
another partner in marriage.
Reply to Objection 1: The first corruption of sin whereby man became
the slave of the devil was transmitted to us by the act of the
generative power, and for this reason God allows the devil to exercise
his power of witchcraft in this act more than in others. Even so the
power of witchcraft is made manifest in serpents more than in other
animals according to Gn. 3, since the devil tempted the woman through a
serpent.
Reply to Objection 2: God's work may be hindered by the devil's work
with God's permission; not that the devil is stronger than God so as to
destroy His works by violence.
Reply to Objection 3: Some spells are so perpetual that they can have
no human remedy, although God might afford a remedy by coercing the
demon, or the demon by desisting. For, as wizards themselves admit, it
does not always follow that what was done by one kind of witchcraft can
be destroyed by another kind, and even though it were possible to use
witchcraft as a remedy, it would nevertheless be reckoned to be
perpetual, since nowise ought one to invoke the demon's help by
witchcraft. Again, if the devil has been given power over a person on
account of sin, it does not follow that his power ceases with the sin,
because the punishment sometimes continues after the fault has been
removed. And again, the exorcisms of the Church do not always avail to
repress the demons in all their molestations of the body, if God will
it so, but they always avail against those assaults of the demons
against which they are chiefly instituted.
Reply to Objection 4: Witchcraft sometimes causes an impediment in
relation to all, sometimes in relation to one only: because the devil
is a voluntary cause not acting from natural necessity. Moreover, the
impediment resulting from witchcraft may result from an impression made
by the demon on a man's imagination, whereby he is deprived of the
concupiscence that moves him in regard to a particular woman and not to
another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether madness is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that madness is not an impediment to
marriage. For spiritual marriage which is contracted in Baptism is more
excellent than carnal marriage. But mad persons can be baptized.
Therefore they can also marry.
Objection 2: Further, frigidity is an impediment to marriage because it
impedes carnal copulation, which is not impeded by madness. Therefore
neither is marriage impeded thereby.
Objection 3: Further, marriage is not voided save by a perpetual
impediment. But one cannot tell whether madness is a perpetual
impediment. Therefore it does not void marriage.
Objection 4: Further, the impediments that hinder marriage are
sufficiently contained in the verses given above ([4987]Q[50]). But
they contain no mention of madness. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, Madness removes the use of reason more than error
does. But error is an impediment to marriage. Therefore madness is
also.
Further, mad persons are not fit for making contracts. But marriage is
a contract. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, The madness is either previous or subsequent to
marriage. If subsequent, it nowise voids the marriage, but if it be
previous, then the mad person either has lucid intervals, or not. If he
has, then although it is not safe for him to marry during that
interval, since he would not know how to educate his children, yet if
he marries, the marriage is valid. But if he has no lucid intervals, or
marries outside a lucid interval, then, since there can be no consent
without use of reason, the marriage will be invalid.
Reply to Objection 1: The use of reason is not necessary for Baptism as
its cause, in which way it is necessary for matrimony. Hence the
comparison fails. We have, however, spoken of the Baptism of mad
persons ([4988]TP, Q[68], A[12]).
Reply to Objection 2: Madness impedes marriage on the part of the
latter's cause which is the consent, although not on the part of the
act as frigidity does. Yet the Master treats of it together with
frigidity, because both are defects of nature (Sent. iv, D, 34).
Reply to Objection 3: A passing impediment which hinders the cause of
marriage, namely the consent, voids marriage altogether. But an
impediment that hinders the act must needs be perpetual in order to
void the marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: This impediment is reducible to error, since in
either case there is lack of consent on the part of the reason.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether marriage is annulled by the husband committing incest with his
wife's sister?
Objection 1: It would seem that marriage is not annulled by the husband
committing incest with his wife's sister. For the wife should not be
punished for her husband's sin. Yet she would be punished if the
marriage were annulled. Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater sin to know one's own relative,
than to know the relative of one's wife. But the former sin is not an
impediment to marriage. Therefore neither is the second.
Objection 3: Further, if this is inflicted as a punishment of the sin,
it would seem, if the incestuous husband marry even after his wife's
death, that they ought to be separated: which is not true.
Objection 4: Further, this impediment is not mentioned among those
enumerated above ([4989]Q[50]). Therefore it does not void the marriage
contract.
On the contrary, By knowing his wife's sister he contracts affinity,
with his wife. But affinity voids the marriage contract. Therefore the
aforesaid incest does also.
Further, by whatsoever a man sinneth, by the same also is he punished.
Now such a man sins against marriage. Therefore he ought to be punished
by being deprived of marriage.
I answer that, If a man has connection with the sister or other
relative of his wife before contracting marriage, even after his
betrothal, the marriage should be broken off on account of the
resultant affinity. If, however, the connection take place after the
marriage has been contracted and consummated, the marriage must not be
altogether dissolved: but the husband loses his right to marital
intercourse, nor can he demand it without sin. And yet he must grant it
if asked, because the wife should not be punished for her husband's
sin. But after the death of his wife he ought to remain without any
hope of marriage, unless he receive a dispensation on account of his
frailty, through fear of unlawful intercourse. If, however, he marry
without a dispensation, he sins by contravening the law of the Church,
but his marriage is not for this reason to be annulled. This suffices
for the Replies to the Objections, for incest is accounted an
impediment to marriage not so much for its being a sin as on account of
the affinity which it causes. For this reason it is not mentioned with
the other impediments, but is included in the impediment of affinity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether defective age is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that deficient age is not an impediment to
marriage. For according to the laws children are under the care of a
guardian until their twenty-fifth year. Therefore it would seem that
before that age their reason is not sufficiently mature to give
consent, and consequently that ought seemingly to be the age fixed for
marrying. Yet marriage can be contracted before that age. Therefore
lack of the appointed age is not an impediment to marriage.
Objection 2: Further, just as the tie of religion is perpetual so is
the marriage tie. Now according to the new legislation (cap. Non Solum,
De regular. et transeunt.) no one can be professed before the
fourteenth year of age. Therefore neither could a person marry if
defective age were an impediment.
Objection 3: Further, just as consent is necessary for marriage on the
part of the man, so is it on the part of the woman. Now a woman can
marry before the age of fourteen. Therefore a man can also.
Objection 4: Further, inability to copulate, unless it be perpetual and
not known, is not an impediment to marriage. But lack of age is neither
perpetual nor unknown. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.
Objection 5: Further, it is not included under any of the aforesaid
impediments ([4990]Q[50]), and consequently would seem not to be an
impediment to marriage.
On the contrary, A Decretal (cap. Quod Sedem, De frigid et malefic.)
says that "a boy who is incapable of marriage intercourse is unfit to
marry." But in the majority of cases he cannot pay the marriage debt
before the age of fourteen (De Animal. vii). Therefore, etc.
Further, "There is a fixed limit of size and growth for all things in
nature" according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4): and consequently
it would seem that, since marriage is natural, it must have a fixed age
by defect of which it is impeded.
I answer that, Since marriage is effected by way of a contract, it
comes under the ordinance of positive law like other contracts.
Consequently according to law (cap. Tua, De sponsal. impub.) it is
determined that marriage may not be contracted before the age of
discretion when each party is capable of sufficient deliberation about
marriage, and of mutual fulfilment of the marriage debt, and that
marriages otherwise contracted are void. Now for the most part this age
is the fourteenth year in males and the twelfth year in women: but
since the ordinances of positive law are consequent upon what happens
in the majority of cases, if anyone reach the required perfection
before the aforesaid age, so that nature and reason are sufficiently
developed to supply the lack of age, the marriage is not annulled.
Wherefore if the parties who marry before the age of puberty have
marital intercourse before the aforesaid age, their marriage is none
the less perpetually indissoluble.
Reply to Objection 1: In matters to which nature inclines there is not
required such a development of reason in order to deliberate, as in
other matters: and therefore it is possible after deliberation to
consent to marriage before one is able to manage one's own affairs in
other matters without a guardian.
Reply to Objection 2: The same answer applies, since the religious vow
is about matters outside the inclination of nature, and which offer
greater difficulty than marriage.
Reply to Objection 3: It is said that woman comes to the age of puberty
sooner than man does (De Animal. ix); hence there is no parallel
between the two.
Reply to Objection 4: In this case there is an impediment not only as
to inability to copulate, but also on account of the defect of the
reason, which is not yet qualified to give rightly that consent which
is to endure in perpetuity.
Reply to Objection 5: The impediment arising from defective age, like
that which arises from madness, is reducible to the impediment of
error; because a man has not yet the full use of his free-will.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DISPARITY OF WORSHIP AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider disparity of worship as an impediment to marriage.
Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?
(2) Whether there is marriage between unbelievers?
(3) Whether a husband being converted to the faith can remain with his
wife if she be unwilling to be converted?
(4) Whether he may leave his unbelieving wife?
(5) Whether after putting her away he may take another wife?
(6) Whether a husband may put aside his wife on account of other sins
as he may for unbelief?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?
Objection 1: It would seem that a believer can marry an unbeliever. For
Joseph married an Egyptian woman, and Esther married Assuerus: and in
both marriages there was disparity of worship, since one was an
unbeliever and the other a believer. Therefore disparity of worship
previous to marriage is not an impediment thereto.
Objection 2: Further, the Old Law teaches the same faith as the New.
But according to the Old Law there could be marriage between a believer
and an unbeliever, as evidenced by Dt. 21:10 seqq.: "If thou go out to
the fight . . . and seest in the number of the captives a beautiful
woman and lovest her, and wilt have her to wife . . . thou shalt go in
unto her, and shalt sleep with her, and she shall be thy wife."
Therefore it is lawful also under the New Law.
Objection 3: Further, betrothal is directed to marriage. Now there can
be a betrothal between a believer and an unbeliever in the case where a
condition is made of the latter's future conversion. Therefore under
the same condition there can be marriage between them.
Objection 4: Further, every impediment to marriage is in some way
contrary to marriage. But unbelief is not contrary to marriage, since
marriage fulfills an office of nature whose dictate faith surpasses.
Therefore disparity of worship is not an impediment to marriage.
Objection 5: Further, there is sometime disparity of worship even
between two persons who are baptized, for instance when, after Baptism,
a person falls into heresy. Yet if such a person marry a believer, it
is nevertheless a valid marriage. Therefore disparity of worship is not
an impediment to marriage.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 6:14): "What concord hath light
with darkness? [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath light with darkness? And
what concord hath Christ with Belial?']" Now there is the greatest
concord between husband and wife. Therefore one who is in the light of
faith cannot marry one who is in the darkness of unbelief.
Further, it is written (Malachi 2:11): "Juda hath profaned the holiness
of the Lord, which he loved, and hath married the daughter of a strange
god." But such had not been the case if they could have married
validly. Therefore disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage.
I answer that, The chief good of marriage is the offspring to be
brought up to the worship of God. Now since education is the work of
father and mother in common, each of them intends to bring up the child
to the worship of God according to their own faith. Consequently if
they be of different faith, the intention of the one will be contrary
to the intention of the other, and therefore there cannot be a fitting
marriage between them. For this reason disparity of faith previous to
marriage is an impediment to the marriage contract.
Reply to Objection 1: In the Old Law it was allowable to marry with
certain unbelievers, and forbidden with others. It was however
especially forbidden with regard to inhabitants of the land of Canaan,
both because the Lord had commanded them to be slain on account of
their obstinacy, and because it was fraught with a greater danger, lest
to wit they should pervert to idolatry those whom they married or their
children, since the Israelites were more liable to adopt their rites
and customs through dwelling among them. But it was permitted in regard
to other unbelievers, especially when there could be no fear of their
being drawn into idolatry. And thus Joseph, Moses, and Esther married
unbelievers. But under the New Law which is spread throughout the whole
world the prohibition extends with equal reason to all unbelievers.
Hence disparity of worship previous to marriage is an impediment to its
being contracted and voids the contract.
Reply to Objection 2: This law either refers to other nations with whom
they could lawfully marry, or to the case when the captive woman was
willing to be converted to the faith and worship of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Present is related to present in the same way as
future to future. Wherefore just as when marriage is contracted in the
present, unity of worship is required in both contracting parties, so
in the case of a betrothal, which is a promise of future marriage, it
suffices to add the condition of future unity of worship.
Reply to Objection 4: It has been made clear that disparity of worship
is contrary to marriage in respect of its chief good, which is the good
of the offspring.
Reply to Objection 5: Matrimony is a sacrament: and therefore so far as
the sacramental essentials are concerned, it requires purity with
regard to the sacrament of faith, namely Baptism, rather than with
regard to interior faith. For which reason also this impediment is not
called disparity of faith, but disparity of worship which concerns
outward service, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 9[4991], Q[1], A[1],
qu. 1). Consequently if a believer marry a baptized heretic, the
marriage is valid, although he sins by marrying her if he knows her to
be a heretic: even so he would sin were he to marry an excommunicate
woman, and yet the marriage would not be void: whereas on the other
hand if a catechumen having right faith but not having been baptized
were to marry a baptized believer, the marriage would not be valid.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there can be marriage between unbelievers?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no marriage between
unbelievers. For matrimony is a sacrament of the Church. Now Baptism is
the door of the sacraments. Therefore unbelievers, since they are not
baptized, cannot marry any more than they can receive other sacraments.
Objection 2: Further, two evils are a greater impediment to good than
one. But the unbelief of only one party is an impediment to marriage.
Much more, therefore, is the unbelief of both, and consequently there
can be no marriage between unbelievers.
Objection 3: Further, just as there is disparity of worship between
believer and unbeliever, so can there be between two unbelievers, for
instance if one be a heathen and the other a Jew. Now disparity of
worship is an impediment to marriage, as stated above [4992](A[1]).
Therefore there can be no valid marriage at least between unbelievers
of different worship.
Objection 4: Further, in marriage there is real chastity. But according
to Augustine (De Adult. Conjug. i, 18) there is no real chastity
between an unbeliever and his wife, and these words are quoted in the
Decretals (XXVIII, qu. i, can. Sic enim.). Neither therefore is there a
true marriage.
Objection 5: Further, true marriage excuses carnal intercourse from
sin. But marriage contracted between unbelievers cannot do this, since
"the whole life of unbelievers is a sin," as a gloss observes on Rom.
14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin." Therefore there is no true
marriage between unbelievers.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:12): "If any brother hath a
wife that believeth not, and she consent to dwell with him, let him not
put her away." But she is not called his wife except by reason of
marriage. Therefore marriage between unbelievers is a true marriage.
Further, the removal of what comes after does not imply the removal of
what comes first. Now marriage belongs to an office of nature, which
precedes the state of grace, the principle of which is faith. Therefore
unbelief does not prevent the existence of marriage between
unbelievers.
I answer that, Marriage was instituted chiefly for the good of the
offspring, not only as to its begetting---since this can be effected
even without marriage---but also as to its advancement to a perfect
state, because everything intends naturally to bring its effect to
perfection. Now a twofold perfection is to be considered in the
offspring. one is the perfection of nature, not only as regards the
body but also as regards the soul, by those means which are of the
natural law. The other is the perfection of grace: and the former
perfection is material and imperfect in relation to the latter.
Consequently, since those things which are for the sake of the end are
proportionate to the end, the marriage that tends to the first
perfection is imperfect and material in comparison with that which
tends to the second perfection. And since the first perfection can be
common to unbelievers and believers, while the second belongs only to
believers, it follows that between unbelievers there is marriage
indeed, but not perfected by its ultimate perfection as there is
between believers.
Reply to Objection 1: Marriage was instituted not only as a sacrament,
but also as an office of nature. And therefore, although marriage is
not competent to unbelievers, as a sacrament dependent on the
dispensation of the Church's ministers, it is nevertheless competent to
them as fulfilling an office of nature. And yet even a marriage of this
kind is a sacrament after the manner of a habit, although it is not
actually since they do not marry actually in the faith of the Church.
Reply to Objection 2: Disparity of worship is an impediment to
marriage, not by reason of unbelief, but on account of the difference
of faith. For disparity of worship hinders not only the second
perfection of the offspring, but also the first, since the parents
endeavor to draw their children in different directions, which is not
the case when both are unbelievers.
Reply to Objection 3: As already stated (ad 1) there is marriage
between unbelievers, in so far as marriage fulfills an office of
nature. Now those things that pertain to the natural law are
determinable by positive law: and therefore if any law among
unbelievers forbid the contracting of marriage with unbelievers of a
different rite, the disparity of worship will be an impediment to their
intermarrying. They are not, however, forbidden by Divine law, because
before God, however much one may stray from the faith, this makes no
difference to one's being removed from grace: nor is it forbidden by
any law of the Church who has not to judge of those who are without.
Reply to Objection 4: The chastity and other virtues of unbelievers are
said not to be real, because they cannot attain the end of real virtue,
which is real happiness. Thus we say it is not a real wine if it has
not the effect of wine.
Reply to Objection 5: An unbeliever does not sin in having intercourse
with his wife, if he pays her the marriage debt, for the good of the
offspring, or for the troth whereby he is bound to her: since this is
an act of justice and of temperance which observes the due circumstance
in pleasure of touch; even as neither does he sin in performing acts of
other civic virtues. Again, the reason why the whole life of
unbelievers is said to be a sin is not that they sin in every act, but
because they cannot be delivered from the bondage of sin by that which
they do.
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Whether the husband, being converted to the faith, may remain with his wife
is she be unwilling to be converted?
Objection 1: It would seem that when a husband is converted to the
faith he cannot remain with his wife who is an unbeliever and is
unwilling to be converted, and whom he had married while he was yet an
unbeliever. For where the danger is the same one should take the same
precautions. Now a believer is forbidden to marry an unbeliever for
fear of being turned away from the faith. Since then if the believer
remain with the unbeliever whom he had married previously, the danger
is the same, in fact greater, for neophytes are more easily perverted
than those who have been brought up in the faith, it would seem that a
believer, after being converted, cannot remain with an unbeliever.
Objection 2: Further, "An unbeliever cannot remain united to her who
has been received into the Christian faith" (Decretals, XXVIII, qu. 1,
can. Judaei). Therefore a believer is bound to put away a wife who does
not believe.
Objection 3: Further, a marriage contracted between believers is more
perfect than one contracted between unbelievers. Now, if believers
marry within the degrees forbidden by the Church, their marriage is
void. Therefore the same applies to unbelievers, and thus a believing
husband cannot remain with an unbelieving wife, at any rate, if as an
unbeliever he married her within the forbidden degrees.
Objection 4: Further, sometimes an unbeliever has several wives
recognized by his law. If, then, he can remain with those whom he
married while yet an unbeliever, it would seem that even after his
conversion he can retain several wives.
Objection 5: Further, it may happen that after divorcing his first wife
he has married a second, and that he is converted during this latter
marriage. It would seem therefore that at least in this case he cannot
remain with this second wife.
On the contrary, The Apostle counsels him to remain (1 Cor. 7:12).
Further, no impediment that supervenes upon a true marriage dissolves
it. Now it was a true marriage when they were both unbelievers.
Therefore when one of them is converted, the marriage is not annulled
on that account; and thus it would seem that they may lawfully remain
together.
I answer that, The faith of a married person does not dissolve but
perfects the marriage. Wherefore, since there is true marriage between
unbelievers, as stated above (A[2], ad 1), the marriage tie is not
broken by the fact that one of them is converted to the faith, but
sometimes while the marriage tie remains, the marriage is dissolved as
to cohabitation and marital intercourse, wherein unbelief and adultery
are on a par, since both are against the good of the offspring.
Consequently, the husband has the same power to put away an unbelieving
wife or to remain with her, as he has to put away an adulterous wife or
to remain with her. For an innocent husband is free to remain with an
adulterous wife in the hope of her amendment, but not if she be
obstinate in her sin of adultery, lest he seem to approve of her
disgrace; although even if there be hope of her amendment he is free to
put her away. In like manner the believer after his conversion may
remain with the unbeliever in the hope of her conversion, if he see
that she is not obstinate in her unbelief, and he does well in
remaining with her, though not bound to do so: and this is what the
Apostle counsels (1 Cor. 7:12).
Reply to Objection 1: It is easier to prevent a thing being done than
to undo what is rightly done. Hence there are many things that impede
the contracting of marriage if they precede it, which nevertheless
cannot dissolve it if they follow it. Such is the case with affinity
([4993]Q[55], A[6]): and it is the same with disparity of worship.
Reply to Objection 2: In the early Church at the time of the apostles,
both Jews and Gentiles were everywhere converted to the faith: and
consequently the believing husband could then have a reasonable hope
for his wife's conversion, even though she did not promise to be
converted. Afterwards, however, as time went on the Jews became more
obstinate than the Gentiles, because the Gentiles still continued to
come to the faith, for instance, at the time of the martyrs, and at the
time of Constantine and thereabouts. Wherefore it was not safe then for
a believer to cohabit with an unbelieving Jewish wife, nor was there
hope for her conversion as for that of a Gentile wife. Consequently,
then, the believer could, after his conversion, cohabit with his wife
if she were a Gentile, but not if she were a Jewess, unless she
promised to be converted. This is the sense of that decree. Now,
however, they are on a par, namely Gentiles and Jews, because both are
obstinate; and therefore unless the unbelieving wife be willing to be
converted, he is not allowed to cohabit with her, be she Gentile or
Jew.
Reply to Objection 3: Non-baptized unbelievers are not bound by the
laws of the Church, but they are bound by the ordinances of the Divine
law. Hence unbelievers who have married within the degrees forbidden by
the Divine law, whether both or one of them be converted to the faith,
cannot continue in a like marriage. But if they have married within the
degrees forbidden by a commandment of the Church, they can remain
together if both be converted, or if one be converted and there be hope
of the other's conversion.
Reply to Objection 4: To have several wives is contrary to the natural
law by which even unbelievers are bound. Wherefore an unbeliever is not
truly married save to her whom he married first. Consequently if he be
converted with all his wives, he may remain with the first, and must
put the others away. If, however, the first refuse to be converted, and
one of the others be converted, he has the same right to marry her
again as he would have to marry another. We shall treat of this matter
further on [4994](A[5]).
Reply to Objection 5: To divorce a wife is contrary to the law of
nature, wherefore it is not lawful for an unbeliever to divorce his
wife. Hence if he be converted after divorcing one and marrying
another, the same judgment is to be pronounced in this case as in the
case of a man who had several wives, because if he wish to be converted
he is bound to take the first whom he had divorced and to put the other
away.
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Whether a believer can, after his conversion, put away his unbelieving wife
if she be willing to cohabit with him without insult to the Creator?
Objection 1: It would seem that a believer, after his conversion,
cannot put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing to cohabit with
him without insult to the Creator. For the husband is more bound to his
wife than a slave to his master. But a converted slave is not freed
from the bond of slavery, as appears from 1 Cor. 7:21; 1 Tim. 6:1.
Therefore neither can a believing husband put away his unbelieving
wife.
Objection 2: Further, no one may act to another's prejudice without the
latter's consent. Now the unbelieving wife had a right in the body of
her unbelieving husband. If, then, her husband's conversion to the
faith could be prejudicial to the wife, so that he would be free to put
her away, the husband could not be converted to the faith without his
wife's consent, even as he cannot receive orders or vow continence
without her consent.
Objection 3: Further, if a man, whether slave or free, knowingly marry
a bondwoman, he cannot put her away on account of her different
condition. Since, then, the husband, when he married an unbeliever,
knew that she was an unbeliever, it would seem that in like manner he
cannot put her away on account of her unbelief.
Objection 4: Further, a father is in duty bound to work for the
salvation of his children. But if he were to leave his unbelieving
wife, the children of their union would remain with the mother, because
"the offspring follows the womb," and thus their salvation would be
imperiled. Therefore he cannot lawfully put away his unbelieving wife.
Objection 5: Further, an adulterous husband cannot put away an
adulterous wife, even after he has done penance for his adultery.
Therefore if an adulterous and an unbelieving husband are to be judged
alike, neither can the believer put aside the unbeliever, even after
his conversion to the faith.
On the contrary, are the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:15,16).
Further, spiritual adultery is more grievous than carnal. But a man can
put his wife away, as to cohabitation, on account of carnal adultery.
Much more, therefore, can he do so on account of unbelief, which is
spiritual adultery.
I answer that, Different things are competent and expedient to man
according as his life is of one kind or of another. Wherefore he who
dies to his former life is not bound to those things to which he was
bound in his former life. Hence it is that he who vowed certain things
while living in the world is not bound to fulfill them when he dies to
the world by adopting the religious life. Now he who is baptized is
regenerated in Christ and dies to his former life, since the generation
of one thing is the corruption of another, and consequently he is freed
from the obligation whereby he was bound to pay his wife the marriage
debt, and is not bound to cohabit with her when she is unwilling to be
converted, although in a certain case he is free to do so, as stated
above [4995](A[3]), just as a religious is free to fulfill the vows he
took in the world, if they be not contrary to his religious profession,
although he is not bound to do so.
Reply to Objection 1: Bondage is not inconsistent with the perfection
of the Christian religion, which makes a very special profession of
humility. But the obligation to a wife, or the conjugal bond, is
somewhat derogatory to the perfection of Christian life, the highest
state of which is in the possession of the continent: hence the
comparison fails. Moreover one married party is not bound to the other
as the latter's possession, as a slave to his master, but by way of a
kind of partnership, which is unfitting between unbeliever and believer
as appears from 2 Cor. 6:15; hence there is no comparison between a
slave and a married person.
Reply to Objection 2: The wife had a right in the body of her husband
only as long as he remained in the life wherein he had married, since
also when the husband dies the wife "is delivered from the law of her
husband" (Rom. 7:3). Wherefore if the husband leave her after he has
changed his life by dying to his former life, this is nowise
prejudicial to her. Now he who goes over to the religious life dies but
a spiritual death and not a bodily death. Wherefore if the marriage be
consummated, the husband cannot enter religion without his wife's
consent, whereas he can before carnal connection when there is only a
spiritual connection. On the other hand, he who is baptized is even
corporeally buried together with Christ unto death; and therefore he is
freed from paying the marriage debt even after the marriage has been
consummated.
We may also reply that it is through her own fault in refusing to be
converted that the wife suffers prejudice.
Reply to Objection 3: Disparity of worship makes a person simply unfit
for lawful marriage, whereas the condition of bondage does not, but
only where it is unknown. Hence there is no comparison between an
unbeliever and a bondswoman.
Reply to Objection 4: Either the child has reached a perfect age, and
then it is free to follow either the believing father or the
unbelieving mother, or else it is under age, and then it should be
given to the believer notwithstanding that it needs the mother's care
for its education.
Reply to Objection 5: By doing penance the adulterer does not enter
another life as an unbeliever by being baptized. Hence the comparison
fails.
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Whether the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife can take another wife?
Objection 1: It would seem that the believer who leaves his unbelieving
wife cannot take another wife. For indissolubility is of the nature of
marriage, since it is contrary to the natural law to divorce one's
wife. Now there was true marriage between them as unbelievers.
Therefore their marriage can nowise be dissolved. But as long as a man
is bound by marriage to one woman he cannot marry another. Therefore a
believer who leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another wife.
Objection 2: Further, a crime subsequent to marriage does not dissolve
the marriage. Now, if the wife be willing to cohabit without insult to
the Creator, the marriage tie is not dissolved, since the husband
cannot marry another. Therefore the sin of the wife who refuses to
cohabit without insult to the Creator does not dissolve the marriage so
that her husband be free to take another wife.
Objection 3: Further, husband and wife are equal in the marriage tie.
Since, then, it is unlawful for the unbelieving wife to marry again
while her husband lives, it would seem that neither can the believing
husband do so.
Objection 4: Further, the vow of continence is more favorable than the
marriage contract. Now seemingly it is not lawful for the believing
husband to take a vow of continence without the consent of his
unbelieving wife, since then the latter would be deprived of marriage
if she were afterwards converted. Much less therefore is it lawful for
him to take another wife.
Objection 5: Further, the son who persists in unbelief after his
father's conversion loses the right to inherit from his father: and yet
if he be afterwards converted, the inheritance is restored to him even
though another should have entered into possession thereof. Therefore
it would seem that in like manner, if the unbelieving wife be
converted, her husband ought to be restored to her even though he
should have married another wife: yet this would be impossible if the
second marriage were valid. Therefore he cannot take another wife.
On the contrary, Matrimony is not ratified without the sacrament of
Baptism. Now what is not ratified can be annulled. Therefore marriage
contracted in unbelief can be annulled, and consequently, the marriage
tie being dissolved, it is lawful for the husband to take another wife.
Further, a husband ought not to cohabit with an unbelieving wife who
refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator. If therefore it were
unlawful for him to take another wife he would be forced to remain
continent, which would seem unreasonable, since then he would be at a
disadvantage through his conversion.
I answer that, When either husband or wife is converted to the faith
the other remaining in unbelief, a distinction must be made. For if the
unbeliever be willing to cohabit without insult to the Creator---that
is without drawing the other to unbelief---the believer is free to part
from the other, but by parting is not permitted to marry again. But if
the unbeliever refuse to cohabit without insult to the Creator, by
making use of blasphemous words and refusing to hear Christ's name,
then if she strive to draw him to unbelief, the believing husband after
parting from her may be united to another in marriage.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [4996](A[2]), the marriage of
unbelievers is imperfect, whereas the marriage of believers is perfect
and consequently binds more firmly. Now the firmer tie always looses
the weaker if it is contrary to it, and therefore the subsequent
marriage contracted in the faith of Christ dissolves the marriage
previously contracted in unbelief. Therefore the marriage of
unbelievers is not altogether firm and ratified, but is ratified
afterwards by Christ's faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit
without insult to the Creator frees the husband from the tie whereby he
was bound to his wife so as to be unable to marry again during her
lifetime. It does not however dissolve the marriage at once, since if
she were converted from her blasphemy before he married again, her
husband would be restored to her. But the marriage is dissolved by the
second marriage which the believing husband would be unable to
accomplish unless he were freed from his obligation to his wife by her
own fault.
Reply to Objection 3: After the believer has married, the marriage tie
is dissolved on either side, because the marriage is not imperfect as
to the bond, although it is sometimes imperfect as to its effect. Hence
it is in punishment of the unbelieving wife rather than by virtue of
the previous marriage that she is forbidden to marry again. If however
she be afterwards converted, she may be allowed by dispensation to take
another husband, should her husband have taken another wife.
Reply to Objection 4: The husband ought not to take a vow of continence
nor enter into a second marriage, if after his conversion there be a
reasonable hope of the conversion of his wife, because the wife's
conversion would be more difficult if she knew she was deprived of her
husband. If however there be no hope of her conversion, he can take
Holy orders or enter religion, having first besought his wife to be
converted. And then if the wife be converted after her husband has
received Holy orders, her husband must not be restored to her, but she
must take it as a punishment of her tardy conversion that she is
deprived of her husband.
Reply to Objection 5: The bond of fatherhood is not dissolved by
disparity of worship, as the marriage bond is: wherefore there is no
comparison between an inheritance and a wife.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether other sins dissolve marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that other sins besides unbelief dissolve
marriage. For adultery is seemingly more directly opposed to marriage
than unbelief is. But unbelief dissolves marriage in a certain case so
that it is lawful to marry again. Therefore adultery has the same
effect.
Objection 2: Further, just as unbelief is spiritual fornication, so is
any kind of sin. If, then unbelief dissolves marriage because it is
spiritual fornication, for the same reason any kind of sin will
dissolve marriage.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (Mat. 5:30): "If thy right hand
scandalize thee, pluck it off and cast it from thee," and a gloss of
Jerome says that "by the hand and the right eye we may understand our
brother, wife, relatives and children." Now these become obstacles to
us by any kind of sin. Therefore marriage can be dissolved on account
of any kind of sin.
Objection 4: Further, covetousness is idolatry according to Eph. 5:5.
Now a wife may be put away on account of idolatry. Therefore in like
manner she can be put away on account of covetousness, as also on
account of other sins graver than covetousness.
Objection 5: Further, the Master says this expressly (Sent. iv, D, 30).
On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 5:32): "Whosoever shall put away his
wife, excepting for the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit
adultery."
Further, if this were true, divorces would be made all day long, since
it is rare to find a marriage wherein one of the parties does not fall
into sin.
I answer that, Bodily fornication and unbelief have a special
contrariety to the goods of marriage, as stated above [4997](A[3]).
Hence they are specially effective in dissolving marriages.
Nevertheless it must be observed that marriage is dissolved in two
ways. In one way as to the marriage tie, and thus marriage cannot be
dissolved after it is ratified, neither by unbelief nor by adultery.
But if it be not ratified, the tie is dissolved, if the one party
remain in unbelief, and the other being converted to the faith has
married again. On the other hand the aforesaid tie is not dissolved by
adultery, else the unbeliever would be free to give a bill of divorce
to his adulterous wife, and having put her away, could take another
wife, which is false. In another way marriage is dissolved as to the
act, and thus it can be dissolved on account of either unbelief or
fornication. But marriage cannot be dissolved even as to the act on
account of other sins, unless perchance the husband wish to cease from
intercourse with his wife in order to punish her by depriving her of
the comfort of his presence.
Reply to Objection 1: Although adultery is opposed to marriage as
fulfilling an office of nature, more directly than unbelief, it is the
other way about if we consider marriage as a sacrament of the Church,
from which source it derives perfect stability, inasmuch as it
signifies the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church. Wherefore
the marriage that is not ratified can be dissolved as to the marriage
tie on account of unbelief rather than on account of adultery.
Reply to Objection 2: The primal union of the soul to God is by faith,
and consequently the soul is thereby espoused to God as it were,
according to Osee 2:20, "I will espouse thee to Me in faith." Hence in
Holy Writ idolatry and unbelief are specially designated by the name of
fornication: whereas other sins are called spiritual fornications by a
more remote signification.
Reply to Objection 3: This applies to the case when the wife proves a
notable occasion of sin to her husband, so that he has reason to fear
his being in danger: for then the husband can withdraw from living with
her, as stated above [4998](A[5]).
Reply to Objection 4: Covetousness is said to be idolatry on account of
a certain likeness of bondage, because both the covetous and the
idolater serve the creature rather than the Creator; but not on account
of likeness of unbelief, since unbelief corrupts the intellect whereas
covetousness corrupts the affections.
Reply to Objection 5: The words of the Master refer to betrothal,
because a betrothal can be rescinded on account of a subsequent crime.
Or, if he is speaking of marriage, they must be referred to the
severing of mutual companionship for a time, as stated above, or to the
case when the wife is unwilling to cohabit except on the condition of
sinning, for instance, if she were to say: "I will not remain your wife
unless you amass wealth for me by theft," for then he ought to leave
her rather than thieve.
__________________________________________________________________
OF WIFE-MURDER (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider wife-murder, under which head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether in a certain case it is lawful to kill one's wife?
(2) Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the
act of adultery?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be
discovered in the act of adultery. For the Divine law commanded
adulterous wives to be stoned. Now it is not a sin to fulfill the
Divine law. Neither therefore is it a sin to kill one's own wife if she
be an adulteress.
Objection 2: Further, that which the law can rightly do, can be rightly
done by one whom the law has commissioned to do it. But the law can
rightly kill an adulterous wife or any other person deserving of death.
Since then the law has commissioned the husband to kill his wife if she
be discovered in the act of adultery, it would seem that he can rightly
do so.
Objection 3: Further, the husband has greater power over his adulterous
wife than over the man who committed adultery with her. Now if the
husband strike a cleric whom he found with his wife he is not
excommunicated. Therefore it would seem lawful for him even to kill his
own wife if she be discovered in adultery.
Objection 4: Further, the husband is bound to correct his wife. But
correction is given by inflicting a just punishment. Since then the
just punishment of adultery is death, because it is a capital sin, it
would seem lawful for a husband to kill his adulterous wife.
On the contrary, It is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37) that "the
Church of God is never bound by the laws of this world, for she has
none but a spiritual sword." Therefore it would seem that he who wishes
to belong to the Church cannot rightly take advantage of the law which
permits a man to kill his wife.
Further, husband and wife are judged on a par. But it is not lawful for
a wife to kill her husband if he be discovered in adultery. Neither
therefore may a husband kill his wife.
I answer that, It happens in two ways that a husband kills his wife.
First, by a civil judgment; and thus there is no doubt that a husband,
moved by zeal for justice and not by vindictive anger or hatred can,
without sin, bring a criminal accusation of adultery upon his wife
before a secular court, and demand that she receive capital punishment
as appointed by the law; just as it is lawful to accuse a person of
murder or any other crime. Such an accusation however cannot be made in
an ecclesiastical court, because, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
37), the Church does not wield a material sword. Secondly, a husband
can kill his wife himself without her being convicted in court, and
thus to kill her outside of the act of adultery is not lawful, neither
according to civil law nor according to the law of conscience, whatever
evidence he may have of her adultery. The civil law however considers
it, as though it were lawful, that he should kill her in the very act,
not by commanding him to do so, but by not inflicting on him the
punishment for murder, on account of the very great provocation which
the husband receives by such a deed to kill his wife. But the Church is
not bound in this matter by human laws, neither does she acquit him of
the debt of eternal punishment, nor of such punishment as may be
awarded him by an ecclesiastical tribunal for the reason that he is
quit of any punishment to be inflicted by a secular court. Therefore in
no case is it lawful for a husband to kill his wife on his own
authority.
Reply to Objection 1: The law has committed the infliction of this
punishment not to private individuals, but to public persons, who are
deputed to this by their office. Now the husband is not his wife's
judge: wherefore he may not kill her, but may accuse her in the judge's
presence.
Reply to Objection 2: The civil law has not commissioned the husband to
kill his wife by commanding him to do so, for thus he would not sin,
just as the judge's deputy does not sin by killing the thief condemned
to death: but it has permitted this by not punishing it. For which
reason it has raised certain obstacles to prevent the husband from
killing his wife.
Reply to Objection 3: This does not prove that it is lawful simply, but
that it is lawful as regards immunity from a particular kind of
punishment, since excommunication is also a kind of punishment.
Reply to Objection 4: There are two kinds of community: the household,
such as a family; and the civil community, such as a city or kingdom.
Accordingly, he who presides over the latter kind of community, a king
for instance, can punish an individual both by correcting and by
exterminating him, for the betterment of the community with whose care
he is charged. But he who presides over a community of the first kind,
can inflict only corrective punishment, which does not extend beyond
the limits of amendment, and these are exceeded by the punishment of
death. Wherefore the husband who exercises this kind of control over
his wife may not kill her, but he may accuse or chastise her in some
other way.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that wife-murder is not an impediment to
marriage. For adultery is more directly opposed to marriage than murder
is. Now adultery is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is
wife-murder.
Objection 2: Further, it is a more grievous sin to kill one's mother
than one's wife, for it is never lawful to strike one's mother, whereas
it is sometimes lawful to strike one's wife. But matricide is not an
impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.
Objection 3: Further, it is a greater sin for a man to kill another
man's wife on account of adultery than to kill his own wife, inasmuch
as he has less motive and is less concerned with her correction. But he
who kills another man's wife is not hindered from marrying. Neither
therefore is he who kills his own wife.
Objection 4: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed.
But the sin of murder can be removed by repentance. Therefore the
consequent impediment to marriage can be removed also: and consequently
it would seem that after he has done penance he is not forbidden to
marry.
On the contrary, A canon (caus. xxxiii, qu. ii, can. Interfectores)
says: "The slayers of their own wives must be brought back to penance,
and they are absolutely forbidden to marry." Further, in whatsoever a
man sins, in that same must he be punished. But he who kills his wife
sins against marriage. Therefore he must be punished by being deprived
of marriage.
I answer that, By the Church's decree wife-murder is an impediment to
marriage. Sometimes however it forbids the contracting of marriage
without voiding the contract, when to wit the husband kills his wife on
account of adultery or even through hatred; nevertheless if there be
fear lest he should prove incontinent, he may be dispensed by the
Church so as to marry lawfully. Sometimes it also voids the contract,
as when a man kills his wife in order to marry her with whom he has
committed adultery, for then the law declares him simply unfit to marry
her, so that if he actually marry her his marriage is void. He is not
however hereby rendered simply unfit by law in relation to other women:
wherefore if he should have married another, although he sin by
disobeying the Church's ordinance, the marriage is nevertheless not
voided for this reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Murder and adultery in certain cases forbid the
contracting of marriage and void the contract, as we say here in regard
to wife-murder, and shall say further on (Sent. iv[4999], Q[62], A[2])
in regard to adultery. We may also reply that wife-murder is contrary
to the substance of wedlock, whereas adultery is contrary to the good
of fidelity due to marriage. Hence adultery is not more opposed to
marriage than wife-murder, and the argument is based on a false
premiss.
Reply to Objection 2: Simply speaking it is a more grievous sin to kill
one's mother than one's wife, as also more opposed to nature, since a
man reveres his mother naturally. Consequently he is less inclined to
matricide and more prone to wife-murder; and it is to repress this
proneness that the Church has forbidden marriage to the man who has
murdered his wife.
Reply to Objection 3: Such a man does not sin against marriage as he
does who kills his own wife; wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: It does not follow that because guilt has been
remitted therefore the entire punishment is remitted, as evidenced by
irregularity. For repentance does not restore a man to his former
dignity, although it can restore him to his former state of grace, as
stated above ([5000]Q[38], A[1], ad 3).
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OF THE IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE, ARISING FROM A SOLEMN VOW (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the impediments which supervene to marriage. We
shall consider (1) the impediment which affects an unconsummated
marriage, namely a solemn vow: (2) the impediment which affects a
consummated marriage, namely fornication. Under the first head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether either party after the marriage has been consummated can
enter religion without the other's consent?
(2) Whether they can enter religion before the consummation of the
marriage?
(3) Whether the wife can take another husband if her former husband has
entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religio
n
without the other's consent?
Objection 1: It would seem that even after the marriage has been
consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent.
For the Divine law ought to be more favorable to spiritual things than
human law. Now human law has allowed this. Therefore much more should
the Divine law permit it.
Objection 2: Further, the lesser good does not hinder the greater. But
the married state is a lesser good than the religious state, according
to 1 Cor. 7:38. Therefore marriage ought not to hinder a man from being
able to enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, in every form of religious life there is a kind
of spiritual marriage. Now it is lawful to pass from a less strict
religious order to one that is stricter. Therefore it is also allowable
to pass from a less strict---namely a carnal---marriage to a stricter
marriage, namely that of the religious life, even without the wife's
consent.
On the contrary, Married persons are forbidden (1 Cor. 7:5) to abstain
from the use of marriage even for a time without one another's consent,
in order to have time for prayer.
Further, no one can lawfully do that which is prejudicial to another
without the latter's consent. Now the religious vow taken by one
consort is prejudicial to the other, since the one has power over the
other's body. Therefore one of them cannot take a religious vow without
the other's consent.
I answer that, No one can make an offering to God of what belongs to
another. Wherefore since by a consummated marriage the husband's body
already belongs to his wife, he cannot by a vow of continence offer it
to God without her consent.
Reply to Objection 1: Human law considers marriage merely as fulfilling
an office of nature: whereas the Divine law considers it as a
sacrament, by reason of which it is altogether indissoluble. Hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not unreasonable that a greater good be
hindered by a lesser which is contrary to it, just as good is hindered
by evil.
Reply to Objection 3: In every form of religious life marriage is
contracted with one person, namely Christ; to Whom, however, a person
contracts more obligations in one religious order than in another. But
in carnal marriage and religious marriage the contract is not with the
same person: wherefore that comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter
religion without the other's consent?
Objection 1: It would seem that even before the marriage has been
consummated one consort cannot enter religion without the other's
consent. For the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the sacrament
of matrimony, inasmuch, namely, as it signifies the union of Christ
with the Church. Now marriage is a true sacrament before its
consummation, and after consent has been expressed in words of the
present. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by one of them entering
religion.
Objection 2: Further, by virtue of the consent expressed in words of
the present, the one consort has given power over his body to the
other. Therefore the one can forthwith ask for the marriage debt, and
the other is bound to pay: and so the one cannot enter religion without
the other's consent.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (Mat. 19:6): "What God hath joined
together let no man put asunder." But the union which precedes marital
intercourse was made by God. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by the
will of man.
On the contrary, According to Jerome [*Prolog. in Joan.] our Lord
called John from his wedding.
I answer that, Before marital intercourse there is only a spiritual
bond between husband and wife, but afterwards there is a carnal bond
between them. Wherefore, just as after marital intercourse marriage is
dissolved by carnal death, so by entering religion the bond which
exists before the consummation of the marriage is dissolved, because
religious life is a kind of spiritual death, whereby a man dies to the
world and lives to God.
Reply to Objection 1: Before consummation marriage signifies the union
of Christ with the soul by grace, which is dissolved by a contrary
spiritual disposition, namely mortal sin. But after consummation it
signifies the union of Christ with the Church, as regards the
assumption of human nature into the unity of person, which union is
altogether indissoluble.
Reply to Objection 2: Before consummation the body of one consort is
not absolutely delivered into the power of the other, but
conditionally, provided neither consort meanwhile seek the fruit of a
better life. But by marital intercourse the aforesaid delivery is
completed, because then each of them enters into bodily possession of
the power transferred to him. Wherefore also before consummation they
are not bound to pay the marriage debt forthwith after contracting
marriage by words of the present, but a space of two months is allowed
them for three reasons. First that they may deliberate meanwhile about
entering religion; secondly, to prepare what is necessary for the
solemnization of the wedding. thirdly, lest the husband think little of
a gift he has not longed to possess (cap. Institutum, caus. xxvi, qu.
ii).
Reply to Objection 3: The marriage union, before consummation, is
indeed perfect as to its primary being, but is not finally perfect as
to its second act which is operation. It is like bodily possession and
consequently is not altogether indissoluble.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the wife may take another husband if her husband has entered
religion before the consummation of the marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that the wife may not take another husband,
if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the
marriage. For that which is consistent with marriage does not dissolve
the marriage tie. Now the marriage tie still remains between those who
equally take religious vows. Therefore by the fact that one enters
religion, the other is not freed from the marriage tie. But as long as
she remains tied to one by marriage, she cannot marry another.
Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, after entering religion and before making his
profession the husband can return to the world. If then the wife can
marry again when her husband enters religion, he also can marry again
when he returns to the world: which is absurd.
Objection 3: Further, by a new decree (cap. Non solum, de regular. et
transeunt.) a profession, if made before the expiry of a year, is
accounted void. Therefore if he return to his wife after making such a
profession, she is bound to receive him. Therefore neither by her
husband's entry into religion, nor by his taking a vow, does the wife
receive the power to marry again.
On the contrary, No one can bind another to those things which belong
to perfection. Now continence is of those things that belong to
perfection. Therefore a wife is not bound to continence on account of
her husband entering religion, and consequently she can marry.
I answer that, Just as bodily death of the husband dissolves the
marriage tie in such a way that the wife may marry whom she will,
according to the statement of the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:39); so too after
the husband's spiritual death by entering religion, she can marry whom
she will.
Reply to Objection 1: When both consorts take a like vow of continence,
neither renounces the marriage tie, wherefore it still remains: but
when only one takes the vow, then for his own part he renounces the
marriage tie, wherefore the other is freed therefrom.
Reply to Objection 2: A person is not accounted dead to the world by
entering religion until he makes his profession, and consequently his
wife is bound to wait for him until that time.
Reply to Objection 3: We must judge of a profession thus made before
the time fixed by law, as of a simple vow. Wherefore just as when the
husband has taken a simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the
marriage debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is it in
this case.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENT THAT SUPERVENES TO MARRIAGE AFTER ITS CONSUMMATION, NAMELY
FORNICATION (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the impediment that supervenes upon marriage after
its consummation, namely fornication, which is an impediment to a
previous marriage as regards the act, although the marriage tie
remains. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful for a husband to put his wife away on account
of fornication?
(2) Whether he is bound to do so?
(3) Whether he may put her away at his own judgment?
(4) Whether in this matter husband and wife are of equal condition?
(5) Whether, after being divorced, they must remain unmarried?
(6) Whether they can be reconciled after being divorced?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of
fornication?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a husband to put away his wife
on account of fornication. For we must not return evil for evil. But
the husband, by putting away his wife on account of fornication,
seemingly returns evil for evil. Therefore this is not lawful.
Objection 2: Further, the sin is greater if both commit fornication,
than if one only commits it. But if both commit fornication, they
cannot be divorced on that account. Neither therefore can they be, if
only one commits fornication.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual fornication and certain other sins are
more grievous than carnal fornication. But separation from bed cannot
be motived by those sins. Neither therefore can it be done on account
of fornication.
Objection 4: Further, the unnatural vice is further removed from the
marriage goods than fornication is, the manner of which is natural.
Therefore it ought to have been a cause of separation rather than
fornication.
On the contrary, are the words of Mat. 5:32.
Further, one is not bound to keep faith with one who breaks his faith.
But a spouse by fornication breaks the faith due to the other spouse.
Therefore one can put the other away on account of fornication.
I answer that, Our Lord permitted a man to put away his wife on account
of fornication, in punishment of the unfaithful party and in favor of
the faithful party, so that the latter is not bound to marital
intercourse with the unfaithful one. There are however seven cases to
be excepted in which it is not lawful to put away a wife who has
committed fornication, when either the wife is not to be blamed, or
both parties are equally blameworthy. The first is if the husband also
has committed fornication; the second is if he has prostituted his
wife; the third is if the wife, believing her husband dead on account
of his long absence, has married again; the fourth is if another man
has fraudulently impersonated her husband in the marriage-bed; the
fifth is if she be overcome by force; the sixth is if he has been
reconciled to her by having carnal intercourse with her after she has
committed adultery; the seventh is if both having been married in the
state of unbelief, the husband has given his wife a bill of divorce and
she has married again; for then if both be converted the husband is
bound to receive her back again.
Reply to Objection 1: A husband sins if through vindictive anger he
puts away his wife who has committed fornication, but he does not sin
if he does so in order to avoid losing his good name, lest he seem to
share in her guilt, or in order to correct his wife's sin, or in order
to avoid the uncertainty of her offspring.
Reply to Objection 2: Divorce on account of fornication is effected by
the one accusing the other. And since no one can accuse who is guilty
of the same crime, a divorce cannot be pronounced when both have
committed fornication, although marriage is more sinned against when
both are guilty of fornication that when only one is.
Reply to Objection 3: Fornication is directly opposed to the good of
marriage, since by it the certainty of offspring is destroyed, faith is
broken, and marriage ceases to have its signification when the body of
one spouse is given to several others. Wherefore other sins, though
perhaps they be more grievous than fornication, are not motives for a
divorce. Since, however, unbelief which is called spiritual
fornication, is also opposed to the good of marriage consisting in the
rearing of the offspring to the worship of God, it is also a motive for
divorce, yet not in the same way as bodily fornication. Because one may
take steps for procuring a divorce on account of one act of carnal
fornication, not, however, on account of one act of unbelief, but on
account of inveterate unbelief which is a proof of obstinacy wherein
unbelief is perfected.
Reply to Objection 4: Steps may be taken to procure a divorce on
account also of the unnatural vice: but this is not mentioned in the
same way, both because it is an unmentionable passion, and because it
does not so affect the certainty of offspring.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife when she is
guilty of fornication?
Objection 1: It would seem that the husband is bound by precept to put
away his wife who is guilty of fornication. For since the husband is
the head of his wife, he is bound to correct his wife. Now separation
from bed is prescribed as a correction of the wife who is guilty of
fornication. Therefore he is bound to separate from her.
Objection 2: Further, he who consents with one who sins mortally, is
also guilty of mortal sin. Now the husband who retains a wife guilty of
fornication would seem to consent with her, as stated in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 35). Therefore he sins unless he puts her away.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 6:16): "He who is joined to
a harlot is made one body." Now a man cannot at once be a member of a
harlot and a member of Christ (1 Cor. 6:15). Therefore the husband who
is joined to a wife guilty of fornication ceases to be a member of
Christ, and therefore sins mortally.
Objection 4: Further, just as relationship voids the marriage tie, so
does fornication dissolve the marriage-bed. Now after the husband
becomes cognizant of his consanguinity with his wife, he sins mortally
if he has carnal intercourse with her. Therefore he also sins mortally
if he does so after knowing her to be guilty of fornication.
Objection 5: On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 7:11, "Let not the
husband put away his wife" says that "Our Lord permitted a wife to be
put away on account of fornication." Therefore it is not a matter of
precept.
Objection 6: Further, one can always pardon the sin that another has
committed against oneself. Now the wife, by committing fornication,
sinned against her husband. Therefore the husband may spare her by not
putting her away.
I answer that, The putting away of a wife guilty of fornication was
prescribed in order that the wife might be corrected by means of that
punishment. Now a corrective punishment is not required when amendment
has already taken place. Wherefore, if the wife repent of her sin, her
husband is not bound to put her away: whereas if she repent not, he is
bound to do so, lest he seem to consent to her sin, by not having
recourse to her due correction.
Reply to Objection 1: The wife can be corrected for her sin of
fornication not only by this punishment but also by words and blows;
wherefore if she be ready to be corrected otherwise, her husband is not
bound to have recourse to the aforesaid punishment in order to correct
her.
Reply to Objection 2: The husband seems to consent with her when he
retains her, notwithstanding that she persists in her past sin: if,
however, she has mended her ways, he does not consent with her.
Reply to Objection 3: She can no longer be called a harlot since she
has repented of her sin. Wherefore her husband, by being joined to her,
does not become a member of a harlot. We might also reply that he is
joined to her not as a harlot but as his wife.
Reply to Objection 4: There is no parallel, because the effect of
consanguinity is that there is no marriage tie between them, so that
carnal intercourse between them becomes unlawful. Whereas fornication
does not remove the said tie, so that the act remains, in itself,
lawful, unless it become accidentally unlawful, in so far as the
husband seems to consent to his wife's lewdness.
Reply to Objection 5: This permission is to be understood as an absence
of prohibition: and thus it is not in contradistinction with a precept,
for that which is a matter of precept is also not forbidden.
Reply to Objection 6: The wife sins not only against her husband, but
also against herself and against God, wherefore her husband cannot
entirely remit the punishment, unless amendment has followed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of
fornication?
Objection 1: It would seem that the husband can on his own judgment put
away his wife on account of fornication. For when sentence has been
pronounced by the judge, it is lawful to carry it out without any
further judgment. But God, the just Judge, has pronounced this
judgment, that a husband may put his wife away on account of
fornication. Therefore no further judgment is required for this.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Mat. 1:19) that Joseph . . . being
a just man . . . "was minded to put" Mary "away privately." Therefore
it would seem that a husband may privately pronounce a divorce without
the judgment of the Church.
Objection 3: Further, if after becoming cognizant of his wife's
fornication a husband has marital intercourse with his wife, he
forfeits the action which he had against the adulteress. Therefore the
refusal of the marriage debt, which pertains to a divorce, ought to
precede the judgment of the Church.
Objection 4: Further, that which cannot be proved ought not to be
submitted to the judgment of the Church. Now the crime of fornication
cannot be proved, since "the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness"
(Job 24:15). Therefore the divorce in question ought not to be made on
the judgment of the Church.
Objection 5: Further, accusation should be preceded by inscription
[*Cf. [5001]SS, Q[33], A[7]], whereby a person binds himself under the
pain of retaliation, if he fails to bring proof. But this is impossible
in this matter, because then, in every event the husband would obtain
his end, whether he put his wife away, or his wife put him away.
Therefore she ought not to be summoned by accusation to receive the
judgment of the Church.
Objection 6: Further, a man is more bound to his wife than to a
stranger. Now a man ought not to refer to the Church the crime of
another, even though he be a stranger, without previously admonishing
him privately (Mat. 18:15). Much less therefore may the husband bring
his wife's crime before the Church, unless he has previously rebuked
her in private.
On the contrary, No one should avenge himself. But if a husband were by
his own judgment to put away his wife on account of fornication, he
would avenge himself. Therefore this should not be done.
Further, no man is prosecutor and judge in the same cause. But the
husband is the prosecutor by suing his wife for the offense she has
committed against him. Therefore he cannot be the judge, and
consequently he cannot put her away on his own judgment.
I answer that, A husband can put away his wife in two ways. First as to
bed only, and thus he may put her away on his own judgment, as soon as
he has evidence of her fornication: nor is he bound to pay her the
marriage debt at her demand, unless he be compelled by the Church, and
by paying it thus he nowise prejudices his own case. Secondly, as to
bed and board, and in this way she cannot be put away except at the
judgment of the Church; and if she has been put away otherwise, he must
be compelled to cohabit with her unless the husband can at once prove
the wife's fornication. Now this putting away is called a divorce: and
consequently it must be admitted that a divorce cannot be pronounced
except at the judgment of the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: The sentence is an application of the general law
to a particular fact. Wherefore God gave out the law according to which
the sentence of the court has to be pronounced.
Reply to Objection 2: Joseph was minded to put away the Blessed Virgin
not as suspected of fornication, but because in reverence for her
sanctity, he feared to cohabit with her. Moreover there is no parallel,
because then the sentence at law was not only divorce but also stoning,
but not now when the case is brought to the Church for judgment. The
Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes when the husband suspects his wife of
adultery he watches her secretly that together with witnesses he may
discover her in the sin of fornication, and so proceed to accusation.
Moreover, if he has no evidence of the fact, there may be strong
suspicions of fornication, which suspicions being proved the
fornication seems to be proved: for instance if they be found together
alone, at a time and place which are open to suspicion, or "nudas cum
nuda."
Reply to Objection 5: A husband may accuse his wife of adultery in two
ways. First, he may seek a separation from bed before a spiritual
judge, and then there is no need for an inscription to be made under
the pain of retaliation, since thus the husband would gain his end, as
the objection proves. Secondly, he may seek for the crime to be
punished in a secular court, and then it is necessary for inscription
to precede, whereby he binds himself under pain of retaliation if he
fail to prove his case.
Reply to Objection 6: According to a Decretal (Extra, De Simonia, cap.
Licet), "there are three modes of procedure in criminal cases. First,
by inquisition, which should be preceded by notoriety; secondly, by
accusation, which should be preceded by inscription; [*Cf. [5002]SS,
Q[33], A[7]] thirdly, by denunciation, which should be preceded by
fraternal correction." Accordingly the saying of our Lord refers to the
case where the process is by way of denunciation, and not by
accusation, because then the end in view is not only the correction of
the guilty party, but also his punishment, for the safeguarding of the
common good, which would be destroyed if justice were lacking.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in a case of divorce husband and wife should be judged on a par wit
h
each other?
Objection 1: It would seem that, in a case of divorce, husband and wife
ought not to be judged on a par with each other. For divorce under the
New Law takes the place of the divorce [repudium] recognized by the Old
Law (Mat. 5:31,32). Now in the "repudium" husband and wife were not
judged on a par with each other, since the husband could put away his
wife, but not "vice versa." Therefore neither in divorce ought they to
be judged on a par with each other.
Objection 2: Further, it is more opposed to the natural law that a wife
have several husbands than that a husband have several wives: wherefore
the latter has been sometimes lawful, but the former never. Therefore
the wife sins more grievously in adultery than the husband, and
consequently they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.
Objection 3: Further, where there is greater injury to one's neighbor,
there is a greater sin. Now the adulterous wife does a greater injury
to her husband, than does the adulterous husband to his wife, since a
wife's adultery involves uncertainty of the offspring, whereas the
husband's adultery does not. Therefore the wife's sin is the greater,
and so they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.
Objection 4: Further, divorce is prescribed in order to punish the
crime of adultery. Now it belongs to the husband who is the head of the
wife (1 Cor. 11:3) to correct his wife, rather than "vice versa."
Therefore they should not be judged on a par with each other for the
purpose of divorce, but the husband ought to have the preference.
Objection 5: On the contrary, It would seem in this matter the wife
ought to have the preference. For the more frail the sinner the more is
his sin deserving of pardon. Now there is greater frailty in women than
in men, for which reason Chrysostom [*Hom. xl in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that "lust is a passion
proper to women," and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that
"properly speaking women are not said to be continent on account of
their being easily inclined to concupiscence," for neither can dumb
animals be continent, because they have nothing to stand in the way of
their desires. Therefore women are rather to be spared in the
punishment of divorce.
Objection 6: Further, the husband is placed as the head of the woman in
order to correct her. Therefore his sin is greater than the woman's and
so he should be punished the more.
I answer that, In a case of divorce husband and wife are judged on a
par with each other, in the sense that the same things are lawful or
unlawful to the one as to the other: but they are not judged on a par
with each other in reference to those things, since the reason for
divorce is greater in one spouse than in the other, although there is
sufficient reason for divorce in both. For divorce is a punishment of
adultery, in so far as it is opposed to the marriage goods. Now as
regards the good of fidelity to which husband and wife are equally
bound towards each other, the adultery of one is as great a sin against
marriage as the adultery of the other, and this is in either of them a
sufficient reason for divorce. But as regards the good of the offspring
the wife's adultery is a greater sin against marriage than the
husband's wherefore it is a greater reason for divorce in the wife than
in the husband: and thus they are under an equal obligation, but not
for equal reasons. Nor is this unjust for on either hand there is
sufficient reason for the punishment in question, just as there is in
two persons condemned to the punishment of death, although one of them
may have sinned more grievously than the other.
Reply to Objection 1: The only reason why divorce was permitted, was to
avoid murder. And since there was more danger of this in men than in
women, the husband was allowed to put away his wife by a bill of
divorce, but not "vice versa."
Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments are based on the fact that in
comparison with the good of the offspring there is more reason for
divorce in an adulterous wife than in an adulterous husband. It does
not follow, however, that they are not judged on a par with each other.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the husband is the head of the wife, he
is her pilot as it were, and is no more her judge than she is his.
Consequently in matters that have to be submitted to a judge, the
husband has no more power over his wife, than she over him.
Reply to Objection 5: In adultery there is the same sinful character as
in simple fornication, and something more which aggravates it, namely
the lesion to marriage. Accordingly if we consider that which is common
to adultery and fornication, the sin of the husband and that of the
wife are compared the one to the other as that which exceeds to that
which is exceeded, for in women the humors are more abundant, wherefore
they are more inclined to be led by their concupiscences, whereas in
man there is abundance of heat which excites concupiscence. Simply
speaking, however, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously
in simple fornication than a woman, because he has more of the good of
reason, which prevails over all movements of bodily passions. But as
regards the lesion to marriage which adultery adds to fornication and
for which reason it is an occasion for divorce, the woman sins more
grievously than the man, as appears from what we have said above. And
since it is more grievous than simple fornication, it follows that,
simply speaking, the adulterous wife sins more grievously than the
adulterous husband, other things being equal.
Reply to Objection 6: Although the control which the husband receives
over his wife is an aggravating circumstance, nevertheless the sin is
yet more aggravated by this circumstance which draws the sin to another
species, namely by the lesion to marriage, which lesion becomes a kind
of injustice, through the fraudulent substitution of another's child.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a husband can marry again after having a divorce?
Objection 1: It would seem that a husband can marry again after having
a divorce. For no one is bound to perpetual continence. Now in some
cases the husband is bound to put away his wife forever on account of
fornication, as stated above [5003](A[2]). Therefore seemingly at least
in this case he can marry again.
Objection 2: Further, a sinner should not be given a greater occasion
of sin. But if she who is put away on account of the sin of fornication
is not allowed to seek another marriage, she is given a greater
occasion of sin: for it is improbable that one who was not continent
during marriage will be able to be continent afterwards. Therefore it
would seem lawful for her to marry again.
Objection 3: Further, the wife is not bound to the husband save as
regards the payment of the marriage debt and cohabitation. But she is
freed from both obligations by divorce. Therefore "she is loosed from
the law of her husband" [*Rom. 7:2]. Therefore she can marry again; and
the same applies to her husband.
Objection 4: Further, it is said (Mat. 19:9): "Whosoever shall put away
his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another
committeth adultery." Therefore seemingly he does not commit adultery
if he marry again after putting away his wife on account of
fornication, and consequently this will be a true marriage.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:10,11): "Not I, but the Lord,
commandeth that the wife depart not from her husband. and, if she
depart, that she remain unmarried."
Further, no one should gain advantage from sin. But the adulteress
would if she were allowed to contract another and more desired
marriage; and an occasion of adultery would be afforded those who wish
to marry again. Therefore it is unlawful both to the wife and to the
husband to contract a second marriage.
I answer that, Nothing supervenient to marriage can dissolve it:
wherefore adultery does not make a marriage cease to be valid. For,
according to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup. i, 10), "as long as they
live they are bound by the marriage tie, which neither divorce nor
union with another can destroy." Therefore it is unlawful for one,
while the other lives, to marry again.
Reply to Objection 1: Although no one is absolutely bound to
continence, he may be bound accidentally; for instance, if his wife
contract an incurable disease that is incompatible with carnal
intercourse. And it is the same if she labor under a spiritual disease,
namely fornication, so as to be incorrigible.
Reply to Objection 2: The very shame of having been divorced ought to
keep her from sin: and if it cannot keep her from sin, it is a lesser
evil that she alone sin than that her husband take part in her sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although after divorce the wife is not bound to
her husband as regards paying him the marriage debt and cohabiting with
him, the marriage tie, whereby she was bound to this, remains, and
consequently she cannot marry again during her husband's lifetime. She
can, however, take a vow of continence, against her husband's will,
unless it seem that the Church has been deceived by false witnesses in
pronouncing the divorce; for in that case, even if she has made her vow
of profession she ought to be restored to her husband, and would be
bound to pay the marriage debt, but it would be unlawful for her to
demand it.
Reply to Objection 4: The exception expressed in our Lord's words
refers to the putting away of the wife. Hence the objection is based on
a false interpretation.
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Whether husband and wife may be reconciled after being divorced?
Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife may not be reconciled
after being divorced. For the law contains the rule (Can. Quod bene
semel, Caus. vi, qu. iv): "That which has been once well decided must
not be subsequently withdrawn." Now it has been decided by the judgment
of the Church that they ought to be separated. Therefore they cannot
subsequently be reconciled.
Objection 2: Further, if it were allowable for them to be reconciled,
the husband would seem bound to receive his wife, especially after she
has repented. But he is not bound, for the wife, in defending herself
before the judge, cannot allege her repentance against her husband's
accusation of fornication. Therefore in no way is reconciliation
allowable.
Objection 3: Further, if reconciliation were allowable, it would seem
that the adulterous wife is bound to return to her husband if her
husband asks her. But she is not bound, since they are separated by the
Church. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: Further, if it were lawful to be reconciled to an
adulterous wife, this would especially be the case when the husband is
found to have committed adultery after the divorce. But in this case
the wife cannot compel him to be reconciled, since the divorce has been
justly pronounced. Therefore she may nowise be reconciled.
Objection 5: Further, if a husband whose adultery is unknown put away
his wife, who is convicted of adultery by the sentence of the Church,
the divorce would seem to have been pronounced unjustly. And yet the
husband is not bound to be reconciled to his wife, because she is
unable to prove his adultery in court. Much less, therefore, is
reconciliation allowable when the divorce has been granted justly.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:11): "And if she depart, that
she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband."
Further, it is allowable for the husband not to put her away after
fornication. Therefore, for the same reason, he can be reconciled to
her after divorce.
I answer that, If the wife has mended her ways by repenting of her sin
after the divorce, her husband may become reconciled to her; but if she
remain incorrigible in her sin, he must not take her back, for the same
reason which forbade him to retain her while she refused to desist from
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The sentence of the Church in pronouncing the
divorce did not bind them to separate, but allowed them to do so.
Therefore reconciliation may be effected or ensue without any
withdrawal of the previous sentence.
Reply to Objection 2: The wife's repentance should induce the husband
not to accuse or put away the wife who is guilty of fornication. He
cannot, however, be compelled to this course of action, nor can his
wife oppose her repentance to his accusation, because although she is
no longer guilty, neither in act nor in the stain of sin, there still
remains something of the debt of punishment, and though this has been
taken away in the sight of God, there still remains the debt of
punishment to be inflicted by the judgment of man, because man sees not
the heart as God does.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is done in a person's favor does him
no prejudice. Wherefore since the divorce has been granted in favor of
the husband, it does not deprive him of the right of asking for the
marriage debt, or of asking his wife to return to him. Hence his wife
is bound to pay the debt, and to return to him, if he ask her, unless
with his consent she has taken a vow of continence.
Reply to Objection 4: According to strict law, a husband who was
previously innocent should not be compelled to receive an adulterous
wife on account of his having committed adultery after the divorce. But
according to equity, the judge is bound by virtue of his office first
of all to admonish him to beware of imperiling his own soul and of
scandalizing others; although the wife may not herself seek
reconciliation.
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OF SECOND MARRIAGES (TWO ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider second marriage. Under this head
there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful?
(2) Whether it is a sacrament?
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Whether a second marriage is lawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that a second marriage is unlawful. Because
we should judge of things according to truth. Now Chrysostom [*Hom.
xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]
says that "to take a second husband is in truth fornication," which is
unlawful. Therefore neither is a second marriage lawful.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is not good is unlawful. Now Ambrose
[*On 1 Cor. 7:40 and De Viduis] says that a second marriage is not
good. Therefore it is unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, no one should be debarred from being present at
such things as are becoming and lawful. Yet priests are debarred from
being present at second marriages, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
42). Therefore they are unlawful.
Objection 4: Further, no one incurs a penalty save for sin. Now a
person incurs the penalty of irregularity on account of being married
twice. Therefore a second marriage is unlawful.
On the contrary, We read of Abraham having contracted a second marriage
(Gn. 25:1).
Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:14): "I will . . . that the
younger," namely widows, "should marry, bear children." Therefore
second marriages are lawful.
I answer that, The marriage tie lasts only until death (Rom. 7:2),
wherefore at the death of either spouse the marriage tie ceases: and
consequently when one dies the other is not hindered from marrying a
second time on account of the previous marriage. Therefore not only
second marriages are lawful, but even third and so on.
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is speaking in reference to the cause
which is wont at times to incite a person to a second marriage, namely
concupiscence which incites also to fornication.
Reply to Objection 2: A second marriage is stated not to be good, not
that it is unlawful, but because it lacks the honor of the
signification which is in a first marriage, where one husband has one
wife, as in the case of Christ and the Church.
Reply to Objection 3: Men who are consecrated to Divine things are
debarred not only from unlawful things, but even from things which have
any appearance of turpitude; and consequently they are debarred from
second marriages, which lack the decorum which was in a first marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: Irregularity is not always incurred on account of
a sin, and may be incurred through a defect in a sacrament [*"Defectus
sacramenti," i.e. defect of signification; Cf. A[2], OBJ[3]]. Hence the
argument is not to the point.
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Whether a second marriage is a sacrament?
Objection 1: It would seem that a second marriage is not a sacrament.
For he who repeats a sacrament injures the sacrament. But no sacrament
should be done an injury. Therefore if a second marriage were a
sacrament, marriage ought nowise to be repeated.
Objection 2: Further, in every sacrament some kind of blessing is
given. But no blessing is given in a second marriage, as stated in the
text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore no sacrament is conferred therein.
Objection 3: Further, signification is essential to a sacrament. But
the signification of marriage is not preserved in a second marriage,
because there is not a union of only one woman with only one man, as in
the case of Christ and the Church. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, one sacrament is not an impediment to receiving
another. But a second marriage is an impediment to receiving orders.
Therefore it is not a sacrament.
On the contrary, Marital intercourse is excused from sin in a second
marriage even as in a first marriage. Now marital intercourse is
excused [*Cf.[5004] Q[69], A[1]] by the marriage goods which are
fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. Therefore a second marriage is a
sacrament.
Further, irregularity is not contracted through a second and
non-sacramental union, such as fornication. Yet irregularity is
contracted through a second marriage. Therefore it is a sacramental
union.
I answer that, Wherever we find the essentials of a sacrament, there is
a true sacrament. Wherefore, since in a second marriage we find all the
essentials of the sacrament of marriage (namely the due matter---which
results from the parties having the conditions prescribed by law---and
the due form, which is the expression of the inward consent by words of
the present), it is clear that a second marriage is a sacrament even as
a first.
Reply to Objection 1: This is true of a sacrament which causes an
everlasting effect: for then, if the sacrament be repeated, it is
implied that the first was not effective, and thus an injury is done to
the first, as is clear in all those sacraments which imprint a
character. But those sacraments which have not an everlasting effect
can be repeated without injury to the sacrament, as in the case of
Penance. And, since the marriage tie ceases with death, no injury is
done to the sacrament if a woman marry again after her husband's death.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the second marriage, considered in
itself, is a perfect sacrament, yet if we consider it in relation to
the first marriage, it is somewhat a defective sacrament, because it
has not its full signification, since there is not a union of only one
woman with only one man as in the marriage of Christ with the Church.
And on account of this defect the blessing is omitted in a second
marriage. This, however, refers to the case when it is a second
marriage on the part of both man and woman, or on the part of the woman
only. For if a virgin marry a man who has had another wife, the
marriage is blessed nevertheless. Because the signification is
preserved to a certain extent even in relation to the former marriage,
since though Christ has but one Church for His spouse, there are many
persons espoused to Him in the one Church. But the soul cannot be
espoused to another besides Christ, else it commits fornication with
the devil. Nor is there a spiritual marriage. For this reason when a
woman marries a second time the marriage is not blessed on account of
the defect in the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfect signification is found in a second
marriage considered in itself, not however if it be considered in
relation to the previous marriage, and it is thus that it is a
defective sacrament.
Reply to Objection 4: A second marriage in so far as there is a defect
in the sacrament, but not as a sacrament, is an impediment to the
sacrament of Order.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO MARRIAGE, AND FIRST OF THE PAYMENT OF THE MARRIAGE
DEBT (TEN ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider those things which are annexed to
marriage: (1) the payment of the marriage debt; (2) plurality of wives;
(3) bigamy; (4) the bill of divorce; (5) illegitimate children.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one spouse is bound to pay the marriage debt to the other?
(2) Whether one is sometimes bound to pay without being asked?
(3) Whether a wife may demand the debt during the menses?
(4) Whether she is bound to pay it at that time?
(5) Whether husband and wife are equal in this matter?
(6) Whether the one without the other's consent may take a vow that
prohibits the payment of the debt?
(7) Whether it is forbidden to ask for the debt at any particular time?
(8) Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for it at a holy time?
(9) Whether it is an obligation to pay it at the time of a festival?
(10) Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times?
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Whether husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the marriage
debt?
Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife are not mutually
bound, under the obligation of a precept, to the payment of the
marriage debt. For no one is forbidden to receive the Eucharist on
account of fulfilling a precept. Yet he who has had intercourse with
his wife cannot partake of the flesh of the Lamb according to Jerome
[*Serm. de Esu Agni viii] quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 32).
Therefore the payment of the debt does not come under the obligation of
a precept.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful to everyone to abstain from what is
hurtful to his person. But it is sometimes harmful to a person to pay
the debt when asked, whether on account of sickness, or because they
have already paid it. Therefore it would seem allowable to refuse the
one who asks.
Objection 3: Further, it is a sin to render oneself unfit to fulfill an
obligation of precept. If, therefore, the payment of the debt comes
under the obligation of a precept, it would seem sinful to render
oneself unfit for paying the debt, by fasting or otherwise weakening
the body: but apparently this is untrue.
Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12),
marriage is directed to the begetting and rearing of children, as well
as to the community of life. Now leprosy is opposed to both these ends
of marriage, for since it is a contagious disease, the wife is not
bound to cohabit with a leprous husband; and besides this disease is
often transmitted to the offspring. Therefore it would seem that a wife
is not bound to pay the debt to a leprous husband.
On the contrary, As the slave is in the power of his master, so is one
spouse in the power of the other (1 Cor. 7:4). But a slave is bound by
an obligation of precept to pay his master the debt of his service
according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues, tribute to
whom tribute is due," etc. Therefore husband and wife are mutually
bound to the payment of the marriage debt.
Further, marriage is directed to the avoiding of fornication (1 Cor.
7:2). But this could not be the effect of marriage, if the one were not
bound to pay the debt to the other when the latter is troubled with
concupiscence. Therefore the payment of the debt is an obligation of
precept.
I answer that, Marriage was instituted especially as fulfilling an
office of nature. Wherefore in its act the movement of nature must be
observed according to which the nutritive power administers to the
generative power that alone which is in excess of what is required for
the preservation of the individual: for the natural order requires that
a thing should be first perfected in itself, and that afterwards it
should communicate of its perfection to others: and this is also the
order of charity which perfects nature. And therefore, since the wife
has power over her husband only in relation to the generative power and
not in relation to things directed to the preservation of the
individual, the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife, in
matters pertaining to the begetting of children, with due regard
however to his own welfare.
Reply to Objection 1: It is possible through fulfilling a precept to
render oneself unfit for the exercise of a sacred duty: thus a judge
becomes irregular by sentencing a man to death. In like manner he who
pays the marriage debt, in fulfillment of the precept, becomes unfit
for the exercise of divine offices, not because the act in question is
sinful, but on account of its carnal nature. And so, according to the
Master (Sent. iv, D, 32), Jerome is speaking only of the ministers of
the Church, and not of others who should be left to use their own
discretion, because without sin they may either abstain out of
reverence or receive Christ's body out of devotion.
Reply to Objection 2: The wife has no power over her husband's body,
except as is consistent with the welfare of his person, as stated
above. Wherefore if she go beyond this in her demands, it is not a
request for the debt, but an unjust exaction; and for this reason the
husband is not bound to satisfy her.
Reply to Objection 3: If the husband be rendered incapable of paying
the debt through a cause consequent upon marriage, for instance through
having already paid the debt and being unable to pay it, the wife has
no right to ask again, and in doing so she behaves as a harlot rather
than as a wife. But if he be rendered incapable through some other
cause, then if this be a lawful cause, he is not bound, and she cannot
ask, but if it be an unlawful cause, then he sins, and his wife's sin,
should she fall into fornication on this account, is somewhat imputable
to him. Hence he should endeavor to do his best that his wife may
remain continent.
Reply to Objection 4: Leprosy voids a betrothal but not a marriage.
Wherefore a wife is bound to pay the debt even to a leprous husband.
But she is not bound to cohabit with him, because she is not so liable
to infection from marital intercourse as from continual cohabitation.
And though the child begotten of them be diseased, it is better to be
thus than not at all.
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Whether a husband is bound to pay the debt if his wife does not ask for it?
Objection 1: It would seem that the husband is not bound to pay the
marriage debt if his wife does not ask for it. For an affirmative
precept is binding only at a certain time. But the time fixed for the
payment of the debt can only be when it is asked for. Therefore he is
not bound to payment otherwise.
Objection 2: Further, we ought to presume the better things of
everyone. Now even for married people it is better to be continent than
to make use of marriage. Therefore unless she ask expressly for the
debt, the husband should presume that it pleases her to be continent,
and so he is not bound to pay her the debt.
Objection 3: Further, as the wife has power over her husband, so has a
master over his slave. Now a slave is not bound to serve his master
save when the latter commands him. Therefore neither is a husband bound
to pay the debt to his wife except when she demands it.
Objection 4: Further, the husband can sometimes request his wife not to
exact the debt when she asks for it. Much more therefore may he not pay
it when he is not asked.
On the contrary, By the payment of the debt a remedy is afforded
against the wife's concupiscence. Now a physician who has the care of a
sick person is bound to remedy the disease without being asked.
Therefore the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife although she
ask not for it. Further, a superior is bound to apply a remedy for the
sins of his subjects even though they rebel against it. But the payment
of the debt on the husband's part is directed against the sins of his
wife. Therefore sometimes the husband is bound to pay the debt to his
wife even though she ask it not of him.
I answer that, The debt may be demanded in two ways. First, explicitly,
as when they ask one another by words; secondly, implicitly, when
namely the husband knows by certain signs that the wife would wish him
to pay the debt, but is silent through shame. And so even though she
does not ask for the debt explicitly in words, the husband is bound to
pay it, whenever his wife shows signs of wishing him to do so.
Reply to Objection 1: The appointed time is not only when it is
demanded but also when on account of certain signs there is fear of
danger (to avoid which is the purpose of the payment of the debt)
unless it be paid then.
Reply to Objection 2: The husband may presume this of his wife when he
perceives in her no signs of the contrary; but it would be foolish of
him to admit this presumption if he does see such signs.
Reply to Objection 3: The master is not ashamed to demand of his slave
the duty of his service, as a wife is to ask the marriage debt of her
husband. Yet if the master were not to demand it, either through
ignorance or some other cause, the slave would nevertheless be bound to
fulfill his duty, if some danger were threatening. For this is what is
meant by "not serving to the eye" (Eph. 6:6; Col. 3:22) which is the
Apostle's command to servants.
Reply to Objection 4: A husband should not dissuade his wife from
asking for the debt, except for a reasonable cause; and even then he
should not be too insistent, on account of the besetting danger.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is allowable for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage debt?
[*This and the Fourth Article are omitted in the Leonine edition.]
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a menstruous wife to ask for the
marriage debt. For in the Law a man who had an issue of seed was
unclean, even as a menstruous woman. Yet a man who has an issue of seed
may ask for the debt. Therefore a menstruous wife may also.
Objection 2: Further, leprosy is a worse complaint than suffering from
monthly periods, and would seem to cause a greater corruption in the
offspring. Yet a leper can ask for the debt. Therefore, etc.
Objection 3: Further, if a menstruous wife is not allowed to ask for
the debt, this can only be because it is feared this may be detrimental
to the offspring. Yet if the wife be unfruitful there is no such fear.
Therefore, seemingly, at least an unfruitful wife may ask for the debt
during her menses.
On the contrary, "Thou shalt not approach to a woman having her
flowers" (Lev. 18:19) where Augustine observes: "Although he has
already sufficiently forbidden this he repeats the prohibition here
lest he seem to have spoken figuratively."
Further, "All our justices" are become "as the rag of a menstruous
woman" (Is. 64:6) where Jerome observes: "Men ought then to keep away
from their wives because thus is a deformed blind lame leprous
offspring conceived: so that those parents who are not ashamed to come
together in sexual intercourse have their sin made obvious to all": and
thus the same conclusion follows.
I answer that, It was forbidden in the Law to approach to a menstruous
woman, for two reasons both on account of her uncleanness, and on
account of the harm that frequently resulted to the offspring from such
intercourse. With regard to the first reason, it was a ceremonial
precept, but with regard to the second it was a moral precept. For
since marriage is chiefly directed to the good of the offspring, all
use of marriage which is intended for the good of the offspring is in
order. Consequently this precept is binding even in the New Law on
account of the second reason, although not on account of the first.
Now, the menstrual issue may be natural or unnatural. The natural issue
is that to which women are subject at stated periods when they are in
good health; and it is unnatural when they suffer from an issue of
blood through some disorder resulting from sickness. Accordingly if the
menstrual flow be unnatural it is not forbidden in the New Law to
approach to a menstruous woman both on account of her infirmity since a
woman in that state cannot conceive, and because an issue of this kind
is lasting and continuous, so that the husband would have to abstain
for always. When however the woman is subject to a natural issue of the
menstruum, she can conceive; moreover, the said issue lasts only a
short time, wherefore it is forbidden to approach to her. In like
manner a woman is forbidden to ask for the debt during the period of
that issue.
Reply to Objection 1: The issue of seed in a man is the result of
infirmity, nor is the seed in this case apt for generation. Moreover a
complaint of this kind is continual or lasting like leprosy: wherefore
the comparison falls.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: As long as a woman is subject to the menses it
cannot be certain that she is sterile. For some are sterile in youth,
and in course of time become fruitful, and "vice versa," as the
Philosopher observes (De Gener. Anim. xvi).
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Whether a menstruous woman should or may lawfully pay the marriage debt to
her husband if he ask for it? [*This and the previous article are omitted i
n
the Leonine edition.]
Objection 1: It would seem that a menstruous wife may not pay the
marriage debt to her husband at his asking. For it is written (Lev.
20:18) that if any man approach to a menstruous woman both shall be put
to death. Therefore it would seem that both he who asks and she who
grants are guilty of mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, "Not only they that do them but they also that
consent to them are worthy of death" (Rom. 1:32). Now he who knowingly
asks for the debt from a menstruous woman sins mortally. Therefore she
also sins mortally by consenting to pay the debt.
Objection 3: Further, a madman must not be given back his sword lest he
kill himself or another. Therefore in like manner neither should a wife
give her body to her husband during her menses, lest he be guilty of
spiritual murder.
On the contrary, "The wife hath not power of her own body, but the
husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore at his asking his wife must pay the
debt even during her menses.
Further, the menstruous wife should not be an occasion of sin to her
husband. But she would give her husband an occasion of sin, if she paid
him not the debt at his asking; since he might commit fornication.
Therefore, etc.
I answer that, In this regard some have asserted that a menstruous
woman may not pay the debt even as she may not ask for it. For just as
she would not be bound to pay it if she had some personal ailment so as
to make it dangerous for herself, so is she not bound to pay for fear
of danger to the offspring. But this opinion would seem to derogate
from marriage, by which the husband is given entire power of his wife's
body with regard to the marriage act. Nor is there any parallel between
bodily affliction of the offspring and the danger to her own body:
since, if the wife be ailing, it is quite certain that she would be
endangered by the carnal act, whereas this is by no means so certain
with regard to the offspring which perhaps would not be forthcoming.
Wherefore others say that a menstruous woman is never allowed to ask
for the debt; and that if her husband ask, he does so either knowingly
or in ignorance. If knowingly, she ought to dissuade him by her prayers
and admonitions; yet not so insistently as possibly to afford him an
occasion of falling into other, and those sinful, practices, if he be
deemed that way inclined. If however, he ask in ignorance, the wife may
put forward some motive, or allege sickness as a reason for not paying
the debt, unless there be fear of danger to her husband. If, however,
the husband ultimately persists in his request, she must yield to his
demand. But it would not be safe for her to make known [*"Indicare," as
in the commentary on the Sentences; the Leonine edition reads
"judicare."] her disaffection, lest this make her husband entertain a
repulsion towards her, unless his prudence may be taken for granted.
Reply to Objection 1: This refers to the case when both willingly
consent, but not when the woman pays the debt by force as it were.
Reply to Objection 2: Since there is no consent without the concurrence
of the will, the woman is not deemed to consent in her husband's sin
unless she pay the debt willingly. For when she is unwilling she is
passive rather than consenting.
Reply to Objection 3: A madman should be given back his sword if a
greater danger were feared from its not being returned to him: and thus
it is in the case in point.
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Whether husband and wife are equal in the marriage act?
Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife are not equal in the
marriage act. For according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) the agent
is more noble than the patient. But in the marriage act the husband is
as agent and the wife as patient. Therefore they are not equal in that
act.
Objection 2: Further, the wife is not bound to pay her husband the debt
without being asked; whereas he is so bound, as stated above
([5005]AA[1],2). Therefore they are not equal in the marriage act.
Objection 3: Further, the woman was made on the man's account in
reference to marriage according to Gn. 2:18, "Let us make him a help
like unto himself." But that on account of which another thing is, is
always the principal. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the marriage act.
But in marriage "the husband is the head of the wife" (Eph. 5:23).
Therefore they are not equal in the aforesaid act.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:4): "The husband . . . hath
not power of his own body," and the same is said of the wife. Therefore
they are equal in the marriage act.
Further, Marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it is a kind of
union, as stated above ([5006]Q[44], AA[1],3). Therefore husband and
wife are equal in the marriage act.
I answer that, Equality is twofold, of quantity and of proportion.
Equality of quantity is that which is observed between two quantities
of the same measure, for instance a thing two cubits long and another
two cubits in length. But equality of proportion is that which is
observed between two proportions of the same kind as double to double.
Accordingly, speaking of the first equality, husband and wife are not
equal in marriage; neither as regards the marriage act, wherein the
more noble part is due to the husband, nor as regards the household
management, wherein the wife is ruled and the husband rules. But with
reference to the second kind of equality, they are equal in both
matters, because just as in both the marriage act and in the management
of the household the husband is bound to the wife in all things
pertaining to the husband, so is the wife bound to the husband in all
things pertaining to the wife. It is in this sense that it is stated in
the text (Sent. iv, D, 32) that they are equal in paying and demanding
the debt.
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is more noble to be active than
passive, there is the same proportion between patient and passivity as
between agent and activity; and accordingly there is equality of
proportion between them.
Reply to Objection 2: This is accidental. For the husband having the
more noble part in the marriage act, it is natural that he should be
less ashamed than the wife to ask for the debt. Hence it is that the
wife is not bound to pay the debt to her husband without being asked,
whereas the husband is bound to pay it to the wife.
Reply to Objection 3: This proves that they are not equal absolutely,
but not that they are not equal in proportion.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the head is the principal member, yet
just as the members are bound to the head in their own respective
capacities, so is the head in its own capacity bound to the members:
and thus there is equality of proportion between them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt
without their mutual consent?
Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife may take a vow
contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent. For husband
and wife are equally bound to pay the debt, as stated above
[5007](A[5]). Now it is lawful for the husband, even if his wife be
unwilling, to take the cross in defense of the Holy Land: and
consequently this is also lawful to the wife. Therefore, since this
prevents the payment of the debt, either husband or wife may without
the other's consent take the aforesaid vow.
Objection 2: Further, in taking a vow one should not await the consent
of another who cannot dissent without sin. Now the husband or wife
cannot, without sin, refuse their consent to the other's taking a vow
of continence whether absolutely or for a time; because to prevent a
person's spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore
the one can take a vow of continence either absolutely or for a time,
without the other's consent.
Objection 3: Further, in the marriage act, the debt has to be demanded
just as it has to be paid. Now the one can, without the other's
consent, vow not to demand the debt, since in this he is within his own
rights. Therefore he can equally take a vow not to pay the debt.
Objection 4: Further, no one can be bound by the command of a superior
to do what he cannot lawfully vow or do simply, since one must not obey
in what is unlawful. Now the superior authority might command the
husband not to pay the debt to his wife for a time, by occupying him in
some service. Therefore he might, of his own accord, do or vow that
which would hinder him from paying the debt.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:5): "Defraud not one another,
except . . . by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to
prayer."
Further, no one can vow that which belongs to another. Now "the husband
. . . hath not power of his own body, but the wife" (1 Cor. 7:4).
Therefore, without her consent, the husband cannot take a vow of
continence whether absolutely or for a time.
I answer that, A vow is a voluntary act, as its very name implies: and
consequently a vow can only be about those goods which are subject to
our will, and those in which one person is bound to another do not come
under this head. Therefore in matters of this kind one person cannot
take a vow without the consent of the one to whom he is bound.
Consequently, since husband and wife are mutually bound as regards the
payment of the debt which is an obstacle to continence, the one cannot
vow continence without the other's consent; and if he take the vow he
sins, and must not keep the vow, but must do penance for an ill-taken
vow [*Cf.[5008] Q[53], AA[1],4;[5009] Q[61], A[1]].
Reply to Objection 1: It is sufficiently probable that the wife ought
to be willing to remain continent for a time, in order to succor the
need of the universal Church. Hence in favor of the business for which
the cross is given to him, it is laid down that the husband may take
the cross without his wife's consent, even as he might go fighting
without the consent of his landlord whose land he has leased. And yet
the wife is not entirely deprived of her right, since she can follow
him. Nor is there a parallel between wife and husband: because, since
the husband has to rule the wife and not "vice versa," the wife is
bound to follow her husband rather than the husband the wife. Moreover
there would be more danger to the wife's chastity as a result of
wandering from country to country, than to the husband's, and less
profit to the Church. Wherefore the wife cannot take this vow without
her husband's consent.
Reply to Objection 2: The one spouse, by refusing to consent to the
other's vow of continence, does not sin, because the object of his
dissent is to hinder not the other's good, but the harm to himself.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two opinions on this point. For some
say that one can without the other's consent vow not to demand the
debt, not however not to pay it, because in the former case they are
both within their own rights, but not in the second. Seeing, however,
that if one were never to ask for the debt, marriage would become too
burdensome to the other who would always have to undergo the shame of
asking for the debt, others assert with greater probability that
neither vow can be lawfully taken by one spouse without the other's
consent.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as the wife receives power over her
husband's body, without prejudice to the husband's duty to his own
body, so also is it without prejudice to his duty to his master. Hence
just as a wife cannot ask her husband for the debt to the detriment of
his bodily health, so neither can she do this so as to hinder him in
his duty to his master. And yet the master cannot for this reason
prevent her from paying the debt.
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Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days?
Objection 1: It would seem that a person ought not to be forbidden to
ask for the debt on holy days. For the remedy should be applied when
the disease gains strength. Now concupiscence may possibly gain
strength on a feast day. Therefore the remedy should be applied then by
asking for the debt.
Objection 2: Further, the only reason why the debt should not be
demanded on feast days is because they are devoted to prayer. Yet on
those days certain hours are appointed for prayer. Therefore one may
ask for the debt at some other time.
On the contrary, Just as certain places are holy because they are
devoted to holy things, so are certain times holy for the same reason.
But it is not lawful to demand the debt in a holy place. Therefore
neither is it lawful at a holy time.
I answer that, Although the marriage act is void of sin, nevertheless
since it oppresses the reason on account of the carnal pleasure, it
renders man unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, on those days when
one ought especially to give one's time to spiritual things, it is not
lawful to ask for the debt.
Reply to Objection 1: At such a time other means may be employed for
the repression of concupiscence; for instance, prayer and many similar
things, to which even those who observe perpetual continence have
recourse.
Reply to Objection 2: Although one is not bound to pray at all hours,
one is bound throughout the day to keep oneself fit for prayer.
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Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt
at a holy time. For Gregory says (Dial. i) that the devil took
possession of a woman who had intercourse with her husband at night and
came in the morning to the procession. But this would not have happened
had she not sinned mortally. Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, whoever disobeys a Divine command commits a
mortal sin. Now the Lord commanded (Ex. 19:15): "Come not near your
wives," when namely they were about to receive the Law. Much more
therefore do husbands sin mortally if they have intercourse with their
wives at a time when they should be intent on the sacred observances of
the New Law.
On the contrary, No circumstance aggravates infinitely. But undue time
is a circumstance. Therefore it does not aggravate a sin infinitely, so
as to make mortal what was otherwise venial.
I answer that, To ask for the debt on a feast day is not a circumstance
drawing a sin into another species; wherefore it cannot aggravate
infinitely. Consequently a wife or husband does not sin mortally by
asking for the debt on a feast day. It is however a more grievous sin
to ask for the sake of mere pleasure, than through fear of the weakness
of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 1: This woman was punished not because she paid the
debt, but because afterwards she rashly intruded into the divine
service against her conscience.
Reply to Objection 2: The authority quoted shows not that it is a
mortal sin but that it is unbecoming. For under the Old Law which was
given to a carnal people many things were required under an obligation
of precept, for the sake of bodily cleanness, which are not required in
the New Law which is the law of the spirit.
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Whether one spouse is bound to pay the debt to the other at a festal time?
Objection 1: It would seem that neither are they bound to pay the debt
at a festal time. For those who commit a sin as well as those who
consent thereto are equally punished (Rom. 1:32). But the one who pays
the debt consents with the one that asks, who sins. Therefore he sins
also.
Objection 2: Further, it is an affirmative precept that binds us to
pray, and therefore we are bound to do so at a fixed time. Therefore
one ought not to pay the debt at a time when one is bound to pray, as
neither ought one at a time when one is bound to fulfill a special duty
towards a temporal master.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:5): "Defraud not one another,
except by consent, for a time," etc. Therefore when one spouse asks the
other must pay.
I answer that, Since the wife has power of her husband's body, and
"vice versa," with regard to the act of procreation, the one is bound
to pay the debt to the other, at any season or hour, with due regard to
the decorum required in such matters, for this must not be done at once
openly.
Reply to Objection 1: As far as he is concerned he does not consent,
but grants unwillingly and with grief that which is exacted of him; and
consequently he does not sin. For it is ordained by God, on account of
the weakness of the flesh, that the debt must always be paid to the one
who asks lest he be afforded an occasion of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: No hour is fixed for praying, but that
compensation can be made at some other hour; wherefore the argument is
not cogent.
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Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times? [*This article is
omitted in the Leonine edition.]
Objection 1: It would seem that weddings ought not to be forbidden at
certain times. For marriage is a sacrament: and the celebration of the
others sacraments is not forbidden at those times. Therefore neither
should the celebration of marriage be forbidden then.
Objection 2: Further, asking for the marriage debt is more unbecoming
on feast days than the celebration of marriage. Yet the debt may be
asked for on those days. Therefore also marriages may be solemnized.
Objection 3: Further, marriages that are contracted in despite of the
law of the Church ought to be dissolved. Yet marriages are not
dissolved if they be contracted at those times. Therefore it should not
be forbidden by a commandment of the Church.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 3:5): "A time to embrace, and a
time to be far from embraces."
I answer that, When the newly married spouse is given to her husband,
the minds of husband and wife are taken up with carnal preoccupations
by reason of the very newness of things, wherefore weddings are wont to
be signalized by much unrestrained rejoicing. On this account it is
forbidden to celebrate marriages at those times when men ought
especially to arise to spiritual things. Those times are from Advent
until the Epiphany because of the Communion which, according to the
ancient Canons, is wont to be made at Christmas (as was observed in its
proper place, [5010]TP, Q[30]), from Septuagesima until the octave day
of Easter, on account of the Easter Communion, and from the three days
before the Ascension until the octave day of Pentecost, on account of
the preparation for Communion to be received at that time.
Reply to Objection 1: The celebration of marriage has a certain worldly
and carnal rejoicing connected with it, which does not apply to the
other sacraments. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: There is not such a distraction of minds caused
by the payment of a request for the debt as by the celebration of a
marriage; and consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Since time is not essential to a marriage
contracted within the forbidden seasons, the marriage is nevertheless a
true sacrament. Nor is the marriage dissolved absolutely, but for a
time, that they may do penance for having disobeyed the commandment of
the Church. It is thus that we are to understand the statement of the
Master (Sent. iv, D, 33), namely that should a marriage have been
contracted or a wedding celebrated at the aforesaid times, those who
have done so "ought to be separated." Nor does he say this on his own
authority, but in reference to some canonical ordinance, such as that
of the Council of Lerida, which decision is quoted by the Decretals.
__________________________________________________________________
OF PLURALITY OF WIVES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the plurality of wives. Under this head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?
(2) Whether this was ever lawful?
(3) Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?
(5) Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not against the natural law to
have several wives. For custom does not prejudice the law of nature.
But "it was not a sin" to have several wives "when this was the
custom," according to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xv) as quoted in the
text (Sent. iv, D, 33). Therefore it is not contrary to the natural law
to have several wives.
Objection 2: Further, whoever acts in opposition to the natural law,
disobeys a commandment, for the law of nature has its commandments even
as the written law has. Now Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xv; De Civ.
Dei xv, 38) that "it was not contrary to a commandment" to have several
wives, "because by no law was it forbidden." Therefore it is not
against the natural law to have several wives.
Objection 3: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting of
offspring. But one man may get children of several women, by causing
them to be pregnant. Therefore It is not against the natural law to
have several wives.
Objection 4: Further, "Natural right is that which nature has taught
all animals," as stated at the beginning of the Digests (1, i, ff. De
just. et jure). Now nature has not taught all animals that one male
should be united to but one female, since with many animals the one
male is united to several females. Therefore it is not against the
natural law to have several wives.
Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal.
i, 20), in the begetting of offspring the male is to the female as
agent to patient, and as the craftsman is to his material. But it is
not against the order of nature for one agent to act on several
patients, or for one craftsman to work in several materials. Therefore
neither is it contrary to the law of nature for one husband to have
many wives.
Objection 6: On the contrary, That which was instilled into man at the
formation of human nature would seem especially to belong to the
natural law. Now it was instilled into him at the very formation of
human nature that one man should have one wife, according to Gn. 2:24,
"They shall be two in one flesh." Therefore it is of natural law.
Objection 7: Further, it is contrary to the law of nature that man
should bind himself to the impossible, and that what is given to one
should be given to another. Now when a man contracts with a wife, he
gives her the power of his body, so that he is bound to pay her the
debt when she asks. Therefore it is against the law of nature that he
should afterwards give the power of his body to another, because it
would be impossible for him to pay both were both to ask at the same
time.
Objection 8: Further, "Do not to another what thou wouldst not were
done to thyself" [*Cf. Tob. 4:16] is a precept of the natural law. But
a husband would by no means be willing for his wife to have another
husband. Therefore he would be acting against the law of nature, were
he to have another wife in addition.
Objection 9: Further, whatever is against the natural desire is
contrary to the natural law. Now a husband's jealousy of his wife and
the wife's jealousy of her husband are natural, for they are found in
all. Therefore, since jealousy is "love impatient of sharing the
beloved," it would seem to be contrary to the natural law that several
wives should share one husband.
I answer that, All natural things are imbued with certain principles
whereby they are enabled not only to exercise their proper actions, but
also to render those actions proportionate to their end, whether such
actions belong to a thing by virtue of its generic nature, or by virtue
of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne
downwards by virtue of its generic nature, and to attract iron by
virtue of its specific nature. Now just as in those things which act
from natural necessity the principle of action is the form itself,
whence their proper actions proceed proportionately to their end, so in
things which are endowed with knowledge the principles of action are
knowledge and appetite. Hence in the cognitive power there needs to be
a natural concept, and in the appetitive power a natural inclination,
whereby the action befitting the genus or species is rendered
proportionate to the end. Now since man, of all animals, knows the
aspect of the end, and the proportion of the action to the end, it
follows that he is imbued with a natural concept, whereby he is
directed to act in a befitting manner, and this is called "the natural
law" or "the natural right," but in other animals "the natural
instinct." For brutes are rather impelled by the force of nature to do
befitting actions, than guided to act on their own judgment. Therefore
the natural law is nothing else than a concept naturally instilled into
man, whereby he is guided to act in a befitting manner in his proper
actions, whether they are competent to him by virtue of his generic
nature, as, for instance, to beget, to eat, and so on, or belong to him
by virtue of his specific nature, as, for instance, to reason and so
forth. Now whatever renders an action improportionate to the end which
nature intends to obtain by a certain work is said to be contrary to
the natural law. But an action may be improportionate either to the
principal or to the secondary end, and in either case this happens in
two ways. First, on account of something which wholly hinders the end;
for instance a very great excess or a very great deficiency in eating
hinders both the health of the body, which is the principal end of
food, and aptitude for conducting business, which is its secondary end.
Secondly, on account of something that renders the attainment of the
principal or secondary end difficult, or less satisfactory, for
instance eating inordinately in respect of undue time. Accordingly if
an action be improportionate to the end, through altogether hindering
the principal end directly, it is forbidden by the first precepts of
the natural law, which hold the same place in practical matters, as the
general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. If, however, it be
in any way improportionate to the secondary end, or again to the
principal end, as rendering its attainment difficult or less
satisfactory, it is forbidden, not indeed by the first precepts of the
natural law, but by the second which are derived from the first even as
conclusions in speculative matters receive our assent by virtue of
self-known principles: and thus the act in question is said to be
against the law of nature.
Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of
children, and this end is competent to man according to his generic
nature, wherefore it is common to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and
thus it is that the "offspring" is assigned as a marriage good. But for
its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has,
among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life,
as stated above ([5011]Q[41], A[1]). And in reference to this they owe
one another "fidelity" which is one of the goods of marriage.
Furthermore it has another end, as regards marriage between believers,
namely the signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the
"sacrament" is said to be a marriage good. Wherefore the first end
corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the
second, inasmuch as he is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a
believer. Accordingly plurality of wives neither wholly destroys nor in
any way hinders the first end of marriage, since one man is sufficient
to get children of several wives, and to rear the children born of
them. But though it does not wholly destroy the second end, it hinders
it considerably for there cannot easily be peace in a family where
several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot
suffice to satisfy the requisitions of several wives, and again because
the sharing of several in one occupation is a cause of strife: thus
"potters quarrel with one another" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4], and in
like manner the several wives of one husband. The third end, it removes
altogether, because as Christ is one, so also is the Church one. It is
therefore evident from what has been said that plurality of wives is in
a way against the law of nature, and in a way not against it.
Reply to Objection 1: Custom does not prejudice the law of nature as
regards the first precepts of the latter, which are like the general
concepts of the mind in speculative matters. But those which are drawn
like conclusions from these custom enforces, as Tully declares (De Inv.
Rhet. ii), or weakens. Such is the precept of nature in the matter of
having one wife.
Reply to Objection 2: As Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii), "fear of the
law and religion have sanctioned those things that come from nature and
are approved by custom." Wherefore it is evident that those dictates of
the natural law, which are derived from the first principles as it were
of the natural law, have not the binding force of an absolute
commandment, except when they have been sanctioned by Divine or human
law. This is what Augustine means by saying that "they did not disobey
the commandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any law."
The Reply to the Third Objection follows from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: Natural right has several significations. First a
right is said to be natural by its principle, because it is instilled
by nature: and thus Tully defines it (De Inv. Rhet. ii) when he says:
"Natural right is not the result of opinion but the product of an
innate force." And since even in natural things certain movements are
called natural, not that they be from an intrinsic principle, but
because they are from a higher moving principle---thus the movements
that are caused in the elements by the impress of heavenly bodies are
said to be natural, as the Commentator states (De Coelo et Mundo iii,
28), therefore those things that are of Divine right are said to be of
natural right, because they are caused by the impress and influence of
a higher principle, namely God. Isidore takes it in this sense, when he
says (Etym. v) that "the natural right is that which is contained in
the Law and the Gospel." Thirdly, right is said to be natural not only
from its principle but also from its matter, because it is about
natural things. And since nature is contradistinguished with reason,
whereby man is a man, it follows that if we take natural right in its
strictest sense, those things which are dictated by natural reason and
pertain to man alone are not said to be of natural right, but only
those which are dictated by natural reason and are common to man and
other animals. Thus we have the aforesaid definition, namely: "Natural
right is what nature has taught all animals." Accordingly plurality of
wives, though not contrary to natural right taken in the third sense,
is nevertheless against natural right taken in the second sense,
because it is forbidden by the Divine law. It is also against natural
right taken in the first sense, as appears from what has been said, for
such is nature's dictate to every animal according to the mode
befitting its nature. Wherefore also certain animals, the rearing of
whose offspring demands the care of both, namely the male and female,
by natural instinct cling to the union of one with one, for instance
the turtle-dove, the dove, and so forth.
The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.
Since, however, the arguments adduced "on the contrary side" would seem
to show that plurality of wives is against the first principles of the
natural law, we must reply to them.
Accordingly we reply to the Sixth Objection that human nature was
founded without any defect, and consequently it is endowed not only
with those things without which the principal end of marriage is
impossible of attainment, but also with those without which the
secondary end of marriage could not be obtained without difficulty: and
in this way it sufficed man when he was first formed to have one wife,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 7: In marriage the husband gives his wife power of
his body, not in all respects, but only in those things that are
required by marriage. Now marriage does not require the husband to pay
the debt every time his wife asks for it, if we consider the principal
end for which marriage was instituted, namely the good of the
offspring, but only as far as is necessary for impregnation. But in so
far as it is instituted as a remedy (which is its secondary end),
marriage does require the debt to be paid at all times on being asked
for. Hence it is evident that by taking several wives a man does not
bind himself to the impossible, considering the principal end of
marriage; and therefore plurality of wives is not against the first
principles of the natural law.
Reply to Objection 8: This precept of the natural law, "Do not to
another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself," should be
understood with the proviso that there be equal proportion. For if a
superior is unwilling to be withstood by his subject, he is not
therefore bound not to withstand his subject. Hence it does not follow
in virtue of this precept that as a husband is unwilling for his wife
to have another husband, he must not have another wife: because for one
man to have several wives is not contrary to the first principles of
the natural law, as stated above: whereas for one wife to have several
husbands is contrary to the first principles of the natural law, since
thereby the good of the offspring which is the principal end of
marriage is, in one respect, entirely destroyed, and in another respect
hindered. For the good of the offspring means not only begetting, but
also rearing. Now the begetting of offspring, though not wholly voided
(since a woman may be impregnated a second time after impregnation has
already taken place, as stated in De Gener. Animal. vii. 4), is
nevertheless considerably hindered, because this can scarcely happen
without injury either to both fetus or to one of them. But the rearing
of the offspring is altogether done away, because as a result of one
woman having several husbands there follows uncertainty of the
offspring in relation to its father, whose care is necessary for its
education. Wherefore the marriage of one wife with several husbands has
not been sanctioned by any law or custom, whereas the converse has
been.
Reply to Objection 9: The natural inclination in the appetitive power
follows the natural concept in the cognitive power. And since it is not
so much opposed to the natural concept for a man to have several wives
as for a wife to have several husbands, it follows that a wife's love
is not so averse to another sharing the same husband with her, as a
husband's love is to another sharing the same wife with him.
Consequently both in man and in other animals the male is more jealous
of the female than "vice versa."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was ever lawful to have several wives?
Objection 1: It would seem that it can never have been lawful to have
several wives. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7), "The
natural law has the same power at all times and places." Now plurality
of wives is forbidden by the natural law, as stated above [5012](A[1]).
Therefore as it is unlawful now, it was unlawful at all times.
Objection 2: Further, if it was ever lawful, this could only be because
it was lawful either in itself, or by dispensation. If the former, it
would also be lawful now; if the latter, this is impossible, for
according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3), "as God is the founder
of nature, He does nothing contrary to the principles which He has
planted in nature." Since then God has planted in our nature the
principle that one man should be united to one wife, it would seem that
He has never dispensed man from this.
Objection 3: Further, if a thing be lawful by dispensation, it is only
lawful for those who receive the dispensation. Now we do not read in
the Law of a general dispensation having been granted to all. Since
then in the Old Testament all who wished to do so, without any
distinction, took to themselves several wives, nor were reproached on
that account, either by the law or by the prophets, it would seem that
it was not made lawful by dispensation.
Objection 4: Further, where there is the same reason for dispensation,
the same dispensation should be given. Now we cannot assign any other
reason for dispensation than the multiplying of the offspring for the
worship of God, and this is necessary also now. Therefore this
dispensation would be still in force, especially as we read nowhere of
its having been recalled.
Objection 5: Further, in granting a dispensation the greater good
should not be overlooked for the sake of a lesser good. Now fidelity
and the sacrament, which it would seem impossible to safeguard in a
marriage where one man is joined to several wives, are greater goods
than the multiplication of the offspring. Therefore this dispensation
ought not to have been granted with a view to this multiplication.
On the contrary, It is stated (Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set because
of transgressors [Vulg.: 'transgressions']," namely in order to
prohibit them. Now the Old Law mentions plurality of wives without any
prohibition thereof, as appears from Dt. 21:15, "If a man have two
wives," etc. Therefore they were not transgressors through having two
wives; and so it was lawful.
Further, this is confirmed by the example of the holy patriarchs, who
are stated to have had several wives, and yet were most pleasing to
God, for instance Jacob, David, and several others. Therefore at one
time it was lawful.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8), plurality of wives is
said to be against the natural law, not as regards its first precepts,
but as regards the secondary precepts, which like conclusions are drawn
from its first precepts. Since, however, human acts must needs vary
according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other
circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions do not proceed from the first
precepts of the natural law, so as to be binding in all cases, but only
in the majority. for such is the entire matter of Ethics according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7). Hence, when they cease to be binding,
it is lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to determine
the above variations, it belongs exclusively to him from whose
authority he derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of
the law in those cases to which the force of the law ought not to
extend, and this permission is called a dispensation. Now the law
prescribing the one wife was framed not by man but by God, nor was it
ever given by word or in writing, but was imprinted on the heart, like
other things belonging in any way to the natural law. Consequently a
dispensation in this matter could be granted by God alone through an
inward inspiration, vouchsafed originally to the holy patriarchs, and
by their example continued to others, at a time when it behooved the
aforesaid precept not to be observed, in order to ensure the
multiplication of the offspring to be brought up in the worship of God.
For the principal end is ever to be borne in mind before the secondary
end. Wherefore, since the good of the offspring is the principal end of
marriage, it behooved to disregard for a time the impediment that might
arise to the secondary ends, when it was necessary for the offspring to
be multiplied; because it was for the removal of this impediment that
the precept forbidding a plurality of wives was framed, as stated above
[5013](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: The natural law, considered in itself, has the
same force at all times and places; but accidentally on account of some
impediment it may vary at certain times and places, as the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 3,7) instances in the case of other natural things. For at
all times and places the right hand is better than the left according
to nature, but it may happen accidentally that a person is
ambidextrous, because our nature is variable; and the same applies to
the natural, just as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 3,7).
Reply to Objection 2: In a Decretal (De divortiis, cap. Gaudemus) it is
asserted that is was never lawful to have several wives without having
a dispensation received through Divine inspiration. Nor is the
dispensation thus granted a contradiction to the principles which God
has implanted in nature, but an exception to them, because those
principles are not intended to apply to all cases but to the majority,
as stated. Even so it is not contrary to nature when certain
occurrences take place in natural things miraculously, by way of
exception to more frequent occurrences.
Reply to Objection 3: Dispensation from a law should follow the quality
of the law. Wherefore, since the law of nature is imprinted on the
heart, it was not necessary for a dispensation from things pertaining
to the natural law to be given under the form of a written law but by
internal inspiration.
Reply to Objection 4: When Christ came it was the time of the fulness
of the grace of Christ, whereby the worship of God was spread abroad
among all nations by a spiritual propagation. Hence there is not the
same reason for a dispensation as before Christ's coming, when the
worship of God was spread and safeguarded by a carnal propagation.
Reply to Objection 5: The offspring, considered as one of the marriage
goods, includes the keeping of faith with God, because the reason why
it is reckoned a marriage good is because it is awaited with a view to
its being brought up in the worship of God. Now the faith to be kept
with God is of greater import than the faith to be kept with a wife,
which is reckoned a marriage good, and than the signification which
pertains to the sacrament, since the signification is subordinate to
the knowledge of faith. Hence it is not unfitting if something is taken
from the two other goods for the sake of the good of the offspring. Nor
are they entirely done away, since there remains faith towards several
wives; and the sacrament remains after a fashion, for though it did not
signify the union of Christ with the Church as one, nevertheless the
plurality of wives signified the distinction of degrees in the Church,
which distinction is not only in the Church militant but also in the
Church triumphant. Consequently their marriages signified somewhat the
union of Christ not only with the Church militant, as some say, but
also with the Church triumphant where there are "many mansions" [*Jn.
19:2].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?
Objection 1: It would seem that to have a concubine is not against the
natural law. For the ceremonies of the Law are not of the natural law.
But fornication is forbidden (Acts 15:29) in conjunction with
ceremonies of the law which for the time were being imposed on those
who were brought to the faith from among the heathens. Therefore simple
fornication which is intercourse with a concubine is not against the
natural law.
Objection 2: Further, positive law is an outcome of the natural law, as
Tully says (De Invent. ii). Now fornication was not forbidden by
positive law; indeed according to the ancient laws women used to be
sentenced to be taken to brothels. Therefore it is not against the
natural law to have a concubine.
Objection 3: Further, the natural law does not forbid that which is
given simply, to be given for a time or under certain restrictions. Now
one unmarried woman may give the power of her body for ever to an
unmarried man, so that he may use her when he will. Therefore it is not
against the law of nature, if she give him power of her body for a
time.
Objection 4: Further, whoever uses his own property as he will, injures
no one. But a bondswoman is her master's property. Therefore if her
master use her as he will, he injures no one: and consequently it is
not against the natural law to have a concubine.
Objection 5: Further, everyone may give his own property to another.
Now the wife has power of her husband's body (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore if
his wife be willing, the husband can have intercourse with another
woman without sin.
On the contrary, According to all laws the children born of a concubine
are children of shame. But this would not be so unless the union of
which they are born were naturally shameful.
Further, as stated above ([5014]Q[41], A[1]), marriage is natural. But
this would not be so if without prejudice to the natural law a man
could be united to a woman otherwise than by marriage. Therefore it is
against the natural law to have a concubine.
I answer that, As stated above [5015](A[1]), an action is said to be
against the natural law, if it is not in keeping with the due end
intended by nature, whether through not being directed thereto by the
action of the agent, or through being directed thereto by the action of
the agent, or through being in itself improportionate to that end. Now
the end which nature intends in sexual union is the begetting and
rearing of the offspring. and that this good might be sought after, it
attached pleasure to the union; as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.
i, 8). Accordingly to make use of sexual intercourse on account of its
inherent pleasure, without reference to the end for which nature
intended it, is to act against nature, as also is it if the intercourse
be not such as may fittingly be directed to that end. And since, for
the most part, things are denominated from their end, as being that
which is of most consequence to them, just as the marriage union took
its name from the good of the offspring [*Cf. Q[44], A[2]], which is
the end chiefly sought after in marriage, so the name of concubine is
expressive of that union where sexual intercourse is sought after for
its own sake. Moreover even though sometimes a man may seek to have
offspring of such an intercourse, this is not befitting to the good of
the offspring, which signifies not only the begetting of children from
which they take their being, but also their rearing and instruction, by
which means they receive nourishment and learning from their parents,
in respect of which three things the parents are bound to their
children, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12). Now since
the rearing and teaching of the children remain a duty of the parents
during a long period of time, the law of nature requires the father and
mother to dwell together for a long time, in order that together they
may be of assistance to their children. Hence birds that unite together
in rearing their young do not sever their mutual fellowship from the
time when they first come together until the young are fully fledged.
Now this obligation which binds the female and her mate to remain
together constitutes matrimony. Consequently it is evident that it is
contrary to the natural law for a man to have intercourse with a woman
who is not married to him, which is the signification of a concubine.
Reply to Objection 1: Among the Gentiles the natural law was obscured
in many points: and consequently they did not think it wrong to have
intercourse with a concubine, and in many cases practiced fornication
as though it were lawful, as also other things contrary to the
ceremonial laws of the Jews, though not contrary to the law of nature.
Wherefore the apostles inserted the prohibition of fornication among
that of other ceremonial observances, because in both cases there was a
difference of opinion between Jews and Gentiles.
Reply to Objection 2: This law was the result of the darkness just
mentioned, into which the Gentiles had fallen, by not giving due honor
to God as stated in Rom. 1:21, and did not proceed from the instinct of
the natural law. Hence, when the Christian religion prevailed, this law
was abolished.
Reply to Objection 3: In certain cases no evil results ensue if a
person surrenders his right to a thing whether absolutely or for a
time, so that in neither case is the surrender against the natural law.
But that does not apply to the case in point, wherefore the argument
does not prove.
Reply to Objection 4: Injury is opposed to justice. Now the natural law
forbids not only injustice, but also whatever is opposed to any of the
virtues: for instance it is contrary to the natural law to eat
immoderately, although by doing so a man uses his own property without
injury to anyone. Moreover although a bondswoman is her master's
property that she may serve him, she is not his that she may be his
concubine. And again it depends how a person makes use of his property.
For such a man does an injury to the offspring he begets, since such a
union is not directed to its good, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: The wife has power of her husband's body, not
simply and in all respects, but only in relation to marriage, and
consequently she cannot transfer her husband's body to another to the
detriment of the good of marriage.
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Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a mortal sin to have
intercourse with a concubine. For a lie is a greater sin than simple
fornication: and a proof of this is that Juda, who did not abhor to
commit fornication with Thamar, recoiled from telling a lie, saying
(Gn. 38:23): "Surely she cannot charge us with a lie." But a lie is not
always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is simple fornication.
Objection 2: Further, a deadly sin should be punished with death. But
the Old Law did not punish with death intercourse with a concubine,
save in a certain case (Dt. 22:25). Therefore it is not a deadly sin.
Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), the
sins of the flesh are less blameworthy than spiritual sins. Now pride
and covetousness, which are spiritual sins, are not always mortal sins.
Therefore fornication, which is a sin of the flesh, is not always a
mortal sin.
Objection 4: Further, where the incentive is greater the sin is less
grievous, because he sins more who is overcome by a lighter temptation.
But concupiscence is the greatest incentive to lust. Therefore since
lustful actions are not always mortal sins, neither is simple
fornication a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin excludes from the kingdom of
God. But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom of God (1 Cor.
6:9,10). Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
Further, mortal sins alone are called crimes. Now all fornication is a
crime according to Tob. 4:13, "Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all
fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know crime."
Therefore, etc.
I answer that, As we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 42, Q[1], A[4]),
those sins are mortal in their genus which violate the bond of
friendship between man and God, and between man and man; for such sins
are against the two precepts of charity which is the life of the soul.
Wherefore since the intercourse of fornication destroys the due
relations of the parent with the offspring that is nature's aim in
sexual intercourse, there can be no doubt that simple fornication by
its very nature is a mortal sin even though there were no written law.
Reply to Objection 1: It often happens that a man who does not avoid a
mortal sin, avoids a venial sin to which he has not so great an
incentive. Thus, too, Juda avoided a lie while he avoided not
fornication. Nevertheless that would have been a pernicious lie, for it
would have involved an injury if he had not kept his promise.
Reply to Objection 2: A sin is called deadly, not because it is
punished with temporal, but because it is punished with eternal death.
Hence also theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other sins are
sometimes not punished with temporal death by the law. The same applies
to fornication.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as not every movement of pride is a mortal
sin, so neither is every movement of lust, because the first movements
of lust and the like are venial sins, even sometimes marriage
intercourse. Nevertheless some acts of lust are mortal sins, while some
movements of pride are venial: since the words quoted from Gregory are
to be understood as comparing vices in their genus and not in their
particular acts.
Reply to Objection 4: A circumstance is the more effective in
aggravating a sin according as it comes nearer to the nature of sin.
Hence although fornication is less grave on account of the greatness of
its incentive, yet on account of the matter about which it is, it has a
greater gravity than immoderate eating, because it is about those
things which tighten the bond of human fellowship, as stated above.
Hence the argument does not prove.
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Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?
Objection 1: It would seem that it has been sometimes lawful to have a
concubine. For just as the natural law requires a man to have but one
wife, so does it forbid him to have a concubine. Yet at times it has
been lawful to have several wives. Therefore it has also been lawful to
have a concubine.
Objection 2: Further, a woman cannot be at the same time a slave and a
wife; wherefore according to the Law (Dt. 21:11, seqq.) a bondswoman
gained her freedom by the very fact of being taken in marriage. Now we
read that certain men who were most beloved of God, for instance
Abraham and Jacob, had intercourse with their bondswomen. Therefore
these were not wives, and consequently it was sometime lawful to have a
concubine.
Objection 3: Further, a woman who is taken in marriage cannot be cast
out, and her son should have a share in the inheritance. Yet Abraham
sent Agar away, and her son was not his heir (Gn. 21:14). Therefore she
was not Abraham's wife.
On the contrary, Things opposed to the precepts of the decalogue were
never lawful. Now to have a concubine is against a precept of the
decalogue, namely, "Thou shalt not commit adultery." Therefore it was
never lawful.
Further, Ambrose says in his book on the patriarchs (De Abraham i, 4):
"What is unlawful to a wife is unlawful to a husband." But it is never
lawful for a wife to put aside her own husband and have intercourse
with another man. Therefore it was never lawful for a husband to have a
concubine.
I answer that, Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) that before the
time of the Law fornication was not a sin; and he proved his assertion
from the fact that Juda had intercourse with Thamar. But this argument
is not conclusive. For there is no need to excuse Jacob's sons from
mortal sin, since they were accused to their father of a most wicked
crime (Gn. 37:2), and consented kill Joseph and to sell him. Wherefore
we must say that since it is against the natural law to have a
concubine outside wedlock, as stated above [5016](A[3]), it was never
lawful either in itself or by dispensation. For as we have shown (Doc.
Perp. iii, 49) intercourse with a woman outside wedlock is an action
improportionate to the good of the offspring which is the principal end
of marriage: and consequently it is against the first precepts of the
natural law which admit of no dispensation. Hence wherever in the Old
Testament we read of concubines being taken by such men as we ought to
excuse from mortal sin, we must needs understand them to have been
taken in marriage, and yet to have been called concubines, because they
had something of the character of a wife and something of the character
of a concubine. In so far as marriage is directed to its principal end,
which is the good of the offspring, the union of wife and husband is
indissoluble or at least of a lasting nature, as shown above
[5017](A[1]), and in regard to this there is no dispensation. But in
regard to the secondary end, which is the management of the household
and community of works, the wife is united to the husband as his mate:
and this was lacking in those who were known as concubines. For in this
respect a dispensation was possible, since it is the secondary end of
marriage. And from this point of view they bore some resemblance to
concubines, and for this reason they were known as such.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8) to have several
wives is not against the first precepts of the natural law, as it is to
have a concubine; wherefore the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: The patriarchs of old by virtue of the
dispensation which allowed them several wives, approached their
bondswomen with the disposition of a husband towards his wife. For
these women were wives as to the principal and first end of marriage,
but not as to the other union which regards the secondary end, to which
bondage is opposed since a woman cannot be at once mate and slave.
Reply to Objection 3: As in the Mosaic law it was allowable by
dispensation to grant a bill of divorce in order to avoid wife-murder
(as we shall state further on[5018], Q[67], A[6]), so by the same
dispensation Abraham was allowed to send Agar away, in order to signify
the mystery which the Apostle explains (Gal. 4:22, seqq.). Again, that
this son did not inherit belongs to the mystery, as explained in the
same place. Even so Esau, the son of a free woman, did not inherit
(Rom. 9:13, seqq.). In like manner on account of the mystery it came
about that the sons of Jacob born of bond and free women inherited, as
Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan.) because "sons and heirs are born to
Christ both of good ministers denoted by the free woman and of evil
ministers denoted by the bondswoman."
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OF BIGAMY AND OF THE IRREGULARITY CONTRACTED THEREBY (FIVE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider bigamy and the irregularity
contracted thereby. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether irregularity attaches to the bigamy that consists in having
two successive wives?
(2) Whether irregularity is contracted by one who has two wives at
once?
(3) Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a
virgin?
(4) Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?
(5) Whether a dispensation can be granted to a bigamous person?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irregularity attaches to bigamy?
Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity is not attached to the
bigamy that consists in having two wives successively. For multitude
and unity are consequent upon being. Since then non-being does not
cause plurality, a man who has two wives successively, the one in
being, the other in non-being, does not thereby become the husband of
more than one wife, so as to be debarred, according to the Apostle (1
Tim. 3:2; Titus 1:6), from the episcopate.
Objection 2: Further, a man who commits fornication with several women
gives more evidence of incontinence than one who has several wives
successively. Yet in the first case a man does not become irregular.
Therefore neither in the second should he become irregular.
Objection 3: Further, if bigamy causes irregularity, this is either
because of the sacrament, or because of the carnal intercourse. Now it
is not on account of the former, for if a man had contracted marriage
by words of the present and, his wife dying before the consummation of
the marriage, he were to marry another, he would become irregular,
which is against the decree of Innocent III (cap. Dubium, De bigamia).
Nor again is it on account of the second, for then a man who had
committed fornication with several women would become irregular: which
is false. Therefore bigamy nowise causes irregularity.
I answer that, By the sacrament of order a man is appointed to the
ministry of the sacraments; and he who has to administer the sacraments
to others must suffer from no defect in the sacraments. Now there is a
defect in a sacrament when the entire signification of the sacrament is
not found therein. And the sacrament of marriage signifies the union of
Christ with the Church, which is the union of one with one. Therefore
the perfect signification of the sacrament requires the husband to have
only one wife, and the wife to have but one husband; and consequently
bigamy, which does away with this, causes irregularity. And there are
four kinds of bigamy: the first is when a man has several lawful wives
successively; the second is when a man has several wives at once, one
in law, the other in fact; the third, when he has several successively,
one in law, the other in fact; the fourth, when a man marries a widow.
Accordingly irregularity attaches to all of these.
There is another consequent reason assigned, since those who receive
the sacrament of order should be signalized by the greatest
spirituality, both because they administer spiritual things, namely the
sacraments, and because they teach spiritual things, and should be
occupied in spiritual matters. Wherefore since concupiscence is most
incompatible with spirituality, inasmuch as it makes a man to be wholly
carnal, they should give no sign of persistent concupiscence, which
does indeed show itself in bigamous persons, seeing that they were
unwilling to be content with one wife. The first reason however is the
better.
Reply to Objection 1: The multitude of several wives at the same time
is a multitude simply, wherefore a multitude of this kind is wholly
inconsistent with the signification of the sacrament, so that the
sacrament is voided on that account. But the multitude of several
successive wives is a multitude relatively, wherefore it does not
entirely destroy the signification of the sacrament, nor does it void
the sacrament in its essence but in its perfection, which is required
of those who are the dispensers of sacraments.
Reply to Objection 2: Although those who are guilty of fornication give
proof of greater concupiscence, theirs is not a so persistent
concupiscence, since by fornication one party is not bound to the other
for ever; and consequently no defect attaches to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, bigamy causes irregularity,
because it destroys the perfect signification of the sacrament: which
signification is seated both in the union of minds, as expressed by the
consent, and in the union of bodies. Wherefore bigamy must affect both
of these at the same time in order to cause irregularity. Hence the
decree of Innocent III disposes of the statement of the Master (Sent.
iv, D, 27), namely that consent alone by words of the present is
sufficient to cause irregularity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irregularity results from bigamy, when one husband has two wives,
one in law, the other in fact?
Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity does not result from
bigamy when one husband has two wives at the same time, one in law and
one in fact. For when the sacrament is void there can be no defect in
the sacrament. Now when a man marries a woman in fact but not in law
there is no sacrament, since such a union does not signify the union of
Christ with the Church. Therefore since irregularity does not result
from bigamy except on account of a defect in the sacrament, it would
seem that no irregularity attaches to bigamy of this kind.
Objection 2: Further, if a man has intercourse with a woman whom he has
married in fact and not in law, he commits fornication if he has not a
lawful wife, or adultery if he has. But a man does not become irregular
by dividing his flesh among several women by fornication or adultery.
Therefore neither does he by the aforesaid kind of bigamy.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that a man, before knowing carnally
the woman he has married in law, marries another in fact and not in
law, and knows her carnally, whether the former woman be living or
dead. Now this man has contracted marriage with several women either in
law or in fact, and yet he is not irregular, since he has not divided
his flesh among several women. Therefore irregularity is not contracted
by reason of the aforesaid kind of bigamy.
I answer that, Irregularity is contracted in the two second kinds of
bigamy, for although in the one there is no sacrament, there is a
certain likeness to a sacrament. Wherefore these two kinds are
secondary, and the first is the principal kind in causing irregularity.
Reply to Objection 1: Although there is no sacrament in this case there
is a certain likeness to a sacrament, whereas there is no such likeness
in fornication or adultery. Hence the comparison fails.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: In this case the man is not reckoned a bigamist,
because the first marriage lacked its perfect signification.
Nevertheless if, by the judgment of the Church, he be compelled to
return to his first wife and carnally to know her, he becomes irregular
forthwith, because the irregularity is the result not of the sin but of
imperfect signification.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?
Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity is not contracted by
marrying one who is not a virgin. For a man's own defect is a greater
impediment to him than the defect of another. But if the man himself
who marries is not a virgin he does not become irregular. Therefore
much less does he if his wife is not a virgin.
Objection 2: Further, it may happen that a man marries a woman after
corrupting her. Now, seemingly, such a man does not become irregular,
since he has not divided his flesh among several, nor has his wife done
so, and yet he marries a woman who is not a virgin. Therefore this kind
of bigamy does not cause irregularity.
Objection 3: Further, no man can become irregular except voluntarily.
But sometimes a man marries involuntarily one who is not a virgin, for
instance when he thinks her a virgin and afterwards, by knowing her
carnally, finds that she is not. Therefore this kind does not always
cause irregularity.
Objection 4: Further, unlawful intercourse after marriage is more
guilty than before marriage. Now if a wife, after the marriage has been
consummated, has intercourse with another man, her husband does not
become irregular, otherwise he would be punished for his wife's sin.
Moreover, it might happen that, after knowing of this, he pays her the
debt at her asking, before she is accused and convicted of adultery.
Therefore it would seem that this kind of bigamy does not cause
irregularity.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. ii, ep. 37): "We command thee
never to make unlawful ordinations, nor to admit to holy orders a
bigamist, or one who has married a woman that is not a virgin, or one
who is unlettered, or one who is deformed in his limbs, or bound to do
penance or to perform some civil duty, or who is in any state of
subjection."
I answer that, In the union of Christ with the Church unity is found on
either side. Consequently whether we find division of the flesh on the
part of the husband, or on the part of the wife, there is a defect of
sacrament. There is, however, a difference, because on the part of the
husband it is required that he should not have married another wife,
but not that he should be a virgin, whereas on the part of the wife it
is also required that she be a virgin. The reason assigned by those
versed in the Decretals is because the bridegroom signifies the Church
militant which is entrusted to the care of a bishop, and in which there
are many corruptions, while the spouse signifies Christ Who was a
virgin: wherefore virginity on the part of the spouse, but not on the
part of the bridegroom, is required in order that a man be made a
bishop. This reason, however, is expressly contrary to the words of the
Apostle (Eph. 5:25): "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved
the Church," which show that the bride signifies the Church, and the
bridegroom Christ; and again he says (Eph. 5:23): "Because the husband
is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church."
Wherefore others say that Christ is signified by the bridegroom, and
that the bride signifies the Church triumphant in which there is no
stain. Also that the synagogue was first united to Christ as a
concubine; so that the sacrament loses nothing of its signification if
the bridegroom previously had a concubine. But this is most absurd,
since just as the faith of ancients and of moderns is one, so is the
Church one. Wherefore those who served God at the time of the synagogue
belonged to the unity of the Church in which we serve God. Moreover
this is expressly contrary to Jer. 3:14, Ezech. 16:8, Osee 2:16, where
the espousals of the synagogue are mentioned explicitly: so that she
was not as a concubine but as a wife. Again, according to this,
fornication would be the sacred sign [sacramentum] of that union, which
is absurd. Wherefore heathendom, before being espoused to Christ in the
faith of the Church, was corrupted by the devil through idolatry. Hence
we must say otherwise that irregularity is caused by a defect in the
sacrament itself. Now when corruption of the flesh occurs outside
wedlock on account of a preceding marriage, it causes no defect in the
sacrament on the part of the person corrupted, but it causes a defect
in the other person, because the act of one who contracts marriage
terminates not in himself, but in the other party, wherefore it takes
its species from its term, which, moreover, in regard to that act, is
the matter as it were of the sacrament. Consequently if a woman were
able to receive orders, just as her husband becomes irregular through
marrying one who is not a virgin, but not through his not being a
virgin when he marries, so also would a woman become irregular if she
were to marry a man who is not a virgin, but not if she were no longer
a virgin when she married ---unless she had been corrupted by reason of
a previous marriage.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: In this case opinions differ. It is, however,
more probable that he is not irregular, because he has not divided his
flesh among several women.
Reply to Objection 3: Irregularity is not the infliction of a
punishment, but the defect of a sacrament. Consequently it is not
always necessary for bigamy to be voluntary in order to cause
irregularity. Hence a man who marries a woman, thinking her to be a
virgin, whereas she is not, becomes irregular by knowing her carnally.
Reply to Objection 4: If a woman commits fornication after being
married, her husband does not become irregular on that account, unless
he again knows her carnally after she has been corrupted by adultery,
since otherwise the corruption of the wife nowise affects the marriage
act of the husband. But though he be compelled by law to pay her the
debt, or if he do so at her request, being compelled by his own
conscience, even before she is convicted of adultery, he becomes
irregular, albeit opinions differ on this point. However, what we have
said is more probable, since here it is not a question of sin, but of
signification only.
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Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?
Objection 1: It would seem that bigamy is removed by Baptism. For
Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus (1:6, "the
husband of one wife") that if a man has had several wives before
receiving Baptism, or one before and another after Baptism, he is not a
bigamist. Therefore bigamy is removed by Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, he who does what is more, does what is less. Now
Baptism removes all sin, and sin is a greater thing than irregularity.
Therefore it removes irregularity.
Objection 3: Further, Baptism takes away all punishment resulting from
an act. Now such is the irregularity of bigamy. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: Further, a bigamist is irregular because he is deficient
in the representation of Christ. Now by Baptism we are fully conformed
to Christ. Therefore this irregularity is removed.
Objection 5: Further, the sacraments of the New Law are more
efficacious than the sacraments of the Old Law. But the sacraments of
the Old Law removed irregularities according to the Master's statement
(Sent. iv,). Therefore Baptism also, being the most efficacious of the
sacraments of the New Law, removes the irregularity consequent upon
bigamy.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii): "Those
understand the question more correctly who maintain that a man who has
married a second wife, though he was a catechumen or even a pagan at
the time, cannot be ordained, because it is a question of a sacrament,
not of a sin."
Further, according to the same authority (De Bono Conjug. xviii) "a
woman who has been corrupted while a catechumen or a pagan cannot after
Baptism be consecrated among God's virgins." Therefore in like manner
one who was a bigamist before Baptism cannot be ordained.
I answer that, Baptism removes sin, but does not dissolve marriage.
Wherefore since irregularity results from marriage, it cannot be
removed by Baptism, as Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii).
Reply to Objection 1: In this case Jerome's opinion is not followed:
unless perhaps he wished to explain that he means that a dispensation
should be more easily granted.
Reply to Objection 2: It does not follow that what does a greater
thing, does a lesser, unless it be directed to the latter. This is not
so in the case in point, because Baptism is not directed to the removal
of an irregularity.
Reply to Objection 3: This must be understood of punishments consequent
upon actual sin, which are, or have yet to be, inflicted: for one does
not recover virginity by Baptism, nor again undivision of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 4: Baptism conforms a man to Christ as regards the
virtue of the mind, but not as to the condition of the body, which is
effected by virginity or division of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 5: Those irregularities were contracted through
slight and temporary causes, and consequently they could be removed by
those sacraments. Moreover the latter were ordained for that purpose,
whereas Baptism is not.
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Whether it is lawful for a bigamist to receive a dispensation?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a bigamist to be granted a
dispensation. For it is said (Extra, De bigamis, cap. Nuper): "It is
not lawful to grant a dispensation to clerics who, as far as they could
do so, have taken to themselves a second wife."
Objection 2: Further, it is not lawful to grant a dispensation from the
Divine law. Now whatever is in the canonical writings belongs to the
Divine law. Since then in canonical Scripture the Apostle says (1 Tim.
3:2): "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be . . . the husband of one
wife," it would seem that a dispensation cannot be granted in this
matter.
Objection 3: Further, no one can receive a dispensation in what is
essential to a sacrament. But it is essential to the sacrament of order
that the recipient be not irregular, since the signification which is
essential to a sacrament is lacking in one who is irregular. Therefore
he cannot be granted a dispensation in this.
Objection 4: Further, what is reasonably done cannot be reasonably
undone. If, therefore, a bigamist can lawfully receive a dispensation,
it was unreasonable that he should be irregular: which is inadmissible.
On the contrary, Pope Lucius granted a dispensation to the bishop of
Palermo who was a bigamist, as stated in the gloss on can. Lector,
dist. 34.
Further, Pope Martin [*Martinus Bracarensis: cap. xliii] says: "If a
Reader marry a widow, let him remain a Reader, or if there be need for
it, he may receive the Subdiaconate, but no higher order: and the same
applies if he should be a bigamist." Therefore he may at least receive
a dispensation as far as the Subdiaconate.
I answer that, Irregularity attaches to bigamy not by natural, but by
positive law; nor again is it one of the essentials of order that a man
be not a bigamist, which is evident from the fact that if a bigamist
present himself for orders, he receives the character. Wherefore the
Pope can dispense altogether from such an irregularity; but a bishop,
only as regards the minor orders, though some say that in order to
prevent religious wandering abroad he can dispense therefrom as regards
the major orders in those who wish to serve God in religion.
Reply to Objection 1: This Decretal shows that there is the same
difficulty against granting a dispensation in those who have married
several wives in fact, as if they had married them in law; but it does
not prove that the Pope has no power to grant a dispensation in such
cases.
Reply to Objection 2: This is true as regards things belonging to the
natural law, and those which are essential to the sacraments, and to
faith. But in those which owe their institution to the apostles, since
the Church has the same power now as then of setting up and of putting
down, she can grant a dispensation through him who holds the primacy.
Reply to Objection 3: Not every signification is essential to a
sacrament, but that alone which belongs to the sacramental effect,* and
this is not removed by irregularity. [*Leonine edition reads
"officium," some read "effectum"; the meaning is the same, and is best
rendered as above.]
Reply to Objection 4: In particular cases there is no ratio that
applies to all equally, on account of their variety. Hence what is
reasonably established for all, in consideration of what happens in the
majority of cases, can be with equal reason done away in a certain
definite case.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE BILL OF DIVORCE (SEVEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the bill of divorce, under which head there are
seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law?
(2) Whether by dispensation it may become lawful to put away a wife?
(3) Whether it was lawful under the Mosaic law?
(4) Whether a wife who has been divorced may take another husband?
(5) Whether the husband can marry again the wife whom he has divorced?
(6) Whether the cause of divorce was hatred of the wife?
(7) Whether the reasons for divorce had to be written on the bill?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether inseparableness of the wife is of natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that inseparableness of the wife is not of
natural law. For the natural law is the same for all. But no law save
Christ's has forbidden the divorcing of a wife. Therefore
inseparableness of a wife is not of natural law.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments are not of the natural law. But
the indissolubility of marriage is one of the marriage goods. Therefore
it is not of the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, the union of man and woman in marriage is chiefly
directed to the begetting, rearing, and instruction of the offspring.
But all things are complete by a certain time. Therefore after that
time it is lawful to put away a wife without prejudice to the natural
law.
Objection 4: Further, the good of the offspring is the principal end of
marriage. But the indissolubility of marriage is opposed to the good of
the offspring, because, according to philosophers, a certain man cannot
beget offspring of a certain woman, and yet he might beget of another,
even though she may have had intercourse with another man. Therefore
the indissolubility of marriage is against rather than according to the
natural law.
On the contrary, Those things which were assigned to nature when it was
well established in its beginning belong especially to the law of
nature. Now the indissolubility of marriage is one of these things
according to Mat. 19:4,6. Therefore it is of natural law.
Further, it is of natural law that man should not oppose himself to
God. Yet man would, in a way, oppose himself to God if he were to
sunder "what God hath joined together." Since then the indissolubility
of marriage is gathered from this passage (Mat. 19:6) it would seem
that it is of natural law.
I answer that, By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the
rearing of the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its
whole life. Hence it is of natural law that parents should lay up for
their children, and that children should be their parents' heirs (2
Cor. 12:14). Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of
husband and wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the latter to
live together for ever inseparably: and so the indissolubility of
marriage is of natural law.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's law alone brought mankind "to
perfection" [*Cf. Heb. 7:19] by bringing man back to the state of the
newness of nature. Wherefore neither Mosaic nor human laws could remove
all that was contrary to the law of nature, for this was reserved
exclusively to "the law of the spirit of life" [*Cf. Rom. 8:2].
Reply to Objection 2: Indissolubility belongs to marriage in so far as
the latter is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ with the Church,
and in so far as it fulfills an office of nature that is directed to
the good of the offspring, as stated above. But since divorce is more
directly incompatible with the signification of the sacrament than with
the good of the offspring, with which it is incompatible consequently,
as stated above ([5019]Q[65], A[2], ad 5), the indissolubility of
marriage is implied in the good of the sacrament rather than in the
good of the offspring, although it may be connected with both. And in
so far as it is connected with the good of the offspring, it is of the
natural law, but not as connected with the good of the sacrament.
The Reply to the Third Objection may be gathered from what has been
said.
Reply to Objection 4: Marriage is chiefly directed to the common good
in respect of its principal end, which is the good of the offspring;
although in respect of its secondary end it is directed to the good of
the contracting party, in so far as it is by its very nature a remedy
for concupiscence. Hence marriage laws consider what is expedient for
all rather than what may be suitable for one. Therefore although the
indissolubility of marriage hinder the good of the offspring with
regard to some individual, it is proportionate with the good of the
offspring absolutely speaking: and for this reason the argument does
not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it may have been lawful by dispensation to put away a wife?
Objection 1: It seems that it could not be lawful by dispensation to
put away a wife. For in marriage anything that is opposed to the good
of the offspring is against the first precepts of the natural law,
which admit of no dispensation. Now such is the putting away of a wife,
as stated above [5020](A[1]). Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, a concubine differs from a wife especially in the
fact that she is not inseparably united. But by no dispensation could a
man have a concubine. Therefore by no dispensation could he put his
wife away.
Objection 3: Further, men are as fit to receive a dispensation now as
of old. But now a man cannot receive a dispensation to divorce his
wife. Neither, therefore, could he in olden times.
On the contrary, Abraham carnally knew Agar with the disposition of a
husband towards his wife, as stated above ([5021]Q[65], A[5], ad 2,3).
Now by Divine command he sent her away, and yet sinned not. Therefore
it could be lawful by dispensation for a man to put away his wife.
I answer that, In the commandments, especially those which in some way
are of natural law, a dispensation is like a change in the natural
course of things: and this course is subject to a twofold change.
First, by some natural cause whereby another natural cause is hindered
from following its course: it is thus in all things that happen by
chance less frequently in nature. In this way, however, there is no
variation in the course of those natural things which happen always,
but only in the course of those which happen frequently. Secondly, by a
cause altogether supernatural, as in the case of miracles: and in this
way there can be a variation in the course of nature, not only in the
course which is appointed for the majority of cases, but also in the
course which is appointed for all cases, as instanced by the sun
standing still at the time of Josue, and by its turning back at the
time of Ezechias, and by the miraculous eclipse at the time of Christ's
Passion [*Jos. 10:14; 4 Kings 20:10; Is. 38:8; Mat. 27:15]. In like
manner the reason for a dispensation from a precept of the law of
nature is sometimes found in the lower causes, and in this way a
dispensation may bear upon the secondary precepts of the natural law,
but not on the first precepts because these are always existent as it
were, as stated above ([5022]Q[65], A[1]) in reference to the plurality
of wives and so forth. But sometimes this reason is found in the higher
causes, and then a dispensation may be given by God even from the first
precepts of the natural law, for the sake of signifying or showing some
Divine mystery, as instanced in the dispensation vouchsafed to Abraham
in the slaying of his innocent son. Such dispensations, however, are
not granted to all generally, but to certain individual persons, as
also happens in regard to miracles. Accordingly, if the indissolubility
of marriage is contained among the first precepts of the natural law,
it could only be a matter of dispensation in this second way; but, if
it be one of the second precepts of the natural law, it could be a
matter of dispensation even in the first way. Now it would seem to
belong rather to the secondary precepts of the natural law. For the
indissolubility of marriage is not directed to the good of the
offspring, which is the principal end of marriage, except in so far as
parents have to provide for their children for their whole life, by due
preparation of those things that are necessary in life. Now this
preparation does not pertain to the first intention of nature, in
respect of which all things are common. And therefore it would seem
that to put away one's wife is not contrary to the first intention of
nature, and consequently that it is contrary not to the first but to
the second precepts of the natural law. Therefore, seemingly, it can be
a matter of dispensation even in the first way.
Reply to Objection 1: The good of the offspring, in so far as it
belongs to the first intention of nature, includes procreation,
nourishment, and instruction, until the offspring comes to perfect age.
But that provision be made for the children by bequeathing to them the
inheritance or other goods belongs seemingly to the second intention of
the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: To have a concubine is contrary to the good of
the offspring, in respect of nature's first intention in that good,
namely the rearing and instruction of the child, for which purpose it
is necessary that the parents remain together permanently; which is not
the case with a concubine, since she is taken for a time. Hence the
comparison fails. But in respect of nature's second intention, even the
having of a concubine may be a matter of dispensation as evidenced by
Osee 1.
Reply to Objection 3: Although indissolubility belongs to the second
intention of marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to
its first intention as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the
moment it was made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it remains
such it cannot be a matter of dispensation, except perhaps by the
second kind of dispensation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was lawful to divorce a wife under
the Mosaic law. For one way of giving consent is to refrain from
prohibiting when one can prohibit. It is also unlawful to consent to
what is unlawful. Since then the Mosaic law did not forbid the putting
away of a wife and did no wrong by not forbidding it, for "the law . .
. is holy" (Rom. 7:12), it would seem that divorce was at one time
lawful.
Objection 2: Further, the prophets spoke inspired by the Holy Ghost,
according to 2 Pet. 1:21. Now it is written (Malachi 2:16): "When thou
shalt hate her, put her away." Since then that which the Holy Ghost
inspires is not unlawful, it would seem that it was not always unlawful
to divorce a wife.
Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that even as the apostles
permitted second marriages, so Moses allowed the bill of divorce. But
second marriages are not sinful. Therefore neither was it sinful under
the Mosaic law to divorce a wife.
Objection 4: On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 19:8) that Moses
granted the Jews the bill of divorce by reason of the hardness of their
heart. But their hardness of heart did not excuse them from sin.
Neither therefore did the law about the bill of divorce.
Objection 5: Further, Chrysostom says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "Moses, by
granting the bill of divorce, did not indicate the justice of God, but
deprived their sin of its guilt, for while the Jews acted as though
they were keeping the law, their sin seemed to be no sin."
I answer that, on this point there are two opinions. For some say that
under the Law those who put away their wives, after giving them a bill
of divorce, were not excused from sin, although they were excused from
the punishment which they should have suffered according to the Law:
and that for this reason Moses is stated to have permitted the bill of
divorce. Accordingly they reckon four kinds of permission: one by
absence of precept, so that when a greater good is not prescribed, a
lesser good is said to be permitted: thus the Apostle by not
prescribing virginity, permitted marriage (1 Cor. 7). The second is by
absence of prohibition: thus venial sins are said to be permitted
because they are not forbidden. The third is by absence of prevention,
and thus all sins are said to be permitted by God, in so far as He does
not prevent them whereas He can. The fourth is by omission of
punishment, and in this way the bill of divorce was permitted in the
Law, not indeed for the sake of obtaining a greater good, as was the
dispensation to have several wives, but for the sake of preventing a
greater evil, namely wife-murder to which the Jews were prone on
account of the corruption of their irascible appetite. Even so they
were allowed to lend money for usury to strangers, on account of
corruption in their concupiscible appetite, lest they should exact
usury of their brethren; and again on account of the corruption of
suspicion in the reason they were allowed the sacrifice of jealousy,
lest mere suspicion should corrupt their judgment. But because the Old
Law, though it did not confer grace, was given that it might indicate
sin, as the saints are agreed in saying, others are of opinion that if
it had been a sin for a man to put away his wife, this ought to have
been indicated to him, at least by the law or the prophets: "Show My
people their wicked doings" (Is. 58:1): else they would seem to have
been neglected, if those things which are necessary for salvation and
which they knew not were never made known to them: and this cannot be
admitted, because the righteousness of the Law observed at the time of
the Law would merit eternal life. For this reason they say that
although to put away one's wife is wrong in itself, it nevertheless
became lawful by God's permitting it, and they confirm this by the
authority of Chrysostom, who says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "the Lawgiver by
permitting divorce removed the guilt from the sin." Although this
opinion has some probability the former is more generally held:
wherefore we must reply to the arguments on both sides [*Cf. [5023]FS,
Q[105], A[4], ad 8; [5024]FS, Q[108], A[3], ad 2; Contra Gentes iii,
cap. 123].
Reply to Objection 1: He who can forbid, sins not by omitting to forbid
if he has no hope of correcting, but fears by forbidding to furnish the
occasion of a greater evil. Thus it happened to Moses: wherefore acting
on Divine authority he did not forbid the bill of divorce.
Reply to Objection 2: The prophets, inspired by the Holy Ghost, said
that a wife ought to be put away, not as though this were a command of
the Holy Ghost, but as being permitted lest greater evils should be
perpetrated.
Reply to Objection 3: This likeness of permission must not be applied
to every detail, but only to the cause which was the same in both
cases, since both permissions were granted in order to avoid some form
of wickedness.
Reply to Objection 4: Although their hardness of heart excused them not
from sin, the permission given on account of that hardness excused
them. For certain things are forbidden those who are healthy in body,
which are not forbidden the sick, and yet the sick sin not by availing
themselves of the permission granted to them.
Reply to Objection 5: A good may be omitted in two ways. First, in
order to obtain a greater good, and then the omission of that good
becomes virtuous by being directed to a greater good; thus Jacob
rightly omitted to have only one wife, on account of the good of the
offspring. In another way a good is omitted in order to avoid a greater
evil, and then if this is done with the authority of one who can grant
a dispensation, the omission of that good is not sinful, and yet it
does not also become virtuous. In this way the indissolubility of
marriage was suspended in the law of Moses in order to avoid a greater
evil, namely wife-murder. Hence Chrysostom says that "he removed the
guilt from the sin." For though divorce remained inordinate, for which
reason it is called a sin, it did not incur the debt of punishment,
either temporal or eternal, in so far as it was done by Divine
permission: and thus its guilt was taken away from it. And therefore he
says again [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St.
John Chrysostom] that "divorce was permitted, an evil indeed, yet
lawful." Those who hold the first opinion understand by this only that
divorce incurred the debt of temporal punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was lawful for a divorced wife to
have another husband. For in divorce the husband did a greater wrong by
divorcing his wife than the wife by being divorced. But the husband
could, without sin, marry another wife. Therefore the wife could
without sin, marry another husband.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine, speaking about bigamy, says (De Bono
Conjug. xv, xviii) that "when it was the manner it was no sin." Now at
the time of the Old Law it was the custom for a wife after divorce to
marry another husband: "When she is departed and marrieth another
husband," etc. Therefore the wife sinned not by marrying another
husband.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord showed that the justice of the New
Testament is superabundant in comparison with the justice of the Old
Testament (Mat. 5). Now He said that it belongs to the superabundant
justice of the New Testament that the divorced wife marry not another
husband (Mat. 5:32). Therefore it was lawful in the Old Law.
Objection 4: On the contrary, are the words of Mat. 5:32, "He that
shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery." Now adultery was
never permitted in the Old Law. Therefore it was not lawful for the
divorced wife to have another husband.
Objection 5: Further, it is written (Dt. 24:3) that a divorced woman
who marries another husband "is defiled, and is become abominable
before the Lord." Therefore she sinned by marrying another husband.
I answer that, According to the first above mentioned opinion
[5025](A[3]), she sinned by marrying another husband after being
divorced, because her first marriage still held good. For "the woman .
. . whilst her husband liveth, is bound to the law of her husband"
(Rom. 7:2): and she could not have several husbands at one time. But
according to the second opinion, just as it was lawful by virtue of the
Divine dispensation for a husband to divorce his wife, so could the
wife marry another husband, because the indissolubility of marriage was
removed by reason of the divine dispensation: and as long as that
indissolubility remains the saying of the Apostle holds.
Accordingly to reply to the arguments on either side:
Reply to Objection 1: It was lawful for a husband to have several wives
at one time by virtue of the divine dispensation: wherefore having put
one away he could marry another even though the former marriage were
not dissolved. But it was never lawful for a wife to have several
husbands. Wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: In this saying of Augustine manner [mos] does not
signify custom but good manners; in the same sense a person is said to
have manners [morigeratus] because he has good manners; and "moral"
philosophy takes its name from the same source.
Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord shows the superabundance of the New Law
over the Old in respect of the counsels, not only as regards those
things which the Old Law permitted, but also as regards those things
which were forbidden in the Old Law, and yet were thought by many to be
permitted on account of the precepts being incorrectly explained---for
instance that of the hatred towards our enemies. and so is it in the
matter of divorce.
Reply to Objection 4: The saying of our Lord refers to the time of the
New Law, when the aforesaid permission was recalled. In the same way we
are to understand the statement of Chrysostom [*Hom. xii in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], who says that "a
man who divorces his wife according to the law is guilty of four
crimes: for in God's sight he is a murderer," in so far as he has the
purpose of killing his wife unless he divorce her; "and because he
divorces her without her having committed fornication," in which case
alone the law of the Gospel allows a man to put away his wife; "and
again, because he makes her an adulteress, and the man whom she marries
an adulterer."
Reply to Objection 5: A gloss observes here: "She is defiled and
abominable, namely in the judgment of him who first put her away as
being defiled," and consequently it does not follow that she is defiled
absolutely speaking; or she is said to be defiled just as a person who
had touched a dead or leprous body was said to be unclean with the
uncleanness, not of sin, but of a certain legal irregularity. Wherefore
a priest could not marry a widow or a divorced woman.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a husband could lawfully take back the wife he had divorced?
Objection 1: It would seem that a husband could lawfully take back the
wife he had divorced. For it is lawful to undo what was ill done. But
for the husband to divorce his wife was ill done. Therefore it was
lawful for him to undo it, by taking back his wife.
Objection 2: Further, it has always been lawful to be indulgent to the
sinner, because this is a moral precept, which obtains in every law.
Now the husband by taking back the wife he had divorced was indulgent
to one who had sinned. Therefore this also was lawful.
Objection 3: Further, the reason given (Dt. 24:4) for its being
unlawful to take back a divorced wife was "because she is defiled." But
the divorced wife is not defiled except by marrying another husband.
Therefore at least it was lawful to take back a divorced wife before
she married again.
On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 24:4) that "the former husband cannot
take her again," etc.
I answer that, In the law concerning the bill of divorce two things
were permitted, namely for the husband to put away the wife, and for
the divorced wife to take another husband; and two things were
commanded, namely that the bill of divorce should be written, and
secondly that the husband who divorced his wife could not take her
back. According to those who hold the first opinion [5026](A[3]) this
was done in punishment of the woman who married again, and that it was
by this sin that she was defiled: but according to the others it was
done that a husband might not be too ready to divorce his wife if he
could nowise take her back afterwards.
Reply to Objection 1: In order to prevent the evil committed by a man
in divorcing his wife, it was ordered that the husband could not take
back his divorced wife, as stated above: and for this reason it was
ordered by God.
Reply to Objection 2: It was always lawful to be indulgent to the
sinner as regards the unkindly feelings of the heart, but not as
regards the punishment appointed by God.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two opinions on this point. For some
say that it was lawful for a divorced wife to be reconciled to her
husband, unless she were joined in marriage to another husband. For
then, on account of the adultery to which she had voluntarily yielded,
it was assigned to her in punishment that she should not return to her
former husband. Since, however, the law makes no distinction in its
prohibition, others say that from the moment that she was put away she
could not be taken back, even before marrying again, because the
defilement must be understood not in reference to sin, but as explained
above (A[4], ad 3).
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Whether the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for divorce was hatred for
the wife. For it is written (Malachi 2:16): "When thou shalt hate her
put her away." Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 24:1): "If . . . she find not
favor in his eyes, for some uncleanness," etc. Therefore the same
conclusion follows as before.
Objection 3: On the contrary, Barrenness and fornication are more
opposed to marriage than hatred. Therefore they ought to have been
reasons for divorce rather than hatred.
Objection 4: Further, hatred may be caused by the virtue of the person
hated. Therefore, if hatred is a sufficient reason, a woman could be
divorced on account of her virtue, which is absurd.
Objection 5: Further, "If a man marry a wife and afterwards hate her,
and seek occasions to put her away"* alleging that she was not a virgin
when he married her, should he fail to prove this, he shall be beaten,
and shall be condemned in a hundred sicles of silver, and he shall be
unable to put her away all the days of his life (Dt. 22:13-19). [*The
rest of the passage is apparently quoted from memory.] Therefore hatred
is not a sufficient reason for divorce.
I answer that, It is the general opinion of holy men that the reason
for permission being given to divorce a wife was the avoidance of
wife-murder. Now the proximate cause of murder is hatred: wherefore the
proximate cause of divorce was hatred. But hatred proceeds, like love,
from a cause. Wherefore we must assign to divorce certain remote causes
which were a cause of hatred. For Augustine says in his gloss (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i, 14): "In the Law there were many causes for divorcing
a wife: Christ admitted none but fornication: and He commands other
grievances to be borne for conjugal fidelity and chastity." Such causes
are imperfections either of body, as sickness or some notable
deformity, or in soul as fornication or the like which amounts to moral
depravity. Some, however, restrict these causes within narrower limits,
saying with sufficient probability that it was not lawful to divorce a
wife except for some cause subsequent to the marriage; and that not
even then could it be done for any such cause, but only for such as
could hinder the good of the offspring, whether in body as barrenness,
or leprosy and the like, or in soul, for instance if she were a woman
of wicked habits which her children through continual contact with her
would imitate. There is however a gloss on Dt. 24:1, "If . . . she find
not favor in his eyes," which would seem to restrict them yet more,
namely to sin, by saying that there "uncleanness" denotes sin: but
"sin" in the gloss refers not only to the morality of the soul but also
to the condition of the body. Accordingly we grant the first two
objections.
Reply to Objection 3: Barrenness and other like things are causes of
hatred, and so they are remote causes of divorce.
Reply to Objection 4: No one is hateful on account of virtue as such,
because goodness is the cause of love. Wherefore the argument does not
hold.
Reply to Objection 5: The husband was punished in that case by being
unable to put away his wife for ever, just as in the case when he had
corrupted a maid (Dt. 22:28-30).
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Whether the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill?
Objection 1: It would seem that the causes of divorce had to be written
in the bill: because the husband was absolved from the punishment of
the law by the written bill of divorce. But this would seem altogether
unjust, unless sufficient causes were alleged for a divorce. Therefore
it was necessary for them to be written in the bill.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly this document was of no use except to
show the causes for divorce. Therefore, if they were not written down,
the bill was delivered for no purpose.
Objection 3: Further, the Master says that it was so in the text (Sent.
iv, D, 33).
On the contrary, The causes for divorce were either sufficient or not.
If they were sufficient, the wife was debarred from a second marriage,
though this was allowed her by the Law. If they were insufficient, the
divorce was proved to be unjust, and therefore could not be effected.
Therefore the causes for divorce were by no means particularized in the
bill.
I answer that, The causes for divorce were not particularized in the
bill, but were indicated in a general way, so as to prove the justice
of the divorce. According to Josephus (Antiq. iv, 6) this was in order
that the woman, having the written bill of divorce, might take another
husband, else she would not have been believed. Wherefore according to
him it was written in this wise: "I promise never to have thee with me
again." But according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xix, 26) the bill was
put into writing in order to cause a delay, and that the husband might
be dissuaded by the counsel of the notaries to refrain from his purpose
of divorce.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider children of illegitimate birth. Under this head
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether those born out of true marriage are illegitimate?
(2) Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?
(3) Whether they can be legitimized?
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Whether children born out of true marriage are illegitimate?
Objection 1: It would seem that children born out of true marriage are
legitimate. For he that is born according to law is called a legitimate
son. Now everyone is born according to law, at least the law of nature,
which has more force than any other. Therefore every child is to be
called legitimate.
Objection 2: Further, it is the common saying that a legitimate child
is one born of a legitimate marriage, or of a marriage that is deemed
legitimate in the eyes of the Church. Now it happens sometimes that a
marriage is deemed legitimate in the eyes of the Church, whereas there
is some impediment affecting its validity; which impediment may be
known to the parties who marry in the presence of the Church: or they
may marry in secret and be ignorant of the impediment, in which case
their marriage would seem legitimate in the eyes of the Church, for the
very reason that it is not prevented by the Church. Therefore children
born out of true marriage are not illegitimate.
On the contrary, Illegitimate is that which is against the law. Now
those who are born out of wedlock are born contrary to the law.
Therefore they are illegitimate.
I answer that, Children are of four conditions. Some are natural and
legitimate, for instance those who are born of a true and lawful
marriage; some are natural and illegitimate, as those who are born of
fornication; some are legitimate and not natural, as adopted children;
some are neither legitimate nor natural; such are those born of
adultery or incest, for these are born not only against the positive
law, but against the express natural law. Hence we must grant that some
children are illegitimate.
Reply to Objection 1: Although those who are born of an unlawful
intercourse are born according to the nature common to man and all
animals, they are born contrary to the law of nature which is proper to
man: since fornication, adultery, and the like are contrary to the law
of nature. Hence the like are not legitimate by any law.
Reply to Objection 2: Ignorance, unless it be affected, excuses
unlawful intercourse from sin. Wherefore those who contract together in
good faith in the presence of the Church, although there be an
impediment, of which however they are ignorant, sin not, nor are their
children illegitimate. If, however, they know of the impediment,
although the Church upholds their marriage because she knows not of the
impediment, they are not excused from sin, nor do their children avoid
being illegitimate. Neither are they excused if they know not of the
impediment and marry secretly, because such ignorance would appear to
be affected.
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Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?
Objection 1: It would seem that children ought not to suffer any loss
through being illegitimate. For a child should not be punished on
account of his father's sin, according to the Lord's saying (Ezech.
18:20). But it is not his own but his father's fault that he is born of
an unlawful union. Therefore he should not incur a loss on this
account.
Objection 2: Further, human justice is copied from Divine. Now God
confers natural goods equally on legitimate and illegitimate children.
Therefore illegitimate should be equalled to legitimate children
according to human laws.
On the contrary, It is stated (Gn. 25:5,6) that "Abraham gave all his
possessions to Isaac, and that to the children of the concubines he
gave gifts": and yet the latter were not born of an unlawful
intercourse. Much more, therefore, ought those born of an unlawful
intercourse to incur loss by not inheriting their father's property.
I answer that, A person is said to incur a loss for some cause in two
ways: First, because he is deprived of his due, and thus an
illegitimate child incurs no loss. Secondly, because something is not
due to him, which might have been due otherwise, and thus an
illegitimate son incurs a twofold loss. First because he is excluded
from legitimate acts such as offices and dignities, which require a
certain respectability in those who perform them. Secondly, he incurs a
loss by not succeeding to his father's inheritance. Nevertheless
natural sons can inherit a sixth only, whereas spurious children cannot
inherit any portion, although by natural law their parents are bound to
provide for their needs. Hence it is part of a bishop's care to compel
both parents to provide for them.
Reply to Objection 1: To incur a loss in this second way is not a
punishment. Hence we do not say that a person is punished by not
succeeding to the throne through not being the king's son. In like
manner it is no punishment to an illegitimate child that he has no
right to that which belongs to the legitimate children.
Reply to Objection 2: Illegitimate intercourse is contrary to the law,
not as an act of the generative power, but as proceeding from a wicked
will. Hence an illegitimate son incurs a loss, not in those things
which come to him by his natural origin, but in those things which are
dependent on the will for being done or possessed.
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Whether an illegitimate son can be legitimized?
Objection 1: It would seem that an illegitimate son cannot be
legitimized. For the legitimate child is as far removed from the
illegitimate as the illegitimate from the legitimate. But a legitimate
child is never made illegitimate. Neither, therefore, is an
illegitimate child ever made legitimate.
Objection 2: Further, illegitimate intercourse begets an illegitimate
child. But illegitimate intercourse never becomes legitimate. Neither,
therefore, can an illegitimate son become legitimate.
On the contrary, What is done by the law can be undone by the law. Now
the illegitimacy of children is an effect of positive law. Therefore an
illegitimate child can be legitimized by one who has legal authority.
I answer that, An illegitimate child can be legitimized, not so that he
be born of a legitimate intercourse, because this intercourse is a
thing of the past and can never be legitimized from the moment that it
was once illegitimate. But the child is said to be legitimized, in so
far as the losses which an illegitimate child ought to incur are
withdrawn by the authority of the law.
There are six ways of becoming legitimate: two according to the canons
(Cap. Conquestus; Cap. Tanta), namely when a man marries the woman of
whom he has an unlawful child (if it were not a case of adultery), and
by special indulgence and dispensation of the lord Pope. The other four
ways are according to the laws: (1) If the father offer his natural son
to the emperor's court, for by this very fact the son is legitimate on
account of the reputation of the court; (2) if the father designate him
in his will as his legitimate heir, and the son afterwards offer the
will to the emperor; (3) if there be no legitimate son and the son
himself offer himself to the emperor; (4) if the father designate him
as legitimate in a public document or in a document signed by three
witnesses, without calling him natural.
Reply to Objection 1: A favor may be bestowed on a person without
injustice, but a person cannot be damnified except for a fault. Hence
an illegitimate child can be legitimized rather than "vice versa"; for
although a legitimate son is sometimes deprived of his inheritance on
account of his fault, he is not said to be illegitimate, because he was
legitimately begotten.
Reply to Objection 2: Illegitimate intercourse has an inherent
inseparable defect whereby it is opposed to the law: and consequently
it cannot be legitimized. Nor is there any comparison with an
illegitimate child who has no such defect.
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TREATISE ON THE RESURRECTION (QQ[69]-86)
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OF MATTERS CONCERNING THE RESURRECTION, AND FIRST OF THE PLACE WHERE SOULS AR
E
AFTER DEATH (SEVEN ARTICLES)
In sequence to the foregoing we must treat of matters concerning the
state of resurrection: for after speaking of the sacraments whereby man
is delivered from the death of sin, we must next speak of the
resurrection whereby man is delivered from the death of punishment. The
treatise on the resurrection offers a threefold consideration, namely
the things that precede, those that accompany, and those that follow
the resurrection. Consequently we must speak (1) of those things which
partly, though not wholly, precede the resurrection; (2) of the
resurrection itself and its circumstances; (3) of the things which
follow it.
Among the things which precede the resurrection we must consider (1)
the places appointed for the reception of bodies after death; (2) the
quality of separated souls, and the punishment inflicted on them by
fire; (3) the suffrages whereby the souls of the departed are assisted
by the living; (4) the prayers of the saints in heaven; (5) the signs
preceding the general judgment; (6) the fire of the world's final
conflagration which will precede the appearance of the Judge.
Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any places are appointed to receive souls after death?
(2) Whether souls are conveyed thither immediately after death?
(3) Whether they are able to leave those places?
(4) Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom?
(5) Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?
(6) Whether the limbo of the patriarchs is the same as the limbo of
children?
(7) Whether so many places should be distinguished?
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Whether places are appointed to receive souls after death?
Objection 1: It would seem that places are not appointed to receive
souls after death. For as Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Wise men are
agreed that incorporeal things are not in a place," and this agrees
with the words of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32): "We can answer
without hesitation that the soul is not conveyed to corporeal places,
except with a body, or that it is not conveyed locally." Now the soul
separated from the body is without a body, as Augustine also says (Gen.
ad lit. xii, 32). Therefore it is absurd to assign any places for the
reception of souls.
Objection 2: Further, whatever has a definite place has more in common
with that place than with any other. Now separated souls, like certain
other spiritual substances, are indifferent to all places; for it
cannot be said that they agree with certain bodies, and differ from
others, since they are utterly removed from all corporeal conditions.
Therefore places should not be assigned for their reception.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is assigned to separated souls after
death, except what conduces to their punishment or to their reward. But
a corporeal place cannot conduce to their punishment or reward, since
they receive nothing from bodies. Therefore definite places should not
be assigned to receive them.
On the contrary, The empyrean heaven is a corporeal place, and yet as
soon as it was made it was filled with the holy angels, as Bede
[*Hexaem. i, ad Gn. 1:2] says. Since then angels even as separated
souls are incorporeal, it would seem that some place should also be
assigned to receive separated souls.
Further, this appears from Gregory's statement (Dial. iv) that souls
after death are conveyed to various corporeal places, as in the case of
Paschasius whom Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found at the baths, and of
the soul of King Theodoric, which he asserts to have been conveyed to
hell. Therefore after death souls have certain places for their
reception.
I answer that, Although spiritual substances do not depend on a body in
respect of their being, nevertheless the corporeal world is governed by
God by means of the spiritual world, as asserted by Augustine (De Trin.
iii, 4) and Gregory (Dial. iv, 6). Hence it is that there is a certain
fittingness by way of congruity of spiritual substances to corporeal
substances, in that the more noble bodies are adapted to the more noble
substances: wherefore also the philosophers held that the order of
separate substances is according to the order of movables. And though
after death souls have no bodies assigned to them whereof they be the
forms or determinate motors, nevertheless certain corporeal places are
appointed to them by way of congruity in reference to their degree of
nobility (wherein they are as though in a place, after the manner in
which incorporeal things can be in a place), according as they more or
less approach to the first substance (to which the highest place it
fittingly assigned), namely God, whose throne the Scriptures proclaim
heaven to be (Ps. 102:19, Is. 66:1). Wherefore we hold that those souls
that have a perfect share of the Godhead are in heaven, and that those
souls that are deprived of that share are assigned to a contrary place.
Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal things are not in place after a
manner known and familiar to us, in which way we say that bodies are
properly in place; but they are in place after a manner befitting
spiritual substances, a manner that cannot be fully manifest to us.
Reply to Objection 2: Things have something in common with or a
likeness to one another in two ways. First, by sharing a same quality:
thus hot things have something in common, and incorporeal things can
have nothing in common with corporeal things in this way. Secondly, by
a kind of proportionateness, by reason of which the Scriptures apply
the corporeal world to the spiritual metaphorically. Thus the
Scriptures speak of God as the sun, because He is the principle of
spiritual life, as the sun is of corporeal life. In this way certain
souls have more in common with certain places: for instance, souls that
are spiritually enlightened, with luminous bodies, and souls that are
plunged in darkness by sin, with dark places.
Reply to Objection 3: The separated soul receives nothing directly from
corporeal places in the same way as bodies which are maintained by
their respective places: yet these same souls, through knowing
themselves to be appointed to such places, gather joy or sorrow
therefrom; and thus their place conduces to their punishment or reward.
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Whether souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death?
Objection 1: It would seem that no souls are conveyed to heaven or hell
immediately after death. For a gloss on Ps. 36:10, "Yet a little while
and the wicked shall not be," says that "the saints are delivered at
the end of life; yet after this life they will not yet be where the
saints will be when it is said to them: Come ye blessed of My Father."
Now those saints will be in heaven. Therefore after this life the
saints do not go immediately up to heaven.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cix) that "the time
which lies between man's death and the final resurrection holds the
souls in secret receptacles according as each one is worthy of rest or
of suffering." Now these secret abodes cannot denote heaven and hell,
since also after the final resurrection the souls will be there
together with their bodies: so that he would have no reason to
distinguish between the time before and the time after the
resurrection. Therefore they will be neither in hell nor in heaven
until the day of judgment.
Objection 3: Further, the glory of the soul is greater than that of
bodies. Now the glory of the body is awarded to all at the same time,
so that each one may have the greater joy in the common rejoicing of
all, as appears from a gloss on Heb. 11:40, "God providing some better
thing for us---that the common joy may make each one rejoice the more."
Much more, therefore, ought the glory of souls to be deferred until the
end, so as to be awarded to all at the same time.
Objection 4: Further, punishment and reward, being pronounced by the
sentence of the judge, should not precede the judgment. Now hell fire
and the joys of heaven will be awarded to all by the sentence of Christ
judging them, namely at the last judgment, according to Mat. 25.
Therefore no one will go up to heaven or down to hell before the day of
judgment.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 5:1): "If our earthly house of
this habitation be dissolved, that we have . . . a house not made with
hands, but reserved in heaven [*Vulg.: 'eternal in heaven'; cf. 1 Pet.
1:4]." Therefore, after the body's dissolution, the soul has an abode,
which had been reserved for it in heaven.
Further, the Apostle says (Phil. 1:23): "I desire [Vulg.: 'Having a
desire'] to be dissolved and to be with Christ." From these words
Gregory argues as follows (Dial. iv, 25): "If there is no doubt that
Christ is in heaven, it cannot be denied that Paul's soul is in heaven
likewise." Now it cannot be gainsaid that Christ is in heaven, since
this is an article of faith. Therefore neither is it to be denied that
the souls of the saints are borne to heaven. That also some souls go
down to hell immediately after death is evident from Lk. 16:22, "And
the rich man died, and he was buried in hell."
I answer that, Even as in bodies there is gravity or levity whereby
they are borne to their own place which is the end of their movement,
so in souls there is merit or demerit whereby they reach their reward
or punishment, which are the ends of their deeds. Wherefore just as a
body is conveyed at once to its place, by its gravity or levity, unless
there be an obstacle, so too the soul, the bonds of the flesh being
broken, whereby it was detained in the state of the way, receives at
once its reward or punishment, unless there be an obstacle. Thus
sometimes venial sin, though needing first of all to be cleansed, is an
obstacle to the receiving of the reward; the result being that the
reward is delayed. And since a place is assigned to souls in keeping
with their reward or punishment, as soon as the soul is set free from
the body it is either plunged into hell or soars to heaven, unless it
be held back by some debt, for which its flight must needs be delayed
until the soul is first of all cleansed. This truth is attested by the
manifest authority of the canonical Scriptures and the doctrine of the
holy Fathers; wherefore the contrary must be judged heretical as stated
in Dial. iv, 25, and in De Eccl. Dogm. xlvi.
Reply to Objection 1: The gloss explains itself: for it expounds the
words, "They will not yet be where the saints will be," etc., by saying
immediately afterwards: "That is to say, they will not have the double
stole which the saints will have at the resurrection."
Reply to Objection 2: Among the secret abodes of which Augustine
speaks, we must also reckon hell and heaven, where some souls are
detained before the resurrection. The reason why a distinction is drawn
between the time before and the time after the resurrection is because
before the resurrection they are there without the body whereas
afterwards they are with the body, and because in certain places there
are souls now which will not be there after the resurrection.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a kind of continuity among men as
regards the body, because in respect thereof is verified the saying of
Acts 17:24,26, "God . . . hath made of one all mankind": whereas He has
fashioned souls independently of one another. Consequently it is not so
fitting that all men should be glorified together in the soul as that
they should be glorified together in the body. Moreover the glory of
the body is not so essential as the glory of the soul; wherefore it
would be more derogatory to the saints if the glory of the soul were
delayed, than that the glory of the body be deferred: nor could this
detriment to their glory be compensated on account of the joy of each
one being increased by the common joy.
Reply to Objection 4: Gregory proposes and solves this very difficulty
(Dial. iv, 25): "If then," he says, "the souls of the just are in
heaven now, what will they receive in reward for their justice on the
judgment day?" And he answers: "Surely it will be a gain to them at the
judgment, that whereas now they enjoy only the happiness of the soul,
afterwards they will enjoy also that of the body, so as to rejoice also
in the flesh wherein they bore sorrow and torments for the Lord." The
same is to be said in reference to the damned.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the souls who are in heaven or hell are able to go from thence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in heaven or hell are unable
to go from thence. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii): "If the
souls of the dead took any part in the affairs of the living, to say
nothing of others, there is myself whom not for a single night would my
loving mother fail to visit since she followed me by land and sea in
order to abide with me": and from this he concludes that the souls of
the departed do not mingle in the affairs of the living. But they would
be able to do so if they were to leave their abode. Therefore they do
not go forth from their abode.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 26:4): "That I may dwell in
the house of the Lord all the days of my life," and (Job 7:9): "He that
shall go down to hell shall not come up." Therefore neither the good
nor the wicked quit their abode.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above [5027](A[2]), abodes are awarded
to souls after death as a reward or punishment. Now after death neither
the rewards of the saints nor the punishments of the damned are
increased. Therefore they do not quit their abodes.
On the contrary, Jerome writing against Vigilantius addresses him thus:
"For thou sayest that the souls of the apostles and martyrs have taken
up their abode either in Abraham's bosom or in the place of
refreshment, or under the altar of God, and that they are unable to
visit their graves when they will. Wouldst thou then lay down the law
for God? Wouldst thou put the apostles in chains, imprison them until
the day of judgment, and forbid them to be with their lord, them of
whom it is written: They follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth? And if
the Lamb is everywhere, therefore we must believe that those also who
are with Him are everywhere." Therefore it is absurd to say that the
souls of the departed do not leave their abode.
Further, Jerome argues as follows: "Since the devil and the demons
wander throughout the whole world, and are everywhere present with
wondrous speed, why should the martyrs, after shedding their blood be
imprisoned and unable to go forth?" Hence we may infer that not only
the good sometimes leave their abode, but also the wicked, since their
damnation does not exceed that of the demons who wander about
everywhere.
Further, the same conclusion may be gathered from Gregory (Dial. iv),
where he relates many cases of the dead having appeared to the living.
I answer that, There are two ways of understanding a person to leave
hell or heaven. First, that he goes from thence simply, so that heaven
or hell be no longer his place: and in this way no one who is finally
consigned to hell or heaven can go from thence, as we shall state
further on ([5028]Q[71], A[5], ad 5). Secondly, they may be understood
to go forth for a time: and here we must distinguish what befits them
according to the order of nature, and what according to the order of
Divine providence; for as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xvi):
"Human affairs have their limits other than have the wonders of the
Divine power, nature's works differ from those which are done
miraculously." Consequently, according to the natural course, the
separated souls consigned to their respective abodes are utterly cut
off from communication with the living. For according to the course of
nature men living in mortal bodies are not immediately united to
separate substances, since their entire knowledge arises from the
senses: nor would it be fitting for them to leave their abode for any
purpose other than to take part in the affairs of the living.
Nevertheless, according to the disposition of Divine providence
separated souls sometimes come forth from their abode and appear to
men, as Augustine, in the book quoted above, relates of the martyr
Felix who appeared visibly to the people of Nola when they were
besieged by the barbarians. It is also credible that this may occur
sometimes to the damned, and that for man's instruction and
intimidation they be permitted to appear to the living; or again in
order to seek our suffrages, as to those who are detained in purgatory,
as evidenced by many instances related in the fourth book of the
Dialogues. There is, however, this difference between the saints and
the damned, that the saints can appear when they will to the living,
but not the damned; for even as the saints while living in the flesh
are able by the gifts of gratuitous grace to heal and work wonders,
which can only be done miraculously by the Divine power, and cannot be
done by those who lack this gift, so it is not unfitting for the souls
of the saints to be endowed with a power in virtue of their glory, so
that they are able to appear wondrously to the living, when they will:
while others are unable to do so unless they be sometimes permitted.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine, as may be gathered from what he says
afterwards, is speaking according to the common course of nature, And
yet it does not follow, although the dead be able to appear to the
living as they will, that they appear as often as when living in the
flesh: because when they are separated from the flesh, they are either
wholly conformed to the divine will, so that they may do nothing but
what they see to be agreeable with the Divine disposition, or else they
are so overwhelmed by their punishments that their grief for their
unhappiness surpasses their desire to appear to others.
Reply to Objection 2: The authorities quoted speak in the sense that no
one comes forth from heaven or hell simply, and do not imply that one
may not come forth for a time.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 3) the soul's place
conduces to its punishment or reward in so far as the soul, through
being consigned to that place, is affected either by joy or by grief.
Now this joy or grief at being consigned to such a place remains in the
soul even when it is outside that place. Thus a bishop who is given the
honor of sitting on a throne in the church incurs no dishonor when he
leaves the throne, for though he sits not therein actually, the place
remains assigned to him.
We must also reply to the arguments in the contrary sense.
Reply to Objection 4: Jerome is speaking of the apostles and martyrs in
reference to that which they gain from their power of glory, and not to
that which befits them as due to them by nature. And when he says that
they are everywhere, he does not mean that they are in several places
or everywhere at once, but that they can be wherever they will.
Reply to Objection 5: There is no parity between demons and angels on
the one hand and the souls of the saints and of the damned on the
other. For the good or bad angels have allotted to them the office of
presiding over men, to watch over them or to try them; but this cannot
be said of the souls of men. Nevertheless, according to the power of
glory, it is competent to the souls of the saints that they can be
where they will; and this is what Jerome means to say.
Reply to Objection 6: Although the souls of the saints or of the damned
are sometimes actually present where they appear, we are not to believe
that this is always so: for sometimes these apparitions occur to
persons whether asleep or awake by the activity of good or wicked
angels in order to instruct or deceive the living. Thus sometimes even
the living appear to others and tell them many things in their sleep;
and yet it is clear that they are not present, as Augustine proves from
many instances (De Cura pro Mort. xi, xii).
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Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom?
Objection 1: It would seem that the limbo of hell is not the same as
Abraham's bosom. For according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xxxiii): "I
have not yet found Scripture mentioning hell in a favorable sense." Now
Abraham's bosom is taken in a favorable sense, as Augustine goes on to
say (Gen. ad lit. xxxiii): "Surely no one would be allowed to give an
unfavorable signification to Abraham's bosom and the place of rest
whither the godly poor man was carried by the angels." Therefore
Abraham's bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell.
Objection 2: Further, those who are in hell see not God. Yet God is
seen by those who are in Abraham's bosom, as may be gathered from
Augustine (Confess. ix, 3) who, speaking of Nebridius, says: "Whatever
that be, which is signified by thut bosom, there lives my Nebridius,"
and further on: "Now lays he not his ear to my mouth, but his spiritual
mouth unto Thy fountain, and drinketh as much as he can receive wisdom
in proportion to his thirst, endlessly happy." Therefore Abraham's
bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell.
Objection 3: Further, the Church prays not that a man be taken to hell:
and yet she prays that the angels may carry the departed soul to
Abraham's bosom. Therefore it would seem that Abraham's bosom is not
the same as limbo.
On the contrary, The place whither the beggar Lazarus was taken is
called Abraham's bosom. Now he was taken to hell, for as a gloss [*St.
Gregory, Moral. xx] on Job 30:23, "Where a house is appointed for every
one that liveth," says: "Hell was the house of all the living until the
coming of Christ." Therefore Abraham's bosom is the same as limbo.
Further, Jacob said to his sons (Gn. 44:38): "You will bring down my
grey hairs with sorrow to hell": wherefore Jacob knew that he would be
taken to hell after his death. Therefore Abraham likewise was taken to
hell after his death; and consequently Abraham's bosom would seem to be
a part of hell.
I answer that, After death men's souls cannot find rest save by the
merit of faith, because "he that cometh to God must believe" (Heb.
11:6). Now the first example of faith was given to men in the person of
Abraham, who was the first to sever himself from the body of
unbelievers, and to receive a special sign of faith: for which reason
"the place of rest given to men after death is called Abraham's bosom,"
as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii). But the souls of the saints
have not at all times had the same rest after death; because, since
Christ's coming they have had complete rest through enjoying the vision
of God, whereas before Christ's coming they had rest through being
exempt from punishment, but their desire was not set at rest by their
attaining their end. Consequently the state of the saints before
Christ's coming may be considered both as regards the rest it afforded,
and thus it is called Abraham's bosom, and as regards its lack of rest,
and thus it is called the limbo of hell. Accordingly, before Christ's
coming the limbo of hell and Abraham's bosom were one place
accidentally and not essentially: and consequently, nothing prevents
Abraham's bosom from being after Christ's coming, and from being
altogether distinct from limbo, since things that are one accidentally
may be parted from one another.
Reply to Objection 1: The state of the holy Fathers as regards what was
good in it was called Abraham's bosom, but as regards its deficiencies
it was called hell. Accordingly, neither is Abraham's bosom taken in an
unfavorable sense nor hell in a favorable sense, although in a way they
are one.
Reply to Objection 2: The place of rest of the holy Fathers was called
Abraham's bosom before as well as after Christ's coming, but in
different ways. For since before Christ's coming the saints' rest had a
lack of rest attached to it, it was called both hell and Abraham's
bosom, wherefore God was not seen there. But since after the coming of
Christ the saints' rest is complete through their seeing God, this rest
is called Abraham's bosom, but not hell by any means. It is to this
bosom of Abraham that the Church prays for the faithful to be brought.
Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident: and the same meaning
applies to a gloss on Lk. 16:22, "It came to pass that the beggar
died," etc., which says: "Abraham's bosom is the rest of the blessed
poor, whose is the kingdom of heaven."
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Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the limbo of hell is the same as the
hell of the damned. For Christ is said to have "bitten" [*Allusion to
Osee 13:14] hell, but not to have swallowed it, because He took some
from thence but not all. Now He would not be said to have "bitten" hell
if those whom He set free were not part of the multitude shut up in
hell. Therefore since those whom He set free were shut up in hell, the
same were shut up in limbo and in hell. Therefore limbo is either the
same as hell, or is a part of hell.
Objection 2: Further, in the Creed Christ is said to have descended
into hell. But he did not descend save to the limbo of the Fathers.
Therefore the limbo of the Fathers is the same as hell.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 17:16): "All that I have shall
go down into the deepest hell [Douay: 'pit']." Now since Job was a holy
and just man, he went down to limbo. Therefore limbo is the same as the
deepest hell.
On the contrary, In hell there is no redemption [*Office of the Dead,
Resp. vii]. But the saints were redeemed from limbo. Therefore limbo is
not the same as hell.
Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "I do not see how we can
believe that the rest which Lazarus received was in hell." Now the soul
of Lazarus went down into limbo. Therefore limbo is not the same as
hell.
I answer that, The abodes of souls after death may be distinguished in
two ways; either as to their situation, or as to the quality of the
places, inasmuch as souls are punished or rewarded in certain places.
Accordingly if we consider the limbo of the Fathers and hell in respect
of the aforesaid quality of the places, there is no doubt that they are
distinct, both because in hell there is sensible punishment, which was
not in the limbo of the Fathers, and because in hell there is eternal
punishment, whereas the saints were detained but temporally in the
limbo of the Fathers. On the other hand, if we consider them as to the
situation of the place, it is probable that hell and limbo are the same
place, or that they are continuous as it were yet so that some higher
part of hell be called the limbo of the Fathers. For those who are in
hell receive diverse punishments according to the diversity of their
guilt, so that those who are condemned are consigned to darker and
deeper parts of hell according as they have been guilty of graver sins,
and consequently the holy Fathers in whom there was the least amount of
sin were consigned to a higher and less darksome part than all those
who were condemned to punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: When Christ, by His descent, delivered the
Fathers from limbo, He is said to have "bitten" hell and to have
descended into hell, in so far as hell and limbo are the same as to
situation.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Job descended, not to the hell of the damned, but
to the limbo of the Fathers. The latter is called the deepest place not
in reference to the places of punishment, but in comparison with other
places, as including all penal places under one head. Again we may
reply with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii): who says of Jacob: "When Jacob
said to his sons, 'You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to
hell,' he seems to have feared most, lest he should be troubled with so
great a sorrow as to obtain, not the rest of good men, but the hell of
sinners." The saying of Job may be expounded in the same way, as being
the utterance of one in fear, rather than an assertion.
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Whether the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers?
Objection 1: It would seem that the limbo of children is the same as
the limbo of the Fathers. For punishment should correspond to sin. Now
the Fathers were detained in limbo for the same sin as children, namely
for original sin. Therefore the place of punishment should be the same
for both.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchir. xciii): "The punishment
of children who die in none but original sin is most lenient." But no
punishment is more lenient than that of the holy Fathers. Therefore the
place of punishment is the same for both.
On the contrary, Even as temporal punishment in purgatory and eternal
punishment in hell are due to actual sin, so temporal punishment in the
limbo of the Fathers and eternal punishment in the limbo of the
children were due to original sin. If, therefore, hell and purgatory be
not the same it would seem that neither are the limbo of children and
the limbo of the Fathers the same.
I answer that, The limbo of the Fathers and the limbo of children,
without any doubt, differ as to the quality of punishment or reward.
For children have no hope of the blessed life, as the Fathers in limbo
had, in whom, moreover, shone forth the light of faith and grace. But
as regards their situation, there is reason to believe that the place
of both is the same; except that the limbo of the Fathers is placed
higher than the limbo of children, just as we have stated in reference
to limbo and hell [5029](A[5]).
Reply to Objection 1: The Fathers did not stand in the same relation to
original sin as children. For in the Fathers original sin was expiated
in so far as it infected the person, while there remained an obstacle
on the part of nature, on account of which their satisfaction was not
yet complete. On the other hand, in children there is an obstacle both
on the part of the person and on the part of nature: and for this
reason different abodes are appointed to the Fathers and to children.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking of punishments due to some
one by reason of his person. Of these the most lenient are due to those
who are burdened with none but original sin. But lighter still is the
punishment due to those who are debarred from the reception of glory by
no personal defect but only by a defect of nature, so that this very
delay of glory is called a kind of punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether so many abodes should be distinguished?
Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish so many
abodes. For after death, just as abodes are due to souls on account of
sin, so are they due on account of merit. Now there is only one abode
due on account of merit, namely paradise. Therefore neither should
there be more than one abode due on account of sin, namely hell.
Objection 2: Further, abodes are appointed to souls after death on
account of merits or demerits. Now there is one place where they merit
or demerit. Therefore only one abode should be assigned to them after
death.
Objection 3: Further, the places of punishment should correspond to the
sins. Now there are only three kinds of sin, namely original, venial,
and mortal. Therefore there should only be three penal abodes.
Objection 4: On the other hand, it would seem that there should be many
more than those assigned. For this darksome air is the prison house of
the demons (2 Pet. 2:17), and yet it is not reckoned among the five
abodes which are mentioned by certain authors. Therefore there are more
than five abodes.
Objection 5: Further, the earthly paradise is distinct from the
heavenly paradise. Now some were borne away to the earthly paradise
after this state of life, as is related of Enoch and Elias. Since then
the earthly paradise is not counted among the five abodes, it would
seem that there are more than five.
Objection 6: Further, some penal place should correspond to each state
of sinners. Now if we suppose a person to die in original sin who has
committed only venial sins, none of the assigned abodes will be
befitting to him. For it is clear that he would not be in heaven, since
he would be without grace, and for the same reason neither would he be
in the limbo of the Fathers; nor again, would he be in the limbo of
children, since there is no sensible punishment there, which is due to
such a person by reason of venial sin: nor would he be in purgatory,
where there is none but temporal punishment, whereas everlasting
punishment is due to him: nor would he be in the hell of the damned,
since he is not guilty of actual mortal sin. Therefore a sixth abode
should be assigned.
Objection 7: Further, rewards and punishments vary in quantity
according to the differences of sins and merits. Now the degrees of
merit and sin are infinite. Therefore we should distinguish an infinite
number of abodes, in which souls are punished or rewarded after death.
Objection 8: Further, souls are sometimes punished in the places where
they sinned, as Gregory states (Dial. iv, 55). But they sinned in the
place which we inhabit. Therefore this place should be reckoned among
the abodes, especially since some are punished for their sins in this
world, as the Master said above (Sent. iv, D, 21).
Objection 9: Further, just as some die in a state of grace and have
some venial sins for which they deserve punishment, so some die in
mortal sin and have some good for which they would deserve a reward.
Now to those who die in grace with venial sins an abode is assigned
where they are punished ere they receive their reward, which abode is
purgatory. Therefore, on the other hand, there should be equally an
abode for those who die in mortal sin together with some good works.
Objection 10: Further, just as the Fathers were delayed from obtaining
full glory of the soul before Christ's coming, so are they now detained
from receiving the glory of the body. Therefore as we distinguish an
abode of the saints before the coming of Christ from the one where they
are received now, so ought we to distinguish the one in which they are
received now from the one where they will be received after the
resurrection.
I answer that, The abodes of souls are distinguished according to the
souls' various states. Now the soul united to a mortal body is in the
state of meriting, while the soul separated from the body is in the
state of receiving good or evil for its merits; so that after death it
is either in the state of receiving its final reward, or in the state
of being hindered from receiving it. If it is in the state of receiving
its final retribution, this happens in two ways: either in the respect
of good, and then it is paradise; or in respect of evil, and thus as
regards actual sin it is hell, and as regards original sin it is the
limbo of children. On the other hand, if it be in the state where it is
hindered from receiving its final reward, this is either on account of
a defect of the person, and thus we have purgatory where souls are
detained from receiving their reward at once on account of the sins
they have committed, or else it is on account of a defect of nature,
and thus we have the limbo of the Fathers, where the Fathers were
detained from obtaining glory on account of the guilt of human nature
which could not yet be expiated.
Reply to Objection 1: Good happens in one way, but evil in many ways,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,
6): wherefore it is not unfitting if there be one place of blissful
reward and several places of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: The state of meriting and demeriting is one
state, since the same person is able to merit and demerit: wherefore it
is fitting that one place should be assigned to all: whereas of those
who receive according to their merits there are various states, and
consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: One may be punished in two ways for original sin,
as stated above, either in reference to the person, or in reference to
nature only. Consequently there is a twofold limbo corresponding to
that sin.
Reply to Objection 4: This darksome air is assigned to the demons, not
as the place where they receive retribution for their merits, but as a
place befitting their office, in so far as they are appointed to try
us. Hence it is not reckoned among the abodes of which we are treating
now: since hell fire is assigned to them in the first place (Mat. 25).
Reply to Objection 5: The earthly paradise belongs to the state of the
wayfarer rather than to the state of those who receive for their
merits; and consequently it is not reckoned among the abodes whereof we
are treating now.
Reply to Objection 6: This supposition is impossible [*Cf. [5030]FS,
Q[89], A[6]]. If, however, it were possible, such a one would be
punished in hell eternally: for it is accidental to venial sin that it
be punished temporally in purgatory, through its having grace annexed
to it: wherefore if it be annexed to a mortal sin, which is without
grace, it will be punished eternally in hell. And since this one who
dies in original sin has a venial sin without grace, it is not
unfitting to suppose that he be punished eternally.
Reply to Objection 7: Diversity of degrees in punishments or rewards
does not diversify the state, and it is according to the diversity of
state that we distinguish various abodes. Hence the argument does not
prove.
Reply to Objection 8: Although separated souls are sometimes punished
in the place where we dwell, it does not follow that this is their
proper place of punishment: but this is done for our instruction, that
seeing their punishment we may be deterred from sin. That souls while
yet in the flesh are punished here for their sins has nothing to do
with the question, because a punishment of this kind does not place a
man outside the state of meriting or demeriting: whereas we are
treating now of the abodes to which souls are assigned after the state
of merit or demerit.
Reply to Objection 9: It is impossible for evil to be pure and without
the admixture of good, just as the supreme good is without any
admixture of evil. Consequently those who are to be conveyed to
beatitude which is a supreme good must be cleansed of all evil.
wherefore there must needs be a place where such persons are cleansed
if they go hence without being perfectly clean. But those who will be
thrust into hell will not be free from all good: and consequently the
comparison fails, since those who are in hell can receive the reward of
their goods, in so far as their past goods avail for the mitigation of
their punishment.
Reply to Objection 10: The essential reward consists in the glory of
the soul, but the body's glory, since it overflows from the soul, is
entirely founded as it were on the soul: and consequently lack of the
soul's glory causes a difference of state, whereas lack of the body's
glory does not. For this reason, too, the same place, namely the
empyrean, is assigned to the holy souls separated from their bodies and
united to glorious bodies: whereas the same place was not assigned to
the souls of the Fathers both before and after the glorification of
souls.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE QUALITY OF THE SOUL AFTER LEAVING THE BODY, AND OF THE PUNISHMENT
INFLICTED ON IT BY MATERIAL FIRE (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the general quality of the soul after leaving the
body, and the punishment inflicted on it by material fire. Under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?
(2) Whether the acts of the aforesaid powers remain in the soul?
(3) Whether the separated soul can suffer from a material fire?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? [*Cf. FP, Q[77],
A[8]]
Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive powers remain in the
sensitive soul. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Anim. xv): "The soul
withdraws from the body taking all with itself, sense and imagination,
reason, understanding and intelligence, the concupiscible and irascible
powers." Now sense, imagination, concupiscible and irascible are
sensitive powers. Therefore the sensitive powers remain in the
separated soul.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xvi): "We believe
that man alone has a substantial soul, which lives though separated
from the body, and clings keenly to its senses and wits." Therefore the
soul retains its senses after being separated from the body.
Objection 3: Further, the soul's powers are either its essential parts
as some maintain, or at least are its natural properties. Now that
which is in a thing essentially cannot be separated from it, nor is a
subject severed from its natural properties. Therefore it is impossible
for the soul to lose any of its powers after being separated from the
body.
Objection 4: Further, a whole is not entire if one of its parts be
lacking. Now the soul's powers are called its parts. Therefore, if the
soul lose any of its powers after death, it will not be entire after
death: and this is unfitting.
Objection 5: Further, the soul's powers co-operate in merit more even
than the body, since the body is a mere instrument of action, while the
powers are principles of action. Now the body must of necessity be
rewarded together with the soul, since it co-operated in merit. Much
more, therefore, is it necessary that the powers of the soul be
rewarded together with it. Therefore the separated soul does not lose
them.
Objection 6: Further, if the soul after separation from the body loses
its sensitive power, that must needs come to naught. For it cannot be
said that it is dissolved into some matter, since it has no matter as a
part of itself. Now that which entirely comes to naught is not restored
in identity; wherefore at the resurrection the soul will not have the
same identical sensitive powers. Now according to the Philosopher (De
Anima ii, 1), as the soul is to the body so are the soul's powers to
the parts of the body, for instance the sight to the eye. But if it
were not identically the same soul that returns to the body, it would
not be identically the same man. Therefore for the same reason it would
not be identically the same eye, if the visual power were not
identically the same; and in like manner no other part would rise again
in identity, and consequently neither would the whole man be
identically the same. Therefore it is impossible for the separated soul
to lose its sensitive powers.
Objection 7: Further, if the sensitive powers were to be corrupted when
the body is corrupted, it would follow that they are weakened when the
body is weakened. Yet this is not the case, for according to De Anima
i, "if an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would, without
doubt, see as well as a young man." Therefore neither are the sensitive
powers corrupted when the body is corrupted.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xix): "Of two
substances alone does man consist, soul and body: the soul with its
reason, and the body with its senses." Therefore the sensitive powers
belong to the body: and consequently when the body is corrupted the
sensitive powers remain not in the soul.
Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the separation of the soul,
expresses himself thus (Metaph. xi, 3): "If, however, anything remain
at last, we must ask what this is: because in certain subjects it is
not impossible, for instance if the soul be of such a disposition, not
the whole soul but the intellect; for as regards the whole soul this is
probably impossible." Hence it seems that the whole soul is not
separated from the body, but only the intellective powers of the soul,
and consequently not the sensitive or vegetative powers.
Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima ii,
2): "This alone is ever separated, as the everlasting from the
corruptible: for it is hereby clear that the remaining parts are not
separable as some maintain." Therefore the sensitive powers do not
remain in the separated soul.
I answer that, There are many opinions on this question. For some,
holding the view that all the powers are in the soul in the same way as
color is in a body, hold that the soul separated from the body takes
all its powers away with it: because, if it lacked any one of them, it
would follow that the soul is changed in its natural properties, since
these cannot change so long as their subject remains. But the aforesaid
view is false, for since a power is so called because it enables us to
do or suffer something, and since to do and to be able belong to the
same subject, it follows that the subject of a power is the same as
that which is agent or patient. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et
Vigil.) that "where we find power there we find action." Now it is
evident that certain operations, whereof the soul's powers are the
principles, do not belong to the soul properly speaking but to the soul
as united to the body, because they are not performed except through
the medium of the body---such as to see, to hear, and so forth. Hence
it follows that such like powers belong to the united soul and body as
their subject, but to the soul as their quickening principle, just as
the form is the principle of the properties of a composite being. Some
operations, however, are performed by the soul without a bodily
organ---for instance to understand, to consider, to will: wherefore,
since these actions are proper to the soul, the powers that are the
principles thereof belong to the soul not only as their principle but
also as their subject. Therefore, since so long as the proper subject
remains its proper passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted
they also must be corrupted, it follows that these powers which use no
bodily organ for their actions must needs remain in the separated body,
while those which use a bodily organ must needs be corrupted when the
body is corrupted: and such are all the powers belonging to the
sensitive and the vegetative soul. On this account some draw a
distinction in the sensitive powers of the soul: for they say that they
are of two kinds---some being acts of organs and emanating from the
soul into the body are corrupted with the body; others, whence the
former originate, are in the soul, because by them the soul sensitizes
the body for seeing, hearing, and so on; and these primary powers
remain in the separated soul. But this statement seems unreasonable:
because the soul, by its essence and not through the medium of certain
other powers, is the origin of those powers which are the acts of
organs, even as any form, from the very fact that by its essence it
informs its matter, is the origin of the properties which result
naturally in the composite. For were it necessary to suppose other
powers in the soul, by means of which the powers that perfect the
organs may flow from the essence of the soul, for the same reason it
would be necessary to suppose other powers by means of which these mean
powers flow from the essence of the soul, and so on to infinity, and if
we have to stop it is better to do so at the first step.
Hence others say that the sensitive and other like powers do not remain
in the separated soul except in a restricted sense, namely radically,
in the same way as a result is in its principle: because there remains
in the separated soul the ability to produce these powers if it should
be reunited to the body; nor is it necessary for this ability to be
anything in addition to the essence of the soul, as stated above. This
opinion appears to be the more reasonable.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is to be understood as
meaning that the soul takes away with it some of those powers actually,
namely understanding and intelligence, and some radically, as stated
above [*Cf. [5031]FP, Q[77], A[8], ad 1 and infra A[2], ad 1].
Reply to Objection 2: The senses which the soul takes away with it are
not these external senses, but the internal, those, namely, which
pertain to the intellective part, for the intellect is sometimes called
sense, as Basil states in his commentary on the Proverbs, and again the
Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 11). If, however, he means the external senses
we must reply as above to the first objection.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the sensitive powers are related
to the soul, not as natural passions to their subject, but as compared
to their origin: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 4: The powers of the soul are not called its
integral but its potential parts. Now the nature of such like wholes is
that the entire energy of the whole is found perfectly in one of the
parts, but partially in the others; thus in the soul the soul's energy
is found perfectly in the intellective part, but partially in the
others. Wherefore, as the powers of the intellective part remain in the
separated soul, the latter will remain entire and undiminished,
although the sensitive powers do not remain actually: as neither is the
king's power decreased by the death of a mayor who shared his
authority.
Reply to Objection 5: The body co-operates in merit, as an essential
part of the man who merits. The sensitive powers, however, do not
co-operate thus, since they are of the genus of accidents. Hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 6: The powers of the sensitive soul are said to be
acts of the organs, not as though they were the essential forms of
those organs, except in reference to the soul whose powers they are.
But they are the acts of the organs, by perfecting them for their
proper operations, as heat is the act of fire by perfecting it for the
purpose of heating. Wherefore, just as a fire would remain identically
the same, although another individual heat were in it (even so the cold
of water that has been heated returns not identically the same,
although the water remains the same in identity), so the organs will be
the same identically, although the powers be not identically the same.
Reply to Objection 7: The Philosopher is speaking there of these powers
as being rooted in the soul. This is clear from his saying that "old
age is an affection not of the soul, but of that in which the soul is,"
namely the body. For in this way the powers of the soul are neither
weakened nor corrupted on account of the body.
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Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the sensitive powers remain
in the separated soul. For Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima xv):
"When the soul leaves the body it derives pleasure or sorrow through
being affected with these" (namely the imagination, and the
concupiscible and irascible faculties) "according to its merits." But
the imagination, the concupiscible, and the irascible are sensitive
powers. Therefore the separated soul will be affected as regards the
sensitive powers, and consequently will be in some act by reason of
them.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that "the body
feels not, but the soul through the body," and further on: "The soul
feels certain things, not through the body but without the body." Now
that which befits the soul without the body can be in the soul
separated from the body. Therefore the soul will then be able to feel
actually.
Objection 3: Further, to see images of bodies, as occurs in sleep,
belongs to imaginary vision which is in the sensitive part. Now it
happens that the separated soul sees images of bodies in the same way
as when we sleep. Thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "For I see
not why the soul has an image of its own body when, the body lying
senseless, yet not quite dead, it sees some things which many have
related after returning to life from this suspended animation and yet
has it not when it has left the body through death having taken place."
For it is unintelligible that the soul should have an image of its
body, except in so far as it sees that image: wherefore he said before
of those who lie senseless that "they have a certain image of their own
body, by which they are able to be borne to corporeal places and by
means of sensible images to take cognizance of such things as they
see." Therefore the separated soul can exercise the acts of the
sensitive powers.
Objection 4: Further, the memory is a power of the sensitive part, as
proved in De Memor. et Remin. i. Now separated souls will actually
remember the things they did in this world: wherefore it is said to the
rich glutton (Lk. 16:25): "Remember that thou didst receive good things
in thy lifetime." Therefore the separated soul will exercise the act of
a sensitive power.
Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9)
the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part. But joy and
sorrow, love and hatred, fear and hope, and similar emotions which
according to our faith we hold to be in separated souls, are in the
irascible and concupiscible. Therefore separated souls will not be
deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers.
On the contrary, That which is common to soul and body cannot remain in
the separated soul. Now all the operations of the sensitive powers are
common to the soul and body: and this is evident from the fact that no
sensitive power exercises an act except through a bodily organ.
Therefore the separated soul will be deprived of the acts of the
sensitive powers.
Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that "when the body is
corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves," and the same applies
to all the acts of the sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul
does not exercise the act of any sensitive power.
I answer that, Some distinguish two kinds of acts in the sensitive
powers: external acts which the soul exercises through the body. and
these do not remain in the separated soul; and internal acts which the
soul performs by itself; and these will be in the separated soul. This
statement would seem to have originated from the opinion of Plato, who
held that the soul is united to the body, as a perfect substance nowise
dependant on the body, and merely as a mover is united to the thing
moved. This is an evident consequence of transmigration which he held.
And since according to him nothing is in motion except what is moved,
and lest he should go on indefinitely, he said that the first mover
moves itself, and he maintained that the soul is the cause of its own
movement. Accordingly there would be a twofold movement of the soul,
one by which it moves itself, and another whereby the body is moved by
the soul: so that this act "to see" is first of all in the soul itself
as moving itself, and secondly in the bodily organ in so far as the
soul moves the body. This opinion is refuted by the Philosopher (De
Anima i, 3) who proves that the soul does not move itself, and that it
is nowise moved in respect of such operations as seeing, feeling, and
the like, but that such operations are movements of the composite only.
We must therefore conclude that the acts of the sensitive powers nowise
remain in the separated soul, except perhaps as in their remote origin.
Reply to Objection 1: Some deny that this book is Augustine's: for it
is ascribed to a Cistercian who compiled it from Augustine's works and
added things of his own. Hence we are not to take what is written
there, as having authority. If, however, its authority should be
maintained, it must be said that the meaning is that the separated soul
is affected with imagination and other like powers, not as though such
affection were the act of the aforesaid powers, but in the sense that
the soul will be affected in the future life for good or ill, according
to the things which it committed in the body through the imagination
and other like powers: so that the imagination and such like powers are
not supposed to elicit that affection, but to have elicited in the body
the merit of that affection.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul is said to feel through the body, not as
though the act of feeling belonged to the soul by itself, but as
belonging to the whole composite by reason of the soul, just as we say
that heat heats. That which is added, namely that the soul feels some
things without the body, such as fear and so forth, means that it feels
such things without the outward movement of the body that takes place
in the acts of the proper senses: since fear and like passions do not
occur without any bodily movement.
It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking according to the
opinion of the Platonists who maintained this as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there as nearly throughout that
book, as one inquiring and not deciding. For it is clear that there is
no comparison between the soul of a sleeper and the separated soul:
since the soul of the sleeper uses the organ of imagination wherein
corporeal images are impressed; which cannot be said of the separated
soul. Or we may reply that images of things are in the soul, both as to
the sensitive and imaginative power and as to the intellective power,
with greater or lesser abstraction from matter and material conditions.
Wherefore Augustine's comparison holds in this respect that just as the
images of corporeal things are in the soul of the dreamer or of one who
is carried out of his mind, imaginatively, so are they in the separated
soul intellectively: but not that they are in the separated soul
imaginatively.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated in the first book (Sent. i, D, 3, qu.
4), memory has a twofold signification. Sometimes it means a power of
the sensitive part, in so far as its gaze extends over past time; and
in this way the act of the memory will not be in the separated soul.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that "when this," the
body to wit, "is corrupted, the soul remembers not." In another way
memory is used to designate that part of the imagination which pertains
to the intellective faculty, in so far namely as it abstracts from all
differences of time, since it regards not only the past but also the
present, and the future as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 11). Taking
memory in this sense the separated soul will remember [*Cf. [5032]FP,
Q[77], A[8]; [5033]FP, Q[89], A[6]].
Reply to Objection 5: Love, joy, sorrow, and the like, have a twofold
signification. Sometimes they denote passions of the sensitive
appetite, and thus they will not be in the separated soul, because in
this way they are not exercised without a definite movement of the
heart. In another way they denote acts of the will which is in the
intellective part: and in this way they will be in the separated soul,
even as delight will be there without bodily movement, even as it is in
God, namely in so far as it is a simple movement of the will. In this
sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God's joy is one
simple delight."
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Whether the separated soul can suffer from a bodily fire?
Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul cannot suffer from a
bodily fire. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "The things that
affect the soul well or ill after its separation from the body, are not
corporeal but resemble corporeal things." Therefore the separated soul
is not punished with a bodily fire.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) says that "the agent
is always more excellent than the patient." But it is impossible for
any body to be more excellent than the separated soul. Therefore it
cannot suffer from a body.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i) and
Boethius (De Duab. Natur.) only those things that agree in matter are
active and passive in relation to one another. But the soul and
corporeal fire do not agree in matter, since there is no matter common
to spiritual and corporeal things: wherefore they cannot be changed
into one another, as Boethius says (De Duab. Natur.). Therefore the
separated soul does not suffer from a bodily fire.
Objection 4: Further, whatsoever is patient receives something from the
agent. Therefore if the soul suffer from the bodily fire, it will
receive something therefrom. Now whatsoever is received in a thing is
received according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore that which
is received in the soul from the fire, is in it not materially but
spiritually. Now the forms of things existing spiritually in the soul
are its perfections. Therefore though it be granted that the soul
suffer from the bodily fire, this will not conduce to its punishment,
but rather to its perfection.
Objection 5: Further, if it be said that the soul is punished merely by
seeing the fire, as Gregory would seem to say (Dial. iv, 29). On the
contrary, if the soul sees the fire of hell, it cannot see it save by
intellectual vision, since it has not the organs by which sensitive or
imaginative vision is effected. But it would seem impossible for
intellectual vision to be the cause of sorrow, since "there is no
sorrow contrary to the pleasure of considering," according to the
Philosopher (Topic. i, 13). Therefore the soul is not punished by that
vision.
Objection 6: Further, if it be said that the soul suffers from the
corporeal fire, through being held thereby, even as now it is held by
the body while living in the body; on the contrary, the soul while
living in the body is held by the body in so far as there results one
thing from the soul and the body, as from form and matter. But the soul
will not be the form of that corporeal fire. Therefore it cannot be
held by the fire in the manner aforesaid.
Objection 7: Further, every bodily agent acts by contact. But a
corporeal fire cannot be in contact with the soul, since contact is
only between corporeal things whose bounds come together. Therefore the
soul suffers not from that fire.
Objection 8: Further, an organic agent does not act on a remote object,
except through acting on the intermediate objects; wherefore it is able
to act at a fixed distance in proportion to its power. But souls, or at
least the demons to whom this equally applies, are sometimes outside
the place of hell, since sometimes they appear to men even in this
world: and yet they are not then free from punishment, for just as the
glory of the saints is never interrupted, so neither is the punishment
of the damned. And yet we do not find that all the intermediate things
suffer from the fire of hell: nor again is it credible that any
corporeal thing of an elemental nature has such a power that its action
can reach to such a distance. Therefore it does not seem that the pains
suffered by the souls of the damned are inflicted by a corporeal fire.
On the contrary, The possibility of suffering from a corporeal fire is
equally consistent with separated souls and with demons. Now demons
suffer therefrom since they are punished by that fire into which the
bodies of the damned will be cast after the resurrection, and which
must needs be as corporeal fire. This is evident from the words of our
Lord (Mat. 25:41), "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire,
which was prepared for the devil," etc. Therefore separated souls also
can suffer from that fire.
Further, punishment should correspond to sin. Now in sinning the soul
subjected itself to the body by sinful concupiscence. Therefore it is
just that it should be punished by being made subject to a bodily thing
by suffering therefrom.
Further, there is greater union between form and matter than between
agent and patient. Now the diversity of spiritual and corporeal nature
does not hinder the soul from being the form of the body. Therefore
neither is it an obstacle to its suffering from a body.
I answer that, Given that the fire of hell is not so called
metaphorically, nor an imaginary fire, but a real corporeal fire, we
must needs say that the soul will suffer punishment from a corporeal
fire, since our Lord said (Mat. 25:41) that this fire was prepared for
the devil and his angels, who are incorporeal even as the soul. But how
it is that they can thus suffer is explained in many ways.
For some have said that the mere fact that the soul sees the fire makes
the soul suffer from the fire: wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) says:
"The soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it." But this does not
seem sufficient, because whatever is seen, from the fact that it is
seen, is a perfection of the seer. wherefore it cannot conduce to his
punishment, as seen. Sometimes, however, it is of a penal or unpleasant
nature accidentally, in so far, to wit, as it is apprehended as
something hurtful, and consequently, besides the fact that the soul
sees the fire, there must needs be some relation of the soul to the
fire, according to which the fire is hurtful to the soul.
Hence others have said that although a corporeal fire cannot burn the
soul, the soul nevertheless apprehends it as hurtful to itself, and in
consequence of this apprehension is seized with fear and sorrow, in
fulfillment of Ps. 13:5, "They have trembled for fear, where there was
no fear." Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 29) that "the soul burns
through seeing itself aflame." But this, again, seems insufficient,
because in this case the soul would suffer from the fire, not in
reality but only in apprehension: for although a real passion of sorrow
or pain may result from a false imagination, as Augustine observes
(Gen. ad lit. xii), it cannot be said in relation to that passion that
one really suffers from the thing, but from the image of the thing that
is present to one's fancy. Moreover, this kind of suffering would be
more unlike real suffering than that which results from imaginary
vision, since the latter is stated to result from real images of
things, which images the soul carries about with it, whereas the former
results from false fancies which the erring soul imagines: and
furthermore, it is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are
endowed with keen intelligence, would think it possible for a corporeal
fire to hurt them, if they were nowise distressed thereby.
Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the soul suffers
even really from the corporeal fire: wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv,
29): "We can gather from the words of the Gospel, that the soul suffers
from the fire not only by seeing it, but also by feeling it." They
explain the possibility of this as follows. They say that this
corporeal fire can be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal
thing, and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. Secondly, as
the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice. For the order of
Divine justice demands that the soul which by sinning subjected itself
to corporeal things should be subjected to them also in punishment. Now
an instrument acts not only in virtue of its own nature, but also in
virtue of the principal agent: wherefore it is not unreasonable if that
fire, seeing that it acts in virtue of a spiritual agent, should act on
the spirit of a man or demon, in the same way as we have explained the
sanctification of the soul by the sacraments ([5034]TP, Q[62],
AA[1],4).
But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every instrument, in
acting on that on which it is used instrumentally, has its own
connatural action besides the action whereby it acts in virtue of the
principal agent: in fact it is by fulfilling the former that it effects
the latter action, even as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body that
water sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood produces the
shape of a house.
Hence we must allow the fire to exercise on the soul an action
connatural to the fire, in order that it may be the instrument of
Divine justice in the punishment of sin: and for this reason we must
say that a body cannot naturally act on a spirit, nor in any way be
hurtful or distressful to it, except in so far as the latter is in some
way united to a body: for thus we observe that "the corruptible body is
a load upon the soul" (Wis. 9:15). Now a spirit is united to a body in
two ways. In one way as form to matter, so that from their union there
results one thing simply: and the spirit that is thus united to a body
both quickens the body and is somewhat burdened by the body: but it is
not thus that the spirit of man or demon is united to the corporeal
fire. In another way as the mover is united to the things moved, or as
a thing placed is united to place, even as incorporeal things are in a
place. In this way created incorporeal spirits are confined to a place,
being in one place in such a way as not to be in another. Now although
of its nature a corporeal thing is able to confine an incorporeal
spirit to a place, it is not able of its nature to detain an
incorporeal spirit in the place to which it is confined, and so to tie
it to that place that it be unable to seek another, since a spirit is
not by nature in a place so as to be subject to place. But the
corporeal fire is enabled as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine
justice thus to detain a spirit; and thus it has a penal effect on it,
by hindering it from fulfilling its own will, that is by hindering it
from acting where it will and as it will.
This way is asserted by Gregory (Dial. iv, 29). For in explaining how
the soul can suffer from that fire by feeling it, he expresses himself
as follows: "Since Truth declares the rich sinner to be condemned to
fire, will any wise man deny that the souls of the wicked are
imprisoned in flames?" Julian [*Bishop of Toledo, Prognostic ii, 17]
says the same as quoted by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 44): "If the
incorporeal spirit of a living man is held by the body, why shall it
not be held after death by a corporeal fire?" and Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that "just as, although the soul is spiritual and the
body corporeal, man is so fashioned that the soul is united to the body
as giving it life, and on account of this union conceives a great love
for its body, so it is chained to the fire, as receiving punishment
therefrom, and from this union conceives a loathing."
Accordingly we must unite all the aforesaid modes together, in order to
understand perfectly how the soul suffers from a corporeal fire: so as
to say that the fire of its nature is able to have an incorporeal
spirit united to it as a thing placed is united to a place; that as the
instrument of Divine justice it is enabled to detain it enchained as it
were, and in this respect this fire is really hurtful to the spirit,
and thus the soul seeing the fire as something hurtful to it is
tormented by the fire. Hence Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) mentions all these
in order, as may be seen from the above quotations.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there as one inquiring:
wherefore he expresses himself otherwise when deciding the point, as
quoted above (De Civ. Dei xxi). Or we may reply that Augustine means to
say that the things which are the proximate occasion of the soul's pain
or sorrow are spiritual, since it would not be distressed unless it
apprehended the fire as hurtful to it: wherefore the fire as
apprehended is the proximate cause of its distress, whereas the
corporeal fire which exists outside the soul is the remote cause of its
distress.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is simply more excellent than
the fire, the fire is relatively more excellent than the soul, in so
far, to wit, as it is the instrument of Divine justice.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher and Boethius are speaking of the
action whereby the patient is changed into the nature of the agent.
Such is not the action of the fire on the soul: and consequently the
argument is not conclusive.
Reply to Objection 4: By acting on the soul the fire bestows nothing on
it but detains it, as stated above. Hence the argument is not to the
point.
Reply to Objection 5: In intellectual vision sorrow is not caused by
the fact that something is seen, since the thing seen as such can
nowise be contrary to the intellect. But in the sensible vision the
thing seen, by its very action on the sight so as to be seen, there may
be accidentally something corruptive of the sight, in so far as it
destroys the harmony of the organ Nevertheless, intellectual vision may
cause sorrow, in so far as the thing seen is apprehended as hurtful,
not that it hurts through being seen, but in some other way no matter
which. It is thus that the soul in seeing the fire is distressed.
Reply to Objection 6: The comparison does not hold in every respect,
but it does in some, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 7: Although there is no bodily contact between the
soul and body, there is a certain spiritual contact between them (even
as the mover of the heaven, being spiritual, touches the heaven, when
it moves it, with a spiritual contact) in the same way as a "painful
object is said to touch," as stated in De Gener. i. This mode of
contact is sufficient for action.
Reply to Objection 8: The souls of the damned are never outside hell,
except by Divine permission, either for the instruction or for the
trial of the elect. And wherever they are outside hell they
nevertheless always see the fire thereof as prepared for their
punishment. Wherefore, since this vision is the immediate cause of
their distress, as stated above, wherever they are, they suffer from
hell-fire. Even so prisoners, though outside the prison, suffer
somewhat from the prison, seeing themselves condemned thereto. Hence
just as the glory of the elect is not diminished, neither as to the
essential, nor as to the accidental reward, if they happen to be
outside the empyrean, in fact this somewhat conduces to their glory, so
the punishment of the damned is nowise diminished, if by God's
permission they happen to be outside hell for a time. A gloss on James
3:6, "inflameth the wheel of our nativity," etc., is in agreement with
this, for it is worded thus: "The devil, wherever he is, whether in the
air or under the earth, drags with him the torments of his flames." But
the objection argues as though the corporeal fire tortured the spirit
immediately in the same way as it torments bodies.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD (FOURTEEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the suffrages for the dead. Under this head there
are fourteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether suffrages performed by one person can profit others?
(2) Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?
(3) Whether the suffrages of sinners profit the dead?
(4) Whether suffrages for the dead profit those who perform them?
(5) Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?
(6) Whether they profit those who are in purgatory?
(7) Whether they avail the children in limbo?
(8) Whether in any way they profit those who are heaven?
(9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the altar, and
almsgiving profit the departed?
(10) Whether indulgences granted by the Church profit them?
(11) Whether the burial service profits the departed?
(12) Whether suffrages for one dead person profit that person more than
others?
(13) Whether suffrages for many avail each one as much as if they were
offered for each individual?
(14) Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages
are not offered, as much as special and general suffrages together
avail those for whom they are offered?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the suffrages of one person can profit others?
Objection 1: It would seem that the suffrages of one person cannot
profit others. For it is written (Gal. 6:8): "What things a man shall
sow, those also shall he reap." Now if one person reaped fruit from the
suffrages of another, he would reap from another's sowing. Therefore a
person receives no fruit from the suffrages of others.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to God's justice, that each one should
receive according to his merits, wherefore the psalm (Ps. 61:13) says:
"Thou wilt render to every man according to his works." Now it is
impossible for God's justice to fail. Therefore it is impossible for
one man to be assisted by the works of another.
Objection 3: Further, a work is meritorious on the same count as it is
praiseworthy, namely inasmuch as it is voluntary. Now one man is not
praised for the work of another. Therefore neither can the work of one
man be meritorious and fruitful for another.
Objection 4: Further, it belongs to Divine justice to repay good for
good in the same way as evil for evil. But no man is punished for the
evildoings of another; indeed, according to Ezech. 18:4, "the soul that
sinneth, the same shall die." Therefore neither does one person profit
by another's good.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:63): "I am a partaker with all
them that fear Thee," etc.
Further, all the faithful united together by charity are members of the
one body of the Church. Now one member is assisted by another.
Therefore one man can be assisted by the merits of another.
I answer that, our actions can avail for two purposes. First, for
acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious work a man obtains the
state of bliss. Secondly, for something consequent upon a state; thus
by some work a man merits an accidental reward, or a rebate of
punishment. And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two
ways: first, by way of merit; secondly, by way of prayer: the
difference being that merit relies on justice, and prayer on mercy;
since he who prays obtains his petition from the mere liberality of the
one he prays. Accordingly we must say that the work of one person
nowise can avail another for acquiring a state by way of merit, so
that, to wit, a man be able to merit eternal life by the works which I
do, because the share of glory is awarded according to the measure of
the recipient, and each one is disposed by his own and not by another's
actions---disposed, that is to say, by being worthy of reward. By way
of prayer, however, the work of one may profit another while he is a
wayfarer, even for acquiring a state; for instance, one man may obtain
the first grace for another [*Cf. [5035]FS, Q[114], A[6]]: and since
the impetration of prayer depends on the liberality of God Whom we
pray, it may extend to whatever is ordinately subject to the Divine
power. On the other hand, as regards that which is consequent upon or
accessory to a state, the work of one may avail another, not only by
way of prayer but even by way of merit: and this happens in two ways.
First, on account of their communion in the root of the work, which
root is charity in meritorious works. Wherefore all who are united
together by charity acquire some benefit from one another's works,
albeit according to the measure of each one's state, since even in
heaven each one will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that
the communion of saints is laid down as an article of faith. Secondly,
through the intention of the doer who does certain works specially for
the purpose that they may profit such persons: so that those works
become somewhat the works of those for whom they are done, as though
they were bestowed on them by the doer. Wherefore they can avail them
either for the fulfillment of satisfaction or for some similar purpose
that does not change their state.
Reply to Objection 1: This reaping is the receiving of eternal life, as
stated in Jn. 4:36, "And he that reapeth . . . gathereth fruit unto
life everlasting." Now a share of eternal life is not given to a man
save for his own works, for although we may impetrate for another that
he obtain life, this never happens except by means of his own works,
when namely, at the prayers of one, another is given the grace whereby
he merits eternal life.
Reply to Objection 2: The work that is done for another becomes his for
whom it is done: and in like manner the work done by a man who is one
with me is somewhat mine. Hence it is not contrary to Divine justice if
a man receives the fruit of the works done by a man who is one with him
in charity, or of works done for him. This also happens according to
human justice, so that the satisfaction offered by one is accepted in
lieu of another's.
Reply to Objection 3: Praise is not given to a person save according to
his relation to an act, wherefore praise is "in relation to something"
(Ethic. i, 12). And since no man is made or shown to be well- or
ill-disposed to something by another's deed, it follows that no man is
praised for another's deeds save accidentally in so far as he is
somewhat the cause of those deeds, by giving counsel, assistance,
inducement, or by any other means. on the other hand, a work is
meritorious to a person, not only by reason of his disposition, but
also in view of something consequent upon his disposition or state, as
evidenced by what has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: It is directly contrary to justice to take away
from a person that which is his due: but to give a person what is not
his due is not contrary to justice, but surpasses the bounds of
justice, for it is liberality. Now a person cannot be hurt by the ills
of another, unless he be deprived of something of his own. Consequently
it is not becoming that one should be punished for another's sins, as
it is that one should acquire some advantage from deeds of another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?
Objection 1: It would seem that the dead cannot be assisted by the
works of the living. First, because the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:10): "We
must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every
one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath
done." Therefore nothing can accrue to a man from the works of others,
which are done after his death and when he is no longer in the body.
Objection 2: Further, this also seems to follow from the words of Apoc.
14:13, "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord . . . for their works
follow them."
Objection 3: Further, it belongs only to one who is on the way to
advance on account of some deed. Now after death men are no longer
wayfarers, because to them the words of Job 19:8, refer: "He hath
hedged in my path round about, and I cannot pass." Therefore the dead
cannot be assisted by a person's suffrages.
Objection 4: Further, no one is assisted by the deed of another, unless
there be some community of life between them. Now there is no community
between the dead and the living, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i,
11). Therefore the suffrages of the living do not profit the dead.
On the contrary are the words of 2 Macc. 12:46: "It is . . . a holy and
wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they may be loosed from
sins." But this would not be profitable unless it were a help to them.
Therefore the suffrages of the living profit the dead.
Further, Augustine says (De Cure pro Mort. i): "Of no small weight is
the authority of the Church whereby she clearly approves of the custom
whereby a commendation of the dead has a place in the prayers which the
priests pour forth to the Lord God at His altar." This custom was
established by the apostles themselves according to the Damascene in a
sermon on suffrages for the dead [*De his qui in fide dormierunt, 3],
where he expresses himself thus: "Realizing the nature of the Mysteries
the disciples of the Saviour and His holy apostles sanctioned a
commemoration of those who had died in the faith, being made in the
awe-inspiring and life-giving Mysteries." This is also confirmed by the
authority of Dionysius (Hier. Eccl.), where he mentions the rite of the
Early Church in praying for the dead, and, moreover, asserts that the
suffrages of the living profit the dead. Therefore we must believe this
without any doubt.
I answer that, Charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the
Church, extends not only to the living, but also to the dead who die in
charity. For charity which is the life of the soul, even as the soul is
the life of the body, has no end: "Charity never falleth away" (1 Cor.
13:8). Moreover, the dead live in the memory of the living: wherefore
the intention of the living can be directed to them. Hence the
suffrages of the living profit the dead in two ways even as they profit
the living, both on account of the bond of charity and on account of
the intention being directed to them. Nevertheless, we must not believe
that the suffrages of the living profit them so as to change their
state from unhappiness to happiness or "vice versa"; but they avail for
the diminution of punishment or something of the kind that involves no
change in the state of the dead.
Reply to Objection 1: Man while living in the body merited that such
things should avail him after death. Wherefore if he is assisted
thereby after this life, this is, nevertheless, the result of the
things he has done in the body.
Or we may reply, according to John Damascene, in the sermon quoted
above, that these words refer to the retribution which will be made at
the final judgment, of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness: for then
each one will receive only according as he himself has done in the
body. Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages of the
living.
Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted refer expressly to the sequel of
eternal retribution as is clear from the opening words: "Blessed are
the dead," etc. Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are
somewhat their own, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Although, strictly speaking, after death souls
are not in the state of the way, yet in a certain respect they are
still on the way, in so far as they are delayed awhile in their advance
towards their final award. Wherefore, strictly speaking, their way is
hedged in round about, so that they can no more be changed by any works
in respect of the state of happiness or unhappiness. Yet their way is
not so hedged around that they cannot be helped by others in the matter
of their being delayed from receiving their final award, because in
this respect they are still wayfarers.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the communion of civic deeds whereof the
Philosopher speaks, is impossible between the dead and the living,
because the dead are outside civic life, the communication of the
spiritual life is possible between them, for that life is founded on
charity towards God, to Whom the spirits of the dead live.
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Whether suffrages performed by sinners profit the dead?
Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages performed by sinners do not
profit the dead. For, according to Jn. 9:31, "God doth not hear
sinners." Now if their prayers were to profit those for whom they pray,
they would be heard by God. Therefore the suffrages performed by them
do not profit the dead.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Pastoral i, 11) that "when an
offensive person is sent to intercede, the wrath of the angered party
is provoked to harsher measures." Now every sinner is offensive to God.
Therefore God is not inclined to mercy by the suffrages of sinners, and
consequently their suffrages are of no avail.
Objection 3: Further, a person's deed would seem to be more fruitful to
the doer than to another. But a sinner merits naught for himself by his
deeds. Much less, therefore, can he merit for another.
Objection 4: Further, every meritorious work must be a living work,
that is to say, informed by charity. Now works done by sinners are
dead. Therefore the dead for whom they are done cannot be assisted
thereby.
Objection 5: On the contrary, No man can know for certain about another
man whether the latter be in a state of sin or of grace. If, therefore,
only those suffrages were profitable that are done by those who are in
a state of grace, a man could not know of whom to ask suffrages for his
dead, and consequently many would be deterred from obtaining suffrages.
Objection 6: Further, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cix), as
quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), the dead are assisted by
suffrages according as while living they merited to be assisted after
death. Therefore the worth of suffrages is measured according to the
disposition of the person for whom they are performed. Therefore it
would appear that it differs not whether they be performed by good or
by wicked persons.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in the suffrages performed
by the wicked. First, the deed done, for instance the sacrifice of the
altar. And since our sacraments have their efficacy from themselves
independently of the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by
whomsoever they are performed, in this respect the suffrages of the
wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we may consider the deed of the
doer, and then we must draw a distinction; because the deed of a sinner
who offers suffrage may be considered---in one way in so far as it is
his own deed, and thus it can nowise be meritorious either to himself
or to another; in another way in so far as it is another's deed, and
this happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering suffrages,
represents the whole Church; for instance a priest when he performs the
burial service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead
a thing is done is understood to do it himself as Dionysius asserts
(Coel. Hier. xiii), it follows that the suffrages of that priest,
albeit a sinner, profit the departed. Secondly, when he acts as the
instrument of another: for the work of the instrument belongs more to
the principal agent. Wherefore, although he who acts as the instrument
of another be not in a state of merit, his act may be meritorious on
account of the principal agent: for instance if a servant being in sin
do any work of mercy at the command of his master who has charity.
Hence, if a person dying in charity command suffrages to be offered for
him, or if some other person having charity prescribe them, those
suffrages avail for the departed, even though the persons by whom they
are performed be in sin. Nevertheless they would avail more if those
persons were in charity, because then those works would be meritorious
on two counts.
Reply to Objection 1: The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes not
his but another's, and consequently in this respect is worthy to be
heard by God. Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, when, to wit,
they ask for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses His goods
not only to the righteous but also to sinners (Mat. 5:45), not indeed
on account of their merits, but of His loving kindness. Hence a gloss
on Jn. 9:31, "God doth not hear sinners," says that "he speaks as one
unanointed and as not seeing clearly."
Reply to Objection 2: Although the sinner's prayer is not acceptable in
so far as he is offensive, it may be acceptable to God on account of
another in whose stead or at whose command he offers the prayer.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why the sinner who performs these
suffrages gains nothing thereby is because he is not capable of
profiting by reason of his own indisposition. Nevertheless, as stated
above, it may in some way profit another, who is disposed.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the sinner's deed is not living in so
far as it is his own, it may be living in so far as it is another's, as
stated above.
Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show
that it matters not whether one obtain suffrages from good or from evil
persons, we must reply to them also.
Reply to Objection 5: Although one cannot know for certain about
another whether he be in the state of salvation, one may infer it with
probability from what one sees outwardly of a man: for a tree is known
by its fruit (Mat. 7:16).
Reply to Objection 6: In order that suffrage avail another, it is
requisite that the one for whom it is performed be capable of availing
by it: and a man has become capable of this by his own works which he
did in his life-time. This is what Augustine means to say.
Nevertheless, those works must be such that they can profit him, and
this depends not on the person for whom the suffrage is performed, but
rather on the one who offers the suffrages whether by performing them
or by commanding them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether suffrages offered by the living for the dead profit those who offer
them?
Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages offered by the living for the
dead do not profit those who offer them. For according to human justice
a man is not absolved from his own debt if he pay a debt for another
man. Therefore a man is not absolved from his own debt for the reason
that by offering suffrages he has paid the debt of the one for whom he
offered them.
Objection 2: Further, whatever a man does, he should do it as best he
can. Now it is better to assist two than one. Therefore if one who by
suffrages has paid the debt of a dead person is freed from his own
debt, it would seem that one ought never to satisfy for oneself, but
always for another.
Objection 3: Further, if the satisfaction of one who satisfies for
another profits him equally with the one for whom he satisfies, it will
likewise equally profit a third person if he satisfy for him at the
same time, and likewise a fourth and so on. Therefore he might satisfy
for all by one work of satisfaction; which is absurd.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 34:13): "My prayer shall be turned
into my bosom." Therefore, in like manner, suffrages that are offered
for others profit those who satisfy.
Further, the Damascene says in the sermon "On those who fell asleep in
the faith: Just as when about to anoint a sick man with the ointment or
other holy oil, first of all he, " namely the anointer, "shares in the
anointing and thus proceeds to anoint the patient, so whoever strives
for his neighbor's salvation first of all profits himself and
afterwards his neighbor." And thus the question at issue is answered.
I answer that, The work of suffrage that is done for another may be
considered in two ways. First, as expiating punishment by way of
compensation which is a condition of satisfaction: and in this way the
work of suffrage that is counted as belonging to the person for whom it
is done, while absolving him from the debt of punishment, does not
absolve the performer from his own debt of punishment, because in this
compensation we have to consider the equality of justice: and this work
of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the
other, for the debts of two sinners require a greater satisfaction than
the debt of one. Secondly, it may be considered as meriting eternal
life, and this it has as proceeding from its root, which is charity:
and in this way it profits not only the person for whom it is done, but
also and still more the doer.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first
considered the work of suffrage as a work of satisfaction, while the
others consider it as meritorious.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?
Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages profit those who are in hell.
For it is written (2 Macc. 12:40): "They found under the coats of the
slain some of the donaries of the idols . . . which the law forbiddeth
to the Jews," and yet we read further on (2 Macc. 12:43) that Judas
"sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem . . . to be
offered for the sins of the dead." Now it is clear that they sinned
mortally through acting against the Law, and consequently that they
died in mortal sin, and were taken to hell. Therefore suffrages profit
those who are in hell.
Objection 2: Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the saying of
Augustine (Enchiridion cx) that "those whom suffrages profit gain
either entire forgiveness, or at least an abatement of their
damnation." Now only those who are in hell are said to be damned.
Therefore suffrages profit even those who are in hell.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.): "If here the
prayers of the righteous avail those who are alive, how much more do
they, after death, profit those alone who are worthy of their holy
prayers?" Hence we may gather that suffrages are more profitable to the
dead than to the living. Now they profit the living even though they be
in mortal sin, for the Church prays daily for sinners that they be
converted to God. Therefore suffrages avail also for the dead who are
in mortal sin.
Objection 4: Further, in the Lives of the Fathers (iii, 172; vi, 3) we
read, and the Damascene relates in his sermon [*De his qui in fide
dormierunt] that Macarius discovered the skull of a dead man on the
road, and that after praying he asked whose head it was, and the head
replied that it had belonged to a pagan priest who was condemned to
hell; and yet he confessed that he and others were assisted by the
prayers of Macarius. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit even
those who are in hell.
Objection 5: Further, the Damascene in the same sermon relates that
Gregory, while praying for Trajan, heard a voice from heaven saying to
him: "I have heard thy voice, and I pardon Trajan": and of this fact
the Damascene adds in the same sermon, "the whole East and West are
witnesses." Yet it is clear that Trajan was in hell, since "he put many
martyrs to a cruel death" [*De his qui fide dormierunt]. Therefore the
suffrages of the Church avail even for those who are in hell.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii): "The high priest
prays not for the unclean, because by so doing he would act counter to
the Divine order," and consequently he says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that "he
prays not that sinners be forgiven, because his prayer for them would
not be heard." Therefore suffrages avail not those who are in hell.
Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 19): "There is the same reason for
not praying then" (namely after the judgment day) "for men condemned to
the everlasting fire, as there is now for not praying for the devil and
his angels who are sentenced to eternal punishment, and for this reason
the saints pray not for dead unbelieving and wicked men, because,
forsooth, knowing them to be already condemned to eternal punishment,
they shrink from pleading for them by the merit of their prayers before
they are summoned to the presence of the just Judge."
Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the words of Augustine (De
Verb. A post. Serm. xxxii): "If a man depart this life without the
faith that worketh by charity and its sacraments, in vain do his
friends have recourse to such like acts of kindness." Now all the
damned come under that head. Therefore suffrages profit them not.
I answer that, There have been three opinions about the damned. For
some have said that a twofold distinction must be made in this matter.
First, as to time; for they said that after the judgment day no one in
hell will be assisted by any suffrage, but that before the judgment day
some are assisted by the suffrages of the Church. Secondly, they made a
distinction among those who are detained in hell. Some of these, they
said, are very bad, those namely who have died without faith and the
sacraments, and these, since they were not of the Church, neither "by
grace nor, by name" [*Cf. Oratio ad Vesperas, Fer. ii, post Dom. Pass.]
can the suffrages of the Church avail; while others are not very bad,
those namely who belonged to the Church as actual members, who had the
faith, frequented the sacraments and performed works generically good,
and for these the suffrages of the Church ought to avail. Yet they were
confronted with a difficulty which troubled them, for it would seem to
follow from this (since the punishment of hell is finite in intensity
although infinite in duration) that a multiplicity of suffrages would
take away that punishment altogether, which is the error of Origen
(Peri Archon. i; cf. Gregory, Moral. xxxiv): and consequently
endeavored in various ways to avoid this difficulty.
Praepositivus [*Gilbert Prevostin, Chancellor of the See of Paris, A.D.
1205-9] said that suffrages for the damned can be so multiplied that
they are entirely freed from punishment, not absolutely as Origen
maintained, but for a time, namely till the judgment day: for their
souls will be reunited to their bodies, and will be cast back into the
punishments of hell without hope of pardon. But this opinion seems
incompatible with Divine providence, which leaves nothing inordinate in
the world. For guilt cannot be restored to order save by punishment:
wherefore it is impossible for punishment to cease, unless first of all
guilt be expiated: so that, as guilt remains for ever in the damned,
their punishment will nowise be interrupted.
For this reason the followers of Gilbert de la Porree devised another
explanation. These said that the process in the diminution of
punishments by suffrages is as the process in dividing a line, which
though finite, is indefinitely divisible, and is never destroyed by
division, if it be diminished not by equal but by proportionate
quantities, for instance if we begin by taking away a quarter of the
whole, and secondly, a quarter of that quarter, and then a quarter of
this second quarter, and so on indefinitely. In like manner, they say
by the first suffrage a certain proportion of the punishment is taken
away, and by the second an equally proportionate part of the remainder.
But this explanation is in many ways defective. First, because it seems
that indefinite division which is applicable to continuous quantity
cannot be transferred to spiritual quantity: secondly, because there is
no reason why the second suffrage, if it be of equal worth, should
diminish the punishment less than the first: thirdly, because
punishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be diminished, even as it
cannot be done away unless the guilt be done away: fourthly, because in
the division of a line we come at length to something which is not
sensible, for a sensible body is not indefinitely divisible: and thus
it would follow that after many suffrages the remaining punishment
would be so little as not to be felt, and thus would no longer be a
punishment.
Hence others found another explanation. For Antissiodorensis [*William
of Auxerre, Archdeacon of Beauvais] (Sent. iv, Tract. 14) said that
suffrages profit the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their
punishment, but by fortifying the person punished: even as a man who is
carrying a heavy load might bathe his face in water, for thus he would
be enabled to carry it better, and yet his load would be none the
lighter. But this again is impossible, because according to Gregory
(Moral. ix) a man suffers more or less from the eternal fire according
as his guilt deserves; and consequently some suffer more, some less,
from the same fire. wherefore since the guilt of the damned remains
unchanged, it cannot be that he suffers less punishment. Moreover, the
aforesaid opinion is presumptuous, as being in opposition to the
statements of holy men, and groundless as being based on no authority.
It is also unreasonable. First, because the damned in hell are cut off
from the bond of charity in virtue of which the departed are in touch
with the works of the living. Secondly, because they have entirely come
to the end of life, and have received the final award for their merits,
even as the saints who are in heaven. For the remaining punishment or
glory of the body does not make them to be wayfarers, since glory
essentially and radically resides in the soul. It is the same with the
unhappiness of the damned, wherefore their punishment cannot be
diminished as neither can the glory of the saints be increased as to
the essential reward.
However, we may admit, in a certain measure, the manner in which,
according to some, suffrages profit the damned, if it be said that they
profit neither by diminishing nor interrupting their punishment, nor
again by diminishing their sense of punishment, but by withdrawing from
the damned some matter of grief, which matter they might have if they
knew themselves to be so outcast as to be a care to no one; and this
matter of grief is withdrawn from them when suffrages are offered for
them. Yet even this is impossible according to the general law, because
as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii)---and this applies
especially to the damned---"the spirits of the departed are where they
see nothing of what men do or of what happens to them in this life,"
and consequently they know not when suffrages are offered for them,
unless this relief be granted from above to some of the damned in spite
of the general law. This, however, is a matter of great uncertainty;
wherefore it is safer to say simply that suffrages profit not the
damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them, as appears from
the authors quoted above.
Reply to Objection 1: The donaries to the idols were not found on those
dead so that they might be taken as a sign that they were carried off
in reverence to the idols: but they took them as conquerors because
they were due to them by right of war. They sinned, however, venially
by covetousness: and consequently they were not damned in hell, and
thus suffrages could profit them. or we may say, according to some,
that in the midst of fighting, seeing they were in danger, they
repented of their sin, according to Ps. 77:34, "When He slew them, then
they sought Him": and this is a probable opinion. Wherefore the
offering was made for them.
Reply to Objection 2: In these words damnation is taken in a broad
sense for any kind of punishment, so as to include also the punishment
of purgatory which is sometimes entirely expiated by suffrages, and
sometimes not entirety, but diminished.
Reply to Objection 3: Suffrage for a dead person is more acceptable
than for a living person, as regards his being in greater want, since
he cannot help himself as a living person can. But a living person is
better off in that he can be taken from the state of mortal sin to the
state of grace, which cannot be said of the dead. Hence there is not
the same reason for praying for the dead as for the living.
Reply to Objection 4: This assistance did not consist in a diminishment
of their punishment, but in this alone (as stated in the same place)
that when he prayed they were permitted to see one another, and in this
they had a certain joy, not real but imaginary, in the fulfillment of
their desire. Even so the demons are said to rejoice when they draw men
into sin, although this nowise diminishes their punishment, as neither
is the joy of the angels diminished by the fact that they take pity on
our ills.
Reply to Objection 5: Concerning the incident of Trajan it may be
supposed with probability that he was recalled to life at the prayers
of blessed Gregory, and thus obtained the grace whereby he received the
pardon of his sins and in consequence was freed from punishment. The
same applies to all those who were miraculously raised from the dead,
many of whom were evidently idolaters and damned. For we must needs say
likewise of all such persons that they were consigned to hell, not
finally, but as was actually due to their own merits according to
justice: and that according to higher causes, in view of which it was
foreseen that they would be recalled to life, they were to be disposed
of otherwise.
Or we may say with some that Trajan's soul was not simply freed from
the debt of eternal punishment, but that his punishment was suspended
for a time, that is, until the judgment day. Nor does it follow that
this is the general result of suffrages, because things happen
differently in accordance with the general law from that which is
permitted in particular cases and by privilege. Even so the bounds of
human affairs differ from those of the miracles of the Divine power as
Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xvi).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether suffrages profit those who are in purgatory?
Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages do not profit even those who
are in purgatory. For purgatory is a part of hell. Now "there is no
redemption in hell" [*Office of the Dead, Resp. vii], and it is written
(Ps. 6:6), "Who shall confess to Thee in hell?" Therefore suffrages do
not profit those who are in purgatory.
Objection 2: Further, the punishment of purgatory is finite. Therefore
if some of the punishment is abated by suffrages, it would be possible
to have such a great number of suffrages, that the punishment would be
entirely remitted, and consequently the sin entirely unpunished: and
this would seem incompatible with Divine justice.
Objection 3: Further, souls are in purgatory in order that they may be
purified there, and being pure may come to the kingdom. Now nothing can
be purified, unless something be done to it. Therefore suffrages
offered by the living do not diminish the punishment of purgatory.
Objection 4: Further, if suffrages availed those who are in purgatory,
those especially would seem to avail them which are offered at their
behest. Yet these do not always avail: for instance, if a person before
dying were to provide for so many suffrages to be offered for him that
if they were offered they would suffice for the remission of his entire
punishment. Now supposing these suffrages to be delayed until he is
released from punishment, they will profit him nothing. For it cannot
be said that they profit him before they are discharged; and after they
are fulfilled, he no longer needs them, since he is already released.
Therefore suffrages do not avail those who are in purgatory.
On the contrary, As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), Augustine
says (Enchiridion cx): "Suffrages profit those who are not very good or
not very bad." Now such are those who are detained in purgatory.
Therefore, etc.
Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that the "godlike priest in
praying for the departed prays for those who lived a holy life, and yet
contracted certain stains through human frailty." Now such persons are
detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, The punishment of purgatory is intended to supplement
the satisfaction which was not fully completed in the body.
Consequently, since, as stated above ([5036]AA[1],2; Q[13], A[2]), the
works of one person can avail for another's satisfaction, whether the
latter be living or dead, the suffrages of the living, without any
doubt, profit those who are in purgatory.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to those who are in the
hell of the damned, where there is no redemption for those who are
finally consigned to that punishment. We may also reply with Damascene
(Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) that such statements are to be
explained with reference to the lower causes, that is according to the
demands of the merits of those who are consigned to those punishments.
But according to the Divine mercy which transcends human merits, it
happens otherwise through the prayers of the righteous, than is implied
by the expressions quoted in the aforesaid authorities. Now "God
changes His sentence but not his counsel," as Gregory says (Moral. xx):
wherefore the Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes
as instances of this the Ninevites, Achab and Ezechias, in whom it is
apparent that the sentence pronounced against them by God was commuted
by the Divine mercy [*Cf. [5037]FP, Q[19], A[7], ad 2].
Reply to Objection 2: It is not unreasonable that the punishment of
those who are in purgatory be entirely done away by the multiplicity of
suffrages. But it does not follow that the sins remain unpunished,
because the punishment of one undertaken in lieu of another is credited
to that other.
Reply to Objection 3: The purifying of the soul by the punishment of
purgatory is nothing else than the expiation of the guilt that hinders
it from obtaining glory. And since, as stated above ([5038]Q[13],
A[2]), the guilt of one person can be expiated by the punishment which
another undergoes in his stead, it is not unreasonable that one person
be purified by another satisfying for him.
Reply to Objection 4: Suffrages avail on two counts, namely the action
of the agent [*"Ex opere operante" and "ex opere operato"] and the
action done. By action done I mean not only the sacrament of the
Church, but the effect incidental to that action---thus from the giving
of alms there follow the relief of the poor and their prayer to God for
the deceased. In like manner the action of the agent may be considered
in relation either to the principal agent or to the executor. I say,
then, that the dying person, as soon as he provides for certain
suffrages to be offered for him, receives the full meed of those
suffrages, even before they are discharged, as regards the efficacy of
the suffrages that results from the action as proceeding from the
principal agent. But as regards the efficacy of the suffrages arising
from the action done or from the action as proceeding from the
executor, he does not receive the fruit before the suffrages are
discharged. And if, before this, he happens to be released from his
punishment, he will in this respect be deprived of the fruit of the
suffrages, and this will fall back upon those by whose fault he was
then defrauded. For it is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded
in temporal matters by another's fault---and the punishment of
purgatory is temporal---although as regards the eternal retribution
none can be defrauded save by his own fault.
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Whether suffrages avail the children who are in limbo?
Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages avail the children who are in
limbo. For they are not detained there except for another's sin.
Therefore it is most becoming that they should be assisted by the
suffrages of others.
Objection 2: Further, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) the words of
Augustine (Enchiridion cx) are quoted: "The suffrages of the Church
obtain forgiveness for those who are not very bad." Now children are
not reckoned among those who are very bad, since their punishment is
very light. Therefore the suffrages of the Church avail them.
On the contrary, The text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes Augustine as saying
(Serm. xxxii, De Verb Ap.) that "suffrages avail not those who have
departed hence without the faith that works by love." Now the children
departed thus. Therefore suffrages avail them not.
I answer that, Unbaptized children are not detained in limbo save
because they lack the state of grace. Hence, since the state of the
dead cannot be changed by the works of the living, especially as
regards the merit of the essential reward or punishment, the suffrages
of the living cannot profit the children in limbo.
Reply to Objection 1: Although original sin is such that one person can
be assisted by another on its account, nevertheless the souls of the
children in limbo are in such a state that they cannot be assisted,
because after this life there is no time for obtaining grace.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking of those who are not very
bad, but have been baptized. This is clear from what precedes: "Since
these sacrifices, whether of the altar or of any alms whatsoever are
offered for those who have been baptized," etc.
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Whether suffrages profit the saints in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that in some way suffrages profit the saints
in heaven; on account of the words of the Collect in the Mass
[*Postcommunion, Feast of St. Andrew, Apostle]: "Even as they" (i.e.
the sacraments) "avail thy saints unto glory, so may they profit us
unto healing." Now foremost among all suffrages is the sacrifice of the
altar. Therefore suffrages profit the saints in heaven.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments cause what they signify. Now the
third part of the host, that namely which is dropped into the chalice,
signifies those who lead a happy life in heaven. Therefore the
suffrages of the Church profit those who are in heaven.
Objection 3: Further, the saints rejoice in heaven not only in their
own goods, but also in the goods of others: hence it is written (Lk.
15:10): "There is [Vulg.: 'shall be'] joy before the angels of God upon
one sinner doing penance." Therefore the joy of the saints in heaven
increases on account of the good works of the living: and consequently
our suffrages also profit them.
Objection 4: Further, the Damascene says (Serm.: De his qui in fide
dormierunt) quoting the words of Chrysostom: "For if the heathens," he
says, "burn the dead together with what has belonged to them, how much
more shouldst thou, a believer, send forth a believer together with
what has belonged to him, not that they also may be brought to ashes
like him, but that thou mayest surround him with greater glory by so
doing; and if he be a sinner who has died, that thou mayest loose him
from his sins, and if he be righteous, that thou mayest add to his meed
and reward!" And thus the same conclusion follows.
On the contrary, As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), Augustine
says (De Verb Ap., Serm. xvii): "It is insulting to pray for a martyr
in church, since we ought to commend ourselves to his prayers."
Further, to be assisted belongs to one who is in need. But the saints
in heaven are without any need whatever. Therefore they are not
assisted by the suffrages of the Church.
I answer that, Suffrage by its very nature implies the giving of some
assistance, which does not apply to one who suffers no default: since
no one is competent to be assisted except he who is in need. Hence, as
the saints in heaven are free from all need, being inebriated with the
plenty of God's house (Ps. 35:10), they are not competent to be
assisted by suffrages.
Reply to Objection 1: Such like expressions do not mean that the saints
receive an increase of glory in themselves through our observing their
feasts, but that we profit thereby in celebrating their glory with
greater solemnity. Thus, through our knowing or praising God, and
through His glory thus increasing some what in us, there accrues
something, not to God, but to us.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the sacraments cause what thy signify,
they do not produce this effect in respect of everything that they
signify: else, since they signify Christ, they would produce something
in Christ (which is absurd). But they produce their effect on the
recipient of the sacrament in virtue of that which is signified by the
sacrament. Thus it does not follow that the sacrifices offered for the
faithful departed profit the saints, but that by the merits of the
saints which we commemorate, or which are signified in the sacrament,
they profit others for whom they are offered.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the saints in heaven rejoice in all our
goods, it does not follow, that if our joys be increased their joy is
also increased formally, but only materially, because every passion is
increased formally in respect of the formal aspect of its object. Now
the formal aspect of the saints' joy, no matter what they rejoice in,
is God Himself, in Whom they cannot rejoice more and less, for
otherwise their essential reward, consisting of their joy in God, would
vary. Hence from the fact that the goods are multiplied, wherein they
rejoice with God as the formal aspect of their joy, it does not follow
that their joy is intensified, but that they rejoice in more things.
Consequently it does not follow that they are assisted by our works.
Reply to Objection 4: The sense is not that an increase of meed or
reward accrues to the saint from the suffrages offered by a person, but
that this accrues to the offerer. Or we may reply that the blessed
departed may derive a reward from suffrages through having, while
living, provided for suffrage to be offered for himself, and this was
meritorious for him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar and alms
profit the departed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of the departed are not
assisted only by the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar
and alms, or that they are not assisted by them chiefly. For punishment
should compensate for punishment. Now fasting is more penal than
almsgiving or prayer. Therefore fasting profits more as suffrage than
any of the above.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory reckons fasting together with these
three, as stated in the Decretals (xiii, Q. ii, Cap. 22): "The souls of
the departed are released in four ways, either by the offerings of
priests, or the alms of their friends, or the prayers of the saints, or
the fasting of their kinsfolk." Therefore the three mentioned above are
insufficiently reckoned by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xviii).
Objection 3: Further, Baptism is the greatest of the sacraments,
especially as regards its effect. Therefore Baptism and other
sacraments ought to be offered for the departed equally with or more
than the Sacrament of the altar.
Objection 4: Further, this would seem to follow from the words of 1
Cor. 15:29, "If the dead rise not again at all, why are they then
baptized for them?" Therefore Baptism avails as suffrage for the dead.
Objection 5: Further, in different Masses there is the same Sacrifice
of the altar. If, therefore, sacrifice, and not the Mass, be reckoned
among the suffrages, it would seem that the effect would be the same
whatever Mass be said for a deceased person, whether in honor of the
Blessed Virgin or of the Holy Ghost, or any other. Yet this seems
contrary to the ordinance of the Church which has appointed a special
Mass for the dead.
Objection 6: Further, the Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide
dormierunt) teaches that candles and oil should be offered for the
dead. Therefore not only the offering of the sacrifice of the altar,
but also other offerings should be reckoned among suffrages for the
dead.
I answer that, The suffrages of the living profit the dead in so far as
the latter are united to the living in charity, and in so far as the
intention of the living is directed to the dead. Consequently those
whose works are by nature best adapted to assist the dead, which
pertain chiefly to the communication of charity, or to the directing of
one's intention to another person. Now the sacrament of the Eucharist
belongs chiefly to charity, since it is the sacrament of ecclesiastical
unity, inasmuch as it contains Him in Whom the whole Church is united
and incorporated, namely Christ: wherefore the Eucharist is as it were
the origin and bond of charity. Again, chief among the effects of
charity is the work of almsgiving: wherefore on the part of charity
these two, namely the sacrifice of the Church and almsgiving are the
chief suffrages for the dead. But on the part of the intention directed
to the dead the chief suffrage is prayer, because prayer by its very
nature implies relation not only to the person who prays, even as other
works do, but more directly still to that which we pray for. Hence
these three are reckoned the principal means of succoring the dead,
although we must allow that any other goods whatsoever that are done
out of charity for the dead are profitable to them.
Reply to Objection 1: When one person satisfies for another, the point
to consider, in order that the effect of his satisfaction reach the
other, is the thing whereby the satisfaction of one passes to another,
rather than even the punishment undergone by way of satisfaction;
although the punishment expiates more the guilt of the one who
satisfies, in so far as it is a kind of medicine. And consequently the
three aforesaid are more profitable to the departed than fasting.
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that fasting can profit the departed
by reason of charity, and on account of the intention being directed to
the departed. Nevertheless, fasting does not by its nature contain
anything pertaining to charity or to the directing of the intention,
and these things are extrinsic thereto as it were, and for this reason
Augustine did not reckon, while Gregory did reckon, fasting among the
suffrages for the dead.
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, wherefore
just as by generation being does not accrue save to the object
generated, so Baptism produces its effect only in the person baptized,
as regards the deed done: and yet as regards the deed of the doer
whether of the baptizer or of the baptized, it may profit others even
as other meritorious works. On the other hand, the Eucharist is the
sign of ecclesiastical unity, wherefore by reason of the deed done its
effect can pass to another, which is not the case with the other
sacraments.
Reply to Objection 4: According to a gloss this passage may be
expounded in two ways. First, thus: "If the dead rise not again, nor
did Christ rise again, why are they baptized for them? i.e. for sins,
since they are not pardoned if Christ rose not again, because in
Baptism not only Christ's passion but also His resurrection operates,
for the latter is in a sense the cause of our spiritual resurrection."
Secondly, thus: There have been some misguided persons who were
baptized for those who had departed this life without baptism, thinking
that this would profit them: and according to this explanation the
Apostle is speaking, in the above words, merely according to the
opinion of certain persons.
Reply to Objection 5: In the office of the Mass there is not only a
sacrifice but also prayers. Hence the suffrage of the Mass contains two
of the things mentioned by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xviii), namely
"prayer" and "sacrifice." As regards the sacrifice offered the Mass
profits equally the departed, no matter in whose honor it be said: and
this is the principal thing done in the Mass. But as regards the
prayers, that Mass is most profitable in which the prayers are
appointed for this purpose. Nevertheless, this defect may be supplied
by the greater devotion, either of the one who says Mass, or of the one
who orders the Mass to be said, or again, by the intercession of the
saint whose suffrage is besought in the Mass.
Reply to Objection 6: This offering of candles or oil may profit the
departed in so far as they are a kind of alms: for they are given for
the worship of the Church or for the use of the faithful.
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Whether the indulgences of the Church profit the dead?
Objection 1: It would seem that the indulgences granted by the Church
profit even the dead. First, on account of the custom of the Church,
who orders the preaching of a crusade in order that some one may gain
an indulgence for himself and for two or three and sometimes even ten
souls, both of the living and of the dead. But this would amount to a
deception unless they profited the dead. Therefore indulgences profit
the dead.
Objection 2: Further, the merit of the whole Church is more efficacious
than that of one person. Now personal merit serves as a suffrage for
the departed, for instance in the case of almsgiving. Much more
therefore does the merit of the Church whereon indulgences are founded.
Objection 3: Further, the indulgences of the Church profit those who
are members of the Church. Now those who are in purgatory are members
of the Church, else the suffrages of the Church would not profit them.
Therefore it would seem that indulgences profit the departed.
On the contrary, In order that indulgences may avail a person, there
must be a fitting cause for granting the indulgence [*Cf.[5039] Q[25],
A[2]]. Now there can be no such cause on the part of the dead, since
they can do nothing that is of profit to the Church, and it is for such
a cause that indulgences are chiefly granted. Therefore, seemingly,
indulgences profit not the dead.
Further, indulgences are regulated according to the decision of the
party who grants them. If, therefore, indulgences could avail the dead,
it would be in the power of the party granting them to release a
deceased person entirely from punishment: which is apparently absurd.
I answer that, An indulgence may profit a person in two ways: in one
way, principally; in another, secondarily. It profits principally the
person who avails himself of an indulgence, who, namely, does that for
which the indulgence is granted, for instance one who visits the shrine
of some saint. Hence since the dead can do none of those things for
which indulgences are granted, indulgences cannot avail them directly.
However, they profit secondarily and indirectly the person for whom one
does that which is the cause of the indulgence. This is sometimes
feasible and sometimes not, according to the different forms of
indulgence. For if the form of indulgence be such as this: "Whosoever
does this or that shall gain so much indulgence," he who does this
cannot transfer the fruit of the indulgence to another, because it is
not in his power to apply to a particular person the intention of the
Church who dispenses the common suffrages whence indulgences derive
their value, as stated above ([5040]Q[27], A[3], ad 2). If, however,
the indulgence be granted in this form: "Whosoever does this or that,
he, his father, or any other person connected with him and detained in
purgatory, will gain so much indulgence," an indulgence of this kind
will avail not only a living but also a deceased person. For there is
no reason why the Church is able to transfer the common merits, whereon
indulgences are based, to the living and not to the dead. Nor does it
follow that a prelate of the Church can release souls from purgatory
just as he lists, since for indulgences to avail there must be a
fitting cause for granting them, as stated above ([5041]Q[26], A[3]).
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Whether the burial service profits the dead?
Objection 1: It would seem that the burial service profits the dead.
For Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes Athanasius
as saying: "Even though he who has departed in godliness be taken up to
heaven, do not hesitate to call upon God and to burn oil and wax at his
tomb; for such things are pleasing to God and receive a great reward
from Him." Now the like pertain to the burial service. Therefore the
burial service profits the dead.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Cura pro mort. iii),
"In olden times the funerals of just men were cared for with dutiful
piety, their obsequies celebrated, their graves provided, and
themselves while living charged their children touching the burial or
even the translation of their bodies." But they would not have done
this unless the tomb and things of this kind conferred something on the
dead. Therefore the like profit the dead somewhat.
Objection 3: Further, no one does a work of mercy on some one's behalf
unless it profit him. Now burying the dead is reckoned among the works
of mercy, therefore Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): "Tobias, as
attested by the angel, is declared to have found favor with God by
burying the dead." Therefore such like burial observances profit the
dead.
Objection 4: Further, it is unbecoming to assert that the devotion of
the faithful is fruitless. Now some, out of devotion, arrange for their
burial in some religious locality. Therefore the burial service profits
the dead.
Objection 5: Further, God is more inclined to pity than to condemn. Now
burial in a sacred place is hurtful to some if they be unworthy:
wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv): "If those who are burdened with
grievous sins are buried in the church this will lead to their more
severe condemnation rather than to their release." Much more,
therefore, should we say that the burial service profits the good.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): "Whatever
service is done the body is no aid to salvation, but an office of
humanity."
Further, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii; De Civ. Dei i): "The
funereal equipment, the disposition of the grace, the solemnity of the
obsequies are a comfort to the living rather than a help to the dead."
Further, Our Lord said (Lk. 12:4): "Be not afraid of them who kill the
body, and after that have no more that they can do." Now after death
the bodies of the saints can be hindered from being buried, as we read
of having been done to certain martyrs at Lyons in Gaul (Eusebius,
Eccl. Hist. v, 1). Therefore the dead take no harm if their bodies
remain unburied: and consequently the burial service does not profit
them.
I answer that, We have recourse to burial for the sake of both the
living and the dead. For the sake of the living, lest their eyes be
revolted by the disfigurement of the corpse, and their bodies be
infected by the stench, and this as regards the body. But it profits
the living also spiritually inasmuch as our belief in the resurrection
is confirmed thereby. It profits the dead in so far as one bears the
dead in mind and prays for them through looking on their burial place,
wherefore a "monument" takes its name from remembrance, for a monument
is something that recalls the mind [monens mentem], as Augustine
observes (De Civ. Dei i; De Cura pro Mort. iv). It was, however, a
pagan error that burial was profitable to the dead by procuring rest
for his soul: for they believed that the soul could not be at rest
until the body was buried, which is altogether ridiculous and absurd.
That, moreover, burial in a sacred place profits the dead, does not
result from the action done, but rather from the action itself of the
doer: when, to wit, the dead person himself, or another, arranges for
his body to be buried in a sacred place, and commends him to the
patronage of some saint, by whose prayers we must believe that he is
assisted, as well as to the suffrages of those who serve the holy
place, and pray more frequently and more specially for those who are
buried in their midst. But such things as are done for the display of
the obsequies are profitable to the living, as being a consolation to
them; and yet they can also profit the dead, not directly but
indirectly, in so far as men are aroused to pity thereby and
consequently to pray, or in so far as the outlay on the burial brings
either assistance to the poor or adornment to the church: for it is in
this sense that the burial of the dead is reckoned among the works of
mercy.
Reply to Objection 1: By bringing oil and candles to the tombs of the
dead we profit them indirectly, either as offering them to the Church
and as giving them to the poor, or as doing this in reverence of God.
Hence, after the words quoted we read: "For oil and candles are a
holocaust."
Reply to Objection 2: The fathers of old arranged for the burial of
their bodies, so as to show that "the bodies of the dead" are the
object of Divine providence, not that there is any feeling in a dead
body, but in order to confirm the belief in the resurrection, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13). Hence, also, they wished to be
buried in the land of promise, where they believed Christ's birth and
death would take place, Whose resurrection is the cause of our rising
again.
Reply to Objection 3: Since flesh is a part of man's nature, man has a
natural affection for his flesh, according to Eph. 5:29, "No man ever
hated his own flesh." Hence in accordance with this natural affection a
man has during life a certain solicitude for what will become of his
body after death: and he would grieve if he had a presentiment that
something untoward would happen to his body. Consequently those who
love a man, through being conformed to the one they love in his
affection for himself, treat his body with loving care. For as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13): "If a father's garment and ring,
and whatever such like is the more dear to those whom they leave behind
the greater their affection is towards their parents, in no wise are
the bodies themselves to be spurned which truly we wear in more
familiar and close conjunction than anything else we put on."
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iv), the
devotion of the faithful is not fruitless when they arrange for their
friends to be buried in holy places, since by so doing they commend
their dead to the suffrages of the saints, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: The wicked man dead takes no harm by being buried
in a holy place, except in so far as he rendered such a burial place
unfitting for him by reason of human glory.
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Whether suffrages offered for one deceased person profit the person for who
m
they are offered more than others?
Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages offered for one deceased
person are not more profitable to the one for whom they are offered,
than to others. For spiritual light is more communicable than a
material light. Now a material light, for instance of a candle, though
kindled for one person only, avails equally all those who are gathered
together, though the candle be not lit for them. Therefore, since
suffrages are a kind of spiritual light, though they be offered for one
person in particular, do not avail him any more than the others who are
in purgatory.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45),
suffrages avail the dead "in so far as during this life they merited
that they might avail them afterwards" [*St. Augustine, Enchiridion
cx]. Now some merited that suffrages might avail them more than those
for whom they are offered. Therefore they profit more by those
suffrages, else their merits would be rendered unavailing.
Objection 3: Further, the poor have not so many suffrages given them as
the rich. Therefore if the suffrages offered for certain people profit
them alone, or profit them more than others, the poor would be worse
off: yet this is contrary to our Lord's saying (Lk. 6:20): "Blessed are
ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God."
On the contrary, Human justice is copied from Divine justice. But if a
person pay another's debt human justice releases the latter alone.
Therefore since he who offers suffrages for another pays the debt, in a
sense, of the person for whom he offers them, they profit this person
alone.
Further, just as a man by offering suffrages satisfies somewhat for a
deceased person, so, too, sometimes a person can satisfy for a living
person. Now where one satisfies for a living person the satisfaction
counts only for the person for whom it is offered. Therefore one also
who offers suffrages profits him alone for whom he offers them.
I answer that, There have been two opinions on this question. Some,
like Praepositivus, have said that suffrages offered for one particular
person do avail chiefly, not the person for whom they are offered, but
those who are most worthy. And they instanced a candle which is lit for
a rich man and profits those who are with him no less than the rich man
himself, and perhaps even more, if they have keener sight. They also
gave the instance of a lesson which profits the person to whom it is
given no more than others who listen with him, but perhaps profits
these others more, if they be more intelligent. And if it were pointed
out to them that in this case the Church's ordinance in appointing
certain special prayers for certain persons is futile, they said that
the Church did this to excite the devotion of the faithful, who are
more inclined to offer special than common suffrages, and pray more
fervently for their kinsfolk than for strangers.
Others, on the contrary, said that suffrages avail more those for whom
they are offered. Now both opinions have a certain amount of truth: for
the value of suffrages may be gauged from two sources. For their value
is derived in the first place from the virtue of charity, which makes
all goods common, and in this respect they avail more the person who is
more full of charity, although they are not offered specially for him.
In this way the value of suffrages regards more a certain inward
consolation by reason of which one who is in charity rejoices in the
goods of another after death in respect of the diminution of
punishment; for after death there is no possibility of obtaining or
increasing grace, whereas during life the works of others avail for
this purpose by the virtue of charity. In the second place suffrages
derive their value from being applied to another person by one's
intention. In this way the satisfaction of one person counts for
another, and there can be no doubt that thus they avail more the person
for whom they are offered: in fact, they avail him alone in this way,
because satisfaction, properly speaking, is directed to the remission
of punishment. Consequently, as regards the remission of punishment,
suffrages avail chiefly the person for whom they are offered, and
accordingly there is more truth in the second opinion than in the
first.
Reply to Objection 1: Suffrages avail, after the manner of a light, in
so far as they reach the dead, who thereby receive a certain amount of
consolation: and this is all the greater according as they are endowed
with a greater charity. But in so far as suffrages are a satisfaction
applied to another by the intention of the offerer, they do not
resemble a light, but rather the payment of a debt: and it does not
follow, if one person's debt be paid, that the debt of others is paid
likewise.
Reply to Objection 2: Such a merit is conditional, for in this way they
merited that suffrages would profit them if offered for them, and this
was merely to render themselves fit recipients of those suffrages. It
is therefore clear that they did not directly merit the assistance of
those suffrages, but made themselves fit by their preceding merits to
receive the fruit of suffrages. Hence it does not follow that their
merit is rendered unavailing.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders the rich from being in some
respects better off than the poor, for instance as regards the
expiation of their punishment. But this is as nothing in comparison
with the kingdom of heaven, where the poor are shown to be better off
by the authority quoted.
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Whether suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as i
f
they had been offered for each in particular?
Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages offered for several are of as
much value to each one as if they had been offered for each in
particular. For it is clear that if one person receives a lesson he
loses nothing if others receive the lesson with him. Therefore in like
manner a person for whom a suffrage is offered loses nothing if some
one else is reckoned together with him: and consequently if it be
offered for several, it is of as much value to each one as if it were
offered for each in particular.
Objection 2: Further, it is to be observed that according to the common
practice of the Church, when Mass is said for one deceased person,
other prayers are added for other deceased persons. Now this would not
be done, if the dead person for whom the Mass is said were to lose
something thereby. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.
Objection 3: Further, suffrages, especially of prayers, rely on the
Divine power. But with God, just as it makes no difference whether He
helps by means of many or by means of a few, so it differs not whether
He assists many or a few. Therefore if the one same prayer be said for
many, each one of them will receive as much assistance as one person
would if that same prayer were said for him alone.
On the contrary, It is better to assist many than one. If therefore a
suffrage offered for several is of as much value to each one as if it
were offered for one alone, it would seem that the Church ought not to
have appointed a Mass and prayer to be said for one person in
particular, but that Mass ought always to be said for all the faithful
departed: and this is evidently false.
Further, a suffrage has a finite efficiency. Therefore if it be divided
among many it avails less for each one than if it were offered for one
only.
I answer that, If the value of suffrages be considered according as it
is derived from the virtue of charity uniting the members of the Church
together, suffrages offered for several persons avail each one as much
as if they were offered for one alone, because charity is not
diminished if its effect be divided among many, in fact rather is it
increased; and in like manner joy increases through being shared by
many, as Augustine says (Confess. viii). Consequently many in purgatory
rejoice in one good deed no less than one does. On the other hand, if
we consider the value of suffrages, inasmuch as they are a kind of
satisfaction applied to the dead by the intention of the person
offering them, then the suffrage for some person in particular avails
him more than that which is offered for him in common with many others;
for in this case the effect of the suffrages is divided in virtue of
Divine justice among those for whom the suffrages are offered. Hence it
is evident that this question depends on the first; and, moreover, it
is made clear why special suffrages are appointed to be offered in the
Church.
Reply to Objection 1: Suffrages considered as works of satisfaction do
not profit after the manner of an action as teaching does; for
teaching, like any other action, produces its effect according to the
disposition of the recipient. But they profit after the manner of the
payment of a debt, as stated above (A[12], ad 1); and so the comparison
fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Since suffrages offered for one person avail
others in a certain way, as stated [5042](A[1]), it follows that when
Mass is said for one person, it is not unfitting for prayers to be said
for others also. For these prayers are said, not that the satisfaction
offered by one suffrage be applied to those others chiefly, but that
the prayer offered for them in particular may profit them also.
Reply to Objection 3: Prayer may be considered both on the part of the
one who prays, and on the part of the person prayed: and its effect
depends on both. Consequently though it is no more difficult to the
Divine power to absolve many than to absolve one, nevertheless the
prayer of one who prays thus is not as satisfactory for many as for
one.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not
offered, as much as special suffrages avail those for whom they are offered
in addition to general suffrages?
Objection 1: It would seem that general suffrages avail those for whom
special suffrages are not offered, as much as special suffrages avail
those for whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages. For
in the life to come each one will be rewarded according to his merits.
Now a person for whom no suffrages are offered merited to be assisted
after death as much as one for whom special suffrages are offered.
Therefore the former will be assisted by general suffrages as much as
the latter by special and general suffrages.
Objection 3: Further, the Eucharist is the chief of the suffrages of
the Church. Now the Eucharist, since it contains Christ whole, has
infinite efficacy so to speak. Therefore one offering of the Eucharist
for all in general is of sufficient value to release all who are in
purgatory: and consequently general suffrages alone afford as much
assistance as special and general suffrages together.
On the contrary, Two goods are more eligible than one. Therefore
special suffrages, together with general suffrages, are more profitable
to the person for whom they are offered than general suffrages alone.
I answer that, The reply to this question depends on that which is
given to the twelfth inquiry [5043](A[12]): for if the suffrages
offered for one person in particular avail indifferently for all, then
all suffrages are common; and consequently one for whom the special
suffrages are not offered will be assisted as much as the one for whom
they are offered, if he be equally worthy. On the other hand, if the
suffrages offered for a person do not profit all indifferently, but
those chiefly for whom they are offered, then there is no doubt that
general and special suffrages together avail a person more than general
suffrages alone. Hence the Master, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45),
mentions two opinions: one, when he says that a rich man derives from
general, together with special suffrages, an equal profit to that which
a poor man derives from special suffrages alone; for although the one
receives assistance from more sources than the other, he does not
receive a greater assistance: the other opinion he mentions when he
says that a person for whom special suffrages are offered obtains a
more speedy but not a more complete release, because each will be
finally released from all punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[12], ad 2) the assistance
derived from suffrages is not directly and simply an object of merit,
but conditionally as it were: hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the power of Christ Who is contained in
the Sacrament of the Eucharist is infinite, yet there is a definite
effect to which that sacrament is directed. Hence it does not follow
that the whole punishment of those who are in purgatory is expiated by
one sacrifice of the altar: even so, by the one sacrifice which a man
offers, he is not released from the whole satisfaction due for his
sins, wherefore sometimes several Masses are enjoined in satisfaction
for one sin. Nevertheless, if any thing from special suffrages be left
over for those for whom they are offered (for instance if they need
them not) we may well believe that by God's mercy this is granted to
others for whom those suffrages are not offered, if they need them: as
affirmed by Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) who says:
"Truly God, forasmuch as He is just will adapt ability to the disabled,
and will arrange for an exchange of deficiencies": and this exchange is
effected when what is lacking to one is supplied by another.
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OF PRAYERS WITH REGARD TO THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider prayer with regard to the saints in heaven. Under
this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?
(2) Whether we should beseech them to pray for us?
(3) Whether the prayers they pour forth for us are always granted?
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Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?
Objection 1: It would seem that the saints have no knowledge of our
prayers. For a gloss on Is. 62:16, "Thou art our father and Abraham
hath not known us, and Israel hath been ignorant of us," says that "the
dead saints know not what the living, even their own children, are
doing." This is taken from Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), where he
quotes the aforesaid authority, and the following are his words: "If
such great men as the patriarchs knew not what was happening to the
people begotten of them, how can the dead occupy themselves in watching
and helping the affairs and actions of the living?" Therefore the
saints cannot be cognizant of our prayers.
Objection 2: Further, the following words are addressed to King Joas (4
Kings 22:20): "Therefore" (i.e. because thou hast wept before Me), "I
will gather thee to thy fathers . . . that thy eyes may not see all the
evils which I will bring upon this place." But Joas would have gained
no such advantage from his death if he were to know after death what
was happening to his people. Therefore the saints after death know not
our actions, and thus they are not cognizant of our prayers.
Objection 3: Further, the more perfect a man is in charity, the more he
succors his neighbor when the latter is in danger. Now the saints, in
this life, watch over their neighbor, especially their kinsfolk, when
these are in danger, and manifestly assist them. Since then, after
death, their charity is much greater, if they were cognizant of our
deeds, much more would they watch over their friends and kindred and
assist them in their needs: and yet, seemingly, they do not. Therefore
it would seem that our deeds and prayers are not known to them.
Objection 4: Further, even as the saints after death see the Word, so
do the angels of whom it is stated (Mat. 18:10) that "their angels in
heaven always see the face of My Father." Yet the angels through seeing
the Word do not therefore know all things, since the lower angels are
cleansed from their lack of knowledge by the higher angels [*Cf.
[5044]FP, Q[106], A[1] ], as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii).
Therefore although the saints see the Word, they do not see therein our
prayers and other things that happen in our regard.
Objection 5: Further, God alone is the searcher of hearts. Now prayer
is seated chiefly in the heart. Therefore it belongs to God alone to
know our prayers. Therefore our prayers are unknown to the saints.
On the contrary, Gregory, commenting on Job 14:21, "Whether his
children come to honor or dishonor, he shall not understand," says
(Moral. xii): "This does not apply to the souls of the saints, for
since they have an insight of Almighty God's glory we must nowise
believe that anything outside that glory is unknown to them." Therefore
they are cognizant of our prayers. Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii):
"All creatures are little to the soul that sees God: because however
little it sees of the Creator's light, every created thing appears
foreshortened to it." Now apparently the chief obstacle to the souls of
the saints being cognizant of our prayers and other happenings in our
regard is that they are far removed from us. Since then distance does
not prevent these things, as appears from the authority quoted, it
would seem that the souls of the saints are cognizant of our prayers
and of what happens here below.
Further, unless they were aware of what happens in our regard they
would not pray for us, since they would be ignorant of our needs. But
this is the error of Vigilantius, as Jerome asserts in his letter
against him. Therefore the saints are cognizant of what happens in our
regard.
I answer that, The Divine essence is a sufficient medium for knowing
all things, and this is evident from the fact that God, by seeing His
essence, sees all things. But it does not follow that whoever sees
God's essence knows all things, but only those who comprehend the
essence of God [*Cf. [5045]FP, Q[12], AA[7],8]: even as the knowledge
of a principle does not involve the knowledge of all that follows from
that principle unless the whole virtue of the principle be
comprehended. Wherefore, since the souls of the saints do not
comprehend the Divine essence, it does not follow that they know all
that can be known by the Divine essence---for which reason the lower
angels are taught concerning certain matters by the higher angels,
though they all see the essence of God; but each of the blessed must
needs see in the Divine essence as many other things as the perfection
of his happiness requires. For the perfection of a man's happiness
requires him to have whatever he will, and to will nothing amiss: and
each one wills with a right will, to know what concerns himself. Hence
since no rectitude is lacking to the saints, they wish to know what
concerns themselves, and consequently it follows that they know it in
the Word. Now it pertains to their glory that they assist the needy for
their salvation: for thus they become God's co-operators, "than which
nothing is more Godlike," as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii).
Wherefore it is evident that the saints are cognizant of such things as
are required for this purpose; and so it is manifest that they know in
the Word the vows, devotions, and prayers of those who have recourse to
their assistance.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood as
referring to the natural knowledge of separated souls, which knowledge
is devoid of obscurity in holy men. But he is not speaking of their
knowledge in the Word, for it is clear that when Isaias said this,
Abraham had no such knowledge, since no one had come to the vision of
God before Christ's passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the saints, after this life, know what
happens here below, we must not believe that they grieve through
knowing the woes of those whom they loved in this world: for they are
so filled with heavenly joy, that sorrow finds no place in them.
Wherefore if after death they know the woes of their friends, their
grief is forestalled by their removal from this world before their woes
occur. Perhaps, however, the non-glorified souls would grieve somewhat,
if they were aware of the distress of their dear ones: and since the
soul of Josias was not glorified as soon as it went out from his body,
it is in this respect that Augustine uses this argument to show that
the souls of the dead have no knowledge of the deeds of the living.
Reply to Objection 3: The souls of the saints have their will fully
conformed to the Divine will even as regards the things willed. and
consequently, although they retain the love of charity towards their
neighbor, they do not succor him otherwise than they see to be in
conformity with the disposition of Divine justice. Nevertheless, it is
to be believed that they help their neighbor very much by interceding
for him to God.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it does not follow that those who see
the Word see all things in the Word, they see those things that pertain
to the perfection of their happiness, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: God alone of Himself knows the thoughts of the
heart: yet others know them, in so far as these are revealed to them,
either by their vision of the Word or by any other means.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we ought to call upon the saints to pray for us?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to call upon the saints to
pray for us. For no man asks anyone's friends to pray for him, except
in so far as he believes he will more easily find favor with them. But
God is infinitely more merciful than any saint, and consequently His
will is more easily inclined to give us a gracious hearing, than the
will of a saint. Therefore it would seem unnecessary to make the saints
mediators between us and God, that they may intercede for us.
Objection 2: Further, if we ought to beseech them to pray for us, this
is only because we know their prayer to be acceptable to God. Now among
the saints the holier a man is, the more is his prayer acceptable to
God. Therefore we ought always to bespeak the greater saints to
intercede for us with God, and never the lesser ones.
Objection 3: Further, Christ, even as man, is called the "Holy of
Holies," and, as man, it is competent to Him to pray. Yet we never call
upon Christ to pray for us. Therefore neither should we ask the other
saints to do so.
Objection 4: Further, whenever one person intercedes for another at the
latter's request, he presents his petition to the one with whom he
intercedes for him. Now it is unnecessary to present anything to one to
whom all things are present. Therefore it is unnecessary to make the
saints our intercessors with God.
Objection 5: Further, it is unnecessary to do a thing if, without doing
it, the purpose for which it is done would be achieved in the same way,
or else not achieved at all. Now the saints would pray for us just the
same, or would not pray for us at all, whether we pray to them or not:
for if we be worthy of their prayers, they would pray for us even
though we prayed not to them, while if we be unworthy they pray not for
us even though we ask them to. Therefore it seems altogether
unnecessary to call on them to pray for us.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1): "Call . . . if there be any
that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints." Now, as Gregory
says (Moral. v, 30) on this passage, "we call upon God when we beseech
Him in humble prayer." Therefore when we wish to pray God, we should
turn to the saints, that they may pray God for us.
Further, the saints who are in heaven are more acceptable to God than
those who are on the way. Now we should make the saints, who are on the
way, our intercessors with God, after the example of the Apostle, who
said (Rom. 15:30): "I beseech you . . . brethren, through our Lord
Jesus Christ, and by the charity of the Holy Ghost, that you help me in
your prayers for me to God." Much more, therefore, should we ask the
saints who are in heaven to help us by their prayers to God.
Further, an additional argument is provided by the common custom of the
Church which asks for the prayers of the saints in the Litany.
I answer that, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) the order
established by God among things is that "the last should be led to God
by those that are midway between." Wherefore, since the saints who are
in heaven are nearest to God, the order of the Divine law requires that
we, who while we remain in the body are pilgrims from the Lord, should
be brought back to God by the saints who are between us and Him: and
this happens when the Divine goodness pours forth its effect into us
through them. And since our return to God should correspond to the
outflow of His boons upon us, just as the Divine favors reach us by
means of the saints intercession, so should we, by their means, be
brought back to God, that we may receive His favors again. Hence it is
that we make them our intercessors with God, and our mediators as it
were, when we ask them to pray for us.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not on account of any defect in God's power
that He works by means of second causes, but it is for the perfection
of the order of the universe, and the more manifold outpouring of His
goodness on things, through His bestowing on them not only the goodness
which is proper to them, but also the faculty of causing goodness in
others. Even so it is not through any defect in His mercy, that we need
to bespeak His clemency through the prayers of the saints, but to the
end that the aforesaid order in things be observed.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the greater saints are more acceptable
to God than the lesser, it is sometimes profitable to pray to the
lesser; and this for five reasons. First, because sometimes one has
greater devotion for a lesser saint than for a greater, and the effect
of prayer depends very much on one's devotion. Secondly, in order to
avoid tediousness, for continual attention to one thing makes a person
weary; whereas by praying to different saints, the fervor of our
devotion is aroused anew as it were. Thirdly, because it is granted to
some saints to exercise their patronage in certain special cases, for
instance to Saint Anthony against the fire of hell. Fourthly, that due
honor be given by us to all. Fifthly, because the prayers of several
sometimes obtain that which would not have been obtained by the prayers
of one.
Reply to Objection 3: Prayer is an act, and acts belong to particular
persons [supposita]. Hence, were we to say: "Christ, pray for us,"
except we added something, this would seem to refer to Christ's person,
and consequently to agree with the error either of Nestorius, who
distinguished in Christ the person of the son of man from the person of
the Son of God, or of Arius, who asserted that the person of the Son is
less than the Father. Wherefore to avoid these errors the Church says
not: "Christ, pray for us," but "Christ, hear us," or "have mercy on
us."
Reply to Objection 4: As we shall state further on [5046](A[3]) the
saints are said to present our prayers to God, not as though they
notified things unknown to Him, but because they ask God to grant those
prayers a gracious hearing, or because they seek the Divine truth about
them, namely what ought to be done according to His providence.
Reply to Objection 5: A person is rendered worthy of a saint's prayers
for him by the very fact that in his need he has recourse to him with
pure devotion. Hence it is not unnecessary to pray to the saints.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the prayers which the saints pour forth to God for us are always
granted?
Objection 1: It would seem that the prayers which the saints pour forth
to God for us are not always granted. For if they were always granted,
the saints would be heard especially in regard to matters concerning
themselves. But they are not heard in reference to these things;
wherefore it is stated in the Apocalypse (6:11) that on the martyrs
beseeching vengeance on them that dwell on earth, "it was said to them
that they should rest for a little while till the number of their
brethren should be filled up [*Vulg.: 'till their fellow-servants and
their brethren . . . should be filled up']." Much less therefore, are
they heard in reference to matters concerning others.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel
shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people." Therefore,
the saints are not always heard when they pray God for us.
Objection 3: Further, the saints in heaven are stated to be equal to
the angels of God (Mat. 22:30). But the angels are not always heard in
the prayers which they offer up to God. This is evident from Dan.
10:12,13, where it is written: "I am come for thy words: but the prince
of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one-and-twenty days." But
the angel who spoke had not come to Daniel's aid except by asking of
God to be set free; and yet the fulfillment of his prayer was hindered.
Therefore neither are other saints always heard by God when they pray
for us.
Objection 4: Further, whosoever obtains something by prayer merits it
in a sense. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of meriting.
Therefore they cannot obtain anything for us from God by their prayers.
Objection 5: Further, the saints, in all things, conform their will to
the will of God. Therefore they will nothing but what they know God to
will. But no one prays save for what he wills. Therefore they pray not
save for what they know God to will. Now that which God wills would be
done even without their praying for it. Therefore their prayers are not
efficacious for obtaining anything.
Objection 6: Further, the prayers of the whole heavenly court, if they
could obtain anything, would be more efficacious than all the petitions
of the Church here below. Now if the suffrages of the Church here below
for some one in purgatory were to be multiplied, he would be wholly
delivered from punishment. Since then the saints in heaven pray for
those who are in purgatory on the same account as for us, if they
obtain anything for us, their prayers would deliver entirely from
punishment those who are in purgatory. But this is not true because,
then the Church's suffrages for the dead would be unnecessary.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): "This is he that
prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the
prophet of God": and that his prayer was granted is clear from what
follows (2 Macc. 15:15): "Jeremias stretched forth his right hand, and
gave to Judas a sword of gold, saying: Take this holy sword, a gift
from God," etc.
Further, Jerome says (Ep. contra Vigilant.): "Thou sayest in thy
pamphlets, that while we live, we can pray for one another, but that
when we are dead no one's prayer for another will be heard": and
afterwards he refutes this in the following words: "If the apostles and
martyrs while yet in the body can pray for others, while they are still
solicitous for themselves, how much more can they do so when the crown,
the victory, the triumph is already theirs!"
Further, this is confirmed by the custom of the Church, which often
asks to be assisted by the prayers of the saints.
I answer that, The saints are said to pray for us in two ways. First,
by "express" prayer, when by their prayers they seek a hearing of the
Divine clemency on our behalf: secondly, by "interpretive" prayer,
namely by their merits which, being known to God, avail not only them
unto glory, but also us as suffrages and prayers, even as the shedding
of Christ's blood is said to ask pardon for us. In both ways the
saints' prayers considered in themselves avail to obtain what they ask,
yet on our part they may fail so that we obtain not the fruit of their
prayers, in so far as they are said to pray for us by reason of their
merits availing on our behalf. But in so far as they pray for us by
asking something for us in their prayers, their prayers are always
granted, since they will only what God wills, nor do they ask save for
what they will to be done; and what God wills is always
fulfilled---unless we speak of His "antecedent" will, whereby "He
wishes all men to be saved" [*Cf. [5047]FP, Q[19], A[6], ad 1]. For
this will is not always fulfilled; wherefore no wonder if that also
which the saints will according to this kind of will be not fulfilled
sometimes.
Reply to Objection 1: This prayer of the martyrs is merely their desire
to obtain the robe of the body and the fellowship of those who will be
saved, and their consent to God's justice in punishing the wicked.
Hence a gloss on Apoc. 6:11, "How long, O Lord," says: "They desire an
increase of joy and the fellowship of the saints, and they consent to
God's justice."
Reply to Objection 2: The Lord speaks there of Moses and Samuel
according to their state in this life. For we read that they withstood
God's anger by praying for the people. And yet even if they had been
living at the time in question, they would have been unable to placate
God towards the people by their prayers, on account of the wickedness
of this same people: and it is thus that we are to understand this
passage.
Reply to Objection 3: This dispute among the good angels does not mean
that they offered contradictory prayers to God, but that they submitted
contrary merits on various sides to the Divine inquiry, with a view of
God's pronouncing sentence thereon. This, in fact, is what Gregory says
(Moral. xvii) in explanation of the aforesaid words of Daniel: "The
lofty spirits that are set over the nations never fight in behalf of
those that act unjustly, but they justly judge and try their deeds. And
when the guilt or innocence of any particular nation is brought into
the debate of the court above, the ruling spirit of that nation is said
to have won or lost in the conflict. Yet the supreme will of their
Maker is victorious over all, for since they have it ever before their
eyes, they will not what they are unable to obtain," wherefore neither
do they seek for it. And consequently it is clear that their prayers
are always heard.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the saints are not in a state to merit
for themselves, when once they are in heaven, they are in a state to
merit for others, or rather to assist others by reason of their
previous merit: for while living they merited that their prayers should
be heard after their death.
Or we may reply that prayer is meritorious on one count, and
impetratory on another. For merit consists in a certain equation of the
act to the end for which it is intended, and which is given to it as
its reward; while the impetration of a prayer depends on the liberality
of the person supplicated. Hence prayer sometimes, through the
liberality of the person supplicated, obtains that which was not
merited either by the suppliant, or by the person supplicated for: and
so, although the saints are not in the state of meriting, it does not
follow that they are not in the state of impetrating.
Reply to Objection 5: As appears from the authority of Gregory quoted
above (ad 3), the saints and angels will nothing but what they see to
be in the Divine will: and so neither do they pray for aught else. Nor
is their prayer fruitless, since as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.
[*De Dono Persever. xxii]): "The prayers of the saints profit the
predestinate, because it is perhaps pre-ordained that they shall be
saved through the prayers of those who intercede for them": and
consequently God also wills that what the saints see Him to will shall
be fulfilled through their prayers.
Reply to Objection 6: The suffrages of the Church for the dead are as
so many satisfactions of the living in lieu of the dead: and
accordingly they free the dead from the punishment which the latter
have not paid. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of making
satisfaction; and consequently the parallel fails between their prayers
and the suffrages of the Church.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SIGNS THAT WILL PRECEDE THE JUDGMENT (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the signs that will precede the judgment: and
under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any signs will precede the Lord's coming to judgment?
(2) Whether in very truth the sun and moon will be darkened?
(3) Whether the powers of the heavens will be moved when the Lord shall
come?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any signs will precede the Lord's coming to judgment?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Lord's coming to judgment will not
be preceded by any signs. Because it is written (1 Thess. 5:3): "When
they shall say: Peace and security; then shall sudden destruction come
upon them." Now there would be no peace and security if men were
terrified by previous signs. Therefore signs will not precede that
coming
Objection 2: Further, signs are ordained for the manifestation of
something. But His coming is to be hidden; wherefore it is written (1
Thess. 5:2): "The day of the Lord shall come as a thief in the night."
Therefore signs ought not to precede it.
Objection 3: Further, the time of His first coming was foreknown by the
prophets, which does not apply to His second coming. Now no such signs
preceded the first coming of Christ. Therefore neither will they
precede the second.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:25): "There shall be signs in
the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars," etc.
Further, Jerome [*St. Peter Damian, Opuscul. xlix; he quotes St.
Jerome, but the reference is not known.] mentions fifteen signs
preceding the judgment. He says that on the "first" day all the seas
will rise fifteen cubits above the mountains; in the "second" day all
the waters will be plunged into the depths, so that scarcely will they
be visible; on the "third" day they will be restored to their previous
condition; on the "fourth" day all the great fishes and other things
that move in the waters will gather together and, raising their heads
above the sea, roar at one another contentiously; on the "fifth" day,
all the birds of the air will gather together in the fields, wailing to
one another, with neither bite nor sup; on the "sixth" day rivers of
fire will arise towards the firmament rushing together from the west to
the east; on the "seventh" day all the stars, both planets and fixed
stars, will throw out fiery tails like comets; on the "eighth" day
there will be a great earthquake, and all animals will be laid low; on
the "ninth" day all the plants will be bedewed as it were with blood;
on the "tenth" day all stones, little and great, will be divided into
four parts dashing against one another; on the "eleventh" day all hills
and mountains and buildings will be reduced to dust; on the "twelfth"
day all animals will come from forest and mountain to the fields,
roaring and tasting of nothing; on the "thirteenth" day all graves from
east to west will open to allow the bodies to rise again; on the
"fourteenth" day all men will leave their abode, neither understanding
nor speaking, but rushing hither and thither like madmen; on the
"fifteenth" day all will die and will rise again with those who died
long before.
I answer that, When Christ shall come to judge He will appear in the
form of glory, on account of the authority becoming a judge. Now it
pertains to the dignity of judicial power to have certain signs that
induce people to reverence and subjection: and consequently many signs
will precede the advent of Christ when He shall come to judgment, in
order that the hearts of men be brought to subjection to the coming
judge, and be prepared for the judgment, being forewarned by those
signs. But it is not easy to know what these signs may be: for the
signs of which we read in the gospels, as Augustine says, writing to
Hesychius about the end of the world (Ep. lxxx), refer not only to
Christ's coming to judgment, but also to the time of the sack of
Jerusalem, and to the coming of Christ in ceaselessly visiting His
Church. So that, perhaps, if we consider them carefully, we shall find
that none of them refers to the coming advent, as he remarks: because
these signs that are mentioned in the gospels, such as wars, fears, and
so forth, have been from the beginning of the human race: unless
perhaps we say that at that time they will be more prevalent: although
it is uncertain in what degree this increase will foretell the
imminence of the advent. The signs mentioned by Jerome are not asserted
by him; he merely says that he found them written in the annals of the
Hebrews: and, indeed, they contain very little likelihood.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine (Ad Hesych., Ep. lxxx)
towards the end of the world there will be a general persecution of the
good by the wicked: so that at the same time some will fear, namely the
good, and some will be secure, namely the wicked. The words: "When they
shall say: Peace and security," refer to the wicked, who will pay
little heed to the signs of the coming judgment: while the words of Lk.
21:26, "men withering away," etc., should be referred to the good.
We may also reply that all these signs that will happen about the time
of the judgment are reckoned to occur within the time occupied by the
judgment, so that the judgment day contains them all. Wherefore
although men be terrified by the signs appearing about the judgment
day, yet before those signs begin to appear the wicked will think
themselves to be in peace and security, after the death of Antichrist
and before the coming of Christ, seeing that the world is not at once
destroyed, as they thought hitherto.
Reply to Objection 2: The day of the Lord is said to come as a thief,
because the exact time is not known, since it will not be possible to
know it from those signs: although, as we have already said, all these
most manifest sings which will precede the judgment immediately may be
comprised under the judgment day.
Reply to Objection 3: At His first advent Christ came secretly,
although the appointed time was known beforehand by the prophets. Hence
there was no need for such signs to appear at His first coming, as will
appear at His second advent, when He will come openly, although the
appointed time is hidden.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened
in very truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that towards the time of the judgment the
sun and moon will be darkened in very truth. For, as Rabanus says,
commenting on Mat. 24:29 "nothing hinders us from gathering that the
sun moon, and stars will then be deprived of their light, as we know
happened to the sun at the time of our Lord's passion."
Objection 2: Further, the light of the heavenly bodies is directed to
the generation of inferior bodies, because by its means and not only by
their movement they act upon this lower world as Averroes says (De
Subst. Orbis.). But generation will cease then. Therefore neither will
light remain in the heavenly bodies.
Objection 3: Further, according to some the inferior bodies will be
cleansed of the qualities by which they act. Now heavenly bodies act
not only by movement, but also by light, as stated above (OBJ[2]).
Therefore as the movement of heaven will cease, so will the light of
the heavenly bodies.
On the contrary, According to astronomers the sun and moon cannot be
eclipsed at the same time. But this darkening of the sun and moon is
stated to be simultaneous, when the Lord shall come to judgment.
Therefore the darkening will not be in very truth due to a natural
eclipse.
Further, it is not seemly for the same to be the cause of a thing's
failing and increasing. Now when our Lord shall come the light of the
luminaries will increase according to Is. 30:26, "The light of the moon
shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be
sevenfold." Therefore it is unfitting for the light of these bodies to
cease when our Lord comes.
I answer that, If we speak of the sun and moon in respect of the very
moment of Christ's coming, it is not credible that they will be
darkened through being bereft of their light, since when Christ comes
and the saints rise again the whole world will be renewed, as we shall
state further on ([5048]Q[74]). If, however, we speak of them in
respect of the time immediately preceding the judgment, it is possible
that by the Divine power the sun, moon, and other luminaries of the
heavens will be darkened, either at various times or all together, in
order to inspire men with fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Rabanus is speaking of the time preceding the
judgment: wherefore he adds that when the judgment day is over the
words of Isaias shall be fulfilled.
Reply to Objection 2: Light is in the heavenly bodies not only for the
purpose of causing generation in these lower bodies, but also for their
own perfection and beauty. Hence it does not follow that where
generation ceases, the light of the heavenly bodies will cease, but
rather that it will increase.
Reply to Objection 3: It does not seem probable that the elemental
qualities will be removed from the elements, although some have
asserted this. If, however, they be removed, there would still be no
parallel between them and light, since the elemental qualities are in
opposition to one another, so that their action is corruptive: whereas
light is a principle of action not by way of opposition, but by way of
a principle regulating things in opposition to one another and bringing
them back to harmony. Nor is there a parallel with the movement of
heavenly bodies, for movement is the act of that which is imperfect,
wherefore it must needs cease when the imperfection ceases: whereas
this cannot be said of light.
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Whether the virtues of heaven will be moved when our Lord shall come?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues of heaven will not be moved
when our Lord shall come. For the virtues of heaven can de. note only
the blessed angels. Now immobility is essential to blessedness.
Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved.
Objection 2: Further, ignorance is the cause of wonder (Metaph. i, 2).
Now ignorance, like fear, is far from the angels, for as Gregory says
(Dial. iv, 33; Moral. ii, 3), "what do they not see, who see Him Who
sees all." Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved with
wonder, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48).
Objection 3: Further, all the angels will be present at the Divine
judgment; wherefore it is stated (Apoc. 7:11): "All the angels stood
round about the throne." Now the virtues denote one particular order of
angels. Therefore it should not be said of them rather than of others,
that they are moved.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 26:11): "The pillars of heaven
tremble, and dread at His beck." Now the pillars of heaven can denote
only the virtues of heaven. Therefore the virtues of heaven will be
moved.
Further, it is written (Mat. 24:29): "The stars shall fall from heaven,
and the virtues [Douay: 'powers'] of heaven shall be moved."
I answer that, Virtue is twofold as applied to the angels, [*Cf.
[5049]FP, Q[108], A[5], ad 1] as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xi). For
sometimes the name of "virtues" is appropriated to one order, which
according to him, is the middle order of the middle hierarchy, but
according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) is the highest order of the
lowest hierarchy. In another sense it is employed to denote all the
angels: and then they are said to the question at issue it may be taken
either way. For in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48) it is explained according
to the second acceptation, so as to denote all the angels: and then
they are said to be moved through wonder at the renewing of the world,
as stated in the text. It can also be explained in reference to virtue
as the name of a particular order; and then that order is said to be
moved more than the others by reason of the effect, since according to
Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) we ascribe to that order the working of
miracles which especially will be worked about that time: or again,
because that order---since, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi), it
belongs to the middle hierarchy---is not limited in its power,
wherefore its ministry must needs regard universal causes. Consequently
the proper office of the virtues is seemingly to move the heavenly
bodies which are the cause of what happens in nature here below. And
again the very name denotes this, since they are called the "virtues of
heaven." Accordingly they will be moved then, because they will no more
produce their effect, by ceasing to move the heavenly bodies: even as
the angels who are appointed to watch over men will no longer fulfill
the office of guardians.
Reply to Objection 1: This movement changes nothing pertaining to their
state; but refers either to their effects which may vary without any
change on their part, or to some new consideration of things which
hitherto they were unable to see by means of their concreated species,
which change of thought is not taken from them by their state of
blessedness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20) that "God
moves the spiritual creature through time."
Reply to Objection 2: Wonder is wont to be about things surpassing our
knowledge or ability: and accordingly the virtues of heaven will wonder
at the Divine power doing such things, in so far as they fail to do or
comprehend them. In this sense the blessed Agnes said that the "sun and
moon wonder at His beauty": and this does not imply ignorance in the
angels, but removes the comprehension of God from them.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the fire of the final conflagration: and under
this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any cleansing of the world is to take place?
(2) Whether it will be effected by fire?
(3) Whether that fire is of the same species as elemental fire?
(4) Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?
(5) Whether that fire will consume the other elements?
(6) Whether it will cleanse all the elements?
(7) Whether that fire precedes or follows the judgment?
(8) Whether men are to be consumed by that fire?
(9) Whether the wicked will be involved therein?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the world is to be cleansed?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not to be any cleansing of the
world. For only that which is unclean needs cleansing. Now God's
creatures are not unclean, wherefore it is written (Acts 10:15): "That
which God hath cleansed, do not thou call common," i.e. unclean.
Therefore the creatures of the world shall not be cleansed.
Objection 2: Further, according to Divine justice cleansing is directed
to the removal of the uncleanness of sin, as instanced in the cleansing
after death. But there can be no stain of sin in the elements of this
world. Therefore, seemingly, they need not to be cleansed.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is said to be cleansed when any foreign
matter that depreciates it is removed therefrom: for the removal of
that which ennobles a thing is not called a cleansing, but rather a
diminishing. Now it pertains to the perfection and nobility of the
elements that something of a foreign nature is mingled with them, since
the form of a mixed body is more noble than the form of a simple body.
Therefore it would seem nowise fitting that the elements of this world
can possibly be cleansed.
On the contrary, All renewal is effected by some kind of cleansing. But
the elements will be renewed; hence it is written (Apoc. 21:1): "I saw
a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth
was gone." Therefore the elements shall be cleansed.
Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei xx, 16] on 1 Cor. 7:31,
"The fashion of this earth passeth away," says: "The beauty of this
world will perish in the burning of worldly flames." Therefore the same
conclusion follows.
I answer that, Since the world was, in a way, made for man's sake, it
follows that, when man shall be glorified in the body, the other bodies
of the world shall also be changed to a better state, so that it is
rendered a more fitting place for him and more pleasant to look upon.
Now in order that man obtain the glory of the body, it behooves first
of all those things to be removed which are opposed to glory. There are
two, namely the corruption and stain of sin---because according to 1
Cor. 15:50, "neither shall corruption possess incorruption," and all
the unclean shall be without the city of glory (Apoc. 22:15)---and
again, the elements require to be cleansed from the contrary
dispositions, ere they be brought to the newness of glory,
proportionately to what we have said with regard to man. Now although,
properly speaking, a corporeal thing cannot be the subject of the stain
of sin, nevertheless, on account of sin corporeal things contract a
certain unfittingness for being appointed to spiritual purposes; and
for this reason we find that places where crimes have been committed
are reckoned unfit for the performance of sacred actions therein,
unless they be cleansed beforehand. Accordingly that part of the world
which is given to our use contracts from men's sins a certain unfitness
for being glorified, wherefore in this respect it needs to be cleansed.
In like manner with regard to the intervening space, on account of the
contact of the elements, there are many corruptions, generations and
alterations of the elements, which diminish their purity: wherefore the
elements need to be cleansed from these also, so that they be fit to
receive the newness of glory.
Reply to Objection 1: When it is asserted that every creature of God is
clean we are to understand this as meaning that its substance contains
no alloy of evil, as the Manichees maintained, saying that evil and
good are two substances in some places severed from one another, in
others mingled together. But it does not exclude a creature from having
an admixture of a foreign nature, which in itself is also good, but is
inconsistent with the perfection of that creature. Nor does this
prevent evil from being accidental to a creature, although not mingled
with it as part of its substance.
Reply to Objection 2: Although corporeal elements cannot be the subject
of sin, nevertheless, from the sin that is committed in them they
contract a certain unfitness for receiving the perfection of glory.
Reply to Objection 3: The form of a mixed body and the form of an
element may be considered in two ways: either as regards the perfection
of the species, and thus a mixed body is more perfect---or as regards
their continual endurance; and thus the simple body is more noble,
because it has not in itself the cause of corruption, unless it be
corrupted by something extrinsic: whereas a mixed body has in itself
the cause of its corruption, namely the composition of contraries.
Wherefore a simple body, although it be corruptible in part is
incorruptible as a whole, which cannot be said of a mixed body. And
since incorruption belongs to the perfection of glory, it follows that
the perfection of a simple is more in keeping with the perfection of
glory, than the perfection of a mixed body, unless the mixed body has
also in itself some principle of incorruption, as the human body has,
the form of which is incorruptible. Nevertheless, although a mixed body
is somewhat more noble than a simple body, a simple body that exists by
itself has a more noble being than if it exist in a mixed body, because
in a mixed body simple bodies are somewhat in potentiality, whereas,
existing by themselves, they are in their ultimate perfection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the cleansing of the world will be effected by fire?
Objection 1: It would seem that this cleansing will not be effected by
fire. For since fire is a part of the world, it needs to be cleansed
like the other parts. Now, the same thing should not be both cleanser
and cleansed. Therefore it would seem that the cleansing will not be by
fire.
Objection 2: Further, just as fire has a cleansing virtue so has water.
Since then all things are not capable of being cleansed by fire, and
some need to be cleansed by water---which distinction is moreover
observed by the Old Law---it would seem that fire will not at any rate
cleanse all things.
Objection 3: Further, this cleansing would seem to consist in purifying
the parts of the world by separating them from one another. Now the
separation of the parts of the world from one another at the world's
beginning was effected by God's power alone, for the work of
distinction was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras
asserted that the separation was effected by the act of the intellect
which moves all things (cf. Aristotle, Phys. viii, 9). Therefore it
would seem that at the end of the world the cleansing will be done
immediately by God and not by fire.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 49:3): "A fire shall burn before
Him, and a mighty tempest shall be around Him"; and afterwards in
reference to the judgment (Ps. 49:4): "He shall call heaven from above,
and the earth to judge His people." Therefore it would seem that the
final cleansing of the world will be by means of fire.
Further, it is written (2 Pet. 3:12): "The heavens being on fire will
be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the burning heat."
Therefore this cleansing will be effected by fire.
I answer that, As stated above [5050](A[1]) this cleansing of the world
will remove from it the stain contracted from sin, and the impurity
resulting from mixture, and will be a disposition to the perfection of
glory; and consequently in this threefold respect it will be most
fitting for it to be effected by fire. First, because since fire is the
most noble of the elements, its natural properties are more like the
properties of glory, and this is especially clear in regard to light.
Secondly, because fire, on account of the efficacy of its active
virtue, is not as susceptible as the other elements to the admixture of
a foreign matter. Thirdly, because the sphere of fire is far removed
from our abode; nor are we so familiar with the use of fire as with
that of earth, water, and air, so that it is not so liable to
depreciation. Moreover, it is most efficacious in cleansing and in
separating by a process of rarefaction.
Reply to Objection 1: Fire is not employed by us in its proper matter
(since thus it is far removed from us), but only in a foreign matter:
and in this respect it will be possible for the world to be cleansed by
fire as existing in its pure state. But in so far as it has an
admixture of some foreign matter it will be possible for it to be
cleansed; and thus it will be cleanser and cleansed under different
aspects. and this is not unreasonable.
Reply to Objection 2: The first cleansing of the world by the deluge
regarded only the stain of sin. Now the sin which was most prevalent
then was the sin of concupiscence, and consequently it was fitting that
the cleansing should be by means of its contrary, namely water. But the
second cleansing regards both the stain of sin and the impurity of
mixture, and in respect of both it is more fitting for it to be
effected by fire than by water. For the power of water tends to unite
rather than to separate; wherefore the natural impurity of the elements
could not be removed by water as by fire. Moreover, at the end of the
world the prevalent sin will be that of tepidity, as though the world
were already growing old, because then, according to Mat. 24:12, "the
charity of many shall grow cold," and consequently the cleansing will
then be fittingly effected by fire. Nor is there any thing that cannot
in some way be cleansed by fire: some things, however, cannot be
cleansed by fire without being destroyed themselves, such as cloths and
wooden vessels, and these the Law ordered to be cleansed with water;
yet all these things will be finally destroyed by fire.
Reply to Objection 3: By the work of distinction things received
different forms whereby they are distinct from one another: and
consequently this could only be done by Him Who is the author of
nature. But by the final cleansing things will be restored to the
purity wherein they were created, wherefore created nature will be able
to minister to its Creator to this effect; and for this reason is a
creature employed as a minister, that it is ennobled thereby.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fire whereby the world will be cleansed will be of the same
species with elemental fire?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fire in question is not of the same
species as elemental fire. For nothing consumes itself. But that fire
will consume the four elements according to a gloss on 2 Pet. 3:12.
Therefore that fire will not be of the same species as elemental fire.
Objection 2: Further, as power is made known by operation, so is nature
made known by power. Now that fire will have a different power from the
fire which is an element: because it will cleanse the universe, whereas
this fire cannot do that. Therefore it will not be of the same species
as this.
Objection 3: Further, in natural bodies those that are of the same
species have the same movement. But that fire will have a different
movement from the fire that is an element, because it will move in all
directions so as to cleanse the whole. Therefore it is not of the same
species.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16), and his words are
contained in a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:31, that "the fashion of this world
will perish in the burning of worldly flames." Therefore that fire will
be of the same nature as the fire which is now in the world.
Further, just as the future cleansing is to be by fire, so was the past
cleansing by water: and they are both compared to one another, 2 Pet.
3:5. Now in the first cleansing the water was of the same species with
elemental water. Therefore in like manner the fire of the second
cleansing will be of the same species with elemental fire.
I answer that, We meet with three opinions on this question. For some
say that the element of fire which is in its own sphere will come down
to cleanse the world: and they explain this descent by way of
multiplication, because the fire will spread through finding
combustible matter on all sides. And this will result all the more then
since the virtue of the fire will be raised over all the elements.
Against this, however, would seem to be not only the fact that this
fire will come down, but also the statement of the saints that it will
rise up; thus (2 Pet. 3:10) it is declared that the fire of the
judgment will rise as high as the waters of the deluge; whence it would
seem to follow that this fire is situated towards the middle of the
place of generation. Hence others say that this fire will be generated
towards the intervening space through the focusing together of the rays
of the heavenly bodies, just as we see them focused together in a
burning-glass; for at that time in lieu of glasses there will be
concave clouds, on which the rays will strike But this again does not
seem probable: for since the effects of heavenly bodies depend on
certain fixed positions and aspects, if this fire resulted from the
virtue of the heavenly bodies, the time of this cleansing would be
known to those who observe the movements of the stars and this is
contrary to the authority of Scripture. Consequently others, following
Augustine, say that "just as the deluge resulted from an outpouring of
the waters of the world, so the fashion of this world will perish by a
burning of worldly flames" (De Civ. Dei. xx, 16). This burning is
nothing else but the assembly of all those lower and higher causes that
by their nature have a kindling virtue: and this assembly will take
place not in the ordinary course of things, but by the Divine power:
and from all these causes thus assembled the fire that will burn the
surface of this world will result. If we consider aright these
opinions, we shall find that they differ as to the cause producing this
fire and not as to its species. For fire, whether produced by the sun
or by some lower heating cause, is of the same species as fire in its
own sphere, except in so far as the former has some admixture of
foreign matter. And this will of necessity be the case then, since fire
cannot cleanse a thing, unless this become its matter in some way.
Hence we must grant that the fire in question is simply of the same
species as ours.
Reply to Objection 1: The fire in question, although of the same
species as ours, is not identically the same. Now we see that of two
fires of the same species one destroys the other, namely the greater
destroys the lesser, by consuming its matter. In like manner that fire
will be able to destroy our fire.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as an operation that proceeds from the
virtue of a thing is an indication of that virtue, so is its virtue an
indication of its essence or nature, if it proceed from the essential
principles of the thing. But an operation that does not proceed from
the virtue of the operator does not indicate its virtue. This appears
in instruments: for the action of an instrument shows forth the virtue
of the mover rather than that of the instrument, since it shows forth
the virtue of the agent in so far as the latter is the first principle
of the action, whereas it does not show forth the virtue of the
instrument, except in so far as it is susceptive of the influence of
the principal agent as moving that instrument. In like manner a virtue
that does not proceed from the essential principles of a thing does not
indicate the nature of that thing except in the point of
susceptibility. Thus the virtue whereby hot water can heat is no
indication of the nature of water except in the point of its being
receptive of heat. Consequently nothing prevents water that has this
virtue from being of the same species as water that has it not. In like
manner it is not unreasonable that this fire, which will have the power
to cleanse the surface of the world, will be of the same species as the
fire to which we are used, since the heating power therein arises, not
from its essential principles but from the divine power or operation:
whether we say that this power is an absolute quality, such as heat in
hot water, or a kind of intention as we have ascribed to instrumental
virtue (Sent. iv, D, 1, qu. 1, A[4]) [*Cf. [5051]TP, Q[62], A[4], ad
1]. The latter is more probable since that fire will not act save as
the instrument of the Divine power.
Reply to Objection 3: Of its own nature fire tends only upwards; but in
so far as it pursues its matter, which it requires when it is outside
its own sphere, it follows the site of combustible matter. Accordingly
it is not unreasonable for it to take a circular or a downward course,
especially in so far as it acts as the instrument of the Divine power.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?
Objection 1: It would seem that that fire will cleanse also the higher
heavens. For it is written (Ps. 101:26,27): "The heavens are the works
of Thy hands: they shall perish but Thou remainest." Now the higher
heavens also are the work of God's hands. Therefore they also shall
perish in the final burning of the world.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (2 Pet. 3:12): "The heavens being
on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the
burning heat of fire." Now the heavens that are distinct from the
elements are the higher heavens, wherein the stars are fixed. Therefore
it would seem that they also will be cleansed by that fire.
Objection 3: Further, the purpose of that fire will be to remove from
bodies their indisposition to the perfection of glory. Now in the
higher heaven we find this indisposition both as regards guilt, since
the devil sinned there, and as regards natural deficiency, since a
gloss on Rom. 8:22, "We know that every creature groaneth and is in
labor even until now," says: "All the elements fulfill their duty with
labor: even as it is not without labor that the sun and moon travel
their appointed course." Therefore the higher heavens also will be
cleansed by that fire.
On the contrary, "The heavenly bodies are not receptive of impressions
from without" [*Cf. Sent. Philosop. ex Arist. collect. lit. c.---Among
the works of Bede].
Further, a gloss on 2 Thess. 1:8, "In a flame of fire giving
vengeance," says: "There will be in the world a fire that shall precede
Him, and shall rise in the air to the same height as did the waters of
the deluge." But the waters of the deluge did not rise to the height of
the higher heavens but only 15 cubits higher than the mountain summits
(Gn. 7:20). Therefore the higher heavens will not be cleansed by that
fire.
I answer that, The cleansing of the world will be for the purpose of
removing from bodies the disposition contrary to the perfection of
glory, and this perfection is the final consummation of the universe:
and this disposition is to be found in all bodies, but differently in
different bodies. For in some this indisposition regards something
inherent to their substance: as in these lower bodies which by being
mixed together fall away from their own purity. In others this
indisposition does not regard something inherent to their substance; as
in the heavenly bodies, wherein nothing is to be found contrary to the
final perfection of the universe, except movement which is the way to
perfection, and this not any kind of movement, but only local movement,
which changes nothing intrinsic to a thing, such as its substance,
quantity, or quality, but only its place which is extrinsic to it.
Consequently there is no need to take anything away from the substance
of the higher heavens, but only to set its movement at rest. Now local
movement is brought to rest not by the action of a counter agent, but
by the mover ceasing to move; and therefore the heavenly bodies will
not be cleansed, neither by fire nor by the action of any creature, but
in lieu of being cleansed they will be set at rest by God's will alone.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 18,24): "Those
words of the psalm refer to the aerial heavens which will be cleansed
by the fire of the final conflagration." Or we may reply that if they
refer also to the higher heavens, these are said to perish as regards
their movement whereby now they are moved without cessation.
Reply to Objection 2: Peter explains himself to which heavens he
refers. For before the words quoted, he had said (2 Pet. 3:5-7): "The
heavens . . . first, and the earth . . . through water . . . perished .
. . which . . . now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto
fire unto the day of judgment." [*The entire text differs somewhat from
St. Thomas's quotation; but the sense is the same.] Therefore the
heavens to be cleansed are those which before were cleansed by the
waters of the deluge, namely the aerial heavens.
Reply to Objection 3: This labor and service of the creature, that
Ambrose ascribes to the heavenly bodies, is nothing else than the
successive movements whereby they are subject to time, and the lack of
that final consummation which they will attain in the end. Nor did the
empyrean heaven contract any stain from the sin of the demons, because
they were expelled from that heaven as soon as they sinned.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether that fire will consume the other elements?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fire in question will consume the
other elements. For a gloss of Bede on 2 Pet. 3:12 says: "This
exceeding great fire will engulf the four elements whereof the world
consists: yet it will not so engulf all things that they will cease to
be, but it will consume two of them entirely, and will restore two of
them to a better fashion." Therefore it would seem that at least two of
the elements are to be entirely destroyed by that fire.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Apoc. 21:1): "The first heaven and
the first earth have passed away and the sea is no more." Now the
heaven here denotes the air, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xx, 18);
and the sea denotes the gathering together of the waters. Therefore it
would seem that these three elements will be wholly destroyed.
Objection 3: Further, fire does not cleanse except in so far as other
things are made to be its matter. If, then, fire cleanses the other
elements, they must needs become its matter. Therefore they must pass
into its nature, and consequently be voided of their own nature.
Objection 4: Further, the form of fire is the most noble of the forms
to which elemental matter can attain. Now all things will be brought to
the most noble state by this cleansing. Therefore the other elements
will be wholly transformed into fire.
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 7:31, "The fashion of this world
passeth away," says: "The beauty, not the substance, passeth." But the
very substance of the elements belongs to the perfection of the world.
Therefore the elements will not be consumed as to their substance.
Further, this final cleansing that will be effected by fire will
correspond to the first cleansing which was effected by water. Now the
latter did not corrupt the substance of the elements. Therefore neither
will the former which will be the work of fire.
I answer that, There are many opinions on this question. For some say
that all the elements will remain as to their matter, while all will be
changed as regards their imperfection; but that two of them will retain
their respective substantial form, namely air and earth, while two of
them, namely fire and water, will not retain their substantial form but
will be changed to the form of heaven. In this way three elements,
namely air, fire, and water, will be called "heaven"; although air will
retain the same substantial form as it has now, since even now it is
called "heaven." Wherefore (Apoc. 21:1) only heaven and earth are
mentioned: "I saw," says he, "a new heaven and a new earth." But this
opinion is altogether absurd: for it is opposed both to
philosophy---which holds it impossible for the lower bodies to be in
potentiality to the form of heaven, since they have neither a common
matter, nor mutual contrariety---and to theology, since according to
this opinion the perfection of the universe with the integrity of its
parts will not be assured on account of two of the elements being
destroyed.
Consequently "heaven" is taken to denote the fifth body, while all the
elements are designated by "earth," as expressed in Ps. 148:7,8,
"Praise the Lord from the earth" and afterwards, "fire, hail, snow,
ice," etc.
Hence others say that all the elements will remain as to their
substance, but that their active and passive qualities will be taken
from them: even as they say too, that in a mixed body the elements
retain their substantial form without having their proper qualities,
since these are reduced to a mean, and a mean is neither of the
extremes. And seemingly the following words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xx, 16) would seem in agreement with this: "In this conflagration of
the world the qualities of the corruptible elements that were befitting
our corruptible bodies will entirely perish by fire: and the substance
itself will have those qualities that become an immortal body."
However, this does not seem probable, for since the proper qualities of
the elements are the effects of their substantial form, it seems
impossible, as long as the substantial forms remain, for the aforesaid
qualities to be changed, except for a time by some violent action: thus
in hot water we see that by virtue of its species it returns to the
cold temperature which it had lost by the action of fire, provided the
species of water remain. Moreover, these same elemental qualities
belong to the second perfection of the elements, as being their proper
passions: nor is it probable that in this final consummation the
elements will lose anything of their natural perfection. Wherefore it
would seem that the reply to this question should be that the elements
will remain as to their substance and proper qualities, but that they
will be cleansed both from the stain which they contracted from the
sins of men, and from the impurity resulting in them through their
mutual action and passion: because when once the movement of the first
movable body ceases, mutual action and passion will be impossible in
the lower elements: and this is what Augustine calls the "qualities of
corruptible elements," namely their unnatural dispositions by reason of
which they come near to corruption.
Reply to Objection 1: That fire is said to engulf the four elements in
so far as in some way it will cleanse them. But when it is said further
that "it will consume two entirely," this does not mean that two of the
elements are to be destroyed as to their substance, but that two will
be more changed from the property which they have now. Some say that
these two are fire and water which excel the others in their active
qualities, namely heat and cold, which are the chief principles of
corruption in other bodies; and since then there will be no action of
fire and water which surpass the others in activity, they would seem
especially to be changed from the virtue which they have now. Others,
however, say that these two are air and water, on account of the
various movements of these two elements, which movements they derive
from the movement of the heavenly bodies. And since these movements
will cease (such as the ebb and flow of the sea, and the disturbances
of winds and so forth), therefore these elements especially will be
changed from the property which they have now.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16), when it
is stated: "And the sea is no more," by the sea we may understand the
present world of which he had said previously (De Civ. Dei xx, 13):
"The sea gave up the dead that were in it." If, however, the sea be
taken literally we must reply that by the sea two things are to be
understood, namely the substance of the waters, and their disposition,
as containing salt and as to the movement of the waves. The sea will
remain, not as to this second, but as to the first.
Reply to Objection 3: This fire will not act save as the instrument of
God's providence and power; wherefore it will not act on the other
elements so as to consume them but only so as to cleanse them. Nor is
it necessary for that which becomes the matter of fire, to be voided of
its proper species entirely, as instanced by incandescent iron, which
by virtue of its species that remains returns to its proper and former
state as soon as it is taken from the furnace. It will be the same with
the elements after they are cleansed by fire.
Reply to Objection 4: In the elemental parts we must consider not only
what is befitting a part considered in itself, but also what is
befitting it in its relation to the whole. I say, then, that although
water would be more noble if it had the form of fire, as likewise would
earth and air, yet the universe would be more imperfect, if all
elemental matter were to assume the form of fire.
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Whether all the elements will be cleansed by that fire?
Objection 1: It would seem that neither will all the elements be
cleansed by that fire. Because that fire, as stated already
[5052](A[3]), will not rise higher than the waters of the deluge. But
the waters of the deluge did not reach to the sphere of fire. Therefore
neither will the element of fire be cleansed by the final cleansing.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Apoc. 21:1, "I saw a new heaven,"
etc., says: "There can be no doubt that the transformation of the air
and earth will be caused by fire; but it is doubtful about water, since
it is believed to have the power of cleansing itself." Therefore at
least it is uncertain that all the elements will be cleansed.
Objection 3: Further, a place where there is an everlasting stain is
never cleansed. Now there will always be a stain in hell. Since, then,
hell is situated among the elements, it would seem that the elements
will not be wholly cleansed.
Objection 4: Further, the earthly paradise is situated on the earth.
Yet it will not be cleansed by fire, since not even the waters of the
deluge reached it, as Bede says (Hexaem. i, ad Gen. 2:8), as is stated
in Sentent. ii, D, 7. Therefore it would seem that the elements will
not all be wholly cleansed.
On the contrary, The gloss quoted above (A[5], OBJ[1]) on 2 Pet. 3:12
declares that "this fire will engulf the four elements."
I answer that, Some [*St. Bonaventure, Sentent. iv, D, 47, A[2], Q[3]]
say that the fire in question will rise to the summit of the space
containing the four elements: so that the elements would be entirely
cleansed both from the stain of sin by which also the higher parts of
the elements were infected (as instanced by the smoke of idolatry which
stained the higher regions), and again from corruption, since the
elements are corruptible in all their parts. But this opinion is
opposed to the authority of Scripture, because it is written (2 Pet.
3:7) that those heavens are "kept in store unto fire," which were
cleansed by water; and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 18) that "the
same world which perished in the deluge is reserved unto fire." Now it
is clear that the waters of the deluge did not rise to the summit of
the space occupied by the elements, but only 15 cubits above the
mountain tops; and moreover it is known that vapors or any smoke
whatever rising from the earth cannot pierce the entire sphere of fire
so as to reach its summit; and so the stain of sin did not reach the
aforesaid space. Nor can the elements be cleansed from corruptibility
by the removal of something that might be consumed by fire: whereas it
will be possible for the impurities of the elements arising from their
mingling together to be consumed by fire. And these impurities are
chiefly round about the earth as far as the middle of the air:
wherefore the fire of the final conflagration will cleanse up to that
point, since the waters of the deluge rose to a height which can be
approximately calculated from the height of the mountains which they
surpassed in a fixed measure.
We therefore grant the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason for doubt is expressed in the gloss,
because, to wit, water is believed to have in itself the power of
cleansing, yet not such a power as will be competent to the future
state, as stated above [5053](A[5]; A[2], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: The purpose of this cleansing will be chiefly to
remove all imperfection from the abode of the saints; and consequently
in this cleansing all that is foul will be brought together to the
place of the damned: so hell will not be cleansed, and the dregs of the
whole earth will be brought thither, according to Ps. 74:9, "The dregs
thereof are not emptied, all the sinners of the earth shall drink."
Reply to Objection 4: Although the sin of the first man was committed
in the earthly paradise, this is not the place of sinners, as neither
is the empyrean heaven: since from both places man and devil were
expelled forthwith after their sin. Consequently that place needs no
cleansing.
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Whether the fire of the final conflagration is to follow the judgment?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fire of the final conflagration is
to follow the judgment. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 30) gives the
following order of the things to take place at the judgment, saying:
"At this judgment we have learned that the following things will occur.
Elias the Thesbite will appear, the Jews will believe, Antichrist will
persecute, Christ will judge, the dead shall rise again, the good shall
be separated from the wicked, the world shall be set on fire and shall
be renewed." Therefore the burning will follow the judgment.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16): "After the
wicked have been judged, and cast into everlasting fire, the figure of
this world will perish in the furnace of worldly flames." Therefore the
same conclusion follows.
Objection 3: Further, when the Lord comes to judgment He will find some
men living, as appears from the words of 1 Thess. 4:16, where the
Apostle speaking in their person says: "Then we who are alive, who
remain unto the coming of the Lord [*Vulg.: 'who are left, shall be
taken . . . to meet Christ'---the words "who remain," etc., are from 1
Thess. 4:14]." But it would not be so, if the burning of the world were
to come first, since they would be destroyed by the fire. Therefore
this fire will follow the judgment.
Objection 4: Further, it is said that our Lord will come to judge the
earth by fire, and consequently the final conflagration would seem to
be the execution of the sentence of Divine judgment. Now execution
follows judgment. Therefore that fire will follow the judgment.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 96:3): "A fire shall go before
Him."
Further, the resurrection will precede the judgment, else every eye
would not see Christ judging. Now the burning of the world will precede
the resurrection, for the saints who will rise again will have
spiritual and impassible bodies, so that it will be impossible for the
fire to cleanse them, and yet the text (Sent. iv, D, 47) quotes
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 18) as saying that "whatever needs cleansing
in any way shall be cleansed by that fire." Therefore that fire will
precede the judgment.
I answer that, The fire in question will in reality, as regards its
beginning, precede the judgment. This can clearly be gathered from the
fact that the resurrection of the dead will precede the judgment, since
according to 1 Thess. 4:13-16, those who have slept "shall be taken up
. . . in the clouds . . . into the air . . . to meet Christ coming to
judgment." Now the general resurrection and the glorification of the
bodies of the saints will happen at the same time; for the saints in
rising again will assume a glorified body, as evidenced by 1 Cor.
15:43, "It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory": and at the
same time as the saints' bodies shall be glorified, all creatures shall
be renewed, each in its own way, as appears from the statement (Rom.
8:21) that "the creature . . . itself shall be delivered from the
servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children
of God." Since then the burning of the world is a disposition to the
aforesaid renewal, as stated above ([5054]AA[1],4); it can clearly be
gathered that this burning, so far as it shall cleanse the world, will
precede the judgment, but as regards a certain action thereof, whereby
it will engulf the wicked, it will follow the judgment.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking not as one who decides the
point, but as expressing an opinion. This is clear from his continuing
thus: "That all these things are to happen is a matter of faith, but
how and in what order we shall learn more then by experience of the
things themselves than now by seeking a definite conclusion by arguing
about them. Methinks, however, they will occur in the order I have
given." Hence it is clear that he is speaking as offering his opinion.
The same answer applies to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: All men shall die and rise again: yet those are
said to be found alive who will live in the body until the time of the
conflagration.
Reply to Objection 4: That fire will not carry out the sentence of the
judge except as regards the engulfing of the wicked: in this respect it
will follow the judgment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether that fire will have such an effect on men as is described?
Objection 1: It would seem that this fire will not have such an effect
on men as is described in the text (Sent. iv, D, 47). For a thing is
said to be consumed when it is reduced to naught. Now the bodies of the
wicked will not be reduced to naught, but will be kept for eternity,
that they may bear an eternal punishment. Therefore this fire will not
consume the wicked, as stated in the text.
Objection 2: Further, if it be said that it will consume the bodies of
the wicked by reducing them to ashes; on the contrary, as the bodies of
the wicked, so will those of the good be brought to ashes: for it is
the privilege of Christ alone that His flesh see not corruption.
Therefore it will consume also the good who will then be found.
Objection 3: Further, the stain of sin is more abundant in the
elements, as combining together to the formation of the human body
wherein is the corruption of the fomes [*Cf. [5055]FS, Q[83], A[3];
[5056]FS, Q[91], A[6]] even in the good, than in the elements existing
outside the human body. Now the elements existing outside the human
body will be cleansed on account of the stain of sin. Much therefore
will the elements in the human body whether of the good or of the
wicked need to be cleansed, and consequently the bodies of both will
need to be destroyed.
Objection 4: Further, as long as the state of the way lasts the
elements act in like manner on the good and the wicked. Now the state
of the way will still endure in that conflagration, since after this
state of the way death will not be natural, and yet it will be caused
by that fire. Therefore that fire will act equally on good and wicked;
and consequently it does not seem that any distinction is made between
them as to their being affected by that fire, as stated in the text.
Objection 5: Further, this fire will have done its work in a moment as
it were. Yet there will be many among the living in whom there will be
many things to be cleansed. Therefore that fire will not suffice for
their cleansing.
I answer that, This fire of the final conflagration, in so far as it
will precede the judgment, will act as the instrument of Divine justice
as well as by the natural virtue of fire. Accordingly, as regards its
natural virtue, it will act in like manner on the wicked and good who
will be alive, by reducing the bodies of both to ashes. But in so far
as it acts as the instrument of Divine justice, it will act differently
on different people as regards the sense of pain. For the wicked will
be tortured by the action of the fire; whereas the good in whom there
will be nothing to cleanse will feel no pain at all from the fire, as
neither did the children in the fiery furnace (Dan. 3); although their
bodies will not be kept whole, as were the bodies of the children: and
it will be possible by God's power for their bodies to be destroyed
without their suffering pain. But the good, in whom matter for
cleansing will be found, will suffer pain from that fire, more or less
according to their different merits.
On the other hand, as regards the action which this fire will have
after the judgment, it will act on the damned alone, since the good
will all have impassible bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: Consumption there signifies being brought, not to
nothing, but to ashes.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the bodies of the good will be reduced
to ashes by the fire, they will not suffer pain thereby, as neither did
the children in the Babylonian furnace. In this respect a distinction
is drawn between the good and the wicked.
Reply to Objection 3: The elements that are in human bodies, even in
the bodies of the elect, will be cleansed by fire. But this will be
done, by God's power, without their suffering pain.
Reply to Objection 4: This fire will act not only according to the
natural power of the element, but also as the instrument of Divine
justice.
Reply to Objection 5: There are three reasons why those who will be
found living will be able to be cleansed suddenly. One is because there
will be few things in them to be cleansed, since they will be already
cleansed by the previous fears and persecutions. The second is because
they will suffer pain both while living and of their own will: and pain
suffered in this life voluntarily cleanses much more than pain
inflicted after death, as in the case of the martyrs, because "if
anything needing to be cleansed be found in them, it is cut off by the
sickle of suffering," as Augustine says (De Unic. Bap. xiii), although
the pain of martyrdom is of short duration in comparison with the pain
endured in purgatory. The third is because the heat will gain in
intensity what it loses in shortness of time.
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Whether that fire will engulf the wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that that fire will not engulf the wicked.
For a gloss on Malachi 3:3, "He shall purify the sons of Levi," says
that "it is a fire consuming the wicked and refining the good"; and a
gloss on 1 Cor. 3:13, "Fire shall try every man's work," says: "We read
that there will be a twofold fire, one that will cleanse the elect and
will precede the judgment, another that will torture the wicked." Now
the latter is the fire of hell that shall engulf the wicked, while the
former is the fire of the final conflagration. Therefore the fire of
the final conflagration will not be that which will engulf the wicked.
Objection 2: Further, that fire will obey God in the cleansing of the
world: therefore it should receive its reward like the other elements,
especially since fire is the most noble of the elements. Therefore it
would seem that it ought not to be cast into hell for the punishment of
the damned.
Objection 3: Further, the fire that will engulf the wicked will be the
fire of hell: and this fire was prepared from the beginning of the
world for the damned; hence it is written (Mat. 25:41): "Depart . . .
you cursed . . . into everlasting fire which was prepared for the
devil," etc., and (Is. 30:33): "Tophet is prepared from yesterday,
prepared by the king," etc., where a gloss observes: "From yesterday,
i.e. from the beginning---Tophet, i.e. the valley of hell." But this
fire of the final conflagration was not prepared from the beginning,
but will result from the meeting together of the fires of the world.
Therefore that fire is not the fire of hell which will engulf the
wicked.
On the contrary, are the words of Ps. 96:3, where it is said of this
fire that it "shall burn His enemies round about."
Further, it is written (Dan. 7:10): "A swift stream of fire issued
forth from before Him"; and a gloss adds, "to drag sinners into hell."
Now the passage quoted refers to that fire of which we are now
speaking, as appears from a gloss which observes on the same words: "In
order to punish the wicked and cleanse the good." Therefore the fire of
the final conflagration will be plunged into hell together with the
wicked
I answer that, The entire cleansing of the world and the renewal for
the purpose of cleansing will be directed to the renewal of man: and
consequently the cleansing and renewal of the world must needs
correspond with the cleansing and renewal of mankind. Now mankind will
be cleansed in one way by the separation of the wicked from the good:
wherefore it is said (Lk. 3:17): "Whose fan is in His hand, and He will
purge His poor, and will gather the wheat," i.e. the elect, "into His
barn, but the chaff," i.e. the wicked, "He will burn with unquenchable
fire." Hence it will be thus with the cleansing of the world, so that
all that is ugly and vile will be cast with the wicked into hell, and
all that is beautiful and noble will be taken up above for the glory of
the elect: and so too will it be with the fire of that conflagration,
as Basil says in Ps. 28:7, "The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of
fire," because whatever fire contains of burning heat and gross matter
will go down into hell for the punishment of the wicked, and whatever
is subtle and lightsome will remain above for the glory of the elect.
Reply to Objection 1: The fire that will cleanse the elect before the
judgment will be the same as the fire that will burn the world,
although some say the contrary. For it is fitting that man, being a
part of the world, be cleansed with the same fire as the world. They
are, however, described as two fires, that will cleanse the good, and
torture the wicked, both in reference to their respective offices, and
somewhat in reference to their substance: since the substance of the
cleansing fire will not all be cast into hell, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: This fire will be rewarded because whatever it
contains of gross matter will be separated from it, and cast into hell.
Reply to Objection 3: The punishment of the wicked, even as the glory
of the elect, will be greater after the judgment than before.
Wherefore, just as charity will be added to the higher creature in
order to increase the glory of the elect, so too whatever is vile in
creatures will be thrust down into hell in order to add to the misery
of the damned. Consequently it is not unbecoming that another fire be
added to the fire of the damned that was prepared from the beginning of
the world.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider things connected with and
accompanying the resurrection. Of these the first to be considered will
be the resurrection itself; the second will be the cause of the
resurrection; the third its time and manner. the fourth its term
"wherefrom"; the fifth the condition of those who rise again.
Under the first head there will be three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?
(2) Whether it is universally of all bodies?
(3) Whether it is natural or miraculous?
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Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not to be a resurrection of
the body: for it is written (Job 14:12): "Man, when he is fallen
asleep, shall not rise again till the heavens be broken." But the
heavens shall never be broken, since the earth, to which seemingly this
is still less applicable, "standeth for ever" (Eccles. 1:4). Therefore
the man that is dead shall never rise again.
Objection 2: Further, Our Lord proves the resurrection by quoting the
words: "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of
Jacob. He is not the God of the dead but of the living" (Mat. 22:32;
Ex. 3:6). But it is clear that when those words were uttered, Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob lived not in body, but only in the soul. Therefore
there will be no resurrection of bodies but only of souls.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle (1 Cor. 15) seemingly proves the
resurrection from the reward for labors endured by the saints in this
life. For if they trusted in this life alone, they would be the most
unhappy of all men. Now there can be sufficient reward for labor in the
soul alone: since it is not necessary for the instrument to be repaid
together with the worker, and the body is the soul's instrument.
Wherefore even in purgatory, where souls will be punished for what they
did in the body, the soul is punished without the body. Therefore there
is no need to hold a resurrection of the body, but it is enough to hold
a resurrection of souls, which consists in their being taken from the
death of sin and unhappiness to the life of grace and glory.
Objection 4: Further, the last state of a thing is the most perfect,
since thereby it attains its end. Now the most perfect state of the
soul is to be separated from the body, since in that state it is more
conformed to God and the angels, and is more pure, as being separated
from any extraneous nature. Therefore separation from the body is its
final state, and consequently it returns not from this state to the
body, as neither does a man end in becoming a boy.
Objection 5: Further, bodily death is the punishment inflicted on man
for his own transgression, as appears from Gn. 2, even as spiritual
death, which is the separation of the soul from God, is inflicted on
man for mortal sin. Now man never returns to life from spiritual death
after receiving the sentence of his damnation. Therefore neither will
there be any return from bodily death to bodily life, and so there will
be no resurrection.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:25-26): "I know that my Redeemer
liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth, and I shall
be clothed again with my skin," etc. Therefore there will be a
resurrection of the body.
Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as appears
from Rom. 5:15. Now death was brought in by sin, for if sin had not
been, there had been no death. Therefore by the gift of Christ man will
be restored from death to life.
Further, the members should be conformed to the head. Now our Head
lives and will live eternally in body and soul, since "Christ rising
again from the dead dieth now no more" (Rom. 6:8). Therefore men who
are His members will live in body and soul; and consequently there must
needs be a resurrection of the body.
I answer that, According to the various opinions about man's last end
there have been various opinions holding or denying the resurrection.
For man's last end which all men desire naturally is happiness. Some
have held that man is able to attain this end in this life: wherefore
they had no need to admit another life after this, wherein man would be
able to attain to his perfection: and so they denied the resurrection.
This opinion is confuted with sufficient probability by the
changeableness of fortune, the weakness of the human body, the
imperfection and instability of knowledge and virtue, all of which are
hindrances to the perfection of happiness, as Augustine argues at the
end of De Civ. Dei (xxii, 22).
Hence others maintained that after this there is another life wherein,
after death, man lives according to the soul only, and they held that
such a life sufficed to satisfy the natural desire to obtain happiness:
wherefore Porphyrius said as Augustine states (De Civ. De. xxii, 26):
"The soul, to be happy, must avoid all bodies": and consequently these
did not hold the resurrection.
This opinion was based by various people on various false foundations.
For certain heretics asserted that all bodily things are from the evil
principle, but that spiritual things are from the good principle: and
from this it follows that the soul cannot reach the height of its
perfection unless it be separated from the body, since the latter
withdraws it from its principle, the participation of which makes it
happy. Hence all those heretical sects that hold corporeal things to
have been created or fashioned by the devil deny the resurrection of
the body. The falsehood of this principle has been shown at the
beginning of the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 4, qu. 1, A[3]; *[Cf.
[5057]FP, Q[49], A[3]]).
Others said that the entire nature of man is seated in the soul, so
that the soul makes use of the body as an instrument, or as a sailor
uses his ship: wherefore according to this opinion, it follows that if
happiness is attained by the soul alone, man would not be balked in his
natural desire for happiness, and so there is no need to hold the
resurrection. But the Philosopher sufficiently destroys this foundation
(De Anima ii, 2), where he shows that the soul is united to the body as
form to matter. Hence it is clear that if man cannot be happy in this
life, we must of necessity hold the resurrection.
Reply to Objection 1: The heavens will never be broken as to their
substance, but as to the effect of their power whereby their movement
is the cause of generation and corruption of lower things: for this
reason the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:31): "The fashion of this world
passeth away."
Reply to Objection 2: Abraham's soul, properly speaking, is not Abraham
himself, but a part of him (and the same as regards the others). Hence
life in Abraham's soul does not suffice to make Abraham a living being,
or to make the God of Abraham the God of a living man. But there needs
to be life in the whole composite, i.e. the soul and body: and although
this life were not actually when these words were uttered, it was in
each part as ordained to the resurrection. Wherefore our Lord proves
the resurrection with the greatest subtlety and efficacy.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul is compared to the body, not only as a
worker to the instrument with which he works, but also as form to
matter: wherefore the work belongs to the composite and not to the soul
alone, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima i, 4). And since to the
worker is due the reward of the work, it behooves man himself, who is
composed of soul and body, to receive the reward of his work. Now as
venial offenses are called sins as being dispositions to sin, and not
as having simply and perfectly the character of sin, so the punishment
which is awarded to them in purgatory is not a retribution simply, but
rather a cleansing, which is wrought separately in the body, by death
and by its being reduced to ashes, and in the soul by the fire of
purgatory.
Reply to Objection 4: Other things being equal, the state of the soul
in the body is more perfect than outside the body, because it is a part
of the whole composite; and every integral part is material in
comparison to the whole: and though it were conformed to God in one
respect, it is not simply. Because, strictly speaking, a thing is more
conformed to God when it has all that the condition of its nature
requires, since then most of all it imitates the Divine perfection.
Hence the heart of an animal is more conformed to an immovable God when
it is in movement than when it is at rest, because the perfection of
the heart is in its movement, and its rest is its undoing.
Reply to Objection 5: Bodily death was brought about by Adam's sin
which was blotted out by Christ's death: hence its punishment lasts not
for ever. But mortal sin which causes everlasting death through
impenitence will not be expiated hereafter. Hence that death will be
everlasting.
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Whether the resurrection will be for all without exception?
Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be for all
without exception. For it is written (Ps. 1:5): "The wicked shall not
rise again in judgment." Now men will not rise again except at the time
of the general judgment. Therefore the wicked shall in no way rise
again.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 12:2): "Many of those that
sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake." But these words imply a
restriction. Therefore all will not rise again.
Objection 3: Further, by the resurrection men are conformed to Christ
rising again; wherefore the Apostle argues (1 Cor. 15:12, seqq.) that
if Christ rose again, we also shall rise again. Now those alone should
be conformed to Christ rising again who have borne His image, and this
belongs to the good alone. Therefore they alone shall rise again.
Objection 4: Further, punishment is not remitted unless the fault be
condoned. Now bodily death is the punishment of original sin.
Therefore, as original sin is not forgiven to all, all will not rise
again.
Objection 5: Further, as we are born again by the grace of Christ, even
so shall we rise again by His grace. Now those who die in their
mother's womb can never be born again: therefore neither can they rise
again, and consequently all will not rise again.
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:28, 25): "All that are in the graves
shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and they that hear shall
live." Therefore the dead shall all rise again.
Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:51): "We shall all indeed rise
again," etc.
Further, the resurrection is necessary in order that those who rise
again may receive punishment or reward according to their merits. Now
either punishment or reward is due to all, either for their own merits,
as to adults, or for others' merits, as to children. Therefore all will
rise again.
I answer that, Those things, the reason of which comes from the nature
of a species, must needs be found likewise in all the members of that
same species. Now such is the resurrection: because the reason thereof,
as stated above [5058](A[1]), is that the soul cannot have the final
perfection of the human species, so long as it is separated from the
body. Hence no soul will remain for ever separated from the body.
Therefore it is necessary for all, as well as for one, to rise again.
Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss expounds these words, they refer to
the spiritual resurrection whereby the wicked shall not rise again in
the particular judgment. or else they refer to the wicked who are
altogether unbelievers, who will not rise again to be judged, since
they are already judged [*Jn. 3:18].
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 23) explains "many" as
meaning "all": in fact, this way of speaking is often met with in Holy
Writ. Or else the restriction may refer to the children consigned to
limbo who, although they shall rise again, are not properly said to
awake, since they will have no sense either of pain or of glory, and
waking is the unchaining of the senses.
Reply to Objection 3: All, both good and wicked, are conformed to
Christ, while living in this life, as regards things pertaining to the
nature of the species, but not as regards matters pertaining to grace.
Hence all will be conformed to Him in the restoration of natural life,
but not in the likeness of glory, except the good alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Those who have died in original sin have, by
dying, discharged the obligation of death which is the punishment of
original sin. Hence, notwithstanding original sin, they can rise again
from death: for the punishment of original sin is to die, rather than
to be detained by death.
Reply to Objection 5: We are born again by the grace of Christ that is
given to us, but we rise again by the grace of Christ whereby it came
about that He took our nature, since it is by this that we are
conformed to Him in natural things. Hence those who die in their
mother's womb, although they are not born again by receiving grace,
will nevertheless rise again on account of the conformity of their
nature with Him, which conformity they acquired by attaining to the
perfection of the human species.
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Whether the resurrection is natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection is natural. For, as
the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14), "that which is commonly
observed in all, marks the nature of the individuals contained under
it." Now resurrection applies commonly to all. Therefore it is natural.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 55): "Those who do not
hold the resurrection on the principle of obedience ought certainly to
hold it on the principle of reason. For what does the world every day
but imitate, in its elements, our resurrection?" And he offers as
examples the light which "as it were dies . . . and is withdrawn from
our sight . . . and again rises anew, as it were, and is recalled---the
shrubs which lose their greenery, and again by a kind of resurrection
are renewed---and the seeds which rot and die and then sprout and rise
again as it were": which same example is adduced by the Apostle (1 Cor.
15:36). Now from the works of nature nothing can be known save what is
natural. Therefore the resurrection is natural.
Objection 3: Further, things that are against nature abide not for
long, because they are violent, so to speak. But the life that is
restored by the resurrection will last for ever. Therefore the
resurrection will be natural.
Objection 4: Further, that to which the entire expectation of nature
looks forward would seem to be natural. Now such a thing is the
resurrection and the glorification of the saints according to Rom.
8:19. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.
Objection 5: Further, the resurrection is a kind of movement towards
the everlasting union of soul and body. Now movement is natural if it
terminate in a natural rest (Phys. v, 6): and the everlasting union of
soul and body will be natural, for since the soul is the body's proper
mover, it has a body proportionate to it: so that the body is likewise
for ever capable of being quickened by it, even as the soul lives for
ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.
On the contrary, There is no natural return from privation to habit.
But death is privation of life. Therefore the resurrection whereby one
returns from death to life is not natural.
Further, things of the one species have one fixed way of origin:
wherefore animals begotten of putrefaction are never of the same
species as those begotten of seed, as the Commentator says on Phys.
viii. Now the natural way of man's origin is for him to be begotten of
a like in species: and such is not the case in the resurrection.
Therefore it will not be natural.
I answer that, A movement or an action stands related to nature in
three ways. For there is a movement or action whereof nature is neither
the principle nor the term: and such a movement is sometimes from a
principle above nature as in the case of a glorified body; and
sometimes from any other principle whatever; for instance, the violent
upward movement of a stone which terminates in a violent rest. Again,
there is a movement whereof nature is both principle and term: for
instance, the downward movement of a stone. And there is another
movement whereof nature is the term, but not the principle, the latter
being sometimes something above nature (as in giving sight to a blind
man, for sight is natural, but the principle of the sight-giving is
above nature), and sometimes something else, as in the forcing of
flowers or fruit by artificial process. It is impossible for nature to
be the principle and not the term, because natural principles are
appointed to definite effects, beyond which they cannot extend.
Accordingly the action or movement that is related to nature in the
first way can nowise be natural, but is either miraculous if it come
from a principle above nature, or violent if from any other principle.
The action or movement that is related to nature in the second way is
simply natural: but the action that is related to nature in the third
way cannot be described as natural simply, but as natural in a
restricted sense, in so far, to wit, as it leads to that which is
according to nature: but it is called either miraculous or artificial
or violent. For, properly speaking, natural is that which is according
to nature, and a thing is according to nature if it has that nature and
whatever results from that nature (Phys. ii, 1). Consequently, speaking
simply, movement cannot be described as natural unless its principle be
natural.
Now nature cannot be the principle of resurrection, although
resurrection terminates in the life of nature. For nature is the
principle of movement in the thing wherein nature is---either the
active principle, as in the movement of heavy and light bodies and in
the natural alterations of animals---or the passive principle, as in
the generation of simple bodies. The passive principle of natural
generation is the natural passive potentiality which always has an
active principle corresponding to it in nature, according to
Metaphysics viii, 1: nor as to this does it matter whether the active
principle in nature correspond to the passive principle in respect of
its ultimate perfection, namely the form; or in respect of a
disposition in virtue of which it demands the ultimate form, as in the
generation of a man according to the teaching of faith, or in all other
generations according to the opinions of Plato and Avicenna. But in
nature there is no active principle of the resurrection, neither as
regards the union of the soul with the body, nor as regards the
disposition which is the demand for that union: since such a
disposition cannot be produced by nature, except in a definite way by
the process of generation from seed. Wherefore even granted a passive
potentiality on the part of the body, or any kind of inclination to its
union with the soul, it is not such as to suffice for the conditions of
natural movement. Therefore the resurrection, strictly speaking, is
miraculous and not natural except in a restricted sense, as we have
explained.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene is speaking of those things that are
found in all individuals and are caused by the principles of nature.
For supposing by a divine operation all men to be made white, or to be
gathered together in one place, as happened at the time of the deluge,
it would not follow that whiteness or existence in some particular
place is a natural property of man.
Reply to Objection 2: From natural things one does not come by a
demonstration of reason to know non-natural things, but by the
induction of reason one may know something above nature, since the
natural bears a certain resemblance to the supernatural. Thus the union
of soul and body resembles the union of the soul with God by the glory
of fruition, as the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1): and in like manner
the examples, quoted by the Apostle and Gregory, are confirmatory
evidences of our faith in the resurrection.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument regards an operation which
terminates in something that is not natural but contrary to nature.
Such is not the resurrection, and hence the argument is not to the
point.
Reply to Objection 4: The entire operation of nature is subordinate to
the Divine operation, just as the working of a lower art is subordinate
to the working of a higher art. Hence just as all the work of a lower
art has in view an end unattainable save by the operation of the higher
art that produces the form, or makes use of what has been made by art:
so the last end which the whole expectation of nature has in view is
unattainable by the operation of nature, and for which reason the
attaining thereto is not natural.
Reply to Objection 5: Although there can be no natural movement
terminating in a violent rest, there can be a non-natural movement
terminating in a natural rest, as explained above.
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OF THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the cause of our resurrection. Under this head
there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's resurrection is the cause of our resurrection?
(2) Whether the sound of the trumpet is?
(3) Whether the angels are?
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Whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection?
Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection of Christ is not the
cause of our resurrection. For, given the cause, the effect follows.
Yet given the resurrection of Christ the resurrection of the other dead
did not follow at once. Therefore His resurrection is not the cause of
ours.
Objection 2: Further, an effect cannot be unless the cause precede. But
the resurrection of the dead would be even if Christ had not risen
again: for God could have delivered man in some other way. Therefore
Christ's resurrection is not the cause of ours.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing produces the one effect throughout
the one same species. Now the resurrection will be common to all men.
Since then Christ's resurrection is not its own cause, it is not the
cause of the resurrection of others.
Objection 4: Further, an effect retains some likeness to its cause. But
the resurrection, at least of some, namely the wicked, bears no
likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Therefore Christ's resurrection
will not be the cause of theirs.
On the contrary, "In every genus that which is first is the cause of
those that come after it" (Metaph. ii, 1). Now Christ, by reason of His
bodily resurrection, is called "the first-fruits of them that sleep" (1
Cor. 15:20), and "the first-begotten of the dead" (Apoc. 1:5).
Therefore His resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of others.
Further, Christ's resurrection has more in common with our bodily
resurrection than with our spiritual resurrection which is by
justification. But Christ's resurrection is the cause of our
justification, as appears from Rom. 4:25, where it is said that He
"rose again for our justification." Therefore Christ's resurrection is
the cause of our bodily resurrection.
I answer that, Christ by reason of His nature is called the mediator of
God and men: wherefore the Divine gifts are bestowed on men by means of
Christ's humanity. Now just as we cannot be delivered from spiritual
death save by the gift of grace bestowed by God, so neither can we be
delivered from bodily death except by resurrection wrought by the
Divine power. And therefore as Christ, in respect of His human nature,
received the firstfruits of grace from above, and His grace is the
cause of our grace, because "of His fulness we all have received . . .
grace for grace" (Jn. 1:16), so in Christ has our resurrection begun,
and His resurrection is the cause of ours. Thus Christ as God is, as it
were, the equivocal cause of our resurrection, but as God and man
rising again, He is the proximate and, so to say, the univocal cause of
our resurrection. Now a univocal efficient cause produces its effect in
likeness to its own form, so that not only is it an efficient, but also
an exemplar cause in relation to that effect. This happens in two ways.
For sometimes this very form, whereby the agent is likened to its
effect, is the direct principle of the action by which the effect is
produced, as heat in the fire that heats: and sometimes it is not the
form in respect of which this likeness is observed, that is primarily
and directly the principle of that action, but the principles of that
form. For instance, if a white man beget a white man, the whiteness of
the begetter is not the principle of active generation, and yet the
whiteness of the begetter is said to be the cause of the whiteness of
the begotten, because the principles of whiteness in the begetter are
the generative principles causing whiteness in the begotten. In this
way the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection,
because the same thing that wrought the resurrection of Christ, which
is the univocal efficient cause of our resurrection, is the active
cause of our resurrection, namely the power of Christ's Godhead which
is common to Him and the Father. Hence it is written (Rom. 8:11): "He
that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your
mortal bodies." And this very resurrection of Christ by virtue of His
indwelling Godhead is the quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection:
since the Divine operations were wrought by means of Christ's flesh, as
though it were a kind of organ; thus the Damascene instances as an
example (De Fide Orth. iii, 15) the touch of His body whereby He healed
the leper (Mat. 8:3).
Reply to Objection 1: A sufficient cause produces at once its effect to
which it is immediately directed, but not the effect to which it is
directed by means of something else, no matter how sufficient it may
be: thus heat, however intense it be, does not cause heat at once in
the first instant, but it begins at once to set up a movement towards
heat, because heat is its effect by means of movement. Now Christ's
resurrection is said to be the cause of ours, in that it works our
resurrection, not immediately, but by means of its principle, namely
the Divine power which will work our resurrection in likeness to the
resurrection of Christ. Now God's power works by means of His will
which is nearest to the effect; hence it is not necessary that our
resurrection should follow straightway after He has wrought the
resurrection of Christ, but that it should happen at the time which
God's will has decreed.
Reply to Objection 2: God's power is not tied to any particular second
causes, but that He can produce their effects either immediately or by
means of other causes: thus He might work the generation of lower
bodies even though there were no movement of the heaven: and yet
according to the order which He has established in things, the movement
of the heaven is the cause of the generation of the lower bodies. In
like manner according to the order appointed to human things by Divine
providence, Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours: and yet He
could have appointed another order, and then our resurrection would
have had another cause ordained by God.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds when all the things of one
species have the same order to the first cause of the effect to be
produced in the whole of that species. But it is not so in the case in
point, because Christ's humanity is nearer to His Godhead, Whose power
is the first cause of the resurrection, than is the humanity of others.
Hence Christ's Godhead caused His resurrection immediately, but it
causes the resurrection of others by means of Christ-man rising again.
Reply to Objection 4: The resurrection of all men will bear some
resemblance to Christ's resurrection, as regards that which pertains to
the life of nature, in respect of which all were conformed to Christ.
Hence all will rise again to immortal life; but in the saints who were
conformed to Christ by grace, there will be conformity as to things
pertaining to glory.
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Whether the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of our resurrection?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sound of the trumpet will not be
the cause of our resurrection. For the Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iv): "Thou must believe that the resurrection will take place by God's
will, power, and nod." Therefore since these are a sufficient cause of
our resurrection, we ought not to assign the sound of the trumpet as a
cause thereof.
Objection 2: Further, it is useless to make sounds to one who cannot
hear. But the dead will not have hearing. Therefore it is unfitting to
make a sound to arouse them.
Objection 3: Further, if any sound is the cause of the resurrection,
this will only be by a power given by God to the sound: wherefore a
gloss on Ps. 67:34, "He will give to His voice the voice of power,"
says: "to arouse our bodies." Now from the moment that a power is given
to a thing, though it be given miraculously, the act that ensues is
natural, as instanced in the man born blind who, after being restored
to sight, saw naturally. Therefore if a sound be the cause of
resurrection, the resurrection would be natural: which is false.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 4:15): "The Lord Himself will
come down from heaven . . . with the trumpet of God; and the dead who
are in Christ shall rise."
Further, it is written (Jn. 5:28) that they "who are in the graves
shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and (Jn. 5:25) they that
hear shall live." Now this voice is called the trumpet, as stated in
the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore, etc.
I answer that, Cause and effect must needs in some way be united
together, since mover and moved, maker and made, are simultaneous
(Phys. vii, 2). Now Christ rising again is the univocal cause of our
resurrection: wherefore at the resurrection of bodies, it behooves
Christ to work the resurrection at the giving of some common bodily
sign. According to some this sign will be literally Christ's voice
commanding the resurrection, even as He commanded the sea and the storm
ceased (Mat. 8:26). Others say that this sign will be nothing else than
the manifest appearance of the Son of God in the world, according to
the words of Mat. 24:27: "As lightning cometh out of the east, and
appeareth even into the west, so shall also the coming of the Son of
man be." These rely on the authority of Gregory [*Moral. xxxi, as
quoted by St. Albert the Great, Sentent. iv, D, 42, A[4]] who says that
"the sound of the trumpet is nothing else but the Son appearing to the
world as judge." According to this, the visible presence of the Son of
God is called His voice, because as soon as He appears all nature will
obey His command in restoring human bodies: hence He is described as
coming "with commandment" (1 Thess. 4:15). In this way His appearing,
in so far as it has the force of a command, is called His voice: which
voice, whatever it be, is sometimes called a cry [*Mt 25:6], as of a
crier summoning to judgment; sometimes the sound of a trumpet [*1 Cor.
15:52; 1 Thess. 4:15], either on account of its distinctness, as stated
in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), or as being in keeping with the use of
the trumpet in the Old Testament: for by the trumpet they were summoned
to the council, stirred to the battle, and called to the feast; and
those who rise again will be summoned to the council of judgment, to
the battle in which "the world shall fight . . . against the unwise"
(Wis. 5:21), and to the feast of everlasting solemnity.
Reply to Objection 1: In those words the Damascene touches on three
things respecting the material cause of the resurrection: to wit, the
Divine will which commands, the power which executes, and the ease of
execution, when he adds "bidding," in resemblance to our own affairs:
since it is very easy for us to do what is done at once at our word.
But the ease is much more evident, if before we say a word, our
servants execute our will at once at the first sign of our will, which
sign is called a nod: and this nod is a kind of cause of that
execution, in so far as others are led thereby to accomplish our will.
And the Divine nod, at which the resurrection will take place, is
nothing but the sign given by God, which all nature will obey by
concurring in the resurrection of the dead. This sign is the same as
the sound of the trumpet, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: As the forms of the Sacrament have the power to
sanctify, not through being heard, but through being spoken: so this
sound, whatever it be, will have an instrumental efficacy of
resuscitation, not through being perceived, but through being uttered.
Even so a sound by the pulsation of the air arouses the sleeper, by
loosing the organ of perception, and not because it is known: since
judgment about the sound that reaches the ears is subsequent to the
awakening and is not its cause.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument would avail, if the power given to
that sound were a complete being in nature: because then that which
would proceed therefrom would have for principle a power already
rendered natural. But this power is not of that kind but such as we
have ascribed above to the forms of the Sacraments (Sent. iv, D, 1;
[5059]FP, Q[62], AA[1],4).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels will do anything towards the resurrection?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels will do nothing at all
towards the resurrection. For raising the dead shows a greater power
than does begetting men. Now when men are begotten, the soul is not
infused into the body by means of the angels. Therefore neither will
the resurrection, which is reunion of soul and body, be wrought by the
ministry of the angels.
Objection 2: Further, if this is to be ascribed to the instrumentality
of any angels at all, it would seem especially referable to the
virtues, to whom it belongs to work miracles. Yet it is referred, not
to them, but to the archangels, according to the text (Sent. iv, D,
43). Therefore the resurrection will not be wrought by the ministry of
the angels.
On the contrary, It is stated (1 Thess. 4:15) that "the Lord . . .
shall come down from heaven . . . with the voice of an archangel . . .
and the dead shall rise again." Therefore the resurrection of the dead
will be accomplished by the angelic ministry.
I answer that, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "just as the
grosser and inferior bodies are ruled in a certain order by the more
subtle and more powerful bodies, so are all bodies ruled by God by the
rational spirit of life": and Gregory speaks in the same sense (Dial.
iv, 6). Consequently in all God's bodily works, He employs the ministry
of the angels. Now in the resurrection there is something pertaining to
the transmutation of the bodies, to wit the gathering together of the
mortal remains and the disposal thereof for the restoration of the
human body; wherefore in this respect God will employ the ministry of
the angels in the resurrection. But the soul, even as it is immediately
created by God, so will it be reunited to the body immediately by God
without any operation of the angels: and in like manner He Himself will
glorify the body without the ministry of the angels, just as He
immediately glorifies man's soul. This ministry of the angels is called
their voice, according to one explanation given in the text (Sent. iv,
D, 43).
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been
said.
Reply to Objection 2: This ministry will be exercised chiefly by one
Archangel, namely Michael, who is the prince of the Church as he was of
the Synagogue (Dan. 10:13, 21). Yet he will act under the influence of
the Virtues and the other higher orders: so that what he shall do, the
higher orders will, in a way, do also. In like manner the lower angels
will co-operate with him as to the resurrection of each individual to
whose guardianship they were appointed: so that this voice can be
ascribed either to one or to many angels.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the time and manner of the resurrection. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the time of the resurrection should be delayed until the
end of the world?
(2) Whether that time is hidden?
(3) Whether the resurrection will occur at night-time?
(4) Whether it will happen suddenly?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the time of our resurrection should be delayed till the end of the
world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the time of the resurrection ought not
to be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together.
For there is more conformity between head and members than between one
member and another, as there is more between cause and effect than
between one effect and another. Now Christ, Who is our Head, did not
delay His resurrection until the end of the world, so as to rise again
together with all men. Therefore there is no need for the resurrection
of the early saints to be deferred until the end of the world, so that
they may rise again together with the others.
Objection 2: Further, the resurrection of the Head is the cause of the
resurrection of the members. But the resurrection of certain members
that desire nobility from their being closely connected with the Head
was not delayed till the end of the world, but followed immediately
after Christ's resurrection, as is piously believed concerning the
Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist [*Ep. de Assump. B.V., cap. ii,
among St. Jerome's works]. Therefore the resurrection of others will be
so much nearer Christ's resurrection, according as they have been more
conformed to Him by grace and merit.
Objection 3: Further, the state of the New Testament is more perfect,
and bears a closer resemblance to Christ, than the state of the Old
Testament. Yet some of the fathers of the Old Testament rose again when
Christ rose, according to Mat. 27:52: "Many of the bodies of the
saints, that had slept, arose." Therefore it would seem that the
resurrection of the Old Testament saints should not be delayed till the
end of the world, so that all may rise together.
Objection 4: Further, there will be no numbering of years after the end
of the world. Yet after the resurrection of the dead, the years are
still reckoned until the resurrection of others, as appears from Apoc.
20:4,5. For it is stated there that "I saw . . . the souls of them that
were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God," and
further on: "And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years."
And "the rest of the dead lived not till the thousand years were
finished." Therefore the resurrection of all is not delayed until the
end of the world, that all may rise together.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:12): "Man when he is fallen
asleep shall not rise again till the heavens be broken, he shall not
wake, nor rise out of his sleep," and it is a question of the sleep of
death. Therefore the resurrection of men will be delayed until the end
of the world when the heavens shall be broken.
Further, it is written (Heb. 11:39): "All these being approved by the
testimony of faith received not the promise," i.e. full beatitude of
soul and body, since "God has provided something better for us, lest
they should be consummated," i.e. perfected, "without us---in order
that," as a gloss observes, "through all rejoicing each one might
rejoice the more." But the resurrection will not precede the
glorification of bodies, because "He will reform the body of our
lowness made like to the body of His glory" (Phil. 3:21), and the
children of the resurrection will be "as the angels . . . in heaven"
(Mat. 22:30). Therefore the resurrection will be delayed till the end
of the world, when all shall rise together.
I answer that, As Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 4) "Divine providence
decreed that the grosser and lower bodies should be ruled in a certain
order by the more subtle and powerful bodies": wherefore the entire
matter of the lower bodies is subject to variation according to the
movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence it would be contrary to the
order established in things by Divine providence if the matter of lower
bodies were brought to the state of incorruption, so long as there
remains movement in the higher bodies. And since, according to the
teaching of faith, the resurrection will bring men to immortal life
conformably to Christ Who "rising again from the dead dieth now no
more" (Rom. 6:9), the resurrection of human bodies will be delayed
until the end of the world when the heavenly movement will cease. For
this reason, too, certain philosophers, who held that the movement of
the heavens will never cease, maintained that human souls will return
to mortal bodies such as we have now---whether, as Empedocles, they
stated that the soul would return to the same body at the end of the
great year, or that it would return to another body; thus Pythagoras
asserted that "any soul will enter any body," as stated in De Anima i,
3.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the head is more conformed to the
members by conformity of proportion (which is requisite in order that
it have influence over the members) than one member is to another, yet
the head has a certain causality over the members which the members
have not; and in this the members differ from the head and agree with
one another. Hence Christ's resurrection is an exemplar of ours, and
through our faith therein there arises in us the hope of our own
resurrection. But the resurrection of one of Christ's members is not
the cause of the resurrection of other members, and consequently
Christ's resurrection had to precede the resurrection of others who
have all to rise again at the consummation of the world.
Reply to Objection 2: Although among the members some rank higher than
others and are more conformed to the Head, they do not attain to the
character of headship so as to be the cause of others. Consequently
greater conformity to Christ does not give them a right to rise again
before others as though they were exemplar and the others exemplate, as
we have said in reference to Christ's resurrection: and if it has been
granted to others that their resurrection should not be delayed until
the general resurrection, this has been by special privilege of grace,
and not as due on account of conformity to Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: Jerome, in a sermon on the Assumption [*Ep. x ad
Paul. et Eustoch., now recognized as spurious], seems to be doubtful of
this resurrection of the saints with Christ, namely as to whether,
having been witnesses to the resurrection, they died again, so that
theirs was a resuscitation (as in the case of Lazarus who died again)
rather than a resurrection such as will be at the end of the world---or
really rose again to immortal life, to live for ever in the body, and
to ascend bodily into heaven with Christ, as a gloss says on Mat.
27:52. The latter seems more probable, because, as Jerome says, in
order that they might bear true witness to Christ's true resurrection,
it was fitting that they should truly rise again. Nor was their
resurrection hastened for their sake, but for the sake of bearing
witness to Christ's resurrection: and that by bearing witness thereto
they might lay the foundation of the faith of the New Testament:
wherefore it was more fitting that it should be borne by the fathers of
the Old Testament, than by those who died after the foundation of the
New. It must, however, be observed that, although the Gospel mentions
their resurrection before Christ's, we must take this statement as made
in anticipation, as is often the case with writers of history. For none
rose again with a true resurrection before Christ, since He is the
"first-fruits of them that sleep" (1 Cor. 15:20), although some were
resuscitated before Christ's resurrection, as in the case of Lazarus.
Reply to Objection 4: On account of these words, as Augustine relates
(De Civ. Dei xx, 7), certain heretics asserted that there will be a
first resurrection of the dead that they may reign with Christ on earth
for a thousand years; whence they were called "chiliasts" or
"millenarians." Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 7) that these
words are to be understood otherwise, namely of the spiritual
resurrection, whereby men shall rise again from their sins to the gift
of grace: while the second resurrection is of bodies. The reign of
Christ denotes the Church wherein not only martyrs but also the other
elect reign, the part denoting the whole; or they reign with Christ in
glory as regards all, special mention being made of the martyrs,
because they especially reign after death who fought for the truth,
even unto death. The number of a thousand years denotes not a fixed
number, but the whole of the present time wherein the saints now reign
with Christ, because the number 1,000 designates universality more than
the number 100, since 100 is the square of 10, whereas 1,000 is a cube
resulting from the multiplication of ten by its square, for 10 X 10 =
100, and 100 X 10 = 1,000. Again in Ps. 104:8, "The word which He
commanded to a thousand," i.e. all, "generations."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the time of our resurrection is hidden?
Objection 1: It would seem that this time is not hidden. Because when
we know exactly the beginning of a thing, we can know its end exactly,
since "all things are measured by a certain period" (De Generat. ii).
Now the beginning of the world is known exactly. Therefore its end can
also be known exactly. But this will be the time of the resurrection
and judgment. Therefore that time is not hidden.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Apoc. 12:6) that "the woman who
represents the Church had a place prepared by God, that there she might
feed [Vulg.: 'they should feed her'] a thousand two hundred sixty
days." Again (Dan. 12:11), a certain fixed number of days is mentioned,
which apparently signify years, according to Ezech. 4:6: "A day for a
year, yea a day for a year I have appointed to thee." Therefore the
time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be known
exactly from Holy Writ.
Objection 3: Further, the state of the New Testament was foreshadowed
in the Old Testament. Now we know exactly the time wherein the state of
the Old Testament endured. Therefore we can also know exactly the time
wherein the state of the New Testament will endure. But the state of
the New Testament will last to the end of the world, wherefore it is
said (Mat. 28:20): "Behold I am with you . . . to the consummation of
the world." Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the
resurrection can be known exactly.
On the contrary, That which is unknown to the angels will be much more
unknown to men: because those things to which men attain by natural
reason are much more clearly and certainly known to the angels by their
natural knowledge. Moreover revelations are not made to men save by
means of the angels as Dionysius asserts (Coel. Hier. iv). Now the
angels have no exact knowledge of that time, as appears from Mat.
24:36: "Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no not the angels of
heaven." Therefore that time is hidden from men.
Further, the apostles were more cognizant of God's secrets than others
who followed them, because they had "the first-fruits of the spirit"
(Rom. 8:23)---" before others in point of time and more abundantly," as
a gloss observes. And yet when they questioned our Lord about this very
matter, He answered them (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the
times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power." Much
more, therefore, is it hidden from others.
I answer that, As Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 58) "as to the last
age of the human race, which begins from our Lord's coming and lasts
until the end of the world, it is uncertain of how many generations it
will consist: even so old age, which is man's last age, has no fixed
time according to the measure of the other ages, since sometimes alone
it lasts as long a time as all the others." The reason of this is
because the exact length of future time cannot be known except either
by revelation or by natural reason: and the time until the resurrection
cannot be reckoned by natural reason, because the resurrection and the
end of the heavenly movement will be simultaneous as stated above
[5060](A[1]). And all things that are foreseen by natural reason to
happen at a fixed time are reckoned by movement: and it is impossible
from the movement of the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is
circular, it is for this very reason able by its nature to endure for
ever: and consequently the time between this and the resurrection
cannot be reckoned by natural reason. Again it cannot be known by
revelation, so that all may be on the watch and ready to meet Christ:
and for this reason when the apostles asked Him about this, Christ
answered (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the times or moments
which the Father hath put in His own power," whereby, as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xviii, 53): "He scatters the fingers of all calculators
and bids them be still." For what He refused to tell the apostles, He
will not reveal to others: wherefore all those who have been misled to
reckon the aforesaid time have so far proved to be untruthful; for
some, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53), stated that from our
Lord's Ascension to His last coming 400 years would elapse, others 500,
others 1,000. The falseness of these calculators is evident, as will
likewise be the falseness of those who even now cease not to calculate.
Reply to Objection 1: When we know a thing's beginning and also its end
it follows that its measure is known to us: wherefore if we know the
beginning of a thing the duration of which is measured by the movement
of the heaven, we are able to know its end, since the movement of
heaven is known to us. But the measure of the duration of the heavenly
movement is God's ordinance alone, which is unknown to us. Wherefore
however much we may know its beginning, we are unable to know its end.
Reply to Objection 2: The thousand two hundred sixty days mentioned in
the Apocalypse (12:6) denote all the time during which the Church
endures, and not any definite number of years. The reason whereof is
because the preaching of Christ on which the Church is built lasted
three years and a half, which time contains almost an equal number of
days as the aforesaid number. Again the number of days appointed by
Daniel does not refer to a number of years to elapse before the end of
the world or until the preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of
Antichrist's preaching and the duration of his persecution.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the state of the New Testament in
general is foreshadowed by the state of the Old Testament it does not
follow that individuals correspond to individuals: especially since all
the figures of the Old Testament were fulfilled in Christ. Hence
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xviii, 52) answers certain persons who wished to
liken the number of persecutions suffered by the Church to the number
of the plagues of Egypt, in these words: "I do not think that the
occurrences in Egypt were in their signification prophetic of these
persecutions, although those who think so have shown nicety and
ingenuity in adapting them severally the one to the other, not indeed
by a prophetic spirit, but by the guess-work of the human mind, which
sometimes reaches the truth and sometimes not." The same remarks would
seem applicable to the statements of Abbot Joachim, who by means of
such conjectures about the future foretold some things that were true,
and in others was deceived.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the resurrection will take place at night-time?
Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be at
night-time. For the resurrection will not be "till the heavens be
broken" (Job 14:12). Now when the heavenly movement ceases, which is
signified by its breaking, there will be no time, neither night nor
day. Therefore the resurrection will not be at night-time.
Objection 2: Further, the end of a thing ought to be most perfect. Now
the end of time will be then: wherefore it is said (Apoc. 10:6) that
"time shall be no longer." Therefore time ought to be then in its most
perfect disposition and consequently it should be the daytime.
Objection 3: Further, the time should be such as to be adapted to what
is done therein: wherefore (Jn. 13:30) the night is mentioned as being
the time when Judas went out from the fellowship of the light. Now, all
things that are hidden at the present time will then be made most
manifest, because when the Lord shall come He "will bring to light the
hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the
hearts" (1 Cor. 4:5). Therefore it ought to be during the day.
On the contrary, Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Now
Christ's resurrection was at night, as Gregory says in a homily for
Easter (xxi in Evang.). Therefore our resurrection will also be at
night-time.
Further, the coming of our Lord is compared to the coming of a thief
into the house (Lk. 12:39,40). But the thief comes to the house at
night-time. Therefore our Lord will also come in the night. Now, when
He comes the resurrection will take place, as stated above
([5061]Q[76], A[2]). Therefore the resurrection will be at night-time.
I answer that, The exact time and hour at which the resurrection will
be cannot be known for certain, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
43). Nevertheless some assert with sufficient probability that it will
be towards the twilight, the moon being in the east and the sun in the
west; because the sun and moon are believed to have been created in
these positions, and thus their revolutions will be altogether
completed by their return to the same point. Wherefore it is said that
Christ arose at such an hour.
Reply to Objection 1: When the resurrection occurs, it will not be time
but the end of time; because at the very instant that the heavens will
cease to move the dead will rise again. Nevertheless the stars will be
in the same position as they occupy now at any fixed hour: and
accordingly it is said that the resurrection will be at this or that
hour.
Reply to Objection 2: The most perfect disposition of time is said to
be midday, on account of the light given by the sun. But then the city
of God will need neither sun nor moon, because the glory of God will
enlighten it (Apoc. 22:5). Wherefore in this respect it matters not
whether the resurrection be in the day or in the night.
Reply to Objection 3: That time should be adapted to manifestation as
regards the things that will happen then, and to secrecy as regards the
fixing of the time. Hence either may happen fittingly, namely that the
resurrection be in the day or in the night.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees?
Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not happen
suddenly but by degrees. For the resurrection of the dead is foretold
(Ezech. 37:7,8) where it is written: "The bones came together . . . and
I saw and behold the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the
skin was stretched out over them, but there was no spirit in them."
Therefore the restoration of the bodies will precede in time their
reunion with the souls, and thus the resurrection will not be sudden.
Objection 2: Further, a thing does not happen suddenly if it require
several actions following one another. Now the resurrection requires
several actions following one another, namely the gathering of the
ashes, the refashioning of the body, the infusion of the soul.
Therefore the resurrection will not be sudden.
Objection 3: Further, all sound is measured by time. Now the sound of
the trumpet will be the cause of the resurrection, as stated above
([5062]Q[76], A[2]). Therefore the resurrection will take time and will
not happen suddenly.
Objection 4: Further, no local movement can be sudden as stated in De
Sensu et Sensato vii. Now the resurrection requires local movement in
the gathering of the ashes. Therefore it will not happen suddenly.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:51,52): "We shall all indeed
rise again . . . in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye." Therefore
the resurrection will be sudden.
Further, infinite power works suddenly. But the Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iv): "Thou shalt believe in the resurrection to be wrought by the
power of God," and it is evident that this is infinite. Therefore the
resurrection will be sudden.
I answer that, At the resurrection something will be done by the
ministry of the angels, and something immediately by the power of God,
as stated above ([5063]Q[76], A[3]). Accordingly that which is done by
the ministry of the angels, will not be instantaneous, if by instant we
mean an indivisible point of time, but it will be instantaneous if by
instant we mean an imperceptible time. But that which will be done
immediately by God's power will happen suddenly, namely at the end of
the time wherein the work of the angels will be done, because the
higher power brings the lower to perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Ezechiel spoke, like Moses to a rough people, and
therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six days into days,
in order that the uncultured people might be able to understand,
although all things were made together according to Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. iv), so Ezechiel expressed the various things that will happen in
the resurrection, although they will all happen together in an instant.
Reply to Objection 2: Although these actions follow one another in
nature, they are all together in time: because either they are together
in the same instant, or one is in the instant that terminates the
other.
Objection 3: The same would seem to apply to that sound as to the forms
of the sacraments, namely that the sound will produce its effect in its
last instant.
Reply to Objection 4: The gathering of the ashes which cannot be
without local movement will be done by the ministry of the angels.
Hence it will be in time though imperceptible on account of the
facility of operation which is competent to the angels.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE TERM "WHEREFROM" OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection; and
under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether death is the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in every
case?
(2) Whether ashes are, or dust?
(3) Whether this dust has a natural inclination towards the soul?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether death will be the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in all cases
?
Objection 1: It would seem that death will not be the term "wherefrom"
of the resurrection in all cases. Because some shall not die but shall
be clothed with immortality: for it is said in the creed that our Lord
"will come to judge the living and the dead." Now this cannot refer to
the time of judgment, because then all will be alive; therefore this
distinction must refer to the previous time, and consequently all will
not die before the judgment.
Objection 2: Further, a natural and common desire cannot be empty and
vain, but is fulfilled in some cases. Now according to the Apostle (2
Cor. 5:4) it is a common desire that "we would not be unclothed but
clothed upon." Therefore there will be some who will never be stripped
of the body by death, but will be arrayed in the glory of the
resurrection.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cxv) that the four
last petitions of the Lord's prayer refer to the present life: and one
of them is: "Forgive us our debts [Douay: 'trespasses']." Therefore the
Church prays that all debts may be forgiven her in this life. Now the
Church's prayer cannot be void and not granted: "If you ask the Father
anything in My name, He will give it you" (Jn. 16:23). Therefore at
some time of this life the Church will receive the remission of all
debts: and one of the debts to which we are bound by the sin of our
first parent is that we be born in original sin. Therefore at some time
God will grant to the Church that men be born without original sin. But
death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore at the end of the
world there will be some men who will not die: and so the same
conclusion follows.
Objection 4: Further, the wise man should always choose the shortest
way. Now the shortest way is for the men who shall be found living to
be transferred to the impassibility of the resurrection, than for them
to die first, and afterwards rise again from death to immortality.
Therefore God Who is supremely wise will choose this way for those who
shall be found living.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:36): "That which thou sowest
is not quickened except it die first," and he is speaking of the
resurrection of the body as compared to the seed.
Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:22): "As in Adam all die, so also in
Christ all shall be made alive." Now all shall be made alive in Christ.
Therefore all shall die in Adam: and so all shall rise again from
death.
I answer that, The saints differ in speaking on this question, as may
be seen in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). However, the safer and more
common opinion is that all shall die and rise again from death: and
this for three reasons. First, because it is more in accord with Divine
justice, which condemned human nature for the sin of its first parent,
that all who by the act of nature derive their origin from him should
contract the stain of original sin, and consequently be the debtors of
death. Secondly, because it is more in agreement with Divine Scripture
which foretells the resurrection of all; and resurrection is not
predicted properly except of that "which has fallen and perished," as
the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv). Thirdly, because it is more in
harmony with the order of nature where we find that what is corrupted
and decayed is not renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar
does not become wine unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass into the
juice of the grape. Wherefore since human nature has incurred the
defect of the necessity of death, it cannot return to immortality save
by means of death. It is also in keeping with the order of nature for
another reason, because, as it is stated in Phys. viii, 1, "the
movement of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature,"
just as the movement of the heart is a kind of life of the whole body:
wherefore even as all the members become dead on the heart ceasing to
move, so when the heavenly movement ceases nothing can remain living
with that life which was sustained by the influence of that movement.
Now such is the life by which we live now: and therefore it follows
that those who shall live after the movement of the heaven comes to a
standstill must depart from this life.
Reply to Objection 1: This distinction of the dead and the living does
not apply to the time itself of the judgment, nor to the whole
preceding time, since all who are to be judged were living at some
time, and dead at some time: but it applies to that particular time
which shall precede the judgment immediately, when, to wit, the signs
of the judgment shall begin to appear.
Reply to Objection 2: The perfect desire of the saints cannot be void;
but nothing prevents their conditional desire being void. Such is the
desire whereby we would not be "unclothed," but "clothed upon," namely
if that be possible: and this desire is called by some a "velleity."
Reply to Objection 3: It is erroneous to say that any one except Christ
is conceived without original sin, because those who would be conceived
without original sin would not need the redemption which was wrought by
Christ, and thus Christ would not be the Redeemer of all men [*See
Editor's note which follows TP, Q[26]]. Nor can it be said that they
needed not this redemption, because it was granted to them that they
should be conceived without sin. For, this grace was
vouchsafed---either to their parents, that the sin of nature might be
healed in them (because so long as that sin remained they were unable
to beget without communicating original sin)---or to nature itself
which was healed. Now we must allow that every one needs the redemption
of Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature, and one cannot
be delivered from an evil or absolved from a debt unless one incur the
debt or incur the evil: and consequently all could not reap in
themselves the fruit of the Lord's prayer, unless all were born debtors
and subject to evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from
evil cannot be applied to one who is born without a debt or free from
evil, but only to one who is born with a debt and is afterwards
delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor does it follow, if it can be
asserted without error that some die not, that they are born without
original sin, although death is a punishment of original sin; because
God can of His mercy remit the punishment which one has incurred by a
past fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman without punishment (Jn.
8): and in like manner He can deliver from death those who have
contracted the debt of death by being born in original sin. And thus it
does not follow that if they die not, therefore they were born without
original sin.
Reply to Objection 4: The shortest way is not always the one to be
chosen, but only when it is more or equally adapted for attaining the
end. It is not so here, as is clear from what we have said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all will rise again from ashes?
Objection 1: It would seem that all will not rise again from ashes. For
Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Yet His resurrection was
not from ashes, for His flesh saw not corruption according to Ps.
15:10; Acts 2:27,31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes.
Objection 2: Further, the human body is not always burned. Yet a thing
cannot be reduced to ashes unless it be burned. Therefore not all will
rise again from ashes.
Objection 3: Further, the body of a dead man is not reduced to ashes
immediately after death. But some will rise again at once after death,
according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), namely those who will be found
living. Therefore all will not rise again from ashes.
Objection 4: Further, the term "wherefrom" corresponds to the term
"whereto." Now the term "whereto" of the resurrection is not the same
in the good as in the wicked: "We shall all indeed rise again, but we
shall not all be changed" (1 Cor. 15:51). Therefore the term
"wherefrom" is not the same. And thus, if the wicked rise again from
ashes, the good will not rise again from ashes.
On the contrary, Haymo says (on Rom. 5:10, "For if when we were
enemies"): "All who are born in original sin lie under the sentence:
Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go." Now all who shall rise
again at the general resurrection were born in original sin, either at
their birth within the womb or at least at their birth from the womb.
Therefore all will rise again from ashes.
Further, there are many things in the human body that do not truly
belong to human nature. But all these will be removed. Therefore all
bodies must needs be reduced to ashes.
I answer that, The same reasons by which we have shown [5064](A[1])
that all rise again from death prove also that at the general
resurrection all will rise again from ashes, unless the contrary, such
as the hastening of their resurrection, be vouchsafed to certain
persons by a special privilege of grace. For just as holy writ
foretells the resurrection, so does it foretell the reformation of
bodies (Phil. 3:21). And thus it follows that even as all die that the
bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of
all perish that they may be able to be reformed. For just as death was
inflicted by Divine justice as a punishment on man, so was the decay of
the body, as appears from Gn. 3:19, "Earth thou art and into earth
shalt thou go [*Vulg.: 'Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt
return']."
Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the
union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of the elements: even
as vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it
first be dissolved into the prejacent matter: for the mingling of the
elements is both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven,
and when this ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure
elements.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours as
to the term "whereto," but not as to the term "wherefrom."
Reply to Objection 2: By ashes we mean all the remains that are left
after the dissolution of the body---for two reasons. First, because it
was the common custom in olden times to burn the bodies of the dead,
and to keep the ashes, whence it became customary to speak of the
remains of a human body as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of
dissolution, which is the flame of the fomes [*Cf. [5065]FS, Q[82],
A[3]] whereby the human body is radically infected. Hence, in order to
be cleansed of this infection the human body must needs be dissolved
into its primary components: and when a thing is destroyed by fire it
is said to be reduced to ashes. wherefore the name of ashes is given to
those things into which the human body is dissolved.
Reply to Objection 3: The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth
will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will
be found living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their
prejacent matter.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not take its species from its term
"wherefrom" but from its term "whereto." Hence the resurrection of the
saints which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection
of the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term
"whereto," and not in respect of the term "wherefrom." And it often
happens that the term "whereto" is not the same, whereas the term
"wherefrom" is the same---for instance, a thing may be moved from
blackness to whiteness and to pallor.
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Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any
natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ashes from which the human body
will be restored will have a natural inclination towards the soul which
will be united to them. For if they had no inclination towards the
soul, they would stand in the same relation to that soul as other
ashes. Therefore it would make no difference whether the body that is
to be united to that soul were restored from those ashes or from
others: and this is false.
Objection 2: Further, the body is more dependent on the soul than the
soul on the body. Now the soul separated from the body is still
somewhat dependent on the body, wherefore its movement towards God is
retarded on account of its desire for the body, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. xii). Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from
the soul, a natural inclination towards that soul.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 20:11): "His bones shall be
filled with the vices of his youth, and they shall sleep with him in
the dust." But vices are only in the soul. Therefore there will still
remain in those ashes a natural inclination towards the soul.
On the contrary, The human body can be dissolved into the very
elements, or changed into the flesh of other animals. But the elements
are homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a lion or other animal. Since
then in the other parts of the elements or animals there is no natural
inclination to that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards
the soul in those parts into which the human body has been changed. The
first proposition is made evident on the authority of Augustine
(Enchiridion lxxxviii): "The human body, although changed into the
substance of other bodies or even into the elements, although it has
become the food and flesh of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will
in an instant return to that soul which erstwhile animated it, making
it a living and growing man."
Further, to every natural inclination there corresponds a natural
agent: else nature would fail in necessaries. Now the aforesaid ashes
cannot be reunited to the same soul by any natural agent. Therefore
there is not in them any natural inclination to the aforesaid reunion.
I answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that
the human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there
always remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which
gives a natural inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in
contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as
with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries
can be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore others say that
these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved
retain more light, through having been united to the soul, and for this
reason have a
natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical,
since the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an
equal share of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that
in those ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but
only by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those
ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account that those
parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul separated from the body remains in the
same nature that it has when united to the body. It is not so with the
body, and consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: These words of Job do not mean that the vices
actually remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they remain
according to the ordering of Divine justice, whereby those ashes are
destined to the restoration of the body which will suffer eternally for
the sins committed.
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OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY (THREE
ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider the conditions of those who rise
again. Here we shall consider: (1) Those which concern the good and
wicked in common; (2) those which concern the good only; (3) those
which concern only the wicked. Three things concern the good and wicked
in common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality:
and we shall inquire (1) about their identity; (2) about their
integrity; (3) about their quality.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the body will rise again identically the same?
(2) Whether it will be the self-same man?
(3) Whether it is necessary that the same ashes should return to the
same parts in which they were before?
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Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same identical
body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul will not be reunited to the
same identical body at the resurrection, for "thou sowest not the body
that shall be, but bare grain" (1 Cor. 15:37). Now the Apostle is there
comparing death to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore
the same body that is laid aside in death is not resumed at the
resurrection.
Objection 2: Further, to every form some matter is adapted according to
its condition, and likewise to every agent some instrument. Now the
body is compared to the soul as matter to form, and as instrument to
agent. Since then at the resurrection the soul will not be of the same
condition as now (for it will be either entirely borne away to the
heavenly life to which it adhered while living in the world, or will be
cast down into the life of the brutes if it lived as a brute in this
world) it would seem that it will not resume the same body, but either
a heavenly or a brutish body.
Objection 3: Further, after death, as stated above ([5066]Q[78], A[3]),
the human body is dissolved into the elements. Now these elemental
parts into which the human body has been dissolved do not agree with
the human body dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even as
any other elemental parts agree with that same body. But if the body
were to be formed from those other elemental parts, it would not be
described as identically the same. Therefore neither will it be the
self-same body if it be restored from these parts.
Objection 4: Further, there cannot be numerical identity where there is
numerical distinction of essential parts. Now the form of the mixed
body, which form is an essential part of the human body, as being its
form, cannot be resumed in numerical identity. Therefore the body will
not be identically the same. The minor is proved thus: That which
passes away into complete nonentity cannot be resumed in identity. This
is clear from the fact that there cannot be identity where there is
distinction of existence: and existence, which is the act of a being,
is differentiated by being interrupted, as is any interrupted act. Now
the form of a mixed body passes away into complete nonentity by death,
since it is a bodily form, and so also do the contrary qualities from
which the mixture results. Therefore the form of a mixed body does not
return in identity.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see
God my Saviour [Vulg.: 'my God']," where he is speaking of the vision
after the resurrection, as appears from the preceding words: "In the
last day I shall rise out of the earth." Therefore the selfsame body
will rise again.
Further, the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 27): "Resurrection is
the second rising of that which has fallen." But the body which we have
now fell by death. Therefore it will rise again the same identically.
I answer that, on this point the philosophers erred and certain modern
heretics err. For some of the philosophers allowed that souls separated
from bodies are reunited to bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways.
First, as to the mode of reunion, for some held the separated soul to
be naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation. Secondly, as
to the body to which it was reunited, for they held that this second
union was not with the selfsame body that was laid aside in death, but
with another, sometimes of the same, sometimes of a different species.
Of a different species when the soul while existing in the body had led
a life contrary to the ordering of reason: wherefore it passed after
death from the body of a man into the body of some other animal to
whose manner of living it had conformed in this life, for instance into
the body of a dog on account of lust, into the body of a lion on
account of robbery and violence, and so forth---and into a body of the
same species when the soul has led a good life in the body, and having
after death experienced some happiness, after some centuries began to
wish to return to the body; and thus it was reunited to a human body.
This opinion arises from two false sources. The first of these is that
they said that the soul is not united to the body essentially as form
to matter, but only accidentally, as mover to the thing moved, [*Cf.
[5067]FP, Q[76], A[1]] or as a man to his clothes. Hence it was
possible for them to maintain that the soul pre-existed before being
infused into the body begotten of natural generation, as also that it
is united to various bodies. The second is that they held intellect not
to differ from sense except accidentally, so that man would be said to
surpass other animals in intelligence, because the sensitive power is
more acute in him on account of the excellence of his bodily
complexion; and hence it was possible for them to assert that man's
soul passes into the soul of a brute animal, especially when the human
soul has been habituated to brutish actions. But these two sources are
refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), and in consequence of
these being refuted, it is clear that the above opinion is false.
In like manner the errors of certain heretics are refuted. Some of them
fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philosophers: while others held
that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle
as the wind, as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople,
in his exposition of Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see my God," etc.
Moreover these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that
they are prejudicial to the truth of resurrection as witnessed to by
Holy Writ. For we cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to
the same body, since resurrection is a second rising, and the same
thing rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the body which
after death falls rather than the soul which after death lives. And
consequently if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will
not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body.
Reply to Objection 1: A comparison does not apply to every particular,
but to some. For in the sowing of grain, the grain sown and the grain
that is born thereof are neither identical, nor of the same condition,
since it was first sown without a husk, yet is born with one: and the
body will rise again identically the same, but of a different
condition, since it was mortal and will rise in immortality.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul rising again and the soul living in this
world differ, not in essence but in respect of glory and misery, which
is an accidental difference. Hence it follows that the body in rising
again differs, not in identity, but in condition, so that a difference
of bodies corresponds proportionally to the difference of souls.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is understood as though it were in
matter before its form remains in matter after corruption, because when
that which comes afterwards is removed that which came before may yet
remain. Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book of Physics
and in De Substantia Orbis, in the matter of things subject to
generation and corruption, we must presuppose undeterminate dimensions,
by reason of which matter is divisible, so as to be able to receive
various forms in its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of
the substantial form from matter, these dimensions still remain the
same: and consequently the matter existing under those dimensions,
whatever form it receive, is more identified with that which was
generated from it, than any other part of matter existing under any
form whatever. Thus the matter that will be brought back to restore the
human body will be the same as that body's previous matter.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as a simple quality is not the substantial
form of an element, but its proper accident, and the disposition
whereby its matter is rendered proper to such a form; so the form of a
mixed body, which form is a quality resulting from simple qualities
reduced to a mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but
its proper accident, and the disposition whereby the matter is in need
of the form. Now the human body has no substantial form besides this
form of the mixed body, except the rational soul, for if it had any
previous substantial form, this would give it substantial being, and
would establish it in the genus of substance: so that the soul would be
united to a body already established in the genus of substance, and
thus the soul would be compared to the body as artificial forms are to
their matter, in respect of their being established in the genus of
substance by their matter. Hence the union of the soul to the body
would be accidental, which is the error of the ancient philosophers
refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2 [*Cf. [5068]FP, Q[76],
A[1]]). It would also follow that the human body and each of its parts
would not retain their former names in the same sense, which is
contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1). Therefore
since the rational soul remains, no substantial form of the human body
falls away into complete nonentity. And the variation of accidental
forms does not make a difference of identity. Therefore the selfsame
body will rise again, since the selfsame matter is resumed as stated in
a previous reply (ad 2).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again?
Objection 1: It would seem that it will not be identically the same man
that shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii):
"Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not
repeated identically." Now such is man's substance in his present
state. Therefore after the change wrought by death the self-same man
cannot be repeated .
Objection 2: Further, where there is a distinction of human nature
there is not the same identical man: wherefore Socrates and Plato are
two men and not one man, since each has his own distinct human nature.
Now the human nature of one who rises again is distinct from that which
he has now. Therefore he is not the same identical man. The minor can
be proved in two ways. First, because human nature which is the form of
the whole is not both form and substance as the soul is, but is a form
only. Now such like forms pass away into complete nonentity, and
consequently they cannot be restored. Secondly, because human nature
results from union of parts. Now the same identical union as that which
was heretofore cannot be resumed, because repetition is opposed to
identity, since repetition implies number, whereas identity implies
unity, and these are incompatible with one another. But resurrection is
a repeated union: therefore the union is not the same, and consequently
there is not the same human nature nor the same man.
Objection 3: Further, one same man is not several animals: wherefore if
it is not the same animal it is not the same identical man. Now where
sense is not the same, there is not the same animal, since animal is
defined from the primary sense, namely touch. But sense, as it does not
remain in the separated soul (as some maintain), cannot be resumed in
identity. Therefore the man who rises again will not be the same
identical animal, and consequently he will not be the same man.
Objection 4: Further, the matter of a statue ranks higher in the statue
than the matter of a man does in man: because artificial things belong
to the genus of substance by reason of their matter, but natural things
by reason of their form, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 1),
and again from the Commentator (De Anima ii). But if a statue is remade
from the same brass, it will not be the same identically. Therefore
much less will it be identically the same man if he be reformed from
the same ashes.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:27): "Whom I myself shall see .
. . and not another," and he is speaking of the vision after the
resurrection. Therefore the same identical man will rise again.
Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 5) that "to rise again is
naught else but to live again." Now unless the same identical man that
died return to life, he would not be said to live again. Therefore he
would not rise again, which is contrary to faith.
I answer that, The necessity of holding the resurrection arises from
this---that man may obtain the last end for which he was made; for this
cannot be accomplished in this life, nor in the life of the separated
soul, as stated above ([5069]Q[75], AA[1],2): otherwise man would have
been made in vain, if he were unable to obtain the end for which he was
made. And since it behooves the end to be obtained by the selfsame
thing that was made for that end, lest it appear to be made without
purpose, it is necessary for the selfsame man to rise again; and this
is effected by the selfsame soul being united to the selfsame body. For
otherwise there would be no resurrection properly speaking, if the same
man were not reformed. Hence to maintain that he who rises again is not
the selfsame man is heretical, since it is contrary to the truth of
Scripture which proclaims the resurrection.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of repetition by
movement or natural change. For he shows the difference between the
recurrence that occurs in generation and corruption and that which is
observed in the movement of the heavens. Because the selfsame heaven by
local movement returns to the beginning of its movement, since it has a
moved incorruptible substance. On the other hand, things subject to
generation and corruption return by generation to specific but not
numerical identity, because from man blood is engendered, from blood
seed, and so on until a man is begotten, not the selfsame man, but the
man specifically. In like manner from fire comes air, from air water,
from water earth, whence fire is produced, not the selfsame fire, but
the same in species. Hence it is clear that the argument, so far as the
meaning of the Philosopher is concerned, is not to the point.
We may also reply that the form of other things subject to generation
and corruption is not subsistent of itself, so as to be able to remain
after the corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational soul.
For the soul, even after separation from the body, retains the being
which accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to share
that being by the resurrection, since the being of the body and the
being of the soul in the body are not distinct from one another,
otherwise the union of soul and body would be accidental. Consequently
there has been no interruption in the substantial being of man, as
would make it impossible for the self-same man to return on account of
an interruption in his being, as is the case with other things that are
corrupted, the being of which is interrupted altogether, since their
form remains not, and their matter remains under another being.
Nevertheless neither does the self-same man recur by natural
generation, because the body of the man begotten is not composed of the
whole body of his begetter: hence his body is numerically distinct, and
consequently his soul and the whole man.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions about humanity and about
any form of a whole. For some say that the form of the whole and the
form of the part are really one and the same: but that it is called the
form of the part inasmuch as it perfects the matter, and the form of
the whole inasmuch as the whole specific nature results therefrom.
According to this opinion humanity is really nothing else than the
rational soul: and so, since the selfsame rational soul is resumed,
there will be the same identical humanity, which will remain even after
death, albeit not under the aspect of humanity, because the composite
does not derive the specific nature from a separated humanity.
The other opinion, which seems nearer the truth, is Avicenna's,
according to whom the form of the whole is not the form of a part only,
nor some other form besides the form of the part, but is the whole
resulting from the composition of form and matter, embracing both
within itself. This form of the whole is called the essence or
quiddity. Since then at the resurrection there will be the selfsame
body, and the selfsame rational soul, there will be, of necessity, the
same humanity.
The first argument proving that there will be a distinction of humanity
was based on the supposition that humanity is some distinct form
supervening form and matter; which is false.
The second reason does not disprove the identity of humanity, because
union implies action or passion, and though there be a different union,
this cannot prevent the identity of humanity, because the action and
passion from which humanity resulted are not of the essence of
humanity, wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve a
distinction of humanity: for it is clear that generation and
resurrection are not the self-same movement. Yet the identity of the
rising man with the begotten man is not hindered for this reason: and
in like manner neither is the identity of humanity prevented if we take
union for the relation itself: because this relation is not essential
to but concomitant with humanity, since humanity is not one of those
forms that are composition or order (Phys. ii, 1), as are the forms of
things produced by art, so that if there be another distinct
composition there is another distinct form of a house.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument affords a very good proof against
those who held a distinction between the sensitive and rational souls
in man: because in that case the sensitive soul in man would not be
incorruptible, as neither is it in other animals; and consequently in
the resurrection there would not be the same sensitive soul, and
consequently neither the same animal nor the same man.
But if we assert that in man the same soul is by its substance both
rational and sensitive, we shall encounter no difficulty in this
question, because animal is defined from sense, i.e. the sensitive soul
as from its essential form: whereas from sense, i.e. the sensitive
power, we know its definition as from an accidental form "that
contributes more than another to our knowledge of the quiddity" (De
Anima i, 1). Accordingly after death there remains the sensitive soul,
even as the rational soul, according to its substance: whereas the
sensitive powers, according to some, do not remain. And since these
powers are accidental properties, diversity on their part cannot
prevent the identity of the whole animal, not even of the animal's
parts: nor are powers to be called perfections or acts of organs unless
as principles of action, as heat in fire.
Reply to Objection 4: A statue may be considered in two ways, either as
a particular substance, or as something artificial. And since it is
placed in the genus of substance by reason of its matter, it follows
that if we consider it as a particular substance, it is the selfsame
statue that is remade from the same matter. On the other hand, it is
placed in the genus of artificial things inasmuch as it has an
accidental form which, if the statue be destroyed, passes away also.
Consequently it does not return identically the same, nor can the
statue be identically the same. But man's form, namely the soul,
remains after the body has perished: wherefore the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the ashes of the human body must needs, by the resurrection, return
to the same parts of the body that were dissolved into them?
Objection 1: It would seem necessary for the ashes of the human body to
return, by the resurrection, to the same parts that were dissolved into
them. For, according to the Philosopher, "as the whole soul is to the
whole body, so is a part of the soul to a part of the body, as sight to
the pupil" (De Anima ii, 1). Now it is necessary that after the
resurrection the body be resumed by the same soul. Therefore it is also
necessary for the same parts of the body to return to the same limbs,
in which they were perfected by the same parts of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, difference of matter causes difference of
identity. But if the ashes return not to the same parts, each part will
not be remade from the same matter of which it consisted before.
Therefore they will not be the same identically. Now if the parts are
different the whole will also be different, since parts are to the
whole as matter is to form (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore it will not be the
self-same man; which is contrary to the truth of the resurrection.
Objection 3: Further, the resurrection is directed to the end that man
may receive the meed of his works. Now different parts of the body are
employed in different works, whether of merit or of demerit. Therefore
at the resurrection each part must needs return to its former state
that it may be rewarded in due measure.
On the contrary, Artificial things are more dependent on their matter
than natural things. Now in artificial things, in order that the same
artificial thing be remade, from the same matter, there is no need for
the parts to be brought back to the same position. Neither therefore is
it necessary in man.
Further, change of an accident does not cause a change of identity. Now
the situation of parts is an accident. Therefore its change in a man
does not cause a change of identity.
I answer that, In this question it makes a difference whether we ask
what can be done without prejudice to identity, and what will be done
for the sake of congruity. As regards the first it must be observed
that in man we may speak of parts in two ways: first as of the various
parts of a homogeneous whole, for instance the various parts of flesh,
or the various parts of bone; secondly, as of various parts of various
species of a heterogeneous whole, for instance bone and flesh.
Accordingly if it be said that one part of matter will return to
another part of the same species, this causes no change except in the
position of the parts: and change of position of parts does not change
the species in homogeneous wholes: and so if the matter of one part
return to another part, this is nowise prejudicial to the identity of
the whole. Thus is it in the example given in the text (Sent. iv, D,
44), because a statue, after being remade, is identically the same, not
as to its form, but as to its matter, in respect of which it is a
particular substance, and in this way a statue is homogeneous, although
it is not according to its artificial form. But if it be said that the
matter of one part returns to another part of another species, it
follows of necessity that there is a change not only in the position of
parts, but also in their identity: yet so that the whole matter, or
something belonging to the truth of human nature in one is transferred
to another. but not if what was superfluous in one part is transferred
to another. Now the identity of parts being taken away, the identity of
the whole is removed, if we speak of essential parts, but not if we
speak of accidental parts, such as hair and nails, to which apparently
Augustine refers (De Civ. Dei xxii). It is thus clear how the
transference of matter from one part of another destroys the identity,
and how it does not.
But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that even the parts
will retain their position at the resurrection, especially as regards
the essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as regards the
accidental parts, such as nails and hair.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers organic or heterogeneous
parts, but no homogeneous or like parts.
Reply to Objection 2: A change in the position of the parts of matter
does not cause a change of identity, although difference of matter
does.
Reply to Objection 3: Operation, properly speaking, is not ascribed to
the part but to the whole, wherefore the reward is due, not to the part
but to the whole.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the integrity of the bodies in the resurrection.
Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the members of the human body will rise again therein?
(2) Whether the hair and nails will?
(3) Whether the humors will?
(4) Whether whatever the body contained belonging to the truth of human
nature will rise again?
(5) Whether whatever it contained materially will rise again?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all the members of the human body will rise again?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the members of the human body
will rise again. For if the end be done away it is useless to repair
the means. Now the end of each member is its act. Since then nothing
useless is done in the Divine works, and since the use of certain
members is not fitting to man after the resurrection, especially the
use of the genital members, for then they "shall neither marry, nor be
married" (Mat. 22:30), it would seem that not all the members shall
rise again.
Objection 2: Further, the entrails are members: and yet they will not
rise again. For they can neither rise full, since thus they contain
impurities, nor empty, since nothing is empty in nature. Therefore the
members shall not all rise again.
Objection 3: Further, the body shall rise again that it may be rewarded
for the works which the soul did through it. Now the member of which a
thief has been deprived for theft, and who has afterwards done penance
and is saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, neither for any
good deed, since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds,
since the punishment of the member would redound to the punishment of
man. Therefore the members will not all rise again.
On the contrary, The other members belong more to the truth of human
nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be restored to man at the
resurrection according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 4). Much more
therefore does this apply to the other members.
Further, "The works of God are perfect" (Dt. 32:4). But the
resurrection will be the work of God. Therefore man will be remade
perfect in all his members.
I answer that, As stated in De Anima ii, 4, "the soul stands in
relation to the body not only as its form and end, but also as
efficient cause." For the soul is compared to the body as art to the
thing made by art, as the Philosopher says (De Anim. Gener. ii, 4), and
whatever is shown forth explicitly in the product of art is all
contained implicitly and originally in the art. In like manner whatever
appears in the parts of the body is all contained originally and, in a
way, implicitly in the soul. Thus just as the work of an art would not
be perfect, if its product lacked any of the things contained in the
art, so neither could man be perfect, unless the whole that is
contained enfolded in the soul be outwardly unfolded in the body, nor
would the body correspond in full proportion to the soul. Since then at
the resurrection it behooves man's body to correspond entirely to the
soul, for it will not rise again except according to the relation it
bears to the rational soul, it follows that man also must rise again
perfect, seeing that he is thereby repaired in order that he may obtain
his ultimate perfection. Consequently all the members that are now in
man's body must needs be restored at the resurrection.
Reply to Objection 1: The members may be considered in two ways in
relation to the soul: either according to the relation of matter to
form, or according to the relation of instrument to agent, since "the
whole body is compared to the whole soul in the same way as one part is
to another" (De Anima ii, 1). If then the members be considered in the
light of the first relationship, their end is not operation, but rather
the perfect being of the species, and this is also required after the
resurrection: but if they be considered in the light of the second
relationship, then their end is operation. And yet it does not follow
that when the operation fails the instrument is useless, because an
instrument serves not only to accomplish the operation of the agent,
but also to show its virtue. Hence it will be necessary for the virtue
of the soul's powers to be shown in their bodily instruments, even
though they never proceed to action, so that the wisdom of God be
thereby glorified.
Reply to Objection 2: The entrails will rise again in the body even as
the other members: and they will be filled not with vile superfluities
but with goodly humors.
Reply to Objection 3: The acts whereby we merit are not the acts,
properly speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man; even as the
work of art is ascribed not to the instrument but to the craftsman.
Therefore though the member which was cut off before a man's repentance
did not co-operate with him in the state wherein he merits glory, yet
man himself merits that the whole man may be rewarded, who with his
whole being serves God.
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Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again
in the human body. For just as hair and nails result from the surplus
of food, so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these
will not rise again with the body. Neither therefore will hair and
nails.
Objection 2: Further, of all the superfluities that are produced from
food, seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature, since though
superfluous it is needed. Yet seed will not rise again in the human
body. Much less therefore will hair and nails.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is perfected by a rational soul that is
not perfected by a sensitive soul. But hair and nails are not perfected
by a sensitive soul, for "we do not feel with them" (De Anima i, 5;
iii, 13). Therefore since the human body rises not again except because
it is perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and
nails will not rise again.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:18): "A hair of your head shall
not perish."
Further, hair and nails were given to man as an ornament. Now the
bodies of men, especially of the elect, ought to rise again with all
their adornment. Therefore they ought to rise again with the hair.
I answer that, The soul is to the animated body, as art is to the work
of art, and is to the parts of the body as art to its instruments:
wherefore an animated body is called an organic body. Now art employs
certain instruments for the accomplishment of the work intended, and
these instruments belong to the primary intention of art: and it also
uses other instruments for the safe-keeping of the principal
instruments, and these belong to the secondary intention of art: thus
the art of warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath for the
safe-keeping of the sword. And so among the parts of an animated body,
some are directed to the accomplishment of the souls' operations, for
instance the heart, liver, hand, foot; while others are directed to the
safe-keeping of the other parts as leaves to cover fruit; and thus hair
and nails are in man for the protection of other parts. Consequently,
although they do not belong to the primary perfection of the human
body, they belong to the secondary perfection: and since man will rise
again with all the perfections of his nature, it follows that hair and
nails will rise again in him.
Reply to Objection 1: Those superfluities are voided by nature, as
being useful for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the perfection of
the human body. It is not so with the superfluities which nature
reserves for the production of hair and nails which she needs for the
protection of the members.
Reply to Objection 2: Seed is not required for the perfection of the
individual, as hair and nails are, but only for the protection of the
species.
Reply to Objection 3: Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and so it
is clear that they share in some operation, which would not be possible
unless they were parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in
man there is but one soul, namely the rational soul, it is clear that
they are perfected by the rational soul, although not so far as to
share in the operation of sense, as neither do bones, and yet it is
certain that these will rise again and that they belong to the
integrity of the individual.
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Whether the humors will rise again in the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the humors will not rise again in the
body. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood cannot possess
the kingdom of God." Now blood is the chief humor. Therefore it will
not rise again in the blessed, who will possess the kingdom of God, and
much less in others.
Objection 2: Further, humors are intended to make up for the waste. Now
after the resurrection there will be no waste. Therefore the body will
not rise again with humors.
Objection 3: Further, that which is in process of generation in the
human body is not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the humors
are still in process of generation because they are potentially flesh
and bone. Therefore they are not yet perfected by the rational soul.
Now the human body is not directed to the resurrection except in so far
as it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore the humors will not
rise again.
On the contrary, Whatever enters into the constitution of the human
body will rise again with it. Now this applies to the humors, as
appears from the statement of Augustine (De Spir. et Anima xv) that
"the body consists of functional members; the functional members of
homogeneous parts; and the homogeneous parts of humors." Therefore the
humors will rise again in the body.
Further, our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of
Christ. Now in Christ's resurrection His blood rose again, else the
wine would not now be changed into His blood in the Sacrament of the
altar. Therefore the blood will rise again in us also, and in like
manner the other humors.
I answer that, Whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in
those who take part in the resurrection will rise again, as stated
above ([5070]AA[1],2). Hence whatever humidity of the body belongs to
the integrity of human nature must needs rise again in man. Now there
is a threefold humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding
from the perfection of the individual---either because it is on the way
to corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance urine, sweat,
matter, and so forth---or because it is directed by nature to the
preservation of the species in some individual, either by the act of
the generative power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as
milk. None of these humidities will rise again, because they do not
belong to the perfection of the person rising again.
The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet reached its
ultimate perfection, which nature achieves in the individual, yet it is
directed thereto by nature: and this is of two kinds. For there is one
kind that has a definite form and is contained among the parts of the
body, for instance the blood and the other humors which nature has
directed to the members that are produced or nourished therefrom: and
yet they have certain definite forms like the other parts of the body,
and consequently will rise again with the other parts of the body:
while another kind of humidity is in transition from form to form,
namely from the form of humor to the form of member. Humidities of this
kind will not rise again, because after the resurrection each part of
the body will be established in its form, so that one will not pass
into another. Wherefore this humidity that is actually in transition
from one form to another will not rise again. Now this humidity may be
considered in a twofold state---either as being at the beginning of its
transformation, and thus it is called "ros," namely the humidity that
is found in the cavities of the smaller veins---or as in the course of
transformation and already beginning to undergo alteration, and thus it
is called "cambium": but in neither state will it rise again. The third
kind of humidity is that which has already reached its ultimate
perfection that nature intends in the body of the individual, and has
already undergone transformation and become incorporate with the
members. This is called "gluten," and since it belongs to the members
it will rise again just as the members will.
Reply to Objection 1: In these words of the Apostle flesh and blood do
not denote the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of flesh and
blood, which are either deeds of sin or the operations of the animal
life. Or we may say with Augustine in his letter to Consentius (Ep.
cxlvi) that "flesh and blood here signify the corruption which is now
predominant in flesh and blood"; wherefore the Apostle's words
continue: "Neither shall corruption possess incorruption."
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the members that serve for generation
will be after the resurrection for the integrity of human nature, and
not for the operation accomplished now by them, so will the humors be
in the body not to make up for waste, but to restore the integrity of
human nature and to show forth its natural power.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the elements are in the course of
generation in relation to mixed bodies, because they are their matter,
yet not so as to be always in transition when in the mixed body, so too
are the humors in relation to the members. And for this reason as the
elements in the parts of the universe have definite forms, by reason of
which they, like mixed bodies, belong to the perfection of the
universe, so too the humors belong to the perfection of the human body,
just as the other parts do, although they do not reach its entire
perfection, as the other parts do, and although the elements have not
perfect forms as mixed bodies have. But as all the parts of the
universe receive their perfection from God, not equally, but each one
according to its mode, so too the humors are in some way perfected by
the rational soul, yet not in the same measure as the more perfect
parts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth of human nature will ris
e
again in it?
Objection 1: It would seem that what was in the body, belonging to the
truth of human nature, will not all rise again in it. For food is
changed into the truth of human nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the
ox or of other animals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever belonged
to the truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of the ox or of
other animals will also rise again: which is inadmissible.
Objection 2: Further, Adam's rib belonged to the truth of human nature
in him, as ours does in us. But Adam's rib will rise again not in Adam
but in Eve, else Eve would not rise again at all since she was made
from that rib. Therefore whatever belonged in man to the truth of human
nature will not all rise again in him.
Objection 3: Further, it is impossible for the same thing from
different men to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in
different men to belong to the truth of human nature, for instance if a
man were to partake of human flesh which would be changed into his
substance. Therefore there will not rise again in man whatever belonged
in him to the truth of human nature.
Objection 4: Further, if it be said that not all the flesh partaken of
belongs to the truth of human nature and that consequently some of it
may possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other---on the
contrary: That which is derived from one's parents would especially
seem to belong to the truth of human nature. But if one who partook of
nothing but human flesh were to beget children that which his child
derives from him must needs be of the flesh of other men partaken of by
his father, since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the
Philosopher proves (De Gen. Animal. i). Therefore what belongs to the
truth of human nature in that child belonged also to the truth of human
nature in other men of whose flesh his father had partaken.
Objection 5: Further, if it be said that what was changed into seed was
not that which belong to the truth of human nature in the flesh of the
men eaten, but something not belonging to the truth of human
nature---on the contrary: Let us suppose that some one is fed entirely
on embryos in which seemingly there is nothing but what belongs to the
truth of human nature since whatever is in them is derived from the
parents. If then the surplus food be changed into seed, that which
belonged to the truth of human nature in the embryos---and after these
have received a rational soul, the resurrection applies to them---must
needs belong to the truth of human nature in the child begotten of that
seed. And thus, since the same cannot rise again in two subjects, it
will be impossible for whatever belonged to the truth of human nature
in both to rise again in both of them.
On the contrary, Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was
perfected by the rational soul. Now it is through being perfected by
the rational soul that the human body is directed to the resurrection.
Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise
again in each one.
Further, if anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man be
taken from his body, this will not be the perfect body of a man. Now
all imperfection of a man will be removed at the resurrection,
especially in the elect, to whom it was promised (Lk. 21:18) that not a
hair of their head should perish. Therefore whatever belonged to the
truth of human nature in a man will rise again in him.
I answer that, "Everything is related to truth in the same way as to
being" (Metaph. ii), because a thing is true when it is as it appears
to him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna (Metaph. ii)
says that "the truth of anything is a property of the being immutably
attached thereto." Accordingly a thing is said to belong to the truth
of human nature, because it belongs properly to the being of human
nature, and this is what shares the form of human nature, just as true
gold is what has the true form of gold whence gold derives its proper
being. In order therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth
of human nature, we must observe that there have been three opinions on
the question. For some have maintained that nothing begins anew to
belong to the truth of human nature and that whatever belongs to the
truth of human nature, all of it belonged to the truth of human nature
when this was created; and that this multiplies by itself, so that it
is possible for the seed whereof the child is begotten to be detached
therefrom by the begetter, and that again the detached part multiplies
in the child, so that he reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on,
and that thus was the whole human race multiplied. Wherefore according
to this opinion, whatever is produced by nourishment. although it seem
to have the appearance of flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth
of human nature.
Others held that something new is added to the truth of human nature by
the natural transformation of the food into the human body, if we
consider the truth of human nature in the species to the preservation
of which the act of the generative power is directed: but that if we
consider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the
preservation and perfection of which the act of the nutritive power is
directed, that which is added by food belongs to the truth of the human
nature of the individual, not primarily but secondarily. For they
assert that the truth of human nature, first and foremost, consists in
the radical humor, that namely which is begotten of the seed of which
the human race was originally fashioned: and that what is changed from
food into true flesh and blood does not belong principally to the truth
of human nature in this particular individual, but secondarily: and
that nevertheless this can belong principally to the truth of human
nature in another individual who is begotten of the seed of the former.
For they assert that seed is the surplus from food, either mingled with
something belonging principally to the truth of human nature in the
begetter, according to some, or without any such admixture, as others
maintain. And thus the nutrimental humor in one becomes the radical
humor in another.
The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to
the truth of human nature even in this individual, because distinction
in the human body does not require that any signate material part must
needs remain throughout the whole lifetime; any signate part one may
take is indifferent to this, whereas it remains always as regards what
belongs to the species in it, albeit as regards what is material
therein it may ebb and flow. And thus the nutrimental humor is not
distinct from the radical on the part of its principle (so that it be
called radical when begotten of the seed, and nutrimental when produced
by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that it be called
radical when it reaches the term of generation by the act of the
generative, or even nutritive power, but nutrimental, when it has not
yet reached this term, but is still on the way to give nourishment.
These three opinions have been more fully exposed and examined in the
Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30); wherefore there is no need for
repetition here, except in so far as the question at issue is
concerned. It must accordingly be observed that this question requires
different answers according to these opinions.
For the first opinion on account of its explanation of the process of
multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth of human
nature, both as regards the number of individuals and as regards the
due quantity of each individual, without taking into account that which
is produced from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of
resisting the destruction that might result from the action of natural
heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting.
Wherefore since at the resurrection it behooves human nature to be
restored to its perfection, nor does the natural heat tend to destroy
the natural humor, there will be no need for anything resulting from
food to rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which
belonged to the truth of the human nature of the individual, and this
reaches the aforesaid perfection in number and quantity by being
detached and multiplied.
The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food
is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual and for the
multiplication that results from generation, must needs admit that
something of this product from food shall rise again: not all, however,
but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of human
nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that all that
was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man who was
begotten of this seed; because this belongs chiefly to the truth of
human nature in him: while of that which afterwards he derives from
nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the
perfection of his quantity; and not all, because this does not belong
to the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires
it for the perfection of quantity. Since however this nutrimental humor
is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this
order, that what first belonged to the substance of a man's body, will
all be restored, and of that which was added secondly, thirdly, and so
on, as much as is required to restore quantity. This is proved by two
reasons. First, because that which was added was intended to restore
what was wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to
the truth of human nature to the same extent as that which came first.
Secondly, because the addition of extraneous humor to the first radical
humors results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the
specific nature as perfectly as the first did: and the Philosopher
instances as an example (De Gener. i) the mixing of water with wine,
which always weakens the strength of the wine, so that in the end the
wine becomes watery: so that although the second water be drawn into
the species of wine, it does not share the species of wine as perfectly
as the first water added to the wine. Even so that which is secondly
changed from food into flesh does not so perfectly attain to the
species of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently does
not belong in the same degree to the truth of human nature nor to the
resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that this opinion maintains that
the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature principally will
rise again, but not the whole of what belongs to the truth of human
nature secondarily.
The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects
agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that whatever is under
the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature,
because this opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during
his whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and
primarily to the truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and
flowing, that belongs. to the truth of human nature merely on account
of the perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being
of the species, as the second opinion asserted. But it states that all
the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature generated
belong to the truth of human nature, as regards what they have of the
species, since thus they remain; but not as regards what they have of
matter, since thus they are indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are
to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as in
the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from the
population by death, while others take their place: wherefore the parts
of the people flow back and forth materially, but remain formally,
since these others occupy the very same offices and positions from
which the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said to
remain the selfsame. In like manner, while certain parts are on the ebb
and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the
parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their
species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains.
On the other hand, The third opinion agrees with the second, because it
holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection of
the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently
the third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the
second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it
holds that the whole of what is produced from the seed will rise again,
not because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that
which comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more
perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied to those things
that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two
opinions agree.
Reply to Objection 1: A natural thing is what it is, not from its
matter but from its form; wherefore, although that part of matter which
at one time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under
the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox
rises again, but the flesh of a man: else one might conclude that the
clay from which Adam's body was fashioned shall rise again. The second
opinion, however, grants this argument.
Reply to Objection 2: That rib did not belong to the perfection of the
individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the
species. Hence it will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, just as the
seed will rise again, not in the begetter, but in the begotten.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the first opinion it is easy to
reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged
to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the
truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten: and thus it will
rise again in the latter but not in the former. according to the second
and third opinions, each one will rise again in that wherein he
approached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue of the
species, and if he approached equally in both, he will rise again in
that wherein he was first, because in that he first was directed to the
resurrection by union with the rational soul of that man. Hence if
there were any surplus in the flesh eaten, not belonging to the truth
of human nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise
again in the second: otherwise what belonged to the resurrection in the
first will rise again in him and not in the second; but in the second
its place is taken either by something of that which was the product
from other food, or if he never partook of any other food than human
flesh, the substitution is made by Divine power so far as the
perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those who die before the
perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as neither
does the ebb and flow of parts.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the first opinion this argument is
easily answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the
surplus food: so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed
whereof the child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions
we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to
be changed into seed, because it is after much separation that the seed
is distilled from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food.
That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the
truth of human nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one
of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence according to the rule
already laid down (ad 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise
again in the person born of the seed; while the remaining matter will
rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the product.
Reply to Objection 5: The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection
before it is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been
added to the seminal substance from the substance of food, since the
child is nourished in the mother's womb. Consequently on the
supposition that a man partook of such food, and that some one were
begotten of the surplus thereof, that which was in the seminal
substance will indeed rise again in the one begotten of that seed;
unless it contain something that would have belonged to the seminal
substance in those from whose flesh being eaten the seed was produced,
for this would rise again in the first but not in the second. The
remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed into seed, will clearly
rise again in the first the Divine power supplying deficiencies in
both. The first opinion is not troubled by this objection, since it
does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food: but there are many
other reasons against it as may be seen in the Second Book (Sent. ii,
D, 30; [5071]FP, Q[119], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again?
Objection 1: It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's
members will all rise again. For the hair, seemingly, is less concerned
in the resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the
hair will all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts
of the body, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) quoted in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 44). Much more therefore whatever was materially in the
other members will all rise again.
Objection 2: Further, just as the parts of the flesh are perfected as
to species by the rational soul, so are the parts as to matter. But the
human body is directed to the resurrection through being perfected by a
rational soul. Therefore not only the parts of species but also the
parts of matter will all rise again.
Objection 3: Further, the body derives its totality from the same cause
as it derives its divisibility into parts. But division into parts
belongs to a body in respect of matter the disposition of which is
quantity in respect of which it is divided. Therefore totality is
ascribed to the body in respect of its parts of matter. If then all the
parts of matter rise not again, neither will the whole body rise again:
which is inadmissible.
On the contrary, The parts of matter are not permanent in the body but
ebb and flow, as stated in De Gener. i. If, therefore, all the parts of
matter, which remain not but ebb and flow, rise again, either the body
of one who rises again will be very dense, or it will be immoderate in
quantity.
Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in one man can
all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter were to partake
of his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man were to
rise again it follows that in one man there will rise again that which
belongs to the truth of human nature in another: which is absurd.
I answer that, What is in man materially, is not directed to the
resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human
nature; because it is in this respect that it bears a relation to the
human souls. Now all that is in man materially belongs indeed to the
truth of human nature in so far as it has something of the species, but
not all, if we consider the totality of matter; because all the matter
that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end would
surpass the quantity due to his species, as the third opinion states,
which opinion seems to me more probable than the others. Wherefore the
whole of what is in man will rise again, if we speak of the totality of
the species which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and order
of parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak of the totality
of matter. The second and first opinions, however, do not make this
distinction, but distinguish between parts both of which have the
species and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both
state what is produced from the seed will all rise again even if we
speak of totality of matter: while they differ in this that the first
opinion maintains that nothing will rise again of that which was
engendered from food, whereas the second holds that something but not
all, thereof will rise again, as stated above [5072](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: Just as all that is in the other parts of the
body will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species, but
not if we speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the
other parts something accrues from nourishment which causes growth, and
this is reckoned as another part, if we speak of totality of species,
since it occupies another place and position in the body, and is under
other parts of dimension: and there accrues something which does not
cause growth, but serves to make up for waste by nourishing. and this
is not reckoned as another part of the whole considered in relation to
the species, since it does not occupy another place or position in the
body than that which was occupied by the part that has passed away:
although it may be reckoned another part if we consider the totality of
matter. The same applies to the hair. Augustine, however, is speaking
of the cutting of hair that was a part causing growth of the body;
wherefore it must needs rise again, not however as regards the quantity
of hair, lest it should be immoderate, but it will rise again in other
parts as deemed expedient by Divine providence. Or else he refers to
the case when something will be lacking to the other parts, for then it
will be possible for this to be supplied from the surplus of hair.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the third opinion parts of species
are the same as parts of matter: for the Philosopher does not make this
distinction (De Gener. i) in order to distinguish different parts, but
in order to show that the same parts may be considered both in respect
of species, as to what belongs to the form and species in them, and in
respect of matter, as to that which is under the form and species. Now
it is clear that the matter of the flesh has no relation to the
rational soul except in so far as it is under such a form, and
consequently by reason thereof it is directed to the resurrection. But
the first and second opinions which draw a distinction between parts of
species and parts of matter say that although the rational soul
perfects both parts, it does not perfect parts of matter except by
means of the parts of species, wherefore they are not equally directed
to the resurrection.
Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of things subject to generation and
corruption it is necessary to presuppose indefinite dimensions before
the reception of the substantial form. Consequently division which is
made according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. But
complete and definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial
form; wherefore division that is made in reference to definite quantity
regards the species especially when definite position of parts belongs
to the essence of the species, as in the human body.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the quality of those who rise again. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all will rise again in the youthful age?
(2) Whether they will be of equal stature?
(3) Whether all will be of the same sex?
(4) Whether they will rise again to the animal life?
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Whether all will rise again of the same age?
Objection 1: It would seem that all will not rise again of the same,
namely the youthful age. Because God will take nothing pertaining to
man's perfection from those who rise again, especially from the
blessed. Now age pertains to the perfection of man, since old age is
the age that demands reverence. Therefore the old will not rise again
of a youthful age.
Objection 2: Further, age is reckoned according to the length of past
time. Now it is impossible for past time not to have passed. Therefore
it is impossible for those who were of greater age to be brought back
to a youthful age.
Objection 3: Further, that which belonged most to the truth of human
nature in each individual will especially rise again in him. Now the
sooner a thing was in man the more would it seem to have belonged to
the truth of human nature, because in the end, through the strength of
the species being weakened the human body is likened to watery wine
according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i). Therefore if all are to
rise again of the same age, it is more fitting that they should rise
again in the age of childhood.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:13): "Until we all meet . . .
unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of
Christ."
Now Christ rose again of youthful age, which begins about the age of
thirty years, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii). Therefore others
also will rise again of a youthful age.
Further, man will rise again at the most perfect stage of nature. Now
human nature is at the most perfect stage in the age of youth.
Therefore all will rise again of that age.
I answer that, Man will rise again without any defect of human nature,
because as God founded human nature without a defect, even so will He
restore it without defect. Now human nature has a twofold defect.
First, because it has not yet attained to its ultimate perfection.
Secondly, because it has already gone back from its ultimate
perfection. The first defect is found in children, the second in the
aged: and consequently in each of these human nature will be brought by
the resurrection to the state of its ultimate perfection which is in
the youthful age, at which the movement of growth terminates, and from
which the movement of decrease begins.
Reply to Objection 1: Old age calls for reverence, not on account of
the state of the body which is at fault; but on account of the soul's
wisdom which is taken for granted on account of its being advanced in
years. Wherefore in the elect there will remain the reverence due to
old age on account of the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in
them, but the defect of old age will not be in them.
Reply to Objection 2: We speak of age not as regards the number of
years, but as regards the state which the human body acquires from
years. Hence Adam is said to have been formed in the youthful age on
account of the particular condition of body which he had at the first
day of his formation. Thus the argument is not to the point.
Reply to Objection 3: The strength of the species is said to be more
perfect in a child than in a young man, as regards the ability to
transform nourishment in a certain way, even as it is more perfect in
the seed than in the mature man. In youth, however, it is more perfect
as regards the term of completion. Wherefore that which belonged
principally to the truth of human nature will be brought to that
perfection which it has in the age of youth, and not to that perfection
which it has in the age of a child, wherein the humors have not yet
reached their ultimate disposition.
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Whether all will rise again of the same stature?
Objection 1: It would seem that all will rise again of the same
stature. For just as man is measured by dimensive quantity, so is he by
the quantity of time. Now the quantity of time will be reduced to the
same measure in all, since all will rise again of the same age.
Therefore the dimensive quantity will also be reduced to the same
measure in all, so that all will rise again of the same stature.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "all
things in nature have a certain limit end measure of size and growth."
Now this limitation can only arise by virtue of the form, with which
the quantity as well as all the other accidents ought to agree.
Therefore since all men have the same specific form, there should be
the same measure of quantity in respect of matter in all, unless an
error should occur. But the error of nature will be set right at the
resurrection. Therefore all will rise again of the same stature.
Objection 3: Further, it will be impossible for man in rising again to
be of a quantity proportionate to the natural power which first formed
his body; for otherwise those who could not be brought to a greater
quantity by the power of nature will never rise again of a greater
quantity, which is false. Therefore that quantity must needs be
proportionate to the power which will restore the human body by the
resurrection, and to the matter from which it is restored. Now the
selfsame, namely the Divine, power will restore all bodies; and all the
ashes from which the human bodies will be restored are equally disposed
to receive the action of that power. Therefore the resurrection of all
men will bring them to the same quantity: and so the same conclusion
follows.
On the contrary, Natural quantity results from each individual's
nature. Now the nature of the individual will not be altered at the
resurrection. Therefore neither will its natural quantity. But all are
not of the same natural quantity. Therefore all will not rise again of
the same stature.
Further, human nature will be restored by resurrection unto glory or
unto punishment. But there will not be the same quantity of glory or
punishment in all those who rise again. Neither therefore will there be
the same quantity of stature.
I answer that, At the resurrection human nature will be restored not
only in the self-same species but also in the selfsame individual: and
consequently we must observe in the resurrection what is requisite not
only to the specific but also to the individual nature. Now the
specific nature has a certain quantity which it neither exceeds nor
fails without error, and yet this quantity has certain degrees of
latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed measure; and each
individual in the human species aims at some degree of quantity
befitting his individual nature within the bounds of that latitude, and
reaches it at the end of his growth, if there has been no error in the
working of nature, resulting in the addition of something to or the
subtraction of something from the aforesaid quantity: the measure
whereof is gauged according to the proportion of heat as expanding, and
of humidity as expansive, in point of which all are not of the same
power. Therefore all will not rise again of the same quantity, but each
one will rise again of that quantity which would have been his at the
end of his growth if nature had not erred or failed: and the Divine
power will subtract or supply what was excessive or lacking in man.
Reply to Objection 1: It has already been explained (A[1], ad 2) that
all are said to rise again of the same age, not as though the same
length of time were befitting to each one, but because the same state
of perfection will be in all, which state is indifferent to a great or
small quantity.
Reply to Objection 2: The quantity of a particular individual
corresponds not only to the form of the species, but also to the nature
or matter of the individual: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 3: The quantity of those who will be raised from the
dead is not proportionate to the restoring power, because the latter
does not belong to the power of the body---nor to the ashes, as to the
state in which they are before the resurrection---but to nature which
the individual had at first. Nevertheless if the formative power on
account of some defect was unable to effect the due quantity that is
befitting to the species, the Divine power will supply the defect at
the resurrection, as in dwarfs, and in like manner in those who by
immoderate size have exceeded the due bounds of nature.
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Whether all will rise again of the male sex?
Objection 1: It would seem that all will rise again of the male sex.
For it is written (Eph. 4:13) that we shall all meet "unto a perfect
man," etc. Therefore there will be none but the male sex.
Objection 2: Further, in the world to come all pre-eminence will cease,
as a gloss observes on 1 Cor. 15:24. Now woman is subject to man in the
natural order. Therefore women will rise again not in the female but in
the male sex.
Objection 3: Further, that which is produced incidentally and beside
the intention of nature will not rise again, since all error will be
removed at the resurrection. Now the female sex is produced beside the
intention of nature, through a fault in the formative power of the
seed, which is unable to bring the matter of the fetus to the male
form: wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima xvi, i.e. De Generat.
Animal. ii) that "the female is a misbegotten male." Therefore the
female sex will not rise again.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): "Those are wiser,
seemingly, who doubt not that both sexes will rise again."
Further, at the resurrection God will restore man to what He made him
at the creation. Now He made woman from the man's rib (Gn. 2:22).
Therefore He will also restore the female sex at the resurrection.
I answer that, Just as, considering the nature of the individual, a
different quantity is due to different men, so also, considering the
nature of the individual, a different sex is due to different men.
Moreover, this same diversity is becoming to the perfection of the
species, the different degrees whereof are filled by this very
difference of sex and quantity. Wherefore just as men will rise again
of various stature, so will they rise again of different sex. And
though there be difference of sex there will be no shame in seeing one
another, since there will no lust to invite them to shameful deeds
which are the cause of shame.
Reply to Objection 1: When it is said: We shall all meet "Christ unto a
perfect man," this refers not to the male sex but to the strength of
soul which will be in all, both men and women.
Reply to Objection 2: Woman is subject to man on account of the frailty
of nature, as regards both vigor of soul and strength of body. After
the resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not
on account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of
merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the begetting of a woman is beside the
intention of a particular nature, it is in the intention of universal
nature, which requires both sexes for the perfection of the human
species. Nor will any defect result from sex as stated above (ad 2).
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Whether all will rise again to animal life so as to exercise the functions
of nutrition and generation?
Objection 1: It would seem that they will rise again to the animal
life, or in other words that they will make use of the acts of the
nutritive and generative powers. For our resurrection will be conformed
to Christ's. But Christ is said to have ate after His resurrection (Jn.
21; Lk. 24). Therefore, after the resurrection men will eat, and in
like manner beget.
Objection 2: Further, the distinction of sexes is directed to
generation; and in like manner the instruments which serve the
nutritive power are directed to eating. Now man will rise again with
all these. Therefore he will exercise the acts of the generative and
nutritive powers.
Objection 3: Further, the whole man will be beatified both in soul and
in body. Now beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 7), consists in a perfect operation. Therefore it must needs
be that all the powers of the soul and all the members should have
their respective acts after the resurrection. And so the same
conclusion follows as above.
Objection 4: Further, after the resurrection there will be perfect joy
in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures, since
"happiness" according to Boethius is "a state rendered perfect by the
accumulation of all goods" (De Consol. iii), and the perfect is that
which lacks nothing. Since then there is much pleasure in the act of
the generative and nutritive powers it would seem that such acts
belonging to animal life will be in the blessed, and much more in
others, who will have less spiritual bodies.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:30): "In the resurrection they
shall neither marry nor be married."
Further, generation is directed to supply the defect resulting from
death, and to the multiplication of the human race: and eating is
directed to make up for waste, and to increase quantity. But in the
state of the resurrection the human race will already have the number
of individuals preordained by God, since generation will continue up to
that point. In like manner each man will rise again in due quantity;
neither will death be any more, nor any waste affect the parts of man.
Therefore the acts of the generative and nutritive powers would be void
of purpose.
I answer that, The resurrection will not be necessary to man on account
of his primary perfection, which consists in the integrity of those
things that belong to his nature, since man can attain to this in his
present state of life by the action of natural causes; but the
necessity of the resurrection regards the attainment of his ultimate
perfection, which consists in his reaching his ultimate end.
Consequently those natural operations which are directed to cause or
preserve the primary perfection of human nature will not be in the
resurrection: such are the actions of the animal life in man, the
action of the elements on one another, and the movement of the heavens;
wherefore all these will cease at the resurrection. And since to eat,
drink, sleep, beget, pertain to the animal life, being directed to the
primary perfection of nature, it follows that they will not be in the
resurrection.
Reply to Objection 1: When Christ partook of that meal, His eating was
an act, not of necessity as though human nature needed food after the
resurrection, but of power, so as to prove that He had resumed the true
human nature which He had in that state wherein He ate and drank with
His disciples. There will be no need of such proof at the general
resurrection, since it will be evident to all. Hence Christ is said to
have ate by dispensation in the sense in which lawyers say that a
"dispensation is a relaxation of the general law": because Christ made
an exception to that which is common to those who rise again (namely
not to partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument
does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: The distinction of sexes and the difference of
members will be for the restoration of the perfection of human nature
both in the species and in the individual. Hence it does not follow
that they are without purpose, although they lack their animal
operations.
Reply to Objection 3: The aforesaid operations do not belong to man as
man, as also the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7), wherefore the
happiness of the human body does not consist therein. But the human
body will be glorified by an overflow from the reason whereby man is
man, inasmuch as the body will be subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12, x, 5),
the pleasures of the body are medicinal, because they are applied to
man for the removal of weariness; or again, they are unhealthy, in so
far as man indulges in those pleasures inordinately, as though they
were real pleasures: just as a man whose taste is vitiated delights in
things which are not delightful to the healthy. Consequently it does
not follow that such pleasures as these belong to the perfection of
beatitude, as the Jews and Turks maintain, and certain heretics known
as the Chiliasts asserted; who, moreover, according to the
Philosopher's teaching, would seem to have an unhealthy appetite, since
according to him none but spiritual pleasures are pleasures simply, and
to be sought for their own sake: wherefore these alone are requisite
for beatitude.
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OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED AFTER THEIR RESURRECTION
(FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the conditions under which the blessed rise again,
and (1) the impassibility of their bodies; (2) their subtlety; (3)
their agility; (4) their clarity. Under the first head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the
resurrection?
(2) Whether all will be equally impassible?
(3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies?
(4) Whether in them all the senses are in act?
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Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?
Objection 1: It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be
impassible after the resurrection. For everything mortal is passible.
But man, after the resurrection, will be "a mortal rational animal,"
for such is the definition of man, which will never be dissociated from
him. Therefore the body will be passible.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in potentiality to have the form of
another thing is passible in relation to something else; for this is
what is meant by being passive to another thing (De Gener. i). Now the
bodies of the saints will be in potentiality to the form of another
thing after the resurrection; since matter, according as it is under
one form, does not lose its potentiality to another form. But the
bodies of the saints after the resurrection will have matter in common
with the elements, because they will be restored out of the same matter
of which they are now composed. Therefore they will be in potentiality
to another form, and thus will be passible.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i),
contraries have a natural inclination to be active and passive towards
one another. Now the bodies of the saints will be composed of
contraries after the resurrection, even as now. Therefore they will be
passible.
Objection 4: Further, in the human body the blood and humors will rise
again, as stated above ([5073]Q[80], AA[3],4). Now, sickness and such
like passions arise in the body through the antipathy of the humors.
Therefore the bodies of the saints will be passible after the
resurrection.
Objection 5: Further, actual defect is more inconsistent with
perfection than potential defect. But passibility denotes merely
potential defect. Since then there will be certain actual defects in
the bodies of the blessed, such as the scars of the wounds in the
martyrs, even as they were in Christ, it would seem that their
perfections will not suffer, if we grant their bodies to be passible.
On the contrary, Everything passible is corruptible, because "increase
of passion results in loss of substance" [*Aristotle, Topic. vi, 1].
Now the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible after the
resurrection, according to 1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption, it
shall rise in incorruption." Therefore they will be impassible.
Further, the stronger is not passive to the weaker. But no body will be
stronger than the bodies of the saints, of which it is written (1 Cor.
15:43): "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power." Therefore
they will be impassible.
I answer that, We speak of a thing being "passive" in two ways [*Cf.
[5074]FS, Q[22], A[1]]. First in a broad sense, and thus every
reception is called a passion, whether the thing received be fitting to
the receiver and perfect it, or contrary to it and corrupt it. The
glorious bodies are not said to be impassible by the removal of this
kind of passion, since nothing pertaining to perfection is to be
removed from them. In another way we use the word "passive" properly,
and thus the Damascene defines passion (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) as being
"a movement contrary to nature." Hence an immoderate movement of the
heart is called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its
operation. The reason of this is that whatever is patient is drawn to
the bounds of the agent, since the agent assimilates the patient to
itself, so that, therefore, the patient as such is drawn beyond its own
bounds within which it was confined. Accordingly taking passion in its
proper sense there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of
the saints after resurrection; wherefore they are said to be
impassible.
The reason however of this impassibility is assigned differently by
different persons. Some ascribe it to the condition of the elements,
which will be different then from what it is now. For they say that the
elements will remain, then, as to substance, yet that they will be
deprived of their active and passive qualities. But this does not seem
to be true: because the active and passive qualities belong to the
perfection of the elements, so that if the elements were restored
without them in the body of the man that rises again, they would be
less perfect than now. Moreover since these qualities are the proper
accidents of the elements, being caused by their form and matter, it
would seem most absurd for the cause to remain and the effect to be
removed. Wherefore others say that the qualities will remain, but
deprived of their proper activities, the Divine power so doing for the
preservation of the human body. This however would seem to be
untenable, since the action and passion of the active and passive
qualities is necessary for the mixture (of the elements), and according
as one or the other preponderates the mixed (bodies) differ in their
respective complexions, and this must apply to the bodies of those who
rise again, for they will contain flesh and bones and like parts, all
of which demand different complexions. Moreover, according to this,
impassibility could not be one of their gifts, because it would not
imply a disposition in the impassible substance, but merely an external
preventive to passion, namely the power of God, which might produce the
same effect in a human body even in this state of life. Consequently
others say that in the body itself there will be something preventing
the passion of a glorified body, namely the nature of a fifth [*The
other four being the elements; this fifth element was known to the
peripatetic philosophers as the quintessence, of which they held
heavenly bodies to be formed]: or heavenly body, which they maintain
enters into the composition of a human body, to the effect of blending
the elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for the
rational soul; but that in this state of life, on account of the
preponderance of the elemental nature, the human body is passible like
other elements, whereas in the resurrection the nature of the fifth
body will predominate, so that the human body will be made impassible
in likeness to the heavenly body. But this cannot stand, because the
fifth body does not enter materially into the composition of a human
body, as was proved above (Sent. ii, D, 12, Q. 1, A[1]). Moreover it is
absurd to say that a natural power, such as the power of a heavenly
body, should endow the human body with a property of glory, such as the
impassibility of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to
Christ's power the transformation of the human body, because "such as
is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly" (1 Cor. 15:48),
and "He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of
His glory, according to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue
all things unto Himself" (Phil. 3:21). And again, a heavenly nature
cannot exercise such power over the human body as to take from it its
elemental nature which is passible by reason of its essential
constituents. Consequently we must say otherwise that all passion
results from the agent overcoming the patient, else it would not draw
it to its own bounds. Now it is impossible for agent to overcome
patient except through the weakening of the hold which the form of the
patient has over its matter, if we speak of the passion which is
against nature, for it is of passion in this sense that we are speaking
now: for matter is not subject to one of two contraries, except through
the cessation or at least the diminution of the hold which the other
contrary has on it. Now the human body and all that it contains will be
perfectly subject to the rational soul, even as the soul will be
perfectly subject to God. Wherefore it will be impossible for the
glorified body to be subject to any change contrary to the disposition
whereby it is perfected by the soul; and consequently those bodies will
be impassible.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Anselm (Cur Deus Homo ii, 11),
"mortal is included in the philosophers' definition of man, because
they did not believe that the whole man could be ever immortal, for
they had no experience of man otherwise than in this state of
mortality." Or we may say that since, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. vi, 12), essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes
employ accidental differences in order to signify essential differences
from which the accidental differences result. Hence "mortal" is put in
the definition of man, not as though mortality were essential to man,
but because that which causes passibility and mortality in the present
state of life, namely composition of contraries, is essential to man,
but it will not cause it then, on account of the triumph of the soul
over the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Potentiality is twofold, tied and free: and this
is true not only of active but also of passive potentiality. For the
form ties the potentiality of matter, by determining it to one thing,
and it is thus that it overcomes it. And since in corruptible things
form does not perfectly overcome matter, it cannot tie it completely so
as to prevent it from sometimes receiving a disposition contrary to the
form through some passion. But in the saints after the resurrection,
the soul will have complete dominion over the body, and it will be
altogether impossible for it to lose this dominion, because it will be
immutably subject to God, which was not the case in the state of
innocence. Consequently those bodies will retain substantially the same
potentiality as they have now to another form; yet that potentiality
will remain tied by the triumph of the soul over the body, so that it
will never be realized by actual passion.
Reply to Objection 3: The elemental qualities are the instruments of
the soul, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38, seqq., for the heat of
fire in an animal's body is directed in the act of nutrition by the
soul's power. When, however, the principal agent is perfect, and there
is no defect in the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument,
except in accordance with the disposition of the principal agent.
Consequently in the bodies of the saints after the resurrection, no
action or passion will result from the elemental qualities that is
contrary to the disposition of the soul which has the preservation of
the body in view.
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Ep. ad Consent. cxlvi)
"the Divine power is able to remove" whatever qualities He will "from
this visible and tangible body, other qualities remaining." Hence even
as in a certain respect "He deprived the flames of the Chaldees'
furnace of the power to burn, since the bodies of the children were
preserved without hurt, while in another respect that power remained,
since those flames consumed the wood, so will He remove passibility
from the humors while leaving their nature unchanged." It has been
explained in the Article how this is brought about.
Reply to Objection 5: The scars of wounds will not be in the saints,
nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs
of the most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake
of justice and faith: so that this will increase their own and others'
joy (Cf. [5075]TP, Q[54], A[4], ad 3). Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xxii, 19): "We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs
so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their
bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall
see them for this will not make them less comely but more glorious. A
certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the body, yet not
of the body but of virtue." Nevertheless those martyrs who have been
maimed and deprived of their limbs will not be without those limbs in
the resurrection of the dead, for to them it is said (Lk. 21:18): "A
hair of your head shall not perish."
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Whether all will be equally impassible?
Objection 1: It would seem that all will be equally impassible. For a
gloss on 1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption," says that "all have
equal immunity from suffering." Now the gift of impassibility consists
in immunity from suffering. Therefore all will be equally impassible.
Objection 2: Further, negations are not subject to be more or less. Now
impassibility is a negation or privation of passibility. Therefore it
cannot be greater in one subject than in another.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is more white if it have less admixture
of black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of the
saints' bodies. Therefore they will all be equally impassible.
On the contrary, Reward should be proportionate to merit. Now some of
the saints were greater in merit than others. Therefore, since
impassibility is a reward, it would seem to be greater in some than in
others.
Further, impassibility is condivided with the gift of clarity. Now the
latter will not be equal in all, according to 1 Cor. 15:41. Therefore
neither will impassibility be equal in all.
I answer that, Impassibility may be considered in two ways, either in
itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be considered in itself,
since it denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be
more or less, but will be equal in all the blessed. on the other hand,
if we consider it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in
one person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul
over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's unchangeable
enjoyment of God. Consequently in one who enjoys God more perfectly,
there is a greater cause of impassibility.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of impassibility in itself
and not in relation to its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Although negations and privations considered in
themselves are not increased nor diminished, yet they are subject to
increase and diminution in relation to their causes. Thus a place is
said to be more darksome from having more and greater obstacles to
light.
Reply to Objection 3: Some things increase not only by receding from
their contrary, but also by approach to a term: thus light increases.
Consequently impassibility also is greater in one subject than in
another, although there is no passibility remaining in any one.
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Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?
Objection 1: It would seem that impassibility excludes actual sensation
from glorified bodies. For according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
11), "sensation is a kind of passion." But the glorified bodies will be
impassible. Therefore they will not have actual sensation.
Objection 2: Further, natural alteration precedes spiritual*
alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional being. Now
glorified bodies, by reason of their impassibility, will not be subject
to natural alteration. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from
"animus"---the mind. Cf. [5076]FS, Q[50], A[1],3m; [5077]FS, Q[52],
A[1],3m.] Therefore they will not be subject to spiritual alteration
which is requisite for sensation.
Objection 3: Further, whenever actual sensation is due to a new
perception, there is a new judgment. But in that state there will be no
new judgment, because "our thoughts will not then be unchangeable," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). Therefore there will be no actual
sensation.
Objection 4: Further, when the act of one of the soul's powers is
intense, the acts of the other powers are remiss. Now the soul will be
supremely intent on the act of the contemplative power in contemplating
God. Therefore the soul will have no actual sensation whatever.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 1:7): "Every eye shall see Him."
Therefore there will be actual sensation.
Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima i, 2) "the animate is
distinct from the inanimate by sensation and movement." Now there will
be actual movement since they "shall run to and fro like sparks among
the reeds" (Wis. 3:7). Therefore there will also be actual sensation.
I answer that, All are agreed that there is some sensation in the
bodies of the blessed: else the bodily life of the saints after the
resurrection would be likened to sleep rather than to vigilance. Now
this is not befitting that perfection, because in sleep a sensible body
is not in the ultimate act of life, for which reason sleep is described
as half-life. [*This is what Aristotle says: "The good and the bad are
in sleep least distinguishable: hence men say that for half their lives
there is no difference between the happy and the unhappy" (Ethic. i,
13)] But there is a difference of opinion as to the mode of sensation.
For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible, and
consequently "not susceptible to impressions from without" [*Cf.[5078]
Q[74], A[4], On the contrary] and much less so than the heavenly
bodies, because they will have actual sensations, not by receiving
species from sensibles, but by emission of species. But this is
impossible, since in the resurrection the specific nature will remain
the same in man and in all his parts. Now the nature of sense is to be
a passive power as the Philosopher proves (De Anima ii, text. 51,54).
Wherefore if the saints, in the resurrection, were to have sensations
by emitting and not by receiving species, sense in them would be not a
passive but an active power, and thus it would not be the same
specifically with sense as it is now, but would be some other power
bestowed on them; for just as matter never becomes form, so a passive
power never becomes active. Consequently others say that the senses
will be actualized by receiving species, not indeed from external
sensibles, but by an outflow from the higher powers, so that as now the
higher powers receive from the lower, so on the contrary the lower
powers will then receive from the higher. But this mode of reception
does not result in real sensation, because every passive power,
according to its specific nature, is determined to some special active
principle, since a power as such bears relation to that with respect to
which it is said to be the power. Wherefore since the proper active
principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside the soul
and not an intention thereof existing in the imagination or reason, if
the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but by the
imagination or other higher powers, there will be no true sensation.
Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons (in whom there
is this kind of outflow of species towards the organs of sense, on
account of the powerful influence of the imagination) have real
sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sensations.
Consequently we must say with others that sensation in glorified bodies
will result from the reception of things outside the soul. It must,
however, be observed that the organs of sense are transmuted by things
outside the soul in two ways. First by a natural transmutation, when
namely the organ is disposed by the same natural quality as the thing
outside the soul which acts on that organ: for instance, when the hand
is heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant through contact
with a fragrant object. Secondly, by a spiritual transmutation, as when
a sensible quality is received in an instrument, according to a
spiritual mode of being, when, namely, the species or the intention of
a quality, and not the quality itself is received: thus the pupil
receives the species of whiteness and yet does not itself become white.
Accordingly the first reception does not cause sensation, properly
speaking, because the senses are receptive of species in matter but
without matter. that is to say without the material "being" which the
species had outside the soul (De Anima ii, text. 121). This reception
transmutes the nature of the recipient, because in this way the quality
is received according to its material "being." Consequently this kind
of reception will not be in the glorified bodies, but the second, which
of itself causes actual sensation, without changing the nature of the
recipient.
Reply to Objection 1: As already explained, by this passion that takes
place in actual sensation and is no other than the aforesaid reception
of species, the body is not drawn away from natural quality, but is
perfected by a spiritual change. Wherefore the impassibility of
glorified bodies does not exclude this kind of passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Every subject of passion receives the action of
the agent according to its mode. Accordingly if there be a thing that
is naturally adapted to be altered by an active principle, with a
natural and a spiritual alteration, the natural alteration precedes the
spiritual alteration, just as natural precedes intentional being. If
however a thing be naturally adapted to be altered only with a
spiritual alteration it does not follow that it is altered naturally.
For instance the air is not receptive of color, according to its
natural being, but only according to its spiritual being, wherefore in
this way alone is it altered: whereas, on the contrary, inanimate
bodies are altered by sensible qualities only naturally and not
spiritually. But in the glorified bodies there cannot be any natural
alteration, and consequently there will be only spiritual alteration.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as there will be new reception of species in
the organs of sensation, so there will be new judgment in the common
sense: but there will be no new judgment on the point in the intellect;
such is the case with one who sees what he knew before. The saying of
Augustine, that "there our thoughts will not be changeable," refers to
the thoughts of the intellectual part: therefore it is not to the
point.
Reply to Objection 4: When one of two things is the type of the other,
the attention of the soul to the one does not hinder or lessen its
attention to the other: thus a physician while considering urine is not
less but more able to bear in mind the rules of his art concerning the
colors of urine. And since God is apprehended by the saints as the type
of all things that will be done or known by them, their attention to
perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing anything else will
nowise hinder their contemplation of God, nor conversely. Or we may say
that the reason why one power is hindered in its act when another power
is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for
such an intense operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from the
principle of life the inflow that the other powers or members should
receive. And since in the saints all the powers will be most perfect,
one will be able to operate intensely without thereby hindering the
operation of another power even as it was with Christ.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection, all the senses will be in
act?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the senses are not in act there.
For touch is the first of all the senses (De Anima ii, 2). But the
glorified body will lack the actual sense of touch, since the sense of
touch becomes actual by the alteration of an animal body by some
external body preponderating in some one of the active or passive
qualities which touch is capable of discerning: and such an alteration
will then be impossible. Therefore all the senses will not be in act
there.
Objection 2: Further, the sense of taste assists the action of the
nutritive power. Now after the resurrection there will be no such
action, as stated above ([5079]Q[81], A[4]). Therefore taste would be
useless there.
Objection 3: Further, nothing will be corrupted after the resurrection
because the whole creature will be invested with a certain virtue of
incorruption. Now the sense of smell cannot have its act without some
corruption having taken place, because smell is not perceived without a
volatile evaporation consisting in a certain dissolution. Therefore the
sense of smell is not there in its act.
Objection 4: Further, "Hearing assists teaching" (De Sensu et Sensato
i). But the blessed, after the resurrection, will require no teaching
by means of sensible objects, since they will be filled with Divine
wisdom by the very vision of God. Therefore hearing will not be there.
Objection 5: Further. seeing results from the pupil receiving the
species of the thing seen. But after the resurrection this will be
impossible in the blessed. Therefore there will be no actual seeing
there, and yet this is the most noble of the senses. The minor is
proved thus: That which is actually lightsome is not receptive of a
visible species; and consequently a mirror placed under the sun's rays
does not reflect the image of a body opposite to it. Now the pupil like
the whole body will be endowed with clarity. Therefore it will not
receive the image of a colored body.
Objection 6: Further, according to the science of perspective, whatever
is seen is seen at an angle. But this does not apply to the glorified
bodies. Therefore they will not have actual sense of sight. The minor
is proved thus. Whenever a thing is seen at an angle, the angle must be
proportionate to the distance of the object seen: because what is seen
from a greater distance is less seen and at a lesser angle, so that the
angle may be so small that nothing is seen of the object. Therefore if
the glorified eye sees at an angle, it follows that it sees things
within a certain distance, and that consequently it does not see a
thing from a greater distance than we see now: and this would seem very
absurd. And thus it would seem that the sense of sight will not be
actual in glorified bodies.
On the contrary, A power conjoined to its act is more perfect than one
not so conjoined. Now human nature in the blessed will be in its
greatest perfection. Therefore all the senses will be actual there.
Further, the sensitive powers are nearer to the soul than the body is.
But the body will be rewarded or punished on account of the merits or
demerits of the soul. Therefore all the senses in the blessed will also
be rewarded and in the wicked will be punished, with regard to pleasure
and pain or sorrow which consist in the operation of the senses.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say
that in the glorified bodies there will be all the sensitive powers,
but that only two senses will be in act, namely touch and sight; nor
will this be owing to defective senses, but from lack of medium and
object; and that the senses will not be useless, because they will
conduce to the integrity of human nature and will show forth the wisdom
of their Creator. But this is seemingly untrue, because the medium in
these senses is the same as in the others. For in the sight the medium
is the air, and this is also the medium in hearing and smelling (De
Anima ii, 7). Again, the taste, like the touch, has the medium in
contact, since taste is a kind of touch (De Anima ii, 9). Smell also
which is the object of the sense of smell will be there, since the
Church sings that the bodies of the saints will be a most sweet smell.
There will also be vocal praise in heaven; hence a gloss says on Ps.
149:6, "The high praises of God shall be in their mouth" that "hearts
and tongues shall not cease to praise God." The same is had on the
authority of a gloss on 2 Esdra 12:27, "With singing and with cymbals."
Wherefore, according to others we may say that smelling and hearing
will be in act there, but taste will not be in act, in the sense of
being affected by the taking of food or drink, as appears from what we
have said ([5080]Q[81], A[4]): unless perchance we say that there will
be taste in act through the tongue being affected by some neighboring
humor.
Reply to Objection 1: The qualities perceived by the touch are those
which constitute the animal body. Wherefore the body of an animal has,
through its tangible qualities according to the present state of life,
a natural aptitude to be affected with a natural and spiritual
alteration by the object of touch. For this reason the touch is said to
be the most material of the senses, since it has a greater measure of
material alteration connected with it. Yet material alteration is only
accidentally related to the act of sensation which is effected by a
spiritual alteration. Consequently the glorified bodies, which by
reason of their impassibility are immune from natural alteration, will
be subject only to spiritual alteration by tangible qualities. Thus it
was with the body of Adam, which could neither be burned by fire, nor
pierced by sword, although he had the sense of such things.
Reply to Objection 2: Taste, in so far as it is the perception of food,
will not be in act; but perhaps it will be possible in so far as it is
cognizant of flavors in the way mentioned above.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have considered smell to be merely a
volatile evaporation. But this opinion cannot be true; which is evident
from the fact that vultures hasten to a corpse on perceiving the odor
from a very great distance, whereas it would be impossible for an
evaporation to travel from the corpse to a place so remote, even though
the whole corpse were to be dissolved into vapor. This is confirmed by
the fact that sensible objects at an equal distance exercise their
influence in all directions: so that smell affects the medium
sometimes, and the instrument of sensation with a spiritual alteration,
without any evaporation reaching the organ. That some evaporation
should be necessary is due to the fact that smell in bodies is mixed
with humidity; wherefore it is necessary for dissolution to take place
in order for the smell to be perceived. But in the glorified bodies
odor will be in its ultimate perfection, being nowise hampered by
humidity: wherefore it will affect the organ with a spiritual
alteration, like the odor of a volatile evaporation. Such will be the
sense of smell in the saints, because it will not be hindered by any
humidity: and it will take cognizance not only of the excellences of
odors, as happens with us now on account of the very great humidity of
the brain, but also of the minutest differences of odors.
Reply to Objection 4: In heaven there will be vocal praise (though
indeed some think otherwise), and in the blessed it will affect the
organ of hearing by a merely spiritual alteration. Nor will it be for
the sake of learning whereby they may acquire knowledge, but for the
sake of the perfection of the sense and for the sake pleasure. How it
is possible for the voice to give sound there, we have already stated
(Sent. ii, D, 2;[5081] Q[2], A[2], ad 5).
Reply to Objection 5: The intensity of light does not hinder the
spiritual reception of the image of color, so long as the pupil retains
its diaphanous nature; thus it is evident that however much the air be
filled with light, it can be the medium of sight, and the more it is
illumined, the more clearly are objects seen through it, unless there
be a fault through defective sight. The fact that the image of an
object placed in opposition to a mirror directly opposite the sun's
rays does not appear therein, is not due to the reception being
hindered, but to the hindering of reflection: because for an image to
appear in a mirror it must needs be thrown back by an opaque body, for
which reason lead is affixed to the glass in a mirror. The sun's ray
dispels this opacity so that no image can appear in the mirror. But the
clarity of a glorified body does not destroy the diaphanous nature of
the pupil, since glory does not destroy nature; and consequently the
greatness of clarity in the pupil renders the sight keen rather than
defective.
Reply to Objection 6: The more perfect the sense the less does it
require to be altered in order to perceive its object. Now the smaller
the angle at which the sight is affected by the visible object, the
less is the organ altered. Hence it is that a stronger sight can see
from a distance more than a weaker sight; because the greater the
distance the smaller the angle at which a thing is seen. And since the
sight of a glorified body will be most perfect it will be able to see
by the very least alteration (of the organ); and consequently at a very
much smaller angle than now, and therefore from a much greater
distance.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subtlety of the bodies of the blessed. Under
this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?
(2) Whether by reason of this subtlety it can be in the same place with
another not glorified body?
(3) Whether by a miracle two bodies can be in the same place?
(4) Whether a glorified body can be in the same place with another
glorified body?
(5) Whether a glorified body necessarily requires a place equal to
itself?
(6) Whether a glorified body is palpable?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?
Objection 1: It would seem that subtlety is not a property of the
glorified body. For the properties of glory surpass the properties of
nature, even as the clarity of glory surpasses the clarity of the sun,
which is the greatest in nature. Accordingly if subtlety be a property
of the glorified body, it would seem that the glorified body will be
more subtle than anything which is subtle in nature, and thus it will
be "more subtle than the wind and the air," which was condemned by
Gregory in the city of Constantinople, as he relates (Moral. xiv, 56).
Objection 2: Further, as heat and cold are simple qualities of bodies,
i.e. of the elements, so is subtlety. But heat and other qualities of
the elements will not be intensified in the glorified bodies any more
than they are now, in fact, they will be more reduced to the mean.
Neither, therefore, will subtlety be in them more than it is now.
Objection 3: Further, subtlety is in bodies as a result of scarcity of
matter, wherefore bodies that have less matter within equal dimensions
are said to be more subtle; as fire in comparison with air, and air as
compared with water, and water as compared with earth. But there will
be as much matter in the glorified bodies as there is now, nor will
their dimensions be greater. Therefore they will not be more subtle
then than now.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:44): "It is sown a
corruptible body, it shall rise a spiritual," i.e. a spirit-like,
"body." But the subtlety of a spirit surpasses all bodily subtlety.
Therefore the glorified bodies will be most subtle.
Further, the more subtle a body is the more exalted it is. But the
glorified bodies will be most exalted. Therefore they will be most
subtle.
I answer that, Subtlety takes its name from the power to penetrate.
Hence it is said in De Gener. ii that "a subtle thing fills all the
parts and the parts of parts." Now that a body has the power of
penetrating may happen through two causes. First, through smallness of
quantity, especially in respect of depth and breadth, but not of
length, because penetration regards depth, wherefore length is not an
obstacle to penetration. Secondly, through paucity of matter, wherefore
rarity is synonymous with subtlety: and since in rare bodies the form
is more predominant over the matter, the term "subtlety" has been
transferred to those bodies which are most perfectly subject to their
form, and are most fully perfected thereby: thus we speak of subtlety
in the sun and moon and like bodies, just as gold and similar things
may be called subtle, when they are most perfectly complete in their
specific being and power. And since incorporeal things lack quantity
and matter, the term "subtlety" is applied to them, not only by reason
of their substance, but also on account of their power. For just as a
subtle thing is said to be penetrative, for the reason that it reaches
to the inmost part of a thing, so is an intellect said to be subtle
because it reaches to the insight of the intrinsic principles and the
hidden natural properties of a thing. In like manner a person is said
to have subtle sight, because he is able to perceive by sight things of
the smallest size: and the same applies to the other senses.
Accordingly people have differed by ascribing subtlety to the glorified
bodies in different ways.
For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xiii, 22),
ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual substances are said to
be subtle: and they said that at the resurrection the body will be
transformed into a spirit, and that for this reason the Apostle
describes as being "spiritual" the bodies of those who rise again (1
Cor. 15:44). But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body
cannot be changed into a spirit, since there is no community of matter
between them: and Boethius proves this (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly,
because, if this were possible, and one's body were changed into a
spirit, one would not rise again a man, for a man naturally consists of
a soul and body. Thirdly, because if this were the Apostle's meaning,
just as he speaks of spiritual bodies, so would he speak of natural
[animale] bodies, as being changed into souls [animam]: and this is
clearly false.
Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain at the
resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety by means of
rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising again will be like the air
or the wind, as Gregory relates (Moral. xiv, 56). But this again cannot
be maintained, because our Lord had a palpable body after the
Resurrection, as appears from the last chapter of Luke, and we must
believe that His body was supremely subtle. Moreover the human body
will rise again with flesh and bones, as did the body of our Lord,
according to Lk. 24:39, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see
Me to have," and Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see God," my Saviour:
and the nature of flesh and bone is incompatible with the aforesaid
rarity.
Consequently another kind of subtlety must be assigned to glorified
bodies, by saying that they are subtle on account of the most complete
perfection of the body. But this completeness is explained by some in
relation to the fifth, or heavenly, essence, which will be then
predominant in them. This, however, is impossible, since first of all
the fifth essence can nowise enter into the composition of a body, as
we have shown above (Sent. D, 12, qu. 1). Secondly, because granted
that it entered into the composition of the human body, it would be
impossible to account for its having a greater predominance over the
elemental nature then than now, unless---either the amount of the
heavenly nature in human bodies were increased (thus human bodies would
not be of the same stature, unless perhaps elemental matter in man were
decreased, which is inconsistent with the integrity of those who rise
again)---or unless elemental nature were endowed with the properties of
the heavenly nature through the latter's dominion over the body, and in
that case a natural power would be the cause of a property of glory,
which seems absurd.
Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by reason of which
human bodies are said to be subtle will result from the dominion of the
glorified soul (which is the form of the body) over the body, by reason
of which dominion the glorified body is said to be "spiritual," as
being wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby the
body is subject to the soul is to the effect of its participating in
its specific being, in so far as it is subject to the soul as matter to
form; and secondly it is subject to the soul in respect of the other
operations of the soul, in so far as the soul is a principle of
movement. Consequently the first reason for spirituality in the body is
subtlety, and, after that, agility and the other properties of a
glorified body. Hence the Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking
of spirituality indicates subtlety: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xiv,
56) that "the glorified body is said to be subtle as a result of a
spiritual power."
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections which refer to the
subtlety of rarefaction.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified body is able to be in the
same place with another body not glorified?
Objection 1: It would seem that by reason of this subtlety a body is
able to be in the same place with another body not glorified. For
according to Phil. 3:21, "He will reform the body of our lowness made
like to the body of His glory." Now the body of Christ was able to be
in the same place with another body, as appears from the fact that
after His Resurrection He went in to His disciples, the doors being
shut (Jn. 20:19, 26). Therefore also the glorified bodies by reason of
their subtlety will be able to be in the same place with other bodies
not glorified.
Objection 2: Further, glorified bodies will be superior to all other
bodies. Yet by reason of their superiority certain bodies, to wit the
solar rays, are able now to occupy the same place together with other
bodies. Much more therefore is this befitting glorified bodies.
Objection 3: Further, a heavenly body cannot be severed, at least as
regards the substance of the spheres: hence it is written (Job 37:18)
that "the heavens . . . are most strong, as if they were of molten
brass." If then the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to
be in the same place together with another body, it will never be able
to ascend to the empyrean,* and this is erroneous. [*The empyrean was
the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by
Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. [5082]FP, Q[56], A[3]].
Objection 4: Further, a body which is unable to be in the same place
with another body can be hindered in its movement or even surrounded by
others standing in its way. But this cannot happen to glorified bodies.
Therefore they will be able to be together in the same place with other
bodies.
Objection 5: Further, as point is to point, so is line to line, surface
to surface, and body to body. Now two points can be coincident, as in
the case of two lines touching one another, and two lines when two
surfaces are in contact with one another, and two surfaces when two
bodies touch one another, because "contiguous things are those whose
boundaries coincide" (Phys. vi, 6). Therefore it is not against the
nature of a body to be in the same place together with another body.
Now whatever excellence is competent to the nature of a body will all
be bestowed on the glorified body. Therefore a glorified body, by
reason of its subtlety, will be able to be in the same place together
with another body.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. i): "Difference of accidents
makes distinction in number. For three men differ not in genus, nor in
species, but in their accidents. If we were to remove absolutely every
accident from them, still each one has a different place; and it is
quite conceivable that they should all occupy the same place."
Therefore if we suppose two bodies to occupy the same place, there will
be but one body numerically.
I answer that, It cannot be maintained that a glorified body, by reason
of its subtlety, is able to be in the same place with another body,
unless the obstacle to its being now in the same place with another
body be removed by that subtlety. Some say that in the present state
this obstacle is its grossness by virtue of which it is able to occupy
a place; and that this grossness is removed by the gift of subtlety.
But there are two reasons why this cannot be maintained. First, because
the grossness which the gift of subtlety removes is a kind of defect,
for instance an inordinateness of matter in not being perfectly subject
to its form. For all that pertains to the integrity of the body will
rise again in the body, both as regards the matter and as regards the
form. And the fact that a body is able to fill a place belongs to it by
reason of that which pertains to its integrity, and not on account of
any defect of nature. For since fulness is opposed to vacancy, that
alone does not fill a place, which being put in a place, nevertheless
leaves a place vacant. Now a vacuum is defined by the Philosopher
(Phys. iv, 6,7) as being "a place not filled by a sensible body." And a
body is said to be sensible by reason of its matter, form, and natural
accidents, all of which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also
plain that the glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as
evidenced by the body of our Lord (Lk. 24:39): nor will it lack matter,
or form, or natural accidents, namely heat, cold, and so forth. Hence
it is evident that the glorified body, the gift of subtlety
notwithstanding, will fill a place: for it would seem madness to say
that the place in which there will be a glorified body will be empty.
Secondly their aforesaid argument does not avail, because to hinder the
co-existence of a body in the same place is more than to fill a place.
For if we suppose dimensions separate from matter, those dimensions do
not fill a place. Hence some who held the possibility of a vacuum, said
that a vacuum is a place wherein such like dimensions exist apart from
a sensible body; and yet those dimensions hinder another body from
being together with them in the same place. This is made clear by the
Philosopher (Phys. iv, 1,8; Metaph. ii, 2), where he considers it
impossible for a mathematical body, which is nothing but separate
dimensions, to be together with another natural sensible body.
Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glorified body hindered it
from filling a place, nevertheless it would not follow that for this
reason it is able to be in the same place with another body, since the
removal of the lesser does not involve the removal of the greater.
Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our body's being now in
the same place with another body can nowise be removed by the gift of
subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from occupying the same place
together with another body, except something in it that requires a
different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, save that
which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinction of place is not
required by any quality of the body, because a body demands a place,
not by reason of its quality: wherefore if we remove from a body the
fact of its being hot or cold, heavy or light, it still retains the
necessity of the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves
(Phys. iv), and as is self-evident. In like manner neither can matter
cause the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, because matter does
not occupy a place except through its dimensive quantity. Again neither
does form occupy a place, unless it have a place through its matter. It
remains therefore that the necessity for two bodies occupying each a
distinct place results from the nature of dimensive quantity, to which
a place is essentially befitting. For this forms part of its
definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity occupying a place.
Hence it is that if we remove all else in a thing from it, the
necessity of this distinction is found in its dimensive quantity alone.
Thus take the example of a separate line, supposing there to be two
such lines, or two parts of one line, they must needs occupy distinct
places, else one line added to another would not make something
greater, and this is against common sense. The same applies to surfaces
and mathematical bodies. And since matter demands place, through being
the subject of dimension, the aforesaid necessity results in placed
matter, so that just as it is impossible for there to be two lines, or
two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places, so is it
impossible for there to be two matters, or two parts of matter, without
there be distinction of place. And since distinction of matter is the
principle of the distinction between individuals, it follows that, as
Boethius says (De Trin.), "we cannot possibly conceive two bodies
occupying one place," so that this distinction of individuals requires
this difference of accidents. Now subtlety does not deprive the
glorified body of its dimension; wherefore it nowise removes from it
the aforesaid necessity of occupying a distinct place from another
body. Therefore the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to
be in the same place together with another body, but it will be
possible for it to be together with another body by the operation of
the Divine power: even as the body of Peter had the power whereby the
sick were healed at the passing of Peter's shadow (Acts 5:15) not
through any inherent property, but by the power of God for the
upbuilding of the faith. Thus will the Divine power make it possible
for a glorified body to be in the same place together with another body
for the perfection of glory.
Reply to Objection 1: That Christ's body was able to be together with
another body in the same place was not due to its subtlety, but
resulted from the power of His Godhead after His resurrection, even as
in His birth [*Cf. [5083]TP, Q[28], A[2], ad 3]. Hence Gregory says
(Hom. xxvi in Evang.): "The same body went into His disciples the doors
being shut, which to human eyes came from the closed womb of the Virgin
at His birth." Therefore there is no reason why this should be
befitting to glorified bodies on account of their subtlety.
Reply to Objection 2: Light is not a body as we have said above (Sent.
ii, Q[13], A[3]; [5084]FP, Q[67], A[2]): hence the objection proceeds
on a false supposition.
Reply to Objection 3: The glorified body will pass through the heavenly
spheres without severing them, not by virtue of its subtlety, but by
the Divine power, which will assist them in all things at will.
Reply to Objection 4: From the fact that God will come to the aid of
the blessed at will in whatever they desire, it follows that they
cannot be surrounded or imprisoned.
Reply to Objection 5: As stated in Phys. iv, 5, "a point is not in a
place": hence if it be said to be in a place, this is only accidental,
because the body of which it is a term is in a place. And just as the
whole place corresponds to the whole body, so the term of the place
corresponds to the term of the body. But it happens that two places
have one term, even as two lines terminate in one point. And
consequently though two bodies must needs be in distinct places, yet
the same term of two places corresponds to the two terms of the two
bodies. It is in this sense that the bounds of contiguous bodies are
said to coincide.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies to be in the same
place?
Objection 1: It would seem that not even by a miracle is it possible
for two bodies to be in the same place. For it is not possible that, by
a miracle, two bodies be at once two and one, since this would imply
that contradictions are true at the same time. But if we suppose two
bodies to be in the same place, it would follow that those two bodies
are one. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is
proved thus. Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the same place. The
dimensions of A will either be the same as the dimensions of the place,
or they will differ from them. If they differ, then some of the
dimensions will be separate: which is impossible, since the dimensions
that are within the bounds of a place are not in a subject unless they
be in a placed body. If they be the same, then for the same reason the
dimensions of B will be the same as the dimensions of the place. "Now
things that are the same with one and the same thing are the same with
one another." Therefore the dimensions of A and B are the same. But two
bodies cannot have identical dimensions just as they cannot have the
same whiteness. Therefore A and B are one body and yet they were two.
Therefore they are at the same time one and two.
Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be done miraculously either
against the common principles---for instance that the part be not less
than the whole; since what is contrary to common principles implies a
direct contradiction---or contrary to the conclusions of geometry which
are infallible deductions from common principles---for instance that
the three angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right angles.
In like manner nothing can be done to a line that is contrary to the
definition of a line, because to sever the definition from the defined
is to make two contradictories true at the same time. Now it is
contrary to common principles, both to the conclusions of geometry and
to the definition of a line, for two bodies to be in the same place.
Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved as
follows: It is a conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one
another only at a point. Now if two circular bodies were in the same
place, the two circles described in them would touch one another as a
whole. Again it is contrary to the definition of a line that there be
more than one straight line between two points: yet this would be the
case were two bodies in the same place, since between two given points
in the various surfaces of the place, there would be two straight lines
corresponding to the two bodies in that place.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem impossible that by a miracle a body
which is enclosed within another should not be in a place, for then it
would have a common and not a proper place, and this is impossible. Yet
this would follow if two bodies were in the same place. Therefore this
cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Supposing two
bodies to be in the same place, the one being greater than the other as
to every dimension, the lesser body will be enclosed in the greater,
and the place occupied by the greater body will be its common place;
while it will have no proper place, because no given surface of the
body will contain it, and this is essential to place. Therefore it will
not have a proper place.
Objection 4: Further, place corresponds in proportion to the thing
placed. Now it can never happen by a miracle that the same body is at
the same time in different places, except by some kind of
transformation, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore it can
nowise happen by a miracle that two bodies be together in the same
place.
On the contrary, The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her Son by a miracle.
Now in this hallowed birth it was necessary for two bodies to be
together in the same place, because the body of her child when coming
forth did not break through the enclosure of her virginal purity.
Therefore it is possible for two bodies to be miraculously together in
the same place.
Further, this may again be proved from the fact that our Lord went in
to His disciples, the doors being shut (Jn. 20:19, 26).
I answer that, As shown above [5085](A[2]) the reason why two bodies
must needs be in two places is that distinction in matter requires
distinction in place. Wherefore we observe that when two bodies merge
into one, each loses its distinct being, and one indistinct being
accrues to the two combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence it is
impossible for two bodies to remain two and yet be together unless each
retain its distinct being which it had hitherto, in so much as each of
them was a being undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now this
distinct being depends on the essential principles of a thing as on its
proximate causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since the first
cause can preserve a thing in being, though the second causes be done
away, as appears from the first proposition of De Causis, therefore by
God's power and by that alone it is possible for an accident to be
without substance as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Likewise by the
power of God, and by that alone, it is possible for a body to retain
its distinct being from that of another body, although its matter be
not distinct as to place from the matter of the other body: and thus it
is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be together in the same
place.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is sophistical because it is based
on a false supposition, or begs the question. For it supposes the
existence, between two opposite superficies of a place, of a dimension
proper to the place, with which dimension a dimension of the body put
in occupation of the place would have to be identified: because it
would then follow that the dimensions of two bodies occupying a place
would become one dimension, if each of them were identified with the
dimension of the place. But this supposition is false, because if it
were true whenever a body acquires a new place, it would follow that a
change takes place in the dimensions of the place or of thing placed:
since it is impossible for two things to become one anew, except one of
them be changed. Whereas if, as is the case in truth, no other
dimensions belong to a place than those of the thing occupying the
place, it is clear that the argument proves nothing, but begs the
question, because according to this nothing else has been said, but
that the dimensions of a thing placed are the same as the dimensions of
the place; excepting that the dimensions of the thing placed are
contained within the bounds of the place, and that the distance between
the bounds of a place is commensurate with the distance between the
bounds of the thing placed, just as the former would be distant by
their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the dimensions of two
bodies be the dimensions of one place is nothing else than that two
bodies be in the same place, which is the chief question at issue.
Reply to Objection 2: Granted that by a miracle two bodies be together
in the same place, nothing follows either against common principles, or
against the definition of a line, or against any conclusions of
geometry. For, as stated above [5086](A[2]), dimensive quantity differs
from all other accidents in that it has a special reason of
individuality and distinction, namely on account of the placing of the
parts, besides the reason of individuality and distinction which is
common to it and all other accidents, arising namely from the matter
which is its subject. Thus then one line may be understood as being
distinct from another, either because it is in another subject (in
which case we are considering a material line), or because it is placed
at a distance from another (in which case we are considering a
mathematical line, which is understood apart from matter). Accordingly
if we remove matter, there can be no distinction between lines save in
respect of a different placing: and in like manner neither can there be
a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of any dimensions
whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose one line to be added to
another, as being distinct therefrom unless it be distinct as to place.
But supposing by a Divine miracle a distinction of subject without a
distinction of place, we can understand a distinction of lines; and
these are not distant from one another in place, on account of the
distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a difference of
points, and thus different lines described on two bodies that are in
the same place are drawn from different points to different points; for
the point that we take is not a point fixed in the place, but in the
placed body, because a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from
a point which is its term. In like manner the two circles described in
two spherical bodies that occupy the same place are two, not on account
of the difference of place, else they could not touch one another as a
whole, but on account of the distinction of subjects, and thus while
wholly touching one another they still remain two. Even so a circle
described by a placed spherical body touches, as a whole, the other
circle described by the locating body.
Reply to Objection 3: God could make a body not to be in a place; and
yet supposing this, it would not follow that a certain body is not in a
place, because the greater body is the place of the lesser body, by
reason of its superficies which is described by contact with the terms
of the lesser body.
Reply to Objection 4: It is impossible for one body to be miraculously
in two places locally (for Christ's body is not locally on the altar),
although it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be in the same
place. Because to be in several places at once is incompatible with the
individual, by reason of its having being undivided in itself, for it
would follow that it is divided as to place. on the other hand, to be
in the same place with another body is incompatible with the individual
as distinct from aught else. Now the nature of unity is perfected in
indivision (Metaph. v), whereas distinction from others is a result of
the nature of unity. Wherefore that one same body be locally in several
places at once implies a contradiction, even as for a man to lack
reason, while for two bodies to be in the same place does not imply a
contradiction, as explained above. Hence the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one glorified body can be in the same place together with another
glorified body?
Objection 1: It would seem that a glorified body can be in the same
place together with another glorified body. Because where there is
greater subtlety there is less resistance. If then a glorified body is
more subtle than a non-glorified body, it will offer less resistance to
a glorified body: and so if a glorified body can be in the same place
with a non-glorified body, much more can it with a glorified body.
Objection 2: Further, even as a glorified body will be more subtle than
a non-glorified body, so will one glorified body be more subtle than
another. Therefore if a glorified body can be in the same place with a
non-glorified body, a more subtle glorified body can be in the same
place with a less subtle glorified body.
Objection 3: Further, the body of heaven is subtle, and will then be
glorified. Now the glorified body of a saint will be able to be in the
same place with the body of heaven, since the saints will be able at
will to travel to and from earth. Therefore two glorified bodies will
be able to occupy the same place.
On the contrary, The glorified bodies will be spiritual, that is like
spirits in a certain respect. Now two spirits cannot be in the same
place, although a body and a spirit can be in the same place, as stated
above (Sent. i, D, 37, Q[3], A[3]; [5087]FP, Q[52], A[3]). Therefore
neither will two glorified bodies be able to be in the same place.
Further, if two bodies occupy the same place, one is penetrated by the
other. But to be penetrated is a mark of imperfection which will be
altogether absent from the glorified bodies. Therefore it will be
impossible for two glorified bodies to be in the same place.
I answer that, The property of a glorified body does not make it able
to be in the same place with another glorified body, nor again to be in
the same place with a non-glorified body. But it would be possible by
the Divine power for two glorified bodies or two non-glorified bodies
to be in the same place, even as a glorified body with a non-glorified
body. Nevertheless it is not befitting for a glorified body to be in
the same place with another glorified body, both because a becoming
order will be observed in them, which demands distinction, and because
one glorified body will not be in the way of another. Consequently two
glorified bodies will never be in the same place.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument supposes that a glorified body is
able by reason of its subtlety to be in the same place with another
body: and this is not true.
The same answer applies to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The body of heaven and the other bodies will be
said equivocally to be glorified, in so far as they will have a certain
share in glory, and not as though it were becoming for them to have the
gifts of glorified human bodies.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by virtue of its subtlety a glorified body will no longer need to b
e
in an equal place?
Objection 1: It would seem that by virtue of its subtlety, a glorified
body will no longer need to be in an equal place. For the glorified
bodies will be made like to the body of Christ according to Phil. 3:21.
Now Christ's body is not bound by this necessity of being in an equal
place: wherefore it is contained whole under the small or great
dimensions of a consecrated host. Therefore the same will be true of
the glorified bodies.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv, 6), that two
bodies are not in the same place, because it would follow that the
greatest body would occupy the smallest place, since its various parts
could be in the same part of the place: for it makes no difference
whether two bodies or however many be in the same place. Now a
glorified body will be in the same place with another body, as is
commonly admitted. Therefore it will be possible for it to be in any
place however small.
Objection 3: Further, even as a body is seen by reason of its color, so
is it measured by reason of its quantity. Now the glorified body will
be so subject to the spirit that it will be able at will to be seen,
and not seen, especially by a non-glorified eye, as evidenced in the
case of Christ. Therefore its quantity will be so subject to the
spirit's will that it will be able to be in a little or great place,
and to have a little or great quantity at will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 30) that
"whatever is in a place occupies a place equal to itself." Now the
glorified body will be in a place. Therefore it will occupy a place
equal to itself.
Further, the dimensions of a place and of that which is in that place
are the same, as shown in Phys. iv, text. 30,76,77. Therefore if the
place were larger than that which is in the place the same thing would
be greater and smaller than itself, which is absurd.
I answer that, A body is not related to place save through the medium
of its proper dimensions, in respect of which a located body is
confined through contact with the locating body. Hence it is not
possible for a body to occupy a place smaller than its quantity, unless
its proper quantity be made in some way less than itself: and this can
only be understood in two ways. First, by a variation in quantity in
respect of the same matter, so that in fact the matter which at first
is subject to a greater quantity is afterwards subject to a lesser.
Some have held this to be the case with the glorified bodies, saying
that quantity is subject to them at will, so that when they list, they
are able to have a great quantity, and when they list a small quantity.
But this is impossible, because no movement affecting that which is
intrinsic to a thing is possible without passion to the detriment [*Cf.
[5088]FS, Q[22], A[1]; [5089]FS, Q[41], A[1]] of its substance. Hence
in incorruptible, i.e. heavenly, bodies, there is only local movement,
which is not according to something intrinsic. Thus it is clear that
change of quantity in respect of matter would be incompatible with the
impassibility and incorruptibility of a glorified body. Moreover, it
would follow that a glorified body would be sometimes rarer and
sometimes denser, because since it cannot be deprived of any of its
matter, sometimes the same matter would be under great dimensions and
sometimes under small dimensions, and thus it would be rarefied and
densified, which is impossible. Secondly, that the quantity of a
glorified body become smaller than itself may be understood by a
variation of place; so, to wit, that the parts of a glorified body
insinuate themselves into one another, so that it is reduced in
quantity however small it may become. And some have held this to be the
case, saying that by reason of its subtlety a glorified body will be
able to be in the same place with a non-glorified body: and that in
like manner its parts can be one within the other, so much so that a
whole glorified body will be able to pass through the minutest opening
in another body: and thus they explain how Christ's body came out of
the Virgin's womb; and how it went into His disciples, the doors being
shut. But this is impossible; both because the glorified body will not
be able, by reason of its subtlety, to be in the same place with
another body, and because, even if it were able to be in the same place
with another body, this would not be possible if the other were a
glorified body, as many say; and again because this would be
inconsistent with the right disposition of the human body, which
requires the parts to be in a certain fixed place and at a certain
fixed distance from one another. Wherefore this will never happen, not
even by a miracle. Consequently we must say that the glorified body
will always be in a place equal to itself.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body is not locally in the Sacrament of
the Altar, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 10, Q[1], A[1], ad 5;
[5090]TP, Q[77], A[5]).
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher's argument is that for the same
reason one part might permeate another. But this permeation of the
parts of a glorified body into one another is impossible, as stated
above. Therefore the objection does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: A body is seen because it acts on the sight: but
that it does or does not act on the sight causes no change in the body.
Hence it is not unfitting, if it can be seen when it will, and not seen
when it will [*Cf. [5091]TP, Q[55], A[4]]. On the other hand, being in
a place is not an action proceeding from a body by reason of its
quantity, as being seen is by reason of its color. Consequently the
comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be impalpable?
Objection 1: It would seem that the glorified body, by reason of its
subtlety, is impalpable. For Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang.): "What
is palpable must needs be corruptible." But the glorified body is
incorruptible. Therefore it is impalpable.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is palpable resists one who handles it.
But that which can be in the same place with another does not resist
it. Since then a glorified body can be in the same place with another
body, it will not be palpable.
Objection 3: Further, every palpable body is tangible. Now every
tangible body has tangible qualities in excess of the qualities of the
one touching it. Since then in the glorified bodies the tangible
qualities are not in excess but are reduced to a supreme degree of
equality, it would seem that they are impalpable.
On the contrary, our Lord rose again with a glorified body; and yet His
body was palpable, as appears from Lk. 24:39: "Handle, and see; for a
spirit hath not flesh and bones." Therefore the glorified bodies also
will be palpable.
Further, this is the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, as
Gregory states (Moral. xxiv): for he said that in the glory of the
resurrection our bodies will be impalpable.
I answer that, Every palpable body is tangible, but not conversely. For
every body is tangible that has qualities whereby the sense of touch
has a natural aptitude to be affected: wherefore air, fire, and the
like are tangible bodies: but a palpable body, in addition to this,
resists the touch; wherefore the air which never resists that which
passes through it, and is most easily pierced, is tangible indeed but
not palpable. Accordingly it is clear that a body is said to be
palpable for two reasons, namely on account of its tangible qualities,
and on account of its resisting that which touches it, so as to hinder
it from piercing it. And since the tangible qualities are hot and cold
and so forth, which are not found save in heavy and light bodies, which
through being contrary to one another are therefore corruptible, it
follows that the heavenly bodies, which by their nature are
incorruptible, are sensible to the sight but not tangible, and
therefore neither are they palpable. This is what Gregory means when he
says (Hom. xxv in Evang.) that "whatever is palpable must needs be
corruptible." Accordingly the glorified body has by its nature those
qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect the touch, and yet
since the body is altogether subject to the spirit, it is in its power
thereby to affect or not to affect the touch. In like manner it is
competent by its nature to resist any other passing body, so that the
latter cannot be in the same place together with it: although,
according to its pleasure, it may happen by the Divine power that it
occupy the same place with another body, and thus offer no resistance
to a passing body. Wherefore according to its nature the glorified body
is palpable, but it is competent for it to be impalpable to a
non-glorified body by a supernatural power. Hence Gregory says (Hom.
xxv in Evang.) that "our Lord offered His flesh to be handled, which He
had brought in through the closed doors, so as to afford a complete
proof that after His resurrection His body was unchanged in nature
though changed in glory."
Reply to Objection 1: The incorruptibility of a glorified body does not
result from the nature of its component parts; and it is on account of
that nature that whatever is palpable is corruptible, as stated above.
Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: Although in a way it is possible for a glorified
body to be in the same place with another body: nevertheless the
glorified body has it in its power to resist at will any one touching
it, and thus it is palpable.
Reply to Objection 3: In the glorified bodies the tangible qualities
are not reduced to the real mean that is measured according to equal
distance from the extremes, but to the proportionate mean, according as
is most becoming to the human complexion in each part. Wherefore the
touch of those bodies will be most delightful, because a power always
delights in a becoming object, and is grieved by excess.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE AGILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the agility of the bodies of the blessed in the
resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?
(2) Whether they will move?
(3) Whether they will move instantaneously?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?
Objection 1: It would seem that the glorified bodies will not be agile.
For that which is agile by itself needs not to be carried in order to
move. But the glorified bodies will, after the resurrection, be taken
up by the angels (according to a gloss) in the clouds "to meet Christ,
into the air" (1 Thess. 4:16). Therefore the glorified bodies will not
be agile.
Objection 2: Further, no body that moves with labor and pain can be
said to be agile. Yet the glorified bodies will move thus, since the
principle of their movement, namely the soul, moves them counter to
their nature, else they would always move in the same direction.
Therefore they are not agile.
Objection 3: Further, of all the animal operations sense surpasses
movement in nobility and priority. Yet no property is ascribed to
glorified bodies as perfecting them in sensation. Therefore neither
should agility be ascribed to them as perfecting them in movement.
Objection 4: Further, nature gives different animals instruments of
different disposition according to their different powers: hence she
does not give instruments of the same disposition to slow as to fleet
animals. Now God's works are much more orderly than those of nature.
Since then the glorified body's members will have the same disposition,
shape and quantity as they now have, it would seem that it will have no
agility other than it has now.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:43): "It is sown in weakness,
it shall rise in power," that is, according to a gloss, "mobile and
living." But mobility can only signify agility in movement. Therefore
the glorified bodies will be agile.
Further, slowness of movement would seem especially inconsistent with
the nature of a spirit. But the glorified bodies will be most spiritual
according to 1 Cor. 15:44. Therefore they will be agile.
I answer that, The glorified body will be altogether subject to the
glorified soul, so that not only will there be nothing in it to resist
the will of the spirit, for it was even so in the case of Adam's body,
but also from the glorified soul there will flow into the body a
certain perfection, whereby it will become adapted to that subjection:
and this perfection is called "the gift of the glorified body." Now the
soul is united to body not only as its form, but also as its mover; and
in both ways the glorified body must needs be most perfectly subject to
the glorified soul. Wherefore even as by the gift of subtlety the body
is wholly subject to the soul as its form, whence it derives its
specific being, so by the gift of agility it is subject to the soul as
its mover, so that it is prompt and apt to obey the spirit in all the
movements and actions of the soul.
Some, however, ascribe the cause of this agility to the fifth, i.e. the
heavenly essence, which will then be predominant in the glorified
bodies. But of this we have frequently observed that it does not seem
probable ([5092]Q[82], A[1];[5093] Q[83], A[1]). Wherefore it is better
to ascribe it to the soul, whence glory flows to the body.
Reply to Objection 1: Glorified bodies are said to be borne by the
angels and also on the clouds, not as though they needed them, but in
order to signify the reverence which both angels and all creatures will
show them.
Reply to Objection 2: The more the power of the moving soul dominates
over the body, the less is the labor of movement, even though it be
counter to the body's nature. Hence those in whom the motive power is
stronger, and those who through exercise have the body more adapted to
obey the moving spirit, labor less in being moved. And since, after the
resurrection, the soul will perfectly dominate the body, both on
account of the perfection of its own power, and on account of the
glorified body's aptitude resulting from the outflow of glory which it
receives from the soul, there will be no labor in the saints'
movements, and thus it may be said that the bodies of the saints' will
be agile.
Reply to Objection 3: By the gift of agility the glorified body will be
rendered apt not only for local movement but also for sensation, and
for the execution of all the other operations of the soul.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as nature gives to fleeter animals
instruments of a different disposition in shape and quantity, so God
will give to the bodies of the saints a disposition other than that
which they have now, not indeed in shape and quantity, but in that
property of glory which is called agility.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement
?
Objection 1: It would seem that the saints will never use their agility
for the purpose of movement. For, according to the Philosopher (Phys.
iii, 2), "movement is the act of the imperfect." But there will be no
imperfection in glorified bodies. Neither therefore will there be any
movement.
Objection 2: Further, all movement is on account of some need, because
whatever is in motion is moved for the sake of obtaining some end. But
glorified bodies will have no need, since as Augustine says (De Spiritu
et Anima, lxiii [*Cf.[5094] Q[70], A[2], ad 1]), "all thou willest will
be there, and nothing that thou willest not." Therefore they will not
move.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo
ii), "that which shares the Divine goodness without movement shares it
more excellently than that which shares it with movement." Now the
glorified body shares the Divine goodness more excellently than any
other body. Since then certain bodies, like the heavenly bodies, will
remain altogether without movement, it seems that much more will human
bodies remain so.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii) that the soul
being established in God will in consequence establish its body. Now
the soul will be so established in God, that in no way will it move
away from Him. Therefore in the body there will be no movement caused
by the soul.
Objection 5: Further, the more noble a body is, the more noble a place
is due to it: wherefore Christ's body which is the most exalted of all
has the highest place of all, according to Heb. 7:26, "Made higher than
the heavens," where a gloss [*Gloss on Heb. 1:3: "On the right hand of
the majesty"] says, "in place and dignity." And again each glorified
body will, in like manner, have a place befitting it according to the
measure of its dignity. Now a fitting place is one of the conditions
pertaining to glory. Since then after the resurrection the glory of the
saints will never vary, neither by increase nor by decrease, because
they will then have reached the final term of all, it would seem that
their bodies will never leave the place assigned to them, and
consequently will not be moved.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 40:31): "They shall run and not be
weary, they shall walk and not faint"; and (Wis. 3:7): "(The just)
shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds." Therefore there will
be some movement in glorified bodies.
I answer that, It is necessary to suppose that the glorified bodies are
moved sometimes, since even Christ's body was moved in His ascension,
and likewise the bodies of the saints, which will arise from the earth,
will ascend to the empyrean [*The empyrean was the highest of the
concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers
with the abode of God. Cf. [5095]FP, Q[56], A[3]]. But even after they
have climbed the heavens, it is likely that they will sometimes move
according as it pleases them; so that by actually putting into practice
that which is in their power, they may show forth the excellence of
Divine wisdom, and that furthermore their vision may be refreshed by
the beauty of the variety of creatures, in which God's wisdom will
shine forth with great evidence: for sense can only perceive that which
is present, although glorified bodies can perceive from a greater
distance than non-glorified bodies. And yet movement will nowise
diminish their happiness which consists in seeing God, for He will be
everywhere present to them; thus Gregory says of the angels (Hom. xxxiv
in Evang.) that "wherever they are sent their course lies in God."
Reply to Objection 1: Local movement changes nothing that is intrinsic
to a thing, but only that which is without namely place. Hence that
which is moved locally is perfect as to those things which are within
(Phys. viii, 7), although it has an imperfection as to place, because
while it is in one place it is in potentiality with regard to another
place, since it cannot be in several places at the same time, for this
belongs to God alone. But this defect is not inconsistent with the
perfection of glory, as neither is the defect whereby a creature is
formed from nothing. Hence such like defects will remain in glorified
bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: A person is said to need a thing in two ways,
namely absolutely and relatively. One needs absolutely that without
which one cannot retain one's being or one's perfection: and thus
movement in glorified bodies will not be on account of a need, because
their happiness will suffice them for all such things. But we need a
thing relatively when without it some end we have in view cannot be
obtained by us, or not so well, or not in some particular way. It is
thus that movement will be in the blessed on account of need, for they
will be unable to show forth their motive power practically, unless
they be in motion, since nothing prevents a need of this kind being in
glorified bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument would prove if the glorified body
were unable even without movement to share the Divine goodness much
more perfectly than the heavenly bodies, which is untrue. Hence
glorified bodies will be moved, not in order to gain a perfect
participation in the Divine goodness (since they have this through
glory), but in order to show the soul's power. On the other hand, the
movement of the heavenly bodies could not show their power, except the
power they have in moving lower bodies to generation and corruption,
which is not becoming to that state. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 4: Local movement takes nothing away from the
stability of the soul that is established in God, since it does not
affect that which is intrinsic to a thing, as stated above (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 5: The fitting place assigned to each glorified body
according to the degree of its dignity belongs to the accidental
reward. Nor does it follow that this reward is diminished whenever the
body is outside its place; because that place pertains to reward, not
as actually containing the body located therein (since nothing flows
therefrom into the glorified body, but rather does it receive splendor
therefrom), but as being due to merits. Wherefore, though out of that
place, they will still continue to rejoice in it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous?
Objection 1: It would seem that movement of the saints will be
instantaneous. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "wherever
the spirit listeth there will the body be." Now the movement of the
will, whereby the spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous.
Therefore the body's movement will be instantaneous.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 8) proves that there
is no movement through a vacuum, because it would follow that something
moves instantaneously, since a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to
a thing that is in motion, whereas the plenum offers resistance; and so
there would be no proportion between the velocity of movement in a
vacuum and that of movement in a plenum, since the ratio of movements
in point of velocity is as the ratio of the resistance offered by the
medium. Now the velocities of any two movements that take place in time
must needs be proportional, since any one space of time is proportional
to any other. But in like manner no full place can resist a glorified
body since this can be in the same place with another body, no matter
how this may occur; even as neither can a vacuum resist a body.
Therefore if it moves at all, it moves instantaneously.
Objection 3: Further, the power of a glorified soul surpasses the power
of a non-glorified soul, out of all proportion so to speak. Now the
non-glorified soul moves the body in time. Therefore the glorified soul
moves the body instantaneously.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is moved equally soon to what is near
and what is distant, is moved instantaneously. Now such is the movement
of a glorified body, for however distant the space to which it is
moved, the time it takes to be moved is imperceptible: wherefore
Augustine says (QQ. De Resurrectione, Ep. cii, qu. 1) that "the
glorified body reaches equally soon to any distance, like the sun's
ray." Therefore the glorified body is moved instantaneously.
Objection 5: Further, whatever is in motion is moved either in time or
in an instant. Now after the resurrection the glorified body will not
be moved in time, since time will not be then according to Apoc. 10:6.
Therefore this movement will be instantaneous.
On the contrary, In local movement space. movement and time are equally
divisible, as is demonstrated in Phys. vi, 4. Now the space traversed
by a glorified body in motion is divisible. Therefore both the movement
and the time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible. Therefore
this movement will not be instantaneous.
Further, a thing cannot be at the same time wholly in one place and
partly in another place, since it would follow that the remaining part
is in two places at the same time, which is impossible. But whatever is
in motion is partly in a term "wherefrom" and partly in a term
"whereto," as is proved in Phys. vi, 6: while whatever has been in
motion is wholly in the term whereto the movement is directed; and it
is impossible at the same time for it to be moved and to have been
moved. Now that which is moved instantaneously is being moved and has
been moved at the same time. Therefore the local movement of a
glorified body cannot be instantaneous.
I answer that, Opinion is much divided on this point. For some say that
a glorified body passes from one place to another without passing
through the interval, just as the will passes from one place to another
without passing through the interval, and that consequently it is
possible for the movement of a glorified body like that of the will to
be instantaneous. But this will not hold: because the glorified body
will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, just as it
will never cease to be a body. Moreover, when the will is said to move
from one place to another, it is not essentially transferred from place
to place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, but it
is directed to one place after being directed by the intention to
another: and in this sense it is said to move from one place to
another.
Hence others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Th. III, Q[23], mem. 3] say
that it is a property of the nature of a glorified body, since it is a
body, to pass through the interval and consequently to be moved in
time, but that by the power of glory, which raises it to a certain
infinitude above the power of nature, it is possible for it not to pass
through the interval, and consequently to be moved instantaneously. But
this is impossible since it implies a contradiction: which is proved as
follows. Suppose a body which we will call Z to be in motion from A to
B. It is clear that Z, as long as it is wholly in A is not in motion;
and in like manner when it is wholly in B, because then the movement is
past. Therefore if it is at any time in motion it must needs be neither
wholly in A nor wholly in B. Therefore while it is in motion, it is
either nowhere, or partly in A, and partly in B, or wholly in some
other intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly in C
and B. But it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for then there would
be a dimensive quantity without a place, which is impossible. Nor again
is it possible for it to be partly in A and partly in B without being
in some way in the intervening space. for since B is a place distant
from A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of Z
which is in B is not continuous with the part which is in A. Therefore
it follows that it is either wholly in C, or partly in C, and partly in
some other place that intervenes between C and A, say D, and so forth.
Therefore it follows that Z does not pass form A to B unless first of
all it be in all the intervening places: unless we suppose that it
passes from A to B without ever being moved, which implies a
contradiction, because the very succession of places is local movement.
The same applies to any change whatever having two opposite terms, each
of which is a positive entity, but not to those changes which have only
one positive term, the other being a pure privation, since between
affirmation and negation or privation there is no fixed distance:
wherefore that which is in the negation may be nearer to or more remote
from affirmation, and conversely, by reason of something that causes
either of them or disposes thereto: so that while that which is moved
is wholly under a negation it is changed into affirmation, and "vice
versa"; wherefore in such things "to be changing precedes to be
changed," as is proved in Phys. vi, 5. Nor is there any comparison with
the movement of an angel, because being in a place is predicated
equivocally of a body and an angel. Hence it is clear that it is
altogether impossible for a body to pass from one place to another,
unless it pass through every interval.
Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the glorified
body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from this that a
glorified body is at the same instant in two or more places together,
namely in the ultimate term, and in all the intervening places, which
is impossible.
To this, however, they reply that, although it is the same instant
really, it is not the same logically, like a point at which different
lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures
the instantaneous, according to its reality and not according to our
way of considering it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in
a different way is not rendered capable of measuring things that are
not simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered in a
different way does not make it possible for one point of place to
contain things that are locally distant from one another.
Hence others with greater probability hold that a glorified body moves
in time, but that this time is so short as to be imperceptible; and
that nevertheless one glorified body can pass through the same space in
less time than another, because there is no limit to the divisibility
of time, no matter how short a space we may take.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is little lacking is as it were not
lacking at all (Phys. ii, 5); wherefore we say: "I do so and so at
once," when it is to be done after a short time. It is in this sense
that Augustine speaks when he says that "wheresoever the will shall be,
there shall the body be forthwith." Or we may say that in the blessed
there will never be an inordinate will: so that they never will wish
their body to be instantaneously where it cannot be, and consequently
whatever instant the will shall choose, at that same instant the body
will be in whatever place the will shall determine.
Reply to Objection 2: Some have demurred to this proposition of the
Philosopher's, as the Commentator thereon observes. They say that the
ratio of one whole movement to another whole movement is not
necessarily as the ratio of one resisting medium to another resisting
medium, but that the ratio of the intervening mediums gives us the
ratio of retardations attending the movements on account of the
resistance of the medium. For every movement has a certain fixed speed,
either fast or slow, through the mover overcoming the movable, although
there be no resistance on the part of the medium; as evidenced in
heavenly bodies, which have nothing to hinder their movement; and yet
they do not move instantaneously, but in a fixed time proportionate to
the power of the mover in comparison with the movable. Consequently it
is clear that even if we suppose something to move in a vacuum, it does
not follow that it moves instantaneously, but that nothing is added to
the time which that movement requires in the aforesaid proportion of
the mover to the movable, because the movement is not retarded.
But this reply, as the Commentator observes, proceeds from an error in
the imagination; for it is imagined that the retardation resulting from
the resistance of the medium is a part of movement added to the natural
movement, the quantity of which is in proportion to the mover in
comparison with the movable, as when one line is added to another: for
the proportion of one total to the other is not the same as the
proportion of the lines to which an addition has been made. [*The same
applies to mathematical quantities: for instance the ratio 2 + 1 to 4 +
1 is not as 2 to 4.] And so there would not be the same proportion
between one whole sensible movement and another, as between the
retardations resulting from the resistance of the medium. This is an
error of the imagination, because each part of a movement has as much
speed as the whole movement: whereas not every part of a line has as
much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has. Hence any
retardation or acceleration affecting the movement affects each of its
parts, which is not the case with lines: and consequently the
retardation that comes to a movement is not another part of the
movement, whereas in the case of the lines that which is added is a
part of the total line.
Consequently, in order to understand the Philosopher's argument, as the
Commentator explains, we must take the whole as being one, that is we
must take not only the resistance of the movable to the moving power,
but also the resistance of the medium through which the movement takes
place, and again the resistance of anything else, so that we take the
amount of retardation in the whole movement as being proportionate to
the moving power in comparison with the resisting movable, no matter in
what way it resist, whether by itself or by reason of something
extrinsic. For the movable must needs always resist the mover somewhat,
since mover and moved, agent and patient, as such, are opposed to one
another. Now sometimes it is to be observed that the moved resists the
mover by itself, either because it has a force inclining it to a
contrary movement, as appears in violent movements, or at least because
it has a place contrary to the place which is in the intention of the
mover; and such like resistance even heavenly bodies offer their
movers. Sometimes the movable resists the power of the mover, by reason
only of something else and not by itself. This is seen in the natural
movement of heavy and light things, because by their very form they are
inclined to such a movement: for the form is an impression of their
generator, which is the mover as regards heavy and light bodies. On the
part of matter we find no resistance, neither of a force inclining to a
contrary movement nor of a contrary place, since place is not due to
matter except in so far as the latter, being circumscribed by its
dimensions, is perfected by its natural form. Hence there can be no
resistance save on the part of the medium, and this resistance is
connatural to their movement. Sometimes again the resistance results
from both, as may be seen in the movements of animals.
Accordingly when in a movement there is no resistance save on the part
of the movable, as in the heavenly bodies, the time of the movement is
measured according to the proportion of the mover to the movable, and
the Philosopher's argument does not apply to these, since if there be
no medium at all their movement is still a movement in time. on the
other hand, in those movements where there is resistance on the part of
the medium only, the measure of time is taken only according to the
obstacle on the part of the medium, so that if the medium be removed
there will be no longer an obstacle; and so either it will move
instantaneously, or it will move in an equal time through a vacuum and
through a plenum, because granted that it moves in time through a
vacuum, that time will bear some proportion to the time in which it
moves through a plenum. Now it is possible to imagine another body more
subtle in the same proportion than the body which filled the space, and
then if this body fill some other equal space it will move in as little
time through that plenum as it did previously through a vacuum, since
by as much as the subtlety of the medium is increased by so much is the
length of time decreased, and the more subtle the medium the less it
resists. But in those other movements where resistance is offered by
both the movable and the medium, the quantity of time must be
proportionate to the power of the mover as compared with the resistance
of both movable and medium together. Hence granted that the medium be
taken away altogether, or that it cease to hinder, it does not follow
that the movement is instantaneous, but that the time is measured
according only to the resistance of the movable. Nor will there be any
inconsistency if it move in an equal time through a vacuum, and through
a space filled with the most subtle body imaginable, since the greater
the subtlety we ascribe to the medium the less is it naturally inclined
to retard the movement. Wherefore it is possible to imagine so great a
subtlety, as will naturally retard the movement less than does the
resistance of the movable, so that the resistance of the medium will
add no retardation to the movement.
It is therefore evident that although the medium offer no resistance to
the glorified bodies, in so far as it is possible for them to be in the
same place with another body, nevertheless their movement will not be
instantaneous, because the movable body itself will resist the motive
power from the very fact that it has a determinate place, as we have
said in reference to the heavenly bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the power of a glorified soul surpasses
immeasurably the power of a non-glorified soul, it does not surpass it
infinitely, because both powers are finite: hence it does not follow
that it causes instantaneous movement. And even if its power were
simply infinite, it would not follow that it causes an instantaneous
movement, unless the resistance of the movable were overcome
altogether. Now although the resistance of the movable to the mover,
that results from opposition to such a movement by reason of its being
inclined to a contrary movement, can be altogether overcome by a mover
of infinite power, nevertheless the resistance it offers through
contrariety towards the place which the mover intends by the movement
cannot be overcome altogether except by depriving it of its being in
such and such a place or position. For just as white resists black by
reason of whiteness, and all the more according as whiteness is the
more distant from blackness, so a body resists a certain place through
having an opposite place and its resistance is all the greater,
according as the distance is greater. Now it is impossible to take away
from a body its being in some place or position, except one deprive it
of its corporeity, by reason of which it requires a place or position:
wherefore so long as it retains the nature of a body, it can nowise be
moved instantaneously, however greater be the motive power. Now the
glorified body will never lose its corporeity, and therefore it will
never be possible for it to be moved instantaneously.
Reply to Objection 4: In the words of Augustine, the speed is said to
be equal because the excess of one over the other is imperceptible,
just as the time taken by the whole movement is imperceptible.
Reply to Objection 5: Although after the resurrection the time which is
the measure of the heaven's movement will be no more, there will
nevertheless be time resulting from the before and after in any kind of
movement.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CLARITY OF THE BEATIFIED BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the clarity of the beatified bodies at the
resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there will be clarity in the glorified bodies?
(2) Whether this clarity will be visible to the non-glorified eye?
(3) Whether a glorified body will of necessity be seen by a
non-glorified body?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether clarity is becoming to the glorified body?
Objection 1: It would seem that clarity is unbecoming to the glorified
body. Because according to Avicenna (Natural. vi, 2), "every luminous
body consists of transparent parts." But the parts of a glorified body
will not be transparent, since in some of them, such as flesh and
bones, earth is predominant. Therefore glorified bodies are not
lightsome.
Objection 2: Further, every lightsome body hides one that is behind it;
wherefore one luminary behind another is eclipsed, and a flame of fire
prevents one seeing what is behind it. But the glorified bodies will
not hide that which is within them, for as Gregory says on Job 28:17,
"Gold or crystal cannot equal it" (Moral. xviii, 48). "There," that is
in the heavenly country, "the grossness of the members will not hide
one's mind from another's eyes, and the very harmony of the body will
be evident to the bodily sight." Therefore those bodies will not be
lightsome.
Objection 3: Further, light and color require a contrary disposition in
their subject, since "light is the extreme point of visibility in an
indeterminate body; color, in a determinate body" (De Sensu et Sensato
iii). But glorified bodies will have color, for as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xxii, 3), "the body's beauty is harmony of parts with a
certain charm of color": and it will be impossible for the glorified
bodies to lack beauty. Therefore the glorified bodies will not be
lightsome.
Objection 4: Further, if there be clarity in the glorified bodies, it
will need to be equal in all the parts of the body, just as all the
parts will be equally impassible, subtle and agile. But this is not
becoming, since one part has a greater disposition to clarity than
another, for instance the eye than the hand, the spirits [*"Animalem,"
as though it were derived from "animus"---the mind. Cf. [5096]FS,
Q[50], A[1],3m; [5097]FS, Q[52], A[1] ,3m] than the bones, the humors
than the flesh or nerves. Therefore it would seem unfitting for those
bodies to be lightsome.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 13:43): "The just shall shine as
the sun in the kingdom of their Father," and (Wis. 3:7): "The just
shall shine, and shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds."
Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:43): "It is sown in dishonor, it
shall rise in glory," which refers to clarity, as evidenced by the
previous context where the glory of the rising bodies is compared to
the clarity of the stars. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be
lightsome.
I answer that, It is necessary to assert that after the resurrection
the bodies of the saints will be lightsome, on account of the authority
of Scripture which makes this promise. But the cause of this clarity is
ascribed by some to the fifth or heavenly essence, which will then
predominate in the human body. Since, however, this is absurd, as we
have often remarked ([5098]Q[84], A[1]), it is better to say that this
clarity will result from the overflow of the soul's glory into the
body. For whatever is received into anything is received not according
to the mode of the source whence it flows, but according to the mode of
the recipient. Wherefore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is
received into the body as corporeal. And consequently according to the
greater clarity of the soul by reason of its greater merit, so too will
the body differ in clarity, as the Apostle affirms (1 Cor. 15:41). Thus
in the glorified body the glory of the soul will be known, even as
through a crystal is known the color of a body contained in a crystal
vessel, as Gregory says on Job 28:17, "Gold or crystal cannot equal
it."
Reply to Objection 1: Avicenna is speaking of a body that has clarity
through the nature of its component parts. It is not thus but rather by
merit of virtue that the glorified body will have clarity.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory compares the glorified body to gold on
account of clarity, and to crystal on account of its transparency.
Wherefore seemingly we should say that they will be both transparent
and lightsome; for that a lightsome body be not transparent is owing to
the fact that the clarity of that body results from the density of the
lightsome parts, and density is opposed to transparency. Then, however,
clarity will result from another cause, as stated above: and the
density of the glorified body will not deprive it of transparency, as
neither does the density of a crystal deprive crystal.
Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared to crystal, not
because they are transparent, but on account of this likeness, for as
much as that which is enclosed in crystal is visible, so the glory of
the soul enclosed in the glorified body will not be hidden. But the
first explanation is better, because it safeguards better the dignity
of the glorified body, and is more consistent with the words of
Gregory.
Reply to Objection 3: The glory of the body will not destroy nature but
will perfect it. Wherefore the body will retain the color due to it by
reason of the nature of its component parts, but in addition to this it
will have clarity resulting from the soul's glory. Thus we see bodies
which have color by their nature aglow with the resplendence of the
sun, or from some other cause extrinsic or intrinsic.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as the clarity of glory will overflow from
the soul into the body according to the mode of the body, and is there
otherwise than in the soul, so again it will overflow into each part of
the soul according to the mode of that part. Hence it is not
unreasonable that the different parts should have clarity in different
ways, according as they are differently disposed thereto by their
nature. Nor is there any comparison with the other gifts of the body,
for the various parts of the body are not differently disposed in their
regard.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the clarity of the glorified body is visible to the non-glorified
eye?
Objection 1: It would seem that the clarity of the glorified body is
invisible to the non-glorified eye. For the visible object should be
proportionate to the sight. But a non-glorified eye is not
proportionate to see the clarity of glory, since this differs
generically from the clarity of nature. Therefore the clarity of the
glorified body will not be seen by a non-glorified eye.
Objection 2: Further, the clarity of the glorified body will be greater
than the clarity of the sun is now, since the clarity of the sun also
will then be greater than it is now, according to Is. 30:26, and the
clarity of the glorified body will be much greater still, for which
reason the sun and the entire world will receive greater clarity. Now a
non-glorified eye is unable to gaze on the very orb of the sun on
account of the greatness of its clarity. Therefore still less will it
be able to gaze on the clarity of a glorified body.
Objection 3: Further, a visible object that is opposite the eyes of the
seer must needs be seen, unless there be some lesion to the eye. But
the clarity of a glorified body that is opposite to non-glorified eyes
is not necessarily seen by them: which is evident in the case of the
disciples who saw our Lord's body after the resurrection, without
witnessing its clarity. Therefore this clarity will be invisible to a
non-glorified eye.
On the contrary, A gloss on Phil. 3:21, "Made like to the body of His
glory," says: "It will be like the clarity which He had in the
Transfiguration." Now this clarity was seen by the non-glorified eyes
of the disciples. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will be
visible to non-glorified eyes also.
Further, the wicked will be tortured in the judgment by seeing the
glory of the just, according to Wis. 5:2. But they would not fully see
their glory unless they gazed on their clarity. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, Some have asserted that the clarity of the glorified
body will not be visible to the non-glorified eye, except by a miracle.
But this is impossible, unless this clarity were so named equivocally,
because light by its essence has a natural tendency to move the sight,
and sight by its essence has a natural tendency to perceive light, even
as the true is in relation to the intellect, and the good to the
appetite. Wherefore if there were a sight altogether incapable of
perceiving a light, either this sight is so named equivocally, or else
this light is. This cannot be said in the point at issue, because then
nothing would be made known to us when we are told that the glorified
bodies will be lightsome: even so a person who says that a dog [*The
dog star] is in the heavens conveys no knowledge to one who knows no
other dog than the animal. Hence we must say that the clarity of a
glorified body is naturally visible to the non-glorified eye.
Reply to Objection 1: The clarity of glory will differ generically from
the clarity of nature, as to its cause, but not as to its species.
Hence just as the clarity of nature is, by reason of its species,
proportionate to the sight, so too will the clarity of glory be.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as a glorified body is not passible to a
passion of nature but only to a passion of the soul [*Cf. Q[82], A[1]],
so in virtue of its property of glory it acts only by the action of the
soul. Now intense clarity does not disturb the sight, in so far as it
acts by the action of the soul, for thus it rather gives delight, but
it disturbs it in so far as it acts by the action of nature by heating
and destroying the organ of sight, and by scattering the spirits*
asunder. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from "animus"---the
mind. Cf. [5099]FS, Q[50], A[1] ,3m; [5100]FS, Q[52], A[1],3m.] Hence,
though the clarity of a glorified body surpasses the clarity of the
sun, it does not by its nature disturb the sight but soothes it:
wherefore this clarity is compared to the jasper-stone (Apoc. 21:11).
Reply to Objection 3: The clarity of the glorified body results from
the merit of the will and therefore will be subject to the will, so as
to be seen or not seen according to its command. Therefore it will be
in the power of the glorified body to show forth its clarity or to hide
it: and this was the opinion of Praepositivus.
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Whether a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body?
Objection 1: It would seem that a glorified body will be necessarily
seen by a non-glorified body. For the glorified bodies will be
lightsome. Now a lightsome body reveals itself and other things.
Therefore the glorified bodies will be seen of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, every body which hides other bodies that are
behind it is necessarily perceived by the sight, from the very fact
that the other things behind it are hidden. Now the glorified body will
hide other bodies that are behind it from being seen, because it will
be a colored body. Therefore it will be seen of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, just as quantity is something in a body, so is
the quality whereby a body is seen. Now quantity will not be subject to
the will, so that the glorified body be able to be of greater or
smaller quantity. Therefore neither will the quality of visibility be
subject to the will, so that a body be able not to be seen.
On the contrary, our body will be glorified in being made like to the
body of Christ after the resurrection. Now after the resurrection
Christ's body was not necessarily seen; in fact it vanished from the
sight of the disciples at Emmaus (Lk. 24:31). Therefore neither will
the glorified body be necessarily seen.
Further, there the body will be in complete obedience to the will.
Therefore as the soul lists the body will be visible or invisible.
I answer that, A visible object is seen, inasmuch as it acts on the
sight. Now there is no change in a thing through its acting or not
acting on an external object. Wherefore a glorified body may be seen or
not seen without any property pertaining to its perfection being
changed. Consequently it will be in the power of a glorified soul for
its body to be seen or not seen, even as any other action of the body
will be in the soul's power; else the glorified body would not be a
perfectly obedient instrument of its principal agent.
Reply to Objection 1: This clarity will be obedient to the glorified
body so that this will be able to show it or hide it.
Reply to Objection 2: A body's color does not prevent its being
transparent except in so far as it affects the sight, because the sight
cannot be affected by two colors at the same time, so as to perceive
them both perfectly. But the color of the glorified body will be
completely in the power of the soul, so that it can thereby act or not
act on the sight. Hence it will be in its power to hide or not to hide
a body that is behind it.
Reply to Objection 3: Quantity is inherent to the glorified body
itself, nor would it be possible for the quantity to be altered at the
soul's bidding without the glorified body suffering some alteration
incompatible with its impassibility. Hence there is no comparison
between quantity and visibility, because even this quality whereby it
is visible cannot be removed at the soul's bidding, but the action of
that quality will be suspended, and thus the body will be hidden at the
soul's command.
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OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN (THREE
ARTICLES)
We must next consider the conditions in which the bodies of the damned
will rise again. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their
deformities?
(2) Whether their bodies will be corruptible?
(3) Whether they will be impassible?
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Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?
Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will rise
again with their deformities. For that which was appointed as a
punishment for sin should not cease except the sin be forgiven. Now the
lack of limbs that results from mutilation, as well as all other bodily
deformities, are appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore these
deformities will not be taken away from the damned, seeing that they
will not have received the forgiveness of their sins.
Objection 2: Further, just as the saints will rise again to final
happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final unhappiness. Now when
the saints rise again nothing will be taken from them that can pertain
to their perfection, therefore nothing pertaining to the defect or
unhappiness of the wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection.
But such are their deformities. Therefore, etc.
Objection 3: Further, just as deformity is a defect of the passible
body, so is slowness of movement. Now slowness of movement will not be
taken from the bodies of the damned at the resurrection, since their
bodies will not be agile. Therefore for the same reason neither will
their deformity be taken away.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "The dead shall rise
again incorruptible"; where a gloss says: "The dead, i.e. sinners, or
all the dead in general shall rise again incorruptible, i.e. without
the loss of any limbs." Therefore the wicked will rise again without
their deformities.
Further, there will be nothing in the damned to lessen the sense of
pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain by weakening the organ of
sense, and in like manner the lack of a limb would prevent pain from
affecting the whole body. Therefore the damned will rise again without
these defects.
I answer that, Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. One arises
from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is
deformed, because he lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole.
Deformities of this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the bodies
of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again
whole. Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the
parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or place---which deformity
is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole.
Concerning these deformities and like defects such as fevers and
similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augustine
remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion xcii) as the Master
remarks (Sent. iv, D, 44). Among modern masters, however, there are two
opinions on this point. For some say that such like deformities and
defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, because they consider
that those who are damned are sentenced to utmost unhappiness wherefrom
no affliction should be rebated. But this would seem unreasonable. For
in the restoration of the rising body we look to its natural perfection
rather than to its previous condition: wherefore those who die under
perfect age will rise again in the stature of youth, as stated above
([5101]Q[81], A[1]). Consequently those who had natural defects in the
body, or deformities resulting therefrom, will be restored without
those defects or deformities at the resurrection, unless the demerit of
sin prevent; and so if a person rise again with such defects and
deformities, this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of
punishment is according to the measure of guilt. And a sinner who is
about to be damned may be burdened with less grievous sins and yet have
deformities and defects which one who is about to be damned has not,
while burdened with more grievous sins. Wherefore if he who had
deformities in this life rise again with them, while the other who had
them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, will rise again
without them, though deserving of greater punishment, the mode of the
punishment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact it
would seem that a man is more punished on account of the pains which he
suffered in this world; which is absurd.
Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fashioned nature will
wholly restore the body's nature at the resurrection. Wherefore
whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or
weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance fever,
purblindness, and so forth) will be entirely done away at the
resurrection: whereas those defects in the human body which are the
natural result of its natural principles, such as heaviness,
passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned, while
they will be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the
resurrection.
Reply to Objection 1: Since in every tribunal punishment is inflicted
according to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the punishments which in
this temporal life are inflicted for some particular sin are themselves
temporal, and extend not beyond the term of this life. Hence although
the damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that there
they will undergo the same punishments as they have in this world: but
the Divine justice demands that there they shall suffer more severe
punishment for eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no parity between the good and the
wicked, because a thing can be altogether good, but not altogether
evil. Hence the final happiness of the saints requires that they should
be altogether exempt from all evil; whereas the final unhappiness of
the wicked will not exclude all good, because "if a thing be wholly
evil it destroys itself," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5). Hence
it is necessary for the good of their nature to underlie the
unhappiness of the damned, which good is the work of their perfect
Creator, Who will restore that same nature to the perfection of its
species.
Reply to Objection 3: Slowness of movement is one of those defects
which are the natural result of the principles of the human body; but
deformity is not, and consequently the comparison fails.
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Whether the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be
corruptible. For everything composed of contraries must necessarily be
corruptible. Now the bodies of the damned will be composed of the
contraries whereof they are composed even now, else they would not be
the same, neither specifically nor, in consequence, numerically.
Therefore they will be corruptible.
Objection 2: Further, if the bodies of the damned will not be
corruptible, this will be due either to nature, or to grace, or to
glory. But it will not be by nature, since they will be of the same
nature as now; nor will it be by grace or glory, since they will lack
these things altogether. Therefore they will be corruptible.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem inconsistent to withdraw the
greatest of punishments from those who are in the highest degree of
unhappiness. Now death is the greatest of punishments, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore death should not be
withdrawn from the damned, since they are in the highest degree of
unhappiness. Therefore their bodies will be corruptible.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): "In those days men shall
seek death, and shall not find it, and they shall desire to die, and
death shall fly from them."
Further, the damned will be punished with an everlasting punishment
both in soul and body (Mat. 25:46): "These shall go into everlasting
punishment." But this would not be possible if their bodies were
corruptible. Therefore their bodies will be incorruptible.
I answer that, Since in every movement there must needs be a principle
of movement, movement or change may be withdrawn from a movable in two
ways: first through absence of a principle of movement, secondly
through an obstacle to the principle of movement. Now corruption is a
kind of change: and consequently a body which is corruptible on account
of the nature of its principles may be rendered incorruptible in two
ways. First by the total removal of the principle which leads to
corruption, and in this way the bodies of the damned will be
incorruptible. For since the heaven is the first principle of
alteration in virtue of its local movement, and all other secondary
agents act in virtue thereof and as though moved thereby, it follows
that at the cessation of the heavenly movement there is no longer any
agent that can change the body by altering it from its natural
property. Wherefore after the resurrection, and the cessation of the
heavenly movement, there will be no quality capable of altering the
human body from its natural quality. Now corruption, like generation,
is the term of alteration. Hence the bodies of the damned will be
incorruptible, and this will serve the purpose of Divine justice, since
living for ever they will be punished for ever. This is in keeping with
the demands of Divine justice, as we shall state further on
[5102](A[3]), even as now the corruptibility of bodies serves the
purpose of Divine providence, by which through the corruption of one
thing another is generated.
Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption being
hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was incorruptible, because
the conflicting qualities that exist in man's body were withheld by the
grace of innocence from conducing to the body's dissolution: and much
more will they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be
wholly subject to the spirit. Thus after the general resurrection the
two aforesaid modes of incorruptibility will be united together in the
bodies of the blessed.
Reply to Objection 1: The contraries of which bodies are composed are
conducive to corruption as secondary principles. For the first active
principle thereof is the heavenly movement: wherefore given the
movement of the heaven, it is necessary for a body composed of
contraries to be corrupted unless some more powerful cause prevent it:
whereas if the heavenly movement be withdrawn, the contraries of which
a body is composed do not suffice to cause corruption, even in
accordance with nature, as explained above. But the philosophers were
ignorant of a cessation in the heavenly movement; and consequently they
held that a body composed of contraries is without fail corrupted in
accordance with nature.
Reply to Objection 2: This incorruptibility will result from nature,
not as though there were some principle of incorruption in the bodies
of the damned, but on account of the cessation of the active principle
of corruption, as shown above.
Reply to Objection 3: Although death is simply the greatest of
punishments, yet nothing prevents death conducing, in a certain
respect, to a cessation of punishments; and consequently the removal of
death may contribute to the increase of punishment. For as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), "Life is pleasant to all, for all
desire to be . . . But we must not apply this to a wicked or corrupt
life, nor one passed in sorrow." Accordingly just as life is simply
pleasant, but not the life that is passed in sorrows, so too death,
which is the privation of life, is painful simply, and the greatest of
punishments, inasmuch as it deprives one of the primary good, namely
being, with which other things are withdrawn. But in so far as it
deprives one of a wicked life, and of such as is passed in sorrow, it
is a remedy for pains, since it puts an end to them. and consequently
the withdrawal of death leads to the increase of punishments by making
them everlasting. If however we say that death is penal by reason of
the bodily pain which the dying feel, without doubt the damned will
continue to feel a far greater pain: wherefore they are said to be in
"everlasting death," according to the Psalm (48:15): "Death shall feed
upon them."
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Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be
impassible. For, according to the Philosopher (Topic. vi), "increase of
passion results in loss of substance." Now "if a finite thing be
continually lessened, it must needs at length be done away" (Phys. i,
4). Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible, and will be
ever suffering, they will at length be done away and corrupted: and
this has been shown to be false [5103](A[2]). Therefore they will be
impassible.
Objection 2: Further, every agent likens the patient to itself. If then
the bodies of the damned are passive to the fire the fire will liken
them to itself. Now fire does not consume bodies except in so far as in
likening them to itself it disintegrates them. Therefore if the bodies
of the damned will be passible they will at length be consumed by the
fire, and thus the same conclusion follows as before.
Objection 3: Further, those animals, for instance the salamander, which
are said to remain living in fire without being destroyed, are not
distressed by the fire: because an animal is not distressed by bodily
pain, unless the body in some way is hurt thereby. If therefore the
bodies of the damned can, like the aforesaid animals, remain in the
fire without being corrupted, as Augustine asserts (De Civ. Dei xxi,
2,4), it would seem that they will suffer no distress there: which
would not be the case unless their bodies were impassible. Therefore,
etc.
Objection 4: Further, if the bodies of the damned be passible, the pain
resulting from their suffering, seemingly, will surpass all present
bodily pain, even as the joy of the saints will surpass all present
joy. Now in this life it sometimes happens that the soul is severed
from the body through excess of pain. Much more therefore if those
bodies will be passible, the souls will be separate from the bodies
through excess of pain, and thus those bodies will be corrupted: which
is false. Therefore those bodies will be impassible.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "And we shall be
changed": and a gloss says: "We---the good alone---will be changed with
the unchangeableness and impassibility of glory."
Further, even as the body co-operates with the soul in merit, so does
it co-operate in sin. Now on account of the former co-operation not
only the soul but also the body will be rewarded after the
resurrection. Therefore in like manner the bodies of the damned will be
punished; which would not be the case were they impassible. Therefore
they will be passible.
I answer that, The principal cause of the bodies of the damned not
being consumed by fire will be the Divine justice by which their bodies
will be consigned to everlasting punishment. Now the Divine justice is
served also by the natural disposition, whether on the part of the
passive body or on the part of the active causes; for since passiveness
is a kind of receptiveness, there are two kinds of passion,
corresponding to two ways in which one thing is receptive of another.
For a form may be received into a subject materially according to its
natural being, just as the air receives heat from fire materially; and
corresponding to this manner of reception there is a kind of passion
which we call "passion of nature." In another way one thing is received
into another spiritually by way of an "intention," just as the likeness
of whiteness is received into the air and in the pupil: this reception
is like that whereby the soul receives the likeness of things:
wherefore corresponding to this mode of reception is another mode of
passion which we call "passion of the soul." Since therefore after the
resurrection and the cessation of the heavenly movement it will be
impossible for a body to be altered by its natural quality, as stated
above [5104](A[2]), it will not be possible for any body to be passive
with a passion of nature. Consequently as regards this mode of passion
the bodies of the damned will be impassible even as they will be
incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has ceased to move, there will
still remain the passion which is after the manner of the soul, since
the air will both receive light from the sun, and will convey the
variety of colors to the sight. Wherefore in respect of this mode of
passion the bodies of the damned will be passible. But the glorified
bodies, albeit they receive something, and are in a manner patient to
sensation, will nevertheless not be passive, since they will receive
nothing to distress or hurt them, as will the bodies of the damned,
which for this reason are said to be passible.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the passion
whereby the patient is changed from its natural disposition. But this
kind of passion will not be in the bodies of the damned, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the agent is in the patient in
two ways. First, in the same way as in the agent, and thus it is in all
univocal agents, for instance a thing that is hot makes another thing
hot, and fire generates fire. Secondly, otherwise than in the agent,
and thus it is in all equivocal agents. In these it happens sometimes
that a form which is in the agent spiritually is received into the
patient materially: thus the form of the house built by the craftsman
is materially in itself, but spiritually in the mind of the craftsman.
On the other hand, sometimes it is in the agent materially, but is
received into the patient spiritually: thus whiteness is materially on
the wall wherein it is received, whereas it is spiritually in the pupil
and in the transferring medium. And so it is in the case at issue,
because the species which is in the fire materially is received
spiritually into the bodies of the damned; thus it is that the fire
will assimilate the bodies of the damned to itself, without consuming
them withal.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (De Prop. Element.),
"no animal can live in fire." Galen also (De simp. medic.) says "that
there is no body which at length is not consumed by fire"; although
sometimes certain bodies may remain in fire without hurt, such as
ebony. The instance of the salamander is not altogether apposite, since
it cannot remain in the fire without being at last consumed, as do the
bodies of the damned in hell. Nor does it follow that because the
bodies of the damned suffer no corruption from the fire, they therefore
are not tormented by the fire, because the sensible object has a
natural aptitude to please or displease the senses, not only as regards
its natural action of stimulating or injuring the organ, but also as
regards its spiritual action: since when the sensible object is duly
proportionate to the sense, it pleases, whereas the contrary is the
result when it is in excess or defect. Hence subdued colors and
harmonious sounds are pleasing, whereas discordant sounds displease the
hearing.
Reply to Objection 4: Pain does not sever the soul from the body, in so
far as it is confined to a power of the soul which feels the pain, but
in so far as the passion of the soul leads to the body being changed
from its natural disposition. Thus it is that we see that through anger
the body becomes heated, and through fear, chilled: whereas after the
resurrection it will be impossible for the body to be changed from its
natural disposition, as stated above [5105](A[2]). Consequently,
however great the pain will be, it will not sever the body from the
soul.
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TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS (QQ[86]-99)
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OF THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH, AFTER RISING AGAIN, MEN WILL HAVE AT THE JUDGMENT
CONCERNING MERITS AND DEMERITS (THREE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must treat of those things which follow the
resurrection. The first of these to be considered will be the
knowledge, which after rising again, men will have at the judgment,
concerning merits and demerits; the second will be the general judgment
itself, as also the time and place at which it will be; thirdly we
shall consider who will judge and who will be judged; fourthly we shall
treat of the form wherein the judge will come to judge; and fifthly we
shall consider what will be after the judgment, the state of the world
and of those who will have risen again.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether at the judgment every man will know all his sins?
(2) Whether every one will be able to read all that is on another's
conscience?
(3) Whether one will be able at one glance to see all merits and
demerits?
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Whether after the resurrection every one will know what sins he has
committed?
Objection 1: It seems that after the resurrection everyone will not be
able to know all the sins he has committed. For whatever we know,
either we receive it anew through the senses, or we draw it from the
treasure house of the memory. Now after the resurrection men will be
unable to perceive their sins by means of sense, because they will be
things of the past, while sense perceives only the present: and many
sins will have escaped the sinner's memory, and he will be unable to
recall them from the treasure house of his memory. Therefore after
rising again one will not be cognizant of all the sins one has
committed.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), that
"there are certain books of the conscience, wherein each one's merits
are inscribed." Now one cannot read a thing in a book, unless it be
marked down in the book: and sin leaves its mark upon the conscience
according to a gloss of Origen on Rom. 2:15, "Their conscience bearing
witness," etc. which mark, seemingly, is nothing else than the guilt or
stain. Since then in many persons the guilt or stain of many sins is
blotted out by grace, it would seem that one cannot read in one's
conscience all the sins one has committed: and thus the same conclusion
follows as before.
Objection 3: Further, the greater the cause the greater the effect. Now
the cause which makes us grieve for the sins which we recall to memory
is charity. Since then charity is perfect in the saints after the
resurrection, they will grieve exceedingly for their sins, if they
recall them to memory: yet this is impossible, seeing that according to
Apoc. 21:4, "Sorrow and mourning shall flee away from them." [*The
quotation is from Is. 35:10. The text of the Apocalypse has: "Nor
mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more."] Therefore they
will not recall their own sins to memory.
Objection 4: Further, at the resurrection the damned will be to the
good they once did as the blessed to the sins they once committed. Now
seemingly the damned after rising again will have no knowledge of the
good they once did, since this would alleviate their pain considerably.
Neither therefore will the blessed have any knowledge of the sins they
had committed.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that "a kind of Divine
energy will come to our aid, so that we shall recall all of our sins to
mind."
Further, as human judgment is to external evidence, so is the Divine
judgment to the witness of the conscience, according to 1 Kings 16:7,
"Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart."
Now man cannot pass a perfect judgment on a matter unless evidence be
taken on all the points that need to be judged. Therefore, since the
Divine judgment is most perfect, it is necessary for the conscience to
witness to everything that has to be judged. But all works, both good
and evil, will have to be judged (2 Cor. 5:10): "We must all be
manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may
receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done,
whether it be good or evil." Therefore each one's conscience must needs
retain all the works he has done, whether good or evil.
I answer that, According to Rom. 2:15,16, "In the day when God shall
judge" each one's conscience will bear witness to him and his thoughts
will accuse and defend him. And since in every judicial hearing, the
witness, the accuser, and the defendant need to be acquainted with the
matter on which judgment has to be pronounced, and since at the general
judgment all the works of men will be submitted to judgment, it will
behoove every man to be cognizant then of all his works. Wherefore each
man's conscience will be as a book containing his deeds on which
judgment will be pronounced, even as in the human court of law we make
use of records. Of these books it is written in the Apocalypse (20:12):
"The books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book
of life; and the dead were judged by those things which were written in
the books [Vulg.: 'book'], according to their works." According to
Augustine's exposition (De Civ. Dei xx) the books which are here said
to be opened "denote the saints of the New and Old Testaments in whom
God's commandments are exemplified." Hence Richard of St. Victor (De
judic. potest.) says: "Their hearts will be like the code of law." But
the book of life, of which the text goes on to speak, signifies each
one's conscience, which is said to be one single book, because the one
Divine power will cause all to recall their deeds, and this energy, in
so far as it reminds a man of his deeds, is called the "book of life"
[*Cf. [5106]FP, Q[24], A[1], ad 1]. Or else we may refer the first
books to the conscience, and by the second book we may understand the
Judge's sentence as expressed in His providence.
Reply to Objection 1: Although many merits and demerits will have
escaped our memory, yet there will be none of them but will remain
somewhat in its effect, because those merits which are not deadened
will remain in the reward accorded to them, while those that are
deadened remain in the guilt of ingratitude, which is increased through
the fact that a man sinned after receiving grace. In like manner those
demerits which are not blotted out by repentance remain in the debt of
punishment due to them, while those which have been blotted out by
repentance remain in the remembrance of repentance, which they will
recall together with their other merits. Hence in each man there will
be something whereby he will be able to recollect his deeds.
Nevertheless, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx), the Divine energy
will especially conduce to this.
Reply to Objection 2: Each one's conscience will bear certain marks of
the deeds done by him; and it does not follow that these marks are the
guilt alone, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Although charity is now the cause of sorrow for
sin, yet the saints in heaven will be so full of joy, that they will
have no room for sorrow; and so they will not grieve for their sins,
but rather will they rejoice in the Divine mercy, whereby their sins
are forgiven them. Even so do the angels rejoice now in the Divine
justice whereby those whom they guard fall headlong into sin through
being abandoned by grace. and whose salvation none the less they
eagerly watch over.
Reply to Objection 4: The wicked will know all the good they have done,
and this will not diminish their pain; indeed, it will increase it,
because the greatest sorrow is to have lost many goods: for which
reason Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "the greatest misfortune is
to have been happy."
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Whether every one will be able to read all that is in another's conscience?
Objection 1: It seems that it will be impossible for every one to read
all that is in another's conscience. For the knowledge of those who
rise again will not be clearer than that of the angels, equality with
whom is promised us after the resurrection (Mat. 22:30). Now angels
cannot read one another's thoughts in matters dependent on the
free-will, wherefore they need to speak in order to notify such things
to one another [*Cf. FP, Q[107]]. Therefore after rising again we shall
be unable to read what is contained in another's conscience.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known either in itself, or
in its cause, or in its effect. Now the merits or demerits contained in
a person's conscience cannot be known by another in themselves, because
God alone enters the heart and reads its secrets. Neither will it be
possible for them to be known in their cause, since all will not see
God Who alone can act on the will, whence merits and demerits proceed.
Nor again will it be possible to know them from their effect, since
there will be many demerits, which through being wholly blotted out by
repentance will leave no effect remaining. Therefore it will not be
possible for every one to know all that is in another's conscience.
Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi in Ep. ad Hebr.), as
we have quoted before (Sent. iv, D, 17): "If thou remember thy sins
now, and frequently confess them before Cod and beg pardon for them,
thou wilt very soon blot them out; but if thou forget them, thou wilt
then remember them unwillingly, when they will be made public, and
declared before all thy friends and foes, and in the presence of the
holy angels." Hence it follows that this publication will be the
punishment of man's neglect in omitting to confess his sins. Therefore
the sins which a man has confessed will not be made known to others.
Objection 4: Further, it is a relief to know that one has had many
associates in sin, so that one is less ashamed thereof. If therefore
every one were to know the sin of another, each sinner's shame would be
much diminished, which is unlikely. Therefore every one will not know
the sins of all.
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 4:5, "will . . . bring to light the
hidden things of darkness," says: "Deeds and thoughts both good and
evil will then be revealed and made known to all."
Further, the past sins of all the good will be equally blotted out. Yet
we know the sins of some saints, for instance of Magdalen, Peter, and
David. Therefore in like manner the sins of the other elect will be
known, and much more those of the damned.
I answer that, At the last and general judgment it behooves the Divine
justice, which now is in many ways hidden, to appear evidently to all.
Now the sentence of one who condemns or rewards cannot be just, unless
it be delivered according to merits and demerits. Therefore just as it
behooves both judge and jury to know the merits of a case, in order to
deliver a just verdict, so is it necessary, in order that the sentence
appear to be just, that all who know the sentence should be acquainted
with the merits. Hence, since every one will know of his reward or
condemnation, so will every one else know of it, and consequently as
each one will recall his own merits or demerits, so will he be
cognizant of those of others. This is the more probable and more common
opinion, although the Master (Sent. iv, D, 43) says the contrary,
namely that a man's sins blotted out by repentance will not be made
known to others at the judgment. But it would follow from this that
neither would his repentance for these sins be perfectly known, which
would detract considerably from the glory of the saints and the praise
due to God for having so mercifully delivered them.
Reply to Objection 1: All the preceding merits or demerits will come to
a certain amount in the glory or unhappiness of each one rising again.
Consequently through eternal things being seen, all things in their
consciences will be visible, especially as the Divine power will
conduce to this so that the Judge's sentence may appear just to all.
Reply to Objection 2: It will be possible for a man's merits or
demerits to be made known by their effects as stated above (A[1], ad
1), or by the power of God, although the power of the created intellect
is not sufficient for this.
Reply to Objection 3: The manifestation of his sins to the confusion of
the sinner is a result of his neglect in omitting to confess them. But
that the sins of the saints be revealed cannot be to their confusion or
shame, as neither does it bring confusion to Mary Magdalen that her
sins are publicly recalled in the Church, because shame is "fear of
disgrace," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), and this will be
impossible in the blessed. But this manifestation will bring them great
glory on account of the penance they did, even as the confessor hails a
man who courageously confesses great crimes. Sins are said to be
blotted out because God sees them not for the purpose of punishing
them.
Reply to Objection 4: The sinner's confusion will not be diminished,
but on the contrary increased, through his seeing the sins of others,
for in seeing that others are blameworthy he will all the more
acknowledge himself to be blamed. For that confusion be diminished by a
cause of this kind is owing to the fact that shame regards the esteem
of men, who esteem more lightly that which is customary. But then
confusion will regard the esteem of God, which weighs every sin
according to the truth, whether it be the sin of one man or of many.
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Whether all merits and demerits, one's own as well as those of others, will
be seen by anyone at a single glance?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all merits and demerits, one's own
as well as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single glance.
For things considered singly are not seen at one glance. Now the damned
will consider their sins singly and will bewail them, wherefore they
say (Wis. 5:8): "What hath pride profited us?" Therefore they will not
see them all at a glance.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii) that "we do not
arrive at understanding several things at the same time." Now merits
and demerits, both our own and those of others, will not be visible
save to the intellect. Therefore it will be impossible for them all to
be seen at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect of the damned after the
resurrection will not be clearer than the intellect of the blessed and
of the angels is now, as to the natural knowledge whereby they know
things by innate species. Now by such knowledge the angels do not see
several things at the same time. Therefore neither will the damned be
able then to see all their deeds at the same time.
On the contrary, A gloss on Job 8:22, "They . . . shall be clothed with
confusion," says: "As soon as they shall see the Judge, all their evil
deeds will stand before their eyes." Now they will see the Judge
suddenly. Therefore in like manner will they see the evil they have
done, and for the same reason all others.
Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) considers it unfitting that at the
judgment a material book should be read containing the deeds of each
individual written therein, for the reason that it would be impossible
to measure the size of such a book, or the time it would take to read.
But in like manner it would be impossible to estimate the length of
time one would require in order to consider all one's merits and
demerits and those of others, if one saw these various things one after
the other. Therefore we must admit that each one sees them all at the
same time.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say
that one will see all merits and demerits, both one's own and those of
others, at the same time in an instant. This is easily credible with
regard to the blessed, since they will see all things in the Word: and
consequently it is not unreasonable that they should see several things
at the same time. But with regard to the damned, a difficulty presents
itself, since their intellect is not raised so that they can see God
and all else in Him. Wherefore others say that the wicked will see all
their sins and those of others generically at the same time: and this
suffices for the accusation or absolution necessary for the judgment;
but that they will not see them all down to each single one at the same
time. But neither does this seem consonant with the words of Augustine
(De Civ. Dei xx), who says that they will count them all with one
glance of the mind; and what is known generically is not counted. Hence
we may choose a middle way, by holding that they will consider each sin
not instantaneously, but in a very short time, the Divine power coming
to their aid. This agrees with the saying of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx)
that "they will be discerned with wondrous rapidity." Nor is this
impossible, since in a space of time, however short, is potentially an
infinite number of instants. This suffices for the replies to the
objections on either side of the question.
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OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT, AS TO THE TIME AND PLACE AT WHICH IT WILL BE (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We must next consider the general judgment, as to the time and place at
which it will be. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there will be a general judgment?
(2) Whether as regards the debate it will be conducted by word of
mouth?
(3) Whether it will take place at an unknown time?
(4) Whether it will take place in the valley of Josaphat?
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Whether there will be a general judgment?
Objection 1: It would seem that there will not be a general judgment.
For according to Nahum 1:9, following the Septuagint version, "God will
not judge the same thing a second time." But God judges now of mans'
every work, by assigning punishments and rewards to each one after
death, and also by rewarding and punishing certain ones in this life
for their good or evil deeds. Therefore it would seem that there will
be no other judgment.
Objection 2: Further, in no judicial inquiry is the sentence carried
cut before judgment is pronounced. But the sentence of the Divine
judgment on man regards the acquisition of the kingdom or exclusion
from the kingdom (Mat. 25:34, 41). Therefore since some obtain
possession of the kingdom now, and some are excluded from it for ever,
it would seem that there will be no other judgment.
Objection 3: Further, the reason why certain things are submitted to
judgment is that we may come to a decision about them. Now before the
end of the world each of the damned is awarded his damnation, and each
of the blessed his beatitude. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:41): "The men of Nineve shall
rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it." Therefore
there will be a judgment after the resurrection.
Further, it is written (Jn. 5:29): "They that have done good things
shall come forth unto the resurrection of life, but they that have done
evil, unto the resurrection of judgment." Therefore it would seem that
after the resurrection there will be a judgment.
I answer that, Just as operation refers to the beginning wherefrom
things receive their being, so judgment belongs to the term, wherein
they are brought to their end. Now we distinguish a twofold operation
in God. One is that whereby He first gave things their being, by
fashioning their nature and by establishing the distinctions which
contribute to the perfection thereof: from this work God is stated to
have rested (Gn. 2:2). His other operation is that whereby He works in
governing creatures; and of this it is written (Jn. 5:17): "My Father
worketh until now; and I work." Hence we distinguish in Him a twofold
judgment, but in the reverse order. One corresponds to the work of
governance which cannot be without judgment: and by this judgment each
one is judged individually according to his works, not only as adapted
to himself, but also as adapted to the government of the universe.
Hence one man's reward is delayed for the good of others (Heb. 11:13,
39, 40), and the punishment of one conduces to the profit of another.
Consequently it is necessary that there should be another, and that a
general judgment corresponding on the other hand with the first
formation of things in being, in order that, to wit, just as then all
things proceeded immediately from God, so at length the world will
receive its ultimate complement, by each one receiving finally his own
personal due. Hence at this judgment the Divine justice will be made
manifest in all things, whereas now it remains hidden, for as much as
at times some persons are dealt with for the profit of others,
otherwise than their manifest works would seem to require. For this
same reason there will then be a general separation of the good from
the wicked, because there will be no further motive for the good to
profit by the wicked, or the wicked by the good: for the sake of which
profit the good are meanwhile mingled with the wicked, so long as this
state of life is governed by Divine providence.
Reply to Objection 1: Each man is both an individual person and a part
of the whole human race: wherefore a twofold judgment is due to him.
One, the particular judgment, is that to which he will be subjected
after death, when he will receive according as he hath done in the body
[*Cf. 2 Cor. 5:10], not indeed entirely but only in part since he will
receive not in the body but only in the soul. The other judgment will
be passed on him as a part of the human race: thus a man is said to be
judged according to human justice, even when judgment is pronounced on
the community of which he is a part. Hence at the general judgment of
the whole human race by the general separation of the good from the
wicked, it follows that each one will be judged. And yet God will not
judge "the same thing a second time," since He will not inflict two
punishments for one sin, and the punishment which before the judgment
was not inflicted completely will be completed at the last judgment,
after which the wicked will be tormented at the same time in body and
soul.
Reply to Objection 2: The sentence proper to this general judgment is
the general separation of the good from the wicked, which will not
precede this judgment. Yet even now, as regards the particular sentence
on each individual, the judgment does not at once take full effect
since even the good will receive an increase of reward after the
judgment, both from the added glory of the body and from the completion
of the number of the saints. The wicked also will receive an increase
of torment from the added punishment of the body and from the
completion of the number of damned to be punished, because the more
numerous those with whom they will burn, the more will they themselves
burn.
Reply to Objection 3: The general judgment will regard more directly
the generality of men than each individual to be judged, as stated
above. Wherefore although before that judgment each one will be certain
of his condemnation or reward, he will not be cognizant of the
condemnation or reward of everyone else. Hence the necessity of the
general judgment.
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Whether the judgment will take place by word of mouth?
Objection 1: It would seem that this judgment, as regards the inquiry
and sentence, will take place by word of mouth. For according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) "it is uncertain how many days this judgment
will last." But it would not be uncertain if the things we are told
will take place at the judgment were to be accomplished only in the
mind. Therefore this judgment will take place by word of mouth and not
only in the mind.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxvi): "Those at least will
hear the words of the Judge, who have confessed their faith in Him by
words." Now this cannot be understood as referring to the inner word,
because thus all will hear the Judge's words, since all the deeds of
other men will be known to all both good and wicked. Therefore it seems
that this judgment will take place by word of mouth.
Objection 3: Further, Christ will judge according to His human form, so
as to be visible in the body to all. Therefore in like manner it seems
that He will speak with the voice of the body, so as to be heard by
all.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that the book of life
which is mentionedApoc. 20:12, 15 "is a kind of Divine energy enabling
each one to remember all his good or evil works, and to discern them
with the gaze of the mind, with wondrous rapidity, his knowledge
accusing or defending his conscience, so that all and each will be
judged at the same moment." But if each one's merits were discussed by
word of mouth, all and each could not be judged at the same moment.
Therefore it would seem that this judgment will not take place by word
of mouth.
Further, the sentence should correspond proportionately to the
evidence. Now the evidence both of accusation and of defense will be
mental, according to Rom. 2:15,16, "Their conscience bearing witness to
them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending
one another in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men."
Therefore seemingly, this sentence and the entire judgment will take
place mentally.
I answer that, It is not possible to come to any certain conclusion
about the truth of this question. It is, however, the more probable
opinion that the whole of this judgment, whether as regards the
inquiry, or as regards the accusation of the wicked and the approval of
the good or again as regards the sentence on both, will take place
mentally. For if the deeds of each individual were to be related by
word of mouth, this would require an inconceivable length of time. Thus
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that "if we suppose the book, from the
pages of which all will be judged according to Apoc. 20, to be a
material book, who will be able to conceive its size and length? or the
length of time required for the reading of a book that contains the
entire life of every individual?" Nor is less time requisite for
telling by word of mouth the deeds of each individual, than for reading
them if they were written in a material book. Hence, probably we should
understand that the details set forth in Mat. 25 will be fulfilled not
by word of mouth but mentally.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why Augustine says that "it is
uncertain how many days this judgment will last" is precisely because
it is not certain whether it will take place mentally or by word of
mouth. For if it were to take place by word of mouth, a considerable
time would be necessary. but if mentally, it is possible for it to be
accomplished in an instant.
Reply to Objection 2: Even if the judgment is accomplished solely in
the mind, the saying of Gregory stands, since though all will be
cognizant of their own and of others' deeds, as a result of the Divine
energy which the Gospel describes as speech (Mat. 25:84-46),
nevertheless those who have had the faith which they received through
God's words will be judged from those very words, for it is written
(Rom. 2:12): "Whosoever have sinned in the Law shall be judged by the
Law." Hence in a special way something will be said to those who had
been believers, which will not be said to unbelievers.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ will appear in body, so that the Judge may
be recognized in the body by all, and it is possible for this to take
place suddenly. But speech which is measured by time would require an
immense length of time, if the judgment took place by word of mouth.
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Whether the time of the future judgment is unknown?
Objection 1: It would seem that the time of the future judgment is not
unknown. For just as the holy Fathers looked forward to the first
coming, so do we look forward to the second. But the holy Fathers knew
the time of the first coming, as proved by the number of weeks
mentioned in Daniel 9: wherefore the Jews are reproached for not
knowing the time of Christ's coming (Lk. 12:56): "You hypocrites, you
know how to discern the face of the heaven and of the earth, but how is
it that you do not discern this time?" Therefore it would seem that the
time of the second coming when God will come to judgment should also be
certified to us.
Objection 2: Further, we arrive by means of signs at the knowledge of
the things signified. Now many signs of the coming judgment are
declared to us in Scripture (Mat. 24, Mk. 13, Lk. 21). Therefore we can
arrive at the knowledge of that time.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:11): "It is on us
[*'These things . . . are written for our correction, upon whom the
ends of the world are come'] that the ends of the world are come," and
(1 Jn. 2:18): "Little children, it is the last hour," etc. Since then
it is a long time since these things were said, it would seem that now
at least we can know that the last judgment is nigh.
Objection 4: Further, there is no need for the time of the judgment to
be hidden, except that each one may be careful to prepare himself for
judgment, being in ignorance of the appointed time. Yet the same care
would still be necessary even were the time known for certain, because
each one is uncertain about the time of his death, of which Augustine
says (Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix) that "as each one's last day finds him, so
will the world's last day find him." Therefore there is no necessity
for the time of the judgment to be uncertain.
On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 13:32): "Of that day or hour no man
knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father."
The Son, however, is said not to know in so far as He does not impart
the knowledge to us.
Further, it is written (1 Thess. 5:2): "The day of the Lord shall so
come as a thief in the night." Therefore seemingly, as the coming of a
thief in the night is altogether uncertain, the day of the last
judgment is altogether uncertain.
I answer that, God is the cause of things by His knowledge [*Cf.
[5107]FP, Q[14], A[8]]. Now He communicates both these things to His
creatures, since He both endows some with the power of action on others
whereof they are the cause, and bestows on some the knowledge of
things. But in both cases He reserves something to Himself, for He
operates certain things wherein no creature co-operates with Him, and
again He knows certain things which are unknown to any mere creature.
Now this should apply to none more than to those things which are
subject to the Divine power alone, and in which no creature co-operates
with Him. Such is the end of the world when the day of judgment will
come. For the world will come to an end by no created cause, even as it
derived its existence immediately from God. Wherefore the knowledge of
the end of the world is fittingly reserved to God. Indeed our Lord
seems to assign this very reason when He said (Acts 1:7): "It is not
for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His
own power," as though He were to say, "which are reserved to His power
alone."
Reply to Objection 1: At His first coming Christ came secretly
according to Is. 45:15, "Verily Thou art a hidden God, the God of
Israel, the Saviour." Hence, that He might be recognized by believers,
it was necessary for the time to be fixed beforehand with certainty. On
the other hand, at the second coming, He will come openly, according to
Ps. 49:3, "God shall come manifestly." Consequently there can be no
error affecting the knowledge of His coming. Hence the comparison
fails.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says, in his letter to Hesychius
concerning the day of judgment (Ep. cxcix), "the signs mentioned in the
Gospels do not all refer to the second advent which will happen at the
end of the world, but some of them belong to the time of the sack of
Jerusalem, which is now a thing of the past, while some, in fact many
of them, refer to the advent whereby He comes daily to the Church, whom
He visits spiritually when He dwells in us by faith and love."
Moreover, the details mentioned in the Gospels and Epistles in
connection with the last advent are not sufficient to enable us to
determine the time of the judgment, for the trials that are foretold as
announcing the proximity of Christ's coming occurred even at the time
of the Early Church, in a degree sometimes more sometimes less marked;
so that even the days of the apostles were called the last days (Acts
2:17) when Peter expounded the saying of Joel 2:28, "It shall come to
pass in the last days," etc., as referring to that time. Yet it was
already a long time since then: and sometimes there were more and
sometimes less afflictions in the Church. Consequently it is impossible
to decide after how long a time it will take place, nor fix the month,
year, century, or thousand years as Augustine says in the same book
(Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix). And even if we are to believe that at the end
these calamities will be more frequent, it is impossible to fix what
amount of such calamities will immediately precede the judgment day or
the coming of Antichrist, since even at the time of the Early Church
persecutions were so bitter, and the corruptions of error were so
numerous, that some looked forward to the coming of Antichrist as being
near or imminent; as related in Eusebius' History of the Church (vi, 7)
and in Jerome's book De Viris Illustribus lii.
Reply to Objection 3: The statement, "It is the last hour" and similar
expressions that are to be found in Scripture do not enable us to know
the exact length of time. For they are not intended to indicate a short
length of time, but to signify the last state of the world, which is
the last age of all, and it is not stated definitely how long this will
last. Thus neither is fixed duration appointed to old age, which is the
last age of man, since sometimes it is seen to last as long as or even
longer than all the previous ages, as Augustine remarks (Qq. 83, qu.
lviii). Hence also the Apostle (2 Thess. 2:2) disclaims the false
signification which some had given to his words, by believing that the
day of the Lord was already at hand.
Reply to Objection 4: Notwithstanding the uncertainty of death, the
uncertainty of the judgment conduces to watchfulness in two ways.
First, as regards the thing ignored, since its delay is equal to the
length of man's life, so that on either side uncertainty provokes him
to greater care. Secondly, for the reason that a man is careful not
only of his own person, but also of his family, or of his city or
kingdom, or of the whole Church, the length of whose duration is not
dependent on the length of man's life. And yet it behooves each of
these to be so ordered that the day of the Lord find us not unprepared.
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Whether the judgment will take place in the valley of Josaphat?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judgment will not take place in the
valley of Josaphat or in the surrounding locality. For at least it will
be necessary for those to be judged to stand on the ground, and those
alone to be raised aloft whose business it will be to judge. But the
whole land of promise would not be able to contain the multitude of
those who are to be judged. Therefore it is impossible for the judgment
to take place in the neighborhood of that valley.
Objection 2: Further, to Christ in His human form judgment is given
that He may judge justly, since He was judged unjustly in the court of
Pilate, and bore the sentence of an unjust judgment on Golgotha.
Therefore these places would be more suitably appointed for the
judgment.
Objection 3: Further, clouds result from the exhalation of vapors. But
then there will be no evaporation or exhalation. Therefore it will be
impossible for the just to be "taken up . . . in the clouds to meet
Christ, into the air": and consequently it will be necessary for both
good and wicked to be on the earth, so that a much larger place than
this valley will be required.
On the contrary, It is written (Joel 3:2): "I will gather together all
nations and will bring them down into the valley of Josaphat, and I
will plead with them there."
Further, it is written (Acts 1:11): "(This Jesus) . . . shall so come
as you have seen Him going into heaven." Now He ascended into heaven
from Mount Olivet which overlooks the valley of Josaphat. Therefore He
will come to judge in the neighborhood of that place.
I answer that, We cannot know with any great certainty the manner in
which this judgment will take place, nor how men will gather together
to the place of judgment; but it may be gathered from Scripture that in
all probability He will descend in the neighborhood of Mount Olivet,
even as He ascended from there, so as to show that He who descends is
the same as He who ascended.
Reply to Objection 1: A great multitude can be enclosed in a small
space. And all that is required is that in the neighborhood of that
locality there be a space, however great, to contain the multitude of
those who are to be judged, provided that Christ can be seen thence
since being raised in the air, and shining with exceeding glory, He
will be visible from a great distance.
Reply to Objection 2: Although through being sentenced unjustly Christ
merited His judiciary power, He will not judge with the appearance of
infirmity wherein He was judged unjustly, but under the appearance of
glory wherein He ascended to the Father. Hence the place of His
ascension is more suitable to the judgment than the place where He was
condemned.
Reply to Objection 3: In the opinion of some the name of clouds is here
given to certain condensations of the light shining from the bodies of
the saints, and not to evaporations from earth and water. Or we may say
that those clouds will be produced by Divine power in order to show the
parallel between His coming to judge and His ascension; so that He Who
ascended in a cloud may come to judgment in a cloud.
Again the cloud on account of its refreshing influence indicates the
mercy of the Judge.
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OF THOSE WHO WILL JUDGE AND OF THOSE WHO WILL BE JUDGED AT THE GENERAL
JUDGMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must next consider who will judge and who will be judged at the
general judgment. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any men will judge together with Christ?
(2) Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty?
(3) Whether the angels also will judge?
(4) Whether the demons will carry out the Judge's sentence on the
damned?
(5) Whether all men will come up for judgment?
(6) Whether any of the good will be judged?
(7) Whether any of the wicked will be judged?
(8) Whether the angels also will be judged?
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Whether any men will judge together with Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that no men will judge with Christ. For it
is written (Jn. 5:22,23): "The Father . . . hath given all judgment to
the Son, that all men may honor the Son." Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, whoever judges has authority over that which he
judges. Now those things about which the coming judgment will have to
be, such as human merits and demerits, are subject to Divine authority
alone. Therefore no one is competent to judge of those things.
Objection 3: Further, this judgment will take place not vocally but
mentally. Now the publication of merits and demerits in the hearts of
all men (which is like an accusation or approval), or the repayment of
punishment and reward (which is like the pronouncement of the sentence)
will be the work of God alone. Therefore none but Christ Who is God
will judge.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 19:28): "You also shall sit on
twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel." Therefore, etc.
Further, "The Lord will enter into judgment with the ancients of His
people" (Is. 3:14). Therefore it would seem that others also will judge
together with Christ.
I answer that, To judge has several significations. First it is used
causally as it were, when we say it of that which proves that some
person ought to be judged. In this sense the expression is used of
certain people in comparison, in so far as some are shown to be
deserving of judgment through being compared with others: for instance
(Mat. 12:41): "The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment with this
generation, and shall condemn it." To rise in judgment thus is common
to the good and the wicked. Secondly, the expression "to judge" is used
equivalently, so to say; for consent to an action is considered
equivalent to doing it. Wherefore those who will consent with Christ
the Judge, by approving His sentence, will be said to judge. In this
sense it will belong to all the elect to judge: wherefore it is written
(Wis. 3:7,8): "The just . . . shall judge nations." Thirdly, a person
is said to judge assessorially and by similitude, because he is like
the judge in that his seat* is raised above the others: and thus
assessors are said to judge. [*An "assessor" is one who "sits by" the
judge.] Some say that the perfect to whom judiciary power is promised
(Mat. 19:28) will judge in this sense, namely that they will be raised
to the dignity of assessors, because they will appear above others at
the judgment, and go forth "to meet Christ, into the air." But this
apparently does not suffice for the fulfilment of our Lord's promise
(Mat. 19:28): "You shall sit . . . judging," for He would seem to make
"judging" something additional to "sitting." Hence there is a fourth
way of judging, which will be competent to perfect men as containing
the decrees of Divine justice according to which men will be judged:
thus a book containing the law might be said to judge: wherefore it is
written (Apoc. 20:12): "(Judgment took her seat*) and the books were
opened." [*The words in brackets are not in the Vulgate. Apoc. 20:4 we
find: "I saw seats, and they sat upon them and judgment was given to
them."] Richard of St. Victor expounds this judging in this way (De
judic. potest.), wherefore he says: "Those who persevere in Divine
contemplation, who read every day the book of wisdom, transcribe, so to
speak, in their hearts whatever they grasp by their clear insight of
the truth"; and further on: "What else are the hearts of those who
judge, divinely instructed in all truth, but a codex of the law?"
Since, however, judging denotes an action exercised on another person,
it follows that, properly speaking, he is said to judge who pronounces
judgment on another. But this happens in two ways. First, by his own
authority: and this belongs to the one who has dominion and power over
others, and to whose ruling those who are judged are subject, wherefore
it belongs to him to pass judgment on them. In this sense to judge
belongs to God alone. Secondly, to judge is to acquaint others of the
sentence delivered by another's authority, that is to announce the
verdict already given. In this way perfect men will judge, because they
will lead others to the knowledge of Divine justice, that these may
know what is due to them on account of their merits: so that this very
revelation of justice is called judgment. Hence Richard of St. Victor
says (De judic. potest.) that for "the judges to open the books of
their decree in the presence of those who are to be judged signifies
that they open their hearts to the gaze of all those who are below
them, and that they reveal their knowledge in whatever pertains to the
judgment."
Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers the judgment of
authority which belongs to Christ alone: and the same answer applies to
the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no reason why some of the saints should
not reveal certain things to others, either by way of enlightenment, as
the higher angels enlighten the lower [*Cf. FP, Q[106]],: or by way of
speech as the lower angels speak to the higher [*Cf. [5108]FP, Q[107],
A[2]].
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Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial power does not correspond
to voluntary poverty. For it was promised to none but the twelve
apostles (Mat. 19:28): "You shall sit on twelve seats, judging," etc.
Since then those who are voluntarily poor are not all apostles, it
would seem that the judicial power is not competent to all.
Objection 2: Further, to offer sacrifice to God of one's own body is
more than to do so of outward things. Now martyrs and also virgins
offer sacrifice to God of their own body. whereas the voluntarily poor
offer sacrifice of outward things. Therefore the sublimity of the
judicial power is more in keeping with martyrs and virgins than with
those who are voluntarily poor.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 5:45): "There is one that
accuseth you, Moses in whom you trust---because you believe not his
voice," according to a gloss, and (Jn. 12:48): "The word that I have
spoken shall judge him in the last day." Therefore the fact that a man
propounds a law, or exhorts men by word to lead a good life, gives him
the right to judge those who scorn his utterances. But this belongs to
doctors. Therefore it is more competent to doctors than to those who
are poor voluntarily.
Objection 4: Further, Christ through being judged unjustly merited as
man to be judge of all in His human nature [*Cf. [5109]TP, Q[59],
A[6]], according to Jn. 5:27, "He hath given Him power to do judgment,
because He is the Son of man." Now those who suffer persecution for
justice' sake are judged unjustly. Therefore the judicial power is
competent to them rather than to the voluntarily poor.
Objection 5: Further, a superior is not judged by his inferior. Now
many who will have made lawful use of riches will have greater merit
than many of the voluntarily poor. Therefore the voluntarily poor will
not judge where those are to be judged.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:6): "He saveth not the wicked,
and He giveth judgment to the poor."
Further, a gloss on Mat. 19:28, "You who have left all things' [*Vulg.:
'You who have followed Me']" says: "Those who left all things and
followed God will be the judges; those who made right use of what they
had lawfully will be judged," and thus the same conclusion follows as
before.
I answer that, The judicial power is due especially to poverty on three
counts. First, by reason of congruity, since voluntary poverty belongs
to those who despise all the things of the world and cleave to Christ
alone. Consequently there is nothing in them to turn away their
judgment from justice, so that they are rendered competent to be judges
as loving the truth of justice above all things. Secondly, by reason of
merit, since exaltation corresponds by way of merit to humility. Now of
all the things that make man contemptible in this world humility is the
chief: and for this reason the excellence of judicial power is promised
to the poor, so that he who humbles himself for Christ's sake shall be
exalted. Thirdly, because poverty disposes a man to the aforesaid
manner of judging. For the reason why one of the saints will be said to
judge as stated above [*Cf. A[1]], is that he will have the heart
instructed in all Divine truth which he will be thus able to make known
to others. Now in the advancement to perfection, the first thing that
occurs to be renounced is external wealth, because this is the last
thing of all to be acquired. And that which is last in the order of
generation is the first in the order of destruction: wherefore among
the beatitudes whereby we advance to perfection, the first place is
given to poverty. Thus judicial power corresponds to poverty, in so far
as this is the disposition to the aforesaid perfection. Hence also it
is that this same power is not promised to all who are voluntarily
poor, but to those who leave all and follow Christ in accordance with
the perfection of life.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx), "we must
not imagine that because He says that they will sit on twelve seats
only twelve men will judge with Him. else since we read that Matthias
was appointed apostle in the place of the traitor Judas, Paul who
worked more than the rest will have nowhere to sit as judge." Hence
"the number twelve," as he states (De Civ. Dei xx), "signifies the
whole multitude of those who will judge, because the two parts of
seven, namely three and four, being multiplied together make twelve."
Moreover twelve is a perfect number, being the double of six, which is
a perfect number.
Or, speaking literally, He spoke to the twelve apostles in whose person
he made this promise to all who follow them.
Reply to Objection 2: Virginity and martyrdom do not dispose man to
retain the precepts of Divine justice in his heart in the same degree
as poverty does: even so, on the other hand, outward riches choke the
word of God by the cares which they entail (Lk. 8:14). Or we may reply
that poverty does not suffice alone to merit judicial power, but is the
fundamental part of that perfection to which the judicial power
corresponds. Wherefore among those things regarding perfection which
follow after poverty we may reckon both virginity and martyrdom and all
the works of perfection: yet they do not rank as high as poverty, since
the beginning of a thing is its chief part.
Reply to Objection 3: He who propounded the law or urged men to good
will judge, in the causal (Cf. A[1]) sense, because others will be
judged in reference to the words he has uttered or propounded. Hence
the judicial power does not properly correspond to preaching or
teaching. or we may reply that, as some say, three things are requisite
for the judicial power; first, that one renounce temporal cares, lest
the mind be hindered from the contemplation of wisdom; secondly that
one possess Divine justice by way of habit both as to knowledge and as
to observance; thirdly that one should have taught others this same
justice; and this teaching will be the perfection whereby a man merits
to have judicial power.
Reply to Objection 4: Christ humbled Himself in that He was judged
unjustly; for "He was offered because it was His own will" (Is. 53:7):
and by His humility He merited His exaltation to judicial power, since
all things are made subject to Him (Phil. 2:8,9). Hence, judicial power
is more due to them who humble themselves of their own will by
renouncing temporal goods, on account of which men are honored by
worldlings, than to those who are humbled by others.
Reply to Objection 5: An inferior cannot judge a superior by his own
authority, but he can do so by the authority of a superior, as in the
case of a judge-delegate. Hence it is not unfitting that it be granted
to the poor as an accidental reward to judge others, even those who
have higher merit in respect of the essential reward.
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Whether the angels will judge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels will judge. For it is
written (Mat. 25:31): "When the Son of man shall come in His majesty,
and all the angels with Him." Now He is speaking of His coming to
judgment. Therefore it would seem that also the angels will judge.
Objection 2: Further, the orders of the angels take their names from
the offices which they fulfill. Now one of the angelic orders is that
of the Thrones, which would seem to pertain to the judicial power,
since a throne is the "judicial bench, a royal seat, a professor's
chair" [*Cf. St. Isidore, Etym. vii, 5]. Therefore some of the angels
will judge.
Objection 3: Further, equality with the angels is promised the saints
after this life (Mat. 22:30). If then men will have this power of
judging, much more will the angels have it.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 5:27): "He hath given Him power to
judgment, because He is the Son of man." But the angels have not the
human nature in common with Him. Neither therefore do they share with
Him in the judicial power.
Further, the same person is not judge and judge's minister. Now in this
judgment the angels will act as ministers of the Judge and, according
to Mat. 13:41: "The Son of man shall send His angels and they shall
gather out of His kingdom all scandals." Therefore the angels will not
judge.
I answer that, The judge's assessors must be conformed to the judge.
Now judgment is ascribed to the Son of man because He will appear to
all, both good and wicked, in His human nature, although the whole
Trinity will judge by authority. Consequently it behooves also the
Judge's assessors to have the human nature, so as to be visible to all,
both good and wicked. Hence it is not fitting for the angels to judge,
although in a certain sense we may say that the angels will judge,
namely by approving the sentence [*Cf. A[1]].
Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss on this passage observes, the angels
will come with Christ, not to judge, but "as witnesses of men's deeds
because it was under their guardianship that men did well or ill."
Reply to Objection 2: The name of Thrones is given to angels in
reference to the judgment which God is ever pronouncing, by governing
all things with supreme justice: of which judgment angels are in a way
the executors and promulgators. On the other hand, the judgment of men
by the man Christ will require human assessors.
Reply to Objection 3: Equality with angels is promised to men as
regards the essential reward. But nothing hinders an accidental reward
from being bestowed on men to the exclusion of the angels, as in the
case of the virgins' and martyrs' crowns: and the same may be said of
the judicial power.
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Whether the demons will carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the demons will not carry out the
sentence of the Judge on the damned after the day of judgment. For,
according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:24): "He will then bring to naught
[*Vulg.: 'When He shall have brought to naught', etc.] all
principality, and power, and virtue." Therefore all supremacy will
cease then. But the carrying out of the Judge's sentence implies some
kind of supremacy. Therefore after the judgment day the demons will not
carry out the Judge's sentence.
Objection 2: Further, the demons sinned more grievously than men.
Therefore it is not just that men should be tortured by demons.
Objection 3: Further, just as the demons suggest evil things to men, so
good angels suggest good things. Now it will not be the duty of the
good angels to reward the good, but this will be done by God,
immediately by Himself. Therefore neither will it be the duty of the
demons to punish the wicked.
On the contrary, Sinners have subjected themselves to the devil by
sinning. Therefore it is just that they should be subjected to him in
their punishments, and punished by him as it were.
I answer that, The Master in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 47 mentions
two opinions on this question, both of which seem consistent with
Divine justice, because it is just for man to be subjected to the devil
for having sinned, and yet it is unjust for the demon to be over him.
Accordingly the opinion which holds that after the judgment day the
demons will not be placed over men to punish them, regards the order of
Divine justice on the part of the demons punishing; while the contrary
opinion regards the order of Divine justice on the part of the men
punished.
Which of these opinions is nearer the truth we cannot know for certain.
Yet I think it truer to say that just as, among the saved, order will
be observed so that some will be enlightened and perfected by others
(because all the orders of the heavenly hierarchies will continue for
ever) [*Cf. [5110]FP, Q[108], AA[7],8], so, too, will order be observed
in punishments, men being punished by demons, lest the Divine order,
whereby the angels are placed between the human nature and the Divine,
be entirely set aside. Wherefore just as the Divine illuminations are
conveyed to men by the good angels, so too the demons execute the
Divine justice on the wicked. Nor does this in any way diminish the
punishment of the demons, since even in torturing others they are
themselves tortured, because then the fellowship of the unhappy will
not lessen but will increase unhappiness.
Reply to Objection 1: The supremacy which, it is declared, will be
brought to nought by Christ in the time to come must be taken in the
sense of the supremacy which is in keeping with the state of this
world: wherein men are placed over men, angels over men, angels over
angels, demons over demons, and demons over men; in every case so as
either to lead towards the end or to lead astray from the end. But then
when all things will have attained to that end there will be no
supremacy to lead astray from the end or to lead to it, but only that
which maintains in the end, good or evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the demerit of the demons does not
require that they be placed over men, since they made men subject to
them unjustly, yet this is required by the order of their nature in
relation to human nature: since "natural goods remain in them
unimpaired" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 3: The good angels are not the cause of the
principal reward in the elect, because all receive this immediately
from God. Nevertheless the angels are the cause of certain accidental
rewards in men, in so far as the higher angels enlighten those beneath
them, both angels and men, concerning certain hidden things of God,
which do not belong to the essence of beatitude. In like manner the
damned will receive their principal punishment immediately from God,
namely the everlasting banishment from the Divine vision: but there is
no reason why the demons should not torture men with other sensible
punishments. There is, however, this difference: that merit exalts,
whereas sin debases. Wherefore since the angelic nature is higher than
the human, some on account of the excellence of their merit will be so
far exalted as to be raised above the angels both in nature and rewards
[*Cf. [5111]FP, Q[108], A[8] ], so that some angels will be enlightened
by some men. On the other hand, no human sinners will, on account of a
certain degree of virtue, attain to the eminence that attaches to the
nature of the demons.
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Whether all men will be present at the judgment?
Objection 1: It would seem that men will not all be present at the
judgment. For it is written (Mat. 19:28): "You . . . shall sit on
twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." But all men do not
belong to those twelve tribes. Therefore it would seem that men will
not all be present at the judgment.
Objection 2: Further, the same apparently is to be gathered from Ps.
1:5, "The wicked shall not rise again in judgment."
Objection 3: Further, a man is brought to judgment that his merits may
be discussed. But some there are who have acquired no merits, such as
children who died before reaching the perfect age. Therefore they need
not be present at the judgment. Now there are many such. Therefore it
would seem that not all will be present.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 10:42) that Christ "was appointed
by God to be judge of the living and of the dead." Now this division
comprises all men, no matter how the living be distinct from the dead.
Therefore all men will be present at the judgment.
Further, it is written (Apoc. 1:7): "Behold He cometh with the clouds,
and every eye shall see Him." Now this would not be so unless all were
present at the judgment. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, The judicial power was bestowed on Christ as man, in
reward for the humility which He showed forth in His passion. Now in
His passion He shed His blood for all in point of sufficiency, although
through meeting with an obstacle in some, it had not its effect in all.
Therefore it is fitting that all men should assemble at the judgment,
to see His exaltation in His human nature, in respect of which "He was
appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead."
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 5), "it does
not follow from the saying, 'Judging the twelve tribes of Israel,' that
the tribe of Levi, which is the thirteenth, is not to be judged, or
that they will judge that people alone, and not other nations." The
reason why all other nations are denoted by the twelve tribes is
because they were called by Christ to take the place of the twelve
tribes.
Reply to Objection 2: The words, "The wicked shall not rise in
judgment," if referred to all sinners, mean that they will not arise to
judge. But if the wicked denote unbelievers, the sense is that they
will not arise to be judged, because they are "already judged" (Jn.
3:18). All, however, will rise again to assemble at the judgment and
witness the glory of the Judge.
Reply to Objection 3: Even children who have died before reaching the
perfect age will be present at the judgment, not to be judged, but to
see the Judge's glory.
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Whether the good will be judged at the judgment?
Objection 1: It would seem that none of the good will be judged at the
judgment. For it is declared (Jn. 3:18) that "he that believeth in Him
is not judged." Now all the good believed in Him. Therefore they will
not be judged.
Objection 2: Further, those who are uncertain of their bliss are not
blessed: whence Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi) that the demons were
never blessed. But the saints are now blessed. Therefore they are
certain of their bliss. Now what is certain is not submitted to
judgment. Therefore the good will not be judged.
Objection 3: Further, fear is incompatible with bliss. But the last
judgment, which above all is described as terrible, cannot take place
without inspiring fear into those who are to be judged. Hence Gregory
observes on Job 41:16 "When he shall raise him up, the angels shall
fear," etc. (Moral. xxxiv): "Consider how the conscience of the wicked
will then be troubled when even the just are disturbed about their
life." Therefore the blessed will not be judged.
On the contrary, It would seem that all the good will be judged, since
it is written (2 Cor. 5:10): "We must all be manifested before the
judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things
of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil."
Now there is nothing else to be judged. Therefore all, even the good,
will be judged.
Further, the "general" includes all. Now this is called the general
judgment. Therefore all will be judged.
I answer that, The judgment comprises two things, namely the discussion
of merits and the payment of rewards. As regards the payment of
rewards, all will be judged, even the good, since the Divine sentence
will appoint to each one the reward corresponding to his merit. But
there is no discussion of merits save where good and evil merits are
mingled together. Now those who build on the foundation of faith,
"gold, silver, and precious stones" (1 Cor. 3:12), by devoting
themselves wholly to the Divine service, and who have no notable
admixture of evil merit, are not subjected to a discussion of their
merits. Such are those who have entirely renounced the things of the
world and are solicitously thoughtful of the things that are of God:
wherefore they will be saved but will not be judged. Others, however,
build on the foundation of faith, wood, hay, stubble [*Cf. [5112]FS,
Q[89], A[2]]; they, in fact, love worldly things and are busy about
earthly concerns, yet so as to prefer nothing to Christ, but strive to
redeem their sins with alms, and these have an admixture of good with
evil merits. Hence they are subjected to a discussion of their merits,
and consequently in this account will be judged, and yet they will be
saved.
Reply to Objection 1: Since punishment is the effect of justice, while
reward is the effect of mercy, it follows that punishment is more
especially ascribed antonomastically to judgment which is the act of
justice; so that judgment is sometimes used to express condemnation. It
is thus that we are to understand the words quoted, as a gloss on the
passage remarks.
Reply to Objection 2: The merits of the elect will be discussed, not to
remove the uncertainty of their beatitude from the hearts of those who
are to be judged, but that it may be made manifest to us that their
good merits outweigh their evil merits, and thus God's justice be
proved.
Reply to Objection 3: Gregory is speaking of the just who will still be
in mortal flesh, wherefore he had already said: "Those who will still
be in the body, although already brave and perfect, yet through being
still in the flesh must needs be troubled with fear in the midst of
such a whirlwind of terror." Hence it is clear that this fear refers to
the time immediately before the judgment, most terrible indeed to the
wicked, but not to the good, who will have no apprehension of evil.
The arguments in the contrary sense consider judgment as regards the
payment of rewards.
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Whether the wicked will be judged?
Objection 1: It would seem that none of the wicked will be judged. For
even as damnation is certain in the case of unbelievers, so is it in
the case of those who die in mortal sin. Now it is declared because of
the certainty of damnation (Jn. 3:18): "He that believeth not is
already judged." Therefore in like manner neither will other sinners be
judged.
Objection 2: Further, the voice of the Judge is most terrible to those
who are condemned by His judgment. Now according to the text of
Sentent. iv, D, 47 and in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxvi) "the Judge
will not address Himself to unbelievers." If therefore He were to
address Himself to the believers about to be condemned, the unbelievers
would reap a benefit from their unbelief, which is absurd.
On the contrary, It would seem that all the wicked are to be judged,
because all the wicked will be sentenced to punishment according to the
degree of their guilt. But this cannot be done without a judicial
pronouncement. Therefore all the wicked will be judged.
I answer that, The judgment as regards the sentencing to punishment for
sin concerns all the wicked. whereas the judgment as regards the
discussion of merits concerns only believers. Because in unbelievers
the foundation of faith is lacking, without which all subsequent works
are deprived of the perfection of a right intention, so that in them
there is no admixture of good and evil works or merits requiring
discussion. But believers in whom the foundation of faith remains, have
at least a praiseworthy act of faith, which though it is not
meritorious without charity, yet is in itself directed to merit, and
consequently they will be subjected to the discussion of merits.
Consequently, believers who were at least counted as citizens of the
City of God will be judged as citizens, and sentence of death will not
be passed on them without a discussion of their merits; whereas
unbelievers will be condemned as foes, who are wont among men to be
exterminated without their merits being discussed.
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is certain that those who die in
mortal sin will be damned, nevertheless since they have an admixture of
certain things connected with meriting well, it behooves, for the
manifestation of Divine justice, that their merits be subjected to
discussion, in order to make it clear that they are justly banished
from the city of the saints, of which they appeared outwardly to be
citizens.
Reply to Objection 2: Considered under this special aspect the words
addressed to the believers about to be condemned will not be terrible,
because they will reveal in them certain things pleasing to them, which
it will be impossible to find in unbelievers, since "without faith it
is impossible to please God" (Heb. 11:6). But the sentence of
condemnation which will be passed on them all will be terrible to all
of them.
The argument in the contrary sense considered the judgment of
retribution.
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Whether at the coming judgment the angels will be judged?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels will be judged at the coming
judgment. For it is written (1 Cor. 6:3): "Know you not that we shall
judge angels?" But this cannot refer to the state of the present time.
Therefore it should refer to the judgment to come.
Objection 2: Further, it is written concerning Behemoth or Leviathan,
whereby the devil is signified (Job 40:28): "In the sight of all he
shall be cast down"; and (Mk. 1:24)* the demon cried out to Christ:
"Why art Thou come to destroy us before the time?" for, according to a
gloss, "the demons seeing our Lord on earth thought they were to be
judged forthwith." [*The reference should be Mat. 8:29: 'Art Thou come
hither to torment us before the time?' The text of Mark reads: 'Art
Thou come to destroy us?'] Therefore it would seem that a final
judgment is in store for them.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (2 Pet. 2:4): "God spared not the
angels that sinned, but delivered them drawn down by infernal ropes to
the lower hell, unto torments, to be reserved unto judgment." Therefore
it seems that the angels will be judged.
On the contrary, It is written (Nahum 1:9) according to the Septuagint
version: "God will not judge the same thing a second time." But the
wicked angels are already judged, wherefore it is written (Jn. 16:11):
"The prince of this world is already judged." Therefore the angels will
not be judged in the time to come.
Further, goodness and wickedness are more perfect in the angels than in
men who are wayfarers. Now some men, good and wicked, will not be
judged as stated in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 47. Therefore neither
will good or wicked angels be judged.
I answer that, The judgment of discussion nowise concerns either the
good or the wicked angels, since neither is any evil to be found in the
good angels, nor is any good liable to judgment to be found in the
wicked angels. But if we speak of the judgment of retribution, we must
distinguish a twofold retribution. One corresponds to the angels'
personal merits and was made to both from the beginning when some were
raised to bliss, and others plunged into the depths of woe. The other
corresponds to the merits, good or evil, procured through the angels,
and this retribution will be made in the judgment to come, because the
good angels will have an increased joy in the salvation of those whom
they have prompted to deeds of merit, while the wicked will have an
increase of torment through the manifold downfall of those whom they
have incited to evil deeds. Consequently the judgment will not regard
the angels directly, neither as judging nor as judged, but only men;
but it will regard the angels indirectly somewhat, in so far as they
were concerned in men's deeds.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle refers to the judgment
of comparison, because certain men will be found to be placed higher
than the angels.
Reply to Objection 2: The demons will then be cast down in the sight of
all because they will be imprisoned for ever in the dungeon of hell, so
that they will no more be free to go out, since this was permitted to
them only in so far as they were directed by Divine providence to try
the life of man.
The same answer applies to the Third Objection.
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OF THE FORM OF THE JUDGE IN COMING TO THE JUDGMENT (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the form of the Judge in coming to the judgment.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ will judge under the form or His humanity?
(2) Whether He will appear under the form of His glorified humanity?
(3) Whether His Godhead can be seen without joy?
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Whether Christ will judge under the form of His humanity?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ will not judge under the form of
His humanity. For judgment requires authority in the judge. Now Christ
has authority over the quick and the dead as God, for thus is He the
Lord and Creator of all. Therefore He will judge under the form of His
Godhead.
Objection 2: Further, invincible power is requisite in a judge;
wherefore it is written (Eccles. 7:6): "Seek not to be made a judge,
unless thou have strength enough to extirpate iniquities." Now
invincible power belongs to Christ as God. Therefore He will judge
under the form of the Godhead.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 5:22,23): "The Father . . .
hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men may honor the Son as
they honor the Father." Now equal honor to that of the Father is not
due to the Son in respect of His human nature. Therefore He will not
judge under His human form.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Dan. 7:9): "I beheld till thrones
were placed and the Ancient of days sat." Now the thrones signify
judicial power, and God is called the Ancient by reason of His
eternity, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. x). Therefore it becomes
the Son to judge as being eternal; and consequently not as man.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.) that "the
resurrection of the soul is the work of the Word the Son of God, and
the resurrection of the body is the work of the Word made the Son of
man in the flesh." Now that last judgment regards the soul rather than
the body. Therefore it becomes Christ to judge as God rather than as
man.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 5:27): "He hath given Him power to
do judgment, because He is the Son of man."
Further, it is written (Job 36:17): "Thy cause hath been judged as that
of the wicked---by Pilate" according to a gloss---therefore, "cause and
judgment thou shalt recover---that thou mayest judge justly," according
to the gloss. Now Christ was judged by Pilate with regard to His human
nature. Therefore He will judge under the human nature.
Further, to Him it belongs to judge who made the law. Now Christ gave
us the law of the Gospel while appearing in the human nature. Therefore
He will judge under that same nature.
I answer that, Judgment requires a certain authority in the judge.
Wherefore it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest another
man's servant?" Hence it is becoming that Christ should judge in
respect of His having authority over men to whom chiefly the last
judgment will be directed. Now He is our Lord, not only by reason of
the Creation, since "the Lord He is God, He made us and not we
ourselves" (Ps. 99:3), but also by reason of the Redemption, which
pertains to Him in respect of His human nature. Wherefore "to this end
Christ died and rose again, that He might be Lord both of the dead and
of the living" (Rom. 14:9). But the goods of the Creation would not
suffice us to obtain the reward of eternal life, without the addition
of the boon of the Redemption, on account of the obstacle accruing to
created nature through the sin of our first parent. Hence, since the
last judgment is directed to the admission of some to the kingdom, and
the exclusion of others therefrom, it is becoming that Christ should
preside at that judgment under the form of His human nature, since it
is by favor of that same nature's Redemption that man is admitted to
the kingdom. In this sense it is stated (Acts 10:42) that "He . . . was
appointed by God to be Judge of the living and of the dead." And
forasmuch as by redeeming mankind He restored not only man but all
creatures without exception---inasmuch as all creatures are bettered
through man's restoration, according to Col. 1:20, "Making peace
through the blood of His cross, both as to things on earth, and the
things that are in heaven"---it follows that through His Passion Christ
merited lordship and judicial power not over man alone, but over all
creatures, according to Mat. 28:18, "All power is given to Me, in
heaven and in earth" [*Cf. TP, Q[59]].
Reply to Objection 1: Christ, in respect of His Divine nature, has
authority of lordship over all creatures by right of creation; but in
respect of His human nature He has authority of lordship merited
through His Passion. The latter is secondary so to speak and acquired,
while the former is natural and eternal.
Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ as man has not of Himself
invincible power resulting from the natural power of the human species,
nevertheless there is also in His human nature an invincible power
derived from His Godhead, whereby all things are subjected under His
feet (1 Cor. 15:25-28; Heb. 2:8,9). Hence He will judge in His human
nature indeed, but by the power of His Godhead.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ would not have sufficed for the redemption
of mankind, had He been a mere man. Wherefore from the very fact that
He was able as man to redeem mankind, and thereby obtained judicial
power, it is evident that He is God, and consequently is to be honored
equally with the Father, not as man but as God.
Reply to Objection 4: In that vision of Daniel the whole order of the
judicial power is clearly expressed. This power is in God Himself as
its first origin, and more especially in the Father Who is the fount of
the entire Godhead; wherefore it is stated in the first place that the
"Ancient of days sat." But the judicial power was transmitted from the
Father to the Son, not only from eternity in respect of the Divine
nature, but also in time in respect of the human nature wherein He
merited it. Hence in the aforesaid vision it is further stated (Dan.
7:13,14): "Lo, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven,
and He came even to the Ancient of days . . . And He gave Him power and
glory, and a kingdom."
Reply to Objection 5: Augustine is speaking by a kind of appropriation,
so as to trace the effects which Christ wrought in the human nature to
causes somewhat similar to them. And since we are made to the image and
likeness of God in respect of our soul, and are of the same species as
the man Christ in respect of our body, he ascribes to the Godhead the
effects wrought by Christ in our souls, and those which He wrought or
will work in our bodies he ascribes to His flesh; although His flesh,
as being the instrument of His Godhead, has also its effect on our
souls as Damascene asserts (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), according to the
saying of Heb. 9:14, that His "blood" hath cleansed "our conscience
from dead works." And thus that "the Word was made flesh" is the cause
of the resurrection of souls; wherefore also according to His human
nature He is becomingly the Judge not only of bodily but also of
spiritual goods [*Cf. [5113]TP, Q[56], A[2], ad 1].
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Whether at the judgment Christ will appear in His glorified humanity?
Objection 1: It would seem that at the judgment Christ will not appear
in His glorified humanity. For a gloss [*St. Augustine, Tract. cxx in
Joan.] on Jn. 19:37, "They shall look on him whom they pierced," says:
"Because He will come in the flesh wherein He was crucified." Now He
was crucified in the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the
form of weakness and not in the form of glory.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Mat. 24:30) that "the sign of the
Son of man shall appear in heaven," namely, "the sign of the cross," as
Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxvii in Matth.), for "Christ when coming to the
judgment will show not only the scars of His wounds but even His most
shameful death." Therefore it seems that He will not appear in the form
of glory.
Objection 3: Further, Christ will appear at the judgment under that
form which can be gazed upon by all. Now Christ will not be visible to
all, good and wicked, under the form of His glorified humanity: because
the eye that is not glorified is seemingly unproportionate to see the
clarity of a glorified body. Therefore He will not appear under a
glorified form.
Objection 4: Further, that which is promised as a reward to the
righteous is not granted to the unrighteous. Now it is promised as a
reward to the righteous that they shall see the glory of His humanity
(Jn. 10:9): "He shall go in, and go out, and shall find pastures, i.e.
refreshment in His Godhead and humanity," according to the commentary
of Augustine [*De Spiritu et Anima, work of an unknown author. St.
Thomas, De Anima, ascribes it to Alcherus, a Cistercian monk; see
above[5114] Q[70], A[2], ad 1] and Is. 33:17: "His eyes shall see the
King in his beauty." Therefore He will not appear to all in His
glorified form.
Objection 5: Further, Christ will judge in the form wherein He was
judged: wherefore a gloss [*St. Augustine, Tract. xix, in Joan.] on Jn.
5:21, "So the Son also giveth life to whom He will," says: "He will
judge justly in the form wherein He was judged unjustly, that He may be
visible to the wicked." Now He was judged in the form of weakness.
Therefore He will appear in the same form at the judgment.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:27): "Then they shall see the
Son of man coming in a cloud with great power and majesty." Now majesty
and power pertain to glory. Therefore He will appear in the form of
glory.
Further, he who judges should be more conspicuous than those who are
judged. Now the elect who will be judged by Christ will have a
glorified body. Much more therefore will the Judge appear in a
glorified form.
Further, as to be judged pertains to weakness, so to judge pertains to
authority and glory. Now at His first coming when Christ came to be
judged, He appeared in the form of weakness. Therefore at the second
coming, when He will come to judge, He will appear in the form of
glory.
I answer that, Christ is called the mediator of God and men (1 Tim.
2:5) inasmuch as He satisfies for men and intercedes for them to the
Father, and confers on men things which belong to the Father, according
to Jn. 17:22, "The glory which Thou hast given Me, I have given to
them." Accordingly then both these things belong to Him in that He
communicates with both extremes: for in that He communicates with men,
He takes their part with the Father, and in that He communicates with
the Father, He bestows the Father's gifts on men. Since then at His
first coming He came in order to make satisfaction for us to the
Father, He came in the form of our weakness. But since at His second
coming He will come in order to execute the Father's justice on men, He
will have to show forth His glory which is in Him by reason of His
communication with the Father: and therefore He will appear in the form
of glory.
Reply to Objection 1: He will appear in the same flesh, but not under
the same form.
Reply to Objection 2: The sign of the cross will appear at the
judgment, to denote not a present but a past weakness: so as to show
how justly those were condemned who scorned so great mercy, especially
those who persecuted Christ unjustly. The scars which will appear in
His body will not be due to weakness, but will indicate the exceeding
power whereby Christ overcame His enemies by His Passion and infirmity.
He will also show forth His most shameful death, not by bringing it
sensibly before the eye, as though He suffered it there; but by the
things which will appear then, namely the signs of His past Passion, He
will recall men to the thought of His past death.
Reply to Objection 3: A glorified body has it in its power to show
itself or not to show itself to an eye that is not glorified, as stated
above ([5115]Q[85], A[2], ad 3). Hence Christ will be visible to all in
His glorified form.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as our friend's glory gives us pleasure, so
the glory and power of one we hate is most displeasing to us. Hence as
the sight of the glory of Christ's humanity will be a reward to the
righteous, so will it be a torment to Christ's enemies: wherefore it is
written (Is. 26:11): "Let the envious people see and be confounded and
let fire" (i.e. envy) "devour Thy enemies."
Reply to Objection 5: Form is taken there for human nature wherein He
was judged and likewise will judge; but not for a quality of nature,
namely of weakness, which will not be the same in Him when judging as
when judged (Cf. ad 2).
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Whether the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Godhead can be seen by the wicked
without joy. For there can be no doubt that the wicked will know with
the greatest certainty that Christ is God. Therefore they will see His
Godhead, and yet they will not rejoice in seeing Christ. Therefore it
will be possible to see it without joy.
Objection 2: Further, the perverse will of the wicked is not more
adverse to Christ's humanity than to His Godhead. Now the fact that
they will see the glory of His humanity will conduce to their
punishment, as stated above (A[2], ad 4). Therefore if they were to see
His Godhead, there would be much more reason for them to grieve rather
than rejoice.
Objection 3: Further, the course of the affections is not a necessary
sequel to that which is in the intellect: wherefore Augustine says (In
Ps. 118: conc. 8): "The intellect precedes, the affections follow
slowly or not at all." Now vision regards the intellect, whereas joy
regards the affections. Therefore it will be possible to see the
Godhead without joy.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is received into "a thing is received
according to the mode of the receiver and not of the received." But
whatever is seen is, in a way, received into the seer. Therefore
although the Godhead is in itself supremely enjoyable, nevertheless
when seen by those who are plunged in grief, it will give no joy but
rather displeasure.
Objection 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible object, so is the
intellect to the intelligible object. Now in the senses, "to the
unhealthy palate bread is painful, to the healthy palate sweet," as
Augustine says (Confess. vii), and the same happens with the other
senses. Therefore since the damned have the intellect indisposed, it
would seem that the vision of the uncreated light will give them pain
rather than joy.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: That
they may know Thee, the . . . true God." Wherefore it is clear that the
essence of bliss consists in seeing God. Now joy is essential to bliss.
Therefore the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.
Further, the essence of the Godhead is the essence of truth. Now it is
delightful to every one to see the truth, wherefore "all naturally
desire to know," as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics.
Therefore it is impossible to see the Godhead without joy.
Further, if a certain vision is not always delightful, it happens
sometimes to be painful. But intellective vision is never painful since
"the pleasure we take in objects of understanding has no grief opposed
to it," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii). Since then the
Godhead cannot be seen save by the intellect, it seems that the Godhead
cannot be seen without joy.
I answer that, In every object of appetite or of pleasure two things
may be considered, namely the thing which is desired or which gives
pleasure, and the aspect of appetibility or pleasurableness in that
thing. Now according to Boethius (De Hebdom.) that which is can have
something besides what it is, but 'being' itself has no admixture of
aught else beside itself. Hence that which is desirable or pleasant can
have an admixture of something rendering it undesirable or unpleasant;
but the very aspect of pleasurableness has not and cannot have anything
mixed with it rendering it unpleasant or undesirable. Now it is
possible for things that are pleasurable, by participation of goodness
which is the aspect of appetibility or pleasurableness, not to give
pleasure when they are apprehended, but it is impossible for that which
is good by its essence not to give pleasure when it is apprehended.
Therefore since God is essentially His own goodness, it is impossible
for the Godhead to be seen without joy.
Reply to Objection 1: The wicked will know most clearly that Christ is
God, not through seeing His Godhead, but on account of the most
manifest signs of His Godhead.
Reply to Objection 2: No one can hate the Godhead considered in itself,
as neither can one hate goodness itself. But God is said to be hated by
certain persons in respect of some of the effects of the Godhead, in so
far as He does or commands something contrary to their will [*Cf.
[5116]SS, Q[34], A[1]]. Therefore the vision of the Godhead can be
painful to no one.
Reply to Objection 3: The saying of Augustine applies when the thing
apprehended previously by the intellect is good by participation and
not essentially, such as all creatures are; wherefore there may be
something in them by reason of which the affections are not moved. In
like manner God is known by wayfarers through His effects, and their
intellect does not attain to the very essence of His goodness. Hence it
is not necessary that the affections follow the intellect, as they
would if the intellect saw God's essence which is His goodness.
Reply to Objection 4: Grief denotes not a disposition but a passion.
Now every passion is removed if a stronger contrary cause supervene,
and does not remove that cause. Accordingly the grief of the damned
would be done away if they saw God in His essence.
Reply to Objection 5: The indisposition of an organ removes the natural
proportion of the organ to the object that has a natural aptitude to
please, wherefore the pleasure is hindered. But the indisposition which
is in the damned does not remove the natural proportion whereby they
are directed to the Divine goodness, since its image ever remains in
them. Hence the comparison fails.
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OF THE QUALITY OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next discuss the quality which the world and those who rise
again will have after the judgment. Here a threefold matter offers
itself to our consideration: (1) The state and quality of the world;
(2) The state of the blessed; (3) The state of the wicked.
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there will be a renewal of the world?
(2) Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease?
(3) Whether the heavenly bodies will be more brilliant?
(4) Whether the elements will receive an additional clarity?
(5) Whether the animals and plants will remain?
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Whether the world will be renewed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the world will never be renewed. For
nothing will be but what was at some time as to its species: "What is
it that hath been? the same thing that shall be" (Eccles. 1:9). Now the
world never had any disposition other than it has now as to essential
parts, both genera and species. Therefore it will never be renewed.
Objection 2: Further, renewal is a kind of alteration. But it is
impossible for the universe to be altered; because whatever is altered
argues some alterant that is not altered, which nevertheless is a
subject of local movement: and it is impossible to place such a thing
outside the universe. Therefore it is impossible for the world to be
renewed.
Objection 3: Further, it is stated (Gn. 2:2) that "God . . . rested on
the seventh day from all His work which He had done," and holy men
explain that "He rested from forming new creatures." Now when things
were first established, the mode imposed upon them was the same as they
have now in the natural order. Therefore they will never have any
other.
Objection 4: Further, the disposition which things have now is natural
to them. Therefore if they be altered to another disposition, this
disposition will be unnatural to them. Now whatever is unnatural and
accidental cannot last for ever (De Coelo et Mundo i). Therefore this
disposition acquired by being renewed will be taken away from them; and
thus there will be a cycle of changes in the world as Empedocles and
Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3) maintained, and after this world there will
be another, and after that again another.
Objection 5: Further, newness of glory is given to the rational
creature as a reward. Now where there is no merit, there can be no
reward. Since then insensible creatures have merited nothing, it would
seem that they will not be renewed.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 65:17): "Behold I create new
heavens and a new earth, and the former things shall not be in
remembrance"; and (Apoc. 21:1): "I saw a new heaven and a new earth.
For the first heaven and the first earth was gone."
Further, the dwelling should befit the dweller. But the world was made
to be man's dwelling. Therefore it should befit man. Now man will be
renewed. Therefore the world will be likewise.
Further, "Every beast loveth its like" (Ecclus. 13:19), wherefore it is
evident that likeness is the reason of love. Now man has some likeness
to the universe, wherefore he is called "a little world." Hence man
loves the whole world naturally and consequently desires its good.
Therefore, that man's desire be satisfied the universe must needs also
be made better.
I answer that, We believe all corporeal things to have been made for
man's sake, wherefore all things are stated to be subject to him [*Ps.
8:5, seqq.]. Now they serve man in two ways, first, as sustenance to
his bodily life, secondly, as helping him to know God, inasmuch as man
sees the invisible things of God by the things that are made (Rom.
1:20). Accordingly glorified man will nowise need creatures to render
him the first of these services, since his body will be altogether
incorruptible, the Divine power effecting this through the soul which
it will glorify immediately. Again man will not need the second service
as to intellective knowledge, since by that knowledge he will see God
immediately in His essence. The carnal eye, however, will be unable to
attain to this vision of the Essence; wherefore that it may be
fittingly comforted in the vision of God, it will see the Godhead in
Its corporeal effects, wherein manifest proofs of the Divine majesty
will appear, especially in Christ's flesh, and secondarily in the
bodies of the blessed, and afterwards in all other bodies. Hence those
bodies also will need to receive a greater inflow from the Divine
goodness than now, not indeed so as to change their species, but so as
to add a certain perfection of glory: and such will be the renewal of
the world. Wherefore at the one same time, the world will be renewed,
and man will be glorified.
Reply to Objection 1: Solomon is speaking there of the natural course:
this is evident from his adding: "Nothing under the sun is new." For
since the movement of the sun follows a circle, those things which are
subject to the sun's power must needs have some kind of circular
movement. This consists in the fact that things which were before
return the same in species but different in the individual (De Generat.
i). But things belonging to the state of glory are not "under the sun."
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers natural alteration which
proceeds from a natural agent, which acts from natural necessity. For
such an agent cannot produce different dispositions, unless it be
itself disposed differently. But things done by God proceed from
freedom of will, wherefore it is possible, without any change in God
Who wills it, for the universe to have at one time one disposition, and
another at another time. Thus this renewal will not be reduced to a
cause that is moved, but to an immovable principle, namely God.
Reply to Objection 3: God is stated to have ceased on the seventh day
forming new creatures, for as much as nothing was made afterwards that
was not previously in some likeness [*Cf. [5117]FP, Q[73], A[1]] either
generically, or specifically, or at least as in a seminal principle, or
even as in an obediential potentiality [*Cf. [5118]FP, Q[115], A[2], ad
4; [5119]TP, Q[11], A[1]]. I say then that the future renewal of the
world preceded in the works of the six days by way of a remote
likeness, namely in the glory and grace of the angels. Moreover it
preceded in the obediential potentiality which was then bestowed on the
creature to the effect of its receiving this same renewal by the Divine
agency.
Reply to Objection 4: This disposition of newness will be neither
natural nor contrary to nature, but above nature (just as grace and
glory are above the nature of the soul): and it will proceed from an
everlasting agent which will preserve it for ever.
Reply to Objection 5: Although, properly speaking, insensible bodies
will not have merited this glory, yet man merited that this glory
should be bestowed on the whole universe, in so far as this conduces to
man's increase of glory. Thus a man merits to be clothed in more
splendid robes, which splendor the robes nowise merited themselves.
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Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease?
Objection 1: It seems that when the world is thus renewed the movement
of the heavenly bodies will not cease. For it is written (Gn. 8:22):
"All the days of the earth . . . cold and heat, summer and winter,
night and day shall not cease." Now night and day, summer and winter
result from the movement of the sun. Therefore the movement of the sun
will never cease.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 31:35,36): "Thus saith the
Lord Who giveth the sun for the light of the day, the order of the moon
and of the stars for the light of the night: Who stirreth up the sea,
and the waves thereof roar . . . If these ordinances shall fail before
Me . . . then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a
nation before Me for ever." Now the seed of Israel shall never fail,
but will remain for ever. Therefore the laws of day and of the sea
waves, which result from the heavenly movement, will remain for ever.
Therefore the movement of the heaven will never cease.
Objection 3: Further, the substance of the heavenly bodies will remain
for ever. Now it is useless to admit the existence of a thing unless
you admit the purpose for which it was made: and the heavenly bodies
were made in order "to divide the day and the night"; and to be "for
signs, and for seasons, and for days and for years" (Gn. 1:14). But
they cannot do this except by movement. Therefore their movement will
remain for ever, else those bodies would remain without a purpose.
Objection 4: Further, in this renewal of the world the whole world will
be bettered. Therefore no body will be deprived of what pertains to its
perfection. Now movement belongs to the perfection of a heavenly body,
because, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii, "those bodies participate
of the Divine goodness by their movement." Therefore the movement of
the heaven will not cease.
Objection 5: Further, the sun successively gives light to the various
parts of the world, by reason of its circular movement. Therefore if
the circular movement of the heaven ceases, it follows that in some
part of the earth's surface there will be perpetual darkness, which is
unbecoming to the aforesaid renewal.
Objection 6: Further, if the movement were to cease, this could only be
because movement causes some imperfection in the heaven, for instance
wear and tear, which is impossible, since this movement is natural, and
the heavenly bodies are impassible, wherefore they are not worn out by
movement (De Coelo et Mundo ii). Therefore the movement of the heaven
will never cease.
Objection 7: Further, a potentiality is useless if it be not reduced to
act. Now in whatever position the heavenly body is placed it is in
potentiality to another position. Therefore unless this potentiality be
reduced to act, it would remain useless, and would always be imperfect.
But it cannot be reduced to act save by local movement. Therefore it
will always be in motion.
Objection 8: Further, if a thing is indifferent in relation to more
than one alternation, either both are ascribed to it, or neither. Now
the sun is indifferent to being in the east or in the west, else its
movement would not be uniform throughout, since it would move more
rapidly to the place which is more natural to it. Therefore either
neither position is ascribed to the sun, or both. But neither both nor
neither can be ascribed to it, except successively by movement; for if
it stand still, it must needs stand in some position. Therefore the
solar body will always be in motion, and in like manner all other
heavenly bodies.
Objection 9: Further, the movement of the heaven is the cause of time.
Therefore if the movement of the heaven fail, time must needs fail: and
if this were to fail, it would fail in an instant. Now an instant is
defined (Phys. viii) "the beginning of the future and the end of the
past." Consequently there would be time after the last instant of time,
which is impossible. Therefore the movement of the heavens will never
cease.
Objection 10: Further, glory does not remove nature. But the movement
of the heaven is natural. Therefore it is not deprived thereof by
glory.
On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel who appeared,
"swore by him that liveth for ever and ever . . . that time shall be no
longer," namely after the seventh angel shall have sounded the trumpet,
at the sound of which "the dead shall rise again" (1 Cor. 15:52). Now
if time be not, there is no movement of the heaven. Therefore the
movement of the heaven will cease.
Further: "Thy sun shall go down no more, and thy moon shall not
decrease" (Is. 60:20). Now the setting of the sun and the phases of the
moon are caused by the movement of the heavens. Therefore the heavenly
movement will cease at length.
Further, it is shown in De Gener. ii that "the movement of the heaven
is for the sake of continual generation in this lower world." But
generation will cease when the number of the elect is complete.
Therefore the movement of the heaven will cease.
Further, all movement is for some end (Metaph. ii). But all movement
for an end ceases when the end is obtained. Therefore either the
movement of the heaven will never obtain its end, and thus it would be
useless, or it will cease at length.
Further, rest is more noble than movement, because things are more
likened to God, Who is supremely immovable, by being themselves
unmoved. Now the movement of lower bodies terminates naturally in rest.
Therefore since the heavenly bodies are far nobler, their movement
terminates naturally in rest.
I answer that, There are three opinions touching this question. The
first is of the philosophers who assert that the movement of the heaven
will last for ever. But this is not in keeping with our faith, which
holds that the elect are in a certain number preordained by God, so
that the begetting of men will not last for ever, and for the same
reason, neither will other things that are directed to the begetting of
men, such as the movement of the heaven and the variations of the
elements. Others say that the movement of the heaven will cease
naturally. But this again is false, since every body that is moved
naturally has a place wherein it rests naturally, whereto it is moved
naturally, and whence it is not moved except by violence. Now no such
place can be assigned to the heavenly body, since it is not more
natural to the sun to move towards a point in the east than to move
away from it, wherefore either its movement would not be altogether
natural, or its movement would not naturally terminate in rest. Hence
we must agree with others who say that the movement of the heaven will
cease at this renewal of the world, not indeed by any natural cause,
but as a result of the will of God. For the body in question, like
other bodies, was made to serve man in the two ways above mentioned
[5120](A[1]): and hereafter in the state of glory man will no longer
need one of these services, that namely in respect of which the
heavenly bodies serve man for the sustenance of his bodily life. Now in
this way the heavenly bodies serve man by their movement, in so far as
by the heavenly movement the human race is multiplied, plants and
animals needful for man's use generated, and the temperature of the
atmosphere rendered conducive to health. Therefore the movement of the
heavenly body will cease as soon as man is glorified.
Reply to Objection 1: These words refer to the earth in its present
state, when it is able to be the principle of the generation and
corruption of plants. This is evident from its being said there: "All
the days of the earth, seed time and harvest," etc. And it is simply to
be granted that as long as the earth is fit for seed time and harvest,
the movement of the heaven will not cease.
We reply in like manner to OBJ 2 that the Lord is speaking there of the
duration of the seed of Israel with regard to the present state. This
is evident from the words: "Then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so
as not to be a nation before Me for ever." For after this state there
will be no succession of days: wherefore the laws also which He had
mentioned will cease after this state.
Reply to Objection 3: The end which is there assigned to the heavenly
bodies is their proximate end, because it is their proper act. But this
act is directed further to another end, namely the service of man,
which is shown by the words of Dt. 4:19: "Lest perhaps lifting up thy
eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of
heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which
the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations, that are
under heaven." Therefore we should form our judgment of the heavenly
bodies from the service of man, rather than from the end assigned to
them in Genesis. Moreover the heavenly bodies, as stated above, will
serve glorified man in another way; hence it does not follow that they
will remain without a purpose.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not belong to the perfection of a
heavenly body, except in so far as thereby it is the cause of
generation and corruption in this lower world: and in that respect also
this movement makes the heavenly body participate in the Divine
goodness by way of a certain likeness of causality. But movement does
not belong to the perfection of the substance of the heaven, which
substance will remain. Wherefore it does not follow that, when this
movement ceases, the substance of the heaven will lose something of its
perfection.
Reply to Objection 5: All the elemental bodies will have in themselves
a certain clarity of glory. Hence though part of the surface of the
earth be not lit up by the sun, there will by no means be any darkness
there.
Reply to Objection 6: A gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 8:22, "Every creature
groaneth," etc. says explicitly that "all the elements labor to fulfill
their offices: thus the sun and moon fill the places appointed to them
not without work: this is for our sake, wherefore they will rest when
we are taken up to heaven." This work, in my opinion, does not signify
that any stress or passion occurs to these bodies from their movement,
since this movement is natural to them and nowise violent, as is proved
in De Coelo et Mundo i. But work here denotes a defect in relation to
the term to which a thing tends. Hence since this movement is ordained
by Divine providence to the completion of the number of the elect, it
follows that as long as the latter is incomplete, this movement has not
reached the term whereto it was ordained: hence it is said
metaphorically to labor, as a man who has not what he intends to have.
This defect will be removed from the heaven when the number of the
elect is complete. Or it may refer to the desire of the future renewal
which it awaits from the Divine disposal.
Reply to Objection 7: In a heavenly body there is no potentiality that
can be perfected by place, or that is made for this end which is to be
in such and such a place. But potentiality to situation in a place is
related to a heavenly body, as the craftsman's potentiality to
construct various houses of one kind: for if he construct one of these
he is not said to have the potentiality uselessly, and in like manner
in whatever situation a heavenly body be placed, its potentiality to be
in a place will not remain incomplete or without a purpose.
Reply to Objection 8: Although a heavenly body, so far as regards its
nature, is equally inclined to every situation that it can possibly
occupy, nevertheless in comparison with things outside it, it is not
equally inclined to every situation: but in respect of one situation it
has a more noble disposition in comparison with certain things than in
respect of another situation; thus in our regard the sun has a more
noble disposition at daytime than at night-time. Hence it is probable,
since the entire renewal of the world is directed to man, that the
heaven will have in this renewal the most noble situation possible in
relation to our dwelling there. Or, according to some, the heaven will
rest in that situation wherein it was made, else one of its revolutions
would remain incomplete. But this argument seems improbable, for since
a revolution of the heaven takes no less than 36,000 years to complete,
it would follow that the world must last that length of time, which
does not seem probable. Moreover according to this it would be possible
to know when the world will come to an end. For we may conclude with
probability from astronomers in what position the heavenly bodies were
made, by taking into consideration the number of years that have
elapsed since the beginning of the world: and in the same way it would
be possible to know the exact number of years it would take them to
return to a like position: whereas the time of the world's end is
stated to be unknown.
Reply to Objection 9: Time will at length cease, when the heavenly
movement ceases. Yet that last "now" will not be the beginning of the
future. For the definition quoted applies to the "now" only as
continuous with the parts of time, not as terminating the whole of
time.
Reply to Objection 10: The movement of the heaven is said to be
natural, not as though it were part of nature in the same way as we
speak of natural principles; but because it has its principle in the
nature of a body, not indeed its active but its receptive principle.
Its active principle is a spiritual substance, as the Commentator says
on De Coelo et Mundo; and consequently it is not unreasonable for this
movement to be done away by the renewal of glory, since the nature of
the heavenly body will not alter through the cessation of that
movement.
We grant the other objections which argue in the contrary sense, namely
the first three, because they conclude in due manner. But since the
remaining two seem to conclude that the movement of heaven will cease
naturally, we must reply to them. To the first, then, we reply that
movement ceases when its purpose is attained, provided this is a sequel
to, and does not accompany the movement. Now the purpose of the
heavenly movement, according to philosophers, accompanies that
movement, namely the imitation of the Divine goodness in the causality
of that movement with respect to this lower world. Hence it does not
follow that this movement ceases naturally.
To the second we reply that although immobility is simply nobler than
movement, yet movement in a subject which thereby can acquire a perfect
participation of the Divine goodness is nobler than rest in a subject
which is altogether unable to acquire that perfection by movement. For
this reason the earth which is the lowest of the elements is without
movement: although God Who is exalted above all things is without
movement, by Whom the more noble bodies are moved. Hence also it is
that the movements of the higher bodies might be held to be perpetual,
so far as their natural power is concerned, and never to terminate in
rest, although the movement of lower bodies terminates in rest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the brightness of the heavenly bodies will be increased at this
renewal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the brightness of the heavenly bodies
will not be increased at this renewal. For this renewal as regards the
lower bodies will be caused by the cleansing fire. But the cleansing
fire will not reach the heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies
will not be renewed by receiving an increase of brightness.
Objection 2: Further, just as the heavenly bodies are the cause of
generation in this lower world by their movement, so are they by their
light. But, when generation ceases, movement will cease as stated above
[5121](A[2]). Therefore in like manner the light of the heavenly bodies
will cease rather than increase.
Objection 3: Further, if the heavenly bodies will be renewed when man
is renewed, it follows that when man deteriorated they deteriorated
likewise. But this does not seem probable, since these bodies are
unalterable as to their substance. Therefore neither will they be
renewed when man is renewed.
Objection 4: Further, if they deteriorated then it follows that their
deterioration was on a par with the amelioration which, it is said,
will accrue to them at man's renewal. Now it is written (Is. 30:26)
that "the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun."
Therefore in the original state before sin the moon shone as much as
the sun does now. Therefore whenever the moon was over the earth, it
made it to be day as the sun does now: which is proved manifestly to be
false from the statement of Gn. 1:16 that the moon was made "to rule
the night." Therefore when man sinned the heavenly bodies were not
deprived of their light; and so their light will not be increased, so
it seems, when man is glorified.
Objection 5: Further, the brightness of the heavenly bodies, like other
creatures, is directed to the use of man. Now, after the resurrection,
the brightness of the sun will be of no use to man: for it is written
(Is. 60:19): "Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day,
neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee," and (Apoc.
21:23): "The city hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon to shine in
it." Therefore their brightness will not be increased.
Objection 6: Further, it were not a wise craftsman who would make very
great instruments for the making of a small work. Now man is a very
small thing in comparison with the heavenly bodies, which by their huge
bulk surpass the size of man almost beyond comparison: in fact the size
of the whole earth in comparison with the heaven is as a point compared
with a sphere, as astronomers say. Since then God is most wise it would
seem that man is not the end of the creation of the heavens, and so it
is unseemly that the heaven should deteriorate when he sinned, or that
it should be bettered when he is glorified.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 30:26): "The light of the moon
shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be
sevenfold."
Further, the whole world will be renewed for the better. But the heaven
is the more noble part of the corporeal world. Therefore it will be
altered for the better. But this cannot be unless it shine out with
greater brightness. Therefore its brightness will be bettered and will
increase.
Further, "every creature that groaneth and travaileth in pain, awaiteth
the revelation of the glory of the children of God" [*'The creature
also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption, into
the liberty of the children of God. For we know that every creature
groaneth and travaileth in pain,' etc.] (Rom. 8:21,22). Now such are
the heavenly bodies, as a gloss says on the same passage. Therefore
they await the glory of the saints. But they would not await it unless
they were to gain something by it. Therefore their brightness will
increase thereby, since it is their chief beauty.
I answer that, The renewal of the world is directed to the end that,
after this renewal has taken place, God may become visible to man by
signs so manifest as to be perceived as it were by his senses. Now
creatures lead to the knowledge of God chiefly by their comeliness and
beauty, which show forth the wisdom of their Maker and Governor;
wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:5): "By the greatness of the beauty
and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known
thereby." And the beauty of the heavenly bodies consists chiefly in
light; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 43:10): "The glory of the stars
is the beauty of heaven, the Lord enlighteneth the world on high."
Hence the heavenly bodies will be bettered, especially as regards their
brightness. But to what degree and in what way this betterment will
take place is known to Him alone Who will bring it about.
Reply to Objection 1: The cleansing fire will not cause the form of the
renewal, but will only dispose thereto, by cleansing from the vileness
of sin and the impurity resulting from the mingling of bodies, and this
is not to be found in the heavenly bodies. Hence although the heavenly
bodies are not to be cleansed by fire, they are nevertheless to be
Divinely renewed.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement does not denote perfection in the thing
moved, considered in itself, since movement is the act of that which is
imperfect: although it may pertain to the perfection of a body in so
far as the latter is the cause of something. But light belongs to the
perfection of a lightsome body, even considered in its substance: and
consequently after the heavenly body has ceased to be the cause of
generation, its brightness will remain, while its movement will cease.
Reply to Objection 3: A gloss on Is. 30:26, "The light of the moon
shall be as the light of the sun," says: "All things made for man's
sake deteriorated at his fall, and sun and moon diminished in light."
This diminishment is understood by some to mean a real lessening of
light. Nor does it matter that the heavenly bodies are by nature
unalterable, because this alteration was brought about by the Divine
power. Others, however, with greater probability, take this
diminishment to mean, not a real lessening of light, but a lessening in
reference to man's use; because after sin man did not receive as much
benefit from the light of the heavenly bodies as before. In the same
sense we read (Gn. 3:17,18): "Cursed is the earth in thy work . . .
Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee"; although it would
have brought forth thorns and thistles before sin, but not as a
punishment to man. Nor does it follow that, supposing the light of the
heavenly bodies not to have been lessened essentially through man
sinning, it will not really be increased at man's glorification,
because man's sin wrought no change upon the state of the universe,
since both before and after sin man had an animal life, which needs the
movement and generation of a corporeal creature; whereas man's
glorification will bring a change upon the state of all corporeal
creatures, as stated above (Q[76], A[7]). Hence there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 4: This diminution, according to the more probable
opinion, refers not to the substance but to the effect. Hence it does
not follow that the moon while over the earth would have made it to be
day, but that man would have derived as much benefit from the light of
the moon then as now from the light of the sun. After the resurrection,
however, when the light of the moon will be increased in very truth,
there will be night nowhere on earth but only in the center of the
earth, where hell will be, because then, as stated, the moon will shine
as brightly as the sun does now; the sun seven times as much as now,
and the bodies of the blessed seven times more than the sun, although
there be no authority or reason to prove this.
Reply to Objection 5: A thing may be useful to man in two ways. First,
by reason of necessity, and thus no creature will be useful to man
because he will have complete sufficiency from God. This is signified
(Apoc. 21:23) by the words quoted, according to which that "city hath
no need of the sun," nor "of the moon." Secondly, on account of a
greater perfection, and thus man will make use of other creatures, yet
not as needful to him in order to obtain his end, in which way he makes
use of them now.
Reply to Objection 6: This is the argument of Rabbi Moses who endeavors
to prove (Dux errantium iii) that the world was by no means made for
man's use. Wherefore he maintains that what we read in the Old
Testament about the renewal of the world, as instanced by the
quotations from Isaias, is said metaphorically: and that even as the
sun is said to be darkened in reference to a person when he encounters
a great sorrow so as not to know what to do (which way of speaking is
customary to Scripture), so on the other hand the sun is said to shine
brighter for a person, and the whole world to be renewed, when he is
brought from a state of sorrow to one of very great joy. But this is
not in harmony with the authority and commentaries of holy men.
Consequently we must answer this argument by saying that although the
heavenly bodies far surpass the human body, yet the rational soul
surpasses the heavenly bodies far more than these surpass the human
body. Hence it is not unreasonable to say that the heavenly bodies were
made for man's sake; not, however as though this were the principal
end, since the principal end of all things is God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the elements will be renewed by an addition of brightness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the elements will not be renewed by
receiving some kind of brightness. For just as light is a quality
proper to a heavenly body, so are hot and cold, wet and dry. qualities
proper to the elements. Therefore as the heaven is renewed by an
increase of brightness, so ought the elements to be renewed by an
increase of active and passive qualities.
Objection 2: Further, rarity, and density are qualities of the
elements, and the elements will not be deprived of them at this
renewal. Now the rarity and density of the elements would seem to be an
obstacle to brightness, since a bright body needs to be condensed, for
which reason the rarity of the air seems incompatible with brightness,
and in like manner the density of the earth which is an obstacle to
transparency. Therefore it is impossible for the elements to be renewed
by the addition of brightness.
Objection 3: Further, it is agreed that the damned will be in the
earth. Yet they will be in darkness not only internal but also
external. Therefore the earth will not be endowed with brightness in
this renewal, nor for the same reason will the other elements.
Objection 4: Further, increase of brightness in the elements implies an
increase of heat. If therefore at this renewal the brightness of the
elements be greater than it is now, their heat will likewise be
greater; and thus it would seem that they will be changed from their
natural qualities, which are in them according to a fixed measure: and
this is absurd.
Objection 5: Further, the good of the universe which consists in the
order and harmony of the parts is more excellent than the good of any
individual creature. But if one creature be bettered, the good of the
universe is done away, since there will no longer be the same harmony.
Therefore if the elemental bodies, which according to their natural
degree in the universe should be devoid of brightness, were to be
endowed with brightness, the perfection of the universe would be
diminished thereby rather than increased.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 21:1): "I saw a new heaven and a
new earth." Now the heaven will be renewed by an increase of
brightness. Therefore the earth and likewise the other elements will
also.
Further, the lower bodies, like the higher, are for man's use. Now the
corporeal creature will be rewarded for its services to man, as a gloss
of Ambrose seems to say on Rom. 8:22, "Every creature groaneth," and a
gloss of Jerome on Is. 30:26, "And the light of the moon shall be,"
etc. Therefore the elements will be glorified as well as the heavenly
bodies.
Further, man's body is composed of the elements. Therefore the
elemental particles that are in man's body will be glorified by the
addition of brightness when man is glorified. Now it is fitting that
whole and part should have the same disposition. Therefore it is
fitting that the elements themselves should be endowed with brightness.
I answer that, Just as there is a certain order between the heavenly
spirits and the earthly or human spirits, so is there an order between
heavenly bodies and earthly bodies. Since then the corporeal creature
was made for the sake of the spiritual and is ruled thereby, it follows
that corporeal things are dealt with similarly to spiritual things. Now
in this final consummation of things the lower spirits will receive the
properties of the higher spirits, because men will be as the angels in
heaven (Mat. 22:30): and this will be accomplished by conferring the
highest degree of perfection on that in which the human spirit agrees
with the angelic. Wherefore, in like manner, since the lower bodies do
not agree with the heavenly bodies except in the nature of light and
transparency (De Anima ii), it follows that the lower bodies are to be
perfected chiefly as regards brightness. Hence all the elements will be
clothed with a certain brightness, not equally, however, but according
to their mode: for it is said that the earth on its outward surface
will be as transparent as glass, water as crystal, the air as heaven,
fire as the lights of heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [5122](A[1]), the renewal of the
world is directed to the effect that man even by his senses may as it
were see the Godhead by manifest signs. Now the most spiritual and
subtle of our senses is the sight. Consequently all the lower bodies
need to be bettered, chiefly as regards the visible qualities the
principle of which is light. On the other hand, the elemental qualities
regard the touch, which is the most material of the senses, and the
excess of their contrariety is more displeasing than pleasant; whereas
excess of light will be pleasant, since it has no contrariety, except
on account of a weakness in the organ, such as will not be then.
Reply to Objection 2: The air will be bright, not as casting forth
rays, but as an enlightened transparency; while the earth, although it
is opaque through lack of light, yet by the Divine power its surface
will be clothed with the glory of brightness, without prejudice to its
density.
Reply to Objection 3: The earth will not be glorified with brightness
in the infernal regions; but instead of this glory, that part of the
earth will have the rational spirits of men and demons who though weak
by reason of sin are nevertheless superior to any corporeal quality by
the dignity of their nature. or we may say that, though the whole earth
be glorified, the wicked will nevertheless be in exterior darkness,
since even the fire of hell, while shining for them in one respect,
will be unable to enlighten them in another.
Reply to Objection 4: This brightness will be in these bodies even as
it is in the heavenly bodies, in which it causes no heat, because these
bodies will then be unalterable, as the heavenly bodies are now.
Reply to Objection 5: The order of the universe will not be done away
by the betterment of the elements, because all the other parts will
also be bettered, and so the same harmony will remain.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the plants and animals will remain in this renewal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the plants and animals will remain in
this renewal. For the elements should be deprived of nothing that
belongs to their adornment. Now the elements are said to be adorned by
the animals and plants [*Cf. Gn. 1:11,12,20,21,24,25]. Therefore they
will not be removed in this renewal.
Objection 2: Further, just as the elements served man, so also did
animals, plants and mineral bodies. But on account of this service the
elements will be glorified. Therefore both animals and plants and
mineral bodies will be glorified likewise.
Objection 3: Further, the universe will remain imperfect if anything
belonging to its perfection be removed. Now the species of animals,
plants, and mineral bodies belong to the perfection of the universe.
Since then we must not say that the world will remain imperfect when it
is renewed, it seems that we should assert that the plants and animals
will remain.
Objection 4: Further, animals and plants have a more noble form than
the elements. Now the world, at this final renewal, will be changed for
the better. Therefore animals and plants should remain rather than the
elements, since they are nobler.
Objection 5: Further, it is unseemly to assert that the natural
appetite will be frustrated. But by their natural appetite animals and
plants desire to be for ever, if indeed not as regards the individual,
at least as regards the species: and to this end their continual
generation is directed (De Generat. ii). Therefore it is unseemly to
say that these species will at length cease to be.
On the contrary, If plants and animals are to remain, either all of
them will, or some of them. If all of them, then dumb animals, which
had previously died, will have to rise again just as men will rise
again. But this cannot be asserted for since their form comes to
nothing, they cannot resume the same identical form. On the other hand
if not all but some of them remain, since there is no more reason for
one of them remaining for ever rather than another, it would seem that
none of them will. But whatever remains after the world has been
renewed will remain for ever, generation and corruption being done
away. Therefore plants and animals will altogether cease after the
renewal of the world.
Further, according to the Philosopher (De Generat. ii) the species of
animals, plants and such like corruptible things, are not perpetuated
except by the continuance of the heavenly movement. Now this will cease
then. Therefore it will be impossible for those species to be
perpetuated.
Further, if the end cease, those things which are directed to the end
should cease. Now animals and plants were made for the upkeep of human
life; wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:3): "Even as the green herbs have
I delivered all flesh to you [*Vulg.: 'have I delivered them all to
you']." Therefore when man's animal life ceases, animals and plants
should cease. But after this renewal animal life will cease in man.
Therefore neither plants nor animals ought to remain.
I answer that, Since the renewal of the world will be for man's sake it
follows that it should be conformed to the renewal of man. Now by being
renewed man will pass from the state of corruption to incorruptibility
and to a state of everlasting rest, wherefore it is written (1 Cor.
15:53): "This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal
must put on immortality"; and consequently the world will be renewed in
such a way as to throw off all corruption and remain for ever at rest.
Therefore it will be impossible for anything to be the subject of that
renewal, unless it be a subject of incorruption. Now such are the
heavenly bodies, the elements, and man. For the heavenly bodies are by
their very nature incorruptible both as to their whole and as to their
part: the elements are corruptible as to their parts but incorruptible
as a whole: while men are corruptible both in whole and in part, but
this is on the part of their matter not on the part of their form, the
rational soul to wit, which will remain incorrupt after the corruption
of man. on the other hand, dumb animals, plants, and minerals, and all
mixed bodies, are corruptible both in their whole and in their parts,
both on the part of their matter which loses its form, and on the part
of their form which does not remain actually; and thus they are in no
way subjects of incorruption. Hence they will not remain in this
renewal, but those things alone which we have mentioned above.
Reply to Objection 1: These bodies are said to adorn the elements,
inasmuch as the general active and passive forces which are in the
elements are applied to specific actions: hence they adorn the elements
in their active and passive state. But this state will not remain in
the elements: wherefore there is no need for animals or plants to
remain.
Reply to Objection 2: Neither animals nor plants nor any other bodies
merited anything by their services to man, since they lack free-will.
However, certain bodies are said to be rewarded in so far as man
merited that those things should be renewed which are adapted to be
renewed. But plants and animals are not adapted to the renewal of
incorruption, as stated above. Wherefore for this very reason man did
not merit that they should be renewed, since no one can merit for
another, or even for himself that which another or himself is incapable
of receiving. Hence, granted even that dumb animals merited by serving
man, it would not follow that they are to be renewed.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as several kinds of perfection are ascribed
to man (for there is the perfection of created nature and the
perfection of glorified nature), so also there is a twofold perfection
of the universe, one corresponding to this state of changeableness, the
other corresponding to the state of a future renewal. Now plants and
animals belong to its perfection according to the present state, and
not according to the state of this renewal, since they are not capable
thereof.
Reply to Objection 4: Although animals and plants as to certain other
respects are more noble than the elements, the elements are more noble
in relation to incorruption, as explained above [*Cf.[5123] Q[74],
A[1], ad 3].
Reply to Objection 5: The natural desire to be for ever that is in
animals and plants must be understood in reference to the movement of
the heaven, so that they may continue in being as long as the movement
of the heaven lasts: since there cannot be an appetite for an effect to
last longer than its cause. Wherefore if at the cessation of movement
in the first movable body, plants and animals cease as to their
species, it does not follow that the natural appetite is frustrated.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE IN REFERENCE TO THE BLESSED* (THREE
ARTICLES) [*Cf. FP, Q[12]]
In the next place we must consider matters concerning the blessed after
the general judgment. We shall consider: (1) Their vision of the Divine
essence, wherein their bliss consists chiefly; (2) Their bliss and
their mansions; (3) Their relations with the damned; (4) Their gifts,
which are contained in their bliss; (5) The crowns which perfect and
adorn their happiness.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints will see God in His essence?
(2) Whether they will see Him with the eyes of the body?
(3) Whether in seeing God they will see all that God sees?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in His essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human intellect cannot attain to
the vision of God in His essence. For it is written (Jn. 1:18): "No man
hath seen God at any time"; and Chrysostom in his commentary says (Hom.
xiv in Joan.) that "not even the heavenly essences, namely the Cherubim
and Seraphim, have ever been able to see Him as He is." Now, only
equality with the angels is promised to men (Mat. 22:30): "They . . .
shall be as the angels of God in heaven." Therefore neither will the
saints in heaven see God in His essence.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius argues thus (Div. Nom. i): "Knowledge
is only of existing things." Now whatever exists is finite, since it is
confined to a certain genus: and therefore God, since He is infinite,
is above all existing things. Therefore there is no knowledge of Him,
and He is above all knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius (De Myst. Theol. i) shows that the most
perfect way in which our intellect can be united to God is when it is
united to Him as to something unknown. Now that which is seen in its
essence is not unknown. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to
see God in His essence.
Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach.) that "the
darkness"---for thus he calls the abundance of light---"which screens
God is impervious to all illuminations, and hidden from all knowledge:
and if anyone in seeing God understood what he saw, he saw not God
Himself, but one of those things that are His." Therefore no created
intellect will be able to see God in His essence.
Objection 5: Further, according to Dionysius (Ep. ad Hieroth.) "God is
invisible on account of His surpassing glory." Now His glory surpasses
the human intellect in heaven even as on the way. Therefore since He is
invisible on the way, so will He be in heaven.
Objection 6: Further, since the intelligible object is the perfection
of the intellect, there must needs be proportion between intelligible
and intellect, as between the visible object and the sight. But there
is no possible proportion between our intellect and the Divine essence,
since an infinite distance separates them. Therefore our intellect will
be unable to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Objection 7: Further, God is more distant from our intellect than the
created intelligible is from our senses. But the senses can nowise
attain to the sight of a spiritual creature. Therefore neither will our
intellect be able to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Objection 8: Further, whenever the intellect understands something
actually it needs to be informed with the likeness of the object
understood, which likeness is the principle of the intellectual
operation terminating in that object, even as heat is the principle of
heating. Accordingly if our intellect understands God, this must be by
means of some likeness informing the intellect itself. Now this cannot
be the very essence of God, since form and thing informed must needs
have one being, while the Divine essence differs from our intellect in
essence and being. Therefore the form whereby our intellect is informed
in understanding God must needs be a likeness impressed by God on our
intellect. But this likeness, being something created, cannot lead to
the knowledge of God except as an effect leads to the knowledge of its
cause. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to see God except
through His effect. But to see God through His effect is not to see Him
in His essence. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in
His essence.
Objection 9: Further, the Divine essence is more distant from our
intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now according to Avicenna
(Metaph. iii), "the existence of an intelligence in our intellect does
not imply that its essence is in our intellect," because in that case
our knowledge of the intelligence would be a substance and not an
accident, "but that its likeness is impressed on our intellect."
Therefore neither is God in our intellect, to be understood by us,
except in so far as an impression of Him is in our intellect. But this
impression cannot lead to the knowledge of the Divine essence, for
since it is infinitely distant from the Divine essence, it degenerates
to another image much more than if the image of a white thing were to
degenerate to the image of a black thing. Therefore, just as a person
in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates to the image of a
black thing, on account of an indisposition in the organ, is not said
to see a white thing, so neither will our intellect be able to see God
in His essence, since it understands God only by means of this
impression.
Objection 10: Further, "In things devoid of matter that which
understands is the same as that which is understood" (De Anima iii).
Now God is supremely devoid of matter. Since then our intellect, which
is created, cannot attain to be an uncreated essence, it is impossible
for our intellect to see God in His essence.
Objection 11: Further, whatever is seen in its essence is known as to
what it is. But our intellect cannot know of God what He is, but only
what He is not as Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) and Damascene (De Fide
Orth. i) declare. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in
His essence.
Objection 12: Further, every infinite thing, as such, is unknown. But
God is in every way infinite. Therefore He is altogether unknown.
Therefore it will be impossible for Him to be seen in His essence by a
created intellect.
Objection 13: Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii):
"God is by nature invisible." Now that which is in God by nature cannot
be otherwise. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be seen in His
essence.
Objection 14: Further, whatever is in one way and is seen in another
way is not seen as it is. Now God is in one way and will be seen in
another way by the saints in heaven: for He according to His own mode,
but will be seen by the saints according to their mode. Therefore He
will not be seen by the saints as He is, and thus will not be seen in
His essence.
Objection 15: Further, that which is seen through a medium is not seen
in its essence. Now God will be seen in heaven through a medium which
is the light of glory, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall
see light." Therefore He will not be seen in His essence.
Objection 16: Further, in heaven God will be seen face to face,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12. Now when we see a man face to face, we see
him through his likeness. Therefore in heaven God will be seen through
His likeness, and consequently not in His essence.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a
glass in a dark manner, but then face to face." Now that which is seen
face to face is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His
essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear we shall be
like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore we shall see
Him in His essence.
Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have delivered up the
kingdom to God and the Father," says: "Where," i.e. in heaven, "the
essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost shall be seen: this is given to
the clean of heart alone and is the highest bliss." Therefore the
blessed will see God in His essence.
Further, it is written (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me shall be loved
of My Father; and I will love him, and will manifest Myself to him."
Now that which is manifested is seen in its essence. Therefore God will
be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, Gregory commenting (Moral. xviii) on the words of Ex. 33:20,
"Man shall not see Me and live," disapproves of the opinion of those
who said that "in this abode of bliss God can be seen in His glory but
not in His nature; for His glory differs not from His nature." But His
nature is His essence. Therefore He will be seen in His essence.
Further, the desire of the saints cannot be altogether frustrated. Now
the common desire of the saints is to see God in His essence, according
to Ex. 33:13, "Show me Thy glory"; Ps. 79:20, "Show Thy face and we
shall be saved"; and Jn. 14:8, "Show us the Father and it is enough for
us." Therefore the saints will see God in His essence.
I answer that, Even as we hold by faith that the last end of man's life
is to see God, so the philosophers maintained that man's ultimate
happiness is to understand immaterial substances according to their
being. Hence in reference to this question we find that philosophers
and theologians encounter the same difficulty and the same difference
of opinion. For some philosophers held that our passive intellect can
never come to understand separate substances. thus Alfarabius expresses
himself at the end of his Ethics, although he says the contrary in his
book On the Intelligence, as the Commentator attests (De Anima iii). In
like manner certain theologians held that the human intellect can never
attain to the vision of God in His essence. on either side they were
moved by the distance which separates our intellect from the Divine
essence and from separate substances. For since the intellect in act is
somewhat one with the intelligible object in act, it would seem
difficult to understand how the created intellect is made to be an
uncreated essence. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Joan.): "How
can the creature see the uncreated?" Those who hold the passive
intellect to be the subject of generation and corruption, as being a
power dependent on the body, encounter a still greater difficulty not
only as regards the vision of God but also as regards the vision of any
separate substances. But this opinion is altogether untenable. First,
because it is in contradiction to the authority of canonical scripture,
as Augustine declares (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). Secondly, because,
since understanding is an operation most proper to man, it follows that
his happiness must be held to consist in that operation when perfected
in him. Now since the perfection of an intelligent being as such is the
intelligible object, if in the most perfect operation of his intellect
man does not attain to the vision of the Divine essence, but to
something else, we shall be forced to conclude that something other
than God is the object of man's happiness: and since the ultimate
perfection of a thing consists in its being united to its principle, it
follows that something other than God is the effective principle of
man, which is absurd, according to us, and also according to the
philosophers who maintain that our souls emanate from the separate
substances, so that finally we may be able to understand these
substances. Consequently, according to us, it must be asserted that our
intellect will at length attain to the vision of the Divine essence,
and according to the philosophers, that it will attain to the vision of
separate substances.
It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. For some, like
Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from the very fact that our
intellect understands any intelligible objects whatever, it attains to
the vision of a separate substance. To prove this they employ two
arguments. The first is that just as the specific nature is not
diversified in various individuals, except as united to various
individuating principles, so the idea understood is not diversified in
me and you, except in so far as it is united to various imaginary
forms: and consequently when the intellect separates the idea
understood from the imaginary forms, there remains a quiddity
understood, which is one and the same in the various persons
understanding it, and such is the quiddity of a separate substance.
Hence, when our intellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any
intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the
separate substance that is similar to it. The second argument is that
our intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all
intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quiddity which it
abstracts from some particular individual be a quiddity without a
quiddity, the intellect by understanding it understands the quiddity of
the separate substance which has a like disposition, since separate
substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the
quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna says
(Met. iii). On the other hand if the quiddity abstracted from this
particular sensible be a quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows that
the intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity, and
consequently since we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come to some
quiddity without a quiddity, and this is what we understand by a
separate quiddity [*Cf. [5124]FP, Q[88], A[2]].
But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, because the
quiddity of the material substance, which the intellect abstracts, is
not of the same nature as the quiddity of the separate substances, and
consequently from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities
of material substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows
the quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the Divine essence,
which more than any other is of a different nature from any created
quiddity. Secondly, because granted that it be of the same nature,
nevertheless the knowledge of a composite thing would not lead to the
knowledge of a separate substance, except in the point of the most
remote genus, namely substance: and such a knowledge is imperfect
unless it reach to the properties of a thing. For to know a man only as
an animal is to know him only in a restricted sense and potentially:
and much less is it to know only the nature of substance in him. Hence
to know God thus, or other separate substances, is not to see the
essence of God or the quiddity of a separate substance, but to know Him
in His effect and in a mirror as it were. For this reason Avicenna in
his Metaphysics. propounds another way of understanding separate
substances, to wit that separate substances are understood by us by
means of intentions of their quiddities, such intentions being images
of their substances, not indeed abstracted therefrom, since they are
immaterial, but impressed thereby on our souls. But this way also seems
inadequate to the Divine vision which we seek. For it is agreed that
"whatever is received into any thing is therein after the mode of the
recipient": and consequently the likeness of the Divine essence
impressed on our intellect will be according to the mode of our
intellect: and the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect
reception of the Divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness may
occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For in one way there is
a deficient likeness, when the form is participated according to the
same specific nature, but not in the same measure of perfection: such
is the defective likeness in a subject that has little whiteness in
comparison with one that has much. In another way the likeness is yet
more defective, when it does not attain to the same specific nature but
only to the same generic nature: such is the likeness of an
orange-colored or yellowish object in comparison with a white one. In
another way, still more defective is the likeness when it does not
attain to the same generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or
proportion: such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in that each is a
being: and in this way every likeness received into a creature is
defective in comparison with the Divine essence. Now in order that the
sight know whiteness, it is necessary for it to receive the likeness of
whiteness according to its specific nature, although not according to
the same manner of being because the form has a manner of being in the
sense other from that which it has in the thing outside the soul: for
if the form of yellowness were received into the eye, the eye would not
be said to see whiteness. In like manner in order that the intellect
understand a quiddity, it is necessary for it to receive its likeness
according to the same specific nature, although there may possibly not
be the same manner of being on either side: for the form which is in
the intellect or sense is not the principle of knowledge according to
its manner of being on both sides, but according to its common ratio
with the external object. Hence it is clear that by no likeness
received in the created intellect can God be understood, so that His
essence be seen immediately. And for this reason those who held the
Divine essence to be seen in this way alone, said that the essence
itself will not be seen, but a certain brightness, as it were a
radiance thereof. Consequently neither does this way suffice for the
Divine vision that we seek.
Therefore we must take the other way, which also certain philosophers
held, namely Alexander and Averroes (De Anima iii.). For since in every
knowledge some form is required whereby the object is known or seen,
this form by which the intellect is perfected so as to see separate
substances is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect from
composite things, as the first opinion maintained, nor an impression
left on our intellect by the separate substance, as the second opinion
affirmed; but the separate substance itself united to our intellect as
its form, so as to be both that which is understood, and that whereby
it is understood. And whatever may be the case with other separate
substances, we must nevertheless allow this to be our way of seeing God
in His essence, because by whatever other form our intellect were
informed, it could not be led thereby to the Divine essence. This,
however, must not be understood as though the Divine essence were in
reality the form of our intellect, or as though from its conjunction
with our intellect there resulted one being simply, as in natural
things from the natural form and matter: but the meaning is that the
proportion of the Divine essence to our intellect is as the proportion
of form to matter. For whenever two things, one of which is the
perfection of the other, are received into the same recipient, the
proportion of one to the other, namely of the more perfect to the less
perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter: thus light and color
are received into a transparent object, light being to color as form to
matter. When therefore intellectual light is received into the soul,
together with the indwelling Divine essence, though they are not
received in the same way, the Divine essence will be to the intellect
as form to matter: and that this suffices for the intellect to be able
to see the Divine essence by the Divine essence itself may be shown as
follows.
As from the natural form (whereby a thing has being) and matter, there
results one thing simply, so from the form whereby the intellect
understands, and the intellect itself, there results one thing
intelligibly. Now in natural things a self-subsistent thing cannot be
the form of any matter, if that thing has matter as one of its parts,
since it is impossible for matter to be the form of a thing. But if
this self-subsistent thing be a mere form, nothing hinders it from
being the form of some matter and becoming that whereby the composite
itself is [*Literally,---and becoming the 'whereby-it-is' of the
composite itself] as instanced in the soul. Now in the intellect we
must take the intellect itself in potentiality as matter, and the
intelligible species as form; so that the intellect actually
understanding will be the composite as it were resulting from both.
Hence if there be a self-subsistent thing, that has nothing in itself
besides that which is intelligible, such a thing can by itself be the
form whereby the intellect understands. Now a thing is intelligible in
respect of its actuality and not of its potentiality (Met. ix): in
proof of which an intelligible form needs to be abstracted from matter
and from all the properties of matter. Therefore, since the Divine
essence is pure act, it will be possible for it to be the form whereby
the intellect understands: and this will be the beatific vision. Hence
the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1) that the union of the body with the
soul is an illustration of the blissful union of the spirit with God.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted can be explained in three ways,
according to Augustine (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). In one way as
excluding corporeal vision, whereby no one ever saw or will see God in
His essence; secondly, as excluding intellectual vision of God in His
essence from those who dwell in this mortal flesh; thirdly, as
excluding the vision of comprehension from a created intellect. It is
thus that Chrysostom understands the saying wherefore he adds: "By
seeing, the evangelist means a most clear perception, and such a
comprehension as the Father has of the Son." This also is the meaning
of the evangelist, since he adds: "The Only-begotten Son Who is in the
bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him": his intention being to
prove the Son to be God from His comprehending God.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God, by His infinite essence, surpasses
all existing things which have a determinate being, so His knowledge,
whereby He knows, is above all knowledge. Wherefore as our knowledge is
to our created essence, so is the Divine knowledge to His infinite
essence. Now two things contribute to knowledge, to wit, the knower and
the thing known. Again, the vision whereby we shall see God in His
essence is the same whereby God sees Himself, as regards that whereby
He is seen, because as He sees Himself in His essence so shall we also
see Him. But as regards the knower there is the difference that is
between the Divine intellect and ours. Now in the order of knowledge
the object known follows the form by which we know, since by the form
of a stone we see a stone: whereas the efficacy of knowledge follows
the power of the knower: thus he who has stronger sight sees more
clearly. Consequently in that vision we shall see the same thing that
God sees, namely His essence, but not so effectively.
Reply to Objection 3: Dionysius is speaking there of the knowledge
whereby wayfarers know God by a created form, whereby our intellect is
informed so as to see God. But as Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep.
cxlvii), "God evades every form of our intellect," because whatever
form our intellect conceive, that form is out of proportion to the
Divine essence. Hence He cannot be fathomed by our intellect: but our
most perfect knowledge of Him as wayfarers is to know that He is above
all that our intellect can conceive, and thus we are united to Him as
to something unknown. In heaven, however, we shall see Him by a form
which is His essence, and we shall be united to Him as to something
known.
Reply to Objection 4: God is light (Jn. 1:9). Now illumination is the
impression of light on an illuminated object. And since the Divine
essence is of a different mode from any likeness thereof impressed on
the intellect, he (Dionysius) says that the "Divine darkness is
impervious to all illumination," because, to wit, the Divine essence,
which he calls "darkness" on account of its surpassing brightness,
remains undemonstrated by the impression on our intellect, and
consequently is "hidden from all knowledge." Therefore if anyone in
seeing God conceives something in his mind, this is not God but one of
God's effects.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the glory of God surpasses any form by
which our intellect is informed now, it does not surpass the Divine
essence, which will be the form of our intellect in heaven: and
therefore although it is invisible now, it will be visible then.
Reply to Objection 6: Although there can be no proportion between
finite and infinite, since the excess of the infinite over the finite
is indeterminate, there can be proportionateness or a likeness to
proportion between them: for as a finite thing is equal to some finite
thing, so is an infinite thing equal to an infinite thing. Now in order
that a thing be known totally, it is sometimes necessary that there be
proportion between knower and known, because the power of the knower
needs to be adequate to the knowableness of the thing known, and
equality is a kind of proportion. Sometimes, however, the knowableness
of the thing surpasses the power of the knower, as when we know God, or
conversely when He knows creatures: and then there is no need for
proportion between knower and known, but only for proportionateness; so
that, to wit, as the knower is to the knowable object, so is the
knowable object to the fact of its being known: and this
proportionateness suffices for the infinite to be known by the finite,
or conversely.
We may also reply that proportion according to the strict sense in
which it is employed signifies a ratio of quantity to quantity based on
a certain fixed excess or equality; but is further transferred to
denote any ratio of any one thing to another; and in this sense we say
that matter should be proportionate to its form. In this sense nothing
hinders our intellect, although finite, being described as
proportionate to the vision of the Divine essence; but not to the
comprehension thereof, on account of its immensity.
Reply to Objection 7: Likeness and distance are twofold. One is
according to agreement in nature; and thus God is more distant from the
created intellect than the created intelligible is from the sense. The
other is according to proportionateness; and thus it is the other way
about, for sense is not proportionate to the knowledge of the
immaterial, as the intellect is proportionate to the knowledge of any
immaterial object whatsoever. It is this likeness and not the former
that is requisite for knowledge, for it is clear that the intellect
understanding a stone is not like it in its natural being; thus also
the sight apprehends red honey and red gall, though it does not
apprehend sweet honey, for the redness of gall is more becoming to
honey as visible, than the sweetness of honey to honey.
Reply to Objection 8: In the vision wherein God will be seen in His
essence, the Divine essence itself will be the form, as it were, of the
intellect, by which it will understand: nor is it necessary for them to
become one in being, but only to become one as regards the act of
understanding.
Reply to Objection 9: We do not uphold the saying of Avicenna as
regards the point at issue, for in this other philosophers also
disagree with him. Unless perhaps we might say that Avicenna refers to
the knowledge of separate substances, in so far as they are known by
the habits of speculative sciences and the likeness of other things.
Hence he makes this statement in order to prove that in us knowledge is
not a substance but an accident. Nevertheless, although the Divine
essence is more distant, as to the property of its nature, from our
intellect, than is the substance of an angel, it surpasses it in the
point of intelligibility, since it is pure act without any admixture of
potentiality, which is not the case with other separate substances. Nor
will that knowledge whereby we shall see God in His essence be in the
genus of accident as regards that whereby He will be seen, but only as
regards the act of the one who understands Him, for this act will not
be the very substance either of the person understanding or of the
thing understood.
Reply to Objection 10: A substance that is separate from matter
understands both itself and other things; and in both cases the
authority quoted can be verified. For since the very essence of a
separate substance is of itself intelligible and actual, through being
separate from matter, it is clear that when a separate substance
understands itself, that which understands and that which is understood
are absolutely identical, for it does not understand itself by an
intention abstracted from itself, as we understand material objects.
And this is apparently the meaning of the Philosopher (De Anima iii.)
as indicated by the Commentator (De Anima iii). But when it understands
other things, the object actually understood becomes one with the
intellect in act, in so far as the form of the object understood
becomes the form of the intellect, for as much as the intellect is in
act; not that it becomes identified with the essence of the intellect,
as Avicenna proves (De Natural. vi.), because the essence of the
intellect remains one under two forms whereby it understands two things
in succession, in the same way as primary matter remains one under
various forms. Hence also the Commentator (De Anima iii.) compares the
passive intellect, in this respect, to primary matter. Thus it by no
means follows that our intellect in seeing God becomes the very essence
of God, but that the latter is compared to it as its perfection or
form.
Reply to Objection 11: These and all like authorities must be
understood to refer to the knowledge whereby we know God on the way,
for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 12: The infinite is unknown if we take it in the
privative sense, as such, because it indicates removal of completion
whence knowledge of a thing is derived. Wherefore the infinite amounts
to the same as matter subject to privation, as stated in Phys. iii. But
if we take the infinite in the negative sense, it indicates the absence
of limiting matter, since even a form is somewhat limited by its
matter. Hence the infinite in this sense is of itself most knowable;
and it is in this way that God is infinite.
Reply to Objection 13: Augustine is speaking of bodily vision, by which
God will never be seen. This is evident from what precedes: "For no man
hath seen God at any time, nor can any man see Him as these things
which we call visible are seen: in this way He is by nature invisible
even as He is incorruptible." As, however, He is by nature supremely
being, so He is in Himself supremely intelligible. But that He be for a
time not understood by us is owing to our defect: wherefore that He be
seen by us after being unseen is owing to a change not in Him but in
us.
Reply to Objection 14: In heaven God will be seen by the saints as He
is, if this be referred to the mode of the object seen, for the saints
will see that God has the mode which He has. But if we refer the mode
to the knower, He will not be seen as He is, because the created
intellect will not have so great an efficacy in seeing, as the Divine
essence has to the effect of being seen.
Reply to Objection 15: There is a threefold medium both in bodily and
in intellectual vision. The first is the medium "under which" the
object is seen, and this is something perfecting the sight so as to see
in general, without determining the sight to any particular object.
Such is bodily light in relation to bodily vision; and the light of the
active intellect in relation to the passive intellect, in so far as
this light is a medium. The second is the light "by which" the object
is seen, and this is the visible form whereby either sight is
determined to a special object, for instance by the form of a stone to
know a stone. The third is the medium "in which" it is seen; and this
is something by gazing on which the sight is led to something else:
thus by looking in a mirror it is led to see the things reflected in
the mirror, and by looking at an image it is led to the thing
represented by the image. In this way, too, the intellect from knowing
an effect is led to the cause, or conversely. Accordingly in the
heavenly vision there will be no third medium, so that, to wit, God be
known by the images of other things, as He is known now, for which
reason we are said to see now in a glass: nor will there be the second
medium, because the essence itself of God will be that whereby our
intellect will see God. But there will only be the first medium, which
will upraise our intellect so that it will be possible for it to be
united to the uncreated substance in the aforesaid manner. Yet this
medium will not cause that knowledge to be mediate, because it does not
come in between the knower and the thing known, but is that which gives
the knower the power to know [*Cf. [5125]FP, Q[12], A[5]].
Reply to Objection 16: Corporeal creatures are not said to be seen
immediately, except when that which in them is capable of being brought
into conjunction with the sight is in conjunction therewith. Now they
are not capable of being in conjunction with the sight of their essence
on account of their materiality: hence they are seen immediately when
their image is in conjunction with the sight. But God is able to be
united to the intellect by His essence: wherefore He would not be seen
immediately, unless His essence were united to the intellect: and this
vision, which is effected immediately, is called "vision of face."
Moreover the likeness of the corporeal object is received into the
sight according to the same ratio as it is in the object, although not
according to the same mode of being. Wherefore this likeness leads to
the object directly: whereas no likeness can lead our intellect in this
way to God, as shown above: and for this reason the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the
body? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[3]]
Objection 1: It would seem that after the resurrection the saints will
see God with the eyes of the body. Because the glorified eye has
greater power than one that is not glorified. Now the blessed Job saw
God with his eyes (Job 42:5): "With the hearing of the ear, I have
heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee." Much more therefore will the
glorified eye be able to see God in His essence.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall
see God my Saviour [Vulg.: 'my God']." Therefore in heaven God will be
seen with the eyes of the body.
Objection 3: Further. Augustine, speaking of the sight of the glorified
eyes, expresses himself as follows (De Civ. Dei xxii): "A greater power
will be in those eyes, not to see more keenly, as certain serpents or
eagles are reported to see (for whatever acuteness of vision is
possessed by these animals they can see only corporeal things), but to
see even incorporeal things." Now any power that is capable of knowing
incorporeal things can be upraised to see God. Therefore the glorified
eyes will be able to see God.
Objection 4: Further, the disparity of corporeal to incorporeal things
is the same as of incorporeal to corporeal. Now the incorporeal eye can
see corporeal things. Therefore the corporeal eye can see the
incorporeal: and consequently the same conclusion follows.
Objection 5: Further, Gregory, commenting on Job 4:16, "There stood one
whose countenance I knew not," says (Moral. v): "Man who, had he been
willing to obey the command, would have been spiritual in the flesh,
became, by sinning, carnal even in mind." Now through becoming carnal
in mind, "he thinks only of those things which he draws to his soul by
the images of bodies" (Moral. v). Therefore when he will be spiritual
in the flesh (which is promised to the saints after the resurrection),
he will be able even in the flesh to see spiritual things. Therefore
the same conclusion follows.
Objection 6: Further, man can be beatified by God alone. Now he will be
beatified not only in soul but also in body. Therefore God will be
visible not only to his intellect but also to his flesh.
Objection 7: Further, even as God is present to the intellect by His
essence, so will He be to the senses, because He will be "all in all"
(1 Cor. 15:28). Now He will be seen by the intellect through the union
of His essence therewith. Therefore He will also be visible to the
sense.
On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 1:2, "There appeared to him
an angel," says: "God is not sought with the eyes of the body, nor
surveyed by the sight, nor clasped by the touch." Therefore God will by
no means be visible to the bodily sense.
Further, Jerome, commenting on Is. 6:1, "I saw the Lord sitting," says:
"The Godhead not only of the Father, but also of the Son and of the
Holy Ghost is visible, not to carnal eyes, but only to the eyes of the
mind, of which it is said: Blessed are the pure in heart."
Further, Jerome says again (as quoted by Augustine, Ep. cxlvii): "An
incorporeal thing is invisible to a corporeal eye." But God is
supremely incorporeal. Therefore, etc.
Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo, Ep. cxlvii): "No man hath seen
God as He is at any time, neither in this life, nor in the angelic
life, in the same way as these visible things which are seen with the
corporeal sight." Now the angelic life is the life of the blessed,
wherein they will live after the resurrection. Therefore, etc.
Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv.), "man is said to be
made to God's image inasmuch as he is able to see God." But man is in
God's image as regards his mind, and not as regards his flesh.
Therefore he will see God with his mind and not with his flesh.
I answer that, A thing is perceptible to the senses of the body in two
ways, directly and indirectly. A thing is perceptible directly if it
can act directly on the bodily senses. And a thing can act directly
either on sense as such or on a particular sense as such. That which
acts directly in this second way on a sense is called a proper
sensible, for instance color in relation to the sight, and sound in
relation to the hearing. But as sense as such makes use of a bodily
organ, nothing can be received therein except corporeally, since
whatever is received into a thing is therein after the mode of the
recipient. Hence all sensibles act on the sense as such, according to
their magnitude: and consequently magnitude and all its consequences,
such as movement, rest, number, and the like, are called common
sensibles, and yet they are direct objects of sense.
An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on the sense,
neither as sense nor as a particular sense, but is annexed to those
things that act on sense directly: for instance Socrates; the son of
Diares; a friend and the like which are the direct object of the
intellect's knowledge in the universal, and in the particular are the
object of the cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power in
other animals. The external sense is said to perceive things of this
kind, although indirectly, when the apprehensive power (whose province
it is to know directly this thing known), from that which is sensed
directly, apprehends them at once and without any doubt or discourse
(thus we see that a person is alive from the fact that he speaks):
otherwise the sense is not said to perceive it even indirectly.
I say then that God can nowise be seen with the eyes of the body, or
perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen directly, neither
here, nor in heaven: for if that which belongs to sense as such be
removed from sense, there will be no sense, and in like manner if that
which belongs to sight as sight be removed therefrom, there will be no
sight. Accordingly seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and
sight as such a sense perceives color, it is impossible for the sight
to perceive that which is neither color nor magnitude, unless we call
it a sense equivocally. Since then sight and sense will be specifically
the same in the glorified body, as in a non-glorified body, it will be
impossible for it to see the Divine essence as an object of direct
vision; yet it will see it as an object of indirect vision, because on
the one hand the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in
bodies, especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body
of Christ, and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so
clearly, that God will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the
body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although our intellect
will not then see God from seeing His creatures, yet it will see God in
His creatures seen corporeally. This manner of seeing God corporeally
is indicated by Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii), as is clear if we take
note of his words, for he says: "It is very credible that we shall so
see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see
most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things,
not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by those
that are made, but as when we see men . . . we do not believe but see
that they live."
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Job refers to the spiritual eye,
of which the Apostle says (Eph. 1:18): "The eyes of our [Vulg.: 'your']
heart enlightened."
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted does not mean that we are to
see God with the eyes of the flesh, but that, in the flesh, we shall
see God.
Reply to Objection 3: In these words Augustine speaks as one inquiring
and conditionally. This appears from what he had said before:
"Therefore they will have an altogether different power, if they shall
see that incorporeal nature": and then he goes on to say: "Accordingly
a greater power," etc., and afterwards he explains himself.
Reply to Objection 4: All knowledge results from some kind of
abstraction from matter. Wherefore the more a corporeal form is
abstracted from matter, the more is it a principle of knowledge. Hence
it is that a form existing in matter is in no way a principle of
knowledge, while a form existing in the senses is somewhat a principle
of knowledge, in so far as it is abstracted from matter, and a form
existing in the intellect is still better a principle of knowledge.
Therefore the spiritual eye, whence the obstacle to knowledge is
removed, can see a corporeal object: but it does not follow that the
corporeal eye, in which the cognitive power is deficient as
participating in matter, be able to know perfectly incorporeal objects
of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the mind that has become carnal cannot
think but of things received from the senses, it thinks of them
immaterially. In like manner whatever the sight apprehends it must
always apprehend it corporeally: wherefore it cannot know things which
cannot be apprehended corporeally.
Reply to Objection 6: Beatitude is the perfection of man as man. And
since man is man not through his body but through his soul, and the
body is essential to man, in so far as it is perfected by the soul: it
follows that man's beatitude does not consist chiefly otherwise than in
an act of the soul, and passes from the soul on to the body by a kind
of overflow, as explained above ([5126]Q[85], A[1]). Yet our body will
have a certain beatitude from seeing God in sensible creatures: and
especially in Christ's body.
Reply to Objection 7: The intellect can perceive spiritual things,
whereas the eyes of the body cannot: wherefore the intellect will be
able to know the Divine essence united to it, but the eyes of the body
will not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the saints, seeing God, see all that God sees? [*Cf. FP, Q[12],
AA[7],8]
Objection 1: It would seem that the saints, seeing God in His essence,
see all that God sees in Himself. For as Isidore says (De Sum. Bon.
1.): "The angels know all things in the World of God, before they
happen." Now the saints will be equal to the angels of God (Mat.
22:30). Therefore the saints also in seeing God see all things.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv.): "Since all see God
there with equal clearness, what do they not know, who know Him Who
knows all things?" and he refers to the blessed who see God in His
essence. Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.
Objection 3: Further, it is stated in De Anima (iii, text. 7), that
"when an intellect understands the greatest things, it is all the more
able to understand the least things." Now God is the greatest of
intelligible things. Therefore the power of the intellect is greatly
increased by understanding Him. Therefore the intellect seeing Him
understands all things.
Objection 4: Further, the intellect is not hindered from understanding
a thing except by this surpassing it. Now no creature surpasses the
intellect that understands God, since, as Gregory says (Dial. ii.), "to
the soul which sees its Creator all creatures are small." Therefore
those who see God in His essence know all things.
Objection 5: Further, every passive power that is not reduced to act is
imperfect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul is a power that
is passive as it were to the knowledge of all things, since "the
passive intellect is in which all are in potentiality" (De Anima iii,
text. 18). If then in that beatitude it were not to understand all
things, it would remain imperfect, which is absurd.
Objection 6: Further, whoever sees a mirror sees the things reflected
in the mirror. Now all things are reflected in the Word of God as in a
mirror, because He is the type and image of all. Therefore the saints
who see the Word in its essence see all created things.
Objection 7: Further, according to Prov. 10:24, "to the just their
desire shall be given." Now the just desire to know all things, since
"all men desire naturally to know," and nature is not done away by
glory. Therefore God will grant them to know all things.
Objection 8: Further, ignorance is one of the penalties of the present
life [*Cf. [5127]FS, Q[85], A[3]]. Now all penalty will be removed from
the saints by glory. Therefore all ignorance will be removed: and
consequently they will know all.
Objection 9: Further, the beatitude of the saints is in their soul
before being in their body. Now the bodies of the saints will be
reformed in glory to the likeness of Christ's body (Phil. 3:21).
Therefore their souls will be perfected in likeness to the soul of
Christ. Now Christ's soul sees all things in the Word. Therefore all
the souls of the saints will also see all things in the Word.
Objection 10: Further, the intellect, like the senses, knows all the
things with the image of which it is informed. Now the Divine essence
shows a thing forth more clearly than any other image thereof.
Therefore since in that blessed vision the Divine essence becomes the
form as it were of our intellect, it would seem that the saints seeing
God see all.
Objection 11: Further, the Commentator says (De Anima iii), that "if
the active intellect were the form of the passive intellect, we should
understand all things." Now the Divine essence represents all things
more clearly than the active intellect. Therefore the intellect that
sees God in His essence knows all things.
Objection 12: Further, the lower angels are enlightened by the higher
about the things they are ignorant of, for the reason that they know
not all things. Now after the day of judgment, one angel will not
enlighten another; for then all superiority will cease, as a gloss
observes on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have brought to nought," etc.
Therefore the lower angels will then know all things, and for the same
reason all the other saints who will see God in His essence.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi): "The higher angels
cleanse the lower angels from ignorance." Now the lower angels see the
Divine essence. Therefore an angel while seeing the Divine essence may
be ignorant of certain things. But the soul will not see God more
perfectly than an angel. Therefore the souls seeing God will not
necessarily see all things.
Further, Christ alone has the spirit not "by measure" (Jn. 3:34). Now
it becomes Christ, as having the spirit without measure, to know all
things in the Word: wherefore it is stated in the same place (Jn. 3:35)
that "the Father . . . hath given all things into His hand." Therefore
none but Christ is competent to know all things in the Word.
Further, the more perfectly a principle is known, the more of its
effects are known thereby. Now some of those who see God in His essence
will know God more perfectly than others. Therefore some will know more
things than others, and consequently every one will not know all.
I answer that, God by seeing his essence knows all things whatsoever
that are, shall be, or have been: and He is said to know these things
by His "knowledge of vision," because He knows them as though they were
present in likeness to corporeal vision. Moreover by seeing this
essence He knows all that He can do, although He never did them, nor
ever will: else He would not know His power perfectly; since a power
cannot be known unless its objects be known: and this is called His
"science" or "knowledge of simple intelligence." Now it is impossible
for a created intellect, by seeing the Divine essence, to know all that
God can do, because the more perfectly a principle is known, the more
things are known in it; thus in one principle of demonstration one who
is quick of intelligence sees more conclusions than one who is slow of
intelligence. Since then the extent of the Divine power is measured
according to what it can do, if an intellect were to see in the Divine
essence all that God can do, its perfection in understanding would
equal in extent the Divine power in producing its effects, and thus it
would comprehend the Divine power, which is impossible for any created
intellect to do. Yet there is a created intellect, namely the soul of
Christ [*Cf. [5128]TP, Q[16], A[2]], which knows in the Word all that
God knows by the knowledge of vision. But regarding others who see the
Divine essence there are two opinions. For some say that all who see
God in His essence see all that God sees by His knowledge of vision.
This, however, is contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that
angels are ignorant of some things; and yet it is clear that according
to faith all the angels see God in His essence. Wherefore others say
that others than Christ, although they see God in His essence, do not
see all that God sees because they do not comprehend the Divine
essence. For it is not necessary that he who knows a cause should know
all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is not in the
competency of a created intellect. Consequently of those who see God in
His essence, each one sees in His essence so much the more things
according as he sees the Divine essence the more clearly: and hence it
is that one is able to instruct another concerning these things. Thus
the knowledge of the angels and of the souls of the saints can go on
increasing until the day of judgment, even as other things pertaining
to the accidental reward. But afterwards it will increase no more,
because then will be the final state of things, and in that state it is
possible that all will know everything that God knows by the knowledge
of vision.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Isidore, that "the angels know in
the Word all things before they happen," cannot refer to those things
which God knows only by the knowledge of simple intelligence, because
those things will never happen; but it must refer to those things which
God knows only by the knowledge of vision. Even of these he does not
say that all the angels know them all, but that perhaps some do; and
that even those who know do not know all perfectly. For in one and the
same thing there are many intelligible aspects to be considered, such
as its various properties and relations to other things: and it is
possible that while one thing is known in common by two persons, one of
them perceives more aspects, and that the one learns these aspects from
the other. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the lower angels
learn from the higher angels the intelligible aspects of things."
Wherefore it does not follow that even the angels who know all
creatures are able to see all that can be understood in them.
Reply to Objection 2: It follows from this saying of Gregory that this
blessed vision suffices for the seeing of all things on the part of the
Divine essence, which is the medium by which one sees, and whereby God
sees all things. That all things, however, are not seen is owing to the
deficiency of the created intellect which does not comprehend the
Divine essence.
Reply to Objection 3: The created intellect sees the Divine essence not
according to the mode of that same essence, but according to its own
mode which is finite. Hence its efficacy in knowing would need to be
infinitely increased by reason of that vision in order for it to know
all things.
Reply to Objection 4: Defective knowledge results not only from excess
and deficiency of the knowable object in relation to the intellect, but
also from the fact that the aspect of knowableness is not united to the
intellect: thus sometimes the sight sees not a stone, through the image
of the stone not being united to it. And although the Divine essence
which is the type of all things is united to the intellect of one who
sees God, it is united thereto not as the type of all things, but as
the type of some and of so much the more according as one sees the
Divine essence more fully.
Reply to Objection 5: When a passive power is perceptible by several
perfections in order, if it be perfected with its ultimate perfection,
it is not said to be imperfect, even though it lack some of the
preceding dispositions. Now all knowledge by which the created
intellect is perfected is directed to the knowledge of God as its end.
Wherefore he who sees God in His essence, even though he know nothing
else, would have a perfect intellect: nor is his intellect more perfect
through knowing something else besides Him, except in so far as it sees
Him more fully. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v.): "Unhappy is he who
knoweth all these" (namely, creatures), "and knoweth not Thee: but
happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these. And whoso knoweth
both Thee and them is not the happier for them but for Thee only."
Reply to Objection 6: This mirror has a will: and even as He will show
Himself to whom He will, so will He show in Himself whatsoever He will.
Nor does the comparison with a material mirror hold, for it is not in
its power to be seen or not to be seen.
We may also reply that in a material mirror both object and mirror are
seen under their proper image; although the mirror be seen through an
image received from the thing itself, whereas the stone is seen through
its proper image reflected in some other thing, where the reason for
seeing the one is the reason for seeing the other. But in the uncreated
mirror a thing is seen through the form of the mirror, just as an
effect is seen through the image of its cause and conversely.
Consequently it does not follow that whoever sees the eternal mirror
sees all that is reflected in that mirror: since he who sees the cause
does not of necessity see all its effects, unless he comprehend the
cause.
Reply to Objection 7: The desire of the saints to know all things will
be fulfilled by the mere fact of their seeing God: just as their desire
to possess all good things will be fulfilled by their possessing God.
For as God suffices the affections in that He has perfect goodness, and
by possessing Him we possess all goods as it were, so does the vision
of Him suffice the intellect: "Lord, show us the Father and it is
enough for us" (Jn. 14:8).
Reply to Objection 8: Ignorance properly so called denotes a privation
and thus it is a punishment: for in this way ignorance is nescience of
things, the knowledge of which is a duty or a necessity. Now the saints
in heaven will not be ignorant of any of these things. Sometimes,
however, ignorance is taken in a broad sense of any kind of nescience:
and thus the angels and saints in heaven will be ignorant of certain
things. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels will be
cleansed from their ignorance." In this sense ignorance is not a
penalty but a defect. Nor is it necessary for all such defects to be
done away by glory: for thus we might say that it was a defect in Pope
Linus that he did not attain to the glory of Peter.
Reply to Objection 9: Our body will be conformed to the body of Christ
in glory, in likeness but not in equality, for it will be endowed with
clarity even as Christ's body, but not equally. In like manner our soul
will have glory in likeness to the soul of Christ, but not in equality
thereto: thus it will have knowledge even as Christ's soul, but not so
great, so as to know all as Christ's soul does.
Reply to Objection 10: Although the Divine essence is the type of all
things knowable it will not be united to each created intellect
according as it is the type of all. Hence the objection proves nothing.
Reply to Objection 11: The active intellect is a form proportionate to
the passive intellect; even as the passive power of matter is
proportionate to the power of the natural agent, so that whatsoever is
in the passive power of matter or the passive intellect is in the
active power of the active intellect or of the natural agent.
Consequently if the active intellect become the form of the passive
intellect, the latter must of necessity know all those things to which
the power of the active intellect extends. But the Divine essence is
not a form proportionate to our intellect in this sense. Hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 12: Nothing hinders us from saying that after the
judgment day, when the glory of men and angels will be consummated once
for all, all the blessed will know all that God knows by the knowledge
of vision, yet so that not all will see all in the Divine essence.
Christ's soul, however, will see clearly all things therein, even as it
sees them now; while others will see therein a greater or lesser number
of things according to the degree of clearness wherewith they will know
God: and thus Christ's soul will enlighten all other souls concerning
those things which it sees in the Word better than others. Hence it is
written (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God shall enlighten the city of
Jerusalem [*Vulg.: 'hath enlightened it'], and the Lamb is the lamp
thereof." In like manner the higher souls will enlighten the lower (not
indeed with a new enlightening, so as to increase the knowledge of the
lower), but with a kind of continued enlightenment; thus we might
understand the sun to enlighten the atmosphere while at a standstill.
Wherefore it is written (Dan. 12:3): "They that instruct many to
justice" shall shine "as stars for all eternity." The statement that
the superiority of the orders will cease refers to their present
ordinate ministry in our regard, as is clear from the same gloss.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS AND THEIR MANSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the happiness of the saints and their mansions.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the happiness of the saints will increase after the
judgment?
(2) Whether the degrees of happiness should be called mansions?
(3) Whether the various mansions differ according to various degrees of
charity?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the happiness of the saints will be greater after the judgment than
before?
Objection 1: It would seem that the happiness of the saints will not be
greater after the judgment than before. For the nearer a thing
approaches to the Divine likeness, the more perfectly does it
participate happiness. Now the soul is more like God when separated
from the body than when united to it. Therefore its happiness is
greater before being reunited to the body than after.
Objection 2: Further, power is more effective when it is united than
when divided. Now the soul is more united when separated from the body
than when it is joined to the body. Therefore it has then greater power
for operation, and consequently has a more perfect share of happiness,
since this consists in action [*Cf. [5129]FS, Q[3], A[2]].
Objection 3: Further, beatitude consists in an act of the speculative
intellect. Now the intellect, in its act, makes no use of a bodily
organ; and consequently by being reunited to the body the soul does not
become capable of more perfect understanding. Therefore the soul's
happiness is not greater after than before the judgment.
Objection 4: Further, nothing can be greater than the infinite, and so
the addition of the finite to the infinite does not result in something
greater than the infinite by itself. Now the beatified soul before its
reunion with the body is rendered happy by rejoicing in the infinite
good, namely God; and after the resurrection of the body it will
rejoice in nothing else except perhaps the glory of the body, and this
is a finite good. Therefore their joy after the resumption of the body
will not be greater than before.
On the contrary, A gloss on Apoc. 6:9, "I saw under the altar the souls
of them that were slain," says: "At present the souls of the saints are
under the altar, i.e. less exalted than they will be." Therefore their
happiness will be greater after the resurrection than after their
death.
Further, just as happiness is bestowed on the good as a reward, so is
unhappiness awarded to the wicked. But the unhappiness of the wicked
after reunion with their bodies will be greater than before, since they
will be punished not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore
the happiness of the saints will be greater after the resurrection of
the body than before.
I answer that, It is manifest that the happiness of the saints will
increase in extent after the resurrection, because their happiness will
then be not only in the soul but also in the body. Moreover, the soul's
happiness also will increase in extent, seeing that the soul will
rejoice not only in its own good, but also in that of the body. We may
also say that the soul's happiness will increase in intensity [*Cf.
[5130]FS, Q[4], A[5] , ad 5, where St. Thomas retracts this statement].
For man's body may be considered in two ways: first, as being dependent
on the soul for its completion; secondly, as containing something that
hampers the soul in its operations, through the soul not perfectly
completing the body. As regards the first way of considering the body,
its union with the soul adds a certain perfection to the soul, since
every part is imperfect, and is completed in its whole; wherefore the
whole is to the part as form to matter. Consequently the soul is more
perfect in its natural being, when it is in the whole---namely, man who
results from the union of soul and body---than when it is a separate
part. But as regards the second consideration the union of the body
hampers the perfection of the soul, wherefore it is written (Wis. 9:15)
that "the corruptible body is a load upon the soul." If, then, there be
removed from the body all those things wherein it hampers the soul's
action, the soul will be simply more perfect while existing in such a
body than when separated therefrom. Now the more perfect a thing is in
being, the more perfectly is it able to operate: wherefore the
operation of the soul united to such a body will be more perfect than
the operation of the separated soul. But the glorified body will be a
body of this description, being altogether subject to the spirit.
Therefore, since beatitude consists in an operation [*Cf. [5131]FS,
Q[3], A[2], seqq.], the soul's happiness after its reunion with the
body will be more perfect than before. For just as the soul separated
from a corruptible body is able to operate more perfectly than when
united thereto, so after it has been united to a glorified body, its
operation will be more perfect than while it was separated. Now every
imperfect thing desires its perfection. Hence the separated soul
naturally desires reunion with the body and on account of this desire
which proceeds from the soul's imperfection its operation whereby it is
borne towards God is less intense. This agrees with the saying of
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) that "on account of the body's desire
it is held back from tending with all its might to that sovereign
good."
Reply to Objection 1: The soul united to a glorified body is more like
to God than when separated therefrom, in so far as when united it has
more perfect being. For the more perfect a thing is the more it is like
to God: even so the heart, the perfection of whose life consists in
movement, is more like to God while in movement than while at rest,
although God is never moved.
Reply to Objection 2: A power which by its own nature is capable of
being in matter is more effective when subjected in matter than when
separated from matter, although absolutely speaking a power separate
from matter is more effective.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in the act of understanding the soul
does not make use of the body, the perfection of the body will somewhat
conduce to the perfection of the intellectual operation in so far as
through being united to a glorified body, the soul will be more perfect
in its nature, and consequently more effective in its operation, and
accordingly the good itself of the body will conduce instrumentally, as
it were, to the operation wherein happiness consists: thus the
Philosopher asserts (Ethic. i, 8,10) that external goods conduce
instrumentally to the happiness of life.
Reply to Objection 4: Although finite added to infinite does not make a
greater thing, it makes more things, since finite and infinite are two
things, while infinite taken by itself is one. Now the greater extent
of joy regards not a greater thing but more things. Wherefore joy is
increased in extent, through referring to God and to the body's glory,
in comparison with the joy which referred to God. Moreover, the body's
glory will conduce to the intensity of the joy that refers to God, in
so far as it will conduce to the more perfect operation whereby the
soul tends to God: since the more perfect is a becoming operation, the
greater the delight [*Cf. [5132]FS, Q[32], A[1]], as stated in Ethic.
x, 8.
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Whether the degrees of beatitude should be called mansions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of beatitude should not be
called mansions. For beatitude implies the notion of a reward: whereas
mansion denotes nothing pertaining to a reward. Therefore the various
degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions.
Objection 2: Further, mansion seemingly denotes a place. Now the place
where the saint will be beatified is not corporeal but spiritual,
namely God Who is one. Therefore there is but one mansion: and
consequently the various degrees of beatitude should not be called
mansions.
Objection 3: Further, as in heaven there will be men of various merits,
so are there now in purgatory, and were in the limbo of the fathers.
But various mansions are not distinguished in purgatory and limbo.
Therefore in like manner neither should they be distinguished in
heaven.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): "In My Father's house there
are many mansions": and Augustine expounds this in reference to the
different degrees of rewards (Tract. lxvii in Joan.).
Further, in every well-ordered city there is a distinction of mansions.
Now the heavenly kingdom is compared to a city (Apoc. 21:2). Therefore
we should distinguish various mansions there according to the various
degrees of beatitude.
I answer that, Since local movement precedes all other movements, terms
of movement, distance and the like are derived from local movement to
all other movements according to the Philosopher (Phys., liber viii,
7). Now the end of local movement is a place, and when a thing has
arrived at that place it remains there at rest and is maintained
therein. Hence in every movement this very rest at the end of the
movement is called an establishment [collocatio] or mansion. Wherefore
since the term movement is transferred to the actions of the appetite
and will, the attainment of the end of an appetitive movement is called
a mansion or establishment: so that the unity of a house corresponds to
the unity of beatitude which unity is on the part of the object, and
the plurality of mansions corresponds to the differences of beatitude
on the part of the blessed: even so we observe in natural things that
there is one same place above to which all light objects tend, whereas
each one reaches it more closely, according as it is lighter, so that
they have various mansions corresponding to their various lightness.
Reply to Objection 1: Mansion implies the notion of end and
consequently of reward which is the end of merit.
Reply to Objection 2: Though there is one spiritual place, there are
different degrees of approaching thereto: and the various mansions
correspond to these.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who were in limbo or are now in purgatory
have not yet attained to their end. Wherefore various mansions are not
distinguished in purgatory or limbo, but only in heaven and hell,
wherein is the end of the good and of the wicked.
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Whether the various mansions are distinguished according to the various
degrees of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the various mansions are not
distinguished according to the various degrees of charity. For it is
written (Mat. 25:15): "He gave to every one according to his proper
virtue [Douay: 'ability']." Now the proper ability of a thing is its
natural power. Therefore the gifts also of grace and glory are
distributed according to the different degrees of natural power.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 61:12): "Thou wilt render to
every man according to his works." Now that which is rendered is the
measure of beatitude. Therefore the degrees of beatitude are
distinguished according to the diversity of works and not according to
the diversity of charity.
Objection 3: Further, reward is due to act and not to habit: hence "it
is not the strongest who are crowned but those who engage in the
conflict" (Ethic. i, 8) and "he . . . shall not be [Vulg.: 'is not']
crowned except he strive lawfully." Now beatitude is a reward.
Therefore the various degrees of beatitude will be according to the
various degrees of works and not according to the various degrees of
charity.
On the contrary, The more one will be united to God the happier will
one be. Now the measure of charity is the measure of one's union with
God. Therefore the diversity of beatitude will be according to the
difference of charity.
Further, "if one thing simply follows from another thing simply, the
increase of the former follows from the increase of the latter." Now to
have beatitude follows from having charity. Therefore to have greater
beatitude follows from having greater charity.
I answer that, The distinctive principle of the mansions or degrees of
beatitude is twofold, namely proximate and remote. The proximate
principle is the difference of disposition which will be in the
blessed, whence will result the difference of perfection in them in
respect to the beatific operation: while the remote principle is the
merit by which they have obtained that beatitude. In the first way the
mansions are distinguished according to the charity of heaven, which
the more perfect it will be in any one, the more will it render him
capable of the Divine clarity, on the increase of which will depend the
increase in perfection of the Divine vision. In the second way the
mansions are distinguished according to the charity of the way. For our
actions are meritorious, not by the very substance of the action, but
only by the habit of virtue with which they are informed. Now every
virtue obtains its meritorious efficacy from charity [*Cf. [5133]FS,
Q[114], A[4]], which has the end itself for its object [*Cf. [5134]SS,
Q[24], A[3], ad 1]. Hence the diversity of merit is all traced to the
diversity of charity, and thus the charity of the way will distinguish
the mansions by way of merit.
Reply to Objection 1: In this passage "virtue" denotes not the natural
ability alone, but the natural ability together with the endeavour to
obtain grace [*Cf. [5135]SS, Q[23], A[8]]. Consequently virtue in this
sense will be a kind of material disposition to the measure of grace
and glory that one will receive. But charity is the formal complement
of merit in relation to glory, and therefore the distinction of degrees
in glory depends on the degrees of charity rather than on the degrees
of the aforesaid virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Works in themselves do not demand the payment of
a reward, except as informed by charity: and therefore the various
degrees of glory will be according to the various degrees of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the habit of charity or of any virtue
whatever is not a merit to which a reward is due, it is none the less
the principle and reason of merit in the act: and consequently
according to its diversity is the diversity of rewards. This does not
prevent our observing a certain degree of merit in the act considered
generically, not indeed in relation to the essential reward which is
joy in God, but in relation to some accidental reward, which is joy in
some created good.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE RELATIONS OF THE SAINTS TOWARDS THE DAMNED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the relations of the saints towards the damned.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints see the sufferings of the damned?
(2) Whether they pity them?
(3) Whether they rejoice in their sufferings?
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Whether the blessed in heaven will see the sufferings of the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed in heaven will not see the
sufferings of the damned. For the damned are more cut off from the
blessed than wayfarers. But the blessed do not see the deeds of
wayfarers: wherefore a gloss on Is. 63:16, "Abraham hath not known us,"
says: "The dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their
own children, are doing" [*St. Augustine, De cura pro mortuis xiii,
xv]. Much less therefore do they see the sufferings of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, perfection of vision depends on the perfection of
the visible object: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that
"the most perfect operation of the sense of sight is when the sense is
most disposed with reference to the most beautiful of the objects which
fall under the sight." Therefore, on the other hand, any deformity in
the visible object redounds to the imperfection of the sight. But there
will be no imperfection in the blessed. Therefore they will not see the
sufferings of the damned wherein there is extreme deformity.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 66:24): "They shall go out and see
the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against Me"; and a
gloss says: "The elect will go out by understanding or seeing
manifestly, so that they may be urged the more to praise God."
I answer that, Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the
perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for
being compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed
beside one another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in order
that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and
that they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are
allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of what the departed saints are
able to do by nature: for it is not necessary that they should know by
natural knowledge all that happens to the living. But the saints in
heaven know distinctly all that happens both to wayfarers and to the
damned. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xii) that Job's words (14:21),
"'Whether his children come to honour or dishonour, he shall not
understand,' do not apply to the souls of the saints, because since
they possess the glory of God within them, we cannot believe that
external things are unknown to them." [*Concerning this Reply, Cf.
[5136]FP, Q[89], A[8]].
Reply to Objection 2: Although the beauty of the thing seen conduces to
the perfection of vision, there may be deformity of the thing seen
without imperfection of vision: because the images of things whereby
the soul knows contraries are not themselves contrary. Wherefore also
God Who has most perfect knowledge sees all things, beautiful and
deformed.
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Whether the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed pity the unhappiness of the
damned. For pity proceeds from charity [*Cf. SS, Q[30]]; and charity
will be most perfect in the blessed. Therefore they will most
especially pity the sufferings of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, the blessed will never be so far from taking pity
as God is. Yet in a sense God compassionates our afflictions, wherefore
He is said to be merciful.
On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares somewhat in his
unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in any unhappiness. Therefore
they do not pity the afflictions of the damned.
I answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a person in two ways:
first by way of passion, secondly by way of choice. In the blessed
there will be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the
reason's choice. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them, except
by the choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the reason's
choice when a person wishes another's evil to be dispelled: wherefore
in those things which, in accordance with reason, we do not wish to be
dispelled, we have no such compassion. But so long as sinners are in
this world they are in such a state that without prejudice to the
Divine justice they can be taken away from a state of unhappiness and
sin to a state of happiness. Consequently it is possible to have
compassion on them both by the choice of the will---in which sense God,
the angels and the blessed are said to pity them by desiring their
salvation---and by passion, in which way they are pitied by the good
men who are in the state of wayfarers. But in the future state it will
be impossible for them to be taken away from their unhappiness: and
consequently it will not be possible to pity their sufferings according
to right reason. Therefore the blessed in glory will have no pity on
the damned.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is the principle of pity when it is
possible for us out of charity to wish the cessation of a person's
unhappiness. But the saints cannot desire this for the damned, since it
would be contrary to Divine justice. Consequently the argument does not
prove.
Reply to Objection 2: God is said to be merciful, in so far as He
succors those whom it is befitting to be released from their
afflictions in accordance with the order of wisdom and justice: not as
though He pitied the damned except perhaps in punishing them less than
they deserve.
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Whether the blessed rejoice in the punishment of the wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed do not rejoice in the
punishment of the wicked. For rejoicing in another's evil pertains to
hatred. But there will be no hatred in the blessed. Therefore they will
not rejoice in the unhappiness of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, the blessed in heaven will be in the highest
degree conformed to God. Now God does not rejoice in our afflictions.
Therefore neither will the blessed rejoice in the afflictions of the
damned.
Objection 3: Further, that which is blameworthy in a wayfarer has no
place whatever in a comprehensor. Now it is most reprehensible in a
wayfarer to take pleasure in the pains of others, and most praiseworthy
to grieve for them. Therefore the blessed nowise rejoice in the
punishment of the damned.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 57:11): "The just shall rejoice
when he shall see the revenge."
Further, it is written (Is. 56:24): "They shall satiate [*Douay: 'They
shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh.'] the sight of all flesh." Now
satiety denotes refreshment of the mind. Therefore the blessed will
rejoice in the punishment of the wicked.
I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First
directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints
will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly,
by reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints
will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein
the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill
them with joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance
will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the
punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly.
Reply to Objection 1: To rejoice in another's evil as such belongs to
hatred, but not to rejoice in another's evil by reason of something
annexed to it. Thus a person sometimes rejoices in his own evil as when
we rejoice in our own afflictions, as helping us to merit life: "My
brethren, count it all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations"
(James 1:2).
Reply to Objection 2: Although God rejoices not in punishments as such,
He rejoices in them as being ordered by His justice.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not praiseworthy in a wayfarer to rejoice
in another's afflictions as such: yet it is praiseworthy if he rejoice
in them as having something annexed. However it is not the same with a
wayfarer as with a comprehensor, because in a wayfarer the passions
often forestall the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes such passions
are praiseworthy, as indicating the good disposition of the mind, as in
the case of shame pity and repentance for evil: whereas in a
comprehensor there can be no passion but such as follows the judgment
of reason.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFTS* OF THE BLESSED (FIVE ARTICLES) [*The Latin 'dos' signifies a
dowry.]
We must now consider the gifts of the blessed; under which head there
are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any gifts should be assigned to the blessed?
(2) Whether a gift differs from beatitude?
(3) Whether it is fitting for Christ to have gifts?
(4) Whether this is competent to the angels?
(5) Whether three gifts of the soul are rightly assigned?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that no gifts should be assigned as dowry to
the blessed. For a dowry (Cod. v, 12, De jure dot. 20: Dig. xxiii, 3,
De jure dot.) is given to the bridegroom for the upkeep of the burdens
of marriage. But the saints resemble not the bridegroom but the bride,
as being members of the Church. Therefore they receive no dowry.
Objection 2: Further, the dowry is given not by the bridegroom's
father, but by the father of the bride (Cod. v, 11, De dot. promiss.,
1: Dig. xxiii, 2, De rit. nup.). Now all the beatific gifts are
bestowed on the blessed by the father of the bridegroom, i.e. Christ:
"Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above coming down from
the Father of lights." Therefore these gifts which are bestowed on the
blessed should not be called a dowry.
Objection 3: Further, in carnal marriage a dowry is given that the
burdens of marriage may be the more easily borne. But in spiritual
marriage there are no burdens, especially in the state of the Church
triumphant. Therefore no dowry should be assigned to that state.
Objection 4: Further, a dowry is not given save on the occasion of
marriage. But a spiritual marriage is contracted with Christ by faith
in the state of the Church militant. Therefore if a dowry is befitting
the blessed, for the same reason it will be befitting the saints who
are wayfarers. But it is not befitting the latter: and therefore
neither is it befitting the blessed.
Objection 5: Further, a dowry pertains to external goods, which are
styled goods of fortune: whereas the reward of the blessed will consist
of internal goods. Therefore they should not be called a dowry.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 5:32): "This is a great sacrament:
but I speak in Christ and in the Church." Hence it follows that the
spiritual marriage is signified by the carnal marriage. But in a carnal
marriage the dowered bride is brought to the dwelling of the
bridegroom. Therefore since the saints are brought to Christ's dwelling
when they are beatified, it would seem that they are dowered with
certain gifts.
Further, a dowry is appointed to carnal marriage for the ease of
marriage. But the spiritual marriage is more blissful than the carnal
marriage. Therefore a dowry should be especially assigned thereto.
Further, the adornment of the bride is part of the dowry. Now the
saints are adorned when they are taken into glory, according to Is.
61:10, "He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation . . . as a
bride adorned with her jewels." Therefore the saints in heaven have a
dowry.
I answer that, Without doubt the blessed when they are brought into
glory are dowered by God with certain gifts for their adornment, and
this adornment is called their dowry by the masters. Hence the dower of
which we speak now is defined thus: "The dowry is the everlasting
adornment of soul and body adequate to life, lasting for ever in
eternal bliss." This description is taken from a likeness to the
material dowry whereby the bride is adorned and the husband provided
with an adequate support for his wife and children, and yet the dowry
remains inalienable from the bride, so that if the marriage union be
severed it reverts to her. As to the reason of the name there are
various opinions. For some say that the name "dowry" is taken not from
a likeness to the corporeal marriage, but according to the manner of
speaking whereby any perfection or adornment of any person whatever is
called an endowment; thus a man who is proficient in knowledge is said
to be endowed with knowledge, and in this sense ovid employed the word
"endowment" (De Arte Amandi i, 538): "By whatever endowment thou canst
please, strive to please." But this does not seem quite fitting, for
whenever a term is employed to signify a certain thing principally, it
is not usually transferred to another save by reason of some likeness.
Wherefore since by its primary signification a dowry refers to carnal
marriage, it follows that in every other application of the term we
must observe some kind of likeness to its principal signification.
Consequently others say that the likeness consists in the fact that in
carnal marriage a dowry is properly a gift bestowed by the bridegroom
on the bride for her adornment when she is taken to the bridegroom's
dwelling: and that this is shown by the words of Sichem to Jacob and
his sons (Gn. 34:12): "Raise the dowry, and ask gifts," and from Ex.
22:16: "If a man seduce a virgin . . . and lie with her, he shall endow
her, and have her to wife." Hence the adornment bestowed by Christ on
the saints, when they are brought into the abode of glory, is called a
dowry. But this is clearly contrary to what jurists say, to whom it
belongs to treat of these matters. For they say that a dowry, properly
speaking, is a donation on the part of the wife made to those who are
on the part of the husband, in view of the marriage burden which the
husband has to bear; while that which the bridegroom gives the bride is
called "a donation in view of marriage." In this sense dowry is taken
(3 Kings 9:16) where it is stated that "Pharoa, the king of Egypt, took
Gezer . . . and gave it for a dowry to his daughter, Solomon's wife."
Nor do the authorities quoted prove anything to the contrary. For
although it is customary for a dowry to be given by the maiden's
parents, it happens sometimes that the bridegroom or his father gives
the dowry instead of the bride's father; and this happens in two ways:
either by reason of his very great love for the bride as in the case of
Sichem's father Hemor, who on account of his son's great love for the
maiden wished to give the dowry which he had a right to receive; or as
a punishment on the bridegroom, that he should out of his own
possessions give a dowry to the virgin seduced by him, whereas he
should have received it from the girl's father. In this sense Moses
speaks in the passage quoted above. Wherefore in the opinion of others
we should hold that in carnal marriage a dowry, properly speaking, is
that which is given by those on the wife's side to those on the
husband's side, for the bearing of the marriage burden, as stated
above. Yet the difficulty remains how this signification can be adapted
to the case in point, since the heavenly adornments are given to the
spiritual spouse by the Father of the Bridegroom. This shall be made
clear by replying to the objections.
Reply to Objection 1: Although in carnal marriage the dowry is given to
the bridegroom for his use, yet the ownership and control belong to the
bride: which is evident by the fact that if the marriage be dissolved,
the dowry reverts to the bride according to law (Cap. 1,2,3, De donat.
inter virum et uxorem). Thus also in spiritual marriage, the very
adornments bestowed on the spiritual bride, namely the Church in her
members, belong indeed to the Bridegroom, in so far as they conduce to
His glory and honor, yet to the bride as adorned thereby.
Reply to Objection 2: The Father of the Bridegroom, that is of Christ,
is the Person of the Father alone: while the Father of the bride is the
whole Trinity, since that which is effected in creatures belongs to the
whole Trinity. Hence in spiritual marriage these endowments, properly
speaking, are given by the Father of the bride rather than by the
Father of the Bridegroom. Nevertheless, although this endowment is made
by all the Persons, it may be in a manner appropriated to each Person.
To the Person of the Father, as endowing, since He possesses authority;
and fatherhood in relation to creatures is also appropriated to Him, so
that He is Father of both Bridegroom and bride. To the Son it is
appropriated, inasmuch as it is made for His sake and through Him: and
to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it is made in Him and according to Him,
since love is the reason of all giving [*Cf. [5137]FP, Q[38], A[2]].
Reply to Objection 3: That which is effected by the dowry belongs to
the dowry by its nature, and that is the ease of marriage: while that
which the dowry removes, namely the marriage burden which is lightened
thereby, belongs to it accidentally: thus it belongs to grace by its
nature to make a man righteous, but accidentally to make an ungodly man
righteous. Accordingly, though there are no burdens in the spiritual
marriage, there is the greatest gladness; and that this gladness may be
perfected the bride is dowered with gifts, so that by their means she
may be happily united with the bridegroom.
Reply to Objection 4: The dowry is usually settled on the bride not
when she is espoused, but when she is taken to the bridegroom's
dwelling, so as to be in the presence of the bridegroom, since "while
we are in the body we are absent from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Hence the
gifts bestowed on the saints in this life are not called a dowry, but
those which are bestowed on them when they are received into glory,
where the Bridegroom delights them with His presence.
Reply to Objection 5: In spiritual marriage inward comeliness is
required, wherefore it is written (Ps. 44:14): "All the glory of the
king's daughter is within," etc. But in carnal marriage outward
comeliness is necessary. Hence there is no need for a dowry of this
kind to be appointed in spiritual marriage as in carnal marriage.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the dowry is the same as beatitude*? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[7], ad 1;
FS, Q[4], A[3]]
Objection 1: It would seem that the dowry is the same as beatitude. For
as appears from the definition of dowry [5138](A[1]), the dowry is "the
everlasting adornment of body and soul in eternal happiness." Now the
happiness of the soul is an adornment thereof. Therefore beatitude is a
dowry.
Objection 2: Further, a dowry signifies something whereby the union of
bride and bridegroom is rendered delightful. Now such is beatitude in
the spiritual marriage. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (In Ps. 92) vision is "the
whole essence of beatitude." Now vision is accounted one of the
dowries. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.
Objection 4: Further, fruition gives happiness. Now fruition is a
dowry. Therefore a dowry gives happiness and thus beatitude is a dowry.
Objection 5: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii),
"beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good
things." Now the state of the blessed is perfected by the dowries.
Therefore the dowries are part of beatitude.
On the contrary, The dowries are given without merits: whereas
beatitude is not given, but is awarded in return for merits. Therefore
beatitude is not a dowry.
Further, beatitude is one only, whereas the dowries are several.
Therefore beatitude is not a dowry.
Further, beatitude is in man according to that which is principal in
him (Ethic. x, 7): whereas a dowry is also appointed to the body.
Therefore dowry and beatitude are not the same.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say
that beatitude and dowry are the same in reality but differ in aspect:
because dowry regards the spiritual marriage between Christ and the
soul, whereas beatitude does not. But seemingly this will not stand,
since beatitude consists in an operation, whereas a dowry is not an
operation, but a quality or disposition. Wherefore according to others
it must be stated that beatitude and dowry differ even in reality,
beatitude being the perfect operation itself by which the soul is
united to God, while the dowries are habits or dispositions or any
other qualities directed to this same perfect operation, so that they
are directed to beatitude instead of being in it as parts thereof.
Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude, properly speaking, is not an adornment
of the soul, but something resulting from the soul's adornment; since
it is an operation, while its adornment is a certain comeliness of the
blessed themselves.
Reply to Objection 2: Beatitude is not directed to the union but is the
union itself of the soul with Christ. This union is by an operation,
whereas the dowries are gifts disposing to this same union.
Reply to Objection 3: Vision may be taken in two ways. First, actually,
i.e. for the act itself of vision; and thus vision is not a dowry, but
beatitude itself. Secondly, it may be taken habitually, i.e. for the
habit whereby this act is elicited, namely the clarity of glory, by
which the soul is enlightened from above to see God: and thus it is a
dowry and the principle of beatitude, but not beatitude itself. The
same answer applies to OBJ 4.
Reply to Objection 5: Beatitude is the sum of all goods not as though
they were essential parts of beatitude, but as being in a way directed
to beatitude, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is fitting that Christ should receive a dowry?
Objection 1: It would seem fitting that Christ should receive a dowry.
For the saints will be conformed to Christ through glory, according to
Phil. 3:21, "Who will reform the body of our lowness made like to the
body of His glory." Therefore Christ also will have a dowry.
Objection 2: Further, in the spiritual marriage a dowry is given in
likeness to a carnal marriage. Now there is a spiritual marriage in
Christ, which is peculiar to Him, namely of the two natures in one
Person, in regard to which the human nature in Him is said to have been
espoused by the Word, as a gloss [*St. Augustine, De Consensu Evang. i,
40] has it on Ps. 18:6, "He hath set His tabernacle in the sun," etc.,
and Apoc. 21:3, "Behold the tabernacle of God with men." Therefore it
is fitting that Christ should have a dowry.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii) that
Christ, according to the Rule [*Liber regularum] of Tyconius, on
account of the unity of the mystic body that exists between the head
and its members, calls Himself also the Bride and not only the
Bridegroom, as may be gathered from Is. 61:10, "As a bridegroom decked
with a crown, and as a bride adorned with her jewels." Since then a
dowry is due to the bride, it would seem that Christ ought to receive a
dowry.
Objection 4: Further, a dowry is due to all the members of the Church,
since the Church is the spouse. But Christ is a member of the Church
according to 1 Cor. 12:27, "You are the body of Christ, and members of
member, i.e. of Christ," according to a gloss. Therefore the dowry is
due to Christ.
Objection 5: Further, Christ has perfect vision, fruition, and joy. Now
these are the dowries. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, A distinction of persons is requisite between the
bridegroom and the bride. But in Christ there is nothing personally
distinct from the Son of God Who is the Bridegroom, as stated in Jn.
3:29, "He that hath the bride is the bridegroom." Therefore since the
dowry is allotted to the bride or for the bride, it would seem
unfitting for Christ to have a dowry.
Further, the same person does not both give and receive a dowry. But it
is Christ Who gives spiritual dowries. Therefore it is not fitting that
Christ should have a dowry.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that
there is a threefold union in Christ. One is the union of concord,
whereby He is united to God in the bond of love; another is the union
of condescension, whereby the human nature is united to the Divine; the
third is the union whereby Christ is united to the Church. They say,
then, that as regards the first two unions it is fitting for Christ to
have the dowries as such, but as regards the third, it is fitting for
Him to have the dowries in the most excellent degree, considered as to
that in which they consist, but not considered as dowries; because in
this union Christ is the bridegroom and the Church the bride, and a
dowry is given to the bride as regards property and control, although
it is given to the bridegroom as to use. But this does not seem
congruous. For in the union of Christ with the Father by the concord of
love, even if we consider Him as God, there is not said to be a
marriage, since it implies no subjection such as is required in the
bride towards the bridegroom. Nor again in the union of the human
nature with the Divine, whether we consider the Personal union or that
which regards the conformity of will, can there be a dowry, properly
speaking, for three reasons. First, because in a marriage where a dowry
is given there should be likeness of nature between bridegroom and
bride, and this is lacking in the union of the human nature with the
Divine; secondly, because there is required a distinction of persons,
and the human nature is not personally distinct from the Word; thirdly,
because a dowry is given when the bride is first taken to the dwelling
of the bridegroom and thus would seem to belong to the bride, who from
being not united becomes united; whereas the human nature, which was
assumed into the unity of Person by the Word, never was otherwise than
perfectly united. Wherefore in the opinion of others we should say that
the notion of dowry is either altogether unbecoming to Christ, or not
so properly as to the saints; but that the things which we call dowries
befit Him in the highest degree.
Reply to Objection 1: This conformity must be understood to refer to
the thing which is a dowry and not to the notion of a dowry being in
Christ: for it is not requisite that the thing in which we are
conformed to Christ should be in the same way in Christ and in us.
Reply to Objection 2: Human nature is not properly said to be a bride
in its union with the Word, since the distinction of persons, which is
requisite between bridegroom and bride, is not observed therein. That
human nature is sometimes described as being espoused in reference to
its union with the Word is because it has a certain act of the bride,
in that it is united to the Bridegroom inseparably, and in this union
is subject to the Word and ruled by the Word, as the bride by the
bridegroom.
Reply to Objection 3: If Christ is sometimes spoken of as the Bride,
this is not because He is the Bride in very truth, but in so far as He
personifies His spouse, namely the Church, who is united to Him
spiritually. Hence nothing hinders Him, in this way of speaking, from
being said to have the dowries, not that He Himself is dowered, but the
Church.
Reply to Objection 4: The term Church is taken in two senses. For
sometimes it denotes the body only, which is united to Christ as its
Head. In this way alone has the Church the character of spouse: and in
this way Christ is not a member of the Church, but is the Head from
which all the members receive. In another sense the Church denotes the
head and members united together; and thus Christ is said to be a
member of the Church, inasmuch as He fulfills an office distinct from
all others, by pouring forth life into the other members: although He
is not very properly called a member, since a member implies a certain
restriction, whereas in Christ spiritual good is not restricted but is
absolutely entire [*Cf. [5139]TP, Q[8], A[1]], so that He is the entire
good of the Church, nor is He together with others anything greater
than He is by Himself. Speaking of the Church in this sense, the Church
denotes not only the bride, but the bridegroom and bride, in so far as
one thing results from their spiritual union. Consequently although
Christ be called a member of the Church in a certain sense, He can by
no means be called a member of the bride; and therefore the idea of a
dowry is not becoming to Him.
Reply to Objection 5: There is here a fallacy of "accident"; for these
things are not befitting to Christ if we consider them under the aspect
of dowry.
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Whether the angels receive the dowries?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels receive dowries. For a gloss
on Canticle of Canticles 6:8, "One is my dove," says: "One is the
Church among men and angels." But the Church is the bride, wherefore it
is fitting for the members of the Church to have the dowries. Therefore
the angels have the dowries.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Lk. 12:36, "And you yourselves like to
men who wait for their lord, when he shall return from the wedding,"
says: "Our Lord went to the wedding when after His resurrection the new
Man espoused to Himself the angelic host." Therefore the angelic hosts
are the spouse of Christ and consequently it is fitting that they
should have the dowries.
Objection 3: Further, the spiritual marriage consists in a spiritual
union. Now the spiritual union between the angels and God is no less
than between beatified men and God. Since, then, the dowries of which
we treat now are assigned by reason of a spiritual marriage, it would
seem that they are becoming to the angels.
Objection 4: Further, a spiritual marriage demands a spiritual
bridegroom and a spiritual bride. Now the angels are by nature more
conformed than men to Christ as the supreme spirit. Therefore a
spiritual marriage is more possible between the angels and Christ than
between men and Christ.
Objection 5: Further, a greater conformity is required between the head
and members than between bridegroom and bride. Now the conformity
between Christ and the angels suffices for Christ to be called the Head
of the angels. Therefore for the same reason it suffices for Him to be
called their bridegroom.
On the contrary, Origen at the beginning of the prologue to his
commentary on the Canticles, distinguishes four persons, namely "the
bridegroom with the bride, the young maidens, and the companions of the
bridegroom": and he says that "the angels are the companions of the
bridegroom." Since then the dowry is due only to the bride, it would
seem that the dowries are not becoming to the angels.
Further, Christ espoused the Church by His Incarnation and Passion:
wherefore this is foreshadowed in the words (Ex. 4:25), "A bloody
spouse thou art to me." Now by His Incarnation and Passion Christ was
not otherwise united to the angels than before. Therefore the angels do
not belong to the Church, if we consider the Church as spouse.
Therefore the dowries are not becoming to the angels.
I answer that, Without any doubt, whatever pertains to the endowments
of the soul is befitting to the angels as it is to men. But considered
under the aspect of dowry they are not as becoming to the angels as to
men, because the character of bride is not so properly becoming to the
angels as to men. For there is required a conformity of nature between
bridegroom and bride, to wit that they should be of the same species.
Now men are in conformity with Christ in this way, since He took human
nature, and by so doing became conformed to all men in the specific
nature of man. on the other hand, He is not conformed to the angels in
unity of species, neither as to His Divine nor as to His human nature.
Consequently the notion of dowry is not so properly becoming to angels
as to men. Since, however, in metaphorical expressions, it is not
necessary to have a likeness in every respect, we must not argue that
one thing is not to be said of another metaphorically on account of
some lack of likeness; and consequently the argument we have adduced
does not prove that the dowries are simply unbecoming to the angels,
but only that they are not so properly befitting to angels as to men,
on account of the aforesaid lack of likeness.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels are included in the unity of
the Church, they are not members of the Church according to conformity
of nature, if we consider the Church as bride: and thus it is not
properly fitting for them to have the dowries.
Reply to Objection 2: Espousal is taken there in a broad sense, for
union without conformity of specific nature: and in this sense nothing
prevents our saying that the angels have the dowries taking these in a
broad sense.
Reply to Objection 3: In the spiritual marriage although there is no
other than a spiritual union, those whose union answers to the idea of
a perfect marriage should agree in specific nature. Hence espousal does
not properly befit the angels.
Reply to Objection 4: The conformity between the angels and Christ as
God is not such as suffices for the notion of a perfect marriage, since
so far are they from agreeing in species that there is still an
infinite distance between them.
Reply to Objection 5: Not even is Christ properly called the Head of
the angels, if we consider the head as requiring conformity of nature
with the members. We must observe, however, that although the head and
the other members are parts of an individual of one species, if we
consider each one by itself, it is not of the same species as another
member, for a hand is another specific part from the head. Hence,
speaking of the members in themselves, the only conformity required
among them is one of proportion, so that one receive from another, and
one serve another. Consequently the conformity between God and the
angels suffices for the notion of head rather than for that of
bridegroom.
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Whether three dowries of the soul are suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to assign to the soul three
dowries, namely, "vision," "love" and "fruition." For the soul is
united to God according to the mind wherein is the image of the Trinity
in respect of the memory, understanding, and will. Now love regards the
will, and vision the understanding. Therefore there should be something
corresponding to the memory, since fruition regards not the memory but
the will.
Objection 2: Further, the beatific dowries are said to correspond to
the virtues of the way, which united us to God: and these are faith,
hope, and charity, whereby God Himself is the object. Now love
corresponds to charity, and vision to faith. Therefore there should be
something corresponding to hope, since fruition corresponds rather to
charity.
Objection 3: Further, we enjoy God by love and vision only, since "we
are said to enjoy those things which we love for their own sake," as
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). Therefore fruition should not
be reckoned a distinct dowry from love.
Objection 4: Further, comprehension is required for the perfection of
beatitude: "So run that you may comprehend" (1 Cor. 9:24). Therefore we
should reckon a fourth dowry
Objection 5: Further, Anselm says (De Simil. xlviii) that the following
pertain to the soul's beatitude: "wisdom, friendship, concord, power,
honor, security, joy": and consequently the aforesaid dowries are
reckoned unsuitably.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) that "in that
beatitude God will be seen unendingly, loved without wearying, praised
untiringly." Therefore praise should be added to the aforesaid dowries.
Objection 7: Further, Boethius reckons five things pertaining to
beatitude (De Consol. iii) and these are: Sufficiency which wealth
offers, joy which pleasure offers, celebrity which fame offers,
security which power offers, reverence which dignity offers.
Consequently it seems that these should be reckoned as dowries rather
than the aforesaid.
I answer that, All agree in reckoning three dowries of the soul, in
different ways however. For some say that the three dowries of the soul
are vision, love, and fruition. others reckon them to be vision,
comprehension, and fruition; others, vision, delight, and
comprehension. However, all these reckonings come to the same, and
their number is assigned in the same way. For it has been said
[5140](A[2]) that a dowry is something inherent to the soul, and
directing it to the operation in which beatitude consists. Now two
things are requisite in this operation: its essence which is vision,
and its perfection which is delight: since beatitude must needs be a
perfect operation. Again, a vision is delightful in two ways: first, on
the part of the object, by reason of the thing seen being delightful;
secondly, on the part of the vision, by reason of the seeing itself
being delightful, even as we delight in knowing evil things, although
the evil things themselves delight us not. And since this operation
wherein ultimate beatitude consists must needs be most perfect, this
vision must needs be delightful in both ways. Now in order that this
vision be delightful on the part of the vision, it needs to be made
connatural to the seer by means of a habit; while for it to be
delightful on the part of the visible object, two things are necessary,
namely that the visible object be suitable, and that it be united to
the seer. Accordingly for the vision to be delightful on its own part a
habit is required to elicit the vision, and thus we have one dowry,
which all call vision. But on the part of the visible object two things
are necessary. First, suitableness, which regards the affections---and
in this respect some reckon love as a dowry, others fruition (in so far
as fruition regards the affective part) since what we love most we deem
most suitable. Secondly, union is required on the part of the visible
object, and thus some reckon comprehension, which is nothing else than
to have God present and to hold Him within ourself [*Cf. [5141]FS,
Q[4], A[3]]; while others reckon fruition, not of hope, which is ours
while on the way, but of possession [*Literally "of the reality: non
spei . . . sed rei"] which is in heaven.
Thus the three dowries correspond to the three theological virtues,
namely vision to faith, comprehension (or fruition in one sense) to
hope, and fruition (or delight according to another reckoning to
charity). For perfect fruition such as will be had in heaven includes
delight and comprehension, for which reason some take it for the one,
and some for the other.
Others, however, ascribe these three dowries to the three powers of the
soul, namely vision to the rational, delight to the concupiscible, and
fruition to the irascible, seeing that this fruition is acquired by a
victory. But this is not said properly, because the irascible and
concupiscible powers are not in the intellective but in the sensitive
part, whereas the dowries of the soul are assigned to the mind.
Reply to Objection 1: Memory and understanding have but one act: either
because understanding is itself an act of memory, or---if understanding
denote a power---because memory does not proceed to act save through
the medium of the understanding, since it belongs to the memory to
retain knowledge. Consequently there is only one habit, namely
knowledge, corresponding to memory and understanding: wherefore only
one dowry, namely vision, corresponds to both.
Reply to Objection 2: Fruition corresponds to hope, in so far as it
includes comprehension which will take the place of hope: since we hope
for that which we have not yet; wherefore hope chafes somewhat on
account of the distance of the beloved: for which reason it will not
remain in heaven [Cf. [5142]SS, Q[18], A[2]] but will be succeeded by
comprehension.
Reply to Objection 3: Fruition as including comprehension is distinct
from vision and love, but otherwise than love from vision. For love and
vision denote different habits, the one belonging to the intellect, the
other to the affective faculty. But comprehension, or fruition as
denoting comprehension, does not signify a habit distinct from those
two, but the removal of the obstacles which made it impossible for the
mind to be united to God by actual vision. This is brought about by the
habit of glory freeing the soul from all defects; for instance by
making it capable of knowledge without phantasms, of complete control
over the body, and so forth, thus removing the obstacles which result
in our being pilgrims from the Lord.
Reply OBJ 4 is clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the dowries are the immediate
principles of the operation in which perfect beatitude consists and
whereby the soul is united to Christ. The things mentioned by Anselm do
not answer to this description; but they are such as in any way
accompany or follow beatitude, not only in relation to the Bridegroom,
to Whom "wisdom" alone of the things mentioned by him refers, but also
in relation to others. They may be either one's equals, to whom
"friendship" refers as regards the union of affections, and "concord"
as regards consent in actions, or one's inferiors, to whom "power"
refers, so far as inferior things are ordered by superior, and "honor"
as regards that which inferiors offer to their superiors. Or again
(they may accompany or follow beatitude) in relation to oneself: to
this "security" refers as regards the removal of evil, and "joy" as
regards the attainment of good.
Reply to Objection 6: Praise, which Augustine mentions as the third of
those things which will obtain in heaven, is not a disposition to
beatitude but rather a sequel to beatitude: because from the very fact
of the soul's union with God, wherein beatitude consists, it follows
that the soul breaks forth into praise. Hence praise has not the
necessary conditions of a dowry.
Reply to Objection 7: The five things aforesaid mentioned by Boethius
are certain conditions of beatitude, but not dispositions to beatitude
or to its act, because beatitude by reason of its perfection has of
itself alone and undividedly all that men seek in various things, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7; x, 7,8). Accordingly Boethius
shows that these five things obtain in perfect beatitude, because they
are what men seek in temporal happiness. For they pertain either, as
"security," to immunity from evil, or to the attainment either of the
suitable good, as "joy," or of the perfect good, as "sufficiency," or
to the manifestation of good, as "celebrity," inasmuch as the good of
one is made known to others, or as "reverence," as indicating that good
or the knowledge thereof, for reverence is the showing of honor which
bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that these five should not
be called dowries, but conditions of beatitude.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE AUREOLES (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider the aureoles. Under this head there
are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the aureoles differ from the essential reward?
(2) Whether they differ from the fruit?
(3) Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence only?
(4) Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of
continence?
(5) Whether an aureole is due to virgins?
(6) Whether it is due to martyrs?
(7) Whether it is due to doctors?
(8) Whether it is due to Christ?
(9) Whether to the angels?
(10) Whether it is due to the human body?
(11) Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned?
(12) Whether the virgin's aureole is the greatest?
(13) Whether one has the same aureole in a higher degree than another?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the aureole is the same as the essential reward which is called the
aurea?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aureole is not distinct from the
essential reward which is called the "aurea." For the essential reward
is beatitude itself. Now according to Boethius (De Consol. iii),
beatitude is "a state rendered perfect by the aggregate of all goods."
Therefore the essential reward includes every good possessed in heaven;
so that the aureole is included in the "aurea."
Objection 2: Further, "more" and "less" do not change a species. But
those who keep the counsels and commandments receive a greater reward
than those who keep the commandments only, nor seemingly does their
reward differ, except in one reward being greater than another. Since
then the aureole denotes the reward due to works of perfection it would
seem that it does not signify something distinct from the "aurea."
Objection 3: Further, reward corresponds to merit. Now charity is the
root of all merit. Since then the "aurea" corresponds to charity, it
would seem that there will be no reward in heaven other than the
"aurea."
Objection 4: Further, "All the blessed are taken into the angelic
orders" as Gregory declares (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Now as regards the
angels, "though some of them receive certain gifts in a higher degree,
nothing is possessed by any of them exclusively, for all gifts are in
all of them, though not equally, because some are endowed more highly
than others with gifts which, however, they all possess," as Gregory
says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore as regards the blessed, there
will be no reward other than that which is common to all. Therefore the
aureole is not a distinct reward from the "aurea."
Objection 5: Further, a higher reward is due to higher merit. If, then,
the "aurea" is due to works which are of obligation, and the aureole to
works of counsel, the aureole will be more perfect than the "aurea,"
and consequently should not be expressed by a diminutive [*"Aureola,"
i.e. a little "aurea"]. Therefore it would seem that the aureole is not
a distinct reward from the "aurea."
On the contrary, A gloss [*Ven. Bede, De Tabernaculis i, 6] on Ex.
25:24,25, "Thou shalt make . . . another little golden crown [coronam
aureolam]," says: "This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins
alone sing in the presence of the Lamb." Wherefore apparently the
aureole is a crown awarded, not to all, but especially to some: whereas
the aurea is awarded to all the blessed. Therefore the aureole is
distinct from the "aurea."
Further, a crown is due to the fight which is followed by victory: "He
. . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" (2 Tim. 2:5). Hence
where there is a special kind of conflict, there should be a special
crown. Now in certain works there is a special kind of conflict.
Therefore they deserve a special kind of crown, which we call an
aureole.
Further, the Church militant comes down from the Church triumphant: "I
saw the Holy City," etc. (Apoc. 21:2). Now in the Church militant
special rewards are given to those who perform special deeds, for
instance a crown to the conqueror, a prize to the runner. Therefore the
same should obtain in the Church triumphant.
I answer that, Man's essential reward, which is his beatitude, consists
in the perfect union of the soul with God, inasmuch as it enjoys God
perfectly as seen and loved perfectly. Now this reward is called a
"crown" or "aurea" metaphorically, both with reference to merit which
is gained by a kind of conflict---since "the life of man upon earth is
a warfare" (Job 7:1)---and with reference to the reward whereby in a
way man is made a participator of the Godhead, and consequently endowed
with regal power: "Thou hast made us to our God a kingdom," etc. (Apoc.
5:10); for a crown is the proper sign of regal power.
In like manner the accidental reward which is added to the essential
has the character of a crown. For a crown signifies some kind of
perfection, on account of its circular shape, so that for this very
reason it is becoming to the perfection of the blessed. Since, however,
nothing can be added to the essential, but what is less than it, the
additional reward is called an "aureole." Now something may be added in
two ways to this essential reward which we call the "aurea." First, in
consequence of a condition attaching to the nature of the one rewarded:
thus the glory of the body is added to the beatitude of the soul,
wherefore this same glory of the body is sometimes called an "aureole."
Thus a gloss of Bede on Ex. 25:25, "Thou . . . shalt make another
little golden crown," says that "finally the aureole is added, when it
is stated in the Scriptures that a higher degree of glory is in store
for us when our bodies are resumed." But it is not in this sense that
we speak of an aureole now. Secondly, in consequence of the nature of
the meritorious act. Now this has the character of merit on two counts,
whence also it has the character of good. First, to wit, from its root
which is charity, since it is referred to the last end, and thus there
is due to it the essential reward, namely the attainment of the end,
and this is the "aurea." Secondly, from the very genus of the act which
derives a certain praiseworthiness from its due circumstances, from the
habit eliciting it and from its proximate end, and thus is due to it a
kind of accidental reward which we call an "aureole": and it is in this
sense that we regard the aureole now. Accordingly it must be said that
an "aureole" denotes something added to the "aurea," a kind of joy, to
wit, in the works one has done, in that they have the character of a
signal victory: for this joy is distinct from the joy in being united
to God, which is called the "aurea." Some, however, affirm that the
common reward, which is the "aurea," receives the name of "aureole,"
according as it is given to virgins, martyrs, or doctors: even as money
receives the name of debt through being due to some one, though the
money and the debt are altogether the same. And that nevertheless this
does not imply that the essential reward is any greater when it is
called an "aureole"; but that it corresponds to a more excellent act,
more excellent not in intensity of merit but in the manner of meriting;
so that although two persons may have the Divine vision with equal
clearness, it is called an "aureole" in one and not in the other in so
far as it corresponds to higher merit as regards the way of meriting.
But this would seem contrary to the meaning of the gloss quoted above.
For if "aurea" and "aureole" were the same, the "aureole" would not be
described as added to the "aurea." Moreover, since reward corresponds
to merit, a more excellent reward must needs correspond to this more
excellent way of meriting: and it is this excellence that we call an
"aureole." Hence it follows that an "aureole" differs from the "aurea."
Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude includes all the goods necessary for
man's perfect life consisting in his perfect operation. Yet some things
can be added, not as being necessary for that perfect operation as
though it were impossible without them, but as adding to the glory of
beatitude. Hence they regard the well-being of beatitude and a certain
fitness thereto. Even so civic happiness is embellished by nobility and
bodily beauty and so forth, and yet it is possible without them as
stated in Ethic. i, 8: and thus is the aureole in comparison with the
happiness of heaven.
Reply to Objection 2: He who keeps the counsels and the commandments
always merits more than he who keeps the commandments only, if we
gather the notion of merit in works from the very genus of those works;
but not always if we gauge the merit from its root, charity: since
sometimes a man keeps the commandments alone out of greater charity
than one who keeps both commandments and counsels. For the most part,
however, the contrary happens, because the "proof of love is in the
performance of deeds," as Gregory says (Hom. xxx in Evang.). Wherefore
it is not the more excellent essential reward that is called an
aureole, but that which is added to the essential reward without
reference to the essential reward of the possessor of an aureole being
greater, or less than, or equal to the essential reward of one who has
no aureole.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity is the first principle of merit: but our
actions are the instruments, so to speak, whereby we merit. Now in
order to obtain an effect there is requisite not only a due disposition
in the first mover, but also a right disposition in the instrument.
Hence something principal results in the effect with reference to the
first mover, and something secondary with reference to the instrument.
Wherefore in the reward also there is something on the part of charity,
namely the "aurea," and something on the part of the kind of work,
namely the "aureole."
Reply to Objection 4: All the angels merited their beatitude by the
same kind of act namely by turning to God: and consequently no
particular reward is found in anyone which another has not in some way.
But men merit beatitude by different kinds of acts: and so the
comparison fails.
Nevertheless among men what one seems to have specially, all have in
common in some way, in so far as each one, by charity, deems another's
good his own. Yet this joy whereby one shares another's joy cannot be
called an aureole, because it is not given him as a reward for his
victory, but regards more the victory of another: whereas a crown is
awarded the victors themselves and not to those who rejoice with them
in the victory.
Reply to Objection 5: The merit arising from charity is more excellent
than that which arises from the kind of action: just as the end to
which charity directs us is more excellent than the things directed to
that end, and with which our actions are concerned. Wherefore the
reward corresponding to merit by reason of charity, however little it
may be, is greater than any reward corresponding to an action by reason
of its genus. Hence "aureole" is used as a diminutive in comparison
with "aurea."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the aureole differs from the fruit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aureole does not differ from the
fruit. For different rewards are not due to the same merit. Now the
aureole and the hundredfold fruit correspond to the same merit,
according to a gloss on Mat. 13:8, "Some a hundredfold." Therefore the
aureole is the same as the fruit.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virgin xlv) that the
"hundredfold fruit is due to the martyrs, and also to virgins."
Therefore the fruit is a reward common to virgins and martyrs. But the
aureole also is due to them. Therefore the aureole is the same as the
fruit.
Objection 3: Further, there are only two rewards in beatitude, namely
the essential, and the accidental which is added to the essential. Now
that which is added to the essential reward is called an aureole, as
evidenced by the statement (Ex. 25:25) that the little crown [aureola]
is added to the crown. But the fruit is not the essential reward, for
in that case it would be due to all the blessed. Therefore it is the
same as the aureole.
On the contrary, Things which are not divided in the same way are not
of the same nature. Now fruit and aureole are not divided in the same
way, since aureole is divided into the aureole of virgins, of martyrs,
and of doctors: whereas fruit is divided into the fruit of the married,
of widows, and of virgins. Therefore fruit and aureole are not the
same.
Further, if fruit and aureole were the same, the aureole would be due
to whomsoever the fruit is due. But this is manifestly untrue, since a
fruit is due to widowhood, while an aureole is not. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, Metaphorical expressions can be taken in various ways,
according as we find resemblances to the various properties of the
thing from which the comparison is taken. Now since fruit, properly
speaking, is applied to material things born of the earth, we employ it
variously in a spiritual sense, with reference to the various
conditions that obtain in material fruits. For the material fruit has
sweetness whereby it refreshes so far as it is used by man: again it is
the last thing to which the operation of nature attains: moreover it is
that to which husbandry looks forward as the result of sowing or any
other process. Accordingly fruit is taken in a spiritual sense
sometimes for that which refreshes as being the last end: and according
to this signification we are said to enjoy [frui] God perfectly in
heaven, and imperfectly on the way. From this signification we have
fruition which is a dowry: but we are not speaking of fruit in this
sense now. Sometimes fruit signifies spiritually that which refreshes
only, though it is not the last end; and thus the virtues are called
fruits, inasmuch as "they refresh the mind with genuine sweetness," as
Ambrose says [*De Parad. xiii]. In this sense fruit is taken (Gal.
6:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy," etc. Nor again is
this the sense in which we speak of fruit now; for we have treated of
this already [*Cf. [5143]FS, Q[70], A[1], ad 2].
We may, however, take spiritual fruit in another sense, in likeness to
material fruit, inasmuch as material fruit is a profit expected from
the labor of husbandry: so that we call fruit that reward which man
acquires from his labor in this life: and thus every reward which by
our labors we shall acquire for the future life is called a "fruit." In
this sense fruit is taken (Rom. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto
sanctification, and the end life everlasting." Yet neither in this
sense do we speak of fruit now, but we are treating of fruit as being
the product of seed: for it is in this sense that our Lord speaks of
fruit (Mat. 13:23), where He divides fruit into thirtyfold, sixtyfold,
and hundredfold. Now fruit is the product of seed in so far as the seed
power is capable of transforming the humors of the soil into its own
nature; and the more efficient this power, and the better prepared the
soil, the more plentiful fruit will result. Now the spiritual seed
which is sown in us is the Word of God: wherefore the more a person is
transformed into a spiritual nature by withdrawing from carnal things,
the greater is the fruit of the Word in him. Accordingly the fruit of
the Word of God differs from the aurea and the aureole, in that the
"aurea" consists in the joy one has in God, and the "aureole" in the
joy one has in the perfection of one's works, whereas the "fruit"
consists in the joy that the worker has in his own disposition as to
his degree of spirituality to which he has attained through the seed of
God's Word.
Some, however, distinguish between aureole and fruit, by saying that
the aureole is due to the fighter, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, "He . . .
shall not be crowned, except he strive lawfully"; whereas the fruit is
due to the laborer, according to the saying of Wis. 3:15, "The fruit of
good labors is glorious." Others again say that the "aurea" regards
conversion to God, while the "aureole" and the "fruit" regard things
directed to the end; yet so that the fruit regards the will rather, and
the aureole the body. Since, however, labor and strife are in the same
subject and about the same matter, and since the body's reward depends
on the soul's, these explanations of the difference between fruit,
aurea and aureole would only imply a logical difference: and this
cannot be, since fruit is assigned to some to whom no aureole is
assigned.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing incongruous if various rewards
correspond to the same merit according to the various things contained
therein. Wherefore to virginity corresponds the aurea in so far as
virginity is kept for God's sake at the command of charity; the
aureole, in so far as virginity is a work of perfection having the
character of a signal victory; and the fruit, in so far as by virginity
a person acquires a certain spirituality by withdrawing from carnal
things.
Reply to Objection 2: Fruit, according to the proper acceptation as we
are speaking of it now, does not denote the reward common to martyrdom
and virginity, by that which corresponds to the three degrees of
continency. This gloss which states that the hundredfold fruit
corresponds to martyrs takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any
reward is called a fruit, the hundredfold fruit thus denoting the
reward due to any perfect works whatever.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the aureole is an accidental reward
added to the essential reward, nevertheless not every accidental reward
is an aureole, but only that which is assigned to works of perfection,
whereby man is most conformed to Christ in the achievement of a perfect
victory. Hence it is not unfitting that another accidental reward,
which is called the fruit, be due sometimes to the withdrawal from a
carnal life.
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Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that a fruit is not due to the virtue of
continence alone. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:41, "One is the glory of the
sun," says that "the worth of those who have the hundredfold fruit is
compared to the glory of the sun; to the glory of the moon those who
have the sixtyfold fruit; and to the stars those who have the
thirtyfold fruit." Now this difference of glory, in the meaning of the
Apostle, regards any difference whatever of beatitude. Therefore the
various fruits should correspond to none but the virtue of continence.
Objection 2: Further, fruits are so called from fruition. But fruition
belongs to the essential reward which corresponds to all the virtues.
Therefore, etc.
Objection 3: Further, fruit is due to labor: "The fruit of good labors
is glorious" (Wis. 3:15). Now there is greater labor in fortitude than
in temperance or continence. Therefore fruit does not correspond to
continence alone.
Objection 4: Further, it is more difficult not to exceed the measure in
food which is necessary for life, than in sexual matters without which
life can be sustained: and thus the labor of frugality is greater than
that of continence. Therefore fruit corresponds to frugality rather
than to continence.
Objection 5: Further, fruit implies delight, and delight regards
especially the end. Since then the theological virtues have the end for
their object, namely God Himself, it would seem that to them especially
the fruit should correspond.
On the contrary, is the statement of the gloss on Mat. 13:23, "The one
a hundredfold," which assigns the fruits to virginity, widowhood, and
conjugal continence, which are parts of continence.
I answer that, A fruit is a reward due to a person in that he passes
from the carnal to the spiritual life. Consequently a fruit corresponds
especially to that virtue which more than any other frees man from
subjection to the flesh. Now this is the effect of continence, since it
is by sexual pleasures that the soul is especially subject to the
flesh; so much so that in the carnal act, according to Jerome (Ep. ad
Ageruch.), "not even the spirit of prophecy touches the heart of the
prophet," nor "is it possible to understand anything in the midst of
that pleasure," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11). Therefore
fruit corresponds to continence rather than to another virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss takes fruit in a broad sense,
according as any reward is called a fruit.
Reply to Objection 2: Fruition does not take its name from fruit by
reason of any comparison with fruit in the sense in which we speak of
it now, as evidenced by what has been said.
Reply to Objection 3: Fruit, as we speak of it now, corresponds to
labor not as resulting in fatigue, but as resulting in the production
of fruit. Hence a man calls his crops his labor, inasmuch as he labored
for them, or produced them by his labor. Now the comparison to fruit,
as produced from seed, is more adapted to continence than to fortitude,
because man is not subjected to the flesh by the passions of fortitude,
as he is by the passions with which continence is concerned.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the pleasures of the table are more
necessary than the pleasures of sex, they are not so strong: wherefore
the soul is not so much subjected to the flesh thereby.
Reply to Objection 5: Fruit is not taken here in the sense in which
fruition applies to delight in the end; but in another sense as stated
above (A[2] ). Hence the argument proves nothing.
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Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of
continence?
Objection 1: It would seem that three fruits are unfittingly assigned
to the three parts of continence: because twelve fruits of the Spirit
are assigned, "charity, joy, peace," etc. (Gal. 5:22). Therefore
seemingly we should reckon only three.
Objection 2: Further, fruit denotes a special reward. Now the reward
assigned to virgins, widows, and married persons is not a special
reward, because all who are to be saved are comprised under one of
these three, since no one is saved who lacks continence, and continence
is adequately divided by these three. Therefore three fruits are
unfittingly assigned to the three aforesaid.
Objection 3: Further, just as widowhood surpasses conjugal continence,
so does virginity surpass widowhood. But the excess of sixtyfold over
thirtyfold is not as the excess of a hundredfold over sixtyfold;
neither in arithmetical proportion, since sixty exceeds thirty by
thirty, and a hundred exceeds sixty by forty; nor in geometrical
proportion, since sixty is twice thirty and a hundred surpasses sixty
as containing the whole and two-thirds thereof. Therefore the fruits
are unfittingly adapted to the degrees of continence.
Objection 4: Further, the statements contained in Holy Writ stand for
all time: "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not
pass away" (Lk. 21:33): whereas human institutions are liable to change
every day. Therefore human institutions are not to be taken as a
criterion of the statements of Holy Writ: and it would seem in
consequence that the explanation of these fruits given by Bede is
unfitting. For he says (Expos. in Luc. iii, 8) that "the thirtyfold
fruit is assigned to married persons, because in the signs drawn on the
'abacus' the number 30 is denoted by the thumb and index finger
touching one another at the tips as though kissing one another: so that
the number 30 denotes the embraces of married persons. The number 60 is
denoted by the contact of the index finger above the middle joint of
the thumb, so that the index finger by lying over the thumb and
weighing on it, signifies the burden which widows have to bear in this
world. When, however, in the course of enumeration we come to the
number 100 we pass from the left to the right hand, so that the number
100 denotes virginity, which has a share in the angelic excellence; for
the angels are on the right hand, i.e. in glory, while we are on the
left on account of the imperfection of the present life."
I answer that, By continence, to which the fruit corresponds, man is
brought to a kind of spiritual nature, by withdrawing from carnal
things. Consequently various fruits are distinguished according to the
various manners of the spirituality resulting from continence. Now
there is a certain spirituality which is necessary, and one which is
superabundant. The spirituality that is necessary consists in the
rectitude of the spirit not being disturbed by the pleasures of the
flesh: and this obtains when one makes use of carnal pleasures
according to the order of right reason. This is the spirituality of
married persons. Spirituality is superabundant when a man withdraws
himself entirely from those carnal pleasures which stifle the spirit.
This may be done in two ways: either in respect of all time past,
present, and future, and this is the spirituality of virgins; or in
respect of a particular time, and this is the spirituality of widows.
Accordingly to those who keep conjugal continence, the thirtyfold fruit
is awarded; to those who keep the continence of widows, the sixtyfold
fruit; and to those who keep virginal continence, the hundredfold
fruit: and this for the reason given by Bede quoted above, although
another motive may be found in the very nature of the numbers. For 30
is the product of 3 multiplied by 10. Now 3 is the number of
everything, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo i, and contains a certain
perfection common to all, namely of beginning, middle, and end.
Wherefore the number 30 is fittingly assigned to married persons, in
whom no other perfection is added to the observance of the Decalogue,
signified by the number 10, than the common perfection without which
there is no salvation. The number six the multiplication of which by 10
amounts to 60 has perfection from its parts, being the aggregate of all
its parts taken together; wherefore it corresponds fittingly to
widowhood, wherein we find perfect withdrawal from carnal pleasures as
to all its circumstances (which are the parts so to speak of a virtuous
act), since widowhood uses no carnal pleasures in connection with any
person, place, or any other circumstance; which was not the case with
conjugal continence. The number 100 corresponds fittingly to virginity;
because the number 10 of which 100 is a multiple is the limit of
numbers: and in like manner virginity occupies the limit of
spirituality, since no further spirituality can be added to it. The
number 100 also being a square number has perfection from its figure:
for a square figure is prefect through being equal on all sides, since
all its sides are equal: wherefore it is adapted to virginity wherein
incorruption is found equally as to all times.
Reply to Objection 1: Fruit is not taken there in the sense in which we
are taking it now.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing obliges us to hold that fruit is a reward
that is not common to all who will be saved. For not only the essential
reward is common to all, but also a certain accidental reward, such as
joy in those works without which one cannot be saved. Yet it may be
said that the fruits are not becoming to all who will be saved, as is
evidently the case with those who repent in the end after leading an
incontinent life, for to such no fruit is due but only the essential
reward.
Reply to Objection 3: The distinction of the fruits is to be taken
according to the species and figures of the numbers rather than
according to their quantity. Nevertheless even if we regard the excess
in point of quantity, we may find an explanation. For the married man
abstains only from one that is not his, the widow from both hers and
not hers, so that in the latter case we find the notion of double, just
as 60 is the double of 30. Again 100 is 60 X 40, which latter number is
the product of 4 X 10, and the number 4 is the first solid and square
number. Thus the addition of this number is fitting to virginity, which
adds perpetual incorruption to the perfection of widowhood.
Reply to Objection 4: Although these numerical signs are a human
institution, they are founded somewhat on the nature of things, in so
far as the numbers are denoted in gradation, according to the order of
the aforesaid joints and contacts.
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Whether an aureole is due on account of virginity?
Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is not due on account of
virginity. For where there is greater difficulty in the work, a greater
reward is due. Now widows have greater difficulty than virgins in
abstaining from the works of the flesh. For Jerome says (Ep. ad
Ageruch.) that the greater difficulty certain persons experience in
abstaining from the allurements of pleasure, the greater their reward,
and he is speaking in praise of widows. Moreover, the Philosopher says
(De Anim. Hist. vii) that "young women who have been deflowered desire
sexual intercourse the more for the recollection of the pleasure."
Therefore the aureole which is the greatest reward is due to widows
more than to virgins.
Objection 2: Further, if an aureole were due to virginity, it would be
especially found where there is the most perfect virginity. Now the
most prefect virginity is in the Blessed Virgin, wherefore she is
called the Virgin of virgins: and yet no aureole is due to her because
she experienced no conflict in being continent, for she was not
infected with the corruption of the fomes [*Cf. [5144]TP, Q[27], A[3]].
Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.
Objection 3: Further, a special reward is not due to that which has not
been at all times praiseworthy. Now it would not have been praiseworthy
to observe virginity in the state of innocence, since then was it
commanded: "Increase and multiply and fill the earth" (Gn. 1:28): nor
again during the time of the Law, since the barren were accursed.
Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.
Objection 4: Further, the same reward is not due to virginity observed,
and virginity lost. Yet an aureole is sometimes due to lost virginity;
for instance if a maiden be violated unwillingly at the order of a
tyrant for confessing Christ. Therefore an aureole is not due to
virginity.
Objection 5: Further, a special reward is not due to that which is in
us by nature. But virginity is inborn in every man both good and
wicked. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.
Objection 6: Further, as widowhood is to the sixtyfold fruit, so is
virginity to the hundredfold fruit, and to the aureole. Now the
sixtyfold fruit is not due to every widow, but only, as some say, to
one who vows to remain a widow. Therefore it would seem that neither is
the aureole due to any kind of virginity, but only to that which is
observed by vow.
Objection 7: Further, reward is not given to that which is done of
necessity, since all merit depends on the will. But some are virgins of
necessity, such as those who are naturally cold-blooded, and eunuchs.
Therefore an aureole is not always due to virginity.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ex. 25:25: "Thou shalt also make a little
golden crown [coronam aureolam]" says: "This crown denotes the new hymn
which the virgins sing in the presence of the Lamb, those, to wit, who
follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth." Therefore the reward due to
virginity is called an aureole.
Further, It is written (Is. 56:4): "Thus saith the Lord to the
eunuchs": and the text continues (Is. 56: 5): "I will give to them . .
. a name better than sons and daughters": and a gloss [*St. Augustine,
De Virginit. xxv] says: "This refers to their peculiar and transcendent
glory." Now the eunuchs "who have made themselves eunuchs for the
kingdom of heaven" (Mat. 19:12) denote virgins. Therefore it would seem
that some special reward is due to virginity, and this is called the
aureole.
I answer that, Where there is a notable kind of victory, a special
crown is due. Wherefore since by virginity a person wins a signal
victory over the flesh, against which a continuous battle is waged:
"The flesh lusteth against the spirit," etc. (Gal. 5:17), a special
crown called the aureole is due to virginity. This indeed is the common
opinion of all; but all are not agreed as to the kind of virginity to
which it is due. For some say that the aureole is due to the act. So
that she who actually remains a virgin will have the aureole provided
she be of the number of the saved. But this would seem unreasonable,
because in this case those who have the will to marry and nevertheless
die before marrying would have the aureole. Hence others hold that the
aureole is due to the state and not to the act: so that those virgins
alone merit the aureole who by vow have placed themselves in the state
of observing perpetual virginity. But this also seems unreasonable,
because it is possible to have the same intention of observing
virginity without a vow as with a vow. Hence it may be said otherwise
that merit is due to every virtuous act commanded by charity. Now
virginity comes under the genus of virtue in so far as perpetual
incorruption of mind and body is an object of choice, as appears from
what has been said above (Sent. iv, D, 33, Q[3], AA[1],2) [*Cf. TP,
Q[152], AA[1],3]. Consequently the aureole is due to those virgins
alone, who had the purpose of observing perpetual virginity, whether or
no they have confirmed this purpose by vow---and this I say with
reference to the aureole in its proper signification of a reward due to
merit---although this purpose may at some time have been interrupted,
integrity of the flesh remaining withal, provided it be found at the
end of life, because virginity of the mind may be restored, although
virginity of the flesh cannot. If, however, we take the aureole in its
broad sense for any joy added to the essential joy of heaven, the
aureole will be applicable even to those who are incorrupt in flesh,
although they had not the purpose of observing perpetual virginity. For
without doubt they will rejoice in the incorruption of their body, even
as the innocent will rejoice in having been free from sin, although
they had no opportunity of sinning, as in the case of baptized
children. But this is not the proper meaning of an aureole, although it
is very commonly taken in this sense.
Reply to Objection 1: In some respects virgins experience a greater
conflict in remaining continent; and in other respects, widows, other
things being equal. For virgins are inflamed by concupiscence, and by
the desire of experience, which arises from a certain curiosity as it
were, which makes man more willing to see what he has never seen.
Sometimes, moreover, this concupiscence is increased by their esteeming
the pleasure to be greater than it is in reality, and by their failing
to consider the grievances attaching to this pleasure. In these
respects widows experience the lesser conflict, yet theirs is the
greater conflict by reason of their recollection of the pleasure.
Moreover, in different subjects one motive is stronger than another,
according to the various conditions and dispositions of the subject,
because some are more susceptible to one, and others to another.
However, whatever we may say of the degree of conflict, this is
certain---that the virgin's victory is more perfect than the widow's,
for the most perfect and most brilliant kind of victory is never to
have yielded to the foe: and the crown is due, not to the battle but to
the victory gained by the battle.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions about this. For some say
that the Blessed Virgin has not an aureole in reward of her virginity,
if we take aureole in the proper sense as referring to a conflict, but
that she has something more than an aureole, on account of her most
perfect purpose of observing virginity. Others say that she has an
aureole even in its proper signification, and that a most transcendent
one: for though she experienced no conflict, she had a certain conflict
of the flesh, but owing to the exceeding strength of her virtue, her
flesh was so subdued that she did not feel this conflict. This,
however, would seem to be said without reason, for since we believe the
Blessed Virgin to have been altogether immune from the inclination of
the fomes on account of the perfection of her sanctification, it is
wicked to suppose that there was in her any conflict with the flesh,
since such like conflict is only from the inclination of the fomes, nor
can temptation from the flesh be without sin, as declared by a gloss
[*St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei xix, 4] on 2 Cor. 12:7, "There was given
me a sting of my flesh." Hence we must say that she has an aureole
properly speaking, so as to be conformed in this to those other members
of the Church in whom virginity is found: and although she had no
conflict by reason of the temptation which is of the flesh, she had the
temptation which is of the enemy, who feared not even Christ (Mat. 4).
Reply to Objection 3: The aureole is not due to virginity except as
adding some excellence to the other degrees of continence. If Adam had
not sinned, virginity would have had no perfection over conjugal
continence, since in that case marriage would have been honorable, and
the marriage-bed unsullied, for it would not have been dishonored by
lust: hence virginity would not then have been observed, nor would an
aureole have been due to it. But the condition of human nature being
changed, virginity has a special beauty of its own, and consequently a
special reward is assigned to it.
During the time of the Mosaic law, when the worship of God was to be
continued by means of the carnal act, it was not altogether
praiseworthy to abstain from carnal intercourse: wherefore no special
reward would be given for such a purpose unless it came from a Divine
inspiration, as is believed to have been the case with Jeremias and
Elias, of whose marriage we do not read.
Reply to Objection 4: If a virgin is violated, she does not forfeit the
aureole, provided she retain unfailingly the purpose of observing
perpetual virginity, and nowise consent to the act. Nor does she
forfeit virginity thereby; and be this said, whether she be violated
for the faith, or for any other cause whatever. But if she suffer this
for the faith, this will count to her for merit, and will be a kind of
martyrdom: wherefore Lucy said: "If thou causest me to be violated
against my will, my chastity will receive a double crown" [*Office of
S. Lucy; lect. vi of Dominican Breviary, December 13th]; not that she
has two aureoles of virginity, but that she will receive a double
reward, one for observing virginity, the other for the outrage she has
suffered. Even supposing that one thus violated should conceive, she
would not for that reason forfeit her virginity: nor would she be equal
to Christ's mother, in whom there was integrity of the flesh together
with integrity of the mind [*Cf. [5145]SS, Q[64], A[3], ad 3; [5146]SS,
Q[124], A[4], ad 2; [5147]SS, Q[152], A[1]].
Reply to Objection 5: Virginity is inborn in us as to that which is
material in virginity: but the purpose of observing perpetual
incorruption, whence virginity derives its merit, is not inborn, but
comes from the gift of grace.
Reply to Objection 6: The sixtyfold fruit is due, not to every widow,
but only to those who retain the purpose of remaining widows, even
though they do not make it the matter of a vow, even as we have said in
regard to virginity.
Reply to Objection 7: If cold-blooded persons and eunuchs have the will
to observe perpetual incorruption even though they were capable of
sexual intercourse, they must be called virgins and merit the aureole:
for they make a virtue of necessity. If, on the other hand, they have
the will to marry if they could, they do not merit the aureole. Hence
Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. xxiv): "For those like eunuchs whose
bodies are so formed that they are unable to beget, it suffices when
they become Christians and keep the commandments of God, that they have
a mind to have a wife if they could, in order to rank with the faithful
who are married."
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Whether an aureole is due to martyrs?
Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is not due to martyrs. For
an aureole is a reward given for works of supererogation, wherefore
Bede commenting on Ex. 25:25, "Thou shalt also make another . . .
crown," says: "This may be rightly referred to the reward of those who
by freely choosing a more perfect life go beyond the general
commandments." But to die for confessing the faith is sometimes an
obligation, and not a work of supererogation as appears from the words
of Rom. 10:10, "With the heart, we believe unto justice, but with the
mouth confession is made unto salvation." Therefore an aureole is not
always due to martyrdom.
Objection 2: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. ix [*Cf. St.
Augustine, De Adult. Conjug. i, 14]) "the freer the service, the more
acceptable it is." Now martyrdom has a minimum of freedom, since it is
a punishment inflicted by another person with force. Therefore an
aureole is not due to martyrdom, since it is accorded to surpassing
merit.
Objection 3: Further, martyrdom consists not only in suffering death
externally, but also in the interior act of the will: wherefore Bernard
in a sermon on the Holy Innocents distinguishes three kinds of
martyr---in will and not in death, as John; in both will and death, as
Stephen; in death and not in will, as the Innocents. Accordingly if an
aureole were due to martyrdom, it would be due to voluntary rather than
external martyrdom, since merit proceeds from will. Yet such is not the
case. Therefore an aureole is not due to martyrdom.
Objection 4: Further, bodily suffering is less than mental, which
consists of internal sorrow and affliction of soul. But internal
suffering is also a kind of martyrdom: wherefore Jerome says in a
sermon on the Assumption [*Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch.]: "I should say
rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she
ended her days in peace, wherefore: Thine own soul a sword hath
pierced---namely for her Son's death." Since then no aureole
corresponds to interior sorrow, neither should one correspond to
outward suffering.
Objection 5: Further, penance itself is a kind of martyrdom, wherefore
Gregory says (Hom. iii in Evang.): "Although persecution has ceased to
offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its
martyrdom; since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the
sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the
spirit." But no aureole is due to penance which consists in external
works. Neither therefore is an aureole due to every external martyrdom.
Objection 6: Further, an aureole is not due to an unlawful work. Now it
is unlawful to lay hands on oneself, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei
i), and yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who laid hands
upon themselves in order to escape the fury of tyrants, as in the case
of certain women at Antioch (Eusebius, Eccles. Hist. viii, 24).
Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.
Objection 7: Further, it happens at times that a person is wounded for
the faith, and survives for some time. Now it is clear that such a one
is a martyr, and yet seemingly an aureole is not due to him, since his
conflict did not last until death. Therefore an aureole is not always
due to martyrdom.
Objection 8: Further, some suffer more from the loss of temporal goods
than from the affliction even of their own body and this is shown by
their bearing many afflictions for the sake of gain. Therefore if they
be despoiled of their temporal goods for Christ's sake they would seem
to be martyrs, and yet an aureole is not apparently due to them.
Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.
Objection 9: Further, a martyr would seem to be no other than one who
dies for the faith, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. vii): "They are
called martyrs in Greek, witnesses in Latin: because they suffered in
order to bear witness to Christ, and strove unto death for the truth."
Now there are virtues more excellent than faith, such as justice,
charity, and so forth, since these cannot be without grace, and yet no
aureole is due to them. Therefore seemingly neither is an aureole due
to martyrdom.
Objection 10: Further, even as the truth of faith is from God, so is
all other truth, as Ambrose [*Spurious work on 1 Cor. 12:3: "No man can
say," etc.] declares, since "every truth by whomsoever uttered is from
the Holy Ghost." Therefore if an aureole is due to one who suffers
death for the truth of faith, in like manner it is also due to those
who suffer death for any other virtue: and yet apparently this is not
the case.
Objection 11: Further, the common good is greater than the good of the
individual. Now if a man die in a just war in order to save his
country, an aureole is not due to him. Therefore even though he be put
to death in order to keep the faith that is in himself, no aureole is
due to him: and consequently the same conclusion follows as above.
Objection 12: Further, all merit proceeds from the free will. Yet the
Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who had not the use of the free
will. Therefore they did not merit an aureole: and consequently an
aureole is not due to all martyrs.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. xlvi): "No one,
methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom." Now an aureole is
due to virginity, and consequently also to martyrdom.
Further, the crown is due to one who has striven. But in martyrdom the
strife presents a special difficulty. Therefore a special aureole is
due thereto.
I answer that, Just as in the spirit there is a conflict with the
internal concupiscences, so is there in man a conflict with the passion
that is inflicted from without. Wherefore, just as a special crown,
which we call an aureole, is due to the most perfect victory whereby we
triumph over the concupiscences of the flesh, in a word to virginity,
so too an aureole is due to the most perfect victory that is won
against external assaults. Now the most perfect victory over passion
caused from without is considered from two points of view. First from
the greatness of the passion. Now among all passions inflicted from
without, death holds the first place, just as sexual concupiscences are
chief among internal passions. Consequently, when a man conquers death
and things directed to death, his is a most perfect victory. Secondly,
the perfection of victory is considered from the point of view of the
motive of conflict, when, to wit, a man strives for the most honorable
cause; which is Christ Himself. Both these things are to be found in
martyrdom, which is death suffered for Christ's sake: for "it is not
the pain but the cause that makes the martyr," as Augustine says
(Contra Crescon. iii). Consequently an aureole is due to martyrdom as
well as to virginity.
Reply to Objection 1: To suffer death for Christ's sake, is absolutely
speaking, a work of supererogation; since every one is not bound to
confess his faith in the face of a persecutor: yet in certain cases it
is necessary for salvation, when, to wit, a person is seized by a
persecutor and interrogated as to his faith which he is then bound to
confess. Nor does it follow that he does not merit an aureole. For an
aureole is due to a work of supererogation, not as such, but as having
a certain perfection. Wherefore so long as this perfection remains,
even though the supererogation cease, one merits the aureole.
Reply to Objection 2: A reward is due to martyrdom, not in respect of
the exterior infliction, but because it is suffered voluntarily: since
we merit only through that which is in us. And the more that which one
suffers voluntarily is difficult and naturally repugnant to the will
the more is the will that suffers it for Christ's sake shown to be
firmly established in Christ, and consequently a higher reward is due
to him.
Reply to Objection 3: There are certain acts which, in their very
selves, contain intense pleasure or difficulty: and in such the act
always adds to the character of merit or demerit, for as much as in the
performance of the act the will, on account of the aforesaid intensity,
must needs undergo an alteration from the state in which it was before.
Consequently, other things being equal, one who performs an act of lust
sins more than one who merely consents in the act, because in the very
act the will is increased. In like manner since in the act of suffering
martyrdom there is a very great difficulty, the will to suffer
martyrdom does not reach the degree of merit due to actual martyrdom by
reason of its difficulty: although, indeed it may possibly attain to a
higher reward, if we consider the root of merit since the will of one
man to suffer martyrdom may possibly proceed from a greater charity
than another man's act of martyrdom. Hence one who is willing to be a
martyr may by his will merit an essential reward equal to or greater
than that which is due to an actual martyr. But the aureole is due to
the difficulty inherent to the conflict itself of martyrdom: wherefore
it is not due to those who are martyrs only in will.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as pleasures of touch, which are the matter
of temperance, hold the chief place among all pleasures both internal
and external, so pains of touch surpass all other pains. Consequently
an aureole is due to the difficulty of suffering pains of touch, for
instance, from blows and so forth, rather than to the difficulty of
bearing internal sufferings, by reason of which, however, one is not
properly called a martyr, except by a kind of comparison. It is in this
sense that Jerome speaks.
Reply to Objection 5: The sufferings of penance are not a martyrdom
properly speaking, because they do not consist in things directed to
the causing of death, since they are directed merely to the taming of
the flesh: and if any one go beyond this measure, such afflictions will
be deserving of blame. However such afflictions are spoken of as a
martyrdom by a kind of comparison. and they surpass the sufferings of
martyrdom in duration but not in intensity.
Reply to Objection 6: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i) it is
lawful to no one to lay hands on himself for any reason whatever;
unless perchance it be done by Divine instinct as an example of
fortitude that others may despise death. Those to whom the objection
refers are believed to have brought death on themselves by Divine
instinct, and for this reason the Church celebrates their martyrdom
[*Cf. [5148]SS, Q[64], A[5]].
Reply to Objection 7: If any one receive a mortal wound for the faith
and survive, without doubt he merits the aureole: as instanced in
blessed Cecilia who survived for three days, and many martyrs who died
in prison. But, even if the wound he receives be not mortal, yet be the
occasion of his dying, he is believed to merit the aureole: although
some say that he does not merit the aureole if he happen to die through
his own carelessness or neglect. For this neglect would not have
occasioned his death, except on the supposition of the wound which he
received for the faith: and consequently this wound previously received
for the faith is the original occasion of his death, so that he would
not seem to lose. the aureole for that reason, unless his neglect were
such as to involve a mortal sin, which would deprive him of both aurea
and aureole. If, however, by some chance or other he were not to die of
the mortal wound received, or again if the wounds received were not
mortal, and he were to die while in prison, he would still merit the
aureole. Hence the martyrdom of some saints is celebrated in the Church
for that they died in prison, having been wounded long before, as in
the case of Pope Marcellus. Accordingly in whatever way suffering for
Christ's sake be continued unto death, whether death ensue or not, a
man becomes a martyr and merits the aureole. If, however, it be not
continued unto death, this is not a reason for calling a person a
martyr, as in the case of the blessed Sylvester, whose feast the Church
does not solemnize as a martyr's, since he ended his days in peace,
although previously he had undergone certain sufferings.
Reply to Objection 8: Even as temperance is not about pleasures of
money, honors, and the like, but only about pleasures of touch as being
the principal of all, so fortitude is about dangers of death as being
the greatest of all (Ethic. iii, 6). Consequently the aureole is due to
such injuries only as are inflicted on a person's own body and are of a
nature to cause death. Accordingly whether a person lose his
temporalities, or his good name, or anything else of the kind, for
Christ's sake, he does not for that reason become a martyr, nor merit
the aureole. Nor is it possible to love ordinately external things more
than one's body; and inordinate love does not help one to merit an
aureole: nor again can sorrow for the loss of corporeal things be equal
to the sorrow for the slaying of the body and other like things [*Cf.
[5149]SS, Q[124], A[5]].
Reply to Objection 9: The sufficient motive for martyrdom is not only
confession of the faith, but any other virtue, not civic but infused,
that has Christ for its end. For one becomes a witness of Christ by any
virtuous act, inasmuch as the works which Christ perfects in us bear
witness to His goodness. Hence some virgins were slain for virginity
which they desired to keep, for instance blessed Agnes and others whose
martyrdom is celebrated by the Church.
Reply to Objection 10: The truth of faith has Christ for end and
object; and therefore the confession thereof, if suffering be added
thereto, merits an aureole, not only on the part of the end but also on
the part of the matter. But the confession of any other truth is not a
sufficient motive for martyrdom by reason of its matter, but only on
the part of the end; for instance if a person were willing to be slain
for Christ's sake rather than sin against Him by telling any lie
whatever.
Reply to Objection 11: The uncreated good surpasses all created good.
Hence any created end, whether it be the common or a private good,
cannot confer so great a goodness on an act as can the uncreated end,
when, to wit, an act is done for God's sake. Hence when a person dies
for the common good without referring it to Christ, he will not merit
the aureole; but if he refer it to Christ he will merit the aureole and
he will be a martyr; for instance, if he defend his country from the
attack of an enemy who designs to corrupt the faith of Christ, and
suffer death in that defense.
Reply to Objection 12: Some say that the use of reason was by the
Divine power accelerated in the Innocents slain for Christ's sake, even
as in John the Baptist while yet in his mother's womb: and in that case
they were truly martyrs in both act and will, and have the aureole.
others say, however, that they were martyrs in act only and not in
will: and this seems to be the opinion of Bernard, who distinguishes
three kinds of martyrs, as stated above (OBJ 3). In this case the
Innocents, even as they do not fulfill all the conditions of martyrdom,
and yet are martyrs in a sense, in that they died for Christ, so too
they have the aureole, not in all its perfection, but by a kind of
participation, in so far as they rejoice in having. been slain in
Christ's service; thus it was stated above [5150](A[5]) in reference to
baptized children, that they will have a certain joy in their innocence
and carnal integrity [*Cf. [5151]SS, Q[124], A[1], ad 1, where St.
Thomas declares that the Holy Innocents were truly martyrs.]
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Whether an aureole is due to doctors?
Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is not due to doctors. For
every reward to be had in the life to come will correspond to some act
of virtue. But preaching or teaching is not the act of a virtue.
Therefore an aureole is not due to teaching or preaching.
Objection 2: Further, teaching and preaching are the result of studying
and being taught. Now the things that are rewarded in the future life
are not acquired by a man's study, since we merit not by our natural
and acquired gifts. Therefore no aureole will be merited in the future
life for teaching and preaching.
Objection 3: Further, exaltation in the life to come corresponds to
humiliation in the present life, because "he that humbleth himself
shall be exalted" (Mat. 23:12). But there is no humiliation in teaching
and preaching, in fact they are occasions of pride; for a gloss on Mat.
4:5, "Then the devil took Him up," says that "the devil deceives many
who are puffed up with the honor of the master's chair." Therefore it
would seem that an aureole is not due to preaching and teaching.
On the contrary, A gloss on Eph. 1:18,19, "That you may know . . . what
is the exceeding greatness," etc. says: "The holy doctors will have an
increase of glory above that which all have in common." Therefore, etc.
Further, a gloss on Canticle of Canticles 8:12, "My vineyard is before
me," says: "He describes the peculiar reward which He has prepared for
His doctors." Therefore doctors will have a peculiar reward: and we
call this an aureole.
I answer that, Just as by virginity and martyrdom a person wins a most
perfect victory over the flesh and the world, so is a most perfect
victory gained over the devil, when a person not only refuses to yield
to the devil's assaults, but also drives him out, not from himself
alone, but from others also. Now this is done by preaching and
teaching: wherefore an aureole is due to preaching and teaching, even
as to virginity and martyrdom. Nor can we admit, as some affirm, that
it is due to prelates only, who are competent to preach and teach by
virtue of their office. but it is due to all whosoever exercise this
act lawfully. Nor is it due to prelates, although they have the office
of preaching, unless they actually preach, since a crown is due not to
the habit, but to the actual strife, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, "He . . .
shall not be [Vulg.: 'is not'] crowned, except he strive lawfully."
Reply to Objection 1: Preaching and teaching are acts of a virtue,
namely mercy, wherefore they are reckoned among the spiritual alms
deeds [*Cf. [5152]SS, Q[32], A[2]].
Reply to Objection 2: Although ability to preach and teach is sometimes
the outcome of study, the practice of teaching comes from the will,
which is informed with charity infused by God: and thus its act can be
meritorious.
Reply to Objection 3: Exaltation in this life does not lessen the
reward of the other life, except for him who seeks his own glory from
that exaltation: whereas he who turns that exaltation to the profit of
others acquires thereby a reward for himself. Still, when it is stated
that an aureole is due to teaching, this is to be understood of the
teaching of things pertaining to salvation, by which teaching the devil
is expelled from men's hearts, as by a kind of spiritual weapon, of
which it is said (2 Cor. 10:4): "The weapons of our warfare are not
carnal but spiritual" [Vulg.: 'but mighty to God'].
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Whether an aureole is due to Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is due to Christ. For an
aureole is due to virginity, martyrdom, and teaching. Now these three
were pre-eminently in Christ. Therefore an aureole is especially due to
Him.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is most perfect in human things must ne
especially ascribed to Christ. Now an aureole is due as the reward of
most excellent merits. Therefore it is also due to Christ.
Objection 3: Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.) that "virginity
bears a likeness to God." Therefore the exemplar of virginity is in
God. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is due to Christ even as
God.
On the contrary, An aureole is described as "joy in being conformed to
Christ." Now no one is conformed or likened to himself, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph., lib. ix, 3). Therefore an aureole is not due
to Christ.
Further, Christ's reward was never increased. Now Christ had no aureole
from the moment of His conception, since then He had never fought.
Therefore He never had an aureole afterwards.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that
Christ has an aureole in its strict sense, seeing that in Him there is
both conflict and victory, and consequently a crown in its proper
acceptation. But if we consider the question carefully, although the
notion of aurea or crown is becoming to Christ, the notion of aureole
is not. For from the very fact that aureole is a diminutive term it
follows that it denotes something possessed by participation and not in
its fulness. Wherefore an aureole is becoming to those who participate
in the perfect victory by imitating Him in Whom the fulness of perfect
victory is realized. And therefore, since in Christ the notion of
victory is found chiefly and fully, for by His victory others are made
victors---as shown by the words of Jn. 16:33, "Have confidence, I have
overcome the world," and Apoc. 5:5, "Behold the lion of the tribe of
Juda . . . hath prevailed"---it is not becoming for Christ to have an
aureole, but to have something from which all aureoles are derived.
Hence it is written (Apoc. 3:21): "To him that shall overcome, I will
give to sit with Me in My throne, as I also have overcome, and am set
down in My Father's throne [Vulg.: 'With My Father in His throne']."
Therefore we must say with others that although there is nothing of the
nature of an aureole in Christ, there is nevertheless something more
excellent than any aureole.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ was most truly virgin, martyr, and doctor;
yet the corresponding accidental reward in Christ is a negligible
quantity in comparison with the greatness of His essential reward.
Hence He has not an aureole in its proper sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the aureole is due to a most perfect
work, yet with regard to us, so far as it is a diminutive term, it
denotes the participation of a perfection derived from one in whom that
perfection is found in its fulness. Accordingly it implies a certain
inferiority, and thus it is not found in Christ in Whom is the fulness
of every perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in some way virginity has its exemplar
in God, that exemplar is not homogeneous. For the incorruption of God,
which virginity imitates is not in God in the same way as in a virgin.
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Whether an aureole is due to the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is due to the angels. For
Jerome (Serm. de Assump. [*Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch. ix]) speaking of
virginity says: "To live without the flesh while living in the flesh is
to live as an angel rather than as a man": and a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:26,
"For the present necessity," says that "virginity is the portion of the
angels." Since then an aureole corresponds to virginity, it would seem
due to the angels.
Objection 2: Further, incorruption of the spirit is more excellent than
incorruption of the flesh. Now there is incorruption of spirit in the
angels, since they never sinned. Therefore an aureole is due to them
rather than to men incorrupt in the flesh and who have sinned at some
time.
Objection 3: Further, an aureole is due to teaching. Now angels teach
us by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting [*Cf. [5153]FP, Q[111],
A[1]] us, as Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi). Therefore at least the
aureole of doctors is due to them.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . shall not be
[Vulg.: 'is not'] crowned, except he strive lawfully." But there is no
conflict in the angels. Therefore an aureole is not due to them.
Further, an aureole is not due to an act that is not performed through
the body: wherefore it is not due to lovers of virginity, martyrdom or
teaching, if they do not practice them outwardly. But angels are
incorporeal spirits. Therefore they have no aureole.
I answer that, An aureole is not due to the angels. The reason of this
is that an aureole, properly speaking, corresponds to some perfection
of surpassing merit. Now those things which make for perfect merit in
man are connatural to angels, or belong to their state in general, or
to their essential reward. Wherefore the angels have not an aureole in
the same sense as an aureole is due to men.
Reply to Objection 1: Virginity is said to be an angelic life, in so
far as virgins imitate by grace what angels have by nature. For it is
not owing to a virtue that angels abstain altogether from pleasures of
the flesh, since they are incapable of such pleasures.
Reply to Objection 2: Perpetual incorruption of the spirit in the
angels merits their essential reward: because it is necessary for their
salvation, since in them recovery is impossible after they have fallen
[*Cf. [5154]FP, Q[64], A[2]].
Reply to Objection 3: The acts whereby the angels teach us belong to
their glory and their common state: wherefore they do not merit an
aureole thereby.
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Whether an aureole is also due to the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is also due to the body. For
the essential reward is greater than the accidental. But the dowries
which belong to the essential reward are not only in the soul but also
in the body. Therefore there is also an aureole which pertains to the
accidental reward.
Objection 2: Further, punishment in soul and body corresponds to sin
committed through the body. Therefore a reward both in soul and in body
is due to merit gained through the body. But the aureole is merited
through works of the body. Therefore an aureole is also due to the
body.
Objection 3: Further, a certain fulness of virtue will shine forth in
the bodies of martyrs, and will be seen in their bodily scars:
wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): "We feel an undescribable
love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the
scars of the wounds in their bodies, which they bore for Christ's name.
Perchance indeed we shall see them, for this will not make them less
comely, but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a
beauty, though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue."
Therefore it would seem that the martyr's aureole is also in his body;
and in like manner the aureoles of others.
On the contrary, The souls now in heaven have aureoles; and yet they
have no body. Therefore the proper subject of an aureole is the soul
and not the body.
Further, all merit is from the soul. Therefore the whole reward should
be in the soul.
I answer that, Properly speaking the aureole is in the mind: since it
is joy in the works to which an aureole is due. But even as from the
joy in the essential reward, which is the aurea, there results a
certain comeliness in the body, which is the glory of the body, so from
the joy in the aureole there results a certain bodily comeliness: so
that the aureole is chiefly in the mind, but by a kind of overflow it
shines forth in the body.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. It must be observed,
however, that the beauty of the scars which will appear in the bodies
of the martyrs cannot be called an aureole, since some of the martyrs
will have an aureole in which such scars will not appear, for instance
those who were put to death by drowning, starvation, or the squalor of
prison.
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Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned, those of virgins, of martyrs
,
and of doctors?
Objection 1: It would seem that the three aureoles of virgins, martyrs,
and doctors are unfittingly assigned. For the aureole of martyrs
corresponds to their virtue of fortitude, the aureole of virgins to the
virtue of temperance, and the aureole of doctors to the virtue of
prudence. Therefore it seems that there should be a fourth aureole
corresponding to the virtue of justice.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ex. 25:25: "A polished crown, etc.
says that a golden [aurea] crown is added, when the Gospel promises
eternal life to those who keep the commandments: 'If thou wilt enter
into life, keep the commandments' (Mat. 19:17). To this is added the
little golden crown [aureola] when it is said: 'If thou wilt be
perfect, go and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor'" (Mat.
19:21). Therefore an aureole is due to poverty.
Objection 3: Further, a man subjects himself wholly to God by the vow
of obedience: wherefore the greatest perfection consists in the vow of
obedience. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is due thereto.
Objection 4: Further, there are also many other works of supererogation
in which one will rejoice in the life to come. Therefore there are many
aureoles besides the aforesaid three.
Objection 5: Further, just as a man spreads the faith by preaching and
teaching, so does he by publishing written works. Therefore a fourth
aureole is due to those who do this.
I answer that, An aureole is an exceptional reward corresponding to an
exceptional victory: wherefore the three aureoles are assigned in
accordance with the exceptional victories in the three conflicts which
beset every man. For in the conflict with the flesh, he above all wins
the victory who abstains altogether from sexual pleasures which are the
chief of this kind; and such is a virgin. Wherefore an aureole is due
to virginity. In the conflict with the world, the chief victory is to
suffer the world's persecution even until death: wherefore the second
aureole is due to martyrs who win the victory in this battle. In the
conflict with the devil, the chief victory is to expel the enemy not
only from oneself but also from the hearts of others: this is done by
teaching and preaching, and consequently the third aureole is due to
doctors and preachers.
Some, however, distinguish the three aureoles in accordance with the
three powers of the soul, by saying that the three aureoles correspond
to the three chief acts of the soul's three highest powers. For the act
of the rational power is to publish the truth of faith even to others,
and to this act the aureole of doctors is due: the highest act of the
irascible power is to overcome even death for Christ's sake, and to
this act the aureole of martyrs is due: and the highest act of the
concupiscible power is to abstain altogether from the greatest carnal
pleasures, and to this act the aureole of virgins is due.
Others again, distinguish the three aureoles in accordance with those
things whereby we are most signally conformed to Christ. For He was the
mediator between the Father and the world. Hence He was a doctor, by
manifesting to the world the truth which He had received from the
Father; He was a martyr, by suffering the persecution of the world; and
He was a virgin, by His personal purity. Wherefore doctors, martyrs and
virgins are most perfectly conformed to Him: and for this reason an
aureole is due to them.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no conflict to be observed in the act of
justice as in the acts of the other virtues. Nor is it true that to
teach is an act of prudence: in fact rather is it an act of charity or
mercy---inasmuch as it is by such like habits that we are inclined to
the practice of such an act---or again of wisdom, as directing it.
We may also reply, with others, that justice embraces all the virtues,
wherefore a special aureole is not due to it.
Reply to Objection 2: Although poverty is a work of perfection, it does
not take the highest place in a spiritual conflict, because the love of
temporalities assails a man less than carnal concupiscence or
persecution whereby his own body is broken. Hence an aureole is not due
to poverty; but judicial power by reason of the humiliation consequent
upon poverty. The gloss quoted takes aureole in the broad sense for any
reward given for excellent merit.
We reply in the same way to the Third and Fourth Objections.
Reply to Objection 5: An aureole is due to those who commit the sacred
doctrine to writing: but it is not distinct from the aureole of
doctors, since the compiling of writing is a way of teaching.
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Whether the virgin's aureole is the greatest of all?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virgin's aureole is the greatest of
all. For it is said of virgins (Apoc. 14:4) that they "follow the Lamb
whithersoever He goeth," and (Apoc. 14:3) that "no" other "man could
say the canticle" which the virgins sang. Therefore virgins have the
most excellent aureole.
Objection 2: Further, Cyprian (De Habit. Virg.) says of virgins that
they are "the more illustrious portion of Christ's flock." Therefore
the greater aureole is due to them.
Objection 3: Again, it would seem that the martyr's aureole is the
greatest. For Aymo, commenting on Apoc. 14:3, "No man could say the
hymn," says that "virgins do not all take precedence of married folk;
but only those who in addition to the observance of virginity are by
the tortures of their passion on a par with married persons who have
suffered martyrdom." Therefore martyrdom gives virginity its precedence
over other states: and consequently a greater aureole is due to
virginity.
Objection 4: Again, it would seem that the greatest aureole is due to
doctors. Because the Church militant is modelled after the Church
triumphant. Now in the Church militant the greatest honor is due to
doctors (1 Tim. 5:17): "Let the priests that rule well be esteemed
worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and
doctrine." Therefore a greater aureole is due to them in the Church
triumphant.
I answer that, Precedence of one aureole over another may be considered
from two standpoints. First, from the point of view of the conflicts,
that aureole being considered greater which is due to the more
strenuous battle. Looking at it thus the martyr's aureole takes
precedence of the others in one way, and the virgin's in another. For
the martyr's battle is more strenuous in itself, and more intensely
painful; while the conflict with the flesh is fraught with greater
danger, inasmuch as it is more lasting and threatens us at closer
quarters. Secondly, from the point of view of the things about which
the battle is fought: and thus the doctor's aureole takes precedence of
all others, since this conflict is about intelligible goods. while the
other conflicts are about sensible passions. Nevertheless, the
precedence that is considered in view of the conflict is more essential
to the aureole; since the aureole, according to its proper character,
regards the victory and the battle, and the difficulty of fighting
which is viewed from the standpoint of the battle is of greater
importance than that which is considered from our standpoint through
the conflict being at closer quarters. Therefore the martyr's aureole
is simply the greatest of all: for which reason a gloss on Mat. 5:10,
says that "all the other beatitudes are perfected in the eighth, which
refers to the martyrs," namely, "Blessed are they that suffer
persecution." For this reason, too, the Church in enumerating the
saints together places the martyrs before the doctors and virgins. Yet
nothing hinders the other aureoles from being more excellent in some
particular way. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether one person has an aureole more excellently than another person?
Objection 1: It would seem that one person has not the aureole either
of virginity, or of martyrdom, or of doctrine more perfectly than
another person. For things which have reached their term are not
subject to intension or remission. Now the aureole is due to works
which have reached their term of perfection. Therefore an aureole is
not subject to intension or remission.
Objection 2: Further, virginity is not subject to being more or less,
since it denotes a kind of privation; and privations are not subject to
intension or remission. Therefore neither does the reward of virginity,
the virgin's aureole to wit, receive intension or remission.
On the contrary, The aureole is added to the aurea. But the aurea is
more intense in one than in another. Therefore the aureole is also.
I answer that, Since merit is somewhat the cause of reward, rewards
must needs be diversified, according as merits are diversified: for the
intension or remission of a thing follows from the intension or
remission of its cause. Now the merit of the aureole may be greater or
lesser: wherefore the aureole may also be greater or lesser.
We must observe, however, that the merit of an aureole may be
intensified in two ways: first, on the part of its cause, secondly on
the part of the work. For there may happen to be two persons, one of
whom, out of lesser charity, suffers greater torments of martyrdom, or
is more constant in preaching, or again withdraws himself more from
carnal pleasures. Accordingly, intension not of the aureole but of the
aurea corresponds to the intension of merit derived from its root;
while intension of the aureole corresponds to intension of merit
derived from the kind of act. Consequently it is possible for one who
merits less in martyrdom as to his essential reward, to receive a
greater aureole for his martyrdom.
Reply to Objection 1: The merits to which an aureole is due do not
reach the term of their perfection simply, but according to their
species: even as fire is specifically the most subtle of bodies. Hence
nothing hinders one aureole being more excellent than another, even as
one fire is more subtle than another.
Reply to Objection 2: The virginity of one may be greater than the
virginity of another, by reason of a greater withdrawal from that which
is contrary to virginity: so that virginity is stated to be greater in
one who avoids more the occasions of corruption. For in this way
privations may increase, as when a man is said to be more blind, if he
be removed further from the possession of sight.
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OF THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED (SEVEN ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider those things that concern the damned
after the judgment: (1) The punishment of the damned, and the fire by
which their bodies will be tormented; (2) matters relating to their
will and intellect; (3) God's justice and mercy in regard to the
damned.
Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in hell the damned are tormented with the sole punishment
of fire?
(2) Whether the worm by which they are tormented is corporeal?
(3) Whether their weeping is corporeal?
(4) Whether their darkness is material?
(5) Whether the fire whereby they are tormented is corporeal?
(6) Whether it is of the same species as our fire?
(7) Whether this fire is beneath the earth?
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Whether in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire?
Objection 1: It would seem that in hell the damned are tormented by the
sole punishment of fire; because Mat. 25:41, where their condemnation
is declared, mention is made of fire only, in the words: "Depart from
Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire."
Objection 2: Further, even as the punishment of purgatory is due to
venial sin, so is the punishment of hell due to mortal sin. Now no
other punishment but that of fire is stated to be in purgatory, as
appears from the words of 1 Cor. 3:13: "The fire shall try every man's
work, of what sort it is." Therefore neither in hell will there be a
punishment other than of fire.
Objection 3: Further, variety of punishment affords a respite, as when
one passes from heat to cold. But we can admit no respite in the
damned. Therefore there will not be various punishments, but that of
fire alone.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 10:7): "Fire and brimstone and
storms of winds shall be the portion of their cup."
Further, it is written (Job 24:19): "Let him pass from the snow waters
to excessive heat."
I answer that, According to Basil (Homilia vi in Hexaemeron and Hom. i
in Ps. 38), at the final cleansing of the world, there will be a
separation of the elements, whatever is pure and noble remaining above
for the glory of the blessed, and whatever is ignoble and sordid being
cast down for the punishment of the damned: so that just as every
creature will be to the blessed a matter of joy, so will all the
elements conduce to the torture of the damned, according to Wis. 5:21,
"the whole world will fight with Him against the unwise." This is also
becoming to Divine justice, that whereas they departed from one by sin,
and placed their end in material things which are many and various, so
should they be tormented in many ways and from many sources.
Reply to Objection 2: It is because fire is most painful, through its
abundance of active force, that the name of fire is given to any
torment if it be intense.
Reply to Objection 2: The punishment of purgatory is not intended
chiefly to torment but to cleanse: wherefore it should be inflicted by
fire alone which is above all possessed of cleansing power. But the
punishment of the damned is not directed to their cleansing.
Consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: The damned will pass from the most intense heat
to the most intense cold without this giving them any respite: because
they will suffer from external agencies, not by the transmutation of
their body from its original natural disposition, and the contrary
passion affording a respite by restoring an equable or moderate
temperature, as happens now, but by a spiritual action, in the same way
as sensible objects act on the senses being perceived by impressing the
organ with their forms according to their spiritual and not their
material being.
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Whether the worm of the damned is corporeal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the worm by which the damned are
tormented is corporeal. Because flesh cannot be tormented by a
spiritual worm. Now the flesh of the damned will be tormented by a
worm: "He will give fire and worms into their flesh" (Judith 16:21),
and: "The vengeance on the flesh of the ungodly is fire and worms"
(Ecclus. 7:19). Therefore that worm will be corporeal.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 9): . . . "Both,
namely fire and worm, will be the punishment of the body." Therefore,
etc.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 22): "The unquenchable
fire and the restless worm in the punishment of the damned are
explained in various ways by different persons. Some refer both to the
body, some, both to the soul: others refer the fire, in the literal
sense, to the body, the worm to the soul metaphorically: and this seems
the more probable."
I answer that, After the day of judgment, no animal or mixed body will
remain in the renewed world except only the body of man, because the
former are not directed to incorruption [*Cf.[5155] Q[91], A[5]], nor
after that time will there be generation or corruption. Consequently
the worm ascribed to the damned must be understood to be not of a
corporeal but of a spiritual nature: and this is the remorse of
conscience, which is called a worm because it originates from the
corruption of sin, and torments the soul, as a corporeal worm born of
corruption torments by gnawing.
Reply to Objection 1: The very souls of the damned are called their
flesh for as much as they were subject to the flesh. Or we may reply
that the flesh will be tormented by the spiritual worm, according as
the afflictions of the soul overflow into the body, both here and
hereafter.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks by way of comparison. For he
does not wish to assert absolutely that this worm is material, but that
it is better to say that both are to be understood materially, than
that both should be understood only in a spiritual sense: for then the
damned would suffer no bodily pain. This is clear to anyone that
examines the context of his words in this passage.
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Whether the weeping of the damned will be corporeal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the weeping of the damned will be
corporeal. For a gloss on Lk. 13:28, "There will be weeping," says that
"the weeping with which our Lord threatens the wicked is a proof of the
resurrection of the body." But this would not be the case if that
weeping were merely spiritual. Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, the pain of the punishment corresponds to the
pleasure of the sin, according to Apoc. 18:7: "As much as she hath
glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow
give ye to her." Now sinners had internal and external pleasure in
their sin. Therefore they will also have external weeping.
On the contrary, Corporeal weeping results from dissolving into tears.
Now there cannot be a continual dissolution from the bodies of the
damned, since nothing is restored to them by food; for everything
finite is consumed if something be continually taken from it. Therefore
the weeping of the damned will not be corporeal.
I answer that, Two things are to be observed in corporeal weeping. One
is the resolution of tears: and as to this corporeal weeping cannot be
in the damned, since after the day of judgment, the movement of the
first movable being being at an end, there will be neither generation,
nor corruption, nor bodily alteration: and in the resolution of tears
that humor needs to be generated which is shed forth in the shape of
tears. Wherefore in this respect it will be impossible for corporeal
weeping to be in the damned. The other thing to be observed in
corporeal weeping is a certain commotion and disturbance of the head
and eyes, and in this respect weeping will be possible in the damned
after the resurrection: for the bodies of the damned will be tormented
not only from without, but also from within, according as the body is
affected at the instance of the soul's passion towards good or evil. In
this sense weeping is a proof of the body's resurrection, and
corresponds to the pleasure of sin, experienced by both soul and body.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether the damned are in material darkness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned are not in material
darkness. For commenting on Job 10:22, "But everlasting horror
dwelleth," Gregory says (Moral. ix): "Although that fire will give no
light for comfort, yet, that it may torment the more it does give light
for a purpose, for by the light of its flame the wicked will see their
followers whom they have drawn thither from the world." Therefore the
darkness there is not material.
Objection 2: Further, the damned see their own punishment, for this
increases their punishment. But nothing is seen without light.
Therefore there is no material darkness there.
Objection 3: Further, there the damned will have the power of sight
after being reunited to their bodies. But this power would be useless
to them unless they see something. Therefore, since nothing is seen
unless it be in the light, it would seem that they are not in absolute
darkness.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:13): "Bind his hands and his
feet, and cast him into the exterior darkness." Commenting on these
words Gregory says (Moral. ix): If this fire gave any light, "he would
by no means be described as cast into exterior darkness."
Further, Basil says (Hom. i in Ps. 28:7, "The voice of the Lord
divideth the flame of fire") that "by God's might the brightness of the
fire will be separated from its power of burning, so that its
brightness will conduce to the joy of the blessed, and the heat of the
flame to the torment of the damned." Therefore the damned will be in
material darkness.
Other points relating to the punishment of the damned have been decided
above ([5156]Q[86]).
I answer that, The disposition of hell will be such as to be adapted to
the utmost unhappiness of the damned. Wherefore accordingly both light
and darkness are there, in so far as they are most conducive to the
unhappiness of the damned. Now seeing is in itself pleasant for, as
stated in Metaph. i, "the sense of sight is most esteemed, because
thereby many things are known."
Yet it happens accidentally that seeing is painful, when we see things
that are hurtful to us, or displeasing to our will. Consequently in
hell the place must be so disposed for seeing as regards light and
darkness, that nothing be seen clearly, and that only such things be
dimly seen as are able to bring anguish to the heart. Wherefore, simply
speaking, the place is dark. Yet by Divine disposition, there is a
certain amount of light, as much as suffices for seeing those things
which are capable of tormenting the soul. The natural situation of the
place is enough for this, since in the centre of the earth, where hell
is said to be, fire cannot be otherwise than thick and cloudy, and
reeky as it were.
Some hold that this darkness is caused by the massing together of the
bodies of the damned, which will so fill the place of hell with their
numbers, that no air will remain, so that there will be no translucid
body that can be the subject of light and darkness, except the eyes of
the damned, which will be darkened utterly.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether the fire of hell will be corporeal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fire of hell whereby the bodies of
the damned will be tormented will not be corporeal. For Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iv): The devil, and "demons, and his men" [*Cf. 2 Thess.
2:3: "And the man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition."], namely
Antichrist, "together with the ungodly and sinners will be cast into
everlasting fire, not material fire, such as that which we have, but
such as God knoweth." Now everything corporeal is material. Therefore
the fire of hell will not be corporeal.
Objection 2: Further, the souls of the damned when severed from their
bodies are cast into hell fire. But Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
32): "In my opinion the place to which the soul is committed after
death is spiritual and not corporeal." Therefore, etc.
Objection 3: Further, corporeal fire in the mode of its action does not
follow the mode of guilt in the person who is burned at the stake,
rather does it follow the mode of humid and dry: for in the same
corporeal fire we see both good and wicked suffer. But the fire of
hell, in its mode of torture or action, follows the mode of guilt in
the person punished; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 63): "There is
indeed but one hell fire, but it does not torture all sinners equally.
For each one will suffer as much pain according as his guilt deserves."
Therefore this fire will not be corporeal.
On the contrary, He says (Dial. iv, 29): "I doubt not that the fire of
hell is corporeal, since it is certain that bodies are tortured there."
Further, it is written (Wis. 5:21): "The . . . world shall fight . . .
against the unwise." But the whole world would not fight against the
unwise if they were punished with a spiritual and not a corporeal
punishment. Therefore they will be punished with a corporeal fire.
I answer that, There have been many opinions about the fire of hell.
For some philosophers, as Avicenna, disbelieving in the resurrection,
thought that the soul alone would be punished after death. And as they
considered it impossible for the soul, being incorporeal, to be
punished with a corporeal fire, they denied that the fire whereby the
wicked are punished is corporeal, and pretended that all statements as
to souls being punished in future after death by any corporeal means
are to be taken metaphorically. For just as the joy and happiness of
good souls will not be about any corporeal object, but about something
spiritual, namely the attainment of their end, so will the torment of
the wicked be merely spiritual, in that they will be grieved at being
separated from their end, the desire whereof is in them by nature.
Wherefore, just as all descriptions of the soul's delight after death
that seem to denote bodily pleasure---for instance, that they are
refreshed, that they smile, and so forth---must be taken
metaphorically, so also are all such descriptions of the soul's
suffering as seem to imply bodily punishment---for instance, that they
burn in fire, or suffer from the stench, and so forth. For as spiritual
pleasure and pain are unknown to the majority, these things need to be
declared under the figure of corporeal pleasures and pains, in order
that men may be moved the more to the desire or fear thereof. Since,
however, in the punishment of the damned there will be not only pain of
loss corresponding to the aversion that was in their sin, but also pain
of sense corresponding to the conversion, it follows that it is not
enough to hold the above manner of punishment. For this reason Avicenna
himself (Met. ix) added another explanation, by saying that the souls
of the wicked are punished after death, not by bodies but by images of
bodies; just as in a dream it seems to a man that he is suffering
various pains on account of such like images being in his imagination.
Even Augustine seems to hold this kind of punishment (Gen. ad lit. xii,
32), as is clear from the text. But this would seem an unreasonable
statement. For the imagination is a power that makes use of a bodily
organ: so that it is impossible for such visions of the imagination to
occur in the soul separated from the body, as in the soul of the
dreamer. Wherefore Avicenna also that he might avoid this difficulty,
said that the soul separated from the body uses as an organ some part
of the heavenly body, to which the human body needs to be conformed, in
order to be perfected by the rational soul, which is like the movers of
the heavenly body---thus following somewhat the opinion of certain
philosophers of old, who maintained that souls return to the stars that
are their compeers. But this is absolutely absurd according to the
Philosopher's teaching, since the soul uses a definite bodily organ,
even as art uses definite instruments, so that it cannot pass from one
body to another, as Pythagoras is stated (De Anima i, text. 53) to have
maintained. As to the statement of Augustine we shall say below how it
is to be answered (ad 2). However, whatever we may say of the fire that
torments the separated souls, we must admit that the fire which will
torment the bodies of the damned after the resurrection is corporeal,
since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that
punishment itself be bodily. Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv) proves the
fire of hell to be corporeal from the very fact that the wicked will be
cast thither after the resurrection. Again Augustine, as quoted in the
text of Sentent. iv, D, 44, clearly admits (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that
the fire by which the bodies are tormented is corporeal. And this is
the point at issue for the present. We have said elsewhere
([5157]Q[70], A[3]) how the souls of the damned are punished by this
corporeal fire.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene does not absolutely deny that this fire
is material, but that it is material as our fire, since it differs from
ours in some of its properties. We may also reply that since that fire
does not alter bodies as to their matter, but acts on them for their
punishment by a kind of spiritual action, it is for this reason that it
is stated not to be material, not as regards its substance, but as to
its punitive effect on bodies and, still more, on souls.
Reply to Objection 2: The assertion of Augustine may be taken in this
way, that the place whither souls are conveyed after death be described
as incorporeal, in so far as the soul is there, not corporeally, i.e.
as bodies are in a place, but in some other spiritual way, as angels
are in a place. Or we may reply that Augustine is expressing an opinion
without deciding the point, as he often does in those books.
Reply to Objection 3: That fire will be the instrument of Divine
justice inflicting punishment. Now an instrument acts not only by its
own power and in its own way, but also by the power of the principal
agent, and as directed thereby. Wherefore although fire is not able, of
its own power, to torture certain persons more or less, according to
the measure of sin, it is able to do so nevertheless in so far as its
action is regulated by the ordering of Divine justice: even so the fire
of the furnace is regulated by the forethought of the smith, according
as the effect of his art requires.
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Whether the fire of hell is of the same species as ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that this fire is not of the same species as
the corporeal fire which we see. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx,
16): "In my opinion no man knows of what kind is the everlasting fire,
unless the Spirit of God has revealed it to anyone." But all or nearly
all know the nature of this fire of ours. Therefore that fire is not of
the same species as this.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory commenting on Job 10:26, "A fire that is
not kindled shall devour him," says (Moral. xv): "Bodily fire needs
bodily fuel in order to become fire; neither can it be except by being
kindled, nor live unless it be renewed. On the other hand the fire of
hell, since it is a bodily fire, and burns in a bodily way the wicked
cast therein, is neither kindled by human endeavor, nor kept alive with
fuel, but once created endures unquenchably; at one and the same time
it needs no kindling, and lacks not heat." Therefore it is not of the
same nature as the fire that we see.
Objection 3: Further, the everlasting and the corruptible differ
essentially, since they agree not even in genus, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. x). But this fire of ours is corruptible, whereas
the other is everlasting: "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting
fire" (Mat. 25:41). Therefore they are not of the same nature.
Objection 4: Further, it belongs to the nature of this fire of ours to
give light. But the fire of hell gives no light, hence the saying of
Job 18:5: "Shall not the light of the wicked be extinguished?"
Therefore . . . as above.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 6), "every
water is of the same species as every other water." Therefore in like
manner every fire is of the same species as every other fire.
Further, it is written (Wis. 11:17): "By what things a man sinneth by
the same also he is tormented." Now men sin by the sensible things of
this world. Therefore it is just that they should be punished by those
same things.
I answer that, As stated in Meteor. iv, 1 fire has other bodies for its
matter, for the reason that of all the elements it has the greatest
power of action. Hence fire is found under two conditions: in its own
matter, as existing in its own sphere, and in a strange matter, whether
of earth, as in burning coal, or of air as in the flame. Under whatever
conditions however fire be found, it is always of the same species, so
far as the nature of fire is concerned, but there may be a difference
of species as to the bodies which are the matter of fire. Wherefore
flame and burning coal differ specifically, and likewise burning wood
and red-hot iron; nor does it signify, as to this particular point,
whether they be kindled by force, as in the case of iron, or by a
natural intrinsic principle, as happens with sulphur. Accordingly it is
clear that the fire of hell is of the same species as the fire we have,
so far as the nature of fire is concerned. But whether that fire
subsists in its proper matter, or if it subsists in a strange matter,
what that matter may be, we know not. And in this way it may differ
specifically from the fire we have, considered materially. It has,
however, certain properties differing from our fire, for instance that
it needs no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. But the differences do
not argue a difference of species as regards the nature of the fire.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of that fire with regard to
its matter, and not with regard to its nature.
Reply to Objection 2: This fire of ours is kept alive with fuel, and is
kindled by man, because it is introduced into a foreign matter by art
and force. But that other fire needs no fuel to keep it alive, because
either it subsists in its own matter, or is in a foreign matter, not by
force but by nature from an intrinsic principle. Wherefore it is
kindled not by man but by God, Who fashioned its nature. This is the
meaning of the words of Isaias (30:33): "The breath of the Lord is as a
torrent of brimstone kindling it."
Reply to Objection 3: Even as the bodies of the damned will be of the
same species as now, although now they are corruptible, whereas then
they will be incorruptible, both by the ordering of Divine justice, and
on account of the cessation of the heavenly movement, so is it with the
fire of hell whereby those bodies will be punished.
Reply to Objection 4: To give light does not belong to fire according
to any mode of existence, since in its own matter it gives no light;
wherefore it does not shine in its own sphere according to the
philosophers: and in like manner in certain foreign matters it does not
shine, as when it is in an opaque earthly substance such as sulphur.
The same happens also when its brightness is obscured by thick smoke.
Wherefore that the fire of hell gives no light is not sufficient proof
of its being of a different species.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fire of hell is beneath the earth?
Objection 1: It would seem that this fire is not beneath the earth. For
it is said of the damned (Job 18:18), "And God shall remove him out of
the globe [Douay: 'world']." Therefore the fire whereby the damned will
be punished is not beneath the earth but outside the globe.
Objection 2: Further, nothing violent or accidental can be everlasting.
But this fire will be in hell for ever. Therefore it will be there, not
by force but naturally. Now fire cannot be under the earth save by
violence. Therefore the fire of hell is not beneath the earth.
Objection 3: Further, after the day of judgment the bodies of all the
damned will be tormented in hell. Now those bodies will fill a place.
Consequently, since the multitude of the damned will be exceeding
great, for "the number of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), the space
containing that fire must also be exceeding great. But it would seem
unreasonable to say that there is so great a hollow within the earth,
since all the parts of the earth naturally tend to the center.
Therefore that fire will not be beneath the earth.
Objection 4: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also
he is tormented" (Wis. 11:17). But the wicked have sinned on the earth.
Therefore the fire that punishes them should not be under the earth.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 14:9): "Hell below was in an uproar
to meet Thee at Thy coming." Therefore the fire of hell is beneath us.
Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv): "I see not what hinders us from
believing that hell is beneath the earth."
Further, a gloss on Jonah 2:4, "Thou hast cast me forth . . . into the
heart of the sea," says, "i.e. into hell," and in the Gospel (Mat.
12:40) the words "in the heart of the earth" have the same sense, for
as the heart is in the middle of an animal, so is hell supposed to be
in the middle of the earth.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), "I am of opinion
that no one knows in what part of the world hell is situated, unless
the Spirit of God has revealed this to some one." Wherefore Gregory
(Dial. iv) having been questioned on this point answers: "About this
matter I dare not give a rash decision. For some have deemed hell to be
in some part of the earth's surface; others think it to be beneath the
earth." He shows the latter opinion to be the more probable for two
reasons. First from the very meaning of the word. These are his words:
"If we call it the nether regions (infernus [*The Latin for 'hell']),
for the reason that it is beneath us [inferius], what earth is in
relation to heaven, such should be hell in relation to earth."
Secondly, from the words of Apoc. 5:3: "No man was able, neither in
heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, to open the book": where the
words "in heaven" refer to the angels, "on earth" to men living in the
body, and "under the earth" to souls in hell. Augustine too (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 34) seems to indicate two reasons for the congruity of hell
being under the earth. One is that "whereas the souls of the departed
sinned through love of the flesh, they should be treated as the dead
flesh is wont to be treated, by being buried beneath the earth." The
other is that heaviness is to the body what sorrow is to the spirit,
and joy (of spirit) is as lightness (of body). Wherefore "just as in
reference to the body, all the heavier things are beneath the others,
if they be placed in order of gravity, so in reference to the spirit,
the lower place is occupied by whatever is more sorrowful"; and thus
even as the empyrean is a fitting place for the joy of the elect, so
the lowest part of the earth is a fitting place for the sorrow of the
damned. Nor does it signify that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) says
that "hell is stated or believed to be under the earth," because he
withdraws this (Retract. ii, 29) where he says: "Methinks I should have
said that hell is beneath the earth, rather than have given the reason
why it is stated or believed to be under the earth." However, some
philosophers have maintained that hell is situated beneath the
terrestrial orb, but above the surface of the earth, on that part which
is opposite to us. This seems to have been the meaning of Isidore when
he asserted that "the sun and the moon will stop in the place wherein
they were created, lest the wicked should enjoy this light in the midst
of their torments." But this is no argument, if we assert that hell is
under the earth. We have already stated how these words may be
explained ([5158]Q[91] , A[2]).
Pythagoras held the place of punishment to be in a fiery sphere
situated, according to him, in the middle of the whole world: and he
called it the prison-house of Jupiter as Aristotle relates (De Coelo et
Mundo ii). It is, however, more in keeping with Scripture to say that
it is beneath the earth.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Job, "God shall remove him out of
the globe," refer to the surface of the earth [*"De orbe terrarum,"
which might be rendered "from the land of the living."], i.e. from this
world. This is how Gregory expounds it (Moral. xiv) where he says: "He
is removed from the globe when, at the coming of the heavenly judge, he
is taken away from this world wherein he now prides himself in his
wickedness." Nor does globe here signify the universe, as though the
place of punishment were outside the whole universe.
Reply to Objection 2: Fire continues in that place for all eternity by
the ordering of Divine justice although according to its nature an
element cannot last for ever outside its own place, especially if
things were to remain in this state of generation and corruption. The
fire there will be of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be
all gathered together from all parts, through being surrounded on all
sides by the cold of the earth.
Reply to Objection 3: Hell will never lack sufficient room to admit the
bodies of the damned: since hell is accounted one of the three things
that "never are satisfied" (Prov. 30:15,16). Nor is it unreasonable
that God's power should maintain within the bowels of the earth a
hollow great enough to contain all the bodies of the damned.
Reply to Objection 4: It does not follow of necessity that "by what
things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented," except as
regards the principal instruments of sin: for as much as man having
sinned in soul and body will be punished in both. But it does not
follow that a man will be punished in the very place where he sinned,
because the place due to the damned is other from that due to
wayfarers. We may also reply that these words refer to the punishments
inflicted on man on the way: according as each sin has its
corresponding punishment, since "inordinate love is its own
punishment," as Augustine states (Confess. i, 12).
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OF THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED (NINE ARTICLES)
We must next consider matters pertaining to the will and intellect of
the damned. Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?
(2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done?
(3) Whether they would rather not be than be?
(4) Whether they would wish others to be damned?
(5) Whether the wicked hate God?
(6) Whether they can demerit?
(7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life?
(8) Whether they ever think of God?
(9) Whether they see the glory of the blessed?
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Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every act of will in the damned is
evil. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "the demons desire the
good and the best, namely to be, to live, to understand." Since, then,
men who are damned are not worse off than the demons, it would seem
that they also can have a good will.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is
altogether involuntary." Therefore if the damned will anything, they
will it as something good or apparently good. Now a will that is
directly ordered to good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have
a good will.
Objection 3: Further, some will be damned who, while in this world,
acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens who had civic
virtues. Now a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous
habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of
the damned.
On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be inclined except to
evil. Now men who are damned will be obstinate even as the demons [*Cf.
[5159]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Further, as the will of the damned is in
relation to evil, so is the will of the blessed in regard to good. But
the blessed never have an evil will. Neither therefore have the damned
any good will.
I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the damned, namely
the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is theirs
not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this
inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature
remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good.
But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as it is in
their power to be inclined by their affections to this or that. This
will is in them always evil: and this because they are completely
turned away from the last end of a right will, nor can a will be good
except it be directed to that same end. Hence even though they will
some good, they do not will it well so that one be able to call their
will good on that account.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Dionysius must be understood of the
natural will, which is nature's inclination to some particular good.
And yet this natural inclination is corrupted by their wickedness, in
so far as this good which they desire naturally is desired by them
under certain evil circumstances [*Cf. [5160]FP, Q[64], A[2], ad 5].
Reply to Objection 2: Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in so
far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their wickedness that
they esteem that which is evil as though it were good. Hence their will
is evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The habits of civic virtue do not remain in the
separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic life
which will not remain after this life. Even though they remained, they
would never come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the
obstinacy of the mind.
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Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned never repent of the evil
they have done. For Bernard says on the Canticle [*Cf. De
Consideratione v, 12; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix] that "the damned
ever consent to the evil they have done." Therefore they never repent
of the sins they have committed.
Objection 2: Further, to wish one had not sinned is a good will. But
the damned will never have a good will. Therefore the damned will never
wish they had not sinned: and thus the same conclusion follows as
above.
Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii), "death
is to man what their fall was to the angels." But the angel's will is
irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot withdraw from the choice
whereby he previously sinned [*Cf. [5161]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore
the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them.
Objection 4: Further, the wickedness of the damned in hell will be
greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some
sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through
blindness of mind, as heretics, or through obstinacy, as those "who are
glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things"
(Prov. 2:14). Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, It is said of the damned (Wis. 5:3): "Repenting within
themselves [Vulg.: 'Saying within themselves, repenting']."
Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that "the wicked are full
of repentance; for afterwards they are sorry for that in which
previously they took pleasure." Therefore the damned, being most
wicked, repent all the more.
I answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways: in one way
directly, in another way indirectly. He repents of a sin directly who
hates sin as such: and he repents indirectly who hates it on account of
something connected with it, for instance punishment or something of
that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins
directly, because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them; but
they will repent indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the
punishment inflicted on them for sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The damned will wickedness, but shun punishment:
and thus indirectly they repent of wickedness committed.
Reply to Objection 2: To wish one had not sinned on account of the
shamefulness of vice is a good will: but this will not be in the
wicked.
Reply to Objection 3: It will be possible for the damned to repent of
their sins without turning their will away from sin, because in their
sins they will shun, not what they heretofore desired, but something
else, namely the punishment.
Reply to Objection 4: However obstinate men may be in this world, they
repent of the sins indirectly, if they be punished for them. Thus
Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36): "We see the most savage beasts are
deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain."
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Whether the damned by right and deliberate reason would wish not to be?
Objection 1: It would seem impossible for the damned, by right and
deliberate reason, to wish not to be. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb.
iii, 7): "Consider how great a good it is to be; since both the happy
and the unhappy will it; for to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater
thing than not to be at all."
Objection 2: Further, Augustine argues thus (De Lib. Arb. iii, 8):
"Preference supposes election." But "not to be" is not eligible; since
it has not the appearance of good, for it is nothing. Therefore not to
be cannot be more desirable to the damned than "to be."
Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is the more to be shunned. Now
"not to be" is the greatest evil, since it removes good altogether, so
as to leave nothing. Therefore "not to be" is more to be shunned than
to be unhappy: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): "In those days men . . .
shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them."
Further, the unhappiness of the damned surpasses all unhappiness of
this world. Now in order to escape the unhappiness of this world, it is
desirable to some to die, wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 41:3,4): "O
death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is in need and to him
whose strength faileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care
about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth wisdom [Vulg.:
'patience']." Much more, therefore, is "not to be" desirable to the
damned according to their deliberate reason.
I answer that, Not to be may be considered in two ways. First, in
itself, and thus it can nowise be desirable, since it has no aspect of
good, but is pure privation of good. Secondly, it may be considered as
a relief from a painful life or from some unhappiness: and thus "not to
be" takes on the aspect of good, since "to lack an evil is a kind of
good" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). In this way it is better
for the damned not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it is said (Mat.
26:24): "It were better for him, if that man had not been born," and
(Jer. 20:14): "Cursed be the day wherein I was born," where a gloss of
Jerome observes: "It is better not to be than to be evilly." In this
sense the damned can prefer "not to be" according to their deliberate
reason [*Cf. [5162]FP, Q[5], A[2], ad 3].
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood in
the sense that "not to be" is eligible, not in itself but accidentally,
as putting an end to unhappiness. For when it is stated that "to be"
and "to live" are desired by all naturally, we are not to take this as
referable to an evil and corrupt life, and a life of unhappiness, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4), but absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: Non-existence is eligible, not in itself, but
only accidentally, as stated already.
Reply to Objection 3: Although "not to be" is very evil, in so far as
it removes being, it is very good, in so far as it removes unhappiness,
which is the greatest of evils, and thus it is preferred "not to be."
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in hell the damned would wish others were damned who are not damned
?
Objection 1: It would seem that in hell the damned would not wish
others were damned who are not damned. For it is said (Lk. 16:27, 28)
of the rich man that he prayed for his brethren, lest they should come
"into the place of torments." Therefore in like manner the other damned
would not wish, at least their friends in the flesh to be damned in
hell.
Objection 2: Further, the damned are not deprived of their inordinate
affections. Now some of the damned loved inordinately some who are not
damned. Therefore they would not desire their evil, i.e. that they
should be damned.
Objection 3: Further, the damned do not desire the increase of their
punishment. Now if more were damned, their punishment would be greater,
even as the joy of the blessed is increased by an increase in their
number. Therefore the damned desire not the damnation of those who are
saved.
On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 14:9, "are risen up from their
thrones," says: "The wicked are comforted by having many companions in
their punishment."
Further, envy reigns supreme in the damned. Therefore they grieve for
the happiness of the blessed, and desire their damnation.
I answer that Even as in the blessed in heaven there will be most
perfect charity, so in the damned there will be the most perfect hate.
Wherefore as the saints will rejoice in all goods, so will the damned
grieve for all goods. Consequently the sight of the happiness of the
saints will give them very great pain; hence it is written (Is. 26:11):
"Let the envious people see and be confounded, and let fire devour Thy
enemies." Therefore they will wish all the good were damned.
Reply to Objection 1: So great will be the envy of the damned that they
will envy the glory even of their kindred, since they themselves are
supremely unhappy, for this happens even in this life, when envy
increases. Nevertheless they will envy their kindred less than others,
and their punishment would be greater if all their kindred were damned,
and others saved, than if some of their kindred were saved. For this
reason the rich man prayed that his brethren might be warded from
damnation: for he knew that some are guarded therefrom. Yet he would
rather that his brethren were damned as well as all the rest.
Reply to Objection 2: Love that is not based on virtue is easily
voided, especially in evil men as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4).
Hence the damned will not preserve their friendship for those whom they
loved inordinately. Yet the will of them will remain perverse, because
they will continue to love the cause of their inordinate loving.
Reply to Objection 3: Although an increase in the number of the damned
results in an increase of each one's punishment, so much the more will
their hatred and envy increase that they will prefer to be more
tormented with many rather than less tormented alone.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the damned hate God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not hate God. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "the beautiful and good that is
the cause of all goodness and beauty is beloved of all." But this is
God. Therefore God cannot be the object of anyone's hate.
Objection 2: Further, no one can hate goodness itself, as neither can
one will badness itself since "evil is altogether involuntary," as
Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is goodness itself. Therefore
no one can hate Him.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
hate Thee ascendeth continually."
I answer that, The appetite is moved by good or evil apprehended. Now
God is apprehended in two ways, namely in Himself, as by the blessed,
who see Him in His essence; and in His effects, as by us and by the
damned. Since, then, He is goodness by His essence, He cannot in
Himself be displeasing to any will; wherefore whoever sees Him in His
essence cannot hate Him. On the other hand, some of His effects are
displeasing to the will in so far as they are opposed to any one: and
accordingly a person may hate God not in Himself, but by reason of His
effects. Therefore the damned, perceiving God in His punishment, which
is the effect of His justice, hate Him, even as they hate the
punishment inflicted on them [*Cf. Q[90], A[3], ad 2; [5163]SS, Q[34],
A[1]].
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Dionysius refers to the natural
appetite. and even this is rendered perverse in the damned, by that
which is added thereto by their deliberate will, as stated above
[5164](A[1]) [*Cf. [5165]SS, Q[34], A[1], ad 1 where St. Thomas gives
another answer].
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would prove if the damned saw God
in Himself, as being in His essence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the damned demerit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned demerit. For the damned have
an evil will, as stated in the last Distinction of Sentent. iv. But
they demerited by the evil will that they had here. Therefore if they
demerit not there, their damnation is to their advantage.
Objection 2: Further, the damned are on the same footing as the demons.
Now the demons demerit after their fall, wherefore God inflicted a
punishment on the serpent, who induced man to sin (Gn. 3:14,15).
Therefore the damned also demerit.
Objection 3: Further, an inordinate act that proceeds from a deliberate
will is not excused from demerit, even though there be necessity of
which one is oneself the cause: for the "drunken man deserves a double
punishment" if he commit a crime through being drunk (Ethic. iii). Now
the damned were themselves the cause of their own obstinacy, owing to
which they are under a kind of necessity of sinning. Therefore since
their act proceeds from their free will, they are not excused from
demerit.
On the contrary, Punishment is contradistinguished from fault [*Cf.
[5166]FP, Q[48], A[5]]. Now the perverse will of the damned proceeds
from their obstinacy which is their punishment. Therefore the perverse
will of the damned is not a fault whereby they may demerit.
Further, after reaching the last term there is no further movement, or
advancement in good or evil. Now the damned, especially after the
judgment day, will have reached the last term of their damnation, since
then there "will cease to be two cities," according to Augustine
(Enchiridion cxi). Therefore after the judgment day the damned will not
demerit by their perverse will, for if they did their damnation would
be augmented.
I answer that, We must draw a distinction between the damned before the
judgment day and after. For all are agreed that after the judgment day
there will be neither merit nor demerit. The reason for this is because
merit or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further good or
evil: and after the day of judgment good and evil will have reached
their ultimate consummation, so that there will be no further addition
to good or evil. Consequently, good will in the blessed will not be a
merit but a reward, and evil will in the damned will be not a demerit
but a punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially to the
state of happiness and their contraries to the state of unhappiness
(Ethic. i, 9,10).
On the other hand, some say that, before the judgment day, both the
good merit and the damned demerit. But this cannot apply to the
essential reward or to the principal punishment, since in this respect
both have reached the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to the
accidental reward, or secondary punishment, which are subject to
increase until the day of judgment. Especially may this apply to the
demons, or to the good angels, by whose activities some are drawn to
salvation, whereby the joy of the blessed angels is increased, and some
to damnation, whereby the punishment of the demons is augmented [*Cf.
[5167]FP, Q[62], A[9], ad 3; [5168]SS, Q[13], A[4], ad 2; where St.
Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or
demerit.].
Reply to Objection 1: It is in the highest degree unprofitable to have
reached the highest degree of evil, the result being that the damned
are incapable of demerit. Hence it is clear that they gain no advantage
from their sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Men who are damned are not occupied in drawing
others to damnation, as the demons are, for which reason the latter
demerit as regards their secondary punishment [*Cf. [5169]FP, Q[62],
A[9], ad 3; [5170]SS, Q[13] , A[4], ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly
retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or demerit].
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why they are not excused from demerit
is not because they are under the necessity of sinning, but because
they have reached the highest of evils.
However, the necessity of sinning whereof we are ourselves the cause,
in so far as it is a necessity, excuses from sin, because every sin
needs to be voluntary: but it does not excuse, in so far as it proceeds
from a previous act of the will: and consequently the whole demerit of
the subsequent sin would seem to belong to the previous sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the damned can make use of the knowledge they had in this world?
[*Cf. FP, Q[89]]
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned are unable to make use of
the knowledge they had in this world. For there is very great pleasure
in the consideration of knowledge. But we must not admit that they have
any pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge they had
heretofore, by applying their consideration thereto.
Objection 2: Further, the damned suffer greater pains than any pains of
this world. Now in this world, when one is in very great pain, it is
impossible to consider any intelligible conclusions, through being
distracted by the pains that one suffers. Much less therefore can one
do so in hell.
Objection 3: Further, the damned are subject to time. But "length of
time is the cause of forgetfulness" (Phys. lib. iv, 13). Therefore the
damned will forget what they knew here.
On the contrary, It is said to the rich man who was damned (Lk. 16:25):
"Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime," etc.
Therefore they will consider about the things they knew here.
Further, the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as
stated above (Q[70], A[2], ad 3; [5171]FP, Q[89], AA[5],6). Therefore,
if they could not use them, these would remain in them to no purpose.
I answer that, Even as in the saints on account of the perfection of
their glory, there will be nothing but what is a matter of joy so there
will be nothing in the damned but what is a matter and cause of sorrow;
nor will anything that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their
unhappiness is consummate. Now the consideration of certain things
known brings us joy, in some respect, either on the part of the things
known, because we love them, or on the part of the knowledge, because
it is fitting and perfect. There may also be a reason for sorrow both
on the part of the things known, because they are of a grievous nature,
and on the part of the knowledge, if we consider its imperfection; for
instance a person may consider his defective knowledge about a certain
thing, which he would desire to know perfectly. Accordingly, in the
damned there will be actual consideration of the things they knew
heretofore as matters of sorrow, but not as a cause of pleasure. For
they will consider both the evil they have done, and for which they
were damned, and the delightful goods they have lost, and on both
counts they will suffer torments. Likewise they will be tormented with
the thought that the knowledge they had of speculative matters was
imperfect, and that they missed its highest degree of perfection which
they might have acquired.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the consideration of knowledge is
delightful in itself, it may accidentally be the cause of sorrow, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: In this world the soul is united to a corruptible
body, wherefore the soul's consideration is hindered by the suffering
of the body. On the other hand, in the future life the soul will not be
so drawn by the body, but however much the body may suffer, the soul
will have a most clear view of those things that can be a cause of
anguish to it.
Reply to Objection 3: Time causes forgetfulness accidentally, in so far
as the movement whereof it is the measure is the cause of change. But
after the judgment day there will be no movement of the heavens;
wherefore neither will it be possible for forgetfulness to result from
any lapse of time however long. Before the judgment day, however, the
separated soul is not changed from its disposition by the heavenly
movement.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the damned will ever think of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned will sometimes think of God.
For one cannot hate a thing actually, except one think about it. Now
the damned will hate God, as stated in the text of Sentent. iv, in the
last Distinction. Therefore they will think of God sometimes.
Objection 2: Further, the damned will have remorse of conscience. But
the conscience suffers remorse for deeds done against God. Therefore
they will sometimes think of God.
On the contrary, Man's most perfect thoughts are those which are about
God: whereas the damned will be in a state of the greatest
imperfection. Therefore they will not think of God.
I answer that, one may think of God in two ways. First, in Himself and
according to that which is proper to Him, namely that He is the fount
of all goodness: and thus it is altogether impossible to think of Him
without delight, so that the damned will by no means think of Him in
this way. Secondly, according to something accidental as it were to Him
in His effects, such as His punishments, and so forth, and in this
respect the thought of God can bring sorrow, so that in this way the
damned will think of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The damned do not hate God except because He
punishes and forbids what is agreeable to their evil will: and
consequently they will think of Him only as punishing and forbidding.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection, since conscience
will not have remorse for sin except as forbidden by the Divine
commandment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the damned see the glory of the blessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not see the glory of the
blessed. For they are more distant from the glory of the blessed than
from the happenings of this world. But they do not see what happens in
regard to us: hence Gregory commenting on Job 14:21, "Whether his
children come to honor," etc. says (Moral. xii): "Even as those who
still live know not in what place are the souls of the dead; so the
dead who have lived in the body know not the things which regard the
life of those who are in the flesh." Much less, therefore, can they see
the glory of the blessed.
Objection 2: Further, that which is granted as a great favor to the
saints in this life is never granted to the damned. Now it was granted
as a great favor to Paul to see the life in which the saints live for
ever with God (2 Cor. 12). Therefore the damned will not see the glory
of the saints.
On the contrary, It is stated (Lk. 16:23) that the rich man in the
midst of his torments "saw Abraham . . . and Lazarus in his bosom."
I answer that, The damned, before the judgment day, will see the
blessed in glory, in such a way as to know, not what that glory is
like, but only that they are in a state of glory that surpasses all
thought. This will trouble them, both because they will, through envy,
grieve for their happiness, and because they have forfeited that glory.
Hence it is written (Wis. 5:2) concerning the wicked: "Seeing it" they
"shall be troubled with terrible fear." After the judgment day,
however, they will be altogether deprived of seeing the blessed: nor
will this lessen their punishment, but will increase it; because they
will bear in remembrance the glory of the blessed which they saw at or
before the judgment: and this will torment them. Moreover they will be
tormented by finding themselves deemed unworthy even to see the glory
which the saints merit to have.
Reply to Objection 1: The happenings of this life would not, if seen,
torment the damned in hell as the sight of the glory of the saints;
wherefore the things which happen here are not shown to the damned in
the same way as the saints' glory; although also of the things that
happen here those are shown to them which are capable of causing them
sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2: Paul looked upon that life wherein the saints
live with God [*Cf. [5172]SS, Q[185], A[3], ad 2], by actual experience
thereof and by hoping to have it more perfectly in the life to come.
Not so the damned; wherefore the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
OF GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARDS THE DAMNED (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider God's justice and mercy towards the damned: under
which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on
sinners?
(2) Whether by God's mercy all punishment both of men and of demons
comes to an end?
(3) Whether at least the punishment of men comes to an end?
(4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians has an end?
(5) Whether there is an end to the punishment of those who have
performed works of mercy?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners?
[*Cf. FS, Q[87], AA[3],4]
Objection 1: It would seem that an eternal punishment is not inflicted
on sinners by Divine justice. For the punishment should not exceed the
fault: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of
the stripes be" (Dt. 25:2). Now fault is temporal. Therefore the
punishment should not be eternal.
Objection 2: Further, of two mortal sins one is greater than the other.
and therefore one should receive a greater punishment than the other.
But no punishment is greater than eternal punishment, since it is
infinite. Therefore eternal punishment is not due to every sin; and if
it is not due to one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely
distant from one another.
Objection 3: Further, a just judge does not punish except in order to
correct, wherefore it is stated (Ethic. ii, 3) that "punishments are a
kind of medicine." Now, to punish the wicked eternally does not lead to
their correction, nor to that of others, since then there will be no
one in future who can be corrected thereby. Therefore eternal
punishment is not inflicted for sins according to Divine justice.
Objection 4: Further, no one wishes that which is not desirable for its
own sake, except on account of some advantage. Now God does not wish
punishment for its own sake, for He delights not in punishments [*The
allusion is to Wis. 1:13: "Neither hath He pleasure in the destruction
of the living," as may be gathered from [5173]FS, Q[87], A[3], OBJ[3]].
Since then no advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment,
it would seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin.
Objection 5: Further, "nothing accidental lasts for ever" (De Coelo et
Mundo i). But punishment is one of those things that happen
accidentally, since it is contrary to nature. Therefore it cannot be
everlasting.
Objection 6: Further, the justice of God would seem to require that
sinners should be brought to naught: because on account of ingratitude
a person deserves to lose all benefits. and among other benefits of God
there is "being" itself. Therefore it would seem just that the sinner
who has been ungrateful to God should lose his being. But if sinners be
brought to naught, their punishment cannot be everlasting. Therefore it
would seem out of keeping with Divine justice that sinners should be
punished for ever.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46): "These," namely the
wicked, "shall go into everlasting punishment."
Further, as reward is to merit, so is punishment to guilt. Now,
according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal
merit: "Every one who seeth the Son and believeth in Him hath [Vulg.:
'that everyone . . . may have'] life everlasting." Therefore according
to Divine justice an everlasting punishment is due to temporal guilt.
Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), punishment is
meted according to the dignity of the person sinned against, so that a
person who strikes one in authority receives a greater punishment than
one who strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against
God, Whose commandments he breaks, and Whose honor he gives another, by
placing his end in some one other than God. But God's majesty is
infinite. Therefore whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment;
and consequently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be
punished for ever.
I answer that, Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely
according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of
time, the measure of punishment corresponds to the measure of fault, as
regards the degree of severity, so that the more grievously a person
sins the more grievously is he punished: "As much as she hath glorified
herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to
her" (Apoc. 18:7). The duration of the punishment does not, however,
correspond with the duration of the fault, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xxi, 11), for adultery which is committed in a short space of time
is not punished with a momentary penalty even according to human laws
[*Cf. [5174]FS, Q[87], A[3], ad 1]. But the duration of punishment
regards the disposition of the sinner: for sometimes a person who
commits an offense in a city is rendered by his very offense worthy of
being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by
perpetual exile or even by death: whereas sometimes he is not rendered
worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens.
wherefore in order that he may become a fitting member of the State,
his punishment is prolonged or curtailed, according as is expedient for
his amendment, so that he may live in the city in a becoming and
peaceful manner. So too, according to Divine justice, sin renders a
person worthy to be altogether cut off from the fellowship of God's
city, and this is the effect of every sin committed against charity,
which is the bond uniting this same city together. Consequently, for
mortal sin which is contrary to charity a person is expelled for ever
from the fellowship of the saints and condemned to everlasting
punishment, because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "as men
are cut off from this perishable city by the penalty of the first
death, so are they excluded from that imperishable city by the
punishment of the second death." That the punishment inflicted by the
earthly state is not deemed everlasting is accidental, either because
man endures not for ever, or because the state itself comes to an end.
Wherefore if man lived for ever, the punishment of exile or slavery,
which is pronounced by human law, would remain in him for ever. On the
other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to deserve to
be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as those
who sin venially, their punishment will be so much the shorter or
longer according as they are more or less fit to be cleansed, through
sin clinging to them more or less: this is observed in the punishments
of this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice.
We find also other reasons given by the saints why some are justly
condemned to everlasting punishment for a temporal sin. One is because
they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal life. This is
mentioned by Augustine (De Civ. Dei. xii, 12): "He is become worthy of
eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal."
Another reason is because man sinned in his own eternity [*Cf.
[5175]FS, Q[87], A[3], ad 1]; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv), it
belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should never cease
to be punished, who in this life never ceased to desire sin. And if it
be objected that some who sin mortally propose to amend their life at
some time, and that these accordingly are seemingly not deserving of
eternal punishment, it must be replied according to some that Gregory
speaks of the will that is made manifest by the deed. For he who falls
into mortal sin of his own will puts himself in a state whence he
cannot be rescued, except God help him: wherefore from the very fact
that he is willing to sin, he is willing to remain in sin for ever. For
man is "a wind that goeth," namely to sin, "and returneth not by his
own power" (Ps. 77:39). Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit
whence he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished
to remain there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself.
Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits
a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and since the whole of
life is directed to its end, it follows that for this very reason he
directs the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing to remain in
sin forever, if he could do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says
on Job 41:23, "He shall esteem the deep as growing old" (Moral. xxxiv):
"The wicked only put an end to sinning because their life came to an
end: they would indeed have wished to live for ever, that they might
continue in sin for ever for they desire rather to sin than to live."
Still another reason may be given why the punishment of mortal sin is
eternal: because thereby one offends God Who is infinite. Wherefore
since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature
is incapable of an infinite quality, it must needs be infinite at least
in duration. And again there is a fourth reason for the same: because
guilt remains for ever, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and
men cannot receive grace after death; nor should punishment cease so
long as guilt remains.
Reply to Objection 1: Punishment has not to be equal to fault as to the
amount of duration as is seen to be the case also with human laws. We
may also reply with Gregory (Dial. xliv) that although sin is temporal
in act, it is eternal in will.
Reply to Objection 2: The degree of intensity in the punishment
corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; wherefore mortal sins
unequal in gravity will receive a punishment unequal in intensity but
equal in duration.
Reply to Objection 3: The punishments inflicted on those who are not
altogether expelled from the society of their fellow-citizens are
intended for their correction: whereas those punishments, whereby
certain persons are wholly banished from the society of their
fellow-citizens, are not intended for their correction; although they
may be intended for the correction and tranquillity of the others who
remain in the state. Accordingly the damnation of the wicked is for the
correction of those who are now in the Church; for punishments are
intended for correction, not only when they are being inflicted, but
also when they are decreed.
Reply to Objection 4: The everlasting punishment of the wicked will not
be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First,
because thereby the Divine justice is safeguarded which is acceptable
to God for its own sake. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv): "Almighty God
on account of His loving kindness delights not in the torments of the
unhappy, but on account of His justice. He is for ever unappeased by
the punishment of the wicked." Secondly, they are useful, because the
elect rejoice therein, when they see God's justice in them, and realize
that they have escaped them. Hence it is written (Ps. 57:12): "The just
shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge," etc., and (Is. 66:24):
"They," namely the wicked, "shall be a loathsome sight* to all flesh,"
namely to the saints, as a gloss says. [*"Ad satietatem visionis,"
which St. Thomas takes to signify being satiated with joy; Cf.[5176]
Q[94], A[3]]. Gregory expresses himself in the same sense (Dial. iv):
"The wicked are all condemned to eternal punishment, and are punished
for their own wickedness. Yet they will burn to some purpose, namely
that the just may all both see in God the joys they receive, and
perceive in them the torments they have escaped: for which reason they
will acknowledge themselves for ever the debtors of Divine grace the
more that they will see how the evils which they overcame by its
assistance are punished eternally."
Reply to Objection 5: Although the punishment relates to the soul
accidentally, it relates essentially to the soul infected with guilt.
And since guilt will remain in the soul for ever, its punishment also
will be everlasting.
Reply to Objection 6: Punishment corresponds to fault, properly
speaking, in respect of the inordinateness in the fault, and not of the
dignity in the person offended: for if the latter were the case, a
punishment of infinite intensity would correspond to every sin.
Accordingly, although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact
that he has sinned against God the author of his being, yet, in view of
the inordinateness of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him,
since being is presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being lost or
corrupted by the inordinateness of sin [*Cf. [5177]FS, Q[85], A[1]]:
and consequently privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any
sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by God's mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons,
comes to an end?
Objection 1: It would seem that by God's mercy all punishment of the
damned, both men and demons, comes to an end. For it is written (Wis.
11:24): "Thou hast mercy upon all, O Lord, because Thou canst do all
things." But among all things the demons also are included, since they
are God's creatures. Therefore also their punishment will come to an
end.
Objection 2: Further, "God hath concluded all in sin [Vulg.:
'unbelief'], that He may have mercy on all" (Rom. 11:32). Now God has
concluded the demons under sin, that is to say, He permitted them to be
concluded. Therefore it would seem that in time He has mercy even on
the demons.
Objection 3: Further, as Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo ii), "it is not
just that God should permit the utter loss of a creature which He made
for happiness." Therefore, since every rational creature was created
for happiness, it would seem unjust for it to be allowed to perish
altogether.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:41): "Depart from Me, you
cursed, into everlasting fire, which is prepared for the devil and his
angels." Therefore they will be punished eternally.
Further, just as the good angels were made happy through turning to
God, so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from God.
Therefore if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an
end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end, which is
inadmissible.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi) Origen [*Cf.
[5178]FP, Q[64], A[2]] "erred in maintaining that the demons will at
length, through God's mercy, be delivered from their punishment." But
this error has been condemned by the Church for two reasons. First
because it is clearly contrary to the authority of Holy Writ (Apoc.
20:9,10): "The devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire
and brimstone, where both the beasts and the false prophets [*Vulg.:
'the beast and false prophet,' etc.] shall be tormented day and night
for ever and ever," which is the Scriptural expression for eternity.
Secondly, because this opinion exaggerated God's mercy in one direction
and depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for
the good angels to remain in eternal happiness, and for the wicked
angels to be eternally punished. Wherefore just as he maintained that
the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length
from their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the souls
of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the
unhappiness of this life.
Reply to Objection 1: God, for His own part, has mercy on all. Since,
however, His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result is
that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy
of that mercy, as do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in
wickedness. And yet we may say that even in them His mercy finds a
place, in so far as they are punished less than they deserve condignly,
but not that they are entirely delivered from punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted the distribution (of the
predicate) regards the genera and not the individuals: so that the
statement applies to men in the state of wayfarer, inasmuch as He had
mercy both on Jews and on Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every
Jew.
Reply to Objection 3: Anselm means that it is not just in the sense of
becoming God's goodness, and is speaking of the creature generically.
For it becomes not the Divine goodness that a whole genus of creature
fail of the end for which it was made: wherefore it is unbecoming for
all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some men
or some angels should perish for ever, because the intention of the
Divine will is fulfilled in the others who are saved.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God's mercy suffers at least men to be punished eternally?
Objection 1: It would seem that God's mercy does not suffer at least
men to be punished eternally. For it is written (Gn. 6:3): "My spirit
shall not remain in man for ever because he is flesh"; where "spirit"
denotes indignation, as a gloss observes. Therefore, since God's
indignation is not distinct from His punishment, man will not be
punished eternally.
Objection 2: Further, the charity of the saints in this life makes them
pray for their enemies. Now they will have more perfect charity in that
life. Therefore they will pray then for their enemies who are damned.
But the prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most
acceptable to God. Therefore at the saints' prayers the Divine mercy
will in time deliver the damned from their punishment.
Objection 3: Further, God's foretelling of the punishment of the damned
belongs to the prophecy of commination. Now the prophecy of commination
is not always fulfilled: as appears from what was said of the
destruction of Nineve (Jonas 3); and yet it was not destroyed as
foretold by the prophet, who also was troubled for that very reason
(Jonah 4:1). Therefore it would seem that much more will the threat of
eternal punishment be commuted by God's mercy for a more lenient
punishment, when this will be able to give sorrow to none but joy to
all.
Objection 4: Further, the words of Ps. 76:8 are to the point, where it
is said: "Will God then be angry for ever? [*Vulg.: 'Will God then cast
off for ever?']" But God's anger is His punishment. Therefore, etc.
Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Is. 14:19, "But thou art cast out,"
etc. says: "Even though all souls shall have rest at last, thou never
shalt": and it refers to the devil. Therefore it would seem that all
human souls shall at length have rest from their pains.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the elect conjointly
with the damned: "These shall go into everlasting punishment: but the
just, into life everlasting." But it is inadmissible that the life of
the just will ever have an end. Therefore it is inadmissible that the
punishment of the damned will ever come to an end.
Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) "death is to men what
their fall was to the angels." Now after their fall the angels could
not be restored [*Cf. [5179]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore neither can man
after death: and thus the punishment of the damned will have no end.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 17,18), some evaded
the error of Origen by asserting that the demons are punished
everlastingly, while holding that all men, even unbelievers, are at
length set free from punishment. But this statement is altogether
unreasonable. For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and
therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are the souls of men who
die without charity, since "death is to men what their fall was to the
angels," as Damascene says.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying refers to man generically, because
God's indignation was at length removed from the human race by the
coming of Christ. But those who were unwilling to be included or to
remain in this reconciliation effected by Christ, perpetuated the
Divine anger in themselves, since no other way of reconciliation is
given to us save that which is through Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 24) and Gregory
(Moral. xxxiv) say, the saints in this life pray for their enemies,
that they may be converted to God, while it is yet possible for them to
be converted. For if we knew that they were foreknown to death, we
should no more pray for them than for the demons. And since for those
who depart this life without grace there will be no further time for
conversion, no prayer will be offered for them, neither by the Church
militant, nor by the Church triumphant. For that which we have to pray
for them is, as the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:25,26), that "God may give
them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from
the snares of the devil."
Reply to Objection 3: A punishment threatened prophetically is only
then commuted when there is a change in the merits of the person
threatened. Hence: "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against
a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that
nation . . . shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil
that I have thought to do to them" (Jer. 18:7). Therefore, since the
merits of the damned cannot be changed, the threatened punishment will
ever be fulfilled in them. Nevertheless the prophecy of commination is
always fulfilled in a certain sense, because as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei. xxi, 24): "Nineve has been overthrown, that was evil, and a good
Nineve is built up, that was not: for while the walls and the houses
remained standing, the city was overthrown in its wicked ways."
Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Psalm refer to the vessels of
mercy, which have not made themselves unworthy of mercy, because in
this life (which may be called God's anger on account of its
unhappiness) He changes vessels of mercy into something better. Hence
the Psalm continues (Ps. 76:11): "This is the change of the right hand
of the most High." We may also reply that they refer to mercy as
granting a relaxation but not setting free altogether if it be referred
also to the damned. Hence the Psalm does not say: "Will He from His
anger shut up His mercies?" but "in His anger," because the punishment
will not be done away entirely; but His mercy will have effect by
diminishing the punishment while it continues.
Reply to Objection 5: This gloss is speaking not absolutely but on an
impossible supposition in order to throw into relief the greatness of
the devil's sin, or of Nabuchodonosor's.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that at least the punishment of Christians
is brought to an end by the mercy of God. "For he that believeth and is
baptized shall be saved" (Mk. 16:16). Now this applies to every
Christian. Therefore all Christians will at length be saved.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jn. 6:55): "He that eateth My body
and drinketh My blood hath eternal life." Now this is the meat and
drink whereof Christians partake in common. Therefore all Christians
will be saved at length.
Objection 3: Further, "If any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss:
but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15), where
it is a question of those who have the foundation of the Christian
faith. Therefore all such persons will be saved in the end.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9): "The unjust shall not
possess the kingdom of God." Now some Christians are unjust. Therefore
Christians will not all come to the kingdom of God, and consequently
they will be punished for ever.
Further, it is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better for them not
to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to
turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them." Now
those who know not the way of truth will be punished for ever.
Therefore Christians who have turned back after knowing it will also be
punished for ever.
I answer that, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 20,21), there
have been some who predicted a delivery from eternal punishment not for
all men, but only for Christians. although they stated the matter in
different ways. For some said that whoever received the sacraments of
faith would be immune from eternal punishment. But this is contrary to
the truth, since some receive the sacraments of faith, and yet have not
faith, without which "it is impossible to please God" (Heb. 11:6).
Wherefore others said that those alone will be exempt from eternal
punishment who have received the sacraments of faith, and professed the
Catholic faith. But against this it would seem to be that at one time
some people profess the Catholic faith, and afterwards abandon it, and
these are deserving not of a lesser but of a greater punishment, since
according to 2 Pet. 2:21, "it had been better for them not to have
known the way of justice than, after they have known it, to turn back."
Moreover it is clear that heresiarchs who renounce the Catholic faith
and invent new heresies sin more grievously than those who have
conformed to some heresy from the first. And therefore some have
maintained that those alone are exempt from eternal punishment, who
persevere to the end in the Catholic faith, however guilty they may
have been of other crimes. But this is clearly contrary to Holy Writ,
for it is written (James 2:20): "Faith without works is dead," and
(Mat. 7:21) "Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter
into the kingdom of heaven: but he that doth the will of My Father Who
is in heaven": and in many other passages Holy Scripture threatens
sinners with eternal punishment. Consequently those who persevere in
the faith unto the end will not all be exempt from eternal punishment,
unless in the end they prove to be free from other crimes.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord speaks there of formed faith [*Cf.
[5180]SS, Q[4], A[3]] "that worketh by love [Vulg.: 'charity'; Gal.
5:6]": wherein whosoever dieth shall be saved. But to this faith not
only is the error of unbelief opposed, but also any mortal sin
whatsoever.
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of our Lord refers not to those who
partake only sacramentally, and who sometimes by receiving unworthily
"eat and drink judgment" to themselves (1 Cor. 11:29), but to those who
eat spiritually and are incorporated with Him by charity, which
incorporation is the effect of the sacramental eating, in those who
approach worthily [*Cf. [5181]TP, Q[80], AA[1],2,3]. Wherefore, so far
as the power of the sacrament is concerned, it brings us to eternal
life, although sin may deprive us of that fruit, even after we have
received worthily.
Reply to Objection 3: In this passage of the Apostle the foundation
denotes formed faith, upon which whosoever shall build venial sins
[*Cf. [5182]FS, Q[89], A[2]] "shall suffer loss," because he will be
punished for them by God; yet "he himself shall be saved" in the end
"by fire," either of temporal tribulation, or of the punishment of
purgatory which will be after death.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all those who perform works of mercy will be punished eternally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all who perform works of mercy will not
be punished eternally, but only those who neglect those works. For it
is written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not
done mercy"; and (Mat. 5:7): "Blessed are the merciful for they shall
obtain mercy."
Objection 2: Further, (Mat. 25:35-46) we find a description of our
Lord's discussion with the damned and the elect. But this discussion is
only about works of mercy. Therefore eternal punishment will be awarded
only to such as have omitted to practice works of mercy: and
consequently the same conclusion follows as before.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 6:12): "Forgive us our debts,
as we also forgive our debtors," and further on (Mat. 6:14): "For if
you will forgive men their offenses, your heavenly Father will forgive
you also your offenses." Therefore it would seem that the merciful, who
forgive others their offenses, will themselves obtain the forgiveness
of their sins, and consequently will not be punished eternally.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Godliness is
profitable to all things," says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule
of life consists in mercy and godliness. Let a man follow this, and
though he should suffer from the inconstancy of the flesh, without
doubt he will be scourged, but he will not perish: whereas he who can
boast of no other exercise but that of the body will suffer everlasting
punishment." Therefore those who persevere in works of mercy, though
they be shackled with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally: and
thus the same conclusion follows as before.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9,10): "Neither fornicators .
. . nor adulterers," etc. "shall possess the kingdom of God." Yet many
are such who practice works of mercy. Therefore the merciful will not
all come to the eternal kingdom: and consequently some of them will be
punished eternally.
Further, it is written (James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole
law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Therefore
whoever keeps the law as regards the works of mercy and omits other
works, is guilty of transgressing the law, and consequently will be
punished eternally.
I answer that, As Augustine says in the book quoted above (De Civ. Dei
xxi, 22), some have maintained that not all who have professed the
Catholic faith will be freed from eternal punishment, but only those
who persevere in works of mercy, although they be guilty of other
crimes. But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can be
acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto eternal life in the
absence of charity. Now it happens that certain persons persevere in
works of mercy without having charity. Wherefore nothing profits them
to the meriting of eternal life, or to exemption from eternal
punishment, as may be gathered from 1 Cor. 13:3. Most evident is this
in the case of those who lay hands on other people's property, for
after seizing on many things, they nevertheless spend something in
works of mercy. We must therefore conclude that all whosoever die in
mortal sin, neither faith nor works of mercy will free them from
eternal punishment, not even after any length of time whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: Those will obtain mercy who show mercy in an
ordinate manner. But those who while merciful to others are neglectful
of themselves do not show mercy ordinately, rather do they strike at
themselves by their evil actions. Wherefore such persons will not
obtain the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that
mercy which rebates somewhat their due punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why the discussion refers only to the
works of mercy is not because eternal punishment will be inflicted on
none but those who omit those works, but because eternal punishment
will be remitted to those who after sinning have obtained forgiveness
by their works of mercy, making unto themselves "friends of the mammon
of iniquity" (Lk. 16:9).
Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord said this to those who ask that their
debt be forgiven, but not to those who persist in sin. Wherefore the
repentant alone will obtain by their works of mercy the forgiveness
that sets them free altogether.
Reply to Objection 4: The gloss of Ambrose speaks of the inconstancy
that consists in venial sin, from which a man will be freed through the
works of mercy after the punishment of purgatory, which he calls a
scourging. Or, if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sin, the sense
is that those who while yet in this life fall into sins of the flesh
through frailty are disposed to repentance by works of mercy. Wherefore
such a one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed by
those works not to perish, through grace bestowed on him by our Lord,
Who is blessed for evermore. Amen.
__________________________________________________________________
Appendix
__________________________________________________________________
Appendix 1
The following two questions were compiled by Nicolai from St. Thomas'
Commentary on the Sentences, and by him included in the supplement
between Questions 70 and 71.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY (TW
O
ARTICLES)
We must next consider the various qualities of souls that are stripped
of their bodies, according to their respective states; and first we
shall treat of the souls which depart this life with original sin only.
Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether these souls suffer from a bodily fire, and are inflicted
with punishment by fire?
(2) Whether these souls suffer from a spiritual torment within
themselves?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those souls which depart with original sin alone, suffer from a
bodily fire, and are punished by fire?
Objection 1: It would seem that souls which depart with none but
original sin, suffer from a bodily fire and are punished by fire. For
Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, xxvii] says: "Hold firmly
and doubt not that children who depart this life without the sacrament
of Baptism will be punished everlastingly." Now punishment denotes
sensible pain. Therefore souls which depart this life with original sin
alone, suffer from a bodily fire and are tormented with the pain of
fire.
Objection 2: Further, a greater fault deserves a greater punishment.
Now original sin is greater than venial, because it contains more
aversion, since it deprives its subject of grace, whereas venial sin is
compatible with grace; and again because original sin is punished
eternally, whereas venial sin is punished temporally. Seeing then that
venial sin is deserving of the punishment of fire, much more so is
original sin.
Objection 3: Further, sins are more severely punished after this life
than during lifetime, for in this life there is room for mercy. Now,
sensible punishment corresponds to original sin in this life, for
children who have only original sin are justly subject to many sensible
punishments. Therefore sensible punishment is due to it after this
life.
Objection 4: Further, even as in actual sin there is aversion and
conversion, so in original sin there is something corresponding to
aversion, namely the privation of original justice, and something
corresponding to conversion, namely concupiscence. Now the punishment
of fire is due to actual sin by reason of the conversion. Therefore it
is also due to original sin by reason of concupiscence.
Objection 5: Further, after the resurrection the bodies of children
will be either passible or impassible. If they be impassible---and no
human body can be impassible except either on account of the gift of
impassibility (as in the blessed) or by reason of original justice (as
in the state of innocence)---it follows that the bodies of children
will either have the gift of impassibility, and thus will be glorious,
so that there will be no difference between baptized and non-baptized
children, which is heretical, or else they will have original justice,
and thus will be without original sin, and will not be punished for
original sin, which is likewise heretical. If, on the other hand, they
be passible, since everything passible suffers of necessity in the
presence of the active, it follows that in the presence of active
sensible bodies they will suffer sensible punishment.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiii) that the mildest
punishment of all will be for those who are burdened with original sin
only. But this would not be so, if they were tormented with sensible
punishment, because the pain of hell fire is most grievous. Therefore
they will not suffer sensible punishment.
Further, the grief of sensible punishment corresponds to the pleasure
of sin (Apoc. 18:7): "As much as she hath glorified herself and lived
in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her." But there is
no pleasure in original sin, as neither is there operation, for
pleasure follows operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Therefore
punishment by fire is not due to original sin.
Further, Gregory Nazianzen in his fortieth sermon, which is entitled on
Holy Baptism, distinguishes three classes of unbaptized persons: those
namely who refuse to be baptized, those who through neglect have put
off being baptized until the end of life and have been surprised by
sudden death, and those who, like infants, have failed to receive it
through no fault of theirs. Of the first he says that they will be
punished not only for their other sins, but also for their contempt of
Baptism; of the second, that they will be punished, though less
severely than the first, for having neglected it; and of the last he
says that "a just and eternal Judge will consign them neither to
heavenly glory nor to the eternal pains of hell, for although they have
not been signed with Baptism, they are without wickedness and malice,
and have suffered rather than caused their loss of Baptism." He also
gives the reason why, although they do not reach the glory of heaven,
they do not therefore suffer the eternal punishment suffered by the
damned: "Because there is a mean between the two, since he who deserves
not honor and glory is not for that reason worthy of punishment, and on
the other hand he who is not deserving of punishment is not for that
reason worthy of glory and honor."
I answer that, Punishment should be proportionate to fault, according
to the saying of Isaias (27:8), "In measure against measure, when it
shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now the defect transmitted to
us through our origin, and having the character of a sin does not
result from the withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon
human nature by virtue of its principles, but from the withdrawal or
corruption of something that had been superadded to nature. Nor does
this sin belong to this particular man, except in so far as he has such
a nature, that is deprived of this good, which in the ordinary course
of things he would have had and would have been able to keep. Wherefore
no further punishment is due to him, besides the privation of that end
to which the gift withdrawn destined him, which gift human nature is
unable of itself to obtain. Now this is the divine vision; and
consequently the loss of this vision is the proper and only punishment
of original sin after death: because, if any other sensible punishment
were inflicted after death for original sin, a man would be punished
out of proportion to his guilt, for sensible punishment is inflicted
for that which is proper to the person, since a man undergoes sensible
punishment in so far as he suffers in his person. Hence, as his guilt
did not result from an action of his own, even so neither should he be
punished by suffering himself, but only by losing that which his nature
was unable to obtain. On the other hand, those who are under sentence
for original sin will suffer no loss whatever in other kinds of
perfection and goodness which are consequent upon human nature by
virtue of its principles.
Reply to Objection 1: In the authority quoted punishment denotes, not
pain of sense, but only pain of loss, which is the privation of the
divine vision, even as in Scripture the word "fire" is often wont to
signify any kind of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Of all sins original sin is the least, because it
is the least voluntary; for it is voluntary not by the will of the
person, but only by the will of the origin of our nature. But actual
sin, even venial, is voluntary by the will of the person in which it
is; wherefore a lighter punishment is due to original than to venial
sin. Nor does it matter that original sin is incompatible with grace;
because privation of grace has the character, not of sin, but of
punishment, except in so far as it is voluntary: for which reason that
which is less voluntary is less sinful. Again it matters not that
actual venial sin is deserving of temporal punishment, since this is
accidental, for as much as he who falls venially has sufficient grace
to attenuate the punishment. For if venial sin were in a person without
grace, it would be punished eternally.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no parity between pain of sense before
and after death, since before death the pain of sense results from the
power of the natural agent, whether the pain of sense be interior as
fever or the like, or exterior as burning and so forth. Whereas after
death nothing will act by natural power, but only according to the
order of divine justice, whether the object of such action be the
separate soul, on which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or
the body after resurrection, since then all natural action will cease,
through the cessation of the first movable which is the cause of all
bodily movement and alteration.
Reply to Objection 4: Sensible pain corresponds to sensible pleasure,
which is in the conversion of actual sin: whereas habitual
concupiscence, which is in original sin, has no pleasure. Hence,
sensible pain does not correspond thereto as punishment.
Reply to Objection 5: The bodies of children will be impassible, not
through their being unable in themselves to suffer, but through the
lack of an external agent to act upon them: because, after the
resurrection, no body will act on another, least of all so as to induce
corruption by the action of nature, but there will only be action to
the effect of punishing them by order of the divine justice. Wherefore
those bodies to which pain of sense is not due by divine justice will
not suffer punishment. On the other hand, the bodies of the saints will
be impassible, because they will lack the capability of suffering;
hence impassibility in them will be a gift, but not in children.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether these same souls suffer spiritual affliction on account of the stat
e
in which they are?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in question suffer spiritual
affliction on account of the state wherein they are, because as
Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in Matth.), the punishment of God in that
they will be deprived of seeing God will be more painful than their
being burned in hell fire. Now these souls will be deprived of seeing
God. Therefore they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby.
Objection 2: Further, one cannot, without suffering, lack what one
wishes to have. But these souls would wish to have the divine vision,
else their will would be actually perverse. Therefore since they are
deprived of it, seemingly they also suffer.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that they do not suffer, because
they know that through no fault of theirs they are deprived thereof, on
the contrary: Freedom from fault does not lessen but increases the pain
of punishment: for a man does not grieve less for that he is
disinherited or deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore
these souls likewise, albeit deprived of so great a good through no
fault of theirs, suffer none the less.
Objection 4: Further, as baptized children are in relation to the merit
of Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit of Adam. But
baptized children receive the reward of eternal life by virtue of
Christ's merit. Therefore the unbaptized suffer pain through being
deprived of eternal life on account of Adam's demerit.
Objection 5: Further, separation from what we love cannot be without
pain. But these children will have natural knowledge of God, and for
that very reason will love Him naturally. Therefore since they are
separated from Him for ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this
separation without pain.
On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior sorrow after
death, they will grieve either for their sin or for their punishment.
If for their sin, since they cannot be further cleansed from that sin,
their sorrow will lead them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the
damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore these children will have
the worm of conscience, and consequently theirs would not be the
mildest punishment, as Augustine says it is [*See A[1], "On the
contrary"]. If, on the other hand, they grieve for their punishment, it
follows, since their punishment is justly inflicted by God, that their
will opposes itself to divine justice, and thus would be actually
inordinate, which is not to be granted. Therefore they will feel no
sorrow.
Further, right reason does not allow one to be disturbed on account of
what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca proves (Ep. lxxxv, and De
ira ii, 6) that "a wise man is not disturbed." Now in these children
there is right reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore they will
not be disturbed for that they undergo this punishment which they could
nowise avoid.
I answer that, on this question there are three opinions. Some say that
these children will suffer no pain, because their reason will be so
much in the dark that they will not know that they lack what they have
lost. It, however, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily
burden should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able to
explore, and many more besides. Hence others say that they have perfect
knowledge of things subject to natural reason, and know God, and that
they are deprived of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow
on this account but that their sorrow will be mitigated, in so far as
it was not by their will that they incurred the sin for which they are
condemned. Yet this again would seem improbable, because this sorrow
cannot be little for the loss of so great a good, especially without
the hope of recovery: wherefore their punishment would not be the
mildest. Moreover the very same reason that impugns their being
punished with pain of sense, as afflicting them from without, argues
against their feeling sorrow within, because the pain of punishment
corresponds to the pleasure of sin; wherefore, since original sin is
void of pleasure, its punishment is free of all pain. Consequently
others say that they will know perfectly things subject to natural
knowledge, and both the fact of their being deprived of eternal life
and the reason for this privation, and that nevertheless this knowledge
will not cause any sorrow in them. How this may be possible we must
explore.
Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by right reason
one does not grieve through being deprived of what is beyond one's
power to obtain, but only through lack of that which, in some way, one
is capable of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to
fly like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since
these things are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked
that to which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that every man
who has the use of free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because
he can prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life [*Cf.
[5183]FS, Q[109], AA[5],6]; so that if he fail in this, his grief will
be very great, since he has lost what he was able to possess. But
children were never adapted to possess eternal life, since neither was
this due to them by virtue of their natural principles, for it
surpasses the entire faculty of nature, nor could they perform acts of
their own whereby to obtain so great a good. Hence they will nowise
grieve for being deprived of the divine vision; nay, rather will they
rejoice for that they will have a large share of God's goodness and
their own natural perfections. Nor can it be said that they were
adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their own action, but by
the actions of others around them, since they could be baptized by
others, like other children of the same condition who have been
baptized and obtained eternal life: for this is of superabundant grace
that one should be rewarded without any act of one's own. Wherefore the
lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children who die without
Baptism, any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others of
the same condition makes a wise man to grieve.
Reply to Objection 1: In those who, having the use of free-will, are
damned for actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain eternal life, but
not in children, as stated above. Consequently there is no parity
between the two.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the will may be directed both to the
possible and to the impossible as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, an ordinate
and complete will is only of things which in some way are proportionate
to our capability; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but
not if we fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which should
be called "velleity" [*Cf. [5184]FS, Q[13], A[5], ad 1; [5185]TP,
Q[21], A[4]] rather than "will"; for one does not will such things
absolutely, but one would if they were possible.
Reply to Objection 3: Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance or
bodily members, wherefore it is not strange that he should grieve at
their loss, whether this be through his own or another's fault: hence
it is clear that the argument is not based on a true comparison.
Reply to Objection 4: The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of Adam, as
stated in Rom. 5:15, seqq. Hence it does not follow that unbaptized
children have as much of evil as the baptized have of good.
Reply to Objection 5: Although unbaptized children are separated from
God as regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from
Him: in fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods,
and so will also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge
and love.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE QUALITY OF SOULS WHO EXPIATE ACTUAL SIN OR ITS PUNISHMENT IN PURGATORY
(SIX ARTICLES)
We must next treat of the souls which after this life expiate the
punishment of their actual sins in the fire of Purgatory.
Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the pain of Purgatory surpasses all the temporal pains of
this life?
(2) Whether that punishment is voluntary?
(3) Whether the souls in Purgatory are punished by the demons?
(4) Whether venial sin as regards its guilt is expiated by the pains of
Purgatory?
(5) Whether the fire of Purgatory frees from the debt of punishment?
(6) Whether one is freed from that punishment sooner than another?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the pains of Purgatory surpass all the temporal pains of this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the pains of Purgatory do not surpass
all the temporal pains of this life. Because the more passive a thing
is the more it suffers if it has the sense of being hurt. Now the body
is more passive than the separate soul, both because it has contrariety
to a fiery agent, and because it has matter which is susceptive of the
agent's quality: and this cannot be said of the soul. Therefore the
pain which the body suffers in this world is greater than the pain
whereby the soul is cleansed after this life.
Objection 2: Further, the pains of Purgatory are directly ordained
against venial sins. Now since venial sins are the least grievous, the
lightest punishment is due to them, if the measure of the stripes is
according to the measure of the fault. Therefore the pain of Purgatory
is the lightest of all.
Objection 3: Further, since the debt of punishment is an effect of sin,
it does not increase unless the sin increases. Now sin cannot increase
in one whose sin is already remitted. Therefore if a mortal sin has
been remitted in a man who has not fully paid the debt of punishment,
this debt does not increase when he dies. But while he lived he was not
in debt to the extent of the most grievous punishment. Therefore the
pain that he will suffer after this life will not be more grievous to
him than all other pains of this life.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (xli De Sanctis): "This
fire of Purgatory will be more severe than any pain that can be felt,
seen or conceived in this world."
Further, the more universal a pain is the greater it is. Now the whole
separate soul is punished, since it is simple: which is not the case
with the body. Therefore this, being the punishment of the separate
soul, is greater than any pain suffered by the body.
I answer that, In Purgatory there will be a twofold pain; one will be
the pain of loss, namely the delay of the divine vision, and the pain
of sense, namely punishment by corporeal fire. With regard to both the
least pain of Purgatory surpasses the greatest pain of this life. For
the more a thing is desired the more painful is its absence. And since
after this life the holy souls desire the Sovereign Good with the most
intense longing---both because their longing is not held back by the
weight of the body, and because, had there been no obstacle, they would
already have gained the goal of enjoying the Sovereign Good---it
follows that they grieve exceedingly for their delay. Again, since pain
is not hurt, but the sense of hurt, the more sensitive a thing is, the
greater the pain caused by that which hurts it: wherefore hurts
inflicted on the more sensible parts cause the greatest pain. And,
because all bodily sensation is from the soul, it follows of necessity
that the soul feels the greatest pain when a hurt is inflicted on the
soul itself. That the soul suffers pain from the bodily fire is at
present taken for granted, for we shall treat of this matter further on
[*Cf. [5186]XP, Q[70], A[3]]. Therefore it follows that the pain of
Purgatory, both of loss and of sense, surpasses all the pains of this
life.
Some, however, prove this from the fact that the whole soul is
punished, and not the body. But this is to no purpose, since in that
case the punishment of the damned would be milder after the
resurrection than before, which is false.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the soul is less passive than the body,
it is more cognizant of actual suffering [passionis]: and where the
sense of suffering is greater, there is the greater pain, though the
suffering be less.
Reply to Objection 2: The severity of that punishment is not so much a
consequence of the degree of sin, as of the disposition of the person
punished, because the same sin is more severely punished then than now.
Even so a person who has a better temperament is punished more severely
by the same sentence than another; and yet the judge acts justly in
condemning both for the same crimes to the same punishment.
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this punishment is voluntary?
Objection 1: It would seem that this punishment is voluntary. For those
who are in Purgatory are upright in heart. Now uprightness in heart is
to conform one's will to God's, as Augustine says (Serm. i in Ps. 32).
Therefore, since it is God's will that they be punished, they will
suffer that punishment voluntarily.
Objection 2: Further, every wise man wills that without which he cannot
obtain the end he has in view. Now those who are in Purgatory know that
they cannot obtain glory, unless they be punished first. Therefore they
are punished willingly.
On the contrary, No one asks to be freed from a punishment that he
suffers willingly. Now those who are in Purgatory ask to be set free,
as appears from many incidents related in the Dialogue of Gregory (iv,
40,65). Therefore they will not undergo that punishment voluntarily.
I answer that, A thing is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, by
an absolute act of the will; and thus no punishment is voluntary,
because the very notion of punishment is that it be contrary to the
will. Secondly, a thing is said to be voluntary by a conditional act of
the will: thus cautery is voluntary for the sake of regaining health.
Hence a punishment may be voluntary in two ways. First, because by
being punished we obtain some good, and thus the will itself undertakes
a punishment, as instanced in satisfaction, or when a man accepts a
punishment gladly, and would not have it not to be, as in the case of
martyrdom. Secondly, when, although we gain no good by the punishment,
we cannot obtain a good without being punished, as in the case of
natural death: and then the will does not undertake the punishment, and
would be delivered from it; but it submits to it, and in this respect
the punishment is said to be voluntary. In this latter sense the
punishment of Purgatory is said to be voluntary.
Some, however, say that it is not voluntary in any way, because the
souls in Purgatory are so replete with suffering, that they know not
that they are being cleansed by their pains, and deem themselves
damned. But this is false, for did they not know that they will be set
free, they would not ask for prayers, as they often do.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the soul in Purgatory are punished by the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in Purgatory are punished by
the demons; for, according to the Master, "they will have for torturers
in their pains, those who were their tempters in sin." Now the demons
tempt us to sin, not only mortal, but also venial when they fail in the
former. Therefore in Purgatory also they will torture souls on account
of venial sins.
Objection 2: Further, the just are competent to be cleansed from sin
both in this life and afterwards. Now, in this life, they are cleansed
by pains inflicted by the devil, as was the case with Job. Therefore
after this life also, those who have to be cleansed will be punished by
the demons.
On the contrary, It were unjust that he who has triumphed over someone,
should be subjected to him after victory. Now those who are in
Purgatory have triumphed over the demons, since they died without
mortal sin. Therefore they will not be subjected to them through being
punished by them.
I answer that, As after the Judgment day the Divine justice will kindle
the fire with which the damned will be punished for ever, even so now
the elect are cleansed after this life by the Divine justice alone, and
neither by the ministry of the demons whom they have vanquished, nor by
the ministry of the angels who would not inflict such tortures on their
fellow-citizens. It is, however, possible that they take them to the
place of punishment: also that even the demons, who rejoice in the
punishment of man, accompany them and stand by while they are being
cleansed, both that they may be sated with their pains, and that when
these leave their bodies, they may find something of their own in them.
But in this life, while there is yet time for the combat, men are
punished both by the wicked angels as foes, as instanced in Job, and by
the good angels, as instanced in Jacob, the sinew of whose thigh shrank
at the angel's touch [*Gn. 32:25]. Moreover, Dionysius says explicitly
that the good angels sometimes inflict punishment.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin is expiated by the pains of Purgatory as regards the
guilt?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not expiated by the pains
of Purgatory as regards the guilt. For a gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral.
xvi, 28] on 1 Jn. 5:16, "There is a sin unto death," etc. says: "It is
vain to ask pardon after death for what was not amended in this life."
Therefore no sin is remitted as to guilt after this life.
Objection 2: Further, the same subject is freed from sin as falls into
sin. But after death the soul cannot sin venially. Therefore neither
can it be loosed from venial sin.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says [*Dial. iv, 39] that every man will
be at the judgment as he was when he left the body, because "the tree .
. . wheresoever it shall fall, there shall it be" [*Eccles. 11:3]. If,
then, a man go forth from this life with venial sin, he will be with
venial sin at the judgment: and consequently one does not atone for
venial sin in Purgatory.
Objection 4: Further, it has been stated ([5187]XP, Q[2], A[3]) that
actual sin is not blotted out save by contrition. But there will be no
contrition after this life, because it is a meritorious act. For then
there will be neither merit nor demerit since, according to the
Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 4], "death is to men what the fall was to
the angels." Therefore, after this life, venial sin is not remitted in
Purgatory as to its guilt.
Objection 5: Further, venial sin is not in us except on account of the
fomes. Wherefore in the original state Adam would not have sinned
venially, as was stated (Sent. ii, D, xxi, 2). Now after this life
there will be no sensuality; because the fomes will cease when the soul
is separated, since it is called the "law of the flesh" (Rom. 7). Hence
there will be no venial sin then, and consequently it cannot be
expiated by the fire of Purgatory.
On the contrary, Gregory [*Dial. iv, 39] and Augustine [*De vera et
falsa poenit. iv, xviii, by some other author] say that certain slight
sins will be remitted in the life to come. Nor can this be understood
of the punishment: because thus all sins, however grave they be, are
expiated by the fire of Purgatory, as regards the debt of punishment.
Therefore venial sins are cleansed by the fire of Purgatory as to their
guilt.
Further, wood, hay, stubble (1 Cor. 3:12) denote venial sins, as we
have said ([5188]FS, Q[89], A[2]). Now wood, hay, stubble are consumed
in Purgatory. Therefore venial sins are remitted after this life.
I answer that, Some have asserted that no sin is remitted after this
life, as regards the guilt: that if a man die with mortal sin, he is
damned and incapable of being forgiven; and that it is not possible for
a man to die with a venial sin and without mortal sin, since the final
grace washes the venial sin away. They assign as reason for this that
venial sin is excessive love of a temporal thing, in one who has his
foundation in Christ, which excess results from the corruption of
concupiscence. Wherefore if grace entirely overcome the corruption of
concupiscence, as in the Blessed Virgin, there is no room for venial
sin. Hence, since this concupiscence is altogether abated and removed,
the powers of the soul are wholly subject to grace, and venial sin is
cast out. But this opinion is nonsensical in itself and in its proof.
In itself, because it is opposed to the statements of holy men and of
the Gospel, which cannot be expounded as referring to the remission of
venial sins as to their punishment, as the Master says in the text
[*Sentent. iv, D, xxi] because in this way both light and grave sins
are remitted in the life to come: while Gregory [*Dial. iv, 39]
declares that light sins alone are remitted after this life. Nor does
it suffice for them to say, that this is said expressly of light sins,
lest we should think that we shall suffer nothing grievous on their
account: because the remission of sin diminishes punishment rather than
aggravates it. As to the proof, it is shown to be worthless, since
bodily defect, such as obtains at the last moment of life, does not
remove the corruption of concupiscence; nor does it diminish it in its
root but in its act, as instanced in those who lie dangerously ill; nor
again does it calm the powers of the soul, so as to subject them to
grace, because tranquillity of the powers, and their subjection to
grace, is effected when the lower powers obey the higher which delight
together in God's law. But this cannot happen in that state, since the
acts of both kinds of powers are impeded; unless tranquillity denote
the absence of combat, as occurs even in those who are asleep; and yet
sleep is not said, for this reason, to diminish concupiscence, or to
calm the powers of the soul, or to subject them to grace. Moreover,
granted that the aforesaid defect diminish concupiscence radically, and
that it subject the powers to grace, it would still be insufficient to
wash away venial sin already committed, although it would suffice in
order to avoid it in the future. Because actual sin, even if it be
venial, is not remitted without an actual movement of contrition, as
stated above ([5189]XP, Q[2], A[3]), however much the latter be in the
habitual intention. Now it happens sometimes that a man dies in his
sleep, being in a state of grace and yet having a venial sin when he
went to sleep: and such a man cannot make an act of contrition for his
venial sin before he dies. Nor may we say, as they do, that if he
repented neither by act nor by intention, neither in general nor in
particular, his venial sin becomes mortal, for that "venial becomes
mortal when it is an object of complacency"; because not all
complacency in venial sin makes it mortal (else all venial sin would be
mortal, since every venial sin pleases for as much as it is voluntary),
but only that complacency which amounts to enjoyment, wherein all human
wickedness consists, in that "we enjoy what we should use," as
Augustine says [*De Trin. x, 10]. Hence the complacency which makes a
sin mortal is actual complacency, for every mortal sin consists in an
act. Now it may happen that a man, after committing a venial sin, has
no actual thought of being forgiven or of remaining in that sin, but
thinks perhaps about a triangle having its three angles equal to two
right angles, and while engaged in this thought falls asleep, and dies.
It is therefore clear that this opinion is utterly unreasonable: and
consequently we must say with others that venial sin in one who dies in
a state of grace, is remitted after this life by the fire of Purgatory:
because this punishment so far as it is voluntary, will have the power,
by virtue of grace, to expiate all such guilt as is compatible with
grace. [*St. Thomas expresses himself differently, De Malo[5190], Q[7],
A[2], ad 9,17: "Guilt is not remitted by punishment, but venial sin as
to its guilt is remitted in Purgatory by virtue of grace, not only as
existing in the habit, but also as proceeding to the act of charity in
detestation of venial sin."]
Reply to Objection 1: The gloss refers to mortal sin. Or it may be
replied that although, in this life, it is not amended in itself, it is
amended in merits, because a man merited here that his punishment
should be meritorious to him there.
Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin arises from the corruption of the
fomes, which will no longer be in the separate soul that is in
Purgatory, wherefore this soul cannot sin venially. On the other hand,
the remission of venial sin proceeds from the will informed by grace,
which will be in the separate soul in Purgatory. Hence the comparison
fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Venial sins do not alter a man's state, for they
neither destroy nor diminish charity, according to which the amount of
the soul's gratuitous goodness is measured. Hence the soul remains such
as it was before, notwithstanding the remission or commission of venial
sins.
Reply to Objection 4: After this life there can be no merit in respect
of the essential reward, but there can be in respect of some accidental
reward, so long as man remains in the state of the way, in a sense.
Consequently in Purgatory there can be a meritorious act in respect of
the remission of venial sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Although venial sin arises from the proneness of
the fomes, sin results in the mind; wherefore even when the fomes is no
more, sin can still remain.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fire of Purgatory delivers from the debt of punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fire of Purgatory does not deliver
from the debt of punishment. For every cleansing is in respect of some
uncleanness. But punishment does not imply uncleanness. Therefore the
fire of Purgatory does not deliver from punishment.
Objection 2: Further, a contrary is not cleansed save by its contrary.
But punishment is not contrary to punishment. Therefore one is not
cleansed from the debt of punishment by the punishment of Purgatory.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 3:15, "He shall be saved, yet
so," etc. says: "This fire is the trial of tribulation of which it is
written (Ecclus. 27:6): The furnace tries the potter's vessels," etc.
Therefore man expiates every punishment by the pains of this world, at
least by death, which is the greatest punishment of all, and not by the
fire of Purgatory.
On the contrary, The pains of Purgatory are more grievous than all the
pains of this world, as stated above [5191](A[3]). Now the satisfactory
punishment which one undergoes in this life atones for the debt of
punishment. Much more therefore is this effected by the punishment of
Purgatory.
I answer that, Whosoever is another's debtor, is freed from his
indebtedness by paying the debt. And, since the obligation incurred by
guilt is nothing else than the debt of punishment, a person is freed
from that obligation by undergoing the punishment which he owed.
Accordingly the punishment of Purgatory cleanses from the debt of
punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the debt of punishment does not in
itself imply uncleanness, it bears a relation to uncleanness by reason
of its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Although punishment is not contrary to
punishment, it is opposed to the debt of punishment, because the
obligation to punishment remains from the fact that one has not
undergone the punishment that was due.
Reply to Objection 3: Many meanings underlie the same words of Holy
Writ. Hence this fire may denote both the present tribulation and the
punishment to come, and venial sins can be cleansed from both of these.
That natural death is not sufficient for this, has been stated above
(Sent. iv, D, 20).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one person is delivered from this punishment sooner than another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one person is not delivered from this
punishment sooner than another. For the more grievous the sin, and the
greater the debt, the more severely is it punished in Purgatory. Now
there is the same proportion between severer punishment and graver
fault, as between lighter punishment and less grievous fault. Therefore
one is delivered from this punishment as soon as another.
Objection 2: Further, in point of duration unequal merits receive equal
retribution both in heaven and in hell. Therefore seemingly it is the
same in Purgatory.
On the contrary, is the comparison of the Apostle, who denotes the
differences of venial sins by wood, hay, and stubble. Now it is clear
that wood remains longer in the fire than hay and stubble. Therefore
one venial sin is punished longer in Purgatory than another.
I answer that, Some venial sins cling more persistently than others,
according as the affections are more inclined to them, and more firmly
fixed in them. And since that which clings more persistently is more
slowly cleansed, it follows that some are tormented in Purgatory longer
than others, for as much as their affections were steeped in venial
sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Severity of punishment corresponds properly
speaking to the amount of guilt: whereas the length corresponds to the
firmness with which sin has taken root in its subject. Hence it may
happen that one may be delayed longer who is tormented less, and "vice
versa."
Reply to Objection 2: Mortal sin which deserves the punishment of hell,
and charity which deserves the reward of heaven, will, after this life,
be immovably rooted in their subject. Hence as to all there is the same
duration in either case. It is otherwise with venial sin which is
punished in Purgatory, as stated above [5192](A[6]).
__________________________________________________________________
Appendix 2
__________________________________________________________________
TWO ARTICLES ON PURGATORY
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is a Purgatory after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a Purgatory after this
life. For it is said (Apoc. 14:13): "Blessed are the dead who die in
the Lord. From henceforth now, saith the Spirit, that they may rest
from their labors." Therefore after this life no cleansing labor awaits
those who die in the Lord, nor those who do not die in the Lord, since
they cannot be cleansed. Therefore there is no Purgatory after this
life.
Objection 2: Further, as charity is to an eternal reward, so is mortal
sin to eternal punishment. Now those who die in mortal sin are
forthwith consigned to eternal punishment. Therefore those who die in
charity go at once to their reward; and consequently no Purgatory
awaits them after this life.
Objection 3: Further, God Who is supremely merciful is more inclined to
reward good than to punish evil. Now just as those who are in the state
of charity, do certain evil things which are not deserving of eternal
punishment, so those who are in mortal sin, at times perform actions,
generically good, which are not deserving of an eternal reward.
Therefore since these good actions are not rewarded after this life in
those who will be damned, neither should those evil actions be punished
after this life. Hence the same conclusion follows.
On the contrary, It is said (2 Macc. 12:46): "It is a holy and
wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from
sins." Now there is no need to pray for the dead who are in heaven, for
they are in no need; nor again for those who are in hell, because they
cannot be loosed from sins. Therefore after this life, there are some
not yet loosed from sins, who can be loosed therefrom; and the like
have charity, without which sins cannot be loosed, for "charity
covereth all sins" [*Prov. 10:12]. Hence they will not be consigned to
everlasting death, since "he that liveth and believeth in Me, shall not
die for ever" [*Jn. 11:26]: nor will they obtain glory without being
cleansed, because nothing unclean shall obtain it, as stated in the
last chapter of the Apocalypse (verse 14). Therefore some kind of
cleansing remains after this life.
Further, Gregory of Nyssa [*De iis qui in fide dormiunt] says: "If one
who loves and believes in Christ," has failed to wash away his sins in
this life, "he is set free after death by the fire of Purgatory."
Therefore there remains some kind of cleansing after this life.
I answer that, From the conclusions we have drawn above ([5193]TP,
Q[86], AA[4],5; [5194]XP, Q[12], A[1]) it is sufficiently clear that
there is a Purgatory after this life. For if the debt of punishment is
not paid in full after the stain of sin has been washed away by
contrition, nor again are venial sins always removed when mortal sins
are remitted, and if justice demands that sin be set in order by due
punishment, it follows that one who after contrition for his fault and
after being absolved, dies before making due satisfaction, is punished
after this life. Wherefore those who deny Purgatory speak against the
justice of God: for which reason such a statement is erroneous and
contrary to faith. Hence Gregory of Nyssa, after the words quoted
above, adds: "This we preach, holding to the teaching of truth, and
this is our belief; this the universal Church holds, by praying for the
dead that they may be loosed from sins." This cannot be understood
except as referring to Purgatory: and whosoever resists the authority
of the Church, incurs the note of heresy.
Reply to Objection 1: The authority quoted is speaking of the labor of
working for merit, and not of the labor of suffering to be cleansed.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil has not a perfect cause, but results from
each single defect: whereas good arises from one perfect cause, as
Dionysius asserts [*Div. Nom. iv, 4]. Hence each defect is an obstacle
to the perfection of good; while not every good hinders some
consummation of evil, since there is never evil without some good.
Consequently venial sin prevents one who has charity from obtaining the
perfect good, namely eternal life, until he be cleansed; whereas mortal
sin cannot be hindered by some conjoined good from bringing a man
forthwith to the extreme of evils.
Reply to Objection 3: He that falls into mortal sin, deadens all the
good he has done before, and what he does, while in mortal sin, is
dead: since by offending God he deserves to lose all the good he has
from God. Wherefore no reward after this life awaits him who dies in
mortal sin, whereas sometimes punishment awaits him who dies in
charity, which does not always wash away the sin which it finds, but
only that which is contrary to it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is the same place where souls are cleansed, and the damned
punished?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not the same place where souls
are cleansed and the damned punished. For the punishment of the damned
is eternal, according to Mat. 25:46, "These shall go into everlasting
punishment [Vulg.: 'fire']." But the fire of Purgatory is temporary, as
the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 21). Therefore the former and the latter
are not punished together in the same place: and consequently these
places must needs be distinct.
Objection 2: The punishment of hell is called by various names, as in
Ps. 10:7, "Fire and brimstone, and storms of winds," etc., whereas the
punishment of Purgatory is called by one name only, namely fire.
Therefore they are not punished with the same fire and in the same
place.
Objection 3: Further, Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii, 16): "It
is probable that they are punished in the very places where they
sinned." And Gregory relates (Dial. iv, 40) that Germanus, Bishop of
Capua, found Paschasius being cleansed in the baths. Therefore they are
not cleansed in the same place as hell, but in this world.
On the contrary, Gregory says [*The quotation is from St. Augustine (De
Civ. Dei i, 8)]: "Even as in the same fire gold glistens and straw
smokes, so in the same fire the sinner burns and the elect is
cleansed." Therefore the fire of Purgatory is the same as the fire of
hell: and hence they are in the same place.
Further, the holy fathers; before the coming of Christ, were in a more
worthy place than that wherein souls are now cleansed after death,
since there was no pain of sense there. Yet that place was joined to
hell, or the same as hell: otherwise Christ when descending into Limbo
would not be said to have descended into hell. Therefore Purgatory is
either close to, or the same place as, hell.
I answer that, Nothing is clearly stated in Scripture about the
situation of Purgatory, nor is it possible to offer convincing
arguments on this question. It is probable, however, and more in
keeping with the statements of holy men and the revelations made to
many, that there is a twofold place of Purgatory. one, according to the
common law; and thus the place of Purgatory is situated below and in
proximity to hell, so that it is the same fire which torments the
damned in hell and cleanses the just in Purgatory; although the damned
being lower in merit, are to be consigned to a lower place. Another
place of Purgatory is according to dispensation: and thus sometimes, as
we read, some are punished in various places, either that the living
may learn, or that the dead may be succored, seeing that their
punishment being made known to the living may be mitigated through the
prayers of the Church.
Some say, however, that according to the common law the place of
Purgatory is where man sins. This does not seem probable, since a man
may be punished at the same time for sins committed in various places.
And others say that according to the common law they are punished above
us, because they are between us and God, as regards their state. But
this is of no account, for they are not punished for being above us,
but for that which is lowest in them, namely sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The fire of Purgatory is eternal in its
substance, but temporary in its cleansing effect.
Reply to Objection 2: The punishment of hell is for the purpose of
affliction, wherefore it is called by the names of things that are wont
to afflict us here. But the chief purpose of the punishment of
Purgatory is to cleanse us from the remains of sin; and consequently
the pain of fire only is ascribed to Purgatory, because fire cleanses
and consumes.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the point of special
dispensation and not that of the common law.
__________________________________________________________________
Indexes
__________________________________________________________________
Index of Scripture References
Genesis
[5195]1 [5196]1 [5197]1 [5198]1 [5199]1 [5200]1 [5201]1
[5202]1 [5203]1:1 [5204]1:1 [5205]1:1 [5206]1:1 [5207]1:1
[5208]1:1 [5209]1:1 [5210]1:1 [5211]1:1 [5212]1:2 [5213]1:2
[5214]1:3 [5215]1:3-4 [5216]1:4 [5217]1:4 [5218]1:5
[5219]1:5 [5220]1:5 [5221]1:6 [5222]1:6 [5223]1:7 [5224]1:7
[5225]1:8 [5226]1:9 [5227]1:11 [5228]1:11-12 [5229]1:12
[5230]1:14 [5231]1:14 [5232]1:16 [5233]1:20 [5234]1:20
[5235]1:20 [5236]1:21 [5237]1:22 [5238]1:24 [5239]1:24
[5240]1:25 [5241]1:26 [5242]1:26 [5243]1:26 [5244]1:26
[5245]1:26 [5246]1:26 [5247]1:26 [5248]1:26 [5249]1:26
[5250]1:26 [5251]1:26 [5252]1:26 [5253]1:26 [5254]1:26
[5255]1:26-29 [5256]1:27 [5257]1:27 [5258]1:27 [5259]1:28
[5260]1:28 [5261]1:28 [5262]1:29-30 [5263]1:30 [5264]1:31
[5265]1:31 [5266]1:31 [5267]1:31 [5268]1:31 [5269]1:31
[5270]1:31 [5271]2 [5272]2 [5273]2 [5274]2 [5275]2
[5276]2:1 [5277]2:2 [5278]2:2 [5279]2:2 [5280]2:2 [5281]2:2
[5282]2:2 [5283]2:3 [5284]2:4-5 [5285]2:4-5 [5286]2:7
[5287]2:7 [5288]2:7 [5289]2:7 [5290]2:7 [5291]2:7 [5292]2:8
[5293]2:8 [5294]2:8 [5295]2:8 [5296]2:10 [5297]2:14
[5298]2:15 [5299]2:15 [5300]2:16 [5301]2:16 [5302]2:17
[5303]2:17 [5304]2:18 [5305]2:18 [5306]2:18 [5307]2:20
[5308]2:20 [5309]2:21 [5310]2:21 [5311]2:22 [5312]2:22
[5313]2:23 [5314]2:23 [5315]2:23 [5316]2:23 [5317]2:23-24
[5318]2:24 [5319]2:24 [5320]2:24 [5321]2:24 [5322]2:24
[5323]2:24 [5324]2:24 [5325]3 [5326]3 [5327]3:1 [5328]3:1
[5329]3:3 [5330]3:5 [5331]3:5 [5332]3:5 [5333]3:6 [5334]3:7
[5335]3:7 [5336]3:14-15 [5337]3:16 [5338]3:16 [5339]3:16
[5340]3:16 [5341]3:16 [5342]3:16 [5343]3:16 [5344]3:16
[5345]3:16 [5346]3:16 [5347]3:17 [5348]3:17 [5349]3:17
[5350]3:17 [5351]3:17 [5352]3:17-18 [5353]3:18 [5354]3:19
[5355]3:19 [5356]3:19 [5357]3:19 [5358]3:22 [5359]3:22
[5360]3:22 [5361]3:22 [5362]3:23 [5363]3:24 [5364]4:1
[5365]4:1 [5366]4:1 [5367]4:3-4 [5368]4:7 [5369]4:7
[5370]4:7 [5371]4:10 [5372]4:10 [5373]4:13 [5374]4:13
[5375]4:23 [5376]4:23-24 [5377]5:5 [5378]6:3 [5379]6:4
[5380]6:7 [5381]7:2-3 [5382]7:20 [5383]8:21 [5384]8:21
[5385]8:22 [5386]9 [5387]9:3 [5388]9:3 [5389]9:3 [5390]9:3
[5391]9:3 [5392]9:4-5 [5393]9:25 [5394]9:25 [5395]11
[5396]12 [5397]12:7 [5398]12:12 [5399]13:1 [5400]13:2
[5401]13:18 [5402]14:18 [5403]14:18 [5404]14:18 [5405]14:18
[5406]14:20 [5407]15:8 [5408]15:9 [5409]15:12 [5410]16:4
[5411]17 [5412]17 [5413]17 [5414]17 [5415]17:1 [5416]17:1
[5417]17:5 [5418]17:11 [5419]17:11 [5420]17:13 [5421]18
[5422]18 [5423]18:2 [5424]18:2 [5425]18:16 [5426]18:17
[5427]18:19 [5428]18:20 [5429]18:25 [5430]18:27 [5431]19
[5432]19 [5433]19 [5434]19:11 [5435]19:17 [5436]19:22
[5437]19:25 [5438]20:2 [5439]20:7 [5440]20:12 [5441]21:14
[5442]22 [5443]22:1 [5444]22:2 [5445]22:2 [5446]22:5
[5447]22:11 [5448]22:12 [5449]22:12 [5450]22:13 [5451]22:14
[5452]22:18 [5453]22:18 [5454]23:8 [5455]24 [5456]25:1
[5457]25:5-6 [5458]25:21 [5459]25:25 [5460]25:31 [5461]26:20
[5462]26:21 [5463]26:24 [5464]27:27 [5465]27:27-29
[5466]27:41 [5467]28 [5468]28 [5469]28:1 [5470]28:13
[5471]28:18 [5472]28:20 [5473]28:20 [5474]28:21 [5475]28:22
[5476]28:22 [5477]29:14 [5478]29:17 [5479]30:5 [5480]30:9
[5481]32 [5482]32:25 [5483]32:25 [5484]32:30 [5485]32:30
[5486]32:30 [5487]32:31 [5488]32:32 [5489]32:32 [5490]34:12
[5491]37:2 [5492]37:2 [5493]37:2 [5494]37:23 [5495]38:18
[5496]38:23 [5497]38:27 [5498]39:21 [5499]40 [5500]41:1-7
[5501]41:22 [5502]41:26 [5503]41:46 [5504]41:51 [5505]42
[5506]42:16 [5507]44:5 [5508]44:15 [5509]44:38 [5510]46:26
[5511]49:10 [5512]49:10
Exodus
[5513]1:21 [5514]1:21 [5515]2:12 [5516]2:21 [5517]3:2
[5518]3:6 [5519]3:6 [5520]3:8 [5521]3:11 [5522]3:13-14
[5523]3:14 [5524]3:14 [5525]3:17 [5526]4 [5527]4:10
[5528]4:12 [5529]4:25 [5530]4:25 [5531]6 [5532]6:2-3
[5533]6:2-3 [5534]8 [5535]8:26 [5536]11 [5537]12 [5538]12
[5539]12 [5540]12:6 [5541]12:8 [5542]12:10 [5543]12:11
[5544]12:12 [5545]12:13 [5546]12:15 [5547]12:19 [5548]12:26
[5549]12:27 [5550]12:29 [5551]12:33 [5552]12:35
[5553]12:35-36 [5554]12:43 [5555]12:46 [5556]12:48
[5557]12:48 [5558]13 [5559]13 [5560]13:2 [5561]13:9
[5562]13:9 [5563]14 [5564]14:21 [5565]14:21 [5566]15:2
[5567]15:2-3 [5568]15:3 [5569]15:11 [5570]15:11 [5571]15:18
[5572]16:32 [5573]17:11 [5574]17:16 [5575]18:19-20
[5576]18:21 [5577]18:21 [5578]18:22 [5579]19:11 [5580]19:12
[5581]19:15 [5582]19:16 [5583]19:20 [5584]19:21 [5585]19:21
[5586]20 [5587]20:1 [5588]20:1 [5589]20:2 [5590]20:3
[5591]20:4 [5592]20:4 [5593]20:5 [5594]20:5 [5595]20:5
[5596]20:5 [5597]20:5 [5598]20:5 [5599]20:5 [5600]20:7
[5601]20:7 [5602]20:7 [5603]20:8 [5604]20:11 [5605]20:11
[5606]20:12 [5607]20:12 [5608]20:12 [5609]20:12 [5610]20:12
[5611]20:12 [5612]20:13 [5613]20:14 [5614]20:14 [5615]20:15
[5616]20:15 [5617]20:16 [5618]20:17 [5619]20:17 [5620]20:17
[5621]20:24 [5622]20:24 [5623]20:24 [5624]20:26 [5625]20:26
[5626]20:26 [5627]21 [5628]21 [5629]21:2 [5630]21:2
[5631]21:7 [5632]21:7 [5633]21:12 [5634]21:16 [5635]21:20-21
[5636]21:22 [5637]21:23-24 [5638]21:24 [5639]21:24
[5640]21:24 [5641]21:26-27 [5642]21:29 [5643]21:29
[5644]21:33-34 [5645]22:1 [5646]22:1 [5647]22:1 [5648]22:1
[5649]22:1 [5650]22:1 [5651]22:1 [5652]22:1-9 [5653]22:2
[5654]22:3 [5655]22:9 [5656]22:10-11 [5657]22:15 [5658]22:16
[5659]22:16-17 [5660]22:18 [5661]22:18 [5662]22:20
[5663]22:20 [5664]22:20 [5665]22:21 [5666]22:21 [5667]22:25
[5668]22:25 [5669]22:26 [5670]22:26 [5671]22:28 [5672]22:28
[5673]23 [5674]23:2 [5675]23:2 [5676]23:3 [5677]23:4
[5678]23:5 [5679]23:5 [5680]23:7 [5681]23:7 [5682]23:8
[5683]23:8 [5684]23:8 [5685]23:8 [5686]23:9 [5687]23:11
[5688]23:13 [5689]23:14 [5690]23:15 [5691]23:19 [5692]23:20
[5693]24:7 [5694]24:7-8 [5695]24:12 [5696]24:12 [5697]24:14
[5698]25 [5699]25 [5700]25:2 [5701]25:18 [5702]25:24-25
[5703]25:25 [5704]25:25 [5705]25:25 [5706]25:25 [5707]25:25
[5708]26 [5709]26:3 [5710]26:18 [5711]27 [5712]27:1-2
[5713]27:1-2 [5714]28 [5715]28:1 [5716]29 [5717]29:18
[5718]30:1 [5719]30:3 [5720]30:7 [5721]30:18 [5722]30:19-20
[5723]31:13 [5724]32 [5725]32 [5726]32 [5727]32 [5728]32:4
[5729]32:6 [5730]32:20 [5731]32:27 [5732]32:28 [5733]32:28
[5734]32:28 [5735]32:29 [5736]32:34 [5737]32:34 [5738]33:11
[5739]33:11 [5740]33:13 [5741]33:18-19 [5742]33:20
[5743]33:20 [5744]33:22 [5745]35:20-21 [5746]38:21
[5747]39:21 [5748]40 [5749]40:31-32 [5750]40:32
Leviticus
[5751]1 [5752]1:13 [5753]1:15 [5754]2:1 [5755]2:5 [5756]4
[5757]4:2 [5758]4:3 [5759]4:23 [5760]4:26 [5761]4:28
[5762]5 [5763]5 [5764]5 [5765]5:1 [5766]5:1 [5767]5:17-18
[5768]7:6 [5769]7:15 [5770]7:15 [5771]7:35 [5772]8 [5773]8
[5774]8:7 [5775]8:7-9 [5776]8:31 [5777]9:9-10 [5778]10:9
[5779]10:16 [5780]10:19 [5781]11 [5782]11 [5783]11
[5784]12:2-4 [5785]12:3 [5786]12:3 [5787]12:6 [5788]12:6
[5789]12:8 [5790]12:17 [5791]14 [5792]14 [5793]14:3
[5794]14:3-4 [5795]15:16 [5796]15:19 [5797]15:25 [5798]16
[5799]16:11 [5800]16:11 [5801]16:16 [5802]16:17 [5803]16:27
[5804]17:11 [5805]17:11 [5806]17:13 [5807]17:14 [5808]17:14
[5809]17:14 [5810]18 [5811]18 [5812]18:4 [5813]18:5
[5814]18:6 [5815]18:7 [5816]18:8 [5817]18:10 [5818]18:19
[5819]19:2 [5820]19:2 [5821]19:2 [5822]19:9 [5823]19:12
[5824]19:13 [5825]19:13 [5826]19:13 [5827]19:13 [5828]19:16
[5829]19:16 [5830]19:16 [5831]19:17 [5832]19:17 [5833]19:18
[5834]19:18 [5835]19:18 [5836]19:18 [5837]19:18 [5838]19:18
[5839]19:18 [5840]19:18 [5841]19:19 [5842]19:19 [5843]19:19
[5844]19:19 [5845]19:23 [5846]19:31 [5847]19:32 [5848]19:32
[5849]19:32 [5850]20 [5851]20 [5852]20:8 [5853]20:9
[5854]20:9 [5855]20:16 [5856]20:18 [5857]21 [5858]21:9
[5859]21:17 [5860]21:17-18 [5861]21:17-18 [5862]21:18
[5863]21:21 [5864]22:27 [5865]23:3 [5866]23:32 [5867]23:36
[5868]24 [5869]24:2 [5870]24:8-9 [5871]24:15 [5872]24:16
[5873]25 [5874]25:4 [5875]25:25 [5876]25:28 [5877]25:39
[5878]25:39-40 [5879]26:26 [5880]27:9 [5881]27:9-10
[5882]27:10 [5883]27:27 [5884]27:28 [5885]27:30 [5886]27:32
[5887]28:22-23
Numbers
[5888]4 [5889]5:12 [5890]5:13 [5891]5:15 [5892]5:19-27
[5893]6:2 [5894]6:8 [5895]6:23-24 [5896]6:27 [5897]7:3
[5898]8 [5899]8 [5900]8:7 [5901]9:15 [5902]11:16
[5903]11:16 [5904]11:17 [5905]11:17 [5906]12:6 [5907]12:6
[5908]12:6 [5909]12:6 [5910]12:8 [5911]12:8 [5912]14
[5913]15:24 [5914]15:30-31 [5915]15:32 [5916]15:34
[5917]15:38 [5918]15:38 [5919]16 [5920]16:26 [5921]16:30
[5922]17:10 [5923]18:8 [5924]18:12 [5925]18:16 [5926]18:21
[5927]18:21 [5928]18:23-24 [5929]18:23-24 [5930]18:26
[5931]19 [5932]19:7 [5933]19:15 [5934]21:16 [5935]22:12
[5936]22:14 [5937]22:23 [5938]23:7 [5939]23:8 [5940]23:19
[5941]24:5 [5942]24:17 [5943]25 [5944]25 [5945]25:7-14
[5946]27:8 [5947]27:16 [5948]28 [5949]28 [5950]28:6
[5951]29 [5952]30:4 [5953]30:4 [5954]30:4-6 [5955]30:6
[5956]30:7-9 [5957]33:53-54 [5958]33:54 [5959]35:25
[5960]35:25 [5961]35:28 [5962]36:6 [5963]36:6 [5964]36:7-8
[5965]38:3-4
Deuteronomy
[5966]1:11 [5967]1:13 [5968]1:13 [5969]1:15 [5970]1:16
[5971]1:16 [5972]1:16-17 [5973]1:17 [5974]1:17 [5975]1:17
[5976]1:17 [5977]1:17 [5978]1:17 [5979]4 [5980]4:2
[5981]4:2 [5982]4:2 [5983]4:6 [5984]4:6 [5985]4:6 [5986]4:6
[5987]4:6 [5988]4:8 [5989]4:9 [5990]4:9 [5991]4:13
[5992]4:13-14 [5993]4:19 [5994]4:19 [5995]4:36-37 [5996]5:1
[5997]5:5 [5998]5:5 [5999]5:5 [6000]5:11 [6001]5:11
[6002]5:14 [6003]5:16 [6004]5:29 [6005]6 [6006]6 [6007]6:1
[6008]6:1 [6009]6:1 [6010]6:4 [6011]6:4 [6012]6:4 [6013]6:4
[6014]6:5 [6015]6:5 [6016]6:5 [6017]6:5 [6018]6:5 [6019]6:5
[6020]6:5 [6021]6:6 [6022]6:7 [6023]6:8 [6024]6:10
[6025]6:13 [6026]6:13 [6027]6:13 [6028]6:16 [6029]6:16
[6030]6:17 [6031]7 [6032]7:2-3 [6033]7:3 [6034]7:4
[6035]7:6 [6036]7:14 [6037]7:25 [6038]7:26 [6039]8:11
[6040]9:5 [6041]9:6 [6042]10 [6043]10:4 [6044]10:12
[6045]10:12 [6046]10:12 [6047]10:12 [6048]10:12 [6049]10:14
[6050]11:1 [6051]12:5-6 [6052]12:31 [6053]13 [6054]13
[6055]13:1-3 [6056]13:3 [6057]13:8-9 [6058]13:9 [6059]13:11
[6060]14 [6061]14:1 [6062]14:22-23 [6063]14:28 [6064]14:28-29
[6065]15:2 [6066]15:4 [6067]15:7 [6068]15:13 [6069]16:18
[6070]16:18 [6071]16:18 [6072]16:19 [6073]16:20 [6074]16:20
[6075]16:21 [6076]17 [6077]17:2 [6078]17:6 [6079]17:8-9
[6080]17:8-9 [6081]17:9 [6082]17:14 [6083]17:14-15
[6084]17:15 [6085]17:15 [6086]17:18-19 [6087]18 [6088]18:10
[6089]18:10 [6090]18:10-11 [6091]18:10-11 [6092]18:10-11
[6093]18:10-11 [6094]18:13 [6095]18:14 [6096]18:15
[6097]18:21-22 [6098]19:4 [6099]19:12-13 [6100]19:15
[6101]19:15 [6102]19:16 [6103]19:18-20 [6104]20 [6105]20:3
[6106]20:3-4 [6107]20:5-7 [6108]20:8 [6109]20:8 [6110]20:10
[6111]20:13-19 [6112]21:1 [6113]21:4 [6114]21:4 [6115]21:10
[6116]21:10 [6117]21:11 [6118]21:15 [6119]21:15 [6120]21:18
[6121]21:18 [6122]21:20 [6123]21:20 [6124]21:23 [6125]22
[6126]22:1 [6127]22:1-3 [6128]22:1-4 [6129]22:5 [6130]22:5
[6131]22:6 [6132]22:9 [6133]22:11 [6134]22:13 [6135]22:13-19
[6136]22:20-21 [6137]22:23-29 [6138]22:25 [6139]22:25
[6140]22:28-29 [6141]22:28-30 [6142]23 [6143]23:1-2
[6144]23:2 [6145]23:3 [6146]23:7 [6147]23:10 [6148]23:13
[6149]23:15 [6150]23:17 [6151]23:17 [6152]23:18 [6153]23:18
[6154]23:18 [6155]23:19 [6156]23:19 [6157]23:19-20
[6158]23:19-20 [6159]23:21 [6160]23:22 [6161]23:23
[6162]23:24 [6163]23:25 [6164]24:1 [6165]24:1 [6166]24:1
[6167]24:1-4 [6168]24:3 [6169]24:4 [6170]24:4 [6171]24:6
[6172]24:10 [6173]24:10 [6174]24:10-11 [6175]24:12-13
[6176]24:19 [6177]25:2 [6178]25:2 [6179]25:2 [6180]25:2
[6181]25:2 [6182]25:2 [6183]25:2 [6184]25:2 [6185]25:2
[6186]25:2 [6187]25:2 [6188]25:2 [6189]25:3 [6190]25:4
[6191]25:5 [6192]25:5-6 [6193]25:9 [6194]25:13 [6195]25:13
[6196]25:13-14 [6197]25:16 [6198]26 [6199]26 [6200]26:2-3
[6201]26:3 [6202]26:3 [6203]26:10 [6204]26:10 [6205]26:20
[6206]27:26 [6207]27:26 [6208]28 [6209]28 [6210]28:1
[6211]28:1-14 [6212]28:11 [6213]28:12 [6214]28:32 [6215]28:56
[6216]30:20 [6217]30:20 [6218]32:4 [6219]32:4 [6220]32:4
[6221]32:4 [6222]32:4 [6223]32:4 [6224]32:4 [6225]32:4
[6226]32:4 [6227]32:4 [6228]32:4 [6229]32:4 [6230]32:4
[6231]32:4 [6232]32:6 [6233]32:6 [6234]32:7 [6235]32:35
[6236]32:35 [6237]32:38 [6238]32:39 [6239]32:42 [6240]33:9
[6241]33:15 [6242]33:26 [6243]34:10 [6244]34:10-11
[6245]34:10-11
Joshua
[6246]3:16 [6247]4 [6248]5:2 [6249]5:5-6 [6250]5:15
[6251]6:4 [6252]7:14 [6253]7:19 [6254]8:2 [6255]10:12
[6256]10:12-14 [6257]10:14 [6258]10:14 [6259]14:15 [6260]22:17
Judges
[6261]2 [6262]3:1-2 [6263]3:9 [6264]3:10 [6265]3:15
[6266]4:4 [6267]5:20 [6268]6:36 [6269]7:3 [6270]7:15
[6271]11 [6272]11:29 [6273]11:30-31 [6274]14:12 [6275]15:14
[6276]16
Ruth
[6277]1:16 [6278]3:7 [6279]3:11
2 Kingdoms
[6280]1:5-14 [6281]1:21 [6282]2:26 [6283]5:4 [6284]5:14
[6285]6:7 [6286]7:3 [6287]12:13 [6288]12:13-14 [6289]19:6
[6290]22:2 [6291]23:1 [6292]23:1 [6293]23:2 [6294]23:3
[6295]23:4 [6296]24
1 Kings
[6297]1:13 [6298]2:3 [6299]2:6 [6300]2:6 [6301]3:1 [6302]4
[6303]4:18 [6304]7:3 [6305]8:7 [6306]8:11 [6307]9:7-8
[6308]9:9 [6309]9:20 [6310]13:14 [6311]14:1 [6312]14:58
[6313]15 [6314]15 [6315]15:17 [6316]15:17 [6317]15:22
[6318]15:22 [6319]15:23 [6320]15:29 [6321]15:29 [6322]16:7
[6323]16:7 [6324]16:7 [6325]16:7 [6326]16:7 [6327]16:7
[6328]17:32 [6329]17:39 [6330]21:13 [6331]26:19 [6332]26:19
[6333]28:8 [6334]28:11
1 Chronicles
[6335]29:14 [6336]29:17
2 Chronicles
[6337]1 [6338]1 [6339]16:14 [6340]19:2 [6341]19:2
[6342]19:2-3 [6343]20:12 [6344]20:12 [6345]29:31 [6346]30:18
[6347]30:18-19 [6348]30:19 [6349]33:18 [6350]37 [6351]37
Esther
[6352]1:3-4 [6353]6:11 [6354]13:9 [6355]13:14
Job
[6356]1:2 [6357]1:6 [6358]1:6 [6359]1:6 [6360]1:14
[6361]1:21 [6362]2:4 [6363]3:1 [6364]3:8 [6365]3:9
[6366]3:11 [6367]3:13 [6368]4:3-4 [6369]4:7 [6370]4:15
[6371]4:16 [6372]4:18 [6373]4:18 [6374]4:18-19 [6375]5:1
[6376]5:1 [6377]5:2 [6378]5:2 [6379]5:2 [6380]5:6 [6381]5:7
[6382]5:12 [6383]5:17 [6384]7:1 [6385]7:9 [6386]8:22
[6387]9:11 [6388]9:28 [6389]9:28 [6390]9:28 [6391]9:33
[6392]10:11 [6393]10:21 [6394]10:22 [6395]10:26 [6396]11:6
[6397]11:8-9 [6398]11:14 [6399]11:18 [6400]11:18 [6401]12
[6402]12:4 [6403]12:11 [6404]12:11 [6405]12:12 [6406]12:13
[6407]12:22 [6408]13:7 [6409]13:9 [6410]13:16 [6411]14:1
[6412]14:4 [6413]14:12 [6414]14:12 [6415]14:12 [6416]14:21
[6417]14:21 [6418]14:21 [6419]14:56 [6420]14:56 [6421]15:2
[6422]15:13 [6423]15:22 [6424]17:16 [6425]17:16 [6426]18:5
[6427]18:17 [6428]18:18 [6429]19:8 [6430]19:25 [6431]19:25
[6432]19:25-26 [6433]19:26 [6434]19:26 [6435]19:26
[6436]19:26 [6437]19:26 [6438]19:27 [6439]19:27 [6440]20:11
[6441]21:7 [6442]21:13 [6443]21:14 [6444]21:14 [6445]21:29
[6446]22:14 [6447]22:14 [6448]24:15 [6449]24:15 [6450]24:19
[6451]24:19 [6452]25:2 [6453]25:2 [6454]25:3 [6455]25:4
[6456]26:11 [6457]26:26 [6458]27:8 [6459]28:17 [6460]28:17
[6461]28:17 [6462]28:17 [6463]28:28 [6464]28:28 [6465]30:23
[6466]31:18 [6467]31:18 [6468]31:20 [6469]31:33 [6470]31:33
[6471]32:8 [6472]33:14 [6473]33:15-16 [6474]33:15-16
[6475]33:15-16 [6476]33:15-17 [6477]33:17 [6478]34:13
[6479]34:13 [6480]34:18 [6481]34:24 [6482]34:26 [6483]34:27
[6484]34:30 [6485]35:6 [6486]35:6 [6487]35:6-7 [6488]35:7
[6489]35:7 [6490]35:8 [6491]35:11 [6492]36:6 [6493]36:13
[6494]36:13 [6495]36:17 [6496]36:17 [6497]36:17 [6498]36:22
[6499]36:26 [6500]36:33 [6501]37 [6502]37:18 [6503]37:18
[6504]38:10 [6505]38:28 [6506]38:28 [6507]38:33 [6508]39:6
[6509]39:21 [6510]39:25 [6511]39:32 [6512]40:4 [6513]40:11
[6514]40:18 [6515]40:28 [6516]40:28 [6517]41:16 [6518]41:23
[6519]41:24 [6520]41:24 [6521]41:24 [6522]41:24-25
[6523]41:25 [6524]41:25 [6525]42:5 [6526]42:5 [6527]42:7
Psalms
[6528]1:2 [6529]1:2 [6530]1:5 [6531]1:5 [6532]1:7
[6533]1:14 [6534]1:19 [6535]2:1-2 [6536]2:4 [6537]2:4
[6538]2:7 [6539]2:7 [6540]2:8 [6541]4 [6542]4:3 [6543]4:3
[6544]4:5 [6545]4:5 [6546]4:5 [6547]4:6 [6548]4:6-7
[6549]4:6-7 [6550]4:7 [6551]4:7 [6552]4:7 [6553]5:7
[6554]5:7 [6555]5:7 [6556]5:7 [6557]5:7 [6558]5:11
[6559]6:3 [6560]6:3 [6561]6:6 [6562]6:7 [6563]6:11
[6564]7:1 [6565]7:1 [6566]7:4 [6567]7:5 [6568]7:10
[6569]7:10 [6570]7:16 [6571]8:2 [6572]8:2 [6573]8:5
[6574]8:6 [6575]8:8 [6576]8:8 [6577]8:8 [6578]8:8 [6579]8:9
[6580]9:5 [6581]9:18 [6582]9:24 [6583]9:24 [6584]9:38
[6585]9:38 [6586]10:5 [6587]10:6 [6588]10:6 [6589]10:6
[6590]10:7 [6591]10:7 [6592]10:8 [6593]10:8 [6594]10:8
[6595]11:2 [6596]11:2 [6597]11:2 [6598]13:3 [6599]13:5
[6600]14:4 [6601]14:5 [6602]15:2 [6603]15:2 [6604]15:9
[6605]15:10 [6606]15:10 [6607]15:11 [6608]15:11 [6609]15:11
[6610]16:10 [6611]16:15 [6612]16:15 [6613]17:6 [6614]17:27
[6615]18:6 [6616]18:6 [6617]18:8 [6618]18:8 [6619]18:8
[6620]18:8 [6621]18:8 [6622]18:9 [6623]18:9 [6624]18:10
[6625]18:10 [6626]18:13 [6627]18:13 [6628]18:13 [6629]18:13
[6630]18:15 [6631]19:8 [6632]19:10 [6633]21 [6634]21
[6635]21:2 [6636]21:2 [6637]21:2 [6638]21:2 [6639]21:3
[6640]21:26 [6641]21:30 [6642]22:2 [6643]22:2 [6644]22:3
[6645]22:5 [6646]22:6 [6647]23:1 [6648]23:1 [6649]23:7
[6650]23:7 [6651]23:8 [6652]23:9 [6653]24:10 [6654]24:10
[6655]25:6 [6656]26:4 [6657]26:4 [6658]26:4 [6659]26:8
[6660]27:7 [6661]28:2 [6662]28:7 [6663]28:7 [6664]29:6
[6665]29:10 [6666]30:1 [6667]30:1 [6668]30:2 [6669]30:6
[6670]30:10 [6671]30:16 [6672]30:21 [6673]30:33 [6674]31
[6675]31:1 [6676]31:1 [6677]31:2 [6678]31:2 [6679]31:5
[6680]31:5 [6681]32 [6682]32 [6683]32 [6684]32 [6685]32:1
[6686]32:1 [6687]32:1 [6688]32:2-3 [6689]32:9 [6690]32:9
[6691]32:15 [6692]32:22 [6693]33 [6694]33:2 [6695]33:2
[6696]33:6 [6697]33:6 [6698]33:8 [6699]33:9 [6700]33:9
[6701]33:10 [6702]33:10 [6703]33:15 [6704]33:15 [6705]33:15
[6706]33:16 [6707]34 [6708]34:13 [6709]34:13 [6710]34:13
[6711]34:13 [6712]34:18 [6713]35:4 [6714]35:7 [6715]35:7
[6716]35:9 [6717]35:10 [6718]35:10 [6719]35:10 [6720]35:10
[6721]35:10 [6722]35:10 [6723]35:10 [6724]35:10 [6725]35:10
[6726]35:10 [6727]35:10 [6728]35:10 [6729]36 [6730]36
[6731]36:1 [6732]36:1 [6733]36:3 [6734]36:4 [6735]36:4
[6736]36:4 [6737]36:5 [6738]36:10 [6739]36:15 [6740]36:24
[6741]36:25 [6742]36:25 [6743]36:39 [6744]36:39 [6745]37:13
[6746]37:13 [6747]37:14 [6748]38 [6749]38:4 [6750]38:4
[6751]38:7 [6752]38:13 [6753]39:5 [6754]39:9 [6755]39:9
[6756]39:9 [6757]39:9 [6758]39:13 [6759]39:18 [6760]39:18
[6761]40:5 [6762]40:5 [6763]40:11 [6764]41:3 [6765]41:4
[6766]41:4 [6767]42 [6768]42:3 [6769]44:8 [6770]44:8
[6771]44:10 [6772]44:10 [6773]44:14 [6774]44:14 [6775]44:17
[6776]45:4 [6777]45:5 [6778]45:11 [6779]45:11 [6780]45:11
[6781]46 [6782]46:6 [6783]46:8 [6784]46:8 [6785]47:4
[6786]47:35 [6787]48:7 [6788]48:13 [6789]48:13 [6790]48:19
[6791]48:21 [6792]48:21 [6793]48:21 [6794]48:21 [6795]49:3
[6796]49:3 [6797]49:3 [6798]49:4 [6799]49:13 [6800]49:13
[6801]49:16 [6802]49:21 [6803]49:22 [6804]49:23 [6805]49:23
[6806]50:1-2 [6807]50:6 [6808]50:6 [6809]50:12 [6810]50:19
[6811]50:19 [6812]50:19 [6813]50:19 [6814]50:19 [6815]51:3
[6816]52:1 [6817]52:6 [6818]52:6 [6819]53:8 [6820]54:13
[6821]57 [6822]57:5 [6823]57:9 [6824]57:11 [6825]57:11
[6826]57:11 [6827]57:12 [6828]58:10 [6829]58:11 [6830]59:6
[6831]61:6 [6832]61:9 [6833]61:12 [6834]61:12 [6835]61:12
[6836]61:13 [6837]62:6 [6838]62:10 [6839]63:7 [6840]64:2
[6841]64:5 [6842]64:5 [6843]64:5 [6844]65:13 [6845]67:5
[6846]67:7 [6847]67:8 [6848]67:19 [6849]67:19 [6850]67:23
[6851]67:26 [6852]67:34 [6853]67:34 [6854]68 [6855]68:5
[6856]68:5 [6857]68:5 [6858]68:5 [6859]68:10 [6860]68:29
[6861]68:29 [6862]69:4 [6863]69:6 [6864]70 [6865]70:3
[6866]70:9 [6867]70:15 [6868]70:15 [6869]70:15-16 [6870]70:18
[6871]72:2 [6872]72:2-3 [6873]72:3 [6874]72:3 [6875]72:5
[6876]72:25 [6877]72:27 [6878]72:27 [6879]72:28 [6880]72:28
[6881]72:28 [6882]72:28 [6883]73:12 [6884]73:12 [6885]73:23
[6886]73:23 [6887]73:23 [6888]74:6 [6889]74:9 [6890]75:5
[6891]75:12 [6892]75:12 [6893]75:12 [6894]75:12 [6895]75:12
[6896]75:12 [6897]76:4 [6898]76:4 [6899]76:8 [6900]76:11
[6901]77:18 [6902]77:25 [6903]77:34 [6904]77:39 [6905]77:39
[6906]79:4 [6907]79:17 [6908]79:17 [6909]79:20 [6910]80:10
[6911]80:13 [6912]80:16 [6913]81:4 [6914]81:4 [6915]81:4
[6916]81:5 [6917]81:6 [6918]81:6 [6919]81:6 [6920]83:3
[6921]83:3 [6922]83:3 [6923]83:3 [6924]83:3 [6925]83:3
[6926]83:6 [6927]83:7 [6928]83:8 [6929]83:12 [6930]83:12
[6931]83:12 [6932]83:12 [6933]83:12 [6934]83:12 [6935]84:2-3
[6936]84:7 [6937]84:9 [6938]84:11 [6939]85:8 [6940]87:4
[6941]87:4 [6942]87:4 [6943]87:6 [6944]88:9 [6945]88:27
[6946]89:1 [6947]89:1 [6948]90:11 [6949]90:11 [6950]90:15-16
[6951]91:5 [6952]91:11 [6953]92 [6954]92:5 [6955]93:10
[6956]93:10 [6957]93:11 [6958]93:12 [6959]93:15 [6960]93:15
[6961]94:3 [6962]94:5 [6963]94:9 [6964]95:5 [6965]95:5
[6966]95:6 [6967]96:3 [6968]96:3 [6969]96:7 [6970]96:8
[6971]98:5 [6972]98:5 [6973]98:5 [6974]98:9 [6975]99:1
[6976]99:2 [6977]99:3 [6978]99:3 [6979]100:8 [6980]100:8
[6981]101:14 [6982]101:23 [6983]101:26 [6984]101:26-27
[6985]102:3 [6986]102:3 [6987]102:5 [6988]102:5 [6989]102:19
[6990]102:20-21 [6991]102:22 [6992]103:4 [6993]103:4
[6994]103:5 [6995]103:15 [6996]103:15 [6997]103:15
[6998]103:15 [6999]103:24 [7000]103:24 [7001]103:24
[7002]103:26 [7003]104:8 [7004]104:15 [7005]104:18
[7006]104:25 [7007]104:37 [7008]105:1 [7009]105:31
[7010]105:38 [7011]105:38 [7012]105:40 [7013]105:40
[7014]106:18 [7015]108:4 [7016]109:4 [7017]109:4 [7018]109:4
[7019]109:4 [7020]109:4 [7021]110:2 [7022]110:4 [7023]110:9
[7024]110:10 [7025]110:10 [7026]110:10 [7027]111:4
[7028]112:4 [7029]112:4 [7030]112:4 [7031]113:3 [7032]113:5
[7033]113:11 [7034]113:11 [7035]113:24 [7036]115:2
[7037]115:11 [7038]115:12 [7039]117:16 [7040]118 [7041]118
[7042]118 [7043]118 [7044]118 [7045]118 [7046]118 [7047]118
[7048]118:1 [7049]118:8 [7050]118:8 [7051]118:20 [7052]118:20
[7053]118:20 [7054]118:32 [7055]118:33 [7056]118:35
[7057]118:43 [7058]118:51 [7059]118:58 [7060]118:60
[7061]118:63 [7062]118:63 [7063]118:72 [7064]118:82
[7065]118:93 [7066]118:93 [7067]118:96 [7068]118:100
[7069]118:100 [7070]118:100 [7071]118:102 [7072]118:103
[7073]118:113 [7074]118:120 [7075]118:120 [7076]118:120
[7077]118:165 [7078]118:165 [7079]118:165 [7080]118:165
[7081]119:5 [7082]120:1 [7083]120:1-2 [7084]120:4 [7085]122:2
[7086]122:2 [7087]124:1 [7088]124:3 [7089]125:5 [7090]127:1
[7091]127:2 [7092]130:1 [7093]130:2 [7094]130:2 [7095]130:2
[7096]131:11 [7097]132:1 [7098]132:2 [7099]132:2 [7100]134
[7101]134:6 [7102]134:6 [7103]135:4 [7104]135:10 [7105]135:10
[7106]136:1 [7107]136:7 [7108]138 [7109]138:1 [7110]138:2
[7111]138:14 [7112]138:16 [7113]138:17 [7114]138:22
[7115]139:6 [7116]139:14 [7117]140:2 [7118]140:4 [7119]140:5
[7120]141:2 [7121]141:4 [7122]142:5-6 [7123]142:10
[7124]142:10 [7125]143:15 [7126]143:15 [7127]144:7
[7128]144:7 [7129]144:9 [7130]144:9 [7131]144:9 [7132]144:9
[7133]144:9 [7134]144:13 [7135]145:6 [7136]146:5
[7137]146:8-9 [7138]146:9 [7139]147:3 [7140]147:3 [7141]147:3
[7142]147:9 [7143]147:20 [7144]148:2 [7145]148:2 [7146]148:4
[7147]148:4 [7148]148:6 [7149]148:6 [7150]148:7-8
[7151]148:7-8 [7152]148:8 [7153]149:6 [7154]159:4
Proverbs
[7155]1:4 [7156]1:18 [7157]1:32 [7158]1:33 [7159]1:33
[7160]2:4-5 [7161]2:14 [7162]2:14 [7163]2:14 [7164]2:14
[7165]2:14 [7166]2:14 [7167]3:3 [7168]3:3 [7169]3:5
[7170]3:5 [7171]3:6 [7172]3:9 [7173]3:12 [7174]3:13
[7175]3:15 [7176]3:16 [7177]3:18 [7178]3:28 [7179]3:34
[7180]4:2 [7181]4:3 [7182]4:3 [7183]4:3-4 [7184]4:18
[7185]4:18 [7186]4:19 [7187]4:25 [7188]4:25 [7189]5:22
[7190]6:1 [7191]6:1 [7192]6:3 [7193]6:6 [7194]6:6-8
[7195]6:8 [7196]6:12 [7197]6:12-14 [7198]6:16 [7199]6:16
[7200]6:19 [7201]6:19 [7202]6:19 [7203]6:30 [7204]6:30
[7205]6:30 [7206]6:30 [7207]6:32 [7208]7:10 [7209]7:22
[7210]8:6 [7211]8:8 [7212]8:8 [7213]8:15 [7214]8:15
[7215]8:15 [7216]8:17 [7217]8:17 [7218]8:18 [7219]8:22
[7220]8:22 [7221]8:23 [7222]8:24 [7223]8:29 [7224]8:31
[7225]9:1 [7226]9:3 [7227]9:3 [7228]9:5 [7229]9:8
[7230]9:17 [7231]10:12 [7232]10:12 [7233]10:12 [7234]10:12
[7235]10:12 [7236]10:12 [7237]10:12 [7238]10:12 [7239]10:12
[7240]10:12 [7241]10:12 [7242]10:23 [7243]10:23 [7244]10:24
[7245]11:2 [7246]11:2 [7247]11:5 [7248]11:10 [7249]11:13
[7250]11:13 [7251]11:14 [7252]11:17 [7253]11:18 [7254]11:26
[7255]11:29 [7256]12:20 [7257]12:21 [7258]12:26 [7259]13:10
[7260]13:10 [7261]13:10 [7262]13:12 [7263]13:12 [7264]13:12
[7265]13:12 [7266]13:16 [7267]13:24 [7268]13:24 [7269]14:13
[7270]14:16 [7271]14:16 [7272]14:22 [7273]14:22 [7274]14:22
[7275]14:22 [7276]14:22 [7277]14:34 [7278]15:1 [7279]15:5
[7280]15:5 [7281]15:11 [7282]15:15 [7283]15:18 [7284]15:18
[7285]15:23 [7286]15:27 [7287]15:27 [7288]15:27 [7289]15:27
[7290]15:27 [7291]16:1 [7292]16:1 [7293]16:2 [7294]16:2
[7295]16:2 [7296]16:4 [7297]16:4 [7298]16:4 [7299]16:16
[7300]16:33 [7301]17:6 [7302]17:16 [7303]17:19 [7304]17:22
[7305]17:22 [7306]18:3 [7307]18:3 [7308]18:5 [7309]18:6
[7310]18:24 [7311]19:5 [7312]19:16 [7313]19:25 [7314]20:1
[7315]20:1 [7316]20:3 [7317]20:8 [7318]20:8 [7319]20:14
[7320]20:27 [7321]20:28 [7322]21:1 [7323]21:1 [7324]21:1
[7325]21:1 [7326]21:20 [7327]21:20 [7328]21:28 [7329]22:1
[7330]22:5 [7331]22:7 [7332]23:4 [7333]23:13 [7334]23:13-14
[7335]24:6 [7336]24:10 [7337]24:11 [7338]24:11 [7339]24:11
[7340]24:15 [7341]24:19 [7342]24:21 [7343]25:9 [7344]25:20
[7345]25:21 [7346]25:23 [7347]25:28 [7348]26:4 [7349]26:5
[7350]26:8 [7351]26:10 [7352]26:16 [7353]26:20 [7354]26:21
[7355]26:25 [7356]27:2 [7357]27:4 [7358]27:4 [7359]27:4
[7360]27:4 [7361]27:6 [7362]27:6 [7363]27:11 [7364]27:21
[7365]27:23 [7366]28:1 [7367]28:1 [7368]28:1 [7369]28:9
[7370]28:9 [7371]28:9 [7372]28:13 [7373]28:13 [7374]28:13
[7375]28:25 [7376]28:25 [7377]29:2 [7378]29:18 [7379]29:18
[7380]29:22 [7381]30:1-2 [7382]30:2 [7383]30:4 [7384]30:8
[7385]30:8 [7386]30:8 [7387]30:9 [7388]30:15-16 [7389]30:17
[7390]31:4 [7391]31:6 [7392]31:10 [7393]31:10 [7394]31:28
Ecclesiastes
[7395]1:4 [7396]1:4 [7397]1:6 [7398]1:9 [7399]1:10
[7400]1:15 [7401]1:15 [7402]1:15 [7403]1:15 [7404]1:18
[7405]1:18 [7406]2:3 [7407]2:3 [7408]2:3 [7409]2:14 [7410]3
[7411]3:5 [7412]3:14 [7413]3:14 [7414]3:14 [7415]3:19
[7416]3:19 [7417]3:19 [7418]4:9 [7419]4:9 [7420]4:10
[7421]4:10-11 [7422]4:12 [7423]4:12 [7424]4:17 [7425]5:3
[7426]5:3 [7427]5:3 [7428]5:3 [7429]5:3-4 [7430]5:5
[7431]5:9 [7432]5:9 [7433]5:9 [7434]5:12 [7435]5:16 [7436]6
[7437]6:2 [7438]6:7 [7439]7:3 [7440]7:5 [7441]7:5 [7442]7:6
[7443]7:13 [7444]7:14 [7445]7:14 [7446]7:14 [7447]7:14
[7448]7:19 [7449]7:23 [7450]7:30 [7451]7:30 [7452]7:30
[7453]7:30 [7454]8:6 [7455]8:6 [7456]8:6-7 [7457]8:8
[7458]8:11 [7459]9:1 [7460]9:1 [7461]9:2 [7462]9:2
[7463]9:10 [7464]9:11 [7465]10:3 [7466]10:11 [7467]10:19
[7468]10:19 [7469]10:19 [7470]11:3 [7471]11:3 [7472]11:3
[7473]11:4 [7474]11:7 [7475]12:12 [7476]12:14 [7477]12:14
[7478]14 [7479]21 [7480]21 [7481]36:6
Song of Solomon
[7482]2:2 [7483]2:4 [7484]2:4 [7485]2:5 [7486]3:4 [7487]4:7
[7488]4:7 [7489]4:7 [7490]5:1 [7491]5:6 [7492]6:8 [7493]6:8
[7494]8:6 [7495]8:6 [7496]8:6 [7497]8:7 [7498]8:12
Isaiah
[7499]1:4 [7500]1:6 [7501]1:11 [7502]1:14 [7503]1:16-17
[7504]1:19-20 [7505]1:22 [7506]2:3 [7507]2:3 [7508]2:4
[7509]2:4 [7510]3:8 [7511]3:9 [7512]3:9 [7513]3:9 [7514]3:9
[7515]3:9 [7516]3:9 [7517]3:10-11 [7518]3:12 [7519]3:13
[7520]3:14 [7521]3:14 [7522]4:1 [7523]4:4 [7524]5 [7525]5:5
[7526]5:20 [7527]5:20 [7528]5:20 [7529]6:1 [7530]6:1
[7531]6:1 [7532]6:1 [7533]6:1 [7534]6:1 [7535]6:1 [7536]6:2
[7537]6:3 [7538]6:3 [7539]6:3 [7540]6:3 [7541]6:6
[7542]6:6-7 [7543]6:8 [7544]6:10 [7545]6:10 [7546]7:9
[7547]7:9 [7548]7:9 [7549]7:11-13 [7550]7:14 [7551]7:14
[7552]7:14 [7553]7:14 [7554]7:14 [7555]7:15 [7556]8:1
[7557]8:3 [7558]8:4 [7559]8:14 [7560]8:19 [7561]9:6
[7562]9:6 [7563]9:6 [7564]9:7 [7565]9:15 [7566]9:16
[7567]10:1 [7568]10:1 [7569]10:1 [7570]10:1 [7571]10:15
[7572]11 [7573]11:1 [7574]11:2 [7575]11:2 [7576]11:2
[7577]11:2 [7578]11:2 [7579]11:2 [7580]11:2 [7581]11:2
[7582]11:2 [7583]11:2 [7584]11:2-3 [7585]11:2-3 [7586]11:2-3
[7587]11:2-3 [7588]11:2-3 [7589]11:3 [7590]11:3 [7591]11:3-4
[7592]11:9 [7593]11:10 [7594]12:2 [7595]14:9 [7596]14:9
[7597]14:12 [7598]14:13 [7599]14:13-14 [7600]14:19
[7601]16:14 [7602]16:14 [7603]18:2 [7604]19:21 [7605]21:10
[7606]24:5 [7607]24:22 [7608]25:4 [7609]26:5-6 [7610]26:9
[7611]26:11 [7612]26:11 [7613]26:12 [7614]26:12 [7615]26:17
[7616]27:6 [7617]27:8 [7618]27:8 [7619]27:9 [7620]27:9
[7621]27:9 [7622]27:9 [7623]27:9 [7624]28:8 [7625]28:9
[7626]28:15 [7627]28:18 [7628]28:20 [7629]29:13 [7630]29:13
[7631]30:26 [7632]30:26 [7633]30:26 [7634]30:26 [7635]30:26
[7636]30:26 [7637]30:33 [7638]31:4 [7639]32:17 [7640]32:17
[7641]32:17 [7642]33:7 [7643]33:15 [7644]33:17 [7645]33:17
[7646]33:22 [7647]35:1-2 [7648]35:3 [7649]35:4 [7650]35:8
[7651]35:10 [7652]37:2 [7653]37:23 [7654]38:1 [7655]38:1
[7656]38:1 [7657]38:1 [7658]38:1 [7659]38:3 [7660]38:8
[7661]38:8 [7662]40:3 [7663]40:5 [7664]40:6 [7665]40:12
[7666]40:15 [7667]40:16 [7668]40:17 [7669]40:18 [7670]40:18
[7671]40:31 [7672]40:31 [7673]41:2 [7674]41:23 [7675]41:23
[7676]42:1 [7677]42:4 [7678]42:8 [7679]43:3 [7680]43:6-7
[7681]43:25 [7682]43:25 [7683]43:25 [7684]43:26 [7685]44:28
[7686]45:2 [7687]45:5 [7688]45:7 [7689]45:7 [7690]45:15
[7691]45:15 [7692]45:21 [7693]46:10 [7694]46:10 [7695]47:9
[7696]47:10 [7697]47:13 [7698]48:9 [7699]48:16 [7700]48:22
[7701]49:6 [7702]49:6 [7703]49:10 [7704]49:18 [7705]50:5
[7706]51:3 [7707]51:3 [7708]51:6 [7709]51:7 [7710]51:9
[7711]51:12 [7712]52:11 [7713]52:13 [7714]52:13 [7715]52:13
[7716]53:1 [7717]53:2-3 [7718]53:3 [7719]53:4 [7720]53:4
[7721]53:4 [7722]53:4 [7723]53:4 [7724]53:4 [7725]53:4
[7726]53:4 [7727]53:5 [7728]53:6 [7729]53:7 [7730]53:7
[7731]53:7 [7732]53:7 [7733]53:7 [7734]53:7 [7735]53:7
[7736]53:8 [7737]53:8 [7738]53:9 [7739]53:10 [7740]53:12
[7741]55:9 [7742]56:3 [7743]56:4 [7744]56:5 [7745]56:7
[7746]56:11 [7747]56:24 [7748]57:1 [7749]57:7 [7750]57:14
[7751]58:1 [7752]58:1 [7753]58:3 [7754]58:3 [7755]58:3
[7756]58:4 [7757]58:4-5 [7758]58:5 [7759]58:13 [7760]59
[7761]59:1 [7762]59:2 [7763]59:2 [7764]59:2 [7765]59:2
[7766]60:1 [7767]60:3 [7768]60:5 [7769]60:15 [7770]60:19
[7771]60:19-20 [7772]60:20 [7773]60:21 [7774]61:1 [7775]61:6
[7776]61:8 [7777]61:10 [7778]61:10 [7779]61:10 [7780]62:2
[7781]62:16 [7782]63:1 [7783]63:1 [7784]63:1 [7785]63:1
[7786]63:7 [7787]63:14 [7788]63:16 [7789]63:16 [7790]64:4
[7791]64:4 [7792]64:6 [7793]64:6 [7794]65:1 [7795]65:14
[7796]65:16 [7797]65:17 [7798]65:21 [7799]65:24 [7800]66:1
[7801]66:4 [7802]66:14 [7803]66:19 [7804]66:24 [7805]66:24
Jeremiah
[7806]1:1 [7807]1:5 [7808]1:5 [7809]1:5 [7810]1:5 [7811]1:6
[7812]1:13 [7813]1:13 [7814]2:20 [7815]2:20 [7816]2:20
[7817]3:1 [7818]3:1 [7819]3:1 [7820]3:3 [7821]3:14
[7822]3:16 [7823]4:2 [7824]4:2 [7825]4:3 [7826]4:3
[7827]4:22 [7828]5:22 [7829]6:13 [7830]6:23 [7831]6:26
[7832]7 [7833]7:16 [7834]7:18 [7835]7:22 [7836]8:5
[7837]8:6 [7838]8:6 [7839]8:7 [7840]9:4 [7841]9:5
[7842]9:19 [7843]9:23 [7844]9:23 [7845]9:23-24 [7846]9:24
[7847]10:2 [7848]10:7 [7849]10:14 [7850]10:23 [7851]10:24
[7852]10:24 [7853]11:15 [7854]11:19 [7855]12:7 [7856]13:1-11
[7857]14:8 [7858]15:1 [7859]15:1 [7860]15:1 [7861]15:17
[7862]15:18 [7863]15:19 [7864]17:5 [7865]17:5 [7866]17:9
[7867]17:9-10 [7868]17:13 [7869]18:6 [7870]18:7 [7871]18:7-8
[7872]18:7-8 [7873]18:7-8 [7874]18:8 [7875]18:9-10
[7876]20:10 [7877]20:14 [7878]22:30 [7879]23:5 [7880]23:6
[7881]23:9 [7882]23:11 [7883]23:14 [7884]23:24 [7885]23:24
[7886]23:28 [7887]26:15 [7888]30:12 [7889]31:3 [7890]31:3
[7891]31:3 [7892]31:3-4 [7893]31:16 [7894]31:16 [7895]31:18
[7896]31:19 [7897]31:19 [7898]31:22 [7899]31:31 [7900]31:33
[7901]31:33 [7902]31:33 [7903]31:34 [7904]31:34
[7905]31:35-36 [7906]32:8 [7907]32:18 [7908]32:18-19
[7909]39:2 [7910]41:8 [7911]48:29-30 [7912]49:32 [7913]51
[7914]51:9 [7915]52
Lamentations
[7916]1:12 [7917]3:15 [7918]3:19 [7919]3:20 [7920]3:25
[7921]3:27 [7922]3:41 [7923]4:6 [7924]5:21 [7925]5:21
[7926]5:21 [7927]5:21
Ezekiel
[7928]1:1 [7929]1:6 [7930]1:6 [7931]1:16 [7932]2:1
[7933]2:6 [7934]3:8 [7935]3:17 [7936]3:18 [7937]4:6
[7938]5:5 [7939]8:3 [7940]8:3 [7941]8:16 [7942]9:1
[7943]9:4 [7944]9:9 [7945]13:3 [7946]13:6 [7947]13:18
[7948]14:20 [7949]16:8 [7950]16:15 [7951]16:25 [7952]16:49
[7953]16:53 [7954]18:4 [7955]18:4 [7956]18:4 [7957]18:4
[7958]18:8 [7959]18:8 [7960]18:17 [7961]18:20 [7962]18:20
[7963]18:20 [7964]18:20 [7965]18:21 [7966]18:22 [7967]18:23
[7968]18:24 [7969]18:24 [7970]18:24 [7971]18:32 [7972]20:25
[7973]21:21 [7974]22:21 [7975]22:27 [7976]22:27 [7977]28:2
[7978]28:2 [7979]28:12 [7980]28:12 [7981]28:12 [7982]28:13
[7983]28:14 [7984]28:15 [7985]28:17 [7986]29:18 [7987]33:6
[7988]33:11 [7989]33:11 [7990]33:11 [7991]34:3 [7992]34:4
[7993]36:25 [7994]36:25 [7995]37:7-8 [7996]43:2 [7997]43:2
[7998]43:23 [7999]43:23 [8000]44:2 [8001]44:10 [8002]44:13
[8003]44:25 [8004]45:13-14
Daniel
[8005]1:8 [8006]1:8-17 [8007]1:12 [8008]1:17 [8009]1:17
[8010]1:17 [8011]1:17 [8012]2 [8013]2:11 [8014]2:11
[8015]2:21 [8016]2:44 [8017]3 [8018]3:60 [8019]3:82 [8020]4
[8021]4:1-2 [8022]4:22 [8023]4:24 [8024]4:24 [8025]4:24
[8026]4:24 [8027]4:24 [8028]4:24 [8029]4:24 [8030]5
[8031]5:5 [8032]5:5 [8033]5:16 [8034]5:25 [8035]7:9
[8036]7:9 [8037]7:10 [8038]7:10 [8039]7:10 [8040]7:10
[8041]7:10 [8042]7:10 [8043]7:10 [8044]7:13-14 [8045]7:14
[8046]9 [8047]9:17-18 [8048]9:18 [8049]9:24 [8050]10
[8051]10:1 [8052]10:1 [8053]10:2-3 [8054]10:12-13 [8055]10:13
[8056]10:13 [8057]10:13 [8058]10:13 [8059]10:21 [8060]12:2
[8061]12:3 [8062]12:3 [8063]12:3 [8064]12:11 [8065]13
[8066]13 [8067]13:5 [8068]13:9 [8069]13:45 [8070]13:45
[8071]13:52 [8072]13:56 [8073]13:56 [8074]13:56 [8075]13:56
Hosea
[8076]1 [8077]1:2 [8078]1:2 [8079]1:3 [8080]2:14 [8081]2:14
[8082]2:16 [8083]2:16 [8084]2:20 [8085]3 [8086]3:1
[8087]4:6 [8088]4:8 [8089]4:10 [8090]4:11 [8091]4:16
[8092]6:6 [8093]8:4 [8094]8:12 [8095]9:7 [8096]9:10
[8097]9:10 [8098]9:10 [8099]10:5 [8100]10:10 [8101]12:10
[8102]12:10 [8103]13:9 [8104]13:9 [8105]13:9 [8106]13:9
[8107]13:11 [8108]13:14 [8109]13:14 [8110]13:14 [8111]14:3
Joel
[8112]2:12 [8113]2:13 [8114]2:13 [8115]2:15 [8116]2:16
[8117]2:23 [8118]2:25 [8119]2:28 [8120]2:28 [8121]2:28
[8122]2:32 [8123]3:2
Amos
[8124]1:2 [8125]1:2 [8126]3:6 [8127]3:6 [8128]3:7 [8129]3:7
[8130]3:7 [8131]4:7 [8132]4:12 [8133]4:13 [8134]5:2
[8135]5:25-26 [8136]6:1 [8137]7:14 [8138]12:6
Jonah
[8139]1:7 [8140]2:4 [8141]3:4 [8142]3:6 [8143]3:7 [8144]4:1
Micah
[8145]2:13 [8146]2:13 [8147]2:13 [8148]3:9 [8149]3:9
[8150]5:2 [8151]5:2 [8152]5:2 [8153]7:6 [8154]7:6 [8155]7:6
[8156]7:8 [8157]7:8
Nahum
[8158]1:9 [8159]1:9 [8160]1:9 [8161]1:9 [8162]1:9 [8163]1:9
Habakkuk
[8164]1:13 [8165]3:2
Zechariah
[8166]1:3 [8167]1:3 [8168]1:3 [8169]1:12 [8170]2:8
[8171]3:1 [8172]3:9 [8173]3:9 [8174]5:3 [8175]6:12
[8176]6:12 [8177]6:12 [8178]8:19 [8179]9:11 [8180]9:11
[8181]9:11 [8182]9:11 [8183]9:11 [8184]12:1 [8185]13:1
[8186]13:2
Malachi
[8187]1:2-3 [8188]1:2-3 [8189]1:6 [8190]1:6 [8191]1:6
[8192]1:6 [8193]1:6 [8194]1:6 [8195]1:8 [8196]1:8
[8197]1:11 [8198]1:11 [8199]1:12 [8200]1:14 [8201]2:2
[8202]2:7 [8203]2:7 [8204]2:7 [8205]2:7 [8206]2:11
[8207]2:16 [8208]2:16 [8209]3:3 [8210]3:6 [8211]3:6
[8212]3:6 [8213]3:10 [8214]3:10 [8215]3:14 [8216]4:2
[8217]4:2 [8218]4:4 [8219]4:4
Matthew
[8220]1 [8221]1 [8222]1 [8223]1 [8224]1:1 [8225]1:1
[8226]1:2 [8227]1:2 [8228]1:2 [8229]1:2 [8230]1:2 [8231]1:2
[8232]1:3 [8233]1:3 [8234]1:8 [8235]1:11 [8236]1:12-15
[8237]1:16 [8238]1:16 [8239]1:18 [8240]1:18 [8241]1:18
[8242]1:18 [8243]1:18 [8244]1:18 [8245]1:18 [8246]1:18
[8247]1:18 [8248]1:19 [8249]1:19 [8250]1:20 [8251]1:20
[8252]1:20 [8253]1:20 [8254]1:20 [8255]1:20-21 [8256]1:21
[8257]1:21 [8258]1:21 [8259]1:21 [8260]1:22 [8261]1:23
[8262]1:24-25 [8263]2:1 [8264]2:1 [8265]2:2 [8266]2:3
[8267]2:9 [8268]2:16 [8269]2:23 [8270]3:2 [8271]3:2
[8272]3:4 [8273]3:4 [8274]3:4 [8275]3:5-6 [8276]3:6
[8277]3:6 [8278]3:6 [8279]3:7 [8280]3:11 [8281]3:11
[8282]3:11 [8283]3:11 [8284]3:11 [8285]3:13 [8286]3:13
[8287]3:13 [8288]3:15 [8289]3:15 [8290]3:15 [8291]3:15
[8292]3:16 [8293]3:16 [8294]3:16 [8295]3:16 [8296]3:16
[8297]3:16-17 [8298]3:16-17 [8299]3:17 [8300]3:17 [8301]3:17
[8302]4 [8303]4 [8304]4:1 [8305]4:1 [8306]4:2-3 [8307]4:2-3
[8308]4:3 [8309]4:4 [8310]4:5 [8311]4:5 [8312]4:5
[8313]4:10 [8314]4:10 [8315]4:10 [8316]4:11 [8317]4:11
[8318]4:11 [8319]4:11 [8320]4:11 [8321]4:11 [8322]4:17
[8323]4:17 [8324]4:17 [8325]4:17 [8326]4:17 [8327]4:17
[8328]4:18 [8329]4:20 [8330]4:22 [8331]4:22 [8332]4:23
[8333]4:24 [8334]4:44 [8335]4:44 [8336]5 [8337]5 [8338]5
[8339]5 [8340]5 [8341]5 [8342]5:1 [8343]5:1 [8344]5:3
[8345]5:3 [8346]5:4 [8347]5:5 [8348]5:5 [8349]5:5 [8350]5:5
[8351]5:6 [8352]5:6 [8353]5:7 [8354]5:8 [8355]5:8 [8356]5:8
[8357]5:9 [8358]5:10 [8359]5:10 [8360]5:10 [8361]5:10
[8362]5:11 [8363]5:12 [8364]5:12 [8365]5:12 [8366]5:15
[8367]5:16 [8368]5:16 [8369]5:17 [8370]5:17 [8371]5:18
[8372]5:19 [8373]5:19 [8374]5:20 [8375]5:20 [8376]5:20
[8377]5:20 [8378]5:20 [8379]5:21 [8380]5:22 [8381]5:22
[8382]5:22 [8383]5:22 [8384]5:22 [8385]5:22 [8386]5:22
[8387]5:22 [8388]5:22 [8389]5:23 [8390]5:25 [8391]5:26
[8392]5:27-32 [8393]5:28 [8394]5:28 [8395]5:30 [8396]5:31
[8397]5:31-32 [8398]5:32 [8399]5:32 [8400]5:32 [8401]5:32
[8402]5:32 [8403]5:32 [8404]5:33 [8405]5:33 [8406]5:33
[8407]5:34 [8408]5:34 [8409]5:34 [8410]5:34 [8411]5:34
[8412]5:34-36 [8413]5:37 [8414]5:37 [8415]5:39 [8416]5:39
[8417]5:39 [8418]5:39 [8419]5:39 [8420]5:40 [8421]5:40
[8422]5:40-41 [8423]5:42 [8424]5:44 [8425]5:44 [8426]5:44
[8427]5:44 [8428]5:44 [8429]5:44 [8430]5:44 [8431]5:44
[8432]5:44 [8433]5:44 [8434]5:45 [8435]5:46 [8436]5:48
[8437]5:48 [8438]5:48 [8439]6 [8440]6 [8441]6:1
[8442]6:1-18 [8443]6:2 [8444]6:2 [8445]6:2 [8446]6:5
[8447]6:6 [8448]6:7 [8449]6:10 [8450]6:10 [8451]6:12
[8452]6:12 [8453]6:12 [8454]6:14 [8455]6:16 [8456]6:16
[8457]6:16 [8458]6:18 [8459]6:19 [8460]6:19-20 [8461]6:20
[8462]6:21 [8463]6:21 [8464]6:21 [8465]6:22 [8466]6:23
[8467]6:24 [8468]6:24 [8469]6:24 [8470]6:25 [8471]6:25
[8472]6:25 [8473]6:26 [8474]6:27 [8475]6:31 [8476]6:31
[8477]6:32 [8478]6:32 [8479]6:33 [8480]6:33 [8481]6:34
[8482]6:34 [8483]6:34 [8484]6:34 [8485]6:34 [8486]6:34
[8487]6:34 [8488]7:1 [8489]7:1 [8490]7:1 [8491]7:2
[8492]7:3 [8493]7:4 [8494]7:6 [8495]7:6 [8496]7:6 [8497]7:6
[8498]7:6 [8499]7:6 [8500]7:7 [8501]7:11 [8502]7:12
[8503]7:12 [8504]7:12 [8505]7:13 [8506]7:13-14 [8507]7:14
[8508]7:15 [8509]7:15 [8510]7:16 [8511]7:17 [8512]7:18
[8513]7:18 [8514]7:18 [8515]7:18 [8516]7:18 [8517]7:18
[8518]7:18 [8519]7:18 [8520]7:19 [8521]7:21 [8522]7:22
[8523]7:22 [8524]7:22 [8525]7:22-23 [8526]7:24 [8527]7:29
[8528]7:29 [8529]8 [8530]8:3 [8531]8:3 [8532]8:3 [8533]8:4
[8534]8:8 [8535]8:8 [8536]8:10 [8537]8:10 [8538]8:10
[8539]8:14 [8540]8:15 [8541]8:16 [8542]8:20 [8543]8:20
[8544]8:22 [8545]8:26 [8546]8:26 [8547]8:27 [8548]8:29
[8549]8:31 [8550]8:31-32 [8551]8:31-34 [8552]8:32 [8553]9:2
[8554]9:2 [8555]9:5 [8556]9:5-6 [8557]9:6 [8558]9:6
[8559]9:8 [8560]9:9 [8561]9:10 [8562]9:11-13 [8563]9:12
[8564]9:12 [8565]9:12 [8566]9:12-13 [8567]9:14 [8568]9:14-15
[8569]9:15 [8570]9:17 [8571]9:30 [8572]9:30 [8573]9:30-31
[8574]9:30-31 [8575]9:36 [8576]10 [8577]10 [8578]10:1
[8579]10:1 [8580]10:5 [8581]10:5 [8582]10:8 [8583]10:8
[8584]10:9 [8585]10:9 [8586]10:9 [8587]10:9 [8588]10:9-10
[8589]10:10 [8590]10:10 [8591]10:16 [8592]10:16 [8593]10:16
[8594]10:19 [8595]10:23 [8596]10:27 [8597]10:28 [8598]10:28
[8599]10:28 [8600]10:28 [8601]10:28 [8602]10:28 [8603]10:28
[8604]10:30 [8605]10:32-33 [8606]10:34 [8607]10:34
[8608]10:34 [8609]11:3 [8610]11:8 [8611]11:9 [8612]11:11
[8613]11:11 [8614]11:11 [8615]11:11 [8616]11:11 [8617]11:11
[8618]11:11 [8619]11:11 [8620]11:11 [8621]11:12 [8622]11:13
[8623]11:19 [8624]11:19 [8625]11:19 [8626]11:25 [8627]11:27
[8628]11:28 [8629]11:29 [8630]11:29 [8631]11:29 [8632]11:29
[8633]11:29 [8634]11:30 [8635]12 [8636]12:1-8 [8637]12:3
[8638]12:3 [8639]12:4 [8640]12:5 [8641]12:5 [8642]12:7
[8643]12:11 [8644]12:24-30 [8645]12:25 [8646]12:25
[8647]12:26 [8648]12:28 [8649]12:32 [8650]12:32 [8651]12:32
[8652]12:32 [8653]12:32 [8654]12:32 [8655]12:32 [8656]12:33
[8657]12:33 [8658]12:34 [8659]12:34 [8660]12:35 [8661]12:36
[8662]12:40 [8663]12:40 [8664]12:41 [8665]12:41 [8666]12:44
[8667]12:45 [8668]12:49-50 [8669]13 [8670]13:8 [8671]13:22
[8672]13:22 [8673]13:22 [8674]13:23 [8675]13:23 [8676]13:23
[8677]13:23 [8678]13:28 [8679]13:29 [8680]13:29-30
[8681]13:30 [8682]13:33 [8683]13:33 [8684]13:33 [8685]13:33
[8686]13:34 [8687]13:39-40 [8688]13:41 [8689]13:43
[8690]13:43 [8691]13:44 [8692]13:57 [8693]13:57 [8694]13:58
[8695]14:4 [8696]14:19 [8697]14:19 [8698]14:31 [8699]14:36
[8700]15 [8701]15:3-6 [8702]15:3-6 [8703]15:3-6 [8704]15:5
[8705]15:6 [8706]15:6 [8707]15:8 [8708]15:11 [8709]15:11
[8710]15:11 [8711]15:11 [8712]15:11 [8713]15:11 [8714]15:12
[8715]15:12 [8716]15:12 [8717]15:12 [8718]15:12-14
[8719]15:14 [8720]15:14 [8721]15:14 [8722]15:17 [8723]15:17
[8724]15:19-20 [8725]15:24 [8726]15:24 [8727]15:24
[8728]15:28 [8729]16:4 [8730]16:17 [8731]16:18 [8732]16:18
[8733]16:19 [8734]16:19 [8735]16:19 [8736]16:19 [8737]16:19
[8738]16:19 [8739]16:19 [8740]16:19 [8741]16:19 [8742]16:19
[8743]16:19 [8744]16:19 [8745]16:19 [8746]16:19 [8747]16:19
[8748]16:21 [8749]16:23 [8750]16:23 [8751]16:24 [8752]16:28
[8753]16:52 [8754]17:2 [8755]17:2 [8756]17:2 [8757]17:2
[8758]17:2 [8759]17:3 [8760]17:3 [8761]17:3 [8762]17:5
[8763]17:6 [8764]17:6 [8765]17:19 [8766]17:19 [8767]17:20
[8768]17:24-25 [8769]17:25 [8770]17:25-26 [8771]17:26
[8772]17:26 [8773]17:26 [8774]18:3 [8775]18:6 [8776]18:6
[8777]18:7 [8778]18:8 [8779]18:10 [8780]18:10 [8781]18:10
[8782]18:10 [8783]18:10 [8784]18:15 [8785]18:15 [8786]18:15
[8787]18:15 [8788]18:15 [8789]18:15 [8790]18:16 [8791]18:17
[8792]18:19 [8793]18:20 [8794]18:20 [8795]18:20 [8796]18:20
[8797]18:21 [8798]18:22 [8799]18:34 [8800]19:4 [8801]19:4
[8802]19:6 [8803]19:6 [8804]19:6 [8805]19:6 [8806]19:6
[8807]19:6 [8808]19:6 [8809]19:6 [8810]19:6 [8811]19:6
[8812]19:8 [8813]19:8 [8814]19:9 [8815]19:9 [8816]19:12
[8817]19:12 [8818]19:12 [8819]19:12 [8820]19:12 [8821]19:13
[8822]19:14 [8823]19:16-30 [8824]19:17 [8825]19:17
[8826]19:17 [8827]19:17 [8828]19:17 [8829]19:21 [8830]19:21
[8831]19:21 [8832]19:21 [8833]19:21 [8834]19:21 [8835]19:21
[8836]19:21 [8837]19:21 [8838]19:21 [8839]19:21 [8840]19:21
[8841]19:21 [8842]19:21 [8843]19:21 [8844]19:21 [8845]19:21
[8846]19:21 [8847]19:21 [8848]19:23 [8849]19:24 [8850]19:27
[8851]19:27 [8852]19:27 [8853]19:28 [8854]19:28 [8855]19:28
[8856]19:28 [8857]19:28 [8858]19:28 [8859]19:28 [8860]19:29
[8861]20:8 [8862]20:10 [8863]20:14-15 [8864]20:14-15
[8865]20:19 [8866]20:19 [8867]20:23 [8868]20:25 [8869]21:9
[8870]21:9 [8871]21:9 [8872]21:9 [8873]21:12 [8874]21:12
[8875]21:19 [8876]21:19 [8877]21:19 [8878]21:19 [8879]21:19
[8880]21:25 [8881]21:28 [8882]21:30 [8883]21:31 [8884]21:38
[8885]21:38 [8886]22 [8887]22:8 [8888]22:13 [8889]22:15
[8890]22:30 [8891]22:30 [8892]22:30 [8893]22:30 [8894]22:30
[8895]22:30 [8896]22:30 [8897]22:30 [8898]22:30 [8899]22:30
[8900]22:30 [8901]22:30 [8902]22:30 [8903]22:30 [8904]22:30
[8905]22:30 [8906]22:30 [8907]22:30 [8908]22:30 [8909]22:32
[8910]22:37 [8911]22:37 [8912]22:37-39 [8913]22:39
[8914]22:39 [8915]22:39 [8916]22:39 [8917]22:40 [8918]22:40
[8919]22:40 [8920]22:40 [8921]23:3-4 [8922]23:5 [8923]23:6
[8924]23:6-7 [8925]23:12 [8926]23:15 [8927]23:23 [8928]23:23
[8929]23:32 [8930]23:35 [8931]24 [8932]24:12 [8933]24:12
[8934]24:13 [8935]24:13 [8936]24:14 [8937]24:14 [8938]24:24
[8939]24:27 [8940]24:27 [8941]24:27 [8942]24:28 [8943]24:28
[8944]24:29 [8945]24:29 [8946]24:30 [8947]24:30 [8948]24:30
[8949]24:32-33 [8950]24:34 [8951]24:36 [8952]24:40
[8953]24:45 [8954]24:45 [8955]24:45 [8956]24:45 [8957]24:45
[8958]24:48-51 [8959]25 [8960]25 [8961]25 [8962]25
[8963]25:6 [8964]25:15 [8965]25:15 [8966]25:15 [8967]25:21
[8968]25:26 [8969]25:30 [8970]25:31 [8971]25:31 [8972]25:31
[8973]25:33 [8974]25:34 [8975]25:34 [8976]25:35-36
[8977]25:35-46 [8978]25:40 [8979]25:40 [8980]25:40
[8981]25:41 [8982]25:41 [8983]25:41 [8984]25:41 [8985]25:41
[8986]25:41 [8987]25:41 [8988]25:41 [8989]25:41 [8990]25:41
[8991]25:41 [8992]25:41-43 [8993]25:46 [8994]25:46
[8995]25:46 [8996]25:46 [8997]25:46 [8998]25:46 [8999]25:46
[9000]25:84-46 [9001]26 [9002]26 [9003]26:10 [9004]26:11
[9005]26:12 [9006]26:17 [9007]26:17 [9008]26:24 [9009]26:24
[9010]26:26 [9011]26:26 [9012]26:26 [9013]26:26
[9014]26:26-27 [9015]26:27 [9016]26:28 [9017]26:28
[9018]26:29 [9019]26:29 [9020]26:30 [9021]26:32 [9022]26:32
[9023]26:35 [9024]26:37 [9025]26:37 [9026]26:37 [9027]26:37
[9028]26:38 [9029]26:38 [9030]26:38 [9031]26:39 [9032]26:39
[9033]26:39 [9034]26:39 [9035]26:39 [9036]26:39 [9037]26:39
[9038]26:42 [9039]26:42 [9040]26:52 [9041]26:53 [9042]26:63
[9043]27:15 [9044]27:25 [9045]27:33 [9046]27:33 [9047]27:37
[9048]27:44 [9049]27:44 [9050]27:45 [9051]27:45 [9052]27:45
[9053]27:46 [9054]27:46 [9055]27:50 [9056]27:50 [9057]27:51
[9058]27:51 [9059]27:52 [9060]27:52 [9061]27:52
[9062]27:52-53 [9063]27:55 [9064]27:55-56 [9065]27:60
[9066]27:64 [9067]28:18 [9068]28:18 [9069]28:18 [9070]28:18
[9071]28:19 [9072]28:19 [9073]28:19 [9074]28:19 [9075]28:19
[9076]28:19 [9077]28:19 [9078]28:19 [9079]28:19 [9080]28:19
[9081]28:19 [9082]28:19 [9083]28:19 [9084]28:19 [9085]28:19
[9086]28:19 [9087]28:20 [9088]28:20 [9089]28:20 [9090]28:20
[9091]28:20 [9092]31
Mark
[9093]1 [9094]1:4 [9095]1:4 [9096]1:5 [9097]1:5 [9098]1:9
[9099]1:9 [9100]1:10 [9101]1:12-13 [9102]1:13 [9103]1:13
[9104]1:23-24 [9105]1:24 [9106]1:24 [9107]1:24 [9108]1:24
[9109]1:25 [9110]1:27 [9111]1:34 [9112]1:38 [9113]2:10
[9114]2:18 [9115]3:22 [9116]3:29 [9117]3:29-30 [9118]4:21
[9119]4:28 [9120]4:33 [9121]5 [9122]5 [9123]5:9 [9124]5:10
[9125]5:19 [9126]5:19 [9127]6:5 [9128]6:5 [9129]6:13
[9130]6:13 [9131]6:13 [9132]6:31 [9133]7:3-4 [9134]7:24
[9135]7:34 [9136]7:37 [9137]7:37 [9138]8 [9139]8:22-25
[9140]8:23 [9141]8:23 [9142]8:24 [9143]8:26 [9144]8:38
[9145]8:38 [9146]8:39 [9147]9:24-25 [9148]9:25 [9149]9:27-28
[9150]9:28 [9151]9:49 [9152]9:49 [9153]10:21 [9154]10:30
[9155]10:30 [9156]11:13 [9157]12 [9158]12:43 [9159]13
[9160]13:32 [9161]13:32 [9162]14:12 [9163]14:12 [9164]14:28
[9165]14:33 [9166]14:33 [9167]15:12 [9168]15:25 [9169]15:25
[9170]15:27 [9171]15:39 [9172]15:43 [9173]15:44-45
[9174]15:46 [9175]16:1 [9176]16:2 [9177]16:6 [9178]16:9
[9179]16:12 [9180]16:14 [9181]16:16 [9182]16:16 [9183]16:16
[9184]16:16 [9185]16:17 [9186]16:17-18 [9187]16:18
[9188]16:19 [9189]16:20 [9190]16:20 [9191]16:20
Luke
[9192]1 [9193]1:2 [9194]1:5 [9195]1:8 [9196]1:9 [9197]1:11
[9198]1:11 [9199]1:15 [9200]1:15 [9201]1:18 [9202]1:20
[9203]1:26 [9204]1:26 [9205]1:26 [9206]1:26 [9207]1:26-27
[9208]1:26-27 [9209]1:26-27 [9210]1:26-27 [9211]1:27
[9212]1:27 [9213]1:28 [9214]1:28 [9215]1:28 [9216]1:30-31
[9217]1:31 [9218]1:32 [9219]1:32 [9220]1:33 [9221]1:34
[9222]1:35 [9223]1:35 [9224]1:35 [9225]1:35 [9226]1:35
[9227]1:35 [9228]1:35 [9229]1:36 [9230]1:36 [9231]1:37
[9232]1:37 [9233]1:37 [9234]1:46 [9235]1:48 [9236]1:49
[9237]1:52 [9238]1:59-61 [9239]1:74-75 [9240]1:76 [9241]1:79
[9242]1:79 [9243]1:79 [9244]1:80 [9245]2:7 [9246]2:7
[9247]2:8 [9248]2:9 [9249]2:15 [9250]2:16 [9251]2:19
[9252]2:21 [9253]2:21 [9254]2:22 [9255]2:22 [9256]2:22-23
[9257]2:23 [9258]2:23 [9259]2:23 [9260]2:23 [9261]2:24
[9262]2:25 [9263]2:25 [9264]2:26 [9265]2:33 [9266]2:35
[9267]2:39 [9268]2:46-47 [9269]2:48 [9270]2:52 [9271]2:52
[9272]2:52 [9273]3 [9274]3 [9275]3:8 [9276]3:8 [9277]3:14
[9278]3:17 [9279]3:21 [9280]3:21 [9281]3:21 [9282]3:21
[9283]3:21 [9284]3:21 [9285]3:21 [9286]3:21 [9287]3:22
[9288]3:22 [9289]3:22 [9290]3:23 [9291]3:23 [9292]3:23
[9293]3:23 [9294]3:25 [9295]3:29 [9296]4:1 [9297]4:1
[9298]4:1 [9299]4:3 [9300]4:3 [9301]4:5 [9302]4:13
[9303]4:13 [9304]4:13 [9305]4:13 [9306]4:13 [9307]4:35
[9308]4:39 [9309]4:40 [9310]4:41 [9311]4:41 [9312]4:41
[9313]4:41 [9314]4:42-43 [9315]5 [9316]5 [9317]5:4
[9318]5:8 [9319]5:27 [9320]5:28 [9321]5:34 [9322]6
[9323]6:12 [9324]6:12 [9325]6:12 [9326]6:12 [9327]6:12
[9328]6:17 [9329]6:19 [9330]6:19 [9331]6:20 [9332]6:20
[9333]6:20 [9334]6:20 [9335]6:20 [9336]6:20 [9337]6:20
[9338]6:21 [9339]6:22 [9340]6:25 [9341]6:27 [9342]6:29
[9343]6:30 [9344]6:35 [9345]6:35 [9346]6:35 [9347]6:36
[9348]6:36 [9349]6:36 [9350]6:38 [9351]7 [9352]7 [9353]7
[9354]7:19 [9355]7:43 [9356]7:47 [9357]7:47 [9358]7:47
[9359]7:47 [9360]7:48 [9361]8:2-3 [9362]8:14 [9363]8:30
[9364]8:31 [9365]8:39 [9366]9 [9367]9 [9368]9 [9369]9
[9370]9:1 [9371]9:3 [9372]9:26 [9373]9:27 [9374]9:30
[9375]9:55 [9376]9:59-60 [9377]9:61 [9378]9:62 [9379]9:62
[9380]9:62 [9381]9:62 [9382]9:62 [9383]9:62 [9384]9:62
[9385]10 [9386]10 [9387]10 [9388]10 [9389]10:1 [9390]10:1
[9391]10:1 [9392]10:1 [9393]10:7 [9394]10:16 [9395]10:16
[9396]10:16 [9397]10:19 [9398]10:30 [9399]10:34 [9400]10:39
[9401]10:39-40 [9402]10:40 [9403]10:41 [9404]10:41
[9405]10:42 [9406]10:42 [9407]10:42 [9408]10:42 [9409]10:42
[9410]11 [9411]11:3 [9412]11:3 [9413]11:3 [9414]11:13
[9415]11:15 [9416]11:15-32 [9417]11:24 [9418]11:26
[9419]11:33 [9420]11:34 [9421]11:41 [9422]11:41 [9423]11:41
[9424]11:53-54 [9425]12:3 [9426]12:4 [9427]12:4 [9428]12:4
[9429]12:4 [9430]12:8 [9431]12:13-14 [9432]12:16 [9433]12:18
[9434]12:26 [9435]12:33 [9436]12:36 [9437]12:39-40
[9438]12:42 [9439]12:47 [9440]12:47 [9441]12:47 [9442]12:47
[9443]12:47-48 [9444]12:52 [9445]12:56 [9446]13:3 [9447]13:14
[9448]13:15 [9449]13:15 [9450]13:28 [9451]13:33 [9452]14:5
[9453]14:11 [9454]14:11 [9455]14:12 [9456]14:12 [9457]14:12
[9458]14:12-13 [9459]14:23 [9460]14:26 [9461]14:26
[9462]14:26 [9463]14:26 [9464]14:28 [9465]14:30 [9466]15
[9467]15:7 [9468]15:7 [9469]15:10 [9470]15:10 [9471]15:10
[9472]15:13 [9473]15:21 [9474]15:22 [9475]15:26 [9476]15:29
[9477]16:5 [9478]16:8 [9479]16:8 [9480]16:8 [9481]16:9
[9482]16:9 [9483]16:9 [9484]16:9 [9485]16:9 [9486]16:9
[9487]16:22 [9488]16:22 [9489]16:22 [9490]16:23 [9491]16:23
[9492]16:23 [9493]16:24 [9494]16:25 [9495]16:25 [9496]16:25
[9497]16:25 [9498]16:25 [9499]16:27-28 [9500]16:27-28
[9501]16:28 [9502]17:5 [9503]17:10 [9504]17:10 [9505]17:10
[9506]17:21 [9507]17:21 [9508]17:22 [9509]17:34 [9510]18
[9511]18 [9512]18 [9513]18:1 [9514]18:1 [9515]18:2
[9516]18:2 [9517]18:7 [9518]18:8 [9519]18:11 [9520]18:13
[9521]18:14 [9522]18:14 [9523]18:19 [9524]18:33 [9525]19
[9526]19:8 [9527]19:10 [9528]19:23 [9529]20:36 [9530]20:36
[9531]20:36 [9532]21 [9533]21:3 [9534]21:3-4 [9535]21:4
[9536]21:15 [9537]21:15 [9538]21:18 [9539]21:18 [9540]21:18
[9541]21:18 [9542]21:19 [9543]21:25 [9544]21:26 [9545]21:27
[9546]21:33 [9547]21:33 [9548]22:7 [9549]22:7 [9550]22:7-8
[9551]22:11-12 [9552]22:15 [9553]22:19 [9554]22:19
[9555]22:19 [9556]22:19 [9557]22:19 [9558]22:19 [9559]22:19
[9560]22:19 [9561]22:19-20 [9562]22:20 [9563]22:20
[9564]22:20 [9565]22:20 [9566]22:24 [9567]22:27 [9568]22:30
[9569]22:32 [9570]22:32 [9571]22:32 [9572]22:32 [9573]22:33
[9574]22:35-36 [9575]22:42 [9576]22:42 [9577]22:42
[9578]22:43 [9579]22:43 [9580]22:43 [9581]23:34 [9582]23:34
[9583]23:34 [9584]23:34 [9585]23:34 [9586]23:43 [9587]23:43
[9588]23:43 [9589]23:44-45 [9590]23:46 [9591]24 [9592]24
[9593]24:21 [9594]24:22 [9595]24:25 [9596]24:25 [9597]24:25
[9598]24:26 [9599]24:26 [9600]24:27 [9601]24:28 [9602]24:31
[9603]24:31 [9604]24:31 [9605]24:32 [9606]24:37 [9607]24:37
[9608]24:39 [9609]24:39 [9610]24:39 [9611]24:39 [9612]24:39
[9613]24:39 [9614]24:39 [9615]24:39 [9616]24:39 [9617]24:39
[9618]24:40 [9619]24:40 [9620]24:40 [9621]24:40 [9622]24:40
[9623]24:41 [9624]24:41 [9625]24:44 [9626]24:44 [9627]24:44
[9628]24:44 [9629]24:45 [9630]24:46 [9631]24:46
[9632]24:46-47 [9633]24:47 [9634]24:49 [9635]24:49
[9636]24:49 [9637]27:6
John
[9638]1:1 [9639]1:1 [9640]1:3 [9641]1:3 [9642]1:3 [9643]1:3
[9644]1:3-4 [9645]1:6-7 [9646]1:9 [9647]1:9 [9648]1:9
[9649]1:9 [9650]1:9 [9651]1:9 [9652]1:10 [9653]1:12
[9654]1:12 [9655]1:13 [9656]1:13 [9657]1:14 [9658]1:14
[9659]1:14 [9660]1:14 [9661]1:14 [9662]1:14 [9663]1:14
[9664]1:14 [9665]1:14 [9666]1:14 [9667]1:14 [9668]1:14
[9669]1:14 [9670]1:14 [9671]1:14 [9672]1:14 [9673]1:14
[9674]1:14 [9675]1:14 [9676]1:14 [9677]1:14 [9678]1:14
[9679]1:14 [9680]1:14 [9681]1:16 [9682]1:16 [9683]1:16
[9684]1:16 [9685]1:16 [9686]1:16 [9687]1:16 [9688]1:16
[9689]1:16 [9690]1:16 [9691]1:16 [9692]1:16 [9693]1:16
[9694]1:16 [9695]1:16 [9696]1:16 [9697]1:16 [9698]1:17
[9699]1:17 [9700]1:17 [9701]1:17 [9702]1:17 [9703]1:17
[9704]1:17 [9705]1:17 [9706]1:17 [9707]1:17 [9708]1:18
[9709]1:18 [9710]1:18 [9711]1:18 [9712]1:18 [9713]1:23
[9714]1:29 [9715]1:29 [9716]1:29 [9717]1:29 [9718]1:29
[9719]1:29 [9720]1:29 [9721]1:31 [9722]1:31 [9723]1:31
[9724]1:31 [9725]1:33 [9726]1:33 [9727]1:33 [9728]1:33
[9729]1:33 [9730]1:33 [9731]1:33 [9732]1:33 [9733]1:34
[9734]1:35 [9735]1:37 [9736]1:39 [9737]2:3 [9738]2:4
[9739]2:10 [9740]2:10 [9741]2:11 [9742]2:11 [9743]2:12
[9744]2:15 [9745]2:16 [9746]2:17 [9747]2:17 [9748]2:17
[9749]2:20 [9750]2:21 [9751]2:25 [9752]3 [9753]3:1
[9754]3:3 [9755]3:3 [9756]3:4 [9757]3:4 [9758]3:4 [9759]3:5
[9760]3:5 [9761]3:5 [9762]3:5 [9763]3:5 [9764]3:5 [9765]3:5
[9766]3:5 [9767]3:5 [9768]3:5 [9769]3:5 [9770]3:5 [9771]3:5
[9772]3:5 [9773]3:5 [9774]3:5 [9775]3:8 [9776]3:9
[9777]3:10 [9778]3:11 [9779]3:13 [9780]3:13 [9781]3:13
[9782]3:13 [9783]3:14 [9784]3:14 [9785]3:14 [9786]3:15
[9787]3:16 [9788]3:16 [9789]3:16 [9790]3:16 [9791]3:16
[9792]3:16 [9793]3:17 [9794]3:18 [9795]3:18 [9796]3:18
[9797]3:18 [9798]3:19 [9799]3:20 [9800]3:21 [9801]3:22
[9802]3:22 [9803]3:22-23 [9804]3:23-24 [9805]3:26 [9806]3:29
[9807]3:31 [9808]3:34 [9809]3:34 [9810]3:34 [9811]3:35
[9812]3:36 [9813]4 [9814]4:2 [9815]4:2 [9816]4:2 [9817]4:8
[9818]4:13 [9819]4:13 [9820]4:13 [9821]4:14 [9822]4:14
[9823]4:16 [9824]4:21 [9825]4:21 [9826]4:23 [9827]4:23
[9828]4:23 [9829]4:23 [9830]4:24 [9831]4:24 [9832]4:24
[9833]4:24 [9834]4:24 [9835]4:24 [9836]4:24 [9837]4:24
[9838]4:24 [9839]4:34 [9840]4:36 [9841]4:36 [9842]4:42
[9843]4:42 [9844]4:44 [9845]4:48 [9846]4:48 [9847]4:53
[9848]5:4 [9849]5:17 [9850]5:17 [9851]5:17 [9852]5:17
[9853]5:18 [9854]5:19 [9855]5:19 [9856]5:19 [9857]5:19
[9858]5:19 [9859]5:20 [9860]5:21 [9861]5:21 [9862]5:21
[9863]5:21 [9864]5:22 [9865]5:22-23 [9866]5:22-23 [9867]5:23
[9868]5:25 [9869]5:25 [9870]5:25 [9871]5:27 [9872]5:27
[9873]5:27 [9874]5:27 [9875]5:27 [9876]5:27 [9877]5:28
[9878]5:28 [9879]5:28 [9880]5:29 [9881]5:30 [9882]5:36
[9883]5:36 [9884]5:37 [9885]5:37 [9886]5:44 [9887]5:45
[9888]5:46 [9889]5:46 [9890]6 [9891]6:1-14 [9892]6:38
[9893]6:41 [9894]6:41 [9895]6:44 [9896]6:45 [9897]6:45
[9898]6:45 [9899]6:45 [9900]6:45 [9901]6:45 [9902]6:45
[9903]6:50 [9904]6:50 [9905]6:51 [9906]6:51 [9907]6:52
[9908]6:52 [9909]6:52 [9910]6:54 [9911]6:54 [9912]6:54
[9913]6:54 [9914]6:54 [9915]6:54 [9916]6:54 [9917]6:54
[9918]6:55 [9919]6:56 [9920]6:56 [9921]6:56 [9922]6:56
[9923]6:57 [9924]6:57 [9925]6:58 [9926]6:64 [9927]6:64
[9928]6:64 [9929]6:64 [9930]6:64 [9931]6:65 [9932]6:67
[9933]6:68-69 [9934]6:71 [9935]6:71 [9936]7:15 [9937]7:20
[9938]7:23 [9939]7:23 [9940]7:23 [9941]7:23 [9942]7:23
[9943]7:23 [9944]7:23 [9945]7:23 [9946]7:31 [9947]7:36
[9948]7:39 [9949]7:39 [9950]7:39 [9951]7:39 [9952]7:39
[9953]7:41 [9954]8 [9955]8 [9956]8 [9957]8 [9958]8
[9959]8:7 [9960]8:12 [9961]8:12 [9962]8:12 [9963]8:16
[9964]8:17 [9965]8:17 [9966]8:29 [9967]8:34 [9968]8:34
[9969]8:34 [9970]8:34 [9971]8:42 [9972]8:44 [9973]8:44
[9974]8:44 [9975]8:44 [9976]8:46 [9977]8:46 [9978]8:50
[9979]8:55 [9980]8:56 [9981]8:56 [9982]8:59 [9983]9:2
[9984]9:3 [9985]9:3 [9986]9:4 [9987]9:4-5 [9988]9:5
[9989]9:6 [9990]9:16 [9991]9:16 [9992]9:31 [9993]9:31
[9994]9:31 [9995]9:31 [9996]9:31 [9997]9:32-33 [9998]9:41
[9999]10:7 [10000]10:9 [10001]10:10 [10002]10:10 [10003]10:11
[10004]10:12 [10005]10:12 [10006]10:15 [10007]10:16
[10008]10:17 [10009]10:18 [10010]10:18 [10011]10:18
[10012]10:18 [10013]10:18 [10014]10:27 [10015]10:30
[10016]10:30 [10017]10:36 [10018]10:38 [10019]10:38
[10020]10:41 [10021]10:41 [10022]11:3 [10023]11:26
[10024]11:31 [10025]11:41 [10026]11:41 [10027]11:41
[10028]11:41-42 [10029]11:42 [10030]11:42 [10031]11:44
[10032]11:47 [10033]11:50 [10034]11:51 [10035]11:51
[10036]11:52 [10037]12:6 [10038]12:6 [10039]12:20-25
[10040]12:24 [10041]12:24 [10042]12:27 [10043]12:31
[10044]12:31 [10045]12:32 [10046]12:36 [10047]12:43
[10048]12:48 [10049]12:48 [10050]13:1 [10051]13:1 [10052]13:1
[10053]13:1-5 [10054]13:4 [10055]13:10 [10056]13:10
[10057]13:13 [10058]13:17 [10059]13:17 [10060]13:18
[10061]13:21 [10062]13:26 [10063]13:26 [10064]13:26
[10065]13:29 [10066]13:30 [10067]14:1 [10068]14:1 [10069]14:1
[10070]14:1 [10071]14:2 [10072]14:2 [10073]14:2 [10074]14:3
[10075]14:3 [10076]14:5 [10077]14:6 [10078]14:6 [10079]14:6
[10080]14:6 [10081]14:6 [10082]14:6 [10083]14:8 [10084]14:8
[10085]14:9 [10086]14:10 [10087]14:10 [10088]14:12
[10089]14:12 [10090]14:12 [10091]14:12 [10092]14:12
[10093]14:12 [10094]14:16 [10095]14:16 [10096]14:17
[10097]14:17 [10098]14:21 [10099]14:21 [10100]14:21
[10101]14:21 [10102]14:21 [10103]14:23 [10104]14:23
[10105]14:23 [10106]14:28 [10107]14:28 [10108]14:28
[10109]14:28 [10110]14:28 [10111]14:31 [10112]14:31
[10113]15:1 [10114]15:3 [10115]15:5 [10116]15:5 [10117]15:5
[10118]15:11 [10119]15:11 [10120]15:12 [10121]15:12
[10122]15:12 [10123]15:13 [10124]15:13 [10125]15:13
[10126]15:13 [10127]15:13 [10128]15:13 [10129]15:15
[10130]15:15 [10131]15:15 [10132]15:19 [10133]15:22
[10134]15:22 [10135]15:22 [10136]15:22 [10137]15:22
[10138]15:24 [10139]15:24 [10140]15:24 [10141]15:24
[10142]15:25 [10143]15:26 [10144]15:26 [10145]16:2
[10146]16:7 [10147]16:7 [10148]16:7 [10149]16:7 [10150]16:8
[10151]16:11 [10152]16:12 [10153]16:12 [10154]16:12
[10155]16:13 [10156]16:13 [10157]16:13 [10158]16:14
[10159]16:22 [10160]16:23 [10161]16:23 [10162]16:33
[10163]17:1 [10164]17:1 [10165]17:1 [10166]17:1 [10167]17:3
[10168]17:3 [10169]17:3 [10170]17:3 [10171]17:3 [10172]17:3
[10173]17:3 [10174]17:3 [10175]17:3 [10176]17:3 [10177]17:3
[10178]17:3 [10179]17:5 [10180]17:5 [10181]17:5-6
[10182]17:10 [10183]17:11 [10184]17:20 [10185]17:21
[10186]17:21-22 [10187]17:21-22 [10188]17:22 [10189]17:24
[10190]18:3 [10191]18:6 [10192]18:11 [10193]18:20
[10194]18:20 [10195]18:20 [10196]18:23 [10197]18:28
[10198]18:35 [10199]18:35 [10200]18:36 [10201]18:37
[10202]18:37 [10203]18:37 [10204]18:37 [10205]19:2
[10206]19:7 [10207]19:11 [10208]19:11 [10209]19:11
[10210]19:11 [10211]19:14 [10212]19:16 [10213]19:25
[10214]19:30 [10215]19:30 [10216]19:30 [10217]19:30
[10218]19:32 [10219]19:34 [10220]19:35 [10221]19:37
[10222]19:40 [10223]19:40 [10224]20:1 [10225]20:1 [10226]20:1
[10227]20:13 [10228]20:17 [10229]20:17 [10230]20:17
[10231]20:17 [10232]20:17 [10233]20:17 [10234]20:17
[10235]20:17 [10236]20:19 [10237]20:19 [10238]20:20
[10239]20:22 [10240]20:22 [10241]20:22-23 [10242]20:22-23
[10243]20:22-23 [10244]20:22-23 [10245]20:23 [10246]20:23
[10247]20:23 [10248]20:23 [10249]20:23 [10250]20:23
[10251]20:26 [10252]20:26 [10253]20:26 [10254]20:26
[10255]20:26 [10256]20:26 [10257]20:27 [10258]20:29
[10259]20:29 [10260]20:29 [10261]20:29 [10262]20:29
[10263]20:31 [10264]20:31 [10265]21 [10266]21 [10267]21:17
[10268]21:17 [10269]21:17 [10270]21:17 [10271]21:21
[10272]21:22 [10273]21:25 [10274]26
Acts
[10275]1:1 [10276]1:1 [10277]1:1 [10278]1:1 [10279]1:1
[10280]1:1 [10281]1:3 [10282]1:3 [10283]1:3 [10284]1:3
[10285]1:5 [10286]1:7 [10287]1:7 [10288]1:7 [10289]1:7
[10290]1:7 [10291]1:8 [10292]1:9 [10293]1:9 [10294]1:9
[10295]1:9 [10296]1:11 [10297]1:11 [10298]1:13-14 [10299]1:26
[10300]2 [10301]2 [10302]2 [10303]2 [10304]2:1 [10305]2:2
[10306]2:2 [10307]2:3 [10308]2:4 [10309]2:4 [10310]2:4
[10311]2:6 [10312]2:6 [10313]2:13 [10314]2:15 [10315]2:17
[10316]2:22 [10317]2:24 [10318]2:24 [10319]2:24 [10320]2:24
[10321]2:25 [10322]2:27 [10323]2:31 [10324]2:38 [10325]2:38
[10326]2:38 [10327]2:38 [10328]2:41 [10329]2:46 [10330]3:6
[10331]3:15 [10332]3:17 [10333]4 [10334]4 [10335]4
[10336]4:4 [10337]4:12 [10338]4:12 [10339]4:12 [10340]4:13
[10341]4:27 [10342]4:30 [10343]4:33 [10344]4:34-35
[10345]4:34-37 [10346]5 [10347]5 [10348]5:1 [10349]5:1-10
[10350]5:3 [10351]5:4 [10352]5:4 [10353]5:9 [10354]5:9
[10355]5:15 [10356]5:15 [10357]5:29 [10358]5:29 [10359]5:29
[10360]5:38-39 [10361]5:41 [10362]6 [10363]6:2 [10364]6:2
[10365]6:3 [10366]6:8 [10367]7:24-25 [10368]7:38 [10369]7:51
[10370]7:53 [10371]7:53 [10372]7:55 [10373]8 [10374]8
[10375]8:12 [10376]8:16-17 [10377]8:17 [10378]8:17
[10379]8:17 [10380]8:18-19 [10381]8:20 [10382]8:22 [10383]9
[10384]9 [10385]9:1 [10386]9:22 [10387]9:29 [10388]9:34
[10389]9:40 [10390]10 [10391]10 [10392]10:1-2 [10393]10:4
[10394]10:9 [10395]10:10 [10396]10:15 [10397]10:15
[10398]10:31 [10399]10:34 [10400]10:34 [10401]10:34-35
[10402]10:34-35 [10403]10:40 [10404]10:40-41 [10405]10:42
[10406]10:42 [10407]10:42 [10408]10:43 [10409]10:44-48
[10410]11:15 [10411]14:21 [10412]15 [10413]15:1 [10414]15:9
[10415]15:9 [10416]15:9 [10417]15:10 [10418]15:10
[10419]15:28-29 [10420]15:29 [10421]15:29 [10422]15:39
[10423]16:3 [10424]17:16 [10425]17:22 [10426]17:24
[10427]17:24 [10428]17:26 [10429]17:26 [10430]17:28
[10431]17:28 [10432]18 [10433]18 [10434]18 [10435]19:1-5
[10436]19:1-7 [10437]19:4 [10438]19:11-12 [10439]20:27
[10440]20:28 [10441]20:35 [10442]21:9 [10443]21:26
[10444]23:6 [10445]23:8 [10446]25 [10447]25:16 [10448]25:27
Romans
[10449]1 [10450]1 [10451]1:2-3 [10452]1:3 [10453]1:3
[10454]1:3 [10455]1:4 [10456]1:4 [10457]1:4 [10458]1:4
[10459]1:4 [10460]1:4 [10461]1:4 [10462]1:4 [10463]1:4
[10464]1:5 [10465]1:5 [10466]1:5 [10467]1:7 [10468]1:14
[10469]1:15 [10470]1:16 [10471]1:17 [10472]1:17 [10473]1:17
[10474]1:18 [10475]1:19 [10476]1:19 [10477]1:19 [10478]1:19
[10479]1:19 [10480]1:20 [10481]1:20 [10482]1:20 [10483]1:20
[10484]1:20 [10485]1:20 [10486]1:20 [10487]1:20 [10488]1:20
[10489]1:20 [10490]1:20 [10491]1:20 [10492]1:20 [10493]1:20
[10494]1:20 [10495]1:20 [10496]1:20 [10497]1:20 [10498]1:20
[10499]1:21 [10500]1:23 [10501]1:23 [10502]1:23 [10503]1:24
[10504]1:25 [10505]1:25 [10506]1:25 [10507]1:25 [10508]1:26
[10509]1:27 [10510]1:28 [10511]1:28 [10512]1:29 [10513]1:29
[10514]1:29-30 [10515]1:30 [10516]1:30 [10517]1:30
[10518]1:30 [10519]1:32 [10520]1:32 [10521]1:32 [10522]1:32
[10523]1:32 [10524]1:32 [10525]1:32 [10526]1:32 [10527]1:32
[10528]1:32 [10529]1:32 [10530]1:32 [10531]1:32 [10532]2:1
[10533]2:1 [10534]2:2 [10535]2:2 [10536]2:4 [10537]2:4
[10538]2:4 [10539]2:5 [10540]2:6 [10541]2:7 [10542]2:9
[10543]2:11 [10544]2:11 [10545]2:12 [10546]2:13 [10547]2:14
[10548]2:14 [10549]2:14 [10550]2:14 [10551]2:14
[10552]2:14-15 [10553]2:14-15 [10554]2:15 [10555]2:15
[10556]2:15 [10557]2:15-16 [10558]2:15-16 [10559]2:16
[10560]2:29 [10561]3:1-2 [10562]3:2 [10563]3:3 [10564]3:8
[10565]3:8 [10566]3:8 [10567]3:8 [10568]3:19 [10569]3:20
[10570]3:20 [10571]3:22 [10572]3:22 [10573]3:22 [10574]3:22
[10575]3:22 [10576]3:22 [10577]3:22 [10578]3:23 [10579]3:23
[10580]3:24 [10581]3:24 [10582]3:24 [10583]3:24 [10584]3:24
[10585]3:24-25 [10586]3:24-25 [10587]3:25 [10588]3:25
[10589]3:25 [10590]3:25 [10591]3:25 [10592]3:25 [10593]3:25
[10594]3:25 [10595]3:25 [10596]3:25-26 [10597]3:25-26
[10598]3:27 [10599]3:27 [10600]3:27 [10601]3:27 [10602]3:30
[10603]4 [10604]4:2 [10605]4:4 [10606]4:4 [10607]4:4
[10608]4:4 [10609]4:4 [10610]4:5 [10611]4:5 [10612]4:5
[10613]4:5 [10614]4:5 [10615]4:6 [10616]4:7 [10617]4:8
[10618]4:9 [10619]4:11 [10620]4:11 [10621]4:11 [10622]4:11
[10623]4:11 [10624]4:11 [10625]4:11 [10626]4:11
[10627]4:11-12 [10628]4:15 [10629]4:17 [10630]4:17
[10631]4:18 [10632]4:25 [10633]4:25 [10634]4:25 [10635]4:25
[10636]4:25 [10637]4:25 [10638]4:25 [10639]4:25 [10640]4:25
[10641]5 [10642]5 [10643]5:1 [10644]5:1 [10645]5:1
[10646]5:1 [10647]5:1-2 [10648]5:2 [10649]5:2 [10650]5:2
[10651]5:2 [10652]5:2 [10653]5:3-4 [10654]5:3-4 [10655]5:5
[10656]5:5 [10657]5:5 [10658]5:5 [10659]5:5 [10660]5:5
[10661]5:5 [10662]5:5 [10663]5:5 [10664]5:5 [10665]5:5
[10666]5:5 [10667]5:5 [10668]5:5 [10669]5:5 [10670]5:5
[10671]5:5 [10672]5:5 [10673]5:8 [10674]5:8 [10675]5:8
[10676]5:10 [10677]5:10 [10678]5:10 [10679]5:10 [10680]5:11
[10681]5:12 [10682]5:12 [10683]5:12 [10684]5:12 [10685]5:12
[10686]5:12 [10687]5:12 [10688]5:12 [10689]5:12 [10690]5:12
[10691]5:12 [10692]5:12 [10693]5:12 [10694]5:12 [10695]5:12
[10696]5:12 [10697]5:12 [10698]5:12 [10699]5:14 [10700]5:15
[10701]5:15 [10702]5:15 [10703]5:15 [10704]5:15 [10705]5:15
[10706]5:15 [10707]5:15 [10708]5:15-16 [10709]5:15-16
[10710]5:16 [10711]5:17 [10712]5:18 [10713]5:18 [10714]5:18
[10715]5:19 [10716]5:19 [10717]5:19 [10718]5:20 [10719]5:20
[10720]5:20 [10721]5:20 [10722]5:20 [10723]5:21 [10724]6:3
[10725]6:3 [10726]6:3 [10727]6:3 [10728]6:3 [10729]6:3-4
[10730]6:3-4 [10731]6:3-4 [10732]6:3-8 [10733]6:4 [10734]6:4
[10735]6:4 [10736]6:4 [10737]6:4 [10738]6:4 [10739]6:4
[10740]6:4 [10741]6:4-11 [10742]6:6 [10743]6:6 [10744]6:6
[10745]6:6 [10746]6:8 [10747]6:8 [10748]6:9 [10749]6:9
[10750]6:9 [10751]6:9 [10752]6:9 [10753]6:10 [10754]6:10
[10755]6:10 [10756]6:11 [10757]6:13 [10758]6:13 [10759]6:13
[10760]6:16 [10761]6:20 [10762]6:21 [10763]6:22 [10764]6:22
[10765]6:22 [10766]6:22 [10767]6:22 [10768]6:23 [10769]6:23
[10770]6:23 [10771]6:23 [10772]6:23 [10773]6:23 [10774]6:23
[10775]6:23 [10776]6:23 [10777]6:23 [10778]6:23 [10779]6:23
[10780]6:23 [10781]6:23 [10782]6:23 [10783]6:23 [10784]7
[10785]7 [10786]7 [10787]7 [10788]7:2 [10789]7:2 [10790]7:2
[10791]7:2 [10792]7:3 [10793]7:4 [10794]7:5 [10795]7:5
[10796]7:5 [10797]7:5 [10798]7:5 [10799]7:5 [10800]7:5
[10801]7:5 [10802]7:7 [10803]7:7 [10804]7:7 [10805]7:7
[10806]7:8 [10807]7:8 [10808]7:8 [10809]7:8 [10810]7:12
[10811]7:12 [10812]7:12 [10813]7:15 [10814]7:15 [10815]7:18
[10816]7:18 [10817]7:19 [10818]7:19 [10819]7:19 [10820]7:19
[10821]7:23 [10822]7:23 [10823]7:23 [10824]7:23 [10825]7:23
[10826]7:23 [10827]7:23 [10828]7:23 [10829]7:24 [10830]7:24
[10831]7:25 [10832]7:25 [10833]7:25 [10834]8:1 [10835]8:2
[10836]8:2 [10837]8:2 [10838]8:2 [10839]8:2 [10840]8:2
[10841]8:3 [10842]8:3 [10843]8:3 [10844]8:3 [10845]8:3
[10846]8:3 [10847]8:3-4 [10848]8:3-4 [10849]8:6 [10850]8:7
[10851]8:7 [10852]8:7 [10853]8:7 [10854]8:7 [10855]8:9
[10856]8:9 [10857]8:10 [10858]8:10 [10859]8:10 [10860]8:11
[10861]8:11 [10862]8:11 [10863]8:11 [10864]8:11 [10865]8:11
[10866]8:11 [10867]8:13 [10868]8:14 [10869]8:14 [10870]8:14
[10871]8:14 [10872]8:14 [10873]8:15 [10874]8:15 [10875]8:15
[10876]8:15 [10877]8:15 [10878]8:15 [10879]8:15 [10880]8:15
[10881]8:16-17 [10882]8:17 [10883]8:17 [10884]8:17
[10885]8:17 [10886]8:17 [10887]8:17 [10888]8:17 [10889]8:17
[10890]8:18 [10891]8:18 [10892]8:18 [10893]8:19 [10894]8:21
[10895]8:21-22 [10896]8:22 [10897]8:22 [10898]8:22
[10899]8:23 [10900]8:23 [10901]8:23 [10902]8:23 [10903]8:24
[10904]8:24 [10905]8:24 [10906]8:24 [10907]8:24 [10908]8:24
[10909]8:25 [10910]8:25 [10911]8:26 [10912]8:26 [10913]8:26
[10914]8:26 [10915]8:27 [10916]8:28 [10917]8:28 [10918]8:28
[10919]8:28 [10920]8:28 [10921]8:29 [10922]8:29 [10923]8:29
[10924]8:29 [10925]8:29 [10926]8:29 [10927]8:29 [10928]8:29
[10929]8:29 [10930]8:29 [10931]8:29 [10932]8:29 [10933]8:29
[10934]8:29 [10935]8:29 [10936]8:29 [10937]8:29 [10938]8:30
[10939]8:30 [10940]8:30 [10941]8:30 [10942]8:30 [10943]8:32
[10944]8:32 [10945]8:32 [10946]8:33 [10947]8:33 [10948]8:34
[10949]8:35 [10950]8:38-39 [10951]8:38-39 [10952]9:2
[10953]9:3 [10954]9:3 [10955]9:4 [10956]9:4 [10957]9:5
[10958]9:5 [10959]9:5 [10960]9:11 [10961]9:11-12 [10962]9:13
[10963]9:14 [10964]9:15 [10965]9:15 [10966]9:16 [10967]9:16
[10968]9:16 [10969]9:16 [10970]9:16 [10971]9:18 [10972]9:19
[10973]9:19 [10974]9:22-23 [10975]9:30-31 [10976]10:4
[10977]10:8 [10978]10:10 [10979]10:10 [10980]10:10
[10981]10:10 [10982]10:10 [10983]10:14 [10984]10:14
[10985]10:14-15 [10986]10:15 [10987]10:15 [10988]10:16
[10989]10:16 [10990]10:17 [10991]10:17 [10992]10:17
[10993]10:17 [10994]10:17 [10995]10:17 [10996]10:17
[10997]10:17 [10998]10:17 [10999]10:17 [11000]11 [11001]11:6
[11002]11:6 [11003]11:6 [11004]11:6 [11005]11:16 [11006]11:16
[11007]11:22 [11008]11:22 [11009]11:24 [11010]11:25
[11011]11:29 [11012]11:29 [11013]11:29 [11014]11:29
[11015]11:29 [11016]11:29 [11017]11:29 [11018]11:32
[11019]11:33 [11020]11:34 [11021]11:34 [11022]11:35
[11023]11:35 [11024]11:35 [11025]11:36 [11026]11:36 [11027]12
[11028]12:1 [11029]12:1 [11030]12:1 [11031]12:1 [11032]12:1
[11033]12:1 [11034]12:1 [11035]12:2 [11036]12:2 [11037]12:3
[11038]12:4-5 [11039]12:5 [11040]12:6 [11041]12:8
[11042]12:10 [11043]12:12 [11044]12:12 [11045]12:12
[11046]12:12 [11047]12:12 [11048]12:14 [11049]12:14
[11050]12:15 [11051]12:15 [11052]12:15 [11053]12:17
[11054]12:17 [11055]12:19 [11056]12:19 [11057]12:19
[11058]12:21 [11059]12:21 [11060]13:1 [11061]13:1 [11062]13:1
[11063]13:1 [11064]13:1 [11065]13:1 [11066]13:1 [11067]13:1
[11068]13:1 [11069]13:1 [11070]13:1 [11071]13:1 [11072]13:1
[11073]13:1 [11074]13:1 [11075]13:1 [11076]13:1-2 [11077]13:2
[11078]13:2 [11079]13:2 [11080]13:2 [11081]13:2 [11082]13:2
[11083]13:3 [11084]13:3-4 [11085]13:4 [11086]13:4 [11087]13:4
[11088]13:4 [11089]13:4 [11090]13:7 [11091]13:7 [11092]13:7
[11093]13:7 [11094]13:7 [11095]13:8 [11096]13:8 [11097]13:8
[11098]13:8 [11099]13:8 [11100]13:8 [11101]13:9 [11102]13:10
[11103]13:10 [11104]13:12 [11105]13:13 [11106]13:13
[11107]13:14 [11108]14:3 [11109]14:3 [11110]14:4 [11111]14:4
[11112]14:4 [11113]14:4 [11114]14:9 [11115]14:9 [11116]14:10
[11117]14:13 [11118]14:15 [11119]14:15 [11120]14:15
[11121]14:17 [11122]14:17 [11123]14:17 [11124]14:17
[11125]14:17 [11126]14:17 [11127]14:21 [11128]14:21
[11129]14:23 [11130]14:23 [11131]14:23 [11132]14:23
[11133]14:23 [11134]15 [11135]15:1 [11136]15:4 [11137]15:4
[11138]15:4 [11139]15:4 [11140]15:8 [11141]15:8 [11142]15:20
[11143]15:27 [11144]15:30 [11145]15:30 [11146]16:1
[11147]16:2 [11148]16:6 [11149]16:25 [11150]16:27
1 Corinthians
[11151]1:5 [11152]1:8 [11153]1:9 [11154]1:9 [11155]1:10
[11156]1:10 [11157]1:10 [11158]1:10 [11159]1:12 [11160]1:12
[11161]1:13 [11162]1:13 [11163]1:13 [11164]1:14 [11165]1:16
[11166]1:17 [11167]1:18 [11168]1:18 [11169]1:20 [11170]1:24
[11171]1:24 [11172]1:24 [11173]1:24 [11174]1:24 [11175]1:24
[11176]1:24 [11177]1:24 [11178]1:24 [11179]1:24 [11180]1:24
[11181]1:25 [11182]1:25 [11183]1:26 [11184]1:27 [11185]1:30
[11186]1:30 [11187]1:30 [11188]2:4 [11189]2:4 [11190]2:6
[11191]2:6 [11192]2:6 [11193]2:6-7 [11194]2:7-8 [11195]2:8
[11196]2:8 [11197]2:8 [11198]2:8 [11199]2:8 [11200]2:9
[11201]2:9 [11202]2:9 [11203]2:9 [11204]2:9 [11205]2:9
[11206]2:10 [11207]2:10 [11208]2:10 [11209]2:10 [11210]2:10
[11211]2:10 [11212]2:11 [11213]2:11 [11214]2:11 [11215]2:11
[11216]2:11 [11217]2:12 [11218]2:12 [11219]2:12 [11220]2:12
[11221]2:14 [11222]2:14 [11223]2:15 [11224]2:15 [11225]2:15
[11226]2:15 [11227]2:15 [11228]2:15 [11229]2:15 [11230]2:15
[11231]2:15 [11232]3:3 [11233]3:3 [11234]3:8 [11235]3:8
[11236]3:8 [11237]3:9 [11238]3:9 [11239]3:10 [11240]3:10
[11241]3:11 [11242]3:11 [11243]3:12 [11244]3:12 [11245]3:12
[11246]3:12 [11247]3:12 [11248]3:12 [11249]3:12 [11250]3:13
[11251]3:13 [11252]3:15 [11253]3:15 [11254]3:15 [11255]3:15
[11256]3:15 [11257]3:15 [11258]3:16 [11259]3:17 [11260]3:18
[11261]3:18 [11262]3:19 [11263]3:19 [11264]4:1 [11265]4:1
[11266]4:1 [11267]4:1 [11268]4:1 [11269]4:1 [11270]4:1
[11271]4:1 [11272]4:1 [11273]4:2 [11274]4:3-4 [11275]4:4
[11276]4:4 [11277]4:4 [11278]4:5 [11279]4:5 [11280]4:5
[11281]4:5 [11282]4:5 [11283]4:5 [11284]4:7 [11285]4:7
[11286]4:12 [11287]4:12 [11288]4:15 [11289]4:15 [11290]4:16
[11291]4:16 [11292]4:16 [11293]4:16 [11294]4:16 [11295]4:19
[11296]4:20 [11297]4:20 [11298]5:2 [11299]5:5 [11300]5:5
[11301]5:5 [11302]5:6 [11303]5:6 [11304]5:7 [11305]5:7
[11306]5:7 [11307]5:7 [11308]5:7 [11309]5:7-8 [11310]5:7-8
[11311]5:8 [11312]5:11 [11313]5:11 [11314]5:11 [11315]5:12
[11316]5:12 [11317]5:12 [11318]5:12 [11319]6:1 [11320]6:1
[11321]6:1 [11322]6:3 [11323]6:3 [11324]6:6 [11325]6:7
[11326]6:9 [11327]6:9-10 [11328]6:9-10 [11329]6:9-10
[11330]6:9-10 [11331]6:10 [11332]6:11 [11333]6:11 [11334]6:11
[11335]6:11 [11336]6:15 [11337]6:15 [11338]6:16 [11339]6:16
[11340]6:17 [11341]6:17 [11342]6:17 [11343]6:17 [11344]6:18
[11345]6:18 [11346]6:18 [11347]6:18 [11348]6:18 [11349]6:19
[11350]6:20 [11351]6:20 [11352]7 [11353]7 [11354]7:2
[11355]7:2 [11356]7:2 [11357]7:3 [11358]7:3 [11359]7:4
[11360]7:4 [11361]7:4 [11362]7:4 [11363]7:4 [11364]7:4
[11365]7:4 [11366]7:4 [11367]7:5 [11368]7:5 [11369]7:5
[11370]7:5 [11371]7:6 [11372]7:6 [11373]7:6 [11374]7:6
[11375]7:7 [11376]7:9 [11377]7:9 [11378]7:9 [11379]7:10-11
[11380]7:11 [11381]7:11 [11382]7:12 [11383]7:12 [11384]7:12
[11385]7:12 [11386]7:12 [11387]7:15 [11388]7:15-16
[11389]7:21 [11390]7:21 [11391]7:25 [11392]7:25 [11393]7:25
[11394]7:26 [11395]7:28 [11396]7:28 [11397]7:28 [11398]7:29
[11399]7:31 [11400]7:31 [11401]7:31 [11402]7:31 [11403]7:31
[11404]7:31 [11405]7:32 [11406]7:32 [11407]7:32-33
[11408]7:33 [11409]7:34 [11410]7:34 [11411]7:34 [11412]7:34
[11413]7:34 [11414]7:35 [11415]7:38 [11416]7:38 [11417]7:39
[11418]7:39 [11419]7:40 [11420]8:1 [11421]8:1 [11422]8:4
[11423]8:5 [11424]8:6 [11425]8:6 [11426]8:8 [11427]8:10
[11428]8:12 [11429]8:13 [11430]8:13 [11431]9 [11432]9:4
[11433]9:4 [11434]9:4 [11435]9:7 [11436]9:7 [11437]9:7
[11438]9:9 [11439]9:9 [11440]9:9 [11441]9:10 [11442]9:10
[11443]9:11 [11444]9:11 [11445]9:12 [11446]9:12 [11447]9:12
[11448]9:12 [11449]9:12 [11450]9:13 [11451]9:13
[11452]9:13-14 [11453]9:14 [11454]9:15 [11455]9:16
[11456]9:16 [11457]9:16 [11458]9:17 [11459]9:22 [11460]9:24
[11461]9:24 [11462]9:24 [11463]9:25 [11464]9:26 [11465]9:27
[11466]9:27 [11467]10:2 [11468]10:2 [11469]10:2 [11470]10:2
[11471]10:2-4 [11472]10:3 [11473]10:4 [11474]10:4 [11475]10:4
[11476]10:4 [11477]10:4 [11478]10:6 [11479]10:11 [11480]10:11
[11481]10:11 [11482]10:11 [11483]10:11 [11484]10:11
[11485]10:11 [11486]10:11 [11487]10:17 [11488]10:17
[11489]10:17 [11490]10:17 [11491]10:17 [11492]10:18
[11493]10:18 [11494]10:19 [11495]10:20 [11496]10:27
[11497]10:31 [11498]10:31 [11499]10:31 [11500]10:31
[11501]10:31 [11502]10:32 [11503]10:32 [11504]10:33
[11505]10:33 [11506]11 [11507]11:3 [11508]11:3 [11509]11:3
[11510]11:3 [11511]11:5 [11512]11:7 [11513]11:7 [11514]11:7
[11515]11:9 [11516]11:15 [11517]11:15 [11518]11:19
[11519]11:19 [11520]11:20 [11521]11:21 [11522]11:21
[11523]11:23 [11524]11:23 [11525]11:23 [11526]11:25
[11527]11:25 [11528]11:25 [11529]11:26 [11530]11:26
[11531]11:26 [11532]11:27 [11533]11:27 [11534]11:28
[11535]11:28 [11536]11:29 [11537]11:29 [11538]11:29
[11539]11:29 [11540]11:29 [11541]11:29 [11542]11:33
[11543]11:34 [11544]11:34 [11545]12 [11546]12 [11547]12
[11548]12 [11549]12:2 [11550]12:3 [11551]12:3 [11552]12:3
[11553]12:4 [11554]12:4 [11555]12:4 [11556]12:4 [11557]12:4
[11558]12:4 [11559]12:4 [11560]12:4 [11561]12:4 [11562]12:4
[11563]12:4 [11564]12:4 [11565]12:5 [11566]12:7 [11567]12:7
[11568]12:7 [11569]12:7 [11570]12:7 [11571]12:7 [11572]12:7
[11573]12:7 [11574]12:7 [11575]12:7 [11576]12:7 [11577]12:7
[11578]12:8 [11579]12:8 [11580]12:8 [11581]12:8 [11582]12:8
[11583]12:9 [11584]12:9 [11585]12:9 [11586]12:9-10
[11587]12:10 [11588]12:10 [11589]12:10 [11590]12:11
[11591]12:11 [11592]12:11 [11593]12:12 [11594]12:17
[11595]12:17 [11596]12:23 [11597]12:23 [11598]12:23-24
[11599]12:24-25 [11600]12:27 [11601]12:27 [11602]12:28
[11603]12:28 [11604]12:31 [11605]12:31 [11606]12:31
[11607]12:31 [11608]12:31 [11609]13 [11610]13 [11611]13
[11612]13 [11613]13:1 [11614]13:1 [11615]13:2 [11616]13:2
[11617]13:2 [11618]13:2 [11619]13:2 [11620]13:2 [11621]13:2
[11622]13:3 [11623]13:3 [11624]13:3 [11625]13:3 [11626]13:3
[11627]13:3 [11628]13:3 [11629]13:3 [11630]13:3 [11631]13:3
[11632]13:4 [11633]13:4 [11634]13:4 [11635]13:4 [11636]13:4
[11637]13:4 [11638]13:4 [11639]13:4 [11640]13:5 [11641]13:5
[11642]13:5 [11643]13:6 [11644]13:6 [11645]13:6 [11646]13:8
[11647]13:8 [11648]13:8 [11649]13:8 [11650]13:8 [11651]13:8
[11652]13:8-9 [11653]13:9 [11654]13:10 [11655]13:10
[11656]13:10 [11657]13:10 [11658]13:10 [11659]13:10
[11660]13:10 [11661]13:10 [11662]13:10-12 [11663]13:11
[11664]13:12 [11665]13:12 [11666]13:12 [11667]13:12
[11668]13:12 [11669]13:12 [11670]13:12 [11671]13:12
[11672]13:12 [11673]13:12 [11674]13:12 [11675]13:12
[11676]13:12 [11677]13:12 [11678]13:12 [11679]13:12
[11680]13:13 [11681]13:13 [11682]13:13 [11683]13:13
[11684]13:13 [11685]13:13 [11686]13:13 [11687]13:13
[11688]13:13 [11689]13:13 [11690]14 [11691]14:1 [11692]14:2-3
[11693]14:3 [11694]14:4-5 [11695]14:5 [11696]14:5
[11697]14:7-14 [11698]14:8 [11699]14:12 [11700]14:12
[11701]14:14 [11702]14:15 [11703]14:15 [11704]14:18
[11705]14:18 [11706]14:20 [11707]14:22 [11708]14:23
[11709]14:24-25 [11710]14:25 [11711]14:26 [11712]14:31
[11713]14:32 [11714]14:34 [11715]14:34 [11716]14:34
[11717]14:34 [11718]14:34-35 [11719]14:35 [11720]14:38
[11721]14:38 [11722]14:40 [11723]14:40 [11724]15 [11725]15
[11726]15 [11727]15:6 [11728]15:6-7 [11729]15:9 [11730]15:10
[11731]15:10 [11732]15:12 [11733]15:12 [11734]15:12
[11735]15:12 [11736]15:14 [11737]15:14 [11738]15:19
[11739]15:20 [11740]15:20 [11741]15:20 [11742]15:20
[11743]15:20-21 [11744]15:22 [11745]15:22 [11746]15:23
[11747]15:24 [11748]15:24 [11749]15:24 [11750]15:24
[11751]15:24 [11752]15:24 [11753]15:24 [11754]15:25-28
[11755]15:28 [11756]15:28 [11757]15:28 [11758]15:28
[11759]15:28 [11760]15:28 [11761]15:28 [11762]15:28
[11763]15:29 [11764]15:36 [11765]15:36 [11766]15:37
[11767]15:41 [11768]15:41 [11769]15:41 [11770]15:41
[11771]15:41 [11772]15:41 [11773]15:42 [11774]15:42
[11775]15:42 [11776]15:43 [11777]15:43 [11778]15:43
[11779]15:43 [11780]15:43 [11781]15:43 [11782]15:44
[11783]15:44 [11784]15:44 [11785]15:44 [11786]15:44
[11787]15:45 [11788]15:45 [11789]15:46 [11790]15:46
[11791]15:46 [11792]15:46 [11793]15:46 [11794]15:46-47
[11795]15:47 [11796]15:48 [11797]15:48 [11798]15:50
[11799]15:50 [11800]15:50 [11801]15:50 [11802]15:51
[11803]15:51 [11804]15:51 [11805]15:51-52 [11806]15:52
[11807]15:52 [11808]15:52 [11809]15:52 [11810]15:52
[11811]15:53 [11812]15:54 [11813]15:54 [11814]15:56
[11815]15:57 [11816]16:5 [11817]16:14 [11818]16:14
[11819]16:33 [11820]23:4 [11821]113:10
2 Corinthians
[11822]1 [11823]1:6 [11824]1:7 [11825]1:11 [11826]1:12
[11827]1:12 [11828]1:15 [11829]1:20 [11830]1:21-22
[11831]1:22 [11832]1:23 [11833]2:7 [11834]2:7 [11835]2:7
[11836]2:7 [11837]2:7 [11838]2:10 [11839]2:10 [11840]2:10
[11841]2:10 [11842]2:10 [11843]2:10 [11844]2:14 [11845]2:15
[11846]3 [11847]3 [11848]3:2-3 [11849]3:3 [11850]3:3
[11851]3:4-5 [11852]3:5 [11853]3:5 [11854]3:5 [11855]3:5
[11856]3:6 [11857]3:6 [11858]3:6 [11859]3:6 [11860]3:6
[11861]3:7-8 [11862]3:17 [11863]3:17 [11864]3:17 [11865]3:17
[11866]3:17 [11867]3:17 [11868]3:18 [11869]3:18 [11870]3:18
[11871]4:2 [11872]4:4 [11873]4:4 [11874]4:13 [11875]4:13
[11876]4:13 [11877]4:13 [11878]4:16 [11879]4:16 [11880]4:17
[11881]4:18 [11882]4:18 [11883]4:18 [11884]5:1 [11885]5:1
[11886]5:4 [11887]5:4 [11888]5:6 [11889]5:6 [11890]5:6
[11891]5:6 [11892]5:6 [11893]5:6-7 [11894]5:6-7 [11895]5:6-7
[11896]5:8 [11897]5:10 [11898]5:10 [11899]5:10 [11900]5:10
[11901]5:14 [11902]5:16 [11903]5:19 [11904]5:19 [11905]5:20
[11906]5:21 [11907]5:21 [11908]5:21 [11909]6:1 [11910]6:4-10
[11911]6:5 [11912]6:5-6 [11913]6:5-6 [11914]6:5-6
[11915]6:5-6 [11916]6:7 [11917]6:11 [11918]6:11 [11919]6:14
[11920]6:14 [11921]6:14 [11922]6:14 [11923]6:14 [11924]6:14
[11925]6:14 [11926]6:14 [11927]6:15 [11928]6:15 [11929]6:15
[11930]6:15 [11931]6:17 [11932]6:17 [11933]6:17 [11934]7:1
[11935]7:1 [11936]7:8 [11937]7:9 [11938]7:9 [11939]7:10
[11940]7:10 [11941]7:10 [11942]7:10 [11943]7:10 [11944]7:10
[11945]7:11 [11946]7:20 [11947]8:9 [11948]8:9 [11949]8:12
[11950]8:13 [11951]8:13 [11952]8:13 [11953]9:5 [11954]9:7
[11955]9:7 [11956]9:7 [11957]9:7 [11958]9:7 [11959]9:8
[11960]9:10 [11961]10:4 [11962]10:4 [11963]10:4-5 [11964]10:5
[11965]10:8 [11966]10:8 [11967]10:8 [11968]10:13
[11969]10:17-18 [11970]10:18 [11971]11:2 [11972]11:2
[11973]11:8 [11974]11:12 [11975]11:12 [11976]11:14 [11977]12
[11978]12 [11979]12 [11980]12 [11981]12 [11982]12:2
[11983]12:2 [11984]12:2 [11985]12:2 [11986]12:2 [11987]12:3
[11988]12:4 [11989]12:4 [11990]12:4 [11991]12:6 [11992]12:6
[11993]12:7 [11994]12:9 [11995]12:9 [11996]12:9 [11997]12:9
[11998]12:9 [11999]12:9 [12000]12:9 [12001]12:9 [12002]12:10
[12003]12:13 [12004]12:14 [12005]12:14 [12006]12:14
[12007]12:14 [12008]12:14 [12009]12:14 [12010]12:15
[12011]12:16 [12012]12:20 [12013]12:20 [12014]12:20
[12015]12:21 [12016]12:21 [12017]12:21 [12018]12:21
[12019]13:3 [12020]13:4 [12021]13:4 [12022]13:4 [12023]13:4
[12024]13:4 [12025]13:11 [12026]13:13
Galatians
[12027]1:8 [12028]1:10 [12029]1:15 [12030]1:16 [12031]1:19
[12032]2 [12033]2:11 [12034]2:11 [12035]2:11 [12036]2:11
[12037]2:12 [12038]2:14 [12039]2:14 [12040]2:15 [12041]2:15
[12042]2:20 [12043]2:20 [12044]2:20 [12045]2:20 [12046]2:21
[12047]2:21 [12048]2:21 [12049]3:1 [12050]3:1 [12051]3:5
[12052]3:5 [12053]3:12 [12054]3:13 [12055]3:13 [12056]3:13
[12057]3:16 [12058]3:16 [12059]3:16 [12060]3:19 [12061]3:19
[12062]3:19 [12063]3:19 [12064]3:19 [12065]3:20 [12066]3:21
[12067]3:23 [12068]3:23 [12069]3:24 [12070]3:24 [12071]3:24
[12072]3:24 [12073]3:24 [12074]3:24-25 [12075]3:24-25
[12076]3:25 [12077]3:26 [12078]3:27 [12079]3:27 [12080]3:27
[12081]3:27 [12082]3:27 [12083]3:28 [12084]3:28 [12085]3:28
[12086]3:28 [12087]3:28 [12088]3:28 [12089]3:28 [12090]3:28
[12091]3:28 [12092]4:3-4 [12093]4:4 [12094]4:4 [12095]4:4
[12096]4:4 [12097]4:4 [12098]4:4 [12099]4:4 [12100]4:4
[12101]4:4 [12102]4:4 [12103]4:4 [12104]4:4-5 [12105]4:4-5
[12106]4:4-5 [12107]4:5 [12108]4:5 [12109]4:6 [12110]4:6
[12111]4:6 [12112]4:6 [12113]4:8 [12114]4:9 [12115]4:9
[12116]4:9 [12117]4:9 [12118]4:14 [12119]4:14 [12120]4:16
[12121]4:18 [12122]4:19 [12123]4:22 [12124]4:26 [12125]5
[12126]5:1 [12127]5:2 [12128]5:2 [12129]5:2 [12130]5:3
[12131]5:3 [12132]5:3 [12133]5:3 [12134]5:3 [12135]5:6
[12136]5:6 [12137]5:6 [12138]5:6 [12139]5:6 [12140]5:6
[12141]5:6 [12142]5:6 [12143]5:6 [12144]5:6 [12145]5:6
[12146]5:7 [12147]5:9 [12148]5:10 [12149]5:13 [12150]5:13
[12151]5:13 [12152]5:17 [12153]5:17 [12154]5:17 [12155]5:17
[12156]5:17 [12157]5:17 [12158]5:17 [12159]5:17 [12160]5:18
[12161]5:19 [12162]5:19 [12163]5:19 [12164]5:19 [12165]5:19
[12166]5:19 [12167]5:19 [12168]5:20 [12169]5:20 [12170]5:20
[12171]5:20 [12172]5:20 [12173]5:20 [12174]5:21 [12175]5:21
[12176]5:21 [12177]5:21 [12178]5:22 [12179]5:22 [12180]5:22
[12181]5:22 [12182]5:22 [12183]5:22 [12184]5:22-23
[12185]5:22-23 [12186]5:22-23 [12187]5:22-23 [12188]5:22-23
[12189]5:23 [12190]5:23 [12191]5:23 [12192]5:23 [12193]5:23
[12194]5:24 [12195]5:24 [12196]5:26 [12197]5:26 [12198]6:2
[12199]6:2 [12200]6:2 [12201]6:2 [12202]6:2 [12203]6:8
[12204]6:10 [12205]6:10 [12206]6:10 [12207]6:15 [12208]6:15
[12209]6:15 [12210]6:22
Ephesians
[12211]1:4 [12212]1:4 [12213]1:5 [12214]1:5 [12215]1:5
[12216]1:5 [12217]1:5-6 [12218]1:6 [12219]1:10 [12220]1:11
[12221]1:11 [12222]1:11 [12223]1:11 [12224]1:11
[12225]1:17-18 [12226]1:17-18 [12227]1:18 [12228]1:18-19
[12229]1:20-21 [12230]1:20-21 [12231]1:20-21 [12232]1:20-22
[12233]1:21 [12234]1:21 [12235]1:22 [12236]1:22
[12237]1:22-23 [12238]1:23 [12239]1:23 [12240]2:1 [12241]2:2
[12242]2:3 [12243]2:3 [12244]2:4 [12245]2:4 [12246]2:4-5
[12247]2:4-5 [12248]2:6 [12249]2:8 [12250]2:8 [12251]2:8
[12252]2:8 [12253]2:8 [12254]2:8-9 [12255]2:10 [12256]2:14
[12257]2:15 [12258]2:15 [12259]2:19 [12260]3:4-5 [12261]3:5
[12262]3:5 [12263]3:5 [12264]3:5 [12265]3:5 [12266]3:8
[12267]3:8 [12268]3:8-9 [12269]3:9 [12270]3:10 [12271]3:14
[12272]3:14-15 [12273]3:15 [12274]3:17 [12275]3:17
[12276]3:17 [12277]3:17 [12278]3:17 [12279]3:17 [12280]3:17
[12281]3:17 [12282]3:17 [12283]3:17 [12284]3:18 [12285]3:19
[12286]3:19 [12287]3:19 [12288]3:19 [12289]3:19 [12290]3:19
[12291]3:20 [12292]4:1 [12293]4:3 [12294]4:5 [12295]4:5
[12296]4:5 [12297]4:5 [12298]4:5 [12299]4:5 [12300]4:5
[12301]4:5 [12302]4:5 [12303]4:5 [12304]4:5 [12305]4:5-6
[12306]4:7 [12307]4:7 [12308]4:7 [12309]4:7 [12310]4:8
[12311]4:8 [12312]4:9 [12313]4:9 [12314]4:9 [12315]4:9
[12316]4:10 [12317]4:10 [12318]4:10 [12319]4:10 [12320]4:11
[12321]4:11-12 [12322]4:12 [12323]4:12 [12324]4:13
[12325]4:13 [12326]4:13 [12327]4:13 [12328]4:13 [12329]4:13
[12330]4:14 [12331]4:16 [12332]4:19 [12333]4:19 [12334]4:23
[12335]4:23 [12336]4:23-24 [12337]4:28 [12338]4:28
[12339]4:29 [12340]4:30 [12341]4:31 [12342]4:31 [12343]4:31
[12344]4:31 [12345]4:32 [12346]5:1 [12347]5:1 [12348]5:1-2
[12349]5:2 [12350]5:2 [12351]5:2 [12352]5:2 [12353]5:2
[12354]5:2 [12355]5:2 [12356]5:2 [12357]5:2 [12358]5:2
[12359]5:2 [12360]5:3 [12361]5:3 [12362]5:3 [12363]5:3
[12364]5:4 [12365]5:5 [12366]5:5 [12367]5:5 [12368]5:5
[12369]5:8 [12370]5:8 [12371]5:8 [12372]5:11 [12373]5:13
[12374]5:13 [12375]5:13 [12376]5:13 [12377]5:13 [12378]5:13
[12379]5:14 [12380]5:15 [12381]5:18 [12382]5:18 [12383]5:19
[12384]5:23 [12385]5:23 [12386]5:25 [12387]5:25
[12388]5:25-26 [12389]5:25-27 [12390]5:26 [12391]5:26
[12392]5:26 [12393]5:26 [12394]5:26 [12395]5:26 [12396]5:27
[12397]5:27 [12398]5:28 [12399]5:28 [12400]5:29 [12401]5:29
[12402]5:29 [12403]5:29 [12404]5:32 [12405]5:32 [12406]5:32
[12407]5:32 [12408]5:32 [12409]5:32 [12410]5:32 [12411]5:33
[12412]6:1 [12413]6:4 [12414]6:5 [12415]6:6 [12416]6:9
[12417]6:12 [12418]6:12 [12419]6:13 [12420]6:14 [12421]6:16
[12422]6:19 [12423]9:6
Philippians
[12424]1:6 [12425]1:7 [12426]1:17 [12427]1:18 [12428]1:22-25
[12429]1:23 [12430]1:23 [12431]1:23 [12432]2:3 [12433]2:3
[12434]2:3 [12435]2:3 [12436]2:3 [12437]2:3 [12438]2:6
[12439]2:6 [12440]2:6-7 [12441]2:7 [12442]2:7 [12443]2:7
[12444]2:7 [12445]2:7 [12446]2:7 [12447]2:7 [12448]2:7
[12449]2:7 [12450]2:7 [12451]2:7 [12452]2:7 [12453]2:8
[12454]2:8 [12455]2:8 [12456]2:8 [12457]2:8 [12458]2:8
[12459]2:8 [12460]2:8 [12461]2:8 [12462]2:8-9 [12463]2:8-9
[12464]2:8-11 [12465]2:9 [12466]2:10 [12467]2:10 [12468]2:12
[12469]2:13 [12470]2:13 [12471]2:13 [12472]2:13 [12473]2:13
[12474]2:21 [12475]3:12 [12476]3:12 [12477]3:12 [12478]3:12
[12479]3:12 [12480]3:12 [12481]3:13 [12482]3:13-14
[12483]3:15 [12484]3:15 [12485]3:15 [12486]3:19 [12487]3:19
[12488]3:20 [12489]3:21 [12490]3:21 [12491]3:21 [12492]3:21
[12493]3:21 [12494]3:21 [12495]3:21 [12496]3:21 [12497]3:21
[12498]3:21 [12499]3:21 [12500]3:21 [12501]3:21 [12502]3:21
[12503]4:1 [12504]4:4 [12505]4:4 [12506]4:4 [12507]4:4
[12508]4:5 [12509]4:5 [12510]4:5 [12511]4:12
Colossians
[12512]1:9 [12513]1:12 [12514]1:13 [12515]1:15 [12516]1:15
[12517]1:15 [12518]1:16 [12519]1:16 [12520]1:19
[12521]1:19-20 [12522]1:20 [12523]1:20 [12524]1:21
[12525]1:24 [12526]1:24 [12527]1:24 [12528]2:3 [12529]2:8
[12530]2:8 [12531]2:9 [12532]2:9 [12533]2:9 [12534]2:10
[12535]2:11 [12536]2:11 [12537]2:11 [12538]2:11-12
[12539]2:11-12 [12540]2:11-12 [12541]2:14-15 [12542]2:15
[12543]2:15 [12544]2:15 [12545]2:15 [12546]2:16-17
[12547]2:16-17 [12548]2:16-17 [12549]2:16-17 [12550]2:17
[12551]2:17 [12552]2:17 [12553]2:17 [12554]2:17 [12555]2:17
[12556]2:18-19 [12557]2:19 [12558]2:23 [12559]2:23
[12560]2:23 [12561]3 [12562]3 [12563]3 [12564]3:1-2
[12565]3:3 [12566]3:3 [12567]3:3 [12568]3:5 [12569]3:8
[12570]3:10 [12571]3:10 [12572]3:10-11 [12573]3:11
[12574]3:11 [12575]3:11 [12576]3:12 [12577]3:14 [12578]3:14
[12579]3:14 [12580]3:14 [12581]3:14 [12582]3:14 [12583]3:14
[12584]3:14 [12585]3:16 [12586]3:17 [12587]3:17 [12588]3:20
[12589]3:20 [12590]3:21 [12591]3:21 [12592]3:22 [12593]3:22
[12594]3:25 [12595]4:5
1 Thessalonians
[12596]2:3 [12597]2:4 [12598]2:5 [12599]2:13 [12600]2:15
[12601]2:18 [12602]3:5 [12603]4:3 [12604]4:11 [12605]4:11
[12606]4:11 [12607]4:11 [12608]4:13-16 [12609]4:14
[12610]4:14 [12611]4:15 [12612]4:15 [12613]4:15 [12614]4:15
[12615]4:16 [12616]4:16 [12617]5:2 [12618]5:2 [12619]5:3
[12620]5:17 [12621]5:18 [12622]5:19 [12623]5:21 [12624]5:22
[12625]5:22 [12626]5:22 [12627]5:22 [12628]5:22
2 Thessalonians
[12629]1:8 [12630]1:11 [12631]2:2 [12632]2:3 [12633]2:4
[12634]2:4 [12635]2:7 [12636]2:9 [12637]2:9 [12638]2:9
[12639]2:9 [12640]2:9 [12641]2:14 [12642]3:2 [12643]3:6
[12644]3:6 [12645]3:8-9 [12646]3:9 [12647]3:9 [12648]3:10
[12649]3:10 [12650]3:10 [12651]3:10 [12652]3:10-12
1 Timothy
[12653]1:5 [12654]1:5 [12655]1:5 [12656]1:5 [12657]1:5
[12658]1:5 [12659]1:5 [12660]1:5 [12661]1:5 [12662]1:5
[12663]1:5 [12664]1:5 [12665]1:6 [12666]1:9 [12667]1:12-13
[12668]1:12-13 [12669]1:13 [12670]1:13 [12671]1:13
[12672]1:15 [12673]1:15 [12674]1:15 [12675]1:15 [12676]1:17
[12677]1:17 [12678]1:17 [12679]1:17 [12680]1:19 [12681]2:1
[12682]2:1 [12683]2:2 [12684]2:4 [12685]2:4 [12686]2:4
[12687]2:4 [12688]2:4 [12689]2:4 [12690]2:4 [12691]2:4
[12692]2:4 [12693]2:5 [12694]2:5 [12695]2:5 [12696]2:5
[12697]2:7 [12698]2:7 [12699]2:9 [12700]2:9 [12701]2:11
[12702]2:12 [12703]2:12 [12704]2:12 [12705]2:12 [12706]2:12
[12707]2:14 [12708]2:14 [12709]2:14 [12710]2:14 [12711]3:1
[12712]3:2 [12713]3:2 [12714]3:2 [12715]3:2-3 [12716]3:2-3
[12717]3:10 [12718]3:11 [12719]3:15 [12720]3:16 [12721]3:16
[12722]4:4 [12723]4:4 [12724]4:4 [12725]4:4 [12726]4:4
[12727]4:8 [12728]4:8 [12729]4:8 [12730]4:8 [12731]4:8
[12732]4:8 [12733]4:8 [12734]4:8 [12735]4:8 [12736]4:8
[12737]4:10 [12738]4:10 [12739]4:10 [12740]4:10 [12741]5:1
[12742]5:1 [12743]5:3 [12744]5:4 [12745]5:8 [12746]5:8
[12747]5:8 [12748]5:8 [12749]5:8 [12750]5:8 [12751]5:11
[12752]5:11-12 [12753]5:12 [12754]5:14 [12755]5:14
[12756]5:16 [12757]5:16 [12758]5:17 [12759]5:17 [12760]5:17
[12761]5:17 [12762]5:17 [12763]5:20 [12764]5:20 [12765]5:21
[12766]5:22 [12767]5:23 [12768]5:24 [12769]6:1 [12770]6:1
[12771]6:1 [12772]6:1 [12773]6:2 [12774]6:8 [12775]6:8
[12776]6:8 [12777]6:8 [12778]6:9 [12779]6:9 [12780]6:10
[12781]6:10 [12782]6:10 [12783]6:10 [12784]6:10 [12785]6:10
[12786]6:11 [12787]6:12 [12788]6:15 [12789]6:16
[12790]6:17-18 [12791]6:17-18 [12792]6:18 [12793]6:20
2 Timothy
[12794]1:6 [12795]1:6 [12796]1:12 [12797]1:12 [12798]1:17
[12799]2:2 [12800]2:4 [12801]2:4 [12802]2:4 [12803]2:4
[12804]2:5 [12805]2:5 [12806]2:5 [12807]2:5 [12808]2:5
[12809]2:5 [12810]2:5 [12811]2:6 [12812]2:6 [12813]2:13
[12814]2:13 [12815]2:13 [12816]2:13 [12817]2:13 [12818]2:14
[12819]2:14 [12820]2:14 [12821]2:15 [12822]2:15 [12823]2:15
[12824]2:19 [12825]2:19 [12826]2:20 [12827]2:20
[12828]2:24-25 [12829]2:24-25 [12830]2:25-26 [12831]3:1-2
[12832]3:2 [12833]3:2 [12834]3:3 [12835]3:5 [12836]3:5
[12837]3:13 [12838]3:16 [12839]3:16 [12840]3:24 [12841]4:5
[12842]4:7-8 [12843]4:8 [12844]11:19
Titus
[12845]1:1 [12846]1:5 [12847]1:5 [12848]1:5 [12849]1:6
[12850]1:7 [12851]1:7 [12852]1:9 [12853]1:9 [12854]1:9
[12855]1:15 [12856]1:15 [12857]1:16 [12858]2:2 [12859]2:5
[12860]2:6 [12861]2:9 [12862]2:11-12 [12863]2:12 [12864]2:15
[12865]3:1 [12866]3:1 [12867]3:5 [12868]3:5 [12869]3:5
[12870]3:5 [12871]3:5 [12872]3:5-6 [12873]3:10 [12874]3:10-11
Philemon
[12875]1:20
Hebrews
[12876]1 [12877]1 [12878]1:1 [12879]1:1-2 [12880]1:3
[12881]1:3 [12882]1:3 [12883]1:3 [12884]1:3 [12885]1:3
[12886]1:3 [12887]1:3 [12888]1:3 [12889]1:3 [12890]1:3
[12891]1:3 [12892]1:4 [12893]1:6 [12894]1:7 [12895]1:12
[12896]1:13 [12897]1:14 [12898]1:14 [12899]1:14 [12900]1:14
[12901]1:14 [12902]1:14 [12903]1:14 [12904]1:14 [12905]1:14
[12906]1:14 [12907]2:2 [12908]2:3 [12909]2:3-4 [12910]2:3-4
[12911]2:4 [12912]2:4 [12913]2:4 [12914]2:5 [12915]2:8
[12916]2:8 [12917]2:8-9 [12918]2:9 [12919]2:9 [12920]2:9
[12921]2:9 [12922]2:9 [12923]2:9 [12924]2:10 [12925]2:10
[12926]2:10 [12927]2:10 [12928]2:10 [12929]2:11 [12930]2:14
[12931]2:14-15 [12932]2:16 [12933]2:16 [12934]2:16
[12935]2:16 [12936]2:17 [12937]2:17 [12938]2:17 [12939]2:18
[12940]2:18 [12941]3:6 [12942]4 [12943]4:12 [12944]4:12-13
[12945]4:13 [12946]4:13 [12947]4:14 [12948]4:15 [12949]4:15
[12950]4:15 [12951]5:1 [12952]5:1 [12953]5:1 [12954]5:1
[12955]5:1 [12956]5:1 [12957]5:1 [12958]5:1 [12959]5:1
[12960]5:4 [12961]5:6 [12962]5:7 [12963]5:7 [12964]5:7
[12965]5:7 [12966]5:8 [12967]5:9 [12968]5:9 [12969]5:14
[12970]5:14 [12971]5:14 [12972]6:1 [12973]6:1 [12974]6:2
[12975]6:4 [12976]6:6 [12977]6:6 [12978]6:16 [12979]6:16
[12980]6:16 [12981]6:16 [12982]6:16 [12983]6:16 [12984]6:16
[12985]6:16 [12986]6:17 [12987]6:18 [12988]6:19 [12989]6:19
[12990]6:19 [12991]6:20 [12992]7 [12993]7:2-3 [12994]7:6-9
[12995]7:7 [12996]7:7 [12997]7:11 [12998]7:12 [12999]7:12
[13000]7:12 [13001]7:14 [13002]7:18 [13003]7:18
[13004]7:18-19 [13005]7:19 [13006]7:19 [13007]7:19
[13008]7:19 [13009]7:19 [13010]7:25 [13011]7:25 [13012]7:25
[13013]7:26 [13014]7:26 [13015]7:27 [13016]7:28 [13017]7:28
[13018]8:4 [13019]8:5 [13020]8:8 [13021]8:8 [13022]8:10
[13023]8:13 [13024]9 [13025]9:4 [13026]9:6 [13027]9:8
[13028]9:9 [13029]9:9-10 [13030]9:10 [13031]9:10 [13032]9:10
[13033]9:11 [13034]9:11-12 [13035]9:11-12 [13036]9:12
[13037]9:13 [13038]9:13 [13039]9:13 [13040]9:14 [13041]9:14
[13042]9:14 [13043]9:14 [13044]9:14 [13045]9:15 [13046]9:16
[13047]9:16 [13048]9:17 [13049]9:22 [13050]9:22 [13051]9:27
[13052]9:27 [13053]10:1 [13054]10:1 [13055]10:1 [13056]10:1
[13057]10:1 [13058]10:1-3 [13059]10:4 [13060]10:11
[13061]10:14 [13062]10:14 [13063]10:14 [13064]10:14
[13065]10:14 [13066]10:14 [13067]10:19 [13068]10:19
[13069]10:19 [13070]10:19 [13071]10:19 [13072]10:19
[13073]10:19-22 [13074]10:22 [13075]10:24 [13076]10:25
[13077]10:28-29 [13078]10:29 [13079]10:29 [13080]10:29
[13081]10:29 [13082]10:30 [13083]10:34 [13084]10:34
[13085]10:38 [13086]10:38 [13087]11 [13088]11 [13089]11
[13090]11:1 [13091]11:1 [13092]11:1 [13093]11:1 [13094]11:1
[13095]11:1 [13096]11:1 [13097]11:1 [13098]11:1 [13099]11:1
[13100]11:1 [13101]11:1 [13102]11:2 [13103]11:2 [13104]11:3
[13105]11:6 [13106]11:6 [13107]11:6 [13108]11:6 [13109]11:6
[13110]11:6 [13111]11:6 [13112]11:6 [13113]11:6 [13114]11:6
[13115]11:6 [13116]11:6 [13117]11:6 [13118]11:6 [13119]11:6
[13120]11:6 [13121]11:6 [13122]11:6 [13123]11:6 [13124]11:13
[13125]11:13 [13126]11:13 [13127]11:16 [13128]11:26
[13129]11:32 [13130]11:32 [13131]11:33 [13132]11:33
[13133]11:34 [13134]11:34 [13135]11:35 [13136]11:37
[13137]11:37 [13138]11:39 [13139]11:39 [13140]11:39
[13141]11:40 [13142]11:40 [13143]12:2 [13144]12:2 [13145]12:2
[13146]12:2 [13147]12:2 [13148]12:3 [13149]12:3 [13150]12:4
[13151]12:4 [13152]12:9 [13153]12:9 [13154]12:9 [13155]12:9
[13156]12:11 [13157]12:14 [13158]12:14 [13159]12:14
[13160]12:14 [13161]12:17 [13162]12:18 [13163]13:5
[13164]13:8 [13165]13:8 [13166]13:12 [13167]13:12
[13168]13:12 [13169]13:12 [13170]13:12 [13171]13:12
[13172]13:12 [13173]13:15 [13174]13:15 [13175]13:16
[13176]13:16 [13177]13:16 [13178]13:16 [13179]13:16
[13180]13:16 [13181]13:17 [13182]13:17 [13183]13:17
[13184]13:27 [13185]29
James
[13186]1:2 [13187]1:2 [13188]1:4 [13189]1:4 [13190]1:4
[13191]1:4 [13192]1:5 [13193]1:6 [13194]1:8 [13195]1:13
[13196]1:14 [13197]1:15 [13198]1:17 [13199]1:17 [13200]1:17
[13201]1:17 [13202]1:18 [13203]1:20 [13204]1:21 [13205]1:22
[13206]1:25 [13207]1:27 [13208]1:27 [13209]1:27 [13210]1:27
[13211]2:1 [13212]2:1 [13213]2:1 [13214]2:1 [13215]2:2-3
[13216]2:2-3 [13217]2:10 [13218]2:10 [13219]2:10 [13220]2:10
[13221]2:13 [13222]2:13 [13223]2:13 [13224]2:13 [13225]2:13
[13226]2:18 [13227]2:19 [13228]2:19 [13229]2:19 [13230]2:19
[13231]2:19 [13232]2:19 [13233]2:19 [13234]2:19 [13235]2:20
[13236]2:20 [13237]2:20 [13238]2:20 [13239]2:20 [13240]2:20
[13241]3:2 [13242]3:2 [13243]3:2 [13244]3:2 [13245]3:2
[13246]3:6 [13247]3:6 [13248]3:15 [13249]3:15 [13250]3:15
[13251]3:16 [13252]3:17 [13253]3:17 [13254]4:1 [13255]4:1
[13256]4:1 [13257]4:3 [13258]4:6 [13259]4:6 [13260]4:6
[13261]4:6 [13262]4:6 [13263]4:7 [13264]4:7 [13265]4:8
[13266]4:11 [13267]4:13 [13268]4:17 [13269]4:17 [13270]4:17
[13271]4:17 [13272]5:12 [13273]5:13 [13274]5:14 [13275]5:14
[13276]5:14 [13277]5:14 [13278]5:14 [13279]5:14 [13280]5:15
[13281]5:15 [13282]5:15 [13283]5:15 [13284]5:15 [13285]5:16
[13286]5:16 [13287]5:16 [13288]5:16 [13289]5:16 [13290]5:16
[13291]5:16 [13292]5:16 [13293]5:20
1 Peter
[13294]1:4 [13295]1:12 [13296]1:12 [13297]1:12 [13298]1:18
[13299]1:18 [13300]2:2 [13301]2:2 [13302]2:2 [13303]2:5
[13304]2:9 [13305]2:13 [13306]2:13 [13307]2:13-14 [13308]2:14
[13309]2:17 [13310]2:18 [13311]2:19 [13312]2:21 [13313]2:21
[13314]2:22 [13315]2:22 [13316]2:22 [13317]2:22 [13318]2:22
[13319]2:23 [13320]3:3 [13321]3:4 [13322]3:15 [13323]3:15
[13324]3:15 [13325]3:18 [13326]3:18 [13327]3:18 [13328]3:19
[13329]3:20 [13330]3:20-21 [13331]3:21 [13332]4:1 [13333]4:1
[13334]4:7 [13335]4:10 [13336]4:10 [13337]4:10 [13338]4:15-16
[13339]5:4 [13340]5:6 [13341]5:8 [13342]5:8 [13343]5:8-9
2 Peter
[13344]1:4 [13345]1:4 [13346]1:4 [13347]1:4 [13348]1:4
[13349]1:4 [13350]1:4 [13351]1:5-6 [13352]1:10 [13353]1:19
[13354]1:19 [13355]1:19 [13356]1:19 [13357]1:21 [13358]1:21
[13359]2:4 [13360]2:17 [13361]2:19 [13362]2:19 [13363]2:19
[13364]2:21 [13365]2:21 [13366]2:21 [13367]2:21 [13368]2:21
[13369]3:5 [13370]3:5-7 [13371]3:7 [13372]3:10 [13373]3:12
[13374]3:12 [13375]3:12 [13376]3:12 [13377]3:12 [13378]3:16
1 John
[13379]1:1 [13380]1:3 [13381]1:8 [13382]1:8 [13383]1:8
[13384]1:8 [13385]1:8 [13386]1:8 [13387]1:8 [13388]1:8
[13389]2:1-2 [13390]2:2 [13391]2:2 [13392]2:2 [13393]2:2
[13394]2:2 [13395]2:2 [13396]2:2 [13397]2:2 [13398]2:4-5
[13399]2:9 [13400]2:10 [13401]2:14 [13402]2:16 [13403]2:16
[13404]2:16 [13405]2:16 [13406]2:16 [13407]2:16 [13408]2:16
[13409]2:16 [13410]2:16 [13411]2:18 [13412]2:27 [13413]2:27
[13414]2:27 [13415]3:2 [13416]3:2 [13417]3:2 [13418]3:2
[13419]3:2 [13420]3:2 [13421]3:2 [13422]3:2 [13423]3:2
[13424]3:2 [13425]3:2 [13426]3:2 [13427]3:4 [13428]3:4
[13429]3:4 [13430]3:4 [13431]3:4 [13432]3:8 [13433]3:8
[13434]3:9 [13435]3:9 [13436]3:9 [13437]3:14 [13438]3:14
[13439]3:14 [13440]3:14 [13441]3:14 [13442]3:15 [13443]3:15
[13444]3:16 [13445]3:16 [13446]3:17 [13447]3:17 [13448]3:18
[13449]3:18 [13450]3:20 [13451]4:1 [13452]4:1 [13453]4:1
[13454]4:10 [13455]4:10 [13456]4:16 [13457]4:16 [13458]4:16
[13459]4:16 [13460]4:16 [13461]4:16 [13462]4:16 [13463]4:16
[13464]4:16 [13465]4:18 [13466]4:18 [13467]4:18 [13468]4:18
[13469]4:19 [13470]4:20 [13471]4:20 [13472]4:21 [13473]4:21
[13474]4:21 [13475]4:21 [13476]5:3 [13477]5:7 [13478]5:7
[13479]5:16 [13480]5:16 [13481]5:19 [13482]5:20 [13483]5:20
[13484]5:20 [13485]5:20
2 John
[13486]3:17
Revelation
[13487]1:5 [13488]1:5 [13489]1:5 [13490]1:5 [13491]1:7
[13492]1:7 [13493]2:4 [13494]2:17 [13495]2:26 [13496]2:28
[13497]3:5 [13498]3:7 [13499]3:7 [13500]3:11 [13501]3:11
[13502]3:21 [13503]3:21 [13504]3:21 [13505]4:1 [13506]4:1
[13507]4:3 [13508]5:3 [13509]5:5 [13510]5:5 [13511]5:10
[13512]5:12 [13513]6:2 [13514]6:8 [13515]6:9 [13516]6:10
[13517]6:10 [13518]6:11 [13519]7:3 [13520]7:11 [13521]7:14
[13522]7:16 [13523]8:3 [13524]8:4 [13525]8:4 [13526]9:6
[13527]9:6 [13528]10:6 [13529]10:6 [13530]10:6 [13531]10:6
[13532]11 [13533]12:4 [13534]12:6 [13535]13:16-17 [13536]14
[13537]14:3 [13538]14:3 [13539]14:3 [13540]14:4 [13541]14:4
[13542]14:13 [13543]14:13 [13544]14:13 [13545]16:9
[13546]18:7 [13547]18:7 [13548]18:7 [13549]18:7 [13550]18:7
[13551]18:7 [13552]19:8 [13553]19:16 [13554]20 [13555]20:4
[13556]20:4-5 [13557]20:9-10 [13558]20:12 [13559]20:12
[13560]20:15 [13561]21:1 [13562]21:1 [13563]21:1 [13564]21:1
[13565]21:1 [13566]21:1 [13567]21:2 [13568]21:2 [13569]21:3
[13570]21:4 [13571]21:4 [13572]21:4 [13573]21:5 [13574]21:8
[13575]21:11 [13576]21:14 [13577]21:16 [13578]21:17
[13579]21:17 [13580]21:22 [13581]21:23 [13582]21:23
[13583]21:23 [13584]21:23 [13585]21:23 [13586]22:2
[13587]22:3-4 [13588]22:5 [13589]22:9 [13590]22:10
[13591]22:11 [13592]22:15 [13593]22:17 [13594]22:18-19
Tobit
[13595]1:16 [13596]1:20 [13597]2:12 [13598]3:22 [13599]4:13
[13600]4:13 [13601]4:14 [13602]4:16 [13603]4:93 [13604]5:7-8
[13605]5:12 [13606]12:7 [13607]12:15 [13608]12:19
Judith
[13609]6:15 [13610]9:17 [13611]14:6 [13612]15:10-11
[13613]16:17 [13614]16:21
Wisdom of Solomon
[13615]1:1 [13616]1:4 [13617]1:4 [13618]1:4 [13619]1:5
[13620]1:5 [13621]1:5 [13622]1:11 [13623]1:13 [13624]1:13
[13625]1:13 [13626]1:13 [13627]1:13 [13628]1:13 [13629]1:13
[13630]1:13 [13631]1:14 [13632]1:15 [13633]1:15 [13634]1:15
[13635]1:16 [13636]1:16 [13637]2 [13638]2:2 [13639]2:2
[13640]2:20 [13641]2:20 [13642]2:20 [13643]2:21 [13644]2:21
[13645]2:22-23 [13646]2:24 [13647]2:24 [13648]2:24-25
[13649]3:7 [13650]3:7 [13651]3:7 [13652]3:7-8 [13653]3:15
[13654]3:15 [13655]3:15 [13656]4:8 [13657]4:8-9 [13658]5:2
[13659]5:2 [13660]5:3 [13661]5:3 [13662]5:3 [13663]5:5
[13664]5:7 [13665]5:7 [13666]5:8 [13667]5:8 [13668]5:21
[13669]5:21 [13670]5:21 [13671]6:5 [13672]6:7 [13673]6:7
[13674]6:8 [13675]6:8 [13676]6:14 [13677]6:21 [13678]6:21
[13679]6:21 [13680]7:7 [13681]7:7 [13682]7:7 [13683]7:8
[13684]7:9 [13685]7:11 [13686]7:11 [13687]7:13 [13688]7:17
[13689]7:17 [13690]7:22 [13691]7:24 [13692]7:25 [13693]7:25
[13694]7:25 [13695]7:27 [13696]7:27 [13697]7:27 [13698]7:27
[13699]7:28 [13700]7:28 [13701]7:28 [13702]7:28 [13703]8
[13704]8:1 [13705]8:1 [13706]8:1 [13707]8:1 [13708]8:1
[13709]8:1 [13710]8:1 [13711]8:1 [13712]8:1 [13713]8:2
[13714]8:2 [13715]8:7 [13716]8:7 [13717]8:7 [13718]8:7
[13719]8:7 [13720]8:7 [13721]8:7 [13722]8:7 [13723]8:7
[13724]8:16 [13725]8:16 [13726]8:16 [13727]8:16 [13728]8:16
[13729]8:16 [13730]8:16 [13731]8:16 [13732]8:16 [13733]8:21
[13734]8:21 [13735]9:10 [13736]9:14 [13737]9:14 [13738]9:14
[13739]9:14 [13740]9:14 [13741]9:14 [13742]9:14 [13743]9:15
[13744]9:15 [13745]9:15 [13746]9:15 [13747]9:15 [13748]9:16
[13749]9:19 [13750]10:2 [13751]10:2 [13752]10:2 [13753]10:10
[13754]10:10 [13755]10:19 [13756]11:11 [13757]11:17
[13758]11:17 [13759]11:17 [13760]11:17 [13761]11:17
[13762]11:21 [13763]11:21 [13764]11:21 [13765]11:21
[13766]11:21 [13767]11:21 [13768]11:21 [13769]11:21
[13770]11:21 [13771]11:24 [13772]11:25 [13773]11:25
[13774]11:25 [13775]11:25 [13776]11:25 [13777]11:25
[13778]11:26 [13779]11:26 [13780]12:10 [13781]12:10
[13782]12:18 [13783]12:18 [13784]13:1-2 [13785]13:5
[13786]13:10 [13787]13:11-17 [13788]14:3 [13789]14:3
[13790]14:9 [13791]14:9 [13792]14:9 [13793]14:9 [13794]14:11
[13795]14:11 [13796]14:11 [13797]14:14 [13798]14:15
[13799]14:21 [13800]14:21 [13801]14:21 [13802]14:22
[13803]14:27 [13804]15:12 [13805]16:20 [13806]16:24
[13807]16:29 [13808]17:10 [13809]17:11 [13810]18:24
Baruch
[13811]3:38 [13812]3:38 [13813]4:1 [13814]6:30
1 Maccabees
[13815]2 [13816]2 [13817]2:4 [13818]2:41 [13819]2:65
[13820]3:2-3 [13821]3:21 [13822]12:9 [13823]13:3
2 Maccabees
[13824]1:2 [13825]1:23 [13826]3:1 [13827]3:15 [13828]3:38
[13829]4:7 [13830]4:14 [13831]5:19 [13832]6:20 [13833]6:28
[13834]6:30 [13835]9:13 [13836]12:40 [13837]12:43
[13838]12:46 [13839]12:46 [13840]14:42 [13841]15:14
[13842]15:14 [13843]15:15 [13844]15:18
1 Esdras
[13845]10
2 Esdras
[13846]4:17
Sirach
[13847]1:1 [13848]1:1 [13849]1:5 [13850]1:5 [13851]1:9-10
[13852]1:10 [13853]1:16 [13854]1:25 [13855]1:27 [13856]1:27
[13857]1:27 [13858]1:28 [13859]1:28 [13860]1:34-35 [13861]2
[13862]2:8 [13863]2:8 [13864]2:8 [13865]3:19 [13866]3:22
[13867]3:22 [13868]3:25 [13869]3:25 [13870]3:26 [13871]3:27
[13872]4:7 [13873]4:10 [13874]4:30 [13875]4:32 [13876]5:4
[13877]5:5 [13878]5:5 [13879]5:8 [13880]5:13 [13881]5:16
[13882]5:17 [13883]6:2 [13884]6:5 [13885]6:15 [13886]6:23
[13887]6:23 [13888]6:26 [13889]6:26 [13890]6:34 [13891]6:35
[13892]7:6 [13893]7:14 [13894]7:19 [13895]7:26 [13896]7:29
[13897]7:34 [13898]7:38 [13899]8:4 [13900]8:18 [13901]8:18
[13902]9:11 [13903]9:14 [13904]9:18 [13905]10:1 [13906]10:2
[13907]10:2 [13908]10:9 [13909]10:9 [13910]10:10 [13911]10:14
[13912]10:14 [13913]10:14 [13914]10:14 [13915]10:14
[13916]10:14 [13917]10:14 [13918]10:15 [13919]10:15
[13920]10:15 [13921]10:15 [13922]10:15 [13923]10:15
[13924]10:15 [13925]10:15 [13926]10:15 [13927]10:31
[13928]11:2 [13929]11:14 [13930]11:14 [13931]11:23
[13932]11:23 [13933]11:23 [13934]11:29 [13935]11:30
[13936]12:3 [13937]12:4 [13938]12:5 [13939]12:6 [13940]12:16
[13941]13:2 [13942]13:19 [13943]13:19 [13944]13:19
[13945]13:19 [13946]13:19 [13947]13:19 [13948]13:19
[13949]13:19 [13950]13:19 [13951]13:19 [13952]13:19
[13953]14:5 [13954]14:5 [13955]14:5 [13956]15:5 [13957]15:5
[13958]15:9 [13959]15:14 [13960]15:14 [13961]15:14
[13962]15:14 [13963]15:14 [13964]15:14 [13965]15:14
[13966]15:14 [13967]15:18 [13968]15:21 [13969]17:1
[13970]17:5 [13971]17:5 [13972]17:7-8 [13973]17:9 [13974]17:9
[13975]17:9 [13976]17:12 [13977]17:14 [13978]17:18
[13979]17:26 [13980]18:1 [13981]18:23 [13982]18:23
[13983]19:1 [13984]19:4 [13985]19:23 [13986]19:23
[13987]19:23 [13988]19:26 [13989]19:26 [13990]19:27
[13991]19:27 [13992]19:27 [13993]20:6 [13994]20:7
[13995]20:15 [13996]20:32 [13997]20:32 [13998]21:2
[13999]21:2 [14000]21:30 [14001]23:9 [14002]23:12
[14003]23:13 [14004]23:32-33 [14005]24:5 [14006]24:14
[14007]24:21 [14008]24:23 [14009]24:27 [14010]24:29
[14011]24:29 [14012]24:29 [14013]24:29 [14014]24:31
[14015]24:45 [14016]25:13 [14017]25:16 [14018]25:16
[14019]25:17 [14020]26:5-7 [14021]26:20 [14022]26:20
[14023]26:20 [14024]26:28 [14025]26:28 [14026]27:1
[14027]27:6 [14028]27:8 [14029]28:2 [14030]28:11 [14031]28:15
[14032]28:15 [14033]29:10 [14034]29:10 [14035]29:13-14
[14036]29:15 [14037]30:4 [14038]30:8 [14039]30:16
[14040]30:24 [14041]30:24 [14042]30:24 [14043]30:24
[14044]30:25 [14045]30:25 [14046]30:25 [14047]31:1
[14048]31:8 [14049]31:25 [14050]31:32 [14051]31:36
[14052]31:37-38 [14053]32:6 [14054]33:7 [14055]33:11-12
[14056]33:15 [14057]33:28 [14058]33:28-29 [14059]34:4
[14060]34:4 [14061]34:4 [14062]34:11 [14063]34:16
[14064]34:21 [14065]34:23 [14066]34:30 [14067]35:17
[14068]37:3 [14069]37:3 [14070]37:12 [14071]37:14-15
[14072]37:34 [14073]38:19 [14074]38:25 [14075]39:1
[14076]40:22 [14077]41:3-4 [14078]41:15 [14079]41:15
[14080]42:11 [14081]43:10 [14082]43:32 [14083]43:33
[14084]43:33 [14085]43:33 [14086]46:23 [14087]46:23
[14088]47:22 [14089]48:4-5 [14090]48:13 [14091]48:14
[14092]49:18 [14093]51:10
__________________________________________________________________
This document is from the Christian Classics Ethereal
Library at Calvin College, http://www.ccel.org,
generated on demand from ThML source.
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5555. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrC
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5583. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrC
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5585. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrC
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5590. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrC
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5594. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrC
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5624. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrC
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5625. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrC
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5626. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrC
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5631. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrC
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5685. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrC
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5788. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5789. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5790. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5799. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5800. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5801. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5802. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5804. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5808. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5809. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5810. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5811. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5812. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5813. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5814. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5815. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5816. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5817. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5818. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5819. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5820. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5821. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5822. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5823. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5824. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5825. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5826. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5827. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5828. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5829. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5830. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5831. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5832. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5833. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5834. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5835. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5836. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5837. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5838. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5839. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5840. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5841. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5842. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5844. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5845. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5846. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5847. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5848. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5849. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5850. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5851. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5852. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5853. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5854. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5855. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5856. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5857. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5858. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5859. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5860. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5861. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5862. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5863. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5864. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5865. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5866. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5867. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5868. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5869. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5870. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5871. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5872. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5873. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5874. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5875. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5876. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5877. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5879. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5880. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5881. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5882. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5883. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5884. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5885. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5886. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5887. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh
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5888. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5889. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5890. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5891. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5892. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5893. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5894. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5895. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5896. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5897. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5898. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5899. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5900. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5901. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5902. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5903. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5904. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5905. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5906. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5907. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5908. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5909. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5910. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5911. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5912. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5913. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5914. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5915. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5916. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5917. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5918. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5919. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5942. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5943. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5944. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5945. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5946. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5948. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5949. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5950. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5955. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5959. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5960. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5961. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5962. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5964. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5965. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh
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5966. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5969. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5974. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5976. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5978. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5979. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5980. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5981. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5982. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5983. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5984. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5985. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5986. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5987. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5988. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5989. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5991. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5992. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5993. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5994. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5995. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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5996. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6000. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6001. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6002. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6003. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6004. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6005. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6009. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6010. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6011. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6012. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6013. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6014. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6015. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6016. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6017. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6018. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6019. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6020. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6021. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6022. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6023. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6024. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6025. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6026. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6027. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6028. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6029. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6030. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6031. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6032. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6033. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6034. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6035. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6036. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6037. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6038. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6039. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6040. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6041. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6042. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6043. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6044. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6045. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6046. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6047. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6048. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6049. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6050. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6051. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6052. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6053. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6054. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6055. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6056. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6202. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6203. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6204. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6208. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6210. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6211. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6212. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6213. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6214. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6215. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6216. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6217. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6218. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6219. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6220. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6221. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6222. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6223. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6224. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6225. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6226. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6227. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6228. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6229. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6230. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6231. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6232. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6233. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6234. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6235. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6236. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6237. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6238. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6239. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6240. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6241. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6242. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6243. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6244. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6245. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrC
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6246. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
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6247. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
h=4&scrV=0#TP_Q39_A4-p4.1
6248. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q70_A3-p8.2
6249. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#TP_Q70_A4-p4.1
6250. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
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6251. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
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h=7&scrV=14#SS_Q95_A8-p3.1
6253. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#SS_Q69_A1-p5.2
6254. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
h=8&scrV=2#SS_Q40_A3-p5.1
6255. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
h=10&scrV=12#SS_Q178_A1-p9.4
6256. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
h=10&scrV=12#SS_Q174_A4-p3.1
6257. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#XP_Q67_A2-p6.1
6258. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#SS_Q178_A1-p9.5
6259. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
h=14&scrV=15#TP_Q46_A10-p4.1
6260. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrC
h=22&scrV=17#FS_Q86_A2-p5.1
6261. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6262. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
h=3&scrV=1#TP_Q69_A3-p7.2
6263. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6264. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
h=3&scrV=10#FS_Q105_A1-p10.4
6265. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
h=3&scrV=15#FS_Q105_A1-p10.5
6266. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6267. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#FP_Q108_A7-p5.1
6268. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6269. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6270. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6271. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6272. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6273. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6274. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6275. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6276. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrC
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6277. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ruth&scrC
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6278. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ruth&scrC
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6279. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ruth&scrC
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6280. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Kgdms&sc
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6281. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Kgdms&sc
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6282. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Kgdms&sc
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6283. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Kgdms&sc
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6284. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Kgdms&sc
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6285. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Kgdms&sc
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6287. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Kgdms&sc
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6299. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6300. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6301. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6303. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6304. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6305. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6309. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6310. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6311. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6312. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6313. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6314. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6315. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6316. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6317. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6318. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6319. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6320. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6321. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6322. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6323. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6324. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6325. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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6326. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrC
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7813. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7814. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7815. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7816. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7817. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7818. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7821. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7822. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7823. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7824. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7825. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7828. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7829. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7830. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7831. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7832. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7833. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7834. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7835. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7836. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7838. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7839. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7840. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7844. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7845. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7847. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7848. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7849. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7850. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7854. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7855. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7856. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7858. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7859. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7860. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7861. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7862. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7863. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7864. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7865. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7866. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7867. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7868. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7869. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7870. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7871. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7872. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7873. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7874. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7875. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7876. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7877. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7878. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7879. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7880. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7881. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7882. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7883. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7884. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7885. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7886. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7887. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7888. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7889. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7890. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7891. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7892. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7893. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7894. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7895. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7896. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7897. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7898. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7899. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7900. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7901. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7902. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7903. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7904. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7905. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7906. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7907. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7908. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7909. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7910. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7911. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7912. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7913. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7914. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7915. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh
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7916. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7917. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7918. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7919. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7920. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7921. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7922. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7923. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7924. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7925. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7926. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7927. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh
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7928. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=1&scrV=1#TP_Q39_A3-p7.3
7929. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=1&scrV=6#FP_Q79_A12-p2.1
7930. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=1&scrV=6#FP_Q79_A13-p7.2
7931. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#FS_Q107_A3-p5.1
7932. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=2&scrV=1#SS_Q171_A1-p13.1
7933. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=2&scrV=6#SS_Q125_A1-p5.2
7934. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=3&scrV=8#TP_Q72_A9-p9.1
7935. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#SS_Q10_A12-p15.1
7936. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=3&scrV=18#FS_Q79_A1-p7.1
7937. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=4&scrV=6#XP_Q77_A2-p3.3
7938. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#TP_Q46_A10-p8.2
7939. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#SS_Q175_A1-p8.1
7940. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#SS_Q175_A6-p6.1
7941. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#FS_Q102_A4-p24.1
7942. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=9&scrV=1#TP_Q62_A3-p7.1
7943. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=9&scrV=4#TP_Q63_A3-p6.2
7944. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=9&scrV=9#FP_Q103_A5-p7.1
7945. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=13&scrV=3#SS_Q171_A1-p12.2
7946. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=13&scrV=6#SS_Q11_A2-p9.1
7947. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=13&scrV=18#SS_Q115_A1-p5.1
7948. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=14&scrV=20#TP_Q19_A4-p3.2
7949. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=16&scrV=8#XP_Q66_A3-p7.4
7950. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=16&scrV=15#SS_Q145_A2-p4.2
7951. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=16&scrV=25#TP_Q8_A1-p6.3
7952. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=16&scrV=49#SS_Q148_A3-p2.1
7953. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=16&scrV=53#FP_Q43_A1-p3.1
7954. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=4#TP_Q68_A9-p8.1
7955. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=4#FS_Q81_A2-p8.1
7956. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=4#XP_Q71_A1-p5.1
7957. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=4#TP_Q19_A4-p2.1
7958. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=8#FS_Q104_A1-p5.1
7959. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=8#SS_Q78_A1-p14.2
7960. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=17#SS_Q78_A2-p9.1
7961. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=20#XP_Q39_A5-p2.1
7962. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=20#FS_Q81_A1-p2.1
7963. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=20#FS_Q87_A8-p5.1
7964. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=20#XP_Q68_A2-p2.1
7965. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=21#TP_Q84_A8-p2.1
7966. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=22#TP_Q86_A1-p5.1
7967. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=23#SS_Q67_A4-p3.1
7968. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=24#TP_Q88_A1-p4.1
7969. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=24#TP_Q89_A4-p5.1
7970. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=24#FS_Q114_A7-p5.1
7971. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=18&scrV=32#SS_Q10_A8-p5.1
7972. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=20&scrV=25#FS_Q98_A1-p2.1
7973. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=21&scrV=21#SS_Q95_A8-p8.1
7974. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=22&scrV=21#SS_Q69_A4-p7.1
7975. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=22&scrV=27#SS_Q118_A3-p6.1
7976. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=22&scrV=27#SS_Q66_A8-p9.1
7977. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=28&scrV=2#SS_Q112_A2-p6.2
7978. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=28&scrV=2#SS_Q132_A3-p6.4
7979. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=28&scrV=12#FP_Q93_A3-p5.1
7980. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=28&scrV=12#SS_Q163_A2-p9.2
7981. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=28&scrV=12#TP_Q4_A1-p4.1
7982. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=28&scrV=13#FP_Q63_A5-p7.2
7983. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=28&scrV=14#FP_Q63_A7-p2.1
7984. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=28&scrV=15#FP_Q63_A6-p2.1
7985. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=28&scrV=17#SS_Q145_A2-p9.1
7986. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=29&scrV=18#FS_Q114_A10-p3.2
7987. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=33&scrV=6#SS_Q10_A12-p6.1
7988. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=33&scrV=11#SS_Q20_A1-p6.1
7989. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=33&scrV=11#SS_Q10_A8-p5.2
7990. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=33&scrV=11#SS_Q64_A2-p3.1
7991. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=34&scrV=3#FS_Q102_A3-p32.4
7992. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=34&scrV=4#SS_Q39_A4-p3.1
7993. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=36&scrV=25#TP_Q66_A7-p6.1
7994. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=36&scrV=25#TP_Q69_A1-p5.1
7995. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
h=37&scrV=7#XP_Q77_A4-p2.1
7996. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrC
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8074. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Dan&scrCh
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8075. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Dan&scrCh
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8076. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8077. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8078. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8079. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8081. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8082. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8083. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8084. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8085. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8086. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8087. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8088. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8089. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8090. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8091. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8092. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8093. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8094. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8095. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8096. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8097. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8098. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8099. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8100. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8101. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8102. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8103. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8104. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8105. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8106. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8107. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8108. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8109. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8110. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8111. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh
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8112. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=2&scrV=12#SS_Q147_A1-p6.4
8113. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=2&scrV=13#TP_Q84_A7-p11.1
8114. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=2&scrV=13#TP_Q86_A1-p7.1
8115. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=2&scrV=15#SS_Q147_A4-p3.1
8116. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=2&scrV=16#SS_Q147_A4-p3.2
8117. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=2&scrV=23#TP_Q9_A4-p7.1
8118. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=2&scrV=25#TP_Q89_A5-p5.1
8119. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=2&scrV=28#FP_Q36_A1-p2.3
8120. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=2&scrV=28#XP_Q88_A3-p10.2
8121. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=2&scrV=28#TP_Q38_A6-p5.2
8122. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=2&scrV=32#SS_Q93_A1-p2.1
8123. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrC
h=3&scrV=2#XP_Q88_A4-p5.1
8124. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrC
h=1&scrV=2#SS_Q172_A3-p2.1
8125. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrC
h=1&scrV=2#SS_Q173_A2-p2.1
8126. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrC
h=3&scrV=6#FP_Q49_A2-p2.3
8127. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrC
h=3&scrV=6#FS_Q79_A1-p5.2
8128. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrC
h=3&scrV=7#FP_Q57_A5-p4.1
8129. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrC
h=3&scrV=7#SS_Q171_A4-p2.1
8130. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrC
h=3&scrV=7#SS_Q172_A4-p3.2
8131. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrC
h=4&scrV=7#TP_Q86_A3-p2.1
8132. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrC
h=4&scrV=12#FS_Q112_A2-p5.1
8133. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#FP_Q41_A3-p5.4
8134. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrC
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8140. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jonah&scr
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8141. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jonah&scr
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8213. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Mal&scrCh
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8217. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Mal&scrCh
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8218. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Mal&scrCh
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8418. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8421. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8422. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8423. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8428. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8430. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8431. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8432. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8433. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8435. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8436. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8437. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8438. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8439. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8440. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8445. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8446. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8447. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8449. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8450. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=6&scrV=10#FP_Q19_A12-p6.1
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h=6&scrV=12#XP_Q99_A5-p4.1
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h=6&scrV=14#XP_Q99_A5-p4.2
8455. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8456. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8461. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8462. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8463. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8464. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8465. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8466. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8468. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8469. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8470. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8475. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=6&scrV=31#SS_Q55_A6-p5.1
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h=6&scrV=31#SS_Q55_A6-p8.1
8477. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=6&scrV=32#FS_Q108_A3-p18.1
8478. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=6&scrV=32#SS_Q83_A2-p2.1
8479. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8480. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=6&scrV=33#SS_Q83_A6-p2.1
8481. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8482. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8483. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8484. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8485. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=6&scrV=34#SS_Q185_A7-p13.1
8486. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=6&scrV=34#SS_Q188_A7-p3.2
8487. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8488. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8489. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8490. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=1#SS_Q60_A3-p5.1
8491. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=2#SS_Q61_A4-p2.1
8492. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=3#SS_Q33_A5-p6.2
8493. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=4#SS_Q33_A5-p7.1
8494. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=6#TP_Q80_A6-p2.1
8495. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=6#TP_Q81_A2-p3.2
8496. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=6#FP_Q1_A9-p8.1
8497. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=6#SS_Q3_A2-p10.1
8498. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=6#SS_Q40_A3-p7.1
8499. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=6#SS_Q43_A7-p3.1
8500. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=7#SS_Q83_A3-p8.1
8501. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=11#FS_Q109_A6-p3.1
8502. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=12#FS_Q99_A1-p4.1
8503. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=12#SS_Q40_A3-p4.1
8504. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=12#SS_Q77_A1-p5.1
8505. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=13#FS_Q71_A2-p4.1
8506. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=13#FP_Q23_A7-p4.1
8507. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=14#SS_Q73_A2-p8.2
8508. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=15#SS_Q172_A4-p4.1
8509. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=15#SS_Q187_A6-p2.2
8510. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=16#XP_Q71_A3-p14.1
8511. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=17#SS_Q64_A7-p6.1
8512. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#SS_Q20_A1-p3.1
8513. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#FP_Q49_A1-p2.1
8514. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#FS_Q20_A2-p2.1
8515. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#FS_Q73_A6-p6.1
8516. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#FS_Q75_A1-p4.1
8517. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#SS_Q43_A2-p3.1
8518. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#SS_Q89_A2-p3.1
8519. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#SS_Q94_A4-p2.1
8520. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#SS_Q79_A4-p11.1
8521. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=21#XP_Q99_A4-p7.4
8522. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=22#SS_Q8_A5-p3.2
8523. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=22#SS_Q172_A4-p9.1
8524. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=22#SS_Q178_A2-p8.1
8525. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=22#SS_Q172_A4-p6.1
8526. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=24#FS_Q108_A2-p6.1
8527. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=29#TP_Q42_A1-p3.1
8528. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=7&scrV=29#TP_Q42_A4-p6.1
8529. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=0#TP_Q86_A5-p7.3
8530. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#TP_Q84_A4-p8.2
8531. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#FS_Q107_A2-p4.1
8532. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#XP_Q76_A1-p8.3
8533. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=4#FS_Q103_A3-p3.1
8534. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=8#TP_Q80_A10-p4.1
8535. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=8#TP_Q80_A11-p2.1
8536. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=10#FP_Q113_A2-p5.1
8537. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=10#TP_Q5_A4-p6.1
8538. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=10#TP_Q15_A8-p5.1
8539. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=14#SS_Q186_A4-p2.1
8540. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=15#TP_Q44_A3-p12.2
8541. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#TP_Q43_A4-p7.2
8542. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=20#TP_Q7_A2-p4.2
8543. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=20#TP_Q40_A3-p5.1
8544. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=22#SS_Q189_A6-p7.2
8545. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=26#XP_Q76_A2-p7.1
8546. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=26#TP_Q44_A4-p10.1
8547. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=27#SS_Q90_A3-p4.2
8548. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#XP_Q89_A8-p3.3
8549. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=31#TP_Q59_A6-p6.5
8550. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=31#TP_Q49_A2-p2.1
8551. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=31#TP_Q44_A1-p5.2
8552. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=8&scrV=32#TP_Q44_A1-p11.1
8553. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=2#FS_Q114_A6-p2.1
8554. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=2#TP_Q44_A3-p4.2
8555. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=5#TP_Q44_A3-p15.1
8556. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=5#TP_Q44_A3-p14.4
8557. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=6#TP_Q64_A3-p3.1
8558. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=6#TP_Q16_A11-p3.2
8559. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=8#TP_Q44_A1-p4.1
8560. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=9#TP_Q44_A3-p9.1
8561. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=10#TP_Q40_A1-p8.2
8562. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=11#SS_Q25_A6-p14.1
8563. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=12#TP_Q61_A2-p5.1
8564. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=12#TP_Q68_A4-p3.1
8565. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=12#TP_Q80_A4-p3.1
8566. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=12#TP_Q1_A5-p6.1
8567. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#TP_Q40_A2-p9.1
8568. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#TP_Q68_A5-p8.2
8569. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=15#SS_Q147_A4-p12.2
8570. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=17#FS_Q96_A2-p9.2
8571. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=30#TP_Q44_A3-p5.2
8572. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=30#TP_Q44_A3-p16.1
8573. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=30#SS_Q104_A4-p2.1
8574. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=30#TP_Q13_A4-p3.2
8575. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=9&scrV=36#SS_Q30_A1-p9.1
8576. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=0#FS_Q108_A4-p5.2
8577. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=0#FS_Q108_A4-p14.3
8578. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=1#TP_Q84_A3-p5.1
8579. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=1#TP_Q13_A2-p10.2
8580. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=5#TP_Q36_A3-p2.1
8581. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=5#TP_Q42_A1-p8.1
8582. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=8#SS_Q100_A1-p12.1
8583. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=8#SS_Q100_A6-p10.1
8584. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=9#FS_Q108_A2-p4.3
8585. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=9#SS_Q185_A6-p3.2
8586. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=9#TP_Q40_A3-p6.2
8587. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=9#TP_Q40_A3-p8.1
8588. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=9#SS_Q188_A7-p6.1
8589. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=10#SS_Q87_A1-p12.1
8590. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=10#SS_Q187_A4-p3.1
8591. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=16#FS_Q58_A4-p8.1
8592. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=16#SS_Q56_A1-p3.1
8593. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=16#TP_Q39_A6-p12.2
8594. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=19#SS_Q53_A4-p2.2
8595. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=23#SS_Q185_A5-p5.1
8596. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=27#TP_Q42_A3-p2.1
8597. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=28#SS_Q19_A3-p5.1
8598. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=28#SS_Q19_A9-p8.2
8599. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=28#SS_Q125_A1-p5.1
8600. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=28#SS_Q126_A1-p3.1
8601. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=28#FS_Q102_A6-p5.1
8602. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=28#SS_Q32_A2-p4.1
8603. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=28#SS_Q140_A1-p8.4
8604. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=30#TP_Q54_A3-p6.2
8605. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=32#FS_Q108_A1-p8.1
8606. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=34#SS_Q29_A2-p4.1
8607. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=34#SS_Q37_A1-p10.3
8608. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=10&scrV=34#SS_Q40_A1-p12.1
8609. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=3#SS_Q2_A7-p3.2
8610. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=8#SS_Q187_A2-p4.1
8611. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=9#TP_Q38_A1-p11.1
8612. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=11#TP_Q66_A9-p3.1
8613. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=11#XP_Q22_A4-p2.1
8614. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=11#FP_Q108_A2-p11.1
8615. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=11#FP_Q117_A2-p5.1
8616. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=11#SS_Q2_A7-p3.1
8617. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=11#SS_Q89_A10-p5.1
8618. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=11#SS_Q103_A2-p2.1
8619. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=11#SS_Q174_A4-p4.1
8620. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=11#TP_Q38_A6-p2.1
8621. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=12#SS_Q140_A1-p8.1
8622. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=13#SS_Q174_A6-p4.1
8623. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=19#SS_Q14_A1-p6.2
8624. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=19#TP_Q40_A2-p5.1
8625. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=19#TP_Q40_A2-p7.2
8626. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=25#SS_Q162_A3-p9.1
8627. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=27#FP_Q31_A4-p3.1
8628. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=28#FS_Q107_A4-p5.1
8629. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#FS_Q68_A1-p10.2
8630. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#SS_Q157_A4-p3.2
8631. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#SS_Q161_A5-p5.1
8632. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#TP_Q5_A4-p5.3
8633. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#TP_Q40_A3-p4.1
8634. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=11&scrV=30#XP_Q39_A4-p7.1
8635. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=0#XP_Q22_A5-p4.1
8636. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=1#TP_Q40_A4-p4.2
8637. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=3#SS_Q122_A4-p11.4
8638. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=3#FS_Q100_A8-p14.1
8639. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=4#FS_Q102_A4-p27.4
8640. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=5#SS_Q122_A4-p10.6
8641. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=5#TP_Q40_A4-p10.1
8642. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=7#SS_Q30_A4-p2.2
8643. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=11#SS_Q122_A4-p11.6
8644. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=24#TP_Q43_A2-p10.1
8645. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=25#FS_Q105_A1-p4.1
8646. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=25#SS_Q37_A2-p4.1
8647. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=26#FS_Q98_A2-p7.4
8648. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=28#FP_Q36_A1-p2.2
8649. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=32#TP_Q80_A5-p6.3
8650. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=32#TP_Q86_A1-p4.1
8651. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=32#SS_Q14_A1-p2.1
8652. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=32#SS_Q14_A1-p3.1
8653. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=32#SS_Q14_A1-p6.1
8654. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=32#SS_Q14_A3-p5.1
8655. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=32#SS_Q34_A2-p2.1
8656. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=33#FS_Q70_A1-p5.1
8657. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=33#FS_Q71_A1-p10.1
8658. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=34#FS_Q48_A4-p4.1
8659. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=34#SS_Q153_A5-p13.1
8660. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=35#FS_Q19_A8-p2.1
8661. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=36#FS_Q18_A9-p5.1
8662. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=40#XP_Q97_A7-p8.2
8663. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=40#TP_Q51_A4-p2.1
8664. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=41#XP_Q88_A1-p5.1
8665. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=41#XP_Q89_A1-p7.1
8666. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=44#FP_Q114_A5-p5.3
8667. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=45#FS_Q68_A1-p3.1
8668. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=12&scrV=49#TP_Q28_A3-p20.1
8669. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=0#SS_Q64_A2-p2.1
8670. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=8#XP_Q96_A2-p2.1
8671. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=22#SS_Q55_A6-p6.1
8672. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=22#SS_Q186_A3-p15.2
8673. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=22#SS_Q188_A7-p9.1
8674. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=23#XP_Q96_A2-p8.2
8675. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=23#XP_Q96_A3-p7.1
8676. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=23#FS_Q70_A3-p3.1
8677. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=23#SS_Q152_A5-p3.1
8678. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=28#SS_Q10_A8-p2.1
8679. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=29#SS_Q108_A3-p2.1
8680. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=29#SS_Q108_A1-p6.2
8681. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=30#SS_Q11_A3-p4.1
8682. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=33#TP_Q74_A4-p4.3
8683. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=33#FP_Q81_A2-p4.1
8684. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=33#FP_Q82_A5-p2.2
8685. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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h=13&scrV=34#TP_Q42_A3-p4.1
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8688. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=13&scrV=41#XP_Q89_A3-p6.1
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h=13&scrV=43#XP_Q85_A1-p6.1
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h=13&scrV=43#TP_Q54_A2-p2.1
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h=13&scrV=57#TP_Q7_A8-p5.2
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h=13&scrV=58#SS_Q178_A1-p6.2
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h=14&scrV=4#SS_Q187_A2-p10.2
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h=14&scrV=19#TP_Q43_A2-p3.2
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h=14&scrV=19#TP_Q43_A2-p8.1
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h=14&scrV=31#SS_Q5_A4-p5.1
8699. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=14&scrV=36#TP_Q80_A4-p2.2
8700. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=0#TP_Q42_A1-p4.2
8701. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=3#SS_Q101_A2-p5.1
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h=15&scrV=3#SS_Q101_A2-p7.1
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h=15&scrV=3#SS_Q101_A4-p6.1
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h=15&scrV=5#SS_Q86_A3-p6.3
8705. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=6#FS_Q96_A4-p3.1
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h=15&scrV=6#FS_Q98_A2-p6.1
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h=15&scrV=8#FS_Q99_A6-p9.2
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h=15&scrV=11#FS_Q103_A4-p13.1
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h=15&scrV=11#FS_Q107_A2-p3.2
8710. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=11#FS_Q102_A6-p15.1
8711. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=11#SS_Q148_A1-p2.1
8712. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=11#SS_Q149_A3-p6.1
8713. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=11#TP_Q40_A4-p3.2
8714. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=12#SS_Q3_A2-p10.2
8715. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=12#SS_Q43_A1-p7.1
8716. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=12#SS_Q43_A6-p2.1
8717. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=12#TP_Q42_A2-p6.1
8718. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=12#SS_Q187_A4-p16.1
8719. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=14#SS_Q43_A7-p9.1
8720. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=14#SS_Q185_A4-p7.2
8721. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=14#TP_Q42_A2-p6.2
8722. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=17#FP_Q119_A1-p2.1
8723. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=17#FS_Q102_A6-p15.2
8724. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=19#XP_Q32_A6-p2.1
8725. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=24#TP_Q7_A7-p9.1
8726. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=24#TP_Q42_A1-p5.1
8727. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=24#TP_Q42_A1-p7.2
8728. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=15&scrV=28#SS_Q5_A4-p5.2
8729. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=4#TP_Q43_A1-p2.1
8730. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=17#TP_Q84_A3-p6.2
8731. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=18#SS_Q174_A6-p7.3
8732. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=18#TP_Q37_A2-p8.2
8733. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#TP_Q84_A3-p6.1
8734. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#TP_Q84_A3-p7.2
8735. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#TP_Q84_A3-p11.1
8736. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#TP_Q84_A3-p13.3
8737. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#TP_Q84_A4-p5.1
8738. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#TP_Q84_A7-p8.1
8739. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#XP_Q17_A1-p5.1
8740. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#XP_Q17_A3-p11.1
8741. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#XP_Q18_A3-p5.1
8742. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#XP_Q18_A4-p7.1
8743. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#XP_Q20_A1-p8.2
8744. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#XP_Q21_A4-p3.1
8745. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#XP_Q22_A1-p6.1
8746. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#XP_Q25_A1-p8.1
8747. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=19#XP_Q40_A6-p2.1
8748. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=21#TP_Q45_A1-p6.1
8749. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=23#SS_Q43_A2-p3.2
8750. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=23#SS_Q43_A5-p2.1
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h=16&scrV=24#TP_Q45_A1-p6.2
8752. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=28#TP_Q45_A2-p5.2
8753. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=16&scrV=52#SS_Q40_A2-p6.1
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h=17&scrV=2#TP_Q81_A3-p2.1
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h=17&scrV=2#TP_Q45_A1-p5.1
8756. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=2#TP_Q45_A1-p7.1
8757. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=2#TP_Q45_A2-p2.1
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h=17&scrV=2#TP_Q45_A2-p5.1
8759. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=3#TP_Q45_A3-p9.1
8760. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=3#TP_Q45_A3-p10.1
8761. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=3#TP_Q45_A3-p11.1
8762. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=5#FP_Q43_A7-p17.2
8763. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=6#TP_Q45_A4-p5.2
8764. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=6#TP_Q45_A4-p11.2
8765. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=19#SS_Q178_A2-p3.1
8766. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=19#TP_Q45_A3-p11.2
8767. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=20#SS_Q147_A2-p2.1
8768. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=24#TP_Q11_A3-p6.1
8769. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=25#SS_Q104_A6-p2.1
8770. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=25#SS_Q10_A10-p9.1
8771. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=26#SS_Q86_A2-p6.4
8772. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=26#TP_Q40_A3-p5.2
8773. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=17&scrV=26#TP_Q44_A4-p8.3
8774. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=3#SS_Q142_A2-p2.1
8775. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=6#SS_Q43_A4-p3.1
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h=18&scrV=6#SS_Q43_A5-p5.1
8777. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=7#SS_Q43_A2-p2.2
8778. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=8#SS_Q10_A9-p11.1
8779. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=10#FP_Q58_A7-p3.1
8780. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=10#FP_Q88_A1-p7.2
8781. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=10#FP_Q113_A3-p2.1
8782. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=10#XP_Q72_A1-p5.1
8783. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=10#SS_Q181_A4-p8.2
8784. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=15#SS_Q11_A4-p10.1
8785. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=15#SS_Q33_A1-p2.1
8786. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=15#SS_Q33_A7-p7.1
8787. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=15#SS_Q33_A7-p9.1
8788. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=15#SS_Q33_A7-p10.1
8789. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=15#XP_Q62_A3-p7.1
8790. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=16#SS_Q33_A8-p6.1
8791. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=17#XP_Q21_A2-p6.1
8792. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=19#TP_Q64_A1-p8.1
8793. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=20#TP_Q72_A12-p6.1
8794. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=20#TP_Q83_A3-p10.1
8795. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=20#SS_Q84_A3-p8.2
8796. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=20#SS_Q188_A8-p3.1
8797. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=21#TP_Q84_A10-p8.2
8798. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=22#SS_Q11_A4-p3.1
8799. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=18&scrV=34#TP_Q88_A3-p4.1
8800. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=4#XP_Q42_A2-p7.1
8801. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=4#XP_Q67_A1-p6.1
8802. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=6#TP_Q82_A8-p8.1
8803. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=6#XP_Q41_A2-p2.1
8804. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=6#XP_Q48_A2-p3.1
8805. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=6#XP_Q54_A4-p2.1
8806. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=6#XP_Q55_A9-p2.1
8807. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=6#XP_Q61_A2-p4.1
8808. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=6#SS_Q10_A12-p2.1
8809. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=6#SS_Q26_A11-p7.1
8810. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=6#XP_Q67_A1-p6.1
8811. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=6#XP_Q67_A1-p7.1
8812. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=8#FS_Q105_A4-p22.1
8813. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=8#XP_Q67_A3-p5.1
8814. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=9#XP_Q62_A5-p5.1
8815. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=9#SS_Q186_A3-p15.5
8816. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=12#XP_Q96_A5-p10.3
8817. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=12#FS_Q108_A4-p11.2
8818. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=12#SS_Q65_A1-p9.1
8819. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=12#SS_Q186_A4-p8.1
8820. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=12#TP_Q40_A2-p3.2
8821. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=13#TP_Q84_A4-p3.3
8822. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=14#SS_Q189_A5-p6.1
8823. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8824. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=17#XP_Q96_A11-p3.2
8825. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=17#FS_Q109_A5-p2.1
8826. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8827. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=17#SS_Q185_A6-p6.1
8828. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=17#TP_Q20_A1-p6.1
8829. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#XP_Q96_A11-p3.3
8830. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q19_A12-p2.2
8831. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q119_A2-p4.2
8832. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#FS_Q108_A4-p11.1
8833. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8834. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8835. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8836. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8837. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q184_A3-p2.1
8838. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q184_A7-p2.1
8839. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q185_A1-p11.1
8840. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q185_A6-p2.1
8841. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q185_A6-p6.2
8842. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q186_A1-p11.2
8843. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q186_A3-p10.1
8844. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q186_A3-p15.1
8845. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q186_A5-p7.1
8846. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q186_A6-p2.1
8847. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=21#SS_Q188_A7-p2.1
8848. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=23#SS_Q186_A3-p15.3
8849. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=24#SS_Q186_A3-p15.4
8850. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=27#SS_Q184_A3-p8.1
8851. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=27#SS_Q185_A6-p3.3
8852. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=27#SS_Q186_A8-p11.1
8853. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=28#XP_Q89_A5-p2.1
8854. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=28#XP_Q89_A1-p5.1
8855. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=28#XP_Q89_A1-p7.3
8856. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=28#XP_Q89_A1-p7.4
8857. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=28#XP_Q89_A2-p2.1
8858. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=28#XP_Q89_A2-p8.1
8859. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=28#TP_Q58_A4-p10.1
8860. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=19&scrV=29#FS_Q69_A2-p10.1
8861. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=20&scrV=8#FS_Q114_A4-p2.1
8862. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=20&scrV=10#FS_Q5_A2-p2.1
8863. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=20&scrV=14#FP_Q23_A5-p12.4
8864. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=20&scrV=14#SS_Q63_A1-p9.1
8865. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=20&scrV=19#TP_Q47_A4-p5.1
8866. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=20&scrV=19#TP_Q53_A2-p5.1
8867. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8868. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8869. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8870. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=9#TP_Q31_A2-p6.5
8871. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=9#TP_Q45_A3-p7.2
8872. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=9#TP_Q46_A4-p4.1
8873. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8874. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=12#TP_Q44_A3-p9.2
8875. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=19#SS_Q76_A2-p5.1
8876. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=19#TP_Q44_A4-p2.1
8877. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=19#TP_Q44_A4-p9.1
8878. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=19#TP_Q44_A4-p9.2
8879. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=19#TP_Q44_A4-p9.3
8880. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=25#TP_Q38_A2-p2.1
8881. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=28#SS_Q184_A4-p8.1
8882. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=30#SS_Q184_A4-p8.2
8883. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=31#SS_Q189_A1-p10.2
8884. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=38#TP_Q47_A4-p2.1
8885. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=21&scrV=38#TP_Q47_A5-p2.1
8886. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=0#SS_Q44_A5-p6.2
8887. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=8#FP_Q117_A1-p2.1
8888. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=13#XP_Q97_A4-p5.1
8889. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=15#SS_Q97_A1-p6.2
8890. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#TP_Q64_A7-p3.1
8891. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#XP_Q49_A3-p12.1
8892. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#XP_Q89_A3-p4.1
8893. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#XP_Q91_A4-p10.1
8894. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#XP_Q92_A1-p2.2
8895. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#XP_Q92_A3-p2.1
8896. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#FP_Q57_A4-p2.2
8897. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#FS_Q3_A2-p13.1
8898. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#FS_Q67_A1-p2.1
8899. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#SS_Q24_A3-p4.1
8900. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#FP_Q98_A2-p2.1
8901. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#FP_Q108_A8-p5.1
8902. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#SS_Q25_A10-p6.2
8903. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#XP_Q72_A3-p4.1
8904. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#XP_Q77_A1-p7.3
8905. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#XP_Q80_A1-p2.1
8906. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#XP_Q81_A4-p6.1
8907. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#XP_Q87_A2-p2.1
8908. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=30#TP_Q11_A3-p4.1
8909. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=32#XP_Q75_A1-p3.1
8910. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=37#FS_Q100_A3-p2.1
8911. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=37#SS_Q44_A5-p4.1
8912. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=37#SS_Q25_A2-p2.1
8913. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=39#FS_Q100_A3-p2.1
8914. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=39#SS_Q26_A4-p5.2
8915. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=39#SS_Q44_A1-p6.3
8916. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=39#SS_Q44_A7-p5.1
8917. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=40#FS_Q99_A1-p8.2
8918. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=40#FS_Q100_A11-p2.1
8919. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=40#SS_Q44_A3-p5.1
8920. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=22&scrV=40#SS_Q184_A3-p5.3
8921. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=23&scrV=3#FS_Q96_A5-p10.2
8922. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=23&scrV=5#SS_Q111_A2-p4.1
8923. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=23&scrV=6#FS_Q102_A6-p25.1
8924. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=23&scrV=6#SS_Q185_A1-p7.4
8925. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=23&scrV=12#XP_Q96_A7-p4.1
8926. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=23&scrV=15#SS_Q189_A9-p3.1
8927. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=23&scrV=23#SS_Q87_A1-p3.3
8928. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=23&scrV=23#SS_Q87_A2-p10.1
8929. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=23&scrV=32#TP_Q47_A6-p5.1
8930. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=23&scrV=35#FS_Q87_A8-p2.2
8931. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=0#XP_Q88_A3-p3.1
8932. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=12#TP_Q80_A10-p14.1
8933. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=12#XP_Q74_A2-p9.1
8934. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=13#SS_Q128_A1-p6.1
8935. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=13#SS_Q137_A2-p9.1
8936. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=14#FS_Q108_A1-p2.1
8937. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=14#FS_Q106_A4-p5.1
8938. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=24#SS_Q178_A1-p3.2
8939. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=27#SS_Q84_A3-p9.5
8940. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=27#XP_Q76_A2-p7.2
8941. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=27#TP_Q36_A1-p4.3
8942. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=28#TP_Q75_A1-p9.1
8943. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=28#TP_Q57_A1-p12.2
8944. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=29#XP_Q73_A2-p2.1
8945. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=29#XP_Q73_A3-p6.1
8946. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=30#XP_Q90_A2-p3.1
8947. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=30#TP_Q25_A4-p16.1
8948. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=30#TP_Q43_A1-p3.1
8949. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=32#TP_Q46_A9-p15.1
8950. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=34#FS_Q106_A4-p6.1
8951. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=36#XP_Q77_A2-p5.1
8952. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=40#SS_Q63_A1-p4.1
8953. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=45#TP_Q82_A5-p6.2
8954. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=45#FP_Q22_A1-p6.4
8955. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=45#SS_Q47_A10-p5.1
8956. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=45#SS_Q80_A1-p12.2
8957. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=45#SS_Q185_A1-p7.2
8958. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
h=24&scrV=48#SS_Q185_A7-p9.1
8959. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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8960. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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9040. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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9045. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrC
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h=28&scrV=20#XP_Q77_A2-p4.1
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9093. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrC
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h=7&scrV=37#TP_Q44_A3-p6.1
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h=8&scrV=22#TP_Q44_A3-p3.2
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h=8&scrV=23#TP_Q44_A3-p11.2
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h=8&scrV=24#TP_Q86_A5-p5.2
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h=8&scrV=26#TP_Q44_A3-p5.3
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h=8&scrV=38#FS_Q2_A3-p8.1
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h=8&scrV=38#FS_Q2_A3-p8.2
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h=8&scrV=39#TP_Q45_A1-p6.6
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h=9&scrV=24#TP_Q44_A1-p5.1
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h=9&scrV=27#TP_Q69_A1-p4.1
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h=9&scrV=28#XP_Q15_A3-p3.1
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h=9&scrV=49#SS_Q29_A4-p2.1
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h=10&scrV=30#FS_Q107_A1-p3.3
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h=13&scrV=0#XP_Q88_A3-p3.2
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h=13&scrV=32#XP_Q88_A3-p6.1
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h=13&scrV=32#TP_Q10_A2-p2.1
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h=14&scrV=12#TP_Q46_A9-p9.1
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h=14&scrV=28#TP_Q51_A2-p3.1
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h=14&scrV=33#TP_Q15_A7-p7.1
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h=15&scrV=27#TP_Q46_A11-p7.3
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h=10&scrV=42#SS_Q180_A8-p5.1
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9422. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9424. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9429. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9431. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9433. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9438. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9440. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9445. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9503. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9505. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9506. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9507. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9508. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9536. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9537. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=21&scrV=15#TP_Q44_A3-p8.2
9538. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=21&scrV=18#XP_Q80_A2-p5.1
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h=21&scrV=18#XP_Q80_A4-p8.1
9540. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9541. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=21&scrV=18#TP_Q54_A3-p6.3
9542. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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h=21&scrV=25#XP_Q73_A1-p5.1
9544. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=21&scrV=26#XP_Q73_A1-p8.1
9545. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=21&scrV=27#XP_Q90_A2-p7.1
9546. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=21&scrV=33#XP_Q96_A4-p5.1
9547. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=21&scrV=33#TP_Q42_A4-p2.1
9548. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9549. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9550. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=22&scrV=7#TP_Q46_A9-p11.1
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h=22&scrV=11#TP_Q83_A3-p3.1
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h=22&scrV=15#TP_Q81_A1-p13.2
9553. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9554. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=22&scrV=19#TP_Q75_A1-p7.1
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h=22&scrV=19#TP_Q78_A3-p8.2
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h=22&scrV=19#TP_Q79_A1-p6.3
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h=22&scrV=19#TP_Q80_A11-p7.1
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9562. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9565. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9573. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9584. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9586. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=23&scrV=43#XP_Q5_A2-p6.1
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h=23&scrV=44#TP_Q44_A2-p5.1
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9618. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9621. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9622. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9623. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9624. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9625. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=24&scrV=44#FS_Q98_A2-p7.1
9626. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9627. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=24&scrV=44#TP_Q55_A3-p7.1
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h=24&scrV=44#TP_Q55_A5-p6.1
9629. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9630. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=24&scrV=46#TP_Q46_A1-p7.3
9631. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9633. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
h=24&scrV=47#TP_Q84_A7-p8.2
9634. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9635. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9637. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrC
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9638. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
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9647. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=9#FP_Q79_A4-p2.1
9648. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=9#FP_Q88_A3-p3.1
9649. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=9#FS_Q79_A3-p7.1
9650. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=9#TP_Q5_A4-p3.1
9651. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=9#TP_Q9_A1-p8.1
9652. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=10#FP_Q47_A3-p5.1
9653. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=12#SS_Q104_A6-p2.2
9654. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=12#TP_Q23_A2-p6.1
9655. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#TP_Q27_A1-p2.2
9656. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#TP_Q28_A1-p12.1
9657. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q69_A5-p6.2
9658. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q72_A1-p12.1
9659. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FS_Q108_A1-p6.2
9660. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q1_A3-p10.1
9661. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q1_A5-p4.1
9662. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q5_A3-p2.1
9663. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q6_A3-p4.1
9664. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q6_A6-p6.1
9665. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q7_A7-p2.1
9666. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q7_A9-p5.1
9667. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q7_A10-p4.1
9668. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q7_A12-p5.1
9669. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q8_A1-p6.7
9670. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q10_A4-p6.2
9671. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q15_A3-p7.1
9672. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q16_A6-p5.1
9673. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q23_A4-p9.1
9674. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q26_A2-p7.1
9675. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q27_A5-p2.1
9676. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q34_A1-p6.2
9677. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q34_A2-p8.1
9678. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q49_A6-p2.2
9679. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q59_A2-p9.2
9680. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q59_A3-p3.2
9681. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q64_A4-p4.1
9682. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q69_A4-p6.1
9683. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q69_A5-p6.3
9684. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#XP_Q76_A1-p8.1
9685. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#SS_Q176_A1-p4.1
9686. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q1_A6-p6.1
9687. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q2_A11-p9.1
9688. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q6_A3-p4.2
9689. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q7_A1-p6.3
9690. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q8_A1-p6.9
9691. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q8_A5-p5.1
9692. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q19_A4-p3.1
9693. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q24_A3-p7.2
9694. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q27_A5-p7.2
9695. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q39_A6-p5.1
9696. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q53_A3-p4.1
9697. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#TP_Q59_A3-p3.3
9698. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#TP_Q61_A4-p2.1
9699. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#TP_Q79_A1-p6.1
9700. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#FP_Q73_A1-p7.1
9701. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#SS_Q14_A2-p4.1
9702. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#FS_Q112_A1-p2.1
9703. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#FS_Q98_A1-p7.3
9704. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#FS_Q98_A3-p3.1
9705. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#TP_Q2_A11-p7.1
9706. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#TP_Q27_A5-p6.1
9707. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#TP_Q38_A3-p6.1
9708. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=18#XP_Q92_A1-p2.1
9709. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=18#FP_Q12_A1-p2.1
9710. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=18#FP_Q33_A3-p9.1
9711. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=18#FP_Q41_A3-p8.1
9712. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=18#FP_Q88_A3-p5.1
9713. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=23#TP_Q38_A2-p8.1
9714. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=29#FS_Q103_A2-p7.1
9715. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=29#FS_Q82_A2-p5.1
9716. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=29#TP_Q1_A4-p5.1
9717. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=29#TP_Q22_A3-p9.2
9718. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=29#TP_Q28_A1-p11.1
9719. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=29#TP_Q31_A8-p8.1
9720. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=29#TP_Q37_A3-p5.2
9721. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=31#TP_Q64_A4-p5.1
9722. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=31#TP_Q36_A4-p9.2
9723. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=31#TP_Q38_A1-p7.1
9724. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=31#TP_Q38_A5-p2.1
9725. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=33#TP_Q64_A3-p2.1
9726. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=33#TP_Q64_A5-p5.1
9727. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=33#TP_Q66_A5-p2.2
9728. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=33#TP_Q66_A9-p14.1
9729. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=33#TP_Q67_A4-p6.1
9730. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=33#FP_Q36_A2-p17.1
9731. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=33#TP_Q38_A2-p5.1
9732. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=33#TP_Q39_A1-p4.1
9733. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=34#SS_Q2_A7-p10.1
9734. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=35#TP_Q43_A3-p4.2
9735. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=37#TP_Q38_A6-p3.1
9736. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=1&scrV=39#SS_Q2_A7-p10.2
9737. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=3#TP_Q27_A4-p4.1
9738. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#TP_Q46_A9-p6.2
9739. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#SS_Q176_A1-p2.1
9740. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#TP_Q44_A3-p12.1
9741. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=11#TP_Q36_A4-p9.1
9742. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=11#TP_Q43_A3-p5.1
9743. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=12#TP_Q28_A3-p6.1
9744. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=15#TP_Q44_A3-p9.3
9745. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=16#SS_Q84_A3-p5.2
9746. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=17#FS_Q28_A4-p8.2
9747. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=17#TP_Q15_A9-p5.1
9748. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=17#TP_Q15_A9-p6.4
9749. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#TP_Q33_A1-p2.1
9750. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=21#TP_Q32_A1-p4.3
9751. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=2&scrV=25#TP_Q10_A2-p6.2
9752. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=0#TP_Q84_A7-p10.1
9753. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=1#TP_Q51_A2-p2.3
9754. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=3#TP_Q84_A7-p12.1
9755. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=3#FS_Q87_A5-p3.1
9756. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=4#TP_Q66_A9-p9.2
9757. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=4#TP_Q67_A4-p4.1
9758. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=4#TP_Q80_A10-p10.1
9759. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q65_A4-p3.1
9760. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A2-p9.1
9761. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A3-p7.1
9762. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A3-p10.1
9763. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A7-p3.2
9764. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A9-p9.1
9765. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A10-p11.3
9766. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q68_A1-p5.1
9767. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q68_A2-p2.1
9768. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q68_A9-p6.3
9769. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q80_A1-p2.1
9770. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#FP_Q74_A3-p12.1
9771. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#FS_Q112_A1-p8.1
9772. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q38_A6-p9.2
9773. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q39_A4-p6.1
9774. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q60_A5-p5.1
9775. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=8#SS_Q24_A3-p5.1
9776. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=9#TP_Q84_A7-p10.2
9777. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=10#SS_Q171_A6-p3.4
9778. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=11#TP_Q1_A6-p11.1
9779. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=13#TP_Q5_A2-p7.1
9780. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=13#TP_Q39_A5-p2.1
9781. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=13#TP_Q55_A6-p11.1
9782. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=13#TP_Q57_A2-p3.1
9783. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=14#TP_Q46_A1-p6.1
9784. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=14#TP_Q46_A4-p9.1
9785. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=14#TP_Q46_A9-p3.1
9786. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=15#TP_Q37_A1-p3.1
9787. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=16#FP_Q38_A2-p8.1
9788. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=16#FS_Q102_A3-p19.1
9789. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=16#TP_Q1_A2-p5.1
9790. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=16#TP_Q4_A5-p3.1
9791. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=16#TP_Q32_A1-p6.2
9792. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=16#TP_Q49_A4-p3.1
9793. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#TP_Q44_A3-p7.1
9794. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=18#XP_Q89_A5-p9.1
9795. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=18#XP_Q89_A6-p2.1
9796. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=18#XP_Q89_A7-p2.1
9797. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=18#XP_Q75_A2-p11.1
9798. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#TP_Q1_A4-p6.1
9799. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=20#FS_Q18_A1-p5.1
9800. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=21#FP_Q17_A1-p7.2
9801. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#TP_Q69_A7-p3.1
9802. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#TP_Q73_A5-p13.1
9803. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#TP_Q38_A5-p5.1
9804. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=23#TP_Q84_A7-p12.3
9805. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=26#TP_Q69_A7-p3.2
9806. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=29#XP_Q95_A3-p7.1
9807. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=31#TP_Q14_A3-p6.2
9808. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=34#XP_Q92_A3-p15.1
9809. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=34#TP_Q7_A11-p2.1
9810. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=34#TP_Q34_A4-p6.2
9811. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=35#XP_Q92_A3-p15.2
9812. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=3&scrV=36#FS_Q88_A4-p2.1
9813. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=0#TP_Q42_A1-p4.1
9814. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=2#TP_Q72_A6-p3.1
9815. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=2#TP_Q84_A7-p14.2
9816. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=2#TP_Q38_A6-p3.2
9817. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=8#SS_Q188_A7-p13.1
9818. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#FS_Q30_A4-p6.2
9819. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#FS_Q33_A2-p5.1
9820. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#FS_Q2_A1-p11.2
9821. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=14#FS_Q114_A3-p7.1
9822. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=14#TP_Q44_A3-p14.5
9823. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=16#FP_Q20_A1-p5.1
9824. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=21#FS_Q108_A3-p16.1
9825. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=21#SS_Q84_A3-p2.1
9826. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=23#FS_Q108_A3-p16.1
9827. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=23#FS_Q101_A3-p4.2
9828. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=23#SS_Q84_A2-p2.1
9829. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=23#SS_Q93_A1-p8.1
9830. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=24#TP_Q63_A4-p7.1
9831. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=24#FP_Q3_A1-p7.1
9832. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=24#FS_Q101_A2-p5.1
9833. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=24#SS_Q81_A7-p2.1
9834. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=24#SS_Q83_A5-p7.1
9835. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=24#SS_Q83_A13-p2.1
9836. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=24#SS_Q94_A2-p4.1
9837. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=24#TP_Q58_A1-p2.1
9838. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=24#TP_Q60_A4-p3.1
9839. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=34#FS_Q69_A2-p11.1
9840. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=36#FS_Q70_A1-p2.3
9841. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=36#XP_Q71_A1-p9.1
9842. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=42#SS_Q2_A10-p6.4
9843. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=42#SS_Q27_A3-p8.1
9844. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=44#TP_Q7_A8-p5.3
9845. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=48#TP_Q43_A1-p4.2
9846. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=48#TP_Q55_A5-p10.2
9847. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=4&scrV=53#SS_Q6_A1-p3.1
9848. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=4#TP_Q73_A1-p8.1
9849. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#FP_Q73_A2-p2.1
9850. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#FP_Q118_A3-p9.1
9851. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#XP_Q88_A1-p7.2
9852. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#TP_Q40_A4-p8.1
9853. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=18#TP_Q47_A4-p4.1
9854. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#FP_Q27_A1-p6.3
9855. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#FP_Q42_A6-p2.1
9856. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#FP_Q42_A6-p5.1
9857. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#TP_Q23_A2-p6.3
9858. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#TP_Q43_A4-p7.3
9859. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#FP_Q42_A6-p3.2
9860. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#XP_Q90_A2-p6.1
9861. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#TP_Q43_A4-p7.4
9862. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#TP_Q56_A1-p4.1
9863. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#TP_Q56_A1-p8.2
9864. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#TP_Q59_A4-p5.1
9865. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#XP_Q90_A1-p4.1
9866. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#XP_Q89_A1-p2.1
9867. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=23#TP_Q25_A1-p2.1
9868. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=25#XP_Q75_A2-p7.2
9869. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=25#XP_Q76_A2-p6.2
9870. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=25#TP_Q51_A1-p6.2
9871. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=27#XP_Q89_A3-p5.1
9872. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=27#XP_Q90_A1-p7.1
9873. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=27#XP_Q89_A2-p5.2
9874. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=27#TP_Q10_A2-p6.1
9875. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=27#TP_Q56_A1-p11.3
9876. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=27#TP_Q59_A2-p5.1
9877. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=28#XP_Q75_A2-p7.1
9878. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=28#XP_Q76_A2-p6.1
9879. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=28#TP_Q51_A1-p6.2
9880. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=29#XP_Q88_A1-p6.1
9881. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=30#FP_Q42_A6-p3.3
9882. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=36#TP_Q43_A1-p8.2
9883. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=36#TP_Q43_A4-p5.1
9884. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=37#TP_Q39_A8-p8.1
9885. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=37#TP_Q39_A8-p9.1
9886. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=44#SS_Q132_A3-p7.1
9887. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=45#XP_Q89_A2-p4.1
9888. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=46#FS_Q106_A4-p12.1
9889. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=5&scrV=46#FS_Q98_A2-p7.2
9890. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=0#TP_Q74_A3-p2.1
9891. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=1#TP_Q44_A4-p12.1
9892. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=38#TP_Q33_A3-p9.1
9893. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=41#FS_Q102_A3-p38.1
9894. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=41#FS_Q102_A4-p29.6
9895. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=44#FS_Q109_A6-p6.1
9896. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=45#TP_Q69_A5-p8.1
9897. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=45#SS_Q2_A3-p7.2
9898. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=45#FP_Q43_A5-p8.1
9899. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=45#SS_Q8_A5-p5.1
9900. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=45#FS_Q113_A3-p5.1
9901. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=45#FS_Q112_A2-p8.2
9902. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=45#FS_Q112_A3-p6.2
9903. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=50#TP_Q79_A4-p4.1
9904. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=50#TP_Q79_A6-p5.1
9905. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=51#FS_Q102_A3-p38.2
9906. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=51#FS_Q102_A4-p29.7
9907. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=52#TP_Q79_A1-p5.1
9908. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=52#TP_Q79_A2-p5.1
9909. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=52#TP_Q79_A8-p2.1
9910. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=54#TP_Q65_A1-p11.3
9911. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=54#TP_Q65_A4-p3.2
9912. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=54#TP_Q73_A3-p2.1
9913. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=54#TP_Q73_A3-p7.1
9914. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=54#TP_Q75_A1-p2.1
9915. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=54#TP_Q80_A9-p10.1
9916. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=54#TP_Q80_A11-p5.1
9917. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=54#TP_Q83_A4-p27.1
9918. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=55#XP_Q99_A4-p3.1
9919. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=56#TP_Q76_A1-p3.2
9920. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=56#TP_Q76_A1-p9.1
9921. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=56#TP_Q79_A1-p8.1
9922. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=56#TP_Q79_A2-p8.1
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9925. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=58#TP_Q79_A1-p6.2
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9928. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
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9929. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=6&scrV=64#TP_Q80_A1-p2.2
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9932. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
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h=6&scrV=71#TP_Q47_A3-p4.1
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9937. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
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9940. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
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9942. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
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h=7&scrV=23#TP_Q40_A4-p10.2
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h=7&scrV=23#TP_Q52_A8-p4.1
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h=7&scrV=39#FP_Q43_A6-p2.1
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h=7&scrV=41#TP_Q47_A5-p7.1
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9956. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=8&scrV=0#XP_Q18_A4-p4.1
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h=8&scrV=0#XP_Q25_A1-p6.2
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h=8&scrV=0#XP_Q78_A1-p11.1
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h=8&scrV=7#TP_Q87_A4-p2.1
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9961. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
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h=8&scrV=16#FP_Q43_A1-p5.1
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h=8&scrV=44#FP_Q114_A3-p3.1
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h=8&scrV=46#TP_Q15_A1-p7.1
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h=8&scrV=50#TP_Q13_A4-p8.1
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h=8&scrV=55#TP_Q9_A2-p5.1
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h=8&scrV=56#SS_Q1_A3-p3.1
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h=8&scrV=56#TP_Q52_A5-p7.1
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h=8&scrV=59#TP_Q44_A3-p9.5
9983. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
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9984. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=9&scrV=3#FS_Q87_A7-p2.1
9985. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=9&scrV=3#TP_Q44_A3-p4.1
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h=9&scrV=4#TP_Q35_A8-p4.1
9987. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=9&scrV=4#TP_Q83_A2-p17.1
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h=9&scrV=5#TP_Q46_A9-p5.1
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9993. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=9&scrV=31#SS_Q83_A16-p2.1
9994. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=9&scrV=31#XP_Q71_A3-p2.1
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h=9&scrV=31#XP_Q71_A3-p9.2
9996. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=9&scrV=31#SS_Q178_A2-p2.1
9997. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=9&scrV=32#TP_Q43_A4-p6.1
9998. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scrC
h=9&scrV=41#SS_Q15_A1-p2.1
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h=10&scrV=7#XP_Q17_A1-p2.2
10000. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10001. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10002. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=10&scrV=10#TP_Q55_A5-p4.1
10003. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10004. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10005. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10006. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10007. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10008. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=10&scrV=17#TP_Q5_A4-p5.2
10009. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=10&scrV=18#TP_Q5_A3-p6.2
10010. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=10&scrV=18#TP_Q47_A1-p2.1
10011. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=10&scrV=18#TP_Q47_A2-p7.1
10012. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10013. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=10&scrV=18#TP_Q53_A4-p5.1
10014. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10015. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10016. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=10&scrV=30#TP_Q17_A1-p6.1
10017. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10018. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=10&scrV=38#FP_Q39_A2-p11.2
10019. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=10&scrV=38#TP_Q43_A1-p8.1
10020. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10021. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10022. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10023. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=26#AP2_Q1_A1-p5.3
10024. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=31#FS_Q114_A9-p7.1
10025. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=41#TP_Q83_A4-p25.1
10026. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=41#TP_Q21_A3-p6.5
10027. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=41#TP_Q43_A2-p9.1
10028. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=41#TP_Q43_A2-p3.1
10029. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=42#TP_Q21_A1-p7.2
10030. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=42#TP_Q21_A3-p7.2
10031. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=44#XP_Q8_A1-p7.1
10032. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=47#TP_Q43_A1-p5.1
10033. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10034. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10035. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=51#SS_Q173_A4-p7.2
10036. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=11&scrV=52#TP_Q35_A8-p9.1
10037. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=6#SS_Q55_A7-p4.1
10038. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=6#SS_Q188_A7-p12.1
10039. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=20#TP_Q42_A1-p9.5
10040. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=24#TP_Q74_A3-p6.1
10041. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=24#TP_Q46_A2-p2.1
10042. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=27#TP_Q54_A2-p6.2
10043. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=31#TP_Q44_A1-p7.1
10044. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=31#TP_Q49_A2-p5.1
10045. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=32#TP_Q46_A4-p10.1
10046. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=36#FS_Q108_A1-p5.1
10047. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=43#SS_Q132_A3-p6.7
10048. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=48#XP_Q89_A2-p4.2
10049. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=12&scrV=48#TP_Q59_A5-p5.1
10050. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=1#TP_Q74_A4-p2.2
10051. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=1#TP_Q46_A9-p6.1
10052. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=1#TP_Q46_A9-p12.1
10053. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=1#TP_Q46_A9-p8.2
10054. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#TP_Q74_A4-p2.3
10055. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=10#TP_Q72_A6-p8.1
10056. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=10#TP_Q83_A5-p16.1
10057. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=13#SS_Q132_A1-p9.1
10058. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=17#FS_Q4_A6-p5.1
10059. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=17#FS_Q5_A7-p5.1
10060. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=18#TP_Q36_A3-p7.1
10061. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=21#TP_Q7_A2-p9.1
10062. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=26#TP_Q81_A2-p4.1
10063. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=26#TP_Q81_A2-p4.2
10064. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=26#TP_Q81_A2-p4.3
10065. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=29#SS_Q188_A7-p13.2
10066. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=13&scrV=30#XP_Q77_A3-p4.1
10067. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=1#TP_Q75_A1-p10.1
10068. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=1#SS_Q1_A9-p6.1
10069. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=1#SS_Q16_A1-p3.2
10070. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=1#SS_Q174_A6-p6.4
10071. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=2#XP_Q93_A2-p5.1
10072. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=2#FS_Q5_A2-p5.1
10073. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=2#TP_Q57_A6-p8.1
10074. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=3#TP_Q57_A1-p12.1
10075. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=3#TP_Q57_A6-p8.2
10076. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=5#TP_Q45_A1-p6.3
10077. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=6#TP_Q78_A5-p5.1
10078. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=6#FP_Q2_A1-p4.1
10079. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=6#FP_Q3_A3-p4.1
10080. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=6#FP_Q16_A5-p5.1
10081. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=6#FP_Q39_A8-p6.1
10082. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=6#SS_Q34_A1-p3.3
10083. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=8#XP_Q92_A1-p23.3
10084. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=8#XP_Q92_A3-p25.1
10085. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=9#SS_Q1_A8-p4.1
10086. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=10#FP_Q42_A5-p5.1
10087. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=10#TP_Q43_A2-p5.1
10088. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=12#TP_Q64_A4-p3.1
10089. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=12#TP_Q69_A6-p3.1
10090. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=12#FP_Q105_A8-p4.1
10091. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=12#FS_Q111_A2-p3.1
10092. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=12#FS_Q113_A9-p5.2
10093. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=12#TP_Q43_A4-p3.1
10094. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=16#FP_Q27_A3-p5.2
10095. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=16#SS_Q83_A10-p2.1
10096. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=17#FS_Q106_A1-p8.1
10097. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=17#FS_Q68_A3-p5.1
10098. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=21#XP_Q92_A1-p21.1
10099. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=21#FS_Q114_A4-p5.1
10100. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=21#SS_Q24_A12-p7.2
10101. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=21#SS_Q27_A8-p6.1
10102. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=21#TP_Q19_A3-p5.1
10103. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=23#FP_Q43_A4-p3.1
10104. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=23#FP_Q43_A5-p6.1
10105. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=23#SS_Q184_A3-p4.2
10106. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=28#FP_Q42_A4-p2.1
10107. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=28#TP_Q3_A8-p2.2
10108. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=28#TP_Q20_A1-p5.1
10109. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=28#TP_Q57_A2-p4.1
10110. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=28#TP_Q58_A3-p4.3
10111. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=31#FP_Q42_A6-p3.1
10112. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=14&scrV=31#TP_Q47_A2-p7.3
10113. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=1#TP_Q74_A5-p5.1
10114. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=3#TP_Q60_A6-p7.1
10115. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=5#FS_Q6_A1-p4.1
10116. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=5#FS_Q109_A6-p9.1
10117. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=5#SS_Q156_A2-p8.1
10118. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=11#FS_Q55_A4-p7.1
10119. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=11#SS_Q28_A3-p5.1
10120. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=12#SS_Q22_A1-p5.1
10121. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=12#FS_Q68_A1-p10.3
10122. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=12#SS_Q16_A1-p9.2
10123. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=13#TP_Q66_A12-p6.3
10124. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=13#SS_Q124_A2-p3.1
10125. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=13#SS_Q124_A3-p7.2
10126. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=13#SS_Q26_A5-p4.1
10127. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=13#SS_Q184_A2-p11.1
10128. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=13#SS_Q184_A5-p4.2
10129. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=15#SS_Q23_A1-p5.1
10130. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=15#SS_Q172_A4-p3.1
10131. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=15#SS_Q172_A4-p10.1
10132. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=19#SS_Q188_A2-p9.1
10133. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=22#TP_Q86_A3-p10.1
10134. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=22#SS_Q5_A2-p4.1
10135. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=22#SS_Q10_A1-p7.1
10136. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=22#SS_Q10_A3-p5.1
10137. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=22#TP_Q47_A5-p6.1
10138. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=24#SS_Q34_A1-p5.2
10139. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=24#TP_Q43_A4-p10.1
10140. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=24#TP_Q47_A5-p3.1
10141. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=24#TP_Q47_A5-p6.2
10142. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=25#SS_Q16_A1-p6.1
10143. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=26#FP_Q27_A3-p5.1
10144. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=15&scrV=26#FP_Q36_A2-p2.1
10145. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=2#FS_Q19_A6-p5.1
10146. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=7#TP_Q72_A1-p9.1
10147. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=7#TP_Q75_A1-p5.1
10148. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=7#TP_Q57_A1-p13.3
10149. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=7#TP_Q57_A6-p5.1
10150. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=8#TP_Q59_A1-p4.1
10151. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=11#XP_Q89_A8-p5.2
10152. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=12#TP_Q42_A3-p6.2
10153. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=12#TP_Q42_A3-p11.1
10154. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=12#TP_Q45_A4-p5.1
10155. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=13#SS_Q1_A9-p8.1
10156. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=13#FS_Q106_A4-p3.1
10157. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=13#TP_Q39_A7-p6.2
10158. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=14#FP_Q36_A2-p14.1
10159. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=22#TP_Q55_A3-p8.1
10160. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=23#SS_Q83_A7-p3.1
10161. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=23#XP_Q78_A1-p4.1
10162. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=16&scrV=33#XP_Q96_A8-p7.1
10163. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=1#TP_Q83_A4-p25.2
10164. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=1#TP_Q83_A4-p32.1
10165. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=1#TP_Q21_A3-p5.1
10166. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=1#TP_Q21_A3-p6.3
10167. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#XP_Q90_A3-p7.1
10168. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#FP_Q10_A3-p6.5
10169. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#FS_Q114_A4-p5.2
10170. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#FP_Q12_A4-p5.2
10171. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#FP_Q12_A6-p5.1
10172. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#FP_Q31_A4-p2.1
10173. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#SS_Q1_A8-p9.3
10174. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#SS_Q24_A12-p7.3
10175. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#FS_Q3_A2-p10.2
10176. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#FS_Q3_A4-p7.1
10177. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#TP_Q9_A2-p3.1
10178. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=3#TP_Q59_A5-p9.2
10179. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=5#TP_Q83_A4-p32.2
10180. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=5#FP_Q46_A1-p12.1
10181. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=5#SS_Q2_A8-p3.1
10182. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=10#TP_Q48_A1-p5.2
10183. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=11#SS_Q188_A2-p9.2
10184. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=20#TP_Q21_A4-p4.1
10185. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=21#TP_Q21_A4-p4.2
10186. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=21#SS_Q183_A2-p2.1
10187. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=21#TP_Q23_A3-p6.1
10188. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=22#XP_Q90_A2-p10.2
10189. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=17&scrV=24#TP_Q21_A4-p4.3
10190. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=3#FP_Q18_A2-p4.1
10191. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=6#TP_Q44_A3-p9.4
10192. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=11#SS_Q40_A2-p6.2
10193. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=20#TP_Q42_A3-p5.1
10194. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=20#TP_Q42_A3-p7.1
10195. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=20#TP_Q42_A3-p11.2
10196. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=23#SS_Q72_A3-p6.3
10197. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=28#TP_Q46_A9-p8.1
10198. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=35#TP_Q47_A3-p4.2
10199. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=35#TP_Q47_A6-p8.1
10200. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=36#TP_Q59_A4-p10.1
10201. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10202. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=37#TP_Q12_A3-p6.2
10203. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=37#TP_Q35_A7-p4.1
10204. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=18&scrV=37#TP_Q40_A1-p6.1
10205. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=2#XP_Q65_A2-p14.1
10206. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=7#TP_Q47_A4-p4.2
10207. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=11#FS_Q73_A2-p5.1
10208. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=11#SS_Q67_A4-p7.1
10209. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=11#TP_Q47_A6-p3.1
10210. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=11#TP_Q49_A6-p7.1
10211. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
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10212. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=16#TP_Q47_A3-p4.3
10213. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=25#TP_Q28_A3-p7.2
10214. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=30#FP_Q73_A1-p2.3
10215. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=30#FS_Q103_A3-p10.1
10216. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=30#SS_Q147_A7-p7.1
10217. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=30#TP_Q47_A2-p7.2
10218. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=32#TP_Q46_A5-p5.1
10219. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=34#TP_Q79_A1-p7.3
10220. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=35#TP_Q74_A8-p2.1
10221. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=37#XP_Q90_A2-p2.1
10222. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=40#TP_Q51_A2-p4.1
10223. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=19&scrV=40#TP_Q51_A2-p9.1
10224. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=1#TP_Q83_A2-p17.3
10225. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=1#TP_Q51_A4-p8.1
10226. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=1#TP_Q53_A2-p4.1
10227. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=13#TP_Q84_A4-p5.2
10228. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=17#TP_Q80_A4-p10.1
10229. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=17#TP_Q20_A2-p7.1
10230. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=17#TP_Q23_A2-p3.2
10231. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=17#TP_Q23_A2-p8.1
10232. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=17#TP_Q55_A1-p10.2
10233. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=17#TP_Q55_A6-p4.1
10234. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=17#TP_Q57_A1-p5.1
10235. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=17#TP_Q57_A1-p6.1
10236. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=19#XP_Q83_A2-p2.2
10237. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=19#XP_Q83_A3-p7.1
10238. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=20#TP_Q55_A3-p2.1
10239. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=22#XP_Q35_A4-p4.1
10240. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=22#FP_Q91_A4-p11.1
10241. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=22#XP_Q19_A5-p2.1
10242. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=22#XP_Q20_A1-p2.1
10243. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=22#XP_Q37_A5-p3.1
10244. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=22#TP_Q3_A8-p4.2
10245. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=23#TP_Q84_A3-p13.4
10246. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=23#XP_Q8_A1-p9.1
10247. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=23#XP_Q18_A1-p2.1
10248. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=23#XP_Q20_A1-p8.1
10249. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=23#XP_Q40_A6-p2.2
10250. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=23#FP_Q43_A7-p17.3
10251. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=26#XP_Q83_A2-p2.3
10252. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=26#XP_Q83_A3-p7.2
10253. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=26#TP_Q14_A1-p7.4
10254. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=26#TP_Q54_A1-p2.1
10255. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=26#TP_Q55_A3-p5.2
10256. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=26#TP_Q55_A3-p6.1
10257. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=27#TP_Q54_A4-p5.1
10258. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=29#SS_Q1_A4-p2.1
10259. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=29#TP_Q41_A2-p7.3
10260. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=29#TP_Q54_A4-p3.2
10261. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=29#TP_Q55_A5-p4.2
10262. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=29#TP_Q55_A5-p10.1
10263. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=31#FP_Q1_A8-p2.1
10264. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=20&scrV=31#FS_Q106_A1-p2.1
10265. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=21&scrV=0#XP_Q81_A4-p2.1
10266. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=21&scrV=0#TP_Q44_A4-p8.2
10267. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=21&scrV=17#XP_Q40_A6-p8.2
10268. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=21&scrV=17#SS_Q185_A1-p7.1
10269. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=21&scrV=17#SS_Q185_A2-p8.1
10270. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=21&scrV=17#TP_Q7_A3-p5.2
10271. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=21&scrV=21#TP_Q89_A3-p13.1
10272. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=21&scrV=22#SS_Q182_A2-p3.1
10273. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=21&scrV=25#TP_Q42_A4-p7.1
10274. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=John&scr
Ch=26&scrV=0#TP_Q57_A1-p11.1
10275. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=1#TP_Q81_A1-p6.1
10276. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=1#TP_Q81_A2-p3.1
10277. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=1#TP_Q7_A3-p3.1
10278. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=1#TP_Q21_A3-p4.1
10279. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=1#TP_Q40_A4-p3.1
10280. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=1#TP_Q41_A3-p9.1
10281. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=3#TP_Q55_A3-p3.1
10282. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=3#TP_Q55_A3-p12.2
10283. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=3#TP_Q55_A5-p5.1
10284. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=3#TP_Q57_A1-p15.1
10285. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=5#FS_Q106_A4-p10.1
10286. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=7#FS_Q106_A4-p11.1
10287. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=7#XP_Q77_A2-p6.2
10288. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=7#XP_Q77_A2-p7.2
10289. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=7#XP_Q88_A3-p8.2
10290. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=7#TP_Q10_A2-p8.1
10291. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=8#SS_Q124_A2-p2.1
10292. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=9#TP_Q55_A2-p3.1
10293. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=9#TP_Q57_A3-p2.2
10294. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=9#TP_Q57_A3-p4.1
10295. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=9#TP_Q57_A4-p6.1
10296. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=11#XP_Q88_A4-p6.1
10297. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=11#TP_Q57_A6-p4.2
10298. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=13#TP_Q72_A5-p6.2
10299. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=1&scrV=26#SS_Q95_A8-p3.5
10300. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=0#TP_Q66_A5-p5.1
10301. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=0#TP_Q66_A7-p6.2
10302. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=0#TP_Q72_A7-p6.2
10303. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=0#FS_Q106_A4-p10.2
10304. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=1#TP_Q72_A12-p4.2
10305. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=2#TP_Q72_A8-p6.1
10306. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=2#FS_Q113_A7-p7.1
10307. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=3#TP_Q66_A3-p13.1
10308. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#TP_Q66_A1-p9.3
10309. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#FP_Q43_A7-p17.4
10310. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#SS_Q176_A1-p5.1
10311. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=6#SS_Q176_A1-p3.1
10312. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=6#SS_Q176_A1-p8.1
10313. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#SS_Q176_A2-p8.5
10314. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=15#TP_Q83_A2-p14.3
10315. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=17#XP_Q88_A3-p10.1
10316. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=22#SS_Q178_A1-p4.5
10317. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=24#TP_Q52_A2-p3.1
10318. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=24#TP_Q52_A4-p5.1
10319. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=24#TP_Q53_A2-p3.1
10320. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=24#TP_Q53_A4-p2.1
10321. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=25#SS_Q176_A2-p8.6
10322. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=27#XP_Q78_A2-p2.2
10323. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=31#XP_Q78_A2-p2.2
10324. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=38#TP_Q68_A6-p4.1
10325. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=38#TP_Q69_A1-p3.1
10326. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=38#TP_Q84_A6-p3.2
10327. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=38#TP_Q84_A7-p13.1
10328. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=41#TP_Q47_A4-p6.1
10329. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=2&scrV=46#TP_Q83_A3-p3.2
10330. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=3&scrV=6#TP_Q84_A3-p14.1
10331. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=3&scrV=15#TP_Q55_A1-p4.1
10332. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=3&scrV=17#TP_Q47_A5-p5.2
10333. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=0#TP_Q66_A5-p5.2
10334. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=0#TP_Q9_A1-p6.3
10335. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=0#TP_Q18_A1-p7.1
10336. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=4#TP_Q47_A4-p6.2
10337. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=12#TP_Q68_A1-p7.1
10338. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=12#SS_Q2_A7-p6.2
10339. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=12#FS_Q91_A5-p11.1
10340. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=13#TP_Q44_A3-p8.3
10341. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=27#TP_Q46_A10-p10.1
10342. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=30#SS_Q97_A2-p7.1
10343. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=33#TP_Q55_A2-p2.1
10344. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=34#SS_Q188_A7-p13.3
10345. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=4&scrV=34#SS_Q55_A7-p4.2
10346. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=0#SS_Q1_A10-p3.2
10347. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=0#SS_Q64_A4-p2.8
10348. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=1#SS_Q55_A5-p3.1
10349. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=1#XP_Q21_A3-p4.1
10350. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=3#FS_Q80_A1-p2.1
10351. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=4#SS_Q33_A7-p3.2
10352. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=4#SS_Q178_A1-p9.2
10353. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=9#SS_Q33_A7-p3.3
10354. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=9#SS_Q178_A1-p9.3
10355. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=15#FP_Q105_A7-p3.1
10356. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=15#XP_Q83_A2-p9.1
10357. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=29#FS_Q96_A4-p8.1
10358. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=29#SS_Q33_A7-p16.1
10359. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=29#SS_Q104_A5-p5.1
10360. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=38#SS_Q189_A10-p2.2
10361. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=5&scrV=41#SS_Q144_A2-p10.1
10362. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=6&scrV=0#SS_Q1_A10-p3.1
10363. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=6&scrV=2#TP_Q67_A2-p7.1
10364. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=6&scrV=2#TP_Q40_A3-p6.3
10365. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=6&scrV=3#SS_Q184_A6-p3.1
10366. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=6&scrV=8#TP_Q7_A10-p2.2
10367. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=7&scrV=24#SS_Q60_A6-p9.1
10368. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=7&scrV=38#TP_Q7_A8-p4.2
10369. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=7&scrV=51#SS_Q189_A1-p13.5
10370. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=7&scrV=53#FS_Q98_A3-p5.2
10371. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=7&scrV=53#TP_Q36_A5-p7.1
10372. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=7&scrV=55#TP_Q58_A1-p4.1
10373. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=8&scrV=0#TP_Q68_A3-p8.1
10374. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=8&scrV=0#TP_Q72_A11-p6.3
10375. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=8&scrV=12#TP_Q66_A6-p2.2
10376. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=8&scrV=16#TP_Q38_A6-p2.2
10377. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=8&scrV=17#TP_Q72_A2-p2.1
10378. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=8&scrV=17#TP_Q72_A7-p6.3
10379. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=8&scrV=17#TP_Q84_A4-p3.2
10380. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=8&scrV=18#SS_Q100_A1-p5.1
10381. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=8&scrV=20#SS_Q100_A1-p10.3
10382. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=8&scrV=22#TP_Q84_A1-p5.1
10383. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=9&scrV=0#TP_Q57_A6-p4.3
10384. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=9&scrV=0#TP_Q57_A6-p12.1
10385. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=9&scrV=1#FS_Q112_A2-p3.1
10386. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=9&scrV=22#SS_Q10_A7-p5.1
10387. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=9&scrV=29#SS_Q10_A7-p5.2
10388. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=9&scrV=34#TP_Q84_A3-p5.3
10389. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=9&scrV=40#SS_Q178_A1-p9.1
10390. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=0#TP_Q68_A3-p8.2
10391. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=0#TP_Q19_A1-p8.2
10392. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=1#TP_Q69_A4-p3.1
10393. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=4#SS_Q10_A4-p5.1
10394. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=9#SS_Q173_A3-p9.1
10395. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=10#SS_Q175_A3-p2.1
10396. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=15#XP_Q74_A1-p2.1
10397. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=15#TP_Q31_A4-p11.1
10398. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=31#SS_Q10_A4-p5.2
10399. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=34#FS_Q79_A4-p4.1
10400. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=34#FS_Q89_A5-p5.1
10401. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=34#FS_Q105_A3-p2.1
10402. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=34#FS_Q98_A4-p3.1
10403. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=40#TP_Q55_A1-p5.1
10404. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=40#TP_Q36_A2-p6.2
10405. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=42#XP_Q89_A5-p5.1
10406. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=42#XP_Q90_A1-p10.4
10407. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=42#TP_Q59_A1-p5.1
10408. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=43#TP_Q45_A3-p4.1
10409. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=10&scrV=44#TP_Q72_A6-p4.1
10410. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=11&scrV=15#TP_Q72_A2-p9.1
10411. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=14&scrV=21#TP_Q45_A1-p6.4
10412. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=15&scrV=0#SS_Q29_A3-p3.1
10413. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=15&scrV=1#FS_Q58_A1-p6.1
10414. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=15&scrV=9#SS_Q7_A2-p5.1
10415. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=15&scrV=9#FS_Q113_A1-p3.1
10416. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=15&scrV=9#SS_Q8_A7-p3.1
10417. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=15&scrV=10#FS_Q98_A1-p4.1
10418. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=15&scrV=10#FS_Q101_A3-p3.1
10419. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=15&scrV=28#FS_Q103_A4-p4.1
10420. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=15&scrV=29#XP_Q65_A3-p2.1
10421. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=15&scrV=29#SS_Q154_A2-p2.1
10422. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=15&scrV=39#SS_Q37_A1-p4.1
10423. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=16&scrV=3#FS_Q103_A4-p2.2
10424. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=17&scrV=16#SS_Q94_A1-p6.1
10425. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=17&scrV=22#SS_Q94_A1-p6.2
10426. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=17&scrV=24#FS_Q102_A4-p2.1
10427. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=17&scrV=24#XP_Q69_A2-p11.1
10428. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=17&scrV=26#FP_Q92_A2-p6.1
10429. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=17&scrV=26#XP_Q69_A2-p11.1
10430. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=17&scrV=28#FP_Q1_A8-p7.2
10431. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=17&scrV=28#FP_Q18_A4-p2.1
10432. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=18&scrV=0#TP_Q18_A1-p8.1
10433. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=18&scrV=0#TP_Q18_A6-p5.1
10434. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=18&scrV=0#TP_Q19_A1-p11.1
10435. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=19&scrV=1#TP_Q38_A6-p5.1
10436. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=19&scrV=1#TP_Q66_A9-p3.2
10437. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=19&scrV=4#TP_Q38_A6-p6.2
10438. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=19&scrV=11#SS_Q178_A2-p9.1
10439. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=20&scrV=27#SS_Q87_A1-p3.2
10440. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=20&scrV=28#SS_Q184_A6-p8.2
10441. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=20&scrV=35#SS_Q187_A4-p4.1
10442. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=21&scrV=9#SS_Q177_A2-p3.3
10443. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=21&scrV=26#FS_Q103_A4-p2.3
10444. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=23&scrV=6#SS_Q37_A1-p3.1
10445. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=23&scrV=8#FP_Q50_A1-p7.1
10446. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=25&scrV=0#SS_Q69_A3-p5.1
10447. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=25&scrV=16#SS_Q67_A3-p6.2
10448. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Acts&scr
Ch=25&scrV=27#SS_Q131_A2-p4.1
10449. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=0#FP_Q32_A1-p2.1
10450. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=0#FP_Q32_A1-p8.2
10451. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=2#TP_Q16_A7-p2.1
10452. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#TP_Q31_A2-p5.1
10453. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#TP_Q31_A6-p3.1
10454. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#TP_Q35_A7-p6.1
10455. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#FP_Q23_A2-p3.1
10456. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q1_A3-p5.1
10457. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q24_A1-p5.1
10458. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q24_A1-p8.1
10459. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q24_A1-p11.1
10460. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q24_A3-p4.1
10461. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q27_A5-p7.1
10462. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q32_A1-p8.2
10463. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q32_A1-p8.3
10464. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#SS_Q4_A3-p4.1
10465. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#SS_Q2_A5-p4.1
10466. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q7_A3-p8.1
10467. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=7#FS_Q110_A1-p4.1
10468. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FP_Q1_A9-p6.1
10469. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=15#XP_Q37_A4-p6.1
10470. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#FS_Q106_A2-p5.1
10471. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#SS_Q11_A2-p5.1
10472. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#SS_Q12_A1-p9.2
10473. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#TP_Q7_A3-p4.1
10474. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=18#SS_Q45_A4-p3.2
10475. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=19#FP_Q1_A6-p6.3
10476. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=19#FP_Q12_A12-p5.1
10477. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=19#FP_Q56_A3-p5.1
10478. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=19#FP_Q111_A1-p3.1
10479. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=19#SS_Q167_A1-p13.1
10480. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#XP_Q91_A1-p10.2
10481. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FP_Q2_A2-p5.1
10482. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FP_Q13_A5-p8.1
10483. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#SS_Q2_A3-p4.2
10484. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FP_Q65_A1-p9.1
10485. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FP_Q79_A9-p7.1
10486. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FP_Q84_A5-p3.1
10487. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FP_Q88_A3-p6.2
10488. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FP_Q56_A3-p7.2
10489. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FS_Q111_A4-p8.1
10490. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FS_Q93_A2-p7.1
10491. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#SS_Q9_A2-p4.1
10492. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#SS_Q27_A3-p3.1
10493. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#SS_Q34_A1-p6.2
10494. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#SS_Q81_A7-p6.1
10495. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#SS_Q175_A1-p10.1
10496. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#SS_Q180_A4-p8.1
10497. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#TP_Q1_A1-p6.1
10498. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#TP_Q60_A2-p2.1
10499. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=21#XP_Q65_A3-p11.1
10500. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=23#SS_Q89_A6-p4.2
10501. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=23#SS_Q94_A1-p8.1
10502. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=23#TP_Q25_A3-p3.2
10503. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=24#FS_Q87_A2-p7.2
10504. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=25#SS_Q89_A6-p4.3
10505. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=25#SS_Q94_A1-p5.1
10506. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=25#SS_Q94_A1-p8.2
10507. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=25#TP_Q25_A2-p3.1
10508. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=26#SS_Q94_A3-p4.1
10509. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=27#SS_Q154_A11-p6.2
10510. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=28#FS_Q79_A1-p2.1
10511. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=28#SS_Q162_A6-p4.1
10512. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=29#SS_Q118_A2-p5.1
10513. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=29#SS_Q118_A4-p2.1
10514. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=29#SS_Q74_A1-p5.1
10515. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=30#SS_Q34_A3-p3.1
10516. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=30#SS_Q72_A1-p6.1
10517. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=30#SS_Q73_A2-p5.1
10518. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=30#SS_Q105_A1-p5.1
10519. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#TP_Q64_A6-p3.1
10520. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#SS_Q118_A4-p2.2
10521. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#SS_Q10_A11-p2.1
10522. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#SS_Q40_A2-p4.1
10523. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#SS_Q62_A7-p5.1
10524. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#SS_Q69_A2-p9.1
10525. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#SS_Q70_A1-p6.3
10526. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#SS_Q71_A3-p6.1
10527. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#SS_Q73_A4-p6.1
10528. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#SS_Q78_A4-p2.1
10529. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#XP_Q64_A4-p3.1
10530. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#XP_Q64_A9-p2.1
10531. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=1&scrV=32#TP_Q40_A4-p4.1
10532. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=1#SS_Q33_A5-p5.1
10533. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=1#SS_Q60_A2-p4.2
10534. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=2#SS_Q66_A5-p17.1
10535. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=2#SS_Q67_A2-p3.2
10536. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#FS_Q76_A4-p4.1
10537. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#SS_Q136_A5-p5.1
10538. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#TP_Q3_A8-p9.1
10539. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=5#TP_Q88_A1-p11.1
10540. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=6#FS_Q111_A1-p5.2
10541. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=7#SS_Q132_A1-p3.1
10542. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=9#FS_Q87_A1-p5.1
10543. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=11#FS_Q73_A10-p3.1
10544. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=11#FS_Q106_A3-p2.1
10545. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=12#XP_Q88_A2-p9.2
10546. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=13#FS_Q100_A12-p2.1
10547. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#FS_Q109_A4-p2.1
10548. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#FS_Q90_A3-p2.1
10549. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#FS_Q91_A2-p5.1
10550. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#FS_Q94_A6-p2.1
10551. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#FS_Q100_A1-p5.1
10552. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#FS_Q106_A1-p3.1
10553. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#FS_Q96_A5-p8.1
10554. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=15#FP_Q79_A13-p2.1
10555. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=15#SS_Q67_A3-p7.1
10556. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=15#XP_Q87_A1-p3.1
10557. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=15#XP_Q87_A1-p8.1
10558. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=15#XP_Q88_A2-p6.1
10559. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=16#TP_Q59_A2-p11.2
10560. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=2&scrV=29#TP_Q68_A2-p8.2
10561. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=1#FS_Q98_A4-p5.1
10562. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=2#TP_Q70_A4-p8.2
10563. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=3#TP_Q88_A1-p9.1
10564. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=8#TP_Q68_A11-p10.1
10565. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=8#FS_Q79_A4-p5.1
10566. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=8#SS_Q33_A6-p4.1
10567. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=8#SS_Q64_A5-p11.1
10568. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#SS_Q85_A4-p2.1
10569. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=20#FS_Q98_A6-p6.1
10570. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=20#FS_Q100_A6-p10.3
10571. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#TP_Q68_A8-p7.3
10572. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#SS_Q124_A2-p7.1
10573. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#SS_Q58_A2-p2.1
10574. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#SS_Q104_A6-p6.1
10575. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#TP_Q6_A3-p9.1
10576. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#TP_Q30_A1-p3.1
10577. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#TP_Q36_A1-p7.1
10578. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=23#XP_Q6_A3-p7.1
10579. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=23#FS_Q106_A3-p2.2
10580. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#TP_Q62_A6-p11.1
10581. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#TP_Q79_A3-p4.2
10582. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#FS_Q109_A9-p5.1
10583. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#FS_Q111_A1-p4.1
10584. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#FS_Q113_A2-p5.1
10585. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#TP_Q22_A3-p6.1
10586. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#TP_Q46_A1-p10.2
10587. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#TP_Q62_A5-p9.2
10588. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#TP_Q64_A3-p9.2
10589. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#TP_Q70_A2-p2.2
10590. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#TP_Q73_A5-p8.1
10591. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#TP_Q86_A4-p4.1
10592. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#TP_Q47_A3-p7.4
10593. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#TP_Q48_A6-p8.1
10594. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#TP_Q49_A1-p13.1
10595. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#TP_Q52_A7-p5.1
10596. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#TP_Q61_A3-p6.1
10597. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#TP_Q78_A3-p14.3
10598. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=27#FS_Q106_A1-p6.1
10599. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=27#SS_Q16_A1-p7.1
10600. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=27#FS_Q107_A1-p4.1
10601. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=27#FS_Q107_A3-p2.1
10602. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=3&scrV=30#FS_Q107_A1-p8.1
10603. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=0#FS_Q66_A2-p3.1
10604. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=2#FS_Q100_A12-p7.2
10605. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#FS_Q114_A5-p5.1
10606. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#FS_Q111_A1-p9.1
10607. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#FS_Q112_A2-p2.1
10608. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q19_A4-p4.1
10609. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q49_A6-p6.1
10610. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q69_A6-p4.1
10611. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#FS_Q113_A1-p7.1
10612. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#FS_Q113_A3-p6.1
10613. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#FS_Q113_A4-p9.1
10614. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q6_A3-p9.3
10615. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=6#FS_Q5_A7-p4.1
10616. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=7#TP_Q88_A1-p5.1
10617. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=8#TP_Q87_A4-p6.2
10618. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=9#FS_Q102_A5-p16.1
10619. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#TP_Q62_A6-p14.1
10620. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#TP_Q63_A1-p9.2
10621. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#TP_Q66_A7-p11.1
10622. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#TP_Q68_A1-p7.2
10623. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#TP_Q70_A3-p5.1
10624. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#TP_Q70_A4-p8.1
10625. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#TP_Q70_A4-p11.1
10626. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#FS_Q98_A6-p10.1
10627. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#TP_Q37_A2-p4.2
10628. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=15#FS_Q106_A2-p3.1
10629. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=17#FP_Q14_A9-p5.1
10630. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=17#FS_Q91_A1-p7.1
10631. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=18#FS_Q41_A3-p4.2
10632. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=25#TP_Q62_A5-p4.2
10633. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=25#XP_Q76_A1-p7.1
10634. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=25#TP_Q21_A3-p9.1
10635. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=25#TP_Q22_A2-p8.1
10636. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=25#TP_Q50_A6-p6.2
10637. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=25#TP_Q53_A1-p10.1
10638. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=25#TP_Q55_A1-p3.1
10639. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=25#TP_Q56_A2-p6.1
10640. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=4&scrV=25#TP_Q56_A2-p11.1
10641. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=0#TP_Q86_A4-p3.1
10642. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=0#TP_Q52_A5-p6.1
10643. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#SS_Q4_A5-p6.1
10644. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#FS_Q111_A4-p3.1
10645. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#FS_Q113_A4-p5.1
10646. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#FS_Q112_A3-p2.1
10647. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#TP_Q14_A1-p11.1
10648. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#FP_Q33_A3-p7.6
10649. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#SS_Q1_A8-p9.2
10650. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#SS_Q19_A12-p4.1
10651. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q8_A6-p9.1
10652. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q40_A1-p8.1
10653. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#XP_Q10_A4-p3.1
10654. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#XP_Q15_A2-p5.1
10655. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#TP_Q63_A3-p4.2
10656. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#SS_Q19_A6-p3.1
10657. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#FP_Q43_A3-p3.1
10658. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#FS_Q65_A2-p3.1
10659. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#FS_Q68_A5-p6.2
10660. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#FS_Q70_A3-p7.2
10661. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#SS_Q24_A2-p5.1
10662. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#FP_Q108_A4-p3.1
10663. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#FS_Q109_A3-p2.1
10664. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#FS_Q107_A1-p12.1
10665. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#FS_Q98_A1-p7.1
10666. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#SS_Q28_A1-p5.1
10667. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#SS_Q44_A1-p3.1
10668. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#SS_Q45_A6-p2.2
10669. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#SS_Q60_A1-p3.2
10670. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#SS_Q136_A3-p7.1
10671. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#SS_Q183_A4-p8.1
10672. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#TP_Q23_A3-p6.2
10673. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=8#TP_Q4_A5-p8.1
10674. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=8#TP_Q46_A3-p6.1
10675. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=8#TP_Q49_A1-p8.1
10676. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=10#TP_Q61_A1-p4.1
10677. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=10#XP_Q78_A2-p6.1
10678. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=10#TP_Q47_A2-p6.2
10679. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=10#TP_Q49_A4-p5.1
10680. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=11#FS_Q98_A1-p9.1
10681. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#TP_Q68_A9-p6.2
10682. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#TP_Q69_A3-p2.2
10683. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#TP_Q84_A2-p9.1
10684. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#FP_Q97_A1-p6.1
10685. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#FS_Q81_A1-p7.1
10686. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#FS_Q81_A3-p5.1
10687. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#FS_Q81_A5-p2.1
10688. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#FS_Q81_A5-p5.1
10689. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#FS_Q83_A1-p8.1
10690. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#FS_Q85_A5-p5.1
10691. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#SS_Q163_A1-p6.2
10692. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#SS_Q163_A3-p3.1
10693. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#SS_Q164_A1-p10.1
10694. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#TP_Q14_A1-p7.1
10695. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#TP_Q14_A3-p5.1
10696. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#TP_Q14_A3-p6.1
10697. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#TP_Q15_A1-p3.1
10698. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#TP_Q31_A1-p4.1
10699. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=14#TP_Q62_A5-p5.1
10700. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#TP_Q68_A11-p2.1
10701. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#TP_Q69_A3-p2.1
10702. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#AP1_Q1_A2-p14.1
10703. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#FS_Q81_A3-p4.1
10704. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#XP_Q75_A1-p8.1
10705. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#SS_Q137_A4-p3.1
10706. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#TP_Q8_A5-p2.1
10707. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#TP_Q52_A7-p3.1
10708. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#TP_Q69_A1-p7.1
10709. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#TP_Q1_A4-p6.2
10710. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=16#FP_Q100_A1-p3.1
10711. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#TP_Q68_A9-p6.1
10712. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=18#TP_Q66_A9-p12.1
10713. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=18#TP_Q68_A1-p6.1
10714. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=18#TP_Q19_A4-p5.1
10715. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#SS_Q105_A2-p4.1
10716. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#SS_Q163_A1-p2.1
10717. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#TP_Q47_A2-p6.1
10718. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#TP_Q89_A2-p4.2
10719. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#FS_Q109_A10-p4.1
10720. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#FS_Q98_A1-p3.2
10721. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#FS_Q106_A3-p8.1
10722. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#TP_Q1_A3-p12.2
10723. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#FP_Q100_A1-p3.2
10724. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=3#TP_Q61_A1-p12.1
10725. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=3#TP_Q66_A2-p2.1
10726. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=3#TP_Q66_A10-p11.2
10727. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=3#TP_Q69_A1-p6.1
10728. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=3#TP_Q39_A5-p12.1
10729. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=3#TP_Q66_A7-p3.1
10730. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=3#TP_Q66_A9-p10.1
10731. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=3#TP_Q68_A5-p6.1
10732. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=3#TP_Q72_A4-p4.1
10733. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=4#TP_Q66_A10-p13.1
10734. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=4#TP_Q68_A7-p6.1
10735. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=4#SS_Q147_A5-p6.2
10736. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=4#TP_Q49_A3-p8.1
10737. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=4#TP_Q51_A1-p6.5
10738. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=4#TP_Q51_A2-p7.1
10739. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=4#TP_Q53_A1-p9.1
10740. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=4#TP_Q55_A1-p7.1
10741. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=4#TP_Q56_A2-p7.1
10742. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=6#TP_Q69_A3-p5.1
10743. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=6#TP_Q69_A3-p7.1
10744. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=6#TP_Q69_A3-p9.1
10745. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=6#TP_Q69_A8-p8.1
10746. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=8#TP_Q69_A2-p6.3
10747. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=8#XP_Q75_A1-p9.1
10748. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=9#TP_Q76_A1-p8.2
10749. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=9#XP_Q77_A1-p8.1
10750. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=9#TP_Q22_A5-p3.2
10751. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=9#TP_Q53_A3-p7.1
10752. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=9#TP_Q54_A3-p7.2
10753. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=10#TP_Q66_A9-p10.2
10754. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=10#TP_Q50_A1-p6.4
10755. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=10#TP_Q55_A2-p6.2
10756. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=11#TP_Q69_A1-p6.2
10757. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=13#TP_Q79_A1-p13.2
10758. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=13#SS_Q25_A5-p7.1
10759. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=13#TP_Q8_A2-p6.2
10760. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=16#SS_Q183_A4-p7.1
10761. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=20#SS_Q183_A4-p6.2
10762. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=21#SS_Q14_A2-p9.1
10763. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=22#XP_Q96_A2-p8.1
10764. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=22#FS_Q3_A2-p2.1
10765. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=22#FS_Q70_A3-p2.2
10766. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=22#SS_Q183_A4-p6.3
10767. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=22#TP_Q60_A3-p4.1
10768. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#TP_Q69_A6-p7.1
10769. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#TP_Q73_A4-p8.1
10770. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#TP_Q86_A3-p13.1
10771. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#FP_Q12_A4-p5.1
10772. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#FP_Q62_A2-p5.1
10773. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#SS_Q24_A12-p7.1
10774. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#SS_Q24_A2-p6.2
10775. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#FS_Q109_A5-p5.1
10776. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#FS_Q109_A5-p8.1
10777. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#FS_Q98_A1-p7.2
10778. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#FS_Q114_A2-p5.1
10779. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#FS_Q114_A2-p6.5
10780. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#FS_Q114_A3-p3.1
10781. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#TP_Q7_A1-p3.2
10782. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#TP_Q49_A3-p4.1
10783. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#TP_Q52_A7-p6.2
10784. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=0#AP1_Q2_A4-p6.1
10785. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=0#FS_Q56_A4-p3.1
10786. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=0#FS_Q89_A5-p2.2
10787. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=0#FS_Q98_A1-p6.2
10788. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=2#XP_Q55_A2-p2.1
10789. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=2#XP_Q62_A5-p4.1
10790. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=2#XP_Q63_A1-p8.1
10791. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=2#XP_Q67_A4-p7.2
10792. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=3#XP_Q59_A4-p11.1
10793. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=4#SS_Q104_A6-p3.1
10794. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=5#FS_Q22_A1-p5.1
10795. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=5#FS_Q24_A2-p4.1
10796. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=5#FS_Q59_A5-p3.1
10797. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=5#FS_Q77_A7-p5.1
10798. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=5#FS_Q77_A8-p5.1
10799. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=5#FS_Q82_A3-p3.1
10800. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=5#SS_Q34_A5-p3.1
10801. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=5#TP_Q15_A4-p4.1
10802. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=7#FS_Q73_A6-p3.1
10803. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=7#SS_Q116_A1-p9.1
10804. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=7#SS_Q118_A2-p4.1
10805. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=7#FS_Q100_A4-p4.1
10806. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=8#FS_Q77_A4-p3.1
10807. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=8#FS_Q98_A1-p3.1
10808. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=8#SS_Q43_A1-p14.1
10809. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=8#TP_Q15_A2-p3.1
10810. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=12#FS_Q98_A1-p5.1
10811. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=12#FS_Q99_A4-p7.1
10812. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=12#XP_Q67_A3-p2.1
10813. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=15#FS_Q17_A7-p2.1
10814. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=15#FS_Q17_A7-p9.1
10815. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#FS_Q30_A1-p3.1
10816. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#FS_Q83_A1-p7.1
10817. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#FP_Q83_A1-p2.1
10818. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#FS_Q10_A3-p2.1
10819. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#FS_Q74_A3-p5.1
10820. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#FS_Q77_A7-p8.1
10821. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=23#TP_Q79_A6-p4.1
10822. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=23#FP_Q81_A3-p3.1
10823. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=23#FS_Q77_A2-p8.1
10824. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=23#FS_Q83_A1-p2.1
10825. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=23#FS_Q90_A1-p2.1
10826. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=23#FS_Q91_A6-p5.1
10827. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=23#SS_Q104_A6-p7.2
10828. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=23#TP_Q27_A3-p8.2
10829. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=24#SS_Q25_A5-p2.1
10830. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=24#SS_Q180_A7-p10.2
10831. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=25#FS_Q109_A8-p7.1
10832. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=25#FS_Q109_A9-p7.1
10833. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=7&scrV=25#TP_Q27_A3-p8.3
10834. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=1#FS_Q89_A5-p2.1
10835. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=2#FS_Q106_A1-p6.2
10836. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=2#FS_Q106_A4-p12.2
10837. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=2#FS_Q108_A1-p3.1
10838. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=2#FS_Q106_A3-p6.3
10839. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=2#XP_Q67_A1-p9.2
10840. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=2#TP_Q42_A4-p11.1
10841. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#FS_Q102_A5-p33.1
10842. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#FS_Q102_A6-p21.2
10843. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#TP_Q14_A2-p5.1
10844. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#TP_Q15_A1-p12.3
10845. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#TP_Q22_A4-p7.3
10846. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#TP_Q28_A2-p4.1
10847. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#FS_Q107_A2-p8.2
10848. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#FS_Q98_A6-p6.2
10849. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=6#SS_Q47_A13-p6.1
10850. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#FS_Q93_A3-p2.2
10851. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#FS_Q93_A6-p3.1
10852. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#SS_Q55_A1-p5.2
10853. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#SS_Q55_A2-p2.1
10854. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#SS_Q55_A2-p3.1
10855. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=9#SS_Q124_A5-p8.1
10856. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=9#TP_Q48_A4-p8.2
10857. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=10#TP_Q68_A1-p8.2
10858. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=10#TP_Q52_A5-p8.1
10859. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=10#TP_Q53_A3-p6.1
10860. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=11#TP_Q69_A3-p6.3
10861. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=11#FS_Q85_A5-p9.1
10862. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=11#XP_Q76_A1-p8.2
10863. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=11#TP_Q8_A2-p6.3
10864. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=11#TP_Q19_A3-p11.1
10865. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=11#TP_Q53_A4-p2.2
10866. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=11#TP_Q58_A4-p8.1
10867. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=13#FS_Q72_A2-p3.1
10868. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=14#XP_Q18_A4-p7.2
10869. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=14#FS_Q68_A2-p8.1
10870. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=14#FS_Q93_A6-p2.2
10871. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=14#FS_Q96_A5-p3.1
10872. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=14#SS_Q52_A1-p4.1
10873. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=15#SS_Q19_A2-p12.1
10874. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=15#SS_Q19_A4-p2.1
10875. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=15#SS_Q19_A4-p5.1
10876. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=15#SS_Q121_A1-p6.3
10877. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=15#SS_Q45_A6-p2.3
10878. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=15#TP_Q3_A5-p3.1
10879. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=15#TP_Q23_A2-p5.1
10880. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=15#TP_Q23_A3-p6.3
10881. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#FP_Q33_A3-p7.5
10882. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=17#TP_Q69_A3-p6.4
10883. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=17#TP_Q79_A2-p9.1
10884. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=17#FS_Q68_A2-p8.2
10885. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=17#FS_Q114_A3-p7.2
10886. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=17#TP_Q3_A8-p7.1
10887. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=17#TP_Q23_A1-p10.1
10888. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=17#TP_Q23_A3-p5.1
10889. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=17#TP_Q49_A3-p9.2
10890. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=18#FS_Q2_A3-p2.1
10891. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=18#FS_Q114_A3-p2.1
10892. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=18#SS_Q100_A1-p16.1
10893. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=19#XP_Q75_A3-p5.1
10894. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=21#XP_Q74_A7-p8.3
10895. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=21#XP_Q91_A3-p10.1
10896. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=22#XP_Q91_A2-p23.1
10897. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=22#XP_Q91_A4-p8.1
10898. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=22#XP_Q74_A4-p4.1
10899. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=23#TP_Q72_A2-p8.1
10900. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=23#SS_Q1_A7-p5.2
10901. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=23#FS_Q106_A4-p8.1
10902. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=23#XP_Q77_A2-p6.1
10903. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=24#SS_Q18_A2-p6.1
10904. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=24#FS_Q5_A3-p9.1
10905. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=24#FS_Q40_A3-p4.1
10906. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=24#FS_Q67_A4-p5.1
10907. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=24#FS_Q69_A1-p6.3
10908. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=24#TP_Q7_A4-p5.1
10909. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=25#FS_Q40_A2-p2.1
10910. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=25#SS_Q4_A1-p9.2
10911. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=26#FS_Q109_A9-p7.2
10912. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=26#SS_Q83_A5-p2.2
10913. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=26#SS_Q83_A10-p2.2
10914. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=26#TP_Q26_A1-p4.1
10915. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=27#TP_Q21_A4-p8.1
10916. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=28#TP_Q89_A2-p2.1
10917. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=28#XP_Q4_A1-p5.1
10918. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=28#FP_Q23_A7-p7.1
10919. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=28#FP_Q22_A2-p13.1
10920. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=28#FS_Q79_A4-p6.1
10921. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#FP_Q23_A6-p5.1
10922. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#FP_Q33_A3-p8.1
10923. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#FP_Q23_A5-p2.1
10924. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#FP_Q93_A4-p3.1
10925. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#FP_Q41_A3-p8.2
10926. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#SS_Q45_A6-p6.1
10927. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#TP_Q3_A5-p3.2
10928. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#TP_Q3_A8-p7.2
10929. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#TP_Q8_A1-p6.6
10930. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#TP_Q23_A1-p8.1
10931. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#TP_Q23_A2-p3.1
10932. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#TP_Q24_A3-p3.1
10933. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#TP_Q24_A3-p7.1
10934. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#TP_Q28_A3-p5.1
10935. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#TP_Q37_A3-p8.5
10936. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#TP_Q39_A8-p9.2
10937. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=29#TP_Q56_A1-p12.3
10938. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=30#FP_Q14_A8-p2.1
10939. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=30#FP_Q23_A1-p6.1
10940. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=30#FP_Q23_A2-p7.2
10941. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=30#FS_Q113_A1-p4.1
10942. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=30#FS_Q113_A1-p5.1
10943. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=32#FP_Q20_A4-p2.1
10944. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=32#TP_Q47_A3-p5.1
10945. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=32#TP_Q47_A3-p7.2
10946. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=33#TP_Q64_A1-p5.1
10947. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=33#FS_Q106_A2-p4.1
10948. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=34#TP_Q58_A3-p4.1
10949. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=35#SS_Q184_A1-p9.1
10950. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=38#SS_Q43_A5-p8.1
10951. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=8&scrV=38#SS_Q81_A8-p6.2
10952. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=2#FS_Q35_A2-p5.1
10953. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=3#SS_Q27_A8-p2.1
10954. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=3#SS_Q182_A2-p7.1
10955. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=4#FS_Q98_A4-p10.1
10956. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=4#TP_Q35_A8-p3.1
10957. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=5#TP_Q16_A2-p5.1
10958. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=5#TP_Q31_A3-p13.1
10959. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=5#TP_Q35_A4-p8.1
10960. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=11#SS_Q164_A1-p16.1
10961. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=11#FP_Q23_A5-p7.1
10962. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=13#XP_Q65_A5-p10.3
10963. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#FP_Q23_A5-p4.1
10964. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=15#TP_Q78_A3-p19.1
10965. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=15#FP_Q23_A5-p2.2
10966. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=16#FP_Q83_A1-p3.1
10967. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=16#FS_Q109_A2-p5.1
10968. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=16#FS_Q111_A2-p4.1
10969. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=16#FS_Q98_A1-p10.1
10970. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=16#TP_Q1_A5-p12.2
10971. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=18#FS_Q79_A3-p5.2
10972. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=19#FP_Q19_A8-p3.1
10973. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=19#FS_Q10_A4-p2.1
10974. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=22#FP_Q23_A5-p12.2
10975. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=9&scrV=30#TP_Q36_A6-p8.1
10976. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=4#TP_Q28_A4-p3.2
10977. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=8#TP_Q38_A6-p6.1
10978. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=10#TP_Q72_A9-p4.1
10979. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=10#XP_Q9_A3-p5.1
10980. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=10#XP_Q96_A6-p2.2
10981. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=10#SS_Q3_A2-p5.1
10982. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=10#SS_Q124_A3-p2.1
10983. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#TP_Q71_A1-p6.2
10984. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#SS_Q10_A1-p3.1
10985. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#SS_Q2_A5-p2.1
10986. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=15#SS_Q6_A1-p6.1
10987. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=15#TP_Q42_A1-p5.2
10988. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=16#FS_Q106_A2-p2.2
10989. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=16#FS_Q94_A4-p2.1
10990. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=17#TP_Q66_A3-p12.1
10991. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=17#SS_Q4_A8-p3.1
10992. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=17#SS_Q5_A1-p4.1
10993. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=17#SS_Q6_A1-p3.2
10994. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=17#SS_Q8_A6-p8.2
10995. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=17#FP_Q111_A1-p9.1
10996. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=17#SS_Q1_A4-p5.1
10997. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=17#TP_Q30_A1-p12.1
10998. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=17#TP_Q36_A2-p7.1
10999. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=10&scrV=17#TP_Q41_A2-p7.2
11000. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=0#SS_Q104_A4-p8.1
11001. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#FS_Q114_A5-p6.1
11002. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#FP_Q62_A6-p3.1
11003. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q177_A1-p4.1
11004. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#TP_Q59_A3-p4.2
11005. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=16#SS_Q78_A3-p2.1
11006. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=16#TP_Q27_A2-p5.1
11007. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=22#TP_Q47_A3-p7.1
11008. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=22#TP_Q47_A3-p7.3
11009. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=24#TP_Q44_A2-p7.1
11010. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=25#TP_Q36_A6-p3.1
11011. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#TP_Q68_A5-p5.1
11012. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#TP_Q68_A6-p5.1
11013. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#TP_Q68_A6-p9.1
11014. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#TP_Q69_A2-p5.1
11015. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#TP_Q88_A1-p6.1
11016. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#FP_Q23_A8-p7.2
11017. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#TP_Q50_A2-p6.1
11018. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=32#XP_Q99_A2-p3.1
11019. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=33#FP_Q14_A1-p5.1
11020. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=34#FP_Q23_A8-p3.1
11021. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=34#SS_Q52_A3-p4.2
11022. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=35#FP_Q21_A1-p7.1
11023. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=35#FS_Q114_A1-p4.1
11024. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=35#FS_Q114_A2-p9.1
11025. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=36#FP_Q44_A1-p5.1
11026. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
h=11&scrV=36#TP_Q32_A2-p2.1
11027. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrC
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11303. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11304. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=7#TP_Q73_A5-p8.2
11305. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=7#TP_Q74_A4-p8.6
11306. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11307. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=7#FS_Q102_A5-p20.1
11308. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=7#TP_Q46_A9-p2.1
11309. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=7#TP_Q66_A9-p17.1
11310. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=7#TP_Q73_A6-p5.1
11311. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11312. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=11#TP_Q80_A6-p7.1
11313. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=11#TP_Q82_A9-p7.1
11314. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=11#XP_Q23_A1-p4.1
11315. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=12#XP_Q22_A6-p2.1
11316. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=12#SS_Q12_A2-p7.1
11317. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=12#SS_Q10_A9-p3.1
11318. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=12#SS_Q10_A9-p6.2
11319. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=1#SS_Q10_A10-p5.1
11320. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=1#SS_Q55_A5-p2.1
11321. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=1#TP_Q34_A1-p3.1
11322. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=3#XP_Q89_A8-p2.1
11323. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=3#TP_Q59_A6-p5.1
11324. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11325. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=7#SS_Q43_A8-p5.2
11326. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=9#XP_Q99_A4-p5.1
11327. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=9#XP_Q99_A5-p6.1
11328. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=9#SS_Q83_A9-p10.1
11329. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=9#XP_Q65_A4-p6.1
11330. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11331. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=10#SS_Q76_A3-p5.1
11332. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=11#TP_Q62_A5-p4.1
11333. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=11#SS_Q99_A1-p8.1
11334. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=11#TP_Q27_A6-p9.2
11335. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=11#TP_Q60_A5-p6.1
11336. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=15#XP_Q62_A2-p4.2
11337. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=15#SS_Q154_A3-p4.1
11338. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=16#XP_Q55_A3-p5.1
11339. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=16#XP_Q62_A2-p4.1
11340. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=17#SS_Q27_A4-p3.1
11341. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=17#SS_Q45_A2-p8.1
11342. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=17#SS_Q154_A3-p9.1
11343. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=17#TP_Q3_A6-p7.1
11344. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=18#FS_Q72_A2-p5.1
11345. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=18#SS_Q118_A1-p3.2
11346. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=18#SS_Q118_A6-p4.1
11347. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=18#SS_Q35_A1-p13.1
11348. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=18#SS_Q154_A3-p3.1
11349. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=19#FP_Q27_A1-p6.2
11350. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=20#SS_Q153_A3-p9.1
11351. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=20#TP_Q46_A3-p6.5
11352. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=0#XP_Q67_A3-p7.1
11353. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=0#SS_Q152_A4-p6.1
11354. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=2#XP_Q49_A5-p3.1
11355. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=2#XP_Q64_A1-p7.1
11356. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=2#SS_Q154_A7-p4.1
11357. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=3#XP_Q41_A3-p9.1
11358. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=3#XP_Q41_A4-p7.1
11359. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=4#XP_Q45_A1-p6.1
11360. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=4#SS_Q65_A4-p9.1
11361. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=4#XP_Q64_A1-p6.1
11362. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=4#XP_Q64_A4-p5.1
11363. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=4#XP_Q64_A5-p6.1
11364. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=4#XP_Q64_A6-p7.1
11365. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=4#XP_Q65_A3-p6.1
11366. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=4#SS_Q170_A1-p8.1
11367. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=5#XP_Q53_A4-p4.1
11368. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=5#XP_Q61_A1-p5.1
11369. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=5#XP_Q64_A6-p6.1
11370. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=5#XP_Q64_A9-p4.1
11371. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=6#XP_Q49_A1-p6.1
11372. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=6#XP_Q49_A5-p3.2
11373. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=6#XP_Q50_A1-p4.1
11374. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=6#XP_Q50_A1-p22.1
11375. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=7#FS_Q66_A2-p2.1
11376. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=9#XP_Q42_A3-p14.1
11377. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=9#XP_Q42_A4-p5.1
11378. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=9#SS_Q154_A3-p2.1
11379. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=10#XP_Q62_A5-p6.1
11380. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=11#XP_Q62_A2-p6.1
11381. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=11#XP_Q62_A6-p7.1
11382. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11383. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=12#XP_Q59_A3-p7.1
11384. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=12#XP_Q59_A3-p9.1
11385. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=12#FS_Q92_A2-p10.1
11386. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=12#SS_Q187_A3-p7.2
11387. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=15#SS_Q10_A12-p2.2
11388. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=15#XP_Q59_A4-p7.1
11389. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=21#XP_Q39_A3-p3.1
11390. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=21#XP_Q59_A4-p2.1
11391. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11392. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=25#SS_Q152_A2-p5.1
11393. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=25#TP_Q28_A4-p3.1
11394. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=26#XP_Q96_A9-p2.1
11395. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=28#XP_Q41_A3-p8.1
11396. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=28#XP_Q49_A1-p8.1
11397. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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Ch=7&scrV=29#XP_Q41_A3-p2.1
11399. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=31#XP_Q41_A3-p11.1
11400. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=31#XP_Q74_A1-p6.1
11401. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=31#XP_Q74_A3-p5.1
11402. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=31#XP_Q74_A5-p6.1
11403. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=31#XP_Q75_A1-p15.1
11404. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=31#SS_Q188_A2-p9.3
11405. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=32#SS_Q186_A7-p7.1
11406. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=32#SS_Q188_A7-p3.1
11407. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=32#SS_Q186_A4-p6.1
11408. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=33#SS_Q88_A11-p11.1
11409. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=34#SS_Q88_A11-p8.1
11410. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=34#SS_Q152_A2-p6.2
11411. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=34#SS_Q152_A4-p6.2
11412. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11413. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=34#SS_Q186_A4-p5.2
11414. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=35#FS_Q108_A4-p11.3
11415. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=38#XP_Q41_A2-p6.1
11416. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=38#XP_Q61_A1-p3.1
11417. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=39#XP_Q58_A1-p10.2
11418. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=39#XP_Q61_A3-p6.1
11419. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=40#XP_Q63_A1-p3.1
11420. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=8&scrV=1#SS_Q38_A2-p4.1
11421. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11422. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11423. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=8&scrV=5#FP_Q11_A3-p2.1
11424. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=8&scrV=6#FP_Q103_A3-p5.1
11425. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11426. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11427. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11428. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11429. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11430. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11431. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=0#SS_Q188_A4-p5.1
11432. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=4#FS_Q108_A2-p12.1
11433. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=4#FS_Q102_A6-p30.1
11434. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=4#SS_Q87_A1-p12.3
11435. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=7#SS_Q71_A4-p9.1
11436. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=7#SS_Q87_A1-p8.2
11437. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=7#SS_Q100_A3-p7.1
11438. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=9#FP_Q22_A2-p6.1
11439. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=9#FP_Q103_A5-p3.1
11440. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=9#FS_Q102_A6-p9.1
11441. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=10#FS_Q40_A8-p5.1
11442. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=10#SS_Q17_A7-p4.1
11443. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=11#SS_Q87_A2-p7.1
11444. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=11#SS_Q187_A4-p10.1
11445. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=12#SS_Q43_A8-p6.1
11446. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=12#SS_Q87_A1-p15.1
11447. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=12#SS_Q185_A6-p9.1
11448. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=12#SS_Q187_A3-p16.2
11449. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=12#SS_Q187_A4-p6.3
11450. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=13#SS_Q86_A2-p6.3
11451. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=13#SS_Q100_A2-p9.1
11452. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=13#SS_Q187_A4-p10.2
11453. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=14#SS_Q100_A3-p3.2
11454. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=15#SS_Q185_A6-p9.2
11455. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=16#TP_Q64_A6-p4.1
11456. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=16#SS_Q58_A3-p8.1
11457. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=16#SS_Q81_A6-p4.1
11458. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=17#FS_Q97_A4-p5.1
11459. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=22#TP_Q40_A2-p6.2
11460. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=24#XP_Q95_A5-p5.1
11461. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=24#FS_Q4_A3-p5.1
11462. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=24#TP_Q15_A10-p6.1
11463. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=25#SS_Q184_A8-p20.1
11464. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=26#FP_Q12_A7-p2.2
11465. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=27#FS_Q63_A4-p6.4
11466. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=9&scrV=27#TP_Q41_A3-p9.2
11467. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=2#TP_Q66_A11-p9.2
11468. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=2#TP_Q70_A1-p3.1
11469. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=2#TP_Q73_A6-p3.1
11470. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=2#TP_Q80_A1-p9.2
11471. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=2#TP_Q72_A1-p3.1
11472. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=3#TP_Q83_A3-p20.1
11473. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=4#TP_Q70_A3-p8.3
11474. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=4#TP_Q74_A6-p7.1
11475. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=4#FP_Q43_A7-p12.1
11476. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=4#TP_Q39_A6-p9.1
11477. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=4#TP_Q60_A5-p2.4
11478. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=6#SS_Q96_A3-p4.1
11479. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=11#TP_Q70_A1-p6.2
11480. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=11#FS_Q103_A1-p7.4
11481. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=11#FS_Q104_A2-p6.1
11482. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=11#FS_Q102_A2-p5.1
11483. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=11#FS_Q102_A6-p14.2
11484. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=11#XP_Q88_A3-p4.1
11485. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=11#TP_Q27_A2-p6.1
11486. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=11#TP_Q60_A2-p3.2
11487. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=17#TP_Q67_A2-p6.2
11488. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=17#TP_Q73_A2-p5.1
11489. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=17#TP_Q73_A3-p7.2
11490. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=17#TP_Q74_A1-p10.1
11491. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=17#TP_Q80_A9-p10.2
11492. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=18#TP_Q82_A4-p6.2
11493. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=18#FS_Q102_A3-p9.1
11494. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=19#SS_Q94_A1-p4.2
11495. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=20#SS_Q90_A2-p4.1
11496. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=27#SS_Q10_A9-p2.1
11497. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=31#FS_Q88_A1-p3.1
11498. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=31#FS_Q100_A10-p3.1
11499. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=31#SS_Q69_A1-p5.1
11500. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=31#SS_Q81_A4-p3.1
11501. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=31#SS_Q83_A14-p6.1
11502. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=32#SS_Q3_A2-p4.1
11503. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=32#TP_Q42_A2-p2.1
11504. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=33#SS_Q115_A1-p2.2
11505. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=33#SS_Q47_A10-p6.2
11506. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=0#XP_Q39_A1-p6.1
11507. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=3#TP_Q67_A4-p7.1
11508. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=3#SS_Q32_A8-p10.1
11509. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=3#XP_Q62_A4-p5.1
11510. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=3#TP_Q8_A1-p3.1
11511. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=5#SS_Q177_A2-p3.4
11512. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=7#FP_Q35_A2-p4.1
11513. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=7#FP_Q93_A4-p2.1
11514. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=7#FP_Q93_A6-p2.1
11515. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=9#XP_Q44_A3-p9.2
11516. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=15#XP_Q28_A3-p2.1
11517. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=15#XP_Q40_A1-p6.1
11518. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=19#SS_Q11_A3-p3.1
11519. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=19#SS_Q43_A2-p10.1
11520. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=20#TP_Q74_A1-p9.1
11521. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=21#TP_Q77_A6-p5.1
11522. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=21#TP_Q80_A8-p9.3
11523. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=23#TP_Q78_A3-p25.3
11524. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=23#XP_Q29_A7-p8.1
11525. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=23#TP_Q25_A3-p5.1
11526. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=25#TP_Q76_A2-p5.1
11527. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=25#TP_Q78_A3-p25.2
11528. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=25#TP_Q80_A8-p2.2
11529. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=26#TP_Q73_A3-p4.1
11530. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=26#TP_Q78_A3-p8.1
11531. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=26#SS_Q40_A2-p8.2
11532. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=27#TP_Q80_A5-p2.1
11533. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=27#SS_Q93_A1-p7.1
11534. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=28#TP_Q80_A4-p14.1
11535. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=28#TP_Q80_A9-p2.1
11536. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=29#TP_Q79_A3-p5.1
11537. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=29#TP_Q80_A1-p5.1
11538. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=29#TP_Q80_A4-p7.1
11539. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=29#TP_Q80_A5-p11.2
11540. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=29#XP_Q99_A4-p9.1
11541. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=29#SS_Q89_A2-p6.1
11542. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=33#TP_Q80_A8-p3.1
11543. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=34#TP_Q64_A2-p7.1
11544. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=11&scrV=34#TP_Q72_A4-p7.1
11545. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=0#XP_Q37_A2-p7.1
11546. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=0#SS_Q87_A1-p8.4
11547. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=0#SS_Q171_A3-p3.1
11548. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=0#TP_Q8_A1-p6.2
11549. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=2#SS_Q172_A3-p5.1
11550. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=3#XP_Q96_A6-p11.1
11551. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=3#FS_Q109_A1-p2.1
11552. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=3#SS_Q172_A6-p2.1
11553. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#TP_Q63_A3-p8.1
11554. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#TP_Q72_A2-p11.2
11555. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#XP_Q35_A1-p3.1
11556. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#XP_Q37_A2-p7.2
11557. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#SS_Q171-p3.1
11558. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#SS_Q171-p3.3
11559. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#SS_Q172_A2-p3.1
11560. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#SS_Q178_A1-p3.1
11561. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#SS_Q185_A3-p11.1
11562. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#TP_Q6_A6-p4.1
11563. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#TP_Q7_A7-p2.2
11564. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#TP_Q32_A1-p7.1
11565. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=5#SS_Q171-p3.7
11566. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#SS_Q1_A7-p11.1
11567. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#FP_Q43_A3-p13.1
11568. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#FP_Q43_A7-p16.1
11569. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#FP_Q104_A4-p6.2
11570. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#FS_Q111_A1-p7.1
11571. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#SS_Q63_A2-p7.2
11572. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#SS_Q171-p3.2
11573. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#SS_Q171-p3.4
11574. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#SS_Q171_A1-p8.1
11575. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#SS_Q172_A4-p7.2
11576. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#SS_Q176_A1-p7.1
11577. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#TP_Q27_A6-p8.1
11578. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11579. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11580. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=8#SS_Q45_A5-p7.1
11581. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=8#SS_Q96_A1-p6.4
11582. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11583. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#XP_Q31_A1-p7.1
11584. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#SS_Q4_A5-p5.1
11585. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#FS_Q111_A4-p6.2
11586. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#SS_Q178_A1-p7.1
11587. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=10#FS_Q111_A4-p6.3
11588. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=10#SS_Q176_A2-p5.1
11589. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=10#SS_Q178_A1-p4.2
11590. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=11#FP_Q43_A5-p2.1
11591. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=11#SS_Q24_A3-p5.2
11592. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=11#SS_Q96_A1-p6.5
11593. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=12#XP_Q37_A1-p5.2
11594. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=17#SS_Q183_A2-p8.1
11595. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11596. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=23#SS_Q145_A4-p9.1
11597. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=23#SS_Q169_A2-p11.1
11598. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=23#SS_Q145_A2-p5.1
11599. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11600. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=27#XP_Q37_A1-p5.3
11601. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=27#XP_Q95_A3-p5.1
11602. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=28#SS_Q178_A1-p4.3
11603. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=28#SS_Q184_A6-p10.1
11604. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=31#SS_Q24_A4-p6.1
11605. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=31#FS_Q111_A5-p5.1
11606. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=31#SS_Q43_A7-p13.1
11607. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=31#SS_Q161_A2-p3.1
11608. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=31#SS_Q182_A1-p4.1
11609. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=0#TP_Q83_A5-p8.1
11610. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=0#FS_Q3_A4-p5.1
11611. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=0#SS_Q17_A5-p6.1
11612. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=0#SS_Q172_A4-p7.1
11613. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=1#FP_Q107_A1-p5.1
11614. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=1#FP_Q107_A2-p2.1
11615. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=2#XP_Q14_A4-p6.1
11616. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=2#FP_Q82_A3-p4.1
11617. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=2#FP_Q43_A5-p3.1
11618. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=2#SS_Q6_A2-p5.1
11619. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=2#FS_Q87_A4-p7.2
11620. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=2#SS_Q178_A1-p6.1
11621. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=2#SS_Q178_A2-p6.1
11622. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=3#TP_Q66_A12-p3.1
11623. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=3#TP_Q89_A6-p5.1
11624. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=3#XP_Q14_A2-p7.1
11625. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=3#XP_Q99_A5-p8.1
11626. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=3#FS_Q114_A4-p9.2
11627. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=3#SS_Q23_A7-p5.1
11628. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=3#SS_Q124_A2-p3.2
11629. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=3#FS_Q100_A10-p2.2
11630. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=3#SS_Q32_A1-p2.1
11631. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=3#SS_Q32_A10-p7.1
11632. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#FS_Q65_A3-p2.1
11633. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#FS_Q68_A8-p11.1
11634. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#SS_Q23_A4-p3.1
11635. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#SS_Q25_A8-p4.1
11636. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#SS_Q28_A2-p2.1
11637. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#SS_Q31_A2-p4.1
11638. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#SS_Q136_A3-p6.1
11639. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#SS_Q186_A7-p10.2
11640. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=5#SS_Q131_A1-p5.1
11641. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=5#SS_Q26_A4-p4.1
11642. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=5#SS_Q47_A10-p6.1
11643. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=6#TP_Q85_A2-p2.1
11644. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=6#FS_Q32_A5-p6.2
11645. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=6#SS_Q28_A2-p2.2
11646. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=8#FP_Q89_A5-p2.1
11647. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=8#FS_Q67_A6-p5.1
11648. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=8#XP_Q71_A2-p8.1
11649. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=8#SS_Q171_A4-p9.1
11650. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=8#SS_Q173_A1-p5.1
11651. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=8#SS_Q180_A8-p2.1
11652. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11653. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11654. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=10#FP_Q58_A7-p4.1
11655. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=10#FP_Q62_A7-p2.1
11656. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=10#FS_Q67_A6-p2.1
11657. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=10#SS_Q4_A4-p2.1
11658. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=10#FS_Q106_A4-p2.1
11659. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=10#SS_Q173_A1-p6.3
11660. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11661. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=10#TP_Q9_A3-p2.1
11662. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11663. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11664. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=12#TP_Q61_A4-p7.1
11665. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=12#XP_Q92_A1-p17.1
11666. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11667. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=12#FP_Q12_A11-p2.2
11668. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=12#FP_Q56_A3-p4.1
11669. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=12#SS_Q4_A2-p5.1
11670. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=12#SS_Q1_A2-p4.1
11671. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11672. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11673. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11674. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11675. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11676. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11677. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11678. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=12#SS_Q180_A7-p4.1
11679. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=12#TP_Q9_A3-p2.1
11680. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11681. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11682. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11683. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11684. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11685. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11686. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11687. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11688. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11689. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11690. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11691. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11692. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11693. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11694. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11695. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11697. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11699. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11700. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11701. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11702. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11704. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11705. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11707. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11708. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11709. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11710. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11711. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11712. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=14&scrV=31#FP_Q106_A3-p2.2
11713. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
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11714. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=14&scrV=34#XP_Q19_A3-p5.1
11715. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=14&scrV=34#XP_Q39_A1-p5.2
11716. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=14&scrV=34#SS_Q177_A2-p5.1
11717. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=14&scrV=34#TP_Q55_A1-p4.2
11718. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=14&scrV=34#TP_Q30_A2-p3.1
11719. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=14&scrV=35#TP_Q67_A4-p2.1
11720. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=14&scrV=38#FS_Q6_A8-p2.1
11721. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=14&scrV=38#FS_Q76_A2-p7.1
11722. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=14&scrV=40#SS_Q43_A6-p6.1
11723. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=14&scrV=40#SS_Q145_A1-p4.1
11724. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=0#FP_Q1_A8-p5.1
11725. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=0#XP_Q75_A1-p4.1
11726. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=0#TP_Q54_A2-p4.1
11727. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=6#TP_Q55_A3-p12.1
11728. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=6#TP_Q55_A3-p10.1
11729. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=9#TP_Q84_A8-p9.2
11730. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=10#TP_Q72_A7-p7.2
11731. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=10#TP_Q7_A1-p3.1
11732. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=12#XP_Q75_A2-p4.1
11733. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=12#TP_Q50_A1-p6.5
11734. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=12#TP_Q53_A1-p8.1
11735. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=12#TP_Q56_A1-p6.1
11736. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=14#XP_Q25_A2-p8.1
11737. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=14#TP_Q53_A1-p7.2
11738. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=19#TP_Q69_A3-p8.1
11739. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=20#XP_Q76_A1-p6.1
11740. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=20#XP_Q77_A1-p11.2
11741. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=20#TP_Q53_A3-p5.1
11742. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=20#TP_Q56_A1-p12.1
11743. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=20#TP_Q56_A1-p7.2
11744. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=22#XP_Q78_A1-p7.1
11745. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=22#TP_Q8_A2-p9.1
11746. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=23#TP_Q56_A1-p12.1
11747. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=24#XP_Q89_A4-p2.1
11748. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=24#XP_Q92_A1-p20.1
11749. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=24#XP_Q92_A3-p13.1
11750. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=24#FP_Q108_A7-p2.1
11751. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=24#FP_Q109_A2-p5.1
11752. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=24#FS_Q93_A4-p3.1
11753. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=24#XP_Q81_A3-p3.1
11754. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=25#XP_Q90_A1-p12.1
11755. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=28#XP_Q92_A2-p8.1
11756. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=28#FP_Q42_A4-p2.2
11757. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=28#FS_Q68_A6-p6.1
11758. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=28#FS_Q93_A4-p3.1
11759. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=28#SS_Q26_A13-p4.1
11760. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=28#SS_Q44_A6-p6.1
11761. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=28#TP_Q20_A1-p4.1
11762. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=28#TP_Q58_A3-p3.1
11763. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=29#XP_Q71_A9-p5.1
11764. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=36#XP_Q75_A3-p3.1
11765. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=36#XP_Q78_A1-p6.1
11766. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=37#XP_Q79_A1-p2.1
11767. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=41#XP_Q96_A3-p2.1
11768. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=41#FP_Q12_A6-p5.2
11769. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=41#FP_Q26_A3-p4.1
11770. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=41#XP_Q82_A2-p6.1
11771. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=41#XP_Q85_A1-p8.2
11772. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=41#TP_Q5_A2-p2.1
11773. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=42#XP_Q82_A1-p7.1
11774. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=42#XP_Q82_A2-p2.1
11775. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=42#TP_Q15_A10-p6.4
11776. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=43#XP_Q74_A7-p8.2
11777. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=43#XP_Q82_A1-p8.1
11778. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=43#XP_Q84_A1-p6.1
11779. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=43#XP_Q85_A1-p7.1
11780. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=43#TP_Q54_A2-p6.1
11781. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=43#TP_Q55_A6-p14.1
11782. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=44#FP_Q97_A3-p8.1
11783. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=44#XP_Q83_A1-p5.1
11784. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=44#XP_Q83_A1-p8.1
11785. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=44#XP_Q84_A1-p7.1
11786. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=44#TP_Q54_A1-p8.2
11787. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=45#FP_Q91_A4-p11.2
11788. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=45#FP_Q95_A1-p2.1
11789. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=46#TP_Q65_A2-p2.1
11790. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=46#FP_Q94_A1-p5.1
11791. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=46#FS_Q106_A3-p5.1
11792. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=46#TP_Q27_A1-p2.1
11793. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=46#TP_Q34_A1-p2.1
11794. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=46#TP_Q1_A5-p8.1
11795. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=47#TP_Q31_A1-p2.1
11796. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=48#XP_Q82_A1-p10.1
11797. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=48#SS_Q183_A1-p3.1
11798. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=50#XP_Q74_A1-p7.1
11799. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=50#XP_Q80_A3-p2.1
11800. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=50#TP_Q5_A2-p3.1
11801. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=50#TP_Q54_A3-p2.1
11802. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=51#XP_Q75_A2-p8.1
11803. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=51#XP_Q78_A2-p5.1
11804. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=51#TP_Q56_A2-p4.1
11805. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=51#XP_Q77_A4-p6.1
11806. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=52#XP_Q91_A2-p12.2
11807. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=52#XP_Q76_A2-p7.5
11808. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=52#XP_Q86_A1-p5.1
11809. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=52#XP_Q86_A3-p6.1
11810. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=52#TP_Q54_A4-p2.1
11811. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=53#XP_Q91_A5-p10.1
11812. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=54#TP_Q69_A3-p6.1
11813. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=54#TP_Q50_A6-p6.3
11814. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=56#FS_Q55_A3-p2.1
11815. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=15&scrV=57#TP_Q46_A3-p6.6
11816. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=16&scrV=5#SS_Q89_A7-p2.2
11817. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=16&scrV=14#SS_Q23_A4-p3.2
11818. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=16&scrV=14#SS_Q24_A1-p4.1
11819. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=16&scrV=33#SS_Q29_A1-p4.1
11820. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=23&scrV=4#SS_Q25_A4-p4.1
11821. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scr
Ch=113&scrV=10#SS_Q171_A4-p9.2
11822. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=1&scrV=0#SS_Q110_A3-p15.1
11823. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=1&scrV=6#TP_Q48_A5-p9.1
11824. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=1&scrV=7#SS_Q45_A5-p8.1
11825. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=1&scrV=11#SS_Q83_A7-p10.2
11826. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=1&scrV=12#SS_Q45_A4-p2.1
11827. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=1&scrV=12#SS_Q75_A1-p8.1
11828. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=1&scrV=15#SS_Q89_A7-p2.1
11829. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=1&scrV=20#FS_Q107_A2-p8.3
11830. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=1&scrV=21#TP_Q63_A1-p5.1
11831. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=1&scrV=22#FS_Q114_A3-p10.1
11832. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=1&scrV=23#SS_Q89_A6-p7.1
11833. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q84_A9-p4.1
11834. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q84_A9-p10.1
11835. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#SS_Q20_A4-p10.1
11836. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#FS_Q37_A2-p4.1
11837. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#SS_Q35_A1-p8.1
11838. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=10#TP_Q64_A2-p4.1
11839. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=10#XP_Q25_A1-p6.1
11840. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=10#FS_Q100_A8-p3.1
11841. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=10#SS_Q88_A12-p6.2
11842. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=10#TP_Q8_A6-p6.2
11843. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=10#TP_Q22_A4-p6.3
11844. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=14#TP_Q83_A5-p17.2
11845. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=2&scrV=15#TP_Q72_A2-p7.3
11846. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=3&scrV=0#XP_Q37_A1-p6.1
11847. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=3&scrV=0#SS_Q174_A4-p9.1
11848. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=3&scrV=2#TP_Q72_A11-p6.2
11849. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=3&scrV=3#FS_Q106_A2-p9.1
11850. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=3&scrV=3#TP_Q42_A4-p11.2
11851. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=3&scrV=4#SS_Q129_A6-p2.1
11852. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=3&scrV=5#FP_Q23_A5-p8.1
11853. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11858. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11859. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11860. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11861. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11862. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11863. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11864. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11865. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11866. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11867. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11868. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11869. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11870. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11875. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=4&scrV=13#TP_Q70_A1-p6.1
11876. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11877. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=4&scrV=13#TP_Q6_A3-p9.2
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11879. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11880. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11881. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11882. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11883. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11884. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11885. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=1#XP_Q69_A2-p6.1
11886. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11887. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=4#XP_Q78_A1-p3.1
11888. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=6#XP_Q95_A1-p14.1
11889. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=6#FS_Q4_A5-p9.2
11890. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=6#SS_Q28_A1-p2.1
11891. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11892. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11893. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11894. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=6#SS_Q175_A5-p2.1
11895. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=6#TP_Q8_A4-p3.2
11896. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=8#TP_Q59_A5-p9.1
11897. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=10#XP_Q89_A6-p5.1
11898. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=10#XP_Q71_A2-p2.1
11899. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=10#XP_Q87_A1-p7.2
11900. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=10#XP_Q88_A1-p8.1
11901. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=14#TP_Q79_A1-p12.2
11902. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=16#TP_Q57_A6-p7.1
11903. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=19#TP_Q3_A8-p10.1
11904. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=19#TP_Q26_A1-p6.1
11905. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=20#TP_Q8_A6-p6.3
11906. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=21#TP_Q15_A1-p5.1
11907. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=21#TP_Q15_A3-p3.1
11908. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=5&scrV=21#TP_Q46_A4-p16.1
11909. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11910. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11911. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=5#TP_Q41_A3-p6.2
11912. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11913. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11914. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11915. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=5#SS_Q187_A3-p8.4
11916. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11917. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11918. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=11#FS_Q33_A1-p2.1
11919. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=14#TP_Q68_A4-p7.2
11920. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=14#XP_Q59_A1-p7.1
11921. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=14#FP_Q8_A1-p5.1
11922. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=14#FP_Q64_A1-p6.2
11923. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11924. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11925. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11926. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11927. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11928. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11929. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=6&scrV=15#TP_Q27_A4-p6.4
11930. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11931. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11932. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11933. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11934. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11935. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11936. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11937. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11938. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11939. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11940. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11941. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11942. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11943. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11944. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=7&scrV=10#TP_Q46_A6-p15.2
11945. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11946. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11947. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11948. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11949. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11950. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11951. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11952. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11953. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11954. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11955. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11956. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11957. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11958. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11959. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11960. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11961. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11962. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11963. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11964. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11965. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11966. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=10&scrV=8#XP_Q25_A1-p5.1
11967. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11968. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11969. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11970. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11971. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11972. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11973. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11974. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11975. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11976. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11977. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11978. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11979. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11980. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11981. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11982. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11983. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11984. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11985. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11986. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11987. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11988. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11989. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
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11990. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=4#SS_Q175_A4-p4.1
11991. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=6#SS_Q112_A1-p6.1
11992. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=6#SS_Q109_A4-p6.1
11993. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=7#XP_Q96_A5-p13.1
11994. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#TP_Q61_A1-p3.1
11995. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#TP_Q72_A7-p7.1
11996. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#FS_Q55_A3-p4.1
11997. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#SS_Q123_A1-p2.1
11998. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#FS_Q111_A3-p3.1
11999. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#FS_Q112_A5-p8.1
12000. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#TP_Q7_A2-p2.1
12001. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=9#TP_Q27_A3-p3.1
12002. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=10#FS_Q13_A3-p6.1
12003. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=13#SS_Q187_A3-p16.4
12004. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=14#XP_Q49_A2-p10.1
12005. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=14#XP_Q57_A1-p3.1
12006. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=14#SS_Q26_A9-p2.1
12007. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=14#SS_Q31_A3-p5.2
12008. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=14#SS_Q101_A2-p3.1
12009. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=14#XP_Q67_A1-p8.1
12010. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=15#SS_Q184_A2-p11.2
12011. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=16#SS_Q55_A4-p2.1
12012. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=20#SS_Q42_A1-p5.1
12013. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=20#SS_Q42_A1-p6.1
12014. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=20#SS_Q42_A2-p5.1
12015. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=21#TP_Q84_A2-p5.1
12016. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=21#SS_Q153_A4-p2.2
12017. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=21#SS_Q154_A1-p6.1
12018. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=12&scrV=21#SS_Q154_A11-p5.1
12019. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=3#SS_Q76_A1-p2.1
12020. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#TP_Q43_A1-p10.1
12021. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#TP_Q44_A2-p4.1
12022. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#TP_Q48_A6-p2.2
12023. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#TP_Q53_A1-p7.1
12024. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=4#TP_Q53_A4-p6.2
12025. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=11#SS_Q183_A2-p4.2
12026. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scr
Ch=13&scrV=13#TP_Q63_A3-p4.3
12027. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=1&scrV=8#XP_Q22_A4-p2.2
12028. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=1&scrV=10#SS_Q115_A1-p7.6
12029. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=1&scrV=15#FS_Q63_A3-p4.2
12030. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#FS_Q63_A3-p4.2
12031. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=1&scrV=19#TP_Q28_A3-p21.1
12032. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=0#FS_Q103_A2-p5.1
12033. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=11#FS_Q103_A4-p10.1
12034. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=11#SS_Q33_A4-p3.1
12035. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=11#SS_Q33_A4-p9.2
12036. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=11#SS_Q111_A1-p3.1
12037. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=12#FS_Q103_A4-p3.1
12038. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#SS_Q43_A6-p3.1
12039. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#SS_Q93_A1-p5.1
12040. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=15#SS_Q161_A3-p6.4
12041. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=15#TP_Q4_A6-p4.1
12042. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#TP_Q69_A5-p6.1
12043. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#SS_Q156_A2-p4.1
12044. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#TP_Q1_A4-p4.1
12045. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#TP_Q47_A2-p7.4
12046. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=21#TP_Q62_A6-p6.1
12047. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=21#TP_Q70_A4-p2.1
12048. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=2&scrV=21#FS_Q109_A7-p5.1
12049. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=1#FP_Q117_A3-p3.1
12050. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=1#SS_Q72_A2-p3.1
12051. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q8_A1-p7.1
12052. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#TP_Q43_A1-p7.1
12053. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=12#FS_Q100_A12-p10.1
12054. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=13#TP_Q46_A4-p16.2
12055. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=13#TP_Q48_A4-p5.2
12056. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=13#TP_Q48_A5-p5.1
12057. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=16#FS_Q98_A4-p8.1
12058. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=16#FS_Q98_A6-p3.1
12059. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=16#TP_Q31_A2-p6.3
12060. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#FS_Q98_A3-p5.1
12061. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#FS_Q98_A6-p5.1
12062. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#XP_Q65_A2-p7.1
12063. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#TP_Q1_A5-p7.1
12064. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#TP_Q28_A3-p18.1
12065. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=20#TP_Q26_A1-p12.2
12066. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=21#FS_Q109_A7-p5.2
12067. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=23#TP_Q66_A10-p4.1
12068. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=23#FS_Q98_A2-p7.3
12069. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#SS_Q1_A7-p10.1
12070. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#FS_Q104_A3-p7.2
12071. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#FS_Q107_A1-p8.2
12072. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#FS_Q98_A2-p8.1
12073. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#FS_Q99_A6-p6.2
12074. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#FS_Q91_A5-p6.2
12075. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=24#FS_Q106_A3-p7.1
12076. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#FS_Q98_A2-p9.1
12077. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=26#XP_Q52_A2-p7.1
12078. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=27#TP_Q62_A1-p6.1
12079. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=27#TP_Q68_A1-p6.2
12080. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=27#TP_Q68_A4-p7.1
12081. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=27#TP_Q69_A9-p2.1
12082. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=27#TP_Q19_A4-p9.1
12083. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=28#TP_Q67_A4-p6.3
12084. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=28#TP_Q70_A2-p5.2
12085. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=28#TP_Q72_A10-p10.2
12086. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=28#TP_Q82_A2-p8.1
12087. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=28#XP_Q13_A2-p9.1
12088. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=28#XP_Q52_A2-p7.2
12089. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=28#XP_Q57_A1-p14.1
12090. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=28#FP_Q93_A6-p10.2
12091. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=3&scrV=28#TP_Q36_A3-p8.2
12092. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=3#TP_Q61_A4-p3.2
12093. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#SS_Q1_A7-p12.1
12094. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#FP_Q73_A1-p2.2
12095. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#FP_Q43_A2-p5.1
12096. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#FS_Q107_A2-p9.1
12097. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q1_A5-p5.1
12098. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q1_A5-p9.1
12099. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q23_A2-p4.1
12100. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q28_A1-p4.1
12101. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q31_A4-p5.1
12102. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q32_A1-p3.1
12103. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q35_A8-p5.1
12104. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q37_A1-p6.2
12105. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q37_A3-p7.2
12106. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=4#TP_Q40_A4-p7.1
12107. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q4_A5-p4.1
12108. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q23_A2-p4.2
12109. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=6#TP_Q3_A5-p8.1
12110. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=6#TP_Q23_A2-p4.3
12111. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=6#TP_Q32_A1-p8.1
12112. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=6#TP_Q32_A1-p9.1
12113. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=8#FP_Q13_A9-p7.3
12114. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=9#TP_Q61_A4-p8.1
12115. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=9#TP_Q62_A6-p5.1
12116. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=9#FS_Q103_A2-p7.3
12117. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=9#SS_Q94_A3-p6.1
12118. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=14#SS_Q81_A1-p13.1
12119. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=14#SS_Q104_A5-p3.2
12120. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=16#FS_Q29_A5-p5.1
12121. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=18#FS_Q28_A1-p2.1
12122. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=19#TP_Q30_A1-p4.1
12123. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=22#XP_Q65_A5-p10.2
12124. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=4&scrV=26#FP_Q106_A3-p2.1
12125. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=0#FS_Q70_A1-p0.2
12126. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#SS_Q10_A11-p3.1
12127. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#FS_Q103_A4-p5.1
12128. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#FS_Q107_A2-p2.1
12129. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q37_A1-p3.2
12130. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#TP_Q62_A6-p4.1
12131. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#TP_Q70_A2-p3.1
12132. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#TP_Q70_A4-p2.2
12133. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#TP_Q37-p2.1
12134. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#TP_Q40_A4-p6.1
12135. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#TP_Q68_A2-p3.1
12136. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#TP_Q68_A4-p10.1
12137. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#XP_Q99_A4-p8.2
12138. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#FS_Q114_A4-p9.1
12139. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#SS_Q23_A6-p3.1
12140. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#SS_Q3_A1-p4.1
12141. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#SS_Q4_A2-p4.1
12142. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#SS_Q8_A3-p6.2
12143. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#FS_Q108_A2-p2.1
12144. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#FS_Q100_A1-p4.1
12145. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#SS_Q9_A3-p6.2
12146. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=7#FP_Q95_A2-p2.1
12147. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=9#SS_Q11_A3-p7.1
12148. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=10#FS_Q42_A3-p4.1
12149. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=13#SS_Q81_A1-p4.1
12150. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=13#SS_Q147_A3-p10.1
12151. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=13#SS_Q184_A4-p7.1
12152. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#XP_Q96_A5-p11.1
12153. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#FS_Q70_A4-p5.1
12154. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#FS_Q77_A7-p2.1
12155. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#SS_Q29_A1-p7.1
12156. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#SS_Q147_A3-p8.2
12157. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#SS_Q189_A10-p9.1
12158. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#TP_Q15_A2-p4.1
12159. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#TP_Q18_A6-p3.1
12160. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=18#FS_Q93_A6-p2.1
12161. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#FS_Q70_A4-p2.1
12162. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#FS_Q72_A2-p2.1
12163. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#SS_Q11_A1-p2.1
12164. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#SS_Q11_A1-p4.1
12165. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#SS_Q153_A1-p7.1
12166. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#SS_Q153_A3-p6.1
12167. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#SS_Q154_A1-p7.1
12168. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#SS_Q11_A2-p3.1
12169. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#SS_Q29_A4-p4.1
12170. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#SS_Q37_A1-p5.1
12171. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#SS_Q38_A1-p6.2
12172. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#SS_Q41_A1-p5.1
12173. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#SS_Q41_A1-p6.1
12174. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#FS_Q89_A2-p7.1
12175. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#SS_Q37_A1-p5.2
12176. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#SS_Q38_A1-p6.3
12177. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#SS_Q154_A2-p9.1
12178. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#XP_Q96_A4-p2.1
12179. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#FS_Q11_A3-p3.1
12180. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#SS_Q123_A8-p3.1
12181. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#SS_Q8_A8-p5.1
12182. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#SS_Q28_A4-p6.3
12183. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#SS_Q136_A1-p4.2
12184. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#FS_Q70_A1-p2.1
12185. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#FS_Q70_A3-p2.1
12186. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#FS_Q70_A3-p13.1
12187. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#FS_Q70_A4-p7.1
12188. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=22#SS_Q52_A4-p4.1
12189. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=23#SS_Q4_A5-p5.2
12190. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=23#SS_Q151_A1-p5.1
12191. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=23#SS_Q155_A1-p4.1
12192. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=23#SS_Q155_A1-p6.1
12193. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=23#SS_Q157_A2-p4.2
12194. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=24#SS_Q124_A5-p8.2
12195. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=24#SS_Q147_A7-p7.2
12196. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=26#SS_Q36_A2-p6.1
12197. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=5&scrV=26#SS_Q44_A3-p9.3
12198. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=2#XP_Q13_A2-p6.1
12199. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=2#XP_Q27_A2-p6.1
12200. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=2#SS_Q32_A2-p10.2
12201. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=2#SS_Q33_A1-p4.1
12202. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=2#SS_Q187_A2-p6.2
12203. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=8#XP_Q71_A1-p2.1
12204. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=10#SS_Q31_A2-p5.1
12205. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=10#SS_Q44_A3-p8.5
12206. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=10#SS_Q44_A8-p8.2
12207. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=15#FS_Q110_A2-p4.1
12208. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=15#FS_Q112_A2-p4.1
12209. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=15#TP_Q3_A8-p3.1
12210. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrC
h=6&scrV=22#XP_Q96_A2-p7.1
12211. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#FP_Q23_A4-p5.1
12212. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q18_A4-p7.1
12213. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#FS_Q110_A1-p8.1
12214. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q23_A1-p5.1
12215. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q24_A1-p2.1
12216. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q24_A4-p5.1
12217. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q7_A11-p6.3
12218. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=6#FS_Q111_A1-p5.1
12219. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=10#TP_Q13_A2-p7.1
12220. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=11#FP_Q19_A3-p8.1
12221. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=11#FP_Q21_A1-p3.1
12222. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=11#FP_Q22_A1-p7.3
12223. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=11#FS_Q14_A1-p3.2
12224. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=11#TP_Q24_A4-p3.1
12225. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#FP_Q12_A3-p7.1
12226. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#FS_Q67_A5-p3.1
12227. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=18#XP_Q92_A2-p17.1
12228. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=18#XP_Q96_A7-p5.1
12229. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FP_Q108_A2-p5.1
12230. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FP_Q108_A6-p7.1
12231. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#TP_Q10_A4-p5.1
12232. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#TP_Q8_A4-p6.1
12233. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=21#FP_Q108_A5-p8.3
12234. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=21#TP_Q57_A5-p5.1
12235. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=22#TP_Q8_A1-p5.1
12236. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=22#TP_Q8_A7-p2.1
12237. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=22#XP_Q37_A1-p5.4
12238. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=23#TP_Q8_A3-p2.1
12239. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=1&scrV=23#TP_Q8_A4-p3.1
12240. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=1#FS_Q72_A6-p2.1
12241. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=2#SS_Q14_A3-p9.1
12242. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=3#FS_Q81_A1-p11.1
12243. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=3#TP_Q2_A12-p6.1
12244. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#TP_Q46_A1-p10.3
12245. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#TP_Q58_A4-p2.1
12246. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#TP_Q87_A2-p2.1
12247. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#TP_Q1_A5-p2.1
12248. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=6#TP_Q58_A4-p2.2
12249. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#SS_Q5_A2-p3.1
12250. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#FS_Q63_A2-p2.2
12251. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#SS_Q4_A6-p2.1
12252. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#FP_Q111_A1-p2.1
12253. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#SS_Q1_A7-p3.1
12254. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#SS_Q6_A1-p5.1
12255. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#FS_Q110_A2-p9.1
12256. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#TP_Q35_A8-p8.1
12257. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=15#FS_Q99_A1-p5.1
12258. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=15#FS_Q102_A1-p2.1
12259. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=2&scrV=19#FS_Q63_A4-p7.1
12260. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=4#FP_Q57_A5-p11.1
12261. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#SS_Q1_A7-p8.3
12262. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#FS_Q102_A4-p23.2
12263. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#SS_Q161_A3-p6.3
12264. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#SS_Q174_A6-p4.2
12265. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#SS_Q174_A6-p8.1
12266. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=8#FP_Q106_A1-p6.2
12267. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=8#TP_Q7_A10-p5.2
12268. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=8#TP_Q69_A5-p3.1
12269. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=9#TP_Q60_A1-p3.2
12270. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=10#FP_Q117_A2-p2.1
12271. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=14#FP_Q33_A2-p11.1
12272. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=14#FP_Q13_A6-p5.1
12273. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=15#FP_Q45_A5-p10.2
12274. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#TP_Q62_A5-p9.1
12275. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#TP_Q68_A1-p7.3
12276. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#TP_Q68_A8-p4.1
12277. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#TP_Q69_A5-p2.2
12278. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#FS_Q62_A4-p2.1
12279. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#FS_Q65_A5-p3.1
12280. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#SS_Q23_A8-p3.1
12281. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#SS_Q8_A4-p3.1
12282. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#FS_Q84_A1-p8.1
12283. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#FS_Q89_A2-p11.1
12284. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=18#TP_Q46_A4-p12.1
12285. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#FS_Q65_A2-p4.1
12286. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#FS_Q66_A6-p7.1
12287. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#SS_Q24_A1-p8.1
12288. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#TP_Q7_A6-p4.2
12289. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#TP_Q7_A10-p3.1
12290. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#TP_Q18_A5-p3.1
12291. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=3&scrV=20#FP_Q25_A6-p6.1
12292. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=1#TP_Q7_A10-p5.1
12293. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=3#SS_Q183_A2-p9.2
12294. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A6-p2.1
12295. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A7-p2.1
12296. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A9-p7.1
12297. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A11-p2.1
12298. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q67_A6-p5.1
12299. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q67_A6-p7.1
12300. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q69_A8-p6.1
12301. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#SS_Q1_A9-p3.1
12302. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#SS_Q4_A6-p5.1
12303. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#SS_Q23_A5-p5.1
12304. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#SS_Q81_A3-p5.1
12305. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A8-p13.2
12306. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=7#SS_Q24_A3-p6.2
12307. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=7#FS_Q66_A1-p11.1
12308. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=7#FS_Q112_A4-p5.1
12309. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=7#FS_Q112_A4-p7.1
12310. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=8#TP_Q57_A4-p9.1
12311. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=8#TP_Q57_A6-p8.4
12312. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=9#FS_Q66_A1-p8.1
12313. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=9#TP_Q49_A6-p7.3
12314. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=9#TP_Q52_A1-p5.1
12315. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=9#TP_Q57_A2-p10.1
12316. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=10#TP_Q57_A2-p3.2
12317. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=10#TP_Q57_A2-p5.1
12318. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=10#TP_Q57_A4-p8.1
12319. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=10#TP_Q57_A6-p9.2
12320. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#SS_Q171-p3.6
12321. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#SS_Q183_A2-p6.1
12322. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=12#FS_Q112_A4-p7.2
12323. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=12#TP_Q7_A4-p4.1
12324. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#TP_Q72_A8-p11.1
12325. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#FP_Q79_A13-p2.2
12326. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#XP_Q81_A1-p5.1
12327. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#XP_Q81_A3-p2.1
12328. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#TP_Q39_A3-p9.1
12329. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#TP_Q46_A9-p16.2
12330. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=14#SS_Q55_A4-p5.1
12331. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=16#SS_Q183_A2-p7.1
12332. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=19#SS_Q20_A1-p5.1
12333. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=19#SS_Q153_A4-p4.1
12334. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=23#FS_Q72_A2-p4.1
12335. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=23#TP_Q6_A2-p6.2
12336. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=23#FP_Q93_A6-p6.1
12337. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=28#SS_Q187_A3-p8.5
12338. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=28#SS_Q187_A3-p8.6
12339. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=29#TP_Q8_A6-p3.1
12340. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=30#TP_Q63_A3-p2.1
12341. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=31#FS_Q46_A8-p6.1
12342. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=31#SS_Q13_A1-p3.1
12343. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=31#SS_Q13_A3-p9.1
12344. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=31#SS_Q158_A2-p6.1
12345. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=4&scrV=32#FP_Q21_A3-p7.1
12346. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#FS_Q24_A3-p3.1
12347. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#SS_Q132_A1-p2.1
12348. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#SS_Q33_A7-p2.1
12349. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q62_A5-p7.3
12350. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q73_A4-p12.1
12351. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q79_A7-p6.2
12352. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q83_A1-p3.1
12353. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#FS_Q101_A4-p2.1
12354. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#FS_Q102_A3-p19.2
12355. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q22_A2-p5.1
12356. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q46_A10-p7.1
12357. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q47_A2-p4.1
12358. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q47_A2-p6.3
12359. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#TP_Q48_A3-p5.1
12360. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#FS_Q72_A2-p5.2
12361. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#SS_Q148_A6-p7.1
12362. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#SS_Q153_A4-p2.1
12363. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#SS_Q154_A4-p2.1
12364. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=4#SS_Q148_A6-p6.4
12365. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#XP_Q59_A6-p5.1
12366. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#FS_Q73_A5-p7.1
12367. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#SS_Q118_A5-p5.1
12368. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#SS_Q154_A4-p2.2
12369. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=8#FP_Q58_A6-p7.1
12370. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=8#FS_Q110_A3-p8.1
12371. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=8#FS_Q108_A1-p5.2
12372. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=11#TP_Q25_A3-p3.1
12373. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=13#FP_Q64_A1-p6.1
12374. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=13#FP_Q67_A1-p4.1
12375. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=13#FP_Q106_A1-p6.1
12376. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=13#FS_Q109_A1-p6.1
12377. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=13#FS_Q112_A5-p4.1
12378. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=13#SS_Q171_A2-p6.1
12379. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=14#FS_Q109_A7-p2.1
12380. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#SS_Q49_A8-p5.1
12381. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=18#SS_Q147_A8-p2.3
12382. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=18#SS_Q153_A3-p5.1
12383. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=19#SS_Q91_A2-p3.1
12384. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=23#XP_Q64_A5-p5.1
12385. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=23#XP_Q66_A3-p7.2
12386. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=25#XP_Q49_A6-p2.1
12387. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=25#XP_Q66_A3-p7.1
12388. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=25#TP_Q60_A6-p5.1
12389. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=25#TP_Q39_A6-p15.1
12390. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=26#TP_Q66_A5-p10.1
12391. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=26#TP_Q66_A7-p7.1
12392. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=26#TP_Q67_A1-p3.1
12393. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=26#TP_Q67_A6-p6.1
12394. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=26#TP_Q68_A4-p6.1
12395. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=26#XP_Q8_A2-p9.1
12396. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=27#FS_Q86_A1-p5.2
12397. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=27#FS_Q89_A1-p5.1
12398. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=28#SS_Q26_A11-p5.1
12399. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=28#SS_Q57_A4-p6.1
12400. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=29#FS_Q29_A4-p5.1
12401. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=29#SS_Q126_A1-p6.1
12402. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=29#SS_Q55_A1-p3.1
12403. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=29#XP_Q71_A11-p14.1
12404. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=32#TP_Q61_A2-p4.1
12405. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=32#TP_Q65_A3-p8.1
12406. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=32#XP_Q42_A1-p7.1
12407. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=32#XP_Q95_A1-p7.1
12408. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=32#FP_Q92_A2-p6.3
12409. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=32#SS_Q2_A7-p6.4
12410. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=32#TP_Q1_A3-p6.2
12411. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=5&scrV=33#SS_Q26_A11-p3.1
12412. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=6&scrV=1#SS_Q32_A8-p4.1
12413. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=6&scrV=4#SS_Q65_A2-p2.1
12414. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=6&scrV=5#SS_Q125_A1-p3.2
12415. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=6&scrV=6#XP_Q64_A2-p10.1
12416. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=6&scrV=9#SS_Q63_A1-p6.1
12417. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=6&scrV=12#FP_Q109_A1-p5.1
12418. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=6&scrV=12#FP_Q114_A1-p5.1
12419. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=6&scrV=13#SS_Q184_A1-p3.1
12420. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=6&scrV=14#SS_Q184_A1-p3.2
12421. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=6&scrV=16#SS_Q184_A1-p3.3
12422. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=6&scrV=19#SS_Q3_A1-p3.1
12423. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrC
h=9&scrV=6#SS_Q65_A2-p2.2
12424. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=1&scrV=6#SS_Q17_A3-p2.1
12425. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=1&scrV=7#FS_Q28_A2-p6.1
12426. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=1&scrV=17#SS_Q38_A1-p3.1
12427. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=1&scrV=18#SS_Q38_A1-p3.2
12428. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=1&scrV=22#SS_Q185_A4-p6.1
12429. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=1&scrV=23#SS_Q25_A5-p2.2
12430. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=1&scrV=23#SS_Q28_A2-p4.1
12431. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=1&scrV=23#XP_Q69_A2-p7.1
12432. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=3#XP_Q34_A1-p3.1
12433. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=3#FP_Q112_A1-p12.1
12434. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=3#SS_Q132_A2-p4.1
12435. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=3#SS_Q103_A2-p11.1
12436. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=3#SS_Q161_A3-p5.1
12437. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=3#SS_Q161_A3-p8.1
12438. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=6#FP_Q31_A2-p12.1
12439. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=6#FP_Q42_A4-p5.1
12440. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=6#TP_Q16_A1-p6.1
12441. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#FP_Q73_A1-p9.1
12442. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#FP_Q113_A4-p2.1
12443. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q2_A5-p6.1
12444. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q2_A6-p2.1
12445. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q5_A1-p2.1
12446. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q11_A2-p3.1
12447. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q14_A1-p7.3
12448. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q16_A12-p2.1
12449. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q20_A1-p6.4
12450. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q21_A2-p5.1
12451. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q28_A1-p5.1
12452. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#TP_Q39_A6-p3.1
12453. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#SS_Q124_A3-p9.1
12454. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#SS_Q186_A5-p7.2
12455. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#TP_Q5_A1-p7.1
12456. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#TP_Q7_A3-p8.2
12457. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#TP_Q20_A1-p6.6
12458. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#TP_Q46_A4-p5.1
12459. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#TP_Q47_A2-p5.1
12460. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#TP_Q49_A6-p5.1
12461. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#TP_Q49_A6-p7.5
12462. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#XP_Q89_A2-p14.2
12463. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#TP_Q19_A3-p6.1
12464. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=8#TP_Q42_A1-p9.3
12465. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=9#TP_Q48_A1-p5.1
12466. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=10#TP_Q52_A1-p6.6
12467. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=10#TP_Q59_A6-p6.2
12468. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=12#FS_Q44_A4-p5.1
12469. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#FP_Q83_A1-p4.2
12470. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#FS_Q9_A6-p5.1
12471. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#FP_Q105_A4-p5.1
12472. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#TP_Q13_A4-p9.1
12473. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#TP_Q18_A1-p9.1
12474. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=2&scrV=21#XP_Q8_A5-p10.1
12475. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=12#FP_Q12_A7-p2.1
12476. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=12#SS_Q24_A7-p5.1
12477. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=12#SS_Q24_A8-p2.1
12478. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=12#SS_Q8_A2-p2.1
12479. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=12#SS_Q184_A5-p9.1
12480. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=12#TP_Q15_A10-p6.2
12481. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=13#FS_Q99_A6-p6.3
12482. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=13#FS_Q113_A5-p3.1
12483. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=15#FS_Q99_A6-p6.4
12484. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=15#SS_Q184_A5-p9.2
12485. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=15#SS_Q187_A4-p6.1
12486. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=19#FP_Q65_A1-p6.2
12487. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=19#FS_Q1_A5-p5.1
12488. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=20#SS_Q23_A1-p9.1
12489. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#TP_Q76_A7-p3.1
12490. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#XP_Q92_A3-p10.1
12491. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#XP_Q95_A3-p2.1
12492. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#XP_Q77_A1-p7.2
12493. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#XP_Q78_A2-p8.2
12494. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#XP_Q82_A1-p10.2
12495. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#XP_Q83_A2-p2.1
12496. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#XP_Q83_A5-p2.1
12497. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#XP_Q85_A2-p5.1
12498. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#TP_Q8_A2-p5.1
12499. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#TP_Q45_A1-p6.5
12500. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#TP_Q45_A3-p5.2
12501. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#TP_Q54_A2-p5.1
12502. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#TP_Q56_A1-p12.2
12503. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=4&scrV=1#FS_Q20_A5-p3.1
12504. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=4&scrV=4#XP_Q4_A2-p2.1
12505. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=4&scrV=4#SS_Q28_A2-p6.1
12506. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=4&scrV=4#SS_Q28_A4-p4.1
12507. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=4&scrV=4#SS_Q44_A3-p8.3
12508. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=4&scrV=5#SS_Q120_A2-p4.1
12509. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=4&scrV=5#SS_Q143_A1-p4.1
12510. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=4&scrV=5#SS_Q160_A2-p2.1
12511. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phil&scr
Ch=4&scrV=12#SS_Q184_A7-p7.2
12512. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=9#SS_Q28_A3-p9.1
12513. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=12#SS_Q24_A3-p7.1
12514. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#FP_Q41_A2-p3.1
12515. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=15#FP_Q33_A3-p4.1
12516. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=15#FP_Q35_A2-p6.1
12517. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=15#FP_Q93_A1-p3.1
12518. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#FP_Q46_A3-p6.2
12519. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#FP_Q108_A5-p8.2
12520. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=19#TP_Q1_A6-p3.1
12521. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=19#TP_Q22_A1-p6.4
12522. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#XP_Q90_A1-p10.5
12523. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#TP_Q44_A1-p8.1
12524. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=21#FS_Q111_A1-p8.1
12525. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=24#XP_Q25_A1-p10.2
12526. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=24#XP_Q37_A1-p5.5
12527. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=1&scrV=24#TP_Q48_A5-p4.1
12528. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=2&scrV=3#TP_Q9_A3-p5.1
12529. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#SS_Q167_A1-p13.2
12530. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#TP_Q60_A3-p2.1
12531. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=2&scrV=9#FS_Q102_A4-p29.3
12532. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=2&scrV=9#TP_Q2_A10-p3.1
12533. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=2&scrV=9#TP_Q9_A2-p2.2
12534. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#TP_Q8_A4-p5.1
12535. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=2&scrV=11#FS_Q102_A3-p23.1
12536. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
h=2&scrV=11#FS_Q102_A5-p17.1
12537. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12538. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12545. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12546. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12548. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12549. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12565. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12566. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12568. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12575. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12581. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12582. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12583. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12584. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12585. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12586. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12587. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12588. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12589. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12590. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12595. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Col&scrC
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12601. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12611. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12612. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12613. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12614. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12616. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12617. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12618. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12619. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12621. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12622. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12623. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12624. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12626. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Thess&s
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12673. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12674. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=1&scrV=15#TP_Q36_A1-p3.1
12675. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=1&scrV=15#TP_Q40_A1-p7.1
12676. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=1&scrV=17#FP_Q31_A3-p5.1
12677. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=1&scrV=17#FP_Q39_A4-p8.1
12678. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=1&scrV=17#FS_Q2_A2-p3.1
12679. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=1&scrV=17#SS_Q132_A3-p3.2
12680. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=1&scrV=19#SS_Q162_A7-p11.2
12681. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=1#SS_Q83_A17-p5.1
12682. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=1#SS_Q83_A17-p6.3
12683. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=2#TP_Q83_A4-p19.1
12684. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#TP_Q67_A3-p6.1
12685. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#TP_Q70_A2-p10.1
12686. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#FP_Q19_A6-p2.1
12687. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#FP_Q23_A4-p4.1
12688. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#FS_Q19_A10-p15.1
12689. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#FS_Q91_A5-p3.1
12690. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#FS_Q98_A2-p5.1
12691. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#FS_Q106_A3-p3.1
12692. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#SS_Q83_A5-p8.1
12693. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=5#XP_Q90_A2-p10.1
12694. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=5#TP_Q7_A1-p6.2
12695. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=5#TP_Q26_A1-p5.1
12696. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=5#TP_Q26_A2-p3.1
12697. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#FP_Q117_A1-p6.1
12698. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=7#SS_Q175_A3-p11.1
12699. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=9#SS_Q149_A1-p4.2
12700. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=9#SS_Q169_A2-p9.1
12701. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=11#XP_Q19_A3-p12.1
12702. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=12#TP_Q67_A4-p3.1
12703. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=12#XP_Q39_A1-p5.1
12704. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=12#SS_Q177_A2-p5.2
12705. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=12#TP_Q27_A5-p11.2
12706. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=12#TP_Q55_A1-p4.3
12707. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=14#FP_Q94_A4-p2.1
12708. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=14#FS_Q89_A3-p2.1
12709. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=14#SS_Q163_A1-p5.1
12710. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=14#SS_Q163_A4-p2.1
12711. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=1#SS_Q185_A1-p2.1
12712. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=2#XP_Q66_A1-p2.1
12713. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=2#XP_Q66_A5-p3.1
12714. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=2#SS_Q149_A4-p3.1
12715. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=2#SS_Q116_A2-p5.1
12716. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=2#SS_Q64_A4-p5.1
12717. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=10#SS_Q44_A6-p3.2
12718. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=11#SS_Q149_A4-p5.1
12719. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=15#TP_Q83_A3-p13.1
12720. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=16#SS_Q1_A8-p9.4
12721. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=16#FP_Q57_A5-p2.1
12722. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=4#FP_Q5_A3-p6.1
12723. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=4#FS_Q103_A4-p13.2
12724. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=4#FS_Q102_A5-p5.1
12725. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=4#FS_Q102_A6-p2.1
12726. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=4#SS_Q154_A2-p2.2
12727. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=8#TP_Q61_A1-p2.1
12728. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=8#XP_Q99_A5-p5.1
12729. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=8#FS_Q68_A7-p3.1
12730. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=8#SS_Q122_A5-p11.1
12731. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=8#SS_Q30_A4-p3.1
12732. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=8#SS_Q32_A5-p13.1
12733. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=8#SS_Q32_A8-p2.1
12734. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=8#SS_Q52_A4-p6.1
12735. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=8#SS_Q154_A2-p6.1
12736. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=8#SS_Q157_A4-p4.1
12737. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=10#TP_Q4_A4-p2.1
12738. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=10#TP_Q8_A3-p5.1
12739. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=10#TP_Q27_A2-p8.2
12740. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=10#TP_Q36_A2-p2.1
12741. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=1#SS_Q33_A4-p7.1
12742. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=1#TP_Q42_A2-p4.1
12743. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=3#SS_Q103_A1-p5.1
12744. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=4#SS_Q189_A6-p2.2
12745. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=8#SS_Q26_A7-p5.1
12746. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=8#SS_Q32_A6-p4.1
12747. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=8#SS_Q32_A9-p5.1
12748. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=8#SS_Q44_A8-p8.3
12749. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=8#SS_Q71_A1-p6.4
12750. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=8#SS_Q189_A6-p6.2
12751. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=11#SS_Q100_A3-p9.1
12752. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=11#SS_Q186_A9-p2.1
12753. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=12#TP_Q28_A4-p4.1
12754. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=14#XP_Q41_A3-p8.2
12755. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=14#XP_Q63_A1-p7.1
12756. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=16#SS_Q185_A7-p4.1
12757. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=16#SS_Q187_A4-p2.1
12758. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=17#XP_Q96_A12-p5.1
12759. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12760. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12761. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=17#SS_Q184_A6-p8.1
12762. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12763. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=20#SS_Q33_A7-p8.1
12764. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=20#TP_Q55_A1-p2.1
12765. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12766. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
Ch=5&scrV=22#XP_Q36_A4-p10.1
12767. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12768. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12769. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12770. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12771. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12772. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12773. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12774. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12775. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12776. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12777. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12778. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12779. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12780. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12781. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12782. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12783. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12784. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12785. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12786. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12787. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12788. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12789. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12790. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12791. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12792. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12793. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scr
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12794. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
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12797. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
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12800. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
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12801. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
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12802. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
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12803. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
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12804. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=5#XP_Q96_A1-p8.1
12805. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
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12806. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=5#XP_Q96_A7-p7.1
12807. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=5#XP_Q96_A9-p5.1
12808. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=5#FP_Q95_A4-p3.1
12809. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
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12810. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=5#TP_Q15_A2-p4.2
12811. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=6#SS_Q187_A4-p13.1
12812. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=6#SS_Q187_A5-p6.2
12813. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#XP_Q25_A1-p2.1
12814. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#FP_Q25_A3-p3.1
12815. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#FP_Q21_A3-p3.1
12816. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#FS_Q100_A8-p10.1
12817. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#TP_Q46_A2-p4.1
12818. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=14#SS_Q10_A7-p2.1
12819. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=14#SS_Q38_A1-p6.1
12820. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=14#SS_Q38_A1-p9.1
12821. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=15#FS_Q37_A3-p2.1
12822. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=15#SS_Q129_A7-p3.1
12823. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=15#SS_Q97_A3-p8.2
12824. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=19#TP_Q63_A1-p2.2
12825. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=19#SS_Q172_A4-p6.2
12826. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=20#FP_Q23_A5-p12.3
12827. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=20#SS_Q183_A2-p6.4
12828. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=24#SS_Q11_A3-p2.1
12829. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=24#SS_Q160_A1-p4.1
12830. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=2&scrV=25#XP_Q99_A3-p11.1
12831. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=1#SS_Q25_A4-p4.2
12832. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=2#SS_Q105_A1-p5.2
12833. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=2#SS_Q107_A1-p5.1
12834. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=3#SS_Q156_A2-p5.1
12835. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=5#SS_Q83_A16-p3.1
12836. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=5#SS_Q101_A1-p4.1
12837. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=13#SS_Q162_A7-p5.1
12838. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=16#FP_Q1_A1-p4.1
12839. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=16#TP_Q31_A3-p8.1
12840. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=3&scrV=24#SS_Q116_A2-p5.2
12841. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=5#SS_Q33_A4-p9.1
12842. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=7#FS_Q4_A3-p5.2
12843. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=4&scrV=8#FS_Q114_A3-p5.1
12844. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scr
Ch=11&scrV=19#FP_Q24_A1-p6.3
12845. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=1#SS_Q188_A5-p11.1
12846. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=5#SS_Q184_A6-p2.1
12847. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=5#SS_Q185_A3-p6.2
12848. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=5#SS_Q188_A5-p3.1
12849. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=6#XP_Q66_A1-p2.2
12850. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=7#SS_Q64_A4-p5.2
12851. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=7#SS_Q151_A3-p4.1
12852. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=9#FP_Q1_A8-p4.1
12853. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=9#SS_Q10_A7-p10.2
12854. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=9#SS_Q188_A5-p7.1
12855. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=15#FP_Q79_A13-p3.1
12856. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=15#SS_Q86_A3-p6.2
12857. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=1&scrV=16#SS_Q124_A5-p7.2
12858. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=2&scrV=2#SS_Q149_A4-p2.2
12859. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=2&scrV=5#XP_Q19_A3-p12.2
12860. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=2&scrV=6#SS_Q149_A4-p5.2
12861. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=2&scrV=9#SS_Q32_A8-p5.1
12862. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=2&scrV=11#TP_Q36_A1-p3.2
12863. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=2&scrV=12#SS_Q149_A1-p4.1
12864. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=2&scrV=15#XP_Q36_A1-p6.1
12865. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=3&scrV=1#SS_Q104_A2-p9.1
12866. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=3&scrV=1#SS_Q104_A6-p5.1
12867. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=3&scrV=5#TP_Q62_A1-p8.2
12868. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=3&scrV=5#TP_Q65_A1-p11.1
12869. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=3&scrV=5#TP_Q84_A10-p11.1
12870. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=3&scrV=5#FP_Q23_A5-p5.1
12871. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=3&scrV=5#TP_Q2_A11-p5.1
12872. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=3&scrV=5#TP_Q69_A4-p5.1
12873. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=3&scrV=10#TP_Q64_A9-p4.1
12874. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Titus&sc
rCh=3&scrV=10#SS_Q11_A3-p5.1
12875. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Phlm&scr
Ch=1&scrV=20#FS_Q11_A3-p2.1
12876. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=0#FS_Q63_A3-p4.1
12877. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=0#SS_Q176_A1-p2.2
12878. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=1#SS_Q176_A2-p2.1
12879. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=1#FP_Q117_A2-p3.3
12880. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#TP_Q63_A1-p8.1
12881. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#TP_Q63_A2-p2.1
12882. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#TP_Q63_A3-p5.1
12883. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#FP_Q3_A1-p3.2
12884. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#FP_Q34_A2-p6.1
12885. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#FP_Q35_A2-p6.2
12886. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#FP_Q104_A1-p6.1
12887. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#FP_Q104_A4-p8.1
12888. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#XP_Q84_A2-p6.2
12889. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#TP_Q13_A2-p5.1
12890. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#TP_Q58_A3-p4.2
12891. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=3#TP_Q58_A4-p2.3
12892. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q22_A1-p2.2
12893. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=6#FS_Q102_A4-p29.2
12894. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=7#FP_Q111_A2-p2.1
12895. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=12#TP_Q83_A3-p2.1
12896. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#TP_Q58_A4-p6.1
12897. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FP_Q62_A9-p3.1
12898. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FP_Q53_A1-p10.1
12899. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FP_Q57_A2-p6.1
12900. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FP_Q57_A5-p8.1
12901. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FP_Q112_A2-p2.1
12902. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FP_Q113_A3-p3.1
12903. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FP_Q113_A5-p2.1
12904. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FP_Q108_A7-p4.1
12905. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FS_Q98_A3-p4.2
12906. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#TP_Q59_A6-p6.3
12907. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=2#FS_Q98_A3-p6.2
12908. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=3#FP_Q43_A7-p16.2
12909. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=3#TP_Q7_A7-p6.2
12910. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=3#TP_Q38_A2-p3.2
12911. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#SS_Q178_A1-p4.4
12912. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#SS_Q178_A2-p4.1
12913. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#TP_Q44_A3-p8.4
12914. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=5#TP_Q59_A6-p9.1
12915. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#TP_Q20_A1-p4.2
12916. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#TP_Q59_A4-p3.1
12917. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#XP_Q90_A1-p12.2
12918. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=9#TP_Q64_A7-p6.2
12919. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=9#SS_Q175_A4-p8.1
12920. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=9#TP_Q7_A8-p4.3
12921. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=9#TP_Q11_A4-p5.1
12922. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=9#TP_Q22_A1-p7.3
12923. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=9#TP_Q30_A2-p10.1
12924. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#FS_Q114_A6-p6.2
12925. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#FS_Q5_A7-p8.1
12926. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#TP_Q4_A5-p4.2
12927. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#TP_Q9_A2-p6.1
12928. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#TP_Q59_A2-p10.1
12929. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=11#TP_Q34_A1-p4.1
12930. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#TP_Q81_A1-p6.3
12931. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=14#TP_Q50_A1-p6.3
12932. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=16#FP_Q20_A4-p3.2
12933. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=16#TP_Q8_A4-p2.1
12934. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=16#TP_Q31_A1-p5.1
12935. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=16#TP_Q59_A6-p6.1
12936. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=17#TP_Q4_A6-p7.1
12937. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=17#TP_Q13_A3-p5.1
12938. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=17#TP_Q14_A3-p4.1
12939. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=18#TP_Q14_A1-p6.1
12940. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=2&scrV=18#TP_Q15_A1-p4.1
12941. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=3&scrV=6#SS_Q129_A6-p4.1
12942. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=4&scrV=0#FS_Q102_A4-p38.2
12943. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=4&scrV=12#TP_Q27_A4-p9.2
12944. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=4&scrV=12#FP_Q14_A6-p5.1
12945. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#FP_Q14_A5-p5.1
12946. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#SS_Q167_A1-p3.3
12947. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=4&scrV=14#TP_Q22_A1-p5.1
12948. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=4&scrV=15#TP_Q41_A1-p9.1
12949. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=4&scrV=15#TP_Q41_A1-p12.1
12950. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=4&scrV=15#TP_Q59_A2-p8.1
12951. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#TP_Q64_A7-p5.1
12952. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#TP_Q83_A4-p31.1
12953. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#XP_Q19_A3-p7.1
12954. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#FS_Q101_A4-p13.1
12955. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#FS_Q105_A1-p5.1
12956. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#SS_Q86_A2-p6.2
12957. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#SS_Q86_A4-p6.4
12958. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#TP_Q22_A1-p6.2
12959. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=1#TP_Q22_A2-p7.1
12960. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=4#SS_Q185_A1-p11.2
12961. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=6#TP_Q22_A4-p7.2
12962. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=7#XP_Q25_A1-p7.1
12963. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=7#TP_Q7_A6-p6.2
12964. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=7#TP_Q21_A4-p6.1
12965. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=7#TP_Q22_A4-p2.3
12966. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=8#TP_Q9_A4-p5.1
12967. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=9#FS_Q106_A2-p2.1
12968. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=9#TP_Q22_A2-p8.2
12969. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=14#SS_Q47_A14-p9.1
12970. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=14#SS_Q186_A5-p3.1
12971. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=5&scrV=14#SS_Q188_A8-p9.2
12972. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=1#TP_Q84_A6-p3.1
12973. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=1#TP_Q89_A6-p6.2
12974. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=2#TP_Q66_A11-p5.1
12975. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=4#TP_Q84_A10-p2.1
12976. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=6#TP_Q66_A9-p10.3
12977. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=6#TP_Q84_A10-p11.2
12978. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=16#XP_Q24_A1-p8.1
12979. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=16#XP_Q46_A1-p4.1
12980. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=16#FS_Q100_A5-p16.1
12981. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=16#SS_Q89_A1-p6.1
12982. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=16#SS_Q89_A2-p6.2
12983. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=16#SS_Q89_A4-p2.1
12984. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=16#SS_Q89_A4-p6.2
12985. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=16#SS_Q89_A10-p2.1
12986. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=17#SS_Q89_A10-p12.1
12987. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=18#SS_Q89_A8-p8.1
12988. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=19#FS_Q40_A6-p2.1
12989. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=19#SS_Q17_A2-p5.1
12990. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=19#SS_Q17_A2-p7.1
12991. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=6&scrV=20#FS_Q102_A4-p29.4
12992. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=0#TP_Q31_A8-p8.2
12993. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=2#TP_Q22_A6-p4.1
12994. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=6#TP_Q31_A8-p2.1
12995. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=7#TP_Q83_A5-p5.1
12996. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=7#XP_Q19_A4-p3.1
12997. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=11#TP_Q61_A3-p4.1
12998. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=12#FS_Q104_A3-p5.1
12999. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=12#FS_Q107_A1-p5.1
13000. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=12#FS_Q91_A5-p5.1
13001. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=14#TP_Q22_A1-p3.2
13002. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#FS_Q104_A3-p4.1
13003. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#FS_Q98_A2-p3.2
13004. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=18#FS_Q101_A3-p7.1
13005. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#TP_Q72_A1-p10.1
13006. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#XP_Q29_A1-p9.1
13007. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#FS_Q98_A1-p7.4
13008. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#FS_Q102_A5-p21.2
13009. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#XP_Q67_A1-p9.1
13010. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=25#SS_Q83_A11-p8.2
13011. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=25#TP_Q22_A4-p6.2
13012. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=25#TP_Q57_A6-p9.1
13013. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=26#XP_Q84_A2-p6.1
13014. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=26#TP_Q4_A6-p2.1
13015. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=27#TP_Q65_A1-p13.1
13016. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=28#FS_Q102_A5-p32.1
13017. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=7&scrV=28#TP_Q22_A4-p9.1
13018. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=8&scrV=4#FS_Q102_A4-p12.1
13019. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=8&scrV=5#TP_Q8_A3-p4.2
13020. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=8&scrV=8#TP_Q78_A3-p4.1
13021. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=8&scrV=8#FS_Q106_A1-p5.3
13022. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=8&scrV=10#FS_Q106_A1-p5.4
13023. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=8&scrV=13#FS_Q103_A3-p6.2
13024. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=0#TP_Q73_A6-p4.1
13025. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=4#FS_Q102_A4-p25.1
13026. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=6#FS_Q102_A4-p23.1
13027. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=8#FS_Q101_A2-p9.1
13028. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=9#FS_Q101_A4-p6.2
13029. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=9#FS_Q104_A3-p4.2
13030. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=10#TP_Q63_A1-p4.1
13031. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=10#TP_Q72_A5-p9.1
13032. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=10#FS_Q103_A2-p6.3
13033. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=11#TP_Q22_A5-p6.1
13034. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=11#XP_Q19_A1-p7.1
13035. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=11#TP_Q49_A5-p8.1
13036. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=12#TP_Q22_A5-p3.1
13037. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=13#FS_Q103_A2-p6.2
13038. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=13#FS_Q103_A2-p10.1
13039. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=13#FS_Q102_A5-p6.2
13040. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#TP_Q66_A12-p4.2
13041. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#TP_Q78_A3-p14.4
13042. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#TP_Q89_A6-p6.1
13043. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#XP_Q90_A1-p15.1
13044. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#TP_Q22_A3-p5.1
13045. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=15#TP_Q79_A2-p7.1
13046. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=16#TP_Q78_A3-p18.1
13047. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=16#TP_Q78_A3-p18.2
13048. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=17#SS_Q185_A8-p12.1
13049. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=22#TP_Q69_A1-p8.1
13050. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=22#TP_Q86_A6-p4.1
13051. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=27#TP_Q84_A10-p15.1
13052. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=9&scrV=27#TP_Q59_A5-p6.1
13053. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=1#TP_Q75_A1-p8.1
13054. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=1#TP_Q83_A1-p6.2
13055. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=1#TP_Q83_A1-p7.1
13056. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=1#FP_Q1_A10-p6.1
13057. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=1#TP_Q42_A4-p3.1
13058. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=1#TP_Q22_A3-p3.1
13059. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=4#FS_Q103_A2-p7.2
13060. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=11#FS_Q102_A3-p19.3
13061. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#TP_Q65_A1-p2.1
13062. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#TP_Q80_A10-p9.1
13063. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#TP_Q83_A1-p2.1
13064. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#TP_Q22_A5-p8.1
13065. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#TP_Q49_A2-p4.1
13066. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#TP_Q52_A8-p6.1
13067. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=19#TP_Q78_A3-p14.2
13068. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=19#TP_Q22_A2-p8.3
13069. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=19#TP_Q27_A1-p4.1
13070. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=19#TP_Q39_A5-p4.1
13071. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=19#TP_Q49_A5-p6.1
13072. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=19#TP_Q57_A6-p3.1
13073. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=19#FS_Q106_A4-p7.1
13074. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=22#TP_Q66_A7-p5.1
13075. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=24#SS_Q167_A2-p9.1
13076. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=25#SS_Q189_A8-p2.1
13077. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=28#FS_Q106_A2-p3.2
13078. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=29#TP_Q68_A3-p4.2
13079. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=29#FS_Q89_A5-p6.4
13080. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=29#SS_Q10_A3-p4.2
13081. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=29#SS_Q186_A10-p6.1
13082. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=30#SS_Q72_A3-p4.1
13083. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=34#SS_Q124_A4-p4.1
13084. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=34#SS_Q184_A7-p7.3
13085. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=38#TP_Q66_A1-p9.2
13086. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=10&scrV=38#FP_Q3_A2-p2.1
13087. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=0#SS_Q124_A4-p7.2
13088. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=0#SS_Q1_A7-p7.1
13089. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=0#SS_Q64_A5-p5.2
13090. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#FP_Q2_A2-p2.1
13091. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#FP_Q32_A1-p6.3
13092. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#SS_Q4_A7-p7.1
13093. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#FP_Q46_A2-p10.1
13094. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#FS_Q67_A3-p8.1
13095. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#SS_Q4_A1-p2.1
13096. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#SS_Q1_A4-p6.1
13097. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#SS_Q1_A7-p2.1
13098. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#SS_Q17_A7-p3.1
13099. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#FS_Q101_A2-p9.2
13100. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#TP_Q7_A3-p5.1
13101. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=1#TP_Q36_A1-p7.2
13102. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=2#SS_Q5_A1-p6.1
13103. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=2#SS_Q1_A6-p8.1
13104. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=3#FP_Q65_A4-p8.1
13105. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#XP_Q89_A7-p7.1
13106. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#XP_Q99_A4-p7.1
13107. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q1_A9-p9.1
13108. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q2_A3-p5.1
13109. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q5_A1-p5.1
13110. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#FS_Q65_A5-p5.1
13111. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q7_A2-p6.1
13112. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q16_A1-p2.1
13113. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q16_A1-p8.1
13114. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q1_A6-p10.1
13115. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q2_A5-p5.1
13116. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q2_A8-p2.1
13117. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q17_A7-p6.2
13118. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#FS_Q107_A1-p2.1
13119. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#FS_Q100_A4-p9.1
13120. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#FS_Q113_A4-p6.3
13121. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#XP_Q69_A4-p7.1
13122. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q161_A5-p9.2
13123. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=6#SS_Q174_A6-p6.3
13124. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=13#SS_Q1_A7-p9.1
13125. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=13#XP_Q88_A1-p7.3
13126. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=13#SS_Q173_A1-p6.1
13127. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=16#FS_Q107_A1-p3.4
13128. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=26#FS_Q107_A1-p13.2
13129. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=32#SS_Q88_A2-p3.1
13130. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=32#SS_Q95_A7-p4.1
13131. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=33#SS_Q2_A9-p5.1
13132. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=33#TP_Q49_A5-p9.1
13133. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=34#SS_Q123_A5-p8.1
13134. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=34#SS_Q124_A2-p6.2
13135. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=35#TP_Q53_A3-p2.1
13136. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=37#SS_Q169_A1-p3.1
13137. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=37#SS_Q187_A6-p5.1
13138. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=39#FS_Q107_A1-p4.2
13139. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=39#XP_Q77_A1-p7.1
13140. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=39#XP_Q88_A1-p7.4
13141. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=40#XP_Q69_A2-p4.1
13142. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=11&scrV=40#XP_Q88_A1-p7.5
13143. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=2#TP_Q7_A3-p3.2
13144. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=2#TP_Q11_A6-p3.1
13145. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=2#TP_Q41_A2-p7.1
13146. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=2#TP_Q43_A1-p4.1
13147. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=2#TP_Q46_A4-p15.1
13148. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=3#SS_Q128_A1-p10.2
13149. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=3#TP_Q14_A1-p7.5
13150. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=4#SS_Q184_A5-p4.3
13151. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=4#SS_Q188_A6-p3.2
13152. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=9#TP_Q67_A8-p8.1
13153. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=9#TP_Q72_A10-p6.2
13154. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=9#SS_Q122_A2-p2.1
13155. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=9#SS_Q189_A6-p7.1
13156. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=11#FS_Q99_A2-p5.2
13157. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=14#FS_Q4_A4-p5.2
13158. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=14#SS_Q44_A3-p8.4
13159. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=14#SS_Q81_A8-p6.1
13160. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=14#SS_Q180_A2-p3.3
13161. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=17#TP_Q86_A1-p2.1
13162. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=12&scrV=18#TP_Q44_A4-p10.2
13163. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=5#SS_Q118_A1-p5.1
13164. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=8#FS_Q102_A4-p38.1
13165. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=8#TP_Q16_A9-p5.1
13166. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=12#TP_Q83_A3-p12.1
13167. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=12#FS_Q103_A2-p10.2
13168. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=12#FS_Q101_A4-p10.1
13169. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=12#FS_Q102_A5-p30.1
13170. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=12#FS_Q102_A5-p33.2
13171. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=12#TP_Q27_A6-p9.1
13172. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=12#TP_Q60_A3-p3.2
13173. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=15#TP_Q83_A3-p14.1
13174. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=15#FS_Q102_A4-p29.8
13175. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=16#TP_Q64_A6-p2.1
13176. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=16#SS_Q30_A4-p8.1
13177. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=16#SS_Q32_A1-p4.1
13178. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=16#SS_Q85_A3-p3.2
13179. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=16#SS_Q86_A2-p2.1
13180. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=16#SS_Q188_A2-p6.3
13181. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=17#SS_Q102_A2-p4.2
13182. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=17#SS_Q104_A1-p5.1
13183. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=17#SS_Q186_A5-p2.1
13184. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=13&scrV=27#TP_Q46_A10-p11.2
13185. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrC
h=29&scrV=0#XP_Q8_A7-p10.1
13186. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=2#XP_Q94_A3-p8.1
13187. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=2#FS_Q38_A4-p6.2
13188. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#FS_Q61_A3-p4.1
13189. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#FS_Q66_A4-p3.1
13190. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#SS_Q136_A2-p2.1
13191. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#SS_Q184_A1-p4.1
13192. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#SS_Q117_A6-p2.1
13193. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=6#SS_Q83_A15-p4.1
13194. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=8#SS_Q53_A6-p3.1
13195. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#SS_Q165_A1-p7.1
13196. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FS_Q9_A2-p5.1
13197. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=15#TP_Q84_A5-p6.2
13198. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#TP_Q61_A4-p4.1
13199. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#FP_Q14_A15-p5.1
13200. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#TP_Q7_A9-p4.1
13201. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=17#TP_Q39_A6-p10.1
13202. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=18#TP_Q23_A2-p6.2
13203. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#TP_Q15_A9-p2.1
13204. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=21#SS_Q157_A4-p2.1
13205. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=22#FP_Q1_A4-p2.1
13206. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=25#FS_Q108_A1-p11.1
13207. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=27#SS_Q81_A1-p2.1
13208. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=27#SS_Q187_A2-p6.3
13209. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=27#SS_Q188_A2-p5.1
13210. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=1&scrV=27#SS_Q188_A2-p9.4
13211. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=1#SS_Q63_A2-p6.1
13212. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=1#SS_Q63_A3-p4.1
13213. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=1#SS_Q63_A3-p5.1
13214. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=1#SS_Q185_A3-p7.1
13215. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=2#SS_Q131_A2-p9.1
13216. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=2#SS_Q63_A2-p3.1
13217. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#TP_Q88_A1-p8.2
13218. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#XP_Q99_A5-p7.1
13219. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#SS_Q5_A3-p10.1
13220. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=10#FS_Q73_A1-p2.1
13221. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=13#XP_Q99_A5-p2.1
13222. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=13#FP_Q21_A3-p7.2
13223. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=13#FP_Q21_A4-p2.1
13224. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=13#SS_Q52_A4-p3.1
13225. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=13#SS_Q67_A4-p2.1
13226. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=18#SS_Q124_A5-p7.1
13227. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=19#TP_Q76_A7-p7.1
13228. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=19#XP_Q16_A3-p2.1
13229. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=19#SS_Q5_A2-p5.1
13230. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=19#FP_Q64_A2-p6.2
13231. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=19#FP_Q64_A3-p8.1
13232. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=19#SS_Q18_A3-p3.1
13233. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=19#SS_Q19_A2-p3.1
13234. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=19#SS_Q7_A1-p5.1
13235. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#TP_Q89_A6-p6.3
13236. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#XP_Q99_A4-p7.3
13237. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#SS_Q4_A4-p3.1
13238. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#SS_Q4_A4-p6.1
13239. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#SS_Q178_A2-p3.2
13240. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#TP_Q8_A3-p8.2
13241. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=2#SS_Q73_A2-p8.3
13242. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=2#SS_Q89_A2-p7.1
13243. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=2#SS_Q147_A3-p8.1
13244. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=2#SS_Q184_A2-p3.1
13245. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=2#SS_Q186_A10-p4.1
13246. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=6#FP_Q64_A4-p11.1
13247. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=6#XP_Q70_A3-p28.1
13248. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=15#SS_Q45_A1-p2.2
13249. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=15#SS_Q45_A1-p9.1
13250. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=15#SS_Q55_A1-p10.2
13251. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=16#SS_Q53_A5-p3.1
13252. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#SS_Q45_A5-p3.1
13253. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=3&scrV=17#SS_Q45_A6-p4.1
13254. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=1#SS_Q116_A1-p4.1
13255. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=1#SS_Q122_A6-p4.2
13256. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=1#SS_Q41_A2-p2.1
13257. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=3#SS_Q83_A5-p2.1
13258. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=6#FS_Q113_A4-p2.3
13259. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=6#SS_Q161_A5-p9.1
13260. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=6#SS_Q162_A6-p6.1
13261. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=6#TP_Q37_A4-p6.1
13262. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=6#TP_Q39_A4-p8.1
13263. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=7#FS_Q80_A3-p6.1
13264. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=7#SS_Q140_A1-p8.3
13265. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=8#FP_Q9_A1-p4.1
13266. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=11#SS_Q74_A2-p4.1
13267. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#XP_Q43_A1-p6.1
13268. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=17#FS_Q71_A5-p5.1
13269. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=17#FS_Q77_A2-p10.2
13270. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=17#SS_Q9_A3-p4.2
13271. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=4&scrV=17#SS_Q79_A3-p6.1
13272. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#SS_Q89_A2-p2.2
13273. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=13#XP_Q15_A3-p2.1
13274. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=14#XP_Q6_A5-p9.1
13275. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=14#XP_Q8_A3-p3.1
13276. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=14#XP_Q29_A4-p5.1
13277. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=14#XP_Q31_A2-p4.1
13278. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=14#XP_Q31_A3-p4.1
13279. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=14#XP_Q32_A1-p4.1
13280. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#TP_Q65_A1-p12.2
13281. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#XP_Q29_A1-p6.1
13282. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#XP_Q29_A9-p4.1
13283. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#XP_Q30_A1-p5.1
13284. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=15#XP_Q31_A1-p2.1
13285. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=16#XP_Q6_A5-p9.2
13286. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=16#XP_Q6_A6-p3.1
13287. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=16#XP_Q8_A1-p2.1
13288. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=16#XP_Q8_A3-p4.1
13289. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=16#FS_Q114_A6-p3.1
13290. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=16#SS_Q17_A3-p3.1
13291. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=16#SS_Q83_A7-p5.1
13292. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=16#TP_Q22_A4-p7.1
13293. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrC
h=5&scrV=20#SS_Q189_A9-p6.1
13294. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=4#XP_Q69_A2-p6.2
13295. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=12#FP_Q58_A1-p3.1
13296. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=12#FS_Q33_A2-p8.2
13297. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=12#FS_Q67_A4-p4.2
13298. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=18#FS_Q102_A5-p20.2
13299. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=18#TP_Q48_A4-p5.1
13300. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=2#TP_Q67_A7-p6.1
13301. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=2#TP_Q68_A5-p8.3
13302. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=2#TP_Q72_A5-p7.2
13303. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=5#TP_Q82_A1-p9.3
13304. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=9#SS_Q99_A1-p8.2
13305. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#FS_Q96_A5-p9.1
13306. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#SS_Q161_A3-p7.1
13307. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=13#SS_Q104_A6-p5.2
13308. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=14#SS_Q69_A4-p5.2
13309. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=17#SS_Q103_A2-p4.2
13310. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=18#SS_Q10_A10-p2.3
13311. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=19#FS_Q96_A4-p5.1
13312. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=21#FS_Q87_A7-p4.2
13313. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=21#TP_Q46_A3-p6.2
13314. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=22#FS_Q87_A7-p4.1
13315. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=22#SS_Q95_A4-p2.1
13316. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=22#TP_Q14_A1-p4.1
13317. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=22#TP_Q15_A1-p8.3
13318. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=22#TP_Q48_A2-p2.1
13319. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=23#SS_Q64_A4-p6.1
13320. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=3#SS_Q169_A2-p2.1
13321. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=4#SS_Q161_A4-p6.4
13322. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=15#TP_Q66_A10-p12.2
13323. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=15#SS_Q2_A10-p5.1
13324. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=15#SS_Q10_A7-p10.1
13325. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=18#TP_Q80_A10-p2.1
13326. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=18#TP_Q49_A3-p8.2
13327. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=18#TP_Q50_A1-p6.2
13328. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=19#TP_Q52_A2-p4.1
13329. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=20#TP_Q66_A11-p9.1
13330. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=20#TP_Q73_A3-p6.1
13331. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=21#TP_Q68_A9-p4.1
13332. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=4&scrV=1#TP_Q48_A2-p4.1
13333. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=4&scrV=1#TP_Q48_A3-p8.1
13334. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=4&scrV=7#SS_Q47_A9-p5.1
13335. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=4&scrV=10#FP_Q96_A4-p7.1
13336. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=4&scrV=10#FP_Q106_A4-p6.1
13337. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=4&scrV=10#SS_Q177_A2-p4.1
13338. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=4&scrV=15#SS_Q124_A5-p2.1
13339. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=5&scrV=4#TP_Q8_A6-p4.1
13340. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=5&scrV=6#SS_Q97_A3-p8.1
13341. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=5&scrV=8#FP_Q113_A6-p5.1
13342. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=5&scrV=8#FS_Q80_A3-p5.1
13343. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scr
Ch=5&scrV=8#SS_Q140_A1-p8.2
13344. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=4#TP_Q62_A1-p8.1
13345. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=4#FP_Q13_A9-p2.1
13346. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=4#FS_Q110_A3-p7.1
13347. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=4#SS_Q85_A2-p2.1
13348. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=4#TP_Q3_A4-p9.1
13349. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=4#TP_Q7_A1-p2.1
13350. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=4#TP_Q22_A1-p6.3
13351. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=5#SS_Q146_A1-p6.1
13352. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=10#FP_Q23_A8-p8.1
13353. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=19#TP_Q83_A2-p12.1
13354. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=19#FP_Q58_A6-p7.2
13355. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=19#SS_Q173_A4-p4.1
13356. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=19#SS_Q174_A5-p6.1
13357. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=21#XP_Q67_A3-p3.1
13358. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=1&scrV=21#SS_Q172_A1-p6.1
13359. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=4#XP_Q89_A8-p4.1
13360. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=17#XP_Q69_A7-p5.1
13361. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=19#FP_Q63_A8-p6.2
13362. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=19#FS_Q80_A4-p3.2
13363. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=19#TP_Q48_A4-p6.2
13364. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=21#XP_Q99_A4-p6.1
13365. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=21#XP_Q99_A4-p7.2
13366. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=21#SS_Q12_A1-p10.1
13367. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=21#SS_Q10_A6-p5.1
13368. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=2&scrV=21#SS_Q189_A4-p2.1
13369. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=5#XP_Q74_A3-p6.1
13370. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=5#XP_Q74_A4-p9.1
13371. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=7#XP_Q74_A6-p7.1
13372. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=10#XP_Q74_A3-p7.1
13373. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=12#XP_Q74_A2-p6.1
13374. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=12#XP_Q74_A3-p2.1
13375. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=12#XP_Q74_A4-p3.1
13376. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=12#XP_Q74_A5-p2.1
13377. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=12#XP_Q74_A6-p6.1
13378. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scr
Ch=3&scrV=16#SS_Q1_A10-p7.1
13379. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=1&scrV=1#TP_Q55_A5-p7.3
13380. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=1&scrV=3#TP_Q55_A5-p7.4
13381. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=1&scrV=8#TP_Q79_A4-p3.1
13382. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=1&scrV=8#SS_Q24_A8-p3.1
13383. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=1&scrV=8#FS_Q59_A3-p7.1
13384. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=1&scrV=8#FS_Q89_A2-p4.2
13385. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=1&scrV=8#SS_Q33_A5-p4.1
13386. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=1&scrV=8#SS_Q43_A5-p4.1
13387. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=1&scrV=8#SS_Q60_A2-p4.1
13388. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=1&scrV=8#TP_Q8_A3-p8.1
13389. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=1#TP_Q68_A3-p11.1
13390. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=2#TP_Q68_A5-p6.4
13391. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=2#TP_Q86_A1-p7.2
13392. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=2#FP_Q12_A1-p6.1
13393. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=2#FS_Q102_A4-p29.1
13394. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=2#TP_Q7_A11-p3.1
13395. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=2#TP_Q8_A3-p5.2
13396. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=2#TP_Q10_A3-p5.1
13397. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=2#TP_Q48_A2-p6.2
13398. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=4#SS_Q104_A3-p8.1
13399. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=9#SS_Q34_A3-p5.1
13400. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=10#SS_Q24_A5-p3.1
13401. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=14#TP_Q72_A5-p7.1
13402. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=16#XP_Q15_A3-p8.1
13403. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=16#FS_Q72_A3-p4.2
13404. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=16#FS_Q77-p7.1
13405. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=16#FS_Q108_A3-p17.1
13406. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=16#FS_Q108_A4-p9.1
13407. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=16#FS_Q77_A5-p6.1
13408. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=16#SS_Q167_A2-p4.1
13409. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=16#SS_Q167_A2-p5.1
13410. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=16#SS_Q167_A2-p5.2
13411. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=18#XP_Q88_A3-p4.2
13412. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=27#SS_Q8_A4-p8.1
13413. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=27#SS_Q45_A5-p6.2
13414. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=27#SS_Q47_A14-p7.1
13415. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#XP_Q92_A1-p19.1
13416. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#FP_Q12_A2-p2.1
13417. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#FP_Q4_A3-p6.2
13418. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#FP_Q12_A6-p2.1
13419. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#SS_Q19_A11-p3.1
13420. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=2&scrV=2#FP_Q12_A5-p6.2
13421. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#FS_Q3_A8-p4.1
13422. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#FS_Q69_A2-p4.2
13423. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#SS_Q1_A2-p11.1
13424. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#SS_Q52_A3-p4.1
13425. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#SS_Q181_A4-p8.3
13426. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#TP_Q45_A4-p7.1
13427. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=4#FS_Q113_A1-p8.1
13428. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=4#SS_Q33_A1-p8.2
13429. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=4#SS_Q58_A5-p9.1
13430. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=4#SS_Q59_A1-p2.1
13431. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=4#SS_Q110_A4-p13.1
13432. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=8#TP_Q8_A7-p8.1
13433. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=8#TP_Q41_A1-p3.1
13434. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=9#FP_Q62_A3-p6.1
13435. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=9#SS_Q24_A11-p2.1
13436. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=9#FS_Q70_A1-p8.1
13437. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=14#TP_Q64_A5-p8.1
13438. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=14#FS_Q65_A2-p5.1
13439. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=14#SS_Q23_A2-p3.2
13440. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=14#SS_Q36_A3-p6.1
13441. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=14#SS_Q184_A1-p8.1
13442. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=15#SS_Q34_A4-p2.1
13443. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=15#SS_Q73_A3-p10.2
13444. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=16#SS_Q124_A3-p2.2
13445. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=16#SS_Q44_A8-p8.1
13446. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=17#FS_Q105_A2-p19.2
13447. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=17#SS_Q71_A1-p6.3
13448. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=18#SS_Q25_A9-p2.1
13449. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=18#SS_Q32_A5-p7.1
13450. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=20#SS_Q27_A5-p3.1
13451. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=1#TP_Q68_A3-p7.2
13452. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=1#SS_Q70_A3-p9.1
13453. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=1#SS_Q189_A10-p2.1
13454. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=10#FS_Q111_A3-p2.1
13455. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=10#SS_Q27_A8-p3.2
13456. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=16#TP_Q64_A5-p3.2
13457. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=16#FS_Q28_A2-p5.1
13458. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=16#FS_Q65_A5-p6.1
13459. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=16#FS_Q66_A6-p6.2
13460. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=16#FS_Q70_A3-p7.3
13461. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=16#SS_Q28_A1-p6.2
13462. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=16#SS_Q74_A2-p9.1
13463. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=16#SS_Q184_A1-p6.1
13464. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=16#SS_Q188_A8-p13.1
13465. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=18#XP_Q4_A1-p3.1
13466. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=18#XP_Q15_A1-p3.1
13467. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=18#SS_Q19_A8-p9.1
13468. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=18#TP_Q7_A6-p4.1
13469. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=19#SS_Q83_A9-p6.1
13470. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=20#FS_Q100_A6-p2.1
13471. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=20#SS_Q26_A2-p2.1
13472. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=21#SS_Q25_A1-p5.1
13473. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=21#SS_Q27_A8-p6.2
13474. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=21#SS_Q44_A2-p6.1
13475. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=4&scrV=21#SS_Q44_A7-p6.1
13476. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=5&scrV=3#FS_Q107_A4-p7.1
13477. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=5&scrV=7#FP_Q30_A2-p7.1
13478. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=5&scrV=7#FP_Q36_A1-p5.1
13479. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=5&scrV=16#AP1_Q2_A4-p2.1
13480. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=5&scrV=16#SS_Q83_A7-p9.2
13481. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=5&scrV=19#FS_Q77_A5-p6.2
13482. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=5&scrV=20#FP_Q27_A1-p6.1
13483. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=5&scrV=20#FP_Q41_A3-p7.4
13484. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=5&scrV=20#TP_Q23_A4-p5.1
13485. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1John&sc
rCh=5&scrV=20#TP_Q35_A4-p7.1
13486. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2John&sc
rCh=3&scrV=17#SS_Q32_A1-p6.1
13487. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q66_A3-p4.2
13488. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#XP_Q76_A1-p6.2
13489. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q49_A1-p7.1
13490. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q56_A2-p5.1
13491. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=1&scrV=7#XP_Q89_A5-p6.1
13492. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=1&scrV=7#XP_Q82_A3-p6.1
13493. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=2&scrV=4#SS_Q24_A11-p6.1
13494. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=2&scrV=17#FS_Q112_A5-p10.1
13495. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=2&scrV=26#TP_Q42_A1-p9.1
13496. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=2&scrV=28#TP_Q42_A1-p9.2
13497. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=3&scrV=5#FP_Q24_A3-p6.1
13498. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=3&scrV=7#XP_Q17_A1-p3.1
13499. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=3&scrV=7#XP_Q19_A2-p4.1
13500. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=3&scrV=11#TP_Q89_A5-p6.1
13501. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=3&scrV=11#FP_Q23_A6-p2.1
13502. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=3&scrV=21#XP_Q96_A8-p7.3
13503. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=3&scrV=21#TP_Q58_A4-p4.1
13504. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=3&scrV=21#TP_Q59_A3-p6.1
13505. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=4&scrV=1#TP_Q69_A7-p2.1
13506. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=4&scrV=1#XP_Q17_A1-p2.1
13507. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=4&scrV=3#TP_Q60_A5-p2.5
13508. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#XP_Q97_A7-p9.1
13509. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#XP_Q96_A8-p7.2
13510. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#TP_Q60_A5-p2.7
13511. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=5&scrV=10#XP_Q96_A1-p10.2
13512. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#TP_Q10_A2-p5.1
13513. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=6&scrV=2#TP_Q15_A2-p4.3
13514. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=6&scrV=8#SS_Q187_A6-p2.3
13515. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=6&scrV=9#XP_Q93_A1-p6.1
13516. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=6&scrV=10#SS_Q18_A2-p5.1
13517. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=6&scrV=10#SS_Q83_A8-p3.1
13518. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=6&scrV=11#XP_Q72_A3-p12.1
13519. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=7&scrV=3#TP_Q63_A3-p6.3
13520. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=7&scrV=11#XP_Q73_A3-p4.1
13521. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=7&scrV=14#TP_Q66_A11-p6.2
13522. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=7&scrV=16#SS_Q136_A1-p2.2
13523. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=8&scrV=3#FS_Q102_A4-p26.1
13524. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=8&scrV=4#TP_Q83_A4-p35.1
13525. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=8&scrV=4#SS_Q83_A4-p6.2
13526. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=9&scrV=6#XP_Q98_A3-p5.1
13527. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=9&scrV=6#XP_Q86_A2-p5.1
13528. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=10&scrV=6#XP_Q91_A2-p12.1
13529. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=10&scrV=6#SS_Q89_A10-p5.2
13530. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=10&scrV=6#XP_Q77_A3-p3.1
13531. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=10&scrV=6#XP_Q84_A3-p6.1
13532. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=11&scrV=0#FS_Q55_A4-p7.2
13533. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=12&scrV=4#FP_Q63_A8-p5.1
13534. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=12&scrV=6#XP_Q77_A2-p3.1
13535. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=13&scrV=16#TP_Q63_A3-p4.1
13536. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=14&scrV=0#SS_Q91_A2-p4.1
13537. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=14&scrV=3#XP_Q96_A12-p2.2
13538. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=14&scrV=3#XP_Q96_A12-p4.1
13539. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=14&scrV=3#SS_Q152_A5-p4.2
13540. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=14&scrV=4#XP_Q96_A12-p2.1
13541. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=14&scrV=4#SS_Q152_A5-p4.1
13542. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=14&scrV=13#AP2_Q1_A1-p2.1
13543. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=14&scrV=13#FS_Q4_A5-p8.1
13544. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=14&scrV=13#XP_Q71_A2-p3.1
13545. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=16&scrV=9#SS_Q13_A4-p5.1
13546. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=18&scrV=7#TP_Q86_A4-p6.2
13547. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=18&scrV=7#XP_Q8_A7-p2.1
13548. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=18&scrV=7#XP_Q97_A3-p3.1
13549. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=18&scrV=7#XP_Q99_A1-p11.1
13550. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=18&scrV=7#AP1_Q1_A1-p8.1
13551. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=18&scrV=7#FP_Q64_A3-p5.1
13552. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=19&scrV=8#FS_Q102_A4-p26.2
13553. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=19&scrV=16#SS_Q67_A1-p3.1
13554. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=20&scrV=0#XP_Q88_A2-p7.1
13555. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=20&scrV=4#XP_Q89_A1-p7.6
13556. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=20&scrV=4#XP_Q77_A1-p5.1
13557. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=20&scrV=9#XP_Q99_A2-p7.2
13558. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=20&scrV=12#XP_Q88_A2-p5.1
13559. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=20&scrV=12#XP_Q89_A1-p7.5
13560. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=20&scrV=15#XP_Q88_A2-p5.2
13561. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=1#XP_Q91_A1-p7.2
13562. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=1#XP_Q91_A4-p7.1
13563. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=1#XP_Q74_A1-p5.1
13564. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=1#XP_Q74_A5-p3.1
13565. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=1#XP_Q74_A5-p8.1
13566. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=1#XP_Q74_A6-p3.1
13567. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=2#XP_Q93_A2-p6.1
13568. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=2#XP_Q96_A1-p9.1
13569. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=3#XP_Q95_A3-p3.2
13570. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=4#FP_Q97_A1-p5.1
13571. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=4#FP_Q113_A7-p6.1
13572. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=4#XP_Q87_A1-p4.1
13573. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=5#FP_Q73_A1-p4.3
13574. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=8#SS_Q125_A3-p5.1
13575. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=11#XP_Q85_A2-p9.3
13576. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=14#TP_Q8_A6-p4.2
13577. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=16#FS_Q66_A1-p2.1
13578. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=17#FP_Q20_A4-p10.1
13579. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=17#FP_Q62_A4-p5.1
13580. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=22#FS_Q103_A3-p8.2
13581. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=23#XP_Q91_A3-p6.2
13582. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=23#XP_Q91_A3-p16.1
13583. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=23#XP_Q92_A3-p30.1
13584. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=23#FP_Q12_A5-p6.1
13585. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=21&scrV=23#TP_Q22_A5-p7.1
13586. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=22&scrV=2#FS_Q70_A3-p6.1
13587. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=22&scrV=3#SS_Q23_A1-p9.2
13588. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=22&scrV=5#XP_Q77_A3-p9.1
13589. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=22&scrV=9#SS_Q84_A1-p8.2
13590. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=22&scrV=10#SS_Q103_A2-p2.2
13591. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=22&scrV=11#FS_Q81_A2-p4.1
13592. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=22&scrV=15#XP_Q74_A1-p7.2
13593. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=22&scrV=17#SS_Q182_A2-p10.2
13594. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrC
h=22&scrV=18#TP_Q60_A8-p2.2
13595. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#SS_Q103_A2-p5.1
13596. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=1&scrV=20#FS_Q102_A6-p12.1
13597. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=2&scrV=12#FS_Q66_A2-p3.3
13598. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#XP_Q15_A1-p2.1
13599. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#XP_Q65_A4-p7.1
13600. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=4&scrV=13#SS_Q154_A2-p8.1
13601. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=4&scrV=14#SS_Q162_A1-p5.1
13602. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=4&scrV=16#XP_Q65_A1-p9.1
13603. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=4&scrV=93#SS_Q32_A10-p5.1
13604. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=5&scrV=7#FP_Q51_A3-p4.2
13605. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=5&scrV=12#FS_Q31_A6-p2.1
13606. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=12&scrV=7#TP_Q60_A1-p3.1
13607. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=12&scrV=15#FP_Q112_A3-p3.1
13608. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Tob&scrC
h=12&scrV=19#FP_Q51_A3-p15.1
13609. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jdt&scrC
h=6&scrV=15#SS_Q21_A1-p6.1
13610. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jdt&scrC
h=9&scrV=17#SS_Q21_A2-p2.1
13611. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jdt&scrC
h=14&scrV=6#FS_Q105_A3-p12.1
13612. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jdt&scrC
h=15&scrV=10#SS_Q110_A3-p4.3
13613. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jdt&scrC
h=16&scrV=17#TP_Q20_A1-p6.2
13614. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Jdt&scrC
h=16&scrV=21#XP_Q97_A2-p2.1
13615. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=1#FS_Q15_A1-p6.1
13616. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#SS_Q45_A4-p5.1
13617. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q27_A4-p6.6
13618. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=4#TP_Q44_A3-p8.1
13619. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q69_A9-p5.1
13620. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q79_A8-p3.2
13621. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q39_A6-p12.1
13622. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=11#SS_Q110_A4-p2.2
13623. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#XP_Q99_A1-p5.1
13624. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#SS_Q19_A1-p11.1
13625. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#FP_Q49_A2-p7.5
13626. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#FP_Q118_A3-p11.1
13627. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#FS_Q79_A4-p3.1
13628. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#FS_Q85_A6-p5.1
13629. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#SS_Q25_A6-p12.2
13630. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=13#SS_Q164_A1-p6.3
13631. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=14#FP_Q65_A2-p2.1
13632. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=15#XP_Q16_A2-p5.1
13633. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=15#FS_Q67_A1-p5.1
13634. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=15#FS_Q104_A3-p2.1
13635. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#SS_Q19_A1-p11.2
13636. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#FP_Q118_A3-p11.2
13637. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=0#FP_Q75_A6-p8.1
13638. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=2#FP_Q75_A6-p3.1
13639. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=2#FP_Q75_A6-p8.5
13640. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#TP_Q25_A4-p2.1
13641. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#TP_Q46_A4-p3.1
13642. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=20#TP_Q51_A2-p2.1
13643. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=21#SS_Q15_A1-p7.1
13644. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=21#FS_Q79_A3-p4.1
13645. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=22#SS_Q103_A3-p3.1
13646. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=24#FS_Q81_A1-p7.2
13647. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=24#SS_Q36_A4-p8.1
13648. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=2&scrV=24#TP_Q8_A7-p8.2
13649. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=3&scrV=7#XP_Q82_A3-p7.1
13650. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=3&scrV=7#XP_Q84_A2-p7.2
13651. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=3&scrV=7#XP_Q85_A1-p6.2
13652. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=3&scrV=7#XP_Q89_A1-p7.2
13653. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=3&scrV=15#XP_Q96_A2-p9.2
13654. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=3&scrV=15#XP_Q96_A3-p4.1
13655. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=3&scrV=15#FS_Q70_A1-p2.2
13656. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=4&scrV=8#TP_Q72_A8-p9.1
13657. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=4&scrV=8#SS_Q63_A3-p6.2
13658. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#XP_Q98_A9-p5.1
13659. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=2#XP_Q85_A2-p6.1
13660. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#TP_Q86_A1-p6.1
13661. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#XP_Q16_A3-p8.1
13662. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=3#XP_Q98_A2-p6.1
13663. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#SS_Q121_A1-p9.1
13664. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=7#FS_Q87_A2-p7.3
13665. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=7#SS_Q137_A4-p4.1
13666. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=8#SS_Q112_A1-p4.1
13667. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=8#XP_Q87_A3-p2.1
13668. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#XP_Q97_A1-p7.2
13669. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#XP_Q97_A5-p6.1
13670. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=5&scrV=21#XP_Q76_A2-p7.7
13671. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=6&scrV=5#SS_Q99_A1-p7.1
13672. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=6&scrV=7#FS_Q73_A9-p4.1
13673. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=6&scrV=7#FS_Q73_A10-p6.2
13674. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=6&scrV=8#FP_Q20_A3-p2.1
13675. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=6&scrV=8#FS_Q112_A4-p2.2
13676. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=6&scrV=14#TP_Q36_A6-p2.1
13677. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=6&scrV=21#FP_Q82_A5-p2.1
13678. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=6&scrV=21#FS_Q30_A1-p2.1
13679. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=6&scrV=21#SS_Q122_A6-p4.1
13680. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=7#SS_Q123_A2-p2.1
13681. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=7#FS_Q113_A3-p8.1
13682. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=7#SS_Q180_A3-p11.1
13683. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=8#SS_Q188_A5-p8.2
13684. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=9#FS_Q2_A6-p7.1
13685. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=11#FS_Q4_A8-p5.1
13686. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=11#FS_Q5_A4-p10.3
13687. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=13#TP_Q42_A3-p6.1
13688. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=17#FS_Q112_A5-p3.1
13689. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=17#SS_Q167_A1-p3.2
13690. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=22#TP_Q72_A2-p11.1
13691. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=24#FP_Q9_A1-p3.1
13692. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=25#TP_Q27_A2-p11.3
13693. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=25#TP_Q31_A4-p4.2
13694. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=25#TP_Q31_A7-p2.1
13695. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=27#FS_Q106_A1-p4.1
13696. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=27#SS_Q45_A6-p3.1
13697. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=27#SS_Q172_A2-p2.1
13698. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=27#SS_Q172_A4-p2.1
13699. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=28#FS_Q68_A2-p5.1
13700. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=28#FS_Q102_A3-p16.2
13701. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=28#SS_Q45_A5-p5.2
13702. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=7&scrV=28#SS_Q149_A3-p2.1
13703. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=0#FP_Q103_A8-p5.1
13704. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=1#FP_Q22_A2-p7.1
13705. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=1#SS_Q23_A2-p10.1
13706. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=1#FP_Q109_A2-p6.2
13707. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=1#FS_Q110_A2-p6.2
13708. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=1#SS_Q165_A1-p6.1
13709. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=1#TP_Q44_A4-p6.2
13710. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=1#TP_Q46_A9-p7.2
13711. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=1#TP_Q55_A6-p8.1
13712. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=1#TP_Q60_A4-p6.1
13713. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=2#FS_Q26_A1-p2.1
13714. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=2#SS_Q180_A2-p10.2
13715. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#TP_Q89_A1-p5.2
13716. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#FS_Q57_A5-p5.1
13717. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#FS_Q59_A3-p2.1
13718. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#FS_Q63_A3-p5.1
13719. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#SS_Q23_A7-p5.2
13720. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#SS_Q47_A5-p5.1
13721. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#SS_Q58_A3-p7.1
13722. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#SS_Q58_A5-p2.1
13723. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=7#SS_Q149_A1-p3.1
13724. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#FS_Q5_A4-p10.4
13725. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#FS_Q33_A3-p2.1
13726. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#FS_Q35_A5-p7.1
13727. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#SS_Q9_A4-p3.1
13728. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#SS_Q28_A2-p5.1
13729. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#SS_Q45_A3-p4.1
13730. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#SS_Q179_A1-p4.1
13731. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#SS_Q180_A6-p2.1
13732. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=16#SS_Q180_A7-p6.1
13733. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=21#FS_Q63_A2-p3.1
13734. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=8&scrV=21#SS_Q156_A2-p2.1
13735. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=10#FP_Q43_A5-p5.1
13736. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#XP_Q43_A3-p16.1
13737. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#FS_Q57_A5-p4.1
13738. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#FP_Q113_A1-p7.1
13739. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#FS_Q109_A9-p7.3
13740. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#FS_Q91_A3-p4.1
13741. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#SS_Q47_A3-p8.1
13742. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#SS_Q52_A1-p7.1
13743. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=15#XP_Q93_A1-p8.2
13744. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=15#FP_Q94_A2-p3.1
13745. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=15#FP_Q101_A2-p2.1
13746. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=15#XP_Q70_A3-p18.1
13747. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=15#SS_Q180_A7-p10.1
13748. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=16#FP_Q88_A1-p7.1
13749. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=9&scrV=19#SS_Q149_A3-p2.2
13750. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=10&scrV=2#FP_Q97_A1-p4.1
13751. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=10&scrV=2#SS_Q85_A1-p3.1
13752. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=10&scrV=2#TP_Q4_A6-p8.1
13753. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=10&scrV=10#FP_Q1_A3-p4.1
13754. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=10&scrV=10#SS_Q9_A3-p10.2
13755. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=10&scrV=19#SS_Q66_A5-p7.1
13756. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=11#SS_Q39_A4-p6.1
13757. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=17#XP_Q5_A2-p3.1
13758. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=17#XP_Q97_A6-p7.1
13759. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=17#XP_Q97_A7-p5.1
13760. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=17#SS_Q99_A4-p6.1
13761. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=17#SS_Q107_A4-p4.1
13762. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=21#FP_Q8_A4-p3.1
13763. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=21#FP_Q5_A5-p2.1
13764. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=21#FP_Q7_A4-p5.1
13765. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=21#FS_Q63_A2-p6.3
13766. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=21#FS_Q1_A4-p8.1
13767. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=21#FS_Q100_A7-p7.1
13768. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=21#SS_Q164_A2-p11.1
13769. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=21#TP_Q7_A11-p5.1
13770. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=21#TP_Q7_A12-p6.1
13771. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=24#XP_Q99_A2-p2.1
13772. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=25#FP_Q20_A2-p6.1
13773. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=25#FP_Q23_A3-p2.1
13774. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=25#SS_Q25_A3-p2.1
13775. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=25#FS_Q110_A1-p7.1
13776. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=25#FS_Q79_A1-p6.1
13777. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=25#TP_Q49_A4-p2.1
13778. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=26#FP_Q19_A4-p6.1
13779. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=11&scrV=26#FP_Q19_A12-p3.1
13780. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=12&scrV=10#FP_Q63_A4-p3.1
13781. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=12&scrV=10#TP_Q2_A12-p6.2
13782. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=12&scrV=18#SS_Q158_A1-p5.1
13783. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=12&scrV=18#SS_Q158_A8-p2.1
13784. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=13&scrV=1#SS_Q94_A4-p6.4
13785. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=13&scrV=5#XP_Q91_A3-p11.1
13786. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=13&scrV=10#TP_Q16_A2-p2.1
13787. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=13&scrV=11#SS_Q94_A4-p6.3
13788. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=3#FP_Q22_A1-p5.1
13789. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=3#FP_Q103_A1-p5.1
13790. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=9#FS_Q79_A1-p6.2
13791. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=9#FS_Q102_A5-p26.1
13792. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=9#SS_Q55_A1-p5.1
13793. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=9#TP_Q49_A4-p6.1
13794. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=11#FP_Q65_A1-p9.2
13795. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=11#FS_Q79_A1-p3.1
13796. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=11#SS_Q9_A4-p6.1
13797. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=14#SS_Q94_A4-p5.1
13798. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=15#SS_Q94_A4-p6.1
13799. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=21#FP_Q3_A4-p2.1
13800. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=21#FP_Q13_A9-p5.1
13801. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=21#SS_Q94_A4-p6.2
13802. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=22#SS_Q29_A2-p10.1
13803. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=14&scrV=27#SS_Q94_A4-p2.2
13804. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=15&scrV=12#SS_Q168_A2-p11.1
13805. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=16&scrV=20#TP_Q73_A6-p6.1
13806. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=16&scrV=24#TP_Q20_A1-p6.3
13807. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=16&scrV=29#SS_Q107_A4-p2.1
13808. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=17&scrV=10#SS_Q21_A3-p2.1
13809. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=17&scrV=11#SS_Q21_A3-p2.2
13810. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Wis&scrC
h=18&scrV=24#FS_Q102_A5-p45.1
13811. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Bar&scrC
h=3&scrV=38#TP_Q4_A4-p6.1
13812. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Bar&scrC
h=3&scrV=38#TP_Q40_A1-p5.1
13813. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Bar&scrC
h=4&scrV=1#FS_Q103_A3-p2.1
13814. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Bar&scrC
h=6&scrV=30#FS_Q102_A6-p34.1
13815. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Macc&sc
rCh=2&scrV=0#SS_Q122_A4-p11.3
13816. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Macc&sc
rCh=2&scrV=0#SS_Q64_A4-p2.7
13817. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Macc&sc
rCh=2&scrV=4#FS_Q100_A8-p5.1
13818. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Macc&sc
rCh=2&scrV=41#SS_Q40_A4-p5.1
13819. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Macc&sc
rCh=2&scrV=65#SS_Q52_A1-p3.1
13820. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Macc&sc
rCh=3&scrV=2#SS_Q188_A3-p7.2
13821. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Macc&sc
rCh=3&scrV=21#SS_Q188_A3-p7.3
13822. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Macc&sc
rCh=12&scrV=9#SS_Q188_A5-p8.3
13823. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Macc&sc
rCh=13&scrV=3#SS_Q188_A3-p7.4
13824. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=1&scrV=2#FS_Q58_A1-p6.2
13825. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=1&scrV=23#TP_Q22_A4-p2.1
13826. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=3&scrV=1#FS_Q29_A1-p3.1
13827. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=3&scrV=15#FS_Q105_A2-p6.1
13828. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=3&scrV=38#TP_Q83_A3-p16.1
13829. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=4&scrV=7#SS_Q131_A2-p3.1
13830. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=4&scrV=14#TP_Q82_A10-p7.2
13831. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=5&scrV=19#SS_Q99_A3-p7.1
13832. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=6&scrV=20#FP_Q23_A2-p9.1
13833. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=6&scrV=28#SS_Q145_A4-p4.1
13834. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=6&scrV=30#SS_Q123_A8-p6.2
13835. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=9&scrV=13#TP_Q86_A1-p2.2
13836. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=12&scrV=40#XP_Q71_A5-p2.1
13837. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=12&scrV=43#XP_Q71_A5-p2.2
13838. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=12&scrV=46#AP2_Q1_A1-p5.1
13839. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=12&scrV=46#XP_Q71_A2-p6.1
13840. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=14&scrV=42#SS_Q64_A5-p6.1
13841. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=15&scrV=14#SS_Q83_A11-p7.1
13842. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=15&scrV=14#XP_Q72_A3-p8.1
13843. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=15&scrV=15#XP_Q72_A3-p8.2
13844. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Macc&sc
rCh=15&scrV=18#SS_Q129_A3-p7.1
13845. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=1Esd&scr
Ch=10&scrV=0#FS_Q105_A4-p7.2
13846. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=2Esd&scr
Ch=4&scrV=17#SS_Q24_A9-p10.1
13847. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=1#FP_Q10_A5-p3.1
13848. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=1#SS_Q167_A1-p3.1
13849. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q3_A8-p6.1
13850. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=5#TP_Q10_A4-p6.1
13851. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=9#FP_Q41_A3-p13.1
13852. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=10#TP_Q12_A3-p8.1
13853. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=16#FS_Q68_A7-p8.2
13854. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=25#SS_Q19_A7-p9.1
13855. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=27#SS_Q19_A7-p7.2
13856. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=27#FS_Q113_A4-p2.1
13857. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=27#SS_Q64_A6-p2.1
13858. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=28#FS_Q68_A2-p5.2
13859. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=28#SS_Q126_A1-p7.1
13860. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=1&scrV=34#SS_Q157_A4-p3.1
13861. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=2&scrV=0#TP_Q41_A1-p7.1
13862. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#FS_Q62_A1-p5.1
13863. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#SS_Q7_A1-p2.1
13864. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=2&scrV=8#SS_Q16_A1-p6.3
13865. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=3&scrV=19#SS_Q157_A4-p3.3
13866. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#FP_Q1_A1-p2.1
13867. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=3&scrV=22#SS_Q167_A1-p10.1
13868. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#FP_Q1_A1-p6.1
13869. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=3&scrV=25#SS_Q2_A3-p11.1
13870. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=3&scrV=26#SS_Q167_A1-p10.2
13871. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=3&scrV=27#FS_Q79_A3-p3.1
13872. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=4&scrV=7#SS_Q114_A1-p5.1
13873. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=4&scrV=10#SS_Q63_A4-p4.1
13874. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=4&scrV=30#SS_Q73_A4-p3.1
13875. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=4&scrV=32#FP_Q24_A1-p2.1
13876. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=5&scrV=4#SS_Q136_A5-p2.1
13877. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#XP_Q4_A1-p8.1
13878. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=5&scrV=5#XP_Q14_A2-p11.1
13879. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=5&scrV=8#TP_Q68_A3-p5.1
13880. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=5&scrV=13#SS_Q157_A4-p2.2
13881. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=5&scrV=16#SS_Q74_A1-p6.1
13882. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=5&scrV=17#SS_Q74_A2-p5.1
13883. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=6&scrV=2#SS_Q112_A2-p3.1
13884. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=6&scrV=5#SS_Q177_A1-p6.1
13885. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=6&scrV=15#SS_Q74_A2-p6.2
13886. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#FP_Q43_A5-p8.3
13887. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=6&scrV=23#SS_Q45_A2-p3.1
13888. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=6&scrV=26#SS_Q35_A1-p6.1
13889. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=6&scrV=26#SS_Q44_A3-p9.2
13890. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=6&scrV=34#SS_Q162_A3-p10.1
13891. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=6&scrV=35#SS_Q49_A3-p6.3
13892. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=7&scrV=6#TP_Q59_A1-p6.1
13893. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=7&scrV=14#SS_Q110_A3-p8.1
13894. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=7&scrV=19#XP_Q97_A2-p2.2
13895. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=7&scrV=26#SS_Q114_A1-p10.3
13896. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=7&scrV=29#SS_Q26_A10-p4.2
13897. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=7&scrV=34#SS_Q54_A3-p3.1
13898. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=7&scrV=38#SS_Q114_A1-p9.2
13899. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=8&scrV=4#SS_Q72_A3-p9.1
13900. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=8&scrV=18#SS_Q127_A1-p5.1
13901. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=8&scrV=18#SS_Q170_A1-p7.1
13902. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=9&scrV=11#SS_Q177_A2-p6.2
13903. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=9&scrV=14#SS_Q26_A9-p7.1
13904. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=9&scrV=18#SS_Q69_A4-p3.1
13905. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=1#TP_Q59_A1-p6.3
13906. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=2#TP_Q64_A6-p6.2
13907. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=2#SS_Q64_A4-p6.2
13908. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=9#SS_Q118_A5-p2.1
13909. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=9#SS_Q162_A6-p8.3
13910. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=10#SS_Q118_A5-p8.1
13911. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#SS_Q19_A9-p14.1
13912. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#SS_Q12_A1-p2.1
13913. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#FS_Q84_A2-p3.1
13914. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#SS_Q158_A7-p9.1
13915. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#SS_Q162_A3-p4.1
13916. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#SS_Q162_A5-p6.3
13917. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=14#SS_Q162_A7-p3.1
13918. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=15#XP_Q1_A1-p6.1
13919. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=15#FS_Q72_A3-p5.1
13920. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=15#SS_Q133_A1-p4.1
13921. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=15#SS_Q12_A1-p2.2
13922. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=15#FS_Q84_A2-p5.1
13923. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=15#FS_Q84_A2-p7.1
13924. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=15#SS_Q162_A7-p7.1
13925. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=15#SS_Q163_A1-p6.1
13926. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=15#SS_Q170_A2-p2.1
13927. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=10&scrV=31#SS_Q157_A4-p7.1
13928. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=11&scrV=2#SS_Q115_A1-p7.3
13929. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=11&scrV=14#SS_Q145_A1-p5.1
13930. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=11&scrV=14#SS_Q145_A3-p3.1
13931. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=11&scrV=23#SS_Q14_A4-p5.1
13932. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=11&scrV=23#FS_Q112_A2-p8.1
13933. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=11&scrV=23#TP_Q52_A4-p2.1
13934. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=11&scrV=29#FS_Q37_A1-p3.2
13935. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=11&scrV=30#SS_Q115_A1-p7.4
13936. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=12&scrV=3#TP_Q49_A4-p7.1
13937. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=12&scrV=4#SS_Q32_A9-p2.1
13938. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=12&scrV=5#SS_Q31_A2-p3.1
13939. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=12&scrV=6#SS_Q32_A9-p2.2
13940. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=12&scrV=16#FS_Q46_A6-p7.1
13941. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=2#SS_Q145_A3-p3.2
13942. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=19#XP_Q91_A1-p9.1
13943. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=19#FP_Q27_A4-p3.1
13944. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=19#FP_Q20_A4-p7.1
13945. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=19#FP_Q60_A4-p5.1
13946. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=19#FS_Q27_A3-p6.1
13947. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=19#FP_Q96_A3-p3.1
13948. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=19#SS_Q114_A1-p8.1
13949. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=19#FS_Q105_A3-p5.1
13950. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=19#FS_Q99_A2-p6.3
13951. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=19#SS_Q26_A2-p3.1
13952. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=13&scrV=19#SS_Q183_A2-p4.3
13953. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=14&scrV=5#FS_Q73_A9-p7.2
13954. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=14&scrV=5#SS_Q119_A3-p2.1
13955. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=14&scrV=5#SS_Q106_A3-p2.1
13956. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=5#FS_Q51_A4-p5.1
13957. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=5#TP_Q11_A1-p5.2
13958. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=9#TP_Q44_A1-p4.2
13959. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=14#FP_Q22_A2-p5.1
13960. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=14#FP_Q83_A1-p7.1
13961. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=14#FS_Q10_A4-p5.1
13962. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=14#FS_Q2_A5-p6.1
13963. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=14#FS_Q91_A4-p3.1
13964. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=14#SS_Q65_A3-p3.1
13965. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=14#SS_Q104_A1-p2.1
13966. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=14#SS_Q165_A1-p8.1
13967. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=18#FS_Q109_A8-p4.1
13968. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=15&scrV=21#SS_Q66_A5-p2.1
13969. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=17&scrV=1#FP_Q91_A2-p6.1
13970. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=17&scrV=5#FP_Q92_A2-p5.1
13971. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=17&scrV=5#SS_Q163_A2-p4.1
13972. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=17&scrV=7#SS_Q91_A1-p9.1
13973. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=17&scrV=9#FS_Q94_A5-p2.1
13974. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=17&scrV=9#FS_Q99_A2-p5.1
13975. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=17&scrV=9#FS_Q100_A1-p2.1
13976. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=17&scrV=12#SS_Q167_A2-p4.2
13977. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=17&scrV=14#FS_Q98_A4-p4.2
13978. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=17&scrV=18#SS_Q32_A4-p5.1
13979. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=17&scrV=26#XP_Q9_A1-p2.1
13980. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=18&scrV=1#FP_Q74_A2-p3.1
13981. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=18&scrV=23#TP_Q83_A4-p12.2
13982. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=18&scrV=23#SS_Q97_A3-p3.1
13983. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=19&scrV=1#FS_Q88_A3-p5.1
13984. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=19&scrV=4#SS_Q2_A9-p4.1
13985. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=19&scrV=23#SS_Q113_A2-p11.1
13986. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=19&scrV=23#SS_Q55_A4-p8.2
13987. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=19&scrV=23#SS_Q161_A1-p3.1
13988. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=19&scrV=26#SS_Q161_A6-p7.2
13989. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=19&scrV=26#SS_Q168_A1-p12.1
13990. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=19&scrV=27#FS_Q102_A6-p24.1
13991. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=19&scrV=27#SS_Q168_A1-p10.1
13992. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=19&scrV=27#SS_Q187_A6-p6.1
13993. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=20&scrV=6#TP_Q36_A4-p8.1
13994. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=20&scrV=7#SS_Q54_A2-p6.1
13995. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=20&scrV=15#SS_Q72_A1-p9.1
13996. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=20&scrV=32#TP_Q7_A7-p4.1
13997. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=20&scrV=32#TP_Q36_A4-p3.1
13998. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=21&scrV=2#SS_Q35_A1-p5.1
13999. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=21&scrV=2#SS_Q62_A8-p6.1
14000. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=21&scrV=30#SS_Q76_A1-p5.1
14001. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=23&scrV=9#SS_Q89_A2-p7.2
14002. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=23&scrV=12#SS_Q89_A5-p5.1
14003. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=23&scrV=13#SS_Q89_A5-p9.1
14004. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=23&scrV=32#SS_Q154_A8-p6.1
14005. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=24&scrV=5#FP_Q41_A3-p5.1
14006. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=24&scrV=14#FP_Q41_A3-p5.2
14007. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=24&scrV=21#TP_Q72_A2-p7.4
14008. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=24&scrV=23#FS_Q70_A1-p9.1
14009. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=24&scrV=27#FS_Q102_A3-p15.1
14010. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=24&scrV=29#FS_Q33_A2-p7.1
14011. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=24&scrV=29#FS_Q33_A2-p8.1
14012. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=24&scrV=29#FS_Q67_A4-p4.1
14013. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=24&scrV=29#FS_Q2_A1-p11.1
14014. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=24&scrV=31#FP_Q1_A9-p3.1
14015. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=24&scrV=45#TP_Q52_A2-p2.1
14016. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=25&scrV=13#FS_Q73_A10-p2.1
14017. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=25&scrV=16#SS_Q19_A7-p10.1
14018. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=25&scrV=16#SS_Q19_A8-p2.1
14019. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=25&scrV=17#FS_Q35_A7-p5.1
14020. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=26&scrV=5#SS_Q108_A1-p6.1
14021. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=26&scrV=20#SS_Q88_A11-p6.1
14022. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=26&scrV=20#SS_Q155_A4-p2.1
14023. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=26&scrV=20#SS_Q186_A8-p3.1
14024. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=26&scrV=28#SS_Q56_A2-p8.2
14025. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=26&scrV=28#SS_Q77_A4-p9.1
14026. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=27&scrV=1#SS_Q186_A3-p3.2
14027. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=27&scrV=6#AP1_Q2_A5-p4.2
14028. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=27&scrV=8#SS_Q115_A1-p7.2
14029. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=28&scrV=2#SS_Q83_A16-p9.1
14030. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=28&scrV=11#SS_Q74_A1-p6.3
14031. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=28&scrV=15#SS_Q74_A1-p4.1
14032. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=28&scrV=15#SS_Q74_A1-p9.1
14033. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=29&scrV=10#FS_Q105_A2-p5.1
14034. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=29&scrV=10#SS_Q78_A1-p15.1
14035. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=29&scrV=13#SS_Q32_A4-p6.1
14036. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=29&scrV=15#SS_Q32_A4-p7.1
14037. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=30&scrV=4#TP_Q59_A5-p7.1
14038. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=30&scrV=8#SS_Q142_A2-p6.1
14039. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=30&scrV=16#FS_Q2_A5-p2.1
14040. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=30&scrV=24#TP_Q84_A5-p8.2
14041. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=30&scrV=24#XP_Q4_A2-p3.1
14042. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=30&scrV=24#SS_Q30_A1-p10.1
14043. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=30&scrV=24#SS_Q182_A2-p10.1
14044. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=30&scrV=25#XP_Q4_A2-p3.2
14045. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=30&scrV=25#FS_Q39_A3-p2.1
14046. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=30&scrV=25#SS_Q136_A1-p6.3
14047. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=31&scrV=1#SS_Q188_A5-p8.1
14048. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=31&scrV=8#SS_Q186_A3-p5.1
14049. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=31&scrV=25#SS_Q148_A6-p3.2
14050. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=31&scrV=32#SS_Q149_A1-p5.1
14051. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=31&scrV=36#SS_Q149_A3-p5.2
14052. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=31&scrV=37#SS_Q149_A1-p6.1
14053. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=32&scrV=6#TP_Q66_A5-p4.1
14054. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=33&scrV=7#FP_Q47_A2-p5.1
14055. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=33&scrV=11#FP_Q113_A2-p9.1
14056. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=33&scrV=15#FP_Q49_A3-p2.1
14057. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=33&scrV=28#SS_Q65_A2-p5.3
14058. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=33&scrV=28#SS_Q187_A3-p8.3
14059. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=34&scrV=4#TP_Q64_A5-p2.1
14060. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=34&scrV=4#FP_Q109_A3-p4.2
14061. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=34&scrV=4#FS_Q102_A5-p6.1
14062. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=34&scrV=11#SS_Q165_A1-p5.1
14063. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=34&scrV=16#SS_Q126_A1-p9.1
14064. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=34&scrV=21#SS_Q86_A3-p6.1
14065. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=34&scrV=23#TP_Q15_A1-p8.2
14066. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=34&scrV=30#TP_Q66_A1-p5.1
14067. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=35&scrV=17#SS_Q65_A4-p3.1
14068. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=37&scrV=3#SS_Q130_A1-p5.1
14069. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=37&scrV=3#SS_Q133_A2-p5.1
14070. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=37&scrV=12#SS_Q189_A10-p6.2
14071. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=37&scrV=14#SS_Q189_A10-p6.3
14072. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=37&scrV=34#SS_Q148_A3-p4.2
14073. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=38&scrV=19#FS_Q37_A4-p5.3
14074. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=38&scrV=25#FP_Q112_A1-p4.1
14075. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=39&scrV=1#SS_Q188_A5-p6.3
14076. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=40&scrV=22#FP_Q78_A1-p4.1
14077. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=41&scrV=3#XP_Q98_A3-p6.1
14078. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=41&scrV=15#SS_Q132_A1-p4.1
14079. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=41&scrV=15#SS_Q73_A2-p6.2
14080. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=42&scrV=11#SS_Q154_A6-p6.2
14081. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=43&scrV=10#XP_Q91_A3-p11.2
14082. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=43&scrV=32#SS_Q93_A2-p2.1
14083. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=43&scrV=33#FS_Q64_A4-p5.1
14084. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=43&scrV=33#SS_Q81_A5-p4.1
14085. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=43&scrV=33#SS_Q91_A1-p2.1
14086. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=46&scrV=23#FP_Q89_A8-p9.1
14087. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=46&scrV=23#SS_Q174_A5-p5.1
14088. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=47&scrV=22#FS_Q86_A1-p5.1
14089. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=48&scrV=4#SS_Q174_A4-p3.4
14090. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=48&scrV=13#SS_Q19_A3-p7.1
14091. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=48&scrV=14#SS_Q171_A1-p2.1
14092. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=49&scrV=18#SS_Q171_A1-p2.2
14093. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrC
h=51&scrV=10#FS_Q40_A2-p7.1
Hidden links:
14094. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3#FS_Q101
14095. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3#FS_Q90_A2
14096. file://localhost/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.html3#XP_Q59_A3